The determinants of ideological moderation in the South African party system: 1994 - 2014

A Doctoral Dissertation in Political Studies

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The purpose of this study is to examine the causes of ideological moderation in the South African party system in the post-1994 period. Previous research stresses the non-left-right feature of politics and when it recognises the centrist feature of major parties and moderation of the party system, the causes of the latter are unexplained. The deficiency in previous research is that moderation and limited left-right disagreements as fundamental causes of broader political dynamics are overlooked — moderate systems foster political consensus and democratic stability. In this study I critically examine three theoretical causal variables that account for moderation: the electoral system, the electorate, and the dominant party. This study relies on a measurement of party system fragmentation, and voter and party system polarisation, as well as an intensive qualitative assessment of the ANC. The evidence is based on a number of nationally representative surveys that measure public opinion; interviews with political party leaders and representatives, and officials from labour and business; and document analysis. The finding is that the ANC as the dominant party is the main driver of moderation in the party system. Coupled with electoral dominance, the centripetal, non-dogmatic, pragmatic and flexible tendencies that characterise the ANC permit the party to induce and stabilise party system moderation. This study: develops a causal framework for understanding moderation; builds on previous research about the centrism of major parties and the moderation of the party system (both quantitatively and qualitatively); departs from the argument about the fragmented and rightist nature of the opposition bloc and the race-based approach to the electorate; and extends the debate about the ANC by arguing that left-right movement occurs within centrist terrain, and that the party is not an amorphous or client entity but a clearly defined one. I also add to: the growing body of knowledge that finds no necessary connection between proportionalism, extremist party positioning and polarisation; the idea that party system polarisation is less reflective of voter polarisation; and concur with previous research that argues that the role of a pivotal centre party is critical for the party system.
I, Letitia Adaken, declare that *The Determinants of Moderation in the South African Party System: 1994 - 2014* represents my own unaided work and is the result of my own original research. No part of this dissertation has been submitted for any degree or examination purposes at any other academic institution. In addition, where secondary material is used, full acknowledgement is given to the sources in accordance with academic integrity and the University’s citation and referencing requirements.

__________________________
Letitia Adaken
Johannesburg, 1 September 2017
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Credit also goes out to the academic readers and colleagues in the Department of Political Studies who commented at the proposal stage, their recommendations added to the theoretical and methodological design of this study.

My appreciation is further extended to political party representatives, government officials, labour and business representatives, and other individuals who offered to participate in this study. Their responses to issues of party ideology and voting behaviour largely contributed to expanding knowledge around the ideological nature of the South African party system, especially when such data was unavailable.

I am grateful for the assistance of the University’s Inter-Library Loan staff who helped me obtain books and journals articles throughout the course of this research when such material was not readily accessible, some resources came from neighbouring countries while others from European and American libraries. Their assistance contributed to the theoretical groundwork of this study.

I am also grateful to the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa who provided financial assistance for this research. Last but not least, I acknowledge the continuous encouragement and motivation that came from my family, friends and my husband. Their support was invaluable throughout the process of this study.
This doctoral research is an output of the National Research Foundation’s (NRF) financial assistance. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, belong to me and are not necessarily attributed to the NRF. Upon receipt of the award, as the scholarship holder, I undertake responsibility for initiating this research which is not research done on behalf of or commissioned by the NRF.
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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEB</td>
<td>Afrikaner EenheidsBeweging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>African Independent Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>African Muslim Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>African Peoples Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASGISA</td>
<td>Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>Azanian People's Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Constitutional Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>Congress of the People South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSES</td>
<td>Centre for the Study of Electoral Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSA</td>
<td>Communist Party of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFF</td>
<td>Economic Freedom Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>Effective Number of Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPOP</td>
<td>Evaluation of Public Opinion Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETT</td>
<td>Electoral Task Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Federal Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Freedom Front</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>Freedom Front Plus</td>
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<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>Fragmentation Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First Past The Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Sciences Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDASA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Independent Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>Minority Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>uMkhonto we Sizwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPNP</td>
<td>Multiparty Negotiation Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDR</td>
<td>National Democratic Revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEDLAC</td>
<td>National Economic Development and Labour Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>National Freedom Party</td>
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<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Growth Path</td>
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<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<td>NNP</td>
<td>New National Party</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Polarisation Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASAS</td>
<td>South African Social Attitudes Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VFP</td>
<td>Vryheidsfront Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WVS</td>
<td>World Values Survey</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The topic under study

This study investigates the determinants of left-right polarisation in the national party system of South Africa in the post-1994 period. Causes behind party system polarisation constitute a central topic in broader literature on political polarisation (Sartori, 1976; Hetherington, 2009; Layman et al, 2006; Curini and Hino, 2012). This is precisely because of the negative effects commonly associated with highly polarised party systems (Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976; Powell, 1982; Lijphart, 1977). Party system ‘polarisation’ refers to the extent to which major parties are ideologically distinct (Sartori, 1976; Dalton, 2008). The degree of polarisation leads to two main types of systems: a moderate and a polarised party system. The former reflects a small ideological difference between major parties who converge to one side of the left-right spectrum, including the centre space; by contrast, the latter system reflects a large ideological distance between major parties who occupy opposed positions on the extremes of the spectrum.

Fundamental theoretical explanations for the causes of moderation and polarisation can be grouped into three perspectives. First, the fragmentation-institutionalist explanation locates causes within electoral laws and party system fragmentation: proportional systems generally produce a large number of parties which cause polarisation; plurality systems tend to produce a small number of parties which cause moderation. Second, the sociological approach puts forward that the nature of voter preferences, whether centrist or extremist, influences the direction of ideological competition amongst parties: when voters are on one side of the left-right spectrum, including the centre, major parties are only moderately different from each other; when voters are poles apart on the spectrum, parties mirror this and are also polarised. Third, the party-centric explanation posits that political parties matter for the state and process of polarisation: low polarisation is consequent of major parties deciding to occupy one side of the left-centre-right space; meanwhile, high polarisation is consequent of major parties occupying diametrically opposed ideologies. These are considered central factors in influencing the degree of polarisation. It is clear that the output is either moderation (low polarisation) or polarisation. These three theoretical strands form the basis of this research enquiry: it acts as a causal framework to assess the determinants of moderation in the South African case.

The main research question is: what are the causes of moderation within the South African party system? I examine the party system in the democratic period (1994 to 2014). The argument about a state of low polarisation in South Africa is arrived at by a literature review which shows broad scholarly consensus on the centrism of major parties and moderation of the party system, and is undergirded by a systematic measurement of polarisation within the system. Both the qualitative literature-informed assessment and quantitative measurement reveal a centrist position for the African National Congress (ANC) and Democratic Alliance (DA) (the two main parties), and substantially low levels of polarisation in the party system. I mainly consider the electorally dominant party, the ANC, which has achieved consecutive majorities since 1994. I also critically engage with the polarising aspect coming from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a radical left party, and determine what this means for a moderate party system. In brief, the intention of this study is to explain the causes of moderation in the party system.
1.2 Problem identification and background

The background informing the research problem emerges from a fundamental scholarly gap within broader South African party system literature. Existing research on the South African party system predominantly focuses on voting behaviour and the degree of openness of the electoral market; race and issue-based politicisation (where the former is seen as the main cleavage line far surpassing the latter); and the numerical aspect of the party system (the level of fragmentation or lack thereof), that is the dominant party system and also its relationship with democracy (Johnson, 1996; Friedman, 2005; Ferree, 2006; Mattes et al, 1995; Hoeane, 2009; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999b; Southall, 2014b). However, in comparison, the component of ideological polarisation in the party system is given significantly little systematic attention. Studies that concentrate on the left-right element mainly assess the ideological base of major parties which are regarded as moderate (either left of centre or right of centre); and as a result, the character of the party system is considered one of low ideological polarisation (Schrire, 2001; Booysen, 2005; Mattes, 2002). Yet, the determinants of such systemic positions are unexplained; what causes the system as a whole to assume a moderate character in the first place is insufficiently attended to. Although implicit explanations surface in the literature (especially the role of the ANC in intra-party pluralism), what may well be assumed knowledge about the causes of moderation in the party system actually deserves deliberate analytical attention. Also, by assuming certain factors, especially a single factor, neglects assessing the matter within a comprehensive framework.

In a related manner, concerns about polarisation are identified in the literature but a systematic starting point to discuss these issues are largely absent. This issue relates to recent concerns about the state of polarisation. The emergence of the EFF (the third largest party) in the 2014 national election is predicted to increase polarisation in the party system. The party is considered an important radicalising element because of its extreme leftwing orientation that is likely to induce the ANC toward a more responsive posture as it deals with a new challenger (Southall, 2014b; de Jager, 2015). Without understanding the causes of low polarisation, it becomes difficult to assess imminent alterations in the state of affairs. To date there has been no critical investigation into whether radical parties like the EFF can cause change in the left-right dynamics of the party system.

Beside emanating from the state of low polarisation, this research topic largely emerges from an empirical puzzle. South Africa is a unique situation because intuitively one would expect polarisation and political conflict given high levels of poverty, unemployment and economic inequality; incentives for extremist party positioning and ideological differentiation under proportional electoral laws; radicalised public rhetoric that advances socialism, the overthrow of capitalism, and hinges toward anti-racial reconciliation; and social protests around services, unemployment, housing and wages. There are justifiable grounds for radicalised policy proposals and ideologically-based politics. But despite this, the party system has remained moderate. There has been little scholarly attention devoted to clarifying this dilemma, and thus, a crucial question remains improperly investigated: why is the party system moderate despite justifiable grounds for extremism?

This study intends to fill the scholarly gap and attempts to explain the empirical paradox by examining the state of low polarisation and centrism in the South African party system.

1.3 Rationale and significance

The rationale of this study is a concern with the significance that moderate and polarised systems have for democratic stability and social order. “The study of ideological polarisation is an important topic in research ranging from behavioural-level to institutional studies of politics” (Clark, 2009: 146). Aside from other components that are used to study the party system, polarisation has come to occupy centre stage. Since the 1970s there has been “a new valuation of the ideological dimension”
undergirding parties and party systems (von Beyme, 1985: 259). Sartori (1976) firmly argues for the relevance of the ideological position of relevant parties in the system. According to Sartori and Downs (1957), the nature of ideological dispersion is an important indicator in providing a deep and rich understanding of the way party systems operate. “Therefore, measures such as parliamentary seat share and other indicators of explicit political strength need to be complemented by indicators related to political ideology” (Pardos-Prado and Dinas, 2010: 763).

To be more specific about this scholarly connection between major parties and ideologies, the left-right positions parties take and the consequent levels of party system polarisation have fundamental implications for democracy. High ideological polarisation, affected by the electoral success of extremist parties, strains political consensus, fosters political violence, affects the stability of democracy and is associated with democratic breakdown and collapse (Sartori, 1976; Downs, 1957; Valenzuela, 1978; Sani and Sartori, 1983; Powell, 1982; Mainwaring, 1999; Dalton, 2008). Although there is no overwhelming scepticism of polarised systems — since some argue that positive effects may actually be associated with systems that have high ideological competition and large policy distances amongst major parties (such as ideological voting, increased voter turnout, and ‘partisan sorting’) — a predominant perspective is one that emphasises negative consequences for broader politics and society (Hetherington, 2001; Lachat, 2008; Dalton and Tanaka, 2007; Wang, 2014; Sorensen, 2014).

Recent research goes beyond the extreme effect of polarisation (democratic collapse) but still finds strong negative consequences. For instance, there is a significant relationship between the percentage of left-right extremists in a party system and the level of protests in a nation (Dalton et al, 2009; Powell, 1986). Others associate polarisation with legislative gridlock, unsuccessful economic performance, and an unpredictable policy environment (Jones, 2001; Frye, 2010). Esteban and Ray (1994: 820) succinctly puts it that “the phenomenon of polarisation is closely linked to the generation of tensions, to the possibilities of articulated rebellion and revolt, and to the existence of social unrest in general”. In the end, stability of party systems are more a function of polarisation than any other factor (Dalton, 2008). This suggests that elite-based, party system polarisation is a significant contributor to social and political instability.

For a long time scholars have suggested that the level of party system fragmentation (that is, the number of parties in the system) adversely affects democracy, and is the number one determinant of party and voter behaviour. However, this view is challenged. An alternative explanation suggests that it is actually the ideological positions of major parties, not the number of parties, that produce negative effects. A strong argument has been put by Dalton (2008) who argues that most of the effects of party systems, such as the representation of social cleavages and voter turnout, can be traced to the ideological distance amongst relevant parties in the system. This argument does not discount the importance of the number of parties in the system but argues that the effects attributed to this phenomenon are actually a consequence of polarisation. To restate, Sartori (2005: 283) makes the point that the number of parties on its own does not affect the stability of government, but only when coupled with the ideological position of relevant parties.

Moderate party systems, on the other hand, are considered highly beneficial for the success and consolidation of democracy and social stability. This is especially the case when relevant parties are in the centre, occupying the moderate political space. Stable and consensus-style politics may also exist when major parties are on the same ideological axis, not necessarily on the centre; either on the extreme right or extreme left. However, it is more common to equate the virtues of moderation with centrisn and non-extremism. Moderate polities are conducive to political and social consensus, and stable and effective government (Downs, 1957). The Chilean party system of 1973 is used as a contrastive case. High level of polarisation is argued to have caused the system to become unworkable, eventually collapsing democracy (Sartori, 2005; Scully, 1992).

The dominance of the centre and little or no oscillation between extremist poles, are considered massive contributors to legislative productivity and efficiency, successful economic performance, and a stable and predicable policy environment. A centrist party system plays a mediating role and holds the balance between extremist parties; it continuously fosters moderation within society and
contributes to the general health of democracy (Scully, 1992). Thus, much of political life hinges on the level of ideological difference amongst major parties. Polarisation is not simply an extension of political jargon but it has real empirical significance.

Given that South Africa is a stable democracy and a party system with a centrist dominant party, understanding the ideological composition of the party system and the degree of polarisation are important in subsequently recognising the contributing factors to stability. Not only is this topic relevant for understanding why major parties in South Africa occupy similar centrist positions, it is also a tool to assess the necessary factors that have the potential to effect change or stability in the ideological makeup of the party system. To be clear, this study focuses on examining the causes and determinants, instead of the effects, of moderation within the South African party system — although it recognises the beneficial consequences of moderation in general politics.

1.4 Methodology and research design

This research is case-oriented and focuses on both cause-effect and causal mechanisms logic. Selection is based on the dependent variable (low left-right polarisation or ideological moderation) and independent variables. It is justifiable to focus on the dependent variable since this research emerges from an empirical paradox whereby the outcome of interest (moderation in the party system) is widely acknowledged. When there is a research puzzle and when the outcome is known, it becomes difficult to ignore effects and simply focus on causes. However, I avoid giving exclusive attention to the outcome. Important theoretical factors that are hypothesised to cause moderation are considered; independent variables encompassed in this research include: fragmentation and electoral systems, the electorate, and the major political party.

There are two main reasons for embedding this research in a theoretical context and considering relevant causal variables. First, I intend to arrive at a comprehensive, plausible and non-spurious framework for the determinants of moderation in the South African party system. This means that I seek to minimise the problem of some other relevant variable explaining the phenomenon. Second, a secondary intention of this research is to add to debates in broader polarisation literature. While a single-country case cannot be considered representative of the population of interest, it adds to the accumulation of knowledge and sheds light on controversial and thorny points in the literature.

I rely on primary and secondary data to meet the objectives of this research. I also make use of a multi-method research design that allows for corroboration, thus increasing the validity of the findings. This consists of (a) interviews with party leaders and officials; representatives from business, SACP, COSATU and NEDLAC; (b) survey data from various nationally representative surveys, between 1982 and 2016 (Afrobarometer, CSES, EPOP, IDASA, SASAS, WVS); and (c) document and content analysis, especially to analyse data on the dominant party (the ANC).

Also, I use a mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Since the latter is particularly useful for establishing the presence or absence of correlations through statistical means, it suits the objective of this project which is to establish a causal framework for moderation in South Africa. However, numerical data is not available on all hypothesised causes, especially on the dominant party. In this regard, I rely mainly on qualitative assessments to interpret the effect the ANC has on the party system and whether (and how) it contributes to moderation of the system. Qualitative analysis is also employed in other sections to determine stimulating factors behind correlations, and this follows a thematic approach. In broad terms, the main approach to analysis involves the search for general patterns, convergence and non-convergence within and amongst data sets.
1.5 Contributions and limitations

Three main reasons inform the scholarly contribution of this research. First, this analysis aims to contribute to the literature by presenting a systematic and rigorous framework for understanding the causes of moderation in the South African party system. Also, given that the study does not emphasise a single causal factor but theoretically relevant ones, it provides a deep, rich and fuller understanding of the causes. Understanding the causes assists in pointing out chief agents or institutions which hold the power to alter the ideological makeup and direction of the party system. Also, having a systematic framework provides a useful reference point to discuss left-right party system change, including the process leading up to polarisation. Second, I contribute in a quantitative way by using existing survey data, reconstituting it, placing it within a theoretical context and a structure of exposition, and deriving statistical findings from it. Third, I add to the literature on theoretical causes of extremist party positioning and polarisation. The findings from the South African case have relevance to broader debates about electoral systems, voters and dominant parties. In this way, I add to the chain of reasoning to offer more insight into these largely controversial and unresolved issues. In brief, I find that proportionalism and voters do not account for moderation, instead, much lies with the dominant party.

Fourth, I contribute on a number of levels to the South African literature. This includes adding to the debate about (a) the ideologically fragmented and rightist nature of opposition parties. I find that the opposition bloc is less fragmented than is often argued and occupies the same space, and former rightwing parties have moved to the centre-left — including the DA. I add to the debate about (b) issue-based and non-policy voting. While the race-based aspect is often argued to dominate voting behaviour, this research finds that voters themselves and party representatives hardly cite identity-based reasons for party support. This study finds that voters have left and right tendencies and are divided on general and salient economic issues, the median voter is centrist and moderate, and voters are engaged in indirect policy voting based on party promises and deliverables. I argue that an increase in policy voting depends on party politicisation of issues and programmes, alleviation of poverty and class migration, and increase in education and literacy. I also contribute to the literature about (c) the left-right, and more particularly, centrist nature of voters and parties. I add a quantitative element to the observation that parties are centrist and the party system is moderate. In addition, I extend the literature by (d) offering a more distinctive argument that the ANC is neither left nor right but largely centrist, and is not an amorphous undefined political entity.

The following factors constitute the limitations of this study. First, this research is based on the assumption that parties can be positioned along a unidimensional left-right continuum, and voter positions on general and economic issues can also be identified in this manner. The downside of this is that by focusing on the economic dimension, I do not consider other left-right dimensions such as political, social and cultural — although not all issues are reducible to left-right terms. Second, a comprehensive assessment of social polarisation on non-ideological matters is not within the ambit of this research project. By restricting the analysis to the phenomenon of moderation, I consequently do not account for polarisation in broader society. Third, the absence of a representative, large-n research design implies that the ability of this research to contribute to broader hypothesised causes of polarisation is limited. It can only provide tentative arguments, dependent on the South African case, rather than robust generalisations.

1.6 Structure of the dissertation

This study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 begins with a schematic theoretical overview of the concept of polarisation. This includes a discussion about centre and pragmatic parties, extremist and ideological parties, and an explanation of the overall definition of moderation (low polarisation) adopted in this research. Then, I delineate the causes of polarisation and moderation as specified by
major theoretical schools. This encompasses the following perspectives: (a) fractionalisation (the number of parties), (b) institutionalist (electoral systems), (c) sociological (voters), and (d) parties (major parties). This is followed by a tabulation of the overall causal framework considered in this research.

Chapter 3 introduces the literature on the South African party system. This section outlines the skewed focus on the study of polarisation, possible origins for the deficiency, and issue-based politics. A discussion follows about the empirical paradox motivating this research. Lastly, it presents the scholarly argument about moderation in the South African party system; this includes a literature-based examination of the economic policy positions of the ANC, DA and EFF.

Chapter 4 focuses on the methodological platform of the analysis. Three broad areas constitute this section. First, I start by outlining the research question and subsidiary questions, and the aims and objectives of the research. I then discuss the basis of case selection and the causal logic employed, and outline theoretical hypotheses. Second, data collection methods and analysis techniques are discussed. This covers the interview, survey and document collection methods; and qualitative and quantitative analysis. Third, the systematic measure of party system fragmentation, voter and party system polarisation is examined. Here, I outline and justify selected formulae; and discuss the left-right and economic cleavage focus of this analysis.

The next three chapters form the data collection and analysis sections of this research. Chapter 5 examines fragmentation and electoral laws. It first discusses the apartheid plurality electoral system and then focuses attention on the main determinants that inform the transition to a proportional electoral system. Second, I focus on analysing the patterns of fragmentation in the democratic party system (1994 to 2014) and subsequently compare this with the period of white minority and apartheid rule (1910 to 1989). Here, I rely on the fragmentation measure to gauge the effective number of parties; the main purpose of this is to understand whether electoral laws influence the number of parties in the system. Third, I discuss party system polarisation in the democratic period. This includes a quantitative measure of individual party positions and a measure of party system polarisation. In this section I also link the findings to existing research. Finally, this section concludes with a critical analysis about whether fragmentation/electoral systems are connected with polarisation.

Chapter 6 deals with the electorate. It first sets out citizen self-placement on the ideological scale, discusses the left-centre-right distribution of general citizen preferences and the moderate-extremist character of the median voter. Second, I focus specifically on the left-right economic preferences of voters — this broadly includes privatisation and state ownership, income inequality and government intervention, responsibility for individual welfare, and property rights. Third, I attempt to map voter positions by identifying the left-right, moderate-polarised direction from the discussed data. Fourth, this is followed by a critical analysis of perceptions of party differences, policy voting, perceived most important issues, and the causes of non-ideological/non-policy voting. Lastly, I examine the element of social influence on the party system by correlating voter and party system polarisation. I also discuss how these findings fit into existing literature.

The final data analysis section, Chapter 7, considers the dominant party. I analyse macroeconomic policies of the ANC from 1994 to 2012; directional policy moves from left to right; centrist positioning of the ANC; the party’s relationship with the SACP (as the main ideological force within the ‘tripartite alliance’) and the basis of it (both historically and in the contemporary period); the ANC’s embrace of a hybrid economic model, including the statutory body NEDLAC, that encircles both labour and business; polarisation and the resurgence of the centre; and the ANC’s self-definition and non-ideological dynamism. This section concludes by discussing the ANC’s effects on the party system. All this assists in qualitatively determining the left-right, centrist-extremist position of the party.

Chapter 8 forms the conclusion of this analysis. It essentially presents a brief overview of the research project (including the purpose of the study, research question, objectives, problem identification and background, rationale, and research design); the principal finding of the study; sets outs the causes of moderation in the South African party system; and discusses implications of
the research for the literature and highlights points for future research. The main finding of this research is that both institutional factors and the electorate, although in some cases acting as influential agents, are not causes of moderation. Instead, constraining polarisation and stabilising moderation has more to do with the dominant party’s individual centrist orientation.
Chapter 2: Party System Polarisation: Definition and Causes

What is polarisation? How is party system polarisation different from generic notions of polarisation? What are the causes of polarised party systems? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by discussing the literature on party system polarisation. It essentially establishes the guiding theoretical framework upon which this study is based. First, I examine the meaning of party system polarisation and moderation, discussing centrist and pragmatic parties, and extremist and ideological parties. Second, I discuss the main theoretical causes attributed to the phenomenon. These include fractionalisation, electoral systems, voter preferences, and political parties.

2.1 Defining party system polarisation

Polarisation as a generic definition is a division of opinions, attitudes and preferences, where people and institutions are divided into opposing camps, each supporting a particular position on an issue. The extent to which groups are separated on fundamental issues in society reflects the level of polarisation: it signifies whether a society is polarised (high polarisation) or moderate (low polarisation). The term ‘polarisation’ is borrowed by the social and political sciences largely from the physical and natural sciences. In the latter fields, ‘polarisation’ comes from the term ‘polarity’ or ‘polarities’ which denotes a number of phenomena occurring at distinct ‘poles’.

In the social sciences, there are different areas in which one can study the phenomenon of polarisation. A distinction is made between political polarisation and social polarisation. Political polarisation refers to political institutions and actors such as parties and candidates; meanwhile, social polarisation refers to the belief systems of people in various social groups and deals with the degree of polarisation in the social world, leading to terms such as ‘racial polarisation’, ‘class polarisation’ or ‘ethnic polarisation’ (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007). Since political polarisation is relatively broad, referring to individual political actors (presidents or ministers) or political institutions (parliament, police, judiciary), party or party system polarisation, although sitting within political polarisation, makes specific reference to political parties within a two-party, multiparty or dominant party system (Pedersen, 1979). In the present research, I refer to this type of polarisation.

What, then, is ‘party system polarisation’? It refers to “the degree of ideological differentiation among political parties in a system”; that is, the policy distance that separates parties which determines how much polarisation there is in the party system (Dalton, 2008: 900, emphasis added; Bartolini and Mair, 2007). In political science, the study of polarisation embraces polarised and moderate polities. The degree of polarisation denotes whether a party system has a moderate or polarised ideological character. Main contributors to the concept define polarisation as ideological distance, as outlined below:

- Ideological polarisation exists when there is ideological distance instead of ideological proximity—where ideological distance refers to “the overall spread of the ideological spectrum of any given polity” (Sartori, 2005: 111).
- When polarisation exists, “parties will remain poles apart in ideology”—located at the extremes of the ideological space (Downs, 1957: 118).

Ideology denotes the opinions or policies of the political elite that centre around some core philosophical outlook such as liberalism or conservatism. Party system polarisation mainly focuses
upon programmatic differences between parties which relates to some ideological doctrine. Party system polarisation is not only the study of the ideological basis of parties and the party system but the ideological distance between parties. Ideological spread is most commonly interpreted and measured using the left-right political spectrum. Ware (1996) suggests that parties are not just ‘left’ or ‘right’ but there are varying degrees of ideological intensity between parties, such as far left or far right, and, knowing how far apart these parties are from each other indicates to what extent the system is polarised. The ideological basis forms a major part of understanding ideological distance between parties.

Polarisation usually involves the study of ‘relevant parties’, that is, the major competitors in the party system in terms of vote or seat share. This points to the power structure operating within the system. Thus, polarisation is the ideological separation amongst relevant parties (Sartori, 2005: 107). Considering parties who are relevant comes from the argument that only parties with significant vote or seat share can command change in the ideological balance of the party system, making minor parties somewhat irrelevant and the study of the major parties’ position-taking highly appropriate to gauge the nature of the party system.

Characterising an entire party system as either moderate or polarised is considered acceptable practice. While individual parties take on particular ideological positions, which can either be centrist or extremist, when major parties are clustered on one side of the political spectrum, such as the centre-right or far right, the party system is regarded as moderate. In brief, ideological positions of parties and their relative strength indicate the degree of polarisation in the whole party system, and therefore, the degree of polarisation clearly shows whether the party system is more inclined towards moderation or polarisation. The centre or extremist position of each major party attributes a particular character to the party system.

In general, there are two types of party systems based on the ideological criterion: moderate and polarised systems. A moderate system is one where relevant parties are structured around the centre of the ideological spectrum and are not poles apart in their ideology; meanwhile, a polarised system is one in which the programmatic positions of relevant parties are very far apart (Kitschelt et al, 2010: 17). There are however two distinct parts to this: scholars like Sartori associate moderation with the centre, while those like Dalton (2008) take it to mean occupation of one ideological bloc. First, systems demonstrating low polarisation or moderation are characterised by ‘centripetal’ competition where major parties compete for the centre of the ideological spectrum, and systems that are polarised reflect ‘centrifugal’ competition where major parties are centre-fleeing and compete for the political extremes (Sartori, 1976).

Second, low polarisation does not necessarily signify centripetal competition since when all parties occupy the same side of the spectrum, polarisation is low. This means that relevant parties could be located at one extremity and the system is considered minimally polarised precisely because there is little competition between two extremes. Thus, moderate systems mean relevant parties occupy one side of the spectrum, whether the centre or extremist space. High polarisation is less confusing as it simply occurs when parties are poles apart on the ideological continuum. Evidence of polarisation can be seen when parties move further apart and diverge in their ideologies and take up clearly distinct and opposite positions, resulting in “sharper divisions and more intense conflicts” between parties (Hetherington, 2009: 413). Clustering towards the ideological poles implies that the political centre becomes a wasteland (Hetherington, 2009).

The definition of party system polarisation, then, encompasses four main notions: (a) Difference: the dissimilarity and distance between parties in their ideologies, policies or programmes—assuming that political parties take stands or positions on societal issues that can be located on a traditional left-right ideological spectrum; and that no matter how similar parties are, some difference can be deduced albeit how minimal that might be (the study of ideological difference). (b) Relevance: considering parties that are relevant in terms of the power structure of the party system, in vote or seat share, such competitors can either gain sufficient seats to govern alone or act as a coalition in government (the study of relevant parties). (c) Direction: parties take a particular position on issues that follow a distinct direction; in ideological terms it falls within a left-right
scale. Parties can either espouse a more leftwing or rightwing orientation in their policy outlook (the study of left-right direction). (d) **Strength:** while parties can be identified on the left-right, they also assume a particular degree of ‘intensity’ on their positions; this can be centre or radical, moderate or extreme (the study of polarities) (Sartori, 1976). Establishing these features indicate how much the party system is polarised.

This study attempts to formulate a systematic definition of polarisation and moderation by coupling the above analysis with the centrism-extremism and pragmatic-ideological characterisation of parties. It is important to note that although I employ the common definition of polarisation, as the level of ideological differentiation amongst relevant parties, I connect it to general party features. Sartori (1976) was one of the pioneers to systematically examine features of polarised and moderate systems. Although his analysis mainly establishes features for polarised party systems, I add to some of the components he described for moderate systems by linking it to general party literature. What is lacking in polarisation literature is a more systematic attempt to define the features of moderate party systems. I do not claim that this is a novel contribution but it does attempt to offer a more formal definitional analysis of polarisation and moderation which goes beyond the general definitional use of the term as the degree of ideological distance between parties. By drawing broadly from party system literature, I examine the role of (a) the centre and pragmatic parties, and (b) the extreme and ideological parties. In so doing, the following section seeks to connect literature on the ideological dimension of parties to the concept of polarisation and moderation.

### 2.1.1 The centre and moderation

Moderation is observed by the movement of parties closer to centrist or moderate ground (Nice, 1984). Centre-based parties share a critical similarity, which is distinguishable from non-centrist or extremist parties: moderation (Hazan, 1997; Keman, 1994). A widespread view of the political ‘centre’ describes it as an ideological position of moderation, in comparison to the political ‘extreme’ which represents more radical positions along some political spectrum such as the far left or far right (Wagner, 2012; Cox, 1990). Duverger (1954: 215, emphasis added) describes the centre as a “geometrical spot at which the moderates of opposed tendencies meet: moderates of the Right and moderates of the Left”. The centre, then, is thought to lie between fundamental political alternatives (Scully, 1992). To be clear, I employ a definition of the centre as directly opposed to extremes. I am not referring to a concept of the centre as a relative point somewhere between, for instance, two far right parties — this is a generic point and not directly linked to discussions about ‘moderation’ and ‘extremism’. In other words, a more conventional definition of the centre, especially within polarisation studies, is understood as a moderating point between political extremes. This means that while there may be less of an ‘objective centre’ party, the centre is not simply a relative position but has a degree of conceptual sturdiness to stand on its own.

When the main parties are centrist, such parties avoid taking up ‘clear-water’ or distinct policies but closely resemble each other on fundamental issues (Downs, 1957). Downs argues that resemblance of party positions does not mean that parties are identical but indicates that they are less programmatic and ideological and are oriented toward more pragmatic politics.

Sartori (1976: 134) states that the centre or centripetal drives “are precisely the moderating drives”. Daalder (2011: 160, 148) and Scully (1992) say that centre parties play a ‘mediating role’. A strong centre party does not offset convergence or discourage centrality; centre parties use counter-polarisation tactics and adopt centripetal tendencies, not allowing other parties to assume the same position, thus thwarting any gains made by the extreme poles (Hazan, 1997). Moreover, when the centre party successfully combats centrifugal competition and remains firmly in the centre, extremist competitors recognise that there is little role for them outside of the centre party (Green-Pedersen, 2004). This process results in the system being moderated by the centre.
Scully (1992: 11) makes an important differentiation between a ‘positional centre’ and a ‘programmatic centre’ where the former leads to moderation and the latter, only makes a minuscule contribution to moderation given its emphasis on doctrinal ‘centrist’ positions. He argues,

A positional center party is one that takes an intermediate, compromise position with respect to the extreme poles along the predominant axis of political conflict. Its leadership is motivated primarily toward the goal of gaining access to the state and maintaining power. In contrast, a programmatic center party is substantively committed to a specific set of policies and a particular outcome along the principal axis of cleavage on which it is unwilling or unable to compromise. Its leaders are primarily interested in using the state to reach specific programmatic goals.

It is a distinction between vote-seeking centrist parties and ideological centrist parties. The latter means centre parties are far from devoid of a clear ideological stand. It is not a mere amalgamation of left-right views. This description argues against the view that depicts the centre as an amorphous entity, continuously squeezed and torn asunder by the left and right centrifugal forces, as advanced by Duverger (1954) (Scully, 1992; Hazan, 1997).

Not all centre parties produce a moderate system. Ideological centrist parties are seen by some as harmful to the party system, much like non-centrist, extremist parties. Using the case of the Christian Democrats in Chile in the 1950s, Scully (1992) argues that this party, acting as an ideologically-based centre party, rejected the views of the left and right and proposed its own way and was unwilling to cooperate and arbitrate between opposite poles. This rigidity, he argues, led to the failure to hold the extremes together and contributed to the polarisation and paralysis of Chilean politics in the 1960s and 1970s, which in the end saw a military coup in 1973.

The main assumption is that centrist parties that advocate a left-right policy mix are more flexible than those who articulate a distinct centrist doctrine; the latter are seen as holding fast to doctrines and unwilling to compromise. Thus, the presence of a ‘centre party’ does not automatically contribute to moderation in the party system.

By contrast, vote-seeking centrist parties who are less committed to some ideological position have a predominantly “temperate, consensus-oriented” nature; they act as “broker[s] between the extremes to hold the party system together” (Hazan, 1997: 166; Scully, 1992: 9). This makes the system relatively non-extremist and moderate (Coppedge, 1998). The presence of a non-programmatic centre in plural societies, with deep social and cultural cleavages, enables political stability (Scully, 1992). In societies that are highly segmented, “government proceeds by Proporz, a deliberate depolarization of issues” (Daalder, 1984: 101). This perspective says that “there is a logical force working for moderation in electoral competition” (Daalder, 1984: 95).

Literature reflects another conditional aspect on the centre: the physical occupation of the centre. Sartori (1976) predicts that the existence of a centre impinge on polarisation and centrifugal tendencies — referring to ‘moderate-induced’ polarisation (Hazan, 1997: 158). For Sartori (2005: 119, 312), when “the central area of the political system is out of competition”, the existence of a centre party, it “discourages centrality, i.e., the centripetal drives of the political system”; this is because the “the leverage acquired by a centre pole” encourages greater competition from extremist parties. This, however, occurs when there are diametrically opposed extremes (polariised systems) and also an occupied centre, especially given a dominant centrist party. When the centre area is occupied, there is little competition for it and parties are forced to compete for the extremes. Moreover, Sartori’s logic says that a centre party that seeks to outdo left–right competitors by capturing their voters, through the politicisation of voter fears related to the presence of extremist parties, and further occupy the centre space, will contribute to centrifugal competition, forcing its opponents to move further out towards the extremes. As this process occurs, the extremists try to attack and squeeze the centre party, leaving the latter to respond with increased attacks on the extremes. Nagel and Wlezien (2010: 303) argue that an occupied centre “is the main source of perverse and counter-productive effects” as the left and right try to squeeze out the centre. This
dynamic competition between the centre and the extremes is believed to increase polarisation in the party system; it becomes more radical as parties capitalise on increased political dissension.

This view of centre-induced polarisation is widely criticised. Scholars like Maor (1997), Daalder (2011: 160) and Scully (1992: 8) argue that as long as there are votes in the political centre, parties should go after these votes and employ “centripetal electoral tactics”. In such contexts, there is no compelling reason why centrist or non-centrist parties should not invariably occupy the centre if there are indeed centre electoral tastes. Daalder (1984) shows that in the case of Italy and Netherlands, left and right parties compete for the centre and this contributes to centripetal drives. More importantly, under conditions of a ‘pivotal centre party’—a ‘pivotal’ party according to Keman (1994) is a relevant party in terms of vote or seat share such as a dominant party—the occupation of the centre will have a strong centripetal effect. Since the centre party is strong in electoral terms, forming a majority either to the left or to the right of it is unrealistic. This pushes office-seeking parties on a coalitional path which moderates these parties (Green-Pedersen, 2004: 324; Arter, 2015). In summation, this school posits that the presence of centrist voters encourage vote-seeking parties to compete for these voters, and the presence of a pivotal centrist party encourages opposition parties to enter into coalition with it; consequently adding to moderation of the party system despite the occupation of the centre.

A moderate system, then, can be seen as a condition that reflects a unimodal distribution where parties occupy the centre political space, merging left-right views or taking a distinct centrist doctrine, and importantly, are willing to comprise with diverse segments. When major parties are clustered in the centre there is less ideological distance in the system and the extreme poles are usually competition ground for minor parties.

2.1.2 Ideological versus pragmatic parties

The fundamental characteristic of polarisation in party systems can be interpreted using the ‘ideological-pragmatic’ continuum which is a way to see whether parties are more or less ideological and to establish the general saliency of ideology in the party system (Almond, 1960; LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Wright, 1967; Blondel, 1969; Sartori, 1976). ‘Ideology’ and ‘pragmatism’ can be defined in contrast to each other. According to Sartori (2005: 69), the ‘ideological continuum’ “goes from the extreme of ideological fanaticism and future-oriented principledness to the opposite extreme of sheer practicalism and pragmatism”. Each category is composed of unique characteristics and political styles, making an ideological party clearly distinct from a pragmatic party. The latter resembles much of the vote-seeking centre party.

Verba (1965) expands on this and argues that a distinction can be made between open-closed, implicit-explicit and expressive-instrumental political beliefs. On the one hand, open, implicit and instrumental political beliefs characterise a pragmatic political style because it generates compromise and bargaining, flexible political values where such values are open to question, encourages the conduct of loose political activity without continuous reference to ideology, and defines politics as a process rather than an achievement of a specific end. On the other hand, closed, explicit and expressive political beliefs denote an ideological political style because it reflects rigidity, unquestionable political values, high ideological competition where policies are discredited and labelled in accordance with ideological precepts, and politics becomes a means to some predetermined end—as such “great political inflexibility” exists within this system (Verba, 1965: 544-9).

Adding to this, Blondel (1969: 70-6, 79–84, 103–11) defines a pragmatic party as more ‘bargaining-oriented’. While it is “not a goal-oriented party aiming at a novel state of mankind”, an ideological party is ‘value-oriented’, engaging in “imposed development” dictated by a particular future vision of politics and society. Sartori (2005: 154, 199, emphasis added) states that pragmatic systems can be described as least ideological: it “is nothing but a state of low affect, of low
temperature of ideologism”; in ideological polities by contrast, “words are weapons, and inflationary wordings play a major role in shaping the course of the polarised systems”. The general picture is that the more politics abides by ideologically-based goal-setting, it is heading towards polarisation whereas bargaining-based politics paves the road for moderation.

Pragmatic parties may actually engage in a “drastic reduction of the party’s ideological baggage”, due to (a) a low degree of ideological cohesiveness, leaving the party with an ambiguous ideological character that is attuned to ‘natural’ than ‘imposed’ development and subject to modification; and (b) greater political and social pluralism, and flexibility, making the organisational character of these parties open to sub-group autonomy, possessing absorptive than exclusionary tendencies, and where the party-in-the-electorate focuses upon social inclusion (Kirchheimer, 1966: 190; Sartori, 2005: 201-2; Blondel, 1969). One crucial aspect missing from this description of the pragmatic party is (c) its vote-seeking motivations. Pragmatic parties share close resemblance with the ‘catch-all’ party. Kirchheimer (1966), who coined the concept and argued that Western European parties were transforming from mass-based to catch-all parties, described the catch-all party as highly skilful in gaining votes and winning elections. This is because it deemphasises a specific social class in favour of securing access to a variety of interest groups and recruiting voters at large (Kirchheimer, 1966: 190).

So, given its broad-based appeal and social inclusion strategies, catch-all parties perform as electoral machines. Wolinetz (2002: 146) and Gunther and Diamond (2003: 184-5) sum it up by describing catch-all parties as “pluralistic and tolerant”; these parties espouse an “overwhelmingly electoral orientation” and are “highly opportunistic [and] vote-seeking” — their overriding purpose is to maximise votes, win elections and govern” by aggregating a wide variety of social interests. Thus, if parties demonstrate that their aim is “to win the votes of as many voter groups as possible and to represent their interests in the state” and show that “[p]olitics is more a matter of getting the best possible out of a given situation than of stubbornly sticking to principles”, the party has a pragmatic political style (Wright, 1967: 386).

Given the state of a reduction in ‘ideological baggage’ and low ideological cohesiveness, (d) party competition occurs around non-policy issues. Actions of the leadership are “judged from the viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system rather than identification with the goals of their particular organization” (Kirchheimer, 1966: 190). Party performance and effectiveness is one aspect in the equation. Bland ideology importantly translates into parties emphasising the personal attributes of their leaders, years of experience, historical legacy or other non-policy issues. This implies that there is a lack of intense ideologically-based inter-party competition, where words are based more on non-policy than ideological matters.

Contrary to Kirchheimer (1966), there might not be a drastic reduction of the pragmatic party’s ideological history or its mass membership base. In fact, the pragmatic party may possess a clear ideological direction, have a distinct programmatic orientation and retain a mass-based focus but the nature of the party’s competition, its expression of policies, its public declarations, its belief systems and outreach to a variety of social segments may neither revolve around strict adherence to an ideological vision or programmatic commitment nor dedication to an unchanging social support base. Particularly on the area of ideology, although pragmatic parties are not absent of ideological parameters and a distinct vision of society, strict devotion to ideology is less valued than immediate political and social compromises and electoral gains. This would imply some form of incoherent ideology since the catch-all party may say one thing in one phase of government and another thing in some other phase — such variability demonstrates its non-ideological commitment.

Ideological parties are far from being ideologically unambitious; instead, ideology is prime and hegemonic, and policies and programmes are clearly defined and articulated. An ideological party is (a) a ‘principled’ party in which ideology is salient, where there is a general unwillingness amongst party elites to compromise on party principles and more adherence to party goals irrespective of electoral consequences. Wright (1967: 386) puts it that if elites explicitly show evidence that their party “should always stand fast to its goals and principles, even if this should lead to a loss of votes”, it is an ideological party. Whereas pragmatic parties are less ideologically rigid and defeat
challengers through flexibility by being willing to move or extend its ideological position to that of its challenger, ideological parties are so strict that it is difficult to move across the political space and there could be severe consequences (such as electoral losses and intra-party tensions) if it does choose to assume another space (Kollman et al, 1992: 932).

Programmatic parties resemble the ideological party since they have a “distinct, consistent and coherent programmatic or ideological agenda”, incorporate those appeals in its electoral campaigns and in the legislature, and engage in sharper definitions of party platform (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 187). Programmatic proposals tend to align to a political doctrine or a mix of views about the social. This does not necessarily mean that such parties are highly ideological. Ideological parties follow a more strict trajectory: they are guided by a coherent set of policy proposals and a commitment to political action.

In addition, programmatic parties have (b) a more limited social and organisational basis of party support. Given the emphasis on policy and programme, these parties seek to mobilise a core constituency rather than to enlarge their support across the preference spectrum, and intra-party composition is usually homogenous — there is little or no room within the party for variance in norms and party policy (Wright, 1967). Winning elections is a rather secondary though not insignificant focus: the main concern is to win elections “with a [voter positional] platform that is spatially close to their ideal [policy] platform” and to pursue programmatic and ideological goals optimally (Kollman et al, 1992: 931). Put differently, voter ideology should match party ideology.

(c) Systems with a strong culture of inter-party policy distinctions tend to experience higher ideological contestation. Inter-party competition is centred upon winning programmes, alternative proposals, and ideologically-directed policy implementation. Parties challenge each other by picking upon political perspectives and the virtues and limits of specific positions. Leadership charisma, party legacy and performance may be somewhat irrelevant, considering the hegemony of doctrines, ideas and ideology. To use Sartori’s (2005: 199) phrase in the opposite, systems with ideological parties are a state of high affect, of high temperature of ideologism.

Thus, the trajectory of party platforms and vision can be classified as pragmatic or ideological. We can deduce that a pragmatic political style is inherent in catch-all parties who seek ideological flexibility and natural development rather than strict adherence to an ideological course, prioritise vote-seeking motivations; and employ political strategies based on pluralism, compromise and bargaining, and non-policy platforms. Ideological parties are best described as programmatic, value-oriented and ideologically rigid, who are unwilling to compromise and bargain on matters relating to party political beliefs; use politics as a means to a predetermined and imposed end; appeal to a select social segment who endorse the party’s ideological proposals rather than broad-based, all-embracing social support; are outwardly expressive and articulate about policy and programmes; and the chief strategy is to discredit opponents on matters of ideology and policy.

2.1.3 Overall definition

From the definitional exploration in this section, the meaning taken in this research of the two concepts is illustrated in Table 2.1. It is clear from the analysis that the features of moderation seem more complicated than polarisation. On the one hand there is a kind of ‘centrist moderation’, dominated by centripetal drives and centre-occupation. On the other hand there is ‘extremist moderation’ (although this is a contradiction of terms), represented by major parties occupying the same side of the extremist spectrum such as far right or far left. In both cases there is ‘moderation’ or low polarisation but it is clear that the direction and strength is ambiguous: it can be centrist or extremist. In this research, I employ both the approach to low polarisation as (a) the presence of major centre-based, pragmatic parties, and (b) major parties occupying the same side of the ideological spectrum (left or right).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General definition</th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Polarisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological difference</td>
<td>Major parties coalesce at the centre or any one side of the political spectrum and are not apart on the ideological spectrum.</td>
<td>Major parties are far apart in their policies and ideology and gravitate toward the extremes, such as far left and far right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party motivation</td>
<td>Vote-seeking and maintains a pragmatic political style; priority is upon appealing to broad social segments to gain votes. In this way, parties assume a catch-all nature; immediate focus is placed on gaining votes and members are preoccupied with strategies to be in or maintain government.</td>
<td>Policy-seeking and maintains a programmatic political style; focus is upon ideological principles. This makes the party narrow in its social support base; ideology comes before electoral victories and members are willing to bear the consequence of being out of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and intra-party base</td>
<td>Appeals to a variety of interests and groups, focuses on social pluralism and expanding its support base; has a ideologically heterogeneous and hybrid intra-party composition, and attracts other parties in coalition.</td>
<td>Less diverse social support base, appeals to a narrow constituency, is apathetic towards social pluralism, has a ideologically homogenous intra-party composition, and is unwilling to coalesce with other parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction of electoral competition</td>
<td>Centre-seeking, non-extremist oriented: Centripetal inter-party competitive dynamics forms the dominant electoral strategy, and parties vie for power by competing for the centre of the ideological spectrum.</td>
<td>Extremist-seeking, centre-fleeing: Centrifugal inter-party competitive dynamics forms the dominant electoral strategy, and parties vie for power by competing for the political extremes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy articulation</td>
<td>Parties take up similar positions which are centrist (a mix of left-right positions or some distinct centrist ideology).</td>
<td>Parties assume clear and distinct positions, which are often radical and empowered by a future vision of politics and society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological nature and political style</td>
<td>Flexibility: no strict commitment to programmatic or ideological ends, willing to compromise with diverse ideological segments. Incoherent: positions are ambiguous given varied ideological positions.</td>
<td>Rigidity: fixed on certain political values, unwilling to compromise on ideological principles. Coherence: coherent positions that rarely undergo variation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-party competition</td>
<td>Competition mainly on non-policy matters: party effectiveness, leadership personality, party experience and party history.</td>
<td>Ideologically-based conflict, sharp definition of party platforms, opponents strongly attacked based upon doctrines and policy alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological power balance</td>
<td>Success of centrist parties: the centre area is a common space that is highly sought after and is the hegemonic ideological bloc in the system. There is a unimodal distribution structure since parties take up less distinct positions making it absent of a bimodal or polymodal structure.</td>
<td>Success of extremist parties: the extremes are a common space that is highly fought for. A bimodal type of party distribution exists as major parties are on either side of the ideological spectrum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2 Causes of polarisation

One perplexing issue is the significant variations that exist in the patterns of polarisation even though party systems exist in the same geographical region and the level of fragmentation is similar (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007). The other concerning matter is the increasing polarisation in what was initially thought of as moderate-inducing electoral systems because of its two-party, plurality feature (Hare and Poole, 2014; Hetherington, 2009). Such developments heightened interest in the examination of the determinants of polarisation. The causal conditions behind distinct political outcomes, both nationally or across party systems, have become a pertinent object of research enquiry where the aim is to provide systematic explanations for the origins of polarisation. Guiding research questions on this matter ask what drives polarisation, why some party systems moderate and others polarised, and what explains periods of polarisation and depolarisation in party systems.

Various propositions have been put forward to explain the phenomena. To be sure, the study of causes behind highly polarised systems receive more attention than the causal dynamics behind moderate systems. This is because much of polarisation literature emerges from highly polarised contexts like America. Polarisation is often thought to have much more negative effects than moderate systems.

Causal explanations have, however, been put forward for moderation, albeit, not to the same extent as polarisation. Once causal variables have been identified, scholars debate the utility of a comprehensive approach to party system polarisation. Some argue that one determinant is sufficient to account for patterns of polarisation. Others posit that a single factor is insufficient, “a larger menu of potential explanatory variables should be considered” to better understand the determinants of polarisation (Curini and Hino, 2012: 462). Party polarisation has numerous causes. This section examines four main theoretical perspectives: fractionalisation, electoral systems, the sociological, and political parties.

2.2.1 Fractionalisation perspective

Party system fractionalisation refers to the counting of the number of parties in a party system. This is one of the most widely examined properties of the party system particularly since the popularisation of this method by Duverger (1954). This is not simply the counting of all the parties in the system but considering the ‘effective number of parties’, that is, the relevant parties in the party system—the “effective number of parties weights the number of parties by their size, so that small parties count less than large parties” (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Laakso and Taagepera, 1979; Dalton and Anderson, 2011: 11). Positing that the number of parties affect the level of party system polarisation, this approach associates polarisation with a large number of parties and moderation with a small number of parties.

Sartori’s (1976) analysis is firmly embedded in this approach. For Sartori, a small number of parties or ‘limited pluralism’ leads to moderation where parties converge to the centre; by contrast, a large number of parties or ‘extreme pluralism’ follows polarisation where parties spread across the ideological spectrum. Downs’ (1957) articulated this idea when he argued that more parties create more room for polarisation as parties try to distinguish themselves from each other to win votes, whereas less parties tend compete for the median voter rather than specific constituencies, and in trying to compete for broad-based support, parties become centrist and moderate. For both Downs and Sartori, two-party systems and systems with fewer than five parties reflect moderation and multiparty systems or systems with more than five parties reflect polarisation.

Fractionalisation is criticised for being an insufficient explanatory theory of party polarisation. Empirical investigations contradict the theoretical assumptions made by Sartori and Downs. Many scholars disagree with the conceptualisation that party fractionalisation causes party polarisation. For instance, Sefteriades (1986), in analysing the Greek party system, shows that the party system
has a small number of parties but is highly polarised. Seferiades attributes polarisation to factors other than the number of parties, such as the presence of extremist factions. In the Brazilian case, the party system has a large number of parties but modest levels of polarisation (Dalton and Anderson, 2011). Similarly, for other scholars, polarisation does not depend on and is not significantly related to the number of legislative parties but can be studied independently (Dalton, 2008; Dalton and Anderson, 2011; Wang, 2014). Empirical research by Wang (2014) finds that low polarisation can be found in highly fragmented party systems and high polarisation can be found in non-fragmented systems. Thus, the relationship between fractionalisation and polarisation is not straightforward.

The discussion on party system fractionalisation is closely related to electoral systems, since some argue that electoral systems actually determine the level of fractionalisation within party systems. To be sure, however, some scholars do not associate party system fractionalisation with electoral systems, but argue that the increase or decrease in the number of parties in a party system is due to sociological variables, mainly salient political cleavages within society. Essentially, what influences the number of parties in the system is heavily debated: schools are divided between the institutionalist approach and the sociological approach. Within party system polarisation literature, electoral systems gain arguably more prominence as a causal factor behind polarisation levels than party system fractionalisation on its own. This school makes an explicit linkage between electoral systems and fractionalisation, seeing both variables as inextricable.

2.2.2 Institutionalist perspective

Polarisation is argued to be a consequence of political institutions that is more specifically identified with electoral systems. Plurality and proportional electoral systems are grouped as the two major types of systems and each is believed to affect patterns of polarisation, leading to different outcomes. Forming what is known as the institutionalist approach of party systems, this school holds that electoral laws influence the number of parties in a party system, where the number of parties in turn determine the representation of social cleavages and preferences, which resultantly affects the degree of polarisation in the party system. To recapitulate, electoral systems and party fractionalisation are interrelated but are also importantly distinct—a plurality system can have more than two parties and a proportional system can have two parties. In general, however, electoral systems are argued to control the number of parties in a party system. Popularised by Duverger (1954) and became known as ‘Duverger’s law’, this school posits that plurality systems reflect two-party systems whereas proportional systems reflect multiparty systems (Riker, 1976). The theory of electoral systems became highly influential amongst many scholars who began to argue that electoral laws correlate with various negative and positive political dynamics, within party systems and the democratic regime in general (Rae, 1971; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1994; Cox, 1997).

The number of parties in the system is considered a strong element behind ideological position-taking. Electoral rules structure parties’ position-taking opportunities which are either moderate or extreme. In proportional systems, polarisation is more likely since such electoral rules provide incentives for parties to take extremist positions. By contrast, in plurality systems or non-proportional systems, parties have an incentive to converge to the centre. This addition of party position-taking being affected by electoral rules largely developed out of the work of Downs (1957: 115) who amplified Duverger’s ideas, arguing that in two-party systems, parties “deliberately change their platforms so that they resemble one another; whereas parties in a multi-party system try to remain as ideologically distinct from each other as possible.”

The winner-takes-all outcome of a plurality electoral structure tends to narrow the field to two competing parties, thus “the usual two-party pressure to converge”, as parties try to draw support from voters of all classes, interests and segments (Downs, 1957: 128; Key, 1942: 224-231). On the
other hand, where proportional representation exists, “the minimum amount of support necessary to keep a party going is much smaller than in a plurality system; so a multiparty system is encouraged” (Downs, 1957: 124). Parties need to win only a small percentage of the total vote and may succeed in placing some of their members in government; because of these electoral rules, parties are not pressurised to appeal to a wide range of voters and viewpoints. Downs (1957: 134) states that “any attempt to widen it [support base] soon causes a collision with another party”, where “no party in a multiparty system has much incentive to spread out” but the only incentive remains to challenge each other ideologically. Thus, Downs (1957: 126-7, 138) says parties in multiparty systems “will strive to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other and maintain the purity of their positions” and as such “differentiate their platforms more sharply”. Sartori (1976) follows this line of logic and posits that the more parties in a system, the more extremist or centrifugal patterns the system displays. Plurality systems, then, mitigate polarisation whereas proportional systems foster it.

Empirical investigations have since tested this theory. The argument that proportional-fragmented systems are more polarised than plurality-unfragmented is faced with contradictory empirical evidence. On the one hand, it is shown that, as predicted by theoretical claims, proportional systems actually produce extremist clustering by supporting greater ideological dispersion, while plurality systems encourage moderate and centrist clustering (Dow, 2010). On the other hand, some find neither a connection between proportional systems and extremist positioning nor a clear relationship between plurality systems and moderate positioning (Grofman, 2004; Ezrow, 2008; Dalton, 2008). The latter group of scholars argue that there is no evidence that extremism increases under proportional systems; such systems do not necessarily foster extremist policy, and little evidence suggests that it increases with an increase in the number of parties. Ezrow (2008: 480) finds that proportional systems “may actually motivate greater policy moderation by political parties”. There are periods where plurality systems experience dispersion and where proportional systems experience moderation. Cases like the US, which is a plurality system, reflects high polarisation: parties take ideologically distinct positions across the entire ideological spectrum; in the British plurality system, polarisation actually increased under Thatcher; and other cases such as Philippines, Peru and Mexico, all proportional systems, indicate moderate polarisation (Dalton, 2008; Ezrow, 2010; Paddock, 1992).

Hence, even plurality systems show signs of polarisation and extremist positioning, and proportional systems show signs of depolarisation and centrist clustering. The empirical cases “point to difficulties that arise when generalising about the effects of electoral systems on party positioning. Electoral rules have remained constant, but average party extremism has changed dramatically” (Ezrow, 2010: 452). In other words, although electoral systems are constant, polarisation levels vary (Dalton, 2008). The latter line of thought is becoming highly influential amongst party system scholars and the classical theoretical argument is gradually diluting and becoming less popular.

In the face of such contradictory findings, one must conclude that there is no necessary connection between electoral systems and ideological polarisation and neither is party fractionalisation a sufficient indicator (Ezrow, 2010). The long-held assumption that electoral institutions shape party systems can no longer be simplistically applied; empirical evidence suggests that the effects of electoral institutions on political outcomes remain at best complex. There is no clear causal relation between electoral systems, fractionalisation and polarisation. Thus, we are directed to alternative explanations for the causes of polarisation and moderation.

2.2.3 Sociological perspective

Non-institutional approaches to polarisation and moderation emphasise the importance of electoral preference distribution in affecting the degree of party system polarisation—this is the sociological,
The particular composition of voter preferences, a variable outside and independent of direct political institutions, is believed to affect party position-taking, patterns of party competition and party system polarisation. “Popular accounts increasingly suggest that increases in party polarisation reflect a growing polarisation of the broader society” (Layman et al, 2006: 93). That is, when voters are poles apart on salient issues, major parties also tend to adopt dissimilar and radical positions. The sociological account draws on the work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) who puts forward that party systems mirror social cleavages since voter preferences determine party policies. Briefly put, this approach argues that party system (political-elite level) polarisation and moderation is, by and large, influenced by social conditions, particularly the preferences and issue preoccupations of the electorate (social-voter level).

Scholars like Jacobson (2003) argue that there is a close connection between voter ideology and party ideology. According to this theory, parties that are or become left, right, liberal or conservative—or any other ideologically-relevant cleavage category—have causal roots that can be traced to a particular constituency or segment of society. In this perspective, parties have traditionally been seen as responding to and rarely shaping social tensions and voter preferences (Seferiades, 1986). Advancing the view of ‘parties as dependent actors’ that are deeply rooted in their social base, the sociological perspective argues that “parties are subject to the whims of the electorate and are largely dependent on voters for their survival; parties have only a minimal independent role to play” (Loomes, 2012: 5-6). Alternatively put, parties are agents of specific social groups rather than autonomous actors and play a passive rather than active role in positional determination; in this way, parties shift their ideology or policy platforms in response to voter preferences (Adams et al, 2004).

Some scenarios indicate this relationship. On the one side, a majority who prefer moderate to an extremist positions will influence parties to move toward the centre. Also, if there is a considerable portion of voters at any one side of the spectrum, major parties will converge to that side, making the system moderate (given that this might be on the extremist bloc, it is considered moderate because competition between the extremes are absent). On the other side, if voters are equally divided along the extremes, parties will vacate the centre and seek to represent this social division, thus the party system will reflect polarisation.

