A food sovereignty critique of the G8 New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition

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Date: 29 May 2015
Contents

List of Acronyms and tables .................................................................................................................. 5
Declaration of Authorship......................................................................................................................... 9
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 10
Chapter 2: Theory .................................................................................................................................. 14
  Food Sovereignty Conceptualisation ..................................................................................................... 14
    A political economy critique of agro-industrial food systems .............................................................. 14
    A constitutive approach to rights ......................................................................................................... 16
    The building of a grassroots movement and alternative ...................................................................... 18
    Critiques of the food sovereignty approach ....................................................................................... 20
Accumulation by dispossession ................................................................................................................ 21
Food regime theory .................................................................................................................................. 23
Chapter 3: Literature Review ................................................................................................................ 25
  Understanding the food challenge ......................................................................................................... 25
    Orthodox approach to hunger ............................................................................................................... 25
    The entitlement, society focused explanation of hunger .................................................................... 26
    Complex political emergency approach .............................................................................................. 27
    Food security ......................................................................................................................................... 28
    Chosen theoretical approach - food sovereignty .................................................................................. 30
Neoliberal modernisation and the globalised food system .................................................................... 32
Chapter 4: Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 40
  Research design ....................................................................................................................................... 40
  Data sources ........................................................................................................................................... 40
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data collection</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case studies</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining variables</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variable</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Historicising Africa’s globalised agriculture</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first food regime (1870–1930s)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The second food regime (1950s–70s)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate food regime (late 1980s-present)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural adjustment programmes</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World Trade Organisation and the Agreement on Agriculture</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on African Countries</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: The New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition decoded</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The promise of L’Aquila</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilising capital</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking innovation to scale</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk management</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability for results</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: The Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa Critique of NAFN</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds and Agrochemicals</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid and GM Seeds</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrochemicals</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certification and patenting</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment and agribusiness</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers to trade</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic support measures</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical analysis</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8: Conclusion</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### List of Acronyms and tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABN</td>
<td>African Biodiversity network</td>
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<td>ACB</td>
<td>African Centre for Biosafety</td>
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<td>AFD</td>
<td>Agency for Development</td>
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<td>AFSA</td>
<td>African Food Sovereignty Alliance</td>
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<td>AFSI</td>
<td>Aquila Food Security Initiative</td>
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<td>AGRA</td>
<td>Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa</td>
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<td>AoA</td>
<td>Agreement on Agriculture</td>
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<td>ARIPO</td>
<td>African Regional Intellectual Property Organization</td>
</tr>
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<td>ARM</td>
<td>Agricultural Risk Management</td>
</tr>
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<td>AFSA</td>
<td>Alliance of Food Sovereignty in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme</td>
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<td>CARD</td>
<td>Coalition for African Rice Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Common External Tariff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFAs</td>
<td>Country Cooperation Frameworks</td>
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<td>CGIAR</td>
<td>Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPAS</td>
<td>Comparing and Supporting Endogenous Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPAC</td>
<td>Co-operative and Policy Alternative Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPAGEN</td>
<td>Coalition for the Protection of African Genetic Heritage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CSO Civil Society Organisation

DBA Doing Business in Agriculture

DFID UK Department for International Development

DOI Doing Business Index

DUAT Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento dos Terras—‘right of use and benefit of land’

EAC East African Community

EC European Commission

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ESAFF Eastern and Southern African Small Scale Farmers Forum

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)

GAFSP Global Agriculture and Food Security Program

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GM Genetically Modified

GMOs Genetically Modified Organisms

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFI International Financial Institution

IFPRI International Food Policy Research- Institute

IMF International Monetary Fund (UN)

IO International Organisations

IPACC Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee

IPR Intellectual Property Rights

MASP Malawi Agro-dealer Strengthening Programme
MNC  Multinational Corporation
NAFN  New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NES  National Export Strategy
NGO  Nongovernmental Organization
ODA  Official Development Assistance
PARM  Platform for Agricultural Risk Management
PASS  AGRA Program for Africa’s Seed Systems
PELUM  Participatory Ecological Land Use Management
PVP  Plant Variety Protection
ROPPA  Agricultural Producers’ Organisations of West Africa
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SAPs  Structural Adjustment Programmes
SLTR  Systematic Land Titling and Registration
SUN  Scaling Up Nutrition
MNCs  Transnational Corporations
TRIPs  (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights)
UN  United Nations
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UPOV  Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WB  World Bank
WEF  World Economic Forum
WTO  World Trade Organization

WWII  World War Two

Table 1: Development Partner Cooperation Framework Commitments and Disbursements by Country (Millions of USD)

Table 2: Interlocutors for CFAs

Table 3: Private sector investments in rice under the Country Cooperative Framework signed between Côte d’Ivoire and the G8
Declaration of Authorship

I hereby certify that the thesis I am submitting is entirely my own original work except where otherwise indicated. I am aware of the University's regulations concerning plagiarism, including those regulations concerning disciplinary actions that may result from plagiarism. Any use of the works of any other author is properly acknowledged at their point of use.

Signature:

Name: Amy Crankshaw

Date: 29 May 2015
Chapter 1: Introduction

In May 2012, at the Camp David Summit the G8 (now G7) launched the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFN) with an aim to bring 50 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa out of poverty by 2022. The G8 has partnered with the African Union as well as private sector partners and is attempting to coordinate African leaders’ country plans and policies for food security to create an investor friendly environment to “expand Africa’s potential for rapid and sustainable agricultural growth” (The White House, 2012). So far Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Benin, Malawi and Nigeria have established Country Cooperation Frameworks (CFAs) which set out the commitments of African countries, G8 members, other public donors, national companies and multinational corporations (MNCs). This is put forward as an extension of the pledges made to the G8’s 2009 L’Aquila Food Security Initiative, which require contributions to be aligned with each African countries’ Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). With the NAFN the G8 also intends to support initiatives such as the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) and the Agricultural Risk Management Platform (PARM). Companies have made more than 200 investment pledges to the African countries involved. Private sector partners include some of the most powerful and predominant corporations in agriculture, including: AGCO Corporation, Cargill, Export Trading Group, Monsanto, Nestle, SABMiller, SwissRe, Syngenta, Unilever, United Phosphorus, and Yara (Obenland 2014, 5).

Despite its admirable objective, the NAFN has been heavily criticised by not only African, but various international NGOs, academics and media. When the Leadership Council of the NAFN met in New York, ninety-one civil society organisations from G8 member countries signed a joint statement opposing the initiative (Global Policy Forum 2014, 1). Katie Campbell, a senior policy analyst at ActionAid US, said the NAFN had “missed the mark”, effectively giving the future of farming in Africa to big agribusinesses, to the detriment of people living with poverty and hunger (2014). GRAIN referred to NAFN as the “New Alliance for Food Security and Corporate Control” (Grain, 2013). The Guardian condemned it as a “new wave of colonialism in Africa” (Ford and Provost 2014, 1). And the latest Progress Report of the NAFN itself revealed how profit driven the initiative is “companies are increasingly realising that investing in
smallholder agriculture is not just socially responsible—it makes sense for their business” (NAFN 2014a, 14).

According to FAO’s 2013 Executive Summary of the state of Food Security, Africa is not on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal hunger target, so one would expect an initiative, supported by the World Bank and African Development Bank and the United Nations’ World Food Program (among others), to supply new and innovative development frameworks and solutions to hunger. However there are speculations that the NAFN is simply a replication of previous International Organisations’ initiatives in its recommendations of neoliberal economic reforms. By neoliberal standards, globalising policies such as trade liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation and increased foreign investment are the best way to achieve economic growth, which is key to achieving food security. However, drawing on past experiences and estimates of other theoretical perspectives, this is not always the case. In order to take an informed stance on this New Alliance, one cannot ignore the literature opposing globalising African Agriculture as a solution to hunger. Critical theories, such as the Food Sovereignty approach, propose that the current global food system is defective and the globalisation of African agriculture (via strategies such as the NAFN) may fuel rather than reduce poverty in Africa. And as such the research question of this paper is: how does the NAFN globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty.

Due to the severity of the situation, it is essential that every possible factor that may impinge on smallholders welfare is investigated; especially initiatives that claim to benefit Africa’s agricultural industry. Africa continues to be the region with the highest prevalence of undernourishment, with more than one in five people estimated to be undernourished (FAO, 2013). Out of the 925 million hungry people in 2010, 276 million were in Africa (FAO, 2010). And although smallholder farmers produce over 90 percent of the continent’s food supply, they make up roughly 50 percent of Africa’s food insecure population, thus it is vital that their interests are prioritised and they are in the centre of policy creation (FAO, 2010). Although the White House claims that that the New Alliance “recognises and will act upon the critical role played by smallholder farmers, especially women, in transforming agriculture and building thriving economies” (2012) there is little evidence that smallholders have been included in the development of the initiative. According to the Nyéléni Declaration definition of food
sovereignty people have right to define their own food and agriculture systems so they can access “healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods”.

To understand food sovereignty and how it can be undermined the theory section explains it as: a political economy critique of agro-industrial food systems, a constitutive approach to rights and the building of a grassroots movement and alternative. Conceptualisation in this manner leaves space to explore some of Polanyi's theories that compliment and contribute to both the food sovereignty definition and identifying the detriments of globalisation that undermine it. An explanation of the food regime approach further reveals the link between globalisation and factors undermining food sovereignty.

This research paper makes use of literature relating to responses to the food challenge, taking into account the orthodox approach to hunger, the entitlement, society focused explanation of hunger, the complex political emergency approach and the human security approach before describing food sovereignty as a superior theoretical lens. Particular attention will be paid to delineating food security and its modernisation theory roots, as this supposedly frames the underlying thinking of the NAFN. A subtheme of neoliberalism and global food systems provides evidence of policies that challenge food sovereignty; which combined with its theoretical underpinnings allows for the formulation of a hypothesis containing factors that potentially globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty: large scale investment of land; the commercialisation of the seed industry and increased use of agro-chemicals and GMOs; increased foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs; decreasing barriers to trade and increasing imports and exports; and cuts in domestic support measures.

The discussion of food regimes feeds into the next chapter which uses the approach to historicise African agriculture from the colonial era to the current corporate regime with particular emphasis on game changing policies such as Structural Adjustment Programmes, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture along with TRIPS.

Elements of the current food regime are found in the chapter that follows, which decodes the NAFN via the pledges laid out in the original fact sheet on the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition that was published by the U.S. White House in May 2012 during the launch of the
New Alliance. The promise of L’Aquila, partnerships, mobilising capital, taking innovation to scale, risk Management, bio-fortified crops and nutrition and accountability for results are expanded upon in this section and the immediately apparent downfalls are highlighted. With an understanding of the food challenge, food sovereignty theory, the state of African agriculture and the structure of the NAFN, a case study may now be approached to apply a food sovereignty critique to resultant policies. The Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) has been seen as “the most vocal and comprehensive in its critique” of the NAFN, identifying it “as one of the biggest threats to reaching food sovereignty in Africa” (Obenland 2014). AFSA is essentially a forum for confronting issues concerning food sovereignty, with a particular emphasis on agro-ecology, family farming, seed sovereignty, land grabbing, campaigning, traditional knowledge systems, community rights, governments and corporate accountability and generally living in harmony with nature with just and equitable ways of life (AFSA 2015). It is a network smallholder of farmers, pastoralists, hunter/gatherers, indigenous peoples, citizens and environmentalists from Africa and their relevant organisations and networks. Critiques of policies mentioned in the previous chapter and examples from Cooperation Frameworks of African countries (since they provide a translation of NAFN goals into commitments) will be constructed with the input of AFSA members to reveal where food sovereignty is undermined. The sections in this chapter are defined by the facets of the hypothesis: land, seeds and agrochemicals, investment and agribusiness, barriers of trade and domestic support measures, so a conclusion is easily reached.

It is imperative that the mechanisms that globalise African Agriculture are analysed and ways in which this can have a negative effect on Food Sovereignty are highlighted; especially within the context of a powerful initiative that is intended to spread throughout Africa. Since the NAFN is a fairly new policy there is a limited amount of academic literature assessing its potential effects and even fewer taking a critical approach. It would be useful to compile the various articles that criticise the NAFN, into a comprehensive research paper; collecting evidence for their claims and comparing them to sources that advocate the initiative. This could validate their predictions and contribute to a movement to reform or abolish the NAFN before it induces negative long term effects or warn off other African countries from cooperating with the initiative.
Chapter 2: Theory

Food Sovereignty Conceptualisation

The conceptualisation of food sovereignty is important for this paper’s theory derivation. In order to ascertain what mechanisms undermine food sovereignty it must be defined and understood within the context of globalisation. The three main elements are: a political economy critique of agro-industrial food systems, a constitutive approach to rights and the building of a grassroots movement and alternative.

Karl Polanyi’s and food sovereignty theorists’ values are essentially the same, his theories aptly describe the underlying thinking of such an approach and his well-articulated contributions assist in formulating certain aspects of it. Corroboration from such a renowned and cited theorist gives the conceptualisation weight and depth. He too believed society was “a natural form designed to provide material substance for its members…various distribution measures had evolved to ensure this: household, reciprocity and redistribution” with a market that was marginalised (Hann & Hart, 2009: 4-5). And a self-regulating market led to “fictitious commodities”: Nature, Society and Humanity became land, money and labour as they entered the market” (Hann & Hart, 2009: 5). He is also famous for his concept of “embeddedness” in The Great Transformation. Polanyi contrasts the market system with economic relations based on reciprocity and redistribution: “Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system” (Polanyi 1944: 57). Food sovereignty is invested in the former and reforming the latter.

A political economy critique of agro-industrial food systems

Since the NAFN works on neoliberal economic principles, a theoretical approach that is able to critically analyse capitalist assumptions is needed to guide this paper. Food sovereignty theorists are critical of the agro-industrial food systems resulting from capitalist “development”. In agro-
industrial food systems: production increase and profit are the main objectives, assisted by the principle of comparative advantage. Produce is distributed internationally making use of global markets and relying on market mechanisms and entitlements to regulate access to food and limiting state interventions. Food is an industrial product, like any other inedible commodity and will thus advance national development with increased exports. Synthetic technological advances are an important part of increasing productivity such as: GMOs, fertiliser and pesticides (Wittman 2011; Beardsworth and Keal 1997).

The food sovereignty approach finds these food systems to be detrimental to developing countries’ agricultural sectors and ineffective as a system to reduce hunger. As a political economy critique it subverts each structural element to promote an alternative food system: local agricultural production and markets should be prioritised and protected from dumping and subsidised food imports; food is recognised as “a symbolic base of life” that should not be commoditised.; sustainable agriculture, a diversified economy and Fair Trade will advance national development and technology should be advanced in the direction of helping farmers increase efficiency through diversifying production and innovative, traditional and natural sustainable techniques such as agro-ecology (Wittman 2011; Beardsworth and Keal 1997; Malassis and Ghersi 1996). While having a bottom up approach, wanting a citizen’s revolution of the food system and recognising states’ ability to undermine food sovereignty, food sovereignty theorists recognise that state intervention is vital for confronting the global food system, dismantling unequal agrarian structures and “recognise the autonomy of people and communities in defining and controlling their food and agricultural systems” (McKay, 2013: 1). Additionally state policy reforms are necessary to reign in the power of transnational corporations and regulate free trade.

The presence of these critiqued elements of agro-industrial food systems can be an indicator that food sovereignty is being undermined.

In part 1 of Polanyi’s The Great Transformation he observes that issues in international affairs are inextricably linked to factors infringing on domestic liberty and that with market society comes codes of moral obligation. A neoliberal society is run on market principles, free from the state, which implies that the market and the state can be separated and Polanyi declares that attempts to establish this separation threaten to destroy “the human and natural substance of
society” which results in a retaliation for self-protection in the form of a counter movement (1944: 3). Polanyi refers to Smith’s view of a self-adjusting market as a “stark utopia” (1944: 3). Polanyi talks about the famine in India being caused by “free marketing of grain combined with local failure of incomes” not just failure of crops. Food sovereignty theorists would make this same criticism, agreeing that the market’s reaction to the shortage (even with food aid) was insufficient and a village community structure may have done better with “small local stores [that] had been held against harvest failure, but had now been discontinued or swept away by the big market” which may not have reacted with unaffordable high prices (Polanyi, 1944: 167). His overall point being effectively: “under the rule of the market the people could not be prevented from starving according to the rules of the game” (Polanyi, 1944: 167).

Founders of some contemporary social theory consider markets to be progressive in their destruction of traditional rural society’s insulating tendencies, introducing humanity to new circles of discourse and relations. Food sovereignty theorists, like theorists’ influenced by Polanyi question why markets are supposed to be subversive of traditional social arrangements and find the answer in markets’ limitless nature threatening local systems of control, acting with the knowledge that all markets are world markets (Hann & Hart, 2009: 2). Just as Polanyi’s followers such as Bohannan and Dalton (1962) found traditional markets in systems that left the bulk of production and consumption to kinship ties to be functional, food sovereignty allows for traditional kinship relationships to guide trade.

A constitutive approach to rights

Explaining food Sovereignty as a constitutive approach to rights requires an explanation of its role as a rights based approach, to describe its contribution to the creation of rights. Essentially, the rights defined within the definition of food sovereignty come to constitute new rights. Ishii-Eiteman (2009, 698) and Wittman (2011, 92) argue that the rights-based approach is embedded in food sovereignty and is “an explicitly moral enterprise, that stands in contrast to the economic processes of market-driven globalisation”.
When Wittman explores Food Sovereignty as “A New Rights Framework for Food and Nature”, she refers to the definition in the final declaration of the Forum for Food Sovereignty, held in 2007 in Sélingué, Mali, which defines Food Sovereignty in terms of certain rights (Nyéléni Forum for Food Sovereignty 2007):

“The right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local producers and users. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic classes and generations”.

Priscilla Claeys argues that La Via Campesina has used the concept of food sovereignty to create new human rights, such as the right of peoples to food sovereignty and the rights of peasants (2013). The community aspect of Food Sovereignty assists La Via Campesina to develop an alternative conception of rights, emphasising the collective dimension of claims over the individual one. La Via Campesina has sought to institutionalise the right of peoples to food sovereignty in two ways: it has tried to translate it into alternative international trade rules for food and agriculture, and it has sought to obtain its universal recognition as a new human right.

Polanyi’s argues against private motives that erode human and natural relationships, unless embedded in institutions of social, cultural values and practices (Banley, 2010: 123). Civil society is embedded in moral, legal and political dimensions.

Both Polanyi and food sovereignty theorists prefer a state that intervenes in the market to ensure fair equality of opportunity (even if this means violating certain non-political rights such as property rights), over a minimal state that protects equal rights-especially property rights-but allows inequality resulting from voluntary distributive outcomes (Roberts and Sutch, 2004:236).
Blaney and Inayatullah’s criticism of neoliberalism rings true in the comparison of Polanyi’s beliefs and the globalised food system: “the more we extend the logic of the market, the more we lose important human values on which our collective life depends” (1981:182). Unlike the neoliberal belief that man must separate the social from the functioning of the economy and dismiss the idea of social justice altogether, in The Great Transformation Polanyi argues that a “man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships” (47). Instead of allowing the market to dictate social relationships, Polanyi finds that human productive relationships give economic life its “definite functions, by embedding it in a wider social and political processes” (Polanyi, 1968: 146-148).

Unlike neoliberalism’s condoning of modern egoist individualism, Polanyi is able to envisage: a different kind of human, social security and action supported by a village environment as well as redistribution by a centralised system to secure livelihood, just as the concepts of food sovereignty support a continuation or even a return to this kind of structure (Banely and Inayatullah, 2010: 84). Mitchell Bernard describes the liberalisation of trade and financial markets as a “second great transformation” thus similarly incorrectly considered as progress. This is aligned with the food sovereignty arguments that production should/could be: simple reproduction family farms for local markets, exchange of food inside the community and parental groups, local agriculture production should be prioritised and preferred by the consumer and steps should be taken to protect local markets from dumping/subsidised food imports (Wittman 2011; Beardsworth and Keal 1997; Malassis and Ghersi 1996). Like food sovereignty theorists Polanyi does not see globalisation and neoliberal economic order as inevitable (Banely, 2010: 113).

The building of a grassroots movement and alternative

The term “Food Sovereignty” was coined in 1996 by the members of La Via Campesina, in a meeting at Tlaxcala. La Via Campesina comprises of an “international coalition of peasant, farmers, rural women’s, and indigenous people’s movements” (Wittman 2011, 87). There are currently more than 148 organisations in sixty-nine countries that have joined the movement and it has joined other networks such as the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (which will be elaborated on in the case study chapter). As a response to trade-driven notions of food security,
“an international social movement is emerging to promote food sovereignty rather than security” (Lee, 2003: 4). The food sovereignty movement advocates “the removal of agriculture from the international trade system altogether and rejects agricultural biotechnology and industrial agriculture in favour of localised food production and the protection of rural livelihoods” (Lee, 2003:4). It advocates an alternative agricultural framework as it initialises movements in forms such as parallel events/public consultations to FAO/ World Economic Forum meetings; parallel protest meetings to WTO negotiations (such as Seattle, Cancún, Hong Kong), the International Forum for Food Sovereignty (Havana and Colombia) and the Nyéléni Forum in Mali, 2007 (Simonyi 2008). In 2008, Ecuador enshrined the concept of Food Sovereignty in its constitution. Venezuela, Mali, Bolivia, Nepal and Senegal have also made food sovereignty part of national policy. Now, after heavy lobbying by La Via Campesina, negotiations are set to begin on a draft UN declaration on the rights of peasants (the Guardian, 2013).

