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Settling our Differences

A demonstration of the development of Derrida’s system (1954-1967)

By Dino Galetti

Submitted in requirement for the Degree of Philosopher of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand

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Summary

Even today there are many, and often incompatible, perspectives on how to approach Derrida, caused in no small measure by the polyfaceted, and no less massive, body of work that he produced. In this dissertation we will suggest a way toward consensus, by means of the “law” which Derrida tells us impelled his corpus since his first student work of 1954. We will begin from that earliest work, and follow Derrida’s progress in close reading through key texts up to Of Grammatology of 1967. In so doing, we will assess how Derrida proceeds. Rather than applying a “structuralism”, we will suggest a cumulative progress toward a “system”, as Derrida evolves better ways to further his concerns. Hence rather than merely explaining an evolution, we will seek to demonstrate it. By our final chapter we will have suggested how différence and the trace evolved from 1954, and also to some degree how they are worked out. In doing so, we hope to provide a way to settle at least some of the issues that remain contentious in Derrida study. Moreover, this approach ought to permit assessment of Derrida’s progress in terms of his own aims, and even to predict how he will “improve” his system. We hope the progress and outcome will provide a starting point for a collaborative project to develop a “logic” to apply across Derrida’s œuvre, and to those disciplines that his work has influenced.
Acknowledgments

Primarily, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Merle Williams, for her professionalism and willingness to consistently go beyond the call of duty.

I would also like to thank Maud Scheydecker and Charles Villet for their help with preparing the manuscript. Special thanks are due to the National Research Foundation and the Faculty of Humanities at the University of the Witwatersrand for the financial assistance that allowed me to work upon this dissertation.
Declaration of authorship

It is hereby declared and affirmed that all of the work in this dissertation is the product of the author, Dino Galetti, save for quotations ascribed to readers en route. It is also declared and affirmed that this work has not yet been submitted for examination at any other university.

Signed:

___________________________
Dino Galetti

Date:

___________________________
8 October 2012
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<td>IDG</td>
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<td><em>Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness</em></td>
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<td>Hyppolite</td>
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LeE  Logique et Existence – Hyppolite, 1953
LI   Logical Investigations (English Translation) – Husserl, 2002 (1913)
LU   Logische Untersuchungen – Husserl, 1901 and 1913 (comb. 1975)
OaG  “Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time” (English translation) – Derrida, 1982
OG   Of Grammatology (English translation) – Derrida, 1976
PA   The Philosophy of Arithmetic – Husserl, 1891
PdG  Le Problème de la Gènese dans la Philosophie de Husserl – Derrida, 1954
PCP  Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (English version) – Husserl, 1965
PDP  Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy – 2000
The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy – Derrida, 2003

The Phenomenology of Spirit (English translation) – Hegel, 1807

Phänomenologie des Geistes – Hegel, 1807

Passions – Derrida, 1993

Prolegomena to a Theory of Language – Hjelmslev, 1953

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Sein und Zeit – Heidegger, 1927

“Le Théâtre de le Cruauté et la Clôture de la Représentation” – Derrida, 1966

Time and the Other (English translation) – Levinas, 1987
| Code | Title                                      | Author   | Year  
|------|-------------------------------------------|----------|-------
| TeA  | *Le temps et l'autre* – Levinas, 1947     |          |       
| TeI  | *Totalité et Infini* – Levinas, 1961      |          |       
| TI   | *Totality and Infinity* (English translation) – Levinas, 1969 |          |       
| TOH  | *The Other Heading* – Derrida, 1992       |          |       
| TS   | *Thing and Space* – Husserl, 1997 (1907)  |          |       
| VeM  | “Violence et Métaphysique” – Derrida, 1964|          |       
| VM   | “Violence and Metaphysics” – Derrida, 1978|          |       
| VP   | “La Voix et le Phénomène” – Derrida, 1967 |          |       
| WS   | *Wissenschaft der Logik* – Hegel, 1972 (1812) |          |       

Introduction

It is probably fair to say that treating Derrida’s work as “systematic” remains a contentious approach. This debate has a long history, which we will summarise before explaining why we believe an approach such as ours is novel, timeous and beneficial.¹

The first exposure of Derrida’s work to the English-speaking community occurred in 1966 with the reading of his paper “Structure, Sign and Play” at Johns Hopkins University (Howells 1998, 35). As more of his work began to be published, Derrida’s approach was associated with antipathy to structuralism, which school had proposed “constant laws of abstract structure” behind the “variations in the surface phenomena” of human life (ODP 365). To be sure, Derrida’s critiques of the “structural linguistics” of Saussure and the tradition of linguistics developed from him, the “structural anthropology” of Levi-Strauss and Rousset’s structuralist approach to literary criticism were indeed prominent (cf. OG 107-140, FS 3-30).²

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¹ We employ the formal “we” to refer to ourselves (the author of this dissertation) for reasons we explain in our “Note on Methodology” (our page 49).

² Derrida since 1963 had emphasised the necessity to begin from Rousset’s structural approach to “literature”, but then “solicit” – appeal to and undo – its supports (FeS 487, FS 7). In 1966 he first mentioned the advantage in Lévi-Strauss’ “structural anthropology”, explaining that “Structures” nevertheless must be “menaced” (NCW 3-4). We will address Derrida’s critique of Saussure’s supposedly “structural” linguistics in some detail (although Derrida
Derrida approach was thus associated with “post-structuralism”, along with such writers as Foucault, Lacan, and Barthes (cf. Said 1972) – despite Derrida’s frequent disagreement with or omission of these thinkers in his works. Critics of this school deemed that it took a skeptical stance, in particular by refusing any concepts of objectivity, reality and truth. (ODP 295)

We will explain that Derrida rather began with objectivity and reality as his basal concerns, since 1954 and his address to Husserl, that a desire for truth was at least a first impetus in his development, and that above all he avoided refusing any of these traditional concerns.

Nevertheless, with such ascription to Derrida of wariness of structure and the refusal of truth arose a resistance to reading his work “systematically”. That Derrida frequently, from 1965, prefers “model” to explain its static aspects, and “system” for its overall progress (DLG 1030, 1041, P 3).

explained his progress by the word “system”, and that in 1968 he noted that his approach allowed for “systematic and regulated transitions” (P 28) was not yet emphasised.4

Instead, following from this alignment by readers of Derrida with critique of structuralists – and Saussur in particular – Derrida’s work in the 1970s was addressed primarily for its linguistic and literary-theoretical relevance. Leavey and Allison (in Derrida, 1978b, 186-193) list over one hundred and eighty articles published about Derrida to that date; the vast majority had to do with writing, language, discourse theory or structuralism, with only one (Allison, 1974) explicitly devoted to Derrida as a phenomenologist.5

The climate in those years thus encouraged a consensus that Derrida was only an advocate of a “play” (jeu) of language. As Norris summarised by 1987, many readers had often deemed this interpretation made Derrida a sort of

4 Derrida also writes that “différance”, as a culmination of these systematic transitions, “develops the most legitimate principled exigencies of ‘structuralism’” (P 28). We will progress as far as “différance” to seek to develop these systematic transitions.

5 With the exception of Allison’s accomplished “Translator’s Introduction” to Speech and Phenomena (1973), the address to Derrida’s approach to Husserl and philosophy seems to be confined to the 1960s, in France (cf. Degay 1963, Schérer 1968, Benoist, 1969). As to English articles, that of Smith – the only listed English article on Derrida in the 1960s to deal with Husserl alone – is made up of three short pages of Smith’s own commentary (Smith, 1967, 120-123), the rest translating an extract from “Speech and Phenomena”.

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mischievous latter-day Sophist, bent upon

reducing every discipline of thought to a

species of rhetorical play (Norris 1987, 21).

Indeed, that the word “play” in French *(jeu)* also refers to a game,⁶ which has structured rules from the first, was underemphasised by those readers. So too was that Derrida had emphasised that even play must be addressed “rigorously” (OG 50, DLGb 73-74, cf. DLG 27).

To be sure, caveats against deeming Derrida’s approach to be a kind of play in which “anything goes” had arisen since at least 1983 (Culler 1983, 110).⁷ Yet treating Derrida as an advocate of play in at least some form was still incommensurate with considering that his work could be explained by its “systematic and regulated transitions” (P 28) – or as we put it, explained “systematically”.⁸

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⁶ Spivak, the translator of *Of Grammatology*, translated *jeu* as “play” or “game” where requisite (cf. OG 50, DLGb 73-74).

⁷ Culler had noted by 1983 that he discerned “no reason to believe, as is sometimes suggested, that deconstruction makes interpretation the process of free association in which anything goes” (Culler 1983, 110).

⁸ For example, the critiques of Derrida by some “analytic” philosophers, such as Searle and Ayer, are well known (and explained by Culler (1983, 110-129), and Norris (1987, 172-193)).
The difficulty of staggered dates of publication

Thus, to begin to justify how a systematic approach could hold, we note a mundane but nevertheless massive reason why Derrida was adopted in that fashion in earlier years – his works were published or re-published in a very irregular order. Derrida’s first long work (the 1954 student thesis *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy*) was only published in French in 1990, and in English in 2003. His next work, the speech “Genesis and Structure and Phenomenology” of 1959, also on Husserl, was published in 1965.9

Derrida’s first long published work, the “Introduction” to his translation of Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry” was published in France in 1962. That is, Derrida’s first nine years of study led to three works that dealt only with Husserl. Yet this order was obscured even in France.10

Derrida’s first article on structuralism (“Force and Signification”) had been published in 1963, seven years after Derrida’s thesis on

9 Henceforth, we will follow the convention of translating titles of works to the English, even when we are addressing the French version. However, the abbreviation listed thereafter will be that of the French work.

10 Nor was Husserl’s the exclusive influence, of course. The “Curriculum Vitae” in *Jacques Derrida*, published in 1993, explained that in 1947-48 Derrida had thought that he must write “‘literature’ rather”, and that he had first read Kierkegaard and Heidegger in 1948 (as “awed reading”) (JD 329). In “The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations”, Derrida explained that in 1957 he had registered a doctoral dissertation in which he had planned to relate transcendental phenomenology to “a new theory of literature” (ToaT, 37). Even in 1957 the broader linguistic influences were involved in his interest in phenomenology.
Husserl. But this progress was made more inscrutable in that during the early 1960s Derrida had published a slew of articles (Leavey, in IOG 182-183) that were collated into two books published in France in 1967. Most were collected into *Writing and Difference*, while the articles “Of Grammatology” and “Nature, Culture, Writing” of 1966 were expanded into *Of Grammatology*. The difficulty arose in that these articles were published with amendments by Derrida, seeming to make his work much more of a piece, thus obscuring his progress during the 1960s (for instance, the word “*Différance*” was added to “Violence and Metaphysics” (1964) in an emendation of 1967, and Derrida only developed “*différance*” in 1965 (*DLG* 46, (866)). The year 1967 also brought two more works on Husserl, “Speech and Phenomena” and “Form and Meaning”, along with the article “The Linguistics of Rousseau”, and the interview “Implications”.

But – even without proceeding to consider those works by Derrida that appeared in France soon afterward – the transition to English was even more convoluted. “Speech and Phenomena” and “Form and Meaning” were translated into English in a book of 1973, including the important essay “*Différance*” of 1968. That

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11 Whether “*différance*” is a word has been an issue of some debate (cf. Gasché, 1994, 6), we will develop the systematic sense of “word” as we proceed.

12 The article “From Restricted to General Economy” of 1967 was included in the French version of *Writing and Difference* of that year.
is, Derrida’s most famous short essay was one of the first to appear in English, and was taken as fundamental. However, Derrida had noted at the outset of the essay that it was a collation of concerns that he had assembled to that juncture (i.e. since 1962) (D 1968 41, D 131). Few of those works were even available, and “*Différance*” was from early on taken to be the touchstone of Derrida’s overall progress.

Thereafter, *Of Grammatology* was published in English in 1976, with much impact. Its first chapter situated Derrida’s approach in relation to philosophy, but its next two chapters considered the relation of “writing” to Saussure’s linguistics, then several linguists who had been influenced by Saussure, and several historians of writing. The argument in *Of Grammatology* then progressed to assess the structuralist anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, and Rousseau. The heavy emphasis on *différence* in the first two chapters confirmed the seeming centrality of this “word” to Derrida’s approach.

Most confusingly, Derrida’s earliest published work of 1962 on Husserl was published in English only in 1978. Moreover, the collection of articles from the 1960s, *Writing and Difference*, was also published in that year. “*Implications*” (the interview in which Derrida summarises the order of his progress through the 1960s) was only published in *Positions* in 1981. That is, of the writers who had published on Derrida by 1978, none yet had access to the
order of Derrida’s progress or his summaries, to ascertain his overall concerns and whether they had evolved in some fashion.

Rather, of the seventeen of Derrida’s works from the 1960s that had been published in English by 1978, all were involved in at least some fashion with writing, language, metaphor or structuralism. As it seemed to readers in English, *Of Grammatology* and four of the chapters (formerly articles) in *Writing and Difference* were heavily orientated towards Derrida’s concerns with writing.\(^\text{13}\)

Even the works that sought to set aside consideration of language *per se* revolved deeply around metaphor (“La Parole Soufflée”, “The Theatre of Cruelty”, “From Restricted to General Economy”).\(^\text{14}\) Derrida’s work was even inseparable from signification and language when interrogating Levinas’ ethics (“Violence and Metaphysics”). Tellingly, the two long works on Husserl’s phenomenology (the “Introduction” of 1962, and “Speech and Phenomena”) also consider the relations of writing, language and signification during the course of their argument.

The core concern was made still more obvious by the subsequent publication in English of *Dissemination* (1981), “The Pit and the

\(^{13}\) One chapter in *Writing and Difference* critically assessed structuralism in relation to literary language, and a second was aimed at the “post-structuralist” Foucault. The at least partly linguistic or literary-theoretical chapters are “Edmund Jabès and the Question of the Book”, “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, and “Structure, Sign and Play”. As noted, “Force and Signification” is an address to Rousset’s structuralism, also in relation to literary writing.

\(^{14}\) “La Parole Soufflée”, despite its title, was never concerned with spoken linguistics, but rather Derrida’s approach to Artaud’s philosophy of theatre (cf. Artaud, 1977).
Pyramid” and “White Mythology” (1982), all of which aligned the thinkers they addressed to some degree via signification and metaphor. There was more than enough support to continue with the canon of reading Derrida as a thinker insisting upon a play of language first, rather than beginning from the coherence of a system.

**The turn to deconstructionism**

Thus instead of progressing toward more systematic relations, most readers retreated from it. Taking its cue from Derrida’s penchant for assessing the works of others in order to tease out their presuppositions, interest in reading Derrida shifted toward the famous method of “deconstruction” which came to prominence after its mention in *Of Grammatology* in 1967. As Gasché explained,

> deconstruction is said to represent the moment where, in a text, the argument begins to undermine itself (Gasché 1994, 26).

Moreover, following Derrida’s liberally-translated phrase “There is nothing outside of the text [Il n’y a pas de hors-texte]” (DLG 1023).

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15 The term “deconstruction” had first been employed in the first article “Of Grammatology” of 1965 (DLG 1023).
everything was deemed amenable to being treated as a “text”. Interpretation of deconstruction in approach to “texts” was applied to multiple fields. No longer confined to reading of Derrida’s work, but having gained the status of a method of reading, deconstruction evolved to “deconstructionism”, which took as its presupposition the belief that any text could be made to undermine itself.

As Poole put it on the back cover of the 1997 version of *Of Grammatology*, that work

is the tool-kit for anyone who wants to empty

dislike to. A handy arsenal of deconstructive
tools are to be found in these pages, and the
technique, once learned, is as simple and as
destructive as leaving a bomb in a brown
dpaper bag outside (or inside) a pub. (Poole,

1976)

The quotation is mentioned by Gasché, who includes Hirsch’s note of 1983 that Derrida’s phrase is ““the element that has appealed to some of the experts about texts – literary critics” (Hirsch 1983, in Gasché 1986, 279). The usual translation of “There is nothing outside of the text” allows for a reference to nothing, rather than a negation or step (*pas*).
Gasché, however, had warned of such an approach that it represents nothing less than an extraordinary blurring and toning-down of the critical implications of this philosopher’s work.

(Gasché 1994, 25)

For our purposes, we note that a belief that any “text” can be emptied of its “presence”, that no absolute truth is possible but only a play of language, and also that Derrida inspired this approach, engenders a resistance to seeking such absolute truth in Derrida’s work above all. It seems to go against everything Derrida argued for. Yet in 1995 Derrida had explained his incomprehension with regard to what happens in the United States […] within American deconstructionism (DP 77).

At the very least, Derrida was wary of the “consensual euphoria” by a “community of complacent deconstructionists” (PS 17) that deemed any text is amenable to “deconstruction”.

Even so, we note, nor does our broad summary comment in any fashion upon the contributions of particular thinkers associated
with that movement. Nor do we in any fashion suggest that Derrida set these interests aside (we will develop some of them as we proceed). We merely note that there might be more to find in *Derrida’s* approach than a simplified sort of deconstructionism.

**The advent of systematic approach**

To that end, an alternative had begun to emerge in 1986, in the works of Rodolphe Gasché and Irene Harvey. Gasché took it that Derrida’s work needed to be reclaimed for philosophy (although he made this claim too strongly, deeming that Derrida can *only* be approached philosophically (Gasché 1986, 2)). Derrida’s approach, for Gasché, arose from the tradition of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, and developed the “form” of a “certain system” (Gasché 1986, 239).

Gasché thus opted for the opposite extreme to deconstructionism – an exceedingly systematic explanation. As Caputo put it,

> in the binary pair of systems/fragment,

> Gasché does not side with the devalorised

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17 Gasché explained his belief that Derrida can “be adequately understood only if approached philosophically – that is, shown to be engaged in a constant debate with the major philosophical themes from a primarily philosophical perspective” (Gasché 1986, 2).
member, ‘fragment’, but with its more prestigious partner, system. (Caputo 1987, 251)

As Gasché broached the possibility of a “form” of a “certain” “system”, we will side with Gasché. We do so, however, rather than because we think opting for “fragment” is incorrect, but in that we will begin from Derrida’s first work of 1954. As had the deconstructionists, Gasché opted for a fixed system rather than assessing whether Derrida’s approach might have changed.

Just so, Harvey – in a book which, Caputo tells us, evolved from a thesis supervised by Derrida (Caputo 1987, 255) – begins with a critique of deconstructionist readings, and argues that Derrida’s work must be assessed for its philosophical bases. Harvey finds the core of Derrida’s reading in a comparison between Husserl and Saussure (Harvey 1986, 37-90). We agree that this interaction is important. However, Harvey in 1986 was also not yet able to take the path from Derrida’s earliest work upon Husserl to Saussure, to assess how Derrida’s relations might progress.

Moreover, Derrida continued to publish prolifically, and the 1990s brought further change. First, Derrida’s calls for some kind of ordered approach to his work began to be hard to ignore, as he began to refer overtly to a strange “logic” permeating his oeuvre (cf. AP 24, A 16, K 89).
Second, Derrida emphasised that – the word “logic” notwithstanding – nor should his approach be constricted to any one discipline (DP 81). Indeed, Derrida’s interests even by 1967 had been varied, but by the 1990s he had engaged in detail with a thoroughly eclectic range of disciplines (for example, literary studies, epistemology, phenomenology, linguistics, ethics, religion, literary criticism, philosophy of science, psychoanalysis, politics, and jurisprudence).18

Thus while Gasché’s next book of 1994 was also notable in that it continued to develop Derrida’s systematic progress via the relations of difference from Derrida’s earlier years, it did not yet seek to develop a “logic” more amenable to adoption by multiple disciplines. Moreover, systematic approach of Gasché’s sort to any of Derrida’s work was still rare.

18 As to the philosophical works, for example, “Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time” stands out (OaG 29-67). As to the seemingly entirely “literary”, the “Envois” to The Postcard has been a topic of discussion (cf. Critchley in DP 28). As to the political, The Politics of Friendship, first of 1994, is important. The later approaches to Levinas’s ethics (“At This Very Moment, Here I Am” (1987) and Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1997) are well known. Religion was addressed in The Gift of Death (1992). As to the epistemological, Derrida published The Archaeology of the Frivolous in 1973, addressing Maine de Biran and Condillac. As to the linguistic, the “The Pit and the Pyramid” (1966) and “White Mythology” (1971) were published in Margins of Philosophy of 1982. Both of the latter retained an important place for Hegel’s theory of signification. The engagement with the performative aspects of language developed by Austin began from “Signature, Event, Context” (1971). The historical explanations of writing were also developed in, for example, “Scribble” (1978), in which Derrida developed the address to Warburton he had begun in 1966 in “Of Grammatology” (cf. DLG 43). The earlier psychoanalytic approaches were concerned with Freud (cf. “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, 1966). “Force of Law” (1990) contributed to the philosophy of law. By this summary of titles, we have merely touched upon the expanse of Derrida’s concerns and publications.
However, return to a basis in philosophy while allowing cross-disciplinary approach had begun to occur in 1992. Simon Critchley argued that Derrida addresses any text via a “clotural” reading (Critchley 1992, 26-27), which applies two moments of reading to a text: the first rigorously analysing the text in line with prevailing interpretations, the second undoing the secure sense of the first. While by then a familiar theme in literary theory, this approach was situated within the philosophical tradition (including the work of Husserl). That said, Critchley was concerned with following Derrida’s development into “ethics”. The inability to affirm absolute truth was re-cast as a “non-totalisable relation”, and deconstruction was deemed to follow the imperative to avoid the “consensus” which Critchley too associated with a “community of complacent deconstructionists” (Critchley 1992, 254). Although this imperative needed to be heeded “in the name of philosophy” (Critchley 1992, 254, Critchley’s emphasis), Critchley’s concern was not yet to approach Derrida’s work in a systematic fashion.

By contrast, Cornell in 1992 had developed a sort of ethics that was less concerned with double reading, and more amenable to systematic application in multiple disciplines. Cornell suggested that Derrida’s “philosophy of the limit” rejected that the progress to a “last word” to the limits of “truth” or “justice” can be completed, for the latter excludes consideration of other “challengers”. By this insistence upon retaining multiple traditions
(thus avoidance of an absolute truth) Cornell re-formulated Derrida’s “Post-Modern” heritage as an ethics interrelated with a philosophy of law (Cornell 1992, 10-11). Even so, the approach was merely amenable to such systematic assessment, and had not yet developed relations that might be applicable to any field.

However, at least one suggestion for a basal “plural logic” occurred in 2004, in the work of Hurst (also 2008b). For Hurst, Derrida’s refusal of choice proceeded via a constructive moment (“economy”) at the centre of Derrida’s structure (inside), and an entwined deconstructive moment of “aneconomy” outside. Such an approach began to unite philosophy, double movement and a broader applicability. To do so, Hurst drew together commonalities from several of Derrida’s works first published in 1967, and four of the thirteen works that Derrida mentioned in his explanation of the “plural logic”. While a helpful

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19 “Post-modernism” is often treated as a variant of “post-structuralism” taken up by literary theory (with both of which Derrida has been aligned, as we explained) and in turn influencing philosophy. It is said to develop from an aversion to naïve acceptance of an absolute truth, which naïvete is said (very broadly) to have held since the Enlightenment. Grenz puts it: “Modernity has been under attack at least since Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 to 1900) lobbed the first volley against it late in the nineteenth century, but the full-scale frontal assault did not begin until the 1970s. The immediate intellectual impulse for the dismantling of the Enlightenment project came from the rise of deconstruction as a literary theory, which influenced a new movement in philosophy” (Grenz 5).

20 In addressing Derrida’s “plural logic” Hurst’s article of 2004, in which the plural logic is discussed in the most depth, refers only to the last two works that Derrida mentions, and only the last features heavily, in an analysis of the gift. In the book of 2008, only the last four are mentioned, and Given Time is the only featured work in the chapter on Derrida’s plural logic (2008b: 107-111). As to elements from the earlier work, and those later works that she does address, it seems to us that Hurst takes the notions of the lack of presence and substitution of signs from “Speech and Phenomena” and “Differance”) those of
contribution, the approach had not yet addressed Derrida’s development from Husserl. Hurst rather situated Derrida’s progress primarily in the Kantian tradition, to which Husserl was seen as a successor (Hurst 2004, 253). There was still not yet consideration of Derrida’s development prior to 1967, nor a way to address Derrida’s overall \textit{oeuvre}.

\textbf{The turn back to phenomenology}

However, a parallel area of enquiry had emerged from 1990 with the publication in France of Derrida’s student work of 1954. By this publication the extent and longevity of Derrida’s early fascination with Husserl was made more obvious. Hence Christina Howells, for instance, began her survey of Derrida’s progress from this first student work, also explaining that Derrida engaged in more detail with phenomenology than with post-structuralism (Howells 1998, 6-52, cf. 29). In the 1990s discussion of Derrida’s relation to Husserl grew more widespread.\textsuperscript{21}

Even so, it was only in 2003 that the first systematic address to Derrida’s work from 1954 to 1967 emerged, in the book of Leonard Lawlor. However, while following Derrida progress via

\textsuperscript{21} For instance, White in 1987 wrote a response to Derrida’s reading of “Speech and Phenomena” (White, 1987). Bernet wrote on Derrida’s “Introduction” of 1962 (Bernet, 1989).
Husserl, Lawlor developed this “system of totality” in Derrida’s work from 1962 via Hyppolite’s rendition of Hegel (Lawlor 2002, 90-155). To the extent that he sought external inspiration, Lawlor de-emphasised Derrida’s concerns and transitions. Thus even though a sort of beginning had been established from Derrida’s first student work, and a greater confidence instilled in a kind of logical approach, there were still lacunae impeding an overall systematic approach to Derrida’s œuvre.

**Some earlier impediments to assessment**

First, there was not yet a way to proceed via Derrida’s interests from his earliest years. This prevented a demonstration of Derrida’s transitions across the years in accordance with those concerns. Second, each approach still sought to explain Derrida’s progress, not yet to demonstrate its evolution. They had not yet developed a way to extend from summary to a basis that could hold Derrida accountable to his aims, or predict how Derrida ought to improve his progress (by his standards, rather than ours). Third, there was no way for the various systematic readings to find a consensus. For instance, Lawlor’s situation of Derrida

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22 Thus Lawlor never emphasises how Derrida also diverges from Hegel (for instance, at the last, Derrida opts for difference rather than absolute position).

23 Hobson (who translated Derrida’s student work) published both on Derrida’s relation with Husserl (Hobson 1998, 43-53), and with a sympathetic cast toward a sort of “logic” from Derrida’s work on aesthetics in “The Double Session” of 1970, published in Dissemination. Hobson notes that Derrida calls the logic a “machine” which “illustrates the logical relation between different conceptions of representation and suggests a dialectical pattern for their generation out of each other through opposition.” (Hobson 2004, 54).
primarily in Hyppolite’s rendition of Hegel in 1962 is often in accordance with Gasché’s reading (cf. Gasché 1986, 27, 34), but incompatible with Hurst’s situation of Derrida’s progress in Kant. Just so, Harvey’s explanation of Derrida’s primary influence as developing from the nexus of Husserl and Saussure is incompatible with any of these.

To be sure, none of these systematic readers confine Derrida to only those primary thinkers. However, the approaches are incompatible to the extent that each reader claims a primary paternity, which implies a primary position by which to consider the influences upon Derrida. This difficulty is still widespread. Even in the past decade, Derrida’s principal source of inspiration has been attributed to Rousseau, Nietzsche, Blanchot, Heidegger, Freud and Levinas. No way yet holds for these readers to avoid incompatibility in the frameworks by which they read Derrida, or to progress in terms of a shared basis.

It is important to note that any or multiple such influences on Derrida may well hold, but seeking influential progenitors searches “outside” Derrida, and to that extent proceeds by contrast rather than demonstration. Such readings remain crucial,

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of course (both as a scholarly method, and in that Derrida was continually absorbent of the work of thinkers as he progressed). However, to the extent that they no longer follow Derrida’s transitions, they preclude opportunity to unify Derrida’s multiple concerns, and his oeuvre, via the kind of “logic” or “system” that he seems to have called for.

Toward commonality in approach

Nevertheless, so much commonality can be discerned amongst the systematic readers (Gasché, Harvey, Lawlor, Hurst, etc.) that such a shared basis seems feasible. Parameters for a shared system emerge by common factor, even though not yet by design. All insist upon Derrida’s avoidance of a final choice between the limits of inside and outside, and upon the inability to arrive at an absolute truth (even though such approach is never excluded). Each reader notes that “conditions of possibility turn into conditions of impossibility”, which we will have begun – but only begun – to explain in our Conclusion.

Yet nor should the systematic commonalities above be privileged in advance as “philosophical” concerns. It is worth noting that Gasché records that in 1982 Derrida put it that

all of the problems worked out in the

Introduction to The Origin of Geometry
Husserl] have continued to organise the work I have subsequently attempted in connection with philosophical, literary and even non-discursive corpora (ToaT 39, in Gasché 1986, 4).

Thus for Gasché, Derrida can only be approached philosophically. Yet Hillis Miller finds a quote in that very work which argues exactly the opposite:

[F]or I have to remind you, somewhat bluntly and simply, that my most constant interest, coming even before my philosophical interest, if this is possible, has been directed towards literature, towards that writing which is called literature. (ToaT 37, in Hillis Miller 2002, 58)

Hillis Miller counters that “[L]iterature is everywhere in Jacques Derrida’s writing” (Hillis Miller 2002, 58, 61).

It seems that help would need to come from a position that allows for both such approaches. As Derrida noted in 1995,
explaining the variation in styles between *The Post Card* and *Of Grammatology* (and also how *Of Grammatology* is the necessary precursor to *Glas*),

I would like to insist on this because it is a recurrent accusation and, given the constraints of time and context, I will have to speak a little brutally: I have never tried to confuse literature and philosophy or to reduce philosophy to literature. I am very attentive to the difference of space, of history, of historical rites, of logic, of rhetoric, protocols and argumentation (DP 79).

It seems that address to difference, space, history, logic, rhetoric, argumentation and protocols; might allow bases common to Derrida’s approach, rather than particular to the disciplines in question. This allows the first inkling of a way forward. The issue is where to begin.
Toward a law that guides Derrida’s oeuvre

We suggest we have found a locus to begin to augment all of the above issues, address their common difficulties, and at least make it possible to unify them in a systematic rendition of Derrida’s work; without privileging any approach in advance.

In the 1990 preface to his student work of 1954 (The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy), Derrida tells us that the work refers to a sort of law [and] since then, even in its literal formulation, this law will not have stopped commanding everything we have tried to prove (PG xiv, PdG vi, Derrida’s emphasis).

Derrida tells us that the question which governs this progress “is already” how the origin of everything can be a complication (we will begin with this in our first chapter). We take it at least to be possible that such a “law” applies. To be sure, it would be preemptive to suggest what it “is”, and we allow for it merely in the fashion that Derrida authorises it: such a law would impel everything that Derrida seeks to prove from 1954 to at least 1990.

Moreover, Derrida writes that in 1954 this “law”
imposes its logic from one end of the book to the other (PG xv, PdG vii).

It follows that developing a “logic” from the “law” as it applies in 1954 could provide some bases to apply across Derrida’s oeuvre. Such a law could provide a basis for readers simply because it arose from the first. That is, until an earlier work by Derrida is unearthed, it would permit a beginning from Derrida’s earliest work, rather than thirteen years after Derrida’s first philosophical works (i.e. in 1967), as all systematic readings besides Lawlor’s have done so far. It could then allow for both a progressive approach, insofar as it arose from the first, and a single basis insofar as it is common to Derrida’s oeuvre.

That is, it is at least possible that such a beginning could encourage unity while also permitting diversity. Instead of finding insuperable divisions amongst Derrida’s tones and styles as he develops, readers could ask why such changes develop relative to Derrida’s central concern (the “law”). Nor would this preclude divergent kinds of readings, even by those seeking Derrida’s primary influence and comparative approach. Readers could also ask why an external influence is relevant to Derrida’s progress at that juncture. Crucially, then, instead of seeking “outside” for Derrida’s inspiration, it would be Derrida’s concerns that are followed from the first. Such an approach can proceed by seeking
relations that are common to Derrida’s works in the multiple disciplines that he addressed (what these might be must still be assessed, but we will come to deem them “basic”).

We thus make broader claims for such a kind of approach. First, it can allow what Derrida often calls “rigour”, in a way that is shared by multiple and even diverse disciplines. An impediment to alignment along these lines thus far, we suggest, may have been that each discipline retains its protocols and methodology by which to assess whether an approach is “rigorous”. Following this law, “rigour” could arise from demonstration of transitions that are basic to these disciplines.

It seems to us that availing ourselves of such an approach is opportune. It is probably fair to say that the association of Derrida’s work with a lack of “rigour” has not yet been outweighed by the calls of a few. That this situation persists, we suggest, might have been stimulated by the lack of a way to assess Derrida’s rigour. Put more broadly, there might not yet have been a way to demonstrate this logic – for Derrida’s work in multiple disciplines, and for this strand of Continental thought. As Caputo wrote in 1987, referring to the “red flag” that the name “Derrida” raises, at the sight of which many philosophers charge,

25 The mere word “rigour” is non-transferable across disciplines. As Sprinker noted in response to Gasché, literary theory can be rigorous too (Sprinker, 1990, 1226 ff.).
The time has come to show with some patience that Derrida is engaged in a critical project which is deeply in accordance with the critique of metaphysics which has marked continental philosophy throughout this century, [and] which began with Husserl (Caputo 1987, 258).

We propose to begin this task, patiently, starting from Derrida’s engagement with Husserl.

However, we go further than Caputo has above. If the approach is “deeper” and more “basic” even than a critique of metaphysics, then it can span multiple concerns and interests, even when these seem unrelated to metaphysics. We emphasise, however, that we only “begin” such a task. Indeed, rather than beginning with a wider scope our approach will require close demonstration of this law and any resultant “logic”. In our dissertation we will follow Derrida’s progress through key works of 1954, 1962, 1964, 1965, 1966 and up to 1967, in order to work out the “logic” as it becomes a certain system.
Note on methodology

As our approach is somewhat atypical relative to many dissertations, and to many readings of Derrida, we will need to preface our approach in a little detail. First, in order to allow accessibility, we will seek to explain at least every major relation, and to make each obvious when it is employed thereafter. Our aim is that these basic relations be “there” for the readership. Sufficiently interested readers from any discipline ought to be able to start from our first chapter, and by our final chapter have some confidence in their grasp of the issues, and even the facility to employ the basics of our reasoning.

To facilitate this aim, we will begin to address the “law” via the most basic relations (demanding a solution, inside, outside, yes, no, and so on). It is helpful that Derrida’s first work will make these bases overt. Our demonstration seeks to begin in this fashion, in order to develop the more complicated reasoning as Derrida goes along. Our basic maxim will thus be to avoid anachronism.

Examples of our linguistic relations

This aim came to affect our employment of language in increasing measure. Derrida from at least 1962 begins to express the transitions of Husserl’s logic via language (which attempt Derrida first attributes to Husserl). To that end, we think our glossary is helpful in explaining the common logical terms by which Derrida
does so. We seek to avoid mentioning these words until they come to signal these logical relations (the notable words to which this maxim will apply are “not”, “can”, “cannot”, “must”, “never”, “in general”, “in particular” (cf. our glossary)). Our aim has been to provide a measure of assurance that when such words are employed, they can be assessed as an ordered transition.

On occasion, thus, a slightly unusual idiomatic or syntactic formulation will also express a logical (or systematic) relation; where the “not” must occur in a sentence, for instance, influences its logical sense. Even so, the requirements of a dissertation prohibit us from writing as Derrida does. We must conform to what we take as relatively standard idiomatic parameters, yet relay an approach that develops from a tradition of language and logic that has developed its own conventions.

To situate this, “logic” in our dissertation will have the sense that Husserl and Derrida allot to it: an application of whole-part and very basic predicative relations sedimented in consciousness. It will never be treated as a symbolic language; thus nor will it attain the rigour of such formulations. Nor would Derrida claim this. In 1962 he sets aside such an ideal to opt for “formal implication” (IOG 56)). Nor will it be a categorical logic even in a classical fashion, for Husserl was a progenitor of a novel sort of whole-part relations (cf. Smith et. al., 1982)), and Derrida first develops his approach by critical engagement with Husserl. However, it
will very much come to be relayed by language, which for Husserl will share a basic form with logic – a consciousness of the object.

**Our general form of approach**

In turn, we sought to align our approach with these conventions. For example, the words “Derrida” and “I” will come to signal instances of a general form of progress toward an object. As we will explain, intentionality takes the pure form of a “consciousness of something”. The logical form of predication corresponds to this progress. Consciousness thus takes positions upon the intentional object, and anything can become an intentional object. Anything can become a “content”. Hence any content can come to posit of itself, and notably the ego. “I am…”, for instance, is already the result of a prior positing of an “I”. By “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964, “I” will come to be overtly employed in transcendental subjectivity in this fashion – as a certain active and particular positing of the Ego, and “me” will refer to its object (itself).

As even these are instances of a more basic intentional and logical form, expressed in language, then even the impersonal and formal “one” (as in “One does…” etc.) will signal the unitary instance of constitution, in either signification or logic, without yet even the content of an ego. Thus in the evolution to transcendental subjectivity the “distance” from Derrida and the form of the proposition will become far less obvious (although Derrida’s
concern will only begin to evolve to the author in particular, such as himself, from “Of Grammatology”).

For instance, from Chapter Three “Derrida can” and “a subject can” will each be particular instances of the form “it is possible that one can”. This is quite easy to comprehend: the reader can merely take it that “Derrida” is proceeding in such a fashion, but the more basic form should be accessible should a reader seek further explanation.

In turn, as anything can become an intentional object any content can arise in this first position, even inanimate objects. Derrida’s employment of prosopopeia in the style of Hegel and Husserl will be frequent. For instance, that Discourse “can only […] negate itself to affirm itself” (VeM 446, VM 130 (566)), will be one such prosopopeia. We have employed these where required; however, we avoided doing so habitually. Again, we have sought to conform to such bases while nevertheless offering the reader a conventional “narrative progression”.

**Some requirements of our language**

As to this narration, following from the employment of “I” and “me” above, we refer to ourselves (the author of this dissertation) by the impersonal singular form “we”. This sustains a critical distance from Derrida, which is a requirement of a dissertation. A resultant critical language (the language we employ in the
positions we take upon Derrida) is inevitable. *Owing to the exigencies of a dissertation, this language will not be made thematic or an object of critique.* We will thus seek to lessen its influence, and note two major issues. *First, we will opt for common or habitual terms in our language and sorts of explanation.* Second, our transitions will even come to be predictable. A reader need take little notice of these, except for noting that we seek to minimise the impact of our language, to allow Derrida’s progress and terms to emerge more obviously. We have provided a short “Summary of some common terms” after our glossary, below.

Nevertheless, we will provide an introduction to these common terms by which to assess our progress. Notably, terms or constructions such as “rather than”, “avoids”, and “it is important to” will be ours (for instance, these avert confusion with negative constructions such as “Derrida does not”). As we develop, some terms will come to be employed frequently, such as the connectives “thus”, and “hence”, which signal an implication following from a previous necessity.

We will seek to avoid incautious employment of “metaphors of light” – metaphors that imply the constituting and the naïve availability of an object in front of a subject (such as “observe that”), except in those cases where these relations are to be emphasised. We will also seek to avoid metaphors of writing (such as, “we will sketch”, “describe”, “illustrate” and so on)
except when Derrida employs them. Instead of these, we have opted for the habitual “note that…”. Accordingly, “or”, “of”, “in” and even “here”, “there” and so on will come to have “logical” senses, which was a feature of Husserl’s writing that Derrida will develop.\(^26\) Just so, and just as we have been required to employ a conservative and critical language, it is required of a dissertation to maintain a stable approach to critical position in space, and a natural sense of temporality (and history). Our references to the time in which Derrida develops and his evolution ought to be taken in this fashion. We make no theoretical commitment to this convention, although we have sought to make a virtue of necessity. Rather than supposing in advance that these will come to be undone, we seek to work out how this occurs.

Indeed, as we seek to avoid anachronism, our language will be employed in incrementally more systematic fashion, as Derrida develops. Most notable is the verb “is”. In 1962, in accordance with Husserl’s “\(S \text{ is } P\)”, Derrida will employ “is” to signal the application of a characteristic to an object. However, he will do so from a hypothetical position that seeks to avoid determination. By 1966, “is” will signal the structure and movement of a trace in its

\(^{26}\) For example, “There”, for Husserl, will signal an other in transcendental subjectivity that is there for me, while I am merely “Here” (CM §54).
difference from itself in the system, and by 1967 it will signal an identity insofar as it is in relation to its non-identity.

The conditional tense will also develop a systematic sense. Although we employ the simpler future and past tenses to refer to our own and Derrida’s development, Derrida will come to employ the conditional “would” to avoid affirming the possibility of the object he refers to. That is, “would” will develop as a version of the conditional “If”… The latter (along with “as if”, the necessary condition “only if”, and the subjunctive “if it were”) will be kept for Husserl and Derrida alone in our progress.

However, nor ought the reader to worry about these relations; we will seek to make them obvious as they develop. To that end, we will italicise sentences quite often to emphasise turning points, as above. We also italicise selected words frequently to emphasise the transition that is evolving at that juncture, although there are too many to italicise in every case.

As to this evolution, Derrida from 1962 will proceed by ongoing implication. As such progressions are incremental, a number in brackets – such as (49) – will refer to a page or segment in our dissertation where a relation had been explained.27 Nor ought

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27 These terms ought also to be taken as Derrida’s. We have sought to avoid employing terms that are strongly associated with major thinkers in this canon, except where Derrida employs them. For instance, the word “project” (projet) is often employed to translate Heidegger’s “Entwurf” (cf. BT 145-151, SZ 155-
these references to detain the reader, and nor are they obligatory in order to follow the argument. Overall, we have sought to allow for a comfortable and sequential reading, the references are merely provided should the reader require orientation. They might also be helpful should closer demonstration be required to audiences at a later stage.

Next, it ought to be helpful to note that this “logic” will be visual. Even temporal durations are visualised and objectified as formal spaces. It will also be difficult to avoid visualising relations to a “beyond” in this fashion, even though it will be necessary to try to avoid such a visualisation. The progress will proceed by means of whole-part relations and address to objects, which align with the form of thought (or intentionality). We will come to call these (following Derrida) the levels and directions. Derrida will develop his approach from these basic relations, and should the words seem complicated, it might be helpful to look for shapes and movements (that is, forms). We would very much like to say that “beneath” the words there will be a form developing – but even our employment of these terms will be guides. Words such as “forward”, “backward”, “underneath” etc. are spatiotemporal (rather than metaphorical), and after 1962, they will no longer be taken naively by Derrida. They will be placed “in parentheses”,

162), but Derrida also employs it to refer to Husserl and Saussure (cf. IOG 104, DLG 1039). Nor could we avoid all such terms; we have merely tried to consider the major cases.
reduced and “noematic” (which relations we will explain as we develop). However, a “level” is never quite of the same order as “forward” or “beneath”, and is indeed deemed by Derrida to be a metaphor (IOG 98-99). It will be a common metaphor in expressing whole-part logic; which in turn is visualised spatially.

**Metaphor and our approach**

This approach to metaphor also requires a (brief) explanation. In particular, to permit a more obviously ordered approach in our language, we will attempt to minimise confusion arising from incautious employment of metaphors. That is, we will seek to employ as few as possible. We will also seek to avoid insensitivity to etymology. The latter will be crucial for Derrida as he develops, and possibly even more important than metaphor in these years, insofar as words have a history, are parts of language in general, and arise from the origin. As a result, we will seek to control our employment of metaphor. By no means do we suppose we succeed in this aim. No approach, probably, leads toward acknowledgment of the futility of such attempt more rapidly than paying attention to connotation and etymology. Any systematic approach must contend with the dispersion of what one wants to say, for language in general is deeply related to metaphor. The *Chambers Dictionary* defines metaphor as
a figure of speech by which a thing is spoken

of as being that which it only resembles (CD 931).

Derrida might have enquired into the omission of writing from this definition, and a “figure” is nevertheless spatial. Even so, by this definition most words are metaphors insofar as they seek to name the object itself, visualised “in front of” consciousness; and every such metaphor would not yet absolutely name its referent. It is easy – although hasty – to suppose from such a situation that metaphors to some degree refer to metaphors. Moreover, each of these words retains its etymology, backwards and forwards from history. Adding metonymy and synecdoche would include whole-part relations, and it is easy to note that these accord with levels and directions. That is, it is tempting to suspect that the tropes of language allow conformity with Husserl’s intentionality.

Derrida will seek to take none of these relations for granted. Hence this is not yet the place for a theory of metaphor, as Derrida’s development via Husserl will be much more detailed. We merely note that we suspect metaphor can evolve in accordance with the form of thought, and that we will develop the progress as far as Derrida’s engagement with Saussure. That is, we still seek to avoid anachronism, and begin to develop metaphor as Derrida does.
To be sure, even in “Force and Signification” of 1963, in address to Rousselet’s structuralist approach to literature, Derrida had begun to employ a more metaphorical style. In the texts that we assess, Derrida will take those thinkers that he addresses at their word, for it is they who seek to implement or rely on ordered relations of language.

However, nor will Derrida be without preference. He will begin from a comparison of Husserl’s ideal of a “scientific” and univocal language (where each word would have only one fixed and determinate sense), and what he takes as James Joyce’s aim of equivocity in Ulysses. Derrida will opt for Husserl’s approach, for an important reason. He will argue that any employment of language begins from a first univocal moment (IOG 102, 103), even should the speaker or writer want it to hold equivocally. By 1967 his approach will have evolved.

The attempt at controlled employment of metaphor and etymology will thus come to have a crucial role as we proceed. It is just these relations that we will assess as we develop until as they become difficulties. We will follow crucial texts insofar as they develop Derrida’s systematic progress into différance, the trace and his more mature understanding of their relations in 1967.

It is well known that Derrida seems to become critical – it would be anachronism to assume that he does – of such a project very
soon after 1967 (cf. in “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy” (1971)). But this is less of a critical warning than a telos. We seek to assess how the relation will hold by that juncture.

That is, as Derrida was concerned with linguistic relations from his earliest published work, following from his reading of Husserl, there may never have been a “linguistic turn” in Derrida’s work at least. There may merely have been an evolution in how language was employed. *We will try to assess this evolution.* By our final chapter, we will suggest that we have begun to explain to some degree how such a progress occurred for Derrida.

Thus we go further, to suggest that only by attempting to engage with these relations can this progress be worked out. *Only* by such a progress can “différance”, the trace etc. be developed *as it occurs in these works over the years*. In beginning from Derrida’s opting for Husserl’s project over Joyce’s *at first*, we will explain how very few words that Derrida employs will be intended as a mere synonym for another. Even the metaphors of writing and speech that Derrida will develop in his address to Saussure in “Of Grammatology” will never simply be indistinguishable. When Derrida writes “inscription” rather than “mark”, or “imprint”, there will be a systematic impetus for this, as each retains its individual etymologies and applicability. Any perfectly substitutable metaphor would be a word without boundaries, and thus be without limits. As invariant, it would be *an absolute*, a
difficulty that Derrida will never cease to address. The necessity, and inescapability, of a telos of univocity will hold in beginning from Husserl’s ideal science expressed in language, and will evolve at least into Derrida’s grammatology. What will be at issue is how to reveal, via the relations of language as logic, what is common to and thus never appears entirely in either language or logic. It is the necessity of this “deciphering” of Derrida’s work (cf. DLG 43) that will apply in increasing measure.

Hence it might be that such a project is less an “option” in approach to Derrida’s “law” than the only option by which to address it in beginning from Derrida’s first work. Thus nor do we take an apologist stance. It is in the service of those who argue against rigour (just as much as for rigour) that we undertake this task. In support of those who resist logic, we will begin with logic; to assess how – or whether – logic can be cast into the crucible of its own critique. Hence we ask for some dispensation from a broader audience to undertake our task.

We believe that accepting this methodology without apology but by appeal to a future consensus has not yet been discerned as an opportunity. For instance, Gasché employed the word “admittedly” to explain that he allotted more prominence to philosophical works (Gasché 1986, 4). This justified Caputo’s inference that Gasché’s opting for a static “system” over “fragment” is a personal choice or idiosyncrasy (Caputo 1987, 251
(25)). Just so, Lawlor suggests that his progress – which evolves in language, as does ours – is a “sort of narrative” (Lawlor 2002, 7).

Yet Lawlor’s approach is much more logical than he seems willing to admit. We seek to further the goal of all of these thinkers: beginning from the “law” allows us to ask how it remains a commonality in Derrida’s work – even should that then require the setting aside of structure, and however it works itself out in the protocols of particular disciplines.

### Issues particular to our dissertation

The next obvious consideration is that of translation, which difficulties will apply to us as much as to every reader of Derrida.

As to how we approach the French works, we sought to learn French to read Derrida. It surprised us to find that beginning from the English several years ago and then turning to the French texts was helpful to our approach. We were able to discover at least some difficulties endemic to English readings of Derrida and related French thinkers, and to begin to rectify these (and doubtless we have not yet discovered many more).

In our reading of Derrida’s work of 1954, and as he has not yet begun to implement language in *bis* approach, we will take Hobson’s English translation as our standard. We will usually employ Leavey’s translations of Derrida’s “Introduction” in 1962, although we will re-translate some paragraphs from Derrida’s final pages as these will require closer reading. We can align with
both of these translations in the main as neither of these works (Derrida’s earliest) were re-published with amendments in the French.

However, when a work has been re-published with amendments, and in order to follow Derrida’s evolution, it has been a *sine qua non* to work from the initial text. On several occasions only the later version has been translated into English. Thus in the French articles “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964 and “Of Grammatology” of 1965 and 1966 we will work *only* from the French versions. As attentiveness to the employment of language and to Derrida’s later amendments will be crucial, we will thus need to proceed via close reading. These translations will be our own, although we will align with the English versions wherever feasible. Wherever relevant, we will thus reference the comparable page number in the later English version when no translation of that French version is yet available. Where our translation has diverged from the English in a fashion pertinent to our progress, we will note the divergence in a footnote, or employ the convention “([French reference], cf. [English reference])”.

Just so, we have preferred to work from the French version of the thinkers we addressed *en route* (notably, Levinas and Saussure), while taking the English as a guide. As to German works, our German is far less reliable than a translator’s. We usually followed the English texts, and cross-checked them against the German
versions upon issues pertinent to our argument. The notable exception is that of Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation, which we assessed more closely in the German, as it is crucial to our logical relations (only the 1913 version is published in the English cf. LU 227-295). Overall, as to writers besides Derrida, in some cases we have been unable to work from the original language, in French or German, simply as the works are unavailable in South Africa.  

Next, in accordance with our avoidance of anachronism, we note that we will proceed by engagement (in descending order of extent) with Husserl, Saussure, Levinas, and only briefly with Hegel. The omission of Heidegger from this list deserves comment. We have done so merely as he features relatively little in the arguments we address. Heidegger is referred to only once in 1954 (in a footnote upon negation that also addresses Hegel (PdG 196, fn. 47, PG 206 fn. 47)). Nor is Heidegger overtly named in Derrida’s “Introduction” 1962. In the section that we will address in “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964, he is referred to only in one sentence (in a mention of Identity and Difference (530)). As our aim is to follow Derrida’s concerns via the systematic transitions of the law, rather than seeking external inspiration by contrast, we will touch upon Heidegger mainly in our footnotes. Nor is this a de-privilege of Heidegger per se. Our

28 Notably, the work of Hjelmslev was addressed only in English.
methodological requirement will apply to every thinker addressed in our progress besides Derrida. We will follow Derrida’s evolution to the extent that he was never dependent even upon *Husserl*. This will hold even when Derrida in 1954 takes phenomenology as the only possible way to proceed in philosophy. It will hold to the extent that Derrida seeks to make phenomenology address his concerns and his law. Should the “law” and its “logic” indeed extend across Derrida’s *oeuvre*, its relations will be more basic than any of the thinkers’ works that Derrida addresses, yet common to all.

**Guide to our chapters**

Our chapters will develop toward a “system” in a cumulative sequence, from Derrida’s work in 1954 up to 1967. We hope that these summaries provide orientations, but obviously the detail is better followed across our chapters.

**Summary of Chapter One**

Our first chapter will address Derrida’s student work of 1954, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology*, to begin from Derrida’s “law”. The latter will arise as a demand to question how the origin of everything can be an “a priori synthesis”. The term “synthesis” refers to a mutual implication of relations at an origin already prior to, thus not yet a part, of thought. Derrida will ask how the
origin of everything can start with a complication (i.e. also a “co-implication”).

In 1954, Derrida’s demand will be for just such absolute knowledge of the origin of the intentional object. He will thus demand a bivalent solution (either true or false), or a knowledge without limitation. The difficulty will be that, as each object already appears to be known, it does not yet appear absolutely in a synthesis. The demand for absolute determination will as yet fall short. To this basis we will add the implicit borders of the outside and the inside which Derrida will be applying, along with “directions” by which Derrida seeks to determine the object.

We will summarise some basic relations in Husserl, as proceeding via the logical form “S is P”, which accords with the form of intentionality. In this form, the logical subject (“S”, or the object) will be predicated of (by a predicate “P”), to determine it as true or false, which form of judgment is deemed by Husserl to be “apophansis”. Husserl will proceed via a “reduction”, which no longer posits of a natural “outside” to the object. Derrida will test each of Husserl’s published works in accordance with his demand, by means of his directions.

These will allow for a small and definable group of directions as what we deem “joints”. Derrida will take hypothetical positions from one direction to another, such as from the inside to its outside, outside to its outside, and so on. The “problem” will begin to emerge in that in each case both the separation from and
the undeniable connection to the origin are not yet affirmed or denied as true or false.

We will then explain the joints in terms of “forward and backward”, in consciousness of the object as a basic proposition predicking of the object (forward), to determine the origin (backward). These directions will also hold when the goal (telos) is the ideal of a determined Science, and the necessity to determine temporality in consciousness. The latter will be “irreducible” to a spatial moment, in that temporality only appears as a form. Each direction will still be problematic. The “complication” of relations at a problematic origin will develop an early version of “contamination” which thus far prevents a simple solution. However, Derrida’s outcome in 1954 will need to develop in accordance with his criteria. To arrive at an absolute solution, he will still verify (absolutely affirm) the truth of the problem, instead of leaving it problematic.

**Summary of Chapter Two**

Our second chapter will summarise Husserl’s “logic” by adding consideration of whole-part levels to the directions from our first chapter. These levels and directions will accord with the pure form of intentionality, as “consciousness of something”. The highest level will be eidetic (the level of Ideas, and their categories, which will include Whole, Part, Object and Something), which predicate of the eidetic object in general. The middle (or lower) level will be that which predicates of grades of
specificity by which consciousness addresses an ideal object. The lowest will be that ideal object that must be determined as true. The latter in turn thus can be false, as contingent. These relations will be those of formal ontology. In turn, the formal ontological levels and directions will correspond to subordinate “material ontology”, which will allow for material content.

As essences already hold, they will be deemed to hold “behind”, as also a priori. As the ideal object must be determined as an essence, these levels will also be goals “in front”. Such levels will merely be hierarchies of necessity and possibility required to determine the object. The levels and directions will allow for the necessity and possibility of determining the object as true. This object would be determined as the pure and essential “Fact”, which would be true at all times and places. As invariant, this would meet Derrida’s goal of the “absolute”. To determine the Fact, however, will require a material content. To do so, a real fact must be able to be affirmed as the same in infinitum.

First, however, an object must be able to begin to be constituted. We will assess the relations of this constituting moment in Husserl to develop the requirements of a right and ground to begin constituting objectivity as true. The latter must occur of originary evidence in accordance with the original (i.e., essential) region of consciousness. To assess what would found all of these, we will develop the Idea in the Kantian sense and summarise its requirements. The approach will develop three parameters with
which Derrida would need to accord: intentionality (i.e. levels and directions), Husserl’s reduction, and the a priori (i.e. also essential) relations of originary ground and right.

In turn, these will devolve to four criteria (conditions) by which Husserl’s relations would answer Derrida’s demand from 1954. Upon “this side” as originary, an absolute ground will be required (from behind, for essential reasons) for the possibility of ideal Objectivity. At the “objective” side, a subject must affirm the ideal object as the same, without possibility of error (forward), in space, time, as an intentional object or a real fact.

Summary of Chapter Three

Our third chapter begins from the mid-parts of Derrida’s work of 1962, his “Introduction” to Husserl’s *The Origin of Geometry*. Derrida will apply his demand for an absolute solution from 1954 to Husserl. He will develop the questions and then address the issues in the order that we developed them in Chapter Two. To prepare, he will first rapidly retract from “exact” scientific approach to enquire into the foundation of propositions prior to their truth or falsity. Such propositions will merely have a value as “open”. The telos of the truth-sense of the open will be deemed the “opening”. Derrida’s question will be how to open a way back to the origin, which he will call “passage”. He will then begin from geometry as a material ontology to work “backward” through its essential foundations. He will do so by address to a material object here and an origin in history. From these he will
work out three basic sorts of “reduction” from worldly content, as a teleology that seeks to address pure and essential relations. By this regression he will arrive at the questions from our previous chapter as conditions for determining any object, including the origin of geometry. He will then develop the levels and directions by means of Husserl’s language in general. Derrida will arrive at an overall reduction and a progress that will thereafter proceed as pure and a priori phenomenology. In so doing he will set aside negation; speech and writing will not yet allow for an absolute ground of possibility or absolute fact. Language in general will nevertheless take “the positive value of univocity” as its version of the telos as absolute, but the production of a univocal moment will pass to “open” relation. As that which must found essential relations, and permit production of content (from behind), then permit a progress to address objects as the same, while remaining inaccessible itself, “absolute univocity” will rather imply an a priori “opening” prior to constituting. This will develop a circularity that will be deemed “analogous” to the Idea in the Kantian sense. Speech, which by its essence never appears but undoubtedly (i.e. “certainly”) produces speech, will also be aligned with the Idea in the Kantian sense. The relations of this circularity that returns to an origin will develop “passage”. Derrida will also seek to determine the origin of thought in history. This will imply a “double necessity” that asks how, but also why, there must have been an origin.
Derrida will then directly address the four requirements in terms of the parameters from our previous chapter, beginning from the Idea in the Kantian sense. He will work out that pure phenomenology cannot ground itself via space and time. Even so, positing of space will nevertheless continue. This in turn will necessitate the circularity, and the radical philosopher will adopt the responsibility to continue seeking an answer (response) to the question. Second, intentionality will not yet determine the object, although also allowing for the circularity. Derrida’s final argument, address to God, will aim “beyond” in a strong version of the absolute without any sort of constraint. This too will imply the circularity. At the last, a “supertemporality” will also be deemed “analogous” to the progress. The overall analogous relations will be generalised as returning to the circularity as a formal and essential passage prior to content. Derrida will let go of his demand for a simple absolute from 1954, in a retraction to the essential Absolute as “Passage”.

**Summary of Chapter Four**

Our fourth chapter continues to follow the final pages of the “Introduction” as Derrida goes on to work out the relations of the “différant”. These will be the first relations of deferral and Difference in his *oeuvre*. After arriving at the Absolute as Passage, Derrida will re-constitute the demand for the absolute in the Absolute as pure phenomenology. The double necessity will evolve to a pure phenomenology asking “why” of sense, and to
ontology in a non-Husserlian sense, which seeks to ask “what” of the Fact. The latter will allow only a metaphysical possibility that continues to seek its object in space and external to itself, thus implying opening. Ontology and its metaphysical possibility will keep only a right to the necessity of opening a question, without yet constituting an external object or a possibility of response.

That pure phenomenology accepts the responsibility to ask “why” will allow it the possibility of avoiding the opening; only it will keep the pure possibility (the responsibility) that it can open the question as a response. In turn, pure phenomenology will again ask “why” of the “what”. This relation of pure phenomenology and objectual ontology, neither of which yet constitute an external object, will imply that pure phenomenology arises as a delay. However, the originary moment will nevertheless be produced as an impossible Difference. This will develop the first moment of the “différant”. However, the progress will still be developing. It will not yet allow for a direction back to me (it will be “unidirectional”), and will have suppressed negation.

**Summary of Chapter Five**

Our fifth chapter turns to Derrida’s articles “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964. We will first summarise how Levinas rejects Husserl’s objectifying intentionality to develop his preferred relations of the other, the Other, _autrui_ and _Autrui_. The latter two have no English equivalents. We will suggest how these develop a necessary sequence ways by which the absolute must be
attained in an ethics. To explain some of these relations in this sequence: Autrui as “You” both on high and intimately as a “you” will first bring me into relation to myself without objectification, opposition or negation (thus as non-violence). This will develop an obligation and Desire for Autrui, which will develop to “autrui”, as the instability of the sign “Autrui” (Thou, you) and “others”. The relations of language too will arise with Autrui, which only then allow me to speak of division from the body of “the other” as a body in the world, by which to continue the obligation to go “beyond” (par-delà) to “the Other”. The latter relations of division will be deemed the Same, which will allow for a formal logic that Levinas will also align with Husserl.

This progress via bodies will encounter the face, which will appear only insofar as it withholds itself, again requiring me to go “beyond” (au delà) to autrui. The latter will resist the logic of the Same and return me to obligation to go to the “beyond” as Autrui, in a sort of ruptured circularity, which Levinas will deem both an “absurd structure” (of Autrui and autrui) as prior to logic, and the “logical structure” in the Same. This will be called “dissymmetry”.

Derrida will accept Levinas’ criteria of a desire for the absolute other, which will accord with his demand for absolute solution since 1954. He will thus accept the telos of ethics as without oppression and negation, to avoid instilling borders or limits. As oppression and negation are sorts of violence, he will accept the
telos of avoidance of violence. However, he will opt for Husserl's intentionality as Derrida had developed it since 1962. Derrida and Levinas will be incompatible from that juncture, as Derrida defends how selected relations developed from his reading of Husserl in 1962 could be more “ethical” than Levinas’ approach. For Derrida, intentionality as the indefinite opening will be deemed a first basis of the “respect” that addresses the absolute other (Autrui) without a violence of negation. He will set aside autrui until later in the argument. He will then re-interpret the approach to the other, the Other and Autrui according to the levels, directions and circularity of Husserl’s pure logic.

To do so, Derrida will develop his passage into two directions via Husserl’s “appresentative transposition”. This will still be without negation and its relation to the same (for what is the same as something is also not something). The two movements will seek to determine the finite other as infinite other, and the Other as Other, thus as absolutely other. Derrida will develop a progress to Autrui that seeks to address it only in its form of Ego, thus as what I can never be. To that extent it will have been respected even though it must have been encountered in me. The directions will arrive at a logical absurdity in the necessity of thinking the other and the Other together. This will result in a positive “economy”, the name for a return to the circularity of the inside in order to develop the relation to an irreducible “beyond”. At that juncture, having arrived at absurdity, Derrida will set
Husserl’s formal logic and respect aside. In setting Husserl aside, he will allow for negation and an ethics of violence.

**Summary of Chapter Six**

Our sixth chapter will continue to follow “Violence and Metaphysics” as Derrida evolves a negative moment to each of the two directions and economy. Allowing negation will develop the two directions to include the relations of the same, hence the movement of the Same and the Other. These will be mediated by the *eteron*, which has the sense both of “other in general” and difference. Derrida will develop the *eteron* in general as a condition even for *autrui*.

However, these movements will then imply contradiction in the origin of thought, speech, and predication (the logos). Derrida will retreat from this implication to avoid “worst violence” and its threat of nihilism. He will rather work out his best ethical arguments of that year as ethical nonviolence and least possible violence. We will note how Derrida then defends the necessity of least possible violence as Hegel’s sort of “war”, and briefly explain how Derrida diverges from Hegel.

Nor will Derrida have given up on avoiding violence. The articles “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964 will evolve the outcomes from 1962, to the necessity of the Absolute as the radical philosopher heeding the responsibility to ask “why finitude?”. At the last, Derrida will devolve the responsibility for finite appearing to God in this subjective a priori. He will not yet have
met his demand that thought exceed the inside to determine the beyond. Moreover, he will not yet have implemented the trace, which Levinas had developed just prior to “Violence and Metaphysics”, and which would no longer confine the finite philosopher to an “inside”.

**Summary of Chapter Seven**

Our seventh chapter addresses selected relations of Ferdinand de Saussure’s *Course in General Linguistics* (1916). Saussure will seek to restore the natural privilege of speech over writing. The latter must exist solely to “represent”, “figure” or “image” speech, as a phonetic writing. The progress will be teleological. We will then develop Saussure’s “system” from his whole-part relations, and his employment of directions. Saussure will begin by studying speech as psychological, and thus its acts of production of speech as psycho-physical. The part-whole relations of the signifier, signified and sign will then be aligned with that of speech, the tongue (*langue*), and language in general respectively.

In this teleology the lowest level of individual acts of speech will thus need to proceed as moments of signifiers in a linguistics of speech. Its goal will be the unity of speech in the tongue, as Saussure’s preferred linguistics in general. This determination of linguistics in general would develop the laws of a semiology that studies a field of signs at the highest level. To restore speech, the lowest and most interior level must proceed (forward) in order to
determine linguistics as the tongue (upward), to develop the ideal progress of semiology (beyond).

At the lowest level, Saussure will then base the “parallel” of the form of speech and the signifier upon the necessity of an idea as a sound. He will devolve to the formal relations of the signifier as an acoustic image. The latter in turn will be comprised of a “psychic imprint”, the form by which the imprint upon a psyche allows for hearing and speech. The imprint in turn will comprise of formal chains of articulatory movements and acoustic impressions. Saussure will unite these chains into the complex unity of a phoneme as his elemental basis. At this lowest level, each phoneme will “correspond” to a written sign.

Saussure will then turn “inside” to address how the formal relations of signification at the most interior can realised a semiology. He will develop a progress that proceeds by means of coverage and value rather than truth or falsity, and in which chains of signifiers will need to proceed by means of what each is not in relation to other signifiers. To do so while remaining internal alone, the relation of signifier to signified will need to remain arbitrary.

We will then summarise some difficulties for Saussure. First, he begins from an ostensible psychology yet retreats to formalism. Second, he will seek to exclude writing from psychology, yet requires a relation to a corresponding form of writing at the most interior only as formal. This might well allow for how the most
elemental relations of speech can be addressed by a phonetic writing, but whether it is psycho-physical or formal will not yet be established. Third, his approach will seem to not yet allow even for a formal relation of temporality. Fourth, he will seem to allow the relations of difference, negation to phonemes too. The latter will also be deemed material. It will not yet be obvious whether the chains of difference etc. are formal or psycho-physical.

**Summary of Chapter Eight**

Our Chapter Eight is preparatory, and turns to the first of the articles “Of Grammatology”, of 1965. We will note that Saussure’s progress aligns – very basically – with Derrida’s in earlier years. Derrida will be discerning an opportunity, in that these might be the sorts of fashions by which any address to borders (metaphysics) proceeds. We will then summarise how Derrida will proceed in our next three chapters. He will begin from address to Saussure’s difficulties, but diverge in increasing measure to work out the implications in accordance with various levels of his teloi. Rather than a structuralism, however, Derrida will start from alignment with Saussure, to “risk” an outcome by the reading.

As to this first article, we will note that Derrida’s approach proceeds in levels (or “parallels”), each of which aligns with a level of his telos. However, levels will be metaphors for “parallel” relations conforming by means of a system that has not yet appeared itself. Derrida will have worked out by 1966 that
particular and general relations are separable merely by abstraction, as chains of traces as metaphor. At the upper level Derrida will prepare to begin with Saussure’s telos of a psychophysical progress to semiology. These relations will be aligned with the general telos of several thinkers in the history of metaphysics who had privileged speech, as a phono-centrism. Yet attaining the telos of speech would be a relation without separation (presence). Thus writing and speech will be instances of a more basic form, appearing also in the progress from one to other, difference, etc.

Yet more basically, Derrida will be preparing to further his demand from earlier years: to assess how thought can go “beyond” its particular moments to determine the absolute. Derrida will concede that his progress from earlier years, and that of a history of metaphysics, thus far seems to allow only a moment at the “inside”, which does not yet permit a trace. He will be seeking to protect metaphysics against this difficulty – or rather, the demand will continue for absolute solution – and the necessity will arise to develop such a trace.

To do so, at a higher level, Derrida will work out what sorts of writing align with the levels of essential relations of speech. This will develop the necessity to assess the conditions of a science of semiology should it need to include writing to its field, as a grammatology. In our next chapter Derrida will begin from Saussure’s teloi and his difficulties to work out the necessities of
including writing to speech. This implication of a grammatology will develop the trace to protect metaphysics in general. In so doing, Derrida will have begun to redress his concerns since 1954.

**Summary of Chapter Nine**

In Chapter Nine, we will assess the first part of the second article “Of Grammatology” of 1966. Derrida’s rigorous assessment will begin. He will work out the “instituted trace”, and the necessity of grammatology in a long and progressive argument. To prepare for it, we will explain that he will begin by accepting Saussure’s telos of semiology, and its levels of generality. At the lowest level, Derrida thus begins from a telos of accepting a psycho-physical speech as a linguistics without “contamination” by writing. This will also require a writing existing only to figure speech (phonetic writing). Derrida will take the latter condition as his premise, and assess whether it is possible. To do so, he will begin from the necessity of the arbitrariness of the sign, and work out the necessity of an instituted moment of writing. He will apply the levels of writing, including the particular concepts of the graphie (the essential and originary concept of what originally founds graphic relations), and the phone (the essential relation of voice and sound). The difficulty will be that natural symbols nevertheless retain motivated relations to the outside.

Each of these will be developed into the main argument, which will first work out that it is necessary to broaden the field of semiology in general to grammatology. Second, it will arrive at the
necessity of contradiction of the phoneme and grapheme at the lowest level. However, an instituted moment will hold despite contradiction of the psycho-physical progress, developing the first basis of an instituted trace. As arbitrariness in psychology leads to the necessity of contradiction, this will also imply the appearing in a difference as such, the first mention of a transcendental approach, and the admission of temporality, each of which from this juncture will be related to Derrida’s progress.

**Summary of Chapter Ten**

In Chapter Ten, we continue with Derrida’s second article “Of Grammatology” of 1966, as he progresses from difference as such in the instituted trace to work out “différance” as the culmination of his article. Derrida will have included an instituted moment of writing, and thus the necessity of substituting Derrida’s “grammatology” for semiology. The parallel relations of writing and difference as such will devolve via two “ways” to an originary and temporalising synthesis, this will necessitate a *pure* (originary) trace as moment of difference. The trace will, in effect, have arisen from what never appears in temporising and is held in “reserve”. In the evolution of the two ways, the signifier will be retracted to its formal constituents, and Derrida will proceed by means of the most interior relations of articulation as chains of appearing toward the appearance as a “psychic image”. These relations will be paralleled by those of chains of difference, and a
trace as irreducible to these relations, which will nevertheless mark its impossibility to permit the chains.

To these implications, the necessity of substitution of metaphors of writing (such as the mark) and speech will be added to the chains, and we will summarise how the “death of the subject” ought to be taken as a particular moment of a “system” as movement. It will thus be an instance of what is held in reserve, thus of death as the resource for living rather than actual death. At the last, Derrida will include protention (from a direction “forward”) in address to Leroi-Gourhan. As protention is pure and does not yet necessitate difference, this will imply a deferral. Derrida in 1966 will first have worked out the relations of différence and the trace in a sequential progress.

We will note several difficulties. Forward, as a protention without difference implies a différence without necessity of difference, this does not yet permit either difference or a trace. From “behind”, the trace will appear only in effect. It will be deemed anterior to writing and the movement of different signifiers. Most importantly, it will only mark the impossibility of its appearing in the possible relations of difference, and the progress of metaphors of speech and writing from one to other. It will be severed from relation forward. Moreover, logically (in a “logic of identity”), it would also be contradictory. Derrida will avoid conceding the latter, which by his measure of 1964 would stifle the origin and preclude his system.
Summary of Chapter Eleven

Our Chapter Eleven follows some of the amendments to the book *Of Grammatology* of 1967. Derrida will systematically redress each of the difficulties from 1966. The “archi-trace” will be added and conceded as contradictory within the “logic of identity” from the first. It will be contradictory “in” this logic only in a reciprocal relation by which it is contradictory, and thus no longer in, the logic. Instead of seeking to bridge the gap from a trace appearing merely “in effect”, Derrida will develop a contortion of a “pathway”. The latter will proceed further backward to the archi-trace in order to proceed forward. Thus Derrida will proceed by an instability, as both proceeding in a conditional fashion as to what is not yet admitted as possible, as ultra-transcendental, and proceeding in a phenomenological fashion, as pre-critical. This will imply that *différance* progress in two parts, as formation of form (thus irreducible to form (behind)), and as the being-imprinted of the formal imprint. The latter will be the telos of the chains of articulated differences (forward).

However, Derrida will no longer settle the trace directly into the articulatory chains. Having developed the instability above, he will rather begin to develop an “enigmatic” way for the trace to proceed. He will work out how the trace avoids determination as to its possibility, but retains the possibility of appearing via spacing in general. The progress of articulation will rather occur by means of the hinge, which in its formation of form will be
irreducible, but which directions will allow for chains of writing or speech. The latter can thus continue as living moments progressing as chains toward the passive imprint. This approach will not yet be without difficulty, as Derrida will need to privilege retention to retain the possibility of the trace at the constituted side of the imprint. Nevertheless, the amendments will settle the mark of impossibility in the hinge, rather than the trace. However, the hinge will no longer make the chains of differences contradictory. The enigmatic inscription of the trace to the elemental chain will in turn permit the chains of appearing. Derrida will have developed toward the more mature relations of the trace, *différance* etc., in a progression from his address to the “law” of 1954.
**Glossary of common terms**

This glossary summarises some terms and relations that will be employed by Derrida in a systematic fashion, or which we employ to explain Derrida’s progress.

absolute (*l’absolu*) – as it will progress in Derrida’s argument: without limitation, invariant in all times and places, as absolute and indubitable ground for all knowledge, and as invariant and thus without limit, border or difference

across (*à travers*) – toward the object, whether forward or backward

affirmation (*affirmation*) – an act that determines a synthetic proposition (i.e. a proposition having content) is true

all (*tout*) – a relation of multiple parts constituted together, but not yet a whole

already (*déjà*) – holding in the originary moment (“behind”), and thus in becoming an appearing object (forward)

an other (*un autre*) – a particular instance of an other in general (cf. also “other”)

as (*comme*) – when italicised, signals an appearing as such
“as if” – the positing of a conditional that allows for doubt as to whether the conditional or its content is possible, or whether it can be true

as such (comme telle/tel) – what appears taken as a part of a general relation, rather than a content to which existence is ascribed; thus what appears in the way and manner of its appearing

at once (à la fois) – pertaining to two or more particular objects which must be thought as one object, in a unity without division, difference or opposition (thus as absolute)

at the same time (au même temps) – the necessity of thinking two or more objects in their progress from one to the other, in temporal moments that are the same (rather than in time itself)

Autrui – (untranslated), the “You”, as necessarily beyond and prior to division and relation to the other (l’autre) and Other (l’autre). Also the “you” as intimate to interiority in a secrecy prior to division, and has the ambiguous sense of “Others”

autrui – (untranslated), the undeniable appearing of Autrui which resists singularisation, as also having the sense of “others”

backward (en arrière) – regression through particular conditions or acts evidently given by the object in general (forward)
becoming (*devenir*) – the positive moment of movement, following from certainty and “coming down from” (*devenir*) or *deriving* from the higher level

behind (*derrière*) – what must have occurred to permit or allow a further moment; also signalled by “already”

beyond (*au-delà*) – further than the furthest forward (or furthest upward), without direction; arising from a movement to the object without mediating relation

beyond (*par-delà*) – a beyond without direction nevertheless passing via (*par*) a relation with exteriority, a less extreme form of a beyond; employed in our address to Levinas

can (*peut*) – the signification of possibility, in language correlative to logic

cannot (*ne … peut*) – signals correlative impossibility of at least three sorts: first, essential (further behind and a priori), which precludes the sense of originary possibility; second, negation of possibility of what was first essentially possible (forward); third, by 1964, an impossibility anterior to essential relations

certain (*certain/é*) – undoubted, as based upon evidence of what must have and does occur, prior to positing or constituting of the object as a telos “forward”
complement (or non-relation) – formed by affixing a negative prefix \((non-)\) to a predicate, resulting in a positive predicate as all that is not the predicate. Can also be explained spatially, as all “around” the object, without particular negation or opposition to any particular thing, nor bound to the relations of generality which would merely relate it to everything, cf. “instability”

conditional – see “if” and “as if”

conditional tense – a verbal employment of the conditional form, as a correlative way to avoid positing of the possibility of the object

Difference (\(\text{Différence}\)) – in 1962 and 1964, the essential relation of difference, no longer capitalised from 1965

difference (\(\text{différence}\)) – at the interior of thought, the division of one particular content from another without opposition; will hold at each level by 1966

direction (\(\text{direction, sens}\)) – a level addressed for its movement from one content to another, also signalled by the word “sense”

each (\(\text{chaque}\)) – refers to a particular, along with “this”

ego (\(\text{ego}\)) – an instance of the subject made object

Ego (\(\text{Ego}\)) – the essential ego (already behind, or further forward)
etc. (etc.) – movement from one to the other that leaves a moment over (from *et cetera*).

every (*tous les*) – applying in general to each

exteriority (*extériorité*) – the relation from the inside to its beyond by referring to the inside

first direction (*la direction initiale*) – progress toward the object; by 1964, our term for explanation of movement from one to the other *in infinitum*, forward (upon the inside)

forward (*avant*) – a progress to the object, whether spatially “in front” of the subject, or merely next in the sequence of necessities, in order to determine the partial object as essential and then absolute (as the whole)

found (*fond*) – the act by which a whole instantiates certain content to a part

from… to (*de… à*) – signals a moment of passage from a posited content to an other

further – our term for the second degree of a direction or level

furthest – our term for the third and essential degree of a direction or level
general (générale) – the predicating of generality of an eidetic object, holding at the highest level of essence without reference to material content

hence – signals an implication, rather than merely the next sentence in a narrative, as does “thus”

henceforth (dès lors) – our term for a relation that will continue to hold from that juncture in our progress and Derrida’s

higher (supérieur) – forward or upward

how (comment) – signals explanation of a progress which occurs from transition to transition, rather than positing of why or what

I (Je, jè) – the essential or particular “I”, thus in the upper or lower case respectively, that signal an instance of a living moment of the ego as positive and subject

ideal object – the nexus (across, forward) of an intentional object in which the formal and essential relations (forward, upward) hold already

ideal Objectivity – the characteristic or predicate of being (not yet in an existential sense of this word) an ideal object, although not yet a positing, thinking or signifying of that ideal object

identity (identité) – the synthesis of content in thought, in accordance with formal law, as affirmation that an object is itself
if (si) – signals a conditional, which avoids doxic positing of the possibility of its object (the antecedent); thus employed to address the irreducible or beyond (idea etc.), cf. also “as if”

in (dans) – at the inside, but will develop to have the sense of no longer outside, and by 1967 will be in a reciprocal relation to an outside as a non-relation

inside (dedans, à l’intérieur) – opposite to the outside, on this side of a limit, whether of an ontological object or a judgment (which latter is also an object)

instability – signals a nexus of circularity in which one sense of a relation passes to another, and returns to the first sense (in the two directions), a more basic form than what Derrida calls the “ambiguity” (ambiguïté) of the two senses of a word

instability (of a prefix) – prefixes such as dis-, un-, in-, de- etc., which can express either negation or a complement, and result in a circularity “in” that word

imply (impliquer) – to necessitate, following from a prior necessity

irreducible – what cannot be included within reduced or pure relations, thus for essential reasons cannot even appear as essential; will come to be related to multiple terms – the Idea in the Kantian sense, temporalising, Speech, irreducible difference, archi-writing, and archi-trace
is (est) – from 1962, the moment of positive predicing of an object, rather than an affirmation of identity. By 1965, the progress of predicating of what becomes itself only when it then becomes different from itself and returns to its originary source. By 1967, in relation to the pure trace as différence, refers to what is itself at the origin only in reciprocal relation with a non-origin

its other – otherness from one to the other without external distance or opposition from one to itself

level (niveau) – a metaphor for the static visualisation of particular directions in their necessary progress toward a whole

logic – Husserl's intentional logic, as ordered relations of direction and levels in accordance with a priori and essential law

moment (moment) – a part which cannot be varied without affecting other parts

movement (mouvement) – the sequential progress from positing one particular content of an object in general to positing another such content, without necessarily entailing convergence upon an external object; begins only after an a priori structure

must (il faut, doit) – the correlative term for necessity; as Derrida proceeds in a teleology, “must” signifies what must still occur of necessity, rather than what does or has
myself - the name for an instance of a living moment of the ego as its object

never (jamais) – signals the preclusion of something occurring for a priori and essential reasons (at the highest level)

no longer (ne sont plus) – refers to that which has proceeded from a prior or originary instance but is not yet determined

non-relation (non-) – cf. “complement”.

not (ne … pas) – a correlative moment signifying negation

not (non pas) – a strong “not!” that avoids negation of what is predicated (n'est… pas). Also an instability between predicative negation (pas) and a non-relation (non)

not yet – what must not or has not yet been determined

of (des) – signals the genitive (internal) relation with the intentional object, and thus the possibility of passage to the object and its hierarchical relation (as “consciousness of something”)

one (l'un) – a unitary and impersonal instance of positing of a particular object, as not yet an other

open (ouvert) – as a noun, a constituted and passive content implying that no values of truth and falsity have yet been constituted, besides the prior truth-sense and value of itself.
to open (s'ouvrir) – to constitute the value of the open, and the possibility of a solution (a response) to the question

opening (ouverture) – in 1962, the constituted content implying a moment prior to the ground, value, and possibility of response to the questioning of open relation

opening (ouvrant) – by 1967, a participle of the verb “to open”, the constituting of value by irreducible relations such as temporalising, before that value must be erased

opposition – two contents in one object that are related solely over against one another

or, either/or – the inclusive and exclusive disjunct respectively. In 1954, when orientated to a demand for an absolute answer, “or” signals the exclusive disjunct in correlative language: either true or false but never both. Upon developing his “problem”, “or” will evolve to an inclusive disjunct: one or other, or both, and then to an instability, as either inclusive or exclusive, without determination, yet permitting continuation (both/and)

origin (l'origine) – the origin as particular object, which must be determined, essentially holds as original or originary

original (original) – predicate of the origin of the ideal object (forward) which already holds essentially (“behind”)
originary (originaire) – the part of the essential relation of the original to which content is instilled, holding behind, rather than further behind, and not yet a moment of becoming

the other, or other (l’autre or autre) – the predication of a substantive object without opposition to the subject, or the predication of the object as separate from the subject. That is, “other” can have the sense of both an adjective (e.g. other ego) and a noun (e.g. other ego)

the Other or Other (l’Autre or Autre) – as for “other”, either the name for an essence or an adjective. A pure but possible essence at the highest level which, by its essence, must be outside essence.

Not yet the “irreducible” or “beyond” of the “Other as Other” or the absolute other, that must merely be supposed

outside (dehors) – on the far side of a limit or border, whether of an object or a judgment (which latter is also an object)

permit (permê) – make possible

positing (postuler, Setzung) – the doxic (believing) act of beginning to constitute and (in logic) to predicate of the object

problem – the inability to (as yet) absolutely affirm or deny that a predication of an object is true or false, or that the object is determined as what it is or is not
second direction – our term for the necessity of exceeding the first direction to determine an object (such as the other) at higher levels

sense (*sens*) – Husserl’s *Sinn*, signals the instability between the sensible appearing and the relation that this appearing instils in consciousness as an object; thus also signals direction

signify (*signifier*) – commonly employed in French as to “mean” in language, and usually translated in this way; Derrida will employ it even when not yet referring to the constitution of a sign. In address to Saussure, “signify” does evolve to imply the constituting moment of a signifier

signified (*signifie*) – the concept, as telos of the unity of one or more finite and particular conditions (signifiers), with what must hold (outside, forward, or behind), signifieds (concepts) remain originary or teloi, as what are certain but not yet wholly determined

signifier (*significant*) – the form of sound which movement will parallel that of speech, and also the unitary moment of one and other upon the inside (or lowest level); its formal parts are the “acoustic image” (above) devolving to the phoneme; by 1965, it will be aligned with writing as well as speech
specific (spécifique) – a part of the general, holding at grades of higher levels than the particular content predicated of in the ideal object

structure (structure) – a priori and essential relations that already hold but arise as movement, in a system that remains certain but has not yet appeared

supposing – a subjunctive conditional, which does not yet concede the possibility of its object, thus retains a relation of doubt cf. also “as if”

system (système) – that which certainly instantiates content to a structure, which structure and content then enter the movement, without yet appearing itself

then (puis) – the next implication in accordance with a prior necessity in a sequence (from behind)

this (plus a noun) (cette) – signifies a particular

thus (donc) – also translated as “therefore”, or “hence”, signals an implication that follows from a prior necessity

thought – consciousness of something, which formal parts are those of positing and signifying (or speech)

thus – “hence”, above
to \( (d) \) – the dative moment of moving toward and applying a predicate

together \( (ensemble) \) – pertaining to two or more particular objects which must be thought alongside one another as one object

transcendental – an approach that avoids naïve or uncritical approach to objects, thus rather considers only the essential and a priori relations of appearing without reference to external existence

underneath \( (en
dessous, sous) \) – the name for the lower level that does not yet appear except as content (including the content of a name); also refers to a foundational relation “from behind”

upper case – signals an essential relation rather than a particular object

what…? \( (qu'est ce que…?) \) – signals a question, demand or thought that seeks to constitute its object

why…? \( (pourquoi…?) \) – signals a question that avoids constituting an object

word \( (mot) \) – a unit of language in general that can be addressed as an object
Summary of some of our common terms

The following collates a few of the common terms and phrases which we have habitually employed in our explanation of Derrida.

above – notes a relation that we developed earlier in our progress

address, approach – explains that which we examine in Derrida without suggesting we as yet determine or “reach” it

allow – to not yet impede occurring, whether possible or not

also – a moment by which Derrida aligns with a relation of an earlier thinker, explained by us previously

and so on – employed rather than “etc.”, which latter is mobilised in the play of the Same

as yet, thus far – employed to avoid determining an outcome in our progress, along with “no longer” and “not yet”. Such issues should rather remain open

below – refers to a relation that we must yet explain in our dissertation

deems – employed rather than “writes”, “says”, “signifies”, and so on. Signals Derrida’s or our explanation of a term, object or relation, without yet referring to such logic or signification
demonstrate – explaining via ordered implications

diverges from – employed rather than difference, contrast, distinction, division, separation, or opposition, each of which terms have systematic application

evolution, progression, development – signals Derrida’s procedure as we will explain it

explain – employed rather than “metaphors of light” or writing such as “describe”, “show”, “illustrate” and so on; also employed to avoid affirmations such as “prove”, “assert”, “confirm”, “determine” and so on

holds – employed to avoid suggesting any logical determination or necessity, but rather what Derrida’s progress implies

indeed – signals when an evolution occurs that we had noted would occur, as Derrida progresses across the years

note that – employed rather than “observe that”, and related “metaphors of light”

preclude – to exclude, for essential reasons, from essential relation

rather than – employed in preference to negative constructions such as “It is not”, “Derrida is not”, “neither” and so on
signals – employed to refer to what a term is intended to convey, rather than signification in the fashion of the thinkers we address to do so (or “in order to”) – refers to the progress of a prior necessity in particular cases, also signals that Derrida is continuing to follow his overall demand and teleology

we – signals ourselves, the writer of this dissertation, rather than “I”, or “me”, which are employed systematically by Derrida will, did (the simple future and past tense) – our noting what will or did occur in a natural sense of time

This chapter addresses Derrida’s first student essay, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy* of 1954 (henceforth, “1954”). Our assessment in this chapter is less concerned with Husserl than with what occurs even at this juncture in Derrida’s progress. For this student Derrida is preoccupied with his “law”, what he seeks to “prove”, and what impedes his proof (the complication of origin). Hence we will summarise the basic relations of Derrida’s approach. By the end of our chapter, this will have been developed as a “problem” of origin, and Derrida’s approach will have arrived at an early basis of “contamination”. This basis will be common to Derrida’s approach in later years.

**Part One: the basic relations of Derrida’s “law”**

Derrida sets out the “law” which he claimed to impel “everything” “he tried to prove” across his oeuvre thus:

> [T]he question that governs the whole trajectory [of his oeuvre] is already: ‘How can the originarity of a foundation be a priori synthesis? How can everything start with a
complication?’ (PG xv, PdG vii, quoting PG xxv, PdG 12)

The criterion that Derrida will apply as to what would be an acceptable answer is important. He tells us in 1990 that what seemed “most curious” in his question of 1954 is that it seeks to “answer” (répondre) a concern for “knowledge” (PG xiv, PdG vi, Derrida’s emphasis). That is, and this might be shocking, Derrida’s œuvre begins from wanting an answer to the question of knowledge. As Derrida will take it from Husserl, “knowledge” would be “proven” of an object in consciousness. Such a knowledge would be a *synthesis*, the act that unites objects in consciousness. As what allows knowledge must already have held prior to his knowing it, it would hold “a priori”, and thus as an “origin” to thought. Knowing the object in accordance with the law would be an a priori synthesis. In this chapter, we assess whether a “logic” holds “from one end of [Derrida’s] book to the other” (PG xv, PdG vii) in 1954, as Derrida seeks to answer this question but arrives at a complication of the origin.

**The basic relations of Derrida’s progress**

We thus introduce the interrelated bases of Derrida’s approach, which first instances are italicised. As Derrida is referring to
himself by this question, we deem what he wants to be a “demand” (cf. GaS 157, ED 233). Crucially, Derrida demands “absolute” knowledge (cf. PG 137, PdG 225). The “absolute” thus far is better taken in a simple fashion, as a knowledge without qualms or insecurity, and thus without any limitation. Hence, as he seeks to “prove” such knowledge, Derrida sets bivalent limits from the first: only true and false are offered as options, and only one of these would be acceptable. Thus the limits apply to an object reasoned about as an either/or option: either it is absolutely known or not. The “problem” will be that the origin of the object is not yet known as either true or false, leaving the demand for absolute solution unmet.

The primary difficulty in solving the problem – as Lawlor also argues – is that any intended object is “always already” (henceforth “already”) there to be found (cf. PG xxv, PdG 13). Thus the problem is interrelated with presence. The difficulty of attaining

29 We opt for the word “demand” as “to question” in French is “demander”, which has a (much weaker) everyday sense of demanding an answer. The question will develop in importance, and will always demand an answer. “Demander” arises from the old French “demander” (“demand”, the root of the English “demand”), which in turn derived from from the Latin “de” and “mandare” (to order) (CDWH 159). After encountering Levinas, Derrida will also call this “desire”.

30 A more “logical” definition would be that of Husserl’s absolute as an object: “an absolute [...] has no aspects which might present themselves now in this way, and now in that” (1 §44). This invariant absolute is not yet the kind of absolute that Derrida requires. In 1954, he demands a truth without limitation. That is, he will never merely seek an invariant relation. He will evolve to align with Husserl to assess an objective relation without limits in 1962, but this will be closer to his quotation, in 1962, of Husserl’s (atypical) “absolute which is situated beyond the world, beyond man, it is the absolute Logos, the absolute truth” (Husserl, E III, 4 60, in Diemer 39, IOG 146 fn. 177, Derrida’s emphases last). We will follow this demand as it impels his progress.

31 By 1954, the issue of a “problem of origin” was no longer new in the criticism on Husserl. Eugen Fink in his “The problem of phenomenology in the work of Edmund Husserl”, had deemed it to be Husserl’s primary
“presence”, which develops in Derrida’s work from 1965 (707), was important even from this earliest work. ³² For a thought of an object

will always have to be already there, in front of a

passive consciousness whose presence remains

accessory or accidental (PG 21, PdG 62, our

emphases).

We will return to this passivity. As Derrida explains, in order to deem that what is presented has a unity of sense (Sinn), one must “suppose” – that is, as we will explain, hypothesise – an implicit conditional (“If… then”) concerning its “presence” (PG 21, PdG 62).³³ Derrida’s demand is for absolute solution (affirmation) of this supposition.

difficulty. Fink notes: “Husserl is guided by a projection of ‘originality’ which is itself ‘problematic’ in his search for original knowledge” (Fink 1981, 38). This “problem” is that “[A] senseful reference back to perception lies in the intentional sense of memory [whether] […] we note it or not.” (Fink 1981, 39). Derrida refers to Fink in his student work, although never to this article. Derrida’s concern in 1954 is to assess whether this problem can be overcome, via a survey of Husserl’s published work.

³² From 1965, Derrida will take “presence” to be the telos of speech without distance or separation (DLG 1027). In 1954, Derrida still takes “presence” in its conventional sense of what is visualised in space before the reader, as known.

³³ Derrida writes: “In order to give a ‘unity of sense’ to this [original] genesis and to its objective product, it has to be supposed present, and autonomous, before the multiplicity of acts of consciousness” (PG 21, PdG 62).
Next, we add the criteria of the “inside” and “outside”, nearly ubiquitous in systematic readings of Derrida (35). The “already” implies that what is already given is not yet absolutely itself. It is not yet absolutely known. That is, its relations are not yet known “inside”. Oppositely, nor is the outside yet absolutely known. Objects already here remain “on this side” of the external origin (PG 137, PdG 225). *A rigorous interaction, for Derrida, does not yet succeed until it interacts with the absolute origin.* Yet the “already” implies that each interaction finds the origin is outside, thus problematic. Thus: such interrelations do not yet solve the problem absolutely.

Derrida often employs this kind of reasoning. When an attempt to know the object fails, “[W]e remain on this side [en deçà] of absolute originarity” (PG 137, PdG 225, our emphasis). We call this “shortfall”, as employed in the 1960s, where

\[ \text{presence [...] had already from the start [from its origin] fallen short of itself (SP 87, VP 97, our emphases)}. \]

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34 In French: “[L]a présence avait déjà commence à se manquer à elle-même” (SP 97). A “lack” (manque) is also a “falling short”. As to remaining upon “this side” (en deçà) in later work cf. DLG 55, OG 47 of 1966 and 1967.
Given Derrida’s demand, shortfall is unacceptable. Note, however, that shortfall is not yet a judgment of failure, but rather a judgment that shortfall is not yet a success.

Thus shortfall is a judicative consequence of the inside-outside criterion. If the origin remains outside, it is judged that the system does not yet meet the demand for absolute solution. Hence Derrida’s difficulty will be that the demand to solve the problem is not yet met; rather than that the object is not there, for the object is undeniable (as we will elaborate upon below). The problem is merely that the question of its origin is not yet absolutely answered.

The “absolute” would be knowledge of the undeniable object as full presence without shortfall in an affirmation of truth or falsity. This will in due course lead to even absolute affirmation and denial becoming problematic. An interrelation with presence is thus set forth: the demand to affirm origin finds, on its “inside”, the presence of an object which must be absolutely determined, but shortfall leads to the problem. These interrelations will form the bases for Derrida’s approach. Hence we turn toward his reading of Husserl, to assess whether this object can be determined, as Derrida demands absolute knowledge. Derrida addresses Husserl’s published works in the order of their publication.
Part Two: the spatial and its joints

Progress through Husserl's works

Even in his earliest published work, The Philosophy of Arithmetic of 1891, Husserl had sought to explain how objects could be “unified” in consciousness. Husserl proposes that the parts of objects are “joined” in consciousness in that their parts are “collectively combined” into a “totality” (PA 76, ln. 10-15, cf. 111, 312-352). Moreover, even in 1891 Husserl took his approach from intentionality, developed by Husserl's teacher Franz Brentano (cf. PR §14 ff.). Crucially, intentionality for Husserl, is “consciousness of something”. Derrida too takes this as basic. To be sure, Husserl later deemed this work of 1891 was “psychologistic”, at least in that it took psychical phenomena as its concern, without critique of how they could be possible (PA 348, cf. FTL §65). Even intentionality in that work was psychological.35

For Derrida, the difficulty is more basic: a concept of “something” is already required in order to have something to

35 Dallas Willard takes it from Husserl's references to the “intention” in 1891, and detailed accounts of “something”, that Brentano's psychological intentionality is “paradigmatically exemplified” in Husserl's account of collective combination (PA 69, fn. 1). However, Willard argues that Husserl's account is “not 'mental' in any usual sense of the word”, but is “psychological” only in the sense that it is “a member of a unique class of relations” which Brentano's intentionality “had used to characterise the psychological or psychical over the physical” (PA 69, fn. 1). That is, Willard is arguing that Husserl's approach in 1891 was a mathematical or formal analysis. Derrida in 1954 would take either a formal or “usual” sense of the psychological to be beset by his difficulty.
collectively combine (PA 84). Derrida deems that this undermines any explanation of objectivity in general, for

if one wished to deduce [...] the ‘something in general’, one would already have to presuppose some other objectivity in general (PG 27, our emphases).

This “objectivity in general” would already be there, and seeking its absolute origin would imply an infinite regress. Thus Derrida concludes that

[t]he ultimate foundation of objectivity cannot be deduced empirically or psychologically (PG 27).

Derrida deems that this undermines *all* psychological thought. For

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36 Note that even from this early juncture, Derrida was wary of deduction (progressing from more general premises to a more particular premise (cf. PDP 124)) as a method that could solve his difficulty. Even so, his concerns in this work of 1954 are in the main unrelated to this whole-part progress, which we will develop in our next chapter.
an exclusively psychological condition [...] will

always have to be already there, in front of a

passive consciousness whose presence remains

accessory or accidental (PG 21, our emphases).

All psychologistic thought – to which Husserl was averse from 1900 onwards – fails to explain “presence”, as its origin is already outside.37

The predicative form as basic

In the 1890’s, Husserl began to develop a “logic” which was critical of psychology, but which was never aligned with the symbolic logic that would soon come to underpin logical positivism (and then modern logic). For Husserl, however much proficiency is attained in manipulating a logical calculus in application to objects, to develop the calculus itself requires theoretical insight (cf. Moran LI p. xxx). Husserl envisaged logic rather as the theory of this insight, a “science of science” as “pure logic”, an inspiration that he attributed to Bolzano (PR §61, in Moran LI p. xxx). The Prolegomena to Pure Logic (henceforth, 37 The implicit issue of the “inside” and “outside” in the Philosophy of Arithmetic has been well-covered since Frege’s criticism that Husserl makes everything a presentation. For a summary and opposing view that Husserl’s system was never a simple “correspondentism” (to the “outside”) cf. Bernet et. al. (1993, 14-24).
Prolegomena) and the Logical Investigations of the following year (1901) aimed to provide a “theory of knowing” that could justify such an approach.

In the Logical Investigations of 1901, Husserl developed the basis of “pure logical grammar”, the word “logical” having been added by Husserl to the revised publication in 1913 (LI 4 §14, 2001 74, LU 21 348). In brief, for Husserl, particular intentions can be signitive, in seeking to constitute the object as a sign. Moreover, the form (which word we address below) of intentionality in general corresponds to that of a logical proposition. Thus even though he avoided symbolic logic, Husserl still based his progress upon the classical form of a basic logical proposition, expressed in language. Husserl exemplifies this by “$S$ is $P$” (PR § 6 ff.). To explain this basic conformity between intentionality and logic, we begin with the former. For Husserl, “constituting” is the term for the act which “brings into being the consciousness of something” (I §88), as the animating function of intentionality. The “constituting” is “active”, while its intentional object is “passively” “constituted”.

Then, as to logic, for Husserl the first act of constituting of the object is a positing (Setzung). Consciousness posits a predicate of the subject $S$ (which is an act of “predicating”). “The apple tree is blossoming” would be one instance of this form. It predicates “is blossoming” of the subject “the apple tree”. This “of” is worthy
of note. Consciousness predicates of the object to determine that object as the logical subject. Hence every intentional act has a logical underpinning (cf. I §§117, 148). Husserl writes in 1913:

[E]very act [...] harbours explicitly or implicitly

a ‘logical’ factor. (I §117)

Thus far, then, the “apple tree” as particular logical subject is in the first instance the object of an intention (cf. I §3). In this particular moment, the essence “apple tree” is intended, and only upon this ground can one confirm, for example, whether an apple tree is blossoming; a ground would be required to provide the right to affirm whether the logical proposition can be true. The confirmatory judgment thus follows only after the logical predication or position (cf. I §6). Applying this to intentionality, one could also write that knowing the object occurs only after the intention as a consciousness of the “object”. Moreover, with this goal of a constituting logical judgment as a confirmation of the constituted object, comes the relation of truth and falsity, and its relation to psychology.

The necessity of essences developed

From at least his Prolegomena, Husserl was also wary of traditional logic in that it merelypredicated of a particular object (Husserl deemed this “objective” logic). Husserl noted that any particular
judgment by an individual psyche about an object can be false. Moreover, even judgments of truth hold at multiple times and places. This, for Husserl, implies the necessity of ideal laws that hold at all times and places (PR §31). These in turn must hold in accordance with essences which are related by those laws. A law for Husserl relates “essential forms” (I §148). From this reasoning, Husserl developed eidetic phenomenology (each such essence is an eidos). The judgments of a classical objective logic are deemed “psychological”, and from this Husserl begins to build a “phenomenology” that no longer addresses a “natural” object. To explain it, Husserl keeps the goals of the judgment of truth and the avoidance of falsity, but this truth must hold at all times and places. That is, it is the essence of the object which must be affirmed as true in a particular instance, rather than the real object as a psychologism would take it in a “natural attitude” (cf. I §§27-30, 39).

Three of the major concerns are thus judgment, logic and “ontology”, and their interrelations. For the relations of each eidos that make truth or falsity possible (we return to possibility and necessity in our next chapter) must already have been grouped into “regions”, which Husserl calls “ontologies” (cf. Ch. 2 (155)). These regions set out formations that do correlate to a “world”
(we place this word in inverted commas, to signal that its sense is no longer supposed to be of the natural world.\textsuperscript{38}

Thus Husserl takes it that the relations as formal. The formal relations of judgment of what can be affirmed of regions occur in the form of the proposition (as \textit{apophansis}). Simply put, “apophansis” is “the form of judgment in the logical sense” (FTL §22; I §134). Moreover, even the proposition is thus a formal and essential relation. Thus whether an apple tree can be blossoming, and whether this can be essentially True would hold according to formal and eidetic law. It thus might be true or false whether an apple tree is blossoming here and now (this judgment would be “contingent”). Any formal-logical law – a logical law as to what can be true or false of something in a proposition – can be deemed a formal-ontological law, which holds for eidetic reasons (I §148). But moreover, for Husserl, in pure logical grammar, even the laws of signification are fixed by these relations, for each object (such as “apple tree”) can be named, and Husserl deems such ontological relations are ideally “fixed” (LI 4 §14, LU 2 1 348). As Derrida puts it, the essences are “canonised” in a “system of laws” (IOG 41).

\textsuperscript{38} Derrida summarises that “[T]he existence of the world is the correlate of certain experience-patterns marked out by certain essential formations” (PG 79, PdG 145).
Apophansis is easily thought of simply as “judgment”, the proposition as “that which is employed to judge with” of the object in intentionality, and ontology as the fixed regions of eidetic relations which determine what can be judged as True or False. While Husserl emphasises the formal overlapping of these relations in intentionality, Derrida is rather interested in each of their shortfall.

Derrida merely glosses the *Logical Investigations* in 1954, yet applies his basic relations. As to the logical proposition, its object (the logical subject itself) would be already given. The “already” (and henceforth) implies that

pregiven [objects] have only external relations

(PG 112, PdG 189).

“External” in this case refers to what must be prior to consciousness of an object (we develop these directions and levels from our next chapter). Thus, for Derrida, a “logical” proposition must suppose “another genesis” prior to the psychic (IOG 40). For Derrida, when phenomenology sets aside psychologism, then a priori logic is outside thought. But moreover, this holds *even when the relations are essential*. Constitutive logic is situated “this side” (i.e. as shortfall) of “constituted essences” and
have not yet allowed Husserl to throw a suitable light on their originary relations. (IOG 41)

Note that this Derrida of 1954 is demanding his own answer. Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* is explaining *how it can be* confirmed that the apple tree is blossoming. Derrida wants absolute knowledge that it *is* blossoming, in a priori *synthesis*, as an absolute knowledge of its origin. But the “already” and its resultant shortfall leads to the difficulty.

**The basic relations of the reduction**

Nevertheless, Husserl’s progress after the *Logical Investigations* might better address Derrida’s demand. For Husserl might have been aware that any such constituted ideal object of a judgment is “outside” a particular moment of thought, even as eidetic, and thus prone to psychologism and doubt about the possibility of its Truth. A famous innovation occurred in 1907 (IOP 33-34). Instead of seeking to determine the object in an external world, in a reduction judgment of the existence of the object in its external world is “suspended”, without doubting it (cf. IOG 33-34, I §32). This suspension was somewhat controversial (even in 1950, Ricoeur suspected that Husserl’s reduction arose from a “sceptical crisis” about the external world, in the years between
1905 and 1907 (cf. Ricoeur, 1967, 33)). For Husserl, after a reduction the origin of the world need no longer be considered, which consideration adopts a “natural” attitude; thus nor is one vulnerable to the errors of psychologism. Instead, the phenomenologist simply begins describing the manner of the object’s appearing as such.\(^ {39}\) Such a reduced consciousness even from 1907 was deemed to be pure (cf. IOP 33-37), in that its relations are no longer even considered as having been provided with content by a psychological origin. By this innovation, Husserl aligns his method with the pure intentional moment of logic in essence. Thus although Husserl’s published works had several aims

\(^ {39}\) The “epistemological” also “phenomenological” reduction was first introduced by Husserl in his lectures of 1907 (IOP 33-34). This, at its simplest, reduced what appears as content in evidence as “absolute” givenness, to a pure and “immanent” essence. Husserl in 1912 deemed that temporality (and spatiality) are never “objective”, but appearing only in a form “as such” (ITC §1); which was not quite a reduction, but from 1913 Husserl employed their relations within the eidetic reduction (cf. below). The “phenomenological reduction” as a methodology of “suspension” of judgment of the givenness of the object, thus “bracketing” of doubt about its appearing, arises in 1913 in (I §31). This will be the basic form of reduction that we will employ in address to the problem, for it will set aside doubt about the object as internal and external. The “eidetic reduction” is implemented midway through the Ideas of 1913, which reduces individuals to the eidetic or purest essential relations (I §§59-60). Husserl works out the transcendental-phenomenological reduction by developing form into transcendental logic, and then into transcendental subjectivity, in Formal and Transcendental Logic of 1929 (cf. FTL §§11ff.). The transcendental-phenomenological reduction as the reduction to an essential ego explicating what is given by its history in itself, is implemented from 1931 (CM §§) which for Derrida will permit a return inquiry in transcendental subjectivity. Judgment, like the pure forms of temporality, is also deemed not yet to pertain to external objectivity, and in Experience and Judgment of 1938 will no longer have an explicit reduction assigned to it, although Derrida will retain a reduction even in relation to judgment. Kamei deems that for Derrida the eidetic reduction comprises the “centre” of the reduction (Kamei 1995, 345); we note that each has its purpose, in a sequence, thus retains that purpose in the evolution – the phenomenological as applied to the doubt of the object not yet given absolutely (which Derrida will strongly critique in 1954), the eidetic as the reduction from the individual and external object to pure phenomenology as such, and the transcendental-phenomenological which will permit transcendental subjectivity in a return inquiry, while setting aside Cartesian doubt, which Derrida will align with from 1962.
(Derrida will address how Husserl seeks to reconcile science, logic, perception, geometry and metaphysics as we continue), the above relations will remain basic.

**The reduction as difficulty**

However, the student Derrida never believes that Husserl's reductions provide exemption from the “problem”, even should the psychological “world” be put in parentheses. Rather Derrida complains that even within the reduction Husserl sets aside the problem of the origin of passive synthesis itself (PG 142, PdG 232). For Husserl, we note, this is exactly the aim; pure and descriptive phenomenology is supposed to begin with the reduction (IOP 34). In deeming that the passive content requires a justification, Derrida demands that phenomenology answer his concern. Hence none of what follows in 1954 is actually about Husserl's phenomenology. *Addressed thus, this young Derrida never was Husserlian.*

Indeed, in the printed version of his next public work, the speech on Husserl in 1959 (which we touch upon only here), Derrida concedes that the reduction is supposed to allow objects to be constituted in consciousness without enquiry into their origin. He admits that phenomenology itself would be “offended” by his
But even in this work, he proceeds to “confess” his aims, to assess whether Husserl

reconcile[s] the *structural* demand (which

leads to the comprehensive description of a

totality [...] with the *genetic* demand (the search

for the *origin* and foundation of the structure)

(ED 233, GaS 157, our emphasis last).

Note, indeed, the term “demand” (*exigence*), as justification for our employment of it. Integrating rigorous *shortfall* with an origin outside, in accordance with the demand, will remain Derrida’s central concern. The “demand” is deemed a first requirement for “structure”, as well as determination of the “origin”, which relation will be made systematic by 1966.

**The *Ideas* as central work**

However, it is in the phenomenology of Husserl’s *Ideas* of 1913 (since called “Ideas 1”, and henceforth “Ideas”) that Derrida finds Husserl’s core. Husserl divides reduced and intentional being into

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40 Derrida writes: “[The reduction] brings eidetic forms once again to light, that is the ‘structural a prioris’... in Husserl’s mind, at least, there never was a ‘structure-genesis’ problem. Phenomenology, in the clarity of its intention, would be offended, then, by our preliminary question” (ED 231-232, GaS 156). We quote from the version of 1967, as the first printed version of 1965 appeared six years after the initial speech.
the pure phases of the material (hyletic) and noetic (I §85). The latter constitutes essence without material input from the hyle. The noema is the “intentional content” which “corresponds” to such a noetic phase. However, for Husserl, the “noema” is no longer a real object (I §88); rather, Husserl deems it “\textit{reell}” (which term refers to the contents of consciousness as noetic phases).

To help explain why the noetic is no longer “real” in a simple sense, consider the working of a mind. When describing the contents of its consciousness (a “content” (\textit{Inhalt}) for Husserl is a particular moment of intentional sense (cf. I §§85, 90)), then a reader would probably not yet deem the “phases” by which those events happen actual “contents” in a natural or psychologistic sense. The latter, more familiar sense might be termed real (\textit{wirklich}). For Husserl the noetic contents would thus be intentional, but only “\textit{reell}”.

However, as to the noema, this is at even a further remove from the “natural attitude” (110). For as a noetic phase is intentional, it arises along with a content. Hence it is no longer orientated to the natural world but related to the essence of what is thought as such (Husserl’s example is “this tree blossoming”, also placed in inverted commas). As a content is intentional, the noema too is intentional, and deemed “correlative” to the noetic phases (I §90). This “noematic correlate” would no longer even be a component of the \textit{reell} intention (cf. I §88).
On the other axis, the *hyle*, which ought to supply “sensile” (or sensory) material is real (*reell*) yet – Husserl claims – *not* intentional (I §85). But then, Derrida asks, how could a noematic intention interact with the hyle? The origin of the hyletic material raises a problem – it is only because such material appears as *already* constituted that it can be intended.  

Hence, for Derrida, the noema does not yet interact with its outside. But a reader should avoid supposing that a *natural* “outside” strands this noema: intentionality arises as multiple intentions (contents) related in this flux. Derrida rather applies his demand to what he requires phenomenology to achieve. Thus he overrides phenomenology again; for he *does* take Husserl’s *Ideas* back to the natural inside-outside sense. By containing sensile matter, the *hyle* also claims to convey what is *outside* itself. But then, Derrida asks, “does [Husserl] not reintroduce, in the form of a “hyletic datum”, passively received, the transcendent object that he claimed to exclude [...]?” (PG 63, PdG 121). Again, the reduction is rejected, as the outside remains a problem. Just as he did in addressing Husserl’s work in 1891 and 1901, Derrida applies his demand to Husserl’s phenomenology of 1913.

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41 Derrida adds that it is only “because [hyletic material] appears as already constituted in its very being, prior to any noematic synthesis, that consciousness can experience originary constitution” (PG 63, PdG 121, our emphases).
Next, Derrida applies his demand and its requirements to apophansis. In *Experience and Judgment* (EJ §1-16), begun from around 1918, Husserl deems that the “world” is a horizon of possible *judgments*, which appear as believed evidence. Husserl applies no explicit reduction to apophansis in this work, which may be because judgment ostensibly does not deal with external objects. However, active judgment still judges of passive “substrates” of judgments. These Husserl explains as antepredicative, i.e. *already there*. Derrida again suspects that Husserl re-creates an inside-outside border, thus a problem of origin.

Second, the texts collated in this work heralded Husserl’s turn to “genetic phenomenology”. The object, for Husserl, contains a sedimented history of past judgments. These are “evident” to active judgment. Phenomenological analysis, from within the horizon of possible judgments, must then strip off prior judgments *in regressus* to explicate the object *in progressus*. This project, were it completed, would reveal the originary judgment in its life-world.

Derrida thus turns to arguing that Husserl’s address to the problem of origin does not yet succeed. The problem arises in that Husserl deems the object to be pre-given (EJ §10), and thus antepredicative. Hence, for Derrida, predication of a “history” falls short, as any regression through sedimentations finds that
the object was already given, thus there may always be a further term. We write “may”, as there would be a shortfall of judgment – one would not yet know absolutely, Derrida writes, whether this is a perceptible basis or even an absolute lack of determinacy. It is not known whether the regression that has to be effected to return to antepredicative existence has to end in a sensuous reality or in an absolute indetermination (PG 114, PdG 193).

Indeed, to begin to introduce a further term, the reference is to the indeterminate, rather than to falsity of the determinate. As a precursor to what Derrida from 1962 will deem “open” (222 ff.), it is not yet even known whether the outcome is indeterminate, for a judgment of indeterminacy still judges of an object.

Thus far, judgment can neither affirm nor deny the outcome of a predication (which we deemed “shortfall”). For Derrida, this undermines Husserl’s entire genetic project. The “passive” substrate of judgments – what one actively judges “of”, just as one judges of ontological objects – merely reproduces the problem. Indeed, Derrida is willing to deem that his basal reasoning holds of any object, even without a reduction; he
suggests that this could just as well be deemed a problem of an empirical genesis (PG 109, PdG 186). Derrida is willing to devolve three decades of Husserl’s work to his basic interactions between inside and outside.

Indeed, Derrida’s approach is no longer compatible with Husserl’s. For the latter, the precedence of the passive is still buttressed by evidence, a criterion which he applied from at least 1900; something arises to be predicated of (cf. PR §6 ff.). Hence the antepredicative is the solution allowing regression to the originary judgment:

anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand (EJ §38, in PG 141, PdG 231).

Derrida demands that evidence appear absolutely, which thus leads to the “problem”.

This, we suggest, is the source of Derrida’s most fundamental misunderstanding of Husserl in 1954. As Derrida will concede in 1962, Husserl’s approach to evidence never required him to

42 It is “a genesis that itself took evidence for granted, and which could easily be assimilated to a simple empirical genesis” (PG 109, PdG 186, our emphasis).
demand an absolute outcome; rather an implicit reservoir of evidence allows the telos of further explication and as yet prevents absolute outcome. Derrida, rather demands an absolute outcome from evidence in the first place, which would have prevented Husserl's explication from proceeding. At this moment of extreme divergence, we begin to explain how Derrida is approaching the problem.

The “joint” upon directions – a model to understand Derrida

As Derrida has not yet begun to problematise metaphor (which begins to occur from 1964 (cf. VeM 446 fn.), we explain his approach via a simplified version of the metaphor “joint” (brisure: also “break”, “hinge” etc.). The word “joint” expresses both a separation and a connection, as it is associated with both movement and stasis. Thus far we have followed Derrida's address to static separation. Every object or structure has an inside and an outside, between which lies a “joint”. The sense of

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43 We will develop this word in *Of Grammatology* of 1967. In that work, Derrida explains that the joint underpins the way in which all metaphysics, bound to inside-outside criteria, can be thought. Prior to *Of Grammatology*, it appears briefly in 1962, in the “Introduction” to Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry” as a double relation that is “out of joint” (cf. IOG 139). In *The Archaeology of the Frivolous*, Derrida will develop the joint as a hinge (brisure) (AF 58). In “Psyche, Inventions of the Other”, the joint underpins the way in which the “invention” is thought relative to truth as a separation and a connection. As Derrida writes at the outset in regard to “The Invention of Truth”, “[A] fold or a joint separates, even as it joins, these two senses […] which are also two forces or two tendencies, relating to each other, the one settling over the other, in their very difference” (P 31). The joint also underpins the overall progress of *Specters of Marx*, where Derrida quotes: “The time is out of joint – Hamlet.” (SM xx).
an object instils a direction (crucially, and henceforth, the French *sens* also implies “direction” (cf. Lawlor 118)).

Thus, in a spatial model, there are at least five directions by which to address a problem: from outside to its outside, outside to inside, inside to outside, inside to its own inside, and overall shortfall (everything to its outside). One side of any joint can be taken as a position, which is only hypothetical (for the problem of the origin has yet been solved). More simply put, even if the first position on one side of the joint holds, then the relation to the other side that it addresses is not yet justifiable because of shortfall, and thus problematic.

*Every one of Derrida's arguments above, and in our chapter, can be treated as a direction upon a joint.* This younger Derrida seeks to assess each of Husserl’s relations by thoroughly examining each direction. Even though only nascent, this approach and these directions will remain the hallmark from which Derrida’s “system” will evolve (cf. DLG 1041 ff.). We will demonstrate how each direction is addressed in Derrida’s analysis of active and passive constitution, which he deems the “final stage” (PG 153, PdG 215) of his research.

First, to put the directions in the simplest fashion, the outside falls short of affirming its outside. That is, Derrida argues that passive constitution outside does not yet justify its presence from
the outside, for it appears as already constituted. Approached from a joint in the opposite direction, it is outside its own constitution (PG 118, PdG 198). As it is already no longer “absolutely originary”, we are referred to a “preceding” moment of constitution. Derrida applies the implicit criterion of shortfall, and the passive falls short of justifying its presence. Importantly, Derrida avoids supposing that “preceding” or “prior” necessarily has a “temporal” sense (for in predication, one does not yet have a right to determine that an “outside” will be temporal (PG 86, PdG 153-154)); rather, what is “already” there does not yet escape the problem.

Second, the active inside falls short of the passive outside. From this juncture, we begin to include the term “synthesis”, as Derrida seeks to unite these two sides of constitution. The “active synthesis”, Derrida deems, is “always preceded” by a passive synthesis (PG 144, PdG 235); the latter is already there. Third, the passive synthesis outside falls short of the active inside. For example, Husserl deems that the passively constituted is “not intentional”. The active itself constitutes the passive. But, Derrida suggests, this includes the passive merely as formal in the active.

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44 Thus Derrida writes: “[T]he supposed transcendental passivity is thus not absolutely originary here and refers us to a preceding moment of constitution” (PdG 198, cf. PG 118).
45 To wit, “the fundamental form of synthesis [is] identification” (PG 135, PdG 225).
46 For “the active synthesis that inaugurates the possibility of a piece of eidetic research is always preceded by a passive synthesis” (PG 144, PdG 235, our emphasis).
But a form of something is not yet the original; a problem of origin (PG 142, PdG 231). Hence the passive is “foreign” to the active as for Derrida it is not yet inside constituting consciousness.

Finally, overall shortfall applies, as the system falls short of its outside. For Husserl also posits something of the active in the passive (PG 118, PdG 199, cf. EJ §23a). But, when the active alone is intentional, the passive does not yet concretely appear in passivity. However, even if there were a real moment of the active in the passive (Derrida would deem this a problem), then the passive would no longer be passive (PG 143, PdG 233).

Hence, even if the active does interact with the passive as an entire rigorous unity, the system still falls short. Derrida summarises:

Why does any constitution start with a

synthesis of passivity and activity? [...] These

questions, which were being posed from the

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47 Derrida puts it thus: “[I]s this inclusion of the passive into the active not precisely to include formally in the activity what is really and ‘in itself’ foreign to the constituting intentionality?” (PG 142, PdG 231).

48 For “[T]o say, as Husserl does [...] that passivity is a moment of activity is to make use of an abstract concept of activity” (PG 142, PdG 231).

49 Derrida explains: “[T]he passive synthesis [...] is thus a constituting [active] moment of the unity of intuition” (PG 143, PdG 233).
very first moments of phenomenology, are still without an answer (PG 118, PdG 199).

As an outcome, having assessed each of these options Derrida affirms that, overall, “genesis is never met” (PG 117, PdG 198).

Even so, it is important to note that Derrida’s assessing of each option signals thoroughness rather than pedantry. In addressing the options comprehensively, he aims to arrive at a credible outcome. When this detail is dismissed, one cannot appreciate Derrida’s subtlety or his rigour, in this work or later years. More importantly, an audience might yet doubt that Derrida’s progress is rigorous and meticulous, and even doubt that these relations could be addressed in such a fashion. Thus we will explain the sequence of Derrida’s argument, as each outcome implies the next.

**The difficulty of formal idealism**

Indeed, following the interactions allows them to cohere to some degree. Following from this shortfall, the “outside” is constituted inside only as *formal*. In its insistence on active and intentional constitution, Husserl’s phenomenology creates a formal idealism. But form too generates a difficulty, for it is an important peculiarity of form that it allows appearing, *thus does not yet appear*
itself. For example, a tree appears with a given form, but the form itself allows the tree to appear.

As Lawlor also argues, this leads to a “formalism”, for the appearing is always already formed. That said, form could be intended as an essence or content, but then even the essence is already there; absolute form is problematically outside.\(^{50}\)

Alternatively, if form is somehow given from outside, then the origin arises from a (passively constituted) outside, and for Derrida, “one would have to admit that knowledge has made a jump, from the evidence of the given to the [...] judgment” (PG 107, PdG 183-4, our emphases). To allow judgment, Derrida would need to jump across a joint. Thus far, not even the evidence of form can explain its origin. Rather, for Derrida in 1954, form is the innermost problem. In the relations that we have set forth above, form in any judgment, logic, or ontology is problematised. Again and again, Derrida finds formal idealism in Husserl, from Ideas to the Cartesian Meditations (PG 107, PdG 183; PG 142, PdG 232). Yet this outcome has followed from Derrida’s basic criteria.

At every turn, indeed, Derrida has posed an either-or choice requiring absolute presence from a hypothetical object in active and

\(^{50}\) As Derrida writes, “[I]f passivity [as form] is placed inside a constituting sphere of activity, the problem is only pushed one stage further back [outside]” (PG 64, PdG 123, our emphasis).
passive constitution. Husserl, however, wants an interweaving constitution within the reduction. Derrida notes:

Husserl [...] merely indicates the impossibility of a 'language' that would distinguish strictly between passivity and activity (PG 118, PdG 199).

We will take it that in 1954 Derrida’s approach arises from his own demand.

**Part Three: temporising and the joints**

With the static and spatial relations thus set out, we turn toward phenomenological time. This was emphasised by Husserl since his lectures of 1905 to be the base of constitution (cf. ITC §§16-17, PG 90, PdG 159). At this juncture, Derrida finds shortfall in Husserl’s “protention” and “retention”. The former is a “pure” intention of what has not yet occurred. For example, on hearing a melody, a series of protentions can arise which anticipate what the next sound might be (ITC §24, 25). These protentions are, however, merely empty intentions – they do not yet have real or individual content. A sound (for example, a melody), is a “primary impression” which moves through the now. Hence the primary impression passes into primary memory, which is restored to
consciousness by a representation (*Vergegenwärtigung*). Retention is “primary memory” and constitutes the present. But as Husserl puts it famously, this content (e.g. sound) is only a nucleus of a “comet’s tail” (*ITC* §§11-12, cf. *SP* 1973, 62) of other retentions. Thus, for instance, a listener understands a musical note restored to consciousness in relation to its place in the melody. For Husserl, the content of a retention is indubitable as it simply restores immediate evidence (*ITC* §16, 17, *I* §78), while “secondary memory”, which returns recollections, can be false.

This flux of restoring the past and anticipating the future leads to the directions of what Husserl deems the fundamental form of the *Living Present*. Protention moves from forward to backward, and retention from backward to forward. For Derrida in 1954, that protentions do not yet provide a real content leads to the difficulty: as the anticipated events have not yet happened, the intentional object they seek to present falls short. Protention as yet falls short of the absolute.

Next, as retention occurs within a reduction, for Husserl its origin need no longer be considered. However, Derrida notes, for Husserl it is an a priori necessity that “an originary impression have some temporal density” (*PG* 62, *PdG* 120). Even in a

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51 Derrida explains: “[I]t is an a priori necessity of the perception of time and the time of perception that an originary impression have some temporal density (*PG* 62, *PdG* 120).
temporal reduction, Derrida demands that phenomenology render absolutely all of the sense of temporality’s density. Thus he rapidly devolves retention to his joints. First, he notes that Husserl especially deems that the retention avoids presenting a “real” \(\text{reell}\) impression. For example, the restored sound of the earlier notes in a melody are no longer really there at a fixed point in time.\(^{52}\) But again, Derrida asks if the retention, since it must still present an intentional object, nevertheless “announces” a real object anyway.\(^{53}\) This retention falls short of a real instance of time. Next, Derrida argues for overall shortfall; for even if either protention or retention presented a real object, any moment of the “now” would still need to be a moment of passive constitution. Derrida’s arguments against spatial constitution apply just as much to the constitution of living temporality.\(^{54}\)

But nor is it merely living temporality that is addressed, for given that the intention has a logical underpinning, this holds also of what can be predicated of time. Derrida turns to Experience and Judgment, where Husserl divides time into the “subjective” and “objective”. The former is the time of perception experienced by

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\(^{52}\) Derrida puts it that “Husserl does not present the a priori necessity of this synthesis [retention of an originary impression] as ontological – and especially not real – but as phenomenological” (PG 62, PdG 120; cf. ITC §12).

\(^{53}\) That is: “[B]ut so that this originary impression may be intentional [...] must it not as such ‘announce’ a real object that is constituted in the same way since it is aimed at it originarily?” (PG 62, PdG 120).

\(^{54}\) For “retention […] implies a synthesis or a passive genesis of a new ‘now’, [but if] the constitution and retention of the past were active, they would, like any pure activity, shut themselves up in the actuality of an originary now” (PG 93, PdG 163, our emphasis).
the subject; the latter, the “time of nature”, is that temporality found in the unity of sense in objects (cf. EJ §36).\textsuperscript{55} Derrida emulates the directions of spatial active and passive synthesis. First, the \textit{inside} of subjective time cannot determine its outside, for the activity of constituting time finds that objective time is “passively received by consciousness” (PG 119, PdG 200), and the problem of passive constitution is posed again. Nor can the outside allow for its outside; objective time outside the subjective activity must already have been given (PG 119, PdG 200), preventing the unitary source that Derrida demands.\textsuperscript{56} Again, this implies shortfall from the overall outside.

Further, and importantly, time brings with it the essential basis of being perceived as a “series” of moments. This could be addressed either from the inside (assessing the origin of the “next” term in its “order”) or as an objectual and thus formally static view of the aggregate (space and time overlap, which we explain below). In the former case, each term of the series leaves its “outside”, which – for Derrida – Husserl never seems to

\textsuperscript{55} Husserl writes: “The time by which objects are united is not the subjective time of perceptual lived experience but the \textit{objective time} conjointly belonging to the objective sense of this experience” (EJ §36, in PG 119, PdG 200). Both subjective and objective time are thus “experienced” (which Husserl deems a highest pure genus (cf. I §12)). Derrida in 1954 is not yet concerned with these essential relations, but addresses them as objects, demanding that their content appear absolutely.

\textsuperscript{56} For what is presented to activity, “the unity of objective is […] produced by a […] genesis of which the ego is no longer the only source” (PG 119, PdG 200).
consider. In the latter case, when the series is made an object in space, only its form yet appears, leading to a problem.

After cataloguing the directions upon his joints in both space and time, Derrida determines that

> What is noteworthy here is that any formal program always stops before the actual genesis;

yet any philosophy not attaining the actuality of genesis is condemned to remain immobilised at the level of a formal idealism. (PG 121, PdG 203, our emphases)

Any formal address, working through the given series of constituted spatiotemporal objects, falls short, returning to formal idealism. This in turn leaves the origin as a problem and Derrida’s demand as yet unmet.

**Toward the irreducibility of the spatial and temporal**

With both space and time having devolved to a common difficulty, we turn toward assessing their interaction. To do so we move to the moment of the object’s becoming in time and space. At this juncture, each finds that it never appears as its counterpart.
First, if time is indeed fundamental, then each spatial moment should devolve to original time. Husserl never asks himself this question, and for Derrida, thus, “at the interior [the inside] of the spatial hyle […], the problem of the constituting becoming is still being posed” (PG 92, PdG 161, our emphasis).

**Parenthesis – the difficulty of time**

By this juncture, Derrida has evolved a new mechanism, arising from the privilege of formalism. For the above suggests more than that time itself is a problem. To assess this upon the “inside”: time is a condition for appearing, but in appearing, it undoes the basis of appearing. Space only appears in the form of origin, thus as a problem of absolute affirmation. But time does not yet even appear at first – this is what Derrida deems “irreducibility” (cf. PG 90, IDG 159). It will be crucial in later years (265 ff.). Yet even so, nor is time doubted, it “interrupts” active constitution even “inside” the spatial moment of becoming (PG 120-121; PdG 202).

However, to be thorough, Derrida works irreducibility out via the joints. To address this from the joint from the outside of becoming: as temporality does not yet justify the absolute outside,

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57 This difficulty has a long precedent in the history of metaphysics. As Derrida will note in “Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time” (henceforth, “Ousia and Gramme”) of 1968, Aristotle had posed it early on. However, it is a seam that Derrida will interrogate over the years.

58 For “the temporality described is fixed; it interrupts the whole movement of constitution at a certain moment” (Derrida PG 120-121; PdG 202).
a right no longer holds to affirm that what is “outside” the becoming of the object is temporal in its origin. To avoid confusion, note that “right”, for Husserl, arises in the moment of positing rather than affirmation (202). Even the right to posit an originary and active intention is no longer temporal. As Derrida puts it:

How can it be affirmed of a reality [...] that it is lived before being intentional if absolute evidence is made into an intentional act? One has the right to determine the hyle as lived only from that moment when an intentional morphe has come to animate it (PG 86, PdG 153-154).

Instead, “becoming” leads to a difficulty of affirming that what appears “inside” has even come from a temporal origin (outside), as “behind”. Nevertheless, Derrida’s demand is that the origin be affirmed absolutely.