Voter motivations and preoccupations about politics play a major role in the nature and development of mass opinion. The study of the ideological nature of the electorate is usually divided into two broad categories. Voters might be motivated by (a) ideological and policy-based issues, where they demonstrate left-right, liberal-conservative, democratic-authoritarian positional orientations on salient matters in society; or (b) non-policy factors like social demographics (race, income, religion, language, education), party image (representation, trust, confidence), government performance (retrospective and future), elite characteristics (demographics or charisma of candidates), and partisanship (closeness to parties) (Curini and Hino, 2012). This assists in determining whether mass opinion falls within an ideological or non-ideological, and subsequently moderate or polarised, category. Each determinant has a different effect on the party system. It is believed that when policy and ideological issues inform how voters cast their ballots, the party system is polarised; by contrast, when voters are preoccupied with matters other than policy and ideology, the party system is moderate (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007). In the end, the nature of the voter spectrum has an important say in the positions and issues parties choose to politicise and assume, contributing to the parallel development of the overall ideological character of the party system.

In general, the sociological perspective, although offering a causal variable to party system polarisation, has two main problems. First, mass opinion does not necessarily underlie or affect political polarisation (Layman et al, 2006; Hetherington, 2009). There is a debate about which came first: mass or elite polarisation. Scholars like Jacobson (2000: 26) argue that the relationship between mass and elite polarisation “is inherently interactive”. Others are however of the view that elite polarisation usually causes changes in mass opinion, since parties are actively engaged in shaping voter preferences, but changes in mass opinion rarely affect elite polarisation. On the latter point, Hetherington (2009: 422) suggests that “changes on the mass level are best thought of as
reinforcing changes on the elite level rather than causing it”. In other terms, elites are more influential in determining party system polarisation than the social. The argument that mass opinion does not affect polarisation to a significant extent comes from the belief that parties actually create and impose on social tensions. Factors such as inter-party competition or other emanating from the non-social context determine the intensity parties attach to social issues rather than mass opinion (Seferiades, 1986).

Second, on the point that increasing polarisation at the mass level causes party system polarisation, in the first place there appears to be little supporting evidence for the idea that the electorate is becoming increasingly polarised. Though elite polarisation may in fact increase, it is not necessary that mass polarisation will undergo the same process. Voters are actually seen as taking moderate positions in many democracies, both established and young (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007; Hetherington, 2009).

Scholars of democratic theory point to a concerning representation gap, which is an electoral disconnect between the average voter position and the positions of major parties. Ideological congruence, as predicted by Downs who argues that parties will converge to the position of the median voter (also known as the ‘proximity model’), does not stand when there is a gap between voters and their representatives (Powell, 2009). In some cases voters are near the centre and prefer a mix of left-right issues but major parties are more toward the extremes (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007). Put differently, the social exhibits more moderation than is naturally assumed.

In conclusion, the movement to one or another side of the politico-ideological spectrum is considered a given; parties inevitability respond to and are at the mercy of mass opinion. However, it appears that position-taking decisions rest with parties. Elite influence, social moderation and the representation gap directly challenge the sociological perspective that elevates voter influence on the party system. It implies that parties and political elites are making decisions that are independent of mass opinion, hence voters have less of an overriding influence. So, evolution or constancy in mass opinion does not automatically translate into evolution or constancy in party positions. From the problematisation of the sociological view, it is expected that a positive linear relationship between (a) voter and party ideology and (b) voter polarisation and party system polarisation is unlikely.

### 2.2.4 Party-centric perspective

While the critique of the sociological approach gives credit to parties, causal propositions emanating from the theory of party system fractionalisation and electoral systems ignore the role played by parties. Individual parties are formative in the polarisation process. The ‘party-centric’ view of polarisation posits that parties and their leaders matter, chiefly because they form a major component in the decision-making matrix; how they compete (centre or radical drives) and what they choose to emphasise (left-right ideological or pragmatic issues) impacts the party system (Blais, 2011; Loomes, 2012: 1). Parties are viewed as independent forces in the process of party system change, including polarisation, where parties can initiate or hinder change, essentially “moulding the environments in which they compete” (Smith, 1989: 355; Mair, 1993: 130; Muller, 2002). Thus, the state of polarisation may originate from the actions of parties themselves.

In its entirety the party-centric approach focuses upon the viewpoints of individual party leaders, intra-party dynamics, organisational discipline, broader party strategies, and the dominant party. This research focuses on the latter.

Scholars observe the effects of party dominance on the level of party system polarisation. In the case of a dominant centrists party or a pivotal centre party—a party “is dominant in that it is [electorally] significantly stronger than the others” because of this it becomes a highly relevant party in the party system—significant incentives exist for moderation of the party system (Hazan, 1995; Greene, 2008; Pempel, 1990; Green-Pedersen, 2004; Keman, 1994; Sartori, 1976: 193). The elements of pragmatism and centrism, discussed in Section 2.1, describes much of the
characteristics of the dominant party. In the main, the argument is that dominant parties contribute to depolarisation of the party system and society. When the largest electoral party is located in the centre, the system displays centrist clustering with little or no extremist parties having the power to change the balance of competition. The opposite is the presence of an extremist dominant party that would contribute to polarisation, where minority centre or moderate parties have little chance of electoral success. Pempel (1990) sums it up that dominant parties have the ability to shape the ideological or policy profile of the country. Most scholarly claims revolve around the argument that dominant party systems tend to reflect moderation than polarisation.

This theoretical proposition does not explain what in the first place causes the dominant party to take a centrist position. Pursuing an explanatory account, Spiess (2009) puts forward that moderation is often due to the two main factors that are largely located with the dominant party: (a) social inclusion and (b) organisational cohesion. This makes the dominant party accommodative, integrationist, conciliatory, catch-all and coalitional. There are also the (c) narrowing of extremism and (d) performance advantages that dominant parties bring along.

First, existing as a catch-all entity, the dominant party avoids narrow and sectional appeals by using ‘selective mobilisation’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ in the electoral market to shape voter preferences in their favour to maintain party dominance (Spiess, 2009). Arian and Barnes (1974: 603) state that the “dominant party assures its continued success by effectively spreading out among many social strata rather than concentrating on only one; it mobilises support from all sectors of society by mobilising groups and issues from a broad spectrum.” Political representation is extended to a variety of competing groups “both within and outside the framework of the ruling party itself” (Kaufman, 1999: 175). These parties find substantial interest in consensus and accommodation as their drive is not primarily geared toward ideological commitments or policy-seeking motives but toward vote-maximisation. In other terms, the central aim is keeping their dominant position and preventing major political challengers from upsetting the balance of power, and in so doing, parties respond to voter preferences from across the preference spectrum (Greene and Ibarra-Rueda, 2014; Downs, 1957). Thus, for the dominant party, deemphasising doctrines and focusing on votes, broadens and maximises its support base and captures the median voter.

Second, social inclusion also exists within the party, either by bringing in other parties or including extra-parliamentary groups within its ranks. Dominant parties “aren’t monolithic structures but coalitions of individuals and sub-party groups with diverse attitudes, interests and ambitions”; they are willing to work with ideologically diverse groups (Boucek 2012: 35). Incentives of power sharing which dominant parties offer to potential partners, contribute to moderation of the dominant party itself. Given that inclusive coalition tendencies often involve compromise of party positions and movement to the centre, they constitute a moderating factor. They prioritise the skill of being able to adapt by compromising and sharing power to overcome deep intra-party disagreements (Friedman and Wong, 2008). Such compromise is often in the form of a culture of open debate and tolerance which prevents party breakdown. This rests upon the party not being stuck to rigid ideological positions. It gives the dominant party a flexible and elastic character where it has the ability to change relatively easily in response to changing electoral circumstances compared to more ideologically committed parties (Pempel, 1982; Arian and Barnes, 1974; Boucek, 2012).

Third, for Arian and Barnes (1974: 602, emphasis added), organisational “cohesion emerges from the mutual desire to share the fruits of power, a desire sufficiently strong to hold extreme demands in check and to moderate potentially disintegrative tendencies”. Put otherwise, the strategic decision to share power, especially within its ranks, is a factor muting ideological extremism. Also, by occupying an expanded and flexible ideological terrain, and by attracting voters and stakeholders from various segments of society, dominant parties make it increasingly difficult for the opposition to pose clear ideological alternatives (Jesudason, 1999). In this environment, opposition parties “are reduced to a role of carping and sniping rather than that of developing immediate alternatives” (Arian and Barnes, 1974: 599). This subsequently reduces the potential for radicalism.
The effect of this is not only seen in the party system but by including diverse segments of society within the dominant party and portraying the party as ‘a party of consensus’, it depoliticises salient social divisions within society and shapes voter preferences away from a polarised stance (Kothari, 1969; Spiess, 2009; Pretorius, 2000; Greene and Ibarra-Rueda, 2014). Pempel (1990) shows how dominant parties can facilitate stability: aside from entrenching democratic institutions, they can marginalise political extremes and fuse ethnic differences, thus creating a platform for both political and social compromise.

Fourth, beside the integrationist, pragmatic and extremist-reducing effects of party dominance there is also effective performance in government that grants the dominant party ‘positional advantages’ (Dunleavy, 2010). It can deny a significant section of the ideological space to its major challengers by threatening to take its voters. This is because the dominant party has a ‘protected core’ of voters who will vote for the party wherever it positions itself on the political spectrum—this makes the opposition unable to adopt and stand by ‘clear-water’ strategies (Dunleavy, 2010: 23, 41). Performance is advantageous for the dominant party — there is little incentive to compete ideologically since a majority of voters endorse the party, electoral strategies then are based upon issues of past record in government, expectations of future performance, competency and charisma of leaders, and issues of honesty and trust (Ezrow, 2008). In the end, these parties affect voting behaviour, often in a non-ideological direction since it dynamically participates in deliberately shaping electoral tastes and strategically prevents opposition parties from offering clear ideological or policy-based alternatives.

Consequent of this analysis, inclusive tendencies, resisting rigid ideological positions, sharing power internally, focusing on performance politics, and having a protected ideological space, enables dominant parties to maintain a centrist position which resultantly contributes to low polarisation of the party system. “Indeed, dominant parties exert so much power that, in most cases, they mould their societies and set the parameters of party competition” (Greene and Ibarra-Rueda, 2014: 33). Arian and Barnes (1974: 601) add that it “controls not only the status quo but also the pace of change”. This is equivalent to saying that dominant parties have a large capacity to alter and stabilise the levels of polarisation in the party system.

2.2.5 Overall causal framework

A summary of this discussion is outlined in Table 2.2. From this analysis, the institutionalist argument based on electoral systems reduce the complex relationships of party systems and underestimates the role of parties in shaping the degree of polarisation with party systems. Theory claims that the dominant party, because of its emphasis, moderates the party system independent of electoral systems. Within the dominant party, maximum focus is placed upon social pluralism, accommodation and integration; decentralising power, co-optation and power sharing; broad internal participation, open debate and organisational tolerance; and non-policy issues like performance policies. This suggests that their influence may override both the influence of electoral systems and mass opinion. Although the dominant party seems to outweigh the strengths of alternative causes of polarisation, this research will look at all causes outlined here to provide a complete explanatory analysis of the determinants of moderation in the South African case.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Polarisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalisation</td>
<td>Number of parties</td>
<td>The number of relevant parties, determined by electoral strength and seat share.</td>
<td>A small number of relevant parties, such as less than five, lead to convergence and moderation. The fewer the number of parties then the greater the chances of gaining a plurality or majority of the vote; so parties target the median voter and hence depolarise platforms. This makes parties appear similar.</td>
<td>A large number, greater than five, causes parties to spread across the ideological spectrum. A high number of parties cause competitors to pursue distinct platforms than converge on similar positions, all because they want to appear different to the ordinary voter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalist</td>
<td>Electoral laws</td>
<td>The type of electoral system determines and structures party position taking.</td>
<td>Plurality electoral laws, which tend to produce two-party systems or systems with a limited number of parties, have a winner-take-all rule which create incentives to converge to the centre or to the median voter position and appeal to all segments of society.</td>
<td>Proportional laws, which tend to produce multiparty systems or systems with high number of parties, have a minimum or no threshold rule where winning a plurality is not necessary to gain parliamentary representation, and this create incentives for extremist position-taking as parties appeal to minority segments of society to gain some minimal representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociological</td>
<td>Voter preferences</td>
<td>The preference distribution of the electorate.</td>
<td>If a substantial number of voters are on or near the centre, parties reflect moderate positions.</td>
<td>If the median voter is located at one or both sides of the extremes, parties take up radical positions and are polarised in the party system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Party dominance</td>
<td>The ideological placement of the major party.</td>
<td>With a centrist dominant party, little opportunity exists for electoral expansion of extremist parties. The party reflects pragmatism, flexibility, social inclusion, power sharing, and performance issues.</td>
<td>With an extremist dominant party there is little space for the growth of centrist parties. The party reflects hardline positions, rigidity, appeals to radical social groups, and focuses on policy issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

The threshold for what constitutes relevance is debated. There is no universally accepted number for what constitutes relevance of a party in terms of vote or seat share (in percentage). However, what is known is that the ‘strength in seats’ is considered more acceptable and avoids complications that could emerge when we rely on electoral strength in terms of vote share (Sartori, 2005: 107). Sartori (2005: 107) elaborates that in general there is a threshold for what not to count. For instance, if a threshold of 5 per cent is established, all parties below this percentage will be discounted as irrelevant (a criterion of irrelevance), although we want to be careful not to make serious omissions, further lowering the threshold means ore irrelevant parties will be included in the analysis. So, the relevance of a party is a function of the distribution of political power essentially within the legislature. But parliamentary strength is not the only measure, added to this is whether a party has the potential to alter the direction of competition of the party system through either ‘blackmail’ or ‘coalition’ potential—threatening the party to exit the coalition if its policies are not put at the forefront of the political agenda or being so important that the party gaining a plurality cannot form a majority coalition without that particular party especially if its on a similar ideological bloc as the main party (Sartori, 2005: 108).

The left-right ideological spectrum is a common tool used to measure and gauge party positions. It is almost universal in its application for political scientists across different countries (see McDonald et al, 2007; Gabel and Huber, 2000). Most democratic countries are argued to have a left-right cleavage, despite the complexities amongst parties across nations (see Budge et al, 1987; Janda, 1993). One main advantage of this traditional spectrum is its usefulness in comparative politics, where party positions can be compared across similar or different cases. Second, combining numerous issues into a single continuum is helpful instead of having various positions for parties on single-issue areas—for instance, such as having party positions on gay issues or religious tolerance, social welfare or private enterprise; one can have a parties position on conservative matters and socio-economic matters, and on a ‘liberal-conservative’ scale if the left-right does not make sense in a particular political context. The utility of the spectrum has its fair share of contestation, like many aspects within political sciences. Since then, calls for modification of the left-right spectrum has arisen where scholars propose that the spectrum should be country-specific (to check what is ‘left’ and what is ‘right’ within a country, avoiding generic application which might led to misleading results) yet theory-specific—an inductive and deductive logic—so that it can be accurately applied to the country under study as well as generalised and used in comparative studies (see Jahn 2011, 2014).

Duverger (1954: 217) states that "the simple majority, single ballot system favors the two-party system."

This was especially since class, linguistic and religious issues dominated the cleavage structure of Western European party systems prior to the rise of post-materialist issues in the late 1960’s (Inglehart, 1990).

Research findings emanating from Dalton and Tanaka (2007) show that voters place themselves near to the centre in countries like Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand.

Since the 1970s, the importance of party strategies has become a pertinent research area, such interest grew out of the political and social developments that surrounded established parties, particularly in Western Europe—where the party system experienced increased electoral volatility, partisan dealignment, fragmentation and declining electoral turnout—which led parties to adjust their strategies in response to a changed landscape (Loomes, 2012; Mair, 1997). This implies that party strategies have systemic impact.
Also, when the party faces a challenge, depending on the extent of any threat from the opposition and the degree to which the ideological space is becoming crowded, the dominant party can choose to converge on the position of the median voter or to diverge and move to the extremes (Greene, 2008; Dunleavy, 2010). When faced with a significant threat, the dominant party appeals to the median voter and will also reach to more extremists social groups to undercut support for the opposition but its mainstream position still remains chiefly centrist (given other motivations like vote-maximisation, social and intra-party pluralism, it still remains uncommitted to ideological rigidity). This implies that the party chooses its ideological makeup more than the influence of the opposition.
Chapter 3: Moderation in the South African Party System -
A Literature Review

What is the state of polarisation in the South African party system? Is the system moderate or polarised? What is the left-right direction of major parties? Are these parties centrist or extremist? Is the party system becoming polarised? Does the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have the potential to change the level of polarisation in the system? This chapter uses existing research to answer these questions. It is primarily a literature review of the South African party system. It tries to establish the existence of ideological similarities or differences between contemporary political parties, and the direction and strength of their positions.

First, I examine the gaps in the study of left-right polarisation in the South African context, potential reasons for such gaps, causes for moderation emanating from previous research, and discuss issue-based and non-policy-based politics. Second, the empirical paradox underlying this research enquiry will be explained. Third, a literature-based examination of the ideological character of major political parties will be conducted; this includes the ANC, DA and EFF.

3.1 Gaps in the study of polarisation in South Africa

3.1.1 Skewed scholarly focus

This section examines previous scholarship on polarisation in the South African party system. Before I examine previous work I look at research on the South African party system in general. This shows that scholarly interest is skewed toward certain aspects of the party system while other areas are ignored. The party system in South Africa has received attention both in the apartheid and democratic era. Notable studies include Stadler (1970), Lipson (1959), Trapido (1966), Woodward (1977), Johnston (1994), Mattes et al (1995), Botha (1996), and Lodge (2006). Over the last two decades most attention has been placed upon the numerical criterion of the dominant party system and how the dominant party, the ANC, interacts with democracy, engages in inter-party competition and deals with intra-party conflict (Southall, 2005; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999b; Southern, 2011; Langfield, 2014; Lanegran, 2001). In addition, a lot of attention is directed toward the electoral market and the cleavage structure. Here scholars investigate voting behaviour and partisanship. Many argue that it is dominated by race and strong partisanship (Johnson, 1996; Habib and Taylor, 2001; Friedman, 2005; Ferree, 2006; Hoeane, 2009; Anyangwe, 2012; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009). By contrast, little consideration is given to the aspect of ideological or left-right polarisation in the party system.

There is a shortage of scholarly attention on polarisation in South Africa. A general consensus exists that major parties in the country assume moderate than radical positions, such as ‘centre-left’ and ‘centre-right’ parties (Schrire, 2001; Booyisen, 2005; Sadie 2006; Southall, 2014a). Although little work exists on party positioning, especially the systematic measurement of party ideology and polarisation, there is even less work on the causal factors behind party positioning and ideological differentiation in the country. It is the latter issue that concerns this research; although major parties are considered ideologically centrist and exist within a state of low polarisation, the reasons for such dynamics are poorly investigated—there is little systematic examination of the underlying structure of ideological difference in the South African party system.
One of the contributing factors to this scholarly deficit possibly rests in the nature of party system competition. Scholars argue that party debate is mostly about racial and technical issues rather than ideological or left-right issues (Schrire, 2001; Booysen, 1999). Some go as far as to suggest that the left-right ideological spectrum makes little sense, is simplistic and misleading when applied to the South African context (Butler, 2004; Petlane, 2009). An ardent exponent of this view is Friedman (2015) who states that “left, right and center are not useful terms when we analyse much of our [South African] politics…politics here…is about [racial] identities”. Schrire (2001: 141) makes the argument that “South African politics is not, therefore, structured around ideology (left-centre-right) or class interests”. For these scholars, party competition is stuck in a race-based arena, where parties emphasise identity issues in electoral campaigns and party debate, and voters vote based on identity issues rather than for parties who are closest to their policy or ideological preference. Even more, opposition parties offer little by way of policy-based alternatives that are able to successfully convince voters. Parties are unable to vigorously articulate “substantive policy agendas as alternatives” to the ANC (Lanegran, 2001: 87).

Relatedly, inter-party debate is said to revolve around adversarial and technical matters. It is observed that South African parties increasingly focus their criticisms not on the ideological or policy differences between themselves and the dominant party but instead on the contrasts they perceive in respect of governance, political competence, integrity and tolerance for dissent (Langfield, 2014; Booysen, 1999). Similarly, Southall (1998: 468) states that opposition parties resort to criticism based on ‘pragmatic grounds’ such as “challenging the lack of overall performance, failure to deliver services, and the reluctance to recognise and root out corruption”. The observed weakness of ideological competition between parties possibly pushed scholars to focus upon racial cleavages and other non-policy factors rather than examine ideological politics within the party system.

Scholars acknowledge that the party system contains important lines of ideological division and note that the South African party system has a low degree of ideological polarisation. I will examine some implicit explanations in the literature. One school of thought emphasises that moderation can be found in the dominant party itself. Since the ANC represents a diversity of ideological views within it, this has subsequently moderated and neutralised radical tendencies.

The ANC is not a monolithic party. It is described as a ‘broad church’ which contains multiple ideologies. These include the SACP’s socialist inclinations, COSATU’s pro-worker interests, and other interests (Southall, 2005; Booysen, 2012). Alliance politics is commonly seen as grounds for conflict between competing ideological sections. It is essentially a “site of struggle between a variety of ideological persuasions” and “we find that vigorous (often vicious) debates and scraps take place between different components” (Southall, 2005: 66). “[K]ey policy debates” in South Africa take place within the alliance “rather than outside the party in parliament” (Southall, 2005: 75). Thus, it appears that the ANC’s inclusion of various groups, prevents ideological differences from occurring outside the party. This resonates with the causal explanation of the dominant party in broader party system literature—that focuses on intra-party pluralism.

First, although this explanation is an indicator of moderation, what is left unexplained is why the ANC has not moved into a radical direction and what has contributed to the centrist resilience of the party. Second, and more important, a univariate factorial analysis of low polarisation is insufficient. Concentrating on a single causal variable, that is, the dominant party and its alliance partners, opens the door for a spurious connection in which some other relevant causal variable may be neglected or ignored. Thus, considering theoretically relevant factors in broader party system literature leads to a comprehensive, non-spurious, accurate and plausible interpretation of the causal factors of centrism and low left-right differentiation in the South African party system.
3.1.2 Issue-based politics

Despite the weakness of ideological competition, scholars recognise that issue-based debate in South Africa is gaining ground. This perspective challenges the view that the racial and non-policy dimension are the only features structuring party competition; parties and voters are beginning to point to matters of policy and issues (Eldridge and Seekings, 1996; Mattes et al, 1999a; Ramutsindela, 2002; Habib and Taylor, 2001; Ndletyana and Maaba, 2010). First, the preeminence of race in scholarly discourse underestimates the significance of “the strategies and campaigns of the major political parties” (Eldridge and Seekings, 1996: 519). This suggests that parties offer issue-based positions to voters and compete based on policy content rather than racial exchange alone. The ANC in particular fought a generally positive, issue-based election since 1994 (Butler, 2014). For instance, in 1994 the party “conscientiously fought the contest as an ‘issue’ election”: it “focused on the policies…[it] promised to implement if elected” (Mattes, et al 1996: 127; Lodge, 1994: 41; Eldridge and Seekings, 1996: 519). Scholars go as far as to argue that the party often presents the electorate with detailed policy programmes incomparable to the alternatives offered by other parties (Lodge, 1994; Butler, 2014). For Lodge (1994: 32), in the 1994 election, “[n]o other party provided a similarly specific set of prescriptions or a manifesto” which was carefully tailored and well-researched to meet public perceptions. Butler (2014) similarly shares the view that the ANC’s policy proposals are driven by its unmatched research capacity in public opinions.

This trend continued and in the 2009 campaign the party presented a positive image “focusing on the strengths of its own policy positions and the character of its senior leadership rather than on denigrating the opposition” (Butler, 2009: 66). In addition, although the ANC entered in the 2014 election as being “out of touch with its historic constituency among the poor especially”, the party chose to present a good news story of the economy since 1994 which was essentially a backward looking campaign (Southall, 2014: 9; Butler, 2014). There is an obvious mix here between policy and non-policy issues: the former refers to specific programmatic proposals and the latter to performance politics. It is evident, however, that issue-based politics is not foreign to the major party and thus the politicisation of issues, policies and programmes is likely to feed into the electorate level.

Second, there is an important element of rational and policy-based voting that is left out of the picture when race takes precedence in electoral analysis. What is assumed is a “crude view of voters who mechanically record their race on the ballot papers rather than exercise any discretion” (Eldridge and Seekings, 1996: 518). It perpetuates an image of an unsophisticated, irrational voting population that vote because of deep racial-historical affiliation. By contrast, studies show that the electorate is sophisticated and engages more discerningly with issues than what is commonly presented. Voters are “not blindly loyal to their parties” but instead, “significant sections of the electorate make rational choices during elections, and decide on the basis of information available to them to choose which party most closely represent their material and other interests” (Ferree, 2006: 804; Habib and Naidu, 2006: 81; Mattes et al, 1999b; Cohen, 2009; Mattes and Piombo, 2001; Ngoma, 2014). This pertains to non-identity issues, and is inclusive of policy and non-policy factors. According to these scholars, voters make decisions also on the basis of class, party image, and government performance (Mattes et al, 1999b; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009; Southall, 2014b: 7).

There is also a policy-based argument emanating from specific evidence of programmatic voting, that is, voting for party programmes and related offerings. Since 1994, voters in certain parts of the country (like the North West and Western Cape) have proven to be “active agents who actually interpret and evaluate campaigns as well as other politically relevant stimuli” (Africa, 2010: 25). Voters vote for parties because of their policies: the choice of ANC, for instance, rests in the belief that the quality of life improved since 1994 (with the access to basic services) and that the party has the best policies to bring about social progress (Africa, 2010; Khosa, 1999; Ramutsindela, 2002; 28).
Rule, 2000). Hence, voters feel that the ANC adopts policies that support the improvement of material conditions.

Race-based voting in South Africa is concerning for “the development of a properly competitive multiparty system” (Johnson, 1996: 319). Proponents of the identity-based approach to voting argue that race is a primary factor and usually hold that a racially bifurcated electorate has adverse consequences for democracy. For them it means that there is very little chance for the opposition to win office, and limited opportunity to hold the ruling party accountable based on matters of policy and performance; they argue that parties, in particular, need to move away from racial politicking to policy-based competition (Spence, 1999; Giliomee et al., 2001; Lodge, 2002; Langfield, 2014). For scholars like Southall (2001: 22) and Maylam (2001), the way forward for democracy in South Africa “lies in transition to an issue-oriented and ideologically based politics in which racial and ethnic affinities play a backstage role”. Opposition parties should focus on “building up a substantial electoral threat based on substantial policy and ideological differences” (van Zyl Slabbert, 1999: 215). In sum, on one hand, the dissatisfaction with race-based politics has resulted in a widespread call for issue-based voting and party competition; on the other hand, available evidence shows that politics is moving in such a direction.

This research intends to contribute to this controversy. I seek to find out whether or not the ideological dimension is gaining ground, especially at the level of the electorate. I also set out to examine the non-policy dimension within the electorate.

3.2 The empirical paradox

There are a number of factors that intuitively leads one to expect a polarised dynamic of political conflict. First, the presence of major racial and class inequalities should have polarised the party system around radical economic ideologies. Segregationist and apartheid policies produced two major cleavages in South Africa: the white-black racial cleavage and the poor-rich class cleavage; this research concentrates on the latter cleavage. Contemporary class divisions in South Africa are deeply rooted in the labour policies implemented under apartheid which were racially driven than class-motivated.\(^1\) Racial labour legislation led to a big prosperity gap between whites and blacks. One of the most significant processes was the splitting of the labour force into two strata: white workers “with skilled or supervisory roles, opportunities for advancement, high wages, and relatively good living conditions”, and black workers who were “devoid of the means to exercise skilled or supervisory roles, poorly paid, and subjected to harsh living conditions” (Thompson, 2000: 112). As class cleavages began to develop, “class never transcended race” as a means of group allegiance (Welsh, 1971: 243). This labour division continues in the post-apartheid period, where a majority of the black population live in poor or relatively poor conditions with only a small portion of prosperous blacks, while a majority of the white population remain relatively prosperous (van Rooyen, 1994; Maylam, 2001).

Second, the proportional representation (PR) electoral system in South Africa is expected to give rise to polarisation. While most of the literature focuses on PR systems as encouraging consensus politics, and plurality systems as leading to a more majoritarian and adversarial politics (Lijphart, 1994), there are also prominent discussions about the expectation that a PR system leads to greater variation in ideological preferences. Given that proportional laws enable maximum diversity in the legislature, it encourages parties to target “a niche sector instead of making moderate and inclusive appeals” (Davies, 2004: 306; Powell, 1982; Sartori, 1976; Downs, 1957; Dow, 2010). In so doing, parties, including major parties, are attracted to take up positions on the ideological fringes, thereby polarising the party system. The plurality system incentivises parties to come to the centre to attract the median voter. This is because the system encourages pluralities or majorities, and parties may be unable to survive on sectional appeals. In contrast, the PR system incentivises parties to assume ideologically distinct positions to attract minority sections of the electorate. This is because the
system does not require parties to gain a plurality of votes — only a small percentage is enough to gain political representation. Yet, South Africa’s major parties, especially the ANC, are largely moderate, despite proportionality (Gouws and Mitchell, 2005). In South Africa, the initial spread under a PR system is one of limited ideological diversity, and the ANC as a majority party appears to be contributing to a converging dynamic. It is not necessary for PR systems to lead to diversity, but it can produce convergence (Grofman, 2004). (Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion on the issue of moderation under proportional electoral rules.)

Third, the political landscape is far from absent of radicalised rhetoric. Instead, more often than not, public comments made by salient political groups are steeped in radical notions of progress and social relations. On one side is the ANC’s relations with the SACP, the radical left organisation. While the SACP supports a socialist transition and the overthrow of capitalism, the ANC has not subscribed to the same position (Wolmarans, 2012; Butler, 2009). Although the ruling party talks of ‘radical economic transformation’, it is not in a socialist sense but refers to racial socioeconomic redress and alleviating poverty, inequality and unemployment within a context that supports social democracy and capitalism. On the other side there are entities like the EFF who call for radical socialism and make statement that challenge racial reconciliation between blacks and whites (de Jager, 2015). This is indicative of radicalised sentiments and the presence of immoderate sympathisers.

Lastly, South Africa is often depicted as the ‘protest capital of the world’ — a site of the ‘rebellion of the poor’ — where protests occur around issues of service delivery, land crisis, wages and corruption (Mail and Guardian, 2012; Lekaba and Sekhejane, 2016; UNESCO, 2016; Seekings and Nattrass, 2015). Research has since justified this argument with empirical evidence. According to research commissioned by the Institute for Security Studies, and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, “South Africa remains the most protest-rich country in the world. Protest is not just escalating, it is becoming more confrontational [and endemic]” (Timeslive, 14 June 2016). Given that people are active in demonstrating dissatisfaction and are also violent in doing so, South Africa is certainly not a peaceful country that is ‘moderate’ in all dimensions. Social protests reveal an evident radical element in the citizenry.

Given structural economic disparities, the PR’s incentive for extremist party positioning and polarisation, radicalised public rhetoric, and social protests, it is perplexing why major parties have failed to adopt far left and radical socialist policies that endorse the radical implementation of social equality and other issues — which would naturally appeal to the poor and more radical political groups. It appears that the race-class character of South Africa, the PR incentive, radical social groups, and protests (the social and institutional influence) provide insufficient incentive for such ideological pursuits — given that major parties are broadly centrist. The South African party system exhibits low polarisation: major parties are particularly moderate on policies and programmes. The aim of this research is to explain this paradox by identifying and examining principal factors that account for the moderation of the party system.

3.3 Party positions: The ANC, DA and EFF

Scholars argue that the policy distance between the ANC and the DA is of a left-right nature where the ANC takes a centre-left position and the DA a centre-right position. While opposition parties are fragmented, amongst others, along ideological lines—where the party system contains ‘ideologically diverse’ parties—Africanist and radical parties remain marginal in the party system while major parties are broadly centrist (Southall, 1998: 466, 1997: 11; Lanegran, 2001; Schrire, 2001; Booyens, 1999, 2005; Sarakinsky, 2001; Mattes, 2002; Zulu, 2012; Southall, 2014a). Much of this argument emanates from the socioeconomic cleavage and the positions parties assume on salient economic issues. From qualitative assessments, scholars converge on the point that the party system has a low degree of ideological polarisation (moderation), since major parties occupy the
centre space. One interesting element in the literature that pertains to the study of polarisation, discusses possible changing dynamics of the ideological nature of the party system. The presence of the radical left party, the EFF, as the third largest party to emerge after the 2014 general election, is argued to contribute to future changes in the left-right direction of the party system (Southall, 2014b). In this section, I examine the ideological character of the ANC and the DA on economic issues, and also outline the argument of the EFF’s potentially polarising role.

3.3.1 The ANC: The dominant party

First, the ANC is often characterised as a social democratic, centre-left party. The party itself uses this label to describe its ideological orientation. The ANC has sought since its inception in 1912 a cross-class alliance for national democracy, but in the post-1940s it demonstrated a certain orientation to the left and the working class. According to Lodge (2004), the workers’ element in the ANC had an important impact on the party’s values and ideas (Lodge, 2004). This was embodied in the Freedom Charter of 1955 — which became a pivotal policy document. In this document, “the ANC embraced a programme that envisaged substantive social reform, including the expansion of public ownership and land redistribution” (Lodge, 2004: 166).

However, “[t]hroughout its [pre-1994] history the ANC…studiously avoided adopting rigid ideological stances that were either race-based or class-oriented” but focused on activism and resistance to apartheid (Maylam, 2001: 111; Marx, 1992: 239). When the party took office in 1994, its ideological direction on economic policy was anything but radical. The ANC embraced a minimalist liberal conception of democracy and privileged the capitalist status quo despite the party’s “long history of association with more radical notions of mass participatory and non-capitalist democracy” (Mckinley, 2001: 184). As early on as Mandela’s presidency, the ANC pronounced at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange that it is a party based on ‘market principles’. The speech, delivered by Mandela, contained no reference to nationalisation of resources or other radical socialist elements (Lodge, 1994). In core ANC policies like the Reconstruction and Development Policy (RDP) (a policy initiated by the ANC as the first macroeconomic policy of democratic South Africa), nationalisation was mentioned but was categorised as a possible option for the future rather than an immediate objective (Lodge, 1994). In other terms, the ANC seemed to sideline radical socialist notions of economic management.

The RDP merged development and economic growth (Wolmarans, 2012; Blumenfeld, 1999). It represented a “careful balance between the ‘growth through redistribution’ policies advocated by the left and the emphasis on growth as the harbingers of redistribution in more orthodox economic analysis” (Lodge, 2002: 22). The policy was designed to secure basic social and economic needs of workers and the poor, and improve the substantive quality of life for people (Mckinley, 2001). In all, the RDP represented a ‘semi-socialist’ project (Schlemmer, 1999: 296). Even the ANC’s policy to provide low-cost housing, in which public funds were used to underwrite private loans to low-income buyers and later to directly subsidise the poor, was not a plan for massive expansion of state housing; this further served to indicate that the ANC was not heading in the direction of a radicalised interventionist state (Lodge, 1994).

Economic developmental policies amounted to a moderate left programme of limited state intervention. In fact, the party maintains a mixed economic position supporting labour and a pro-poor agenda “within the confines of capitalism and the free market” (Booysen, 2009: 97). The ANC’s election campaigns have always been left-leaning. Since 1994 the party has set manifestos with a pro-poor agenda but with a moderate and “anti-populist flavour” that also supported capital (Butler, 2014: 44). Core policy definers have not followed communist planning nor unfettered free market mechanisms. The ANC places limits on capitalism and embraces state-interventionist policies of redistribution but shies away from radical socialism (Koebble, 1999). In essence, the
party’s economic policies fall in the category of moderation as the chief means to transform society (Lodge, 2002).

Second, even when the party shifted to the right in 1996, some scholars argue it retained a mixed ideological stance while others purport that it represented a neoliberal shift. The latter saw GEAR as a ‘paradigm shift’, an ideological u-turn in a business-friendly direction (Southall, 2009: 2; Blumenfeld, 1999: 43; Webster, 2001; Piper, 2004). Mbeki, who pioneered the policy, displayed greater sensitivity to free-market policies than his predecessor, Mandela (Evans, 1999). This move received criticism “for being a shift towards the sort of neoliberal policy heterodoxy that prevails throughout much of the world” (Calland, 1999: 5). It articulated deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and represented the government’s acceptance of market-imposed criteria where the state became a marginal than primary facilitator of growth and development (Spence, 1999; Blumenfeld, 1999; Evans, 1999; van Zyl Slabbert, 1999; Mckinley, 2001).

Scholars argue that the policy signalled an ideological defeat for those on the left in the ANC. Some SACP members rejected it because it was “indicative of a rightward shift”, and it placed “capitalist accumulation at the centre of growth and development, as opposed to the prioritisation of basic needs and redistribution in the RDP” (Mckinley, 2001: 191). COSATU, in particular, developed an “increasingly articulate critique of South Africa’s ‘neo-liberal’ capitalist trajectory” (Southall, 2014b: 15). The shift led some to proclaim that (a) the ANC abandoned socialist policies in order to satisfy internal and domestic capital, and that the ANC leadership were “no longer ‘socialist’-oriented” (Uys, 1999: 28; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999a: 345). This reading is not inconsistent with claims that (b) the 2004 election campaign revealed the ANC’s “return to the left ground it occupied in 1994” where it avoided subjecting itself to a ‘neoliberal tone’ and contrasted itself with more rightist parties like the DA and IFP (Piper, 2004: 100).

Others, however, debate that the ANC ‘returned’ to left ground since it never abandoned it in the first place. While a clear rightward policy was in place, the ANC maintained its commitment to and implementation of leftist policies, in particular, social welfare. Scholars point out that during the implementation of GEAR, public spending on the social welfare, which accounts for more than half of the government’s expenditure, actually increased (Seekings, 2005). “What is remarkable...is the retention and expansion of the state’s commitment to welfare” (Lodge, 2004: 171). The resilience of the welfare element demonstrates the unceasing attention the party devoted to the vulnerable and poor while embracing and expanding the opportunities for the business sector. In addition, “[i]t makes more sense to view the massive expansion of welfare provision...as an effect of the ANC’s incorporation of the countryside into its political domain” in which the party is “becoming increasingly rural” (Lodge, 2004: 170-2). It appears that the ANC’s constituency proved to be a key factor in the party’s continuation of welfare policies.

Even during this shift, the party expressed in the 1999 campaign that the poor must be cared for by the generosity of those well-off; it made a defence that it did not lose touch with the poor and did not scrap its welfare system (Lodge, 1999). In this way, although GEAR was the ANC’s policy of choice, the 1999 election saw the annihilation of leftwing opposition parties due to the “ANC’s occupation of much of both the centre and moderate left of the political spectrum” (Booysen, 1999: 249). This effectively continued in subsequent campaigns, especially in 2004, where the party “was situated significantly to the left of those of the main opposition parties...the ANC differentiated itself very effectively from its opponents” by focusing on the poor, unemployed and working class (Piper, 2004: 110). Similarly, the party’s 2009 manifesto indicated moderate and anti-populist economic policy — the ANC did not veer into the far left but kept centrist ground (Butler, 2009).

Third, the ANC’s embrace of leftist political entities under the banner of the tripartite alliance (the alliance between the ANC, SACP and COSATU) leads it to project itself as supportive of a revolutionary transformation process; although it does not explicitly articulate the SACP’s endorsement of a transition to a socialist system (Lodge, 2004). The ANC “regularly and ritually presented its pragmatic centrism in revolutionary terms in order to solidify its alliance with the SACP and COSATU” (Southall, 2014b: 15). For instance, the party’s 2014 manifesto stood as a “confusing conflation of conservative and radical proposals” where the party said it began a new
phase of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which was in the form of the second transition encapsulated under the National Development Plan (NDP) (Butler, 2014: 51). One main discourse in the ANC is the NDR which refers to the pursuit of national democratic revolution, a theory premised upon the eventual achievement of socialism. This idea owes much to the party’s allies. “Since the 1960s, the SACP provided the ANC with much of its ideological direction, effectively embedding the need for a national democratic revolution” (Wolmarans, 2012: 109). For the SACP, the NDR will move South Africa towards a full socialist revolution.

Yet, the ANC holds a different interpretation of the socialist path. An analysis of the ANC’s own documents indicates that there is no explicit link between the NDR and a pure socialist agenda (Wolmarans, 2012). This suggests that the ANC’s take on the NDR is significantly moderate compared to the SACP’s interpretation. For the party, the NDR simply serves as a policy outlook designed to rectify the injustices of the past and correct the skewed distribution of wealth and income. This attaches itself to a particular conception of the state as articulated by the ANC: the ‘developmental state’. The idea of a development state refers to the need to shift to a more active role by government and involves a greater role for the state in investment and production that goes beyond macroeconomic management (Southall, 2009).

Furthermore, the party uses the NDR as a rhetorical political word game to solidify the alliance and prevent a breakup, and to maintain its support amongst the poor and working class; the party’s own view is that a radical version of the NDR is unrealistic and unimplementable (Southall, 2014a). Despite the political rhetoric of radical transformation following a predetermined socialist path, the reality remains that “[t]oday the ANC presides over a robust capitalist democracy” and senior ANC leaders enjoy close connections with the business sector; in addition, moderate economic policies are firmly in place (Lodge, 2004: 167; Butler, 2014). Given this reality, the key division in the party has been between conservative or rightwing members in the ANC, who are inspired by the party’s historical commitment to capitalism, and left members in the alliance who strongly oppose the consolidation of a capitalist state — these ideological tensions were particularly acute under Mbeki’s presidency (Lodge, 2002, 2004).

Although alliance partners were initially unable to effect policy change in a left direction, they were later considered influential. On the one hand, GEAR produced sharp conflict within the alliance where for the first time since 1994 alliance partners openly criticised the ANC (Mckinley, 2001). However, the alliance eventually backed GEAR. The support of the policy unequivocally suggested that the left was ineffective in its ability to influence policy and create leftward pressure for redistributive policies (Habib and Taylor, 2001; Webster, 2001). On the other hand, despite their support, the alliance waged a decade long war of attrition against Mbeki’s rightwing socioeconomic policies; they felt more and more marginalised under his government (Butler, 2009; Southall, 2009). The left-backed ANC camp began to express support for Zuma who was seen as the best chance since RDP “to sway policy in more pro-worker, pro-poor directions” (Booysen, 2009: 91; Butler, 2009; Southall, 2009).

Yet, this was contained within a moderate platform. Upon Zuma’s rise to power, the business sector was concerned about a ‘leftward surge’ in ANC policy; however, the 2009 ANC manifesto promised ‘continuity’ in the mixed economy sense and also ‘change’ to a more ‘active state’ that favoured balanced growth (Southall, 2009). Thus, the embrace of left policies occurred on centre-left ground. From this analysis, it can be argued that the ANC’s connection with left partners does not by itself entail radicalisation of socioeconomic policies. In fact, since 1994, it appears that the party has shown a repeated pattern of ideological and policy-based moderation.

In summary, from this literature assessment it appears that (a) the ANC’s inclusion of leftwing groups have not been enough to cause radicalisation of party policy; (b) socioeconomic policies and programmes rest on a social democratic, centre-left foundation, with moderate state intervention and welfare policies; and (c) the party embraces capitalism in practice. The ANC can also be described as a party that indulges in the rhetoric of the transition to a socialist state in order to retain its alliance with left partners, and gain support from the majority of the black electorate who are poor and working class; but at the root the party remains committed to moderate economic policies.
Briefly stated: neither did its interest in capitalism represent a steadfast shift to the right nor did its association with the left signify radical leftism. The objective of this research is to further examine the ANC’s economic policies, its relationship with the left, and in what ways (if any) it contributes to low polarisation.

3.3.2 The DA: The main opposition party

The DA is often characterised as a “traditionally liberal” party (Simon, 1999: 95). It was described as “increasingly conservative” in the 1990s due to the strong support it held for the government’s GEAR policy, its ‘fight back’ campaign of 1999 where it supported liberal democracy and the need for oversight of the ruling party; and its racial tinge where the party represented white and other minority communities (Simon, 1999: 95). There is broad consensus on the view that the DA “is a liberal party, yet more neoliberal than the ANC”; and a party that is “clearly right leaning” and “to the right of the ANC” (Booysen, 2005: 132, 143; Schrire, 2001: 141; Piper, 2004; Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014). The rightwing conception of the DA emerges from its support for free-market liberal policies and opposition to race-based redress measures. It is a commonly ascribed label, even amongst political parties. For instance, when the DA and IFP entered an alliance during the 2004 election campaign, the ANC viewed it as a ‘right-wing’ coalition since both parties shared a neoliberal, capitalist outlook (Lodge, 2005; Welsh, 1999).

Since 1994, the party has often marketed itself as fighting for an ‘open opportunity society’, making the link between ‘opportunity, effort and ability’ (Jolobe, 2009: 141). For the DA, this encourages economic growth and job creation in a ‘caring society’ that will provide better housing and improve quality health care (Jolobe, 2009). What propels this characterisation is its ostensibly colour-blind liberal approach to race, and its non-convergence with ANC’s racial equity and state interventionist policies. The party argues that the state cannot undo the wrongs of the past but a market-oriented system “will maximise growth rates and thus in time reduce the overall levels of poverty and inequality” (Schrire, 2001: 139). The former party leader, Tony Leon argued that “it is immoral and impractical to...[take] steps that will again entrench race as the central determinant of life chances in South Africa” (Mare, 2001: 95). “We thus have a clear conflict between the liberal view of politics as an instrumental process designed to influence society only at the margins [the DA], and the view of the political as part of a much larger historical mission [the ANC]” (Schrire, 2001: 139). According to the ANC, the DA’s “brand of right-wing liberalism is a clever way of protecting white privilege and racism” (Mare, 2001: 96).

Movement leftward, in the sense of approving state interventionism in the economy, and to embrace some race-based element has been occurring within the DA. Former DA parliamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko, took the step to endorse Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), though the party ultimately voted against it. Some accepted “the need for using race as a factor in employment decisions” (Mattes, 2014: 184). Mattes (2014: 184) calls this “a significant shift in DA ideology”. It is clear that there are internal disputes within the party about these policies. More conservative rightwing sections say that “any endorsement of race-based policies” amount “to a desertion of liberal principles” (Southall, 2014b: 14). Zille responded to this by arguing that there is a need for “interventionist policies if historical racial inequalities were to be overcome” (in Southall, 2014b: 14). However she opposes race-based forms of intervention.

Scholars have, however, argued that there is (a) a major disconnect between the DA’s ideological position and voter preferences. While Zille claimed to be taking the party in a social democratic direction, “its commitment to business-friendly economic policies...lacked appeal to the broad mass of black South Africans, who looked for vigorous state action to improve their livelihoods” (Southall, 2014b: 14). The main argument is that there is the need for the DA to reinvent itself to become relevant to the black electorate (Jolobe, 2009). Nijzink (2001: 66) observes that the DA “seems to focus on issues that are less important for the majority of voters”. On the one
side, the DA capitalises on political issues of the ruling party to gain support, arguing that it is the protector of the constitution and the guardian of liberal democracy; by contrast, the ANC devotes more attention to issues of poverty and unemployment, presenting their policies on a social democratic and moderate leftist platform in favour of the poor and the growing black middle-class (Kotze, 2001). A DA strategist stated that the party “had failed to demonstrate care for the concerns of the African electorate and that it showed insufficient emotional intensity in articulating these concerns” (Jolobe, 2009: 136). The DA needs to convince blacks that the party “can be a vehicle for their interests too” (Kotze, 2001: 129).

Scholars also argue that there is (b) a major contradiction in the party’s ideological position. Although the party has made moves in a leftist direction, particularly in the area of social welfare, it has been met with policy ambiguities. Booysen (2005: 132) shows that during the 2004 campaign, “its policy solutions were overwhelmingly free-market, which constituted a policy environment that was essentially incompatible with the party’s proposal for a Basic Income Grant”. The DA’s 2004 manifesto spoke of economic policies that would create jobs by unleashing the private sector and boosting growth, a basic income grant of R110 per month for those living in poverty and without access to another grant, speeding privatisation, increased police offices, fighting corruption, free antiretrovirals, and improved education (Booysen, 2005). Although the party “wished upon itself the label of social democrat”, it veered into conservative policies and hence displayed “a mixed bag of orientations” (Booysen, 2005: 143). In essence, the “incongruous ideological positioning” of the party is “unviable because they do not offer policies that would enable them to attract a significant electoral constituency”, such as those similar to the ANC’s RDP policy (Booysen, 2005: 143; Habib and Taylor, 2001: 216). Scholars argue that it is necessary for the DA to mirror the leftist, RDP-style of the ANC.

In summary, the main argument is that the DA’s rightwing economic policy commitments undermine its own viability and growth. If the party continues to challenge the ANC on the centre-right it will not make inroads into the majority of the electorate. Simultaneously holding onto liberal free-market policies and promoting social welfare, is considered an ideological contradiction. Moreover, that the DA must transform its policies toward a social democratic direction to appeal to the vast majority of the poor, is not a suggestion toward radicalisation of socioeconomic policies. Scholars suggest that the DA should shape itself similar to the ANC’s RDP policy which is overwhelmingly moderate left. The debate about the DA’s ideological transformation involves a proposed change from a centre-right to a centre-left orientation.

Although there may be policy changes within the DA towards a less ambiguous position, the purpose of this chapter is to see whether major parties are centre or extremist; it does not seek to explain ideological developments to the present. Also, this research broadly focuses on the ANC as the major party in the system.

3.3.3 The EFF: A potential polarising agent

Scholars have recently pointed to the possible changing nature of ideological polarisation. Southall (2014b: 19) questions “the [future] shape of the party system” and how the EFF, being the third largest party, could influence it. The EFF is ideologically closer to, but more radical than, the ANC. First, in the past, ideological and policy debate is widely argued to have emanated from extra-parliamentary forces, within the tripartite alliance, rather than from within parliament (Maylam, 2001: 115; Mckinley, 2001; Mills, 1999; Piper, 2004). Webster (2001: 272) goes as far as to state that the nature of political debate inside the alliance is “more significant for the future of democracy in South Africa than those taking place in parliament”. However, while most leftist criticism emerged from within the ANC, some scholars have recently claimed that such criticism will in future come from parliamentary forces like the EFF (Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014). Scholars suspect that the ANC’s response to EFF’s leftward criticism will cause the ruling party to
shift more left. Second, another implication from scholarly debate is that being a radical left party, the EFF could possibly influence the left-right direction of competition and increase polarisation within the party system. This implies that the future of democracy may lie more with parliamentary parties than the ANC’s alliance partners.

The EFF defines itself using an array of terminology such as ‘radical’, ‘socialist’, ‘left’, ‘revolutionary’ and ‘anti-capitalist’. The first group define the party as clearly leftwing due to its socialist orientation toward economic issues (Pithouse, 2013; Booysen, 2015), the second group see it as rightwing because of its racial rhetoric and anti-white stance (Friedman, 2014a), and the third group believe the party has a contradictory ideological stance — “all kinds of everything”, “a hodge-podge of ideological and political strains” (Robinson, 2014: 77; Fakir, 2013; Drew, 2015). This section analyses the first group since it pertains to the economic cleavage — which is the main concern of this research.

The attainment of political freedom in 1994, the EFF argues, is a formal matter but what is more fundamental is the lack of ‘economic freedom’. This is not a free market or centre-right ideological framework which the party makes reference to but a radical socialist definition of freedom. Its anti-capitalist stance is captured in the party’s statement that “capital dominates the world economy” and carries a negative potential “to undermine all efforts to build a better life for all people” (EFF, 2013: 11). The party not only challenges economic globalisation and South Africa’s dependency on the global economy whose major beneficiaries are corporations and individuals, but places itself firmly in the socialism of Marx.

Proceeding from a ‘Marxist-Leninist’ tradition, the party’s main focus is “economic emancipation” which is intended to “fundamentally transform the South African economy” (EFF, 2013: 8). Their primary target constituency is the working class, particularly the black majority, where the party considers itself a ‘vanguard’ of class struggle, a “mass organisation leading the revolutionary masses in the fight against the capitalist class enemy” (EFF, 2014: 2). Those who constitute the core of the party’s emancipation agenda are those who do not own the ‘means of production’; they include the: youth, homeless, rural and urban poor including informal settlement dwellers, unemployed and underemployed, and discriminated and undermined professionals.

Together with a Marxist characterisation of society and support for the working class, the party states that capitalism in South Africa places certain racial groups at certain points of the economy and is dependent on the ‘exploitation’ of poor labourers whose survival is dependent on ‘selling their labour to capitalists’. The EFF’s anti-free-market commitment and working class appeal is articulated as follows:

The basic programme of the EFF is the complete overthrow of the neoliberal anti-black state as well as the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; the establishment of the dictatorship of the people in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the triumph of socialism over capitalism.

(EFF, 2014: 2)

Our indignation at the continued economic domination of the people of South Africa and the extreme exploitation of the black working class explains where we come from, where we are, what our mission is, what our character is, and what is to be done to emancipate the black people of South Africa, the working class in particular, from economic bondage

(EFF, 2013: 1)

One of the party’s chief messages is nationalisation. Continued economic dominance of “private corporations, particularly in the natural and mineral resources sector” should “be discontinued in order to stimulate state-led and aided industrial development” (EFF, 2013: 1). The party broadly supports nationalisation; state takeover of land without compensation; 60 per cent state ownership of mines, banks and other key sectors; state-owned enterprises under workers control; the doubling
of social grants and salaries of public servants; and vigorous pursuit of BEE and AA. The EFF believes that the state should be “in command and in control of the commanding heights of South Africa’s economy” (EFF, 2013: 7). Not only does the party propose to nationalise key economic sectors but also direct state intervention toward regulating, limiting and abolishing foreign control and ownership of strategic sectors of the South African economy (EFF, 2013: 15). According to the party, these “are not dogma but ideological instruments that will guarantee our movement political and economic victory over the bourgeoisie” (Shivambu, 2014: 99).

Bringing radical socialism and anti-capitalism to the forefront of ideological debate and inciting new levels of policy-based in the party system is one matter. The other is the imminence of left-right competition and polarisation in the system. On the latter point, it is important to examine the concept of ‘party system change’. It is a situation which “occurs when a party system is transformed from one class or type of party system into another” (Mair, 1997: 51-2). Party systems are passive and “changes only through the forces acting on it”; such forces are the political parties that are part of the party system (Smith, 1989: 355). One of the aspects of party system change is ideological change, which is observed by alterations in the degree of ideological distance between parties. Party system change in the South African case would be, for instance, from moderate to polarised (Sartori, 1976). It also pertains to left-right competition, taking the form of change from one ideological bloc to another (from a centre bloc to a far left bloc) (Mair, 1997).

Previous research shows the fate of radical left parties in South Africa. Since 1994, the South African party system included far left parties who, no different from the EFF, supported radical socialism and challenged neoliberal policies. These parties included the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), and the African People’s Congress (APC) who all gained enough electoral support to represent their constituencies in parliament. However, one major commonality between these parties is poor electoral performance. Since 1994, far left parties gained an average of less than three per cent of the vote. Moreover, AZAPO was outflanked in the 2014 national election and gained no parliamentary representation, the PAC has continually faced internal organisational contestations around party leadership, and the APC has shown signs of support for the ANC. According to scholars like Schrire (2001), radical left parties have remained marginal in the party system. It might be that the EFF also falls in this category (Robinson, 2014; Booysen, 2015; Southall, 2014b).

It is indubitable that from the party self-postulation of the overthrow of capitalism, the socialist replacement and proletarian dictatorship, it is nothing less than a radical left party. Moreover, its support of nationalisation and control of key economic sectors, the promotion of state ownership of property, the expansion of the welfare state, protected industrialisation, and its attitude toward liberalised markets is further indicative of the party’s radical economic interventionism. Political moderation and pragmatism seem to fall far from the party. It seems unable to accept differing political beliefs and the idea that no one has a monopoly over truth; instead, the party embraces a highly rigid ideological position, especially on economic matters (de Jager, 2015). In addition, the literature analysis shows that the EFF may be unlikely to affect ideological change in the party system, given the unpopularity of former far left parties amongst the electorate. This research intends to further explore the EFF as a ‘polarising’ element, and whether this will contribute to increased ideological difference in the party system.
Notes

1 The apartheid government’s aim was to protect white domination in industries by devising policies favouring white labour interests. As the process of industrialisation occurred, industries developed and the wage-based economy grew. Class was deeply associated with race because the poor class, often the black population, were barred from gaining an economically prosperous life. The government set wage limits for black workers, limited their educational opportunities, and prohibited the ownership of profit-making industries by the black business class. Industrialisation led to high levels of labour migration, particularly since the discovery of diamonds and gold in the late 1800s, blacks began moving into white-dominated areas to work. Owners used cheap labour from the African reserves to sustain the developing mining industry. As the wage-based economy gradually developed, blacks remained dispossessed and exploited.

The earliest racial labour law was the Mines and Works (or ‘Colour Bar’) Act of 1911, which introduced a statutory colour bar in the economy and the principle of job reservation to protect skilled and semi-skilled white workers from black competition. It ensured that “African workers remained a peasant proletariat with one foot in the Reserves” (or the ‘homelands’ which were severely underdeveloped conditions) (Davenport, 1977: 366). In addition, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 meant that white employees could negotiate with employers for improved working conditions and wages while Africans were debarred from bargaining power and denied of the right to organise under trade unions. The Wage Act of 1925, designed to assist unskilled, poor white workers by keeping black workers under conditions and wages that suited whites, restricted black workers to the necessities of life. The apartheid government was driven by the belief that the black man was inferior, barbaric and undeveloped, and thus needed a wage that suited such characteristics. This was clearly echoed when Prime Minister, J. B. M. Hertzog stated that the system was discriminating in favour of “persons whose standard of living conforms to the standard generally recognised as tolerable from the usual European standpoint”, “persons whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities of life as understood by barbarous and undeveloped peoples” (Thompson, 2000: 168).
Chapter 4: Methodology

The methodological platform of this research is undergirded by various analytical approaches and strong theoretical claims emanating from party system polarisation literature. In this section, the methodological grounds of this study will be established. First, I outline the research question and subsidiary questions, and the research aims and objectives. Second, I situate the study as a case method, which involves looking into the specificities of the single-country approach and outlining the strategy for case selection. Third, the causal logic of this research will be outlined and defended, and hypotheses emanating from the theory will be set out. Fourth, I elaborate on the data collection and analysis techniques employed in the course of the research. Lastly, I set out the formulae used to measure fragmentation, party system polarisation and voter polarisation. This section also explains the use of the left-right scale and the particular cleavage dimension that this research is restricted to.

4.1 Research question and subsidiary questions

The guiding question of this research is: What are the determinants of ideological moderation (low left-right polarisation) in the South African party system, in the democratic period (1994 to present)? The following subsidiary questions are directly applied to the South African case and are thematically arranged:

(a) Does the proportional electoral system lead to low polarisation? Does low fragmentation account for moderation? What is the nature of the relationship between proportionalism, low fragmentation and moderation?
(b) What is the left-right preference distribution of the electorate on economic issues? Where is the median voter positioned on the left-right spectrum? Are voters policy-oriented? Do voter preferences influence party system moderation?
(c) What is the role of the dominant party in fostering moderation? What is the ANC’s ideological character and left-centre-right position? Does the ANC influence moderation of the entire system? What is the relationship between party dominance and party system moderation?
(d) Can the state of low polarisation in the party system be explained by a univariate or multivariate cause? What is the overall causal framework for party system moderation?

4.2 Research aims and objectives

The aim of this research is to explore, understand, explain and describe the causes of left-right moderation in the South African party system. The following objectives allow me to achieve this aim:

(a) Identify the main theoretical causes of party system polarisation to produce a comprehensive and theoretically-sound platform to explore the causes in the South African context, and outline the hypotheses.
(b) Unravel and discuss the state of polarisation in the South African party system by using existing literature and previous studies on party positioning and ideological differences amongst major parties.
(c) Apply hypotheses to, and test it in, the South African case by collecting and analysing data on the major causes (fragmentation, electoral systems, voters and the dominant party).
(d) Systematically measure, using appropriate formulae, (i) party system fragmentation, (ii) party positions and polarisation, and (iii) voter positions and polarisation.
(e) Establish correlations between (i) fragmentation, the electoral system and party system polarisation; (ii) voter polarisation and party system polarisation; and (iii) the dominant party and party system polarisation.
(f) Construct a causal framework from the empirical findings for the causes of low polarisation in the South African party system.

