Cash, Care and Social Justice: A study of the Child Support Grant

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Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work and has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. All the sources I have used have been acknowledged by complete references.

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Abstract

South Africa claims to be a developmental state with redistribution and justice at the heart of its social policy. The existence of large scale social investment programmes support this claim, such as the well-regarded Child Support Grant (CSG), a cash transfer disbursed to over 11 million poor children monthly. Substantial evidence exists of the important positive material impacts of the CSG. However, is the material improvement of people’s lives enough to deliver social justice?

In this study I investigate the social, care, and gendered impacts of the CSG in poor households in Johannesburg in order to investigate whether this cash transfer delivers social justice for the primary caregivers of children getting the grant. Theoretically and empirically I understand social justice as a balance of redistribution, recognition, and representation, drawn from Nancy Fraser’s (1997, 2009, 2013a) work, in order for individuals to live with freedom, agency, and dignity. I combine Fraser’s trivalent theory of social justice with the applicability of the capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2000, 2003, 2011; Sen, 1999, 2009) to explore the reality of how policy plays out for the individual women who get the grant.

Via a feminist narrative approach, I uncover the immediacy, intricacy, and intimacy of the lives of six women who get a CSG on behalf of one or more children in their care. These narratives offer clues to critical areas we need to consider for building a truly just society, and point to the unrealised transformative potential of welfare policy.

The study findings corroborate the redistributive benefits of the CSG, and identify some specific positive recognition and representation outcomes too. However, evidence from the data in this research exposes the devastating failures of the South African state in delivering substantive recognition and representation justice, therefore falling short of offering dignity and freedom for caregiver recipients. The narratives demonstrate that, however effective and important, the CSG is a narrow instrument which cannot act alone to offer social justice. Its potential is undermined by institutional, ideological, and political failures which are particularly stark in the area of welfare service provision.

Following from these findings, I take issue with the characterisation of the state as ‘developmental’, arguing that a crucial aspect missing from their practice is the practice of care. While the CSG has taken South Africa some distance on the road to social justice, the missed opportunities and crucial shortcomings in caring for a population in need mean we still have a long way to travel.
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My son was born a few weeks after I first registered for my doctoral degree, and now he is a busy six year old about to start primary school; his development reminds me of the long journey of this doctorate and the many debts I have incurred along the way.

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The names of the research participants and the members of their families have been changed to maintain confidentiality. All the photographs in this thesis were taken and used with the express permission of the women and their families in question.
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Chapter 1

The Child Support Grant: hopes for a transformative agenda

South Africa presents an interesting social policy story, full of paradox and contradictions. It is a glowing example of peaceful political transition, progressive and rights based legal and regulatory frameworks, and has a vast bastion of policies and programmes specifically to improve the lives of the poor. There is also remarkable consensus across the political spectrum, that poverty is the most important, persistent, and dangerous social problem, which should be urgently addressed. However, how this should be done is fiercely contested. The political right complains ANC policies are constructing a state of hand-outs which produce dependency, while the left slams the ANC’s subscription to conservative neoliberal economic and social policies, claiming they hurt the poor. Both sides of the spectrum also harshly criticise the nation’s persistent poverty, high levels of unemployment, and inefficient and often dysfunctional policy implementation and delivery. These tensions reflect social policy debates globally, in both high and lower income contexts. Overall the notion of redistribution by the state via social policy programmes is complex and disputed, and deserves greater attention.

Consequently, in this thesis I investigate at a micro-level one social policy programme as an example of large-scale redistribution, as a means to engage with the question: are we doing enough to give all people in South Africa a fair and dignified existence? I attempt to explore this by examining the social justice impacts of the widest-reaching, and by all accounts, most successful, poverty alleviation strategy in the country, the Child Support Grant (CSG). The CSG is a small monthly cash transfer for poor children under the age of 18 years, currently supporting over 11 million children nationally.

My interest in the CSG originally stemmed from puzzlement at the virulent anti-welfare attitude reflected in so much public discourse: CSG grant recipients are widely out of favour, despite their clear need for state support to raise their child/ren. This discourse reflects a changing political context that is complicated and confusing: on the one hand there exists a progressive, rights-based, redistributive, developmental social policy framework, while on the other hand, there is growing public discourse that is negative, denigrates grant beneficiaries, and undermines their dignity. These contradictions are being played out in a context of an increasingly economic, social and politically conservative environment which signals a departure from the remarkable forward-thinking and progressive policy-
making of the mid to late 1990s. I then began to ask questions about what consequences cash transfers such as the CSG have beyond the income support for which they are designed. And how do these outcomes affect the experiences of the recipients? Do these outcomes make the intervention less or more just?

Following Rawls, Sen, Nussbaum, Fraser, and other distributive justice theorists, especially those with strong feminist foundations, I use as my starting point the assumption that poverty and inequality are unjust, and that sovereign states have an obligation to offer succour to those who are socially and economically excluded. Central to my argument is the notion that social justice is not just a matter of economic inputs; and that genuine justice requires outcomes in social, economic, cultural and political spheres, what Nancy Fraser (2013b) terms redistribution, recognition, and representation. The capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2011; Sen, 2009) offers a view that social justice entails being able to live a life that one values, in a context of freedom and dignity. Using a framework of social justice that engages with these aspects of social life allows me to ask questions about whether people receiving state intervention are not only being assisted economically, but whether they ‘fare well’, in other words, is welfare (in the form of the CSG) in South Africa fair, right and dignified?

There is wide consensus within both scholarly and political discourse on the positive material effects of the CSG (DSD, SASSA, & UNICEF, 2012; Woolard, Harttgen, & Klasen, 2011), and this current research supports and corroborates this view. Over and above this, though, the intention of this study is to open a conversation about the importance of recognition, representation, freedom, and dignity, when pursuing a redistributive state intervention such as the CSG. South Africa claims to be a developmental and pro-poor state, but understanding what this actually means for individual citizens allows us to see the gaps between the principles of justice and the reality of policy practice. The narratives about women’s everyday lives that appear in this thesis offer clues to critical areas we need to consider for building a truly just society, and point to the unrealised transformative potential of welfare policy. This study asks both how far we have come along the journey to building a just and dignified society, and how far we still need to travel.

To engage with these issues, I investigate, on a micro-scale, what receiving a grant means for individual women who get it on behalf of children in their care. This requires a multi-faceted, complex, thick, narrative approach, engaging with the everyday triumphs, joys, dreams, pain and losses that real people face. This study is not simply about the CSG, but rather about a few of the women who receive the CSG for children in their care, and a narrative feminist analysis of how this social policy has or has not influenced their lives. Through these stories I engage with the politics of social policy, specifically
social protection, at a national and international level, contributing to the broader debates on the need for transformative social protection that actively strives towards social justice outcomes.

Using a feminist distributive social justice perspective, in this chapter I will introduce social protection, and social assistance more specifically, and raise some of the global debates in this field. I move onto South Africa, offer a broad account of the welfare landscape, and explain the CSG in detail, including what we already know about its impact. I then explain the aims and purpose of the study, and end with a brief explanation of the study’s conceptual approach, the research design, and the limitations. The final section outlines the content of each chapter of the document.

Social protection and its darling, cash transfers, in global context

Social policy’s quiet revolution

What has been termed the ‘quiet revolution’ (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008) in anti-poverty measures was a profound shift from conventional ‘safety-net’ approaches to a new recognition that reducing or eliminating poverty and inequality necessitates economic growth, basic service provision and social protection (Niño-Zarazúa, 2010). This reflects a change in how poverty as a phenomenon is understood, from seeing poverty only as a lack of income, to notions of poverty as complex and multidimensional; a notion pioneered by Amartya Sen (1999, 2009) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the human development approach to poverty (UNDP, 1990). In this approach, poverty is the combined and interacting effects of economic, material asset, social, health, psychological, environmental and political deprivations, and how these influence and shape the past, current and future lives of those affected.

Social protection is generally understood as fulfilling two main functions: “to smooth the incomes of the not-so-poor, and to ensure that no-one – not even the poorest – falls below a certain minimum threshold of human dignity” (Voipio, 2014, p. 293). These functions are seen as being fulfilled by public action in three different categories: social insurance; labour market regulation; and social assistance (ILO, 2001). Social insurance is designed for those who are employed, and is made up of contributory programmes to protect against life-course and work-related contingencies such as maternity, old-age, unemployment, sickness and accidents. Labour market regulations are legislation and labour polices to protect worker rights and ensure basic working conditions. Social assistance is a range of policy instruments designed to address poverty and vulnerability, including pensions and grants which are widely known as cash transfers (Niño-Zarazúa, Barrientos, Hulme, & Hickey, 2012). The place of public works schemes and social services such as health and education are contested, with some claiming they are social protection mechanisms (Walker, 2013) and others insisting that they belong to other
categories; for example, McCord argues strongly that public works programmes are chiefly designed to address market failures and therefore cannot be categorised as social protection per se (McCord, 2012; McCord & Meth, 2013).

The new anti-poverty emphasis on growth, services and social protection rather than short-term safety nets has meant that social assistance as a policy instrument has exploded worldwide. It is currently seen as the most important and effective tool to tackle extreme poverty, offering predictable and reliable income to more than 860 million people worldwide (Niño-Zarazúa, 2010). De Haan (2014) posits that the popularity of social protection (especially in the form of cash transfers) has been largely due to the evidence, through global economic crises first in Asia, then Latin America, and then internationally, that economic growth is not as sustainable nor as protective as was previously thought by those who set great faith in markets as the best tool to address social and economic woes. He adds, however, that the strongest drivers for the growth of social protection have been political ones; from the rise of pro-market populism and democracy in Latin America which demonstrated that pro-poor policies were politically and economically sustainable, to the authoritarian roots of places such as Ethiopia which sees social protection as a means to stave off social protests and control a disaffected population.

In any event, the literature is overwhelmingly in favour of cash transfers as the most efficient and effective form of social assistance. The new paradigm for the anti-poverty agenda began with a surge of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in Latin America, established around the same time as South Africa introduced its unconditional cash transfer programme for children. Latin American CCTs have been judged extremely successful (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Lopez, 2011; Paes-Sousa, Soares, & Kleiman, 2011). The two most recognised and wide-reaching programmes are Oportunidades in Mexico, and Bolsa Familia in Brazil. Mexico’s Oportunidades (previously called Progresa and begun in 1997), reached 5 million households in 2010, which is about 25 million beneficiaries or 25 percent of the population (a large proportion regarded as extremely poor and living in rural areas) (Barrientos, Niño-Zarazúa, & Maitrot, 2010). Bolsa Familia, begun in 2003, reached 12.5 million beneficiary households in 2009, which is about 52.3 million individuals (or 25 percent of the population) (Barrientos et al., 2010). Both have had very encouraging social and material impacts, with remarkable improvements especially in educational outcomes, particularly for girls, health outcomes for mothers and children, and varied but interesting results in improvements in women’s empowerment (Adato, de la Brière, Mindek, & Quisumbing, 2000; Barrientos et al., 2010; de Brauw, Gilligan, Hoddinott, & Roy, 2013).

Sub-Saharan Africa is now the region with the fastest growing social assistance field, mostly in the form of unconditional cash transfers (UCTs). Models of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa vary
greatly, as their design is influenced by the politics of social protection as much as by the demographics, financial and institutional resources, and the needs of the population under discussion (Patel, Midgley, & Ulriksen, 2013). Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2012) identify two broad social assistance ‘typologies’ in Africa; Southern Africa has taken a different pathway to what they term ‘Middle Africa’, made up of eastern, western, and central sub-Saharan Africa. The key differences are that the Southern African model, typified by South Africa, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe, is focused on categorical grants, primarily for older people, but in South Africa also for children and others (Ellis, Devereux, & White, 2009). In these countries there is the institutional capacity to collect public revenue and deliver grants nationally by the state. Social assistance is legislated and therefore is an entitlement for citizens. Social protection in ‘Middle Africa’, typified by Malawi, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia and to some extent Ethiopia, is also based on transfers, but tries to integrate other services into the programmes too. In addition, these countries have tended to follow a donor-driven pathway: social assistance is largely donor-funded and partner-implemented, and programmes are shorter-term and not protected by law. Therefore the long-term sustainability of these programmes is unclear (Ellis et al., 2009).

The biggest social protection programmes in Africa are South Africa’s system of categorical cash transfers currently paying over 16 million people monthly (about 32 percent of the population), and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme which is a mix of a large public works programme and household cash transfers, covering 8.2 million people in 2009 (about 11 percent of the population), although it is still expanding (Barrientos et al., 2010; Ellis et al., 2009). Evaluations of social protection in Africa have focused on improved food security and household assets; both of which have been demonstrated in many countries. Improvement levels are generally modest as the scale of the social protection programmes is small compared to other parts of the world, with the exceptions of Ethiopia and South Africa.

**Transformative notions of social policy and social protection**

Perusing the results from the massive evaluation industry measuring outcomes of social protection programmes globally, one would be forgiven for thinking there is little controversy in this field. Everyone believes cash transfers are a good thing. The only debates appear to be on targeting (de Haan, 2014; Ellis, 2012; Handa, Devereux, & Webb., 2011; MacAuslan & Riemenschneider, 2011), evaluation methods (de Haan, 2014; Devereux & White, 2010), and whether transfers should be conditional or not (Barrientos, 2011; Gaia, Hujo, & Bennett, 2011). However, largely ignored by the evaluation studies, there is an important conversation on the developmental objectives of social protection which offers valuable input from a justice perspective, which I will now address.
In a strongly worded article, Adesina (2011, p. 466) criticises what he calls the ‘social protection paradigm’ (SPP). He states:

The problem...is not ‘social protection’ *per se*; it is impossible to conceive of social policy without its protection tasking. Rather, the concern [is] with the problematic nature of the prevailing SPP, central to which is the narrow vision of social policy, a refusal to engage with (or confront) the neoliberal analytical and policy regime, and the perfunctory attention (if at all) to inequality.

Instead, he claims that “social policy regimes grounded in *solidarity and norms of equality* are much better at producing social cohesion and inclusivity” (Adesina, 2011, p. 466, my emphasis), and his argument is that the popularity of cash transfers has meant social policy instruments that promote what he terms the common good, such as good quality, free, universal healthcare and education, have become sorely neglected. By focusing on poverty, and especially chronic poverty, concerns about economic, social and political inequality seem to have fallen away. In contrast, he posits that the notion of transformative social policy, framed by the norms of solidarity and equality, will have developmental outcomes such as “production, protection, reproduction, redistribution, and social cohesion or nation-building” (Adesina, 2011, p. 465; Mkandawire, 2007), a much wider basket of positive outcomes than just improved food security. This is a call not just to consider wider developmental strategies in which social protection should play a part, but also to recognise the political nature of social policy-making, with major implications for outcomes for recipients. It is also aligned with the priority and egalitarianism political philosophy views of social protection, which encourage assistance to those worse off not via a charity approach but because their lives are worse off than others *and* than they could be in different circumstances (Barrientos, 2013).

The notion of social policy as a tool to maintain or disrupt the status quo is not new: feminists in particular have long critiqued practice and theory on welfare and comparative analyses of welfare states for their silence on how welfare policy outcomes are different for men and women. They have also been critical of the lack of analysis of how women have been included in the policies of welfare states, especially in relation to the politics of their needs and their entitlements (Hassim, 2006a; Sainsbury, 1994), and the continued use of women as a conduit to serve children and families while overburdening them with care responsibilities (Chant, 2008; Molyneux, 2007). The contribution of feminist scholarship to our understanding of welfare states and systems has been significant, as it has broadened the analytical focus to include the care economy (Folbre, 2008; Fraser, 1989; Tronto, 2010), has exposed the role of familial and gender ideologies in shaping state provision of benefits and services (Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Sainsbury, 1994), and has revealed the differences and frequently
gender unequal outcomes between women and men as recipients of state benefits (G. Lewis, 2000; Sainsbury, 1994). While early feminist contributions revealed the assumption of the male breadwinner as the norm which relegated women to second-class citizens with regard to welfare rights, more recently feminists have criticised the feminisation of welfare which increases women’s care burdens without transforming gender relations (Fredman, 2014).

Feminist critique of welfare opens the way for a gendered analysis of both the intended and unintended consequences of the receipt of the CSG. This is a largely new area of research in South Africa, with a small body of work developing these ideas (Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011; Patel & Hochfeld, 2011; Patel, Hochfeld, & Moodley, 2013; Patel, Hochfeld, Moodley, & Mutwali, 2012). A multi-year household study entitled “The Gender Dynamics and Impact of the Child Support Grant” (Patel et al., 2012) explored the gendered outcomes of the grant in relation to women’s empowerment, specifically, decision-making, care responsibilities, participation, and access to services. It concluded that the CSG contributes to women’s empowerment and has some positive socially transformative features, namely that women who receive the CSG appear to spend more time than those not getting a grant on the ‘social care’ of children, such as helping with homework, playing with their children, and watching TV with children. My thesis builds on these and other insights using a qualitative methodology to explore the social impacts of the grant in more depth.

In the same ideological vein, transformative social protection, strongly associated with the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex, UK, is an approach exhorting policy-makers to conceptualise social protection as a tool to shift inequality and structural deprivation and secure entitlements instead of just to lessen food insecurity. The notion of transformative social protection is based on the assumption that “by challenging power hierarchies and inequitable social relations, social protection can contribute to social transformation, which in turn will reduce economic [and social] vulnerabilities” (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2006, p. 2; Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2008). While largely aspirational at its birth, the concept is gaining momentum as an imperative to offer poor people choice and freedom in living their lives, rather than just improved income security.

Similarly, a body of writing specifically on gender and social protection strongly criticises a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, arguing that women and men’s differing social positions require gender-sensitive social protection tools and programmes (Holmes & Jones, 2013; Patel, 2012b; Sabates-Wheeler & Roelen, 2011). Without a gender disaggregated approach, social protection can easily have oppressive or problematic unintended consequences, reinforcing gender and power differentials and often overburdening women with care responsibilities (Chant, 2008; Kabeer, 2014; Molyneux, 2006).
In contrast to transformative and gender-sensitive views, residual approaches to social protection, where benefits are targeted towards certain populations who are deemed ‘the poorest’, do not lend themselves to socially just outcomes, as the intention is to support those in extreme poverty rather than make major structural changes to society (Kabeer, 2014). It is possible, therefore, for cash transfers without transformatory objectives to achieve access to basic needs and smoothed consumption irrespective of whether or not the programme supports clientelism, encourages discriminatory power relations, or entrenches inequitable practices (Ellis, 2012; Harland, 2014).

Social protection is fundamentally a social contract between the state and its people, and the political flavour of that contract will determine how likely the policy is to be developmentalist, transformative, and rights-based (Devereux, 2013; Hickey, 2011). Unless a social and political discourse exists that affirms the rights of poor people to be given support from the state to alleviate conditions that were not of their making or choosing, then it is unlikely that, firstly, the social protection programme is sustainable, and secondly, that there will be any positive changes in recipients’ lives aside from a decrease in food insecurity (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012). In addition, negative discourses on social protection can eventually erode people’s rights as they become increasingly politically contested (Patel, 2013).

Drawing from the contemporary scholarship that argues that poverty is multi-dimensional (Sen, 1999), and in concert with Fraser’s trivalent theory of justice and the capabilities approach, in this study I affirm that while relieving material forms of poverty is critical, and a first step in all societies, it is important not to crowd out a focus on non-material poverty. The concern with the latter does not imply that I am indifferent to the imperative of the former; it is recognising and engaging with the complexity of both aspects of poverty and inequality that I argue is important.

I will now address South Africa’s past and current welfare and social protection landscape as a background and context for this study.

Social welfare in South Africa

Turning towards the specifics of South Africa cannot be accomplished without first considering the historical and socio-economic context of poverty and inequality.

Poverty and inequality

Poverty in South Africa is caused by a number of variables, but apartheid’s creation of an artificially manufactured underclass of black people to serve the social, political and economic privilege of white people, and post-democracy jobless growth are two major factors.
The massive backlog in infrastructure and development from apartheid’s neglect of most of the population meant that the substantial achievements of the post-apartheid ANC-led governments are not sufficient to deliver on all the hopes and dreams of the current population (World Bank, 2014). This has been exacerbated by rising corruption, political patronage, and capitalist accumulation of the elite (Patel, 2012a). The levels of poverty in a middle-income country like South Africa, at almost 53 percent according to UNICEF (2010), and the stark inequality, as evidenced by a Gini co-efficient of 0.69 in 2011 (World Bank, 2014), implies we are very good at keeping a few people rich and many, many people poor.

There is remarkable national consensus that poverty is a critical problem in South Africa, which has resulted in substantial legitimacy for redistributive expenditure (Du Toit, 2012). There is also agreement that poverty results partly from South Africa’s most persistent problem of unemployment, despite slow but upward economic growth since the end of apartheid. However, this is where the consensus ends. Conservative market oriented ideology suggests solutions based on markets and entrepreneurial upskilling (McKague, Wheeler, & Karnani, 2015). Leftists reject this analysis outright and rather emphasise structural inequality which will not shift without radical economic interventions (Desai, Maharaj, & Bond, 2010; Du Toit, 2010, 2012).

In any event, unemployment rates for the working age population are between 25 percent and 34 percent depending on the definition used: the latter percentage includes the ‘work discouraged’, that is, those who have stopped looking for work (DSD et al., 2012; Woolard et al., 2011; World Bank, 2014). Almost 20 percent of households have inadequate access to food and therefore sometimes go hungry (StatsSA, 2012b). In addition, overall human development outcomes are poor: in 2009 the Human Development Index for South Africa was 0.68, a ranking of 129 out of 182 countries (UNDP, 2009). This is partly due to low life expectancy as a result of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, but is also due to poor outcomes in general for health and education.

While the end of apartheid meant significant improvements in services and infrastructure for black people, 12 percent of all households (and more than 20 percent in urban areas) continue to live in informal housing or slums (StatsSA, 2012b) and in rural parts of the country nearly 20 percent of households have no sanitation or potable water (StatsSA, 2012b). Service delivery protests have become familiar on the political landscape in South Africa, as people voice their dissatisfaction with failing local government and poor or non-existent services (Ballard, 2015; Hart, 2013). Children, women, those living in a rural area, and those of African descent remain the most disadvantaged and the poorest (Bhorat & Van Der Westhuizen, 2012; Dorrit Posel & Rogan, 2012; SAHRC & UNICEF, 2014).
South Africa also struggles with major social and public health issues such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, extremely high levels of inter-personal violence particularly against women and children, and linked to this, substantial sexual abuse of women and children, a very high crime rate, significant substance abuse and addiction problems, and families that are unable to cope with the social and financial stressors that are common to much of the population (Budlender & Lund, 2011; Patel, 2015).

Next I consider the welfare policy situation in South Africa.

**Welfare policy history and landscape**

South Africa does not fit neatly into models of welfare regimes (Patel, 2015; Seekings, 2005), as advanced by theorists such as Esping-Anderson (1990), and instead is an example of what some have called a democratic developmental welfare state (Hassim, 2006b). In this section I will briefly outline the history of the welfare sector, and then explain the context for the welfare choices made by the new democratic government, ending with some of the current issues and critiques.

Apartheid South Africa created a comprehensive welfare state for white people and a residual system for everyone else, with the fewest financial and institutional resources going to the black (African) population (Lund, 2008; Patel, 2015). For the white population this eventually included a functional formal welfare service sector, job protection, social assistance in the form of state pensions and other grants, and quality universal healthcare and education. While many accounts of this history credit the state at the time with a cohesive and modernist view of welfare as a social policy objective, in truth the development of these services were iterative and ad hoc, in response to growing concerns about the ‘poor white problem’ (Seekings, 2008b). While comprehensive, welfare services for whites were certainly not developmental or even strongly welfarist in nature, and took a Western remedial approach, which actually was largely effective as the population was small in relation to the financial inputs and protected from the most severe forms of poverty and vulnerability (Lund, 2008; McKendrick, 1990; Seekings, 2008b). At the same time, a minimal residual welfare system was running, as very few services and institutional supports were available for blacks. It was assumed that the extended family structure and ethnic-based communities would take responsibility for the welfare of the black population, and the state stepped in only in a small number of very dire circumstances (Lund, 2008). Further, the complicated system of ‘homelands’ administering small bits of land across South Africa resulted in very inefficient, sometimes corrupt, and poor quality delivery to black people in rural areas especially (Lund, 2008). Despite inefficiencies and lack of services, in one respect the history of welfare in South Africa is exceptional: the expansion of the Old Age Pension to all race groups in the first half of the twentieth century laid the foundation for a welfare system founded on
social assistance and created expectations of citizen entitlements long before the end of apartheid (Seekings, 2008b).

The dismantling of apartheid brought a powerful drive to build a new country based on values of equality, non-discrimination, and rights, set down in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, and this vision was the context for the building of a new welfare regime. One of democratic South Africa’s first policy documents, launched in 1994, was the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), which laid out a vision of economic and social growth, strongly motivated by the principle of redistribution in order to eliminate inequality based on race. But even by 1997 this plan had been overtaken by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, a policy with substantial allegiance to neo-liberal ideals of the market as the primary source of growth. Critics cautioned against “shifting responsibility for social welfare from government to individuals, families and the private sector... [resulting] in the abrogation of state responsibility for meeting needs” (Patel, 2015, p. 101).

However, the state still considered itself as pro-poor and committed to investing in the social needs of the population and still dedicated to redressing the wrongs of the past. This is clearly articulated in the state’s welfare policy, The White Paper for Social Welfare (Department of Welfare and Population Development, 1997), which to date continues to be the guiding policy document for South Africa’s welfare trajectory (although it is currently under review by a ministerial committee). The White Paper along with pro-poor and progressive policies in housing, health, and education form a core of policy instruments which have at their heart substantial social and financial investment in the majority of the population.

The White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) is based on the five features of developmental welfare, as fashioned by Midgley (1995), Patel (1992, 2005, 2015) and others. These features are: a rights-based approach, linking economic and social development, bridging the micro-macro divide, democracy and participation, welfare pluralism and partnerships. While these features are set down clearly, exactly how they were to be operationalised for developmental social welfare was not delineated as lucidly (Lund, 2008) and this definitional confusion has persisted among researchers and practitioners until the present (Patel & Hochfeld, 2008, 2012).

The historical antecedents to the current welfare regime laid the foundation for a strong NPO sector which is a critical player in delivering services, as they are contracted to the state for various statutory (such as child protection) and non-statutory (such as residential care) assistance. In addition, the NPOs and other stakeholders in welfare “contribute to development in many other ways through providing additional resource flows, knowledge of local contexts; giving a voice to the poor and marginalized
groups; providing greater flexibility in service delivery and responsiveness; and enhancing state capability” (Patel, 2012a, p. 5). This pluralist delivery model, plus the existence of both market strategies (following from GEAR) as well as continued redistributive policies, has led Patel (2014) to conclude that South Africa’s social welfare provision is more a mixed or hybrid model, which consists of a blend of characteristics including redistribution, social investment emphasising productivist elements, corporatism, and market-based strategies.

Two areas of current criticisms of developmental welfare as implemented in South Africa are important for this study. Both can be understood using an analytic tool advanced by Jenson (2004), Razavi (2014) and others, the care diamond. This notion links the four key players in care: the family and private relations, the state, NPOs and markets. The care diamond resonates with the idea of developmental welfare and pluralism, with the role of the state as proactive leader of development and the custodian of justice in a collaborative partnership with other actors.

The first area of criticism is that the state expects substantial care services from the NPO sector, but this sector is woefully under-funded and does not function optimally. The funding model for welfare has prioritised social grants; while this has been successful, it has led to severe financial neglect of welfare services, the second arm of welfare, which is consequently contracting in size, reach, and quality (Patel, 2015). This will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. The second criticism of relevance here is that the White Paper and the implementation of community-based strategies for welfare have been criticised as ‘familialist’ and burdening women in particular with increased care responsibilities in and outside the home (Sevenhuijsen, Bozalek, Gouws, & Minnaar-McDonald, 2003). Using the idea of the care diamond, in South Africa there is a heavy reliance on the family as a source of care, which is under-resourced and stretched (Patel, 2014).

The intention of the White Paper was not to promote pluralism in order to allow the state to abrogate its responsibilities, but to strengthen service delivery, with the state playing a key role in relation to financial and implementation support. The care diamond, however, allows us to see the unintended but current mismatch of the expectations the state has of the family and NPOs in relation to care responsibilities, and the thin and contradictory support the state provides to these institutions.

Overall, however, it is my view that the state’s political commitment to social and economic investment was and remains clear; it is in the current articulation and implementation of these policies where problems arise. Others are far less convinced that this pathway is a redistributive one.

Barchiesi’s (2007, 2011) work has direct relevance to social welfare, and thus is important to review here. He puts forward a fiercely critical argument about the South African government’s veneration
of a neoliberal capitalist agenda and its impact on social justice. He claims that the ANC led government has bought into the primacy of waged labour as the signifier of full citizenship, even in a context where there is a profound crisis of wage labour in the country. This crisis, evidenced by the persistent unemployment rates, and the precariousness and insecurity of the work experiences of so much of the population earning a living in informal and vulnerable ways, has not led to a political re-imagining of social and economic policies, which instead continue to revere waged labour as the key route to social inclusion. His argument is radical in that he criticises the normativity of work, exposing the misery of low paid waged employment and arguing that the assumption that, in the context of such high unemployment, any job is a golden chalice to be treasured, is a major betrayal of the social justice ideals of the revolution.

Barchiesi (2011) is not much reassured by the increase in social assistance spending; while acknowledging it is remarkable in scope and delivery, he claims the fact that it is directed at those deemed vulnerable (older people, children, and disabled people) does nothing to disrupt the assumption that working aged adults should be in stable formal employment and therefore do not need direct public social assistance.

He extends his argument by claiming that social protection in South Africa is poorly designed, particularly because the contributory system of social insurance further forsakes those in low paid jobs or who are unemployed, as they get less support than those who have or have had formal employment, creating a massive divide between the formally employed and everyone else. He says,

...social assistance stands to social insurance in a relationship that mirrors the hierarchical nature of work-based citizenship. Being socially insured means receiving the superior benefits that go with full economic participation... As a result, unemployed workers running out of UIF benefits, first-time jobseekers, informal workers, and many casual employees do not receive any social security provision whatsoever. For them precariousness of work goes hand in hand with a virtually total commodification of life; the more they need public social protection, the less entitled they are to claim it (Barchiesi, 2011, pp. 101-102).

I take issue with Barchiesi’s dismissal of the social assistance programme as largely inconsequential as it is embedded in a greater neoliberal context, but I do think his notion of the ‘work-citizenship nexus’ is very useful. In particular, the ‘work-citizenship nexus’ helps to explain the state’s contradictory and ideologically incoherent policies, some of which I specifically address in this thesis: redistribution on a large scale, but a discourse of work reverence; concerns about structural causes of unemployment, but the continued adherence to conventional, established capitalist economic policies; social policies
which aspire to social justice outcomes, but the denigration of those that need to use the programmes offered.

In addition, it is quite remarkable considering how important grants have been shown to be that the state pits the notion of developmentalism against ‘hand-outs’ (Department of Social Development, 2000), seeing the two as mutually exclusive. In addition, on the one hand the state is defensive, closed, and impatient when it comes to questions of how it is addressing poverty, as seen in comments made by high ranking government officials (such as Joel Netshitenzhe, Seekings, 2002) and in the repeated discourse of their fear of creating a 'culture of entitlement' rather than offering the 'dignity of work' (Hassim, 2006a; Seekings, 2002), but on the other hand, publically available state documentation acknowledges the major failings of the state to achieve this outcome of social justice (such as the NDP 2030, National Planning Commission, 2012). The redistributive ideology of the early ANC government is largely at odds with the neoliberal economics it has espoused and practiced since the introduction of GEAR. In essence, different arms of the state function on the basis of different principles; a good example is the Department of Social Development supporting the recommendation of the Taylor Commission report for the introduction of a Basic Income Grant (BIG), while the Treasury and other arms of the state would not countenance support of ‘non-vulnerable’ groups that were not work-based grants (Barchiesi, 2011; Seekings, 2002). The result was the state’s stifling of the BIG as a notion, even with overwhelming support of trade unions and other civic society groups.

Barchiesi’s voice was certainly not alone in questioning the welfare choices of South Africa in the context of high unemployment and a market driven economy. Natrass and Seekings (2001, p. 494) pointed out that:

> It is ironic that the classes that formed the basis of the struggle for democratisation now form the basis for preserving inequality – particularly that between the employed and the unemployed.

Seekings argues that new fault lines of class were created with the deracialisation of the South African welfare system (Seekings & Natrass, 2005), and that, in effect, post-apartheid social citizenship excludes the unemployed because the assumptions behind the new welfare agenda were based on visions of near universal employment.

In summary, my aim in this study is to sustain a dual gaze on the policy intentions and the often divergent practice outcomes in order to deliver a critical analysis of nuance in relation to the South African welfare regime, with a particular focus on welfare services. The spirit with which I do this is one of hope and optimism that this research can contribute to the journey towards a just society,
rather than a dismissal of the justice achievements as perpetually inadequate. I turn now to a more specific description and discussion of the social protection instruments used by the South African state.

Social policy and social protection in South Africa

The contemporary state and policy responses to poverty and inequality include a substantial social policy and social protection framework made up of social insurance programmes, a large public works programme (called the EPWP, Expanded Public Works Programme), and tax regulations that favour the poor. In addition, free and subsidised services, known as the ‘social wage’ (Dorrit Posel & Rogan, 2014), include a large school nutrition programme (feeding 9 million children a meal every school day), largely free primary and secondary education, free primary healthcare, and free and subsidised housing. Finally, arguably the keystone of this framework, the state runs an extensive social assistance programme in the form of 16 million cash transfers paid to individuals monthly.

Social insurance, key to welfare nations of Europe, has a very limited reach in South Africa as it is usually funded through contributions workers make while employed. In addition, the country has not prioritised social insurance in its welfare framework (Barrientos, Møller, Saboia, Lloyd-Sherlock, & Mase, 2013). South Africa’s unemployment rate means a large majority of the population fall outside the reach of existing public social insurance mechanisms such as maternity benefits or the Unemployment Insurance Fund (Patel, 2015). Public health insurance, an important feature of social insurance in the developed world, is still in the planning phases in South Africa, although pessimism about the quality of healthcare it will be able to deliver due to a crumbling healthcare sector has shadowed its public profile (Marais, 2011). Primary healthcare in South Africa is free, and access has improved considerably since the end of apartheid (Motsoaledi, 2012). Nevertheless problems in the quality of primary health delivery is concerning, including frequent drug shortages, very long waits, and an overworked and consequently uncaring nursing workforce (Mayosi et al., 2012).

A similar picture is true of the education system. Access to education is excellent in South Africa, with school enrolment at the primary level almost universal (Lund, 2011), and parents are motivated to send children to school even in remote areas where children have to walk long distances. The delivery of quality education, however, is another thing altogether: non-delivery of textbooks, protracted teacher strikes, absent teachers, extensive sexual coercion or abuse in high schools, and dismal maths and science results when compared internationally are persistent problems (Bhana, 2013; Fleisch, 2010; Van der Berg, 2008).
The EPWP focuses mainly on creating work opportunities in infrastructure development and care services, such as early childhood development. There is some controversy on its effectiveness, as the numbers reached via the programme fall far short of anticipated numbers: 1.2 million work opportunities were created in the 2013/2014 financial year, instead of more than triple that targeted (Patel, 2015). In addition, the EPWP appears to have a limited impact on poverty and longer term sustainable employment even for those who are reached (McCord, 2012; Patel, 2015).

Whereas the social protection measures mentioned above are important but are functioning at sub-optimal levels, consensus exists that the ‘star’ of the social protection basket is the extensive social assistance programme. Social grants go to 32 percent of the population, and account for a large percentage of the income of households not only amongst the very poor, but also a significant proportion of households in the middle of the income distribution (Bhorat & Van Der Westhuizen, 2012). A modest but significant reduction in national levels of poverty can be attributed directly to social grant receipt (Bhorat & Van Der Westhuizen, 2012; Dorrit Posel & Rogan, 2012; Samson et al., 2004) and some remark on a similar decrease in inequality (World Bank, 2014).

The historical context in which social grants began in South Africa was the problem of a growing ‘poor white’ population in the 1920s, which was not adequately responding to the favourable treatment in the labour market that white people enjoyed (Patel, 2015). Amongst other racially targeted social protection measures, this gave rise to non-contributory old age pensions for white and ‘coloured’ populations in 1928 (Lund, 2008). Gradually, these pensions were extended in reach, and by 1944 were given to the black population too, less from any altruistic notions and more to give legitimacy to the artificial system of ‘homelands’ as independent national bodies (Woolard et al., 2011). Thus an instrument designed for a small privileged population expanded to eventually include all race groups, making it an unusually comprehensive system for a developing country (Lund, 2008; Seekings, 2002).

The Old Age Pension set the scene for a social security system based primarily on social assistance, and other grants were added over the years to the portfolio. In 1992, during the initial crumbling of apartheid legislation, all discrimination according to race in social grants was abolished (Woolard et al., 2011).

The Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced to South Africa in 1998, in line with the political and policy shifts towards developmental social welfare in the country at the time (Lund, 2008). The CSG replaced the State Maintenance Grant (SMG) which was far more generous in the amount disbursed to each claimant, but targeted only a small percentage of needy families in a discriminatory and racist system, as it was received largely by Indian and coloured women as a family transfer. Instead, following on from the recommendations of the Lund Committee in 1996, the intention of this new
grant was explicitly transformatory: it had clear redistributive objectives as well as the unequivocal intention of redressing racial imbalances of the past (Patel, forthcoming; Lund 2008). The intention of the establishment of the CSG was to intervene in poor children’s lives at an early point in order to improve their nutritional intake, critical for their long term development and prospects (Lund, 2008).

During this period, debate about the proposed CSG was spirited. While now it is difficult to imagine resistance to the establishment of the CSG, at the time it was extremely controversial. One major concern was the perceived injustice of removing family support by scrapping the SMG. The argument was that this was reactionary and unfair, and would plunge a group of women and their families into serious deprivation (Lund, 2008; Seekings, 2002). More leftist concerns, vocalised by COSATU (the Congress of South African Trade Unions) at the time, centred on the decision of the Lund Committee to work within the fiscal constraints given by the treasury of the time; their view was that these financial limits should have been rejected outright by the committee (Lund, 2008). Indeed, affordability was a prominent theme, with the treasury of the time unconvinced that this could be a major poverty alleviation tool. In an insightful and strategic move, the Lund Committee eventually agreed for the CSG to be instated at a low monetary level to a limited group of children (0 – 7 years old), as a way to root the idea and functionality of the grant in the welfare system and with a view to expanding its reach later (Lund, 2008). This is exactly what has occurred, with a recent announcement from the Department of Social Development that they plan to extend the CSG up to 23 years old (City Press, “Child Grants Until Age 23”, 11/01/2015). The CSG, along with the pre-existing Old Age Pension, thus became the cornerstones of the current social assistance programme in South Africa.

Although greater fiscal resources than most other African countries is an obvious factor for South Africa’s remarkable achievements in creating a comprehensive and effective social assistance framework, it is certainly not the decisive factor. Far more important has been the political commitment to pro-poor policies which has persisted over 20 years of democracy and has transformed into a set of rights (Devereux, 2011). While South Africa certainly had a solid infrastructure and institutional experience prior to the rapid expansion of the social assistance programme, it is the translation of the political moment immediately post-apartheid into a sustained set of entitlements aligned with the redistributive intentions of the ANC-led government, that really cemented the future of a largely progressive and extensive social protection framework. As Devereux (2011, p. 418) points out, “where the political commitment exists, financial and administrative capacity invariably follow”.

Devereux (2011) argues that there were four features in the South African trajectory that lent particular weight to its social protection success, which offer good lessons for other countries. These
features are, firstly, the fact that the system is government-led from conception to implementation (as opposed to donor-driven). This was facilitated by a renewed social contract defining the right to social protection due to major political shifts in the country (Barrientos et al., 2013). Secondly, the critical role that civil society played in shaping the approach and in obtaining and defending social rights, both at the birth of the CSG, and via the continual push to improve access and insist on the expansion of the CSG to the age of 18 years, and in the removal of certain barriers to access (Proudlock, 2011). Thirdly, the basis of the framework is a social contract enshrined in the constitution and a range of policies and laws and is therefore immune to the worst of the shifting sands of political change. Finally, particular design features and choices that were made in implementation have maximised access to and impacts of cash transfers. Some of these issues will be returned to later.

The South African cash transfer system is categorical, that is, it targets people at an individual level who are members of particular vulnerable groups, such as the aged, the disabled, and children. No grant exists for adults between the ages of 18 and 60 who are able-bodied. While this policy design implies that able-bodied adults have no need for support as they are engaged in productive and income-generating activities, the government acknowledges the high unemployment rate which renders this assumption a fallacy. The state is attempting to respond to unemployment through the development of micro-enterprises and other labour-promoting schemes rather than via another social assistance instrument (Patel, 2015).

In the table below the various current cash transfers are outlined, including the monetary value of each grant, and how many people receive it each month. By far the most important grants in relation to their population reach are the CSG and the OAP, with the DG offering support to smaller numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Assistance</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Amount of Grant</th>
<th>Number of Beneficiaries as at March 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child Support Grant</td>
<td>Paid to the primary caregiver of a child/children up to 18 years old, subject to a means test.</td>
<td>R320</td>
<td>11,703,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Age Pension</td>
<td>Persons over the age of 60 years old.</td>
<td>R1,350</td>
<td>3,086,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability Grant</td>
<td>Persons medically-diagnosed as disabled over the age of 18 years old.</td>
<td>R1,350</td>
<td>1,112,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster-Care Grant</td>
<td>Foster families caring for children under 18 years old.</td>
<td>R830</td>
<td>499,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care Dependency Grants</td>
<td>Parents, primary caregivers, foster parents caring for a child with a disability requiring permanent care by another person.</td>
<td>R1,265</td>
<td>126,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants-in-Aid</td>
<td>A person with a physical or mental condition requiring regular attendance by another person.</td>
<td>R300</td>
<td>113,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Veterans’ Grant</td>
<td>Veterans of World War Two.</td>
<td>R1,285</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL NUMBER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>16,642,643</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Social Assistance: type, target group, amount paid and number of beneficiaries. (Source: South African Social Security Agency, 2015)
All grants in South Africa are disbursed through the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), a national centralised state institution, via cash at paypoints spread nationally, or deposited directly into bank accounts, depending on the preference of the recipient. The establishment of SASSA, innocuous and bureaucratic as it sounds, has been an important feature in achieving administrative efficiency, as SASSA replaced the numerous welfare systems (stratified as they were by province and by race) inherited from the apartheid past. Not only did these different systems engender great inefficiency, but also corruption, uneven and piecemeal implementation of legislation, political tensions and bureaucratic red tape (Lund, 2008). These problems have largely been eliminated through centralised, skilled, and dedicated management and an efficient and functional civil service of SASSA. Nonetheless, some delivery problems persist, and cases of corruption, maladministration, and political controversy do occur (Kaseke, 2010).

Although the take-up of the CSG is very good nationally (Gomersall, 2013), some barriers to accessing the grant remain. These include challenges in obtaining necessary documents such as identity documents, birth certificates, and affidavits; not enough money to fund transport to apply for grants or do follow-up visits; a cultural imperative and desire to keep new-born children and their primary caregivers inside for the first months of life; and illness and poverty which stop eligible primary caregivers from being physically able to apply for the grant (DSD et al., 2012; Goldblatt, 2005; Goldblatt, Rosa, & Hall, 2006; Gomersall, 2013).

As the system of distribution is now relatively efficient and no longer crippled by high levels of fraud, a substantial proportion of the budget of R120.9 million (approximately USD12 million) in 2014 earmarked for grants actually reaches the intended individuals, although administration costs are fairly high (Woolard et al., 2011). Funding for this state programme comes from the public purse, collected primarily as tax revenue, making it directly redistributive from those earning to those not earning. Of 11 countries with similar levels of development, South Africa has the highest fiscal spend on broad social protection measures (World Bank, 2014) which is a key expression of its redistributive and pro-poor policies.

Most cash transfers in South Africa are means-tested, but because the budget is affordable and there is a legislated right to social security, the means-test is set at a relatively generous amount. This translates to a basic social protection floor (ILO & UNDP, 2011), a step in the journey towards the progressive realisation of social protection rights that the Constitution legislates explicitly (Patel, 2015). A further important point is that the social and economic problems that have been identified in other developing countries arising from targeting only the very poor have largely been avoided in South Africa due to generous means-testing. This is a significant achievement as serious levels of
stigmatisation and social tension can arise from targeting within largely poor populations (Ellis 2012; MacAuslan and Riemenschneider 2011).

The CSG and what we already know

Approximately 17 years from its start, the success of the largest cash transfer, the CSG, as a support to children is undisputed. In this section I will describe the CSG and its important and innovative features, and outline the areas where consensus exists on its strengths and weaknesses.

The grant is disbursed to poor children under the age of 18 years via their primary care-givers, who have to be aged 16 years or above (Social Assistance Act No. 13 of 2004). As of January 2015, the monthly amount of the CSG is R320 per month, which is increased by usually one or two R10 increments over the financial year to try and keep pace with rising prices (although this is under official inflation figures).

The CSG uses the principle of ‘follow the child’ rather than a family-based transfer, which was unusual and progressive at the time of its design. This means the grant is disbursed to the child’s primary caregiver, whom ever that may be. This design was due to the history of expansive kinship structures and high levels of economic migration in South Africa, resulting in children often being cared for by adults other than their biological parents. Most adult caregivers (overwhelmingly women) registered to get the CSG are biologically related to the child (Vorster & de Waal, 2008), but quite a number are not the biological parents. Part of the innovation of this design feature lies in its gender-neutral language: by law, CSGs can go to male or female caregivers, biologically related or not. However, the gendered nature of care has meant that very few men (approximately four percent according to Vorster & de Waal, 2008) claim the grant for children in their care, and there is evidence that barriers and stigma exist for men trying to access the grant (Gomersall, 2013; Vorster & de Waal, 2008). Most grants go to the biological mother or grandmother of the child (Patel et al., 2012). Interestingly, it seems that the probability that a child will receive the CSG depends on the presence of the child’s biological mother (Case, Hosegood, & Lund, 2003), and that CSG children are more likely to live with their biological mothers only than with both parents or than just with their biological fathers (Delany, Ismail, Graham, & Ramkisson, 2008; Vorster & de Waal, 2008).

The grant is means-tested: only those children whose families earn less than R3,200 per month for single caregivers, or R6,400 for married couples, are eligible to apply (Black Sash, http://www.blacksash.org.za/index.php/your-rights/social-grants/item/you-and-your-rights-2). This income level is relatively generous, catching in its net not only the extremely poor, but also the relatively poor and the working poor.
It was conceived of as unconditional, but as Gazetted in November 2009, the CSG is now given only on the condition that the child beneficiary attends school (Government Gazette, 2009), an odd requirement in a country of almost universal primary school attendance. It has been argued that this was a political step to appease conservative factions in government who believe that caregivers need to ‘do something’ in order to get the grant, and has merely added administrative burdens to the already overstretched school system (Lund, 2011).

It is remarkable, considering the small monetary value of the CSG, that research on its impact has indicated substantial positive effects as a cash transfer (SAHRE and UNICEF 2014). In the sections below I will group the research results into national and household outcomes, outcomes for the child receiving the grant, and outcomes for the primary caregiver who collects and usually is the decision-maker for grant expenditure. I end with some brief comments on perverse effects of the CSG.

National and household effects

To start, studies have shown the positive national poverty reduction effects of social assistance in general and of the CSG in particular (Delany et al., 2008; Leibbrandt, Levinsohn, & McCrary, 2010; Møller, 2011; Dorrit Posel & Rogan, 2012; Van der Berg, 2011; Woolard et al., 2011). The Old Age Pension has been shown to have a significant positive impact on poverty in especially rural areas (Lund, 2004). As with the Old Age Pension, CSG income is pooled in households so economic benefits, while smaller for the intended recipient, accrue well beyond that individual to support whole households (Delany et al., 2008; Neves, Samson, van Niekerk, Hlatshwayo, & du Toit, 2009). This has led to improved food security at household level.

In addition, evidence from households where an Old Age Pension, Disability Grant, or a Child Support Grant is received, indicates that grants powerfully influence household formation and composition (Neves et al., 2009; Seekings, 2008a). The grants act as a ‘magnet’ to especially young single individuals in the context of the scarcity of waged work, and in some cases one or two grants can be the sole income stream for the survival of surprising numbers of household members, especially true in very poor rural areas (Dubbeld, 2013). While this is positive in relation to the food security of these households, it seriously dilutes the potential of the grant for the individual recipients.

