CHINA’S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS, THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE

MASHINGAIDZE ANDREW MICHAEL

896526

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Supervisor:

Professor Garth Shelton, Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
DECLARATION

I, Andrew Michael Mashingaidze, declare that this dissertation is my own work. It is being submitted for a Masters degree in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. I confirm that the work has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at this or any other University.

Signature-------------------

Date-------------------------
DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to my family for its constant support and advice throughout my academic journey. I sincerely hope that this work will make my family proud and that they take it not only as a trophy of my achievements, but also as theirs.
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ABSTRACT

Although contemporary analysis of foreign policy now incorporate diverse issues originating from diverse subject areas, it has neglected the issue of change in foreign policy in favour of foreign policy continuity. This paper investigates the subtle changes that China has instituted in its foreign policy towards Africa. It argues that, these subtle foreign policy changes, although beneficial to China, have inherent negative implications on African states and signifies a manifestation of an active, assertive and confrontational Chinese foreign policy in future. In this investigation, China through the implementation of its moralistic five principles of peaceful development, the open door policy and its strategy of instituting policies that target states that it seeks to do business with, has managed to attract and solicit partnership from most African states.

Sub-national institutions like the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, the Chinese military, think tanks, Exim Bank and individual Chinese provinces have been tasked to carry out and implement China’s Africa foreign policy. The FOCAC meetings have emerged to be the most important platform through which the notion of change and the main objectives of China’s Africa policy are expressed. There, exists numerous models which can be used to analyse foreign policy change but the paper adopts Eidenfalk’s extent of foreign policy change model to analyse the various issues, both domestic and international, that influence changes in foreign policy. For China, international more than domestic factors wield greater influence on foreign policy. As a result three strands of foreign policy change can be identified in China’s Africa policy i.e. from single aid to aid provided on a win-win basis, from ideological focus during the colonial period to pragmatic considerations and from non-interference to active engagement on the continent. Given the close relationship that had formed between China and most African states, changes identified above, will have negative political and economic consequences for African states. For instance, African states will no longer enjoy Beijing’s cushion against UN sanctions, weakening of African economies and identity crisis are all possible consequences of China’s evolving policy. Zimbabwe is dependent both economically and politically on China. It would follow that any form of change in China’s foreign policy will leave Zimbabwe exposed to the above effects.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AHRDF – Africa Human Resource Development Fund
ANC – African National Congress
AU – African Union
BIT – Bilateral Investment Treaties
BP – British Petroleum
BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CADFund – China Africa Development Fund
CCP – China Communist Party
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
Exim Bank – China Export – Import Bank
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC – Forum on China Africa Co-operation
FRELIMO – Mozambique Liberation Front
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
IMF- International Monetary Fund
LSG – Leading Small Group
MDC – Movement for Democratic Change
MOFCOM – Ministry of Commerce
NOCs – National Oil Companies
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAIGC – African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
PLA – People’s Liberation Party
PSC – Politburo Standing Committee
S.E.Z – Special Enterprise Zones
SWAPO – South-West Africa People’s Organisation
TAZARA – Tanzania-Zambia Railway
UN – United Nations
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
US$ - United States Dollar
WTO – World Trade Organisation
ZANU – Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU PF - Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZCTU – Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
ZWD – Zimbabwean Dollar
Chapter 1
Introduction

1. Introduction
China’s recent rise to super power status and continued integration in the global economy has had a profound impact on the political economies of many countries, especially in the developing world. Africa as a developing continent, it would follow, has significantly benefited from China’s favourable foreign policy and generous development assistance disbursed at limited cost and with no attached conditions. As a result, Africa has in the past two decades experienced a proliferation of Chinese private and public companies and co-operations. These companies have established a wide catchment area spanning from primary extractive industries to secondary service provision. This deepening partnership, interestingly, occurs at the expense of and moment of receding Western investments on the continent. As a result, hostility and criticism towards China’s interests and new role in Africa have since emerged. Western states consider China’s role in Africa as a threat to both economic and political ambitions on the continent.

Responding to Western concerns, both Chinese and African scholars have argued that, Sino-Africa relations and partnership are not a new phenomenon. Instead, cooperation between the two can be traced back to the colonial era. During this era, Sino-Africa cooperation was driven by ideology, specifically China’s anti-Soviet and anti-imperialist expansionism. Contemporary China-Africa relations according to Anshan (2007) and Botha (2006) have undergone a transitional shift from the ideological emphasis to incorporate recent diversification into social but mostly economic and political spheres. More specifically the relations shifted from the ideology of opposing Soviet and imperialist expansionism to trade, especially, natural resource exploration. Today, economic cooperation more than politics and social factors primarily form the basis of China’s foreign policy towards Africa.

Western concerns and fears regarding trade between China and Africa emanate from the impressive and ever increasing trade statistics. According to a Chinese White Paper (2013) in 2000 trade between China and Africa amounted to US$10.6 billion, almost doubling to US$18.545 billion recorded in 2003. Regardless of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, trade figures between the two maintained a rapid momentum. As a result, in 2009, China surpassed the US to become Africa’s number one trading partner. Volumes of trade in 2012 rose to US$198.49 billion, signifying a growth rate of approximately 19.3%. These positive
figures are not only positive on a combined continental basis, but the same trends hold for individual states which have trade relations with China.

Since the study employs the single case study of Zimbabwe to represent Africa, it is necessary that China-Zimbabwe trade statistics be stated generally in this section. Trade between China and Zimbabwe increased from ZWD 760 million in 1997 to ZWD 6.9 billion in 2000 (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004). Regardless of the severely devalued value of the Zimbabwean Dollar (ZWD) during this time, converted to United States Dollar (USD) terms the increase in China-Zimbabwe trade remains significant (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004). According to Chirara and Kachembere (2014), the Chinese Ambassador to Zimbabwe proclaimed that trade between the two states surpassed US$1.1 billion by the end of 2013. Exports of mostly minerals and tobacco account for more than half of these figures.

China’s high import levels originating from Africa shows how it desperately needs greater access to African markets especially Africa’s mineral resources i.e. energy resources, necessary to drive its complex economic and industrial growth. Minerals that China targets include but are not limited to oil, uranium, gold, iron, phosphate, lead, cobalt, copper and bauxite (Duarte, 2012). Though economic interests are the primary drivers for China’s presence in Africa, political considerations cannot be ignored. One could argue that, Zimbabwe relates with China due to its need to formulate a new international identity and securing an ally to oppose western isolation. However, what is of particular interest to this research is the changing nature of Chinese foreign policy and strategies in engaging Africa and how such changes will intern create negative consequences for African states.

1.1 Statement of the Problem
The extent of China’s penetration and trade in Africa today cannot be doubted. This renewed focus on Africa post 2000 can explicitly be shown by the rising trade statistics, the rising number of government to government bilateral agreements, developmental aid and the number of Chinese companies and Chinese citizens operating in Africa. Premised on a shared ideology of anti-western expansionism during the colonial era and now the need for economic development within the developing world, Sino-Africa relations have significantly strengthened in the economic, political and social realms, where China has gained access to African mineral resources and political clout while at the same time Africa receives developmental assistance from China as well as representation at international forums.
Regardless of the established economic and political ties between China and Africa, the research assumes that subtle changes, in the form of a shift from single aid to a win-win scenario, from non-interference to active engagement and from ideological to pragmatic considerations, in Chinese foreign policy towards Africa brings about negative economic and political implications for African states. These negative implications manifest in the weakening of volatile African economies, identity crisis and lack of cover from punitive measures instituted by the United Nations that some African countries got from China.

1.2 Purpose of the Study/Rationale

The aim of carrying out this research is to investigate and have an understanding of China’s foreign policy towards Africa, so that one can be able to analyse and evaluate the subtle changes in China’s foreign policy. The study goes on to show that regardless of the attractive aid and developmental packages that China promises, a foreign policy prescription that is in constant evolution makes policy formulation and implementation difficult and at the same time presents negative consequences on its African partners. Furthermore, China’s new strategy of ‘demonstration effect’, its need to address issues which international organisations are either neglecting or failing to address and its intention to sell its identity and public diplomacy globally, are some of the major reasons why China has become so dear on the continent. Growing ties between China and African countries, which in some instances have developed into a dependency syndrome, as will be shown in the discussion on Zimbabwe, coupled with subtle changes in China’s foreign policy may compel African governments to re-think or re-invent their political and economic policies. The study thus, seeks to draw from existing work and to go on further to contribute to the discourse.

1.3 Literature Review

China’s deepening engagement with Africa has received a lot of scholarly attention in the past decade. Scholars have debated extensively the nature, motives and impacts of this partnership. This section presents the views of various scholars who have deliberated and written on Sino-Africa and Sino-Zimbabwe relations.

Zheng Bijian (2005), Shelton (2009), Carmody and Taylor (2010), Tull (2006) and Alao (2014) amongst other scholars, have written extensively on China’s involvement on the African continent in the context of a growing globalized world. For Bijian (2005) China’s developmental strategy had to shift away from ineffective ways of energy consumption, to
adopt a new path driven by technology and economic efficiency when it comes to resource utilization. Carmody and Taylor (2010) like Edoho (2011) further noted that, China ‘shifted from being an overall exporter of raw materials and minerals to become a large scale importer’ and has turned to Africa as a potential solution to its growing energy demands.

According to Alden (2007) three competing views can be used to explain China’s intentions in Africa i.e. China as a development partner, competitor and coloniser. Further, Adem (2004) captures these competing explanations in a modest and fascinating manner. He divides African attitudes as well as Western concerns towards China into two categories; the Sino-optimism and Sino-pessimism.

Sino-optimists praise China as Africa’s saviour and development partner. Amongst the many scholars subscribing to Sino-optimism are Tull (2006) who regards China’s foreign policy as ‘dynamic, constructive, flexible and self-confident.’ As a result, China has been welcomed by most African leaders. For him, China’s Africa package which has a mix of political and economic incentives strengthens the idea that cooperation will result in a win-win scenario. Shelton (2009) reiterated these positive expectations when commenting on the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Forum on China Africa Co-operation (FOCAC). He noted that, the promises of tariff free access to Chinese markets and access to loans amongst many other cooperation agreements, presents great opportunities for Africa.

Adopting a negative stance to China’s relations in Africa are Sino-pessimists. They consider China as not only sucking Africa’s resources but are certain that China will destroy Africa’s developmental potential. Duarte (2012) reminds his audience of Africa’s colonial past by alleging that, ‘once again Africa has become a chessboard game.’ Sautman and Hairong (2008) argue for an international discourse on China-Africa relations in which China is considered to be a rival of Western states in resource exploration. Western media on the other hand, commented on such a discourse portraying China as a ‘patron of African mismanagement.’

Asserting the same sentiments, Alao (2014) interestingly points out that, by deepening its activities in Africa, China has managed to make everyone unhappy. The Europeans and Americans are worried about their declining profit shares. Africans on the other hand, are concerned about the unequal relationship they have with China, moreover the fact that China
has assumed proprietorship over African natural resources. Alao, specifies that China’s confrontation with the West is not with its partnership with all African states but with specific states that fall under certain categories. He notes four categories i.e. states with considerable political clout and influence on the continent, states with considerable natural resources endowments that are crucial to China’s strategic interests, states recovering from conflict and states marginalised by the West for poor governance and human rights violations.

The above perspectives and viewpoints adopted by people in different societal stations are a result of Beijing’s rising interest towards Africa. Ian Taylor is among numerous scholars who have made significant efforts in documenting China-Africa foreign policy. Taylor argues that China’s Africa policy has its pillars in the events surrounding the June 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square. This single event marked a turnaround in China’s foreign policy in the face of Western condemnation. Taylor’s emphasis on a historical approach in assessing China’s foreign policy is very crucial in that, it brings out the fact that China had neglected foreign policy initiatives targeted towards Africa in favour of Western and other developed states that accrue economic benefits back to China. China’s neglect of Africa might have been motivated by the changing complexity of the global political system i.e. the decline of the Soviet Union and also Africa’s failure to develop its economies (Taylor, 2007).

The assumption is, changes in the global political economy have a bearing on the evolution of a country’s policy direction and formulation. China is not an exception to this. China’s foreign policy has undergone change and transformation in the same way that its economy developed. These changes in Chinese circumstances that have a direct effect on its foreign policies have since raised concerns as to whether China’s foreign policy will still follow the peaceful path defined by Chinese leaders of Mao Zedong’s era or will it become aggressive and seek domination as the circumstances facing China today might suggest. Factors like China’s increased integration in the global system and the idea that foreign policy is responsive to events and the influence of leaders, suggests that Chinese foreign policy is more likely to change in the future (Harris, 2014).

The issue of change in Chinese foreign policy was explored by Mung (2008) when he noted that, changes in China’s Africa policy were in line with its grand transformation strategy. He claims that China’s foreign policy is a derivative of its economic goals i.e. its strategy for development. As a result Chinese policy, over time, has transformed from ‘ideological
emphasis to ideological neutrality, from a unitary form to multiple channels of bilateral exchanges and from single aid to a win-win strategy in international cooperation.’ It would seem, from a utilitarian view, that China’s foreign policy is designed in a way that is self-serving or in other words solely designed to secure economic benefits and growth to China by securing mineral resources and widening its exports. Anshan (2007) further elaborated on the issue of change in Chinese foreign policy, arguing that it was Chinese policies and not principles that changed. Principles of equal treatment, respect for sovereignty, non-interference, mutual benefit and co-development persisted.

In discussing China’s presence in Zimbabwe, Chun (2004) argues that China-Zimbabwe relations cannot be viewed as a microcosm of China-Africa relations, implying that it is not possible to generalise or subscribe a general pattern to China’s interaction with all African states. China-Zimbabwe relations can be analysed from two perspectives i.e. China as exploiting or China as supporting a pariah state. Alao (2014) agrees with Chun, pointing out that, of all China-Africa relations, its partnership with Zimbabwe deserves the most attention. This is sanctioned by the domestic political conditions in Zimbabwe and how the international community responds to them. In contrast, Youde (2007) takes on a different perspective. He notes that Zimbabwe engages China as a diversionary tactic to reduce mounting pressure at both domestic and international levels as well as to broadcast a different identity.

Considering the above discussion on China’s emergence in Africa, its foreign policy, changes in foreign policy and its partnership with Zimbabwe, it might seem as if existing literature on the topic has adequately exhausted every possible dimension to this discourse. But the issue of change in China’s foreign policy has received less attention. Regardless of the fact that some scholars have pondered on the notion of change in China’s foreign policy, there exist a poverty of literature that has explored the possibility of consequences for potential future change in China’s foreign policy, especially policies it holds fast when dealing with African states. Such an analysis would consider how possible policy shifts would disorient both economic and political developments and policy formulations in Africa.

1.4 Research Question(s)
Regardless of the wealth in literature available on Sino-Africa relations, important questions concerning China’s changing foreign policy towards Africa remain largely unanswered. The
predominantly guiding question to this research is; what is the nature of China’s foreign policy towards Africa and how has it changed overtime? The following minor question is addressed as well. What are the political consequences and implications for Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular of partnering China given the changing nature of its foreign policy?

1.5 Methodology & Methods
The research employs qualitative methods in gathering and analysing data. Qualitative research strives to examine, explore and understand complex phenomenon in society. The study adopts a historical descriptive approach to analyse and evaluate China’s changing foreign policy interactions with Africa, with the goal of providing meaningful answers to the research questions mentioned in the previous section. The study further, makes use of a single case study of Zimbabwe as a way of providing an in depth understanding of the nature and effects of a changing Chinese foreign policy as Kaufman & Kaufman (2005) asserts.

As a qualitative research, the study draws information from predominantly journal articles accessed from the Universities online catalogues and search engines, books available in the Universities library, online newspaper articles; reports published by independent media and organisations such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and from official diplomatic correspondences published on the Chinese government websites. The study also analyses public statements made by government leaders and other government representatives as well as media reports on Chinese foreign policy towards Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular. Together, these structured and unstructured sources form the basis of qualitative research.

The research further employs a qualitative analytical method of content analysis which according to Krippendorff (2004) is a ‘technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the content of their use’ done through classification and tabulation. This method is handy in analysing patterns and trends in texts and documents and in this case, in monitoring shifts in China’s foreign policy (Mande bv, 2014). Further, it is useful in analysing the contents of official reports on all the FOCAC meetings, these reports contain important agreements made between China and African states. Statements made publicly by government leaders and reports published in newspaper articles and other media sources are also collected, these capture the official position of the Chinese government regarding Africa.
It is these statements embedded in speeches and reports that show the shifts in Chinese foreign policy and forms the cornerstones of Chinese foreign policy in Africa. Other instruments used by China such as, debt cancellation, aid and loans are also crucial information sources. The purpose of applying content analysis to this research is to bring out the motives behind the Chinese generous gestures and actions. Information gathered from these sources will then be arranged and coded in different columns which are divided according to year, type and particulars. This classification will allow for inferences to be made to ascertain the nature and shifts in China’s changing foreign policy and to determine the political challenges that African states can experience as a result.

1.6 Theoretical Framework
This section tries to locate the discussion on China’s changing foreign policy towards Africa in a theoretical framework in which the relationship can be analysed. Though the proposed theoretical concepts are inadequate to comprehensively explain China’s foreign policy towards Africa, they capture different aspects and causal mechanisms that are crucial in advancing knowledge of the two continent’s interactions. The combination of identity, constructivist and neorealist conceptions deepen our understanding of China’s changing foreign policy in Africa.

China-Africa relations can be considered firstly in terms of identity and subjectivity. During the 18th and 19th centuries, before the wave of decolonisation of previously colonised states, the relationship between the West and Africans was unequal. The Europeans perceived themselves as rational, civilised and human, while on the other hand, Africans were regarded as barbarous, living-in-nature and thus non-human.

This distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans brings out the dominant norm of ‘othering’ that defines the racial and exclusionist mind-set of that time and informed the Europeans engagement with Africa. By consciously formulating an identity of the ‘self’, the Europeans explicitly formulated an identity of what they were not. As the other, Africans, it would follow, are not rational, not capable of civilisation, in need of guidance and thus according to John Lock, not worthy of property rights. Today, this differentiation between European and non-European exists in the developed/developing dichotomy, in which European states assume the developed and non-Europeans are considered developing (Butler, 2009).
In contrast to the Western perspective, China has a different approach to its relations with African states, given that it regards itself as a developing state. Regardless of rapid and advanced industrial development and her awareness of the privileged position she holds in global politics, China’s perception of the less developed Africans did not resemble dichotomies of we and them as its global position would suggest. As a result, China’s stance in Africa invokes a new paradigm of thinking concerning the nature of China-Africa relations i.e. what it means to have a global leader that is a developing state? It might as well follow that, China’s new identity as part of the developing world has been the enabling factor behind the global South-South relations. China in this case, is reconstructing global politics, where the previously marginalised Africa is given a new meaning and identity through cooperative association with a global leader. Further by identifying herself as belonging to the same developmental category as African states, China seeks to legitimise its foreign policy ambitions and strategy of increasing economic trade on the continent.

As rhetoric of identity, China-Zimbabwe relations are premised on the two countries association that is, premised on ideological, colonial and development similarities (Slaughter, 2011). Interactions on economic and mostly political fronts have been the dominant ideology driving friendship between the two countries before and after the Cold War. Further, the two states identify themselves as belonging to the same category of former colonised states, eager to devise their own strategies to develop their economies (Zimbabwe is yet to realise this goal). Furthermore, it is difficult to ignore Zimbabwe’s agency in this relationship. Given Zimbabwe’s marginalisation by Western states in the past two decades over allegations of human rights violations and authoritarian tendencies, Zimbabwe has been eager and impatient to engage a global power that she would identify herself with. Questions now remain as to whether it will keep up with the developments in Chinese foreign policy?

Emphasis on the social context, made above, in which inter-state relations between China and Zimbabwe are produced and conducted are reflective of constructivists claims regarding identity and beliefs. For constructivists, socialisation necessitates the formation of a cultural theory which builds perceptions of friends and enemies and feelings of being part of or not part of a group. As the prominent theorist behind constructivism Alexander Wendt, regards this culture as a culture of anarchy, and a culture constitutive of shared ideas which are fundamental in shaping state’s interests, capabilities and tendencies. State behaviour in this
instance is determined by its social interactions in the international system. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy shift, from being a close ally, investment and aid hub of mostly Britain and other Western states, to become an all-weather friend with China can be an instance of constructivist’s worldview, specifically how it stresses the propensity towards change in the international system. Through interaction with China, Zimbabwe’s interests and in turn China’s interests and capabilities could be realised from the two states close cooperation (Wendt, 2003).

The international system is an arena of anarchy as the neorealist points out. By anarchy, they do not refer to physical violence or disorder as postulated by the Hobbesian (classical realist) account but rather, the absence of an overarching government tasked with regulating and maintaining order in the international system. Anarchy for Wendt (1992) is the ordering principle (structure) in the international system. Unlike in domestic politics, where a state’s government is the authoritative body, in international politics there is no body of authority that has absolute control over the manner in which states behave and interact with each other. With a system structured in terms of anarchy, does it then imply that the absence of a world government forces states to act competitively? How can international institutions and regimes overcome this problem? Anarchies in this view are self-help systems that produce competition (security dilemma) in the international system. The pursuit of one’s interest breeds insecurity in another state. China’s shifting foreign policy goals focussed on achieving economic interests in Africa, has brought about insecurity and fears amongst Western states. Scepticism concerning China’s intentions in Africa arose on two fronts; on one hand they consider China’s involvement in Africa as a strategic move towards world domination. On the other hand, they see China as a threat to the profitability of Western investments on the continent. Regardless of the growing scepticism, international institutions like the United Nations and its arm the World Trade Organisation; have little influence or rather have no authority to block China’s renewed relations with Africa. Instead, China has on several occasions vetoed against resolutions that would affect its interest in Zimbabwe and other African states (Wendt, 1992).

1.7 Limitations & Delimitations

By making use of the single case study of Zimbabwe instead of Africa as a whole in analysing changes Sino-Africa relations, the scope of the research is limited. This arises from the fact that results and conclusions derived from the analysis of single case studies cannot be
generalised. Further, a clearer picture of Sino-Africa relations cannot be adequately captured by the case of Zimbabwe given its international image and sanctions post 2000. Although some lessons can be derived from Zimbabwe’s interactions with China, most African states are not pariah states or face the same treatment and conditions as Zimbabwe did under western sanctions, thus the application of Zimbabwe to the case is not sufficient to represent all African states. Language is also another limitation to the study since the study utilises data from sources published in English alone, this entails that any important and relevant data that may be published in mandarin is automatically excluded.

1.8 Significance of Study
Though a lot of literature now exists on the rise of China globally and especially in Africa, a study of China’s interactions especially in Africa and its changing foreign policy is still essential. Regardless of China’s great achievements in partnering most African countries and becoming Africa’s number one trading partner after the US and other western states, global changes and developments render interstate relations, between China and its African partners to be unpredictable. As a result, constant monitoring and appraisal is necessary to capture the changes in policies that may affect or have economic and political effects in other countries. China’s policy evolution from its traditional non-interference in domestic politics of other countries to a more confrontational policy is a cause for concern for African state. The analysis and assessment presented in the research will help contribute to the discourse on China-Africa partnership, particularly the necessity of constant appraisal of trading and political partners. Ambitiously, the study may aid policymakers on how changes in the foreign policy of a country’s trading partner can affect political and economic events in their countries.

1.9 Chapter Outline
Chapter 1 introduces the topic by stating the purpose and reasons for carrying out this investigation. It states the questions that the research endeavours to address and the theoretical framework in which the discussion will be based as well as the significance of carrying out the research. Chapter 2 analyses China’s foreign policy from its traditional roots to the present emphasising on the post 2000 era. The chapter also considers the players promoting Chinese foreign policy and the instruments used in advancing it. Chapter 3 provides an account of foreign policy change that is, the definition and nature of and methods
of change. These methods or models of change are then used to analyse instances of change in China’s foreign policy. Chapter 4 explores the single case study of Zimbabwe. This includes brief developments in Zimbabwean political situations post 2000 and how relations with China strengthened after this period. It will also cover the major trade agreements and developments between the two countries. Chapter 5 sums up all the claims, assumptions and evidence presented in the research into one argument and it also determines whether or not what the research has set out to do in the introduction has been achieved.
Chapter 2
China’s Foreign Policy

2. Introduction
Contemporary foreign policy analysis has distanced itself from the traditional rigid and state centric modes of analysis. According to Garrison et al (2003) foreign policy analysis is ‘a new path of inquiry essential to opening the black box of domestic politics and policymaking in an effort to understand actors' choices in global politics.’ Garrison’s black box analogy entails that, the state’s monopoly in foreign policymaking has been diluted. The ever transforming nature of the international community ushered a complex environment that mandated the inclusion of individual, institutional, cultural and societal factors in the decision making arena. The states strategy to achieve national goals in this complex global environment is through decentralisation of foreign policy roles to individuals, institutions and departments that have expertise in a specific field. In this instance, China’s foreign policy, as this chapter highlights, is strategically tailored to export and ensure the achievement of its domestic and national policies through observation of certain ideologies and use of various sub-national actors. The chapter proceeds by identifying the central pillars in the history of Chinese foreign policy, but due to space limitations, a concise discussion of the history of Chinese foreign policy will be given. Much detail is presented in the second section in which the discussion of China’s foreign policy is presented over a specified time period i.e. as from 2000 onwards. Lastly, the chapter looks at the effectiveness of Chinese foreign policy in achieving and securing foreign policy goals outlined in the first section of the chapter.

2.1 Central Pillars of Chinese Foreign Policy
The theoretical section in chapter one presented the importance of constructivist’s notion of socialisation and how states interact and consequently alter each other’s behaviour. In this section, the notion of social interaction resonates in the discussion on China’s traditional foreign policy pillars, strategies and the manner in which China’s foreign policy actors conduct themselves. The goal is to show that China’s foreign policy is a result of well calculated strategies that foster Chinese development through closer co-operation and interaction with its neighbours, specifically targeted states and the international community in general. China defines foreign policy as a series of goals or slogans. The following are some of the important slogans highlighting how China conducts herself internationally.
2.1.1 Peaceful Co-existence as the Basis of International Conduct

‘The future of China is closely linked to the future of the world. China consistently carries out an independent foreign policy and adheres to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries’ (NPC, 2015).

This extract from the Preamble to the Republic of China’s constitution highlights the extent to which the idea of peaceful development and co-existence of global states is entrenched in China’s foreign policy. It also outlines the five key principles that China observes and ought to be observed by other states when pursuing national strategic interests and when interacting with other states. In other words, the principles set the stage for bilateral relations between China and other states (Xinhua News, 2014). The codification of these guiding pillars follow, and qualify as an application of Alexander Wendt’s (2003) constructivist theory that advocates for the development of a culture realised through perceptions of friendship and belonging.

The principles of peaceful development and co-existence, as outlined in the extract, are not an exclusive Chinese invention. Rather, these principles originated after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, when former communist states reviewed their interaction with the West. Instead of the traditional confrontation between the two blocks, a new strategy of peaceful coexistence which sought to reduce the incidence of war was desirable. Officially, the five principles were adopted in 1954 by leaders of China, India and Myanmar. Several reasons, both domestic and international, have been proposed as possible explanations for the adoption of these principles that in turn form the foundation of China’s foreign policy. Among them, is China’s need to launch its Five Year Plan by 1953, this required a stable and peaceful political environment. Internationally, China sought to reach out to the non-communist states. This goal was made possible by the death of Stalin, which brought moderation into communist policies. Further, security issues contributed to the adoption of these principles. China’s intention was to ‘win over’ alliances from its neighbouring states. The adoption of these principles was meant create a belt of neutral states, which would function in more or less the same manner as the ‘zone of peace.’ This was a result of geopolitical considerations, specifically targeted at halting US penetration of Chinese borders (Chi Kwan, 1996).
According to the Chinese High Commission to South Africa (2014) whilst speaking on the sixteenth anniversary commemoration of the principles of peaceful co-existence in 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasised the centrality of the principles when he stressed that the principles were still relevant and remain an important facet in guiding China’s conduct with other states. He further stated that ‘the principles have become the basic norms governing international relations as well as basic principles of international law.’ These sentiments speak highly of the principles. By considering them as forming law, implies universality, hence their application transcend Chinese borders into other global states regardless of their social and political system as well as their level of economic development. Such an interpretation suggests the kind of global political system and norms that China envisages.

The principles are centred on the belief that ‘no one should do to others what he/she does not want others to do to them,’ a reinterpretation of the golden rule. Following this ethical stance, China does not intend to impose its will on another states neither will it seek global dominance regardless of how much power it wields. However, what is crucial here is the recognition of sovereignty and equality between and amongst states. Placing sovereignty at the centre of this debate minimises the monopoly of a single state in the international system and reduces the likelihood of strong states bullying weak states. As a result, an equitable international political order is established. This debate on sovereignty can be summed up by Premier Wen Jiabao’s remarks that, ‘sovereignty is the birthmark of any independent state, the crystallization of its national interests and the best safeguard of all it holds dear.’ The remaining principles are meant to increase mutual benefits, inclusiveness, deepening cooperation with other states and to ensure that its partners benefit from its own development (China High Commission South Africa, 2014; Zhuqing, 2004).

2.1.2 Identifying with Target States

China’s foreign policy during the 1960-1970’s took a drastic shift from the 1950’s alignment with communist Soviets. During this period the Chinese adopted an anti-Soviet and anti-imperialist stance. They vilified US imperialism as outlined in a 1965 policy document, ‘Long Live the Victory of People’s War’ presented by Defence Minister Lin Biao. This policy document and Chinese policy actions during this era signified a more confrontational attitude and desire in Chinese foreign policy which had a revolutionary international thrust. As a result China assisted violent insurrections, in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, with
moral and material assistance. For instance China gave military assistance and training to revolutionary movements in Tanzania, Algeria, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe amongst others. This confrontation with the world’s super powers, of the time, resulted in China’s isolation internationally (Zhu, 2001; MLM Revolutionary Study Group, 2007).

International isolation gave China the opportunity for internal reflection, which resulted in China realising the need to develop and establish relations with the third world. The five principles of co-existence presented by Zhou Enlai, discussed above, were a bold move in this respect and appealed to the developing world. The principles signified that China had also felt the effects of Western colonialism as had most developing countries. Regardless of its level of development during the 1970’s China sought to be associated with developing states. This policy position was a strategic move meant to reinvent China image and identity in the face of a changing political environment. China’s need for a new identity is clear in Chairman Mao’s claim made whilst addressing the visiting Malian President Moussa Traore that, ‘we all belong to the Third World, we are [all] developing countries.’ The centrality of reviving China’s identity is also evident when China developed the Three World System in which it classified the US and Soviets as first world, Japan and the other European and Western allies as second world and itself and the rest of the formerly colonised states as third world. China’s identification with the third world was meant to promote and preserve China’s national independence, consolidating China’s image in the international community as well as breaking its international isolation (MLM Revolutionary Study Group, 2007).

2.1.3 The ‘Open Door Policy’
After years of international isolation, China returned to the international community through the open door policy. The policy, announced in December 1978 by the pragmatist Deng Xiaoping, who is hailed in China as the father of China’s economic reform, was a mercantile strategy designed to achieve economic development through amassing foreign capital and technology whilst China remained committed to socialism. The policy initiated two major policy changes in China. Firstly, it opened up geographic regions to foreign investments and secondly, it made specific Chinese institutions accessible (Galbraith et al, 2000; Kobayashi, et al, 1999).

Opening up of geographic regions stated in 1979 when China granted preferential policy flexibility to provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. In 1980 Special Enterprise Zones (S.E.Z)
were established in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen, followed by Yangtze River Delta, Zhu River Delta, and three other regions in Fujian, Liaonin, and Shandong. The trend continued in this manner until all major cities were open to international trade (Galbraith et al, 2000). Kobayashi et al (1999) further argue that, the policy not only established S.E.Zs but it also established several other areas through which foreign investment was to be channelled into China, these included ‘open coastal cities, economic and technology development zones, delta open zones, peninsula open zones, open border cities, and high-tech industry development zones’.

In terms of trade, China implemented the decentralization of its foreign trading system, applied the corporate system to foreign trading companies, lifted the ban on profit transfers, launched an export promotion policy, introduced the market system into foreign trade which subsequently reformed China’s foreign exchange system and most importantly China negotiated and entered the World Trade Organisation (WTO). All these were meant to open up the economy ushering a market economy as well as setting up a private sector (Galbraith et al, 2000; Hayashi, 2003).

Zhang et al proposed several reasons that prompted Chinese leadership of Deng’s era to adopt the ‘open door policy’. Geostrategic considerations, particularly, the fear of Soviets encroachment and encircling prompted China to initiate close ties with the West. Domestically, Chinese economic growth and standards of living were no longer comparable to that of neighbouring Asian countries for instance Japan. Also the Cultural Revolution had brought considerable devastation, especially, to China’s social fabric and including Mao’s socialist vision.

2.2 Chinese Foreign Policy towards Africa post 2000
The year 2000 marked a turnaround in Sino-Africa relations. Unlike before, concrete commitments have been made in China-Africa relations in pursuit of mutual peace and development within the developing world. In this regard, actual action by respective governments has been observed. In like manner, the analysis of Sino-Africa foreign policy and relations has to be attuned to reflect on these developments. Instead of mere stating Chinese policies and their motives, it becomes paramount to stem foreign policy analysis in light of the institutions and mechanisms promoting it. The rational being, by analysing policy from the institution formulating, implementing or promoting it, one would be able to draw
out the extent of importance and urgency of achieving such policies. As a result, China’s foreign policy post 2000 is analysed by having a critical discussion on how the Chinese adhere to the institutional framework to export and portray a culture of mutual development and how they managed to decentralise the responsibility of carrying out strategic foreign policy goals to different subordinate institutions and departments. The following institutions and institutional mechanisms are identified as promoting Chinese foreign policy in Africa.

2.2.1 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

The Chinese foreign policymaking machinery has always been a puzzle that analysts found challenging. The challenge emanates not from obscure or unclear foreign policy goals, but from the fact that the Chinese are secretive. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation which was launched in 2000, marked an end to the secretive nature of China’s policymaking and at the same time provided a mouth piece through which foreign policy goals are disseminated and understood (Executive Research Associates, 2009).

As a joint initiative between China and Africa, FOCAC was designed to save as a platform to advance collective, pragmatic consultation and ensure meaningful dialogue between China and Africa (Janson, 2009). According to Hon et al (2010), as a framework crafted to embody and ensure China’s win-win ties with Africa, FOCAC, also presents China and Africa with a grey area through which their relations can be formalised, institutionalised and most importantly strengthened. They further argue that, it ensures that mutual development, of common economic and political interest for all parties, is achieved within the context of an increasing globalised international system. As the basis for strategic partnership, Cisse (2012) considers FOCAC as an extension of the Chinese government’s need to solidify economic, political and diplomatic cooperation with Africa.

As an institutional mechanism designed to advance dialogue and cooperation, the forum has enjoyed great success signified by the increasing number of African presidents at the second and subsequent FOCAC meetings. Since its inception, Ministerial meetings have been held in Beijing 2000, Addis Ababa 2003, Beijing 2006, Sharm El Sheik, Egypt 2009, Beijing 2012 and South Africa 2015. The fact that these conferences have managed to convene every three years, as planned, regardless of numerous hindrances, including the Asian financial crisis, signify the commitment and dedication towards greater integration between China and its African counterparts. Commitment towards the success of this institution can also be
considered in terms of the follow up mechanisms and policy documents released before and after the meetings. For instance, following the Beijing 2000 conference, the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development were adopted (Hon et al, 2010).

