CHAPTER FOUR

In this chapter I argue that intentionality effected a paradigm shift away from the ontology of ideas. I discuss Brentano’s re-introduction of the concept into modern philosophical discourse as well as Twardowski’s tripartite analysis of the mental act which allowed for an ontology of non-mental as well as mental entities. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Husserl’s distinction between immanent and transcendent perception, a distinction which marked the end of the immanent object as a model for all objects.

I argued in the previous chapter that the early years of the twentieth century saw a move away from the traditional Cartesian-inspired paradigm of subject and object and the ontology of ideas that accompanied it.

In opposition to the view that consciousness was a property of immaterial substance Moore and Sartre claimed it was a relation that deserved consideration independently of the question of what a subject of consciousness might be. As we saw in the last chapter Moore put a question-mark over the issue of a subject of consciousness and Sartre outrightly denied an enduring ego at the centre of conscious acts, arguing that consciousness was impersonal or pre-personal.

This conception of consciousness calls for a metaphysic that is very different to that of the traditional ontology of ideas. As we have already seen, according to that ontology the one entity serves as both subject and object and the relation between them is logical rather than real.
In this concluding chapter I will argue that the concept of intentionality provided this new metaphysic. It did so in two ways. Firstly, it substituted a relation involving two entities, consciousness and its object, for a relation that in the traditional ontology of ideas involved only one entity, the subject. Secondly, proponents of intentionality claimed that the second term of the relation, that to which consciousness referred, was in all cases an entity distinct from consciousness itself. Not only did this avoid the ambiguities associated with the distinction between subject and object present in Idealism, it also affected the traditional immanence/transcendence distinction. If that to which consciousness referred was an entity other than consciousness then it no longer made sense to speak of the object as ‘immanent’ where that is understood as internal to the mind or subject. In these respects intentionality opened the way for the development of an independent object category that would not be affected by the reduction to subjectivity inherent in the ontology of ideas.

This chapter will have the following structure. I will first of all discuss Brentano’s understanding of intentionality and the intentional object. I will
argue that although Brentano drew a distinction between a mental act and its content, designating the latter the intentional object of the act, a further distinction needs to be made between content and object. Without this distinction the limiting term of the mental act is a mental entity, the intentional object. Brentano does not make this further distinction and as a result his ontology admits only intentional entities.

Twardowski overcame this with his conception of the ‘presented object’ as that to which the intentional object, or content of a presentation, refers. Since the ‘presented object’ can be either physical or mental phenomena Twardowski’s account provides for a wider ontology than that of Brentano. Twardowski’s ‘presented object’ is both the limiting term of the mental act and the entity to which the content, or intentional object, of that act refers.

I will conclude with a discussion of Husserl’s theory of transcendent perception which rests on the claim that there is a fundamental difference between the perception of external and immanent objects. A consequence of Husserl’s distinction between the two types of perception is that the immanent
object of reflective consciousness, which had hitherto served as a model for

_all_ objects within the ontology of ideas, no longer plays this role. In this

respect Husserl’s work on transcendent perception initiated a new paradigm

in respect of the object.

We can see the limitation to the mental in Brentano’s account of

presentation, or the appearance of something in consciousness, in

*Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (Brentano, 1970). Every mental

act, Brentano tells us, presents the mind simultaneously with a _primary_ and a

_secondary_ object. The primary object is the direct referent of the act, whereas

the secondary or intentional object is an indirect referent. Brentano, like

Descartes, believed that every mental act had a cognitive element as a

necessary condition of the act itself. In Brentano’s view it is this cognitive

element relating to the subject’s own awareness that is the act’s secondary, or

intentional, object. We can see this in the following passage:

The presentation of the sound [primary object] and the presentation of the

presentation of the sound [secondary object] form a single mental

phenomenon: it is only by considering it in its relation to two different

objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental

phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations. In the

same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we

simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. _What is more, we

apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the_
sound as content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time (Brentano 1970, p.127. Emphasis mine).

This description refers to three objects: the awareness (presentation) of the sound; the awareness of the awareness of the sound and the sound itself. The first two of these objects are mental entities; the third, the sound, is a non-mental entity. Brentano is concerned with the two mental entities, or awarenesses, and the relation between them, rather than with the non-mental entity and any relations that might hold between it and the mental entities.