4.3 Case selection

This research is based on case selection on the dependent and independent variable, which are as follows:

(a) Dependent variable
   • Moderation in the South African party system

(b) Independent variables
   • Party system fragmentation/electoral system
   • Voter preferences
   • The major political party

By focusing on selection on the independent variable, it often clashes with the core motivation of research: to explain the occurrence of the dependent variable, the political outcome in question (King et al, 1994; Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999). “[S]electing on the dependent variable is often an outgrowth of an empirical puzzle” (Barakso et al, 2014: 182). It becomes difficult to ignore the dependent variable and simply focus on independent variables, especially when existing research attests to a well-known outcome of interest.

Also, a major drawback of selecting on the independent variable alone is that if the value of the dependent variable is already known, independent variables may be chosen in such a way that it matches up with the known value of the dependent variable (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Thus, it is justifiable and sensible to focus on the dependent variable, which in my case is low polarisation in the South African party system; and the empirical puzzle of moderate policies and programmes (especially socioeconomic) despite intense socioeconomic inequalities, PR electoral incentives, radicalised public rhetoric, and social protests.

However, I also consider independent variables. By focusing on the outcome of interest alone, it risks leaving important causal or explanatory variables unaccounted (Geddes, 1990). One is able to knock down a selection error by controlling for theoretically important factors (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Some argue that the independent variable should take greater priority in the research design. “Of course, in practice, we often cannot help but know what value the dependent variable takes for each of our cases, but the important thing is that this knowledge should not influence our selection decisions” (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 215).

Yet, the problem of selection bias does not come from explicit selection or knowledge of the dependent variable but from neglecting and not controlling for important independent variables. Thus, I argue that regardless of whether one selects his or her cases based on the independent or dependent variable, it is important that the selected cases allow for sufficient representation of both variables. Since research originates from an empirical puzzle, the outcome of interest cannot be avoided; moreover, important causal variables should be included in the case to ensure plausible and non-spurious inferences. To reduce the possibility of false inferences, implausible findings and
a spurious connection, I account for important underlying factor, as theoretically purported, that accounts for low polarisation. This includes the party system fragmentation, the electoral system, voter preference distribution, and political parties. In sum, the choice of the South African case is based upon (a) the outcome of interest: moderation, emerging from an empirical puzzle, and (b) the presence of theoretically relevant independent variables.

4.4 Causal logic and theoretical hypotheses

First, case studies are argued to best suit descriptive (causal mechanisms) than causal (causal effects) inferences. The latter is often grounded in large-n research and theory testing since the goal is to make broad inferences, and focuses on empirical evidence for an X:Y relationship (Gerring, 2004).\(^2\) It investigates the effect on Y for the presence or absence of X, establishes correlations, and uncovers the presence of significant variables and relationships. By contrast, descriptive inferences involve in-depth analysis, and is usually grounded in small-n studies and theory generation. It looks into “what connects a purported X to a particular Y”, “a pathway from X to Y”, “rather than revealing the average strength of a factor that causes an effect” (Gerring, 2004: 349, 2007: 43; Blatter, 2008: 69).\(^3\)

One of the major strengths of the case method is ‘rich description’ (Geertz, 1973). It allows for particularist and “context-dependent” information to be collected from one case “in considerable depth” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 221; Hammersley and Gomm, 2000: 3).\(^4\) “[C]ase studies can use more and more diverse indicators for representing a theoretical concept and for securing the internal validity of causal inferences and/or theoretical interpretations for these cases” (Blatter, 2008: 69). Thus, single-country studies produce conclusions that are better informed by contextual specificities and provide tremendous insight about case-based correlations and underlying factors behind relationships. Meanwhile, large-n studies are argued to sacrifice and dilute in-depth analysis (Creswell, 2007).

Gerring (2004: 341, 2007: 44), like many other scholars, subscribes to the view that the case study method “is correctly understood as a particular way of defining cases, not...a way of modelling causal relations”; since it “is difficult to arrive at a reliable estimate of causal effects across a population of cases by looking at only a single case”. Abercrombie et al (1984: 34) simply puts it that “a case study cannot provide reliable information about the broader class”. Thus, given the absence of a large-n focus, the limited generalisability, external validity and representativeness that comes from focusing on a single case, the method is used less to uncover what but more to uncover how and why the independent causes the dependent variable (the causal mechanism behind established correlations); it is also particularly strong for generating theory, and is less strong for making wider causal inferences about theory (Van Evera, 1997: 55; Flyvbjerg, 2006).\(^5\) According to this argument, testing theory seems purposeless since a theory cannot be validated or refuted on the basis of one case which is “a single example of a larger phenomenon” because the sample is far from the population mean (Gerring, 2007: 42).

However, “[t]his does not mean that case study research is not concerned with causal questions, but it usually takes the descriptive–interpretive elements more seriously” (Blatter, 2008: 68-9). Although this usually applies to situations that intend on making broad inferences from a single case study, it is less problematic when the primary goal is to establish a cause-effect relationship within the case itself, that is, not to test but generate theory as a way to explore a case.

The goal of this research is to make causal inferences for low polarisation in the South African party system by using preexisting theories as a causal framework, and is not mainly for making generalisable propositions for the entire population of moderate party systems, proportional electoral systems, low fragmented systems, moderate voters, and dominant party systems. In addition, this research not only specifies case-based correlations but also explores the reasons for how and why these causes influence moderation. Moreover, the strict dichotomy that emerges
within the debate about theory testing and theory building may not be applicable to every research design. For instance, the intention of this research is not chiefly inductive as I use existing theories and apply a theoretical causal framework to the case of South Africa. Thus, using theory may not be for the prime purpose of theory testing since it can be employed in a case-based method as a theoretical framework to guide case-based causation.

Second, case studies can, however, be used to test propositions or hypotheses albeit to a limited extent. It is argued that a single-country study can be a rigorous test for an established theory. Popper’s (1959) ‘falsification’ notion puts forward that one observation of a single black swan would falsify the propositions that ‘all swans are white’; and for Flyvbjerg (2006), one observation can indeed provide for theory testing as much as large-n studies do. Context-specific knowledge enables understanding of the universal strength or limitation of theoretical predictions, and it also enables discussion on the circumstances under which a theory might or might not apply (Smaling, 1987). In addition, “[t]hat knowledge cannot be formally generalised does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 227). In brief, the single case yields important benefits for broader theory and its evidence adds to an incremental understanding of theories.

The case method can claim some form of generalisability since it is “not idiosyncratic accounts, but because they illuminate more general issues” and may possibly pave the way for theoretical innovation (Stark and Torrence, 2005: 34). The generalisations that emerge out of case research are at best contingent, deterministic and tentative (that say “if circumstances A then outcome O”) (George and Smoke, 1974: 96; George and Bennett, 2005: 30; Donmoyer, 1990). In sum, I take the position that it is undeniable that some kind of insight, however limited that generalisable capacity might be, can be generated from a case study.

Similar to an aforementioned point, an important step to ensure a measure of validity is to situate the study in a theoretical context. According to Blatter (2008: 71), the quality of a case study does not necessarily depend on providing causal mechanisms but “on a skilful use of empirical evidence for making a convincing argument within a scholarly discourse that consists of competing or complementary theories”. This is done by using a broad theoretical framework which provides a comprehensive perspective of the case and, more importantly, allows one to rule out possible rival or alternative independent variables that might have influenced the outcome—this “enable[s] stronger causal inferences” (Shavelson and Towne, 2002: 109). In brief, paying attention to theoretically relevant explanatory variables (those that are hypothesised as crucial to explaining the observed outcome) and applying it to the case, increases the validity of the study (Creswell, 2007; Landman, 2008).

A secondary goal of this research is to use the case study to shed light on the applicability of theoretical propositions in broader party system polarisation literature. Although generalisability is not the primary goal of this research, it is implausible to suggest that one should have no interest in elaborating on broader inferences since in the end, cases find life in a wider theoretical context. I intend to contribute in some way to theoretical debate by adding evidence for the existence of a clear or ambiguous theoretical relationship. In essence, although firm, strong and robust inferences are limited and tentative conclusions are plausible. While this research uses South Africa as the single case, the findings should not be ruled out or unlinked to broader theory.

Third, I specify the theory under investigation, and state the expectation and predication emerging from theoretical schools (hypotheses) about what I should observe in the case and what I should observe if it is false (Van Evera, 1997). In the previous chapter, I outlined the main theoretical schools which account for the outcome of polarisation and moderation. The main hypothesised relationships emerging out of the three main schools (I include fragmentation and electoral systems as one school), that will be applied to the South African party system, are as follows:
(a) The institutionalist perspective
- Hypothesis a: Different levels of party system fragmentation and different electoral systems have varied effects on the degree of party system polarisation.
- Hypothesis a1: Low party system fragmentation (often found in two-party systems) is conducive to moderate polarisation and centripetal competition (moderation).
- Hypothesis a2: High party system fragmentation (often found in multiparty systems) is conducive to high polarisation and centrifugal competition (polarisation).

(b) The sociological perspective
- Hypothesis b: Voter positions and polarisation affect party positions and party system polarisation—parties respond to social divisions and shift their ideology in response to shifting voter preferences, and the party system reflects divisions at the social-electorate level.
- Hypothesis b1: If the median voter is centrist and voters are not polarised, parties will shift their positions toward the centre, and the party system will reflect low ideological differentiation (moderation).
- Hypothesis b2: If the median voter is extremist and voters are polarised, parties will shift their positions toward the extremes, and the party system will reflect high ideological differentiation (polarisation).

(c) The party-centric perspective
- Hypothesis c: Party system polarisation is dependent upon the ideological character of political parties.
- Hypothesis c1: Parties facilitate ideological similarities or low polarisation within the party system when electorally relevant parties occupy the same side of the political spectrum, and are in the centre (moderation).
- Hypothesis c2: Parties facilitate ideological differentiation or high polarisation within the party system when electorally relevant parties occupy separate sides of the political spectrum, and are on the extremes (polarisation).

4.5 Data collection and analysis

This research relies on primary and secondary data collection. By using multiple forms of data (interviews, surveys and document analysis) validity and reliability of the findings are established; it also helps to minimise subjectivity bias. Essentially, it provides for corroboration and stronger substantiation of constructs: “[w]hen a pattern from one data source is corroborated by the evidence from another, the finding is stronger and better grounded” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541; Creswell, 2007). Subsequently, it allows for convergent data, that is, multiple data sources leading to similar conclusions; and ‘a chain of evidence’ (Yin, 1981: 63). By corroborating data, I strengthen claims about underlying causes and relationships.

4.5.1 Interviews

I conducted a number of interviews with party leaders and party officials. Interview-based research is advantageous because it sheds light on puzzling questions and respondents can provide rich information on this. In addition, direct statements from interviewees “are more valuable in terms of impact and credibility” especially when compared to indirect methods of data collection (Matthews and Ross, 2010; Lilleker, 2003; Rathbun, 2008: 693). This method is useful for this research which focuses on developing an explanatory framework for the moderate ideological nature of the South African party system. It is most beneficial for two main reasons: it allows me to interact with
parties, as one of the main representatives of the electorate, to better understand voter preference distribution; and to unearth the reasons for centrist and mixed positions of the ANC.

To identify potential respondents I used snowballing sampling which is used when “the researcher may not be aware, at the outset, of all the relevant players involved” (Barbour and Schostak, 2005: 44; Mosley, 2013). However, the technique is bias because the researcher becomes trapped in a network of people who see the world through the same lens. Hence, I also employed purposive sampling where I identified potential interviewees because of their unique ability to provide rich responses to the phenomenon (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013; Rathbun, 2008: 688). Interviewees were recruited through email and phone invitations —email invitations included the participant information sheet, consent form and the ethics protocol number. The information sheet and consent form sent to interviewees were similar to one used to invite parties (see Appendix E to G for the participant information sheet, consent form and ethics clearance certificate).

One of the major problems I encountered during the data collection stage was the low response rate. Many of those identified as best placed for providing rich responses were unavailable. I tried to minimise non-response by continuously prompting potential interviewees and using convenience but purposive sampling in the event of individuals becoming unavailable. However, even the latter were unavailable or in most cases were unable to be contacted.

Interviews on the (a) proportional electoral system included party leaders and officials. I also interviewed individuals who were present during CODESA, MPNP and CA deliberations; this included: Frank Madlalose, Ken Andrew, Kenneth Meshoe, Pieter Mulder, Roelf Meyer, and Tony Leon. This attributes a degree of reliability to the findings, especially those pertaining to the reasons motivating the transition from the plurality to the proportional system. Interviews on the (b) voters also included party leaders and officials; it was broadly representative of those parties in parliament as at the 2014 general election, this included: the ACDP, AIC, ANC, APC, COPE, DA, EFF, FFP, IFP, NFP, PAC and the UDM. These parties are able to offer reliable information about the left-right distribution of the electorate and the moderate-extremist character of citizens; the presence of policy and non-policy voting; causes behind the moderate or extremist character of voters; and the connection between party policy and voter preoccupations.

Interviews that focused on the (c) ANC included former ANC members, alliances partners (SACP and COSATU), NEDLAC representatives, and those representing business. The response rate for the ANC was particularly low; I only managed to interview one former senior official: Frank Chikane. I interviewed a couple of individuals from the SACP (Alex Mashilo and Jeremy Cronin) and COSATU (Patrick Craven, William Madisha and Zakhele Cele). I also interviewed Saki Macozama, the President of Business Leadership South Africa and a former ANC MP.

While I focus on the SACP, COSATU and the business sector to ascertain the ideological character of the ANC, I find that including the statutory bargaining institution, NEDLAC, is particularly beneficial. Since NEDLAC is a body that helps to develop consensus around socioeconomic issues, is a place for national dialogue amongst salient stakeholders, and seeks to avoid the unilateral determination of economic policy; it allows me to broadly uncover the government’s, and by extension the ANC’s, relationship with and attitude towards business and labour, and the general left-right posturing of the party. Senior officials within NEDLAC, who observe the bargaining process, are able to provide reliable information on this. I interviewed two former Executive Directors (Phillip Dexter and Herbert Mhkize) of NEDLAC and the current Executive Director (Madoda Vilakazi). A multi-sectoral interview approach on the ANC helps me to corroborate results and minimise the error that came through non-responses from the side of the ANC.

A total of 26 interviews were conducted, as outlined in Table 4.1 and 4.2. I initially targeted 50+ interviews but the non-response rate of participants meant that there was not much progress to get more individuals that were capable of providing rich responses to the questions. This was the case for the ANC, SACP, COSATU and organised business. Given that interviews were wide-ranging and included a diversity of representatives, it minimised skewed data from non-responses (Bleich
Interviews were conducted mainly by phone—they were recorded and then transcribed. Interviews followed a semi-structured format, where I asked questions appropriate for each party (see Appendix A to D for questions). I relied on a structured format because the main objective was to compare responses across a range of interviews; a completely open-ended format cannot do this (Ayres, 2008; Firmin, 2008; Rathbun, 2008). It means that respondents “are given equal opportunities to provide data across the same research constructs” (Firmin, 2008: 837; Leech, 2002: 667). By ensuring stability of the measure, the reliability of the data is increased (Matthews and Ross, 2010). Also, questions were guided by theoretical topics, and this also enhances the content and construct validity of the data (Qu and Dumay, 2011: 246; Matthews and Ross, 2010: 221; Morgan and Guevara, 2008; Wilson and Sapsford, 2006).

Table 4.1 Interviews conducted on the electoral system and voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Mphontsheane</td>
<td>Former MP of the IFP</td>
<td>8 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantu Holomisa</td>
<td>Leader of the UDM</td>
<td>2 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bheki Gumbi</td>
<td>Acting national chairperson of the NFP</td>
<td>27 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Madlalose</td>
<td>Headed the IFP delegation to CODESA</td>
<td>26 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godrich Gardee</td>
<td>MP in the EFF’s parliamentary caucus</td>
<td>26 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Moakes</td>
<td>Head of policy at the DA</td>
<td>8 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Andrew</td>
<td>Former head of policy at the DA and part of the CA</td>
<td>26 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Meshoe</td>
<td>Leader of the ACDP and part of the CA</td>
<td>21 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luthando Mbinda</td>
<td>Leader of the PAC</td>
<td>27 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandla Galo</td>
<td>Leader of the AIC</td>
<td>23 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosiuoa Lekota</td>
<td>Leader of COPE</td>
<td>20 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pieter Mulder</td>
<td>Leader of the FFP and part of CODESA and the MPNP</td>
<td>20 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roelf Meyer</td>
<td>Chief negotiator for the NP during the transition talks</td>
<td>19 October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themba Godi</td>
<td>Leader of the APC</td>
<td>22 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Leon</td>
<td>Former leader of the DA and part of CODESA and the MPNP</td>
<td>14 September 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 16
4.5.2 Surveys

Given the scepticism about the empirical data produced using interviews, especially advanced by positivists, that denounce it as subjective interpretations, I enhance the validity of the data by corroborating it with survey information. This mainly pertains to the preference distribution of the electorate. This includes both general and salient economic issues that are either on or can be placed on a left-right scale. A range of surveys that focus on voter perceptions and public opinions were examined from 1982 to 2016. This includes Afrobarometer, CSES, EPOP, IDASA, SASAS and WVS surveys. No particular survey is given more prominence over others. Instead, surveys are primarily selected based on their questions. In some cases surveys ask commensurate questions (with only minor terminological differences or a different scale) in different years; I rely on multiple surveys to draw data for one question. And from this, longitudinal data on particular questions can be obtained.

In most cases survey data is reconstituted to reflect certain categories. The data in its original form does not add value to this study unless when attached to particular categories. Beside plotting mean and standard deviation measures, I draw out (a) left-right bloc competition in the electorate; and use the (b) 10-point scale on economic issues in two ways. Surveys that use the 10-point scale asks citizens to select 1 and 10 for total agreement on two different statements. For instance, on the issue of privatisation, surveys took 1 as total agreement with the statement that private ownership of business and industry should be increased, and 10 as total agreement with the statement that government ownership of business and industry should be increased. First, I merged categories 1, 2, 46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alex Mashilo</td>
<td>SACP spokesperson</td>
<td>25 October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Chikane</td>
<td>Former director general in the Presidency</td>
<td>9 November 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Mhkize</td>
<td>Former executive director of NEDLAC</td>
<td>24 October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Cronin</td>
<td>Deputy secretary general SACP and deputy minister of public works</td>
<td>13 October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madoda Vilakazi</td>
<td>Executive director of NEDLAC</td>
<td>16 November 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Craven</td>
<td>Former spokesperson of COSATU</td>
<td>1 November 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillip Dexter</td>
<td>Former executive director of NEDLAC</td>
<td>21 October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saki Macozama</td>
<td>President of Business Leadership South Africa and former ANC MP</td>
<td>14 November 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Madisha</td>
<td>Former President of COSATU</td>
<td>28 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakhele Cele</td>
<td>Secretariat Coordinator COSATU</td>
<td>21 October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9, 10 as ‘strongly agree’; 3, 4, 7, 8 as ‘agree’ or ‘somewhat agree’; and 5 and 6 as ‘don’t agree with either’ or ‘in-between’.

Second, although some surveys simply ask respondents to agree or disagree with a statement, the use of a 10-point scale suggests that it is possible to measure intensity of choice. In this way, I plotted these results on a 10-point left-right scale. The following categories were assigned on top of the categories above: far-right (1.00), far-left (-1.00) (strongly agree); centre-right (0.50), centre-left (-0.50) (agree/somewhat agree); centre (0.0) (don’t agree with either/in-between). Finally, I use this reconstituted data to derive a set of statistical findings such as voter mean positions, polarisation and correlation coefficients.

These surveys use (a) a sampling methodology that permit country-wide generalisations. Beside the large number of participates that are often proportionate to the population size (as Table 4.3 shows), surveys are based on a nationally representative random sample that considers all demographic groups and geographic areas in the country, and are further stratified according to other criteria. It is most common for the sample to be stratified according to salient elements like province, rural-urban, racial group, age, gender, education, and income. Data taken from between 1982 to 1993, mainly from WVS, contained a population of interest which was all adults (18+) in South Africa (it was not exclusive to the white population) and was nationally representative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>N range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrobarometer</td>
<td>2 200 to 2 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSES</td>
<td>1 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPOP</td>
<td>2 672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDASA</td>
<td>2 406 to 3 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASAS</td>
<td>2 744 to 5 734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVS</td>
<td>1 596 to 3 531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the sample size and methodology of these surveys are representative of the universe from which it was selected (according to the voting population, geographical and demographic representation), it allows for results to be projected to the universe: the South African electorate and the broader population. In addition, most of them provide (b) replicated modules, periodic and time-series data on the country’s changing social attitudes. In sum, these surveys constitute a highly useful resource that provides reliable and credible information on social perceptions and enable valid country-wide inferences.

### 4.5.3 Document collection

The major strength of document collection is that documents contain large amounts of information which assist in qualitative research enquiry. They are static and present a snapshot of a particular time; documents enable assessment of the immediate and changing context (Matthews and Ross, 2010: 278; Stark and Torrence, 2005). I primarily use this method to provide a descriptive and explanatory discussion of the ANC and assess whether it contributes to low polarisation of the party.
system. It is also beneficial for validity because it helps to compare derived patterns with the interview data.

One limitation of the method is that it is subject to interpretation and subjective bias since one cannot exactly know the meaning of the content. To prevent this, I use thematic analysis, that is, collecting documents on the same topic, and analysing it within the theme; I also refer back to the literature on the topics. This increases validity of the document collection and analysis.

The type of content used in this study include: (a) macroeconomic policies and (b) party documents. First, I analysed economic policy from 1994 to 2012, this encompassed of the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP); Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR); Accelerated and Shared Growth (ASGISA); New Growth Path (NGP); and the National Development Plan (NDP). Second, numerous ANC documents were examined, this consisted of: national consultative conference reports, national conference addresses, national executive committee statements and NEC Bulletin, president’s political reports, discussion documents, reports on tripartite alliance summits, Mayibuye, ANC Today, and Umrabulo. Most of the content is sourced from the ANC’s historical archives website, parliamentary and government online repositories, and other historical archival channels.

Sampling validity is enhanced because this research considers the document collection representative of the ANC, it is not a collection of a single type of content (Lederman, 1991). Data collection is also reliable because it uses credible documents and reports, especially from trusted online sites and channels.

4.5.4 Data analysis

A mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis is used in this research; each one best suits different sections. The main benefit of qualitative research, as a more ‘word-centred’ approach, is that it provides for more detailed analysis of complex patterns (Creswell, 2007; Gerring, 2007; Travis, 1999). Qualitative analysis is most appropriate for discussing, especially from interview data, the proportional electoral system and the rationale for adopting the system, the preference distribution of voters, and the ANC (this includes explaining the party’s position on economic policies, its relationship with the SACP, and its understanding of global economic dynamics and the business enterprise). Here, results cannot be translated into a statistical score.

Quantitative analysis is used for two sections of this research: the proportional system and the electorate. On the former, I use formulae to establish party system fragmentation, party left-right positions, and party system polarisation. On the latter, I focus on extrapolating survey data using graphical and statistical interpretation of results—in most cases it is in the form of mean estimates and measures of standard deviation—I also measure voter polarisation. In brief, quantitative analysis focuses on mean and standard deviation estimates, and correlation coefficients. This was calculated either by hand or computed using Apple’s Numbers and Microsoft’s Excel.

The process of analysis involved, first, identification of patterns and general tendencies in the data (Kalof et al, 2008; Van Evera, 1997). Data was often divided into themes to ensure comparison, validity and reliability—this was especially the case for content analysis which systematically classified sentences and phrases into meaningful themes (Krippendorff, 1980, 2004). During the data collection process, the following major categories or themes emerged:

(a) Electoral system: proportional representation
- Plurality electoral laws
- British, Westminster model
- Winner-takes-all effect, first-past-the-post
- Consensus, negotiations
- Minorities, empowerment, fear
Accommodation, inclusion, representation, fairness
Peace, political stability, conflict, violence, unrest, civil war
Unity, racial reconciliation
Voter registration, districts, constituencies, procedure, closed-list, democratisation
Global shifts, group rights
Party positions, left-right placement
Party system fragmentation, number of parties, relevant parties, seat share

(b) The South African electorate
Type of voter (ideological, non-ideological or other)
Left-right self-placement, political scale, citizen placement of parties
Moderate, centrist, radical, extremist voters
Reasons for particular voter characterisation
Key voter concerns, voter preoccupation, priority issues, most important concerns
Government intervention and management, state ownership, government-run economy
Market intervention and management, private ownership, market-run economy
Income equality, income differences
State-led land repossession, land seizure and confiscation, property rights, security of tenure
Political interest, policy understanding, issue-voting, importance and complexity of politics
Competitive politics, policy choices, party differences

(c) The dominant party: The ANC
Party economic policies: RDP, GEAR, ASGISA, NGP, NDP
Radical economic transformation, developmental state, NDR, Freedom Charter
Government’s attitude toward and relations with business and labour
SACP’s attitude toward the ANC’s economic policies
Business’s perspective of the ANC’s economic policies
Ideology, rigidity, pragmatism, capitalism, neoliberalism, communism, socialism, revolution
ANC’s centre-leftism and moderation, social democracy, mixed economy
ANC discrediting communism, the ultra-left
Partnership, alliance, coalition, unity, political freedom, apartheid
Open debate, tolerance, organisational discipline
A new world, globalised capitalism, free-market economy
Intra-party pluralism, accommodation, inclusion, mass party, broad church, multi-class
Nationalisation, land redistribution, property rights

I relied on hand-coding due to the small-n of documents and to avoid some of pitfalls that often burden computer-assisted qualitative software (Hopkins and King, 2010; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). Interpretative validity was enhanced by looking for points of agreement and disagreements, especially in interview data (Mosley, 2013; Mikhaylov et al, 2012; Klingemann et al, 2006).

Collected data was analysed, second, by comparing the empirical findings with initially stipulated theoretical relationships to see if there is a match between the empirical and the theoretical (Yin, 2013: 324). In other terms, “reporting is oriented towards theoretical explanations of the action and contributing to social theory” (Stark and Torrence, 2005: 34). This included searching for convergence and non-convergence in relation to theory. Third, I also focus on obtaining causal strength: the magnitude and consistency of X’s effect on Y across the cases (Gerring, 2007: 54). According to Gerring (2007), that A, B, C are present is sufficient to establish them as independent causal variables for the case in question.
4.6 Measuring fragmentation and polarisation

4.6.1 Fragmentation

The standard measure of the ‘Effective Number of Parties’ (ENP) is used. It measures the levels of fragmentation that exists within the party system. The formula is a derivative of the party system fractionalisation/fragmentation index put forward by Rae (1971). I use a reformulated version of Rae’s index as proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979): the Laakso-Taagerera index—I refer to it as the ‘Fragmentation Index’ (FI) and it is used interchangeably with the ENP. The chief strength of the FI is that it counts parties in the legislature by weighting them by their relative strength in terms of vote or seat share so that one can gauge the ‘effective’ or ‘relevant’ number of parties in the system, and it discounts the relevance of small parties (Dalton, 2008). The formula is computed as follows, as stated in Dalton (2008: 917):

$$\text{Effective Number of Parties} = \frac{1}{\sum (\text{party seat share in legislature})^2}$$

where i represents the individual party.

Although this is an inverse of the Herfindahl index, a correlation between this and the Laakso-Taagerera index reveal an $r = .92$, which implies that they are interchangeable measures (Dalton, 2008). For the measure of fragmentation, I use seat share because electoral results for the apartheid period were mainly in the form of seats won—this enables me to compare both the apartheid and democratic levels of party system fragmentation—and I am interested in those parties who gain formal representation in the legislature.

The FI does not have a prescribed range since the score is limited by the party system. A hypothetical FI score of 8 implies there is more or less 8 parties (although not necessarily 8 since 8 parties would have to equally share in the vote), a value of 2 implies that between 1 to 3, gain a significant vote share. In general, however, according to scholars like Sartori (1976), more than 5 parties implies a fragmented system; while inline with two-party theory, less than 3 parties produce a system with low fragmentation.

Also, one cannot have an FI that is bigger than the actual number of parties in the legislature. In South Africa, the mean number of actual parties from 1994 to 2014 is 12 which means the ENP would not exceed greater than 12. Thus, the ENP score can be compared with the actual number of parties to gauge whether the score is indicative of low or high fragmentation.

4.6.2 Party positions

A measure of party system polarisation depends on two things: party left-right positions and party vote share. For the former, I rely on a unidimensional numerical left-right scale (RILE index)—I refer to this as the ‘Ideological Index’ (ID)—which is a manifesto-based approach to measuring party positions. As there are limited sources of a systematic measure of the ideological characterisation of South African parties, I use a data base generated by my Master’s dissertation which relies on the RILE index (Rohanlall, 2014). Moreover, surveys have not consistently asked citizens to place parties on the continuum (citizen placement of parties constitutes an important measure of party positions and party system polarisation), thus, citizen placement of parties cannot be relied upon.\textsuperscript{19}
The main strength of the measure is that it provides a good rendition of where parties stand in a particular point in time and its position in relation to other parties, it also allows one to track changes in party positions (Budge and Meyer, 2013).

The number of statements, deduced from manifestos, pertaining to the left and right side is summed. The final score is, according to Budge (2013):

\[
\text{RILE Index} = \frac{\text{Right} - \text{Left}}{\text{Right} + \text{Left}}
\]

It yields an index of -1.00 to +1.00 where - refers to left emphases and + to right emphases. I further employ the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Far left</th>
<th>Moderate left</th>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Moderate right</th>
<th>Far right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.50 to -1.00</td>
<td>-0.01 to -0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01 to 0.49</td>
<td>0.50 to 1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using this latter index assists in comparing party positions to voter positions from citizen self-placement data. The -1 to 1 scale is similar to the measure used by surveys that measure voter positions — it often employs an eleven-point scale, 0 to 10: where 0 is far left or communist, 5 is centre, and 10 is far right or conservative.

However, the controversy around the measure is that it (a) summarises numerous policy categories into one unidimensional scale, and (b) pertains to saliency of statements. On the first matter, for scholars like Jahn (2011), it is not always theoretically or methodologically consistent to merge categories like social, political and economic as it distorts the overall left-right score for a party (for instance, where a party emphasises more right elements in the economic and more left elements on the social and political, the score is skewed to the left). In this sense, I focus on one domain: the economic. In other terms, my study is restricted to the economic cleavage dimension.

On the second matter, it is possible to gauge whether a party is radical or moderate on the left-right by adding a qualitative element. Table 4.4 outlines the economic elements and the scale attached to it. Given that my research is based on a small-n, it is possible to compare the saliency delivered by the RILE with specific manifesto statements to place parties within a centrist-extremist scale.

One of the basic assumptions of this research is that party systems can be spatially mapped on a left-right continuum. I concur with the criticisms of using a single dimension; which states that politics is too complex to assign one dimension, especially since salient cleavage may revolve around race, ethnicity and religion and may even be unrelated to the left-right descriptions (Stokes, 1963). As Sigelman and Yough (1978: 356) posited, “many salient issues are not reducible to left-right terms” and by focusing on ‘left-right’ party positions and polarisation, one ignores other potentially polarising political and social issues in society. However, a comprehensive assessment of political disagreements, differences and conflicts is not the objective of this research; my analysis is restricted to party positions and party system polarisation in the economic dimension which can be placed on the classic left-right continuum.

Although ‘left-right’ means something different in every context, in South Africa it is a well-used political jargon in intra- and inter-party debate. It mostly refers to the socioeconomic cleavage, where parties use terms such as ‘left’ and ‘right’ to differentiate themselves from other parties on salient economic issues. If parties themselves use this dimension and given that this politicisation is frequently associated with the economic domain, it is reasonable to make use of a single left-right
4.6.3 Polarisation

4.6.3.1 Party system polarisation

What the RILE index does is to assume that parties are ranked according to their ideological base, this however does not make assumptions about their relative size. Thus, there is a different measure for party system polarisation. The ‘Polarisation Index’ (PI) consists of plotting left-right scores for parties against their share of votes—the value on the left-right is weighted on the basis of the electoral strength of parties (Taylor and Herman, 1971; Sigelman and Yough, 1978; Ersson and Lane, 1982; Dalton and Anderson, 2011; Lachat, 2008; Sorensen, 2014). So, “for any party system, the measurement of polarisation consists of plotting each party’s left-right score against its share of votes in a national election” (Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 357). The PI enables one to calculate the value of ideological difference for the whole party system; it is essentially “how party system profiles can be generated and translated into quantitative scores” (Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 357).
I use Taylor and Herman’s (1971: 34) index which is represented as, as stated in Lachat (2008: 691):

\[ V = \sum_{j=1}^{J} w_j (p_j - \bar{p})^2 \]

\[ \bar{p} = \sum_{j=1}^{J} w_j p_j \]

where \( w_j \) is the vote share of party \( j \), \( p_j \) is the position of party \( j \) on the left-right scale, and \( \bar{p} \) is the weighted average position on this scale (as shown in the second part of the formula).

For left-right positions, I use scores generated by the RILE index. I also focus on vote share, unlike Taylor and Herman (1971) who measure support by percentage of seats, because using the percentage of votes minimises the distorting effects of electoral systems—which tend to distort the distribution of popular support (Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 366).

The PI uses a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 is unpolarised (all parties are on the same position on the left-right spectrum) and 1 means highly polarised (all parties are divided on the two extremes of the left-right spectrum, with both opposite party groups having the same vote share).\(^{21}\) The highest possible polarisation score, 1, would be seen when one party has 50% of support and is located on the extreme left pole and the other party also has 50% but is on the extreme right pole. The least possible polarisation, 0, would be seen when one party or many relevant parties occupy a single position anywhere on the left-right continuum (Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 357).

The main alternative to this is an unweighted measure of party system polarisation. The two formulae from Sigelman and Yough (1978: 357) (unweighted measure) and Lachat (2008: 691) (weighted measure) are derivatives from Taylor and Herman (1971: 34) and includes party vote share as a major variable. Having the latter as a variable ensures that larger parties have a greater relevance on the PI index as compared to smaller parties. When compiling the variance, Lachat did not use the party system mean of left-right scores as per Taylor and Herman but rather carried out a weighted average of the left-right scores, thus introducing the vote share element twice. This entails that larger parties have an added relevance on the final PI index relative to smaller parties. A correlation score between the two methods yields an \( r = .83 \). This means that the two methods produce relatively similar results. However, Lachat’s formula was preferred because of the added relevance he accords to major parties: it better reflects system dynamics where larger parties have a bigger influence on party system polarisation.

### 4.6.3.2 Voter polarisation

First, to gauge the left-right positions of citizens, I use survey data that includes questions about citizen self-placement on the political scale. This scale provides for an estimate of voter direction and strength. In other words, whether voters are more leftist, rightist or centrist; and whether they are moderate or radical on this scale. From this, the position of the median voter can be identified. Surveys also ask citizens to locate major parties on this scale.\(^ {22}\)

On voter self-positioning, according to Inglehart (1990), most citizens in most nations can locate themselves on the left-right scale, irrespective of whether the polity falls under an advanced democracy. Nonetheless, the main problem with using citizen self-placement data is that citizens, when questioned about left and right positions, respond based on country-specific discourse where in such contexts the meaning of left-right varies, and also individuals have different interpretations of the scale (Powell, 2009).\(^ {23}\) There is an obvious lack of political sophistication on the part of the voter who might be ignorant, subject to stereotypes or engage in non-ideological issues. So, if citizens place themselves and parties, the ‘true’ position might never be known (Powell, 2009; Dalton, 2008).
However, it can be assumed that (a) voters are neither completely ignorant nor highly sophisticated about the scale; (b) less informed citizens can truthfully choose ‘don’t know’, ‘neutral’, ‘haven’t heard of the left-right’ or ‘non-politically aligned’—this minimises inaccuracies in the median voter position; and (c) survey information provides an unparalleled, reliable and indispensable source of information about voter left-right positions—especially when there is no alternative measure (Granberg and Brown, 1992; Dalton and Tanaka, 2007).

Since citizens may have varied interpretation of the left-right scale, I corroborate self-placement data with specific data on citizen positions on economic issues. The major advantage of this is that each citizen interprets his or her position on a specific economic issue. Since questions do not directly pertain to a left-right scale, it uses a ten-point scale (that for instance refers to 1 as more government intervention and 10 as more market intervention); this scale can be translated into a left-centre-right scale (especially given that economic issues can be easily located on an ideological continuum). This rests on the assumption that citizens are capable of interpreting their positions on salient economic matters relative to South Africa.

Second, it is less conventional to measure voter polarisation but this is not impossible. Given that one of the major objectives of this research is to compare party system polarisation with voter polarisation to deduce if a relationship exists between the two, it is important to measure the latter. There is obviously one problem: while voter left-right positions can be easily obtained, there is no seat or vote share for voters; they are obviously not like parties whose seat share can be inputted in the party system polarisation index. According to Taylor and Herman (1971: 34), who popularised the formula for ideological difference between parties and uses a single left-right dimension, the PI is a “usual variance statistic”: it is a measure of the variance of the left-right score of each party relative to the average or weighted average of the party system left-right score. This means that one has to remove the seat-vote share element and focus on voter polarisation as a measure of standard deviation (Ezrow et al, 2013). From this, the distance between voters can be identified, and compared to party system polarisation. I corroborate voter polarisation from self-placement data and voter polarisation from economic issues data to gain an overall sense of voter polarisation in South Africa.
Exploratory analysis is “well suited for studying a substantive area about which little is known in order to
describe phenomena in detail” (Kalof et al, 2008: 83). Explanatory analysis seeks to explain patterns related
to the phenomena, this often means examining causal relationships and is a (dis-)confirmatory factor analysis
designed to test hypotheses (Onwuegbuzie and Hitchcock, 2015; Yin, 2013). Descriptive analysis offer a
descriptive account of the outcome of interest, it involves what and how questions, somewhat merging cause
effect and causal mechanisms.

Y refers to the dependent variable, which is the effect. X is the independent variable, which is the cause. The
‘causal’ or ‘treatment’ variable is the variable that could plausibly be the cause of the outcome (Herron and
Quinn, 2014). Two types of causal estimation exist when one is examining causal effects: effects of causes
and causes of effects (Holland, 1986; Gerring, 2007). The ‘effects of causes’ particularly concerns a situation
where the outcome is being explained together with the independent variables—such as what is the effect of
a proportional electoral system, a centrist dominant party, and a moderate electorate on the party system?
This extensively explores the implication produced for the wider social and political system. The ‘causes of
effects’, by contrast, prioritises a causal than an effect analysis—such as what causes a moderate party
system, how does a centrist party, a propositional electoral system, and a moderate electorate decrease
polarisation?

Proponents of causal mechanisms criticise large-n, causal-effect research, for the lack of understanding it
generates on the causal mechanisms behind the proposed causal relationship, since it does not ‘connect’ or
‘join the dots’ between an X:Y, causal-effect relationship; and the ‘thin’, reductionist and simplistic
connections it makes (George and Bennett, 2005; Brady and Collier, 2004). These scholars argue that case
studies focusing on causal mechanisms allows one to “peer into the box of causality to locate the
intermediate factors lying between some structural cause and its purported effect” (Gerring, 2007: 103,
emphasis added).

Depth can be understood as the “detail, richness, completeness, wholeness” of the information (Gerring,
2007: 49; Blatter, 2008: 69).

A critical trade-off for the case method is that by focusing on internal validity, external validity is sacrificed.
By limiting the number of cases, the method is more intensive than extensive and hence sacrifices the
capacity to make broad generalisations and inferences for a wider population (Lijphart, 1971; Landman,
2008). As such, the method is viewed by some with extreme circumspection as an inferior research method.
‘External validity’ is the capacity of a study to make generalisations about a broader population, sometimes
universal generalisations; ‘internal validity’ is the credibility of inferences concerning the causal effect,
mechanisms and relationships under investigation. ‘Generalisability’ and ‘representativeness’ refer to “the
degree to which causal relationships evidenced by that single unit may be assumed to be true for a larger set
of (unstudied) units” (Gerring, 2004: 348). In sum, unlike positivist methods that aspire toward
generalisation, based on large-n studies that are probabilistic or randomly selected samples, cases studies are
limited in its capacity to generalise beyond the respective case.

In so doing, it helps to militate against the problem of having too many inferences and too few observations
(King et al, 1994).

Multiple methods and data are essentially used to address the same question, to corroborate findings, and to
show that “those findings are unlikely to be the result of measurement biases” (Vanderstoep and Johnston,
2009: 179; Bloor et al, 2002: 12). In the end, it increases confidence in the research findings.

An interview is a conversation between the researcher and the participant and is one of the main data
collection methods used by social scientists.

Snowballing is also valuable because people are more likely to respond through referrals (Bleich and
Pekkanen, 2013).

During the process of convenience sample, I ensured that those who are available still met the criteria for selection (deMarrais, 2004).

Numerous calls to Luthuli House (ANC’s head office) were largely unproductive, people were unable to provide contact details for individuals especially those who previously worked for the ANC. Alternative avenues such as searches on the internet also yielded very little information.

First, data collection over the phone is a popular method as it allows for information to be collected quickly (Kalof et al, 2008). It is advised that the phone interview be short to avoid fatigue of the participant (Kalof et al, 2008). The use of voice and video calling software like Skype or Zoom is becoming popular for modern researchers, however the only challenge is participants’ access to fast internet and knowledge of how to use the software (Deakin and Wakefield, 2014). Second, on the recording and transcribing, voice recordings are able to enhance the reliability of the findings and as such I ensured that the voice quality was free from distortions and was clear; I also transcribed the material to avoid any criticism directed towards the accuracy of the findings (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013; Walliman, 2001).

Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher “to explore with the participant different aspects of the social phenomenon” and to elaborate on it (Matthews and Ross, 2010: 224). Having a relatively structured format with a rigorous design produces more engagement from interviewees (deMarrais, 2004: 67).

The subjectivity is argued to contribute to the “unreliable, impressionistic, and not objective” element in interview research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 12). See Rathburn (2008) and Mosley (2013) for multi-method data collection; deMarrais (2004) and Thody (2006) for problems like lengthy and general interview questions;

In the case of IDASA surveys, the task team used a multi-stage, area stratified probability sampling methodology. This was stratified by province, population group and community size (metro, city, large town, small town, village and rural)—metropolitan areas were stratified into ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ settlements to ensure good representation. Afrobarometer Rounds employed a similar method. CSES Module 3, similar to IDASA and Afrobarometer surveys, based itself on census-enumerated geographical areas that encompass primary sampling units; and a random, nationally representative, stratified, probability cluster sample proportionate to the population size. Under the auspices of the HSRC, both EPOP and SASAS surveys were also a stratified random nationally representative sample; the same applies for WVS waves.

“Qualitative studies often weave together extensive quotes, detailed descriptions and a researcher’s observations of the subject matter to tell a story about an event, phenomenon or set of experiences or behaviours” (Kalof et al, 2008: 82).

“Content analysis is a technique used to analyse texts, whether written, spoken or visual” (Kalof et al, 2008: 105; Stone et al, 1966: 5). It is a well-known method in political science. Validity is often increased by developing themes and codes which are linked to theory. For Poole and Folger (1981: 477) a coding scheme “is essentially a translation device that allows investigators to place utterances into theoretical categories”. Moreover, content analysis, especially, requires face or practical validity where “the coding system is logically consistent and the categories clearly defined” (Folger et al, 1984: 137).

I spatially mapped party positions from 1994 to 2009, I further added 2014 to the analysis—these years are based on election manifestos emerging from general elections.

Characterising parties in terms of their standing on the left-right continuum is often related to a positive-negative scale, the positive indicates the right, the negative indicates the left (Janda, 1970, 1975; Dodd, 1974).

In all, large parties at the centre or on any one side of the scale generates low polarisation but if there are a number of large parties at the left-right extremes it produces a high polarisation (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007).
On voter positioning of parties, it should not be confused with questions on party identification—which involves how close one feels to a party, seeking to measure the strength of party loyalty and predict average levels of electoral volatility—this specifically relates to ideological identification and placement on a left-right ideological scale (Lewis-Beck and Chlarson, 2002).

For the purposes of cross-national studies, it becomes an appropriate research strategy to avoid absolute or thick meanings of what constitutes the left-right scale but to employ loose categories that have room to be country-specific, yet theoretically relevant (Jahn, 2011).
Chapter 5: Moderation and Centre-Positioning under Proportional Electoral Laws

This chapter examines whether the South African electoral system is a causal determinant of party system moderation. It first discusses the transition from plurality to proportional representation (PR) and assesses the underlying motivations for the adoption of the latter. Here, much of the decision to adopt PR rested with the ANC's commitment to compromise and desire for political stability which largely facilitated the moderation that went behind the PR decision. Second, it interrogates the theoretical claim that the proportional electoral system produces a highly fragmented party system, that is, a large number of competing parties; and extremist party positioning and a highly polarised party system. It also critically assesses the claim that centrist occupation fosters extremism and polarisation. Third, a final discussion of the relationship between the electoral system and polarisation forms the last part of the analysis. This chapter relies on interview data, document and manifesto analysis; and systematically measures party system fragmentation, party left-right positions, and party system polarisation. The main finding is that the phenomenon of low polarisation is unrelated to the electoral system. A more plausible causal determinant appears to be the presence of the dominant party, the ANC, in constraining the emergence of party system polarisation, perpetuating low levels of fragmentation, stabilising the centrist makeup of the system, and pulling opposition parties to the centre.

5.1 The plurality system, 1910 - 1989

5.1.1 The British transplant with modifications

The two party and the dominant party system was a tradition since the Union of South Africa was established in 1910. Prior to the Union, each former colony, that is the Boer republics and the British colonies, had their own political systems in which the affairs of government were conducted. The 1910 constitution not only created a political system that placed non-whites in a subordinate position, where both white and Afrikaner groups opposed conceding political and civil freedoms to black South Africans, but also established a ‘modern’ unitary political form of government (Venter and van Vuuren, 1987). Delegates agreed upon the British Westminster political system. This system included parliamentary supremacy and government, a bicameral parliamentary structure, and a plurality electoral system. The political system “was an authentic Westminster transplant”: it was from the British that South Africa derived its initial political attitudes and government structures; the political system was largely “an artificial creation of its colonial heritage” (Boule, 1994: 10; Vosloo, 1979). The party system which began to develop in Britain after the civil war of the seventieth century was exported elsewhere by the nineteenth century to countries like Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa (Lipson, 1959). The establishment of the Union “represented a major historic event in the development of the [South African] party system” (Botha, 1996: 210).

The first South African parliament emerged after the general election in 1915. The method of apportionment to parties was styled after the Westminster-type, Anglo-American winner-takes-all plurality structure which derived from the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system. The South African electoral system “has always been modelled on the Westminster precedent of single-member constituencies operating according to the plurality principle” (Boule, 1984: 77; 1994).
constituency system rests upon an individualist approach to politics where voters in designated districts elect an individual candidate to represent them in the legislature. The winner-takes-all mechanism comes to the fore when the candidate or party who wins the most votes — that is, pluralities which are not necessarily majorities — in each constituency becomes the district’s representative in the national parliament; and the party with the majority of legislative members are then able to form a government. Thus, the first point of accountability, albeit to the white electorate, was the individual who held seats of power not the political party they belonged to.

However, one of the most significant variations from the British model was the limited franchise and unrepresentative legislature; it was a whites-only parliament which was hardly considered a parliamentary democracy (Reynolds, 1994; Sisk, 1995; Boulle, 1994). But South Africa’s affinity to the ‘pseudo Westminster constitutional system’ began to change. The major constitutional change was in 1961 that moved South Africa from the status of a Union to a Republic. However, the institutional structure of 1961 closely followed that of the Union, keeping the Westminster model firmly in place (Vosloo, 1979). The legitimacy crisis, that emerged from excluding the black majority from government, influenced the apartheid state to incorporate the plurality and heterogeneous nature of social groups into the political system. When political rights were granted to blacks in the homelands — through the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 — direct representation was still absent in the white-based national parliament. Despite changes, in the late 1970s, the South African political system was criticised because it reflected an artificial system that failed to incorporate different population groups into a unitary system (Vosloo, 1979). Therefore, the chief political question in the 1980s centred upon movement away from a pseudo Westminster model to more democracy and pluralism.

In 1983 the government adopted a new constitution that made provisions for a tricameral parliamentary system in which two population groups were incorporated in the national structure: coloureds and indians, together with whites. The problem with this solution was that non-white and white groups were in separate houses of parliament and functioned only as junior members with limited powers. In other words, despite the changes, the system still favoured the dominance of whites who maintained a monopoly over national affairs (Boulle, 1994). Separate legislative structures, differential access to power, focus on intra-group structures, and the preclusion of formation of a unitary system implied that democracy “now pertained more within a group context, with due recognition of traditional political cultures” (Venter and van Vuuren, 1987: 29; Boulle, 1984: 217; Marais, 1989). The deviation from the Westminster model to incorporate a consociational and power-sharing framework did not constitute a national assembly in the democratic sense and could not give direct expression to the will of a nationally inclusive electorate.

5.1.2 The winner-takes-all effect

Notwithstanding severe problems with an institutionalised system of limited franchise, the plurality electoral system came with its own problems for the white government. A main problem was that the system benefitted only major parties. Since the Union, South Africa did not adopt any proportional mechanisms such as multi-member constituencies that could provide representation to small parties. Indeed, similar political consequences to those of its British counterparts occurred where one of the major weaknesses of the plurality system was that the white parliament constantly experienced vote-seat share distortions. This meant that a party with a minority of votes (less than 50 per cent) was able to secure a majority of seats in parliament (Heard, 1974; Kahn, 1960; Boulle, 1984).

The electoral system generated a two-party system and later a dominant party system. Two major parties composed the party system since 1910, the National Party (NP) and the South African Party (SAP) (later became the United Party). The two-party system has been a major part of South
Africa’s electoral tradition. The 1915 election seemed to be a three or four party system — with the SAP, NP, Unionists and Labour Party — but once a merger formed between the SAP and the Unionists in 1921, the three-party system disappeared (Kapp, 1987). Since then, the SAP and NP emerged as almost equal contenders for office. Alternation in power was between the two major parties; however, after 1948, no alternation in power occurred for over four decades. The explanation for this is associated with the presence of the dominant party. Although the dynamics in the post-1948 period was “largely unconnected with the electoral system”, it might have been the plurality system that bolstered the NP’s dominance in the first place (Boulle, 1984: 77).

The demographic composition of the white population was such that the Afrikaners were numerically dominant and Afrikaner support largely inclined toward the NP — especially in more rural Afrikaner communities (Thompson, 2000). Although the NP began to move into white English-speaking communities to attract support, its primary base was the Afrikaner group. Given the strong partisanship towards the NP, the party began to emerge as a dominant one and two party competition gradually vanished. Despite the legitimacy crisis the party faced, “with its electoral base secure, it could, in dealing with non-white opposition and overt unrest, rely on coercion without the necessity of moderating its efforts for fear of losing office” (Heard, 1974: 70). Moreover, the NP’s support base continued to pledge allegiance to the party, rather than more liberal democratic parties, despite repressive and brutal ways in which the NP-led government dealt with the ‘black problem’. The party’s commitment to represent the will of its ‘extremist constituency’ (who largely supported apartheid and the philosophy of racial superiority) acted as one of the main contributors to continuous electoral succession of the NP in government.

Since the late 1940s, the two party system witnessed change to a dominant system where the NP held almost unbroken political power. There was no room for a third party or a two party system to emerge. Functioning as “a single-party-dominant system” or a ‘one party system’, led to a big gap between the electoral strength of the NP and its opponents (Welsh, 1987: 90; Heard, 1974; Woodward, 1980; Kapp, 1987). Since 1948, the NP successively won office till its last electoral victory in the 1989 election. The party was the only party since the Union to win an electoral majority repeatedly for over four decades.

Although Kapp (1987: 11) states that “[n]o serious challenge to the party’s power developed”, the developments in the 1980s proved otherwise. Parties like the Republican Party, Herstigte Nasionale Party, and Conservative Party (CP) emerged during the dominance of the NP but it was mainly the latter party in the 1980s that presented itself as a threat to the NP. It proposed more systematic and rigorous implementation of apartheid, and challenged the NP’s reform to accommodate a plural society. In fact, the CP took away support from the NP in 1989 election but although it was considered a ‘realigning election’, where a large proportion of Afrikaners switched allegiance to the CP, the party was not successful in displacing the NP (Van Vuuren et al, 1987; Rule, 1989; Bekker and Grobbelaar, 1987).

5.2 The birth of democracy and a new electoral system

This section discusses the shift from plurality to proportionality, and explores the origins of the proportional model in South Africa. The main purpose for this is to determine whether major parties (especially the ANC) who were involved in taking the decision to adopt a PR system where articulating moderate or radical proposals.

Ongoing deliberations during the early 1990s transition period not only sought to grant universal franchise but to fundamentally redesign the political system. By the end of these discussions, the system that emerged out of the political consensus, amongst both white and black representatives, established that all segments of the population participate in the national elective system, effectively conceding democratic rights to all population groups. Overthrowing the restrictive franchise, an unrepresentative parliament, and whites-only inter-party competition, birthed a genuine democratic
party system in which parties were permitted to articulate the interests of any social group and, importantly, the interest of the majority of South African voters. Put differently, interest aggregation and political representation was legally open to all social groups. The consensus and the general election of 1994 opened the space for a truly competitive and representative political system. The majority were afforded the opportunity, for the first time, to support a political party of their choice and hence participate in establishing a democratic government.

As shown earlier, a strand of the 1970s apartheid deliberations focused on ensuring greater accommodation and pluralism for blacks, Indians and coloureds within political structures. The point was advanced that it “would naturally be quite futile to impose Western European or Anglo-American models [the plurality system] on the political system of South Africa” (Nieuwoudt, 1977: 167). In other words, there was a need for a system that more fairly distributed power through consociationalism or other means. Similarly, a pertinent point during the deliberations to shift South Africa towards democracy centred upon ensuring whites were included in the system. This time, the need for pluralism came from white stakeholders — although not them alone. The issue of electoral system change was put on the table: the main proposal being to retreat from the plurality, winner-takes-all system, and to cater for political representation of numerically non-dominant sections of the population, that is, minority groups. As such, new electoral structures formed its basis upon proportional representation (PR), as articulated in Section 46 (1) of the final Constitution of 1996 (Constitution, 1996).

This rested upon fundamental principles of consensus to ensure wide and direct political participation and representativity in a divided and multiracial society, affording electoral structures a strong sense of inclusiveness and accommodation. Thus, the core of electoral design was informed by consociational models of governance. “Consociationalism rests on the premise that in bitterly divided societies the stakes are too high for politics to be conducted as a zero-sum game” (Reilly and Reynolds, 2000: 447).

The democratic electoral system originated primarily from sensitivity and awareness to domestic socio-political realities; that is, the adoption of proportionalism was largely informed by “the salient and relevant aspects of the South African context” (ETT, 2003: 15). The origin of the proportional model can be found during the transition talks of the early 1990s which gave momentum and life to the notion of formally inclusive democratic mechanisms. “In...[a] bargaining process each party tries to maximise its gain and minimise its losses...whereas bargainers need to reach a settlement, they also prefer one that is most favourable to themselves” (Du Toit, 1989: 214). Stakeholders like the ANC, NP and others opted for proportional principles since it guaranteed prospective legislative parties net gains — although the FPTP mechanism would have advantaged the ANC (as will be later discussed).

However, stakeholders did not simply express narrow self-interested concerns but demonstrated concerns for broader matters of social stability and democracy. Juxtaposed with continuing the plurality model, which would have prevented the creation of an inclusive and representative society, the 1990s deliberation signified a commitment to accommodate the diversity of South African society. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which commenced in December 1991 and attended by some nineteen party groups, sought to investigate, amongst other matters, the setting up of a new electoral system. Negotiating parties, including the ANC and NP, commenced by signing a ‘Declaration of Intent’, acknowledging their solemn commitment to move the country beyond apartheid and pursue liberal values of equality, freedom and democracy. Parties pledged:

…to bring about an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship… pursuing amidst our diversity, freedom, equality and security for all irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed…and to establish a free and open society based on democratic values where the dignity, worth and rights of every South African are protected by law…

(CODESA, 1991a)
On the one hand, the inclusion of various stakeholders and organisations, both black and white, sought to threaten consensus-based politics. On the other hand, the presence of multipartism during the negotiations reflected the foundations of inter-party dialogue that followed accommodative lines to be implemented in the new constitution. In Mandela’s address to CODESA, he observed that:

The strength of the CODESA initiative lies in the range of political parties and persuasions represented here. The presence of so many parties augurs well for the future. The diverse interests represented, speak of the capacity to develop consensus across the spectrum and of the desire to maximise common purpose amongst South African.

(CODESA, 1991b)

Going into the specifics of the framework of agreement, parties agreed that discussions at CODESA aimed to set in motion the establishment of:

…a multi-party democracy with the right to form and join political parties and with regular elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll; in general the basic electoral system, shall be that of proportional representation.

(CODESA, 1991a, emphasis added)

Though the Declaration did not have legally binding force, it established the contours of discussion. It already set the intention to discuss the PR model and located the model in the context of movement to accommodation and inclusion of all groups. This effectively narrowed the space for radical, non-centrist, and immoderate counterproposals. Given that the ANC itself articulated the desire to move ahead with a PR model testifies to the ‘moderate internal compass’ that existed with the party, and its role in fostering rather than inhibiting a spirit of compromise and inclusion.

By the end of the negotiations, the PR model was encapsulated as one of the 34 constitutional principles, namely ‘principle VIII’. Moreover, it formed part of the Interim Constitution of 1993 and subsequently went on to structure the final constitution. The negotiations revealed that “[r]epresentatives from the whole spectrum of South Africa’s politically, socially, racially, ethnically and religiously divided society agreed on this system” (ETT, 2003: 66). Principle XIV went on to state that “[p]rovision shall be made for participation of minority political parties in legislative process in a manner consistent with democracy” (Act 200, 1993). Long prior to CODESA, it was clear that the NP had an interest in protecting minority interests, especially those of the white community. In an address, Prime Minister P. W. Botha stated:

If we ignore the existence of minorities; if we ignore the individual’s right to associate with others in the practice of his beliefs and the propagation of his values; if we deny this in favour of a simplistic “winner-takes-all” political system-then we will diminish and not increase the freedoms of our peoples. Then we would deny the right of each and everyone to share in the decisions which shape his destiny.

(Botha, 1991)

5.2.1 Political representation

Four interrelated reasons fed into the sharp discontinuity from the plurality system: political representation; reconciliation and stability; checks and balances; and best practice. Reducing one of the main adverse effects of the FPTP system, namely the disparity between seat and vote share, was far from a driving rationale behind the decision to espouse proportionality. This logic is rather likely to inform societies that are relatively homogenous.
Expressing, representing and protecting the interests of salient social groups constituted the leading rationale in endorsing the proportional model. In essence, it can be succinctly put that “[p]roportional regimes are sensitive to proportions; majoritarian regimes are sensitive to majorities” (Cohen, 1997: 610). In more homogenous societies, operating under a plurality electoral system, politics is associated with liberal values as emphasis is placed upon individual competition and most groups are likely to compete on an equal basis (Cohen, 1997). In stark contrast, playing out as a self-fulfilling prophecy, competitive dynamics in heterogeneous societies, operating under a plurality electoral system, implies that the numerically dominant social segment will almost always control government. With the application of a plurality, constituency-based system, the ANC, the most popular party amongst the black electorate, would emerge as unilateral holders of victory — creating virtually permanent party dominance and leading to unrepresentative electoral outcomes. In other words, the party representing the social majority gets most representation in the legislative assembly under situations of plurality.

Given this pre-1994 imminent reality, the way votes were translated into seats became an important concern especially for minority parties. The special nature of societal divisions suddenly surfaced as a potent and priority issue. The apartheid government were fully cognisant that electoral strength and legislative power would inevitably be located with the newly enfranchised majority. Coming out of a system that gave exclusive power to a minority of whites, the NP concluded that the numerical preponderance of the black electorate would mean that under a constituency-based, plurality system, it would effectively have no or absolutely minimal representation. A delegate during multiparty transition talks and leader of the ACDP, Kenneth Meshoe, stated that “the National Party…knew that when it came to numbers they were disadvantaged because of the size of white people in South Africa, that only the voices of the black majority would be accommodated” (Interview). The uncertainty surrounding minority political representation under plurality-based institutions, then, informed the bottom line of the NP’s interest in proportionalism.