The efforts to resist liberalisation, impose regulations on the financial market and construct regional economic projects are considered movements to “subordinate markets…to wider social and political purposes” (Latham, 1997: 53-62). Polanyi’s vision of re-embedding the economy acknowledges the alternative practices of small-scale economies all over the world, in terms of developing thinking this is a social and institutional response to the forces of capitalism, such as agro-ecology and the sustainment of seed economies acknowledged as routes to development in the context of food sovereignty (Esteva, 1993: 6-25). While neoliberal theorists such as Hayek see the only forward – to avert the road to serfdom - to pursue the market economy structures and logic, Polanyi sees solutions in community economies that necessarily exist within and beside them, and like food sovereignty theorists, acknowledges a need to re-visit certain traditions and values (Gibson-Graham, 2006).

A common neoliberal solution to social conflict is replacing a variety of social and political relationships with the logic of the market, Polanyi finds this a means of disposing the moral entity to man (Polanyi, 1957: 73). Like food sovereignty theorists Polanyi indicates a faith in cultural traditions and social relationships that are considered out of date by modern capitalist standards. He uses “ethical resources from the past to critique modernity’s pretensions” (Banely, 2010: 106).
Polanyi’s “perspectivism” has to do with seeing the contemporary market society as a recent invention, instead of the most recent stage of an evolving economy. This allows for thought about the necessity of our market society, a contingent approach allows room for alternative developmental trajectories. Polanyi, allows for a larger stock of resources by taking into account historical references that produce the perspectivism that helps avoid a deterministic view and allows us access to alternate values and possible courses. The food sovereignty approach was born out of the perpectivism that allows for a deviation from neoliberalism’s “road” creating a new path, disrupting a neoliberal notion of historical development.

**Critiques of the food sovereignty approach**

Scholars such as Jansen have described the food sovereignty approach as being romantically optimistic about the agroecology route and accused it of overlooking the importance of expanded reproduction (2014, 1). He asserts that food sovereignty theorists needs to respond to three challenges: “the desires of farmers to be incorporated into larger commodity networks, the importance of industrialization and complex chains for feeding the world population, and the central roles of the state and science” (Jansen 2014, 1). Jansen considers Bernstein’s approach to be “the most systematic critique of the food sovereignty framework” and uses it to extend his critical interrogation (2014, 1). Firstly, Bernstein asserts that “there are no ‘peasants’ in the world of contemporary capitalist globalisation” and that food sovereignty theorists fail to take into account various differences between agrarian classes (Bernstein 2014, 15). Instead they group classes to make up peasants that are threatened by capital and its reproduction, when in fact “all farming operations are pre-dominantly driven by the dynamics of commodity production” (Jansen 2014, 2). Bernstein is also sceptical of the productivity of peasant farming as oppose to capitalist production and market structures that he considers a better way to meet demand and ensure low food prices. Bernstein puts forward that the current food regime did not impose a model of agriculture without farmers (as McMichael suggests) but that subjects were active in creating it and many smallholders actively seek to get involved in commodity chains (Jansen 2014). Agarwal (2014, 1247) identifies contradictions in the food sovereignty vision for example: “between promoting food crops and a farmer's freedom to choose to what extent to
farm, which crops to grow, and how to grow them; between strengthening family farming and achieving gender equality; and between collective and individual rights, especially over land ownership”. National self-sufficiency goals may not align and be realised by household self-sufficiency aims; nations need to serve all citizens, respecting their choices to be non-farmers or farmers that do not make decisions that move a country towards food self-sufficiency (Agarwal 2014, 1264-1265). Food sovereignty emphasises protecting the rights of the disadvantaged but exercising their rights of voice and choice may not align themselves with the recommendations of the food sovereignty approach, such as choosing to leave agriculture or move from subsistence to commercial farming, using chemicals and decreasing dependence on local markets. Agarwal also sees the future of food security for all depending on the on people’s ability to purchase rather than produce their own food and therefore finds food sovereignty unrealistic in the context of urbanisation. Agarwal does however see merit in group approaches along the lines of the food sovereignty approach if they are based on voluntary cooperation and democratic principles as well as support from the government and civil society.

Accumulation by dispossession

Marx’s theory of falling rate of profit predicts a crisis of accumulation where there are both surpluses of capital and labour power without a way to make them profitable (Harvey 2005a, 63). Ways to absorb these surpluses are then pursued such as geographical expansion and finding ways to open new markets, improve production capacities and pursue “resource, social and labour possibilities elsewhere” such was the theme of colonialism (Harvey 2005a, 63).

Marx’s theory of capital accumulation assumptions are those of classical political economy and he assumes that “primitive accumulation” (original accumulation) has already occurred and now accumulation is via expanded reproduction where labour is exploited in production within an equal society with a closed economy (Harvey 2005b, 143). This allows observation of what would happen if the neo-liberal project of neo-classical economists was realised. Marx draws the conclusion that such a situation would not lead to a “harmonious state” but increase inequality just as it has in the last 30 years as well as instability due to overaccumulation (Harvey 2005a, 73-74). Harvey finds the disadvantage of these assumptions to be that they consider
accumulation via predation, fraud and violence to be in the past or outside the capitalist system (Harvey 2005a, 74). Instead Harvey considers it an ongoing process present in the “long geography of capital accumulation” and terms it accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2005a, 74).

In terms of aforementioned overaccumulation, accumulation via dispossession looks to solve the issue by releasing assets (this could even be labour power) at a very low cost. The surplus capital can then be used to purchase this cheap set of assets and make them profitable. An example from Marx’s description of primitive accumulation resembles modern land grabs. It includes taking/enclosing land and displacing the population that lived there to create “a landless proletariat” and then “releasing the land into the privatised mainstream of capital accumulation” (Harvey 2005b, 145). Access to cheap inputs is key to this process and requires the opening up of markets and privatisation to allow capital to invest in cheap resources, land and labour (Harvey 2005b, 139).

According to Harvey (2005a, 75) new instruments of accumulation by dispossession include the WTO’s TRIPs agreement that emphasises intellectual property rights that allow patenting and licensing of genetic material, such as seed plasmas. Harvey also lists biopiracy as a means of dispossession or “pillaging” by MNCs as well as wholesale commodification of nature that entails depleting local natural resources, environmental degradation and development towards only capital-intensive agro-industrial agricultural systems (Harvey 2005a, 75). As in the past the state is being used to assist processes of privatisation (like “enclosing the common”) but also processes of dispossession continue to provoke resistance, Harvey (2005a, 75) concludes that “this now forms the core of what the anti-globalisation movement is about”. The food sovereignty movement is part of this anti-globalisation effort acting in opposition to the recurring forms of dispossession.

Financial liberalisation has been a means to globalise the food system, it encourages securitisation or tradable debt. The value of money becomes removed from it’s the wage relation and is instead valued by its ability to command credit. Accumulation by dispossession involves an expansion of capital through releasing and centralising assets (McMichael 2004, 296). The wage relation is disrupted with challenges to the state, organised labour is weakened by capital seeking access to the global labour market, undermining wage-labour order. The value of capital
assets is no longer increased through the application of value-forming labour in production, instead non-market mechanisms come to govern various forms of labour: “corporate globalisation reconstitutes its labour force on world scale, through dispossession, casual contracts, and the recursive ‘race to the bottom’ dynamic”, wages and living standards of labour drop as countries deregulate and companies relocate production, competing to produce and acquire the cheapest labour (McMichael 2004, 296). When money comes to be reproduced via global financial relations, it supersedes “capitalism’s earlier focus on the reproduction of wage–labour in the consolidation of the nation-state” (Hoogvelt, 1997; Polanyi, 1957; McMichael 2004, 296)

This paper’s hypothesis predicts dispossession of land via large scale investment, commercialisation of the seed industry resulting in biopiracy and environmental degradation, “pillaging” with increased foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs, decreasing barriers to trade and increasing imports and exports with the agro-industrial model and cuts in domestic support measures with privatisation.

**Food regime theory**

Food regime theory acts as a lens through which to study international political economy, as they involve special geographical and patterns of accumulation (McMichael 2004, 276). McMichael argues that the ‘food regime’ “expresses the genetic structure of capitalism in the accumulation/dispossession dynamic” and the political structure of states relations to global food circuits. Cameron and Palan find that authority and sovereignty are no longer akin to each other in “imagined economies of globalisation” (2004,15), the state no longer has easily definable boundaries and becomes itself defined by its international relations and its position in the construction of world agriculture. The condition for food security in such a construction is an “assault on peasant cultures” to maintain the transnational circuit (McMichael 2004, 298).

McMichael uses an explanation of the Doha Development Round to illustrate the competitive relations that exist between unequal states, influenced by corporate interests. Their perusal of comparative advantage across the state system is vital to the construction of global agricultural
systems with new circuits of casual labour (McMichael 2004, 271). As mentioned above, in the corporate food regime financial relations are deregulated, monetary value is measured by credit relations instead of labour relations with privatisation, agriculture and agro-exports being commercialised (McMichael 2004, 271). With this the world price for commodities becomes far removed from actual costs, through political means such as depressing agricultural prices through overproduction and dumping (McMichael 2004, 271). In the corporate food regime the world price is determined and spread, through liberalisation by: devaluing currency, reducing farm supports and allowing for corporatisation (McMichael 2004, 271). The globalisation of African agriculture leaves farmers vulnerable to dispossession. The character of ‘world agriculture’ with corporate-driven food supply chains has been determined by a historic process that has involved the dumping of subsidised food surpluses and increasing corporate access to land, labour and markets in developing countries (McMichael 2004, 276).

McMichael and Friedmann delineate between food regimes using periods of British and US hegemony. British hegemony relied on free trade in agriculture while the US reverted to managed agriculture. In the nineteenth century the form prioritised providing cheap foodstuffs for emerging European industrial classes, while in the mid-twentieth century the latter used aid programmes to transfer surplus foods and green revolution technologies into developing countries (McMichael 2004, 274). Britain secured hegemony by linking the “new fortunes of capitalism” to growing cheap global supply circuits while the US attained allies and markets for its agribusiness (McMichael 2004, 276). Both industrialised and specialised their agricultural sectors but separating them into distinctive food regimes reveals and emphasises the differences between the two periods that have evolved into the current food regime. The chapter historicising African globalised agriculture will use food regime theory to delineate different periods and identify recurring policies that globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty.
Chapter 3: Literature Review

This paper finds middle-range theories useful, these theories can process many variables and encourage interchanges with “other IR subfields, the other subfields of political science and other social sciences” (Bennett 2013, 475). Food sovereignty draws from various subfields which allows it to compare international decision making to resolutions of smallholders on the ground and critique international flows and global food chains. Typological theories are mechanism-based theories of phenomena; the question at hand requires theory that identifies mechanisms that globalise African Agriculture and undermine food sovereignty. The literature to be reviewed in this paper can be observed within two main themes: “understanding the food challenge” and “neoliberal modernisation and the globalised food system”.

Understanding the food challenge

The literature used to investigate this theme (to improve an understanding of food challenges) is categorised into groups dependent on their solutions to hunger (or hypothesised causal mechanisms).

Orthodox approach to hunger

The orthodox approach to hunger classifies overpopulation as the main issue and considers hunger to be a natural disaster due to scarcity (Evans and Thomas 2011, 471). Thomas Robert Malthus is considered a founding author in this field, his most relevant work being his *Essay on the Principle of Population* written in 1798. His works explores the link between food supply and human population growth. By his estimation, the latter naturally increases faster than the former and thus food availability per capita naturally decreases (Evan and Thomas 2011, 471). His theory is that resultant starvation or disaster reduces human population back to a sustainable level that can be satisfied by the food supply (Evan and Thomas 2011, 472).
The proposed solution to food crises’ is thus ways to reduce population growth such as: reducing fertility, especially in areas where the birth rates are high such as “the poor of the Third World”, increasing food production through agricultural productivity, and allowing famine to be a natural check (Evan and Thomas 2011, 472). There was a Malthusian revival in the 1960s and 1970s where the following works applied the orthodox approach to explain the world food crisis: *The population bomb* (Erlich), *Famine -1975* (Paddock and Paddock), *Lifeboat ethic: the case against helping the poor* (Hardin) and *Who Will Feed China* (Brown, 1995).

The orthodox approach suggests that international organisations should not provide solutions to hunger and the approach does not seem to criticise or advocate globalisation. The approach would not be concerned with the question at hand but provide an example of theorists who would advocate “hunger solutions” that are not effective or entirely benevolent.

*The entitlement, society focused explanation of hunger*

In response to such an approach, scholars developed “the entitlement, society focused explanation of hunger” (Evan and Thomas 2011, 472). These scholars criticise the orthodox explanation of hunger for being too simplistic and recommend that hunger should be defined as a lack of access to food, not just availability. While acknowledging that overpopulation in certain areas can contribute to hunger, they accentuate the issue of food distribution (Evan and Thomas 2011, 472). They recognise that chronic hunger in countries like Africa has worsened despite the developments in the agricultural sector and increase in food production.

These critics put forward statistics that prove there is enough grain alone to provide everyone in the world with “3,600 calories a day, even taking into account population growth” (Evan and Thomas 2011, 472). They also direct focus to the aforementioned paradox, in which the developing world produces the majority of the world’s food while holding the most malnourished people and the developed Western world holds the highest consumers (Evan and Thomas 2011, 472). These scholars explain hunger by looking at “social, political and economic factors that determine how food is distributed” which brings issues, such as food being used for biofuels and livestock rather than people, to the fore (Evans and Thomas 2011, 473).
A prominent author in this critical field is Amartya Sen. In An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation published in 1981, he argues that hunger is a result of food not being available but rather that starving people lack “entitlement” to the food. This would explain why famines occur even when food availability is at its peak (Evan and Thomas 2011, 472).

Amartya Sen is a pioneer in this approach and describes hunger as: “the characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat” (1981). Scholars such as Sen hold the global market responsible for situations (predominantly seen in hunger stricken parts of Africa) where: land is devoted to export crops, locals find themselves with little space for local production, high unemployment rates exist alongside little or no welfare and thus local people can establish no entitlement to food (Sen 1981). This approach replaced the Malthusian approach as the dominant theoretical framework for analysing famines in the 1980s and effectively shifted qualitative and quantitative research towards entitlement collapse (demand) rather than focusing mainly on food availability decline (supply).

**Complex political emergency approach**

The complex political emergency approach emphasises the role of domestic politics in perpetuating hunger and the effects of external forces of globalisation. Prominent theorists of this approach are Alex de Vaal, Mark Duffield and David Keen. While the orthodox explanation of hunger views it as natural disaster and the entitlement approach sees hunger as an economic failure, the complex emergency approach sees food crises as “political pathologies” (Duffield, 1998: 87). Hunger can be attributed to local power struggles, political repression, and failure of the international community and the politicisation of foreign aid. Scholars explaining hunger in this manner put forward evidence to demonstrate that “21 out of the 32 major famines have adverse politics at the local national or international level as a principal cause” (Evan and Thomas 2011, 475). Their proposed solution to hunger is therefore political accountability and “criminalisation of mass starvation”, which may also assist in the mobilisation of the international community.
Food security

It is important to interrogate the concept of food security as it reveals some of the underlying thinking of the G8 in their construction of the New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition.

This approach has been developed with the evolution of security studies and is increasingly intersubjective and multidimensional, as the shift in security studies from formal institutions of security (military, statist and territorial) to security policies based on people occurs. New focus on human security exposes that conditions that breed insecurity are: globalisation, migration, conflicts and bad governance, criminal war lords, issues of poor health and environmental threats.

Human and food security studies reveal new reasons for why Africa experiences such insecurity and thus new solutions affecting the formulation of policy and the elaboration of models in the management of food crises. In addition, the 1975 UN definition used to be technical (based on food quantity per capita) but now includes the following important elements of the right to food: that food must be available (from natural resources or for sale), accessible (economic and physical access through affordability and delivery to elderly, children, victims etc.) and adequate (satisfying dietary and cultural needs).

Food insecurity is no longer seen simply as the failure of agriculture to produce sufficient food at the national level, but instead as a failure of livelihoods to guarantee access to sufficient food at the household level (Clover, 2008). In the 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food Security, food security is defined as: “food that is available at all times, to which all persons have means of access that is nutritionally adequate in terms of quantity, quality and variety, and is acceptable within the given culture”. Thus the UN’s policies and frameworks for understanding hunger have changed: structural poverty is recognised as a cause of food insecurity and hunger. Not only does poverty cause undernourishment, it decreases the capacity for work, for study, for mental development, for skills acquisition and for educational achievements.

In theory the solution to hunger does not entail merely an increasing production, it involves: managing harvests that have failed, food prices that have risen sharply and livestock prices that have fallen (what we are witnessing in Southern Africa); ensuring that security of land tenure is
accompanied by comprehensive programs of agrarian reform (including access to credit, savings and markets) in rural areas to reduce inequality; and addressing the connection between under-nutrition, lack of potable water and diarrhoea (one of the world’s biggest killers) (Clover, 2008). However, in practice food security initiatives such as the NAFN tend to continue to focus on means to increase production, focusing more on the availability than accessibility of food.

Lead research of the African Centre for Biosafety, Stephen Greenberg (2015) considers it imperative to distinguish food security from food sovereignty to fully understand the thinking behind the NAFN and its counter-movement. He finds merit in certain aspects of food security and stresses that it must not be entirely dismissed but the way in which it is being used must be scrutinised. “one must take very seriously the breakdown of the food security concept there is some truth to it, so you cannot dismiss it entirely… there are certain technical factors that need to be in place in a different society but the problem is how these get realised and how they are crudified to basically be quantified”. One of his major criticisms is that everything must be quantified so it may be commodified therefore overlooking socio-ecological aspects.(Greenberg 2015).

After being coined at the 1974 World Food Conference, the use of food security as a concept was prevalent in the 1980s (Jarosz 2014, 170). The context in which food security emerged as a discourse is important as it has come to shape a certain mind-frame of food security advocates. In 1972-1973 there were the Sahelian famines and in 1972-1974 there was the global food price crisis (Jarosz 2014, 170). Out of this emerged the perception that “the haves and have-nots are separated by technological access and innovation, good fortune and geography [which] remains popular and influential today" (Jarosz 2014, 171). The Green Revolution that followed prioritised large-scale, mechanized agricultural programs. Institutions such as the World Bank and World trade Organisation “began appealing to food security discourse as a way to justify neoliberal trade liberalization projects” (Otero et al. 2013). Consequently it became a means to perpetuate a political and economic doctrine advocating privatization, deregulation and reduction of public spending to achieve economic growth (Harvey 2005c). A 1987 World Bank report defined food security as “achieved only if all households have the ability to buy food. There is no necessary link between self-sufficiency and food security” (World Bank, 1986: 31). Jarosz (2014, 171) finds this report to be important since it conceptualises food security as “identical to
mainstream development issues” and thus food insecurity is repairable through structural adjustment programs, trade liberalization, and integration into global capital markets.

The 1980s saw a shift away from basing solutions on food self-sufficiency such as provisioning for local markets and trading surplus food. Instead food availability was to be ensured through the logics of free trade, comparative advantage and international aid (Weiler et al 2015, 1079). A lack of liberalisation was recognised as one of the causes of hunger. There is a certain level of individualisation as people become ‘rational’ economic actors and certain responsibilities shift away from the state (Weiler et al 2015, 1079). If food security is defined as a lack of individual purchasing power, people are responsible for increasing their income or crop productivity in order to alleviate their hunger. The dynamics involved in targeting hunger then involve access to land, terms of trade and employment opportunities as well as volatile global and regional food prices (Jarosz 2015, 171).

Theorists such as Redclift (1987, 32) attribute impediments to self-sufficiency in food production in the South to regional structures in the North in “the illusory” pursuit of food security. A prime example of this is cash crops on appropriated land in Africa had a detrimental effect on agrarian economies and national self-sufficiency, while contributing to food security in North America and Europe (Jarosz 2014, 172).

**Chosen theoretical approach - food sovereignty**

The food sovereignty approach is the one adopted by this paper as it provides a framework that is critical of the international trade regime and the international organisations that are responsible for shaping it. This approach is apt as it addresses the potential mismatch between agricultural research along with international policies and the reality of farming systems. Like the food security approach, it provides a more multidimensional approach to hunger than the orthodox approach, the entitlement society focused explanation of hunger and the complex political emergency approach. The food sovereignty approach incorporates factors from each of the other approaches and suggests further reasons for hunger in Africa.
It is superior to the orthodox approach in the context of Africa, sharing the concerns of the entitlement-society theorists, asserting that the problem is not insufficient food but rather its distribution and access. Food sovereignty theorists have similar criticisms of the international trade system and threats to local production as entitlement-society theorists. The food sovereignty approach holds similarities to the complex political emergency approach in its criticisms of the politicisation of foreign aid – criticising the ‘philanthropic’ attempts of international organisations, Western countries and NGOs for pushing Mache agendas of multinational corporations. However while some complex political emergence theorists advocate the mobilisation of the international community (are pro-globalisation) to reduce hunger in Africa, food sovereignty theorists find merit in the practices of local farmers and hold the belief that these can be undermined by international assistance.

In terms of food security, food sovereignty theorists adopt the same holistic definition for hunger which is very useful to the topic hand. It differs in its approach to international organisations and the stance that solutions can be found in the mainstream economic standard model and the privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation. The concepts of food security and food sovereignty both have both changed the thinking and practice in the fight for access to food, and against global hunger. They have affected the formulation of policy and the elaboration of models in the management of food crises: the growth in international agricultural trade has been used with the notion of food security while the food sovereignty approach has a clear belief that international organisations and the institutions of international agricultural trade require reformation being at odds with the fight against global hunger.