The relation between the mental entities is such that the one cannot occur without the other. The primary object (awareness of the sound) is dependent upon the secondary or intentional object (awareness of the awareness of the sound) as its condition: hearing a sound is dependent upon being aware of hearing a sound. This does not seem correct. Hearing a sound is dependent upon awareness of the sound. It is not dependent upon an awareness of an awareness of the sound. Put differently, I can hear a sound without having to reflect on my awareness of hearing the sound, although I cannot be aware that I am hearing a sound unless there is a sound to be heard, assuming the
hearing is veridical. As Moore and Sartre have observed, my experience can exist even when I am not aware of it.

If an awareness of something is dependent upon an awareness of an awareness of that thing then reflection is invoked as a necessary condition of experience. As mentioned in a previous chapter¹, this was the position of reflection in the ontology of ideas. In the example of hearing a sound discussed above there is no direct relation to the sound itself, even though Brentano calls it the direct referent of the mental act. The only direct relation is to the intentional object which, being an awareness of an awareness, is a reflected mental entity. That Brentano thinks of presentations or awarenesses in terms of reflective relations between mental entities can be seen in the following passage:

The presentation which accompanies a mental act and refers to it is part of the object on which it is directed. If an inner presentation were ever to become inner observation, this observation would be directed upon itself. Even the defenders of inner observation, however, seem to consider this impossible...One observation is supposed to be capable of being directed upon another observation, but not upon itself. The truth is that something which is only the secondary object of an act can undoubtedly be an object of consciousness in this act, but cannot be an object of observation in it. Observation requires that one turn his attention to an object as a primary object. Consequently, an act existing within us could only be observed by means of a second, simultaneous act directed toward it as its primary object. There just is no such accompanying inner presentation of a second act, however. Thus we see that no simultaneous

¹ See chapter three, pp.95-96.
observation of one’s own act of observation or of any other of one’s own mental acts is possible at all. We can observe the sounds we hear, but we cannot observe our hearing of the sounds, for the hearing itself is only apprehended concomitantly in the hearing of sounds. On the other hand, when we recall a previous act of hearing, we turn toward it as a primary object, and thus we sometimes turn toward it as observers. In this case, our act of remembering is the mental phenomenon which can be apprehended only secondarily. The same holds true with regard to the perception of all other mental phenomena (Brentano 1970, p.128).

In his discussion of the difference between the content and object of presentations Twardowski takes Brentano’s distinction between act and content as his point of departure. Recognising the importance of this distinction in so far as mental acts are concerned Twardowski notes that there is, nonetheless, a case to be made for a further distinction between content and object (Twardowski 1977, p.1).

The reason for this, Twardowski tells us, lies in the ambiguity in the use of the word ‘object’ in that it is sometimes used to refer to the content of a presentation and sometimes to refer to the object to which the presentation itself refers. This ambiguity is carried over in the phrases ‘presented’ and ‘presentation’ which can be used to designate either the intentional or immanent object (content) of an act or the object to which this intentional or immanent object refers (Twardowski 1977, p2). Twardowski’s concern is to draw a conceptual distinction between the intentional object and the object to
which the intentional object refers because in his view they are two very
different entities although both are embraced by the mental act itself.

To secure this Twardowski argues extensively for a tripartite distinction
within the mental act between act, content and object, referring in particular to
analogies with judgement and language to support his claim. I will not go into
these arguments in detail except to note that they are many and varied.

For my purposes the most important claim Twardowski makes is
contained in the following passage and relates to the meaning of the word
‘object’ in so far as it applies to phenomena or appearances:

The meaning of the word ‘object’ coincides in this respect with the
meaning of the expression ‘phenomenon’ or ‘appearance’, whose cause is
either, according to Berkeley, God, or, according to the extreme idealists,
our own mind, or, according to the moderate “real-idealists”, the
respective things as such. What we have said so far about the objects of
presentation and what will come to light about them in the following
investigations is claimed to hold no matter which one of the just
mentioned viewpoints one may choose (Twardowski 1977, p.33).

In Twardowski’s discourse the ‘phenomenon’ or ‘appearance’, which in the
ontology of ideas serves as the termini of mental acts and is always immanent
in the sense of being ‘in’ the subject, becomes a transcendent object. As
such it moves out of the subject category and into the object category. The
change can be represented schematically as follows:
The schema of the ontology of ideas:

Subject category ➔ Object category

[Act (subject) ➔ content (object)] ➔?