Under a proportional system, each party is allocated a number of legislative seats proportional to the votes it received in an election. The system aims to obtain some form of social equilibrium or social representation, depending on the numerical configuration of social groups. The critical concern for the NP when it came to talks about changing the electoral system, was to push for a system which would make it possible for minority segments to acquire a stake in state power, increase direct access to political institutions, distribute policy-making power, and guarantee the representation of minority interests. Since the proportional model generally applies a low threshold for political representation — or in the South African case admits no legal threshold — dispenses the points of victory, and increases the opportunities for power, “allowing for the maximum spread of party representation within national and provincial legislatures, offering full expression of racial, religious and political diversity”, it was evidently the most beneficial system for the NP and other parties who knew they would become small or minor parties given the popularity of the ANC (Southall, 2009: 7; Mattes, 2014 and Cohen, 1997). The central rationale, then, for the adoption of the proportional system was to account for the numerical configuration and pluralism of society and cater for the representation of salient minorities. Indeed, a proportional system was believed to be the most representative system that was also protective of minorities, since legislative seats correspond closely with the proportion of votes, where every vote counts, is equal and is not wasted.

For Ken Andrew, a key representative for the DP during the Constitutional Assembly (CA), the system proves to be “fair and democratic…it ensures that if it is a substantial minority, of whatever thought that translates into a political minority, it gets fair representation” (Interview). According to then DP leader, Tony Leon, who also represented the party during the negotiations, puts it that it is unequivocal that the logic was motivated by minority empowerment:

…the most compelling reason for the PR system was really that it would empower minorities in this country and I think it was part of the package of the proposals — because obviously when the system changed and you had an empowered minority who were going to suddenly become a
very less of a [empowered] minority in the future...[T]he thinking was that this was a very fair way of dealing with giving equal franchise rights to everyone and giving everyone a stake in the system...

(Interview, 14 September 2016)

A chief of staff in office of F. W. de Klerk during the transition period, Dave Steward, also echoed this point from the perspective of the NP:

I think the main reason that contributed to the proportionality position was the perception that we needed an electoral system that would also give minority parties representation in parliament because South Africa's population...[formed the starting] context. It was thought that a simple first-winner-past-the-post might lead to the exclusion of minorities from parliament altogether.

(Interview, 23 September 2016)

A former parliamentary leader of the DA, Lindiwe Mazibuko, puts it that:

The origins of the decision to go with a proportional representation system in...[South Africa] are noble enough: proportionality was built into the Constitution as a means of securing the rights of minority groups and ensuring that elections would never again constitute a parliament made up of MPs from only a single racial or ethnic group.

(Business Day, 7 July 2016)

Zero-sum perceptions of politics were avoided by bargainers at all costs, including parties such as Inkatha, ACDP, DP and FF, who desired at least some political representation in the new system than one popular party taking a large chunk of the electorate. Proportionalism is a system intended “to accommodate all parties...[it ensures] that even if you are small...you get your share in the legislature” (Gumbi, Interview). “The current system, where even the smallest party can gain representation if it musters enough votes for a single seat, provides the ultimate in inclusivity” (ETT, 2003: 67). According to a key NP delegate during the negotiations, Roelf Meyer:

...the general conclusion by all parties was that, that [the proportional model] was a way to ensure that participation in the elections would be fairly distributed to different political participants. In other words, smaller parties would also have the opportunity to have representation in parliament and that would be the fairest way to create that objective.

(Interview, 19 October 2016)

It was not simply meant to consider racial minorities but all social groups, even those within the majority that held diverse preferences, and thus the aim was to provide for representation across the board. From the viewpoint of Bantu Holomisa, leader of the UDM, the adoption of “[PR] was to make sure that all sectors of our society are expressed...[it suited] the South African situation where you have...rich diversity” (Interview). Meshoe underscored the models output of broad representation by drawing upon a pertinent distinction between the popular and unpopular, saying that proportionalism:

...was [chosen] to accommodate smaller voices...[such as] smaller political parties...so that every opinion in South Africa would be taken on board when the new democratic dispensation was charted. So, everybody including the popular and unpopular had a contribution to make...If it was a constituency-based system from the beginning, you would have had a one dominating political party and smaller political parties would not have a voice, so it was the best thing to have done for the new South Africa.

(Interview, 21 September 2016)
Indeed, parties embraced the unique situation of pluralism that existed within society. Even organisations, such as Inkatha (later called the IFP), who initially refused to engage in transition talks acceded to it. An IFP representative, Alfred Mpontshane, said “[w]e [the IFP] realised that South Africa was a plural state” (Interview). Although the IFP was repulsive on certain issues, it often stressed pluralism. Jonathan Moakes, policy head at the DA, further highlighted the aspect of party pluralism, stating that:

The main purpose of advocating for a PR system was to ensure that in the new democratic dispensation we had a plurality of views in the new constitutional and national assembly...I think experience has shown, if you had constituency...first-past-the-post-systems, that the voices of minority interests are often drowned out...[So] it was felt at the time that a plurality of voices and the ability of many voices in a parliament that was going to forge the new South Africa was important.

(Interview, 8 September 2016)

The electoral model was “an attempt to ensure that every voice, every vote gets a space...it was meant to create a system that encourages inclusion, that encourages participation” (Godi, Interview). In sum, the adoption of the system went forward “because its the fairest reflection of the views of the voters and it means that parliament therefore is constituted in a way that, proportionally, all the voters views are represented in parliament” (Andrew, Interview). As the Electoral Task Team Report — the team was setup by the government in 2002 to investigate electoral reform — puts it, “[t]he present electoral system was introduced, primarily, to ensure the promotion of political diversity within our legislatures, and broad political representation” (ETT, 2003: 73).

5.2.2 Reconciliation, stability and democratisation

Another reason for adopting proportionality were immediate concerns to create and foster national unity, peace, reconciliation, and fast-track democratisation. This impulse came particularly from the side of the ANC. At the societal level, “South Africa as a whole had to be reconciled, there had to be reconciliation between blacks and whites” (Mpontshane, Interview). Several interview respondents noted that the ANC was trying hard to avoid a situation of violence and civil war. It became clear that Mandela’s administration was premised on the principle of accommodating everyone on the basis that it would largely pave the way for securing peace. “[T]he ANC...wanted each and every race group...[to] feel at home in South Africa” and this was considered critical to social stability (Galo, Interview).

At the political level, negotiating parties who held fast to contesting demands, and those engaged in inter-party fighting, had to be brought into a place of inclusion for democracy to move forward. Not only were organisations like Inkatha and conservative rightwing groups refusing to engage in transition talks, labelling the ANC ‘collaborators with the system’, there were episodes of political violence in 1992 (Mpontshane, Interview).² The agreement during the transition was that after a general democratic election, the parties elected will form a constitutional writing body, known as the Constitutional Assembly (CA), to pass the final constitution. This particular agreement had an impact on delegates to opt for the proportional position. According to FF Plus leader, Pieter Mulder, who was part of the negotiation processes:

…the argument was that we must get everybody involved, if you go for the British constituency-system you’ll end up with only two or three strong parties and a lot of people will not be part of it [the CA] and would not be part of writing the final constitution. So...the proportional system...[made] it possible for almost everybody to get in...I think the ANC realised that if they want to get a constitution that is accepted by the majority...they must get as
many people as possible in parliament...whoever then is in that body [the CA] [it] was important that they...represent everybody in South Africa and I think the ANC pushed that it must be as inclusive as possible and the proportional [system] would do that.

(Interview, 20 September 2016)

Indeed, in the ANC’s own perspective, inclusivity motivated the rationale behind the proportional model:

We adopted this system during negotiations before 1994, because we wanted an inclusive system and the representation of minority views, in the interest of an inclusive transition...The PR system is the most democratic in that no votes are wasted or lost...It ensures that the urban poor and rural voters participate fully and have a powerful impact on results...Minority parties also get fair representation and can express their needs as part of the democratic process.

(ANC, 2002a)

Given the tension, strife, and incidence of heavy fighting between parties, “proportional representation was meant to unite the warring factors which existed” (Mpontshane, Interview). The ANC strategically conceded to institutions fostering inclusiveness for the main purpose of securing peace and fast-tracking democratisation. Andrew stated that:

...in the spirit of inclusiveness and compromise, epitomised by Nelson Mandela...they [the ANC] realised that if the country was going to succeed you needed to have wider support across all groupings in the country — racial, ethnic, hence, they [the ANC] went out of their way to get [for instance] Inkatha included...

(Interview, 26 September 2016)

Reconciling various stakeholders, choosing to adopt a proportional model, and putting a premium on gaining a fair portion of political power, amounted to a strategic political calculation. White parties in particular, as much as others, were not giving up unless they were guaranteed some sort of inclusive system. The imminent implication of “inadequate institutions [is that it] can leak, crack or overflow” (Taagepera, 1998: 68). From the perspective of Steward, “[i]t [that is, the failure to adopt proportionality] would cause much greater instability if small parties or small communities were not represented in parliament” (Interview). Even the ETT (2003: 12) noted that “[t]he current electoral system...has contributed greatly towards transitional stability”. It went on to say that:

By this is meant that, given the demographic, ethnic, racial and religious diversity of the South African voting population, every attempt should be made to allow the widest possible degree of participation by various political preferences in the representative legislatures. An electoral system that inhibited inclusiveness could be a source of instability and conflict...the protection it [the system] provides for small parties...that are so necessary for stability, given our context.

(ETT, 2003: 16, 66)

In other words, there is an acknowledgement that faults in institutional design can powerfully connect itself to broader dynamics of social stability. The shift to proportionalism and other crucial inclusive mechanisms such as the Government of National Unity, persuaded stakeholders that peace was on the horizon. Such strategic decisions significantly calmed tensions that would have escalated if minority racial groups were excluded from the precincts of political power.

In addition to peace-building concerns, the urgency to adopt a new constitution and the need for an immediate general election that was premised upon democratic principles and mechanisms, led to avoiding a constituency model. In other words, the adoption of proportionalism, especially the closed-list mechanism, was informed by the push for democratisation. Stakeholders easily conceded to the proportional model primarily because of the massive procedural undertaking required for the establishment of a constituency-based system. Krennerich and de Ville (1997: 31-2) and Gouws and
Mitchell (2005) were among the few scholars to point this aspect out. Krennerich and de Ville stated, “[t]he adoption of this system was motivated by various factors, inter alia the fact that there was not time enough to register voters (which would be required if representatives were to be elected in constituencies)”. Previously disenfranchised people, especially the majority in the homelands and those returning from exile, were not in possession of identity documents and moreover, were not registered in designated geographical districts. The latter requirement, in particular, was a major hurdle for stakeholders; in essence, districting the country, sectioning voters into relevant voting areas, and redrawing electoral boundaries would have significantly delayed the prospect of a general election. A closed-list proportional model implied that the electorate could vote anywhere across the country, without being subject to a particular district. Thus, “it was as simple as possible to be able to get a representative parliament and also a representative…[CA]” (Andrew, Interview).

According to Meyer:

…it would have been impossible for the first election to divide the country into constituencies for constituency-based elections. We could not even manage to get a voters roll ready for the first election let alone dividing the country into constituencies…[this] led our thinking…that was the thinking all-round amongst the different political parties at the time…All the parties, including the ANC conceded to that…One can’t underestimate…[this] because we would never have had the ability to have elections on the 27th of April [1994] if the country had to be divided into constituencies.

(Interview, 19 October 2016)

5.2.3 Checks and balances and best practice

Aside from the two core reasons above, two further reasons informed proportionalism. One was the desire to have a mechanism of checks and balances. Some stakeholders believed that aside from particular liberal democratic institutions that assist in checking executive power, it was fundamental to ensure the legislature was not saturated with one political party that would rubber-stamp executive preferences. This was of course an ‘indirect beneficial feature’ for smaller parties who, through entry first and foremost in the legislature, could exercise oversight. Nonetheless, facilitating meaningful inter-party competition would not be possible without the presence of legislative parties engaged in debating bills, policies and other matters, and scrutinising the executive. According to Mulder:

But the second argument was just as strong [as the first argument of inclusivity] and that was for another check and balance [beside the two-third majority mechanism built into the system to change the constitution and other checks and balances]. As the parties were looking at each other all the time and trying to…make sure that no one has got so much power that he can dominate the other one…I would think the National Party…and other parties were more in favour of the second argument, the checks and balances…they argued…that surely that will protect and make sure that the ANC would not get such a big majority that you cannot have any check and balances on it.

(Interview, 20 September 2016)

This liberal-based argument was strategically used by parties like the DP during subsequent elections where it presented itself as an opposition party with an eye on government, guarding against the abuse of state power. It was from this viewpoint that parties looked with favourability on the proportional system. Despite knowledge of the ANC’s obvious electoral victory and dominance, parties thought it worthwhile to see its core function as an active legislative party in exerting pressure on the ANC in terms of keeping watch and having a critical eye to counterbalance the system, and ensuring that regulation of the state is not left unchecked.
Another reason was the element of best practice. The ANC looked outside of the immediate domestic context to determine an appropriate electoral system. In a post-Second-World-War political environment, most countries in Western Europe adopted the element of proportionalism, whether purely PR or a mixed-system. The roots of proportionalism are not simply located in the quest for inclusion, representation and other domestic political issues, the new institutional architecture and the switch in electoral formula modelled itself after many countries elsewhere — the global climate was one that was increasingly being marked by systems encouraging party pluralism rather than systems fostering one or two party patterns of competition. In general, institutions perpetuating individualistic tendencies were sidelined for those giving a place for communal identities and group representation. Although other polities differ in terms of the level of social inequality and heterogeneity, law-makers gradually retreated from the idea that liberal politics were satisfactory in securing fair representation as group politics gained ascendence. The ANC considered this ‘best practice’: the idea of proportionalism was aligned to international standards. Andrew mentioned that this global phenomenon reverberated within the ranks of the ANC, he said:

The ANC was obviously looking after their own self-interest, as...[much] as any party would, but they generally had a mindset of ‘lets have the best system that we can find in the world’...[The ANC] when we were looking at legislation on almost any issue...their guiding...thing was ‘what is the best practice in the world’.

(Interview, 26 September 2016, emphasis added)

There was relatively widespread consensus for proportionalism from almost all stakeholders, especially on the point that the “electoral system should produce a high degree of proportionality and encourage cooperation and national integration by representing all social and political groups in parliament” (Krennerich and de Ville, 1997: 34). “I don’t recall this [espousing a PR system] meeting with a great deal of resistance...I don’t think it was only the minority parties, I don’t recall particular resistance from the ANC” (Andrew, Interview). This was further echoed by Steward, who highlighted that “the ANC...were open to the decision, I don’t think there was too much disagreement which [was] really testified by the fact that it was accepted” (Interview). Leon, also added to the voices, he said the adoption of the electoral model:

...wasn’t a very contentious matter... it was not one of the matters that caused...any breakdowns, any critical meetings...it...went through because very few people could see any disadvantages to the system...for the political parties, especially the smaller ones, it just seemed to be a net gain and it was not hugely contentious.

(Interview, 14 September 2016)

That the proportional model was satisfactory to almost all organisations involved in transition talks, was fast-tracked and underwent little contention is attributed to the concept that developed during the negotiations of ‘sufficient consensus’. This concept meant that if core stakeholders, that is the NP and the ANC, who were in a position to mobilise resources on their side, disagreed on any proposal, negotiations would be deadlocked; by contrast, once both sides “agreed...it was more or less a done deal” (Steward, Interview). Stakeholders accepted that if either party failed to consent to a proposal, it was not going forward. Thus, since the NP and the ANC agreed, proportionalism was accepted as a legitimate electoral system. Moreover, the aspect of political leadership played a significant role in engineering the electoral system and maintaining an environment of consensus.

An interesting point is that pressure to adopt proportionality did not come primarily from smaller parties. One would suspect that pressure would have come from minority parties since a purely constituency-based, majoritarian model would have been even more beneficial for the ANC in government. And hence, the ANC would have been the main party to contemplate the adoption of a model — it would substantially increase its vote share, its presence in the legislature, and limit the
entry of smaller parties and their oversight role [as Gouws and Mitchell (2005) and Mattes (1994) also state]. Contra to purely power-based and narrow self-interested party concerns, the ANC demonstrated a predisposition to the proportional model. Meshoe, noted that “[i]f Mandela himself was opposed to that, the ANC would not have accepted the PR system…Because he wanted…the democratic dispensation to succeed, he knew that…the new democracy could be built by everybody and not only by people who supported the ruling party” (Interview). He further pointed out that:

…the presence of Mr Mandela…made this whole thing [the adoption of PR] very possible because he was a very accommodative person who wanted national unity. When he spoke about nation-building and reconciliation, it was not just cheap talk for him or just saying what could have been construed to be good to ears of the international community, but it was something that came from his heart, he was a genuine man, an honest man, who truly wanted to see South Africa succeed going forward…So, the voices of the small minority parties was definitely a very important one but if we did not have a man like Mr Mandela it…could not have been as easy as it was…

(Interview, 21 September 2016)

From the part of the ANC, this inclination was motivated by the ‘spirit of the negotiation’ which was characterised by inclusion, accommodation and compromise. Given that parties such as Inkatha were outside the negotiation process and refused to participate, the ANC realised that all groups needed to be united for democratisation to move forward. In fact, “[t]he first argument [about inclusivity] was coming mostly from the ANC that ‘we want to get everybody included’, [not from the minority parties]” (Mulder, Interview). Mandela’s administration were unequivocally strategic in favouring the idea of diverse participation in political life. Galo underscored the point that despite the decades of oppression of the black majority and the position of white people at the helms of power in society, the ANC’s approach reassured white sections of society that they would not be driven out of the country and also perpetuated particular reconciliatory doctrines to the oppressed black community to heal the wounds between the race groups (Interview). Themba Godi, African Peoples Congress (APC) President, mentioned that “the ANC was very, very accommodative in its approach to the negotiations and I don't think on…the adoption of proportionalism] it would have required necessarily any pressure from anybody” (Interview).

In addition, the system was advantageous for the ANC’s own operations. Thus, small parties were not articulating for a proportional model by themselves, the ANC welcomed it because of inherent benefits within the closed-list mechanism [as Gouws and Mitchell (2005) and Mattes (1994) also point out]. The particular context of the 1994 general election was one in which critical members of the ANC were released from prison and pro-democratic organisations were unbanned in the early 1990s. The expulsion of core individuals meant that not all members of the ANC were known to the South African public, both those in prison and exile, “including President Mandela [who] spent…many years in prison” (Lekota, Interview). The constituency system mandates that individual candidates instead of parties stand for elections, in an environment of public uncertainty and weak linkages between individual members and local communities, a plurality-FPTP, model would not have worked for the ANC. The ANC opted for a situation in which those who fought for freedom and those were were known inside of the party were not sidelined in the new government (Holomisa, Interview). It was clear that parties were better known than individuals. Thus, the proportional model was the ideal model since it allowed for the names of parties not individuals to appear on the ballot paper, effectively immunising the ANC from potential losses in national and provincial elections. Moreover, the control that parties gain from a closed-list proportional mechanism to maintain discipline amongst members was another advantageous reason for the ANC to opt for it than the plurality model. According to Leon:

…the advantage from any party political point of view of proportional representation especially the system we went for [closed-party list] is that it gives the political party much greater control
over the members. So, I’m not entirely sure that the ANC...was that keen on...just having individual-empowered members of parliament, I think the idea of having party bosses and leaders determining party lists and keeping members under control was attractive to them...I can’t say that was deeply thought through but that would have certainly been part of the motivation.

(Interview, 14 September 2016)

In summary, the proportional representation electoral system is deeply rooted, first, in the concern to express and represent the interests of salient sectors of society, catering both for minority racial groups and for preference-diversity within the majority. Second, it is rooted in the need to foster stability, peace, unity and reconciliation between societal groups and belligerent political organisations, and to accelerate democracy by opting for a system that did not require extensive redistricting which would have otherwise impeded the occurrence of a general election. Third, it allowed parties to check and balance government and counteract negative effects of imminent party dominance by providing vigorous debate and critical questioning. Fourth, it came from a desire to align with best practice electoral models in an international political climate that was gradually moving away from plurality-FPTP to proportional models. For these reasons, the proportional model proved superior to its predecessor, the plurality, constituency-based electoral model, or any other alternative. Important subsidiary and background factors facilitated the overall absence of hostility toward proportionalism and the existence of ‘sufficient consensus’. This included, first, Mandela’s ability to mobilise a cohort of ANC members behind a peace-unity-reconciliation line and bring various segments into an environment that guaranteed inclusive arrangements. Second, the inherent advantage of the closed-list mechanism that incentivised the ANC not only strengthened the power of party leaders but catered for the deficit of minimal public knowledge of individual ANC members.

These findings fit into broader literature by extending the motivating framework of the PR model. Analysis on the PR system is often unaccompanied by sufficient systematic theoretical discussion about the driving factors behind it. In fact, electoral reform debate, that surfaced soon after the 1994 election, subsumes much of this attention. The findings of this analysis ties with one of the main arguments presented in the literature that since PR admits no threshold for parties to enter the legislature, it allows for maximum representation of salient cleavage, creates incentives for small parties, and fosters a sense of political stability (Lodge, 2002; Southall, 2009; Mattes, 2014; Reynolds, 1995). As Krennerich and de Ville (1997: 31-2) succinctly puts it, a motivating factor was for “a composition that reflects as accurately as possible the number of votes cast for each party in the election”. While maximum diversity is regarded as a chief motivating factor, there are other equally critical factors. This includes the concern for political stability through inclusion, the acceleration of democratisation, a mechanism of oversight to curtail any negative effects of party dominance, and alignment to changing international standards of legislative representation. Thus, the 1991 - 1993 consensus to adopt proportionalism was a comprehensive and multifactorial political decision that goes beyond the single factor of maximum representation of social divisions.

Pertaining more specifically to this research, the driving forces behind the adoption of proportionalism gives testimony to critical moderating elements within the major stakeholder: the ANC. In spite of the obvious fact that a plurality system would have advantaged the ANC, consolidated its dominance, and limited the entry of other parties and minority social groups, rather than propagating this model during CODESA and MPNP deliberations, the ANC compromised and embraced proportionalism. The decision was motivated “by a mixture of principled, pragmatic, and self-interested reasons” (Gouws and Mitchell, 2005: 358). Although the acceleration of democracy was within the interest of the ANC, the manner in which the organisation dealt with the transition revealed important moderate element that constituted an ‘internal compass’ within the ANC to weather the apartheid storm. Adopting proportionalism was not simply a grudging concession: the ANC demonstrated a deep understanding of political dynamics. It facilitated rather than inhibited consensus politics, inclusion and accommodation; and was concerned about political stability and
reconciliation. By being sensitive and open to the demands from minority groups, the ANC demonstrated the capacity to compromise rather than stand by rigid and exclusive political positions — such as excluding minority groups or proposing plurality laws — and was guided by the ‘spirit of moderation’.

5.3 Party system fragmentation, 1910 - 1989 and 1994 - 2014

This section explores the patterns of fragmentation in both the apartheid and democratic period. One of theoretical claims it assesses is whether the electoral system affects the number of parties in the party system. The apartheid operated under the plurality system and the democratic operated under the proportional system. The first democratic election took place in 1994, and between that time to the 2014 national election, although minor parties consistently gained legislative seats, the party system was marked as a dominant one because of one party’s (the ANC) successive electoral victories. In this way, the contemporary South African party system is often characterised by the presence of a dominant party that exists within a multiparty environment with smaller parties occupying the legislature.

The ANC’s unbroken chain of electoral victories saw the party take, on average, over 65% of the popular vote but no more than 70%, although it almost came eye to eye with this in 2004. The by-product of the ANC’s dominance is that other parties are left with a combined vote share of around 35%. A clear demarcation between major and minor parties form the chief pattern of legislative party composition. In essence, one large party absorbs much of the electoral market.

In the early years of democracy, in 1994 and 1999, the most electorally successful opposition parties were the New National Party (NNP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), but by 2004 the vote share of these parties significantly decreased, as illustrated in Table 5.1. Not only were some of the loses accredited to the increase in the ANC’s support, especially since it grew the most in 1999 and 2004, but it spread to other parties, namely the DA, ACDP, FFP, PAC and AZAPO (see Table 5.2). Since then, opposition terrain came to be dominated by a growing political party, the DA, who from 1999 till 2014, became the official opposition party in the national legislature. As Table 5.2 shows, it effectively planted itself as the only opposition party to consistently increase its voting base, in other terms, its electoral victories came without any negative growth over the past five elections.
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Source: IEC www.elections.org.za
Despite the ANC’s continuous dominance over the past five national elections, the electoral market and more importantly, the proportional representation electoral formula, has given room for a functioning multiparty system. Overall, the party system encompasses some 12 parties on average (see Figure 5.1). Especially since the election between 1999 and 2014, it appears that the general trend of parties occupying the legislature is around 12 to 13. The election of 1999 resulted in a significant expansion in the number of parties represented in the legislature, it almost doubled the number of parties that existed in 1994. The increased fragmentation of the party system, that is, the level of party representation in the legislature, sustained itself up till the 2014 election. Thus, by the end of the 2014 election, the party system appeared to be more fragmented than in 1994.

Yet, however, if the notion of fragmentation is taken on its own, by a simple measure of counting parties, it overlooks the association between party legislative representation and seat-vote share. Stated differently, the number of parties in the legislature does not necessarily say anything about large or small parties, or point to parties who obtain majorities over pluralities. Thus, it is important to examine the Effective Number of Parties (ENP). The ENP essentially weighs parties according to their vote or seat share (I use the latter as explained in the Methodology chapter), in order to determine the ‘effective’ or ‘relevant’ number of competitors in the system — the final score allows one to focus on major rather than minor parties.

Figure 5.2 and 5.3 show the ENP in the party system for the democratic and apartheid period, respectively. First, between 1994 and 2014, a period of five elections, the level of party system fragmentation mean stood at 2.14. This is very low compared to the bounded limit for the system which is 12. So, although there is in fact, on average, 12 competing parties, the actual ‘effective

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<th>ANC</th>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td>-2.15</td>
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<td>+5.57</td>
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<td>-6.75</td>
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*This table includes parties that were longstanding up till the 2014 national election; as such some parties were excluded. Since this table is based on comparative election data which requires a minimum of two elections, the growth of new parties as at the 2014 election cannot be calculated (that is for the EFF, NFP, AIC and AgangSA).*
number’ of parties is two or less than two. Second, by contrast, between 1910 and 1989, a period of twenty elections, the average level of fragmentation was 2.12. So, even under systems of plurality rule, the number of effective parties was low.

The apartheid period of winner-takes-all elections produced more or less bipolar patterns of competition in its very early years till 1953. However, this became less obvious since, in some cases, third parties were able to garner pluralities and government by majority was not possible without coalitions (see Table 5.3). The first phase of bipolarity since 1910 included competition between the South African Party and the Unionist Party, where the Labour Party and Independents took the place of third parties; and while the Unionist Party fell away, the National Party stood as the major competitor from 1921 to 1933. By phase two, effective competition was between the United Party and the Reunited National Party from 1938 to 1953; and phase three resulted in the demise of bipolar competition and the rise of party dominance for some three decades. The point here is that the dominant party under apartheid accounted for constraining fragmentation since it absorbed large pluralities.

Third, to a large extent this affirms ‘Duverger’s law’ that simple plurality systems tend to produce two-party systems. The plurality system contributed to the low entry of new parties and this allowed for the low degree of fragmentation to be maintained. Under proportionalism (1994 to 2014), on average six parties were able to enter the legislative arena; by comparison, under plurality rules (1910 to 1989), on average two parties were able to come into parliament during an electoral cycle. This shows that proportional rules produce more permissible structures for the entry of new parties than plurality rules. The effects of proportionalism is not, however, far-reaching.
Figure 5.3 Party system fragmentation, 1910 - 1989

Election year vs. Effective number of parties
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Source: [African Elections Database](http://africanelections.tripod.com)

Some of the results reflected in this table may slightly vary in the 'actual' number of seats won. Some of the most reliable source such as the Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa and numerous scholarly tabulations (e.g. Heard, 1974; Stadler, 1970) of the election results during the period of 1910 to 1989 yield contradictory figures. Moreover, the number of votes per party, the total number of valid votes, and the percentage results for most of the years were not easily available.
There is a critical weakness with electoral system theory: it does not consider the presence of a dominant party that subsequently erodes a two-party system to produce a dominant one. Where the causal premise of plurality systems loses strength is the period following 1958 when the NP began to muster significant majorities; suddenly the party system began to give room for one-party dominance than two-party competition. Thus, it was not the institutional structure surrounding plurality rules that contributed to clear patterns of low fragmentation; the single dominant party that swallowed most of the votes had a significant role in maintaining low fragmentation. In this way, the plurality electoral formula, under the apartheid period, had little effect on the emergence of a two-party system and it did not necessarily preempt the emergence of a dominant system.

In addition to this, the premise that proportional systems, more often than not, cause multipartism and is synonymous with high levels of fragmentation, is challenged when applied to the democratic period. It remains an anomaly why low fragmentation (mean = 2.14) is present in a proportional system. In fact, the difference between plurality and proportionalism is .02 and a correlation reveal an $r = -.09$. This means that, in the South African case, under different electoral systems there was no significant variance in the overall level of party system fragmentation; instead, it remained almost the same. Therefore, electoral systems do not have an overriding influence on fragmentation. At one point the highest level of fragmentation (3.82) (1920) existed under the plurality system whereas the highest point under proportionalism was less than this (2.26) (2014). According to classical theoretical predictions, more fragmentation is expected with proportional rules and less fragmentation is expected with plurality rules. However, for South Africa in 1920, there was some four competing parties; this means that plurality laws did not yield to the classically predicted two competing parties. In the case of 2014, only one party stood without any effective electoral competitors; this means that proportional laws did not yield to the classically predicted five or more competing parties. What this deduction implies is inconsistencies in the theoretically purported effects of electoral systems. It essentially ignores the presence of one major party.

The South Africa case shows: contrary to theoretical expectations, an institutional shift from plurality to proportional rules did not change the level of party system fragmentation from one of low to high; contextual factors matter and there is no simple relationship between electoral laws and party system fragmentation. Context matters, in that, the presence of a dominant party not only stabilises the party system and creates expected patterns of government alternation but largely contributes to low fragmentation of the party system. This was clear when the plurality system presided over the apartheid party system and was also observable when the proportional system presided over the democratic period. In both periods, there was no considerable diversity or variance in the size of the party system and limited fragmentation was the defining feature. The common dominator in maintaining low party system fragmentation is more the existence of a single dominant party than any particular electoral design — this was especially seen by the failure of proportionalism to produce patterns of multipartism and high party system fragmentation. From this case study, the main argument is that electoral rules do not necessarily determine the number of parties in a party system. Thus, a tentative conclusion is that in polities with one dominant party that successively wins majorities, irrespective of the electoral system, whether plurality or proportional, low party system fragmentation is expected to follow and override patterns of bipolar or multipolar competition.

5.4 Party system polarisation, 1994 - 2014

While the electoral system is frequently taken as a determinant of party system fragmentation, it is also said to cause polarisation. According to theoretical assumptions, given that a plurality electoral system leads to a small number of parties in the party system, parties are forced to compete for large pluralities and this competition in turn causes them to attract a wide spectrum of public opinion. In
so doing, parties come to the centre, jettison extremist positions, and the party system assumes a moderate nature. Meanwhile, proportional electoral rules apply less pressure for large pluralities, given that the system incentivises parties to obtain a small portion of the vote, parties go after sectarian interests. Consequently, parties in a proportional system are ideologically diverse, tend to take on extremist positions, are far less moderate or centrist, and the party system is polarised.

In brief, electoral systems are commonly thought of as fostering the number of parties in the system which by extension affects ideological differentiation between parties — moderation is symptomatic of small parties (usually facilitated by plurality systems) and polarisation is symptomatic of large number (usually facilitated by proportionalism). All this is to point to a single premise: the number of parties determined by electoral systems (party system fragmentation) determines party system left-right division (party system polarisation).

This section critically assesses theoretical premises in relation to the South African case. First, it examines the subsidiary premise of whether proportionalism produces extremist party positioning by measuring party left-right positions from manifesto data. Second, it investigates whether proportionalism produces polarisation by systematically measuring left-right polarisation.

### 5.4.1 Party left-right positions

In the following section I use the RILE index (or ideological index) to position parties on the left-right scale (as explained in the Methodology chapter). To map ideological positions of parties, I use a scale of -1.00 (extreme left) to 1.00 (extreme right). The immediate impression from Figure 5.4 is that during the period between 1994 and 2014, the left-right position of individual parties was highly diversified. While major parties, more often than not, prefer moderate positions, both on the centre-left and centre-right, other parties opt for slightly more radicalised positions — although not completely radicalised positions because some parties who scored 1.00 or -1.00 concentrated on emphasising more left than right issues or more right than left issues. A deeper analysis reveals that the scattering of parties across the left-right is becoming less prominent especially for major parties. Instead, there has been a pull to the centre and centre-left in the post-2009 period. Major parties, including those within the opposition, prefer to articulate a mixture of policies, both supporting leftist economic concerns and enabling the market. This infers that preference for ideological margins are irrelevant since major parties are occupying the centre.

Three significant observations emerge from Figure 5.4. First, parties closer to the centre are less subject to arbitrary fluctuations to the extremities and usually stick to the centre, only swinging between the centre-left and centre-right. Whereas between 1994 and 2004 parties were more likely to disperse close to the edges of the spectrum, 2009 and 2014 witnessed the strongest concentration of parties at the centre. A careful analysis of party manifestos reveal that parties were particularly inclined to adopt more mixed than one-sided positions on the economic dimension during this period. Another notable point is in relation to new parties and the centre. When new parties emerge, especially within a context of pre-existing competitors who occupy a particular ideological position, they tend to base themselves on moderate doctrines, as seen with the ID, COPE, AgangSA and NFP.

A frequently argued perspective is that opposition parties in South Africa are peripheral, marginal and fragmented (Giliomee et al, 2001; Southall, 1998, 2014). Although marginality is self-evident in terms of electoral strength, scholars argue that ideological fragmentation prohibits parties from ascending as an effective and viable challenger to the ANC; moreover this fragmentation is driven by “historical ideological differences” (Southall, 1998: 465). Yet, however, the analysis of party positional evolution indicates that since 2009, parties are far less ‘ideologically diverse’. In fact, the shift to the centre contradicts the argument that states there is “no obvious glue of commonality to bind them [opposition parties] together” (Southall, 1998: 466; 1997: 11). Opposition parties are converging towards the policy space of the ANC (centre-left), and there may well be a new ideological glue being forged in the party system.
Figure 5.4 Party left-right placement, 1994 - 2014*

*For parties that received 1.00 or -1.00, it indicates that they made no or very little reference to the opposite side of the spectrum. For instance, IFP in both 1999 and 2004 referred to statements that pertained to the right side of the socioeconomic dimension (market and market libertarian statements). With no reference to the left side (whether social welfare, mixed economy, redistribution or affirmative action). The same occurred with the UDM in 2009, and the FFP in 1999 and 2009. A party’s -1.00 score in 2009 and 2014 shows that the party referred to left issues such as opposition to private property, opposition to market libertarianism, opposition to the market and support for state intervention, mixed economy, redistribution and social welfare and made no reference to anything on the right side.
Second, unlike the relative stability of the centre bloc, parties on the right fringe showed signs of positional volatility. In the case of the DA, it gradually shifted away from placing too much emphasis on market fundamentalist principles and moved to the centre in 2004 and more specifically to the centre-left in 2009 and 2014. Similarly, the ACDP and UDM settled for less far right or free-market principles and presented a centre-left agenda in their manifestos; focusing on social welfare, government intervention, trade protectionism and a mixed economy as tools to alleviate social ills and foster growth. In fact, nearly all parties that prioritised more far right socioeconomic positions, from 1994 to 2009 (DA, IFP, FFP, ACDP and UDM) actually moved to the centre by 2014, although some shifted by 2009 and maintained centrist terrain till 2014 (DA, IFP and ACDP). This movement away from the right fringe leaves a vacuum on the far right especially since its decrease may be attributable to the unpopularity of rightwing policies amongst the electorate — such as less emphasis on social welfare, redistribution and affirmative action.

Conventional views about one of the major opposition parties, the DA, suggest deficiencies in the party’s policy positions. One view is that the DA must “move towards the centre of the political stage and begin a genuine process of seeking to appeal to the African community” (Schrire, 2001: 144). The other is that the party is in need of ideological change to the left (Southall, 2014b: 19). Both arguments are related since any attempt to attract the median voter, the black majority in particular, cannot be separated from social democratic policy proposals. Scholars frequently propose that the DA should focus on pro-poor issues and become a vehicle for black interests (Nijzink, 2001; Kotze, 2001; Jolobe, 2009). While it is recognised that the party “moved towards the political centre [to attract black voters] to compete with the ANC”, it is less observed that it is undergoing policy redefinition on the economic dimension (especially to the left) (Southall, 2014b: 14).

During the party’s first step to centre occupation (2004), its policy proposals were contradictory; it was “overwhelmingly free-market [especially on accelerating privatisation], which constituted a policy environment that was essentially incompatible with the party’s proposal for a Basic Income Grant” of R110 per month (Booysen, 2005: 132). However, the party seems to have found a way to manoeuvre around these issues. While it still opposes affirmative action and racial quotas, it came to embrace black economic empowerment. It went as far as to say that its intention is to find a right balance between race and growth, and conceded to the need for some form of state intervention to uplift the middle class. Moreover, the party also spoke about speeding up land reform but especially said that state-owned land should be distributed; and it further highlighted the need to balance labour flexibility and worker protection. Coming to terms with South African reality and pressures for party growth, the DA appears to be playing a very caution policy game, while some of its policies are leftist, others appear leftist with rightist conditions. For instance, some inconsistencies were evident, while the party supported bringing down costs, it called for working with the private sector to deliver services. The 2014 manifesto firmly placed the party on the centre-left, sold a clear leftist programme that unequivocally targeted the median and the growing black middle-class. It was supportive of the welfare state, social grants and spoke about the need for the youth wage and housing subsidy. Although neither specifying specific programmes and amounts like it did in 2004 nor going into explicit conditions attached to its newfound leftist policies, the party has however began to prioritise issues that it traditionally evaded.

Essentially, the plausibility of the argument that the DA is “unviable because they do not offer policies that would enable them to attract a significant electoral constituency” and that it challenges the ANC on the centre-right, needs to be revisited to take stock of the party’s embrace of social democratic and moderate leftist positions (Habib and Taylor, 2001: 216; Booysen, 2005). This finding is congruent with interview data. DA policy head, Jonathan Moakes, explained that there is a perpetuated notion that the DA is stringently rightist; meanwhile, the party is moving away from old-defined ideologies. Former DA leader, Tony Leon, said that in some circles people feel that the party is too much like the ANC on policy matters. Given that the party has shifted into the centre-left space, which explains its embrace of social democratic platforms, this analysis advances the argument that the DA appears less committed to traditional rightwing economics and recognises
that positioning itself on the right bloc undermines its viability and growth. In a similar vein, Mattes (2014: 184) argues that its redefinition, especially in supporting black empowerment and by extension, state intervention in the economy, is “a significant shift in DA ideology”.

Third, a bleak picture emerges for the far left. Whereas the ANC was slightly further from the centre-left in 2009, although it was not far left (since its emphasis was still within a centrist paradigm, it simply emphasised more left than right issues), it effectively reassumed centre ground by 2014. However, two well-known radical left parties, the PAC and APC, held steadfast to far left emphases and made no compromise to move to the centre-left. One party in particular, AZAPO, abandoned its far left anti-market rhetoric (such as its policy to reverse any form of privatisation of public services and state assets) of 1999 and 2004 and occupied centre-left ground in 2009. Less can be said about the ideological evolution of the new far left party, the EFF — since comparable information will emerge in forthcoming electoral cycles. What can be said from observing the positional behaviour of the existing far left bloc is that it appears more resilient in occupying the left periphery, especially parties like the PAC and APC who from its origins formed itself on radical socioeconomic predispositions, rather than those parties that were positioned more towards market libertarianism and who admired free-market ideals. Parties on the far left tend to sidestep policy evolution; alternatively stated, whereas most within the far right bloc moved to the centre, the same change did not occur for the far left bloc. Similar to the recognition of the right bloc that seemed to resolve that greater preference for marketism appear unfavourable, the far left retains its position on the left margins precisely because its rhetoric finds relevance in an electoral market where a majority live in situations that provide a breeding ground for extreme leftism (poverty, inequality and unemployment).

In conclusion, at first glance the argument that the party system is ideologically diverse becomes erroneous when evolution is considered. By analysing party positions by year it becomes possible to deduce positional evolutions. The party system on the whole is less widely fragmented along the ideological spectrum; instead, it is more plausible to argue that ideological fragmentation or diversity exists more within the moderate, centre space, than across the whole spectrum. It follows from the analysis that parties evolve in the way they present policies predispositions. While Figure 5.4 gives an initial impression that some two-fifths of party positions are located at the ideological margins, a deeper analysis of the evolution of party positions from 1994 to 2014 reveal that the party system is dominated by the umbra of moderation where a conglomeration of parties offer centrist packages to the median voter. This is characterised by parties consistently occupying the centre and others moving from left-right fringes to the centre. The right, however, is more sensitive to policy revision and adaption, in some cases moving from far right to centre-right and to the centre-left. But for the far left bloc, its lack of flexibility pulls it away from skipping from the left to the centre, let alone, to the right side of the fence.

5.4.2 Party system polarisation

Despite pertinent findings about the ideological composition of the party system along the unidimensional left-right spectrum, there is something more fundamental: the degree of polarisation. As outlined in Chapter 2, polarisation refers to a division of opinion, and although a party may be internally divided amongst competing camps (individual party polarisation), party system polarisation refers to the strength of inter-party ideological divisions (moderate or polarised) — it does not point to the direction of ideological division between parties (left-centre-right) which is what the ideological index does. The polarisation index (PI) is a measure of party system polarisation. Its two main variables being the ideological index (party left-right scores) and vote or seat share (electoral relevance). The PI essentially weighs individual party left-right scores according to their vote or seat share. Once a summation of the weighting is complete, a general picture of the degree of ideological division emerges. If the index is or is close to 0 it means that all
relevant parties occupy the same position on the left-right scale, and if it is or is close to 1 it means that all relevant parties are divided along the ideological extremes (Dalton, 2008).

In the case of South Africa, despite ideological variance and spread in party positions and the occupation of left-right fringes, the system is not polarised. From Figure 5.5 it can be deduced that parties are on the same side of the spectrum, the index does not even reach moderately polarised (0.5), in fact, the system was extremely close to the 0 margin both in 1994 (0.02), after this period and even by 2014 (0.07). Although the highest level was seen in 2004 (0.20), this is only modest. The PI for South Africa not only signifies the substantive degree of moderation present in the system, it importantly points to the stability and unchanging nature of polarisation. The low score means that parties converge to the same side of the ideological bloc, whether centre or extremist. In the case of South Africa, parties have come to occupy the centre in recent years, and because of their electoral relevance and their occupation of the same bloc, there is no significant opposition on the other side of the ideological divide to challenge these parties, effectively making the system moderate. This is, however, not as straightforward because it is less a situation of ‘many parties’ occupying the centre, but one major party absorbing the space. An opposite case would be one in which parties are dispersed across the spectrum, occupying positions on contrastive ideological blocs, and so if electorally relevant parties are present who are on dissimilar blocs, the system is polarised. According to the polarisation score, the classical argument about the ideologically fragmented nature of the South African party system, advanced by Giliomee et al (2001) and Southall (1998, 2014), may not hold. Mapping party positions on various points of the left-right spectrum reveals considerable levels of ideological diversity; however, low polarisation suggests that actual ideological diversity is irrelevant given that major parties are occupying the same ideological space. Moreover, it is the dominance of one party that inhibits any significance of ideological distinctions.

What the PI measure essentially means is that parties who have a large stake in the votes drive the level of polarisation in the party system. So, for the South African party system, it is clear that
party positions stretch across the left-right spectrum. Especially between 1994 and 2004, there were fundamental positional differences on socioeconomic issues given the clear presence of the far right and far left blocs. Put in the negative, during a number of electoral cycles, there has been no shortage of parties taking dichotomous ideological positions, as deduced from their policy articulations in their election manifestos. Yet, however, herein lies the fundamental issue: these parties are not large enough to affect change in the level of polarisation, in other words, although parties hold distinct positions this has little impact on overall party system ideological differentiation. The system is largely moderate because the ANC absorbs some two-thirds of the vote share; it is one large party (as opposed to a few large parties) assuming a significant space in the party system, subsequently choking the emergence of electorally relevant and ideologically distinct parties. That is the equivalent of saying even though the ruling party faces opposition on different sides of the ideological spectrum, the relevance of such opposition has to be factored in (weighted according to their vote share). And since extremist parties are not electorally large, they do not drive the degree of polarisation, hence, it follows that the ruling party as the largest party determines the level of polarisation in the entire party system.

Considering that the PI does not mean parties are structured around some particular ideological bloc like the centre (since a number of relevant parties like the ANC could be on the far right or far left and there will still be low polarisation because major parties are not on opposite extremes), what it does say is that parties are, like in the case of South Africa, clustered on the same space. The PI can however be associated with the RILE index. In this case, it is clear that the ANC, by absorbing large pluralities is a factor behind low inter-party ideological competition, and is permitting the stability of a centrist party system; primarily because it holds mixed positions on the socioeconomic sphere and is the largest party in the system.

Also, related to the latter point, since the ANC drives the level of party system polarisation, its ideology remains significant not for changing the nature of polarisation — because as long as the ANC as the largest party occupies any position, the system is still unpolarised — but for inducing change in the positions of the opposition. Given that it is a centrist party, it seems to be drawing other parties to a centrist and more particularly a centre-left policy space, especially those on the right bloc. This is producing convergence of parties on the centrist side. Scholars like Sartori (1976) and Nagel and Wlezien (2010) predict that centre occupation produces centre-fleeing tendencies and insinuates extremist party positioning. Similarly, one argument presented in the early phase of democracy stated that the PR’s low threshold would encourage parties [especially small ones] to target “a niche sector instead of making moderate and inclusive appeals”, whether on the political or economic dimension (Davies, 2004: 306). Powell (1982) also stresses the point that proportional rules are prime generators of ideological polarisation. The view was that the effect of PR to produce high representation, especially of social cleavages and the politicisation of nationalist issues, would lead to extremist party positioning and subsequently a highly polarised party system that would in turn challenge the emergence of political stability. Contrary to this, the case of South Africa shows that many parties within the opposition bloc are moving to the centre, especially on the economic cleavage, and this might be induced by the dominant party’s absorption of centre space. I hence concur with scholars like Green-Pedersen (2004), Daalder (1984) and Hazan (1997) who argue that occupation to the centre space, whether in PR or plurality systems, does not necessarily discourage moderation of the party system; and as long as there is a centrist electorate and general incentives to move to the centre, parties do so. Thus, the occupation of the centre by a major party, and the PR system, does not necessarily cause polarisation or extremist party position.

A concern surfaced in the post-2014 period that questioned whether the presence of the radical left opposition party, the EFF, was likely to change not only the modest level of ideological
polarisation in the party system but cause the ANC to move to the extreme as it responds to the new radical left challenge. Since the EFF is on the left bloc, the ANC needs to ward off criticism from the left and whereas it often faced such criticism from its internal structures, the space of intra-parliamentary and inter-party debate might intensify, even alter the ANC’s position and hence potentially polarise the party system. And this might have obvious implications for “the [future] shape of the party system” (Southall, 2014b: 19; Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014: 231).

While this concern is justifiable, there is a deficiency in it. The findings of low polarisation challenge the view of diversification of party positions, especially in terms of extremist positioning, and the imminence of significant change. It is important to note that the PR gives room for ideologically distinct parties and Figure 5.4 testifies to left-right variegation of the party system. Despite the incentive for exclusive appeals and extremist positions, the relevance of it is largely constrained. Moreover, although it remains an open matter since the EFF is a fairly young party to conclusively judge its effects but what can be said is that from the prior presence of the far left bloc, though such parties continued to remain ideological distinct, their influence remained negligible.

The argument about the extremist effects of proportionalism and the presence of the EFF overlooks two things. In the first place (a) because the dominant party absorbs the electoral space, there is limited room for opposition from the other side; and more importantly, (b) the party system has shown signs of centrist evolution and progression. The system has shown signs of centripetal conglomeration, thus contradicting the view that extremism is abundant and centrist is largely absent. Proportionalism failed to retard moderation and to create favourable grounds for extremist party positioning to mean something substantial for the party system — although this does not ignore that minor parties are inclined to assume radical positions — primarily because of the constraint the dominant party applies on the system. In relation to this, the ANC as a chief driver of polarisation implies that the significance of the EFF being the third largest party in the party system with a far left orientation is unlikely to change the structure of the party system from moderate to polarised — particularly since a large vote share is an essential requisite (coupled with a contrasting ideology) for such change to occur. In addition, even if the ANC evolves in its positional platforms to respond to left-right pressure, as long as it remains the largest party on the left bloc, with no subsequent electorally strong contender, party system polarisation will not increase.

In sum, the South African party system has considerably low polarisation and this means parties occupy the same ideological space and are not poles apart in their ideology. In other terms, there is a small ideological distance amongst relevant parties. Thus, the South African party system exhibits substantially high levels of ‘ideological proximity’ (where major parties, in this case, the ANC, converges to the one side of the spectrum) rather than ‘ideological difference’ (Sartori, 2005: 111). The fragmented nature of party positions (that is, some parties occupying the centre, far left or far right) does not automatically translate into the bifurcation of policy or ideological positions amongst parties (polarisation), especially considering the presence of the EFF. For ideological diversity to be translated into polarisation, parties have to fulfil the major prerequisite of vote share, such that two or more parties equally share a large stake in the vote share, if so it allows for potential polarisation to emerge. Yet this is not the only prerequisite, the other follows from the former that parties who have significant pluralities must also occupy opposed ideological positions. Instead, the presence of one or a few major parties determine whether this ideological bifurcation is politicised and made relevant in the party system; and as long as there are no major parties located on contrasting blocs, the system is moderate. Stated differently, a state of polarisation emerges when two or more electorally relevant parties occupy contending ideological platforms. These form the conditions for polarisation to emerge in the South African case.

This analysis also argued that extremism through centre occupation and proportionalism is not evident in South Africa. The ANC, the major centre party, not only causes the system to be largely moderate rather than polarisation, with acutely limited ideological differentiation (given the absence of electorally significant parties), it also makes the system centrist rather than extremist. With a large party at the centre, it tilts the whole system to chiefly reflect a centrist outlook. On top of this, there is a general level of ideological convergence to the centre taking place amongst opposition
parties. Movement to converge at the centre signifies that opposition parties are increasingly proposing similar mixed-model positions, leading to relative ideological homogeneity in the party system — especially between 2009 and 2014. While parties were more bifurcated and assumed dichotomous positions on fundamental policy areas in the early years of democracy, there appears to be convergence to the centre.

5.5 Correlating fragmentation and polarisation

One of the objectives of this research was to test the applicability of electoral theory to South Africa and to determine whether it stands as a causal variable for low polarisation. It is found that the theoretical claim that multiparty systems, usually produced by proportional electoral systems, cause polarisation in the party system does not apply to the case of South Africa. Figure 5.6 indicates that the theory relative to PR systems is found in quadrant 3 but South Africa is placed in quadrant 1, which is obviously inconsistent with theoretical expectations. Quadrant 1 is applicable to plurality electoral systems that produce two-party competition, this means that South Africa stands as an anomaly to theory.

The institutionalist-electoral side of the fragmentation argument posits that proportionalism fosters dispersion across the ideological continuum and this produces polarisation in the form of high levels of left-right disagreement and a large ideological distance between major parties. Meanwhile, the South African electoral system is a PR one but the assumed effect on polarisation is not evident. In fact, the PR system has very little to do with the dynamics of ideological differentiation in the party system. Given prevalent tendencies of moderation under proportional rules, where there is no effective electoral competitors at opposite sides of the spectrum, there is something more that accounts for low polarisation in South Africa. Put differently, this analysis
dismisses the electoral system as a causal variable behind low polarisation and centrist position-taking.

In contention with theory, PR rules are not incentivising major parties to take extremist positions and locate themselves on opposed left-right fringes. PR does appear, however, to be incentivising smaller parties like the FFP, ACDP, EFF and others who find space in the electoral market for Afrikaner and African nationalism, conservative religious doctrines, and socialist economic policies. Thus, the argument becomes that inbuilt systemic incentives are less problematic than the presence of an electorally major party that skews the degree of ideological differentiation in the party system to itself. To recapitulate an earlier point, despite evidence of ideological fragmentation and dispersion across the left-centre-right space and that parties are finding distinct constituencies to represent, this has not translated into polarisation. Instead, that one major party is electorally strong, squeezes opportunities for the emergence of two or more parties to equally share in the voting market who could in turn potentially compete on contrasting ideological platforms. This implies that there is little that the electoral rules are doing on their own to incentivise major parties like the ANC to adopt particular positions. Gouws and Mitchell (2005: 365) echo this point, they state that dynamics in the party system “despite highly inclusive electoral rules, is primarily a function of the electoral dominance of the ANC, rather than an outcome of the electoral system per se.”

Not only is the electoral system an unconvincing causal variable, something can be said about the theory more broadly — not considering party dominance is precisely where electoral systems theory falls short. The case of South Africa leads me to concur with scholars who question the relationship between proportionality and polarisation (Ezrow, 2008; Dalton, 2008). Even though this research does not intend to make far-reaching generalisations, the single case study does add to a growing body of scholarship around this matter, it shines doubt on the classical linear and universal connection between electoral systems and polarisation. Unlike the argument purported by Downs (1957), Sartori (1976), Dow (2010), Powell (1982) and Davies (2004), what the South African case points to is provided there is a dominant party under proportionalism, polarisation is skewed to one side (parties seem to be on the same side of the spectrum). In other terms, there is little, if not no, significant ideological bipolarity (parties on opposed ends of the spectrum) in the ideological space under conditions of party dominance. If a dominant party is present, the type of electoral system does not matter because the dominant party appears to govern overriding patterns of polarisation.

There is another point here altogether, that PR leads to ideological dispersion and not necessarily polarisation, on the extremes and centrist clustering, can be explained by the dominant party. For Downs (1957: 126-7, 138), parties in PR systems “will strive to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other and maintain the purity of their positions” and as such “differentiate their platforms more sharply”. However, observations from Figure 5.4 show that parties have largely moved to the centre despite the incentive from PR rules to move to the ends, parties seem to want to remain in the centre to attract the median voter and to challenge the ANC from that position. While extremism was meant to increase under conditions of proportionality, the South African case shows that it actually decreased since parties on the right and some on the left moved from the outskirts to the centre. Thus, this case agrees with the thesis posited by Grofman (2004), Ezrow (2008) and Dalton (2008), that there appears to be no necessary connection between PR systems and extremist clustering.

To conclude, whereas the hypothesis was to examine whether the PR system accounts for the low degree of ideological differentiation in the party system, the findings show that the PR system has little effect on low polarisation given the constraint the dominant party applies on the system. There are incentives under a PR system to adopt extremist positions and for polarisation to emerge; however, this link is broken under conditions of centrist party dominance and absence of electorally strong ideological competitors. For the causal framework of this research, it is then not considered a significant factor in stimulating moderation. I find that the dominant party may reveal more about the causes behind moderation in the South African party system rather than electoral rules and
institutions. This analysis has also shown that the case study joins itself to the growing argument that polarisation does not necessarily emerge or increase under a PR system.

5.6 Conclusion: The electoral system and party system moderation

The exploratory part of this analysis first looked at the transition from plurality to proportionalism and outlined some of the chief factors motivating the decision to adopt a PR electoral system. It found that while maximum representation is fundamental, other motivating factors have also fed into the decision. This includes concerns about political stability, the need to accelerate democratisation, to have an alternative oversight mechanism, and to align with international political dynamics. Moreover, the ANC as one of the major stakeholders during the democratic transition talks, showed propensities towards moderate politics. This was because the organisation compromised and was sensitive to the demands of the white minority who preferred a more accommodative and inclusive system; however, the ANC was moved by its own internal concerns for political stability and social reconciliation. And these propensities were background forces that advanced moderation rather than exclusive, non-accommodative, and plurality FPTP proposals.

The causation part of this analysis examined the nexus between fragmentation, electoral systems and polarisation. Three main things emerged. First, there appears to be no significant relationship between the PR electoral system and the level of party system polarisation. Whereas the PR system is considered fostering ideological differentiation and polarisation, in the South African party system, despite the auspices of proportionalism, there is a substantially low degree of polarisation. Parties occupy the same side of the left-right spectrum. Much of this is attributable to the presence of the ANC as the major party driving low polarisation.

Second, theory leads us to expect that proportionalism and centre occupation generates centrifugal tendencies — both incentivise major parties and the opposition bloc to adopt distinct positions to capture exclusive and non-centrist voters to gain legislative representation, and to respond to centre occupation by fleeing outward to the ideological margins. This is questionable in relation to the findings of this research because many opposition parties have moved to the centre despite the ANC’s occupation of the centre (between 2009 and 2014) and the presence of PR laws. So while in previous years the opposition bloc was more diverse and bifurcated, this changed since the post-2009 period. The ANC’s centre-left position may well be pulling opposition parties to gain support by articulating similar positions. Parties that were on the right bloc have come to occupy the centre, especially the centre-left. The right side appears more sensitive to policy reconsideration and evolution whilst parties on the extreme left demonstrate little sign of moving to the centre-left. In fact, the party system has shown signs of centrist conglomeration, and this is fostering a common glue that is joining many opposition parties to challenge the ANC from similar platforms. This finding challenges the often perpetuated notion that the DA and opposition parties generally, are still challenging the ANC and appealing to voters from a rightwing rather than a centre-left platform. Moreover, it departs from the ‘fragmentation thesis’ that emphasises ideological diversity and the absence of a common ideological glue to bind parties together to challenge the ANC. In sum, centre occupation of the ANC even under conditions of proportionalism is actually producing centripetalism of the party system; that is, an overwhelming centrist outlook and centre-based competition.

Third, I critically interrogated the claim that the EFF is likely to change the ideological nature of the system. I found that the dominance of ANC constrains the relevance of extremist parties. Even if radical left parties are present, as long as they remain electorally small, they cannot polarise the system. Coupled with this, the ANC needs to undergo positional change to locate itself on the other pole. In general, this analysis argued that the PR thesis does not apply because of two conditions that make it unable to meaningfully give effect to extremist positioning and polarisation: (a) the presence of a centrist major party and electoral irrelevance of ideological parties, and (b) the
absence of positional change of the major party to arise as an ideological contender (far right) to an 
electorally strong ideological party (far left).

The type of electoral system in South Africa does not account for centrist party position-taking, 
centrist amalgamation, and low polarisation. Considering the South African party system, the 
common denominator in the weaknesses of electoral systems theory is the dominant party. The 
determinants of moderation in the party system is not connected to the PR system, the number of 
parties or a multiparty structure; instead, evidence points to the strength of a major party, the ANC, 
in driving moderation and the low degree of ideological differentiation in the party system. The 
ANC is both a centrist occupier and is pulling opposition parties to that position. Thus, for South 
Africa, much seems to be contained within the ANC rather than in outer institutional structures.
Notes

1 I use the terms ‘majoritarianism’ and ‘plurality’ interchangeably since it forms part of First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) winner-takes-all electoral systems. The FPTP method is also called the ‘simple plurality method’. It is common to use either term to signify that both use the FPTPs electoral formula to convert seats into votes, which is that the candidate or party that gains the most votes wins elections regardless of their vote share. Simply put, the highest polling candidates fill seats. In this sense, both have the FPTP principle embedded within them. A clear difference begins to emerge in the way votes are obtained, not in how votes are calculated. The plurality system requires that a representative does not necessarily have to secure a majority (50+1 per cent of the vote) but obtain more votes than the competitors (less than a majority but the largest share of votes); majoritarian systems, on the other hand, require a representative to secure a clear majority to form a government.