Outcomes for children

In relation to outcomes for children, research indicates the CSG is spent primarily on food (Delany et al., 2008; Neves et al., 2009; Patel et al., 2012), and that this food is bought for the household as a whole. The CSG has led to improved food security and improved nutritional intake for the children getting the grant as well as the households in which they live (Agüero, Carter, & Woolard, 2006; Delany
et al., 2008; DSD et al., 2012; Woolard et al., 2011). As children’s cognitive development depends on receiving adequate nutrition in the first few years of life, the finding that nutritional improvements in childhood can be directly attributed to the grant offers vital evidence of the CSG’s role as an investment in human capabilities (DSD et al., 2012).

Secondly, in relation to children, the CSG is also spent on school-related costs (such as Early Childhood Development fees, transport to schools, and uniforms and books when these are not provided). Positive education outcomes are undisputed. It has contributed to more regular school attendance and is helping to keep children in school longer (Delany et al., 2008; DSD et al., 2012). Children who were enrolled in the CSG at birth managed to complete more grades of education than children enrolled in the programme later (DSD et al., 2012). A recent study by Eyal & Woolard (2014) has shown that the CSG has raised the enrolment of older teenagers in school by at least 10 percent, and in some groups the impact is even higher. The longer the CSG is received, the more positive the impact on school enrolment for older teens, showing its positive outcome for schooling (Eyal & Woolard, 2014). In addition, adolescents who live in a household where there is a CSG, even if it is not for them specifically, have reduced absences from school (DSD et al., 2012).

Thirdly, health benefits for individual recipient children have been found, with early enrolment in the CSG significantly increasing height for age in children (Woolard, Carter, & Agüero, 2005) and reducing the likelihood of illness (DSD et al., 2012). In addition, receipt of the CSG reduces risky sexual behaviours in adolescent girls, less so for boys, especially the practice of transactional sex and relationships with older men for economic survival purposes (Cluver et al., 2013; DSD et al., 2012).

Early enrolment in the CSG, which therefore increases the number of years of grant receipt, substantially strengthens health, education and nutritional outcomes for children (DSD et al., 2012).

Outcomes for caregiver

The CSG has been shown to have multiple positive effects on the caregiver who receives the grant on behalf of the child and her household. Firstly, the CSG seems to have productive economic effects beyond consumption. It has labour-promoting effects in that it can improve a woman’s capacity to go out and look for work, or can act as capital to kick-start income generation and it gives recipients flexibility in how they source their livelihoods (Gomersall, 2013; Neves et al., 2009; Woolard et al., 2011). In addition, savings and investment behaviour are elevated in general after receiving a social grant, and access to formal and informal credit is facilitated due to the regularity of payments (Neves et al., 2009; Plagerson & Ulriksen, 2013). Grants can also buy durable assets, hire productive equipment, and purchase agricultural inputs (Plagerson & Ulriksen, 2013). This resonates with
international literature which promotes cash transfers as a stimulus for economic activities (Barrientos & Sherlock, 2002; Grosh, Del Ninno, Tesliuc, & Ouerghi, 2008a; Schubert, 2005).

Secondly, research has shown the CSG is supporting women’s empowerment in relation to the control over resources and decision-making in the household (Patel et al. 2012; Patel and Hochfeld 2011; Adato and Bassett 2008). While the CSG is not a direct cause of the presence of positive empowerment indicators, the ability to control cash as well as the legitimacy to decide how to spend it seems to support and facilitate women’s empowerment in households and the community (Patel & Hochfeld, 2011; Patel et al., 2012).

Thirdly, the CSG has been shown to relieve women’s care burdens to some extent in households (Patel & Hochfeld, 2011; Patel et al., 2012). In addition, it seems to have had a direct positive effect on the quality of children’s care in the household, as recipient caregivers are spending more time than caregivers not getting a CSG in activities such as doing homework with children, playing with and reading to them, watching television together, and walking them to school (Patel et al., 2012; Patel, Knijn, & van Wel, 2015). This positive impact of care is welcome, but as the CSG does not challenge the gendered nature of care and therefore reinforces women’s care responsibilities (Molyneux, 2006; Patel & Hochfeld, 2011), some have cautioned that getting a CSG can effectively increase care burdens on vulnerable women, especially as we know grant recipient households attract new and often vulnerable members (Neves et al., 2009; Seekings, 2008a).

The reduction in private remittances in CSG households (Patel et al., 2012) appears to be due to the substantial financial pressure under which remitting individuals live, meaning they see the CSG as a chance for them to reduce or stop income assistance to receiving households. While this is a positive relief of pressure to the remitting individuals, it is a negative outcome for CSG households as just as they gain one source of income, they lose another (Jensen, 2003; M. J. Williams, 2007).

Perverse incentives

A final area worth mentioning is a body of research studying the possible perverse incentives of the CSG. Dependency and pro-natal concerns are particularly strong themes in the media, in public discourse, in communities, as well as amongst government officials (Hassim, 2006a). However, research concludes that the rate of teenage pregnancies has been unaffected by the introduction of the grant (Makiwane, 2010), that there is no evidence of a dependency culture emerging amongst grant recipients, and that any potential disincentives are counterbalanced by stronger positive effects (Steele, 2006; Surender, Noble, Wright, & Ntshongwana, 2010; M. J. Williams, 2007).
Summary

In summary, the evidence overwhelmingly shows the manifold positive developmental impacts of the CSG, which multiplies its benefits in relation to alleviating poverty and vulnerability. These impacts are both material and non-material. It promotes human capital development, has some positive gender effects, and also contributes to reducing the historical legacy of inequality in relation to race, gender and class.

This study contributes to the evidence on material and especially non-material effects of the grant by offering a micro view of grant recipients, which is missing from most other research in this field. In this work I build a story of the life of a few women, and thus the life of the grant rather than narrowly just considering the direct effects of the CSG. What I offer here is a view of a holistic life at a micro-level, which is then scrutinised for how the CSG does or does not insert itself into this portrait. This approach is different in that I consciously combine universality and singularity (Miszta, 2013), that is, I begin with an assumption of the universalism of the value of dignity and social justice, but continue to hold the view that the individual human being is the unit where these ethics do or do not play out. In other words, my interest is in the inherent and intrinsic worth of all humans and how this interacts with the CSG, not the CSG as an instrument of technology. Deverux and McGregor (2014, p. 299) assert: “The full significance of why the experience of poverty matters is not yet fully taken into account”; I am hoping that this study makes a contribution to further understanding the meaning of poverty.

In addition, the notion of care and its importance in the lives of the women receiving the grant is addressed in the current body of research, but these studies frequently focus on care activities, such as reproductive labour, while the ethic and moral life of care is mostly neglected.

With these debates in mind, and in light of the described background, I now briefly explain the study’s aims and purpose, conceptual framework, and research design and limitations.

Aims and objectives

The overall aim of this research is to understand more about the social, care, and gendered impacts of the Child Support Grant (CSG) in poor households in Johannesburg, in order to assess the social justice outcomes of this state intervention. I wished to uncover the reality for women living in poverty who care for children: how each woman understands her most pressing needs, what care responsibilities are hers in the household, what internal and external resources she uses to survive and to manage her life, the dynamics of the intra-household relationships, and the role of the CSG in mediating, supporting, or undermining these issues.
In addition, I wanted to explore a woman’s agency, defined as her ability to engage with the world in order to improve her life, and how this enables her to negotiate, make choices, and construct a set of capabilities. Theoretically, I sought to consider the balance of redistribution and recognition offered by the CSG, as well as whether receiving the CSG enhances freedom and dignity. Overall, I use a feminist narrative analysis to ask whether women are able to live a life they value and hope for.

The remainder of this chapter briefly addresses the theoretical and research design approaches I have chosen, the study limitations, and an overview of the thesis structure.

**Conceptual framework**

In this research I will use Nancy Fraser’s work (1989, 2003, 2009, 2013b) on social justice to frame my thinking about the CSG and its social effects. Overall Fraser’s work is not merely a social theory of need, but unpacks how, at the site of policy, in the design of state programming, and in the functioning of public discourse, the contestation of meanings is also the struggle for power. She asserts that social justice can only be attained when all people have ‘participatory parity’, by this she means that “social arrangements are just if, and only if, they actually institutionalise the possibility for people to participate on a par with one another in all aspects of social life” (Fraser in Bozalek, 2012, p. 147). The three dimensions that have to be remedied in transformatory ways to reach parity are maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation. This trivalent framework for social justice is explained below.

I connect Fraser’s work to another body of useful theory which fits into a social justice framework, capability theory, specifically the work of Sen (1999, 2009) and Nussbaum (2000, 2011). Capabilities frame the issue of freedom and choice as critical to justice outcomes, and give important precision and applicability to the language of rights. In addition, I apply these theoretical approaches to the notion of transformatory social protection, advanced by especially Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2008). These theories assist us to inquire not just what is right, but why we think this, and what ideological framework binds us to our viewpoints. It situates my study as politically engaged to progressive feminist and equality ideals.

Below I lay out how I operationalise these theoretical notions to link social protection to social justice for the purposes of analysis.

Fraser (2009) considers redistribution injustice as socio-economic forms of inequality. She defines this as primarily economic exploitation, deprivation, and economic marginalisation. As I am taking a broad view of resources as critical to socio-economic justice, by redistribution I refer to the distribution of material and non-material resources, such as cash, in-kind contributions, basic service access such as housing, water, electricity, child-care and psychosocial support, access to employment, safety and
security, and access to training and skills development opportunities. In this study, I ask what are the redistributive effects of cash (income protection) and service access? And what are their limits?

Recognition justice is related to parity of social status and social positioning (Fraser, 2009). It is less about identity politics and more about how one is treated and perceived in the social context of everyday life, and is located in “social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication” (Fraser, 2009, p. 71). I wish to ask how the CSG mediates women’s status and positioning in society. That is, does the CSG influence how society perceives these women, and how they view themselves?

The third arm of Fraser’s trivalent system of social justice is representation. Representation is the level of in/visibility individuals have in relation to the nation state as well as in broader global context. It can also be understood as how and under what circumstances women claim rights they are entitled to, and in this study, is important in relation to CSG and other rights that women claim for themselves.

The capability approach concentrates on the quality of life that individuals are actually able to achieve. Capabilities refer to the set of valuable functionings (states of ‘being and doing’) that a person has access to; in other words, the effective freedom of a person to choose the kind of life they have reason to value (Sen, 2009). The notion of capabilities has been made concrete especially by Nussbaum (2011), and she advances a specific set of capabilities that are important for social justice. Nussbaum’s list is as follows: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation (both towards other humans and being treated with dignity); other species; play; control over one’s environment (both political and material environments). While I don’t use this set in a rigid way, I do find that it assists in evaluating the women’s lives in relation to key shortfalls in certain dimensions, and so do at times ask what role the CSG plays in enabling specific capabilities and what are its limitations.

One of the key differences between the work of Sen and of Nussbaum, and their specific contributions, is the emphasis that Sen puts on freedom as critical to justice, as opposed to the emphasis that Nussbaum places on dignity. In this study I ask questions about how the CSG does or does not contribute to women’s freedom and dignity. Further, I use the notion of ‘hope’ as a capability, following from Duflo’s (2012) work on paternalism and freedom, as I ask how the CSG facilitates or limits women’s hope for the future.

Finally, the notion of agency cuts across the study as a whole. I understand agency as an individual’s ability to engage with the world in order to improve her life. In the study, I ask how women negotiate resources to ensure achievements, notions drawn from Kabeer’s (1999) work on empowerment and concepts that link directly back to functionings and capabilities. I am interested in finding out what
they are able to do to improve their status and positioning in society, and whether the CSG facilitates this process or not.

Conceptually, I investigate the interaction between intrapersonal, interpersonal and structural factors and how these impact on women’s functioning, autonomy, dignity and freedom.

Research design

As indicated, this research aimed to explore social justice by engaging deeply with the everyday intricacies of social relations, micro-experiences, stories and meanings of women receiving the CSG. My ontological position, in concert with theorists such as Harding (1993), Alcoff and Potter (1993), and Chase (2011), is that social reality is fundamentally constructed by people’s views, understandings, interpretations, expectations and social relations. In addition, I align myself with a critical feminist research tradition which is intended to unsettle the social hierarchies of gender and other inequalities in both the production of knowledge and in the lived experience of everyday life (Harding, 1993; Hesse-Biber & Leckenby, 2004; Naples, 2003).

This positioning required a deep contextual understanding of women’s lives, and of feminist research ethics that could respect women’s personal life meanings as legitimate, authentic, and belonging to themselves. A qualitative research design based on feminist narrative inquiry (Kohler Riessman, 2008; Naples, 2003) flows logically from these demands.

Feminist narrative research is intended here to mean a broad focus on the generation of rich data thickly described, using stories to paint a picture of the topic of research, with the express intention of engaging with social hierarchies and inequalities based on gender and other social cleavages (Chase, 2011; Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Kohler Riessman, 2008; Naples, 2003). This study resonates with some key features of narrative inquiry, such as the co-creation of stories, where the researcher and participant both influence the production of knowledge through the research process (Chase, 2008; Kohler Riessman, 2008). This sharing of meaning-making is also a way to respect research participants, and flows directly from feminist research ethics (Naples, 2003). A third aspect of narrative inquiry important here was the biographical nature of the research (Merrill & West, 2009). Two further features of this research prominent in both narrative and feminist approaches are the functioning of the research as a form of ‘giving testimony’ (Naples, 2003), and the quest for social justice via the research process (Chase, 2008).

This research design dovetails well with the conceptual framework of social justice, freedom, and dignity, and therefore these were not just research aims but also practice ethics with which I chose to engage in the research process.
Data was generated primarily via interviews, observation, and notes in a field journal. Some participatory methods (such as photovoice and lifeline drawings) were also conducted. Research participants consisted of six women with whom I formed relationships over the period of the study. As narrative is a form of meaning-making of past experiences (Chase, 2008), the research design allowed a slow and progressive building of the women’s stories over a period of time. I was led by them in exploring their worlds in an ongoing and dynamic way, offering a deep but necessarily partial view of their worlds. I interviewed each woman multiple times to form a life-wide narrative of their lives, with a focus on their receipt of one or more CSGs for children in their care. In addition, I interviewed a number of household members, including partners, parents, and children of the women.

My analysis was narrative in that I attempted to keep each story ‘intact’ by theorising from the case rather than from component themes across cases. My focus, therefore, was vertical, building meaning from within each case, rather than horizontal, building thematic meaning across cases. Consequently, of the four data chapters, three act like mini-case studies, and take the narrative of three individual women who receive CSGs and paint a picture of their lives at a micro-level. The fourth shifts to a more horizontal view, exploring one particular issue that was germane to almost all of the research participant narratives.

The research took place in an urban setting, with the participants living in Sophiatown, Westbury, and Claremont, Johannesburg.

Limitations

All studies of this nature, namely, qualitative and narrative in approach, can explore certain issues and not others. There were areas of these six women’s lives to which I was not privy, and I also could not engage with a large range of wider issues that they did not or could not reflect on.

Further, these women had experiences that were typical of South African women living in poverty, such as financial stress, the burden of caring responsibilities, and experiences of violence. However, they also were atypical in some senses, such as their particular household configurations, their urban positioning, their individual health statuses, or their personal concerns. Therefore these findings are not generalisable or representative of the population of CSG recipients in South Africa, even if there are some similarities and themes that are suggestive of collective issues and national concerns.

In addition, the women interviewed narrated their stories as they wished to share them; no assumptions of perfect accuracy or ‘truth’ is claimed in this study (see chapter 3), and is, moreover, not desirable using this research approach.
Feminist research has as its fundamental purpose facilitating changes to gender and other inequality, and this research is no different. The extent to which this has been achieved is debatable, and in particular no major change has occurred for these particular women in the study. This is a limitation.

Finally, I chose to focus on women’s perspectives, a legitimate choice, but it doesn’t therefore say anything about officials, politicians’ or the public’s views, nor is it a policy analysis. The data generated limits the discussion to a certain standpoint and a certain approach.

Overview of structure

Following this introduction, I outline the conceptual framework that I use in order to engage with and interpret the findings from the empirical data. Chapter 2 focuses on Fraser’s work on both needs interpretation as well as her trivalent model of social justice. It also outlines the capability theory and its areas of most use for this study.

Chapter 3 is a detailed explanation of the feminist narrative research design and methodology I used in this study, with a particular focus on the ethics I utilised and the trustworthiness of the research findings.

Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are data chapters that are written as mini-case studies. They give an in-depth glimpse into the lives of three women who receive a CSG, and explore whether and how the grant plays a role in their survival. The chapters present some of the key challenges women face in managing and constructing lives they have reason to value. A range of issues is raised and explored to show the detailed consequences of vulnerability in an unsupportive context. Chapter 7 is the final data chapter, and focuses specifically on one experience that spans the participants’ lives: violence against women. I use this opportunity to explore the detailed intrapersonal, interpersonal and social consequences of violence in these women’s stories.

My conclusions come in chapter 8, which outlines the contributions of this research in relation to knowledge building, theory, and method. I end this chapter with some policy recommendations that could possibly help guide intervention in lives such as those lived by my participants, and change them for the better.
Chapter 2

Please, sir, may I have some more? Social justice and the politics of redistribution

Introduction

How can we understand welfare theoretically? At its heart, welfare is a system of redistribution. It is based on a fundamental premise that nation states have a communal obligation to individuals, and at an economic level this entails the state distributing resources collected from the excess of the wealthy (whether individuals or institutions) amongst those who have unmet basic needs (whether individuals or groups). A cash transfer such as the CSG is a good illustration of this, as it is funded by taxpayers and is given to those well below the income tax bracket.

There are many different ways of approaching this basic idea of redistribution through the state. I could outline ‘models’ of welfare, following theorists such as Esping-Andersen (1990), and list the different institutional frameworks that are used to categorise welfare into universal, institutional, residual, developmental, or other kinds of welfare models. The notion of South Africa as a developmental state was introduced in chapter 1, and will be returned to later in this thesis. While important especially for planning and service purposes, using only a ‘model’ approach in understanding welfare means we largely miss why or how the decisions were made to form the kind of system that exists in different nation states. Alternatively, I could compare South Africa’s welfare policies and programmes with those in other parts of the world, but, again, this cannot properly explain the ideas that support or contest the current welfare situation in South Africa.

Rather, in this chapter, I want to ask the social justice question of who is entitled to what, under what kind of conditions, and why? In order to answer these questions and unpack the political nature of welfare, a critical conceptual framework is necessary. In engaging, in the first instance, with the complex and political determination of need, by necessity we enter into a discussion of power. This changes the focus from institutions and policy, to politics and contested discourses. It politicises the notion of redistribution and allows us to see whose interests are served, and how those who are marginal are intentionally and unintentionally kept marginal, through the seemingly uncomplicated idea of who should get what. Problematising entitlements to public resources politicises distributional
and other policies at the level of the state; similarly problematising the intra-household determination of needs politicises the private space of the home. Engaging with who feels entitled to what and how at the household level deepens our understanding of the micro-processes of distribution and status. Both macro and micro levels of analysis, as well as the tension between them, are important; this research attempts to understand both. Therefore, in this chapter I shall describe the particular social justice lens I have chosen to use.

The next issue for discussion is the idea of ‘needs’. The political process of redistribution is key to the question: how is the notion of ‘needs’ interpreted, and thus met? Nancy Fraser’s theory of needs interpretation allows us to see beneath the surface of a ‘thin’ theory of need, and rather develop a ‘thicker’ more politically sensitive understanding of need.

The above sets the stage for then introducing the ideas of redistribution, recognition, and representation, as three key features of social justice. I will draw from Fraser’s integrated theory of justice and outline how she approaches the question of redistribution. This is intimately linked with her idea of recognition, and the balance between the two allows us to see beyond the economic to understand welfare as a project of social justice in the first instance (Hassim, 2008b). I will discuss how this framework can be used for analytical purposes.

As I combine Fraser’s trivalent theory of justice with the capabilities approach in this study, the next section deals with the conception of capabilities and how this is a productive set of ideas to use in the process of this research. The notion of freedom, agency and dignity are key to my study, and are well developed from a capability perspective.

A final theoretical construct of importance here is the idea of the ethics of care, which is a set of analyses which engage with care as a political and private set of processes, behaviours, needs and ethics. This guides issues related to intrahousehold processes, as well as how these connect with the larger social and political environment.

The chapter closes with a discussion on Fraser’s strategies to overcome injustice: she differentiates between affirmative strategies, which respond to injustice by generating identity recognition or resources but without shifting any structural positioning, and transformative strategies, which not only ‘patch’ the injustice, but also change the structural relations of power in society towards more egalitarianism. This conceptual distinction is helpful in evaluating the nature of the CSG as a strategy to ameliorate poverty and inequality. It is also central to a recent area of theorising known as transformative social protection, which has great promise for progressive welfare design and analysis.
Normative social justice

A social justice perspective is grounded in humanism and embraces the potential of people as agents (Merrill & West, 2009). The focus of social justice is how humans, individually and collectively, are able to exercise their agency within practical and contextual constraints as well as to question and challenge these constraints. Economic deprivation is usually merely the top layer of social injustice, and implies deep levels of inequality and deprivation that reach well into the intricacies of people’s lives. A social justice approach opens the way to understanding welfare “as an issue of justice in the first instance, rather than purely or primarily as a mechanism for addressing the social needs of the poor” (Hassim, 2008b, p. 107). I take the view that the value of welfare is, therefore, at its heart, an ethical project of justice (Hassim, 2008b; Ife, 1999). I use the notion of social justice not in an abstract, philosophical sense, but as an approach that aims to give voice to how people are and are not able to act out their life choices.

In choosing this conceptual pathway, I am aligning myself with normative social justice theorists, particularly those drawing from a Rawlsian tradition. At its simplest, Rawls’ theory of justice (1999) views justice as fairness, an idea that has profoundly influenced both the globally recognised development economist Amartya Sen (1999, 2009) and in turn the capability theorist Martha Nussbaum (2000, 2003, 2011), as well as the highly regarded feminist theorist Nancy Fraser (1989, 1997, 2003, 2007, 2009). All three are normative theorists, concerned with the justice of people’s actual lives. They start with the ethical question of what kind of societies we want, but they are not interested in the philosophical development of ‘ideal’ societies which are divorced from the realities of power that structures our world. This is where they depart from theories which Sen (2009) calls transcendental institutionalism, or the theoretical construction of a ‘perfectly just’ world. Rather, they engage with social realities, relative justice and injustice, and they incorporate their knowledge of power imbalances and contestation into how they grapple with mapping preferred social processes.

This means their work is explicitly emancipatory, with a focus on how to improve the everyday realities of the many people currently living in unjust circumstances. They are particularly (but not only) concerned with women’s unequal status and how this results in injustice. Below, I will outline the notion of needs interpretation, which Fraser uses to unpack the political and sometimes oppressive nature of deciding on public needs and benefits.
The politics of needs interpretation

The enquiry: ‘Who has the most pressing needs?’ is commonly considered the critical question in the process of deciding to whom welfare distribution will be directed. But attempting to answer this question raises fundamental ideological concerns, which are generally unacknowledged within political systems. The less homogenous a society, the more contested the answer to this question is likely to be. Nancy Fraser’s work exposes how welfare practices are under-laid by discursive ideological assumptions and norms; consequently, welfare programmes should be seen as “institutionalised patterns of interpretation”, or as actions that reflect unspecified but powerful social norms (Fraser, 1989, p. 146), rather than technical and neutral institutions. Her politicisation of welfare complements and builds on other feminist work on welfare (G. Lewis, 2000; Sainsbury, 1994).

Dominant groups have often unacknowledged social assumptions about how the world ‘does’ and ‘ought to’ operate and why and how some people are in need; tracing the consequences of these assumptions allows us to see that welfare outcomes are ‘path dependent’ and thus almost pre-determined. For example, neo-liberal, market-driven welfare policies are based on the assumption that a free market economy gives everyone the opportunity to compete fairly for employment. Therefore, unemployment is assumed to be a result of individual deficiencies and does not constitute a need that should be legitimately addressed by the state. The principle of self-reliance, used in neo-liberal contexts, means that only in very special circumstances, such as when an individual is barred from participating fully in the labour market by age (too old or too young to work) or pathology (disability or illness), would a neo-liberal state perceive of any obligation to assist individuals. The basic assumption that men and women of working age should be self-sufficient, and therefore have no needs, results in negative perceptions of those who make claims on the state as undeserving and deficient. These perceptions are expressed both in the institutional framework of welfare (who can claim for what) as well as public discourses on welfare recipients (seen as ‘lazy’ and ‘drains’ on the state).

The above is an example of what Fraser (1989) calls a ‘thin’ theory of need, where decisions about welfare policies are seen as ‘self-evident’ because critical political questions remain unacknowledged. ‘Thin’ theories of need make assumptions such as the following (Fraser, 1989, p. 164): Firstly, they assume that the interpretation of needs is a simple and unproblematic process. Secondly, they assume that it does not matter who interprets needs and for whose interests those needs are constructed. Thirdly, they assume that the public discourse regarding need interpretation is adequate and fair. And finally, they assume that the logic of institutions and social processes are neutral and apolitical. Fraser contests these assumptions strongly in her work, demonstrating the ideological nature of the
interpretation of needs, and consequently of the programme decisions and implementation processes that are put in place in response to these needs. Engaging with the politics of needs interpretation and acknowledging that no programme development is ideologically neutral leads to a ‘thick’ theory of need.

Two institutions play a major role in the depoliticisation of needs. Firstly, when it is assumed that it is the domestic institution of the family that should be meeting social needs, then needs have been privatised/familialised and removed from the domain of public responsibility. The second institution is the official economic capitalist system via the market: if needs are seen as “impersonal market imperatives, or as ‘private’ ownership prerogatives, or as technical problems for managers and planners” (Fraser, 1989, p. 168) then they are again depoliticised. These institutions, the family and the market, are ‘naturalised’, that is, their structure, form and functions remain largely unquestioned. Therefore they entrench specific interpretations of needs that follow the logic of, respectively, normative domesticity, such as the primacy of male household headship, and the official capitalist economy, such as that the notion of private land ownership is unassailable. Further, both domestic and official capitalist economies necessarily reproduce relations of dominance and subordination. “[T]he specific interpretations they naturalise usually tend, on the whole, to advantage dominant groups and individuals and to disadvantage their subordinates” (Fraser, 1989, p. 168), primarily gender subordination in the family, and class (but also race and gender) subordination in the economy. As an illustration, childcare has been largely understood as entirely domestic (and thus a mother’s responsibility) and not economic, thus it becomes invisible in the economic sphere. As ‘motherhood’ is irrelevant to the economy when employing women workers, arrangements for care of her children is a ‘private’ problem and state provision of day-care services is not seen as a public good. The result of these discourses of depoliticisation is the continuation of class, gender and race inequalities, as they are seen as individualised, private issues, divorced from the social, political, and economic space.

Feminist analysis from the USA, a largely neo-liberal economy, illustrates this by exposing the conservative and pathologising notions of those who are in need of welfare assistance (Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Lens, 2002). Welfare needs and debates on the ‘dependency’ of recipients are constructed in racist and sexist ways which ensure that the welfare needs of women, particularly lone parents, are individualised and pathologised (Asen, 1996; Fraser, 1987; Lowe, 2008), and the care services women provide remain not only unpaid, but largely invisible (Christopher, 2004; Folbre, 1994, 2008; Lowe, 2008; Shakespeare, 2000).

Paying attention to needs interpretation is particularly useful for this research in three areas. Firstly, it helps to analyse the politics behind the prevalent discourse of welfare dependency. Secondly, it
opens the space to understand needs talk as a contested space. And finally, it allows us to understand the politics behind needs as a tussle over resources. Below these three points are expanded.

The global primacy of neo-liberal values and the rise of neo-conservative politics, even in states where policies are a mix of progressive and more conservative such as Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa, results in a widespread preponderance of concern about the dangers of ‘dependency’ on welfare, perceived as an unhealthy reliance on welfare for long periods of time which will inevitably lead to a ‘lack of initiative’, ‘laziness’ and a ‘disinterest’ in graduating from state assistance. In these contexts, welfare is seen as ‘emergency’ assistance and therefore as short-term, sufficient to meet the need of recipients to ‘get back on their feet’ (in other words, find employment). Welfare needs are interpreted in very narrow terms, focusing on adult employment and ignoring the structural constraints such as employment patterns, employment gate-keeping, and gender differentiated responsibilities that make this seemingly ‘simple’ process almost unattainable. The fear of welfare dependency is used to argue for the pulling back or rationalisation of welfare services in industrialised nations as well as the need to limit welfare reach in developing nations (Christopher, 2004; Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Lens, 2002; Lowe, 2008; Seccombe, James, & Battle Walters, 1998).

A particularly interesting response to the ‘dependency debate’ has been feminist theorists who have interrogated the concept of ‘dependency’. They argue that all humans are inter-dependent. “To offer care, and receive it, is part of what makes us human” (Sweetman, 2011, p. 171). None of us exists entirely independently from others, although this reliance on other people is particularly acute at certain stages of our lives (such as when very young, when ill, and when much older) (Sevenhuijsen, 1998). They also argue that full-time employment implies a dependency on others to perform care work on one’s behalf: child-care, care of ill or older relatives, and the domestic support such as laundry and cooking for those working. These are all tasks that are primarily done by women, and this ushers in a strong gender bias when the notion of ‘independence’ is assumed of employed individuals (Tronto, 1993), and employment is seen as the only important need of recipients of welfare. Further, the tools of independence (usually, from the perspective of the state, employment) are very often structurally determined and the availability of decent jobs is completely independent of the desire and the initiative to work of welfare recipients (Sevenhuijsen, 2003a). This has consequences in South Africa that are particularly strong in terms of race and class as those who were disadvantaged in the past in relation to education, skills development, and employment experience will continue to be structurally less able to access employment.

While the issue of welfare dependency is inherently gendered, this aspect is often disguised. Welfare ‘entitlements’ are often seen to be rather an opportunity to shape, indeed, ‘reform’, recipients’
behaviour to conform to dominant understandings of what is acceptable and ‘deserving’ (Albelda, 2001; Wilcox, Robbennolt, O’Keefe & Pynchon, 1996; Gordon, 1994). There is clear international growth in conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and other behavioural requirements for receiving welfare benefits. While in some nations the CCT model has been judged as successful (for example, Oportunidades in Mexico, Adato et al, 2000), conditional requirements can be extremely punitive and unrealistic (such as the welfare-to-work model in the TANF programme in the USA). Understanding concerns over welfare dependency as politically determined is helpful in a context like South Africa which has a complex mix of progressive and conservative ideas, and an economy that is unable to offer employment to a vast swathe of working age adults.

A second area of illumination which is facilitated by the politicisation of needs interpretation, is that a ‘thick’ theory of needs permits us to understand needs talk as a site of struggle. Where powerful groups with command over substantial resources (including discursive resources) hold tightly to ‘thin’ theories of needs and insist that programme decisions are leeched of ideology, needs interpretation is intended to exclude groups on the margin. At the same time, however, subordinate or oppositional groups will interpret needs in ways that are intended to challenge dominant interpretations. In both cases, these “are acts and interventions” (Fraser, 1989, p. 166), strategies to maximise gain and eliminate counter-arguments, and thus highly charged manoeuvres in a struggle for power in a stratified and plural society. Useful for this research is Fraser’s identification of ‘oppositional’ forms of needs talk, which arise when needs are politicised ‘from below’:

Here, needs become politicised when, for example, women, workers, and/or peoples of colour come to contest the subordinate identities and roles, the traditional, reified, and disadvantageous need interpretations previously assigned to and/or embraced by them. By insisting on speaking publicly of heretofore de-politicized needs, by claiming for these needs the status of legitimate political issues, such persons...do several things... First, they contest the established boundaries separating ‘politics’ from ‘economics’ and ‘domestics’. Second, they offer alternative interpretations of their needs... Third, they create new discourse publics from which they try to disseminate their interpretations of their needs... Finally, they challenge, modify, and/or displace hegemonic elements of the means of interpretation and communication; they invent new forms of discourse for interpreting their needs. (Fraser, 1989, p. 171).

This opens her theory of needs interpretation from talk only of the tools of oppression, to show how these very same processes can be utilised to contest and even change an unequal status quo.
Evaluating these subtle but powerful processes of politicisation from below offers me an additional purchase on the impact of the CSG in South Africa.

Finally, a thick theory of needs highlights the politics behind the battle over resources. Recognition theorists tend to downplay the struggle over resources as having been reshaped in post-socialist, and to some extent post-welfare societies, as recognition struggles: Honneth (2003b, p. 151) claims that the “concept of redistribution struggles must be reconstructed [in ways that are] not tailored to the level of state redistributional measures, but rather take into account the non-state spaces where the initial efforts to delegitimize the prevailing distribution order are undertaken”. However, this reflects his focus on industrialised nations: I maintain that severe limits on access to resources remains a core area of state injustice to those without political or economic power in the developing world. Even Fraser, who is well aware that conflict over resources is far from won for the poor and marginal, I believe, does not sufficiently engage with the ‘traditional’ struggle between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. However, the thick theory of need she expounds allows us to consider state responsibilities to the population in relation to access to resources, and to consider the overt and covert means the population uses to influence resource allocation in a context where resources are severely limited.

In this section I have shown that understanding redistribution is deeply dependent on how needs are interpreted. Dominant ideas, largely, in the current context, conservative-leaning and sympathetic to neo-liberal values, present needs as uncomplicated and depoliticised. In particular, the family and the market are co-opted to steer welfare away from questions of structural inequality and discrimination and towards concerns about those who make claims on the state as ‘lazy’ and ‘dependent’. But needs are contested, and the battle over the interpretation of needs mirrors the tussle over resources that those in dominant positions generally have far more chance of winning than those who are marginal. Overall, therefore, Fraser’s ‘thick’ theory of needs gives us purchase on the politics of needs interpretation and allows us to unpack the assumptions behind welfare programme decisions. While this section has argued for recognition of ideological and political influences on the interpretation of needs, I now turn to a consideration of redistribution, recognition, and representation in order to construct a notion that is a thick, politically engaged means to social justice.

Fraser’s trivalent theory of social justice: the redistribution, recognition, representation nexus

Nancy Fraser’s integrated theory of justice (1989, 1997, 2003, 2009) spells out the relationship between redistribution, recognition and representation in a synergistic and compelling way. Fraser’s theory has been described as a normative theory that derives from both a sociological framework and
socio-historical analysis (Lovell, 2007a), meaning she does not separate “normative claims and their assessment... from well-founded analysis of the socio-historical contexts in which these claims have arisen” (Lovell, 2007a, p. 2). The central threads of emancipation, normativity and agency that arise in Fraser’s theory are what attract me to her work. These areas resonate strongly with my own values of social care and feminism, and lend great usefulness of her ideas to the context of South Africa, considering the country’s dire need for care and freedom in the social and economic (as opposed to the political) realm.

For Fraser, formal notions of equality are insufficient; she places her emphasis rather on substantive equality, and does this via her principle of participatory parity, the cornerstone of her theory of social justice (1997, 2003). According to this principle “justice requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life” (Fraser, 2007, p. 20), and she goes on to develop criteria for evaluating whether institutional arrangements allow people to operate as partners in social interaction. Participatory parity, therefore, is both a substantive principle of justice as well as a procedural standard that allows us to assess the legitimacy of norms; or, put differently, it allows us to examine “who is included and who excluded from the circle of those entitled to make justice claims on one another, and [to consider] the meta-question of the procedures which structure such public processes of frame setting and misframing” (Pia Lara & Fine, 2007, p. 44). Further details of her theory are outlined below.

**Redistribution**

That economic inequality is unjust is not a new insight. This basic concern fuelled Karl Marx’s theories of class, and has long preoccupied social justice philosophers, distribution theorists, and development economists. For Fraser, maldistribution is when economic structures ensure people do not have the resources to participate as peers; they are suffering, therefore, from distributive injustice via the class structure of society. Three primary types of maldistribution are: exploitation (others appropriating and benefiting from the fruits of one’s labour), economic marginalisation (when one is limited to undesirable or poorly paid work, or denied access to income), and deprivation (denial of an adequate material standard of living) (Fraser, 1997). Any one or a combination of these results in not only unbalanced resource allocation, but the perpetuation of economic injustice due to an imbalance of power.

However, the injustice of economic inequality has not always been the motivation for the development of welfare programmes. The ‘charity’ approach that characterised early European attempts at welfare was based more on the moral obligations of compassion of the monied classes than on any sense that the inequality between rich and poor is wrong. Charity implies a moral
conscience, but does not aspire to genuinely redistribute wealth. Similarly, in countries with a fierce adherence to contemporary conservative notions of self-reliance, there is acknowledgement that there will always be members of society that need to be ‘rescued’ by the state. Redistribution is understood in exceedingly narrow, temporary and conservative ways.

Welfare based on democratic principles of justice, however, is more a matter of the principle of the rich “sharing with their fellow citizens the same set of entitlements and rights... This implies a linkage between citizenship and welfare rights [and]... suggests that welfare should be regarded as a universal entitlement rather than a safety net to relieve the worst of the poverty” (Phillips, 1999, p. 80). This shifts the notion of welfare from the realm of charity, benevolence, or moral conscience, to the realm of rights and entitlements, and therefore to a far more balanced distribution of power.

**Recognition**

While distributive justice is putatively about income support of some form (that is, redistribution),

a gentle scratching of the surface often reveals deeply rooted assumptions about some people counting more than others: a disdain for the poor as activated by an unthinking politics of envy, or exaggerated respect for the rich and successful, whose achievements in the sphere of money-making are somehow thought to give them a superior [status] (Phillips, 1999, p. 79).

In other words, injustice is not only about not having enough resources to meet one’s needs, it is also about disrespect and a lack of worthiness, what Fraser terms misrecognition. Justice, therefore, cannot be narrowly defined along economic lines.

The shift in the politics of justice where the pendulum of critical political opinion swung sharply from its socialist peak and moved into a focus on identity and recognition is known as the ‘cultural turn’. This bloom in theory revealed that,

a great many contemporary social movements can only be properly understood from a normative point of view if their motivating demands are interpreted along the lines of a ‘politics of identity’ – a demand for the cultural recognition of their collective identity. The more recent emancipatory movements – as represented by feminism, ethnic minorities, gay and lesbian subcultures – no longer struggle mainly for economic equality or material redistribution, but for respect for the characteristics by which they see themselves culturally bound together (Honneth, 2003b, p. 111).

Recognition theorists such as Axel Honneth (1995, 2003b), Charles Taylor (1994), Will Kymlicka (1995), and others have made vital contributions to our understanding of justice in that they explain the social,
community and individual consequences of economic inequality, and allow other forms of inequality (based on identity, such as sexual identity or an ethnic minority) to be considered as important as the economic in striving for justice. However, they have been criticised for a reification of culture and identity and for losing sight of the extremely harsh realities of a shortage of resources (Benhabib, 1999; Fraser, 2003; Rorty, 1994).

The power of recognition theory is, to my mind, most acute when combined with redistribution theory, a nexus Fraser has proposed in great detail in the body of her work, which I shall use as a framework for understanding the effects of the CSG in households.

Fraser (2007, p. 20) calls “institutionalised hierarchies of cultural value”, which deny people full participation, ‘misrecognition’. The problem is one of differentiated status, of a lack of cultural respect, and therefore limited or no recognition in society. Fraser identifies three key types of misrecognition as cultural domination (subjection to alien standards of judgement), non-recognition (cultural invisibility), and disrespect (routine subjection to negative stereotypes) (Fraser, 1997). Fraser is careful to differentiate her particular use of recognition, what she calls status recognition, from ‘identity’ recognition which is more about the respect for identity differences rather than striving for equality of status.

It is important that she emphasises that neither misrecognition nor maldistribution exist discretely; they are intimately connected in causal and consequential ways, and neither one on its own can adequately explain social injustice because the injustice is embedded in the economic and cultural spheres simultaneously. Race and gender are good illustrations of this as the roots of the inequality draw partly from economic arrangements and partly from cultural assumptions and norms. However, misrecognition and maldistribution can’t be considered as one and the same thing: Fraser identifies that, on the one hand, the politics of redistribution calls for the flattening out of economic differences by abolishing economic arrangements that keep groups apart and unequal; the politics of recognition, on the other hand, calls for the recognition of specificity and differentiation between groups to ensure that dominant discourses don’t deny group differences in experience and need. In other words, what she calls the redistribution-recognition dilemma: striving to be more the same but respecting and valorising difference at the same time.

Applying this nexus to political justice, Anne Phillips (1999, p. 83) explains the linkages between redistribution and recognition succinctly when she states that:

The problem for democracy is not just how to equalise people’s political resources but how to establish their equal human worth; the problem with economic inequality is not just that it
constrains the exercise of political rights but that it shapes (and damages) perceptions of fellow citizens.

Recognition is strongly aligned to the idea of dignity, which I will address in more detail later in this chapter.

**Representation**

Fraser’s third dimension of justice is a new addition to her work, and responds to the challenges of an increasingly globalised and trans-national world. She states that this dimension, expressly political in a specific, constitutive sense, involves the issue of representation:

At one level, which pertains to the boundary-setting aspect of the political, representation is a matter of social belonging; what is at issue here is inclusion in, or exclusion from, the community of those entitled to make justice claims on one another. At another level, which pertains to the decision-rule aspect, representation concerns the procedures that structure public processes of contestation; what is at issue here are the terms on which those included in the political community air their claims and adjudicate their disputes (Fraser, 2007, p. 21).

The key difference between the initial two dimensions of justice and representation, is that the former is concerned with the question of “what is owed as a matter of justice to community members” and the latter is rather about “who should count as a [community] member and which is the relevant community” (own emphasis) (Fraser, 2009, p. 15). Sovereignty and nation states are no longer the obvious ‘frame’ in which to consider questions of justice, and global communities appeal to global principles of justice in a manner never before considered possible. This framing asks questions of global justice and who is considered worthy of equitable treatment or not.

This idea of representation has been used for asking questions of framing also at the subnational or local level (Goldblatt, 2014; S. H. Williams, 2014) in relation to who is entitled to benefits and services; it is in this permutation and in relation to claiming rights that I find this idea useful for the current research. In South Africa a progressive Constitution supports entitlement claims. Devereux and Lund (Devereux, 2011; Devereux & Lund, 2010) have argued that the cash transfer system in South Africa, and particularly the CSG, contains essential elements of a binding social contract between the state and its citizens; consequently, South Africa is an example of a system of ‘democratised welfare’. Key to this is the protection of citizen rights that the Constitution offers. The historical trajectory of South Africa led to a Constitution thought of as substantively progressive the world over. This includes the protection of political freedoms, so absent during the years of apartheid, but also outlines socio-economic rights that are rarely constitutional obligations of the state in other parts of the world. Two
sections play an important role to secure these rights: s27(1)(c) and s27(2) should be read together to demonstrate its protective power:

Everyone has the right to have access to...

(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance;

(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.

The formalisation of this right into law (The Social Assistance Act of 2004) means that these lofty ideals can be enforced by a court, offering a powerful tool to civil society to use to force government compliance where gaps, discrimination, or problems exist for citizens wanting to enact their entitlement (Devereux, 2011; Proudlock, 2011). Four critical Constitutional Court cases have fleshed out exactly how these socio-economic rights should be interpreted and have provided constitutional jurisprudence laying out exactly what the obligations of the state are, in relation to the provision of social security in particular (Goldblatt & Liebenberg, 2004).

The existence of a powerful screen of protection (the Constitution and the law) against the erosion of social security rights in the hostile context of conservative discourses is fundamental to the way the impact of the CSG plays out both in the public as well as in private homes. Added to this is the important role social security plays in electoral politics, which further cements its institutionalisation. Therefore, no matter how the grant is perceived, no matter how disdainful of recipients politicians and the public are, and no matter how tight the fiscal purse becomes, the CSG (and the other cash transfers) have been “institutionalised as a permanent, claims-based entitlement for all eligible citizens” (Devereux, 2011, p. 422). This has an important bearing on representation and recognition.

Nonetheless, research has shown that recipients do not feel protected by the entitlement to social security; indeed, the perceptions of recipients is that the CSG is vulnerable to political or fiscal decision-makers and, as a ‘benevolent gift’, can be withdrawn at any time (Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011). This further illustrates the complexity and politicisation of needs; even where rights are institutionalised and legally secure, negative public discourse can erode the confidence of those eligible, and undermine representation afforded by the CSG.

Critique of Fraser’s justice framework

Fraser’s theory of justice (in particular the dimensions of redistribution and recognition, as representation is a more recent addition) have been criticised in a number of areas. The main
criticisms are that they are too discrete from each other (Butler, 1997; Honneth, 2003b; Young, 1990), they are too focused on the public sphere (Honneth, 2003b), and that they are too narrow in scope (Robeyns, 2003a).

Young (1990) and Butler (1997) both suggest that Fraser’s work attempts to reclaim unhelpful dualisms between the ‘material’ and the ‘cultural’ that have long been discredited in both socialist and feminist theory (Lovell, 2007a), and that more recent feminist work had managed to dispense with the material by incorporating it into the broader concept of ‘recognition’.

Honneth (2003b), also zeroes in on the dualism of her early theories and asserts that injustice of distribution does not need its own theorisation and can be understood just as fairly via the concept of misrecognition. He further believes Fraser focuses too much on the public domain, seeming not to recognise that ‘most misery’ is located in the private sphere. As Honneth chooses to address barriers to ‘human flourishing’, he is focused more on individuals and their attainment of ‘the good life’ than Fraser whose focus is primarily on the public sphere (Lovell, 2007b).

In contrast, Robeyns (2003a, p. 550) is more optimistic about Fraser’s work but says that participatory parity is merely a “special (and narrower) case of the capability approach” and that therefore “the capability approach can deal with issues of recognition at least as well as participatory parity, and...in some cases even better”. She concludes that the capability approach is far wider in scope than Fraser’s work, and thus despite its real contributions, it is not better than the capability approach as a social justice theory.

Those who have largely agreed with Fraser’s theory but take issue with certain details include Phillips (1999) who questions how realistic Fraser’s remedies for injustice are (which I outline below), Garrett (2010), particularly interested in the workings of welfare, who states she does not theorise the role of the state enough, Pía Lara and Fine (2007) for the under-development of the idea of global justice in her work, and Lister (2007) for ignoring disability as a central inequality and for underplaying the psychological consequences of misrecognition.

She has responded to these challenges, convincingly in my view, that her framework is not fixed and closed and that it allows us to understand welfare in a theoretical, analytic way but does not prescribe how it should be used or where the emphasis should lie. She takes issue in particular with the view that she is reverting to a ‘dualistic theory’ (Fraser, 1998, 2003). In these responses, she emphasises that she at no point implies that misrecognition and maldistribution function separately from each other, and in her work even goes into detail on the ways they are interconnected, but that for analytical purposes it is critical that we don’t marginalise the cultural (as earlier theorists, influenced
by Marxism, have done), or the economic (as more recent theorists, influenced by the cultural turn, have done). The only way to properly understand the significance of these interplaying factors is to separate them analytically.

This intimate relationship between redistribution, recognition and representation frames the issues around the CSG extremely well, allowing me to ask questions beyond material impacts of the grant. It offers a structure for analysis in relation to assessing the justice outcomes of the grant vis à vis the developmental democratic state and the original intentions of social assistance.

The section which follows outlines the capabilities theory and its usefulness for this study.

**Capabilities and the core elements of freedom, agency and dignity**

The current popularity of the capabilities approach as a theory of justice can be partly explained by its application potential and its integration into development discourse. As a social justice theory, it moves away from the traditional development focus on economic development, a focus which has numerous limitations, particularly that it cannot adequately deal with unequal distribution of resources, nor disaggregate key aspects of development not directly related to the economy (such as education) (Sen, 1999, 2009). Literature on the capabilities approach has recently exploded (key theorists include Alkire, 2002, 2005; Brighouse & Robeyns, 2010; Deneulin, 2006, 2009; Nussbaum, 2000, 2011; Robeyns, 2003b), but by far its most famous proponent is Amartya Sen (1999).

The capability approach focuses on,

- a person’s capability to do things he or she has reason to value... The focus here is on the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that... [T]he idea of freedom ...respects our being free to determine what we want, what we value and ultimately what we decide to choose (my emphasis, Sen, 2009, pp. 231-232).

The capability approach “proposes a serious departure from concentrating on the means of living to the actual opportunities of living” (emphasis in original, Sen, 2009, p. 233), and therefore is concerned with ‘substantial freedoms’ that open the way to a truly just society. Capabilities are not just the internal abilities each person possesses (such as a skill, or knowledge, or a talent), but “also the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the political, social, and economic environment” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 20).