Twardowski’s schema:

Subject category

↓

Object category

[Act (subject) ➔ content (intentional object) ➔ object (object of presentation)]

One can see here that whereas in the ontology of ideas reference is circular between subject and object within a single thing, in Twardowski’s scheme of things reference is directed outward and links things that belong to two categories. I mentioned above when discussing Brentano that the intentional object served as the limiting term of mental acts. However, as can be seen from the above diagram, in Twardowski’s schema the ‘presented object’ as
that to which the intentional object refers is the limiting entity. The mental act
refers to both the intentional object and the presented object as transcendent
to or other than the subject.

A comparison of the two schemata also shows how the

traditional schema is compatible with a substance/properties ontology

whereas Twardowski’s has to be interpreted as relational between different

tentities.

As we saw above Brentano interprets hearing a sound as one

mental phenomenon or presentation involving two objects, both of which are

mental entities or awarenesses. According to Twardowski’s schema,

however, whilst the intentional object is always a mental entity, the ‘presented

object’, or that to which the intentional object refers, can be either mental or

non-mental. On this view to hear a sound is to directly apprehend the sound

itself (non-mental entity) through the intentional or mental entity. However,

and this is where Twardowski differs from Brentano, the intentional object

itself is not experienced as an object in addition to that of the sound within the

space of the one mental act. All that is involved in hearing a sound is the
apprehension of a single, non-mental, object. However, the apprehension can *itself* become an object of awareness, in which case reference is to an *awareness* of a sound rather than to a sound itself. In this case a mental entity, the awareness itself, is the ‘presented object’. Again, although reference is through the intentional entity, the mental presentation involves the apprehension of only one entity, in this case the awareness of the sound.

As a consequence of this Twardowski’s account of mental presentation differs from Brentano’s in several respects. Brentano’s account involves two mental entities, the primary and secondary (intentional) object, presented simultaneously to the mind. Twardowski’s concept also involves two entities and two objects: the content or intentional object and the ‘presented’ object. The content or intentional object is always a mental entity whereas the ‘presented’ object may be either mental or non-mental. However, Twardowski differs from Brentano in that in his account the mind is not simultaneously presented with both objects. The ‘presented’ object *only* is present to the mind in the form of either a mental or non-mental entity. For all mental acts the intentional object will always be the condition of presentation. However, in
reflective mental acts an intentional entity will present as the object of the act.

That is, an intentional entity will be the 'presented' object or limiting term of the act. In such an act it is important to distinguish the intentional object as a condition of the act from the intentional object as the 'presented' object of the act. An intentional object that is the condition of an act cannot function simultaneously as the 'presented' object in that act.

In Twardowski’s schema the presentation or awareness which accompanies a mental act and refers to it is not a part of the object on which the presentation itself is directed. It is always distinct from the object to which it refers even when that object is another mental entity. Twardowski therefore avoids the problems of inner observation and inner presentation that beset Brentano.

An important consequence of Twardowski’s recasting of the mental act is that the esse est percipi formula entirely falls away. Neither the intentional object nor the ‘presented’ object are in any way a part, or quality, of the mental act: consciousness can never be its own object as it is in the philosophies of Idealism and the ontology of ideas which informs them.
At this point it would be worthwhile to recapitulate the main points of this chapter before proceeding further.

I have argued that although Brentano can be credited with re-introducing the concept of intentionality into modern philosophical discourse it is only with reference to Twardowski’s interpretation of the concept that we can really speak of an independent object category. This is because Twardowski clearly distinguishes within the mental act between content and the object to which such content refers. Brentano, as we have seen, although clearly distinguishing between mental act and content, and recognising the referential nature of such content, failed to make a further distinction between content and object with the result that content itself is treated as the object, or terminus, of the act. In this respect Brentano’s account, at a metaphysical level, is subject to the criticism that the only objects that fall within its ontological domain are mental objects.

Twardowski avoids this limitation to the mental by drawing a careful distinction between mental content, or intentional object, on the one hand, and the object to which such content refers, the ‘presented object’, on the other.
In so doing he not only construes intentionality as relational, he also introduces, in the guise of the ‘presented object’, a third entity into the equation. Whereas, in the traditional ideas paradigm, the mental act and its content fell under the subject category, in Twardowski’s scheme of things mental content, as intentional object, and the ‘presented object’, as that to which such content refers, fall squarely under the category of object. An important consequence of this is that the necessity of reducing all objects to mental phenomena, which prevailed in respect of the ontology of ideas, is avoided. In addition, the introduction of the ‘presented object’ as a third entity results in the elimination of the formula *esse est percipi* or ‘to be is to be perceived’ since the ‘presented object’ can never be a part or quality of the mental act itself.