2 Particular instances of politically-related violence included the Boipatong and Bisho killings of June and September 1992, respectively.

3 The ANC’s election results sit in the range of 60: the party’s lowest result was 62.15 per cent (2014) and its highest was 69.69 per cent (2004).

4 Although the argument largely surrounded race-based matters and pertained less explicitly to policy or ideological issues, an important point can be extracted from the debate. The contrasting argument was that since “historical patterns of polarisation” especially around race and language tend to “solidify group identities”, given that proportionalism allows for diverse representation, it accommodates differences and this in turn reduces extremism and conflict (Muthien, 1999: 12; Norris, 2008; Lijphart, 1977). This belief extended itself to anticipate proportionalism as fostering moderation in the party system since it provided contentment in the sharing of political power and the acknowledgement that group distinctions were represented in the legislature.
Chapter 6: The Left-Right Moderate-Polarised Distribution of the Electorate

This chapter analyses left-right polarisation at the level of the South African electorate. The theoretical assumption is that voters affect party system polarisation. When there is a large ideological distance within the electorate (division between the extremes of the left-right spectrum), the party system reflects high polarisation. When there is a small ideological distance within the electorate (occupy the same side of the spectrum), the party system reflects moderate tendencies. To examine the effects voters have on the party system one has to get an idea about the nature of social division. A comprehensive analysis of social polarisation is not the objective of this chapter nor is an examination of the non-ideological dimension (race-based, identity or other non-policy issues). Instead, this analysis is restricted to the nature of left-right polarisation at the voter level. In so doing, this chapter seeks to establish the presence or absence of ideological polarisation at the mass level by using a range of public opinion surveys between 1982 and 2016. It also corroborates this with interview data. The reasons for employing these methods were outlined in the Methodology chapter.

Three main features are foundational to the analysis: determining the direction of voter preferences (left or right), the strength of such preferences (moderate or radical), and the distance between voters (polarisation). This chapter first examines citizens left-right self-placement, positions on left-right economic issues, and attitudes toward social change. Second, it assesses the policy-based issue in party differences and party support. Third, it examines the implication of the findings as a cause for party system moderation and links it to the literature. The purpose of this chapter in doing all this is to determine whether or not voters are a causal factor behind the moderate phenomenon of the party system. The primary finding is that voter preferences influence party positions but voters do not have an overriding influence on this since parties maintain a degree of independence in policy determination and there is sometimes a disjuncture between voter and party positions. Moreover, voters hardly affect moderation; in fact, while voters are polarised on general issues and salient economic issues, the party system has not mirrored this dynamic. Thus, the cause of moderation rests less with social dynamics but more with the dominant party that is constraining polarisation and stabilising the system in a centrist and moderate direction.

6.1 General ideological predispositions

The present section discusses two things. First, it establishes the median voter position by looking at citizen self-placement data (this is self-identification on the left-right ideological scale). It also encompasses citizen placement of major political parties. Second, it looks at the preferred nature of social change as an indication of general ideological inclinations at the social level.

6.1.1 Citizen self-placement and placement of parties

Surveys that ask citizens to place themselves on the left-right political scale usually pose the question as follows, as in World Value Survey (WVS) waves: “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” The data presented below emerges from this question — although I use a many data sources, the survey
question remained the same with only slight terminological variations. The left–right scale ranges from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Findings from nine time periods, between 1982 to 2013, indicate that the mean voter position is an overall average of 5.70. The mean voter position over the years fluctuates between 5 to 6.5, with 1994’s result being the only outlier with a score of 3.6 (centre-left), as reflected in Figure 6.1. This overall mean score lies in the centre and centre-right range, thus left-right fluctuation is generally contained within this parameter. In other words, the average citizen locates themselves on the centre, centre-right bloc. In terms of the relationship between the citizen and ideological extremism, self-placement data reveals that the median voter rarely thinks of himself or herself on or close to the far-left or far-right; instead, there is large preference for the centre political space.

When considering changes between ideological blocs, and the portion of respondents who ‘don’t know/haven’t heard’ of the left-right or are ‘non-politically aligned’, four main deductions emerge from Figure 6.2. First, the centre has been consistently higher (mean = 31%) than the right and left bloc between 1982 and 1996 but the growth and stability of the centre was followed by significant fluctuation between 1997 and 2001. Centre partisans halved from 1996 to 1997 but increased by 132% in 2001 (this year had the highest percentage of people identified with the centre); and
between 2006 to 2013 centre identification relatively stabilised (mean = 35%). The latter situation resembles centre positioning in the 1982 - 1996 period.

Second, not only was the left bloc slightly larger than the right in 1990 and 1994 but during 1990 to 1996 there was close contestation between the left-right bloc. Nonetheless, the left space in the electorate seems largely unoccupied. By 2006 to 2013 left placement was lower (mean = 8%) than 1982 to 2001 (mean = 17%). Moreover, what is occurring with the centre and right bloc seem more relevant than the left. While centre and right support ranges from between 30% to 45%, on average, support for the left ranges from 10% to 20% — voter identification with the left bloc reached its lowest between 2001 to 2013.

Third, while the left and right were proximate between 1990 to 1996, this subsequently changed. There appears to be more voter identification with the centre and the right. Since 1982 to 2013, mean results in Figure 6.3 indicate that the South African electorate is almost equally positioned on the centre (mean = 32%) and right (mean = 30%), with only less than half drawn to the left (mean = 14%). On average, 62% of the public are distributed across the centre and the right. The consistent decrease in ‘don’t know’ caused a gain in the percentage of people identified with the centre ($r = -0.55$) and right ($r = -0.71$) — meanwhile very little support went from the ‘don’t know’ to the left ($r = -0.05$).

Fourth, almost one quarter (mean = 24%) of citizens were unsure where they stood on the political scale, had not heard of the ‘left-right’, were not politically aligned or simply refused to answer. Interpreted in the affirmative, large majorities, 76%, identify themselves on the left-right scale. In addition, there is evident decrease in the percentage of ‘don’t know’. In 1982, the percentage of ‘don’t know’ stood at 50% (the highest it ever reached), by 1997 it was 20% and by 2013 it was 13% (decreasing by 281% from 1982). The decrease in the ‘don’t know’ reflects an increase in the proportion of newly politically-aligned citizens that choose to identify with politics in left-right terms. This implies there are increasingly more people locating themselves somewhere along the political spectrum. Although there is an obvious potential lack of citizen sophistication of the meaning of ‘left-right’, the low percentage who ‘don’t know’ compared to ideological partisans signify that there is high ideological self-positioning at the electoral level. Without ignoring the controversy around ideological orientations or lack of it amongst voters, it is clear that a large chunk of the South African public can position themselves on the political scale and this accords an important degree of validity to the left-right dimension at the social level.

Figure 6.3 Citizen self-placement by mean, 1982 - 2013

[Diagram showing the percentages of citizens identifying with different political blocs: Centre bloc 32%, Right bloc 30%, Left bloc 16%, Don’t know 24%.

Survey data that indicates the presence of a centrist electorate is congruent with interview data. Interview respondents, who mostly composed of party leaders and officials, were questioned about whether they thought voters were centrist/moderate or radical/extremist particularly on socioeconomic policy preferences. Most respondents were of the same opinion and expressed certainty and conviction in their views. They stated that voters were ‘broadly moderate’ and ‘not extreme’: “moderation is the normal trend” in South Africa (Madlalose, Interview). One respondent from the DA said: “most definitely the South African electorate is moderate in terms of their wishes” (Andrew, Interview). Leader of the far left party, the APC, said: “the current position of the average South African voter is not extreme, whether left or right” (Godi, Interview).

An extremist voter on economic issues would either be (a) completely communist or Stalinist, and intolerant of any capitalist system; or (b) completely capitalist and believing in market fundamentalist principles, and opposed to socialism and state intervention. An IFP respondent stated that there is no extreme of one or the other type: “[t]he capitalistic-type as opposed to the communistic-type, these are world apart, and I think people are somewhere in between the two” (Madlalose, Interview). This means that people feel that capitalist approaches are allowed in the country together with socialist economic values. So, according to parties, voters are not extremist about a governing economic system whether capitalist or socialist, they prefer a relatively moderate, centrist and in-between system.

Another portion of this analysis compares voter mean positions to voter placement of parties. In addition to asking individuals to locate themselves on the political scale, only a few surveys asked them to also place major parties on the left-right scale. According to Figure 6.4, respondents located themselves in the centre in 1994 and moved close to the centre-right in 1997 and 2009 — this is consistent with the findings above where the average individual tends to locate himself or herself within a relatively moderate range, especially close to the centre-right. When respondents place parties on the scale, they perceive major parties like the ANC and DA as in or close to the moderate

![Figure 6.4 Citizen placement of parties on the left-right scale by mean](image-url)

*IDASA 1994 worked with a 6-point scale, hence the centre range is from 3 to 4, while surveys in 1997 and 2009 worked with a 10-point scale, hence the centre is from 4 to 6). Source: IDASA (1994, 1997), CSES (2009).*
range. From the data it is observable that individuals never placed these parties on the extreme left or extreme right. In other words, the average citizen does not view major parties as extremist.

It is interesting that the ANC in 1997 and 2009 was placed relatively close to the median voter position. In 1994, citizens placed the ANC near the centre-left but felt that the DA was very close to their position. In 2009, respondents placed the DA in the centre-left while they were on the centre-right and placed the ANC in that position. It seems like in 2009 voters felt that the DA was further away from their position than the ANC. In fact, individuals perceived opposition parties as quite distant. Although little time-series data is available, it might be that citizens feel the ANC better reflects their ideological predispositions rather than the opposition bloc. Moreover, there is a degree of accuracy in voter placement of parties primarily because the placement of the DA on the centre-left is consistent with the findings in Chapter 5 that show the party has been moving to the left. Yet, it is not clear why the ANC is often characterised as centre-right — in this case, citizens may be referring to some other dimension that is unrelated to the economic cleavage.

In conclusion, it can be deduced that the left-right positions of citizens are clustered around the centre and centre-right of the spectrum. This also primarily implies that the average voter prefers less extremist positions and is rarely located on the ideological fringes. Party leaders and representatives converged on the point that voters are relatively moderate and take up in-between positions. In relation to specific ideological blocs, the left bloc consistently lost appeal over the years as a preferred personal position for citizens. Also, when the median position of citizens are compared with their placement of major parties, results indicate that they locate the ANC closest to them, that is on the centre and centre-right, and feel that the opposition bloc is further away from their preferences. In this sense, voters think the ANC better represents them on policy and ideological issues rather than opposition parties — only in 1994 citizens placed the DA close to and the ANC further from them. In sum, citizens position themselves and major parties in the centre and centre-right rather than on the extremes.

6.1.2 Social change: Reform or fundamental transformation

While left-right self-placement provides a direct measure of ideological orientations within the electorate, other more indirect measures serve as additional indicators. One such measure includes what citizens think about social change. WVS waves asked respondents to choose between three kinds of attitudes about the mode of change in society. It is evident from Figure 6.5 that people have consistently felt that valiant defence and radical change of society is much less preferred than gradual reforms and improvements. Some 56% on average position themselves in a moderate space by opting for gradual improvements of society through reform. In stark contrast, only 15% opt for fundamental change and 16% for valiant defence. In the negative, a low proportion think the entire way society is organised must be radically changed through revolutionary action and actionable vanguardism against existing social structures — on the latter, WVS referred to ‘valiant defence’ as a brave defence of society against all subversive forces.

This suggests that during the period of apartheid (1980s) and particularly in the political negotiation period (early 1990s), a majority of individuals surveyed preferred modest and gradual reform even under conditions of political unfreedom that seemed to demand radical transformation. Such preferences seem to concur with the ANC’s, as the major liberation movement, political approach in the early 1990s which was largely characterised by suspension of the armed struggle and the pursuit of negotiations as the preferred method for progress. However, this explanation does not suffice because suspension of military action only occurred in 1990. This means citizens were operating relatively independently of political dynamics by opting for moderate tendencies.

In addition, given the levels of violence that occurred during this period and also post-apartheid protests, it does not necessarily signify that people are more radicalised in the their preference for change (Bond et al, 2013). It is more plausible to think about citizens as dissatisfied with the state of
progress. This means, for instance, that citizens expect accelerated and quality political output such as service delivery rather than some radical restructuring of the social makeup.

On the whole, given that over the years, from 1982 to 2001, citizens regularly and almost unchangingly assumed a modest and moderate approach to social change, it signifies the lack of appetite for radicalism in the general social structure, including the socioeconomic. This finding acts as another factor that provides evidence of moderation at the social level. Moreover, to be more specific, this kind of moderation is primarily related to preferences for change not social mobilisation.

6.2 Economic preferences

Citizen preferences on economic policies provide an important indication about their position on the left-right economic cleavage. In this way, economic issues also serve as a measure to check the validity of citizen self-placement data. This section includes an examination of citizen preference on (a) control and management of the economy, (b) income inequality and government intervention, and (c) property rights and land redistribution.
6.2.1 Control and management of the economy

WVS and Afrobarometer surveys asked citizens about their views on private and government ownership of business and industry — these were relatively similar questions. Results depicted in Figure 6.6 show that in 1990, a majority of citizens preferred private over government ownership of business but between 1996 to 2006, there was close competition between the two groups of citizens. By 2013, more citizens opted for government ownership, in direct comparison to the 1990 result.

Moreover, two episodes of inconsistency appear in the data. First, while there was more stability of the pro-privatisation group between 1996 to 2006, the pro-government group showed greater signs of flux between 1996 to 2001. Second, between 2006 to 2013 both groups diverged and preference for government ownership was on the increase matched by a decrease in support for private ownership. Given this inconsistency, observing the latter result alone may be unreliable; the mean result should be considered for a broader picture of the overall pattern of preferences.

Mean scores reveal close contestation between pro-government, 37%, and pro-privatisation, 38%, adherents. In addition, 20% of citizens are unsure about what they support. This means that 75% of citizens, between 1990 and 2013, locate themselves somewhere in the privatisation debate.

Figure 6.6 Private or state ownership of business, 1990 - 2013*

*Percentage that agree. WVS used a scale: 1 = totally agree with the statement that private ownership of business and industry should be increased, 10 = totally agree with the statement that government ownership of business and industry should be increased. I assigned the following categories to the numerical hierarchy: 1, 2, 9, 10 = strongly agree; 3, 4, 7, 8 = somewhat agree; 5 and 6 = don’t agree with either, in-between. I further merged strongly agree and somewhat agree. This categorisation is similar to the Afrobarometer (2000) survey question on government ownership versus privatisation.

**The 2000 survey asked respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: “The government should retain ownership of its factories, businesses and farms; “It is better for the government to sell its businesses to private companies and individuals”. Source: WVS (1990, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2013), Afrobarometer (2000)
Citizens, in addition, are almost equally divided on whether they prefer government or private ownership. On the latter, although from 2001 pro-government adherents increased, over the years there has been no clear majority to reflect preference for any one side — if citizens were regularly on one side they would not be divided. The balance could, however, be tipped by movement of the undecided or floating group becoming partisan to either economic side.

In addition, although there appears to be a negative linear relationship between the pro-government and undecided group, there is a weak relationship. This means it cannot be said that when pro-government adherents increase this comes from a decrease in the undecided group ($r = -.17$). In fact, decreasing support for private ownership goes to an increase in the undecided group ($r = -.65$) and an increase in pro-government support ($r = -.62$). Thus, former pro-privatisation supporters choose to sit in a grey area of indecision and some choose to defect to the pro-government side.

When citizens were asked about management of the economy, a 2002 Afrobarometer survey revealed that a clear majority (62%) strongly approved/approved that individuals decide for themselves what to produce and what to buy and sell and a small proportion strongly disapproved/disapproved (17%). Also, citizens seem to prefer free-marketism when it comes to them being free to earn as much as they can even if it leads to large differences in income (63%) rather than the government placing limits on how much rich people earn even if it discourages others from working hard (33%) (Afrobarometer, 2000). This resembled much of the situation in 1994 when almost 50% strongly disagreed/disagreed that government ought to decide how much people earn, and 31% strongly agreed/agreed (IDASA, 1994). People prefer to migrate from lower to middle and upper-class ladder; for them, the government should not limit this movement by controlling income. Thus, on production/distribution decided by the individual and free earnings, citizens seem to eschew interventionist tendencies on the economic structure of society.

The observed movement to the left by opposition parties and even the dominant party embracing the left position may be associated with citizen decrease in support for the issues like privatisation, and the preference left issues. However, this is not straightforward since major parties are rarely articulating issues of nationalisation. In can, nonetheless, perhaps be said that voter preferences on economic issues affect the type of policy packages parties offer back to the electorate.

In summary, some 70% of citizens take a stand on who should control and manage the economy. Longitudinal data shows that in 1990 a majority wanted private ownership of the economy but in 2013 more opted for government ownership — this locates citizens on the left bloc. However, the overall picture shows a public divided between pro-privatisation and pro-government adherents. In other words, there is no clear majority that consistently preferred either type of economic model. Some citizens are on the right and some are on the left. Moreover, it is not easy to place citizens on the left because (a) a clear majority approve that the individual should decide what to produce, buy and sell. In addition, (b) citizens in 1994 and 2000 consistently showed majority preference for the market enabling them to earn as much as they can rather than the government limiting their earnings. It can be concluded that citizens do not show absolute or unconditional preference for a government-run or free-market economy: they are located on the left and right on certain issues. It might be that citizens prefer an appropriate mix between the ideological blocs.

### 6.2.2 Income inequality and government intervention

Figure 6.7 shows the percentage of people who support income equality or income inequality. Mean scores show that over the years there has been close competition between the groups. In 1990 to 2013, those who agreed that incomes should be made more equal constituted 40% of citizens, those who opted for income inequality and differential income structures formed 39% of citizen, and 19% were in-between these two categories. Citizens are largely divided on the matter.
Compared to 1990, a declining number of citizens think that income should be made more equal, as shown in Figure 6.7. By 2013, only 24% strongly agreed/agreed that there is a need for income equality, compared to 53% in 1990. This signifies that people are increasingly subscribing to the idea that large income differences are justifiable and that those who work hard, demonstrate individual effort and take responsibility for their success deserve to be rewarded. Those who hold the view that incomes should be kept unequal and there is a need for larger income differences, consistently increased since 1990. In addition, whilst most citizens took a clear stand in 1990 whether to equalise income or not, by 2013 there was a 244% increase in those who were unable to clearly support a particular view. Any (a) increase in support for equalising incomes comes from a decrease in the number of indecisive citizens ($r = -.96$); and (b) further increases in support for income inequality comes from those fed-up with supporting income equalisation ($r = -.93$). Thus, it appears that citizens who were previously committed to the ideal of income equality are becoming dissuaded by it and are resorting to the grey area of indecision or are supporting income inequality. This tallies with the above finding that instead of some kind of ‘absolute equality’, citizens accept the feature of ‘relative equality’ in terms of income; and expect to be rewarded for hard work irrespective if this reward produces income inequality.
Whilst there is usually a degree of division and an emerging divergence between those who support income equality and income inequality, on average 43% of individuals think that government should take more responsibility for the wellbeing of the population; 35% feel that individuals should carry this burden; and 21% are unable to place themselves in any of these categories (as shown in Figure 6.8). So in spite of decreasing support for government responsibility, on average support for it has been higher than individual responsibility. Compared to the time-series data, a 1999 EPOP survey revealed a similar finding, it found that 49% of individuals believe that government should be more active in the economy, while 37% said that the market should be active. According to Figure 6.8, when there is an increase in the government-responsibility group, there is a decrease in the individual-responsibility group and vice versa ($r = -.95$); and when support for the former increase/decrease, there is a decrease/increase in those who are undecided ($r = -.77$). This suggests in one sense that when citizens become frustrated with supporting the government, they are likely to turn to individual responsibility or are undecided.

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*Figure 6.8 Responsibility for peoples wellbeing, 1990 - 2013*

*Percentage that agree. WVS waves used the scale: 1 = totally agree with the statement that the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for, 10 = totally agree with the statement that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. I assigned the following categories to the numerical hierarchy: 1, 2, 9, 10 = strongly agree; 3, 4, 7, 8 = somewhat agree; 5 and 6 = don't agree with either, in-between. I further merged strongly agree and somewhat agree.


In terms of government intervention in creating jobs, one survey showed that 57% of citizens think that the government should help to provide employment for everyone who wants to work; while only 42% agreed that the best way to create jobs is to encourage people to start their own large or small businesses (Afrobarometer, 2000). So, a majority feel that the public sector should have a larger role in job creation — but also a considerable percentage feel that individuals should take responsibility in the job market. Also, as Table 6.1 shows, WVS waves in 2006 and 2013 asked citizens about their view on government taxation used for subsidisation. A majority of citizens, 56%, felt that the state should tax the rich to subsidise the poor, which was considered an important feature of democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1 Government tax rich and subsidise poor, 2006 and 2013*</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not an essential characteristic of democracy</td>
<td>20,7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An essential characteristic of democracy</td>
<td>56,6</td>
<td>55,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t agree with either/in-between</td>
<td>16,9</td>
<td>22,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(n=)</em></td>
<td>(2,816)</td>
<td>(3,473)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*WVS waves used the scale: 1 = not at all an essential characteristic of democracy, 10 = it definitely is an essential characteristic of democracy. I assigned the following categories to the numerical hierarchy: 1, 2, 9, 10 = strongly agree; 3, 4, 7, 8 = somewhat agree; 5 and 6 = don’t agree with either, in-between. I further merged strongly agree and somewhat agree. Source: WVS (2006, 2013)

There is considerable homogeneity between survey and interview data. On the latter, party leaders and officials converge on the notion that there are socialist tendencies within the electorate. While on social matters citizens are conservative, on economic issues they are more leftist. According to interview respondents, this is primarily evidenced (a) through the perception that ‘government should provide everything’. The poor, in particular, have been led to believe there are unlimited resources and the state is capable of using it to dispense social goods. UDM leader, Bantu Holomisa, explained that there is a strong ‘culture of dependency’ where citizens tend to depend too much on government support, in the form of grants or other state ‘handouts’. One IFP respondent said that this culture originates from past material exclusion and economic deprivation: when citizens compare the democratic period to the apartheid era, they expect the elected government to deliver basic needs and sympathise with their poverty. For others, (b) electoral results and party support indicate leftist electorate tastes. Since the ANC is a left of centre party that gains popular support, it implies that there are strong leftist currents amongst the electorate. So, parties argue that there is a government-dependent citizenry who support a centre-left party.

In conclusion, it seems that (a) public sentiments favour the left, that is state intervention in the economy and a higher role for the state (government responsibility, active state, job creation and taxation). However, this is not an overriding majority and sometimes there is no clear majority in the first place. Leftist inclinations within the electorate are also observed by party leaders and officials, who interact with voters on the ground and hence provide a reliable source of information about the ideological distribution of the electorate. They state that citizens seem to view the government as an important part in alleviating social ills, and also choose to put a centre-left party in government. According to longitudinal and single-time period data, (b) a considerable portion of the citizenry also feel the market and individuals should play a role in the wellbeing of citizens and in job creation. In addition, the right element comes in because people prefer ‘relative equality’,
accept income differences and want to be rewarded for work. Less people are endorsing the leftist ideal of income equality — effectively locating citizens on the right bloc on the income equality matter. Thus, although the government plays a critical role in citizen perception of responsibility, it is not seen as the only transformative force for an individual’s success and wellbeing — since citizens also support individual initiatives. Citizens prefer left elements in the form of an active state (especially in job creation and taxation) and right elements on income difference.

6.2.3 Property rights and land redistribution

Three surveys make it possible to assess citizen perception of land redistribution and property rights, as Figure 6.9 depicts. In 1995, an IDASA survey found that when individuals were asked what they thought about government taking possession of someone’s land: 38% said never, 26% felt it should be for public good, 29% mentioned restitution and giving land back to people who previously owned it or to those without land, and 1% said the state should possess land whenever it wants.10

![Figure 6.9 Property rights and land redistribution](source)

On the issue of how land repossession should proceed, the following views were found. The first relates to confiscation, seizure and stealing of property. In 1994, when asked about government-led confiscation of land, 41% of citizens disagreed that the government should confiscate land and give it to the landless while 37% agreed (IDASA, 1994).11 A 2013 WVS wave asked citizens whether it is acceptable to steal property. Results show that 57% strongly agreed/agreed that stealing property was never justifiable, and 26% strongly agreed/agreed that it is always justifiable.12 It is striking that no significant change occurred from 1994 to 2013. There was an 11% drop in those who supported confiscation, and a 16% rise in support for those who disagreed with it. Given that a large plurality supported confiscation, it signifies an extremist element within the electorate. However, it seems that respect for property rights is increasing and radical notions of land possession is decreasing.

The second relates to the payment of repossessed land; that is, whether there should be market-based compensation or no payment at all. In general, the public look favourably on property rights.
When asked how the government should pay for repossessed land, 72% said it should follow current market value and 3% said the government does not have to pay (IDASA, 1995). Similarly, in 2002, an Afrobarometer survey it found that 68% of people mentioned that the government must abide by laws in acquiring property, including paying the owner; and 17% agreed that in order to develop the country, the government should have the power to seize property without compensation. It seems that those who believe in no compensation and no payment have increased by 14%, and those who support payment decreased by 4%.

In summation, although 55% of citizens are of the view that government should repossess land for public good or for redistribution, there is no overriding majority that support government repossession. But more importantly, there is a plurality that subscribe to stealing or confiscating property. However, this has decreased. Moreover, those who support property rights have always been higher than those who do not; in fact, there was majority support that stealing property is unacceptable. And any state-led repossession should follow market compensation and legal procedures. This shows that although citizens are inclined to support land restitution and redistribution, a considerable number tend to respect property rights, market-valued compensation and legal procedures for repossession. This effectively locates citizens in a mixed position. On the one hand they value some kind of government-led land repossession; on the other hand, they value respect for property rights.

6.3 Mapping voter left-right positions and polarisation

This section summarises much of the discussion. It locates the general trajectory of voter positions in terms of the left-right and the degree of polarisation at the electorate level.

6.3.1 Citizen left-right positions

On the ideological nature of the electorate, in most cases there is no clear majority that adheres to a free-market or government-run economy but more prefer the latter. Since 2006 more citizens opted for government ownership of business and industry; and between 1996 to 2006 more supported government responsibility for citizen wellbeing. From individual time-period data, a clear majority supported an active government in job creation, taxing the rich to subsidise the poor, and government-led land repossession; yet these majorities are not overwhelming. This implies there is preference for the left side of the political spectrum. But from longitudinal data, given the absence of majority preference, it cannot be said that citizens skew the ideological balance at the social level in such a way that there is a unimodal left distribution (which would produce low polarisation since most voters would occupy the left side), but it can be said that citizens are in some occasional instances located on the left side more than they demonstrate preference for the right side (market-run economy and privatisation) of the political spectrum.

It is important to consider bipolarity at the level of voters. Left preference is not observable in every instance: citizens are clearly on the right on some issues. This includes subscribing to the notion that individuals not the government should decide what they produce, buy and sell; and that the government should not limit an individual from earning as much as they want especially if they work hard. On the latter issue, longitudinal data shows that an increasing number of citizens are preferring differences in incomes for those who put more individual effort in their work; and are less supportive of equalising incomes. In addition, citizens who support redistribution of land, are also on the right side because they respect property rights, disapprove of stealing land, and are unsupportive of state-led repossession without market-based compensation and law-abiding procedures.
Mean results from longitudinal data on the economic cleavage reveal the overall strength of left-right preferences. As Figure 6.10 shows, voters are located in the moderate range, either centre, centre-left or centre-right. The scale takes -1.00 to mean extreme left, -0.50 to mean centre-left, 0.0 to mean centre, 0.50 to mean centre-right and 1.00 to mean extreme right. Citizens are dispersed on the left and right side of the political spectrum. However, consistent with the earlier analysis in this chapter, voters are more moderate than extremist — and consistent centre positioning attests to this.

On the left, they do not hold the view that the government is the exclusive and absolute agent of economic change since no clear, let alone overwhelming, majorities are found on salient economic matters. Also, because citizens have preference for rightwing values, this prevents them from being on the extreme left; in effect characterising them as centre-left. On the right, while they opt for rightist ideals in certain cases, they are on the centre-right primarily because they have preference for leftist issues as well, meaning that citizens are not on the extreme right.

Associating these results with the data from voter self-placement, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, it shows that voters are clustered in the centre, and this is the case for economic issues. So while the left-right self-placement pertains to general issues across a range of dimensions, on the economic dimension, it is clear that citizens are in the centre and this is either movement in the centre-left or centre-right. There is less appetite for the extremes. This infers that citizens accept some mixed position on economic issues, where they can merge leftist with rightist issues.
6.3.2 Citizen left-right polarisation

Longitudinal data reveals that voters are polarised on the left-right economic cleavage. As illustrated in Figure 6.11, the standard deviation (a measure voter polarisation) shows there is a large distance between those who support privatisation and government ownership of the economy, income equalisation and income differences, and government and individual responsibility. The scale takes 0 to mean unpolarised (voters are all on the same side of the left-right spectrum) and 1 to mean polarised (voters are divided between the extremes). It is evident that as the years pass by, voters are approaching the range of moderate polarisation: there has been a consistent move in the direction of decreasing polarisation.

Although results show that voters are not located in the extreme polarity range (0.9 to 1.0), they are highly polarised on specific economic issues. There is usually a large distance between voters on issues of the privatisation, equality and responsibility rather than a small distance between them. In other terms, citizens rarely occupy similar or one-sided positions on economic issues — such as when most are clearly located on the left, centre or right side of the spectrum. On the issue of privatisation, polarisation ranged from 0.60 (2013) to 0.78 (1990); on equalising incomes, it varied between 0.64 (2013) to 0.85 (1990); and on government-individual responsibility, it fluctuated between 0.64 (2013) to 0.81 (1990). The subsequent observation is that polarisation was particularly high in 1990 and significantly lowered by 2013.

In brief, South African voters are (a) divided on salient socioeconomic issues; a portion assumes the left and another assumes the right, thus making the electorate polarised. Evidence shows, however, that voters are (b) consistently moving in the direction of moderate polarisation; this suggests the more of the electorate are coming to occupy relatively similar left-right positions rather than choosing to be poles apart. Furthermore, it might be that parties have acknowledged the need
for a mix between these two preferences. The division at the electoral level, in other words, might be aggregated by parties who choose to merge them into some middle-of-the-ground position. Moreover, the absence of a clear majority on any side might be dissuading parties from adopting one-sided ideological positions — although it cannot automatically be assumed that parties are driven primarily by social influence.

However, there is a limitation to this analysis. Given that the question in WVS waves did not directly pertain to the degree of leftness and rightness, that is whether citizens are moderate or radical on an issue, it cannot be clearly determined whether on the economic dimension, voters are highly polarised because one section is on the ‘extreme right’ and another on the ‘extreme left’. What nonetheless remains conclusive is that voters are divided on salient economic cleavages; both longitudinal and single time-period data (from economic issues), more often than not, show polarisation to be a constant social dynamic.

When comparing voter polarisation on specific economic issues with voter polarisation from self-placement results, there are striking similarities between the two datasets. The latter, as depicted in Figure 6.12, shows that in 1994 (0.77) and 1997 (0.78) there was high levels of polarisation. This was because almost equal amounts of citizens placed themselves on opposite ends, both on the far left and far right. From 1982 to 1990, 1990 to 1994, and 1994 to 1997, voters were becoming increasingly polarised and assuming opposite political preferences; but since 2001 (0.58) voters began to move in the direction of low polarisation, so much so that by 2013 (0.47), voter firmly entered the space of moderate polarisation.

Three specific phases of polarisation can be identified from voter left-right self-placement results (as summarised in Figure 6.13). The first phase is one of high polarisation between 1990 to 1997, where the same number of voters positioned themselves on opposite ends, mainly on the extreme left (9%) and extreme right (9%). Meanwhile 7% were on the centre-left and 5% were on the

![Figure 6.12 Citizen polarisation by left-right self-placement, 1990 - 2013*](image)
centre-right. Considering this in terms of blocs, 16% supported the left, 14% supported the right and 11% were in the centre. Given that dissimilar ideological blocs absorbed almost equal portions of support and there was not enough centre support or support for any one side over another, the output was high polarisation. The shift to higher polarisation from 1990 (0.68) to 1994 (0.77) is attributed to an increase in support for the extreme left and extreme right. In addition, the move from 1994 to 1997 (0.78) to slightly higher polarisation is due to a large increase in extreme rightwing support and increases in extreme leftwing support. However, given that the centre was not absent or unoccupied and that slightly more preferred the left bloc over the right, it stopped polarisation from significantly increasing and moving into the 0.9 to 1 range. In this way, the centre seemed to hold the balance, inserting some moderation in the system — and if more individuals sat at the centre then polarisation would have abated (since it would be skewed to one side, the centre side).

The second phase is one of semi-polarisation, between 2001 and 2009 (including 1982 and 1996). It involved an increasing number of citizens identifying themselves on the right; this outweighed those on the left from inducing high polarisation. It also included a decreasing number of citizens placing themselves on the left. This period saw only 3% defining themselves as extreme left and 9% as extreme right; meanwhile 6% were on the centre-left and 11% on the centre-right. In terms of blocs, 9% were on the left bloc, 20% on the right and 15% in the centre. This clearly shows that opposing blocs, on the left and right, did not get equal support as in the period of 1990 to 1997. The movement to lower levels of polarisation from 2001 (0.58) to 2006 (0.54) was marked by a significant drop in the support for the extreme left and centre-left, even the centre; the decrease in polarisation came from an increase in support for the centre-right and extreme right. Slight digression from 2006 to 2009 (0.58) was due to small increases in extreme left and right support. However, given that less were located on the opposite side, that is, the extreme left, it accounted for modest or semi-polarisation. Also, from 2001 to 2009, the scale tilted more to one side, that is, to the centre and right where more citizens were located.

The third phase is one of moderate polarisation, this was particularly seen in 2013. The striking element in this year was that most citizens located themselves in the centre (34%) or centre-right (28%). Also, only 4% saw themselves as extreme left, 11% as extreme right, and 10% as centre-left. The support for particular ideological blocs give a clearer picture: only 14% were located on the left, meanwhile 39% were on the right and 34% on the centre. Since significantly more, two-fifths, placed themselves on the right, and three-quarter positioned themselves in the centre and right category, it implies that moderate polarisation is due to citizens occupying similar rather than
opposed positions on the political spectrum, particularly the centre and centre-right. In other words, citizens are ascribing far less support for opposed and dissimilar ideological positions; rather they are supporting more similar positions.

It is clear that there has been significant moves to the centre and occupation of right side of the political spectrum, and this has produced moderate levels of polarisation. By 2013, voters were less divided than between 1990 to 1997. This is due to relatively consistent movement to adopt similar rather than differing ideological positions, especially on the right bloc. Also, this might have some influence on opposition parties who adopt similar positions to the ANC — consistent moves to similarity at the voter level might match consistent moves to similarity amongst parties. However it is not easy to determine whether voters are influencing parties or vice versa, or whether this is a dynamic interaction. Evidence seems to be pointing to the dawn of low polarisation amongst the South African electorate where they are beginning to converge to one side of the left-right continuum; and more people are exhibiting growing preference for similar ideological orientations and less people are poles apart especially in defining their personal political orientation. This suggests that voters are likely perceiving and identifying with politics and salient social and economic issues from one particular ideological lens: the centre.

There is notable correspondence with polarisation results obtained from voter self-placement and economic issues. A correlation, in respective relational years, for both data sets reveal a significant relation ($r = .94$). This importantly suggests that there is reliability in the polarisation scores that is derived from economic issues. Moreover, the way voters define themselves reveal high polarisation, similar to more indirect measures from the economic dimension. In addition, both results concur a similar and consistent directional movement, that is, voters have been moving toward moderate polarisation.

6.4 Policy voting: A critical analysis

This section examines the presence of policy voting and perceived most important issues. This serves to provide a specific and direct sense of whether voters are policy-oriented and issues that occupy their attention. First, I discuss citizen perceptions about the difference between political parties and the presence of real policy choices. This is followed by a discussion of policy and non-policy reasons for partisanship and voting. Second, the subsequent discussion is about perceived national priorities and most important issues. After this, I discuss the causes of non-ideological voting. Both sections rely on survey and interview data.

6.4.1 Party differences and policy voting

Existing data makes it possible to assess citizen perception about party difference and competitive policy choice. The 2004 SASAS wave asked respondents whether “political parties don’t give voters real policy choices” (unfortunately, this element was not carried into subsequent waves, and other surveys rarely asked this question, so time-series data on this matter is largely unavailable; although one snapshot should not be excluded altogether since it presents valuable information about citizen perceptions). The survey result indicates that more individuals, 38.3%, strongly agreed/agreed that parties do not present real policy choices, while 28.2% believed that parties actually offer real policy-based choices to the average voter, and 21% supported neither option.15

The 2009 CSES wave asked: “During the election campaign, would you say that there were major differences between the parties, minor differences or no differences at all?” Although this is a rather comprehensive and not a direct policy-based question, we can assume that citizen perception of overall party difference is inclusive of some notion of party policies and programmatic platforms — to be sure, perceptions of party difference may relate to a number of things, including campaign
strategies, party motivations such as vote-seeking, integrity and trust, and representation and interest articulation. A majority of respondents, 50.3%, held that there were major differences between parties during the 2009 election campaign, only one-third, 33.8%, felt that parties occupy similar platforms and have only minor differences, and a small portion, 8.4%, believed that parties are exactly the same with no observable difference between them at all, whether ideological or non-ideologically.\textsuperscript{16}

Although 92.5% of the public have an opinion about the similarity and difference between parties, it is unlikely this constitutes policy-based reasons. It appears that the majority who felt there were major differences are locating these differences outside of a policy space. Since in 2004 only a handful concurred that parties were not offering genuine policies as opposed to 2009 where a majority felt differences were evident between parties, this suggests that perceptions of party difference may be unrelated to policy proposals. If it were in a policy sense, then those who said parties were offering genuine policy choices would have been in the majority which would tally with the majority that said there were major differences between parties. This is, however, a rather tentative argument because circumstances surrounding voter perceptions might have changed between 2004 and 2009; so voters might have felt in 2004 that policy choices were lacking but by 2009 felt that party difference were related to parties offering real policy or programmatic choices. Nonetheless, the non-policy reasons for party difference is more plausible given the data below.

To be more specific on the nature of differences, a 2016 Afrobarometer survey asked individuals to state the most important difference between the ANC and opposition parties. Only 26.4% thought there were no differences but 68.6% felt that differences were evident, as displayed in Table 6.2 — this tallies with the majority in 2009 that also agreed there were differences. Of those who saw parties as distinct, 52.3% highlighted non-policy reasons such as party integrity or honesty, experience and candidate personality (including religious, ethnic and regional affiliation); and only 13.8% cited economic and development policies as a reason. This implies than only one in seven voters are likely to see party difference as related to socioeconomic developmental policies and programmes, while the vast majority perceive party differentials in terms of non-policy factors. So while a significant number of citizens have consistently held opinions about party differences,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most important difference between the ruling party and opposition parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The honesty or integrity of party leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their economic and development policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The experience of party leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The personalities of party leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The religion of party leaders or members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ethnicity of party leaders or members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The regional identity of party leaders or members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source: Afrobarometer (2016)}
evidence shows that they locate such differences in a non-policy space, although it is important not to eliminate the policy factor because of its low score.

However, this argument can be questioned in light of partisan dynamics. Although party differences are not interpreted in overt ideological or policy terms, voting behaviour and partisanship is based upon indirect measures of programmatic platforms albeit irregular and occasional. Surveys specifically asking citizens to state reasons for party support reveal different results. On the one hand, there is little policy voting, while on the other side, voters are engaged in endorsing programmatic platforms. On two occasions voters were asked reasons why they voted for a particular party in the election.

In 1994, results presented in Table 6.3 show that voters were largely preoccupied with issues that were outside of the conventional policy space. In fact, the non-policy dimension (58%) surpassed the policy dimension (28%) by a large margin. Party performance and anticipation of future performance, party competence, candidate personality, partisanship, trust and integrity in the party, and party strength, subsumed more than half of the non-policy space (39% out of 58%). Specific identity issues like race, ethnicity and class took only one seventh (9%) of this. Yet, there is a considerable fraction within the electorate that assert overt ideological responses and policy preferences as a determinant of party support. It is interesting that as early as 1994, the first democratic election, voters were far from immune to programmatic or policy-based voting behaviour, where some 28% highlighted ideological, policy and moral principles for voting.

There was observable change in the 1999 survey. Voters specified more policy-based reasons for party choice (69%), as shown in Table 6.4. This included a number of specific policy and programmatic promises made by parties like improved material conditions, the delivery of jobs, housing, land distribution, subsidised education and crime prevention. The first three issues on its own represented 53%. This indicates the importance of the socioeconomic cleavage at the electoral level. On more non-specific deliverables, 11% of respondents endorsed general party promises, policies and vision, party economic policy and felt that their preferred party represented their interests and needs. Of the 19% who opted for non-policy reasons for party support, only 4% located such reasons in racial terms (‘a party for blacks or whites’ or ‘gives blacks a chance to govern’), and the remaining 15% mentioned trust in the party, an effective opposition party, an alternative party of government, and political stability. Voters clearly demonstrated preference for policies parties presented to address social problems — although it may not necessarily infer rigorous engagement in programmatic approval or disapproval.

While identified policy factors not directly relate to some ideological orientation, as interview respondents highlighted, promises made and messages presented cannot be easily separated from policy. For the party itself, policies and principles guide programmes and the message articulated to voters. A policy represents a message and a message is a function of policy. As former DA leader, Tony Leon, noted, the example of the DA in 1999 where the party proposed the need for oversight and checking political power, these ideas were embodied in a liberal philosophical outlook. Even policies by the EFF on nationalisation, land reform, and drastic increases in social welfare, are embodied in far leftism. So, there is an element of policy that indirectly influences voters who support certain messages, promises and programmes.

When assessing the 1999 election manifesto of the major party (where the ANC forms the main focus of this research project), much of the policy inclinations of individuals in the 1999 survey tallies with what the ANC presented to the electorate. It cannot, however, be assumed that all survey respondents voted for the ANC, what can be assumed from a nationally representative survey is that responses mimic partisanship patterns at the voter level. The ANC stated in its 1999 manifesto that it “has the policies in place for us to build a better life together” and was “determined to align all government policies and programmes to achieve our objective of sustainable jobs for all at a living wage” (ANC, 1999). The party largely confronted the scourge of unemployment, poverty and inequality from a platform that it had the right policies in place. The ANC specifically asserted its commitment to the RDP and presented its campaign under the slogan ‘a better life for all’. Particular areas of party programme included improving the housing subsidy and uplifting
conditions of the urban poor in informal settlements, speeding up job creation and expanding economic opportunities for the poor and other groups, and racial empowerment policies. This seems to correspond with the issues citizens highlighted in the 1999 survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy reasons</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological responses</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy preferences</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral principles</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy reasons total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance to date</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future performance</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalities of candidates</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the times</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group reference: Race</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group reference: South Africa</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group reference: Ethno-linguistic</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group reference: Me</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group reference: Class</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group reference: Minorities</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference: Undefined</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference: Family</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference: Friends</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference: race</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference: Ethno-linguistic</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-policy reasons</strong></td>
<td><strong>58.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidential</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t like other parties (could be policy or non-policy reasons)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                                        | (2,406) |

*Source: IDASA (1994)*
### Table 6.4 Policy- and non-policy-related reasons for party support: 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy reasons</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party promises programmes that will create better life and improve material</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party promises programmes that will deliver jobs (give me a job)</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party promises programmes that will deliver housing (to get a house)</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party makes good promises</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party policy, vision and solutions</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime policy, parties promise to stop crime and violence and create a safer</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party represents my interests and needs</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good economic policy</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party is democratic, liberal and non-discriminatory</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party promises not kept</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal rights</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most realistic party</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports land distribution (give me land)</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School bursaries (subsidise education)</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy reasons total</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-policy reasons</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust or belief in party</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition party (good or only party in opposition)</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A party for all blacks</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give blacks a chance to govern</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To give government a chance</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase pension</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To give another party a chance</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A party for the nation</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A party for whites</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For political stability</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-policy reasons total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Like the party (could be policy or non-policy reasons)</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party does the right thing (could be policy or non-policy reasons)</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better than other parties (could be policy or non-policy reasons)</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For no reason</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party will make things right (could be policy or non-policy reasons)</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(n=) (2,672)

*Source: EPOP (1999)*
In brief, the 1999 theme emphasised the government’s intent to speed up existing programmes of the party “to improve the quality of life of the people”. Although parties like the DP focused on economic policies, it particularly prioritised the government’s “[b]acksliding in respect of labour market flexibility, pubic sector downsizing and privatisation” and creating an efficient market-based economy, thereby giving reduced prominence to improving the quality of life (DP, 1999). It also focused on the ‘ugly face of race’ pursued through the government’s empowerment policies and the ANC ‘grabbing all levers of power’ — it was a campaign to ‘fight back for a better future’.

Although voters were preoccupied with non-policy reasons for voting in 1994 (especially party performance, competence, candidate personality, partisanship, party trust and strength) and non-policy reasons for party difference in 2016, a handful stated ideological responses, policy preferences and economic policies for party support. This indicates that a portion of the electorate are receptive to and persuadable by party policy platforms. Moreover, the balance seemed to have tipped by the 1999 election where voters perceived parties as offering policies that were close to and supportive of their own preferences and needs, especially on the economic cleavage (quality of life, jobs and housing). Buttressing the idea that the electorate are actively engaged in policy-based inter-party discrimination, it revealed demonstrable preference for programmes, policies and promises.

Much of this might be explained by the ANC’s popularisation of the RDP in the post-1994 period and voter observation of party performance and trust. In other terms, voters were more concerned about party policies and programmes that would advance social progress and development, and they stood on this platform from the vantage point of prior performance where they trusted parties (their strength, competence and candidates) to perform. Put another way, there was an evident intermixing of reasons which seemed to undergird policy and programmatic preferences. In addition, the ANC as the major electoral party strongly put forward an issue-based agenda consistent with the RDP; and it could be that the politicisation of policy-based cleavages influenced voters to notice policies and programmes. In fact, a survey asked voters whether they heard about specific economic policies, namely the RDP, and 89% responded ‘yes’ (IDASA, 1995). Strikingly, much less, 13%, were aware about the Structural Adjustment Programme, presumably included under the auspices of GEAR; and this might be attributable to the ANC’s avoidance of politicising the unpopular policy and opting to present the RDP as the chief programme of government in the 1999 election (Afrobarometer, 2000).

While there may be an ebb and flow in policy-voting, there certainly is no committed majority that consistently and discernibly engage in policy-based calculations. As seen in 2009 and 2016, party difference is not perceived in policy terms; and in 1994, the non-policy dimension dominated party support — only 1999 stood as an exception for policy voting. Since subsequent data is unavailable, I rely on observations of parties. When relating the survey-based findings of both non-policy and policy voting, interview data indicates the prevalence of the former. Almost all respondents coalesced on the presence of the non-ideological/non-policy feature of the electorate. COPE leader, Mosiuoa Lekota said: “I think the rank-and-file voters are not so enlightened about ideologies” (Interview). Former DA policy head, Ken Andrew, puts it that “most people are not all that interested in the details of [party] policy” (Interview). Agreeing with this view, former DA leader, Tony Leon, said that “people vote on other concerns rather than strict ideology”; voting has “less to do with programme-specifics” (Interview). UDM leader, Bantu Holomisa, emphatically posited that “[t]he politics of ideology is not in the vocabulary of the majority of voters in this country” (Interview). Added to this, former senior ANC member, Frank Chikane, said people are not ‘socialised’ in ideological terms — whether liberal, conservative, centrist, moderate, left or right (Interview). In other words, the average voter is not an ideologue; and voters are not so much driven by specific or sharp issues. By extension, voters hardly think ideologically about parties. One respondent said that policy-based issues are mainly discussed at the party level (Gumbi, Interview). As APC leader, Themba Godi, conveyed, although parties subscribe to policies and programmes as expressed in manifestos, “the percentage of people who make their choices based on such rationale readings are…very few” (Interview). Thus, according to most party respondents, the majority of
voters are fundamentally not informed by specific policy choices; choices voters make are less explained in purely policy terms or rational policy calculations.

Parties, however, are cautious of over generalising. They concede that there is a section of the electorate that look at policies, especially those in business, the educated, professionals, and middle and upper class — although they remain a minority that is largely overshadowed by a non-policy-oriented majority. Both the middle and upper-class are supportive of social democracy and look for favourable economic policies (Habib, 2013; Butler, 2009; Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014; Ngoma, 2014; Lodge, 2004; Seekings, 2005). Thus, there is a small proportion that actually express an opinion and think in policy terms.

For almost all interview respondents there is more to voter decisions than mere statements of an ideological or policy line. Parties alluded to the driving factors that they believe constitute the non-policy dimension of voting. This included history and loyalty, party performance and trust, candidate personality, party campaign and voter needs, media access and party funding, and race.

(a) Parties mentioned that voters are inclined to vote for parties who freed them and thus vote according to old party lines — they are historically retrospective and are ‘loyal to liberators’ (Chikane, Godi, Meshoe, Mpontshane, Mulder: Interviews). History was considered the prime determinant of partisanship. This is, for respondents, not relative to the African electorate alone but even observable in the Afrikaner electorate. For these respondents, what this means is that voters demonstrate tolerance and patience towards parties like ANC even in circumstances of dissatisfaction. One respondent called this ‘simplified voting’ on loyalties.

(b) Party respondents also expressed that voters believe in parties that will deliver; they look at party performance and base their trust on that (Andrew, Gumbi, Holomisa, Lekota, Moakes: Interviews). In other words, what parties actually do in terms of political output and their experience on the ground are important to voters. “[F]ar more than what your policies say on paper, what you actually do in practice is going to count to your benefit or to your detriment” (Andrew, Moakes: Interviews). (c) Some felt that people vote on personality factors — this particularly came from an IFP respondent. This relates to particular characteristics, experience and charisma of individual leaders. Voters, in this sense, feel that their interests and preferences are encapsulated in a single leader.

(d) The empathising need-based campaign was also flagged as an important driving factor behind voting and party support. Those parties who respond to the needs of voters get support; it is insufficient to extend a policy line to voters because, according to respondents, they need to ‘experience’ the party. This ‘experience’ comes less from ‘selling’ policies but approaching voters “on the basis of the issues that they confront” (Godi, Interview). Respondents explained that the concern for parties is whether the message presented during the campaign resonates with voters. Voters are not interested in what ideological content that message is wrapped in but “vote where they think they will be helped” and for the party that best represents their interests (Chikane, Gardee, Gumbi, Holomisa: Interviews). So although parties appeal to public perceptions from particular ideological schools, voters are not concerned about the ideology but whether parties sympathise with their issues.

When asked whether they thought radical left parties gain support because of ideological factors, respondents said that voters who vote for these parties do so “not because they are [ideologically] radical” but they feel radical parties offer “instantaneous resolution of their problems” (Lekota, Madlalose, Mpontshane: Interviews). The rhetoric appeals particularly to the poor who believe exaggerations, unrealistic promises and unimplementable programmes. Even one EFF respondent recognised that party support derives less from ideological principles but from sympathising with the needs of the electorate. The leader of one radical left party, the PAC, said “most of the time what we tell people is what they want to hear” (Mbinda, Interview). In addition, some explained that it is dissatisfaction with the ANC. Parties like the EFF win support not on the grounds of ideological radicalism but their political posturing as an antidote to the ANC; some termed this ‘revenge politics’ against the ruling party for failing to deliver on their promises (Andrew, Godi, Moakes: Interviews).
Another factor was the perception of an alternative party constituting a strong opposition to the ANC. Former DA leader explained that during his time as party leader, “most people voted for the DA...really for a perception that the party was a strong opposition...more than on policy grounds” (Interview). Parties also mentioned media access. Voters vote the way they do because of poor access to media or when such access is controlled by the state (such as SABC). This restraints voter access to alternative sources of information, especially in rural areas (Andrew, Mbinda, Mulder). One respondent alleged that opposition parties are often vilified in these news channels and are presented as the enemy of the majority — an enemy that will “bring back apartheid”. Interviewees presume that openness to more sources of information will result in shifts in voting behaviour and party support. In addition, a respondent mentioned party funding as the reason why voters keep voting for particular parties. The lack of campaign funding, that stems mainly from the proportional allocation of party funding, hinders parties from reaching voters and subsequently limits the vote share of small parties. If a party cannot access funds, they cannot access the electorate and there is no meaningful competition and little shifts/gains in party support.

Moreover, only two respondents gave a race-based approach to voting (Andrew, Steward: Interviews). Andrew said the vast majority of blacks identify more or less with the ANC, and whites identify more or less with the DA; this feature of “identity politics” is what he terms a “down-to-earth thought process” occurring within the electorate (Interview). If a party leader is the same race as the party’s largest constituency, voters would feel that particular leader will more likely represent their views. According to race-based subscribers, everything else is irrelevant except one’s race.

It is striking that many respondents did not mention the argument that people identify with parties in racial terms. Even though almost all agreed that South Africans vote according to factors other than the content of policies, they did not include race as a non-policy factor. On the non-policy dimension, in fact, most respondents mentioned historical loyalty and material needs. For them, race has little to do with party support and voting behaviour; and partisanship and needs are not necessarily linked to race. So from a party angle, it appears that voters are not simply voting on racial considerations and race does not ‘magnetise’ the ordinary voter; voting is more historically embedded and needs-based rather than racially relevant.

What can be concluded from survey and interview findings is that (a) while citizens perceive party difference less in terms of policy platforms (that is, non-policy reasons constituting the chief difference between major parties), (b) voting and party support is associated with instances of policy voting. There is a cohort within the electorate that take heed of ideological and policy proposals of parties; and in some cases the majority vote on the basis of party promises and specific deliverables emanating from party programmes (material improvement, jobs and housing). (c) Although policy-based voting occurs, it is hardly a consistent and regular feature because voters are not ideologues or interested in policy-specifics of parties. Moreover, (d) given that the non-policy dimension takes prevalence within the electorate, it encompasses many issues and the race/ethnicity factor gains little support (both as a self-identified factor by voters and a factor flagged by parties). Non-policy issues include party integrity/trust/honesty, performance, competence, experience, candidate personality, partisanship/historical loyalty, campaign/needs, and media access/party funding. However, even though voters state that they do not identify themselves to parties through race and parties are of the opinion that race is less important than other factors, the dimension of race is an important part of voting behaviour in South Africa which cannot be ignored or oversimplified. It may well be that the issue of race informs non-policy aspects, especially historical loyalty; however, more research needs to be done on the role of race and policy voting in South Africa.
6.4.2 Most important problems and causes of non-policy voting

Perceptions about national priorities and problems provide important cues about what preoccupies voters and whether their concerns lie within a policy or non-policy space. Figure 6.14 shows that when citizens were asked what constituted the most important problems in the country that the government should address, from 1994 to 2016 (eleven time periods), a considerable plurality of citizens stated unemployment as a chief problem (mean = 51%); this includes job creation, poverty reduction, a stable economy and general economic management (finances, incomes and salaries). The second problem was crime and violence (in the early period of democracy it included concerns about political instability and unrest) (mean = 21%). The third group of concerns centred upon the provision of basic needs and services, including housing and shelter provision, education, water, electricity, health and HIV/AIDS prevention, and infrastructure (overall mean = 21%). Concerns over corruption, discrimination and other issues constituted about one eighth (mean = 13%) of this.\footnote{\textit{Data not reflected in the figure - \textquotedblleft Others\textquotedblright: 6.7 (1994), 12.9 (1995), 19.3 (1997), 9.9 (1998), 8.9 (1999), 6.6 (2000), 4.6 (2002), 7.6 (2006), 7.8 (2008), 5.4 (2011), 5.7 (2016); \textit{'No answer/refused':} 0.0 (1997), 0.5 (1999); \textit{'Don't know':} 1.7 (1994), 1.4 (1995), 0.0 (1997), 0.8 (1998), 0.5 (1999), 0.2 (2000), 0.5 (2002), 1.2 (2006), 0.0 (2008, 2011), 0.4 (2016); valid N: 2,430 (1994), 2,673 (1995), 3,500 (1997), 3,493 (1998), 3,384 (1999), 2,299 (2000), 2,400 (2002, 2006, 2008), 2,399 (2011), 2,390 (2016). Source: IDASA (1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999). Survey 2 of 1998 and 1999 were selected because of larger sample sizes; Afrobarometer (2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2016).}

Although this does not directly point to the absence of concerns over economic policies to tackle the prevalence of the unemployment problem at the social level, evidence from WVS waves included an option of ‘ideas’ within the range of concerns, as illustrated in Table 6.5. Consistent with the previous result, a stable economy forms the first important issue that government should...
address (mean = 46%) and the fight against crime forms the second (mean = 32%). Meanwhile, the conception that ‘ideas count more than money’ gained very little support (mean = 9%).

Unemployment and crime are commonly perceived as problems for the majority of people. On the other side, the need for ideas in society above economic growth and social development counts far less as a chief problematic agenda for citizens. This shows that voters are more preoccupied with issues of unemployment, crime and basic needs and services rather than debating about the relevance of particular policy proposals and ideological orientations that would best solve these problems. Voters seem less concerned about how social problems are resolved, that is, the means employed and political-ideological path taken to alter material circumstances — social and economic deliverables override policy-based debate. This element constitutes an important cause behind non-ideological voting (as will be discussed below).

Related to the discussion about policy-based determinants of partisanship, it can be argued that the electorate support parties who promise output and tangible material outcomes from their installation in government or the legislature. Additionally, it can be argued that party policies, according to voters, are relevant at the social level only when they are linked to pertinent social problems that concern the majority within the electorate. This advances a perception emanating from the social that party policies, promises, visionary solutions and programmes must be linked to deliverables; that is, the imperative and proximate connection between policies and output. In other terms, evidence of pertinent social problems does not necessarily negate the preference for policy-oriented and visionary solutions that target such problems. In the end, policies and party promises are intertwined, and this is what voters look at: whether parties articulate voter interests and needs.

### 6.4.3 Causes of a moderate non-ideological electorate

What contributes to the lack of ideological voting and the presence of a moderate electorate? Interview respondents mentioned a number of causes that fed into the non-ideological/non-policy voter dynamic. One explanation put the cause on parties. “[T]he appetite for radical, either left or right, economic solutions is very limited” because major parties propagate relatively centrist and moderate rather than extremist policies (Andrew, Godi, Leon, Mulder, Steward: Interviews). Thus, voters tend to mirror this dynamic. On the role of parties, Lekota puts it: “leadership that is radical will tend to agitate their followers to a more radical position, but moderate parties will also tend to advocate policies more inclined towards moderation and more well-thought out processes of resolving the crisis in society” (Interview). In this way, that major parties rarely advocate radical
redistributive or revolutionary policies, contributes to the moderate umbra of the electorate. In other words, the nature of political representation and party formation influences social patterns; parties matter in the causal chain of voter moderation.

However, the main factors that emerged from the interviews related not so much to non-extremism of the electorate but the feature of non-policy/non-ideological voting. Two main explanations were purported: (a) the lack of education, and (b) needs and material conditions. First, when literacy and education is low, it is difficult for people to comprehend issues and policy proposals. As Meshoe puts it, “the more educated the voters, the more they are able to analyse the policies but the majority of South African voters are do not analyse policies” (Interview). This severely limits the element of debate and cross-questioning amongst the electorate. It implies that the ordinary voter largely lacks capacity to interrogate policies and promise, and are unable to ‘punch holes’ in party manifestos. Parties made strong reference to voter characteristics in rural areas. In rural areas, where a large percentage of people are uneducated and poverty-stricken, people are unable to explain and express what a party stands for, they merely believe at face-value what they are told and promised (Galo, Meshoe, Mulder: Interviews).