**Toward complication of origin**

To follow this demand, we add that the directions and joints apply to space, which must be perceived to be absolutely sustained in time. For example, space in constitution, as a cessation of time,
is outside temporal movement and its own absolute origin. As, for Husserl, space and time allow a priori synthesis, then synthesis is jointed in three directions: space is already outside time, time is irreducible to space, and the living now is outside time. In this moment, synthesis is not yet simple. Even so, the interactions are rigorous. Becoming is outside the irreducible temporal (living) intention which would fix its origin, and the having-become is outside its temporal origin. Yet in each instance, time itself still becomes; irreducibility is a dissymmetry.

The directional model set upon these bases

Note that this has been a progressive development from the demand into the joints and directions. Having arrived at this nexus of an objectual movement in both the static and temporal moments, it is relatively easy to add the next parameters, “forward” and “backward”. These will form the basis of the “return inquiry” of the later Husserl, which Derrida begins to support in 1962, as treated in our Chapter Two. For only insofar as temporality is a difficulty at origin can what is no longer given from behind (a history) come to be interchangeable with what has not yet come from the “front” (a telos outside, in future) in moments of space.

Derrida will still write in 1967 that spacing sets out “the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space” (OG 68, DLGb 92, our emphases).
Derrida follows Husserl’s basic model in three areas: perception of the object, history and science. As to the first: the structure of perception of the object is the basic preoccupation of epistemology. For Husserl, most obviously in the *Logical Investigations* of 1901, identification of the object *absolutely* is also a telos. Husserl diverges from the Kantian distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself; for Husserl a thing is one kind of essence (cf. I §15). Hence to return to the things themselves is to adumbrate an object toward its ideal completion. However, as the phenomenological object is given only partially, consciousness then adumbrates its aspects forwards towards its putative completion (cf. Husserl LI 6, §14(b); I §142). Hence again, determination always remains outside the adumbration of the object. Thus far, the approach has still led to shortfall from the absolute.

Second, “history” – in theory, “behind” – is aligned with this base. In Husserl’s genetic project, regression to the life-world would reactivate the history of the object. However, for Derrida, when the process of regression through sedimented judgments is infinite, history would end up remaining inside consciousness, in the movements of intentionality alone. Derrida complains that “[H]istory will thus be only the intentional chain of meanings [des

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60 As Derrida notes of *Experience and Judgment*: “Intentional referrals are in principle infinite and, to that degree, never take on the absolute of their sense” (PG 144, PdG 235).
significations)” (PG 144, PdG 234). Thus the teleological project of seeking a history itself in the sedimentations in the object finds simply a process of explication without solution.\(^{61}\) As intentions are explicated forward, in the Living Present, then regression and explication, movement forward (through aspects \textit{in progressus}) and backward (\textit{in regressus}), become indistinguishable. History is also a telos.

Third, in the \textit{Cartesian Meditations} of 1931, Husserl introduces a “teleological ideal” of an ultimate science, which phenomenology aims toward by assessing individual sciences. Thus the telos is something that would need to be achieved by moving “forward” in time. As any particular object, including a science, would need to be seen as intentional, Derrida applies his bases set forth above, leading to his dilemma.\(^{62}\) If this telos of the ultimate science were achieved, then its becoming would be fixed, and it would be divorced from its origin in time. However, if the object of science were determined, it would no longer be a becoming. The joint “forward” to the absolute telos of an ideal science could be crossed only if time is set aside. As Husserl does allow an infinite temporal continuation, this implies that the project of an

\(^{61}\) Derrida writes that “this infinite totality of sedimentations is an idea: the idea of an absolute and completed history or of a teleology constituting all the moments of history” (PG 108).

\(^{62}\) If the object “managed to [achieve its telos, then], on the one hand, the sense that it would thus produce would not have its foundation in any existence, on the other, it would mark the end of its own becoming: two mythical or metaphysical consequences that would suspend the originary intentionality and temporality of lived experience” (PG 142-143, PdG 232).
ultimate science, his *mathesis universalis*, will explicate its objects without ever reaching its telos. *These arguments thus far apply to any intentional object, iterated toward its completion.* Adumbration as yet falls short of the outside. Seeking for genesis in history and the *telos* of an ideal science become a single structure in that each is a teleological moment, explicating evidence but as yet falling short of its object.

As an outcome, which would otherwise seem an absurd conclusion, the teleological ideal already “precedes” the historical object, which is thus made problematic. Derrida is confronted by a reasoning by which what would come from outside in the genetic, scientific or epistemological projects cannot even be affirmed as “in front” or “behind”. Enquiry forward ends up being a problem of origin “behind”. In short, nowhere in Husserl’s projects of history, science or the knowledge of objects does Derrida find the absolute solution, the *synthesis* of the object that he demands. *He finds only shortfall in every direction*, including even the ability to determine direction.

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63 Derrida puts it that “teleology could not be given to a concrete subject in an originary clear evidence. To be faithful to its mission, it had to precede any active constitution” (PG 153).
The “transcendental” sort of approach, and its subjectivity as a problem

Next, Derrida turns toward their integrated moment (PG 130 ff., PdG 215) in Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations* of 1931, in what Husserl calls the “transcendental” ego. Importantly, this term “transcendental” develops from at least Kant’s employment of the term. It begins from the idea of a science to investigate essential relations as to their origin. It does so via a logic that assesses these relations only a priori, thus no longer refers to their existence in the natural world (cf. CPR A57-58/B81-82). That is to say, only by 1931 could Husserl introduce a “transcendental reduction” to an ego that addresses the origin.

Moreover, by 1931 Husserl deems the ego to be the surest basis of investigating what has already been given. After the

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64 Husserl deems its basis applies to all issues of constitution thus, Derrida quotes, it “applies to phenomenology as a whole” (CM §33, PG 137).

65 As Kant puts it, this would be “the idea of a science […] whereby we think objects entirely a priori. Such a science, which should determine the origin, the scope, and the objective validity of such knowledge, would have to be called transcendental logic [which] [...] concerns itself with the laws of understanding and of reason solely in so far as they relate a priori to objects.” (CPR A57-58/B81-82, Kant’s emphases). For Kant these relations apply via the reason and understanding, which latter, Derrida explains, will have no important sense in Husserl.

66 In so doing, Husserl also extends his project in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Husserl writes “All Objective being has in transcendental subjectivity the grounds for its being. [...] [for] it finds, as constituted within itself, all ‘Objective’ being and all ‘Objective’ truth, all truth legitimated in the world. [...] Thus the ultimate grounding of all truth is a branch of the universal self-examination that, when carried through radically, is absolute. [...] As this absolute ego, considering myself henceforth as our exclusive fundamental thematic field, we carry on our specific philosophical sense-investigations” (FTL §104). Husserl insists that this occurs only after a transcendental reduction: “In other words, it is a self-examination which we begin with a
transcendental reduction, in this phenomenological method, the ego explicates what it already knows. The constituted judgments already sedimented in itself become the object of the constituting ego. Hence the latter, Husserl writes, is inseparable from “intentional objectivities” (CM §31). According to Husserl from at least 1913 (cf. I §16), each region of eidetic relations already holds as a priori (which we will develop as a direction “behind” consciousness). Essential relations already predetermine what can hold of the object in its appearing. But these must be determined as the telos of science, history and so on.

Hence the transcendental ego is also the general form of the essential ego (the eidos ego), in which such regional relations must have been sedimented. In turn, this ego must be determined as a “transcendental subject” in its logical moment. A transcendental subject is a telos that must be determined by an undoubted transcendental ego. However, in explicating the constituted ego, the constituting ego comes to be involved as constituted as itself by itself. In general, transcendental subjectivity, whatever its senses – egoic, intentional, historical, etc. – takes the form of a

transcendental reduction, and which leads me to the grasping of our absolute self, our transcendental ego.” (FTL §104).
teleological circularity between the “two poles” of the constituting ego and its appearing.\textsuperscript{67}

The latter particular moment in this circularity is what Husserl again calls the appearing of the ego “as such” (als solches); that is, described in the manner of its essential appearing, without direct reference to the intentional object from which it arose (for instance, “pleasure” would be accompanied by “pleasing as such” (I §88, cf. I §5).\textsuperscript{68} Rather than a direct ego, the transcendental ego in phenomenological method describes even its own appearing as such. [OT]

Indeed, Husserl emphasises that the entire method across his oeuvre has arrived at this juncture. As Derrida quotes:

\begin{quote}
[I]f we think of \textit{a phenomenology} developed as an

intuitively \textit{a priori} science purely according to the

\textit{eidetic method}, all its eidetic researches are
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{67} As Husserl writes: “I exist for myself and am continually given to myself, by experiential evidence, as ‘I myself’. This is true of the transcendental ego and, correspondingly, of the psychologically pure ego; it is true moreover with respect to any sense of the word ego.” (CM §33).

\textsuperscript{68} Husserl writes: “Perception, for instance, has its noema, and at the base of this its perceptual meaning, that is, the \textit{perceived as such}. Similarly the recollection, when it occurs, has as its own its \textit{remembered as such} precisely as it is [...] ‘consciously known’ in it; so again judging has its own the \textit{judged as such}, pleasure the \textit{pleasing as such}, and so forth. We must everywhere take the noematic correlate, which (in a very extended meaning of the term) is here referred to as ‘sense’ (\textit{Sinn}) \textit{precisely} as it lies ‘immanent’ in the experience of perception of judgment, of liking, and so forth” (I §88).
nothing else but uncoverings of the all-embracing
\[ \textit{eidos}, \text{transcendental ego as such} \] (CM §34, in PG 137, PdG 225, Husserl's emphases).

The transcendental ego applies the method to explicate the “universal eidos” contained in the ego as such. The transcendental ego thus becomes a circularity in a method (moving forward, then backward) in which a constituting of the constituted uncovers its own particular sedimentations, as “the same I”. The “I” is the particular moment of the transcendental ego in general. It is this sense of “the same I” that in turn is part of the constituting of the sense of its objects. By 1962, Derrida will have come to rest the necessity of such determination upon foundation on the Idea in the Kantian sense, which for Husserl permits such moments to be re-identified (in an identity synthesis) as the same (IOG 139, I §143, (270 ff.)). In 1954, Derrida still demands the genesis of transcendental subjectivity (PG 159, PdG 256), and applies his spatial reasoning.\(^6^9\)

First, Derrida notes Husserl’s concession that the “genetic structure of the ego” remains to be explained. To attain a “maximally universal” phenomenology, Husserl would like the

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\(^6^9\) As Derrida summarises, this is “at once a temporal and ontological necessity.” (PG 140, PdG 228).
ego eventually to “vary itself” so freely that it is no longer restricted by the world constituted in its own sedimentations (CM §37), freeing itself from shortfall. Derrida refers to his analysis of temporality, where becoming falls short of the temporal absolute (PG 138, PdG 226). Given this “finitude of temporal existence”, Derrida grants no such freedom to the ego to escape the world by determining the infinite series.70

Second, for Husserl the transcendental ego in turn requires a reduction (cf. FTL §104). Yet for Derrida, the transcendental ego falls short of the “absolute constituting source” of consciousness itself. It is constituted rather than constituting, and falls short of its origin (PG 137).71 The “egological genesis” would already be there, thus not yet determined. A separation arises in the transcendental circularity of the ego from itself.72 Thus Derrida concludes, “we remain on this side of absolute originarity” (PG 137, PdG 225, our emphasis). Transcendental subjectivity has become the locus of directions by which every particular object or telos would be explicated. However, affirmation of the object (itself) falls short.

70 “Idealism being constituted by the finitude of temporal existence, a universal [absolute] eidetics of genetics will never be possible. [...] The ego, contrary to what Husserl said, cannot carry out variations of the self with [such] freedom” (PG 140, PdG 228).

71 Derrida writes: “[T]o reduce the [Me] to an eidetic generality is to lose what there is in it that is both originarily temporal and constituting. [...] [To do so is] to miss [fall short of] the description of an authentic transcendental genesis.” (PG 137, PdG 225).

72 As Derrida quotes Husserl even in 1967; this is a separation from the absolute origin, as “[W]hat can look at itself is not one” (OG 36, DLG 55).
Part Four: the law and initial bases of contamination

We can thus interrelate the above to address the “law” with which we began. The divorce from original relation leads to a problem of “identification”. In turn, Derrida deems identification is the basic form of synthesis, with which his law is concerned.73 At this juncture, both the ordinary object (which is ontologically outside) and the ego as object itself are beset by a structure of separation in becoming. Synthesis as yet precludes the demand for absolute affirmation of identity. Were an intentional object to be identified, it would be determined in a priori synthesis in an intuition. But proceeding from the argument advanced above, by way of the inside-outside and forward-backward joints, synthesis has remained problematic. The “already” leads to synthesis as the locus of a problem.

At this seeming lack of resolution to identity, however, we evolve toward the next, crucial aspect. In no instance is a “joint” (brisure) an absolute separation. Nowhere in the work does Derrida deny a basis upon the given in synthesis. Rather, when pointing to the flaws of the ego, as explained above, Derrida comments that

there is the risk of transforming the passive

synthesis, the only foundation of objectivity so far, the

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73 Derrida notes that “the fundamental form of synthesis [is] identification” (PG 135, PdG 225).
pure activity of the subject (PG 144, PdG 235, our emphasis).

Being for Derrida is undeniable (as “certain”). Even though the genetic project was problematised, Derrida writes, the sedimented history of an object depends upon what must already have been given, thus on history even in the natural sense (PG 143, PdG 233). Just so for time: Derrida insists that inner temporality does not escape natural (or psychologistic) time, for after a reduction, the autonomy it seems to have acquired is only a modality of its dependence (PG 108, PdG 184).

Indeed, as phenomenology is supposed to be based on time, the problem of phenomenology is one of unsolved dependence of the particular object upon the world (as essential or natural). Hence this applies to every major relation thus far. Shortfall is just as much a connection as a failure of relation.

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74 Thus, Derrida continues, “phenomenological history presupposes real history” (PG 143, PdG 233).
This returns us to the methodical aspect of the problem. Rather than *givenness* failing, the *explanation* of givenness has failed. Derrida in 1954 appears as the most frustrated idealist rather than an anomist or nihilist. Indeed, in sustaining his demand that falls short, nihilism is what he seeks to avert (cf. 571). It might thus become more obvious how claustrophobic the “problem” is for one who demands absolute solution. Indeed, it is plangent that this young Derrida finds himself “imprisoned” by it (PG 107, PdG 183; cf. PG 142, PdG 231).

**Return to the basic “law”: synthesis and contamination as rigorous**

It might thus be appreciated in a basic fashion why Derrida puts the question that impels his *oeuvre*:

‘How can the originarity of a foundation be an a priori synthesis? How can everything start with a *complication*?’ (PG xv, vii, quoting PdG xxv, 12, our emphasis)

When, instead of a “pointlike” synthesis, a scission preventing affirmation arises, the problem of the “already” is unsolved. Yet the attempt to deny the pointlike synthesis also falls short.
This allows us to return to our beginning to address how the problem leads toward the initial difficulty of contamination. As Derrida later explained this student work:

[All the [either-or] limits on which phenomenological discourse is constructed are examined from the standpoint of the fatal necessity of a “contamination” (“unperceived entailment or dissimulated contamination”) between the two edges of the opposition: transcendental/“worldly”, eidetic/empirical, intentional /nonintentional, active/passive, present/non-present, pointlike/nonpointlike]

(PG xv, PdG vii).

We have explained each relation in the progress above. First, when the transcendental is not real, predication “falls short” of a real world. Second, Husserl’s eidetic explication is “outside” an empirical basis, to which it is nevertheless connected. Third, the hyle remains outside the intentional noema, preventing material data from entering pure phenomenology. Fourth, the passive,
outside the intention, precludes affirmation across the “joint” to the active, without allowing denial. Fifth, the essence has arisen merely as a formal constitution without passive empirical givenness; thus (sixth) non-presence can neither be affirmed nor denied, in the indeterminacy which prevents pointlike synthesis of reality (seventh).

Furthermore, any term above can also be reached from any other. For example, the “eidetic” (second above) has arisen only in active constitution without an affirmable link across the joint to a passive outside; the resultant indeterminacy prevents a pointlike synthesis of reality (sixth). This holds in general as a complication (a co-implication) of synthesis is common to each such term. For Derrida continues:

the quaking of each [particular] border com[es]

to propagate itself onto all the others (PG xv,
PdG vii, cons.).

Thus far, we note, “contamination” is more than merely a simple opposition of two contents which fails as they interpenetrate each other. In contamination each of the options – logical, ontological, apophantic, eidetic, intentional – has led to a mutual inability
either to be separated from or to solve the problem of origin. 75

Thus far, in 1954, contamination arises from complication. By the latter term, even at this juncture, we refer to a group of ordered transitions, in which each particular term nevertheless falls short of absolute solution to the problem of origin.

**What needs to develop after 1954**

To be sure, Derrida in 1954 has not yet worked out the implications of his approach. Notably, he determines that the project of absolutely affirming the origin is “condemned” to continually run into this problem (cf. PG 138, PdG 226). 76 Derrida in 1954 deems this outcome is a “dialectic”. This holds in terms of the ordered transitions we have developed: following from the demand, originary bivalence, joints, directions and the problem, the progress continually moves from one position to its opposite, falling short of the absolute of sense or the determination of essence in arriving at the problem. However, we also note how, at least in some measure, “dialectic” is a term that Derrida later needed to “give up” (PG xv, PdG vii). The difficulty

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75 As Derrida puts it, contamination is an “unperceived entailment” (PG xv, PdG vii). The unperceived would be unaffirmed, while the entailment would be inseparable relation of implication.
76 For Derrida, “the race toward the originary is permanently and essentially condemned to failure” (PG 122, PdG 204). He even generalises this to all of philosophy, concluding that “[E]very philosophy is condemned to work back along the actual itinerary of every becoming” (PG 138, PdG 226).
77 As Derrida explains, this synthesis is already there, thus “[T]hese intentional referrals are in principle infinite and, to that degree, never take on the absolute of their sense” (PG 144, PdG 234). Derrida takes “never” in this case to be an affirmation of what cannot hold, rather than an eidetic necessity of incompletion. We address these relations from Chapter Three.
rests in the affirmation of the instances leading up to such dialectic. Derrida in 1954 summarises:

> [T]here is here a classical dialectical movement

> that we will verify at every moment [instant]. All

> the absolutes meet in the same indetermination. (PG xxxiv, PdG 24, our emphases)

Such verification (affirmation as true) again determines at least one characteristic of the particular object (its indetermination) in each moment, and this holds for all address to the absolute, or the whole approach. The problem of origin is dispelled in all of its directions “forward” and “backward”. Derrida does not yet comply with the premise that he noted en route:

> [I]n all good logic, the absolute antepredicative must

> not receive any determination (PG 112, PdG 190, our emphases).

He has instead determined the absolute, dispelling the problem. Thus in 1990 Derrida stresses that his student work was re-

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78 Thus Derrida deems this a “hyperdialectic” (PG xv, PdG vii); it is a moment which falls short of the “worldly dialectic” of phenomenological sense.
published without removing “imperfection” (PG xvi), at least one of which would be this overall difficulty. By 1962, Derrida will redress the difficulty by developing Husserl’s proposition until verification falls short even of indeterminacy (cf. 232).

The preparation for Derrida’s outcome in 1962

However, Derrida acknowledges even in 1954 that Husserl made the explication of the object toward the telos take the form of a “return inquiry” which, instead of absolute determination of the “antepredicative”, returns to the particular act that undoubtedly arises from origin (PG 145, PdG 235). Derrida even deems this the moment of “greatest clarity” in Husserl’s “whole reflection”. However, he still finds this form and its directions are “paradoxical”, as it already requires a “whole ontology” (PG 128, PdG 214) that precedes the particular moments of a becoming. For Derrida, this “signifies nothing less than the collapse of phenomenological transcendental idealism” (PG 128, PdG 214). It is ironic that in 1954 Derrida notes a relation that he will take as basal to phenomenology in his next work; yet in 1954 his demand for the absolute makes this the moment that he deems that Husserl’s project fails. In his next work, Derrida will begin from his demand for the absolute, but at the last will reformulate his approach to arrive at a first moment of deferral. To prepare to assess this, our next chapter turns to Husserl’s phenomenology.
Chapter Two: From Husserl to Derrida’s Requirements

Introduction

Our previous chapter was concerned with Derrida’s progress in 1954 as he addressed Husserl. We thus turn to Husserl’s “logic” in more detail, along with its whole-part relations, to prepare for Derrida’s asking of his question in 1962. That is, how can the object be determined absolutely? The object, as noted (cf. 134), can be a thing, science, future, history, origin, or (as we address in our next chapter) language, other consciousnesses, and so on. We will devolve four requirements and four parameters by which Husserl’s phenomenology could determine the absolute. Our next chapter turns to Derrida’s first published work of 1962, as he addresses the requirements via the parameters, to work out how his demand for the absolute must evolve to an early basis of deferral.

Part One: preparing Husserl’s basis

We will first develop Derrida’s employment of directions to the object to include whole-part relations. These, Sokolowski explains, are
the skeleton for Husserl’s more elaborate
philosophical doctrines about subjectivity and
its world (Sokolowski, 1968, 537).

To explain this “skeleton” as a basis for subjectivity, we will
address Husserl’s first chapter of the *Ideas*, and his amended Third
Investigation, both of 1913.80

**From the content to the whole**

To start, we note that for Husserl “Whole” and “Part” are
deemed to hold “eidetically”, as pure *eidoi*. They will hold at a
highest level, and in turn provide the logic by which the levels are
worked out. As to the relations “contained” within the whole,
Husserl’s Third Investigation proceeds via genus and species.
Husserl tells us that

many enquiries would bring the relation of
genus and species to eidetic division under the

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79 Moran also notes that Husserl’s “part-whole analysis always remains central
to his philosophy” (LI Vol. 1, iv).
80 When republishing his amended Logical Investigations, Husserl noted: “I
have the impression that this [Third] Investigation is all too little read. I myself
derived great help from it: it is also an essential presupposition for the full
understanding of the Investigations that follow” (LI Vol. 1, 7). Husserl also
refers the reader to this Investigation in the *Ideas* (I §15, fn.). The Third
Investigation was first published in 1901, and even in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*
(1891), Husserl had deemed that “unity” into a “totality” arises when “parts”
(such as “1 + 1”) are collectively combined (PA 76).
relation of the ‘part’ to the ‘whole’. Here, ‘whole’ and ‘part’ bear indeed the widest conceptual meaning of ‘containing’ and ‘contained’ (I §12).

These will indeed be the “widest” (most encompassing, or what we deem “basic”) relations by which we proceed. We will begin with the part, in order to develop from our previous chapter.

As noted, a content (Inhalt) arises with an intention, thus as an intentional object which has sense (I §85). However, any content arises as an object, and thus as partial. Husserl explains that

[W]e need only say ‘object’ and ‘partial object’, instead of ‘content’ and ‘partial content’ (LI 3 §5).

Every part is in some relation to and thus “founded” on a whole. However, parts can be relatively independent or non-independent of the wholes that found them (cf. LI 6 §58, I §85). The former (when independent, they are called “pieces” (LI 3 §17)) can be thought as a separate object:
[A] part often *can* exist without a whole whose part it is. (LI 3 §11, Husserl's emphasis)

We will develop this “can” as we proceed (cf. 242). Thus far, as an example, “something” can be thought as separate from, yet still a part of, “everything”, as the content “roof” is separate from yet still a part of a “house”. As to dependent parts, these cannot be separated from the whole (as “red” cannot be thought without “colour”, for instance). 81 Some parts can be separated from wholes, but cannot be varied without in some measure affecting the whole, or related parts. As Sokolowski explains, the brightness of an object cannot be varied without altering its colour. Such variations are deemed “moments” (Sokolowski 1968, 541, cf. Smith et. al., 57). *Any parts or moments can be content of the object.*

‘Content’ means the parts and moments of the

perception or the parts and moments of the

object. (TS §11)

Next, from our previous chapter, we add essences (*which are henceforth denoted by capitalised first letters*). *Any parts are different from one another* (as a “house” is different from “red”) in accordance

81 Husserl explains “dependent” parts rather as “non-independent”. We will follow the convention of translating these as “dependent”.
with their essences, which delineate what that content can be. Thus rather than perceiving an object (or content, such as “red object”) directly, for example, the essence of “Colour” allows me to perceive a specific instance of the colour “Red” as a content in the object. Whole-part relations thus divide into levels of relation – in this case, the genus or essence “Colour”, its specific instance “Red”, and its appearing as a content as an object.

For Husserl, there are ever only three such levels, in that the highest and lowest are the “limits”, and the second level holds as grades of specificity between these limits (cf. also FTL §§13-28, EJ §49 ff., IOG 98-99).82 The highest pure essence would be the Eidos, or also “Idea” (cf. I §§3, 12, 142), at the eidetic level. The middle would be the graded relations, and there may be many such at this level, as it holds between the limits. These are still pure essences (cf. I §§12, 142), which Husserl explained above as those of the species. The lowest level is the specific essence made most singular and partial, as a content (FTL §28).

However, crucially, that all contents are parts, never implies that all parts are contents. These levels can also be without content (thus “empty” and “pure”). This requires some explanation. Husserl explains his crucial maxim in 1901 (and every moment across our dissertation continues to apply this):

82 Cf. (183 fn.) and (178 fn.) for summaries of the levels in Formal and Transcendental Logic and Experience and Judgment.
anything, everything can be objectified […] i.e. can become an intentional object (LI 4 §8, our emphases).

We begin from the constituted (objectual) side. As multiple essences hold at each level, even the levels can be made into objects and divided according to their whole-part relations. This, it seems to us, is Husserl’s most indispensable premise.

Thus even the highest eidetic level can be made an object and would have its singular relations, and these singular relations would be without content (when made constituting, just below, these relations will be deemed “essential generality”). In turn, any relations at any level can be different – whether as essential (eidetic), or specific. Husserl summarises the above:

[E]very essence, whether it has content or is empty (and therefore purely logical), has its proper place in a graded series of essences, in a graded series of generality and specificity. The series necessarily possesses two limits that never coalesce. Moving downward we reach the
lowest specific differences [Differenzen], the eidetic

singularities, and we move upwards through the

essences of genus and species to a highest genus.

(I §12, our emphases on “downward” and

“upward”)

Henceforth, in our dissertation, “upward” and “downward” refer
to a movement from one level to its part or whole, and “never”
expresses what must be precluded for essential reasons.

The formal and contentless levels

We are still assessing how the object can be determined. We begin
with the “pure” and (Husserl claims) contentless relations, on the
constituted side. Such “mere essential forms” are “completely
empty”. At this highest level, the “formal” and “pure” region,
then, is “properly no region at all, but the pure form of region in
general” (I §10). We will develop the relation of generality below.

Thus far, of such “formal, contentless items”, the purest and
most formal essences are notably those of

Something, One, Object […] Relation, […]

Order, […] Whole, Part […] etc.” (I.I 3 §11).
Husserl deems these categories (PR 67, LI 3 §11, I §11)). These essences are grouped into the formal-ontological regions. In formal ontology, importantly, “Something” would devolve (i.e. move “downward”) to a singular “something”, and “Object” to “object” and so on. A part at the furthest limit from whole relations holds at the lowest level. This most particular and essential moment, not yet even one, something or an object, is called experience (I §1). This minimal relation is deemed “originary” (originärer, cf. I §1, HU III 11), as the first condition by which essential wholes can be particularised, and thus a condition for the appearing of objects. We will return to it.

The relation to content via correlativity

Next, each such pure relation would need to relate to content (it must be possible to relate “something”, for instance, to a content “house”). To assess this: note that contents arise as intentional objects. Hence “content” is never placed “into” a “pure” relation, as though consciousness is comprised of boxes within boxes. Objects arise in acts, and moreover as compound intentions where multiple terms arise as correlative. A “correlate” is a consciousness of – thus positing, and predicating of – contents which “mutually entail one another” (LI 3 §11), which contents thus arise in “parallel” (I §§104, 139). Correlation between essences is thus a positive and necessary relation where each accompanies the other upon “one side” and the “other side” (I §10). In such instances,
correlation permits the positing of “correspondence” (cf. I §88), whenever laws (i.e. the essential forms) pertaining to an essence is shared by a related essence.

Thus correlative to the pure, formal and empty essences, correspond the relations of content. That is, to

these essences [having content] correspond the

concepts of propositions, which we sharply distinguish from purely formal concepts and

propositions, which lack all [...] ‘content’ (LI 3 §11).

Note that “concepts” for Husserl are taken to arise from unities of particular and given moments. It might be suspected that these formal relations, as contentless, are without existence. Indeed, as Husserl confirms in 1929, they are irreal (cf. FTL §61). However, the corresponding concepts (essences) which can have content are deemed propositions.

The relations of essential generality

We thus begin to include directions “across” (and return to their correspondence below). Importantly, the general (as its form implies) is a predicating of an object, thus of an object which can
have content, yet can also set aside content. That is, as any level can be made an object, the pure object is still intended as an “individual”, as “distinct” in the visual field. However, when the highest eidetic level is made an object, and predicated of as general, then a general direction predicates

about the individual, but purely as an instance

of essential being, and in accordance with the rubric ‘in general’ (I §5, Husserl’s emphasis).

“In general” henceforth has this sense, as on “this side” of an existing or real content. By this innovation, *Husserl accomplishes his earliest logical preparation for a reduction to the “pure”*. Such predication is about the essential object’s appearing “as such” (*als solches*), without direct reference to the existence of the individual (I §5). At the highest level, this constituting moment is deemed “eidetic generality”, but as *any* essential relations can be specified at this level, it is more often deemed “essential generality” (I §5).

**From specification to a priori synthesis**

However, to *determine* an object nevertheless requires specific content. Taking this transformation to hold from the *Ideas*, each such addition of content follows from “an awareness of individual instances of the essence” (I §5), which we henceforth deem an “instance”. Following from essential *generality*, these
instances of parts of essences are specifications. These can be either pure or material, even when referring to a singular specification of a subject, for instance, “This house is red” (LI 3 §12). This proposition holds in accordance with a formal-ontological law in that, “in general”, every whole includes its parts. However, such a pure specification is without reference to existence. When the latter reference applies, Husserl deems the content is “material” (sachhaltige) (LU 260-295). Just so, it must be possible to transform every specific content, whether material or pure (such as, “is red”) into the pure and empty form “is Something” (LI 3 §12), thus transforming it into a positing of eidetic law. This possibility holds insofar as the judgments (positing) thereof are deemed universal.

The universal ought never be conflated with the general. As to the latter, Husserl worked out in 1900 that as particular judgments at one time and place can be wrong, then there must be essential laws which are thus pure and a priori (behind). Henceforth, all pure laws, as already holding in general, do so a priori (PR §21). As to generality, the latter predicates in essential generality of the specific content (from behind). Importantly, such laws are then

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83 As Husserl puts it, in general, “the existence of a whole W (A, B, C …) generally includes that of its parts (A, B, C …)” (LI 3 §12).
84 This emphasis will alter, Derrida will suggest, as Husserl develops over the years. For Derrida, the “concept of horizon is progressively substituted for that of structure and [structured] essence”, as a “modification of universal and transcendental norms in the classic sense”. Instead, “the essence becomes a norm” (IOG 80) – that is, appearing as incomplete yet requiring that it be given absolutely). Thus while Husserl in 1901 began from insistence upon the
posited (forward), as “universal”, as what must hold at all times and places. Husserl summarises that:

[it] must be possible, without altering the proposition’s logical form, to replace all material which has content, with an empty formal Something, and to eliminate every assertion of existence by giving all one’s judgments the form of universal […] laws. (LI 3 §12, our emphasis)

We will return to the “must” below. Note that to permit such replacements in accordance with formal law, all specifications must already hold a priori, even when of material content.

The basic a priori propositions

Husserl in 1913 emphasises these a priori relations hold even of material content. A proposition that contains “concepts” that

universal rather than the general (LI 2 §2) by 1929 the universal will have its a priori (essentially, behind). We begin to explain this just below.

Analytic approaches sometimes take the whole-part relation to be that from universal to particular, rather than general to particular (cf. ODP 387). For our progress in address to Derrida, the general-particular relation, as predication of generality of a part, precedes the essential relations of what can be judged to hold universally.
require no external foundation for the truth of their relations is “analytic”. That is, its truth is independent of an instance of external foundation. Such propositions are analytic a priori. That is, such relations hold in accordance with pure law (LI §3 § 11). Note that without external reference they can refer to specific material content, but cannot refer to an external foundation upon existence. Thus such pure laws (e.g. “Every whole includes its parts”) can correspond to the material and analytic a priori proposition (“Every house has a roof”).

When the a priori proposition depends for its truth on an instance of a foundation that does exceed a concept (for instance, the colour of a house is never contained in the concept “house”), then the propositions are synthetic. These cannot be purely formal, hence they cannot be laws, although they must conform to law; Husserl rather deems these relations to be only necessities (LI §3 §11). However, as material, they can also include foundation on existence. In the latter case the material content can include an empirical specification. The specific and pure relation of “This house is red”, for Husserl in 1913, is thus an instance of material a priori synthesis. Husserl's example of an a priori synthesis that includes empirical specification is “This red is different from this green” (LI 3 §12). We will briefly assess how such propositions can arrive at “truth” by working out how Husserl's formal laws and necessities proceed.
The purest relations of ideal Objectivity

That is, analytic or synthetic a priori propositions of any sort have a prior condition: to be possible, what they posit must accord with pure and formal law. This returns us to essential (eidetic) generality. When the Object is intended as essentially general, it can be individuated (rather than specified) at the eidetic level, i.e. as singular and particular. Importantly, the latter predicates of an ideal object (cf. also CM §38, OOG 161). At the purest limit, the logical relations and their laws in essential generality would be predicated of the ideal object. The latter, then, would be optimally suited for assessment of “transcendental” logical relations (i.e. without reference to external existence (cf. 138), in a fashion that permits formal assessment as to how to determine the object.

That is, and without exception, after Husserl in 1913 performs a reduction it will be the pure (i.e. irreal) relations developed from essential generality that he investigates, rather than the material. This will hold even when the pure regions in turn re-constitute the real relations in irreality. Essential generality will permit the transcendental approach as reduced and noematic. To explain how this occurs, we turn to Husserl’s Third Investigation of 1913.

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86 Husserl explains “the form of region in general, or, which comes to the same thing, to the formal essence: object in general” (I §16).
87 Thus in 1962, when Derrida seeks to assess what is essentially possible for transcendental subjectivity, he will begin from the ideal object as “model” for any object at all, thus for “objects in general” (IOG 66).
Developing the implicit teleology

First, it is also important to emphasise that Husserl’s approach by at least 1913 is teleological; he seeks to demonstrate how an object can be known. Thus, it is pure relations that are specified, and – as explained above – the parts (or contents) that appear as objects, whereas the formal categories and their ontological regions already hold a priori. It is then the pure object in turn that must again be determined as an idea (forward). Even though Husserl allows for a priori synthesis, when his approach is taken as teleological, it nevertheless must proceed by examining the parts in this synthesis to determine the idea.

The possibility of appearing

Hence we begin to develop the formal relation “across” to the object. What appears as containing content in accordance with pure form does so as an object, and thus as a logical subject (S). It is thus a predicate of a proposition (Satz, which also implies “leap” (IOG 89)). Husserl explains that

[e]very possible object, or to put it logically,

‘every subject of possibly true predications’ has its own

ways, that of predicative thinking above all, of
coming under a glance (I §3, Husserl’s emphases).

We explain why this is merely the “possibly true” object below. Note that “thinking” for Husserl is a term referring to the general form of intentionality, of which predicative (logical) thinking is one sort. Thus far, the “glance” (or gaze) is a metaphor for objectifying an object “in front of” consciousness. This permits progress “forward”, in order to determine the object in front of it (IOG 83).

**From certainty, forward and upward**

To do so, note that moments of specific content at the inside (“internal content”) can henceforth be investigated to determine the unity of content in a Species. The moments of specific content can be addressed as to their “certain mutually requiring moments” (LI 3 §11). In our example, to determine “this red house”, as the species Red, the moments “red, brightness, intensity…” and so on can be “pointed to”. These positions (that is, judgments) can progress in accordance with formal law, as explained. To do so without reference to an external whole, in essential generality, each such moment can be *freely varied* (LI 3 §11), by which act the related moments too are varied. Thus imagination, for instance, which can freely vary its moments
without external reference, is important to Husserl’s sort of progress.

However, taken as pure and specific, Husserl never allows such a free variation of moments to be determined; “internal content” can refer to relative properties

\[\text{but it only does so with formal indefiniteness.}\]

\[(LI 3 \S 12)\]

That is, such contents are not yet determined, even though their relations are possible. The mutual relations are rather merely \textit{certain} (which we will explain, signifies the barest form of fact (205), cf. PH 151). Certainty is emphatically not yet an affirmation of truth, or determination. As Husserl explains,

\[\text{if a certain A stands in a certain relation to a certain B, this same B stands in a certain corresponding (converse) relation to that A; A and B are here quite freely variable. (LI 3 \S 11, Husserl's emphases)}\]

A “converse” relation switches the terms in a categorical proposition, e.g. “All A are B” becomes “All B are A”. Any
moment would mutually imply the moment of the corresponding moment. In our example, the specific colour “red” of an object would in turn be founded upon the corresponding Brightness, and assuming that white and black are colours, its specific brightness would also be founded upon Colour. Note, indeed, that whole-part relations of internal content for Husserl can have multiple foundations, in no obvious direction, but arising merely from the relations of their specific essences.

As to this formal progress, such assessment of essential relations can progress “forward” from certain relations to determine this object as an Idea. Thus teleology can proceed in an “ideation” (Wesensbahn). When progressing in the direction “forward”, to the object in front of consciousness, then instead of “descending” from the relation that already holds, ideation ascends to the specific relation. To do so, it proceeds from the singular essence “upward” through “more inclusive wholes”. That is, it can proceed through the degrees of generality at Husserl’s second level, in order to comprehend the species.

As Bernet explains of Husserl’s levels:

[I]instead of descending from the ideal generality to

its individual givenness, ‘ideation’ [Wesensbahn]

ascends from the singular individual to
comprehension of the species. (Bernet et al. 1993, 40 our emphases)

Our progress thus far has instilled a formal-logical relation of levels and directions for the progress of ideation. As we explain it, the progress can proceed from behind (as the a priori relations that already hold), forward in the relation of internal contents that are certain but not yet given as a greater whole. In turn, these must proceed in an ideation that must determine the species, and then even the Idea. Note moreover that, in this progress the Idea does not yet appear; it somehow remains even “further” removed than the species. However, even the latter, according to the implications of Husserl’s approach, is also removed from determinability by internal relations of moments. This teleological and essential relation of levels and directions will be basal to Derrida’s approach in 1962.

The material ontologies

Nor is this process purely formal. Even though material relations can be specific, they arise from a priori relations which are no

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88 In accordance with Derrida, we also emphasise that ideation arises as ideal relations that must hold already and a priori, in that they certainly provide content. For Derrida ideation forward (*Wesensbahn*) to intuit the highest level of essence will lead to a problem of origin – the intuitable essence will come to depend upon a moment of *idealisation*, cf. IOG 66-67, fn. 61) as foundation on the Idea in the Kantian sense which must have produced this internal content. We are still working toward these elements.
longer formal and pure. They form an ontology correspondent to formal ontology. Thus, for instance, to rise in ideation from “this red”, to seek to determine the particular instances in the unity of a species “Red” (cf. LI 2 Introduction), would in turn be a species of the essential genus “Colour”. The latter, it seems to us, would be a highest level of essence in a “material ontology”, in that a “Colour” is confined to material applicability. The whole-part relations are merely correspondent. Thus a “material ontology” (as Pentzopoulou-Valalas emphasises (1981, 122)) is never directly founded upon but correspondent to formal ontology. Each is “on the other side” of the other.

The ordinal hierarchy of formal ontology

However, as we seek to follow Derrida, we do note the ordinal relation. Formal ontology nevertheless predelineates what is essentially possible via laws, to which material ontologies conform. For instance, that “This house is red” is possible insofar as every whole in general includes its parts; but whole and part relations are never bound by the relations of houses and roofs. As Derrida puts it, material ontologies are “subordinated” (IOG 32), in a “hierarchy” of ordinality (importance). This will hold in that the formal-ontological laws hold of correspondent necessity even in

89 In the Third Investigation, Husserl founds the Genus “Colour” in turn upon extension, and situates that in turn in the visual field (LI 3 §10).
90 The relations of “other” are not yet developed in the sense of Derrida’s progress from one to other.
material ontology. Indeed, the commonality in each relation above is *necessity*. Ideal laws must hold of necessity, so too must its regions and the a prioris. Just so, necessity is fundamental to the proposition, and the propositional form in turn is one of the regions that correlates to how the world is (106). That is to say, Husserl develops necessity according to his levels and directions.

**The levels of necessity**

To situate its relations, we will begin from the lowest level of the proposition. Most formal logic takes “necessity” *only* as propositional. Moreover, many logics define it in terms of itself, and in insoluble relation with truth: for instance, that what is necessary was always going to result in truth (ODP 257). What is true was necessary. This explanation, we note briefly, never seeks to explain why something is necessary. Husserl aligned such approaches with the “psychological” (PR §30-31). In the *Prolegomena* of 1900, in working out the necessity of ideal laws, he also noted that judgments occur *after the necessity*, and this is also why they *can* be false in *particular instances*. This is how Husserl

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91 Husserl in 1900 equates this necessity with Heyman’s explanation in *Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens* of 1890, 1, 19-20 (cf. LI V.1 317), which “compels us to hold the conclusion to be true” (PR §31). But, Husserl notes, *this necessity is prone to error, and can be revised*. In the case of any particular judgment of truth, this is merely a person’s conviction that the element is true. Such “psychological” views of necessity, thus defined, are current even today. For example, “A proposition is necessary if it could not have been false.” (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 257). However, Husserl’s “logical necessity” is *valid* in any circumstances, for it has a “governance by ideal law” (PR §31). Nevertheless, the task for Husserl is that such laws and necessities must still be verified.
could work out that ideal laws remain necessary *already* and in
general, prior to particular propositions and judgments. There
*must* be a relation that already allows any particular proposition to
be true or false, no longer bound to the vicissitudes of the error-
prone judger. For Husserl, the seemingly inseparable relation in
psychological logic of necessity and judgment of truth needs to be
revised. However, Husserl accepts that necessity is an
indispensable component of a proposition.

Thus, without commenting upon the undoubted rigour that
symbolic and predicative calculus can attain, we note merely that
Husserl seeks to supply a more encompassing logical approach
than merely a direction across. Necessity first holds in the *levels of
essences*. That is, it holds because of eidetic *law*. For example, *that*
“A whole in general includes its parts”, or “Red is a Colour” is
*necessary* in accordance with a law. For Husserl, to be necessary
implies standing in the “context” of a law (cf. I §23). The issue is
*how* essential laws can hold of necessity in a proposition, in order
to allow judgments of truth or falsity without psychologism.

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92 To avoid confusion with this living and transcendental subject (that is, the
logical subject predicated of in transcendental subjectivity as circularity) we will
usually deem predication occurs of an object, rather than in order to determine
a logical subject.
How essential necessity allows material contingency

We begin from the highest level. The highest necessity is that of the pure and formal *eidetic* necessity, which holds in accordance with formal-ontological law. This necessity is *a priori* (I p. 46), thus also “behind”. Any such relations can be particularised even as essential, and these objects in turn are “eidetic objects” (I §2). In turn, each specific law would hold of necessity, *including* the form that can have content – that of the proposition. These in turn predicate of “objects” (I §2). As noted, essential generality arises as predicating of pure objects. Correlative to an act predicating essential generality is that the relation hold of essential necessity (I §6). That is, essential necessity holds in propositions that predicate of a pure object.

Such predicating thus allows for pure judgment. Each such judgment (at the lowest pure level) of an object, which can be true in accordance with a valid formal-ontological law, holds in turn by eidetic necessity (I §2).\(^{93}\) Hence, of essential necessity, even pure judgments can be true, and thus can be *false* (were this never so, phenomenology would emerge as complete). Essential necessity is the sort which, of its essence, *allows for judgment of what can be false according to eidetic law*.

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\(^{93}\) As Derrida will seek to determine the ideal object as absolutely true, and it is analytically necessary that eidetic objects be true, he will be concerned mainly with essential necessity (cf. IOG 64, 173, VeM 436, VM 120).
In turn, as formal ontology corresponds to material ontology (167), essential necessities correspond to subordinate material necessities. This develops how propositions in material ontology can be true or false, in accordance with eidetic law. Note that such propositions are called “contingent”. They depend upon what is judged of the content to be true in accordance with eidetic law.

**Part Two: the requirements for the absolute fact**

**Turning toward truth – intentionality as genitive**

Thus far necessity holds of propositional relations, including any of these sorts of particular content. Next, we begin to ask how such propositions can be True. As the closest such necessity to judgment, we add the “apodictic” – the consciousness of the necessity of a judgment about specificity (I §5). However, even apodictic necessity is merely consciousness “of” the object (“the necessity of judgment about specificity”). It too conforms to the predicative act, which pure form is a consciousness of something.

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94 Husserl in the Third Investigation explains that analytic a priori relations hold both as laws and “analytically necessary propositions” (I.I 3 §§11, 12), but synthetic a priori relations are mere necessities. We worked out how this holds above.

95 The *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* defines “contingent” as a truth “that is true as it happens, […] but that did not have to be true.” (ODP 257). It has also been noted that contingency has been deemed “a disguised necessity” (cf. ODP 257).

96 Husserl writes: “[T]he consciousness of a necessity, or more specifically a consciousness of a judgment, in which we become aware a certain matter as the specification of an eidetic generality, is called *apodictic*, the judgment itself,
That is, Husserl retains the maxim of intentional objectification (and his keeping of “something” in addition to “whole” at the highest formal-ontological level is pertinent). For anything, everything can become an intentional object (LI 3 §8), even the levels; even necessity. A sort of circularity develops. What must hold of the object in general forward must already hold (“behind”), at a higher level. Its content must in turn already arise as certain, which must be determined of the particular object (forward). Hence intentionality proceeding “across” to the object is first a genitive relation, and only then dative. 97 It is first a possessive predication of the object in general (across), in a sort of circularity of formal and a priori levels, which object itself is only then indirectly given (as dative) (cf. CM §38). 98 For instance: to posit that “something is in front of me” (S is P) is also to intend that something is placed in front of me. Consciousness intends the “in front of me-ness” (cf. IOG 83) of the object. The pure form of intentionality is “consciousness of something” (I §84, our

the proposition, an apodictic (also apodictically – “necessary” of) consequent of the general proposition to which it is related.” (I §5, Husserl’s emphasis).

97 The Chambers Dictionary explains the genitive as “of or belonging to a case expressing origin, possession, or similar relation” (CD 617). The dative is a case “expressing an indirect object” (CD 382), to which we add that the dative is the case of giving (from dare). As to the genitive “of”, one is indeed first and certainly in possession of the origin (cf. IOG 140). As to the dative “to”, all such objects remain indirect though possible, mediated by their essence.

98 As Derrida explains the bases of passage as movement “across” in 1962, in terms of the dative relation and this “in front of me-ness”: “[I]n front of and for ourselves essentially implies, then, given as an object. The world, therefore, is essentially determined by the dative and horizontal dimension of being perceived.” (IOG 83). However, to be perceived in this “horizon”, the world must first be intentional, which consciousness of something first allows the possibility of its explication.
emphasis). This helps to explain Husserl’s famous but only seemingly simple statement. Note, however, that the overall basis arose in that “anything, everything, can become an intentional object” (153), yet this too arises as a pure and a priori form.

**Parenthesis: circularity and intentionality**

One fashion by which Derrida would need to engage with these issues is in accordance with this first basis of intentionality as consciousness of something. We should thus prevent a misunderstanding as to whether phenomenology is to be approached as *either* a priori, formal and regional *or* a living intentionality. The essential regions demarcate what holds a priori, and such essences can be made *ideal objects* (noemata), which must be determined as an Idea, forward. Everything, then, has its a priori – the formal, material, universal, and even the living subject. But this is still *everything*, as a generalisation of the intentional object “something”. In turn, *any* a priori can be explicated as an intentional object (forward) to determine its essence in ideation (upward). Yet it is only via essential relations already holding in their highest generality that the “living” form of intentional consciousness can be described; even the essential relations of history. That is, past judgments are certainly sedimented in the *history* of the positing ego (cf. Ch. 1 (116)).

Moreover, the formal possibilities of transcendental subjectivity already hold as the “subjective a priori” (VM 132), which
predelineates how a subject can predicate even of historical content in its levels.\textsuperscript{99} In turn, when made a noematic object, such relations take the pure form of judgment (apophansis) in a subjective a priori. No choice needs to be made between a consciousness of the appearing of the ideal object in its essential relations, and the essential relations which already hold to permit its appearing. Phenomenology takes the form of a vital, constituting intentionality, of ideal objects which essential regions are already constituted, where the back becomes the front (CM §50), and the front already holds behind (cf. IOG 64, I §76). It is the sense of these objects that must be explicated toward their Ideas (upward), toward the telos of affirming the object as True. We will continue to assess how intentionality could attain this telos.

\textbf{The necessities of a priori propositions}

We begin with a priori propositions. As noted, analytic a priori propositions (as pure or material), are \textit{irreal}, and independent of external content for their truth. Husserl in these chapters never considers whether a judger could be mistaken in determining the truth of a particular analytic a priori proposition (for instance, in deeming that mermaids rather than unicorns have magical horns, or that a miscalculated mathematical formula is correct). It is

\textsuperscript{99} As Pentzopoulou-Valalas puts it, this is “the side of the subjective a priori which Husserl situated on the side of the knowing subject, on the side, that is to say, of intentional consciousness.” (Pentzopoulou-Valalas 1981, 116).
feasible to argue on these grounds that no particular judgment about such objects is analytically true. However, nor does Husserl need to consider this. He has defined his approach in a manner that should the judgment about such a proposition is false, then the proposition was never necessarily an analytic a priori law. Thus far, an irreal, a priori and analytic proposition could be affirmed as *eidetically true* only by a prior ontological relation of eidetic necessity.

As to synthetic a priori propositions and material ontology, these can be without reference to existence of the content (as irreal). However, they can also include a reference to the existence of the content (as empirical or real). Husserl seems to run into a difficulty in the former case. For example, for Husserl, assertion of a particular moment (e.g. “This x here”) is insufficient to deem a proposition is “synthetic” or that its content is existent. Husserl explains that they arise only from the pure propositions that contain concepts from material ontologies that cannot be formalised as true of every instance (“salva veritate”). Only given this essential *impossibility* (which relation we will develop

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100 The affirmation is the confirmation of the position (I §106b). We will come to position below, as the basis of passage across to the Telos which, upon being confirmed, would be affirmed. We will employ “affirmation” instead of confirmation, to signal what would be the affirmative moment of a consequent judgment.

101 Husserl puts it that “[E]ach pure law, which includes material concepts, so as not to permit a formalisation of these concepts salva veritate – each such law, i.e. that is not analytically necessary – is a synthetic a priori law.” (LI 3 §12). Since 1900, it has been the essential “Truth” that has concerned Husserl rather than the psychologistic and particular truths.
of material relations would such synthetic a priori propositions be possible. Husserl furnishes no examples, and these might be hard to come by, as to posit that essential and material concepts cannot be formalised, without formalising why this is so, seems absurd. It seems that positing this necessity requires knowing every specific moment of internal content of a specific object without formalising it; but were this totality known, the material content would be absolutely determined. Husserl has rather stressed that such relations are indefinite. We explain how this would apply just below.

However, Husserl is on more obviously firmer footing as to the existent sort of synthetic a priori proposition. This can include a specification of empirical existence. Provided that the material content exists “here” as an internal content, this is necessarily both a material existent and “empirical specification” of the synthetic a priori proposition: for example, “This red is different from this green” (LI 3 §12). Such a relation can escape formalisation. This might seem odd – as surely it is a law that one colour is different from another? In this instance the worth of Husserl’s logic comes to the fore – this proposition is synthetic as its predicate contains a material component (red, green), which

102 For instance, to determine that the relations of a totality of colours cannot be formalised into a law, it would be necessary to tally every instance of colour. Husserl never ceases to stress that such adumbrations never arrive at determination.
Red and Green are specific (at the lowest level). Yet these relations are not yet able to be formalised as no reference to a foundation in the genus “Colour” is included. Red and Green are never different per se, the proposition requires a shared foundation. However each such proposition is contingent and partial, dependent upon an empirical whole. In each case above, the synthetic a priori proposition is precluded from Truth without yet affirming a greater whole.

Thus (setting aside the difficulty of Husserl’s lack of example in the first case) such material laws, by definition, also hold of necessity (LI 3 §21). In sum, the strongest version of each of these a priori propositions would be apodictic necessity. Yet even this remains merely a consciousness of the necessity of a specific judgment. We will consider what is necessary for truth in general.

**The first four requirements**

The correspondence between pure and material relations continues to exert its influence. To be an Idea, the object must be determined as true at all times and places (as eidetic truth (I §8), or “Truth” (I §139)). That is, Truth is an Idea, to which even an
Our basal formal condition is that the ideal object must be true at all times and places.

However, a particular truth must determine an object as *true in a particular time and place*. For our purposes, a pure, material, real or empirical existent “here” would determine the object as true “here and now”. Note that we include “pure” to this group; that is, something “pure” can also exist in spatiotemporality, for the latter is not yet a content. In general, this would be an instance of an object

having spatio-temporal existence, as something existing in this time-spot [...] which is present at this place in this individual physical shape (I §2).

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103 While Something, One, Whole, Part, Object etc. deemed categories, these must be referred to Truth as an Idea (PR §67).
104 These levels also hold in *Experience and Judgment* (1918 ff.) to “determine” the sense of the origin in particular, Husserl again deems that the first level accords with predication of the form “S is p” (Husserl switches to the lower-case variable “p” in later years rather than “P”). Moreover, “p” is again a “dependent” part (EJ §50) which has not yet “determined” the subject as a whole. Thus in the second level applies “a ray of attention” (forward) to “p” which “turns back to S” (EJ §50) as its whole. But as this second level has still not yet determined S as a whole, the “third and highest level” is indeed that of the formation of generalities as essential. That is, the third level is addressed to “the formation of generalities [which] […] opens onto the essence of predicative formation in general, and the relationship to events on the lower level.” (EJ §49). The levels and directions hold of all these phases, by which Husserl seeks to determine the object in general.
The next two requirements for this truth are that the pure, material, or real object must be determined in space and time.

**The necessary conditions for progress**

As to how such determination could occur, Husserl recognises the difficulty that a judgment here and now could only affirm judgments *subjectively*, and be false. Instead of a first relation to truth, he seeks instead to provide

the *necessary validity* of the *particular* case, i.e. a

validity *grounded* in the *law*. (PR 73, our emphases)

Husserl begins to retract from truth to the constituting side of the proposition. Necessity arises when propositions are *grounded* in a *valid form* in accordance with an *essential law*. We will address these italicised interrelations in order. First, as to ground, a reader should avoid supposing this term refers to an actual physical basis – rather it refers to what lets it be known that the relation is *necessary* (PR §39).

Second, validity applies merely to the form by which positing occurs. The grounded validity allows the necessity of the first *positing* of the object in general. These do not yet

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105 “To know the ground of anything means to see the necessity of its being so-and-so” (PR §§39, 88).
converge upon truth, which judgments can be wrong. They are not yet even positing, but merely conditions for positing of truth and of knowledge.\textsuperscript{106}

Indeed, these would permit all of Husserl’s projects, insofar as they align with this basic form. Husserl writes

that we need grounded validations in order to pass beyond what, in knowledge, is immediately and therefore trivially evident, not only makes the sciences possible and necessary, but with these also a theory of science, a logic. (PR §6, Husserl’s emphasis last)

To assess how grounded validations make it possible and necessary for a proposition to “pass beyond” trivial and immediate evidence requires a development of the logic.

First, an “immediate” relation does not yet mediate relations between particulars. The term “Mediation” signals a general relation that is required to allow commonality between particulars

\textsuperscript{106} In his summary of to what is acceptable in logical necessity, Husserl writes “[N]othing is here said about a consciousness or the acts and circumstances of its judgment” (PR §31).
(e.g. for purely specific instances red and green to be different, they must be mediated by the genus “Colour”). As noted, mediation of particular moments occurs “forward”.

Thus, third, instead of referring “forward” to find a ground, Husserl refers backward. Grounds must be provided by law (cf. I §8). For instance, given that “This house in front of me has extension”, then the law “all spatial objects have extension” would be a ground for judgment that “This house here is spatial”. Such a ground would allow even what was contingent to be judged of the predication according to essential law. A judgment that a particular object exists in space (“here”), would determine it as an individual. The individual “here and now” would be a “fact” (IOG 47).107 We will develop the conditions for this fact at both the level of essential generality and the singular proposition, which as yet is material and real. That is, while it seems we are moving “forward”, we are rather moving “back” (PR §66) into ideal law to investigate the Relations that would provide a ground for possibility (forward).108 We are henceforth addressing essentially “necessary conditions” (PR §66).

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107 As Derrida puts it in 1962, “the characteristic which defines fact [is] namely, singular and empirical existence, the irreducibility of a here and now” (IOG 47, Derrida’s emphasis). Derrida’s sentence is ambiguous, in that “irreducibility” also refers to what eludes appearing here and now.

108 Husserl explains in the Prolegomena, “[T]he logical justification [as a ground] of a concept, i.e. of its ideal possibility, is achieved by going back to its intuitive or deducible essence. Logical justification […] demands that we go back to the essence of its form, and so to the concepts and laws which are ideal constituents of theory in
The fact as basis for the absolute

For Husserl, a posited fact is not yet a Truth (i.e. eidetic truth), which would hold at all times for everyone. However, for instance, that “This house is here now” (which can hold as pure or material) is a fact also conforms to a pure and eidetic form (e.g. “S is P”. Thus

every fact includes an essential factor of a
material order, and every eidetic truth pertaining
to the pure essence thus included must furnish a
law. (I §8, Husserl’s emphases)

Note that judgment would conform to the valid fundamental form “S is P”, which is valid and essential. This is also how, even for such material relations, “S is P” is the fundamental apophantic form (cf. FTL §13).\textsuperscript{109} The judgment of the truth of a fact as an individual “here and now” would determine material content in accordance with essential law. In turn, this fact would be True at all times and places. We deem this the next requirement.

general (the ‘conditions of its possibility’)” (PR §66, our emphases). We employ “Relation” as for Husserl it is a category (cf. also ATVM 23). However, note that these are conditions of possibility; we add possibility just below.

\textsuperscript{109} As Derrida puts it in 1967: “And one knows that for Husserl ‘S is P’ is the fundamental and primitive form, the originary apophantic operation from which every logical proposition must be derivable by simple construction.” (VP 81-82, our emphases, cf. H FTL, §13, cf. SP 73). Allison translates “originary” as “primordial”.

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Developing the criteria from levels of possibility

In order to examine further how the fact can be determined, we add possibility. The latter is also crucial as the laws of essence already define what can be posited of every object (LI 3 §14), and hence whether a proposition can be judged to have sense (Sinn). The relations from our previous pages thus combine (170 ff.). As with necessity, possibility also holds at every level. However, only some eidetic laws are concerned with “the formal laws of possible truth” (cf. Bachelard 1968, 14; FTL §§28, 51). To begin at the highest: every law already holds of eidetic necessity. Thus, moving “downward”, the laws provide the formal and essential basis for predication as a horizon of possibility “across” (Derrida deems this “horizontality” (DLG 83)). This level applies the fundamental form “S is P”. As eidetic necessity and possibility already hold, “S must be P” and “S can be P” already predefine what can be posited as what it is via the form “S is P” in a particular proposition.

110 As Husserl puts it, these laws show us what “can be said […] in advance of all objective matters” (LI 3 §14).
111 The levels and these teloi still hold in comparable form in Formal and Transcendental Logic of 1929. As Bachelard (to whom Derrida refers in footnote of 1962 (IOG 55 fn. 50, 135 fn. 16)) explains, Formal and Transcendental Logic begins on the categorial and apophantic side of pure logic, and indeed seeks to work out three “stratifications” to determine the truth of the object. Husserl, we note, calls these stratifications “levels” (Stufe, cf. FTL § 14, and overall §§13-28). The lowest level is indeed that of the fundamental logical form of the proposition “S is P” (Bachelard 1968, 11, cf. FTL §13b). To assess what can and must have sense, the middle level assesses whole-part relations as to what can have sense for essential and a priori reasons. For example, “All A’s are B’s, including some which are not B’s” would be absurd (Bachelard 1968, 13). The
Every such possible truth that holds in accordance with these
eidetic laws (above, 187) is a *formal and pure* possibility. In turn,
essential necessity is that part of eidetic necessity that allows for
the contingency of objects (171). Propositions that hold of
essential necessity can be true or false. Importantly, “can” in turn
signals possibility (we will develop this). Essential necessities that
can be true or false do so in accordance with *formal and pure*
possibility. Every essential necessity as a contingency holds of
formal and pure possibility. In turn, material ontologies are
subordinate to formal ontology, and correlative to essential
necessity are material necessities (171). Thus *formal and pure*
possibilities correspond to material possibility.

These material ontological propositions, even as particular (“This
x here”) can avoid reference to existence; these are *irreal* (175).
Such material ontological possibilities are still *pure possibilities*, and
still contingent.\(^\text{112}\) Importantly, Husserl deemed that they can

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\(^\text{112}\) Several further kinds of possibility have been noted. Mohanty, for example,
also points to “presumptive possibilities”, where “something counts in favour
of one as against another”, but one has not arrived at the affirmation “yes” or
“no”. Mohanty may be referring to *Experience and Judgment*. For the purposes
of application to Derrida, we could add the possibility that something may be
such and such, where one forms a “problematical possibility” (EJ Sec 21b 94-7)
upon this base of primal validity. There is also an “enticing possibility”, a
phenomenological element which leads us to believe that something is true or
false of an object, even while doubting that it is so, yet leading to judgment
(APS Sec. 11, 81). These are simply modalisations of the pregiven horizontal
certainty. Finally, we note “fantasy possibility”, where one imagines that
something could be real, even though it has no real possibility (such as Socrates
with a longer nose). Derrida does refer to this sort in his “Introduction”; as we
escape formalisation, to truth as indefinite (170). At this juncture, we can explain how they can be indefinite which Husserl took for granted (LI 3 §12, (175)). Any such proposition that is inconsistent with formal, a priori and essential law, or incompatible with its content, must then be judged to be absurd and excluded from sense (as Widersinn (LI 4 §12)). Such absurdity can be formal and analytic (such as “something is nothing”) or purely material and synthetic (“a square is round” (LI 4 §14)). Such exclusions cannot be formalised “salva veritate” (LI 3 §12, (175)). They cannot have sense and thus are no longer necessary laws; their truth is contingent but indefinite.113

However, material ontological propositions can also allow for reference to existence (176), these are no longer pure but real (real) or empirical possibilities (176, cf. Pentzopoulou-Valalas 1981, 122).114 These too for Husserl can escape formalisation, when such propositions do not yet determine a greater and essential whole (176). These real possibilities too are contingent

will treat it, fantasy possibility arises from the free variation of pure possibilities in essential generality. We thus remain with essential, pure, and predicative (logical) possibility as that which Derrida will investigate.

113 Given a telos of “rigorous” science (e.g. I §5), it is necessary to “avoid” such predications (LI 4 §14). Just so, it is necessary to avoid propositions that have no sense at all (Unsinn).

114 By addressing Husserl’s summaries in 1913 we have thus suggested how, as Pentzopoulou-Valalas puts it, “‘This table here’ represents in the state of pure possibility, and prior to its being grasped by consciousness, a material a priori. Once ‘incarnated’ in the individual example, it is no longer an a priori matter except as the horizon of potentialities implied in the concrete example.” (Pentzopoulou-Valalas 1981, 122, our emphasis). Just so, the horizon of potentialities (which includes possibilities) depends upon the a priori (i.e. the eidetic (I p. 46) relations. Derrida will assess how such relations can be incarnated.
and can be indefinite. However, to be true, such real possibilities must be true of the ideal object at all times and places (182). They must be an individual fact, and thus a Fact.

Next, however, from above, we move backward (181). For the truth of the object to be possible, it must be necessarily possible. The criteria of necessity thus apply to possibility. Henceforth, our enquiry into necessary conditions evolves to enquiry into conditions of possibility. To allow for possibility there must first be a grounded validity in accordance with a priori essential law (behind).

We have developed for criteria for truth: a ground of possibility (behind), and also the pure or real possibility of determination in space and time, or as a Fact (as horizontality, forward). Derrida will apply these criteria and sides in his demand for the absolute.

**Part Three: the conditions for the fact**

**The relation of negation**

To assess how such conditions for a ground could have sense, or fact be achieved, we add the relations of negation, contradiction and impossibility. To continue from above: when an absurd proposition is posited, its necessity and possibility is then negated,

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115 Cf. our page 185 fn. Above (PR §66).
116 We avoid deeming this a ground for “the possibility of the truth of…”, as a ground is required prior to the constituting of truth.
which is “designated” by “not” (I §106).\footnote{117 Husserl explains: “the ‘cancelling’ of the corresponding positing character, its specific correlate is the cancellation character we designate as ‘not.’” (I §106).} This act is a “cancelling” (cf. I §106, EJ 21). In apophansis (the sedimented forms of judgment), when I discover that a thing is not what I anticipated it to be, I am disappointed and “cancel” my previous position (for instance, I am disappointed that the far side of a table is not white). Husserl applies a formal and logical negation to the positive proposition (“$S$ is not $P$”).

However, negation “modifies” and is thus subsequent to the positing (I §106). As we will explain below, it is removed from the originary evidence of positing. For Husserl, “$S$ is not $P$” is never deemed a component of the fundamental form (cf. EJ §72). Just so, each negation in turn must have derived from a “position”, which arises from a positing intention (i.e. a judgment) (I §§5, 106). That a negation occurs by a prior and sedimented judgment is accepted by Husserl from at least 1918, and augments the basic relation of Husserl’s genetic project; the appearing of the object must arise from a history of judgments (passive substrates) already sedimented in the object, and consciousness must proceed first by positions and cancellations through those prior judgments toward its closer determination (forward) (cf. EJ §1-14).
The avoidance of contradiction

Next, we develop the kind of absurdity that such a progress of position and negation must avoid – that of contradiction (cf. PR §40). For Husserl in 1900, “Contradiction” at the highest level is an essential, pure and hence timeless “law of logic”. It takes the form of positing the truth of two ideal relations which for essential (thus a priori) reasons cannot both be true (PR §28). In particular, contradiction would arise when two incompatible predicates are posited of one content “at the same time” (PR §28), and this act judged as true. Such incompatible predicates, we note, are then deemed contradictories (VeM 446 fn. 1).

Note, however, that just as negation arises after position, contradictories can be posited – for anything can be made an 118

118 Husserl appeals to the laws of “[Non-]Contradiction, Double Negation, or the Modus Ponens” for the avoidance of formal absurdity (LI §14). Derrida will overtly appeal only to the first – although we note that his progress of inductive implication will be in accordance with Modus Ponens, while he will never employ Double Negation in 1962 as he will avoid negation, and nor will he allow it in 1964 insofar as this is deemed to turn back to an absolute Identity. We will address the latter briefly only in Chapter Six.

119 Husserl explained in 1900 that “the same content of judgment cannot […] be both true or false.” (PR 36), by which Husserl also takes it that such an act of judgment holds “in one and the same time and act” (PR §28), rather than of “timeless ideal unities”.

120 Husserl’s version is basic even by classic standards. Kant’s “principle of contradiction” also distinguishes between formal contradiction of predicates and of the thing. Kant also refers to the relations of contraries (CPR 150/189-152/191). In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl divides contradiction into the subjective (the pure form of what a judger must judge as true), holding a priori, and the Objective, pertaining to a contradiction of the objects in general (FTL §75). However, it seems to us that by the Cartesian Meditations the distinction is much less defined as the ego explicates of sedimented relations within itself. We remain with objective contradiction, to emphasise how Derrida will develop away from what must hold “at the same time” in transcendental subjectivity.

121 Contradictories cannot both be true or false together (CD 327). We touch upon impossibility (“cannot”) just below.
intentional object, and first can have sense. They are only then excluded from sense, upon the ground of what already held of its content. Rather than a contradiction of the things themselves, which would be a denial that arrives at absolute Truth, Husserl seeks to avoid necessary contradiction. He seeks to avoid the positing of necessity and possibility that is subsequently negated in accordance with a priori law. Henceforth, essential and a priori impossibility will be the criterion which replaces the judgment of falsity, until truth (or Truth) has been attained.

The levels of impossibility summarised

Husserl thus accords with basic modal propositional maxims, in that what is necessarily not possible is impossible (cf. Mohanty, 2005). However, as with propositional necessity and possibility, Husserl provides a systemic relation. The relations must begin from a general possibility (a priori), and then a particular predicative possibility, for anything can be made an intentional object and have sense. As Husserl puts it, “What cannot be thought, cannot be. What cannot be, cannot be thought”. That something has first been thought implies its possibility. The relations which must then be negated imply an a priori and essential impossibility of the laws of its relations (signalled by “never”, and “cannot”). To do so requires the negation of a necessary and possible proposition (which is also regional), in what we deem “propositional impossibility” (“S cannot be P”). Any possibility can have its
impossibility. For instance, thus far these would be pure, real, material or empirical.

Without fail, when Husserl writes “can”, “must” and “not” in the Third Investigation and Ideas, he signals possibility, necessity and negation. In turn, every employment by Husserl of “cannot” in the revised Third Investigation and first chapter of the Ideas accords with the relations of essential impossibility (cf. LI 3 §12).

We have accorded with these relations thus far in the language of our dissertation. However, from this juncture, “must”, “can”, “not” and “cannot” explicitly correlate to “necessity”, “possibility”, “negation” and “impossibility” respectively (cf. esp. I §106).

Husserl has situated these modal relations via his whole-part relations.

**The reduction from the material and empirical**

From this juncture, we continue forward in Husserl’s œuvre. Further on in the Ideas, he proceeded to a reduction to pure phenomenology (110 fn.), and then toward transcendental subjectivity. Crucially, after a reduction, Husserl sets aside enquiry into the possibility of objects in the material ontologies (I §60). After a

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122 Husserl explains of “the ‘cancelling’ of the corresponding positing character, its specific correlate is the cancellation character we designate as ‘not’. The cancelling mark of negation strikes out something posited […] in an analogous way, out of the ‘possible’ […] we get the ‘impossible’” (I §106).

123 This is, then, an “eidetic reduction”. Husserl writes: “If we wish to construct a phenomenology as a pure descriptive theory […] we must exclude from this limited field […] the real Nature of physical science and the empirical
reduction, the *material, empirical, and also natural sense of the real* (wirklich, real (cf. I §88)) are no longer considered, in order to allow a *descriptive* phenomenology (111).

Rather, within a pure (which henceforth also implies “reduced”) consciousness, the hyletic stratum provides the material data (Stoffe) for the noetic phases of consciousness (I §85). Husserl adds two further “purifications” to descriptive phenomenology. First, even the material data of the hyle, which is “reell” (subjectively irreal), is set aside as the noetic phases are considered. Here, the intentional object (logical subject) only allows “reell” noetic content (I §88). But even this is no longer considered. Rather, this pure noetic proposition itself finds a “correlative” relation to a noematic object. The corresponding noematic sense is even less *real* (irreal) (I §88).124 Devolving inward from the empirical to the material to the pure hyletic material, to the real noetic content, to the noema, develops the most “extended” form of content as *sense* (Sinn).

In such a moment of “suspension” what appears again does so “as such” (cf. I §88, HU III 219)). For instance, the “pleasure” I feel natural sciences i.e. the sciences which study what belongs essentially to the physical objectivity of Nature as such. [...] [It is also advisable here to state explicitly that [this is a reduction] including the *eidetic sciences in their material bearing*” (I §60, Husserl’s emphasis). The material elements are reduced along with the natural sciences. As we proceed, such a science will be geometry. 124 Husserl writes: “[C]orresponding to all points to the manifold data of the real (reellen) noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in actually pure [wirklich reiner] intuition, and in a correlative “noematic content”, or briefly “noema” (I §88).
upon perceiving “an apple-tree in bloom” holds in just this reduced fashion, but the apple-tree keeps the characteristic “beautiful” (cf. I §88). Rather than related directly to the real, the noematic object appearing as such is perceived “in” the reduction via “content” that I predicate of it (hence as irreality). This position no longer makes reference to the external whole as it appears on the inside, which latter as a content is deemed the appearing itself. As Husserl explained since 1907, the reduction to the pure takes the givenness of content as “immanent” (IOP 33-34, I §88), in its appearing as such. Rather than a simple inside, the immanent is an irreal content which external whole is no longer predicated of (thus “bracketed off”).

What Husserl worked out via essential generality in his devolution to the pure and singular parts has thus been aligned with his reduction to pure phenomenology in the noema. These intentional objects are again pure, and thus able to be related to formal logic. Each noematic content is only pure, and pure intentionality only posits of the ideal object. To be sure, no sort of content is lost as a possible object (cf. 162). Notably, in such instances, the “spatial” and “temporal” in general can still be

125 Husserl explains: “Perception, for instance, has its noema, and at the base of this its perceptual meaning, that is, the perceived as such. Similarly the recollection, when it occurs, has as its own its remembered as such precisely as it is “meant” and “consciously known” in it; so again judging has its own the judged as such, pleasure the pleasing as such, and so forth. We must everywhere take the noematic correlate, which (in a very extended meaning of the term) is here referred to as ‘sense’ [Sinn] precisely as it lies ‘immanent’ in the experience of perception of judgment, of liking, and so forth” (I §88, Husserl’s emphases).
investigated for their sense. To avoid error and to permit truth at all times and places, even a fact “here and now” must be constituted from these pure noemata.

**The conditions for a constituted pure object**

Next, we will assess the ontological conditions by which such a fact here and now (i.e. as objectual) can be absolute. Note that the pure (irreal) still requires a worldly and real foundation, for all content must have arisen from the world. The real remains necessary (and Husserl will restore it as content, just below). As to their conditions, such a fact could be pure or real.

The *pure* formal-logical relations of earlier years are kept by a reduction. In order to be restored, what is “real” must no longer be natural, but an essential object (i.e. specific, forward). Husserl – as Derrida will note – explained this in *Experience and Judgment*:

> [W]e call real in a specific sense all that which,

in real things in the broader sense, is,

according to its sense, essentially individualised

by its spatiotemporal position, but we call

irreal every determination which, indeed, is

founded with regard to spatiotemporal
appearances in a specifically real thing, but

which can appear in different realities as

identical – not merely as similar (EJ §65,

Husserl's emphases, in IOG 88 fn. 1/91 fn.

93).

Assessing “irreality” is relatively straightforward (at least, according to what is required). An ideality in essential generality (irreality) can be particularised, to what must hold in a pure spatiotemporality at any particular time and place. It can be “identical” to itself. This permission is analytic a priori. Were this never so, it was never analytic a priori.

As identical at every particular time and place (the pure fact), thus at all times and places, it would meet Husserl’s requirement for a law true at all times and places. Moreover, it would meet Derrida’s requirement since 1954, as an absolute without doubt or limitation (97). This develops the relation to the objectual absolute, as without limit. As Husserl puts it, when

\[126\] It would be absurd to suggest that an act is forever repeatable as identical yet is false, for what is determined as false is the particular act, and the law which continues to determine it as false would be ideal and true.
I look upon it, I have before me an absolute;

it has no aspects which might present

themselves now in this way, and now in that. (I

§44)

A pure fact repeatable as identical would be invariant, thus an eidetic fact (Fact). As invariantly true it would be True, thus an absolute fact.

**Three conditions for a constituted real object**

However, we avoid suggesting that it is easy to determine such a proposition. First, from above, such a truth is merely analytic (behind). *Yet the pure requires to be founded upon the real* in accord with eidetic law (cf. I §8). At this juncture, the progress requires the possibility of a real content. Second, an absolute would need to be true as a synthesis. Invariance thus must apply for essential reasons to the (noematic) real fact. To that end, note that it is implicit above that the real content in individual moments of real space and time is *never identical to itself*, for it occurs in a different reality each time. It holds rather “merely as similar” (EJ §65, our emphasis). A condition of possibility for the real fact is that it can be repeated as invariantly the same in different times and places. We will address these in order (the latter will require the Idea in the Kantian sense (209)). For, from above (186 ff.), the prior
condition for determination of any object before it can be repeated, is that pure laws permit its content to be constituted in the first place. Both of these conditions must first allow for their grounded validity (behind).

The crucial restoration of the real as positing

To begin from the first condition, Husserl at this juncture performs an impressive feat. Just as in logic, pure relations can again relate even to the “material” content as hyletic (Stoffe). Moreover, after the reduction to the irreal (reell), Husserl restores his sense of the real (wirklich) to phenomenology in this “noematic nucleus” (I §103). Each relation from the earlier years is restored by the transcendental reduction. Second, however, such content, pure and real, arises again as first merely in relation to ground and validity, as a mode of “doxic” believing, and thus a “correlate” of “certainty” as “posited” (I §103, HU III 103, cf. I §141, HU III 346).127

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127 Crucially, Husserl explains that this holds of every “noematic nucleus of the object” which “must be characterised somehow” by the “levels” of the nucleus, and indeed by “differences, alternatives and […]selected from each genus” (I §102). As to the restoration of the real, Husserl goes on that these are “correlatively related to modes of Being – as ‘doxic’ or ‘belief characters’ […] present as a real (reell) factor in normal perception, and functioning therein as a ‘sense of reality’. […] To it corresponds in the appearing ‘object’ as noematic correlate the ontical character ‘real (wirklich). The same […] noematic character is shown in the ‘certainty’ which may accompany all repeated representations […]. Such are ‘thetic’ acts, acts that ‘posit’ Being.” (I §103, HU III 103).
Part Four: the originary nexus

From evidence toward truth

Thus we turn toward how a content (pure or real) can begin to be constituted at this positing and constituting side. By this we assess the conditions to permit convergence upon the object in general, in order to determine it absolutely. First, possibility must arise with positing, which Husserl takes from a decision that guided his entire career as a phenomenologist. He began his Prolegomena thus:

if [judgment] is to be called ‘knowledge’ in the

narrowest, strictest sense, it requires to be

evident, to have the luminous certainty that

what we have acknowledged is, [...] if we are

not to be shattered on the rocks of extreme

scepticism. (PR §5, Husserl’s emphasis)

From the outset, Husserl took “evidence” as a sufficient “authority” even for certainty, in that it evidently supplies something to be predicated of (“is”). Though positing or predication may not yet be true, evidence provides a ground for
believing it can be true, hence predication can occur. Husserl calls this ground a “trivial” evidence (PR §5), which term is far from dismissive: it implies a relation that requires no further justification. Hence Husserl’s famous “principle of all principles” is that originary (originär) dator evidence is the basic right (Recht) to allow knowledge (I §141).

As Husserl puts it in the “Origin of Geometry” (and Derrida quotes), evidence is

\[ \text{grasping an existent in the consciousness of its originary being-itself-there (OOG 160, IOG 62, our emphases).} \]

Before assessing how this grasping is authorised by this “right” (Recht) in relation to ground, we assess the consequences for the demand for an absolute.

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128 Husserl writes: “The most perfect ‘mark’ of correctness is inward evidence, it counts as an immediate intimation of truth itself.” (Pr 17). An intimation is not yet an affirmation, but merely provides a right for convergence upon Truth.

129 As Husserl puts it, the “principle of all principles [is] that every originary [originär] dator Intuition is a source of authority for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in “intuition” in originary [originär] form [...] is simply be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it presents itself.” (I §24, Husserl’s emphasis).

130 Cairns, in his index to the Ideas, stresses that the right (Recht) is an “intrinsic justification” which confers “authority” (I p 458).

131 As Føllesdal puts it: for Husserl [...] evidence is presupposed by judgment [...]. it is found already on the pre-predicative level, to use Husserl’s terminology.” (Føllesdal 2005, 210, our emphasis). As Ströker explained,
From evidence to the demand for truth

For evidence as “grasped” is also already constituted for predication. As predicative and intentional necessity holds, there can be, Husserl explains, a “demand” for further giving of the object itself (FTL §60, C §7, IOG 146). Husserl too retains a demand, arising from the basis on evidence, to permit the telos of determination of the ideal (forward). Evidence, as the basis of all intentional (predicative) consciousness, sets up an “all-pervasive teleological structure” (FTL §60). This develops the next element; for that telos is knowledge as truth. The demand arises with the ground and right to allow logical predication of evidence as the truth. Husserl had put it since 1900:

‘ground of judgment’ […] means no more than our logical right to judge. […] This means that we may demand of each judgment that it should declare what is true to be true. (PR §39,

Husserl’s emphasis)

evidence from the first was normative (2005, 115). It instills a norm for what must yet be determined in a rigorous science.  

132 Husserl explains: “[T]he single evidence, by its own intentionality, can implicitly ‘demand’ further givings of the object itself; it can ‘refer one’ to them” (FTL §60). We employ “refer” in this fashion.
It must thus be asked how the first positing, given the demand, can begin to pass horizontally to the telos of Truth. This will develop the basic relations at the “originary” side of this progress. We will explain this via a sequence, moving from “behind”, then returning to the originary moment.

**The progress toward Truth**

First, Husserl has moved “backward” to a formal, a priori and necessary moment prior even to a ground for positing the object (and truth is also an object). Thus the concept of truth, as for falsity, is deemed a correlate of the “formal implication of axioms”, rather than yet positing even the truth of the axioms.\(^{133}\) We remain on this formal axiomatic side thus far; the reader can deem this the side of the noetic. It can thus be taken as a “positing intention”, for a noema can contain structures “posited of”.

Hence, truth is still implied by the formal axioms, as the first moment of the telos of a proposition. No truth is abandoned. However, it arises correlative to the positing intention (Setzung, henceforth “positing”). As noted, a “correlate” is an implied relation

\(^{133}\) Husserl writes, and Derrida quotes: “the concepts ‘true’ and ‘formal implication of the axioms’ are equivalent, and likewise also the concepts ‘false’ and ‘formally implied as the opposite of the formal implication of the axioms’” (I §72, in IOG 56).
“parallel” to, rather than occurring exactly when truth does.\textsuperscript{134} But truth remains only the telos that arises with positing, as “proto-doxic”. Rather than simply believing as theoretical (the doxic), it has the sense of “believing certainty” (I §139).\textsuperscript{135} Thus, crucially, note that the “certain” (gewiss) is also only a correlate of positing (cf. I §103, HU III 256). Rather than an affirmation of truth, it allows positing only a “relative and imperfect right” to converge upon essential Truth (I §141, HU III 347).\textsuperscript{136}

However, certainty still has a “weight” (which latter, for Husserl, provides a “motivating power” (I§138, OG 93)). As we will address just below, certainty arises in the nexus of correlative reason, positing and evidence).\textsuperscript{137} Hence the certainty (and thus positing) cannot be dismissed. It still requires a ground and a right to begin to constitute the truth of the object, and yet is impelled to do so. Put in a related fashion (I §5), what is certain undoubtedly “appears” as such, but what is undoubted is not yet an

\textsuperscript{134} Cf. I §139, and above. If Truth emerged with correlative truth, all positing would be true “at the same time”. We will develop the latter as we progress.

\textsuperscript{135} Husserl writes: “Truth is manifestly the correlate of the perfect rational character of the protodoxa, the believing certainty.” (I §388)

\textsuperscript{136} Moreover, “certainty” is a root form of the noema. That is, in noesis, when one predicates doxically (i.e. one believes it), this implies a parallel noema, “being certain”. Instead of converging upon the simple object, “certainty” underpins the noema that allows phenomenology to avoid positing of the natural object. In the Ideas, Husserl notes that one should keep the two kinds of certainty separate. We primarily employ the former as we are explaining intentionality via predication, but every such predication has its noema.

\textsuperscript{137} As Husserl writes in regard to what can said of positing and self-evidence in regard to “rightness”: “[I]n a certain way indeed every clear recollection possesses an original and immediate right; considered in and for itself, it “weighs” something, whether little or much [...].But it has only a relative and imperfect right.” (I §141, HU III 347)
affirmation. It must be determined, even though no logical basis for convergence upon its Truth has yet developed.

This leads us to address how there can be such “grasping” of evidence; for positing in the certain moment only occurs correlative to truth. Following from the correlation of intention and predication, positing for Husserl is an act correlating both logical positing of the subject, in the fundamental form “S is P”, and a living standpoint upon the object (I §139) in the demand for its perfectibility. Thus positing and reason (Vernunftsetzung §141, HU III 347), in turn, are the components which occur in the first moment of “grasping” the originary givenness as evidence (I §136, §141). Evidence evolves to self-evidence, and the “originary” is thus the first moment permitting the right to constitute a particular self-evident object. A “right” (Recht) is a justification, a permission, and also the character of “rightness” of the posited self-evidence.

Thus in a fashion the “originary” must provide the right to exceed itself. Husserl explains this necessity by the word “ursprüngliche”, which implies an origin (Ursprung), but also authenticity, and thus

138 This fundamental logical form thus allows even the doxic beliefs to be treated in logic. For example, Husserl writes, “[I]f the protodoxic self-evidence, that of believing certainty, is lacking, then we say, with respect to its content of meaning ‘S is P’, a doxic modality may be self-evident, the presumption, for instance, that ‘S should be P.’” Husserl never lets go of the basic positive quality of “S is P”, for this can still be converted to the “self-evident position, or the truth, “that S is P is presumable (probable)” (I §139).
right, and third, has the sense of “springing up above” the originary. Husserl writes:

[We are to understand, of course, that only

the originary (originä) self-evidence is an

authentic (ursprüngliche) source of authority and

the rational positings [of it] are in certain ways

‘derived’. (I §141, HU III 347, cf. I §138)

This explains why Husserl’s “principle of principles” is that the
originary (originä) is the fundamental “authority” for dator
evidence (cf. I §1). As authentically originary (ursprüngliche) it
provides the ground, and thus a basic right for a certain reason and
positing (as perfectibility).¹³⁹

The circularity of the originary and original

However, even the originary moment must have its essence,
which as the predicate of an ideal object is deemed original. This
essence of the originary moment, as yet without content, must
essentially found even the originary (it must be even further behind
what is behind).

¹³⁹ Husserl summarises the above, it is valid that “the positing has its original
[ursprüngliche] ground of legitimacy [i.e. its right] in the originary givenness.” (I
§138).
This brings the moment of “grasping” toward its developed essential form. To reach back and “grasp” the origin sedimented in the subject presupposes this essentially original (“Original”) basis. For

\[\text{[E]very apperception [the ego’s positing of itself] in which we […] noticingly grasp objects}

given beforehand – points back to a “\text{primal instituting\ldots}” […] and the \text{primarily institutive Original [Original] act is always [already] livingly present} (CM §51-§52, CMg 140-141, Husserl’s emphases).  

Derrida’s employment of “\text{originaire}” and “\text{original}” will accord with Husserl’s (cf. VeM 440, VM 124).\textsuperscript{141} The original will be that predicate of the ideal object (forward), holding essentially and a

\textsuperscript{140} Note that the “Original” for Husserl is deemed primally “institutive”. Derrida will deem the source of the “institution” is irreducible.\textsuperscript{141} Moran, following Findlay, translates Husserl’s “\text{originär}” in the \textit{Logical Investigations} at least on occasion as “in primal fashion” (cf. PR §62). As to Derrida, many translators have not yet been sensitised to or never emphasised this terminology. Spivak follows the translation accurately. Leavey’s translation of the “Introduction” translates “\text{originaire}” as “primordial” (cf. IOG 29, 153, cf. IDG 170-171), and “\text{original}” as “original”. Allison in “Speech and Phenomena” (1973) also translates “\text{originaire}” as “primordial” (SP 73). Bass in \textit{Writing and Difference} (1978) often translates “\text{originaire}” as “original”. Overall, these lacks of consistency have made it difficult, we suggest, for English readers to discern Derrida’s whole-part reasoning and the common relations applied across his works.
priori, which must ground the originary grasping, in order to
determine the originality of the object (forward) (cf. IOG 45,
IDG 29). But this only must occur of essential necessity, for the
Original has not yet appeared as an object. The particular relation
that provides a right and ground to posit of content in a particular
proposition at the lowest level is deemed originary.

These logical relations translate to the circularity of Husserl's
grasping of the object; the general right to posit formal law is
provided by self-evidence, for an originary moment permits
predication by the self of its own evidence. Originary production
(Leistung, Bildung) is already a certain positing of itself, given this right
of reason and self-evidence, for the constitution of Objectivity to
converge upon absolute Truth. Originary self-evidence for
Husserl validates what by 1931 is the mature transcendental
subject, as the subject must explicate of itself.

142 As Derrida explains in the “Introduction”, both the highest level of essence
(l’idéos) and the ideal object (l’objet ideal) must be “originarily grounded” (leur
fondament originaire) and must do so “through” an “original history” (histoire
originale) (IOG 45, IDG 29). We will follow Derrida to employ “original” in the
lower case as it is first the necessary and ideal object, which must already be
essential.

143 “Originaire” from the Latin “originarius” refers in French to what “originates
from”, such as “Ma famille est originaire d’Alsace” (“My family is originary
from Alsace”). “Original” refers to what seems to have originated as anterior,
but has the sense of “individual” (i.e. as predicated of in front).

144 The term “production” is relevant to Husserl’s approach in the “Origin of
Geometry”, which will assess these logical relations to determine the origin of
geometry as it has been passed forward by tradition. As Derrida emphasises,
“pro-duction, which leads to the light, constitutes the ‘over against us’ of
Objectivity” (IOG 40, fn. 27, our emphases). “Bildung” in German also carries
the sense of “culture” by which Husserl will allow the tradition to constitute
the production which leads forward, hence permitting Objectivity.
The above instils the conditions for a predication of objectivity that has not yet attained Truth as absolute, but must merely return to the essential moment (behind). Each of the relations arising in the nexus of logic’s first “grasping of the originary” – demand, ground, right, reason, certainty, correlative truth, necessity evidence, positing – are connected (I §139). Yet these relations have not yet begun to posit Truth (forward). Husserl summarises that

\[
\text{in the end all the lines of connexion converge back upon the primary belief, and its primary reason upon the ‘Truth’ (I §139, Husserl’s emphasis ).}
\]

Even though having begun from essential and apodictic necessity, and having devolved to evidence, for Husserl the relations of the “formal implication of axioms” then merely converge “backward” to grasp the origin (in order to move forward).\(^{145}\) Yet until a ground, right, validity etc. have been found to exceed the originary, this is not yet even a constituting of the object (cf. I §5, below). There is not yet a ground even to begin to determine the

\(^{145}\) Husserl writes that to “reduce[e] evidence to an insight that is apodictic [necessary], absolutely indubitable, and, so to speak, absolutely finished in itself – is to bar oneself from the understanding of any scientific production.” (FTL §60).
fact or Truth (“forward”)(I § 39). This remains an enquiry into the possibility of constituting ideal Objectivity.

**Part Five: toward Derrida’s reading**

**From the internal to possibility of the beyond**

It might thus be wondered: *How can subjectivity exceed this originary circularity to determine the absolute?* Put via content: how can Truth or the fact be determined in space and time? This leads to two more criteria. The first is that of remaining within this progress, avoiding external relation, in order to proceed “beyond”. To do so, we assess the progress “forward” again, *while remaining in accordance with formal relations “behind”*. We turn to Husserl’s final emendations to his Third Investigation of 1913 (LI 3 §25).

In these, Husserl addresses (particular) “bits” of space and time in nature (i.e. the a priori and essential region of nature). At this juncture, the naïve whole of part-whole logic is no longer sufficient to permit an absolute possibility of a whole (proof). Husserl explains that whole-part logic

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146 Husserl in 1900, explaining the relations of ground, right, demand and truth, explained that “[o]nly the probability [i.e. the motivated possibility] of fact can be grounded, not the fact itself, or the judgment of fact” (I §39). It might well be wondered how the absolute fact can be determined; this will be Derrida’s difficulty, which we begin to address below.
does not prove the relative ‘foundedness’ of

bits of space and time [upon a greater whole],

and so does not prove space and time to be

really infinite, nor even that they can [a

possibility] really be so. This can only be

proved by a law of causation which presupposes

[...] [from behind] the possibility of being extended

beyond [forward] any given boundary. (LI 3 §25,

LU 1, 300, our emphases)

First, to proceed “forward”, evidence allows the relations of space

and time to be certain. However, to assess the progress “forward”

the teleological structure addresses only parts of parts. Hence we

include the finite and infinite. The evident parts of parts, as not yet

proven as infinite, will be taken to be finite. But it is not yet even
determined whether they can be an infinite, for this would be the

greater whole uniting a finite series, and thus a unity of the

infinite (note, indeed, that such an implication is absurd).

Thus, Husserl emphasises above, this series of particular

moments of space and time do not even yet determine the parts

as real, even as infinite (Derrida will suggest both the sense of the
infinite and indefinite imply “opening” (IOG 138)). By this Husserl avoids dependence upon a naïve external whole, even though it remains necessary. Rather, from behind, only a prior law of causation can permit this progress. Possibility would need to come from formal relations “behind”, to permit the progress of finite parts (Derrida will call this a “finitising principle” (IOG 138)). A formal and essential law of nature allows space and time to progress to the infinite.

This develops two criteria that would meet the demand. First, note that, from furthest behind, this progress presupposes a relation that would allow the possibility of exceeding any limits, to the “beyond”. That is to say, such a possibility would be what Derrida deems “absolute”. We caution that Husserl does not yet assess whether such relations ought to be absolute; he is merely constraining the relations of possibility, “forward”. Yet could such a possibility in immanence be absolute, it would also permit this possibility in the progress of space and time, which are requirements for truth, Truth, and the fact.

**The Idea in the Kantian sense**

The second option accords with the progress above, and the logic that Husserl stresses in 1913, although we emphasise it merely to

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147 We employ this example of partial “bits” of space and time for a reason, for these are the first two requirements to determine the fact, which Derrida will investigate via the finite and infinite in 1962.
prepare for Derrida’s reading. Above, Husserl sets aside the possibility of an external whole, yet retains the possibility of a beyond. Such a beyond would be foundational. It could allow the possibility of progress in space and time, by means of the finite and infinite relations predicated of evidence. Moreover, our third condition from above was that the real requires the progress to be repeatable as invariantly the same (195). Thereafter, we noted that to be possible a right must arise from originary evidence.

Derrida will emphasise that these are the characteristics of the “Idea in the Kantian Sense” (I §§137-143).148 We summarise seven characteristics, in a circularity from “behind”:

First, from furthest behind, the Idea in the Kantian sense must be the Idea of what must necessarily found and then determine even essence. It must thus for essential reasons never be an essence, whether formal or real (or material etc.) (I p. 46).149 To explain this, second, it is certainly grasped as “open to evidence” (I

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148 Derrida deems these passages on the Idea in Husserl’s Ideas (I §§137-143) to be “the most precise text concerning its type of evidence” (IOG 139).
149 Husserl explained at the outset of the Ideas “the need to keep the highly important Kantian concept of the Idea free from all contact with the general concepts of the (formal or material) essence.” (I p. 46). Thus Husserl avoids making this Idea a part of his logical components in the first Chapter of the Ideas, nor admits it to the originary lines of connection. Derrida in turn notes that Husserl never makes the Idea in the Kantian sense a (logical and objective) theme at all. We note that for Husserl this might have been planned. As Derrida seeks to exceed essential relations (cf. IOG 142 fn. 17), he too will take this as an authorisation.
§143). It thus has “a type of evidence all its own” (I §143). Third, as evidence provides a form to predicate of, and intentionality seeks its object, the Idea in the Kantian sense must thus demand that the partial and finite content be given as essential unity with the infinite. For it

demands the transparent givenness [in evidence] of the Idea of this infinity. (I §143)

These relations combine to make it what Derrida, in accordance with Kant (CPR A508/B356), will call a “regulative ideal”, which never can appear in simple phenomenological evidence (IOG 139, I §143, cf. CPR A 617/B 645).

Fourth, it must never appear as particular pure content in phenomenological evidence as itself. First, its evidence is general, and second, its evidence is never a simple phenomenological evidence (it “never phenomenalises itself” (I §143, cf. CPR A313/B369, IOG 137)). Yet, insofar as essential and particular relations certainly appear, it must demand content besides itself. This might be a pure Object, or a content (Husserl calls this “X” (I §§143, 145)).

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150 Boyce Gibson translates “evidence” in this section as “insight”, which Husserl deems earlier in the Ideas is “evidence in general” (§137). Derrida translates it at “evidence”.

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Fifth (forward), following from this demand and the given finite and thus partial content, Husserl explains, the Idea in the Kantian must allow the X to be repeated as
ever one and the same (I §143, OOG 166, cf. I §145).

The Idea in the Kantian sense must allow closer convergence on “complete givenness” (the whole) in infinitum, by repeatedly identifying the content (“X”) as the same.

However, sixth, that it is “demanded” (I §143) that the repetition be infinite, even as absolute, does not yet determine or even necessitate that the series is given as an infinite (forward), thus nor yet that the series is determined as finite or indefinite. It must rather be more closely defined as infinite in its directions. Husserl explains that

this continuum is more closely defined as

infinite in all directions (I §143).

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151 Husserl explains of the “Object” that it “first comes forward as a noematic X […] it appears further as the title for certain connexions of the reason” (I §143).

152 For “on principle we could only have inadequately appearing (thus inadequately perceivable) objects. But we must not overlook the modifying qualification we made: inadequately perceivable, we said, within the finite limits of appearance.” (I §143).
Nevertheless, seventh, the Idea in the Kantian sense, which must exceed evidence and finite or indefinite relation (beyond) nevertheless instils the necessity of complete givenness of the infinite as an absolute telos, for

as Idea (in the Kantian sense), the complete
givenness is nevertheless prescribed – as a connexion

of endless processes of continuous appearing,

absolutely fixed in its essential type. (I §143,

Husserl’s emphasis first)

It must thus return to its evidence, which is never phenomenological, restoring a circularity.\(^{153}\)

\(^{153}\) Neither Husserl nor Derrida overtly develop the relations to Kant. In brief, Kant writes that the idea of the reason is a “regulative principle” that instructs us to attain the absolute necessity of the object. However, as a faculty without the empirical content of the understanding, “the idea of reason cannot then be regarded as valid [a part of logic] – except as a rule for the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions, according to which we must proceed from the conditioned, through all subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned, although this goal will never be attained” (CPR A508/B356). That is, following this demand, the understanding must “scrutinise appearances” (CPR A125) to unite the totality of its conditions of possibility in accordance with a rule, to arrive at a judgment of absolute necessity of the object. However the accumulation of conditions in this series is never sufficient for the understanding to determine the totality in a judgment, and the progress continues (in infinitum or indefinitum (cf. 282 fn.)). As Fisher and Watkins summarise, whatever “reason demands”, nevertheless, “one can say that reason does not constitute the object, but rather regulates the understanding (and the relations between its judgments) and it does so by directing the understanding to act as if the world were constituted in a particular way despite the fact that the understanding may not have been given intuitions that would warrant constituting objects in this way.” (FW 381). There are myriad divergences from
Finally, we note that the Idea in the Kantian sense necessitates that the relations be “determined a priori” (I §143), in accordance with “an established dispensation of essential order” (I §143). The Idea in the Kantian sense would accord with the necessities of the originary nexus. Moreover, it applied to “all realities” (Realitäten). The Idea in the Kantian sense can pertain to finite relations as real. Even so, we caution, the Idea in the Kantian sense merely proceeds by necessity. It does not yet determine or require absolute possibility.

**Summarising the requirements and parameters**

How, then, can the object be determined absolutely? At this juncture we can explain some of the parameters and requirements for an answer (i.e. conditions of possibility). As to the parameters, any approach would need to accord with pure a priori law. It would need to proceed in accordance with levels and directions, which are also those of intentionality. Second, to be Husserlian, it must proceed via a reduction, and its whole-part relations of finitude in immanence. The reduction would need to make material content into irreal content, to allow for the irreal to again constitute the real (and material). Third, it would need to be a real rather than merely an analytic pure possibility or fact.

Husserl, notably that – as Derrida adds – Husserl never develops any privileged sense of the “understanding”. The relations are Husserl’s.  

154 As Derrida explains in the “Introduction”, for Husserl the region of Nature includes that of natural spatiality (IOG 32).
As to the requirements, we thus note that any of these would suffice: at what we deem the “far side”, the real object must be determined in space and time, as ever one and the same. It must thus be a fact, which is true at all times and places, for everyone. Second, the object must be determined as the Same in space and time, and thus as an eidetic fact (or Fact), and True. Either must no longer be contingent, thus must no longer allow the possibility of falsity. However, at the “originary” and a priori side, an absolute and originary ground of possibility for constituting ideal Objectivity must be found. Only this originary ground would permit the possibility to begin constituting the ideal object.

To unite these components, we note four direct requirements. First, such a ground must be possible in space. Second, the ground must be possible in time. Third, real possibility would need to hold in accordance with intentionality, as the form of consciousness of something. Fourth, a real possibility for the “beyond” by remaining in immanence would also suffice. Finally, a possible foundation by means of the Idea in the Kantian sense, which thus far remains necessary, would determine this absolute. Determining an absolute ground or truth for any of these would meet Derrida’s demand for the absolute from 1954. Next, we assess Derrida’s progress in 1962, as he seeks to do so.
Chapter Three: Toward the Absolute as Passage (the “Introduction”, 1962 pt. 1)

Introduction

This chapter turns to Derrida’s first published work, dated 1962, the “Introduction” to Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry”.\textsuperscript{155} We will begin to assess the work from its middle sections (Section IV ff.). Derrida will set out a sequential progress addressing each requirement in the order above. First, however, Derrida will develop the bases by which he can question the problem of origin to allow for the possibility of an answer. Second, he will address the material thing in space, and its origin in time, to develop the criteria for his questions. These will indeed be those of an absolute ground of possibility, and absolute determination of the fact. Third, he will assess these questions in address to language in general. In so doing, Derrida will develop the circularity of the Idea in the Kantian sense as “analogous” in the relations, rather than a solution. Thereafter, Derrida will take the Idea in the Kantian sense as authorisation. He will directly address the requirements of space, time, and intentionality in general, and then the beyond by means of the Idea of God, to assess the possibility of the

\textsuperscript{155} The “Origin” was written in the early 1930’s but published as an Appendix to Husserl’s “The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology” of 1936 (hereafter, “Crisis”).
absolutely real. None of Derrida’s approaches will yet absolutely ground or absolutely verify the possibility of an external and objectual absolute. Instead, the analogies will imply a continuing a priori circularity as “passage”, and Derrida will revise his demand to accept an immanent, a priori, essential and pure absolute. This will be the “Absolute as Passage”. In our next chapter we will work out how Derrida develops this implication toward deferral and Difference.

The Origin as palimpsest for the levels

In the 1930’s Husserl began to deem that European science had been the recipient of a “tradition” and cultural world of truths (as theories, formulae etc.), but had neglected its responsibility to enquire into their provenance. Moreover, the empirical sciences employed a method that no longer even questioned the possibility of their object. To remedy this “bankruptcy” of “responsibility” (IOG 36) and naïve objectivism, the task was set for phenomenology as a Rückfrage (literally, “return question”) to uncover its origin by assessing the object.

In the “Origin of Geometry”, Husserl selects geometry as an exemplary science to do so. His aim is still that of determining an ideal science (forward). Second, as acts of geometry are constituted in space, Husserl deems that such objects (forward) take the form of the spatial thing (IOG 32). Third, geometry has certainly been provided to the community by the historical
tradition. Hence the subject certainly has access to the history of these syntheses sedimented in the geometrical object. The subject can work toward explicating that object (forward) from one particular synthesis of geometry to another (cf. OOG 159). Such a completed project would allow the reactivation of the primal institutive act of geometry in the essential history sedimented in the subject’s originary self-evidence (backward) (OOG 160, IDG 29, IOG 45). The successful reactivation of the origin would be the eidos of geometry.

Derrida thus from the first takes Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry” (henceforth, “Origin”) to be a palimpsest for Husserl’s project as it had matured by 1931 into transcendental subjectivity (IOG 29). The directions proceed “forward” in subjectivity through particular objects, with the necessity to determine the origin as a one particular object, in order to return “backward” to the

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156 Derrida had done so even in 1954. In bringing his student essay toward a close, Derrida had deemed that Husserl’s “Origin” holds at a “level” below the basic directions in Husserl’s approach to history and the origin. In turn he deemed that the latter depended upon Husserl’s prior analyses. Thus, as to the whether the regressive method to the origin will necessarily be “indefinite”, Derrida noted that “[t]his is a question that cannot be posed at the level [niveau] of the Origin of Geometry. This latter – and this is true of the whole of Husserl’s philosophy of history – remains finally below the constitutive analyses which have nevertheless preceded it.” (PG 165, PDG 264). The “Introduction” of 1962 is thus revealed as Derrida’s sustained attempt to answer a question that he had posed as a culmination of his approach in 1954. Moreover, it will do so in accordance with his concerns for the origin, directions, and “law” of 1954.
Moreover, Husserl deems that these directions are applicable to any invention:

[O]bviously it is the same here with every other invention (OOG, 159, Husserl’s emphasis).

For Derrida, the geometrical project corresponds to the basic directions of approach to any object (IOG 25 ff.). He emphasises that

[t]he ideal object is the absolute model for any object whatever, for objects in general. (IOG 66)

The model of levels and directions is made absolute, in the sense of “primary”. It will be basal to Derrida’s progress.

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157 Derrida quotes Fink’s division in a footnote, between Husserl’s “logical explication” (our intentional and logical movement “forward”) and reactivation of the “tradition of sense-formation” (backward). Fink writes that “when reactivation in the first sense [“explication” forward] is completed, when it comes to an end, only then does reactivation as return enquiry concerning the “primal instituting” begin” (Fink 1939, 215; in IOG 55). Explication “forward” (of the intentional object, across) in time must be completed first. The direction “forward” will be the first direction. How it can occur is just what Derrida is enquiring into.
The addition of levels

However, in 1962 Derrida will more obviously allow for levels. The progress of parts from one to other (forward), determined as a totality, would rise to a higher essential level (IOG 45, IDG 29).

As Husserl summarises:

[C]learly, then, geometry must have arisen out

of a first acquisition [and is] not only a mobile

forward process from one sort of acquisition to another

but a continuous synthesis […], all make up a

totality such that […] the total acquisition is, so

to speak, the total premise for the acquisition

of the new level (OOG 159).

Derrida will assess how this origin can be determined (forward), in order to “acquire” the levels that Husserl takes as a premise.

Part One: from science to the opening

The reduction to “this side” of exact sciences

First, as Husserl had deemed that the “crisis” of objectivism and origin holds of all European sciences, Derrida must assess how to approach geometry as a particular science. Moreover, as to his
concern, Derrida will assess how his demand for the “truth” of the origin ought to apply. In so doing, he will begin to develop the structure of his teleology as passage.

First, as geometry is a mathematical science, Derrida rapidly seeks to retract from “exact” scientific approach. He will rather seek to allow enquiry into an essential basis prior to mathematics. As noted, the ideal of an “exact” science is to determine the truth or falsity of its object by means of its formulae etc. (217). Derrida takes this to apply to mathematics. The latter proceeds by means of prior axioms. However, for Derrida, even axioms are dependent for appearing upon prior relations of “axiomatics in general”. In turn, even axiomatics in general depends upon 

\textit{originary relations} which allowed the \textit{formation of their “sense” (sens)}. “Formations” are made necessary moments “behind” even form (henceforth “behind” implicitly holds as “\textit{always already}” so, and we take this to hold as \textit{necessarily prior}).\textsuperscript{158} Derrida quotes Husserl that:

\begin{quote}
\textit{[O]riginary evidence must not be confused with the evidence of ‘axioms’ for axioms are in principle already the results of originary formations}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{158} That formation is prior to form will be important to Derrida in 1967 (901).
of sense, and have this sense *always already behind*

them (OOG 165, IDG 41-42, cf. IOG 65, our emphases).

As noted, since 1954, the difficulty for Derrida was that even form does not yet appear as content. Hence axiomatics in general requires “an originary evidence” for its content (IDG 42, cf. IOG 52), yet that evidence has not yet appeared itself. Mathematics is “already exiled from the origins to which Husserl now wishes to return” (IDG 42, IOG 55).

Such an origin would be *prior to mathematical truth and falsity*. Importantly, mathematical propositions concerning the origin do not yet have *values* of truth and falsity (IDG 43, IOG 56). In accordance with logic, *Derrida deems that propositions without values of truth or falsity are “open”* (cf. ODP 270).159 “Values” for Husserl are those noemata arising as *doxic positing* prior to material content – Husserl’s examples are “goodness” and “badness”. As doxic (believing (200)), open propositions nevertheless allow for a

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159 The *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* defines an “open sentence” as “[A] sentence containing free variables, i.e. an expression that is not itself interpretable as true or false” (ODP 270).
consciousness of the *possibility* of truth or falsity in general (I §116).\textsuperscript{160} In turn, they keep a value.

However, from above (222), values too depend on the prior *sense-formation of truth in general*. In turn, that truth or falsity in general are the basic options holds from a prior assumption of *bivalence* (two values). Derrida argues for

\begin{quote}

a truth, or rather a [...] truth-sense in general,

which does not permit itself to be bound by

the alternative of ‘true’ or ‘false’ (IOG 56).
\end{quote}

Thus Derrida is never dispelling truth or falsity in general, but assessing what holds of them when the concern is to determine such truth-sense. As truth in general, or rather truth-sense in general (behind) has not yet appeared as particular evidence, from this juncture mathematical truth and falsity hold as originary contents along with axioms. They are deemed “equi-valent” to Husserl’s “formal implication” of axioms (I §72, IOG 156, (199)).

\textsuperscript{160} As Husserl puts it, in the pure noetic phases “there is constituted no new determining marks of the mere ‘material’ [Sachen], but values of the materials [...] [such as the noemata] goodness and badness; or the object for use [...] and so on; [These are] similar in function to the ‘possible’”. Thus, for Husserl, this doxic progress of values is still “positional” (I §116). That noted, for Husserl, such noetic phases are “grounded in the noemata” (I §116). Derrida has not yet accepted that such a ground can be found.
Thus falsity keeps a value, but as “disvalue” (Derrida no longer employs “falsity” alone). As Derrida seeks an origin prior to bivalence, importantly, he also seeks an approach prior even to “undecidable” propositions. The latter cannot be proven as true or false within an axiomatic system (PDP 224). However, by no means is Derrida seeking to dispute the rigour or validity of mathematical systems in general, or the difficulties raised by mathematical undecidability. He accepts their relevance but seeks to allow for his progress.

He seeks to do so via a long chain of implications. First, he notes that even undecidable propositions have a “value” (IDG 39-40, IOG 53). Hence, as values are doxic they still allow for the possibility of determination as true or false, which Derrida calls “decidability”. There must be some relation to the possibility of decidability before it can be deemed that a proposition is undecidable. He thus notes that undecidable propositions necessarily have some “reference to an ideal of decidability”. Thus the determination of truth, falsity and even undecidability depends upon a prior Idea (i.e. essence) of decidability.

Derrida has developed the necessity of dependence upon at least one Idea (essence). The latter is required even for the Idea of

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161 Disvalue is no longer a negation of truth. We will explain below how Derrida sets aside negation.
truth-sense. Hence truth-sense in turn depends upon a formation of such truth sense. Derrida thus deems that even un decidable propositions depend on the formation of the truth-sense of truth or falsity (behind). In turn, in accordance with Husserl, Derrida notes that such a dependence of mathematical propositions in general – true, false or undecidable – also requires a grounding to begin to constitute value.

Hence Derrida goes on that his “kinds” of concerns with the formation of truth-sense seek a prior ground to those concerned with a ground for mathematical determinability (IDG 41, IOG 54). As noted, dispelling the latter would be unwarranted in that Husserl too was often accepting of mathematical rigour (cf. I §7), and thus sympathetic to mathematical grounds. Derrida is thus able to deem that Husserl wanted mathematics in general to be his “secondary grounding” (IDG 41, IOG 54-55). Moreover, Derrida has worked out how Husserl could feasibly do so.

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162 Derrida is seeking to protect Husserl’s overall progress, in that Husserl’s “confidence” in mathematics had been “seriously threatened” by the work of Gödel in 1931. Note that Derrida is avoiding engagement with, but endorsing Gödel’s theorems. The latter had demonstrated that “in any consistent system” that “an arithmetical sentence can be found that cannot be derived within that system” (PDP 224). Gödel deemed these “undecidable” propositions, and also noted that his proof applies “to the axiom system of set theory” (Gödel 1986, 194-195). The latter formalises whole-part relations. Thus Derrida puts it that “[E]ven if Husserl at one time adopted the conception of grounding axiomatics and even proposed it as the ideal for all ‘exact’ eidetic disciplines (Ideas I §7 [...]”), it seems he only considered this to be a secondary grounding” (IDG 41, IOG 54). However, Derrida retracts even from what Husserl on occasion might have wished, for “without doubt” these kinds of enquiry would seek to be prior to axiomatics in general. Thus Derrida from the first hives off that part of Husserl who had since been demonstrated to have untenable aims.
From this juncture, and at least as far as 1967, Derrida will no longer align with systems that seek to determine truth via axioms (that is, “deductive” systems). He rather opts for “formal implication” in the fashion of Husserl (I §72, IOG 56, (199)). The latter, we note, seeks to proceed by “inference” from formal relations and its “directions”. Moreover, it does so to find a “ground” (behind) to judge upon the fact (forward) (PR §39). Such approach still allows for essential laws such as Contradiction, which remains crucial to any thought that seeks sense (LI §14 (188 fn.)). Derrida continues to seek this ground by pursuing the implications of his enquiry.

The teleology of opening

First, note that Derrida by seeking a ground avoids deeming that a prior dependence upon the ideal of decidability determines that

163 Derrida’s claim of the dependence of mathematics upon the ideal of decidability is broad, and would be indefensible were it a polemic, as there are many sorts of mathematical approaches. To support how he seeks to allow his sort of enquiry from the logic of that era, we note merely that any variable (such as the “p” in “S is p”, or “x”) already arises from and is constituted by a positing consciousness. Gödel had developed his theorems in address to the *Principia Mathematica* of 1910 to 1913 (Russell and Whitehead, 1997). In 1937 the younger and still logical-positivist Quine noted that “[a]ll logic in the sense of the *Principia*, and hence all mathematics as well, can be translated into a language which consists only of an infinity of variables ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’, ‘x’’, etc.” (Quine 1937, 72). Derrida will ask how such variables come to be constituted.

164 Husserl explains, for example, that “[e]very principle of inference, every genuine axiom is in this sense groundless, as in the opposite direction likewise every judgment of fact” (PR §39, our emphases).

165 For example, Derrida adds that Husserl’s “confidence [in mathematical exactitude] did not have to wait long before being contradicted; […] particularly when Gödel discovered the rich possibilities of ‘undecidable’ propositions in 1931” (IDG 39, IOG 55). Derrida suggests that even Gödel’s results depend upon a prior consciousness, by someone considering them, that they contradict the tehs of deductive mathematical systems.
there is such an idea (i.e. essence). The latter would make his argument inconsistent, in that it could be false or undecidable. Rather, Derrida adds Husserl’s question. Importantly, for Husserl, a question follows from certainty, as a modality of doxic positing (I §103). That ideas are believed to hold rather develops the task of questioning the origin of the idea of decidability. This moment develops the beginning of Derrida’s teleology.

Thus in this sequence, Derrida can prepare to ask whether “undecidability” of mathematical propositions is no longer an ideal of determinability (or decidability), but already a determination (that is, a prior and positional determination). Yet Derrida is aware that it is not yet true or false even that undecidability is a determination; such a question still requires a ground. Hence Derrida will posit this question as a conditional. As we noted since 1954, a conditional begins as a hypothesis (we will develop this relation as we proceed (119)).

In turn, the above develops an initial sort of reduction, although applicable merely to the mathematical object in general. To ask if the ideal of decidability as an originary truth-sense prior to true or false content seeks at least a telos of purity. Following this

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166 Husserl writes: “[T]he way of “certain” belief can pass over into that of […] question” (I §103, Husserl’s emphases). Moreover, Husserl emphasises its circularity. He also puts it: “[T]aken in a completely general sense, questioning is the striving [forward], arising [from behind] from the modal modification, from the cleavage and obstruction [division and problem], to come to a firm judicative decision” (EJ §78, Husserl’s emphases).
retraction to a question, then when “investigating origins”, the “ideal itself of decidability […] is reduced” (IOG 56).

Thus, as Husserl did after his reductions, Derrida seeks to restore this ideal of truth as a task in pure phenomenology. He investigates the origin of the truth-sense in general of truth (forward). Note that Derrida never quite deems that he seeks a truth-sense prior to undecidability, which would be difficult to support. Rather, in this teleology, he questions the ground of possibility of a truth-sense prior to open propositions. To that end, note that the “open” too becomes an intentional object, and thus constituted. Derrida has not yet developed a retraction from a natural sort of space (cf. 237), and any such telos is still constituted. In 1962, Derrida thus deems this telos of a constituted origin of the open the “opening” (ouverture).167 Importantly, as he seeks to return to determine the truth (i.e. the truth-sense) of the origin, Derrida still seeks to determine the truth-sense of the opening.

Moreover, the opening remains possible and certain. Thus, as for Husserl, progress to an opening is not yet precluded from particular progress in infinitum (208). However, Derrida asks if its possibility is already precluded from final determination. At this

juncture, he does deem this exclusion an *a priori* (essential) impossibility. For Derrida, as for Husserl, this impossibility is signalled by “cannot” (we will develop this too). However, rather than a position – which would invalidate his approach – Derrida has *worked out* that such an implication already arises as a *norm* (below, “should only”) by which to question the hypothesis of determination.

Thus to assess the implications for mathematics in general, Derrida is able to summarise the chain of implications above. He is able to *ask*, and *a fortiori* without polemics, *but allowing for his task*:

> what is *mathematical determinability in general, if the* undecidability of a proposition, for example, is still a mathematical determination? *Essentially,*

> such a question cannot expect a determined result

> [réponse], it *should only* indicate the *pure opening* of

> an *infinite horizon* [of possibility].” (IDG 43-44, IOG 56, our emphases).

As the origin is first an object, only proceeding “forward” to the opening will allow a “return” to the origin. Importantly, *Derrida refers to this telos by the verb “to open”.* That which first allows opening
is a condition for truth and falsity, and thus a condition for response to the question. He is working out how

only a \textit{teleology can open [s’ouvrir]} a passage toward

the \textit{beginnings}. (IDG 54, cf. IOG 64, DLG 31

(cf. 808), our emphases)

Moreover, note that Derrida deems this implication of a progress forward with a telos that it can open the origin backward a “passage” (cf. Lawlor, 2002). He thus begins to assess how passage in general can occur.

\textbf{Part Two: the permissions for the question}

\textbf{The first preparation – the ideal object in space}

First, Derrida addresses the progress “forward”, in space. To begin, note that the geometrical object is still mathematical (Derrida merely allowed for seeking its prior ground). As geometry pertains to spatial form, Husserl deems geometry is a \textit{material} ontology (IOG 32). The geometrical object is thus a spatial thing appearing in the region of Nature (IOG 32).\footnote{Derrida writes: “geometry is a material ontology whose object is determined as the spatiality of the thing belonging to Nature” (IOG 32). Husserl writes: “it is the \textit{essence} of a material thing to be a \textit{res extensa}, and that consequently geometry is an ontological discipline relating to an essential phase of such thinghood, the \textit{spatial form}” (I §9, in IOG 32, Husserl’s emphases).}
Next, Derrida indeed *deems that material ontology is* “subordinated” to formal ontology (167). He thus prepares to apply the correspondent relations of formal ontology that will delineate the necessities of material ontology (167). Derrida’s argument is much easier to comprehend upon noting that he works out the relations of material ontology at each juncture by means of formal ontology. He can slide from address to history or a thing, to ideal objects, yet the form remains basic.

**The retraction through prior dependencies**

As did we, Derrida begins from intentionality (153 ff.), to retract to prior essential dependencies of formal ontology. The geometrical thing depends upon a formal relation of appearing as something. To appear as something in particular (forward), *everything* must first appear as an object, and thus first depends upon the *category* of the Object (backward)(155). Yet as it must first be an object, Derrida proceeds at the level of essential generality (156), which predicates generality of the object (forward). *Everything – including the origin of geometry – first depends upon the category of the object in general* (155 ff.). This instils

the *initial direction* of phenomenology: the

object *in general* is the final *category* [behind] of
Thus, he questions the *origin* of the object in general (Object). As such an origin has not yet been constituted, he thus questions its Objectivity (forward). Yet as noted, Derrida first seeks a ground for this Objectivity, and thus for its possibility. The question from our second chapter (148) takes “its sharpest form” as:

‘How is ideal Objectivity possible?’ (IOG 67, cf. OOG 160, 163)

However, Derrida adds the telos (i.e. *the object of the demand*) of determining this Objectivity as *absolute*. Husserl proceeds “as if [his] theme were”

the *genesis of the absolute Objectivity* of sense

169

(IOG 63, Derrida’s emphases).

Derrida concedes, we note, that this “absolute” demand was never quite Husserl’s. Thus far, he has developed the first

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169 The “as if [it] were” is the phrase upon which Derrida’s reading turns – in employing a subjunctive conditional, Derrida avoids positing this of Husserl, committing to it himself, or positing directly of an absolute genesis. Derrida will let go of this supposition and re-orientate his explanation of what Husserl seeks of the absolute, in closing.
question from our previous chapter – enquiry into the absolute ground of possibility of ideal Objectivity (behind)(cf. 214).

Next, Derrida is still questioning the possibility of the essential relations. In turn, such questioning of the object occurs by means of (the region of) subjectivity in general (forward). The latter restores questioning of essential generality as to the pure relation of an “inside” to consciousness.

The progress “forward” again

At this juncture, Derrida begins to restore a concern for content. As we explained, a purely formal ground remains analytic (195). Even a subjectivity in general must determine a fact of “real” or material content (in particular, that content is the mathematical thing). Derrida thus deems that Husserl’s approach arises from a concern holding since at least 1907:

[How can subjectivity go out of itself in order to encounter or constitute the object? (IOG 63, IOP 17, our emphases)]

This was our final question in our previous chapter. The demand (“in order to”) is that subjectivity (in general) exceed its inside even to begin to constitute even the originar object as outside (97 ff.).

170 Derrida also finds this question in FTL §10, cf. IOG 63 fn. 38.
From facticity to the two questions

Yet Derrida seeks for this object (forward) to be absolute. It must thus indeed be “invariant” (IOG 47), and determined without possibility of error. To “go out of” itself (forward), subjectivity must indeed “encounter” the object as a fact. Derrida explains this by the word “facticity” (facticité). That an object can be a fact is certain, which is predicated of it as its facticity. Yet a certain object is not yet determined as truly itself; “facticity” in French also has the sense of “artificiality”. As not yet truly itself, facticity in French also has the sense of contingency (170). In turn, as not yet determined as truly itself it can be false here and now.171

Derrida thus allows for the necessity to consider truth both in space and time. Subjectivity must indeed begin from the facticity of an ideal object (forward) to judge upon it as true no longer merely “here and now”, but in all times and places for everyone. It must be an eidetic fact (Fact) (IOG 47).

Hence Derrida asks, of this sequence that began from the problem of the truth-sense of evidence:

171 Leavey translates “facticité” as “factuality”, which we have changed as we progressed. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy explains the issue in English thus: “[T]he question of […] facticity is whether a commitment is apt for truth” (ODP 134). Derrida is indeed seeking to question whether (doxic) commitments in general are apt for truth.
How can evidence give rise to an ideal and true object for ‘everyone’, [...] uprootedness out of every ‘here and now’ facticity, etc.? (IDG 52, cf. IOG 63, our emphases)

Derrida has re-orientated the approach to ask the two versions of his question from our previous chapter (214). At the originary side, he asks (demander) whether the subject can absolutely ground (i.e. affirm) the possibility of ideal Objectivity. At the “objectual” side, he asks whether the subject can absolutely determine the truth of the Fact at all times and places (IOG 63). However, such a Fact is not yet material.

The reduction by essential necessity

For Derrida is still assessing the mathematical thing, as essentially “here”. As noted, subjectivity in general is no longer external to essence. Its pure form is that of a subjectivity in general that addresses objectivity. Derrida aligns this with the pure form of intentionality (IOG 64). In turn, subjectivity in general must question objectivity as to its facticity. For Derrida, this conforms to essential necessity. As we noted, the latter progresses from essential generality to objectivity in order to permit contingency (184).
Derrida takes it for granted that essential necessity corresponds to material necessity. In turn, we worked out how essential necessity thus predelineates the necessities and possibilities of particular objects in material ontology (170, 183 ff.). Yet as ontologies never appear besides as an object, such a sense of the originary act in material ontology (the first act in history) must be found in the particular and constituted object:

[T]he sense of the constituting act can only be
deciphered in the web of the constituted object.

And this necessity is not an external fate, but an essential necessity of intentionality (IOG 64, our emphases).

Derrida has effected a second sort of partial reduction. This mathematical thing in space is thus no longer quite real, material, or a “natural existent”. Its necessities and possibilities are questioned insofar as they pertain to the ideal object of formal ontology. Thus nor is this yet the noema (IOG 66). Derrida emphasises:

[t]his ideality of the object, i.e. here, of the mathematical thing itself, is not the non-reality of
Derrida has not yet worked out a “final” reduction, but is still progressing via eidetic logic.172 However, he has restored the possibility of address to the facticity of the mathematical and spatial thing in accordance with the formal relations of the ideal object.

**The second preparation – the temporal object**

Next, Derrida must allow for questioning of the geometrical object as true for everyone at all times. He thus addresses temporality and history. For the mathematical object of geometry in space also has an origin in time, in its history (backward). A “primally instituting” (cf. EJ §50) constituting act of geometry must have occurred (behind), for the object of geometry is certainly intended (across).173 The geometrical origin appears in evidence.

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172 Thus Derrida refers with approval to irreality in a footnote (IOG 66), but refrains from deeming the ideal object is yet irreal. He merely deems that the ideal object is “more objective than the real object, than the natural existent. […] Therefore, the real object can never retain that absolute Objectivity which can be proposed for all subjectivity in general in the intangible identity of its sense.” (IOG 66-67, our emphases).

173 To support this, Derrida quotes Husserl that geometry “has, from its primal institution, an existence which […] – of this we are certain – is accessible to all men”(OG 160, IOG 65). In general (as Husserl explains of acquisition of the invention, above), the evidence of a content provides access both to what necessarily must have occurred, and certainly occurs because its evidence must first have occurred. By this the movement from past to present arises as sedimented in the object. Husserl ever implies the implicit maxim ‘Ex nihilo nihil fit’. That is, when ‘Out of nothing, nothing comes’, then when something comes, it has come and was never absolutely nothing.
Thus certainty indeed holds even *without* a material (spatial) instance of this act. That is,

[S]ince the first geometrical evidence has had
to conform to this pattern, we can have a first
certainty about it in the absence of any other
material knowledge. (IOG 62, OOG 160).

As a first certainty holds without materiality, the origin of geometry is taken as an instance of the general “model” for any such origin of an object (forward). Thus the levels of origin are added. The geometrical approach corresponds to any approach to the *essential* origin of the object. Derrida had earlier noted that

geometry would equate to the *original origin of*

*any object* of consciousness (IOG 25).

To the “originary” and “certain” Derrida has added the “original” (204). Indeed, the latter is taken to be the predicate of the particular object (the origin in general), which in turn remains essential (behind).

Yet as with the spatial object of science in general, the “primitive genesis” is “already done, its sense being already evident” (IOG 62). Derrida had mobilised the “already” as support in retracting
from deductive mathematics to a certain truth-sense prior to originary evidence (behind). From this juncture, the “already” instil the difficulty (98), as he is seeking for the origin (forward). Thus while Husserl indeed takes the originary moment as support given his “profound decision” to take trivial evidence as his “principle of principles” (203) (IOG 62), Derrida notes that, as already given, evidence would be merely a “general” form.¹⁷⁴ No particular evidence of origin yet appears to be predicated of.

The implications of Derrida’s questions

Hence Derrida assesses the prior conditions for the directions in history. Thus far, the origin of geometry is certain, even without its materiality; it arises with evidence in general. For this originary constituting act in history to be evident as having occurred “after” the general relation that permitted it, the sense of “after” must already be available to the subject. An ideal relation must permit this sense of “after” (cf. IOG 65, OOG 160); hence this essence must not yet be wholly available here and now for the subject. Thus such employment of temporal directions must depend upon “supertemporal” essences. The latter, by their essence, do not yet appear even in temporality. In turn, temporality does not yet even appear in spatiality (cf. 134).

¹⁷⁴ Husserl, Derrida explains, “is content to recall that we know the general form of this evidence” (IOG 62, our emphasis).
This dependence upon an even purer relation necessitates a retraction further “backward” into a third sort of “reduction” (IOG 65) (cf. 448). Derrida worked out of the mathematical object that it depends upon an essential relation prior to originary content, which is then questioned as pure; the temporal “reduction” accords with these levels. He has developed the necessity to question a supertemporal essence that does not yet even appear in the general evidence of temporality. Yet such a return to the origin in passage still remains possible (228). Derrida goes on:

‘[B]efore’ and ‘after’ must then be neutralised

[reduced] in their facticity and employed in

quotation marks. (IOG 65, our emphasis)

Note, however the “facticity”. Derrida thus applies the implications developed en route, for “the necessity of this reduction has been justified at the outset” (IOG 65). The temporal origin in history too corresponds to a pure objectivity. Subjectivity in general again can question its objectivity (233). The necessities and possibilities of essential necessity still apply to allow the contingency of the ideal

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We address how “neutralisation” is an intentional basis for the reduction in more detail below (448). We also employ Husserl’s “behind” rather than “before” (222), as the former more obviously explains directions without seeming to privilege a temporal form.
object (IOG 64) (170, 183 ff., 235). Yet this investigation henceforth proceeds by essential logic (236). These allow questioning of the facticity of the pure material object. In an essential investigation, the subject can be wrong in judging that an originary act of geometry in history holds at all times for all men. Yet as this is a material object in time, the telos of such a facticity is no longer merely an eidetic Fact but a material fact.