Food security and food sovereignty differ in the following ways: firstly, in terms of models of agricultural production, food security advocates an industrial model while food sovereignty looks to agro-ecological methods; secondly, in terms of the models of agricultural trade, food security follows a neoliberal one, while food sovereignty is protectionist; and in their approach to plant genetic resources food security is pro-private property rights while food sovereignty theorists are anti-patents and prefer a communal approach to agricultural systems (Lee, 2003:12). The research question at hand requires an approach that will readily deviate from the neoliberal capitalist model, acknowledge flaws in international policies and regimes and explore various avenues to solving hunger.
There are also important points of convergence when comparing food security to food sovereignty (Jarosz 2014, 174). A 2009 report by the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development (IAASTD) describes them as interrelated concepts when it comes to access, distribution, security and equity (Jarosz 2014, 175).

Convergence has been realised in the 2012 Global Strategic Framework for Food Security by the FAO’s Committee on World Food Security. The Nyéléni Declaration’s definitions of food sovereignty have been included. An example of food sovereignty and food security discourses being related in discourse and through practice is the Zero Hunger program under President Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva in Brazil (Jarosz 2014, 175). In Belo Horizonte, a Municipal Law was passed “setting a food security policy that is committed to the concept of food sovereignty” and outlining “the right of peoples to define their own food and agricultural policies, to protect and regulate their production and trade in such a manner as to secure sustainable development, to determine the degree of their autonomy, and to eliminate dumping on their markets” (Jarosz 2014, 175).

The discourses are similar in that they have evolved over time, reacting to global political and cultural economies of food systems (Jarosz 2014, 179). Initially the concept of food security, like food sovereignty, emphasised state responsibility to provide for their people via food reserves and striving for self-sufficiency (Jarosz 2014, 179). This similarity declined in the 1980s and 1990s as food security became entwined with developmentalist discourses, requiring market access and entering the global food system (Jarosz 2014, 179). Food sovereignty on the other hand tends to be anti-globalisation.

Food security and food sovereignty can be considered interrelated at a grassroots level in food security movements, in indigenous peoples’ movements for self-determination, and in the most FAO’s international food policy publications” (Jarosz 2014, 179). Jarosz considers the most important difference to be stances on genetic modification (Jarosz 2014, 179). She emphasises that considering food sovereignty and food security relational will encourage a re-evaluation of reliance on GMOs in the food security discourse and encourage reconstruction of food systems as a means to achieve food security (Jarosz 2014, 179).

Neoliberal modernisation and the globalised food system
Both Greenberg and McKeon emphasise that modernisation theory forms the basis of the thinking behind food security which is considered to a neoliberal construct. McKeon describes modernisation to be the central pillar of New Alliance’s narrative.

The traditional modernisation theory assumes: societies are logically organised systems, two definable social systems have emerged through development, the traditional and the modern. According to this theory, modernisation involves a transition from the traditional to the modern mode of existence. “The modern” is defined with reference to the institutions and culture of “specifically Western societies (which were typified as individualistic, democratic, capitalist, scientific, secular, and stable and as dividing work from home in gender-specific ways)”. Modernisation is considered to be a unilinear, historical process that is inevitable, providing the traditional society with resources for “a general process of adaptive upgrading, including economic take-off to industrialisation, democratisation via law, secularisation and science via education” (1994:168). Modernisation theory also recognises the problem of dualism: where modern sectors that are technologically developed, commercialised and usually urban, exists side by side with traditional sectors that are less productive, rural subsistence producers (Ssirmai, 2005:78). The theory asserts that once internal barriers to development are removed, the traditional sectors will develop and inequality will diminish, in the same way developing countries will eventually catch up with developed countries (Ssirmai, 2005:78-79).

Rostow, a renowned modernisation theorist developed a stage theory of growth to explain how this transition is to take place. The five stages that outline a unilinear track for development are: “traditional society, preconditions to take off, take-off, drive to maturity and mass consumption society” (Ssirmai, 2005:79). Traditional societies progress from a stage of static production technology to the precondition stage in which they seek to improve their standard of living by beginning to use modern science to advance production technologies (Ssirmai, 2005:79). This transition is dependent on economic conditions that are susceptible to industrialisation, such as an increase in productivity in the mining and agricultural sectors (Ssirmai, 2005:80). This allows for surplus and investment opportunities in infrastructure and the emergence of a modernising elite. The take-off stage requires increased investment to be “directed towards the industrial sector” and adequate available entrepreneurship as well as loanable funds (Ssirmai, 2005:80). The final stage entails all sectors of the economy following the leading sectors example of
adopter new production techniques and a “mass-consumption society, which looks surprisingly like Rostow's North American Society” benefitting from “increased opportunities for consumption” (Ssirmai, 2005:80). The stages of agricultural development follow this pattern from traditional to a mass consumption society, the traditional society entailing smallholder farming and the take-off aided by initiatives such as the NAFN (it looks to create susceptible economic conditions with investment opportunities, loanable funds and advanced production technologies such as hybrid/GM seeds and agro-chemicals). The diagram below depicts stages of progression via increasing commodification and industrialisation of the agricultural industry according to a neoliberal modernisation theory model:

**Figure 1**

[Diagram showing stages of progression]

*Diagram by Y. Zhou, Syngenta Foundation*

Source: (McKeon 2014, 9)

Neoliberalism predicts balanced, universal growth through a capitalist, open-market, laissez faire economic system. Like that endorsed by Adam Smith, it relies on the invisible hand of market forces to allocate goods and resources and to determine prices, believes actors in the market to be rational and advocates non-interventionist and privatisation strategies. The theory also advocates
Adam Smith’s solution to economic growth; that the key lies in increasing divisions of labour, by which workers’ specialisations increase the scale of production which eventually results in market expansion (and globalisation), increased trade and market benefits for all. The problem of underdevelopment is characterised as being a shortage of capital, thus development policies responses following this line of reasoning assume the form of foreign investment, loans and aid. Neoliberal modernisation has chosen the trajectory of the global food system, focusing on increased productivity and trusting in capital and global market forces.

Goodman and Redclift adopt a global approach to explain hunger in their work *Refashioning Nature, Food, Ecology and Culture* (1991). They attribute developing countries’ food crises to the “global organisation of food production and access to food” which allows transnational corporations to play a major role (Evan and Thomas 2011, 474). As local farming systems find themselves incorporated into a global trading system they change from much-needed subsistence farming for their family and community towards producing for the international market on a cash-crop system.

According to War on Want one of the seven principles of food sovereignty (as advanced by La Via Campesina) is:

> Ending the globalisation of hunger. Food sovereignty is undermined by multilateral institutions and by speculative capital. The growing control of multinational corporations over agricultural policies has been facilitated by the economic policies of multilateral organisations such as the WTO, World Bank and the IMF.

Globalising, neoliberal capitalist policies have allowed MNCs to purchase land in Africa that may have otherwise been used/owned by local farmers. Furthermore, neoliberal policies have enabled external actors to use African land for biofuels. Food Sovereignty theorists emphasise the unethical aspect of food being grown (and in most cases exported) for energy supply, on a continent with millions of hungry people.

Neoliberal economic theory has become the foundation of the workings of African agriculture since the 1970s oil crisis that left Africa heavily indebted. The debt burden forced African countries to look to the international financial institutions for financial support (Thomas, 2004:177). To meet WB and IMF loan requirements countries had to adopt neoliberal policies such as trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation in industries including the agricultural
sector. These very much coincide with the interests of the transnational capitalist class which is largely a result of Western policy makers within institutions like WB, IMF and WTO having vested interests with major MNCs (van Elteren, 2009:183).

The WTO’s main focuses were: “market access, export subsidies and domestic support” (Fonseca 2012, 218). To increase market access, non-tariff barriers were to be removed and existing tariffs reduced (Fonseca 2012, 218). Resultant trade liberalisation has led to a huge increase in imports and a lesser increase of exports resulting in “millions of people being forced off their land and to a concentration of land holdings” (Madeley 2000, 46). Liberalisation was expected to have a positive impact on net food-exporting countries because higher world food prices increase export revenues but instead it undermined African food security due to higher and more volatile food prices and declining levels of food aid as well as the negative effects of food dumping (Gayi 2006, 3-5) (Madeley 2000, 7).

Food sovereignty advocates such as Shiva, Patel, Clapp and Kloppenburg all agree that globalisation is linked to the commercialisation of the seed industry and can be accused of gearing the agricultural market towards profit rather than targeting hunger. Key to this argument is the tendency of firms to push their few varieties of seed (which results in monocultures, as one type of seed is repetitively regrown without natural changes) in order to earn royalties while inhibiting the evolution of seed diversity (Seeds of Freedom 2012). Traditionally, farmers have re-sown seeds that have best adapted to the environment through evolutionary change throughout the ages (Shiva 2001, 121). The case for seed diversity over monocultures rests on the claim that one variety of seed inhibits the natural tendencies of seeds to build resilience, suit diverse nutritional needs and survive climate change (Seeds of Freedom 2012).

Without the commercialisation of seeds localised seed economies are free to operate; here, seed is freely saved and exchanged, predominantly by women. Availability of food in localised seed economies is ensured by seed saving, which minimises risk and makes for self-reliance; this is particularly important to women who gain “bargaining power in the household” (Pionetti 2005: xiv).

Another benefit of this system, is that it is environmentally sustainable thus helping to ensure long term availability of food. Pionetti’s research found that if seeds are continually exchanged for local crop varieties, “genetic resources from one field to another within a village territory and
beyond” are circulated; this facilitates the “adaptation potential of local crops to evolving environmental conditions and limits the risk of genetic erosion” and thus contributes to the stability of local agricultural systems (Pionetti 2005, 154). In addition, constant and unlimited seed transactions ensure the land is not “left fallow for lack of seeds” which results in soil erosion, soil that has a lower organic matter content and soil with a lower water-retention capacity (Pionetti 2005, 154). The UN-organised Plant Genetic Resources Conference in Leipzig in 1995 reported that 75 per cent of all agricultural biodiversity had disappeared because of monocultures, and since then erosion had hastened (Shiva 2012, 1). Furthermore, monocultures are more vulnerable to pests and diseases, and local diversity that supports livestock is destroyed, further hurting the self-provisional farmer (Shiva 2012).

When patented (mass produced and distributed) seeds are bought from corporations, the natural system is interrupted; seeds for each season are no longer selected by the community according to their own environmental and climatic needs. Pionetti (2005) found that the technical information provided by the corporations’ agricultural specialists – such as genetic engineers and nutritionists – was inferior to local agricultural systems and knowledge that are tailored to the needs of the region (through the natural evolution of seeds for thousands of years).

Purchasing patented seeds locks farmers into a production chain in which seed (and agro-chemical) corporations predetermine the choice of inputs and nature of the harvest (Pionetti 2005, xv). Accessibility is restricted by relative purchasing power, seeds must be purchased (with money) every season. When subsistence farmers buy commercialised seeds (made by large seed MNCs like Monsanto) but cannot afford to buy these new seeds each season, they and their dependents are left hungry. Shiva emphasises the point that food sovereignty is threatened by the disempowerment of farmers by policies where life forms are included as subject matter for intellectual property rights (IPR). This has a direct negative impact on subsistence farmers and adverse long-term effects as the natural evolution of seeds is interrupted (Shiva 2012).

Chemical multinationals such as Ciba Geigy, ICI, Monsanto and Hoechst are developing organisms that are more tolerant of herbicides and pesticides, to increase sales of herbicides and pesticides that they themselves produce (Shiva 2012). Furthermore, this results in biological pollution, as superweeds develop with the “naturally occurring gene transfer” (Shiva 2012). Intellectual property rights allow MNCs ownership of the seeds and thus the ability to create
their desirable properties in the seeds (such as increased tolerance to herbicides and pesticides) they intend to distribute.

As with the ‘globalisation and hunger’ approach the food sovereignty approach recognises and emphasises the dubious birth of the pesticide and herbicide industry. During the two World Wars, chemicals were produced in large quantities for explosives and nerve agents. When peace was established, the companies needed an alternative outlet and thus reformulated chemicals to be used on farmlands.

Monocrops for export have replaced a huge amount of subsistence farming. Promises that increased exports (due the superiority of MNC’s patented seeds) contribute to farmers’ and the countries’ wealth doesn’t account for the increased productivity costs, as farmers are forced to purchase new seeds, fertilisers and pesticides for each new season and these modern crops’ subjection to unpredictable international markets. For example, in 1993 in Karnataka, India, the farmers cost of production with Cargill’s sorghum was Rs 3,230 per acre and their income was Rs 3,600 per acre. However, with indigenous seeds the cost of production was only Rs 300 per acre and their income was Rs 3,200 thus returning Rs 2,900 per acre as oppose to Rs 370 per acre (when having to purchase seed and chemicals)(Shiva 1997, 90). This example indicates the reduced accessibility and affordability of food that accompanies MNC’s control over the nature of seeds (and thus the chemicals they need), that they are only able to own and distribute due to the TRIPs agreement.

Shiva blames debt – created by the need to buy seeds, pesticides and herbicides (increasing production costs) together with falling food prices in the international agricultural market for the farmer suicides epidemic in India. This started in 1997- “That's when the corporate seed control started” (Shiva 2010, 1); the Indian government statistics estimate that 200,000 farmers committed suicide from 1997-2010 (Lerner 2010, 1). This has had a direct effect on the accessibility and availability for their families and communities and on a broader scale the loss of farmers on a national scale has contributed to hunger in the same way.

Biopiracy is made possible by intellectual property rights (IPR) laws that allows for the patenting of any agricultural knowledge; companies can claim intellectual property rights over plant species from developing countries without permission or compensation- leading communities to lose control their natural resources (Patel 2007, 132). Shiva asserts that “the patenting of
products and processes of plants on the basis on indigenous knowledge has become a major issue of conflict in the IPR domain” (1998, 69).

Food sovereignty theorists such as Madeley think the WTO’s agreements failure to prevent or ease Africa’s food security dilemma is largely due to them making food into a commodity and the resultant power this gives corporations. The Uruguay Round Agreement strengthened MNCs considerably by leaving governments with fewer means of regulating and restricting them (Madeley 2000, 93). This perpetuates their role in the creation of international trade policies and ability to side step countries’ attempts to protect their agricultural industry. MNC’s monopolise the global agricultural industry: for example, six corporations handle 85 percent of world trade in grain (Madeley 2000, 91). This is unsurprising given the extensive role of MNCs when the WTO agreements were created; during the Uruguay negotiations’ MNCs provided staff for all 15 groups that assisted to draw the US position (Madeley, 2000 91).

Reviewing literature and theory around the food challenge reveals the main tenets and theoretical challenges to food sovereignty and investigating a subtheme of neoliberal modernisation and globalised food systems reveals policy trends that have globalised African agriculture and undermined food sovereignty. Combined this allows for the formulation of a hypothesis that: the NAFN globalises African Agriculture and undermines Food Sovereignty with neoliberal solutions to hunger: large scale investment of land, commercialisation of the seed industry, increased use of agro-chemicals and GMOs, increased foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs, decreasing barriers to trade and increasing imports and exports and cuts in domestic support measures.
Chapter 4: Methodology

Research design

The purpose of this research is exploratory as the NAFN is a relatively new development with little existing research and is likely to leave room for subsequent studies. This exploratory research, involving a literature search and interviews, is relatively broad in focus rather than attempting to provide definite answers. Exploratory research is useful in identifying key issues and key variables, the research at hand requires the identification of key variables that globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty and key issues surrounding the NAFN. This research is deductive in nature, as the paper sets out to test a theory, namely that the NAFN globalises African Agriculture and undermines Food Sovereignty with neoliberal solutions to hunger such as large scale investment of land, the commercialisation of the seed industry and increased use of agro-chemicals and GMOs, increased foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs, decreasing barriers to trade and increasing imports and exports and cuts in domestic support measures.

Data sources

The research will rely on both primary and secondary sources to inform the research question. The most important primary sources will be the interviews with participants – organisations and individuals who may be involved in the field or experts who observe and analyse the behaviour of the participants in their respective contexts. Secondary or ‘processed’ sources of data will also be important, the advantage of secondary data is that it can be faster to locate and employ in the research. The sources of this qualitative research project include: journals, academic novels, newspaper articles, NGO reports, documentaries and public policy documents.

Literature on food sovereignty can be found in various academic approaches and disciplines: anthropology, sociology, geography, political Sciences, agroecology, nutritionists and crop
scientists (Besner Kerr 2010; Msachi et al 2009; Quaye et al.2009). The concept of food sovereignty “remains fragmented among numerous journals that are not widely read beyond the discipline”, so it is important to find and consolidate literature from many different study areas (Ishii-Eitman 2009, 691).

Little or no academic literature in the form of theses, journal articles and books exist on the NAFN since it was only launched in 2012. There are a limited amount of newspaper articles (almost all online), unpublished critiques and NGO policy briefs that are useful. Many of the sources are opinion-based and thus unreliable in terms of factual evidence but useful in building critiques. Data sources imperative to understanding the NAFN include official publications by the NAFN: Cooperation Frameworks, Fact Sheets (especially The White House’s “Fact Sheet: G8 Action on Food Security and Nutrition” Released May 18, 2012 by the Office of the Press Secretary), speeches, press releases and progress reports. When this research began there was no central site for the New Alliance and such sources were scattered between government websites and the “feed the future” website making it difficult to locate, access and consolidate official documents on the NAFN.

Data collection

The research project will employ qualitative data collection methods, through conducting interviews (informal/semi-structured), document analysis and examining a case study.

Qualitative methods have been chosen as these tend to be more useful in exploring and explaining social processes in any specific setting. Data from qualitative research is mainly in the form of documents, transcripts and observations – although they may also include quantification (of statistics, monetary values, etc.) if this illustrates an argument or proposition. Qualitative methods are useful for exploring stakeholders’ (such as G8 states, private investors, African farmers and consumers and MNCs) own accounts of their attitudes, motivations and behaviour. In assessing a policy framework, it helps to understand the perspectives and interests of the various role players – as well as the motivations behind strategy recommendations and their likely outcomes.
Case studies

The advantage of case studies is that they offer an opportunity to take a holistic view of how the subject of a research topic ‘plays out’ in an empirical situation, allowing an analysis that pays attention to context (ISights Harvard Education 2008). It can also offer realistic answers to research questions if an extensive range of relevant variables are well considered (ISights Harvard Education. 2008).

The Alliance of Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) can be used as a case study of a food sovereignty critique. The case study is useful as a source to discover ways in which food sovereignty is undermined since AFSA and its member organisations are geared towards exposing situations in which this is the case. AFSA has recently spoken out against the NAFN in a press release and its various members’ critiques, either of the NAFN or similar policies, providing valuable sources of input.

AFSA includes smallholder farmers, pastoralists, hunter/gatherers, indigenous peoples, citizens and environmentalists from Africa. These actors are represented by networks and farmer organisations such as: the African Biodiversity network (ABN), Coalition for the Protection of African Genetic Heritage (COPAGEN), Comparing and Supporting Endogenous Development (COMPAS) Africa, Friends of the Earth- Africa, Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC), Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM) Association, Eastern and Southern African Small Scale Farmers Forum (ESAFF), La Via Campesina Africa, FAHAMU, World Neighbours and Network of Farmers ‘and Agricultural Producers’ Organisations of West Africa (ROPPA) (AFSA 2011). Relevant contributions towards the subject of food sovereignty and/or the NAFN from all these groups will be included in the case study chapter. The main way to access information on AFSA members is through their websites, unfortunately many of the sites are underdeveloped, not regularly updated and tend to contain mainly opinion pieces and unpublished research.
**Interviews**

Some of the data will be collected through interviews. Using semi-structured interviews will encourage an informal conversation covering certain themes and questions (the questions may vary from one interview to the next, as may the order of the questions) (Keys 1997, 1). This format of interview is particularly useful in explanatory research to understand the relationships between variables – most of which will have been identified already in the literature review (Keys 1997, 1). The intention of the interviews and their informal structure is also to detect topics that have not been covered so that gaps in the research can be identified and addressed.

The interviewees are:

- Stephen Greenberg - Lead researcher for the African Centre for Biosafety which is part of the AFSA network
- Gareth Jones – Researcher for the African Centre for Biosafety
- Mamlidia Kompe – Co-founder of the Rural Women’s Movement and member of the Limpopo Provincial legislator
- Brittany Kesselman – PHD student specialising in food sovereignty
- Bridget Mugambe – AFSA Co-ordinator
- Andrew Bennie – COPAC grassroots facilitator and researcher, coordinator of the Food Sovereignty Campaign in South Africa
- Mpho Lekgheto – Member of the Rural Women’s Assembly, also part of AFSA.
- Patrick Sekhula – Dsumeria Area Farmers Association
- Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss – Biowatch Seeds and Knowledge Initiative director (Biowatch is a founding member of the African Biodiversity Network, which is a founding member of AFSA)

Most interviewees were chosen for their link to AFSA to aid data collection for the case study especially given the limited amount of information online. Consulting farmers and representative organisations is vital for a food sovereignty critique given that food sovereignty emphasises the importance of consultation and representation of farmers when approaching the issues this paper covers.
The interviews are done in person or over Skype, email and telephone. Although Skype and telephone were preferable means (for those unable to meet in person) some candidates were without access to adequate internet lines or had poor phone signal, so email interviews were done.

Topics of conversation were geared towards subjects relevant to the hypothesis: land, seeds, agrochemicals, MNCs, barriers to trade and domestic support measures as well as AFSA if they were connected to the network.

**Document analysis**

Drawing from various secondary sources that have been produced surrounding this topic (mentioned above) reveals recurring themes useful for constructing a hypothesis and structuring the focal points of this paper.

The weaknesses of document analysis are that the reliability and validity of information may be compromised by subjectivity and bias may be difficult to detect (Keys 1997, 1). This topic is particularly problematic in its newness, having only been created three years ago no journal articles or books cover this specific area. This will be overcome by collecting data from different viewpoints and comparing them to create a more objective view, cross-referencing will be a technique used in an attempt to counteract bias commonly found in these secondary sources.