Respondents also made a distinction between the poor/uneducated and the more affluent/educated. While the poor are interested in ‘handouts’ and are unable to analyse policies, the more affluent are concerned about policies and understand the realism behind party promises — that is, the limits of what parties can and cannot do (Holomisa, Madlalose, Mpongshane: Interviews). Interviewees presume that the more educated and middle or upper class may be aware that radical promises cannot be implemented and that extremist parties give false impressions. In addition, while the majority of uneducated people only listen to party promises (given illiteracy) during election campaigns, in between electoral cycles they cannot engage meaningfully in political debates and rigorously interrogate party performance (Mbinda, Galo: Interviews). This hampers their ability to make correct judgement and hinders democratic accountability since voters are unable to decide whether parties adhered to promises. In other words, some of the positive effects associated with ideological voting, such as democratic accountability, is constrained with the presence of an uneducated electorate.

Second, some mentioned that deprivation and poverty is more important than the lack of education. “Voters are not necessarily clued up with ideological issues, [because] its about bread and butter issues to them” (Gardee, Interview). In the face of dire socioeconomic conditions of the majority, parties cannot simply afford to harp on policy-based and ideological issues; people want practical things, not policy-based debate, that will address their needs (Lekota, Mpontshane, Moakes: Interviews). The poor seek “immediate need satisfaction” from parties; thus, to them, it’s neither here nor there whether you’re in left politics or centre stage or centre to the left or centre to the right or a right-winger” (Madlalose, Gardee: Interviews). Mbinda posited that instead of policies and programmes, for ordinary people, elections and voting is about ‘stomach politics’. ‘If you are hungry you need food’; and it is in this manner that voters believe “things will drop on their table” if certain parties are put in power (Godi, Gumbi, Mbinda, Meshoe: Interviews). Leon said: “if you are poor you driven by survivalist impulses” (Interview). “[O]rdinary people get on with the ordinary things of their life” — they are concerned about getting jobs, education, health care and so on (Andrew, Interview). According to some interviewees, parties tend to exploit hunger and poverty by providing food parcels to buy the vote. Thus, voters are concerned with immediate issues of poverty, they are service-inclined, are primarily motivated by need-satisfaction, and lay emphasis on deliverables. The immediate environment means more to them. In brief, party support is not driven by policy preference or ideology, it is driven by need.

But there is also an interplay between poverty and the lack of education. This problem is more apparent in rural areas where it is not only the lack of education but people are voting for parties because they believe they will provide material things. For instance, some party respondents explained that the mantra in poor communities is that if people do not vote ANC, their social grant will be withdrawn (Gumbi, Holomisa, Meshoe: Interviews). This kind of intimidation targets the poor and uneducated. Moreover, the less educated “the less complex political arguments become”:

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the poor tend to think in very basic ways about what a party should do and can do (Moakes, Interview). This means that people not only care much less whether policies can be implemented in the first place but also how policies are implemented, such as the ideological direction parties follow. In both cases, deliverables are more important rather than a realistic or a socialist-capitalist-based policy. There is little “economic literacy out there in terms of [issues like] how jobs are created and what’s the difference between economic policies” (Moakes, Andrew, Holomisa: Interviews). “[T]he majority of voters are not fuzzed about whether that’s created through the state, through private enterprise, through growth-led policies; they just simply want to make sure that jobs are created” (Moakes, Interview). Given that voters are fundamentally concerned about immediate issues of service delivery and job creation, if parties tell them the dominant policy approach to social problems, whether neoliberal or socialist policy, the majority are not sophisticated enough to engage in these matters. Thus, the interplay between the lack of education and poverty arises from the fact that the majority of people simply ‘want the basics’ given circumstances of poverty; and these people are unable to interrogate manifestos and engage in complex arguments given the lack of education.

Respondents mention that as voters increasingly develop a more policy aware state, parties themselves will be challenged to present more substantive, coherent and ‘believable’ policies. Some respondents correctly explained that as voters move up the class ladder, focus less on material needs and immediate circumstances, and become literate and educated, this process of social modernisation is not only likely to produce a demise of voting based on old party lines but also affects policy understanding and awareness. Voters will test party representatives on policy matters; and this might consequently increase democratic accountability.

6.5 Implications of the findings

6.5.1 The social influence on the party system

How does the left-right composition of the electorate affect party system polarisation? According to theoretical claims from the sociological school, the social constitutes a pertinent influence for polarisation dynamics at the party system level. Preferences for moderation and modest division of opinion will mirror itself at the party level where vote-seeking parties will compete to match the median ideological distribution of the electorate, and inter-party left-right polarisation will be moderate. Meanwhile, the opposite is the case for an extremist and polarised electorate: parties will subsequently take up positions on the radical fringes and intense divisions between parties will ensue, all because parties are interested in reflecting and representing public opinion. The implication of this argument is that both low or high polarisation are reflected in the party system.

In the South African case, findings from voter self-placement data show that prior to 2001 (1990 to 1997), voters were highly polarised, reaching a mean score of .74. Even though between 2001 and 2009, polarisation decreased to .57 and by 2013 it stood at .47, this was much higher than actual polarisation at the party system level. Even voter polarisation on economic issues reveals a mean score of .73, although by 2013 it reflected .62. The party system prior to high levels of voter polarisation, both in 1994 and 1999, reflected a polarisation score of .02 and .15; and even after this period, between 2004 and 2014, it was lower than .20 (as shown in Figure 5.5 in Chapter 5). This suggests that there is a significant discrepancy between voter and party system polarisation. According to Figure 6.15, the correlation between voter polarisation (by self-placement and economic issues) and party system polarisation, reveal an insignificant negative correlation ($r = -.13$ and -.08 respectively). This implies that voters do not exert an overriding influencing force on ideological differences in the party system. Moreover, the causes for low polarisation in the party system are largely located outside of the electorate — presumably with the dominant party.
A related deduction is that not even the decrease in party system polarisation can be explained by the decrease in voter polarisation; precisely because the gap between the two is so large to constitute a potential causation. Although party system polarisation decreased from 2004 to 2014, it cannot be matched by the decrease occurring with voter polarisation because in 1994 the party system exhibited the lowest level of polarisation (0.02) yet voter polarisation in the same year stood at high levels (0.77).

Although voters are beginning to occupy similar ideological positions both in self-placement and economic issues, this is not necessarily reflective of or induced by low polarisation at the party system level. This is because one party at the helm of power is absorbing the ideological space and constraining increases in polarisation; which it has been doing since 1994 when voter polarisation was high. In other terms, voters had the opportunity to decrease in differential platforms long prior to levels of moderate voter polarisation as at 2013. This means that while there is an absence of a forward sociological effect, that is voters influencing party positional platforms and ideological differences in the party system, there is also an absence of a backward party effect, that is parties and the party system influencing voter positions and difference of opinions. While scholars like Jacobson (2003) posit a dynamic and interdependent causal nature of polarisation, both the forward and backward element is lacking in South Africa.

It can be argued that the presence of one party is constraining inter-party ideological differentiation from becoming meaningful especially coupled with the lack of a competitive voter share in the opposition. So, it might be that much of the ideological contestation and dissimilarity at the social level is reflected within the ANC. While the party system is not absent of ideological differentiation and dispersion across the spectrum, opposition parties are unable to skew the balance of polarisation given their limited vote share, so party system based polarisation is far less of an influencing factor in social left-right differentiation.

But it is implausible to say that voters do not have any influence at all on the party system: there may be far less influence on polarisation but there is observable influence on party positions. On the issue of positional platforms of parties, the major party, according to Figure 5.4 in Chapter 5, has been on the centre and centre-left. Meanwhile, the opposition bloc reflected much more rightist positions like the DA, IFP, UDM, FFP and ACDP. However, (a) major opposition parties like the
DA are evidently moving to the centre-left. Implications follow that parties (centre-left) are moving to occupy left preference at the electorate level. Most interview respondents conceded to the idea that “politics [and policies] has to be guided by the needs of the voters” (Meshoe, Galo, Leon: Interviews). “In most cases parties adopt policies more because they seek to respond to what they see as the need in society” (Lekota). In other words, party manifestos are informed by social needs. Parties acknowledge that policy choices cannot be made independently from the reality of the country — although some policies may be unpopular and may need to be downplayed to be attractive to voters (Moakes, Andrew: Interviews). But there is a degree of independence because while voter are increasingly preferring issues like government ownership instead of privatisation, major parties are hardly articulating proposals for nationalisation. Thus, there is a disjuncture between party positions and voter preferences.

Moreover, (b) it can be deduced that parties are reflecting the public’s preferences for similar positions, that is, the consistent movement towards occupying similar positions on general and economic issues. Within the opposition bloc, parties are occupying similar positions (centre-left), and voters are also coming to occupy similar positions or vice versa. It is, however, a complex matter to determine whether voters are influencing parties or vice versa, or whether this is dynamic relationship. In addition, (c) mean scores show that the average voter sits in the centre for both general and economic issues, and major parties are also centrist. Thus, in terms of extremism at the voter and party level, both occupy centrist ground.

However, it must be said that voters do not have an overriding influence on party policy positions. Correlation coefficients show that when mean voter positions by self-placement are compared with the ideological positions of the two major parties in respective years between 1994 to 2014, it indicates an $r = -0.77$ for the ANC and an $r = -0.65$ for the DA. When voter polarisation by economic issues are considered, it reveals an $r = -0.86$ for the ANC and $r = -0.96$ for the DA. As shown in Table 6.6, results suggest that there is a significant negative relationship between voter left-right positions and party positions. As voter positions increase in the direction of right, party positions move in the opposite direction and increase toward the centre-left, or sometimes decrease in leftist issue salience. In the case of the ANC, leftist emphasis increased since 2004 to 2009 and slightly decreased in 2014 but still remained centre-left, yet voter mean positions were in the centre-right. In addition, the DA has been rightward in its issue salience but were more emphatic about rightwing issues than voters who positioned themselves on the right especially in 2001 to 2013; moreover, the party began to move in the opposite direction of mean voter self-placement positions, especially in 2009 and 2014.

On economic issues, results infer that as voter positions decrease on the left, the ANC’s position actually increased on the left. For the DA, as voter positions decrease on the left, the party’s positions increase in the opposite direction like in 1994 to 2004, and by 2013 when mean voter

| Table 6.6 Correlating voter mean positions with party positions |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Voter mean position by left-right self-placement | -0.07           | 0.06            | 0.28            | 0.25            | 0.19            |
| Voter mean position by left-right economic issues | -0.08           | -0.06           | -0.05           |                 | 0.01            |
| ANC ideological position | -0.10           | -0.07           | -0.33           | -0.69           | -0.43           |
| DA ideological position  | 0.71            | 0.77            | 0.50            | -0.20           | -0.03           |
positions on economic issues revealed a 0.01 score, the DA’s position was -0.03, which shows slight differences in positions.

This implies that party positions, especially on the centre-left, are less influenced by voters. Even if voters are in the centre and slightly centre-left like in the case of economic issues — party positions often tend to be more leftist than voters. This is equivalent to saying that parties do not necessarily move in relation to moving voter positions. Although the median voter prefers similar positions on salient economic issues to party positions, there still remains a discrepancy within this result, that is, party positions tend to increase in leftist emphasis. Thus, in the South African case, parties are less dependent on social influence and less deeply rooted in representing median voter positions than theory suggests. Instead, parties including the ANC and the DA operate within a relatively independent space from voters in the determination of policy positions, although this may not necessarily mean opposite positions since in the case of economic issues both voters and parties are on the left. Briefly put, voters have some noticeable influence on party positions and polarisation but this is far from overriding.

One of the contributing factors to the lack of extremism within the electorate is the presence of major centrist parties, the lack of education, and immediate concerns over poverty and needs. In addition, moderation is largely attributed to non-policy voting. The majority of voters are not ideologues or sophisticated in analysing policy-specifics. By contrast, they focus on issues such as party trust, competence, performance, experience, personality, partisanship, and needs. Race is regarded as an irrelevant and minor element in determining party support. Voters tend to be non-policy-oriented because the majority are poor and seek immediate resolution to their needs (material improvement, job creation and housing), and are also uneducated. In this way, voters are not driven by policy matters but parties who sympathise with their needs and articulate policies that encompass those needs. This particular character of the electorate implies that there is only negligible influence voters can put on the party system.

In conclusion, first, polarisation and differential positions at the voter level is not concomitant with moderation at the party system level. This implies that reasons for low polarisation within the party system is located outside of the sociological explanation and linked more to the major party, the ANC — which is constraining the space for ideological dissimilarities in the system. Second, parties are relatively independent actors in the determination of left-right policy platforms. Although on economic issues voters are on the left, parties generally exemplify more leftist emphasis than voters. And on self-placement data, voters are on the centre-right while parties are on the centre-left. Moreover, the unique factors that characterise voters largely on a non-policy platform, constrains left-right policy voting and extremism. Thus, voters are far from being a pertinent influencing force or a cause behind the adoption of party positions or the direction of party system polarisation.

6.5.2 The findings in relation to the study of the electorate

The findings presented in this research challenges some scholarly perspectives and also concurs with some previous arguments. First, the predominant view, particularly amongst those who support the racial approach to electoral analysis, that the left-right means very little in the South African context loses substance in relation to the findings of this research. According to scholars, the left-right ideological spectrum makes little sense, is simplistic and misleading when applied to the South African context. The view is that left, right and centre are not useful terms when analysing South African politics — some say ideology does not play a role because identity is prime (Friedman, 2015; Schrire, 2001; Butler, 2004; Petlane, 2009). While there are two issues in this argument, that is voter left-right and party system left-right, scholars tend to perceive of the entire political landscape as one painfully afar from such dynamics. Parties are often talked about as detached from inter-party policy debate, it is even more rare to talk about voters as being inclined to policies. This
means that the social is considered in a way that is much further away from analysis of party left-right positions.

The propensity of citizen left-right self-placement, the consistent position of the median voter as centre and centre-right, the substantial decrease in the rate of unawareness of or inability to engage in self-defined left-right positions, voter engagement with left-right economic issues, and varying levels of voter polarisation, testifies to the presence of a left-right dimension at the social level. There are observable ideological differences at the social level and demonstrable, albeit non-sophisticated, engagement with salient national economic debates. Moreover, there is a considerable degree of validity in voter placement of parties. In particular, voters saw the DA as a centre-left party in 2009, and this is consistent with the finding in Chapter 5 that shows the DA's progressive movement leftward.

It is unclear however along what dimension (it might be the non-economic dimension) citizens are placing parties and why the ANC is often placed in the centre-right. But what remains plausible is that voters regard major parties as moderate, which is consistent with the findings that parties are indeed occupying a centrist terrain.

Second, although left-right identification and polarised opinions does not directly or automatically imply policy-based voting, evidence discussed reveals a resident feature of indirect and direct ideological and policy factors as a determinant of party support from as early as 1994. On the other hand, there is evidence that this is not a regular feature within the electorate; instead, voters are largely non-policy oriented. Yet, at the same time, it is important not to overgeneralise given that a minority within the electorate focus on policies. Scholars who posit that party alignments are a rubberstamp for racial demographics and reflects a racial bifurcation of popular support, over exaggerate the connection between identity and voting (Hoeane, 2009; Johnson, 1996; Ferree, 2006; Schrire, 2001; Piper, 2004). The race-based argument has concerning methodological problems that indicate a spurious connection between race and voting behaviour — especially given that the racial composition of a party’s support base cannot simply emerge as a causal factor of racial voting. Evidence presented in this study for the determinants of party support show that voters themselves assign such an insignificant amount of support for identity issues.

It has been consistently seen that when voters subscribe to non-policy reasons but specific identity reasons such as voting because the party supported is a party for blacks or whites or voting to give blacks a chance to govern, gain less than 10%, and in some cases, less than 5% of popular support. This implies that citizens themselves are discrediting the notion that their individual party support is dependent on identity. Moreover, party interview respondents barely highlighted race as a factor in voting. While scholars promoting the race-based view say that race alone does not determine party support and non-identity factors should also be included, this study shows that the (a) non-prevalence of the identity element emerging from citizen self-defined reasons for partisanship must be dealt with, including (b) the evidence of policy-based inclinations. Given that voters are influenced by non-policy issues (such as trust, competence, performance, experience, personality, partisanship, and needs) that have very little to do with allegiance to racial identity, it may well be a challenge to the methodologically spurious and misleading argument that race is the dominant factor, an enduring cleavage that is capable of decisively influencing electoral behaviour (Ramutsindela, 2002; Anyangwe, 2012; Friedman, 2005; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009). Instead, voters seem decisively influenced by factors outside the racial space, even more, when they indicate their support for parties are based on policy, they still intermix and undergird this with non-identity factors like trust and performance. Also, the idea that voters “are still locked into different racial/ethnic compartments”, is contrary to the evidence of the 1999 survey that shows an electorate that asserts the preeminence of party programmes, visions and policies (Ramutsindela, 2002: 54, emphasis added). The ascendance of and shift to policy-based voting over non-policy factors in that year signifies an electorate that is sensitive and responsive to party programmatic platforms. Moreover, the very shift from 1994 to 1999 implies that voters are not ‘locked’ away in a racial chamber, they are willing to evolve, shift and adopt in their reasons for party support. I am not arguing that race is not at all significant in the South African context, race does importantly feature in politics and society, sometimes as an explicit or latent conflict dimension. It
might also be that race feeds into non-policy factors such as historical loyalty — while more methodologically rigorous research needs to show this. What I am putting forward is that other factors should also be considered in the matrix of possibilities when dealing with voting behaviour in South Africa, and while one should not oversimplify complex dynamics in the electoral landscape, one should also avoid overgeneralising and boxing voting behaviour under the ‘race’ label.

In this way, the findings concur with the opposite group of scholarly opinion that argues first that voters are not blindly loyal to parties or simply vote because of racial demographics; instead, voters are far from being immune to or non-sympathisers of party programmatic platforms. This is reflective of the rational voter aspect that Eldridge and Seekings (1996), Mattes et al (1999b), Habib and Taylor (2001) and Ndletyana (2010) argue. In brief, this research shows not only that voters are disassociating themselves from identity-based reasons for party support and connect with other non-policy factors, but that they are actively engaged in endorsing party policy platforms — albeit indirect from party promises. Yet, this is so provided that the nexus between partisanship and policy is undergirded by promises of tangible output and relates to pertinent social problems.

Third, the results question the view that voters are social democratic and leftist. Rightwing policies are considered “unviable because they do not offer policies that would enable them to attract a significant electoral constituency”, this obviously implies that leftist policies favour the electorate especially given pertinent social problems (Habib and Taylor, 2001: 216; Booysen, 2005). Since 1982, mean voter positions reveal that voters have constantly positioned themselves more on the centre and right bloc. Moreover, although there is leftist self-placement, citizens show preference for rightwing ideals in the economic sphere and are not clearly placed on the left on issues of privatisation, income equality and responsibility. Thus, a unimodal leftist, and rightist, distribution is not a feature within the electorate. Instead, there is a moderately polarised dynamic of division along the left and right.

6.6 Conclusion: Voters and party system moderation

The guiding purpose of this chapter was to examine the preference distribution of the electorate on the left-right political continuum, the centrist or extremist nature of such preferences, and the degree of left-right polarisation at the voter level. This chapter achieved this by discussing general ideological predispositions, including median voter positions from self-placement and economic issues data, and perceptions about the nature of social change. It also dealt with the polarisation of voter opinions on general and economic issues.

It is clear that on general issues, the centre and centre-right constitute a highly saturated space and a much referred locale for the majority of citizens. The results presented here suggest that the left side of the continuum falls out of favour as a preferred political position amongst citizens on general issues. To be sure, the average citizen does not locate themselves on the centre-left, extreme left or extreme right. Average left-right volatility occurs within centre and centre-right parameters instead of the extremes. It is almost as if voters have cornered themselves in this space and marked off a clear ideological boundary. Thus, mean citizen positions are characterised by a unimodal distribution along the moderate range.

On salient economic issues there is evident preference for the left bloc; especially for a government-run economy, government ownership, government responsibility for citizen wellbeing, government intervention in job creation, government action in taxing the rich to subsidise the poor, and government-led land redistribution. The embrace of such issues is noticeable in the major party but also in the DA. The DA seems to have evolved consistent with median voter preferences: it is articulating less preference for rightward economic issues and exhibiting left preferences as expressed by voters. Voter preferences, however, may not be highly influential since major parties are hardly expressing nationalist proposals — but public sentiments may be influential to some
extent given that voters are increasingly preferring government ownership of business and industry. While parties may in some, indirect or direct, way be influenced by voters, there is an important degree of independence in party policy determination and a disjuncture between voter and party positions.

Centre-right self-placement is consistent with citizen self-placement results, a considerable cohort of citizens are also sympathisers of the right. They prefer that the individual not the government should determine what an individual produces, buys and sells; support market-based rather than state-dictated income determination; back the liberal meritocratic philosophy that justifies individual effort and hard work as a factor in incentivising higher incomes; and respects property rights even in the process of land repossession by the government (including market-valued compensation and legal procedures). In a related way, a majority of citizens consistently feel that society should not be changed by fundamental or radical reforms but ally with the idea of gradual improvement. This implies that even issues of land redistribution may not be interpreted as radical left or in any other politically radical manner. This importantly signifies the moderate or centrist nature of citizens; and the presence of left and right preferences on economic issues.

In addition, it is difficult to maintain the scholarly argument that the left-right has little prevalence in the South African context, especially at the social level. Given that seven in ten South Africans position themselves on the left-right and see themselves as aligned to some orientation within the political scale, a significant amount of validity attaches to the left-right dimension at the social level, albeit the potential absence of expert voter understanding of the scale. Recognising that citizens were regularly vying between the centre and centre-right between 1982 and 2013, and the substantial reduction in the rate of don’t know, signifies an important and almost undeniable feature within the electorate: they seem to have a general predisposition to the centre and the right. Moreover, the relatively unchanging nature of this implies that citizens seem clear about where they are located. Added to left-right validity is the ‘accurate’ positioning of the DA by voters as a centre-left party, consistent with the findings in Chapter 5 that shows the party moved gradually to the left. Although, it is less clear why the ANC is positioned as centre-right; it may mean voters are using a non-economic dimension or simply equating the ANC to where voters themselves sit. Moreover, citizens engage in positioning themselves on salient left-right economic issues. In other words, the left-right is not only a valid social phenomenon but may well also qualify as a credible one.

On the issue of left-right polarisation, first, citizens are largely divided on salient economic issues such as privatisation, equality and responsibility; in another way, citizens assume opposed ideological positions on the economic nexus between the government, the individual and the market. However, standard deviation results show there is movement toward moderate polarisation; by 2013 voters firmly entered this space. Second, citizen self-placement results indicate that polarisation within the electorate was particularly high where a number of citizens were poles apart on the left-right; but since 2001 and by 2013, self-definition on dissimilar ideological blocs were gaining less support. In both cases, citizens were showing preference more for one side, particularly the centre. This implies that individuals are beginning to take up more similar positions on economic issues and seeing themselves in similar ways on the left-right. In all, there is far less left-right sectarianism than in the 1990s and citizen are mostly centre partisans. This seems to influence the movement of parties where the opposition bloc is occupying similar positions (centre-left) or possibly vice versa. Also, major parties might be articulating a mixed position instead of reflecting the polarisation at the social level — however, the dominant party is constraining ideological differences form becoming meaningful.

The overriding finding is that voters are more centre and centre-right on general issues, and left and right on economic issues; moreover, voters are polarised about general and economic issues — some prefer a left stance while others a right stance on salient matters. What is also important for the analysis is that voters regard themselves as centrist and moderate on generic and economic issues, and on the nature of social change; they also perceive of major parties as moderate. Most interview participants conceded to the idea that the electorate can best be characterised as moderate rather than extremist on the left-right. They however saw voters as having more preference for left
issues such as an active government and subsequently inducing a ‘culture of dependency’ in the electorate. However, the deficiency in this conclusion is that it ignores rightward tendencies in the electorate, both in voters defining themselves as centre-right and having clear preference on certain economic issues that are to the right. Thus, while it is more plausible and conclusive to state that the electorate is relatively moderate and centrist, it is less accurate to think of voter left-right preference as a unimodal left distribution. This feature is evident in the polarisation level that show voters are divided on the left and right on generic and salient economic issues. This hence concluded the engagement with the general and more specific nature of the ideological predispositions within the electorate.

Another portion of this analysis dealt with the presence of ideological and non-ideological voting. This incorporated citizen perceptions of party difference, policy choices and policy-based voting, and opinions about pertinent social problems. Although there is evident citizen left-right self-placement and left-right polarisation, this not concomitant with consistent or high levels of issue-based, programmatic identification or policy-centred partisanship. In other words, while citizens position themselves on the political scale and express opinions about left-right economic issues, they are hardly policy-motivated voters. However, evidence presented here suggest modest levels of such voting. Although voters are largely not ideologues or concerned about the specifics of programmes, voters are not exempt from or completely void of supporting parties because of programmatic platforms and promises. In the first place, there is an evident tug of war between policy and non-policy reasons for party support and party differences, voters are not stuck on any one side; there are observable shifts from the non-policy to the policy side. However, the non-policy dimension is more dominant.

The rational and policy-oriented nature of the electorate largely challenges the race-based argument about partisanship and voting behaviour. Moreover, in times of majority support for the policy dimension, the game plan of parties endorsed by voters are undergirded by non-policy issues such as party integrity, competence, performance and candidate personality — yet not racial identity elements. Still, when voting is plainly non-policy oriented, race features as a less prominent factor than is often argued. The argument of this chapter is that while race is an important factor in the electoral and political landscape, overgeneralisation should be avoided, precisely because more complex dynamics, such as the evident cohort of policy-oriented voters, are being ignored and sidelined.

The presence and progressive movement of policy-based voting is conditional on politicisation of party programmes (like in the case of the RDP), the matching of policy to pertinent socioeconomic problems, and the guarantee and promise of tangible political outcomes emanating from proposed programmes. Moreover, the lack of education and poverty are factors that constrain policy-based voting. In the end, there is less of a dead policy space at the social level than is often argued in the literature. The ideological-policy-based architecture of the South African electorate is more evident than what is usually presented; and although this is not prevalent, there is a section of the electorate that are motivated by policies and those who are motivated by non-policy issues are guided by non-race-based factors. While race might be feeding into issues such as historical loyalty, more rigorous research needs to be conducted until one can discard the idea that voters are engaged in non-race-based voting.

Some of the causes for non-extremism and non-policy voting were discussed. This included the presence of major centre parties, the lack of education, and poverty and needs. Lastly, this research shows that voters are rarely an influencing factor in the party system. First, while there is high to moderate polarisation at the voter level, the party system demonstrates low polarisation, there is little association between the two. Second, party positions are also less influenced by voter positions, although there is some influence; and parties are relatively independent actors in policy determination. Importantly, the causal dynamics of low polarisation in the party system are related to factors outside of the sociological.
**Notes**

1 For the ‘left bloc’, I take the mean position of the scores deemed on the left side of the scale, that is, from 1 to 3 (on a ten-point scale) or 1 and 2 (on a six-point scale). For the ‘right bloc’, I take the mean position of scores on the right side of the scale, that is, from 6 to 10 (on a ten-point scale) or 5 and 6 (on a six-point scale). For the ‘centre bloc’, I take 4 to 6 (on a ten-point scale) which is centre-left (4), centre (5), and centre-right (6), or 3 and 4 (on a six-point scale) which signifies centre positions relative to the left and right.

2 76.3 is obtained from adding the left, right and centre mean scores.

3 Such preferences seem to concord with the ANC’s, as the major liberation movement, political approach at the time which was largely characterised by the suspension of the armed struggle and the pursuit of negotiations as the preferred method. However, this explanation is not suffice because suspension of military action only occurred in 1990, this means citizens were operating relatively independently of political dynamics by opting for moderate tendencies.

4 In 1990 and 1996, pro-government supporters increased and the amount of undecided citizens also increased, in 2000 the increase in the former was matched by a decrease in the latter, 2001 was followed by a decrease in the pro-government and an increase in the undecided, finally in 2006 and 2013, when pro-government support increased, the undecided bunch decreased and then increased. Actually, between 2001 and 2013 when preference for government ownership increased, support for privatisation decreased, similar to the 1990 and 1996 dynamic, so it might be that those who previously opted for privatisation were opting for government ownership.

5 ‘Neither approve nor disapprove’: 15.1; ‘Don’t know’: 6.5; N = 2,400 (Government plans production and distribution of goods and services). ‘Neither approve nor disapprove’: 17.1; ‘Don’t know’: 3.4; N = 2,400 (Individuals decide for themselves what to produce and what to buy and sell).

6 ‘Don’t agree with either’: 2.5; ‘Don’t know: 1.7; N = 2,200.

7 Other data: ‘In-between’: 10.3; ‘Don’t know’: 9.3 ; N = 2,516.


9 Other data: ‘Don’t agree with either’: 0.6; ‘Don’t know’: 0.7; N = 2, 200.

10 Other data: ‘Don’t know’: 6.1; N = 2, 671.

11 ‘In-between’: 13.7; ‘Don’t know’: 7.9; N = 2,517

12 The survey included a category of 1 = ‘never justifiable’ and 10 = always justifiable. I assigned the following categories to the numerical hierarchy: 1, 2, 9, 10 = strongly agree; 3, 4, 7, 8 = somewhat agree; 5 and 6 = don’t agree with either/in-between. I further merged strongly agree and somewhat agree. Other data: ’Don’t know’: 1.2; ‘In-between’: 15.7; N = 3,488.

13 Other data: ‘What the owner originally paid for the land’: 14.5; ‘Don’t know’: 3.0; N = 2,673.

14 Statement A: The government must abide by the law in acquiring any property, including paying the owner. B: In order to develop the country, the government should have the power to seize property without compensation. Data reflects ‘strongly agree/agree’. Other data: ‘In between’: 6.9; ‘Don’t know’: 7.9; N = 2,400.

15 The ‘missing’ or ‘unknown’ value was 12.5%, and N = 2,756.

16 The ‘Don’t know’ is 7.4%, and N = 1,200
17 ‘No’ score: 10.9, ‘don’t know’: 0, N = 2,642

18 ‘No’ score: 79.8, ‘don’t know’: 7.3, N = 2,200

19 The category ‘discrimination’ included race relations, inequality, affirmative action and minorities.
Chapter 7: The Dominant Party and the resilience of the centre

This chapter examines the presence of moderation within the dominant party: the ANC. A few months after the historic election in 1994, some sections held that the transition was a harbinger of "radical directional change" that would luridly include the “wholesale takeover of white houses and farms” (*The Natal Witness*, 14 July 1994). Those who adopted the prognosis of imminent economic radicalisation (nationalisation and state-takeover of private property) were hardly expecting an ideologically moderate government led by the most popular party, the ANC. Yet there was largely no ‘crash, boom, bang’ in the new South Africa (despite ‘black-on-black’ violence that occurred in the transition period). The absence of both radical behaviour and doctrines on the part of the ANC gave the embryonic democratic state a character of moderation. This chapter seeks to describe and critically discuss the moderate trajectory of the ANC.

The main purpose of this chapter is to establish whether the dominant party is left or right and centrist (moderate) or radical (extremist). It also seeks to understand the ANC’s effect on the party system. This is undergirded by a critical examination of macroeconomic policy from 1994 to 2012. Useful analysis of South Africa’s economic policy evolution or particular periods of economic policy has been conducted by a number of scholars (Habib, 2013; Marais, 2011; Seekings and Nattrass, 2006; Bond, 2000; Desai, 2003; Satgar, 2008; Terreblanche, 2012). Although their work importantly feds into this analysis, I specifically examine economic policies from the angle of deducing the left-right, centrist-extremist and pragmatic-ideological backbone of the ANC.

This chapter first discusses the role of the state in dealing with social and economic issues (poverty, unemployment and inequality). Second, it assesses the shift from RDP to GEAR to ascertain the left-right and moderate-radical direction of the movement. Here, I assert that overemphasising the change in left and right policy risks overlooking the variability that largely occurs within a centrist space. Third, this chapter seeks to explain the centrist position of the ANC by examining the social partnership and mixed economy environment; and the character of the ANC-SACP’s association in the pre- and post-1994 period. Fourth, I critically assess the causes of left-right moderation and the absence of left extremism. Here, I argue that the ANC’s own position and its active stance in ideological discourse are causes behind its centrism in addition to other causes. Lastly, I conclude by discussing the overall position of the ANC and its influence on the party system — I essentially argue that the ANC is the main cause of moderation in the party system.

### 7.1 The State: Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality

An enduring feature of macroeconomic policy is concern about poverty, unemployment and inequality. All policies since 1994 took into account patterns of poverty and joblessness. South Africa’s social and economic policy framework followed five policies, namely the: Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (1994); Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (1996); Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) (2006); New Growth Path (NGP) (2010); and the National Development Plan (NDP) (2012). Although not all macroeconomic policies strictly treaded the same ideological line, there are significant commonalities that undergird it — which this chapter will broadly discuss. One common feature is the ANC-led government’s approach to social problems.
After holding the first democratic election in 1994, the purpose of the ANC government was to restructure, transform and democratisethe economic sector. According to the RDP White Paper (1994), no political democracy flourishes if the majority are victims of poverty: “[a]ttacking poverty and deprivation will therefore be the first priority of the democratic Government.” Sixteen years into democracy, and the government, through the NGP (2010), put social problems rather thanmarket prerogatives or budgetary constraints at the centre of economic policy. ASGISA (2006) best captures the government’s resolve: although the policy set an ambitious target, it planned to halve unemployment by 2014 from 28 to 14 per cent. The NDP (2012) further encapsulated this in ‘vision 2030’. It presented a visionary outlook for the country; amongst many things, it included a vision for an efficient, healthy and developed population; and a population with access basic to quality services and needs (water, toilets, food, shelter, security, quality health services, and good education). To borrow RDP’s vocabulary, economic policies constituted a ‘people-centred’ programme for social transformation.

In this sense, the government often followed a developmental line, as embodied in the ANC embrace of a ‘developmental state’. For the party this refers to a democratic and transformative state. The ANC elucidates on the requirement to associate political freedom with economic freedom, and explicitly links the developmental state to a pro-poor agenda. Joel Netshitenzhe, a member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC), said that “[t]he state does not exist for its own sake, but as a critical instrument in ensuring the realisation of the strategic objective of the liberation movement [that is, to deal with poverty]” (ANC, 2010a). Given the social conditions of the vast majority, “[t]o accelerate progress, deepen democracy and build a more inclusive society, South Africa must translate political emancipation into economic wellbeing for all” (NDP, 2012: 14). Differently stated: the developmental state “tackles the root causes of poverty and inequality” and intervenes “to support and guide development so that benefits accrue across society” (NDP, 2012: 44). This entire model is encapsulated in social democracy. The ANC views the developmental agenda as reflective of “the best traditions of social democracy”, that is, a system which places the needs of the poor and social issues (such as health care, education and a social safety net) at the top of the national agenda (ANC, 2007a).

One of the means the state uses to tackle poverty is redistribution. The RDP recognised the interrelated nature of economic growth and social development. It posited that through prioritising redistribution of income, wealth and resources, the government would create a “strong, dynamic and balanced economy” (RDP, 1994). This philosophy became know as “growth through redistribution” (Terreblanche, 2003: 89). The redistributive regime particularly pertains to social welfare — which includes social grants. The RDP’s conception of redistribution implied that market forces were not capable on their own of social development; instead, the active role of the state through economic redistribution was to stimulate development. The policy allowed the government to operationalise the idea of the developmental state — the mantra was that state intervention would alleviate poverty more than reliance on market forces alone. For the ANC, “[r]econstruction and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the State” (RDP, 1994, emphasis added). Although this arguably changed during the phase of GEAR, I argue in subsequent sections that the state retained redistributive social welfare.

The government’s intention of redistribution is not meant to force the poor into a culture of dependency on the state. Another way the government seeks to reduce poverty is by being active in creating an environment for job creation. It also, however, importantly includes the private sector in this matrix. According to the NGP (2010: 11), “[c]reating more and better jobs must lie at the heart of any strategy to fight poverty, reduce inequalities and address rural underdevelopment”. Following the NGP, economic policy went a little further. The government’s presentation of the NDP spoke a stronger language of individual responsibility. It challenged an inactive citizenry, and encouraged the population to recede from the “sit back and the state will deliver” approach (NDP, 2012: 27). It put forward the need for citizens to be active in their own development, making an implicit summons for active job-seekers and more hard-workers than reliance on direct cash payments from the government.
7.2 The State and Market: RDP and GEAR

7.2.1 From left to right

The manner in which social ills were addressed were not always through the enabling role of the state. After the government initiated GEAR in 1996, market forces were given greater emphasis in addressing the country’s development challenges. The conception of the state’s role in the economy differed from what RDP espoused. In analysing the change from RDP to GEAR, two different arguments are presented. The first one is that GEAR embodied a rightwing shift: it was a departure from social democracy and the initial developmental vision of the ANC. The second, in contrast to the first, argues that GEAR exemplified an important element of leftist continuity.

Solving structural inequalities under GEAR relied on the idea of trickle-down economics to boost market-led growth and development. Creating institutional space for accelerated economic growth was associated with progress toward stronger employment creation, equitable income distribution, and improved living standards. GEAR purported that growth will have favourable redistributive effects. A distinction emerged between ‘growth through redistribution’ (this means ‘first develop then grow’); and ‘redistribution through growth’ (this means ‘first grow then develop’) (Visser, 2004; Terreblance, 2003: 89; Habib, 2013). GEAR resembled the latter and RDP the former.

Policies promoting higher economic growth as first priority are often followed by laissez-faire economics that support minimal or no government interference in the market to enable and stimulate growth and development. GEAR concentrated on what any rightwing policy would: fiscal deficit reduction, low inflation, a strong exchange rate, increased investment and competitiveness, trade liberalisation, capital and labour market deregulation, and privatisation of state assets. Burgeoning social ills and financial and economic constraints pushed the government to adopt GEAR. The policy was meant to compensate for exchange rate depreciation, counter resurgence in inflation, free up resources for investment, and establish a favourable investment climate to attract foreign capital, thereby accelerating economic growth, reducing unemployment/poverty/inequality, and permitting resources to settle the fiscal deficit. All in all, GEAR advocated a tight monetary policy and market liberalisation: a clear rightwing policy.

For the right, it was success and triumph of the market. Business saw it as a “complete reorientation in ANC policy perspectives” (ANC, 1996a). Yet on the other side, this was no policy achievement to celebrate. This ‘reorientation’ was fiercely challenged by those on left. The argument was that GEAR stood for explicit neoliberal economics that favoured business, investors and the market; and sidelined workers and the poor (Desai, 2002; Hart, 2002; Habib, 2013; Marais, 2011). It was openly Thatcherite and reflected the neoliberal policy heterodoxy that was dominating the world (Terreblance, 2003; Calland, 1999; Habib and Padayachee, 2000). GEAR represented ‘a momentous shift’ or a ‘substantive rupture’ for a party that was allied to working-class and socialist organisations (Visser, 2004: 10; Habib, 2013: 75). Mbeki, then deputy president, who pioneered the policy, was criticised for his lack of sympathy for the poor. He retreated from accepting the dire situation of poor service delivery and downplayed salient social problems. His personal predispositions exposed the vision of a “caring and socially responsive democratic society” as a mere fallacy (Habib, 2013: 10).

Beside discussion in academic circles, the policy was denounced by the ANC’s alliance partners — especially COSATU who was more vocal and critical about GEAR than the SACP. For COSATU, the RDP had been ‘diluted and abandoned’; the ANC was hijacked by ‘international and local business interests’ (Sunday Tribune, 1 December 1996). COSATU’s then president, John Gomomo, said the policy was “the reverse gear of our society” and a ‘get rich quick’ policy that benefited the elite (COSATU, 1997; ANC, 2006). The trade union distanced itself from towing the market line; for COSATU, global realities needed to be interpreted through a left lens — one that
put primacy on social problems and the weak and vulnerable through emphasising the developmental role of the state. Gomomo emphatically said:

For us “global realities” are not about a set of tired arguments of why we should cut social spending, remove exchange controls, reduce company tax to even lower levels, privatise state assets, retrench public sector workers and deregulate the labour market.

(COSATU, 1997)

Even though COSATU gradually came to accept the policy and failed to unilaterally affect policy change (since GEAR continued), it continued to present its dissatisfaction with GEAR. Moreover, it did not withdraw from its non-subservient posture towards capital and globalisation. For these critics, the RDP and GEAR treaded two different ideological lines: whereas the RDP was more leftist and socialist-oriented, GEAR was more rightist and capitalist-oriented.

7.2.2 The retention of the left

The second argument advanced here about the transition from RDP to GEAR is that the latter had an important element of continuity from the former. The view presented by scholars from the first argument was that “GEAR’s agenda cannot even be seen as self-contained or reformist. It represented a regression in social terms for South African society” (Habib, 2013: 86). This, however, seems to bypass the point that the developmental agenda continued in certain areas; the market was not the sole proprietor of government attention, the poor importantly featured as well (albeit to a lesser extent). This alternative argument does not deny that GEAR moved to the right. Rather, it attacks the overemphasis on the rightist direction of the policy and the lack of recognition of the leftist element that continued during the GEAR phase. From my reading of economic policies and analysis of GEAR, I concur with this argument. GEAR represented a watered-down, non-radical kind of conservative market doctrine. A hardline (radical) rightist government would (a) severely limit the intervening role of the state; and (b) strictly and enthusiastically apply overarching rightward economic prescriptions. Yet, these two things failed to occur: there was a degree of ambiguity and lethargy that encircled the life of GEAR.

It is important to consider both what GEAR stood for and the ambiguity/lethargy that surrounded it. Coupled with “a faster fiscal deficit reduction programme to contain debt service obligations” and cuts in government expenditure, GEAR (1996: 2-6) was set to increase economic growth, exports and investments, and create a favourable market climate. Deregulation of the financial and labour market, and trade liberalisation, were two critical elements pursued by the state. Government explained that where regulations raise the costs of job creation, employers tend to turn to unregulated forms of employment — and irregular, sub-contracted, out-sourced or part-time employment is a preferred source of labour for many employers (GEAR, 1996: 17). It is in this context that the GEAR policy called for greater labour market flexibility especially through ‘flexible bargaining’. It spoke of the need for “structured flexibility within the collective bargaining system to support a competitive and more labour-intensive growth path”; this included reduced minimum wages for young trainees, reduced indirect wage costs and wage moderation (GEAR, 1996: 5). It clearly supported the market, demonstrated more sensitivity to market ‘needs’, and addressed the need for organised labour to avoid rigid positions.

It also scored high points for the right because of its espousal and pursuance of trade liberalisation through tariff reduction and lowering of trade barriers in many economic sectors. GEAR aligned itself to the clauses of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreements. According to a policy statement by the government released to the WTO (1998: 6): it was committed to the “reduction of tariffs and phasing out of [export] subsidies” — these measures were considered ‘compatible’ with the rules of the WTO.
In the midst of clear rightward prescripts, ambiguity surfaced in the space accorded to the state in the economy. State interventionism for the ANC-led government referred to the palpable hand of the state through redistribution. Some believe that the ‘human face’, advanced through the activist state, behind GEAR’s neoliberalism came after the government realised the policy’s negative impact (Habib, 2013: 88; Glaser, 2010). Social expenditure increased in the form of social grants, the state also intervened by embarking on infrastructure investment and a public works initiative. This is, however, open to question: I argue that it is important to consider that although GEAR was argued to have exacerbated poverty and inequality [see Seekings and Nattrass (2006) and Habib (2013)] which consequently pushed for and consolidated a more active state, there were also initial commitments on the redistributive front. The government decided in the same year GEAR was adopted that “it will not cut down on spending for essential services, but it will cut down on wasteful expenditure” (ANC, 1996a). Moreover, the policy itself succinctly put it that the economic trajectory was one of strengthening rather than weakening the redistributive role of the state:

The budget is the primary vehicle through which access to social services is assured. Nearly half of all government spending is devoted to education, health, welfare, housing and related services. *Strengthening of the redistributive thrust of these expenditures remains a fundamental objective of economic policy.* Reprioritisation within the health and education budgets, a municipal infrastructure programme, restructuring of the welfare system, land reform and a review of training and small business support policies are amongst the initiatives which aim to *address the claims of the poor to a fair package of basic needs.*

(GEAR, 1996: 10, emphasis added)

Redistribution, the social welfare system, land reform and small business development were considered pro-poor initiatives in the midst of a market-oriented strategy. Also, ‘reprioritisation’ was not meant to involve a decrease in social spending on welfare. So, the government held an initial commitment to redistribution and this was consolidated during the GEAR phase.

From assessing the social impact of GEAR, a downsizing of the redistributive role of the state failed to occur. GEAR’s espousal of tight monetarism and deficit reduction did not imply that the government pulled out of existing redistributive commitments. Even though many distinguish between the RDP’s ‘growth through redistribution’ and GEAR’s ‘growth with redistribution’, redistribution was a resilient feature (Habib, 2013: 78). One of GEAR’s main pillars was the social support regime. Progressive tax was expanded and this was subsequently used to finance extended social provisions. The increase was such that the government did not spend less on social welfare; rather, public expenditure on the welfare budget increased during the period of GEAR (Seekings, 2005; Habib 2013; Glaser, 2010). Despite GEAR’s rightwing position: a remarkable feature was “the retention and expansion of the state’s commitment to welfare” (Lodge, 2004: 171). So, whilst GEAR seemed to interfere in trade liberalisation and labour deregulation, the state did not roll back social welfare.

A less ambiguous and more lethargic position was evidenced through the government’s almost stagnant and inactive stance on privatisation. The policy held that public sector assets needed to be restructured; this included the “sale of non-strategic assets” (GEAR, 1996: 2-6). While portions of state-assets were sold to the private sector, which lead to service fee increases for ordinary citizens, the entire privatisation clause was slowly followed in the initial phase and later dropped. Some scholars, who perhaps focus less on the neoliberal front of GEAR, observe that privatisation of state-owned enterprises was a less pursued objective. In the early to mid-2000s out went the idea of large-scale privatisation; but to be sure, from the beginning it was “never vigorously pursued” (Glaser, 2010: 29). The state seemed to be in the centre (especially its indecisiveness to apply privatisation) and also moved to the centre-left (it focused state-owned enterprises). If one starts first with the ANC’s early 1990s nationalisation stance (as soon as Mandela was released from prison he publicly declared the ANC’s intention to nationalise), the eschewal of it and even the SACP’s acceptance of a mixed environment did not translate into the opposite: privatisation.
Compared to GEAR’s privatisation proposal, the government was actually lethargic in opening up state-owned enterprises to the private sector. The DA, a party traditionally viewed as on the right, lashed out at the ANC in its 1999 campaign. Appealing to its rightwing constituency, the DA critiqued the ANC’s ‘failure to privatise’ and its inability to ‘speed up privatisation’. This suggests that the ANC failed to nationalise in the 1990s and also failed to privatise in the 2000s. A degree of hesitancy is noticeable within macroeconomic policy implementation: an indecision to move left or right on issues of privatisation and nationalisation — the government seems unwilling to embrace either side.

The post-GEAR, and, more particularly, the post-Polokwane environment signalled a shift more to the left. ASGISA, GEAR’s successor, was less rightist in tone and arguably managed to appease leftist critics. By connecting ‘accelerated growth’ (growth) and ‘shared growth’ (redistribution) (where the latter meant the fruits of economic growth were to be shared to eliminate poverty and inequalities) it reflected an economic policy that stripped itself of previous conservative neoliberal jargon. As Habib (2013: 11) point out, the post-GEAR environment “deepened the economic shift to the left”. This was because, in one sense, the state positioned itself to be at the forefront of sector-led growth — such as investing public capital in education, energy and telecommunications. The ASGISA (2006: 11) policy spoke of leveraging “increased levels of public expenditure” to stimulate programmatic sector-led growth — especially in the provinces. Striking a cord with the first macroeconomic policy, ASGISA plainly said ‘state intervention was first’ as a means to forerun growth: “[w]ithout interventions directly addressed at reducing South Africa’s historical inequalities, growth is unsustainable” (ASGISA, 2006: 11). The leftist element continued during the NGP (2010: 55) which spoke of an ‘inclusive economy’ and ‘inclusive growth’: there was a need to create “decent work and inclusive and balanced growth”. The policy envisioned a role for the state in facilitating job creation in the public sector and offering a stimulus for ‘job driving’ sectors, trade protectionism and mechanisms to protect workers, and the expansion of the social wage in the form of a national health insurance.2

7.2.3 Left-right placement: What about the centre?

The main contention of this section relates to the presentation of discourse. My position is that (a) GEAR was rightist on many fronts and that it (b) retained leftist elements even under rightwing prescriptions; and (c) the post-GEAR, post-Polokwane context represented a deepening of the left agenda. However this characterisation must be qualified. Although I myself engage in left-right placement, I suggest that it is important to emphasise the centre as well.

First, the presentation of GEAR as a neoliberal agenda often comes with connotations of radical rightism. Those who advance the right-side of the policy describe it as inaugurating a market fundamentalist, Thatcherite state. But this ignores the centrist element: as seen by the government’s holding onto the welfare state and opening space for the market. In some areas clear distinctions could be identified but in other equally salient areas it was rather blurred. No ‘leftist cleansing’ occurred during the phase of GEAR — as argued above: the redistributive element was not sidelined, the social democratic element of the 1990s continued through to the end of GEAR. There might have been a watered down version of social democracy but not a closure of the development chapter: GEAR involved progressive policies in some areas and conservative policies in others.

It is in this light that I argue that the movement from RDP to GEAR was not of a fundamentally different order. Which rightist government would advance some rightist policies and keep/pursue leftist policies? It is in all probability a centre-right government. On the other hand, an extremist rightwing government would do-away with all leftist/socialist elements — which would be considered the most constraining element in the market operating unbridledly. It is hard to be persuaded by the view that GEAR resembled a complete shift to Thatcherite thinking. Thus, what appeared to be a radical rightwing policy by the left, was a rather moderate, centre-right
macroeconomic framework. The neoliberal view risks downplaying the moderation that the rightwing policy was encircled in. Given this, it is difficult to characterise the GEAR period as a neoliberal one since there were important continuities with the RDP. It may be more accurate to categorise it as the government’s struggle to find an appropriate alternative for growth and development within a centrist makeup.

Second, and related to the above argument, seeing economic policies as either left or right makes the mixed, centrist and moderate position of the ANC less important than it seems. Also, by emphasising (a) *change* from left to right and back to left, and (b) *continuity* of the left agenda, both bypass the *stability of the centre*. I advance an argument of broad centrism in the government’s economic policy trajectory — this challenges the tendency to compartmentalise the ANC as either left or right.

Thinking of the ANC too much in terms of whether it is more to the right or more to the left, although highly important in deducing distinctions and similarity in policy, is deficient in some respect because it fails to recognise the in-between element of centrism and policy variability within a centrist terrain. An important feature that persistently prevails in the broad economic setup of South Africa is centrism. From the RDP to NDP, policy has variably shifted within a centrist environment. By this I mean that while RDP was centre-left, GEAR centre-right, and from ASGISA to NDP policy seems to be centre-left. Put differently, economic policy has swayed between the centre-left to centre-right and back to the centre-left. In brief, any left-right movement falls within the centre: macroeconomic policy eschews economic radicalism or fundamentalist conceptions of both state and market. In the following sections I demonstrate the centrism within the ANC by examining the ‘social pact’ and the party’s relationship with the SACP.

## 7.3 State or market? Corporatism, the social pact and a mixed model

### 7.3.1 The private sector and developmental objectives

While embracing the developmental interventionist state, the ANC also recognises the limits of the state. Essentially, the party abjures exclusive state-led intervention. Given the uniqueness of structural socioeconomic problems in the country and a hostile global environment, statist approaches are, according to the party, unlikely to attract investment and increase growth. Rather, it is the market that would enable the government to tackle fiscal and budgetary issues. The ANC strongly believes that by and large the South African government depends on the private sector for revenue to finance policies.

While GEAR took this approach further, since 1994 the government held an open approach to capital. In the RDP (1994) the government was quick to add the need for “a thriving private sector and active involvement by all sectors of civil society”. It recognised that “both the private and public sector [must] create productive employment opportunities at a living wage for all South Africans” (RDP, 1994). It is in this context that a central goal of government was to “integrate into the world economy utilising the growing home base in a manner that sustains a viable and efficient domestic manufacturing capacity, and increases the country’s potential to export manufactured products” (RDP, 1994). The ANC-led government also welcomed foreign capital investment and trade liberalisation.

On the one side the government accorded a place for the private sector in the new state to join an economically globalised society and engage in capitalist-based initiatives, on the other side its belief was for the private sector to carry the weight of the government’s social development agenda and to economically empower the poor. The RDP (1994) stated: “[w]hile both business and labour have the freedom in a democratic South Africa to protect and promote their immediate interests, it is the Government’s fervent hope that they will jointly pursue the broader challenges of extending
opportunity to the millions of adult South Africans who can currently find no place in the formal
economy”. Herein lay the resolve to form ‘constructive relationships’ and ‘active partnerships’
between government, unions, organised business, and “the workings of the market” (RDP, 1994).
Some refer to this as the ‘social pact’ that testified to the corporatist state that South Africa
constructed (Habib, 2013).

This led the ANC at one point to infer that: we “can also not over-stress that our success depends
on the partnership between the public and private sectors on the basis of mutually beneficial
interests” (ANC, 2001a). Hence, the ANC sees itself in a “transformational engagement” with
capitalism, that is, a relationship for social development (ANC, 1997b). Saki Macozama, president
of Business Leadership South Africa, puts it that: “[b]usiness does not see itself as a counter lever
which is supposed to swing government one way or the other…[but wants] to make business good
for South Africa and South Africa good for business” (ANC, 2001a). Herbert Mhkize, former
NEDLAC executive director, succinctly describes government-business interactions as a ‘symbiotic
relationship’ predicated on social development (Interview).

7.3.2 NEDLAC and Government’s relationship with business and labour

When interview respondents were asked about how they perceived government’s relationship with
business and attitude toward capital and the free-market, Phillip Dexter, former executive director
of NEDLAC, said “generally, it’s not antagonistic towards private capital (Interview). He said the
government even has cordial relations with certain sections of white business. The current
NEDLAC director, Madoda Vilakazi held the same opinion; he said “government is very open and
supportive to capitalism”; it “understands and accepts the important role of the private sector in the
economy” (Interview). Government-business interaction is evident in non-statutory structures, as
interviews alluded to, like the forum of more than 90 CEO’s that regularly meet at the level of the
president to discuss issues of economic growth and development. By the time of the NGP, the
government conceded that “[k]ey to the implementation of the new growth path is the development
of more constructive and collaborative relations between the state and business” (NGP, 2010: 63-4,
emphasis added). So, not only was there a collaborative framework in place but the government
calls for increased collaboration.

The inclusion of all relevant stakeholders in development objectives of the government can be
observed through NEDLAC — a statutory institution setup in 1995 embodying the social
partnership. NEDLAC is based on the politics of consultation and dialogue where salient
stakeholders meet to determine economic policy. This set up includes government, business, labour
and civil society. For the ANC, all relevant groups “must cooperate in formulating economic
policy” (RDP, 1994). The establishment of the statutory body sought to prevent policy discussions
that were either on the radical left or neoliberal right. This is because the inclusion of contending
groups (especially business and labour) in the determination of policy, moves, although not
necessarily, stakeholders toward a mixed economic architecture — they are pushed to compromise
and jettison radical orientations.

Of course this relationship is not static or unproblematic; it varies and depending on issues
discussed; there are less polarised or highly tense dynamics. The nature of social dialogue is a
negotiation and like any negotiation there is inherent conflict. Mhkize describes the relationship
between various constituencies as an “adversarial-type relationship” (Interview). Each group seeks
to defend and expand their turf. For instance, labour pushes for more leftist issues like banning
labour brokering or increasing wealth or capital gains tax. Vilakazi and Mhkize make an interesting
point about business: instead of moving more right, business is prone to push for more centrist
policies. In fact, they tend to be largely “on the defensive mode” instead of moving more to the
neoliberal side (Vilakazi, Interview). According to Dexter’s observation, “there are some hardline
market fundamentalists in the business world, but there’s a minority; the consensus in our country
is that some kind of a mixed system is the best way to go” — certain things are delivered by the free market and others that are delivered by the government (Interview). Hence, the private sector generally feels accommodated in this arrangement. Even some quarters of business that feel government goes too far with some economic policies, “still finds government policies to be reasonably accommodating” (Mkhize, Interview).

The RDP (1994) teased out these competing interests. On the one hand, basic to consultative discussions were the protection of worker rights and labour standards; on the other hand, discussions were inherently stamped with private sector interests (RDP White Paper, 1994). Here, the ANC was describing the need to move discussion both to a labour-friendly and market-friendly place. The mixed approach was succinctly summed as follows: the government “is committed to creating an enabling environment that will encourage private investment by facilitating efficient markets and by redressing the distortions of the past” (RDP, 1994). Part of creating a supportive environment for business included gradual trade liberalisation; yet, this was balanced out, although rather ambiguously, with the government’s intention to protect local manufactures from unfair international competition (RDP, 1994). Even the GEAR policy emphasised an “appropriate balance” between market-led job creation and protection of workers (GEAR, 1996: 18). Although the latter was given less priority, the policy testified to the government’s push toward some mix.

The NGP, for instance, encouraged stronger investment by the private sector to grow employment-creating activities. More specifically it said: “[m]ost of the projected new jobs will come from the private sector...In a mixed economy, private business is a core driver of jobs and economic growth” (NGP, 2010: 23, 62, emphasis added). At the same time, ‘state-led’ economic policies that informed the developmental state were to “articulate well with market institutions” (NGP, 2010: 61). What the NGP was plainly stating was that even though the state identified job-driving sectors and set out to advance a pro-worker, pro-redress agenda, such social developmental initiatives were not at the expense of the private sector. Compared to ASGISA, the NGP appeared to accommodate the business community in a fresh new way. An objective of the policy was to create a favourable climate for business, particularly through minimising costs for business — unnecessary economic costs such as regulatory requirements and poor infrastructure. While GEAR sought to minimise cost through providing business with space to use the deregulated labour market (but given that the government operated under the Labour Regulations Act of 1995, such deregulation was not overriding), the NGP’s strategy was less rightist; yet, it did not debar the right.

Since the early 1990s the ANC demonstrated its committed for a mixed approach but this was consolidated in the 1960s (as will be discussed later). In its Ready to Govern document, it set out the economic model it envisaged for the country: “a mixed economy [that] will foster a new and constructive relationship between the people, the state, the trade union movement, the private sector and the market” (ANC, 1992, emphasis added). Trevor Manuel, the first finance minister in the new government, alluded that the ANC came to drop more leftist clauses like nationalisation and accepted a mixed economy (Financial Mail, 13-18 December 2013). This feature embedded itself in the fabric of the state, it continues till the present. The party said in 2010, its aims is to “promote a mixed economy, where the state, private capital, cooperative and other forms of social ownership complement each other in an integrated way to eliminate poverty and foster shared economic growth” (ANC, 2010b).

7.3.3 Government: the centrist arbiter ‘walking a tight rope’

The government partnership includes three critical economic players: the state, market and labour. The government acts as a ‘centrist arbiter’: it engages in mediating between and petitioning contending groups. Although (a) persuading business to join the developmental agenda of the state, the government also seeks to (b) influence labour to put aside unreasonable demands and work with
business. Labour, like capital, is at the centre of the ANC’s concerns. According to the party, there is an important role that labour plays in a capitalist context: “the working class together with the democratic state and capital complete the proverbial golden triangle necessary for the development and transformation of society” (ANC, 1996b). Yet the ANC recognises a critical challenge: for organised labour to support employment creation and equity concomitantly with policies that support the needs of the business sector (NGP, 2010). This arbitration role of the ANC was seen in the early 1990s. Trevor Manuel emphasised how Mandela played a critical role in getting the leftwing to acquiesce in the idea of a mixed economy “run along essentially market-based lines”; and this “was invaluable in holding the centre” and maintaining political stability (Financial Mail, 13-18 December 2013: 34).