Key elements of the approach have been usefully summarised by Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 18-19) as follows:
1. It “takes each person as an end, asking not just about the total... well-being but about the opportunities available to each person”.

2. It is “focused on choice or freedom... [and]... thus commits itself to respect for people’s powers of self-definition”.

3. It is “pluralist about value” in that it holds that capability achievements are different in quality and quantity for different people, and cannot be reduced to a single numerical scale.

4. It is “concerned with entrenched social injustice and inequality”.

5. It “ascribes an urgent task to government and public policy... to improve the quality of life for all people”.

**Value of capabilities approach**

To broaden the limited lives into which the majority of human beings are willy-nilly imprisoned by force of circumstances is the major challenge of human development... Informed and intelligent evaluation both of the lives we are forced to lead and of the lives we would be able to choose to lead through bringing about social changes is the first step in confronting that challenge (Sen, 2004, p. 453).

The following are particularly strong aspects of the theory that have relevance and application for my own research. Firstly, the capabilities approach recognises that “fundamental entitlements... [should be] to some extent independent of the preferences that people happen to have, preferences shaped often by unjust background conditions” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 34). This is especially important for engaging with social justice for women, as people who live in persistently deprived circumstances adapt their preferences to match what they are likely to achieve, rather than on the basis of what would be most socially just (Sen, 2009).

Secondly, it recognises and theorises the importance of freedom, and two related notions, agency and dignity. This engages not only with negative freedom, the absence of interference or coercion of others, but also positive freedom, which is genuine opportunities for choice from a range of options for each person, especially critical for those in oppressive circumstances such as girls and women (Robeyns, 2003b). Freedom is conceptualised not just as related to current states of well-being (which represents states and functioning of personal choice), but also the opportunities for well-being into the future, which presupposes ongoing and real choice (Crocker & Robeyns, 2009). Therefore “Sen treats freedom as simultaneously instrumental, constitutive, and constructive for development, setting out the deep mutually constitutive links that exist between these two concepts and domains in ways that make their inseparability clear” (Uvin, 2010, p. 168). This is useful for my work in that development without freedom, and, similarly, freedom without development, both result in
continued injustice of some kind. Analysis of whether these notions are combined for women who receive the CSG would go some way towards evaluating this measure’s potential for justice.

Sen’s (1999, p. 281) insistence that people ought to be “active participant[s] in change, rather than … passive and docile recipient[s] of instructions or of dispensed assistance”, means his idea of freedom is unattainable without agency and choice. Crocker and Robeyns (2009, p. 83) explain the value of agency in Sen’s work, identifying three specific elements:

It is intrinsically valuable: we have reason to value agency for its own sake (although the exercise of agency may be used for trivial or nefarious actions)… Agency is also instrumentally valuable as a means to good consequences. If people are involved in making their own decisions and running their own lives, their actions are more likely to result, when they so aim and act, in achievement of their well-being freedoms, such as being able to be healthy and well-nourished… Finally, agency is, what Sen calls, “constructively” valuable, for in agency freedom the agent freely scrutinizes, decides on, and shapes its values. Included in the constructive value of agency is agent’s selecting, weighing, and trading-off capabilities.

Agency is a matter of degree, rather than something you ‘have’ or ‘don’t have’, and can therefore be seen as progressively realised when a number of supporting conditions combine (Crocker & Robeyns, 2009). Conditions such as self-determination, using reason and goal orientation, taking action, and impacting on the world can all combine in various ways to ensure strong or weak forms of agency (Crocker & Robeyns, 2009; Sen, 1999).

The other notion linked to freedom in the capabilities approach is dignity. Nussbaum (2008) in particular emphasises dignity as critical to a life one has reason to value; she says that all 10 of the capabilities she outlines are necessary for the fulfilment of human dignity as an end in itself. The combination of agency and dignity as core to the notion of freedom, and irreducible into separate components, is a key contribution the capability approach has more broadly made to social science (Deneulin & McGregor, 2010). The emphasis on dignity is one of the reasons that the capabilities approach has been instrumental in restoring ethics as a central concern of policy-making (Deneulin & McGregor, 2010). Dignity as an analytical concept is very productive for studies related to social justice as it enables a linking of private troubles to public issues (Misztal, 2013). In addition, reflecting on the “normative content of the universal implementation of the respect for dignity of the person can help social science engage once more in thinking about the human condition in general” (Misztal, 2013, p. 118), a goal of the capabilities approach, and intimately related to the research under discussion.
Thirdly, the capabilities approach gives “important precision and supplementation to the language of rights” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 37), in that capabilities can assist in defining and shaping what is actually meant by declarations of basic human rights that many states already endorse. In other words, just because an individual has a ‘right’ on paper, if there are no effective measures in place that give people a genuine opportunity for exercising that right, then this is not a socially just society (for example, the threat of political violence preventing certain groups from voting, or disabled children being barred from education due to a lack of appropriate infrastructure to facilitate them).

Critique

Criticism of the capability approach comes from those who do not agree with the overarching values, but also internally from those who take issue not with the approach as a whole, but certain aspects as advanced by particular theorists. One of the most significant differences is between Nussbaum and Sen in relation to specifying a list of central capabilities. Nussbaum claims that Sen does not go far enough in his theorising, because we need more than broad guidance on justice, we need a sense of “what minimum level of capability for a just society might be” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 35). She asserts that the capability approach needs far more substance in the form of content, and this is why she endorses a list of capabilities as “central requirements of a life with dignity. These ten capabilities are supposed to be general goals that can be further specified by the society in question... but in some form all agree part of a minimum account of social justice” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 40).

Sen, on the other hand, believes that specifying a list immediately becomes prescriptive, and he has consistently argued for democratic debate and government by discussion as the correct location for decisions on the content of capabilities for each society, as a superior approach (Sen, 1999, 2009). While a list gives content and direction and therefore substance to the idea of social justice, I am intuitively wary of prescriptions, however openly they are expressed. In an interview, Fraser (Bozalek, 2012, p. 148) puts this concern succinctly:

No list, no list. The point is that we cannot say what tomorrow will bring. Human beings are creative, plastic beings in history who create new forms of participation, and so I don’t believe in this idea of the theorist... setting out what the capabilities are... it’s up to the people

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1 Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities is as follows: 1. Life; 2. Bodily health; 3. Bodily integrity; 4. Senses, imagination and thought; 5. Emotions; 6. Practical reason; 7. Affiliation (A) Being able to live with and toward others,...to engage in various forms of social interaction [freely], (B) Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation;...nondiscrimination on [any basis]; 8. Other species; 9. Play; 10. Control over one's environment (A) Political, (B) Material (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33-34).
themselves to figure that out. What we as theorists can say is whatever forms of participation we are talking about, parity is a standard.

However, Nussbaum’s goal with her work on capabilities is far more directed than Sen’s at being a tool for citizens to justify and argue for constitutional principles to which all people should be entitled (Robeyns, 2005). In this case, her insistence on a list as a basic set of entitlements is well motivated. She justifies this endorsement of a list as follows:

The capabilities approach is a powerful tool in crafting an adequate account of social justice. But the bare idea of capabilities as a space within which comparisons are made and inequalities assessed is insufficient. To get a vision of social justice that will have the requisite critical force and definiteness to direct social policy, we need to have an account for political purposes, of what the central human capabilities are, even if we know that this account will always be contested and remade (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 56).

One common criticism of the capabilities approach coming from non-capability theorists is important to address in some detail. Critics, especially those that are sensitive to Euro-centric theories, claim that it is in capabilities theory’s insistence on individual choice that its fundamental alignment with a liberal-individualist approach is most obvious and most offensive. They claim its focus on freedom means “the priority is individual liberty, not social solidarity; the freedom to choose, not the need to belong” (Dean, 2009, p. 167).

I am in agreement that the goals of relational and solidaristic values are critical, and that individualism has brought many narrow judgements of societies that diverge from the Western norm. However, individualism is not a monolithic concept with pre-determined outcomes. Ingrid Robeyns (2005) differentiates between ontological and ethical individualism, arguing that the outcomes of these ideas are dissimilar. She makes the point that ontological individualism “states that only individuals and their properties exist, and that all social entities and properties can be identified by reducing them to individuals and their properties. Ontological individualism hence makes a claim about the nature of human beings, about the way they live their lives and about their relation to society” (Robeyns, 2005, p. 108). On the other hand, ethical individualism “postulates that individuals, and only individuals, are the units of moral concern” (Robeyns, 2005, p. 107, my emphasis). In other words, individuals are the critical level at which we should be judging the outcomes of social policies and public processes in order for certain individuals not to be rendered invisible by the claims of more powerful individuals, but this does not preclude recognition of the social world we live in, specifically the importance of social relations and the constraints and opportunities of social structures.
Her alignment with ethical individualism as a framework is not so different from the ‘solidaristic’ theories which construe individuals as whole only through their relationships with others (Dean, 2009; Metz & Gaie, 2010; Turner, 2006), but has the added advantage of protecting people at the individual level in the first instance, especially when solidaritic claims clash with individual freedoms. Particularly important for this study is the feminist insight that human flourishing is accomplished fundamentally through dependency on others (Kittay, 1999; Sevenhuijsen, 1998), and that this dependency is not inherently negative unless it disadvantages one individual over another. Theorists of the feminist ethic of care (such as Kittay, 1999; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Tronto, 1993) have engaged substantively with the inherent inter-dependency we have on each other, and our lifelong need for care. They specifically theorise the over-reliance society has on women’s care work, and the severe under-recognition this is given, which is an analysis of ethical individualism. Nussbaum (2003) in particular has not ignored the importance of care, but her list of capabilities is still constructed in the framework of an individual; this has been unfairly criticised as not recognising humans’ reliance on social relations.

I now turn to one key issue that weakens the capabilities approach’s potential for my use. The consensual approach that is embedded in Sen’s (2009) idea of democratic debate as a means to iron out the content of a society’s central capabilities is, in my view, problematic, as it implies that social justice gains can be won without any form of struggle. Consensus may in reality be merely another way of dominant beliefs and groups prevailing, because alternative voices are so effectively silenced. The optimism of Sen’s work and the belief that reason will ultimately overcome ‘unreason’ (Sen, 2009) to solve many of the world’s problems does not recognise that it is fundamentally unrealistic to expect that the lives we strive for will never be in conflict with other’s lives, and that the quest for well-being for some might directly prevent others from achieving their own goals (Deneulin & McGregor, 2010). In this way, Dean (2009, 2010) advances his view that the politics of need is really “about struggle, not consensus: the struggle for the recognition of unspoken needs; the struggle for more direct forms of political participation; the struggle against exploitation and the systemic injustices of capitalism” (Dean, 2009, pp. 274-275). As I will outline later in this chapter, it is precisely this understanding of power and struggle that offers such a useful notion of social justice in Nancy Fraser’s (1989, 2013b) work.

Other problems have been raised regarding the capabilities approach. Those that have bearing on my research area include its difficulty in managing intra-household inequality (Dean, 2009; Iversen, 2003), the need to limit some freedoms that impact negatively on the freedoms of others (Gasper & van Staveren, 2003; Nussbaum, 2003), and its lack of criticism of capitalism as inherently exploitative (Dean, 2009).
Resonance between the capabilities approach and Fraser’s participatory parity

Fraser’s work is a fully developed theory of justice, while the capabilities approach is not a complete theory, and is rather an approach. The capabilities approach is a workable framework of application, while Fraser’s work contains explanatory theory along with implementable tools for application. This is a fundamental difference between them. However, although their tools of analysis are also conceptually and semantically different, the two bodies of work have significant resonance and in my opinion can be legitimately combined.

Unlike many recognition theorists, capabilities theorists recognise the importance of resources in order to have a life of value. They see material goods, their entitlement to them, and social institutions that offer and provide services as very important means to well-being (Crocker & Robeyns, 2009). This links closely to Fraser’s notion of equitable redistribution. Fraser’s recognition arm of her theory of justice resonates with the capabilities idea that resources are, however, not an end in themselves, and that a life of freedom and choice is qualitatively different to a life of material comfort but restricted freedoms (Sen, 1999). Importantly, though, both approaches insist that core capabilities or arms of justice are not reducible or exchangeable for others, and that justice requires attention to the material, the cultural and the political.

In sum, the capability approach proposes a broad, rich and multidimensional view of human well-being and pays much attention to the links between material, mental and social well-being, or to the economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of life, which are the core concerns for Fraser’s theory of justice.

One additional concept I wish to address in this chapter before moving on to remedies for injustice, is the idea of care, and its place in the broader field of welfare. Referred to a number of times already in this thesis, an ethic of care is a helpful set of ideas to guide my research design as well as my theoretical position. I shall elaborate below.

The ethics of care

Care is a social and moral practice (Sevenhuijsen, 2003b; Tronto, 2010) that is socially situated and is thus strongly gendered, as care is traditionally seen to be the responsibility of women. We all need and offer care of various kinds, but women are by far most burdened by the daily caring tasks in our society. Theorists have identified that care is a social process, consisting of different dimensions. Sevenhuijsen (2003b, p. 6) summarises these values and practices as follows:
Caring about stands for the recognition that there is a need for care. The corresponding value is attentiveness. Essential to good care is the ability and willingness to place oneself in the needs and the perspectives of others. Taking care of consists of taking the necessary steps in the care situation in question. Taking care of is based on the willingness and the capacity to take responsibility that ‘something’ is done to provide for the need in question. Care giving, the third dimension, consists of carrying out actual caring activities, which ensure that the caring needs are met. This supposes that people have the competence and the resources for care giving in accordance with what is needed in the situation concerned. Care receiving refers to the interaction between the care giver and care recipient; for the caring process to succeed it is important that there is room for responsiveness, or a mutual receptivity for each other’s perspectives. These four values: attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness form the core of the ethic of care as moral orientation, and thus as care as social practice.

These values can be applied to care needs in both a private context, such as within a household, as well as in the public space, such as the care needs of a community or population. Those writing about the ethic of care take a critical approach when they emphasise the links between the public and the private, and challenge the moral assumption of individualism as the basis for social policy decisions, and the acceptance of uncaring institutions (Folbre, 2008; Sevenhuijsen, 2003b). From the level of the most private and intimate, through nation states, to global relationships, the “guiding thought of the ethic of care is that people need each other in order to lead a good life and that they can only exist as individuals through and via caring relationships with others” (Sevenhuijsen, 2003b, p. 183).

The last section of this chapter deals with strategies to overcome injustice, from the perspective of Fraser’s theory of social justice.

**Strategies to overcome injustice: affirmation vs transformation**

The remedying of injustice is approached most often by what is variously called assimilation (Phillips, 1999), affirmation (Fraser, 1997), social integration (Lockwood, see page 267 note 18 for reference), and visibility (Honneth, 2003a). As Phillips (1999) notes, assimilationist strategies were popular in second wave feminism where it was thought women’s equality rested on their participation in previously male spheres of work such as science and politics. However, she points out that the “difficulty with this is that the equality then depends on eliminating what has made women different from men. Many have regarded this as an unhealthy capitulation to dominant values and norms” (Phillips, 1999, p. 91). Fraser concurs, in that what she calls affirmative remedies for injustice aim to correct “inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework
that generates them” (Fraser, 1997, p. 23). Therefore an affirmative strategy for misrecognition is what she calls mainstream multiculturalism. In this process, disrespect is addressed “by revaluing unjustly devalued group identities, while leaving intact both the contents of those identities and the group differentiations that underlie them” (Fraser, 1997, p. 24). Similarly, affirmation in relation to redistribution seeks “to redress end-state maldistribution” (Fraser, 1997, p. 24), by making “surface reallocations again and again” (Fraser, 1997, p. 25), but “leaves intact the deep structures that generate class disadvantage” (Fraser, 1997, p. 25).

In contrast, remedies that attempt to destabilise social or economic structures, or at least question them, are substantively different. Phillips (1999) suggests that convergence, when it does not require the subordinated group to always converge to the dominant one, could be a useful means of social deconstruction. For example, “convergence, understood as a transformation in the conditions of life for both women and men, is not objectionable” (Phillips, 1999, p. 94, emphasis in original). Again this is a general point with which Fraser heartily agrees. She believes transformative remedies aim to correct “inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework” (Fraser, 1997, p. 23). Transformative remedies for misrecognition are not just valuing a previously devalued group, but deconstructing the nature of the distinction between the dominant and the marginal. An example of an affirmative approach to racial inequality is to recognise black identity as ‘equally valuable’ as white identity. In contrast, the movement that began to deconstruct notions of whiteness (Frankenburg, 1993; Steyn, 2001) and expose its imbrications in the construction of power-differentiated racial categories is far more transformative. Maldistribution approached in transformative ways has been historically associated with socialism: “by restructuring the relations of production, these remedies would not only alter the end-state distribution of consumption shares; they would also change the social division of labour and thus the conditions of existence for everyone” (Fraser, 1997, p. 25).

Fraser makes the case that affirmation generally promotes existing group differentiation, while transformation should lead in the long-term to the destabalisaiton of existing groups in order for fundamental and structural change to occur (Fraser, 1997). While both remedies are important at different stages, and sometimes the politics of the time rule out transformative remedies in particular, affirmation can inadvertently promote stigmatisation of the group as group members are seen to be ‘different’ and their benefits are often resented as they appear to be ‘chosen’ for their difference rather than for their disadvantage. Transformation should, in the long-term, have an opposite effect of promoting solidarity as people begin to recognise the similarities between themselves and the ‘other’ group.
The notion that remedies for social problems can have either affirmative or transformative effects has been creatively applied to the field of social protection. Affirmative redistributional outcomes are short-term solutions to poverty, for example, food transfers, or fertiliser provision for poor farmers. Such programmes provide much needed material assistance to those without any other means of support and are critical state responses to poverty. However, affirmative programmes do not fundamentally change distributional structures; the poor will remain poor. In fact, they often solidify class differentiation and alienation. Transformative social protection, however, is a new area of theorisation, proposing the extension of social protection beyond material support to attempting to address structural and social vulnerabilities to result in great autonomy and equality for people (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2007). It is “fundamentally [a] political way of thinking about poverty, its causes, and potential solutions” (Sweetman, 2011, p. 171).

Social protection in the form of economic safety nets is a widely accepted conceptualisation, whereas incorporating genuine social transformation into the goals and programmes of social protection is substantively different; critics say it is too challenging, much messier, overly ambitious, and too long term (Aoo, Butters, Lamhauge, Napier-Moore, & Ono, 2007). While transformative social protection does require a far broader mindset than traditional ideas of safety nets, it does not require an extension of the definition of social protection to all development policy measures, making it amorphous, un-measurable, and essentially unattainable. Rather, transformative social protection is acknowledging that poverty and inequality is not a matter that can be solved through a simple asset transfer. Sabates-Wheeler and Roelen (2011, p. 182) make explicit the need for a politicisation of social protection:

The question is no longer, ‘how do we design a policy so that various groups face less risk in given spaces?’ It becomes, how did this risky space, or vulnerable context, emerge? Whose interests were served in the creation of the space, and whose interests are served in maintaining the status quo? This leads to our analysing the social and political reasons for vulnerability.

This body of literature insists that once the questions of cause are asked of poverty and inequality, solutions cannot ethically only deal with the effects. This idea resonates directly with Fraser’s insistence that political questions must always be asked of welfare programmes. Socially transformative social protection strategies are those that combine the need for material support (‘provision measures’) with preventive, promotive and transformative measures which address, respectively, the prevention of deprivation through social insurance (such as health insurance or maternity benefits), the promotion of incomes and capabilities through livelihood-enhancing
programmes (such as micro-credit to support small business development), and the transformation of conditions of injustice and exclusion through advocacy, collective action, education, and other measures that encourage fundamental social shifts (such as collective action for worker’s rights, men’s education campaigns to eliminate domestic violence, improved access to entitlements) (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2007, pp. 25-26). These goals are often interlinked and one programme can have multiple outcomes if designed carefully and with the intention to target a number of social needs. Therefore state interventions can have transformative outcomes (both redistributional and in relation to recognition) even where material support (affirmation, in Fraser’s language) is the main goal (for example, in income support programmes).

As the inherently political nature of the strategies outlined above rules out the traditional ‘neutrality’ of protection mechanisms, this approach is controversial in contexts where social protection measures are initiated by NGOs and other external agencies who can therefore be accused of imposing their own values on local communities (Aoo et al., 2007). In the case of sovereign programmes, however, and especially in countries with a strong and progressive constitutional guide such as South Africa, this criticism holds little water and in fact social transformation can be argued as a constitutional imperative, despite the often great lags between the ideal of laws and the realities of inequality and discrimination.

In this research this concept of transformatory social protection will be used to understand the outcomes of the CSG. Gender will be central to this analysis, but social transformation in South Africa is inherently and necessarily also about race. In fact, the CSG has already met some criteria for social protection that is socially transformative in this regard, as it was conceived of as one of the first social programmes in the newly democratic South Africa. It was designed to target the most vulnerable members of our society, previously ignored: poor children, in the vast majority black. At the same time it was structured as racially blind to undo previous racial discrimination.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has laid out the theoretical frameworks I use to understand the CSG and the women receiving it. The value of Fraser’s work is not merely as a social theory of need. It unpacks how, at the site of policy, in the design of state programming, and in the functioning of public discourse, the contestation of meanings is also the struggle for power. Fraser has “understood that the meanings we give to our actions, the expression we give to our needs and the interpretations we make of how things are, are all sites of political struggles” (Pia Lara & Fine, 2007, p. 38). She has managed to integrate, in a functional framework, some of the key concerns of socialist feminism, postmodernism,

Used in concert with Fraser is the body of work on the capabilities approach, which expresses so clearly the critical place freedom, agency and dignity have in striving for well-being and a life of value. Both of these conceptual frameworks allow me to ask questions of politics in relation to welfare. It is not just a question of a body of ‘rights’, nor is it a functionalist question of ‘what should we do about poor people’, nor is it an institutional, often path-dependent, one of ‘what is possible in the institutional structure we have created’. Fraser asks not just what is it we think is right, but why we think this, and what ideological framework blinds us to alternate viewpoints. The capabilities approach offers tools for evaluating freedom and a life of value. Both help place the CSG as a welfare benefit firmly into a notion of entitlements in a wider frame than that of pedestrian social policy analysis, encompassing not just the welfare benefit itself, but the political space of need and freedom.
Chapter 3

Narrative without stories; stories without narrative

It is said that we *tell* stories so that we do not die of truth. But we also tell stories to know who we are and to make sense of the world. We constitute our social identities through narrative and, although life is much more than stories, stories also try to create order in the chaos of our lives. Stories in their widest sense can be used to bring order, or tell about chaos.

We *listen* to one another’s stories so that we share carrying the truth. But we also listen to stories in order to become, for one brief moment, somebody else, to be somewhere we’ve not been before. We listen to stories in order to be changed. At the end of the story we do not want to be the same person as the one who started listening (Krog, Mpolweni, & Ratele, 2009, p. 19, emphasis original).

This research is the story of six women who receive child support, a project to make them visible, whole, real and complex human beings. The best way to learn about these women is to hear their lives described through stories, as stories are meaningful to us and enable a statistic to speak with a human voice.

As I will discuss in this chapter, this research is arguably not a typical narrative inquiry but it does offer the reality of the people who took part in this research as a story in order for us to understand them in the fullness and richness of real lives, and not as a flat measurement. Qualitative research was the obvious choice in order to tackle the questions raised in this research. As mentioned, quantitative evaluations of the CSG have been undertaken in South Africa, and there is a growing body of knowledge on the material impacts of the grant, not just economic impacts, but also the material impacts in relation to education, household food security, health, and so on. What remains hidden is a rich understanding of the lives of the women and children who receive the grant; only in-depth qualitative methodology can offer this kind of data.

The research design chosen was a critical feminist approach. Studying intimate relationships and lives requires a holistic perspective, and taking women’s social positions seriously as a research subject is grounded in the feminist tradition. In addition, because I engaged with biographical stories, this can
also be identified as narrative research. However, as I will explain below, it developed, counter-intuitively, without many stories, but eventually became a story which is not a typical narrative.

The chapter starts with situating my ontological position and how this shaped the research paradigm, first with an overview of the influence of feminist epistemology and research ethics on my work, and then a specific focus on the ways this research resembles a narrative inquiry.

I then move on to the practicalities of the design and methodology: first describing the research site as the physical and community context for the playing out of these women’s lives, and then describing the research participants, the data generation, and the data analysis. I end the chapter with a discussion of the trustworthiness and limitations of the research, and a discussion on research ethics.

**Feminist research**

This research is at its heart a feminist project. Feminist epistemology is concerned with the way political relationships are implicated in theories of knowledge, the ways gender and other social hierarchies influence the production of knowledge, and is dubious about claims of universal knowledge which discounts the social context and status of knowers (Alcoff & Potter, 1993). Relevant to my work, feminist epistemology is also attentive to exposing the erasure of marginalised voices, especially women’s, in the course of the conventional production of knowledge (Harding, 1993).

Five issues are to my mind central to the design of feminist research, and consequently informed my research project. These five themes will be revisited throughout this chapter. Firstly, feminist epistemology argues that value-free knowledge is an impossible and, indeed, undesirable objective, as ‘truth’ is always shaped by our social conditions and is thus dependent on one’s standpoint (Harding, 1993). Therefore, feminists reject the idea that research and knowledge production can or should be objective, this position leads them to the frequent use of naturalistic research methods. These qualitative methods often, and are usually chosen to, elicit rich, thick descriptions of everyday life and not to guarantee generalisability, objectivity, and external validity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Secondly, feminist research favours deep engagement with people with whom the research is concerned, involving them as active research participants rather than objectified subjects of the research (Beetham & Demetriades, 2007). Participatory research techniques are therefore common, and are particularly important in research with possible development outcomes as they ensure people have a say in future interventions that might affect their lives directly (Hoare, 2007). This last point touches on the third issue: all research is inherently a political process and choices made in the process of research will have political consequences for the individuals who agreed to be participants, on
others in their community, on academics and other scholars, and on policy-makers and the broader public.

Fourthly, feminist research recognises the researcher’s role in the production of knowledge (Beetham & Demetriades, 2007; Presser, 2005) as opposed to seeing the researcher as a mere instrument of data collection, and therefore requires reflexivity as an integral part of the research process. This includes reflexivity about the researcher’s own identity and how this might affect the research (Presser, 2005).

Finally, as far as possible, feminist research acknowledges and attempts to minimise the power differentials between the researcher and the researched (Hoare, 2007; Llewelyn, 2007; Presser, 2005), and recognises that usual hierarchies of knowledge construction intimately affect research outcomes (Llewelyn, 2007; Presser, 2005).

These principles have guided the design of this research.

Narrative research

Drawing from the above feminist principles, my ontological position is that people’s views, understandings, interpretations, expectations and social relations are meaningful properties of social reality, and therefore to understand this social reality in depth, I need to gather information directly from people themselves. This position also converges with personal research ethics and my view that people own their personal life meanings, and thus ought to be given the opportunity to represent themselves as fully as possible; all of which requires, in this instance, a qualitative methodology.

I planned to conduct a feminist narrative inquiry because this choice was a logical step from my chosen ontological position as well as from the nature of the research question, which aims to uncover the intricacies of social relations and people’s micro-experiences within households. Narrative research is intended here to mean a broad focus on the generation of rich data thickly described, using stories to paint a picture of the topic of research. Narrative is “meaning making through the shaping and ordering of experience, a way of understanding one’s own or others’ actions, of organizing events and objects into a meaningful whole, of connecting and seeing the consequences of actions and events over time” (Chase, 2011, p. 421). Located in their broader socio-political and cultural contexts, stories provide insights into how the story-tellers construct and make sense of their experience. I wanted a narrative approach in this research to expose and track complex and contradictory household relationships, to trace processes of myth-making in the household, to follow negotiation and bargaining, and to see how these processes shape the self and relationships. This use of narrative
would arguably fit into what Chase (2011) identifies as a pragmatic or applied kind of narrative inquiry, or what she calls ‘the story and the life’.

I was particularly enchanted with the idea that I was not looking for answers, but looking for stories. Armed with the extensive reading I did, my feminist principles of respectful eagerness to enter people’s worlds, and my certainty that because everyone loves stories and humans are naturally storytellers, this would be methodologically uncomplicated, I was bound to be disappointed. I became increasingly frustrated that my experience in getting people to open up and share their lives, gained as a social worker and researcher, was useless in the face of truncated and often monosyllabic responses, conversations about ‘things’ rather than experiences and meaning, and conversational tangents dealing with issues far outside of my direct research interests. It was at this point that I moved into a certainty that what I had done bore no resemblance to narrative research; and I claimed to those who would listen that issues of language, literacy and circumstance had all conspired to ensure a narrative inquiry was impossible in the complicated SA urban context. Secretly, I added to that list my clearly inadequate research skills. An extract from my field work journal captures this persistent struggle:

26 August 2011
Haven’t seen any women for a while – busy at work and home. Feel out of touch and worried about the quality of data collection, worried about losing relationship momentum by being away. Finally have [been working with my] transcripts... reading them, they have a sense of (1) superficiality and (2) lack of narrative. I had no idea it would be so hard to get stories. Is it because I am not honing in on a central topic? I still feel like I have no framework – this is a huge weakness in my methodological and conceptual preparation. Is this my overactive critical voice or am I fairly representing my deficits?

While I do think methodologically my research project as a whole has quite a bit in common with a thematic qualitative analysis (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994) and an extended case study approach (Burawoy, 2009), I have come to realise that I owe a considerable amount to the narrative turn. This project intersects with narrative inquiry philosophically, ethically and in approach, and I will address some of these intersections below.

Firstly, an aspect of this research that is strongly narrative in philosophy is the assumption throughout the process that I was a co-creator of stories, a principle which coalesces with the feminist approach as mentioned above. No story ‘exists’ outside of its audience, and an interviewer will be strongly influential in how a person’s story is formed for the purposes of research; as Portelli (1981, p. 103) has expressed, “oral sources are never objective”. This is now widely accepted for a range of qualitative research, but is a particular feature of the philosophy of narrative inquiry (Kohler Riessman, 2008). In narrative inquiry it is recognised that the researcher and research participant have a dialectical, active relationship in the process of data generation. It is because of this process that narratives “are not
transparent renditions of reality but they... call for our interpretation” (Eastmond, 2007, p. 252). The researcher is thus complicit in the process of the production of narrative as well as an active storyteller him/herself when interpreting story meanings (Chase, 2005).

At first I assumed my role in the co-creation was just in the direction of the conversation and thus what material was shared, as I generally controlled the subject of discussion via my questions. But I subsequently realised it was also in the interpretation of the slivers of ‘life experience’ which participants shared, and the meaning this seemed to have in their bigger biographical tale. Despite my frustration that I hardly ever got long, detailed, thick answers to my questions, the small slivers began to make sense to me over time as I got to know participants, and I started to ‘see’ how they fitted together to make a coherent whole. I accepted that my attentive gaze came with the responsibility to build their stories with integrity; to ensure I was receptive, “cognizant of the vital temporality within experience: connecting past, present, and future, and portraying people living in and through a situation” (Kim & Macintyre Latta, 2010, p. 69). I also realised, however, that this ‘whole’ was a story of truth, but by no means the only story of truth for these women. The way they chose to share their lives with me allowed me to see a particular set of events as forming a jigsaw puzzle that I then chose to put together in a certain way; there could have been many other ways to complete these jigsaw puzzles.

A second way this research has strong links to narrative inquiry is its biographical nature. Rather than the type of narrative research that focuses on the nature, convention and structure of stories (Andrews, 2007; Chase, 2011), the research utilised stories verbally told to construct a biographical account. Biographical narratives cannot be told as “brief, tightly bounded stories in answer to a single question” and inherently require repeated interviews in order to “traverse temporal and geographical space” (Kohler Riessman, 2008, p. 23). The stories here are not biographical in the life history sense, that is, navigating a whole life’s trajectory, but rather are a means to reflect the ‘story of experience’ for my research participants (Merrill & West, 2009). The strengths of a biographical approach are its “peculiar power and potential...to generate novel perspectives on important social phenomena and to challenge a tendency in social research to over-simplify complex problems...by insufficiently engaging, in a lifelong and lifewide way, with those most directly concerned” (Merrill & West, 2009, p. 11).

A third debt this research owes to the narrative turn is the fact that the research process gave the participants a chance to process traumatic or difficult events from their lives, as a part of the story telling process, what I might call ‘giving testimony’. This is, again, found commonly in feminist research (named variously, including ‘survivor discourse’) and is a powerful transition space for the private to
be made political (Naples, 2003). In the case of a traumatic event or a longer more persistent experience of trauma, psychological theory is based on the hypothesis that sharing this experience verbally is an opportunity to psychologically process your experiences in order to minimise lasting damage to the psyche (J. Herman, 1992). Narrative theory would add that giving testimony is also about the act of sharing the story, the use of your own voice to order, manage and understand the meaning this experience has in your life. Indeed, especially if this is one of the first times one shares the traumatic incident with another, Krog et al. (2009) argue that giving testimony is a way of restoring dignity.

The restoration of dignity via testimony is a contested relationship, however. Writing about the effects of testifying at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Fiona Ross (2003) comments that harm can be caused through both public testimony and the scholarship of trauma. She argues that as soon as speakers lose control over their speech, such as when it is appropriated for other uses in scholarship or the media, there is a terrible sense of loss of dignity of the self for the testifier. This “arrogation or loss of voice may then be haunted by humiliation of abjection” (Ross, 2003, p. 335).

I had not been prepared for the level of hardship, particularly abuse, which coloured the lives of the women I met. Sexual abuse or rape was a feature in five of the six women’s stories, and time and again I was told this was the first time they had spoken of those experiences, and heard what a relief it had been to disclose a secret hidden in some cases since childhood. This will be discussed further in chapter 7. Silence in the face of trauma can be a “language of pain and grief” when the experiences you have are ‘unspeakable’ (Motsemme, 2004, p. 910); without a space in which to make sense of the experience, some people might always choose muteness to express their trauma. Since the stories were not used in a public space and this project of scholarship does not reveal identities in a public way, I believe that the process of sharing this information was beneficial for the women, as they themselves expressed, rather than damaging vis à vis Ross’ (2003) argument, even after the fact. I had never intended to provide a form of therapy, but the process of giving testimony was a therapeutic one for the women.

Fourth, while this is not germane only to feminist and narrative approaches in the qualitative research family, they both explicitly encourage social justice and democratic processes via critical thinking (Chase, 2008, 2011). Chase (2008, p. 80) argues that narrative research, by way of ‘giving voice’ to those marginalised and ‘naming silenced lives’, facilitates a democratic engagement in public life. She believes that “when researchers’ interpretive strategies reveal the stranglehold of oppressive metanarrative, they help to open up possibilities for social change”. While this is certainly an aim of my research, which renders it applied and normative in many ways, the challenge is for this work to
open up conversations in public life where the specific narratives that have been silenced up until now are heard.

**Sophiatown and surrounds: a mobile, urban, mixed research site**

The main research site for this work was Sophiatown. It is located to the north-west of the Johannesburg city centre, and is bordered in the east by Westdene, a middle-class gentrified suburb, to the south by Coronationville and Westbury, predominantly poor white and ‘coloured’ areas, and to the west and north by Claremont, Newlands, Albertskroon and Albertville, lower- to middle-class Afrikaans areas, poorer to the west and more affluent towards the north. Coronationville is the site of the SASSA paypoint closest to Sophiatown, although all my research participants bar one received their grant via electronic banking and did not use the paypoint system.

![Figure 1: View of Johannesburg from the Sophiatown Police Flats](image)

Sophiatown is a suburb of Johannesburg that has a very important social history. It was a node of great cultural activity, particularly music and dance, during the 1940s and 1950s, and an unusual space in that it had a racially diverse and socially cohesive population during the period of the establishment of formal apartheid. In the 1950s, however, the apartheid government re-classified Sophiatown a whites-only suburb, and forcibly removed the majority of the population to various townships across the city. The name ‘Sophiatown’, which became a symbol of lost cultural richness and resistance to apartheid, was changed to ‘Triomf’ (‘triumph’ in Afrikaans) and the suburb was transformed into a lower-middle class suburb for white Afrikaners. Recently, however, the profile of this area has once more changed, along with its name. Again called Sophiatown since 2006, the place remains predominantly lower-middle class, but is racially and ethnically mixed and includes pockets of poor people (often transient in nature) closer to the industrial borders of the suburb. Residents themselves perceive the suburb as very diverse racially and ethnically and while this externally is a good example of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ dream, there are also social tensions with interacting with people from such
a wide social network (Morgan, 2015). Sophiatown is two places, the place of imagination, imbued with the gravity of history, and at the same time, the place of everyday suburban life (Fink, 2015; Knevel, 2015). Sometimes these two Sophiatowns are connected, but in many cases they are not. In most of my research the mythical historical Sophiatown was invisible, and the contemporary everyday struggles of life were prominent. While we are all constituted by space and history, and those living in Sophiatown particularly so, at the same time, these do not constitute all that we are; our future selves are also made up of the immediate struggles that face our everyday lives (Erlank, 2015).

Sophiatown’s population is relatively young, with nearly 50 percent of residents under the age of 30 years, as represented in the graph below.

![Sophiatown Population: Age](image)

*Figure 2: Sophiatown Population 2011: Age*
*Source: Census, 2011*

The educational level of Sophiatown’s residents aged 20 years and older is relatively high: almost 19 percent have completed some post-school education, and a further 48 percent have completed secondary school (grade 12). Only four percent of the population have no secondary education at all. Sophiatown residents speak Afrikaans (44 percent) and English (32 percent) and then a range of other home languages. Zulu and Tswana are each spoken by five percent of the population, with smaller numbers speaking Pedi, Xhosa, Ndebele, and Sotho. Of the residents, 41 percent are white, 27 percent are black African and 26 percent coloured. Of adult residents, 48 percent are married and 35 percent have never been married (StatsSA, 2012a).

In addition, the residents aged between 15 and 64 years old are generally employed: 55 percent, with only eight percent unemployed (including discouraged work-seekers). Even in Sophiatown, an area
not considered especially poor, 29 percent of households report no income at all (aside from social grants and remittances). The income levels of other households in Sophiatown are relatively comfortable, with a full 21 percent earning above R153,800 per annum. The residents have good access to electricity, water, clinics, schools, and refuse removal (StatsSA, 2012a).

Sophiatown offered an interesting social diversity in my research sample, particularly in relation to race and class origin, despite the obvious financially difficult nature of all families receiving a CSG. The naturalist means of my identifying research participants meant, however, that some lived in bordering areas, namely Westbury and Claremont.

Claremont is poorer than most of Sophiatown, a very old suburb that until relatively recently was an enclave of working class Afrikaners, but is now very run down and more diverse, including many poor coloured families.

Westbury borders on Sophiatown to the south. It is a more homogenous area: a coloured township that compared to Sophiatown is more uniformly poor, more edgy, more crowded, more desperate, and more dangerous. Gang membership, gun proliferation and high levels of alcohol and drug use are specific social challenges with which the area has been grappling for decades. The photo below is the view of neighbouring flats from a participant’s front door in Westbury:

Figure 3: Two views of Westbury, the left from the front door of a research participant’s flat and the right opposite the Westbury Clinic

Westbury has a particularly young population, as seen in the graph below, with nearly 60 percent of the population below the age of 30 years. This is younger than the national population, which is 60 percent below 35 years (StatsSA, 2012a).
Westbury’s residents are less well educated than those in neighbouring Sophiatown. While 33 percent of those 20 years and older have completed grade 12, only a further three percent have any post-school qualifications, 53 percent of residents have some secondary schooling, and 11 percent have no secondary education at all. The residents speak predominantly Afrikaans (57 percent) and English (37 percent), which is not surprising considering it was initially a coloured township, and remains predominantly coloured in racial terms (88 percent, with 10 percent black African), and so is less diverse than Sophiatown. Most adult residents report they have never been married (52 percent) and 28 percent are married (StatsSA, 2012a).

Including discouraged work-seekers, 43 percent of Westbury’s residents aged 15 – 64 years are unemployed, significantly more than in Sophiatown, with an employment rate of 37 percent (the remaining 30 percent of residents are not economically active due to attending school, studying, or disabled, etc). While the vast majority of households have access to electricity, water, clinics, schools, and refuse removal, they remain income poor. There is no income for 39 percent of Westbury households (survival is based on grants, remittances, and ad hoc livelihood strategies; 25 percent of all households earn below R19,600 per annum (StatsSA, 2012a).
My race and class were relatively inconspicuous in Sophiatown (I could very plausibly be a resident there myself), but did identify me as an outsider in the poorer and the traditionally coloured areas. Two extracts from my field work journal capture what this felt like for me, even, in the second extract, after having spent quite a lot of time in the area:

3 February 2011
Coronationville Recreational Centre, paypoint (near Claremont).

Arrived 9:15am, escorted by Sergeant Lekalakala in his police van, this and my car and my race definitely attracted attention. Pavements lined with tables piled with goods for sale: 2nd hand clothes, household detergents, grannies selling home-made biscuits and samoosas, plastic packets filled with unidentifiable meat, Naomi selling funeral benefits and other insurance; on the opposite side of the road, fruits and vegetables.

Queue of mothers because at this paypoint pensioners are let in first, thus the mothers must wait. I am very conspicuous. I walk along the queue and talk to women; they start off very suspicious, but warm up after chatting, mostly coloured women, some black. I realised after a while I was targeting young women with warm/open faces. I am intimidated by the hard cold faces of the older coloured women.

I also realised when looking at the young coloured men hanging around against the cars and while driving through Westbury en route that I am far more comfortable in the black townships than in coloured areas. I am an object of “interest” in black townships, but in the coloured areas I feel like a potential “target”, it feels rougher and more dangerous.
2 November 2011

Had an appointment with a new participant... Into the depths of Westbury, a different part to the one I am used to; littered and run down and filled with piles of rubble and discarded items with no further use. The traffic turns suddenly from Johannesburg traffic on the main road to township traffic in the space of two blocks – cars missing parts and spluttering along, multicoloured where scrap yards have been scoured for new body panels. My car and race announce loudly that I’m an outsider, but people I stop and ask for directions are warm and helpful. I instinctively remove my nice watch – not that I expect it to be stolen but because accessories just exacerbate difference.

The choice of geographic location was influenced by the easy accessibility of this area as well as the presence of easy access for an outsider to communal sites (such as paypoints and clinics), and community groups (such as crèches, soup kitchens, community policing forum). In addition, a University of Johannesburg research group, with whom I had some contact, had been working there for some time on a completely different research topic, and had very good community contacts and relationships. The principal researcher of the Sophiatown project facilitated my access to community events to meet possible research participants.

Research participants lived in generally poor and crowded conditions. Four of the women lived in small flats in flat buildings, with considerable room-sharing and bed-sharing in each one. The most crowded was a flat in Westbury, housing five adults (and teenagers) and two children. The flat consists of a single room, a tiny kitchen in an entrance alcove, and a small bathroom. Two women lived in houses, but again these were very crowded and people were forced to share both bedrooms and beds with various family and non-family members. I did not visit the home of one of the women, but she reported on the living conditions, staying in a friend’s home consisting of at least three households. The others I visited numerous times.

Figure 6: Small and crowded conditions in Westbury (left) and Sophiatown (right). Each bed sleeps between one and four people in these homes.

The levels of crowding and poverty bore no relationship to the relative neatness of the women’s homes: three were extremely neat every time I visited, whether planned or unannounced. Two were
untidy to an exceptional degree, not only messy, but also what I believe to be very unhygienic. An excerpt from my field journal and some photos below attest to this:

13 May 2011: CLAREMONT

... Louise let me in and I was stunned by the state of their front yard and home. Later she told me her brother’s livelihood was using his truck to collect and dump building rubble and other household rubbish for people, and because one has to pay for each visit to the dump he waits until the truck is full before he dumps things – in the meantime he stores all the rubble in the front garden. The garden genuinely looks like a rubbish dump: it is covered with building rubble and trash, old rusty equipment, old carpets, and so on. At the end of the interview we went outside and the one little boy was playing amongst the trash and Louise didn’t seem too concerned. It is definitely a serious health hazard – or is that just my middle-class talking?

Entering the house is not much of an improvement: the front room has very old threadbare couches, a tv, music blaring, things lying everywhere, a dark brown filthy looking fitted carpet and old coffee cups, apple cores, bits of crumpled paper, are lying about. The walls have been scribbled on and remain uncleaned, the one corner table is covered in a stained cloth, and beyond the room is a dining area piled with things...

I was pretty shocked – it was not just messy, it was a TIP.

Figure 7: One of the participants’ messy home.

Overleaf appears a map of the area with the intentionally approximate (rather than exact) location of their homes (depicted by red stars) and the context of the area where they live.
The six women who participated in this research were all receiving one or more CSG for children in their care. Interviews were conducted with two further women, but they chose to discontinue their participation in the research. Quite a number of other contacts were made but either these women did not meet my criteria for inclusion, or they themselves chose not to be part of the research. One of the criteria was the presence in the household of one or more adult male. I assumed that the adult male, whether an intimate partner, a relative, or neither, would have a fairly key relationship to the woman in question and would therefore be an important person to interview to understand gender relations in the household. This assumption was incorrect in some cases, and in others it was
inappropriate or even an unwelcome intrusion to request an interview. Hence only two men from the women’s households were interviewed during this research.

Other family members, however, were key to this inquiry, and mothers, fathers, children, and siblings became part of this project to a greater or lesser extent in every household.

Below is a table representing the basic demographics of each household (at the primary time of the data collection during 2011) and the number of interviews conducted. The names of the women and all their family members have been changed to maintain confidentiality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal participant</th>
<th>Thokozani</th>
<th>Jane</th>
<th>Loretta</th>
<th>Louise</th>
<th>Nandi</th>
<th>Cindy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>37 years</td>
<td>37 years</td>
<td>28 years</td>
<td>30 years</td>
<td>23 years</td>
<td>31 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of people in household (adults: children)</td>
<td>4 adults, 2 children</td>
<td>9 adults, 2 children</td>
<td>7 adults, 2 children</td>
<td>9 adults, 3 children</td>
<td>9 adults, 4 children</td>
<td>2 adults, 1 child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current intimate partner?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of interviews (including family interviews)</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>12 + *</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8 + *</td>
<td>3+ *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The + indicates other contacts and informal interviews beyond the number identified.

Table 2: Household demographics.

Access to these women started by my getting to know Sophiatown and Westbury as physical locations and as communities. I spent time visiting communal spaces such as the shopping areas, the community centres, the clinics, the parks and walking on the streets. I also spent time in public service spaces which allowed me to get a sense of the needs and issues at large: I attended the Sophiatown Residents Association and Sector Crime Forum meetings for a few months, and also ‘hung around’ the queues outside the SASSA paypoint for the area (in Coronationville) over a few months. For a while I was a regular visitor to the Sophiatown Police Station, the Trevor Huddleston Community Centre and the Sophiatown Cultural Centre, the Westbury Clinic, the church soup kitchen and feeding centre opposite the Clinic, and had made good connections with community members in these areas who ran private services, such as Rachel who runs a day-care and aftercare centre in addition to fostering children in her own tiny flat in Westbury, and Vanessa who runs a full-day crèche located in the Police Accommodation, a huge flat complex in Sophiatown.

Slowly, through these points of contacts and via word of mouth, I began meeting women who were willing to take part in this research.
Data generation

Data generation was primarily via individual interviews, but group interviews (within households), observations, field journaling, the drawing of life lines, and life photography were also used.

Interviews

Interviews were usually between 30 minutes and an hour, and took place in the woman’s home, with two exceptions: one woman felt her home was too crowded and exposed and we conducted interviews at the local clinic, where she was completing a community health education worker course. In another case, initial interviews took place in the woman’s home, but when she found work, it moved to a restaurant near her job. One family member (the father of one of the women) was interviewed in a quiet spot at his place of work. The home location of the interviews was important in that it was safe and personal, and it also gave me an opportunity to meet the families and understand the households far better than if the interviews were elsewhere.

However, the disadvantages of being in the home included that there were multiple interruptions to interviews, at times the interview was stilted or superficial if the ‘wrong’ household member was within earshot, and my being in the women’s private spaces meant the lines between researcher and personal friend could be blurred and this made negotiating relationships difficult at times.

Multiple interviews and regular contact with the women over the period of field work via visits and telephone calls meant I came to know some families extremely well. The research relationships with the six women were not homogenous: in some cases they resembled more typical ethnographic relationships (where I knew whole families and sometimes took part in family life and events), and in other cases were more conventional, but still intimate, qualitative connections. In all cases trust and rapport was built over time; but I was constantly taken aback by the depth of intimacy and sharing that the women chose to allow even in initial interviews. This is likely to be related to my ‘outsider’ status in their lives; my knowing very personal information was not threatening as I could not use it for any hurtful or negative purpose.