Consequently, Twardowski’s introduction of the ‘presented object’ as the terminus of the mental act represents an extension of the ontological domain to objects of awareness other than the mental.

As a result of this there should be no ‘problem of the external world’ in an intentional account of consciousness since it is not reductive nor does it
claim that consciousness is essentially reflective. The remainder of this chapter will address the question of whether or not an intentional conception of consciousness can adequately account for our experience of material or corporeal objects.

According to Lewis such an account must meet what he calls the four crucial commonsense truths: (C1) Material objects exist when there are no human beings who are perceiving them (or thinking of or acquainted with them in any other way); (C2) Material objects undergo a variety of changes and yet remain the same objects; (C3) Vast numbers of ordinary perceptual judgements, expressed by predicative sentences such as ‘This is a chair’, and ‘That is a door’, are true; and (C4) Although we can make mistakes when we make such judgements we nonetheless make them very commonly and with the greatest certainty (Lewis 1965, p.122).

In what follows I will summarise, following Lewis, the main accounts of material objects given in the literature. I will then compare them with Husserl’s account of transcendent perception in an attempt to ascertain whether his analysis can account for C1 and C2 of the commonsense truths.
mentioned above. I am only concerned with C₁ and C₂ because as I have
demonstrated elsewhere in this dissertation² they cannot be adequately
accounted for within the ontology of ideas. I will not address the claims of C₃
and C₄ since they are epistemological in nature and hence fall outside the
scope of this dissertation.

Lewis distinguishes between a realist and a non-realist analysis of
material objects. Realist analyses, or substance analyses, derive initially from
Aristotle who regarded material objects as being composed of two kinds of
entities, a substance and the various accidents and attributes which inhere in
it. As Lewis points out, on this analysis in the sentence ‘This chair is brown’
the phrase ‘this chair’ refers to a substance and ‘brown’ to an accident which
inheres in it (Lewis 1965, p.124). The difference between substances and
accidents as ontological kinds is reflected linguistically by the fact that ‘chair’
cannot occur as a predicate in a predicative sentence. The substance, as that
which has the accident, cannot be a predicate of anything else. A modern
proponent of a substance analysis, although differing in several respects from

² See Chapter Two,
Aristotle, is Locke for whom a material object consisted of primary qualities inhering in a substratum.

Opposed to this are the non-realist analyses, the most outstanding example of which is that of Berkeley who acknowledges only one kind of entity, namely, accidents or sensible qualities. Material objects on this view are complexes of such qualities. Lewis points out that in terms of this analysis the sentence ‘This chair is brown’ expresses a complex of sensible qualities of which brown is a member (Lewis 1965, pp.124-25). The copula in this case does not reflect an exemplification or inherence connection as in a realist analysis but rather a part/whole connection between members of the complex.

Lewis further points out that in a realist analysis the substance, or in Locke’s case, the substratum, not only serves as the support of accidents, it also serves as a continuant or that entity which endures through changes of its accidents (Lewis 1965, pp.125, 127).

A non-realist analysis does not have to be an idealist analysis. It can embrace a notion of substance and in this regard Lewis refers to Gustav Bergmann as a case in point. In Bergmann’s analysis of material or corporeal
objects substances are momentary entities which do not function as
continuants. As a consequence sameness, which in the traditional realist
analysis is accounted for by the independent existence of the substance
through the changes of its accidents, must be accounted for in another way.
In Bergmann’s analysis it is accounted for by spatio-temporal relations and
lawful connections among the individual constituents in the material object
itself (Lewis 1965, pp.126-27).