Government has consistently committed to collaborating with both organised business and labour. The NDP (2012: 28) characterised the role of the state as one that focuses on “[b]uilding partnerships between the public sector, business and labour to facilitate, direct and promote investment in labour-intensive areas”. In other words, while the government is encouraging cooperation, all social partners are meant to work inclusively in an accommodative environment to promote growth and development. Despite these sentiments from government, on a more critical level, when interview respondents were asked whether they observe the government as being in favour of any particular interest (labour or business), they denounced this idea. Government tries to “find a delicate balance on the various interests”; “it would not be outright business, likewise it would not be outright in favour or organised labour: its a balance” (Mhkize, Interview). As Mhkize notes, there are times when the relationship gravitates more to labour or more to business, whether on labour market or monetary policy; yet this does not constitute fundamental shifts to either side (Interview). If the government does move more left or right, it still maintains some balance to ensure the interests of the other side are catered for. Macozama shared this view; he explained that the relationship between government and business is fraught with contradictions but still radical leftist remedies in favour of social transformation have not been pursued (Interview).

On the issue of tax, for instance, “government is very careful to say we can’t increase this [wealth or capital gains] tax in a manner that suggests its a sin to be wealthy or its a sin to earn more than one and a half million rands” (Vilakazi, Interview). So, despite pressure from labour, government considers the interests of business to ensure that as an arbiter, government is not pushed too far left or isolates business. Thus, it is in this sense Mhkize argues that no group can levy the criticism that government social and economic policies as either socialist or purely capitalist in character: its very much fixed with elements of both (Interview). Vilakazi made the point more emphatically: “government is not in favour of any of the two parties [business and labour], I think they are trying to walk a very tight rope…I think they are just being moderate and in the middle-of-the-road” (Interview).

Although each constituency seeks to inherently advance their interests, there is a general understanding of the ‘social developmental consensus’ that requires both a conducive environment for economic growth and pro-poor policies. This understanding that the two are indispensable and should work together seems to constitute ‘pulling ground’ that causes parties to gravitate to the middle-of-the-road. According to the Dexter, “that we have social dialogue in our country…and a very strong bargaining culture means that the relationship between the social partners, generally speaking, is a good one” (Interview). Dexter calls this institutional arrangement an “advanced and mature” system of social dialogue (Interview). As he correctly elucidates: without a bargaining culture and a system that fosters convergence of interests, whether at a statutory or informal level, “the alternative really is all out conflict”. In other terms, polarisation would almost be a regular feature of politics (Interview).

Moreover, the government recognises that the push for an environment of constructive social dialogue and broad consensus is not only to shape the country’s developmental economic policies but to achieve “requisite policy stability and coherence” (NGP, 2010: 18). Here, the government is making an important link between consensus politics and policy stability. Thus, it is accommodative to both labour and business; it perceives itself as spawning ‘necessary’ tradeoffs and sacrifices, on
the side of business, to ensure a visibly “fair distribution of the benefits from growth” (NGP, 2010: 18).

In this sense, the government makes note of its own limitations, advances the need for business, recognises the importance of labour, and builds on a corporatist platform as a centrist arbiter. The ‘focused partnership’/social pact’ setup constrains capitalist and socialist policies from maximally prevailing. The ANC is a moderate party of government that encourages these tendencies to agree on a mixed position. Thus, its embrace of collaborative politics shows that the ANC is less of an ideologically rigid, clear-cut left-right party; rather, it positions itself as a pragmatic party, that sits in the centre and is willing to consider and arbitrate ideological tussles.

7.4 Radical leftism? The ANC and the SACP: The non-ideological alliance

It is not the purpose of this research to embark on a rigorous assessment of the entire left bloc — especially given practical concerns. I focus mainly on the most ideologically-inclined left partner: the SACP — initially named the Communist Party of South Africa until 1953 (CPSA). Also, COSATU is based upon practical organisation of the working class and improvement in their material condition; and this is not always connected to some ideological orientation. However, I do not completely exclude COSATU, especially since the interview process included COSATU as an important element. This section critically assesses the nature of the relationship between the SACP and ANC. It begins by assessing (a) the ANC’s position on the ideology of socialism; (b) how the party defines its relationship with the left, both in the liberation (pre-1994) and democratic phase (post-1994); and (c) assesses the moderation of the SACP and the causes behind it.

7.4.1 The historical relationship

The ANC’s relationship with the leftist SACP is one that evolved over time. It started from a place of discrediting the communist party and later moved to joint cooperation with it. This section critically assesses the ANC’s perception of communism and cooperation with the SACP. First, the liberation movement expressed very little intention to radically overhaul the country’s economic system and replace it with something fundamentally different. The movement emphatically detached itself from ‘imposed’ communist definitions that associated it with economic radicalism (the ANC was banned under the ‘Suppression of Communism Act’ in the 1960s). During the 1960s the ANC took an assertive position on ideological issues. It stated: “[the ANC] is not and was never a communist movement” (Mandela, 1964). Rejection of socialist labels began to emerge in response to varied interpretations that surrounded the ANC’s core policy document: the Freedom Charter of 1955. Assertively clarifying its ideological position on the Charter, Mandela (1964) said: the policy was “by no means a blueprint for a socialist state...The ANC has never at any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it... ever condemned capitalist society”.

The ANC expressed reservations about unconditionally following communist footprints precisely because it had an interest in and saw the benefit of the capitalist system. In one instance as Mandela explained in his autobiography, in the 1980s he described the Freedom Charter as “a blueprint for capitalism”: it “does not even purport to want to destroy the capitalist system” (Mandela, 2010: 250). This was because an ANC government wanted Africans to have the opportunity “which they have never had before, of owning property wherever they want, and capitalism will flourish amongst them as never before” (Mandela, 2010: 250). Similarly, when the party assumed government in 1994, it said: “the ANC cannot bar blacks from becoming and being capitalists, any more than it could debar them from becoming lawyers, doctors, accountants, engineers, [and] skilled workers” (ANC, 2007b). In addition, the ANC did not concede to the idea of worker power
(proletarian democracy), worker ownership, and production for use. Instead, its position was one that supported a “unification of various classes”, the transfer of state power “not to any single social class but to all” (workers, professionals and bourgeoisie alike), and profit-accumulation (Mandela, 1956).

It, however, recognised the need for “some form of socialism” to enable people “to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty” (Mandela, 1964). Mandela was pointing to the non-radical nature of the left element in the party: “this does not mean we are Marxists”, we are influenced by “both West and East” (Mandela, 1964). The ANC’s position was anything but rigid and dogmatic. Economic policy determination proceeded from an all-rounded, comprehensive approach, that took “everything into account” (Tambo, 1980). Oliver Tambo, former ANC president, highlighted that the search for an economic model followed “purely from a pragmatic point of view” (Tambo, 1985a). Policy positions factored in the unique history of the country, the needs of the poor and deprived, and economic growth. What the ANC was advancing was a mixed and flexible framework. In the 1980s the movement defined this ‘mixed model’ as one where “some of the industries, would be controlled, owned, by the State (as happens in many countries), and the rest by private ownership — a mixed economy”; it went further to add that the driving motive behind it was to ensure “a more equitable distribution of the wealth of the country” (Tambo, 1985a).

The moderate stance of the ANC was challenged by more radicalised elements in the organisation. Although individuals and groups coalesced around the ideals of the Freedom Charter, which, for the ANC, stood for a socialist-capitalist blueprint for a future economic setup, a cohort were however not persuaded by the mixed approach. One of the major splits from the movement resulted in a defection led by Robert Sobukwe who formed the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959. Those who defected not only resisted the ANC’s accommodation of inter-racial unity but also the movement’s partial embrace of communist policies.

Consistently, especially since the 1960s, not only did the ANC seize the opportunity to reshape public narratives about what the movement stood for — particularly given that the world order surrounding such developments were fierce competition between two ideological strongholds: communism and capitalism — but it made the left bloc understand the ‘boundaries’ it drew for itself. The ANC’s self-proclamation of economic positions gave no illusion to those around it that it was a movement that endorsed economic radicalism; the movement did not straddle one or another ideological fence. By defining its own stance, it avoided living in an ideological void. Since the 1960s the ANC occupied a clear stance on left-right issues: a moderate and mixed position between West-East ideologies — it neither supported revolutionary change in the economic structure nor condemned a capitalist society. The model it was advancing for the country had a role for both the state and capital. This importantly demonstrates manifestations of economic centrism since the 1960s in the ANC. It reflected an impetus to draw upon the two competing ideological strands, and pull the benefits from each side to reach some positional convergence; and by extension, it sidelined a unimodal dogmatic position.

Second was the ANC’s association with the SACP and the non-ideological grounds for this connection. Although presumably more capitalist admirers like Mandela initially perceived communism as a ‘foreign ideology’ and supported the expulsion of communist subscribers from the movement, ANC members grew in tolerance towards the communists. In the first place the ANC did not deny but recognised the existence of diverse ideological strands; it knew that it differed with some sections on ideological and political questions (Tambo, 1985a). Tolerance was defended on grounds of inclusivity: the moderate opinionated leaders of the ANC promoted accommodation of ‘various political convictions’ for the prime purpose of national liberation (Mandela, 1964). The movement saw itself as a uniting force of a multiplicity of ideological strands — including Christian, Muslim, communist, bourgeois and others. By and large, the ANC pursued the position: “whatever we differ about, let us be united in defeating and destroying the apartheid regime” (Tambo, 1985b). Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression was a luxury the ANC could not afford (Mandela, 1964). It was this purpose that led the ANC’s NEC to
declare that commitment to principles of unity over other affiliations (both ideological and other) should enable different groups to “find a place in its ranks” (ANC, 1989). Proceeding from this context came the association between the ANC and SACP: partnership forged itself not on the basis of economic freedom but political liberation. In fact, cooperation with communists was merely proof of a common goal (the removal of white supremacy) and “not proof of a complete community of interests” (Mandela, 1964). No economic ideological glue that based itself on radical leftism joined the ANC to SACP. Cooperation, inclusivity and accommodation faired better than ideological polemic and hardline dogmatic separatism; and the need for immediate self-determination superseded narrow economic preoccupations.

Despite this cooperation both the ANC and the communist party advanced distinct political missions. On the one hand, the ANC’s was a political mission; it was striving to win liberation, political rights and democracy. On the other hand, the SACP’s was an ideological mission; it was aspiring to dismantle capitalism and replace it with communism and proletarian democracy. This distinction was evident; in one instance the ANC asserted that Marxist tendencies were confusing the working class about the ANC’s positions and what it stood for (ANC, 1985). Dissimilar missions produced ‘respect’ and recognition for organisational distinctions and boundaries. Each one had their distinct role and “respect for their boundaries has ensured the survival and consolidation of our cooperation and unity” (Tambo, 1981). Here the ANC was secluding itself in a predefined shell: one that said it was not for communism but for political freedom. It was as if there was no negotiation on whether it supported economic radicalism: the boundary lines were drawn. The ANC also firmly pointed out that it was not controlled by the SACP; in fact, it clearly stated that it was very well capable of influencing it. But since the prime purpose of the ANC was liberation, it did not want to be too polemical against the SACP. And as such, the ANC said the relationship between it and the SACP is not a one-way process but the “two influence each other” (Tambo, 1981).

Essentially, reinforcing popular action through unity, pluralism and accommodation within the context of liberation allowed the ANC to transcend minor and major ideological differences. Policy-based animosities were labelled petty and unsubstantive for a progressive political and social order. This suggests that the economic dimension was less emphasised (although it nonetheless constituted an important concern), it was political liberation that formed the main agenda. Here I concur with scholars who state that the ANC “studiously avoided adopting rigid ideological stances”; it was less occupied with ‘ideological rectitude’ but more interested in the politics of activism, resistance and strategy (Maylam, 2001: 111-2; Marx, 1992). In the end, the history between the ANC and the SACP was one where the two barely influenced each other on matters of ideology (Maloka, 2013). Perhaps, however, it may be more plausible to say that while the ANC may be contributing to moderation of the SACP (as will be later discussed), the latter’s radical leftist seed, although embedded in the ANC, failed to germinate anything close to fundamentalist doctrines. It was essentially a non-ideological alliance predicated less on economic radicalism than political freedom.

7.4.2 The contemporary relationship

In the democratic phase the alliance between the two evolved but not towards an ideological direction. The connection in the post-apartheid period rested on two main things: history and development. The ANC welcomed the SACP as a strategic partner in the first instance because of shared historical connection. “The Alliance between the ANC and the SACP is one based on principles and trust, derived from practical experiences of sharing trenches” (ANC, 2013). In this statement by the ANC’s secretary general, Gwede Mantashe, ideology featured nowhere. In addition, both entities recognised that it shared economic objectives to eradicate poverty, inequality and unemployment. Partnership in the contemporary period moved from the political dimension, away from self-determination and political freedom, to the economic dimension. Both saw
themselves as extinguishing the association between race and class: we are “fighting basically two features of the same monster” (capitalism and race) (ANC, 2013). Although the purpose shifted, this was still only weakly ideologically-grounded in economic radicalism. Yet, distinct missions still prevail to some important extent. As a former senior ANC member puts it when he alluded to the tripartite alliance: labour deals with labour issues, government deals with government issues, and the communist party deals with their own programmes (Chikane, Interview).

A guiding conceptual model of both the SACP and ANC is the ‘national democratic revolution’ (NDR) which is joined to the ‘development state’, which is subsequently joined to social democracy. The NDR is primarily constructed upon state-based interventionism. It is clear, however, that both entities hold different ideas about what the NDR constitutes. The ANC espouses the NDR’s socialist values: “[t]he national democratic society is meant to be based on human solidarity and the spirit of caring for the most vulnerable in society” (ANC, 2015). “Whilst not rejecting the role of the market, the new government has positioned the state such that it is able to drive economic growth and development, to intervene in the economy whenever this became necessary and to manage the economy” (ANC, 2010a). As a result, the ANC’s take on the NDR reflects the ‘some form of socialism’ approach that the party articulated in the 1960s. Rather than the dogmatism some on the left attach to the NDR, the ANC displays fondness for realistic and pragmatic approaches to social and economic problems. While the ANC uses Marxist language to describe its position (such as ‘bourgeoisie’), the party embraces the concept of ‘nation’ as a multi-class structure with both elements of capitalism and socialism:

A nation is a multi-class entity. Under a system of capitalism, it will have its bourgeoisie, middle strata, rural communities - rich and poor. The objective of the NDR is not the creation of a socialist or communist society…Among the central tasks of the NDR is the improvement of the quality of life of especially the poor, and also to ensure that in the medium- to long-term, the place that individuals occupy in society is not defined by race…An important part of this is that the NDR also entails the building of a black bourgeoisie. The tendering conditions that government has introduced, and its encouragement of the private sector to promote all kinds of “empowerment”, aptly illustrates this…At the same time, the unfolding NDR has also meant the fast growth of a black middle strata. This process will speed up even more as opportunities open up in various areas of life.

(ANC, 2007b, emphasis added)

As the ANC described its own middle-ground, mixed economic model in 1990s: choosing one over another is one-sided and amounts to ‘[f]ailure to appreciate both the ‘with and against’. The reality that capitalist corporations own and control enormous resources is a reality that “cannot just be wished away”; however, “the capitalist accumulation process, left to itself, everywhere promotes inequality and underdevelopment”—thus, it is a struggle with and against capitalism (ANC, 1997a, emphasis added).

For the ANC, the NDR was more to be interpreted as a centrist position that induced an appropriate mix between contending positions; rather than through narrow pigeon-holes of left-right or socialist-capitalist. In other words, “[t]he NDR should not be seen in narrow ideological terms” (ANC, 1997b). To use the party’s 1969 description: “[t]he revolutionary-sounding phrase does not always reflect revolutionary policy, and revolutionary-sounding policy is not always the spring-board for revolutionary advance” (ANC, 1969). The ‘revolutionary’ element in the NDR should not straightforwardly be associated with leftist economic revolutionary advance.

Some in the SACP accuse the ANC of betraying the NDR. In response, the governing party unapologetically asserts that competing with the far left on ‘revolutionary rhetoric’ and ideologically rigidity must be consciously avoided (ANC, 2015). For the ANC, the NDR’s conception of ‘revolution’ is not socialist in nature: it is not a ‘mechanical stage’ (like the two-stage theory of revolution articulated by the SACP) that develops ‘capitalist conditions’ to move into socialism (ANC, 1997b). It plainly elucidated that it was far from a socialist party: the ANC “is,
inherently and by definition, not a movement whose mission is to fight for the victory of socialism” (ANC, 2002b). Like its defence of the Freedom Charter, the ANC proclaimed that the NDR is not a programme hijacked by socialists who are “hitching a ride, with a separate agenda up their sleeves” (ANC, 1997a). In analysing the ANC’s relationship with Marxism, some scholars consequently describe the party as ‘denuded of radical impulses’ (Jara, 2013: 261).

Related to the debate surrounding the socialist character of the NDR: whilst the ANC considers the right as inimical to social transformation and unsupportive of the redistributive role of the state (especially in inter-party competition), the ultra-left purports unrealistic doctrines and an ‘adventuristic struggle’ against global relations (ANC, 2002d). In the 1980s the ultra-left stood for black communism which combined black consciousness with the rhetoric of socialism (ANC, 1985). In the contemporary period the extreme left has become increasingly associated with ‘excessive subjectivism’ that confuses what is desirable with what is objectively possible (ANC, 2007a). According to the party, the far left idea of a linear reversal of the capitalist market and the state as the owner of production, advances the ‘impossible’ and takes ‘dangerous great leaps forward’. It essentially “reflects a systematic inability to understand the dynamic complexity of objective factors” (ANC, 2002c). It is in this sense that the ANC equates the ultra left challenge as infantilism (ANC, 2013). Moreover, having postulated itself as having a “bias towards the poor”, the party hastened to add that it was, however, a “disciplined force of the left” (ANC, 2010a). What this does is draw the boundary line that the ANC was not crossing: it was uninterested in moving to the extreme left.

The critique of the far left was advanced particularly under the administration of Mbeki who polarised the left-right divide in the ANC. During this time major ANC publications, including NEC statements, national conference reports and Umrabulo, constantly made mention of the ultra-left. While the party may be less able to quell extremism and unrealistic dogmatism (since important dividing lines exist between the ANC and its internal left bloc), its accommodative position is not valued on the basis of ideological orientations or similarities but some agreement on a common purpose in the contemporary phase. In fact, in the alliance “members are valued on the basis of their allegiance and commitment to the values, vision and program of the movement, not on the basis of their ideological orientation” (ANC, 2010a). The ANC, in other words, expects that the SACP consider it as the guiding mother body and work within its umbra of pragmatism. If economic similarities were fundamental, any senior representative of the ANC would make first mention of this before any other determining factor. Since historical connections and development objectives take precedence, it continues to give the impression that the contemporary alliance is not forged on ideological similarities. Moreover, the discourse of ultra-leftism, as some objectionable and unwanted ingredient, crafted a very articulate critique of the transition from capitalism to socialism. Even though Mbeki spawned ideological divisions within the party, during his time the ANC consolidated its position against radical leftism — it was regarded as a leftism that showed no understanding of global realities and little acceptance for the ANC’s mixed model.

7.4.3 Moderation and the SACP

One side of the picture is that socialism forms an important part of the relationship between the SACP and ANC, given that the NDR still lives on despite the collapse of communism (Filatova, 2012). This argument, however, neglects engaging with the other side which is that the SACP seems to have ‘moderated’ its position. The evolution of the SACP to relatively pragmatic or less ideological positions is evident in the comments made by Jeremy Cronin, deputy secretary general in the SACP and deputy minister in government. Even though the SACP would not openly, let alone assertively, articulate that they have moderated or watered-down their position, in reality this is the case. Cronin conceded that the SACP reviewed what they mean by socialism: “what we understand as a communist party…by the kind of socialism [we are proposing]…is not a return to the era of...
the Soviet Union…but a socialism of the 21st century” (Interview). Accordingly, he perceives of radical left parties (like the EFF) as promoting economic proposals that lack “realism and practicality” (Interview). For SACP, social democracy is a temporary phase that meets the needs of the poor under a capitalist system (Mashilo, Interview). Obviously, there are deep divisions between more pragmatic and ideological sections within the SACP, and its documents ostensibly assert its commitment to an ultimate socialist future. But by and large, the SACP seems to be following a less dogmatic position.

What are the driving factors behind this moderation? First, some argue that the SACP was influenced by the global and domestic context where capitalism constituted a dominant force. The Party began to realise that it is “impelled by material reality rather than ideas” (Glaser, 2013: 189). Pragmatic economic perspectives surfaced when SACP leaders like Joe Slovo reckoned that under new global circumstances, sacrifice was needed ‘on all sides’ (Adams, 1997). Even prior to this, in 1991 Chris Hani, another SACP leader, accepted social democracy even though it was regarded as a ‘gradualist vision’ or a temporary phase in the SACP’s two-stage theory of revolution (Adams, 1997). Both SACP and COSATU interview respondents said that “we do need to be realistic about the objective conditions, global as well as domestic, so we’re not saying that some great leap forward is possible in some easy way, there are many difficulties including a hostile global reality” (Cronin, Zakhele Cele: Interviews). One SACP respondent emphasised this point, he said that what happens in South Africa is not determined by the ANC or SACP alone but by the balance of forces both internally and internationally. “[W]e [the SACP] acknowledge the limitations imposed on our struggle by objective realities, we do not overemphasise subjective factors and ignore objective reality” (Mashilo, Interview). Policy, in other words, “is not determined simply by the mind and brains of the people who are leading the alliance formations but it is determined by the material condition and the balance of forces on the ground” (Cele, Interview). Respondents agreed that the ANC could not ignore reality.

Second, others argue that the SACP’s loss of autonomy given its alliance with the ANC largely accounts for the watering-down of radical leftism. The SACP has become “tempered and moderated by its unwavering commitment to the ANC” (Thomas, 2007: 135). McKinley (2001: 186) describes this as the ‘historic compromise’ that bargained away radical leftism and acquiesced to work in the moderate, pro-capitalist and multi-class framework of the ANC. There is a general understanding within the ANC and even in the alliance (ironically though, given the alliance launches criticisms against the ANC) that the ANC is not for socialism. The ANC cannot be pushed into the direction of socialism primarily because “it’s not a socialist party but it’s a pro-poor party”; “it’s a social democratic party…not a socialist organisation (Chikane, Dexter: Interviews). As Dexter puts it: it is a “national liberation movement and it doesn’t see building socialism as part of its mandate” (Interview). Interview respondents from both COSATU and the SACP underscored that it accepts the broadness of the ANC. A senior COSATU representative said the union “accepts the contradictions in the alliance”, it recognises that the alliance is not an organisation of one class (Cele, Interview). “The ANC is a multi-class organisation: in the ANC there are capitalists and socialists; so we would not expect the ANC to openly advance the struggle for socialism” (Cele, Interview).

Mashilo explained that the historical mission of the SACP to overthrow capitalism and replace it with socialism, belongs primarily to the SACP; instead, the ANC is a mass party that seeks to cater for everyone (Interview). Thus, “[t]he SACP is not interested in changing the nature and character of the ANC” (Mashilo, Interview). Cronin strongly shared this perspective. He said “we sought as a communist party to influence its [the ANC’s] politics but also to respect its broadness”; in this context, “it’s not necessarily difficult [to advance radical socialism], obviously we need to respect there is a range of different views and not everyone would agree with a radical socialist perspective in the ANC” (Interview). Thus, there is striking correspondence rather than juxtaposed views within the alliance that the ANC is not advancing an extreme left agenda; instead, the governing party is a broadly representative entity that caters for all class interests. This ostensibly places boundaries on the SACP and COSATU, and determines what they perceive as their ‘mission’ within the alliance.
Moreover, both left partners do not approach the ANC with the exclusive purpose to influence it and push forward its agenda. As Mashilo notes: “[w]hen you engage in an alliance, you not only seek to influence but you must be readily open to be persuaded by the people you work with as well” (Interview). This characterises the SACP as a Party that supports an open dialogue relationship to persuade and be persuaded.

Third, there seems to be a shortfall in both causal explanations: both ignore the position of the ANC as a potential cause. Although the two stated causes are fundamental, I argue that we should add another factor to the explanation for why the SACP moderated its position. Although this position may not stand alone or independently but may relate to the above positions, it is important to explicitly give credence to it. Both arguments recognise that material/objective factors and the alliance with the ANC are important (facilitating the lose of autonomy), yet, the ANC is an important agent in contributing to SACP’s adoption of such positions in the first place. Not only was the ANC since the 1960s constantly asserting its own pragmatic non-ideologically rigid position and also discrediting the dogmatism of the communist party, it tried to persuade the SACP to be less ideological and more pragmatic. This became evident in the democratic period. More specifically, the ANC was seeking to stimulate a culture of pragmatism within intra-organisational debate. The party recognised that a major source of strength was in consensus, agreement and pragmatism. While it encourages enquiring minds and wide-ranging internal debates on ideological questions, this is within a context of discouraging dogmatism (ANC, 2002d). Fostering open debate was not inimical to eschewing dogma and the disjuncture between theory and practice (ANC, 2011b). In brief, a vibrant alliance based on progressive policy platforms can succeed on condition it operates “without the imprisonment of dogma” (ANC, 1997d).

Picking from the social pact analysis of this chapter, the ANC views itself more than a ‘centrist arbiter’ between the extremes but a dynamic party spawning new positions rather than consuming predetermined ones, both on the left and right. It said: “[t]he ANC has a responsibility to contribute to the renewal of progressive ideas and policy alternatives”; we “must refuse to be passive consumers of ideas and policies” (ANC, 2011). This began presumably when the balance of forces in the domestic and global environment led the ANC to describe the challenge for the alliance as: “how to take forward, intelligently and in a sustainable manner, a transformation struggle” (ANC, 1997a). It was necessary to “learn from the accumulated experience” “to construct its own policies…[by accepting] to think in a bold and innovative manner” (ANC, 1996b). Reconciling the global environment with domestic challenges took on a posture of creative manoeuvring — which was primarily based on avoiding rigid dogmatic formula (ANC, 2002d). But this push for policy redefinition is not limited to understanding the dominance of capitalism. The party still maintains the position of an alliance that is “capable rationally and logically of dealing with substantive issues and lifting the refinement of public discourse” (ANC, 2015). So, in other words, it can be inferred that the ANC’s call for elements of rationality, logic and creativity in search for policy alternatives assists the push for the alliance to move into accepting a mixed position. In this sense, the ANC plays a critical role in actively stimulating pragmatism in the left bloc.

Succumbing to the dominance of capitalism, losing autonomy, or persuasion by the ANC all contribute to changes in the SACP’s ideology. But whatever the cause, the effect of this moderation is obvious and noticeable. The SACP’s capacity to exercise counter-hegemony is constrained (Saul, 2013: 215; Thomas, 2012). This is often evidenced by the removal of the proverbial ‘socialist hat’ when SACP members occupy the senior positions in government; “dozens of SACP members are in government, but are incapable of articulating [Communist] Party positions within those sites of power” (Thomas, 2012: 120; Madisha, Interview). This was evident in the case of GEAR when the left was unable to deter the government’s position. So in spite of what Charles Nqakula, then SACP general secretary, describes as the watchdog role of the SACP — “to ensure that the ANC in the first instance does not go astray in terms of the policies” — its leftist influence seems negligible (Maloka, 2013: 156).
7.5 Polarisation and the resurgence of the centre

7.5.1 Points of polarisation

The ANC is not a homogenous ideological party, let alone a consistent centrist party, but at the same time it is not a socialist party. As evident from the above analysis, the socialist character of the ANC has always been repudiated by the party itself. Yet since its inception, evident lines of left-right division and even periods of polarisation emerged within the ANC. Together with capitalism and other ideological adherents, there has been an ebb and flow of communism in the organisation. Here I discuss four noticeable instances: Gumede’s links with the CPSA (1930s), ANC-Soviet relations (1960s to late-1980s), Mbeki’s communist background and government administration (mid-1990s to mid-2000s), and Zuma’s left-backed camp (late-2000s to present).

Josiah Gumede, president of ANC, visited the Soviet Union in 1927, accompanied by James la Guma of the CPSA, to commemorate the decade anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. He supported the CPSA’s socialist orientation and the socialist project in the Soviet bloc. In his address at the International Congress Against Imperialism in Brussels, Gumede called for “the complete overthrow of capitalist and imperialist domination” (ANC, 1927). He also described the situation in South Africa’s mines as black worker exploitation for capitalist profit; he said, “[t]hey [the miners] have to go down the bowels of the earth to bring up gold to enrich the capitalist, but the capitalist gives them two shillings a day and puts them in dirty compounds” (ANC, 1927). After visiting the Soviet Union Gumede began to advocate for connections between the ANC and CPSA. He strongly believed that the Communist’s had a role to play in defeating imperialism and worker exploitation. More particularly, Gumede was swayed by the economic element where he admired that the working class were at the forefront of change in Russia. However, his pro-communist inclination did not sit favourably within upper echelons of the movement. During his leadership there was heightened difference of opinion in the movement and in 1930 Gumede lost his position as president general. His successor, Pixley Seme, stood more as a vanguard of the ANC’s moderate wing that was suspicious of the radicalism of communist ideas. Seme resuscitated the moderate element in the ANC that Gumede was challenging. In the post-Gumede period, the ANC’s 1939 conference asserted how “[c]ommunism threatened to seize the reins of Congress leadership” (Furlong, 1997). This period teasing out the moderate-radical division inside the organisation (Dubow, 2000; Jordan and Ndebele, 2010). In this case radical orientations were outflanked by moderates.

In the late-1940s there was a transition in the ANC from peaceful offensive to mass and militant resistance. A radical regrouping occurred within the structures of the ANC in 1949; the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) advanced a Programme of Action that called for mass action to defy and resist separatist policies (Glaser, 2012; Butler, 2012). It seemed that for “the first time in its history the organisation [the ANC] was able to plan, lead and execute a systematic national campaign of political action” (Dubow, 2000: 34). One influential ANC official, Z. K. Matthews, described the evolution away from orthodox reformism by saying that “the ANC is an action group, not a study circle” — indicating the withering of persuasive intellectual professionalism that defined the 1912 to 1949 ANC (ANC, 1955b, emphasis added).

In the 1950s the ANC entered into an informal alliance with the banned SACP. In this period the ‘Congress Alliance’ came into being through a formation of political pacts between the ANC and other entities — such as the Coloured African People’s Organisation, the Indian Congress, and the White South African Congress of Democrats. Matthews described the Congress Alliance and the Freedom Charter by saying that, “for the first time was a Congress which brought together people drawn from all sections of the population” (ANC, 1955b, emphasis added). In fact, this joining of people of various convictions and classes resulted in core policy documents like the Freedom Charter being subject to heterogeneous ideological interpretations. The ANC acknowledged that
from their friends and supporters among other racial groups were also “outstanding examples of individuals who...[were] devoted to the cause of freedom for all” (ANC, 1955b). In this period a broad centrist organisation was being formed that was committed to eradicate racial prejudice through a “great deal of unity in action” (Turok, 2010: 5). Similarly, Dlamini-Zuma and Turok (2010: 75) stress that “a new unity was [being] built across racial lines”. Therefore, it cannot clearly be said that during the 1940s and 1950s the ANC was leftist or preoccupied with the economic structure of society. Instead, the ANC during this period stressed mass mobilisation and resistance politics. Mass mobilisation together with the ANC’s concern to rally a broad cross-class and cross-racial alliance in itself inhibited the ascendance of clearly formulated radical economic doctrines.

During the ANC’s exile period since the 1960s formal alliances were forged with anti-apartheid groups like the SACP. The ANC’s Morogoro conference of 1969 endorsed the SACP’s theoretical interpretation of the South African situation. This included radical reform of political and economic structures. The ANC was also engaging directly with the Soviet Union between the 1960s and late 1980s. Prominent ANC officials like Oliver Tambo, Yusuf Dadoo and Moses Kotane visited Russia in the 1960s. Moscow agreed to provide arms, financial resources and military training to support ANC’s uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) operation. During this period an ANC delegation led by Oliver Tambo made annual visits to Moscow and senior members would meet Soviet representatives to discuss policies of the organisation. Communist influence in the ANC was reflected in the 1969 Strategy and Tactics document that said the “struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa is taking place within an international context of transition to the socialist system” (ANC, 1969). Senior leaders like Tambo openly supported socialism in his address in 1975; he said the struggle is not just political but economic: “the struggle [is] against the entire system of national and class oppression” (ANC, 1975). As Filatova (2012: 533) notes, in 1976 Tokyo Sexwale, an MK operative, said that the ANC works hand-in-hand with the SACP since both were “ideological allies” who believed in nationalisation of the means of production. According to Shubin (1999), senior ANC leaders during this period made Moscow understand that the intention went beyond the eradication of apartheid. In the late 1970s there was less direct and regular relations with Moscow. In this period it was agreed that military training would occur in Angola rather than in the USSR; and emphasis was placed on the armed struggle and immediate liberation.

The mid-1980s was a unique period because of profound changes that occurred in the USSR. Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and later president of the Union, adopted a programme of economic restructuring. While the USSR was experiencing political liberalisation, Gorbachev said in 1985 that there was a “reasonable and realistic alternative to bloodshed, tension and confrontation in Southern Africa” — dialogue and peace (Shubin and Traikova, 2008: 1038). In that same year Tambo and other delegates met with Gorbachev to discuss the possibility of a political settlement. According to Shubin and Traikova (2008: 1040) this meeting was “a pinnacle in Moscow’s relations with the ANC”. In 1987, the ANC met with Russia again to discuss alternative to violence — this delegation included Oliver Tambo, Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Alfred Nzo and Thabo Mbeki. Moreover on the economic front Gorbachev admitted to the failure of the ‘Great October Socialist Revolution’ and his successor, Boris Yeltsin, sought investment, capital and trade flows into Russia. The end of the Cold War and the dissolving of the Soviet Union largely contributed to the demise of socialism as an ultimate state of mankind and this caused a drop in revolutionary left rhetoric in the ANC and SACP (Prevost, 2006). Since Gorbachev the USSR’s successor states have pursued pro-western policies to reconstruct, reform and renew the economic system. The collapse of communism deprived the far left “of a viable developmental model and a meta-narrative alternative to neoliberal capitalism” (March, 2011: 568).

Marxism-Leninism failed to cause fundamental change in the ANC between the 1960s and late 1980s and in the democratic period the same pattern emerged. Mbeki is a different case from Gumede. He had a clear communist background: he was brought up in the SACP from the 1960s to early 1990s, served in its leadership structures, received ideological training in Russia (between 1969-71), and was thought of as a potential SACP leader (Glaser, 2010: 10; Gevisser, 2007; Pottinger, 2009; Gumede, 2005). Yet, Mbeki was a “free-market convert”: he abandoned decades of
leftist ideological indoctrination and unapologetically regarded himself as a Thatcherite (Glaser, 2010: 4). Mbeki, even before his appointment as deputy president, ostensibly pronounced in the 1980’s that the ANC was not a socialist party, never pretended to be one, and will never please its left critics (Saul, 2013). This period consolidated Mbeki’s liberal approach to economic policy (Gevisser, 2007).

What is perplexing is not only shift from his left to right position but perhaps also that his rightward embrace did not constitute a radical move. Mbeki’s government, although widely recognised as rightwing, was correctly characterised as one that was absent of a radical right policy break (Glaser, 2010: 35). Glaser (2010: 4) makes the point that Mbeki passed the baton of a “mixed economy” to Zuma; in addition, Mbeki’s personality and ideological character was rather multifaceted — he was both a “free-market convert and development-statist” (the latter especially pertains to his support of the black middle and capitalist class). This characterisation of Mbeki meant that his openly Thatcherite position was contained within a centrist space: he was essentially espousing many kinds of ideological tastes. Glaser (2010: 9) demonstrates the difficulty of separating Mbeki’s tendencies; he argues that he can best be characterised as a ‘pragmatic ideologue’. So while Mbeki was pragmatic in some cases, he was dogmatic in others: a dogmatic politicians of a neoliberal kind; and hence, he was not so much a “post-ideological figure” (Glaser, 2010: 9). While Mbeki showed little interest in economic radicalism and far leftism, it appears that his ideological orientation to the right was caught in pragmatism and this is what arguably prevented the veering to more far rightist terrain.

Zuma’s rise to power in Polokwane 2007 was preceded by an environment of dissatisfaction with Mbeki’s rightist inclinations, and support from the left-backed camp in the ANC, especially the ANCYL. While scholars like Habib (2013) discuss the deepening of the left agenda after Polokwane and the growth of leftist influence in the ANC; it is acknowledged that the outcome of Zuma’s installation did not cause a fundamental shift to the far left. The SACP, together with COSATU, always hoped to pull the ANC further to the left (Thomas, 2012). It is this leftist element that concerned the business sector; and the tug-of-war between Mbeki and Zuma flared-up fears that the ANC was on the brink of a radical policy shift to the left. Under Zuma, however, there was a shift to a more equitable position and a slight weakening of the market position (Habib, 2013: 95). These policies amounted to “no radical changes in economic and social policy” (Habib, 2013: 93; Bond, 2008; Satgar, 2008). Even the changes that occurred in the structures of the alliance, resulting in it being regarded as the political centre for policy determination, failed to spark radicalism (Pillay, 2008). Others like Marais (2011) acknowledge the element of policy continuity between Zuma and Mbeki — but perhaps less concedes to subtle leftist change. ANC leaders like Gwede Mantashe, Kgalema Motlanthe and Trevor Manuel affirmed the ANC’s commitment to orthodox economic trajectory (Pillay, 2008). In so doing they sent a message to the business sector that the ANC was not veering into radical left terrain.

7.5.2 Unravelling the ANC’s centrism: Neither left nor right

What explains Gumede’s inability to push a radical left line; the failure of ANC-Soviet relations to induce Marxism; Mbeki’s disinterest in moving to the far right; Zuma’s reluctance to tread far left ground; and that in spite of a poor majority who are the core of the ANC’s support base, “the ANC has never agreed to pursue a socialist programme or to implement socialist policies” (Dexter, Interview). It is the presence of moderates and centrists in and outside the ANC that articulated preference for less extremist doctrines. Many features undergirded this including the heterogeneous nature of the ANC and emphasis on political liberation and unity over economic transformation and ideological sectarianism.

There is the view that if the ANC came to power through a military victory in the 1960s and 1970s with Soviet support followed by white regime collapse, it would have implemented
radicalised policies. However, some like Filatova (2012) believe that the reason for moderation lies in the absence of capitalist conditions that give rise to socialism. But it was not simply this, the process was rather complicated. The argument about a radicalised ANC government of the 1960s -1970s ignores three main things.

First, the ANC was forging inter-racial and broad international support to end apartheid and this prevented it from becoming a staunch and coherent Marxist-Leninist party. In addition, senior ANC members were inclined to capitalism; since the inception of the ANC in 1912, the presence of the petty bourgeoisie was evident in the ranks of the organisation (Dubow, 2000). The ANC grew as a heterogeneous and internally divided entity. This dates back to the 1920s when multiracial delegations were sent on diplomatic missions to Britain and inter-racial cooperation was consolidated in the 1950s. After the 1986 meeting with Moscow, Tambo said that both “East and West, North and South can and must act together in a decisive manner for the triumph of democracy in South Africa” (Tambo, 1986). The push for liberation not only forged consensus in South Africa’s racially diverse anti-apartheid community but managed to transcend political ideologies that placed people and groups poles apart. The integration of people suggested that the ANC could not simply be persuaded to follow one direction. Radical left rhetoric was not simply confined to communists within the ANC, the organisation was a “complicated ideological recipe” that contained a mixture individual ideological identities, combining Western Marxism, communist Eastern philosophies, and Christian liberalism and the protestant ethic (Lodge, 1987, 24; Dubow, 2000). The ANC’s own forging of unity meant that compromises in ideological positions would reduce the effectiveness of radical policy implementation. Following an ideological line was not the guiding feature of the ANC-Soviet relations. The ANC acknowledged that its relationships with communists was based on their generosity and willingness to assist to defeat the white government rather than supporting a radical economic ideological agenda.

Second, there was no overriding support for socialism amongst those parties being aided by the USSR and Moscow was not pushing a radical agenda in Africa. Even though the Soviet Union was supporting Southern African countries like Frelimo in Mozambique, MPLA in Angola, SWAPO in Namibia, there was no coherent interpretation of what constituted ‘scientific socialism’ amongst these parties and they also supported non-socialist ideals. In Mozambique and Angola, for instance, in spite of the USSR’s financial and military aid and the presence of Marxist-Leninist parties, there was differences about economic policy (Nolutshungu, 1985). They pursued “harmonious relations with western capitalist states” (Somerville, 1984: 90). In addition, Moscow’s interest in Southern Africa was political independence in revolt to the West. The Soviet Union was not interested in spurring economic revolution in other countries, strategic considerations (to ‘breakdown’ the West) rather than ideological imperatives motivated Moscow’s involvement in Africa (Nolutshungu, 1985; Kempton, 1990). According to Nolutshungu (1985:142), Moscow “did not favour a break in economic relations with the West” or the establishment of a stage to bring about socialism. This suggests that the ideological position of liberation movements in Southern Africa “are the result of a process of evolution which has been entirely indigenous rather than imposed or transplanted from abroad” (Somerville, 1984: 90).

Third, emphasising ANC-Soviet relations neglects the dynamics of the ANC in exile that was exposed to alternative economic models. In spite of the ANC’s relations with the USSR and support of socialism, it “has never been a client organisation and has maintained good relations with Scandinavian governments, with some western states, and with the non-aligned movement” (Somerville, 1984: 100). It did not take an anti-western and pro-Soviet stance. In fact the ANC understood that that placing the principles of socialism and ideological separation at the forefront of the liberation struggle would hinder the effective forging of unity to end apartheid amongst non-socialist countries (Kempton, 1990). In this sense allies of the ANC were not just those of Soviet Union. Given that the ANC was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-western, the moderation in the mid-1980s was due to ANC’s “principled beliefs” in a mixed economy and its exposure to social democratic models (Lodge, 1987: 21).
There was a complex relationship between the Soviets and ANC since the 1960s. And the SACP accompanied the ANC to meetings with Soviet representatives and was tightly involved with the ANC during the exile period. Yet liberation and political freedom seemed to surpass Marxism-Leninism — although it was very much existent. While one cannot argue that there has been an uninterrupted feature of moderation and centrisms within the ANC given the involvement of Soviet and other radical voices, the ANC’s forging of political and diplomatic consensus to end apartheid contributed to its diversity-rich feature. In addition, the USSR was not pushing the ANC toward an economic restructuring and the ANC’s own counterparts in Southern Africa were not wholly commitment to socialism. It was not simply global events like the end of the Cold War and profound changes in the USSR that caused a departure from radical leftism. The undercurrents of radicalism was constrained by the ANC’s cross-cutting engagement and ideological heterogeneity; its priority on political liberation; and its exposure to Scandinavian economic models. Similar to Somerville’s (1984: 100) argument, it has never been proved that the ANC is controlled by the SACP nor that it was acting on Soviet dictates. Thus, there has been an ambivalence in the ANC, a vying toward socialism and a liking for capitalism. But there was no straightforward road to adopting and implementing socialism in spite of the ANC’s relations with the Soviet Union and the SACP.

When considering the democratic period some like Dexter argue that left forces are the main cause for the absence of the emergence and implementation of a radical left agenda (Interview). Socialist forces are not strong and coherent enough to advance a socialist agenda; this is because they lack organisational capacities, are divided on what socialism means, and are constrained by the balance of forces which are not in their favour. Although he argues the balance of forces are important, he is more inclined to the view that when the forces necessary to drive socialism are strong enough then a radical left agenda will prevail. Vilakazi, on the other hand, posits that the lack of economic growth and revenue is one of the reasons why the government is not aggressive in implementing radical policies (Interview). The main argument perhaps for the cause of left-right moderation and the lack of left extremism in the ANC, points less to the strength of socialist forces and economic growth. Instead, many argue that it is a capitalist environment both domestic and international that constitute the chief cause.

First, some maintain that the global dominance of capitalism is too constraining and powerful to advance a more leftist agenda, let alone an extremist one (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006; Bond et al, 2013; Adams, 1997; Pillay, 2008). The ANC, according to this view, operates under the mantra ‘globalisation made me do it’ as seen by its acquiesce to the Washington Consensus; and as such the ANC embraces a “hardline capitalist position” and “lost a great deal of its earlier focus on fundamental transformation” (Saul, 2013: 197-9; Turok, 2008: 264-5). According to Saul (2013: 200, 214), the ANC is “stranded in a sea of capitalist globalisation” and it is “primarily a ‘taker’ of economic signals from the global corporate world”. The ANC, in the midst of capitalist dominance, stood as a ‘mature pragmatic’ party; the context meant that it had to consider rightwing elements and this by extension implied that the party could not move more leftist. Even prior to its assumption of power, the party regularly said that it could not run away from the changed international landscape (ANC, 1997c). “[T]he democratic movement must take into account the fact that the world is witness to the globalisation, centralisation and concentration of capital” (ANC, 1996b). According to Chikane, the ANC was “constrained by the international class” as “ideological perspectives in the world shifted”; the party made a decision to be “strategic” (Interview).

Second, others propose that domestic capital, and the ANC’s own business-oriented and heterogenous organisation (some emphatically assert that the ANC is controlled by bourgeois-nationalist class interests), constrains movement leftward (Marais, 2011; Satgar, 2008; Andreasson, 2006; Saul, 2013; Pillay, 2008). On the issue of the ANC’s bourgeois character, Dexter explained that there are business people in the ANC who “are not going to pursue a socialist agenda” (Interview). Patrick Craven, former senior member in COSATU said “[t]he main reason [for the lack of socialist advance] has to be that ANC leaders, not all of them but the majority, are themselves increasingly becoming part of the capitalist, free-market economy” (Interview). Craven
proposes that there is a direct link and actual involvement not just an ideological capitulation to the ideas of capitalism in the ANC. William Madisha, former president of COSATU, also shares this opinion that the ANC has become more right; according to him, SACP leaders inside the ANC like “Blade Nzimande have become ultra-rightist” (Interview).

In fact, there was a noticeable divergence in the views of interview respondents: while some strongly believe that the ANC supports a mixed environment for both business and labour, others assert that the ANC is more corporatist rather than leftist. According to more leftist subscribers, they dispute that there is a mixed economy or a social democratic government. Craven in particular said that South Africa has one of the most monopolised private sector economies where even state-owned enterprises are run for maximum profit (Interview). Given this, the economic model is “nothing remotely resembling socialism or even what you call social democracy” (Craven, Interview). Even Dexter and Macozama felt that the relationship has tilted in favour of business and the corporate world (Interviews). Thus, together with domestic business interests, the internal structure of interests in the ANC are important factors abating left extremism.

Both perspectives argue that business interests, whether globally, domestically or inside the ANC, cause the absence of radicalism and in some cases the vitiation of the left agenda. In contention with these views some like Habib (2013) argue that presenting the ANC as subservient to capitalism and a junior partner in relation to contending forces is not incorrect but overplayed. The capitalist agenda is not the only inevitable and reasonable option. For him the left, in the post-Polokwane environment, has become a major influencing force despite institutional and structural constraints. The left’s influence resulted in a “human-oriented development trajectory” occurring in the ANC (Habib, 2013: 21). Similarly, Maloka (2013) and Thomas (2012) argue that in contrast to what is usually thought, there is dynamism in the relationship between the left and the ANC, and opposition to capital hegemony is strong; thus, neoliberalism is not an inescapable final state. The government, in other words, is less crippled by rightwing forces. There has been important developments within the ANC. The party has showed increasing dissatisfaction with rightwing prescriptions. The NGP policy that was drafted in the aftermath of the 2008/9 global economic downturn, noted that the opportunity presented by BRICS “opened up new policy space for developing economies to go beyond conventional policy prescriptions” (NGP, 2010: 12). The policy was critical about radical free-marketism; it stated: “[a] developmental state is not simply hostage to market forces and vested interests” (NGP, 2010: 62). Implicitly adducing the Washington Consensus that prioritised the role of the market over the state, the NGP articulated an alternative: the government’s embrace of the developmental state — a state that played a role in accelerating social and economic development. In essence, the ANC was discrediting strict ideologically-based dogmatism that characterised Washington-Consensus-styled prescriptions. COSATU believes that under Zuma the ANC has moved more left; Cele said in the post-2007 period there is a shared determination that development proceeds from the minimum platform of the Freedom Charter, and this includes that the working class be at the centre of government policy (Interview). He also acknowledged that the government is trying to find alternatives especially given its association with BRICS; but while BRICS may not be predicated on socialism, it is founded on the belief that there a need for an alternative path. Open denunciation of rightwing positions, however, did not translate into a radical left agenda. In fact, the NGP did not challenge the era of globalised capital from an exclusive left platform: it recognised the significance of capitals’ input in the economy especially through propelling social development initiatives. Given that it renounced neoliberalism and did not purport socialist dogmatism, it is indicative of a mixed economic approach. It can be deduced that the ANC-led government is of the view that any kind of strict adherence to ideology is unattainable for the country’s developmental agenda.

However, to conclude that the ANC in the current period is more leftist is not easy. From the interview data it is clear that respondents observe that the ANC is more supportive of capitalist interests and shows greater propensity toward the right at the detriment of the left. While COSATU and the SACP may have deepened the left agenda under Zuma, the right still influences the ANC. Thus, given the debate between the ‘deepening of the right’ group and the ‘deepening of the left’, it
is perhaps best to say that evidence is contradictory and less straightforward that we would like to believe.

Yet this is also problematic because the ANC seems open to both sides: it is simultaneously deepening a left agenda and supporting a right agenda. In fact, according to Cronin’s observation, it is rather difficult to disentangle and clearly put the ANC in either a left or right box (Interview). Within the ANC no two armies or brands exist, and as such there is no clearcut division between pro-capitalists and pro-socialists. Cronin is not only pointing to the broad ideological nature of the party but also importantly inferring that the ANC is willing to converge to a centre point: the merging of some right and left elements rather than rigidly sticking to one approach. It is in this context that perhaps a more plausible argument would be that the ANC is more centrist and convergent rather than a clearcut left or right party. Moreover, since most of causes pertain to explaining left moderation, what can serve as an explanation for right moderation is not only the presence of socialist and labour interests in the ANC but the very centrism that the ANC propagates. This refers to the ANC’s ability to take ‘everything into account’, as Tambo articulated in the 1980s.

Such causal propositions are highly illuminating and important. There is, however, a limit to the analysis. While some emphasise the right (domestic and global capital) and others the left (SACP-COSATU), they perhaps neglect underscoring the ANC’s own position in relation to all these forces that seek to influence it. What prevented the ANC from veering too rightward and too leftward is also its own position. Since before it assumed government in 1994, as my analysis has consistently shown, the party has defined itself as pragmatic, non-ideological and multi-class. In 1997 the party said it “does not seek to define itself in exclusivist, or narrow ideological terms” (ANC, 1997c). While arguments outlined above present the ANC as at the mercy of either the right or left, I am of the view that part of what has kept the ANC from moving to the ideological fringes and maintaining a stable centrist position is its own character and style — largely emerging from its self-definition and shaping of alliance discourse. Other causes for left-right policy change are important but the ANC’s individual position is as equally pertinent in the causal matrix. The ANC is an active agent in determining not only policy change but stability.

The converging approach of the ANC is found in its moderate leadership that recognised the relevance for a mixed model. While leaders like Tambo were exposed to the neo-Keynesian and social democratic model in Scandinavian and Western European countries, their own openness to such models allowed for such exposure to become meaningful. In other words, political agency has an important role to play in endorsing or refuting certain positions; political elite may well make their own individual choices about the most appropriate model.

The ANC cannot be described as a party that is forced into a place where it has no incentive to occupy a preferred ideological position. Its belittling of ideological dogmatism may be less the SACP’s and COSATU’s influence but the ANC’s long-held position of centrism: the West-East balance, considering ‘everything’, working ‘with and against’ capitalism, and the mixed economic model. Equally, its embrace of market doctrines emanates not only from its own interest in capitalism but its recognition that an appropriate mix is essential for growth and development, and for the general advancement of the African population. Moreover, the ANC positioned itself in a space that eschews rigidity and dogmatism; for the party, this chokes creativity, rationality and logic, and ultimately distorts the emergence of policy alternatives.

Also, as argued in this analysis, the party chooses to assume the position of a ‘centrist arbiter’ facilitating convergence amongst various stakeholders. It emphatically stated, for instance, in 2010 that the alliance “is not a museum, and therefore not static, but it is a strategic point of convergence of these forces of change” (ANC, 2010a). It is the party that actively calls against dogmatic, rigid and static perspectives whether on the side of labour or business. In so doing, it unilaterally and by its own choice pushes its partners to transcend the fault-lines of political convictions. Because the ANC itself holds onto the centre, it enables much of the operating structures and environment to take on a moderate feature; including the social pact and the general atmosphere of bargaining politics.
Reading too much into the ‘either or’ cause may ignore the centrisim of the ANC, where such
centrism originates from its own perceptions of the political economy. To be pushed or pulled in a
direction is one thing but to have a position on these matters is another. The ANC is not an
amorphous entity that is subject to variability whether by inside-outside or left-right forces. There
are crucial centrist ideological currents within the ANC that have largely prevented a move to any
radical side. And having a stance on policy allows the party to navigate through difficult
circumstances; yet this stance is not rigid or dogmatic which means that the degree of flexibility
inherent within the ANC allows it to better navigate challenging circumstances. The inverse is more
concerning for policy stability: a rigid ideologically-inclined party. The degree of versatility and
flexibility that exists within the ANC in terms of policy positions is perhaps best seen in the GEAR
period. At the time of tremendous restructuring of the global economic environment, the ANC
proved that it could capacitate itself to pause at any given historically significant juncture and
review policy positions. Yet, GEAR was not too far right nor did it amount to a ‘left cleansing’ —
signifying the ANC’s centre space to consider both sides. This flexibility that was associated with
the centre party came principally because the party resolved that ideology is historically specific and
changes as societies change (ANC, 2001b). According to the party:

In the midst of our own rapid, negotiated transition, the international forces were changing around us. The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc. This has introduced new dynamics, and new possibilities into our continent. We need to review and partly redefine what is meant, relative to these new realities, by the national democratic project.

(ANC, 1997c)

As the party aptly captured its own position:

The ANC has never been a dogmatic organisation. In fact, it eschews dogma and encourages its members to be critical thinkers. In its approach to policy review, evidence informs its attitude to whether a particular policy should be adopted, not ideological obsession. It neither subscribes to neoliberalism’s “primacy of the market” paradigm or the ultra-left’s “omnipotence of the state”.

(ANC, 2011)

7.6 Conclusion: The dominant party and party system moderation

In the economic dimension, the guiding principles behind macroeconomic policy, from 1994 to 2012, reveal a pattern of moderate state intervention, cooperation with the private sector and a space for capitalism, and a shared sense of policy determination amongst government-labour-business. While the ANC is neither an absolute defender of free enterprise nor proponents of absolute state control, it renounces ideologically-based interpretations to socioeconomic issues. Policy direction more often not, follows a mixed direction and a balance between statist and marketism; even the exceptional centre-right policy, GEAR, while ascribing more space for deregulation and liberalisation, maintained the welfare and redistributive role of the state — thus enabling it to stay on moderate ground than move to the far right. The social bargaining environment encompassing statutory institutions like NEDLAC encourages compromise and consensus rather than attachment to radical economic prescriptions. The post-1994 ANC, in essence, successfully embraced social democracy and bargaining politics as the chief hybrid economic model and guiding principle for growth and development.

Its relationship with a major left formation, the SACP, both in the liberation and democratic phase, assumed a largely non-ideological form; association primarily based itself on historical unity and a shared commitment to social transformation. The ANC discredited communist forms of politics and economics; held preferences for ‘West and East’ ideals and a comprehensive approach to socio-economic issues; preferred capitalism together with socialism; worked ‘with and against’
capitalism, put forward that the NDR is not a socialist policy nor to be interpreted in narrow ideological terms, made reference to ultra-left tendencies as adventuristic and unrealistic; and emphatically perceives itself as a ‘centrist arbiter’ and a ‘converger’ amongst contending poles. In addition, the ANC pushes for pragmatism, realism and creativity within the alliance. By proactively defining its ideological position, the ANC shows itself as a major actor in policy determination. Its consistent centrist and moderate approach to economics indicates that the ANC is far from a rudderless ship travelling the ideological sea and straying contending terrain. I argued in this chapter that the ANC is not simply subject to ‘push pull’ dynamics where it is at the mercy to contending forces; instead, it takes clear positions that embrace some sought of mix.

This chapter showed that the weakness of socialist forces, the lack of economic growth and revenue, the dominance of global capitalism, the presence of domestic capital, and internal ANC business interests, all serve as pertinent and crucial causes for the absence of the ANC’s pursuit of left-based economic radicalism. However, I argued that the ANC’s own articulation of centrism and an appropriate mix between polarised interests equally constitute a cause for the ANC’s moderation and explains the ANC’s centre-left centre-right movement. Moreover, I argued that the ANC cannot be easily placed in a left or right box. As shown above, the party ostensibly propagates a simultaneous embrace of left and right interests. It is neither a clear-cut left or right party; similarly, it does not pursue an overtly left or right agenda. It is perhaps best characterised in a centrist sense.

Between the 1950s and 1970s the ANC emphasised political liberation. This emphasis encouraged unity amongst people and groups of various political convictions and because of this the ANC grew as a heterogeneous entity. In this period ANC-Soviet relations were unable to push forward radical left-style transformation like that pursued in the USSR. While the ANC regularly engaged with and relied upon Moscow, it was clear that key policy positions of the movement, as outlined in the Freedom Charter of 1955, were fiercely debated. This debate saw the ANC emphasising that the policy was not socialist and the ANC never condemned a capitalist society. Moreover, Moscow’s interest in Southern Africa was much less about stimulating an economic revolution but was more strategic and focused on supporting African liberation movements in defiance of Western imperialism. The Soviet’s aid to countries like Mozambique and Angola did not result in unconditional support of socialism. Instead, there was no coherent interpretation of socialism and there was harmonious relations between Soviet-backed Southern African states and capitalist nations. And so there was no straightforward road to say the 1960s-1970s would have resulted in the implementation of radical policies if the ANC militarily seized power with Soviet assistance nor was it simply a matter of missing perquisite conditions for the emergence of socialism. Economic restructuring in the USSR under Gorbachev in the mid-1980s and the end of the Cold War were not the only causal determinants behind the demise of radical undercurrents in the ANC and SACP. The movement’s own exposure and openness to alternative economic models like those in Scandinavian countries moved the ANC to adopt a principled stance of a mixed economy.

This period revealed the willingness of the ANC to respond in a pragmatic, flexible, non-ideological and non-dogmatic manner to changing situations. The presence of moderates within the ANC from Gumede to Zuma accounted for the stability of the centre and constrained the ascendance of polarising and radical elements. While the ANC is not a homogenous political entity that seamlessly followed an uninterrupted moderate direction, since there were evident points of polarisation, the organisation has successfully managed to find a balance between contending ideologies and avoided adopting extremist positions on the economic front.

From this analysis, the dominant party shows more moderate and centrist propensities rather than hardline ideological extremism. Given this reality, the ANC’s own stability in the centre even in the midst of radical elements, and variability within centrist terrain (from centre-left to centre-right), gives the party system a largely moderate character. The ANC’s centripetal drives, eschewal of extremism, and strong preference for mixed positions between left-right poles may well account for the ideological feature of low polarisation in the South African party system.
Notes

1 South Africa was signatory to WTO, which replaced GATT, since January 1995.

2 Social wage refers to amenities provided to society through public funds. These include social grants, retirement savings and pensions, risk benefits such as unemployment or death benefits, subsidised services like electricity and water, subsided housing and transport, no-fee schooling, and subsided basic and tertiary education.

3 The definition of ‘communism’ under the Act, adopted by the apartheid regime, was designed to be as widespread as possible to curb any political view that challenged white supremacy. Thus, liberals fighting for political freedom and who said nothing about a classless, Marxist, USSR-style society, were jailed under the Act.