The focus of this section is to determine the influence and extent of influence that FOCAC as an institutional mechanism has on the formulation, direction and implementation of Chinese foreign policy in Africa. In this regard, the observation made by the Executive Research Associates (2009) that, FOCAC provides with an ‘integrated system that guides relations between China and Africa but at the same time reinforcing Chinese businesses especially oil companies that have recently emerged as the vanguard of Chinese diplomacy in Africa’, presents a broad base to stem this argument. This remark is divided into two. The first part, acknowledges the dominant claim that China has policies specifically tailored for Africa. Interaction between China and Africa, on economic, political and social parameters, is premised and guided by a set of policies i.e. policies pinned on the three foreign policy slogans discussed above. It is unquestionable today that China implements strategies of territorial integrity, respect sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in other countries internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence to identify with and win cooperation from African countries.

The last part further broadens the scope of China’s African policies, highlighting the element of self-fulfilment integrated within the policies. It again fits in a traditionally dominant narrative common in both media and scholarly circles that, China is in it for the resources, especially African oil. Self-fulfilment motives are not only unique to China. African states as well have certain selfish expectations from this partnership. Aggregating all these hidden motives presents a daunting challenge for policy analysts, as a result Chun (2013) synchronised all these expectations to come up with four principle guidelines that explain the momentous need for greater cooperation between China and Africa. These are: sincerity, friendship, mutual benefit, reciprocity, common prosperity and seeking common development. It is not surprising that Chun’s guidelines are a derivative of or a reinterpretation of the principles governing China’s foreign policy in general.

If one analyses the FOCAC publications on the Ministerial meetings, it is difficult to miss the fact that African countries in almost or all cases acknowledge the challenges and
complexities of governance in the increasing globalised international world but are incapable of coming up with measures to counter such complexities. African states have developed a wait and receive attitude at the FOCAC forums. Following this line of argument, development in Africa is, at least in part, stimulated by China’s generosity. Table 1 below gives detailed evidence for this claim. It summarises the most significant commitments made by China during the 2000-2012 Ministerial round of meetings. The reason for presenting this information in a summarised tabular format is to make it easy to draw out the main points that China emphasises in each meeting and to aggregate these concerns to establish its foreign policy goals and direction. It also highlights the extent of China’s commitment to see closer interaction between itself and Africa.
|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|

- **Debt cancellation for poor countries in Africa.**
  - China will continue to increase assistance for poor countries in Africa.

- **Prioritise imports from African countries.**
  - China will increase imports from African countries.

- **Ensure operation of Investment and Trade Promotion Centres in Africa.**
  - China will establish tariff-free access for African products.

- **Establish a China-Africa Joint Business Council.**
  - China will train up to 10,000 African personnel in various fields.

- **Create a China-Africa Products Exhibition Centre in China.**
  - China will hold a China-Africa Youth Festival in 2004.

- **Send additional medical supplies.**
  - China will grant approved double aid.

- **Double aid to Africa by 2009.**
  - China will provide US$ 10 billion in concessional loans.

- **Provide US$ 3 billion as preferential loans, US$ 2 billion as preferential buyer’s credits.**
  - China will provide US$ 1 billion for African small and medium business.

- **Cancel government debt; namely: matured interest-free loans due in 2005.**
  - China will cancel debt associated with interest-free government loans due in 2009.

- **Set up the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFUND).**
  - China will hold a China-Africa Development Fund (CADFUND).

- **Increase the number of zero-tariff export items from 190 to 440 for the 30 leading export products from African.**
  - China will increase the number of zero-tariff export items from 190 to 440 for the 30 leading export products from Africa.

- **Launch China-Africa Science and Technology Cooperation.**
  - China will launch the China-Africa Science and Technology Cooperation.

- **Provide US$ 3 billion as preferential loans, US$ 2 billion as preferential buyer’s credits.**
  - China will provide US$ 1 billion for African small and medium business.

- **Cancel debt associated with interest-free government loans due in 2009.**
  - China will cancel debt associated with interest-free government loans due in 2009.

- **Duty-free and quota-free treatment for 95% of products from African.**
  - China will grant duty-free and quota-free treatment for 95% of products from African.

- **Implement the Special Plan on Trade in Africa.**
  - China will implement the Special Plan on Trade in Africa.

- **Provide US$ 10 billion in concessional loans.**
  - China will continue to provide US$ 10 billion in concessional loans.

- **Provide US$ 1 billion for African small and medium size business.**
  - China will provide US$ 1 billion for African small and medium size business.

- **Encourage Chinese companies to establish processing and manufacturing plants in Africa.**
  - China will encourage Chinese companies to establish processing and manufacturing plants in Africa.

- **Scale up the CADFUND to US$ 5 billion.**
  - China will scale up the CADFUND to US$ 5 billion.

- **Duty-free and quota-free treatment.**
  - China will extend duty-free and quota-free treatment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establish an African Human Resources Development Fund (AHRDF).</th>
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<tr>
<td>Teams and equipment to teams and equipment to Destination least developed African states.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish Destination Status to eight African states.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish 3 to 5 trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Train 15,000 African professionals, build an African Union conference Centre.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technology partnership. Train 20,000 professionals in various fields.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase the number of agricultural demonstration centres to 20.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase government scholarships to Africa to 5,500.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continue to support peacekeeping activities in Africa.</td>
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<td>Continue to finance growth of SME’s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement the Africa Talent Program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase African scholarship in China to 18,000.</td>
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<tr>
<td>For 97% of products from African.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extend credit line to US$ 20 billion to African countries.</td>
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Source: Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (http://www.focac.org/eng/)
As an institution, FOCAC serves as both a framework and an instrument of Chinese foreign policy. It sets out the guiding principles through which China can advance its policy goals in Africa. Through the meetings, China compiles all the challenges and opportunities that African policymakers are facing and can offer in their respective countries. It then uses this information to tailor policies that attract and at the same time advance its national interests on the continent. Debt cancellation and forgiveness, establishing trade relations through provision of loans, credit facilities and investment funds for infrastructural development portray African economic challenges but at the same time present the means through which African governments are attracted to Chinese partnership. Politically, China is concerned with spreading a Chinese culture through cultural exchanges, training African professionals and increasing African scholarship in China. These issues, regardless of how diverse they are, are central to and shape Chinese foreign policy towards Africa in the contemporary era. FOCAC as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy redefines China’s image and identity. All the agreements and commitments made during the sessions, especially China’s pledges to Africa are an attempt by the Chinese to enhance their image in Africa.

A number of challenges both inherent and attributed to FOCAC processes have either been anticipated or experienced. These challenges are not specific to the FOCAC forum but encompass China’s foreign policymaking strategy and processes. The relationship between FOCAC and China’s foreign policymaking machinery is of a machine and its constitutive parts where the malfunction of one part will derail or reduce efficiency of the machine as a whole. In like manner, challenges to FOCAC as an instrument of China’s foreign policy, are challenge to the whole strategy behind achievement of China’s Africa policy.

Regardless of the positive impact of the forum in Africa, some analysts for example Cissé (2012) have argued for the negative impact of China’s deepening foot in Africa, especially in its mineral resources. They have noted negative implications around social and environmental issues emanating from Chinese business activities. The FOCAC has over the years, underestimated the significance and impact social and environmental issues may have on both the institution and Chinese business activities in African countries. As a matter of urgency, FOCAC ought to address issues pertaining to the observation of standards in the way China conducts its business especially in the extractive sector.
FOCAC has also been criticised for its weak follow up mechanisms. Of all fifty one FOCAC member states, China, South Africa and Ethiopia are the only countries that have developed mechanisms that allow for monitoring progress on the agreements made in the forum. In most countries decisions are made on an ad hoc basis or based on the personality and experiences of specific individuals as the case with the African diplomatic corps in Beijing which relies on the expertise from a long serving African Ambassador to evaluate, implement and initiate further cooperative policies that arise from commitments made during the forum. This point draws us back and validates a point made earlier that, all African countries are interested in from these meetings is the pledges that China makes and not the process of learning and acquiring experience from the different actors participating in the meetings. Also there is need for diversification in imports and exports (Grimm, 2012).

Lastly and relating to the idea of change, the emergence of the agenda on peacekeeping in FOCAC IV and peace and security in FOCAC V marks a turn in Chinese foreign policy. This is in line with China’s recent contributions to the UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa (Forum on China Africa Cooperation, 2012).

2.2.2 China’s Exim Bank

The impressive economic policies and management skills ushered by the Deng administration significantly enhanced China’s economic standing internationally and consequently it’s lending capacity. China’s economic diplomacy and new role as a financial service provider has made a significant impact in the global political economy, especially in Africa. In Africa, China’s need to develop and increase economic cooperation through empowering African governments and businesses is financed through several state backed financial institutions. These include the China Export-Import Bank (Exim), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China International Trade and Investment Corporation (CITIC), China Development Bank (CDB), Sinosure and the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (CECIC) (Executive Research Associates, 2009).

These financial institutions have contributed to the development of African economies and advancing China’s economic driven foreign policy through the provision of export credit, international guarantees, overseas construction loans and investment loans, as well as lines of credit (Moss and Rose, 2006). The Exim Bank since its establishment in 1994, and as a new instrument of trade diplomacy, has assumed a leading role in providing preferential loans to
Africa. Concessional loan refer to ‘the medium and long-term, low interest rate credit extended by [the] Exim Bank under the designation of the Chinese government with the nature of official assistance’ (Corkin, 2011).

Like most export-import banks, the Exim Bank was designed to provide finance meant to increase China’s exports. This argument ties with the goal oriented (economic prowess) drive in China’s Africa policies discussed under FOCAC. As a result, the bank has become central in implementing Chinese foreign policy in that, it promotes Chinese commercial interests abroad, secures raw materials in a controversial manner which most analysts now refer to as the ‘Angola mode’ (Corkin, 2011). Further, as a state owned institution, the framework in which it operates together with its guiding policies resembles and strictly adheres to China’s foreign policy strategy. For instance, the bank does not impose any conditions, political or economic, on the applying government prior to and after disbursing the loan, as most Western states require for African countries. This is also in line with the principle of co-existence ushered by the Mao era discussed above. It is remarkable to notice how Chinese companies, in this case the Export-Import bank, manage to strictly observe, carry out and advance national strategy a lesson most African states must emulate (Moss, 2006). This takes us back to the analogy of the machine above. China has managed to have all its machine parts serviced and performing well evidenced by the manner in which all institutions tasked with promoting and conducting Chinese business abroad fit in the overall policy goals.

According to the Executive Research Associates (2009) China’s use of its financial institutions to execute and implement its foreign policy strategies of deepening its feet in Africa has also extended to include the investment and purchasing of considerable stakes in Africa’s large banking institutions like Standard Bank which operates in eighteen African countries and Barclays which is the largest financial institution in Africa. This entails that China’s finance has virtually reached even the remote parts of Africa where these banks operate.

Though there is a scarcity and lack of consistency in official data and sources concerning how much the Exim Bank has issued out as concessionary loans in Africa, approximate statistics shows that the bank had distributed approximately US$12.6 billion in infrastructural development projects in sub-Saharan Africa by 2006 with an estimated rise to 200 billion by 2020 (Kou, 2015). Other figures have placed the loans towards Africa at US$
1.7 billion, US$ 11.32 billion and US$ 23 billion respectively (Corkin, 2011). These loans, according to the Exim Bank’s commercial interest chats (2015), have interest rates which are as low as 2.3 to 3.6 % and a repayment period of between four and twelve years depending on the nature of the contract. These figures, though insignificant compared to China’s GDP or forex reserves, when compared with GDP figures of most African states, they portray an unquestionable commitment and desire to partner Africa.

Some of the projects the bank has financed in Africa include a possible US$ 1.2 billion loan to Ghana, of which US$ 600 million was for the construction of the Bui dam, US$ 2.3 billion extended to Mozambique for the construction of Mepanda Nkua dam and hydroelectric plant and US$ 300 million towards the Moamba-Major dam, US$ 1.6 billion loan to establish a Chinese oil project in Nigeria, US$ 200 million preferential buyers credit to set up Nigeria’s first communications satellite, and a US$ 2 billion credit line to Angola (Moss, 2006). According to the Executive Research Associates (2009) and as evidenced by the nature of projects already funded, infrastructure is at the core of the Exim Bank and by 2008 it had financed over 300 projects at a cost of US$ 6.5 billion. Further, the bank is now well known for its deal structures i.e. the ‘Angola mode’ or ‘resource for infrastructure’ which entails the repayment of loans by resources.

Corkin (2011) is sceptical about the manner and trend in the selection and distribution of China’s concessional loans in Africa, arguing that the process is biased towards resource rich states. She notes that most of the loans made out to Africa were received by resource rich states for instance Angola, Sudan, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Though he further clarifies that her claim does not deductively imply that China and the Exim bank are particularly interested in resource rich countries as the statistics show, she implies it in a hidden manner. She further clarifies that like any other loan facility, China’s loans are provided considering a states ability to repay. Thus, natural resources only happen to be a form of collateral for the loans and not a criterion for allocation. Corkin establishes that the loans are meant to ‘fund manufacturing projects, infrastructure construction projects and social welfare projects in the borrowing country, which can generate promising economic returns or good social benefits’ as well as ‘financing the procurement of Chinese mechanical, electronic products, complete sets of equipment, technology and service and other goods by the borrowing country’. All of which are strategically meant to promote China’s economic foreign policy goals.
2.2.3 Chinese Provinces
According to Zhimin & Junbo (2009) China has 33 province divisions that are made up of 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities and 2 administrative regions. Matters concerning governance and decision making regarding foreign policy in these provinces and in China used to be controlled by the state. With a long history of totalitarianism, centralisation in decision making was an inherent feature in the old China. Provincial governments had little or no say in the country’s foreign policy architecture (Zhimin, 2005). Zhou Enlai’s doctrine that ‘there are no small matters in diplomacy’ highlights the tight grip that the government had on foreign policymaking and implementation. Hence the domain was reserved for the central government alone. In the centralised China, provinces had no power and incentives to conduct economic relations with foreign companies and other states (Zhimin et al, 2010).

It was only during Deng’s leadership 1978-1992 that China experienced an economic restructuring program that transformed China from being a centralised state into a much more decentralised and internationally oriented country (Zhimin & Junbo, 2009). China’s policy of opening up geographic space pushed its provinces into the international arena. Decentralisation and internationalisation, the twin forces, transformed the provinces into international actors and subsequently actors in Chinese foreign policymaking. The provinces now have the capacity to act individually internationally and now enjoy access to and can influence the internal foreign policymaking structures (Zhimin, 2005). During the reform, the provinces were tasked with managing local economic and social development as well as providing welfare and employment to locals, this required that the provinces wield considerable power over economic policy (Zhimin et al, 2010).

For Zhimin & Junbo (2009) it was the 1982 Constitution that empowered the provinces with administrative powers over issues concerning local affairs. Gradually provincial bodies were transferred more power and autonomy especially in areas of economic relations and approval of foreign investment projects. Though the empowerment wave was not even, China managed to empower all its provinces.

As sub-national actors in international relations, the analysis of their role and influence in decision making proceeds in two directions. Firstly, they can be viewed in terms of para-diplomacy which investigates the emergence of new actors in foreign policy formulation. The
second, and most relevant to this discussion is the multi-layered diplomacy, which considers the increasing involvement of sub-national organisation in foreign policymaking as a sign of the evolution of the policymaking process. The emergence of China’s provinces internationally is a result of the domestic conditions in China which saw many issues of low politics attracting attention at national level and how domestic issues were being internationalised. Simply stated, China’s policymaking evolved from the traditional state centred model to a more decentralised model that empowered provinces to conduct business and advance China’s foreign policy internationally (Zhimin, 2005).

The multi-layered theory does not consider foreign policy as the sole responsibility of the central government. Rather, all levels of governance from the bottom-up have a say and contribution towards the foreign policymaking process. The advent of transformation and internationalisation operationalised the multi-layered model in China even though the Chinese government controls the important decision-making process. This produced a stratified system in foreign policymaking that ranks top officials of the Chinese Communist Party on top of the hierarchy going down to provincial and communal structures in terms of importance of the decision that needs to be made (Zhimin & Junbo, 2009).

The provinces have since asserted their interests abroad as a way of attracting FDI, promoting their exports and enhancing their status internationally. As a result the provinces have become financially strong that they now can finance and support their activities internationally. This has created a partnership between the government and provinces in which the government now relies on the provinces to carry out and support its foreign policy goals. As a result these provincial governments/structures have started sending trade delegations internationally, in this case to Africa. For instance Zhang Dejiang of Guangdong province led a high-profile delegation to Africa in October 2004 which culminated in the signing of contracts worth US$ 1.2 billion. In terms of trade by 2006 trade between Chinese provinces and Africa reached US$7.9 billion with Shanghai and Zhejiang provinces constitute bulk of this trade i.e. US$ 3.048 billion and US$ 2.31 billion respectively. In total the provinces trade with Africa reached US$ 106.8 billion in 2008. However, regardless of these impressive trade figures, when considered as a percentage of the provinces total trade, the levels are still insignificant, for instance African trade constitute 1.3% of Shanghai’s trade and 1.5% for Guangdong’s both failing to surpass the national average of 3.1%. Economic activity between China’s provinces and Africa is increasing rapidly, the provinces now
consider Africa as a region to sustain, expand and diversify trade, and these same sentiments are shared at the national level. In the construction sector, due to the Chinese company’s good work, timely delivery and low costs, Chinese construction companies are becoming market leaders in Africa with 45% of construction contracts originating from Africa (Zhimin & Junbo, 2009).