Literature for the theory section and literature review were more easily accessible but, as some of the interviewees commented, there is little work done on consolidating the various dimensions of food sovereignty, so this was one of the objectives. The data from this analyses is used to build a strong definition of what kind of reforms constitute as “globalising African Agriculture” and “undermining food sovereignty” so as to form a hypothesis.
Defining variables

*Dependent variable*

The dependent variable has been defined in the literature review and is encapsulated in the hypothesis, indicators that food sovereignty is undermined and agriculture globalised are:

- large scale investment of land
- the commercialisation of the seed industry and increased use of agro-chemicals and GMOs,
- increased foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs
- decreasing barriers to trade and increasing imports and exports
- cuts in domestic support measures

Continuities between NAFN’s recommendations and these indicators will be investigated by referring to sources such as NAFN progress reports and Cooperation Frameworks.

*Independent variable*

Defining the independent variable NAFN and how it globalises African agriculture and undermines food sovereignty, requires an understanding of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’s main objectives (as described by the Whitehouse Fact Sheet 2012):

- Encouraging bilateral and multilateral investments in food security
- Mobilising capital for food security
- Taking innovation to scale
- Reducing and managing risk
- Nutrition and bio-fortified crop varieties
- Ensuring accountability for results
These objectives must be ‘decoded’ by referring to the NAFN Progress Reports, Cooperation Framework Agreements, fact sheets, policy briefs and other documentation available to identify the way these objectives manifest themselves as tangible reforms. Cooperation Framework Agreements reveal themselves to be the most useful in this regard, used and critiqued in the AFSA case study chapter.

There are three main explanatory factors that will make up the empirical chapters in this paper. Firstly, African agriculture is historicised to identify ways in which it is globalised and make out globalising policies that undermine food sovereignty so that continuities in the NAFN can be recognised. Secondly, the NAFN itself and its link with the paradigm of globalised agriculture will be explored, exposing the immediately apparent flaws in its main objectives. Finally, the AFSA case study is used to critique the ways in which the NAFN materialises as commitments by African member states.
Chapter 5: Historicising Africa’s globalised agriculture

This chapter uses a food regime approach to set out various stages in the history of agriculture and factors that have contributed to its globalisation and potentially undermined food sovereignty. The identification of such factors provides an understanding of the flaws in previous attempts to “develop” Africa’s food system, so that any continuities can be recognised within the NAFN (when dissected in the next chapter). The NAFN has been accused of neo-colonialism, being Structural Adjustment 2.0 and contributing to a new scramble for Africa. The first two sections provide an understanding of how the global agricultural system has developed and the final section of this chapter is particularly important to the question at hand, delving into neoliberal responses to underdevelopment related to Africa and providing examples of policy recommendations to look out for in the NAFN.

The first food regime (1870–1930s)

Britain’s free trade imperialism was the foundation of the first food regime (as defined by McMichael and Friedmann). It was empowered by economic liberalisation policies that allowed Britain to penetrate the economies and colonies of other European countries. It involved a price-governed world market, with food coming from ‘European peripheries’ in the pursuit of cheap labour (Friedmann 1987, Luxemberg 1963, Davis 2001). The first world market was facilitated by the City of London and the sterling/gold standard. It assisted investment into the world’s economic ‘peripheries’ made necessary by European protectionism (McMichael 2005a, 11–27). Following the (detrimental) monocultures imposed in the colonial era, in the nineteenth century Britain subcontracted its staple food production to its colonies with settlers. Imports from colonies provided for the European industrial classes. Settler colonies on the rise (such as the US, Canada and Australia) developed national agricultural sectors which set the scene for twentieth-century ‘development’, a special relationship between these and industrial sectors.
These global systems made up the “first price governed market” in food, emerging with the foundation of US family farming which produced cheaper wheat than capitalist farms in Europe (Friedmann 2005, 125).

The second food regime (1950s–70s)

This period featured social protections such as policies of full employment and managed farm sectors (McMichael 2004, 275). While Britain colonised gaining land and resources, backstopped the gold standard and manipulated countries’ sterling balances to “deepen the circulation of capital” the US was focussed on containing Soviet expansion (McMichael 2004, 275). ‘The development project’ entailed state-building with economic and military assistance with a unilinear development trajectory towards a US model of consumption (McMichael 2004a). Managed agriculture resulted in food surpluses and the food aid regime presented a solution to the overaccumulation of agricultural products in offering cheap commodities to Third World allies in the context of the Cold War (McMichael 2004, 276). Publicly regulated trade left agricultural product prices relatively stable and US hegemony was maintained through this ‘development project’ benefitting MNCs in terms of accessing foreign markets (McMichael 2004, 276).

One of the factors that accelerated the globalisation of food systems was: after WWII the US’s large food surpluses were off-loaded onto developing countries in the form of cheap imports (Evan and Thomas 2011, 474). With cheaper and more varied forms of food available, farmers in developing countries had an incentive to convert from subsistence farming to working for a monetary wage (creating a cheap labour force) (Evan and Thomas 2011, 474). Local food production in developing countries decreased and cheap imports have also changed “consumer tastes” (Evan and Thomas 2011, 474). Furthermore advanced agricultural technology has led to mass loss of jobs and subsistence farmers being displaced from traditional lands. Hunger has been increased by price volatility in the agricultural market due to speculative investments encouraged by the creation of a “global agri-business” (Evan and Thomas 2011, 475).
The current food regime has an imperial history inducing the non-European world to export monocultures and requiring poverty and marginalisation to maintain development and overconsumption elsewhere, in accordance with predictions by the accumulation by dispossession theory. Dispossession from the colonial-era filtered through to the next regime such as the deconstruction of village grain reserves in non-European countries with the commodification of grain and production for export (McMichael 2004, 279). The ‘development project’ (1950s-1980s) involved cash cropping, industrialisation, imported cheap food products and the idea that peasant culture is a thing of the past and progress requires development into a world urban consumer (McMichael 2004, 279). Subsistence farming was discounted as unproductive and peasant cultures were displaced as cooperative labour, seed saving, managing the commons, biodiversity and traditional knowledge were undermined.

McMichael also argues that the strategy of corporate globalisation is centred on US imperial strategy (2004, 295). Corporate globalisation is said to have begun in the deregulation of financial relations in the 1970s when the US attempted to move debt to weaker states in terms of currency and further empower itself. In the 1970s the offshore dollar market and global banking institutions benefitted from the end of the gold standard and floating currencies (McMichael 2004, 295). US hegemony was sustained by financialisation: reducing capital controls, creating specifications for accessing global savings by opening capital markets, with reduced trade and investment barriers being in the interests of US MNCs, states were exposed to financialisation via structural adjustment and free trade agreements (McMichael 2004, 295; Soederberg 2004, Panitch and Gindin 2004).

One of the factors aiding the transition from the ‘development project’ to ‘the globalisation project’ was the tragedy of structural adjustment following the debt crisis and “the debt regime began the institutionalisation of the ‘globalisation project’” via the WTO and its Agreement on Agriculture.
Corporate food regime (late 1980s-present)

In this regime citizenship and national sovereignty are challenged by the neoliberal ‘globalisation project’, deviating from welfare and development states of the previous regime (McMichael 2004, 277). McMichael (2004, 277) considers the vehicle of this corporate driven process to be the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture with its institutionalisation of economic liberalism set to deepen market relations with the privatisation of states.

*Structural adjustment programmes*

In the second regime the national state restricted the rise of MNCs and offshore money markets (McMichael 2004a). In the 1980s there was a debt crisis in developing countries which inhibited investments and structural adjustment allowed firms to move manufacturing to developing countries’ exporting zones (2004, 277). With structural adjustment came agro-export dumping of cheap food products and an end to the second regime’s stable prices: “world agricultural prices fell from a mean of 100 in 1975 to 61 in 1989” (2004, 277).

Since the structural adjustments of the 1980s most African countries have changed significantly along the lines of the ‘Washington Consensus’ which advises the pursuit of free-market capitalism, by way of 10 core policy recommendations: “(1) Fiscal Discipline; (2) Restructuring Public/Social Expenditure Priorities; (3) Tax Reform; (4) Liberalising Interest Rates; (5) Competitive Exchange Rates; (6) Trade Liberalisation; (7) Liberalisation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment; (8) Privatisation; (9) Deregulation; and, (10) Property Rights” (Williamson, 2004:3). Not all of these policies are harmful, but their “rigorous application without regard for political context has caused irreparable damage to a generation of Africans”, rather than the development promised (Glennie, 2008:38).

Financial liberalisation was a key macroeconomic change instituted through structural adjustment lending; World Bank policy recommendations were geared towards reducing governments’ power over their finances (Patel, 2007). According to Patel financial liberalisation is still a core part of the Bank’s approach to lending, despite the harmful effects on agriculture.
(2007). Those farmers who are most able to benefit are the minority that are “growing the appropriate commodities and possessing access to markets, credit, transportation and land” (Patel 2007). These policies help export-oriented agriculture and larger landholders, but the World Bank admits the ‘vast majority’ of farmers “are smallholders, and an estimated 85 percent of them are farming less than two hectares” (WDR 2008).

Government financial interventions, such as setting of exchange rates were removed because they were considered distorting. The globalised food system became more and more unpredictable with expensive farm subsidies (in developed counties) and price volatility far removed from the cost of production, this lead to the 1986 GATT Uruguay Round, the creation of the WTO and the signing of the Agreement of Agriculture (AoA) ‘which institutionalised the corporate food regime”(McMichael 2004, 278).

The World Trade Organisation and the Agreement on Agriculture

The Agreement on Agriculture’s main elements are allowing market access and reducing export subsidies and domestic support (Fonseca 2012, 218). In response to the recession of the 1970s, countries had attempted to protect their national industries, deviating from the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade’s recommendations, rendering it ineffective (Patel 2007, 96). The US government initiated a series of negotiations to rectify this (Patel 2007, 96). This institution continued the core agreements of GATT but extended its reach with new policies on intellectual property, services, textiles, and most importantly agriculture (taking the form of the AoA) (Patel 2007, 97). The AoA advocated increased market access via the removal of non-tariff barriers and reduction of existing tariffs (Fonseca 2012, 218). Export subsidies and domestic support were to be reduced with certain allowance for developing countries: they had to reduce the former by 24% and the latter by 13.3% (and did not apply to 49 least developed countries) while developed countries were to reduce by 36% and 20% accordingly (Fonseca 2012, 218) (Madeley 2000, 45).

WTO membership required countries to adopt these recommendations largely based on trade liberalisation. Since the agreement provides that “countries will not raise their level of
protection for the agricultural sector above what they were already giving before 1993” some developing countries found themselves unable to increase their levels and unable to compete with the already high levels that developed countries had been able to afford (Madeley 2000, 45).

Another pattern in Africa and other developing parts of the world is that trade liberalisation led to a huge increase in imports and a lesser increase of exports resulting in “millions of people being forced off their land and to a concentration of land holdings” (Madeley 2000, 46). The AoA was expected to have a positive impact on net food-exporting countries because higher world food prices increase export revenues; but instead it undermined African food security due to higher and more volatile food prices and the negative effects of food dumping (Gayi 2006, 3-5) (Madeley 2000, 7.)

Madeley describes the Agreement on Agriculture as a “pact between the EU and the US” due to the minimal input by developing countries - the Blair house agreement on which it based was created by the EU and US in Washington (Madeley 2000, 43). In essence the agreement that the rest of the world would sign, let them continue to subsidise their farmers while developing countries such as Africa had to forgo this right (Patel 2007, 97). Subsidisation of agriculture in Western countries rose from US$182 billion in 1995 (beginning of WTO) to US$362 billion in 1998. In this way Western countries maintained their food reserves while being able to access the agricultural supplies of the Global South. Additionally, to this end, private sector companies gained access to developing countries agricultural industries, while the US and EU government was able to work with the private sector to regulate domestic agriculture (Patel 2007, 97).

The Agreement on Agriculture was part of the transition between the ‘development project’ and ‘globalisation project’ and food security became part of the neo-liberal free trade international market vision in the WTO as a privatised international market relation (McMichael 2004, 280). The AoA inhibits states from being food self-sufficient. The WTO has a minimum import rule, so member states must allow at least 5 percent of their value of domestic consumption to be imports (McMichael 2004, 281). It came to be assumed by influential leaders of agricultural development that the notion of developing countries feeding themselves was outdated and food security was to be achieved by relying on cheaper foreign agricultural products (McMichael 2004, 282).
Europe had had the chance to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency in the late 1950s and 1960s with protective Common Market Policies with high internal prices and overproduction solved with dumping of surpluses in the world market, production quotas, reducing the farm population and encouraging corporate monocultures (McMichael 2004, 281-282).

The US agribusiness gained a competitive advantage via the AoA and new definition of food security, requiring an open market and commodity prices constructed through political means (McMichael 2004, 282). For example in 1986 Zimbabwe had to cut its grain prices almost in half and reduce its purchase quota from US corn producers because of dumping (Watkin 1991, 43).

The Uruguay Round led to politically constructed prices in attempts to halt farm subsidies and overproduction crises from the agricultural policies of the US and European Community (Dawkins 1999, 12-14). Such a move benefits agribusinesses globally. The North is able to purchase agricultural products at low prices (unrelated to production costs), this enables dumping, further assisted by export subsidies causing domestic prices to fall (McMichael 2004, 282).

The WTO required national health, social and environmental regulations to be reduced over time as they were thought to restrict trade (McMichael 2004, 282). By deconstructing ‘market management’ of agriculture, focus shifted from public interest and domestic self-sufficiency to private/public prioritisation of profits and export revenues. The process of liberalisation reduces protections in the South (economies are opened to imports and agribusiness offshore investment) but Northern agribusinesses are still able to access public funds (McMichael 2004, 284).

‘World agriculture’ (as defined by McMichael, possesses the traits contained in this paper’s hypothesis, it involves: “land dispossession and concentration”, “withdrawal of public supports and exposure to world price”, “bio-engineered seeds and specialised agricultural inputs”, “a transnational space of corporate agricultural and food relations integrated by commodity circuits” and “elimination of biodiversity, seed saving, and local knowledge via agro-industrial monocultures” (2004, 285-287).

The liberalising Agreement on Agriculture was the “quid pro quo” for the developing world’s acceptance of TRIPs which “soon proved to be a double threat to food security and sovereignty in the developing World” (Wallach & Woodall 2004, 193; McMichael 2004, 273).
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)

A pertinent characteristic of the corporate regime that globalises and does much to undermine food sovereignty is the enforcement of intellectual property rights on living organisms (McMichael 2004, 285-286):

“Deploying the Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime discourse of intellectual property rights, the biotechnology industry seeks to institutionalise gene patenting, through the WTO’s TRIPs protocol, as a key to elaborating a world agriculture, premised on the elimination of extant agricultures and agro-ecologies through the privatisation of knowledge – a principal feature of the corporate food regime.”

TRIPs was also part of the Uruguay Round Agreement, created by GATT in 1994. Article 27.1 requires patentability in all fields; Article 27.3(b) states that member states “shall protect plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system” (TRIPs Agreement 1994) (Cullet 2001, 99). The significance of this Agreement is that it extends patentability to living organisms, which includes plants and plant processes. It allows corporations to protect their intellectual property through “copyrights, trademarks, patents, industrial design, software and geographical indications”; which requires the reform of legal and administrative systems (Fonseca 2012, 219) (Madeley 2000, 50) (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994).

Countries have to provide intellectual property protection for products and processes, even in the agricultural industry. TRIPs requires that all signatory countries accept the patenting of “micro-organisms and microbiological processes”. (Clapp 2012, 75). The justification of such agreements is that intellectual property rights (IPRs) encourage innovation and (as the American Seed Trade Industry asserts): “Strong intellectual property protection allows developers of new plant varieties and improved seeds to be rewarded for their efforts. This promotes research and development, which ultimately enhances crop production and conservation of genetic resources.” (Kuyek 2002, 2). However, food sovereignty theorists observe that the “developers of
new plant varieties” are largely MNCs and that TRIPs has the potential to reduce crop production in local smallholder farmers and interrupt their own conservation tactics, which ultimately reduces their availability and access to food, especially in the long run.

These global rules for intellectual property protection were pushed for by firms so that they would be compensated for any variety of seed they patented, instead of it being sold or replicated freely (Clapp 2012, 74). Thus TRIPs was a particularly important agreement for firms looking to expand their industries and access the developing countries’ agricultural markets (Clapp 2012, 74). Pre-empting the negative effect this could have, “a number of African countries as well as India were against the idea of imposing intellectual property rights on life forms such as plants” (Clapp 2012, 74). Their apprehensions were rooted in fears that corporations would patent varieties created by thousands of years of plant breeding and experimentation by their farmers (without compensating them) or that these innovations would be side-lined by genetically modified firm owned plant varieties, in a way that prioritised profit; steering the agricultural industries’ function towards profit rather than ensuring availability, access and adequacy of food for locals (Clapp 2012, 74).

The innovation and technological advances the agreement aims to reward, have been largely confined to the MNCs that have been able to monopolise Africa’s seed breeding industries, through their application of IRPs. Smallholder and even commercial farmers in Africa have experienced the restriction rather than the dissemination of knowledge, which has resulted in decreasing availability and accessibility of food. TRIPs has allowed for the dominance of MNCs and the commercialisation of seed. African countries have been inundated with patented seeds and agro-chemicals; the hypothesis predicts that the NAFN perpetuates rather than rectifies this.

African agriculture has continuously been globalised via trade liberalisation and allowing market access in return for financial assistance. International organisations and developed countries have urged financial liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, property rights and foreign investment as a formula for development, the next chapter reveals how the NAFN continues this trend.
**Impact on African Countries**

Africa did not play a large role in the first food regime until after the First World War and the 1929 crisis when European countries paid proper attention to organising sources of supply in their African colonies, to aid their objective of self-sufficiency in food products. Market fragmentation, protectionism and state intervention affected the export sectors of these colonies. Divisions of labour were developing on a global scale, some territories specialised to food production and others in industrial products but was inhibited by “the gradual nationalization of agricultural markets after the First World War and decolonization after the Second World War”.

Daviron (2008, 70) traces the marginalization of Africa in the international food trade: from the 1970s to the present day, which is useful when outlining how the current corporate food regime specifically impacted African countries. The effect of the second food regime was prolonged in Africa alone, as it continued on the “path shared by the developing countries in the three decades following the Second World War” (Daviron 2008, 70). Africa is the only region with a market share that is continuing to decline, Latin American and especially Asian countries regained the market shares they had lost while Africa’s market share (now less than 4 percent) is below its market share in 1913 (Daviron 2008, 70). This is largely due to its close relationship with the EU with 50 percent of African food exports going there. However, EU imports are not increasing as fast as imports to Japan or Far Eastern countries prior to the 1997 crisis and its Common Agricultural Policy continues to aim for food self-sufficiency (Daviron 2008, 70). Furthermore, Africa has failed to retain all its markets outside the EU. While many firms elsewhere have taken the transnational route since 1986, organising “fresh, frozen and processed foods for the Japanese market, and to manufacture abroad for markets abroad”, Africa is in a different situation (Daviron 2008, 70). African exports are comprised with three complexes: traditional tropical foods, legal drugs and fresh fruits and vegetables. In the past the traditional tropical food complex were protected from competition in the national self-sufficiency multilateral food regime, international agreements protected coffee and cocoa markets. However, in the last fifteen years the international trade of these has decreased substantially. In terms of legal drugs and fresh fruits and vegetables their share of imports is increasing rapidly, as is the case for South
African wine, Malawian tobacco and Kenyan horticultural products. Such a contrast between complexes indicates that neoliberalism has not been applied uniformly across Africa.
Chapter 6: The New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition decoded

The continuities between past efforts and current trends in the corporate food regime becomes obvious as the NAFN is disassembled and its various parts explained. The Working Group Food and Agriculture of the Forum on Environment and Development, made up of more than 15 German NGOs, has branded the NAFN as Structural Adjustment 2.0. They condemn the cooperation with Bayer, Cargill, Yara and Monsanto, with governments helping them by mitigating investment risks, “by providing investment-related information and a positive investment climate in agricultural input markets (seeds, fertiliser, and pesticides) and the land sector”. They predict resultant problems that are similar to this paper’s hypothesis (Working Group Food and Agriculture of the Forum on Environment & Development 2013, 2):

“concentration of power in the seed market, loss of agro biodiversity, marginalisation of rural communities, concentration of land, land grabbing and the substantial conflict of aims between the claim of combating hunger and the original business interests of corporations are systematically disregarded by the G8 New Alliance. At the same time, national states are backing out from active policy making”.

The initial factsheet for the NAFN outlines its main facets, which come to make up the subsections of this chapter:

1. The promise of L’Aquila
2. Partnerships
3. Mobilising capital,
4. Taking innovation to scale
5. Risk Management
6. Nutrition
7. Accountability for results

These require decoding and explanation in order to consider how its proposals potentially globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty.
The promise of L’Aquila

The New Alliance is the second phase of the G8’s 2009 L’Aquila Food Security Initiative and pledges to build on and assist the realisation of the promises of L’Aquila. In L’Aquila, G8 governments committed to increasing Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocated to agriculture, advocating public-private partnership and market-based instruments such as open trade flows that supposedly have a “positive role in strengthening food security” (Obenland 2014, 4) (G8 2009, 3-5). This was also spearheaded by the US and committed members to donor funding to support national agricultural initiatives in developing countries developed by the countries themselves (GRAIN 2013, 3). For Africa this translated into the funding of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) (GRAIN 2013, 3). In 2003, African Heads of State and Government pledged 10 percent of their national annual budgets to agriculture through CAADP (New Alliance Progress Report 2014, 4). The NAFN looks to fulfil outstanding financial pledges and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships (The Whitehouse 2012, 1).