Thus, in formal ontology, Derrida has allowed for the questioning of the grounds of ideal Objectivity. At the “objectual” side, he has allowed approach to the material and real object in space and time as to its facticity. He has developed the criteria by which necessities and possibilities from our previous chapter can be questioned. An “a priori and eidetic reading […] should be possible.” (IOG 66). He goes on:

[f]actual history can then be given free rein: […]

it will always more or less naively suppose the

possibility and necessity of the interconnections
described by Husserl. (IOG 65)

Only from this juncture (IOG 66 forward) can Derrida begin to assess his questions.
The transition to language in general

Henceforth, in our dissertation too, the directions are no longer employed naively. To be sure, Derrida’s reductions in address to the spatial object merely retracted to the truth-sense prior to the empirical and mathematical object, and then prior to a real or material natural existent. As to temporality, he has merely developed a reduction of directions from a certain geometrical origin. Derrida seeks to address the implications of these relations for the absolute object in general. He requires a broader reduction. His first address to his questions will also do so.

To allow this transition, Derrida notes that the sense of the word “after” is necessary for the evidence of the supertemporal essence. Hence this sense of the word is no longer bound to a single subjective temporality. The sense of the word “after” must be available at all times and places to “everyone”. In turn, the condition for this availability of the sense of the words “before” and “after” is permitted by language in general. This particular and material object is thus far the word. Language in general thus conforms to progress from generality to particular ideal objects. Hence language in general too conforms to ideal Objectivity.

Indeed, Derrida’s progress has been sequential. This sequence implies that even the formation of the truth – i.e. the truth-sense in general – of science in general has come to depend upon the prior premises of language in general. Yet the latter still depends
upon ideal Objectivity, and its eidetic relations. Derrida starts his next section:

> ideal Objectivity not only characterises geometrical and scientific truths; it is the element of language in general. (IOG 66)

Derrida begins to address his questions to language in general; and will do so overtly by means of the three levels.

*Part Three: beginning the assessment via levels*

**The three levels of language and their reduction**

Derrida has yet to work out the essential relations of language, and adds a level of particular languages. As noted, language in general (behind) too is “thoroughly made up of ideal objects” (OOG 161). *Its parts are particular languages.* The smallest part of a particular language that first appears as a material object is thus deemed the word (OOG 161).\(^{176}\) As Derrida must yet work out the reduction, he begins from the “empirical” moment of the appearing of the word. In turn, he seeks the absolute of a fact, true at all times and places. Thus in every language words must refer to the same

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\(^{176}\) The word is the most particular object. Husserl also refers to “Language itself in all its particularisations (words, sentences, speeches)”, each of which can be ideal objects (IOG 161).
thing. Only this “translatability” to every language would permit words to be true for all men, thus at all times and places.

First, note that just as anything and everything can become an intentional object (thus an ideal Objectivity), anything and everything for Husserl is “nameable”. Thus, at this lowest level, the word “lion” requires the empirical instance of a lion (IOG 70). In order for it to have been named (of this Derrida is certain), someone at some time must have seen something like a lion. This word is “bound” to the necessities of an empirical content. A judgment of a lion (forward) can only be contingent upon an encounter with a lion. Hence, it of all the levels can only be an “empirical fact” (IOG 70), bound to merely one time and place. It can least be true at all times and places.

Hence Derrida “crosses” (i.e. across, via correspondence) and rises to the “higher” level of ideal Objectivity (IOG 70, IDG 64), from the word to the particular language. This linguistic level accords with Husserl’s second level, in that when positions are taken from several languages, each can refer to a specific Objectivity that must be the same for each (I §85). The possibility of sameness has begun to be introduced. Indeed, at this second level, “the same content can be intended starting from several [particular] languages” (IOG 70, Derrida’s emphasis first).
But even such a language is not yet free of particular specification (e.g. the word “Löwe” occurs only once in German (IOG 67)). Moreover, this word is still “bound” to the necessities of an empirical content (that is, no-subject that speaks a particular language might yet have encountered a lion). The word lion, then, will not be absolute and universal. It will be empirically conditioned by the contingent [contingente] encounter […] [with] something like a lion. (IOG 71, IDG 63)

Thus while the sensible thing (a lion) “grounds its ideality” it does so merely as contingent. These levels allow neither an absolute ground nor “absolute” (and universal) translatability (IOG 71).

Derrida thus proceeds to the highest (“tertiary” (IOG 72)) level of language in general. This would be a “free” ideality, without tethering to words with their particular essences, but merely the Objectivity governed by the pure and formal laws of language in general, which in particular are propositions about ideal objects. Derrida thus makes the telos of truth overt. Such propositions about ideal objects can be repeated as the same (which holds for pure relations henceforth), and thus “the same for all” (at all times and places). For example, Derrida notes, I can repeat the assertion “The automobile is the fastest way to travel”, which was
true at one time, but “I know it to be false and out-of-date” (IDG 66, cf. IOG 73). Even this level

can still encounter a factual restriction: that of
disvalue, falseness (IOG 73).

However, this access to ideal Objectivity is certain, and must and can still be accessed (IOG 73). Derrida argues that such propositions “had been true” (IOG 74). Each possesses an “omnitemporality” as an essential relation no longer bound to an empirical contingency. Moreover, one can always distinguish that “about which” something is said, as independent of the assertion, as ideal Objectivities (IOG 75, OOG 74). In such essences,

we pass beyond and rid ourselves of the ideal,

but still bound, Objectivity of language [at the

lowest level]. We simultaneously reach an

Objectivity that is absolutely free with respect to

all factual subjectivity. (IOG 75)

Note the inclusion of “passage” as progress “beyond” the particular subject to the actuality. This level allows the absolute of Objectivity
– as defined since Chapter One, as without limit (IOG 72) even by language; as ideal fact, without possibility of falsity (195).\textsuperscript{177}

**Reduction to the lowest pure level**

However, nor would such an absolute possibility yet be acceptable. There is not yet a relation to a pure particular content, thus not yet a *ground*. The highest level merely and henceforth provides the *right* (*droit*) of relation of subjectivity to language (IOG 75). To relate to this content, Husserl “seems to redescend” to the lowest level of language (and its predicating of particular objectivity) (IOG 76).\textsuperscript{178} It turns out that “we see” this relation “in advance” (forward, thus from behind). That is, a particular content of language is already a

condition of possibility for absolute ideal Objectivity, for *truth* itself (IOG 76).

A fortiori, the “re-descent” is no longer in address to an *empirical particular*, but to the *particular instance of an ideal language no longer bound to content*. It is intended as “pure possibility”. Such pure objects (such as a “lion”, or “geometry”), are henceforth established as *irreal noemata*.

\textsuperscript{177} Derrida writes: “[T]he ideal Objectivity [...] is absolute and without any kind of limit” (IOG 72).

\textsuperscript{178} Derrida puts it that: “Husserl then seems to redescend toward language as the indispensable medium and condition of possibility for absolute ideal Objectivity, for *truth* itself” (IOG 76).
Derrida has worked out how a reduction to pure and a priori phenomenology can occur via whole-part reasoning, to determine essential Objectivity in general. This

brings to its final completion the purpose of

the reduction itself. (IOG 76)

This instils our parameter of the reduction for pure phenomenology in general. Intentionality (across) is thus consciousness of the particular in the pure and general relations of language, and the descent to the lowest level remains pure (henceforth, taken in its reduced sense). At this juncture, Derrida can ask his questions of language in general in pure phenomenology.

Parentheses – the turn toward signifying

This situates what will be helpful to appreciate Derrida’s language up to 1967. Language in general and logic are correlative, thus conformant in address to ideal Objectivity. Hence, for Husserl, necessity, possibility and negation are expressible by their noematic correlates “must”, “can”, “not” (cf. I §106 (187))). However, Derrida sought to retract from axiomatic systems. The reduction to pure phenomenology in address to the object in general developed from language in general. Even should deductive logic in general be set aside, the prior foundation upon language in general still allows the ideal object in general to be
The correlative intentional verbs of signifying (to speak, call, name, designate, mean (signifie), express, announce, say, and so on) can still be employed to name ideal objects. So too can “thinking” be employed, which form is that of intentionality in general. In so doing, thinking and speaking still conform to the essential levels and directions. Such possibility holds even when logical propositions imply an opening (cf. 283). Language and logic will continue to be inseparable. However, Derrida often employs verbs of signification (or thinking) to refer to ideal objects.

Parenthesis: avoiding a confusion with the sign

Hence we must forestall a confusion. Derrida is able to do so without yet addressing a “sign”. The French “signifies” (signifie) is a standard term for “means”, and also has the sense of “implies”. “Designate” has the sense of “referring to” and “naming”. The French terms can refer to a sign (by 1965 they will overtly do so); but are not yet bound to it. Derrida’s concern in 1962 is not yet with Husserl’s sign (Zeichen) of 1901, nor the meaning (Bedeutung)

179 For example, Derrida explains in 1967 that “[T]he subject S must be a name, the name of an object.” (VP 80-81, cf. SP 73, cf. FTL §13).
180 Thus, for instance, Derrida proposes of the undecidability of mathematical propositions, as noted above, that their “unity is still to come on the basis of what is announced in its origin” (IOG 53, our emphasis second).
181 Cf. VM 127, VeM 443.
182 Since the Logical Investigations Husserl had divided these into a double sense, “expression” (Ausdruck) and “indication”. The former concern those senses of a sign intended for communicative meaning, and were aligned with writing and speech (cf. LI 1 §5). The second was aligned with senses of a sign – such as gestures, or knots in a handkerchief – never intended or believed to convey meaning, or to attain to the reality of an other (person) (cf. LI 1 §2 ff.). The word for “expression” (expression) in the “Origin” – Derrida notes – is
that develops in relation to it. Derrida will not yet address these until 1967 (SP, FM). In 1962, he remains concerned with sense (Sinn) in its directions (sens).

We must thus avoid a second confusion, as writing and speech will be major concerns for Derrida from 1965. At this juncture in 1962, Derrida goes on to address writing and speech. But he is not yet concerned with their relations to the sign, or even their relations to each other. Rather, for Husserl in the “Origin”, writing and speech are treated as parts of language in general. Derrida will ask whether the parts of language in general can absolutely ground the possibility of ideal Objectivity or the fact.

Parenthesis – the elision of negation

The reduction to the pure thus has an important logical implication. It is indeed the necessity of pure possibility that is required to exceed the life of one “factual individual” (the geometer) to converge upon this truth:

_Ausserung_, as an utterance, rather than _Ausdruck_ (IOG 77). Hence, Derrida also avoids mobilising the signitive intention, which Husserl introduced in the first Investigation and developed in the Sixth Investigation (LI 6 §70) since 1901. The latter nevertheless keep to the form of intentionality. As Husserl puts it, for example, signitive intentions are the ‘significative acts’ which give expressions meaning [Bedeutung], and which have […] a certain objectivity of reference” (LI 6 §70, our emphases). Derrida does not yet develop these relations (cf. our next footnote).

183 Cf. SP 36, FM 114 ff. When Derrida relates “Bedeutung” and “Sinn” in “Form and Meaning”, he correctly equates them with the levels (strata) of the noetic-noematic structure in the Sixth Investigation (FM 114 ff., cf. I §124).

184 Husserl in the _Logical Investigations_ relates writing and speech strongly to expression (Ausdruck) (cf. LI 1 §§5, 6 ff.), but never relates them directly to language in general.
[T]he Objectivity of this truth could not be constituted without the pure possibility of an enquiry into a pure language in general. (IOG 77, Derrida’s emphases)

Pure possibility is a condition from which to begin to constitute Objectivity from language in general.

However, Derrida has separated negation (signalled by its correlative “not” (I §106 (187)) from pure possibility, in that without such separation there could not be a reduction. There must first have been a negation to devolve from the outside to a reduction. However, from that juncture the negation of the outside must then be excluded. That is, by the re-descent a negation would determine an empirical instance (outside). It would preclude the pure possibility required for the reduction. Thus, Derrida stresses, every reduction “must be kept from being [...] a negation” (IOG 119, cf. also 86, 46 fn. 38). To avoid this, Derrida deems the difficulty of determination a pure essential impossibility (“cannot”). As preventing sense a priori, the latter does not yet necessitate a predicative possibility of the sense of Objectivity (forward). It thus precludes negation (“not”) of the possibility of ideal Objectivity. For example, Derrida explains:
as long as ideal Objectivity is not, or rather can not be engraved in the world [as empirical] [...]

then ideal Objectivity is not fully constituted.

(IOG 89, IDG 86, Derrida’s emphasis)

Even though the difficulty is that of a priori impossibility of determination, Derrida prefers this to the negation of that lack of determination. To be sure, what is essentially impossible implies what is necessarily not possible. This unsustainable exclusion of *predicative* negation (“is not”) will be set aside in 1964.

However, as to how this direct negation could be avoided in 1962, Derrida adds a condition that must hold forward. As noted, for *ideal* Objectivity to be possible, it must be possible at times and places that exceed the individual. Thus the ideal object must be able to be re-identified as *the same* (IOG 70, above, ff.). In 1962, Derrida takes it that what is *essentially* the same is not yet (or no longer) “not” something else. Derrida in 1962 excludes negation from passage, and pure phenomenology.185 This will be relevant in his next argument.

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185 Derrida explains several pages later: “the Living Present permits the reduction, without negation, of all alterity” (IOG 86). This occurs in his address to a single subject, which we explain below.
The next argument: assessment of speech

For having returned to the pure, Derrida returns to subjectivity. However, as he has returned a “completion” of the reduction, it is no longer a natural but a transcendental subject that employs language. Derrida henceforth avoids dividing subjectivity into an “ancient” history of the first geometer, and the “modern” geometer in his community. These would naively return the directions to a natural subject. Even a “modern” geometer would essentially have a history in these directions, and the possibility of explicating a judgment that would determine geometry absolutely. Derrida is rather concerned with the possibility of determining ideal Objectivity in pure phenomenology, and begins from the horizon of possibility to determine language in general (forward, and thus at its origin). As language in turn is employed by multiple subjects, Derrida explains,

at bottom [most basically, behind], the problem of geometry’s origin puts the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity on par with the phenomenological origin of language.

(IOG 79)
In 1962, Derrida follows Husserl to set aside the problems of intersubjectivity and the origin of language. Both are merely accepted as “interrelated possibilities” (IOG 79, OOG 161).

Given this interrelation, for Husserl, the “horizon” of man is not yet even singular. Rather, it depends upon the possibility of a language in general, which certainly gives the subject access to a community. Thus this language and community must have held a priori; the linguistic consciousness is already consciousness of other egos. As Derrida explains of at least “two men”, their languages

will appear to them at the bottom of an a priori structure: the linguistic community, i.e.

the immediate certainty of both being speaking subjects (IOG 81).

Thus Derrida returns to assessing the pure and a priori spatio-temporality of subjects in a world. Note that he no longer proceeds via the universal (cf. 241), which is dependent upon this prior possibility. Such a “classic sense” of “universal

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186 In “Speech and Phenomena”, Derrida notes that Husserl bracketed off the question of the origin of the essence of language in general across his entire “itinerary” (SP 7). Derrida from “Of Grammatology” of 1965 will enquire of this origin, and assesses the relations as indirectly pertaining to Husserl only in 1966. The origin of intersubjectivity in Husserl will be addressed in “Violence and Metaphysics” from our Chapter Five.
transcendental norms” (IOG 80), would retain the division between the historical subject in a natural history, and this “modern” subject with a history, a childhood and so on (IOG 80). Derrida continually prefaces the “universal” with the “possible” (IOG 79, 85, 87). This horizontal “we-consciousness” originally establishes the possibility even of a universal language (IOG 79).  

The finitude of translatability

This consciousness of a “pre-cultural we”, with a prior possibility of accessing universal language, instils the immediate certainty that the same thing is being perceived by two subjects. Derrida deems these speaking subjects. Such an “absolutely fixed” foundation ought to determine that the same objectivity is perceived here and now by speaking subjects. This ought to be an absolute but particular pure fact.

Derrida argues that, when the eidos in general has become a norm (telos), the essence of Nature is never wholly present. However, speaking subjects can share perceptions of material things only in Nature. Thus, for essential reasons, even when it is certain that the same thing is perceived, the natural ideal object appearing as such

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187 Derrida writes: “[C]onsciousness of being-in-community in one and the same world establishes the possibility of a universal language” (IOG 79). We develop this “same” just below.
is merely partial, and any subjects can still be wrong. Even when they agree that they perceive the same thing. Thus,

are not non-communication and

misunderstanding the very horizon of culture

and language? [...] Is not finitude the

essential which we can never go beyond?

(IOG 82)

As noted, Derrida has worked out an essential impossibility, precluding the horizon of possibility of determination of the absolute. Subjectivity is thus far constrained to finite knowledge, not yet going beyond itself to speak to a second subject (forward), and precluded from the pure fact.

**The speaking subject and the same**

Hence Derrida can devolve from the linguistic community to within a speaking transcendental subject. He assesses whether the single subject in a linguistic community can agree with itself that what it perceives is absolutely the same over time.\(^{188}\) For Husserl, from the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, the Ego – as essential, a

\(^{188}\) Derrida writes, the “world is consequently the universe of Objects which is linguistically signifiable in its being and its being such” (IOG 2, quoting OOG 162).
priori and general – constitutes of what is sedimented in
transcendental and sedimented bases inside itself; including
c Constituting egos in the community. Derrida deems this basis is
the “egological” speaking subject (IOG 86). Before I employ
language, I must be conscious of the sedimentations in myself as an
originary “we”. It is a condition of access to the absolute
possibility of Objectivity that the egological subject constitute the
“absolute origin to other absolute origins” (IOG 86, our emphasis)
in itself.

To this, Derrida adds the logical result of setting aside the negation
of the same in his reduction to the pure. What is no longer
negated cannot be not the same. This lack of an object that is no
longer “not the same” is merely predicated of as “other”. Thus the
egological subject, before constituting a relation to other egos,
must essentially constitute a certain Ego already in itself. It can
thus constitute the same thing from its position and in a
consciousness of the other ego’s position upon this thing (IOG
86).

Such a series adds a form of “temporality” (i.e. necessary and
essential rather than real). The single subject in this temporal
series (the “Living Present”) thus can constitute the same thing as
other inside itself over time. Derrida summarises that, inside itself, the position from

the Living Present permits the reduction, without negation, of all alterity. The Living Present constitutes the other as other in itself, and the same [thing] as same in the other [ego]. (IOG 86, our emphases)

We emphasise – when the suppression of negation is rescinded in 1964, this will amend the logical relations of the same in large measure, to add a “second direction”. In 1962, Derrida is following his requirements. A speaking subject, it seems, can agree with itself, as other to itself, that it is conscious of the same thing over time.

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Derrida summarises: “[B]efore being the ideality of an identical object for other subjects, sense is this ideality for other moments of the same subject” (IOG 86).

Derrida also employs the “same” in a blunt fashion in 1962 in relation to identity: what is the same in myself is a “coincidence [recouvrement] of identity” (IOG 86). This is not yet an identity, but a relation of two identities. However, Derrida has not yet developed the relations of this co-incidence that would divide identity as always other to itself. He does so from 1964 (cf. 508).
The relations “forward” as speech and writing

But nor is this yet an answer (réponse). For, Derrida explains, even a speaking subject as transcendental is by its essence tied to one time and community (IOG 87). It cannot provide an absolute access to history (forward) across all judgments in time.

But the latter is a condition for any essence. Thus a speaking subject by itself cannot absolutely ground the constituting of ideal Objectivity. Derrida goes on:

*By itself* the speaking subject, in the strict sense of the term, is *incapable of absolutely* grounding the *ideal Objectivity* of sense. (IOG 87, our emphases)

In turn, no possibility yet holds for the speaking subject to begin to constitute ideal Objectivity to determine a fact.

Hence Derrida develops the next part-whole relation; *writing* too is a part of language in general. For essential reasons, writing *can* perdure across time in the absence of a single subject, to permit

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191 Derrida avoids overtly mentioning that speaking subjects die, as this would restore the natural sense of a geometer in history. A reader might complain that the implicit basis for arguing that a speaking subject is tied to an “institutive community” (IOG 87) depends upon this essential relation anyway.
access to the origin in history. That is, moving forward, Husserl takes it as certain that this ground for possibility must have occurred. *After* having been written as true, writing perdures across history without the possibility of encountering falsity. For Husserl, writing thus permits a true judgment of *the same* thing at all times and places. In turn, this would absolutely ground ideal objectivity. Writing, it seems, will ensure the possibility that ideal Objectivity be *absolutely* true. Such a writing would be the “place of absolutely permanent ideal objectivities and therefore of absolute Objectivity” (IOG 88).

**Writing set aside in 1962**

Given that completion requires deeming that the partial object is the same while converging upon truth, and the speaking subject has been excluded from doing so, Derrida explains that writing is the primary condition of possibility and necessity for absolute completion:

> [T]he [pure] possibility or necessity of being incarnated *in a graphic sign* [...] is the sine qua

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192 Moreover, it seems, writing will assure “absolute ideal Objectivity – i.e. the purity of its relation to a universal transcendental subjectivity.” (IOG 87). Note that such possibility of universal transcendental subjectivity would be divested even of essential relation to speaking subject.
non condition of Objectivity’s internal completion. (IOG 89, our emphasis)

But that Husserl makes writing the sine qua non condition, we suggest, never implies that Derrida is privileging writing. He continues to seek an absolute ground for the possibility of ideal Objectivity (indeed, below, he will rather align the Absolute with essential Speech (IOG 139, 141, 149, (302))).

From lack of ground to opening

Thus writing too is set aside. That is, Derrida explains, Husserl took writing to permit the perdurance of what was already true (as above), but neglected to assess how this could have been made absolutely true in the first place (IOG 89-90). Such a moment requires an origin “outside” origin and “before” the particular instantiation of the sense of objectivity (indeed, this holds for

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193 Bernet suggested this privilege is basal to Derrida’s “Introduction” (Bernet 1989, 144-148); we address this in our “Contribution” section (390).

194 From 1966, that writing can perdure without a speaking subject will be important to Derrida’s developing of a kind of writing no longer necessarily bound to a human consciousness (cf. 859). At this juncture Derrida mentions Hyppolite’s suggestion of transcendental phenomenology as a “subjectless transcendental field” (IOG 88). Hyppolite made this comment, Derrida tells us, in the discussion following the lecture of Father Van Breda upon “The Phenomenological Reduction”, in Cahiers du Royaumont, 323. Derrida will never develop the “subjectless transcendental field” in 1962, as he will argue rather for the responsibility of the philosopher to continue questioning.

195 Derrida writes that what holds of speech is “a fortiori true for writing”, and asks, “but does not this linguistic embodiment permit [as a fortiori that of writing] to be understood as taking place outside the being sense of ideal Objectivity? […] Does not this formulation give the impression that ideal objectivity as such is fully constituted before and independently of its embodiment […]?” (IOG 89-90, Derrida’s emphases second and third).
speech too). Hence this instantiation too could have been false, which precludes the absolute ground of the possibility of ideality in general. This progress does not yet permit the constituting of a fact as true (i.e. in its truth-sense) at all times and places (forward). Just as for the speaking subject, Derrida deems that this transcendental sense of writing does not yet ground the possibility of ideal objectivity (IOG 92).

Having addressed language in general, writing and speech, Derrida summarises that whenever

sense must first be able to be set down in the

world and be deposited in sensible

spatiotemporality, it must put its pure

intentional ideality i.e. its truth-sense, in

danger. (IOG 92)

More than merely applying to what holds “here and now”, this endangering of truth-sense holds of transcendental subjectivity thus far for any instance of space or time, even in history. An absolute ground has not yet been found for the possibility of ideal Objectivity, nor yet for the absolute truth of a fact.

Even so, Derrida’s progress is remedying some of his relative immaturities from 1954, where he “verified” the problem at every
turn in his bivalent approach (146).\textsuperscript{196} In 1962 he as yet finds no ground even for the possibility of ideal Objectivity to be absolute, thus even to begin to constitute facticity as true (let alone True). As both speech and writing in particular retained the possibility of disvalue (IOG 73), Derrida notes that Husserl insists both speech and writing are necessary (IOG 80) and seeks to absolutely determine language in general.

**Univocity and equivocity as circularity**

Derrida only has the certainty, however, that language in general appears as words. The demand is that the intention determine the word, or words. Such words must be univocal (cf. LI 1 §32 ff.). Rather than implying only one essence, univocality would imply only one object, and have merely one sense – itself. Having retracted from truth to value, this “telos” is deemed the “positive value of univocity” (IOG 104). Such a positive univocity would determine a word as the same as itself at all times and places (IOG 101, cf. 70, IOP 35).\textsuperscript{197} It would provide an “absolutely selfsame” sense to the word. A positively univocal word would thus ground itself as an identity, and ground ideal Objectivity. Moreover, should all of the word’s senses be fixed in one word, this would set aside relation to an external essence or greater whole.

\textsuperscript{196} It was Derrida who later deemed that his outcome of ongoing verification of dialectic was immature (PdG xv, PG vii).

\textsuperscript{197} Derrida explains: “[a]s it brings everything to view within the present act of evidence, univocal language remains the same” (IOG 101, cf. 70).
(“language in general” (IOG 104)). That is, we note, univocity would imply that even part-whole relations vanish; language in general would be known absolutely. Positive univocity would be “absolute univocity” (IOG 104, cf. (271)). The form of Derrida’s questions have been developed again.

To situate this, Derrida notes that Husserl seeks the univocity of each word in a scientific language. This would set aside language as equivocal, which latter seeks to refer to multiple objects and essences via its words (Derrida’s provides the example of Joyce’s *Ulysses* (IOG 102, 103 fn. 112)). Husserl rather seeks to “impoverish” language to arrive at the “transparency” of a referent as the origin of the word.

Derrida begins from the initial component of passage – an undeniable (certain) univocity. He thus begins from the positing moment. Even should Joyce have wanted to write nonsense (“non-sens”), there “must have” been at least a consciousness of the intelligibility of his telos for Joyce in writing a word. An equivocal word must admit a first, a priori and undeniable moment of (particular) univocity, or its basis “would have been unintelligible” (IOG 103). Thus, Derrida argues, the “positive value of univocity” is a “common telos” even for equivocity (IOG 103)). This instils a first originary basis as positive; henceforth the positive progress is a priori.
As to the absolute determination of univocity from its first insertion into equivocity, Derrida argues by “reductio ad absurdum”. That is, he begins with the premise of absolute univocity to assess whether it is absurd. For a word as positively univocal to be a part of language, it requires a “network of linguistic relations”. It must thus be both with and without external relation. This “hypothesis” of a univocal language “is, then [done] absurd and [essentially] contradictory” (IOG 103). As we explained (185), what is absurd first has sense but is then excluded from a priori and essential relations (behind) at any level, and from directions (sens).

But just so, Derrida continues, this first univocity – as merely partial and finite – does not yet determine the absolute of univocity. Thus, partial univocity too as yet finds no absolute ground for its possibility:

the ground of univocity [...] is always relative

(IOG 104).

Univocity has to “re-admit” equivocity to its origin. However, as noted of Joyce, equivocity never appears even partially in the first constitution of this a priori positing. As it cannot be included in the first place to the horizon, equivocity would then be “irreducible” (IOG 103), in the fashion of temporality in Chapter One (131), as what certainly applies yet eludes appearing.
However, Derrida argues for Husserl, a scientific language has at least the certainty that its ideal objects can be asserted as repeatable “once and for all”, which can thus forever be repeatable as identical (IOG 104, OOG 165-166). This instils the horizon of possibility as an infinite progress of finite parts. Thus, as to irreducible equivocity in the first moment of passage, the undoubted moment of univocity in turn instils “the absolute horizon of equivocity” (IOG 104, our emphasis). The possible senses of equivocity are somehow predelineated by univocity, even though the latter’s ground is relative.

However (moving forward), an absolute equivocity would exceed a finite horizon. For instance, we note, it would be absurd – and thus already essentially impossible – to suggest a limit to the linguistic relations of poetry. Equivocity, thus far, implies irreducibility at both the origin and the end. Without a ground for or possibility of material content at origin, or as object, Derrida writes “there is a sort of pure equivocity here” (IOG 104). However, the relation at origin is “non-symmetrical”, in that even the first positing of equivocity is univocal. This is why “there is” even a sort of pure equivocity. Even though merely finite, a first

198 Derrida quotes Husserl that “[I]n accordance with the very essence of science, then, its functionaries maintain the constant claim, the personal certainty, that everything they put into scientific assertions has been said ‘once and for all’, that it ‘stands fast,’ forever identically repeatable, usable in evidence and for further theoretical or practical ends” (IOG 165-166).
univocal moment arises even with pure equivocity; however, equivocity is excluded from positing (irreducible).

Thus Derrida develops the partial relations of the “finite” in this certainty of repeatability (IOG 105). As the ground of univocity is also relative in the progress of (finite) parts it “takes its source in an infinitely open project” (IOG 104), without determination either as absolutely univocal or equivocal.

*Derrida has worked through each of the elements of language, and instead of determination has found an open relation.* He has not yet deemed this an “opening” prior to originary content. Rather, the progress “forward” does not yet absolutely determine the value of its object, but renders it open. Derrida goes on that, *if* equivocity is irreducible, this is because

words and language in general are not and

never can [i.e. essentially cannot] be absolute

*objects* [forward] (IOG 104, Derrida’s emphasis).

Thus far, for essential reasons, an irreducible equivocity prevents that words be absolute objects. However, even that emphasis is nested in a conditional form. Derrida proceeds by “hypothesis” (IOG 103). The “if” never affirms even the possibility of the antecedent (i.e.
the possibility that equivocity is irreducible). To affirm or deny even the ground of possibility for equivocity determines the irreducible, necessitating contradiction. No absolute foundation for either the univocity or equivocity of a word (thus nor of language in general) has yet been deemed possible or impossible.

*Crucially, in arriving at the “infinitely open project” rather than a ground for determination, Derrida is working out a pure circularity. His address to language in general has worked out that a first univocal moment is the a priori condition that permits passage toward a telos of itself as absolute (IOG 104). Univocity as

*the absolute horizon of equivocity [...] is both the

*a priori and the teleological condition [...] without

which the very equivocations of [...] history

[behind] would not be possible. (IOG 104-105, our emphases)

But this “absolute” a priori condition arises only as a partial univocity with only a relative ground (behind). It thus as yet falls short of absolute determination in the repeatability of either univocity and equivocity as open.
The circularity of language, as conformant to the Idea in the Kantian sense

This brings Derrida’s work in 1962 to an important juncture. We will summarise the characteristics of passage in the form of the circularity that has developed from univocity, and explain its parallel to the Idea in the Kantian sense.

First, a univocal moment is a necessary condition for intelligibility. We noted that the Idea in the Kantian sense is necessary for appearing (IOG 142, (210)).

Second, as even equivocality is relative only to univocity, the latter undeniably arises as a finite certainty. The second characteristic of the Idea in the Kantian sense was that its finite content remains certain (I §§143, 145, (210)).

Third, the common telos of the positive value of univocity, instilled a teleological consciousness. The third characteristic of the Idea in the Kantian sense was that it “demands” “givenness” (I §143, (210)).

However, fourth, Derrida worked out that an absolute univocity of a word would be absurd (IOG 103), thus the absolutely univocal itself cannot enter the originary moment in the first place. The

199 As Derrida puts it: “The Idea, then, is not essence. [Moreover,] it is also necessary to say of the Idea that it has no essence [...]. As the invisible condition of evidence, by preserving the seen, it loses any reference to seeing indicated in eidos.” (IOG 142, our emphases).
fourth characteristic of the Idea in the Kantian sense was that it never appear as finite evidence itself (211).

Rather, fifth, a moment of positive univocity applies as the horizon of equivocity, setting it an “infinite task” (IOG 104). Moreover (to proceed forward), a scientific language has at least the finite certainty that its ideal objects can be repeated in words “once and for all”, and thus be “identically repeatable” as the same in infinitum (IOG 104, OOG 165-166, fn.). The fifth characteristic of the Idea in the Kantian sense was that it allows repeatability as “ever one and the same”, and indeed as “infinite in all directions” (I §143, OOG 166, (211)).

However, this passage of univocity to the object arose merely as an “infinitely open” project (IOG 103), not yet determined even as infinite or indefinite. The sixth characteristic of the Idea in the Kantian sense was that the progress of finite conditions not yet necessitate that the progress be infinite or indefinite (212).

Even so, univocity remained both the absolute “teleological” and “a priori” condition of equivocity (beyond), a passage which would be absolute (IOG 104). The seventh characteristic of the Idea in the Kantian sense was that it nevertheless proscribes the continuation of the progress as given absolutely (212).
This restored a circularity to univocity, and thus passage without absolute univocity; so too it restored the necessity of a return to circularity for the Idea in the Kantian sense.

Indeed, a fortiori, Derrida thus goes on that in this progress of a word, identically repeatable as the same, to determine the ideal Objectivity of language, the former as yet finds no absolute univocity, thus no absolute ground for sameness:

[A]bsolute univocity is inaccessible but only as an Idea in the Kantian sense can be (IOG 104, our emphases).

Importantly, Derrida continues that the levels, directions, and thus passage in all of the relations of language in general are “analogous” to those of the Idea in the Kantian sense (IOG 106).

However, we note, the relations above are merely analogies. The circularities are merely basically conformant. The Idea in the Kantian sense proceeds as regulative evidence, whereas language certainly arise as phenomenological evidence. However, Derrida is seeking a way to address the conditions for determination. Thus, he suggests, the Idea in the Kantian sense “authorises” (i.e. provides the right (198)) to “leap” across to the limit (IOG 135, 141) to determine the absolute. He begins to address the
requirements more directly, according to the Idea in the Kantian sense’s sort of evidence.

**Parenthesis – ambiguity and instability**

Before addressing this, we add an important relation: the circularity can still continue by means of language, and in words in particular. Derrida had explained that the a priori circularity would be a difficulty, which he aligned with “ambiguity”. That is, ambiguity has more than one sense, thus more than one possible value, and also implies a circularity “in” the word (from “*ambigere*”, which also has the sense of “to go around” (CDWH 19)). Derrida employs “disappearance” as his example. As to “the possibility of truth’s disappearance”, he explains:

> [W]e purposely [i.e. toward this telos] use the ambiguous word disappearance. What disappears is what is annihilated, but also what ceases, *intermittently or indefinitely*, to appear in fact, yet without affecting its being or being-sense (IOG 93, our emphases).

In French, the word “disappearance” (*disparition*) has the sense of a departure from a place, of what no longer appears as something
(in progressing toward nothing, as an-nihil-ated), and then extinction or death. That is, the ambiguity first names the certain appearing in a living present, which sense is as yet open rather than a fact. It must return to the origin prior to living consciousness and disappear. Ambiguity evolves to a basis of passage in the sense of a single word, by which Derrida seeks to address the problem of the absolute. Derrida went on of this truth-sense:

\[ \text{To determine the sense of this} \]

\[ \text{‘disappearance’ of truth is the most difficult} \]

\[ \text{problem posed by [...] all of Husserl’s} \]

\[ \text{phenomenology (IOG 93).} \]

When this ambiguity applies to an object in general, including a word, we henceforth deem it “instability”. There will be many such examples, the first will be that of “God” in his third argument.

Next, we turn to the final segment of the “Introduction” (IOG 134 ff.), as Derrida begins to address the issues directly.
Derrida thus goes on from language in general to *address the four requirements from our previous chapter*. He had worked out that any sensible spatiotemporality must put its truth-sense “in danger” (258). Just so, the source of language in general merely has a value of the open. Yet he had devolved language in general to the pure noema, and can still speak of pure relations (249). His first two arguments question the possibility of an absolute ground for *pure* spatiotemporality (IOG 104). In turn, such relations are objective, and as pure can be questioned in general (forward). He thus is also questioning ideal objectivity in general:

Husserl often *says* that ‘geometry’ is an

‘abbreviation’ for all the objective and exact

sciences of *pure spatiotemporality*. But this is

*generally true* for all pure *absolute* ideal objectivity.

(IDG 142, cf. IOG 131 fn., our emphases)

As Derrida will assess what can be absolutely “true” of absolute ideal objectivity for spatiotemporality in general, this would settle
what can hold of an absolute ground of space and time for all of
phenomenology, including the real (IOG 131 fn. 153).\textsuperscript{201}

**The argument addressing spatiality**

*Derrida's first two arguments address the originary side*, to assess whether
the ground of possibility of ideal Objectivity can be absolute. As a
ground must be sought in the origin (“behind”), Derrida turns to
the “origin of the ability to idealise” (IOG 134). That is, he indeed asks how what does not yet exist is “graspable” as particular
evidence (IOG 142 fn. 160 (201 ff.)). As noted, he treats the
“already” as a difficulty (239), and disqualifies even pure formal
ontologies (at the highest essential level) as a source. To be intended inside, the Idea must already have arrived.\textsuperscript{202} A relation from beyond essence must permit the content to be given (from behind), and in turn allow the ideation to essence. (IOG 139).

Rather, explication of self-evidence as ideation toward the Idea
(*Wesenschau*) from the first depends upon *idealisation* of the Idea in
the Kantian sense. Derrida deems the latter “the invisible
condition of evidence” (IOG 142, cf. fn. 170), and begins to
examine its relations. The characteristics of the Idea in the

\textsuperscript{201} Derrida explains that the arguments will hold in *essential* spatial relations: for
the Telos of Husserl’s overall model could be “true” in an a priori “only
insofar as these objectivities are related [...] to spatiality in general; [and] [...] to
movement in general.” (IOG 131, our emphasis)

\textsuperscript{202} This exclusion occurs via protention and retention: “for the intentional
anticipation [as protention] to leap to the infinite [forward], it must already be
ideal.” (IOG 139). We will explain the spatial argument first, and address
temporality second.
Kantian sense will apply overtly – it will be that which “never phenomenalises itself” (IOG 139), yet instils a regulative demand for the complete givenness of evidence, in a finitude not yet given absolutely that must and can be repeated in infinitum, permitting the object to be repeatedly identified as the same.

Derrida begins from the simplest moment: that Husserl’s “archetypal” kind of evidence is finite. As we explained, Husserl’s approach is based on the decision to predicate of an evidential given, always presented “in person” (IOG 138-139), thus as always enough to predicate of.\(^\text{203}\) Husserl notes that the particular ongoing appearances in its directions must be infinite:

\[
\text{[T]his continuum is more closely defined as infinite in all directions, consisting in all its phases of appearances of the same determinable X (I §143, our emphases).}
\]

Importantly, Husserl avoids affirming the movement of directions is ever infinite – it is rather a closer convergence upon this infinity. Yet it is evident and thus certain that the finite is given – the originary (“finitising”) moment. Insofar as the part is

\(^{203}\) The Idea’s “archetypal” form of evidence is the immediate presence of the thing itself “in person”. The latter is implicitly “the phenomenally defined or definable thing, therefore the finite thing.” (IOG 138-139).
not yet the whole of originary evidence, it is ever first possible to predicate of evidence, *in infinitum*.

The difficulty resides still in finding a ground for this “primary possibility”. For Husserl *does* accord a ground for this convergence (cf. §§86, 116 (223 fn., 346 fn.)); yet the horizontal movement (of possibility) could be *wrong*. The infinitising could “in principle” only continue *in infinitum* were there no ideal laws. But it is the ideal laws (via the Idea) which must afford the principle (formal law), or else a judgment even of infinity can be wrong. Derrida notes that phenomenology is caught between its two principles – the “principle of principles”, which indeed takes the *originary* moment to supply evidence (it is “finitising”), and the ideation that seeks to move the finite into infinity (“infinitising” (IOG 138, cf. Leavey 16)).

We address the finitising basis first, at both the originary and objectual ends. First, the *Idea* essentially proscribes the presence of finitude in person. Such a presence would need to be the absolute terminus of the series of predications, rather than still given “now in this way, now in that” (195), which latter could be wrong. This leads to an important involution. It is easy to note

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204 Derrida explains: “[p]henomenology would thus be stretched between the finitising consciousness of its principle [intentionality] and the infinitising consciousness of its final institution, [...] [and is] indefinitely deferred [différée] in its its content, but always evident in its regulative value.” (IOG 138, Derrida’s emphases).
that affirming Objectivity would unite it even with the “beyond”, at the end of passage. But crucially, as what must arise at origin, as the foundation even of essence, the Idea *thus can be equated with the telos of* absolute solution. The demand is for absolute solution to ideal Objectivity, thus to *anything* which can be an object (Truth, determination of the thing itself, Science, and so on).

However, at the objectual end, finitude can only be given in phenomenological evidence. Thus when the object is the Idea itself the content of this evidence is set aside, for the Idea demands the finite (hence is not yet the finite). This Idea would be the “Idea (in the Kantian sense)”. But then the particular comprehension of the Idea in the Kantian sense is no longer dependent on appearing in phenomenological evidence.\(^{205}\) As Derrida explains:

\[\text{[I]ts own particular presence, then, cannot} \]

depend on a phenomenological type of

\[\text{evidence (IOG 139, cf. I §143 (211))}.\]

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\(^{205}\) Derrida puts it that “it loses any reference to *seeing* indicated in *eidos* […]. The Idea can only be heard [*entendre*]” (IOG 142). “*Entendre*”, Leavey notes, also has the sense of “understand”; although what is heard does not appear.

\(^{206}\) “*Presence*” at this juncture is merely associated with the object that must be absolutely affirmed.
To assess what can be said of it, then – as made an object without evidential content, the Idea in the Kantian sense is finite only as “pure” and “formal” – thus the content of the Idea in the Kantian sense is absent from finite evidence. Its content [...] is evidence only insofar as it is finite, i.e. here, formal, since the content of the infinite Idea is absent (IOG 139, Derrida’s emphases).

On the objectual side, as the Idea in the Kantian sense must (and problematically does) allow the repeatability of the object, as the “Same X”, it would predelineate the possibilities of objectivity as infinite. Thus, as original pole of the demand, it is also the starting point from which something in general can be determined (IOG 139). The Idea in the Kantian sense is, in effect, also the foundation of the categories of pure and formal ontology that can determine content (Object, Something etc.). It would be the basis of Objectivity as such. Derrida thus goes on:

[The Idea [in the Kantian sense] is the basis on which a phenomenology is set up in]
order to achieve the final intention of philosophy. (IOG 141)

Hence (which is more than a recap) this “basis” (foundation) instils the necessity of an institutive infinitising that could arise only as devoid of finite evidence of itself, or any objectivity (as a condition for something); second, it necessarily seeks determination of the finitude of this evidence, and third, it must then make that objectivity possible in its determinability. These are the characteristics of intentionality. As noted, Derrida first founded even the latter upon the category of the object in general (IOG 234, (224)). But the latter in turn depends upon an Idea as no longer even objective. Derrida sums up:

[T]he Idea [in the Kantian sense] is only the pole of a pure intention, empty of every determined object. It alone reveals, then, the being of the intention: intentionality itself. (IOG 139)

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207 Derrida settles upon the Idea in the Kantian sense as the basis instead of Husserl's a priori of History, as the former would found even the a prioris.
By this Derrida avoids (absolutely) affirming such an Idea, or that it is intentionality absolutely, for it has as yet no evidence. It is merely the basis that must permit intentionality in general. What would found the end of phenomenology must found its beginning. But importantly, as it also must found possibility on the side of givenness, the Idea in the Kantian sense arises as a pure pole (IOG 139) as yet without a possible evidence of itself, but which must pass to itself.

We thus assess the kind of evidence that this Idea in the Kantian sense requires to achieve the “final intention of philosophy” (the absolute). It follows – and Derrida quotes Husserl to this effect – that this evidence is of an “absolutely exceptional” kind (IOG 139, cf. §143); such an Idea allows no originary or finite content that is evidence of itself as Idea.

Hence we turn to the “infinitising” side. Note that “infinitising” is not yet an objectual infinite, nor posited of trivial evidence (which latter is the ultimate authority for the possibility of intuition, the principle of principles). Infinitising arises upon the “side” of the necessary and regulative principle. Derrida explains this return to the origin via the relation of the infinite and indefinite. Return to

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208 Derrida quotes Husserl, this Idea “designat[es] through its essential nature a type of evidence that is its own.” (I §143, IOG 139). As noted, Boyce Gibson translates this “evidence” as “insight”, which Husserl deems is “evidence in general” (§137).

209 It “has no proper content, or rather it is not evidence of the Idea’s content.” (IOG 139).
Kant is helpful to explain this. In address to the necessity to determine the totality of conditions, Kant allowed for both a regressus in infinitum and in indefinitum (CPR A511/B540). For Kant, if the whole can be given in experience, then a series is possible as given in infinitum; however, if only one part can be given, this series is possible only in indefinitum. For example, a piece of matter, Kant argues, can be divided into parts in infinitum, but the series of ancestors proceeding backward could only be given in indefinitum; as there may or may not be a final ancestor, one cannot be judged that the procedure is infinite. Just so, as we explained, Husserl is aware that determining even that a whole of a given series (parts of parts, in space and time) is infinite, or even that it can really be infinite (a real possibility) would determine finitude (LI 3 §25, (207)).

Husserl follows his logical bases; he cannot affirm either the finitude of the formal progress to determine the origin (for then he determines a finitude absolutely) or its infinitude, for no law allows this (LI 3 §25, above). No evidential ground yet holds for a law that permits positing an end to the series that seeks to affirm the first real origin; even infinitising constitutes the finite as

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210 Kant puts it: “[I]f the series is given in empirical intuition as a whole, the regress in the series of its internal conditions proceeds in infinitum; but if only one member of the series is given, from which the regress is to proceed to absolute totality, the regress is possible only in indefinitum.” (CPR A511/B540).
indefinite. Thus in 1954 Derrida complained that Husserl never considered the origin of the temporal series (130). In 1962 (hence we are considering the series in general, and only reach the temporal (below [pgl]) Derrida admits that Husserl’s omission was strategic.

Thus we continue to a seeming difficulty. Husserl allowed a certain right of convergence upon the continuum as infinite (I §143), yet no formal law provides this ground (I.I 3 §25). To be sure, the Idea’s content is never supposed to be law, but what founds law. Thus Husserl seeks to retain a unique kind of evidence (and the ground for certainty) of the Idea as regulative. Derrida summarises that phenomenology is “stretched” between its finite moment as regulative principle, evident as regulative rather than as content, and the resultant necessity of consciousness that the ongoing finite series be made absolute (“infinitising consciousness”). Husserl seeks a basis

indefiniely deferred [différée] in its content but

always evident in its regulative value (IOG 138).

211 For Kant, this applies particularly when there may not be a final term. For Husserl as Derrida reads him, this holds in general as there may not yet be a ground for positing the infinite.
Thus we reach Derrida's first mention of “deferral” in his oeuvre.\textsuperscript{212} While as yet undeveloped (it merely addresses a progress as not yet determined content, without yet relating to Difference), it arises from an important implication.\textsuperscript{213} Thus far even a certainty of the convergence of the finite upon the infinite no longer corresponds to its trivial evidence. Hence

\begin{quote}
the finite certainty of infinite phenomenological determinability [is] a certainty without a corresponding evidence.
\end{quote}

(IOG 139)

Yet Derrida too takes it as certain that a ground for the possibility of the objectual holds, demanding that it be absolute; thus he begins to assess this regulative kind of evidence.

But rather than invalidating certainty, its basis is merely resituated. \textit{For Husserl still retains one certainty at the finitising side, and thus one finitude: that of the indefinite.} Hence Husserl does need a simple ground (the logical content which reveals a necessity) to allow this certitude of a finitude. The regulative idea with its own unique

\textsuperscript{212} Credit must be given to the translator Leavey, in his attentive translation, for isolating the instances of this word in the work.

\textsuperscript{213} Leavey has explained this paragraph as the overall result of Derrida’s introduction. By following the procedure, we are working out how this is still only a first moment, which Derrida will interrogate in much more detail before leading toward deferral of Difference in closing.
evidence thus does need the provision of at least one content from (trivial) evidence. Husserl’s basis comes to depend upon just the provision of a content which the Idea itself excludes. The pure pole of intentionality allows no content to describe itself as regulative.\(^{214}\) Hence this content essentially cannot find a logical ground.

Nor, at the last, can phenomenology thus ground the positing of the “limiting” of its power\(^ {215} \) even that of positing the infinite or indefinite. Crucially, as the intention for Derrida is the basis of phenomenology, he goes on:

\[
\text{[A]ccordingly, } \text{phenomenology cannot be }
\]

\[
\text{grounded as such in itself, nor can it itself }
\]

\[
\text{indicate its own proper limits. (IOG 140,}\]

\[
\text{216}
\]

Derrida’s emphases)

\(^{214}\) Thus Husserl cannot “describe” an “intention in which nothing is given […], at least, not in its content.” (IOG 140).

\(^{215}\) As Boyce Gibson has explained, “power” (\textit{Kraft}) is a synonym for the weight of positing (I 454).

\(^{216}\) That is, even though for Husserl “the general \textit{aim} of grounding science absolutely” (CM §3 ff., our emphasis) motivates his project in 1931, its own relations originarily fall short of this Telos. For Derrida, “phenomenology’s ultimate critical legitimation: i.e. what its sense, value and right tell us about it […] never directly measures up to phenomenology” (IOG 141). By this juncture, phenomenology, in a constituting pole positing itself, cannot find a logical ground for positing its own value, even though its general Telos remains.
Is it positing of evidence which provides a ground that (along with a right and reason) allows the convergence on the object. Thus on the positing side of self-evidence, even though positing instils necessity, a ground for this basis has not yet been found within phenomenology.

For the first time in the “Introduction”, Derrida’s progress is overtly no longer in accordance with Husserl. It is a difficulty for Derrida that in doing so, he takes a position from outside the formal or transcendental approach of transcendental subjectivity in a natural and absolute affirmation of what objectually occurs. Derrida notes that Husserl, “without wanting to” posits space anyway (IOG 140, our emphasis). Even though he never wants to, nevertheless

Husserl [...] recognises, distinguishes and posits

this intentionality as the highest source of

value. He locates the space where consciousness

notifies itself of the Idea’s prescription. (IOG 140, Derrida’s emphases)

Derrida is developing his first result. Thus far, a positing of space goes on anyway even without a regulative ground for its pure possibility, and thus without absolute phenomenological possibility. Just so,
this positing of a highest value occurs even of the objectual absolute as indefinite.

As a ground supplies a right of convergence upon the object, this outcome will be Derrida’s basis for developing a positing of space even *without ground for convergence even upon external spatiality*. From this juncture, “positing” refers to a positing without a ground for the object in which objects appear. However, we note that this loss of absolute ground of pure (also called “phenomenological”) possibility does not yet impede the first “regulative possibility” (IOG 139) of the Idea’s kind of evidence. With this development in place, we turn toward Derrida’s second argument.

**The argument addressing temporality**

For the above also applies to temporality, and we return to the “indefinite”. First, we note a further way to explain the groundless positing of the indefinite. As noted, even positing the possibility of the indefinite posits of the object, thus its value is at least open. However, a positing also implies that even this inability to determine the open cannot yet find a ground.

This preface in place, Derrida’s assessment of the second requirement for determining the absolute – predication of temporality – can be explained concisely. It again depends upon
the Idea and thus the argument above. Derrida begins with phenomenological time, where the future is treated as the Telos. What must be perceived in time has not yet occurred, and is posited as a protention (forward). These set out only pure possibilities (ITC §§24, 25 (124 ff.)). The demand to determine time requires that the content of the protention be fixed. Yet as Derrida requires a factual temporal moment, for the origin to be present “now” (IOG 136) rather than in an objective time and thus separate from me (ITC §1 (139)) it must be lived. Derrida takes this back to the Living Present in its essential directions. To appear, this lived moment cannot be fixed as the now itself, for that would leave the Living Present on the inside of the Now, and temporality outside the Now.

Instead, Derrida remains with phenomenology’s kind of thinking, calling this the Now as such (comme telle). Temporality is taken in the manner of its appearing, thus no longer referring to an objective temporality, or to an external whole for its completion (207). But here, as essential, would appear the (noematic)

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217 Derrida set up the approach to temporality prior to the static argument, to make the static result (his passage) definitive. We have swapped them to avoid an extremely lengthy first argument.

218 All of this is summarised in Derrida’s dense sentence: “[T]he Living Present has the irreducible originality of a Now, the ground of a Here, only if it retains [...] the past Now as such, i.e. as the present past (présent passé) of an absolute origin, instead of purely and simply succeeding it in an objective time.” (IDG 149, cf. IOG 136-137).

219 Husserl, in the Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness, explained: “[O]ur aim is a phenomenological analysis […]. [I]nvolving in this, as in any other such analysis, is the complete exclusion of every assumption, stipulation or conviction concerning Objective time (of all transcendent presuppositions
phenomenon as the sense of the predication, while “itself” for Derrida refers to the noematic constitution of the external as absolute (cf. IOP 33-34). As the content of this kind of objectual appearing has a sense (Sinn), in this instance, this moment now as such in the Living Present must be a “present past” (present passé), that sense of the past returned from behind to the present (IOG 136-137). Thus what holds from behind, for Derrida, also holds as a priori and essential, which future remains as a pure possibility as yet without objective content (forward). Just as in Husserl's example of objective “pleasure” which evolves to the “pleasing” as such (137), Derrida calls the objectivity of the “Now” (Maintenant) which is necessary as such a “Nowness” (Maintenance). The temporal has become an ideal Objectivity as such.

It is pertinent to note a somewhat polemical move by Derrida. What can be restored as a present past could be a sedimented memory, holding in accordance with a priori law, but can also be a retention. The latter is no longer compatible with Derrida’s project of seeking for the first judgment in history, which would be secondary memory that can be false. To preserve purity, and alignment between the “return inquiry” and Living Present, concerning existents). […] [Thus] what we accept, […] is not the existence of a world-time, the existence of concrete duration, and the like, but time and duration appearing as such.” (ITC §1).
Derrida overtly privileges the protention (IOG 137). For the future to be able to be lived as fixed – to determine the origin – retention in turn depends on the protention for its material basis. That is, for the originary act to be restored in its phenomenological sense, it could have been lived only as a pure moment which comes from the future, and which has thus not yet appeared (IOG 137); thus indeed implying an indefiniteness in its appearing. Derridasummarises the difficulty in a rather formidable sentence:

[T]his Maintenance [Nowness] itself appears as

such, it is the Living Present, and it has the

phenomenological sense of a consciousness only if

the unity of this movement is given as indefinite

and if its sense of indefiniteness is announced.

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220 That is, we must admit “the privileged position of the protentional dimension in intentionality, that of the future in the constitution of space in general must be acknowledged.” (IOG 137).

221 Derrida explains: “this retention will not be possible without a protention which is its very form” (IOG 137). Only the directional form of the protention could allow the material element to be restored in the retention.
As noted, when predicating loses its ground, verbs of correlative language can still hold ("is announced"). Second, Derrida has retracted to necessary conditions ("only if"), which can proceed without a ground for possibility, as the latter first requires a necessity. The necessary condition of the absolute is determination of the future in the Now (the Living Present).

To move from this evolution of Derrida’s approach to the argument: the characteristic of now-ness (rather than the “Now” itself, which would be absolutely objectual) could only appear even “as such”, as Living, only if a basis of finitude – or infinity – is avoided (as we come to, either must pass to opening). Nevertheless, finitude is certainly announced as such. Yet to make this temporal basis of the first institutive act (predicatively) possible, there would need to be a productive act: that is, without ground for positing an “outside”, thus preventing positing of a

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222 Husserl does refer to the finite and infinite, but we have found no such reference directly to the “indefinite” in relation to the Idea in the Kantian sense in those paragraphs in Husserl’s published work to which Derrida refers (for example, in the Ideas, Husserl explains that it is “intrinsically incapable of being given”, and “endless” (I §43, cf. 83). Derrida refers to Group C of the manuscripts at this juncture in the Husserl Archive (IOG 137).

223 Such an idealised space would allow “us to go immediately to the infinite limit of what is in fact an unfinished movement” (IOG 136). For Derrida, this cannot be justified.
content from the future as finite or even infinite, or temporality itself.\(^{224}\)

Yet even though no ground for a simple distance yet arises to allow even a subsequent content, the progress is an involution to the **originary, prior to content**, which space is located anyway. Moreover, even without a ground, a moment of originary space retains the necessity of a *right*. As noted (198), a “right” (*Recht*) for Husserl also arises at the originary side, as accorded by the authentic (*ursprüngliche*) relation of the originary to evidence and its certainty of a given object. Reason retains its right to constituting of ideal objectivity. Thus, for this (undeniable) right to be provided, it would need to be *lived*. Derrida goes on that this movement holds in the Living Present only

> if the opening of the infinite future is, as such,

> a possibility lived [*vécue*] as sense and right

(\textit{IOG 137}).

The second argument concerning temporality then devolves to depend on that of spatiality. It too cannot absolutely ground phenomenology. However, this progress is no longer merely an

\(^{224}\) It “will not be comprehended as sense but as a fact extrinsic to the movement of temporalisation.”
infinitely open project, which the analogy with language had developed, but an opening.

**Parenthesis – space and the opening**

For, in address to both space and time, Derrida has worked out a progress, as yet without a ground for determination, yet prior even to *originary* evidence and originary content. *He has moved from the “infinitely open” to the criteria for “opening”* (228). For essential reasons, this ought to preclude any possibility of a ground for ideal objectivity or a fact at all. Yet Derrida arrives at “opening” only upon arguing for *his* evolution. This opening retains a right and is lived. Moreover, even without a ground, and even without wanting to, yet Husserl “posits” this space anyway. Opening is introduced in its essential relations without a ground for originary content, prior to phenomenological evidence, yet arising with originary *space*. Moreover, the *first* possibility of time is not yet precluded (indeed, it is certain), and the necessity still holds to determine it absolutely (forward). Derrida has not yet found an absolute ground; but nor will he yet allow preclusion of possibility. The opening retains the possibility of determining objectivity in space or time.

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225 Note that we avoid deeming – yet – that opening arises as a direct metaphor for the opening of originary space. Derrida argues for the positing of space and possibility of time that goes along with opening.
Part Four: the next two arguments, genitivity and the beyond as God

Situating the progress via Derrida

Thus, without an evident ground for pure spatiotemporality, Derrida sets aside seeking a ground for the possibility of its ideal Objectivity. He indeed turns directly to assess whether ideal objectivity can be absolutely real as an object (i.e. as an individual in its spatiotemporal position). That is, he begins to directly assess whether intentionality can go “beyond” itself to a real absolute. By this juncture, however, Derrida is also working out what the approach implies, even should no absolute determination be arrived at.

Situating the implications of the progress

That is, the implications of the progress are more accurately taken as following less from a “Derrida” (or Husserl) interpreted as a philosopher in a natural attitude than in accordance with the necessities of transcendental subjectivity. Thus far, an absolute ground of possibility of ideal Objectivity has not yet been found in pure spatiotemporality (although positing of space goes on anyway). Moreover, a regulative necessity and possibility remain foundational even without such evidence, to permit the closer determination of the finite as infinite:
What does appear is only the regulative possibility of appearing and the finite certainty of infinite phenomenological determinability (IOG 139).

The above is not yet a “result” (réponse) of the logic or “answer” (in French, also réponse) to the question; such an answer would determine a content,226 while the question has merely implied an opening (IOG 56, cf. IDG 164, IOG 148). Instead, insofar as it is \textit{originarily prior to} content, the pure and regulative possibility and necessity of the teleological subject seeking an answer implies a responsibility (r\^{e}ponsibilité) for the future.227 Hence

phenomenology starts from the lived anticipation as a radical [originary]

responsibility (IOG 141, cf. 146).

Thus far, the responsibility to determine the content in this and future times as the same for everyone, hence as \textit{True}, is based on

\footnote{Derrida emphasised this use of “réponse” (as both “result” and “answer”) in first arriving at his questioning of mathematical indeterminacy, as the teleology and his opening: “\textit{such a question cannot expect a determined result} [réponse], it should only indicate the \textit{pure} opening and unity of an infinite horizon [of possibility]” (IOG 56, cf. IDG 164, IOG 148, (232), our emphases).}

\footnote{The German versions of the relations from which Derrida develops “réponse” and “r\^{e}ponsibilité” are “\textit{Antwort}” and “\textit{Verantwortung}” (cf. IOG 149).}
the Idea in the Kantian sense, “in order to achieve the final intention of philosophy” (IOG 141). Yet the Idea is never known by any evidence except the regulative demand and responsibility to know it (IOG 137).228

Indeed, note that while Derrida began by aligning the teleological (ideal) object with irreality, he had not yet justified it as noematic (236). This Idea as “pure pole” of the opening, but moreover without even a ground for space, time, or the possibility of evidence, qualifies as an extreme sort of irreal noema. Hence importantly, in such a teleology it can be said to be only the purest source of being without even pure content or essence; that is, the being of intentionality itself. As pure relation to the object, in the furthest moment from its particular sense, it is, in the broadest sense, Objectivity itself.

(IOG 139)

Thus, Derrida summarises, Husserl

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228 Thus what makes this “phenomenalisation of time possible” is “therefore always the Idea in the Kantian sense which never phenomenalises itself.” (IOG 137).
speaks of disclosing the final sense (Zwecksinn)
of science as a ‘noematic phenomenon’. (IOG 142, cf. CM §§4)

Derrida can thus begin to align this basis with transcendental subjectivity in its directions, and the responsibility to determine the origin as a fact, in order to prepare for his next two arguments. For what must be determined in future (the telos as “target”) is History (“behind”). Of course, the joint between the Idea and History is a problem; if the basis of the Idea is ahistorical (outside History), how could it interact with the first historical fact, that is, here and now (IOG 141)? Yet as a certain basis on history is necessary, there must have been an origin. Indeed, there must even have been an “empirical” origin in the simplest sense of this term. But “inside”, the return-inquiry requires explicating of the absolute object (the object itself) here in a determined space. However, as its history is sedimented in the object as such, this must reveal the historicity now. The certain

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229 Derrida writes: “Are we not confronted with an ahistorical Idea on the one hand and its insertion in the event or historical fact on the other?” (IOG 141, our emphases).

230 Hence, “[W]hat we truly need is to investigate the Idea’s profound historicity.” (IOG 141).
historical origin (“behind”) must be affirmed here and now in phenomenology as such.231

**The basis of the double necessity**

Importantly, Derrida had earlier deemed this

a double necessity: it is that of a *Quod* [because, why?] and a *Quomodo* [how?], a necessity of having had a historical origin, and having had such an origin (IOG 49, Derrida’s emphases).

Phenomenology in this nexus of Objectivity questions the divide between “why” this origin arose in history (there) and “how” to speak of it as such (here). For, since Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations* (CM §8, (cf. 463)), the transcendental subject was deemed to explicate the sedimented history (there) as given to itself (here). The regulative necessity, for the subject, evolves to its responsibility. Combining the above, the double necessity occurs in the noematic constitution of the responsibility for the transcendental subject to ask itself why the origin is given to itself, and what of the origin is given.

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231 To relate this to the earlier argument, the regulative demand is for the totality of the temporal series, as finite appearing in infinitum, to be given now, while even the indefinite relation between the infinite and its Telos, is located willy nilly, as a stretch in space.
Rather than a History, this evolution to subjectivity instils the regulative possibility in irreality, with the telos of explicating the origin, as the subject’s *historicity* (*Geschichtlichkeit*). These instil the directions (*sens*) as “historico-transcendental subjectivity” (IOG 142). As Derrida puts it:

> historicity […] is a ‘sense’, a teleological ought-to-be which constitutes being as movement.

(IOG 145, Derrida’s emphasis, cf. 150)

To be sure, this necessity holds as one single intentional passage which finds its historicity sedimented in its object (forward) (IOG 148). Subjectivity and objectivity (itself) mutually constitute of one another, in a finitude without ground even for positing space or time in the Idea (IOG 142, cf. CM §34). No distance arises to speak of, or ground to find. The transcendental basis successively evolves backward into itself.

Thus, in its most “radical” moment – this also implies its etymological sense, of historical “root” – Derrida’s telos of the absolute as objectual is devolving to the essential necessity of what Derrida

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232 Derrida explains that “these essential interconnections would be impossible, they would be nothing without a transcendental subjectivity and its transcendental historicity” (IOG 142).

233 As Derrida explains it, “subject and object are reciprocally engendered and governed” (IOG 142).
will call the Absolute. It no longer constitutes an objective absolute here, no longer only descends into an originary history “there”, which space would constitute its empirical limit. As Derrida puts it:

[T]he Idea is not an Absolute that first exists in

the plenitude of its essence and then descends

into history […]. If that were true, all

transcendental historicity could be said to be

only an “empirical history […]” (IOG 142,

quoting Cavaillès 1947, 77, our emphases).

Such an Absolute is no longer concerned with avoiding appearing as “now in this way, now in that”, in the fashion of the objective absolute thus far (195). As Absolute – in the upper case – it is essential insofar as its movement is that of the responsibility of transcendent subjectivity to circulate in its Objectivity rather than as objective,\(^{234}\) as the pure and regulative circularity of the Reason. Quoting Husserl, Derrida summarises this pole of the Absolute, combining the Idea and historico-transcendental circularity as

\(^{234}\) As to Derrida’s use of “circularity”, he writes that in the movement of historicity “Traditionality is what circulates from one to the other in a movement wherein consciousness discovers its path in an indefinite reduction, always already begun, and wherein every adventure is a change of direction” (IOG 149). We have italicised the bases that we have explained.
“absolute subjectivity in its historicity” (IOG 144, fn. 173, cf. Diemer, 36). The only absolute thus far is the circularity prior to objectivity. But Derrida has not yet turned away from the absolute as Object – the argument is still in progress.

The alignment of the Idea in the Kantian sense and Speech

Derrida thus redresses his earlier difficulties with speech and writing. A writing perduring across history (from behind) and positing of space (across) provided no absolute ground of possibility for ideal objectivity. The difficulty, Derrida has come to realise, is that phenomenological evidence demands what is “visible”, “in front of” the subject (as writing or any spatial determination). Hence nor did the speaking subject find a ground for the same object “in front of” it; historico-transcendental subjectivity is prior to a human subject. Thus Speech – as essential and a priori – by its essence also cannot appear in phenomenological evidence (behind), yet makes particular acts without visual content possible. Speech in general is “like” – analogous to rather than the same as – the irreducible Idea in the

235 Derrida refers this subjectivity to a letter by Husserl, published by A. Diemer (1954), which Derrida will also quote from in his final argument on transcendental divinity. Husserl writes: “For, with the transcendental reduction, we attained, we are convinced, concrete and real subjectivity in the ultimate sense [...] and in this subjectivity, universal constituting life [...] absolute subjectivity in its historicity” (Diemer 36, IOG 145, fn. 173). We still employ the lower case version of “absolute” as it will be to this kind, Derrida suggests, to which Husserl devolves.
Kantian sense and its regulative possibility. Derrida no longer makes writing the “sine qua non”, for even when it finds no ground, and even though the Idea essentially cannot appear in phenomenological evidence to be determined, the movement then permits something in general to be said (IOG 139). Derrida goes on:

[That a phenomenological determination of
the Idea itself may be radically impossible from
then on [after its particular kind of evidence]
signifies perhaps that phenomenology […]],
can never be given in a philosophy of seeing,
but (like all Speech) can only be heard or
understood through [i.e. in passage through]
the visible. (IOG 141)

That it is necessary to go back to the irreducible (such as the presence of Speech) to assess originary writing will be important in “Of Grammatology” (cf. 890). Thus far, in general, Derrida has made the Idea in the Kantian sense permit a thought of

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236 Levinas emphasises this “logical” divergence of the like and the same cf. TI 289, TEI 26.
something in general, in a phenomenology which no longer gains a simple distance or ground to reflect on its object.

**The Absolute of Genitivity as pure possibility**

Yet in addressing the originary and objectual sides of passage Derrida has merely assessed *consciousness of something*. Next, he addresses “consciousness of something” (which relates the transcendental subject to the ideal object) via correlative language in general. Hence Derrida turns to *the genitive relation to the object and its possibility*. He excludes the particular bases – noting of language that this “of” can be neither an absolutely subjective nor an objective genitive (IOG 143). He explains:

[T]he of designates neither a merely objective

nor a merely subjective genitive (IOG 142).

Derrida is brief, and we interpolate an explanation from linguistics. Subjective and objective genitives have a common form that unites two words, to allow definition of the *linguistic subject and object*. The subject in such cases is the *active* agent and the object the recipient of the act (or patient). The subject, for Derrida is also the logical object, “S”, which has devolved since to the *originary, active and essential* object as the noematic correlate in pure transcendental subjectivity – in such a thought, the subject is *something*. The object is rather the ideal objectivity as predicative; it
“is P”, which demand is for the absolute, as consciousness. Each genitive can be recognised by revising the linguistic sentence.

In general, then, Derrida explains, what is being assessed is the Absolute of Objectivity itself. In this phrase the “consciousness of something” would signify the subjective genitive, and “something of consciousness” what is objective. Hence the originary consciousness of the object in the objective genitive remains certain, as the “pure relation to the object”; however, the subjective genitive finds merely a regulative possibility in its dependence upon the irreducible Idea in the opening (IOG 143). The subject can be made originary object, and dependent upon a prior opening, and the subject in its regulative opening can constitute the originary (pure) object. Even so, the general form of the “of” remains common and implies its possibility. Derrida explains that

"The of can mark the subject's; as well as the object's, genealogically secondary and dependent status; then, through the very opening of its indetermination, it can mark its originary interdependence. (IDG 157, cf. IOG 143, Derrida’s emphases)."
Such a circularity of opening and originary does not yet even determine the absolute possibility of facticity, let alone an absolute fact (IOG 144).

Rather, the circularity – i.e. passage – of genitivity retracts to a possibility prior even to the originary content and its absolute, to an Absolute. Derrida summarises:

the Absolute of genitivity itself is the pure possibility of a genetic [originary] relation (IOG 143, our emphases second).

Moreover, we note, the progress implies that the transcendental circularity to the Absolute retracts to passage in general, in the circularity of the opening and the originary. Yet Derrida has still not yet abandoned the demand that the absolute be objectual.

**Preparing for the final address to the real**

Having as yet found no absolute result, Derrida addresses the second half of his question directly. He considers what can be absolutely determined of the original objectual act in general, as to whether it exceeds the (noematic) irreal object. Derrida asks whether a pure possibility to posit the “beyond” (au delà, cf. IOG 78, 82) as absolute transcends irreality to arrive at the real. To assess this, Derrida must re-orient the entire basis of transcendental subjectivity toward the beyond as object. He prepares for this in (at least) six moments, four upon the originary basis of the Absolute
in subjectivity (soon to be termed the Logos), and three at the objectual or Teleological end. That is, Derrida is asking Husserl’s question (IOG 63, IOP 17, (233)): how can subjectivity go out of itself, to encounter the object as a fact? 237

First, on the side of the originary: as noted, each relation in historico-transcendental subjectivity is based upon the Idea. This includes the Ego’s constituting of itself, as ego. Thus, first, Reason is made a condition of historico-transcendental subjectivity. To do so, by referring primarily to the *Cartesian Meditations* (CM §34, IOG 145 fn. 174), 238 Derrida dismisses the suggestion that Reason is an ability, for indeed, the latter restores psychologism, positioning reason as “extrinsic” to History (IOG 145). Rather, second, he notes that there could have been no institutive act without an (irreal) act of Reason in historicity as such (rather than History itself), nor could there have been transmission across the tradition without historicity.

Third, Derrida thus evolves Reason to the Logos. From the outset of the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl (FTL §1ff.) devolved the Logos to investigation of what the Ego can establish. Logos, for Husserl, implies Reason as thinking, the

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237 Husserl puts this: “we have still not yet gone beyond the subject and his objective, evident capacities; that is, we still have no ‘objectivity’ given.” (OOG 163).

238 Derrida reveals his exercise in selecting elements which are helpful to his model at this juncture, for Husserl does say reason is an ability in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (FTL §1).
general form of consciousness of the object. Logical predication is one part or form of thinking, as is speech. That is, henceforth, the Logos implies the uttering (and thus speech) of what is thought (FTL §1),\(^{239}\) as well as correlative predication or asserting of the object. The Logos is thus the

predicating, the asserting, or other thinking in

which a sense-content is generated as

concerning the objects [...] in question (FTL §1).

The Logos is the irreal form of thinking (in particular as speaking, positing, asserting and so on) of the object, in which the sense-content is generated (for Derrida, produced), impelled by regulative evidence with a telos of Truth (FTL §1).\(^{240}\) As we explained, for Husserl, convergence upon Truth occurs in the nexus of positing and Reason, to which the right to determine the Truth more closely is provided by the ground of evidence (I §134). The right holds even without a ground. As noted, Derrida prefers to avoid the telos as only “absolute truth” (IOG 146 fn. 177), in this “common telos” such values can be signified in many

\(^{239}\) “Logos” in Classical Greek means “speech” (FTL §1).

\(^{240}\) Husserl also explains that “reason itself is thinking directed to a truth given in evidence [Evidenz]” (FTL §1).
forms (absolute univocity, the total fact, and so on (cf. 272)). He thus investigates what can be said of the absolute right of the Logos to pass to its Telos in general.

However, this right needs a motive impetus. Fourth, Derrida continues to follow Husserl to apply the “demand” in transcendental subjectivity based upon the Idea of the Reason as the subject’s “responsibility” (IOG 146, (295)). In the pure pole of radical circularity, the constituting ego as Logos demands its Telos, and as constituted, it is demanded of and must respond (répond). As Reason is the essential basis of humankind as “animal rationale” (IOG 145 ff., cf. CM §23), to it falls the constituting responsibility to respond (répondre) and realise the Telos of humanity itself. Each of the regulative and then epistemological demands of the Idea in the Kantian sense are situated upon this Logos and its Telos.

Parenthesis – the responsibility of the radical philosopher

Indeed, for Derrida, insofar as this regulative necessity is an originary responding to the demand (forward), rather than a determined result (réponse), the responsibility of the subject can be particularised to the originary philosopher. Derrida explains:

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Derrida writes: “If Reason is but the essential structure of the transcendental ego [...] it is, like them [the essential structure and transcendental ego], historical through and through” (IOG 145).
Insofar as the radical philosopher complies with the demand of the Logos, he must prescribe [the Telos]: insofar as he responds to and is responsible for it, he assumes the responsibility for the mandate. (IOG 146, our emphases)

The reader may find such whole-part divisions upon a regulative side allegedly without content to be implausible, as while Reason may never need to appear in phenomenological evidence, at least the body of a philosopher must. Moreover, Derrida has gone to great effort to remove transcendental subjectivity from natural human consciousness. Nevertheless, Derrida set aside the problem of other human egos (253), and is developing the implications of the progress. That is, while the body of a philosopher obviously can appear as finite content in phenomenological evidence; in 1962, the philosopher is a pure and originary part of humankind as “animal rationale”, and to that extent a part of Reason without corresponding content. In 1962, even the philosopher is a moment of the originary directions and levels, and we continue with these more general relations of passage.
The objectual side of radical passage

Thus, fifth, to turn toward the objectual end, the above develops the overall telos – by situating Reason as an investigation of being as such which aims for the “beyond”. In this work, Derrida treats being simply, as the posited weight of the sense of what arises originally in Reason (IOG 145). Yet in historico-transcendental subjectivity, the telos is history itself. Hence sixth, in this nexus of the Logos, being and history are set up as what “ought-to-be” in approaching the Telos. Everything remains essential in this pure Telos of the Idea, to determine a content.242 That is, it is “being” (ousia) that Reason investigates in order to form the medium by which to determine what can be said of the Idea as “beyond”. The Idea, Derrida emphasises, is “beyond being” (epekeina tes ousias).

A fortiori, to approach this fact directly, “beyond”, Derrida’s argument crystallises all of the relations of the direction of passage “across” into the teleological movement of the Logos to the Telos. Derrida deems that

\[ \text{historicity can only be the passage of Speech [like the} \]

\[ \text{Idea], the pure tradition of an originary Logos across} \]

\[ \text{to a Telos (IOG 149, our emphases).} \]

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242 Derrida writes: “But being, which articulates Reason and History in relation to each other, a ‘sense’, [which overall approach creates] a teleological ought-to-be which constitutes being as movement.” (IOG 145).
We have italicised the words explained thus far. Indeed, the relations are sufficiently condensed, without relation to a content appearing in simple distance, to be deemed a passage of only one “Pole” of the Logos to its Telos (IOG 147).

The fourth argument – divinity and reality

Each argument has devolved to this passage so as to address the absolute, “beyond”. Thus Derrida assesses the ultimate basis for an outside – the idea of a transcendental God. To situate this: from at least 1913, and to avoid admitting the outside, Husserl treated transcendence as one kind of constitution in pure consciousness – to be adumbrated, as in all passages, without determinable result.

In Derrida’s condensed (irreal) passage, transcendence should simply be another basis of the movement of the Logos to its Telos, whose demand is to determine the transcendental subject. Thus Derrida notes

since the Logos has the form of a Telos, its transcendence would not be a real transcendence, but the ideal Pole for bringing about [i.e. as its Telos] transcendental subjectivity itself. (IOG 147)
Yet Derrida seeks to re-orient this explanation, for he requires this transcendence itself to be the absolute beyond the ideal. He turns to God, accorded an unusual role in Husserl’s treatment of transcendence. In the *Ideas*, Husserl explicitly set aside the “world-transcendent” God (I §51), in favour of a God situated in the reduced stream of consciousness. God, Derrida argues, is the principle which points to what eidetic and formal laws could never prove. *God is the indicator of eidetic “impossibility”* within eidetic possibility (cf. IOG 147). Thus Husserl allowed no real (or empirical) fact, instead using the word “God” in an “ambiguous” sense (272): as *absolute impossibility*, and thus the *irreal origin within* pure consciousness; yet also to signify the origin of *possibility*243 as a *formal* fact of the *beyond* (I §58).244 God is a privileged and pure Pole which signifies in particular what is beyond the possible. Moreover, for Derrida, an Idea of God has been derived from the Idea in the Kantian sense in transcendental subjectivity. But Derrida seeks to assess the possibility of God’s transcendence to absolutely determine the *real*.245

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243 Derrida explains that this “transcendence of God” is “not concrete facticity in general, but concrete actuality as the source of possible and real values” (IOG 174).

244 Derrida puts it that Husserl's God is “the transcendent principle – and consequently also ‘reduced’ [principle] [...] – of every universal factual teleology” (IOG 147) Derrida seeks a concrete (individual) facticity, and moreover a possibility that is real rather than pure.

245 That is, Derrida seeks to assess what can be said by means of the real fact beyond, rather than the irreal noematic object.
It is hard to avoid noting that in doing so, Derrida’s aim diverges from Husserl’s published works: and he admits this divergence (IOG 147). Derrida avoids, however, admitting that he is addressing unpublished fragments to develop his concerns. For the innovation in the fragments, Derrida writes, is that

[D]ivine consciousness [...] [is] the directing

Telos for the real universe. As such, it is a

facticity. (IOG 147, OdG 163)

A fortiori, Derrida investigates what can be said of the absolute “beyond” as the real universe, by assessing the facticity of God “inside”. This develops the next, and much stronger sense of the absolute than an objectual invariant. Derrida quotes Husserl; this is

[T]he absolute polar ideal Idea, that of an

absolute in a new sense, of an absolute which

is situated beyond the world, beyond man,

beyond transcendental subjectivity: is the

absolute Logos, the absolute truth. (Husserl, E

246 He explains that “[O]ther passages suggest this, passages which, [...] more literally conform to all of Husserl’s most lasting intentions.” (IOG 147, cf. I §51).
Husserl’s emphasis)

Every moment has devolved to this – what is at stake is what can finally be determined of the *absolute* at its extreme, *beyond the ideal object in any form, and thus as absolutely real*. In other words, what is at stake is how the object beyond the logical object can be affirmed as true without reservation or limit. This was Derrida’s version of the absolute, which led to his problem, since 1954.  

**The fourth requirement addressed – the real**

To do so, Derrida’s argument treats of the Logos in both language and logic (that is, in both correlative parts of intentionality). First, in language, it is certainly possible to *speak of* the beyond in its broadest sense. As noted, however, in the turn

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247 Derrida’s emphasis is upon the inversion into the Logos of transcendental subjectivity. He thus notes that Husserl “profoundly recuperates the original scholastic sense [i.e. sens, also direction] of the transcendental” (IOG 146). It is worthwhile noting that the “transcendental” in the Scholastic tradition (or at least, as first developed by Aquinas) also proceeds via “directions” and “levels”, in a parallel “analogy” that has not yet determined being. As Macirowskies and Montagnes explain it, “[T]he analogy of being develops in two directions: the horizontal one is that of the divisions of being according to the categories; the other, vertical dimension, is that of the degrees of being constituted by the substances themselves. Let us call them predicamental analogy and transcendental analogy” (Macirowskies and Montagnes 2004, 6). In the transcendental analogy, God arises as the essential level of being, which is transcendental in that God grounds being prior to the predicamental direction (across): “In the same way, on the transcendental level, [it] is God who grounds the analogy of being, since beings receive by participation what He is by essence; there is no primary instance of being other than He” (Macirowskies and Montagnes 2004, 6). Derrida has instilled this basic relation of “transcendental” as the essence of “God” prior to predication of possibility in Husserl, although Derrida has also worked out that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot ground itself, and Derrida does not yet accord such a ground to God.
to the signifying rather than objectual language, these senses have again been simplified to what can be questioned of *eidetic* sense. The demand of a scientific language is that its principle must be revealed as law in transcendental subjectivity, and yet these words must refer beyond subjectivity. Thus Derrida notes that Husserl's use of the word “beyond” proceeds by “ambiguity” (272). Derrida avoids writing “equivocity”, passage is no longer a simple distance in which separate senses of the word “beyond” stand “in front of” a subject. Yet even so, from above, even though the real cannot be *absolutely* separated from the interplay with the irreal, signification of it still intends the beyond. The absolute referent is still inseparable from yet exceeds the irreal object.

Thus, instead of affirming the real possibility, Derrida settles upon pure possibility. For an *Absolute* as only *pure* possibility no longer permits this simple distance in general, but rather the Idea of God as pure circularity of transcendental subjectivity constituting the sense of the beyond in an originary moment. Given this factual (*factice*) indeterminacy, only the *reduction* of God – to the pure circularity of language – would allow the eidetic constitution of a transcendental “beyond” as *factual* (rather, we emphasise, than *fact*); for as Derrida explained, the pure level of language is no longer bound to particular words (IOG 70, (246)). Only

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the reduction of God as factual \textit{factual} being

and factual consciousness sets free the

signifying of transcendental divinity. (IOG 147, IDG 163)

This addresses the requirement that the factual be real. A reduction to factual consciousness can indeed signify the beyond as transcendental divinity. However, it is a condition of the real (and of real factuality itself) that it be individuated in its spatial and temporal position. Yet even taking God as a pure Pole for signifying the real universe in transcendental subjectivity, God is never by his essence really spatial or temporal. This is a pure beyond only for the pure self, thus only factual (and a Fact) for the Self. Derrida goes on:

in this sense, the Pole as ‘beyond’ is always beyond \textit{for the Self} of transcendental consciousness. It is \textit{its own} beyond. It will never be a real transcen dence (IOG 147 fn. 129, Derrida’s emphases).
The attempt to aim “beyond” in the fourth argument has not yet met Derrida’s criteria for an absolute. Instead, the arguments have progressively devolved to a pure possibility in an Absolute without simple distance, in the passage of the Logos to its Telos. Derrida has assessed the requirements in the order we have developed across Husserl’s oeuvre, employing the parameters of intentionality, logic, and Idea in the Kantian sense, but he has arrived only at this involuted passage.

The analogy to temporality

Derrida adds one more relation before applying the above. For his task is to assess the possibility of ideal objectivity as absolute for all of descriptive phenomenology. This has been condensed into the Logos as passage. However, the fundamental form of intentional consciousness for Husserl is temporality. Derrida at the last must address the basal form of temporality in relation to the Living Present as transcendental subjectivity, to determine the ideal object as fact.

To explain: when one considers the appearing of things in the world in time as an object, one is assessing the ideal objectivity of several objects together. This, for Husserl, describes a pure “omnitemporality” (Überzeitleibkeits) (EJ §64d)). This temporality, we note, is predicated of only as what must never appear in particular ideal objectivity. One could thus infer a time that allows even such an ideal unity of temporalities, and the origin of
temporality – “supertemporality” (Urzeitlichkeit), or early temporality.

This, Derrida notes, is “profoundly analogous” to seeking the “beyond”. In essence, supertemporality is so far removed as to no longer even be temporal, intemporal (in-temporal, (EJ §64c IOG 148)). Rather than absolute, Derrida takes supertemporality as the Absolute of time itself, for predication is merely of the (characteristic of) “timeliness” (Zeitlichkeit) of Time. That is to say, “omnitemporality” maps to what exceeds a particular “ideal objectivity” of what can appear, and its “factual reality” (IOG 148). Supertemporality, as intemporal, maps to the beyond. This relation of temporalities has been made “profoundly analogous” (at a deeper level, for time itself has not yet appeared) to the fourth argument and the transcendental God. 248

Thus Derrida can begin to apply the progress developed across our chapter. As to language, the “ambiguity” still applies, as Husserl “speaks of” – signifies – the “constituting” of the possibility of a real temporal fact (that is, beyond the irreal) by

248 Thus Derrida asks, “[A]re not supertemporality and omnitemporality also the characteristics [i.e. predicates] of Time itself [...] of the Living Present, which is the absolute concrete form of [...] all transcendental life? (IOG 148, Derrida’s emphases first).
both kinds of time. Yet again, the absolute beyond is addressed by constituting in the transcendental Absolute.²⁴⁹

The generalisation of the analogies, as one progress

Thus, insofar as it is without determinable temporality, this ambiguity of God (and the intemporal) as “beyond”, and God (and the omnitemporal) as pure pole of passage are said to hold “at once” (IOG 148) in the involutions of historico-transcendental subjectivity to the Absolute. Indeed, crucially, Derrida generalises this relation to every passage that be developed since the outset, deeming that

[T]his situation of the Logos is profoundly analogous

– and not by chance – to that of every ideality

(such as our analysis of language has enabled us
to specify the concept) (IOG 148, Derrida’s emphasis last).

We followed from the outset of our chapter how the relations of language to the ideal object were in turn analogous to the Idea in

²⁴⁹ Derrida writes that Husserl “qualifies [ideality in general, which should be absolutely factual alone] sometimes in one fashion, [e.g. omnitemporal] sometimes in the other [e.g. supertemporal], according to whether or not he relates it to factual temporality” (IOG 148).
the Kantian sense, which argument progressed to the Logos. Derrida is approaching a result to his overall progress.

But rather than this ambiguity of both a pure pole and a beyond then leading to contradiction, in that both senses hold “at once” (for Derrida has not yet included negation or opposition), such contents (parts) would be founded by a unity which source is withheld (as beyond, “profound”). That is,

\[ \text{T}he \text{ two \ at \ once \ [à \ la \ fois], \ beginning \ from \ [à partir \ de]} \text{ a unity even more profound, such [telle]} \text{ is perhaps the only possible answer [réponse]} \text{ (IDG 164, cf. IOG 148)} \]

A fortiori, Derrida has worked out what, for essential reasons, can be the only possible answer (result). Next, every ideal object arose only from withdrawal to appearing as such, to the reduction without negation. As – for Husserl – temporal constitution in the Living Present is deemed the basis of all ideal objectivities (125),

\[ \text{250 The senses of the ambiguity could no longer hold “at the same time”, as the ambiguity is in part temporal. Even so, when applying the necessity of thinking two contents “at once”, when they are opposite to one another and negation has been returned then Derrida, from 1964, will insist upon the necessity of contradiction (545). In 1962, this is not yet a contradiction of the contents as such, but rather depends upon a deeper unity, of the two at once.} \]

\[ \text{251 Derrida mitigates even this outcome by a circularity in the word “perhaps”, as it ought to imply opening rather than affirmation. He has not yet developed this “perhaps” in detail in his progress.} \]
cf. EJ §64), Derrida thus generalises this to every reduction, and every kind of temporality. The hidden temporal unity of [...] ‘in’-temporality as one part [d’une part] and of omnitemporality on the other is the unitary ground of all the instances dissociated by the various reductions (IDG 165, cf. IOG 149).

A fortiori, the only ground that Derrida allows for a result is this moment of passage in the Logos. But even so the foundation is only hidden; the unitary alignment of all of the reductions as what constitutes a beyond in internality without evidence or positing, but rather as responsibility to enquire of the object.

The evolution beyond 1954

Thus Derrida can generalise this responsibility in order to answer (répondre) his question. For pure possibility has found no absolute external solution to the demand to determine the Fact. The subject no longer goes out of itself to encounter the object.

252 Leavey translates “instances” as “signifying”, while noting the French. We retain “instances”, which refers to a logical moment.
Rather, each argument has been assessed in address to his question, but in each case the Logos remains merely a passage in the Absolute. At this juncture a seminal change occurs in Derrida’s œuvre, and a notable evolution toward the mature work which is familiar to so many readers, as his bases of 1954 are set aside. Without an absolute possibility of a real fact, Derrida’s imposition upon Husserl of the requirement of an absolute as objectual is set aside. Derrida no longer insists upon the “dilemma” arising from the demand that a problematic object be affirmed absolutely. Instead, he at last accepts the later Husserl’s intentions – phenomenology circulates in passages according to a form that has not yet appeared. Derrida goes on:

[Instead of frantically investigating the options, we must strive toward [across to, à travers] the necessarily single root of every dilemma. (IOG 148, our emphasis first)]

This “frantic” investigation has been Derrida’s approach in every argument since 1954. After eight years, he ceases struggling and accepts this involuted but single direction of passage and its necessity, as holding of essential law.
Arrival at the Absolute as Passage

A fortiori, Derrida concludes

all of this signifies then that the Absolute is Passage. (IOG 149, Derrida’s emphases)

Instead of exceeding passage in the objectual absolute, we have arrived at signifying of the Absolute as Passage. Indeed, Derrida emphasises that he has developed all of these arguments sequentially via intentionality. He writes:

[A]ll this rigorously develops the discovery of intentionality. (IOG 150)

We have followed how Derrida’s progress evolved via intentionality, in the “rigorous” progress of Derrida’s argument. In our next chapter, we turn to the final pages of the “Introduction” in 1962, as Derrida develops the “only possible result” to work out his first moment of deferral of Difference.

Derrida writes, summarising the bases we set out: “[S]ince there can be nothing outside the pure historicity of that passage, since there is no [...] sense outside of this historicity [...], since the [passage of the] Logos and Telos are nothing outside the interplay of their reciprocal [i.e. transcendental] inspiration, this signifies then that the Absolute is Passage.” (IOG 149, Derrida’s emphases).
Chapter Four: Deferral and Difference  
(the “Introduction”, 1962 pt. 2)  

Introduction  
This chapter continues to follow Derrida’s progress in the final pages of the 1962 “Introduction” to Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry”. Derrida will work out how the Absolute as passage leads to deferral and Difference (as différant), as the emergence of these relations in his oeuvre. Hence by the end of our chapter we will have followed how the différant developed in a progressive argument from Derrida’s concerns since 1954.  

Part One: from the Absolute to the différant  

Retaining the absolute, inside  
In our previous chapter, we followed as Derrida questioned how the (external) absolute of ideal Objectivity is possible, and arrived in a sequence at the Absolute as Passage. Thus it is important to avoid supposing that a result has been determined for epistemology (or any other object that must be known entirely). It is important to avoid deeming that the absolute is done away with as telos. The argument is a necessary progression, and the absolute remains the first demand. The Absolute is only then Passage. Derrida has only set forth that the absolute should no longer be approached by naïve insistence upon a “dilemma”. Hence as this
telos in passage holds, and necessity as a “single root” still applies, thought still seeks its object as absolute. In particular, one must also still speak of this absolute. None of the relations developed thus far are discarded. The question remains how ideal Objectivity is possible. The telos is still to determine the Fact, at the last even as “beyond”) and the outcomes of the four arguments in our previous chapter hold.

The absolute in the Absolute

We will first explain how the absolute remains the telos of the Absolute. That is, how the absolute as object is restored to ideal objectivity. This occurred in Derrida’s third argument, which outcome will thus be developed. Having devolved to the Absolute of Objectivity in transcendental subjectivity in its directions, and a pure possibility, Derrida turned to Cavaillé’s critique of Husserl which, in brief, seeks a foundation in Husserl as either subjective or objectual (absolute) logic. In what follows, Cavaillé’s “subjective logic” is taken by Derrida to be transcendentally-subjective logic, and his “absolute logic” (as for us) to be objectual. For Cavaillé, then, if an “absolute” logic were

254 Derrida emphasises this “indestructibility” of necessity across his oeuvre (cf. ToC 233, TdLC 597, ED 343, OG 89, AT 29, cf. Lawlor 139). Derrida refers in “The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation” in 1966 to an “ineluctable necessity” [nécessité ineluctable] (ToC 233, TdLC 597, ED 343). Importantly, in Of Grammatology, Derrida deems it “an indestructible but relative necessity, within a system that encompasses it” (OG 89, DLGb 136). Derrida is developing this system, but in 1962 it occurs in the levels and directions of intentionality (cf. the next footnote).
fundamental, as objectively founded, this would exclude a subjective (for Derrida, Absolute) and logical basis. Just so, for Cavaillès,\textsuperscript{255} if subjective logic were the ground of the transcendental, then no absolute logic could be found (cf. L 61).\textsuperscript{256} The absolute logic would be a “consciousness of progress”, as objective genitive, and the Absolute the “progress of consciousness” as subjective genitive (IOG 143).

Derrida worked out that the Absolute of Genitivity is neither (IOG 142), thus he seeks no foundation upon either, but proceeds via an Absolute as Passage. To do so he proceeded via the Idea which (as we saw) circulates as a pure pole of subjectivity to itself. For Cavaillès had deemed that Husserl found it

\textsuperscript{255} Cavaillès writes – of the Ideas and the Formal and Transcendental Logic: “since no content except consciousness has the authority to posit itself in itself […] [Then] […] if transcendental logic really founds logic, there is no absolute logic (that is, governing the absolute subjective activity). If there is an absolute logic, it can draw its authority only from itself, and then it is not transcendental” (Cavaillès 78). Derrida does observe that Cavaillès allowed that the transcendental subjectivity of the Cartesian Meditations might allow a way out of this blunt dilemma (IOG 143, Cavaillès 1947, 65). Derrida had quoted this argument in 1954 (PG 124-125, PDG 208), to argue that even Cavaillès “transcendental genesis” without content made “the absolute of logical truths into something fleeting, contingent, and out of date” (PG 125, PDG 208). In 1962, Derrida is reformulating his approach to a simple problem of origin, as a demand for the absolute, to allow for the moment of creativity of content (even pure content) as produced in the Absolute by the irreducible.

\textsuperscript{256} We think Lawlor’s explanation of Cavaillès is excellent: “If subjectivity […] is absolute, then formal logic would have to be conceived as relative to this one being known as consciousness; tied to something that is singular, logic would no longer be able to be conceived as universal [i.e., general]. In short, it would lose its authority over different beings. Conversely, if logic is absolute, it would not be able to be identified with [and in] transcendental logic, having cut its ties to [positing] consciousness, logic would be ungrounded.” (Lawlor 2002, 61) Note Lawlor’s employment of “absolute” and “ground”. We are following how, for Derrida rather than Cavaillès, neither absolute logic nor a logic of subjectivity are given primacy in this progress, as Derrida develops the relations of pure phenomenology. To that end, we are working out the relations of genitivity as neither subjective nor objective, by means of our whole-part relations of levels and directions in an ongoing progression.
“impossible or difficult to admit” (Cavaillès 1947, 65) a moment of creativity to transcendental subjectivity, as consciousness has the authority to posit content only in itself. This, for Cavaillès, inculcates a division between subject and object. For Derrida, the “creative” moment in Husserl’s *oeuvre* is precisely the production of the Idea in the Kantian sense (IOG 136, OOG 167), which did not exist before its originary idealisation (IOG 135-136, (210)).

That is, even without a ground, or simple evidence of real content, idealisation and its production certainly arises, hence consciousness can create the beyond. In turn (IOG 136), such a “constituting” moment then allows the objective moment (forward), to proceed toward determining the mere intuition of the object in general. It can converge upon “the absolute”. Or as Derrida summarises, when the originary Idea is “constituting”, this leads to

a constituted objective sense (which is

therefore its 'absolute logic') (IOG 143).

Next, the object in general can be the sense of the absolute origin in particular. This possibility, of course, again must determine the

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257 As Derrida puts it: “[the] *Idea in the Kantian sense* […] is the object of an ideation, a name Husserl often gives to idealisation and which must be distinguished from the ideation as the intuition of an essence [Wissenschaft]. The difference between these two ideations is: one can constitute an object as a creation, the other can determine it in an intuition.” (IOG 135-136, Derrida’s emphases).
productive moment of the Idea in the Kantian sense (beyond) as foundation for the essential levels and directions (intentionality) in itself. This is in turn originarily productive, in the circularity:

[I]n the creative movement by which it goes beyond itself [it] produces a new sense [which] will also be the moment of a higher sense-investigation in which the past [objectual] sense, sedimented and retained first [originarily] in a sort of objectivist attitude, will be reawakened in its dependent relation. (IOG 143, our emphases)

For Derrida, the Absolute and transcendentally subjective logic can in turn constitute the sense of the absolute as objectual in general (as “objectivist”), which can again be the object as particular (or singular) origin, even as the absolute. Hence this is never “to abuse the singularity of the absolute” (IOG 144, Cavaillé 1947, 65) as Cavaillé suggests. Rather, this return implies a re-application to
itself of the constitution of the object, leading to “the opening of indetermination” (IOG 143).\footnote{Derrida asks: “[I]f [this return] is clearly the case, why should we choose, as Cavaillès thought, between an ‘absolute logic’ and a ‘transcendental logic’?” (IOG 143, cf. Cavaillès 77).}

The absolute no longer arises as the Telos of an object (across), but “in” the constituting of idealities (“upward”). Thus far, this progress sets forth how the Absolute retains the absolute “in” the Living Present: in its circular essentiality. When the objects of pure phenomenology are essential, the creative application of pure phenomenology to sense can continually rise “upward”.

Indeed, Derrida returns to the vertical metaphors to explain this; each moment would be “a higher sense-investigation” (IOG 143, just above) of these absolute moments of passage. Derrida, it seems, has justified the predicative possibility of the absolute. The constituting of the absolute leads to it as constituted “in” the Living Present.

Indeed, this is deemed

the co-implication of the constituted and constituting moments in [dans] the absolute

identity of a Living Present (IOG 144, our emphases).
Note that this is a “co-implication” (thus also a complication), the difficulty preventing identity synthesis which Derrida deemed the problem since 1954 (138).

Thus far, were Derrida to remain Husserlian in opting for the Living Present as the fundamental form, the devolution to an absolute “inside” would have solved the problem of origin in general. Just by letting go of the problem as naïve demand for an external absolute, Derrida would have solved it. Notably, the transcendental Ego in its “pure pole” no longer posits itself as an external object. Rather, the absolute “in” (dans) the Absolute allows the Ego to create itself as other, to go beyond and enquire of the ego. Thus the entire “field” of possible ideal objectivities, sedimented in the Ego, can be constituted in the circularity of the Absolute (IOG 144, 149). Even so, this is merely a moment on the way; as Derrida explained in 1954, this complication continued to trouble him.

**Toward the separation of the object**

Indeed, the circularity of subjective and objective logic that Derrida defends against Cavaillé, he is willing to critique in his progress (although, we note, he will refrain in 1962 from following this criticism through entirely). At this juncture we begin to work toward deferral and Difference.
Importantly, the naïve use of “in” (or “within” (cf. IOG 153, 173)) must be set aside, insofar as it constitutes an outside. The certainty of sense arises rather as production in a priori essential relations, retracted from content “to the inside”, as regulative demand to address the objective as beyond. However, this demand is as yet without ground for constituting this object. Address to the beyond as yet passes to opening rather than a limit that re-constitutes the inside as an opposite to the outside. Thus the Absolute will pass to deferral, and this identity of the Living Present will be no longer be undivided in itself.

To explain: in the first and second arguments in address to the Idea in the Kantian sense, phenomenology lost its ground, though Husserl located objectual space anyway. That was a shortfall of logic in general that left the certainty of the absolute (as object, whether internal or external) as an opening. Internally, the moments of sense could thus not yet find a ground to converge toward the absolute, at the “higher” essential level. We make three comments. First, whether the Absolute constitutes the absolute object as pure, or the absolute is made objectual despite the failure of ground in the Absolute, in either case the absolute is retained. Second, as the Idea in the Kantian sense must found both language and logic, both lose the ground that justifies constituting an object. Indeed, Derrida sets aside “ground” in what follows (IOG 142). To assess what can be said of the objectual (absolute), he rather turns to the correlative moment of
“right”. Only the pure will hold in the Absolute as a circularity, and *why* it can constitute without an object will arise from the question.

**The initial division in possibilities**

To begin to explain what will thus no longer be “undivided” (IOG 153) – it is important to note that the right to convergence (or closer determination) arises at the subjective side of passage. However, the kind of positing in the pure (or Absolute) passage cannot be direct (i.e. a simple doxic) outcome, but as yet implies opening (cf. 304). Henceforth, Derrida continues to deem the pure and regulative necessity and possibility to be “responsibility” (295), but the horizon of *predicative* possibility to be “possibility”.\(^{259}\) Insofar as it is addressed by responsibility, it is certain that even the latter and its objects evolve in phenomenology in its *pure* sense. Thus Derrida’s outcome from his arguments was the responsibility to address a “*pure* possibility”

\(^{259}\) By this division, Derrida avoids what would otherwise be an unsurpassable gap between pure and regulative possibility and its constitution of phenomenological and pure possibility. The former merely evolves to a responsibility that the latter be determined, rather than it needing to determine the latter. As we explained, pure and regulative necessity and possibility in turn arose from the “demand” for the Reason to determine the ideal object. The progress has evolved from the demand to determine the complication of origin, which Derrida applied since 1954.
As to the Absolute, for Derrida, although Objectivity (in the pure form of intentionality) yet determined no factual basis, pure possibility remained. However, the first justification for the possibility of determinability of the object is even more basic, as possibility is certain. That is, as founded upon the Idea, a possibility to determine the object in general holds from the first, and consciousness can more closely determine the finite object by repetition. This possibility holds even when opening is the *outcome*. But one should avoid deeming that this possibility is a doxic *positing* (let alone affirming) of even an intentional object “as such” (e.g. a phenomenon) as absolute. In the evolution to the Absolute, pure possibility is reconstituted as possible. This remains an a priori, essential and general possibility in the Absolute as Passage.

Further, from the address to the Idea, we worked out that what is given must have been *created* from an origin even outside pure phenomenology, and even though no corresponding content of such an outside can appear. Hence *the responsibility to ask “why”* (295, 297) *applies in pure possibility in the ascension to higher levels of*...
sense, of an object that is no longer outside (thus no longer “external”). Thus, as the objective sense can no longer arise from pure possibility, Derrida retains a possibility at the side of the subject constituting the object that is no longer even a predication of the object as content. It is a predication of what can no longer originate in pure possibility, by pure phenomenology. Thus Derrida has worked out a first “limitation” (cf. IOG 153, IDG 170) of pure phenomenology. He will thus re-instil a “division” between pure phenomenology and “(phenomenological) ontology”.

The sense of the division between phenomenology and ontology

But nor should this “division” be taken as merely external, the moments of “higher sense” produced by the Idea in the Kantian sense are investigated in pure phenomenology (IOG 143). It is easy to neglect that pure phenomenology applies a method, impelled by a teleology, and anything can be investigated in the sense of its appearing as such, and thus as essential (IOG 151, 152): even limitation and division. This a priori circularity of Method allows “methodic reflection” (IOG 152) even upon the sense of pure phenomenology as such in its division from ontology.261 Thus

261 This evolves the essential “Method” – which in 1962 henceforth is deemed thought as consciousness of its directions made object (IOG 149). The best explanation of phenomenological method that we have found is that by Heidegger in the “Fundamental Discoveries of Phenomenology, its Principle, and its Clarification of its Name”. As Heidegger explains in “My Way to Phenomenology”: “the expression the perceived as such now refers to this entity in
Derrida retains “Husserl’s phenomenological ontology” (IOG 151, our emphasis), yet he is also adding “ontology” in general.

To develop the above: as this progress remains originary, instead of an ontological object, this questioning of higher sense allows pure phenomenology to ask the “ontological question” (IOG 150). Thus in asking “why”, Derrida can “separate” ontology from the subjective questioning by pure phenomenology as such. As phenomenology in its questioning retains pure possibility, a fortiori this permits the reconstitution by pure phenomenology of “ontological or metaphysical possibility” (IOG 150). Hence at this higher level, phenomenology in general can be “opposed” to ontology or metaphysics in general. Derrida’s next moment thus restores the sense of the problem of the origin. For upon entering the Absolute, the ontological possibility can be questioned as to its particular origin (to determine essential Being as History). The ontological question is that of Being.

However, we caution, while Derrida seems to diverge from Husserl’s pure phenomenology, which never asked the question of Being, he is beginning to re-constitute the latter within Husserl’s

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the way and manner of its being-perceived.” (Heidegger 2002, 267). This, Heidegger explains, is “a completely new structure”, that of phenomenological method less as a school but a possibility of (eidetic) study of anything at all. Thus phenomenology “can disappear as a designation in favour of the matter of thinking” (Heidegger 2002, 256, our emphasis).

262 This “or” is inclusive, on or other or both. The “ontological” and “metaphysical” are both kinds of possibility that reconstitute a limit.

263 This, Derrida explains, is “philosophy [in general] posing [positing] the question of Being and History” (IOG 150).
phenomenology. As he explained, this essence must have been founded by the Idea; this question cannot (an essential impossibility) have come from within a pure phenomenology as such. To allow for this exclusion, Derrida deems this a “non-Husserlian” sense.

**The “non” relation introduced**

It is pertinent to explain this “non”, which will grow in importance as we proceed. A usual sort of formal opposition would be bivalent, when one term is not the other. To be sure, Derrida set aside bivalence of truth and falsity early on (222 ff.), in retracting to value and opening. Yet Derrida must still allow at least the opening, thus the bivalence of possibility and impossibility of particular objects must also be avoided. For an opposite which is not Husserl’s phenomenology, would set aside even the reduction and purity.

To explain this, it is important to note how predicative negation of a particular object diverges from essential, a priori and general negation. Within a proposition, for Husserl, “not” signifies the negation of a predicate. Such a negation does not yet modify the predicate itself. However, crucially, “non” is affixed to the predicate (the intentional object, word etc.). Nowadays this “non-relation” is called “predicate-term negation”, the “term complement” or “complement”. It is denoted in English by “non-” or “not-”, but
ever with a hyphen linking it to the predicate (object). A non-relation signifies *all that is not the object*. As Hyppolite summarised:

\[
\text{Non-}A \text{ [Non-}A\text{] signifies [or means] all that is not } A.
\]

(LeE 145, cf. LE 113, our emphases).

Note the “all” – this “not” signifies a negation in general, rather than a negation of a particular ideal object. Yet as purely objective, it is also helpful for readers to assess the relations visually, as *everything* around *A* when the relation are purely essential. Moreover, it can be expressed as *all around A*, when even the pure refers around itself, and thus no longer necessarily even to essentiality and generality.\(^{265}\) Moreover, as speech is a correlative and “non” is posited as a relation without content, “non” also signifies (or means) everything around the pure form of the relation, which we will take as implicit.\(^{266}\) We will develop these relations as we proceed (cf. 514).

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\(^{264}\) The French is: “Non-\(A\) signifie tout ce qui n’est pas \(A\)” (LeE 145). We have amended the translation of “Non-\(A\)” as “Not-\(A\)” (LE 113), returning it to “Non-\(A\)”. We first developed this complement when comparing the French and English translations of Derrida by Bass, and comparing translations of Hyppolite’s *Logic and Existence* (co-translated by Lawlor and Sen) in address to Derrida. We are not yet sure whether Lawlor is aware of this in Derrida, as he and Sen translate Hyppolite’s “non” as “not” in 1998, but Lawlor in 2002 translates Derrida’s “non” as “non”.

\(^{265}\) As Hurley puts it: “[T]he complement of a class is the group consisting of everything outside the class” (Hurley 2000, 217, our emphases).

\(^{266}\) Hurley adds, the “term complement is the word or group of words that denotes the class complement” (Hurley 2000, 217). We follow Derrida and Husserl, for whom the constituting of these relations occurs as correlative.
Thus far, in accordance with traditional logic, a relation of a complement which is no longer a negation of the particular relation is *always positive* (Nolt *et al.* 2001, 114). Yet as explained, a reader should avoid supposing that even the negation in general is of an external object. Derrida’s progress has pulled “back” from such assertion to the Absolute in its essential relations. In this case, non-\(A\) can be substituted by “non-Husserlian”, which latter can only have a value that is no longer the particular negation of Husserl’s phenomenology, but is moreover a positive version of purity.\(^{267}\) Thus the non-relation can also be thought of as signifying all around phenomenology. Ontology (and phenomenological ontology) hold in a *non*-phenomenological (*non phénoménologique*) sense, as signifying all of what is no longer phenomenological (IOG 150). When this ontological question “cannot” stem from pure phenomenology (as non-Husserlian), it must stem from around the pure. Thus nor is the non-relation confined to ontology, for a non-relation signals *all* that is not phenomenology. This allows for any ontology, rather than merely phenomenological ontologies besides Husserl’s (henceforth, “ontology”). Derrida summarises this as the

\(^{267}\) Hyppolite’s “A” could just as well be Husserl’s “P”, although we have avoided this substitution to avoid confusion in translation.
'ontological’ question (‘ontological’ in the non-
Husserlian sense of the word which alone can
be, and often is, opposed to Husserl's
phenomenological ontology) cannot stem
from a phenomenology as such. (IOG 150)

The allusion to Heidegger seems to be obvious.

Parenthesis – Derrida’s formal progress to
ontology in general

We do note, however, that as a non-Husserlian sense applies to all
that is not Husserl’s phenomenology, this allows for those besides
Heidegger's. Indeed, even Heidegger situated his approach in this
fashion. For Heidegger, “[a]ll ontology” (BT 9/SZ 11, Heidegger's
emphasis), begins by asking “what” the object is, even the
“ancient ontology” in history (BT 20/SZ 23). Heidegger thus
deems that “ontology” to be “a discipline [which] can be
developed only from the objective necessity of particular
questions [...] demanded by the ‘things themselves’” (BT 24, SZ
27). In turn, for Heidegger, to continue asking “what”, ontology

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268 For Heidegger, “ontology taken in its broadest sense” begins from the
necessity to ask “what we really mean by this expression ‘being’” (BT 9/SZ 11,
our emphasis). We explained how “being” for Derrida’s explanation of Husserl
evolved to the Absolute as Passage. Derrida is situating his question prior to
only the content “being”, which for Derrida follows from the “what”.

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develops a “question” that is posed of the Being of beings in their historicity, to investigate its sense in History."

Derrida concedes that ontology seeks to ask this question. However, in referring to the “non-Husserlian” sense, thus as all of what is not Husserl’s ontology, he can continue to investigate what holds of these relations in general, as developed in his progress (thus Derrida avoids mention of external thinkers, or detail). That is, in assessing the directions, one of the double necessities was to ask “what” the origin of the object is in history (IOG 49). Having retracted to the Absolute, this indeed evolves to the necessity to question of the essence of Being in History.269 As these have developed from Husserl, Derrida in 1962 will work out in this progressive argument that only Husserl’s pure phenomenology can address them (cf. IOG 152).270 He continues to investigate the formal relations.

269 That is, address to Heidegger would be fruitful, but in 1962 would merely proceed by contrast; Derrida is following his concerns as they developed since 1954. We will continue to follow Derrida’s “law”.

270 Derrida’s progress could never have opted for Heidegger’s ontology, we suggest. For example, Heidegger explains that “[h]istoricity means the constitution of being of the ‘occurrence’ of Da-Sein as such; it is the ground for the fact that something like the discipline of world-history’ is at all possible” (BT 18, SZ 20). However much Heidegger will develop, still, Derrida in 1962 set aside a ground for the fact. Derrida will work out that “phenomenology alone can make infinite historicity appear […] as the pure possibility and the very essence of Being in manifestation. It alone can open the absolute subjectivity of Sense to Being-History [in the Absolute]” (IOG 152, our emphases).
Evolving the double necessity

Thus far, the relations follow from this “division” in the pure Absolute to allow a “non-Husserlian” sense of ontology. Importantly, given a telos of the absolute, even without bivalence, what cannot hold of a particular object must originate from all around it. Thus when non-Husserlian phenomenology is limited, the possibility of asking “why” of ontological possibility must fall to Husserlian phenomenology, which includes its levels of “ontology”. As ontological possibility is objectual (in asking “what”, it constitutes a limit), it is also metaphysical. Hence, as the pure can constitute “ontological or metaphysical” possibility (IOG 150, above), Derrida avoids disqualifying the question of ontology from convergence upon the sense as such of the external object; such a disqualification would determine the sense of the external object rather than leaving the question as an opening. Pure phenomenology as such, however, remains concerned with asking why the sense of the ideal Objectivity arises as appearing, rather than a simple external moment. Derrida retains the question for pure phenomenology too; even to question the sense of objectivity.\textsuperscript{271}

\textsuperscript{271} That is, from the second and third arguments, this locating of space as positing goes on anyway, without convergence upon the external object, but rather in the moment of phenomenology stretched between the creative Idea and its address to origin.
Hence, possibility and right can be apportioned, for consciousness of the History of Being addresses the *temporal* moment of appearing in space, and consciousness of the pure object addresses the *spatial* object without ground or content as it must have appeared in history. Derrida is evolving his “double necessity” (298), which asked *why* the object had an origin, and *how* it had *such* an origin. Derrida can ask, in pure phenomenology and of History and Being, how an object which appears had an origin in time, and why it had *such* an origin in space. The former asks the question of the fact of the object’s history and being (in ontology as non-phenomenology), and the latter asks why appearing as such arises in its historicity as non-being (in pure phenomenology).

*A fortiori*, the form of the question of the absolute with which Derrida began has been evolved. Husserl’s question as to “how” ideal Objectivity is possible (IOG 67, (232)) is evolved into “*in view of what?*” (which seeks to constitute its Object in *space* as absolute), while “*why?*” sets aside this object to assess the productive creation as Absolute. Derrida has indeed developed Husserl’s implications to assess the complication (co-implication (IOG 144)) of origin. That is, to ask “*why*” can only emerge *after* a consciousness – in ontological possibility – that the facticity of the object can then cease to be. Derrida calls this possibility that asks “what” its
“eventuality”, a word for “possibility” in French which also has the sense of contingency. However, that a being can be “what” it is only holds when a (pure) possibility (possibilité) of asking “why” applies. Thus to “pass from the question ‘how’ to the question ‘why’” (IOG 150), Derrida summarises the complication we developed above:

[T]he why can emerge only from the possible (in the metaphysical or ontological, and non-phenomenological sense [et non phénoménologique]) non-being of historical facticity, and non-being as non-history only discloses its eventuality in departing from a consciousness of pure sense and pure historicity. That is to say, from a consciousness of [pure] possibility in the phenomenological

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272 Derrida will continue to align ontological possibility, with its empirical and contingent facticity, with “eventuality” (cf. VEM 445, VM 129 (548)).
The question of which comes first – the pure and reduced “why” or the originary and constituted “what” – is the basis for what will become delay and Difference. Before addressing these, Derrida summarises the outcomes that we have developed thus far.

**Derrida’s assessment, and support for our explanation en route**

That is, as we have explained since Chapter Two, the telos of the objectual, set out in the four arguments, was ultimately to determine the Fact. As far as Derrida has progressed, in address to the objectual absolute, on the side of phenomenological ontology, asking why of its facticity would then ask what the Fact is. Indeed, Derrida explains that the question “to which a phenomenological ontology responds [répond] as a rule” is

‘What is a Fact?’ (IOG 151)

However, the evolution to the Absolute developed toward questioning facticity as no longer objectual (no longer a “what”),

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273 Leavey translates “non phénoménologique” as “and not phenomenological”. Derrida is rather employing a non-relation without negation, as everything outside phenomenology, avoiding a “refusal” (denial) of pure phenomenology that would set aside the reduction.
thus as the “hidden source” of every reduction. That is, the original (essential and general) source of possibility. The responsibility holds to ask, in pure phenomenology, why the origin \emph{can} arise as factual, i.e. as facticity. Thus, Derrida writes, phenomenology as such (pure phenomenology), can ask

\begin{quote}
‘\textit{Why are a factual starting point in facticity and a reduction possible in general?}’ (IOG 151, Derrida’s emphasis)
\end{quote}

We note a second benefit of the “why”: it supports our emphasis on a first certainty (the barest fact (cf. PH 151, PHG 179, (cf. 238))). Indeed, the “why” is dependent upon this certainty for its possibility; but this must no longer pass to questioning of the Fact as objectual.\footnote{An \textit{absolute} origin would be defined by the absolute or total fact as invariable, and also the solution to the “beyond” in the strong sense that Derrida developed thereafter.} Derrida summarises the evolution:

\begin{quote}
\[\text{[W]e pass from phenomenology to ontology (in the non-Husserlian sense) when we […] question the upsurge of stark fact and cease to consider the Fact as function. (IOG 152)}\]
\end{quote}
For Husserl, “Function” is the essential relation pertaining to questions of the “constituting of the objective field” (I §86, Husserl’s emphasis). Derrida is aligning such questions with “ontology”. He rather worked out that the a priori and essential Fact can then be set aside; it need no longer be asked “what” the fact is.

In the constituting moment of the transcendental subject in which the historical fact is sedimented, thus

I can clearly ask myself why there would be any historicity. (IOG 151)

Thus phenomenology in its pure possibility passes to and poses the question “why” to ontology. The “why?” can ask of Being

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275 For Husserl – at which moment phenomenology evolves to a functionalism, questioning the function of the object – “Function” is an essential relation, “grounded in the pure essence of the noeses”, allowing address to “the greatest problems of all”, the “constituting of the objective field of consciousness”. This “central viewpoint of phenomenology” “enquire[s] how objective unities of every kind are ‘known’ or ‘supposed’” (I §86, Husserl’s emphases). Questioning of function is necessary as intentionality “is just consciousness ‘of’ something; [thus] it is its essential nature to conceal ‘meaning’ within itself.” (I §86). By addressing “function”, “ontology” in the non-Husserlian sense is allowed for again in Husserl’s progress without objectivity. However, note that in ceasing to question function, Derrida insists upon a purity that Husserl never quite did; Derrida is developing his concerns.

276 The Fact remains certain, of course, but thus far must pass away: “[N]aturally, […] the Fact must then not function: its [objectual] sense must not be determined outside or independently of phenomenology” (IOG 152). Note also that Derrida’s approach is still immature (by his standards) in that it employs a subsequent moment of negation, which he seeks to exclude.

277 We will develop these relations of “I” to “myself” in Chapter Five.
(rather than being) only as phenomenology. Thus, Derrida writes, this (logical) “assertion” points to

the moment phenomenology can be

articulated, without confusion, with a

‘philosophy’ posing the question of Being or

History. (IOG 150, IDG 166)

Derrida has returned to thorough support of Husserl’s bases, and deems the progress has arrived at a moment by which “philosophy” (as phenomenology) can ask its question coherently.

The restriction of the right to the objectual

For Derrida is still heeding the responsibility for philosophy to question how the absolute in its complication with the Absolute can be determined as a Fact, via intentionality. First, we note why a question would be “posed” in speech, in the progressive argument. Intentionality seeks to determine its object as absolute. Its every positing begins from the certainty of evidence, thus believing that its object is possible (I §5), as is determination of it. However, writing and the speaking subject found no ground to

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278 This is phenomenology allowing “the pure possibility and the very essence of Being in manifestation.” (IOG 152)
279 It is at this juncture that Derrida explains “[A]ll this rigourously develops the discovery of intentionality.” (IOG 150).
determine the possibility of the object in space (cf. 262). That is, both writing and the speaking subject posit what the object is in space, but lost their ground to do so. For Derrida, it was rather Speech which created the originary circularity of historicity that permitted speech (302); that in turn evolved to radical responsibility in pure phenomenology. In general, the radical philosopher in pure phenomenology still has a responsibility to speak to others to ask how the absolute is first possible as a Fact (the essence of speaking to others is deemed Discourse). But without a ground for asking “what”, the positing no longer quite believes in the possibility that the object can be what it is. This evolves the relations of the question.

**The question as developed in the progress**

That is, the progress of questioning is no longer merely a naïve sort of question as though merely posited by “Derrida”. Nor it is any longer quite posited as doxic (I §103 (227)). Henceforth, a question no longer quite believes in the possibility of an absolute answer (réponse (IOG 148)) to what it asks about. As to how it

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280 Intentionality is deemed the “pure movement of the phenomenological temporalisation as going out from self to self of the Absolute of the Living Present” (IOG 151).

281 Doubt is a related modality to the question. Husserl also deems: “[T]he way of “certain” belief can pass over into that of […] question and doubt” (I §103, Husserl’s emphases (cf. 347)). Doubt for Husserl is never quite serious, of course, such a modality rather occurs further along “passage” of a prior certainty. However, that an absolute solution to a question has arisen can then be doubted.
proceeds, the question thus retains its correlatives of right, certainty and ground of convergence for both phenomenology and ontology. Hence even without a ground, the right to speak remains for both phenomenology and ontology (205). We address ontology first.

**The privilege of pure phenomenology**

Derrida can thus work out that, as ontology no longer posits doxically of the absolute as what it is, it loses the right to absolute positing of facticity. It only retains the right to that constrained positing which no longer (quite) believes in the possibility of a result – the question. The questioning of space, we explained, thus far leads to opening rather than a result (292). Hence ontology

must stand in the precarious opening of a question (IOG 151).

Hence, when it posits or speaks,

\[
\text{[O]ntology only has a right to the question.}
\]

(IOG 151)

Thus the privilege of (pure) phenomenology arises. As the ontological possibility of an absolute result no longer holds, this possibility can only be pure. Hence, on pain of missing the entire
progress, it is crucial to avoid deeming, as has been suggested, that

[phenomenology alone provides evidence; it alone makes sense, *it alone knows.* (Lawlor 2002, 141, our emphasis)]

Rather, only phenomenology *can* know. Only pure possibility can permit transcendental subjectivity’s approach to the being of the absolute to open to the Absolute and Being. As Derrida puts it:

[F]or phenomenology alone *can* make infinite historicity appear [...] as the pure possibility and the very essence of Being in manifestation.

It alone *can open* the absolute subjectivity of Sense to Being-History [in the Absolute] (IOG 152, our emphases)

Indeed, Derrida has arrived at an outcome he sought from the outset (230). “Manifestation” is deemed that originary moment of Being’s revealing itself which is not yet its (objectual) appearing to the gaze of the subject. That is, while the questioning of space arrived at opening, only pure phenomenology which asks “why”
can open the relation. It alone can open the pure possibility of a response, to avoid the opening of ontological possibility and its question. Rather than ontology and its demand for the absolute, such a possibility arises rather from the Absolute and its irreducible source. Thus phenomenology in the Absolute as Passage “begins by claiming the right to speech” (IOG 152, our emphases), and only this retains the pure possibility of an answer (or result, as réponse). Derrida summarises:

\[ \text{[E]very response \[réponse\] to such a question} \]

\[ \text{can resurface only in a phenomenological} \]

\[ \text{process. [However] [O]ntology only has a right} \]

\[ \text{to the question (IOG 151, our emphasis).} \]

A fortiori, the possibility of response falls only to pure phenomenology, as only it questions “why?”. Yet such a question still begins from certainty, thus seeks to determine the fact absolutely (it takes the external object “seriously”).

\[ \text{Each object that was excluded from pure phenomenology can be re-included in} \]

\[ \text{its rising to higher moments of sense. This is how thought in its pure certainty can again ask “why?” of the originary and pure sense of the Absolute, to ask “what” the object can be:} \]
because the ‘why’ owes its seriousness to a

phenomenological certainty and through this

seriousness recovers the virulence of an ‘in

view of what?’ (IOG 151).

The double necessity has evolved to the single necessity of pure phenomenology and its responsibility (cf. IOG 148). Indeed, Derrida soon allots to pure phenomenology the responsibility to ask why for all of philosophy.

But even this most positive moment (soon to be moderated) of the pure avoids the simple dogmatism of affirming the truth of phenomenology. Rather than retaining possibility for pure phenomenology because it can claim more, we suggest that Derrida does so in order to avoid claiming too much. First, to question (demander) still retains the demand to ask “why”. Indeed, phenomenology

\[\text{can only be a teleological consciousness. (IOG 151, our emphases).}\]

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282 In addition, Derrida writes: “[T]he why can emerge only from the possible”, and “I can clearly ask myself why” (IOG 150-151).
Such a “can only” arises from the preclusion of ontological possibility, retaining only an eidetic necessity of pure possibility. Thus essentially, phenomenology must be teleological. Consciousness in its seriousness remains a demand through and through. However, that something can and must occur has no affirmable bearing on whether it does. Accepting this “mandate” (IOG 146) for phenomenology may be a heavier burden than ceding responsibility for absolute truth to a realism or scepticism. Only pure passage can arrive at outcome even to ontology – but even that possibility is not yet affirmed. Its insoluble demand is caught in the Absolute’s evolution to an absolute as purer sense.

That said, the reader might deem the above unconvincing. At base, that the absolute produced by the Idea as Absolute surely restores the essential object “inside” the Absolute. Thereafter, as a juridical priority is posited (every positing is a judgment (I §5), even a question), thus may be affirmed as absolute. Thus in excluding the ontological, the primacy of judgment returns absolute position, dispelling the problem.

**The arrival at delay rather than primacy**

But Derrida is aware of this, although he will not yet solve it entirely. He begins to undo both the Absolute and the

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283 Derrida explains: “this teleology [...] cannot be determined in a philosophical language without provisionally breaking this unity for the benefit of phenomenology” (IOG 151).
complacency of the absolute “inside”. The difficulty, we note, is that Derrida’s outcome has been a *privileging of the “why”*. For one must first ask “what” in order to ask “why”, or there could have been no evidence for appearing at all. The Fact must only *then* not function. Thus, just as the positive conclusion about pure phenomenology and the possibility of asking “why” is *generalised to all of philosophy*, Derrida instils this primacy by appealing to conditions of possibility:

> [O]n the condition [of possibility] that the taking

seriously of pure facticity *follows after*

phenomenology’s possibility and assumes its

juridical priority [...] [this] completes

philosophy. (IOG 151, our emphases)

Hence one should be cautious. This basis would complete philosophy only if the question taken “seriously” (i.e. asking only questions of what one believes can have sense) follows from possibility. The argument holds only if the pure itself *first* constitutes the phenomenological possibility of ideal Objectivity. That is, it holds only after a Reduction (as essential) in the Absolute. However, the difficulty is that the Reduction must then be prior to the object already given in ontology.
That is, the difficulty is again that of Method. As one must ask “what” before one can ask “why”, two options arise. If ontological possibility holds, even without the fact, then the objectual absolute comes first. Derrida’s outcome has simply been to rest the Reduction in general upon a first address to the object in order to determine the fact; instilling just the dependence he seeks to avoid in 1962. However, if pure possibility is taken to hold first, thus if phenomenological ontology is re-constituted by pure phenomenology in the Reduction, then the latter has to be imposed first and the object is first dependent upon the Reduction for the ideal constitution of its Sense.

The explanation above in turn leads to two options, each developing to this difficulty of dependence upon origin; thus a problem. First, the Reduction is by its essence a withholding of positing “what” the origin is, a technique in pure phenomenology which avoids an ontological constitution. Thus Derrida explains:

[I]n the lacklustre guise of a technique, the

Reduction is only pure thought [...]

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Note that whatever Derrida might have argued as to the avoidance of simple bivalence (229), the demand for the absolute is implicitly bivalent. Were both “what” and “why” accepted as holding at once, there would no longer be a difficulty.
investigating the sense of itself [...] within philosophy. (IOG 153)

Again, this leaves the objectual basis (the origin appearing, at the end of passage) as that which first appeared in general (“behind”). Hence, and next, the object (forward) is also the origin (the possibility of historicity) as absolute object.

A fortiori, instead of a result, the implication is a delay of judgment – the absolute of ontology before the Absolute, and of the absolute following from phenomenology as Absolute. This implies that for this Living Present,

delay is the philosophical absolute, because the

beginning of methodic reflection can only consist in

the consciousness of the implication of another

[i.e. forward], previous, possible, and absolute origin

in general. (IOG 152, our emphases)

Thus Derrida has begun to redress the seeming complacency of his argument against Cavaillès. Methodic reflection (i.e. making the method into an object), as a co-implication rather than synthesis, can only hold as delay.
That is, delay is first a *consciousness* of the problem of origin, rather than positing the priority of an object over a pure consciousness, or a pure consciousness over the fact. It is “pure thought investigating the sense of itself” (IOG 153). Thus Derrida moves to the (consciousness of) the necessary and particular moment of the origin, for there must “already” have been such an instance, which is itself problematic. That is, being or historicity can only be produced as originary, as the pure consciousness prior to a reduced and objectual absolute. But the object (in particular, the origin) is necessary to investigate what for essential reasons can be created prior to the originary. Derrida thus poses both of his outcomes, the problem of origin and philosophy’s acceptance of the responsibility to question its appearing, in sequence:

[C]ould there [pouvoir-il] be an authentic thought of Being as History, as well as an authentic historicity of thought, if the consciousness of delay could be reduced? But could there [pouvoir-il] be any philosophy if this consciousness of delay was not originary [originaire] and pure? (IDG 170, cf. IOG 153, Derrida’s emphases)
Given the right to question facticity, the thought of essence in the Absolute is dependent upon a delay which as first object must exceed pure phenomenology (IOG 153). Yet in turn only a first pure consciousness and its Method could allow the object.

As to the correlative language, there has been a subtle evolution that will be important for Derrida later: possibility (heretofore, “peut”) is phrased as a conditional (pourrait), as even the right to possibility implies the consciousness of its delay. A verb in the conditional tense never quite asserts even possibility (we develop this below (477 ff.)). The above works out how, as Leavey suggests, Derrida arrives at a “logic” that thus far avoids choice (cf. Leavey, IOG 5). Originary positing of any sort, demanding the absolute even in delay, is beset by consciousness of its delay.

The evolution of delay

That said, the progress is still developing, as Derrida must still assess delay from inside the Living Present, which latter is founded upon temporal constitution. For it is important to avoid deeming that delay is a postponement of judgment of a fact in time (or space). To explain: in particular, delay can arise only with the

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285 We employ “how” in our progress, rather than “why” or “what” to emphasise the procedure as a concern for method.

286 We add that logic is only one part of the movement of intentionality, and this outcome will also be spoken of as at the last a consciousness of Difference, which in 1962 nevertheless signifies a choice.