2.2.4 Chinese Military

Even though the Chinese military has historically been and continues to be a player in Chinese foreign policy, its influence was curtailed by the reform process that sought, among other things, to professionalise and distance the army away from civilian decision making processes. This has been signified by China’s failure to replace retired PLA Navy commander Liu Huaqing in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) in 1997. The army has not been represented in the PSC since. On the other hand, the PLA enjoys authority jointly with the government over issues concerning weapons and weapons proliferation, especially in foreign policy issues related to strategic arms, territorial disputes and national security (Jakobson, 2006).

The Chinese White Paper on China’s National Defence published in 2010 outlines the mandate of and edges the PLA to ‘take an active role in dealing with various security threats, safeguard national security and development interests, and [to] play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development’. Under the third mandate, taking an active role in world peace and promoting common development, the Chinese government tossed the PLA at the centre of global peacekeeping, a moral role that is in line with and reinforces China’s strategy of peace for development. This also parallels the mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that strives to enforce and achieve a ‘harmonious world.’ The changing complexity and increased investments of China globally sanctions the adoption of such strategies as follow up measures and means of safeguarding China’s interests abroad (Rajan, 2011).

The PLA today, influences the policymaking machinery through the Central Military Commission which is part of the PSC. The PLA can also influence foreign policy through the Leading Small Group (LSG) which is responsible for the deliberation of major policies and comprised of members of the PSC and the CCP. On the other hand, Professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University in 2009 regarded the PLA as a ‘new’ actor in foreign policy because of its
recent transformation into a more professional military and because of the PLA’s increasing contacts and cooperation with the outside world.’ The effect of professionalization and increased contact with other countries is that the Chinese military will disengage from the ideological standpoint to embrace nationalistic values premised on peaceful development (Rajan, 2011; Jakobson, 2006). According to Dale-Huang (2015) the PLA’s role in foreign policy was also shown by Xi Jinping in January 2015 when he called upon military staff to embark on a new phase of military diplomacy through military exchange with other countries.

Also, China’s 2006 Africa Policy states that ‘China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military-related technological exchanges and co-operation. It will continue to help train African military personnel and support defence and army building of African countries for their own security.’ As a result China has offered military assistance to Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which are mostly countries it maintains diplomatic relations and close trade ties with. Also China’s increased peacekeeping missions in Africa signify the growing role of the military in foreign policy. Between 2003 and 2013 China deployed UN Peacekeepers in Mali, Liberia, Sudan and Somalia. By 2013 it had its troops involved in Cote D’Ivoire, Darfur, the DRC, Liberia, Mali, Republic of South Sudan, and Western Sahara. In total by 2013 China had 2,078 peacekeepers deployed in nine different missions comprised of 174 policemen, 39 military experts and 1,865 military troops. This re-emergence internationally is driven by China foreign policy objective of advanced economic cooperation and development in Africa, which can only be achieved if the international system is peaceful (Cordano, 2014).

2.2.5 Chinese Think-Tanks

The escalation and significance of Chinese think-tanks today is not different from or is rather intertwined with the significance of the military in foreign policymaking. The increased economic growth in the past two decades unravelled a complex political economy for the state, that requires or mandates careful consideration and contribution from numerous state, sub-state and independent organs in order to sustain China’s developmental path. Chinese think-tanks of this generation owe their existence to this scenario. This is consistent with Abb (2009) who identified China’s restructuring program especially its policy decision to ‘open up’ as the springboard from which most think-tanks rose to prominence. Reformation and
transformation presented an environment in which the Chinese government was continually confronted with new issues and problems that had an international dimension. As a result the government relied on think-tanks and scholars for advice.

China’s rapid economic development made it imperative for the Chinese government to engage professional advice if they were to make sound decisions on foreign policy. This led think-tanks dealing especially with foreign affairs, economic cooperation and national security to play a role and have influence on foreign policy (Ahmad, 2008).

The primary influence these think-tanks have on foreign policy is through submitting reports requested by government. In recent years think-tanks have engaged the mass media, providing the media and public in turn with expert analysis, as a way of gaining influence in the policymaking process. Some are now referred to as policy advocates. Though civilian views do not count in Chinese political system, the government considers keeping a satisfied public to be essential in portraying a collective image of the government (McGann, 2012; Abb, 2009). Furthermore, think-tanks have exerted influence on foreign policy through their leadership, for instance China Institute of International Studies’ (CIIS) Ma Zhengang and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ (CASS) Zhou Hong are regarded as ‘soft-power buffers’ who contribute to the policymaking process through ‘participation in think-tank seminars, informal dialogues with institutions and preparing the Ambassador’s public interventions’ (Bondiguel & Kellner, 2009).
<p>| Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), West Asia and African Department | 1977 | 50 | State Council, supervised by the CPC Propaganda Department | Dangdai Yatai (IAPS); shijie jingji, shijie jingji yuzhengzhi (IWE) |
| Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies (IAPS), Institute for World Economy and Politics (IWEP) | 1988 | 130 | | |
| China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) | 1956 | 93 | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Guojiwentiyanjiu, China International Studies |
| China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) | 1980 | 175 | Ministry for State Security | Xianadaguojiguanxi, Contemporary International Relations |
| Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) | 1960 | 82 | Shanghai municipal government, informal ties to Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Guojizhanwang, Global Review |
| Center for American Studies, Fudan University (CAS) | 1985 | 14 | Ministry of Education | Meiguowentiyanjiu |
| Institute of International Relations, School of Int. Studies, BeiDa | 1996 | 51 | Ministry of Education | Guojizhengzhiyanjiu |</p>
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<tr>
<td>Institute for International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU)</td>
<td>1955</td>
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Source Abb, 2009
According to Menegazzi (2015) the Chinese President Xi Jinping in October 2014, called for the development of think-tanks with Chinese characteristics. These remarks go a long way in changing the nature and influence of think-tanks dealing with foreign affairs and economic affairs. For Peiyan (2014) Xi’s call is pregnant with numerous concerns which cannot be stated openly. Firstly, the Chinese government is seeking to channel out a course through which Chinese think-tanks ought to follow. With the changing complexities in the international system, think-tanks find it highly necessary to interact and exchange ideas with other international think-tanks. This presents a great threat to Chinese secretive manner of conducting policymaking. This brings the discussion to the second point in which Xi prefers sticking to the basic socialist ideology and basic foreign policy goals i.e. peaceful co-existence and development, hence the call for think-tanks with Chinese characteristics. In essence Xi is calling for think-tanks to follow the government’s long term strategic plans.

2.3 Foreign Policy Instruments

The institutions discussed above as promoting China’s foreign policy make use of various resources, material or not, at their disposal to influence closer ties with China. These instruments i.e. interest free loans, FDI packages, aid and debt cancellation have been used extensively by China in Africa as a means of attracting African governments to increase her partnership and economic cooperation with China. In discussing these instruments, the objective is to show the extent to which China is committed to partnering African states. It is rather difficult to determine the extent China’s commitment in financial terms since expressing such figures as a percentage of China’s overall GDP or trade with other states would present a totally different image of what is actually happening. The best way, in this case, would consider each instrument individually and determine the significance that such an instrument makes in promoting China’s foreign policy in that respect.

2.3.1 Interest Free Loan and FDI

Interest free loan or rather cheap money and FDI are the most significant foreign policy instruments China applies when dealing with Africa. According to a publication by the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China published in the Xinhua Global Times (2013), China’s FDI destined for Africa, against receding financial activity globally, increased with an impressive 20.5% in 2009. In real terms, FDI increased from US$ 1.44 billion to US$2.52 billion. Cumulatively China’s FDI destined for Africa jumped from US$9.33 billion to US$21.23 billion over the same period. These impressive
growth figures signify that Africa has a development and investment appeal attracting China. It also signifies Africa’s increasing role in China’s foreign policy.

China’s investments are also increasing in Africa with over 2000 Chinese companies now operating in Africa. Chinese companies have invested or partnered with African companies/states in agriculture, mining and construction, resource processing and manufacturing. By 2012 China had entered into bilateral investment treaties (BIT) with 32 African states and established joint economic commission mechanisms with 45 states. The China-Africa Development Fund pledged to support African projects and had invested US$1.806 billion in 53 projects by 2012. During FOCAC IV China pledged financial support to small and medium sized businesses. By 2012, of the promised US$1.213 billion China had already granted loans worth US$666 million (Xinhua Global Times, 2013).

Today they are over forty nine African countries that have framework agreements with the Chinese Exim Bank. But most of these agreements are made with countries where Western finance has been wary for instance Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe and with rich countries such as Botswana and Mauritius (Rotberg, 2008).

2.3.2 Debt Cancellation
Debt cancellations and forgiveness presents one of China’s most attractive foreign policy instruments in Africa, motivated by the level of indebtedness of African countries. Usually they are used in conjunction with low interest loans. China’s debt cancellation exercises have a greater impact and potential for advancing China’s policy goals in Africa than anywhere else in the world. Though analysts have had a difficult time in determining the exact value of debt that China has cancelled in Africa, estimations range from US$ 1.2 billion in 2000, US$ 750 million in 2003, US$ 1.42 billion in 2006 and a further US$ 1 billion by 2007. During his Africa trip President Hu Jintao visited Mozambique announcing the cancellation of US$ 20 million debt. Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing also visited 7 African states in 2007 cancelling debt in several countries. Also from the time FOCAC was launched in 2000, China has cancelled US$ 1.3 billion in African debt (Davies et al, 2008).

2.3.3 Aid packages
Aid packages, according to Lengauer (2011) and Cissé (2012), have since been used by governments to achieve foreign policy goals. China’s aid packages, considered here, are an
instance of such an instrument used to broker closer cooperation. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), development assistance entails grants or loans extended to developing countries undertaken through government to government bodies. The Chinese conception of development assistance does not defer from that used by the DAC but is rather, wider and more ambitious. Instead of being limited to a more state centric model, the Chinese consider development assistance as co-operation in terms of FDI and contracts with Chinese companies and government. This broader definition adopted by Chinese signifies a broad range of policy issues that China endeavours to address in Africa (Davies et al, 2008).

China uses aid and development assistance as a tool to drive forward its grand strategy of deepening cooperation with Africa on political, social and mostly economic fronts. For instance, China uses grants, loans and relief packages alongside commercial investments and preferential trade to gain access to strategic resources and or forge stronger political ties. Also China’s insistence in categorising itself as a developing country is a way of trying not to be compared with other donor countries (developed) such a comparison will render China’s aid lagging (Davies et al, 2008).

Aid packages were part of the instruments used to support China’s 2002 ‘go out strategy’. China’s aid to Africa include provision of office equipment and a web printing press (Zambia), agricultural equipment and irrigation equipment (Zimbabwe), training government officials and military assistance (Ghana), agricultural assistance (Liberia), Uganda Industrial Research Institute and the construction of the 1,721 acre Kibimba rice scheme (Uganda) and technical training in agriculture, tourism, defence and foreign affairs through the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) and Joint Initiatives for Priority Acquisition (JIPSA) (South Africa) (Davies et al, 2008).

2.4 Conclusion

In sum, the discussions presented in this chapter have set the ball rolling for any interesting and intuitive discussion on the China’s foreign policy. It has been noted that China’s re-emergence internationally and especially in Africa has been firmly premised on a strong ideological impetus that pushes for the establishment of a new global political dispensation. Ideologically, China perceives the prevalence of peace both regionally and internationally as crucial in the attainment of this new dispensation. As a result it highlighted the issue of
peaceful development and co-existence as the basis of its conduct internationally. The five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence identifies specific issues and areas in which China’s foreign policy would recognise and implement as a strategy of penetrating and soliciting partnerships with African countries. Further, to complement the rapid and advanced industrial development in the country, China’s foreign policy had to be synchronised in line with the new challenges. As a result, its policies had to identify and be attractive to target states as well as implementing an open-door-policy. Given the complexities in a globalised international system, China brought in sub-national actors that would promote and assist the foreign policy decision-making process. These institutions include the FOCAC, China Exim Bank, Chinese Military, Provinces and Think-Tanks. From the discussion presented on these institutions, it is clear that the FOCAC and the Chinese think-tanks are crucial to the decision-making machinery as compared to the other three, the reason being that, they are tasked with the identifying potential areas in which the other three institutions will then come in to explore. They provide with expert analysis and solutions on foreign policy challenges which would then be implemented by other sub-national institutions promoting Chinese foreign policy. Furthermore, it has been established in the chapter that China’s foreign policy is also sold out, especially in Africa, through the provision of low cost capital and disbursement of aid in developing countries. Lastly, the commissioning of these sub-national actors in foreign policy decision-making and the growing globalisation and complexity of the international political demands the fast evolution of a states foreign policy. The evolution of China’s foreign policy is discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 3  
Changes in China’s Foreign Policy

3. Introduction

The preceding chapter made interesting observations on the manner in which the Chinese go about their international business. It outlined the foundation, trajectory and developments in China’s guiding principles when dealing with other states. Building on the assumptions made in the previous chapter, this chapter makes an initial assumption that China’s foreign policy is not static, but prone to change. Making such a claim, burdens the research to furnish satisfactory evidence to support the assumption, if not, to retract the assumption. Numerous scholars subscribe to the idea of change in foreign policy among them Herman (1990) who argues that ‘change is a pervasive quality of government’s foreign policy.’ But regardless of Herman’s views and that of other scholars, foreign policy studies have paid less attention to the possibility of change in favour of stability and continuity in foreign policy. It was only after the 1980’s that global developments for instance, the formation of the European Union, the demise of the Soviet Union, the spread of democracy as an ordering principle, the Arab spring and the rise to prominence of China, coupled with the need to improve theories that led scholars to begin showing increased interest in why, when and how states need to reorient their foreign policies. These questions allow us to evaluate foreign policy decision making and to identify factors that influence and challenge it.

The chapter proceeds by firstly, presenting a brief discussion on one of the most neglected terms in foreign policy analysis, foreign policy change (Huxsoll, 2003). The discussion outlines the various theoretical models of foreign policy change that have been proposed by different scholars. But, although these models by Herman (1990), Goldman (1998), Calsnaes (1992), Skidmore and Rosati form the basis and backbone of any study in foreign policy change, the research focuses on the model presented by Joakim Eidenfalk (2006) as the most relevant when applied to China’s relations with Africa. This model is further refined by adding the manner in which foreign policy changes occur. This entails determining whether the change is along/within an existing policy framework or is it a complete change from one policy to another. For these models to be operational, various factors that compel leaders and governments to institute foreign policy are discussed. These factors vary from domestic, regional and international sources of change. Thirdly, making use of the influencing factors just discussed, the chapter analyses different instances in which China is said to have instituted changes in her foreign policy towards Africa. The analysis is presented within the
context of Eidenfalk’s model and the changes identified would determine whether the changes are within or from the policy framework guided by the principles and institutions discussed in chapter two. In concluding the chapter, the research looks at the possible implications that arise from China’s foreign policy changes, the application of these implications is the focus of the next chapter.

3.1 Models of Foreign Policy Change
In its general form, the notion of change has enjoyed relative controversies in the manner in which it is defined. The controversy emanates from the way it is entangled and married to its synonym, shift. In the most basis sense, the two are similar, they all hint on a certain form of movement. But, it is the nature of this movement that this chapter is more concerned about. Although the element of a movement is present in both, the research defines change as a minor movement within the confines of an existing policy, whilst, a shift would refer to a major movement from an existing policy to a completely different one. What differentiates the two is the degree of movement. In as much as this analysis seems far-fetched, it is of crucial importance and resonates in most of the models discussed below. This differentiation helps us in determining the exact policy movement in China’s foreign policy towards Africa and whether it is a complete deviation from its traditional policies or a minor movement along/within its traditional foreign policy framework.

Given the above discussion, no one definition can appropriately capture the idea of change in foreign policy. Instead Gustafson (1999) notes that various authors understand and explain the notion of change in foreign policy in many different ways. For instance, Goldman (1992) defines change as ‘either a new act in a given situation or a given act in a situation previously associated with a given act’ and Holsti (1982) consider it as a ‘dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations.’ These two definitions explain the same phenomenon not only in different words but also in varying degrees in which change occurs. The following models explain the framework in which states are influenced or coerced to initiate foreign policy changes. Even though, these different approaches resemble each other, they are based on either the source or resultant change in foreign policy.

The first model of foreign policy change, we consider, was proposed by Holsti (1982). Holsti’s model argues for a specific mode of foreign policy change that is, restructuring which he defines as the ‘the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external
relations.’ His model limits its scope to one form of extreme change in foreign policy. Further, changes resulting from restructuring are different from any other normal type of change which occur slowly and in an incremental manner. Rather, restructuring is characterised by its fast pace, need for fundamental changes and non-incremental tendency. Applying the definitions of change set out above, Holsti advocates for a shift instead of a change in foreign policy.

To capture the dramatic overhaul manner in which change occurs in his model Holsti developed four types of foreign policy categories in which states fall under if his model is applied. These categories include isolation, dependence, self-reliance and non-alignment. Holsti makes use of these four categories to examine external, domestic, historical, cultural variables and the policymaking process as a way to determine why states restructure their foreign policies. Interpreting this model, states that fall in different categories or that face different circumstances in terms of pressures from external, domestic, historical, cultural variables, are most likely to behave differently when it comes to restructuring their foreign policies (Huxsoll, 2003).