Informal contact with additional family members happened organically, but in addition, some formal interviews took place. Two mothers, one father, one partner, one sister, and, in one case, the whole family including children, were interviewed, sometimes alone, sometimes with the woman present. Family members were all current household members, bar one, who drifted in and out of the household according to the needs presented by her serious drug addiction and usual homelessness.
Interviews were guided, initially by a broad interview schedule (see Appendix B), and focused on the CSG and its impact on intra-household relationships and decision-making. Very soon, however, even in initial interviews, we veered from the prepared questions into unplanned territory. This is to some extent expected in in-depth, and especially narrative, interviews as the purpose is to get rich descriptions and not monosyllabic responses, and is described as an unstructured approach (Fontana & Frey, 2008). However what I wasn’t expecting was that so little of the conversation seemed to be directly about the CSG. I struggled with this at first, worried that I was being led into territory that was not useful for me, thereby effectively ‘duping’ women into unfocused conversations that would not be employed for my work. But examining interview transcripts was enlightening as they offered a life-wide, thick knowledge of the lives of the women and the grant was a small (but important) part of the tapestry. I will return to this later in this chapter when discussing data analysis.

Overall, my interview style is commensurate with feminist ethics of care (Bozalek, 2011; Hochfeld & Graham, 2012) as well as the assumption that all interviews are politically laden and co-constructed (Chase, 2008; Fontana & Frey, 2008). I also took an explicitly empathic stance, which has been described as a position “in favour of the individual or group being studied. The interviewer becomes an advocate and partner in the study, hoping to be able to use the results to advocate social policies and ameliorate the conditions of the interviewee” (Fontana & Frey, 2008, p. 117).

In addition, data was generated via the informal conversations that framed all the relationships I had with the women and their households. This “data through talking” (Madden, 2010, p. 59) was generated via telephone calls, face to face conversations, and building relationships throughout the data phase of the research.

Please note that in the thesis I have edited verbatim texts for readability, while keeping as much as possible to the exact words used by participants. Further, I have deleted the inputs from the translator unless her presence, her comments, or her responses influence the conversation in a way that is significant for the issue under discussion.

**Participatory methods of data collection**

It was intended that interview techniques drawn from the field of participatory action research such as social mapping or time-use surveys would be prominent in this research. I planned a number of different activities, such as visual prompts, time-use diaries and drawing as a graphic representation of certain issues. However, the participants were consistently not very interested in engaging with these activities and preferred to simply talk to me. In the end I made use of participatory techniques
in only two instances: the first was the graphic representation of a lifeline, the second was a ‘photovoice’ project with one of the families.

The purpose of asking research participants to draw a ‘lifeline’ and indicate the significant points or events, both positive and negative, over a life period, is for participants to highlight meaningful experiences that shaped their lives and current identities. The line is meant to undulate in response to the dips (negative) and hills (positive) points in their lives, with a graphic, words, short phrases or sentences giving a description of the significant moment. In particular, it allows participants to construct independent narratives rather than ones driven by the questions of the interviewer.

In this research, the only lifeline activity that was completed revealed a very low level of literacy and comfort with non-verbal depictions of ideas, experiences or feelings for the one woman who took part, and this made it a very challenging activity for her. Despite this, she persevered and said she found it a useful exercise. It was useful for my purposes in that it raised a number of key past issues that have bearing on her current identity and behaviour.

![Figure 9: Nandi’s Lifeline, 4 October 2011.](image)

In the ‘photovoice’ project I undertook with the children from one of the families, I gave each of the eight children a disposable camera, showed them how to use it, and asked them to take photos relating to the theme of “This is my Family”, which I anticipated would give me insight into intra-household relationships and issues. Photos have been shown to be an extremely successful means of depicting social reality amongst children and adults, particularly in marginalised communities (www.photovoice.org). The central idea behind a photovoice project is to give the participants the ‘means of production’ (a camera) for them to depict their reality in ways they personally choose (Kohler Riessman, 2008). They then are complicit in the interpretive process, ensuring a collaborative and less unequal process of analysis as an outcome. The benefit of this kind of data generation is that it offers significant power to the participant in relation to the subject of discussion, and it is also a method that allows us to “connect... to the self, yet distance us from ourselves” (Mitchell, Weber, and Pithouse, 2009, p 119, in Graham, 2012, p. 87).
This was unexpectedly successful as a tool to build rapport with the children as they had a wonderful time and we had lots of fun doing this project together. However, it was minimally useful as a visual data set as more snaps of arbitrary people at the local pool and of school friends were taken than shots consciously representing family. In retrospect probably more preparation could have been done with the children prior to their taking possession of the camera. However, the conversation with them about the photos, after they were developed, was illuminating in relation to intra-family relationships, and for that it was worth undertaking.

I also periodically took photographs of research participants in their homes and of the home environment with the permission of the people in the photographs.

Observations

While I did not use traditional ethnographic participant observation in the strictest sense during this research, I spent a significant amount of time in the geographic and life space of research participants and thus was able to observe certain household processes first-hand. My level of participation shifted with the different relationships I had with the women, depending on the levels of trust and my knowledge of the household, which reflects normal variances in observation research (Heath, Brooks, Ireland, & Cleaver, 2009). My observations were mainly captured in field notes and have functioned as primary data along with interview transcripts in my analysis. This is particularly important for the information gathered during shared moments with research participants that did not take place during formal interviews. These times ranged from chatting in corridors, parks and streets, accompanying participants to supermarkets, schools, counselling, and visits, assisting with hanging washing, collecting post, visiting participants at their place of skills training, and, in one case, being her chauffeur and a guest at her wedding.

Reflexive field notes

My field notes not only recorded straight observations, but also documented my own role in the research, the ways in which my presence and questions shifted social relationships or participants’ perceptions of self and others, the impact of my race, gender and class on the research process, my internal emotional responses and how this affects the research, how language and translation inserts dynamics into the research, and other foreseen and unforeseen issues of self.

This is in line with feminist research processes and values in the following ways (Harding, 1992; Hesse-Biber & Leckenby, 2004; Naples, 2003; Wasserfall, 1997). Reflexivity is central to the research process in relation to analysis, knowledge creation, ethics, and critical thinking. It is a tool with which to problematise categories of being, and highlight social, economic, and political positionality. It also
opens possibilities for new ethical and moral maps to explore ethical terrains more appropriately and more honestly. Finally, it is important as it opens new spaces for work to be done and knowledge to be subverted and constructed.

Sandra Harding (1992) famously differentiated between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ reflexivity. Strong reflexivity is the awareness of power dynamics in the research process, and challenges the authority of the author and of the power differences in the field. Finlay (2002) describes the processes of mutual collaboration, social critique and discursive deconstruction, where attention is paid to the ambiguity of meanings in language used, as key to the notion of strong reflexivity. Weak reflexivity, what I prefer to call ‘personal’ reflexivity, is the reflection of your own responses to the research, the research relationship, and the process of research co-construction; it requires continued self-awareness and self-questioning throughout the research process. Finlay (2002) identifies introspection and intersubjective reflection, where researchers explore the mutual meanings emerging within the research relationship, as key to personal reflexivity.

Language issues

My language competency is limited to English, and I wanted to conduct my own interviews and analysis as the quality of the data in a study such as this depends to a large extent on the relationship of trust built with participants. Hence I made it a criterion that all the women were comfortable to use English as a medium of conversation. This was successful to varying degrees. Only in one case (Nandi) did it become clear during the process that our interaction was very superficial due to language limitations; I therefore arranged for an interpreter, Pinky Nkete, who joined me for all our subsequent interviews. This was critical in the process of learning about this woman’s life. This same interpreter helped me when interviewing Nandi’s mother and father (separately). A different, male, interpreter accompanied me to one family member’s interview in a different household (the male partner of a research participant).

Language and issues of interpretation have substantial significance in a qualitative endeavour. Interpretation inserts not just another person into the relationship, but also another process of meaning-making in the journey of the research. Krog, Mpolweni and Ratele (2009), in their book on understanding one of the women who testified about gross human rights violations at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, share their journey of discovery in an intricate and intimate discussion on the role of translation in creating meaning. They explain how language awareness and interpretation is far from merely a technical skill and demonstrate its role in restoring “the dignity of the testifier” (Krog et al., 2009, p. 55). My experience with the interpreter, Pinky, generated another layer of conversation in the research as she became invested in the story and in the woman herself.
The gravitas of the experience was enhanced by her presence, and her being emotionally moved by the story of the participant elevated the participant’s story to one of importance. My own responses were different with Pinky there: when, for example, she cried after a particularly difficult and sad interview, I was able to unpack the impact of this in discussion together, helping us both, rather than recording this in my field work journal only.

Data analysis

A synthesis of two related analytic methods, thematic content analysis and thematic narrative analysis, describes my analysis process in this study. Both focus specifically on the content of the data, what was said, rather than the form or symbolism, how or why it was said. Both are invested in thick descriptions and rich detail and understand research as constructivist, but they differ in how they treat the body of research data.

A particular feature of narrative thematic analysis that differentiates it from other qualitative analytic methods is that “narrative scholars keep a story ‘intact’ by theorizing from the case rather than from component themes (categories) across cases” (Kohler Riessman, 2008, p. 53). In other words, a narrative analysis is searching for ‘stories within the story’, looking for the voices that emerge within each narrative (Chase, 2008). This is in contrast to the typical qualitative thematic analysis which tends to use smaller units of data and links themes across cases more (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). While I have tended to use smaller data units than is usual with narrative thematic analysis, I have done so primarily within a particular case, thus preserving the narrative of the case as a whole and not breaking the data up into separate ‘sound-bites’.

The data analysis process was circular and iterative, and took place over the lifetime of the research, not just at one phase. The first part of the analytic work took place in my research journal where the initial thoughts about the data were recorded, and an early conversation with myself about the meaning of the lives of these women took place. Some of these issues have persisted, some were abandoned when member checking and other forms of credibility testing revealed their minimal relevance. As a body of texts started building in the form of interview transcriptions, the formal analytic work of coding began.

The computer software Atlas-ti was used to manage the data set, and most of the coding and early thematic stitching took place in Atlas-ti. First cycle coding is the processes used during the initial engagement with data and produces early and simple coding schemes (Saldana, 2009). I began my first cycle coding with open coding, a process of breaking up the whole into individual units of data,
considering the conversation line by line. In-vivo codes, codes that use the participant’s own words, and short descriptive codes are both common (Saldana, 2009).

This coding process began painting a picture of the key issues under discussion, and in some cases, generated particular themes. A typical next step in qualitative thematic analysis would be to join these codes into themes, then families, then networks, which creates a final analytical body of knowledge (Friese, 2012). However, this process links ideas across the research participants, whereas in my case my interest was in a ‘vertical’ (within each case) rather than a ‘horizontal’ (across each case) analysis. This is where my methodology diverged from typical qualitative thematic analysis, and began to resemble thematic narrative analysis.

Second cycle coding is the process of refinement and re-coding in response to constant comparison (Saldana, 2009), the subsequent, conceptual level analysis (Friese, 2012), a growing knowledge of the data, and asking questions from the outside looking in. Following from the diversion from horizontal to vertical analysis, my second cycle of coding focused on each case separately, and I began to see not just themes but also narrative strategy emerging. The term “narrative strategy draws attention to the complexity within each [participant’s] voice – to the various subject positions each woman takes up – as well as to diversity among [participants’] voices because each [participant’s] narrative strategy is particular” (Chase, 2008, p. 73). Because stories do not ‘mirror’ the real world in exact ways, narratives present ‘nonunitary subjectivities’ and ‘unsettled identities’ (Chase, 2008), and analysis is the process of not merely listening to the content, but uncovering subject positions, complexities and ambiguities within each story thread (Chase, 2008; Kohler Riessman, 2008). This formed the basis of the chapters that draw on single case analyses.

Finally, the individual stories were read with an eye for threads of meanings that wove through them, what others have called ‘essential elements’ (Dahlberg, Dahlberg, & Nystrom, 2008, p. 112). These elements allowed the sewing up of the interpretations drawn from the individual narratives into explanations that engaged with the women as a group.

Despite my adherence to a collaborative and co-constructivist style in this research, I have chosen to use my researcher’s ‘authoritative voice’, which means the interpretation was done primarily by myself, but through this, I have tried to make visible everyday and unscrutinised practices, structural and cultural features of our everyday world (Chase, 2008).
Trustworthiness

In order to be taken seriously, all research should be defensible and worthy of trust. Positivist designs use the notions of validity and reliability to definitively judge the quality of a piece of research; these notions are not very helpful in the context of qualitative inquiry, as they assume the superiority of quantitative standards and norms and imply the existence of a ‘truth’ that can be found (Smith & Hodkinson, 2008). There are profound differences in how quantitative and qualitative researchers judge research quality, and therefore, as Smith and Hodkinson (2008, p. 427) assert: “The politics of criteria is inescapable”.

Qualitative researchers have tackled this issue in various ways, but overall the consensus is that the validity of research should not be measured by the replicability of the findings, or the discovery of ‘truth’; the value of qualitative research is, indeed, the opposite: the richness of description, the meaning of experiences, the eschewing of superficiality, the revelation of micro-processes, and the unpicking of politics. Partly due to the nature of these outcomes, and partly because the qualitative researcher uses the self as a research tool, no study can be exactly replicated in this paradigm. I would support, rather than an entirely relativist position which I believe to be devoid of social justice ethics, a ‘critical realist’ position, which asserts that validity derives from generating findings that do have an important relationship to realism, but only in provisional ways: accounts of events are always mediated by time, language, and relationship (Merrill & West, 2009).

The idea of trustworthiness is a helpful idea for me. Different authors identify a variety of key factors that can contribute to trustworthiness, although those writing about qualitative research methods are becoming more and more reluctant to offer standards for evaluation, as this is seen as “refin[ing] and squeeze[ing] the novelty and richness out of experience in favor of some bygone notion of rigor and efficiency” (Altheide & Johnson, 2013, p. 408). Instead, each researcher is expected to demonstrate why readers can and should trust their product, and to show scholarship and personal accountability. Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) criteria of trustworthiness include credibility, confirmability, and dependability, and below I will use these ideas loosely to expose the processes of my own research.

Demonstrating credibility is enhanced by the following (Kohler Riessman, 2008; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Naples, 2003):

1. **Prolonged engagement and persistent observation**: trust only develops over time, and only with trust can participants offer rich and full stories to the research project; further a ‘long’ gaze over time allows the researcher to understand meanings for research participants in ways that render the research more ‘real’ and reflective of the lives under discussion. My
involvement with women in this research began in 2011, and in some cases continues to this day. I got to know all the women over multiple interviews and informal interactions, and while some relationships were fuller than others, all offered more than a superficial engagement. Further, I have been working with the broad issues around the CSG since 2006, giving me more than nine years of engagement with these issues.

2. **Member checks:** the idea of member checks is that research participants need to be overtly involved in the construction of research material, the ‘expert’ on their own lives who can offer feedback when the researcher might have got things wrong or when the researcher is uncertain about something. For me this was a simple matter of clarifying facts, experiences and meanings on subsequent visits when I believed I had either misunderstood or missed out on something important. I did this in informal and verbal ways during natural conversation, not based on texts.

3. **Analysis of negative cases:** in a study which engages with few research participants, it is important that some divergent views and experiences are reflected. This is not because this will offer representivity, but because it allows the revision of understanding through divergent experiences and hindsight (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), ensuring that the study does not appear as a single case study. In my searching for research participants, I specifically chose to engage women with divergent experiences, different race groups and languages. This offered different stories that enhance the credibility of the findings.

4. **Reflexivity and accounting for the self:** the field journal that I kept was filled with both observations and self-reflections. This assisted me to better enter the lifeworld of participants as I was able to identify my own ‘barriers’ to understanding, such as assumptions or prejudices or resistance, and attempt to move beyond them. It also assisted me to engage in the empathy required to really try and live ‘in the shoes’ of participants. In addition, I have chosen to ‘write myself into’ the thesis, using what has been termed ‘the confessional style’ (Fontana & Frey, 2008) in order for my insertion to be both upfront and interrogated, rather than assuming the interviewer is a neutral tool for information gathering. Further, this style facilitates realistic and authentic research, rather than research that claims truth and total accuracy.

There is consensus among qualitative researchers that it is necessary to demonstrate the process of the construction of findings for a study to be worthy of trust. Confirmability refers to being able to track your interpretations back to the raw data to show they are drawn from the evidence and not
constructed outside of the empirical space. Despite a distaste for the word for some (such as Smith & Hodkinson, 2008), this can be described as an ‘audit’ trail. In my case, the audit trail consists of the following (drawing from Lincoln and Guba, 1985); the documents described below are all saved on two computers, in cloud storage, and appear on the audit disc that accompanies this thesis (Appendix C).

1. **The preservation of raw data throughout the life of the project**: I have possession of all the interview audio files, the written transcripts (in the original language of the interview as well as the translation into English), and the collection of observations, reflections, and comments that make up my research journal, written by hand in notebooks and typed up into electronic files.

2. **Data reduction and analytical evidence**: this consists of the analytical code lists and the coding of each transcript which was done in Atlas ti, the memos and analytical notes in Atlas ti that were written during the coding phase, and also the written notes of analytical ideas from the research journal and notes taken during supervision sessions.

3. **Data synthesis**: this consists of themes, individual narrative descriptions, and the drafts and development of each section and, eventually, each chapter.

Finally, dependability refers to the process of the research, and whether the processes were planned and systematic, even if flexible (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Earlier in this chapter I describe the procedures used, and ensure that findings are drawn from evidence in explicit ways. It is not my intention to make any part of this process ‘mysterious’ as that would detract from the dependability of the study.

One particular concept I wish to explore here is the applied notion of ‘truth’ during my research. The idea of ‘the truth’ was challenged directly in the process of constructing a few of the stories. I offer this description here to illustrate that trustworthiness of the research does not necessarily mean the research exposes the exact and factual truth.

As an outsider with no other real links to the lives of these women, I had no means to corroborate their stories and so they could choose to represent themselves in any way they preferred. Sometimes this meant they left certain details out or even created new parts to the story. This experience is not a new insight: psychology researchers have long referred to this as ‘impression management’ (Thunholm, 2001; van Breda & Potgieter, 2007). The literature implies this is usually a conscious choice, in order to present the participant in the best possible light during interviews, and, especially in more positivist leaning texts, many suggestions are made about how to minimise the deleterious
impact on the research findings (Ströber, Dette, & Musch, 2002; van Breda & Potgieter, 2007). In the case of my research I do not conceive these ‘stretches’ of the truth as problematic, as they are revealing the story via other means. These moments were not only conscious choices, but also unconscious processes, the construction of how women wished their lives were. Aspirations are another kind of truth, as are purposeful ‘cover-ups’. I cannot know exactly which parts of which stories are examples of these, but there were some moments that stood out clearly for me. I do not believe this was very common, and it mostly did not bother me at all; in other words, I had no desire to ‘find out’ the ‘truth’.

The exception was my experience with Nandi, one of the women I came to know best. In her case, there were things that didn’t make sense to me, and in the process of trying to work out the meanings of her story, I did attempt to clarify, and sometimes even corroborate, her version with her parents, especially her mother. What bothered me in particular was that the parts of the stories that were directly contested by her parents were details that were severely traumatic or shocking. I did not know why it was these details especially that she seemed to be changing; sometimes swapping one severely traumatic incident with another, equally harrowing. I could not understand the narrative, relationship, or intra-psychic value of doing this, and so could not work out the meaning behind these story changes. Of course, it could be the case that one of her parents chose to change the details of the story themselves, but my intuition suggested it was Nandi making the changes. Eventually I needed to make peace with the uncertainty, realising that it was a reflection of Nandi’s own sense of fluctuating identity and lack of internal coherence. In fact, Kohler Reissman (2008) makes the point that incoherence and fragmentation in testimonies is often a result of the internal disintegration that is common from experiences of trauma, citing examples from research on Holocaust survivors and others. She adds that, even in non-traumatic life circumstances, “life as lived does not have coherence, it is essentially prenarrative... With interpretation comes a story and here ‘fiction plays a mediating role’ (Ricoeur, 1991, pp. 28). Internal consistency of a life story may be illusory (if present at all)” (Kohler Riessman, 2008, pp. 190-191).

Limitations of the research design

A key limitation has already been mentioned: the fact that I spoke to the women in English, the home language of only one of the participants. This means the women’s narratives were conveyed in a language that was to a greater or lesser extent not their language of greatest fluency and comfort: this surely had an impact on the structure, flow, delivery and perhaps meanings of their stories. In one case I needed to use an interpreter, and this always mediates the narrative form and might change subtle meanings too.
In addition, while I built trust and rapport to the best of my ability, it is possible that participants chose to hide key facts and experiences, and also might have offered answers that they believed were socially desirable (‘impression management’).

The reflexivity I chose to use in this research was a good buffer for challenging my own assumptions coming from my personal social positioning, especially in relation to class and race. Nevertheless, even if I always used this skill well, which is debatable, it could never entirely allow me to ‘step into someone else’s shoes’, and there are certain things I may not have heard or understood the significance of due to certain social blindness.

In the next section I will address the issues of ethics and reciprocity in great detail. However I wish to point out here that the principle of ethics of care I tried to uphold, a distinctly feminist, qualitative approach, does mean that I did not conduct this research with emotional detachment. The times of intense emotional engagement could have clouded my interpretation of the narratives being offered.

Ethical considerations

In this section I will deal briefly with what I call ‘procedural ethics’, which entails the process by which I ensured that no harm would come to my participants through their participation in my research. I will then turn to a longer discussion about the ‘ethics of care’, an approach to research that prioritises relationships with and responsibilities to the people with whom you are working in your research.

Procedural ethics

All good research should have measures in place to ensure their research participants come to no direct harm via their participation in a study. These measures are often technical in nature and can be prescribed if research takes place under the auspices of an institution, such as in my case. Some of these would fall under the notion of ‘principle ethics’ (Sevenhuijser, 2003b) which stands in contrast to the ethic of care approach, although these two approaches can successfully be combined (Hochfeld & Graham, 2012; Sevenhuijser, 2003b).

Ethical clearance from the Faculty of Humanities Ethics Committee at the University of the Witwatersrand was obtained prior to beginning this field work. Participants took part on an entirely voluntary basis, and in two cases individuals who originally agreed to be a part changed their minds and no pressure was put on them to continue. Information gathered from them was not used in this thesis. Participants signed informed consent forms (explained verbally to everyone regardless of their literacy skills), and written permission was given to audio record all interviews (bar two initial
interviews with one respondent who was not comfortable with the recording until later). Written permission for any photographs taken and used was also obtained.

The research was explained to all participants and I made it clear that the research has no ‘official’ status in relation to the Child Support Grant: I was not in the position to obtain grants on behalf of the participants, nor could I intervene to help manage difficulties the participants may be having in receiving social grants. However, prior to the field work I did gather some basic information on grant services in the area (such as where to apply, when the office is open, what forms must accompany an application, and so on) and referred individuals (not only research participants) who had questions to the correct place. Furthermore, I made it clear upfront that while the research would not result in any negative material consequences (for example, it would not cost the participants anything in any way), it would also not result in any overt material benefits for the participants, such as cash payment or access to employment.

I formally approached Sophiatown Psychological Services, a counselling NGO situated nearby my research sites, and they agreed to accept any referrals I might make, which I did on a number of occasions. Finally, I committed to refer anyone in a dangerous or particularly vulnerable position, especially children, to appropriate services. Sadly, while I did so in two cases, neither resulted in any further assistance: one case was when I believed social work intervention was required to monitor the needs of the children in one woman’s household, and formal welfare services did not respond despite many follow-ups, and another time was for addiction services to a woman’s family member but she did not follow through with the service.

Finally, I formally included the children in one family in the study. Permission was first sought and given from their mother, and then directly from the children themselves. Signed consent was given by their mother and the children gave formal verbal consent.

**Ethics of care**

The approach known as the ‘ethics of care’ (Bozalek, 2014; Cockburn, 2005; Kittay, 1999; Sevenhuijsen, 2003b; Tronto, 1993), “proposes... interdependency, care and solidarity as basic moral phenomena and [suggests it is imperative] to integrate these in our thinking on ethics” (Sevenhuijsen, 2003b, p. 394). Formal and informal caring work, provided predominantly by women the world over, is undervalued and under-recognised. The ‘ethics of care’ field foregrounds the centrality of care and dependence in human lives, and argues that care is relational rather than substantive. In addition it sees care as more than just a practice, it is also a moral and political concept. It is this approach that
shaped my interaction with the women in this study, and that influenced particular research practices in the field and in the interpretation process.

Three distinct ethical issues, consistently raised by feminist theorists (Harding, 1988; Naples, 2003; Reinhartz, 1992; Wolf, 1996), have relevance here: first, social positionalities, and, relatedly, the issue of reciprocity; second, the control over the research process; and third the politics of data interpretation (Hochfeld & Graham, 2012).

Researchers are socially dominant over research participants in most cases due to the strength of their social positionalities as individuals in relation to race, gender, language, life opportunities and particularly class differentials. South Africa’s inequality along lines of especially race and class intensifies this relationship imbalance in the research process (Swartz, 2011). Remarkably for South Africa, ‘whiteness’ as research privilege is too often overlooked as a relevant factor in shaping the research, even though there is local and international intellectual precedent for doing so (Bozalek, 2011; Frankenberg, 1993; Swartz, 2011).

As a means to engage with these issues, I find the notion of the ‘citizen anthropologist’ a compelling one, described by Becker, Boonzaier and Owen (2005, p. 132) in the following manner:

> It would be a fallacy to assume that our relationships with the people studied were quasi naturally more equal and intersubjective, simply because we – as citizen anthropologists – share the same wider geographical and political-historical space with our ‘subjects’. ... Being ‘citizen anthropologist’, instead, indicates a commitment to the broader social context and, most importantly, to issues of equality with the fellow-citizens among whom we work.

This idea refers to the fact that socio-political power relationships, constructed through centuries in advance of the study, are the context of the research and have to be delicately negotiated in the field. In my case, being white and middle class immediately set me apart from my participants, and was exacerbated by education and my competence in English. While these differences set me apart and sharply defined my relative privilege and their relative disadvantage, it also assisted in that it positioned me as an outsider in their world, and allowed them an openness that might have been much more difficult with an insider. Another means of managing this was using my training and experience as a social worker to mitigate the natural social distance that my race and class created in the process of relationship building with the research participants, and actively using my gender and motherhood status as a space of commonality to bind these relationships.

A related issue that was present throughout this research was the ethics of reciprocity. While Swartz (2011, p. 56) notes that giving is reciprocity that helps to “flatten the power gradient”, gifts also,
paradoxically, reinforce class and power distinctions between the researcher and participant (Hochfeld & Graham, 2012). I chose to use gifts of food (usually in the form of fruit or vegetables) at every visit as a means of thanking participants, demonstrating an ethic of care, and recognising their material needs in relation to my own privilege. In one household I occasionally brought second hand books for the children too to ‘feed’ their clear love of reading. This was genuinely appreciated in every case, and I was thanked authentically verbally and in the cementing of relationships. However, it placed me in a position of ‘giver’, and I constantly had to manage the expectation that I was a material and social resource for my participants. I wanted to help, and did so in other ways too (referrals for services, trying to use my social capital to intervene on behalf of the women), but I certainly didn’t want to set up a ‘powerful’ vs ‘powerless’ dynamic. I was successful to a varying degree: in one case I am still seen, years later, as the ‘rescuer’ and ‘source’ of all good things, despite my failure to solve so many of the material and social problems presented to me. It is a cause of continued discomfort that I not only appear to be all-powerful, but also continue to ‘fail’. But in most of the other cases I think this ethic led to more genuine and reciprocal relationships with participants.

Secondly, the control the researcher exerts over the research process requires the researched to comply and follow rather than set the agenda. This includes unequal exchange (the researcher asking questions and the participant responding), and the choice of topic or direction (Naples, 2003). What surprised me in this work, however, is how much agency the participants did actually display in the conversations. They were far more likely to take control over the content of the discussion than I expected, and there were times I realised that in fact they had led the entire interview process rather than myself. As the opportunity to speak about pressing issues in their lives was at times fulfilling their own specific needs, my releasing control over the process was a form of care in that we would thus both get something important from the exchange.

Finally, the writing and reporting phase of the research process is frequently conducted entirely separately from the research participants and in this way the researcher has great power over the interpretation of the information given to them. This has implications not just for the individual research participants, but in relation to the politics of representation as a social group too (Denzin, 2008). Clandinin and Connelly (2000, p. 174) remark that a hallmark of ethical research is the care taken “to compose a text that does not rupture life stories”. Care does not imply the need to keep silent about uncomfortable features of a person’s story, but it does recognise the power of written text to destroy people’s lives and worlds. Interpretation is the meaning you ascribe to the stories shared with you and is therefore constructed and not the ‘truth’. Taking responsibility for this and acknowledging its interpretive nature is ethical practice, despite how much the product might vary.
from the person’s own perspective. Using an ethic of care thus acknowledges the obligation to enhance the lives of our participants and people like them (Hochfeld & Graham, 2012).

The pictures I paint here of the research participants certainly diverges from how they might want to be depicted. But I reveal the awkward, the unpleasant, the shocking, and offer interpretations that are at times critical and even painful, in order to pay tribute to these women’s genuine struggles to live lives with meaning. My intention is to show the rich complexities in the lives of people who are too often merely caricatures of the good or the bad, and in this way I hope to interrupt a politics of erasure currently at work. Even if these women don’t like everything in this thesis, I trust that they recognise my genuine ethic of care.

Conclusion

The threading together of slices of women’s experiences into stories in this study was dependent on many different and carefully chosen methodological processes; the outcome is not exactly replicable, or representative, or the ‘truth’, but is a collection of narratives that reflect the real lives and concerns and complexities of these women’s lives with integrity. The process of generating narratives was not a conventional one in that women in this study largely offered short comments on a variety of issues rather than fully constructed narratives, but piecing these slices together allowed me to eventually build stories about their lives. Hence my titular description of this study as a narrative without stories, and stories without narrative.
When I first met Jane in 2011, she was a seriously clinically depressed 37 year old woman. Her life had gone from professional success, financial security, and familial happiness, through severe trauma and crisis, to a life of difficulty, characterised by long illness, daily struggle, unemployment, and food insecurity.

Jane is an overweight and usually carelessly dressed Zulu speaking woman, born in Mpumalanga to a life of physical and emotional hardship. She was physically abused by her mother, and between the ages of approximately six to nine, was repeatedly sexually abused and raped by her older brother, until he left home. She married a man she met while she was still in police training college, and they had five children together. Her husband ran a successful airport transport service and Jane had trained as a police officer and was working at the Flying Squad as an emergency telephone operator, and then at the Sophiatown Police Station. They therefore had financial security, and, according to her, a happy family and an excellent marriage.

A tragic event in 2009 changed this life forever: her husband was abducted and killed, and soon after this Jane fell into a severe depression. So severe, in fact, that she was hospitalised for a number of months and has little recollection of this period. Jane emerged from this time to the stark reality that she had been dismissed from her job due to her long absence. She immediately contested this dismissal as unfair as she had been clinically ill over this time, but as of October 2014 this case was still ongoing and she was living in a strange limbo for years in that she was not earning any salary but could not look for work while her case was still pending with the South African Police Service (SAPS).

Nathi, a Zimbabwean, was a friend of Jane’s and her husband’s, and from the moment it was clear her husband was missing, Nathi stepped in to help Jane. He was the one who unquestioningly moved into her flat when she was hospitalised, looking after her children, including her two-month old baby. Nathi is still there today. Together they have two children (their youngest, Mpho, was born in 2013, after the majority of my interviews with Jane had been completed and so I refer to Mpho sparingly in this chapter). In January 2014 Nathi and Jane were married in a moving ceremony at a wedding sponsored by her church and her friends. This ushered in a new period of hope and promise for them both.

Nathi, 29 years old when I met him, is a trained mechanic, but, without a South African work permit, is unable to get formal employment. He fixes people’s cars privately, but working on his own and without his own workshop in which to work, he is vulnerable to non-payment by his clients, which happens regularly. For most of the period I was interviewing Jane, she was receiving between two and four CSGs, and this, along with Nathi’s unpredictable earnings, was their only income.

The household is a large one. In 2011 there were 10 people living in a run-down three-bedroomed flat: Jane and Nathi, five of Jane’s children (her eldest had moved out by then), and two relatives Jane was also taking care of: her deceased step-mother’s 14 year old whose immediate family never came forward to help when her mother died, and her sister’s seven year old daughter, as her sister, a homeless drug addict, is unable to care for her child. They live in official police accommodation (the SAPS Sophiatown flats) and are regularly threatened with eviction due to Jane’s uncertain employment status.
Jane has heavy childcare responsibilities and no support from her extended family. She also remains prone to depression and has high blood pressure. Jane is an intelligent, charismatic and caring woman fallen on very hard times.

Jane’s story is one of remarkable strength and perseverance, but it is also a story about the fragility of success. The many rungs Jane climbed to achieve happiness, financial security, a profession, and a warm, close family life, were completely erased by tragedy, trauma, illness, and injustice. Jane, never a candidate for the CSG in her ‘previous’ life, was desperate for the cash transfer when circumstances changed. I wish to explore, through Jane’s story, what this grant can do for someone who could be living a very different life. My argument here is that the grant helps, but that the grant alone cannot provide the pathway to ‘graduation’ from social assistance because of the failures of other areas of welfare services and social protection. Jane has fallen into need and is not a typical portrayal of long-term and persistent poverty that so many other women receiving grants represent. Jane needs a ‘hand-up’, and not a ‘hand-out’; sadly, the CSG is unable to offer this in and of itself.

The second part of this chapter engages with the issue of care, focusing on masculinities, fatherhood, and the intimate relationship between Jane and her partner. What is interesting here is the unusual circumstances of care that Nathi offers to Jane and how this facilitates her ability to cope. Below is a photograph of Jane, Nathi and the family:

Figure 10: Jane with her family.
The suffering of institutional injustice

In this section I want to differentiate between institutionalised injustice and institutional injustice. I understand institutionalised injustice to mean attitudes and practices that have become normative or acceptable or the status quo, such as institutionalised racism or homophobia. In contrast, institutional injustice, at issue here, is more about actual institutions such as the state, or the market, or drilling down further, the education system, or the healthcare system, and the ways in which their policies and/or practices directly disadvantage, humiliate, or harm individuals.

Concern about institutional practices is not merely to appease moral disquiet, but because it causes circumstances of great injustice for the people affected. Fraser’s (2013b) notion of participatory parity requires social arrangements to allow everyone to participate in a social interaction on a par with one another, therefore any institutionalised as well as institutional obstacles that prevent someone from full participation is a form of injustice. In addition, institutions should be assessed for their impact on our actual lives and the actual workings of political and social interactions, and not just for their symbolic worth (Sen, 2009). In Jane’s story the devastating consequences of a set of specific institutional injustices are laid bare, and demonstrate the importance of actual and substantive rights vs symbolic or formal rights. Jane’s formal rights don’t change in the course of this narrative, nor do the institutions of democracy, the state and its obligations, the context of labour regulations, and so on. It is rather that the functioning of these institutions fails in some fundamental ways, and in doing so deny Jane her substantive rights to these institutions, and thus change Jane’s life for the worse. It is this messy reality of political and institutional functioning that leads Sen (2009, p. 86) to so vehemently and persuasively argue throughout his writings on justice that “we can never simply hand over the task of justice to... social institutions and social rules that we see as exactly right, and then rest there, and be free from further social [obligations to assure they are functioning as they should]. To ask how things are going and whether they can be improved is a constant and inescapable part of the pursuit of justice”.

One distressing consequence of Jane’s experiences is that she acutely feels her life is split into a ‘before’ and ‘after’, both in relation to financial security and in relation to her own identity (that is, how she understands herself). The ‘previous’ Jane had a life she valued, it was a life that included forms of freedom and dignity, whereas the ‘current’ Jane has a life of lack and struggle, devoid of the choices she had in the past. In the following extract she makes this clear:
Jane: Ja, when my husband was still alive, actually we were fine, we never had this problem.

Tessa: So it’s almost like after you lost him your life changed.

Jane: It’s like he took away that other (previous) life with him, sometimes when I think about that I ask, how can he do that ‘cause he knows there are kids.

Tessa: So do you still think you are the same person?

Jane: No, I feel differently.

Tessa: So it’s like there was one Jane before and now there is another one?

Jane: Yes, yes... Because my husband used the car [for his shuttle business], he was taking people to the airport, everywhere, so we were making a lot of money. We had [contracts to transport] staff from different companies... So he was making a lot of money even my salary I didn’t have to use it. But now.

Tessa: Very different life to the one you are having now?

Jane: Very, quite different.

Her slide into unemployment, depression, and crisis was precipitated by the first institutional injustice: Jane was dismissed from her position at the SAPS during the worst of her illness, and therefore had none of those supports she was entitled to as an employed individual at a large state service. The services due to her should have been paid sick leave, the guarantee of her previous position when she was able to return to work, the continuation of her work-funded medical aid, the continuation of her work-linked accommodation without the threat of eviction. The way Jane describes the process of dismissal she underwent is illustrative:

Jane: [Rebecca] is a SAPS member... she was here as a social worker to witness [the dismissal]. So when I was filing [my request for a review of the dismissal], she called me one day at the station, she says I was worried that we brought you the [dismissal letter that day]. Do you know, do you remember what happened? I told her I don’t know what you are talking about, then she said, I did see that, you didn’t see what was happening, it was wrong for us to give you the letter of a dismissal on that condition you were. You looked very sick and you looked confused. Then she said to me: the day they want witnesses at the court I want to be there. She even wrote her summaries and took her summaries to them.

Tessa: So she could see for herself?

Jane: Ja, she said it was wrong because you cannot fire someone who has got a severe depression and more especially the way, the looks of it, she did see that something was not right.

Tessa: Ja. Were you here? Were you at home?

Jane: Yes, I was here at home. ‘Cause they gave me [strong medication], I don’t know. Like that time I couldn’t remember anything ‘cause even when I was coming from hospital, I didn’t even know my kids, that I have got kids that I have got to attend to. According to my daughter, she said that the doctor also said they must tell me who is this, who they are and they must remind me that I have got kids, this happened to me so, I didn’t know anybody. Like even in hospital
I was, like, who are these people, where am I? How did I come here, then I was asking questions so that’s why the doctor said to my daughter, you must make sure you remind your mother because if she stays here at the hospital it’s gonna make more money [be expensive] so at least at home you will be: this is, this is, *(meaning you can keep reminding her who everyone is).*

Tessa: You can point out and say I am your daughter and these are your children.

Jane: Mmm. Even my colleagues they say they came here, I know them, then I was asking who are they, what do they want?

Tessa: Ja, ja.

Jane: Why are so many people coming in this house?

Tessa: Who are you? Ja?

Jane: So it’s my daughter who was helping me with that. So the social worker knew about that and she [thought it was wrong]. Like even if you can call her, she will tell you everything, she knows everything then she said to me I mustn’t worry, if they want a witness she will [do it].

Tessa: Uhm, uhm.

Jane: Then at her statement at the Station they said, you mustn’t write a statement like this *(meaning they wanted her statement to support the SAPS actions)*, she said, I don’t have to lie, I don’t have to give you what Jane and I are talking, it’s confidential. So she said [to me] I am not gonna give them... information [that will disadvantage you]; I must find out from my captain [what] to take it out, if it’s really needed for [them to make a case against you] then I have to take it out because if it’s gonna boost [the case for them], I have to. So she was helping.

Tessa: Uhm, uhm, can she be of help to get..., to find out more about your Labour case or because she works for SAPS that she’s not allowed to assist you with that?

Jane: No, she can’t because she even tried to talk to the hospital social workers then they said, it was wrong [what they did to me], there was no one [before in their experience] who was having a severe depression who was dismissed so that thing is wrong... But even at that station there, they were undermining her.

Dismissal while severely ill is a direct contravention of law specifically designed to protect employees.

But it is moreover a profound experience of misrecognition, as this event ‘erased’ Jane’s status as an employed and economically independent member of society.

In addition, Jane’s helplessness in managing to do anything about this injustice is a powerful symbolic means of keeping her ‘invisible’. The ongoing struggle to get answers about her employment status and the unfair dismissal case was a constant theme in our discussions. She was being represented by a union attorney from whom she received almost no feedback on her case. Many of the recurring legal setbacks appeared to be due to incompetence on his part, such as the case being removed from the court case roll due to incorrect documents submitted, or the case being referred from the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) to the labour court as it had been filed at the wrong
court. This ‘limbo’ Jane lived in had many consequences: financial hardship, accommodation insecurity (as she lived in an official SAPS residence there were constant threats of eviction), health problems (this undoubtedly contributed to her depression and high blood pressure), and the lack of purpose and sense of productivity that professional work can provide. These experiences constitute an intense erosion of Jane’s sense of value as a human, precisely Fraser’s argument about the injustice meted out by misrecognition in concert with maldistribution (Fraser, 2013b).

Another consequence of her unfair and unresolved dismissal was the strange experience of being accused of grant fraud, a further institutional injustice: In September 2011 Jane’s CSGs were abruptly stopped. When she investigated, Jane was told that she was fraudulently receiving the money as she was in full-time employment and earning over the means test limit. She discovered that as her case for unfair dismissal was still pending, the SAPS head office still recorded her as employed, and a routine check by SASSA meant they terminated her CSG receipt. Astonishingly, this happened twice: she managed to get her grants reinstated by submitting documents proving her current position, and they were again terminated for the same reason a few months later.

While on the one hand SASSA’s level of follow-up and beneficiary management is impressive via this example, Jane’s experience of this was of being unfairly persecuted at a time when she most needed the CSG as a financial lifeline, accused of using social protection for personal enrichment. This is a classic case of bureaucracy as a ‘blunt instrument’, not being nuanced enough to manage the specificities of individual needs, and rendering invisible her very real struggle for survival and for caring for her family. This is a complacent state that assumes that because the formal protection structures are in place, it does not need to concern itself with arbitrary or misdirected outcomes of state action (Charlton, Unpublished; Gupta, 2012), leading to devastating institutional injustice. A tiny insight into what this does is provided via my field notes over the first period of grant termination:

**20 October 2011**

Interview with Jane, the first in ages. She was clearly depressed – a bit like the first ‘blank’ time I saw her – she is overwhelmed by a string of stressful and awful circumstances, culminating in the termination of her grants for ‘fraud’. She sobbed throughout the interview.

There is no food, no money and no washing powder as her grants have been suspended, from the bigger perspective it is totally institutionally ‘correct’ to review grants and get rid of fraud, but in this case, knowing that she is not fraudulent and seeing what the grant suspension does to a home is awful. I said I would come past tomorrow to bring her bread and soap and toothpaste and washing powder. I don’t feel ok to just be an audience to her struggles and say sorry when I drive home in my car to a home of no wants.
The psychological effects of misrecognition are apparent in these extracts, an issue which Fraser has been criticised for not paying enough attention to (R. Lister, 2007). Critics say that psychic harm is a contingency of injustice, in other words, experiencing injustice by definition creates psychological damage (Honneth, 2003a; R. Lister, 2007). I agree with Lister that by trying to show that the wrongness of injustice should not hinge on the subjective experience of psychic harm (with which I concur), Fraser herself does not appreciate the magnitude that the presence of that harm, when it is executed, can have. In other words, Fraser does not give enough weight to the negative psychological consequences of misrecognition. Jane is certainly psychologically negatively affected by the above institutional injustices: it is not just the economic consequences (maldistribution), or the symbolism of the status changes (misrecognition), but also the deep sense of pain and distress she feels for being ‘kicked when she was down’. This was not just a private experience of harm: the negative public discourses about what has been painted as an epidemic of fraud in relation to the CSG automatically labels Jane as a lazy, irresponsible, and undeserving recipient. This distortion of her circumstances was a real hurt, and a blow to her self-esteem and sense of entitlement. It also engendered apprehension and fear about engaging with the state (Von Holdt, 2010). In addition, it fundamentally undermined another core element of social justice: dignity. Nussbaum (2011) makes the case that achieving resources in the absence of dignity is not an attainment of social justice, and the undermining of dignity is in itself unjust.

The accusation of fraud generated not only maldistribution and misrecognition, but also Fraser’s (2013b) notion of misrepresentation, specifically what she calls ‘ordinary-political’ misrepresentation. This is when someone has been wrongly deprived of the opportunity to participate fully, as peers, or, as in this case, has been wrongly deprived of their rights. Being wrongly accused of fraud and having her grants withdrawn cancelled Jane’s substantive political rights to social assistance. In addition, to get the grant reinstated was not just a case of presenting the right documents, but also a fight for political voice and entitlements. As Fraser comments, by having your rights denied, what Hannah Arendt called a kind of ‘political death’, you are forced into a space of ‘non-rights’. She says that “those who suffer it may become objects of charity or benevolence. But deprived of the possibility of authoring first-order claims, they become non-persons with respect to justice” (Fraser, 2013b, p. 197).

Linking back to my opening comments on institutions, being a ‘non-person’ in the space of institutions foregrounds structure over agency. Structures are necessary and in this thesis I argue that they have the potential to be enormously enabling; in this sense they are incorrectly opposed to agency (Lovell, 2007a). However it is here that Fraser’s insistence that in order for there to be social transformation, there can be ‘no structures without agency’, makes sense. Jane does display agency – she chose to contest the dismissal, and has continued to push her union, her attorney, and the SAPS to resolve the
case. In fact, she directly embodies one of the key components of agency, as defined by Naila Kabeer (1999, p. 438): “people’s capacity to define their own life choices and to pursue their own goals, even in the face of opposition from others”. I believe she will, eventually, find some kind of resolution in this case, and this will be as a result of a persistent exercising of her agency, even when the odds are stacked so forcefully against her. However, exercising individual agency in the face of a monolithic structure might be brave, it might be just, it might even bring a result, but it is unlikely, on its own, to lead to social transformation.

Another area of concern raised by Jane’s story is how welfare services, supposedly existing to support those most vulnerable, fail to adequately assist her widen her capabilities and opportunities. This is discussed in the next section.

The failures of service delivery

In her book entitled ‘Rethinking the South African Crisis’, Gillian Hart (Hart, 2013) argues that while policies and regulations are developed and function at national and provincial levels of government, it is local government that is a key site for conflicts and struggles over issues of social need, social control and governmentality. Local government is at once both a manifestation of the pro-poor policies of the national state, as well as a space of production of the ongoing, unstable, and unresolved social and economic crises that is South Africa today. She is referring in particular to the localised popular protests that have swept across the country more and more intensely over the last decade, and makes the point that it is not that local government is merely engulfed in crisis, but that it is the interface between the state and the population and is therefore the site of contradictions between the ideal and reality. Fraser’s (1989) claim that the interpretation of needs is an intensely contested and political process is borne out by Hart’s analysis, which shows that social protests are not merely an expression of discontent, but a real fight for the legitimacy of needs. While the context and details of my work diverges somewhat from Hart’s, some of her insights resonate with certain issues raised here, such as welfare service failure.

In this section I want to raise the issue of welfare service delivery failure, and explore the outcomes of these failures in the lives of ordinary people. Hart’s (2013) argument helps me understand how the state is not unitary, and how the developmental intentions of national policy can be so far removed from the degree of fragmentation, disinterest and dysfunction that permeate welfare service delivery in South Africa. In this section I want to show that just as the one arm of social development, social assistance, is an important demonstration of the state’s commitment to assisting the poor, the other arm, welfare services, is a demonstration of the state’s failure to do so.
Previous research has identified that the failures of welfare and other services have substantially eroded the benefits of the CSG. In these discussions the erosion has been identified as an economic, and thus distributive, concern, such as when grant money pays for healthcare or educational costs which should be freely available (Patel, 2012b; Patel et al., 2012). However, in this section I demonstrate that it can be symbolic misrecognition too, which accrues from having to continually reassert your needs or continually fight to claim benefits, as described in Jane’s story. I introduce this with a description of the considerable problems in the sector, and then I turn to how some of these problems play out in ordinary people’s lives, illustrated by Jane’s narrative, and demonstrate that the consequence of these failures is the serious undermining of the so-called developmental state.

South African social services are located in a social development paradigm of welfare, described in the White Paper for Social Welfare (1997). This is a well imagined system of social security and social care, offering therapeutic and development services in equal measure to treat social problems and support the population suffering due to historical and structural inequality and poverty. South Africa takes pride in pioneering a ‘new way’ of welfare, avoiding the paternalism, high costs, and heavy bureaucracy of traditional welfare states, but rejecting the neglect of those falling through the wide spaces in the market-driven insurance net favoured by residual nations. Beyond the imaginary, however, South Africa’s successes in welfare are far narrower. The construction of an extensive and effective social assistance programme is, as has been mentioned, undoubtedly the biggest accomplishment of the welfare system post-apartheid. But the efforts expended to develop and fund this have greatly overshadowed the needs of the welfare service arm of the Department of Social Development.