Table 1: Development Partner Cooperation Framework Commitments and Disbursements by Country (Millions of USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Original Funding Intention</th>
<th>Prorated Funding Intention (expected to date)</th>
<th>Disbursement to Date</th>
<th>Percent Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>173.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>643.5</td>
<td>471.4</td>
<td>280.3</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire*</td>
<td>284.9</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia**</td>
<td>1252.4</td>
<td>1076.3</td>
<td>931.1</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>582.9</td>
<td>279.9</td>
<td>215.0</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi***</td>
<td>480.0</td>
<td>148.1</td>
<td>121.3</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>384.3</td>
<td>200.8</td>
<td>173.7</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>476.6</td>
<td>119.0</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1007.7</td>
<td>242.4</td>
<td>110.6</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>897.0</td>
<td>335.0</td>
<td>192.5</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>6182.8</td>
<td>2927.8</td>
<td>2099.3</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NAFN 2014a, 22).
There is a promise to match assistance to country plans. The New Alliance is supposed to continue these objectives, funding national plans developed through the African Union’s CAADP (GRAIN 2013, 3). GRAIN, however, does not see this materialising. Obenland (2013,3) finds there are few policy commitments found in CAADP plans that were developed through national consultations and the frameworks seem to be aimed at increasing corporate investment in agricultural lands and input markets (GRAIN 2013, 4). The Global Policy Forum (2014, 1) also sees the processes and components of CAADP aimed at benefitting small-scale food producers, to have been side-lined.

Partnerships

“The New Alliance pledges to “be rooted in partnership” (The Whitehouse 2012, 1). These manifest themselves in the form of cooperation framework agreements (CFAs) and corresponding bilateral and multilateral investments starring prominent actors such as the World Economic Forum and initiatives such as Grow Africa.

NAFN Cooperation Frameworks are to be created aligned with each African countries’ Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme national investment plan, including “predictable funding commitments, specific policy actions, and statements of intent from the private sector” (The Whitehouse 2012, 1).

The Cooperation Frameworks include a system of G8 and international organisation interlocutors, for example the European Union serves as an interlocutor for the cooperation in Malawi. In this way G8 countries are able to regulate commitments and pledges between the private and public sectors (Obenland 2014, 5). The G8 countries encourage investment by assisting African governments to improve infrastructure, capacities and investment credits (Obenland 2014, 5). See Appendix A for corporations with pledges under the NAFN and the table below for the interlocutors for CFAs.
Table 2: Interlocutors for CFAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperating Country</th>
<th>Interlocutor(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Japan and United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Chair of RED-FS (agriculture sector donor working group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: GBNA (2012a-f) and GBNA (2013a-d).

The NAFN implementation is in theory focused towards African ownership and entails partnerships between the G8, the African Union, New Partnership for Africa’s Development and CAADP as well as the Grow Africa Partnership (which facilitates partnering with the AU and NEPAD) (McKeon 2014, 11; The Whitehouse 2012, 1).

Writing on behalf of the Global Policy Forum, Obenland (2014, 8) finds human rights standards to be missing from the NAFN. The determinants are instead, the New Vision for Agriculture and the Grow Africa Initiative of the World Economic Forum. The NAFN incorporates efforts by the New Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, the Scaling Up Nutrition initiative and the World Bank with its “Doing Business in Agriculture” project. This leads Obenland to describe the NAFN as a “bracket” that binds these mechanisms together (2014, 8). The G8 also welcomes the “support of the World Bank and African Development Bank and of the United Nations’ World Food Program, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and Food and Agriculture Organisation for the New Alliance” (The Whitehouse 2012, 1)

The World Economic Forum (WEF) is a member of the Leadership Council of the NAFN representing the initiative on a global level with its Grow Africa partnership being heavily
involved in convening (the main convenor for private actors) and reporting (Obenland 2014, 8). Its New Vision for Agriculture initiative (led by 33 companies) sets out the shared goals of the actors involved, seeking predominantly market-based solutions for sustainable agricultural growth (Obenland 2014, 8). It recognises its challenges to be: increasing productivity and economic growth and reducing waste, emissions and poverty. The New Vision outlines roles of the public sector, the private sector and civil society, all of which seem to be directed towards the facilitation of the private sector. The public sector is to reform regulations to make them more attractive to foreign investors and ensure market access. Civil society’s role involves “leveraging capital to bridge gaps in the value chain” (Obenland 2014, 8). The private sector is to innovate, invest and target the needs of consumers (Obenland 2014, 8).

The Grow Africa partnership is one of many public-private partnerships it has generated. The Grow Africa partnership documents the commitments made by companies and their progress. Its three main goals are: “increasing private-sector investments in African agriculture; enabling multi-stakeholder partnerships; and expanding the knowledge of best practices and existing initiatives” (Obenland 2014, 9). The partnership is also convened by the African Union Commission, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the World Economic Forum (WEF). Agricultural Growth Corridors are a major part of the NAFN and are some of the initiatives promoted by Grow Africa in Mozambique and Tanzania. Agricultural Growth Corridors are being developed by the government to attract investment. Such environments are advertised to investors as good for exporters with available land and ideal location (Obenland 2014, 9).

Obenland (2014, 14) suggests an overreliance on partnerships. ‘Partnerships’ may be considered a misleading term due to underlying conflicts of interests and disregard of the risks that come with this by the initiatives mentioned. Corporations seek access to African countries’ resources and land and to control prices and production methods, which may clash with the interests of small-scale farmers (Luig 2013, 5). Negotiations are bound to be unequal power dynamic between influential corporations, governments and local communities (that lack political power) as well as between developed G8 countries and developing African countries.

Cooperation Frameworks not only entail partnerships with African governments but also agribusiness and food corporations. This allows corporations to lobby together for a package of
policy reforms in countries that suits them and the opportunity to benefit from African
governments’ capital investments (that companies would not receive quick returns from)
especially infrastructure (Obenland 2014, 14). Only 14 of the 55 corporations/investor groups are
situated in Africa, MNCs are benefitting other national economies with 35 having their
headquarters in G8 countries and 15 elsewhere (Obenland 2014, 14). In the G8 countries’
approach to partnerships, they view themselves as facilitators of relationships between African
governments and corporations that allow the free market to function, rather than delineating
action to be taken should people’s rights be at risk (for example through land grabbing, poor
working conditions and toxins from agro-chemicals) (FIAN 2014, 3). The NAFN gives MNCs
the power to influence political, policy and financial decision making.

Mobilising capital

The NAFN is to support multilateral initiatives such as a new Fast Track Facility for Agriculture
Infrastructure which facilitates and finances “bankable” agricultural infrastructure projects (The
Whitehouse 2012, 1). The Agriculture Fast Track was initialised by USAID along with the
African Development Bank and Government of Sweden. It was launched in 2013 at the Grow
Africa Investment forum in Cape Town and has given $6.5 million to support project preparation
to leverage approximately $250 million in private investment that will somehow (but it is not
explicitly explained) benefit 92, 000 smallholders (NAFN 2013-2014 Progress Report). Fruiteq,
a company based in Burkina Faso, was granted $420 000 by the fund and has invested in
research and infrastructure that has allowed it to facilitate “the export of products by West
African smallholder” (NAFN 2014a). It involves the idea of ‘patient capital’ where public or aid
funds are to be used for “up-front funding” (for mainly infrastructural projects) since the public
sector investors have a longer time frame to watch the benefits materialise, whereas most
companies require quicker returns (McKeon 2014, 11). Essentially public sector resources, that
could be used elsewhere perhaps directly benefitting small-scale farmers, are used to reduce
corporations’ transactions costs.

The NAFN will also support the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) and
aims to secure commitments of $1.2 billion over three years from donors, improving the
interactions and mechanisms of its public and private sector windows. Support is also to be given to other mechanisms that allow countries to guide the direction of solutions especially in alignment with CAADP national investment plans (The Whitehouse 2012, 1).

The World Bank established GASFP in 2010 after it had been commissioned by the G20 in 2009 (McKeon 2014, 8). It facilitates the pooling of some funds that donors committed to at the L’Aquila G8 Summit (McKeon 2014, 8). Initially it was focussed on public sector initiatives but the International Finance Corporation opened a “Private Sector Window” (funded by Canada, the US and The Netherlands) (McKeon 2014, 8). This exposes a pattern of International Organisations initiating programmes with corporate interests in mind, far removed from the well-being of smallholder farmers. Certain aspects of this can be attributed to the influential role of multinational corporations in important forums and initiatives, for example Yara is in “partnership with the Gates Foundation and some bilateral aid programmes, USAID, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation” (McKeon 2014, 8). Private sector forums like the WEF and rich economies like the G8 are largely responsible for deciding the approach to development and often international institutions like IFAD and FAO, and African authorities take on these programmes primarily for the promise of funding (McKeon 2014, 8).

The NAFN’s aim to improve risk mitigation tools for smallholder farmers and medium-sized agribusiness and report on finance institutions may have been helpful but this objective has been dropped as an Enabling Action (according to the latest Progress Report, with no additional information as to what this is exactly) (The Whitehouse 2012, 1). Instead development finance institutions continue to catalyse additional private investment in African agriculture without such supervision.

Next the NAFN pledges it will look to the World Bank along with other partners, to create a “Doing Business in Agriculture Index” (The Whitehouse 2012, 1). The World Bank publishes a “Doing Business” report each year to assess countries’ economies’ “business friendliness” via their “regulatory frameworks, tax systems, infrastructure and service availability” (Obenland 2014, 11). This has been adapted by the World Bank in a concept note to a “Doing Business in Agriculture” (DBA) index (Obenland 2012, 11). “Doing Business” as a means of measuring success, is continually mentioned in African countries’ Cooperation Frameworks. The DBA sets
out to measure: the exporting of agricultural products; land, water and agricultural inputs and credits; and backing of contract farming (Obenland 2012, 11). Such indicators seem more directed towards corporate interests than those of smallholder farmers whose sovereignty and security remain unmeasured.

In 2012 the NAFN intended to acquire Letters of Intent from “over 45 local and multinational companies to invest over $3 billion across the agricultural value chain in Grow Africa countries, and the signing by over 60 companies of the Private Sector Declaration of Support for African Agricultural Development” in relation to their public-private partnerships (The Whitehouse 2012, 1). According to the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’s official website it “is accelerating action and achieving results, demonstrating significant progress in catalysing responsible private sector investment in African agriculture”. This claim is made on the basis that since its inception participating African countries have grown from three to ten, close to 180 Letters of Intent have been signed by African and international companies pledging an investment of $7.8 billion in African agriculture (and in 2013 $1.1 billion materialised), 36,600 jobs have been created with 3 million smallholders receiving private investments, 96 percent of African governments’ policy commitments have been advanced or and $2.1 billion has been distributed by development partners (NAFN 2014).

Letters of Intent are signed by private sector companies, pronouncing the investments they have committed to and host countries are required to create an environment conducive to investment (such as increasing market access to seed, fertiliser and pesticide markets and changing land laws). However while the latter are required to fully describe such policy reforms, private sector investors are not required to be quite so transparent (Obenland 2014, 4). Letters of intent are not available to the public (they are only briefly summarised in CFAs Annexes) and pledges by companies tend to be varied and unspecific (Obenland 2014, 4). Companies’ pledges come in various forms and are generally vague. For example Yara pledged to invest 1.5-2 million dollars in the production of fertiliser “if a suitable site for a plant can be found” or Cargill’s pledge to commit “$1.35 million to improve vocational agricultural education opportunities in Northern Mozambique farming communities” (NAFN 2012; Obenland 2014, 4).
Taking innovation to scale

Taking innovation to scale is to be achieved by such action as launching a Technology Platform jointly with the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa and a Scaling Seeds and Other Technologies Partnership housed at the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) (McKeon 2014, 11). This is part of a 10 year target that involves improving sustainable agricultural yields, using new production technologies such as improved seed varieties and “post-harvest management practices as part of a value-chain approach” (McKeon 2014, 11). This proves to be an unlikely combination if one considers “improved seed varieties” and the value chain approach to have the potential to subvert the NAFN’s goal to “ensure ecological sustainability and safeguard agro-biodiversity” (The Whitehouse 2012, 1).

A term coined in the 1990s, the first link in “value chains” are smallholder farmers and the final one the customers. The basis of the argument is that farmers may have surplus but cannot access the market which leads to “to local gluts and collapse in local prices in season, which acts against farmers adopting yield-improving technologies” (African Centre for Biosafety 2012, 4). This addresses the NAFN intention to “link smallholders to [global neoliberal] markets” a repeated aim that dismisses the existence of diverse local food markets that sustain the majority of Africa’s population (McKeon 2014, 9). This seemingly unilinear trajectory is regulated by supply and demand and “value” appears to only have an economic dynamic when interpreted by actors aligned with the NAFN such as USAID. The assumption is that food security can be attained by increased production, distribution and marketing of fortified staple crops which generates higher rural incomes (McKeon 2014, 9). In a recent article McMichael (2009) characterises value chains as “a generator of debt on the part of smallholders and of fatal dependence on external inputs and markets”.

The AGRA Program for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS) is able to structure value chains to do with inputs by funding research, new companies and marketing networks, which excludes smallholders from decisions about the trajectory of development. AGRA funds the Malawi Agro-dealer Strengthening Programme (MASP) where Monsanto is “responsible for 67% of all inputs” (War on Want 2012). The value chain is structured with the intention of creating demand
by farmers for MNC’s products (War on Want 2012). The Gates foundation and Monsanto profit from the World Food Programme purchasing grains from smallholder farmers which allows them to buy the more expensive hybrid seeds sold by Monsanto through the MASP. The Gates foundation benefits by funding the World food Programme and holding stocks in Monsanto. Farmers get into the habit of buying rather than saving seeds, encouraged by initiatives such as MASP and NAFN, they find themselves tied to and reliant on externally-funded programmes in which they have little or no power and representation.

Value chains can also be designed to suit monocrops for export. Due to many land grabbing allegations, MNCs and partners have looked to out grower schemes and contract farming, however this does not always benefit the smallholders left to bear the risks while corporations control when, how and what they plant as well as the price (McKeon 2014, 9). Due to power imbalances “value chain linkages have been found to work for only the top 2-20 per cent of small-scale producers, mostly men” (Vorley, Cotula, Chan 2012, 6).

In looking to launch a Technology Platform CGIAR, the NAFN and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa work along with other partners such as the Tropical Agriculture Platform and the Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD) initiative. CARD is to make sure that “improved technologies” for food commodities are available (since they are apparently “critical to achieve sustainable yield, resilience, and nutrition impacts”), look for challenges to adoption and accelerate the process (The Whitehouse 2012, 1). The Technology Platform assists countries to evaluate the potential effects of new technologies on yields, income, nutritional and environmental indicators. The next chapter explores the nature of these technologies which are not necessarily an improvement and questions the motives behind removing barriers to their adoption, seemingly pushing them on farmers.

NAFN also promises a Scaling Seeds and Other Technologies Partnership based at the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa. This initiative is aimed at supporting the seed sector and promoting “the commercialisation, distribution and adoption of key technologies improved seed varieties, and other technologies prioritised by the Technology Platform” (The Whitehouse 2012, 1). The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa plays a prominent role in the structure of the NAFN. It also prioritised improved market access through trade and value chain development (African Centre for Biosafety 2012). In addition, it focuses on providing loans for smallholders
and agribusiness and looks to limit public sector involvement in the seed market. Its Scaling Seeds and Other Technologies Partnership has a goal of increasing production of modified seeds by 45 percent in three years (Boincean et al 2013, 6). In cooperative agreement with AGRA the US has signed a four year $47 million cooperative agreement in six New Alliance countries (NAFN Progress Report 2013-2014, 38).

AGRA was launched in 2006 by the Rockefeller Foundation and Gates Foundation and is considered by theorists such as Shiva to be a threat to food sovereignty in Africa. AGRA focuses on four main areas “seeds, soil health, market access, and policy and partnership programs, with an overlying focus on innovative financing” (Obenland 2014, 9). AGRA promotes privatisation in the seed market and constraining the public sector (Obenland 2014, 9). AGRA funds public breeders to create new varieties and it funds private companies to sell these to farmers, on top of which it provides credit to farmers so they can purchase these seeds (GRAIN 2007, 1).

A dubious aspect of AGRA, which may explain why efforts and grants are directed towards developing plants, genes and seeds, (as oppose to other harvesting technologies such as “water technologies, agro-forestry, and agro-ecological techniques that can raise yields without involving the use of high technologies” (Patel 2012, 1) is that Monsanto is an interim director of Gates’ agricultural development programme. De Schutter (2009), in his special repertoire in the UN General Assembly, asserted that the intellectual property rights regime protects Monsanto and other biotech companies. Allowing them to spend billions of dollars on research and development, without it necessarily benefiting poor farmers in developing countries (Risvi 2009, 1). “In a number of grants, for instance, one corporation appears repeatedly – Monsanto,” he wrote in the study, noting that “both corporations [Gates’, Microsoft and Monsanto] have made millions through technology and aggressive defence of proprietary intellectual property” (Risvi 2009, 1). AGRA is notorious for empowering corporations while claiming to assist smallholders (such actions are expanded upon in the next chapter due to their relevance to the hypothesis), they involve: hybrid and GM seeds, agrochemicals and “general commercialisation of agricultural production” (McKeon 2014, 6). A system is being created around Africa in which farmers are losing the freedom to decide what, when and how they want to plant. They are unable to “use the knowledge they have accumulated over years, they cannot respond to weather changes and
other changes in their environment” but the most concerning issue is the question of what will happen once the donors stop subsidising (GRAIN 2007, 1). These ‘philanthropic’ efforts will essentially have locked farmers into a vicious circle once they are left with an impoverished soil and no seed, they cannot seed save or share freely once indigenous economies have been destroyed and biodiversity lost. They are forced to purchase new seeds each season along with the matching herbicides and pesticides from the MNCs that own them all and have monopolised the now privatised seed industries. They are forced to make full use of the credit access that has been so generously supplied to them and fall further into debt.

Risk management

The NAFN supports the Platform for Agricultural Risk Management (PARM) as a way to assess risk on a national level. PARM was launched in 2013, the outcome of G8 and G20 discussions on food security and agriculture, in response to the inherent price and yield risks of farming. In seeking to identify, assess, quantify and manage agricultural risks in African countries PARM is supported by “Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the European Commission (EC), the Government of Italy, NEPAD and IFAD (the International Fund for Agricultural Development)” (IFAD 2014). IFAD slogan is “investing in rural people” and it provides the most comprehensive explanation of PARM. Acknowledging that small-scale farmers bare most of the risk IFAD proclaims that smallholder farmers are “at the centre of attention of its interventions” however ARM lacks at this stage enough representation from civil society and smallholder farmers, which should be the main beneficiaries (Pasquini 2013, 1). The Advisory Committee has as many MNCs as farmer organisation beneficiaries (only two). The Steering Committee has only representatives from donors and NEPAD, lacking members from smallholder farmer networks. The private sector is continuously mentioned and well represented, and since they have as much to gain from risk assessments as smallholders and are more empowered, one has to question whether efforts will be equally directed. Public resources are easily mobilised through such efforts to mitigate risks for foreign investors.

Although price volatility is a result of globalisation, PARM seeks to mitigate risk (such as “volatile food prices”) with globalising neoliberal solutions: “working through value chains by
linking smallholders to processors and markets bears great potential to reduce risk exposure of small-scale producers” (IFAD 2014). This makes PARM yet another globalising mechanism of the NAFN.

The NAFN provides little detail on its aim of making an “agricultural index insurance” available via a global action network, indicating either a lack of success or transparency. This pledge entailed pooling data and findings, identifying challenges, supporting training and accelerating developing instruments for smallholders. The final pledge in this section is to recognise the progress of the AU in creating African Risk Capacity, ambiguous as to whether “recognising the progress” entails any sort of joint action or assistance and there has been little mention of it since.

The question remains as to whether risk management systems are being designed to protect private investors or smallholders.

**Nutrition**

The NAFN supports the Scaling Up Nutrition movement to improve nutrition, with a particular focus on reducing child stunting (The Whitehouse 2012, 1). The Scaling Up Nutrition movement is made up of “governments, UN organisations, civil society organisations, transnational corporations, and researchers” which includes representatives from the Gates Foundation, Unilever and Britannia Industries in the Lead Group (Obenland 2014, 10). Aspects of its mission that become problematic through a food sovereignty lens include “the fortification of foods and micronutrient supplementation” (Scaling up Nutrition 2012). Although its commitment to supporting breastfeeding is aligned with food sovereignty it adds that the “SUN Business Network” fosters partnerships with the private sector and market orientated solutions such as “tax exemptions for food fortificants and premixes” as well as influencing national plans (SUN 2012). African countries’ CFAs include SUN to the point that its policies have become more binding than voluntary which is problematic given the controversy surrounding biofortification and corporate control.
The NAFN is committed to ensuring there is “coordination of nutrition activities across sectors” (The Whitehouse 2012, 1). The second NAFN factsheet released by the Whitehouse declares its commitment to coordinate with civil society and other partners with a special focus on breaking the cycle of poverty through nutritional measures in the critical 1000 days from a woman’s pregnancy (Whitehouse 2013, 1). G7 countries such as the US have coordinated with other nutritional efforts such as Feed the Future, the Global Health Initiative, the World Health Assembly, UK’s Nutrition for Growth event and food aid programs (Whitehouse 2013, 1). Between 2012 and 2014 the US has provided $1 billion for nutrition-specific interventions and nearly $9 billion for nutrition-sensitive activities, fostering bio-fortification to reduce anaemia, acute malnutrition, child stunting and community gardens (Whitehouse 2013, 1).