Next, is Herman’s model that analyses foreign policy change from the view of an actor within the international political system. He argues for what he calls ‘self-correcting change’ which entails an actor’s own initiative to change a country’s foreign policy course. Much like Holsti, Herman considers foreign policy change as an action oriented initiative targeting a certain program that produces four possible changes. These include adjustment changes which are quantitative in nature, program changes which are qualitative, problem/goal changes which change the purpose of foreign policy, and international orientation changes which are the most extreme form of change and entail a complete redirection of a state’s orientation (Herman, 1990). Unlike Holsti’s model that is restricted to the most extreme forms of change, Herman’s model has a mild approach and suggests an incremental manner through which change occurs.

Goldman (1982) presents a slightly different view in which to analyse foreign policy change. His model is based more on the probability of source factors affecting change that is, he argues more on the process and not the resulting change as Holsti and Herman did. In essence Goldman’s model is based on stabilisers located in the policymaking system and is designed to try to address foreign policy problems i.e. ‘what factors determine whether, when, and to
what extent pressure for change in a policy will in fact produce change.’ Goldman considers how stabilisers interact with sources of foreign policy change as well as sources of decision making to produce a change in the foreign policy of a country. By stabilisers he refers to variables that affect the possibility of an event to trigger the process of change while a source is the event that triggers the process. The assumption here is that, the absence of stabilisers will make foreign policy sensitive to sources (Huxsoll, 2003).

Other models of foreign policy change include those proposed by Rosati (1994) and Skidmore. Rosati’s model recognises that periods of stability are regularly followed by periods of transition. Although his observation of the interplay between stability and transition are more or less common knowledge, he goes on further to specify the gradual manner in which foreign policy changes occur. He identifies levels in which policies can change as intensification, refinement, reform and restructuring which correspond respectively to little changes, minor changes, moderate changes and major changes in foreign policy goals, strategy and objectives.

On the other hand, Skidmore argues that changes in foreign policy are dictated by a state’s internal and external strength that is, how a state perceives its economic and military power in relation to other states. His concern is more on the pace through which policy changes occur, thus he differentiates between sporadic and evolutionary change (Gustafson, 1999).

Regardless of the persuasive authority of all the models presented above, the model that adequately captures and advances the main discussion on China’s changing foreign policy towards African, is the ‘extent of change’ model presented by Joakim Eidenfalk (2006). This model is most suitable to analyse the China-Africa relationship due to its balanced approach when considering factors and actors in the policymaking process. Eidenfalk encompassed factors like the media, public opinion, global and regional dimensions and the role of leaders in opening windows of opportunity. All these factors were either previously side-lined or had no significant influence in other theoretical models.

The ultimate goal of any theoretical model is to breakdown a given phenomenon into simple and understandable terms. In like manner, by incorporating all possible factors in his model Eidenfalk (2006) made it relatively easy to clarify why foreign policy changes and explain that change is not only influenced by a single factor but an eclectic array of factors.
Considering these factors, individually, it also enhances our capacity to understand why countries change their foreign policies. Eidenfalk further warns against the tendency of merely stating the factors that influence the policy process, stressing, instead, the importance of the interactions and influence that these factors have on each other as well as on the actors in the policy process in understanding why foreign policies change and the accompanying policy effects. He called his model the ‘extent of change’ in that it ‘looks at the scope, domain, and effects of change, thereby measuring the extent of change.’ Unlike other models, Eidenfalk’s concentrate on the ‘dimensions and aspects of change itself.’

3.2 Factors Influencing Changes in China’s foreign Policy
The most relevant question to ask, is ‘why’ China’s foreign policy towards African states has changed. Given the hierarchical and tedious processes that characterise the policymaking process especially in democratic states, there has to be genuine and pressing reasons demanding for change. This section addresses and highlights the conditions which facilitate and necessitate change in a state’s foreign policy. These factors are categorised into domestic and international factors. Domestic factors consider the internal political and economic dynamics in China that push for or compel the government to adjust its policies whilst international push and pull factors emanate from the international system. The significance of this section is captured by Herman (1990) when he observed that changes that institute a reversal or redirection in a state’s foreign policy are important because of the demands they place on the instituting government as well as the consequences they pose for other countries.

3.2.1 Changes in the Domestic Structural System
Domestic constituencies are also important in determining whether a state’s foreign policy changes or not. Herman (1990) defines domestic constituencies as those ‘entities which are necessary to authorise the legitimate survival of a regime.’ These range from but not limited to interest groups, members of political parties, military officers, landowners and civilian associations. The effect and impact these constituencies have on the policy process arises when there is a change in preferences of these players or in the relationship between these players and the governing regime. This fallout, in most cases triggers the need for changes in foreign policy. Such a condition renders foreign policy dependent on the stable relationship between domestic political constituents and the regime in place. An upset in the system will produce a change in foreign policy.
Although foreign policy is a preserve of the state, in China, domestic constituencies, as defined above, have not contributed much to the foreign policymaking environment. This may be due to the communist style of governance that suppresses certain freedoms of these actors. As a result, not much is known about such constituencies. Yun Sun (2012) explores how the invisible hand of the Chinese government has effectively undermined the influence of public opinion on foreign policy. She is convinced that the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy has been reversed. Her expectation is for public opinion to command strong influence on the direction of foreign policy, yet in China, as Yun points out, it is the government that shapes and directs public opinion. The government through the Propaganda Department of the CCP controls all media outlets to the extent that it decides what and how news on crucial foreign policy issues is to be expressed on national news networks and papers. Regardless of all these efforts to suppress public opinion, Sun argues that ‘expressions of Chinese nationalism are becoming increasingly vocal and frequent [urging] Beijing to stand up against hostile foreign forces or it will lose legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens.’ Although Sun referred to other international events to support her argument, similar cases concerning events in Africa may have occurred but no written evidence exists.

The business community presents another source of pressure on the government to deepen cooperation with Africa and to cushion Chinese investments made on the continent. Regardless of the relative scarcity in accurate statistics on the number of companies operating in Africa, approximate figures used in this research do not deviate from the point to be made. The increasing number of commercial companies and individual business interests intending to invest in Africa signify mounting pressure on the Chinese government to devise policies that enable the realisation of such interests. China’s Ministry of Commerce of the Peoples Republic of China (MOFCOM) officially received 1346 applications from companies that were interested in investing in Africa between 1988 and 2010 (Wenbin & Wilkes, 2011). Today approximately 2000 companies are operating in Africa (MOFCOM, 2013). The National Oil Companies (NOCs) (CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC and Sinochem) (Alden & Alves, 2009) and Chinese construction companies (Cottle, 2014) are among some of the big companies spearheading the Africa investment drive and constantly pushing the government to create a conducive environment for business in Africa.
Other domestic constituencies pushing the same agenda include opportunistic individuals intending to establish small enterprises in Africa. On the other hand, Chinese civilians at present perceive their government’s generosity and investments in Africa as returning greater economic benefits to the country and that such benefits will eventually trickle down in form of better economic conditions. The moment these civilians realise that their expectations are least likely to be fulfilled, the relationship with the government can change. Further, considering the fragile legitimacy of the CCP, the government cannot disregard the concerns of these groups (Medeiros, 2009).

Another domestic factor considered when analysing foreign policy change is the bureaucratic manner in which governance and decision making is carried out in a given state. Bureaucratic processes entails that, information is collected and analysed by professionals working in an organisation and policy decisions are made by ministers or senior officials in government departments. Herman argues that the organisational structure of the government and political parties acts to oppose and resist change in foreign policy. Thus any change in foreign policy has to be stronger than the opposing power of the political administration and processes of existing governments. The greater the shift the more resistance the policy is likely to face (Herman, 1990).

Even though foreign policy making proceeds in both top-down and bottom-up approaches in China, important and crucial policy issues remain the domain of the apex in China’s Communist party. China’s Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee, the Central (Committee) Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce debate foreign policy issues at the national level but whether or not a policy is adopted depends on the seven men Standing Committee of the Politburo. Badkar (2012) strengthens this view when she deliberated on the internal dynamics of the PSC. She states that the possibility for change has been greatly affected by the relegation of Wang Qishan, a strong advocate of change, to the least influential position in the PSC. Also, the bureaucratic structure bears testimony of Herman’s argument that, the steeper the bureaucracy the more resistant change becomes. A perfect example of such resistance will be established later in the chapter when the Chinese official confirms that China’s foreign policy remains the same regardless of having exhibited actions that suggest otherwise (Verhoeven, 2014).
Doeser (2013) argues that foreign policy change can also be a result of a single initiative by the state leaders. He notes that this type of policy change ‘is the result of an authoritative policy-maker, frequently the head of government, who imposes his own vision of the basic redirection necessary in foreign policy.’ It is the leaders’ vision and determination, which is important in determining changes in foreign policy. A leader’s determination towards a complete/minor change, in his/her country’s foreign policy can be assessed by the leaders energy (enthusiasm to do something), power (entail the skills and experience of the leader) and conviction (unwavering belief in something) to convince other actors to change course. It is apparent from this interpretation that, the possibility of change occurring in this manner is slim considering the amount of effort and expertise required to institute such changes. Deng Xiaoping’s transformation of China from the ideological and confrontational conduct during Mao’s era, to emphasise more on economic openness, integration and friendly partnership, somehow fits Doeser’s conception of leader driven foreign policy change (Botchway, 2011). But the timeframe in which Deng’s changes occurred fallout of the scope of this research. Xi Jinping’s greatest challenges in Africa concerns security, for Chinese investments, citizens as well as Africa peace and security. The challenges create a window of opportunity that he could explore, but Xi’s own initiative in this regard is yet to be determined. Since his inauguration, China has adopted a more assertive stance in Africa by engaging directly in diplomatic negotiations and through deploying combat troops in conflict zones, but this cannot be attributed to his name (Sun, 2014).

3.2.2 Changes in the International System
States do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they exist and interact with each other in a community. Blavoukos & Bourantonis (2014) uphold that changes in the foreign policy of a state that actively participates in this community (international system) can be a result of the socialising effect of being part of the system. By virtue of being active in the international system, China is subject to the effects of these two factors. The conflict in Sudan captures the effect of these two agents of change with regards to China. The mounting international pressure that China (as a member of the UNSC and aspiring global leader) act responsibly in Sudan signifies the socialising component (Meidan, 2006) while the increased incidence of civil war, refugees, terrorism and poverty in the country and in many locations across Africa have a bearing on the structure of the international system, specifically on sovereignty which binds the system together (Delbrück, 2001). Chinese interests in Sudan are to a greater extent economic and guided by China’s foreign policy goal of non-interference. But escalating
violence and security threats to Chinese citizens presents substantial political risks to China’s
goal of peacefully securing oil for its burgeoning domestic economy. These structural
changes in the international system prompted China to change the policies it applies in its
interactions and operations in Sudan (Bradbury, 2012/13).

Explaining the socialising effect further, constructivist theory dictates that continued and
deeper interaction between and among states has the power to alter behaviour, in this case, a
states behaviour in the international system is portrayed by its foreign policy. Assuming that
every organisation has its own normative and cultural basis, membership in such an
organisation entails observation and strict adherence to the organisations values, norms and
culture. The probability or a state’s propensity to change its foreign policy due to the
socialising effect depends on how the state is embedded in the organisation. The more
involved it is, the higher the chances of a state embracing the values of that organisation and
in like manner, changing its policies to suit the expectations of its member states. The
opposite holds true for states that are not closely involved with the organisation (Blavoukos
& Bourantonis, 2014). Previously, not many expectations were placed on China
internationally in terms of its behaviour and contribution to the global political system. This
was due to its less involvement and position. But as China continues to rise in rank,
positioning itself as a major force and global leader in economic and security issues, other
states now expect Beijing to act and behave like a ‘responsible major power’ (Medeiros,
2009). Coerced in this way, China is presented with a window of opportunity to adjust its
policies to suit the prevailing norms in its environment.

Blavoukos & Bourantonis (2014) suggest that a state’s conflicting relations with other states
produce a crisis situation which presents a window of opportunity through which foreign
policy changes can be made. This point can be refined further, redefining conflict to
encompass competition in the positive sense. 21st century globalisation has ushered a new era
in which China and the US, including other Western states that have economic and political
interests in Africa, are in constant competition over resources, markets and political alliances
in Africa (Walker, 2008). In introducing his thesis, Walker points out that the US was
reluctant to make long-term strategic investments in Africa after the Cold. Coupled with the
conditionality’s that accompany Western investments and aid in Africa, China saw a window
of opportunity (Selbervik, 1999), through which it could counter and secure the much need
natural resources from the continent. China then re-aligned its policies towards Africa to
include a package of interest free and low interest concessional loans, debt cancellation and capacity development programmes.

3.3 Encroaching Boundaries: Signs of Change

This section presents the most important discussion of the research, particularly the discussion on the actual changes in China’s policies towards Africa. The preceding section and chapters established the framework, theoretical and factual basis on which one can then derive that a change in policy has indeed been observed or recorded. The section suggests that China’s foreign policy changed in three different aspects. Firstly, it argues for a change from single and condition free aid to a strategy that is based on win-win cooperation. The second instance considers the shift from non-interference to active engagement with African states and lastly, the shift from ideological cooperation to pragmatic considerations. All these changes are then summed up to determine the extent of change required by the modified Eidenfalk model of foreign policy change.

3.3.1 Cooperation Strategies: A Transition from Single-Aid to a Win-win Scenario

The primary concern behind China’s relations with Africa is the adherence and realisation of the five principles guiding its foreign policy. But, out of the five principles, China’s actions, judged through state visits and financial commitments, mutual economic development ranks higher than subsequent commitments to eradicate poverty and ensure independence in Africa. The research argues that China’s foreign policy has transformed in three phases i.e. from provision of single-aid to exchanges of economic development experience to adopt the recent win-win posture that China applies in Africa today (Anshan, 2007). To illustrate how this form of cooperation changed, the research presents the discussion of the three phases in the order that they have been named.

According to a 2011 White Paper on China’s foreign aid, China began assisting developing countries with financial and material assistance just after the founding of the PRC in the 1950’s. The purpose of China’s aid, during this period, was to ‘strengthen [the recipient country’s] self-development capacity, enrich and improve their people’s livelihood, and promote their economic growth and social progress.’ The 1964 declaration of the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries provided the premises on which China provided foreign aid to other countries. The core principles on provision for foreign aid include ‘equality, mutual benefit and no strings attached.’ After
being carried to the United Nations by African countries, China increased its assistance to Africa. For instance, China committed itself to the completion of, one of China’s greatest legacies in Africa, the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) and various other high impact infrastructural development projects on the continent (UNICEF, 2011). Another example of free aid was the assistance China gave to African political parties during their liberation struggles. Egypt was the first African country in 1956 to receive this kind of assistance from China (FOCAC, 2015).

According to Anshan (2007) during the 1993 African Development Tokyo International Conference, African leaders suggested that traditional aid was less efficient in ensuring self-sufficiency on the continent. They suggested and encouraged foreign donors to provide development assistance and foreign investment that would enhance developing productivity on the continent. Such concerns confirm what Hu Yaobang pointed out a decade before when he this remark, ‘as for the economic assistance, the method of total present is disadvantageous to both sides, judging from historical experience.’ Hu’s claim marked the turning point in the evolution of China’s aid policy. On one side it clearly explains how China provided its aid i.e. aid as presents where no return was expected. Following this, China began reorienting its aid policies and trying new forms of aid. For instance, after realising Africans incompetency to operate and maintain projects it had financed under the total present aid policy, China became hands on in the operations and training of staff at the Aniye Sugar Plant in Togo and Segu Textile Plant in Mali.

Capacity building schemes and economic exchange programmes were meant to revolutionise the effectiveness of China’s aid presents as well as equip African governments and professionals with the necessary technological, management skills and experience necessary to initiate and manage development in their own countries. As stated earlier, China as a developed developing country identifies with African countries and considers herself as a brother to other developing states, hence is in a better position to demonstrate to its African counterparts how to successfully develop their economies. China organised seminars in which it trained African professionals. One such seminar was the 2003 Seminar on Economic Reform and Development Strategies that attracted twenty two officials from sixteen African countries and seven from the African Development Bank (Anshan, 2007). Furthermore, the FOCAC agreements and pledges targeted to establish an African Human Resources
Development Fund, train 10,000, 15,000 and 20,000 African professionals in 2003, 2006 and 2009 respectively as well as to provide 18,000 scholarships to Africans to study in China.

The last and most comprehensive instance of change in China’s aid towards Africa is evident in how China now applies a win-win scenario when providing aid to Africa instead of the traditional presents (Anshan, 2007). A win-win scenario entails the realisation of the need to derive mutual benefits from partnership. This implies that China’s aid would provide for African interests in much the same way as did traditional aid provided in form of free presents. The difference now is that, previously unaccounted for and marginalised Chinese interests in Africa are factored in the benefit equation. This new policy requires the identification of China’s interests in providing aid, which includes guaranteed trade in natural resources and other commercial and geopolitical considerations. African countries on the other hand, require capital to develop their economies, favourable trading conditions as well as less pressure and conditions attached to aid. The Chinese have succeeded in this regard in that, unlike other donor countries, they have managed to identify and master what Africa wants and are sticking to that. The ‘Angola Model’ perfectly resembles the kind of win-win strategy present in current aid packages to Africa.

According to Sun (2014) in Angola, aid towards infrastructural development in form of concessional loans is tied to China’s access to mineral resources. Zhao (2011) further describes the situation, asserting that although Western oil companies ‘ChevronTexaco (US), ExxonMobil (US), TotalFinaElf (France), BP (UK), and Agip/Eni (Italy),’ have more stake in Angolan oil, the China’s National Oil Companies (NOCs) is increasingly gaining hold in Angola with its deals backed by loans, credit lines and infrastructure development projects. For instance, in 2004 China extended US$ 2 billion credit to Angola in retain for production rights in Block 3/80, in 2005 China provided a US$ 2 billion loan to Angola in exchange for oil and again in 2007 China extended a US$ 2.5 billion credit line to Angola. In as much as China’s aid strategy can be despise, the strategy not only benefits China but provides Angola with the much needed foreign investment and low interest and interest free loans necessary to jump start African economies.