According to Lewis substance analyses deserve the term ‘realist’
because they can account for the independence of material objects (C1) in the
strongest possible way. That is, on a substance analysis material objects are
neither qualities of the mind nor are they in any way dependent upon being
perceived in the widest sense of that term. As entities material objects are
analysed in such a way that not every constituent of them can exist only while
it falls within the intention of an act (Lewis 1965, pp.127-28). Berkeley’s
analysis is not realist because there is no constituent in the material object
which guarantees that it exist unperceived. Indeed, as Lewis points out, and
as I also demonstrated earlier in this dissertation\(^3\), on Berkeley's analysis of perception material objects \textit{cannot} exist unperceived. Consequently, Berkeley's analysis cannot account for the independence of material objects in either of the two senses referred to above. It is, therefore, both non-realist and idealist. Bergmann's account, according to Lewis, is non-realist but \textit{not} idealist. The reason for this is that in Bergmann's account the substantial element in material objects makes them independent of minds in the sense of not being qualities of mental acts but not in the sense of existing independently of those acts themselves. In Bergmann's account, then, material objects are \textit{not} qualities of the mind or of the perception or awareness of them but they \textit{do} depend upon the mind in the sense that they exist only so long as they are the objects of acts of perception or of other kinds of awareness of them (Lewis 1965, p.128).

In my view Husserl's notion of the presented object of transcendent perception is similar in some respects to Bergmann's account of a material object. Husserl, like Bergmann, claims there is a substantial element in a

\(^3\) See chapter two, pp.78-79.
thing which is the bearer of qualities and, again like Bergmann, Husserl
believes this to be a momentary entity coincident with the apprehension of it.

The independence of material objects as outlined in C_1 can, as a
consequence, be accounted for but only in the weak sense outlined above in
reference to Bergmann. However, because Husserl’s substances are
momentary entities his analysis cannot account for the sameness of objects in
the way that a realist analysis does. Where that analysis appeals to a
substance which endures through the changes in its accidents to account for
sameness, Husserl appeals to the substantial element as an individual
constituent of a pattern of momentary substantial elements which are lawfully
connected and spatially and temporally related to each other in a way in which
they are not so related to any others. Husserl’s analysis, then, like that of
Bergmann’s, is non-realist but not idealist.

What evidence is there in Husserl’s writings for this view? That
Husserl is not idealist in respect of transcendent perception can be seen by
comparing the latter with his analysis of immanent perception. Husserl
maintains that in immanent perception a part/whole relation exists between
the mental act and its object, a relation which he denies to transcendent perception. In immanent perception cogitatum and cogitatio are so closely united that we can only separate them by means of abstraction. Objects given in immanent experience, therefore, form a unity with the experience itself. This thought is expressed clearly in the following passage:

In the case of an immanently directed, or, more briefly, immanent (the so-called “inner”) perception, perception and perceived essentially constitute an unmediated unity, that of a single concrete cogitatio. The perceiving here so conceals its object in itself that it can be separated from it only through abstraction, and as something essentially incapable of subsisting alone (Husserl 1931, p.124).

Transcendent perception, on the other hand, is characterised by the absence of this relation:

It is then evident [so far as transcendent perception is concerned] that intuition and the intuited, perception and the thing perceived, though essentially related to each other, are in principle and of necessity not really (reell) and essentially one and united (Husserl 1931, p.130).

This distinction between unity and relatedness underpins Husserl’s description of the difference between the two types of perception. In denying that a part/whole relation is involved in the perception of material objects Husserl claims that such objects are not qualities or constituents of the mind, or of our knowledge or perception or awareness of them. Husserl further
claims that in transcendent perception two entities are involved whereas in immanent perception this is not the case\(^4\). Husserl, then, appears to be idealist in respect of the latter type of perception but not so in respect of the former.

Husserl denies that entities beyond appearances have any causal role in perception and he insists that an account of the perception of corporeal or material objects must be located \textit{entirely} within the domain of appearances. In this respect he is concerned to vindicate the truth of the view of “the man in the street” or the common-sense view of perception when it claims, illusions and hallucinations aside, that we can confirm empirically the presence of a thing in experience simply through experience itself (Husserl 1931, p.127).

He is aware that the common-sense view faces the challenge of science. Science tells us that of the primary and secondary qualities it is only the former which are ‘objective’, the latter, being ‘merely subjective’, only functioning as signs of the former. This simply won’t do in Husserl’s view because Berkeley’s famous objection can be levelled at it: namely, given that

\(^4\) In this he differs from Twardowski who argues for a tripartite structure in respect of the mental act regardless of whether or not it takes a mental or non-mental entity as its object.
the primary qualities are unthinkable without the secondary, on what grounds can we justify drawing a distinction between the two, labelling some ‘objective’ and others ‘subjective’?

Husserl believes that the dichotomy implicated here is misplaced and is in fact of a much more radical nature. Consequently, he treats the ‘thing’, or object of science, as an entity that entirely transcends, or goes beyond, its every possible perceptual appearance. Even the space of such an entity cannot be sensible space or the space of the world. Were that the case such a space would also fall under Berkeley’s objection (Husserl 1931, p.128).