The NAFN’s objective to “support the accelerated release, adoption and consumption of bio-fortified crop varieties, crop diversification, and related technologies to improve the nutritional quality of food in Africa” brings us to the debates around biofortification. Elenita C Daño describes biofortification of staple crops as a “Trojan horse of corporate food control” allowing entrance to GM food and corporations to staple food crops via public sector initiatives. Focus is shifted to monocrop systems “that narrowed down the dietary base [and] is the same approach being adopted to bring back micronutrients in staple food crops” (Elenita C Daño 2014). In South Africa (staple) agricultural products such as maize meal have extra nutrients but Jones (2015) reveals that this is only necessary because of the milling process that is required for mass production, leaving it highly refined and lacking in nutrients, “biofortification then puts nutrients back in”. Biofortification is problematic even on an ethical level when nutrients are added without proper consultation with the consumers (Greenberg 2015). AFSA also flaws the NAFN for focussing almost solely on bio-fortification of staple crops to address malnutrition instead of solutions such as crop diversification and addressing the socio-economic causes (AFSA 2013, 1).

In terms of developing nutrition policy research NAFN actors such as AGRA invest in research such as the “Agricultural Innovation in Africa” programme at Harvard University that promotes biotechnology so that they can claim their policies to be evidence-based (Juma 2011). Consultants from this programme come to advise African countries on biosafety laws (McKeon 2014, 5).
Accountability for results

The first objective to achieve accountability for the NAFN was to convene a Leadership Council “to drive and track implementation” and report progress to the G8 and African Union (The Whitehouse 2012, 1). The Leadership Council was established at Camp David and comprises of “G8 representatives, heads of state or high-level representatives from five African countries, CEOs from seven participating companies, one civil society organisation (CSO), and two regional farmers’ organisations” (East African Farmers Federation and the Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions, both have a strong representation of large-scale commercial farmers). The co-chairmen were the AU, WEF and US (Oxfam 2013, 4). Criticisms of the Council include its lack of: mandate, advisory functions, explicit responsibilities and transparency (Obenland 2014, 5). It has only held three half-day meetings and in September 2013 it drafted a framework with the following proposed outcomes: “improved enabling environment for investment, increased responsible private sector investment in agriculture, and increased agriculture sector growth” (McKeon 2014, 13).

Even though the Cooperation Frameworks continually refer to “mutual accountability” of partners this is very difficult to achieve and measure as no institution is solely responsible for it. Although Grow Africa compiles a review it is based on self-reporting by companies and no accountability to human rights institutions (Obenland 2014, 15). Obenland observes the time frame between some important pledges and fulfilment of commitments leaves little time for citizen consultation. According to Oxfam (2013, 5) smallholder representative organisations have not been involved during the development of CFAs (their participation being mainly after the CFAs have been passed, in information sessions) and negotiations between governments and companies have been opaque.

The next chapter uses extracts from Cooperation Framework Agreements, critiqued by food sovereignty activists, to demonstrate how the NAFN has materialised into commitments by member states that have the potential to globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty.
Chapter 7: The Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa Critique of NAFN

The Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa serves as a case study in this chapter to formulate a critique of the NAFN. The sections are defined by the factors that are predicted to globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty, as included in the hypothesis: land, seeds and agrochemicals, investment and agribusiness, barriers of trade and domestic support measures. Critiques of policies by AFSA members, of or similar to those in the NAFN, will be set out alongside examples from Cooperation Frameworks, since they exhibit the NAFN in action.

If compilation of evidence in relevant sections reveals that instances of large scale investment of land, the commercialisation of the seed industry, increased use of agro-chemicals and GMOs, decreasing barriers to trade and increasing imports and exports, increased foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs, and cuts in domestic support measures, are contained in the Cooperation Frameworks and the AFSA food sovereignty critique confirms how such factors globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty, then the hypothesis is validated.

AFSA is essentially a forum for confronting issues concerning food sovereignty, with a particular emphasis on agro-ecology, family farming, seed sovereignty, land grabbing, campaigning, traditional knowledge systems, community rights, governments and corporate accountability and generally living in harmony with nature with just and equitable ways of life (AFSA 2014).

It was formed at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change COP 17 in 2011, to bring together the voices of smallholder Farmers, pastoralists, hunter/gatherers, indigenous peoples, citizens and environmentalists from Africa. These actors are represented by networks and farmer organisations such as (AFSA 2011):

- the African Biodiversity network (ABN),
- Coalition for the Protection of African Genetic Heritage (COPAGEN),
• Comparing and Supporting Endogenous Development (COMPAS) Africa
• Friends of the Earth- Africa
• Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC)
• Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM) Association
• Eastern and Southern African Small Scale Farmers Forum (ESAFF)
• La Via Campesina Africa
• FAHAMU
• World Neighbours
• Network of Farmers ‘and Agricultural Producers' Organisations of West Africa (ROPPA)
• The African Centre for Biosafety
• Groundswell International
• Food Sovereignty Ghana
• Rural Women’s Assembly

AFSA defines its core purpose to be influencing policies and putting forward African solutions for food sovereignty, it intends to serve as a continental platform that brings together food sovereignty issues and “together marshal a single and louder voice on issues and tabling clear workable solutions” (AFSA 2014). Using inputs from AFSA and its member organisations on issues surrounding the NAFN provides a consolidated food sovereignty critique. Where different members’ critiques overlap, cross-referencing has enhanced the validity of their accounts.

AFSA has officially identified the NAFN as a threat to food sovereignty after meeting in Addis Ababa 12-16th August 2013 to discuss factors endangering Africa’s food systems. Areas of particular concern “are genetically modified (GM) seeds, agro-chemicals, resource grabs and laws that prevent farmers from freely using, sharing or selling their seed” (AFSA 2013a, 1). One of AFSA’s members, ESAFF (2013) whose purpose is to assist, unite and make heard smallholder farmers in Eastern and Southern Africa to promote their interests at grassroots, national, regional and international, accuses the G8 of “attacking food sovereignty”.
Land

According to PELUM Uganda (2014, 1) land grabs involve “deliberate seizure of land, from the people. It is enabled by power imbalances, unequal distribution of resources and skewed access to information and knowledge”. AFSA condemns land grabs by mining companies and biofuel and export agribusiness that displaces smallholder farmers (AFSA 2013a, 1). One of AFSA’s main objective is to aid resistance to the corporate industrialisation of African agriculture that will “result in massive land grabs, displacement of indigenous peoples especially the pastoral communities and hunter gatherers and the destruction of their livelihoods and cultures” (AFSA 2014). AFSA is concerned that large scale investment in land also results in: “insecurity in communities, food insecurity as people lose land for production and cannot afford to buy from markets. In some extreme cases people have lost lives due to the nature of evictions” (Mugambe 2015). People are losing land in return for only small monetary compensation or the promise of working as hired labour, the processes of accumulation by dispossession are blatant in the case of land grabs.

Friends of the Earth refer to the UN special rapporteur on the right to food in their condemnation of large-scale land acquisitions and leases threatening livelihoods (Chandrasekaran & Bassey 2013, 1). They even call for the G8 to abandon their proposed initiative (from the 2013 Summit) to confront land grabbing since its focus on transparency in land transactions may serve only to provide investors with more information on land availability (Friends of the Earth 2013, 2). The Coalition for the Protection of Africa’s Genetic Heritage (COPAGEN) issued a declaration on family agriculture and land grabbing in Africa which they define as “the purchase or very long-term leasing (30-99 years) of large areas of agricultural land by foreign countries, transnational companies and private national companies”(COPAGEN 2009, 1). Land grabs have increased following the food crisis, financial crisis and increase in oil prices, that have made agriculture more strategically important (COPAGEN 2009, 1). Similarly FAHAMU describes land grabs in the context of a new race for Africa and also refers to them as a result of the financial crisis, food crisis and rising fuel prices. Developed countries with little arable land find themselves increasingly vulnerable to food insecurity and foreign corporations have realised the potential profits to be made from supply disruptions. Two years after the financial crisis developed
countries had invested more than $100 billion in land (COPAGEN 2009, 1). According to COPAGEN in 2009 several hundreds of thousands of hectares were being sold for the production of biofuels and to fill food deficits of rich countries. One of the arguments against biofuels is that the 232 kg of maize needed to produce a 50 litre tank of petrol could supply the calories needed to feed one child for a year (COPAGEN 2009, 1).

Land grabs are particularly detrimental when a MNCs and private speculators “lease millions of acres of the country’s most fertile territory from the government at bargain basement prices” as is the case in Ethiopia (Aljazeera 2014). To make such large areas of land available to investors (who grow not only foodstuff but biofuels for export), authorities are displacing hundreds of thousands of indigenous peoples and in this way land grabs impact the poor by “abusing their human rights, destroying their traditions, trashing the environment, and making them more dependent on food aid than ever before” (Aljazeera 2014). The investors now in charge of the land attend to markets that provide them with the biggest profit, most are not interested in the local markets and grow crops according to the needs of the global market (Aljazeera 2014). A study by Friends of the Earth International revealed that 10% of Ethiopia's farmland was controlled by foreign actors (Food Rights Alliance 2014, 1). Foreign actors such as Saudi Arabia control farmland in Ethiopia to meet its own food security needs. This is evident in the fertile regions such as Gambella, where massive plantations are owned by Saudi Arabia for exportation to the Middle East and Saudi Arabia, while local people do not consumer rice. Gambella also provides an example of the government’s programme of ‘villagisation’ where tens of thousands of people making up the local ethnic groups of Anuaks and Nuers have been displaced and resettled in artificial communities. Food sovereignty is undermined as people are forced to abandon their traditional way of life with reports of people’s crops, houses and belongings being destroyed if they refuse to move when the government decides the land should be available for investors.

Most of the African CFAs refer to registering/certifying land and creating databases/information systems to assist private investors to access land. In Benin policy reforms in terms of land include monitoring the access to and use of land, making sure rural land ownership plans “cover the entire country” and an information system on rural land ownership is set up (NAFN 2013a, 7). One of Burkina Faso’s decrees relates to the development, occupation and use of land for
agro-business, similarly looking to improve access to land and registering land areas (NAFN 2012a, 5-8). Ethiopia is creating “a one-window service” to help agriculture investors (local and foreign; of all sizes) to obtain access to land. In an attempt to foster investment, land use rights are to be improved. Steps are being taken to extend land certification to all rural land holders and alter land law where necessary to promote long-term land leasing and assist the enforcements of contracts for commercial farms (NAFN 2012c, 4-5). Nigeria is adopting a Systematic Land Titling and Registration (SLTR) process (NAFN 2013c, 4-5).

Ghana is creating a database of suitable land for investors with an aim to have 10,000 ha registered by December 2015 and 5,000 ha of land in database established by model lease agreements (NAFN 2012d, 4). To improve access to land, water, farm inputs and basic infrastructure to support food security and nutrition, the Malawi Government pledges to release 200,000 hectares for large scale commercial agriculture by 2015 ” (NAFN 2013b, 6-8 ). “A survey” is stated to be the means of identifying idle land and crop suitability” (NAFN 2013b, 6-8). Çote d’Ivoire also looks to facilitate access to land for private enterprises and secure rural land tenure (NAFN 2012b, 4-5). For example the following are private sector investments in rice under the Country Cooperative Framework signed between Côte d’Ivoire and the G8:

Table 3: Private sector investments in rice under the Country Cooperative Framework signed between Côte d’Ivoire and the G8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Size of investment</th>
<th>Land involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olam (Singapore)</td>
<td>US$ 50 million</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Dreyfus (France)/SDTM (Côte d’Ivoire/Lebanon)</td>
<td>US$ 60 million*</td>
<td>100,000-200,000 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe Mimran (France)</td>
<td>US$ 230 million</td>
<td>182,000 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cevital (Algeria)</td>
<td>US$150 million</td>
<td>300,000 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe CIC (Switzerland)</td>
<td>US$ 30 million</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Trading Group (Singapore)</td>
<td>US$ 38 million</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novel Group (Switzerland)</td>
<td>US$ 95 million</td>
<td>15,000 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud Industries SA</td>
<td>US$ 150 million</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (GRAIN 2013, 3)

Ensuring farmers have rights and documents of land ownership is key for private investors to be able to purchase the land. Tanzania looks to secure certificate of land rights for smallholders and
investors (NAFN 2012f, 4). The G8 Cooperation Frameworks that require countries to make changes in their land laws and put together a centralised land registry, make it easier to build up a market in land that can be purchased or hired (Jones 2015). ACB research on Tanzania touched on pledges made to put aside large tracks of land for large scale investment, classified as under-utilised but Tanzania has a large population of pastoralists who move around so the land they use cannot be formalised under a land register (Jones 2015). They will be left with less land to move around on with large scale investment in land. Mozambique’s approach to reforming land use rights is a DUAT system (from the Portuguese Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento dos Terras—‘right of use and benefit of land’) (NAFN 2012e, 4-5). Mozambique’s basic provision of the Land Law states that “the land is the property of the State and cannot be sold or otherwise alienated, mortgaged, or encumbered.” but the DUAT is sellable (Brink 2008, 1). The law gives local communities titles to land which provides security to investors and it allows the state to give land concessions for commercial businesses (Brink 2008, 1). Mozambique’s Cooperation Framework pledges issue DUATs fast to promote agribusiness investment (NAFN 2012e, 4-5).

Seeds and Agrochemicals

*Hybrid and GM Seeds*

Food sovereignty is undermined with the adoption of hybrid and GM seeds: Belay and Ruth Nyambura, an advocacy officer of the African Biodiversity Network, reiterate how traditional African seed varieties are superior to and more resilient than hybrid and GM seed. They have been “bred for their flavours and better nutrition, and have evolved with local pests and diseases and are adapted to different soils and weather patterns” (2014, 1). AFSA’s concerns on the NAFN are mainly around seed and land. Mugambe (2015) is concerned by the lack of mention of farmer-based seed systems or farmers’ rights and the “unsustainable and simplified solutions to complex situations” which will benefit only a small elite category of farmers.

Friends of the Earth describe the New Alliance as a means to lock poor farmers into a system in which they are required to purchase increasingly expensive seed (including GM), resulting in a
loss of access to traditional local varieties and genetic diversity in seed that Friends of the Earth identify as key to the fight against hunger (Chandrasekaran & Bassey 2013, 1). According to Bennie the NAFN is all about modernising and increasing investment in African agriculture, a top down approach using industrial techniques such as GMOs and fertilisers (Bennie 2015).

Part of Ethiopia’s objective “to increase private sector participation in seed development, multiplication, and distribution” entails incentivising the private sector to commercially multiply and distribute seed, joining government research with universities and extension services and incentivising international seed companies to operate in Ethiopian seed markets (however exceptions are made in terms of indigenous crops such as teff, coffee, niger seed, and inset) (NAFN 2012c, 4-5).

A main objective for Mozambique is to form policies and regulations to encourage competitive, private sector agricultural input markets, especially for smallholder farmers. This requires: reforming National Seed Policy to inhibit the circulation of free and “unimproved” seeds and authorising the private sector to carry out inspections (NAFN 2012e, 4-5). Nigeria is looking to form its seed laws around the role of the private sector in technological development on certified and foundation seed, seed multiplication and marketing (NAFN 2013c, 4-5). In terms of producing, marketing and trading seed and other inputs Tanzania is encouraging private sector participation with the alteration of local seed and input policies (NAFN 2012f, 4).

Ghana is creating policies that allow the private sector to “develop, commercialise, and use improved inputs” (NAFN 2012d, 4). Food Sovereignty Ghana is in the process of attempting to sue for an interim injunction on the commercial release of Bt cowpea and GM rice at the Human Rights Division of the Accra Fast Track Court (Food Sovereignty Ghana 2015).

The G8 and AGRA hybrid seed interventions are interested in standardisation and economies of scale. Hybrid staple crops such as hybrid maize can realise economies of scale and provide profitability opportunities for large corporations (Greenberg 2015). When it comes to indigenous seeds there is a smaller demand in localised areas which are not profitable on a national scale, so are not going to be sponsored by corporations (a food sovereignty approach prefers such localised decentralised pockets of demand) (Greenberg 2015).
The implications of the commercialisation of the seed industry include loss of biodiversity due to the use of GM and hybrid seeds. The commercialisation of seed production as a whole focuses on the large profitable crops on a national level such as maize, soya, legumes which may displace other typed of crops more suitable to local conditions (Greenberg 2015). According to Jones the G8 model is narrow and focussed on the Green Revolution model of agriculture, coupled with the proposed changes on seed laws and to increase fertiliser use. The G8 is pushing one model of agriculture on to the continent concentrating resources and finance efforts into a few cash crops at the expense of a more broad research agenda (Jones 2015).

Some farmers will benefit from adopting improved seed varieties (having come through a formal breeding process and certification) and use of other costly inputs such as fertilisers. Those who cannot afford this will have to rely on loans and repay them with profits from surplus yields however during the Green Revolution in India, although on average the yields on wheat increased on average for the first 10-20 years, farmers were growing less of other crops on their farms as they had to focus on growing more for the market place. In the long run this had implications for agricultural diversity, diet and nutrition and the environment. ACB’s argument is that although a thin layer of farmers may benefit from this G8 system of commercialisation, the majority of farmers are not going to be able to participate in the system into which a large amount of research and resources are being funnelled (Jones 2015).

Replanting hybrid seeds yields less in the next season, so if a farmer wants the same yield each year he would have to purchase fresh seed from the company. Those who do not have the resources to do so cannot sign contracts promising a certain yield each year. Jones’s experience in Malawi, where hybrid maize seed is widespread through the subsidy programme, is that the farmers know they shouldn’t replant hybrid seed in the following season because the yield cannot be guaranteed. Under the NAFN companies are pushing for increased use of hybrids, as oppose to open pollinated varieties/local farmers varieties that can generally be replanted from year to year without substantial loss in yield (Jones 2015). Farmers in Malawi are sometimes forced to replant hybrid seed if they lack resources to purchase new seed. (Jones 2015). Local varieties have an inherent yield potential that might not be as high, but are more locally adapted and are more resilient, giving the farmer more flexibility and less expense. Additionally the ‘high yields’ referred to with regards to hybrid seeds are potential yields which requires irrigation,
good climate and synthetic fertilisers at the right time, so there are many factors that may inhibit seeds from reaching their highest yields (Greenberg 2015; Jones 2015).

The African Biodiversity Network has a Community Seed and Knowledge programme that opposes the use of hybrid and GM seeds and their required costly inputs. Instead it promotes traditional knowledge and local food sovereignty as the best way to feed populations and cope with climate change (African Biodiversity Network 2014). La Via Campesina’s article quotes Beatrice Katsigasi (2013, 1) from ESAFF who explained “we do not want nor need hybrid seeds. Women farmers have few resources and do not want seed that we can plant for one season only or seed that is owned by companies. We believe in our own seeds that we can access from our own collections or from our farmer networks, free of charge”. AFSA co-ordinator Million Belay states that farmers who have to buy seed every year become dependent because they cannot store seeds distributed by seed companies and that the introduction of farm chemicals is killing the soil (Belay 2014). His argument against GM crops is even if you increase production, if it is at the cost of the ecosystem, independence of local communities and crop and seed diversity, they are not useful.

Although they are not promoting the GM policies, Mpho Lekgheto (Member of the Rural Women’s’ Assembly) says women find themselves without a choice in the current situation. GM and hybrid seeds are being promoted and distributed and it becomes “difficult to reverse and change people’s mind-sets” (2015). Movements like the Rural Women’s movement, opposing hybrid and GM seeds, often find themselves without the resources to run effective campaigns and are unable to compete with corporate promotions of inorganic inputs or government handouts. Lekgheto corroborates that farmers using such seeds have started to buy new seeds and fertiliser each year and have had to move elsewhere when the soil becomes unusable.

**Agrochemicals**

Like the seed industry the fertiliser industry is dominated by powerful companies and the ACB recognises the long term detrimental effects agrochemicals can have on the environment (Jones 2015). The increased use of agrochemicals is a result of globalisation and food sovereignty is
undermined by such environmentally unsustainable techniques. Patrick Sekhula (2015) of the Dsumeria Area Farmers Association related the experience of one of his fellow farmers who used agrochemicals such as pesticides and fertilisers. He now has very low yields, “dead soil”, diseases of a “high standard” and suffers losses rather than profits.

Ethiopia is concentrating on agrochemical importation policies and regulations concerning private sector distributors and commercial farms (NAFN 2012c, 4-5). Belay criticises monocultures and the use of chemical fertilisers and advocates the use of natural fertiliser for soil conservation following a long-term study in Ethiopia showing that crops produce more in an environment where soil and water are conserved in composted land than on land where fertiliser and imported seeds are used (Belay 2014). COMPAS (Comparing and Supporting endogenous development) is committed to assisting local and indigenous communities to be self-sustainable, biocultural diversity and reducing environmental degradation. One of their policy briefs is about promoting endogenous farm practices with lessons from Ghana. Interacting with 19 communities in the Upper-West region of Ghana an NGO LACERD sought to re-introduce and encourage traditional soil and water conservation techniques, farming practices and food-crops. There findings were that traditional soil and water conservation innovations can replace the application of inorganic fertilisers (COMPAS 2010, 1). Groundswell describes agroecology as a viable alternative to agrochemicals that is key to assisting rural communities fight hunger and poverty while serving the environment (Groundswell 2015). They too have discovered natural ecological agricultural techniques, such as composting and harvesting rainwater, to improve soil health, food production and even community resilience (Groundswell 2015).

Mozambique is focussing on its National Fertiliser Strategy and regulations which require modification and implementation (NAFN 2012e, 4-5). Nigeria finds it important to increase private sector participation in the production and distribution of seed and fertiliser (NAFN 2013c, 4-5). It commits to improve private sector participation in fertiliser distribution system and register agro-dealers in a national database to help develop the private sector input market (NAFN 2013c, 4-5). Companies such as Monsanto require a contract to be signed, indicating that their pesticide and herbicide will be used, otherwise they will not be held responsible for the failure of the seed (Greenberg 2015). Farmers become bound into a package and Monsanto ends up profiting even more from the herbicide than the seed. World Neighbours assists communities
to develop ecologically sound agricultural practices, be self-sustainable and reduce dependence on external purchased inputs which is key to achieving food sovereignty (World Neighbours 2015).