The same scenario occurred in Nigeria where China promised US$ 7 billion in investments if Nigeria grants Chinese NOCs to operate in the country (Sautman & Hairong, 2007). In Zimbabwe, Anjin’s permission to mine diamonds in the country was contingent on its
construction of the Zimbabwe Defence College (Chikuhwa, 2013). Numerous other instances in which China ties aid to resources exist in Africa but such references are difficult to come by given the secretive manner in which they are concluded.

The institutionalisation of FOCAC meetings, outlined in Table 1 chapter two, was a way of officialising, operationalising and implementing the win-win strategy. For instance FOCAC I to V outlined aid strategies that ensured mutual economic benefit for both China and Africa. Africa’s capital concerns were addressed through debt cancelation outlined in FOCAC I, II and IV. Assistance with favourable trading conditions were realised through establishment of special economic, tariff-free and duty-free zones outlined in all FOCAC meetings. The promise to establish an African Fund, provision of billions of dollars in concessional loans and interest free loans reinforce Africa’s continued close alliance with China.

Lastly trade statistics portray a clear picture for mutual beneficial relations as well. China Africa trade figures increased remarkably from US$10.6 billion in 2000 rising to US$18.545 billion by 2003, reaching US$198.49 billion in 2012 (Chinese White Paper, 2013) and US$200 billion in 2014 (MOFCOM, 2015). Although discourses on trade relations at times suggest that China stands to benefit more, as the stronger power in this partnership, such texts shy away from quantifying the benefits accruing to Africa in terms of employment opportunities, sector development, access to resources and capacity building. Further, the impact of increases in trade figures is highest in Africa compared to China. This follows the fact that a one dollar (in US$ terms or any currency) gain for someone with a hundred dollars does not have the same impact as a one dollar gain for someone who has ten dollars. In fact, the first instance has a tenfold impact compared to the second instance.

3.3.2 Shift from Non-Interference to Active Engagement

Although this section could perfectly fall under the discussion on ideological shifts it is presented as an independent instance, owing, to its strong evidence supporting instances of a shift in China’s foreign policy. If presented in the same category as ideological shifts there is a risk of having the discussion overshadowing other instances of ideological shifts as presented below.

Although China’s non-interference strategy is not a new phenomenon, it has emerged to be the centre stage for most contemporary debates on the burgeoning China Africa relations.
Some analysts praise the strategy for its strict observation of basic human rights of freedom and sovereignty of nation states whilst most opposing Western literature demonises it for turning a blind eye on human rights abuses. By prioritising human rights over sovereignty, the Western view has the effect of mandating external intervention to ensure human security. It is apparent, from this observation that China’s non-interference approach is considered to be an ‘irresponsible see no evil approach’ that paralyses efforts towards democratisation in Africa (Alden & Large, 2013; Osondu, 2013).

China has repeatedly defended itself and its non-intervention strategy, arguing that attempts to link democracy and human rights to economic partnerships is instead, a violation of sovereign rights of independent states. China’s Deputy Foreign Minister in 2004 confirmed China’s position on this issue whilst addressing the Sudan crisis. He stated that China does not mix business with politics as a result China has no right to intervene in the internal processes in Sudan. For instance, in 2004 China blocked a United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564 which was meant to impose sanctions on Khartoum, to stop the mass killing of innocent civilians. Such actions have prompted analysts to question what China refers to as business. In this instance China’s business refers to where its political and economic interests are vested. China has business interests in Sudanese oil and will not have politics jeopardise its venture. The same can be argued for China’s relationship with Zimbabwe (Osondu, 2013).

Strict adherence to non-interference even when risking international ridicule, does not imply that China has so much respect for and high expectations for ideology or the principles of co-existence that guide its conduct internationally. As it will be established in the next section, ideology is not static but in constant flux, especially when responding to global development in the political-economy. If stripped of the ideological impetus, non-interference remains an issue of strategy, in which case the self-motivated interest of China to conduct its business in a particular state. It is this self-interest that China is willing to defend at all costs and not ideology or the seemingly over-emphasised concern for sovereign independence of states. As a result, China’s non-interference posture is not static but prone to shifts depending on the prevailing conditions in China’s business environment.

The principles of co-existence that harbour the contested non-interference stance adopted by China when dealing with African states has recently been subjected to great international pressure. As Meidan (2006) asserts, this pressure emanates mostly from Western states that have become impatient and frustrated at China ‘free riding’ tendencies and now suggest that
it acts as a ‘responsible stakeholder’. As a result, cracks in the policy or signs of shifts in China’s policy have since been apparent. This has been necessitated by China’s growing integration and position in the international system. Despite China’s earlier reluctance to apply pressure on Khartoum, China has become a key player in negotiating cease fire and in deploying peacekeepers in conflict areas in Africa. China today, has the largest number of peacekeepers serving in UN Missions compared to any other UN Security Council members (Tjønneland, 2014).

China application of the non-interference principle has been largely selective. Adherence to the principle is influenced by national interest. For instance China moved from non-interference to active engagement when faced with a potential boycott of the 2008 Olympics, a landmark event that Beijing considered as a platform to export its culture and identity. China negotiated with Sudan so it accepts the UN-African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in an agreement in Ethiopia. To achieve this, China promised debt cancellation and construction of a presidential palace for president Al-Bashir. Prioritisation of interests in China’s foreign policy ranked higher than ideology here. Regardless of numerous and constant critics on its non-interference posture, China only resolved to take heed of international outcry in Sudan only in the event when it felt comfortable to do so i.e. when a higher priority than economic interests presented itself, changing the political landscape (Osondu, 2013).

China’s expanding commercial interests on the continent are faced with numerous challenges. These problems arise from issues of governance, terrorism, corruption, protection of Chinese workers and citizens, reputational risks and numerous other political risk vulnerabilities. Terrorism is one such illustration of the likely challenges emanating in Africa and challenging China’s political and economic prospects on the continent. These developments in turn compel China to rethink its foreign policies to suit and enable its continued existence in such risky environments (Tjønneland, 2014). Beijing’s initial response to international pressures was tentative and gradualist at first (Alden & Large, 2013).

Interestingly, officials in Beijing continue and argue that China still strictly adheres to the principle of non-interference. They instead, point out that in dealing with international relations issues, cases differ and so does their responses, we presume. Going along with such thought will lead to absurd conclusions i.e. that the prescription of foreign policies is but a futile exercise if application and response to differing circumstances in the international
system, which in this case is the ground in which such policies are tested, do not warrant the same response guided by a certain policy (Verhoeven, 2014).

Even if we are to grant China’s defence, benefit of doubt, allowing for the possibility of exceptions, outliers or in the phrasing of Nassim Nicholas Taleb ‘black swans.’ Verhoeven’s argument that, ‘how many exceptions does it take before establishing an identifiable pattern’ disapproves China’s claim of consistency in its foreign policy. Further, the discovery of just one black swan in Australia, according to Taleb, was enough to cast aside the existing theory that all swans were white. China’s conduct in Sudan is a classic instance of such an outlier. The question now is does the Sudan case not count as a black swan, capable of overturning a predominant theory? Taleb proposes that we look beyond the facial presentation of things when he said ‘our reactions, our mode of thinking, our intuitions, depend on the context in which the matter is presented, whereas black swans come from a context greatly beyond the norm.’ Such a suggestion is relevant in foreign policy analysis as well; especially where China’s insistence that it still adheres to the principle of non-interference blinds us of the actual subtle policy shifts that it has already initiated in the background (Giles, 2007; Verhoeven, 2014).

After the 2013 outbreak of civil war in Sudan, Chinese diplomats actively engaged Salva Kiir and Riek Machar to get them to sign a cease fire agreement. This marked the first time China broke out of its illusory and ideal international system to confront real issues that warrant global attention. Observing this shift in normal Chinese protocols, Zhong Jianhua, the Chinese Special Envoy for African Affairs referred to the Sudan conflict as a ‘game changer’. Fabricius (2014) further elaborated Zhong Jianhua’s surprise at China’s new course of action. In his article Fabricius quoted Zhong as saying, ‘I think for the last two or three decades we were quite rigid about non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, in such a typical domestic conflict, we try to avoid making direct contact with the opposition...when you talk to a rebel force that means stepping into internal affairs.’

Summing up the above discussion, Tiezzi (2015) observed that China became involved in an unprecedented action when it got involved in the mediation and negotiations in Sudan. Unlike earlier, where China used to distance itself from interfering in other countries, China now implements a gradualist approach of ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones.’ This
implies that China is experimenting with active participation in global politics i.e. intervening in other states gradually (Liu, 2014) testing if it works.

### 3.3.3 Ideological Cooperation to Pragmatic Considerations

Anshan (2007) acknowledges the close relationship between China’s foreign policy and its ideology. In fact, for Wang, China’s ideology works as the guiding principle and cornerstone of how China interacts with other global states, in this case African countries. The research assumes, at this point, that this linkage between ideology and China’s foreign policy is a possible faulting area given the fact that ideology is prone to evolve. The research argues that, if ideology, as the guiding principle of foreign policy, evolves foreign policy will follow suit. As a result, the link between these two factors presents one of the most notable and significant instance in which China has shifted from the way it normally interacts and engages African states.

Before the 1980’s China’s relations with Africa were strongly motivated by ideological deliberations, specifically directed towards curtailing Soviet expansionism, European colonialism and American imperialism in Africa. Zhou Enlai’s 1964 tour of Africa confirmed China’s interest in assisting African political parties and declaring Africa as the ideological ‘battleground with Washington and Moscow’ (Mohan & Power, 2008). Following such commitments, the CCP sponsored and supported radical African liberation parties with rhetorical financial and military training and equipment (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). These parties include the South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa (Worden, 1986), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in Mozambique, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) amongst many others (MLM Revolutionary Study Group, 2007). China’s continent-wide coverage shows the level of commitment it had towards realising its ideology and more importantly, the achievement of the objectives and goals that mandated its presence in Africa.

According to Anshan (2007) against previous instances in the 1950-1960’s in which the CCP refused to partner with non-communist political parties in Africa, the 1982 CCP party conference ushered a new strategy for engaging other progressive political parties. The strategy included guiding principles such as ‘independent, equal, respect for each other and
non-interference in internal affairs,’ which are principles motivated by the 1954 principles of peaceful coexistence. Mohan & Power shared the same view as Anshan pointing out that Mao and Enlai’s era paid special attention to ideology and applied ideology in establishing the principles that were to govern cooperation and provision of aid to developing countries. China’s ideology cocooned the notions of independence and nationalism, ethical values that were meant to enhance the image of China in Africa while at the same time demonising the West and its ideologies of domination based on colonialism and imperialism (Mohan & Power, 2008).

These positive trends in the manner in which the CCP engaged African countries were no longer driven by ideology as highlighted at the beginning of this section. This deviation from ideology reconfigures China’s Africa relations and three interpretations to this effect can be raised. In the first instance, cooperation with African governments is no longer based on socialist ideology, but now includes all parties regardless of their ideological stand points. Partnership with Africa is no longer based on party politics but now encompass interaction between sub national actors like Ministries of Trade, Finance and Foreign Affairs, NGO’s, multinational cooperation’s and individual provinces. Lastly, there is no specific focus on ruling parties and non-ruling parties (Anshan, 2007).

In essence, China’s foreign policy shifted from the Cold war ideology to a more pragmatic and ‘classical pursuit of economic self-interest in the form of access to raw materials and the construction of spheres of influence through investment, trade and military assistance.’ The FOCAC signifies a combination of all these pragmatic considerations and the numerous pledges made by China shows its commitments to this new strategy. The move from ideological emphasis also changed the strategy through which China sought partnership with its African counterparts. It ‘gradually changed its tactics from confrontation to co-operation, from revolution to economic development, and from isolation to international engagement’ (Mohan & Power, 2008).

3.4 Applying Eidenfalk’s Model of Foreign Policy Change
Eidenfalk stressed that any analysis of foreign policy change has to be balanced in the manner in which it considers factors that affect or influence changes in foreign policy. In the section on factors influencing China’s foreign policy change, domestic and international factors i.e. role of public opinion, business interests, government bureaucracy, China’s
competition with Western states and the socialising effect of being integrated in the community of states (UN), are taken into consideration. These factors do not operate independently instead influence one another. For instance, demands from commercial interests and increasing nationalism compel the government to shorten bureaucratic processes and hasten foreign policy changes. The impact of these domestic factors on foreign policy is not significant given the style of governance in China i.e. civilian concerns do not affect the policymaking process. On the other hand, factors emanating from the international system wield great influence and have a higher propensity to inspire change. Such influence derives from the fact that, they affect the identity or image of the country. In this case, the steepness of China’s foreign policy bureaucracy, public opinion, increasing intentions of individual and large cooperation’s intentions to extend their operations to Africa are all represented by China’s existing foreign policy. A change in the structure of the international system, brought about by security threats in the form of civil war, refugees, terrorism and poverty, require states immediate action, mandated by the collective action element that defines characteristics of expected state behaviour in the contemporary international system. Defying these expectations mandates criticism by other states. China has been a recipient of such critics, which have affected its image as a potential global leader. In addressing such negative perceptions on its image, China recently shifted its foreign policy from the non-interventionist stance to a proactive one.

This close interaction and blending of source factors influencing foreign policy change determine the extent to which foreign policy changes. From the instances of change discussed above and drawing from the earlier discussion and differentiation of a change and a shift in foreign policy, China changed its foreign policy from that of disbursing aid in form of presents to a strategy that returns economic and political benefits back to Beijing. This move did not significantly deviate from China’s foreign policy. Instead, it only changed the goals and objectives within the same aid policy framework. The move from non-interference to active engagement is regarded as a shift and not a change in China’s foreign policy. This becomes an issue of categorisation. For instance, the non-interference principle is codified in the five principles guiding China’s international conduct but active engagement is not. Since the two are not classified in the same category, the movement cannot be regarded as a change but a compete shift in China’s policy from one category to the other.
3.5 Conclusion

This chapter identified and conceptualised the idea of change in a state’s foreign policy as an important and central anchor of this research. As opposed to the traditional belief in a continuing and static foreign policy, the chapter advocates that more attention be directed towards the possibility of changes taking place in a country’s foreign policy orientation. Policy changes may have potential negative consequences attached to it. The chapter presented a brief discussion on six models through which changes in foreign policy can be analysed. These models differ mainly in the extent in which the perceived change occur. Holsti presents the most extreme model that advocates for a complete restructuring of a state’s foreign policy. The extent of change decreases in intensity in Herman, Goldman, Rosati, Skidmore and Eidenfalk’s models, respectively. Eidenfalk’s model is identified as the most suitable model in analysing changes in China’s Africa policy because of its balanced viewpoint as well as its emphasis on bringing out the extent of change. From this model, domestic and international factors that influence the policy changes are explored. The research established that international more than domestic factors, in China’s circumstances, place more demands on the evolution of its foreign policy. The constructivist notion of socialisation and structural changes in the international system has contributed more towards China’s changed international behaviour. As a result China’s foreign policy towards Africa has transformed from providing aid as presents to aid provided on a win-win basis. Also transformation is apparent in China’s more assertive conduct in Africa as well as in how it has moved from ideological towards pragmatic considerations. These changes in China’s policies may have negative consequences in Africa. The following chapter considers the possible consequences emanating from such changes.
Chapter 4
The Consequences of a Shift/Change in China’s Foreign Policy: The Case of Zimbabwe

4. Introduction

It has been established in the previous chapter that China has recently shifted/changed or is in the process of shifting from the traditional way she used to conduct herself in the international community to a new and unprecedented approach towards international politics. Although Chinese government officials insist that China has not ushered a new foreign policy path, the black swans argument presented by Nassim Nicholas Taleb suggest otherwise. This chapter develops the argument further. It argues that these shifts in China’s foreign policy i.e. the shift from non-intervention to direct intervention in the internal political dynamics of African countries and from ideological based cooperation to pragmatic considerations, has a number of consequences attached to it. The main objective here is to prove that, due to the increased integration and deepening of relations between most African countries and China, any shift in the policies that are holding this relationship together is likely to produce negative political and economic effects on African countries.

The chapter will proceed by firstly, outlining the possible economic and political consequences that can result from the policy shift. It is worth mentioning that these consequences are forecasted and not actual consequences that have been experienced in Africa. This clarification implies that the research findings do not form or test any theory but serve as guidelines and a toolkit, to inform readers and audiences of this piece of the possible disadvantages accruing from close partnership with China. Next, the research considers the single case study of Zimbabwe. The aim is to determine whether the consequences outlined in the first section apply in the African context. China’s close ties with Zimbabwe, a pariah state, makes the selection of Zimbabwe as a case study uncontested. The paper goes on further to discuss the background of the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe post 2000, the development of Sino-Africa relations and identifies geopolitics, political ambitions and trade as the factors holding together relations between the two countries. The last section of the chapter tries to formulate how the consequences mentioned above manifest in Zimbabwe.

4.1 How will a Shift in China’s Foreign Policy Affect African States?

Bordewieck (2011) outlines a list of possible economic and political consequences to both China and Africa pertaining to China’s recent foreign policy shift. On the African side,
Bordewieck notes that African countries will no longer enjoy the cushion from punitive measures proposed by the UNSC and other multilateral organisations, African economies maybe at risk of slowing down due to the receding competitiveness of Chinese companies and lastly, due to the fact that China penetrated Africa through attractive policies that resemble African tradition and that respect state sovereignty, some African countries identify themselves with China. A shift in China’s policies will result in identity crisis amongst African countries.