Analysis of South Africa’s welfare sector confirms the glaring imbalance between the strong social assistance side and the poorly funded, overloaded, poorly supported social services side (Patel, 2015). Budgetary allocations are a stark illustration of the relative neglect of social services: the overall budget for social development is substantial, R117.8 billion in 2014 (Budget Process and Sector Analysis Meeting, 2014). However, the lion’s share of this amount has been swallowed by the significant expansion of the social assistance programme. Leila Patel (2015, p. 72) comments that social assistance has crowded out funding support for welfare services because:

...social assistance spending amounts to 94 percent of total social development spending leaving negligible amounts to developmental welfare services. This leaves limited funding available for preventative and developmental aspects of national policy as well as for supportive services for vulnerable persons and families.
The combination of underfunding, structural inefficiencies, and a lack of visionary leadership have resulted in a social welfare service sector beset by problems. To start, the state has a formal obligation to provide services mandated by law, the Constitution, international treaties which South Africa has signed, and social policies. Examples of these would be the range of services and responses committed to in the Child Care Act, such as court-mandated foster care services, the actions required by signing the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, such as preventing child labour, UN and AU agreements and guidelines on the treatment of refugees, and so on.

However, the state does not have the capacity to deliver these services on its own. Traditionally, South Africa has had a strong and extensive NPO sector which offers statutory services on behalf of government, such as child protection services. The problem is that government is legally obligated to offer these services, but when NPOs offer them on government’s behalf, the state behaves as if it is absolved from the obligation of provision and does not pay fully for them (Lofell, Personal Communication, 27 June 2014). Instead of NPOs being financially compensated for the full cost of a service they offer that is the responsibility of the state, the state offers a small subsidy and expects the NPO to fundraise to cover the rest. This is unrealistic in an environment of financial strain and where NPOs, who are partners in service delivery, are forced to compete with each other to raise money to offer services. The NPO sector’s complaint that this funding model is woefully inadequate has been formally legitimised by the Free State High Court, which ruled in 2013 that state funding for welfare services should be fair, equitable and transparent about what the respective contributions of government and NPOs should be for social welfare services ("National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations and Others v MEC for Social Development, Free State and Others (1719/2010) [2013] ZAFSHC 49 (28 March 2013)," 2013). Despite this ruling, budget allocations for the next three years do not depart from historical practices and it is likely that the funding model will remain in place in the near future (Patel, 2015).

These and other welfare services problems have been well-aired: NPOs as well as, to a lesser extent, government social workers, have also long lamented their large workloads, vacant posts, inadequate salaries, and notoriously difficult structural and infrastructural conditions (Patel, 2015; Patel & Hochfeld, 2008). This multiplicity of challenges create imperfect service delivery, and below I wish to illustrate, using Jane’s experiences, how these can negatively affect the lives of individuals.

One of the key deficiencies of our social services is that individuals and families under intense strain are expected to access and use the services that do exist out there without assistance. Jane is a good example of the failings here because she is an educated, literate, confident woman living in a central urban area who was thwarted by the difficulties of sourcing, negotiating, and using the range of
services her family needs: how much harder is it for those with fewer personal resources? It is under these conditions that I slipped into a role of helping, mainly trying to access and refer Jane and her family for what she needed. A few examples follow:

1. I referred Jane to the nearest public hospital for psychiatric care for symptoms of clinical depression.
2. I referred Nokhutula, Jane’s 14 year old relative who lives with her, for bereavement and other counselling at a near-by counselling centre to deal with her mother’s death and the rejection by her late father’s family.
3. I referred Mandisi, Jane’s 17 year old son, who has Downs Syndrome, to a Downs Syndrome association which conducted an assessment and offered a variety of services he needs.
4. I referred Jane to legal aid when she was threatened with eviction from her flat, and to the local ward councillor to investigate public housing options in the area.
5. I referred Jane’s addict sister for rehabilitation services at two different organisations.
6. I gathered some information about bursaries for a good private school nearby to which Jane was keen to send her children.

None of these referrals is particularly complicated, nor are the services that difficult to find out about. But in the context of overwhelming care responsibilities, frequent bouts of depression, and severe financial concerns, she would not have managed to access any of these without my assistance. Jane’s experience prompts me to rethink how we engage people in service delivery. The failure of delivery is not just the well-criticised ‘silos’ and ‘sectorisation’ of services (Patel, 2015), but that people are not understood as embedded in a life of ‘thick needs’, rather than one-dimensional and narrow single needs. These thin needs are externally identified, depoliticised through privatisation, and are linked subtly to an individual deficit approach (Fraser, 1989).

Pragmatically, how would ideal service delivery look? The notion missing, I believe, in the welfare services sector as a whole, is care. I am not implying that these services are all devoid of care, nor that the practitioners working in this field are uncaring. That is patently untrue; in fact, many individuals working in this field have the utmost dedication to caring practices and continue to offer genuine human care even under the most terribly difficult circumstances. It is instead the structural, political, and instrumental nature of the services that is uncaring. The individualised and separate organisation of services, the difficulties in finding information on and then accessing services, the overburdened nature of the services leading to long delays and burned-out practitioners, the functioning of services
in contexts of severe resource constraints, and the lack of integration of services are largely to blame for the lack of care.

An example is the fragmented nature of welfare and other social services. A key issue is single access but multiple delivery. In other words, if somebody accesses a service, they should be given access to and assistance in getting a whole range of other services they may need. Instead, benefits often have to be fought for, and sometimes lost, individually. An illustration is Jane’s experience when trying to get a school fee exemption for her sister’s seven year old daughter, Thenjiwe, who lives with Jane’s family and for whom Jane is receiving a CSG. Thenjiwe’s mother is a drug addict and lives on the streets. Jane described the experience:

Jane: So when I apply for an exemption, they tell me that I must have the full custody of the child from court. And I cannot, my sister is alive. I am just helping because I cannot just ignore the child. They said I must go to court for it and I can’t do that. And then they make me walk around the streets to look for my sister to sign the forms, I found her in Joubert Park but she would not come with me so I made her sign there on the street. But the school, they said every year she had to come every time if she doesn’t make her life better so it’s up to her and then they wont give the child the exemption.

The receipt of a CSG should automatically entitle the recipient to a range of benefits, and then open up avenues to necessary social services without the person in need having to fight for or negotiate the confusing landscape of state and NGO offerings available.

This is the idea behind a ‘one stop shop’ service design, where a person only has to negotiate one route to service delivery, and then is offered a range of service options, with the support to access these and sustain them. This was a common service design amongst NGOs and local government services in the 1990s; but these did not seem to flourish and are now mostly a thing of the past. Their failure can be attributed to a few issues, key amongst them a lack of funding - this kind of delivery will certainly cost more than sectorised services as it is time-consuming and costly to streamline service delivery across sectors, and facilities must be made available in places accessible to the local population - and a lack of leadership - expecting staff to manage this without creative and dedicated leadership which finds ways to make this more feasible and rewarding is unrealistic (Lofell, Personal Communication, 27 June 2014).

Currently, local and provincial government commonly offer generic social work services which in theory do the same thing: the social worker will assist the family to apply for grants, to access schooling, to find housing, give information, and offer basic counselling. However, they are so overloaded with work that the waiting list is long and follow-up is minimal, and their leadership is so conventional and constrained by regulations, that re-imagining the manner in which services are offered is almost impossible. An example is given in Chapter 5 where after a full year of my following
up and requesting help, a social worker still had not contacted a family with potentially devastating child protection needs. This is not the face of a caring developmental state; it is a state which too often functions partially, bureaucratically, and callously.

These examples in a small way show the consequences of an unbalanced welfare model. By funnelling such a large part of the welfare budget into grants, the state has weakened the second arm of the welfare system and welfare services have suffered, but what is also missing is the vision of a caring state, and the active stewardship this implies. Therefore the support that people need in order to convert the grant into real opportunities to change their lives is missing, severely undermining the positive impact of the grant. These outcomes of social assistance expansion are of course unintended, but by not acknowledging and remedying these negative effects, the state fails to deliver the promise of developmental welfare. Gupta (2012), writing about India, examines how red tape and bureaucracy in India undermines state provision of care: the state seems completely insensitive, indeed oblivious to these consequences.

The failure is not ideological in that the intention is pro-poor and developmental as opposed to a regressive or conservative policy environment. Rather, it is a failure of practice, a failure of leadership, a failure of recognition, and a real failure to acknowledge the perverse effects of the most successful programme to eradicate poverty in South Africa to date.

**Redistribution offered by the CSG**

Fraser’s (2003) notion of redistribution justice refers to a change in status from economic exploitation, deprivation or marginalisation, to economic inclusion and participatory parity. To achieve this, she differentiates between affirmative and transformative remedies, acknowledging that the latter by definition eradicate the causes of economic injustice, while the former merely alleviate the outcomes. The distinction is important, as transformative justice in relation to redistribution would fundamentally alter the economic system that requires the presence of a large number of poor people willing to sell their labour cheaply, and a far smaller number of wealthy people to fuel a capitalist economy, such as the South African context. She asserts that affirmative justice would,

seek to redress end-state maldistribution, while leaving intact much of the underlying political-economic structure. Thus [it] would increase the consumption share of economically disadvantaged groups, without otherwise restructuring the system of production. Transformative remedies, in contrast, have been historically associated with socialism. They would redress unjust distribution by transforming the underlying political-economic structure. By restructuring the relations of production, these remedies would not only alter the end-
state distribution of consumption shares; they would also change the social division of labour and thus the conditions of existence for everyone (Fraser, 1995, p. 84).

The idealism of economic transformation is a long way from achievable in the current capitalist and interconnected global economy in which South Africa plays its part. More realistic but far less satisfactory from a justice perspective is an affirmative remedy, of which the CSG is an example. The CSG can intervene to lessen the severity of the injustice, but it cannot alter structural injustice. As McCord and Slater (2015, p. 141) comment:

Social protection transfers can only address a limited set of financial barriers to labour supply and demand, with minimal impact on the structural determinants of under- and unemployment and related issues of social exclusion. Complementary interventions are required for a cash transfer to contribute to the promotion of sustainable employment.

The CSG is not intended to obliterate poverty in South Africa – not even the most enthusiastic government promoter would claim this. Rather, it is a small intervention (although large in scale) which has been shown to relieve the worst desperation of poor people’s lives (Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011), something that is an important theme in Jane’s story too.

While in the sections above I am critical that the CSG does not function as the magical single access to a range of appropriate welfare service delivery, at the same time, it is in Jane’s experiences that we can see the role the CSG plays as a critical financial ‘plug’, not serving as a real income replacement, but offering a thin cushioning when times are extremely hard. Four grants cannot provide food security for a family of 10, but it can offer the chance once a month to buy some staple goods to last a few weeks which is supplemented by the sporadic income earned by Nathi. These goods, consisting of items such as maize, oil, salt, pasta, nappies and basic toiletries are a thin support so that earned income can go on daily food items such as bread, eggs and vegetables. The grants are a critical piece of this family’s survival kit, and while they can and have survived without it for periods, it would not be sustainable over the longer term, both materially as well as emotionally.

Below Jane describes the importance of the grant for her children’s food security, although here, too, the limits are clear:

| Jane:       | I am really trying [to manage], I can say thank you [for the grant] because with the kids I can buy food... it is very hard when they are crying for bread. [When I get the grant] I feel very great, like a good mother, because, I know with kids it’s not like, well, you [an adult] can go hungry but not the kids. But [with the grant] I manage to buy them food. I don’t buy groceries like I used to do when I was working. I just buy those important things that they need, then I must make sure that we’ve got the money that is left to buy the bread as bread is needed every day. But the grant doesn’t last the whole month, yes, it doesn’t last us even half a month. |
Research has lauded the multiplier effects of the grant (Neves et al., 2009; Patel, Hochfeld, et al., 2013; Patel et al., 2012), showing how it can offer security beyond nutrition. In Jane’s case, the grant offered access to health provision when, after my intervention, her previous private psychiatrist offered to see her for free:

Jane: So, I told her that the problem is that I don’t have money [since the medical aid was suspended by the SAPS], that is why I am not coming. She said no, it doesn’t matter. It’s the first doctor that I have heard [say] that, I couldn’t believe she could say that she is going to see me for no money, doctors need money.

Tessa: So when are you going to see her? Did you make an appointment?

Jane: No I could not make an appointment. It is because I don’t have money to go there. You see it’s right in town. So when I get that money [the grant] then I was gonna go but may be next week, during the week, I will see. I can go only when I will be having that money.

The grant then offers a financial resource that has a small but significant material effect on people’s lives. It is in these ways that the CSG can be understood as redistributive following Fraser, but the service delivery failures greatly minimise the distributive effects. Recognising the grant’s successes is important, and this (part) redistribution corresponds in critical ways with Fraser’s model for achieving participatory parity, even if the remedy is affirmative rather than transformatory.

Deepening the analysis of justice, I now turn to considering capabilities in the context of Jane’s narrative.

Capabilities as freedom

Jane’s experiences drive home the importance of understanding capabilities as a combination of internal and external factors, as her previous set of capabilities were drastically reduced by a range of internal factors (such as poor health, trauma) and external factors (such as the death of her husband, loss of job). These factors changed Jane’s capabilities ‘basket’ for the worse.

While in her ‘previous’ life there were of course challenges and difficulties, she made choices (usually with her husband) from a range of options that would enhance her and her childrens’ lives. But the litany of bad experiences drastically reduced her options, until she had very few left and was forced into circumstances and behaviours that would never have been her own choice. In particular, her freedom to live the life she would choose was severely constrained in relation to her bodily health, Nussbaum’s capability two (2011, p. 33), and her control over her material environment, capability 10B (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 34). This is, of course, not static and Jane will hopefully regain some of this
lost ground. For example, as Jane’s mental health improves, her choices widen, and she is able to start taking on new challenges, such as attending a community course in commercial baking (during 2013), and having plans to begin studying social work as a profession in 2015. But these improvements in her ability to make these choices (exercising her freedoms) was the result of a bitter health struggle that she waged largely on her own (along with her family), unsupported by passive or active levels of welfare service delivery.

This is an illustration of both how external factors can severely strangle capabilities, and also how capabilities are connected to the notion of freedom. Capabilities are not just what people can do but also what they choose to do. While capabilities seem useless if they are not ever used, at the same time, it is critical to recognise that the freedom to choose has inherent worth above and beyond the action or behaviour itself. As Nussbaum (2011, p. 25) explains, “To promote capabilities is to promote areas of freedom, and this is not the same as making people function in a certain way... Options are freedoms, and freedom has intrinsic value”.

The notion of freedom is intimately connected to the notion of agency (Sen, 1999). This narrative raises, oddly, both an expression of and the limits of Jane’s agency. Jane is not a passive person, and in relation to agency she has in her past displayed remarkable self-determination, goal orientation, self-action, and impacted on the world, all key elements of strong agency (Crocker & Robeyns, 2009). For example, as a teenager and young woman Jane was politically aware and involved with the struggle for freedom in South Africa. She shares some of this experience as follows:

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I was in politics, and my sister, so the police would often come to our house to search it and harass us. By that stage my mother was in detention. So I had to go out of the country, in exile, me and my sister were in Tanzania. So we studied there and finished at school, and when we came back we were supposed to go back to the army, but instead we both applied to SAPS in South Africa.
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None of this could have happened without Jane’s sense of agency and ability to impact on her world. In this study, there are many points in her narrative where she shows she is exercising agency. In fact, considering the institutional and structural factors against her, she has remarkable perseverance in ensuring she attains the best possible outcomes within constrained circumstances, such as fighting to get her niece’s fee exception at school, succeeding in avoiding eviction from her police accommodation despite her dismissal, continuing to follow-up her dismissal case with the SAPS. This has intrinsic value in and of itself, and instrumental value in that it results in some important gains, widening her actual capabilities (Sen, 1999). However, in some cases, the odds are stacked against Jane, such as when she is trying to battle the structural monolith of the SAPS, and thus her agency has
little ‘impact on the world’, a notion which puts forward that the more the agent’s actions make a difference in the world, the more fully that person is exercising agency (Crocker & Robeyns, 2009).

Finally, Jane’s story supports the verity of Nussbaum’s (2011, p. 30) claim that “a focus on dignity will dictate policy choices that protect and support agency, rather than choices that infantilize people and treat them as passive recipients of benefit”. By treating Jane as undeserving and untrustworthy, she is reduced to a recipient relationship without voice; she is denied an active status and paternalistic decisions are made without considering her specific circumstances.

I now turn to consider the issue of masculinity, fatherhood and care and how this contributes to Jane’s coping with difficult circumstances.

Fatherhood and the ethics of care

Care is a social process that is both personal and political (Bakker & Gill, 2003b; Bezanson & Luxton, 2006; Sevenhuijsen, 2003b; Tronto, 2010). The discussion of the problems in the welfare service sector earlier in this chapter illustrated gaps in the public caring process, where especially responsibility (taking care of) and competence (care giving) are weak and thin (Sevenhuijsen, 2003b). In this section, I want to explore the issue of care in the private space, and show how this connects to public issues.

Gender and care are intimately linked, even in the case of individuals choosing non-traditional gender roles in relation to care. This is always an active choice, as the default position in South Africa is undoubtedly the traditional role of women assuming responsibility for the vast majority of all reproductive labour. In Jane’s narrative, it is striking how unconventionally her partner, Nathi, inhabits the role of care, both as a father and as a partner. Here I want to explore this process and its impact on Jane and the household.

Nathi fell into the role of fatherhood when Jane became ill and he stepped in to help. From the outside he was able to see the need for care in the household, corresponding to the value of attentiveness, or caring about. It was particularly sensitive in that no-one requested he care about this family – his natural empathy in response to their circumstances initiated his attentiveness.

In addition, he assumed the active responsibility of taking care of the family, the second dimension of the moral orientation of care. He has proven a very dedicated, involved and caring father, for both his biological and non-biological children. He has no children from previous relationships and he considers the family as central to his identity. This is illustrated by the following exchange we had:

| Tessa: | Nathi I wanted to ask how you see yourself in the family? Because obviously it’s a bit hard for you that the family was here before you came and you came into the family. What do you |
think..., how do you see your role in the family? What are you important for in this family, in the household?

Nathi: In this house, my [role] is to look after [Jane]. And, Eish, it’s like to look after her, to see how is Jane, how is the kids.

Tessa: You think that your job is to make sure that everybody is fine?

Nathi: Yes, yes. I must look after [all of them], to give them food and to see they go to school. Like a father.

Tessa: You see yourself as a father here?

Nathi: Yes.

Tessa: To all the children?

Nathi: Ja, to all the children.

Tessa: The older kids they knew their father as well. Is it..., do they struggle with having you as a father now or is it easy for them?

Nathi: It is easy for them. Ja (nods)

Jane: He’s quite right. He is very easy with them. They understand him and they like him.

Tessa: Do they call you father? What do they call you?

Nathi: Daddy.

Tessa: They call you daddy?

Nathi: Me, I’m proud of that. That is what I want.

Some of this care is reflected in this photograph of Nathi and the two youngest children at the time, his youngest son fast asleep, below:

![Image](image.jpg)

*Figure 11: Nathi in a fatherhood role.*

Nathi’s sense of place in the family is corroborated by other conversations I had with Jane and the family. For example, Jane here expresses what an important role model he is to Mandisi, her 17 year
old (at the time of the interviews) Downs Syndrome son. Mandisi is a slight and short young man who has minimal speech but is accepted as completely as any other member of the family. He is relatively functional and while he could not live on his own, can take part fully in ordinary family life. Mandisi was an enthusiastic attendee at a vocational training school for mentally disabled young people. Sadly once he turned 18 he had to leave school and now spends all his time at home, which has made him bored and lethargic. This conversation with Jane explaining Mandisi’s love of Nathi took place before he had to leave school:

Jane: ‘cause even..., Mandisi. [Nathi] won’t say Mandisi is disabled, he knows that [Mandisi wants to copy everything he is doing]... okay like when Nathi is cooking he will stand like this next to Nathi. Whatever Nathi is doing, he will stand like this... The only thing that he doesn’t like, is when Nathi is doing the car... I think he is scared... But if it’s something in the house, he will do [whatever Nathi is doing].

Tessa: Ja, that’s great. Mandisi, obviously has a great relationship with Nathi hey?

Jane: Too much, like if I can sit here and Nathi is not here he won’t sit here. He will just go around looking for him. So I have to even say, okay Mandisi, I’m doing that. Can you do that thing... Then, his, his mind is not here it’s, where’s Nathi, where’s Nathi?

This small insight into his relationship with Mandisi is so evocative of both care giving (competence in caring tasks) as well as care receiving, which is all about responsiveness, a mutual receptivity for each other’s perspectives (Sevenhuijsen, 2003b). It also shows Nathi’s recognition of his position as a role model, and his complete willingness to play this role, something sorely missing in so many other fatherhood relationships in South Africa (Shefer, 2014).

Nathi places financial provision as a key role of fatherhood, which is concomitant with perceptions of masculinity that predominate in South Africa. The role of provision as a father is tied up to his own sense of financial independence. His ambition to run a successful business as a mechanic is both connected to his own sense of achievement as well as the tool that would allow him to fulfil the responsibilities of fatherhood. He explains this as follows:

Tessa: Nathi, you were saying that you are proud..., you are proud to be a father. What are the things that are important, that will make you happy as a father?

Nathi: I want my own house [for] my family. And what I want, [my dream] is I want to work, but I don’t want a job, to work for someone else. I want to go and fix a car [on my own].

Tessa: To have your own mechanic shop?

Nathi: My own workshop (nods, laughing).

This notion of financial independence is raised by Nathi in our discussions in a number of different ways, for example, he expressed it in the following way too:
Nathi: You see... According to me it depends on the social situation one find himself/herself, you see I don’t like that I must raise my kids with grant money. If I had a good job I would like it that I raise my kids out of this grant money and would not allow my kids to get a grant from the state. I would really like raise my kids with my own money because I don’t want that in the future my say that they raise by grant money. I must raise my kids from my own money. I want my kids to say that daddy did everything for me.

Nathi’s notion of fatherhood is that it is flawed if you are in any way needing help to provide for your children, and that his role is to ensure his children want for nothing. He sees state assistance as a kind of failure on his part, a necessary evil that he wishes to shake free from as soon as he can. This attests to the social complexities of a sense of entitlement to services when public discourses strongly promote self-reliance and independence: studies have shown how grants can be understood simultaneously by recipients both as a right as well as a shameful admission of need (Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011).

Sadly, in South Africa instead of financial provisioning being one part of the many responsibilities of fatherhood, it is considered the only legitimate means of being a father by many. Studies on fatherhood in South Africa emphasise the importance placed on material and financial support by both men and women in this country, and men’s lack of experience, knowledge, access and often even interest in investing in other roles of fatherhood (Mavungu, Thomson-de Boor, & Mphaka, 2013; Morrell & Richter, 2006; Richter, 2006). Combined with other factors, such as the high rate of unemployment and poverty, shifting family forms, a normalisation of ‘serial monogamy’, and strong gendered norms and roles, absent fathers are extremely commonplace (Mavungu et al., 2013). Formal and informal institutions do not support involved fatherhood, ignoring fathers at best, such as social workers only engaging with women regarding the care of children (Hochfeld, 2008), and actively discouraging fathers, such as when lobola (bride price) has not yet been paid, fathers can feel less culturally entitled to make decisions for and engage with their children (Mavungu et al., 2013; Shefer, 2014).

Further, social norms deride men’s involvement in ‘women’s work’, legitimising men’s lack of engagement with, indeed, interest in, fatherhood roles outside of provisioning (Mavungu et al., 2013). Ironically, though, requesting just financial support for children can be a wasted effort to which the notoriously inefficient maintenance court can attest (Budlender & Moyo, 2004; Khunou, 2006).

It is remarkable, therefore, considering the dominant context of masculinity in South Africa, that Nathi understands fatherhood as both to offer financial security as well as to engage in the reproductive
labour that is traditionally seen as the preserve of women. He expresses this proudly, as illustrated in the extract below:

| Tessa: Nathi so when it’s food for the house, you give money straight to Jane? Or you - |
| Nathi: ya I give it straight to Jane, I give it to my wife because she knows what is short in the kitchen. I give her money and then she will ask me to go with her to Shoprite and get the things that we need. |
| Tessa: You also know what is in the kitchen, he is a good cook this man (said to the translator). |
| Nathi: Yes... I will get something we need in the kitchen and [also] give her money to buy other thing we will need in the kitchen. I can cook, and I don’t wait for my wife to come cook for us. I go to the kitchen and prepare food, especially when I see that she is tired and when the kids are hungry I go to the kitchen put the pots on the stove and prepare a meal. And give the kids food when food is prepared. And I also do the laundry especially on Friday when the kids are back from school, I take their school uniform and wash it for the following week and on Sunday when I come back from church I do the ironing for all kids school uniform. |

Nathi’s involvement in domestic labour and the care giving activities that are central to raising children, such as spending leisure time with children, helping them with homework, expressing love and care directly to children, are most certainly an active choice he has made, rather than a default position. These choices he has made have not always been easy, and he has displayed determination in his resistance of the ‘usual’ (unengaged) expectation of masculinity in relation to fatherhood and intimate partner; for example, he has had to actively change his social life in order to be true to his choice to be an engaged and present father. This is illustrated in the following exchange:

| Nathi: When I started dating Jane I got rid of my friends... intentionally because I realised that sometimes friends can mislead you and encourage you to not use his salary in a correct way. For example, they would tell me how I must use my money and that time I don’t want to use it like they advising, I want to use it my own way and because Jane was already present in my life, I wanted to use it with her not my friends. So this is the reason why I got rid of my friends. I decide that my friend is going to be my girlfriend and wherever I am going I am going to take her with me except when I am going to work. I made this decision because I realise that my friends were mostly doing thing that I don’t like and I knew that my girlfriend would not like those things as well. Because most of them just after we get paid they go straight to the taverns and they don’t even start at home they just go to the taverns. What I have realised is that most of them they don’t even have girlfriend. So it does not make sense to befriend a person who does not have girlfriend, what advice will they give when I need [it]... For example when I will go to my friends and tell them that Jane and I are arguing, they just tell [me] to leave her and that is not good advice. |

Nathi clearly did not see a contradiction between care work and ‘being a man’, but the exchange above shows he did recognise that his understanding of masculinity was different to most men’s. This has similarities to men integrated in care work in a research study by Morrell and Jewkes (2014). While
many yearned to engage in behaviours which are considered part of conventional masculinities, in Nathi’s case, being financially independent, this did not bar them from engaging in other behaviours that were decidedly unconventional for men, such as being a primary carer for a baby, as Nathi did for a period (Morrell & Jewkes, 2014).

Very interesting from a care perspective is that Nathi choosing to take on reproductive labour is not just a sense of shared responsibility for these tasks, and thus values of gender equality, but also it is a form of expression of care for Jane. This is shown clearly in the exchange below, which took place between myself and Jane, but in the presence of Nathi:

Jane: Nathi can clean, after cleaning, wash, after washing, iron, after that go and cook. Then I will say to him, no [you should stop], and he will say “no relax, when I was looking at you; I saw that you’re not fine. Okay?”

Tessa: It’s unusual though Nathi, because a lot of men can sit and do nothing.

Jane: Hoh hai, he's very helpful. Even you can call these one’s (meaning ask the children) they will tell you, that no if maybe Nathi was cooking on Monday, Mama will cook maybe Tuesday or Wednesday or Nathi can cook the whole week, they know... More especially when I'm stressed, when I'm not sleeping at night. I'll just like come in the morning sometimes I can’t even eat, I can’t..., I'm just thinking of whatever problem. He will do those things and ask me, are you okay? And he does [everything] for me.

This exchange offers a slightly different way of thinking about the body of literature on the ethics of care. It is Nathi’s willingness and responsiveness in taking on reproductive labour that expresses care for Jane (and by extension the children), rather than because she is unable to do this labour herself and thus is dependent on him. In other words, she is not unable, or absent; he takes on these tasks not only because he sees sharing them is just, but also to express his care for her, especially when she shows evidence of need (such as when she looks stressed). While Nathi’s care takes place in a private realm, he is inadvertently also acting politically, as he is offering private care in the stark absence of the state. This is not to say he should not be caring, indeed, even as care should be a public good, it cannot be divorced from its fundamentally private dimensions. As Sevenhuijsen (2003b, p. 194) eloquently comments:

    Daily care is everything to do with who one is and who one can be and, thus, with identity. It is inherently linked with embodiment and intimacy. It is part of primary relations and the emotional dynamics with which these are linked.

The supports of social networks and families remain particularly critical to care in developing countries (Shara Razavi, 2011) in the absence of a caring state; the political nature of Nathi’s care is that this is all that there is for Jane. My argument is not that the state should be undertaking these activities for Jane; in fact, no welfare states undertake direct hands-on care of relatives in the private space of the
home (Morrell & Jewkes, 2014, p. 339). Rather, it’s that Nathi’s private caring is not supplemented by public facilities that could assist or even slightly relieve his care burden as well as Jane’s. Support for family members in care work is the international trend in comprehensive welfare systems elsewhere (Morrell & Jewkes, 2014).

One final point about the care that Nathi offers: receiving care from Nathi does not merely assist Jane in domestic tasks, nor does it only offer her children a second engaged and present caregiver in the home; it is also a form of private recognition of Jane exactly when her recognition in the public space is being undermined and destroyed. This is symbolic and psychologically healing: while she is invisible and a ‘non-person’ in the outside world, within the private space of the household she is highly visible and significant as a human. In a small sense, Nathi offers Jane a private form of justice.

Through care, Jane and Nathi create a sense of family, beyond the collective of members of a household. The closeness of the children is hinted at in this photograph, below, taken at a local park:

Figure 12: Family time outside at a local park.

I now proceed to raise the question of choice as a form of freedom in the context of intimate relationships.

**Settling for security: relationships in the context of the CSG**

It was not my expectation that in a relationship involving a caring, supportive, committed, non-violent man, I would also discover relationship dissatisfaction. Among my research participants, Nathi fulfils the ‘ideal’ partner (or relative, in those cases where women do not have a partner) far more neatly than anyone else I have been told about. Jane recognises this with great clarity; but also shared her discontentment with the relationship. Her main worry is that he takes her lead in everything and does not express his opinion or discuss issues in a peer-like manner. She interprets this to be his anxiety
that he doesn’t belong and his place in the family and the relationship is precarious. Jane expresses this as follows:

Jane: It is similar, it's just that Nathi is..., he doesn’t talk much like my [late] husband. [My late husband] would say “hey I was thinking of one, two, three”, then maybe we will talk about that but with Nathi, what is different, I think he has got that thing that... eh... this is not his place, he doesn’t have [the right] to say... Always he follows what I ask him. He doesn’t come and say, “you know I was thinking of, can we do this?”. Mmm, with my husband we will talk about something, I wasn’t like always the one who has to think, let’s do this, let’s do that.

Tessa: And is it easier for you to be the person who is the one who is making decisions?
Jane: No.
Tessa: It’s a heavy burden?
Jane: Ja (sighs and starts to cry)... Sometimes I feel like, hey I don’t know, lost, ‘cause even when he makes his money, I don’t feel happy to use his money... Not to say it’s because I don’t like [him, but], he is too reserved, I don’t know what he thinks.
Tessa: It’s hard to know what’s going on in his mind, ja.
Jane: We don’t sit down and say okay because [of that issue], let’s do this.
Tessa: Mmm, mmm. He will follow whatever you say? Are there ever times when he doesn’t follow?
Jane: No, he always follows... And that’s what worries me ‘cause even when we talk, Nathi [responds] mmm, mmm, (meaning yes), there is [never] eh- eh-. (meaning no) everything is yes, of which is not fair [to him] and it’s like we are oppressing him... What I am [worried about] is maybe in his heart he is saying it’s not my place, they can kick me out anytime, what will I do [then] so [I must just agree].

This is raised a number of times in our conversations. In the following excerpt, Jane obliquely agrees with me when I suggest that perhaps her relationship with him was circumstantial, and that she would never have chosen him as a partner had things been different. She yearns for a different Nathi, one who gives the care and concern he does, but also takes on a stronger role in the family with strong opinions, ideas, energy, and firmer parenting skills. Jane mourns not having a peer as a partner, something she had in her previous relationship.

Jane: Sometimes here in the house, we can say, he will sit that side, I will sit that side only he will come and say, are you okay? Do you want food? Okay let me make you something that you can drink, so that’s the language... He is too quiet, he is too quiet. I always ask myself how did I meet him ‘cause he is too quiet...

Tessa: Jane, I know you are very appreciative that he has helped you but at the same time it worries you that it’s somebody that may be in different circumstances you wouldn’t have chosen, hey? And he is a wonderful man but he might have not been your choice, it’s because it happened, circumstances happened.

Jane: Yes, he is too quiet. He won’t say no, other men will... say things they don’t want, Nathi everything he wants, why?
Tessa: You mean he never argues, he never says no, ja, does that worry you?
Jane: Ja ‘cause it’s like maybe you have oppressed him or maybe he feels that hey because I am not a South African or what I don’t know... But when you are a woman, you need a husband, where you will see that, ja this is the husband that will do, Nathi even the kids, they can do anything they want, he’ll say ja, I will talk to (discipline) them.

Tessa: But then he doesn’t. He is too soft hey?

Jane: I am not saying he must punish them but at least he must show that no, I am a father, don’t do this.

Certainly Jane’s experience of having to ‘settle’ for the security of the current circumstances rather than look for a different partner is not unique to women receiving a grant. Many women, indeed, men too, do not have the partner they would like and choose to ‘make do’ with whomever is with them, for a variety of reasons. What is different for Jane, though, is that this change in the kind of intimate partner she has is symbolic of her changed circumstances, and reflects her downward fall into having to accept whatever is offered (such as the CSG), instead of being able to choose between options, a significant narrowing of capabilities.

This is not to say that Nathi is not a good partner; he is, and Jane recognises this. These conversations were very private exchanges reflecting Jane’s inner dissatisfactions with life’s pathway, and what she has to accept due to a different world. Ultimately, Jane makes peace with this and she and Nathi were married in January 2014 at a ceremony at which she was extremely, unreservedly happy; I was very moved to be a part of this.

Figure 13: Family photo at Jane and Nathi’s wedding, 2014.
Learning from Jane

Examining Jane’s life holistically allows us to understand the place the CSG takes in her life beyond just plugging perpetual income deficits, which is the fear that conservatives have about the role of the CSG as a permanent income for some families rather than a short-term support.

Jane is the perfect candidate for ‘graduation’ out of the social protection system, as she has the internal skills and resources to one day return to a life of financial independence. The notion of graduation, or exiting social protection programmes, is controversial. Often a “politically expedient device for getting poor people off social programmes to reduce costs and avoid creating ‘dependency’, … the desire by some governments to ‘graduate’ people from poor relief schemes is directly related to their perception of such schemes as ‘hand-outs’” (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2015, p. 4). While the CSG has a built-in exogenous exit point (Samson, 2015) in that graduation is automatic when a child turns 18, there is still talk about programme exit due to ‘success’. As Samson (2015, p. 15) comments, “a narrow view of graduation programmes that focus on exit may ignore the key objective of promoting dynamic developmental impacts that enable households to progressively lift themselves out of poverty”.

Therefore, Jane’s exit from the CSG will not occur without external supports. Until Nathi can replace his Zimbabwean passport and can attain a visa that entitles him to work, he is supremely vulnerable to exploitation and has no means to establish a sustainable business. Until Jane’s dispute with the SAPS is resolved and her employment status is thus clarified and she is reinstated in her position or free to look for other work, she will have no means of working for a regular wage. Until Jane’s mental health is stable and she feels competent enough to take on other challenges, such as studying, working and being a mother at the same time (which personal experience illustrates to me is challenging for any individual), she will have no means of trying to better herself, to grow and to learn. Until she can offer her children accommodation that is safer, cleaner, more spacious and less run down, she has to make do with living in an unsafe, filthy, and falling apart structure, such as is reflected by the photographs of her flat and building:
Until the private care of the household is supported by a caring state, it is individuals who take on the burden of structural failures. In other words, if Jane had help to resolve some of these barriers she would no longer need a ‘hand-out’; for her the CSG could be that ideal ‘hand-up’ out of poverty and she could use it as the stepladder to a better life. But without these other supports it is not likely that Jane will be able to attain the life she has reason to value; and she is unlikely to genuinely leave the CSG behind.

In a comment that resonates strongly with Fraser’s distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies, Fredman (2014, p. 22) states that social grants can only ever be a strategy of one-dimensional relief in the absence of universal quality public services, the genuine delivery of equal rights, and the availability of flexible working and childcare.

Institutional injustice and failing welfare services leave Jane’s set of capabilities greatly reduced, limit her freedom and dignity, and misrecognise and misrepresent her. In the face of these issues, the important redistributive role that the CSG fulfils cannot move Jane out of poverty and into a life she has reason to value.
Chapter 5

The more you need the less deserving you are: Nandi’s story of poverty

Nandi is a young woman; 23 years old when I met her in 2011. She has a small frame, pretty eyes and missing teeth. Her clothing is usually an amalgamation of old and faded items, ill-fitting and often revealing (seemingly through disinterest rather than sexual provocation). Nandi’s home languages are Zulu (from her father) and Sotho (from her mother). She speaks English, Afrikaans, and Tswana too, but at a very basic level. In fact, all conversation with Nandi is basic, even simple (including in her home languages), and she presents as educationally and intellectually deprived. Her schooling ended after Grade 9 and she has no wish to further her education. Nandi’s history is one of trauma and emotional deprivation. Nandi reports that at the age of five she was raped by a landlord’s son, and her mother told me that Nandi experienced a brutal gang rape at the age of 16 years, which was reported to the police and resulted in the arrest and conviction of three (of the 10) young men for the crime. Certainly, Nandi has felt cyclically rejected by society since her childhood. She comes from a home where excessive use of alcohol, intense conflict, domestic violence, and periodic rejection (for example, being thrown out of the house) was common, both between her parents as well as inter-generationally and between her siblings. It is from this context that Nandi has developed into an emotionally and intellectually immature woman.

When I first met her in mid-2011, she lived with her parents, Margaret and Joseph, in Joseph’s flat which he bought with the help of his long-time employer (he works as a gardener in an affluent suburb). Margaret is a domestic worker, doing ‘piece-work’. While there is intense tension and often conflict between her and her parents, her mother remains the most important person and support in Nandi’s life. During 2011 the household consisted also of a friend of Joseph’s, and five children, two of whom were Nandi’s, and three of whom were Nandi’s sister’s children (her sister did not live there).

Nandi’s children are both girls: Kagiso was three years old, and Gontlafetse one and a half years old when we met. They had the same father, a man who Nandi describes in idealized terms who was murdered in a stabbing at work in April 2011. By 2013, Nandi had moved through several relationships, ending up with Malusi who was the father of her third child, another girl, born in March 2013. Baby Poppy died of pneumonia at the age of 20 days old. Malusi, Nandi, and the two children lived together in a small room above a garage a few blocks from her parent’s flat, until their eviction in August 2013 when they all returned, again, to live with Nandi’s parents. The interviews took place primarily while she was living with her parents before her third child was born.

Nandi occasionally assists her mother with domestic work contracts, but has no other means of income aside from the CSG which she is getting for both her children. Her partner, Malusi, is unemployed.

One of the central contributions of Sen’s (1999, 2009) work and the work of other capabilities theorists, is to take us beyond poverty as income; their work compellingly demonstrates that poverty has causes and consequences that have only a passing relationship to being financially deprived.
Poverty interacts with and shapes all your capabilities and your life as a whole well beyond your ability to earn an income.

What I want to reveal in this chapter using Nandi’s narrative as a point of reflection and illustration, is the multi-layered and complex nature of deprivation and need. I want to demonstrate what poverty really is, what it does to you beyond restrict consumption. My argument is that a cash transfer cannot impact on a deeply embedded poverty of options, choices, opportunities and emotional resilience. This chapter is not about the limits of the grant as such, it is more about exposing our lack of acknowledgement of the deep damage a trajectory of poverty, through generations, can cause. The needs Nandi has cannot be reduced to just a job, or income. We must be alerted to the danger of focusing on only the material and ignoring the role of dignity, affect, emotion, and ideology, as this leads to superficial or simplistic solutions to the needs of poor people. Fraser’s (1989) notion of thick versus thin needs helps to expose the politicisation of the interpretation of needs for those in positions similar to Nandi’s, and in the next section I explore this idea in more detail.

Following this, I outline how negotiating the transition from youth to adulthood is a fraught process for poor young people, and this can at times complicate their role as carers. Finally, I question the idea of the ‘undeserving’ welfare recipient and offer a surprising conclusion: the more you need, the less deserving you appear to be. In this conversation I also explore how state failures can shape the ‘bad’ behavior of some people receiving a CSG.

Thin vs thick needs

Nandi’s everyday life is both simple and complex, both privileged and deprived. It is simple in that it is made up primarily of routine tasks and actions; despite occasional bouts of work-seeking, it mostly consists of social reproductive work or ‘hanging around’ with friends. It is also privileged (compared to many other South Africans) as she has shelter, clothes, and food, even at a basic level, despite not having employment. But it is complicated by her history, her past experiences of difficulty and trauma, her unmet needs, and her lack of future. This is the source of her deprivation.

Using Fraser’s (1989) differentiation between thin and thick needs interpretation, Nandi’s needs can be understood thinly as a need for a job. She would express this as a ‘felt’ need (Bradshaw in Dean, 2013, p. 54) and it would also be acceptable as a ‘normative’ need and a comparative need (social comparison), but again, the fact that she seldom goes hungry and has a roof over her head makes her comparatively privileged. Further, while comparatively and normatively it could be argued that she has a need to complete her high school education, Nandi has no desire to do so, nor does she see any
great benefit in doing this; thus this is not a felt need. Overall, a thin conception of needs would likely end at employment.

On the other hand, thinking about her needs multidimensionally and from a vantage point of not only public service delivery, but also of the enhancement of her quality of life, her opportunities and capabilities, Nandi’s needs are far more complex. A thick conception of need would see beyond income and look towards a holistic understanding of this in concert with Nandi’s social and interpersonal needs. The remainder of this section explores this idea of thick needs in relation to Nandi’s story.

Figure 15: The household lives in a small and crowded flat in Sophiatown.

Gaps in the building blocks of resilience

When considering fundamental capabilities as outlined by Nussbaum (2011), it is easy to assume that the absence of mental illness is the equivalent of the presence of mental health within the ambit of Nussbaum’s (2011) capability of *bodily health*, including mental health, and *emotions*, which includes healthy emotional attachments. In this section I want to challenge that assumption, showing how there are particular experiences from Nandi’s past and the way she deals with her present that are far from psychologically robust, even if she is not obviously suffering from a mental illness per se.

Resilience is a concept which captures an individual’s ability to ‘bounce back’ from traumas and crises and manage even significant misfortune (Herrman et al., 2011; Luthar, Sawyer, & Brown, 2006; Ungar, 2008). Resilience can be understood in two fairly different ways. A sociological notion of resilience would be engaging a range of strategies and resources that facilitates coping and survival, called by some ‘problem-focused strategies’ (Dageid & Duckert, 2008; Holmes & Jones, 2013), such as acquiring
new skills, joining a collective savings programme (in South Africa known as a ‘stokvel’), seeking

treatment for illness, the involvement in a faith-based community and faith activities (such as praying),
or the use of social capital and networks to access support and alternate livelihood strategies.

A more psychological notion of resilience is focused on the ability to manage emotionally, to regain
emotionally health after misfortune and to maintain it through persistent hardship. Studies indicate
there are many factors, known as protective factors, which will contribute to building an individual’s
dependence, such as intrapersonal, interpersonal, community and social, physical and
environmental, and other factors (Luthar et al., 2006; Ungar, 2008). However, arguably some of the
most important factors are those involving a stable, positive, intimate relationship with at least one
person, understood as attachment in psychological literature (Bowlby, 2005 (1988)). Both the ability
to form healthy attachments as well as resilience are embedded in childhood, giving the person the
ability to have positive interpersonal relationships and manage adversity into their later lives (Bowlby,
2005 (1988); Herrman et al., 2011). This also implies the importance of a past where the individual
received effective parenting or had the presence of at least one meaningful and positive role-model,
with which there was an intimate emotional connection (Ungar, 2008).

Nandi and her parents describe a past in which there was constant conflict at home, where Nandi had
a close but ambivalent relationship with her mother and an antagonistic relationship with her father,
distant and troubled relationships with her siblings, and friendships with others who are in similarly
precarious emotional and economic positions. These troubled relationships all imply that Nandi’s
psychological and emotional needs are largely unmet, both from the past as well as currently. Nandi’s
behavior can be described as ‘emotion-led’ rather than problem-solving (Dageid & Duckert, 2008),
where she chooses to withdraw, avoid and deny problems as a means of emotional survival: helpful
in the short-term to allow her to carry on, but destructive in the long-term as the problems remain.
For example, after a fight with her boyfriend in the emotionally fragile period directly after the birth
of her third baby, she ‘disappeared’ to teach him a lesson and he was left with a 12-day old baby and
no conception of how to manage. He took the baby to the police station, and processes to have the
baby placed in a court-mandated care facility had begun when Nandi eventually ‘turned up’ to reclaim
her child.

Another source of resilience comes from positive relational mutuality. While the notion of mutuality
is certainly not new (African philosophy has historically been built on this concept in the form of, for
example, ubuntu, Metz, 2011), until the late 1970s theoretical perspectives that emphasised how
human nature was to strive towards individual autonomy were dominant in fields as diverse as
psychology, economics, and sociology, particularly in the West. Feminist theory, and especially
feminist psychology (for example, see Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1976), helped to shift this idea toward aealisation that humans are constituted in relation to others; that is, mutual inter-subjectivity is not only important when we are very young children, but remains a critical part of our development throughout our lives (J. V. Jordan, 1986). Mutuality is not just that we need community, or that we are social beings; it is that intimate and reciprocal relationships form us, make us who we are, and are necessary for every human’s intra-psychic and inter-personal growth (the relationship to attachment and resilience is clear here). In addition, relational mutuality implies an ongoing interdependence as a normal and necessary part of human social life (John-Steiner, 2000), an idea that has been well developed via writing on the ethics of care (Kittay, 1999; Tronto, 1993).

This mutuality can come from peer solidarity, and certainly research indicates that community and social solidarity is a significant source of resilience (Deneulin & McGregor, 2010; Herman et al., 2011). Sadly, it seems that Nandi’s peer relationships are similarly fraught and ill-equipped to offer genuine strength and support.

An experience I had during my relationship with Nandi illustrates the deep unmet emotional needs with which she and her friendship group are grappling, and the consequent destructive coping mechanisms they utilise. After not managing to get through to Nandi or her mother by phone for a number of weeks, I thought I would go past her home to see if everything was all right and to make an appointment to see her for an interview. The following is an extract from my field work journal, describing the experience:

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<th>1 September 2011, Thursday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As I ascended the stairs I could hear loud male voices - they were coming from her flat. Intimidated and unsure who I would find there, I went back down the stairs, but then I heard the door open and people exit. So I greeted the young woman on the stairs and addressed the young man on the landing just outside her flat, asking if Nandi was in. He said yes, come in – strong smell of alcohol at the flat door. Smoke-filled room. About six or seven young men and Nandi and her friend who returned, Nqobile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi was a little embarrassed, taking me aside in the passage. We spoke. She freely said “we’re drinking” and then asked if I could talk to her brother Andile, whom she had previously called me about who’d been suicidal and has a drinking problem.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Everyone there was drunk; Andile especially so. We spoke for a while in the parent’s bedroom. He freely said he had a problem with drinking, he was very unhappy and he hated living with his parents mainly because they disapproved of his girlfriend (whom he called his wife). He has a nine year old son with her (he’s only 24 years old!!), and he has no job or income. He also freely admitted he’d served a few months in prison for assault (long story about girlfriend, new boyfriend and conflict over her). I asked if he wanted to be a good responsible father and partner and when he said yes, I said only he can make the changes he wants and he should decide. Referred him for counselling with little hope that he’ll go.</td>
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</table>
Then Nqobile and her boyfriend Loyisa were in and out of the room, telling me their ‘stories’ which involved intense conflict with parents, unhappiness, and overuse of alcohol, also very needy for rescue. But when one of the other young people also wanted ‘counselling’, I declined and politely left. My overall impression is that this is such a sad lost group of young people with so little hope and opportunity. All are young parents, all completely ill-equipped to be present parents. They are unhappy and all very angry and feel betrayed by people (often their own parents) and circumstance, and seem to see their young children as pawns to use in the struggle over identity and belonging.