287 In French, “délai” has much less of a temporal connotation, closer to the English sense of a delay of, in our example, a delay at a train station. Such a
right to question how this absolute fact (in omnitemporality) is constituted in my Living Present (made particular and genitive); but then delay as omnitemporal is not yet objective. In general and a priori, delay can only arise in a circularity of the pure and originary Absolute in my Living Present, as a supertemporality only “analogue” to the beyond. But this precludes essential constituting of the delay as beyond. This undeniable fact of delay, Derrida explains, is then inseparable from limitation. As Derrida explains, that the

absolute origin structurally appears in my [i.e. in particular without distance from myself] Living Present and since it can appear and be recognised only in the originarity of something [a pure particular] like my Living Present, this very fact signifies [signifie] the authenticity of phenomenological delay and limitation. (IOG 153, IDG 170, Derrida’s emphases)

delay takes the form of a stretch of time, before a temporal event (the train arriving, and departing) occurs. As Derrida explained since 1954, one has the right to determine something as temporal only from the moment it is lived.
Note that the absolute origin is deemed to “structurally” appear; a word Derrida allows as even the certainty of this structure of delay is delayed. For as we will explain, the “limitation” of delay is that it appears as a “Difference”.

**Negativity rather than negation**

To prepare for this we first address negation. We explained above why and how negation (and its correlative “not” in language) was precluded to retain the reduction to the pure (250). However, delay was difficult to reduce even to the essential, and we assess whether ideal objectivity in this structure can be negated. For Husserl (187), negation follows after ground, right and certainty. However, ground was set aside except for the “hidden” unity of the reductions in the pure Absolute, with purity depending upon the exclusion of negation. To be sure, the latter does not yet preclude a ground in an ideal object seen as not myself. Even so, given a delay, no ground yet holds to determine what the object is not as absolute, thus nor in the Absolute.

As to right, phenomenological ontology retained only the right to ask what the object can (or cannot) be; which question thus far retains the opening. But phenomenology claims the right to speak, yet even this is not yet a right to say what the object itself can (or cannot) be. Such a right does not yet speak of Being itself.

Yet this Being itself certainly appears. In general, Derrida goes on:
[in] the always open breach of this question,

Being itself is \textit{silently} shown under the

negativity of the \textit{apeiron}. (IOG 151)

The \textit{apeiron} (cf. IOG 48-49, PCP 116, our emphasis) would be the
fact without a border (\textit{peras}), hence without position \textit{and} negation
of being, and thus without speaking of what is and is not.\textsuperscript{289} Yet it
is certain that Being itself appears, thus being “shown” to me.
Hence Derrida admits only a “silence” and “negativity” (the
predication of a lack even of negation of appearing in itself).

Excluding negation in particular, we note, might be hard to
sustain absolutely, \textit{as negativity must still be “not” a positivity}, even if
only originally. But even if negation \textit{were} included, the other
would not yet be myself.

\textsuperscript{288} What is “shown” for Derrida does not yet include negation, thus we avoid
aligning it with Hegel.

\textsuperscript{289} The \textit{apeiron} would thus preclude the possibility of singularity as a fact here
and now. Derrida had earlier quoted that, in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”
of 1911, Husserl had deemed that “the singular is eternally the \textit{apeiron}.
Phenomenology can recognise with Objective validity only essences and
essential relations” (PCP 116). Derrida equates this merely with his progress as
attempt to determine the fact. He continued that Husserl “evidently
understood by singularity [in that sentence that] only the essence of oneness of
act in its pure facticity and not that of the eidetic singularities defined in \textit{Ideas I}
as ultimate material essences” (IOG 48-49, §§14, 15)).
Opposition as retained

This shortfall from a limit allows us to re-assess opposition. In the first “two arguments”, even a groundless positing of the object as absolute located its space, thus a separation from the Ego. This is not yet an opposition of the object to me (it is merely a positing of space as the condition for objectivity). Moreover, as following from a reduction, this positing must avoid negation.

But in the third and fourth arguments, all three of transcendental subjectivity, the Idea and address to the beyond “retracted” into an essential circularity without a simple external object or content, in the Absolute as Passage. This evolved to the Logos, in passage from a “pure pole”, and its “polar” Telos (310, 313). To address these three alignments respectively, the “me” arises as opposite (polar) to the “I”, originary evidence arises as opposite to regulative evidence, and God arises as opposite to God. Even without simple distance in involution to the Absolute, and even if never real or a fact, the Logos is first evidently an opposition between two contents. Only then does opposition fall short of a limit in the opening, in a lack of opposite pole.

Just so, in the progress to the Living Present, the Object in general is in opposition to me. Thus including particular relations (forward), first, we note that opposition and limitation can hold originarily (essentially, behind). Only then do they pass to the particular object which avoids absolute opposition to me (or
anything) and avoids a limit. Importantly, as Lawlor first discovered (Lawlor 2002, 140), *this particular object (forward) without an opposite or limit is deemed an “other” (un autre)*. The predicate of otherness in general, we add, is “alterity”. Thus as to delay, the fact of the appearing of this object implies an essential *limitation*, even when its alterity falls short of an external *limit* (*peras*). As Derrida put it (we repeat this quote with new emphases):

> [S]ince this *alterity* of the absolute origin

structurally *appears* in my Living Present, […]

this very fact signifies the authenticity of

phenomenological delay *and limitation*. (IOG 153, our emphasis)

Without a first essential limitation, there could never be originary opposition to permit a Difference related to delay.

**Contradiction, at the same time, set aside**

Before addressing this Difference, we note that the progress in 1962 thus sets aside Contradiction, which would usually arise when opposite characteristics are posited of an object “at the same time”, where each is also not its opposite. But for Derrida’s questioning of the other as delay without negation or opposition, negativity no longer permits contradiction; even when opposite
characteristics are posited “at the same time” (IOG 153). This allows the next evolution to the general basis of delay.

**From particular delay to Difference**

Given that delay must arise in the Living Present, and that as pure it demands the absolute, Derrida begins to set delay into relation with Difference.\(^{290}\) To explain this: the general (thus essential) relations of the basis (from behind) already hold in the particular, derived and certain moment. As ontological possibility lost the right to constitute content, this consciousness in the Living Present *can only* be a pure possibility of anticipation (forward, cf. (cf. 128)). Second, the historical address to origin (which evolved to the *a priori* investigation of the origin of the object in History), in turn implies this originary consciousness as delay. Derrida puts it that:

\[
\text{an originary consciousness of delay could only}
\]

\[
\text{have the pure form of anticipation. At the}
\]

\[
\text{same time [en même temps], pure [teleological]}
\]

\[
\text{consciousness of delay can only be a pure and}
\]

\[^{290}\text{To be sure, even though Husserl employed a specific (essential) difference in the *Cartesian Meditations*, Derrida did not yet employ it in the four arguments (he does mobilise it earlier in the “Introduction”), and it is easy to wonder whether this Difference stems from the admission of phenomenological ontology, and thus an ontological sort of difference (cf. IOG 150 ff.).}\]
legitimate [rightful] presumption, thus a priori,
without which (once again), discourse and
history would not be possible (IDG 171, cf. IOG 153).

In doing this, Derrida sets up delay in its two directions of the Living Present – forward and backward – in address to the particular origin. But the “at the same time” is important – for it instils a prior necessity of opposition to that delay as “backward and forward”.

As noted, the origin is a particular moment of the ideal object in general. Thus in general (and essentially) this consciousness can only be a pure possibility of the origin as such without real content. But in particular it can only depend upon the originary content as historical (backward).291 The first direction, forward, is the pure as Absolute as such, the second its constituted and objectual absolute (the origin of the pure). To be sure, general and particular moments are never essentially “opposite”. However, as predicates, they can be. The opposing predicates (forward-

291 Consciousness “discovers its path in an indefinite reduction [to the pure passing to opening], always already begun [from behind], wherein every adventure [forward] is a change of direction, and every return to the origin [behind] is [a] move toward the horizon [forward] (IOG 149, our emphasis). But these directions have evolved into the whole-part relations in the pure pole of the first necessity.
backward, anticipatory-historical, general-particular) can only be possible at the same time *without negation*, thus avoiding contradiction. Thus in general, in the Living Present, the ego is always *other* to itself without absolute position or negation.

This introduces the difficulty of *identity* to the origin. Such a Living Present as absolute origin (as delay) is always other to identity with itself. The

Living Present [*is*] the sole and absolutely

absolute origin [*...*] but always other in its self-

identity. (IOG 153, IDG 171)

Note that Derrida is still finding fashions by which to address the absolute, even in delay. This otherness from self-identity is still the absolute, indeed, the “absolutely absolute”.

Thus as “limitation” is as authentic as delay, nor is this certain moment “undivided” (IOG 153) in its identity to itself as other; Derrida returns the necessity of division. In general, the *origin as absolute is first divided from itself and opposite to itself, but not yet a negation or contradiction*. Derrida thus adds Difference into the relations of absolute and Absolute. In the progress above, the *Absolute* led to delay, and the *absolute* to the partial right to (questioning) the originary object. Thus difference has arisen from the latter as objectual; there *must have been* an historical origin as Difference,
and there certainly is a difference in the possibility of the object as “this side” of the absolute, while delay holds of the Absolute.

At last, Derrida generalises this particular moment to call this

the originary Difference of the absolute Origin

(IOG 153).

Such an originary Difference cannot have content (an essential impossibility (251)). This in turn develops the relations of the absolute Origin, which were founded upon the irreducible Idea “beyond” the Living Present. For the pure evidence of Difference must have been produced in consciousness by the “beyond”.

Hence this “impossibility” is

292
given in an originary and pure consciousness of Difference (IOG 153, our emphases).

292 Once again, we caution that it would obscure Derrida’s progress to assess how his Difference derives from earlier philosophers. We follow Derrida’s “law” from 1954, and make only these brief comments upon Husserl, Hegel’s and Heidegger’s kinds of difference, the only sorts that Derrida mentions in the extracts that we will read as we progress. As to Husserl’s “lowest specific Difference” (Differenzen) (I §12, 15, 16), this indeed applies at the lowest level of essence. It is indeed, like Derrida’s, thus far an originary (evidentially based) difference which is already essential. However, for Husserl at the lowest pure level an eidetic singularity is different, in that it stands out from other elements. Overall, for Husserl, difference singularises. This is closer to what Derrida will deem distinction from 1965. Derrida’s “Difference” in 1962 is first but not yet absolutely opposite to its other, nor is it particular (specific) difference. As to Hegel’s Difference, we note three kinds: Unterschied, as scission between two poles, and Verscheidenheit, which – Derrida adds – Hegel employs to emphasise
But in turn (forward), Difference is nevertheless the condition for the possibility of appearing, and thus is necessary to signal the “beyond” from its most interior and originary possibility. That is, Difference is necessary for content to appear in particular. This arrives at a sort of outcome to every one of Derrida’s requirements. This Difference would be how ideal Objectivity is possible in particular; as real, empirical, or factual. It would be

the beyond or the this-side which gives sense to all empirical genius and factual profusion

(IOG 153).

In this outcome, we have also developed the first kind of Difference that we meet in Derrida: as pure, essential, originary, necessitating originary opposition, but as yet without negation or contradiction. However, Derrida avoids capitalising “delay”, as it is merely a delay of the essential Absolute as absolute. There can

qualitative variety. Derrida by 1968 deems that these are spatial sorts of Difference, and will rather align with the temporal “Different” he finds in Hegel’s earlier Jena Logic. In 1962, however, Derrida as yet allows no negation as opposite to position (and indeed, no simple position), thus preventing any kind of alignment with Hegel’s differences. This also remains far removed from Hyppolite’s Hegel, for Hyppolite makes both empirical and speculative (for Lawlor, internal) negation crucial to his kind of difference (cf. Lawlor 2002, 99, LeE 130-131, LE 101-102). As related to a question, Difference bears affinity with Heidegger’s “Difference”, for in general it questions the difference between being and Beings. However, this ascription too would be misleading, for in 1962 Derrida’s approach includes the basic progress of delay. Rather, this first kind of Difference that we encounter in Derrida appears as originary opposite without, as yet, allowing negation of others. Notably, even Derrida’s Difference is developing, as he will include negation by 1964 (505), and has not yet allowed for difference as irreducible.
only be a consciousness of the particular essential moment as Difference.

**The circularity of the *différant***

Thus, the transcendental ego in the Living Present is set into an uncomfortable relation where it must address itself as always other to itself, in accordance with an (intemporal) necessity, via the ideal Objectivity that is *originarily given as consciousness of Difference*. A determination remains possible, of course, but in a pure phenomenology, the absolute which it constitutes is then delayed in the essential impossibility of absolute solution to the Absolute.

Even so, above all, the Telos is that the Absolute be given absolutely. But upon reflection, delay too must and *can only* manifest as object (forward). Yet as object, the Absolute as delay could only hold as already *divided from itself by originary Difference* ("behind").\(^{293}\) It is an a priori impossibility (thus not yet a negation forward) that the Absolute appear. And yet, it *must, can* and certainly does hold originarily in a Difference from itself. Thus Derrida summarises:

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\(^{293}\) As Derrida explains it, this is a moment preventing rest “in the simple maintenance [nowness] of a Living Present, [which is] the sole and absolutely absolute origin [...], but always other in its self-identity.” (IOG 153).
because the Absolute is [originarily] present

only in being deferred-delayed [différant]

without respite, this impotence and this

impossibility are given in an originary [originaire]

and pure consciousness of Difference. (IDG 171 cf. IOG 153)

Crucially, Derrida thus aligns the word “difference” (différence) with a synonym for delay (délai) in its “deferral” of itself (se différant). In the deferral of speech and object, delay is in turn only originarily given as Different.

In sum, the Absolute as impossibility is delayed, and is certainly given only in the consciousness of originary Difference. As we have worked out since the first two arguments, such a process in transcendental subjectivity would be infinite. But as ever, given the demand, thought must strive to go “beyond” this originary Difference to affirm it absolutely; and can expect this result only to be indefinite (forward). This is:

294 The “différant”, according to Leavey’s translation, is a deferral-delay. Note that, “delay” in French even in the différant has the sense of an intemporal duration.
The pure and interminable disquietude of thought striving to ‘reduce’ Difference [to the inside] by going beyond factual infinity. [But] thought’s pure certainty […] can look forward to the already announced Telos only by advancing on (or being in advance of) the Origin that indefinitely reserves itself. (IOG 153)

The above instils the circularity, as yet without absolute solution, of the differant in 1962.

**The conservation of sense in 1962**

Even so, we emphasise that Derrida’s outcome has been positive, and even “conservative” (that is, opting to retain rather than dispel the possibility of sense). Derrida in 1962 is anything but an anomist. Rather than an ongoing deferral, and loss of sense, Derrida prefers a relentless and absolute consciousness of originary Difference. His outcome insists upon an Absolute and a priori preservation of sense in general, as impossible in general and a priori but given in particular. This evidence is no longer “given” as phenomenological content, but arises from the regulative and
exceptional sort which must have been produced by the beyond; yet still first is evident and no longer a consciousness of delay. By 1967, Derrida will have integrated difference and deferral as *originary* in the node of the word “*différance*”. Thus far, his progress has arrived at deferral that can be present and given *via a consciousness of Difference*.

Indeed, this “progress” (cf. IOG 143) has developed in a sequence from the four arguments, to the Absolute as passage, to delay and Difference. *The above, we suggest, has worked out in some measure how Difference and the *différant* evolved in a sequence across Derrida’s work of 1962. Moreover, it has followed how the progress developed from Derrida’s address to the “law” of the complication of origin and the problem as it held since 1954.*

**Part Two: what must yet develop**

That said, even originary Difference has not yet arrived at absolute solution; Derrida’s progress – philosophy itself – must go further. Moreover, the approach is nascent, and we will briefly summarise what needs to develop. First, the progression is better considered as *Derrida’s* even in 1962. As noted, in the first and second arguments, Derrida deemed that phenomenology cannot ground itself (whatever Husserl might wish). Yet “without wanting to”, Husserl posits the space in which finite objects appear (IOG 140, (286)). Derrida’s progress early on exceeded what Husserl intended, in order to allow for continuing
possibility. Had this groundless positing of space never occurred, ontology and then originary Difference would have been precluded.

Thereafter, Derrida’s selection of a fragment of Husserl’s unpublished work to address God diverged from Husserl’s “more lasting intentions” (IOG 147, above). Thus while the Derrida of 1962 deems at the last that Difference and deferral is “the movement sketched in The Origin of Geometry” (IOG 153), this is probably the comment of a philosopher who still needed to moderate his claims. As in 1954, the approach is better thought of as his working out of how (parts of) phenomenology can address his telos of absolutely determining the problem of origin. Thus in 1968 Derrida was willing to emphasise:

[in] the introduction to Husserl’s The Origin of

Geometry [...] the problematic of writing was

already in place as such, bound to the irreducible

structure of “deferral” in its relationships to

consciousness, presence, [...] the disappearance or

delay of the origin, etc. (IMP 5, our emphases)

We worked out how writing early on lost its ground to posit what ideal objectivity is as such (cf. 262), evolving to disappearance. By
the end of the “Introduction”, this progress had evolved to the return of the “what” to pure phenomenology, progressed to the structure of delay, then to deferral and Difference, in the “différant”.

We do caution that Derrida in 1962 does not yet overtly mention that delay or deferral are “irreducible”, but we worked out that delay can appear even essentially only as pure Difference. Moreover, writing as a primary originary necessity was set aside; this is merely a problematic rather than irreducible writing (Derrida opted for pure Speech as irreducible foundation (302)). Moreover, writing (cf. IOG 87-93) has not yet been overtly aligned with Difference in the final pages (IOG 153). Insofar as pure phenomenology permits the reconstituting of the question “in view of what?”, and writing is essentially tied to letters in space, essential Difference can indeed permit a sort of writing. But Derrida does not yet develop or examine these until “Of Grammatology” of 1966 (672 ff.).

**Passage as still uni-directional**

However, the most obvious indicator that this is Derrida’s approach in 1962, and that it must develop, is that he explains only selected parts of Husserl’s phenomenology. First, and importantly, Derrida does not yet consider a position from the other ego upon *myself*. When addressing other consciousnesses in the community, Derrida was concerned merely with the lack of
ground for speech or positing (255). That is, his concern in 1962 is the epistemological project developed since 1954, to found the absolute origin of the world for me.

Thus in 1962, after this object always available to the gaze is returned to the involution to the Absolute, the subject goes forth in itself only from the finite Ego to the object, to fall short in the opening (we deem this passage “unidirectional”). Hence, the Living Present is made the only absolute origin of the world. Derrida explained that the

Living Present [is] the sole and absolutely absolute origin of [...] Being and Sense. (IOG 153)

The address to the Living Present never allows that it in turn might be other to another absolute origin. Derrida had merely noted that the issue of the origin of intersubjectivity was set aside (IOG 79, OOG 161, cf. SP 7). Whether such address would still permit his outcome has not yet been addressed.

Thus while Derrida’s progress does work out the implications from his bases, we are rather noting the lacunae that arise given his initial demand: to solve absolutely the epistemological problem that fascinated him since 1954. A more comprehensive explanation of Husserl, and more robust phenomenology, would
need to consider other possible origins of the world. Indeed, this is crucial to Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity, or what (in the *Cartesian Meditations*) Husserl calls “appresentation” (464). Taking the latter into consideration would allow this, by permitting the absolute basis of transcendental subjectivity as unidirectional to include (at least) one further direction – from the position of the other upon me. Derrida will do so in 1964.

**The suppression of negation**

Also important is Derrida’s suppression of negation. First, he had excluded it from a reduction (IOG 119, cf. 86, 46 fn. 38). To be sure, Derrida takes this sort to be a particular “negation” of the external world, which would invalidate a reduction. He rather opted for an *a priori* negation and essential negation, as already holding. Derrida then retracted ontology to a relation prior to truth or falsity, and pure opening.

Yet Husserl allowed even for a negation in accordance with an *a priori* and pure ontology:

> every negation is a negation of something, and

> this Something points us back to the modality of belief. (I §106)
That is, a predicative negation in turn holds in accordance with an ontological law, by which a doxic relation to pure law (forward) is established. In turn for Husserl (forward), the negation of the purely possible implied the impossible, and negation of the “questionable”, the “unquestionable”. 295

Second, Derrida also elided consideration of negation of the origin in particular. Yet in *Experience and Judgment* (EJ §21, (187)), Husserl explained how negation (as “disappointment” and “cancellation”), is crucial to explication (forward). That is, upon realising that the far side of a table is not white, by this judgment of negation the sedimented history of the object is re-arranged; hence the ego has more closely intuited what the thing is, and thus was at its origin. Husserl’s return enquiry could never work without negation. Further, this applies to any kind of position. It holds in an analogous manner for every other intending, object positing consciousness

295 In the *Ideas* – within a reduction – Husserl opposes “negation and affirmation” (Husserl’s emphasis). He then goes on that “every negation is a negation of something, and this Something points us back to the modality of belief. […] Its specific correlate is the cancellation character we designate as ‘not’…[Thus] through the transformation of the plain consciousness of Being into the corresponding consciousness of negation, the plain character ‘being’ [seiend] turns in the noema into that of ‘not being’. In an analogous way, out of the ‘possible’ […] and the ‘questionable’, we get the ‘impossible’ [and] […] the ‘unquestionable’. And therewith the whole noema is modified, the whole ‘posited meaning’” (I §106).
(positional consciousness) and for its

objectivities (HEJ §21c, 90).

Negation could never be separated from enquiry into objectivity in Husserl's overall phenomenology.

**The first impetus for the elision of negation**

Derrida in the early 1960’s never explains why he suppresses Husserl’s negation from pure phenomenology in 1962 – the only clue is from 1954. As we explained from Husserl, negation is an intentional modification (or “operation”) (I §106) that occurs only after the fundamental positional consciousness. For Husserl the fundamental form (S is P), is only then negated to “S is not P” (cf. EJ §72). Second, as it applies after such positing of ideal objectivity, negation is precluded from foundation upon the whole-part relations of essence. Thus, first, for Derrida, the “operation” of negation is never permissible in the *originary* circularity of transcendental subjectivity. Hence in 1954, in assessing this section of *Experience and Judgment* (PdG 196-197, PG 115-117), Derrida had noted in a long footnote that

Husserl, [when] trying to describe the

phenomenon of negation starting from a

transcendental theoretical subject must, as
soon as he is obliged to invoke a concrete and existential attitude (the only one that saves negation from a logical and predicative origin), do so in terms of psychology. Failure, disappointment, etc. have no transcendental status. They are thus purely empirical. (PG 205-206, fn. 47)

A negation as psychological permits error and precludes the possibility of the fact as absolute. Yet as empirical, it finds no particular evidence, and precludes the possibility of determination of an origin. Neither were acceptable in Derrida’s teleology of 1962.

A reader might disagree with Derrida, in that Husserl also allows negation its authentically originary role. He emphasises in Experience and Judgment that in disappointment is described the authentically originary [ursprüngliche] phenomenon of negation of the ‘other’ [anders] (H EJ, §21, our emphases).
The difficulty of admitting this for Derrida in 1962, we suggest, is again that of sequence – even when Husserl does seek “negation” to be originary, it is consequent to the originary production (187), precluding its applicability to the problem of origin. But even as transcendental, for Derrida, Husserl’s negation could never permit affirmation of the origin.

Thus, we suggest, Derrida may have excluded negation of the other from Husserl’s pure transcendental circularity in that, as consequent to the positive moment, it is no longer even certain, and thought finds no basis in anything without this certainty. But when negation is included, it is no longer compatible with transcendental subjectivity. Difference as deferral might have included negation, but would have needed to exclude transcendental subjectivity. By this reading, Husserl’s negation never could have been included to Derrida’s transcendental address in 1962.

We avoid suggesting that Derrida’s progress is wrong – he is well aware of the issue, and seeks to proceed at a more basic level to assess his telos. However, we do suggest that he would need to account for negation both to address Husserl more fully, and to develop a more comprehensive approach. Moreover, omitting consideration of negation in 1962 does raise difficulties. First, Derrida had avoided including negation to his assessment of writing and speech. When speaking subjects failed to absolutely
determine the fact, Derrida allotted this difficulty merely to the essential possibility of “misunderstanding” (IOG 82). He considered merely partial relations of sameness and otherness.

Second, Derrida then evolved the address to the “positive value of univocity” as not yet an objective truth. That implied an a priori impossibility that words can be absolute objects, by which he arrived at a basis “analogous” to the Idea in the Kantian sense. Yet without a pure negation, it is difficult to justify Derrida’s inclusion of impossibility, even as only a priori impossibility. Third, indeed, Derrida then retracted to the Absolute as a priori, yet still avoided negation. Rather, he opted for negativity, in thought’s “pure certainty”. Yet nor could some kind of negation be absolutely separated from Derrida’s pure certainty, for even a Being silently shown as negativity (IOG 151) must be a negation of positivity, even should this have been a priori (cf. I §302, (377 fn.). Finally, he then argued only for the opening of the question. Yet consideration of negation would concede the “unquestionable”. Derrida sought to allow a right to the question without restraint. The possibility of an unquestionable object or origin, in 1962, would threaten the possibility of sense.

The first important corollary is that when Derrida includes negation, he will need to re-assess the relations of sameness and “otherness”. Second, he will need to add relations of negation to the progress “forward”. Third, he will need to reconsider
transcendental subjectivity in its arrival at deferral. Deferral will no longer be mentioned in Derrida’s approach until he works it out again by revisiting his approach to transcendental appearing in “Of Grammatology”. By that juncture, Derrida will be able to apply the arguments which developed his unidirectional passage from 1962.

The second impetus for the elision of negation

However, Derrida never does address negation in Husserl in the early 1960s; his reading of Husserl was ever selective. When he does add negation in 1964 he will set Husserl aside, and briefly opt for alignment with Hegel (VeM 442-443, VM 126-127). Even this was portended in 1954 when, in critiquing Husserl’s kind of negation he noted that, as an operation, it never questioned its origin. He preferred Hegel’s and Heidegger’s kinds, which sought to give an originary sense to negation and found it, not on […] an operation but on nothingness. (PdG 197 fn. 47, PG 206 fn. 47)

As to Hegel, Derrida in 1954 is referring at least to the first section of the Greater Logic, where Hegel arrives at the first moment of determinate Being by the negation of Nothing (H GL 199, WS 72). As to Heidegger, Derrida is referring at least to Being and Time, where Heidegger deems that “not” has no ground
besides nothingness (BT 261-262, SZ 283-284). Yet even in 1954, Derrida was wary of supposing that such a basis upon nothingness as productive of becoming could be entirely separated from the logical production of sense. That is, such inseparability from a foundation would preclude any absolute foundation except no foundation at all. Taken absolutely, this would imply nihilism.

In our next chapter, we turn to “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964. Derrida will include the second direction from Husserl, considering other absolute origins in his teleology. In Chapter Six, we will follow as Derrida includes negation to this progress, and sets Husserl aside to align briefly with Hegel and Heidegger. He will evolve the relations of sameness and otherness in the two directions. Yet that alignment too will be merely partial, as Derrida develops his progress from earlier years to continue to question finitude but avoid nihilism. Before turning to “Violence and Metaphysics”, we will contextualise our progress thus far.

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Nor do we suggest that Derrida adopted Hegel’s approach to negation. In 1954 he went on that “[i]t would remain to be seen if, in making of nothingness a dialectical “motor” of becoming, there is not given back to it a logical sense that would be the dissimulation of the originary nothingness” (PdG 197 fn. 47, PG 206 fn. 47). By 1964, Derrida will be more accepting of Hegel’s negation, although not yet of Hegel’s contradiction (583). By 1966, Derrida will deem that the “blind spot” of Hegel’s dialectic is the origin of negation (RGEf 30, RGE 259). Those elements of the article in 1966 can thus be seen as the evolution of a task Derrida had proposed to address since 1954.
Contribution of Chapters One to Four

Contribution of Chapter One

As far as we are aware, only Lawlor has followed a path from Derrida’s *The Problem of Genesis* of 1954, through Derrida’s “Introduction” of 1962 to demonstrate a “logic”. Hence our most notable sense of interlocution in the prior chapters has been with the Lawlor of 2002. Thus it is important to avoid deeming our address is critical; it is required of a dissertation to signal its divergence and contribution (this will apply to every reader we address). Lawlor’s approach to Derrida’s work in 1954 merely diverges in emphasis from ours, although our approaches and outcomes are incompatible by 1962.297

As to 1954, Lawlor assesses Derrida’s external influences, while we follow Derrida’s “law”. Thus Lawlor follows Derrida’s progress via comparison of Derrida’s dialectic to Tran Duc Thao and Cavaillès) (Lawlor 2002, 48-87). We sought to explain the basic interrelations of the demand and problem, merely noting that dialectic verifies the problem and would need to evolve. Hence Lawlor suggests that Derrida’s awareness of a “logic”

297 Lawlor then progresses to a short explanation of “Violence and Metaphysics”, although his mentions of the 1964 version are brief, and he takes his argument from the version of 1967; by that juncture we will have diverged almost entirely. Thereafter, we move to “Of Grammatology”, while Lawlor proceeds to assess “La Voix et le Phénomène” of 1967 (published as “Speech and Phenomena).
arises in 1962. We agree, but followed Derrida’s transitions insofar as they would be habitual in his approach, even though Derrida could not yet have known it then.

That is, to our knowledge, we are the first to mention Derrida’s “law”, and the first to begin from it to seek a basis by which to follow Derrida’s oeuvre.\textsuperscript{298} Following from this, that we started from Derrida’s “demand”, then developed the basic relations, directions of the joints, relations of contamination and the problem are novel. That our dissertation develops in a progression from these bases, we suggest, will make our approach novel at least overall.

**Contribution of Chapter Two**

As we have not yet had access to Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts (and work mostly from the English texts), we deem our reading of Husserl a contribution merely to study of Derrida. Moreover, Derrida proceeds mainly by assessing those works that Husserl published or approved for publication in his lifetime (with the notable exception of his fourth argument in 1962 (IG 146-147)),\textsuperscript{299} and we usually follow this protocol.

\textsuperscript{298} We introduced these relations in our articles “Finding a Systematic Base for Derrida’s work”, and “Re-Thinking what we Think about Derrida” (Galetti, 2010b, Galetti 2010c).

\textsuperscript{299} In 1954, Derrida notes he had not “had the time” to include Husserl’s manuscripts after his visit to Louvain (PG 149-150/241-243). The exception to Derrida’s rule of only working from the published works as definitive, in those
Even so, our overall interpretation of Husserl is based upon the whole-part relations of the Third Investigation of 1913 (LU 227-295). Although the importance of these sorts of relations is accepted and applied (cf. LI p. 7; Sokolowski 1968, 541), to our knowledge direct transcendental-logical readings of this Third Investigation are rare (cf. also Mohanty 2005). We are aware of none that have sought to facilitate this logic by working from the emendations of 1913 to relate them to the Ideas of 1913, to prepare a way to apply these to Husserl’s oeuvre as Derrida reads him.

As to those who have assessed Husserl in this way: our reading of Derrida diverges from Sokolowski in that we introduce three levels and their relations. Second, Sokolowski deems that “moments” are crucial, while “pieces” (such as a “head”, which can be thought separately, thus can be independent parts) are “not very important philosophically” (Sokolowski 1968, 541; 2004, 257). Our concern has been to assess the relations of what can be separated, thus separated from its outside (cf. our note upon LI 3 §25, in which Husserl avoids mention of an external whole). For Derrida, the difficulty of separation from the whole arguments that we follow closely, occurs in Derrida’s address to God in 1962, which he takes from a letter published in Biemel, Hua VI, from K III (IOG 147). For examples of Derrida’s referring to the manuscripts only in passing, without engagement cf. IOG 82, 117 fn. 128.

300 Sokolowski also notes that “[n]eglect of this Investigation could indeed prove disastrous to understanding Husserl’s thought” (Sokolowski 1968, 537; 2004, 253).
(outside) develops the primary problem for philosophy. Third, Sokolowski remains upon the “constituted” side (Sokolowski, 544). Derrida is concerned with the shortfall of judgment from affirming content of the object. He thus begins from the “constituting” side to apply his “directions” forward and backward in whole-part relations.

Second, J.N. Mohanty deems that Husserl’s “pure possibility” is situated at the level of dependent essences or ‘abstracta’. For Mohanty, a dependent essence such as “red circle” would be a pure possibility.301 We noted that Husserl deems that the entirely pure is without content (LI 3 §11). According to our progress, “red circle” is a content in a material ontology. Mohanty takes no account of the ontologies (Mohanty 322-326). By taking “pure possibility” to hold in pure ontology, thus correspondent to material ontology, we have been able to apply the relations to the Ideas, and in turn to the form of intentionality. In turn, we were able to apply these to a reduction, and to Husserl’s oeuvre.

Third, in so doing we are much closer to Pentzopoulou Valalas, whom we supported above (185 fn.). However, Pentzopoulou-Valalas deems that material ontologies, “once incarnated” are no longer a priori matters” (Pentzopoulou-Valalas 1981, 122, our

301 Mohanty writes: “[t]he ideal objects that are pure possibilities, then, are what Husserl calls ‘dependent essences’ or ‘abstracta’ (Hua III/1, 35). The ‘red circle’ refers to a dependent essence, it cannot be by itself.” (Mohanty 2004, 322).
emphasis). As Derrida takes it, we explained, the movement retracted to a priori relations as the Absolute.

Fourth, Husserl’s whole-part logic has been important to the development of mereology as a mathematical discipline (cf. Smith et. al. 1982, Fine 1995). However, such approaches set aside the living aspect of intentional directions that are also crucial to Husserl. They are also not yet concerned with applying the formal whole-part relations to assess how Husserl works out his progress across his oeuvre. Rather, these approaches proceed via symbolic, deductive and diagrammatic reasoning. We followed how Derrida seeks to avoid these in favour of a situation in “formal implication” as a primary ground prior to deductive axiomatics (IOG 56, cf. I §72).

Fifth, we have diverged from formal-logical treatments of Husserl. Kit Fine notes that Husserl in his Third Investigation had deemed that he was amenable to the formalisation of whole-part relations (Fine 1995, 464; LI 3 §24). Fine continues that Husserl often never clarifies whether he assesses relations which “indicate a relation between two individuals, which happens to be of the respective species A and B, and what indicates a relation between the two species A and B themselves.” (Fine 1995, 465). However, Fine goes on, as the relations between individuals are deemed “objectual”, that “it is clear that Husserl thinks the objectual notions are somehow to be understood in terms of the
generic ones” (Fine 1995, 465). Yet Fine then sets forth a detailed and deductive symbolic treatment that is concerned only with the “simpler” “theory of objects”. For Derrida, phenomenology proceeds by address to objects that must be related to generic and essential relations by formal implication.

To that end, we have developed the levels and directions, and noted that influential and recent readers of Husserl explain movement through whole-part relations and directions by the metaphors of “upward” and “downward” (cf. Bernet et. al. 1993, 40), and even Husserl scholars in Derrida’s era proceeded via three levels (Bachelard 1968, 11-14). We merely suggest our approach is basically compatible with how Husserl progresses. Our explanation of the criteria and parameters, and their interrelations, however, was oriented toward how Derrida approaches Husserl in 1962, to develop Derrida’s transitions as he proceeds.

**Contribution of Chapters Three and Four**

As we are aware of none that have sought to begin from Husserl’s Third Investigation to proceed forward and develop these criteria and parameters, we suggest our approach is helpful in reading of Derrida. We also believe we are the first to seek to explain the “Introduction” of 1962 as a progression, and to closely assess the final sections (Section X ff.). Should this hold, then we are the first to work out the relations of the *différant*. 
Bernet, in seeking to summarise the work for Derrida readers in 1989, is very aware of its situation in relation to various and incompatible kinds of reading of Husserl of that era. We have sought rather to follow the “law”, and thus Derrida’s concerns. We thus noted that any such readers can be appealed to by Derrida upon particular issues, insofar as they are helpful for Derrida’s argument at that juncture.

Thus our progress and outcomes have diverged. Bernet deems that Derrida’s “principal contribution” is asking “why Husserl should have chosen geometry in particular” (Bernet 1989, 141); we have sought to explain that Derrida seeks to develop his concerns from 1954 to arrive at the *différant*. In turn, Bernet deems Derrida’s concern in the circularity is “pre-eminently” that of writing (Bernet 1989, 144). We have explained that Derrida sought a ground of possibility in a progressive argument, and set writing aside in his progress to alignment of Speech with the Idea, then to the Absolute as Passage, and then to the *différant*, in which writing could have a role (as difference), but was not yet implemented. Thus while Bernet deems that idealisation is “also” important, we have followed how Derrida evolves these in a progression.

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302 We noted in footnotes, for instance, that Derrida refers at various junctures to the dedicated phenomenologist Fink (1939, 215, cf. IOG 55, 89), to Ricoeur’s transcendental-idealist comparison with Kant (Ricoeur 1967, 201, cf. IOG 140), Hyppolite’s reading of Husserl via Hegel, signification and passage (Hyppolite 1953, cf. IOG 67, fn. 62), and the logical approaches of Bachelard (in 1957, cf. IOG 55) and Cavaillès’ (in 1947, cf. IOG 142 ff.).
An overview of our divergence from Lawlor

As to the Idea in the Kantian sense, Leavey provided an insightful but brief summary in 1978 (IOG, Translator’s Preface, 1-21). However, Lawlor’s is the only detailed explanation of the “Introduction” of which we are aware.

As noted, Lawlor seeks external contrast rather than following Derrida’s law. Thus he develops Derrida’s indebtedness to a logic that Lawlor works out from Hyppolite’s reading of Hegel in Logic and Existence of 1953 (Lawlor 2002, 95-99).³⁰³

Lawlor introduced several trailblazing relations to Derrida study from this contrast. He emphasised (in more detail than Bernet of 1989) that Derrida develops a “circularity” from a progress of return enquiry, where what holds “forward” and “across” (à travers) must in turn hold “behind” (cf. L 129-130). However, Lawlor was the first to explain that Derrida is a philosopher of “passage” (cf. Lawlor 1998 ff.). He was also the first to explain that Derrida employs language logically: that “must” and “can” are expressions of necessity and possibility, while “not” signifies a negation.³⁰⁴ Thus, to our knowledge, he was the first to begin to demonstrate how a logic could apply to Derrida. Indeed, our appreciation of

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³⁰³ We address the explanation of Hyppolite’s logic when touching upon Hegel below (613).
³⁰⁴ Lawlor never noted that “not” is employed systematically in his reading, which is a pity, as his work might have been less appreciated than it should have been. Our summary in these pages be the first to engage with the logic.
otherness as avoiding opposition developed after reading Lawlor’s contrast to Hegel (cf. 617).

Although our readings of Derrida diverge, several of our outcomes (which we developed in our progression) evolved to accord with Lawlor’s basic relations. Lawlor noted that for Derrida

this passage implies that Derrida is separating

*alterity* from *negation* [...]; *in other words*, Derrida is

not allowing *alterity* to be pushed *all the way up*

*to contradiction* or to be deepened down to


We agree with this, and sought to work out *how* Derrida develops these relations.

To that end, our inclusion of whole-part (general-particular etc.) relations, developed via Husserl, are ours. So too are the criteria and parameters that we developed from them across our chapters. Thus our progress diverges considerably from Lawlor’s.
A brief application to readings of Derrida

We will demonstrate a brief but pivotal example. Lawlor’s explanation of Derrida’s “Introduction” finds the “logic” in its early part, in the address to language and writing. Lawlor notes (and we agree) that in this instance Derrida’s demand is a necessity for absolute univocity.

However, we diverge from the crucial quote by which Lawlor begins to develop the logic. Lawlor quotes Derrida that:

[I]f equivocity is always irreducible, that is

because words and language in general are not

and never can be absolute objects. (Lawlor 123,

quoting IOG 106, Derrida’s emphasis)

Lawlor then takes this is a negation of the possibility of determining the absolute. Thus, Lawlor quotes that “there is a sort of pure equivocity here” (IOG 107, Lawlor 124), and negates this relation, and moreover negates purity. For Lawlor, what cannot be pure equivocity cannot be pure univocity. There “cannot be [...] pure community”, thus words “can never be pure objects” (Lawlor 2002, 124). Lawlor thus affirms the end of pure phenomenology in 1962, and the first moment (not yet quite
impurity, but negation of the possibility of purity) of Derrida’s “contamination” (Lawlor 2002, 124, 141).

However, we note, rather than the object “purity” in the quote, the object is “absolute objects”. Moreover, Derrida seeks to avoid the direct negation of its possibility, but seeks a circularity. He employs “are not” and “never can be”, which instils a relation from a negation (forward), to an essential impossibility as preclusion (behind) (cf. 250). Indeed, nor did Derrida affirm even this, prefacing the above with: “[I]f equivocity is always irreducible…”. To posit this irreducibility as possible would require a ground for possibility, and an instance of the equivocal – but Derrida has worked out that no such ground yet holds. Thus Derrida makes no mention of impurity or contamination, yet frequently mobilises pure possibility, and continues to do so.

Following from this negation of possibility, Lawlor in 1962 develops a “double necessity” (Lawlor 2002, 139) – a first necessity and possibility of exiting the Living Present as an “impotence” to exceed this limit and thus “oppositely”, the necessity to remain within the Living Present. Without a negation of predicative possibility, we found no second direction of “double necessity” in 1962. We noted that Derrida’s single employment of “double necessity” in 1962 is “that of a Quod

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305 That the relation is “impossibility or negation” never settles upon predicative negation, but develops an instability.
[why, what] and a Quomodo [how?]” (IOG 49, Derrida’s emphases). We thus developed the argument progressively to the relations of “why” and “what” in closing.

Lawlor, however, needed to exclude the pure possibility from the “why”. As we explained, by developing the relations of ground and the absolute, Derrida never could have sought the pure, for he sought the pure and absolute ground of ideal Objectivity, and it evolved to the pure movement as différant. Lawlor needed to exclude relations of possibility, and in the closing pages, which arrive at the différant, he rather suggests,

[t]hat Derrida uses the word ‘pure’ so frequently in these closing pages shows again that he has not yet in 1962 understood the implications of the word ‘contamination’, despite the fact that he used it already in [1954]. Indeed, in these closing pages Derrida does not seem to understand the logic of totality that he himself develops in the

*Introduction.* (Lawlor 2002, 141)
We rather noted that in 1968 Derrida deemed that in these closing pages, and the overall work of 1962, he had for the first time worked out the relations and even “structure” of deferral in relation to writing as such (IMP 5, cf. ToAT 39; Gasché 1986, 4, (373)). We sought to work out how this occurs.

Lawlor thus never relates “delay” to Difference, nor does he mention deferral. We continue to suggest our working out of the differant is novel.

**Hopkins’ reading**

However, there has also been a hostile reading of Derrida’s “Introduction” by the Husserlian scholar Hopkins (2011) that warrants consideration, in case it signals a new wave of misunderstanding or regression in the comprehension of Derrida. Hopkins goes so far as to suggest Derrida’s reading of Husserl is “perhaps […] a joke” (Hopkins 2011, 260).

306 In opting for direct affirmation, Lawlor rather sets aside relation of pure possibility as a shortfall from judgment, deeming that “phenomenology […] alone knows” (Lawlor 2002, 141), we explained how only phenomenology “can” know (350).

307 We will summarise Hopkins’ rendition of what Husserl wants in the “crisis” years, relative to Derrida, in this footnote. For Hopkins, the difficulty of ideality rests in two “independent” moments. The first is that of the ongoing individuation of evidence in distinct moments (Hopkins avoids overtly deeming this “repetition”), and the investigation of the ontic (i.e. particular) modes of being of ideal (irreal) objects (Hopkins 2011, 249-250). Thus, he explains, natural ideal objects such as Husserl’s writing desk are irreal (represented in consciousness) insofar as they are in space and time, and implicitly in nature, but equilateral triangles are never situated in space and time, these moments are not “contaminated” by one another, and as Hopkins puts it, accounting for one moment “does not” account for the other. Hopkins deems that Derrida “collapses” both moments into one issue (Hopkins 2011, 251), thus that Husserl’s genetic project is “not visible” to Derrida. We note merely that what Hopkins’ wants from Husserl diverges from what Derrida wants. Derrida takes it that geometry (and thus equilateral triangles) are material ontologies for Husserl in the region of Nature, and thus of space and
briefly assess Hopkins’ critique of deferral, as Derrida develops it in the “Introduction”.

Hopkins, as we do, begins by emphasising that Derrida is never doubting the appearance of ideality, and takes it that Derrida enquires into how a fact can be determined (or unified) (Hopkins 2011, 249). When this attempt to “unify” the fact is deemed “in principle, impossible”, Hopkins suggests that for Derrida pure ideality is “not coincident with its origin”, which leaves “a recovery of the origins of ideal meaning […] as being – in principle – impossible.” For Hopkins, Derrida deems that a recovery of the origin is thus “unrealisable as its telos” (Hopkins 2011, 248). Thus, he explains, when passage for Derrida arrives at deferral (delay), then:

[T]his delay and passage mean an ideality can only appear in terms of the alterity of its absolute origin, an alterity in which is

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... time (IOG 32, cf. I §9) (219). Hopkins takes geometry to be free of space, time and nature. Thus while Hopkins wants to investigate Husserl’s “small beginnings” by which the modes of being of ideal objects can be investigated, Derrida dispels this aim from the outset: “[I]n the first place, we are not interested here in the manner of being which the sense [of geometry] had in thinking.” (IOG 35, IDG 15). Derrida wants to investigate the first conditions by which even material ontology could have an origin, prior to its mode of being. When it is noted that the difficulty is merely that the goals of Hopkins and Derrida diverge, conciliation seems much more feasible.
announced the infinitely deferred telos of its absolute presence (Hopkins 2011, 248).

We agree with Hopkins’ summary, and sought to work out how these relations hold.

The difficulty for Hopkins is that he makes this unrealisability into the loss of origin. For Hopkins, this impossibility is

[t]he principle behind Derrida’s rejection of the possibility of a recovery of the origins

(Hopkins, 259, our emphasis).

Most importantly, we suggest, Hopkins takes the relations of impossibility to be denial. Setting aside the logical difficulties in such an approach, we note merely that this precludes access to Derrida’s reasoning.

Second, Hopkins takes Derrida’s continual opening of the question to be an answer. Thus Hopkins combines the difficulties to make Derrida’s answer that deferral “cannot provide an answer” (Hopkins 249). For Derrida, the opening of the question rather leads to deferral. That is why it is called deferral, rather than a rejection. It is Hopkins who turns the question into an answer (réponse).
Even so, Hopkins’ wariness might have been alleviated were it noted how Derrida is in no fashion a sort of pernicious anomist. For nor does Derrida in 1962 permit deferral to be a negation (even as negativity, Being is silently shown prior to vision). Derrida resists negation of an external origin (denial) far more than Hopkins does. Hopkins thus never notes Derrida’s arrival at possibility again in the relation to the open. That is, Derrida worked out that for a pure (irreal) phenomenology, the pure origin in history remains both necessary and ever possible (IOG 150-151):

\[ \text{[T]he ‘why’ can emerge only from the possible,} \]

\[ \text{[thus] I can clearly ask myself why there would} \]

\[ \text{be the history rather than nothing (IOG 150-151, Derrida’s emphasis first).} \]

Only phenomenology can open such a relation. Instead, Hopkins worries that Derrida “is unable to see that what he calls the ‘alterity’ of the origin of ideality is not something that necessarily has to remain inaccessible to thought.” (Hopkins 252). As we worked out, this is just what Derrida insists upon, by developing the relations of the “why” for pure phenomenology. Indeed, Derrida goes even further, to work out that what is impossible is given as Difference:
this impotence and this impossibility are given

in an originary [originaire] and pure

consciousness of Difference. (IDG 171 cf.

IOG 153)

The difficulty, for Derrida, is that what is given must be explained in a philosophy worthy of its name, which consciousness passes to deferral. Thus what Hopkins takes as a denial arises for Derrida first from a teleological consciousness of Difference. Hopkins makes no mention of Difference, which latter might have palliated his concerns. Instead, he continues to treat deferral as an answer, instead of a deferral.

Thus we have sought to work out how Derrida’s progress occurs, from his earliest work, but also to suggest how it might be followed in his later work. We move on to Derrida’s work in 1964, to assess this progression.
Chapter Five: Positive Economy
(“Violence and Metaphysics”, 1964)

In our next two chapters, we turn to Derrida’s French articles “Violence and Metaphysics”, published in two parts in 1964. We will address a core segment of the section “Of Transcendental Violence”, where Derrida seems to defend Husserl against Levinas, to justify that Husserl’s pure phenomenology allows for an ethics (VeM 434-442, cf. VM 123-133). In our first subsection, we will summarise how Levinas’ beginning from an aversion to Husserl’s sort of intentionality and reduction leads rigorously to Levinas’ “metaphysics”. We will develop a sort of ruptured circularity that Levinas calls “asymmetry”, that will be amenable to comparison with Derrida’s “levels” and directions. However, we develop this sequence merely to explain that, as Derrida will prefer Husserl’s intentionality, Derrida’s approach will be entirely incompatible with Levinas’. In our third part we begin to follow Derrida’s progress, as he evolves his basic concern from 1962, as to how to determine the absolute. He will still do so without negation, leading to a positive “economy” as a “most peaceful” ethics of “respect”. In our next chapter, we assess how Derrida adds negation, and leaves his partial alignment with Husserl aside, to develop his concerns to a negative economy of violence.
Part One: Levinas’ metaphysics

Rejecting Husserl’s intentionality will develop “metaphysics” as a movement “analogous” to a circle. This will occur via Levinas’ Autrui, the other and the Other, and autrui. To begin: as has been noted (Davis 1993, 37), Levinas’ argument in Totality and Infinity anticipates and doubles-back on its progress; we will set the relations forth in a progression, beginning from intentionality as we did in Husserl. For importantly, Levinas in Totality and Infinity begins the section which arrives at his main ethical relation by rejection of Husserl’s intentionality (TEI 94 ff., TI 122 ff.). The latter is deemed to instil a “primacy of the objectifying act” (TEI 95, TI 123), which for Levinas, assumes a “mastery” of the object (TEI 96, TI 123). Husserl oppresses the object’s “exteriority”.

308 As far as we can tell, this critique of Husserl’s intentionality as a “primacy of the objectifying act” had been maintained by Levinas from the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, although it had vacillated in the decades afterward. Earlier in “Violence and Metaphysics”, Derrida had deemed in a footnote – lifted into the main argument in 1967 – that Husserl’s giving himself the power of theory, for Levinas, is a critique of the objectifying basis of intentionality (VM 85, cf. VeM 329). By this, Derrida is implicitly referring to the critique of Husserl that Levinas had maintained since his earliest years. In “On Ideas” of 1929, Levinas writes that intentionality is consciousness itself, as “the relation to the object”, thus “that the subject reaches the object cannot be a problem”. But Levinas indeed (as did Fink, and Derrida in 1954) deems this the “main problem” of phenomenology (Levinas 1998, 13). In his dissertation of 1930 Levinas wrote that the “theoreticism” of the objectifying act as one of representation and intentional adequacy (cf. TOI 135), which relation to adequacy we develop just below. That said, as his article of 1929 suggests that in 1930 the young Levinas was influenced by Heidegger, he had moved away from his concerns about the epistemological shortcomings of intentionality. He rather deemed that Husserl’s theoricism was an “intellectualism” that set aside ontological consideration of existence (Levinas 1973, 119, 154). By 1940, Levinas seems to endorse that Husserl’s intentionality allows an other: “[I]ntentionality is the way for thought to contain ideally something other than itself” (DE 59, Levinas’ emphasis). This approach precludes alignment with Totality and Infinity of 1961. The ontology and epistemology of 1930 and 1940 are set aside in favour of ethics by 1961. That Husserl’s is an “intellectualism” is explicitly no longer
Thus Levinas deems Husserl’s telos is “total adequation” (TEI 96, TI 123) between thinker and object. Levinas takes this from the Logical Investigations of 1901 (TEI 95, TI 124). In that work, we note, Husserl had indeed argued that the ideal object could be adumbrated toward its adequacy (cf. also Levinas 1998, 26-27). Rather than absolute truth, we note, adequacy would be the most that can be known of the thing. For Levinas, however, Husserl judges adequacy is all there is to be known, which mastery sets aside concern with an exterior being (TEI 96, TI 123). Levinas deems that Husserl retains this “obsession” with adequation throughout his oeuvre (TEI 95, TI 124).

From the violence of oppression to enjoyment

Levinas thus deems that Husserl’s progress after the Logical Investigations continued to seek this mastery. Hence he is critical of Husserl’s “reduction” (begun from 1907) and its noemata, precisely as it “brackets” off external existence to allow the “astonishing possibility” of reducing the being of the existent (TEI 100, TI 127), again “exhausting exteriority”. The critique then extends to temporality – addressed via the Ideas of 1913 – and Husserl’s kind of “representation” (that is, a re-presentation,

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309 Levinas writes in 1929 of the “results arrived at in the Logical Investigations”, that “[A]dequate self-evidence […] is characterised by the fact that the object intended is entirely covered by the object seen” (Levinas 1998, 26-27).
310 Levinas refers to this as the epoché (TEI 98, TI 125), Husserl’s term for the bracketing of external existence.
also called “presentification” (*Vergegenwärtigung*). Levinas complains that for Husserl, at the objectual side of intentionality, a representation of an object is restored to the intentional present only by a retention, and has a sense “ascribed by the representing subject to an object” (TeI 97, TI 125). Representation too is a mastery of the past, which refuses what is “exterior” (*extérieur*, which we also deem “outside”) to itself. This, for Levinas, in turn develops the constituting ego upon this “inside (the “I” (*le Moi*)), which was central to Husserl’s apophantic logic. The “I” grants itself centrality, again assuming a mastery and setting aside an exterior being.\(^{311}\)

Thus instead of Husserl’s doxic *positing* as arising first, Levinas deems each intentional reduction to noemata is one of *negativity*, its “first movement is negative” (TeI 98, TI 125). This negativity, we note, holds in *two* fashions. First, Husserl’s “positing of a pure existent” (TeI 98, TI 125) for Levinas is a moment of positing exemption from the outside appearing inside the I.\(^ {312}\) Hence by this, second, Levinas is also deeming that even Husserl’s *positing* of the object, *that pure and formal logic, as intentionality* is unsatisfactory. For Levinas, its moment of negativity is a first

\(^{311}\) Levinas writes that Husserl’s basis is a “mastery exercised by the thinker upon what is thought in which the object’s resistance as an exterior being vanishes” (TI 96, TI 123-124).

\(^{312}\) Levinas summarises: “Its first movement is negative: it consists in finding and exhausting in itself the meaning of an exteriority, precisely convertible to noemata. Such is the movement of the Husserlian *epoché* which, strictly speaking, is characteristic of representation” (TeI 98, TI 125).
kind of violence. At this juncture, we introduce “the Other” (l’Autre) to Levinas’ reading of Husserl. It can thus far be taken in basic fashion as it pertains to Husserl; the Other is never included by the constituting of the I (TEI 93, TI 64). The first kind of violence is that this “I” insists upon mastery of the object (thus excludes the Other).

In sum, for Levinas, Husserl begins by an objectivity in a simple intentionality, which violence “suppresses” (cf. TEI 45) the wholly outside, and then reduces that to a total mastery of the object “inside”. Again and again, Levinas makes it clear that acts of violence as expulsion of the outside are “negating”:

to doubt [...], to destroy, to kill – these negating acts [actes négateurs] assume objective exteriority rather than constitute it. (TEI 100, TI 128; cf. TEI 172, TI 198)

Above all, and from the first, Levinas seeks to avoid Husserl’s “objectifying intentionality” and its reduction, which would let go of the outside to master the object in a “negativity” as violence. The reversal of Husserl’s kind of intentionality is deemed “enjoyment”. Levinas summarises:
The intentionality of enjoyment can be described by contrast with the intentionality of representation, it consists in holding on to the exteriority which the transcendental method involved in representation suspends. (TEI 100, TI 127)

Note that Levinas’ “enjoyment” remains an intentionality, which can be described by “contrast” to Husserl. We will do so.

**The enjoyment of interiority**

Levinas builds his ethics and his metaphysics from this juncture in a sequence. First, enjoyment begins as a *non-objectifying* “intentionality”. Even for Levinas, the prefix “non” signifies what avoids opposition between objects, but refers to what is never included to an object (we avoid deeming that it refers to “all of what is not”, or “everything outside” the object, as these terms for Levinas are aligned with Husserl). Such a non-relation is never necessarily the whole outside the part, which would determine that a part has limits. Enjoyment is a living state prior to any *division*. Thus Levinas explains enjoyment as
life's relation with its own dependence on things

(TEI 84, TI 112, our emphasis).

Note that Levinas’ approach begins by accepting whole-part relations in a fashion, but refusing Husserl's sort of dependence upon wholes. Enjoyment is merely a dependence that “lives from” what gives life. That is, enjoyment is life’s relation to its relation with existence, as yet without objects or foundation upon an external whole. In such a moment life’s relation to itself as yet includes no whole, and thus no outside at all; not yet even an independence from a whole. The Other does not yet relate to enjoyment (nor yet does Autrui, as we address below). Thus nor does the particular object yet appear. Thus enjoyment is not yet a dependence of the particular (made individual) or upon the general, which are derived from whole-part relations (upward). Its content is its own whole, thus the “refusal” of a whole in general.\(^{313}\) This allows for intentional content as its own whole. Thus it develops Levinas’ version of “egoism”, a “happiness” (cf. TEI 122, TI 148) as it is without mastery or violence; for no object as such arises as outside, or in any sense. This is a moment in which life is produced and “throbs”) in which “I” live from “good soup” and air. It is solitude, as I am not yet even in relation to myself. Hence

\(^{313}\) We avoid deeming it is an “exclusion” of a whole, as does Levinas, which would restore the whole; a refusal resists the option.
the self is not yet even a “representation” of the self for itself (TEI 90, TI 118).314 No intentional negativity of the self to itself, or to the object yet holds, for no inside has yet developed to relate to exteriority (TEI 123, TI 149).315 Levinas calls this *interiority* – my relation *without division*.316

Indeed, interiority staunchly refuses such concepts (TEI 90, TI 118) as general or “specific” (TEI 93, TI 121), or individual object inside the outside; This is “ipseity” insofar as its relations hold together (below, con-sists). Levinas summarises our explanation thus far; the

ipseity of the I consists in remaining outside

the distinction between the individual and the

general [...]. The refusal of the concept is not

only one of the aspect of its being, but its

whole content; it is interiority. (TEI 90, 118,

our emphasis)

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314 This is not yet “a representation of self by self.” (TEI 90, TI 118).
315 Levinas writes: “[T]he original relation of man with the material world is not negativity, but enjoyment” (TEI 123, TI 149).
316 We have relayed “my relation” as intransitive on purpose, to emphasise the lack of reciprocity in this relation as yet, even to myself.
We will develop “ipseity” below, to assess how it no longer consists of such relations. Thus far, as enjoyment does not yet permit relation to an object, even myself divided from self, nor does it yet permit opposition (nor its relations “across” which instil distance). Thus it does not yet permit the priority of positing, negation, or formal logic (TEI 31, TI 60). This is an “original” relation, of a sort without logical predication, dependence or spatiality.

Nor is this yet a temporal priority, as time itself can arise only with separation in space. Every moment in Levinas’ sequence rather works out an ordinal relation. Thus Levinas summarises the above:

ipseity is produced originally [originellement] in

the enjoyment of happiness, [...] in this

enjoyment the separated being affirms an

independence that owes nothing [...] logically,

to the Other [l’Autre] which remains

transcendent to it. This absolute independence

[...] does not posit itself by opposing (TeI 31,

cf. TI 60).
We must still develop “the Other” through opposition. For a beginning of separation does occur, and Levinas’ next moments are also those of Derrida and Husserl. First, a desire (what we deem Derrida’s demand) holds for the absolutely other (absolument l’autre, TEI 170, TI 196). This absolutely other is an expression of a relation of interiority to any otherness (alterity), and develops a limit as other insofar as it desires a lack of limit (cf. (97)).

But even this first desire is preceded by a relation that allows it to avoid a simple return to dependence on an inside and outside: Levinas’ interiority begins by “holding on to the exteriority” that Husserl’s transcendental method suspends (TEI 100, TI 127). This moment of solitude is named the secret; a secret kept even from interiority.³¹⁷ By this turn, “exteriority” too finds that its relations cannot be explained by a simple relation to an “inside”, for the secrecy of solitude resists such imposition.³¹⁸ Interiority and its relation to the absolutely other is balanced upon a secret. As only keeping the secret allows this relation;³¹⁹ the secret “guarantees” the entire basis (TEI 90, TI 118) even of an ethical relation (we thus work toward the latter); the secret first makes the absolutely other possible.

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³¹⁷ This withholding “is solitude par excellence. [Hence] [t]he secrecy of the I guarantees the discretion of the totality.” (TI 118, cf. 120)
³¹⁸ We employ this word “resistance” following Levinas, to refer to what resists inclusion to intentionality (TEI 96, TI 124).
³¹⁹ Levinas writes: “Totality and the embrace of being, or ontology, do not contain the final secret of being.” (TEI 53, TI 80).
From this secret, the relation to Autrui arises. Autrui in French, typically means (signifie) an “Other” with a religious connotation, a “You” (Vous) of a master (cf. TeI 48, TI 75) to which I am supplicant, in a dimension of height.\textsuperscript{320} Prior – i.e. henceforth, ordinally prior – to a simple relation between inside and outside, Autrui is higher than I am (for no “I” has yet arisen). Yet in holding on to exteriority, Autrui is only guaranteed insofar as secrecy holds in interiority, a closeness even before the “I” which Levinas deems “intimacy”. This is Autrui as “tu” (TEI 129, TI 155).\textsuperscript{321} We note that “ipseus” originally means “self”, “himself”, but also a “master” and “host” (cf. CLD 191, TeI 48, TI 75). In ipseity, only secrecy allows Autrui to rupture interiority with a Thou as you (TeI 91, TI 119).

Hence, for Levinas, this rupture of totality is “radical” (TEI 91, TI 119),\textsuperscript{322} which, as with Derrida, should be taken in an etymological fashion, as originally prior to a constituted division between inside and outside, and thus also an original relation. For Autrui would also be prior to the separation and thus prior to relation to intentional objectivity (TEI 37, TI 67). This permits

\textsuperscript{320} Levinas explains Autrui thus: “To recognise Autrui – it is to give. But it is to give to the master, to the lord, to him whom one approaches as “You” [Vous] in a dimension of height” (TeI 48, TI 75).


\textsuperscript{322} Levinas writes: “[T]he rupture of the totality that is accomplished [by Autrui] is radical.” (TI 119, TeI 91).
the ethical relation as a “relation without relation” (TEI 52, TI 80) for it is thus a necessary relation from Autrui prior to relation. By this Levinas’ progress allows the beginnings of an ethical sort of “transcendence” which is more evolved from its outset than any simple metaphysics that begins from inside-outside division to overcome an opposite (cf. TEI 111, TI 41). A “relation without relation” must be without opposition, thus without negativity (TEI 111, TI 40-41) and even without negation; it must thus be without violence (see above). No separation has yet arisen to allow anything to negate. For this relation without relation Levinas reserves the term “religion” (TEI 152, TI 80). We note that this develops from “religare”, to “revere”, and “bond”, both addressed above, and also to “obligate” (CDWH 520)).

For as Autrui is prior to me, in this relation the Desire arises to go to Autrui, beyond. The Desire of transcendence toward Autrui is arising with religion as an “obligation” (cf. TEI 174, TI 201). No relation of opposition or negation yet holds. Thus this obligation (a term not yet bound to formal logic, as prior to opposition) is “non-neutralisable” (TEI 172, TI 198). Hence no negation or position upon possibility yet impacts on this priority of obligation.

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323 Hence, Levinas writes, putting this via ontology and being: “the relation between the being here below and the transcendent being that results in no community of concept or totality – a relation without relation – we reserve the term religion.” (TEI 152, TI 80). Religion arises from the ethical relation.

324 This obligation is just beginning, however, for Levinas as yet “reserves” the “term” religion, it is also held back. It is still religion and not yet responsibility.
The linguistic relations of *autrui*, prior to logic

However, as Levinas proceeds in this ordinal hierarchy of what must precede the next, he too proceeds via necessity, thus by prior necessary conditions. As to *how* this Desire proceeds even before any separation, Levinas develops the next necessary relation, that of *autrui*. This allots an important priority to language. For, note how “ipseity” allows for an original instability, rather than merely “one” singular meaning. Just so, and crucially, in French the collective pronoun *autrui* usually has the sense of “others”. However, it is employed without a definite article, the relation resists singularisation, or pluralisation to the general (cf. TEI 93, TI 121). Moreover, *Autrui* in French also has the sense of “others” whenever it is a capitalised moment of *autrui* (we have yet to establish why it would be a capitalised).

Such a moment is deemed a “sign” (rather than a word) (TEI 64-65, TI 92). As *autrui* signifies itself by a sign, importantly, the prior relation of *autrui* in language “is already necessary” even should it be withheld (TEI 65, TI 92). Yet as *autrui* is prior to me, in this religion, I already receive *autrui* “as taught”. Such teaching occurs only by speech – for as I am still not yet in relation to myself, which requires an object, then I

am not yet ‘in view of [my] own existence’

(TEI 90, TI 118).
Thus “[S]peech refuses vision” (TEI 273, TI 296). Speech occurs without separation from an object, even such as myself. For Levinas, no form of writing would have priority, as enjoyment has not yet divided to allow simple distance from the subject.  

Importantly, following from autrui, this “reception” of original teaching from a “master” allows an expression of Autrui (TEI 64, TI 92), in a sense that resists singularisation (we also deem this “instability”). “Expression” means a distinction (from the old French “espèrè”, originally from “espressus” as distinctly presented), and an act of speaking outward (CDWH 214). Thus expression occurs of Autrui who must be signified even though withheld. In turn, what must signify as withheld gives the sign; and thus language (this is not yet given to me, for I am not yet in view of myself). Rather, it is the sign of autrui that allows the expression of Autrui, and henceforth language relates to others. This instability in expression of language in obligation allows the next moment, of “responsibility”). This developed originally from responsus, the earliest sense of which was answering, and then answerable to, and

325 Levinas explains: “Speech refuses vision, because the speaker does not deliver images to himself only, but is personally present in his speech.” (TEI 273, TI 296).
326 We employ “instability” rather than equivocity, which latter assumes comparability of objects.
327 The subsection “Expression is the Principle” makes no mention yet of an “I” or subject. The relation of Autrui to the cogito develops afterward (cf. TEI 64-66, TI 92-93).
most recently the accepting of an obligation (CDWH 523). Following from the Desire for Autrui, I am responsible to Autrui, autrui and others.

The “logically absurd structure” of ethics

The relation of expression and responsibility makes language the condition of ethics (TEI 174, TI 200). In answering to and answering I begin to obey and command the other (l’autre) in language. Yet as ethical, the other will still arise in relation to Autrui (we must yet explain this); not yet an other in the world. This command thus does not yet even attain the other in mere space (for no such division yet holds). Levinas writes that:

[L]anguage, which does not touch the other

(l’autre), even tangentially, reaches the other by

calling upon him or commanding him or by

obeying him, with all the straightforwardness

[droiture] of these relations (TE 134, TI 62).

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328 “The original sense was answering [to]. The current sense answerable [to] dates from the 16C, and that of involving responsibility from the 19C.” (CDWH 523). Responsibility in French also has the sense of the beginnings of a solution (réponse), the beginnings of logic.

329 This is the “bond between expression and responsibility, this ethical condition or essence of language”, which is “prior to all disclosure of being” (TEI 174, TI 200).
By this Levinas never allows the sign to be produced by Husserl’s signitive intention (247), as an “intentional modification” and objectification, as though the other (even as thing) is a content of my consciousness. It is never quite Husserl’s “mastery” even though it commands (and obeys). Yet even though “straightforward” in a systematic fashion, the above – as yet without distance or phenomenological sense (sens) – has developed a “logically absurd structure” (TEI 90, TI 118). Language does not yet relate to “formal logic” and “truth” (TI 172, TEI 147). In the progress from enjoyment to language, Levinas’ “structure” addresses the other as ethical yet sets aside the primacy of theory.

Preparing for the logical “structure” of the Same and the Other

Having allowed some ethical relation to the other via speech, Levinas prepares to relate to the other (l’autre) in more conventional fashion. For necessary conditions still apply, and language and signification are “analogous” to appearance (TEI 64-65, TI 92). Levinas begins to allow for a (merely analogous) “structure” of objectivity, sense, directions and logic. For what is analogous is withheld yet remains possible; language thus makes the relation to objects possible in that I can signify a theme as an object (TEI 185, TI 210; TEI 64, TI 92). Thus the relation to

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Levinas does so less overtly than Derrida, and we will usually employ the present indicative tense, as does Levinas, instead of Derrida’s preponderant “must”.

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objectivity arises (TEI 164-167, TI 189-193). With objectivity, empty space arises as a modality of enjoyment (TEI 165, TI 191). Space in turn returns a further condition of possibility, for it too makes the object possible. With the relation of object in space in interiority arises vision. That is, vision is horizontal, combining the direction with the horizon of possibility of determining the object (TEI 166, TI 191). It permits the “lateral” progress “across” (à travers) toward the object.

**From desire to the other**

This object in vision can also be myself. *This instils the dividing of totality*, which allows “the I” as object. This in turn develops “separation” of the I from its object. But objectivity allows for the object as *absolute*. The *desire* of the I becomes the desire for the *absolutely* other (TEI 3, TI 33, cf. TEI 165, TI 191). This develops the “mode” by which the absolutely other must be determined:

[T]he I is thus the mode in which the break-up of totality, which determines the presence of the absolutely other [absolument l’autre], is

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331 Levinas adds: “[T]he objectivity of the object and its signification comes from language.” (TEI 69, TI 96).
Levinas emphasises that this progress does not yet permit going “beyond” (au delà) to Autrui. This is still not yet a separation permitting a simple objective opposite.\(^{333}\) Just so, no position upon myself can yet be taken as an object that is not myself. However, such relation can begin to develop.

As objectification is possible, there can be multiple objects. Just so, as objective, the world becomes a theme, and thus an object (TEI 64, TI 92), and so too the things in the world. Thus the relation of space does allow horizontal relation of things toward the others (rather than autrui, these are singular objects). This is the space across which things are transported

\[\text{from one toward the others \[les \, une \, vers \, les \, autrui\]}\] (TEI 166, cf. TI 191).

This permits the movement across others, which as yet we take in the basic sense of others as separated from me, merely as finite “goods

\(^{332}\) For Levinas, the Same also “turns to the absolutely other only on call from Autrui” (TEI 39, TI 67). We address this below.

\(^{333}\) For example, amongst many quotes: “[T]he infinite does not raise up the finite by opposition” (TI 148). Levinas also separates from Hegel by this means: the other cannot be an “antithesis” that allows a dialectical evolution. We will return to Hegel below.
of this world” (TEI 49, TI 76). In this obligation, I must go via (or across) (par) the others as things of the world to the absolute, which is beyond (par-delà) (TEI 48, TI 76). Having returned space, separation, and movement across particular others, the progress begins to allow the “structure” of whole-part and predicative “logic” (cf. Lingis TI 14, (425 fn.)).

The general-particular relations of Objectivity

For as noted, language comes from Autrui prior to me, which permits the object. That there are many objects permits the subject also to be made object. However, Levinas reverses the phenomenological tradition in which the object is given to the subject. As speech is a condition of possibility for commanding and obeying the other, and the desire in obligation is to go to the absolute other in an ethical relation, it is the subject that proceeds to the particular object, in the ethical relation. The subject gives to the other, in generosity.

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334 I must go “beyond [par-delà] the egoist and solitary enjoyment, and hence making the community of goods of this world break forth from the exclusive property of enjoyment” (TEI 48, TI 76).

335 For the originary “givenness” of the object to intentionality in Husserl, without concern for the Other cf. I §§19, 67. In Being and Time, Heidegger explains the “es gibt”, translated in the English as “there is”, which can also be translated as “it gives” (cf. BT 5, SZ 7); Derrida argues the latter sense merely appears “discreetly” in that work (GT 20)). Heidegger develops the instability of “es gibt Sein” or “es gibt Zeit”, “there is Being”, and “there is time”, or “it gives Being” and “it gives Time” overtly in On Time and Being in 1962 (Heidegger 2002, 5). Levinas’ intemporal reversal of the direction of giving to existence amends Husserl’s and Heidegger’s lack of concern for autrui and Autrui, while Levinas keeps his “there is” (il y a) for “pure existing” (cf. TA 46, (552)).
At this juncture Levinas seems to be more accepting of Husserl in this transition. For this “generosity” which begins the address to 
Autrui must already hold prior to particularity of the object, and is
deemed correlative to the “generality” of the Object:

\[ \text{[T]he generality of the Object is correlative} \]

with the generosity of the subject going to the

Other \textit{[Autrui]}, beyond \textit{par-delà} the egoist and

solitary enjoyment. (Tel 48, TI 76)

However, correlativity is also a moment of parallelism (as analogy), and by this progress \textit{Autrui} does not yet appear even as pure content in the constituting of the Object (or object). \textit{From this juncture an essential logic holds; for Levinas has emphasised this of the Object in general.} General and particular relations are returned in a tolerance for essential logic, as the relations of the other \textit{(l’autre)} begin to develop via the particular objects in the world. For what my generosity reveals in the world is an \textit{existent} other. Thus the other is also a \textit{thing} that has \textit{form} (TI 75, TEI 47). Things are those which I possess in the world; this is still a “happiness” for it has not yet evolved negation. But things in turn have bodies, and crucially, \textit{I too} have a body. A fortiori, this develops the sense of an other \textit{like} me.
The return of the Same as logic

Thus the movement begins by going to the other (l’autre), but as a finite thing, to determine what is beyond the finite. In the world, such relations seek to determine the whole of the finite thing. I must proceed toward this wholly other (thing) via bodies in the world. Thus far, the prior relations are necessary to proceed, but the movement has not yet proceeded “beyond” things in the world. What is beyond the finite thus requires an idea of the infinite. (TEI 166, TI 191); but no way has yet arisen to constitute it.

Levinas deems this relation is necessarily open. He explains:

[E]goism, enjoyment, sensibility, and the whole dimension of interiority – the articulations of separation – are necessary for the idea of infinity,

the relation with the Autrui which opens forth

336 Levinas explains: “[T]he metaphysical desire turns toward the wholly other thing [toute l’autre chose], toward the absolutely other [absolument l’autre]” (TEI 3, TI 33).
In this Desire for the absolutely other, I (as subject, which makes of the thing an object) must proceed via the finite other, the existent thing in the world, to determine the infinitely other, which opens from this relation. We must yet explain how that it opens forth exceeds the finite alternatives of logic as true or false; thus far these relations are merely necessary.

But that this finite other is like me permits a relation to the other as the same as me (in the lower case and as particular). It is important to realise the progress from the “like” as external to the “same” is deemed, by Levinas, to be a logical passage without external reference. As the other is in a fashion the same as me, this permits an essential relation to what I am in general, thus an Identity. I can be an Identity (“A is A”) to myself. As a first exteriority applies, the object is no longer identified as what it is from a simple “outside”. Identity occurs from within. In particular, as the other is never identical to me but merely the same, it is thus never “identified” as another ego like me (cf. VM 128). Thus an

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337 Lingis has noted this division between “desire”, which is “attracted” by what is “not yet possessed or needed”, and the “need which seeks to fill a negation or lack in the subject” (TI 19). We agree, and are seeking to explain how this occurs, as need arises after desire. We add the resultant negation, below.

338 Levinas explains: “[T]here exists a logical passage from the like to the same” (TI 289, TEI 265).
object is identical only to itself via being “the same as itself” only “from within”. Levinas summarises that

\[ \text{[T]he identity of the individual does not consist in being like to itself, and in letting itself be identified from the outside by the finger that points to it; it consists in being the same \[ \text{[le même]} \] – in being oneself, in identifying oneself from within. (TEI 266, TI 289)} \]

In particular, given a lack of position from the outside upon a likeness, what is the same as itself is merely the identity of an other to itself (TEI 99, TI 126), without even an external object. In turn, this avoids opposition; the I is unalterable in relation to every one of the others (a multiplicity). Henceforth, “the other” and “the others” must be understood in this constricted fashion.

Thus, *in an implicit generalisation*, Levinas explains that this movement is precisely the involution to the Same. As Levinas summarises,

\[ \text{[W]e call it ‘the Same’ because in representation the I precisely loses its} \]

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opposition to the object; [...] bringing out the identity of the I despite the multiplicity of its objects, that is, precisely the unalterable character of the I (TEI 99, TI 126).

This permits the return of a sort of internal negation (expressed by “is not”) of finitude. In particular, when an other is taken as the same as me, it is not identical to me. Rather, this other is a being that in a certain sense [sens] is not [me] by relation to me, [...] that is in a relation with me only insofar as he is wholly by relation to himself (TEI 74, TI 200).

Note, however, that this is no longer an “external” and violent negation of an other, permitting a sort of ethical progress to the infinite. When the finite is the name for the first moment of egoic limitation before the external other, a subject constrained only to be unalterable from itself (as Derrida will quote, “riveted” to itself (VeM 447, cf. TA 46, (588)), then the desire is for the other that is not the finite me. In ethics, I must and can go to the infinite other, which relation remains open.
This implicit bivalence (signified by “entre”) between what is and is not again evolves this horizontal dimension. For as this other also relates back to me only in order to be wholly itself, in general, I become conscious of the further degree of the Other (l’Autre). What is withheld in general from the other in interiority is Other, only insofar as it must also hold “beyond” me (par delà) only as wholly itself. “Insofar as” (dans la mesure où) never instils a determinate “quantity” (TEI 170, TI 196). It is by this constriction (retournement) that the interiority of a subject can go to the Other “beyond” itself (par delà) in a relation that still proceeds via (par) its relations to itself. The Same has henceforth evolved to the dual relation of interiority in a relation that must go from the finite to infinite other and to the Other. As this arose from the desire to determine the object, which object is beyond itself, this develops the logic. Indeed, Levinas tells us, it is only the Same which is in the mode of “truth”.

In the movement of the Same, Levinas has thus constricted the I to the “interior” even upon this side of an other and Other. This sum of relations of the Same and the Other, then, is deemed

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339 Lingis writes: “Levinas, of course, is not denying that a great part of our speaking and thinking is rigorous and bound by logic of some kind. What he is interested in showing is that prior to these systems, [...] and presupposed by them is the existing individual and his ethical choice to welcome the stranger [...] by speaking to him.” (TI 14) We have been aiming to augment Lingis, by setting forth how this logic in turn is included into the progress of metaphysics, to address how to speak to the other. Our only divergence from Lingis, then, upon the above is to note that the “individual” only arises with logic in going to the stranger (which latter will be autrui).
“totality”. It is this constriction to this *internal* in its relation to the beyond, this ongoing desire for address to an *infinite* other which returns to finitude that Levinas – from the etymology of *oikos* and *nomos*, the law of the house – occasionally in *Totality and Infinity* calls “economy”. Economy is a moment of totality which attains the beyond only insofar as it returns to a circularity “closed in upon itself” (VeM 442, VM 128), in accordance with law.\(^3^{40}\) Indeed, Levinas tells us this passage from the like to the same is a “logic” which the “entire analysis” of *interiority* has sought to explain in his book (TI 289, TEI 266 (422)).

**From the logic of the Same to *autrui***

However, Levinas only allots the sense of a “logic” to interiority. Yet the metaphysical desire is still for the “absolute other” (*Autrui*) (TEI 170, TI 196), and the horizontal movement must go beyond the Same, via the Other. Thus far, the finite other is a body and the Other appears as the other only insofar as he is wholly withheld (beyond). A position is taken upon the Other only insofar as it is an *aspect* (*face*) (TEI 170, TI 196) of a beyond, through which finite aspects I must proceed (a moment comparable to Husserl’s adumbration).\(^3^{41}\) Thus the desire for the

\(^{340}\) Derrida summarises the above: the Same would be “a totality closed in upon itself, and identity playing with itself, having only the appearance of alterity, in what Levinas calls economy.” (VeM 442, VM 128).

\(^{341}\) Although comparable to an adumbration, this moment is no longer quite a doxic position (“the facing position can only be a moral summons” (TEI 170,
finite movement in the other as Other must exceed the infinite, but does not yet “conceive” of the infinite in this opening. The Kantian relation is rather of an ideal (produced in interiority from beyond the concept). The relation to exteriority is “maintained” in the idea of the infinite.

This develops from the Other to the next moment further “beyond”, for

what is produced here is not a reasoning but

the epiphany of the face. (TEI 170, TI 196)

Hence the movement “proceeds from the Other” (l’Autre) which is present only insofar as wholly Other, to the face which “turns to me”. It is an “object-cognition” only insofar as it maintains exteriority (TI 75, TEI 47), that is, only insofar as it is even further beyond. The face to face relation thus “maintains” a relation of exteriority to the logic of the Same. Importantly, in this progress, “only the face opens the relation to autrui.” (TEI 75, TI 81)).

We develop Levinas’ “open” just below. Thus far, what exceeds but maintains the Same thus develops again a language that maintains but resists logic, as autrui (TEI 93, TI 121). To be sure, autrui arose first from a body, and thus far maintains a beyond

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TI 196), for the Other as absolutely other is experienced only as “beyond”, thus merely by going toward its effect (as “effectuated”).
(par-delà) merely as totally different to the “object-cognition” of the Same. Yet it resists language and logic in a strange way.

As noted, the pronoun *autrui* has the sense of “others” without a definite article; the relation again resists the singular (and plural). The strangeness of *autrui* begins to resist logic. It begins to resist the particular and general relations and predication as a singular object. It begins to resist the Same. Thus speech in address to *autrui* is no longer in the logical mode of truth (it is “rhetoric”). No longer in the mode of truth and resisting logic, such a relation remains open. Moreover, insofar as the collective noun *Autrui* in French also has the sense of “others” whenever it is a moment of *autrui* as essential; but it resists the singularisation or multiplication that could make this essence true (it is a “suppression of pluralism” (cf. TEI 196, TI 221)). Insofar as this sense of *Autrui* also avoids determining its truth as plurality, it avoids confinement to singularity or multiplicity as essential. A freedom is allotted to speak of *autrui* as resisting individuation in order to address *Autrui*. This is

[T]he strangeness of *autrui*, its [sa] very

freedom! (TeI 46, TI 73)

But it is important to note the necessities in this structure arose in a chain (TEI 170, TI 196). The relation to the other as Other to the Same then permits the Freedom to go “beyond” rhetoric:
Freedom presents itself as Other \([l’autre]\) to the Same \([Même]\), [This existence] is in the world, a destitution. There is here a relation between me and the other \([l’autre]\) beyond \([au delà]\) rhetoric (Tel 47, TI 75).

This develops the more extreme version of the “beyond” (\(au-delà\)) (cf. TEI 37, TI 67). As it is first a body, I must first determine \(autrui\) in passage across the things that I recognise in the world.\(^{342}\)

Thus

\[
\text{[T]o recognise } autrui \text{ is therefore to come to him across [\(à travers\)] the world of possessed things (Tel 48, TI 76).}
\]

Yet “\(au-delà\)” is without the intermediary “\(par\)”. It expresses a relation closer to the world and destitute of a relation to a “beyond”, yet in a relation to the beyond without intermediary. Thus I am free to \(try\) first to pass (\(à le\)) to \(autrui\) as “beyond” without relation. \(Then\) the freedom arises to go “beyond” (\(au delà\))

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\(^{342}\) “Recognition” for Levinas has the multiple senses of what logically knows the object, thus the ethical acknowledge by the subject of the other, and also re-cognition of this object restored to me.
even *autrui* to *Autrui*. For *Autrui* is said to hold at a “height” beyond (*au-delà*) even the *autrui* that resists the formal logic of the *Same*. The desire to go to *Autrui* prior to logic and opposition has passed through the other and the Other to exceed logic again to *autrui*, then to *Autrui*.

Yet as noted, *Autrui* holds most intimately in the *secret* of interiority from which separation, and then relation to things in the world arises. This allows for an “asymmetry”, only the Same allows a symmetry, in the Same as with itself without external opposition, yet *Autrui* expresses itself in interiority before symmetry, a non-symmetry without particular or general relation. This exceeds interiority to the relation without relation of *Autrui* from which ethics began (from behind), in asymmetrical relation to the logic of the Same. For importantly, this Other as absolutely Other (*Autrui*) is no longer merely necessary. It does not “limit” interiority (as opposition) but rather *institutes* (*instaure*) the freedom of the Same (TEI 171, TI 197). *Autrui* certainly “produces” the formal logic of the Same (TeI 31, TI 60) to permit even the idea of the infinite as symmetrically other to the finite. *Autrui*, then, *opens* up the “idea” of the infinite (in the lower case, a particular institution rather than Husserl’s eidetic necessity of the irreducibility of the Idea in the Kantian sense, for *Autrui* exceeds essence).
Levinas has developed the open relation prior to “individuation” (TEI 121) which is “irreducible” to (TEI 52-53) but maintains the relation to exteriority in the Same. Such a sequence begins to explain, as we noted above, how interiority evolves to the idea of infinity, the relation with Autrui, which opens forth from the separated and finite being. (TI 148, our emphasis)

In the Same (which is “inside” only after interiority) the relation of what the finite other is and is not can again proceed to the infinite other, with an idea of “transcendence” of finitude to the infinite other (TEI 18, TI 48).

Indeed, note that Levinas deems the relation to autrui develops from a “structure” of “ontology” (TEI 170, TI 196). The latter term by this juncture includes Husserl’s pure ontology in his noetic-noematic structure, and also any standard versions of “metaphysics”, which would propose merely the limit of an other, finite and infinitely other, and Other. All of these for Levinas evolved in logical relation to the Same and economy. Levinas’ relation of transcendence allows his version of “metaphysics”

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343 Levinas emphasises: “[O]ne of the principal theses of this work [Totality and Infinity] is that the noesis-noema structure is not the primordial structure of intentionality” (TEI 271, TI 294).
(TEI 18, TI 48). For as the idea of the infinite in the Same and the Other in turn *supposes a prior* relation to *Autrui* that institutes and opens up separation, for Levinas, “[O]ntology presupposes metaphysics” (TEI 18, TI 48).

That is, in beginning from *Autrui*, Levinas’ metaphysics has developed a necessary progress to the other and the Other, and then, via *autrui* and the face, back to the origin as *Autrui*, then back to the infinite other and so on. However, it must never be deemed Husserl’s “return enquiry”. Levinas’ circularity ruptures itself. There have been two sorts of “structures”, the absurd (countersensical) and that of sense: could they even be aligned as “two”, which symmetry they resist also. Insofar as these relations are made themes (objects), as Levinas puts it, the movement of totality and economy continually “overflows” itself, in asymmetry (430). For Levinas, “asymmetry [...] summarises the theses of the present work” (TEI 190, TI 215).

**Levinas’ asymmetry of violence and nonviolence**

In turn, the structures above allow us to summarise three sorts of violence, to prepare for reading Derrida. The first arises from Husserl’s intentionality, as “*oppression*” of the Other (and thus *autrui* and *Autrui*). We began from this relation, as Levinas preferred to begin from enjoyment (405). Levinas then progressed to movement upon the inside, allowing negation of the one and the other. Progress to the other across the world of
possessed things is a negation. By employing a thing for my purposes, I make it what it is for me, thus not what it is itself. However, Levinas never deems this an ethical violence. For

the negation effected by [...] usage remained

always partial. (TEI 173, cf. TI 198)

Even *destruction* of things in the world – including living beings without a “face” – still “answers to a need”. It is negation of relations besides the particular that leads to violence. That is, the negation of the next relation, the face, begins to “annihilate” the Other rather than dominate things. Negation of the *totality* develops violence. Levinas calls this “murder”:

[m]urder alone lays claim to total negation

(TEI 173, cf. TI 198).

The negation of the totality of others, and thus Others, annihilates the relation of *autrui* and *Autrui*. Yet it is *Autrui* alone who obligates me. *I can only want* (*veut*) to kill *Autrui* (TEI 173, cf. TI 198). As we noted, the “I” and possibility only arise with the Same. Violence arises as negation of the *logical* structure of one to other upon the inside, then of the totality, and thus of *Autrui*.

The next sort of violence is that which refuses the structure from one to other in their progress of opposition, negation etc. (by
which I go to *Autrui*). Note that such progress from one to other need no longer be that of a single subject, it can also be a “being”. Violence is made “war”. Hence

[w]ar therefore is to be distinguished from the logical opposition of the one and the other by which the one and the other are defined within a totality [...]. In war beings refuse to belong to a totality (TEI 197, TI 222)

The violence of the Same develops a part-whole hierarchy. As to what would be *ethical*, Levinas thus allowed only one logically-absurd sort, which evades this hierarchy. As noted, Desire and thus the “obligation” to go to *Autrui* was non-neutralisable (TEI 172, TI 198). As prior to negation and opposition, this obligation is a non-relation that Levinas deems ethical *nonviolence*. Even

[m]urder finds itself before a datum absolutely non-neutralisable. (TEI 172, TI 198). Thus even though I *can* want to murder *Autrui*, interiority is already obligated to ethical nonviolence in the Desire for *Autrui*. *Asymmetry* also allows for the relations of ethics.
Levinas has developed his absurd and logical structures in an ordered fashion. He has allowed for violence, yet a prior ethical obligation to nonviolence thus has precedence. Derrida will develop these sorts of violence as he proceeds, in the sequence above. He will do so to work out how ethical nonviolence is possible. However, he will do so in his fashion.

**Part Two: setting aside of Levinas**

**The incompatibility with Levinas**

We have explained the above in order to summarise that Levinas’ relations must be set aside, as Derrida will opt for Husserl’s intentionality. As every moment in Levinas’s progress arises from a rejection of Husserl’s intentionality, then every relation that Derrida develops will be incompatible with Levinas’. This will hold even though many terms are common, for Levinas develops from a tradition of metaphysics that includes Husserl. Moreover, Derrida adopts many of Levinas’ terms. He will be able to do so as he will develop his basic levels and directions from 1962. Indeed, those in turn developed from Derrida’s approach in 1954.

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344 Derrida will argue that the thematisation of the face is “an intentional modification upon which Levinas indeed must base the sense of his discourse” (VM 128, VeM 444).
The alignment of Levinas and Derrida’s teloi

That is, at base, and *insofar as these relations will be transferable to later years*, Derrida will be furthering his concerns from 1954. Hence he will accept Levinas’ telos of the desire to go to the absolute other (*Autrui, absolument autre*). Such a telos *accords with Derrida’s demand for the absolute “beyond”* that held since 1954. Thus he accepts the telos of relation to the absolute other as “ethical”. This *necessitates* the avoidance of the violences of oppression and negation, and war.

These accord with Levinas’s asymmetry. First, a lack of oppression no longer instils an outside and a limit. Second, a relation without negation would be without limit. Avoidance of violence would allow for ethical relation to the absolute other. Each would allow for the subject to go out of itself, and thus for a determination of the absolute. Third, avoidance of war (peace) still allows for violence, merely in that beings enter the progress from one to other. However, this at least permits the progress of ethics (forward). The telos of what Levinas calls “ethics” accords with the *form* of Derrida’s telos from earlier years. A contrastive reading is thus *very* feasible. However, from this juncture we will follow how Derrida develops his earlier concerns and relations.

**How Derrida will proceed**

By no means, then, do we suggest that Derrida has little concern for an ethics. He will work out how the bases that he has
developed can allow for a better ethics. Yet at base he will be asking how the subject can exceed its subjectivity, and more basically still how the absolute can be determined without limit. Each of these are levels of teloi according to a basic form. Moreover, each were bases from 1962.

Indeed, Derrida will begin by aligning his four arguments from 1962 with this progress in an “ethical” and neutralised noema. He will then work out how thought in these directions must proceed to attain the beyond without limit (i.e. without violence). He will turn to Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation, in which Husserl addresses the relations of intersubjectivity to develop the relations of the other and the Other. Derrida will explain that Husserl’s “appresentation” allows for a phenomenology of “respect”, in that it seeks to avoid any determination of the Other.345 To work this out, Derrida will evolve the unidirectional passage from 1962 to allow for a “second direction”. The two directions will address the other and the Other.

However, Husserl has no phenomenology of autrui and Autrui,346 and Derrida will need to account for how Husserl’s ethics could

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345 For Levinas’ suggestion that his “ethics” is one of “respect”, cf. TI 43. That Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity is one of “respect” in the fashion that Derrida will take it, we note, had been suggested by Ricoeur in 1954 (Ricoeur 1967, 197). Derrida develops this in much more detail.
346 Derrida had justified his opting for Husserl’s as a “better” way to ethics earlier in “Violence and Metaphysics”. He noted (as we explained) that autrui in French (“others”) “tolerates” neither definite article nor plural (VeM 350, 350 fn. 1, VM 104). Moreover, as a pronoun (such as “it” or “they”), autrui allows
consider them. Derrida will also suggest *en route* that Husserl wants to address *Autrui* only in its *form* of ego, which will also be respectful. The progress will allow for the most peaceful ethics possible. In turn, the necessity of thinking both directions as one object will evolve Derrida’s positive version of “economy”.

Yet as in 1962, Derrida will be building an ethics from selected elements of Husserl. First, Derrida will still not yet include Husserl’s negation. Thus nor will Derrida concede that Husserl progresses in the Same, or even mention the same. As *autrui* resists position and negation, Derrida will not yet address *autrui* until he includes negation and the Same. By that juncture he will have set Husserl aside, to develop a negative economy. This will occur in our next chapter.

no relation of an object to an “epithet” (a term which affixes a characteristic to an object). That is, as language is logical, *autrui* indeed tolerates no predication of Husserl’s sort, let alone predication of the logical Subject. As *autrui* allows no determined particular or multiple component, it never engages with the general, or categorical (i.e. regional and essential (cf. I §10)) relations. Thus “the French word *autrui* does not yet [*pas … encore*] designate a category of the genre *autrui*” (VeM 350, VM 105). However, for Derrida, *autrui* nevertheless instils what it seeks to avoid. Derrida equates *autrui* and *Autrui* with Levinas’ Judaeo-Christian heritage in the Latin “*alter-huic*, the dative relation to “this other” (VeM 350, VM 105). Thus from the outset, for Derrida, *autrui* and *Autrui* nevertheless are spoken of as what appears as an other in particular that exceeds otherness. Yet as *autrui* tolerates no relation of particular or general, Levinas’ metaphysics as yet provides no way to proceed toward the absolute other (*Autrui*) to remedy this contravention of its ethics. Derrida will thus opt for Husserl’s the other and the Other. As he explains, “the other” (l’autre) can allow a definite article, thus be an epithet (or predicate). Hence, second, “the other” can be pluralised, and then generalised (“des autres en général” (VeM 440)). Derrida will thus seek to proceed by means of the Greek category of the “other in general” (έτερον, henceforth “eteron”); as we will explain, eteron can also be translated as an adjectival “difference”. “Violence and Metaphysics” will proceed in an arc, as Derrida will have worked these relations out via his negative economy, in our next chapter. We are following Derrida’s “law” and will develop the relations as he proceeds.

347 Levinas aligns Husserl’s “transcendental” progress with the Same at TEI 48, TI 76.
It should be obvious that Derrida never would accept Levinas’ fundamental argument that Husserl’s “theoretical intentionality” seeks “total adequacy”. Derrida worked out at length that for Husserl since at least 1913, total adequacy is precisely what never held, even given a telos of the absolute in any fashion. Thus as to intentional inadequacy, Husserl allowed no objectification of the beyond simply as no evidence arises for it (rather than excluding it, as Levinas suggests) – formal-logical proof even in the Logical Investigations of 1913 cannot reach that far (LI 3 §25, (210)). Thus in his first part (VeM 434-436, VM 118-120), Derrida directly contests Levinas’ premise:

is there a more rigorously, and, especially, a

more literally Husserlian theme [in general]

348 It has been suggested (cf. Bernet et. al. 1993) that Husserl “flirted” with an absolute outcome to adequacy in the Logical Investigations. But the early phase was never Derrida’s core interest. Indeed, instead of Levinas’ view of commonality across Husserl’s oeuvre, Derrida suggests a division in Husserl between the static phenomenology of the Logical Investigations and Husserl’s pure bases from 1913, which latter subsequently evolved to the genetic project. Hence, instead of Levinas’ view of Husserl’s “obsession” (TI 122) with adequacy across his oeuvre, as we followed, Derrida closely addressed the reduced, transcendental basis primarily from 1913.
than the theme of [intentional] inadequation?

(VM 120)

Indeed, Derrida had followed how Husserl’s every effort from 1913 never allowed a final outcome, whether historicist, epistemological, genetic or transcendental. Insofar as Levinas’ progress is sequential, Derrida was never going to accept any transition in Levinas’ progress, even though he accepts the importance of the relations. Instead, he begins to assess the kind of ethics that can be developed from Husserl.

Phenomenology’s right to constitute the face

First, Derrida argues that phenomenology in general has the right to be deemed ethical (VeM 436-438, VM 120-122). Indeed, it is “in” the web of directions in the object (noema) that Derrida seeks justification, including the constituting of objectification (cf. 296) – the particular noema of ethics.

To do so, he develops his levels and directions from 1962 (that is, he applies intentionality). He begins by adding the basic directions, from the moment furthest “behind” (i.e., the highest

349 Indeed, Levinas suggests Husserl’s basis was “obsessive”. Yet Derrida asks: “Who was more obstinately determined to show that vision [intentionality as space] was originally and essentially the inadequation of interiority and exteriority?” (VeM 436, VM 120). Derrida bluntly disagrees with Levinas, again on the basis of his arguments from 1962. That said, the reader might disapprove of Derrida’s employing Levinas’ terms – for as we explained above, for Levinas, interiority arises from enjoyment.
eidetic level (I §10). To be employed, Derrida suggests, every ethical concept (such as ethics, transcendence, infinity etc.), must already hold eidetically, as must the laws which guide what is possible amongst them (VEM 436, VM 121). Just so – moving forward, or downward – ethical relations, as particular relations of the eidetic must certainly arise. In turn, these relations can be made an object which essential relations hold a priori.

Thus Derrida begins to justify an “ethical” noema, and applies the outcomes of his four arguments from 1962 (without explaining them; as he worked them out then). In the first two arguments of 1962, both space and time developed the movement from finite certainty (in this instance of the other) to the indefinite rather than infinite (forward), and the necessity of foundation upon the Idea in the Kantian sense (forward, and thus backward) (272).

These movements are again included (and Derrida indeed calls them the “two intentional directions” (VeM 436, VM 120). This is not yet a second direction from an object (in particular, the face)

350 Note that the eidetic is deemed to be prior to the “concept”, which latter holds at the middle level.
351 Derrida writes: “[N]ot only nominal definitions, but, before them, [logical] possibilities of essence [across and upward] which guide all concepts, are presupposed when one speaks of ethics, of transcendence, of infinity, etc.” (VeM 437, VM 121).
352 Indeed, we suggest, these portions of “Violence and Metaphysics” (VeM 434-437) are difficult to comprehend without considering that they build from Derrida’s arguments of 1962.
353 Derrida explains: “[I]n the two intentional directions […] the Idea in the Kantian sense designates the infinite overflowing of a horizon which, by reason of an absolute and essential necessity which itself is absolutely principled and irreducible, never can become an object itself” (VeM 436, VM 120, Derrida’s emphases last (cf. 439)).
toward me, but the directions of an intentionality seeking to progress to the object which must for essential reasons pass to what necessarily founds it.

For as in 1962, the Idea in the Kantian sense is deemed to be “irreducible” to phenomenological evidence (“behind”). Thus the certainty of an object remains; although as yet without a ground for positing a foundation, for the Idea in the Kantian sense eludes objectification (VeM 436, VM 120). Thus Derrida again notes the difficulty of distinguishing the infinite as adequate (i.e. in its phenomenological possibility), or even determining it as indefinite. Importantly, Derrida equates this with the bases he worked out from his first two arguments, that the progress implies an opening:

[T]hat the infinity of the Husserlian horizon has

the form of an indefinite opening [ouverture] [...]

does this not certainly keep it from all
totalisation? (VeM 436, VM 120-121)

Indeed, this remains merely a certainty, and as ontology was given only the right to the question (349), Derrida merely asks this. He thus proceeds to the outcome of his third argument from 1962.
That is, following from the lack of ground of the Idea in the Kantian sense, Derrida had worked out that even *genitivité* (consciousness “of”) led to opening in progress of finite others (infinite inadequation). Indeed, Derrida asks:

\[
\text{If a consciousness of infinite inadequation to the}
\]

\[
\text{infinite […] distinguishes a body of thought}
\]

\[
\text{[ethics] [then] [i]s not intentionality respect}
\]

\[
\text{itself? (VeM 436-437, VM 121, our}
\]

354 \text{emphasis)
}

Importantly, *the opening of intentionality from 1962 is aligned with Husserl’s first basis for “respect”, in that it never even begins to constitute a finite object.

Indeed, in the fourth argument from 1962, the Idea of God signalled the radical *impossibility* of constituting the object as absolutely possible. Derrida thus suggests that this “unobjectifiability” of all objects in general (*tout objet en général*) holds

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354 This question is also phrased as a conditional, to avoid determining the possibility of respect. We will develop these relations as we proceed.
Next, the overall address to the four arguments, we explained, sought to ask how a real fact is possible, as an absolute (and “truth” remains a way to signify this Telos (228)). After continually returning to a priori truth, Derrida accepted the essential relations of passage as “prior” to real or external content (323) (that was deemed the “Absolute” as “Passage”). Yet that outcome still retained the absolute in this relation prior to real possibility, as constituted originarily (cf. 329), even though facticity led to passage.

Thus Derrida again writes that

[Th]is domain of absolutely ‘prior’ truths is the domain of the transcendental phenomenology in which […] a phenomenology of ethics must take [originary] root. This rooting is not real

[real] (VeM 437, VM 122).

Thus in particular, even an ethical phenomenology would no longer determine a fact, or even absolute value or truth. Derrida goes on that
it would be vain to reproach transcendental

phenomenology for being *in fact* incapable of

ingendering ethical values (VeM 437, VM 122,

Derrida’s emphasis).

Rather, for Derrida, such incapability – lack of particular possibility, even though general possibility remained a priori – would be *respectful* (VeM 437, VM 121).

Moreover, Derrida had explained that all of these relations were “rigorously” derived from intentionality (323). Yet in 1962, even though phenomenology lost its ground, intentionality retained the *right* to question the absolute fact itself (350 ff.); and Derrida *asks* whether phenomenology is “respect itself” (VeM 436-437, VM 121). *Derrida has taken his arguments from his relevant results in 1962.* These in turn implied delay. Derrida never mobilises this, at least as its concerns are no longer objective, hence no longer convincingly allow for an ethics.

Thus Derrida applies his right to summarise these irreal relations as noema. As every noema (for example, that of ethics) supposes the possibility of noema in general, it is “fitting to begin
rightfully” with a Husserlian ethics. To be sure, “ethics” is only one noema (Derrida also concedes Husserl's concerns with the natural (i.e. the spatiotemporal region of Nature) and political (VeM 438, VM 122)). Derrida is working out how a particular sort of phenomenology can be ethical, and developing his relations.

**Parenthesis: Husserl's reduction, the same and violence**

For an important amendment is required. The noema was evolved by Husserl in a reduction to the pure. For Levinas, Husserl's reduction sought to allow mastery of the object, returning Husserl's pure logic; it was a reduction to the Same (IOG 34-35):

> the neutralisation of the other who becomes

> [...] an object is precisely his reduction to the

> Same. (TEI 14, TI 43)

As we explained of Levinas, to include the same in relation to particular objects: what is the same as an other is also in a fashion not the other. According to the tenets above, it would be violent

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355 Derrida also emphasises that this ethical moment holds as the noema is irreal, and thus respectful (VeM 437, VM 122).

356 This develops Derrida's relations of the “same” from 1962 (cf. (255)), which only required the same word to be other to the subject itself, and univocity to be the same as itself (the whole).
In the relations of the Same which arose in objectification, a reduction would preclude ethics.

To avoid this negation, Levinas had developed from the intentionality of enjoyment to “command” the object (415) (which is particular). This command, for Derrida, borders on violence. Thus, Derrida adds a paragraph in 1967. He goes on that Husserl’s intentionality

commands ‘nothing’ […]. It is the very neutralisation of this [particular] kind of commandment. (VeM 441, VM 125)

We develop this “nothing” below. Note that we employ a quote from 1967 merely as Derrida insists upon neutralisation (cf. VeM 441, VM 125) but has not yet explained it.

Thus to avoid negation and this sort of “Same”, Derrida re-interprets the reduction via Husserl’s intentional neutralisation (but no longer as Levinas takes the term). Indeed, Husserl suggests neutralisation is the intentional basis for every reduction (I §109). Derrida summarises this (only in a 1967 emendation): “the same is a violent totality” (VM 119, cf. VeM 435).

As Husserl puts it: “[N]eutralisation [...] lies enclosed [i.e. internally] in every “withholding of performance”, “setting out of action”, “bracketing” (I §109).
landscape seen in a visit to a museum. The memory can be
doxically posited of an object as such (e.g. “I visited the museum”).
But as to the image of the landscape “within” the memory, it is
not yet believed (i.e. doxically posited) to be real in that
intention. It is thus no longer even a “copy” of the external
world, which would restore an external border to the real
landscape (cf. esp. I §113). Yet even so it is posited; this positing
would be a “neutralisation”. For Husserl, a neutralisation of the
noema is so much further from positing of reality that noesis
(which is already irreal (191)) no longer “seriously” posits even of
what is objectified as irreal. Thus this ethics would no longer
believe that the posited other is actually even other (I §109).
Indeed, as a correlate even of noesis, the other would contain
nothing that can be predicated of (I §109). Ethics seriously posits

Of course, this is a circularity in Husserl, for the neutralisation of the noema
only arises after the eidetic reduction. Derrida never addresses this difficulty.
But instead of disagreeing with Levinas that a simple reduction can respect the
other in an “outside” – for such a thought would restore the outside – Derrida
goes more deeply “into” phenomenology, to one kind of noetic intention as the
act from which the reduction arises.

Note that a face is certainly an image, thus can be neutralised in Husserl’s
fashion. We address this below.

Just so, if it were deemed not to be real, that would be false, for it can be
confirmed as neither irreal nor real in that intention.

As the noema is even less real than the noetic “in the most extended sense”,
thus furthest from the outside, neutralisation of the noema holds at the very
interior of the intention.

As Husserl puts it: “[T]he belief is no longer seriously a belief, the
presumption not seriously a presumption, the denying not seriously a denying.
It is “neutralised” belief, presumption, denial, and the like” (I §109).

That is, “[T]he neutralised positings are essentially [from behind]
distinguished by this mark, that their correlates contain nothing that can be posited,
nothing that can be predicated” (I §109, Husserl’s emphasis). That is, if it is no
longer believed or taken “seriously” in the noetic phases then, for Husserl, its
noematic correlate – which is a corresponding outcome of what is posited
noetically – will contain nothing.
nothing even of the other. When *nothing* appears to have sense, nothing *appears* to have sense. There would be nothing of an other to be shut outside, letting the appearing of the other be.

To hold for ethics, however, neutralisation would need to avoid both negation and the same (both of which, as noted, Derrida will consider only upon leaving Husserl aside (VeM 442, VM 126, (505)). To assess a seeming difficulty, we explain this from Husserl – for a neutralisation *retains a negation* (cancellation); one must first recognise that the painting is *not* real. But Husserl’s innovation combines the correlative noemata of neutralisation as “nothing” and as negation (I §106). This negation “cancels nothing” (I §104). That is, as negating nothing, it posits *something* (I §106), which for formal-ontological and essential reasons is no longer negative. No particular thing is cancelled.

We have thus explained how neutralisation is compatible with an avoidance of negation, even though it applies a negation. In this fashion, Husserl can avoid negation of the ethical object in his ethics. Even though negation precludes respect by making the

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364 Husserl’s every employment of “not” still refers to the correlative *noetic act* of negation (I §106 (187)).

365 Husserl explains: “[E]very negation is the negation of something, and this Something points us back to this or that modality of belief” (I §106). The doxic belief, in turn is a positing.
other what it is not, intentionality as neutralisation can be respectful.\textsuperscript{366}

Thus, crucially, Derrida in 1964 still retains a pure basis in neutralised intentionality.\textsuperscript{367} As in 1962, it is essence that is investigated for its relations a priori. Even its whole-part and particular relations and content are prior to real content. Derrida’s “neutral level” of analysis prepares for an “eidetic-transcendental” analysis, thus seeks to apply at a “purely ethical level” (VeM 445, VM 129).\textsuperscript{368}

Derrida can thus begin to restore all of the relations of pure phenomenology’s passage from 1962, as yet without negation,\textsuperscript{369} and without further consideration of Husserl’s reduction. Derrida summarises the above:

one can speak of ethical objectivity, or of ethical

values or imperatives as objects (noemas),

\textsuperscript{366} Indeed, we note, although the right and certainty of facticity remain, a neutralised phenomenology no longer speaks of the existential facticity (the predication and certainty of the existence of the fact (cf. VeM 441, VM 125)). This accords with Derrida’s outcomes from 1962, and is the closest he can get to ethics as a “relation without relation” in Husserl (TI 80), while retaining the directions and levels.

\textsuperscript{367} What Derrida achieved in 1962 by the “re-descent” from the highest tier of language to particularisation of pure relations (246), he has achieved by neutralisation of intentionality in 1964. We address language just below.

\textsuperscript{368} Derrida explains after this analysis: “[I]t is difficult to see how the notion of violence [...] could be determined rigorously on a purely ethical level without prior eidetic-transcendental analysis” (VeM 445, VM 129, our emphases).

\textsuperscript{369} In the French version, Derrida avoids employment of “not” (pas) in these pages (VeM 439-441, cf. VM 123-125), except for negating that Husserl negates the Other (“This is precisely what Husserl does not do” (VM 441, VM 125)).
without reducing this objectivity to [...] the model

for what is commonly understood as

objectivity (theoretical objectivity, political, [...] natural, etc.) (VeM 438, VM 122, our emphases).

We will return to this “one can speak” just below. Thus far, in this particularised ethical noema and ethical intentionality, a reader should avoid deeming that Derrida’s ethics is compatible with Husserl overall. Derrida is furthering his concerns. Hence nor should the reader be surprised that Husserl will be left behind, toward the end of our chapter.

Thus, Derrida goes on, as Husserl’s intentionality “cannot” (Derrida worked out this essential impossibility in 1962) address the object itself, it can be respectful even in addressing Levinas’ face, even in a theoretical intentionality:

370 To point out the extent of the disagreement with what Levinas takes to hold of Husserl, and by which Derrida diverges from Husserl too, note that it is one of Levinas’ central theses in Totality and Infinity that the noetic-noematic relation is no longer to be supported, as his own intentionality held prior to any object. Levinas emphasises: “[O]ne of the principal theses of this work [Totality and Infinity] is that the noesis-noema structure is not the primordial structure of intentionality” (TEI 271, TI 294). Derrida has begun from the opposite premise of intentionality, working up to support the neutralised as noematic; by emphasising merely one kind of noema in Husserl.
I respect [the object in general] as such, as what it
is, in its sense [sens]. I have regard for
recognising that which cannot be regarded as a
thing, [...] I have regard for the face itself.

(VeM 438, VM 122)

The moment of developing this particular Husserl is also the
moment that Derrida reverses Levinas’ critiques of Husserl,
argues that Husserl’s ethics is no longer precluded from
addressing Levinas’ concerns, and prepares for a progress that
will exceed Husserl. From this juncture Levinas’ “face” is no
longer addressed. For Husserl has no phenomenology of the face,
but addresses the other and Other via the body.

Part Four: toward Derrida’s second direction
“forward”

First, as Derrida has only been addressing “the object in general”
(VeM 437, VM 122, our emphasis), which cannot be addressed
itself, he must justify how particular ethical objects can be
addressed as such (soon, the other and Other). Hence he turns to
things in the world, which include bodies (of which faces are

371 Bass notes in a footnote to this paragraph that by “regard”, Derrida is
addressing both the ethical and visual relations.
parts). Husserl’s phenomenology, Derrida reminds us, takes the “reality” of the external world “seriously” (VeM 440, VM 124). Even though the noema is irreal and thus respectful, and a neutralised noema even more respectful, the external reality must be determined absolutely. But in general, however seriously I take the existence of things in the natural world, in a neutralisation their reality is respected. For instance, the reality of “the landscape” I saw in the museum can only be neutralised (448). Thus something of the thing “remains hidden” (VM 124, VeM 440). This hiddenness of the thing holds also of bodies in the world, and bodies can be made the other and Other. Something of the other and Other remains hidden. By this Derrida begins to assess how Husserl’s approach can be ethical in addressing Autrui. He officially turns to the “Fifth of the Cartesian Meditations” (VeM 440, VM 124).

**Parenthesis: the right to language allotted**

But in order to proceed, Derrida must add a right. He worked out above that in Husserl’s ethical intentionality “one can speak” of the object in general. Language in general for Husserl is correlative to logic (henceforth, the impersonal French “one” (*on*) is a form prior to a logical subject, thus basal to both logic and speech). Derrida must still grant a right, and thus a possibility, for the subject to speak of the particular other (and Other) as such. He thus argues that even though Levinas refuses Husserl’s kind
of language as arising with the (signitive) intention, Levinas in fact speaks of the other in language (cf. esp. TA 46, cf. TI 130, TEI 102). For Derrida, since 1962, to speak of a fact I must first have a right (IOG 152, (351)), and even ontology retained its right. To combine the progress thus far: by beginning from (neutralised) intentionality which leave the fact as open, to address bodies in which something is hidden, Husserl “gives himself the right” to speak of the other.

Derrida reverses Levinas’ order. For Levinas, language and speech are prior to the generosity that goes to the object (416 ff.). For Husserl, the right to predicate of the fact is given in evidence (205). Only by this can intentionality begin to signify a content of something that appears as such. As language in general, and thus any language, already permits speech, this Other can be constituted in any possible language. Thus for Derrida

372 For Levinas’ employment of the “fact” that “there is” an absolutely other in language, cf. TA 46.

373 Derrida explains that “by acknowledging in this infinitely other as such [infiniment autre comme tel] (appearing as such) the status of an intentional modification of the ego in general, Husserl gives himself the right to speak of the infinitely other as such” (VeM 441, VM 125, Derrida’s emphasis). Derrida has not yet added negation, and this is merely a right to speak. This infinitely other must be produced by an idea, prior to negation.
Derrida has added Husserl’s sort of language in its levels and directions, and allowed possibility (from behind, and thus forward). Henceforth, any of the relations of the other and Other can be spoken of in their appearing as such. Derrida concedes that such a language might return an ethics of respect to “violence” (VeM 441, VM 125). But he has yet to assess what sort of violence this must be.

**Toward Husserl’s two directions**

To prepare, we will explain Husserl’s address to the other and the Other in the Fifth Meditation. We avoid suggesting Derrida’s approach is entirely accurate – Husserl applies a reduction in this work (CM §44), rather than a neutralisation; the developing relations are Derrida’s. Yet as Derrida did since 1962, Husserl proceeds by developing the transcendental subject (cf. VeM 442, VM 127). Even though the ego must of its essence also be

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374 Derrida had addressed in detail earlier that, he suggests, there can be “no philosophical logos which must not [ne doit] first let itself be expatriated into the structure Inside-Outside” (VeM 428, VM 112, Derrida’s emphasis). This in turn arises as possibility of this “beyond” (forward) – “the possibility of metaphysics is the possibility of speech” (VeM 432, VM 116). Levinas’ employment of possibility, we noted, is far less evident.
“human”,\footnote{As I must be a man, then made an object, the Other must then be “my neighbour [prochain] as foreigner” (cf. VeM 442, cf. VM 127).} as myself, nor is it only human; such natural and external \textit{affirmation} is what Husserl seeks to avoid. Husserl again explains the transcendental ego as that which allows convergence upon universal a priori norms \textit{(forward, thus behind)}, in turn allowing pure eidetic law (CM §35). He

explores the universal a priori without which

neither I nor any transcendental Ego \textit{[in general, as essential]} whatever is ‘imaginable’\footnote{For Husserl, “imagination” \textit{(Einzahlung)} – such as a presentation to self of a centaur – is not yet even an experience of a worldly object (cf. I §23). Thus this pure and eidetic basis of the transcendental subject is deemed “an unbreakable law” (CM §35).} [thus never neutralisable] (CM §35).

This essential basis allows positing of this “I” as noematically inseparable from the transcendental ego, hence as \textit{correlative} (CM §36, (155)). This “I” in general \textit{(for Derrida “Je”, as egoity in general)}\footnote{The English “I” never quite relays the essential and general sense of this “I” (“Je”), as it is only a singular letter, and always capitalised. “I” (“Je”) in the French as capitalised, for Derrida, instils the essential basis of the I (VeM 442, VM 126) that must be determined, which general basis is egoity. As Derrida summarises, “I” [Je] (in general: egoity)” (VeM 442, VM 126). However, “je” in the lower case is the particular moment of the originary arising of myself, which I (“Je”), as first I (“Je”) address to determine the “I” in general. Derrida never adopts Levinas’ “I” (“le Moi”), and treats Levinas’ use of “Je” as essential.} \textit{includes} the sense of my existence, but remains investigation of transcendental sense as such. As movement,
Husserl thus permits convergence upon the original instance of the ego (forward), to explore its a priori relations. This instils the circularity of transcendental subjectivity.

**The medium as prior necessity for passage**

Next, Husserl can make the transition to the other as “human”, in its directions. For essential reasons, that I can constitute an ego in general makes it a necessary condition that the other must have appeared to me (as an other human like myself). Further, this other certainly appears in evidence (VeM 442, VM 123), hence as an intentional object. Thus it is necessary that there be a particular content of the other as a man. Indeed, Husserl explains this by beginning from “the intentionality directed at what is other [als Fremdes]” (CM §44). He adds a note:

[T]o men and to myself as a man. (CM §44)

Husserl has added the levels of ideal objectivity, from the other as essentially a human (in general, men), to the particular other as a man, and thus to the other as a man (forward) posited of. But that Husserl has explained both men in general and in particular as “other” (als Fremdes) allows the instability.
For we have not yet added a way to pass to the other as myself. A fortiori, such passage must be mediated. To explain “mediumhood” overall: to take a position from the other, a content must be found in the particular other that is also in me in general (thus indeed, Husserl avoids deeming this the “same” as me, which would make this other not me). But a mediate intention as correlative arises originarily (the name for the part of origin at which arise the right, possibility and so on for the content of evidence to be spoken of). As an ego (correlatively, “I”) is originarily a man, then egoity can be predicated of men in general.

But as I am first a man, Husserl thus moves the originary egoic “nexus” (CM §44) further “within” myself, away from the other itself. This “second ego” will develop into the level of the Other (der Andere), which is pulled “inward” in order to pass “beyond” myself:

\[I\]n [i.e. inside] this pre-eminent [prior]

intentionality there becomes constituted for me

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378 Derrida insists: “Husserl’s most central affirmation concerns the irreducibly mediate nature of the intentionality aiming at the other” (VeM 440, VM 123, Derrida’s emphasis). This concern arises as at the last this intentionality must be mediated by the irreducible, the non-phenomenal, as we explain below.

379 Husserl explains that he “delimit[s] first of all the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiar ownness” (CM §44).
the next existence-sense that goes beyond

\[ \text{überschreitet [my ego]} \] (CM §44, our emphases).

Note that Husserl is seeking to avoid denying that the Other “beyond” is a consciousness as I am (cf. §109).\(^{380}\) Derrida employs the verb “refuse” (refuser) for denial. Such a refusal – that the Other is not what I am – refuses that an Other is an Ego in general as I am.\(^{381}\) Derrida emphasises:

\[
[T]o \text{ refuse to see in [the Other] an ego in this sense, is, within the ethical order, the very gesture of all violence (VeM 441, VM 125, our emphases).}
\]

\(^{380}\) Husserl writes, as we return to below that “neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally.” (CM §50)

\(^{381}\) Husserl writes, this other is “a “mirroring” of my own self, and yet not [nicht] a mirroring proper” (CM §44). That is, Husserl both posits and negates this relation.

\(^{382}\) By “gesture”, Derrida also refers to Husserl’s indicative sense of the sign, that falls short of the intentions of the other consciousness, just as no meanings (Bedeutungen) are yet communicated by these indications to me (for instance, by facial expressions (LI 1 §5, LU 38)).
Respect avoids this sort of violence. Indeed, note that an “order” of violence holds “within” ethics – and the more grievous violence is that of negation of the Other.  

The setting aside of negation of Autrui

As to Levinas, however, Derrida quotes Levinas’ earlier Existence and Existents (1947) and Time and the Other (1947):

Autrui, insofar as [en tant que] it is autrui, is not only an alter ego. It is what I myself am not (EeE 162, TeA 182, VeM 441, cf. VM 125 our emphases).

Derrida’s argument is somewhat unfair, as Levinas by 1961 is entirely aware that negation of the other in any sense is a violence (TI 198). Derrida is supporting his Husserl. He argues, first, that Husserl sets aside any sort of negation, and second, that Husserl sets aside negation of the egoity of Autrui:

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383 By “order”, Derrida indicates at least a necessary sequence (across) as well as a hierarchy (upward): violence will apply in the levels.
384 The “Other as Other” ought never to be confused with Levinas’ Other as Other (Autre en tant qu’il Autre cf. VeM 443)). By the latter phrase, Levinas seeks to avoid reference to Husserl’s appearing as such; “tant que” rather has a sense closer to “insofar as”, which avoids measuring an extent, an Other appearing as Other merely insofar as it is Other.
Rather, Husserl begins from the Other, which after a reduction includes a body, and thus is a man as I am (CM §44). Thus Husserl explains that the “Other” is somehow a “mirroring” of myself. This would be an appresentation (making of the Other and myself into one object as co-present), in which the relations are analogical.

But just so, Husserl avoids a confirmation of a consciousness outside, for again phenomenology would cease to be respectful, as the Other would be confirmed as not myself. Further, this would deem that the problem of origin even of the absolute Other is solved, for it is merely an intentionality as I am (VeM 441, VM 125). As Derrida emphasises, for essential reasons,

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385 Several sections earlier in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl deems that this other is “a “mirroring” of my own self, and yet not [nicht] a mirroring proper” (CM §44). Even so, Derrida is correct, in that this is merely not a mirroring, rather than not what I am.

386 We avoid suggesting this negation of the Other as what I am is a simple refusal of the natural existence of the Other; Husserl seeks to proceed via a reduction. Husserl writes: “if I reduce other men to what is included in my ownness, I get bodies included therein” (CM §44).

387 As Derrida suggests (rather than affirms absolutely) “it seems that one may not suppose that Husserl makes of the Other an other like Myself without misconstruing his most permanent and openly stated intentions.” (VeM 441, VM 125).
the Other [...] as Other absolute origin and other zero point in the orientation of the world [...] can never be given to me in an originary fashion and in person, but only through analogical appresentation (VeM 440, VM 124).

As in 1962, Husserl as Derrida reads him has retreated from the absolute as “outside”. For while the Other is certainly signified via the other (forward), the Other as Other (VeM 440) never appears absolutely. Just as for univocity and the Idea in the Kantian sense from 1962, the Other as Other never even arises in originary evidence. It is indeed deemed “irreducible”. 388 But to work out how this holds, Derrida will seek a solution more intricate than a simple position that my ego and the Other’s can be mediated by egoity in general, for this then cannot hold of the irreducible Other as Other.

388 Cf. also VeM 439, 442, VM 124, below.
From mirroring to transposition

To explain this, we address how mirroring holds in “analogue appresentation” so as to relate it to irreducibility. First, to allow the mediate intention, the content of the other which for essential reasons both I (“Je”) and the other share, must be what comprises egoity in general. The emphasis, then, is first upon what I find of the other’s world in me. For the other’s body is “There” while I am merely Here (CM §54); hence this holds of bodies in general. Husserl avoids making the leap simply to the body There; rather, to recognise this other in me as particular, a mediate intention of the other in this world sedimented in me intends a certain characteristic of the other, which appears there for me, as unitarily in me. I must actively constitute what is peculiarly “my own” (mir eigenes) of that man in the “external world”.

For Husserl, at an even further remove, this occurs at least via the constitution of our shared bodies, where mine is more active (animate) than the other’s body There. That is, as particular

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389 Derrida merely puts it that “it would be easy to show the degree to which Husserl takes pains to respect, in its sense, the alterity of autrui [and thus Autrui] [...], he is concerned with describing how the Other insofar as it is Other [l’autre en tant qu’Autre], in its irreducible alterity, is present to me [à moi]” (VeM 439, VM 124). As Derrida does not yet explain what he takes as basic, we will do so.

390 Derrida deems this an outside for me: “[B]odies, transcendent and natural things, are others in general for my consciousness. They are outside [for my consciousness]” (VeM 440, VM 124, our emphases, cf. CM §50). For Derrida these relations are essential, as the natural is the spatiotemporal region by which worldly things can be situated.
examples of this originarily ideal “ownness essence”, human others in general have bodies; and my own “animate organism” mirrors theirs (CM §44).391 By this act, indeed, I would constitute even the body of the other there (not yet the Other) in me. Husserl is devolving “inward” to extraordinary lengths so as to respect the other. He has prepared enough to suggest that a right (as correlative to positing) holds to converge on the (particular) content of the body (Körper) of the other in its appearing in me (CM §43).392

For Derrida, this is the other as such. Importantly, I (in general, egoity) can then objectify the other’s body and my animate body as such “together”. Husserl calls this “appresentation”, the

making intended as co-present (CM §50)

Such relation to the other, then, is deemed analogical, for its multiple evolutions inward authorise only that I posit of myself what must apply to the other there as co-present. This is analogical appresentation of the other as such to me, by me.393 With this arises the correlative constituting of truth, then the pure

391 By “mirroring”, Husserl employs a metaphor of reflection back to me.
392 This is “intentionality in which the being of others for me becomes ‘made’ and explicated in respect of its rightful [particular] content – that is, its fulfilment content.” (CM §43, our emphases).
393 The appresentation (Appäsentation) implies a-presentation, going to the body (Körper) of the Other only by means of our shared basis in the primordial world (CM §50).
possibility of affirming the Truth of the other (below, as “verified”) as unitarily my own.

Given this telos, appresentation provides the right to pass across (trans-) to a position upon me (forward, then backward). My egoity in general (which already holds) can then become an other. I can speak of an other animate body, which is originally an ego as I am, thus essentially refers to the act of institution of the originary content to the Living Present: “the primally institutive original [Original] act is always livingly present” (CM §51). At this juncture, we emphasise, Husserl makes this moment of return enquiry in its levels overt. This act permits

the [pure] possibility of verification by a

corresponding fulfilling present (the back becomes the front) (CM §50).

The possibility of the Original can be predicated of the originary “in front”, to verify its essential relation “behind” as a “genesis at a higher level” (höherstufigen Genesis). 394 These “levels” – which we

394 Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations deems this moment of arising to be authentically originary as “ursprünglicher” (CM §50). As we noted, Husserl’s “principle of principles” is that the originary (originär, I §§141, 138, I §1, HU III 11) provides the right and authority for such predication of the ursprünglich. Derrida is ever concerned with this right, and employs “originary” (originair).
first noted of Derrida in 1962 (IOG 25, (244)) – will continue to be important.

**Developing the Other as Other**

Husserl thus develops the second direction to address the Other at this higher level. The other for me is thus constituted as passive in me (CM §51). But as for Levinas, the body of the other (des Fremden Leibkörpers, cf. CM §55) is “strange”, in that something of it is always hidden from me. The other is my alter ego (which is henceforth my Other). This develops the form of the two directions: I am free to pass to the corresponding position of the other, without yet verifying that this Other is an ego as I am.

Henceforth, the two directions are taken as implicitly correspondent, thus analogical, and returning to a higher level in order to return to the lower. Thus, moving forward, the particular content of this other body which is there for me (as ego) as yet falls short of what must be verified of this other body as me: that it is an Ego as I am. For essential reasons, this psyche is “essentially inaccessible to me originaliter” (CM §55, our emphasis). Rather,

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395 Cairn’s translates Husserl’s “der Andere” as either alter ego or Other depending upon the context. Thus at CM §54 ln. 4, he translates “des Anderen” as “other ego”. At §54 ln. 36, Husserl writes of “der Andere” which is also translated as “the other ego”. However, the translation is sometimes difficult to follow, as on occasion these words are also rendered by Cairns in the lower case in English. At §55, pg. 151 ln. 31, Cairns translates “des Anderen” as “the Other”, but “der Anderen” is translated as “the other”, and at §55 154 ln. 2, he translates “der Anderen” as the plural “of others”. However, in general, “des Anderen” (cf. also CM §55 153, lns. 6, 12) is translated as “the Other”, and the body of the other, or the other, is signalled by “des Fremden” to which we will adhere.
what is grasped “with actual originarity” (wirklicher Originalität) is only

the Other’s [des Anderen] body itself, but seen

just from my position and in respect [gemäß] of

this aspect (CM §55).

*We have arrived at Husserl’s “respect”. The Other too can only appear as a body, but is seen only from my position. Husserl has again developed the levels. In sum, this Other by its essence must be inaccessible in the region of the origin of the ego. What can be posited “such as I should be if I were there”, by its essence must never enter even the origin. This is what Derrida deems irreducibility. Yet it certainly appears as such only insofar as it is Other (the Other as Other). Hence, moving downward, it can only be said to be grasped as me originally, to become an ego at the lowest level. Derrida summarises that*

[T]he Other as alter ego, this signifies the

Other as Other, irreducible to my ego, precisely

because it is an ego; because it has the form of

the ego. (VeM 442, VM 125, Derrida’s emphasis)
But we must still work out how “respect” would hold logically, via this “form of the ego”.

**Difference and similarity in Husserl**

For, next, taking a position merely from the *other’s* body for Husserl would indeed allow the body of the other to be adumbrated or explicated. However, as only from my position, such predication would be finite. Such a progress *never* attains the infinite determination even of the other. That is, as noted since 1962, Derrida insists that such an “enrichment” (toward an infinite other) must for essential reasons always remain “partial” (VM 124). Instead, it is an *originary* (essential) impossibility that even the infinite other be determined (thus again, by “infinite” Derrida does not yet include negation of the finite, but merely what exceeds all of the finite).