As a consequence of this line of argument Husserl ends up with a dichotomy of appearances and the physical ‘thing’ of science. In the context of this dichotomy appearances have lost their traditional role as signs since the very nature of the dichotomy itself renders any notion of subjective entities functioning as signs for objective entities beyond them meaningless. If the entities of science are as completely removed from the realm of sensible appearance as Husserl maintains for the purposes of this argument then it
seems pointless to look for clues to their meaning in such a realm. As Husserl puts it:

The “true Being” would therefore be entirely and fundamentally something that is defined otherwise than as that which is given in perception as corporeal reality, which is given exclusively through its sensory determinations, among which must also be reckoned the sensori-spatial (Husserl 1931, p.129).

There would be no point in looking for the source of transcendent perception here since a transcendence defined in this manner is beyond all perception.

This is a position in terms of which appearances are, so to speak, cut adrift. They can neither function as signs of ‘things-in-themselves’ nor as immanent objects since the latter, in Husserl’s view, are not implicated in transcendent perception at all. Yet, in so far as transcendent perception has a ground, that ground has its source in the world of appearance. There must, then, be a class of appearances that are themselves transcendent to perception. And, indeed, this is what Husserl concludes as the following passage shows:

……. what is it, we ask, that belongs to the concrete real nature (reellen Bestande) of the perception itself, as cogitatio? Not the physical thing, as is obvious: radically transcendent as it is, transcendent over against the whole “world of appearance”. But even the latter, though we refer to it habitually as “merely subjective”, does not belong in all its details of
things and events to the real nature of perception, but is opposed to it as “transcendent” (Husserl 1931, pp.129-130).

It is with this transcendence, that is, that between perceiver and the appearances of things and events that Husserl is concerned since this is a transcendence that is known or perceived as such (Husserl 1931, p.130). Husserl’s contention, then, is that it is on the terrain of this transcendence, and not that between the appearance and the physical object of science, that a theory of transcendent perception must be worked out. It is on this terrain that the perceiving subject encounters objects that are experienced as not being a part of the perceptual act itself but are yet apprehended by it. There is no place here for any metaphysical notion of substance since that would take the issue of transcendent perception beyond the realm of appearances and would raise questions about the relation between such a substance and appearances themselves. Husserl believes that transcendent perception involves issues about relations, but relations between mental and non-mental entities within the realm of appearances, not outside it.

That Husserl embraces a notion of substance is evident in his various references to material objects being ‘bodily’ present in perception. This bodily
presence is experienced as a variation in the object’s appearance where each variation correlates on a one-to-one basis with each change of visual perspective on the part of the perceiving subject. Changes of perspective in relation to an object cause changes in the perceptual content of the perceptions relating to that object. However, the experience or perception of an object in Husserl’s view is not limited simply to these momentary apprehensions of its ‘bodily’ presence nor are such apprehensions the referents of demonstratives as sense-data are in Moore’s discourse. On the contrary, reference in Husserl’s view is always to the object in its entirety through, or by means of, the various perceptions of its different aspects. We can see this clearly in the following passage:

Every determinate feature [of the thing] has its own system of perspective variations: and for each of these features, as for the thing as a whole, the following holds good, namely, that it remains one and the same for the consciousness that in grasping it unites recollection and fresh perception synthetically together, despite interruption in the continuity of the course of actual perception (Husserl 1931, p.131).

An object’s being the same is accounted for not by reference to an enduring substance but rather by the correlation of past and present perceptions, on the one hand, with the different spatial aspects exhibited by the object, on the other. Through the concept of the ‘continuum’ Husserl
describes transcendent perception as a series of spatio-temporal relations involving the mental element of intention and the non-mental or presented object. The continuum represents a correlation between the intention and the object within a single act as well as between individual acts themselves. Apprehension of a part or aspect of an object can be achieved within the space of a single perceptual act within the specious present. A single perception, however, is insufficient to determine whether or not the perceived object is a material or corporeal object. That can only be achieved through the perception of the object’s many and different aspects each of which correlates with a single perception within the series itself.

We can get a better idea of this by considering Husserl’s example of what is involved in the perception of a table.