4 The youth brach influenced the ANC’s 1949 conference by replacing Alfred Xuma with James Moroka and called for mass action in the form of strikes and boycotts. Early leaders of the ANCYL included Nelson Mandela, Anton Lembede, Walter Sisulu, A.P. Mda and Robert Sobukwe. Mandela was one of the participants who became increasingly radicalised toward mass action, defiance and resistance politics during this period.
This chapter constitutes the culmination of this research. First, I restate the purpose of this analysis; this includes reiterating the research problem, the aims and objectives of the study, its significance, and the methodological approach employed. Second, this is followed by a systematic and holistic discussion about the main findings of the study. This is grouped thematically and pertains to the proportional system, the voters and the dominant party. Third, I outline the central argument of this study. Last, but certainly not least, I outline the implication of the findings for both theory and practice. The value and relevance of the findings in relation to the area of study this analysis fits into will be discussed. Here I mainly state the contributions that the study makes to previous research; and how I build on this and also, in some cases, position the findings against scholarly debate. The main argument of this research is that it is less the institutional and social perspectives that win out in the case of South Africa; rather, the party-centric view is particularly strong in explaining party system moderation. The dominant party is the chief cause of the moderate dynamic.

8.1 Overview of the research project

This study set out to ascertain the determinants or causes of the phenomenon of ideological (left-right) moderation in the South African party system. The guiding research question is: What are the determinants of ideological moderation (low left-right polarisation) in the South African party system, in the democratic period (1994 to present)? The objective of this research is to identify major causes of moderation by linking the investigation to major theoretical schools that argue for the relevance of certain causes; applying selected hypotheses to the case; systematically measuring and correlating variables; and constructing a causal framework from the findings.

The main problem motivating the research is the insufficient and unsystematic explanation for factors and forces driving systemic moderation. The background informing the problem is one in which there is essentially imbalanced scholarly analysis on the ideological dynamics of the South African party system. Although a lot of attention is concentrated on parties and the party system, much of this focuses on the nature of the ANC’s electoral dominance and the persistence of the racial and non-policy based cleavage (both at the party and voter level). Previous research broadly concedes that major parties (ANC and the DA) are centrist, and radical parties (left or right) are marginal in electoral terms and hence are unable to affect the degree of polarisation in the system. Yet, little explanation is given to why this state of affairs prevails in the first place.

This study is particularly important because moderate party systems are considered facilitators of government and general political stability. The presence of major centrist/non-radical parties and limited ideological differentiation in the party system encourages consensus politics, non-ideological and flexible political positions, mediation between opposed positions, and moderates social opinions. Meanwhile, highly polarised system are often associated with negative consequences such as democratic collapse and government breakdown (Sartori, 1976; Downs, 1957; Valenzuela, 1978; Sani and Sartori, 1983; Powell, 1982; Mainwaring, 1999; Dalton, 2008). In the end, much of the dynamics in political systems hinges on the level of ideological difference in the party system, and the centrist-extremist and pragmatic-ideological nature of major parties.

Locating itself within the study of party system polarisation, this research worked with a definition of the concept ‘polarisation’ (particularly party system not political polarisation in general) as: the degree of ideological differentiation between major parties in the system (Sartori,
The causal framework for the South African case emanates from three theoretical schools that provide distinct explanations for the causes of moderation. Such theories refer to the state of party system fragmentation (the number of parties: low or high) and the type of electoral system (plurality or proportional); the ideological character and nature of polarisation at the social level (moderate or extremist electorate); and the role of political parties (a pivotal/major/dominant centrist or extremist party).

Each theoretical school proposes two main effects of the presence of any causal variable(s): a moderate or polarised party system. The former is considered a state of low temperature of ‘ideologism’, while the latter is a state of high temperature of ‘ideologism’ (Sartori, 2005: 199). In other words, the predominant pattern in either of these systems is low/poor or high/rich ideological competition amongst major parties. When major parties engage with contending ideologies the system is polarised, and when they lack this feature the system is moderate or unpolarised.

To state each causal school more specifically: the (a) party system fragmentation and electoral systems perspective argues that when there is a plurality system (where the outcome tends to a low number of parties—usually less than five), the system is usually moderate (major parties compete on similar ideological platforms to attract the median voter). In contrast, in the presence of proportional electoral laws (where the outcome tends to be a high number of parties—usually more than five), the system usually reflects polarisation (major parties compete on distinct platforms which are ideologically-based to differentiate themselves from their numerous counterparts to win voters). The (b) sociological school puts forward a similar causal logic but the difference is the cause emanates from non-institutional setups. It essentially places emphasis on the electorate or the median voter, meaning that it emphasises the societal influence on party positions and party system polarisation. On one hand, when voters are distributed almost equally along the ideological poles (extreme left and extreme right), the party system is polarised (major parties mirror voter extremism and parties are poles apart). On the other hand, when voters are clustered in one spot of the ideological continuum (either left, right or centre), the system is moderate (major parties take on the dominant ideological position of the average voter and parties reflect similar positions). The final school of thought focuses on the (c) major political party, whether a pivotal or dominant party. It advances a perspective of party system moderation as facilitated by the presence of a major centrist party; conversely, systemic polarisation is induced by the absence of centrism and the presence of an extremist electorally strong party.

The choice of the South African case rested on the presence of moderation in the party system as the dependent variable or outcome — that is, the motivation for this study is based on the effect or phenomenon of low left-right polarisation amongst major parties. Previous research argues that there is justifiability in selecting a case on the outcome of interest, especially if the outcome may be a known phenomenon. In addition, selection on the effect emanates from a puzzling issue that a researcher seeks to explain. In my case the paradox is: despite sufficient social grounds (intense class divisions, poverty, unemployment and inequality; incentives for extremism under proportional rules; radicalised public rhetoric; and social protests) for adopting economic radicalism and extremist party positioning, social and institutional conditions have not influenced major parties in this direction. Instead, the system is one where major parties assume centrist positions either to the left or to the right. A major weakness, however, is that when there is exclusive concentration on the outcome (the dependent variable), one is likely to ignore important alternative factors that may account for moderation. And it is in this light that I also base case selection on three identified causal variables that are claimed as theoretically relevant for the phenomenon of moderation (those derived from the schools of thought outlined above).

This study rests on a causal logic that seeks to examine both cause-effect and causal mechanisms behind correlations. This includes both establishing correlations and explaining why and how it exists. Contingent generalisations are of interest to this study. I seek to use the findings to add to the knowledge of certain theoretical causal connections — although this research is limited in its generalising capacity, it can add to the accumulation of knowledge. Interviews, surveys and documents constitute the main data collection method (since it is a multi-method approach, it helps
to corroborate the findings and ensure reliability and validity). Analysis of the data followed a mixed approach of qualitative and quantitative. I also applied established methods (which are, in some instances, not uncontroversial) for quantitatively measuring party and voter left-right positions, party system fragmentation, and party system and voter polarisation. The main assumption this research makes is that both parties and voters can be identified on a unidimensional left-right political scale. I also delimit this study to focus primarily on (a) the economic dimension rather than a comprehensive analysis of political/social polarisation, and (b) the dominant party (the ANC) who is a major agent capable of influencing the dynamics in the party system.

8.2 Main findings

8.2.1 Party system fragmentation and electoral laws

In understanding whether the electoral system constitutes a cause, I began by outlining the plurality British-style single-member constituency electoral system that was in place since the Union and came to an end when white minority rule ended. After this, I critically examined the rationale for adopting the proportional system in the democratic period. In this section I found that a number of integral concerns drove the adoption of proportionalism: political representation and empowerment especially of minority groups; racial reconciliation, political stability and acceleration of the democratic transition; oversight mechanisms; and ‘best practice’ standards. In addition, it was the ANC as one of the major stakeholders in the process that facilitated moderation by compromising and being sensitive to minority demands rather than advocating radical proposals like the FPTP that would have limited representation and fostered political deadlock. A second major finding is that by comparing the level of party system fragmentation in the apartheid and democratic period, what is clear is that despite differing electoral systems, a closely similar score prevailed (mean: 2.14, 2.12 respectively). What this means is that the presence of party dominance seems to affect the number of parties more than the prevailing statutory electoral system. In the democratic period although the general pattern is twelve parties occupying the legislature, the ‘effective number’ (party relevance) of parties is very low. Given the presence of one major party, the possibility of effective competition amongst two or more parties is squeezed out. Although the expectation is that proportional rules should increase fragmentation, the ANC as the dominant party seems to apply a constraining effect on the system. Simply put, the electoral system has a weak influence on determining the number of parties in the South African party system — it is unsuccessful in inducing more parties since there is electoral dominance by one party. This implies that even under the presence of many parties (multipartism), effective competition amongst more than two parties is low. Small parties, however, who find a place in the party system may influence left-right dynamics but, as will be discussed below, proportionalism also has a limited effect on making left-right party positions relevant.

The third finding directly pertaining to the hypothesis is that from a quantitative measure of party positions, parties are scattered across the ideological spectrum where they take on a range of positions across the left-right space. A deeper chronological assessment, however, challenges the ‘fragmentation thesis’, it shows that parties have been moving to occupy centre terrain (especially the centre-left). It is more plausible to say that major parties are clustered in the centre and offer a centrist policy package to the median voter. While the ANC has been almost consistently positioned on the centre-left (though in 2009 it emphasised more leftist issues yet not radical leftism), the main opposition party (the DA) has been moving away from the right to the centre-left. Given that this analysis relied on manifesto data and was delimited to socioeconomic emphasis of parties, major parties are predisposed to a mixed position between the extremes on salient economic matters. Meanwhile, some parties that are electorally small relative to the dominant party move to occupy one-sided positions. This means that they find some incentive under the PR to diversify across the
spectrum; yet, this diversification is not seen amongst major parties like the ANC and DA. In fact, the latter two are beginning to occupy the same terrain (centre-left). Moreover, smaller parties within the opposition moved to the centre since 2009. It appears that the ANC, as the main centrist party, is causing centrist clustering within the opposition rather than inducing these parties to occupy extremist positions.

Also those parties in the centre (mainly major parties and also smaller ones) exhibit less fluctuation from this position. They tend to be resilient in occupying the centre instead of moving closer to the extremes of left or right. Meanwhile, those parties that previously occupied rightist positions are more sensitive to positional evolution (since most moved to the centre); however, the left bloc (including centre- and extreme-left) are sturdily leftist and seem less sensitive to changing ideological positions. The result of this is that there seems to be a growing vacuum on the right bloc, whereby parties who were rightist seem to have abandoned conservative market doctrines on social and economic prescriptions.

Fourth, and in relation to party positions: the party system is unpolarised. This means that major parties are not poles apart along the left-right spectrum but are instead clustered in the same space (from the above, it is the centrist space). In essence, the South African party system is one of low ideologism and the temperature of ideological differentiation amongst major parties is particularly low. Major parties prefer to cluster in one spot than to spread. However the major/dominant party seems to be a highly constraining factor in assigning worth to ideological differences. This suggests that because it occupies most of the vote share, those parties who are ideological distinct from each other lack electoral strength to cause a shift in the degree of polarisation in the party system. In the case of the EFF, as the third largest party in electoral terms, it will be unable to change the ideological composition of the party system from one of moderate to polarised. In addition, ideologically-based parties can only affect change if there is an electorally relevant competitor on the other side of the pole (in other words, while parties like the EFF are on the far left, the major challenger would have to be far right). Recent concerns about the polarising element that comes from the EFF is not relevant for the party system (Southall, 2014; Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014). In brief, what inhibits movement to polarisation is: (a) the similarity of positions adopted by the ANC and opposition parties like the DA (centre-left), (b) the absence of electoral strength of ideological parties (especially the far left), and (c) the unlikelihood of major parties contending along the ideological fringes (since they show propensity for centrism).

In sum, from this analysis it appears that the major party drives polarisation. The centrist character of the system and the state of low polarisation seem to depend much on the ANC. The polarisation score is affected both by ideological direction and electoral strength; and since the ANC is a centrist party and the most electorally relevant party, the polarisation index (as a measure of standard deviation) shifts to the ANC. It also seems to be permitting the stability of the state of centrism and moderation of the party system, and is preventing a state of polarisation along the extremes. By extension, whatever ideological position the dominant party takes on becomes highly relevant for the general state of party system affairs.

Lastly, does proportionalism produce polarisation? From this case study the answer is no. According to theoretical claims, PR laws induce extremist party positioning and polarisation. For South Africa, major parties seem to unilaterally adopt overwhelmingly centrist positions independent of institutional incentives. Major parties are not ‘striving to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other’; there is little ‘sharp differentiation’ amongst relevant parties (Downs, 1957: 126-7, 138). Parties like the ANC and DA (and many others in the opposition bloc) are more engaged in appealing to a broad spectrum of the population and adopting centrist (centre-left) ideologically similar positions (conveying ‘centripetal’ drives), rather than carving out a niche constituency or taking on one-sided ideological orientations to maintain ‘ideological purity’ (Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976; Davies, 2004). There is no compelling reason why the PR would automatically persuade major parties to move to the extremes. Concerning the causal framework of this research, it seems that the institutionalist perspective is weak in accounting for moderation.
8.2.2 The sociological influence

The first portion of the analysis of voter positions and polarisation discusses the general ideological predisposition of citizens along the left-right dimension. This primarily relies upon citizen self-placement and interview data. Survey results from between 1982 to 2013 reveal that the median voter is positioned in the centre, more specifically the centre-right. The median voter rarely identifies with ideological extremities, whether left or right. There seems to be poor identification with the left bloc — over the years self-definition as ‘leftist’ decreased significantly; voters think of themselves as either a ‘centrist’ or ‘moderate rightist’. In addition, the percentage of people who ‘don’t know’, ‘haven’t heard’ of left-right or are non-politically aligned, consistently and significantly decreased — in 1982 50% were in this category but in 2013 this was only 13%. This means that a large portion of the South African public identify with the left-right scale.

Also, when voters are asked to place major parties on the scale, they place themselves in the centre and centre-right, and place major parties in the centre range. Although they placed the ANC in the centre-left in 1994, voters did not equate themselves to this same position; but in 1997 and 2009, they placed the ANC closer to them. Voters think of the ANC as centre-right, as a moderate party on salient issues in society. They feel that the party better represents their ideological position than opposition parties (including the DA). On the latter, voters placed the DA in the centre-left category in 2009 — which echoes with the finding in the aforementioned section that identified the DA as centre-left. Voters, however, consistently think of the ANC as centre-right. This raises issues about voter understanding of the scale. Since the scale pertains to any social cleavage, voters may not necessarily exhibit poor understanding of it but might consider themselves and the ANC as rightist on non-economic issues (such as political, social or cultural issues). Beside this, the essential point here is that voters rarely think of major parties like the ANC and DA as extremist; instead, the average voter considers them moderate. While voters prefer some mixed position between the extremes, they feel that major parties are proclaiming this ideological fusion and adopting middle-ground positions in dealing with varied issues.

In assessing whether voters are centrist or fundamentalist on social change, this study shows that on a number of occasions a majority of citizens consistently felt that social change (whether economic or not) should follow gradual and progressive reform rather than fundamental restructuring. The average voter gives far less credence to the notion of revolutionary change or vanguardist defence of society; rather, citizens take on more moderate attitudes towards change. This further indicates moderation in terms of ideas and attitudes to social change at the voter level. As stated in Chapter 6, this may not necessarily imply moderation in terms of social mobilisation, but at the same social protest and expression of dissatisfaction do not necessarily imply a radicalised citizenry that are supportive of fundamental restructuring of the entire social system — whether political, social or economic. Moreover, almost all interview participants conceded to the non-extremist character of the electorate on ideological issues. The appetite for extremism is limited because of the presence of major centrist parties. Parties and leadership seems to constitute important factors in moderating social opinions. If major parties articulate radicalised notions of social change or economic transformation, voters are likely to move in this direction.

A second major portion of this analysis examined additional data that helps to ascertain the left-right position of citizens on the economic policy dimension. These issues include privatisation and government ownership and control of the economy, income equality, and state or individual responsibility for peoples wellbeing. There is an absence of a large chunk who side with either privatisation or government ownership of business and industry — citizens are actually divided on this issue. While those who prefer privatisation have been steadily and sharply decreasing, more citizens are coming to prefer government ownership. This strikes a chord with former rightist parties who have been similarly decreasing on the right; and while citizens are showing more leftist preference, previous rightwing parties have moved left. It is a separate point, however, whether parties are actually articulating a nationalisation stance as opposed to some mixed or moderate
position. But it can be added that citizen preferences might determine the kind of economic proposals parties embrace.

In addition to increasing support for government ownership, other single time-period surveys show that citizens mention that the government should be active in the economy, take responsibility for peoples’ wellbeing, redistribute land, create jobs and tax the rich to subsidise the poor. It seems that there is a more leftist group within the electorate who support an active and interventionist government. Most interview respondents felt that because the majority of citizens are poor, they exhibit leftist tendencies and a ‘culture of dependency’ on the government. And that citizens have been led to believe that the state can provide everything because there are unlimited resources. However, it cannot be simply concluded that citizens are leftist: there are critical rightist tendencies too. Citizens prefer that the individual be able to decide what is produced and distributed; the market determine how much an individual earns; people should be free to earn as much as they want even if it results in income inequality; more income differences to incentivise hard work rather than income equality; stealing property is never justifiable; and compensation of redistributed land at market value and following legal procedures. Thus on certain issues, people prefer a less interventionist state and are not of the opinion that the government should decide upon every issue. Nor are they of the opinion that the market should provide for their needs.

There is no majority that has consistently been on one side of the left-right economic divide — thus a unimodal distribution of voters is largely non-existent. Citizens seem to move between the blocs and do not follow one side unconditionally. Mean scores from the economic dimension, from between 1990 to 2013, reveal that when issues are translated in left-right terms citizens are scattered in the moderate range. Similarly, according to some interview respondents, citizens are neither totally capitalistic nor totally socialistic, instead, they prefer a moderate mixed position — a system that incorporates both sides. It seems that parties have acknowledged the need for a mix between these two preferences.

The data on citizen self-placement and economic issues suggests that voters are polarised on the left-right dimension. Even though self-placement data did not pertain to a particular cleavage line, when it was correlated with economic issues (which is reducible to a left-right scale), it revealed an $r = .94$; this suggests that the two measures are not entirely different but closely related. Citizens are largely divided on issues of privatisation, income equality and responsibility. Differently stated, they do not occupy similar positions but have opposed preferences on social and economic issues. However, compared to 1990, citizens are becoming moderately polarised; they are coming to occupy similar positions on the economy. Similarly, while self-placement data reveals that citizens were highly and semi-polarised, by 2013 they firmly entered the moderate space, thus occupying less opposed positions. In general, from both data sets voters show movement to occupying similar ideological positions.

Are voters causing moderation of the party system? The answer is likely no but is not straightforward to arrive at a conclusion on the matter. While voters are polarised on the general left-right dimension and on specific economic issues, party system polarisation has not followed the same trajectory; rather it has been significantly lower than voter polarisation. This importantly suggests that voters are not influencing the direction of party polarisation — this is particularly because one major electoral party is constraining ideological differences from becoming meaningful in the party system.

Some indicators show that there might be social influence especially on party positions but this is not overriding. The case of (a) the DA is noticeable: the party’s shift from the right to the left seems to reflect voter preference for more leftist rather than rightist economic issues (such as government ownership). But voter preference for left issues like government ownership shows there is a degree of independence in party policy determination because major parties are hardly advancing a program of nationalisation. Also, (b) consistent moves by the voters to the direction of decreasing polarisation, might be associated with the party system since opposition parties are coming to increasingly reflect similar positions (centre-left). But it is less easy to determine whether this is a dynamic relationship (whether both parties and voters are influencing each other) or a one-way
interaction (where voters are influencing parties or vice versa). Moreover, (c) the centrist or moderate position of the average voter seems to reflect the moderation of major parties who are centrist. But what is more important is that major parties are not assuming the same polarisation at the voter level; instead, they are clearly opting for more mixed positions such as in the case of the ANC. In all, voters might have an influence on the left-right policy package parties offer but they certainly do not possess overriding influence on parties.

A third portion of the analysis looked at policy-based voting. One of the reasons for a moderate electorate is because of non-policy/non-ideological voting — although this is not automatic, it is present in the South African case. There is a general prevalence of non-policy voting within the electorate. The majority of voters are generally not ideologues or interested in the specifics of policy. They are less inclined to think about policies in purely left-right terms. In the first place, voters are not inclined to see differences between parties in policy terms. Second, although there has been indirect policy voting given that voters cite party promises and deliverables arising from party programmes (and in some cases direct policy voting because voters state ideology and socioeconomic policy as reasons), this is not a regular or uniform occurrence. Instead, non-policy factors account for much of voting behaviour and party support. It is, however, not an overarching phenomenon; a segment of the electorate do vote in policy terms; they look at socioeconomic developmental policies, and are ideologically-inclined. This most plausibly refers to the middle and upper-class who tend to support issues like social democracy and favourable economic policies (Habib, 2013; Butler, 2009; Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014; Ngoma, 2014; Lodge, 2004; Seekings, 2005). Thus, the non-policy dimension cannot be overgeneralised to extend to the entire electorate.

Third, when voters themselves point to specific reasons for party support, and from the observations of party respondents, it is clear that within the non-policy dimension, race is a less dominant factor. Less than 10% cite race-based identity factors. Moreover, from interviewing party respondents, most did not explain voting behaviour in blunt racial terms. Instead, issues like party trust, performance, competence, experience, personality, campaign and needs, history and partisanship, and media access and party funding, are specified as more apparent. There is a possibility that race feeds into these elements, however more rigorous research needs to be done to confirm or reject this assumption. In fact respondents emphasised loyalty to the ANC, that historical experience of the liberation movement undergirds partisanship and this is not necessarily based on race. They also stressed the needs-based approach to voting. Given the poverty situation of the majority of voters, they are more interested in voting for those parties who promise immediate resolution to their problems and deliverables when in office. This is congruent with survey data that shows the main concern of voters centres around the economic cleavage. On a regular basis, between 1994 to 2016, citizens mentioned job creation, poverty reduction and a stable economy as top priorities that government should address.

Citizens are much less interested in debating the ideological-pragmatic path used to solve social problems — such as whether party programmes are based on socialist, mixed or capitalist platforms. However, party policies, promises and programmes must be connected to salient social issues since voters look for those parties who sympathise with their immediate circumstances. As party respondents stressed, party messages and the general package parties present to voters cannot be disconnected from policies — since parties take clear policy positions on how they will resolve social issues. So there is an indirect level of policy identification and approval-disapproval at the voter level.

The causes of non-policy voting was also interrogated in this analysis. Given the lack of education and low levels of literary, voters are unable to meaningfully interact with party policies, they are unable to cross-question issues, and cannot determine whether promises are realistic and implementation. Another hinderance to policy voting is the prevalence of poverty. Voters are concerned about basic needs and immediate needs-based satisfaction. The average voter is simply trying to get by and survive, they are less interested in left-right politics. By contrast, more affluent and educated sections are able to critically engage with policies and look for whether their
preferences are reflected in party manifestos. There is, however, an interplay between poverty and education, both affect each other. In more rural communities whether people are both uneducated and poor, they are simultaneously needs-oriented and policy-inept. The presence of a poverty-stricken and uneducated citizenry severely dilutes the ability of ordinary voters to understand the complexity of political arguments and engage meaningfully in policy-based voting. An increase in an issue-based policy-oriented citizenry depends on the politicisation of programmes and policies (like in the case of the RDP where voters were largely aware of it compared to GEAR), the alleviation of poverty and social modernisation of society into a more middle and upper-class composition, and the increase in education and literacy. The presence of these factors are likely to strengthen democratic accountability and push parties to offer more reasonable and realistic policy positions.

8.2.3 The dominant party

This section examined the ideological character of the ANC, its left-right and moderate-extremist position. First, the ANC takes a strong stance on poverty, unemployment and inequality. It sees itself as leading an intervening and activist state. This position, however, is encapsulated in the idea of a developmental state, social democracy and a mixed economic model. Second, the ANC pursues a transformational and strategic engagement with capitalism for social development. Moreover, it is open to bargaining with both labour and business. While labour is pushing a more left agenda, business is pushing a more centrist agenda instead of a neoliberal one. Business also largely accepts the mixed economic environment and the social development objectives of the government. In general, both labour and business feel accommodated in South Africa’s socioeconomic policy environment — despite contention and polarisation within social bargaining structures like NEDLAC.

When analysing the mixed economy model and the social partnership, a significant finding was that (a) the ANC tries to pursue a balanced position that is open to both sides and not overtly in favour or either. Also, (b) the ANC-led government acts as a ‘centrist arbiter’ between contending groups; it encourages divided groups to adopt some common understanding. And in so doing, the ANC maintains the stability of the centre and fosters ideological moderation rather than policy extremism and instability. It importantly champions a ‘convergence approach’; and even though there may be some fundamentalists in the ANC and in labour and business, the general understanding is that a middle-ground between conflicting interests is necessary for social progress. Given this analysis, South Africa is an accommodative policy environment that operates largely under a centrist milieu, and the ANC plays a very important role in holding this structure together.

Third, this section also examined the ANC’s position on socialism and its relationship with the SACP. It found that (a) the ANC long prior to 1994, especially in the 1960s, expressed no real desire to fundamentally overhaul the economic system. It renounced socialist definitions of the organisation. In fact, the ANC rejected neither capitalism nor socialism; rather, it advocated for a mixed not a unimodal approach. The party believed that those marginalised under apartheid would prosper under a capitalist system (especially owning land and making profit); it detached itself from the idea of working class democracy or worker ownership of production. In spite of the party embracing social elements to assist the poor, it quickly added that this did not equate to the party being Marxist; rather, the ANC said it supported a ‘West-East mix’. In the 1980s, Oliver Tambo clearly defined the ‘mixed model’ the ANC was pursuing. The party positioned itself as one that was not set on one particular ideological orientation, instead, it took ‘everything into account’. This importantly attests to early signs of flexible ideological positioning of the ANC. In all, the way the ANC defined its own positions in relation to the left-right debate since the 1960s attributed a sense of dynamism to it. The liberation entity took on an active role in making clear its own stance. And in so doing, the organisation gave no illusion that it supported economic radicalism. In other words,
the party more often than not made clear its stance on left-right economic matters and such positions were largely in the centre.

It also found that (b) the ANC’s historical alliance with the SACP based itself on political liberation not ideological radicalism. The ANC accommodated groups like the SACP on grounds of defeating white supremacy not on a common agreement on economic positions. In the contemporary period, the alliance is still not strongly based upon ideological similarities. History is an important connection, and the relationship has shifted from focusing on the political to the economic. Even the NDR model that joins the ANC and SACP is interpreted differently by each party. The ANC articulates a moderate view of the policy; the party on numerous occasions asserted that the NDR is not a path to socialism. Moreover, the ANC states that it does not regard itself as a socialist party. During the time of Mbeki, the ANC skilfully launched ‘pragmatic missiles’ against the ultra-left; and it consolidated its position as a party that is non-dogmatic. The SACP, in contrast, sees the NDR as a two-stage phase for the attainment of socialism. Ironically, the SACP and COSATU seem to have moderated their position give that they accept objective domestic and international realities, and that the ANC is a broad mass-based party that caters for a multiplicity of classes and is clearly not a socialist party (contributing to the loss of autonomy and opening the left to persuade and be persuaded). Added to this, the way in which the ANC responded to the collapse of communism and the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union revealed elements of sophistication, flexibility and pragmatism. This has caused moderation of its radical leftism. However, I argue that another factor is equally important, that is, the ANC’s role in this process. The ANC has actively been pushing for non-dogmatism in the SACP; for the ANC, open debate within the context of flexibility and pragmatism forms an important feature in securing a stable and vibrant alliance. In essence, the ANC expects the alliance to function as a rational, logical, creative and non-dogmatic body capable of participating in policy redefinition and policy alternatives.

Fourth, this section discussed observable periods of polarisation and the failure to move to the left or right fringe. Under Gumede in the 1930s the ANC did not assume a radical left character; ANC-Soviet relations failed to promote fundamentalist doctrines in the ANC; under Mbeki the party did not move to the far right; under Zuma the ANC were unable to advance radical leftism; and despite the party’s overwhelmingly poor support base, it has not shifted to the left fringe. Overall, no radical policy shifts occurred in the ANC either to the left or right. Even though the ANC is argued to have moved more left under Zuma, this has not been radical leftist. The ‘more left, more right’ debate is problematic in the face of contradictory evidence that shows the ANC is more right and yet others attest it is more leftist; I argue that it may be less easy to box the ANC neatly as more left or more right, the party can best be described as a centre one that simultaneously gives space to both interests. Given that the party is on both sides of the fence, it is important to consider the moderation that it espouses where if it is more left it still includes right elements, and if it is more right, it still includes left elements. This means that overall left-right movement occurs within a centrist terrain. So while there has been evident polarising and radical voices in the ANC since its inception, the moderate element within the party — coming from its emphasis on political liberation rather than economic restructuring, its forging of unity amongst diverse political convictions, its heterogeneous internal composition of interests, and its own predispositions towards capitalism and some form of socialism — has effectively kept it from veering into extremist terrain. While the presence of moderates does not necessarily outflank extremists, it contributes by inhibiting the ANC from following in a unimodal radical economic direction.

Even though the 1980s introduced moderation in the ANC because of Gorbachev’s economic reforms and the collapse of communism, Moscow was unable to push the movement to adopt fundamentalist policies. This was because the USSR’s prime focus was less economic transformation in Southern Africa but strategic engagement to challenge Western imperialism. Also Soviet-aided Southern African countries like Angola and Mozambique were not steadfastly following a socialist line but were also engaged with capitalist countries. In addition to this was the ANC’s own role in accepting alternative economic models like in Scandinavian countries that pursued social democracy and a mixed position. Thus it was not simply a matter of adopting
radicalism or not, not even the notion that South Africa lacked certain prerequisites for socialism, it was both a complicated mix of the USSR’s interests and the ANC’s heterogeneous nature.

Lastly, I critically examined the causes of this moderation in the democratic period which explains the lack of left extremism: the weakness of left forces to coherently advance socialism, the lack of economic growth and government revenue, the dominance of global capitalism, domestic capitalist interests, and the business-oriented character of the ANC. I argue that (a) what can explain the absence of movement to the far right is not only the left’s presence in the ANC but the latter’s own centrism where it considers both right together with left interests. I also importantly posit that (b) while it is commonly presented that the ANC is moved by forces to the left and to the right of it, the ANC’s own occupation of the centre and its active self-definition of pragmatic-ideological positions eschews both left-right radicalism. In essence, the party demonstrates an important character of being willing and open to all sides and this internal facet contributes to the stability of the centre. The ANC must be considered as an important actor in this causal framework. It is not a undefined amorphous entity that is simply at the mercy of contending forces; rather, it holds onto a specific conception of approaching social and economic issues — a conception that converges contending tendencies rather than a staunch attachment to any particular side.

8.3 The argument - The cause of moderation in the party system

The main determinant of ideological moderation in the South African party system in the democratic period is the dominant party. The ANC constitutes a univariate cause of moderation. Left-right movement in the party occurs in centrist rather than extremist terrain. Despite radical elements, to the left and right, inside and outside the party, the ANC’s dynamism in defining its own position, its embrace of pragmatism and flexibility, and its own acknowledgement for a mix between contending poles, has allowed the party to adopt a position as a ‘centrist arbiter’ and ‘converger’ — this largely maintains the balance of the centre. Even the decision to adopt the proportional system was from an internal desire in the ANC for political stability and compromise politics, which largely facilitated moderation and evaded political deadlock. Low left-right party system polarisation is less influenced by the electoral system and the electorate. And therefore the cause is not multivariate.

Proportionality and centre occupation does not induce extremist positioning and polarisation. The reason for this is that the ANC is constraining extremism, stabilising the centre, and attracting opposition parties to the centre. Although the PR model incentivises parties to disperse across the spectrum, this feature is becoming less evident in South Africa since opposition parties are conglomerating to occupy similar positions on the centre and centre-left. And even when there are extremist parties, their influence is constrained by the dominance of the ANC. Thus, extremist parties are not relevant in affecting the dynamics of polarisation. As long as the ANC is dominant and there is an absence of electorally relevant ideological contenders, the party system remains moderate. The ANC drives the ideological nature and the degree of polarisation of the party system. This means its centrist position together with its electoral strength are what account for low polarisation. For polarisation to emerge the ANC would have to positionally change to the right if it is faced with an electorally strong leftwing contender and vice versa. By extension, the ideological position of the dominant party, whatever it is, becomes highly relevant for the general state of party system affairs. Therefore, there is an insignificant relationship between proportionalism and moderation.

The left-right distribution of the electorate is hardly affecting moderation. Even though voters are polarised on general and specific economic issues, this dynamic is not concomitant with party system polarisation. Rather, the latter has been significantly lower than voter polarisation. Voter movement to occupy similar positions, voter preference for centre-left issues (although also centre-right issues) and a decrease in voter polarisation, influence the movement of parties to occupy
similar positions and left stances on the economy. However, there is a disjuncture between voter and party positions and party system polarisation because major parties are not articulating issues like more government ownership of the economy and are not reflecting voter polarisation. This means that the ANC is constraining voter polarisation from becoming pertinent in the party system. Also, given that voters are far from being ideologues and rigorous left-right policy engagers, parties are more independent in policy formulation and position-taking rather than simply being at the mercy of sociological forces. This importantly suggests that voters are not influencing the direction of party polarisation. Therefore, there is a weak relationship between the electorate and party system moderation.

8.4 Implications of the findings

8.4.1 Implications for literature on the South African party system

The main contribution of this research is the development of a framework to analyse the causes of party system moderation. While existing research lays great emphasis on political and democratic issues surrounding the main party and the preeminence of the racial cleavage, this study importantly contributes to understanding the left-right, moderate-radical ideological composition of both voters and the ANC. The findings are important because they provide an indication of the influential factors in the political system — whether it is institutional factors, the electorate or the dominant party — which both academics and politicians alike would have an interest in (to assess current dynamics and predict policy change or change in the degree of left-right polarisation). It is particularly important because it shows that much of the party system dynamics rests with the dominant party and what ideological feature the party takes on has implications for political consensus and democratic stability. Moreover, moderate party systems, less intense left-right inter-party divisions and pivotal centre parties are crucial for political consensus, the stability of democracy and general social stability.

In the first place, this study adds a degree of quantitativeness to existing literature on fragmentation, party positions and polarisation in South Africa. It amalgamates and reconstitutes data sets and places it in a particular theoretical context from which a range of statistical findings are deduced. Second, this study concurs with scholars who argue that moderation and centrism is a primary feature in the party system and that radical parties have remained marginal (Schrire, 2001; Booysen, 2005; Southall, 2014). Third, in contention with existing literature that argues that opposition parties are too ideologically fragmented to present a coherent and viable alternative to the ANC (Giliomee et al, 2001; Southall, 1998, 2014), I argue that many within the opposition bloc, including the DA, actually occupy similar ideological terrain as the governing party. For instance, in 2004 the DA emphasised less one-sided rightwing positions and seemed to advocate for some kind of mix between the left and right. However, by 2009 the party moved to the centre-left (laying emphasis on more leftwing economic prescriptions for social development and economic transformation) and this position was sustained by the 2014 election. Even parties like the ACDP, FFP, IFP and UDM (all traditionally regarded as right-wingers on the economy) have moved to the centre. It is from this changed position that they emphasise social welfare, government intervention, a mixed economy and trade protectionism, rather than market fundamentalist principles. It appears that growing economic inequality, increasing social problems and the failure of the market to transform the social setup, moved parties to sympathise with citizens’ social demands — which include demands for the hand of the state in enabling growth and development. Not only the unpopularity of rightward principles but the recognition of an appropriate mix and an emphasis on a moderate leftist model by parties themselves seem to have spawned the shift from the right to the centre-left.
Fourth, and relatedly, I disagree with the view that the DA is competing with the ANC from a rightward position and needs to opt a social democratic model (Schrire, 2001; Southall, 2014; Nijzink, 2001; Kotze, 2001; Jolobe, 2009). While many acknowledge that the DA has shifted on the political front and moved to the centre (placing less emphasis on minorities and more on the back majority), it is less often noted that the party has undergone equivalent policy redefinition on the economic front. Social welfare including grants, the housing and youth subsidies, land distribution, and worker protection were formative leftist issues dominating the 2009 and 2014 DA manifesto. Given the DA’s movement to the left, albeit some differences may be evident between its position on leftist issues and the ANC’s take on those issues, it is presenting itself as an ideologically similar alternative to the ANC for the ordinary voter. This does not mean that the DA is ideologically coherent but like other parties it seems to be working on representing both left and right constituencies and resolving possible policy contradictions. The party is less ‘in need of ideological change to the left’; it may well be already in this place. Moreover, it is from this platform that the opposition party is appealing to the lowest stratum of society (the poor black majority).

Fifth, I contend with the perception that the left-right makes little sense especially at the voter level. Scholars argue that the ideological dimension cannot be used in South African politics to analyse dynamics between parties, expressing an implicit doubt in the ability of this dimension to gain any meaning at the voter level (Friedman, 2015; Schrire, 2001; Butler, 2004; Petlane, 2009). This study shows that not only (a) large chunk from between 1982 to 2013 (76%) see themselves as able to place their positions on this scale (whether they interpret the scale as dealing with single issues: political, cultural or economic); also, (b) citizens take a stand on salient economic issues that can be identified on a left-right spectrum. Given this feature, we cannot perpetuate simplistic views about the electorate, such as they are void of reasoning or engaging in left-right terms because they directly and indirectly do so. In a related manner, I depart from the view that tends to present the electorate as unimodally leftist (Booyens, 2005; Habib and Taylor, 2001). I find that voters together with left preferences also have rightist tendencies. Although on matters of voter choice and party support and differences there are important elements of non-policy voting, this study shows voters have clear left-right preferences — whether or not they engage directly or indirectly with ideological issues. Moreover, left-right dynamics are fundamental to general politics, especially in the party system, because highly polarised systems affect a range of things including democratic stability, while more moderate systems are highly beneficial. Thus, the left-right position voters and parties take are important for broader dynamics.

In addition, I argue that it is weak to advance a race-based view of the electorate. I depart from those who argue that race is primary and fundamental (Johnson, 1996; Hoeane, 2009; Anyangwe, 2012; Friedman, 2005). I find that even though voters are more non-policy than policy inclined, when they specifically state the reasons for party support, they do not equate it with race or ethnicity. In some cases they vote on policy matters and when non-policy voting occurs this is undergirded by non-race-based factors (trust, performance, competence, partisanship, personality, and needs). The crux of my argument is that the element of race, although important in South African society and politics, should not be used to overgeneralise complex dynamics — there are important elements of policy-based voting within a section of the electorate. In brief, while race should not be downplayed, it should also not be overplayed. Although the lack of education and poverty are obstacles to policy voting, voters are sensitive to party promises and look for parties whose programmes are commensurate with voter needs — they are neither completely non-policy oriented nor vote on purely rational terms. This cannot be disconnected from broader policy platforms which means that there is a level of indirect policy involvement at the voter level. This finding builds on the work of those who criticise the race-based approach, either arguing for important dimensions of an issue-centred electorate or non-policy yet non-race-based approaches (Eldridge and Seekings, 1996; Mattes et al, 1999b; Habib and Taylor, 2001; Ndletyana and Maaba, 2010; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009).

Lastly, from my analysis of the dominant party, (a) I disagree with the presentation of policy change. Most scholars tend to describe economic policy movement in a left-right setup (much of
this is contained in the RDP to GEAR shift). One group perceives the RDP as leftist and GEAR as rightist, and some further describe the shift in the post-GEAR post-Polokwane era as leftist (Desai, 2002; Hart, 2002; Habib, 2013; Marais, 2011). The other group argues that GEAR retained important socialist elements (Seekings, 2005; Lodge, 2004). Although I do not disagree with this categorisation and concede it is important, I agree that GEAR had right elements but argue that it had important socialist elements, and the Zuma period reflects a move to the left. However, this presentation has a deficiency: it presents overall policy in oversimplified left-right categories and neglects the presence of the centre. I argue that it is not easy to place the ANC in any two categories because the party simultaneously embraces a mix between the poles. It is important to look at the centre because overall policy fluctuation can be interpreted in terms of centre-left to centre-right and back to centre-left (this ‘backward’ turn is argued to have occurred under Zuma’s administration). This analysis places emphasis on the flexible, non-dogmatic and pragmatic character of the ANC — looking at the left-right alone risks neglecting these features and overemphasising movement as ideologically driven.

In addition, (b) I depart from presentations of the causes of moderation. Those explaining why the ANC has not pursued a radical left agenda cite the weakness of socialist forces, the lack of economic growth and revenue, the global dominance of capitalism, domestic business interests, and business interests in the ANC. All are salient causes; however, I argue that the ANC’s own position in relation to these forces is an additional causal factor. Although the party is not ideological homogenous or completely centrist (given polarising and radical elements), it plays an active role in policy determination and this helps to explain why the ANC remains resiliently centrist. The party has consistently, especially since the 1960s, held onto more cross-cutting and mixed rather than clear-cut positions. This argument does not avoid radical elements in the party but states that by and large, the ANC has held onto the centre. In addition, (c) presenting the ANC within a matrix of contending forces pulled and pushed in any direction ignores the definition the ANC ascribes to itself. Perceptions about whether the ANC is influenced by the left or right are prone to presenting the party as an undefined entity that is subject to varying social forces. It confers the impression that the ANC cannot dare to be an independent agent but remains a passive entity subject to contending whims. However, I argue that the ANC has its own beliefs about socioeconomic issues and it responds to changes from this platform. It is not an amorphous or client entity. This suggests that the strength of capitalism would not necessarily push the ANC to the far right, and the growth of the left would not necessarily push it to the far left. It is the party’s own adherence and keeping with a centrist terrain that eschews extremism and fundamentalist doctrines.

In brief, I add to the literature by (a) establishing a framework to ascertain the causes of moderation; and (b) adding a quantitative measurement for party positions and systemic polarisation. I also build on (c) the centrist feature of major parties and negligible role of extremist parties. This study adds by (d) advancing the argument that major parties are less ideological diverse that is usually purported, and that the DA occupies a leftist than rightist position; and (e) presenting the view that the electorate engage in left-right terms even though they do not engage rigorously with the policy dimension in politics. Concurring with scholarly arguments that argue for the presence of policy positions at the voter level, I state that there is indirect policy involvement. In addition, I extend the literature by (f) arguing that the ANC is a largely centrist, pragmatic and non-dogmatic party; average left-right policy volatility in relation to government macroeconomic policy occurs within a centrist terrain; and the ANC is not an amorphous entity but an actively defined one.

From this study, two main things seem to constitute important aspects for future research: (a) a critical analysis of the DA’s, or opposition parties in general, policy evolution to the left; and whether the ANC’s occupation of the left space or social needs are influencing these parties to move leftward. In addition, (b) it may be important to examine what voters mean by the centre and centre-right since they consistently position themselves in these categories since 1982. And also what dimension or cleavage line is being used by the median voter to position parties on the centre-left. Another important matter concerns (c) broadening understanding about the significance and shortfalls of ideological moderation at the social level. For the South African electorate it means...
assessing whether the evidence of direct and indirect policy-based competition might increase ideological voting and contribute to democratic accountability (Lachat, 2008; Hetherington, 2001; Dalton and Tanaka, 2007). While the pitfalls of non-policy based voting may be acknowledged in South Africa, it may be necessary to assess the effects of a policy-centred electorate.

8.4.2 Implications for broader literature

While the single case approach adopted in this study limits the capacity for broad generalisations, the findings speak back to broader political science literature in ways that are deterministic and suggestive. First, in contention with the classical view that proportionalism correlates with polarisation, I argue that the South African case shows that this link is not universally applicable, since the party system is unpolarised and overwhelmingly moderate. Unlike the argument (presented by Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976; Dow, 2010; Powell, 1982; Davies, 2004) that the number of parties in the system produces extremism and polarisation, the South African party system exhibits centrist conglomeration despite operating under conditions of proportionalism. In addition, the argument that centre occupation induces polarisation — as argued by Sartori (1976) and Nagel and Wlezien (2010) — is not the case in South Africa, opposition parties occupy centre positions similar to the dominant party. I concur with scholars who argue that proportionalism does not necessarily retard moderation (Ezrow, 2010; Dalton, 2008; Grofman, 2004) and that centre-induced polarisation is a necessary outcome especially when there are reasonable grounds to move to the centre (Green-Pedersen, 2004; Daalder, 1984; Hazan, 1997). To use Sartori’s (2005: 111) term: the South African case shows more ‘ideological proximity’ than ‘ideological difference’. I suggest that the traditional argument ignores two things: (a) the presence of an electorally strong party (like a dominant party) that has the potential to stabilise patterns of moderation and constrain polarisation (since it is electoral strength that enables an ideological party on the opposite pole to polarise the system). And (b) the role of party agency or social influence (or even global factors) in influencing adoption of and movement toward centrisim (since parties can unilaterally decide, based on a number of reasons independent of the electoral system, to adopt either centre-left or centre-right positions).

Second, the South African case shows that while there is division at the electoral level, especially on economic matters, the party system has not reflected such polarisation. Much seems to rest with the dominant party who seems to be constraining the ability of voters to affect party positions and cause meaningful representation of social cleavages. Even though there are semblance between voter positions and party positions (especially given the move to the centre-left by parties and the leftist preference at the social level), social influence on polarisation is much less connected. While scholars purport a straightforward or dynamic influence between voter preference distribution, party position-taking and party system polarisation (Jacobson, 2003; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), I concur with those who argue that the social affects systemic polarisation less than we think (Layman et al, 2006; Hetherington, 2009; Dalton and Tanaka, 2007; Seferiades, 1986). I advance the view that parties are not simply at the mercy of the voter, but there are other factors such as individual party agency, where parties decide what position to take on, and an important degree of independence from voters.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Interview questions for political parties

1. The proportional electoral system

A. What do you think were the main reasons for South Africa adopting the electoral system of proportional representation? What motivated the shift from a plurality to a proportional system?

B. Was this decision motivated by minority groups? If so, why? Do you think major stakeholders were in broad agreement? What do you think were the points of contention during the CODESA and MPNP (if applicable) on this matter?

2. Establishing voter left-right preference distribution and moderate-extremist character

A. From your interactions and experience with voters, how would you describe voter policy preferences, especially in terms of socioeconomic positions? Though there are sectional groups, in the main how would you describe the electorate? Are the kind of policy preferences voters inclined towards leftist, rightist, centrist or neither? Do you think voters think about social and economic issues in a left-right manner?

B. Would you describe voters as moderate or extremist in their policy likings? This involves socioeconomic tastes, such as preference for a capitalist, socialist or mixed system. Or do you feel the average voter cannot be squarely placed in any ideological category?

3. Policy and non-policy voting

A. In your opinion, do you think the support base of your party actually prefer and make decisions on the basis of the policies offered by your party? Or do you feel that voters are non-policy oriented and vote for parties on some other non-ideological basis?

B. Would you describe the electorate as motivated by race? What do you think are some of the main factors that drive voting decisions and party support? Also, do you think we have a ‘sophisticated’ electorate in South Africa, that does not ‘blindly’ vote for parties but clearly knows what issues they support, whether ideologically- or performance-based?

C. Voters point out some of their key concerns (such as jobs, housing, water and electricity), do you think voters vote for parties that best represent their preference on these issues? What would you say the electorate is mainly concerned about? In addition, from your analysis of the concerns of the electorate, do you think it matters to the ordinary voter what ideological or policy stance is employed to meet voter concerns?

D. In general, do you think the ideological or policy positions parties take on issues, whether centrist or extremist on the left-right, matters much less for voters than whether parties actually deliver on their promises? Or would you say voters are interested in party policy and programmes?
E. Do you think that because the majority of citizens are poor and uneducated, it makes them non-ideological or non-policy focused, that is, they care less about policy positions than more affluent social groups? In other words, do you believe social conditions are behind the lack of ideological voting?

4. Underlying explanations for voter preference distribution

A. If you think the electorate is moderate and not extremist or radical on policy preferences, why do you think this is the case? If you think the electorate is extremist, what do you think contributes to this?

B. One puzzling issue is that there was an expectation that South Africa would break into civil war and social unrest during the democratic transition, but this did not occur. What do you think contributed to the general state of moderation in society?

5. Uncovering the party-voter causal dilemma: voter influence on parties

A. Do you think parties choose policy positions because voters prefer a certain intensity and direction such as moderate or radical, left or right? In other words, do you believe that voters have an influence on the policy or ideological positions that parties decide to adopt?

B. Does your party engage in making policy-based, programmatic decisions independent of voters? Or does social factors contribute a great deal in policy-formulation?

C. Do you think there is a disjuncture between party policy positions and voter preoccupations, or is there a correlation where party policies and voter concerns coincide?
Appendix B: Interview questions for the SACP and COSATU

1. SACP

A. What motivated the SACP to enter into an alliance with the ANC? Was this related to any ideological or policy-seeking motivations to implement socialist policies?

B. The ANC is characterised as a centre-left party, does the SACP prefer to work within this framework? Does it mean the SACP is not interested in advancing far left policies? Or does it believe that it can do so through its alliance with the ANC?

C. Why do you think the SACP has not been able to advance radical socialism as a governing policy? Does the ANC factor in this process? If so, how? Can you explain other factors that contribute to the continuation of non-radical leftist policies in the country?

D. Why does the SACP still support working with the ANC? Is socialism still a longterm ambition for the SACP?

2. COSATU

A. What motivated COSATU into an alliance with the ANC? Was this related to any ideological or policy-seeking motivations to implement worker-centred leftist policies?

B. The ANC is characterised as a centre-left party, does COSATU prefer to work within this framework? Does it mean COSATU is not interested in advancing labour-friendly, anti-neoliberal policies? Is COSATU content to advance worker interest through its alliance with the ANC?

C. Why do you think COSATU has not been able to advance radical socialist, worker-based policies? Does the ANC factor in this process? If so, how? Can you explain other factors that contribute to the continuation of non-radical leftist policies, and even in some cases to rightist economic policies, in the country?

D. Why is COSATU still in support of the ANC?
Appendix C: Interview questions for the ANC

1. The proportional electoral system

A. During the CODESA negotiations, the ANC agreed to adopt a proportional electoral system, can you give a background for why the ANC decided to go with a PR than a majoritarian, winner-takes-all electoral system? Also, was a PR system the most preferred electoral system for the ANC?

B. Was the ANC pressured by minority groups to adopt a system that would give more room for representativity and inclusiveness in the emerging democratic dispensation?

2. Establishing voter left-right preference distribution and moderate-extremist character

A. From your interactions and experience with voters, how would you describe voter policy preferences, especially in terms of socioeconomic positions? Though there are sectional groups, in the main how would you describe the electorate? Are the kind of policy preferences voters inclined towards leftist, rightist, centrist or neither? Do you think voters think about social and economic issues in a left-right manner?

B. Would you describe voters as moderate or extremist in their policy likings? This involves socioeconomic tastes, such as preference for a capitalist, socialist or mixed system. Or do you feel the average voter cannot be squarely placed in any ideological category?

3. Policy and non-policy voting

A. In your opinion, do you think the support base of the ANC actually prefer and make decisions on the basis of the policies offered by the party? Or do you feel that voters are non-policy oriented and vote for parties on some other non-ideological basis?

B. Would you describe the electorate as motivated by race? What do you think are some of the main factors that drive voting decisions and party support? Also, do you think we have a ‘sophisticated’ electorate in South Africa, that does not ‘blindly’ vote for parties but clearly knows what issues they support, whether ideologically- or performance-based?

C. Voters point out some of their key concerns (such as jobs, housing, water and electricity), do you think voters vote for parties that best represent their preference on these issues? What would you say the electorate is mainly concerned about? In addition, from your analysis of the concerns of the electorate, do you think it matters to the ordinary voter what ideological or policy stance is employed to meet voter concerns?

D. In general, do you think the ideological or policy positions parties take on issues, whether centrist or extremist on the left-right, matters much less for voters than whether parties actually deliver on their promises? Or would you say voters are interested in party policy and programmes?

E. Do you think that because the majority of citizens are poor and uneducated, it makes them non-ideological or non-policy focused, that is, they care less about policy positions than more affluent social groups? In other words, do you believe social conditions are behind the lack of ideological voting?
4. Underlying explanations for voter preference distribution

A. If you think the electorate is moderate and not extremist or radical on policy preferences, why do you think this is the case? If you think the electorate is extremist, what do you think contributes to this?

B. One puzzling issue is that there was an expectation that South Africa would break into civil war and social unrest during the democratic transition, but this did not occur. What do you think contributed to the general state of moderation in society?

5. Uncovering the party-voter causal dilemma: voter influence on parties

A. Does the ANC choose policy positions because voters prefer a certain intensity and direction such as moderate or radical, left or right? In other words, do you believe that voters have an influence on the policy or ideological positions that the party decides to adopt?

B. Does the ANC engage in making policy-based, programmatic decisions independent of voters? Or do social factors contribute a great deal in policy-formulation?

C. Do you think there is a disjuncture between the party’s policy positions and voter preoccupations, or is there a correlation where the ANC’s policies and voter concerns coincide?

6. Explanations for the ANC’s centre-leftism

A. The ANC is a centre-left party that supports pro-poor and pro-business policies, what do you think led or caused the ANC to adopt these policies? Do you think the global shift towards a capitalist, free-market era contributed to the ANC’s non- embrace of radical leftism?

7. The ANC relationship with the left

A. What motivated the ANC to work with the SACP and COSATU? Is this based on ideological grounds?

B. Even though the ANC includes socialist organisations like the SACP, why has these organisations not pressurised the party to move toward the far left, close up the market, reduce pro-capitalist policies, and favour radical nationalisation and redistribution?

8. The ANC relationship with the right

A. How would you describe the party’s view of the business sector and its attitude towards capitalism and the free-market?

B. What motivated the decision to include the business community within the policies of the ANC? Was this a longstanding commitment within the ANC prior to 1994? Why did the party not articulate ideological lines that were anti-capitalist, anti-business; and what contributed to the ‘mixed model’?
Appendix D: Interview questions for NEDLAC and business

1. The attitude of business towards the ANC

A. How would you describe government’s (where the ANC is the party-of-government) relationship with and attitude towards the private sector, capitalism and the free-market? How open is the government towards negotiating, bargaining and compromising with business?

B. Do you perceive government as working in favour of any particular interest, such as labour or business? Is government balanced in advancing a pro-poor and pro-business agenda?

C. Would you say that the business sector is largely satisfied to work within the government’s moderate, centre-left and mixed-market economic model? Or do you think this model is non-existent?

D. Do you think business feels accommodated and included in South Africa’s socioeconomic policy environment?

2. Understanding the dynamics in NEDLAC (if applicable)

A. Overall, how would you describe the nature of interactions and dialogue between government, business and labour? Do you think NEDLAC is an effective channel for constituencies to share their views?

B. From your observation, how would you describe government’s relationship with labour? How open is the government towards the proposals coming from the left? Does labour try to influence government to adopt radical socioeconomic policies? If so, what is government’s response? Do you think the government is willing to move into a radical leftist direction?

C. How would you describe government’s relationship with business? How open is the government towards pro-business proposals? Does business try to influence government in a neoliberal direction? If so, what is government’s response? Do you think the government is willing to move into a radical rightist direction?

D. Do you think both groups understand the overall socioeconomic model espoused by the ANC government? In general, does labour and business feel they are given sufficient space to contribute to socioeconomic policy determination?

3. Explaining the ANC’s centre-leftism

A. Do you think the presence of business influenced the ANC’s moderate leftism? What would you say is the cause of the ANC taking a moderate than radical position on socioeconomic policy? Do you think the global dominance of capitalism has anything to do with this?

B. Why do you think the ANC hasn’t managed to be influenced by radical socialism (through SACP and COSATU)?
Participant Information Sheet (Interviews: Parties)

Title of study
Explaining moderate ideological polarisation of the South African party system

Introduction
I am a researcher from the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. I am conducting a research project and you have been invited to take part in it. The research deals with political parties and the party system in South Africa. You were selected because you have the characteristics needed for this research to offer valuable information about the research topic.

What is the purpose of the research?
This study seeks to examine party ideology in South Africa. This involves understanding why parties have adopted certain ideological positions whether on the Left or Right of the ideological space.

How will the research be conducted?
This research involves conducting interviews. The interview will be conducted in the form of phone, Skype, or face-to-face interviews with you. The aim is to discuss your perspective on the topic for between 30 minutes to 1 hour. The interview involves general and open-ended questions about the ideological position of the party you represent.

What are the possible risks involved in taking part in the research?
There are no known risks or disadvantages. The objective of this study is to gather perspectives on the ideological development of the party. It does not harm or endanger you in any way. The interview will be audio recorded. Anonymity cannot be guaranteed but confidentiality can be given to you upon your request (that is, if you do not want your names/position to be stated in the research, then this information will be kept confidential: only known by me and not reported elsewhere).

What are the possible benefits of taking part in the research?
You will be able to reflect on or talk about the political party you represent; the history, policy and various other development trajectories associated with the ideological position of the party; and you will ultimately contribute to expanding knowledge around the ideological nature of the South African party system.

How will my opinion be used?
Your opinion will be given due acknowledgement (that is, the research report will state that the opinion came from you but if you want your identification to be protected, your personal details will not be stated in the report). The results will be used to complete a Doctoral Degree. The results of this research will be available on the Witwatersrand University's Electronic Theses and Dissertations website for public viewing.

Do I have to take part in the research?
You are not obligated to take part in this research. You are free to withdraw at any time and there are no consequences for this. If you have indicated your willingness to participate but cannot make the interview for whatever reason, please let me know.

Are you interested in the study?
If you are interested or want to enquire about this research, please contact me (the researcher): Letitia Adaken 061 439 6245 letitia.adaken@outlook.com or my research supervisor: Professor Daryl Glaser daryl.glaser@wits.ac.za

Thank you for taking the time to read this information.
Appendix F: Consent form

Formal consent (Interviews: Parties)

Title of study
Explaining moderate ideological polarisation of the South African party system

Purpose of this research
The purpose of this research, that is, what the study is about has been explained to me. I understand that it is about party ideology and involves understanding why the party I represent has assumed a certain ideological position.

What the study requires
I understand that taking part in this study involves being interviewed. I am aware that the interview will be conducted in either the form of phone, Skype, or face-to-face interviews. The aim is to discuss my perspective on the topic for between 30 minutes to 1 hour.

Risks involved
I have been told that there are no known risks or disadvantages to take part in this study.

Benefits involved
I understand that I will be able to reflect on or talk about the political party I represent; the history, policy and various other development trajectories associated with the ideological position of the party; and will ultimately be contributing to expanding knowledge around the ideological nature of the South African party system.

My opinion
My opinion will be given due acknowledgement. I understand that the results will be used to complete the researcher’s Doctoral Degree. I am aware that the results of this research will be available on the Witwatersrand University’s Electronic Theses and Dissertations website for public viewing.

Participation
I understand that I am not obligated to take part in the research, I am free to withdraw at any time and there are no consequences for this.

Audio-recorded
This interview will be audio-recorded and I agree to this (please state yes or no) ________

Confidentiality
I request for my personal information (names and party position) to be protected (that is, I do not want this information to be stated in the research) (please state yes or no) ________

Consent
By signing this consent form, I am indicating that I fully understand the above information and agree to participate in this interview.

Printed name: ____________________________
Participant’s signature: ____________________________
Date: ____________________________

If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact me: the researcher: Leitlia Adaken 061 439 6245 leitlia.adaken@outlook.com or my research supervisor: Daryl Glaser daryl.glaser@wits.ac.za
Appendix G: Ethics clearance certificate

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (NON-MEDICAL)
R14/49  Adaken

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

PROJECT TITLE
Explaining moderate ideological polarization of the South African party system

INVESTIGATOR(S)
Ms I. Adaken

SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT
Political Studies/

DATE CONSIDERED
21 August 2015

DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE
Approved unconditionally

EXPIRY DATE
06 September 2018

DATE
07 September 2015

CHAIRPERSON (Professor J Knight)

cc:  Supervisor: Professor D Glaser

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR(S)

To be completed in duplicate and ONE COPY returned to the Secretary at Room 10005, 10th Floor, Senate House, University.

I/we fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to resubmit the protocol to the Committee. I agree to completion of a yearly progress report.

Signature 16/Sept/2015

Date

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER ON ALL ENQUIRIES