This evolves to the next moment, for movement from one to the other employs Husserl’s *difference* in progress from one to the other, in this peculiar sense. As in 1962, this Other to which I pass is no longer opposite to me as outside, but merely *my other* as *similar* (a predicate of sameness). Husserl deems the intentional

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396 As Derrida puts it, such a stranger is “infinitely other” because “by his essence no enrichment of his profile [as a part of his body] can give me [an essential impossibility] the subjective face [face, aspect] of his experience from his perspective, such as he has lived it. Never will this experience be given to me originary, like everything which [in Husserl] is *mir eigenes* [proper, my own, near] [...] always [already] inaccessible on the basis of always partial attempts” (VeM 440, VM 124).
unity of the “pairing” of myself and other is the “unity of similarity” (cf. CM §51). Importantly, by this Husserl *is refusing the use of the word “same”,* and also identity, (in CM §§50-55), each of which would determine that the Other as the same as me, and prevent respect (CM §50).\(^{397}\)

Thus in the positing of general similarity between *myself and other*, *and only my position upon the Other*, I can pass to positing of our *separation*, which then passes to our similarity. Reflection upon this separation in turn allows *difference*, and upon the unitary as a moment of similarity. This, Husserl writes,

> uncovers my own psychic life in its similarity and difference (CM §54, our emphasis).

At this seeming alignment with Derrida’s concerns, we note *how* the progress was better taken as Derrida’s from the first.

**Brief critical notes on Derrida’s approach**

Importantly, Derrida has founded his ethical noema upon the Idea in the Kantian Sense.\(^{398}\) But Husserl seeks to avoid such

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\(^{397}\) Husserl had explained that “[i]f what belongs to the Other [*des Anderen*] were directly accessible, it would merely be a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he and I myself would be the same [*und schließlich er selbst und ich selbst einerlei*]” (CM §50).

\(^{398}\) In the Second Meditation Husserl does refer to an “infinite regulative idea, […] as the evidently presupposable system of possible objects” (CM §22, Husserl's emphasis). This is in accordance with Derrida’s address to the *Idea* in
dependence upon an ontological “beyond” in the *Cartesian Meditations*; the Idea in the Kantian sense is never mentioned in these pages. Second, in preferring the constituting unity of similarity to the constituted re-identification of the object as the same, the approach is never quite compatible with the Idea in the Kantian sense (I §143). Indeed, the Idea in the Kantian sense would restore negation, for what is the same as something else is also *not identical* to something else. Thus Derrida depends upon appresentative transposition for his particular ethics, but avoids admitting that it precludes his ethical and noematic basis, developed from 1962, by which he deemed intentionality in general is “respect itself”. When Derrida does address difference and mediation from other to other and includes predicative negation, he will return identity, but rather align with Plato and Heidegger. (VeM 443, VM 127, (530)).

**Toward non-objective mediation**

Hence, moving forward again, we begin to develop the relation of the *Other* and *Autrui*. As noted, even as “irreducible” (VeM 442), the sense of the Other must have been given, even as Wholly Other (*Tout Autre*, beyond), as *particular* and object (phenomenon, from behind). Derrida wrote:

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1962. However, for Husserl this is infinite rather than Derrida’s open, indefinite or irreducible Idea in the Kantian sense.
One could neither speak [on pourrait], nor have any sense of the Wholly Other [Tout Autre] if there was not [originally] a phenomenon of the Wholly Other. (VeM 439, VM 123)

But the Wholly Other (as Ego), diverges from “natural” essences, such as a body or stone (VeM 442, VM 125). By its essence, the Wholly Other must be irreducible to the essence that can appear to me. As Husserl put it:

[T]his being there in person does not keep us from admitting forthwith that, properly speaking,

neither the other ego himself, nor [...] anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience as authentically originary

[Ursprünglicher]. (CM §50)

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399 The Other must be able to speak to me, this is why he is an Other, rather than a “stone” (VeM 442, VM 124).
For essential reasons, positing of the Wholly Other (alter ego himself) in the region of what can appear must then be absurd. As not yet even original, it precludes the right to originary grasping of its sense as a body in the world (there). This is the only “verification” (below, as “confirms”) that Husserl allows – that something of the other as there for me is precluded from sense (as irreducible).\footnote{400} It would no longer proceed via the mediate intention.

**Toward the transcendental relations of Autrui**

Yet, as noted, the Wholly Other certainly appears (as alter ego), yet in an intentional relation of respect. Thus, Derrida writes densely, and accurately – analogical appresentation

> confirms and respects separation, the unsurpassable necessity of (nonobjective) mediation. (VeM 440, VM 124, our emphases)

This “non-” refers all around the object, thus is no longer bound even to the relations of general and particular by which objective mediation progresses (cf. 337, 516 ff.). This develops the

\footnote{400}{As Derrida generalises, the other in general, thus further others, retain a moment of the other that must be “hidden” in their appearing as sign: “[A]nother sign of this alterity in general, which things share here with Autrui, is that something within them too always hides itself” (VeM 440, cf. VM 124). For Derrida, this is the nub of Levinas’ misreading. Husserl never assumed a “mastery” even over things in the world.}
necessity of an essence irreducible to myself, *an Ego as essential origin of the world in relation to its non-objectuality*. It would thus be in relation to its non-phenomenality. It would thus never refer to anything that can appear as a real Ego for me. Yet as it remains certain, it certainly appears as what I can never be. Derrida goes on:

[I]t is this appearance of the Other as that which I can never be, this originary non-phenomenality, which is examined as the ego’s *intentional phenomenon*. (VeM 440, VM 124, Derrida’s emphasis)

That is, as Husserl has no obvious version of *Autrui*, Derrida is deeming that these relations of the Other are “like” *Autrui* (comme *Autrui* (VeM 441)). 401

Rather than suggesting Husserl merely lets *Autrui* be, 402 Derrida is working out the ethical relations as transcendental. The Other (i.e. alter ego) would be that *Ego in originary relation to its non-phenomenality*. It

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401 These are likened rather than the same, for the relations are analogous (422).
402 It is worth noting that “respect” evolved from the Latin “to look back”, which in turn instils a second direction looking back at me; making the Other an ego like me. The very word “respect” instils a violence or an instability that avoids containment into a simple sense of “letting the Other alone”. 
would be its *alter* ego; thus without relation to anything that can be a body in the world. Like *Autrui*, it would thus never be anything I can be, or that can be a real Other for me. Such an alter ego can appear for me only in its form of Ego, an Ego founded beyond anything real (VeM 441).403

Derrida summarises that Husserl “wants only to recognise” the Other – i.e. his telos – like *Autrui*

in its form as Ego, in its form of alterity which

cannot [for essential reasons] be that of things

in the world. If the Other was not recognised

as [comme] transcendental alter ego, it would be

entirely in the world and not [non], as I am, an

origin of the world. (VeM 441)

403 Kant’s definition of “transcendental logic” is helpful in that, Kant explains, it “concerns itself with laws” “solely insofar as they relate a priori to objects.” (CPR A57/B82). Derrida is working out the whole-part relations and directions of a transcendental ego relating solely a priori.
Having developed the originary and transcendental basis (behind), we can add the telos. *This alter ego must be determined by me as what it is – alter ego – without violence.*\(^{404}\) We thus begin to build the ethics.

### Beginning the approach to the ethics of the Other

Henceforth, by “*Autrui*”, Derrida also implies a relation like the Other, and it is the latter he seeks to develop. For unlike the Other as Other, which position I can take “such as I should be if I were there”, Derrida explains that,

> [T]his possibility is absolutely rejected in the case of *Autrui* [Here one finds] the radical impossibility of going around to see things from the other side ([VeM 440, cf. VM 124, our emphases](#)).

For Levinas it is basic that, as *Autrui* is prior to division, one cannot take a position from *Autrui* at “the other side” (cf. 413). This is an impossibility prior to logic; Levinas’ sort of radical impossibility. But in Husserl’s analogical appresentation, the form of a transcendental Ego never even allows me to take a position

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\(^{404}\) Negation would no longer be respectful, as *Autrui* in its form of ego would be “inside”, and a negation would be direct violence to *Autrui.*

\(^{405}\) Bass translates *Autrui* as “Others” in this sentence; we note that neither *Autrui* nor the Other can be determined as plural (or singular).
“from” an ego at the other side (the alter ego). Husserl’s pure logic, Derrida is arguing, precludes transposition in any fashion to the Other. To assess why this “possibility” would be rejected, thus be “radically impossible”, and “absolutely” so for Husserl, we address the italicised phrases in order.

The subjunctive conditional as ethical

For in the case of the other, Husserl explains in the Cartesian Meditations that in this positing of its body over there, it is

as if I were standing over there, where the other’s body [des Fremden Leibkörpers] is (CM §55, Husserl’s apostrophes). 406

Just so, for the Other, Husserl explains that it

must be appresented as an ego now coexisting in the mode There, ‘such as I should be if I were there’ [wie wenn ich dort wäre] (CM §54).

406 Cairns has capitalised “Other”. Following from Husserl’s explanation in §44, and in accordance with Cairn’s usual translation of the other in intentionality as “des Fremden”, we have retained the “other”.
Husserl employs the conditional “as if I were there” (wenn ich dort ware, cf. also CM §54, ln. 10, ln. 16)) to refer to positions from both the body of the other, and the alter ego (the Other).\textsuperscript{407}

The conditional has an unusual ethical status. To explain this, we begin from a basic conditional, of the form “If $S$ then $P$”. To determine the truth of such a conditional, consciousness takes a position upon its relations. Thus, for instance, even the proposition “If there is any sense in speaking of an Other, it is determined” never commits doxically to the truth of the conditional. Such a form never even commits to whether the content of the antecedent ($S$) can be a possible object.\textsuperscript{408} Note, then, that a conditional can posit even of the beyond, wholly Other, Autrui etc. while never committing to its possibility. Just so, a negative form of such a conditional never commits to the negation. For instance, even hypothesising that “the Other is not determined” never commits to the possibility of this negation of the beyond. This hypothesis never commits to violence. A basic conditional is more ethical than the basic form of the proposition,

\textsuperscript{407} At §54 l. 10, Husserl writes that my body in space “[S]ie erinnert an mein körperliches Aussehen wenn ich dort ware” (Husserl’s emphasis). It “brings to mind the way my body would look ‘if I were there’”. At line 16 he addresses of the “ego in the Mode There (as if I were there) [ego im Modus Dort (wie wenn ich dort wäre)]” (Husserl’s italics).

\textsuperscript{408} Such a form is not yet an exclusively necessary condition (“Only if... then...”), which doxically posits a necessity and possibility of the form and its consequent from the first. The latter applies the a priori exclusion for essential reasons of related necessary conditions, thus already applies a determination.
and allows address to the Other without concern for the latter’s possibility.

However, the “as if” thesis has even more claim to ethicality. It too does not yet posit the possibility of its antecedent. Moreover, Husserl phrases it as a subjunctive (in English, as if I were there), a tense which expresses doubt.\(^\text{409}\) Note that a “doubt” is not yet a negation of the other. Rather, while a conditional does not yet posit possibility in the first place, a subjunctive conditional believes even less that the object posited of can be true.\(^\text{410}\) In Husserl’s example, it believes even less that “the ego There” is possible. Just so, it believes even less that any negation within the proposition (i.e. the ego as not There, or as not an ego etc.) can be true.

Moreover, this holds even for an intention as a “mirroring” (cf. CM §44) of the self. Husserl wrote in 1913:

\[
\text{in the ‘as if’ theses, the theses improperly so-called, ineffectual mirrorings [are] incapable of}
\]

\(^\text{409}\) The subjunctive linguistic tense as Rowlinson puts it, is employed for “expressing doubt or unreality” (Rowlinson 1991, 39).

\(^\text{410}\) We avoid deeming this a counterfactual conditional. The *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* defines the counterfactual conditional thus: “sometimes known as subjunctive conditional, although the terms do not exactly coincide. A counterfactual is a conditional of the form ‘if }p\text{ were to happen }q\text{ would’, or ‘if }p\text{ were it to have happened }p\text{ would have happened’, where the supposition of }p\text{ is contrary to the known fact of not-}p\text{’” (CDP 85-86). We employ the term “subjunctive conditional”, as a counterfactual would suppose a prior negation of the factual. Derrida has not yet included negation, and approaches doxically, as the fact is certain but the “known fact” has the form of an indefinite opening.
carrying on any actual thetic [objectivising]

functions in respect of their noemata even

when neutralised. (I §117 cf, I §113)

As noted, what never functions (cf. 346, 346 fn.), does not yet provide a ground for positing even the possibility of objectivity (I §86). When an “as if” thesis has no such function, it does not yet permit consciousness of something, as respect.\textsuperscript{411} Note that this holds of the “as if” thesis even when neutralised in Derrida’s ethical intentionality, which protects from existential assertion anyway (it posits nothing (448)).

Thus, within a transcendental reduction (for Derrida, transcendental neutralisation) in the Fifth Meditation, Husserl employs the “as if” to address the positions from both the body of the other and Other. To describe the level “beyond” the alterity of bodies, he neutralises appearing, doubting even the positing of its possibility.

This, indeed, is the logical basis for Husserl’s respect. This is why, in respect, the position is taken \textit{only} in believing it holds from me.

\textsuperscript{411} As Husserl explained of a function: “Consciousness is just consciousness ‘of’ something; it is its essential nature to conceal ‘meaning’ within itself.” (I §86). This relation is respected even more so in the “as if” thesis.
As to Derrida, the French “as if” (comme si) requires an indicative verb, precluding its use in a subjunctive conditional. In this case, he employs “as to” (comme à) and the subjunctive (which Bass in 1978 translates as “as if”). Derrida explains a little further on:


to gain access to the egoity of the alter ego as to

[comme à] its alterity itself is the most peaceful

gesture there could be [qui soit]. (VeM 444, cf.

VM 128, our emphasis)

But nor is this exemption from violence absolute, for however many involutions away from the direct position it might be, it remains doxic. By positing even less of the Other, I predicate less what the Other is not; the most peaceful gesture there could be.413

**Toward the levels and the conditional**

Thus, we summarise why the Other in such a position is radically impossible, hence irreducible to the originary (“behind”). As noted, the other has a body (cf. VeM 440, VM 124). First, we note, it might seem obvious that the Other is originally precluded from

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412 In this case, “comme à” plus “qui soit” implies “as one would...”, while expressing doubt that the action occurs. Hence we amended Bass’ translation of “qui soit” as “possible”. Such a gesture does not yet posit possibility.

413 Levinas explains peace as what “absorbs the totality of beings”, without limitation (TI 222). Without limit, thus as without negation, Derrida takes peace as what would be an absence of violence (as an absence of war).
what can appear as originary in that by its essence it must be separate from the body there. Deeming this would be an error (CM §55), for it would determine something of the Other. Rather, as Husserl explained above, the body of the Other can be seen, but only from my position. Thus it appears while hiding something irreducible, as non-relation even to a body. As Derrida puts it of this irreducibility, it adds

a dimension of incompleteness [to] the body

of the Other in space (VeM 440, cf. VM 124).

Such a “dimension” is no longer wholly included to the essential “level”. We will develop this below.

Thus far, to combine the above: that the Other essentially cannot (rather than does not) appear for me in its alterity itself makes its appearing an essential impossibility. The absolute Other cannot appear for me (cf. 468). This outcome permits Derrida’s logical exclusion of Autrui as “beyond” – an essential impossibility – just as it permits address to the other and Other in ongoing explication, with

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414 Husserl explains: “[A]ccording to the sense-constitution involved in perceiving someone else, what is grasped originaliter is the body of a psyche essentially inaccessible to me originaliter” (CM §55). To suppose this Other is separate from its body as I am would make it the same as myself (CM §50).

415 That is, the Other would thus not be absolutely Other. Even so, it would be absurd, and the gesture of all violence, to deny that the other (or Other) is a consciousness as I am. Solipsism is never taken seriously, for it refuses (denies) the sense of the Other. Nor can one yet affirm that the Other is only a consciousness.
even the possibility that the Other be originary withheld. *Autrui* can only take the form of an Ego, thus not even *as if* it were seen from my position. Derrida returns this shortfall from the absolute, summarising (although only as a conditional):

[I]f *Autrui* was a real moment of my egological

life, [...] I would perceive it originaliter. Husserl
does not cease to emphasise that this is an

absolute impossibility. (VM 441-2, VeM 125)

That is, Derrida has worked out *the radical impossibility of the alterity of Autrui*. But in just this moment, Derrida has worked out *a basis that can approach the other and the Other as respect*. Henceforth, *Autrui* is precluded from consideration as “alterity” (otherness in general), as Derrida continues to address *the other and Other*.

For note that Derrida has employed a basic conditional above. In French, a conditional form (“Si…”) also never employs a subjunctive. Rather, it applies an indicative tense in the antecedent, and a conditional in the consequent. A basic conditional does not yet *doubt* what it never commits to doxically as possible (indeed, it was then worked out as essentially *impossible*). But even so, Derrida employs a simple conditional as he is addressing the *essential* level. He is indeed progressing in accordance with the levels (*niveaux*) of phenomenology.
The levels in pure phenomenology

Thus importantly, the Other remains necessary even before its essential possibility or impossibility. Hence Derrida generalises this loss of even original possibility of sense, leading to radical impossibility as implying a

more profound dimension of nonoriginality

(VeM 440, VM 124).

This would be a “more profound” dimension all around (as a non-relation) even the essentially original. Derrida will soon call it a “second” dimension of alterity. As he explains further on:

[I]t is difficult to see how the notion of violence [...] could be determined rigorously on a purely ethical level without prior eidetic-transcendental analysis of the relations between ego and alter-ego in general (VeM 445, VM 129, our emphases).

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416 As more “profound”, this level would also be more foundational.
Derrida has indeed been proceeding on the “purely ethical level” by the analysis of ego and alter ego in general. Thus far, this highest and essential level is addressed as a simple conditional.

But to address the level “beyond” appearing at the furthest eidetic level in pure phenomenology, Husserl neutralised appearing even further “inside”, doubting even the possibility of its positing. Derrida deems this ethics the

neutral level of transcendental description

(VeM 441, VM 125).

This led toward positing of the Other as a more “profound” level irreducible even to the eidetic (general). This is indeed deemed a “pre-eidetic level” (VeM 443, VM 127). But Derrida must yet find a way to address it in a fashion comparable to Husserl’s subjunctive conditional.

The addition of “supposing” the further level

Thus Derrida avoids affirming this oppression, or more profound level, in that he only supposes such irreducibility:

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417 For Levinas’ employment of the “more profound level” (”un niveau encore plus profond”) of Autrui exceeding the cogito, cf. TEI 65, TI 93. For Derrida, the relations are worked out eidetically. The sense of such a pre-eidetic level is only in question, and thus supposed, as we address below.
supposing [à supposer] [...] that there would be

any sense [qu’il y ait] in speaking of preethical

violence (VeM 444, cf. 441, VM 128, cf. 125).

Crucially, “supposing” is a form of conditional that avoids committing even to the validity of a proposition (cf. ODP 86)). For example, “Suppose that ‘if there is any sense in speaking of an Other it is determined’” also avoids positing the possibility even of the form of the conditional, let alone its components. Moreover, in French, “suppose” can be employed with an indicative or subjunctive tense; Derrida has employed a subjunctive, in the mode of doubt. He supposes what he doubts can even have a valid essential form (at the highest level). Henceforth, as Husserl employs a subjunctive conditional in his “respect”, Derrida employs “supposing”. By this means he addresses the level beyond the highest essential level.

The question as means to address the Other

However, Derrida is also constraining positing of this level beyond via the question. Since 1962, both pure phenomenology and ontology have a right to the question (349), but in 1964 Derrida allots only the former a right to constituting without an object in general, and in particular the other. Moreover, as noted, a question is a modality of position that avoids doxic positing of
the truth of the object. But for Husserl, a question also expresses doubt (I §103, EJ, §78); for the level (beyond the highest) is not yet believed to be possible.

Thus, in accordance with this essential logic and spatial reasoning, this beyond is deemed a question of (and merely supposed to be) a zone irreducible to the essential relations and levels of the origin:

in question then is an irreducible zone of facticity,

an originary and transcendental violence, previous
to any ethical choice. (VeM 441, VM 125, our emphases)

As such a zone (or dimension) is previous to ethical choice, this permits assessment of irreducibility as violence. This will be the first kind from which we began, that of “oppression” (405, 432).

The ethics of respect as sequence

For it is important to note that there has not yet been an affirmation of irreducibility or pre-ethical violence; the progress moves via necessities even prior to possibilities. In the ordinal sequence, beginning from the demand to determine the object (the

418 As to its facticity, according to the progress from 1962, the irreducible Other is dependent upon (pure) essential necessity, thus contingent upon those relations, even prior to its certainty as a fact (235 ff.).
noema of ethics), and the possibility of its objects (other and Other), it then becomes necessary that the Other be irreducible. It must be supposed that the Other as irreducible is oppressed even from the sense (directions) of origin (VeM 444, cf. 441, VM 128, cf. 125, above). The condition of possibility of an ethics of respect is that it then violently oppress the Other from all possibility of entering the origin. In order to be ethical, a phenomenology of respect must then be unethical. Moreover, this irreducibility is prior to any choice, thus prior to ethics. That is, ethics already arises from an essential source of unethicaity.419

The culmination in oppression as ethical

Thus we can also explain this as a culmination of the ethics of respect. As ever, we move from furthest behind. First, we began from ethics as a necessity to encounter the Other without violence. Thus far, this sense of this supposed Other would be oppressed from the originary, as violence. Yet even so, encountering this Other as originary must have occurred; I could never speak or have a sense of it unless it had appeared in evidence.420 This allows a first basis in Derrida’s œuvre for institution (the necessity of what must be supposed, and is certainly

419 It is well-known in assessing Derrida’s reading of Levinas that in 1987 Derrida already needed to give “ingratitude” to be grateful to Levinas (cf. Critchley 1991, ATVM) – we have worked out, we suggest, a basis for why it is beginning to hold. 420 As Derrida put it above: “[O]ne could neither speak [on pourrait], nor have any sense of the Wholly Other if there was not [originarily] a phenomenon of the Wholly Other.” (VeM 439, VM 123)
instituted), which in turn will be a basis for the trace. Derrida only addresses this after having included negation (505).

Thus – moving forward – this appearing is certain, the constituting of which object is then possible (as “tied to phenomenality”) as other and Other. Such a position from the other is as yet indefinite. However (forward again), by only positing address to the Other “as if” to its radical alterity, this conditional would be “the most peaceful gesture there could be” (VeM 444, VM 128, above). A possibility of the Other (the Other as Other) is not yet posited, but merely supposed (below, “alluded” to). 421

As in 1962, where the four arguments arrived at the Idea as irreducible “beyond” within a Logos without limits, as the essential relation of correlative uttering, thought and asserting (FTL §1). 422 In this ethics as objectual, the other and Other must be thought and said as the logos. Derrida can thus ask if the pre-ethical violence instils the sense of the Other in the logos. He summarises:

421 Bass translates “qui soit” as “possible”, which we have amended. The Other in this peaceful gesture (i.e. indication) is not yet supposed to be possible.
422 The Logos, as developed over our chapters since our explanation of Husserl (307) is the general basis of passage in every originary element: reason, position, signifying (speech), right, ground, and predication – with the telos still that of convergence on the other to determine it as absolutely what it is (i.e. as a Truth).
[Is there any sense in speaking of a preethical violence? [...] If [a conditional] the transcendental “violence” [of oppression] to which we allude is tied to phenomenality itself, and to the possibility of language, it would then be embedded in the [originally] root of sense and logos. (VeM 441, VM 125, our emphases)

Derrida’s positive ethics of respect of the Other has been developed, as encountered in the logos. Before following why the progress must include negation, we summarise it thus far. 423

The basic directions summarised

We explain this from furthest “behind” within the Ego (where “in” has the sense of neutralisation of an outside). First, that there be an Other for me remains necessary, even supposing it is pre-eidetic and never originarily possible. 424 Moving forward, it is indeed so that the eidetic bases are then taken as general, but this

423 When negation is added to this moment of the Logos in the “negative economy”, we note, its contradiction of the beyond will “stifle” even the necessity of originarily appearing (545).
424 Henceforth, we employ “supposing” with a conditional tense, to avoid an odd English grammar. The sense of subjunctive doubt is expressed by the verb.
Other is radically impossible as an *eidos ego* (ego in general). For, (moving forward to a lower level, and by *analogy*), its particular content yet holds, even as originary or original (thus the Other is irreducible, behind). Yet it remains *necessary* that it must already have held originarily.

This is also to write that the condition of the resultant alterity (body of the other and Other) depends upon the first (earliest) alterity (irreducible Other). As Derrida puts it,

> without the first alterity, the alterity of bodies

> [...] the second alterity could never emerge.

(VeM 440, VM 124)

By “first” and “second”, Derrida instils the *ordinal* sequence to the levels that we are developing. For next, we move forward to the certain moment. As necessity applies, and *right* and *certainty* of what is tied to phenomenality hold, I can and must constitute the object in general.

This constituting of the other and Other instils *two directions* “forward”. *First*, the particular content of the object in general, takes the form of the other as human. This can be given to me in a circularity of the two levels (originary and original, ideal object and essence). Thus I *can* and must pass to a position from the first alterity, as other (VeM 440, VM 124). However – as the necessary
founding act is still upon the irreducible rather than an objectual infinite (VeM 439, VM 123) – this content is radically impossible in phenomenological evidence. From the other side, its content is irreducible to the ego. This regulative evidence in 1962 was deemed “infinitising” evidence rather than the positing of finite evidence. Such a progress from one to the other cannot yet attain an infinite (or even a finite) other (l’autre, VeM 440, cf. VM 124). Thus, forward again, this otherness (alterity) of bodies can be generalised but as yet falls short of unity. Even the possibility of determining the infinite (thus the unity of this infinite other) in the indefinite is in question. That is, thus far the outcome of the objectual relation to alterity is “open”.

However, second, the form of the ego as appearing certainly refers to a mediate relation to the Ego, which is supposed by analogy to be co-present in the Other. Just so, the body of this Other certainly signifies the Other as Other, even if the latter is absolutely hidden from me originarily (irreducible, behind), and I radically cannot take a position “from the other side” (VeM 440,

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425 Husserl’s progress must be via “a consciousness of infinite inadequation to the infinite (and even the finite)” (VeM 436-437, VM 121), as the institutive infinitisation arises as irreducible.

426 As noted, there is not yet a negation in this positive employment of in-finite.

427 Derrida explains: “in the case of the other as transcendent thing, the possibility in principle of an originary and original presentation of the hidden face is always open in principle and a priori” (VeM 440, VM 124).
Moreover – which in turn is certain – the Other must speak (signify) to what appears to me as phenomenon (above).\textsuperscript{429} Such appearing of the body of the Other too (its alterity) can be generalised. This is essentially what makes it an other Ego for me (VeM 412, VM 124).\textsuperscript{430}

But again, to take a position from the Other as Other, furthest forward, this certainty must pass to non-objective mediation of one and Other (again, by everything irreducible to the levels of ego and ego in general (\textit{eidos ego}). As Derrida puts it, this is this

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the phenomenon of a certain non-
phenomenality which is irreducible for the ego

as ego in general (\textit{eidos ego}) (VeM 439, VM 123).
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To be sure, this \textit{“non-phenomenality”} that exceeds the originary and essential levels no longer refers to a simple \textit{“outside”}) one must at least try to think this irreducible Other, by essential reasoning, as \textit{“beyond”} essence and directions, as a

\textsuperscript{428} This \textit{“more profound”} level instils a non-originarity, as the \textit{“radical impossibility of going around to see things from the other side”} (VeM 440, VM 124).

\textsuperscript{429} As Derrida puts it: \textit{“[T]he Other as alter ego signifies the Other as Other, irreducible to my ego, precisely because it is ego, because it has the form of the ego”} (VeM 412, VM 124).

\textsuperscript{430} Derrida writes: \textit{“[T]he egoity of the Other permits him to say ‘ego’ as I do, and this is why he is Other, and not a stone.”} (VeM 412, VM 124).
“transcendence of Infinity rather than [non de la] Totality” (VeM 441, 124). But, as one demands (desires) the Other as Other, such a progress of finite positions from the other must also pass to “indefinite inachievement” (VeM 440, VM 125) of the Other, as open. This second passage to the indefinite returns us to the necessity of the irreducible, as circularity. As Derrida explains, this alterity

is thus irreducible by a double power of the

indefinite. (VeM 440, VM 124)

Thus far, both “movements” to the indefinite develop from an ordinal sequence, as much as taking the form of levels and directions. *We deem these the basic “movements”* (VeM 442, VM 126).

**From the demand toward *autrui***

For in each passage, the *demand* remains to determine the absolute other, without “limitation”. The other must be determined as the absolute unity of finite conditions (Derrida still calls this telos the “absolute other” (VeM 442, VM 126)). As no longer oppressed, the absolute other would avoid violence. Just so, while the Other as Other must be thought without limit, were it attained

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431 Bass has translated “non de la” as “not”, we have changed this as the former refers all around the object, and Derrida is not yet employing negation.
(affirmed) in this fashion absolutely, it would cease to be Other.\textsuperscript{432}

Thus Derrida in 1967 amends the explanation of the two indefinite directions, adding this phrase:

\[\text{The system of these two alterities [...] must be thought together [ensemble] [...] (ED 179, VM 124, our emphasis).}\]

This works out how the demand and teloi of epistemology and ethics coincide. Thus, next, Derrida assesses whether the “two alterities” \textit{can} be thought together in this positive progress, as determined absolutely.

\textit{Part Five: the positive economy}

\textbf{The symmetry of economy}

The progress will evolve an “economy”. When this leads to absurdity (non-sense) rather than an absolute other, it will imply the two directions (senses) must be thought as \textit{autrui}, thus no longer as a positive progress. First, as Derrida heeds the demand to assess whether the two alterities can be thought \textit{together}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{432} It is worth emphasising that this remains a telos, and were this an absolute determination, it would be absolute \textit{violence}. A telos is a mere necessity following from the demand or (for Levinas) desire.

\textsuperscript{433} We will not yet call this a “system” in 1964 as, in these pages, Derrida deems the progress a system (three times) only in the emendations of 1967 (VM 123, 124, 125). Thus far, we remain with “progress”, “logic”, and “movement”.}
(ensemble), this returns to unidirectional passage to a single object (the ethical relations in the neutralised noema). This telos is no longer that of the human other, but the relations of the progress (in 1967, “system”). The two passages must be thought together, in one object. Thus Derrida avoids the mediation of first and second alterities (of other and Other as Other) by irreducibility. The address to alterities for me requires mediation by the Ego, thus for me (that is, “me” refers to the transcendental “I” made object). Derrida takes it as implicit that each moment of the Other must first arise in the body of the other, hence leaps from the telos of the absolute other to the telos of determining the Other absolutely.

Thus he summarises this first “symmetry” (he will develop a second (561)):

\[ \text{[I]he Other, for me, is an ego which I know to be in relation to me as to an Other. (VeM 442, VM 126)} \]

Derrida still excludes negation; the components arise as two “sides” (our metaphor), to which my knowing acts as the mediate position.

We will explain each moment. First, upon one side, “the Other, for me” is first a positing of the Other as it certainly appears for me (rather than an Other as Other). Second, predicating “is an ego”
permits the mediate intention that will allow similarity. That is, third, “which I know” returns to the moment of constituted activity of this ego as mediating (“I know”, of course, is a moment of positing rather than absolute knowing).

Passing to the other side, the further moment of this mediation, “to be in relation to me”, refers to the particular moment of being of the Other (“to be”) of which I can predicate its egoity (cf. above), and taking the position as if from the Other, positing that for this Other I am its Other. But to know this, the Other must again be an Other for me. The transcendental symmetry sets up a circularity (we deem this “movement”).

But in the symmetry the sides must be thought together. A fortiori, Derrida deems each side to be an “asymmetry”, as the relations to an Other that exceeds me nevertheless place me in relation to the Other. The two sides mediated by my knowing imply two asymmetries which can be made a symmetry. The latter returns to the unidirectionality as positing of a possible and necessary noematic (irreal) object, thus without real content. This is a

434 Derrida explains that “[T]he movement of transcendence toward the Other […] would have no sense if it did not carry within it, as one of its essential significations, that in my ipseity I know myself to be Other for the Other” (VeM 442, cf. VM 126).

435 As noted, Levinas’ asymmetry arises from the first rupture of the Other into enjoyment, obligating ipseity prior to opposition to the other. Derrida has arrived at this moment by beginning with opposition and egoity.
symmetry, which is not of the world, and which,

having no real aspect, imposes no limit on

alterity – makes them possible, on the

contrary. (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphasis)

We will return to this “on the contrary”. But note that this is a first employment of negation, although not yet of alterity.

Rather, the movement is deemed “economy”. Its first hallmark is positing that I – as transcendental subject – take a position upon the asymmetries together.\textsuperscript{436} Such movements are no longer worldly, for their object is merely the passage as such. This allows the second hallmark of economy: my deeming that the directions which seemingly addressed the irreducible beyond, objectified as a whole, returns to essential, general and formal law as a circularity “inside”.

The progress has developed Derrida’s “economy”.\textsuperscript{437}

Thus, the return to eidetic law permits an outcome. While the unidirectional passage of thinking the two symmetries is irreal (the ethical noema), each side retains general and particular relations (e.g. the Other for me), which latter (only) certainly instil

\textsuperscript{436} The transcendental subject, as we have explained, is never a determined objectual “I”, but a continuing and teleological movement.

\textsuperscript{437} The word “economy” is derived from “oikê” and “nomos”, the law of the home (or hearth) (CD 473).
content (as factual, real and so on, but also empirical). Derrida summarises:

Despite the logical absurdity of this formulation,

this economy is the transcendental symmetry of two empirical asymmetries. (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphases)

A fortiori, this is deemed to be absurd. As noted, “absurdity” arises for Husserl when a proposition can be constituted but is then excluded from logical sense, as no longer in accordance with a priori and essential law (for instance, “a square is round” (LI 4 §14)).

Derrida’s symmetry avoids the absurdity of contradiction, for negation has not yet been included to the irreal (inside). Moreover, without negation, the content of the “sides” avoid opposition (I know the Other to be in relation to me, as my

438 We return to this positing below – it is the judgment (or first, positing) of dissymmetry as negative.
439 Husserl writes: “[T]he consistency or absurdity of meanings [Bedeutungen] expresses objective (i.e. a priori) possibility (consistency, compatibility) as opposed to objective impossibility (incompatibility) [i.e. at the side of the constituted object, originally]; in other words, the possibility or impossibility of the being of the objects meant [bedeuteten] [...] to the extent that this depends on [as whole-part] the intrinsic essence [i.e. essential, general and formal logical relations] of meanings” (LI 4 §14, our emphasis first).
other). Indeed, contradiction is never mobilised in this positive ethics of 1964. Rather, the economy is inconsistent (LI 4 §14). For indeed, the irreal position of thinking the two together “makes them possible, on the contrary” (above). As Derrida is applying these terms, contraries are relations that can be posited as essentially necessary “together” only at the cost of absurdity, even though neither need to be true in this particular instance. For instance, to assert “It is dawn” and “It is noon” can hold together would be absurd; moreover, it might be evening. The content of contraries can be opposites, but opposition is never necessary (“This object is black”, and “This object is white”, although the object may be grey, or coloured). Contrariety can hold as a criterion for absurdity in relations of otherness (alterity in general).

Thus as to how this transcendental symmetry of empirical asymmetries is essentially absurd: I must think of the other and Other, which as yet passes to the indefinite, yet in the symmetry I

440 The negation of the symmetry as “of the world” is not yet contradictory, for the symmetry is thus merely made irreal (noematic).
441 Derrida in 1967 adds a note that “temporalisation” contradicts alterity, but that he “emphasise[s] this elsewhere” (VeM 124, cf. VeM 437). Temporalisation is never addressed in this positive economy in 1964.
442 As particular content, neither of a contraries needs to be true — here and now, it might be evening. Derrida employs “contrary” in a constrained fashion, both must be true in that everything must be true, their facticity must be a fact. For as we noted, the essential necessity applies to determine everything, and such positing makes everything possible at first. However, in particular, they can still be contingent, but must be determined as true.
443 Derrida may also want this to hold of content: that I know the body of the Other is originarily other for me (as predicatively possible), and also that I know it as Other (as radically impossible) thus never other for me, thinks contraries together absurdly. In such an instance the outcomes still follow.
must think the two particular objects together, which must render them definite. Such a necessity leads to absurdity. Thus, “despite” having arrived at an absurdity, and an outcome then precluded from Husserl’s formal logic, Derrida deems this “double power of the indefinite” implies that of autrui (ED 179, VM 124). Derrida will only address this in our next chapter, when the progress evolves to but must exceed the Same and the Other.

For even so, a general possibility of sense holds a priori, and position still makes the object in general possible. The two alterities (other and Other, noon or dawn, etc.) can still be thought together.444 The progress can continue despite its absurdity. Yet, and as a notable evolution in his oeuvre, Derrida has worked out an implication that no longer allows for with Husserl’s logic. Indeed, precisely as this positive Husserlian logic is let go of, he asks:

[W]here have these movements been better

described than in [Hegel’s] The Phenomenology of Mind? (VeM 442, VM 126).

444 This progress turns out to be a “pure” form in an unusual sense, as worked out above; as they implied absurdity, such necessities ought to be without even irreal phenomenological content.
445 This sentence at the culmination of the argument of the positive economy from 1964 is why we have employed the term “movement” to signal the progress.
As noted, Hegel does include a negation of the other, which no longer arises subsequent to positing (cf. 382, 580). Even so, the progress will remain Derrida’s. To prepare for it, we note the third moment of positive economy, as transition to the negative.

**From dissymmetry toward negation**

For this symmetry in turn must be determined, which again takes a unidirectional position upon the object – in this instance, economy as such. Derrida calls the outcome “*dissymmetry.*” This word, we suggest, signifies the further position that the economy of symmetry of asymmetries is absurd. It has followed sequentially – Derrida emphasises that dissymmetry can be possible only if there was first a positing of symmetry (VeM 442, VM 126).\(^{446}\) For indeed, rather than the “*a-*” of the asymmetries, as indefinite and open, or “*syn*” of a symmetry as positing together, the “*dis-*” signifies a negative moment applied to symmetry. Importantly, *some prefixes are treatable as negation of the particular object, non-relation (all that is not the object), or both, and one such is “*dis-*.*\(^{447}\)

The possibility of negation of the proposition has arisen. But this is still not yet a negation of *autrui*. For even the latter, Derrida explains, must still appear as a body despite its absurdity. But this

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\(^{446}\) Derrida writes: “no dissymmetry would be possible without this symmetry” (VeM 442, cf. VM 126).

\(^{447}\) As noted, Nolt *et al.* explain that “prefixes such as ‘un-’, ‘in-’ and ‘ir-’ may also express complementation [non-relation]” (cf. Nolt *et al.*, 2011, 114).
body appears as an essence of another kind to “economy” (or “stone” (VeM 442, VM 125)); the two directions have been developed only for the other and Other rather than an object in general. “Dissymmetry” is rather the possibility of a negation of the telos of symmetry. Positive ethics has not yet succeeded in determining the absolute.

Just so, as “economy” is an essence of another kind to the human, a reader should avoid deeming it is a harmonious circularity upon the inside, where in “dissymmetry” the other with name of man or even autrui are found again as an object, even as negative, to return the two directions. The positive economy is no longer compatible with a telos of ethics, signalling that the progress must go further, for the overall telos has not yet been met. However, this progress to economy is indeed Derrida’s. As he admits in an addition of 1967, he arrives at

an economy in a new sense; a sense which

would doubtless be intolerable to Levinas (ED 185, cf. VM 125).

In Levinas’ economy, beginning from the intentionality of enjoyment led to autrui, which “tolerated” no relation to a first moment of positing, and the asymmetry to Autrui (beyond). For Derrida, beginning from theoretical intentionality and this
positing led economy toward two asymmetries, with Autrui holding only in its form as Ego, which must address autrui. Thus nor has Derrida even allowed Husserl’s respect to be a relation of the Same.

To think these two “indefinite” systems together, Derrida will need to develop their interrelations. We have noted that a robust explanation of Husserl and ethics would need to include negation, but would then preclude (Derrida’s version of) Husserl’s respect. However, Derrida’s progress by this juncture must include an overt negation, for position alone has not yet thought the two directions (infinitely other and Other) together. The addition of negation will return the same, and thus the relations of the Same and the Other, to address autrui. Only at that juncture will Derrida’s begin to exceed these relations to determine a beyond in a more developed ethics. However, that progress too will raise difficulties. We follow this in our next chapter.
Chapter Six: Negative Economy, ("Violence and Metaphysics", 1964, pt. 2)

Introduction

This chapter continues the assessment of “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964, as Derrida adds negation. This will lead to a negative counterpart to each positive direction “forward”, then to each moment of the positive economy. The directions will evolve the relation to the other, and then to the Same and the Other. They will be mediated by the eteron, as nexus of Difference and otherness that permits both movements. The eteron will be necessary even for autrui, which latter will be set aside as Derrida develops his implications. Thereafter, the movement of Same and the Other permitted by this original source of Difference will arrive at contradiction, and stifling even of the originary, so as to imply a nihilism. Derrida will resist this outcome to develop four outcomes for ethics. As Levinas’ trace is only nascent, Derrida will return to his conservative outcomes from 1962: questioning why of finitude, and God. Our next chapter follows Derrida’s progress as he develops his version of the trace, in 1966, as a better solution.
Part One: the two directions evolved

The possibility of negation

As ever, we begin from behind – for note that an essential negation of formal law was implicit, in essential impossibility, thus in particular, radical and originary impossibility. These essential and originary negations remain problematic, as they already predelineate what must be determined absolutely. Thus, just after introducing dissymmetry and briefly mentioning Hegel, Derrida indeed moves “forward” to include predicative negation (henceforth, negation or “not”) of content.

First, Derrida adds the possibility of negation to the propositional form:

one can [peut] invert [inverser] all of these

propositions without difficulty (VeM 442, cf. VM 126).

Inversion, in logic, arises from including negation to the proposition (PDP 282).\(^4\)\(^4\)\(^9\) In so doing, Derrida makes it overt that

\(^4\)\(^8\) We have amended Bass’ translation of “peut inverser” from “can be reversed”, which implies a change of direction to “can be inversed”.

\(^4\)\(^9\) As the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy puts it: “[I]n propositional logic the inverse of a conditional is obtained by negating its components” (PDP 282). In traditional categorical logic, inversion implies obversion by just this inclusion of negation: “All” becomes “Not All”, thus “No”, which “is” evolves to “is
all the positive moments that he has developed can be negated: the object in general, and thus the other, Other, their relations, and even economy.

Second, Derrida aligns with Parmenides’ *On Nature*. For Parmenides, we note, the “that is” (οιως εστιν) and “that not is” (ος ουκ εστιν) can be thought, but never as separate from thought (Parmenides, B 2.3 and 2.5, cf. TA 42-43). As the Greek words emphasise, this is no longer only Husserl’s negation *after* positing, *but a negative arising bound to thought*, where neither “is” or “not is” are given primacy.

Third, in aligning with Parmenides, Derrida questions *my* ability to separate from the other. For – we explain – Parmenides admitted no external “other” or object, but “that is” (or “not is”) only as intransitive. Thus in particular,

\[
\text{[O]ther than must be other than myself. (VeM 450) 442, VM 126)
\]

not” etc., which also introduces non-relations (cf. ODP 199, 267). Hurley explains how such relations are worked out in these classical (categorical) forms (cf. Hurley 218). Husserl developed his sort of mereology, and we develop these bases as *Derrida* employs them, basically.

As Levinas explained of the relation of otherness to Parmenides, most verbs are transitive, such as “I see the other”. However, the verb “to be”, is intransitive when emphasis is placed on the “am”; “I am not the other” (TA 42, Levinas’ emphasis). Thus he seeks to “break, if this can be dared” with Parmenides, cf. TA 42-43, TeI 36). This “break” was doubtless a central “aim” of Levinas’ book of 1947. Derrida has rather settled upon the “other”, in the
Parmenides is employed to mobilise Derrida’s formal-logical basis.

The movement from “I” to “me” (“my”, “myself”) signals the particular versions of the directions “in” the Living Present. Just so, “Ego” and “ego” signal these directions in general, made object in the subjective a priori, proceeding as transcendental-subjective circularity. As most formal, “one” and “other” signal these unitary and impersonal directions as yet without egoic content. Hence this “myself” is generalised from “I” to the essence of egoity:

[H]enceforth [the other] is no longer absolved

of a relation to an ego. (VeM 442, VM 126)

Of course, “no longer absolved” avoids confirming (subsequently affirming or denying, which latter still affirms) the other, which would make it external.

Thus as ever (and Derrida moves forward again), rather than an object denied as absolutely outside, this is a shortfall in itself (256). Hence, this other is not absolutely other:

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451 Derrida’s employment of “henceforth” (dès lors), or “from then on”, signals that from this juncture he will take this necessity to hold. This is also why we have employed the term to signal what will hold as the progress continues.
Therefore, it is no longer infinitely, absolutely other (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphasis last).

Following from this egoic generality and retracting from the absolute (external) to myself, Derrida can include the mediate intention that allows passage. That is, I must share the characteristic of egoity that is predicated of my other.452

Yet I still begin with position. It is important to avoid confusing a lack of primacy of position or negation in certainty, or affirmation or refusal thereafter, with the telos of ethics. We explained that its basic telos is that the object be encountered without violence, i.e. without negation or limit, and thus as absolute. In particular the other and Other are objectual, and in a relation to the subject. This also includes the necessity of the mediate relations. The telos, hence the first necessity, is to make either the other or Other absolutely what it is for me.453

This evolves the first direction from our previous chapter, the passage from one to the other to affirm the finite other, which in avoiding negation as yet passed to the indefinite. For indeed, as

452 From this juncture, as I am never absolved of relation, Levinas’ clear division between the Same and the Other, which Levinas (Derrida quotes) deems the “ultimate structure”, in a closed totality set against infinity, is no longer supported (VeM 443, VM 127, quoting Tel 247).
453 Derrida will explain this necessity as the Other “appearing-for-me-as-what-it-is”, an “appearing” which hyphenations are without distance (VeM 444, VM 128).
Derrida has included negation and set aside such respect, only at this juncture does Derrida include the same (in the lower case) (438). In 1962, he worked out that what is the same for a subject is not yet its negation (258). However, an other has been added. For essential reasons what is the same as what is other must also in some fashion be “not what is” other (cf. Parmenides B 8.34-36).

In particular, what is the same as myself is then not myself. Thus, crucially, Derrida summarises:

[T]he infinitely other cannot be what it is –

infinitely other – except by [unless it is] being

absolutely not the same. That is, in particular, by

being other than itself (non ego). Being other than

itself, it is not what it is. Therefore, it is not

infinitely other etc. (VeM 442, VM 126, our

emphases)

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454 Thus, for Parmenides (Derrida takes this as implicit), the “same” is thought in relation to the “not”, as never separate from what is. For example: “[T]hinking and the thought that it is are the same; for you will not find thought apart from what is, in relation to which it is uttered.” (B 8.34-36).
We emphasise that Derrida proceeds by general and particular relations. For ease of comprehension, we will repeat each portion, as we explain it in sequence.

**Evolving the first direction with negation**

Derrida begins:

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[T]he infinitely other cannot be what it is –

infinitely other – except by [unless it is] being

absolutely not the same. (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphases)
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Importantly, in having included negation (376 ff.) and thus evolving from 1962, relations between particular objects must be restored as bivalent. When one finite object is what it is, it must then be not the other. Thus in this reasoning, what cannot be one must be the other. This first moment then sets out the particular relations in accordance with the necessities of formal law. The infinitely other is not yet given absolutely (as outside upon this inside) as finite and thus what it is. But it must be what

455 With the “except by” and “cannot”, Derrida begins by investigating conditions of possibility. These avoid a positive affirmation should these conditions be met. They are merely necessary for the relations to be possible – yet more conditions might be required. To avoid rendering the phrases exactly as Derrida does, we employ the word “when”. These relations are necessary in general provided that a condition holds – even though there may not yet be such instances, such relations are possible.
it is absolutely (essentially, even to be determined as infinitely other is to be what it is, for if it is finite, it is not infinite and no longer itself). Thus it cannot (an essential impossibility) be what it is unless it is absolutely not the same, for the same instils a negation to again make the infinitely other not what it is. Note that this nevertheless instils the essential and originary absolute, from our previous chapter.

However, continuing with Husserl’s involution to what the other is for me, this infinitely other (such as I should be if I were there (cf. 467)) must be constituted as in me (in particular, as ego). Thus, to be what it is, it must be other than itself. However, a fortiori, as absolutely without negation, this particular moment must refer “all around” itself in the ego; that is, to the particular content as non-relation (non-ego). Thus Derrida went on:

That is, in particular, by being other than itself

(non ego). (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphases).

This progress is evolving the “non” relation, which we introduced in Chapter Four (337). In 1964, it allows for negation of the finite

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456 We avoid writing that this would make the infinite other as not what it is into the finite, for what is “not the infinite”, as we will develop, is never necessarily two negations turning back to identity.

457 Note that this has still required a mediate moment – the other can only be me by our shared relation of bodies; this appearing of other and Other is henceforth taken as implicit by Derrida.
object (and thus the infinite), and also the necessity of relation “beyond”.

**Preparing to develop the levels of the non-relation**

Indeed, to explain the whole-part relations, Derrida equates the progress with the *Sophist*, in which Plato introduces the non-relation. As affixed to the ideal object, a non-relation is a nexus of both kinds of spatial reasoning – across, as the object in particular, and toward the whole (outward). Thus, “non” signifies *all* that is around the *particular* ideal objectivity. The non-relation in this instance refers all around the *ego*. That is, rather than merely relating to ideal objectivity, by referring to *all* around the *ego* and other, it permits the possibility of going further “outward” (forward) even than the ego in general or essence. This develops *how* a non-relation can no longer be confined even to essential generality.

It thus modifies the finite object in relation to what can be beyond even essence. Indeed, we explained this relation via Hyppolite (337), who summarised that “Non-A [Non-A] signifies all that is not A” (LeE 145, cf. LE 113, our emphases). Hyppolite too developed this basis from these paragraphs in Plato (LeE 145,

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458 At its simplest, one can think of non-A as the *originary whole* of what is not-A. Of course, to think the infinite other as the absolute whole (at once) is the telos, and such a conception as yet leads to shortfall. This is another way to write that the ideal object is not yet given absolutely.
cf. LE 113, our emphases). Thus – as Hyppolite translates – *Plato also explained the whole-part relation to the infinite spatially,*

*[a/round each form, there is therefore [...] an* infinite quantity of non-being. (Sophist, 256d, translated by Hyppolite in LE 112, our emphases)

We are indeed addressing this finite object, which must be what it is. “Around” it is signified an infinite amount of otherness as non-relation, thus this finitude for Derrida must be explicated toward the whole (the infinite other as what it is). As a non-relation; as all around a particular negation, thus as a positive term (337), our aim is to assess how for Derrida this can be *absolutely*

459 Plato, in this section of his *Sophist* (253D-259B), explores the relations amongst whole and part, general and species, Form, Sameness, Difference, non-relation, etc. in assessing what is and is not. As we follow Derrida’s basic “law”, we only summarise some alignments; and opt for one reading of Plato (Cornford 1964, 262-298). A first major divergence from Cornford’s reading of Plato and Derrida (as developing from Husserl) is that for the latter the whole is never extended as far as the “whole of wholes” (Plato’s “All” (cf. Cornford 1964, 271)). For Husserl, such a whole must be but has not yet been confirmed (cf. LI 3 §25) – it is the telos of the absolute. The second divergence is a shift in emphasis from the approach we have taken from Hyppolite, to the visual relations of naming. Cornford never includes a “non-” relation as an infinite amount around the object, but translates “not-A” as a “collective name” which can be “distributed over the whole field” (Cornford 1964, 290). This possibility holds for Derrida too, although the whole field is not yet wholly signified. Plato has merely noted that this the pre-fix “non” implies an “infinite” quantity, rather than a fixed field, and this relation to “All” is never quite so obviously a fixed whole. For Derrida, what is outside as everything is infinite, but even this falls short from the whole as indefinite, and refers beyond, to the Other that must be absolute.
without negation. What follows is helpful in order to appreciate Derrida’s ongoing progress.

**The levels and directions of the non-relation**

We thus begin by emphasising that all of what is not-A is negated. “Non” can refer to the general or particular, but as to the latter (which Derrida addressed above), these are not yet all of what is not-A, thus not yet negated. Take, for instance, a forest of trees that surrounds a castle. One can say that the castle is not outside the forest (it can be inside the forest). However, one cannot say that the castle is not outside one of its trees, which would be nonsense, as it would then be inside a tree. Such particular objects escape negation.

However, nor is negation of the object in general and particular precluded – one can still say this castle or a castle in general is not a tree. The relation from tree to castle is still positive (the non-relation as positive). As non-relations, even a particular or general other can thought as an object without negation, thus as still a positive relation that can be negated.\(^{460}\) It is the in-finite around the finite originary part.

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\(^{460}\) In particular, it also allows the other to be spoken of without negation. We employ “allows” henceforth without allocating this as a possibility within the logic we are developing from Derrida (for whom possibility is signalled by “can”, and “makes possible” by “must”) – what is allowed is merely not yet precluded.
Further, one can say the non-relation allows the particular object outside to be other. That is, one can say a castle as not outside the forest is the opposite of outside the forest (inside the forest), but one cannot say the castle is opposite to one of the trees. That is to say, the particular object that escapes opposition is other. Hence – the non-relation allows thought of an other without absolute opposition. To be sure, ego and other remain “originarily opposite” – to suggest opposition is dispelled would do away with the other as first not me. However, the non-relation allows thought of a particular other that is no longer opposite, while retaining position and its negation.

Indeed, without this non-relation, there would be no movement, for (as non-ego) it avoids determining that only the general surrounds the particular – which would determine the general as absolute (outside) and thus its part “inside”. Even so, in a non-relation, the relation to the object must necessarily reside “outside”, but this whole remains to be determined. This allows for an infinite other. This will also allow the relation to difference from others, without opposition.

Finally, we move beyond even the general and infinite. For note that even when the castle is opposed to a “world”, or a (infinite) world...

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401 Lawlor suggested of Derrida in 1962, that all the “negative” terms (“non-problematicity”, “non-history” etc.) should be treated as positive. This accords with accepted logic. We are working out how this holds by adding general-particular relations, and developing the implications.
“universe” outside the world, then the above relations must still hold. But when the relation is “between” a castle and a non-
castle, as everything outside the castle, then the non-relation is no
longer confined even to general relations. Importantly, even the
irreducible and indefinite “beyond” would be a non-relation. This will allow
for the Other in the second direction.

Continuing with the first direction

The above instilled, we continue with the first direction. For the
relation between ego and other must still be permitted by a
commonality between ego and alter ego (for instance, the other as
body in my world). But instead of a shared relation of the
particular ego to egoity in general, Derrida has preferred a mediate
moment from the ego to all around itself (non-ego). As to how
this permits this first direction – in particular, the non-relation
would escape the relation of the same (which makes the infinite
other what it is not, i.e. finite), thus a particular (i.e. finite) other
would escape negation. The finite other would be absolutely without
negation. Hence we can summarise what was needed above; where
the “infinite other” is a positive object – for the “infinite other” to be
what it is for me, as absolutely without negation, it must be non-ego.

Thus as to the third moment: and to continue this necessity: for
the infinitely other to be what it is, it must be non-ego. As other
to the ego, the particular infinite other (which can be negated, cf.
just above) must then be not what it is itself (in general, ego):
Being other than itself, it is not what it is. (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphases)

Given the telos of being what it is without limit, the infinitely other must then be not what it is.

Fourth, with the above demonstrated, Derrida merely compresses the next transition. He substitutes “what it is” (not other) by “infinitely other”:

Therefore, it is not infinitely other etc. (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphases).

The “etc.” develops the fifth moment. In particular, something “remains over” (ceterus) and continuation is allowed.462

The brings the first direction “forward” to a more developed form. In our previous chapter, the first direction merely followed from the demand to affirm the other absolutely, but passed to the indefinite (as open). When such a position is mediated internally to ideal objectivity, as no longer absolutely other (as above), this necessitated a progress to infinity which does not yet fall short even in the indefinite (opening). Following from the addition of negation, this first direction can and must proceed in infinitum (an ordinal necessity

462 For this employment of “Et Caetera”, cf. also DLG 1019.
rather than temporal guarantee). The necessity and possibility of repeating the progress toward the infinite still applies, even though a transcendental negation has been added, and Husserl’s respect left behind.\textsuperscript{463} Thus Derrida evolves the “non” to the second direction forward, to the Other (and the Same).

**Toward the second movement**

For the first direction as movement *in infinitum* has not yet exceeded the one-ness of Parmenides to encounter the Other in its exteriority. Derrida thus addresses how division could occur inside this oneness (which will occur in the essential region of egoity (Ego)).

To do so, Derrida turns directly to Plato’s *Sophist*. The Stranger, in dialogue with Socrates, sought to break (*rompre*, cf. TA 42, TeI 36) from “Eleatism”, i.e. from Parmenides’ approach in general, “in the name of alterity” (VeM 443, VM 127). That is, he sought to speak (i.e. also think) of the other (or Other, as we come to). But this Stranger,

knows that alterity can be thought [i.e. in general] only as negativity, and above all can be

\textsuperscript{463} As noted, for Derrida, Husserl’s sort of negation has “no transcendental status” (PG 205-206, fn. 47 (379)).
These relations (as “can only”) are thus formal and essential.

The next negative “relation” has evolved. This is negativity, as the characteristic (i.e. predicate) of the lack of positivity of the Other. To exceed the first direction, the particular Other can essentially be said only as a negativity (rather than a negation of the other). Henceforth, the Other has a dual function (what we deem an “instability”). It signifies what must be thought of as essentially related to the inside, as negativity, yet of its essence must be thought as Other to positivity – the Other as Other (l’autre comme Autre). The parallel movement to the first direction forward thus occurs as essential. Even “other”, “ego” etc. as particular objects in the lower case are assessed for their essential relations. In this “pure” movement, no choice can yet be made between what the object is and the essential relations which already predelineate what it is.

**The second movement as play of the Other**

To develop this second movement, it is helpful to recall that in the positive system the basis of respect was to posit the Other only as if from my position, in a conditional without negation. We return to this “as if”, but begin with the demand.
This remains a positive teleology in the region of my Egoity – even before I posit it, the Other as Other must appear for me as what it is. As Derrida explains, this is

the necessity of speaking of the Other as

Other, or to the Other as Other, on the basis

of its appearing-for-me-as-what-it-is (VeM 444, VM 128).

This appearing must be without distance (hence the hyphenations), thus without limit or negation (violence). Thus, as the demand to think of the outside absolutely still holds, this Other must still be “absolutely other”. Yet, as this Other certainly appears as such, it must be the Other appearing-for-me-as-what-it-is, i.e. the Other as Other.

Thus to determine the Other as Other (appearing as such without distance, which must essentially be Other) this Other must be said as a negativity. As essential, these are treated as an instance of the Same. Thus the telos can also be phrased as the necessity that the Other appear for me as absolutely what it is, exterior to the Same. Henceforth, “exterior” signifies an “outside” without limits (soon “beyond”).
Thus Derrida continues to consider the instability in the essence of the Other:

the Other cannot be absolutely exterior to the

Same without ceasing to be Other (VeM 412, VM 126).

To explain *this* version of the progress in general and particular relations: in the first necessity, to think (or in particular, speak) of the Other as Other, it must be in some fashion the same as I (an ego). But in general, as I and other are mediated by egoity, the Other is no longer Other, but a mere alter ego, another ego the same as myself. Thus Derrida goes on:

the Other, thus, would not be what he is (my neighbour [prochain] as foreigner) if he were not alter ego. (VeM 443, cf. VM 129)

However, as the necessity is to make the Other appear (absolutely) as what it is, it *can only* be said as negativity. But for the negativity of the Other to be absolutely Other it can only be not what I am, otherwise it *would cease to be Other* (above). As not what I am (Ego), it is essentially not an Other (alter ego). But then the Other is in some fashion the Same as me,
The Other is only absolutely Other in being an Ego, that is to say in a certain fashion the Same as me (VeM 443, cf. VM 127).

But again, as the Same as me, the Other is Other to itself – Other as Other. This evolves the second direction as what Derrida deems the “play of the Same”, which in turn would lead to a progression. However, Derrida avoids appending “etc.”, which would return a progress in infinitum, to the infinite other. This is just the difficulty, for the infinitely other would no longer be absolutely other (Other).

This leads to the next comparable moment; the two directions of respect needed to be thought “together”. Having added negation, Derrida evolves this to “at once” (à la fois), as no longer two objects both thought in one object, but as two “movements” (VeM 442, VM 126) – to the other in infinitum and also the absolutely other (Other) – which must be determined as what it is. Derrida summarises:

this exercise is not just verbiage, or dialectical virtue in the ‘play of the Same’. It would signify that the expression ‘infinitely other’ or
‘absolutely other’ cannot [ne peut pas] be said
and thought at once. (VeM 442, VM 126)

This exercise would signify that the teloi of the two directions cannot
be thought and said at once. The relations of what is thought
and said, develop the levels and directions of the logos from the
positive two directions. We explained that the Logos implies the
uttering (and thus speech) of what is thought as well as correlative
predicating or asserting of the object, but as objectual in this
ethics, they are thought and said as the logos (FTL §1, (307, 488
fn.)).

This evolves the next moment. For they must be thought and said
at once in the logos. That is, in Literary French, “ne peut” signals
“cannot”. Yet in a divergence from his almost ubiquitous habit,
Derrida has added “pas”. It is feasible that “cannot not”, also
signifies “not necessarily not”, a modal version of “must” (cf. VM
131). Derrida must yet assess whether the two directions can be
thought at once.

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464 To avert a confusion: thinking and saying are correlative in the logos, hence
Derrida employs a conjunction (“and”), rather than a disjunctive “or”. Had it
been the latter, the relations would have evolved in two paths, as the instability
between what can be thought and said; Derrida has avoided this. What is
thought and said will develop as the logos.

465 As the Oxford Dictionary of French Grammar explains it: “Pas is omitted in
literary French with the verb […] pouvoir” (ODFG 162). In his translation in
Writing and Difference of this paragraph the 1967 version, Bass omits to translate
this second “not” above, but does translate “ne peut pas” as “cannot not” in a
Part Two: difference and the Same

The division in the Same instilled

To do so, Derrida again returns to furthest behind. For such a relation of two directions is already and essentially necessary, thus (moving forward) certainly (doubtless) “inside”. Thus Derrida asks:

[H]ow could there be a ‘play of the Same’ if

alterity itself was not already in the Same, with

a sense of inclusion doubtless betrayed by the

word *in*? (VeM 442-443, cf. VM 126-127)

As explained, such an undoubted “in”, also signifies “no longer in opposition to the outside”. It is necessary that the Same be Other to its self-identity in itself, in its progress “forward”.

Thus, at first, these *can* be thought together, but not yet absolutely so (at once). Henceforth, the first direction (the infinite other, as what it is, is not etc.) is equated with the Same, for it as yet remains within *formal law in infinitum*. As to the second direction, the Other as Other is taken as a necessary instance *in* the Same,

1967 addition by Derrida to VM 131. It is worth noting that in his reading of our dissertation, Professor Geoffrey Bennington queried our suggestion that Derrida’s inclusion of “pas” might imply a second “not”.

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thus also as Other to the Same. Derrida addresses them together, as “the Same and the Other”.

Thus far, the progress has not yet exceeded the inside (to infinite or absolute other (Other)). To think the directions at once from this certain “inside”, Derrida assesses the “division” in the Eleatic One (Being) between the Same and the Other. Derrida asks:

\[\text{[W]hat is the division of \textit{Being} [\textit{Être}] between the} \]

\[\text{Same and the Other? (VeM 443, cf. VM 129)}\]

As to what will mediate “between” the directions: we noted that a non-relation signifies all that is not the object (whether infinite or absolute other). Put spatially, the non-relation refers all around the object, yet no longer necessarily confined to essential and general relations. Thus Derrida develops the non-relation into essential difference.

**The evolution of the levels of Difference**

To do so, Derrida continues with the *Sophist*,\(^{466}\) where the Stranger, in order to break away from Eleatism and support “alterity” said:

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\(^{466}\) Derrida is referring to the paragraph just following the excerpt translated by Hyppolite. Derrida’s paragraph develops the non-relation (which mediates the first direction, above).
[S]o when it is asserted that the negative signifies an opposite, we shall not agree, but admit no more than this – that the prefix ‘not’ indicates something different from the words that follow, or rather from the thing that is designated by the word pronounced after the negative. (Sophist, 257b-c, quoted in LE 113, our emphasis, cf. Cornford 1964, 290).

This evolves the next relation. The Stranger admits the “prefix ‘not’” (i.e. non-) in relation to the word (or thing) only as without opposition. Such parts are indeed merely other without negation. The “non” indeed refers to the infinite amount of particular things around and relative to a word’s Being in general (Sophist, 256d, LE 112, (337)). The non-relation without negation of the other is what Plato wants to explain by different.

467 Cornford translates this as “[S]o when it is asserted that a negative signifies a contrary, we shall not agree, but admit no more than this: that the prefix ‘not’ indicates something different from the words that follow – or rather from the things designated by the words pronounced after the negative." (Sophist, 257b-c; Cornford 1964, 290).
Indeed, Difference, in its general and particular relations, accords with each level and non-relation,\(^{468}\) as a nexus of these movements. As noted, the non-relation – as signifying all of what is outside the object – can refer both to what is outside it as essential (eidetic, general etc.), or “beyond” essence. Derrida thus adds *difference* as mediating “between” the negation of the other and negativity of the Other. For

in its difference from Being, the other is always relative, is stated *pros eteron* (VeM 443, VM 127).

We note that “*pros eteron*” – as accusative – signifies a movement to the other (across), but also what is “over and above” (Feyerabend, 325). Thus – objectually put – this relativity of the particular other as non-relation is never excluded (as non-conceptual) from the *eidos*. As *eteron*, this

does not prevent it from being an *eidos* ([…] in a nonconceptual sense) (VeM 443, VM 127).

\(^{468}\) Husserl too, in explaining his levels of essence in the *Ideas* did so via *Differences* (*Differenzen*), which descended to the lowest specific difference (I §12, (154)).

\(^{469}\) Derrida usually employs the modern alphabet to transliterate Classical Greek terms. We have rendered them in the version he employs at each juncture.
Such a *Difference* never prevents the sense of relations around the concept (thus exterior to the differences of *particular* things, others etc.), in the first direction. It thus allows relations “included” to the *eidetic* levels, which signify what for essential reasons must go beyond essence (as Other), as the second direction. Difference of the latter sort would hold *between* the Same and the Other. Hence Derrida deems this

the difference between the Same and the Other, Difference (VeM 445, cf. VM 127).

But a difference “between” also relates two objects. As to how this Difference could permit the Same and the Other to be thought together, Derrida appeals to an instability in its senses. The adjective “different” (*ετερος*) in Classical Greek signifies both *different from an opposite and “of another kind”* (Feyerabend, 169).

In the first case, this is different as what is not the other, thus is the other, etc. (the first direction as the Same),⁴⁷¹ and in the second, the *non*-relation of the other (also permitting relation to the Other, the second direction).⁴⁷² In what is “said” or predicated

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⁴⁷⁰ This usage of Difference is amended in 1967 to *différance*, which we reach below (600).

⁴⁷¹ Hence Plato writes of all of the kinds of Form: “the nature of Difference make each one of them [i.e. in particular] different from Existence and so makes it a thing that ‘is not’” (Sophist, 256E, in Cornford 1964, 288).

⁴⁷² Again, as Plato puts it, “in the case of every other Form there is much that it is and then an indefinite number of things that it is not. [...] And, moreover, *existence itself must be called different from the rest*” (Sophist 256E, our emphasis).
of as the eteron, no absolute difference is yet instilled, but a nexus between the two directions.

As to how these pass to one another: the non-relation (outward) must mediate the (essential and) general relations of the particular ideal objectivity (forward), between the other as what it is, is not etc. (as the Same) and negativity of the Other (as the Same and also Other). For, as noted, “eteron” also designates “other in general”, the constituting moment of the other as essence. Thus even the essential “Other” is certainly thought in relation to the “eteron in general”.

In turn, these imply a progression. In one particular moment, the other (and Other) is spoken of or predicated in real (reell) “logical objectivity” (VeM 443, VM 127) as other. Hence, as different from me (in general, egoity) it must be the Same, thus the other in general must be what it is not. But as what it is not, this must in turn be intended as an identity (what it is). It is thus not, and other to, me. Yet as to the non-relation, the ideal object as other in general must also be spoken of as “of another kind”, a difference no longer negated, where the “negativity” of other and Other in its alterity in general no longer relate to me, but around itself, a difference without opposite (non-other). Thus far, as absolutely not me, the Other would simply be the Same as itself, thus the kind of difference which is not me, returning to the first direction. Derrida explains:
‘same as itself’ already supposing [...] mediation, relation and difference (VeM 443, VM 127).

We have, we suggest, begun to work out how this holds.

**Parenthesis: the furthering of Heidegger**

Before proceeding, we emphasise again that the progress is Derrida’s, in accordance with his progress *since 1954*, related thinkers are mentioned only as his progress aligns with them. Indeed, Derrida refers to Heidegger’s *Identity and Difference* at this juncture. In address to the paragraphs of the *Sophist* to which Derrida is referring (254d), Heidegger writes “Plato [...] has the Stranger say at this point: [...] ‘Each one of them is different [*ετερον, ein anderes*] from the (other) two, but itself the same for itself.’” (ID 24). Heidegger goes on:

> [S]ameness implies the relation of ‘with,’ that is, a mediation, a connection, in synthesis: the unification into a unity. (ID 25, 87).

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473 In Husserl’s terms, this “mediation” would be more exactly rendered as “mediate”, but mediation is what holds in general. Derrida also deemed this the “irreducibly” mediate intention, and indeed, the relations above are merely supposed. We are working out this irreducibility.
Derrida, we note, has followed rather the certain connections and separation in sameness, to include the relations of difference as mediation and also other, the general-particular and non-relation. These are not yet found in Heidegger’s analysis. Heidegger also writes

to get to the point where the relationship of

the same as itself emerges as [...] mediation

within identity, Western thought required

more than 2000 years. (ID 25)

Derrida’s procedure is also developing the necessary relations at the origin of thought (“Western” or otherwise), which permits this relationship of movement of the same, identity etc. Derrida, we suggest, is going “further” in this project for Western thought than Heidegger did in Identity and Difference.

The exceeding of Levinas in difference

Indeed, at this juncture Derrida seeks to make even Levinas’ “metaphysics” dependent upon this progress. For having permitted a further thought of all around this relation (“beyond”), Derrida can return to autrui by which, for Levinas, I must begin to address the radically impossible origin of Autrui. As autrui “resists” (TEI 95, TI 123-124) singularisation or generalisation
(428), it resists relation to the Same, thus relation of the Same and the Other; it thus resists relation to the *eteron*. Derrida reminds us that Levinas would “refuse to assimilate *autrui* to the *eteron*” as the Same and the Other (VeM 443, VM 127).

But Derrida argues that the *eteron in general*, in *mediating* the Same (which already supposes mediation etc.) thus the Same and the Other, resists confinement to either. As supposing what resists the Same and the Other in particular requires a difference in general, then the *eteron* in general, Derrida suggests, is necessary even in speaking of *autrui*. He asks,

> how [can one] think or speak of *autrui*

> without reference [...] to the alterity of the

*eteron* in general? (VeM 443, VM 127)

The *eteron* in general is no longer necessarily confined to opposition even to *autrui*, thus no longer restricted to the inside of thought. Derrida summarises that

> the *alterity* of the *eteron in general* [...] no longer

> has the *restricted sense* [at the inside] which

> permits its simple opposition to the notion of
*autrui*, as if it was confined to the region of real or logical objectivity (VeM 443, VM 127, our emphasis).

Henceforth, *autrui* and *Antrui* are set aside (VeM 443-450), as Derrida works out his movements. Indeed, the use of “as if” to address this alterity begins to do so. To develop this, we add the next moment; for the *eteron* in general nevertheless permits such relations. As to difference, the *eteron* retains its link to other in general and Other via the non-relation (*non-ego*). It is necessary that both are different from me. Thus the *eteron* in general permits the movement of negation of the other, sameness, identity and so on (the Same), and also permits the essential negativity in the objectual Other (the Same as Other). Second, however, the *eteron* avoids opposition even to that which exceeds the movement of the Same and the Other, yet it makes the relation of their difference and otherness in general possible. Thus, third, the *eteron* in general in turn mediates the relation between the *Same and the Other*.\(^{474}\) This origin must be an irreducible level “beyond”, which mediates the two lower levels. Put logically, it must be the radical impossibility which nevertheless holds originally, and thus appears

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\(^{474}\) To be the same as the Other, the Same must be other to the Other etc., thus mediated by everything outside it (non-Same and non-Other).
originarily. This outcome *accords with the three levels of the positive progress.*

That is, for the latter, the internal relation to the Other (beyond) was attained “as if” from its position on the condition that the latter’s undeniable *possibility* became the *radical impossibility* ([pgs]) of entering origin in the first place (as irreducible). This was deemed the “more profound dimension of nonoriginality” (VeM 440, VM 124). Just so, Derrida indeed explained above that this other in general is only approached “as if” no longer restricted to an inside as opposite even to *autrui.* Thus, directly linking the positive levels in our previous chapter to the negative, the

\[ \text{eteron, here, belongs to a more profound and} \]

\[ \text{originary zone (VeM 443, cf. VM 127, our} \]

\[ \text{emphasis).} \]

Derrida has developed the levels from the two negative directions too. Even so, he is in the process of bringing it toward a difficulty.

*Part Three: the stifling of the logos*

**Toward the Same and the Other**

Thus far, the basic progress from the positive economy in its directions still holds – the supposition as if from a beyond (cf.
555), as founding the essential (original) and general level that must devolve to its particular, originary moment. Such a content, already becoming apparent, provides a right to think (and speak, predicate and constitute) of it as object; thus as other, and Other.

However, the two positive directions have evolved – first, to the telos of the infinite other as what it is, is not, etc., falling short in the opening (henceforth, as within totality, this first direction is also deemed the Same). The second, as the necessity this embodied Other be absolutely what it is, led to the instability of the negativity of the Other as essential (the Same), which must of itself refer to a non-relation beyond, as a more profound level even than the Infinite. As Derrida explains it, this must be a

transcendence of Infinity, and not [et non] of

*Totality.* (VeM 441, VM 124, Derrida’s emphases)

To transcend Infinity, the Other must essentially – i.e. within the Same – be Other to the Same. Henceforth, that *second direction* is also deemed a movement of the “Same and the Other”. 475

475 Note that “the Same and the Other” are thus posited together. We develop this moment below.
Thus far, the two directions are mediated by the *eteron*, as movement of other, other in general, and Difference. By this movement, the second alterity is only referred to as beyond (Other) insofar as it returns to internal essence, thus to what already holds (within the Same) to instil the necessity of the beyond.

But this “beyond” as non-relation remains *certain, prior to* what can be said of a logic (as positing, right, predicating, negating etc.) that begins to constitute the object. Derrida emphasised earlier (via an important summary) that:

\[
\text{[I]t can be said only of the other that its}\]

\[
\text{phenomenon is a *certain* nonphenomenon, its}\]

\[
\text{presence (is) a certain absence. Not \textit{non pas}}\]

\[
\text{pure and simple absence, for there logic could make its}\]

\[
\text{claim [to refusal, position, right, etc.], but a}\]

\[
\text{certain absence. (VeM 336, VM 91, Derrida's}\]

\[
\text{emphasis)}\]

This leads back to the necessity of constituting, “forward”, and circularity. Indeed, we suggest, even “non pas” (*not!*) develops an extra kind of negation. It signifies an instability between negation...
(pas) and all around negation (non), avoiding negation of “what is” in circularity (n’est… pas) (cf. IOG 171, DLG 1023). It signifies a negation and non-relation prior to a fixed position “inside” to which logic has a claim.

**The setting aside of transcendental symmetry**

Thus Derrida begins to assess the outcomes, which do not yet arrive at economy (cf. VM 444, VeM 127). To wit, the necessity in the positive system was to think other and Other together. To do so, Derrida privileged the Other, mediated for me by egoity, in the transcendental symmetry of two asymmetries: “[T]he Other, for me, is an ego which I know to be in relation to me as to an Other” (VeM 442, VM 126, (495)). In the negative version, the necessity is to think the Same and “the Same and the Other” together; but this can no longer be posited as a simple “symmetry”.

To explain: the first direction proceeds in the Same, in that the infinite other must proceed by what it is, then is not etc. mediated by the same, non-ego etc. Derrida also notes that particular difference (in the lower case) thus can be said to apply only in movement by which the infinite other can be what it is and is not (for what is not itself must also be different from itself). This particular kind of difference between one and other will remain important (cf. 889).

But in turn, as the demand is to determine these particular others as the whole, these relations must hold of the other in general –
as \textit{Difference} – only which can mediate the “division” between the Same and the Other. As Derrida summarises:

\begin{quote}
[...]

The difference between the Same and the Other, which is not a difference or relation among others, has no sense \textit{[sens]} in the infinite except to speak [...], of the infinite which determines and negates itself. (VeM 445, cf. VM 129)
\end{quote}

But in turn, the Other can pass to its Difference from the Same only in referring to the Same, thus as movement from one to the other in difference. In sum, Derrida can never speak of a symmetry “between” the Same and the Other. Derrida made this overt:

\begin{quote}
Finally, let us confess our total deafness to propositions of this type: ‘Being [...] \textit{is divided} into Same and Other. This is its ultimate structure’. (VeM 443, VM 127, quoting TeI 247, our emphasis)
\end{quote}
This is also to note that Derrida can no longer simply oppose the Same and the Other as if both are constrained to an ideal objectivity (explained above (532)); rather they are set into movement by the non-relation, as a Difference avoiding opposition.

For despite his deafness, Derrida (or in this movement, “I”) must still speak of the object as absolute, thus of the Same and “the Same and the Other” at once. Further, I can do so. The movements have developed from the positive directions, which first hold. Merely their confirmation has (thus far) fallen short, to return to the Same. To attempt a unification of the two directions, Derrida returns the Ego to Husserl’s sort of positive mediation.

**From avoidance of symmetry to stifling of origin**

As each positive direction has a negative, there are two such moments (we deem them “mediations” rather than symmetries), each with two sides, in relation to each other. First: as in the positive economy, the demand (thus the necessity) is again that the Other be absolute. Derrida sets out the first necessary mediation thus:
the Other is absolutely Other only if he is an Ego, that is, in a certain way, if he is the Same as I (VeM 443, VM 127).

As a relation to me from a more “profound and originary” level, this relation is not yet mediate but is merely necessary (signalled by “only if”), and assured only as certain. Next, we add a crucial evolution (from which even Derrida’s explanation of Levinas’ “trace” will develop in 1964). Following Husserl rather than Levinas, *Derrida is nevertheless making it essentially necessary that this Other “prior to” essence must be an Ego as I am* (alter ego). Such a relation does depend upon mediacy.

Derrida justifies this via the logic. An alter ego, certainly, must have appeared as a thing in the world (essentially, as Rei). This must apply even insofar as it is an alter ego (Other). That is, it must appear for me as an alter ego, even if this is only supposed to hold at a level prior to (beyond) the eidetic. The Other, then, must be a real ego (or subject) for me, even if only supposed at a pre-eidetic level. Even if it were never an Ego. We explained this
use of the subjunctive conditional in address to a level “beyond” essence in our previous chapter (485). 476 Indeed, Derrida asks,

[D]oes not Levinas treat the expression alter ego [Other] as if alter were the epithet of a real subject (on a pre-eidetic level)? (VeM 443, VM 127,

our emphases)

An epithet fixes a characteristic (or predicate) of an object. This is a feasible question to pose, in that Levinas aligns the real and the subject merely with the Same (and only these does he deem correspond to Husserl's eidetic levels (TE 48, TI 76)). Thus, for Levinas the Other (l'Autre) is not the same as the subject, hence is thus not eidetic (cf. 425). 478 But these were never Levinas' primary considerations; the ethical relation to Autrui is beyond the Same and pre-eidetic relation to the alter ego. Derrida is developing his argument.

476 As Derrida puts it: “[T]he Other, then, would not be what it is [...] if he were not alter ego” (VeM 445, VM 129, Derrida’s emphasis). This employment of the necessary and subjunctive conditional (i.e. compare it to “the other can only be what it is if it is an alter ego”) nevertheless instils the circularity; for this is also to note that the Other, then, would be not what it is, if it were not alter ego.

477 Derrida asks this as such a supposition of the pre-eidetic would only hold “as if” it were true.

478 Derrida notes that he proceeds “in terms of a formal logic that follows for once, at least when Levinas refuses to call [denies] the Other alter ego” (VeM 443, cf. VM 126, Derrida’s emphasis). Derrida is following the formal logic that Levinas rejects, by making these relations essentially necessary.
Hence, according to Derrida’s essential progress, this certain Other can be what it is, absolutely Other (exterior), only if it is an Ego (in general). However, as an Ego it is the Same as I, and is then not what it is (not absolutely Other), and returns to the Same. But “inversely” (VeM 443, cf. VM 127) — the negation of the first mediation above — for the Other to be what it is at once (absolutely Other as inside (510 ff.)) it must appear first as Res (essentially: Thing, Body or Other) thus less the same as me:

the Other as Res is at once [à la fois] less other

(non absolutely other) and less the same as I.

(VeM 443, cf. VM 127)

As explained (511), this is mediated by the non-relation (hence as the other is the part, by the non-absolutely Other).

Note, however, that Derrida has avoided writing that this Other is “not the same” as me, which would return only to the relations in the first direction. That is, rather than an unsustainable symmetry and opposition “between” the Same and the Other (cf. above), Derrida deems all around the absolutely other to be “less other”. The predicates “more” and “less” avoid opposition — for example, that a tree is more tall or less so, at different stages of its growth never fixes it as “not tall” or “not short”. Thus “more” and “less” allow for the relation of each in the other (more tall is
less short of itself, and vice versa). However, both must still be thought at once, as one object. A fortiori, Derrida summarises:

\[\text{à la fois}\] more and less other, which signifies again [signifie encore] that the Absolute of Alterity is the Same. (VeM 443, cf. VM 127)

The demand for the absolute has again led – for the first time in these pages – to the Absolute in passage. However, in 1964 these are indeed two movements as the Same (cf. 375), rather than the unidirectional movement of 1962.

**The necessary contradiction and stifling of origin**

However, this too is only a moment along the way. For as we noted, contradiction in the positive progress was not yet admissible, as no negation was yet included (498). The negative progress does indeed include and develop contradiction. To explain – as the characteristics “more” and “less” allow relation of one in the other without opposition of their content, these are contraries rather than permitting contradiction (498). Second, crucially, Derrida evolves the bases of the positive economy; these must hold “at once” rather than “together”. That is, two asymmetries thought together would allow a symmetry between essentially incompatible objects thought as one object. Hence, these contrary
predicates (“more” and “less” Other) can be thought at once only if mediated by the instability in a *Difference* that avoids opposition.

This evolves the basic kind of contradiction (cf. 190), to a relation already holding (“behind”) between two essentially incompatible but not yet opposite contents which must be thought (or said) at once.\(^{479}\) Indeed, it is diverging from a classical sort of contradiction (forward) of positing a contrary characteristic and its negation of an object “at the same time” (PR §28, (188)). This is rather an *essential* and *necessary* contradiction (“behind”) arising from a teleology as yet without opposition. Moreover, an essential contradiction implies an essential impossibility. That which is essentially contradictory (behind), is precluded from any particular sense that can then already be an *originary* content.

Thus, to continue, both of Derrida’s mediations, led to a passage and its negation, then to a circularity. When each side is first thought (and said) at once, the outcome must be an *Other* that is *the Same as me and not me*, and an *Other* *both more and less other* than me (cf. above). This leads to the next comparable moment. As we worked out, the logos became the overall telos by which thought and logic combine in order to speak of the Other. In the positive economy, the necessity of oppression of the Other as originary

\(^{479}\) To be sure, these can be contraries or contradictories, but avoid the necessity to be one or the other so long as they are not yet posited at once. We also avoid writing “thought or said of the same object at once”, for in this contradiction the same would introduce a play rather than a stasis.
signalled the optimal moment of an ethics of respect in the logos; as the most peaceful way to address the Other. That is, Derrida had worked out how it was nevertheless necessary (from behind), and as the most peaceful gesture there could be, to speak of an Other oppressed from origin (“behind”), supposing there is sense in speaking of such oppression; and thus to posit the Other only as if from its position thereafter (forward) (VeM 444, VM 129).

A fortiori, in the negative economy, the necessity of an Other in the origin has rather implied a contradiction even prior to the certain moment of content in the logos. It has followed that the Other can be thought and said to be absolutely Other only if an original contradiction and impossibility precludes speaking to the Other, and precludes any speech in the logos. Crucially, this progress implies that the sign

is stifled [soufflé] in the [essential and Absolute]

region of the origin of language as dialogue

and difference. (VeM 444, VM 128, our emphasis)

Rather than a support for the necessity of the beyond at origin, this “stifling” appears to be the sign that the Other may no longer be spoken of:
this contradiction and this impossibility […]

are the sign, rather, that one no longer

breathes here, inside [dans] the coherence of the

Logos (VeM 444, cf. VM 128, Derrida’s

480

emphasis).

These relations imply the stifling of the logos in accordance with
eidetic necessity, and thus hold even of the Logos. Derrida’s telos of the absolute Other has led, “in terms of a formal logic” (VeM 442, VM 126), to the essential necessity that the absolute Other no longer even be admitted as originary content, thus must be excluded from thinking and saying “what it is”. It ought to necessitate the terminus of all possibility of ethics, and indeed of any thought at all.

The impetus for wariness of truth

At this juncture, critics might have found an impetus for the wariness of the absolute truth taken as a telos by the history of philosophy, by which Derrida is said to have inspired Post-

480 Derrida is also working with metaphors of signifying (speaking) as correlative to logic. He noted at the outset that he would be investigating how language “seems to run out of breath” (s’essoufler, VeM 350, VM 113). In address to the other and the Other, Derrida has worked out the contradiction, which has the sense of both a breath and stifling at once, when – certainly – one breathes (respirer) even though this “breath” is stifled.
Modern thinkers since the 1960s (cf. Grenz 5, (31 fn.)). Derrida has worked out logically how positive logic then no longer can speak of the Truth of the absolute Other, even though it remains certain. Indeed, we suggest, we have in some measure worked this out, across Derrida’s work since his “law” of 1954. However, we caution against hastiness. Every moment still arises from the first demand for a truth of the Other as absolute. Derrida will seek to avoid nihilism.

*Part Four: the negative economy*

For nihilism is indeed the danger. Beginning from logic has led to the necessity to preclude the possibility of *rationally speaking or predicating of something* (i.e. in the Logos (307)). As a content must no longer enter the origin or have sense to be spoken of, the necessary object of phenomenology ought to be “pure Non-Sense [nonsense]” (VeM 446, VM 130). This would necessitate that nothing be spoken of, a telos of nihilism. It would no longer even allow positing of what is or is not, or negation, or even (posited) supposition of the sense of irreducibility. This oppression from the originary would necessitate what Derrida deems a “worst violence” (568). *Derrida will seek to avoid this* in two fashions – a retraction to the a priori, and return to thinking the relations

481 A trace holding despite contradiction even of the originary would dispel Derrida’s difficulty, but Derrida’s address to the trace has not yet developed.
together, leading to negative economy. The latter – as we will support below – will be Derrida’s conservative moment in 1964.

**Toward negative economy – the retraction to the pre-eidetic**

Instead of irrationality, Derrida returns to the certainty of evidence,\(^{482}\) and thus the possibility of the reduction of the empirical to real content. *This no longer follows in the sequence, which ought to have conceded that when speech is stifled in the Logos, thought and appearing are too.* We deem this Derrida’s first “conservative” moment in 1964. However, it could be argued as legitimate insofar as one begins again from evidence of the certain, in Husserl’s progress, which first of all restores the possibility of determining objectivity (i.e. eventuality (343)). Derrida goes on that

> every reduction of the Other to a real [réel]

moment of my life, its reduction to the state of

empirical alter-ego, is an empirical possibility,

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\(^{482}\) Derrida never lets go of certainty and its possibility of empirical content. He goes on soon afterward: “[V]iolence, certainly, appears within the horizon [of possibility] of the infinite” (VeM 445, VM 129).
"Reduction" first has the sense of bringing of the empirical Other into my sphere, and in this sense all thought is reduction. But Derrida slips to Husserl’s bases, for with the reduction to the real come the pure essences that “already” hold. Hence when speaking or positing of something rational (i.e. from within the Logos) is stifled, even that of supposing the irreducible, Derrida concedes that this stifling is “nothing less than irrational” (VEM 444, VM 128).

Importantly, the necessary relations without content then merely move “backward” to the “purely eidetic level” (VEM 444, VM 129). A necessary contradiction of the Logos remains eidetic and merely stifles the originary. Phenomenology, then, must become pure, eidetic, and transcendental again (i.e. without reference to real relations, as a priori alone). In a retreat to an a priori level prior to originary content, the relations of Reason, Speech and so

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483 As we explained, eventuality is the possibility associated with an object or content (even empirical), thus facticity and contingency (343).
484 Derrida re-emphasises: “[I]t is difficult to see how the notion of violence (for example, as the [...] oppression of the Other by the Same, a notion which Levinas employs as self-evident, and which, however, already signifies alteration of the Same, of the Other as what it is) could be determined rigorously on a purely ethical level without prior eidetic-transcendental analysis of the relations between ego and alter-ego in general” (VeM 445, VM 129, our emphasis).
on are also thus rendered essential again. Derrida thus goes on
straightaway that this progress

*presuppose* [présumposer] the necessary *eidetic*

relationships envisaged in Husserl’s
descriptions (VeM 444, VM 128, cf. VeM 445,
VM 129, our emphases).

“Presupposed” is not yet a logical positing of supposition of irreducibility, but refers to a prior dependence. In this case, what
is presupposed is *eidetically* necessary but prior even to originary content; thus not yet direct positing (or negating) of a real alter ego. Essentially, *Nothing* is posited of alterity. Hence Derrida indeed appeals to the “as if”, as Husserl did, which doubts even the possibility of the real alter ego. Derrida goes on:

*to gain access to the egoity of the alter ego as if*’

*to its alterity itself is the most peaceful gesture*
Derrida has turned what seemed to be a difficulty into *his most ethical relation* – so long as the implications which led to these pure necessities are accepted. Moreover, Derrida has developed this as a single chain of implications. Even the presupposed essential relations are implied by what is first supposed. Derrida makes this link to the earlier basis overt:

supposing, as we said above, that there would be any sense [*qu'il y ait quelque sens*] in speaking of preethical violence. (VeM 444, VM 128)

A reader might be unconvinced. The implications of supposition made Husserl’s formal logic absurd (countersensical), in arriving at economy. Yet Derrida has appealed to a supposition of its sense. Derrida wants to return rationality to an eidetic level prior even to what Levinas deems the Same. Yet Derrida has excluded the progress from the Same to which he seeks to return.

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485 For Husserl, this positing of nothing also occurred in a neutralisation (448), with which Derrida has aligned.
Derrida is aware of this. Facing this muteness inside the Logos, Derrida seeks to found the relations at a further level, and appeals to Levinas’ “there is” (il y a). As Levinas put it in 1947:

[T]he fact of existing imposes itself when there

is no longer anything. […] Existing returns no

matter with what negation one dismisses it.

There is, as the irremissibility of pure existing.

(IA 46, cf. 46-50, our emphases)

Levinas makes it explicit that he never employs “there is” unwarily. For Derrida, there is (il y a)\footnote{The capitalization of the first letter is merely grammatical. On the previous page Levinas explains that when everything is set aside, what remains “of everything is not something, but the fact that there is.” (TA 46).} an origin of the Same before the originary. It is a fact in Levinas’ sense of 1947, the brute fact of existence. The transcendental and pre-ethical violence of oppression must be the moment there is an irreducible origin even of the Same. Importantly (cf. DLG 30), Derrida calls this the archia (the Greek “archi” has the sense of the primitive origin, the beginning, but also power and authority (Feyrerabend, 63)).\footnote{This term “archi” was developed quite directly in the fashion that Derrida applies it, in address to Husserl's transcendental subjectivity, by Funke in 1957, as “the condition of the possibility” of the “absolute beginning”, in an “enquiry back to the origin” of the logos (Funke 1981, 74-75).}
The primitive origin as irreducible violence of the Same and the Other

In turn, the archia of the Same is thus Other to the Same. But given that there is the Same, and thus the Same, and the Same and the Other made essential object, Derrida again returns to economy. Its hallmark is again that it no longer addresses the real other, but the relations of Same and “the Same and the Other”. Note that this eidetic level is no longer referred to by lower-case letters; there is relation only prior to the originary.

However, we note a second polemical moment; thinking even the archia of the Same and “the Same and the Other” at once even as pure would necessitate contradiction and stifle pure sense, leaving only that there is. Instead, Derrida will subtly return to the necessity of thinking their relations together.

Thus, as in the positive economy (in dissymmetry), as certain and possible, Derrida takes the stifling of the progress leading to the telos as having been negated (501). But rather than the negation of a simple transcendental symmetry of asymmetries (both directions together), Derrida deems this a “general dissymmetry”. For Derrida, even though this evolved from (and returns to) the Same, it avoids negation of a simple symmetry, which in the positive economy held of particular objects mediated by egoity (the two asymmetries).
Rather, even this foundation upon the eidetic by the *archia* of the Same must be merely *pre-supposed* (cf. 484), as an irreducibility; there is a pre-violence of oppression.\(^{488}\) Derrida summarises the above:

there is a transcendental and pre-ethical violence [oppression], a (general) dissymmetry whose archia is the Same (VeM 444, VM 128).

Moreover, in letting go of the relation between the Same and “the Same and the Other” as particular object, Derrida has let go of the mediation by relations of egoity.\(^{489}\) The *archia* is prior even to the eidetic origin, thus the egoic and mediate. But as noted, it is also the power and authority. Derrida begins to return originary content.

**The necessity of institution by irreducibility**

Thus instead of foundation upon the mediate to allow passage of Same and “the Same and the Other”, the necessity of foundation is authorised by a *pre-supposed basis of irreducibility*. For although there is a violence of oppression even from the eidetic and a

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\(^{488}\) Note again that Derrida employs the subjunctive conditional (485), as explained in our previous chapter: this no longer posits even the possibility of the irreducible.

\(^{489}\) Derrida will return a mediation by the necessary *irreducibility* constituted in egoity below, as a level necessarily further beyond upon the inside.
priori, an instituted content even to the pure and *originary* remains certain (note that this also permits the finite other). Instead of the “mediate” relations by egoity, Derrida refers to the necessity of the *institutive* act.\(^{490}\) He summarises:

\[
\text{[T]his transcendental violence [i.e. irreducibility] [...]originarily institutes the relationship between two finite ipseities. (VeM 444, VM 128).}
\]

Note, *that there are thus “two” finite ipseities* (the Same, and “the Same and the Other”, or any finite content again). However, Levinas’ intentionality allowed ipseity only prior to division, thus not yet *two*; Derrida’s applies a division prior to ipseity (it will evolve to irreducible Difference).

**Toward completion of economy, and basis for the trace**

For – importantly for Derrida’s *oeuvre* – these two finite ipseities *must* somehow be spoken of as they appear *for me*, even though this cannot be via their shared egoity (as Ego). Thus, in a divergence from Derrida’s first direction, this telos never arises as

\(^{490}\) For Husserl, as noted, the instituted act arose from the Original (205). Derrida has supposed an origin further “beyond” the essential origin.
the infinite that must be what it is via egoic mediation. *Each finitude (which arises certainly) is rather confined to its relation with itself, related by the supposition of irreducibility.*

Hence instead of a “symmetry” as in the positive economy, Derrida will deem it a “strange symmetry”. The former arose as a doxic positing mediated by egoity, which led to an absurdity that essentially cannot have sense (from behind). The latter is more extreme: it must be related rather by a *supposition* of what must be originary but is then irreducible even to the sense of the origin (further behind), and thus absolutely Other. Derrida summarises the above that, “supposing there is any sense in speaking of pre-ethical violence”, then

> the necessity of speaking of the Other as

> Other, [...] on the basis of its appearing-for-me-as-what-it-is: these necessities are [...] the

> transcendental origin of an irreducible violence

(VeM 444, cf. VM 128).

Derrida’s demand for the absolute since 1954 has evolved to this moment, just as a relation that will be important in later years *begins* to develop (the initial basis of the trace).
The two directions set aside

For there has been an evolution to a necessary moment of what must institute the two directions of finitude, which is irreducible even to origin. That which never enters origin in the first place (the absolute Other) must institute both directions for me. But just so, from inside, a finitude must be produced. Derrida will thus work out a third direction to this strange symmetry: the Other to which I know I am its Other. To do so, he tests both directions, (the Same, and “the Same and the Other”) by addressing them as ipseities. But as noted, Derrida has retreated from thinking both directions at once to thinking them together. Thus as to content, as the Same, and “the Same and the Other” as finite ipseities avoid opposition in their symmetry, they cannot be contradictories at once (which is just what Derrida wants to avoid). But as one of them must hold, given the demand that the Other appear absolutely as what it is for me, Derrida can apply the exclusive disjunct to the directions: either there is the Same or there is the “the Same and the Other” (but never both, which would preclude an absolute). By this, Derrida assesses the outcomes of this telos:

491 Derrida wrote, to repeat “[O]n the contrary, to gain access to the egoity of [Husserl’s] alter ego as to its alterity itself is the most peaceful gesture there could be.” (VeM 444, VM 128).
492 Note that we avoid suggesting “the Same” and “the Same and the Other” are contraries, as it is never necessary for both contraries to hold at once. Above, for essential reasons, given the demand for the positive absolute, one of these must hold.
either there is only the Same, which can no longer even appear and be said, nor even exercise violence (pure infinity or finitude)

(VeM 444, cf. VM 128, Derrida’s emphases).

As we explained above, the Same was the *pure* (neutralised) logical and positive moment which evolved to the play of the infinite other as what it is and is *not*, *in infinitum* (cf. 510). But this has not yet made the absolute Other appear (or be said) as what it is. Rather, thereafter, the condition of the *Other* is that it then imply the Same *and* the Other, which led to stifling of the originary. The Same then can no longer appear and be said. Note that if only the Same and the Other hold, then this is no longer pure finitude. However, this not yet an impurity as *negation* of the purity of the first option (finitude or infinitude). Derrida is not yet concerned with negation of purity, but is seeking to demonstrate the difficulty of symmetry.

Thus as to the second direction, the implications of the instability of the Other (which must for *essential* reasons (as the Same) be Other to essence (Other to the Same)) are applied:

*or* indeed there is the Same *and* the Other, and then the Other cannot be the Other – of the
Same – except by being the Same (as itself: ego), and the Same cannot be the Same (as itself: ego) except by being the Other’s Other: alter ego (VeM 444, cf. VM 128, Derrida’s emphases).

As to the second option above: the Other can be absolutely Other (ego, rather than ego in general, which is excluded) to me only if it is itself (ego), thus in some measure the Same (i.e. the same as me, ego). But the Same, in turn, can be what it is (ego) only if it is Other to the Other.

An important evolution has occurred. According to the two directions, to return to an alter ego, Derrida should have written the Same as “the Other’s other”. But that would be a symmetry mediated by what I (in general, Ego) know of the ego. Instead, in the retraction to the eidetic, Derrida has written “Other’s Other”. In this outcome, the Same is no longer other to the Other via the mediate (and thus no longer related by a shared alterity in general). Instead, the Same and the Other must indeed be related by the irreducible. The Same would be Other to the Other. Derrida has included the necessity of a position from the Other to its Other. Taking such a position would be in excess of the first and second movements; it implies a third direction as what must be institutive yet is irreducible even
to the Other. Such a position is unjustifiable even as a supposition. To begin to assess it, Derrida addresses its relation to me.

**Parenthesis: Other Others, and preparing for the trace**

To prepare, note that such a necessity avoids supposing a relation from Other to Other holds in general. The Other must be an origin of the world, and there must be many more such “origins of the world” (VeM 445, VM 129); but only in general for me. One would avoid supposing I can know if an Other communicates to an Other other than me.

However, for essential reasons, for the Other to be Other for me, I must know of at least one other Other to it – its Other, me. Thus in the third direction, this must in turn be known by me, even though no longer mediated by a position in egoity. This is no longer merely the necessity of knowing the body of the other or Other of Derrida’s two directions – as mediation by egoity. Rather, it develops the eidetic necessity of my knowing of an Other to which I am its Other, of an institution produced without relation by egoity as eidetic. A position is thus taken upon this

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493 A supposition is still a sub-position, and thus a position. At least in its basic relations, the Other to the Other would be absolutely Other to me, and beyond position.
strange necessity of relation of myself to the beyond, and my knowing this relation of the beyond to myself, in the final symmetry:

[I]hat I am also essentially the Other’s Other,

and that I know I am [que je le sache], is the evidence of a strange symmetry whose trace appears nowhere in Levinas’ descriptions.

(VeM 444, VM 128)

The trace as yet undeveloped

Note that we have come to the ethical “trace”. It follows from the implication that what never enters origin in the first place (the absolute Other) must institute both directions for me. However, in 1964, the trace is mentioned only once in the argument (above), and only in noting that it “appears nowhere”. At worst, it is excluded from the appearing anywhere; at best, it appears only nowhere. The only further mention of the trace in 1964 in these pages is in a footnote (597). Instead, “Violence and Metaphysics” develops the outcomes of economy to arrive at Derrida’s two best outcomes for ethics, and two best outcomes for philosophy in general, which latter two evolve the outcomes from 1962. The rest of our chapter summarises this. We return to the trace only in closing, to
assess why it was not yet included, and why and how it must develop as a better solution.

**Part Five: Derrida’s first two outcomes in 1964**

Thus, to continue with economy, Derrida emphasises that this particular evidence of the irreducible (i.e. as institutive) is a necessary condition for the resultant ethical (general) dissymmetry. That is, as noted, two finitudes were permitted by the irreducible, but neither in the disjunct resulted in the Other appearing for me on the basis of what it is (as positive absolute). This led to the negative outcome of the strange symmetry, in general dissymmetry. The latter completes those moments comparable to the positive economy.

**The first outcome – permitting ethical nonviolence**

Derrida can thus evolve his ethical solutions. As general dissymmetry has not yet met the telos, this leads to inversion (negation) even of general dissymmetry. General dissymmetry

\[
\text{ultérierement permits [i.e. makes possible]}
\]

the inverse dissymmetry, that is, the ethical non-

---

494 Derrida writes: “[W]ithout this evidence, I could not desire (or) respect the other in ethical dissymmetry.” (VeM 444, VM 128)
The telos of ethics which Derrida accepted was encountering the other or Other without violence (i.e. without opposite or limit). As we have developed the non-relation, this telos can be put as ethical non-violence.

As to how general dissymmetry permits this telos, note that inverse dissymmetry never necessarily turns back to a (strange) symmetry, in a double negation. Rather, “dis-” can be a negation or complement (i.e. or both (337 fn.)). In the first case, “dis” negates the particular object. Though still violent, this avoids violence to the Same or “the Same and the Other”. It merely negates that the relations of the two finite ipseities have been determined (henceforth, it is implicit that the relations are addressed). Hence it merely negates that general dissymmetry has met its telos. Inverse dissymmetry permits ethical violence.

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495 We have changed Bass’ translation of “ultérieurement” as “eventually” to our term “then” which emphasises an outcome dependent upon a necessary sequence. Derrida deems that “éventualité” (as a possibility of constituting an object (343)) is a word that signals possibility as a violence. He is at this juncture seeking to allow nonviolence. (VeM 444, VM 128).
In the second case, “dis” negates *all that is not the object* (i.e. a non-relation, all around the particular object without opposition). That object can be the Same and “the Same and the Other”, but in turn their relations address the other and Other. Each of the other and Other can appear as what it is, which positive term refers beyond itself, but as yet without negation (avoiding violence, in nonviolence). *This permits ethical nonviolence.*

Third, both imply a circularity. We will develop the eidetic relations first. That is, in this passage the (relations to) the object can be negated, but its non-relation refers to everything outside the object. The lack of particular outcome again implies negation, returning the necessity of circularity without cessation. As without particular or general relation, the relation is open, but as constituting without simple distance to an Other again implies an *opening*. Henceforth, “dis” implies this opening of relation in an instability.

As to particular content in this, pure, a priori and transcendental relation: first, the “dis” refers again to negation of the relation “between” the two transcendental finitudes (i.e. negation of the irreducible relation of violence). However, in this case, the “inverse” of the negation of symmetry makes the first relation *what it is* (inside). As no longer a negation of the Other, this is again ethical violence. Second, the “dis” then opens this relation, as ethical nonviolence. Derrida summarises that
this transcendental origin, as the irreducible

violence of the relation to the Other [behind], is

[…] [also] nonviolence, since it opens the relation
to the Other [forward]. (VeM 444, VM 129,

our emphases)

In this circularity that opens the relation, a non-relation is again returned, as the possibility of ethical nonviolence.

**The second outcome – least possible violence**

However, it remains to assess how this ethics proceeds. Thus far, the most peaceful gesture possible was to gain access “as if” to the alterity of the Other, in the positive economy. But the relations of negation have been added, in the retraction to the eidetic. The Other must and can be spoken of, but this possibility already includes originary negation – originary violence. This transcendental region of speaking to the infinitely other and the absolutely Other is deemed Discourse.\(^496\) Thus discourse is treated as the essential content that must appear as absolutely what it is to permit ethics. Derrida goes on: if this relation is originary violent (for the transcendental violence arising from irreducibility must

\(^{496}\) In 1962, Derrida aligned Discourse with the essential relations of speaking to others, in the community (348). He had not yet begun to address the Other.
merely be supposed), then discourse can only be violent to itself. He explains famously:

Discourse, then, if it is originally violent, can only do itself violence \( \text{[se faire violence]} \), can only negate itself \( \text{[se nier]} \) to affirm itself (VeM 446, VM 130, our emphasis)

By this, Derrida at yet only instils one finitude. Discourse enters the first direction, where what it is and is not proceeds toward the infinite other (forward) to determine its origin (“behind”) without violence.

Thus we caution against misunderstanding that this violence is absolute. This play is still that of what is and is not etc., rather than a negation of negation. Discourse can only “negate itself to affirm itself”. That is, given the telos of determination in transcendental-subjectivity, it is only possible to negate itself; and “itself” is first a positive moment, proceeding \( \text{in infinitum} \). But moreover, in such negation of position, Discourse

\[ \text{never has } \text{the power } \text{[pouvoir]} \text{ to recuperate this} \]

negativity, to the extent that it is discourse.

(VeM 446, cf. VM 130, Derrida’s emphasis)
That is, Derrida worked out above, a negation of itself (discourse) can never turn back to itself as an identity, for the same as itself already supposes mediation and Difference (VeM 443, VM 127). By this Derrida returns the second direction as second finite ipseity: for essential reasons, the telos of determination of the Other as Other (in its negativity), never can turn back to Identity, but can only proceed in the first direction, negating itself to affirm itself in infinitum. For as explained, the Same and “the Same and the Other” are contradictories. Thought at once, as both the Same and Other to itself, these would return essential contradiction, stifle the Logos in its origin, and prevent any sense in speech.

Such stifling, then, would even preclude contraries, which latter would allow the essential possibilities a priori, even when neither must be spoken of (forward). Without opposition or contrarisation, it would stifle even the possibility of speaking of negation, and the least possible violence in infinitum. As Derrida summarises, such recuperation would imply

\[
\text{[t]he worst violence, the violence of a primitive}
\]

\[
\text{and prelogical silence, [...] an absolute violence}
\]

\[
\text{which would not even be the contrary of}
\]

\[
\text{nonviolence. (VeM 446, VM 130)}
\]
This would be worst violence pre-supposed as irreducibly prior to the eidetic logic – indeed, Derrida deems it “previolence”. Thus far, of the negatives, the negation and affirmation of the two directions are the only way to avoid worst violence. Thus “within” the “order of philosophical discourse”, Derrida summarises, the “infinite passage through violence” of discourse affirming itself to negate itself is

the least possible violence, the only way to

repress the worst violence (VeM 443, VM 130,

Derrida’s emphases)

*It is indeed worst violence (stifling of the Logos)* that Derrida in 1964 seeks to “repress” by his directions and levels.

**Nihilism as outcome and avoided**

Hence it is important to avoid supposing that Derrida in 1964 is antithetical to retaining sense. His ethics follows from the most direct insistence upon retaining its possibility. As worst violence would prevent even the essential relations of the Logos, it would preclude sense and necessitate a pure non-sense (i.e. as all around anything that can have sense, rather than an opposite to sense). It would preclude intentionality as consciousness of Something, necessitating only Nothing. Derrida summarises the second outcome, and makes the telos overt:
Thus discourse chooses itself violently against Nothingness and pure non-sense, and,
in philosophy, against nihilism. (VeM 446, VM 130)

However, note that even this outcome, as insisting upon evidence and Discourse rather than stifling, still leaves Nothing to think. A rigorous ethics would leave only the necessity of nihilism. But ethical nihilism would be the contemplation merely of the instability between what is not Nothing (being given Nothing to think) and non-sense (being given Nothing to think). A demand for the absolute as positive never excludes even nihilism.

The positive absolute as difficulty

Thus we develop Derrida’s difficulty – he resists absolute violence because in 1964 he insists upon retaining a positive absolute. 498

497 Bass translates “contre” as “in opposition to”, which we have changed, as merely supposing a worst violence would not yet constitute it to be an opposite.
498 We employ this word “resists” in relation to Derrida in these early years as he did so in analysis of a “beyond” to univocity in 1962, to first arrive at passage. Derrida worked out that if the beyond is irreducible, then words cannot be absolute objects, with no “resistant” and permanent absolute identity. (IOG 104, IDG 106/107). Confronted by an absolute violence implied by this supposition of the beyond in 1964, Derrida affords such a resistance to the sense of a positive absolute. He thus compromises the implications from 1962, to preserve the absolute possibility of sense in 1964. Derrida will only arrive at a better outcome in 1966. Note that Levinas employs “resistance” in a relatively unrelated fashion, to refer to what resists (and is difficult to) return to the Same, as the Other, autrui and Autrui (cf. TI 123-124); and we have employed the term in this fashion at those junctures.
But in an absolute without limit, as defined and applied since Chapter One, there should be no opposition between an outcome as a positive or a negative absolute. Insofar as they are irreducible, absolute violence and peaceful irreducibility ought to be indistinguishable.

To be sure, it is ever so that one begins with this demand that the absolute first be positive. However, in a willingness to accept only positive outcome, seeking to “repress” absolute violence, the demand excludes the negative as absolute outside. Despite all of Derrida’s ministrations in insisting upon finitude, still an absolute opposite re-imposes a limit upon the outcome.

**Derrida’s conservatism**

At this juncture we particularise our approach to the philosopher as yet conservative (and Derrida in particular). The latter term signals the adherence to the necessity to conserve sense, even when the outcomes of the logic then necessitate its refusal. The Derrida from 1954 who plangently insisted upon an outcome for philosophy in general remains. Indeed, instead of insisting upon anomie, Derrida is revealed as dedicated to the positive as outcome, even though his progress implies it no longer be so; and even though it never escapes solipsism in its resistance. But *Derrida knows this*. Backed into a corner, he quotes (without quotation marks) from Husserl:
for philosophical children this may \[peu]\] well be the dark corner to which the ghosts of solipsism [...] or relativism return (VeM 448, VM 131).

In 1964, such solipsism must be kept outside – whatever the consequences. As noted, this process began when Derrida retreated from stifling of the originary content of the Logos to the eidetic basis, and set aside the necessity of thinking the Same and “the Same and the Other” at once. “Violence and Metaphysics”, we note, is riven along this fault-line. Even so, Derrida must go further. Thus far, even least possible violence has not yet made an object appear as absolutely what it is, to prevent solipsism.

**Part Six: brief comparison to Hegel**

Before following how Derrida continues to develop his outcomes, we are able to assess his alignment with Hegel. Derrida began to address the two directions by aligning the “movements” with Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind* (henceforth, “Phenomenology”)

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499 Upon adding negation to his movement and having left Husserl aside, Derrida asked: “[W]here have these movements been better described than in [Hegel’s] *The Phenomenology of Mind*?” (VeM 442, VM 126).
Moreover, having evolved to his relations of least possible violence, he deems that

this infinite passage through violence is what is called history. (VeM 443, VM 130)

The latter too is an implicit reference to Hegel, which relations we will also summarise. By no means do we suggest that we exhaust even the fragments of Hegel that we address; we aim merely to explain that Derrida’s progress adopts selected bases from Hegel. As ever, the progress will be Derrida’s.\footnote{Our aim is never to situate debates about Hegel as they might pertain to Derrida. Notably, we refer to the recent and widespread debate as to whether Hegel’s work is “metaphysical” as a sort of Spinozist monism, or an extension of the Kantian critique of address to conditions of possibility (cf. Kreines 2006 for a summary). A corollary of this debate has also been concerned with whether Hegel’s logic pertains to “things”, or to “modes of thought” (cf. de Boer 346, who opts for the latter, or Lawlor’s account of Hyppolite (2002, 98) which opts for the former in a phenomenological sense of “things”). As to the first issue, Derrida takes Hegel’s progress to be an extension of an approach to conditions of possibility, and an evolution of Kant’s critical project. As to whether Hegel’s logic pertains to things or modes of thought, Derrida opts for both, suggesting Hegel’s is a “living logic which reconciles formal tautology and empirical heterology” (VM 153, VeM 473). Whatever the status of Hegel’s overall aims, or how to interpret or situate his system, we assess how Derrida’s explanation of Hegel’s transitions (in these segments) work. That is to say, we do so according to those basic relations by which Derrida assesses them. In this we are closer to Houlgate’s recommendation that readers “look in the main body of [Hegel’s] texts at the many particular analyses” and from this develop a broader sense of Hegel’s “pattern” (Houlgate 2006, 5). Houlgate takes Derrida to be antipathetic to Hegel, and we are prevented within our scale from addressing this.}

Preparing for alignment with Hegel’s “war”

As to Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology}, Derrida is referring to its initial segment, which proceeds from the Introduction to \textit{just short of}
“the dialectic of Master and Slave” (PH 144-227). In this subsection we will summarise some of Derrida and Hegel’s commonalities. First, Derrida explains that Hegel’s is a “science of the experience of consciousness” (VEM 446). Derrida is referring, without quotation marks, to the Introduction to the *Phenomenology* “Preface” (PHG, PHM 88). Second, Derrida also deems this a “necessary” progress (cf. PHG, PHM 88) in the “structure” of its “movement” (cf. PHG 141, PHM 230).³⁰¹ Third, for Hegel, the progress begins from “certainty” as the “poorest kind of truth”. For Hegel, certainty merely “says”, “it is” (PHG 80, PHM 150). Fifth, in proceeding from signifying of certainty and the basic evidential form “it is”, Hegel develops his movement via essential relations. Sixth, this proceeds as far as the moments in which the Ego [Ich] is not “object”. Rather, the object is just as much ego as object (PHG 139, PHM 227).

For Hegel, this is the first moment of “self-consciousness”, by which the Ego is made other to itself. Seventh, this moment then proceeds via relations of self-consciousness as a relation to “the other” (das Andre). As the ego is also object, importantly, this develops a “double” relation of others within self-consciousness (PHG 141, PHM 201).

³⁰¹ This necessity is also a logical sort, as Hegel explains, this is “a logically necessitated process” (PHG 90, PHM 162).
PHM 230). That is, the movement progresses as “the action of one alone” (PHG 141, PHM 230). Eighth, as what is common to the necessary sequence, it then proceeds from certainty of the other, via position, seeing sameness as the other, opposition, mediation, and negation of each other from its other (PHG 141 ff., PHM 230 ff.). Each of these and the cumulative progress are easily comparable to the relations that Derrida developed from Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity.

The beginnings of divergence from Hegel

However, we will begin to note some divergences. For Hegel, the double relations then arrive at a moment of reflection (a position upon each movement, in relation to the other, and thus upon both movements). In this relation, one is essentially independent and for itself (it posits itself against itself) and the other is dependent (it posits itself as not itself, thus dependent upon the other) (PHG 144-145, PHM 234). Only at this juncture do the movements above develop into the essential relations of Master and Slave (PHG 144, PHM 234). Continuing the movements of the ego within itself, the Master and Slave go on to mutually define and separate from one another in an ongoing evolution until the slave attains a measure of autonomy in work (PHG 144-149, PHM 234-240). However, it would be easy to take it that a “Master” and “Slave” equate to the “human” other and Other. Derrida expressly sets aside such comparison.
First assessment of Hegel – alignment with war

Rather, it is only after developing his two directions (VEM 441-444) that Derrida aligns with the “Master and Slave” movement. Before doing so, he aligns with Hegel via the first direction of violence in infinitum as an approach to “war” across “history” (VEM 445). These are implicit references to Hegel’s *The Philosophy of Right*.

To situate this: Hegel had often been reproached for advocating the benefit of war in the development of political States in history. For Hegel, states that are at war with each other thus “reciprocally recognise” each other (H PR 215), and by this gain a measure of self-identity. Second, warring states avoid the stagnation and moral corruption which for Hegel had arisen in empires throughout history during prolonged periods of peace. Third, Hegel took it as evident that war is an inevitable fact of the passage through history. He was thus deemed to be opposed to “perpetual peace”, and welcoming of the inevitability of war (cf. H PR 210).

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502 Derrida avoids calling the movement “dialectic”.
503 Hegel wrote, “War has the higher significance that by its agency, […] ‘the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone ‘perpetual’, peace’” (H PR 210).
504 This was a relatively common point extracted from Hegel’s approach to history, in that he was taken to be opposed to Kant’s suggestion in *The
We will address these in the order above, as an interrelated sequence. First, Levinas argues that war makes persons no longer recognise themselves. That is, as we explained, in war beings hold themselves outside of the totality. For Levinas, I am only in view of myself after opposition arises with the Same. Persons merely arise with the Same. As persons no longer recognises themselves in war, which for Levinas is a violence of oppression, war “destroys the identity of the Same” (TEI ix-x, TI 21). War in history has destroyed the possibility of peace. Note, also, that it follows that war destroys identity. Indeed, second, Levinas argues that empires (which are comprised of totalities of persons) are never returned to their self-identity as peaceful by the passage of war across history. Hence nor is such identity restored by war to any beings that hold themselves outside of the totality (cf. 434). War “does not restore to the alienated beings their lost identity.” (TI 22). Third, to escape the fact of this inevitability, Levinas argues that a relation with what is “beyond” totality is required, and returns to the ethical relation. Levinas deems that Hegel’s approach to war arises “wrongly” as a “judgment” of the “objectivity” of the evidence of history (TI 24). Hegel’s war begins from the objectifying intentionality that Levinas rejects. For Levinas, in ethics I am obligated to Autrui, to whom I desire

Metaphysics of Morals that the “highest political good” is “perpetual peace”. For an assessment of commentary and discussion upon this issue from around the time of writing of Totality and Infinity, cf. “Hegel on War” (Smith 1965).
to go to exceed objectivity. He rather mobilises the ethical relation to *autrui*, which *escapes* objectivity to allow the “gleam of exteriority” (we explained how this holds for Levinas (428)). Hence such a negation is never “purely negative” (TI 23-24) in the fashion of Husserl’s (or Hegel’s) objectifying approach. Instead, the idea of *infinity* permits an orientation toward the infinite passage to peace *beyond* totality, as the horizon of the logos as a final peace to come. We suggested above how, for Levinas, the infinite idea arises from *autrui* and language in its progress in the Same. That is, Levinas’ progress above follows in a structured fashion. Indeed, he explains that the relations were “rigorously developed” in a fashion that “resembles what has come to be called transcendental method” (TEI xii-xiv, TI 24-25).

Derrida too opts for assessing Hegel upon these basic lines, as a *phenomenological and transcendental* analysis. However, he does so in accordance with the implications developed from *objectifying* intentionality, as we followed in detail. These implications led to Derrida’s refusal of worst violence. As we have worked out these bases, our assessment can be summary. First, Derrida argues that – following the basis he developed via Parmenides to what we explained as the “second direction” – the Other cannot be absolutely Other to the Same (VEM 445, VM 129). War cannot yet result in the “destruction” of the Same, and retains the possibility of passage to peace.
Thus Derrida retains the possibility of the interior progress from one to other, *in infinitum* (the first direction). Hence he argues that violence *certainly* appears on the horizon (VEM 445, VM 129).

However, as we explained of the movements of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, above, Derrida notes that Hegel deemed “war” is the ongoing movement as the “infinite absolute” of history. That is, war proceeds by position and negation from one to other *in infinitum, and without external distance from self*. The movement merely “determines and negates *itself*”. Yet as its telos is the absolute without limit, it requires a telos without violence. The telos of this infinite movement is “absolute pacification”. This “infinite passage through violence” in history preserves the telos of absolute peace (VEM 445, VM 129).

For Derrida, the telos of least possible violence is peace. A state defines itself against itself (and the other state as constituted in itself), in order to avoid the risk of the worst violence of utter annihilation, from the stifling of the Logos. Even so, nor is Derrida giving up on escape from

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505 Derrida has justification for this approach. For Hegel the “finite and indifferent” institutions of States imply the necessity of their infinite passing away, and that the relations of states to each other in history is “absolute”. For instance: “[t]he fact that states reciprocally recognise each other as states remains, even in when […] a bond wherein each counts to the rest as something absolute. Hence in war, war itself is characterised as something which ought to pass away. It implies therefore […] that the possibility of peace be retained.” (H PR 215).

506 Thus, as to how a least possible violence of Derrida’s sort could apply even in war: for Hegel, for example, war should never impact upon civilians, or intrude upon “the peace of family and private life” (H PR 215). War is never without restraint or limit, avoiding the danger of unrestrained and utter annihilation. To be sure, Hegel was writing prior to a century when modern warfare regularly endangers or engages family life, and utter annihilation is a
violence; we will address this below. First, we will assess how Derrida diverges in his more basic relations.

**Toward the second assessment of Hegel – away from the human other**

Thus far, note that Derrida’s is a phenomenological analysis, and he follows its *basic relations*. This, for Derrida, is an essential movement of a self-consciousness aware of the difficulty of objectifying the *absolutely exterior* in general, no longer even necessarily a human reality. Importantly, these directions are no longer applicable to the human other alone; the latter (insofar as it is human) and history are each content in the “movements”.

Hence at this juncture Derrida notes that it is “not by chance” that Hegel avoids “anthropological reference” in the movement of Master and Slave, which is also an “example” of war. Derrida never subscribed to the readings of the Master-Slave movements as “anthropological” popularised in France by Kojève’s lectures in the 1930’s (Kojève 1954). Moreover, Derrida works this out via his two directions.\(^{507}\)

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\(^{507}\) Derrida in 1968 explained his reservations about such “humanist” approach in general were that the “origin of the concept of (human) reality, and the reality of the real, no questions are asked.” (TEOM 116). Derrida prefers to question the origin of this reality. However, as we explain below, nor is Derrida applying Hyppolite’s approach (LE, 1953), which initiated a turn in France to read Hegel as logical. This progress is Derrida’s.
Second assessment of Hegel – overall divergence

Hence, we suggest, to compare Derrida’s movements with Hegel, the progress requires doing so via just what Derrida explains: the developments in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as they align with Hegel’s relations to war in history. Derrida’s progress is never compatible with Hegel’s well-known relations in his oeuvre.

To explain this, we begin by developing alignments into incompatibility. For Hegel, and *contra* Husserl, negation is the first “power” which makes One relate to itself (PHM 92, PHG 165). For Derrida, as noted, this power of origination arises from what it is irreducible even to the negative relation between the Same and the Other. Nevertheless, Hegel’s movement proceeds by means of position and negation of one and other. Derrida too proceeded from one to other by a teleological progress that to be what “it is”, the other must be mediated by an essence, to then be “not what it is […] etc.” (510 ff.).

However, in what seems to be a first divergence, Hegel in the *Phenomenology* arrives at an absolute by means of negation of itself (PDG 91-93; PHM 163-165, 174). For example, the negation of the One to itself permits the essence “Thing” to be itself. Hegel

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508 Cf. “[T]he ‘One’ is the moment of negation, as in a direct and simple manner, relating itself to itself, and excluding others (*Andere*): and is that by which ‘Thinghood’ is determined qua Thing.” (PHM 165).
develops it to be absolutely itself by the negation of the thing from all otherness:

[T]he thing is set up as having a being of its own, […] as an absolute negation of all otherness; hence it is absolute negation merely relating itself to itself. (PHG 100, PHM 174)

Even so, we note, a mere absolute for Hegel too is never a turn back to identity, but a locus of essential movement on the way to a highest telos, which for Hegel in the *Phenomenology* is Absolute Knowledge as Subject (PH 789). Hence Derrida’s progress from one to other is still compatible in that he never allows negation to “recuperate” itself to an absolute that stifles movement.

However, at this juncture compatibility to Hegel’s overall work stops. First, Hegel is often noted to employ negation of negation (cf. Lawlor 2002, 99; LeE 130-131, LE 101-102; de Boer 2010, 370). As far as we can tell, Hegel in this section (Two) on Perception (PH 161-178) does not yet employ negation of negation. Moreover, Derrida in the pages that we read never

509 The next section, on Force, prior to that of the “Master and Slave” movement is not yet compatible with Derrida, who employs no relations of force in these pages of “Violence and Metaphysics”.

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employs “not not”. 510 His only employment of two consecutive
“negatives” has occurred in emphasising that the two directions
“cannot not” be thought at once, a modal version of necessity
(VeM 442, VM 126, cf. VM 129, (523)).

Second, crucially, for Hegel, this leads to a “sublimation” (or
better, Aufhebung (PHG 100, PHM 174)). The word “Aufhebung” is
famously without English equivalent, but implies a sort of
“downlifting”, a lifting up from below. For Hegel,511 sublimating
(Aufheben) thus has a twofold sense, as “to negate and to
preserve,” (PHG 91, PH 164), and also to suppose these
relations.512 Derrida in the pages in 1964 that we followed never
arrives at a moment of sublimation to rise to higher sense. The
progress from one to other must rather continue in infinitum, implying the
opening.

Third, to that end, Lawlor and Hyppolite also stress (and it is
accepted by modern readers of Hegel’s logic),513 that contradiction is
the crucial means by which Hegel in his œuvre arrives at
sublimation. Hegel does employ contradiction (Widerspruch) in this

510 This avoidance of double negation holds for both the 1964 and 1967
versions of “Of Transcendental Violence”.
511 Hegel goes on, and we employ the English translation by Baillie “this kind
of negation is the cancelling and superseding of itself” (PHM 174).
512 This for Hegel leads to a verbal “non-relation”, as “a distinction which
exists only in words; the non-essential which has nevertheless to be necessary,
cancels its own meaning, or is what we have just called the negation of itself.”
(PH 175, Hegel’s emphasis). We are not yet developing the relations of
signification in Hegel, which Derrida only addresses in “The Pit and the
Pyramid” (1966).
case in the *Phenomenology*, prior to arriving at this sublimation. He explains that the thing is for itself (as explained above), and thus a unity for itself, yet its unity is also “disturbed” by its relation to “other things”. Thus it is at once (*zugleich*) both the preservation of its unity and the preservation of what is outside itself (PDG 99, PHG 173). As to how this implies a contradiction, it seems to us that, when reflected upon together, “other things” are made a unity that is opposite to the thing. This opposition of unity and disunity at once is a contradiction which retains an outside to the thing. It is the basis that allows the thing as negation of itself to rise above itself in sublimation (*Aufhebung*). The contradiction maintains and continues the movement, but allows for an “outside” by which the relations can be reflected upon.514

Yet whatever the fashion by which Hegel’s contradiction permits sublimation, Derrida’s only employment of contradiction in the movements implied the “stifling” of the Logos rather than a sublimation. As Derrida noted later, he had a “critical wariness” of Hegel’s sort of contradiction even in these years (P 101 fn. 3).515 That is to say,

514 How contradiction applies in Hegel is still a relatively controversial issue (cf. de Boer 2010 for a detailed assessment). Even so, by our brief explanation above we believe we are in accordance with at least the basic form of Hegel’s contradiction as explained by Longuenesse and de Boer. For example, de Boer explains that contradiction arises “between, on the one hand, the unity of its contrary determinations, which it is in itself, and on the other, the one-sided content to which it has been reduced” (de Boer 2010, 367).

515 Derrida explains: “If I have more often spoken of conflicts of force than of contradiction, this is first of all due to a critical wariness as concerns the Hegelian concept of contradiction” (P 101 fn. 13.). Derrida explains that this wariness arises from Hegel’s explanation of contradiction in the Doctrine of Essence in the *Science of Logic* (which, we add, is basically an address to essential
Derrida aligns with selected portions of Hegel – as he did with Husserl, Levinas, Parmenides, Plato and Heidegger. He is able to do so insofar as these portions are common (basic). Yet Derrida does so to further his concerns.

In sum, Derrida’s two sorts of relation to Hegel above were alignment of the movements with violence as war, and the more basic relations. Derrida sets each aside by his next two arguments. As to the basic relations, for Derrida since 1962, the a priori subject had accepted the responsibility to demand a response to the question of the absolute. Derrida sets aside the “impersonal ‘absolute Logic’” of “Hegelianism”, and returns to the “subjective a priori” – the a priori region of subjectivity – that he developed at length (VEM 448, VM 132), and that led to his two best ethical outcomes thus far.

Second, nor has Derrida given up on avoiding even least possible violence; he had developed ethical nonviolence above. He will deem that God’s signalling of radical impossibility will be the “Idea of Peace”, “beyond history” (VeM 446, VM 130), and thus also

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516 Derrida writes further on: “[L]et us note in passing that the ‘subjective a priori’ recognised by transcendental phenomenology is the only possible way to check the totalitarianism of the neutral, impersonal ‘absolute Logic’ that is eschatology without dialogue [with the Other] and everything classed under the conventional – quite conventional – rubric of Hegelianism.” (VeM 448, VM 132, our emphasis).
beyond Hegel’s sort of war. Derrida develops these in order, and we henceforth set Hegel aside.