These are Nandi’s closest friends and confidants. None of them are in the position to offer more than sympathy to Nandi – they themselves have no role-models, sources of emotional care, material resources, powerful networks, or cultural capital. They themselves cannot escape their bleak future of no educational qualifications, no stable work, and could easily land up living lives of alcohol abuse and broken relationships, and possibly troubled parenting or even child neglect or abuse.

The significance of this for Nandi is captured by Moodley (2012, p. 35) who, when discussing resilience, notes that sharing similar hardships with others might create a sense of solidarity, but does not offer any material, psychological or social resources to escape these circumstances: “social and psychological outcomes can be impacted negatively by economic hardships... This therefore poses a risk for low-income women who have been shown to be more likely to associate with people in close proximity to them for support. They may have limited opportunity and freedom in choosing who to interact with, and often find themselves in similar circumstances as those to whom they turn to for support”.

If relational mutuality is constitutive of humans, and positive relational mutuality is critical in building resilience, then Nandi’s difficulties in relationships from an early age would explain some of her current challenges. Imbalances in mutuality or mutuality that feeds maladaptive behavior or emotions causes “significant psychological pain” (J. V. Jordan, 1986, p. 1).

The misrecognition of rape and violence

As integrated beings, humans’ needs are shaped not only by current conditions, but also by personal history. Starting with Nandi’s past, it is easy to see that she has had to weather extremely traumatic events, challenging for any individual. South Africa’s levels of violence, especially against women, are horrific and represent a major social challenge which is frighteningly unchanging. This is described and discussed in further detail in chapter 7; here I will briefly explore Nandi’s experiences of violence and how this has contributed to her emotional fragility.

Nandi experienced rape at an extremely young age (five years old), and again as a teenager when she was brutally gang raped. She lost her boyfriend, the father of her two daughters, to a work fight when
he was stabbed to death. Each of these three events is in itself deeply traumatic and emotionally scarring.

In order to understand her current emotional needs, we need to understand not just the above events, but how these events were dealt with by Nandi and those close to her. Nandi comments that nothing changed in the aftermath of her rape as a young child by the landlord’s son. Nandi continued to live in the same place, in close proximity to the boy who had raped her. It is not clear whether her parents knew anything about this experience. Nandi did receive medical attention in hospital after her gang rape, which was particularly brutal, but no counselling. After the murder of her boyfriend (the father of her children), she would go regularly to court hearings. However, sustaining this in her life context was impossible as no-one explained what was happening, she didn’t have money for transport to go every time the case was postponed, and no-one could accompany her for support, and so she gave up going to court and since then has been unaware of the progress of the case and has had no formal intervention following his death.

This kind of response to trauma and the lack of resolution of traumatic events are considered ‘normal’ in her world. Both children and adults are expected merely to ‘carry on’ after difficult events and seem to be given no or few extra supports or tools to manage. The part of her that sustained the emotional hurt and damage is not socially acknowledged in any way. Undoubtedly, these experiences have had a deleterious effect on Nandi’s emotional health in the absence of active means to assist her, as is normal after severe trauma that remains unacknowledged or untreated (J. Herman, 1992). The denial of the effect of violence on Nandi’s life is a profound form of misrecognition and injustice because conservative social norms ensure that women’s experience of violence is widely seen to be both normative and unimportant.

In addition, Nandi’s story seems to be a sad demonstration of theories of social learning (Mihalic & Elliott, 1997), which claim that experiences of pervasive violence, especially as a child, teach violent behaviours to survivors. I was told quite regularly of Nandi’s own tendency to violence when angry or threatened. This is, worryingly, sometimes directed at her children, sometimes at her boyfriend, and judging by one memorable conversation with her father, Joseph, sometimes at her mother:

| Joseph: Nandi and [her boyfriend], they used to fight a lot because the boyfriend would come and look for her at our house and Nandi would beat him up. |
| Tessa: Who beats who? |
| Joseph: Nandi would beat her boyfriend up (he laughs). |
| Tessa: Nandi beat her boyfriend? |
Joseph: Yes. But I and Margaret never got involved. Margaret sometimes tries to reprimand her but she does not listen, she actually fought with her mother and she bites her mother’s ear. I am tired of Nandi.

Pinky: She bit your wife?
Joseph: Yes (he laughed).

Tessa: When was this, long time ago?
Joseph: No it was this year. They were fighting, Nandi likes to fight, and then Nandi bit her on the ear… (Tessa and Pinky sit in shocked and incredulous silence). You see Margaret loves Nandi too much and every time I reprimand her, her mother tells me to leave her, and should I try to stop her, she (Margaret) would go and report me to the police and now Margaret tell lies that she was bitten by a dog. Some of her ear is now gone. (Tessa and Pinky continue to stare at him in shocked silence).

(He starts to chuckle at the ridiculousness of this, and we join in; then we all laughed uproariously for a long time at how absurd this is, tears trickling down all our faces).

Joseph: I was there, I saw everything, but when people like the neighbours ask her what happened to her, she would lie and tell them that she was bitten by a dog.

This incident also speaks to the power of the cultural and moral authority of kinship, specifically motherhood. Nandi’s behavior in this incident is atrocious, but Margaret chooses not to sanction her in any way. Seekings (2008a) identifies that in a ‘radius of responsibility’, unconditional altruism and expectations of reciprocity are linked in varied combinations. In this case, Margaret takes on the burden of responsibility of motherhood without any expectations of Nandi, as she accepts the conflict and violent behavior because this is her daughter, and she believes she has a moral obligation to do so. Later in this chapter I explore this further, identifying that this unconditional kinship link is a vital form of stability and safety in Nandi’s life.

A final observation drawing from this incident is the level of Nandi’s anger. Violent behavior is a learned response to frustration and anger. Biting her mother, the ‘hand that feeds her’, had to be precipitated by such unresolved frustration and anger that she saw no other possible response. This is both a sad comment on Nandi’s coping skills as well as on how trapped, disillusioned, and enraged she must feel.

Hope as a capability

I believe there is another psychological reason which is a critical barrier to ‘self-improvement’: Nandi seems to have no sense of future in an appreciable way. When asked in a number of different ways, Nandi expressed no dreams, wishes, or desires for her future aside from ‘get a job’ – any job. Her deliberateness in falling pregnant for the second and third times has to do with tying down her
partners, and fulfilling her motherhood ‘duties’, and not to do with seeing a future for her or her children. The conversation below is a typical exchange between us, with me working hard to get her to express a sense of ambition or future, and her politely tolerating this but not offering anything of substance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tessa: And your mother is sending all of [the children to creche]? So now what are you doing with your time? It’s totally different, you used to be so busy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nandi: I’m sleeping the whole day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tessa: Are you sleeping? (They laugh).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi: I’m cooking after cooking I’m eating then I go to the bed and sleep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa: Okay, is that wonderful for you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi: (Nods vigorously) ‘Cause I [hate to try and sleep when the children] make a noise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa: Nandi, If you could choose, just think, forget about all the things that stop you to do this. What would you do with your day now that you’ve got time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi: ‘Cause I want to work, and get my own money.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tessa: So did you think to look for work or you haven’t, you need to catch up on sleeping first? Have you started to look or not yet?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nandi: I’ll start Monday.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tessa: Okay. And what will you do?</td>
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<td>Nandi: (Shrugs a few times)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tessa: Will you just walk around and ask people?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nandi: Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[And later in the conversation]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tessa: You are [young] Nandi you’ve got so much ahead of you, even though you had many, many hard things, many hard things. You don’t want to look back when you are 70 and say Eish! I never did anything that I wanted or I never lived a life I was happy with or ..., I’m sure you can live a life you are happy with. What do you think?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi: Yes, I think ((laughs)). That’s fine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa: You think so? What are your dreams for yourself, do you have dreams for yourself?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nandi: Not yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa: You don’t know yet what you want?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi: (shakes her head and shrugs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa: I understand, you need time to think about that. But I bet you weren’t thinking when you were 10, you weren’t thinking, oh at 21, I’m gonna have three children, hey? (They laugh) Ja... Do you want more children or do you think you are done with children?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi: I’m not done.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Tessa: You are not yet done, okay. But you must make a decision about when you want your other children, don’t just let it happen. So you must think about being at the clinic in order so that even in your future you don’t just let it happen you must choose when you want more children, you know?

Nandi: Yes.

This is not uncommon in South Africa: Graham (2012) in her study on young people located in an informal settlement and their perceptions of risk, found, similarly, that young people struggled to articulate future aspirations. Many gave little thought to their future and didn’t believe their lives could be appreciably different. Those who did talk of their future discussed it in terms of unachievable dreams rather than clear goals. Their aspirations were confined to long-term but vague and unattainable ambitions (such as ‘live in a brick house in the suburbs’ or ‘drive a nice car’), and seldom constituted clear aims of how to change their current circumstances and realistically shape their longer-term future. Young women in particular struggled to think through future aspirations and goals beyond intending to get married or secure longer-term relationships with boyfriends (often through having a child with their partner - most were already mothers). Similarly, Dubbeld (2013, p. 11) refers to this lack of dreams of a future amongst youth in a rural area as the condition of ‘waiting’: “This waiting of the youth [is] not a waiting that [is] constitutive of a future... It [is] a waiting that [is] almost inevitably impotent; a pause that might seek in vain to reconnect with a [rural] homestead; a punctuation of the experience of becoming part of a rootless casualised work force on the margin of the city”. Morris (2008) sees the lack of interest of youth in the future as indicative of their adaption to life without work, ever, and living in constant danger of ‘death’ (HIV contraction).

Often hopelessness about a future is linked to inaction because of the likelihood of failure (Duflo, 2012). In South Africa, small improvements in education or skills or training do not lead directly to the easy acquisition of satisfying work; the staggering rates of youth unemployment (at approximately 36% according to StatsSA, 2014) mean that unless you are able to significantly change your educational or skill level (via a degree, for example), the effort that is required is not going to guarantee employment success. Therefore why put in all that effort if you are likely to fail to get work anyhow? Only if poor people see genuine opportunities to realise their aspirations will they be incentivised to put in the considerable effort required, while those that have “nothing to lose [by not trying or not saving income]... will tend to make decisions that reflect that desperation” (Duflo, 2012, p. 50).

It is due to this logic that Duflo suggests that hope operates as a capability: hope and the sense that goals are reachable can operate as a strong motivation to work towards that goal, but “hopelessness,
pessimism, and stress put tremendous pressure both on the will to try something and on the resources available to do so” (Duflo, 2012, p. 51). In other words, hopelessness and inaction may well be a rational response to poverty, just as fear of failure (losing what little security or assets one might have) is a powerful disincentive to invest effort or cash in changing one’s circumstances. Put differently, if your efforts to achieve a life of value are repeatedly idiosyncratically or systematically defeated, you will eventually stop expending the energy to achieve change (Devereux & McGregor, 2014).

In addition, Duflo (2012) makes the point that hope fuels aspirations, and hope is significantly influenced by role-models achieving unthinkable success. If young people see someone, from circumstances similar to their own, achieving far more than they have, it offers them hope, and this is the source of aspirations. In other words, it is hard to dream about a different life if you believe that no-one like you has been able to change their circumstances; conversely, if you see it is possible, you can aspire to do the same.

This notion of hope as an important capability is a significant insight for Nandi’s life. Overall, the effort, perseverance and levels of resourcefulness that would be required to change her life and future are impossible without clear, realistic and workable goals and aspirations. Nandi’s life has been shaped by circumstance and not by risk-taking for the purposes of working towards a long-term goal.

‘Solving Nandi’: care as a private response to need

Nandi’s most important and enduring form of security is her parents, specifically her mother, who continues to ‘rescue’ her at each crisis despite expressing frustration and disappointment with Nandi. It is helpful to us to consider how Nandi survives, how she copes in difficult circumstances, how she makes choices and decisions that are within her control to improve her life, and how she acts as an independent agent despite many long-term limitations and constraints. The care she gets from her mother is, I believe, key to the potential of good life outcomes for Nandi and her children. At the same time, however, the burden is a heavy one for Margaret to bear as it does not come without huge sacrifices from her in relation to time, money, and emotional energy.

In this exchange below, Margaret expresses her frustration, her worry, but also her anxiety about what consequences ‘solving’ Nandi will bring, particularly in relation to further burdens she might have to bear.

| Margaret: | With all these problems she is doing [like drinking and disappearing]... So I want you to solve Nandi. |
| Tessa:   | Uhmmm, Mme I think... I am happy to talk to Nandi again. I do want to see her again. But, I am not going to be able to change her. Do you know what I’m saying? I will be happy to talk to her but I can say, you must do this and do that but maybe she is not |
going to listen to me. I do think she needs to have maybe..., I’m hearing it sounds like things are not easy in the house and maybe I can get a social worker to come and visit you. Would that be okay?

Margaret: Yes, I do agree. [The social worker] can fix her properly and Nandi she can hear properly, and maybe if they talk to her she will behave.

Tessa: Okay. I’ll find out, I can’t promise. They are not going to come tomorrow. Okay, it’s not quick like I phone today, they come tomorrow. It maybe will take some time because they have lots of people to see, but I will let you know once I have spoken to a social worker.

Margaret: All right. I don’t want them to take her to that place [remove her from the home]. I just want her to solve her, maybe she will hear. Because if they take her, I will have problems again with the children with the crèche and I have to go to work. You see?

Margaret’s source of support arguably rests primarily on steady employment: while she is a ‘piece worker’, at a different home each day of the week as a domestic worker, all her employment is long-term and fairly secure. But this is not the only factor in being Nandi’s primary source of support: she sees her role as a mother as consisting of unconditional acceptance of her daughter, no matter what, and their lifelong connection. Hence, when Nandi could no longer cope with caring for five children at home and one day just left the children on their own and didn’t return for days, it was Margaret who immediately put the two youngest in daycare and paid for the fees herself. When Nandi fought so fiercely and violently with Margaret that she bit off part of her mother’s ear, it was Margaret herself who persuaded her father, Joseph, to let Nandi return to their home to live. When Nandi’s baby died while she was living ‘independently’ with her boyfriend and three children, she returned immediately to her mother’s home to perform mourning rituals and to wait for the funeral.

At one point Nandi expressed her heavy reliance on her mother by saying, during an exercise where she graphically represented her life:

Nandi: My mother takes care of us. Everything.

Tessa: Yes

Pinky (Translator): And one of the questions that she asks here [on the picture]..., what she said to me is that what would happen if her mom would die now, you know..., what would happen to them?

While Margaret’s behavior attests to this in that she is constantly ‘saving’ Nandi, verbally she expresses this in muted terms, explaining when I asked about a particular time I knew had been challenging, when Nandi fell pregnant for the first time, that helping Nandi often comes at a cost. She said:

125
Tessa: Okay. When Nandi was pregnant with her first child, what did you..., when. Did she tell you she was pregnant or did you see?
Margaret: I saw for myself.
Tessa: But she didn't tell you?
Margaret: No. With her first child, she told me when she was eight months.
Tessa: But you already saw her?
Margaret: I already saw her that she was not herself. I could see.
Tessa: When she told you she was pregnant, what did you say to her?
Margaret: I asked her why did she keep quiet and not say anything about being pregnant. She said she was scared. I [first] got angry and then after I told myself what’s done is done. What will I do?

The idea that Nandi needs to be ‘solved’ begins with Margaret’s own limited ability to offer emotional care to her daughter, as she too is so constrained by her experiences of poverty and the burdens this brings. Margaret herself has had a life of deprivation and challenges. In my field work journal I describe Margaret at our first interview together:

2 November 2011

Margaret is a picture of a hard-work life – I suspect she looks older than she is, her hands are calloused, marked and dry indicating a life of washing and cleaning, her overall is washed out and threadbare and held together with bent pins, her legs and feet look used, a large burn scar and other marks cover them. She is thin and worried looking and her usual expression is one of anxiety, but her face changes when she smiles – her teeth are white and strong and her smile lights her eyes. She is not very wrinkled, she just looks tired and ‘used’. She is very short, tiny in fact, and does not have a strong physical ‘presence’.

As a Sotho village girl from QwaQwa, she was living with family in Limpopo at age 14 when she met a 17 year old boy at school and ‘fell in love’. In order to avoid the formal negotiations around marriage between the families, Margaret was taken under the cover of night to her boyfriend’s home in a traditional form of abduction, called “ukuthwala” in Zulu (Nkosi & Buthulezi, 2013), with the result that her family had no choice but to agree to the marriage. She never returned to school and has no other qualifications. After two children her husband lost interest, began a relationship with another woman and after the birth of a child from this union, moved to live with his new family. She returned to her family in QwaQwa and raised her two children in poor and constrained circumstances, until she was compelled by economic conditions to search for work in Johannesburg. She soon met Joseph, and they began a life together. She has been with him for more than two decades and they have three
children together (the oldest a girl, then their son, Andile, and, finally, Nandi). However, Margaret states Joseph has refused to marry her, and she claims he has a wife with whom he continues to have a relationship. During arguments he has previously evicted Margaret and stated that he will replace her with his other wife. He has been physically abusive towards her, but this seems to have reduced since she started defending herself by using the law. Below she describes this:

| Margaret: | He doesn’t hit me anymore; he used to hit me at first. Yes, it was in 2008, and that’s when I notified the police. At the police station they warned him, so now the only one thing I don’t like about him, is when he is angry he chases me out of the house saying I must find my own place. |
| Tessa: | Oh, okay. But he doesn’t hit you anymore? |
| Margaret: | No. He doesn’t hit me anymore. |
| Tessa: | So every time you fight, then he will end the fight to say go. |
| Margaret: | Yes. |
| Tessa: | What do you do? |
| Margaret: | I tell him I won’t go (we both laugh). |
| Tessa: | And what does he do? |
| Margaret: | He just keeps quiet. |

This raises an important feature of Margaret’s character that is not evident if you examine only the litany of sad and difficult events she has weathered: she exercises agency and strength, even if in quiet or invisible ways, and this has been the source of her stability for Nandi. Even when life seems overwhelming, she chooses to carry on, to keep going.

Further, in a glimmer of hope in the litany of service failures, Margaret’s ability to report the domestic violence and the police action to support her, delivered a substantial shift in power relations in her relationship. This is in fact a well-executed form of state intervention: the prevention of further crime via the appropriate response to violence against women. The difficulty with this success, though, is that it is partly idiosyncratic. In other words, it worked well in this case; but many examples exist where it doesn’t work at all. Not only has it been pointed out that involving the police in domestic violence cases can be entirely ineffectual (Rasool, 2011), it can also be extremely destructive: on the one hand, violent men can be incensed that they have been reported and can increase levels of violence, to the point of femicide (Abrahams et al., 2009), and on the other hand, police themselves can dismiss the claims and send a vulnerable woman back into a dangerous situation (Rasool, 2011). This variability in outcome raises an important set of questions: what are the circumstances that lead to the success of services, and when are they likely to fail? How can services be designed to respond effectively to a
range of diverse circumstances? What kind of service ‘package’ is necessary to ensure that if a service fails, another one is available to offer alternatives to those who need them?

Returning to the narrative, Margaret’s story reveals a naïve young girl in a shifting social world who became a parent while still herself a child, who likely never expected to have to continue to shoulder the burden of care for her adult children and their children. Her own narrow set of capabilities leads to a lack of resources to ‘manage’ or ‘solve’ the problems Nandi presents. But the story also points to the critical role Margaret plays in Nandi’s life as a space of care and acceptance in an otherwise hostile and uncaring world.

Overall, the needs described in this section are both private and political: private in that the attachment, resilience, and the misrecognition of the consequences of violence have internal, intrapsychic consequences, but political in that her experiences are not vastly different from a worrying proportion of young people’s lives, and are partly created by a long trajectory of difficult and unsupportive socio-economic circumstances and political processes that disregard the poor and unequal.

I wish to now raise the issue of youth transitions, and how this impacts strongly on how Nandi inhabits her role of ‘mother’ in particular.

Am I my mother’s child or my children’s mother? Youth transitions

A youth development approach views youth not as a specific and time-limited phase that all young people pass through, with a clear set of processes that everyone will experience in similar ways; rather, as a “life stage involving intensive identity-work” (Graham, 2012, p. 41). This stage is a kind of transition period which profoundly shapes the life to follow, and therefore opportunities to manage the identity-work in productive and positive ways are essential.

As there is a very real lack of meaningful opportunities for young people in South Africa once they leave school, it has been argued that poor youth in South Africa have a difficult and often extended transition phase between childhood and adulthood (Graham, 2010, 2012; N. Jordan, Patel, & Hochfeld, 2014). Early motherhood generally increases young women’s vulnerability, due to the additional caregiving burdens they have, as well as the limits having a child places on accessing employment or skills development opportunities (Hutchinson, Forthcoming). In addition, young women tend to become invisible when they are mothers as their identity as youth with the concomitant needs and desires this brings, are suddenly erased and they are viewed exclusively as mothers and carers (Hassim, 2006a; Shara Razavi, 2011).
It appears that Nandi is constantly negotiating issues of ‘transition’. She lives her life feeling ‘sandwiched’ between her role as a mother and her role as a child. In her relationship with her parents she tends to resist their authority, and they relate to each other in a typical authoritarian parent vs rebellious teenage fashion. But she is also a mother, although the ongoing transition issues she faces means she is ambivalent about embracing her motherhood status, and so this is sometimes a welcome identity and at other times a heavy burden.

Consequently, Nandi’s life is the play-out of different parts of her, depending on her circumstances and needs at the time. This shifting of roles and identities is not particular to Nandi: very few of us are integrated into a seamless and coherent ‘whole’; we all inhabit many roles, many identities and many ways as a function of survival in today’s complex, post-modern, global world. Ideally, these different selves need to make some kind of coherent sense, even if we function in very different roles at different times (Fuchs, 2007). But this seems to be a struggle for Nandi. Her different selves are not just different; they are often contradictory. This makes managing the different roles and lives very difficult. Nandi is sometimes the dutiful daughter, and at these times also enacts a role of the responsible mother. But when she is the rebellious child, she also becomes the irresponsible and wayward mother. The consequences of Nandi acting out these different identities are real, and often contradictory, being both positive and negative at different times.

The mother that deliberately and responsibly planned her second and third pregnancies, that periodically gives her grant money to the crèche teacher for safekeeping to ensure that she herself doesn’t misuse it, that at times spends it all immediately on nappies, milk and food so that she knows it goes to the correct expenses, is proud of being a mother, and tries to rise above her dysfunctional background and a litany of traumatic experiences by saying they are in the past. This is the mother for whom the grant is the only reliable, secure monthly protection for her and her children. During 2013 Nandi had agreed for her mother to be the custodian of the CSG money and they would go together to withdraw it and she would immediately hand it to her mother for safekeeping. She was shocked when I asked why she didn’t use the money for her own benefit:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pinky (translator):</th>
<th>You know I was just asking about this one person that Nandi knows. Apparently she uses the money to fix her hair and all that.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tessa:</td>
<td>Why don’t you [also] do that Nandi?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi:</td>
<td>He-eh (emphatically shakes head meaning no).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa:</td>
<td>Okay, but why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi:</td>
<td>I can’t. (non-verbals express shock)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa:</td>
<td>You can’t?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nandi: He-eh (emphatically shakes head meaning no).
Tessa: What is the reason for that?
Nandi: No, eat the kids’ money? It’s not yours it belongs to the kids.

While part of this response might well have been her giving me the ‘correct’ answer, what is known as ‘impression management’ (van Breda & Potgieter, 2007), she expressed a similar attitude at other times, when she was thinking of herself as a ‘good mother’.

Figure 16: Nandi in her ‘good mother’ role taking down clean washing out of shot.

But Nandi’s other enactment of motherhood is when she avoids looking for work, neglects her children, drinks with her friends, and disappears for days on end without notifying anyone of her whereabouts. She borrows money from micro-lenders who charge exorbitant rates of interest so that she and her friends can drink, and then uses CSG money to repay her debts. It is this Nandi that abandoned her 12-day old baby to its father who felt forced to take the little girl to the police station as he had no way of managing on his own. This is the Nandi who lies as a matter of course, perhaps constantly wanting to please the listener of the moment, even if she openly contradicts a previous statement. The consequence of this role for me was that I could never quite work out the details of the issues we discussed, and found this frustrating until I accepted that living with uncertainty is a way of entering Nandi’s world.

Neither of these two constructions of Nandi is ‘false’: both are authentically her, and it is a combination of circumstances and Nandi’s ability to hold a consistent or path of choice that will determine which Nandi is dominant at the time. In addition, Nandi’s two enactments are not evidence of mental illness or a multiple personality disorder: the ‘good’ Nandi lives with guilt, shame and self-disappointment that she can’t always be ‘good’, and the ‘bad’ Nandi lives with the burdens, intense anger, and sense of injustice about the fact that being good all the time is impossible in her world.
Missing here is the ‘third’ story of Nandi. She is not only a child to her mother and a mother to her children, but she is also authentically ‘herself’. But this Nandi seemed to be keenly linked to having a partner, so was also externally referential and related to a specific socially defined gendered role. There were very few indications for me that Nandi had a sense of independent identity outside of these ‘roles’. This is something that has been identified elsewhere in research on youth in South Africa: Graham (2012) found young women’s identity, sense of future, and security were closely wrapped up with having a stable boyfriend, even if he had other sexual relationships that were well-known. She explains the great economic and social pressure to have an intimate partner, and demonstrates that young women believe that having children is a key way to try and secure one. Trying to unpick which parts of these stories are authentically ‘Nandi’ demonstrates the complexities of identities and the profundity of the role of mother; it is difficult to see past her mothering, whether good or bad, to understand Nandi, the young woman.

The next section draws together the idea of thick needs and the complexities of youth transition in South Africa in confronting the notion of the ‘undeserving’ recipient of the CSG.

The ‘undeserving’ welfare recipient and notions of citizenship

In conservative welfare environments, such as the USA, the left, led by socialist and feminist critics, have long questioned the moralistic imperative with which welfare is often dispensed. Drawing from the paternalism of upper class charity towards ‘the poor’, the perception that some people are undeserving of support is an old idea. The particular term that has become shorthand for morally problematic is ‘welfare dependent’. Fraser and Gordon (1994) trace the genealogy of the term dependency when associated with welfare, and conclude that the idea of post-industrial welfare dependency has long been constructed as a serious social pathology. They comment that the post-industrial ideal has become the independent individual, in stark opposition to the dependent or interdependent person who is locked into roles that presuppose moral disorder, a lack of work ethic, and a drain on resources, and that this is a reflection of “a whole series of hierarchical oppositions and dichotomies that are central in modern capitalist culture” (Fraser & Gordon, 1994, p. 334). The remarkable power of this notion is evidenced by its insidious creep into the discourse of not only the avowedly politically conservative (examples abound in the USA, but also in other parts of the globe), but also those who consider their politics to be left-leaning and socially responsible: Thabo Mbeki was considered a socially liberal-minded (although economically conservative) president, and he consistently used language implying those needing help were prone to dependence and laziness (Hassim, 2006a). Although far less of an issue in locations that have a history of a full or part welfare state system (such as northern Europe), it is a recurring conversation worldwide.
This attitude is accompanied by the perception that it is acceptable to judge the behavior of poor people, and behaviors that are disapproved of are often used as ‘proof’ of misuse and dependency. For example, scrutiny of the purchases made with state support is common, with moralistic judgements made on how poor people spend their money. The notion of ‘workfare’, that welfare should be conditional on looking for and taking any available job, has become increasingly popular, even in a context where working creates other major social problems, such as single mothers who can’t work as there is no affordable childcare, or long expensive commutes on a minimum wage (Jessop, 2000; Michaud, 2004).

Misrecognition

Here I wish to pick up on the acute misrecognition that labelling someone undeserving or dependent might bring. Research from elsewhere in the world identifies serious levels of stigma for welfare recipients, from the USA (Seccombe et al., 1998) to Malawi (Ellis, 2012), and Zimbabwe (MacAuslan & Riemenschneider, 2011). However, when social protection is provided by the state and not donors, the more social protection is embedded in a social rights approach, the more universal the provision of social assistance and other protective programmes are, the less stigmatising it is for recipients (Devereux & McGregor, 2014; Ellis, 2012; Kabeer, 2014). South African experiences of social assistance are not deeply stigmatising in relation to other parts of the world, chiefly because we partially meet the conditions just mentioned. However, there is evidence that receiving assistance in South Africa is, nonetheless, not similar to places such as Scandinavia or Canada, where welfare assistance such as child grants are universal entitlements and thus almost entirely shame-free. Feelings of humiliation, shame and disgrace have been identified as familiar in South Africa (DSD, SASSA, & UNICEF, 2011; Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011).

In particular the discourses of ‘undeserving’ recipients are so entrenched that recipients themselves interiorise these views, believing that they are among the very few who use the money in ‘correct’ ways, but that the vast majority of recipients are irresponsible and unworthy of the support (Hochfeld and Plagerson 2011).

It is here that we can consider Nussbaum’s (2008) association between dignity and political entitlements, of which the CSG is an example. Her argument here and elsewhere (2011) forwards that giving services, programmes, rights, and other public goods in ways that undermine people’s dignity is not treating them as fully equal citizens, and thus is undermining a life of value even as the system might be offering value in some material way as a public good. Applied to the CSG, her argument would run that the grant offers important material support and redistributive symbolism, but the demeaning scrutiny required for dividing those who receive a CSG into categories of ‘deserving’ and
'undeserving' and the negative view of recipients is a strong form of misrecognition, socially divisive, and undermining of dignity, and therefore treats recipients as less than fully entitled or worthy. Sen (1999), whose work more strongly emphasises freedom, believes that human dignity is critical to freedom and choice, and would describe the lack of dignity as an ‘unfreedom’.

This is also an opportunity to identify an example of one of the most identified shortcomings in especially Sen’s version of the capability approach: his faith that human reasoning and consensus-based engagement will eventually lead to a society made up of valued lives. Inherent social discord, conflict and hostility is not dealt with satisfactorily in Sen’s work. The negative social discourses that surround the CSG and the resistance to further social spending on the poor is a kind of ‘backsliding’ of progressive policies, and an example of the pulling back of capabilities via ‘unreason’ in the public space. Deneulin and McGregor (2010, p. 514) comment that Sen’s optimism “needs to be tempered by a deeper reflection on the finitude of human reason, and a more explicit analysis of the reality of conflict and power which lies at the heart of the construction of meanings that make reasoning possible”.

The unfreedom created by South Africa’s conservative, moralistic trends, is the subject of the section which follows.

Moral surveillance of grant recipients in South Africa

In Chapter 1 I described the puzzling persistence of negative views of grant recipients as dependent, lazy and irresponsible. This is even despite research demonstrating no evidence of widespread perverse incentive effects of social grants (Makiwane, 2010; Steele, 2006) and research demonstrating, conversely, the poverty-alleviating and social investment effects of the CSG and other grants. The country’s ideological pluralism which has led to a mix of progressive policies, such as the CSG, existing in an increasingly conservative and punitive social and political space means some policies are not widely supported. For example, the practice of granting refugee status, and therefore the entitlement to work and send children to school, to a small number of African asylum seekers, is widely controversial. The intensely hostile attitude to poor foreigners with small businesses creates a social tolerance, even encouragement, of violence towards foreigners. The most recent violence of 2015 is not quite as explosive as the xenophobic violence of 2008, but it is indicative of a continuing and unresolved social problem arising from conservative and populist political and social views existing in the same space as conservative social trends.

With regard to grants, what appears to happen is that the anecdotal cases of grant misuse, which of course exist, are interpreted in the current conservative and punitive public space as both proof of
extensive misuse as well as an indication of the value of distinguishing between deserving and undeserving recipients. In South Africa there are some practices that are so common, even across socio-economic divides, that they are perceived as normative, for example, high levels of indebtedness, the consumption of alcohol as a form of leisure, the perception that airtime for mobile phones is a necessity not a luxury purchase, and motherhood at a young age. Despite the widespread nature of these practices, they are strongly disapproved of if the individual is a grant recipient (DSD et al., 2011; Makiwane, 2010).

The public takes a moral high-ground and expects that behaviours that are hardly remarked on in the normal course of events, even in poor communities, are evidence of unworthiness when they take place in the context of state support. I wish to argue that this is a powerful form of misrecognition, and I will discuss this in more detail in the next section. I am not condoning the use of cash transfers to buy alcohol rather than food for children, or any number of other uses that do not promote the well-being of households. Rather, I am amazed that we expect the receipt of a grant to magically change the coping mechanisms and social challenges of ordinary members of our communities. The spiral of indebtedness is so common, why do we deplore people using their grants to service ‘loan-sharks’? Why is motherhood at a young age, prevalent but completely uncorrelated to rates of CSG uptake (Makiwane, 2010), somehow far more disgraceful when the young mother asks for state help to support her child?

It appears that we believe we are at liberty to judge behaviours of those receiving state support using different standards to those we use to judge our own behaviours. It is assumed, that because the CSG money comes from the public purse, all of us have a right to judge the appropriateness of its use. However, this level of surveillance is accorded only to those who publically acknowledge their need, and the need is derived from structural, socially constructed, relations of deprivation and power. So while we assume that the entitlement to the grant compels responsible behaviour, we do not also recognise that grants form part of a social responsibility to poor people we should all be acknowledging, due to inequities in global and sovereign arrangements.

Theoretically, this raises the question of the relationship between rights and duties, and the kind of citizenship being created in the South African context. I will discuss this further in the next section.

Rights and duties

Whereas civil and political rights mostly require states to protect such rights, and citizens not to violate the rights of others, social rights – to be meaningful – require active promotion and implementation by a range of formal and informal duty-bearers. The nature of social rights is
that they provide protection in times of vulnerability. Beneficiaries of social rights are often in a position of dependence upon others to provide financially or in-kind transfers, services or care (Ulriksen & Plagerson, 2014, p. 755).

Kabeer (2005) argues that the relationship between rights and duties is shaped by the ideological context of a country’s policies. On the one hand, strongly neo-liberal or welfare contractual approaches to social rights assume the passivity of the poor and benefits are seen to be conditional on particular ‘good’ behaviours, in a relationship of simple market-like exchange (Ulriksen & Plagerson, 2014). In this kind of environment, duties are understood to precede rights. On the other hand, classical liberal theory sees rights as preceding duties, and these fundamental rights form the basis of the person’s citizenship (Kabeer, 2005).

Sen (2009) considers duties in relation to freedom: he believes genuine freedom is not rampant individualism; rather freedom requires us to be accountable for what we do. This conception therefore not only opens the way for choice, but also for responsibility in how we use that choice. “Since a capability is the power to do something, the accountability that emanates from that ability – that power – is a part of the capability perspective, and this can make room for demands of duty – what can be broadly called deontological demands” (Sen, 2009, p. 19). In relation to social protection, the right to the CSG can be understood as inherently including the duty to use the money in the best interests of the child for whom it was intended.

However, this not a simple linear relationship. South Africa’s welfare paradigm is conceptualised as developmentalist, which is to a large extent based on a human rights approach. While drawing from a rights framework places rights before duties, and is thus a far more progressive approach than where social support is not enshrined in a rights framework (Sepulveda, 2014), Ulriksen and Plagerson (2014) point out that this approach can have problematic consequences. They explain that it tends to characterise citizens as only rights holders, and the state as only a duty bearer, in quite polarised terms. They argue that this encourages hostility towards those who are using the protection social rights affords them, as they are seen to be passive recipients and dependent on the state without offering any social contributions to society. What this approach does not recognise is the range of social duties that poor people receiving assistance do already provide, such as childcare and social reproduction (largely provided by women), informal education and care for children and youth, community development activities, community volunteering, active citizenship in relation to environment, infrastructure and health, and so on. As these are largely invisible, the poor are understood to be a drain on society rather than active contributors. This is such a pervasive view in
South Africa that even former president Mbeki remarked while in office on how grant recipients do not contribute to society (Marais, 2011).

If these activities were recognised and perceived to be social contributions, different to but as important as the taxes paid by the middle and upper classes, and if infrastructure and functioning public facilities were understood as duties towards the broader population just as the social wage is a duty to the poor, then there might be a far better sense of social inclusion and investment (Ulriksen & Plagerson, 2014).

Balancing rights; expecting duties

In light of the above discussion, I will set down below an excerpt from an interview I had with Nandi’s mother, Margaret, in order to consider the question: if Nandi has a right to social assistance, does she then have a duty to behave in a certain way? While her rights come before her duties, do her duties include the specific use she makes of state support?

| Margaret: | I’ve got a problem with Nandi. |
| Tessa: | What has she done now? |
| Margaret: | Nandi, I want you to forcefully reprimand her for me, for you to actually reprimand her. Nandi drinks alcohol, she doesn’t come home and she doesn’t know if the children eat. She doesn’t even know if the children’s clothes are washed, at the moment I’m doing the children’s washing. I phoned her and told her that you are coming, she says, she is coming, she is coming. It’s for the second time I am calling her, she is at her sister’s place. Now, I want you to scold at her seriously. (I: Mmm) and there is a boy here that she is having a relationship with. I gave this boy a notice not to ever again come here. This boy comes and this boy is sick [HIV/AIDS] and Nandi is busy with him. |
| Tessa: | There are problems with Nandi? So is it only now you have problems with Nandi or all the time you had problems with Nandi? |
| Margaret: | She was never like this. She has just started, she had this friend and they were both doing this. And when she gets paid the children’s grant money… |
| Tessa: | What did she do with the children’s grant money? |
| Margaret: | She used it all at the tavern. Five hundred. [And this drinking], it started a long time, but she used to drink and come home. She wasn’t doing all that stuff. |
| Tessa: | So when did she start not coming home? |
| Margaret: | She started when that girl started taking her and they were running around. So now what I see is that she has given herself to alcohol. |

I argued in chapter 1 that evidence shows the majority of recipients use the CSG to further the well-being of their children and households, and I argued in this chapter that the negative discourses about
grant recipients are politically shaped and not a reflection of pervasive ‘bad’ behavior. But it is important to consider the cases, which of course exist, of those who do use the CSG in ways that don’t benefit their children or are even destructive.

Nandi is a perfect example of this. The picture painted by her mother in the above exchange is Nandi at her most rebellious and angry, Nandi who sees her only release as to ‘give herself to alcohol’. While this is rather depressing, I claim that part of the reason for Nandi’s spectacularly ‘bad’ behavior is exactly the process of struggling to resolve issues of transition and need in the context of little hope that I raised previously. It is Nandi asserting herself, using agency, sadly in destructive and unhelpful ways. This destructive behavior is unfortunate, and not in the interests of her or her children. But this behavior pre-dated receiving the CSG, and a grant on its own cannot substantively change Nandi’s coping mechanisms, whether productive or dysfunctional.

I conclude from this, and in relation to the discussion on rights and duties, that if we were to link the CSG to specific required behaviours we would be undermining the social right Nandi has to support for her children. In addition, I believe her duties are the broader civil duties we all have to contribute socially, and that the two should not be linked in a linear way. My argument does not, of course, nullify the need to ask questions of justice in the case of a mother using the CSG on alcohol, and Nandi should be encouraged and supported to use more constructive coping mechanisms. But withdrawing rights in response to behavior is punitive, and would erode the basis on which democratic South Africa is built.

Revisiting public services: paternalism and freedom

Following on from the need to assist Nandi to behave in ways that promote the well-being and capabilities of her and her children, I next ask: Where are public services such as health, education, child protection, counselling services, and housing services in Nandi’s story? From the time she was a child, the public services offered to her were minimal or in some cases non-existent. I want to balance Nandi’s ‘bad’ behaviour with the ‘bad behaviour’ of the state.

Two examples from my experience are sufficient, I believe, to illustrate this extreme lack of responsiveness of the state in offering citizens forms of support. The first is the number of conversations I had with Margaret where she described her frustration in not receiving housing she had applied for despite being on the housing list for many years. In its biggest failure, communication, the impression left on the unsophisticated Margaret was that she would be ‘called’, by name, over the radio when her house was ready: all she needed to do was wait and listen.
The second example comes from the complete lack of responsiveness of the province’s Department of Social Development: In November 2011 I believed that the tension and conflict in the home was at a high level, and at the time that Nandi was drinking a lot and not managing to fulfil even basic mothering responsibilities. I wrote a formal social work referral letter to the DSD office in Gauteng, and followed it up with telephone conversations with the intake and the allocated social worker. To date, despite many follow-up calls for over a year, they still have not visited the family.

These echo the service failures discussed with reference to Jane in chapter 4, where I outlined how the successes of social assistance came at a cost, as money was funnelled away from struggling social services. In this chapter I want to build on that discussion by assessing the social justice outcomes of current institutional arrangements of welfare in South Africa, through asking philosophical questions about the balance of paternalism and freedom, using Nandi’s experiences as an illustration.

In her 2012 Tanner Lectures, Esther Duflo questioned the assumption that state paternalism is necessarily problematic. Paternalism, providing for people according to priorities set by the giver and not the receiver, is criticised for removing an individual’s right to choose, because the giver believes they ‘know better’. In a thoughtful discussion on paternalism and freedom, she identifies that our life choices are not exercised in a vacuum, and that private and public institutions powerfully influence what choices we make, not just in the opportunities that exist, but in the kind of energy, time, and recourses we must expend to exercise these choices. She identifies the “powerful influence of the ‘default’ situation, what an individual will end up doing if she exercises no active choice at all... [and] the determinants of the status quo are... functions of current regulation and past and present public investments” (Duflo, 2012, p. 8).

In the absence of a job, what options does a young woman like Nandi have to choose from to improve her life? One imagines that in the relatively sophisticated urban environment in which she lives, there are a number of possibilities, from accessing services that are already available to using initiative to create new opportunities. For example, she could complete her schooling; she could be trained and work as a volunteer in an NGO; she could apply for a learnership; she could go on a parenting skills enhancement programme; she could join an income generation programme; she could start a small business. These all require significant investments of time, energy, and resources, and this, coupled with a lack of knowledge of how to go about these things, means Nandi slides into the default position of doing nothing at all. Nandi’s language skills, very limited in English and Afrikaans (essential for the work world), her immaturity, her lack of self-confidence and her lack of cultural capital in the world of work all ensure that the default position is going to prevail for Nandi. As noted by Duflo (2012, p. 10), “small barriers that may appear to us to be minuscule in view of the likely benefits may be significant
factors in the [person’s] decision-making... [In addition, a] step ... may have a very different significance for a literate, educated person, [to] an illiterate person who might easily feel intimidated”.

Just having the services available does not mean that people can easily use them. “Choice is not costless” (Duflo, 2012, p. 17), as it requires knowledge, energy, and skills to select and access the correct option; thus unmediated choice, in reality, skews outcomes towards the default of do nothing. Duflo makes the point that policies that offer automatic access to certain services, or easier activation of services in bundled formats, rather than having to identify and fight for each one individually, require design and structure in a top-down, state-managed way. For some, this is uncomfortably paternalistic. Nonetheless, these policies and programmes actually promote meaningful freedoms in ways that freely available but disparate and hidden services do not. Therefore freedom for poor people requires more social and institutional service design, not less (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011).

Duflo’s argument attempts to challenge the ‘dirty’ status of paternalism, dirtied as a result of the powerful global self-reliance discourse, a discourse that can have devastating consequences when it is short hand for the rationalisation of services, the pull back of state responsibilities, and the disavowal of rights to social care. South Africa assumes that the developmental model of welfare is a model of state care, but the language of self-reliance is a strong one throughout both policy and practice designs, and the care of the state falls far short of the needs of the individuals who struggle to create lives they value.

Capabilities and needs

It is here I wish to suggest thinking about Nandi in relation to her capabilities. One of the hallmarks of the capability approach is “normative deliberation on the ends of policy-making... [which requires] normative evaluation of its objectives; i.e. are the objectives ‘good’? Do they enable people to live ‘good’ or ‘better’ lives?” (Deneulin & McGregor, 2010, p. 508). If we ask this question of the CSG in relation to Nandi, the answer is definitely ‘yes’: the grant does make her life better in relation to the objectives of the grant itself, which are to support the food security and schooling needs of children. However, the grant does not broaden Nandi’s capabilities outside of material support. While the objectives of the CSG never claimed intended impact beyond material support, our social expectations of recipients of social assistance are that their receipt of the transfer should induce them to behave and think in certain ways. We expect Nandi to use the grant to be self-reliant, to make progress, to make something of her life.

Nussbaum’s list of capabilities show the vast realm of freedoms that we all require to ‘live a life we have reason to value’ (Sen’s widely followed definition of capability, 2009). They extend beyond the
basic needs for shelter and nutrition, and include such things as ‘political control over one’s environment’ (capability number 10A), and ‘affiliation’ (capability number 7) (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 34). In all, Nandi’s life has some freedoms as described by Nussbaum, such as ‘life’, but lack other critical freedoms which would offer her a life of ‘value’. In particular, Nandi’s continued lack of opportunities constrains her being able to have, in its fullest, ‘senses, imagination and thought’, defined as “Being able to use the sense, to imagine, think and reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 33), as well as probably ‘practical reasoning’, which is defined by Nussbaum as “Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 34).

Prior to receiving the grant, Nandi lived her life as circumstances dictated rather than engaging in critical reflection about the planning of her life, had education of a minimal nature such that her ability to express her emotions, needs and dreams were constrained, and lacked ‘imagination’ about different possible futures, because Nandi has a lack of hope that her life can realistically be appreciably different in the future. These are particular forms of the paucity of capabilities that many poor young women in Nandi’s position might experience, and these areas are unaffected by the CSG: why would the CSG magically assist Nandi to make future plans, to become self-reliant, to be able to control her environment in ways that have nothing to do with material well-being? This is a vital lesson about the CSG: it cannot deliver a ‘life one has reason to value’ in and of itself: it is too small, too limited, too one-dimensional. This is not a lament about the limitations of the grant; rather it is a lament about our unrealistic expectations of the reach of the changes the grant can bring about.

Conclusion

Nandi’s story is a good illustration of the complexity of poverty and need, and how multiple layers of circumstances and deprivation can have serious effects on women living a life that they value. Reducing need in these circumstances to just income ignores the many forms of misrecognition and misrepresentation that being poor can bring. Moreover, over-emphasising cash as a solution to poverty has led to the subsequent neglect of welfare services in South Africa and a demonising of women who ‘misuse’ state grant money. The depth of Nandi’s narrative exposes some of the long-term unfulfilled emotional and social needs she has which almost guarantee that it will be extremely difficult for her to consistently and continuously use the CSG in ways that would be widely approved of. Thus the more needs she has, the less deserving she seems to be.
Chapter 6

Choosing between security and freedom: households and cash

Loretta is a plump, pretty young woman of 31 years who has one son, Warren, who is two years old. She dresses neatly, has carefully made up her face and hair, and speaks slowly and clearly in a strong ‘coloured’ accent. While the household speaks mainly Afrikaans, Loretta has chosen to speak only English to her son. Loretta lives in Westbury in a busy and crowded building surrounded by litter and unkempt grass. She inhabits a truly tiny single roomed flat which has a small bathroom, and a kitchenette in the entrance alcove. She shares a single bed with her son (the bottom of a bunk bed) and the rest of the household sleep in the other (shared) beds and on blankets on the floor. The household consists of seven people: her mother, Sally, her two adult brothers, a teenage brother and sister who are still at school, and Loretta and her son. Despite its size and crowding, the flat is extremely tidy and clean.

Loretta receives one CSG and gets a further R500 maintenance from her ex-boyfriend, her son’s father, which is taken off his monthly salary through an order of the maintenance court. He left Loretta when she was pregnant, but has never denied paternity. Loretta’s two younger siblings both receive a CSG, but the money goes to their mother who, according to Loretta, almost always spends it on alcohol. Sally also receives a disability grant due to a back injury she got many years before when her husband pushed her out of a window during a fight. Loretta uses her income on milk and nappies for her son and food for the household.

When I first met her, Loretta was training to be a community health educator at the Westbury Clinic, but during the period of our interviews she was expelled from the programme for fighting with a fellow student, and was then unemployed and looking for work. She did not complete high school.

The household is a conflictual one, with physical fighting, extensive drug and alcohol use, theft of each others’ valuables, and very little trust. Loretta has experienced various forms of abuse, from the emotional abuse of her childhood, to attempted rape and rape as an adult. She is polite and reserved in our interviews, but judging from stories she relates, can hold her own in a physical fight which she has regularly had to do to protect herself and her son.

This chapter considers the role that the CSG plays in households in relation to household composition and intrahousehold relationships, and the management of money and household survival. The chapter is an illustration of some of the nuanced and varied effects of the grant: on the one hand, its effects fall short of offering freedom and dignity to recipients in relation to choice of household membership, a form of misrecognition as the consequences of this can be damaging. On the other hand, it is a vital factor in household survival and forms an important keystone of security in relation to income, functioning as a form of redistribution and contributing significantly to Nussbaum’s (2011) capability of bodily health, which includes basic nutrition and shelter. To begin, I consider the factors that
influence membership in Loretta’s household, including income such as the CSG, and some of the consequences of the membership configuration.