4.1.1 Cushion from Punitive Measures
The argument proposed here emanates in part from Beijing’s voting behaviour at the UNSC meetings, concerning the adoption and rejection of sanctions towards undesirable behaviour by UN member states particularly African states. As the highest governing body in the international system, the UNSC is a platform through which member countries express their ideas and preferences. In this regard, the research considers the UNSC as a platform in which China shows its commitment towards its ideological obligations which as ascertained earlier, guide its foreign policy. Such commitments can in this case be proven by the manner in which China defends resolutions that are contrary to the realisation of its ideology and national interest. The non-interference posture, the quest to create a harmonious world and mutual recognition are some of the ideological commitments that China stands by, which we can use to put across this argument (Mu, 2014).

Judging from its voting behaviour at the UNSC, China has a positive attitude towards the imposition of sanctions as a way of constraining negative behaviour. From 2000 to date, the UNSC has seen through 178 sanctions related resolutions, of these, China supported 170 and negatively voted against 8. It is interesting to note that most of China’s negative votes closely relate to sanctions imposed against African states. For instance, China blocked UNSC Resolutions against strong actions towards Sudan 2005, 2006 and 2010; Zimbabwe 2008; Somalia and Eritrea 2009, 2011 and Libya 2011. Two opposing streams of thought have been proposed to explain this behaviour. The first, relates to China’s commitment and defence of its non-interventionist policy in which China argues that it respects the sovereignty of independent states and respects local initiatives to solve crisis situations. This implies that in all these cases, China acted to prevent international involvement in the political spaces of the five respective countries. On the other hand, some analyst argue that, it seems China’s
negative votes only manifest each time sanctions are applied against countries in which it has mostly economic interests (Mu, 2014; Reilly, 2012).

The task of determining the validity of these two arguments falls out of the scope of this investigation. What is of particular importance is the realisation that, a shifts/change in China’s foreign policy, from that of non-interference to active engagement with African states it will no longer afford to protect African countries from punitive measures proposed by the UNSC. To argue that China no longer upholds the non-interventionist policy but continues to defend African countries from sanctions from the UN will be contradictory.

4.1.2 Weakening of African Economies

On the economic side, China’s subtle foreign policy shifts have a negative bearing on the economic performance of African economies. The assumption being that, some African countries have become dependent on China’s development assistance offered in form of low cost loans, FDI and increased volumes of imports and exports, to drive their economies and or sustain economic growth in their countries (Caulderwood, 2014). It follows from this assumption that, China’s rise in Africa as a leading trading partner is based mostly on its attractive policies compared to other western countries that have investment interests in Africa (Grauls & Stahl, 2010). After its re-emergence in the African continent, China has been hiding behind the ideological veil of non-interference to turn a blind eye on the activities of repressive and pariah regimes in Africa (Osondu, 2013). China has during this period and under this seemingly blind policy, defended African states that have bad human rights records, are corrupt, responsible for mass killings and that squander state resources at the expense of their citizen’s livelihoods (Aidoo, 2012). In exchange for this, African governments have granted China full access to trade in their countries.

On the other hand, less attention has been paid on the possible outcomes of a shift in China’s foreign policy that is responsible for and necessitates the increasing trade and partnership in Africa. A wide range of outcomes can be forecasted here, but emphasis is made on the response of African governments towards this shift. It would thus be logical for African governments to discontinue prioritising trade partnerships with China and Chinese companies. This implies that, profit margins and special rights once extended to China seize. Partnership and survival of Chinese companies will now be dependent on their competitiveness. As a country that is constantly looking for opportunities that can help
sustain its modern development and economic growth, China or Chinese company’s eagerness to invest in Africa let alone provide the much needed development assistance might fizzle out as African governments discontinue trade.

The main point here is not on the dynamics of business or partnership formation between China and Africa but, the effect of a policy shift on the performance of African economies. The assumption is that, a shift in China’s non-intervention policy to adopt a direct and more active policy has the effect of weakening the economic performance of African economies. For this assumption to be effective, the research further assumes that, a certain state’s economic performance must be dependent to some extent on trade and finances from China or has China as one of its major trading partners.

4.1.3 Identity Crisis
The notion and concept of identity refers to a sense of belonging and membership to a certain group based on shared attributes. These attributes vary from language, race, religion, geographic location, economic development, shared history and political orientation or ideology. These points apply at both individual communities to national levels. This relationship forming behaviour is based on consciousness and expressed in terms of a ‘we-they’ separate relationship with other groups. Considered on a country to country basis, it implies that a certain country’s need to belong to a certain group of countries is only expressed in relational or oppositional terms of inclusion or exclusion from other groups (Premdas, 1996).

China’s re-emergence as a power in post-colonial Africa presents a case in which closer cooperation between the Asian giant and African governments was facilitated and strengthened by a shared identity between the two continents (van de Looy, 2006). Chinese officials and leaders have at times referred to the rhetoric of a shared colonial past as a way of invoking a sense of identity with their African counterparts. As a former Western colony, China like Africa has suffered the injustices of colonialism i.e. economic and political marginalisation. Thus China is dedicated to draw out strategies that address issues of development and political representation as measures of correcting past injustices within the developing world (Larkin, 1971). In this regard, China has since identified herself as a developing state willing to lead all states in this category towards development. Furthermore, China’s Africa policy, premised on a strong ideological belief in non-interference and mutual
respect among others principles codified in the 5 principles of coexistence, resemble and satisfies the requirements of an African tradition and philosophy of Ubuntu. As a result African states relate and identify more with China relative to Western states (Sun, 2014).

Numerous instances that highlight the formation of a China-Africa identity manifest in the commissioning of associations such as the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), institutionalisation of forums such as the FOCAC and how some African countries have tailored their foreign policies from cooperation with Western states in favour of a ‘Look East Policy’ as is the case in Zimbabwe. In some essence African leaders now look up to China to drive economic growth in their respective countries and as a mouth piece at the United Nations. A shift in China’s foreign policy or any characteristic component of its policy has negative effects on African governments. African policy makers will have the challenge of determining whether or not to turn back to Western cooperation or to continue cooperation with China.

4.2 Case Study: Zimbabwe
The research employs the single case study of Zimbabwe as a way of demonstrating how subtle changes in China’s Africa policy, discussed in the previous chapter, can have consequences for China’s partner countries in Africa. Zimbabwe’s disengagement with Western states and donor institutions preferring instead to partner and solely look up to China for development assistance under its dubbed ‘Look East Policy’ makes it a good example from which to develop an analysis of how China’s policy shift affects African countries and in this instance compel Zimbabwe to re-evaluate its political and economic policy and position. Further, Zimbabwe’s relationship with the Asian giant has always been a puzzle. Considering the fact that Zimbabwe is not among China’s top trading partners nor does it possess abundant or significant resources, relative to other African countries, that China might be keen to acquire, the research is concerned with how China has always defended against the UNSC taking strong punitive action against the Mugabe regime. This over reliance (dependency) on China renders Zimbabwe vulnerable and highly sensitive to any shifts or changes in China’s foreign policy.

4.2.1 Background
Although there is a lot more that can be discussed on both the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe post 2000, such an enterprise will not be sufficient in exploring and
providing evidence necessary to prove the case under investigation here. Instead, a closer consideration of factors and events that portray an unusual relationship between China and Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe’s dependency on China is sufficient. The research regards the relationship between China and Zimbabwe as unusual in that, against western isolation, China continues to support and increase its economic support to the Southern African country. The research looks at Zimbabwe’s land reform programme, inclination towards the use of violence and the controversial government policies as the triggers of Zimbabwe’s international isolation and criticism for human and property rights violations post 2000.

Post 2000 Zimbabwean political economy does not in any way resemble Zimbabwe’s political economy soon after its independence in 1980, a culmination of the gross political and economic mismanagement. Endowed with good reserves of numerous natural resources, productive agricultural land and climatic conditions, an educated workforce and a functional government during its early years of independence, there was no doubt that Zimbabwe’s future was promising. In a few years after its independence, this potential quickly transformed into what most analysts referred to as the ‘jewel of Africa,’ a catch phrase used to describe the countries impressive achievements and economic environment (Richardson, 2005). As a model of post-colonial success in Africa, Zimbabwe attracted huge investment initiatives and capital inflows which contributing approximately 70% of the nation’s capital stock, sourced from countries like the US and Britain and international financial organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Gwenhamo, 2009).

Zimbabwe’s ‘jewel’ era did not last long. The country’s political and economic situation gradually denigrated to such an extent that it is now ranked amongst the low income countries in Africa and the world today with a GDP US$ 13.66 billion and an estimated 70% of the population living under the poverty lines (World Bank, 2014). Analysts have interestingly captured the turn in Zimbabwe’s fortunes from being that of Africa’s jewel (Richardson, 2005) and breadbasket to become a basket case itself (Tonini, 2005). Like in most conflict situations across Africa, there exists no single explanation that adequately captures the post 2000 political and economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. Instead, Mvutungayi (2010) recommends that the situation be explained by considering a combination of complex events and elements that took place during the period under investigation. In this case, such an account incorporates factors and events such as the 2000 land garbs dubbed ‘3rd
Chimurenga,’ pre and post-election violence, commodity outages, electoral disputes, skyrocketing inflation, mass migration of skilled labour, party factionalism, controversial government policies, unconstitutional amendments to the constitution and the popular anti-Western rhetoric, to explain how and the extent to which the country is in crisis.

Zimbabwe’s land reform program is considered the most significant factor contributing to the country’s international pariah status and internal economic havoc. Despite the fact that the issue of land redistribution in Zimbabwe already had political appeal prior 2000 (Richardson, 2005), the ruling ZANU PF government’s failure and need to maintain a patronage relationship with the country’s over decorated heroes of the liberation struggle, popularly known as war veterans, and the government’s tendency to push through undemocratic constitutional changes created a doomsday scenario for Zimbabwe. These events culminated in the war veterans demanding and violently expropriating white owned farms without any compensation as had been stipulated in the 1979 Lancaster House Conference (Mlambo, 2010).

An in depth discussion on how the land reform process unfolded in Zimbabwe is not however significant for this investigation. Rather, our concern is in the manner in which the whole process was conducted, specifically the gross neglect of human and property rights of fellow white Zimbabweans. As a result, the Zimbabwean situation during the land reform programme was flagged internationally. Western states and human rights organisations chastised and condemned the government’s support and failure to end the use of violence against a minority segment of its citizens. According to the Human Rights Watch (2002) 891 cases of violence against white farmers were reported. Further, it has been established that, by the time these violent land grabs ended a total of 7 white commercial farmers had been killed and many more threatened or even assaulted. Farm worker and their families were without reprieve. An estimated 3000 farm workers have since been displaced, 27 killed and over 1600 injured in the process. The turn of violence from inter-ethnic conflict, between black and white ethnic groups, to intra-ethnic violence targeted at farm workers shows the complexity of the crisis. It is difficult, in this case, for one not to realise the similarities between the violent land re-distribution programme implemented by Zimbabwe and the civilian conflict and genocides elsewhere in Africa. The elements of murder, mass migration and damage to property also persist.
Closely related to the violence that characterised the land reform process is violence sponsored by the ruling ZANU PF party against opposition parties in the country. Economic and political decay in Zimbabwe towards the turn of the millennium resulted in strong civic actions mostly led by unionist organisations, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) in particular. These labour groups sought to compel the government to stop abusing the rights, liberties and livelihoods of its members and Zimbabweans in general. They pushed the government to increase worker’s salaries in line with the rising inflation levels as well as ensuring that a stable economic environment exists in the country. A combination of these unionist organisations came together in 1999 to form the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by the charismatic ZCTU chairman Morgan Tsvangirai. From the time of its formation to date and as the most formidable opposition party ZANU PF has encountered since independence, the MDC has always been a recipient of political violence sponsored by the ZANU PF party. This use of violence did not only target key opposition political members and activists alone, it also targeted individuals pursuing their constitutional rights of freedom of association and membership. In essence the political conditions in the country during this period were no longer sufficient for democratic norms and practice to prevail; taking from the point that one’s freedom of association and political affiliation are necessary conditions in a democratic country.

Furthermore, prospects for the continued prevalence of democracy in Zimbabwe were further constrained by disputes surrounding the conduct and processes of elections in the country. All elections held in Zimbabwe during this period 2000-2012 have been heavily criticized for not being free and fair, with numerous incidences of violence and electoral fraud reported. Opposition parties have raised concerns over a slow and selective registration of voters, ghost voters, violence, suppression of media, slow release of electoral results and lack of transparency in the electoral process. For instance, Dennis Kadima and Khabele Matlosa of the Electoral Institute of Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2008) reported that the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe were characterised by lack of transparency, escalation of political violence as well as a slow process of releasing election results.

The point here is not that the international community must determine who wins or loses election or who is in power in any country, rather it is the observation and respect of democracy as the international doctrine that accommodates and guarantees the will of the entire citizen’s rights and liberties collectively that should be enforced and corrective
measures taken collectively to re-establish any imbalances. John Makumbe (2009), a prominent Zimbabwean political analyst also elaborated on the declining levels of democracy in the country arguing that: ‘Confronted with the inevitable prospect of losing political power, since early 2000 the ZANU-PF regime has transformed Zimbabwe into a fascist state where the rule of law is not only selectively applied, but new and effectively draconian legislation is generated and used as a tool of repression.’ From the evidence presented, it is apparent that the political situation in Zimbabwe has depreciated severely from that of a celebrated democratic state at independence to total or near total authoritarianism. As a result the state has been regarded as a pariah in need of international intervention through selective application of economic and political sanction on the key elites of the ruling ZANU PF government compelling them to reform their policies and political conduct in Zimbabwe.

Another factor that has exacerbated the crisis in Zimbabwe is the controversial policies that the government has adopted especially in regards to the ownership and control of businesses and resources in the country. This factor highlights how the Zimbabwean government has been trapped in a vicious cycle of expropriations, starting with land grabs, which it is failing to break from. The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 14 of 2007 gazetted into law in 2008 is one such legislation. The new law requires that all foreign owned companies with a share capital in excess of US$ 500 000 yield 51 % of their shares to either local citizens or companies respectively (Munyedza, 2011). The government’s commitment to this policy is apparent in its choice of Ministers of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwawo respectively, responsible for overseeing compliance with indigenisation laws. These two are well known for their hard-line anti-Western stance and their non-compromising attitude towards enforcing ZANU PF policies, which they have arguably used for the self-fulfilment and enrichment of elites in the ZANU PF party. The effect of adopting such a controversial policy in Zimbabwe manifested in massive capital flight from the country especially in Bulawayo which was once considered the industrial hub of the country (Moore et al, 2013). Surprisingly and against rational behaviour in the face of racial policies, China continues to invest and gain greater economic share in Zimbabwe’s economy.

A closely related crisis issue in the Southern African state is the level of corruption which has penetrated both the public and private sectors. According to Transparency International (2014) in 2014 Zimbabwe ranked 156/175 countries with a score of 21 on the corruption
index. Although some analysts on the discourse have argued and concluded that corruption can indeed work as a speeding factor in acquiring contracts and permits from rigid governments, a 1997 World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Survey suggested otherwise. Instead, it established that companies that showed a greater inclination towards bribing spend considerably more time negotiating contracts and permits with government officials as compared to those with a less inclination towards bribes. The results from this survey suggest that corruption, reduces instead of fast tracking the acquisition of contracts and licences from governments, with the respective administration applying unnecessary and discretionary regulations. The overall effect is that it creates a dysfunctional government that is not capable of making sound administrative policies. In Zimbabwe, corruption has over the years created an environment that is not conducive for doing business and when coupled with black empowerment policies discussed above, shatters any prospects for foreign investment and survival of foreign businesses in the country (Voskanyan, 2000). The significance of these points, land grabs, political violence, controversial polices and corruption, to the main thesis of the chapter emanates from how these have resulted in Zimbabwe becoming isolated internationally, with most Western donations and development assistance drying up and economic sanctions applied on the ruling ZANU PF leadership until meaningful reforms are made in the country (Coltart, 2008).

4.2.2 Development of Relations with China

According to Chun (2014) economic and political ties between China and Zimbabwe can be traced back to trade relations between the Munhumutapa Empire and the Ming and Qing dynasties and China’s 1960’s military support of Zimbabwe against the British colonial regime. These two interactions in the history of China and Zimbabwe, paved the way for the contemporary forms of comradeship and partnership. Relations between the two countries during the 1980’s grew slowly and were facilitated through the provision of loans, projects and diplomatic state visits.

China-Zimbabwe relations deepened around 2000-2002 in the wake of Zimbabwe’s controversial land reform programme, state sponsored political violence directed at opposition supporters, discussed above, and the resultant EU and Western sanctions against the ruling ZANU PF elites. These events created an opportunity through which China could snub Western domination in the country, especially in the economic sector. Again, as was the case in the 1960’s, China-Zimbabwe relations were boosted by coincidence or perfect timing.
This time the convergence of Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East Policy’ and the launch of FOCAC meetings in 2000 fuelled the pace of cooperation between the two. Chapter 2 presented the whole discussion on the role of FOCAC in promoting diplomatic and trade ties between China and Africa. Hence it will not be repeated in this section.

4.2.3 Relationship Anchors
This section of the research tries to identify evidence that expresses the closer ties between China and Zimbabwe. This evidence is drawn from economic, political and geopolitical angles. The purpose is, in part, to show that a dependency syndrome has developed between the two countries, with Zimbabwe relying on China to ensure political as well as economic growth in the country.

4.2.3.1 Dependency Based on Economic Ties
According to Maunganidze et al (2013) the growing trade relations between Beijing and Harare are best explained by making reference to China’s jump in GDP growth in the period 2000-2005. This period marked a sharp increase China’s demand for raw materials hence the go-global strategy. On the other hand, Robert Mugabe strategically announced Zimbabwe’s official ‘Look East Policy’ in 2015 providing a gateway for China to pursue its economic interests in the country. Mugabe’s strategy can, arguably, be considered as a way of enticing China to assume the dominant financier and investor in the country, a vacuum created by the withdrawal of Western states and their financial institutions in the country.