**Part Seven: Derrida’s final two outcomes in 1964**

**The third outcome as evolution from 1962**

After arriving at the necessity of choosing philosophy against nihilism, and the alignment with Hegel, Derrida asks again

\[ \text{How are we to interpret the necessity of thinking} \]

\[ \text{the fact of what is first of all [i.e. certainly] in} \]

\[ \text{sight, in occurring as that which one calls, in} \]

\[ \text{general, the end of history [...]? This question} \]

\[ \text{returns to asking what the thought of the Other} \]

\[ \text{as Other means } \text{[signifi] (VeM 445-446, VM} \]

\[ 129, \text{Derrida’s emphases)}.} \]

As we explained, what certainly appears (in front) – and history is such a content too – “returns” to the necessity of thinking of the irreducible origin, the Other as Other (although as no longer necessarily anthropological). Thus far, phenomenology merely implies the necessity of the Other appearing “as such” only as absolutely exterior to appearing. Thus, Derrida asks:
whether or not the light of the ‘as such’ in this
unique case is not dissimulation (VeM 446, cf.
VM 129).

As before, the “dis-” of dissimulation restores the instability of
negation and non-relation to an originary simulation of the Other
itself for me – circularity.

Derrida in 1964, however, refuses to give up phenomenology – it is
the sense of the other in its appearing which is first the sense of its
“disappearing” to the irreducible (cf. IOG 93, (263)). He opts for
sense over nonsense, continuing:

[N]o, it is necessary to reverse the terms:

‘Other’ is the name, ‘Other’ is the sense of this

unthinkable unity of light and night. (VeM 446,
VM 129, our emphasis)

Given the instability in the sense of the term “Other”, implying
what must of its essence be thought by me as un-thinkable,
Derrida opts for the appearing of sense. He still prefers the basis

517 Note that we have taken this “as such” to support that by the “Other as
Other” Derrida refers to the Other appearing as such as what it is for me
(absolutely Other), which we developed from Husserl.
of “transcendental phenomenology” (and its subjectivity) to address the sense of the beyond.\footnote{The “name” was developed by Derrida in 1962 in address to Husserl’s levels of language, as what must first have been encountered in order to have been named (IOG 70). Everything, for Husserl, is nameable; even the Other.}

Thus, he returns to the (pure and transcendental) thinking and speaking of the Same and “the Same and the Other”, and officially returns to Husserl’s questioning of finitude from 1962. That progress arose with reason, right, certainty, and ground. Derrida worked out how phenomenology cannot ground its positing (285), yet deemed that Husserl give himself the right to speak of the Other in an ethics of respect (VeM 441, VM 125). No such right is argued for in the two directions of violence.

Rather, only a mere certainty (e.g. of violence) remains in this horizon. For, as certainty is the first and bare fact, it must be prior to the necessity of affirming the fact of the ideal object (as beyond, the irreducible Other). But in such an ethical attempt, in accordance with this formal-logical basis, only two finitudes must be the outcome (of the two directions). To think of the beyond, these must in turn be made one object (in general dissymmetry), which latter possibility is negated (in inverse dissymmetry). Such a negation returns the basis of egoity in its address to the fact as irreducible to the essential relations of the finite (even though such production is instituted).
This evolves a turn in 1964 in Derrida’s ethics. Instead of a right of convergence of the finite toward the beyond (Other), Derrida instils an *archia as irreducible* facticity (behind) *even as egoic*:

Husserl knew this. And he called the irreducibly egoic essence of experience [...] ‘archi-facticity’ (*Urtatsache*) (VeM 448, VM 131)

Hence, as to this confinement for *essential* reasons to a finite ego founded on an irreducible fact (from behind as certain), which must nevertheless question this beyond (Other, forward), but which possibility of progress forward is negated (impossible) Derrida summarises that

‘this *impossibility* for the ego [*le moi*] to not [*ne pas*] be itself’, even when it ventures out toward [*sortir vers*] the Other, and without which it could not depart from itself ‘marks the tragedy of the self, the fact that it is riveted
As arising from irreducibility (beyond), we note, this impossibility governs all of the essential and a priori impossibilities (eidetic, originary and predicative). This develops the tragedy of a finite ego. Bound to an irreducible facticity (contingency), yet it must question (forward (vers)) this irreducibility (beyond, Other, behind). For, as the impossibility to not be itself, the ego must be itself, which is necessary for it to depart from itself (forward). But as “riveted” to itself the radical impossibility prevents its even constituting this first object.

Thus as in 1962 (cf. 345), rather than questioning the “what” of a constituted object in ontology, to which it can no longer proceed, the philosopher must ask why of finitude:

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519 Bass, it seems to us, would agree with our employment of necessity and negation. Derrida writes (in 1964 and 1967), also quoting Levinas: “cette impossibilité pour le moi de ne pas être soi même quand il sort vers l’autre, et sans laquelle il ne pourrait d’ailleurs sortir de soi; ‘impossibilité’ dont Levinas dit fortement qu’elle ‘marque le tragique foncier du moi, le fait qu’il est rivé à son être’” (VeM 447, ED 192, quoting EeE 143, cf. TA 56-57). Bass translates this as “the impossibility of the ego not to be itself is not dissolved. The ego cannot not be itself even when it ventures out toward the other, nor could it venture forth without this impossibility, which thus ‘marks the innate tragedy of the ego, that fact that it is riveted to its own being’ (VM 131, our emphasis, cf. EeE 143, TA 46). Unless Derrida inserted this italicised and quite central phrase, Bass interpolates what Derrida explains. The “cannot not” agrees with our basic modal terms – when the ego (or rather, “the me”) cannot not be itself, it must (i.e. necessarily) be itself.
[I]n other words, why finitude, [...] Why the why?

(VeM 447, 449; VM 131, 133)

Even so, for formal-logical and essential reasons, even the irreducible must certainly be instituted in my Ego, and questioned as such, even though the ego remains confined to finitude, and possibility of progressing to the Other is negated. Hence, as to this essential Reason, Derrida asks, quoting Schelling:

[I]n other words, why finitude, if, as Schelling has said, ‘Reason and Egoity, in their true Absoluteness are one and the same thing’ [...].

(VeM 447, VM 131)

The outcome of Derrida’s work in 1964 has been an evolution from 1962 – the constriction into a moment of irreducibility as ongoing questioning of finitude, in pure phenomenology.

**The constriction from the beyond**

This has again led to the winding “inward” (riveting, confinement) even for this eidetic-transcendental approach to the Absolute from 1962. As I (the essential and general I) then never extend to speak of the possibility of what I certainly “experience”,

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but must rather question beyond my finitude in general, I must ask why it is impossible to think of it absolutely. Derrida thus asks

[Why is an experience which could not be

lived as my own (for an ego in general, in the

eidetic-transcendental sense of these words)

impossible and unthinkable? (VeM 443, VM 127,

Derrida’s emphasis first)

As, Ego, Reason, egoity, ego in general, Absolute, and eidetic, this has returned to a highest level of pure phenomenology, a questioning of the Absolute, essentially without any content that can be absolute, even my own experience. Of course, given the sequence from the certainty of evidence, the instituted moment (i.e. of the phenomenon, thing, object as such, etc.) still appears unthinkable.520 The originary content is certain, first possible, and instituted, but the primary necessity of the philosopher is ask “why finitude?” of the Absolute.

Indeed, this has been a progression. As we worked out, Derrida’s insisting upon keeping the rationality of the Logos by retracting to the eidetic-transcendental purity (548) led to the inversion of

520 The “un” of the unthinkable again refers to the circularity, as what can be said to include either complement or negation.
general (i.e. transcendental) dissymmetry. That opened and permitted relation to the absolute Other as ethical nonviolence (562). This progress continues to allow address even in the Absolute, as the opening of a question. Derrida ends off:

[T]his opening is thus a question posed, in the inversion of transcendental dissymmetry, to philosophy as Logos (VeM 450, VM 133, our emphases).

Even so, the reader might find Derrida’s outcome in 1964 dissatisfying. He has constricted questioning of finitude “inward”, prior even to constituting the other (forward), to a foundation only upon the “subjective a priori” (VeM 448). But in so doing, it seems no room remains even for constituting an ethical object or a system “outward” (or “forward”), let alone the “beyond”. In asking why, I no longer ask what. In terms of the demand, even a prospect of an Other that can appear on the basis of what it is for me cannot hold. I can only ask why. But Derrida too may be dissatisfied. He adds one more outcome (i.e. réponse), which also develops an argument from 1962 – that of God.
The fourth outcome – God as best solution

For even God, in 1964, can be what he is only in this subjective a priori. That is,

the subjective a priori is what precedes the

being of God and of all that which, without

exception, exists for me (VeM 448, VM 132).

Thus Derrida again appeals to the scission developed from the Idea as regulative principle without evidential content (from beyond). That infinitising principle impelled finitude to intuit the object, and Derrida’s fourth argument evolved that responsibility to God. But rather than merely Husserl’s transcendental God that signals the possibility of an essential impossibility (IOG 147, (312)), Derrida in 1964 has worked out his further levels. God signals the essential necessity that this radical impossibility (irreducibility) have sense.

Thus, for essential reasons, the subjective a priori must hold before any production of content. It must hold prior to God who signals what holds for me “beyond” the subjective a priori, if that is possible. By this, Derrida re-creates a relation to egoity in this
subjective a priori. For essential reasons, God would no longer have the sense of a “third party” as absolute Other with the name of man, to which I know I am its Other, but would instil a “supreme transcendence” (VeM 448, VM 132). Rather than appearing for me as a content, God has sense only for an ego in general. (VeM 448, cf. VM 132).

Hence the responsibility to save philosophy in general is divine (from beyond), yet never impinges upon my responsibility as a finite philosopher to question why. Derrida explains this in a sentence added in 1967 (we employ it only as support). The delegation of this responsibility to God is not an abdication, God not being a finite third-party: thus conceived, divine responsibility neither excludes nor diminishes the integrity of my own responsibility, the responsibility of the finite philosopher. (VM 130, cf. VeM 447)

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521 This is an “intentional relation” (VeM 448).
“Violence and Metaphysics” has evolved in a progression: from Husserl’s intentional inadequation as respect (443) to the inadequation with God’s responsibility and my own, as “the inadequation of these two responsibilities” (VM 130, cf. VeM 447). This brings Derrida’s argument toward its best conclusion in 1964.

But whatever the outcomes, Derrida’s difficulties remain. First, he retained the telos only of the Other as absolutely positive.\(^{522}\) When contradiction led to stifling, Derrida turned back to certainty to resist worst violence. He thus developed the division in “two finite ipseities”, but no longer sought to think them at once, which would have led again to stifling. That God was made the irreducible foundation and final authority, to permit “philosophical children” to ask “Why finitude?”, holds only in that Derrida had to retreat from the implications of the reasoning to save philosophy from nihilism. A better way to think of the issue only began to appear in Levinas’ work of 1963.

**Part Eight: what must yet develop**

**Levinas’ “trace” of 1963**

For Levinas in an article of 1963 had allowed the beginnings of a way for Derrida to avoid his difficulties. The article, “The Trace

\(^{522}\) Thus Derrida goes on that his outcome “defines the unthinkable as the limits of reason” (VeM 449, VM 132).
of the Other”, began to develop the beginning of a further direction from the beyond that Levinas had excluded from *Totality and Infinity* of 1961. Thus Derrida adds a late inclusion in 1964, again in a footnote, that the “unthinkable”

does become a theme in the meditation of the

trace announced in Levinas’ most recent

writings. (VeM 449 fn. 1, cf. VM 132)

We will summarise why a trace would solve Derrida’s difficulty, *but also why it is precluded from development in “Violence and Metaphysics”*, as it would be incompatible with the outcomes of 1964. We then turn to how it will develop, via Derrida’s additions of 1967. Levinas explained this further direction to the beyond thus:

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523 Levinas' “The Trace of the Other” was published in September of 1963. The two articles “Violence and Metaphysics” were published in July and September of 1964. Thus Derrida notes in a footnote that he only became aware of Levinas' “The Trace of the Other” (and also the essay “Signification and Meaning”, which Derrida does not yet mention in these pages), when “Violence and Metaphysics” was at the presses. Thus, as Bernasconi explains, “in consequence there could only be brief allusions to [the essays and the concerns with the trace], added when the proofs were […] corrected. [Thus] references to these publications are confined to the notes of “Violence and Metaphysics' [of 1964]” (Bernasconi 1988 15). Bernasconi also notes, correctly, that even in 1967, Derrida's additions “did not seem to reflect the more positive attitude to the trace revealed in other contemporary essays by Derrida” (Bernasconi 1988, 15). We explain the impetus for this just below.
Beyond being is a third person, which is not definable by the oneself, by ipseity. It is the possibility of this third direction of radical unrightness which escapes the bipolar [i.e. bivalent] play of immanence and transcendence proper to being. (TA 356, Levinas’ emphasis on “unrightness”)

Such a “third direction” from a “beyond” accords with Derrida’s basis of a “beyond” that was irreducible to the relations of the first two directions (for Derrida, from one to other (immanence), and to the Other (transcendence)).

Yet that this would be a third person would institute its relation to me. Thus Derrida turns to the trace in a footnote, after retreating from contradiction. He goes on in the footnote:

[I]t is possible to say [on peut dire], as Levinas does in The Trace of the Other that it concerns [il s’agit]

524 “Unrightness” evolves from the relations of straightforwardness and “uprightness” (droiture) by which, we explained, Levinas began the directional movement to the other in the Same (TE 134, TI 62).
Derrida has worked out the *necessity* of this relation of the irreducible moment as institutive (as if I am Other to the Other) of the two contradictory directions (of the Same, and the “the Same and the Other”). However, he has only partly developed its logic. First, in 1964, Derrida suggests that such a trace *can* be spoken of as institutive (forward), even after the first two directions necessitate contradiction (i.e., as contradictories), and evolve as irreducible to theeidetic.

Such a more profound moment must rather be supposed or questioned, prior to its possibility (484). However, Derrida goes on:

> [B]ut it can only appear and be said as third. If one calls it ‘Trace’, this word could only appear as a [...] philosophical elucidation

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525 Levinas had argued that the third way avoids contradictories. He explained in the article: “[T]he relationship which goes from a face to the absent is outside every revelation and dissimulation, a third way [troisieme route] excluded by these contradictories.” (Lawlor 2002, TA 344, L TdlA 618, my emphases). Derrida in 1964 is not yet able to agree.

526 Hence, in 1967, in his only emendation to these sentences, Derrida changes the “It is possible to say […] that it concerns a third way”, to the question “Does it concern a third way […]?” (ED 190, cf. VM 129).
Derrida has begun to work out the relations. As he put it, “if one calls it Trace” (our emphasis), this would allow me in some measure to know that I am Other to the Other, and a Trace of the Other as what it is for me. However, this trace was not yet acceptable to Derrida’s main argument for at least six reasons.

How the trace was not yet a solution

First, Derrida needed to adhere to his meticulous argument in 1964; that had implied the contradictories led to a stifling of the Logos, and retraction to the eidetic. Notice, indeed, the capitalisation of “Trace” above (“Trace” is no longer capitalised in 1967, again making the reasoning difficult to follow (ED 190)). A Trace does not yet return originary content. Second, the Trace could appear only when contradictories necessitate the stifling of the Logos, which for Derrida in 1964 would necessitate worst violence and nihilism. Third, crucially, a trace does not yet permit the Other to appear absolutely-for-me-as-what-it-is; but only as a trace. A trace is incompatible with the telos of ethics in 1964. That is, when the

527 Derrida thus merely notes that such a trace “appears nowhere” in Levinas’ work (561). In Totality and Infinity, its appearance could never be tolerated, simply as Autrui is already prior to the limitation that allows its constitution. Nor do we suggest that Levinas’ work suddenly undid itself. Even in the article, Levinas never directly says that this third person “beyond” leaves a trace; a trace would rather appear in the face.
telos is that the Other be absolutely what it is, even if a trace appears to escape contradiction as third, the Logos in its two directions is stifled and prevents the telos.

Instead, in 1964, Derrida had set the trace aside to proceed to his best outcomes. But just so, fourth, nor are these yet compatible with a trace – for if a trace holds, the philosopher is no longer confined to asking only “Why finitude?”. The argument in “Violence and Metaphysics” never could have accepted a trace. The latter impasse will no longer be applied in works after 1964, as Derrida develops the relations.

**Différance not yet included**

To do so, Derrida will also need to develop *différance* and contamination. *Neither are components of the reasoning in 1964*. Each is mentioned only in an addition of 1967 (VM 127, 129) and only once in these pages. However, the relations are preparing for their development. As to *différance*: while the two movements remain *certain*, the play of the Same and the Other in negation and the *eteron* etc. led to the necessity of a contradiction, and stifling of difference prior to the Logos, logic, possibility, other, division, play of the Same and the Other etc. This retracted to a transcendental Difference; but the supposed Difference “between” the Same and “the Same and the Other” would arise from an irreducibility. Difference would no longer permit an
essentially valid logical form to their division. Hence Derrida explains that what “certainly appears” is first of all

a reign in which the difference between the

Same and the Other, Difference, would no

longer be valid. (VeM 446, VM 129)

Thus in 1967, Derrida alters essential “Difference” to “différance” (ED 186, VM 129 cf. VeM 445). A source as not yet originarily even a Difference – hence a basic sort of deferral – must be institutive (of difference). Derrida includes no alignment with deferral as it occurred in 1962, nor several of the other components of différance (e.g. temporising) that he develops from 1965. Moreover, he develops no relation as yet to the trace.

**Contamination not yet included**

As to “contamination”, we worked out from 1954 that it arose insofar as terms were related by a shared basis upon the problem of origin (as originary). By 1964, this evolves in that contamination would depend on a supposition of a relation of two ipseities by the irreducible. Thus in 1967, Derrida adds this to the former footnote upon the trace:

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528 As noted (179), validity arises with right, certainty etc., as a necessary condition to then constitute the object as possible.
And the phenomenon supposes its originary contamination by the sign. (ED 189, VM 129, cf. VeM 446 fn. 1)

For Levinas, the sign of *Autrui* expresses the relation of ipseity in language (409 ff.), prior to appearing. Derrida’s right to language occurs with objectification of things in the world (the phenomenon) (454), and in turn its movement from one to other implies an institutive moment from what is supposed as irreducible. Yet even by 1967, the originary contamination by a trace must only be supposed. We will develop this avoidance of affirmation of contamination in our Conclusion.

**Derrida’s later developments set aside**

The above demonstrates how “Violence and Metaphysics” is as not yet a mature work (by Derrida’s later standards). Proceeding via a logical absolute, it is riven by a difficulty: first seeking the positive absolute at once in the logos, then aiming for ways to retain its relations after the Logos is stifled. Hence, second, this “conservative” moment proceeded by subtly avoiding the necessity to think the two together that should stifle the Logos. Instead, third, Derrida’s four arguments in 1964, which evolve from economy and inverse dissymmetry, return to his questioning of finitude from 1962. However, fourth, these preclude his more
mature relations. In our next chapter, we begin to assess how Derrida will develop the trace, *différance* etc. in 1966, by way of Saussure. Before doing so, we will briefly situate and suggest some contributions of our previous two chapters.
Contribution of Chapters Five and Six

The contribution to reading Levinas

Our main aim has been to work out Derrida’s development of his concerns in “Violence and Metaphysics”. This required a first situation of Levinas’ approach – in Totality and Infinity alone – according to the whole-part reasoning that Derrida applies. We do suggest that our approach is beneficial in reading of Levinas, for four consequent reasons. First, it seems to us that mentioning all of Autrui, autrui, the other and the Other is relatively rare in reading of Levinas (we are aware of only Peperzak who has done so (Peperzak, 1996, xiv)). Most employ merely other and Other, following Lingis’ translation of Totality and Infinity. Second, most who refer to the terms omit at least one of them. Third, the

529 As to omission of some of the words: Lingis, in Totality and Infinity, translates both autre and Autre as “other” and autrui and Autrui as “Other”. He is thus also “forced to drop the capital” in translating “Same” and “same” (TI 26 fn.). Peperzak’s To the Other of 1993 – refers to the terms “autre”, autrui and Autrui merely at the outset. However, autrui and autre are both translated as “other” (Peperzak 1993, 19-20). Autrui is mentioned once, only capitalised at the beginning of a sentence, which might refer to autrui (Peperzak 1993, 20). Davis in 1996 omits autrui, as does Llewellyn in 1998 (Llewellyn 1998, 145). Fryer in 2004 omits Autrui (Fryer 2004, xii). Saghafi, in 2005, addresses autrui, Autrui and autre in detail, but is following Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1967 and omits Autre. In 2009, Bergo mentions Autrui and autrui, without mention of autre and Autre (Bergo, in Hofmeyr et. al., 39, 43, 50, 51). Peperzak in that year mentions autrui without Autrui (Peperzak, in Hofmeyr et. al., 60). Anckaert mentions only autrui (Anckaert, in Hofmeyr et. al, 151). Zeillinger addresses only l’autre and autrui (Zeillinger, in Hofmeyr et. al, 2009, 95, cf. 107). Duyndam, Lingis, Zeillinger, Topolski, and Hand make no mention of autrui or Autrui in that compilation. In 2011, Hand omits autrui (Hand, 2011).
terms “other” and “Other” are often “mapped” to some or all of Levinas’ terms in incompatible fashions.\footnote{Lingis' “other” applies to both “autre” and “Autre”, and “Other” to “autrui” and “Autrui”. Davis translates both Autre and Autrui as “the Other” (Davis 1996, 43). Zeillinger deems “the other” refers to “both senses implied by the French terms l’autre and autrui” (Zeillinger, in Hofmeyr et. al, 95, cf. 107). Bergo translates autrui as both other, and “the other person” (Bergo, in Hofmeyr et. al., 39, 43, 50, 51). In 2011, Hand suggests that “Other or other […] denote the French terms autre, Autre and Autrui.” (Hand 2011, 39). Peperzak notes in 1996 that it had become a convention to employ “the Other” for any form of Levinas’ reference to a “human other”, whether Autrui, autrui, autre, or Autre (Peperzak 1996, xiv); this convention requires interpretation by every reader on each occasion.} Fourth, the logical relations by which Autrui resists logic have only been noted by one reader of whom we are aware, and in that case of only three of Levinas’ terms (Llewellyn 1998, 145).\footnote{Only Llewellyn in 1998, to our knowledge, noted that Autrui for Levinas is “the singular plural” and thus “epekeina tes ousias” (beyond being) (Llewellyn 1998, 145), although Llewellyn does so without mentioning autrui. Llewellyn’s approach (which is in accordance with Derrida’s) seems to have been set aside thereafter. Zeillinger deems that autrui is “the concrete particularism of the personal other” (Hofmeyr et. al, 95, cf. 107), which is no longer compatible with Llewellyn (and Derrida).} Fourth, our approach might help to settle the worries of those who deem that Levinas wants to confuse us.\footnote{Peperzak deems the terms are “unsystematic” (Peperzak 1996, xv). Hand suggests that each term “somehow” and rapidly evolves to the next as Levinas “does not want” the relations to “add up”, and “the other must not be categorised” (Hand 2011, 40).} Combining the above, we are aware of no readings of the sort we have suggested, following from the implementation of Levinas’ signs of Autrui, autrui, the other and the Other. Hence the way we have related the terms in one progression to develop the ruptured “structures” of asymmetry, we believe, is novel.
Suggestions and summary

We believe our approach to Levinas is at least helpful to assess “Violence and Metaphysics” in that until all of Autrui, autrui, the other and the Other are employed, and their relations assessed, it will be difficult to assess the argument in “Violence and Metaphysics”. To that end, we believe our approach is also novel in employing all four of the terms to read Derrida. Part of the reasons that these have not yet been noted, we suggest, is that in the amended French version of “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1967 Derrida’s references to both l’autre and l’Autre are rendered in the lowercase (for reasons that must yet be established by assessment of his transition to 1967). This difficulty of applicability to Levinas transfers to the English version of 1978.

The contribution to reading of “Violence and Metaphysics”

As to assessment of “Violence and Metaphysics”, a further impediment is that Bass’s translations of the terms vary quite considerably. It seems to us that the argument that Derrida

533 As some examples: Bass translates Autrui in some instances as “other” (VM 125, ED 180, cf. VeM 441), and in some instances as Other. But he also writes “l’autre [the Other]”, and then translates “l’autre comme Autrui” as “other as Other [autrui]” (VM 105, ED 155, cf. VeM 350). Thereafter, when rendering the terms in English, Bass relays the relations inconsistently. As only some examples, he translates autrui as “Others” but also “other” (VeM 440, cf. VM 124; ED 183, cf. VEM 127). He then translates a quotation by Derrida of Levinas’ Autrui as “other”, but just thereafter, Bass translates Derrida’s employment of Autrui as “the other as Other” (VM 125, ED 184, cf. VEM 441).
developed in 1964 is very difficult to work out from the later version in the French, and more so in the English.

To that end, addressing the work in 1964 is rare (we are aware of only Bernasconi (1998) who has done so). However, Bernasconi seeks to compare Derrida to Levinas; we have sought to explain how Derrida diverges from Levinas, and also Husserl, in developing his concerns. Of those we have read, we are the first to note that Derrida employs all of the relations of the other, the Other, autrui and Autrui. It seems to us that it has not yet been even been noted that Derrida employs these in the version of 1964. Saghafi’s beautifully-written article of 2005, purports – as a central thesis – to treat of “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964, but deems “other” (autre) is “always written in the lower case” (Saghafi 2005, 43). Thus while our concerns overlap with Saghafi’s, none of our elements or relations would co-incide.
As Saghaﬁ is writing of what he takes to be “canonical” of “Violence and Metaphysics”, we take it that awareness that Derrida’s later version diverges from the early holds of the canon of which Saghaﬁ is aware.

**Overall summary**

To our knowledge, thus, we are the first to suggest “Violence and Metaphysics” in 1964 proceeds in a sequence, as it develops these terms. It also seems to us that we are the first to work out how a progress develops, from the positive relations of economy to the negative, and to ethics. We think that each of our relations (such as the first direction, second direction, economy, negative economy, **eteron**, ethical nonviolence, contradiction and retraction to the subjective a priori) is novel. In turn, we developed these via whole-part logic as well as predicative directions (as a basic eidetic-transcendental analysis), which we also believe is novel. We developed those from Derrida’s first engagement with Husserl, and should this novelty also hold then our working out as well as encompassing what has traditionally been understood as a formal or logical sense of alterity (for example, in the Hegelian and Husserlian sense) without being reduced to it.” (Saghaﬁ 2005, 43) We agree with the explanations of the formal-logical relations, address to Husserl (at least), and that Derrida’s relations retain their own progress; we have sought to explain how this occurs.

Thus, for instance, Saghaﬁ takes the alter ego to be the other as other: “Husserl understands the other as alter ego to mean ‘the other as other’ [l’autre comme autre] (ED 184/125, my italics)”. We noted that Derrida in 1964 wrote this as “Other as Other” (Autre comme Autre)” (VeM 444). As this was irreducible it implied Husserl’s Other (beyond) led to a “more profound” level (VeM 440, VM 124, cf. VeM 443). There are many more such relations, which we followed in our chapters.
how the relations develop from 1954, and from Derrida’s “law”,
ought also to be a contribution.

**How this sort of approach is helpful**

We also suggest this sort of approach is helpful, although what
follows is tangential to, and applicable in each case merely to
fragments of, our sequential progress. First, there has often been
disagreement about what platform to take to begin to read
“Violence and Metaphysics”. Critchley in 1993 deemed “Violence
and Metaphysics” to be a critique of Levinas, by which Derrida
follows the ethical imperatives (begun by Levinas) that one must
be ungrateful to be grateful (Critchley 1991). Derrida indeed
developed these concerns in “At This Very Moment, Here I Am”
of 1987. We have worked out an early basis for this, in that a
respectful ethics must oppress the Other, as “most peaceful
gesture possible”, and discourse can only negate itself to affirm
itself, as “least possible violence”. That said, Derrida in 1964 has
not yet arrived at address to an authorial position where
“Derrida” can be ungrateful to Levinas. Thus we have begun to
develop a way to work out Derrida’s evolution into his later
ethical works. To that end, we have sought to demonstrate how
Derrida in 1964 is concerned with his progress, rather than with
reading Levinas violently.

Next, Critchley and Bernasconi suggest that it is a
misunderstanding to deem that “Violence and Metaphysics” is a
critique of Levinas (Critchley and Bernasconi, eds., 1991, xii, cf. Davis 64). Rather, they propose that it ought to be read as an example of Critchley’s “clôtural” reading (Critchley 1991, 26-27), as a moment of deconstruction arising from a first constructive interpretation, and a second reading which finds “blind spots” and then opts for a space “between” the two metaphysics. By working from the version of 1964, we are able to note that in the section “Of Transcendental Violence” such double movements have not yet developed. Rather, Levinas was set aside from the first as Derrida follows his concerns.

Hurst (2008) deems the core of “Violence and Metaphysics” is a comparison of Husserl and Levinas, in which Derrida prefers Husserl. Hurst also deems this is “canonical” (Hurst 2008, 18).539 We have noted how Derrida diverges from Husserl too, and at what junctures, to develop bases as they evolved since 1954. We have thus followed how the sequence is a progression, as Derrida builds a basis of ethics from his selective reading of Husserl, then sets Husserl aside to continue evolving an ethics, while developing his concerns from earlier years.

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539 Hurst first writes: “[T]o begin with, there is hardly a Derridean who would not immediately point out that when Derrida painstakingly lays out the disagreement between Husserl and Levinas concerning the question of the Wholly Other, he hardly comes up on the side of Levinas.” (Hurst 2008, 18) To be sure, we will agree that Derrida hardly comes up on the side of Levinas, but follow how Derrida thus follows his concern, rather than “painstakingly” (and implicitly, for Hurst, thus accurately) explaining Husserl.
Even so, Hurst aligns Derrida’s approach – as do we, and every other systematic reader of Derrida – with the difficulty of division between the inside and outside when offered only an absolute choice (Hurst 2008a, 18), and to that extent we have sought to explain a way by which such approaches can be engaged with.\(^{540}\)

In turn, we can help to assess readings that take opposing positions. Hurst criticises Zizek who (Hurst suggests) takes it that Derrida aligns with Levinas, in insisting upon an “abyssal divide” from the Other. Saghafi too deems it an “ironclad rule” for readers of Derrida that what “Violence and Metaphysics” is “about” is that “the other can never be entirely separate from the absolutely other” (Saghafi, 50)).\(^{541}\) By following the progress, we can note that each of these approaches has merit (although the essential relations of other, Other etc. must yet be accounted for), as Derrida does arrive at the “riveting” to finitude too. The difficulty is that the readers are each referring to divergent segments of the text, and assume the work is homogeneous rather than an evolving argument. That is, in following the progress, we have suggested how Derrida’s argument by turns aligns with each

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\(^{541}\) This can also be put in the progress as language. Faron, Davis has noted, has suggested that “[T]he essential point of Derrida’s argument consists in recognising that philosophical discourse can only say the Other in the Language of the Same” (Davis, 64). We worked out how this holds during the course of our overall progress.
of these approaches (in working out the interconnections of Other, Same etc.), then arriving at the subject “riveted” to itself, asking “Why finitude?” We have done so in accordance with working out Derrida’s concerns from earlier years, via a progress that is still developing.

Thus, rather than opting for “Levinas”, or “Husserl” (or Parmenides, or Plato, or Heidegger, or Hegel), we have assessed in a more basic fashion how Derrida adopts a shared telos of ethics, but begins from an incompatible premise of intentionality, then employs relations that are basic to the tradition. We were thus able to demonstrate how he rarely agrees with Levinas or a fuller approach to Husserl, and aligns with related thinkers only in passing. Hence, we suggest, our approach can help to settle seemingly irresolvable disagreements by assessing at what juncture, and working out how, the transitions occur.

Assessment of demonstrability –Hegel

To assess whether the sort of reading that we are suggesting allows demonstrable engagement without polemics, we will briefly

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542 W thus support Davis’ early suggestion that Derrida’s work goes “far deeper than simple critique”, in that “his intense and ongoing studies of Husserl and Heidegger put him in an almost unique position to assess Levinas’ relationship to his most evident sources. Most importantly, Derrida’s essay is also to some extent an act of philosophical self-recognition, as Levinas’ ambiguous relationship to the language and values of the philosophical tradition is a reflection of Derrida’s own position.” (Davis 64). Again, we have sought – and are seeking – to work out how this “self-recognition” occurs. Thus we have worked out how the “reflection” in this case is a reversal of Levinas’ sort of intentionality rather than an emulation.
address the issue of whether Derrida is “Hegelian”. Lawlor followed Gasché to suggest Derrida was “very close to Hegel” in a tradition developed from Hyppolite (Gasché 1986, Lawlor 2002). We will first summarise Lawlor’s elegant explanation of Hyppolite’s version of Hegel’s logic. For Hegel, to think of language as univocal (the Logos), the knowing subject animating “empirical reflection” negates the external and empirical origin (Lawlor 2002, 97, 93). This leads to a turn to “internal” (or speculative) negation, which is then a negation of itself (Lawlor 2002, 98). In turn, this implies an internal moment as a contradiction between opposites in itself (speculative reflection is self-contradictory (LeE 131, 154; LE 102, 119)) in stasis, and relation of mediation between others in its internal difference from itself (an essential difference) (Lawlor 2002, 98)). In the latter case, the internal absolute in difference from itself will be mediation (thus, for Lawlor, Derrida’s arrival at the Absolute as passage is analogous to this progress (LeE 74, LE 61)). But in this difference from itself, position can turn back to the “absolute position” via a negation of negation (Lawlor 2002, 99, LeE 130-131, LE 101-102). The Logos thinks the univocal “beyond” of Nature (the other to the Logos) only in its self-contradiction and difference from itself (Lawlor 2002, 99).

To assess this: Derrida in 1962, had set aside negation, and permitted no absolute opposition or contradiction (Lawlor agrees with this (Lawlor 2002, 140, cf. LE 113, LeE 145, our emphases)).
Hence it is very difficult to deem Derrida’s approach to Hegel in 1962 is compatible with Hyppolite, or with Hegel. In 1964, we summarised that Derrida avoids negation of negation, and then worked out how contradiction leads to “stifling” of the Logos, rather than its thinking of the “beyond”. Derrida was doubtless inspired by Hyppolite and Hegel (as he was by Husserl and Heidegger); we merely note that to the extent that a reading seeks external influence, to that extent address to Derrida’s concerns is precluded, as is how they impel his transitions and development.

To that end, we have not yet chanced upon readers who have mentioned, thus nor who have demonstrated, that “Violence and Metaphysics” is still a developing work (by Derrida’s standards). That is, we noted that “Violence and Metaphysics” is situated on a cusp, as the philosopher began to get a sense of how the trace (and différence, which he must yet develop) might align with the

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543 Lawlor summarises the “system of totality”: “if this difference is one that breaks through to the other as other – finite and not the same – and also at the same time one that makes the other be the same -- infinite and not not the same -- then this difference must be understood as negativity. [...] But also at the same time, insofar as the totality must be infinite sameness, it must negate what is not the same (not not the same)” (Lawlor 2002, 155, our emphases). It does seem to us that Lawlor develops a further “level” in negativity, as did we via the Other. However, in sum, in working from 1964, we employed the levels of “the other” and “the Other” (but also “autrui” and “Autrui”), to develop our whole-part levels, along with the general and specific relations (such as the éternité), and the divergence between “at once” and “at the same time”). Even so, this relation was merely one moment upon the way, in what we developed as a progression from positive economy to the responsibility of God in the subjective a priori.

544 Derrida referred in a footnote of the “Introduction” to Logic and Existence as allowing the “profound convergence” of “Hegelian and Husserlian thought to appear” (IOG 67, fn. 62).
levels and directions of 1964 to imply a new way to address these concerns; indeed, an approach applicable to any such attempt in a “history of metaphysics”. The breakthrough work to do so was “Of Grammatology” of 1965 and 1966. To prepare for it, we will first need to address Saussure.
Chapter Seven: Saussure, semiology and form

This chapter turns to selected portions of Saussure’s posthumously-collated Course in General Linguistics (henceforth, Course) of 1916. We will develop the sequential progress of the “system” by which Saussure sought to prepare the way for “semiology” as the science of the social relations of signs. The progress will develop hierarchies and directions comparable to Derrida’s basic approach from earlier years. However, Saussure will begin from a psychological study of speech in consciousness, with formal bases, but devolve to a formalism alone. Our final part briefly notes some of the difficulties that these bases raise. As we select the portions to prepare for Derrida’s reading, little role for Saussure the practising linguist will be allowed, which we will explain as we progress.

Part One: from a linguistics of speech to semiology

Saussure too begins with an object that must be addressed. Moreover, “object” (objet) also refers to what must be addressed in order to determine it. Hence, a fortiori, every moment of address to this object will be teleological. The object is first that
“system” of “language” (*langage*) (C 33, 45, Ce 13, 24). Importantly, the parts of language are writing and speech. Linguistics can take both speech and writing as its object. *However, for Saussure, the optimal linguistics would be a study of speech.* Its particular object is the “spoken word” (C 45, Ce 24). As Saussure explains:

> [T]he linguistic object is not defined by the combination of the written word and the spoken word. *The spoken word constitutes its sole object.* (C 45, cf. Ce 24, in DLG 1033-1034, Derrida’s emphasis)

In this way, Saussure seeks to invert a tradition of linguistics in which writing has “usurped” the authority of speech. This occurred, Saussure explains, for at least two reasons. First, the written form of a word seemed “permanent” and hence more fitting to “persist through time” (C 45, Ce 25). Second, as writing “conveys visual impressions”, these seemed to be “clearer and more lasting than auditory impressions” (crucially, note that

545 Following Saussure, this chapter employs “is” uncritically, as Saussure never employs a critical language in the fashion that Derrida developed from Husserl. Derrida will not yet employ “is” in assessing Saussure (in the second article) until he has made Saussure’s psychology imply necessary contradiction, and aligned with the transcendental (DLG 23-25 (768 ff)). He will then begin to employ “is” (and “must”, “can” and so on) in systematic fashions, as will we.
Saussure takes writing to appear *visually* (C 46, Ce 47). Hence many took the written word as more reliable. Many, for example, took spelling from the written rather than spoken word (C 47, Ce 26). Thus, for Saussure, this visual and persistent writing, codified in written grammars, was deemed wrongly to be more important to linguistics than speech. Writing claimed an “unmerited” authority\(^{546}\) and the “natural” relation between writing and speech was “reversed” (C 47, Ce 26, DLG 1038).\(^{547}\)

**From the privilege of speech to phonetic writing**

The *crucial* reason that this privilege ought to be amended arises in that linguistics for Saussure – as for Derrida and Husserl – is a science of “consciousness” (C 140, Ce 98). Yet, Saussure emphasises,

we learn to speak before learning to write (C 47, Ce 26, in DLG 1038).

For Saussure this had been overlooked to egregious effect. Moreover, for Saussure, one had to learn to speak before writing

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\(^{546}\) Saussure writes that “the written word [...] manages to usurp the principal role.” (C 45, Ce 25).

\(^{547}\) We will return to this word “natural”, as it will signify both a telos of sensible presence in a psychology (as speech), and the restoration of the privilege of this speech to a linguistics. When Derrida has nearly evolved to include a transcendental basis (DLG 25 ff.), the “natural” will also have come to be equated with Husserl’s pejorative employment of this term as signalling an uncritical “natural attitude” (cf. 796 fn.).
even *in history* (backward). Indeed, nor are these directions confined to a single consciousness. Spoken or heard language for Saussure also has a “tradition” historically independent of and thus prior to any single consciousness.

Next (and moving “forward” from history), for Saussure as for Husserl and Derrida, language bestowed by the tradition must be available to a consciousness, thus able to be accessed by particular communities (C 112-113, Ce 77-78). By this Saussure begins to instil the *whole-part relations* to language. For what permits communication first is also “*language in general*” (*langage*) (C 31, Ce 14). In turn, the *particular* language which arose in history and is shared in a community is deemed a *tongue* (*langue*) (as, for example, various communities have a “native tongue” (C 44, Ce 24)). A tongue is one dialect permitted by language in general. Again, moving “downward” (to the most interior), as for Husserl’s intentional act, this tongue is produced only in “an individual act” (C 31, Ce 14) of speech. Saussure’s pun on the tongue as the physiological member that produces sound is considered (*langue*), as it *emphasises the necessary equation*, given Saussure’s *telos*, that must occur between the tongue and speech. Combining the above, *speech as the tongue must be more fundamental* to linguistics than writing.

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548 We translate *langue* as “tongue”, as a dialect of a nation or culture, rather than translating this as “linguistic structure”, “language system”, or “the language”, as occurs in our English version of the *Course*. Each of these obscure the connotation to the “tongue” employed in production of speech. Confusion is easily caused when referring to both “*langue*” and “*langage*” as “language”.
in its history (DLG 1038). The “natural” historical privilege (implicitly, “behind”) of speech over writing must be restored in the tongue (forward). For Saussure, only speech must be addressed in the tongue as the object of the study of linguistics in history. This study would be “phonetic”, as “the study of the evolution of sounds” (C 55-56, Ce 33) in history.

Thus Saussure’s concerns are practical – it is important to avoid taking from this “only” (seul) that Saussure does exclude writing from phonetics. Writing is acknowledged as an “independent” system, thus is “comparable” to speech when Saussure requires it (C 33, 165; Ce 13, 117, DLG 28). However, when he is concerned with a linguistics of speech, Saussure refers to writing unwillingly (cf. C 44, Ce 24), as he seeks to restore the privilege of speech. Writing must rather merely be a subordinate system in this phonetics of speech.

To begin to assess how this could occur: first, writing is also an “independent part” of language in general, which also holds as a part of the tongue (i.e. the tongue in general). Hence, first, writing must also hold as an independent part in history, in the study of phonetics. As Saussure puts it:

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549 The word “phonetics” derives from the Greek “phonetikos”, as “relating to speech” (the Greek phone) (CD 1130).
550 Saussure explains that “in that other system of signs, writing […] offers a useful comparison.” (C 165, Ce 117).
551 Saussure in the Course also complains: “[E]ven in the case of our native tongue, the written form constantly intrudes.” (C 44, Ce 24).
the tongue thus has an oral tradition independent of writing (C 46, DLG 1038).

However, as Saussure wants linguistics to be the study of speech (C 56, Ce 33), in order to determine it as the tongue, he deems the only purpose of writing to be that of “representing” (or “figuring”) speech. Saussure calls this “phonetic writing” (C 47, Ce 26).  

The whole-part relations at work

These introductory bases in place, we begin to explain how, for Saussure, restoring speech as the primary object ought to occur. First, instead of merely inside-outside relations as objectual, a general-particular (and more basically, whole-part) system is applying in this teleology. Saussure calls this a “Course in General Linguistics” (our emphasis). As Husserl knew (cf. Ch. 2), whole-part relations of dependence and independence arise whenever objects are arranged inside or outside one another in order to be determined. Saussure writes:

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552 The page numbers that Derrida provides in his article diverge from those we have found in our French version. We have listed the page numbers for his quotes as we have found them in our version.

553 Saussure summarises our progress thus far: “[The concrete object of our study is [...] the tongue. But this product differs from one linguistic community to another. What is given to us are tongues [langues], [...] The tongue [langue] and writing are not two distinct systems of signs; the sole reason for the existence of the latter is to represent the former. The linguistic object is not defined by a combination of the written word and the spoken word. The spoken word alone constitutes that object.” (C 44, Ce 24-25, our emphases).
The study of language in general thus comprises two parts. The essential part takes for its object the tongue, which is [...] independent of the individual. [...] The subsidiary part takes as its object the individual part of language, that is to say, speech, including phonation. (C 37, Ce 19, our emphases)

We return to “phonation” and the “individual” below. Thus far, as for Derrida and Husserl, the address is to an object (i.e. in front of a viewer), which also retains its whole-part relations. The initial object (of study) is language (langage). For Saussure’s whole-part arrangement, the relations “in” this object allow for independence. As for Husserl, what is individual is made “distinct” in the visual field. The tongue for Saussure “is independent” of speech, as a tongue can be thought without speech (it could be an act of writing, for example).

Note, however, that Saussure makes the object the tongue (which Derrida will take to be a tongue in general (DLG 1039)). One never speaks in every tongue, but only in a tongue (cf. C 44, Ce 24). Thus the tongue is also independent of the individual. An “individual”, as for Husserl, is that made distinct in the visual field. Saussure
wants only speech to be distinct, hence the tongue is “independent” of speech. However, speech is never made independent of tongues (C 44, Ce 24-25), for the former cannot occur without the latter, even though every tongue has not yet occurred. Speech also depends upon the tongue. As Saussure explains:

[D]oubtless, these two objects are linked and the one supposes the other (C 37, Ce 19, our emphases).

That is, speech is also a part of the tongue.

**The three levels, and the direction “across”**

In order to develop the hierarchy, we add the direction “across”. Saussure explains again that the acts of speech are “individual” (C 38, Ce 19). Crucially, these are never “collective”, they are never “united” into a greater whole. Rather, each is merely an “aggregate” (“somme”). In turn these can be put formally. The relations of speech are “no more than an aggregate [somme] of particular cases” (C 38, Ce 19, our emphases). Saussure explains this “formula” thus:

\[(1 + 1' + 1'' + 1'''\ldots)\] (C 38, Ce 19).
Note first that, as for Husserl and Derrida, “individuals” are made “particular” when formalised. Second, a fortiori, Saussure formalises these particular cases in a direction “across”, which we will also deem “forward”. We do so in that a prior moment (e.g. 1’) is necessary before the next (e.g. 1”) in every case.\textsuperscript{554} As Saussure puts it of individuals, these are the “acts of phonation […] necessary for the execution of these combination of words” (C 38, Ce 19). Third, the ellipsis (“…””) signals that the progress is not yet limited. To combine these: particular relations of aggregates of speech can continue in this direction, even though not yet united.

Moreover, the dashes signal that these particular cases are dependent. That is, each act of speech is an instance of a greater whole that appears partially, although not yet wholly.\textsuperscript{555} At this juncture the dependence of speech upon both language and the tongue is made obvious. Rather than language in general, such dependence of a particular moment of speech is first upon the tongue (i.e. the tongue in general (DLG 1039)). The directions of the tongue too are thus formalised “across”:

\[1 + 1 + 1 + \ldots\ (C.38, C.19).\]

\textsuperscript{554} Saussure seems to take this origin of speech (e.g. 1’) to be unproblematic, which Derrida will avoid doing.

\textsuperscript{555} The employment of the word “instance” is ours, in that the moment of the tongue is “in each individual, but is none the less common to all” (C.38, C.19, our emphasis), cf. our next page.
Importantly, Saussure adds no parentheses to this sequence, for
*the* tongue does not yet arise in any speech act, which in any
“linguistic community” is rather *a* tongue (C 44, Ce 25). Hence
the tongue *is not yet even aggregated*. It appears only “in” individual
acts of speech as “common” to all acts of speech in any
community (C 38, Ce 19).

Thus far, a moment of speech has been instilled by a greater
whole of the tongue. However, the tongue is a part of language in
general (*langage*), Saussure goes on that “language in general, as a
whole [*le tout global*]” is “unknowable” (C 38, Ce 20). Language in
general is so removed from the relations of speech that *Saussure
never even allows it to appear as formal*.556

**The lowest level as psycho-physical**

Hence to these whole-part relations we introduce Derrida’s term
“level” (DLG 1022, 1039, 30). Henceforth, each part is also
treatable as a lower “level”, and each whole a “higher”. As for
Derrida and Husserl, there are *three* levels: from lowest to highest.
The lowest, most particular, and thus “interior” is that of speech,
the next that of the tongue, and highest that of language in
general.

556 Language in general is deemed “heterogeneous” to that language which is
homogeneous and can be made a “language system” (C 31, Ce 14). Derrida
never overtly takes Saussure up on this heterogeneity of language in general as
an irreducible difference, although it is worth noting this further extreme of
what cannot appear as an object in the first place.
We begin with the lowest level. As speech can be made an individual, it too can be an object of study. However, in an important divergence from Derrida and Husserl, for Saussure this begins as a “psychological” (psychique) study. By this Saussure implies, along with the typical sense of psychological, a study of what is grasped in consciousness (C 98, Ce 66). The necessity of grasping in consciousness holds even when such objects are seemingly physical (sounds, syllables, etc.); they are to be assessed for their relations to one another as objects in consciousness. Crucially,

[T]his is a psycho-physical study. (C 37, Ce 20)

Thus at the lowest “level”, the object of study is speech (parole). In a psychology, the term “speech” implies the physiological production of an individual sound by organs such as the larynx, tongue etc. (Ce 67, C 42 ff.). The latter is deemed phonation (C 38, Ce 19). Each such individual act is in accordance with an act of the “will” of the speaker that produces a “spoken word” (C 45, Ce 24-25). At this lowest and most particular level, the object of study of the phonation of a spoken word as act of speech (parole) is produced as sound. This characteristic would be phonic. We will develop these

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557 Saussure opts for “psychique” (psychological) rather than “psychologique” (psychological). This will nevertheless still have the sense of “psychological” as Derrida takes it, following Husserl, as naively natural, but also the relation to a “psyche”, which Derrida will relate to the history of metaphysics.

558 Saussure writes “[S]peaking of the sounds and syllables of a word need not give rise to any misunderstanding, provided one always bears in mind that this refers to the acoustic-image” (C 98, Ce 66). We will develop these relations as we proceed.
relations as we go along. As an object of study, each act of speech proceeds “across”, as per Saussure’s formula above.

The tongue as telos of speech, at the second level

Next, we add what this progress must proceed across to (i.e. its telos). As both speech and the tongue are “objects”, the combinations of spoken words must be studied (C 37, Ce 19). Saussure wants to study more than one tongue, however, as linguistics would address what holds across many tongues, thus the tongue (the tongue in general).

To do so, indeed, the spoken word is phonated in a tongue, but proceeds according to the grammatical codes, “passively” available to the conscious act (C 30, Ce 13), provided by language (behind) and the tongue. But while language itself is unknowable, a tongue is “given to us” (C 44, Ce 24-25). Each act of speech occurs as a moment of a tongue. Thus the study of relations of speech are grasped only by a tongue arising inseparably with each act of speech (C 44, Ce 24). Hence Saussure deems that only the tongue is satisfactorily “graspable” by consciousness.\(^5\) A fortiori, according to this “formula” (as Derrida will take it, “form”), a linguistics of speech must proceed toward and be aggregated into the relations of the tongue. The tongue is the telos of study as a

\(^5\) Saussure explains: “linguistic structure seems to be the one thing that is independently definable and provides something our minds can satisfactorily grasp” (C 25, Ce 9).
“linguistics of speech” (C 38, Ce 20), which is henceforth Saussure’s preferred “linguistics”. Completely determining the tongue in a linguistics of speech would result in the optimal “linguistics in general” (DLG 1039).

In turn, as language in general has not yet appeared even formally, the study of the tongue must be employed to determine language in general (forward), even though it is unknowable. There is, for Saussure, “only one solution”:

[It] is necessary to make the prime concern

that of the terrain of tongue, and take it for the

norm of all the other manifestations of

language. (C 25, cf. Ce 25, Saussure’s emphases)

In accordance with Derrida in early years, the tongue (second level) must be addressed first to determine those relations that have not yet appeared.

**Continuing with the whole-part relations**

Next, we address how such a study of psycho-physical acts of speech can proceed “across” to an aggregate in the tongue. The word “terrain” above is helpful; this object will be addressed as a
visual “field”. Moreover, the relations of the tongue are deemed a system of signs (C 33, Ce 15). We will begin to develop the directions of the tongue in the overall system, in order to relate it to the field of signs.

First, as noted, speech furthers the telos of the system (to determine the tongue, forward). But the system also has the sense of a beginning (“starting point”), as Derrida’s original whole (DLG 33). It is thus necessary to begin from the whole in order to grasp the “elements” of this system. Saussure emphasises that

it is from the system as a whole [solidaire] that it

is necessary to begin to grasp the elements by

analysis (C 157, cf. Ce 112).

This allows for possibility too. Only beginning from the whole makes it possible (peut) for the “elements” to be “grasped” (C 157, cf. Ce 112).

As the directions “across” to parts arise from the whole as a “starting point”, we also deem that the relations of the system as a

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560 Every element thus far can be aligned in this fashion. As we noted, the formal sequence of speech began “(1’ + …)”, rather than as “… 1’ + …”). Speech is assumed to hold at the origin. In turn, it holds in accordance with “grammatical” rules which are “passively” received. As these are instituted by a tongue, this allows the progress to be “possible” (C 38-39, Ce 19-20, C 30, Ce 13).
whole hold “behind”. Such a whole includes the relations of history and phonetics as objects, although the whole exceeds it and is never necessarily temporal. The progress is formal, hence what holds “behind” does so as a prior necessity.

Next, we combine the above with the directions of history. A linguistics of speech would reverse the privilege of writing and restore the “natural” relations to speech, from behind. As noted, such a natural relation of history must be available to a community. It would be the tongue available to this community. Study of the tongue in turn is the aim by which to restore the “natural” privilege of writing (in the ordered progress, forward). That is, concern with the tongue “introduces a natural order” (C 25, Ce 10) to the study.

The parallel whole-part relations of the sign

As to how the progress can continue in the system as a whole, Saussure begins from the word. As noted, Saussure seeks to make the “spoken word” the sole object, rather than the written word (C 44, Ce 24-25). Thus the word holds as necessarily prior to any division between writing and speech, in the united whole.

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561 This “behind” refers to a direction in a teleology, as ever, as what is first necessary in order to achieve a telos, rather than a reified structure.
562 As we explained it above, the spoken word arises as the psycho-physical act of speech phonated according to the will of the speaker. It is important to note that the progress is cumulative.
563 As Derrida puts it (quoting and emphasising Saussure, as we did above), as to “the combination of the written word and spoken word; the latter alone
Hence Saussure turns to the “sign”, which is made a particular word. The spoken sign can thus be the sole object in a linguistics of speech. We thus add the whole-part levels and directions of the sign.

Saussure proposes to retain the word sign to designate the whole and to replace concept and acoustic image [image acoustique] respectively by signifier [signifiant] and signified [signifié] (C 99, Ce 67, our emphases).

A fortiori, Saussure’s word “sign” must be a whole divided into its parts, the signifier as acoustic image and signified as concept (C 99-100, Ce 67).

**The first alignment of signifier and speech (across)**

The word “signifier” can thus be the sole object of study, as an acoustic image. In turn, we are concerned with how the

constitutes that object.” Derrida goes on “the word is already a unity of sense and sound, concept and voice, [...] or signified and signifier” (DLG 1034, quoting C 44, Ce 25, Derrida’s emphasis).

564 “Signifier” and “signified” are translated as “signification” and “signal” respectively in our English translation of Saussure’s Course. We have preferred the latter, as is standard, and as Allison has done for this quote in “Speech and Phenomena” (SP 46 fn. 5, VP 51 fn.).
relations of the sign can further a teleology of the linguistics of speech, and align its whole-part relations with those of speech and the tongue. First, at the lowest level, Saussure deems that *even sound has a form* (to provide an Husserlian example, a melody can be formalised). It thus can form an acoustic *image*, as *visual*. Importantly, the acoustic image

can translate itself into one constant visual

image. (C.32, Ce 15)

As a sound can take a visual form as a “constant” image, Saussure then allows for a continuing progress of such constant acoustic images (signifiers). The signifier and speech align *with the particular form and order of the directions of speech in a psyche*.

Hence, Saussure also *depicts the movement in the form of the “horizontal” directions across*.

As for speech, Saussure explains the “order of signifiers”, in the form of one signifier at the lowest level, proceeding to the next
possible part as object, thus the next signifier without terminus (C 159, Ce 113, cf. DLG 24).\(^{565}\)

Note that the progress has evolved from the act of speech, which began its formal sequence with “1’”. However, the order of signifiers is no longer taken as, or requires, a terminus at the origin. These directions can proceed forward and backward (this will allow application of signifiers also to a history and origin in the system as a whole). *We will return to this lowest level of form* to assess how it allows “elements”. For the moment we take it that Saussure allows these forms to align at this level. We will continue to develop the whole-part parallels.

**Aligning the signified and tongue (across)**

Next, as he did with speech and the tongue, Saussure relays the relation of signifier to signified visually by levels “upward” or “downward”:

![Diagram](image)

Diag. b. (C 159, Ce 113)

Note that whether a relation arrives from “upward” or “downward” is of little concern. Each merely refers to an instantiation of a particular relation from “outside”. Even so, we

\(^{565}\) Both Saussure and Derrida employ the term “order” that allows for the ordinal necessity of a progression (the “order of signifiers”), a necessary hierarchy, and a coherent aggregation.
will develop this level “from underneath” later (695), as a helpful way to appreciate such basic relations. Thus far, a relation from the signified (from upward) arises with each signifier; this aligns with the form of speech and the tongue.

Moreover, each signifier “depends on the simultaneous coexistence” with its signifier and all of its signifieds (C 159, Ce 113). This merely implies a dependence, not yet a determination that these relations exist (for Derrida these must hold “at once”). It is rather implicit that they must hold as the whole of these relations, by means of the unity of directions “across”. This accords with the form of speech and the tongue. Importantly, the signified as concept is aligned with a tongue. That is, a signified arises with each signifier, as a tongue occurs in each act of speech. The telos of unity with all the signifieds aligns with that of the tongue.

**The sign as telos at the third level**

In turn, this telos of unity of signifier and signified (across, outward, upward etc.) would then also be a further whole in the sign. Saussure indeed does not yet suggest that this sign is made distinct. Indeed, he never allows the sign to appear in the diagrams at all, whether as a whole, behind or forward. As we noted, he merely “proposes” (hypothetically) to “designate” (refer to) the word “sign” as a whole (cf. DLG 1020, 1021). He thus merely “proposes” to designate it as a whole (behind, and forward).
Aligning the sign and language in general

Just so, the greater whole of the tongue is that of language in general. Language was made unknowable; and Saussure elided the sign from appearing. These too align at the third level (or whole) in that they have not yet appeared yet remain foundational. Moreover, as this proposed sign is prior to a signifier, the signifier would need to signify and unite with its signified in a sign. The telos of the linguistics of speech has evolved to that of the necessity of the study of the sign.\textsuperscript{566}

Toward semiology by study of the particular sign (upward)

It follows that, in this study of the spoken word, signifying must signify every concept as a sign. The relations of the tongue too must be a sign. Unifying the signifiers and signifieds as a sign, or comparably, speech and the tongue as a sign would determine (i.e. complete) the tongue as a linguistics in general, and indeed the sign of language in general.

At this juncture, Saussure works toward making the telos of a linguistics in general subsidiary to the telos of a greater “science”.

\textsuperscript{566} Note that these remain merely necessities, and teloi. That the determination of the tongue will not yet have occurred will imply that the progress toward language in general will never really begin in Saussure, it will remain unknowable. As Saussure explained above, the tongue will come to be the major concern. Just so, the progress of determining signs in Saussure will never really begin, as he will not yet determine signifiers and signifieds in a unity.
For the tongue in turn is comparable merely to one sign, in a field of social signs, which include writing. The comparable whole-part relations must be made a unity. This will be possible insofar as these are objects in the field. That is, a tongue must be studied as a part of the whole “field” (champ) of social signs (forward) (DLG 1039). We must be cautious, in that the relations of a field are never a whole, or levels, themselves, but the possible relations of an object visualised “forward”. To this field Saussure thus includes systems of signs that are neither spoken nor written, such as

the alphabet of deaf-mutes, symbolic rites,

forms of politeness, military signals (C 33, Ce 15, cf. DLG 28).

The tongue “is only the most important of these systems (C 33, Ce 13, cf. DLG 28, our emphasis). Thus to “discover” what can be said of a tongue in a linguistics of speech, what is common in “all other systems of the same kind” must be studied (C 35, Ce 17).\(^\text{567}\)

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\(^{567}\) Saussure explains that “[i]f one wishes to discover the true nature of tongues, one must first consider what they have in common with all other systems of the same kind” (C 35, Ce 17). Note that these are merely the “same” in a teleology; Derrida will employ his relations of the same.
**The highest telos of semiology “beyond”**

This brings us toward the highest telos. It would be the determination (or “seeing in a new perspective”) of *these signs and their relations in the whole field of social signs*. Saussure emphasises that:

> [B]y considering writing, customs, etc. as signs, it will be possible, we believe, to see them in a new perspective [...]. [This will be] in terms of the laws of semiology (C 35, Ce 17).

A fortiori, the study of the field of signs and their relations would allow the development of the laws of *a science of semiology* (from the Greek “sign” *(smeion)*) (C 33, Ce 15).

However, while every level is a telos in this progress, in a divergence from speech, the tongue, and language, semiology is a telos of a sort that does not yet exist. Even its *laws* must yet be determined. We avoid deeming such a telos a “level” (or a whole) at all; it will rather be aligned with a “beyond”.

Henceforth, the highest telos *must* be the study of the sign of the field of signs, as semiology. Indeed, this has developed in an ordered progress from the lowest particular level of speech and signifying, to the *possibility* of the conception (i.e. as a signified) of this science. Hence
it is possible to conceive [concevoir] of a science

which studies the role of signs (C 33, Ce 15, our emphases).

However, we must still develop a comparable moment to a “sign” “beyond”, that aligns with semiology.

**The alignment of the “beyond” also as idea**

For in turn, *as the telos of signification*, Saussure *also* adds the “idea”, of which *even the sign* is a part, at the highest level. As we explained, a part remains formal; a sign is still not yet individual or physical. As this sign does not yet appear, we deem this further level – as it is for Derrida – to hold “beyond”. In turn, the telos of semiology as a science is deemed the “ideal semiological process” (C 101, Ce 68); these too hold “beyond”, as teloi yet to be realised. Derrida will take this as the *idea of a science that studies the field of social signs by means of the spoken word alone* (DLG 1040).

**The teleology of the levels of psychology**

Thus far, *beginning from psychology* as the study of *speech*, linguistics must proceed “forward” to the tongue (second level) to arrive at a linguistics in general. In turn, as the tongue is a system of signs, it must be studied in the whole field of signs in order to determine the greater whole of language in general, to develop the laws of
semiology. *Saussure wants a psychological study of speech, at the most inside,* to be the way to determine the tongue (and thus linguistics in general), language in general, and semiology, at the higher levels outside. It is “for the psychologist to determine the exact place of semiology” (C 33, Ce 16, cf. DLG 1040). Yet thus far, even the tongue is not yet known, nor a linguistics in general attained. The sign and language in general have thus not yet begun to appear, and even less so has semiology as a science. Saussure’s is thus far a hierarchising progress of levels and directions as a teleology.

**Part Two: the address to semiology from the most interior**

**The devolution to the most interior**

Thus we turn to how psychology at the lowest level of the signifier would need to proceed toward semiology. It is important to note that the progress must begin from the lowest level. Yet *Saussure wants to avoid overt external dependence as founded “already” upon a “beyond”* (in the fashion of Husserl’s “Idea” in the Kantian sense). For Saussure this would assume the idea of a semiology in order to found a semiology, as it would assume what exceeds a sign. Crucially, the *basis for any progress must remain* interior to the linguistic system. Saussure explains that

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As Derrida also puts it: “all of linguistics, at the interior of semiology, is placed under the authority and surveillance of psychology” (DLG 1040, cf. CIG 33, Ce 13).
instead of ideas given in advance, we find values emanating from the system. (C 162, Ce 115, Saussure’s emphasis, cf. C 157, Ce 111)

For Saussure, as for Husserl, values hold when truth or falsity no longer apply to an object. That is, the progress of the directions at the inside must be withdrawn from affirmation of positive terms, and notably from the idea of truth. In turn, the lowest level is that of the signifier. The first implication is that the telos of thinking signifiers and signified as a unity that exceeds value is deemed a (seeming) impossibility (C 159, Ce 113).

Hence Saussure refers to the diagrams of the signifier and signified (632). He asks:

[S]o how does it come about that value, as defined, can [a possibility] be equated with sense, i.e. with the counterpart [signified] of the acoustic image [signifier]? For it seems impossible to assimilate the relations represented here by horizontal arrows to these other
relations represented [...] by *vertical* arrows (C

159, Ce 113, our emphases).

It might be helpful to note the *form* by which Saussure is proceeding. The necessity and possibility of movement from one to the other is first possible, yet this *telos of truth is then* negated, as it falls short of the outside and its unity with the signified (forward). It then seems impossible – rather than false – that the aggregates of signifiers can be united as their greater wholes. It seems that the unity of signifier and signified, distinct sign, and idea are impossible.

This begins to develop how semiology must be addressed. As we noted of the whole-part relations of language, semiology did not yet relate even to the sign of the field of signs yet remained a telos. The relations align with the levels of the sign. Given this right to speak of semiology, and its first possibility, linguistics can study the relations of the signifier to develop this idea of the science of semiology. Even should semiology then become impossible.\(^{569}\) Even when one *cannot say* it will ever exist. Saussure summarises:

\(^{569}\) As Derrida worked out of the relations of Husserl, even when expecting only a value, and even if the Idea is then impossible, Husserl retained a right to question the object (for Saussure, to study the object).
semiology […] does not yet exist, one cannot

[an impossibility] say that it will be, but it has a
	right to existence (C 34/15, in DLG 27).

Hence we turn to the solution by which Saussure proposes to retain the possibility of this idea of a science, by means of the value of signifiers, which fall short of unity with the signified.

**Falling short from the idea in value**

Importantly, this holds by insisting upon the arbitrariness of relation between the sound (thus the signifier) and the idea, etc. As Saussure explains:

\[
\text{Values remain entirely relative, and that is why}
\]

the link between idea and sound is radically arbitrary. (C 157, Ce 111)

Values are entirely relative to values, and thus without external relations. As to how such values can progress toward the unity of signifiers via arbitrariness (which will allow for negation) etc., *Saussure adds the “principle of difference”*. Even though still psychological, these will instil a difference from outside and inside.
The general and internal difference

We begin from furthest behind. First, importantly, just as he never allows for a founding “Idea” in the fashion of Derrida, Saussure never develops an irreducible difference, which must found even the difference; as a difference “beyond”. However, he assumes a relation in general. By this, he assumes “a difference” that already holds (behind):

in general, a difference presupposes positive terms

between which the difference holds (C 166, Ce 118, our emphases).

As Derrida will take this to allow consonance with his development, the original difference (as “anterior”) already “found” the system (DLG 33).\(^{570}\) Such a difference in general is taken to be possible. Thus, to move forward, it permits a particular and originary difference in the tongue and its signifiers. Forward again, it permits the differences amongst signifiers (cf. C 166, Ce 119). Indeed, as semiology has a right to exist, a right is retained for the movement of different signifiers to progress in order to determine semiology.

\(^{570}\) For Saussure, what is “presupposed” merely refers to a dependence upon a prior term. He never employs this term or “supposing” in the logical fashion that Derrida does. As with “is”, Derrida will not yet employ “suppose” until after his first alignment with a transcendental basis (cf. DLG 32-33 (cf. 809)).
However, moving forward, and as we develop below, insofar as its telos is speech at the most inside, this difference from one to the other – henceforth, an internal difference – does not yet permit a relation to the signified, even though this remains necessary (Saussure retains value for this movement, and allots relation to the signified to arbitrariness (C 157, Cc 111)). Hence, moving forward again, it does not yet permit signifying a difference from the sign (or the greater wholes of the idea, language in general etc.), from which it falls short.

Thus, as Derrida summarises of the essential “originality [originalité] of this difference”, its

possibility is anterior by rights to all that which one

calls sign (DLG 33, our emphases).

The anterior difference in general is taken for granted, as permission for his internal difference. Next, to move forward, note that such a difference in general (“behind”) could not yet be distinguished as all of a sign (forward). Relations of the value of difference must be particular, thus prior to the distinction of any whole term.

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571 As noted, for Derrida, originality is a predicate of origin of the ideal object that must already found the originary, as essential.
Devolving from opposition to internal difference

Thus Saussure’s internal difference seeks to proceed further “inward” to its parts. To do so, Saussure deems that the whole relations are “positive terms”, which he will separate from difference. For, at the level of the whole, the sign is deemed to be positive:

[T]he moment we consider the sign in its totality, we encounter something which is positive in its own domain. (C 166, Ce 118)

This develops the relations of distinctness rather than a difference. The former applies to a sign united into a totality of its components. This totality alone is in opposition (DLG 33) to related signs. For

[T]wo signs […] are not different from each other, but only distinct. They are simply in
Opposition is reserved only for distinctness, which is not yet included to the partial relations of the signifier and signified. To be sure, Saussure notes that the “combination” of signifier and signified is positive (C 166, cf. Ce 118-119), indeed, it is a fact. Indeed, for Saussure, this is the “sole species of facts comprising the tongue” (C 166, cf. Ce 119).

The progress of differences at the most interior

Thus while the totality of a sign, as signifier and signified, is a positive fact, Saussure is concerned with the particular relations. He famously seeks an internal difference without relation to positive terms (which latter are distinct signs). He writes:

\[ \text{As soon as one compares between signs –} \]

\[ \text{which are positive terms – one cannot any} \]

\[ \text{longer speak of difference; the expression} \]

\[ \text{would be improper, in that it applies only to} \]

\[ \text{Saussure employs a negation, although this is not yet the systematic employment of negation of signifiers that he will emphasise below (cf. 646). He is merely separating distinction from difference.} \]
the comparison between two acoustic images. (C 166, Ce 199, our emphasis)

Distinction would allow only a relation of opposition, by making even signifiers distinct, rather than a difference without opposition. Thus it is for the signifier as acoustic image alone (at the most interior) that Saussure reserves the lowest level of “difference”:

the term ‘difference’ [...] is suitable only for comparisons between acoustic images (C 166, Ce 118).

At this juncture the difficulty has arisen. Saussure seems to have constricted difference so far “inside” the tongue that no relation to any external concept (signified), sign or idea seems to be possible.

**Developing Saussure’s internal relations**

To attempt to restore this relation via difference without opposition, Saussure seeks to reproduce all the general-particular relations, negation and the non-relation; but as only upon the inside and its value (C 160, cf. Ce 114).

First, that signifiers must be related by “value” (C 158-161) allows for divergence from the telos of truth of an idea (C 162, Ce 115).
The relation of signifiers rather allows for “coverage” across signifiers; that is, no longer a particular relation between signs. For example,

The difference in value between *sheep* and *mouton* is that in English there is also another word *mutton* for the meat, whereas *mouton* in French *covers both.* (Ce 114, C 160, our emphasis last)

Value – and thus difference – is spread “around” (*autour*) multiple signifiers (cf. C 166, Ce 118).\(^{573}\) This develops how a “coverage” no longer instils the particular signifier in bivalent opposition to other signifiers. In turn, Saussure is able to retract from the positive – which he associates with distinct, opposite, and positive signs.

**The arrival at negation**

In so doing, Saussure is able to move to the relations of negation (*also* expressed by “not” (*n’est pas*)). As for Derrida in 1964, what each signifier “is not” no longer pertains to an opposite. As noted, opposition requires two distinct relations that can be opposed to

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\(^{573}\) Saussure’s ongoing employment of visual metaphors such as “next to” and “around” (C 166, Ce 118) is consistent with the formal approach as visual that Derrida will first assess. Both the English translator and Derrida (Ce 114, DLG 25) employ the metaphor of “covering.”
each other, and Saussure expressly allows distinction only for
signs as a whole. However, upon the “inside” he has allowed the
relations of negation by systematically developing the internal
progress of value. Such a lack of relation to an opposite holds
precisely insofar as the negation refers to a coverage dispersed
across the relations in (dans) the sign, even though the sign is not
yet determined. Just so, these relations hold of signifiers as
parallel to speech “in” the tongue. In the tongue each signifier
thus no longer relates to any positive term. Each is rather addressed by
other signifiers in their value (inside), rather than negating the sense
of a single or objectual sign at the highest level.

Saussure writes of such sorts of relations:

[w]hat characterises each most exactly is being

whatever the others are not. (C 162, Ce 115, our

emphases)

Thus, importantly, what is not the signifier must be only in
“contrast” to other signifiers, as the non-relation. Saussure
summarises:

it will never be possible for a fragment [part] of

the tongue to be founded upon anything other
than its non-coincidence with the rest. (C 163, cf. Ce 116, our emphases)

As we explained, the term “non” develops general-particular relations. A particular object can be “not” other particular objects (the castle is not the tree), but only in non-relation to every object around it (336, 514-516). That is, a non-relation refers from a particular object to others “around” itself, without opposition. Indeed, Saussure summarises that

\begin{quote}
in [dans] a sign, that which matters more than any idea or sound associated with it is what there is around it in other signs [autour de lui dans les autres signes] (C 166, Ce 118, our emphasis).
\end{quote}

Crucially, *Saussure summarises the approach above*:

\begin{quote}
Everything we have said so far comes down to this. In the tongue, there are only [particular] differences. Even more important than that is that, *in general a difference presupposes positive terms* [from behind] between which [and thus opposite
to] the [general] difference holds, in the tongue there

are only [particular] differences, without positive terms. (C 166, Ce 118, Saussure’s emphasis first).

However, we have not yet addressed how, for Saussure, the movement from signifier to signifier can proceed via internal difference toward unity in the concept of a tongue (as linguistics), without positive terms.

**The necessity of arbitrariness**

Thus far, the internal difference and negation amongst signifiers without opposition, prevents the opposition of truth and falsity. Each signifier retains only a value for the goal of determining the tongue. Its value develops by means of the coverage of each signifier, or the network of relations to related signifiers. The greater the coverage, the more progress has been made toward determination of a tongue. But for greater coverage to avoid making a signifier distinct, which would render it a positive fact again, the relation of signifier to the outside must be arbitrary. Hence Saussure deems this his “fundamental principle”:

[The link between signifier and signified is

arbitrary [arbitraire] (C 100, Ce 67).
Note that it is only the “link” between signifier and *signified* (rather than other signifiers) that must be arbitrary (cf. DLG 23-24). Putting this via the levels: it is the *relation* between a particular acoustic image becoming itself “at the interior” (DLG 24) and the signified (as exterior) that must be arbitrary. Moreover, this holds of a signified in particular or *general*.

Thus indeed, Saussure explains the relations of *difference* as only *holding internally in comparison of signifiers*. He provides an example, in that the “French sequence of sounds s-ö-r” (inside) and the idea “sister”, have no “internal connection” (C 100, Ce 67) (i.e. as “beyond”). Rather, the relation of each such acoustic image to its outside is arbitrary. And first of all, for Saussure, this relation to the outside as arbitrary must be the concept (signified). Saussure’s related example is from the sound to the concept “father” (C 100, Ce 67). Hence, further outside, the relations from the acoustic image to the “idea” (beyond) is without relation even between arbitrariness and difference, and Saussure refused such relations of an “idea” outside.

Even so, this does not yet preclude a relation from the signified. We can thus begin to explain how this movement of internal difference of signifiers can retain only value, to *avoid* a relation of difference to the signified. For as Saussure explains:

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574 Note that the relation between signifiers must *avoid* arbitrariness, which would make the outside arbitrary – this is very far from a relativism.
Arbitrary and differential [i.e. different] are correlative qualities (C 163, cf. Ce 116, Saussure’s emphases).

Saussure, like Husserl, takes “correlative” to express two certain terms which are first related, and provide a right for, but do not yet converge upon truth (rather, what arises from the correlation of difference and arbitrariness is value). Internal difference retains its value amongst particular signifiers (inside, across), as permitted by arbitrary relation to the general or external whole.

Thus what seems like a difficulty in Saussure is the moment his system matures at the most interior. As internal difference depends upon arbitrariness as instilling an immotivated relation to the signified (“outside”), the reader might suspect a strange division that would restore a difference between signifier and a signified, outside, undoing Saussure’s internality. But it is just this that Saussure seeks to address, and “outside” expresses a direction rather than constituting an external object. The relationship to the

578 Given Saussure’s telos, we take “differential” between the signified and its others to signify an internal and constituting “difference”. Saussure never needs to clarify the relations of “differential” or “different”, also writing, for example that signs are “constituted solely by differences” (C 117). For Derrida, this is important, as Saussure’s differential and arbitrary “properties” are predicates. They only become “difference” in intentionality as objectual. Derrida will begin with arbitrariness, but will only arrive at difference once he has instilled the relation of the trace, which can signify the relation of objectual difference, to some degree, without absolutely objectifying it. This will be a difference *as such*. 
signified is arbitrary insofar as difference and arbitrariness are “co-relative”: the *more* the difference between signifiers, the relatively *more* the arbitrariness between signifier and signified.\textsuperscript{576}

But such arbitrariness of a signifier in coverage *avoids opposition to all the other signifiers*.

Thus the movement of differences between signifier and signifier avoids referring to all the other signifiers (and a signified in general), as thought “outside” in a simple sense. *Both* difference and arbitrariness must be internal, and each difference of signifier to signifier (inside) must *signify* an outside *in general* “without difference” (DLG 31) upon the inside.\textsuperscript{577} That is, as a signifier in its coverage *avoids opposition to all the other signifiers*, the “difference” between signifier and signifier would be a *non-difference* from signifier to signified (as Derrida will put it, this implies that the difference is “nothing” (cf. DLG 1029)).

**Summary of Saussure’s internal teleology in psychology**

In this moment, we suggest, Saussure’s psychology in its part-whole levels and directions accomplishes an involution comparable to Derrida’s turn to the Absolute from 1962 and

\textsuperscript{576} That correlativeity requires moments of “more” and “more” will be important in Derrida’s approach to contradiction. The contradiction in Saussure’s outcome will be between a relation that opposes the “more” and “more” at once (769).

\textsuperscript{577} As Derrida explained it, this is “the desire [demand] for speech without writing, that is to say without difference.” (DLG 31).
1964. Saussure develops a most interior without limit to the exterior. As Derrida summarises:

\[
\text{[At the inside of the ‘natural’ relation between}
\]

the phonic signifiers and their signifieds in

general, the relation between each determined

signifier and each determined signifier would be

\textit{arbitrary}. (DLG 24, our emphases)

Moreover, we have arrived at how the system at the most interior would allow internal difference, and thus semiology. When each signifier is different to, not but no longer opposite to all the other signifiers, its value provided merely by coverage with other signifiers, while its relation to the signified in general is arbitrary, then movement as a series of different signifiers, toward a telos of the signified as unity of a particular sign \textit{can} and has a \textit{right} to occur.

But this does not yet determine the relation to the signified, hence nor its relation to the greater unity in the idea of a sign. Thus, to make these relations individual: as noted, speech proceeds at the most interior as a signifier. Hence to achieve this telos of a linguistics in general, this movement of the signifier must signify

\[578\] We will return to Derrida’s employment of the conditional tense.
the tongue at the lowest level to determine the particular sign of
the (total) field of signs at the highest. This would determine the
relations of the sign, thus of the laws of semiology. To do so, for
Saussure, it must begin from the movement of signifiers, without
yet determining a difference from (or relation to) the signified,
sign or idea of semiology. Only this allows Saussure to speak of a
semiology which has a “right” to exist but remains only a telos.

Part Three: the “second” Saussure, and the formal
relations of the signifier

The transition to the elemental sound

However, a difficulty remains – that of the origin of these
relations. It must be asked how the highest moment of the idea
can arise at the most particular level of a signifier, and in turn the
idea of the sign etc., each of which would be contained by it. To
do so, Saussure seeks to appeal to sound. For even the idea first
arises as a sound. Thus

[...] every linguistic signifier is a part or a

member, [...] where an idea fixes itself [s'fixe]

in a sound, and a sound becomes the sign of an

idea. (C 157, Ce 111, our emphases)
Note that this is no longer a “comparison” (C 33, 165; Ce 13, 117, DLG 28). The idea of which the sign is a part fixes itself in a sound. It might well be suspected that whatever allows this fixation of sound would found the overall system. To prepare to address this, note that sound applies at the particular level as the signifier. Yet sound comprises merely a part of the signifier (as acoustic image). Saussure also develops these part-whole relations.

From this juncture, a reader would be justified in finding a second “Saussure” in the Course in General Linguistics. That is, although the directions and levels of speech, signifier, etc. had their formal bases, from the moment that Saussure devolves to the partial relations of the signifier, Derrida sets aside phonation, and the physical. Indeed, it is important to note that from that juncture the progress will no longer be concerned with psychology. Rather, Saussure in these whole-part relations seeks to found the formal relations of the signifier upon the elemental base of the phoneme. Yet, the relations will nevertheless found the signifier, which in turn would proceed toward chains of signifieds. These relations too are necessary for a semiology. Hence we turn to the formal relations of the signifier, as the necessarily elemental relations even of speech.

The formal relations of the signifier made partial

First, note that the signifier is never anything sensible or psychological per se. Rather, Saussure proposes to apply the word “signifier” to designate the “acoustic image” (C 99, Ce 67). The
word “signifier” refers to a form by which the acoustic and the image relate as speech. That is, the signifier in this case takes the form of a unity rather even than the psycho-physical phonation. Thus Saussure seeks to unite the chains of the aggregates of speech with the signifier in the form of the acoustic-image. He thus adds a form that aligns with speech, and a particular form of speech, which together will comprise the acoustic image. This will develop the crux of his linguistics of speech (at the most inside).

**The first partial relation of the signifier**

To begin to explain this: note that forms are nevertheless forms of relations, which can be investigated. That is, even though the laws of semiology have not yet been developed, the relations of form hold, as that of which they are a form (Derrida will take the relations as essential (cf. C 37, Ce 19)).

Thus, to investigate these formal relations: first, to proceed in the psyche toward a tongue, a psyche must be able to understand what is spoken. It must thus be able to hear what is spoken, and must be able to hear a sound. Importantly, *Saussure calls the formal relation that allows this the “psychic imprint”*. It formalises how the acoustic is heard by a psyche. Thus as what is spoken is heard, the

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579 Saussure made the “essential relations those of the tongue” (C 38, Ce 19, Cb 37). That it could be extrapolating too much to develop essential relations in Saussure will be addressed below.

580 In French, “entendre” has the sense of both hearing and understanding.
unit of hearing too occurs in a psyche. Note that Saussure is never concerned to ask whether an external hearer perceives the sound, as he assesses the object of speech in linguistics. The concern is with a psyche hearing the sound that is spoken. Hence, as the imprint is required for the acoustic and the spoken, it subdivides into two chains.

The particular chains of acoustic impression and articulation

Thus, just as speech proceeds as an aggregate of chains (623), so “acoustic chains” too proceed in aggregate (somme, (C 6, Ce 41)). However, for Saussure the two chains of speech and hearing are made into a unity (unité) in the form of an “acoustic impression”. Note that an “impression” also remains formal, as a visual image of the acoustic. To explain how this would progress from the chains of acoustic impressions to the signifier: the impression makes an imprint that can be a visual image of the acoustic, permitting one of the relations of an acoustic image (signifier).

Second, the form of the produced unit of speech (rather than the phonation) is particularised to what Saussure calls “articulation”. Saussure takes this from the Latin “articulus”, which he aligns with a “part” (C 26, Ce 10, DLG 35). Moreover, an articulation also has the sense of a division of an act of speech. However, as formal and particular, it refers rather to “the subdivision of the spoken chain in syllables” (C 35, our emphases). That is to say, a
syllable is the *smallest unit* (part) of a spoken word, which particular syllables can be formalised as a visual chain into a spoken word. Hence, articulation is formal, and not yet the sense of an individual or physical act of phonation. The chain of particular syllables is *aggregated* into the form of an “articulatory movement” as a spoken word. Moreover, Saussure privileges the latter chain. Addressing the acoustic impression can occur *only via the articulatory chains*; for the “acoustic unities taken in their own chains are unanalysable” (C 66, Cf. Ce 42).  

**The elemental unity of the phoneme**

Thus articulatory chains are the most particular (lowest) level that can be made an object of study, even in the signifier. However, for Saussure, each of the aggregated chains of acoustic impression and articulatory movement can be unified, and then both unified (or rather, for Saussure they are “already” unified) into a *phoneme*. Saussure explains that

> the phoneme is the aggregate of acoustic impressions

and articulatory movements, the heard unity and the

> spoken unity, the one conditioning the other:

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581 Derrida might well accord with this, as he will address the articulatory chains alone.
thus it is already a complex unity, which has a foot

in each chain. (C 65 cf. Ce 41, our emphases)

Saussure makes no overt appeal to this moment as a unit of meaning in the psyche (for Saussure, the psyche is an object of study). Rather, the “phoneme”, as the complex unity of the articulation and the acoustic impression, refers to the smallest possible unit of speech which allows the linguist to “know [connaître] and classify” (C 66, Ce 41) these relations as objects of study. The phoneme is thus deemed an “element”. We have arrived at the elemental unity that allows these partial relations to permit linguistics. That is, as objects, phonemes in turn allow for the acoustic (i.e. acoustic impression) and the visual and most particular form of speech (as an image) to be a “constant visual image”. Phonemes are the elements of signifiers. In turn, the latter can proceed as chains at the most interior, on the base (sur la base) of the phoneme.

However, from the diagram above, an aggregate of signifiers is not yet determined in a unity with the signified. The elemental unity of the phoneme nevertheless remains a basis for the signifier of which the telos is the tongue. Thus, in a teleology of the linguistics of speech (i.e. of the formal relations of speech and hearing), the

582 Derrida will thus proceed by means of sense (rather than Bedeutung in Husserl's fashion).
interior of the psyche is comprised only of signifiers. In turn, only signifiers comprise a tongue, and “[I]n the tongue […] there are only acoustic images” (C 32, cf. Ce 15). Saussure has united the parallel whole-part relations of the signifier at the lowest level, by these formal relations of the signifier. In so doing, he unites the basis of the linguistics of speech upon these formal chains.

**Temporality as internal form**

Next, in this devolution to form, Saussure aligns with temporality. To explain this, we begin from speech and devolve to the phoneme. As noted, Saussure allotted (psycho-physical) speech a form in its ordinal progression from the first (i.e. in the “formula” “(1 + 1’ …)”, (623)). That “formula” is a visual and formal necessity of ordinal progress (for example, “ 1” ” must occur after “ 1' ”). Psycho-physicality in turn evolved to the form of the signifier (as acoustic image), which must allow for translation as “one constant visual image” (C 32, Ce 15). In the alignment of particular sequences of signifiers, however, Saussure explains that in the Greek word “barbaros” (barbarian), each sound “corresponds” (correspond) to a letter:

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B A Ρ B A Ρ O Σ
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583 Thus Saussure takes the classical Greek alphabet as optimal (C 64, Ce 64).
As for speech and the signifier, the progress is formally directional. The “horizontal” line “represents the phonic chain”, and the “vertical” lines represent the movement “from one sound to an other [un autre]” (C 64, Ce 40). Note that, implicitly, such sequences in turn must be united into signifieds in these chains. However, note also that there are multiple “vertical” lines in the direction across. Saussure deems that this form represents a temporal movement.

Saussure then avoids an incipient difficulty. It follows that to unite sound as a constant visual image requires a temporality that does not yet allow divided units of time (we avoid yet writing “different”, which word Saussure does not yet include to this section. Indeed, Saussure explains that each of the letters occurs “in a homogeneous time” (temps homogène) (C 64, cf. Ce 40). That is, he goes on, the “duration” of a unit of sound is of little import, the important relation is the “impression” (C 64, Ce 40). Hence, we note, the formal relation is no longer that of actually (and materially, and psycho-physically) divided times.

In turn, the partial relations of the acoustic image evolved into the unity of the chains of acoustic impression and articulatory

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584 Saussure explains that “the acoustic chain does not divide itself into equal times, but into homogeneous times, characterised by the unity of the impression” (C 64, cf. Ce 40). Saussure’s “not” is not yet employed in the fashion by which he relates it to difference, for no relation to difference is yet developed in this section of the Course (668).
movement follows (659 ff.). Saussure explains that the unit of the chain of the acoustic impression “corresponds” to the unit of the articulatory sequence:

\[ b \text{ (auditory time)} = b' \text{ (articulatory time)} \]  
\[ (C 65, \text{cf. Ce 40}). \]

Saussure deems this sequence the *elemental basis for the phoneme as “spoken chain”* (C 65). We have devolved to the most elemental relation. That is, our chapter has developed the relations of this teleology from a psycho-physical linguistics (upward) to its goal of semiology. It also proceeded downward to the elemental and formal relations of the signifier. In turn, the relations of the former to the latter develop some difficulties for Saussure.

**Part Four: the difficulties of alignment between the first and second Saussure**

**The first difficulty: the retraction to form**

First, we explained that Saussure began by opting for psychology as the means by which to develop a semiology. Those psychological relations were also formalised. Yet to arrive at the elemental unity of the acoustic image in the phoneme, *Saussure needed to appeal to multiple relations of form alone.* The latter arose from the complex unity of articulation, and the acoustic impression. Indeed, to allow both bases, Saussure dissociates *psychology* (the
study of sound in the psyche), from phonology (the study of the form of the “physiology of sound” (C 55, Ce 32, C 63)). Moreover, he emphasises that the relation between them can be thought only by “abstraction”, in his reformulated sort of “linguistics”. However, he also emphasises the preference for form:

[L]inguistics, thus, works at these limits [le terrain limitrophe] where the elements of two orders combine; this combination produces a form, not [non] a substance. (C 157, cf. Ce 111, Saussure’s emphasis)

Saussure’s telos of psychology is set against his formalism. The tongue, comprised of acoustic images, is a form and not [non] a substance (C 169, Ce 120).

The issue thus arises as to how form could allow any individual speech as psychological. That is, the latter began from a study of phonation. However, an articulation formalises the particular relations of syllabification, but never formalises the vocal production of sound by the larynx etc., in phonation. We deem this Saussure’s “first difficulty”.
The second difficulty: the dependence on writing

However, Saussure is aware that these “chains” of phonemes never quite allow for such relation (C 65, Ce 41). His solution might be surprising. To opt for form in the phoneme, he sets aside phonation. He concedes that the physical production of the movements of speech would be “infinite”, and argues that “phonemes” are elemental in that there are only a finite (limited) number of forms. That is, he argues that there are merely a limited number of phonemes (i.e. a language allows only a limited number of syllables).

Thus, a fortiori; it is at the lowest level of the phoneme that Saussure also locates the basis of “writing” A sign of writing thus “corresponds” to these lowest elemental forms of the phoneme. Each phoneme can be represented by a corresponding sign of writing. Saussure summarises the above:

[i]n [dans] the tongue […] there is only the acoustic image, and that can translate itself into one constant visual image. For when one abstracts the multitude of movements necessary required to complete it in speech,
each acoustic image […] is the sum of a limited
number of elements or phonemes, susceptible
in their turn to being evoked by a
corresponding number of signs of writing. (C
32, cf. Ce 15, our emphasis)

The acoustic image, and thus relations in the tongue, depend
upon the system of phonetic writing, arising at the level of the
phoneme, for its “tangible” form:

the tongue is a repository of acoustic images,

and writing the tangible form of these images.

(C 32, Ce 15)

Writing is the form upon which the tongue, and thus the
linguistics of speech, linguistics in general, and semiology depend
for their tangibility.

The outcome has led to a second difficulty. Saussure sought for
his psychology to exclude the relations of phonetic writing – the
study which must “represent” and “figure” the formal relations of
speech in history. Yet the phoneme at the lowest level depends
upon a corresponding moment of writing for its tangible form
(Derrida will call this the grapheme). It might well hold that the
grapheme allows for phonetic writing to figure speech as a
However, what began by seeking to exclude a psychological sort of writing has come to depend upon writing as formal. We deem this the second difficulty.

**The third difficulty: the status of temporality**

Next, we add a difficulty that pertains to both psychology and formalism. First, Saussure’s psychology accepts that phonation (by the larynx, and so on) occurs in an unexamined sort of temporality. A psychological moment of space too was *implicit*. However, the temporality that Saussure made “elemental” was the formal. This occurred as the “spoken chains” in phonemes (such as the aggregate of syllables “barbarai” (C 64, Ce 40 (662)).

Second, that time was “homogeneous” (*temps homogène*) (C 64, cf. Ce 40). We noted that even the formal relations ought not yet to allow heterogeneity as temporal *difference*. Saussure indeed set aside the importance of “duration” in favour of the “impression” (C 64, cf. Ce 40), and never mentioned “difference” at that juncture (C 62-64, cf. Ce 39-40). Third, for Saussure as its elemental “base” of spoken chains, the phoneme depended upon the correspondence of the units of auditory and articulatory movement (C 63-66, Ce 39-41). Those relations were explained as

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585 It might be argued that the difficulty is formal too: that of necessary contradiction; speech was made an independent part of writing, yet speech depends upon writing for its tangibility at the lowest level. Derrida will assess these relations in detail, to develop a trace from the necessary contradiction.
correspondent at base (i.e. as “b = b’”). A series of sequential difficulties arise, in the order above.

First, as formal – is the temporal relation to be psycho-physical or formal? Second, in a homogeneous time without duration, would temporality apply to difference in any psychological sense? Third, the basal temporal correspondence of “b’ (auditory time) = b” (articulatory time)” (C 65, cf. Ce 40) is no longer even overtly temporal. Should the spoken chain depend upon a temporal sequence at base that never appears even formally, could temporality have a role in the system?

The fourth difficulty: the phoneme and difference

The final difficulty applies to the relations of the overall system. In the section that emphasises that arbitrariness and difference are correlative, Saussure also retracts from substance. However, he goes on that

the linguistic signifier is incorporeal,

constituted not by [non par] its material substance, but uniquely by the differences that separate the acoustic image from all the others.

(C 165, cf. Ce 117)
Yet at this juncture, he also explains that

this fundamental principle applies to every

material element used by the tongue, which

comprise of phonemes. [...] Phonemes are

above all contrastive, relative and negative

entities. (C 164, cf. Ce 117)

The first implication is an opportunity. The progress of differences, negations, contrast, etc. that applied to signifiers pertain also to phonemes. It is thus implicit that the relations of difference etc. apply to the particular relations of the phoneme, as articulation. Thus, although – we noted – Saussure never overtly relates articulation to difference, negation etc., the above would allow the relations to be common in this teleology, from the progress of articulation up to the telos of semiology.

However, the difficulty is again that of formalism versus psycho-physicality. Saussure made the phoneme a formal unity. He then disqualified the formal from relation to substance. Yet Saussure has just equated the phoneme with the material (i.e. physical and substantial) relations. At issue is whether the phoneme ought to be treated as psycho-physical or formal. This pertains to its
particular relations. Are the relations of difference, negation, non-relation, articulation etc. to be taken as formal or psycho-physical?

These bases developed, we turn to Derrida’s approach. The first part of our next chapter will summarise how Derrida will engage with Saussure. In so doing we will prepare for how Derrida will develop his concerns.
Chapter Eight: From Saussure to Metaphysics (“Of Grammatology”, Pt. 1, 1965)

This chapter is preparatory, and turns to the first of Derrida’s French articles “Of Grammatology”, published in 1965 and 1966. We will summarise how Derrida aligns his concerns and relations from earlier years basically with Saussure. As these bases are common, Derrida will also begin to align them with the relations of a “history of metaphysics”. By such parallels the implications that might follow from reading Saussure will be made applicable to that history. At the more basic level, when such relations are deemed to remain merely internal, they will preclude a trace. This will develop the necessity of working out the trace that Derrida will follow in “Of Grammatology” of 1966, by beginning to test Saussure’s psycho-physiology and its telos of semiology. We will turn to that second article in our next chapter.

Part One: preparing for our next three chapters

To prepare the reader, we will situate how Derrida will proceed. First, it might have been noted that Saussure’s system, developed in our previous chapter, conforms very basically to Derrida’s approach as he had developed it since 1954. Each approach begins from address to a particular object, which needs to be determined as a whole (or outside, or absolutely). Each seeks to address relations both of an
origin in consciousness, and an origin of history. Each then
developed directions “forward”, which allow for relations
“backward”.

In turn, that a right to an ideal science holds even without the
latter’s existence allows comparison. So too does that value arises
prior to and retracted from even truth and impossibility. Just so,
the progress of signifiers is comparable in its directional form to
the progress from one to the other (Derrida’s first direction).
Importantly, each in turn proceeds by means of an internal negation,
without opposition to the external. Each allows for a non-relation as
both general and particular, referring around itself.

Thereafter, each developed three sorts of levels in this approach.
In sum, the relations from signifier to signified align with a telos
of unity of the other in general as Other. The sign as further
inaccessible whole basically parallels the level of the Other as
Other. The telos of an idea of semiology that does not yet exist
aligns with Husserl’s telos of the ideal of science, and a
foundational relation upon an idea. In general this applies to the
necessity of relation to an idea, which for Derrida in earlier years
held as “beyond”. Finally, the teloi would be comparable in that a
unity of acts of speech without writing would be without distance
or spatial limit. Derrida in earlier years had deemed the latter the
absolute.
We expressly caution against simplification; the alignments are to basic relations common to each approach (telos, whole, part, level, difference, direction, negation, etc.), rather than a simplification between the approaches. The relations are never identical even basically. For example, Saussure assumes relations of fact as positive. Since 1962 Derrida had taken a positive fact “behind” to hold merely as certain, and the determination of facticity as a telos. Second, Saussure never develops the general and particular relations of mediation; Derrida’s in 1964 were intricate and rigorous. Moreover, third, while Saussure on occasion does refer to “essence” and relations in general, Derrida’s essential relations in 1964 were much more detailed. Fourth, Saussure is concerned with a telos yet to be attained (forward), and a restoration of relations in history. However, he never developed the elaborate philosophy of history and the origin that Husserl did. The relations are as little “identical” as are those of any thinker in history.

However, we are noting basic “parallels” in that an opportunity is developing. A philosopher born (Derrida) has been applying such systematic relations and finding them applicable to selected relations of multiple thinkers – Husserl and Levinas, and more selectively to Parmenides, Plato, Hegel, Heidegger. Thus Derrida’s approach holds as common to the history of such attempts. Derrida is beginning to suspect that these are the kinds of relations that pertain to any such thought. Insofar as these relations are
“common to all” (cf. DLG 25), then any such thought begins from a telos of what has not yet been attained. Derrida will deem these relations “metaphysics”. He is beginning to assess whether any such attempt in metaphysics begins by establishing a border to the outside, and thus develops difference, part-whole relations, and negation. In turn, he is preparing to assess whether any such thought thus develops “degrees” (or levels) – a progress to infinity, a thought of what exceeds infinity, and a relation somehow resisting any such thought.

However, as we caution against simplification, we begin to note divergences from Saussure, after which we will align the bases again. First, Derrida in earlier years – and most metaphysics – had proceeded by means of seeking to attain the “outside”. Saussure has insisted upon remaining upon the inside. Saussure’s relation of arbitrariness is peculiar to his progress. Next, how Saussure’s progress develops into its internal and formal relations of articulation are notably his. However, such bases – address to signification, signs, by means of the voice in the psyche – also accord with a segment of thinkers and works in history (as we will touch upon, these will be at least Aristotle’s On Interpretation and Hegel’s Aesthetics). Yet more basically, insofar as each pertains to basic relations, a telos of speech is nevertheless applicable to a telos of an absolute. An absolute would be neither inside nor outside. Moreover, Saussure – implicitly – allowed these to proceed by means of negation, units of value and so on; it thus
seems that the entire progress of difference, negation, non-relation etc., at least by implication, is applicable even to the internal and formal relations. That is, even such relations are at first applicable in their basics to metaphysics.

Moreover, the necessity to remain internal offers an unusual methodological way to assess this opportunity. Derrida in earlier years, had sought to consider an absolute as first “outside”. So too has most metaphysics, such as theology and epistemology (which Heidegger will call “onto-theology” and Derrida will take to be a part of metaphysics). By assessing Saussure’s progress as to whether an outside can be kept from the inside, Derrida will be assessing whether Saussure’s progress is impossible, and thus whether a metaphysics that seeks the outside is possible.

Hence, we caution, nor should it ever be taken that these relations are Saussure’s, even in address to semiology. Derrida will develop the implications of the relations more rigorously than the Course does. To that extent, he will be developing what is possible for a semiology in general, whatever the extent of Saussure’s aims. Thus Derrida will note from the outset that Saussure’s

linguistics is not general [which the title of the

Course claims] so long as it does not rigorously

distinguish the essence and the fact in their
respective degrees of generality [i.e. levels]

(DLG 1041, Derrida’s emphasis).

Derrida will seek to do so. As we will explain en route, his approach will only barely be applicable to an assessment of the relations of the Course to itself.

Rather, the above allows for at least four teloi, holding in particular and general levels. Most obviously, Derrida will be concerned with the particular relations of determining speech in preference to writing. That telos will be called “presence” (707, 731 ff.). He will thus be concerned with developing a progress to a science which can assess such relations. In general, Derrida will thus be considering what holds for any such approaches in history. These are easily comprehended as an “upper level” of his telos. However, more basically, Derrida’s progress will be preparing to assess what can hold of his particular concerns, as they applied since 1954, to determine the absolute. This will be his basic telos. In turn, insofar as the relations and teloi are common, and common to such attempts, then each of the teloi above will be applicable to the history of metaphysics. This will be Derrida’s overall telos. Thus even the term “history” must be treated as systematic first. Derrida will never begin from uncritical realism, of which his approach had been wary since 1954. Just so, he will evolve to set aside the psychological concept of history.
Thus most basically, the demand and the progress will be Derrida’s, and Saussure’s system will be employed to attain Derrida’s aims. Hence, in accordance with his more basic telos – the applicability of what is possible for address to speech, and for a metaphysics in general – Derrida will develop the implications of the progress. Hence these will diverge in increasing measure from Saussure, just as they did from Husserl and Levinas.

The progress over our next three chapters

Derrida will first align these sorts of relations – very basically – with Saussure. He will then proceed to associate Saussure with thinkers in history who sought to privilege speech. Yet nor do we suggest that Derrida’s approach will be a structuralism or an imposition upon Saussure. He will align with Saussure, rather than vice versa; the outcome will be dependent upon the reading of Saussure. A strategy of “risk” (from rischiare, to run into danger) will apply rather than a structuralism. We will follow that alignment in this chapter.

Derrida will then begin to assess Saussure. In accordance with his basic telos, he will only address the first two difficulties. As to whether semiology is to be addressed as a psycho-physiology or a formalism, Derrida will begin by testing psycho-physiology to bring it to necessary contradiction. It will follow that semiology can only be addressed formally. As to Saussure’s second difficulty, the relation of dependence upon phonetic writing, Derrida will
test this by his address to psychology. He will ask whether writing must exist only to figure or represent speech in a psychology. As did Saussure, Derrida will devolve to the lowest level of the phoneme and its relation to writing in order to assess this. In so doing, Derrida will be preparing for his divergence. When the teloi of psycho-physiology and writing as only phonetic imply necessary contradiction, this will imply that the formal relations must include the relations of writing. This will broaden the field of Saussure’s idea of a science of semiology to what Derrida will call grammatology. In so doing, it will develop the first sort of trace. This will occur in our Chapter Nine.

By that juncture, the progress will be Derrida’s, and he will never quite assess Saussure’ third or fourth difficulties. That is, Derrida will only assess arbitrariness of the signified, and the resultant necessity of contradiction will imply a trace; thus difference will only be conceded as necessary after Derrida has allowed for a trace. From the first, it will no longer be confined to the inside. Moreover, psychology will have been precluded, and difference aligned with the formal, as difference “as such”. The contradiction of psychologism will allow Derrida to align the formal relations of difference with a transcendental approach. Yet the trace will imply it is no longer confined to the interior of such approaches. Thus Derrida will allow for the relations of temporality (Saussure’s third difficulty) only upon having allowed for the formal and a trace. That temporality may not appear even formally will then be important
to his progress in developing the trace and its relations to difference. As to Saussure’s fourth difficulty, that of the status of the phoneme, Derrida will have considered it only as psychological, and will set it aside. He will develop only those formal moments that allow for the progress of difference as such. These will be the chains of articulation. By working out the trace, difference, form, articulation, temporality and so on, Derrida will be developing his contribution to the difficulty that beset the history of metaphysics, in accordance with his concerns. We address this progress in Chapter Ten.

“Of Grammatology” as contribution

Thus it is important to note that the most general intent of “Of Grammatology” is extraordinarily beneficent. To situate this: it might be tempting to critique Saussure’s formalism. For example, it might be argued that the acoustic image is merely an image – at best, the form of a prior articulation. In turn, a psychic imprint is doubtless amenable to being heard and imprinted upon by speech, yet this form would never represent the physical phonation. Such a form severs a speaker from understanding of the sound he makes, or has made. Indeed, Saussure argued that the phoneme is “already” a complex unity (C 65 cf. Ce 41). But then the psyche is already separated from the production of speech. Just so, articulation and acoustic impressions are already separated from their unity. That is, one could pick a path to argue
that the speaker cannot hear or understand himself. Psychology would be severed from phonology, there could never be a valid linguistics, or any form of signification in general. "Of Grammatology" emphasises that these are precisely the sorts of questions that Derrida will avoid. That is, while it would be feasible to develop a shadow work that would genuinely be the approach that critics of that era feared (20), “Of Grammatology” will be its very contrary. Derrida will continue to emphasise that he never doubts Saussure’s phonologist necessities (cf. DLG 30). He will rather be seeking to overcome the confinement to finitude which had beset him since 1964, and thus to protect metaphysics in general and philosophy against such a scission (DLG 1025). That is to say, Derrida will develop the trace. More generally, Derrida will thus be seeking a science of grammatology. How this might develop remains to be assessed.

**Part Two: the alignment with phonocentrism**

**Derrida’s notification of what he risks**

Derrida signals from the first that he endangers his approach from earlier years. This process “risks”

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586 Derrida explains of this history of metaphysics that he will seek “first, to keep it from all relativism [d'abord les soustraire à tout relativisme]” (DLG 25).
for essential reasons, to never see the day as such

[in phenomenology] and under that name [as language, but also at a level beneath naming].

To never have the possibility [ne pouvoir] of defining the unity of its project [...] and of its object,

[…] or describe the limits of its field [as absolute beyond] (DLG 1018, cf. 1019, our emphases).

The teleology develops in its progress forward (as a project, from the Latin to throw forward). Yet it risks falling short of definition of unity upon an inside, and also of the limit as absolute (the two directions), in appearing as such. This would indeed hold for essential reasons, as never possible of an object.

**From ideal object to first direction as writing**

Thus Derrida begins from the object. The telos is no longer to determine the beyond insofar as it is human, “Other” is no longer mentioned in the articles. The “other” (l’autre) is developed
merely in *the lower case*, as Derrida aligns the finite and infinite other with the signifier, and develops the levels via the sign.587

As to the first direction, this “movement” (DLG 1020) is indeed more basic and *impersonal*, as the

*passage from ones to others* (DLG 1022,

Derrida’s emphasis, cf. 1025, C 64)

The evolution does not yet include negation from one to the other. As in the negative first direction (510 ff.), this passage would proceed from one to the other, *in infinitum*. Derrida *asks*

why is this situation on the way to make itself

*known as such?* This question would name an

infinite analysis. (DLG 1022, Derrida’s

emphasis)

**The addition of the conditional tense**

Note that Derrida has employed the conditional tense along with the question. That is, thus far, Derrida has employed the question and supposition in order to address the irreducible. However, we

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587 As noted, “*autre*” in French need never necessarily apply to a human.
noted that since at least 1964 he was aware that a conditional does not yet posit the possibility of its antecedent. Importantly, from this juncture, Derrida also begins to employ the conditional tense to avoid positing the possibility of that which exceeds the inside.\textsuperscript{588}

Yet a first possibility of determination of the object remains. Thus, moving forward, such an infinite analysis retains the possibility of application from the particular predicate “one” to the “other”. As has held since 1962, \textit{anything can be made a particular object}. Indeed, even the directions of ethics can align with this progress. To be sure, although the telos of determining the Other is no longer the basal concern, even a face (\textit{face}) and gestures can still be particular objects with a telos of the infinite. The unity of such objects, as in 1964 and in accordance with Saussure, is still deemed the “totality”\textsuperscript{589}.

\textbf{The broad sense of “writing” and “speech”}

However, even more basically than the address to Saussure, this totality of objects is said – “saying” is correlative to the basic and impersonal positing of “one” (cf. 457) – to be “writing” (forward in general, and behind). Derrida explains:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{588} For Derrida’s emphasis of this relation in \textit{Of Grammatology}, cf. OG 243-244, DLGb 345-346. Derrida aligns “language thus described in the conditional” with the “ideal” of the “language of origin” (OG 243).
\textsuperscript{589} Saussure too employs “totality” in this fashion, deeming that the “totality” of language is unknowable (C 38, Ce 20, above).
\end{flushright}
one holds [on tend] now to saying ‘writing’ for all other things [and things as others]: to designate not only those physical gestures but also the totality of that which makes these possible, then also, the face [face] as signifier, the face signified (with its infinite complexity): by this all which can give place to an inscription in general. (DLG 1021, 590 our emphases)

Importantly, “writing” designates that essential region signified by any particular object that can appear (forward), in accordance with general relations (Derrida avoids claiming this for speech, which for essential reasons cannot appear (cf. 302 ff.). Even so, in preparing to align with Saussure, yet still “on the way” to appearing as such, writing and speech still allow for a psychological sense. 591

590 As in 1964, the “face” (face) also refers to one aspect of the other that must be addressed in the movement from one to other (cf. DLG 46), rather than a human face. This is nevertheless a face involved in signifying of physical gestures to me (Husserl’s “indication” (252)).

591 The writing in these levels and directions can still be deemed “vulgar”, as still psychological and objectivist (cf. DLG 38 fn. 14, cf. esp. BT 372, SZ 405). We will address this below (855 fn.).
The alignment with the sign

The basic first direction is soon aligned with Saussure. The appearing of an emptiest “one” (cf. 689) is aligned with the signifier, and its infinite object the signified (concept) (cf. C 99, Ce 67). The signifier arises as a finitude, appearing in movement from one to the other, with the telos of unity of signifiers. The telos of the signified is aligned with the infinite, as exterior to the signifier. Thus far, any of these signifiers, in particular, is first named a metaphor of writing (such as “inscription”) insofar as it can appear and “give place” to others.

This telos, in turn, would be to signify the writing in general (forward), which in turn is necessary to determine the sign (further forward), and the sign of the idea (cf. 661) (furthest forward). As Derrida explains, in the movement “from one to the other”,

[T]his exteriority of the signifier is the exteriority of writing in general […]. Without this exteriority, even the idea of the sign falls to ruin (DLG 1026).

As noted, Saussure instilled a whole-part hierarchy of teloi, from signifier to signifier (one to the other), signified (other in general
as a unity, further forward, exterior), to the sign and then the idea of the sign. So too does Derrida, but he includes the necessity of writing to the relation of both the signifier and its exteriority, the idea of the sign.

The whole-part relations of language

Next, to advance the overall telos, Derrida develops these whole-part relations via language. For as a signifier at the most interior, speech is essentially a way to signify a particular language, or a tongue. As Derrida explains,

one would say “tongue” \([\text{langue}]\) for action,

movement, thought, reflection, conscious,

unconscious, experience, affectivity, etc. (DLG 1021, our emphasis).

For essential reasons, all thought is only made possible by signifying in a tongue, permitting consciousness (and even unconsciousness, further behind). Yet one merely would say this,
as an implicit conditional, for the tongue is merely a telos of such signifying in thought.\footnote{592}

Indeed, this implies that thought, consciousness etc. have not yet appeared in what is said. As the telos is to determine the origin of writing in general (forward), this would be a part of the tongue (behind), as originary. Thus Derrida can work toward the overall telos of determining a science of the essential origin of writing (behind) – this would be grammatology.

**The sign as basis rather than Idea in the Kantian sense**

To begin to address this science, Derrida introduces the necessity of the furthest level “beyond”. This arises as the consciousness of the idea, which appears merely “in front”. In particular this telos is the essential idea of science, and indeed, in particular a science of writing which can thus be investigated in its origin. This telos as yet only appears as an object and goal.

Second, note that Derrida also no longer appeals to the regulative evidence of the Idea in the Kantian sense as producing content. That sort of evidence led only to questioning of finitude, Derrida is seeking a better way to exceed finitude. He rather appeals to the

\footnote{592 “Saying” has no relation yet to Levinas’ employment of the term in *Otherwise than Being* (cf. Levinas, 1974, 5 ff.), which latter was published in French nine years later, in 1974.}
necessary institution of the *sign* (behind) as certain, thus *in particular* as already and certainly a *concept* (i.e. signified, “behind”) of the idea of science. Thus, forward, the maxim remains that anything can become an object, including an idea. Derrida goes on that

[t]he idea of science and the idea of writing –

and thus also of the science of writing – has

sense for us only since an origin at the interior of a world to which a certain concept of the

sign has already been assigned (DLG 1019, our

emphases).

The *concept* (signified), as yet without content, has been made the prior nexus by which the certain sense of the idea of science arises and must be united (forward) by means of the progress from one to other.\(^{593}\)

\(^{593}\) As to the history of metaphysics: while Husserl (as does Saussure), explains the “concept” as a telos of the unity of particular parts (cf. LI 3 §11), he never overtly instils its relation to the Idea (cf. I §143). Kant does. For Kant (A508/B536), the regulative principle of the Reason applies – for Derrida, already applies – as a rule by which the understanding must judge upon the totality of the series of finite conditions (forward). Such a judgment *would be* a “complete concept of the object”. As we explained, for Kant too such a regress in the understanding is never complete (CPR A508/B536) (279, 216 fn.).
The whole-part relations of the sign aligned with

Indeed, Derrida overtly aligns with Saussure to proceed. Moving forward, he works out the necessities of this empty form. For

the notion [concept without content] of the

sign *always* [already] implies in itself the

*distinction of signified and signifier* (DLG 1024, 594 our emphases).

As noted, “distinction” makes a particular relation “stand out” as an individual, and thus as separate. But importantly, Derrida explains that this is merely *implied*. It arises as merely necessary, following from a certain concept of a unity of signifier and signified that already holds (behind). Derrida is still proceeding by implication, which in earlier years had led to the involution to the transcendental approach.

Indeed, to forestall a reader deeming this a simple idealism, or progress in a natural attitude, we note that the signifier for Derrida instils the telos of a *signified as unity*. This is thought

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594 Following from our short alignment with Kant in the footnote above, we will relate “notion” only to the formal “notion”: “A pure concept, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone, and is not the concept of a pure sensible image, is called *notio*. A concept formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or concept of the reason” (A320/B376). The notion is not yet a determination of the content of an image (for Derrida, signifier) concept (signified) or idea (or a sign).
outside” a signifier, to be sure, but still by reference to the “interior”, rather than to a thing in any natural sense outside (DLG 33, cf. CPR A514/B542). Derrida retains this inside-outside kind of approach, but a concept (signified) would be a unity of signifiers rather than an empirical content. Rather, the signifier (in interiority) refers to the certain sense of reality etc. as comparable to Husserl’s noema. As Derrida summarises the above:

the signifier (sense, thing, noema or reality etc.)

(DLG 1027, 1028).

Derrida seeks to retain a basic compatibility of levels, directions, and critical approach with Husserl.  

The divergence from Husserl’s sign

Hence we must avoid a confusion straightaway – Saussure’s whole-part relations of language, writing, speech and word conform to Husserl’s as Derrida treated them in 1962. However, Derrida avoided mention of Husserl’s “sign” in that work, and does so merely in 1967 (cf. SP, FM). Derrida never does compare these relations in Saussure and Husserl in the 1960s, except to

595 Nor is this relation confined to Husserl. For example, a condition in a given series is never an empirical content. For Kant, as for Derrida, the regression of conditions as mere appearances is never given “in the object” (CPR A514/B542), developing a transcendental-logical internality of the sort that Derrida evolved in the Absolute of 1964.

596 The relation of the transcendental to Saussure will only be worked out by Derrida’s second article.
note in a footnote of 1967 that Husserl’s are much more complicated (SP 46 fn.). Derrida is rather applying bis levels and directions from earlier years insofar as they are basic; and to that extent common to such approaches.

**Toward the deeper level as parallelism**

Given these caveats, we can summarise the levels that are developing, as basically evolved from the two directions of 1964. In this teleology, the sign holds as one basis for what was previously a foundation only upon Husserl’s regions and pure categories (Something, One etc.). In turn, the sign implies a concept (behind), which was formerly the originary and particular concepts. Moving forward, the signifier will be parallel to signifying (or thinking) of the progress from one finite condition to the other as speech, and also as writing (698) (the first direction from earlier years). Then (moving forward), this unity with the signified as infinite will again be parallel to the concept. Further, the exteriority of the signifier at the lowest level again refers to that of the sign

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597 Derrida explains in a footnote in 1967: “The equivalencies signifier/expression and signified/Bedeutung could be posited were not the bedeuten/Bedeutung/sense/object structure much more complex for Husserl than for Saussure.” (SP 46 fn. 5). Cf. our pages 244-245 for a brief summary of these relations in Husserl.
(even the sign of the idea) beyond, which telos remains that of the idea, which does not yet exist (second direction). 598

However, the relations of writing too are aligning with these at each level. In particular, we emphasise, writing in turn becomes a particular moment of the signifier, in its movement from one to the other. Writing in general is then aligned with what must be signified. As we noted, the relation of “parallelism” is the difficulty – that is, a difference as no longer internal or a simple passage from one to the other. Derrida summarises that, in this progress at the lowest level

of writing thought […] in the exteriority of sense,

belong thus the difference between signifier and

signified, or at least the strange divergence of their

parallelism, […] from the one to the other. (DLG 1024-1025, our emphases)

We will return to this “difference”. Thus far, note that the “at least” emphasises that no such relations are identical; they

598 As Derrida is preparing to align the historico-metaphysical epoch with Saussure, he continues of this “certain concept”: “[We] will be able to say further on the [distinct] concept of the sign” (DLG 1019, Derrida's emphasis).

599 Derrida avoids deeming that speech parallels the movement from one to other, as it will be his contention that speech itself cannot appear (cf. 767).
proceed insofar as they are “parallel”. To help to explain how this occurs, we develop the level “underneath” in the manner that Saussure added to his diagrams. This ought to simplify how each such parallel must be “content”.

**The psychologistic explanation of levels**

Derrida explained this level even in his “Introduction” of 1962. He summarised the progress “across” to the logical relations sedimented in the noema (forward), which already hold (“behind”), as

\[
[T]he \text{image of level […]} - \text{what is deposited by an inroad or a progression after the radical [i.e., origininary] novelty of an irruption or upsurge: every advance, every proposition [Satz [position]] of a new sense is at the same time a leap [Satz, forward] and a sedimentary [satzartig] fall back of sense (IOG 98-99, Derrida’s emphases)\]

*A level holds as anything can be made an object, thus anything can be content. Yet the origin of this progress according to levels is as yet “concealed”, it escapes naming (sous le nom (DLG 1018, 1020))"
insofar as each content is no longer the original content. Rather, this content moves at an “upper” level (IOG 98-99).

Hence, indeed, the particular level “underneath” is signified as the “more profound” foundation of the region of the level itself. That is, what is “behind” even essence can be said to found instantiation from “underneath”. Yet as never appearing as content, it must then essentially be irreducible to the region. From the reasoning developed thus far (484 ff.), it ought thus only to be supposed. Indeed, Derrida refers to it as

the image of the substantial permanence of

what is then supposed or situated under the surface

of actually present evidence. (IOG 99, our emphases)

Any relations which essentially conform to the levels can be instantiated as content to this movement (forward) as sedimented in the noema, for they already hold furthest “behind”. Yet they can be instantiated merely by what is supposed. Derrida in 1965 has a fortiori availed himself of this permission. All of the moments

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600 As Derrida explains, this region of the level implies “the image of the concealed presence that an activity of excavation can always [already] reproduce aboveground as the foundation […] of higher stratifications.” (IOG 98-99).
thus far (the whole-part relations of sign, Idea, writing, and all of
the latter’s particular objects etc.) proceed as content of the levels
and directions, by means of which one must distinguish the “system”. As
Derrida explains in 1962, the level

brings all this together in the structural and

internal unity of a system, of a ‘region’ (IOG 98-99, Derrida’s emphases).

For Derrida, Saussure’s “system” also arises at the deeper level, by
eluding appearing as an instance of structure.\footnote{601}

Note, however, that it is helpful to take the movement from
signifier to signifier, and of writing and speech, to hold more
basically as one and other. Even so, a “level” is a metaphor.
Contents are rather “parallel” insofar as they conform to a system
that has not yet appeared as such.\footnote{602}

\footnote{601}{That this level is deemed an “image” will continue to be important, as a
basis for the acoustic image, and the trace as grapheme.}
\footnote{602}{Note that these levels (or parallels) begin from a psychologism. Upon
aligning with a transcendental basis, Derrida will suggest that these relations are
separable merely by abstraction (779). It might be helpful (merely as support) to
note Derrida’s explanation of Husserl’s “parallel” of the transcendental
relation of the regions of the worldly and the “psyche” (SP 12-13), that “[t]o
conclude that this parallelism is an adequation is the most tempting, and most
subtle, but also the most obscuring of confusions: \textit{transcendental psychologism}”
(Derrida’s emphases). The approach is still on the way to the transcendental,
we begin from compatibility with these relations.}
The preparation for metaphor

That is, in signification, as each moment is certainly the production of a signifier at the level “upward”, the particular instances as movement from one to the other (thus signifier to signifier, or speech and writing) begin to develop via metaphor. Each metaphor is a *particular instance of a signifier* in general, permitted by language in general, as what certainly “carries over” (from the Greek *meta-pherein*) its concept, but thus far falls short of its referent. We caution that no metaphor is identical to any other, thus each “novel” metaphor in this first direction must find similarity and then difference in its progress from one to the other (across), toward unity with the totality (Derrida also deems the progress a “metaphoric” (DLG 1041)). The teloi of writing and speech will conform to this, each of which will have their particular yet specific metaphors (cf. 730).603

The logos and logocentrism

Thus the basic movement inside *thought, as speech and logic is deemed the Logos*, as it was since 1962. As noted, logic as asserting or predicating is henceforth usually signified by correlative speech, or deemed thought. That is, “Logos” refers to the moment of grasping the object in thought or speech. In 1965 this appears as

603 Derrida will explain that “[A]s one does not have a non-metaphorical language to oppose here to metaphors, it is necessary […] to multiply the antagonistic metaphors” (DLG 35, our emphases).
the “logos” in particular, which as object is always other to itself. But as since 1964, no choice can yet be made between signifying of the logos as noema (forward) or progress of the logos as a priori. Each moment from one to the other arises in this certain appearing of the sign then signifying of signifying in its address to truth in infinitum:

sign signifying a signifying signifying an eternal truth, eternally thought and said in the proximity to the logos. (DLG 1026-1027)

However, the signifier (acoustic image) has developed the alignment of hearing with speech. Henceforth the logos also signifies the parallels of hearing and speech, as a proximity, a closeness nevertheless separated from itself. Proximity is not yet a unity; the chains of signifiers in the first direction are still “open”.

Even so, the object must be affirmed (thus thought and said) as what it is, so as to think its object beyond (sign, idea etc.). This orientation to determining the truth of the object is deemed a “logocentrism” (cf. DLG 1041). We emphasise, however, this is a basis to which Derrida is never opposed (DLG 26). Rather, to test

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604 In 1966, Derrida writes of the “conditions of grammatology” that the fundamental condition is the “solicitation” (appeal to and undoing) of logocentrism (DLG 40, cf. OG 74).
this metaphysics, he must begin by accepting it, to risk the implications. Logocentrism takes its beginning in thought to determine the Logos in passage. As it has been since 1962, this is the inevitable starting point and initial destination of philosophy (DLG 40, 1028).

A parallel to the sign – language as telos

This orientation developed, we add the next “parallelism” (DLG 1025) in accordance with the level “underneath”. To unify this signifier of writing as writing in general, thus a sign itself, Derrida adds the telos of determining language in general as sign, as

inflation of the sign ‘language’, as much as

inflation of the sign itself (DLG 1019).

In a logocentrism, language and the sign (of language), as further forward, are necessarily parallel teloi.

The parallel necessities of writing added

Importantly, this instils the necessity of writing as a part of language in general (rather than a part of the logos). Thus we will summarise

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605 As Derrida puts it: “[T]he logos of being, ‘the Thought obedient to the voice of Being’, is the first and last resource of the sign, and the difference between the signans and the signatum” (DLG 1028, Derrida’s emphases). Derrida is quoting Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik, (Heidegger 1930, 46).

606 Derrida emphasises that these are necessary conditions, for: “[w]ithout this exteriority, even the idea of the sign falls to ruin.” (DLG 1025).
the “diverse concepts of writing” at each level, which must determine language (and the sign of language, for the idea of a science). Derrida explains the necessities of this passage (circularity):

\[\text{Everything comes to pass (Tout se passe) as if that which one calls language could be in its origin and in its end only a moment [i.e. a dependent part], an essential but determined mode, a phenomenon, an aspect, a species of writing, [...] only in the course of an adventure (forward) (DLG 1021, our emphases).}\]

Note that Derrida is retaining the alignment (“as if”) to essential relations. As for the Other in 1964, this progress holds only as if language in general could be derived from specific writing (“behind”), to be a phenomenon (ideal object, forward). Only this hypothesis would in turn permit the sign. For even though it is

\[\text{“Diverse” relations avoid opposition, as concepts, they thus avoid a difference holding between two distinct poles.} \]
\[\text{Derrida summarised his levels in 1962 (cf. IOG 149) as changes of direction also by means of the word “adventure”, which has the sense of coming to (as “ad” and “venture”) and setting out toward.}\]
certain, affirming this “beyond” requires that such a furthest level be *supposed*. As Derrida explains,

> [T]o affirm thus that the concept of writing exceeds and understands [i.e. as concept] that of language supposes [...] a certain definition of language and writing. (DLG 1021)

In turn, one should avoid deeming that writing is given primacy. Writing in general, thus far, is the way to address what certainly appears, to exceed this writing and distinguish the sign of language in general.

**Levels and directions as historical language**

To do so, beginning from the supposition and moving forward to the originary, we note that it is ever implicit that the regress of conditions is a regress through the finite acts of *history*. Derrida emphasises often that this progress occurs in the “epoch” of historico-metaphysical directions, that is, to determine the progress forward, thus certainly impelled from behind, with the demand to determine the beyond.⁶⁰⁹

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⁶⁰⁹ The historico-metaphysical directions are not yet the historico-transcendental movement in Husserl’s sense, which Derrida will never quite impose, as even
To determine this language in general as an idea of science (forward), Derrida seeks to return to the first necessary instance of writing in its history. This must have been made possible by the essential relations of language and writing in general (further behind). Preparing for Saussure, Derrida begins from the origin of Western philosophy, taking the original model of language to be the Greek alphabet (cf. 748). Importantly, the instance of the first act at the origin which produced even the letters of the alphabet at the highest level would be named a *gramme* (DLG 1022). In Greek, *gramme*, founded upon the verb “*grapho*” (to write), signifies what forms the lines of the letters of the alphabet. Second, and hence, it refers to a source that first develops a boundary from the outside and thus, third, it would be an “origin” of language in living consciousness, as a metaphor of life (Liddell and Scott 1869, 325). Liddell and Scott define *gramme* thus:

1. the stroke or line of the pen, a line, as in mathematical figures, also in forming letters, an outline; 2. the line across the course, to mark the starting or winning place, hence when he progresses to a transcendental basis as such in 1966 he will no longer seek to be “naïve” in an objectivist fashion.
metaph. of life, a boundary-line, edge (Liddell and Scott 1869, 325).

According to its etymology, the first letter (gramma) in history (behind) must have originated from the outside of thought, and a writing even before the letter. However (according to its etymology), “gramme” as the forming of a line would not yet have the sense of the drawing of a letter; which extension is rather accorded by another derivative of “grapho”, the graphie. Both a gramme and graphie would be essentially necessary for writing to appear as spatial (as a line or drawing); however, the graphie is necessary for writing as a graphic symbol as well as a letter. We will develop these relations as we proceed. Thus far, Derrida seeks to instil these as necessary conditions for symbols and writing at the most interior of thought.

Thus, as an instance of appearing at the most interior is certain (across), one can say something must first have appeared in history; and this particular moment of appearing of the graphie is deemed a grapheme. Derrida writes in the conditional tense of these moments: 610

610 Note that we do not yet deem that this originary moment of writing is “archi-writing” (although the former is a condition for it), as Derrida will develop the latter only after developing the originary trace.
the gramme – or the grapheme – would thus become the name of an element. (DLG 1022, Derrida’s emphasis)

To address Saussure’s phoneme as an element (which Saussure related to writing at his lowest level), Derrida will be assessing the relations of the gramme; yet this is phrased merely as a conditional, for that the gramme “becomes” an element at the lowest level is not yet affirmed.611 Rather, in particular, such a moment of writing follows from its essential levels in history; Derrida calls this “derived” writing. To affirm (DLG 1021) this certain concept of writing as language in general (forward) will depend on the graphie and gramme (behind). Derrida will make these fundamental to his investigation of Saussure.612

The necessary kinds of speech

However, as noted, writing is never given priority when the telos is first the tongue (and thereafter, language in general). In also beginning from logocentrism, a moment of speech must also hold at each level of this progress. To begin from the above: for the logos too, the

611 Derrida’s inclusive “or” develops an instability as to whether the gramme appears as a grapheme at the elemental level.
612 Derrida summarises the circularity of these relations in his second article: “the name of language begins [i.e. originarily] to […] at least resume under the name of writing […], ceasing to designate a particular form, derived, auxiliary to language in general […] which writes on the contrary even the origin of language” (DLG 1020).
telos is first that of determining the tongue. Thus, from behind, in the first institutive moment of history, there must already have been an original possibility of speech. Just so in my living present, I learn to speak before I write, and Derrida supports Saussure upon this issue. Thus, just as for the instances of the *gramme* and *graphie* in originary space, there must have been an *originary* instance of the *phonation of sound as sensible speech* (soon, the voice). Derrida calls this necessary part the *phone* (from the original Greek for both “sound” and “voice”).

Thus, moving forward again, the relation to the *phone* as originary remains certain. Derrida summarises:

> in this logos, the originary and essential

> relation to the *phone* has never been severed

(DLG 1023).

Yet, for Saussure's psychological (*psychique*) approach, speech is available as part of a tongue available to the community, and permitted by language in general. Again, such a *phone* merely remains necessary, but as signifier is certainly instilled in its becoming, as *phonation* upon the inside; thus it is predicated as
phonetic (forward).\(^{613}\) As in 1962, Derrida deems this necessity a phonetic “production” (327). Next, this phonetic production must be determined “forward”, as the tongue, and language in general. Just as each level of writing must found a moment in Derrida’s progress from signifier to signifier, these necessities apply to speech.

**The instability of presence**

However, as in 1962, a crucial divergence from writing applies. The latter certainly appears in space, yet speech by its essence cannot appear; it is not yet seen. That is, with the relation of the phone as sound arises the merely parallel possibility of hearing (as acoustic).\(^ {614}\) The original speech, of its essence must be unheard. It must be without relation to the originary phone (“a-phone”, DLG 1028) and its production of the phonetic. Just as for the Other in 1964 (cf. 533), for Derrida this instils the instability in essence as hallmark of irreducibility, of a voice heard merely when excluded from the originary (DLG 1028).\(^ {615}\)

Thus, a fortiori, *this indeed “supposes”* a synthesis which occurs

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\(^ {613}\) Saussure deems the phonetic the “physiology of sounds” (C 56, Ce 32, our emphasis), which would hold as a predicate at the most interior.