Certification and patenting

Vital to the commercialisation of seeds and promotion of GM and hybrid seeds (and their required agro-chemicals) is certification and patenting. Burkina Faso aims to facilitate private sector participation in fertiliser supply contracts and review the role of the private sector in terms of selecting and certifying seed, production and marketing (NAFN 2012a, 5-8). Côte d’Ivoire is taking measures to ensure seed varieties can be approved and entered into the official catalogue efficiently (NAFN 2012b, 4-5). Like other New Alliance countries Ghana’s new seed laws are geared towards establishing a seed registry system but also concentrating on protocols for variety testing, release and registration, authorisation to conduct field inspections, seed sampling, and seed testing along with seed classification and certification ((NAFN 2012d, 4). In Mozambique, Southern African Development Community (SADC) seed protocol requirements are again referred to when reformation of legislation involving the production, trade, quality control and seed certification is set out (NAFN 2012e, 4-5). Nigeria’s public funding is to improve the seed and fertiliser certification process and quality control (NAFN 2013c, 4-5). For Tanzania international, as well as regional, seed sales are to be improved with seed testing accreditations (NAFN 2012f, 4).

Malawi has committed to implement SADC and COMESA “Seed Harmonisation Programme” (NAFN 2013b, 6-8). In 2014 AFSA lamented the likelihood that COMESA and ECOWAS will follow ARIRO and SADC’s example and draft legal frameworks modelled on the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 1991. These laws allow foreign breeders to enter and “threaten the rights of small-scale farmers” (AFSAb 2014, 1). Such a commitment involves protecting breeders’ crop varieties via legislation, certifying seeds, making way for the increased use of pesticides and fertilisers and “Contract Farming Strategy”. Nigeria’s
aligning protocols to ECOWAS seed laws signifies a movement towards the Seed Harmonisation Programme (NAFN 2013c, 4-5).

AFSA has strongly criticised COMESA Seed Trade Harmonisation Regulations and called for it to be completely “scraped”, the draft of which was approved in September 2013, saying it spells disaster for food sovereignty (AFSA 2013b). AFSA condemned the lack of consultation with citizens (especially smallholder farmers) who will be hugely impacted by this binding agreement. The regulations are intended to enhance the diversity, quality and quantity of seeds (AFSA 2013b). However, AFSA is against these regulations since they are orientated towards genetically uniform and commercially bred varieties and threaten diversity by disregarding the importance of traditional seed varieties and maintaining heterogeneous crop varieties (AFSA 2013b). According to AFSA, it provides unequal access for players in the seed market, prioritising the interests of corporate seed producers seeking to control it over the needs of smallholders who struggle to purchase registered seeds even in the case that there are more available in the regional market (AFSA 2013b). Mugambe (AFSA co-ordinator) (2015) is also concerned with the harmonisation of plant variety protection (PVP) laws and national seed trade laws since they allow for “easier circulation of capital and extraction of resources across the continent”.

The COMESA Seed Certification System and Variety Release System excludes smallholder farmers’ varieties that do not fulfil their requirements for distinctness, uniformity and stability (AFSA 2013b). Smallholders looking to protect locally adapted varieties and establish seed enterprises are disregarded by this approach to seed quality control and variety registration that favours commercially bred varieties (AFSA 2013b). With such regulations “heirloom, traditional, open pollinated varieties” that do not live up to certain certification standards become unregistered plant varieties and are thus not protected by plant breeders’ rights and patents (AFSA 2013b).

The seed law harmonisation process is pushing African governments to join UPOV 1991 in various African countries (La Via Campesina 2013). Tanzania is also changing their Seed Act to align it with the UPOV 1991 system (NAFN 2012f, 4). It is described as narrow and draconian by ACB researcher Gareth Jones, as very strong intellectual property laws obstruct farmers’ rights to save and exchange seed. More broadly it’s to encourage private investment in
agribusiness, seed and seed research. Seeds have to fulfil certain requirements (such as Distinct Uniform and Stable (DUS)) to be listed and legally traded, this very technical process encourages mono-cropping and narrows the range of crops (Jones 2015). Big seed companies put a lot of research into staple crops such as maize and soya whereas in Africa, farmers still grow their own variety crops, some of which do not fulfil the DUS requirements. Potentially, these cannot be entered on a national seed list making it illegal to trade such varieties and excluding them from agricultural research and development (Jones 2015). Such a one size fits all system also disregards the importance of diversity and indigenous knowledge.

All African countries under the NAFN are required to change their seed laws to strengthen intellectual property rights over seeds (Jones 2015). According to its Cooperation Framework Mozambique’s regulations around seed patenting laws must be improved to encourage private sector investment in seed production (NAFN 2012e, 4-5). One of AFSA’s main aims, to make sure food sovereignty is not undermined, is the reformation of policy on the continent in the areas of “community rights, family farming, promotion of traditional knowledge and knowledge systems, the environment and natural resource management” which entails opposing the certification and patenting of seeds (AFSA 2015).

Investment and agribusiness

According to the African Biodiversity Network one of the manifestations of the new scramble for Africa is the resource take-over, “which is being referred to as foreign investment” (2014, 1). Foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness undermine food sovereignty because food sovereignty requires a fairly distributed and inclusive control over the food system. The African Centre for Biosafety (ACB) lead researcher Stephen Greenberg defines food sovereignty as democratic control over the food system, empowering immediate producers, prioritising social justice and ecological sustainability (Greenberg 2015). Coordinator of the Food Sovereignty Campaign in South Africa Andrew Bennie also defines food sovereignty as democracy in the food system which requires reasserting social power and control over the food system by actors such as farmers, communities and consumers. Food sovereignty is about the control of resources,
distribution of food, access to land and water (Bennie 2015). A food economy that serves the needs of people rather than being geared towards accumulation and profit.

Part of AFSA’s definition of food sovereignty is that it places producers, distributors and consumers of food “at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations” (AFSA 2015). It offers alternatives to the current corporate trade and food regime that undermine food sovereignty. AFSA coordinator Bridget Mugambe (2015) describes policies that undermine food sovereignty to be those that “facilitate the control of production and food systems by a few private companies or individuals who in majority cases are those from the North” and that such policies are manifesting themselves in global frameworks such as the NAFN. She describes the NAFN as an initiative of developed countries from the North, rather than a partnership, establishing enabling conditions for private investment in agriculture. AFSA is concerned about the “entire spirit” of the NAFN, the commitments required by member countries being for the benefit of private companies, as they gain entry and access to resources (mainly seed and land) and “ultimately control food systems”.

La Via Campesina held a continental meeting on seeds in November 2013 with a particular focus on the dangers of foreign investment in African agriculture by MNCs and the exploitation of African land and resources for the production of food for foreign countries (La Via Campesina 2013, 1). This AFSA member is against the industrialisation of agriculture blaming corporations and initiatives like NAFN that enable them (La Via Campesina 2013, 1). La Via Campesina also criticises efforts linked to this such as the AU, NEPAD and CAADP (La Via Campesina 2013, 1).

La Via Campesina rejects corporate seed laws describing them as “assault on peasant seeds and food sovereignty” (La Via Campesina 2013, 1). Particular concerns are around the aforementioned certification systems that criminalise all non-certified seed, outlawing traditional varieties and traditional practices of saving and exchanging seed. It is clear to La Via Campesina that such a set up will result in a concentrated system where large companies gain power through intellectual property monopolies (La Via Campesina 2013, 1). The African Biodiversity Network refers to the requirements of UPOV 1991 as “injurious” with the potential to undermine food sovereignty in Africa, corroborating that it will allow powerful multinational seed companies to influence laws that will criminalise the handling and exchange of indigenous seed and that such
laws remove responsibility of African communities to sustain themselves and pass it on to MNCs whose priority is profit (African Biodiversity Network 2014, 1). True food sovereignty requires farmers to “reclaim, liberate, use, protect and share locally the resources of the continent” (African Biodiversity Network 2014, 1).

Biowatch displays the article *AFSA: Africa's Food Sovereignty under attack by Corporate Interests* where they quote Elisabeth Mpofu, from La Via Campesina Africa as saying: "We are outraged at the way African governments are being strong-armed into adopting draconian seed laws that ensure the dominance of corporate seeds; giving private breeders monopoly and exclusive marketing rights over seeds" (2013, 1). It is necessary to critically interrogate this assertion, as African states and elites may not need coercion and are willingly implementing the NAFN as a means through which to ‘modernise’ agriculture. The next chapter shows the active role of the state such as developing land registries. An important part of the New Alliance is the G8’s partnership with African Union as well as private sector partners. As mentioned before the Grow Africa partnership is also convened by the African Union Commission and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development so some African leaders are on board and supporting widespread adoption and implementation of the policies. Participating African governments are essentially handing over agricultural policies to the market but they are still involved in disseminating a particular model of agriculture. The idea of patient capital (discussed below) is an indication of the active role of the state to the point of costs remaining in the public sector despite profits being privatised (Kerr 2010). African investors are also increasing their investments, indicating an active role being played by local elites embracing the New Alliance, for example in Benin, Malawi, Nigeria, and Senegal’s increased level of planned private investment from $3.7 billion to $8 billion from 180 companies, two-thirds are based in Africa (NAFN Progress Report 2014, 11). When the NAFN Progress Report describes companies are investing in smallholder agriculture because it is good for business, it cites examples of local agribusiness in Benin Agro-space and Les Fruits Tillou investing and training to benefit from pineapple becoming the biggest revenue generator for the country. McKeon (2014, 14) admits that “African governments seem to be convinced that traditional family farming is not capable of ensuring agricultural development” and thus embrace efforts such as the NAFN supporting modern business-oriented agriculture. She also observes the role of national elites and capital, as
proponents of the corporate-led food regime, perpetuating this approach and pressurising governments to adopt it.

AFSA has condemned the NAFN for promoting the interests of MNCs over those of smallholder farmers whose rights are being violated and stressing the importance of the smallholder agro-ecological family farming practices and traditional knowledge (AFSA 2013a, 1). COPAGEN also laments the elimination of family farming for the profit of agribusiness, emphasising that it is a way of life not merely an agricultural production unit (2009, 1).

Friends of the Earth deems the NAFN a “flawed project” granting MNCs unprecedented access to resources in Africa (Chandrasekaran & Bassey 2013, 1). This member of AFSA finds corporate control over the food system to be increasing with new biotechnologies and assistance from the NAFN (Friends of the Earth 2013, 2). It recognises hunger to be “a crisis of consumption - not production” and finds global industrialisation to be the root of the problem (Friends of the Earth 2013, 2). Instead of being geared towards local self-sufficiency, countries have been encouraged to export food which leaves them vulnerable to price shocks (Friends of the Earth 2013, 2).

The monopolisation of agribusiness is only possible with private investment opportunities that allow companies access to African countries’ agricultural sectors. Benin is revising its “Investment Code” in order to promote its agricultural sector (NAFN 2013a, 7). Malawi aims to reduce risk in doing business for private sector investments and maintain a more competitive environment investments in “various value chains related to food security and nutrition”. The focus is on “priority crops” (maize, groundnuts, soya beans, sunflower, cotton, pigeon peas and sugar cane and dairy) and the organisation of agribusiness, cooperative programmes and nutrition incentives (NAFN 2013b, 6-8). Nigeria’s Cooperation framework emphasises the need to entice private sector investment by improving the business environment and private sector led agricultural commodity exchange (NAFN 2013c, 4-5). A priority is to fast track improvements in Staple Crop Processing Zones (NAFN 2013c, 4-5). Senegal’s Cooperation framework also explicitly states its intention to attract private investment in the agricultural sector and creating various incentives (NAFN 2013d, 10-12). Tanzania aims to produce incentives for the private sector by decreasing taxes, and increasing transparency (NAFN 2012f, 4).
Policies that undermine food sovereignty allow for concentration of wealth in private hands (despite the rhetoric) (Greenberg 2015). The overall emphasis is on economic growth, which is driven by competition and private profit which is problematic in that they are taken for granted when written into policies. As oppose to private property ownership, food sovereignty puts other models of cooperation such as shared resources as a basis for human society to the fore. AGRA is very much integrated into the New Alliance coordinating the seed work and agro-chemicals through Scaling Seed and Technologies Partnership (Greenberg 2015).

The agrarian structure of Africa is many small scale producers and anytime there is carving out of hectares for production there is bound to be displacement and elimination of the chances of those people to produce for themselves and produce for local markets (Greenberg 2015). People stop being farmers and start being farm labour but they are not all able to be absorbed into large scale production which is very capital intensive and doesn’t need as much manual labour (Greenberg 2015). “You are basically killing off people’s livelihoods” with the modernisation path they are following: agriculture needs to expand in size, you need economies of scale to be competitive internationally and those who drop out of agriculture being unable to compete will become labourers and although industry is expected to expand alongside it is not possible in Africa anymore except unevenly in particular places (Greenberg 2015). Industry is dominated by other countries already, they have economies of scale which make it impossible for Africa to compete industrially. Therefore the idea that labour which is lost in agriculture as a result of consolidation of land will be absorbed somewhere else is misleading (Greenberg 2015).

Financialisation in capitalist development is one of the issues surrounding increased foreign investment. It plays a role in facilitating and getting productive activity going but the concern is who controls it and what the purposes are for the investment (Greenberg 2015). Agriculture and food become just another “asset class” so the returns must be high enough to compete with other asset classes such as mining, the motive becomes profitability rather than the needs of people (Greenberg 2015). The monopolisation of agribusiness by multinational corporations causes people to be excluded from productive activity they become passive consumers rather than active producers in the economy. It also allows for price manipulation by large corporations (Greenberg 2015). Ethiopia’s main objective is “to increase private sector participation in seed development, multiplication, and distribution” which entails, among other measures “allowing market pricing
of seeds” (NAFN 2012c, 4-5). One of the biggest issues with the “Green Revolution” approach (a model pursued by the NAFN) is the persistent low prices of output markets (Greenberg 2015). The purchase of seeds, irrigation, agro-chemicals becomes expensive but the promise of high returns due to increased yields should cover it according to the system. However, local conditions do not shape the output markets, global dynamics such as US surpluses decrease prices to a level that African farmers cannot compete with (Greenberg 2015). Farmers are left spending more on inputs than they receive for outputs and therefore do not have the accessibility component of food security, exacerbated by situations in which they are left with inedible monocrops such as cotton or coffee.

The Green Revolution model that pushes hybrid seeds, agrochemicals, irrigation and credit is also condemned by La Via Campesina on the grounds that it destroys seed diversity and food sovereignty. The African biodiversity network also opposes the “Green Revolution” type approach that “concentrates the control of agriculture in corporate hands” (African Biodiversity Network 2014). Belay, often published by the ABN, is an ecological campaigner that opposes the intervention of initiatives such as the work of the Bill Gates Foundation because “the problem comes with agri-business”, production for the market and optimum supply for market demand (Belay 2014, 1). The Bill Gates foundation pushes the Western model of agriculture that disregards biodiversity and culture. Seeds become a way of controlling the market, their efforts involve assisting seed companies to improve the distribution of seed, since it is seen as a way to improve the lives of the people (Belay 2014, 1).

ESAFF observes an element of the hunger issue referred to in the literature review of this paper, the misconceptions of a “food security” approach in agribusiness and philanthropic investment and with it also questions nutrition in agricultural policies. Food security is often preoccupied with increasing outputs and incomes as a way to reduce poverty and hunger (ESAFF 2014, 1). However, ESAFF points out, there is poor reflexion on the link between increased production and food security. It too is critical of the green revolution solutions put forward a crop-centred approach for population food security which ignores the benefits of diversification. The food sovereignty approach emphasises that diversification improves nutrition, minimises climate change risks, increases annual production per hectare and properly distributes labour requirements and incomes all year round (ESAFF 2014, 1). ESAFF also criticises the Green
Revolution solutions that involve the use of large amounts of external inputs (hybrid and GM seeds and the associated agro-chemicals). Like Jones and Greenberg ESAFF emphasises that such techniques are only effective in certain stable agro-climatic conditions and the environment has enough initial fertility and resilience against soil erosion (ESAFF 2014, 1). Again financial crisis and bankruptcy are considered potential results of costly inputs and the destruction of family-farming economies (ESAFF 2014, 1).

Just as this paper has referred to previous food regimes, La Via Campesina touches on African food systems during the colonial period that were focused on commercial, profitable crops for export but emphasises that outside these ‘enclaves’, African seed systems controlled by farmers supplying local communities, saving and exchanging seed indicates that throughout history seeds have been the “very basis of human society” (La Via Campesina 2013, 1). Farmers avoid dependence on expensive inputs and their producers and have seeds that are better adapted to their local environment and more likely to survive climate change, if they maintain control of the seed system (La Via Campesina 2013, 1). By adopting policies via the NAFN that encourage private investment African countries allow their agricultural sectors to be globalised and industrialised and food sovereignty is undermined by the resultant corporate control, monocropping, price controls and dependence.

According to Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss (2015), Biowatch Seeds and Knowledge Initiative director, public research sectors are doing little research in the public interest in terms of the advantages of orphan crops and scrutinising policies on pesticides, GMOs and biofuels. Biowatch is a founding member of the African Biodiversity Network, which is a founding member of AFSA. They are concerned by the top down agenda from big economies with a history of extracting from Africa to boost their own industries (Pschorn-Strauss 2015). Pschorn-Strauss (2015) recognises that with the NAFN, although the language is changing the impact is the same: existing livelihood systems are being replaced so that farmers can produce for export. Policies like the NAFN facilitate government income being used to buy seeds and fertilisers from MNCs, further directing the flow of resources away from Africa, leading to the loss of soil, seed, water, land and knowledge. For Pschorn-Strauss from Biowatch, the most concerning impacts of the monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs is the dependency it creates, distortion of markets
through anti-competitive behaviour and the monetary power companies accumulate which allows them to have a big influence on policy makers.

Barriers to trade

Friends of the Earth question the effectiveness of NAFN corporate investment in assisting smallholders to be self-sufficient and feed local populations and acknowledges that corporate farming “tends to focus on exports and rich markets” (Chandrasekaran & Bassey 2013, 1). As pointed out by Greenberg above, decreasing barriers of trade may not benefit African countries because industry is dominated by other countries already, “they have economies of scale which inhibits Africa from competing industrially” (2015).

Ethiopia’s answer to assisting the private sector to access markets is “by reducing barriers to competitiveness” (NAFN 2012c, 4-5). One of Mozambique’s main focuses under the New Alliance is liberalisation with an aim of facilitating trade and market of agricultural products. One of the barriers to go is the permit (guia) requirements for agricultural commodities (NAFN 2012e, 4-5). Ghana’s Cooperation Framework reveals “reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers” to be a priority (NAFN 2012d, 4). Similar to Ghana, Tanzania seeks stability and to minimise “disruptions in the market” in reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers (NAFN 2012f, 4). Its intention to increase exports is clear when it states it will find alternatives to export bans. Barriers such as taxes on seeds and seed packaging are to be reduced or eliminated which will accommodate import (NAFN 2012f, 4). As will reviewing factors that make releasing new varieties of imported seeds from outside the region a slow process (NAFN 2012f, 4).

ESAFF considers barriers such as the EAC Common External Tariff (CET), key in its protection of important agricultural products. It protects small-scale farmers with lower productivity than farmers exporting from elsewhere. Increased levels of protection result in reduced regional food dependency and thus protective tariffs should be maintained (ESAFF 2014, 1). However, some African countries are removing such barriers. Benin seeks to encourage investment in the agricultural sector by changing tax and regulatory laws. To facilitate access to markets certain foods and agricultural products are to be exempt from VAT (NAFN 2013a, 7). Côte d’Ivoire
similarly aims towards reforming its taxation system (especially for firms processing fishery products) and allowing the free movement of agricultural products (NAFN 2012b, 4-5). It does however pledge not to impose export quotas on commercial farm output and processed goods. Malawi aims to remove export bans (on all crops except maize) and improve its National Export Strategy (NES) and the government’s Export Development Fund. Here tax regimes also require review to maximise incentives and encourage mechanisation of agriculture” (NAFN 2013b, 6-8).

Another aspect of the Seed Trade Harmonisation Regulations is to reduce transaction costs. This requires reforming trade arrangements across countries in the region which translates into the removal of non-tariff barriers to ensure a free flow of trade and attract foreign investment (AFSA 2013b).

According to Jones, most of the inputs required by the G8’s Green Revolution model are imported to Africa at a very great cost (Jones 2015). AGRA is working on developing policies in terms of fertiliser that allow for imports, developing subsidy schemes so there is essentially a market for these products (Greenberg 2015). AGRA has a two-tracked approach, firstly prioritising large scale industrial crops such as soya, sugar, cotton which have an export demand. The other side is a smallholder focus towards commercialisation and providing market access (Greenberg 2015).

Reducing barriers and increasing imports and exports is a mechanism of globalising African agriculture and food sovereignty is undermined by the aforementioned effects of inorganic seeds and agro-chemicals imports and production for export rather than a focus on the availability and accessibility of food for local communities. Liberalisation also assists foreign investors to access to markets, the downfalls of which have been discussed above.

Domestic support measures

G8 favours more targeted subsidies than across the board assistance (Jones 2015). Burkina Faso promises only temporary agricultural input subsidies and looks to establish a way of making subsidies more targeted rather than widespread (NAFN 2012a, 5-8). Senegal also looks to ensure
better targeting of recipients and “reduce the budgetary level of input subsidies from 0.5% to 0.3% of gross domestic product over three years” (NAFN 2013d, 10-12).