Households and power

Households are usually understood to be a group of people in co-residence, who co-operate in productive ways, who share income, and who have mutuality linkages, such as affection, or being kin (Neves & du Toit, 2008). However, household boundaries are not immutable as many internal and external factors result in fluidity, mobility, and shifts in composition and location. Neves and du Toit (2008) usefully suggest that it is households as a shared project or narrative, that influences the kind of claims, counter claims and negotiations that take place within and across household boundaries, especially in relation to scarce resources.

Cooperation and bargaining

While ideally households are constructed around notions of mutuality, resources are a very strong, sometimes overriding, point of consolidation (Neves & du Toit, 2008), and are central in Loretta’s case. Evidence in South Africa shows that social grants (largely the CSG, the Old Age Pension and the Disability Grant) play a decisive role in household formation within poor communities (Lund, 2002; Neves et al., 2009; Seekings, 2008a). Those without grants or eligibility to apply for grants migrate towards households where there is a grant recipient. The migration is principally gender and age specific as young men have no claim on social grants, whereas older people and women of any age with children do.

Theories of households and intra-household resource allocation has moved on from the unitary model of neo-classical economic theory. The unitary model assumes that all members of the household agree on how best to jointly pool time, material goods, and resources to maximise the welfare of the household as a whole. This, it is assumed, usually occurs under the decision-making authority of a ‘benevolent dictator’, conceptualised as a male breadwinner and head of household who has altruistic goals for the household as a whole. Fiercely contested by feminists and others who recognise intra-household resource allocation is at its heart an expression of power, and thus vulnerable to serious inequities on the basis of gender, age, generation, and so on, the unitary model has been largely discredited and more collective models of households have been developed (Kabeer, 1994; Sen, 1990).

Amartya Sen’s (1990) notion of ‘cooperative conflicts’ and Denise Kandiyoti’s (1988) idea of ‘bargaining with patriarchy’ have both been very influential in revealing how power within households is critical to understanding resource allocation and relationships, especially gender relationships, in
the household. Sen (1990) suggests that all gender relationships in households are made up of both relations of cooperation as well as of conflict. These relations do not just randomly exist, but are carefully shaped by members according to their own positions in the household, their perceived and real contributions and interests. Each person has a ‘breakdown position’, where cooperation is no longer possible, and conflict will arise. Women are especially likely to rationally balance cooperation and conflict as they usually have the least power in households where men reside. Therefore, a woman might cooperate in one area in order to consolidate her power for the purposes of demanding change or commanding resources in another area. This process is taken up by Kandiyoti (1988, 1998), and she explained women’s means of influencing household decisions and events as ‘bargaining with patriarchy’ as power is often wielded in embedded, indirect, or hidden ways in order not to challenge the patriarchal authority of men, or older women in positions of power in the household (such as Sally, in Loretta’s case).

Loretta’s household raises quite clearly the contradictory incentives for cooperation and conflict, relationships of unequal interdependence, and the ideological links between authority and responsibility within the home, the last an expression of the changing gender and generational norms and expectations about household headships and financial responsibilities (Kabeer, 2000; Seekings, 2008a; Sen, 1990). Sally is the household head, and her position is consolidated by her age and relationship to the members (she is the eldest and mother or grandmother to everyone living there). In addition, the flat is rented in her name. These aspects all ensure she is in a position of authority and power in relation to the other members. As the quote below indicates, Sally appears to use her authority in calculated and arbitrary ways, in large part to control membership, behaviour, resource management, and relationships in the household. This behaviour disrupts the ideological assumption that headship confers an obligation of benevolence and financial support to other household members (Kabeer, 2000).

My knowledge of Loretta’s background of emotional abuse and her mother’s long-standing self-serving behaviour explains her deep distrust of her mother as a household head. However, the cultural and affective logic of deferment and respect for her mother, as well as the necessity for shelter for her and her son, compels her to accept Sally’s authority in the household. Loretta comments:

| Loretta: I think the decisions here in this flat ..., because it is not mine, it is my mother’s decisions. Normally, it is her way or the highway... Many a times we get thrown out of the house on several occasions, I think the latest was maybe last week. We were thrown out of the house again. So each thing happens through her. Like when she ..., when it comes to money. Normally, I will take his maintenance money neh? And I will like buy groceries in the house. My mother, she will like go and sell it, you know the whole grocery she will go and sell it and just to buy herself liquor. My opinion about that is that ..., it’s like she is pushing me somehow |

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into a corner, do you understand? It’s like..., because I am depending on this place for staying do you understand? So I must just be quiet.

Tessa: Because you can’t get up and leave and go somewhere? There is nowhere else to go.

Loretta: Where can I go? And then..., my mother like I am saying right now ..., she is getting her own grant..., a disability grant and the grant for [my younger sister and brother], but yet out of her money what does she do? Totally nothing.

The interdependent nature of households mean that the ‘choice’ to live there is by no means a freedom to do so, here I use freedom as a capability notion (Sen, 1999). Loretta feels forced to live with her mother and brothers with whom she has unhappy and complicated relationships, due to a lack of resources. She is unable to afford to live independently. Further, her participation in her mother’s household is regulated by social norms and ideologically constructed allocatory systems (Quisumbing, 2010), but are largely not open to negotiation or change. Sen (1999) understands freedom as the presence of valuable options or alternatives; that is, genuine choice unencumbered by circumstances predetermining the outcome of that choice. In this case, Loretta has no genuine alternative choices: her income is not enough for her to live independently with her son, nor does she have other family who are able to have her live with them and where she would be happy to live. The income offered by the CSG is therefore not sufficient to provide freedom to Loretta. In addition, the fact that Loretta is compelled to stay where she doesn’t want to be is a form of active misrecognition; and the consequences are negative: the environment of conflict and distrust is especially toxic for her mental health.

My comments here do not imply that I expect the CSG to offer independent living opportunities for every recipient; that would be grossly unrealistic and perhaps inappropriate in relation to current wage levels which also often do not provide this. Rather, I wish to point out the inherent limitations of interventions such as the CSG, contributing to the argument that it is impossible for a social grant to work on its own, in isolation, to improve people’s lives; other services, such as decent subsidised housing, are critical to offer a life people have reason to value.

While the CSG does not offer freedom in the sense described above, it is without doubt a source of power, as is the small amount of maintenance Loretta gets monthly from her child’s father. Along with the other social grants in the household, these forms of income are the only solid and dependable forms of monthly cash, and Loretta is thus an important resource in the family system. This might protect her and her son from the worst of her mother’s regular tendency to throw her out of the household. The income she brings in is a form of leverage in the balance of power, and obliges her mother to offer some cooperation herself.
Bargaining and cooperative behaviour in households is enacted for rewards and to avoid penalties (Francis, 1998). Loretta cooperates and, at times, bargains, for the reward of less conflict, more shared decision-making and cooperative relationships in the household. She also does so to avoid the penalty she may face for withdrawing cooperation: she will be forced to leave the household. For her this cooperative behaviour takes the form of avoiding conflict, placating her mother, submitting to her mother’s authority, and protecting herself, her son and her resources in active and sometime secretive ways. This is only sometimes successful; as is clear, conflict is endemic to the household and Loretta is frequently asked to leave. But it does give her a precarious place of belonging, even if this is insecure and frequently unpleasant.

Finally, the notion of cooperation and bargaining helps us to make Loretta’s agency visible. Her lack of freedom around household membership does not mean she is entirely at the mercy of her mother as household head: she uses her agency in implicit and explicit ways to serve the interests of her son, herself, and as the next section will show, her two younger siblings. While direct challenges to or defiance of her mother’s authority would invariably lead to intense conflict, and often a loss of privilege (in the form of household membership), indirect or covert non-compliance and deliberate but quiet changes to household norms or authority were commonly used by Loretta, and were often successful. This is typical in the functioning of agency for household members who occupy lower positions in the household hierarchy, and is the key reason that “the exercise of power within the family [is]... unlike power in any other domain of life” (Kabeer, 2000, p. 336). This is subtly illustrated in the exchange below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tessa:</th>
<th>The money that you get for Warren, the grant and the maintenance, is that entirely your money or does [Sally] ask you for rent or money or whatever?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loretta:</td>
<td>She wants rent, but I don’t pay rent because I buy groceries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa:</td>
<td>Okay, okay, so you pay rent in other ways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loretta:</td>
<td>Well, she wants rent but like I say I [am not interested], I just know that if I give her that money she will just go and drink it. So I always just get the groceries, even though she rather wants money.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thokozile, one of the other participants in this study, displayed something similar when we spoke about the use of the grant. When I asked what her boyfriend thought of her getting the grant, she said “he doesn’t like it because he is not getting the grant; when he gives me R500 I spend it on food for everyone, but [my daughter’s grant] money I keep in my pocket [just for her]”. Her own earnings as a part time domestic worker is also kept for her discretionary use because she commented that if she gives it to her boyfriend she can’t send money home to help her large and very poor rural family. These
are powerful acts of agency within the household linking resources (cash) to achievements (chosen and valued outcomes) via decision making processes (Kabeer, 1999; Sen, 1999).

Mutuality and care

Considering mutuality instead of just resource consolidation, it is only in relation to an ethic of care that Loretta feels pulled towards, rather than pushed away from, the household. While in theory Loretta has only one son to support on her single grant, and her younger siblings’ needs are being seen to via their own grants, in practice Loretta often uses some of her CSG and maintenance money on her younger brother and sister. She has long played a mothering role to these siblings both in the absence of her mother and when her mother uses their CSGs on alcohol. She explains this in the following way:

Loretta: The other reason why I’m here is because my brother and my sisters they were still small, even now they are still small like I think my mother she doesn’t like really care about them because like if she do care about them she was not going to leave them alone several times. Because like my knowledge to that is like anything can just happen to them. I can just go and move out, I can just start somewhere? What will happen to them because she always drinks... Even before I had [my son] I always had a responsibility towards [my brother and sister].

Tessa: You are kind of like a mother to them, a second mother, is that right?

Loretta: I was a mother to my brothers and my sister, [the three older ones]..., I don’t know what went wrong with my mother but for a couple of years she was not with us. I think back then I was still in primary school so I was a mother to them and now with the younger two as well. Often she is not here, so I’m here... That time when I used to work. Okay I would buy them umh, maybe sometimes give them money... I would buy them clothes with my money. I would like wash their clothes, wash my brothers’ as well ..., do their washing and iron them, I would keep them neat and tidy. I would buy them food and sometimes help them with their homework.

Tessa: If you are not buying groceries, does your mother buy groceries?

Loretta: No, she won’t.

Tessa: Okay so the money she gets from the grant and things she does not buy for the house, hey?

Loretta: No, she used to. Maybe..., I will maybe say maybe the year before last. Because right now when..., now I don’t have any income, I don’t have money right now neh. So maybe my [elder] brother will like to buy maybe something for tonight to eat. Sometimes my [elder] brothers they do intervene, do you understand? They do buy things and help. Ja, they do actually help. I think they are more dependent on my grant that I am getting. Like when it is the first ((1st)), they expect me to buy things while I must..., I must buy for my son as well.

Tessa: For your son, ja.

Loretta: And I must buy for the house sometimes as well.

Tessa: Mh. That’s a big responsibility for you Loretta.

Loretta: I don’t think of it in that way.
The last comment in the above quote indicates that the caring role Loretta plays in the lives of her siblings has offered her an identity of carer, and she sees this as a welcome part of her character rather than a burden she has to carry. This identity strongly influences her behaviour, and it appears that Loretta is extremely accountable and dependable not only in the expenditure and care for her own child, but for her dependent siblings too. This role and her age (the eldest sibling) also gives her authority (and thus power) in the household, and might explain what appears to be heightened hostility between Sally and Loretta as Loretta is a kind of threat to Sally's power. This benefit contributes to the magnitude and significance of this carer role in her identity.

Perhaps these insights offer a clue to why some women do not use their CSG income for the well-being of their children, just as much as why most women do: if a woman's role as carer resonates for her and is a valued part of her identity, she is unlikely to misuse grant money. If, however, she has any ambivalence or aversion to her motherhood or carer role, this will engender resentment towards spending the only income she has on her child/ren. This tentative statement certainly has merit when considering Nandi, who is described in chapter 5. Undoubtedly her fluctuating and confused identification with her motherhood role powerfully contributes to her inconsistent and sometimes problematic grant expenditure behaviour.

This conclusion warrants consideration, in that interventions to support women (usually mothers) in their role as caregivers might then have a positive effect on the spending patterns of those who are erratic or 'irresponsible' with their CSG money. Leaving women to parent or care in vulnerable, unstable, unpleasant, or unpredictable circumstances without support poses parenting challenges and financial pressures that can prove too much. Consequently, CSG expenditure and good parenting, and by extension, their children, can suffer a great deal.

The powerful national discourse of young women who are irresponsible and misuse the grant money has been discredited as this clearly does not take place on a massively large scale, and as discussed in the previous chapter has more to do with the current national public and political attitude to poverty. However, there is no doubt that it does take place on a smaller scale. Nandi is one example. Another example is given by Loretta in one of our conversations. I thought it worth reporting here as I think it talks to the vulnerabilities caused by the particular environment of Westbury:

| Loretta: | Most women... are misusing the money... Meaning like they will take care of themselves... What they will do is that they will go to the ATM and withdraw money and go straight into a liquor store, buy themselves liquor for that day, go to the shop. Maybe next go to the shop and they buy for the children maybe a bunny chow (local meal of filled bread) with chips and |
there is polony on it or maybe a Russian [sausage] and maybe a cold drink. And that’s it, they have spent because it does not go far. And then they will feel so guilty.

Tessa: Why do you say they feel guilty, have you seen people who say that?

Loretta: Ja, most of the ladies that I do know they will like say, oh I misused it man, shoo. I should have bought my child that thing or should have spent it on something else rather than on booze. Ja, I know a lot.

A state response to circumstances such as these is totally ideologically driven: those from a conservative political position would argue that it is a parent’s responsibility to parent, and this ‘blatant’ failure to do so should be punished via the withdrawal of the grant. However, I claim that a genuinely developmental and caring approach would acknowledge it is society’s responsibility to ensure the conditions for good parenting are available to every parent. Therefore services to assist these mothers to manage better and resist the lure of alcohol would be far more positive.

The next theme I wish to explore is similarly linked to the conditions for good parenting: the environmental violence, conflict and substance use to which Loretta and her son are exposed.

Conflict, violence and substance use

While very neat, the living space is extremely limited in the single room (with a kitchen entrance alcove) in which this household lives, depicted in the photos below:

![Figure 17: The entrance alcove used as a kitchen and the single living and bedroom of Loretta’s household.](image)

A crowded and resource-scarce household is logically going to produce tension. However, the level of tension and conflict in Loretta’s household is extreme, by anyone’s standards. Despite direct kinship between all the household members, mistrust, verbal mistreatment, fierce disagreements, and physical violence are all common. This can be attributed to a number of social and emotional causes;
but I will focus specifically on substance use below as it has such a powerful influence on this particular household.

The drug use of Loretta’s older brothers is open knowledge, and in addition her mother admits that she is a heavy drinker. Loretta and Sally both concur that the consequences of both habits are very destructive, leading to conflict, violence, theft, and hunger. The following conversation with Sally occurred after a brief period of abstinence, although Loretta confirms this was short-lived and Sally returned to drinking soon after.

| Sally: | I like it the way it is now without alcohol. It’s been about two weeks now without alcohol and it’s much better like this, no argument, no fighting. Because whenever when I am drunk, I don’t speak to anybody and I fight with everybody. No, I don’t like that. I prefer it like this, because the [relationships] are much better... We understand each other and respect each other... It’s not worth it to stay drunk every day. It might take the pain away for that time but when you get up the next day, it’s only worse and worse. And I realised it’s better to quit now... it’s not worth it maan. |
| Tessa: | Ja, and it also eats your money, hey? |
| Sally: | Obviously, and then when you are drinking you have got a lot of friends and when you don’t drink you don’t have friends and I prefer it that way. You know when you are under the influence, you don’t see things right and in the right light neh? But when you are sober you can see what is wrong and what is happening around and all that stuff. |
| Tessa: | Okay. Ja, it’s hard though when you have got money in your pocket..., you know it is easy to drink... |
| Sally: | But sometimes I feel it is selfish of me, because okay, you want now a beer which is R10 already. Or you could just have taken that R10 and bought a cold drink for everybody to benefit from it. Or maybe buy a loaf of bread and everybody can eat of it. Obviously, by the end of the day, okay, you are gonna take that R50 and you are gonna buy now alcohol. When you come again you are hungry and there is nothing to eat, you see? No, I prefer to stay sober rather. |

Later in the conversation we discussed drug use in the home, as follows:

| Tessa: | Oh so are the boys mostly smoking dagga? Or not? You don’t know? |
| Sally: | Yes, yes. Especially the one. |
| Tessa: | Is it something that worries you or are you fine with it? |
| Sally: | No, no, no, I’m not fine with it. It is something that really bothers me. It’s really honestly something..., it bothers me. |

Later on:

| Sally: | The only problem here is Loretta must watch the brother, the one who is smoking dagga. |
| Tessa: | Is he taking money hey? |
| Sally: | Ooh he is, he is... That’s the problem, that’s a problem. |
| Tessa: | Ja, things disappear hey? |
Sally:  My cards, my cigarettes my everything. I used to [sell single cigarettes to earn money] now what is the use, you sell one cigarette and you must go and come again and you must count your money again, and see if it’s [all still there], you understand?

It appears levels of abuse at home from Loretta’s past and present are closely related to substance use, in her mother’s case over a very long period of time. Loretta refers to serious emotional abuse as a child (discussed further in chapter 7), and constant conflict at home, and she cannot recall a time ever when her mother did not drink heavily, apart from fleeting periods of abstinence.

No substance addiction is easy to break, but addiction over a lifetime in a community where there has been long standing historical substance use and addiction is frighteningly intractable. A chief cause of alcohol use and misuse in the coloured community was the convention of paying farm workers on wine (and other) farms with alcohol and other goods rather than cash, locking them into an easy, long-term supply of alcohol with few if any exits or alternatives (London, 2000; Viljoen, 2013). Begun hundreds of years ago, this remained a common practice right up until the later part of the twentieth century (London, 2000; Viljoen, 2013), and it is still happening although now illegal. The current levels of alcohol and drug addiction have other causes too, such as poverty and unemployment, and the combination of social difficulties have created a serious problem of addiction in the coloured communities of especially the Western Cape, but also in Westbury and other parts of Johannesburg (Dannhauser, 2006; London, 2000).

Sally candidly concedes she is the source of much of the tension, as reflected in the following exchange:

Sally:  Most of the time, it’s when it’s conflict, it is when I’m drunk. You know I’m not too big to say I’m also wrong because nobody is perfect. Not because I am the mother I am perfect and I am not wrong. Many times I am causing these troubles. And I realise it when I am sober.

Tessa:  Are you able to say sorry when you are sober?
Sally:  Ja. Sorry Loretta and then it’s finished and then I go out again [and drink more]. (She laughs). And sometimes I feel like I don’t want to apologise, I just ignore them.

Her honesty is disarming, but does not change the destructive impact of her behaviour. Of course the addiction does not itself cause the abuse, just as it doesn’t cause violence and conflict in general; however, it does provide a very fertile ground for this kind of behaviour (Postmus, 2012).

Loretta shared the following when I asked about her relationship with her adult brothers:

Loretta: We will like get along [sometimes]... We will like sit and watch maybe a movie and laughing together and just chilling together. But mostly [we don’t get on]. What is not good is maybe
when we get into a fight, when we are maybe arguing..., it’s just like..., there is this one time when my..., I think I was maybe seven months pregnant and I had an argument with my mother and then my brother came in and he just started kicking me. While I was pregnant. So what happened is my friend came in. I think she was maybe on her way here. So she came in at the perfect time. She..., she just tried to stop him. [He was kicking me] in the stomach.

Tessa: So he was specifically kicking you to hurt you and your baby hey? (Loretta nods) Was it the only time?

Loretta: No, a lot of times when I was pregnant. Maybe I was cursed when I was pregnant because a lot of things happened when I was pregnant. But there was another time when my brother and I, we had an argument... because they are using drugs neh? He was high and he wanted to watch a certain movie and we were already in the house and we were busy watching something else, so I said no, and then we had an argument and he just started swearing, swearing. He swore and I swore him back and then he just..., he took the extension cord and he wanted to hit me with it, but [I got out of the way], then he hit me with his fist but then I did hit him back. And then it was over. Ja, and there was another time when he stole my three hundred rand until I went to the police station and I got him arrested. And when the police came back with me... all of a sudden the money was all of a sudden there. All of a sudden it just appeared after he got arrested for it.

Tessa: Well done, you could definitely defend yourself.  

Loretta: Ja, I must defend my child, I must.

It is interesting that in the quote above, Loretta speaks of defending her unborn child, rather than herself. This was a theme in other discussions we had: her role as a mother is not just to care for her child, but to actively defend her child against a violent and predatory world.

Statistics on violence in South Africa indicate the very high levels of aggression and violence between men, especially young men. This is particularly true for Westbury, which has a long history of gangsterism, drug use, and violence among young men, although this improved substantially after peace interventions in the township in 2001 (Dannhauser, 2006). While I have no doubt that her brother, depicted in the quote above, has experienced brutal violence himself, and probably metes it out to other young men too, this extract indicates a pointedly gendered flavour to the behaviour. Her brother specifically aims his kicks at her unborn child, knowing this is a double injury to Loretta both physically and emotionally. He actively uses her pregnant status to his advantage, and the fact that they are direct kin does not temper his violence in the least. In chapter 7 violence against women is discussed in more depth, as this is a theme for all the women in the study.

A final point about the consequences of living in such a damaging environment is its impact on her own behaviour. While partly out of necessity for survival, Loretta herself can behave in destructive ways. For example, the contributions her brothers make to the household she accepts even though
some of this is likely to be from illegal means. Also, she herself was expelled from her Community Health Educator course due to violent behaviour even though she denounces it in her own home.

The importance and dependability of cash

Regarding money management for a woman getting the CSG, a few things bear mention. The first is that the amount, now R320 per month but at the time of the interviews R270 monthly, is very little to cover the costs associated with supporting a child. In research on the CSG the recommendation women give most often when asked about the improvement of the cash transfer system is for the monetary value to be increased (DSD et al., 2011). This is unsurprising: using any measure the value of the grant is small. However, this does not mean the CSG is unhelpful. At a macro-level national poverty has decreased as a direct consequence of cash transfers (Dorrit Posel & Rogan, 2012), and at a micro-level women report that while they remain poor, the grant saves them from destitution in many cases (Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011). This is borne out in this case too. For example, in an interview with Sally, Loretta’s mother, I asked what had changed since Loretta had started getting a grant. Sally commented as follows:

Sally: A lot of things [have changed]. There are [a lot of financial needs], [so the CSG] it covers a little hole. Luckily for Loretta, Warren is not [using disposable nappies], but [there are still expenses as he needs to] eat... and he also drinks juices. Then there is clothing. There is many a times he gets sick and not all hospitals is for free... So there is a little..., there is a difference, although it is not [enough] money... But at least she can cover something there, especially for her child.

Tessa: So you think it’s a good thing?

Sally: It’s a good thing for her, it’s a good thing. [And now] at least she contributes towards food. She even contributes towards her smaller brother and sister towards clothing. Outings if she has got money she contributes. She gave me now this [food I am eating] because I told her there was nothing and I don’t know where did she get it now. Loretta she wants to start to sell ice cream.

Tessa: That’s a good idea.

Sally: Ja, at least everybody starts small.

A related point, and alluded to above, is that poor households often depend on diverse income streams, so the little ‘bits’ of cash are pooled to construct a collective survival strategy (Patel et al., 2012). Livelihood frameworks (Baden, 2013; Beall & Kanji, 1999) have allowed us to move away from seeing only wage-based employment as legitimate means of economic survival. In reality, poor people worldwide use a range of activities, resources and relationships to make a living, and they do this in rational and active ways.

Income pooling from cash transfers, where money is combined with other forms of income to make purchases beneficial for the household as a whole, is both common and understood by recipients as
a legitimate use of the grant (DSD et al., 2011; Neves et al., 2009). In addition both the Old Age Pension and the CSG have been shown to improve general household welfare rather than only the individual recipient, although the impact is significant largely only when the recipient is a woman, implying that women’s income is spent on general household welfare while men’s income is less so (Duflo, 2003; Lund, 2002). International research demonstrates that an increase in women’s income is used for household consumption, and has a positive measurable impact on children’s well-being (Barrientos & DeJong, 2006; Haddad, 1999). In contrast, income increases flowing to men increases men’s discretionary personal spending and decreases household consumption (Alam, 2012). In addition to better outcomes for children, earnings or cash transfers going to women has significant transformatory potential in relation to personal empowerment and the longer-term health and educational outcomes for children (Kabeer, 2000; Quisumbing, 2010).

While in Loretta’s household there is a lot of tension about who controls what cash, there is also income pooling in that when groceries are bought the household as a whole benefits. Cash and in-kind income in their household comes from four grants (three CSGs and one disability grant), the maintenance Loretta receives from her son’s father, daily food parcels from the Abram Kriel Children’s Home outreach services, and varied and minimal income from Loretta’s brothers which is unpredictable and often not from legal sources. None of these income sources are ‘automatic’, they all take effort to find out about, access, and receive. Loretta’s decision to apply for maintenance is a conscious rational one, with a view to securing a more appropriate and dependable source of income. When I asked her why she had applied for formal maintenance, she answered as follows:

Loretta: Normally, what we used to do because he used to buy the child’s things by himself neh. So each month when I would..., I like asked like please, please this month..., because normally he would buy four soaps neh. Like the bath soaps, so I would say please this month don’t buy another soap because we still have soap... can you please buy something else then I would get emotional abuse like he would like say I am useless, can’t I go and look for a job. He would like call me name over the phone. So at some point I got tired and I was so scared that I was gonna hate this person and he is the father of my child and the child needs him... So I just went to the court, I did not tell him what happened and..., and then ever since then I got maintenance.

A third point which relates to the CSG as a form of cash income, and one of the most valuable aspects of the grant, is its dependability. This is one of the features of cash transfers that make them such a valuable and popular choice of social intervention (Holmes & Jones, 2013). Those who get them know how much and when they will receive the money and this makes it so much easier to plan their lives and manage their money. In South Africa this has been noted as an important attribute of social grants, contributing to their effectiveness in reducing poverty (DSD et al., 2011; Plagerson & Ulriksen, 2013; Dorrit Posel & Rogan, 2012). The key outcome is a form of financial security, which even though it
does not significantly change the economic status of the recipient, changes their real and perceived vulnerability to the worst outcomes of poverty (Dorrit Posel & Rogan, 2014).

This is very unlike the majority of other income streams for poor people; casual labour, informal work, remittances, and survival tactics are all unpredictable and unreliable forms of cash. Even money via a court ordered maintenance is unpredictable, as Loretta explains below:

Loretta: I do have another [bank account for receiving my]... maintenance, it’s FNB. For the garnishee order [I get from my child’s father].

Tessa: And that again, do you know when it is coming in, every month?

Loretta: No! I can even show you now. Yoh! It is supposed to be each month on the seventh. But I will get it maybe on the twenty fifth, or I will get it maybe..., like I got it yesterday.

Tessa: Oh goodness, it’s not the seventh! It’s ten days late.

Loretta: Each month [it’s late]. So... that money, I don’t depend [on it, for example] like telling someone I’ll [pay them back what I owe them] on my maintenance day because I don’t know, do you understand?

The dependability of the CSG and the financial security this offers contributes significantly to the redistributive effects of the intervention. In addition, as the effects also have an impact on the perception of recipients (Dorrit Posel & Rogan, 2014), we can extrapolate that there are positive recognition outcomes too. Women who have a sense of financial security, who have a ‘back-up’ plan, who have a dependable income stream, however small, will have reduced levels of financial pressure and emotional stress. This is captured in the words of a research participant in a study reported on in Patel et al (2012, p. 22):

It [the grant] made a lot [of difference] since now [...] [I do not] go to sleep and ask myself I wonder what I will do with the child in the morning. So the difference was very huge especially in my mind, such that my mental state is always good. I think about things that I need to think about. That poverty that I used to think about before is no longer in my mind. So, now I am able to live just like any other mother.

Fourth, while cash is fungible, flexible and convenient, it is also vulnerable to theft and is hard to keep for allocated goods when it is accessible. Loretta chooses not to give anyone her cash – she controls its use entirely, because she does not trust her mother or other household members to use it for the common good. But she also recognises that cash is very easy to spend herself, and that it never lasts very long in her own pocket. This is clear in the following exchanges at different times during our interviews:

Tessa: Do you like to have a bank account or do you prefer not to? Is it easier to have your money at home... or what do you prefer?
Loretta: I prefer the bank account. It’s not like I save for like [something big], but I save for that day or so. Eh, having money in my pockets is like ..., oh! You can’t trust [cash] it can just get lost in a second.

Tessa: Lost or used?

Loretta: Used [by me]. But also... you can lose it meaning someone will take it and just lie to me and say no, there was no money lying there, I have not seen anything (said in a high pitched voice mimicking the hypothetical person).

From another interview:

Loretta: My card got lost... last month and I had to [apply for] another one... I don’t know ‘cause ..., it just got lost..., it’s like I’m putting it with all my private things but when I’m looking for it, it’s gone.

Tessa: At home? Here in the flat?

Loretta: Yes.

Loretta: So what do you think happened?

Loretta: I can’t tell. I really can’t tell because I’m asking did you see my card anyone of you, have you seen my card? No, we haven’t, but then I know it was supposed to be there with the other card.

Tessa: And when you either find it or get a new one from the bank has money been taken out? Do you think it was taken by somebody?

Loretta: It happened ..., when it was lost maybe a couple of months ago and [the money] was gone. But now this last month there was still money. I don’t think they know my pin.

Tessa: Okay, okay. So do you have an idea who might be taking it?

Loretta: Hayi I’m taking three guesses but I can’t say who. Because like all three of them I don’t trust so I can’t like say who.

Tessa: Tell me..., tell me who you think it is.

Loretta: I would say my mother. And my two brothers.

A fifth point that Loretta’s experience raises is that budgeting using a bank account for short-term saving as well as medium-term saving is very difficult with the small amount received, and that incurring debt is almost universal for those getting a grant. These issues are referred to in the exchange I had with Loretta, below:

Tessa: But you can [withdraw] the [CSG cash from the ATM] the way that you want, you don’t have to take it all out at once. You can take out R10 and then R100.

Loretta: Yeah you can, but I don’t think that works. I do draw everything at the same time for whatever that I am doing on that day.

Tessa: Okay, you don’t ..., you don’t leave it hey?
Loretta: No, because I think it’s just easier, and the fact that it is..., because I think ..., like I am saying that R270 is so little *neh*. You can’t just leave it. Why are you gonna leave it? Because things are so expensive [you need it all at once]... You are gonna pay for that [bill, or another expense], so I mean [its better to] just take it out at once, so it will be fine.

Tessa: *Ja, ja...* and then do you go straight that day to buy things or do you keep the money for the next day?

Loretta: It depends, am I owing certain people? If I owe a person I will give their money, otherwise I will go to Checkers and just buy my child some things there.

Tessa: *Mh, mh and come straight ja. Okay... Are you able to save?*

Loretta: No. I’m using the money.

Tessa: Do you ever have to save for something? Like if there is something specific that Warren needs or you need... and today you only have R20 so do you [save it] or do you just wait till the next month?

Loretta: Normally, I’ll just wait for next month, I don’t save.

Tessa: *Okay, ja.*

Loretta: But I would like to save for my child for his education. It’s all that I would like to save for.

Internationally, research reveals that cash transfers impact positively on saving behaviours in impoverished households, and in the medium and longer term support the accumulation of assets (Barrientos, 2008; Grosh, Del Ninno, Tesliuc, & Ouerghi, 2008b). This has also been noted in South Africa, although the extent of the impact is higher for Old Age Pensions than for CSGs due to the monetary value differences (Neves et al., 2009). Nonetheless, Loretta does not save due to the pressures of consumption on the small value of the grant, although her mother, Sally, notes the purchasing power of the Disability Grant (also more valuable than the CSG) is significant when she does not spend it on alcohol, as follows:

Sally: But then I come to understand and to realise it’s... really a waste because I am entertaining friends, paying alcohol bills instead of doing something in your flat or whatever, and then I started. I didn’t have a stov. I didn’t even have a washing machine. I opened for me an account and today I have a stove, a *wasmasjien* (washing machine in Afrikaans), a fridge and that plasma stand. And I pay R800 a month... And it’s a debit order so they deduct the money so maar early... and the rest I get.

Tessa: That’s clever because you ..., if it’s up to you then [it’s hard to save the money].

Sally: If you must pay it out of your pocket! No! Really, [I would never manage to pay the monthly hire purchase costs] that’s now a fact.

Tessa: That’s a clever way to do it, very clever. So are you nearly finished to pay it or is there still a while?
Sally: It is going to be a while because the fridge and the stand it’s only one month old. Now, December I should have been finished with the *wasmasjien* (washing machine) and a stove... [and] now after six months I can take something else.

Conclusions

Loretta inhabits this story with fierce protectiveness of herself and her son, street smarts, and a consciousness about her agency, even amid the commonplace experiences of violence, mistrust, and deceit.

This chapter is explicitly about power in the household, and the complex threads of authority and hierarchy that shape household membership, decision-making, and the relative happiness of its members. In Loretta’s case, it is clear that the CSG is an important source of power. Its dependability is key to the survival of the household, and it plays a critical role in household money management and food security. The CSG, and other grants, are the foundation upon which other income streams can be built, as they are frequently the only dependable stream of income for poor people. While the CSG might draw people into households, it is not enough for people to make independent household membership choices. Thus the grant on its own cannot offer genuine freedom and dignity, and the serious financial constraints that remain, even with the CSG, mean recipients’ choices in many areas are limited or non-existent. This again indicates how important welfare and social services are in supporting the work of the CSG.

The chapter also highlights the importance of a ‘care identity’ for carers, which Loretta uses in productive ways for her son and siblings, which, if supported and nourished, might offer some carers struggling with parenting an opportunity to manage better and offer a more consistent experience of care for their charges. This is not to say I am advocating maternalist politics, harking back to ‘traditional’ values and emphasising the naturalisation of care for women. I am offering ideas for how to effectively support carers, especially women but not exclusively, in their current roles, for them to be the kind of carers they wish to be more consistently, in concert with feminist commentators such as Folbre (2008), Fraser (2013b), Hassim (2006a), Bezanson and Luxton (2006) Bakker and Gill (2003b).

Finally, the chapter also indicates how destructive external conditions can be for the well-being of children and their carers, and how the CSG is powerless to shift conditions such as violence, substance abuse, and social conflict. Again, the point is made that interventions other than the CSG are critical to support the best possible care of children.
Overall, Loretta’s story reinforces the redistributive capacity of the CSG, and its potential to build the capabilities of recipients; but shows the possibilities for recognition and representation are patchy at best, and non-existent at worst.
Chapter 7

Violence against women: listening to everyday voices

Through this research I have come to know Jane, Nandi, and Loretta very well, and have chosen to use their stories to enter the world of women receiving CSGs. The other three women I interviewed, Thokozile, Cindy, and Louise\(^2\), have played a minor role in this conversation until now. In this chapter, I wish to lift my gaze from the individual narratives and examine one theme across their stories, that of violence and abuse (the only woman who did not report abuse was Thokozile). I was taken aback during the field work at how much abuse was exposed during this research, and this issue appears to me to be pivotal in the broader story of the CSG.

I start with an overview of gender based violence in South Africa, and move on to examining the different experiences of violence and abuse my participants reported: childhood abuse, domestic violence, sexual assault, and sexual harassment. The conclusions consider the relevance of these experiences for social justice outcomes.

Gender based violence in South Africa

Prevalence of violence against women is notoriously difficult to measure in South Africa: reporting rates are low, partly due to the poor response women receive from police when reporting, and partly due to the shame associated with sexual and domestic violence. Whatever estimates are used, however, violence against women is unacceptably high: In a 2010 study in Gauteng, 18 percent of women reported an experience of violence at the hands of intimate male partners, 25 percent of women interviewed had experienced sexual violence in their lifetimes, while 37 percent of men admitted to having perpetrated such violence (Machisa, Jewkes, Lowe Morna, & Rama, 2011). We know that the rates of intimate femicide (men’s killing of their intimate female partners) in South Africa were five times those of the global average in 2009 (Abrahams, Mathews, Martin, Lombard, & Jewkes, 2013). In a different Gauteng based study on rapes reported to the SAPS, children aged three years and younger accounted for a shocking three percent of all victims where an age could be

\(^2\) Brief profiles of these women can be found in appendix A.
determined (Vetten et al., 2008). Hence for many girls, violence starts very early, and can continue in different guises throughout their lives.

Explanations vary for the very high national levels of interpersonal violence against women. It is important to note that violence between men is also very high and contributes to a generally violent society. Historical conflict between a widely diverse set of societies over land and freedom in Southern Africa, usually settled via violent overthrow or even genocide (such as communities of the San and Herero), set the scene of violence as a means of resolving conflict, both prior to and during colonial times. This was intensified by the legitimised brutality and violent practices of the state during apartheid, and subsequent armed resistance by the anti-apartheid movement. This long historical trajectory of violence and the legacy of a militarized society is certainly one part of the explanation, but other factors also play a role. A very diverse society, persistent and protracted poverty and high rates of inequality, the break-up of families and traditional forms of support through apartheid legislation and forced migrant labour, a culture of substance use and misuse, especially alcohol (historically encouraged), and strong patriarchal social tendencies which accept violence as a means for men to ‘discipline’ women and children, all feature in the reasons for our national epidemic of violence against women (Jewkes, Sikweyiya, Morrell, & Dunkle, 2011; Machisa et al., 2011; Vetten et al., 2008; Watson, 2014).

The epidemic of violence against women is deeply disturbing and discouraging so long after the end of apartheid. National efforts to ameliorate this scourge have largely failed, because “high-level policy commitments have been leached of their transformatory content over time, through changing notions of gender equality and discursive shifts emphasising women’s vulnerability” (Vetten, 2014, p. 48), powerfully limiting the effectiveness and functionality of gains hard won through decades of activism. Sadly, the women’s social movement, so strong during apartheid, has lost significant momentum, partly due to the co-option of women leaders into formal state structures which removes them from the activist field and requires them to play ‘party politics’ (Hassim, 2014), and partly due to the co-option of grassroots NGOs into the delivery of services which reduces their politicisation and ability to play a watchdog role (Gouws, 2014). Thus it is mostly the small gathering of civil society groups using coalition strategies that continue to advocate for transformative efforts to eradicate violence against women and children, such as the Shukumisa campaign (Gouws, 2014).

Current public understandings of gender equality remain at the formal level and due to our progressive rights based legislation it is assumed that gender equality is largely won and needs little further attention. Conversations regarding equality are widely limited to ‘gender quotas’ in political representation and in the workplace. There is also a discourse that women have ‘too many rights’, and
a bemoaning of power ‘lost’ by men (Abrahams, Jewkes, Laubscher, & Hoffman, 2006; Gouws, 2014). This is a clear reflection of a resurgence of conservative ideas of gender relations, legitimised at all levels of society, including the role-modelling of the president and others in positions of power with traditional views on gender relations which is a distinct shift away from liberationist principles of the mid to late twentieth century ANC (Gouws, 2014; Hassim, 2009). It appears we are suffering the consequences of “failing to address feminist demands around sexuality and gender-based violence; that is, of ruling out any form of explicitly feminist debate that went beyond national liberation” (Hassim, 2009, p. 68). Indeed, as Bonnin (2014) notes, during the liberation struggle not only was rape used as a strategy of violence against political enemies (for example, in the township conflicts of the 1980’s and the vicious ‘war’ between the ANC-aligned United Democratic Front and the Inkatha Freedom Party in the 1990’s), but even within political movements women were expected to be sexually available for the men at the ‘frontline’ of violence and danger. The underlying assumptions about male sexual virility and entitlement have not been simply erased by today’s rights based and protective regulations.

Again here is an illustration of a set of very progressive policies and legislation, such as the affirmative action legislation or the Domestic Violence Act, existing in the context of a socially conservative environment. It is the broad social context that prevents these formal measures from making any substantive social changes. Also, these policies are largely ameliorative remedies, setting down what should happen to support and protect survivors of sexual assault, for example, or promoting the employment of women at management levels, but they do not substantively shift the experiences of being female in South Africa today: women remain poorer, less employed, more economically and socially vulnerable, more at risk of serious violence or abuse, than men, and are commonly harassed and disparaged for their gender at all turns (Abrahams, Martin, & Vetten, 2004; Hassim, 2014; Dorrit Posel & Rogan, 2012).

The parallels with the circumstances of the progressive CSG existing in a conservative social space are not merely superficial: very similar social processes are at work which are partly responsible for undermining the recognition potential of the CSG, and with dismissing, ignoring, and blaming women for their experiences of violence.

Fraser (2013a) engages with this interesting paradox in her more recent work: the success of the feminist movement is also the source of its downfall. The discourse of gender equality that has been so widely accepted by now, and that was the hallmark of an emancipatory project, has been co-opted into the language of ‘post-Fordist, transnational, neo-liberal’ capitalism, rendering it totally ineffectual as a transformatory tool. She takes issue with the usual view of the successes and failures of second
wave feminism. The usual logic proceeds thus: the significant positive shifts in attitudes towards
gender equality have been unmatched in pace by shifts in actual practices of gender equality, but this
is just a minor lag and the latter will eventually draw level with the former. In other words, it is
assumed that second wave feminism has achieved cultural success but institutional failure, and that
if the latter were to catch up with the former then gender equality will ensue. Fraser’s (2013a, p. 211)
argument, in contrast, is that the cultural successes themselves have been “conscripted in the service
of a project that [is] deeply at odds with our larger, holistic vision of a just society”. Feminist victories,
therefore, are empty, as transformatory demands have been quashed by the legitimation and use of
emancipatory discourse in the service of capitalism and political conservatism.

As an illustration of this process at work, it is remarkable that in South Africa the significant success in
exposing the nature and prevalence of violence against women, and the public discussion of this as a
terrible scourge, has done nothing to change our prevalence levels. With all the talk in South Africa of
halting violence against women, including an annual period of national focus on violence against
women called the 16 Days of Activism every November, there have been no changes to the incidence
and experiences of women with regard to violence. I do not want to dismiss the important progress
that has been made: there has certainly been an improvement in knowledge, police and legal
responses, and, in some locations, services for survivors, thanks to the tireless work of grassroots
women’s movements. But we are no closer to eradicating it.

The reasons for this, according to Fraser’s logic, is that firstly the problem of violence against women
has not led to any transformatory remedies – the responses are all affirmative in nature, hence
services for survivors etc. Secondly, and relatedly, the discourse of gender equality, and therefore the
talk around gender based violence, has been pulled into the service of conservative politics in South
Africa. For example, increasingly publically supported remedies for gender based violence include
strongly worded talk of men needing to ‘protect’ women from predators (Vetten, 2014). This shifts
the problem from the political to the personalised pathology of a few ‘evil’ men, and the crisis of
women’s ‘vulnerability’. These concerns are in contrast to perceiving the problem in feminist political
terms: such as the lack of “citizen agenda and subjectivity” (Gouws, 2014, p. 23), and the ubiquitous
acceptance of violence as a legitimate gendered way of interacting. A consequence is the inexorable
slip backwards to the privatisation of the issue. Violence, especially sexual violence, remains an
individualised and ‘private’ kind of trouble and women continue to be asked what they have ‘done’ to
provoke the violence. In addition, they continue in the main to keep it a secret, another both
consequence and cause of sustained privatisation. This intense secret-keeping ensures the
depoliticisation of the actual experience, making it one of private trauma and not an expression of
public and political failures.
Relatively, the pressure for women to ‘keep it in the home’ encourages women to accept violence and tolerate men who perpetrate it, even when the violence is common knowledge in the community (Rasool Bassadien & Hochfeld, 2005; Rasool, 2012). Victim blaming and secondary traumatisation is common, both by the public as well as formal services such as the police or in healthcare settings (Christofides et al., 2005; Gouws, 2014).

An illustration of how secret, and thus privatised, these experiences can be is the fact that in many cases in this research I was the first person with whom these women had shared their story. I was not investigating gender based violence, but stumbled across it unexpectedly in five of the six cases all the same. Despite years of social work practice and previous research in this field, I was still shocked at the extent of ‘ordinary’ women’s experience of gender based harassment and violence. A note from my field journal captures one experience:

22 July 2011

Today I had an interview with Jane. I wanted to get a bit more information on her background and stupidly blundered in indelicately by asking about her family and childhood, as I was not expecting anything heavy. Why was I not? Maybe I had assumed that because she had a profession and had previously ‘made it’ she came from a ‘good’ background? She just jumped right in and told me about her ongoing rape for years by her older brother (10 years older) and as an adult by a gang of men, and physical abuse by her mother.

I felt very humbled and shocked. Most amazing is that she so easily told me but revealed that she had never shared this with her late husband nor her current partner Nathi (neither of whom were abusive)... Afterwards she said how relieved she felt by telling me despite how much it still hurts.

The violence took different forms for the women in this research. Five of the women revealed experiences of severe abuse, in some cases from childhood, both systematic and ongoing, and isolated incidents. Jane, Nandi and Louise were sexually molested raped at a young age. Jane and Louise both had repeated and ongoing sexual abuse from family members (brothers, fathers, cousins) between the ages of six and 10 years old, and told no-one at the time that it was happening. They also endured physical and emotional abuse from their parents, as did Loretta. Nandi was raped at age five, and her parents took no action against the perpetrator, a landlord’s son, and continued to live in the same rented place in close proximity to the rapist. Later she was gang raped. Cindy, Nandi and Loretta experienced domestic violence; in Cindy’s case it was particularly severe.

Effects of violence against women

Extensive literature documents the impacts of violence against women. Evidence shows that all forms of violence against women and girls have negative psycho-social and health effects, although the
seriousness of these depends on the severity and the duration and frequency of the experience, as well as the cumulative effects of re-traumatisation (Walsh, DiLillo, & Scalora, 2011; WHO, 2013). The woman’s support system and her resilience also mediate the impact of violence.

In general, though, substantial agreement exists that women who have experienced past childhood sexual abuse, ongoing intimate partner violence, or adult sexual assault are significantly more likely to experience anxiety, depression, impaired self-esteem, post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol abuse and high levels of psycho-social distress (Anderson, Renner, & Danis, 2012; C. S. Lewis et al., 2006; Lindhorst & Beadnell, 2011; WHO, 2013). Psychological abuse can also produce variants of the above sequelae. Other health effects of sexual and physical abuse include chronic pain, gastrointestinal problems, reproductive concerns, low birth-weight babies, and increased prevalence of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV (Campbell, 2002).

Sexual abuse in particular, whether experienced as a child or an adult, disrupts the development and management of a psycho-emotional process known as emotion regulation which is “a multifaceted construct... involving the clear identification, labelling, and expression of one’s emotional experiences..., the ability to attend to environmental cues and pursue goal directed behaviours in the face of emotional distress..., acceptance of one’s own emotional responses..., and utilization of adaptive regulatory strategies for a given situation” (Walsh et al., 2011, p. 1104). The difficulties described above can mean adult survivors struggle with regulating emotional states (which can lead to outbursts of anger or bouts of depression), avoid situations that are emotionally difficult (such as negotiating relationship problems or disciplining children in ways that are not simply punitive), and use disengaging coping behaviours (such as substance or alcohol abuse, sexual promiscuity, or emotional withdrawal) (van Roode, Dickson, Herbison, & Paul, 2009; Walsh et al., 2011).

Research demonstrates that adaptive coping with the experience of abuse or violence and eventual recovery is possible over time, especially with the right care and resources that assist in both material and emotional support (Anderson et al., 2012; Lindhorst & Beadnell, 2011). Informal care from friends and family is particularly important and effective in the recovery process (Rasool, 2011) and in fostering resilience. Resilience is not merely a personality characteristic but a complex interaction between individual traits, caring intimate connections in the family, and positive social interactions (Anderson et al., 2012), as discussed in chapter 5.

However, repeated experiences of violence and abuse have cumulative negative psycho-social and health effects and powerfully interferes with the psychological integration and recovery process (J. L. Herman, 1992; C. S. Lewis et al., 2006; Lindhorst & Beadnell, 2011; Walsh et al., 2011). The levels of violence against women in South Africa, evidence from this study’s small sample, along with
corroboration from other research (Abrahams et al., 2004) demonstrate that repeated trauma from violence or abuse is very common in this country. The potential for this to result in poor recovery due to cumulative effects of trauma is high in the absence of focused and effective intervention services and social support.