\(^ {614}\) The phone, as voice and sound, is not yet of its essence related to hearing, as acoustic (cf. the Classical Greek “*akoustikei*” (CDWH 6)).

\(^ {615}\) Derrida adds in a footnote, commenting on Heidegger’s *Was ist Metaphysik*, that “the voice of being […] is silent, mute, unheard, originarily a-phone” (DLG 1028).
at an other level [niveau] or where one hears more

... profoundly still the passage from one to the other has

never been absolutely tied to a phonetic

production (DLG 1022, our emphases).

As for the sign, idea, and language in general, speech is equated with the more profound level of the irreducible, for of its essence it must never appear; it must merely be heard at a profound level. Yet the telos of linguistics is the determination of speech.

Derrida calls this telos presence (praes-ens, a speech prior to even the appearing of the thing). That is, “presence” by 1965 signals an instability, of what must appear as proximity of hearing and speech without distance or border, only insofar as it is supposed to be heard at a level irreducible to hearing.

**Why address to Saussure must occur – the trace**

Thus far, Derrida has prepared his teleology and levels for alignment with the sign so as to apply to Saussure, along with the telos of presence. We thus begin to summarise why he does so, in order to develop the necessity of the trace, and then how toward the telos of a grammatology. First, the necessity still remains to determine movement from one to the other, then as a unity with the signified (forward), and then the more “profound” level of
the irreducible. Thus Derrida develops difference and the non-relation.

As we have explained, since 1964 Derrida allowed for difference as mediating relations from one to the other, other in general, and Other, via the *eteron* (527). The term “*eteron*” is no longer mobilised in “Of Grammatology”. However, just as the Other in 1964 appears in the movement of negativity only in this complicated difference, in 1965 the progress implies that

fundamentally [underneath], the difference

between the signifier and signified *is nothing*.

(DLG 1029, Derrida’s emphasis)

As noted, Saussure allowed only difference from signifier to signifier, never between signifier and signified (651). Just so, Derrida’s “*is nothing*” implies a difference without opposition to its signified. This as yet falls short of consciousness of something, and also of the positivity of anything. Yet it remains a pole of certainty; even without opposition, the difference also “*is nothing*”.

Derrida could not yet lay claim to a difference from the signified. He can thus go on, when
the sign must [do Î·] be the unity of a heterogeneity [of difference between signifier and signified], then the signified (sense or thing, noema or reality) is not in itself a trace, is not constituted in its sense by its relation to a possible trace (DLG 1027, Derrida’s emphasis on “trace”).

A crucial evolution has occurred. Given the telos of unity of one and other (the first direction), it is then impossible that any relation to the outside can hold. In an internal difference a trace is not possible. Derrida concedes that his every attempt developed over the years cannot exceed interiority.

Indeed, only at this juncture, after ten pages, has Derrida added his first negation; in the first employment of the present indicative “not” (cf. DLG 1017, 1021). He negates the telos of a relation to the outside. Yet this is still an external negation, a refusal of the possibility of exceeding the inside (459).

616 The first article is twenty-six pages long.
617 Derrida’s earlier employments of “pas” were as “not only”, “not been able to not” (i.e. “necessarily must have”), and an employment of “not” in a conditional phrase (DLG 1021).
The operative trace as establishing a task

Importantly, however, nor is a trace yet excluded, Derrida rather introduces the *operative* trace. The term “operative” is taken from Fink in 1957, who distinguished between it and the “thematic” (i.e. for Derrida, the objectifying). The “thematic” is concerned with “thinking” as “understanding of the reality of the world” (Fink 1981, 59). For Fink, such relations “remain in the milieu of the concept” (i.e. for Derrida, they remain within the progress of signifiers not yet attaining to the signified). The operative concepts, however, are employed even though not yet justified:

in the formation of thematic concepts, creative

thinkers use their concepts and patterns of

thought, they operate with intellectual

schemata they do not fix objectively. (Fink 1981, 59)

For Fink, these relations “form, metaphorically speaking, the shadow of philosophy” (Fink 1981, 59, our emphasis). Thus, for

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618 Fink had read this paper at a lecture, which Derrida referred to in 1962, along with its explanation of operative concepts, as “admirable” (IOG 69, fn. 66).

619 Fink briefly suggests that thematic concepts hold in Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and the “transcendental subjectivity” of Husserl (Fink 1981, 59).
Derrida, the trace *is operative* (even though not yet certain) in essential relations; it will be so even should it be impossible. The issue is *how* such a trace can be determined in particular (DLG 1030). Thus Derrida tells us he will “try to demonstrate”

the essential necessity of the trace written in

philosophical discourse (DLG 1030).

Derrida will indeed seek to do so via writing, and that in turn via more basic relations. For, as noted (208, 230), essential necessity applies levels and directions, in order to determine an objective content (forward) that is not yet fixed.

**Turning to the “beyond” in the second direction**

To prepare for this, this relation of the outside to *exteriority* must be assessed at a more basic level. Derrida turns to the second direction, so as to exceed the inside toward that beyond (forward). This telos of the being of the beyond is deemed “onto-theology”, a term taken from Heidegger. The term refers to the commonality amongst ontology (i.e. also classical metaphysics), theology, anthropology and psychology, each of which have a

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620 That Derrida will “try to demonstrate [essaiérons de […] montrer]” (DLG 1030) the trace is relevant in that the articles will proceed in very rigorous fashion.
“missing foundation” (cf. BT 46, SZ 49). For Derrida, none yet exceed the interior to a founding whole without difference.

That is, as we worked out in address to Saussure, the difference between a particular signifier and all “around it” must be thought as a non-difference, exceeding objective relations and their basic outside, to the “beyond”. Thus

[O]nce more it is necessary to pass by the question of being, as it is posed at and beyond onto-theology, to accede to the thought of this strange non-difference. (DLG 1029, our emphases)

A difference without limit even from the beyond must occur in internality.

Note that the “strange symmetry” of 1964, and its third direction which allowed institution by the beyond to make being possible, applies in 1965. But Derrida is aware by this juncture that this non-difference of the irreducible allows a basis for the trace.

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621 In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explains the “missing ontological foundation” for theology, anthropology and psychology; in their fixation on the “objective”, being remains undetermined (BT 46, SZ 49). Derrida will address this objectivism in relation to Heidegger upon generalising his outcomes (DLG 38, fn. 14).
The advent of writing

Derrida can thus return to the circularities of writing and speech in order to work out how to proceed. That is, as developed from Husserl, the Logos is certainly an object in the Living Present which essential relations must be “sedimented” (115) in its history, whose telos is that they be determined absolutely (forward). Instead of “Logos”, Derrida employs “logos in general”, which includes all of the essential levels. Just so, the logos is the particular “instance” (DLG 1023) of the object thought or spoken of. Moreover, these relations still necessitate the unity of signifiers upon the inside as signified, then the distinction of the sign (beyond). As noted, this consciousness of sedimentations in the logos also parallels the directions of the history of metaphysics, in its address to truth. Thus, Derrida writes,

[All of the metaphysical determinations of

truth, [in history] [...] are more or less

immediately inseparable from the instance of
the logos [...] in any sense by which one hears it (DLG 1023).

Note that only when it has been heard could the logos be a truth. Those approaches in history that demanded to speak and hear the truth of the “beyond” are deemed metaphysical (as Saussure’s linguistics has been added, this term exceeds “philosophy”). As one sense of “logos” is that of an original act of speech in history, to the “logos” we include the etymology sedimented in its historicity. The logos is what must have predetermined the sense of the truth of language as speech since the Greeks (in the phone).

The basic alignment with historical psychophysiology

However, the relations of speech must be unified as this truth – formally and essentially put, as the signified. This telos of the logos signifies a privilege of the phone in history as presence. It would speak and hear the truth. Thus

[T]he formal essence of the signified is presence,

and the privilege of its proximity to the logos

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622 Derrida continues that this holds of “the pre- or post-Socratic, [...] the Hegelian or post-Hegelian sense.” (DLG 1023) He does not yet explain in these articles how the logos would be interpreted relative to these styles of interpretation.
as phone signifies [signifie] presence (DLG 1027,

Derrida’s emphases).

Yet, we note, it seems that this privilege no longer allows anything to appear to be true. Hence Derrida begins to explain his famous difficulty, that in the history of metaphysics, the telos of speaking (i.e. and hearing) the truth as phonocentrism was privileged over writing. However, in beginning from alignment with Saussure in these essential relations, the logos and phone, allow for a beginning in psychology. Even the “history of metaphysics” refers to philosophers situated in an uncritical sort of temporality, which Husserl deems “natural” (DLG 1037 cf. 109).

Thus, Derrida notes that Aristotle had deemed that the “voice” symbolises the states of the soul. Writing was taken merely as what symbolises those states in the voice (DLG 1023). Derrida quotes:

the sounds emitted by the voice are the

symbols of the states of the soul, and the

written words the symbols of the words
emitted by the voice (DLG 1023, De Interpretatione 16a, 3-5).

The alignment with Saussure is obvious. For Aristotle, the word for “voice” was “phone”, and for soul was “psukhe”. Moreover, the voice for Aristotle is a sound (phone), that is “produced” by a living being that has a soul. Third, for Aristotle, the voice is produced in the “windpipe” by the soul. What applies of Saussure’s phonation of sound in a psychological (psychique) study aligns with Aristotle’s basic concerns, at the origin of the approach to speech and writing.

Indeed, Derrida notes (DLG 1024) – without explaining – that Hegel’s telos of speech is absolute “proximity”. Hegel too is aligned with Saussure (C 157, Ce 111 (656)), as production would be the idealisation of a sound arising along with the voice. Hegel’s telos is

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623 This translation is ours, from Derrida. Ackrill translates the above as: “Now spoken words are symbols of affection in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds” (Aristotle, De Interpretatione 16a, 3-5, in Ackrill, 1963).
624 “Voice is the sound produced by a creature possessing a soul” (Aristotle, de Anima, 2.8.420b5-6, our emphases, trans., Svenbro 1993, 139).
625 “The voice consists in the impact of inspired air upon what is called the windpipe under the agency of the spirit [psukhe]” (Aristotle, de Anima, 2.8.420b27-29, our emphases, trans. Svenbro 1993, 139).
626 Aristotle privileges the phonic symbol; Derrida will assess the relations of the graphic symbol in Saussure and Hegel, to develop a trace.
627 Saussure deemed the relation the “idea” rather than the idealisation (C 157, Ce 111 (656)).
[the] absolute proximity of the voice (Hegel shows very well the privilege of the sound in
the idealisation and production of the concept [signified]), determination of sense in general

628

as pre-sence (DLG 1024).

Absolute proximity would be presence, a proximity without distance, in a unity of the concept and idea.

For, as far as we have come, Derrida notes that Saussure’s telos is also that of the phonic as pre-sence (DLG 1024 (cf. 711)). From these inevitably sparse examples, the history of metaphysics as logocentrism is aligned with phonocentrism. A fortiori, Derrida has endorsed this privilege of speech for the truth of “presence” in Hegel, above. This telos remains necessary for a history of metaphysics (cf. DLG 1025 fn. 8). Phono- centrism is a necessary telos of metaphysics, just as for Saussure’s linguistics. Derrida emphasises:

628 For Derrida’s explanation of Hegel’s “idealisation” in line with Saussure’s privilege of speech, signifying, arbitrariness, etc. cf. PP 82-84.
629 Derrida writes in a footnote of the relations of metaphysics and its telos of exteriority, “[O]nce again, it would not do here to ‘reject’ these notions: they are necessary and today at least, nothing more is thinkable for us without them.” (DLG 1025).
630 For example, the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy deems that “In de la Grammatologie (1967, trans. Of Grammatology 1976), Derrida argues against the
we think that Saussure’s reasons are good, and
do not concern ourselves here with placing
into doubt, at the level at which he says it, the truth
of that which Saussure says with such accents

(DLG 1039, cf. 30 Derrida’s emphases).

We will develop this “level” as we proceed. Thus far, when the
content is speech, it is undoubtedly (certain) that there must have
been a relation of the signifier to speech (“behind”), which must
be a determination of the relations (and thus even the privilege)
of speech, forward.

Thus crucially, Derrida accepts this telos of only speech as presence.
He goes on:

for it must be believed that there is an inside to

the tongue (DLG 1035).

Yet it is the deeper “level”, which includes the necessities of
writing, that Derrida is addressing. For he has worked out that
both writing and speech in their original levels must be teloi. A

phonocentrism that privileges speech above writing” (ODP 100). By working
from 1954, then through the articles of 1966, we are demonstrating how such
approaches to Derrida can be evolved.
reformulated kind of reason must apply to include the telos of writing in an attempt to exceed the interiority of the logos as speech (DLG 1023). For

[the rationality [...] which commands writing

in the sense thus enlarged and radicalised no

longer issues from a logos (DLG 1023).

Hence, by investigating Saussure’s linguistics as a “privileged example” (DLG 1032, ff.), Derrida will begin from phonocentrism (with its corollary of a writing as merely phonetic (621)) so as to test its consistency and to assess its impact upon the tradition of such thought. But “underneath” this, a system will be implied which furthers Derrida’s concerns as developed over the years. Indeed, Derrida deems that upon the “inside”, these necessities relations form a “certain system” (DLG 1030); that is, a system which first appears but does not yet appear absolutely in this circularity.

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631 It might be thought that the classical notion of reason is abandoned – it is rather amended. As Derrida notes, it might no longer be applicable to employ the word “rationality”, yet another kind of reason must instead arise as a telos (end): that which includes this further necessity that exceeds the logos. As he puts it of “rationality”: “it would perhaps be necessary to abandon this word for the reason which is going to appear at the end of this phrase” (DLG 1023, our emphases). It will be the telos of deconstruction that develops this revised sort of reason (DLG 1023).
The origin of deconstruction

Before proceeding, Derrida allots a name (but merely one name) to how this circularity must proceed. Since 1962 he had questioned the necessity to choose between the consciousness of relations sedimented in the history of the object (noema), and the progress of consciousness in my Living Present according to those relations (326, 329 fn.). This object has become the logos (in front), but in this progress the logos is first certain and undoubted, and must include necessities that exceed it. The logos must then refer all around what is sedimented in itself, without negation or opposition. This is deemed a “de-sedimentation” of the logos. Derrida worked out that even the noema, as part of the logos, is still “internal”. Hence it does not allow signifying of what exceeds and radicalises it (beyond), which negation also makes the logos what it is.

But as we noted, the relations sedimented in the noema arise as already a structure (cf. 177), and a negation structures it as what it is. The instability returns the circularity to the certain structuring relations of the logos that must refer beyond itself, as non-relation. The telos inaugurates a deconstruction. Put via language, “de-” signals the instability between the particular negation (pas)
of a word and the complement (‘non’), referring to the beyond which must return to the origin of that word (DLG 1023).\(^{632}\)

Derrida also deems this return a “destruction”, probably taking this from Heidegger’s “de-structuring” (‘Destruktion’ (BT 19-24, SZ 22-27)).\(^{633}\) However, the reference is, we suggest, a privilege of neither Husserl nor Heidegger, but an alignment by means of their commonality, to apply to such relations of signification insofar as they are basic. To summarise, the necessity

\[
\text{inaugurates the destruction, not [‘non pas’] the}
\]

\[
\text{demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-}
\]

\[
\text{construction of all of these significations which}
\]

\[
\text{have their source [origin] in that of the logos.}
\]

(DLG 1023, Derrida’s emphasis first)

How “deconstruction” develops the application of contradiction to a text has not yet been assessed, and we will do so only briefly

\(^{632}\) As noted, we suggest that Derrida employs “‘non pas’” (not!) to emphasise this instability, a strong form of negation which juxtaposes both the particular negation (“pas”) and complement that refers to all that is not, and thus all around the object (“non”).

\(^{633}\) We merely note the basic commonalities of Heidegger and Derrida (for it is merely such commonalities that Derrida is developing). Heidegger too puts it that “if” the “question” is to achieve “clarity regarding its own history”, then a “de-structuring” of the “primordial” (‘ursprüngliche’) and “traditional content” is “necessary” (BT 20, SZ 22). Heidegger too begins from “positive possibilities”, rather than seeking an entire “negative” sense to this conditional enquiry into the original history of the tradition.
However, we suggest, the word “deconstruction” for Derrida was first a name for this formal circularity developed since 1954 into an instability in logic (thought) and language.

As a name for this formal circularity of necessities, deconstruction in turn can refer to particular content (such as the structural relations of “psychology”). It can name a movement that must signify its particular content, then pass beyond predication, thus negating it. One such way can be to make the object contradictory. In our next chapter, Derrida will bring Saussure’s psychological system to such necessary contradiction, to evolve his instituted trace in a difference as such.

A preparatory guide to the levels and directions

Before following this progress, we summarise a “general template” (DLG 27) that has developed over the years and will be applicable to Saussure. We do so at the level of the signifier, parallel to the object. As ever, anything can be made an object, which must be determined absolutely. We begin by supposing a beyond, which for essential reasons must be irreducible to essence, yet must in turn found essence. The highest level would be that of essences, which in turn would be composed of specific parts. When the origin is in question, the essential region is

634 Our dissertation will address in passing how the systematic relations of deconstruction begin to develop in Chapter Two of Of Grammatology. Derrida will address the text as an interweaving via a contradictory archi-trace (885).
original. Its parts, of essential necessity, correspond to the form of originary content. Such content in turn is already and thus certainly given (including as any signified or concept). The originary moment develops the nexus in which grasping of the object arises in its forms (for instance, becoming, signifier, one, other etc.). Provided that a right to do so is accorded, such contents must and can be constituted as ideal objects by means of position, negation etc. toward the telos. The latter again seeks to determine the beyond. Hence the ideal objects in turn must be thought of in the first direction, in the progress from one to other, in order to arrive at a unity. This progress can occur in particular by means of signifiers, with the telos of unity with the signified as concept. In turn, the necessity is to think or speak of this unity in order to exceed the first direction and at the last to determine the non-objectual and absolute (beyond). Such a necessity would return us to the necessity of relation to the irreducible that must found essence.

To this form we add particular content (and importantly, writing and speech are content too, as are their particular relations in the signifier; acoustic image, phoneme etc.). The telos from which Derrida began above is the idea of a science of semiology in general. To signify the logos (forward) by means of the enlarged and radicalised sense of writing (in the levels from behind) would
necessitate a broadening of the field of semiology in general to
grammatology.\footnote{Derrida attributes the word “grammatology” to Gelb (1952) (DLG 1018 fn. 4).}

**The conditions of grammatology as circularity**

The relations that Derrida requires to permit a grammatology (i.e. its conditions) thus progress in a circularity. Before beginning his analysis, Derrida asks what it signifies if (i.e. he poses a question as a conditional of this irreducibility):

1) From beyond to behind, then to appearing as certain:

   even the idea of science was born in a certain

   epoch of writing (DLG 1030).

2) From the relations behind to certain content: that this “task” of determining the idea must proceed via a language *in general*, that implies *certain kinds* (i.e. as specific) of relations between speech and writing (DLG 1030).

3) From furthest behind to behind, and then preparing to move forward to determine the content: that the idea of science is first “tied to the concept” (signified) and to the “adventure” (from behind, and then forward) of phonetic writing, as to the “*telos*” of *determining “all writing”* (DLG 1030, our emphasis).
4) To proceed forward, from this certain moment: that this idea of the science of writing in general arises at the origin “in a certain determined system” of relations between particular living speech and inscription (a metaphor of writing) (DLG 1030).

5) Preparing to explain that the content in turn would determine the general relations: that writing (from behind) is the condition of possibility of “ideal objects”, as “in particular” developed by Husserl (DLG 1030).

6) Developing this telos forward as seeking to proceed furthest forward, thus behind: that the directions of history are tied a possibility of writing beyond (au delà) the particular forms of writing (DLG 1031), and thus to the idea of a science.

These conditions would make a “grammatology” possible. Yet these too are instances of a more basic form that has developed from the demand to determine the absolute. To assess these possibilities, Derrida begins the address “rigorously” (DLG 1041).
Chapter Nine: The Instituted Trace (“Of Grammatology” Pt. 2, 1966)

Introduction

This chapter turns to the second of Derrida’s French articles “Of Grammatology” (henceforth “1966”). Derrida will begin from Saussure’s telos of a psycho-physiology that must allow a semiology, and rigorously assess it. His assessment will develop in one progressive argument to imply the instituted trace. The latter will imply the avoidance of confinement to the internality common to all such systems of signification. The progress will also imply the necessity of a grammatology. In turn, these relations will imply difference appearing as such and temporalisation, to prepare for address to a transcendental system. However, it will not yet develop a relation of différance, which will be the culmination of the second article. We address these in our next chapter.

Part One: the requirements of the progress

The benefit in approaching Saussure

The opportunities for Derrida in approaching Saussure are multiple. To explain this relevance, note that speech and writing are instances of content, thus less “basic” than the relations of unity and difference. Put via content, Saussure’s is
the desire [demand] for a speech without
writing (DLG 31).

*We caution that Derrida will still work these relations out*, but we note as an aid that writing *first* arises as a visual difference, which is a condition for an inside and outside (cf. 793). Speech for essential reasons no longer allows visible difference, thus nor does it yet allow the outside or inside as a limit. At the level “underneath”, Saussure’s goal aligns with Derrida’s since 1954, a demand for unity with the object *without limits*. In earlier years, this was Derrida’s absolute (97, cf. 313).

**Acceptance of Saussure’s hierarchy of teloi**

This develops a hierarchy of interrelated teloi at their levels. First, as noted, nor does Derrida *doubt* Saussure’s “phonologist” *necessities at its “level”* (DLG 1039, cf. 30, (718)). Such relations are certain, and determining speech produced by phonation remains the *first* necessity of such a linguistics of speech. Hence Derrida *begins by accepting that linguistics must be a psychology*. That is, Derrida begins by accepting that in a linguistics, psychology must take as its object the spoken word alone, in phonation of the psychological concept of the sound. In turn, he begins by accepting the necessity to proceed by means of speech to determine the tongue, as a linguistics in general. Thus he accepts the necessity of developing *semiology* as the idea of a science, from
a determination of the tongue. Put via signification, Derrida is assessing the parallel system to speech, that of signification in general. He accepts the necessity that the progress of signifiers (as speech) be united as a signified (tongue), and thus as a sign of the whole field of signs.

**The condition that Derrida assesses**

To assess this telos, Derrida considers further necessities, as a necessary condition. Following from above, as it must be believed that there is an inside to the tongue (DLG 1035 (718)), it must also be believed that there is an outside to the tongue (i.e. an outside to speech). Indeed, Derrida worked out the necessity to speak of writing at each level, in our previous chapter. This establishes how Derrida can address Saussure. Crucially, given the telos of psycho-physiology, Derrida is also accepting the necessity of a subordinate writing which exists only to represent speech (phonetic writing). What we deem a “converse telos” arises (1). That is, for speech in general (and thus the tongue) to be the sole object, it must be possible for speech to be independent of writing. Just so, it must thus be possible for a writing that exists outside speech, and which exists merely to develop a linguistics of speech. Derrida is thus accepting the telos of a writing as only phonetic is a condition for Saussure’s telos of semiology (we

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636 The verb “believe” arises from Husserl, to express doxic positing (200).
develop this “only” below). To do so, it must also be possible for *speech to keep every sort of writing outside itself*.

In general, Derrida explains, of the telos of speech as the tongue (concept), that Saussure seeks

> to restore the internal system of the tongue in

the purity of its concept, against the most serious contamination [...] [T]he contamination by writing (DLG 1036)

We have arrived at the necessity to avoid “*contamination*” (in general, an instance of one part inside another, when the telos is to keep the parts separate). In assessing contamination, Derrida can begin to assess what holds of “purity” for the instances of speech and writing at the inside.637

Hence Derrida notes *why* he tests what Saussure requires of phonetic writing. Crucially: if writing at the lowest and particular level exists only to figure the tongue (phonetic writing), there would then be a “right” to exclude it from the interiority of the

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637 “Purity” is employed in a fashion that is not yet phenomenological, yet compatible – as the characteristic of lack of content. In this case, Saussure seeks “purity from”, purity is merely a telos of a lack of certain sorts of content (Husserl claims that pure content is irreal, thus pure *per se*).
teleological “system” of speech (DLG 1035). To attain this, Saussure requires (requiert (DLG 25)) at least two elements. First, that there must only be a phonetic writing implies that Saussure must retain the purity of speech by keeping every other level of writing outside both speech and phonetic writing. Writing must only figure speech.

Thus, at the lowest level and most interior level, should a phonetic writing as only existing to represent speech be impossible, then writing must be re-included to the telos of speech as the tongue, hence to a linguistics of speech. It would then be necessary to expand semiology at the highest level to Derrida’s “grammatology” (cf. DLG 27 ff.). Just so, at the highest level, should the necessities of writing exceed the field of semiology in general, then grammatology would be necessary.

**Derrida’s hint as to what will occur**

But thus far Derrida can only “suspect” (DLG 1036) that in the basic relations,

\[ \text{The sense [direction] of the outside has always [already] been inside the inside, that is to} \]

638 Derrida writes: “[I]f writing [in particular] is only the figuration of the tongue [that is, at this lowest level], one has the right to exclude it from the interiority of the system” (DLG 1035, our emphasis).

639 We employ “requires” (as does Derrida) as one verb to signify what is necessary for Saussure to attain the telos.
say *imprisoned* outside the outside [as irreducible] and vice versa. (DLG 1036, our emphases)

Confirmation of this suspicion would solve all of Derrida’s difficulties. Put via the content of speech and writing, Derrida as yet merely suspects that, for essential reasons,

the system of writing in general [outside the outside] is not exterior to the system of the tongue in general (DLG 1041).

Thus he only suspects that, given his telos of distinguishing a *semiology* in general (DLG 24, (676)), that a relation to writing outside will hold that necessitates a grammatology.

But Derrida gives a strong hint as to how he will begin to assess his suspicion, in the telos of phonetic writing as a converse condition. For

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640 These quotations are from the closing pages of Derrida’s first article, where he makes it overt what needs to be achieved in the second. The articles develop a considered progression.
one already suspects that if writing is ‘image’
and ‘figuration’ outside, this ‘representation’ is
not innocent. (DLG 1036)

Derrida merely suspects that a psychology that seeks a pure
phonetic writing will imply contamination of purity, and also that
it will imply difficulties for a psychology of speech. 642

**Part Two: preparing for the argument**

**Summary of the preparation to follow**

In our first part, we follow as Derrida begins from the necessity
of arbitrary relation to the signified. He will devolve from the
most exterior level to the interior of the phoneme as sensible, in
order to work out the necessities of a writing at each level. This
will allow for institution of writing at the lowest level (most
interior). Derrida will then need to allow for a relation of both
writing and speech at the most interior. He will do so by means of
the concept of the *graphie*, which relation of the image permits the

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641 By “innocent” Derrida is referring to Saussure’s tone of moral indignation
at the *oppression* of speech from writing in the tradition of linguistics. For
Derrida this aligns with the *first kind of violence* from 1964, which is deemed the
“violence of forgetting” (DLG 1038). The reference to “forgetting” is to
Heidegger’s *Vergessenheit* (cf. BT 1, SZ 1 ff.), which Derrida in 1968 also
assesses by reference to Heidegger’s “The Anaximander Fragment” (D 155, cf.
Heidegger 1975, 51). As Derrida explains in 1968, when one forgets, in such
amnesia one no longer even knows if one knew something originally (cf. OAG
66); one forgets even that one needed to remember.

642 Derrida also employs “not” as it signals the violence of negation.
relation of both the signifiers of speech and writing. Third, Derrida will thus develop the difficulty – that Saussure’s relations of the natural symbol preclude the thesis of the arbitrariness of the signified. Derrida will then work out the relations of the instituted trace, and the necessity of grammatology.

**The instance of the levels to be addressed**

Importantly, in order to allow phonetic writing, writing must be kept outside of speech. Derrida opts for the relations of signifiers which pertain to this exclusion of the exterior. The particular relations of signifier to the signified must thus be arbitrary (*across*). Derrida addresses

the necessity of those relations between

signifiers and determined signifiers. *Only* the

last relations are regulated by arbitrariness

(DLG 23-24, our emphasis).

Moreover, as speech must be independent, it must be possible that this relation is *entirely* arbitrary. Only this would allow the telos of a linguistics of speech in the tongue, and the idea of semiology. Derrida quotes, summarising the above:
One can thus say that the entirely [entièrement] arbitrary signs realise better than others the ideal of semiological procedure; this is why the tongue [...] is just so the most characteristic of all [signs in the field]; in this sense linguistics can become the general template [patron, i.e. as prior and essential form] of all semiology, even though the tongue would only be a particular system [at the lowest level] (C 101, Ce 68, DLG 27, our emphases).

We have explained the italicised relations as we proceeded. They also explain how this progress can occur (as “becoming”). Thus, Derrida summarises, semiology in general would remain commanded by linguistics [...] at its centre [most interior], at once and in its telos [forward] (DLG 27, our emphases)
Yet such linguistics at the most interior and as a teleology,\textsuperscript{643} remains commanded by psychology:

all of linguistics, at the interior of semiology, is

placed under the authority and surveillance of

psychology (DLG 1040, cf. CIG 33, Ce 13).

To further the telos of a psychological tongue as speech, Derrida must assess whether the field of linguistic signs remains internal alone. He never needs to include the “deaf-and-dumb alphabet, symbolic rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and so on” (C 33, Ce 15) – from the greater field of signs – to Saussure’s psychology.

**Avoiding a first methodological trap**

Next, Derrida turns toward Saussure’s first requirement, that phonetic writing only be a figuration. He will thus develop the necessity of an instituted moment of writing to each part of the linguistic field of signs.

Note that by beginning from testing figuration, Derrida avoids the methodical trap of arguing for the importance of a writing in general in history, and thus for an institutive act of writing, and

\textsuperscript{643} This quote is the impetus for employing the word “telos” (cf. also DLG 1030), although we could employ “demand”, as what impels the constituting of the telos, in each case. Note also that the telos in turn must be thought “at once” (à la fois), which will imply a necessity of contradiction. We develop this toward the end of our chapter.
the inability of speech to escape originary contamination. Saussure acknowledged that writing has an independent tradition (C 45, Ce 25, DLG 1038, above), hence that there must have been such a moment. Moreover, that a written sign endures over time in the absence of the first speaker, and thus that the modern linguist is dependent upon its historical origin, is one of the issues that Saussure complained had misled linguists to privilege writing (617). Saussure countered that an oral tradition can retain the “features” of a language even more durably than a written one (cf. C 45-46, Ce 25). Arguing for dependence upon a writing in history merely *polemically* opposes Saussure’s phonologist necessities, the value of which Derrida also never doubts (DLG 30). It begins, indeed, from the privilege that Saussure rejects. *Derrida never privileges writing at the outset of his address to phonetic writing*, but continues to work with Saussure’s telos.

**The institution of writing to the levels**

Given that speech must be signified to distinguish the sign (of the field of signs, thus semiology), Derrida notes that this institutive moment of writing in general must have held for the originary instance of *the sign*. By this the “system” as a “structure of return”

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644 Saussure provides the example of the Lithuanian “which is still spoken today in Eastern Prussia and parts of Prussia is attested in written documents only since 1540; but at that late period it presents on the whole as accurate a picture of Proto-Indo-European as Latin of the third century BC. That in itself suffices to show the extent to which language is independent of writing.” (C 45, Ce 25).
(or circularity), as developed by Derrida by 1965, is included in all its moments (cf. DLG 25, 25 fn. 3). Moreover, Derrida turns to the sign to work out in his third moment how each instituted instance is a signifier (Saussure’s first requirement) – including writing. This will prepare to assess the conditions for phonetic writing at the most interior. The approach begins from the sign (“behind”), hence from the original kinds of writing.

**The necessity of institution by writing**

Thus, Derrida notes, to appear in history (in particular), the sign is certainly “inscribed”, thus must already have been originarily written. The latter implies the concept of a (original cf. DLG 33) writing in general (further behind). Writing by its essence signifies what appears and endures, as “instituted” (cf. 620, 777). As the unity into a whole (a sign in general) is the telos (across), and the entire field composed of signs, Derrida goes on:

[I]f ‘writing’ signifies inscription, and firstly the
durable institution of a sign (and this alone is the
nucleus of the concept [signified] of writing)
[then] writing in general covers the whole field of linguistic signs. (DLG 24)

It is indeed Saussure’s field of linguistic signs, addressed via language in general (734) that must be covered. However, the necessity to exceed this overall field of signs must still be established. Indeed, Derrida puts the above as a conditional: as in 1964, this necessity is prior to positing even the possibility of the sense of its object (writing in general) upon this inside. However, as noted, as institution is certain, Derrida argues for the necessity of the latter, hence a founding moment for what is henceforth called the “possibility of writing”.

This instils the circularity. For, moving forward, to heed the necessity to found this institution, Derrida situates this even further beyond the particular idea. Even the idea itself of an instituted moment would depend upon this profound possibility of writing:

645 “Durable” should never be confused with “permanent”. Saussure insists that durability implies a permanence wrongly ascribed to writing. Thus he finds a counterexample, that spoken language can be more permanent than the written word in particular (C 45, Ce 25 (736 fn.)). Derrida never suggests this is permanent, and also as permanence would be absolute. Durability implies a persistence that can fall short.
the idea itself of institution – thus the arbitrariness of the sign – is unthinkable before the possibility of writing (DLG 24).

Thus the instituted moment must depend upon this possibility of writing (we return to why the latter is equated with arbitrariness, just below). To emphasise the evolution, Derrida has made institution dependent upon the possibility of writing rather than the idea itself (and hence any sort of idea). This includes the idea in general, Idea, idea of the linguistic sign (and even Husserl’s Idea in the Kantian sense, which is no longer mentioned).

Derrida avoids suggesting that this writing replaces the idea itself (a hierarchy of what is beyond hierarchy would be difficult to establish). However, for essential reasons (further behind), the idea of institution must first be derived from what institutes content (furthest behind), rather than from what then allows for closer determination of that content as what it is (as signifiers “across”, the same as itself, etc.). The idea of institution must be derived from “writing”. Henceforth, “writing” without general or

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646 The idea itself would be without limits, as what it is (outside or inside); it would be necessary for, and thus prior to, any idea that can be thought. As appearing, it would also hold at each level. Of course, in opting for “writing” as prior necessity, then unless Derrida remains within the essential relations this could be the necessity of foundation on anything at all. Derrida’s argument remains bound to essential relations, however far beyond essence it seeks to extend.
particular reference signals what for essential reasons must found the general and particular writings at each level.

Note that it is uncertain whether such a writing itself engages with the general, or even the idea; it arises first merely as a certain possibility of writing. Thus when referring to the supposition that it can hold in general, to “found” even this possibility, Derrida deems it “the general possibility of writing” (DLG 28). As ever, the whole-part reasoning remains basic, even when it must exceed the general and particular. Derrida writes of this “frontier” beyond even the idea that it is a possibility founded in the general possibility of writing (DLG 28).

By this necessity of an instituted moment of writing (we avoid yet deeming it “irreducible” (cf. 805 ff.), a first condition for the trace has been developed.

Given the telos of arbitrariness, there must then be an instituted moment to the sign. Hence, as we noted would be worked out, the telos is the signifying of the whole field of signs, and writing in general “covers” the whole field of linguistic signs (above). That is, coverage permits the value of the system in its signifying, upon

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647 This moment will be “irreducible” only when the system implies an originary contradiction, yet retains the instituted moment (DLG 25 ff., (778)).
the inside. The arbitrariness of the sign is unthinkable without the institution of writing to the signifier (DLG 24). In so doing, an instituted moment of writing applies to the entire field of linguistic signs. The field of signs in turn includes the sign of language in general, which at the lowest level includes the signifier as speech. It is implicit that Derrida has added an instituted moment of the possibility of writing to signifying that covers the (whole) field of linguistic signs, thus to both speech and writing.

**The institution of writing to speech**

A moment of writing is thus instituted into the certain signifier of speech. This is important to permit address to Saussure’s linguistics from the position of phonetic writing (due to his privilege of speech, Saussure was never concerned to develop this). Beginning from the telos that speech determine the tongue implies an instituted moment of writing, as a condition for phonetic writing. Just so, it is crucial to allow alignment with Derrida’s levels. That is, given his acceptance of Saussure’s telos, were there no such instantiation of writing to the signifier from what exceeds it (from “underneath” its name (682)), *Derrida could never include instances of metaphor to the movement of signifiers*. Metaphor would be “forbidden” (cf. DLG 37).

Yet the above merely develops a moment on the way to phonetic writing, for we have not yet added the possibility of “figuring”
speech in signifying. The relations of institution to the lower levels of speech and writing have not yet been addressed.

Preparing for the relations of the graphie

To do so, Derrida combines the two moments thus far, and devolves to the phoneme and grapheme at the most interior. Above, he deemed that “institution” depends upon the possibility of writing, and so too does “the arbitrariness of the sign” (DLG 24, above). In sum, the instituted moment would be a signifier, which in its “coverage” thus instils an arbitrary relation to the signified. Henceforth, it is certain that instituted moments as arbitrary (i.e. as immotivated) relate to signifieds. Moreover, instituted moments are signifiers which must be without motivated relation to signifieds, and thus to signs. In particular, to develop a semiology, signifiers must have arbitrary relations to signs in the whole field of linguistic signs.

Thus Derrida moves on to the foundations and kinds of instituted signifiers (of signs) that can be inscribed in this field. We begin from the anterior moment of the signified in general, in particular from writing in general. Hence, moving forward, this writing in general must have had an originary moment as particular signified or concept.
From the Greek alphabet to the symbol

That said, a concept of writing could follow from any of the essential relations of writing in general. Such concepts (specific kinds of writing) are numerous, and Derrida develops them in more detail upon having permitted a grammatology (cf. DLG 41 ff.). Saussure considers only two.

The first is ideographic, in which “a word is represented by some uniquely distinctive sign which has nothing to do with the sounds involved” (C 47, Ce 26), and of which Chinese writing is the best example. As this kind need never relate to sounds, it is incompatible with a telos of semiology. For Saussure, only “phonetic writing” is suited to linguistics, as it is intended to represent the sequence of sounds as they occur in the word (C 47, Ce 26, our emphases).

To that end, for Saussure, the “primitive” (for Derrida, original) Greek alphabet is the optimal language in history, for in it each “individual” (i.e. particular) letter represents only one “sound unit” (i.e., forward). No forms in which multiple letters must represent

648 Saussure, for example, never includes hieroglyphics.
649 By “intends”, rather than intentionality, Saussure is referring to a teleology. Even so, for Derrida, intentionality is teleological.
an individual sound were yet employed (the later English “th”, for instance, was written as “θ” by the Greeks).

Second, although Saussure and Derrida concede that the ideograph and alphabetic letter are “related”, as both take visual form (as graphic), Derrida deems this of “little import” (DLG 24 fn. 2). For the Chinese ideograph never needs to depict its referent as an “image”, and is henceforth set aside.

It is thus the relation of the image of alphabetic writing and speech that Derrida must address. For note that there have been two “paths” by which such writing relates to its object: the individual relation that figures its image as phonic, and the signifying by a letter of a sound. That is, as phonetic writing must be only the “figuration”, “image” or “representation” of speech, the latter moments should be indissociable in signifying as phonetic writing. Further (moving forward), in both ways, phonetic writing must take as its sole object the sign of speech (forward).

Derrida must work out how the representation as “image” and alphabetic (allowing for the representation of the sound as image) can be employed together, in a signifier as phonetic writing.

650 As we have explained, “speech” refers to a single act (parole).
Aligning the kinds of writing with the system

As each way moves “forward”, these directions are aligned with the movement. Derrida deems the relation between ideographic and alphabetic is of “little import” for this telos, in that neither kind of writing requires a motivated relation to what it “represents” (DLG 24 fn. 2). That is, when each instance (letter, or individual ideograph) is made a signifier, its relation to its signified is arbitrary. For instance, the alphabetic letter “t” has no motivated “connection” to the sound that it signifies (C 165, Ce 118), and an ideograph has no motivated relation to what it “represents” (C 47, Ce 26).651

Motivation and arbitrariness are correlative – the more the relation is motivated, the less it is arbitrary. As immotivated, arbitrary relation to the signified is kept for both alphabetic symbol and signifier.

This relation permits an instance of signifiers – as the alphabetic and ideographic – that must determine the sign, but which relation to the signified as yet remains arbitrary. Both the latter relations permit the instances of alphabetic writing to align with the system (“underneath”) in its progress forward. However, the relation from the alphabetic (and ideographic) to the phonetic has not yet been instilled.

651 Saussure writes that: “[A]n identical state of affairs is to be found in that other system of signs: writing. [...] 1. The signs used in writing are arbitrary. 2. The letter t, for instance, has no connection with the sound it denotes.” (C 165, Ce 117-118).
The devolution of the alphabetic to the phonetic via the symbol

To begin to do so, Derrida writes that the relation of alphabetic and ideographic is again “of little import” as what “counts” for this telos is that in this system of alphabetic writing – and phonetics in general –

no relation of ‘natural’ representation would be implied, no ‘symbolic’ relation in the Hegelian-Saussurean sense (DLG 24, fn. 2, our emphases).

This introduces an important divergence. Alphabetic writing, for Derrida, does imply representation as “symbolic” (such as the letter “θ”). However, it implies “no” symbolic relation in the Hegelian-Saussurean sense of “natural representation”. We address these in order.

The levels in alphabetic writing

We begin by following the relation of symbol and alphabetic writing in order to establish the possibility of phonetic writing. First, no means yet holds for writing to be instituted as a signifier with this telos of representing the image of speech. We move in our basic progression from earlier years, beginning from further
behind. For Saussure, a first and unknowable moment of language in general (*langage*), permitted the evolution of the optimal tongue in history (the essential relations of the Greek alphabet). At this level, the Greek language is the original and general model for phonology, i.e. for the telos of determining the tongue in linguistics, and in turn for the original relations of the *letter*. Next, moving forward, a devolution to the *originary* parts (*species*) must indeed already have occurred. At this level, the *signifieds* (*concepts*) hold in accordance with original laws. Then, moving forward, such specific relations appear as *certain* (as psycho-physical signifiers (C 31, Ce 14)).

In turn, however, writing is also certain, and the language in general that permitted the original alphabet also permitted writing. The original alphabet also devolves to an originary concept (signified) of alphabetic writing. For essential reasons, Derrida explained, if writing signifies institution of what appears and endures (i.e. is *instituted*), then the concept of writing covers the whole field of signs; Derrida deemed this “alone” the “nucleus” of the concept of writing (747), and at least takes this institution as certain. Specific alphabetic signifieds can thus be written even though also derived from the phonological alphabet.

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652 The above does not yet consider the difficulty of the absolute origin of writing, with which Derrida is not yet concerned. We merely note that *institution*
In turn, moving forward from the certain moment, the object thus can appear and thought can begin to constitute its object. This object is, as ever, the field of signs and its particular signs. Moving forward again at this lowest level, the originary progress of what appears can proceed from one signifier to another. It can then figure its image as phonic (as we will explain, via the graphic). Next, it can represent the signifier as phonic (as sound) (cf. above). The suffixal form “-ic” occurs as these specific moments are predicated of their objects. Derrida summarises:

[I]n this field can then appear a certain species of instituted signifieds, [...] graphic in the narrow and derived sense of this word, regulated by a certain relation to other instituted signifiers, thus ‘written’ even though they are ‘phonie’. (DLG 24, our emphases)

But we must yet explain how these “certain relations” regulate these possibilities of the graphic and phonic, to permit phonetic writing via the two paths above.

has been permitted by the derivation, from language in general and the phonologist alphabet, to a concept of writing.

653 This suffixal form was applied to the alphabetic and ideographic too.
The common relation via the *graphie*

Thus Derrida seeks an (essential) relation of writing in general that covers the alphabetic, and just so the figure, image, representation etc.\textsuperscript{654} Crucially, he finds a commonality in that each are already graphic. We thus add the next moment. Importantly, following the converse telos, Derrida seeks to permit phonetic writing in address to the *sound* via the “*image*, representation, or figuration”, etc. (Derrida continues to list these in order (cf. DLG 24)).

The simplified version of “representation”

To begin to explain this: first, for essential reasons, each in this order can *appear* as visual.\textsuperscript{655} This is in accordance with Saussure, hence that they are “*spatial*” is not yet mentioned, nor is the classical concept of “*space*”. But that these occur in order is relevant, for as noted, even the “interior” level of the signifier must appear as an instance of the system, thus as *metaphor*.\textsuperscript{656}

\textsuperscript{654} Derrida never addresses the symbol as phonic. This could be criticised: Saussure also deems that “rites” are “symbolic” (C 33, Ce 15), and that these are never entirely visual as they involve phonation (of chants, for instance). Just so, Saussure’s example of military tattoos in the greater field of signs is expressly phonic. But nor would these be included insofar as Derrida as yet assesses whether writing must only represent speech.

\textsuperscript{655} Further on, “spacing” is equated with the intervals between letters, and thus with a vanishing of sense too (DLG 36).

\textsuperscript{656} This was ever an implication of Saussure’s teleology. As he noted, “all definitions based on words are vain. It is an error of method to proceed from words in order to give definitions of things.” (C 31, Ce 14). At this juncture in the *Course*, Saussure instead introduces the study of the signifier, concept and sign, which for Derrida enters the circularity. But then even the word “signifier” is a metaphor of the system “underneath”.

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Thus each instance (henceforth, it is implicit that these are instituted) can indeed be a metaphor, which becomes another metaphor, etc. This progress allows the relation of image, figure, representation etc. as signifiers moving from one to the other in infinitum (etc., cf. 510), even though these can never be synonymous.657

But nor must these relations yet be addressed in a chain, thus not yet as temporal elements. For metaphors by their essence are only partially related, by their “resemblance” (DLG 25). The latter refers to the shared relation by the visual basis in the concept of the graphie (“behind”). Thus the metaphor of the graphic covers “image”, “representation”, or “figuration” etc., and in particular these metaphors would be

the incision, engraving, illustration, or the letter

e tc. (cf. DLG 24-25, our emphasis)

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657 By this progress Derrida averts the necessity to consider Saussure’s terms in the context of metaphysics. For instance, the word “representation” has a long history (cf. ODP 329). To take this only from Husserl, a representation (Vergewärtigung) restores a moment of content (including an image) from memory to the living present (cf. I §99). More broadly assessed, the difficulty of “representation” as what can only represent “pictures” if these are in turn inaccessible “ideas” is well known, for example, in Berkeley’s critique of Locke (cf. Bennett 1984, 124). As the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy summarises of the debates amongst Locke and Spinoza, and the critique of Locke by Hume: “the fundamental problem [in those debates, as to “resemblance”] is that the mind is ‘supposing’ its ideas to represent something else, but it has no access to this something else except by forming another idea” (ODP 329, our emphases). This is just the difficulty that Derrida is addressing via his levels and the italicised terms.
Importantly, in the last signifier Derrida subtly encompasses the essential instances of alphabetic writing. The “letter” as much as the symbol is an instance of the image or figure.658

Derrida is seeking to relate the symbol and sign by means of writing. For thus far, he has not yet begun from furthest behind, in what would be the essential source of the original alphabetic letter (and thus the *gramme*), for a *gramme* does not yet address a relation from sign to visual symbol (703).659 Rather, Derrida devolves to the “concept” of the *graphie*, which also covers *illustration* (cf. DLG 25). As originarily part of writing in general, the “concept of the *graphie*” (DLG 25) (behind) already implies and then makes possible the *graphic*, the predicate (characteristic) of the object in general. It thus permits the alphabetic,660 symbolic, or any metaphor of writing as appearing, such as figuration, image, representation etc.

**The inclusion of phonologism**

Having worked out the common basis for phonetic writing as graphic, we can turn toward how it addresses representation,

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658 The Greek “letter” (*gramma*) is explained by Liddell and Scott as “that which is drawn, a drawing, that which is written, a written character, letter, hence the alphabet” (Liddell and Scott 1869, 326).

659 Derrida will only derive the progress to the *gramme*, which has become famous in his *oeuvre*, after the psychological basis upon the *graphie* is brought to the necessity of contradiction, to allow an archi-writing (790 ff.).

660 Just so, this permits the ideographic (such as Chinese writing), which figures the idea of what it refers to. But the ideographic, which of its essence figures whole concepts, cannot relate to the phoneme.
figuring etc. at the most interior as a phoneme. Derrida began by accepting the study of phonation (the physiological production of sound and speech in the psyche (C 37, Ce 20, (622)), as the production of speech as a sound. Thus the relations of the phone (voice and sound) were accepted from the first.

As deriving from the study of language with its telos of speech (further behind), the instituted moment of the phone (the originary unit of both “sound” and “voice”) is thus instilled along with the graphie. Moving forward, this in turn derives to the certain relation and thus the predication of the phonic (the characteristic – predicate, forward – of sound, speech etc.). The graphic would apply to a signifier at the interior of speech which is just so phonic. Thus in the movement that tests psychology in particular, as psycho-physical production of sound, Derrida devolves from the phone to the phoneme.

The permission for phonetic writing in the grapheme

Indeed, Derrida is not yet treating the phoneme for its formal parts (680). He addresses psychology to assess what is required for phonetic writing to figure speech as a signifier, as acoustic image. The phoneme is thus assessed as the smallest signifying unit of sensible sound that can be figured as an image. This develops the alignment. The concept of graphie is necessary for an image, which by this juncture is necessary for “writing”, “letter”, and
“sound”. Thus the certain moment of the grapheme is deemed the particular moment of the graphic, and can figure the phoneme as graphic. This is how the species of graphie and phone are

regulated by a certain relation to other instituted signifiers, thus ‘written’ even though they are ‘phonie’. (DLG 24, our emphases)

We have at last devolved to the most interior moment, as the study of physiologically produced sound, which relations of the system apply to both grapheme and phoneme. We have arrived at the permission for phonetic writing, as the most interior of speech can be figured as signifiers which can progress to linguistics as a tongue. In so doing, Derrida has developed the relations of institution to the field of signs, and the shared relation upon the graphie. Next, Derrida notes what will lead to the difficulty.

The difficulty of the natural symbol

For importantly, given the telos of a tongue as speech, then the image, figuration, representation, etc. signify a symbol as well as an alphabetic letter. As Derrida notes, this is
the Saussurean definition of writing as ‘image’

– thus as natural symbol – of the tongue (DLG 24 fn. 3, our emphasis).

The difficulty, we note, will develop from the “natural” symbol, which is thus taken to relate to all of the images as writing. Speech, Derrida will explain, ought to imply no relation to the natural symbol.

To do so, Derrida twice aligns the symbol with the natural sort “in the Hegelian-Saussurean sense” (DLG 24 fn. 2, 24). He never explains this in “Of Grammatology”, but does address Hegel’s relation of the symbol, sign and arbitrariness in comparison to Saussure in “The Pit and the Pyramid” of 1966. Derrida writes, and then quotes:

[T]he motif of the arbitrariness of the sign, the

distinction between sign and symbol, is

clarified at length in [Hegel’s Aesthetica]. There,

Hegel specifies the ‘purely arbitrary linkage’

which constitutes the sign itself, and above all

the linguistic sign: ‘[But] […] it is a different
thing when a sign is to be a symbol. The lion, for example, is taken as a symbol of magnanimity, the fox of cunning [...]. But the lion and the fox do possess in themselves the very qualities whose significance they are supposed to express.’ (PP 84, quoting HA 304-305)

Hegel goes on that the symbol is rather a sign which in its externality comprises in itself at the same time the content of the idea (Vorstellung) which it brings into appearance.

(PP 85, HA 305, our emphasis)

Thus far, insofar as Derrida aligns Hegel and Saussure in this psychology, we note the commonality: all signs that are symbols.

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661 The translation of Hegel’s “Vorstellung” as “idea” in “The Pit and the Pyramid” is Derrida’s. In “Of Grammatology” of 1966 the content instituted from this beyond would rather be that of writing.
662 Should a critic take the sense of “circle” to be no longer “natural” on the grounds that it is no longer within the world, this would confuse Saussure’s “psycho-physicality” with the directly “physical” (cf. C 98, Ce 66).
– these are only ever treated by Derrida as visual – “represent” the sense of their object as an image (e.g. “θ”, or circle).

Hence, in a divergence from alphabetic symbols, natural symbols must have a motivated relation to their referent, thus preclude an arbitrary relation to externality. Derrida takes at least some signs in this telos of a phonetic writing that represent sound via an “image” to be “natural signs”. 663

Natural signs can be images, yet also retain arbitrariness (the symbol θ and its sound “th”, for example). But as to natural symbols in particular, they are also images – each, we explained, is derived from the graphie – but their contents do have motivated relations to what they “represent”, “figure”, etc. (DLG 24). These symbols preclude arbitrariness in such relation. Thus, Saussure notes, the “symbol of justice, the scales”, could hardly be replaced by a “chariot” (C 101, Ce 68). 664 The difficulty is that arbitrariness of the signifier is a condition for the linguistics of speech.

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663 We refer the reader to our next footnote.
664 Saussure puts it that “it is characteristic of symbols that they are never entirely arbitrary. [...] They show at least a vestige of natural connexion between the signifier and its signified. For instance, the symbol of justice, the scales, could hardly be replaced by a chariot” (C 101, Ce 68).
Part Three: working out the instituted trace

The necessity of coverage of the field of signs

We thus begin to work out Derrida’s argument, which will interrelate the elements above. Derrida will begin from Saussure’s teloi, and apply the relations of institution, and the graphie. Third, he will then apply the difficulty.

He begins with the premise that allows for his application of writing (we quote this again to guide the reader):

[I]f ‘writing’ signifies inscription, and firstly the durable institution of a sign (and this alone is the nucleus of the concept [signified] of writing)

[then] writing in general covers the whole field of linguistic signs. (DLG 24)

This is posed as a conditional, as Derrida is investigating necessary conditions, which avoids even positing the possibility that the whole field of signs is as yet undetermined. As in every year thus far, the conditional form allows Derrida to address the highest level without determination of possibility. The argument
will proceed by necessary conditions alone.\(^{665}\) Second, as we explained, coverage applies at the most interior by means of signifiers, not yet united into a concept. Derrida is thus proceeding from within the relation of signifiers at the lowest level. That is, the lowest level (of signifiers) must signify the highest (semiology in general).

Thus, if writing signifies the durable institution of a sign, then writing in general covers the whole field of signs. As Derrida worked out above, for essential reasons, writing must signify durable institution, this is the “concept” of writing that must already hold (i.e. as a signified) (DLG 24). For instance, the durable institution of a symbolic rite or form of politeness can be signified by writing, and just so for any sign in the field. It is necessary that writing in general cover the whole field of signs.

**The appearing of relations of writing as speech**

Thus Derrida applies the institution of relations to coverage in this field. He worked out above that a “certain species of instituted signifieds” (DLG 24, our emphasis) of writing can appear in the whole field of signs that writing in general must cover. It is possible that such certain signs in the overall field can appear as

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\(^{665}\) Derrida is testing necessary conditions at this juncture, which are exclusionary in advance (“only if”), as Saussure deems that writing must “only” figure speech. These are not yet transcendental conditions of possibility (cf. 803 fn.).
signifieds. These are necessary concepts of writing (behind), which can be addressed as signifiers.

However it is also possible, Derrida is explicitly neither doubting nor testing, and Saussure is urging, that the whole field of signs in a linguistics of speech can be signifiers in the tongue. But as writing occurs in a sign, then such signs can be spoken of just as they can be written of. The signs predicated of (in a signifier) as graphic must for essential reasons be related to those signs that are spoken of, as phonic. Such signs must and can be “written” in their instituted moment just as much as they are “phonic”. *Derrida worked out the permission for this from the concept of the graphie above, which in particular applies to the grapheme.* Thus, for example, as phonic and graphic, the sign “scales of justice” can be both written and spoken. The latter example, note, is also a natural sign.

**The parallel line of argument**

Derrida then develops a second line of argument. He begins again from the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, and thus the necessity of retraction to only an internal relation of signifiers. Moreover, following from the telos of a linguistics of speech, the unity (or totality) of signifiers and the progress of the order of signifiers in a signified must apply. Given this telos, then the retraction to signifiers that are entirely arbitrary (i.e. immotivated)
ought to exclude all “natural subordination” in the field of signifiers:

[from the moment one considers the totality of determined signs, spoken and a fortiori written, as immotivated institutions, it is necessary to exclude all relation of natural subordination, all natural hierarchy between the signifiers or orders of signifiers. (DLG 24)

There ought to be no necessary hierarchy imposed by “natural” and worldly relations of motivation from the exterior of the relations of signifiers, or the chains of signifiers that must proceed to the signified. That is, this must hold at the lowest level of the linguistics of speech. There ought thus to be no necessary dependence of the phoneme and grapheme upon a natural hierarchy of relations of signifieds in general (DLG 24).

**The relation of subordination from the natural**

However, Derrida has worked out such a hierarchy in detail, and then worked out that natural symbols must have motivated relations to their referent. Hence, they do imply a relation of subordination from outside the tongue. Such relations can no longer be entirely
arbitrary at the most interior. Yet arbitrariness at the most interior is a requirement for linguistics in general and thus for semiology in general. Hence, in such a teleology, such symbols must “fall outside” the tongue, and outside the field of linguistics in general, and hence outside of the entire field of semiology in general. That is to say, the latter requires that no subordination hold at the lowest level of signifiers for its possibility, and signs that develop such relations fall outside of its field.

**The argument for grammatology**

Next, as we worked out, at least some natural signs are natural symbols (such as Hegel’s “eagle”, and Saussure’s “scales of justice” (C 100)). What applies to the symbol thus applies to some signs, and thus to signs in general (the “totality of determined signs”, above). Following in a necessary progression from Derrida’s first conditional of the coverage of writing, it is necessary to conclude, that if the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign is maintained, then at least some natural signs are excluded from the field of linguistics in general. They must thus fall outside the field of semiology in general.

However, such relations are necessarily those that include relations of a certain species of signifiers, which signs are graphic as much as they are phonic. The relations of this field outside of semiology in general are those of writing in general. As the grapheme can figure the phoneme, this holds of writing in
general. Yet the relations of writing still include those of *semiology in general* (or “semiology as grammatology”, below). They necessarily include relations of writing to a broadening of the field of semiology. Maintaining the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign thus implies a *grammatology*:

> it is necessary for one to conclude that only
> those natural signs, those which Hegel and Saussure call ‘symbols’, escape semiology as grammatology, but they fall *a fortiori* outside the field of linguistics as region of general semiology (DLG 24).

Thus *if* Saussure maintains the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, *then* there is a broadening of the field to include writing that exceeds that of semiology in general (676). But then writing exceeds the field of semiology, which implies a *grammatology*. Moreover, we add, this implies that necessary relations of *writing* must then be included to the whole field of signs.

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666 Note again the term “region”, Derrida is preparing to align the general and particular relations with Husserl again.
However, Saussure does need to maintain this thesis, or the relation to the outside is no longer arbitrary, and then \textit{a relation would arise from the outside of speech at the most interior}. This would be a relation from writing. But it was a necessary condition of a linguistics of speech that it must be able to be a distinct system, and thus that writing can be kept outside at every level.

Thus as Saussure requires phonetic writing to \textit{only} figure speech, Derrida is posing an exclusive disjunct. Either a telos of semiology implies a grammatology, which has broadened the field of semiology to include writing in general; \textit{or} an exterior relation to speech applies from writing, in which case writing is no longer merely phonetic, and the linguistics of speech includes a particular kind of writing (permitted by the grapheme). In turn the latter can only signify semiology in general by means of signs that are graphic as much as they are phonic, at the lowest level. Yet as the signifieds or signs of such signifiers must then also include that of writing, this must continue on up to the field of semiology in general, to \textit{broaden} its field anyway, to “semiology as grammatology”. A necessary relation of writing is included to semiology in general, which again broadens the field of semiology in general to imply a grammatology.

Thus if Saussure maintains the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, this implies that necessity of a broadening of the field of grammatology. If Saussure no longer keeps this thesis, then the
necessity applies to include writing, and thus include writing in
general. *There must be a broadening of the field of semiology to include
writing in general, as a grammatology.* Derrida will develop this in our
next chapter.

**The second argument for institution**

The above necessity of inclusion thus holds at the highest level of
the teleological system in general. However, Derrida must as yet
account for the relation of writing as a trace, and develops a
second argument from the above. He begins at the lowest level.
The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, he notes,

> takes good account of a conventional

[necessary] relation between the phoneme and

the grapheme (in phonetic writing, between

the signified phoneme and signifying

grapheme) (DLG 24).

We worked out how, for *Saussure*, this must hold of the formal
relations of the phoneme, as each sound must correspond to a
relation of writing (666). Derrida has worked this out at its level,
although rather as psycho-physical, by the devolution of writing
to the grapheme, as dependent upon the graphie.
Hence, provided that the grapheme can figure the phoneme, then the thesis of arbitrariness of the sign does allow for a phonetic writing, which exists only to figure, image, and represent speech; Derrida thus accepts Saussure’s thesis (718). The grapheme can become the signifier that takes as its telos that it represent the phoneme in the unity of a signified (668). The grapheme as signifier can thus allow for the telos of a linguistics of speech, and semiology.

However, Derrida goes on, this conventional relation also precludes that the phoneme be an “image” of the grapheme (DLG 24). That is, if a phoneme is an image of the grapheme, then the grapheme would be inside the phoneme again, for as an image, the concept of the graphie founds both of these. This would no longer allow a phonetic writing as independent of speech, and preclude the right to exclude writing from the most interior of speech.

Thus, Derrida notes, to maintain the possibility of a pure speech and linguistics in the tongue, and thus of writing and speech as “two systems of distinct signs” (DLG 24 fn. 3) – speech and phonetic writing – it was indispensable for the exclusion of writing as ‘external system’ that it must exclude “an
This has led to the difficulty. First, note that phonemic relations are parts of speech, and an instance of the former is an instance of the latter; this holds for the grapheme and writing at the most interior too. Thus the first and “conventional” thesis of phonetic writing as outside speech implies that it is necessary to think of speech as a writing in itself. The first thesis is necessary, hence the second must follow.

This leads to the next moment. For Derrida explains that the conventional relation of phoneme to grapheme thereby \([\text{par là même}]\) precludes that the former \([\text{phonème}]\) be an image of the latter \([\text{graphème}]\).  

\[(\text{DLG 24})\]

The employment of “same” is considered, as it allows the relation of negation. Derrida applies the bases developed since 1964, as

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667 The word “reality” is employed (cf. DLG 24) as it allows alignment of the natural and psycho-physical with Husserl’s “real” (or reell) at the interior of a teleological consciousness.
“writing” arises in its strange “parallel” from one to other (693).

To be what it is in the movement of signifiers, thus united in the order of signifiers (thus as the tongue), the “signifying grapheme” (i.e. of phonetic writing) must then be not what it is.

Thus as phonetic writing must be what it is; it is necessary to signify the unity of the progress of signifiers as a distinct sign. It is thus necessary to signify the opposites at once (DLG 24, 24 fn. 3). Hence phonetic writing must be what it is, as the image (and symbol) of speech (thus as interior to speech, which is a writing in itself). Yet phonetic writing must then be not what it is, not the image and symbol, and exterior to relation to speech.

The two, which are not each other, must be thought at once. As not each other at once, they can be opposed. This implies – we note – that they are contradictories (DLG 29); the opposites cannot both be necessary at once. In this progression, the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign necessitates the contradiction of phonetic writing. Derrida explains:

it is now necessary to think [signify] that writing is at once more exterior to speech, not being

668 Derrida explains a further contradictory argument in a footnote, in that speech and writing are “at once” both figuration, and just so “two systems of distinct signs” (DLG 25 fn. 3, cf. C 45, Ce 24-25); this sort of contradiction is comparable to the Hegelian sort that we noted above (583).
669 As explained, as movement, these contraries progress “by the same”, which mediate moment permits the movement from one to the other – the same, thought “at once”, implies necessary contradiction (546).
[n’étant pas] its ‘image’ or ‘symbol’, and more
interior to the speech which is already in itself a
writing (DLG 24-25).

We will address the “more” and “more” below. Thus far, and from above, if the thesis of arbitrariness of the sign is maintained, this implies a necessary contradiction of phonetic writing. The latter was the necessity that Derrida assessed from the first.

Yet from above, the necessity of writing is maintained despite the necessity of contradiction. Moreover, if there is a contradiction, then there ought to be no possibility of the relation of writing or speech at the most interior; yet Derrida has worked out, from the graphie, that a moment of institution by an irreducible writing must occur. In this case, the institution of writing is kept despite the necessity of contradiction. A fortiori, this relation is deemed the instituted trace.

Setting aside of psycho-physiology

In such a moment at the most interior, beginning from the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign implies that Saussure’s telos of semiology in general as psycho-physical is no longer valid. Yet in devolving from the concept of the graphie, an instituted moment of writing is nevertheless maintained. This develops the possibility of an instituted trace, even when it must no longer be believed that there is an interior to speech as psycho-physiology.
However, Derrida’s more basic telos is to work these relations out for semiology in general, thus for *any such system of signification*. Thus we note that his implication avoids opposing speech and writing *absolutely*; Derrida proceeds by means of “more” and “more”, which avoid opposition of the content. That is, speech and writing have not yet been made contradictory in themselves, rather, the relations in general necessitate contradiction.

Indeed, were these “more” and “less” other, as in 1964 (542), it would no longer be contradictory to think them at once; for it is necessary for internality that the greater the difference between signifiers, the more arbitrary the relation to the signified (654). This would allow the options to *not* be one another in the movement of the same, without necessity of contradiction; an *internal negation*. Derrida has explicitly negated the relation to the outside.

**The institution of the trace**

This progress has followed by working out the relations of the *graphie*. Hence *a fortiori*, Derrida goes on that for essential reasons, and thus as common to all:

the concept [signified] of the *graphie* implies, as

the possibility common to all systems of
signification, the instance of *the instituted trace*.

(DLG 25, Derrida’s emphases)

Instead of necessary contradiction leading to a “stifling” of the origin, as in 1964, *the institution that remains after necessary contradiction implies an instance of a trace*.

Thus indeed, as explained above, as instituted yet arising from the telos of arbitrariness, this implies the trace arises from the immotivated relation:

[T]race instituted (not [non] capricious but

‘immotivated’) (DLG 25).

We have, we suggest, followed in one sequence how Derrida systematically *works out* the first moment of the *trace* in his *oeuvre*. Indeed, Derrida above deems that the implication is “common to all” such systems of signification as he is indeed developing the possibilities for semiology in general (676). To do so, in particular, he is working with the basic relations, of which the trace is an *instance*.

670 The term “implied” (DLG 25) – and, following Derrida, we have been employing it in this fashion since the “Introduction” – refers to a necessity worked out by a prior necessity (235).

671 By “non capricious”, Derrida notes that the trace is everything outside the capricious; rather it is rigorous.
Avoiding a methodological confusion, and Derrida’s “rigour”

However, it is important to avoid deeming that Derrida has related the phone to the graphie, and phonetic to the graphic, in that the signifier too is an acoustic image. Were this so, Derrida could simply have argued, having developed the graphie, that “The signifier is an acoustic image”, then that “The graphie can figure an image in general”, which would include an acoustic image, and then, “The graphie can figure the signifier”. As it happens, this would seem to prove Saussure’s condition of phonetic writing without possibility of dispute.

First, however, such a relation to the signifier or phoneme as image is not yet allocated any role in Derrida’s argument. As we noted at the outset, Derrida begins by accepting each element of the signifier that Saussure argues for. Each telos with which we began (the acceptance of teloi, and then the converse telos) has been indispensable. Thus each moment of the argument remained upon the “side” of phonetic writing. Derrida has adhered to testing, in rigorous fashion, whether phonetic writing can only represent, figure, or “image” the signifier.

Second, the argument arguing for relation of signifier to image, and thus to the graphie or grapheme would no longer follow through, as it would no longer adhere to the levels. A graphie relates to the phone, which has no such relation to an image (but
merely to sound and voice). Rather, the grapheme relates to the phoneme (which relation implied the necessary contradiction). Derrida has rather argued by the rigorous “protocol” of a reductio ad absurdum (37, 265). He began with one of Saussure’s conditions (that writing only figure speech), to develop it to necessary contradiction, which thus applies to Saussure’s overall possibility of phonetic writing as psychological.

Parenthesis: the logic of the structure maintained

Next, we must avoid misunderstanding. Rather than deeming Saussure’s progress to be false (the value of such phonologist arguments, Derrida will re-emphasise, is undoubted (DLG 30)), Derrida develops the implications from which necessities one must begin (DLG 25). The resultant necessity of contradiction is not yet its confirmation. Psychology remains a prior necessity, and is kept as an origin. Thus rather than logic failing, it is kept in order to maintain this necessity of contradiction, which latter merely holds of sensible content.

Indeed, Derrida is working at a level of which even writing and speech are mere content. Writing and speech at this level are metaphors for appearing and lack of appearing respectively. In turn, writing (which appears) still aligns with progress from one to other as a passage to the indefinite. Derrida is working out how these ought to be separable merely by abstraction (779). To do so, he develops their implications as structure and movement.
From evolution of the “is” to a “general structure” of the instituted trace

First, in the derivation to the trace, the difficulty that Derrida deemed beset “philosophy” since 1954 – the inability to affirm the origin – has been permitted in an unusual fashion. Only at this juncture does Derrida go on of this instituted moment:

[I]t not only implies this [instituted] trace, it is

this instance. (DLG 25, our emphases)

In the article of 1966 (DLG 23-25), Derrida has refrained from admitting this word “is” until after the logic arrives at contradiction, to permit its continued progress.

To explain this, we begin from furthest behind (i.e. from beyond), as irreducible, the instituted moment from the irreducible – supposing it has sense to speak of this – no longer remains only a mere necessity of appearing from behind. It has evolved to an instituted moment from an irreducible absence that appears inside as what it is (put via content, it appears as writing inside speech, as presence). This “is”

an irreducible absence in the presence of the

trace (DLG 25).
Just so, moving forward and downward from the originary level, the trace thus already appears in its becoming (*de-venir*), an implicit “is” of appearing as such.

But nor is such existence affirmed. For (forward again), the trace as having become passes to indefinite relation (i.e. without definite motivation). Indeed, Derrida writes:

[1]he immotivation of the trace is always

[already] *become*, [...] The trace *is* indefinitely its

own becoming-immotivated. (DLG 26,

Derrida’s emphasis first)

This trace “is” itself – the “is” of predication which held from the first (across) – only as becoming other to itself in the movement of the *same* (DLG 25). Yet in doing so, it appears to be itself only as *not* being what it is (cf. 510 ff.), passing to the indefiniteness even of its im-motivation, thus indefiniteness even of arbitrariness, as *a disappearing* (263). Put via language, the prefixes “im-”, and “dis-” instil the instability of the negation and non-relation, thus opening (500 fn.).

As ever, given the demand, this arrival at the indefinite instils the necessary return to the origin (a priori) in the structure of return (DLG 25). That is, in turn, the relations of circularity – rather
than the content of “appearing”, writing etc. – have again been
made object. From this position, the structure and movement must
be thought as what it is (an implicit “is” of identity) (DLG 25-26).
But one can speak of this structure as an object only if it “is” itself
as always already other to itself in the movement. Hence one can
speak of it only as no longer a progress of content resembling one
another as the same (metaphor), by means of a position upon a
relation of the displacement of this continuity.

Thus instead of demanding a synthesis (in its fundamental form
of “identity” (as required since 1954 (138, 329))), Derrida writes
that this trace “is”

without any simplicity, any identity,

resemblance or continuity (DLG 25).

Thus, in the evolution from simple content to a structure and
movement, Derrida seeks to develop the implications.

**The evolution to difference and the trace**

For in turn, beginning from Saussure’s assumption of the
*psychological* and *psycho-physical* (which latter Derrida from this

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672 In 1964, this moment of making the movement into an object led to
“economy” (VeM 442), which Derrida never mentions in the pages we address
in “Of Grammatology”, only adding the term in the book version.
673 As an instance, it is stretched in passage through, or across (à travers (DLG
25, fn. 3)) itself in the circularity.
juncture deems “sensible” and “natural” (DLG 29)) in the tongue led to the necessity of contradiction of arbitrariness. The attempt to distinguish the sign via *arbitrariness* led to the necessity of contradiction of the sensible, at the most interior of the phonic signifier. It thus also set aside *opposition* to an outside, and thus a simple limit to the outside (650) as absence. Hence, crucially, Derrida notes that the movement *is pulled back* to “this side of opposition” of the sensible content (DLG 25).

Even so, the progress does not yet contradict the movement of difference at the most interior. However, it does imply that the relation from a natural and sensible tongue evolved to necessary contradiction. Just so, it implies that the relation of phonetic writing (as dependent upon speech) developed to necessary contradiction. As Derrida puts it,

difference never was in itself, and by definition, a sensible plenitude, its necessity contradicts the pretended necessity of a natural phonic essence of the tongue and thus the pretended natural dependence of the graphic signifier by relation to the phonic signifier.

(DLG 29)
Hence this movement between signifiers in Saussure as different to one another, was only internal difference from the other, indeed without external opposition (646). In particular, the attempt to allow for speech as presence, by assessing phonetic writing, implied a contradiction and necessity of admission of writing. Yet nor are presence or the moment of writing dispelled.

For a trace remains as instituted to the most interior. The trace of the irreducible can become what it is, at the very interior of this movement, only in “internal” difference from its other, without external opposition.674 Indeed, Derrida admits internal difference only after retracting from the sensible and having developed a trace (679).

That is, thus far in this movement, the trace as a signifier is what it is (not the other) only in its difference from the other, and as object, so to speak. The trace as structure of return appears as what it is (an identity) only in becoming different from itself without particular sensible content.

Next, Derrida adds an element that was implicit to psychology. As noted, Saussure assumed the psycho-physical acts of speech and phonetic writing to hold in an unexamined sort of space and

674 What Derrida suspected has begun to come to pass, that “[T]he sense [direction] of the outside has always [already] been inside the inside [the trace after the necessary contradiction of the phoneme], that is to say imprisoned outside the outside [the trace as irreducible]” (DLG 1036, (730)). Derrida has not yet worked out how this holds “vice versa”, as he has not yet worked out an irreducible difference.
time (668). For Derrida since 1962 such particular moments of material space and time were referred to as “here” and “now” (IDG 52, cf. IOG 63 (234)). In 1966 they have implied necessary contradiction, although the trace and difference as such continue to apply. Derrida summarises importantly:

\begin{quote}
[T]he absence of an other here-now, of an other transcendental present, of an other origin of the world appearing as such, presents itself as an irreducible absence in the presence of the trace.
\end{quote}

(DLG 25, our emphasis last).

Note that by this Derrida never does dispel presence: it has been worked out how the irreducible trace must “present itself” in becoming absent in the movement of one and other. Derrida has set forth a noteworthy contribution to the history of phonocentrism to assess what can be determined of presence. Yet Derrida is preparing to go further. Indeed, only at this juncture in his argument has be aligned his approach with the “transcendental” (DLG 25 (679)).

**Preparing for the transcendental**

Derrida thus begins to develop the implications. To be sure, the first possibility of being a phenomenon remains (as it has since
1962), while the necessities then imply the above. Derrida indeed deems the overall progress to be a system. He adds:

>[It]t is from the possibility of this total system that it is necessary to begin and depart [il faut partir] (DLG 25 fn. 3).

“Il faut partir” has the unstable sense both of beginning from (and thus related to) and departing from (and thus other to). Even the system must evolve as a circularity. Derrida thus heeds the necessity to determine the totality of particulars as a system.

**Toward the general structure by abstraction**

At this juncture the psychological sense of levels and directions evolves. *Every* element in address to Saussure had been a psychological content. Thus the order of signifiers, writing, one and other etc. were easily visualised by “parallelism” (694). Their progress from one to other in space and time was also accepted. So too the hierarchy of writing was treated as fixed and visual, while those of speech were assumed as necessary from the first. Yet these led to necessary contradiction.

The first implication is that no easy objectifying of particulars is to be had. Derrida explains that this *structure* and *movement* can henceforth be thought merely by “abstraction”. The latter term refers to a
generalisation without *separability of parts* (cf. PDP 3, LI 6 §40).675

The particular progress of *one and other, and chains of writing* are no longer so easily separable as “parallels” or “levels”. In turn, when parts then no longer appear as psycho-physical, so too, neither does a whole that connects them. The trace relates the movement from *one to other and writing* in a *structure and movement* without separability of sensible content.

Moreover, that the particular moment here-now – these are no longer separated – implies necessary contradiction, for Derrida implies a basis that eludes particular appearing. Since 1954, for Derrida, that basis had been temporal; yet even the latter has been made necessarily contradictory (240, 129)). Derrida no longer merely includes a temporal relation as constituted, but rather a temporalisation.

675 More recently, the *Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy* summarises abstraction via whole-part relations, as “the process of considering only some aspects of a whole” (PDP 3). Abstraction famously arises with Locke, for whom hierarchical relations of signification and ideas can be separated only by abstraction. Locke’s Book 3 of his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* deals directly with these relations. He writes that “words are general […] when used for signs of ideas, […] and ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things”. Thus “signification is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them” (*Locke* Book 3, iii, 2). At this juncture, Husserl is very relevant. He makes abstraction his most explicit whole-part explanation in the *Logical Investigations* (LI 2 §15b ff.), and critiques Locke upon the relations above. Husserl cautions that *abstracta* (dependent parts rather than separable pieces) must never be confused with simple part-contents as “only possible in or attached to” particular concrete (real) content. The latter he associates with the *psychological* approach to sense-content. Rather, Husserl emphasises that abstraction occurs without separability, and also employs abstraction as a progress to generalisation in essence and language, as “description of the essence”, and “to clarify the meaning of general names”, as Derrida seeks to do (LI 6 §40). Derrida has progressed from necessary contradiction of psychological particulars to arrive at the alignment with appearing *as such*, by this preparing for the progress to general and essential relations as transcendental, in order to align with Husserl.
Even so, the trace remains. *Provided that* this movement from one to the other in the same henceforth occurs by *abstraction*, the progress as such *can* be called the “general structure” of the immotivated trace. Derrida summarises:

[*]he general structure of the immotivated trace

connects in the *same possibility* and without one

being able to separate them *other* than by

*abstraction*, the *structure of relation to the other*,

the *movement of temporalisation*, and language

as writing. (DLG 25-26, our emphases)

A fortiori, in this moment of abstraction of an internal difference without separability in its movements from one to other, *Derrida calls this the appearing of difference as such.*

In sum, and indeed, only at this juncture in the progress in 1966 has Derrida included temporalisation to the relations of difference and the trace (DLG 25, (679)). He summarises these as

[*][T]he instituted trace [...] that is to say,

retention of difference in a structure of return
where difference appears as such (DLG 25, our emphasis).

Having included temporalisation, Derrida also includes its relation as retention. We will develop this in our next chapter, for Derrida must still explain his relation of a system to the transcendental, and appearing as such, which ought to arise with a reduction.

**Preparing for the progress as evolution from 1962**

At this juncture we will align the above with Derrida’s progress since 1962, to situate the progress in our next chapter. Derrida will apply several impetus that he first developed at the outset of his work of 1962. He has retreated from the sensible and particular to a general progress, at a more profound level even than temporality’s lack of appearing. As it had since 1962, this will allow for a sort of “reduction” (240) to address a founding but irreducible basis. Crucially, moreover, that progress had developed from a question that ought to open a passage to the origin (222-228).676

From that juncture in 1962 Derrida had employed directions in “quotation marks”, and developed the reduction. That is, the

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676 Derrida had begun his progress by working out that “only a teleology can open [s’ouvrir] a passage toward the beginnings.” (IDG 54, cf. IOG 64, DLG 31 (224-228), our emphases).
purpose of a reduction is to allow restoration of the general and particular relations as pure and formal, without external dependence. The levels and directions will be kept. However, *Derrida must yet work out how to restore them* to the abstracted progress of writing and speech, and one to other that he developed from Saussure. Thus he will ask in closing:

[W]here and when does [a general possibility of

writing] pass from one writing to the other, from

writing in general [behind] to writing in the derived

[étroit] sense, then to a [lower] level of writing to the

other etc.? (DLG 40, our emphases)

Derrida’s progress in 1966 aligns with the basic telos and relations that he had worked out from the start of his first published work in 1962. Yet he has developed his address to them in far more detail. We will follow in our next chapter as continues to do so.

**Part Five: brief critical notes, and the elision of the “third” Saussure**

As it is required of a dissertation to be critical, we will briefly explain how Derrida’s concerns are his own. In order to assess what is possible for semiology, he has indeed exceeded the degree of rigour that Saussure developed in the *Course*. However, as with
Husserl and Levinas, to do so Derrida needed to proceed via a selective explanation of Saussure. First, were the relation from the signifier to signified entirely arbitrary, Saussure would be recommending only a study of signifiers upon the inside, which would be senseless. For example, it would study the French sequence of sounds (signifiers) “s-ō-r” in the differences of its phonemes, which relation to the concept, sign and idea (“sister”) is arbitrary. Phonetic writing would represent only such garbled sounds. To be sure, Derrida worked out the necessity of institution by the sense of a writing that appears in the signifier – but this inclusion was never Saussure’s.

To be sure, Derrida had noted that nor does Saussure deem relations between signs are arbitrary in every case. Derrida quoted that

signs which are entirely arbitrary convey better

than others the ideal semiological process (C 68, DLG 27, our emphases).

Yet as we have followed, Derrida only ever tested those relations of the signs (as signifier to signified in speech) which must be entirely arbitrary, or they would admit external relations from the first. That is to say, Derrida needed to take Saussure’s telos to be that of an absolute arbitrariness, to develop his concerns from
earlier years. To demonstrate that the limits cannot hold in
general, Derrida needed to deem that Saussure enforces these
limits in the first place. Only this allowed Derrida to work out
that the premise necessitates contradiction.

Just so, Derrida needed to take phonetic writing, which he then
derived from writing, to have the telos of only representing
speech. Only this let him arrive at the necessary contradiction
while retaining an instituted moment. Only such teloi then
necessitate contradiction, to permit the trace of what Saussure
seeks to exclude (and develop Derrida’s concerns).

But Saussure never did suppose that all signs were entirely arbitrary
in relation to language. He explains that:

[The fundamental principle of the arbitrary

nature of the linguistic sign does not prevent

us from distinguishing in any tongue between

what is intrinsically arbitrary – that is,

immotivated – and what is only relatively

arbitrary. Only a part of signs are absolutely

arbitrary. [Une partie seulement des signes est

Note the word “absolutely”. Saussure, as does Derrida, takes what is “entire” to be absolute. Yet for Saussure, arbitrariness can be partial, e.g. the “word” “nineteen” contains relations both to “nine” and “ten”, while “twenty” is immotivated (C 181, CE 130).

Thus nor is any tongue only immotivated (C 183, Ce 131). Saussure puts it that

there exists no tongue [langue] in which nothing

at all is motivated. (C 183, cf. Ce 131)

For Derrida, it is only the telos of a relation of speech as signifier, in entirely immotivated relation to the tongue that permits Derrida’s falling short of such separation to allow a trace.

But moreover, for Saussure, insisting that the relation of the sign to the word in language in general is arbitrary “without restriction” would lead to thorough “chaos” (C 182, Ce 131). 677 Instead, Saussure implies that a tongue which retains motivation does “exist” (C 183, Ce 131, above), 678 rather than merely opting for a tongue as a telos in the service of a semiology that “does not yet exist” but has a right to (642).

677 Saussure explains: “[F]or the entire linguistic system is founded upon the irrational principle that the sign is arbitrary. Applied without restriction, this principle would lead to utter chaos.” (CGL 182, Ce 131).
678 We take it that when Saussure writes that “there exists no tongue in which nothing at all is motivated” (C 183, Ce 131) that Saussure takes it that there exists at least one tongue in which something is motivated.
The difficulty arises from a Course fissured into a third Saussure, who is allotted no role in “Of Grammatology” at all. While the Saussure addressed above is concerned with mobilising the relations of the tongue to develop a semiology in psychology, but not yet a formalism, this third Saussure is a linguist explaining signs of words in actual (concrete and material) languages according to the grammar of language in general.

To this extent, Derrida’s systematic reading as a historicoco-transcendental metaphysics of appearing (or “visibility” (DLG 1041)) opts for assessing what can hold for a semiology, by which Derrida must occlude Saussure the practising linguist. Hence Derrida provides no linguistic examples, while Saussure’s work is replete with them. Consequently, Derrida never could consider Saussure in any relation to the history of linguistics (cf. Koerner 1973, Culler 1976, 53-89), as only metaphysics seeks to engage with limits thought as “entirely” outside.

Thus Derrida reinterprets this first Saussure as a teleologist who demands the absolute. But then only the first Saussure was a good example of a phonocentrism in the history of metaphysics. It is in

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679 It is ever relevant that Saussure’s course was collated posthumously by his colleagues and students.

680 Thus, for example, Saussure’s doctoral thesis – acclaimed by his peers – sought to establish an original phonemic basis for IE vowels in Indo-European (Kirchner 1973, 24). Such works are less obviously concerned with borders. Koerner provides a solid treatment of the tradition of linguistics in which Saussure worked (Koerner 1973, cf. esp. 1-42), which emphasis on Indo-European linguistics arose at least via William von Humboldt, whose work was continued by Misteli, Finck and Schuchardt (Kirchner 1973, cf. 38).
this line between polemics by elision and accurate interpretation of the possible consequences of the goal of a fragmentary Saussure that Derrida furthers his abiding concern since 1954, in the “question” of the complication of origin; to assess how the absolute can be attained for the history of metaphysics.

It is indeed the origin of the system that Derrida will begin to consider, allowing for a transcendental moment en route. By this he will develop the kinds of trace, difference, temporalisation, and shortfall from a “reserve” which in 1966 culminate in différance. By 1967 he will have brought these toward his maturity.
Chapter Ten: Working out *différance* (“Of Grammatology”, Pt. 2, 1966)

**Introduction**

This chapter continues to follow the second article “Of Grammatology” of 1966 as Derrida progressively develops the “system” of the trace, in order to determine the beyond. He will evolve the progress of difference as such from temporalisation, to work out the originary *trace*, then progress to the return of a “spacing” to temporalising, in the movement of writing, speech, and metaphor. Thereafter, the progress will evolve to retention, and the writing subject, culminating in Derrida’s working out of his first employment of *différance* via protention. However, this progress will develop from some incipient difficulties, first, that a trace is merely necessary in effect, and importantly, that a trace is impossible in becoming. Derrida will avoid conceding that the latter is contradictory. Our final chapter will summarise how Derrida redresses these difficulties in his emendations to *Of Grammatology* of 1967.

**Part One: from semiology to grammatology**

Derrida had worked out the necessities of the broadening of the field of semiology to grammatology, but we must yet assess what “grammatology” entails. As noted, as phonetic writing implies contradiction, then writing cannot be *only* the figuring etc. of
speech, and other kinds of writing must be admitted. These can only be permitted, however, in terms of this progress. That the graphie necessitated contradiction implies that all forms of writing are no longer bound to the graphie, but necessarily by the institution of an originary moment by an irreducible writing:

[B]efore being or not being ‘noted’,

‘represented’, ‘figured’ in a ‘graphie’, the

linguistic sign implies an originary writing.

(DLG 28, our emphases)

Thus the telos of speech as a sign (semeion) of speech at the lowest level, which led to the contradiction of the logos, must include the necessity of the gramme along with the phone to the logos. Derrida indeed calls the instituted and originary moment at the inside the gramme, as the originary necessity which already must have applied, to permit every form of writing and its telos. Put via language, as we noted, “gramme” has the sense of what inscribes a line and thus a boundary before any graphic writing or drawing, yet nevertheless forms letters, as a metaphor for the origin and telos of life (Liddell and Scott 1869, 325 (702)).

In turn, the particular telos of linguistics at this lowest level, to signify – in a spoken tongue alone – the field of signs at the highest as a semiology, must include the relation of writing (as the
gramme) to signifying. Such an idea of a science as semiology, must then evolve to what Derrida deems a “grammatology”.

Thus when semiology is accepted as first telos, but the “field” of its project – the overall field of signs that must be expressed by the tongue through language – would (devrait) be “broadened” to include writing (DLG 27). Derrida goes on that

[B]y a substitution […] one would thus need

[devrait donc] to replace semiology by

grammatology (DLG 27).

Derrida does so logically, quoting a sentence by Saussure and merely substituting grammatology for semiology:

[Grammatology] does not yet exist, one cannot

say that it will be, but it has a right to existence

(C 34, Ce 15, in DLG 27, Derrida's insertion).

Grammatology too “cannot” yet existoriginarily – an a priori and thus radical impossibility. Thus it does “not yet” exist; but as in 1962 this originary impossibility nevertheless retains its right.

681 Derrida deems that “this substitution […] will liberate the semiological project itself in its greater [plus grande] theoretical extension” (DLG 27).
We caution – should Derrida take this to be a privilege of writing alone he would have merely reversed the privilege of speech, which he seeks to avoid. Rather, the telos of semiology only then implies the necessity of grammatology, which retains a semiology of speech as its inaugural telos. Thus Derrida is – in the systematic sense of this word – privileging writing insofar as the telos in general is then and still to make the object appear. It was ever a corollary of Saussure’s approach that he sought the valorisation of what would first vanish (in its presence to consciousness without distance or limit). For Derrida, whatever disappears must first have appeared.

As ever, Derrida is “demanding” (DLG 28) that the irreducible beyond must appear, in the various fashions he has formulated it over the years: to determine the object absolutely (97 ff.), for subjectivity needing to go out of itself to encounter the absolute (226), or even of the appearing of a sense of speech without distance, thus without a limit to an outside (654). It will henceforth ever be appearing, sense, spacing, writing, that Derrida first insists upon. As the telos of a psycho-physical semiology without writing (thus without difference) has arrived at necessary contradiction, Derrida has some justification for this. Henceforth, the ideal science of address to the field of signs will be named a grammatology.

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682 “Then”, put as a necessary implication, is signalled by “thus” (donc, above).
But nor is such a telos of grammatology privileged over the system. For a “substitution” replaces a variable (e.g. \( p \)) by a verbal predicate (e.g. “\( S \) is \( P \)” can be replaced by “\( S \) is blossoming” (104)). To do so, we note, a “substitution” occurs in accordance with a form that must have been “set up from underneath” (from the Latin “sub” plus “statuere”, “under” and “to set up”). It occurs in accordance with a form of which the content of this expression is merely its appearance. For instance, “blossoming” could be any predicate, and even “\( p \)” could be any other letter or symbol. As since 1954, the form of this progress has not yet appeared. Thus, following the demand, Derrida summarises:

\[
\text{[W]e are trying now to go beyond these formal}
\]

\[
\text{[…] considerations (DLG 28, our emphases).}
\]

In seeking to do so, Derrida in 1966 will develop his system as far as \( \text{différance} \).

\textbf{Part Two: preparing for the two ways}

\textbf{From difference as such toward a “reduction”}

As the most general telos is still to affirm the “beyond”, the first necessity is still to exceed finitude. Particular versions of this telos will arise, below, according to the content and level. We begin from where we left off in our previous chapter. We explained that Derrida returned to internal difference. Moreover, however, the
“premises” (DLG 29) of arbitrary relation to the signified in psycho-physicality then necessitated contradiction. As this is not (an internal negation) a solution in the progress of signifiers, only at this juncture must Derrida return to correlative difference. The latter brings with it the relations of value, coverage and so on. Derrida begins:

[I]t is not to the thesis of the arbitrariness of

the sign that we will make appeal but to that

which is associated [with it] by Saussure as an

indispensable correlate and which we are

preparing rather to found, the thesis of difference

as source of linguistic value. (DLG 28, our

emphases)

Moreover, the psychological approach (in what Husserl deemed a “natural attitude”) to physical signifiers (which latter Derrida deems a “sensible plenitude” (DLG 29)) necessitated a contradiction of sense. Hence the signifier no longer posits or negates its signified. This indeed implies a “pulling back” (cf. DLG 32 (782)) to difference appearing as such, no longer positing or negating the psychological and sensible object outside.
Thus, as for Husserl, this difference “as such” leads to a setting aside of psychology by a logical “suspension” of this outside. Henceforth, the term “inside” is much better taken as no longer outside. More systematically than the early Husserl (who merely applied the necessity of a reduction from psychology), Derrida in 1966 has worked out a reduction. He has done so from Saussure, as “privileged” example of the history of metaphysics.

Aligning with Saussure’s retreat from the physical

Thus Derrida aligns with the Saussure in the Course who retreats from the telos of the tongue and its material, physical and sensible relations (DLG 29, (cf. 665)). Derrida quotes:

[I]n essence, it [the linguistic signifier] is in no fashion phonic, it is incorporeal, constituted not by

[non par] its material substance, but uniquely by the differences which separated this acoustic image

[signifier] from all the others (C 164, Ce 117, in

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683. Derrida followed in the “Introduction” that Husserl, since 1900, arrived at the possibility of essences in that particular psychological judgments can be false. Derrida has worked out how, in his application of basic relations to Saussure, that – insofar as this can be generalised – a psychological approach cannot be true.

684. Derrida suggests that this outcome “is the consequence that Saussure himself levers against the premises defining the internal system of the tongue.” (DLG 29).
Note that by this juncture “Saussure” is a palimpsest. Aside from the development of the trace, Saussure never thought his principle of arbitrariness arrived at contradiction in order to devolve to the internal, nor that by this it precluded a psychological semiology. Nor did he seek to include further levels of writing, and institution at the lowest level. Hence, when the instituted moment remained after contradiction, nor would Saussure’s reduction and its internal difference have allowed for an instituted trace.

Hence, note that – as Derrida quotes Saussure – this holds for essential reasons. Even though Saussure may have divergent sorts of “essence” in mind than Husserl’s, for Derrida the progress as such will still be amenable to assessment via essential levels and directions, according to common relations.\footnote{In 	extit{Plato’s Pharmacy} Derrida emphasises again that Saussure’s necessity of contradiction of the levels of inside and “being-outside of the outside”, was an important example of the project in the history of metaphysics to privilege speech (PP 156), and also as developed from the “eidetic model” (PP 157).}

Indeed, to address the incorporeal signifier via differences, Saussure mobilises a complement (\textit{non par}): as what signifies a \textit{difference of a particular other without opposition} from “all the other”
visual signifiers. This is deemed Saussure’s “non-consideration of the phonic substance” (DLG 32), as Derrida begins to apply the basic internal relations. For this is no longer even the necessity of a non-object, but non-thought of a substance, in a form without opposition to an external object (DLG 32).\textsuperscript{686} We will return to the temporal moment below. Thus far, the progress ought to imply “suspension” from natural appearing.

\textbf{“Suspension” evolving to the transcendental}

Hence Saussure’s approach is indeed aligned with the “transcendental” in the fashion of Husserl. Derrida summarises that the

\begin{quote}
putting in parentheses of natural experience
\end{quote}

ought \textit{[doit], as for Husserl, to discover a field of}

\begin{quote}
transcendental experience (DLG 32, our \textsuperscript{687} emphasis).
\end{quote}

Again, note the systematic relations – the complement “discovering” \textit{(decouvrir)} also refers to the necessity of reference to

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{686} We do not yet deem this non-signifying, which Derrida made contradictory, and must still permit again in the “acoustic image”.
\textsuperscript{687} Derrida has aligned “natural” in Saussure’s sense as a psychological privilege, with Husserl’s “natural attitude”, and the “natural” is henceforth reduced.
\end{flushright}
non-coverage, via this transcendental difference without opposition to the outside.

**The devolution to internal relations of form**

Thus, just as Husserl's reduction developed a way for the noematic nucleus to constitute the *real* from the *reell* again at the most inside (200), in developing this reduced Saussure, Derrida has found a way for all of the relations in a natural outside to be constituted again as such. But this as yet holds only as a right (cf. 202, 348, 457), without convergence yet upon this outside. Saussure

> gives himself thus the right to 'reduce', in the

*phenomenological sense* of this word, the sciences of the acoustic [as heard] and of physiology [as spoken] (DLG 33).

Hence only at this juncture in "Of Grammatology" does Derrida allow the formal relations of the signifier as acoustic image. In this necessity of address to a transcendental field, Derrida can *re-include* the necessity of address to the signifier as *heard* in all its aspects, and

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688 This reduction of the signifier, as the quotation explains, will be to the acoustic impression and to articulation.
as spoken in its appearing as signifier (cf. DLG 33). Thus, he goes on, the

acoustic image is the appearance of sound

which is nothing less than the sound appearing. It is this precisely which Saussure calls 'signifier' (DLG 33).

This is one of what Derrida deems two “ways” by which movement can proceed (deux voies (DLG 32)), as one structural “part” of the system.

That is, Derrida is developing the implications of this next and incompatible Saussure. This part is no longer a naive psychology that studies phonic production as speech (phonology), yet it can restore phonetics as the study of sound in its origin (cf. C 44, Ce 32). Indeed, henceforth, phonology is “auxiliary” to this (reduced) phonetics (DLG 29). Note that this return to a concern for the origin avoids absurdity. It was merely arbitrariness from the

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689 This appearing will also be that of articulation.

690 Derrida prefaces his explanation of the two ways with: “[A]s to the one part… [a]s to the other part [[D]’une part… [d]’autre part]” (DLG 32-33, Derrida’s emphases). These proceed in accordance with whole-part reasoning, although a whole, as irreducible, is no longer overtly conceded.

691 “[T]his reduction of the phonic substance thus not only permits the distinction between phonetics in one part (and a fortiori acoustics and physiology) and phonology as the other part. It makes of phonology an ‘auxiliary discipline’ of linguistics” (DLG 33).
signified that necessitated the contradiction in psychology, and
thus the appearing of difference as such. Derrida can and must
return to phonetics via difference as such in its signifiers. He deems
this the other “way” or part (DLG 32). For

the phonic element, [...] the presence which

one calls sensible, would not appear as such

without the difference or the opposition which

gives them form (DLG 32).

By these two “ways” – difference as condition for appearing as
such, and retraction of the signifier from the sensible – Derrida
can continue to heed the demand to go “beyond”. That is,
importantly, Derrida can return to questioning even phonetics as
to its origin itself, as it appears as a signifier, to question the origin
of what appears as such. The “consequence” of both ways (for
they must be thought at once) will develop the system of traces.

Avoiding the confusing of Saussure and Husserl

Moreover, Derrida’s progress has exceeded even this Saussure, who
after his “reduction” to form never sought a return to signifying
the phonic. We repeat:
In essence, [the linguistic signifier] is in no fashion phonic; it is incorporeal (C 164, Ce 117, in DLG 29, our emphases).

This is Derrida's progress.

In turn, to permit his ways, such progress must exceed Husserl's sort of transcendental reduction. Thus defined, Derrida is no longer a "Husserlian". While Husserl's reduction took its authority from an object which is evidently given then falls short, Derrida's instituted trace arose from a first assessment of the conditions for a sensible, psychological and visual object, and then the necessity of contradiction.

It is thus important to avoid deeming that the approach "is" transcendental. It remains dependent upon relation from the psycho-physical origin itself, and "is" a trace only in the sense developed above (773-775). Indeed, as it follows from contradiction of a visual object, it no longer allows for Husserl's logic. Derrida had explained that the trace as "present-transcendental" arose first as "irreducible absence" (rather than

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692 We avoid the term "quasi-transcendental" (cf. Hurst 2004, Houlgate 2006, 110) which Derrida has not yet employed. He tells us in 1995 that he first employed the term in Glas (DP 81). How Derrida would develop such relations after 1966 must yet be worked out.

693 Cf. our footnote (p. 819) that Husserl's later work might have sought relations prior to objective spatial relations. However, Derrida's basis is no longer compatible with Husserl's beginning from evidence.
Husserl’s evidence as primary authority), which irreducibility entered the system only as the trace. Indeed, the “two ways” must be prior to any objective transcendental approach. Thus Derrida begins to develop them.

**Toward the levels of archi-writing**

As the progress has evolved to align with Derrida’s concerns, the two ways must include writing to the relations of difference as such.\(^{694}\) We caution: it might seem obvious to a reader that writing appears as a difference in that writing instils visual limits. This holds as Derrida’s telos is still to determine this “beyond” as it first appears. But it would be erroneous to take the visual relation of difference and writing as the essential foundation; a visual writing as graphic in psycho-physiology necessitated contradiction. The *gramme* is never necessarily a moment of appearing as visual, and is henceforth more encompassing and originally necessary. Thus we begin to assess the relations of writing as such. That difference appears as such will necessitate a writing at each level.

\(^{694}\) It would preclude the rigour that Derrida takes as a *sine qua non* to simply assume that the levels of writing from our Chapter Seven, or from psychophysiology could be imposed: the former were made dependent upon the latter, and the latter implied necessary contradiction. The whole-part relations must be worked out anew.
The levels of archi-writing

The sequence of conditions from which Derrida evolved the instituted trace is still developing. First, at the originary level, whatever the importance of the graphie in permitting a derived progress that can proceed by position and negation, to allow for writing, it must for essential reasons presuppose, and thus depend upon the grammme (behind). Before being “represented”, “figured” and so on, the sign implies an originary writing (DLG 28, (702, 740)). This instils the essential necessity of an instituted original writing.

But as to what must found this, and moving “backward”: in turn the original writing (writing in general, as a part of the original language) must have founded the concept of the grammme. But behind (or beyond) the original writing, the absolutely necessary condition prior to all appearing which must permit the original language and its writing, would be, as we explained, the absolute necessity of an irreducible source prior to possibility (cf. 487, 744).

Derrida calls this an “archi-writing” – that is, the primitive origin, beginning, power and authority arising from writing (cf. 743 ff.)\(^695\). Archi-writing would be the absolute origin, the authority which

\(^695\) Cf. also our footnote (552 fn.) on Funke’s development of this term “archi” in 1957 in address to Husserl.
power (pouvoir) in particular makes even the form of evidence possible. Indeed, it would only be supposed (or suggested) (485, 695), and Derrida explains:

[W]e would rather suggest [rather than posit] that this derivation, so real and so massive as it would be, is possible only on one condition: that the original language which one opposes to writing is already a writing. (DLG 30, our emphases)

Hence the overall foundation even of the original, Derrida suggests, would depend upon this irreducible archi-writing:

[However] original […] it would be, the […] graphic “substance of expression” remains […] very dependent on the archi-writing of which we are speaking here. (DLG

697 The “real” is taken in its phenomenological sense, permitted by the irreal, which in turn would be dependent on archi-writing.

696 The sequence of necessary conditions, by which Derrida had addressed the instituted trace by means of psychology (757-768), begins from at least this juncture to address conditions of possibility. It does so as “transcendental”, however, only in the fashion developing above.
But Derrida’s demand is still to determine these relations, and archi-writing would merely provide a foundation. We thus proceed forward again. As this archi-writing must *for essential reasons* be irreducible to essence, it would in turn be founded upon the “general possibility of writing” (DLG 28, (740)).

Importantly, *Derrida summarises what he seeks to do*, by adding instances of speech and writing to this form:

> [W]e are trying now to go beyond these formal

> […] considerations. We are asking *[demandons]*,

> in a *more interior* fashion *[lowest level]*, how the

> *tongue is not only a species of writing* […] but a

> *species of writing*. Or rather, […] *a possibility

> founded in the general possibility of writing* (DLG 28,

Derrida’s emphasis on “of”).

To continue the attempt to go “beyond” such formal relations, and moving forward, such an original possibility must devolve to its part, the _grammat_ as originary, and then devolve to appearing as such. As the _grammat_ is never doubted *(certain)*, and moving forward, its appearing “permits” *(i.e. makes possible)* the derived kind of writing:
the *gramme as such* without doubt makes possible the emergence of ‘writing’ in the derived sense (DLG 46, our emphasis).

We explained that this would be the writing that holds at the “most interior” of thought. Finally, moving forward, the species of writing that *must* be spoken of, in particular, in order to determine it as a concept (forward, higher) via this derived writing “is” again that of this archi-writing. But to determine it in its appearing *as such*, Derrida must in this way nevertheless speak of the phonetic as graphic, as a concept, and then as beyond. This is an

[A]rchi-writing which *necessity* we *would* like to

*indicate* here, and *illustrate* this new *concept*.

(DLG 30, our emphases)

The progress will no longer quite be as simple as implying a moment of a writing that certainly appears in its moment of becoming. For “writing” (as ever, taken in its maximally broad sense (DLG 31, (685, 739))) must still be aligned with the necessity of *difference* at each level.
The relations of difference as such

That is, at the lowest level it was difference appearing as such that permitted the return to address the phonic and writing (DLG 32) in its form rather than its substance. In turn, original (DLG 33) and originary difference must be what for essential reasons appears (as writing), yet also for essential reasons must be irreducible to what can appear as sensible as such. Derrida writes that this difference is

*a fortiori* anterior to the distinction between the

[essential] regions of sensibility (DLG 34, Derrida’s emphasis).

But given the demand, these relations must still be thought at once. What needed to be a unity of signifier and signified in the psychological approach, and thus determination of the field of signs in a transcendental field as such must rather be a *synthesis*. That is, it must be an absolute synthesis anterior to appearing in the transcendental field.

The progress thus allows the next moment. As noted, difference appearing as such was related by Derrida to the contradiction of a sensible here-now as *temporalising*, as even further removed from the temporality that never appears (782). Thus Derrida summarises:
[A]rchi-writing, movement of difference, irreducible

archi-synthesis, opening at once, in the sole and same

possibility, temporalisation, the relation to the other

and language [...] cannot [...] be an object in its

field. (DLG 31, our emphases)

Rather than an opening (ouverture (292)) that precludes passage; there has rather been an evolution, for this anterior approach as temporal cannot be given in its field. It was ever a basis of the object here and now that it first can be given as an object. Archi-writing does not yet even proceed “forward”; yet it necessarily opens the movement of temporalisation, writing and difference from one to other (cf. esp. 182, 230).

Thus we can begin to work out how the two ways develop the system as it seeks to go “beyond” while remaining “this side” of the transcendental field (DLG 32). The first way will move via irreducible difference and writing “from behind” to the originary synthesis in a pure trace, and the second will withdraw the signifier to the originary synthesis.
Part Three: the two ways to originary synthesis

The first way devolving to the originary trace

The first way, thus, arises from difference in its appearing as such, which developed the levels of difference. Yet – following from this demand for the beyond, which latter must be thought without limit – a synthesis of difference and writing must be supposed even at the irreducible level, as an archi-synthesis (DLG 31). Prior to and permitting these levels, however, Derrida has worked out an instituted trace (773). Hence, this trace (even as a trace of a synthesis of difference and writing) is no longer an instance of a psychological content, except in its form as such. In turn, in its essential relations, this supposed trace must devolve to a synthesis at the lower levels of difference and writing.

Importantly, in accordance with this progress, Derrida never devolves to a trace as an original synthesis “preceding” the originary, as for essential reasons a trace of temporal difference cannot appear. Henceforth, the irreducible synthesis (of difference and writing) devolves to an originary synthesis (behind):

here, the appearing in the functioning of
difference supposes an originary synthesis which no
absolute simplicity precedes (DLG 32-33, our
emphases).
As noted (346, 346 fn.), “Function” for Husserl arises as an essential relation (behind), allowing address to what the intentional and particular object “conceals” (forward). Derrida’s progress supposes a functioning as originary difference without original (essential) dependence (behind), which allows for an originary appearing as such. 698

Thus, Derrida writes of this trace:

[This would thus be the originary trace. (DLG 33)]

We have developed the next sort of trace from the levels in this “way”.

However, nor is such appearing necessarily sensible in its previous fashion. As we have explained, this trace of archi-writing and irreducible difference never arose from the graphie. Thus it never depended upon any (psycho-physical) “sensible plenitude” of phonic and graphic, for these necessitated essential contradiction:

698 Husserl put it that the “central viewpoint of phenomenology” “enquire[s] how objective unities of every kind are ‘known’ or ‘supposed’” (I §86, Husserl’s emphases), which Husserl deemed the “greatest problems of all”. Derrida’s supposition of functioning has developed the pure trace.
This pure trace depends on no sensible plenitude, audible or visible. (DLG 33)

A fortiori, as no longer dependent upon even the essential content of a greater whole (which has been precluded), this originary trace is also called the “pure trace”. 699

To be sure, this trace does depend upon the progress from address to sensible plenitude (as visual and phonic) to its necessary contradiction and an instituted trace. However, insofar as the return to speak of this irreducible origin arises as such, this originary trace is rather “the condition” of the visual and phonic (DLG 33). Thus, having made the pure trace a condition for addressing the phonic, graphic, signifier etc. (cf. 782), Derrida keeps this reduced synthesis as such from moving “forward”.

Halting prior to the positive

To situate this progress: we noted that Saussure had assumed a difference in general that founds the positive fact (643). He had not yet developed the necessity of foundation upon an irreducible difference “behind” the general (644). Yet Saussure took it as a positive fact that particular differences apply. Derrida deems that

699 Derrida even by 1966 had not yet set aside purity (as has been suggested (cf. Lawlor 2002, 124, 141)). Rather, a place has been kept for it via this progress; it will be indispensable to working out “différance” in 1966, and in the book Of Grammatology of 1967.
Saussure could do so by assessing “work”. The latter, we note, arises with visible progress toward a telos, in accordance with prior necessities. Yet work itself or its origin are never visible themselves. Saussure’s factual science permits only the work of difference to be positive, without difference itself or the origin appearing. Thus Derrida notes that

the positive sciences of signification can only
describe the work and the fact of difference, the differences […]. There cannot be a science of difference itself, nor [non plus] of the origin of presence itself. (DLG 33, Derrida’s emphases first and second)

Derrida’s first way, however, permits thought of the origin, as irreducible difference itself. In turn, this devolved to the originary synthesis of difference. But this synthesis in a transcendental field is indeed prior to the positive fact (and thus prior to being). Derrida’s difference is prior to “the differences” of one and other to which a “positive science” too has access. Moreover, note that Derrida has generalised the approach, and “science” is made plural. He has made the psycho-physical approach to the fact imply contradiction.
Beyond Hjelmslev’s factual and positive structuralism

Derrida thus assesses the sciences that applied these relations as formal. He turns briefly to Hjelmslev, whom Derrida deems develops the most “rigorous” consequences of Saussure’s “progress” (DLG 31). Derrida never explains Hjelmslev, and we do so briefly. In his *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language* of 1943, Hjelmslev had adopted Saussure’s division between form and substance (PTL 69-70/49), although he worked out that both sorts end up as *formal* (PTL 109/79), and that the “right” to withdraw from the physical substance is never assured (PTL 109/79). Indeed, in a moment closer to Derrida than Saussure, Hjelmslev did seek an “indifference” to the phonic substance – a non-relation, referring all around difference and form (PTL 69-70/49). Hjelmslev’s indifference also deemed that such an outside should be set aside as an object of linguistics. However, Derrida has reduced form from the graphic, and deems that this term “indifference” above all implies the necessity of a “direction” going “beyond” to the “non-graphic” (DLG 31).

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700 Hjelmslev takes as his best outcome that this remains a “purely epistemological question of physicalism contra phenomenalism”, where even the latter object has “some right” (PTL 109/79).

701 Hjelmslev wrote that: “in direct consequence of Saussure’s distinction between form and substance, [this] lead[s] us to recognise that language is a form and that outside that form, […] is present a non-linguistic stuff, the so-called substance” (PTL 69-70/49, our emphases).
Thus Hjelmslev never deemed temporalising was necessary to the static “structure” that would be his total object of linguistics (PTL 7/2). Hence nor did he develop a necessity of a writing from a temporalising synthesis beyond the *objective* phenomenon (thus nor a difference irreducible to the object). Archi-writing, and the necessity of going beyond such structure in a derived writing via its internal difference and non-relation, for Derrida, “had no place in the algebra of Hjelmslev” (DLG 31). Hjelmslev’s “science” could also only describe the work of difference (DLG 34), and remained objectivist. It never could describe irreducible difference *itself*, and the origin itself. Importantly, Derrida has aligned even Hjelmslev (and, Derrida suggests without explanation, the greater “Copenhagen School” (DLG 32)) with metaphysics. Derrida henceforth addresses a naïve transcendental objectivism *in general*, no longer even Saussure’s or Husserl’s.

Crucially, Derrida thus emphasises how he will proceed:

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702 Hjelsmlev made this setting aside of the non-relation the object of linguistics from the first: “[T]o establish a true linguistics, [...] [L]inguistics must attempt to grasp language, not as a conglomerate of non-linguistic (e.g., physical, physiological, psychological, logical) phenomena, but as a self-sufficient totality, a structure sui generis.” (PTL 7/2, Hjelmsev’s emphasis). Thus, for Hjelsmlev too, difference only applies “inside”, between the “parts” (PTL 28/18) of form of any sort: “[D]ifferences between languages do not rest on different realisations of a type of substance, but on different realisations of a principle of formation” (PTL 69/49). As an outcome, the substance is indeed referred to as around the form of language (“non-linguistic”). Yet the latter never exceeds the static and structural approach to the phonic, which Derrida had related to the graphic.
[I]t is to go beyond the naïve objectivism that we refer ourselves to a transcendence which we are elsewhere putting in question. It is because there are, we believe, a this-side [en-deçà] and beyond [au-delà] of transcendental criticism.

(DLG 32, our emphases)

Derrida’s first way instituted the temporalising synthesis, a “beyond” on “this side” of the transcendental field. However, Derrida has not yet re-assessed the “direction” of naïve objectivism (forward).

The second way as going beyond, this side

He thus turns to the second way. This will retract signifying to this originary synthesis of difference, writing and the trace, via at least six interrelated ways. To prepare, note that the graphic and visual are still implicitly aligned with space (DLG 35). The necessary contradiction in the graphic movement of signifiers implied a reduction to difference as such as temporal (DLG 25). Thus first, crucially, Derrida introduces the divergence of “acoustic image” (DLG 33) from “objective sound”, where the former is better deemed the signifier. As reduced, it instils the acoustic image and
image, both phonic and graphic, as necessarily \textit{first} the form of sound. Such a form would not yet appear.

Thus Derrida avoids aligning this yet with \textit{speech (parole)}, which does partly appear visibly and as \textit{objective} (in the vibration of the larynx and so on (cf. C 69, Cc 43)). After this reduction, the acoustic image – henceforth, this reformulated “signifier” without speech – is

the appearance of sound, which is nothing less

than the sound appearing (DLG 33).

Even so, this foundation can only appear and be said as an image; the sound is still \textit{nothing less} than its reduced \textit{appearing}. We will develop the difficulty that this raises, below.

\textbf{From the work of difference to temporalising}

Thus Derrida revisits the conditions for the work of difference. First, difference itself requires entry to consciousness. That this entry must not yet be objective, sensible or spatial implies that it holds at a highest level prior to such content. Derrida deems this “minimal unity” “experience” (Husserl too deems experience a highest and most formal “pure genus” (I §12)). Second, as no longer spatial or sensible, Derrida aligns this minimal formal unity with the temporal.
Third, the experience of difference as temporal requires a temporalising synthesis, which latter implies a pure trace. Fourth, to combine these, the condition for the work of difference is made a return of a temporal experience (from behind) of a trace. Derrida deems this a retention:

[W]ithout a retention in the minimal unity of
the temporal experience, without the trace
returning the other as other, no difference
would do its work [faire son œuvre] and no sense
would appear. (DLG 33)

Derrida must first develop how such a minimal temporal moment allows a return to consciousness (only then will he re-include retention). He begins to develop the originary directions.

Thus, the highest genus of experience as furthest from sensible content is still particularised, but merely devolves to “specific” (DLG 34) appearing as such. It is only in this “zone” (i.e. the minimal unity of the originary experience) that progress can continue (DLG 34). 703 However, although the visual (thus

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703 At the outset of the Ideas, Husserl evolved his earliest logical basis for a reduction from essential generality, predicated of as an object without material content, thus appearing as such. Derrida has devolved the general to its
implicitly spatial) progress led to necessary contradiction while leaving an irreducible trace, one ought to avoid affirming that the irreducible trace is temporal. Only the visual and its essential relations necessitated contradiction, the irreducible was never dependent upon that progress. Even in 1954, Derrida knew that only from the moment that something enters the living present (that is, the essential levels and directions of temporal constitution) does one have the right to deem it is lived as temporal (cf. PG 86, PdG 153-154). Hence there must be a source of the minimal temporal unity. Fifth, a fortiori, Derrida calls this “temporalising” (DLG 34).

Even so, an important divergence from appearing arises in essence — for as Derrida noted (above), such a moment cannot appear as an object even in its own field. At this juncture, fifth, Derrida aligns the sound that appears as such with temporality. Crucially, for essential reasons, both temporality and sound cannot appear. Neither can be objects even in a transcendental field (Derrida thus deems them “non-reell” (DLG 33)).

Derrida is thus devolving this “way” to temporalising as the originary synthesis of writing, difference and the trace, prior to

relations of the specific even prior to objective relation (cf. 239). He will nevertheless return an originary horizontality in spacing (no longer space), below, to seek to avoid a naïve objectivism.

704 No requirement holds for the irreducible to be temporal, for it was merely the internally visual (in general, as spatial) that necessitated contradiction, from which the irreducible was independent.
objective appearing. Yet such a foundation upon an irreducible archi-writing and anterior difference, devolving to its originary synthesis, leaves its pure trace. Hence, fifth, it is then prior to and founds opposition, which latter arises with objectifying (cf. 412, 646).

Sixth, Derrida thus obviates the dilemma arising from the traditional opposition between the sensible and intelligible. Neither Saussure nor Husserl, as far as we are aware, imposed such a division;705 Derrida is concerned with transcendental objectivism in general. It is helpful to explain the issue via Kant.

**Parenthesis: temporalising as diverging from Kant**

For Kant, the opposition of sensible and intelligible in the spatial relations of the understanding led to the separation of knowledge from the sensible (phenomenal) world. But rather than deeming it impossible, Kant for once denied any possibility that a concept of

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705 Husserl's approach to intelligibility had in the decades prior to the writing of “Of Grammatology” been a topic of debate. For example, in a footnote of *Time and the Other*, which Derrida had assessed in passing in 1964, Levinas argued against de Waelhens, who had suggested in a lecture that Husserl's turn from descriptive to transcendental analysis “resulted from an identification of intelligibility and construction – pure vision not being intelligibility”. Levinas argued rather that “the Husserlian notion of vision already implies intelligibility”, in that the object is already “one's own” (TA 64). In seeking an approach prior to a naïve objectivism and its philosophy of light, Derrida's progress in 1966 seeks a situation prior to the terms of the debate. Note that Derrida never quite accuses *Husserl of a naïve objectivism*: Derrida levered the critique above only after address to Hjelmslev and The Copenhagen School. Husserl's approach remained objective in the early years (cf. the lectures “Thing and Space” of 1907, Sections VI and VII, TS 173-247), and geometry in the “Origin” was still deemed spatial. However, in 1962, Derrida also noted that Husserl in the “Origin” sought a “preobjective spatiotemporality” (IOG 124). Derrida treats even such spatiotemporality as what his temporalising must be prior to.
the greater whole can be provided by the series of conditions (CPR A254/B309, our emphasis).\footnote{Kant opts for the impossibility of determination of the series of conditions in the understanding (CPR A511/B540) (270). However, he explains that the conditions “do not thereby determine a greater sphere of objects.” (CPR A254/B309, our emphasis).} As he put it:

\[D\]oubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities corresponding to the sensible entities;

there may also be intelligible entities to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation whatsoever; but our concepts of understanding, being mere forms of thought

for our sensible intuition, could not in the least supply them. (CPR A253/B309)

For Kant, “no knowledge of any object thus remains” (CPR A254/B309), as such knowledge would need to be known of the concept in the understanding. But even without such possibility the forms of thought remain, as the “mode of determining an object” (CPR A254/B310). This allows a “noumenon” as a thought only in a “negative sense” without direct relation to an object (CPR A254/B310). When such a mode is a priori, Kant
deems it transcendental (cf. A57/B82), which for Derrida is the
originary transcendental zone.

But Derrida seeks to go “beyond”, without confinement of
transcendental critique to the “this-side” of synthetic a priori
knowledge and its preclusion of relations that exceed the
originary. Form has been reduced from sensible and implicitly
spatial relations, and temporalising synthesis has been made prior
to the opposition that makes such a dichotomy insoluble. Derrida
rather developed a pure and originary trace. Hence Derrida goes on
that this originary synthesis (of difference, writing, trace etc.)
would “found the opposition” between sensible and intelligible.

Hence, eighth – and moving forward – this originary synthesis
must then (puis) found, be prior to and thus permit that writing
which derived to appearing as graphic and phonic (signifiers), and
must thus found the opposition between signifier and signified:

[I]t is this, this originary writing, that permits the

articulation of speech and writing – in the derived

sense – as it [the originary writing] founds the

metaphysical opposition between sensible and

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707 Nor has Derrida’s approach been positive (as explained above), for positive
relation arises with opposition.
intelligible, and *then between signifier and signified*

(DLG 33, our emphases).

We will return to this “articulation”. Thus far, a temporalising synthesis (as originary writing and difference) must permit the moment of derived writing. This would occur without a necessarily objective moment, as prior even to opposition, which must yet be related to retention.

**Retracting from appearing as such**

Derrida thus begins to develop the implications. To go beyond, this originary appearing must not yet even be constituted *as such*. The progress must no longer be a phenomenology, must be a non-phenomenology. Indeed, in this second way the beyond must be made to appear without limits, and even the appearing “as such” *must only be supposed*. Derrida has retracted to “this side” of transcendental critique, to go “beyond” it.

Yet the movement “across” must be restored, although no longer naively objectually, and Derrida evolves the next moment. Thus far, he had avoided mentioning “space”. The latter was never a concern for Saussure, who rather emphasised the “visual” (cf. C 270-272, Ce 196-197 (cf. 635)). As *implicit* in the graphic and thus the essential commonality of the graphic, figure, image etc., a psychological sense of space had nevertheless necessitated
contradiction. The two ways then returned the possibility of approaching the origin itself via the acoustic *image*, employing an implicit sort of transcendental space. Yet Derrida seeks to go beyond such objectivism (793).

As the progress must remain *prior* to appearing *as such*, only at this juncture does Derrida admit space, in noting that this temporalising synthesis of trace, archi-writing and difference must be prior to it (DLG 34, 35). He thus seeks to restore a movement “across” as no longer naïve, arising from temporalisation. That is, the psycho-physical signifier led to necessary contradiction, and then retraction to appearing as such. However, the signifier can be said to be an acoustic image, precisely because for essential reasons speech and sound cannot appear as such.

**Devolution to the psychic imprint as telos**

Derrida thus devolves even from the signifier as originary appearing as such to its particular relations. As noted, the first of these was the “psychic imprint” (DLG 34-35 (658)). This, we explained, allows the acoustic image to be formalised, as the unity of the acoustic form and the psyche (C 98, Ce 96, (658 ff.)). Derrida concedes that the word “psyche” may no longer be suitable (for the psychological and its telos of presence has
evolved to the transcendental) (DLG 34). He thus opts for the latter and its “living present”, which object is made the lived.

Several relations thus align. First, the “psychic imprint” would need to be determined in order to unify a signifier and signified. Moreover, an “imprint” is visual. The psychic imprint is thus made the objective telos upon the inside, as lived. As lived and objective, it is implicitly a constituted appearance. In turn, as constituted it is aligned with the “passive” (DLG 35). The psychic imprint as “lived appearance” (DLG 35) is henceforth made the telos of the originary moment.

As to how it must be determined, we noted that the psychic imprint allowed the devolution to chains of the “acoustic impression” and “articulation” (cf. C 65 cf. Ce 41, (659)). Although the acoustic relation remains certain, it is never a condition for appearing. Derrida avoids addressing it, taking it that speech arises in a “certain unheard sense” at this interior (DLG 35). He rather devolves to the chains of appearing as Saussure’s “articulation”:

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708 Derrida explains: “the word 'psychic' is perhaps no longer suitable, but the originality of a certain place is well marked off” (DLG 34); the “perhaps” avoids affirmation that the psyche is no longer suitable, which would be an absolute affirmation. Its “originality” is not yet dispelled in this formalisation of the “originary”. However, Derrida’s concerns will be the latter.

709 Derrida is in accordance with Saussure at this juncture, who had deemed that the acoustic impression is “unanlysable” (C 64, cf. Ce 41).
it is from the first possibility of this articulation

that it is necessary to depart (DLG 35).

Derrida has devolved to Saussure’s most particular and formal level, as condition for a “spoken chain” (C 65). Articulation arises as the condition of appearing of both speech and writing.

**Articulation as permitting the phonic again**

This word “articulation” thus permits progress via an *instability* in its particular form. We begin from furthest “behind”. Historically, the word “*articulus*” allows the *idea* of both particularisation as *visual*, and as division of a series (DLG 35, C 26, Ce 10, (cf. 663)). Next, moving forward, it remains certain. Thus, third, it allows instances of writing and the syllables of speech to be “constituted” as spoken words, as parts of the tongue. Hence, at the most interior, Derrida quotes Saussure at length:

[A] certain definition of that which one calls

‘articulated language’ would be able to confirm this

*idea*. In Latin, *articulus* signifies ‘member, part, subdivision* of a series of things’; in the matter of language, *articulation* can designate the subdivision of the *spoken chain in syllables*, or the
[spatial] subdivision of the chain of significations

in significative unity (C. 35, our emphases).

To permit this certain moment as such, Derrida devolved to the chains of articulation that make appearing possible. Thus, Derrida goes on, this experience

permits [makes possible] a graphic chain

(‘visual’ or ‘tactile’, ‘spatial’, as one says) to articulate itself, possibly in a linear fashion on a spoken chain (‘phonic’, ‘temporal’) (DLG 35).

Derrida has moved from sound as phonetic (behind) to the phonic. He has thus returned even to the permission for speech, which latter can again appear in space. At this most interior, Derrida has allowed the possibility even of the phonologism that he had supported from the first (cf. DLG 1025, 1039, 30 (718)).

The progress to circularity, forward

Next (moving forward), such chains allow the possibility of confirming the unity of distinct signs at the next level. Moreover, they in turn permit the telos of the idea (beyond). Derrida has developed the three further “levels” forward, at the most interior. He quotes Saussure that the important concern is
the faculty to constitute a tongue, that is to say

a system of signs corresponding to distinct

ideas. (DLG 35, C 26)

At the interior of a tongue (i.e. of a signifier), articulation as constituting addresses the “idea” of the constituted psychic imprint (forward) (DLG 35). Importantly, the latter is thus deemed “irreducible” (DLG 35).

Derrida has developed the circularity of appearing at the most interior, as the idea for him is irreducible to appearing. The idea is required as an archi-synthesis, along with temporalising. As for Derrida since 1962, the irreducible idea returns to the origin. Thus he begins to align the form with bis more basic concerns.

The basic circularity from temporalising synthesis

That is, by abstraction, the progress above also occurs via the relations of difference, space, time, etc. (779). As ever, we begin from furthest “behind”, and the necessity of irreducible temporalising (and thus irreducible difference and archi-writing) that has been the privileged source of originary synthesis. Left thus, such a privilege would simply turn from objectivism to a naïve foundation upon temporal constitution in the living present. Moreover, these alone would preclude space, a necessary condition for appearance. Thus, Derrida has noted that, even though not
yet a visible appearing, temporalising permits the pure experience (the minimal unity) of appearing as such as temporal. In turn, the condition for appearing, and thus a condition for articulation, is referred to by the word spacing (espacement). Spacing is thus the condition for the appearing of space:

[S]pacing (one remarks that this word says the articulation of time and space, the becoming space of time) (DLG 36).

Derrida, in 1966, avoids suggesting a becoming time of space. He had deemed since 1954 that the irreducibility of temporality poses a difficulty for phenomenology (cf. OG 68, DLGb 92 (917)).

**Parenthesis – Derrida’s ambition**

Just as he restored Saussure’s phonology (above), Derrida has restored appearing as such at the most interior, although no

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710 As noted, a “word” for Saussure is a positive unity prior even to the sign (631).
711 “Spacing” probably developed in “Of Grammatology”, although it is difficult to affirm this. In his article “The Theatre of Cruelty” – also of 1966 – Derrida evolves a novel sense of space without a direct object via Artaud’s three-dimensional space of the stage (cf. Artaud, 1977), and Derrida explains: “[S]pacing, that is to say, production of a space which no speech could summarise or comprehend, since it [speech] supposes itself first” (TDLC 602, cf. WD 237). Such relations of speech and space are in the process of being worked out in “Of Grammatology” – beginning from a certain speech, which merely supposes itself, thus can never determine itself in space, nor space itself. As the first article of “Of Grammatology” was published in 1965, it is feasible to deem that “Of Grammatology” preceded “The Theatre of Cruelty”; although this is not yet definitive.
longer even as a “naïve” originary objectivism. The extent of Derrida’s ambition is thus made overt. For Husserl, the transcendental and objective progress needed to be able to restore the real via the reell (196). Derrida seeks a system that goes “beyond” transcendental (a priori and originary) objectivism, which bases he has generalised. In turn, this must be able to re-constitute every element as such, even the sensible, for the history of metaphysics.

To begin to develop this, and to proceed “forward”, the necessary condition for this certain appearing, which thus makes it possible, proceeds “forward” in becoming as such. Thus the irreducible relation of spacing permits the experience of space and time […] to appear as such (DLG 35, our emphases).

Importantly, appearing henceforth has this unstable sense as both pure, originary and prior to content, yet progressing in the movement heretofore applied to sensible becoming as such (forward). This could no longer even be said to be ambiguous, as the progress must permit and be prior to even originary opposition.

**The abstract levels of difference**

We have developed as far as the articulation of time and space. As spacing and temporalising permit these relations, they develop the levels of difference as such. We will explain these basically via the
levels from earlier years. First, as is archi-writing, the difference ("la différence", which we also refer to “difference”) is irreducible, and the condition for appearing as such. Then, moving “downward”, the progress of appearing from one to other proceeds as differences. Next, moving forward, the relation between the inside and outside, or appearing and appearance, is a difference. These first and second directions were developed at length in 1964.

To this we add “content”. The chains of “units” of time and space are moments of difference as such. In turn, the articulatory chain depends upon the more basic relation of the difference. That is, the movement of articulations from one to other arise as differences (first direction). We thus add a caveat. As particular content can only be separated by abstraction (779), then difference arises with articulation (DLG 35). Derrida explained that

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Difference is articulation (DLG 35).

We will return to this “is” below.