The New Alliance does not necessarily entail cuts in public spending for all countries as the hypothesis predicted. The last 10 years has seen a big revival of agricultural input subsidies in quite a few African countries especially Malawi, with a focus on hybrid seeds and fertiliser (Jones 2015). Public private partnerships are very important to the NAFN, public expenditure is used to create foundations for private profitability (as is the case with the aforementioned patient capital) (Greenberg 2015). Greenberg finds this a critical issue, rather than a cut in public expenditure it is directed towards the interests of corporations. CGIAR supports public sector germplasm development however aid from USAID and the Rockefeller Foundation provide money with the focus of the long term commercialisation of these products instead of keeping them in the public sector (Greenberg 2015). Work is done using public resources and privatised further on which creates a path towards dependency and new investments also follow this and entrench this development trajectory.

In pursuit of food sovereignty Friends of the Earth call for a redirection of public funds away from industrial agriculture towards smallholder farmers and an end of subsidies and targets for crop-based biofuels (Friends of the Earth 2013, 2). With the NAFN the trend is not to cut domestic spending, as was the case in the Structural Adjustment programmes, but to re-direct it in the interests of MNCs and a handful of farmers. Again food sovereignty is undermined when the needs of smallholders are not prioritised and private investors are empowered.

**Theoretical analysis**

The AFSA critique of the NAFN benefits from engaging with some of the theoretical ideas highlighted in Chapter two, particularly Polanyi’s ideas on countermovements, accumulation via dispossession and food regime theory.

The globalization of agriculture via the NAFN has created the conditions for AFSA and other civil society organisations to build a global countermovement. This is an indication of the ongoing political struggle described by Polanyi between the dis-embedding force of the free
market and re-embedding efforts of those opposing it. As shown above, African and international organisations with critiques based on the food sovereignty approach have found themselves with common ideals and corresponding reactions to the NAFN. They are similarly opposed to such a neoliberal conception approach to solving hunger and recognize the need for re-embedding the economy by resisting liberalisation and pursuing alternatives development strategies. The food sovereignty discourse and networks upholding it, such as AFSA, are social and institutional responses to capitalism. The ‘double movement’ that Polanyi describes as characterising the market economy is evident as NAFN is a force “of economic liberalism seeking to spread and expand the role and the remit of market forces” and AFSA is effectively “a sort of backlash from society, as society is subjected to ever more dislocation” seeking “social… to protect vulnerable citizens” (Jansen 2014, 1). Like Polanyi, AFSA’s vision of re-embedding the economy acknowledges the alternative practices of small-scale economies and sees value in cultural traditions and social relationships that are considered out of date by modern capitalist food security efforts such as the NAFN, for AFSA this translates into practices of agro-ecology and preserving local seed economies. An important element of AFSA’s approach corresponds to Polanyi’s “perspectivism”, since contemporary market society is recognised as a recent invention, as oppose to the NAFN’s food security approach that considers this market society to be the most recent stage of an evolving economy. Thus AFSA is able to consider alternative developmental trajectories and avoid a deterministic view by considering effective methods from the past.

As predicted in Chapter two this paper, using a food sovereignty critique, has discovered the NAFN to resemble Harvey’s projections in the following ways: dispossession of land via large scale investment, commercialisation of the seed industry resulting in biopiracy and environmental degradation, “pillaging” with increased foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs, decreasing barriers to trade and increasing imports and exports with the agro-industrial model and cuts in domestic support measures with privatisation.

Marx’s explanation of primitive accumulation includes processes that are ever-present in the history of neoliberalism and pertinent to an analysis of the neoliberal policies of the NAFN such as commodification, privatisation of land, uprooting of peasant populations, reforming property rights to be more exclusive, “suppression of indigenous forms of production and power…”
imperial processes of appropriation of assets, including natural resources, monetisation of exchange and taxation particularly of land... national debt and ultimately the credit system” (Harvey 2005a, 74). The state is vital to this process in allowing and supporting the processes (as with African countries that enter partnerships within the framework of the NAFN). The NAFN facilitates such processes and as Harvey (2005a, 63) also predicts uses the help of financial and state institutions since they have the ability to generate credit.

Viewing the NAFN in this way supports Harvey’s assertion that accumulation via predation, is not in the past or outside the capitalist system but is an ongoing process. Certain aspects of the NAFN are similar to Marx’s description of responses to the crisis of accumulation and condemned by AFSA such as: geographical expansion (large scale investments in African land) and finding ways to open new markets (decreasing African members’ barriers to trade to facilitate trade and market for agricultural products), improve production capacities (via promoting hybrid and GM seeds and agro-chemicals) and pursue resource, social and labour possibilities elsewhere (by investment and monopolisation of agribusiness).

AFSA opposes land scale investment in land, recognizing (like Marx’s description of primitive accumulation) that taking/enclosing land and displacing the population that lived there creates “a landless proletariat” and “releasing the land into the privatised mainstream of capital accumulation” resembles land grabs (Harvey 2005b, 145).

Food regime theory acts as a lens through which to study international political economy, as they involve special geographical and patterns of accumulation (McMichael 2004, 276). McMichael argues that the ‘food regime’ “expresses the genetic structure of capitalism in the accumulation/dispossession dynamic” and the political structure of states relations to global food circuits. Cameron and Palan find that authority and sovereignty are no longer akin to each other in “imagined economies of globalisation” (2004,15), the state no longer has easily definable boundaries and becomes itself defined by its international relations and its position in the construction of world agriculture. The condition for food security in such a construction is an “assault on peasant cultures” to maintain the transnational circuit (McMichael 2004, 298).

McMichael uses an explanation of the Doha Development Round to illustrate the competitive relations that exist between unequal states, influenced by corporate interests. Their perusal of comparative advantage across the state system is vital to the construction of global agricultural
systems with new circuits of casual labour (McMichael 2004, 271). As mentioned above, in the corporate food regime financial relations are deregulated, monetary value is measured by credit relations instead of labour relations with privatisation, agriculture and agro-exports being commercialised (McMichael 2004, 271). With this the world price for commodities becomes far removed from actual costs, through political means such as depressing agricultural prices through overproduction and dumping (McMichael 2004, 271). In the corporate food regime the world price is determined and spread, through liberalisation by: devaluing currency, reducing farm supports and allowing for corporatisation (McMichael 2004, 271). The globalisation of African agriculture leaves farmers vulnerable to dispossession. The character of ‘world agriculture’ with corporate-driven food supply chains has been determined by a historic process that has involved the dumping of subsidised food surpluses and increasing corporate access to land, labour and markets in developing countries (McMichael 2004, 276).

McMichael and Friedmann delineate between food regimes using periods of British and US hegemony. British hegemony relied on free trade in agriculture while the US reverted to managed agriculture. In the nineteenth century the form prioritised providing cheap foodstuffs for emerging European industrial classes, while in the mid-twentieth century the latter used aid programmes to transfer surplus foods and green revolution technologies into developing countries (McMichael 2004, 274). Britain secured hegemony by linking the “new fortunes of capitalism” to growing cheap global supply circuits while the US attained allies and markets for its agribusiness (McMichael 2004, 276). Both industrialised and specialised their agricultural sectors but separating them into distinctive food regimes reveals and emphasises the differences between the two periods that have evolved into the current food regime. The chapter historicising African globalised agriculture will use food regime theory to delineate different periods and identify recurring policies that globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty.

In Bernstein’s critique of food regime theory he includes a short section on resistance which fails to account for the current mobilisation of small producers as embodied by AFSA, being a ‘movement of movements’, alliances being “cross thematic and cross-class” and “expressing a particular conjunctural crisis precipitated by neoliberal institutions of market rule (structural adjustment, WTO trade and investment regime, state privatization)” encapsulated by the NAFN (McMichael 2015, 195). Food regime theory was used in Chapter five to identify recurring
policies that globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty. AFSA’s critique of
the NAFN reveals it to be a continuation of other policies that have shaped the current corporate
food regime featuring deregulation, privatisation, agro-exports being commercialised and the
world price for commodities becoming far removed from actual costs (the world price is
determined and spread, through liberalisation by: devaluing currency, reducing farm supports
and allowing for corporatisation) (McMichael 2004, 271).
Chapter 8: Conclusion

This exploratory research engages with the concept of food sovereignty, contextualising it in terms of the food challenge and highlighting its usefulness in comparison to other solutions to hunger such as the orthodox approach, the entitlement or society-focused explanation of hunger, the complex political emergency approach, and the human security approach. Critiquing the NAFN requires a theory that not only challenges mainstream policy but also finds fault in the global economic environment that constructs it. By touching on the theme of neoliberalism, modernisation and the globalised food system, the core of the NAFN’s narrative comes to light: neoliberalist assumptions, the idea of a unilinear development trajectory, universal growth, and industrialisation through open market capitalism and foreign investment, loans and aid. This entails globalising strategies such as privatisation, deregulation, commodification, a move from subsistence farming to cash crops for the international market, and increased investment from MNCs. The commodification of seeds has come to characterise the global food system due to its extensive implications: destruction of local seed economies and self-reliance, monocultures, farmer debt, biopiracy and loss of indigenous knowledge, increased use of agrochemicals, unsustainable farming practices, and the empowerment of and monopolisation by MNCs. This sets the scene for the current state of agriculture and allows for a hypothesis to be formulated.

Food sovereignty is further conceptualised in the theory chapter, complemented by the works and words of Karl Polanyi. As a political economy critique of agro-industrial food systems, it shifts focus away from production, profit and market mechanisms to an alternative food system prioritising the needs and autonomy of people and communities that seek the protection (rather than the limitation) of the state. Polanyi emphasises the dangers of separating the market and the state, and of relying on market mechanisms as opposed to prioritising self-sufficiency and local systems of control. In terms of building a constitutive approach to rights, food sovereignty emphasises the collective dimension of claims over the individual one; it looks to protect access to natural resources, cultural practices, the interests of the next generation, transparency and the right to define one’s own food and agricultural system while dismantling the current corporate trade and food regime. Polanyi describes how private motives and allowing the market to dictate social relations is destructive, and how the logic of the market inhibits the values of collective
life and prioritises individual rights. Finally, food sovereignty involves the building of a grassroots movement and alternative, promoting localised food production and the protection of rural livelihoods. Like Polanyi’s perspectivism, contemporary market society is seen as a recent invention that is not inevitable and can be countered. Food sovereignty movements, appreciate the value of re-visiting certain traditions and values rather than “moving on” from the “traditional” as neoliberalism and modernisation theory propose.

Another theory useful to this paper is “accumulation by dispossession” which characterises the global environment that has come to shape the food system and brings to the fore recurring processes that simultaneously globalise and divest (subsequently undermining food sovereignty). It exposes neoliberal capitalisms’ need to constantly open new markets and privatise in order to rectify overaccumulation elsewhere. Historically, this has involved commodification, privatisation of land, displacing peasant populations, enforcing property rights, suppressing traditional forms of production and power, imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources, monetisation of exchange and taxation particularly of land), the national debt, and expansion of the credit system, usually facilitated by the state. This continues today, made possible by initiatives such as the NAFN that use “partnerships” to access foreign economies and resources, using even more instruments of accumulation by dispossession – such as commodification of seed and biopiracy (via patenting of living organisms) and financial liberalisation to globalise the food system and acquire cheap resources and labour. All the facets of the hypothesis translate into forms of dispossession with the potential to undermine food sovereignty.

Food regime theory was said to express the genetic structure of capitalism in the accumulation/dispossession dynamic and the position of political power in the global food system. This theory also emphasises the negative effects of financial deregulation, corporate-driven food supply chains, corporate perusal of comparative advantage and new circuits of casual labour – with the resultant warping of world prices for food commodities through overproduction and dumping that have come to characterise world agriculture. The current corporate food regime can be considered a product of previous food regimes such as when British hegemony relied on free trade in agriculture, followed by the US reverting to managed agriculture - both of which industrialised and specialised agricultural sectors.
McMichael and Friedmann’s explanation of the first and second food regimes sets the scene for a historicisation of African agriculture under neoliberalism. From the beginning, economic liberalisation policies have empowered developed countries to penetrate the economies of periphery countries. Britain’s free trade imperialism was particularly effective in the context of African colonies, where monocultures were imposed and exports prioritised (not an unfamiliar concept to the current regime). Factors from the second food regime that live on are: strategic placement of investment and aid and elements of ‘the development project’ such as cash cropping; industrialisation; imported cheap food products; subsistence farming being discounted as unproductive; peasant cultures being displaced; and cooperative labour, seed saving, managing the commons, biodiversity and traditional knowledge being undermined. In the current corporate food regime, ‘the development project’ has been replaced by ‘the globalisation project’ driven by policies such as those contained in SAPs, the AoA and TRIPs. As mentioned, particularly harmful efforts have been financial liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation and property rights (beneficial only to minority commercial farmers), exacerbated by cuts to domestic support measures. African countries regressed from being net-exporters to net-importers and were discouraged from being self-sufficient, while corporations gained profit and power with new access to markets and cheap resources.

With this background and an understanding of food sovereignty, the following chapter extends the critique and decodes the NAFN. On the surface, the NAFN’s main pledges seem promising but closer analysis reveals that African countries are partnering with a complex web of private and public actors representing a variety of interests.

The partnerships that the New Alliance pledges to foster link African countries not only to G8 countries and corporations but also to international organisations such as the WEF and existing initiatives such as AGRA, all of which seek market-based solutions and have mandates which seem directed towards the facilitation of the private sector. Africa becomes an advertisement to investors as more markets become accessible and more land is made available, an ideal location for profit and export. Risks and concerns that partners’ interests may not be aligned are not addressed by NAFN documentation, but this is bound to be the case; for example, the corporations seeking access to African countries’ resources and land are the very agencies that control pricing and production methods which may not be in the interests of small-scale farmers.
The NAFN assists corporations’ access to African leaders and gives them an opportunity to lobby together. Again, we observe corporate control of the food regime as they gain influence through the NAFN.

While attempting to mobilise capital for food security, the NAFN manages to mobilise public sector resources as patient capital, in a way that directly benefits private investors by reducing their transaction costs. It also exposes a lack of transparency in terms of letters of intent and use of financial contributions. Poverty alleviation criteria and indicators (set out by the NAFN) have not been sufficiently defined and do little to measure whether smallholders’ interests are being served. The indicators that are deemed important by the New Alliance are: the World Bank’s Doing Business Index; the percentage increase in private investment in the commercial production and sale of improved seed; and the rise in private investment in the agricultural sector. These all seem very far removed from the implications this initiative may have on African farmers. These indicators reflect a theme in the NAFN of directly catering for the needs of (predominantly foreign) private investors.

When decoding what ‘taking innovations to scale’ entails, value chains are exposed as generators of smallholder debt and dependence on external inputs and markets as well as the dubious actions and add-on relationships involved in a partnership with AGRA that basically also results in the empowerment of corporations at the expense of smallholder farmers. The NAFN considers biofortification to be the primary solution to malnutrition, without considering the debates around the issue and ethical conundrums. Biofortification, although briefly mentioned in this paper, requires further study and debate on a scientific and social level, before being accepted as the best way to achieve nutrition objectives.

With an understanding of the food challenge, this document has set out the following: food sovereignty theory; the state of African agriculture and the structure of the NAFN; and a case study of AFSA as a food sovereignty critique. Critiques of policies mentioned in the previous chapter and examples from Cooperation Frameworks of African countries (since they provide a translation of NAFN goals into commitments) was constructed with the input of AFSA members to reveal where food sovereignty is undermined. Certain evidence gained legitimacy with repetition from various sources. A different facet of the hypothesis was explored in each section.
to ascertain if it could be validated. Some aspects of the hypothesis reveal themselves to be more relevant than others.

Firstly, land revealed itself to be a common objective in all the Cooperation Framework Agreements of the African countries. Registering and certifying land, creating databases and releasing hundreds of thousands of hectares for large scale commercial agriculture - set out in the CFAs – assists private investors to access land and results, as the hypothesis predicts, in large scale investment of land. AFSA members’ critiques of such policies confirm the ways in which this undermines food sovereignty: livelihoods and cultures are destroyed as indigenous people are displaced (especially pastoral communities) with inadequate compensation, often leaving them without land for production and the inability to afford to buy from markets. African agriculture is globalised in this sense as foreign countries and MNCs purchase or lease large areas of agricultural land with intentions to export produce; land grabs have increased as agriculture has become more strategically important following the food crisis, financial crisis and increase in oil prices.

The commercialisation of seeds and increased use of agro-chemicals and GMOs revealed themselves to be the most relevant aspects of the hypothesis, being extensively mentioned in CFAs and the main concern for most of the AFSA members’ critiques. It would have been more accurate, however, for the hypothesis to have mentioned hybrid seeds being of equal concern and greater prevalence. In some CFAs, private sector involvement in seed development and distribution is encouraged. African countries are forming policies and regulations to incentivise the commercialisation and use of improved inputs, such as funding research or even inhibiting the circulation of “unimproved” seeds. The use of hybrid and GM seeds have been condemned by food sovereignty advocates for being a threat to biodiversity, benefitting only a small minority of farmers, putting farmers into debt and encouraging farming practices that are inferior to agro-ecological methods. Seed being developed and sold by MNCs, as oppose to local seed economies and seed saving, is an indication of globalisation via the commercialisation of seeds. Food sovereignty is undermined by the dependency this creates as farmers come to purchase new seeds every season and abandon a system of diverse seeds that are locally adapted, more resilient and free of charge.
The increased use of agro-chemicals is inextricably linked to the commercialisation of seeds, sold by the same MNCs and often as a package deal. Various AFSA members corroborate that agro-chemicals make soil unusable in the long term and produce studies proving the effectiveness of inexpensive organic methods to avoid such environmental degradation and debt.

Key to the commercialisation of seeds and promotion of so-called “improved inputs” is the certification and patenting of seeds. CFAs outline member countries’ intentions to certify seeds, classify them, create official catalogues, and improve testing and quality control. This encourages mono-cropping and, when smallholder farmers’ seed doesn’t meet the requirements and cannot be listed, it cannot be legally traded. The intention of certain countries to join the Seed Harmonisation Programme is particularly concerning, with the UPOV 1991 enshrining especially strong intellectual property rights. AFSA members oppose such efforts, which are orientated towards genetically uniform and commercially bred varieties, as these threaten diversity by disregarding the importance of traditional seed varieties.

Food sovereignty requires that farmers are placed at the heart of food systems and policies; however, foreign investment and the monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs has led to the demands of corporations and markets shaping the food system. Various members of AFSA are equating foreign investment through the NAFN with corporate control and ‘resources grabs’. Seed certification systems result in intellectual property monopolies by large companies and the acquisition of large tracts of land is equally empowering; this creates a vicious circle, since the greater the monopoly and power MNCs acquire, the more they are able to influence laws and ensure that handling and exchange of uncertified seed is criminalised and that land is made available for foreign investment. Many AFSA members make a point of condemning the current systems’ prioritisation of profit and promotion of global industrialisation as the root to development, as this disregards the importance of family farming, self-sufficiency and the merit of other agricultural approaches such as agro-ecology. As such, CFAs are geared towards attracting private investment and improving the business environment, again perpetuating the assumption that economic growth will solve hunger. The majority of farmers will not be able to be absorbed into large scale capital intensive production, having to compete internationally (industrialisation is essentially a mechanism of globalisation). Additionally, considering food to be just another asset class is problematic, expecting competition with other assets, encouraging
production for the global market, allowing “the market” to set prices, despite the possibility of prices being manipulated by powerful monopoly MNCs – leading to global rather than local conditions shaping output markets.

The hypothesis that the NAFN’s neoliberal solutions that globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty include increased foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs, is correct. However, it should have taken into account that domestic private investment also poses a threat to food sovereignty and that “the monopolisation of agribusiness by MNCs” does not effectively describe the many dimensions of the agribusiness’s effects on African agriculture.

In terms of the prediction that the NAFN would decrease barriers to trade and allow for increasing imports and exports (although it receives less attention from AFSA critiques), the NAFN is targeting barriers to trade as a strategy to aid importation of agricultural inputs and exportation of produce. CFAs include commitments to liberalise, removing permit requirements for agricultural commodities, reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers and eliminating export bans. Although tax and regulatory laws are being changed to facilitate imports and exports, some member states retain certain protective barriers and there are no export or import quota pledges (as with some past development efforts such as SAPs). Reducing domestic support measures is also not as much a focus for the NAFN as it was for efforts such as SAPs, with little mention in the African CFAs. Instead of eliminating subsidies altogether, they are to become more targeted. What is of concern is that, rather than cutting public expenditure, it is directed towards the interests of corporations.

Themes that were not sufficiently covered by the hypothesis and require further research include the nature of credit institutions provided for in the NAFN, the dynamics and effects of financialisation, and the nutrition aspect. However, overall the facets of the hypothesis had various degrees of merit. The recommendations and commitments of the NAFN have been shown to globalise African agriculture and undermine food sovereignty with neoliberal solutions to hunger (similar to past development efforts and typical of the corporate food regime). A food sovereignty critique, with the help of the voices of AFSA, has revealed the mechanisms to be: large scale investment of land; the commercialisation of the seed industry and increased use of agro-chemicals and GMOs; increased foreign investment and monopolisation of agribusiness by
MNCs; decreasing barriers to trade; increasing imports and exports; and cuts in domestic support measures. These dimensions of the NAFN must be considered before even more African countries join the Alliance. A food sovereignty critique reveals that such an initiative cannot be reformed to serve African interests, as it is built on the foundation of flawed assumptions about what type of food system we should be working towards.
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## Appendix A

### Foreign Corporations with Pledges under the NAFN (according to CFAs)

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<th>Corporation</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
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I This International company is part of Alliance One International.
II This is a joint venture between Softprotec and Group Castel.
III Subsidiary of Dominion Group.
IV Subsidiary of Green Seed Group.
V Joint venture consisting of PZ Cussons PLC and Wiltern International.
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<td>Competitive African Cotton Initiative (Corporate partners: Cargill, Emanuel, Industrial Promotion Services West-Africa, Plexus Ltd)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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Sources: (Obenland 2014, 7; NAFN 2012a-f; NAFN 2013a-d)