Perceiving a table veridically, that is, as a table and not as an illusory entity, involves the perceiving subject in a series of ever-changing perceptions of the one thing. What causes the perceptions to change is the subject’s variation in movement in relation to the table. This movement can vary from walking around the table and observing it to simply opening and closing one’s
eyes in its presence (Husserl 1931, p.130). Each change in movement reveals a different aspect of the table. As a consequence of this, and hence of the variation in the subject’s perspective on the table, we can speak of perceptions that differ in content being temporally and materially related to each other. These related perceptions, or appearances, form a continuum through which the table reveals itself as a single entity. One of the points Husserl seems to be making here is that variation in the content of perceptions is a necessary feature of the apprehension of an object as a corporeal or material object, as opposed to a mental object which does not exhibit this feature. The continuum refers to the object perceived both in its entirety and in respect of its different parts. The different perceptions that make up the continuum each refer to different aspects of the table whereas the continuum as a whole refers to the table in its entirety through all the different appearances which constitute it. The continuum, if you like, is the intentional product of the relation between the perceiver and the thing perceived. Husserl expresses it this way:

But the perception itself is what it is within the steady flow of consciousness, and is itself constantly in flux; the perceptual now is ever
passing over into the adjacent consciousness of the just-past, a new now simultaneously gleams forth, and so on. The perceived thing in general, and all its parts, aspects, and phases, whether the quality be primary or secondary, are necessarily transcendent to the perception, and on the same grounds everywhere (Husserl 1931, p.130).

There are no private or subjective entities here: every aspect of the object perceived is transcendent to, or other than, the perception of it.

Nothing is immanent or 'in' the subject.

Transcendent perception, then, is perception mediated by virtue of the relationship between individual perceptions and the object’s perspectives, on the one hand, and the continuum or ensemble of perceptions and the entire object, on the other. To perceive the ‘same thing’ in this context is to perceive an object through the multiple perceptions of its many different parts.

Moreover, because perception is open-ended an object is never given in its entirety, something Husserl expresses by saying that the perception of transcendent objects is inadequate or incomplete. This term needs to be interpreted in a technical sense and understood against the concept of immanent perception as complete or adequate perception, that is, perception involving the presentation of an object without perspectives and that is
transparent to the perception of it. Objects of immanent perception are given
‘all at once’ as opposed to those of transcendent perception which can on
principle never be given in their entirety. To say that the perception of
material objects is ‘incomplete’ is to recognise that such objects have
perceived and unperceived parts and that the latter exist outside the
intentions of acts.

It is this open aspect of transcendent perception that informs Sartre’s
conception of the opacity of the object. Such opacity refers to the horizons of
potentially infinite perceptions involved in the apprehension of material
objects. Both concepts have their origin in Husserl’s thought. It is because
material objects are always open to further perceptual points of view and have
further aspects to disclose that transcendent perception is ‘incomplete’ or
‘inadequate’ perception.

Husserl claims that these descriptive differences between the
perception of corporeal and mental objects are only possible because the
entities to which the respective descriptions refer are different. He maintains,
therefore, that there is a real, and not merely an apparent, difference between
mental and non-mental entities. This is an important claim when one
remembers that within the ontology of ideas the difference between the two is
an apparent and not a real difference. It is for this reason that I mentioned
above that Husserl’s concept of transcendent perception marks the end of the
dominance of the immanent or subjective object as a model for all objects. If
the relation between consciousness and its object is real rather than simply
logical so is it contingent rather than necessary. Necessity determines the
relation between experience and its object if the entity experienced is
regarded as an aspect or part of the experience of it. If blue is a part or phase
of the experience or awareness of blue then blue can only exist when
experienced or perceived. This is what *esse est percipi* means. As I pointed
out earlier in reference to Twardowski this formula has no place in an
intentional conception of consciousness. The ‘presented object’ in not being a
part of the awareness of it is only contingently, or factually, related to
experience.

The aim of this chapter was to show how the concept of intentionality
effected a paradigm shift away from the ontology of ideas. We have seen that
although Brentano re-introduced the concept into modern philosophical discourse it was Twardowski’s tripartite analysis of the mental act that initiated an object category that was not dependent upon the subject. Husserl took this further with his analyses of immanent and transcendent perception and the descriptive differences between their respective objects. As I have argued above Husserl’s analysis can account for the commonsense truth that material or corporeal objects exist when unperceived but only in the weak sense of not being constituents of the mental acts which apprehend them. This is all that is needed, however, to refute the *esse est percipi* formula of the ontology of ideas.