Following strings of arguments proposed by dependency theorists, such as presented by Matunhu (2011), the research argues that, the dramatic withdrawal of support by Western countries and their financial institutions left Zimbabwe exposed and with no country to depend on financially. Thus Mugabe’s launch of the Look East Policy highlighted the fact that China was a capable alternative to Western countries. It would then follow that China’s assumption of the former Western states position in Zimbabwe tilted the dependency equation in the country back to equilibrium. This in turn implies that Zimbabwe is now dependent on China to drive its development and economic growth. In arguing for the validity of this claim, in the next paragraph, the research goes at length in providing evidence of how Zimbabwe has become dependent on China.
Chinese commercial links in Zimbabwe in 2003 were so ingrained to the extent that Alao (2014) claimed that “hardly any aspect of Zimbabwean life did not feel the Chinese impact.” Alao’s qualification implies that Zimbabwe is one among numerous African countries experiencing extensive Chinese influence that spans across agriculture, telecommunication, mining, hospitality, construction and retail. Trade statistics between the two countries can bear witness to this. Although trade figures indicating the rising levels of trade between China and Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2010 are available, the process of converting from ZWD to US$ can derail our arguments. Hence, statistics recorded after 2010 will be considered. China-Zimbabwe trade levels were recorded at US$ 533 million in the first half of 2012 and reached a high of US$ 800 million by the end of the financial year. These figures highlight the continued integration of the two country’s economies.

Martin Kadzere (2014), writing on the growth of trade between China and Zimbabwe, notes that China’s investment in Zimbabwe since 2010 rose by more than 5000 %, a clear indication that Zimbabwe overwhelmingly welcomes and does not restrict Chinese capital. He further pointed out that Zimbabwe is now among the top African countries receiving the largest amounts of FDI from China, with its FDI increasing from US$ 11.2 million in 2009 to US$ 602 million by the end of 2014. In 2013 alone, China contributed 74 % of the US$ 134 million FDI inflows into the Southern African country. From the percentage of China’s contribution towards FDI in the country, one can then argue for a positive relationship between FDI and development, GDP growth, in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s cushioning of Chinese companies from the harsh indigenous policies instituted in 2008 shows its commitment to Chinese capital. For instance, in 2011 China and Zimbabwe entered an agreement that would see China extending concessional loans worth US$ 700 million in return for the protection of Chinese companies from the countries destructive indigenisation laws (Alao, 2014).

On the micro level, Zimbabwe is becoming increasingly dependent on the East Asian Giants financial muscle to rescue and develop its failed or ailing industries and projects. The Chinese massive investment and development in the Marange diamond fields in the Eastern regions of Zimbabwe are a case in point. According to Tukić and Tapula (2014) two Chinese companies Anjin Investments and Jinan Investments have invested a total US$ 460 million in the Marange fields, placing China as a major player in the diamond extraction industry in the country. Zimbabwe has also sought China’s rescue in revamping and capacitating key
industries in the country. For instance, following a 2004 agreement between Zimbabwe and China, China North Industries Corporation (Norinco) came in to rescue Hwange colliery from a debt of US$ 6.3 million that had threatened its closure. China has also made inroads in the iron and steel manufacturing in the country. Shougang Group is tipped to take over operations at Zisco Steel following a US$ 50 million investment towards upgrading of blast furnaces (Kuwaza, 2015). Shanghai Baosteel Group further invested US$300 million in the Industry (Mvutungayi, 2010). Experiencing serious shortages and declining capacity in electricity generation, Zimbabwe has partnered and subcontracted a Chinese company to construct power generators that will add 600 Mega Watts of electricity to the national grid (Mail & Guardian, 2015). Numerous other instances exist in which the government of Zimbabwe has turned to Chinese companies and capital to ensure the continued existence of key industries in the country.

4.2.3.2 Political Ambitions

Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East Policy’ instituted in 2003 was not solely geared towards attracting and developing economic ties with East Asian countries, China in particular, instead, there exist other strategic political dimensions to it. Facing economic and political isolation from Western countries and their financial institutions, Mugabe’s regime did not cower. Rather, Mugabe interpreted the sanctions as an ongoing battle between Zimbabwe and its former colonisers on who determines and dominates Zimbabwe’s internal politics and processes. It is the prospect of Western domination that Mugabe stands to reject. Famously known for his ‘take no prisoners’ approach, Mugabe views the Western conduct as a continued battle to control and colonise Zimbabwe and blacks as a person, thus took it upon himself to fight Western imperialism even to the extent of risking the collapse of Zimbabwe as a functioning state (Youde, 2013).

Mugabe’s position and fight against the West can be explained by making reference to the debates in Siba Grovogui’s native emancipationist arguments laid out in his book ‘Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and self-determination in international law.’ For Grovogui (1996) the fight against black inferiority included the desire for native people to be able to dispose of themselves and this entailed that there be free to choose the political systems of their choice in cognizant of the consequences thereof. As a decade long confrontation, the quest here and analogously Mugabe’s quest, is the complete decolonisation of native attitudes, systems and way of life. The Look East Policy embraces such ideological
intentions, in which Zimbabwe chose the East (China) as credible partners and custodians of their sovereign rights as opposed to the West.

Mugabe appears, from this scenario, to be playing China and the West against each other. His inability to deal with Western superiority and tendencies compelled him to elevate China’s political status and economic standing, identifying it as a suitable replacement to Western states in the country. Mugabe’s political manoeuvring in this situation not only forces us to rethink China’s position in global politics but does suggest a new global political system in which China plays a pivotal role of placing the agenda of former native societies, now developing states/low income countries, on the agenda for discussion at the UN. Interestingly enough, though not clear or known whether it is China or Zimbabwe that is playing along this strategy, China’s foreign policy and voting behaviour in the UNSC suggests the practicality of this claim. Thus in return Harare receives a political umbrella from Beijing. We shall not divulge much on the discussion on China’s vetoes against strong action on African countries, as it has received fair attention earlier in this chapter, rather, it is mandatory to mention that China’s non-interventionist policy and its decision to block punitive action against Mugabe and his cronies is compatible with Grovogui’s argument and Mugabe’s war against the West.

4.3 Where does Zimbabwe Stand in the Face of Changing Chinese Foreign Policy?
This section applies the arguments presented in the first section of this chapter i.e. the cover from punitive measures, weakening African economies and identity crises respectively to the single case study of Zimbabwe. The objective is to determine whether or not the subtle changes in China’s foreign policy effects Zimbabwe’s political economy.

Zimbabwe, as a dependent recipient of political cover from punitive action instituted by the UNSC, as was the case in 2008 UNSC meeting (UN, 2008), is highly vulnerable to the slightest change in China’s foreign policy. Considered a pariah due to its failure to uphold human and property rights and its tendency towards authoritarian modes of governance, Zimbabwe, without the cushion of China’s negative vetoes, will be subjected and exposed to international punitive measures. These can be in form of economic, travel and political sanctions. In most severe instance, the exclusion from multilateral institutions can be a possibility. The later was the case before Zimbabwe pulled out of the Commonwealth group of countries and IMF 2003 (Chigora, 2007). A possible counter argument will is that, punitive measures have already been instituted against Zimbabwe, for instance Chingono
(2010) states that between 2000 and 2003 the United States of America, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the European Union imposed smart sanctions on Zimbabwe. Although these sanctions were targeted at a few top government officials, the government of Zimbabwe and some Chinese scholars have claimed that these sanctions are responsible for the declining economic conditions in the country (Mu, 2010). As a result additional sanctions will not make a difference.

What makes changes in China’s foreign policy a cause for concern is that, smart sanctions are just one form of punitive measure that can be applied on Zimbabwe. With China out of the way, comprehensive economic sanctions can be instituted (Chingono, 2010). These will have the effect of blocking any exports and imports in and out of the country and other economic transactions with the international community. Further, if China complies with sanctions proposals made at the UNSC, this entails that it will no longer be providing financial and any other form of aid to Zimbabwe. This will have a huge blow on Zimbabwe.

From the discussion above and as developed in the previous sections, it is the nexus between the shifting behaviour of a socialised and responsible China and the consequences of such behavioural changes that is central to this investigation. Economic arguments in this regard are more appealing and pressing than political and social ones. The research assumes that, China’s subtle policy changes are inspired by its need to act as a responsible global leader. In order to fit in these shoes, China’s favourable policies towards pariah African states will have to stop. As a result, any form of monetary assistance will be extended in a way that upholds and does not counter sanctions imposed by other Western states. This implies that FDI and other development assistance China used to extend to Zimbabwe dries up. Economic havoc, such as experienced in 2007-2009, will thus be a certainty. Recent events in Zimbabwe bear testimony to this argument. Burdened by receding productivity signified by persistent negative inflation figures, liquidity crises and low export levels, the Government of Zimbabwe has been torn between those advocating for a return to Western financial institutions and hard-line leftists who still perceive China as the only solution to the countries problems. This split amongst ZANU PF bigwigs can be considered as a hint and caution against the country’s dependency on China. Furthermore, the declining African exports in the last quarter of 2015 carrying on in the first quarter of 2016, triggered by China’s economic slowdown is another perfect example of dependency on China.
Lastly, Zimbabwe due to its international status as a pariah has its image and identity crystallized around China as a political and economic partner. The development and crystallisation of this image has been facilitated by China’s favourable foreign policies that Zimbabwe could hide behind and rely on as an alternative to Western cooperation. China’s conduct in Sudan, preferring to intervene directly as opposed to its traditional non-interference policy must be a cause for concern for Mugabe and ZANU PF.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter explored the most important issue in this research i.e. determining the end results of all the theoretical perspectives that we have been building from chapters 1-3 concerning China’s shifting foreign policy towards Africa. By employing a single case study of Zimbabwe, the research went on further to prove the operational validity and truthfulness of the claims already established. The most important element of this chapter is the identification of consequences emanating from the evolution of China’s foreign policy and the resultant effects they have in Africa. These consequences manifest in form of weakening African economies, identity crisis and lack of cover from punitive measures that can be instituted against what may be considered undesirable behaviour. Zimbabwe, once paraded as the epitome of post-colonial economic successes in Africa, is a good example to prove how absurd position policymakers may find themselves in the face of shifting Chinese foreign policies. Following the two country’s historical relationship and the current economic destitution that Zimbabwe is facing, a dependency relationship complemented by political ambitions, mostly on the Zimbabwean side, has held the two country’s relations firm. Such a scenario, the research established, works out for China more than it does for Zimbabwe. This unequal relationship has had an impact in Zimbabwe’s economic and mostly political landscape, particularly in averting international condemnation. Being on the receiving end, Zimbabwe is vulnerable to any changes in this relationship. As a result more and tougher action from international multilateral institutions can be instituted against a defenceless Zimbabwe. Economically, the dire situation in the country can be made severe if Chinese soft loans are withdrawn. The following chapter summaries all the key points set out in the paper.
5. Conclusion

This chapter seeks to establish whether or not what the research set out to prove in the first chapter has been accomplished. This task is achieved by unpacking all the key theories, elements and cases discussed in the paper. The chapter will firstly look at the idea of foreign policy change as the most important theory behind the research. Key elements in China’s Africa policy are discussed next. These elements include China’s moralistic policy of non-intervention in the affairs of sovereign independent states, identifying with target states and its adoption of an open door policy when doing business. Key elements in China’s relations with Zimbabwe are crucial as well. The chapter goes on to forecast how China’s foreign policy is likely to change on the future and make recommendations. Lastly, the chapter identifies elements that require further research.

Although the two words ‘change and shift’ are normally used interchangeably and all entail some form of movement, when considered closely, they suggest two different forms of movements. On one hand, a change is regarded as a minor redirection of a state’s foreign policy while a shift, on the other, is considered as a major or wholesome alteration a state’s foreign policy. The two are differentiated by the degree of movement. With this kind of variation, no one-size-fits-all definition can be ascribed to foreign policy change instead numerous definitions that bring out the difference between the two words exist.

A number of theories have been proposed to try and explain why a state’s foreign policy changes. Amongst these theories are models presented by Holsti who advocates for the most extreme form of change by emphasising on restructuring of a state’s foreign policy. Herman like Holsti, considers a redirection of foreign policy but as influenced by leaders. Goldman, Rosati and Skidmore argue for milder versions of change. They look at the factors that produce change, alternating periods of stability and change and a state’s internal and external strength as causes of foreign policy change respectively. Eidenfalks’s model specifically looks at the extent to which change in foreign policy occurs by looking at various factors both domestic and international. It was identified as the most suitable model to analyse possible movements in Chinese foreign policy. Although Eidenfalks’s model considers both domestic and international sources of change, the research established that international more than domestic factors produce more pressure for China’s foreign policy to evolve. This evolution
in China’s foreign policy is apparent in its shift from providing aid as presents to a win-win scenario and from ideological partnership to pragmatic considerations.

It is interesting and confusing to note how China strongly claims that it adheres to the five principles of peaceful cooperation as guiding both its domestic and foreign policies but the findings of this research claims otherwise. This scenario shows the complicated nature of China’s foreign policy and the difficulties faced by African governments to conduct business with the country. The notion of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries is one specific element in Chinese ideology and a central facet of its foreign policy that has generated this kind of confusion. Other important elements in Beijing’s foreign policy include its ability to identify with the states that it targets to do business with. In the case of Africa it implements the rhetoric of colonial similarities as well as the contestable categorisation that it belongs in the developing group of states. These elements including the open door strategy and its perceived adherence to the five principles of peaceful existence with other global states has resulted in the creation and involvement of an eclectic array of players in China foreign policymaking process. These players include amongst numerous others the FOCAC, the military, think tanks, Chinese provinces and financial institutions. Regardless of the centralised structure of the Chinese political landscape and policymaking process, these players now wield significant influence in the foreign policy arena.

The discussion identified three instances in which China’s foreign policy has changed or where the possibility of change is highly likely. The first, originates from the manner through which China used to distribute aid in Africa. Before the turn of the millennium China provided aid to African states mostly as presents. Aid was provided on a humanitarian basis with no expectation for anything in return. But as its economy developed and its presence increased on the continent, China now provides aid that is conditional to its greater access to business and political spaces in Africa. Secondly, the non-interference principle in China’s foreign policy is another angle through which change can be identified. As an ideology it is prone to evolve with changing circumstances in the international system. The constructivist notion of socialisation, in this instance, influences the speed with which change occurs. China has been criticised internationally for its neglect of human rights issues in regions in which it conducts its business. As a rising super power calls for a responsible actor have become louder with each passing day. As a result China’s ideological stance on non-intervention has softened. A close and related issue is the changes emanating from the changing circumstances
in the environment in Africa, for instance, the increasing political risks associated with investing in politically unstable environments in Africa requires an active participation. Lastly, a shift from ideological to pragmatic considerations is apparent in China’s Africa policy. Cooperation was once premised on anti-Soviet expansion and brotherly assistance during the colonial era but now partnership is rooted in mostly economic considerations.

The research identified Zimbabwe as a good example and case study to apply in the discussion. Relations between Harare and Beijing date back centuries ago and have experienced fluctuating periods of highs and lows to date. Although political considerations solidified this relationship during the colonial era, today economic considerations take priority. Considered in light of the struggling Zimbabwean economy and its political isolation by the West and its financial institutions, a dependency relationship has since formed between the two countries with Zimbabwe as the dependent country. Zimbabwe’s look east policy is a two edged sword meant to brings China and Zimbabwe’s economic and political ambitions as close to each other as possible, particularly it created an environment in which Zimbabwe could identify herself with China. A shift in China’s foreign policy, given the dependency relationship between the two, would make Zimbabwe extremely vulnerable. As a cushion from punitive measures from the UNSC a change in China’s foreign policy would entail that comprehensive sanctions and a possible exclusion from the international governing body is possible. Also Zimbabwe’s look east policy would no longer be effective, leaving Zimbabwe exposed and facing identity crisis. In the same manner that China has made an impact in Zimbabwe, significantly investing in strategic and key sectors of the economy and coming to Zimbabwe’s political rescue, so will a change in China’s foreign policy.

The research established that subtle shifts in China’s foreign policy have been initiated. Broad categories in which those shifts have taken place have been identified i.e. from ideological to pragmatic considerations and from non-intervention to active engagement. Although these factors return their soundness, the central question concerns the future, in particular how China’s foreign policy is likely to change in the future?

The answer to this question can also be derived from the elements of change identified in chapter 3, but priority is accorded to the changing circumstances in which this relationship unfolds. Africa’s unstable political environment presents the most notable factor that would affect China’s business and political circumstances. Most African states that have abundant
natural resources are a case in point. These countries have in the past decade experienced a rising tide of political violence. The two Sudan’s, Nigeria, Libya, and Angola amongst other Northern states all have fluctuating political situations that from time to time denigrate into episodes of civil war. These wars have the grievance of access to the country’s wealth as a common factor. China as a rising player in the extractive sector in these countries and in Africa in general is facing considerable levels of political risks. These risks range from expropriations, damages to infrastructure, policy inconsistencies to kidnappings and other insecurities targeted at Chinese nationals. Given these circumstances Chinese foreign policy is expected to evolve in line with the risks it faces. It is most likely that the Chinese will intervene to protect its investments and citizens in Africa.

On the other hand and as discussed in chapter 2, China implemented the open door policy as a strategy of selling Chinese products globally. Following this statement it is necessary to make it clear that, this open door policy was meant to make China more attractive to Africa. Trade statistics presented in the discussion bear testimony of Africa’s position in China’s international trade. As a country that is seeking to advance itself, China has been under severe pressure from other global states to be firm when dealing with Africa. Although Africa has become a key energy market for the Chinese the West is very important to China’s strategy. Hence China can eventually give in to calls for her to take a tougher stance in Africa.
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