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712 Helpfully for Derrida’s progress, and as with the trace, the “the” is not yet a particular “a difference”, even though “the” refers to a definite article. To avoid odd English grammar, we take the “the” as implicit whenever omitting it. 713 By putting “Difference” at the beginning of a sentence, Derrida allows for an instability of Difference as essential or particular. He thus allows for the relations of abstraction that we explained, which include general relation, rather then a simple sense-content (LI 6 §40, (779)). He also allows by this for its irreducible relation. However, Derrida is no longer seeking essential relation, but relation from the irreducible to the originary. Henceforth, Derrida will almost without exception refer to difference in the lower case, to refer to a relation between irreducible “difference” and the differences.
Next, as noted, *the telos of the chains of articulation is the psychic imprint* (823); this relation too is a difference (the second direction). These teleological relations are also those of the constituting to the constituted (or passive), appearing as such to appearance, and living to the lived.

Moreover, this progression has devolved from *temporalising synthesis as a condition for the work of differences*; and in turn difference is a condition for the articulation of particular temporal moments. Thus Derrida explains the progress, from the irreducible “ideas” of articulation and the psychic imprint to difference as articulation:

[W]ithout the difference between the sensible appearing and its lived appearance (psychic imprint), the temporalising synthesis, permitting the differences to appear in a chain of signification, would never be able to do its work (DLG 35).

**The alignment of the trace and elements**

Hence, to move forward again, as *difference “is” articulation*, we add the relations of the “is” developed in our previous chapter.
The differences arise in the internal progress of a relation as merely other to itself, as prior to external opposition or negation (cf. 780). At this juncture, Derrida can begin to treat the options in these chains as “neither … nor”, and also “not more… nor more”. As we explained, the predicate “more” avoids opposition (542), and “neither… nor” (ni… ni…) also negates two contents which need never be opposite. As minimal units and formal abstractions, the chains of articulation are no longer “contents” in a basic sense, rather they are deemed “elements”. For Derrida, their appearing is made possible insofar as each is a trace.

That is, to develop the progress from above, first, appearing as such only does so insofar as an originary temporalising synthesis, and thus as an originary and pure trace. Second, difference as such arises in this appearing in the chains of articulation, in the movement from one to other without opposition. Thus the pure elements in their chains of differences arise as neither more in time

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714 By this juncture, the progress is very strongly Derrida’s. Having set aside the psycho-physical phoneme, he avoids including it to any of the formal reasoning (DLG 26-39), just as he elides the acoustic impression. Yet for Saussure, the phoneme is the elemental and complex unity of the unified chains of acoustic impression and articulatory movement (C 65 cf. Ce 41, (661)). Derrida seeks to avoid the essential dependence in his argument upon the phone and its necessary contradiction. He has made the “elements” those of the articulatory moments (DLG 34, above). Moreover, Derrida is avoiding a difficulty that beset Saussure, who deemed that the acoustic impression is unanalysable (C 66, Cf. Ce 42, (660)), yet united it as a chain in the phoneme. Derrida is noting that the chains cannot be unified, in that the acoustic relation, aligned with temporalising, has not yet appeared. Thus he puts it that “[t]he difference between the full unities of the phone remains inaudible” (DLG 35). Derrida is rather seeking to work out how the articulated relations are elemental as traces.
than in space, neither more heard than seen, etc. Derrida summarises that the originary progress would be

this trace, in temporalisation as lived [vécu] that

is neither in the world nor in another [un autre]

world, which is not more sonorous than

luminous, not more in space [espace] than in

time, that the differences appear between the

elements, make them arise as such and

constitute […] chains and systems of traces.

(DLG 34, our emphases)

The trace as derived from a temporalising synthesis has devolved to the most interior in this progression (we begin to develop this as a difficulty just below).

Thus far, each element can only continue in this movement:

[T]hese chains and these systems can only

recognise themselves in the tissue of this trace

[…] and all the other traces (DLG 34).
Only in these ways can the aural find itself in the visual, time find itself in space, in the differences between one and all the other traces, *Et Cetera* (VeM 442, VM 126, DLG 1019). This interrelation, Derrida adds, would be a text (from “*texere*”, to weave (cf. FM 112)). This word should henceforth be taken in this systematic sense, as a metaphor for these most particular relations of the chains of traces of writing and speech.

**Summary thus far, and the nascent difficulty**

The above summarises Derrida’s two ways. The first devolved from irreducible temporalising synthesis to a pure trace as an originary synthesis of writing and difference without content (behind). The second retreated from appearing as such to a signifier that remains originary, and devolved to articulation and the psychic imprint. Derrida combined these to instil the trace of a temporalising synthesis to necessitate the difference between the irreducible relation to the originary, and chains of pure traces in their differences. He has drastically retracted from positive, internal, and naively objectivist linguistic, phenomenological and transcendental approaches.

Nonetheless, we note, a nascent difficulty has arisen from the two ways, in Derrida’s privileging of the trace as originary

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715 This “can only” signals essential relations, we have not yet begun to instil these contents of writing, speech and so on as what is appearing.
temporalisation. While such chains of traces have not yet exceeded the originary in movement from one to the other, the acoustic image in its movement of traces from one to the other is nothing unless it appears (cf. 824). As it can only appear as positive, this precludes a temporalising trace. We will develop this just below.

**Part Four: the trace and difference**

**The trace as the absolute origin**

Thus, to move “forward” from the chains of traces, Derrida seeks to restore the levels and directions (*sens*) to the originary trace. Insofar as each originary (pure) relation must be related in general, then the originary and pure traces of one in the other can only arise and have sense upon the condition of the trace (of irreducible temporalising, difference and archi-writing). 716 Thus while the pure trace and its originary differences must be anterior, the trace is deemed “a fortiori anterior” (DLG 34). 717 As irreducible, this anteriority instituted an elemental foundation for sense which “is” a trace (in the sense of movement from itself

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716 Derrida avoids deeming that these traces in the plural are “particular” traces, for they must not yet have taken objective form. The “trace” in the singular is what arises as irreducible or originary, and “all traces” occur as this trace proceeds in its chains of differences.

717 This is also to write that the trace is a fortiori interior. It must not yet appear even in the originary moment, thus eludes appearing as inside or outside, yet it must found even the chains of traces at this origin. The most interior is just so the most irreducible.
developed above). Derrida thus moves from the essential “can only” to “is”. He continues:

[D]he trace is *in effect* [en effet] the *absolute origin* of

ulse [sens] *in general* (DLG 34, our emphases).

Derrida has begun to *redress* the demand which has held since his student work of 1954, to exceed essential finitude to speak of the absolute. However, he no longer deems the outcome is the *Absolute*. The absolute origin must be the irreducible synthesis of difference, archi-writing and the trace as *temporalising*; thus a condition for its appearing is that it *essentially must never appear*. Derrida concedes merely that it *is* an absolute origin signified by its effect.

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Derrida employs the phrase “in effect” in accordance with Hume’s caution that one only has impressions of *causes* via particular effects. In one of his well-known arguments, Hume argued that as it is possible to conceive of any idea as distinct, including those of cause and effect, then any idea can be thought as being and non-being, without necessary causal connection by a productive principle. Thus, as ever possible, demonstration of the truth of causal connection is impossible via ideas, and hence never necessary (Hume 1992, 48). For a rendition of this argument via the claim that Hume proceeds by logical necessity, cf. Bennet, 1984, 272. Hume’s solution, such as it was, was at least that, as nothing “produces any impression” of the “idea”, or “original” cause, we rather form a “customary connexion”, and only from then begin “to entertain the notion of cause and connexion”, in that “a number of similar instances” “differ from every individual instance”. This is the sole relation of differing that for Hume permits this inference (Hume 1991, 117). Derrida in 1966 is seeking to develop possibility, necessity, impossibility, difference, and similarity of instances in his fashion, to redress a scission that Hume deemed insurmountable. However, by deeming that this holds merely “in effect”, Derrida has not yet developed a way for this trace to be known besides the necessity of its having arisen. By *Of Grammatology*, Derrida will evolve a way to do so via *différance* and the trace.
This, we note, develops an instability. “In effect” (*en effet*) is often translated as “indeed”;\(^7\) the trace of the absolute indeed appears. However, it also has the sense of merely an effect of what no longer appears, and must yet be affirmed.\(^8\) Each instance is thus “already a trace” (DLG 34). The trace is thus no longer the absolute origin, and given a demand for the absolute, it must then be said that it is *not* the absolute origin of sense in general. Thus Derrida goes on of this absolute origin:

> that which returns to saying (cf. above) it [the trace] is not the absolute origin of sense in general (DLG 34).

The condition for the solution to Derrida’s concern since 1954 is this circularity which returns to a negation of the trace.

**The difficulty of the impossible trace**

We thus add a critical note: the progress to this absolute foundation on the trace worsens the difficulty arising from the two ways (838). This absolute trace must be temporalising, which

\(^7\) Derrida prefers “*en effet*” (indeed, in fact, but only in effect, and not yet affirmed) rather than “*en fait*” (in fact), as he seeks to set aside naively positive facts.

\(^8\) Derrida in 1971 explains this instability and its relations: “this ‘new’ concept of effect borrows its characteristics from both the opposition cause/effect and from the opposition essence/appearance – *effect, reflect – without nevertheless being reduced to them*. It is this fringe of irreducibility [in 1966, the trace] that needs to be analysed.” (P 67, Derrida’s emphases).
is irreducible to appearing. Thus temporalising was aligned with sound, as what can be articulated at the most interior only as never appearing. It can appear only insofar as it never appears as something. The latter (most particularly, the articulated element) is “the appearance of sound which is nothing less than the sound appearing” (DLG 34). But when an absolute trace appears only as sound, it can appear only as nothing. The absolute trace is annihilated, which precludes a pure and originary trace.

To assess this difficulty via possibility: in the first moment of what it “is”, the trace finds no relation to itself other than its effect, and appears only as nothing. Only nothing can then be negated. It is precluded from appearing, and it is then only possible that nothing appeared. A fortiori, the temporalising trace is essentially impossible from the first (DLG 37), both not everything and referring beyond everything that can appear as such.

Moreover, this “is” of movement of differences and writing thus depends on a general possibility that the relation can have sense. This trace is incompatible with a difference and writing. For archi-writing and difference permit writing (DLG 37), and the derived movement from one to the other in its differences is ever possible. As the trace is impossible in this first moment (cf. DLG 37, below), it ought to be precluded from any work, and preclude all progress (forward) in the living present.
The turn toward difference

But Derrida is aware of this. He goes on:

[T]his would be impossible without the
difference at work in [dans] each of the chains.

(DLG 35)

Instead of the trace, Derrida appeals to the work of difference (812). He thus prepares to develop the permission for movement in the appearing of differences. As the trace is merely the absolute origin in effect, it can only relate to appearing via the difference between the inside and outside (appearing and appearance, living and lived etc. (824)). Derrida goes on that

the difference between the appearing and the

appearance, lived experience and world, is the

condition of all [toutes] the other differences, of all the

other traces (DLG 34 our emphases).

However, note that Derrida has made difference as “a” condition into the condition. The difference has been taken as the condition for all difference between appearing and appearance; thus even for all the traces, and all differences in movement from one to other.
Crucially, from this juncture in the article the trace and its impossibility is de-emphasised. Derrida mentions the trace only once in its relation to difference, and only while emphasising that difference permits this progress (DLG 35, below). He returns to the trace only after he has developed his overall progress of chains of metaphors, in the use of language as subjectivity (cf. DLG 34-37). At that juncture, the trace is indeed mentioned merely as remaining “a priori”, “behind”, and indeed a “problem of origin”, for it is “impossible” (DLG 37).

**Part Five: from metaphor to the subject**

Hence Derrida seeks to evolve the progress “forward”. Above, he developed the moment of articulation as constituting, which in turn depends upon spacing. Spacing as such is aligned with as consciousness, and consciousness passes to the unconscious. Rather than merely not conscious, the complement “unconscious” develops negation in consciousness in progress from one to the other as such, and refers beyond each level of a system, as non-relation. Thus, Derrida goes on,

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721 Derrida avoids the word “active”, although he employs “constituting”; this may be as constituting takes the form of a movement from active to passive.
722 As we have noted, Derrida in 1965 explained the tongue as both conscious and unconscious in general, as what exceeds the particular moment of constituting, writing, etc. (DLG 1021, (687)).
[S]pacing [...] is always [already] the non-perceived as such, the non-present and the non-conscious as such. (DLG 36)

Derrida is nearly ready to move to the articulating (writing and speaking) subject.

**The evolution of metaphor**

As noted, the telos of a psychic imprint, as the form of the acoustic image, is that of speech. Hence the telos of speech (in the acoustic image) is aligned with irreducibility to this interior progress. That

the 'imprint' would be irreducible, implies also

that speech is originarily passive, but in a sense

of passivity that all intra-mundane metaphor

can only betray. (DLG 35)

An important evolution occurs to *metaphor*. Derrida sets aside concern with “intra-mundane” metaphor (i.e. those proceeding only in a natural or psychological world). He quotes Saussure that the important concern in devolving to the interior
is not that spoken language [langage] is natural to

man, but the faculty to constitute a tongue (C 26, in DLG 35, Derrida’s emphasis).

It is this faculty, Saussure noted, that permits the constituting of distinct signs corresponding to ideas (C 26, in DLG 35).

Henceforth, Derrida bypasses language in general (langage). Metaphors arise as instances of irreducible ideas in the tongue. Thus each are instances of the irreducible arising in the chains. That is, the word metaphor originally arose from the Greek meta and pherein, to “bear above”, which then united into metapherein, to transfer (CDWH 379). At this juncture, the binaries “conscious-unconscious”, “graphic-phonic”, “sonorous-luminous” etc. employed above are indeed “metaphors” in this systematic sense. Indeed, any appearing arises as what is called “metaphor”, and can and must proceed in chains from one to other.

Parenthesis – avoiding confusion with free play

It is thus feasible to explain how the employment of metaphors – in “Of Grammatology” in 1966 – ought never to be deemed the “free play” associated with Derrida in earlier years. As any

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723 That this is no longer a “natural” sense of “man” will pertain to Derrida’s approach to subjectivity, below.
metaphor can only be partially related to another, each retains its essential specificity. A fortiori, the levels must be kept. Derrida’s concern is merely how they are instituted, as no longer intra-mundane. Moreover, however related or unrelated to one another in their sense or concepts, metaphors in the system (as instances to the chain) are related by the shared dependence upon irreducible difference (and thus their sameness). Yet the necessity is still to proceed via the chains of metaphor (forward), from one to other, in order to determine those relations in the ascending hierarchy: the psychic imprint, signifier, signified (tongue), sign, idea etc.724

The necessities of chains as metaphor

Derrida thus assesses how to move forward, and adds the non-relation to the progress from one to other, and its internal negations. Importantly, the relations of metaphor in their progress are in non-relation to language in general (and thus no non-metaphorical language is available). They are thus no longer opposed to each other; yet it is necessary to proceed from one to other without external opposition. Derrida deems this a necessity of “antagonism”. He explains:

[A]s one does not have a non-metaphorical language in general [langage] to oppose here to

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724 To affirm that no metaphor determines the telos would be hasty; Derrida has years’ worth of metaphor to explore in his oeuvre (cf. DISS, PP).
metaphors, it is necessary [...] to multiply the

antagonistic metaphors (DLG 35, our emphases).

The term develops an instability internal to the word, as “antagonistic” the binaries are conflicting and opposite, but as derived from the original Greek (as “anti” and “agon”), they are also “against conflict” – hence also mere others.\(^\text{725}\)

Derrida is indeed beginning to multiply such antagonists. That is, note that particular metaphors can and must permit antagonism in their sense. Thus, above, as temporalising and spacing (difference) are antagonistic, the metaphor “interval” institutes the antagonism between the signifiers (acoustic image) of a musical pause and a spatial gap (in writing), as does “pause”. Just so, “blank” (blanc) institutes an image of absence and also “white” (blanc) in the spatial extension of a colour, while one can “punctuate” one’s speech as well as one’s writing etc. (above, DLG 36). In turn, each of these metaphors can be antagonistic only by means of the essential relations that sustain their specific

\(^{725}\) Derrida is aware of the divergence in the senses of “antagonistic” and “agonistic”, and employs the latter term in his “Outwork” to Dissemination, which explains his “logic” (DISS 8). The agonistic pertains to “closed” “hierarchical fields” of oppositions and difference (that is, the levels, directions, inside and outside etc., without a beyond). The instability of antagonism “opens” this hierarchy, and – as above – does so by metaphor (cf. DISS 5).
senses. The possibility of application of metaphors to further Derrida’s system has developed at least through the articles “Of Grammatology”.

**Arche-writing as spacing**

Overall, as metaphor in general is derived from archi-writing, and *spacing is a condition for any appearing* (even of the *graphie* etc.), Derrida goes on:

> [A]rche-writing is spacing (DLG 30).

Thus spacing permits the (horizon of) what can hold “across”.

Derrida supports this, and again calls spacing as archi-writing a “*horizontality*” (DLG 36). However, it is henceforth supposed that the directions of spacing “across” are *irreducible*. Along with the difference and archi-writing, the directions of spacing are supposed to institute and permit even the directions of the progress of differences, which in turn are prior to the spatial progress as such. Hence spacing founds sensible plenitude. In

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726 Just as the directions and levels were made noematic since 1962 (279), Derrida seeks to reformulate hierarchy. He asks whether a “natural hierarchy” continues to have any sense (DLG 34-35) from this juncture; however, the relations remain as this systematic “hierarchy”, which seeks to remain this side of the transcendental, in order to go “beyond”; words retain their essential relations, the difficulty is explaining how such parallels apply.

727 Cf. *Plato’s Pharmacy* (PP 55-62) for an example of Derrida’s employment of metaphor to compare Plato, Rousseau and Saussure in terms of this reasoning, developing from metaphors as “contradiction”.
turn, such metaphors can be negated, in spacing as becoming absent, thus not temporalising, in the antagonism etc. For instance,

[I]t is not even necessary to say that spacing

cuts [coup] (DLG 36).

“Cuts” (coup) in French, as an incision of difference that instils absence, also has the sense of “cups”, as a sensible plenitude.

Thus moving forward, such a system would take the form of a movement instituted by an irreducible structure, and proceeding in its chains to return to the irreducible.

**The admission of the reserve**

At this developed restoration of elements to the system [i.e. of signification], which undoubted moment as yet falls short of the absolute present, Derrida in 1966 calls that which necessarily fails to appear (in signifying as temporalising, spacing, speech, writing, etc., at every level and beyond) the “reserve” (DLG 36). While spacing permits what is articulated as difference, the reserve would hold itself back:

[S]ignification takes its form thus only at the cross of difference, […] discretion, […] and of
Indeed, as we will explain, the reserve in 1966 is given a weight equal to and inseparable from difference and the trace (cf. DLG 53).

The difficulty of the reserve in retention

By this Derrida has instilled a further scission, forward. *Thus far a scission holds between the movement (in all its forms – temporalising, speech etc.) and the reserve* (forward). From behind, what the reserve has provided *in effect* remains merely necessary; this holds whether in a progress from forward or behind, for the “beyond” is never bound to the directions of consciousness.728

Yet as to the latter directions, the progress as it has arrived at retention also falls short of a reserve. *Even were* an originary trace restored to consciousness (from behind), retention thus far still falls short (forward). We return to this when Derrida adds the reserve as *protention*, to arrive at *différance*. Thus far, Derrida has developed a movement of retention in a living present that articulates language, in its antagonistic metaphors of spacing that falls short – permitting a writing and speaking subject.

728 A reserve is never irreducible, for the latter requires certain appearing that cannot be reduced to appearing. The reserve holds of that which not appear.
The subject as movement

Thus Derrida evolves to what has been called “the death of the subject”. This, we suggest, was misunderstood by many readers since Derrida’s earliest years, in that Derrida was aligned with post-structuralists in general. For example, in the discussion after Derrida’s first reading of his essay “Différance”, in 1968, Goldmann stated:

[A]s for Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Barthes, Althusser, Lacan, Greimas, so for Derrida, there is no subject. (D 1968, 91)

Derrida replied succinctly,

I have never said that ‘there is no subject’. (D 1968, 92)

By 1966, nor would Derrida have done so, for every reason we have developed since his work of 1954. Nor does Derrida imply, of course, that he affirms a subject. Rather, even the subject is a part of the structure instituted in the movement.

729 Barthes’ essay, published in 1968, was titled The Death of the Author, and puts it that “the text is henceforth made and read in such a way that at all its levels the author is absent” (Barthes 1977, 133).
To explain: *as far as we have evolved in 1966*, certainly, a subject has an origin. However, this must still be explained rigorously. Thus, certainly a subject appears (as logical (“S”)), and also becomes conscious of and constitutes itself as ideal object. Its constitution is “also that of the thing-object” (DLG 36).

In turn, as to these directions, the developed movement of retention has progressed in every moment from the psychological to its contradiction, to the necessities of archi-writing and originary synthesis of difference *as* such, and the chains of particular signifiers of writing and speech in the text. Just so, it evolved to a lived experience of retention which can proceed in signifiers in its movement of difference and negation. At a level “above”, it can proceed as constituting of spacing in its *becoming-absent* (which one must above all avoid confusing with absence), thus aligned with pure temporalising, sound and passive constitution. Moreover, it can proceed as articulating of writing and its antagonistic metaphors, as yet falling short in the reserve (DLG 36). This *becoming-absent* in consciousness as spacing proceeds to the *instability* of the tongue as unconscious (cf. 501 fn.), falling short of language and returning to the originary:

> [S]pacing as writing is the *becoming-absent and the*

> *becoming-unconscious* of the subject. (DLG 36, our emphases)
We have italicised the interrelated elements.

Thus, more particularly, as to antagonistic metaphors, the living moment as becoming-absent is antagonistically related to its death, in the reserve of the living present. This in turn repeats the progress from one to the other. Death is antagonistic and other to life, and then signifies beyond life. Thus it can be aligned with temporalising, sound etc., and returns to become the *originary moment* of absence in lived experience (DLG 40). Derrida explains that by this progress of the subject (across) is constituted the very structure of subjectivity:

\[ \text{[T]}\text{his becoming is, as relation of the subject to its} \]

\[ \text{death, the constitution even of subjectivity (DLG 36, our emphases).} \]

We hope that this averts misunderstanding as to the actual death of the subject. Derrida is rather seeking to work out the implications of subjectivity’s relation to its death “in rigorous fashion” (DLG 41), following the idea of a science.

Indeed, this has developed Derrida’s thorough reformulation of what for Husserl was a transcendental subjectivity, which – we suggest – we have worked out in a system since 1954. Thus indeed, one should avoid deeming that *the subject or subjectivity* take priority. As what can also be a “thing-object”, thus without
doubting it and retaining its essential sense, even the subject is a particular instance of this system. Notably, Derrida subtly avoids deeming that death is a trace of the originary in life. Nor does he deem that the subject (author) as such appears as a trace. Nor could he, for as we explained, the trace would be impossible, and excluded from the living chains.

**The difficulty of the trace supported**

Indeed, the possibility of this chain developed, only in the next paragraph does Derrida return the trace (DLG 37), and merely to note that it remains “behind” and “a priori”. A fortiori, it thus “marks” (a metaphor of writing as appearing) the impossibility of appearing (cf. 840).

Moreover, Derrida indeed supports that this difficulty applies to every level of this chain of metaphors of speech and writing, “forward”. First, it precludes the progress of metaphors of writing (e.g. the mark) to progress to unification of chains in the psychic imprint (824). Hence, forward, it precludes the unity in the signifier. Forward again, it precludes unity with the signified, and then the sign. In turn, it precludes an absolute without limits (present, beyond). The

trace […] marks the impossibility for a sign,

for the unity of a signifier and a signified, to
produce itself in the plenitude of a presence

and an absolute presence (DLG 37).

Instead, Derrida merely aligns the trace with the archi-

phenomenon of memory (retention as irreducibly only behind).

The originary trace remains a problem of origin, and Derrida goes on:

such is the place of the problematic of the

trace (DLG 37).

Indeed, as prior to any moment of a living present, Derrida writes that the trace is before “humanity” (DLG 37). We address this when Derrida progresses to “the name of man” and evolution to “différance”, below (DLG 46, (866)). Thus far, the trace is “impossible” when it appears; Derrida will seek to evolve this difficulty by an evolution to différance.

Derrida’s summary, and support for our progress

Before doing so, Derrida summarises his evolution to bring it toward a culmination. So far, he has developed the system, to its

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730 The word “mark” as a metaphor of writing may have been derived from Husserl’s mark (Merkmal). It refers to the sense of a sign (indication) that essentially cannot express a spoken or written “meaning” (Bedeutung) in signification, such as a knot in a handkerchief (LI 1 §2, Hua XIX (1) 31). A mark is impossible, for essential reasons, in the internal relations of speech and writing, yet certainly appears as a mark.
appearing of difference as such, then to the archi-writing that
developed as the *gramme*, which could then return to the phonic
difference and again to the *graphie*. Thus, Derrida explains,

[A]rchi-writing [would be the] first possibility

of speech, then of the *graphie* in the derived

sense (DLG 37).

In turn, when the *gramme* evolved to the originary difference of
the phonic as temporalising, this permitted the movement in the
living present from consciousness to non-consciousness, as
derived writing and the phonic, then to their movement as
metaphor. Derrida summarises (in that order):

[T]he *outside*, *spatial* and *objective* exteriority

[... ] would not appear as such without the *gramme*,

without the [originary] *difference* as

*temporalisation*, without the *non-presence* as sense

of the *present*, without the relation to the

concrete *structure* of the *living present*. [Without
this progress] metaphor would be forbidden. (DLG 37, our emphases)

But in turn, metaphor as yet falls short of the beyond in its progress.

**The generalisation to the history of metaphysics**

Having developed these implications in a long sequence, Derrida at last *generalises* them. *Any* approach that seeks to determine an objective outside begins from a dualism, with a *telos* of “presence”, “without difference” (DLG 38)). Any such progress implies the trace. Derrida goes on:

> [a]ll the dualisms, […] as well as all the monisms, spiritual or material, are the unique theme [i.e. object] of a metaphysics which in all of history stretch [i.e. in space, *tendre*] toward the reduction to this presence-absence, that is to say of the trace (DLG 37-38).
Derrida has generalised his certain system as necessarily applying to the history of metaphysics, and even onto-theology (711).\textsuperscript{731} Moreover, he has indeed done so according to these common (basic) relations. This brings our initial progress since Derrida's alignment with Saussure in Chapter Seven toward a close. However, we caution that the above merely generalises the implications of systematic levels and directions in “history”. The latter term ever had an essential rather than a natural sense.\textsuperscript{732}

The transition to particular thinkers

The next evolution in Derrida’s œuvre thus occurs systematically. He avoids determining the implications of every thinker, or even of any other thinker. He had explained that

\textsuperscript{731} Derrida thus includes “onto-theology” (BT 46, SZ 49) to what he deems “metaphysics” (DLG 1029, (711); OG 67-68, (905 fn.).

\textsuperscript{732} Indeed, as to the phrase “history of metaphysics”, only at this juncture does Derrida deem that these relations of archi-writing, trace, temporalising etc. no longer allow a “vulgar concept of writing” (DLG 38, fn. 14), aligning with Heidegger. In Being and Time, the vulgar “designates” the uncritical “concept of time thought and beginning from the spatial movement which dominates all of philosophy […]” (DLG 38 fn. 14, cf. esp. BT 372, SZ 405). As Derrida takes it, Heidegger’s aim by 1928 was no longer to avoid merely a real or psychological sense of temporality, but even the spatial sense of authentically originary (ursprüngliche) transcendental phenomenology. Derrida’s articles have developed in a considered progress to this juncture and his generalisation. In 1965, he began from a psychological concept of the “history of metaphysics” in the “occidental tradition”, which had its origin in Aristotle’s and Hegel’s privilege of the voice. By 1966, as short of and beyond the transcendental field, the words “history of metaphysics” in the “occidental tradition”, which had its origin in Aristotle’s and Hegel’s privilege of the voice. By 1966, as short of and beyond the transcendental field, the words “history of metaphysics” in the “occidental tradition” still retain their sense, in that any content can be a trace, although without simple spatial relations (DLG 38 fn. 14). In the turn to archi-writing, Derrida thus aligns with the reformulation of temporality which – Derrida notes that Heidegger argues – held from Aristotle to Hegel. Derrida assesses these relations of temporality in Aristotle, Hegel and Heidegger in “Ousia and Gramme”, in accordance with the trace. This footnote in 1966 (DLG 38, fn. 14) develops the necessity for that article, which – while ancillary to his main argument – Derrida was preparing for in his progress through “Of Grammatology”.
it would be necessary to re-examine [this science of the trace and writing] cautiously in each system of speech-writing across the world and history. (DLG 27)

“Of Grammatology” was never a massive overclaim based upon hasty affirmation of a natural history. Rather, it prudently develops the systematic relations as the site of a task.

For nor is the evolution complete; as for semiology, such a science must yet be developed. Thus its relations must be developed according to their necessities. The next evolution in Derrida’s progress too occurs systematically: he begins to examine the approach to speech and writing by particular thinkers in history (cf. esp. DLG 40-53). Yet the necessities are still to develop the implications of the progress. These will evolve to différance. [OT]

**Part Six: from the problematic of the trace to différance**

**The alignment with Leroi-Gourhan**

This occurs in the final pages of “Of Grammatology” by means of Derrida's address to the work of André Leroi-Gourhan. Rather than engagement, Derrida opts for alignment. For Derrida, Leroi-Gourhan’s anthropological approach to history avoids an overt
phonocentrism. Rather than concern for “speech as present or absent” (GP 12), Leroi-Gourhan is rather concerned with writing.\footnote{Leroi-Gourhan, we note, does add that at the “linear” stage of graphism, writing becomes “completely subordinated to spoken language”. Derrida never follows these relations; but nor has he yet addressed linear writing (DLG 48). We are following the evolution of \textit{différance}.} He also employs a relation comparable to the \textit{gramme}.

First, Derrida aligns his levels and directions with Leroi-Gourhan. In developing his progress, Derrida had worked out that his originary movement was prior to “humanity” (852). Leroi-Gourhan assesses those tribes in history merely addressed by “\textit{the name of man}” (DLG 46, Derrida’s emphasis). For Derrida, “history” is a concept that must enter the movement as a signifier in the living present, in the direction “forward” toward the origin. Moreover, following from a basis of an irreducible writing, history would become derived and certain via writing. Writing in passage preserves history.\footnote{As Leroi-Gourhan puts it, from the first, “[I]ndividuals find themselves in the presence of a body of traditions […] a dialogue takes place, from infancy, between the infant and the social organism.” (GP 24, cf. GS 228).}

However, while Saussure was concerned with a tradition of tongues that developed orally, Leroi-Gourhan sets aside such consideration to assess the primitive tribes in history “without writing”.\footnote{Leroi-Gourhan also maintains a conventional sort of approach to language rather than the tongue, by deeming that “the preservation and transmission [of knowledge in a tradition] is ensured by language [\textit{langage}].” (GS 228). Derrida will be concerned with his address to writing.} Yet, without writing, it seems that such tribes would be excluded from history. Derrida goes on that Leroi-Gourhan
deems that these tribes lacked only “a certain type of writing” (our emphasis), nevertheless retaining “other forms of fixation” (GP 2, 32). As Leroi-Gourhan explains it, “graphism” in the origin of history began with “graphic signs” as both figuration and engravings (GP 1 263, GS 188). That is, as we followed, the certain moment of writing arose from the instituted trace as graphic, hence as “image”, “figuration”, “representation” etc. (DLG 1036, (728 ff.)). Indeed, such sorts of writing no longer appeal to writing simply as derived from the graphic in general (and hence no longer to “alphabetic writing” (DLG 46)), by which Derrida arrived at the instituted trace (769). Derrida can rather address the more encompassing concept of the gramme. That is, for Derrida, supposing a general possibility of writing then permitted the gramme as foundation for every form of writing; this allowed a difference in writing that exceeds the regional relations of the graphic (DLG 46 (802)).

Next (moving forward), the supposition of the gramme nevertheless institutes a certain moment. Hence, as originary the gramme can appear as such. In turn, as “articulation” it indeed permits a derived writing in this broader sense. The appearing of

the gramme as such without doubt makes possible [i.e.]

permits] the emergence of ‘writing’ in the
derived sense (DLG 46, our emphasis).
Such a derived writing, for Derrida, permits the articulation of history in a living present.

We add a brief critical note: even though, for Derrida, Leroi-Gourhan is little concerned with speech, Derrida does appeal to speech via “articulation”, and indeed, in subtle employment of “that is to say” (c’est a dire). As he did with Husserl, Levinas, and Saussure, Derrida subtly imposes his progress upon Leroi-Gourhan. Articulation will be “the content/foundation [fond] of the history of the grammé” (DLG 46), and its originary difference (i.e., as concept or signified), which in turn is articulated as differences. Thus Derrida proceeds by examining

an articulation in the history of life (that is to say, of difference) conceived as history of the ‘grammé’ (DLG 46, our emphases).

We developed the levels of this “history” just above. Derrida emphasises that this progress evolves in its levels and directions:

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736 The French “fond” has the sense both of a “bottom”, and thus foundation (by a whole), and content “opposed to form”, and thus a particular moment of opposition upon the inside. By “Of Grammatology” and the development of this “thesis of difference” as the “source of linguistic value” that Derrida sought to “found” (DLG 28), “fond” can be taken as a locus for the circularity of the system.
the possibility of the *gramme* structures the continuity of its history according to levels, types, and rigorous original rhythms (DLG 46).

This structuring of the levels by the *gramme* is developing, as the *programme* will permit a direction from the future.

**Memory and the trace of the future**

Thus we prepare to move forward from this necessity of the *gramme* in history. As we have explained, Derrida’s *originary* moment as derived retains the *trace* (from behind), which devolved to *retention* (847). Thus the trace was deemed the archi-phenomenon of memory (DLG 37, above). For Leroi-Gourhan, there are at least four kinds of memory that *already* hold in the animal world \(^{737}\) – the reactive physiological memory of a nervous system (as in the earthworm), genetic memory (as in the ant), the social and linguistic memory of humans, and a form of memory in *tools and technology* (GP 2 14-53, GS 222-237). \(^{738}\)

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\(^{737}\) Leroi-Gourhan addresses the ant and earthworm at GP 2 14-17 (GS 222-224), the social and linguistic memory of humans at GP 2 2-24 (GS 227-229), and the memory of tools and technology at GP 2 53 ff. (GS 237 ff.).

\(^{738}\) Note that Derrida does not yet mention Heidegger in this approach.
Derrida aligns with the latter kind. For someone to employ a tool there must already be a memory that permits the tool to be employed. Moreover, Leroi-Gourhan “supposes” (suppose) this memory to hold already; both behind and (for Derrida) beyond. Indeed, such a memory of tools too has its levels and whole-part relations. At this juncture, the movement is depersonalised from human subjectivity. For the memory of tools already holds at a level more general than simply that of man. It applies “from primate to human being” (GP 238, GS 239). Derrida’s alignment with the memory of tools in animal behaviour thus “overflows” the moment of “intentional constitution” of what was “heretofore called man” (DLG 46). By this “exteriorisation of the trace”, the trace of retention exceeds all other human consciousesses.\footnote{As noted, the Other in Levinas’ fashion is no longer addressed in “Of Grammatology”. The approach addresses the structure of subjectivity in a living present, according to the levels and directions developed from language, and then the tongue and its relations of metaphor.}

We thus begin to move forward from this moment of the trace that exceeds a living present. All of the behaviour of such animals is bound to the use of the memory of tools and technology. Even genetic needs such as the survival of the group are responded to by employing tools. As Leroi-Gourhan summarises the above:
The operational synergy of tool and gesture supposes the existence of a memory in which the behaviour programme writes itself. At the animal level, this memory entwines itself with the whole of organic behaviour (GP 2 53 ff., cf. GS 237 ff. our emphases).

Next, we move forward to the “goal” addressed by this behaviour, which aligns with Derrida’s telos. Instead of relying on ethnocentric divisions between “instinct and intelligence” to impel such movement (GP 1 12 ff., GS 221), Leroi-Gourhan appeals to a programme (that is, a programme, forward). As developed above, a “programme” is that which writes itself in the act. This allows a further moment – for such memories permit tools to be applied toward a goal. This animal activity, no longer human, develops programmes in the service of such goals.

Hence for Leroi-Gourhan such a memory allows a form of anticipation of its outcomes, which Derrida thus equates with Husserl’s protention (DLG 46). The gramme as moment of writing

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740 As Leroi-Gourhan puts it, in setting aside the “distinction between instinct and intelligence”, the nervous system (and its memory) “responds to internal and external demands by constructing programmes” (GP 1 12 ff., cf. GS 221). Note that this programme heeds “demands” from inside and outside.
supplied by retention (from behind) finds a further moment in the *pro-gramme*, anticipating *what is yet to come, as protention*.

**The addition of the direction from “forward”, as basis of *différance***

Derrida’s system is progressive – Husserl’s protention has not yet been mentioned in *any* of the reasoning we addressed in “Of Grammatology”. As we followed, Derrida sought to question the origin of the system itself, from writing in general to the derived moment, thus from the originary and temporalising reserve, in movement of difference from one to the other to *retention*, which in turn fell short. *Every moment as yet moved “from behind”, then “forward” in its structure of return*. But in the exteriorisation of the trace of anticipation, a moment of what is yet to come, of what overflows consciousness, arises as much from the *programme* (in front), and passes through the living present to history (backward).

The latter for Derrida arises with the *gramme*. Derrida is very brief, but for the first time in this reasoning, calls this a “double movement” (DLG 46) – without yet including negation, it instils *two directions* to the living present (front to back, in a retention that must found the future, and back to front, in a history that intends the protention). But as ever, these signifiers must be thought as a unity; thus Derrida summarises that the *programme* can be included to the *gramme* only in beginning from (*à partir de*)
a history of possibilities of the trace as unity of

a double movement of retention and

protention. (DLG 46)

But crucially, we suggest, what is to come is never necessarily a difference (except insofar as protention anticipates what is to occur from what has occurred, as what Husserl calls “the future of the recollected” (ITC §24)).

The evolution of différance

Indeed, at this juncture Derrida diverges from Husserl, for whom even the fulfilment of a protention is evidently a moment of retention. Husserl explains that

it is evident that if what is expected makes its

appearance, i.e. becomes something present,

the anticipation of this situation itself has gone

by. If the future has become the present, then

the present has changed to the relatively past.

(ITC §26)

741 Recollection, for Husserl, is the moment of positing what has been reproduced from the primary remembrance of retention (cf. ITC §23).
As he did in his Third Investigation (cf. LI 3 §25, (210)), Husserl seeks to avoid acknowledging the greatest whole (beyond), preferring to found the directions of the living present on evidence.

Derrida in 1966 no longer accords evidence a primary authority. He has rather worked out the necessities of an irreducible foundation that withholds itself, in the reserve. He thus admits a protention to the horizon of possibility, by which what never appears can be held in reserve. What is implicit, it seems to us, is that no content of difference is yet necessary in protention, no judgment must yet have been sedimented in the future. What is beyond (forward, future) is not yet even necessarily different from what is behind, and the reserve remains possible.

Thus a reorientation to the demand for difference as absolute, which had held since 1954, occurs via protention. In 1954, Derrida had sought to determine the origin as absolute; he swiftly set protention aside as it does not yet provide a real content (125). However, in 1966, Derrida favours protention. Without a difference that must necessarily have appeared, protention instils an originary moment where difference need not yet hold. A crucial evolution thus occurs in Derrida's oeuvre, as he introduces what he will call différance. Note that as such a deferral is not yet able to be articulated – it is yet to come – he thus far merely writes that he will call this différance.
As Derrida later explained (cf. P 8), the signifier “différance” derives from the present participle of the verb différer, to defer or delay and also to differ. However, it first develops in 1966, as a deferral of that originary difference by a future becoming past. Moreover, for essential reasons, this again holds in relation to what never appears; just as originary temporalising requires a difference that never appears. It can be said that anticipation of the reserve permits the deferral of difference.

But indeed, protention adds a further degree of reserve. What is to come as a deferral of difference would be essentially withheld even from what has not yet occurred as temporalising in living consciousness. Such a reserve is thus possible as a deferral of difference. A fortiori, Derrida writes, this movement

enlarges the difference (we will say the

différance) and the possibility of putting in reserve

(DLG 46, Derrida’s emphasis).

Derrida has worked out the first moment of différance in his œuvre. It has arisen from the gramme, protention, and the reserve. These relations allow Derrida’s best outcome in “Of Grammatology” to the “question” of the origin, which had held since 1954. In a protention, even the opening of the question posed by the living present has not yet arrived at the answer it anticipates (cf. 348),
but rather only at *différence*. Even so, the living present can continue to think of the future given that it remains without content, and thus no longer as objective.

**The second *différence* in 1966 – articulation**

Yet thus far, Derrida has merely evolved a permission. To explain how the living present can “go beyond” while remaining on “this side” of objectivism, we note that a second (much less overt) version of *différence* holds in the closing pages of 1966, as a culmination of the relations of articulation. As noted, Leroi-Gourhan is *not yet concerned* with the presence or absence of speech, hence Derrida ostensibly begins from the *gramme* and *programme*. Even so, in deeming the progress that of articulation, “that is to say, of difference”, and as what can only be “said” in this “same movement” (DLG 46), he subtly mobilises the necessities of his system.

To summarise: first, it would be speech – insofar as it almost never appears in Derrida’s explanation of Leroi-Gourhan – that permits the articulation of difference and deferral to be *other to one another*, thus to enter the “same movement” at the lowest level. That is to say, if *différence* is to be heard as what it is (if the sounds “*différence*” can only be understood (*entendu*) as no longer “*différence*”) then difference cannot appear in writing or speech, and is deferred. If it is to be written as what it is (via the *gramme*), then one can only say it is no longer different, thus no longer
what it is (différance), and thus it is different from itself. It can be written or spoken only as what is no longer spoken or written, and is not the same as itself. In this movement from one to the other in infinitum, it opens and refers “beyond” only insofar as it remains bound to the movement of signifiers. Or at least, it would refer “beyond” on “this side” of the transcendental field so long as those chains can be chains of traces, and différance permits a trace. We will return to these issues below, as they nevertheless raise difficulties.

**Toward conclusion in 1966**

The above brings Derrida’s address to the history of metaphysics in 1966 toward a close. We have followed how Derrida worked out the progress to différance in a long sequence, as a way to address the “beyond”. To situate this, he began from the telos of a rigorous science of semiology, and developed to the necessities of grammatology. These implications were generalised to a “history of metaphysics”, which outcome in turn has implied a différance, trace and reserve.

This implication for the history of metaphysics is named a “closure” (clôture). This word develops an instability; first, as bringing to a close the progress of metaphysics in the historical sense, in a new epoch. It must ever be noted, however, that the sequence of conditions begins from and is dependent upon metaphysics. Second, it thus has not yet exceeded metaphysics.
That is, “closure” also has the sense of an enclosure. This activity remains within metaphysics. Thus, third, “closure” has the sense of closing. It develops the site of an instability between object and act, constituting and constituted, this-side and beyond. When metaphysics is closed off from its beyond, it is not closing. As different from closing, it is not wholly a closure. When closing it is not yet closed, and not yet a difference. Closure would still be to come as différence held in reserve. Its movement could be called a signifier in the closure (such as writing), only insofar as signifiers too are metaphors of the more profound (“root”) level of différence, trace, reserve etc.

As we have emphasised, these relations apply to the history of metaphysics insofar as they are common (basic). Thus indeed, Derrida explains of the closure of metaphysics in his final paragraph of the articles “Of Grammatology”,

[T]his common root, which we have named trace,

reserve or différence would call itself writing only

in the historical closure of science and philosophy. […] But the thought of the trace,

difference or the reserve […] ought [doit] also to
point beyond their own field (DLG 53, Derrida’s emphases).

Derrida has worked out how to address his concerns from 1954 to permit the exceeding of subjectivity to think the beyond, while permitting this rigorous “science”.

**Part Seven: what needs to develop**

**The severing of **différance** as protention from the trace**

However, in terms of Derrida’s reasoning, the basis is not yet mature and we add some critical notes. The overall difficulties pertain to the trace. First, **différance** has been developed via protention, but is thus severed from the trace. However, when there is no necessary relation to a content of difference in the future (as explained), there is no necessary relation by a trace. Next, as there is thus no necessary relation even to a difference in general (or any difference), there is not yet a difference to defer, or a necessity for deferral to become difference. That is, difference to come could only be held in reserve, for the progress only permits delay. Instead, the moment of difference as content could only be restored to consciousness by retention.

However, then there is no necessary relation to a trace of memory which must first have been instilled to retention by the future.
Retention could only have been restored to consciousness in subjectivity by history (which is absurd, as then I would never develop a history), by archi-writing and thus the *gramme*, or by temporalising and spacing. To be sure, each of these must be irreducible, but their synthesis in a living present depends upon the institution of a trace. Yet a *différance* only resulting from protention never necessarily requires a content; thus *différance* never necessarily institutes a content or an instance of a trace. Pure anticipation (forward) would be absolutely severed from recollection (from behind).

For Derrida in 1966, *différance* would be a constituting (from behind, in the *gramme*), then progress to disappearing in protention. Derrida also calls this “effacing”, the disappearance of the aspect (*face*) of the subject (or object).

This *différance* as protention, Derrida goes on:

constitutes and effaces [...] in the same

movement, the subjectivity said [to be]

conscious (DLG 46).

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742 At the outset of “Of Grammatology”, Derrida explained that writing could address the face (face, also as *aspect*), which developed from Husserl’s adumbration and Levinas’ progress in the same, from one to other. Ef-facing develops the instability of negation and non-relation in its circularity in the word.
Yet without a trace of content from protention, we suggest, no such movement from recollective constitution to anticipatory effacing can occur. By 1967, Derrida will no longer appeal to protention to develop *différance*.

**The three difficulties of the trace**

However, the major difficulty has held since the “two ways”, in the severing of the originary trace from becoming. This holds in at least three related fashions. First, the trace is only necessary in effect. Hence it as yet provides no link from the originary “forward”, thus nor to originary difference or writing. To be sure, this merely has not yet met the telos, and is not yet a systematic difficulty. But second and crucially, the trace in its appearing as nothing *marks only its impossibility*. Following from this incompatibility with the necessarily possible progress of metaphors in their differences, and derived writing, it is thus no longer possible that these differences and derived writing retain a trace. They are severed from the movement of becoming. Hence it is no longer certain that these relations can begin to constitute the progress “forward” in signification as chains of traces as such.

That is (from behind), without a trace, nor are they any longer necessarily founded upon a trace of originary difference and archi-writing, nor in turn upon a trace of anterior (irreducible) difference and archi-writing. Archi-writing would be severed from originary writing, irreducible difference would be severed from
originary difference. The originary synthesis in all of its moments would be severed from becoming. In turn, without a trace to instil a relation to difference, the temporalising synthesis would as yet be severed from the relation to spacing.

Finally, that an originary trace must be originarily necessary and possible (arising as difference), yet that the trace also marks its impossibility in its becoming would be necessarily contradictory. Indeed, in his devolution from the instituted trace and difference as such, to the pure trace as originary synthesis, and then to subjectivity and différence, Derrida has assiduously avoided mention of contradiction. By his previous standards, a contradiction of the originary would have led to a stifling of the sense of the logos, thus the necessity to think only nonsense and nothing (nihilism). Derrida has even avoided all mention of the necessity of thinking the possible and impossible moments of the trace at once. His subtle elisions suggest that he is aware that there are difficulties in his 1966 articles. He will redress them in 1967.
Chapter Eleven: The evolution toward early maturity (Of Grammatology, 1967)

In this final chapter we turn to the book version of Of Grammatology of 1967, to assess how Derrida’s amendments precisely redress his difficulties from 1966. Derrida will deem that the trace is contradictory from the first, then develop an architrace to devolve all of the levels “behind” to a relation even further “behind”. This will develop four versions of différance much earlier in the book, as anterior and temporalising rather than derived from protention. Derrida will then take a path in the originary relations “forward” only in a reciprocal relation of irreducibility to such progress. He will in turn make the mark of the impossibility of content a function of the “hinge” rather than the trace. These evolutions will redress the scission of the trace from the chain of differences by leaving an “enigmatic” way for a possible trace to address the beyond, via a spacing that again permits difference. Although he will still retain a conservative moment in de-privileging protention, Derrida’s reformulated system will bring his work closer toward his “early maturity”.
Part One: the contradictory trace endorsed

Situating the progress

The two articles “Of Grammatology” are expanded into the first three chapters of the book Of Grammatology of 1967 (henceforth, 1967). The address which we followed in detail in our Chapters Eight and Nine, from Saussure to the instituted trace (DLG 1033-1041, esp. DLG 23-25), and then from difference as such to the development of retention, reserve and difference (DLG 25-37), is expanded into the crucial second chapter of Of Grammatology (cf. esp. DLGb 46-108, OG 30-73). Most of Derrida’s expansions to the book arise from his lifting of his footnotes from 1965 and 1966 into the main body of the argument in 1967 (cf. OG 48-53, DLGb 69-73, DLG 26-27, fn. 4), along with a new introduction (OG 27-30, DLGb 42-45), some long inserted paragraphs (cf. OG 60-62, DLGb 89-91), and seemingly smaller amendments to the portions from 1966. For our purposes, it will be the latter two that are crucial. Every quote that follows will be an addition or amendment in 1967, except for those that we note arose in 1966. We will follow Derrida’s emendations to the argument of 1966, as it proceeds from the appearing of difference as such to the pure (originary) trace (OG 53-71, DLGb 77-103), as Of Grammatology develops an amended yet still progressive argument.

743 The chapters thereafter in Of Grammatology were expanded from Derrida’s article “Nature, Culture, Writing” of 1966 (NCW, DLGb 143 ff., OG 95 ff.).
The inclusion of the archi-trace as contradictory

First, Derrida concedes a trace that is contradictory (i.e. two opposite and incompatible predicates necessarily apply to it), although in a fashion that will avoid the stifling of origin. To begin to explain this, we note that the overall telos is still to determine a moment of the origin in what appears; there must be a trace of the beyond instilled to content (in particular, to the metaphors of writing, speech etc.). Indeed, there must be a trace as content. Such an origin is not yet an originary trace, but the trace of the irreducible origin, the trace as absolute source and authority for what can appear even as writing. A fortiori, Derrida deems this the “archi-trace” (OG 61 ff., DLGb 90 ff.). As we noted, “archi” in classical Greek implies “origin”, “beginning”, and also “power” (Feyerabend 63, (552)), an authoritative source. That is, the concept of an archi-trace as irreducible is added to that of archi-writing, along with temporalising and difference. But in turn an originary (pure) trace would need to have arisen from this archi-trace. What holds of the archi-trace must hold of an originary and pure trace.

Next, this trace which must appear first can do so (OG 62, DLGb 91). Further, the trace (henceforth employed to refer to the archi-

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744 The archi-trace is no longer an instituted trace, which arose from the psycho-physical levels, though it depends upon it in the ordinal progress.
745 It is difficult to suggest that the originary trace is a “part” of the archi-trace, yet the whole-part reasoning continues to be applied. What holds of the archi-trace holds of the originary trace (although the converse never holds). For example, what holds of all fruits holds of oranges, although it would be absurd to say that what holds of all oranges holds of all fruits.
trace including the originary trace) and its becoming is necessary for appearing. The trace is necessary as there must have been, and certainly must be, a moment of the archi in what appears.

However, Derrida in 1966 had worked out that this anterior trace, that is first possible and necessary for appearing, then must appear only as necessary but impossible (DLG 33-37). The trace which must and can appear then cannot, but moreover – to preserve logic – must not appear. That trace must then disappear. Put via content as writing, that progress implied a trace that marked its impossibility (forward).

Crucially, although the necessity to continue “forward” remains, Derrida follows a pathway in 1967 that first retracts the progress “backward”. Rather than a writing that appears as particular content and then must not appear, Derrida explains this as an instance of the moment of derived writing that must be “erased”. This will develop Derrida’s first mobilisation of erasure in his reasoning, and in his oeuvre. He adds in 1967:

\[\text{\footnotesize 746}\]

Derrida had mentioned Heidegger’s “crossing out” of Being – which occurred, we note, during the lectures Zur Seinsfrage of 1955 (H ZF 13, OQB 83) – with approval in the article of 1965. He had done so in aligning with Saussure (DLG 1029), which he still does in his first chapter (OG 23, DLGb 38). However, this is only mentioned in relation to “what I shall later call différence” (OG 23, DLGb 38) – erasure at that juncture was preparatory, and not yet employed in Derrida’s reasoning.

\[\text{\footnotesize - 877}\]
the value of the transcendental archie [origin]

must make its necessity felt before letting itself

be erased. The concept of archi-trace must

comply with both that necessity and that

erasure. (OG 61, DLGb 90)

Note that this necessity is that of the erasure of value, prior to constituting of the object (and even originarily appearing and truth as such are constituted as objects). The value of the archi-trace must be felt (i.e. have a weight (204, 226)) as writing, then must be erased.

The necessity to avoid objective content

The next evolution has occurred. In 1966 Derrida sought “to go beyond a naïve objectivism” (DLG 32) and his “two ways” then made possible the constituting of appearing as such originarily, That progress of situating the trace in appearing content then implied the pure trace that marked its impossibility). Whether Derrida returned to a naïve objectivism in 1966 is debatable, but in 1967, he seeks to improve upon his approach. He amends the sentence, and seeks to “escape falling back into a naïve objectivism” (OG 61, DLGb 90, our emphasis). Derrida seeks to avoid an objectivism that tries to go “beyond” to determine the trace in
writing (forward) (DLG 28. Importantly, he opts for the necessity
of a single “pathway” (parcours) prior to the “two ways” (deux voies)
(OG 61-62, DLGb 90-91). This will be prior to the originary and
pure trace (OG 61, DLGb 90, DLG 32)). The archi-trace
requires a mere value and its erasure from the originary.

Derrida thus notes that an archi-trace “must have left a track” in
the origin. A fortiori, he refuses to call this relation of the archi-
trace “simple content” (OG 61, DLGb 90). He will seek a way
beside simple content. This track of an archi-trace is necessary
and possible. Yet to have a value prior to originary content, it
must then be precluded from leaving a track (or trace). Note that
a preclusion could be of any sort (negation, non-relation, a priori
exclusion, and so on). Derrida will work with negation and non-
relation.

The negation in the logic of identity

To do so he assesses the structure rather than movement. The
two concepts of the trace must be thought as identical. Note that
both options would be the trace; “a” trace would be particular,
implying that a trace can be a constituted object (which levers an

747 The two relations to Saussure are still explained as “the one part” and “the
other part”, but the necessity is first that of a single pathway, via the archi-trace
as prior to these ways. Derrida no longer directly mentions or deems that these
parts are “two ways” (OG 61-63, DLGb 90-92, cf. DLG 32).
When this preclusion is a negation, then as “both” necessarily possible and not necessarily possible (impossible), the trace is “contradictory” in (according to) a logic that seeks identity. Thus a fortiori, Derrida goes on:

[i]t is in effect contradictory and not acceptable

in [dans] the logic of identity. (DLGb 95, cf. OG 61)

Derrida in 1966 had avoided conceding that the trace is contradictory, which would have excluded it from a logic of identity. In 1967, he embraces this contradictoriness from the first. However, to do so, Derrida has only conceded a contradictory relation of the archi-trace, and thus the trace. The contradiction merely necessitates the preclusion of the archi-trace as originary. Derrida is subtly beginning to redress the difficulty from 1966. We thus note a relevant implication – as the trace is contradictory in the logic of identity, it is no longer impossible in its moment of becoming. This would apply insofar as the trace holds in some fashion avoiding logical impossibility (this would no longer even be deemed “beyond”).

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748 Derrida in 1966 referred to the trace, and “all the other traces”, but never deemed them “parts”, for as originary they were not yet constituted. To be sure, a trace in its moment of becoming would be constituted as particular – but that moment was made impossible.
Derrida thus begins to develop an “enigmatic” solution by which to avert the difficulty from 1966.

**The negation of the logic of identity, as non-origin**

For the “in” (above) develops an unstable relation to this logic. Note that the basic transition holds by opposition of a possibility and its negation. What must and can have the value of a trace, and must and cannot have the value of a trace, is contradictory. But the appearing of an impossibility would negate the first telos of sense. Positing the latter would preclude that the trace appear “in” the logic of identity. In this option, the preclusion would be non-logical.

Thus, to continue, the “track” (that which must have been left by the trace) at the origin remains necessary and certain. The archi-trace, as contradictory origin “becomes the origin of the origin” (OG 61, DLGb 90, our emphases). Hence this trace implies that an origin of origin, as contradictory, “did not even disappear” in the first place. In turn, as non-logical,

> it was never constituted except reciprocally by

a non-origin (OG 61, DLGb 90).

This trace never disappeared, for – as first worked out via logic and the essential levels – it then cannot have been a content in the first place, nor employed logically except by the relation from a non-origin (and the archi-trace is both origin and non-origin). Hence,
importantly, nor is this contradictory archi-trace a “stifling” of the origin as it was in 1964. Nor is it a stifling of logic, the logos, or living present, each of which are signifiers in this movement. Rather, the non-origin is certainly reciprocally constituted by the origin and its system, even without content.

Moreover, thus far, only the archi-trace is in effect contradictory, and by no means is the “logic” of identity precluded. Thus nor is Derrida’s system of levels, directions, non-relation etc. precluded, which had worked out the relations of identity as movement. It is by keeping such relations that Derrida allows a way to avoid them. *Derrida thus keeps the originary (pure) trace for logic*, which is at this juncture even “purer”. That is, it has been worked out from a non-originary trace, of which one must and can speak.

However, while the levels (thus derivation to a pure trace) are retained for archi-writing or difference, *nor is the archi-trace any longer a simple derivation* from the levels “behind”. An archi-trace and originary (pure) trace in this progress are moments of *the* trace, of levels which for essential reasons must only be traces of essential levels, thus not yet derived in particular to their becoming (as mark etc.). That is, to

wrench the concept of the trace from the

classical scheme, which would derive [the
trace] from a presence or an originary nontrace

and would make of it an empirical mark, one

must indeed speak of an originary trace or

archi-trace. (OG 61, DLGb 90, our emphasis)

Had Derrida written “and” instead of “or” there could still have been a hierarchy of foundation. However, the “or” instils an instability. In critical reasoning, an “or” can be inclusive (allowing either option or both) or exclusive (allowing either option but never both). Thus one must speak of “archi-trace” or “originary trace”, or “archi-trace or originary trace”. The latter instils an instability as to whether these are substitutes, separable, or synonyms, and taking both together they are indeterminate. Such relations pass from one to the other via this instability of predicating “in” the concept.

Yet nor is this a mere instability as per the earlier years, except via this evolved sense of “in”. Thus far, this instability arises in the trace as contradictory in logic (according to logic), or contradictory in logic (precluded from logic). Hence just so, this progress applies to the logos, appearing as such, living present etc. Derrida must find a way to speak of this “beyond” without choice between one or other, no longer between the absolute demand that a position be answered by “yes” or “no” – put in logic, as no longer the
affirmation or refusal of truth or falsity. Derrida had allowed only these options in his demand since 1954 (97), which led to the problem of origin. In 1962 he had sought to set aside truth and falsity in opting for value, and thus no longer bound to bivalence (238). Yet the pathway of the archi-relation seeks a progress no longer bound to value.

Thus he goes on:

[t]herefore I admit the necessity of passing through/by [passe par] the concept of the archi-trace. (OG 62, DLGb 91)

“Passe par” implies “going through”; working through the necessities of the archi-trace in passage and in logic. When the archi-trace is contradictory in logic the trace must hold at “the interior of the system” as the originary trace (OG 62, DLGb 91). However, in French, “passe par” also has the sense of a detour, and thus an archi-trace no longer included to the logic or the interior of the system.749 The instability of this “in” must be developed.

749 The above is also to put it that the value of the archi must make its necessity felt (as originary), and let itself be erased (as a non-origin) (OG 61, DLGb 90) (878). “Erasure”, as a metaphor of writing, holds as a level by which to refer to the developing necessities.
For as movement, a contradictory archi-trace must be both this interior structure, and then what the structure is not, to pass to non-structure. That is, Derrida is applying a deconstructive thinking (720) prior to *bivalence*. He adds in 1967:

He adds in 1967:

> to *pose* [posit] the *problem* in terms of choice, to oblige or from the first [doxically] believe oneself obliged to answer by a *yes* or a *no* […] is to confuse very different levels, paths and styles. In the deconstruction of the archi, one does not make a choice. (OG 62, DLG 91)

Thus, even though the trace is contradictory, and this difficulty of choice established, for all of the reasons above the levels must still be kept. The progressive reasoning from Derrida’s earlier years is “sustained”, by which he begins to develop his “pathway” (i.e. a way to address a telos). Derrida proceeds

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750 Derrida has implicitly generalised the “archi” to every archi-relation, such as archi-writing and temporalisation, for the trace in turn must relate to every such relation, which will include differance, just below.
in [dans] the discourse that we sustain and
according to the pathway that we follow

(DLGb 90, cf. OG 61, our emphases).

Derrida has merely worked out that, if a trace is to apply in discourse (and logic), he must find a path that is no longer necessarily bound to choice in (henceforth, in both senses of this word) the originary levels of discourse (and logic). To begin to do so, he implements the relations of différance.

**Part Two: the anterior pathway to différance**

**The insistence upon relations “in effect”**

The argument is indeed progressive: in 1966, difference only appeared as such after the necessary contradiction of Saussure’s sensible plenitude (781). By that juncture, the reasoning had followed merely from Saussure’s arbitrary relation to the signified (OG 47, DLG 23 ff. (733 ff.)). Thus as différance evolves from difference as such, even in the book version Derrida does not yet employ “différance” when arriving at the instituted trace (OG 46, DLGb 68). Thereafter, Derrida began from the necessity of determining difference, he still emphasises that it is the thesis of
difference that he seeks to “found” (OG 52, DLGb 77). He thus begins from the telos of founding difference in its levels, and has not yet worked out how différence could arise.

However, we noted that in 1966 the impossibility of the trace in its becoming (henceforth, we deem this a severing) also severed originary difference from the differences between one and other (l’autre). Thus it severed originary writing from derived writing. The originary was severed from becoming in all its interrelations.

In 1967, with a derivation from an archi-trace no longer taken as a foundation for objectivism, Derrida begins to allow a way for the trace to proceed forward. He will evolve this instability to insist on this severing, and on a trace.

**The evolution to the absolute origin**

First, as noted in 1966, that a trace is merely known “en effet” (“in effect” and thus not yet itself, but also “indeed” and said to hold in its effect) developed the instability of its appearing. It was one fashion by which a trace was severed from becoming. Derrida went on to emphasise that originary différence between appearing and appearance was the condition of all the differences in movement from one to the other, and all the other traces (DLG 34, (833)). That difference was taken to already be a trace, yet

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751 “Founding” continues to refer to both the whole-part relation and the content, thus no longer to a “simple content” (OG 61, DLGb 90).
from that juncture, the trace was subtly set aside in favour of difference (840-851).

But in 1967, Derrida italicises the final phrase:

\[ \text{the difference between the appearing and the appearance} \]
\[ \text{(between the ‘world’ and ‘lived experience’) is the condition of all the other differences, all the other traces, and it is already} \]
\[ \text{a trace}. \text{(OG 65, DLGb 95, Derrida’s emphasis)} \]

Rather than seeking to correct a trace that is merely known “in effect”, in 1967 Derrida is \textit{insisting} upon the relation of an archi-trace as only known “in effect”. Instead of first seeking to proceed “forward” by means of difference, he seeks to develop the foundation “backward”, toward a trace no longer even appearing originarily, as an archi-trace.

This allows the relation to an absolute origin. As contradictory and not acceptable in the logic of identity, the trace implies a certain moment no longer bound “within” opposition and difference. Thus it implies an origin without limits. As it has been since 1954, this would be an \textit{absolute}, the trace as absolute origin. Moreover, as no longer even logical, the trace of the origin is also
in reciprocal relation with a non-origin without levels. This too implies the trace is without limits, as the absolute origin.

However, “within” the logic of identity and its directions and levels (sense in general), the trace of the absolute origin is contradictory, which in turn precludes that it be an absolute origin. It can then only be said that there is no such absolute origin. In turn, we note, when there is no absolute origin, there is merely a reciprocal relation with non-origin, and thus again an absolute origin. Thus in 1967, Derrida italicises the sentences:

[i]The trace is in effect the absolute origin of sense in general. Which returns to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. (DLGb 95, cf. OG 65, Derrida’s emphasis)

This is Derrida’s longest italicisation in the chapter. He has developed the relation of the trace as absolute origin, in reciprocal relation to its absolute exclusion. Indeed, Derrida no longer refrains from mention of the trace from this juncture, as he did in 1966. That said, we have still remained prior even to originary relations, and Derrida must find a way to proceed.
The earlier evolution of *différence*

Next, he develops the relation of anterior *différence*. As noted, an archi-trace as an absolute no longer permits opposition “between” one and other. *The absolute origin of sense in general precludes an irreducible difference; thus it necessitates a deferral.* In turn, the *value* of the archi-trace must make itself felt prior to the truth of originary appearing.752 Since 1962, Derrida had deemed that which instils the possibility of value (prior to truth or falsity) *opens* the relation to sense in general (231, cf. 349). As without opposition, it would open appearance as deferral. This constituting by the trace as deferral would be the absolute origin as condition of the difference between appearing and appearance (as signifier and signified). Basically put, the difference between one and other would be founded upon deferral.

Yet the return to saying that the trace is not the absolute origin of sense in general (cf. above) returns to saying that the absolute origin is not a deferral. The instance of the trace thus opens a difference, which is the condition for appearing and signification. In turn, such a relation (difference) is already a trace, is in effect contradictory and implies a deferral. The progress merely permits

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752 To be sure, Derrida avoids mentioning “truth”, as “yes or no” must be avoided as options, and *value is prior to truth*. However, we caution, this progress does not yet let go of truth (which would be absurd), for by opening (*ouvrir*) it allows at least the truth-sense and value of appearance as open (cf. 230). This was the necessity of the value of the transcendental archi that must first make itself felt before letting itself be erased (OG 61, DLGb 90, (878)).
the trace to open difference and deferral in a circularity prior to originary content. Thus Derrida goes on:

\[ \text{the trace is the différance which opens} \]

appearance and signification. (OG 65, DLGb 95, Derrida’s emphasis)

Derrida amends “difference” to “différance”, and italicises the phrase. He has worked out his first version of “différance” in Of Grammatology. This has indeed occurred much earlier than in 1966, in address to the difficulties of his system from that year.\(^7\) The relations of difference between one and other have been made dependent upon a prior archi-trace that avoids levels, and implies a différance.

**Part Three: the pathway via formation of form**

However, the above relations are merely conditions, as necessities prior to any originary content. That is, différance has been worked out as anterior, but it has not yet been applied to becoming, thus does not yet address the severing of the trace from metaphors of writing and speech as such. It does not yet avoid the difficulty of a trace that certainly appears only by “marking the impossibility”

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\(^7\) Derrida had mentioned différance in his address to Hjelmslev once, at DLGb 88 (OG 60), but merely in noting that Hjelmslev could find no place for it.
of absolute presence (DLG 37); hence the progress has not yet been made possible. However, the trace was not yet precluded from possibility (insofar as it is no longer bound to the logic of identity), and the pure-trace was kept for logic. Derrida begins from the latter to seek a way to move “forward”.

The difficulty of content, and the progress to the second différance

At this juncture, he indeed begins to employ difference again. However, Derrida has come to appreciate that to write of difference after a pure synthesis resulted in the difficulty for the trace. That is, a temporalising and originary difference was deemed to be prior to opposition, yet even so it constitutes difference in the relation to an other. It implies constituted difference, thus no longer temporalising, as no longer pure. Hence, the concept of difference still implies content as such. Yet a pure trace must be prior to “simple content”, thus prior to difference. Moreover, a pure trace would appear only as content, thus never as pure. It too would be contradictory, although without the exemption that Derrida developed from the archi-trace, for it would never deny or erase itself. It would still only mark the impossibility of appearing.

That is, the next task is to avoid the severing between the (temporalising) pure trace as impossible, and the ever-possible instances of becoming (i.e. as spacing). Avoiding this scission
would not yet permit, but would no longer preclude relation to the chains of the differences of signifiers, by no longer precluding a trace of appearing.\textsuperscript{784} The task thereafter will be to permit this relation.

To begin – in 1966 the pure trace did not yet relate to difference in movement from one to the other (thus the metaphors of writing and sound etc.). Further, at that juncture in 1966, even should an originary difference have avoided constituted content, in doing so it could no longer relate to spacing. Hence the pure trace could only appear in difference as impossible. By 1967, Derrida has made this pure trace (or archi-trace) contradictory. Thus he introduces a différence to the trace as originary, by setting aside the instances of constituting difference, and negating the constituted relations and their content. This evolves the pure (originary) trace to différence. Derrida goes on:

\begin{quote}
[i]t is not the question of a constituted
difference here, but rather, before all determination

of the content, of the pure movement which
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{784} As ever, we employ “precluding” to refer to an a priori and essential lack of impediment to possibility, and “permit” to signal “making possible”.

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produces difference. The (pure) trace is différance.

(OG 62, DLG 92, Derrida’s emphasis)

A fortiori, the pathway that the progress of the pure trace will take will not yet be that of content. It will thus no longer preclude application of the trace to originary appearing.

Moreover, a second version of différance has been worked out by setting aside content, as Derrida did in address to Leroi-Gourhan in 1966. In Of Grammatology this occurs much earlier in the work, in relation to a pure trace. Derrida can do so no longer merely as the pure trace of temporalising for essential reasons must never appear as a difference as such (he emphasised this anteriority even in 1966 (DLG 34)). Rather, this holds insofar as the pure trace, necessarily contradictory even in its form “in” this logic of identity, no longer enters the originary synthesis and is not yet a difference, and enters the originary synthesis as a pure and constituting difference to be made contradictory. The first moment is not yet a difference as a non-origin. The second is a difference (or it could never be contradictory), then precluded from the origin as contradictory. Such a setting aside of difference is deemed a deferral.
Parenthesis – the evolution of the “is” to the pure trace

A short note upon the evolution of the “is” seems pertinent. This had developed since 1966 in the instituted trace as the possibility common to all systems of signification and content.\(^7\) Derrida went on:

[I]t not only implies, it is this instance. (DLG 25)

The instituted trace arose with the appearing of difference as such (DLG 25). However, the relation of the trace to difference as such then implied impossibility. In 1967, Derrida deletes the sentence above. Indeed, in 1966 he had explained that

[t]he trace is the difference which opens appearing and signification. (DLG 34, our emphasis)

\(^7\)An instituted trace was not yet beset by the difficulty of impossibility; it was what must be produced despite necessary contradiction. Such difficulty merely arose merely with the “two ways” after the reduction to the pure trace of difference as such.
In 1967, this “difference” too is replaced by “*différance*”. No claim is made for any sort of trace that “is” in relation to *difference* in Derrida’s chapter. Thus far, only the (pure) trace “is” *différance*.

Derrida’s emendations are planned. In 1966, three classical versions of the “is” (predication, existence and identity) were set into movement. An instituted *content* can be predicated as what it “is”, an existent, only in a structure of becoming different from and thus not identical to itself, while passing to the indefinite and a return to the origin. In 1967, an archi-trace must be in reciprocal relation to the non-origin so as to avoid a classical basis. It is thus contradictory “in” the logic of identity.

Just so, the pure trace as contradictory must have this unstable sense (cf. just above). It must be what it “is” both in the originary relation (which is not yet real) and as a *pure* identity already supposing a difference from itself (in relation to irreducible difference as *deferral*). When he comes to address content, Derrida will rather develop the *hinge* in order to relate the directions of difference and impossibility.

**The possibility of the pure trace**

Derrida is still preparing to move “forward” to this content. Before doing so, he indeed retains a sort of ‘possibility’ for the trace without content. Even though the archi-trace is contradictory, the *possibility* of the pure trace holds, although only
as anterior. Importantly, Derrida adds in 1967 of the pure trace that “is” difference that

[although it does not exist [...] its possibility is

by rights anterior to all that one calls sign

(signified/signifier, content/expression etc.) (OG 62, DLGb 92, our emphasis)

A reader might disagree: could such a possibility be sustained when the archi-trace is contradictory? To accept this, it must be granted that Derrida no longer allots the archi-trace an absolute place in the “logic of identity”. Anything still remains possible in the logos in a logical sense, according to either sense of “in” (even when it is contradictory), so long as it is not yet accorded a place as a moment of appearing or existence.

Thus, above, Derrida grants the pure trace no right to possibility in the moment of becoming, even as reduced – “it does not exist” in any moment of content or signification. Derrida thus no longer accords the pure trace a possibility of proceeding in this movement

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756 This employment of “expression” is both logical and phenomenological. As The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy explains “expression” – any action that makes public or communicates a state of mind thereby expresses it (ODP 132). Content is added to expression. Just so, this “expression” applies to Husserl's approach, which allots sense (as intentional content) to expression in a certain moment of writing or speech (in 1962, this was Ausserüng, rather than Ausdruck). Derrida's path has sought to be prior by rights to such progress. He aligns this with Husserl again, below.
of becoming as difference from one to the other. He will rather find a movement aside from them.\(^{757}\)

**The difficulty from 1966 increasing**

The preceding considerations lead to a first outcome in 1967. Rather than ameliorating the scission from becoming, Derrida has even more thoroughly severed the originary trace from possibility of relation to the internal difference (thus from movement of spacing, writing, etc.). However, in granting a possibility that is merely anterior, Derrida in 1967 still avoids deeming the pure trace is impossible, whether essentially so or in its moment of becoming. He will develop this opportunity.

Thus as the temporalising and originary trace is severed from the inside, he indeed requires a link (soon, “hinge”) to the originary relations and appearing. To begin to develop this, we note also that, as prior to constituting difference, temporalising is still separated from the necessity of appearing as such. That is, \textit{différance} as a pure trace remains only originary, and not yet a difference. It does not yet proceed from the anterior possibility of the originary trace to a certain (and possible) moment of existing.

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\(^{757}\) In 1966, as noted, Derrida adopted Husserl’s and then Saussure’s right to what ought to occur – a transcendental phenomenology as reduction from the sensible. In his involution to the originary, a right allows the possibility to begin constituting (we leave this sentence as intransitive). In 1966 Derrida developed such a moment that allowed his restoration of appearing as such, arising from spacing. No such right is granted to this “enigmatic” possibility.
Derrida is extremely aware that given his additions, an originary trace must be made to enter passage.

Hence in 1967 he supports the “path’ he has taken in the articles, and how he will begin to address it:

how does the path that leads from Saussure to Hjelmslev forbid us to avoid the originary trace? In that its passage through form is a passage through the imprint. (OG 62, DLGb 91,

Derrida’s emphasis upon “imprint”)

We indeed followed Derrida’s “path” from Saussure to Hjelmslev in 1966. However, that passage had arrived at the originary trace as chains of difference, precluding trace and content. In 1966, Derrida thus seeks a way for the trace to avoid passage. In so doing he must nevertheless allow for appearing as chains of difference. He will do so by developing the relations of passage of form and the imprint.

758 In Of Grammatology, Derrida has expanded his explanation of Hjelmslev (OG 57-60, DLGb 83-88), yet retains his basic results that Hjelmslev’s algebra could allow no place for an archi-writing, and irreducible difference as non-relation (OG 60, DLGb 88, cf. (813)). Derrida does, however, alter this employment of “difference” to “différance” (OG 60, DLGb 88).

759 In 1954, the difficulty of form led to the “joint” as a problem – in 1967, a prior relation to form will lead to the hinge as a better outcome.
Developing a passage prior to the originary

Thus, Derrida in 1967 no longer seeks permission for content via the trace (this will allow the trace to be related merely to general relations (926)). We will develop the trace below. Derrida rather seeks this permission for content (signalled by “is”) via form. As form never arises as content, but rather the form of content, he is allowing for the imprint as prior to real content. That is, we explained that in 1966 the “reduction” to the originary from sensible substance particularised the acoustic image to its form. Thus, we note, form will be common to each of the particular relations of the signifier. The first of these was the form of the “psychic imprint”, the formal unity by which acoustic and image could arise in the psyche. That in turn devolved to the form of chains of articulation. Thus, to unify the chains as a signifier, the latter again took the psychic imprint as its first telos.

In 1966, although the word “psyche” is still deemed less than convenient, Derrida again devolves to the possibility of this passage. He adds a paragraph noting that the “psychic imprint” can be retained, provided that it is taken in Husserl’s sense, in that the “content” of the lived experience of the acoustic image is “reell” (i.e. irreal) but never real (OG 65 ff., DLGb 95 ff.). Such content in turn permits the acoustic image, and thus the psychic imprint of an image without real content. Derrida refers to Husserl’s treatment of the “image” which we explained is neutralised by Husserl (cf. I §109, (448)), thus no longer a copy of the external (I §113). Derrida puts it that “[T]he
the image must no longer be affirmed as in the world. The imprint too can be the form of an image prior to content. Importantly, the form of this originary passage would again be from articulation to the psychic imprint. This would allow the originary passage of 1966. Since 1966, however, Derrida sought an approach prior to Husserlian or Saussurean content and its difficulties. He is still seeking to situate such passage further “behind”.

Thus, as to form, Derrida avoids appealing to it as making appearing possible. Rather, he appeals to the prior constituting moment of the formation of form (OG 63, DLGb 92 (221)). The latter – we suggest – does not yet have even a form to which content can be instilled and made contradictory. Henceforth, formation of form would necessarily be prior even to the form of originary passage.

Second, as to the psychic imprint, in Derrida’s approach the word “psychic” is set aside, and his necessary passage evolves to the “imprint” alone (OG 65, DLGb 96). For Derrida, by this juncture, the “imprint” refers to a form that “outlines” appearing as acoustic or writing, without yet being filled by either (thus nor by metaphors of writing, such as “mark” etc.). Yet the formation of Husserlian correction is indispensable […]. As to the intentional object, for example, the content of the image, it does not really (real) belong either to the world or to a lived experience […]. The psychic image of which Saussure speaks must not be an internal reality copying an external one” (OG 64, DLGb 95).
form would be prior even to the form of an imprint. Derrida’s progress as yet remains prior to such originary passage.

That is, doubtless, the passage from form to the imprint is a condition for pure appearing, by which to move “forward”. However, Derrida is still moving “backward”.

Parenthesis: the traditional problem of the bridge, and preparation for the hinge

Indeed, each moment of Derrida’s progress thus far seems to put him in even more trouble than the tradition of metaphysics; he is beset even more severely by the “old grid” of an inside and outside, and the difficulty of linking them. For example, in such traditional readings a rationalism (e.g. a conventional critique of Descartes) or subjective idealism is beset by the problem of explaining how an outside of appearance is constituted.\(^{761}\) In turn, an empiricism such as Locke’s would be beset by this difficulty, and then the further difficulty of explaining how sensation transmutes into ideas.\(^{762}\)

\(^{761}\) See our next footnote for this commonly-held reading of Descartes. Husserl read Descartes as setting aside this difficulty insofar as he provided a forerunner to a reduction. Husserl’s entire *Cartesian Meditations* is a testament to this. The innovation of the reduction, however, is precisely what Derrida has sought to evolve to, and then both “this-side” and “beyond” of (815) – by this pathway, Derrida is seeking to avoid the difficulty of the bridge.

\(^{762}\) Scruton summarises this difficulty for Locke versus Descartes. For Locke, ideas arise from experience, hence “there are no innate ideas or principles. In making this claim, Locke is explicitly going against Descartes, who had argued that […] ideas like those of God, thought and extension which we perceive
It is helpful to explain this via Maine de Biran’s summary of this “grid”. Derrida never explains this reference in *Of Grammatology*, but does in *The Archaeology of the Frivolous* (AF 53, OG 67-68, DLGb 99). Maine de Biran finds in Condillac, “the inheritor of Locke”, a

kind of idealism wherein the ego would remain

alone in the purely subjective world of its very

own modifications [...] [which] necessarily

presupposes the objective reality of organs

which receive them and of bodies which

produce them. (OMB, 3, 137-138, quoted in

AF 59)

That is, for Maine de Biran, Condillac is beset by a subjective idealism just as much by the difficulties of empirical “production” of the outside of sense (organs) and the outside of the outside (bodies). These instil the difficulties of linking the outside of clearly and distinctly [...] are innate, implanted in us by God.” (Scruton 1995, 82).

Derrida in *The Archaeology of the Frivolous* explains the difficulty as a rejection of “rationalism” and the “empiricist limit” (AF 58), which implies a “formal contradiction” (AF 59); i.e. of both a creative and receptive moment of consciousness at once. In *Of Grammatology* he notes that the hinge and *différance* will avoid these difficulties of “creative activity” (i.e. subjective idealism), and
the outside, outside to the inside, inside to the inside etc., in every
direction of active and passive constitution. Derrida had worked
these out even of a formal idealism in 1954, each of which had led
to the joint as a problem (123). Indeed, it turns out that his
approach in 1954 was traditional, and Derrida will also seek to
avoid a formal idealism.

In *The Archaeology of the Frivolous*, Derrida rather suggests that
“différance” is the solution, while

the opposition of activity and passivity forms the

hinge (AF 58, our emphases).

Derrida’s approach in *Of Grammatology* will proceed by means of
the formation of form to différance (behind). The latter will allow
the active and passive passage of the hinge (forward).\(^764\) We
address these in order.

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the “single step [pas] outside metaphysics” will no longer be a “return to
finitude” (which a single negation (pas) would entail). Indeed, it is deemed that
such relations belong to “the onto-theology they fight against” (OG 67-68,
DLGb 99), which return of a limit Derrida since 1966 had applied to the
overall history of metaphysics (854).

\(^764\) In 1966, articulation was deemed constituting, and the psychic imprint as its
telos was deemed “passive” (DLG 35). Derrida developed the basis for this
form above.
Part Four: toward the enigmatic trace

From formation of form to the parts of différance

For – as Derrida noted since 1966 – beginning with the telos of an external moment (forward), and thus a difference, implies the grid above. Derrida rather develops différance. For the formation of form thus also avoids a return to the necessity of the spatial relation implied by a constituted difference. The transcendental (and constituting) “formation of form” as temporalising permits the movement to an other form that appears as such. Hence in 1967 this relation of form proceeds as a difference without an other; again, as a deferral of différance. This develops a third version of différance as formation of form, thus (moving “forward”) no longer bound to the originary.

Crucially, the above allows for another “part”, in that the moment of formation of form as constituting also allows for relation with spacing. Such passage from form to the imprint would occur as irreducible (OG 66, DLGb 97). This would permit the application of being – a prior condition for instances of articulation – to the imprint. However, no such irreducible passage yet takes form. Rather, the formation of form has been aligned with différance. Crucially, Derrida adds a sentence:

Note that the “being” above is taken as prior to form. We develop the instability by which it can appear just below.
[différance] is therefore the formation of form.

But it is for its other part [d'autre part] the being-imprinted of the imprint. (OG 63, DLGb 92, Derrida’s emphasis first)

Derrida’s “pathway” will develop from each part. The first will develop the relation irreducible to form (behind), in an unstable relation to originary appearing as such. This will permit the progress. In turn, the second will allow the chains of differences “forward”. We will follow these in order.

The first part – instability of the conditional

First, to avoid the bridge directly ahead, Derrida’s “pathway” will require a “contortion” that will re-orientate the relation of the irreducible to the originary. For – as in 1966 – irreducible relations are aligned by means of the “is”; différance “is” the formation of form. Formation of form, as irreducible, henceforth makes even the form that it forms conditional. A fortiori, even form is merely treated as a conditional – “if it is a form” (OG 68, DLGb 99 (cf. 225). As ever, a conditional avoids positing the possibility of its object or

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766 We have changed Spivak’s “on the other hand” to “for its other part” to emphasise the whole-part reasoning in movement from one to the other. “On the other hand” is the conventional English translation, and in everyday French the whole part reasoning has little role, but it is crucial to note the implicit formal relations that Derrida mobilises.
its antecedent. Derrida’s progress henceforth evolves to allow for instability of the relations of the conditional (“if”) and the position (or signifying) of “is”.

Thus, first, if passage arises as a form, then its relations would permit appearing. As no longer positing the possibility of its object, the progress no longer signifies even a simple non-relation to phenomenology, which latter requires such an object as its content. Analysis of appearing would occur beyond the possibility of formal appearing as such. As Derrida explains:

>[A]s such, if one can still use this expression in a non-phenomenological way; for here we pass the very [même] limit of phenomenology. (DLGb 99, OG 68, Derrida’s emphasis on “as such”)

Yet, we note, by this the form of appearing as such is no longer precluded.

Moreover, note that phenomenology has been made the object. However, Derrida had worked out by 1964 that, an irreducible moment of phenomenology could only be said as other than phenomenology (VEM 445, VM 129 (506)).

Hence Derrida develops an instability in the quotation above. To say “if one can still use this expression non-phenomenologically”
expresses a doubt that employment can proceed except phenomenologically. If so, rather than beginning from the beyond, one only passes the limit “here”. Such approach would still be in phenomenology. It would thus still be objectively transcendental, and allow the appearing of content as such. However, the instability in the two passages does not yet allow a certainty of originary difference, hence not yet even the certainty of positing the appearing of the beyond in the originary. Such relations merely develop a part of différence in general (OG 62, DLGB 91).

A fortiori, whether the approach is irreducible or originary, a conditional “if” or originary “is” will not yet be settled in Of Grammatology. Nor would this be required. For in either case above, appearing can be addressed as such. Derrida has re-orientated his approach in order to proceed without a naïve objectivism.767

767 Derrida explained at the outset that this “contortion” of the pathway would need to occur. That is, in order to develop the necessities, the progress must then no longer allow for the beyond as a difference upon the inside. To situate this: since 1966 he had called the “text” the interweaving of relations at the most interior of originary form (DLG 34 (834)). The instability of formation of form as irreducible to the transcendental, yet also no longer precluding the transcendental approach, is aligned with an ultra-transcendental text. Here, Derrida passed the limit of phenomenology. But, here, Derrida passed the limit of phenomenology. Such progress is deemed “pre-critical”. The latter would be prior to the transcendental critique (PDP 116) as originary (i.e. pre-critical); or historically prior to the Kantian sort of critique (i.e. pre-critical). It would thus again be ultra-transcendental or a classical sort that restores the old grid. But Derrida had explained that “[t]o see to it that the beyond does not return to the within is to recognise in the contortion the necessity of a pathway. That pathway must leave a track in the text. Without that track, abandoned to the simple content of its conclusions, the ultra-transcendental text will so closely resemble the precritical text as to be indistinguishable from it.” (OG 61, DLGb 90). That is to say, such an indistinction requires a track, and thus an archi-trace and a possible trace. With a possible trace, Derrida’s pathway via différence might well emerge as setting aside the old grid of realism, empiricism, idealism and
The transition to *différance* as being-imprinted

Next the appearing as such of content in chains of differences must be permitted (without a trace, which would be made impossible). Thus Derrida develops the “other part” of *différance* (and these pass from one to other) as difference and the hinge.

First, as worked out just above, if the imprint is irreducible (OG 66, DLGb 97) then the relations of passage from active articulation to the passive imprint would be allowed, as *différance in general* (OG 62, DLGb 91). We address the active relations first. These would allow for the return of the sense of progress from one to other, and vice versa. Derrida explains that this must be a “double passage”, which would be prior to content. He noted that

> the sense of *différance in general* would be more accessible to us if the unity of that *double passage* appeared more clearly. (OG 62, DLGB 91, our emphases)

transcendentalism in a novel fashion. Without the possibility of a trace, and thus without a way for the trace to avoid impossibility, Derrida's work might be allowed no way to progress at all. We note merely that Derrida's concerns of 1967 would also be redressed by settling his difficulties from 1966, and we continue to follow the latter.
We thus turn toward the “other part” of différance in general, to follow its “active” part, and the constituting relations of articulation as difference.

**The hinge as articulating difference**

To do so, Derrida quotes a letter from Laporte, as seeking

a single word for designating difference and articulation. [...] The word is hinge (brisure):

broken, cracked apart, [but also] [h]inged articulation of two parts of wood- or metal-work (OG 65, DLGb 96).

A hinge, for essential reasons, instils a structural connection between two wholes (for example, a door, inside, and its frame outside) but also permits their movement and thus connects them in space and time (OG 65, DLGb 96). Yet a hinge also retains a separation (as brisure), and thus a difference between the relations; it permits articulation.

A fortiori, as articulating spatial form, the hinge is indeed not yet equated with différance, but merely difference:

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768 A door and doorframe (which is our example) can be made of wood, metal, or other materials.
Difference is articulation (OG 66, DLGb 96, Derrida’s emphasis)

Derrida italicises this phrase in 1967. It remains crucial to note when Derrida retains “difference” instead of différence.

Yet to go forward, by means of this “contortion” to a pathway further behind, Derrida thus re-aligns with the archi-syntheses that he had developed in 1966. For that the hinge is permitted by a formation of form implies that the hinge is “irreducible”, as had been temporalising synthesis (OG 66, DLGb 96). The latter synthesis in turn implied the appearing of differences in articulation (DLG 35 (808, 830 ff.)). Just so, in 1967 the progress depends upon

the temporalising synthesis, which permits

difference to appear in a chain of significations

(OG 66, DLGb 96, our emphasis).

We will continue with the relation of the hinge as articulation and then progress to its temporalising. For in 1967 this chain of articulations no longer proceeds from the trace (DLG 35), but from the instability in the formation of form. Importantly, even that the chains of articulation are formal is no longer conceded from the first. Derrida only concedes that if articulation is a form, it is because “the tongue is a form” (DLGb 98, C 166, cf. OG 68).
Derrida can thus begin to build the hinge in this instability. If the unity of the chains of formation of form appeared (OG 62, DLGb 91), then they would proceed in two directions, from one to other and vice versa (OG 62, DLGb 91). The directions of a hinge can thus be addressed as this crossing “in” Derrida’s reformulation of originary purity. A hinge is permitted by the “double passage” (OG 62, DLGb 91) from one side to another (from one side, to the other, and vice versa). The progress thus accounts for the stasis of the structure (the form of one and other at once), and its movement from one to the other.

**Toward the return of sense**

Yet a hinge in general is formed only as the relations of direction, connection and separation (DLGb 100-101, cf. OG 68-69). The directions of the hinge thus permit the form that is articulated as different (OG 65, DLGb 96). However, it does not yet allow even for the particular sensible (or “intramundane”) signification of one side of the hinge to return to and found its opposite. For instance, a hinge never permits a door to be a door-frame. If it is a form, a hinge in both passages never permits content to pass to

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769 To add content, the double passage in an imprint would proceed in articulated chains of writing and speech.
770 Derrida explains the irreducible direction of the possibility of appearing as the “horizontality of spacing” (OG 69, DLGb 101). He explains separation as “discontinuity” (OG 69, DLGb 101), and connection and separation at once as “constituting and dislocating at once [à la fois]” (DLGb 100, cf. OG 68).
771 As Derrida puts it, this would be “a single word for designating difference and articulation” (OG 65, DLGb 96).
its opposite. According to Derrida’s progress, it would merely permit passage from one to other.

**The progress of the hinge to spacing “as such”**

But Derrida’s progress must yet account for the originary relations of appearing to allow this progress. He thus proceeds in a sequence of conditions “forward”. First, as the irreducible relations permitting movement in temporalising, the form of the hinge allows the relation to *spacing*. In turn, second, “spacing” permits the

becoming-space of time, and the becoming-time of *space* (OG 68, DLGb 99, our emphasis).

In 1967, Derrida adds the italicised phrase, to allow even a form of becoming-*time* of space, which had been a problem since 1954, and he had avoided in 1966 (cf. DLG 36, (828)).\(^{772}\) The instability of the progress as formation of form or originary allows even the irreducible to be addressed as formal. Hence, third, and to move forward, spacing allows the relations of *appearing “as such”* (OG 68, DLGb 92), henceforth *in the unstable sense that we developed above*.

\(^{772}\) Derrida in 1966 wrote: “[S]pacing (one remarks that this word says the articulation of time and space, the becoming-space of time)” (DLG 36).
The evolution to chains “as such”

Thus, in the sentence after introducing the hinge, Derrida can reprise that it permits

the experience of space and time [...] to appear as

such (OG 65-66, DLG 35, our emphases).

The experience of space and time, we noted, was the necessary minimal unity prior to the instantiation of content, thus a particular originary moment furthest from originary content (DLG 33, (cf. 817)). Thus in this instability, appearing as such can indeed be included to the hinge in articulation, as the progress of differences. In turn, the chains of articulation as such (no longer as simple content) are possible.  

The first elision of the impossible trace

Derrida continues with the seeming result from 1966, this

difference permits a graphic chain (‘visual’ or

‘tactile’, ‘spatial’, as one says) to articulate itself,

Note that the active experience of the appearing as such of the temporal, via articulation as spacing, is not yet the relation of speech as passive and temporal, via the imprint. The latter will be aligned with retention, in accordance with temporalising. We are continuing to follow articulation, and address the passively temporal below.
possibly in a linear fashion on a spoken chain


However, as we predicted, that the chains of difference arise in the
“tissue of this trace” (DLG 35, (832)), from 1966, has indeed been omitted in 1967. Moreover, Derrida admitted at this juncture in 1966 that the trace was impossible, requiring a difference to permit the chains from one to other (DLG 35). Derrida deletes this sentence and its relation to impossibility. The progress of articulations in the hinge must be possible. Derrida still continues:

[I]t is from the first possibility of this

articulation [of difference] that it is necessary

to depart. (OG 66, DLGb 96, cf. DLG 35).

These evolutions supported, we address the temporal relations of the hinge as passive.

**Toward the enigmatic possibility of the trace**

That is, Derrida’s necessities are progressive. To permit this progress of appearing, he must yet allow the trace to be omitted from these chains of articulating difference. Next, he must allow

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774 Derrida deletes: “[T]his [chain of traces] would be impossible without the difference which is thus at work in each of the chains.” (DLG 35).
for it to keep its possibility. Thereafter, he must address how the trace makes appearing in chains of difference possible. It must do so while avoiding its impossibility, yet also permitting the chains.

To do so, Derrida again alters the progression from the articles, as retention and protention are addressed much earlier than the approach to Leroi-Gourhan (OG 66-67, DLGb 96-97, cf. DLG 35) (864). However, anticipation will no longer be “privileged” (OG 66, DLGb 97). The basis by which Derrida first developed di ff erance in his œuvre in 1966 will no longer be accepted.

He thus begins from the imprint again. As worked out above, if the imprint is irreducible then the relations of passage from active articulation to the passive imprint would be allowed as di ff erance in general (OG 62, DLGb 91 (894, 895)). Since 1966, articulating was that moment of form aligned with the active, the living and appearing. Moreover, the imprint was aligned with the passive, the lived and appearance (DLG 35 (824)). Just so, articulating makes the telos of its passage again that of the imprint. In turn, that telos would determine the signifier, and thus speech. As ever, the telos is that of presence. Yet as the imprint is lived but irreducible, it follows that speech is made even more irreducibly passive. Derrida reprises his sentence:
[t]hat the imprint would be irreducible wants
to say [means] also that speech is originally
passive (DLGb 97, cf. OG 66, DLG 35).

Derrida thus assesses the necessity of provision of passive
content to the living moment. The necessity of the provision of a
lived and passive moment to the living aligns in the hinge with a
direction from “behind, forward”. That is, Derrida aligns the lived
imprint with the past, which must restore content to the living as
retention. He adds that

[th]is passivity is also the relationship to a past.

(OG 66, DLGb 97)

Articulating as living is in turn aligned with this living progress.
The necessity by this juncture is to return a content from the past
to “re-animate” the living moment (OG 66, DLGb 97). Indeed,
as Derrida worked out since 1954, the necessity is to re-animate
the living “absolutely”, for only presence would be absolutely
without limits or difference (forward).

775 Derrida still goes on that this passivity is of a sense of passivity “that all
intramundane metaphor would only betray” (DLGb 97, cf. OG 66, DLG 35).
As in 1966, the relations of metaphor must arrive via the relation from
irreducibility (and construed thus, even terms such as “living” and “appearing”
etc. are metaphors, although retaining their essential specificity). We have
addressed these relations, and take them as implicit.
Yet as aligned with speech, which is beyond the imprint, the necessary content of retention is made even more irreducible than the past, and aligned with the absolute past. While such appearing remains certain (manifestly evident),\(^776\) the restoration of content by retention in the originary chains implies the absolute past. That its certain return of the past to the originary present is the reference to what is absolutely past implies that absolutely re-animating the living is impossible.

Indeed, as he had worked out since 1954, Derrida thus goes on,

\[\text{[t]his impossibility of re-animating absolutely}\]

\[\text{the manifest evidence of an originary presence}\]

\[\text{returns us thus to an absolute past. (DLGb 97, OG 66)}\]

Note that \textit{merely the re-animating is impossible}; the absolute past escapes possibility or impossibility. Such a direction to the absolute past manifestly appearing despite a living impossibility would be the \textit{trace}. The necessity of content then implies that a trace of the absolute past is no longer dispelled, even when a content in living consciousness is impossible.

\(^{776}\) Since 1962, “manifesting” was deemed the originary moment of revealing of Being which is not yet objective, thus not yet content (IOG 152, (350)).
Thus Derrida goes on:

[That is what *authorised us* to call ‘trace’ that

which does not let itself be summarised in the

simplicity of a present. (OG 66, DLGb 97, our

*emphasis*)

Derrida in 1967 has sought to *avoid the impossibility* which in 1966 had been associated with the trace in its chains of articulation and difference. By this, he seeks to no longer preclude its possibility, and allow the a priori right (authorisation) to call it a trace. However, this leads to a difficulty.

**Parenthesis – Derrida’s conservative moment in 1967 – protention “forward” de-privileged**

For Derrida had worked out from Leroi-Gourhan in 1966 that anticipation of a future no longer necessitates difference, and from this evolved to deferral of difference (DLG 46). But we noted that then implied the loss of necessity of a trace of the future. Thus Derrida argues,

777 The aggregate or sum (*somme*) of chains was Saussure’s means by which to collate the acts of speech (C 38, Ce 19, (659)). Derrida avoids aggregates as much as the resultant unities.
if anticipation were privileged, the irreducibility
of the always-already-there and the
fundamental passivity that is called time would
risk effacement. (OG 66, DLGb 96)

He refuses to take this risk, or consider the passage from the
future. Rather, the relation of irreducible passivity and its absolute
origin is emphasised.

This develops Derrida’s conservative moment even in Of
Grammatology. For – we ask – even in a temporalising moment,
and for essential reasons, how are such instances provided to
retention, unless from protention? How can memory arise?
Derrida grants the difficulty:

[i]t could in effect have been objected that […]

protention is as indispensable as retention.

(OG 66, DLGb 96)

He refuses to concede the objection, to avoid the risk of the
effacement and impossibility of the trace. Thus even in Of
Grammatology of 1967, Derrida’s progress must still develop. As in
1954, 1962, and 1964 (146, 370, 570), Derrida insists on
privileging the goal of philosophy (the absolute present) over the
implications of the progress. Nor will he solve this difficulty in this book. Yet as in 1964 (cf. VeM 448, VM 131, (571)), Derrida is aware of his polemical stance, and what is at risk if he fails to hold to it. In 1967, and plangently so given his immense attentiveness to rigour, Derrida was above all never a nihilist.\textsuperscript{778}

\textbf{The “enigmatic” avoidance of impossibility}

Thus, importantly, Derrida in 1967 no longer deems this the \textit{impossibility} of the (pure, originary) \textit{trace} (OG 66, DLG 96). Rather, it is \textit{impossible} for the directions of the absolute past to determine the \textit{structural relations} of the trace adequately. They fall short of the absolute past, while the absolute future was excluded from the first.

Hence the directions must fall short of the unity that would determine the absolute present (an absolute speech without writing, thus without difference):

\textsuperscript{778} Derrida opts for retention, which no longer places “the irreducibility of the always-already there” of what is called time at “risk”. In the next sentence he summarises that “[i]f the trace refers to an absolute past, it is because it obliges us to think a past that cannot any longer \[\textit{ne peut plus} \] be understood in the form of a modified [i.e. intentional] presence” (DLGh 97, OG 66). We merely note a condition of Derrida’s necessary condition: if the past cannot any longer be understood in the form of a modified presence, it is because it is first the relationship to an always-already there. No such particular necessity arises with protention.
The concepts of present, past and future, […]

cannot adequately describe the structure of the

trace (OG 67, DLGb 97).

What is “adequate” would be the “strongest” determination of possibility or impossibility (cf. I §138), but such considerations are no longer relevant. Rather than implying the impossibility of an instance of the trace, the directions merely fall short of determining the trace as possible or impossible. Possibility and impossibility remain originary.

Moreover, note that such living moments have developed by alignment with articulation, and thus as analogous to graphic and phonic metaphors (hence, above, Derrida employs the metaphor of de-scribing). Basically put, as eluding de-scription by chains of graphic and phonic metaphors, “what is called trace” no longer needs to “mark” its impossibility.

The anterior possibility of the trace

Importantly, however, Derrida has worked these relations out, and is proceeding by more than simple analogy. The concern in the relations of the past and absolute past is for retention insofar as it

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779 Husserl explains adequacy as “incapable in principle of being either ‘strengthened’ or ‘weakened’” (I §138), where the weight is deemed a “positive phenomenological enhancement with respect to [its] motivating power”. That is, adequacy would be without grades of difference in its weight.
“disjoints” (disjoint) the present from its “self-identity” (DLGb 97, cf. OG 66).

To situate this: the absolute would be without limit, thus the absolute itself would be neither past nor future. Derrida refers to the “absolute past” in that the restoration of the past (as a present-past (present-passé (DLGb 97, cf. IDG 149 (281)) is never severed from the absolute to which it refers. That is, the direction develops levels – the present, irreducible past and the absolute past in turn align with articulating, imprint and speech; thus also that of temporalising. The trace develops via the reasoning that worked it out as the archi-trace and pure trace. We will develop this via différance.

To apply Derrida’s reasoning: certainly, the difference between the absolute past and the present makes its necessity felt (as irreducibly temporal, we avoid writing that it “appears”). It “is” thus both absolutely past and present in the systematic fashion that we developed above. Hence, as we noted, it is contradictory in the logic of identity, and hence contradictory in the logic of identity. In this instability such a difference is deferred.

Thus, in the logic of identity, which cannot “adequately” describe the structure of the trace, the trace has retained its necessity and anterior
possibility. To the extent that its retention has exceeded internal possibility, in deferral of difference, then the trace is no longer precluded from protending the future and past. Thus:

the strange movement of the trace proclaims

as much as it recalls; différance differs-defers

(OG 66, DLG 97).

Derrida in the cumulative progression in 1967 has worked out différance in a fourth and more developed fashion. Yet the trace remains anterior to absolute awakening or signification of originary evidence, and to that extent eludes all particular appearing in constituting of originary difference. Derrida still notes, as in 1966:

such is the place of a problematic of the trace

(OG 70, DLGb 102).

However, the evolution to the trace is important, in that it retains a possibility prior to the origin and its levels. Thirteen years after his first application to the problem, Derrida has at least found a strange way for the trace to remain possible, as no longer

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780 That an extent applies is never pre-determined by the phrase “to the extent that”.
originally bound within logic, truth or falsity. The relation, rather, is “strange” and “enigmatic” (DLG 70, DLGb 103).^781

**Toward the relations “forward”, the trace as relation in general**

Next, importantly, Derrida must still permit the direction from the enigmatic trace, to make it possible for the chains of signification to proceed, as no longer confined to particular sense as *difference*. For it is important to avoid deeming that the trace, no longer overtly related to *difference*, is still bound to the originary appearing in the chains of articulation. The trace still exceeds the intramundane possibility or impossibility in becoming, and is prior to signification. Nowhere in these pages does Derrida deem that a trace appears in any *particular* articulation (or signification, or awakening). The trace is only aligned with relations in general, as the formal relations of “presence-absence”, “alterity”, “other”, “inside”, “outside”. Moreover, it is relentlessly emphasised as

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^781 The “strange” is at least a reference to Levinas’ explanation of the relation to *Autrui*. In 1967, Derrida *begins from a relation prior to originary and intentional opposition* (as Levinas’ enjoyment does), and begins from the impossibility of restoring an absolute past in the hinge to presence. He thus restores a relation of possibility to a trace as prior to relation. This will permit the progress of difference via spacing, which we develop just below. After *Totality and Infinity*, we explained, Levinas had related this “beyond” to the trace, and it is with this which Derrida aligns as “alterity”, rather than *Autrui* or *autrui*. That is, by 1967, Derrida has allowed for Levinas’ contributions. Derrida goes on three pages later: “[h]us, I relate this concept of trace to what is at the centre of the latest work of Emmanuel Levinas […] relationship to the illety of an alterity of a past that never was and can never be lived in the originary or modified form of presence” (OG 70, DLGb 102-103).a
“considerably anterior”, as “already”, “a priori”, “before”; an archi-relation even to memory (cf. OG 70-71).

The amended pathway of the trace in general

Thus Derrida indeed begins from the trace as merely a relation in general, and from one to other in general (cf. 900). Hence, second, rather than relating the trace to difference and thus inscription etc., Derrida keeps the enigmatic relation of the trace for spacing. The latter is a condition for appearing, yet never of itself a hinge. Next, third, in 1966 it was relatively de-emphasised that spacing “is” – in the senses we explained above – the moment of “becoming-absent”, as condition for movement in the living progress from one to other upon the inside (and thus a condition for the chains of derived writing and speech (DLG 36, OG 69)). Derrida expands upon the paragraph from 1967:

this trace is the opening of the first exteriority

in general, the enigmatic relationship of the living

to its other and of an inside to an outside: […]

spacing. (OG 70, DLGb 103, cf. DLG 37, our emphases)

Derrida adds the italicised “of the living to its other”. He emphasises the possibility of the enigmatic relation of the trace to
living relations (retention, and the chains of articulation); even though the trace cannot yet be related to difference. For (and here is the relation from an enigmatic trace to the possibility of appearing), the movement of spacing, in the hinge, can constitute the progress from one to the other in particular. In 1967, the trace takes a path via spacing, and of these only spacing is a condition for the movement of differences.

**The hinge as basis of possibility in 1967**

However, how impossibility proceeds instead must be accounted for, as must how it no longer precludes articulation or a trace. A fortiori, in 1967, *Derrida replaces the words “trace” as marking impossibility with the “hinge”:

> the hinge marks the impossibility for a sign, for the unity of a signifier and signified, to be produced within the plenitude of a present and of an absolute presence (OG 69, DLG 102, our emphasis).

The mark of an impossibility of appearing in the movement of difference as articulation, which in 1966 held for the trace, has indeed been worked out as holding for the form of the hinge. The hinge permits the levels “forward” (from the chains to the
imprint, unity of signifier and signified, sign, and idea) in an absolute present. Yet rather than retaining the trace, the hinge precludes the appearing of the absolute trace in the movement “forward”, as impossibility. It retains the possibility of the trace as enigmatic (cf. 881).

**The impossibility that avoids contradiction**

We will briefly assess whether the approach thus far redresses the difficulties from 1966. First, the hinge needed to permit the mark as impossibility, yet avoid a contradictory outcome that no longer permits articulation. Second, it needed to allow the possibility of chains of differences. We address these in order.

First, we note again that the “hinge” develops from the instability of formation of form. If a hinge is irreducible, its form might never appear even originarily. Its impossibility would never impact upon originary appearing, which does not yet preclude articulation and difference. If the hinge is a form, the relations of 1966 would apply. As articulated, for a hinge as such can be articulated, it appears and is marked. The irreducible which cannot appear nevertheless appears and marks its impossibility. Yet its particular marking of impossibility need no longer preclude every

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782 Derrida sought to avoid confinement to the interior (imprisonment) since 1954, and developed this as a basic issue to be addressed by the trace since 1965, (142).
moment of appearing. Such a permission would be provided by an enigmatic relation of the trace.

Second, as noted, the hinge permits the articulation of differences. The relations of writing and speech in articulation as difference arise as possible and impossible. The hinge does allow for the necessity of contradiction and the marking of impossibility of signifiers, as did the trace in 1966. However, even if the hinge is impossible, the possibility of appearing or differences as possible and impossible is unimpeded. Such a relation would also be provided by the trace. Derrida has redressed the difficulties of 1966, by developing the enigmatic relation.

**The enigmatic trace as spatial element**

Thus Derrida reprises his sentence from 1966:

> [i]f the trace […] belongs to the very movement of signification, then signification is a priori written, whether inscribed or not, in one form or another, in a ‘sensible’ and ‘spatial’ element

(OG 70, DLGb 103, our emphases).

Derrida has indeed worked out how this “a priori” and enigmatic trace can relate to this movement, via spacing in the form of one and other. Such a
trace must hold in the *elemental* spatial moment permitted by spacing. This a priori moment that provides a certain sense is deemed writing (740). Such a necessity and possibility hold whether or not the trace is inscribed (i.e. as a written content). *Derrida by his enigmatic relation has allowed the necessity and possibility of a trace in the elemental movement.* He thus raises a footnote from 1966 into the main argument:

> to *make enigmatic* what one thinks one understands by [...] ‘presence’ [...] ([…] and the pre- of presence), is our final intention in this [book]. (OG 70, DLGb 103, cf. DLG 37 fn. 13)

The “enigmatic” relation was not yet implemented in the main argument of 1966, nor any of the arguments that we addressed in previous years. By 1967, Derrida’s telos of making presence enigmatic allows for his contribution to the difficulties that beset the history of metaphysics. In so doing it develops the approach to his concerns since 1954. These, in turn, have concerned us since our first chapter. Many more relations must yet be

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783 In 1967 Derrida replaces “essay” with “book” (DLG 37, fn. 13).
developed and assessed, even in *Of Grammatology*. To avoid hasty
treatment we will rather bring our dissertation toward its close.
Contribution of Chapters Seven to Eleven

Contribution to Chapter Seven (Saussure)

As explained, our reading of the Course in General Linguistics needed to occlude Saussure the practising linguist. We thus suggest it is primarily a contribution to assess Derrida’s reading as to what is possible for a semiology in general, and for a history of metaphysics. To that end, we are aware of no readings that have approached “Saussure” in our whole-part fashion. Nor are we aware of any that sought to do so by alignment with Derrida’s whole-part logical relations as developed since 1954; it seems to us that such consideration is novel in Derrida reading.

784 Nor do we minimise the importance of this project for Saussure, and the worth of Derrida’s approach. Holdcroft, for instance, quotes Saussure’s summary that “if I have succeeded in assigning linguistics a place amongst the sciences, it is because I have related it to semiology” (C. 33, Holdcroft 1991, 155). To that end, Holdcroft explains that Saussure sought to develop the “semiological perspective” so as “to develop the theory of signs […] and then to derive a description of linguistic sign systems from the theory and the principles” (Holdcroft 1991, 156). Derrida undertook this task as one of his teloi. For Holdcroft, however, such a strategy is “questionable”, as it “takes for granted that different sign systems have something interesting in common”. We explained that Derrida found relations interesting precisely insofar as they are “common to all”, thus as basic to the history of metaphysics.

785 Strozier sought to relate Saussure to Derrida in a sort of logical critique (1988), although addressing Saussure’s linguistics rather than the relations of semiology (Strozier 1988, 1-159). Strozier provides only a brief assessment of Derrida’s comments afterward (Strozier 1999, 228-235). He thus notes that Derrida takes it that Saussure “places linguistics and semiology under the aegis of psychology”, and that Derrida “finds a contradiction” in Saussure’s psychology, but never seeks to work out how they hold (Strozier 1998, 230).

786 Cf. our reference to Harvey (29), as having written prior to Derrida’s publication of his first thesis. For an approach that began from Saussure to proceed to Of Grammatology, then to seek to describe Derrida’s “general system” across the years, see Bennington, in Jacques Derrida (1993, pp. 23ff).
Contribution of Chapters Eight to Eleven

Our primary aim has been to develop the relations of the articles “Of Grammatology”. As far as we are aware, we are the first to approach the articles. If so, as our approach has been sequential, then our interrelations are novel. To that end, we hope our approach has been helpful in beginning to explain how Of Grammatology develops an ordered approach, in line with Derrida’s concerns from earlier years. Indeed, we suggest that unless the articles are considered, it is very difficult to assess Derrida’s relation to his earlier years, at least in that he needed to re-orient

787 Only Gasché, to our knowledge, has sought to summarise the second chapter of the book version Of Grammatology in a “systematic” fashion along our lines (Gasché 1994, 45-49). We find multiple moments of concord; for example, Gasché still discerns that Derrida begins from the arbitrariness of the sign, and Saussure’s attempt to exclude writing from language, in order to develop an instituted trace (Gasché 1994, 44). However, while Gasché in working from 1967 suggests that the instituted trace is “the deconstructed term” (Gasché 1994, 44)); we worked out – without disagreeing – how the progress leads from the levels and directions to contradiction of the phoneme and grapheme. Gasché then turns to the archi-trace, which we noted was added in 1967. Beginning from the articles allowed us also to develop the pure trace, which Gasché in 1994 had not yet assessed.

788 For example, Hillis Miller in 2011 suggests that Derrida’s second chapter, in Of Grammatology, and the address to the hinge, exhibits a “relative lack of logical development” (Hillis Miller, in Gaston, Machlachlan, et. al., 2011, 39). We hope to have explained how starting from the articles allows the logical relations to be more obvious. Hillis Miller quotes that in his approach to temporality Derrida refers to “a past that can no longer be understood in the form of a modified presence, as a present-past” (OG 66). Hillis Miller goes on that this is “a past that is not a past, a ‘passé absolu’, whatever, exactly, that means” (Hillis Miller, in Gaston, Machlachlan, et. al., 2011, 39, his emphasis). We noted that Derrida’s address to retention aligned the absolute past with speech, as an irreducibility more extreme than the past, which latter he aligned with the form of the imprint, to work out the degrees of the past; we related these to the levels of the archi-trace (917 ff. esp. 922-923). However, the sentence to which Hillis Miller is referring occurs as Derrida opts for retention over protention in his refusal to risk effacement (920). That the absolute past is kept and an absolute future occluded, in 1967, signals Derrida’s conservative moment. What Hillis Miller takes as a “linguistic ploy” and “contortion[…] [of the] grammatical” (ib. id.), we suggest, rather signals a moment that Derrida in 1967 is protecting metaphysics, and developing his approach accordingly.
his overall approach in the progress from the articles to the book.\footnote{Derrida’s additions, and inclusion of footnotes to the main argument also make the progress more difficult to discern. As an example: Derrida lifted his long footnote upon Peirce into the main body of \textit{Of Grammatology}, in between the relations by which he developed the instituted trace and those that then developed the pure and transcendental implications (OG 48-53, DLGb 69-73, DLG 26-27, fn. 4).}

As to engagement with the current readership of Derrida, as we – to our knowledge – have taken a novel path, comparison to readings of the book version ends up merely noting how none have yet taken our path, or how we have not yet taken their path, both of which are somewhat tautological. The engagement with current reading remains a worthwhile prospect. However, our primary aim has been to develop the progress from earlier years, as a shared means by which to engage with Derrida’s evolution.

To suggest one such site of contribution, a conspectus upon the book \textit{Of Grammatology} was published in 2011 (Gaston and Machlachlan, \textit{et. al.}, 2011), with contributions by several Derrida readers. The articles “Of Grammatology” are mentioned by the editors in the \textit{Introduction}, in order to situate \textit{Of Grammatology}. The editors opt to note only that Derrida’s quotation of Aristotle’s conception of “soul” (i.e. \textit{psukhe}) in the articles remained pervasive “in relation to a determined ordering of language, inscription, signs, representation and senses” (Gaston Machlachlan, \textit{et. al.}, 2011, xv). We sought to begin to work out...
such an “ordering” in starting from the articles (and in turn, from Derrida’s earlier years). Thus, although it was ancillary to our reading, we noted that Aristotle too was concerned with *psukhe*, *phone*, and the symbol. Derrida generalised the implications of his address to Saussure’s psycho-physiology and symbol to all such systems of signification (DLG 25, (716, 769)). Those implications arrived at the instituted trace. Yet by no means did Derrida’s formal analysis yet address Aristotle in particular.

However, we noted in a footnote that in arriving at his developed systematic relations in 1966, which had been worked out from temporalising, Derrida had (in a footnote) deemed that his approach was no longer a “vulgar concept of writing”. He had thus returned to mention Aristotle’s approach to temporality which – Derrida noted – Heidegger had deemed vulgar. To that end, “Of Grammatology” is merely a precursor for Derrida’s more detailed engagement with Aristotle (and Hegel) and Heidegger in “Ousia and Gramme” (esp. OaG 57-62). We remain hopeful that our approach can contribute toward scholarly discussion as Derrida’s progress develops to later years.⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁹⁰ For example, in 2001, Bennington had noted that Derrida’s approach to the decision in *Politiques de l’amitié* (*The Politics of Friendship*), in which Derrida had explained how “I am responsible for the other and before the other” is a “rigorous consequence” of the relations of “the quasi-concept of difference, at least as developed through the notion of the ‘trace’ in *Of Grammatology* in 1967” (Bennington 2001, 202; quoting PdA 87-88, PF 68-69). The quotation to which Bennington refers this to in *Of Grammatology* is that in which Derrida develops “the general structure of the immotivated trace”. We arrived at this quotation
However, we also seek for our work to be applicable to a broader audience, upon which Derrida’s oeuvre still has appreciable influence. We are hopeful that our approach allows demonstration to avert severe misunderstandings. For example, readings such as this still receive international distribution:

> Imagine that you go into a bookshop and pick up a copy of *Of Grammatology*. You would think that, if you were to read the book, by the end you would have a reasonable grasp of what ‘grammatology’ itself might be, what Derrida’s main ideas were on the subject, and what this said about the world. But for Derrida, texts do not work this way.

(Buckingham *et. al.* 2010, 310)

We hope that our approach will allow newcomers to begin to assess how, in beginning from the articles, Derrida explains very

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791 It is quite feasible that this quotation has been phrased in a very scholarly fashion indeed. In that case, the difficulty is merely that of emphasis – we suggest that readers of Derrida ought never to be misled in this way.
well what grammatology is about, along with several interrelated elements.\footnote{792 In so doing, we hope to have accorded with those who have suggested that \textit{Of Grammatology} ought to be treated as “rigorous” (cf. Norris 1987, 65; Gasché 1994, 45-49).}

**Overview of the progress**

Overall, we are also aware of no readings that have yet applied a reasoning of our sort to seek to “work out” selected elements in the progress of \textit{Of Grammatology}. Nor do we know of any that have done so in a fashion developed from the articles, and nor from Husserl’s whole-part reasoning. Nor are we aware of any that sought to do so in developing a progress from earlier years; nor any that sought to do so by following a “law” from Derrida’s earliest work. Finally, nor are we cognisant of approaches that sought to do so to help \textit{Of Grammatology} provide access, as one moment upon the way, to a developing study of Derrida’s work.

With that broader aim in mind, we turn to our Conclusion.
Conclusion

We will avoid summarising the sequence – it is better followed across our chapters. Rather, we will return to our overall aim. We began from the “question” which Derrida in 1990 claimed to guide his work from 1954. We sought to develop this question and this logic “from one end of the book to the other” (PG xv, PdG vii, our emphasis), and then across the years in key works as far as 1967. As Derrida had explained,

> the question that governs the whole trajectory

> [of his oeuvre] is already: ‘How can the originarity of

> a foundation be an a priori synthesis? How can

> everything start with a complication?’ (PG xv, PdG vii, quoting PG xxv, PdG 12, our emphases)

By this juncture, the interrelations of Derrida’s “logic” ought to be more obvious. This “imposition” “from… to the other” refers to the progress of passage from an irreducible source. The question asks how (rather than what or why (cf. 343)) the complication of origin can be demonstrated and determined. The “can” refers to possibility, and the question asks how the “originarity” of a (whole-part) “foundation” can be an “a priori” synthesis (already, behind) to allow the essential relations from which “everything” begins,
starting from an approach to something. We followed the
development of a priori synthesis and its “complication” (co-
implication) up to the hinge and trace in our final chapters.

Indeed, Derrida deems that his progress arose from a “necessity”
impelling an ineluctable question:

[I]t is always a question of an originary
complication of the origin, of an initial
contamination of the simple, that no analysis
could present, make present in its phenomenon or
reduce to the pointlike nature of the element,
instantaneous and identical to itself. (PG xv,
PdG vi-vii, Derrida’s emphases)

We have developed the originary complication of origin in its
inability to make the phenomenon “present”, even after
“reducing” it. To do so, we followed in detail how this
phenomenon, by 1967, remains always other in its self-identity,
rather than an instantaneous point (an instant as ever other to
The phenomenon entered the play of the same, leaving a trace that could never be summed up in the present.

**Contamination and impurity not yet evolved**

Next, as to “contamination” of the simple, above, our first chapter followed how “contamination” arises from the systematic form of binaries in problematic relation to an origin. By “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964 we had noted that an institution occurs by the irreducible, which was not yet implemented. By “Of Grammatology”, we explained that the word “contamination” occurs only in the first article of 1965 (DLG 1036), in relation to Saussure. It was never related to Saussure or mentioned in the second article, in the progress of the pure trace. In 1967 we worked out that Derrida’s proceeded in an unstable relation of formation and purity, and the “The (pure) trace is différance” (OG 62, DLGb 92).

It might well be argued that contamination is implied by the resultant elemental relation of the trace. This may well be so; but Derrida has not yet said so, nor developed it. Were there a direct instantiation of content to the interior, then the trace would no longer be enigmatic, and would again mark its impossibility. There would also no longer be différance, which “is” a pure trace.

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793 Derrida assesses the “point” in more detail in “Ousia and Gramme” (1968, cf. OAG 43 ff.).
An affirmation of contamination would determine something of the origin, which Derrida had sought to avoid in *Of Grammatology*. In 1954, Derrida had rather asked

> why the very [même] word ‘contamination’ has not stopped imposing itself on me (PG xv, PdG vi-vii (amended)).

Thus, to begin to apply these relations, while Lawlor deemed that impurity and contamination held since 1962, and Hurst argues that Derrida’s work by 1967 is a “logic of contamination”, we have been able to work out how such relations are not yet applicable. By no means do we disagree as to the importance of the issues (along with many well-known later elements). We merely note that where and how the relations occur must yet be addressed.

**Conditions of impossibility as example of critical engagement**

This returns us to our primary aim: to develop a way to work out Derrida’s progress, in a fashion that allows for collaboration. To assess such applicability, we continue with the second major commonality to systematic readings of Derrida (Caputo 1987,
that conditions of possibility turn into conditions of impossibility.\textsuperscript{794} We avoid suggesting that we work these bases out in detail in a few short paragraphs, when Derrida might work them out in multiple works over decades. However, we can summarise some initial elements.

Derrida began with conditions of possibility in 1962, which we developed via Husserl (181 ff.). According to Husserl, to the extent that an approach remains formal and a priori it is investigating conditions of possibility (PR §66). Of those works we addressed, only in Of Grammatology does Derrida first refer to this turn to conditions of impossibility. He amends a paragraph:

\begin{quote}
\textit{In what conditions is a grammatology possible? Its fundamental condition is certainly the appeal to and undoing of \textit{sollicitation} logocentrism. But this condition of possibility turns into a condition of impossibility} (OG 74, cf. DLG 40, our emphasis).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{794} The more basic commonality that these readers suggested is that Derrida’s approach seeks to be neither inside nor outside (35), which implications we addressed from 1954 as far as the trace, \textit{différance} etc.
Certainly, a condition for a relation to be possible then turns into a condition for it to be impossible. It is easy to suggest that this holds in that a condition of possibility would be negated or imply an opening, in a sort of erasure. Such an approach is doubtless valid to some degree. Even so, it applies an observation rather than working out how such a turn occurs.

First, note that the “fundamental” condition in 1967 is that of a “solicitation” of logocentrism. We again emphasise the whole-part relations, and instability of movement. Derrida explained of this word “sollicitation” in 1963, in assessing how structuralism could be addressed:

[t]his operation is called (from the Latin)

soliciting. In other words, shaking in a way related to the whole (from sollus, in archaic Latin, ‘the whole’, and from ‘citare’, ‘to put in motion’ (FS 7, cf. FeS 487, Derrida’s emphases).

We will begin from the necessity to determine the whole as absolute presence (in 1967, logocentrism), and a particular telos of determining the conditions by which such determination is
Derrida explains in 1987 (in engagement with Levinas):

[I]t is has \textit{not} been made \textit{possible} except by that

Relation (classical form of a statement on a

condition of possibility) (ATVM 23, Derrida’s

emphases).

Henceforth, the subject “it” stands for “condition of possibility”,
and we add the “classical” objective form “what makes a relation
possible”. As Derrida first worked out from engagement with
Levinas, to be what it is (“what makes a relation possible”), such a
process in general must be mediated by relation in general (“what
makes a Relation possible”). The necessary condition for
possibility is Relation.\textsuperscript{796} Thus to be what it is, it must in turn not
be what it is (itself), hence is not what makes a relation possible.
To be what it is, it must be what it is \textit{not}, etc. (cf. 509). The
necessary condition of possibility, turns into the negation of a
necessary condition of possibility. The condition of possibility
turns into a condition of impossibility.

\textsuperscript{795} Rather than remaining with logocentrism, we take this word more basically
as impelled by a demand for absolute presence, thus an absolute.
\textsuperscript{796} “Relation” is one of Husserl’s pure and formal-ontological categories (155)
by which conditions of possibility are to be assessed (cf. also CPR A80/B 106).
But even by 1967, Derrida had sought to wrest his progress from the “classical” formulation (OG 61, DLGb 90 (883)). Hence note that the syntax of Derrida’s “statement” above is ambiguous, which he emphasises in italicising “not” and “possible”. Taken as positive: provided that it has been made possible, then “it has not been made possible except by” implies a Relation. The Relation has made it possible. Relation is a condition of possibility. But taken as negative, when a condition of possibility is not yet determined as possible, then “it has not been made possible except by” posits that it has not been made possible (except by that Relation). It has not been made possible except in those instances where mediated by a particular Relation. Without such a Relation it is not or never was possible. Such a preclusion might be a negation of possibility, or a priori impossibility, or an irreducible non-possibility.

The necessity then arises to determine this Relation. This allows at least three options: that of predicative possibility and impossibility, a priori possibility and impossibility, and either or both of these possibilities to irreducible non-possibility. As to the first, the possibility and impossibility would enter the play from one to other as the same. Following from the demand since 1964, these opposites must be thought at once. Thought together they are necessarily contradictory and no longer the same (même). As to the second option, it was never possible and no negation or possibility begin to enter the same. As to the third opposition, no opposition could be found in the reciprocal relation between the
same and preclusion of the same, and non-possibility. Yet in a reciprocal relation of the same and its non-possibility, it would be necessary that such a possibility first arise. As then negated it would contradict itself before passing to its non-possibility. Conditions of possibility would turn into conditions of impossibility in an ongoing recurrence.

As Derrida explained in 1993 of the “conditions of possibility as conditions of impossibility, which recurs almost everywhere” in his *oeuvre* (A 15, Ap 36), the basis evolves as a single duty [*même devoir*] that recurrently duplicates itself […] and contradicts itself without remaining the same (A 16, Ap 37, quoting TOH 77).

We emphasise again that the above is merely introductory. For example, we have not yet worked out the *différance* of the above. Nor have we assessed how “recurrently duplicating itself” might relate to repetition. Indeed, even the latter must still be assessed. We seek to *begin* to permit engagement.

**The application to 1954**

We thus return to address Derrida’s “law”, and the question from 1954 that he tells us impels his *oeuvre*. How can the origin of
everything be an a priori synthesis? How can everything start with a co-implication? In effect, a certain system is forming. Derrida summarised in late 1967, of a progress that developed from all of his works to that juncture:

\[ I \text{n effect they form, but indeed as a } \]

\[ \text{displacement and as the displacement of a } \]

\[ \text{question, a certain system somewhere open to an } \]

\[ \text{undecidable resource that sets the system in motion.} \]

(P 3, our emphases)

We have italicised some of the interrelations that we developed en route. Even so, there is still much more to be assessed in the 1960s, even in those works that we addressed; how a certain system applies would need to be reconsidered in each case.

**Appeal to a shared progress**

By no means, then, are we advocating that even our approach will remain so complacent. There are many issues that we have not yet addressed. For example, we have explained that Derrida replaced the trace with the hinge in 1967 in order to correct a difficulty from 1966 and to find a better way to allow for the trace. By 1972, Derrida had begun to be critical of a joint, and referred instead to displacement as a “disjoint” (DISS 21). Yet the hinge
will continue to be employed in later years (117 fn. 43), although much less frequently than the trace. We have not yet assessed why this would be so in order to avoid anachronism.

Yet, and crucially, we have hardly begun to “shake” ourselves. We have not yet begun to critique the stable sense of temporality, history, and evolution of our authorial position and logic. We might have given ourselves the right to do so at least since the footnote on Heidegger (855, fn. 732), in which Derrida aligned archi-writing with avoidance of vulgar temporality. That critique of ana-chronism might begin from this juncture. What will be at issue, we suspect, in Derrida and readings of him is the ways in which even the foundations of logic in general can be rocked in a tremblement de terre (GoD 53). Nor do we yet anticipate how such an abstract progress might be applied, or applied to multiple disciplines, such as those of comparative literature or politics. The “protocols” for such engagement still need to be established. Just so, we do not yet predict how works such as the “Envois” to La Carte Postale, which are obviously much less “teleological” in a linear sense, ought to be approached.

Indeed, if Derrida is not misleading us about his history, then the law would hold even in those works, and – we will say perhaps – in relation to some elements of the system thus far. Such

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797 This “trembling” is a core concern in Derrida’s The Gift of Death in 1993.
assessments are doubtless what Derrida invited us to do by explaining his question as it held since 1954, and which

since then, even in its literal formulation, […]

will not have stopped commanding everything

I have tried to prove (PG xv, PdG vii).

Such a law does not yet suggest that Derrida tries to prove something in each case. In a certain sense, thought might well mean nothing. However, a task has been set to work through Derrida’s œuvre to assess this; cautiously and with some attempt at rigour; whatever “rigour” might come to entail.

Such a task exceeds what we will be able to achieve in our lifetime. To that end, our dissertation seeks to be less a monolithic presentation than an appeal for collaboration. To that end, we hope it is settled that Derrida never was antipathetic to “rigour” in these years, in his fashion. We hope we have helped to begin to return a modicum of exactitude to the enterprise of thought that he sought to further, and the cultural movements that he inspired. Indeed, we hope that this will be taken as our overall contribution.
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