The implications of this knowledge for the participants in this study are worrying. Issues raised in previous chapters such as emotional neediness and lack of emotional engagement (for example, Nandi), high levels of depression and anxiety (for example, Jane), and negative coping behaviours (such as Loretta’s aggression in certain circumstances), could all be symptomatic of unresolved, untreated, and at times cumulative experiences of violence against women and previous sexual abuse as a child. In addition, Cindy’s history of substance abuse and her extremely fragile emotional state and Louise’s previous emotional volatility and her past sexual promiscuity are also very likely symptoms of unresolved sexual, emotional and physical violence.

One final category of effects is also important to raise: economic impacts. It is important to note that violence against women and poverty reinforce each other: they are both related in cause, and in effect (Loya, 2014). Violence against women can disrupt or diminish a woman’s earning capacity in a number of different ways, and in addition, poor women are at greater risk of experiencing violence, as those with financial and social resources can both avoid and recover from violence better than poor women, merely due to the resources at their disposal (Loya, 2014).

Violence depletes resources from not just the survivors and the perpetrators, “but also presents significant costs to businesses, the private sector, all levels of government, and civil society. Costs include health, justice, and other service costs, lost earnings, lost revenues, lost taxes, and second-generation costs, which are the cost of children witnessing and living with violence, such as increased juvenile and adult crime. It is widely held in the economic costing literature that the whole of society pays for the costs of not addressing violence against women” (Brooks, 2014, p. 1). The cost of this violence in South Africa in the year 2012/2013 is estimated at between R28.4 billion and R42.4 billion, representing 0.9 percent to 1.3 percent of GDP (Brooks, 2014, p. 2).

Below I will describe the range of gender based violence experienced by my research participants. The purpose of the description is to unveil how some of the consequences identified above play out in real lives.

Childhood sexual, emotional and physical abuse

Four of the participants experienced abuse as a child. Their stories are varied in nature but what they all have in common is that they appeared to endure this alone and with little or no support or care
from anyone, including close family. When parents were not the perpetrators themselves, they were not available or able to offer the deep care that could ameliorate the trauma and long-term impact; this has been found too in other studies (Rasool, 2011).

Louise expressed her experiences to me as follows:

Louise: I was molested previously in my life by my cousins and my (biological) father.

Louise: So that’s the reason we got placed into my grandmother’s place and I was nine years old. I didn’t fully understand why were these things happening. I just thought that my mother gave us to my grandmother and that’s it but at the end of the day as I grew up, I realized that it’s... because he was abusive towards my mother. He used to beat my mother up so she didn’t want us in that environment. But she didn’t know [what my father was doing to me]. And also about my cousins who we saw every day because when my parents were working we spent time at my uncle’s house. And that’s nobody knows about it, no one.

Tessa: Your mum knows about it now?

Louise: Uh- uh (meaning no).

Tessa: Really, wow.

Louise: And I am not even planning on telling anyone. And then after living with my grandmother, at the age of 15 my grandmother sent me back to my mother to live. And I had a boyfriend at that time.

Tessa: Yes.

Louise: So this boyfriend when I was 15 took my virginity (Louise is referring to full intercourse), and I just thought ..., because [of the past molestation] I wanted to experience love, [I thought it was] love at first sight but I didn’t realize it was [wrong]. Because every day to me was the experience of having sex every single day, like in my mind, I didn’t know what to do and expect because [that is how regular it had been with the molestation]. Then... all the experiences of being molested came up in my mind and [I realized] that everything that happened to me is wrong and what is happening to me [now is also wrong].

This narrative clearly illustrates the negative impact sexual abuse has on appropriate sexual maturation and the sexualisation of relationships at an early age. Louise further comments that she ‘doesn’t pick the right men’, and her children are fathered by three different partners. The poor choice of partners and difficulty in sustaining longer-term relationships with men, along with risky sexual behaviours, are a well-recognised outcome of childhood sexual abuse (van Roode et al., 2009). This has implications for financial security for Louise, as none of the fathers offer regular monetary support, and contributes to her need to income assistance via the CSG. My suggestion, therefore, is that the past sexual abuse is one of (many) causal factors in Louise’s current need for the CSG.

Jane was continually raped by her brother for a number of years as a child, and is still expected to respond to him as an ordinary member of her family now. She harbours intense unresolved anger
towards him and her mother (now deceased), who did not notice the abuse and punished Jane for avoiding the house and coming home late. In her case her emotional response is complicated by the expectation by her family that she should love her brother as a family member, and, although she hotly denied it, her own possible confusion of both loving and hating him simultaneously which is common among survivors of family abuse (Rasool, 2011). Jane’s description to me was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jane:</th>
<th>My childhood, it wasn’t good… We were suffering, we were very poor. My mother, she had to work and she was earning little, but then she couldn’t look after us. Sometimes my mother would go to work and leave us with my other brother, the older one, who is in England now. That one, he would sleep with me.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tessa:</td>
<td>Jane, oh, it sounds to me like you really had a hard time. He was a lot older than you, hey?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane:</td>
<td>He was 10 years more than me. So but I managed to tell my mother before she passed away. I said, I hate your son. She say why. I say he abused me. He was sleeping with me, that time you had the house in Diepkloof. She said so why didn’t you tell me. And I said I was afraid. And I didn’t know what was going on. You see, I was very young. I was in grade one and grade two, maybe. Every time my mother would go out, he would call us to the house and sleep with me. Every time, every time. It was from grade one up until standard one. Then when I was little bit older I wasn’t coming home quickly, I come home late, so it was less. Then my mother will beat me, why are you late. Then I won’t tell her, I just keep quiet. Then I only told her when I was an adult. And this thing was big for me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa:</td>
<td>Did anyone else know?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane:</td>
<td>No I was telling no-one. Because if I told my father he was going to kill him. And I was afraid to tell my mother because she really liked my brother… He would say to us, it’s time to sleep. Then when the others were sleeping he would wake me up, so it was happening often, all the time, all the time. And I didn’t say anything because I didn’t know why he was doing that. I was too young to know what was happening. It was only when I grow up that I realised what he was doing. That’s when I got angry. Angry. This man.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This unresolved anger has negative consequences for Jane’s emotional and mental health. Without sharing and dealing with the anger, it is likely to affect her lifelong. As outlined earlier in this chapter, anxiety, depression and psycho-social distress, described in great detail in Jane’s narrative in chapter 4, are typical responses to ongoing sexual abuse in early life (Anderson et al., 2012; C. S. Lewis et al., 2006; Lindhorst & Beadnell, 2011; WHO, 2013). Jane’s experience of abuse was exacerbated by the trauma of her husband’s murder; it is my supposition that these events had a deep influence on her subsequent battle with clinical depression as a symptom of repeat trauma (J. L. Herman, 1992). The depression was instrumental in her dismissal from her job, and thus her need for social protection. Hence there is a relationship between the sexual abuse and her current financial needs, even if it is by no means direct.
While not gender based per se, Loretta and Jane experienced other childhood abuse too: Jane was regularly beaten by her mother, and Loretta’s mother emotionally abused her throughout her childhood. She describes is thus:

Loretta: Mh..., most of my childhood years, I don’t much remember but what I can remember is the you know the abuse from my mother neh?

Tessa: Mh.

Loretta: But afterwards when my father died that is when I realised it was abuse. When I was four I just thought maybe..., that it was [how it was], it was swearing but she was always speaking on me (she means the swearing was directed at Loretta). So my childhood years were just like..., I don’t like it, I don’t like to think about it because even though it happened back then, it’s like, it still has an impact on me now, [it really hurts] because the same name she called me back then are the same names she is calling me right now. She will like call me because now I have a child she will like call me a... whore, she will call me like I’m useless, she will call me I’m good for nothing, she will call me ..., she used to [say and she still does, that she will] just bump (kill) me and that she won’t pay for my funeral and that she hates me, all sorts of things. And it made me so scared when I was little.

The damage this caused Loretta is different to that rendered by physical and sexual abuse, but is also emotionally devastating. It is certainly a source of her fierce drive to protect her son from the negative impact of her family at all costs. And it explains clearly her distrust of her mother and her drive to move out of Sally’s house. Her lack of other options traps her in a space in close proximity to the source of her abuse and emotional pain; this is an example of how the limits in monetary value along with the lack of housing options reduces the potential freedom offered by the CSG.

As shown here, childhood abuse is particularly damaging because of children’s dependence on others and their lack of frame of reference that life could be different. One of the most pernicious consequences of violence against children, especially sexual abuse, is how children themselves carry a sense of guilt, shame and blame, which is almost universal (Postmus, 2012). The nature of child sexual abuse in particular is secrecy and concealment, which is very effective in keeping the abuse intensely private, not only during the experience but also for a long time afterwards (Plach, 2008). Shame is a powerful motivation to keep the experiences secret, and the privatisation reinforces the shame. While the issue of sexual abuse of children is well aired as a problem in this country, the discourse around it is more along the lines of moral panic than political engagement with social issues (Deborah Posel, 2005). As mentioned previously, among the five women who revealed their experiences of violence, three said they had shared this information with nobody else or only one very close confidant, revealing both the intimate and private nature of these traumas, as well as the lack of support available to women who experience them (Rasool, 2011).
The complexity of carrying a burden of shame and trauma is definitely complicated by gender. Firstly, girls are such frequent targets of sexual abuse. Secondly, they are often characterised as responsible for the abuse through provocation (Postmus, 2012). Thirdly, the kind of support and care women can expect from men afterwards can also be strongly influenced by gender. In the following extract, Jane explains how she carries the emotional burden of her past abuse alone:

Jane: I didn’t even tell my husband [about the sexual abuse and rape]. Even though he was open – he would say, you can share anything. But I saw that it was going to be a problem for him, a man, so I didn’t tell him. And one night this year where my sister wrote [something about sexual abuse] on Facebook it really [affected me] and I was crying and crying the whole night. And Nathi was asking is there something wrong, what happened. I was crying up until four in the morning. But I couldn’t tell him. Luckily the men I am in love with, they are the understanding ones, who can be kind, but I still couldn’t tell [my husband]. And I also can’t tell Nathi. It would just [hurt them].

Of the women who participated in this research, Jane’s two partner relationships as an adult were the most caring, loving, supportive and egalitarian by far. It is thus very telling that she never told her previous nor current partner about her sexual abuse and rape from the past.

Therefore it is not only the trauma but also the recovery (or suffering, if there is no recovery) that is private, it belongs exclusively to Jane. This is not necessarily true for every sexual abuse survivor, but in this case and others similar to it, it is ironic that violence perpetrated by a man is a great burden of responsibility for the woman long after the events, and perhaps long after the perpetrating man has forgotten his actions, and non-perpetrating men are protected from the trauma of their loved one’s experience by virtue of their gender and women’s judgement of what men can ‘handle’. In this case it also might have been Jane’s concern that the knowledge of the sexual violence might change or jeopardise her relationships in some way.

This section describes some of the childhood abuse experienced by my research participants and illustrates the lack of support the women received as children and adults. They dealt with the consequences alone, leavening them with sadness, anger, and undoubted emotional damage. This has implications for their current needs both as individuals and as parents, and illustrates how the complexity of these issues cannot be addressed through income support alone. The next section focuses on domestic violence.

Domestic violence

What is commonly known as domestic violence, or violence perpetrated by an intimate partner, was a dominant feature in two women’s stories. Domestic violence is the gendered control of an intimate partner via physical, emotional, sexual, or economic abuse (Postmus, 2012).
Cindy describes the consequences of the very violent relationship she endured for 15 years as follows:

Cindy: I was 15 years in the relationship, as you can see here (she points to a severe scar running across her one arm and shoulder), he was a very violent man.

Tessa: Oh my goodness!

Cindy: And (she sighs deeply) I had three miscarriages from this guy only one child survived, you see... my son.

Tessa: It sounds hectic, Cindy.

Cindy: It has been hectic. I was actually traumatised, yoh, I wasn’t myself, I did the overdose, I ended up in the mental institution you know, and there was a time where I started rejecting my son, there was a time where I blamed him for the whole thing. I didn’t tell him like I would just blame him, comes to me, “mama” and I push him away and there was a time where I started drinking and I am not a woman who drinks and goes to clubs and there was a time when I tried drugs also that is how complicated it was hey?

Tessa: I can believe that, you went through a lot.

Cindy: There was a time where I lived with my mom oh it was..., it was..., it’s like..., you know [they were not supportive of me trying to leave him]. I wanted to get over him, but every time they will be telling me: “we know you want to go back” and you know, that is not something nice and every time [I felt forced to go back], and I will just end up with him again.

Tessa: Mmm.

Cindy: I was working for Spar for nine years and believe me I didn’t achieve anything. My wages used to slip through my fingers [because] he used to control everything of me. [I didn’t realise what it was doing to me]... I got my sister-in-law a job at Spar, and then she picked it up that I am a different person, I am a happy person, I am a people’s person but when I come home, when I reach home, I switch completely off. It’s like I get a split personality. I am totally different, I am miserable and I don’t speak to anyone.

This extract reveals a number of critical issues. The first is how Cindy’s story reveals a number of incidents of help-seeking in both informal (her family), and formal settings (hospital) without any sustained services being given. This aligns with Rasool’s (2011) research which dispels the myth that women don’t ask for or want help in cases of domestic violence; rather they are frequently ignored, told to return, or treated only for physical symptoms. The abuse was never addressed in the healthcare system despite many warning signs. This is a serious indictment of the responsiveness of health and other services, and brings us back to the theme of service failure.

A second issue is her capability to parent her son. In this short extract below she describes a time she tried to kill herself and her son at the same time. It is interesting to note that this was discussed in front of her 12 year old son:
Cindy: There was a time when I really wanted to take our lives. Honestly. I had tablets in my hand, I gave us both overdoses of (a kind of medicine). And we both ended up in hospital and I just told them that we are sick, but I never told them that I gave him overdose of medicine.

The level of repeated trauma effectively erases her sense of self and destroys who she was before the relationship (J. L. Herman, 1992). The violence has major implications for how she is able to manage her life now, and her ability to parent her son. Cindy effectively tried to murder her son; thankfully she was unsuccessful. But it indicates her level of desperation, how alone she felt at the time, and the lack of support offered to her.

In Cindy’s case, her needs extend far beyond income support. She has a plethora of material and practical needs, the first being accommodation as she currently shares a mattress with her son in a small, crowded two bedroomed home which houses 14 people. At the time of the interviews she was training to be a community health promoter, which would eventually give her a small monthly stipend, but this would not stretch far enough to find independent accommodation. Leo has educational challenges, his school teacher is concerned about his withdrawn behaviour, he is being bullied at school, and he reports extensive drug use (by others) in his class even though he was only in grade seven when we met.

The psycho-social and health effects of domestic violence on a survivor were described earlier in this chapter; but the more severe and the longer the duration of the abuse the more serious the impact will be on the survivor. The history of mental illness, including suicide attempts, drug and alcohol use, miscarriages and other reproductive problems, and severe levels of distress and post-traumatic disorder symptoms that Cindy revealed to me, are all typical of the kind of violence she has endured over years.

Therefore both Cindy and Leo have far-reaching psycho-social and material needs which are completely misrecognised by identifying them merely as income ‘poor’, with only material needs to contend with.

This is where the capability approach is useful; it moves the definition of ‘the good life’ away from narrow concerns with income only, to a holistic view on all aspects that constrain or facilitate an individual’s capability to choose a life of value. Income is one of the means of well-being, and thus important, but does not matter intrinsically in the way that, for example, freedom does (Robeyns, 2003b). Sen (2009) is very sensitive to the controlling effects of domestic violence, specifically saying that it is a form of unfreedom that greatly constrains a woman’s set of functionings and capabilities. Nussbaum’s (2011) capabilities include health, plus mental health, freedom of association, and other
aspects that are missing in a life of abuse. In addition, she argues, using domestic violence as an illustration, that some people’s freedoms limit others in pernicious and destructive ways, such as men who resent laws against domestic violence as they claim it limits their freedom, and therefore freedom also has to be just. In a capabilities list specifically designed to respond to gender inequalities, Robeyns (2003b) identifies the following three capabilities as most important for women in an unequal society: life and physical health, mental well-being, and bodily integrity and safety. Cindy has none of these three capabilities, and while income deficits are always stressful and food security most pressing as a need, it is in Cindy’s narrative that we can see the importance of freedom: freedom from violence, tyranny, and control would significantly positively impact on a life of dignity for her and her son. Aside from her need for psycho-social support and therapy, a holistic intervention would help in practical ways too.

We can see this practical assistance and how powerful it can be in Loretta’s narrative. Like Cindy, Loretta remains linked to her ex-partner as they share a son. She describes one frightening incident after the breakup of the relationship, which also shows institutional tools of the state working, which is an important finding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tessa:</th>
<th>So what made you get a protection order [for your ex-boyfriend] in the first place?  Was he being threatening to you? Did he hit you?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Loretta:</td>
<td>Well, he was..., this same woman he had been seeing while we were dating neh? That same lady used to phone me..., I think I changed my number five times... This woman, she was always [harassing] me and like reminding me like he left me for [her], do you understand? [She] would threaten me like... I should not send my child to his place or that she was gonna give him slow poison, she said and that was not his child..., a lot of things you know... So this one incident he phoned me the previous day asking me like Loretta can you please bring the child. I never used to ..., I never once left the child unattended with him, never ever, neh? [But he begged me to] And when I got there, she was there. And I did ask him, listen here Lwazi how can you do this? You said I must bring Warren knowing I don’t want Warren in the presence of this lady then why do you do that? ... And then all of a sudden this guy was just ..., shoo, he was...,shoo! He was degrading me in front of that lady, he was calling me names and he was calling me ..., he said to me I’m useless, I can’t amount..., I can’t even buy the child one Kimbi (a brand of disposable nappies), I’m a Boesman (derogatory name used to refer to coloured people), he called me all sorts of names and at that point neh, I don’t know what happened to me..., I don’t know what happened I just wanted to pick up my son and go but he started pushing me around, now, hard. So I was shocked and he started pushing me around and he ..., the thing I remember is that... he grabbed my son. I think Warren was eleven months old and... he grabbed my son’s arm because I had my son in my side... the child was crying and now... I was just telling him that listen here, you are hurting the child but somehow I wanted to cry or scream.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tessa:</td>
<td>That sounds awful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loretta:</td>
<td>And I just said please leave me, those are all the words that came out at that time please leave me, and I just went [taking Warren]..., so that’s why I went for a protection order. I was scared [about what would happen next time]</td>
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While Loretta’s experience was not physically damaging, this is a classic example of abuse via manipulation, control, and threats, which was especially frightening due to his use of her son as leverage. In Loretta’s case she managed to use the system available to her to protect her and her son. The first tool is a protection order, which her ex-boyfriend, Lwazi, has regularly ignored, but it has definitely reduced the intensity of emotional and threatened physical abuse. The second tool Loretta has used is the maintenance court. Loretta managed to apply for and be granted child maintenance from Lwazi through a monthly ‘garnishee’ order on his salary. This means the maintenance amount is removed prior to the payment of his salary and she does not need to fight for it every month, which she did previously. This is unquestionably a major victory for Loretta, and an outcome with huge positive potential for the well-being of her son. This is also an excellent example of how using agency in a way that has impact on your world rewards the individual with direct benefits (Sen, 1999). While agency is individualised behaviour, the context of state functioning can have a major impact on outcome.

It is also an illustration of how well-being is facilitated by integrated and coordinated services: the grant plus the maintenance combined gives financial security to Loretta, and the maintenance system in concert with the protection order offers protection from the unpredictability and abuse from her son’s father. But this ‘package’ of services is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, as the huge backlogs and problems in the maintenance court, plus the inadequacy of protection orders in many cases, attest. For example, filing for maintenance is only useful in cases where men earn wages. Punitive enforcement for men who have no regular income can be counterproductive, as it persecutes fathers and does not assist mothers.

Another illustration is that the same protection order that has helped Loretta would be woefully inadequate for Cindy; her experience is a string of severe emotional, physical, financial and sexual abuse over many years. Her partner’s level of violence, jealousy and controlling behaviour is a serious potential threat to Cindy’s life. While Cindy has actually left the relationship, she still sees her ex-partner and he uses their son to manipulate her into seeing him. If there is a point at which she severs all ties, research makes it clear that she could be at risk of being killed by him as a means to control her (Rasool, 2011). Known as intimate femicide, murder of a female partner by an abusive man is most likely when she tries to leave him or his circle of influence, and South Africa has very high rates of this kind of death (Abrahams et al., 2009). Men who have this kind of behaviour profile usually completely ignore a protection order or any other aspect of the law (Abrahams et al., 2009). In fact, Cindy revealed to me her ex-partner is a habitual drug user and possibly a drug dealer too, and so has already demonstrated he is not concerned about breaking laws.
This section has demonstrated how domestic violence severely limits a woman’s capabilities, freedom, and dignity. Thus interpreting her needs just in terms of income support is woefully inadequate. An example of services that function well is contained in Loretta’s story, as her protection order and maintenance order do offer substantive protection and support. The challenge is that there is only a narrow band of women for whom this will be effective, as firstly these are inflexible and hard to access tools that require agency and persistence to use. Secondly, their effectiveness is determined by the particular circumstances of the people involved as well as the presence or absence of certain personality characteristics. This has been noted elsewhere in the literature on violence against women (Abrahams et al., 2009; Abrahams et al., 2004).

I now turn to the experience of sexual assault.

Rape and sexual assault

Rape or attempted rape as a teenager or adult featured in three women’s stories. Aside from her repeated rape as a child, Jane was gang-raped as a young adult, as was Nandi. Jane’s experience has led to her being particularly protective of her own children. She said:

Jane: My childhood was very difficult... Then after my brother [who repeatedly raped me over years] moved from the house, it was then I got raped one day by other guys, that I knew from my area. Four of them. So that is why, yes, that is why I don’t want my kids to play outside on their own. I don’t want them to. I always want to watch them. I know there are bad things happening.

Nandi’s experience of gang-rape and assault by 10 men at age 16 was brutal, and she required hospitalisation for her severe injuries. In this case, some of the men responsible were apprehended and served some time in prison for the attack. But her rape at age five by her landlord’s son resulted in no action being taken, including that she continued to live in close proximity to the teenager.

Loretta’s attempted rape while she was pregnant with her son resulted in bleeding and the threatened miscarriage of her son, and she described in detail another, recent, experience of rape, which resulted in pregnancy and subsequent miscarriage. This appears below:

Loretta: I think it was in April, during this year, I went to go enquire about the maintenance from the boy’s father. And on my way there I got raped.

Tessa: Oh goodness Loretta! That must have been...

Loretta: It was the weirdest experience. Up until today I don’t know that person.

Tessa: Oh you never saw his face?

Loretta: Mh. The only thing I can remember about that person is that he had glasses on and he had a tight-fit skipper (T-shirt) on. And his smell, it was just so [overpowering]. Ja, that’s the only thing that I can actually remember [about him]. We were in a lift. It happened in a lift.
Tessa: In a lift, goodness! And the doors didn’t open?
Loretta: They did not open. It just [took] I think a few minutes.

Tessa: Oh! That must have been very difficult. What did you do straight away afterwards? Did you come home?
Loretta: I went to my friend’s house.

Tessa: Good, I’m glad you had somewhere to go hey?
Loretta: And she [said] Loretta I am here... and we went straight [to the police station] but really, because I couldn’t let, I was so scared of someone touching me that day. I was just too scared and I couldn’t go through with the [physical examination], so I just could not go through with that, and they said no, it’s fine you can just leave it... But after that I was just coping fine up until today. It’s almost out of my head.

Tessa: So what made you tell me? What made you decide to say?
Loretta: I’m really trying to get that out of my head, if ..., it is somehow, but now it just came out. But I’m actually happy I did tell you about it because like I am saying no one knows, not anyone in this house knows, only my friend and now you.

Tessa: Goodness, Loretta. You have not told anybody else?
Loretta: No. I think my mother she will just throw it back at my face or remind me about it.

Tessa: I understand.
Loretta: And somehow I’m glad it happened because that was my worst fear..., oh it was my worst, worst fear, but it came true... But I think I am glad it happened, I am so glad because my fear came through, and it is now behind me.

Tessa: Ja, in other words you lived through it, you are fine. Ja.
Loretta: I’m fine. At least I don’t have HIV. They tested the next day. But after it happened I was pregnant.

Tessa: Oh that must have been hard! What did you do?
Loretta: I didn’t do anything I could not do, I think abortion is against my beliefs so I think I was willing to keep the baby, I was willing but I just had this bleeding problem. I was bleeding because I was beyond stressed out.

Tessa: I am sure you were. And then you were bleeding so you lost the baby?
Loretta: Yes.

Tessa: Oh Loretta. And how did that make you feel?
Loretta: I felt bad. I feel sad to the baby, you know, I really feel sad because I was willing to offer my life to that child even though..., I don’t look at it as like I got raped because of the child, no, I was willing to take the child as mine ‘cause it was going to be my child.

This story raises an interesting point about services for survivors of gender based violence, one that is commonly accepted in the field: services offered are not always used, for various reasons, often
related to the shame or psychological trauma of the events (Rasool, 2011). In this case Loretta felt that a physical examination and police reporting would have been too distressing, and so she turns down this service offered. The conundrum is how to offer services to those who need them in a way that makes them easy to use; and if they aren’t used, what further responsibility does the state have to respond to those needs?

Loretta’s comment that “I am glad it happened... it was my worst fear” is very revealing of the kind of circumstances in which women in South Africa exist. This is a sad indictment of such high levels of violence that living in anticipation of rape can be harder than dealing with the aftermath of the rape itself; while the latter is traumatic, it is almost a relief that it is an experience that can be left behind.

The stories of rape demonstrate not only the terrible personal impact this has on women, but also the terrible misrecognition and limits to freedom this brings. In addition, it is striking that in all the cases I heard of, only in Nandi’s one experience were the perpetrators caught and served time in prison. The almost complete impunity men who rape have in South Africa is a strong form of misrepresentation of women: woman’s right to safety and her lack of legal recourse are all undermined and ignored; thus she should stay silent and endure as there are no other options.

**Sexual harassment**

Another example of the ‘accept and carry on’ mentality is the ongoing experience and fear of sexual harassment. At the time of the majority of the interviews with Nandi, an acquaintance of her father’s was living in the household. Nandi described how this man touched her at every opportunity, and continually requested intercourse from her. Despite her continuing to decline and telling her parents, and her mother repeatedly requesting that Nandi’s father, Joseph, ask the man to leave, Joseph saw this as a minor issue and so the man continued to live there. In this patriarchal context Nandi’s only means of dealing with this constant invasion was to ‘schedule’ her time at home to ensure she was not alone with him. This is both an example of the common minimisation and dismissal of the seriousness of sexual harassment (Rasool, 2011), as well as the repetition of the theme of ‘there is nothing to do about it so carry on’, a profound form of misrecognition. In fact, Joseph himself felt this behavior was acceptable: when I interviewed him with Pinky, my young attractive translator, he began to make inappropriate sexual comments towards her near the end, demonstrating that harassment of young women was considered completely normal. Interestingly, it seems that my race and age set me apart and he at no stage made advances to me.

I would venture to say that sexual harassment in South Africa is a form of Bourdieu’s (1977, in Kabeer, 1999) idea of *doxa*, which he explains as particular established behaviours or ideas that form part of
tradition and culture and which have become so accepted that they have become totally naturalised and therefore unquestioned. “Doxa refers to traditions and beliefs that exist beyond discourse and argumentation... Bourdieu suggests that as long as the subjective assessments of social actors are largely congruent with the objectively organized possibilities available to them, the world of doxa remains intact. The passage from ‘doxa’ to discourse, a more critical consciousness, only becomes possible when competing ways of ‘being and doing’ become available as material and cultural possibilities, so that ‘common sense’ propositions of culture begin to lose their naturalized character, revealing the underlying arbitrariness of the given social order” (Kabeer, 1999, p. 441). Sexual harassment of women by men is such an accepted form of interpersonal interaction that it largely goes entirely unnoticed, certainly by men, and often by women too, as in the case of Bourdieu’s doxa. For Nandi her discomfort with the harassment indicated to her that it was not acceptable behaviour, but in her world only her mother registered any concern; otherwise she needed to deal with it as best she could. This involved by necessity curbing her movements and therefore changing her expectations of agency in relation to her own self-management of time and movement and personal space at home. But for her dad Joseph it is a form of cultural capital to be exploited at any opportunity even in the context of this interview.

In relation to the other experiences of gender based violence this example seems to be a minor and quite irrelevant infringement. However, this example exposes injustice due to the reduction in agency, misrecognition, curbing freedom of movement, and fear that a social context of conservative gender relations produces, even in the absence of serious physical or emotional harm.

Conclusions

This chapter has largely been a detailed and rich description of the experiences of abuse and gender violence that the women in this study have endured. The literature on violence against women in South Africa attest that while they might have had some particularly brutal encounters, they are not atypical in the female population, due to the very high rates of violence in this country. The effects of this violence have been evident, both from their own reporting of symptoms as well as linking some of the key life challenges they now face to probable roots in the violence and trauma.

Violence as a material (or actual) experience has material consequences. There are substantial direct and indirect economic costs of gender based violence, exacerbated when injuries, psycho-social problems, and sometime women’s lack of mobility due to controlling partner behaviour or fear of violence, all inhibit the opportunities for income generation for women. In this study, Jane’s depression, the source of which is partly her repeated experiences of sexual abuse and rape, is a significant obstacle to finding work. Cindy’s brutal experiences of domestic violence affected her work
performance and reliability by her own admission. Similarly Loretta was prevented from working by ill health after her rape and subsequent miscarriage. These are all considerable barriers to redistribution, and therefore have bearing on deferred social justice.

The violence described here also has significant misrecognition effects. At the least, violence in itself denies women physical integrity, freedom, respect, and dignity. In addition, a consequence of such elevated levels of violence against women in the context of patriarchal beliefs about men’s rights over women, is that the deep emotional trauma women endure is largely unacknowledged. Once women heal from physical wounds, they are expected to continue with their everyday life, unchanged. This was raised in chapter 5, where I noted that neither Nandi nor her family stopped to consider the emotional toll her experiences of violence had taken on her. The previous extract from my conversation with Loretta raises this issue again: she chooses to tell only one friend about her experience, and implied that her best defense is to ‘forget’ about the experience entirely. Therefore the recognition harm from violence is not only serious health and emotional effects, but also harm derived specifically from the erasure of the experience itself. The invisibility or dismissal of such grave experiences of trauma,

does not represent an injustice solely because it constrains the subjects in their freedom for action or does them harm. Rather, [it] is injurious because it impairs these persons in their positive understanding of self—an understanding acquired by intersubjective means (Honneth, 1992, p. 189).

From Fraser’s (1995) perspective, this form of misrecognition would require a remedy of specification, or the bringing to public attention the terrible emotional and other costs to individuals and society of violence against women; a remedy long used by especially second wave feminists. However, while on a broader level the success of feminist activism has meant that violence against women is widely recognised as at epidemic levels in South Africa, its ubiquitous spread has resulted in not the affirmation of experience of specificity (Fraser, 1995), a requisite response for the long-term outcome of resolution, but rather the devaluing of the experience due to its widespread and unremarkable nature, and due to the increasingly conservative political and social context, which can render it sensational but still privatised. The meaning these repeated events of personal invasion and violence have for Loretta are all about her own sense of vulnerability, lack of agency, and need for self-protection against a very harmful world. She mentions that rape was her ‘worst fear’, and thus is ‘glad it happened’ as her only way to manage this experience is to affirm herself by saying she ‘lived through it’. These processes are a severe shrinking of sense of agency in the world, Loretta has no defense aside from ‘live through it’, and ‘keep it secret’. This is certainly a clear example of cultural injustice at
work. It is also an example of how the undermining of agency is also the undermining of capability: Loretta’s capabilities of bodily integrity, freedom of movement, and equal citizenship were all damaged by her experience of rape, and also by the threats her child’s father made against her.

The relationship between these outcomes and the wider concerns of this study are important. As I have tried to demonstrate, these are not merely sad stories of individual women. They are illustrative of a major failing of South African society broadly, but also of the state. The women in this study are subject to maldistribution and misrecognition specifically owing to their experiences of gender based violence, and it appears the state’s concern for them not only does not offer substantive affirmative remedies, but also appears to contribute to the problem via a conservative political discourse around violence against women and the required social responses. This resonates with the concerns I have raised about how the state perceives its responsibility to citizens in need in a very one dimensional form: income support, and that it fails to offer genuine care to those who have needs beyond food insecurity.
... cash transfers can only be palliative. Universal access to good quality public services such as health and education, free at the point of delivery; availability of childcare and flexible working; equal rights in relation to property and family law; minimum wage laws and a particular focus on the informal sector are all essential components of any strategy to address women’s poverty (Fredman, 2014, p. 22).

In many ways, the CSG in South Africa is a story of success. As indicated, previous research establishes that the CSG makes an important contribution to the survival of poor households, and is spent largely on food, education, and other essential costs. National levels of poverty have declined due to social grants, and the management and distribution of grants is largely efficient and effective. This study corroborates the vital role the CSG plays in the lives of poor children and their families, and therefore in easing severe poverty across South Africa. While laudable and encouraging, this narrative is only a part of the story of the CSG.

In this study I ask not only whether the CSG helps individuals with income support, but whether, in addition to this, the CSG delivers social justice. Theoretically and empirically I understand social justice as a balance of redistribution, recognition, and representation in order for individuals to live with freedom, agency, and dignity. To answer this question my research aimed to understand more about the social, care, and gendered impacts of the CSG in poor households in Johannesburg.

I used a feminist narrative approach to peer behind the statistics and ask questions that delved into the immediacy, intricacy, and intimacy of the lives of six women who get a CSG. In this final chapter I seek to draw together the issues raised through this process, laid out in the previous sections of this study, and to develop a comprehensive view of the social justice outcomes of the CSG. In my argument I acknowledge the huge benefits and successes of the grant, but point out the missed opportunities and failures of the developmental state in the way social protection is imagined and delivered in South Africa. This evidence raises questions about the politics of social protection and welfare, and the way we understand social citizenship in South Africa.

I open by revisiting the notion of transformative social protection, as an underlying theme in this thesis. I then move on to reflect on the theoretical contributions this study has made to the field of social protection, welfare, and social justice. The next part of this chapter is a synthesis of the main
themes uncovered in the research, using Fraser’s trivalent theory of social justice as a framework for analysis. This section leads on to a reflection on the notion and practice of the developmental state of South Africa. I argue that South Africa’s welfare approach is developmental in certain aspects, but not others. Specifically, I claim that South Africa is an uncaring state, and therefore cannot offer social justice. I explore the political and theoretical significance of this lack of care for welfare and social justice and then end the chapter with some thoughts about what implications this analysis has for social policy.

In this chapter I talk repeatedly of ‘the state’ as a single personalised actor with intentions, behaviour, ideological leanings, and so on. It is important to note that I recognise that this notion of a single coherent state does not, in actuality, exist. The state has, in the Foucauldian sense, many levels of operation and engagement and outcomes of state action are messy, complex, and even contradictory. In addition, the state exercises power in different ways and times and the actual organs of the state may or may not themselves overtly subscribe to the ideological outcomes of their actions. However, for the purposes of this analysis I do refer to ‘one’ state as a way to expose some of the contradictions in state actions that have real impacts on real people.

Transformative social protection towards social justice

The notion of transformative social protection that was raised at the start of this thesis is a helpful one to understand the varied outcomes of social protection strategies. The ideological underpinnings of any programme to relieve poverty have major political, social, and economic consequences. Most social protection programmes in the developing world have ameliorative objectives, with poverty reduction as a primary concern. This is of course positive and has made a significant impact on millions of individual’s lives. However, providing a safety net to prevent starvation does not alter the social, political and economic causes of that starvation in the first place.

Instead, transformative social protection will explicitly focus on both relieving poverty, a consequence of injustice, and altering some of the structural causes of the injustice in the first place (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2008). Fraser’s (2003) differentiation between affirmation and transformation has reference here. These two forms of remedy for injustice both have positive outcomes, and both will offer progress towards more just strategies, but only one can genuinely offer social justice. Her argument is that affirmative strategies are ameliorative, for example, relieve desperate poverty through grants or food aid, or decrease discrimination towards pregnant women in the workplace through protective employment legislation. These actions are very important in cases of maldistribution, misrecognition, or misrepresentation – but affirmation will not change the cause of the injustice, rather only attend to the symptoms. On the other hand, transformative strategies tackle
the structural causes of injustice. In reference to the previous examples, changing a pernicious capitalist economic system that has aggressively rationalised labour costs might be a transformative remedy to deal with the former, or changing childcare practices so men are equally responsible for childcare would transform the discriminative tendencies in the latter. These two examples also illustrate how difficult transformation can be, primarily because radically changing social, economic and political power relations hurts those in power, and thus they are extremely resistant to this kind of change. This does not, however, mean we should merely accept the status quo because change is difficult (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2007). Tackling these very fraught, difficult and explosive issues is critical in order to ensure that we pressurise governments to uphold their political commitments and we pressurise the social and political elite to enter into progressive and lasting social contracts for the public good (Hickey, 2011).

In some cases cash transfers have had transformative outcomes, but only where these outcomes were intended and factored into the design. For example the conditional cash transfers in strongly patriarchal societies such as Latin America have had positive impacts on a woman’s social inequality, facilitating a woman’s increased community participation and positively influencing her social status and voice in the household (Adato et al., 2000). However, most cash transfers in Africa and other parts of the developing world are designed to relieve the worst vagaries of poverty, and do this with greater or lesser success, but are not designed to do more (Devereux & McGregor, 2014). This is because dominant assumptions are that the causes of vulnerability and poverty lie at the individual or household level, and therefore programmes are designed to intervene at these levels, rather than at structural levels (Devereux & McGregor, 2014). This methodological individualism is problematic, because:

- It does not tell us the whole story. This approach to poverty reduction does not sit consistently with more complex explanations of what poverty is and how it is produced and reproduced. In particular, it ignores, or treats too simplistically, the roles of social structures, institutions, politics and power at every level (Fine, 1997). So how does this square with notions of social justice? (Devereux & McGregor, 2014, p. 298).

Cash transfers on their own without a transformative agenda are therefore important affirmative responses to poverty, but are not transformative. This conclusion is strongly borne out by this study. The CSG is an effective, important, and successful programme. But the evidence from this study also shows it is a limited intervention, offering relief but no opportunities for participants to change their circumstances, their economic status as poor, and their unequal position in society. The CSG on its
own does not deliver social justice, although it does offer important steps on the pathway towards justice.

A key missing link highlighted by this study is welfare services. My argument is not that good welfare services would completely transform women’s lives, but that welfare services offers one feature of social protection that does have critical transformatory potential. Certainly, without functional and accessible welfare services, there are so many barriers to making lasting and substantive changes that it is virtually impossible to do so.

Theoretical contribution: benefits of blending Fraser’s participatory parity with the capabilities approach

Social justice as a concept has been an enduring notion for theorists, especially from the fields of political philosophy. But many of these philosophical approaches are attempts to frame a notion of ‘transcendental institutionalism’ (Sen, 2009), or the production of a perfectly just world, with a focus on institutions, and have largely been lacking in nuance when it comes to application of these ideas to real life. A second stream of theorists are rather comparative or social realisation theorists who are interested in the real world, but their models are often unwieldy to use as an evaluative framework for justice in particular circumstances. Using a social realisation approach, one of the strongest aspects of Sen’s work, and the capabilities writers that have followed him, is the potential for application; the opportunity to ask social justice questions about real circumstances and real lives. But an often cited criticism of the capability approach is that while as a normative framework it is excellent as a tool for application, it is not a fully formed theory that can also explain poverty and inequality.

On the other hand, Fraser’s trivalent theory of social justice is strongest in her explanatory analysis for why societies are unjust and how the injustice functions. Her three arms of social justice gives texture to how to achieve participatory parity, which is her fundamental requirement for a just society. She is also very clear and detailed about how rich descriptions of needs and real understandings of lives are critical to understand the processes of injustice as well as the remedies for injustice. However, she doesn’t specify the best tools with which to do this.

In this study I have blended these two approaches to offer, I believe, a richer and more holistic framework to both explain, evaluate, and address social injustice. Fraser’s theory gives a broad framework of analysis, but the capability approach offers the tools with which to evaluate whether circumstances are distributive, offer recognition, or are representative. By unpacking the continuum of capabilities from those most associated with material and financial resources, to those most
associated with personal abilities and internal self-esteem and efficacy, the capability approach is able to expose the range of social injustices that concern Fraser.

These two approaches are not perfectly aligned; there are differences and potential conflicts. For example, Nussbaum (2011) has focused on developing a list of the key capabilities required for a good life; whereas Fraser is adamant that there should be no list (Fraser in Bozalek, 2012, p. 148), as she believes this is far too prescriptive to apply to all societies, and it is up to the communities and individuals themselves to figure out how parity of participation should play out. However, there are fundamental correlations and alignments that make this a productive marriage of ideas. Two of the key bridging concepts are that of freedom and dignity: developed coherently in the capabilities approach, but used as fundamental notions in Fraser’s work too.

In an interview, Fraser (in Bozalek, 2012, p. 147) acknowledges the connections between these two approaches as follows:

I believe that my approach actually does belong to the broad family of capability theories... [In my view] social arrangements are unjust if they entrench obstacles that prevent the people from the possibility of parity of participation... [Therefore]... what we want are social arrangements that give everyone the possibility, or, if you like, the capability, to participate on a par.

However, while there are clear synergies, neither she nor others have extended the analogies to see how they work together in practice.

The outcome is that I have been able to investigate the micro-circumstances of women’s lives as well as use Fraser’s trivalent framework in a single analytical process, both complementing each other. The importance of this is two-fold: firstly, the micro-details of real life can feed into the bigger questions of political ideology and social policy. Secondly, this theoretical approach exposes what failures of the state actually mean to real people living lives of struggle and deprivation. Both of these are critical in the pursuit of social justice. This research therefore succeeds in filling the gap between the conceptual notions of justice and the detail of what this actually means.

In this vein, the next section is a review of the key findings from the study that feed into the social justice successes and failures of the CSG.
Social justice outcomes of the CSG

Fraser’s (2009) trivalent theory of social justice is the theoretical framework I have used to understand the themes that were raised in this research. Below I will discuss the findings in relation to the notions of redistribution, recognition and representation.

Redistribution outcomes of the CSG

Redistribution

Redistribution is the first arm of social justice. This is usually understood to mean financial redistribution, and it is incontrovertible that the cash of the CSG helps families materially, demonstrated over and over in the stories of the women who participated in the research. While they all felt the grant was not high enough in value, their household’s daily survival depended to a large extent on the money from the CSG. In all cases the grant was not their only form of income; their households were a good depiction of the ‘working poor’, as there was at least one person in every household who had a job, a small business, or sporadic means to earn money. However, the CSG was largely their only reliable form of income security, coming at the same time every month which allowed these women to plan, budget, and manage their money to some extent. Shown here, the CSG is a vital factor in household survival and is the keystone of security and dependability of income.

The CSG thus offers a solid form of redistribution, which positively impacts on national poverty levels (World Bank, 2014), but it is not a poverty eradication strategy. Recipients remain poor, and, as I will discuss further below, remain to a large extent unable to change their circumstances. This corroborates other research which shows that the CSG is not able to change the economic status of households, as they remain poor even after receiving the grant (Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011; Patel & Hochfeld, 2011). It is therefore helpful to see redistribution as a process or continuum, rather than an end state. The CSG offers redistribution, but as the intervention is an affirmative one of relieving the worst vagaries of poverty without any transformation of the structural causes of poverty, the redistribution remains at an early stage of the continuum.

As redistribution can also refer to non-material goods, another area of positive redistribution is the shift in the balance of power in a household with the receipt of the grant. As a young woman can generally be said to have less power in a household than men or older women (Kabeer, 2000), the fact that she receives the CSG directly and for her own use (in relation to the child in question) offers her a form of power. The grant increases the value of the member who receives it and thus offers a form of membership protection, seen in this study clearly in the case of Loretta, and documented elsewhere too (Holmes & Jones, 2013). The CSG thus also offers redistribution of power within households.
Maldistribution is the term Fraser (2003) uses for when distribution remains highly unequal, favouring those who are already privileged by virtue of their social position. While material needs are most usually connected to notions of redistribution, non-material resources can also be unequally distributed, disadvantaging some and not others. The idea of maldistribution I want to set out is related to resources that are non-material, as opposed to financial or in-kind material distribution.

In this study the multidimensionality of poverty was starkly highlighted. This notion has become far more accepted as an alternative to the idea that poverty is merely a lack of income; in this research the reality of what this means and how this works came sharply into focus. The levels of deprivation, financial pressure, and need were complex and interconnected. While food security and financial survival was at the forefront of every woman’s set of concerns, it was by no means the only or even the most important concern. The issues each woman faced were different, but all were forms of poverty of opportunity, poverty of resources, and poverty of freedom. Significant constraints on women’s capabilities narrowed their choices, their opportunities, and their lives.

Examples of these from this study are education, training and skills, livelihood opportunities, strategic social networks, healthcare, housing, and so on. For every woman in the study the ability to access resources was closely linked to her social position: middle class people can buy these resources (such as education or good healthcare), while the public delivery of these resources was clearly inadequate and inaccessible for women who are poor and not linked into social networks that can smooth access. For example, quality and responsive healthcare is impossible to obtain for Jane’s mental health needs; Louise wanted to widen her job skills but had no way of accessing affordable training; Nandi’s educational background was extremely limited; decent and affordable housing is a major need for Jane, Loretta, Nandi, and Cindy. This is where it is easy to see that resources combined with the opportunity to use these resources is clearly a kind of capability: healthcare, job skills training, education and housing are all ‘available’ public resources, but finding, accessing and using them are beyond the capabilities of these women.

In addition, and more directly connected to income as a distributive resource, the CSG’s monetary value is too little to present opportunities to save for these women. If they were able to save cash this would offer them the chance to either buy assets (such as household goods), non-material resources (such as training) or generate further material resources (such as start a small business). This was an impossible thing to do in the context of their needs. This finding is different to the findings from other research which has demonstrated that the CSG and other social grants do result in increased saving behaviour of recipients (Daidone, Pellerano, Handa, & Davis, 2015; McCord & Slater, 2015).
It is in this kind of context where poverty is multidimensional and interconnected with many forms of
deprivation and need, that Samson (2015, p. 13) points out that ‘graduation’ or ‘exiting’ social
protection systems should be thought of “as a process of continually strengthening household
developmental outcomes” rather than exiting poverty altogether, which is unrealistic in sub-Saharan
Africa. Thus while the successes of the CSG should be celebrated, that celebration should be tempered
by a healthy concern with the greater socio-economic context of substantial inequality which prevents
the ability of grant recipients to significantly change their lives.

**Recognition outcomes of the CSG**

*Recognition*

Fraser’s second arm of justice is recognition, what she refers to as cultural justice and parity in social
status and social positioning. In this study, the CSG was shown to offer some aspects of recognition.

Firstly, the very existence, functionality and efficiency of the CSG is an important form of recognition
of material need. The scale of the programme offers direct acknowledgement of legitimate need to
millions of households who live in poverty. In addition, as an intervention it is explicitly designed to
recognise the structural constraints that keep children poor. This is a significant achievement and has
been acknowledged as such, both when compared to other developing countries as well as developed
societies, such as the USA who’s social policies are far less progressive (Devereux, 2013; Seekings,
2002).

Secondly, in addition to offering redistributive justice, the dependability and regularity of the grant
payments also leads to recognition outcomes. The sense of security and the acknowledgement of
ongoing need, rather than merely short-term crisis support, is an important recognition outcome. The
combination of redistribution and recognition in relation to the grant’s dependability is also a
capability support, in that it offers increased peace of mind in relation to food security, and the ability
to plan and manage a budget, all part of increased agency as a form of capability (Crocker & Robeyns,
2009).

A final point I wish to make about positive recognition outcomes of the grant is the small but significant
issue of the SASSA bank account that is provided for those who want it. It is an important financial tool
which offers cash safety and the possibility of saving (even if this is not realised in this group of
women).

These points combine to give women increased, even if limited, participatory parity and thus are
positive outcomes for them as grant recipients. These points are all aspects of the design of the CSG

and its implementation system, reinforcing the point that careful and progressive design and efficient and functional delivery are key aspects of recognition in relation to social protection policies.

Misrecognition

In contrast, misrecognition is a form of social disrespect and a lack of social worth. The misrecognition is both passive and active: passive misrecognition is, for example, where services are available but those in need are not supported to find or use these services and so their needs are effectively ignored, what Fraser (1995) would name cultural invisibility. Active misrecognition are acts of commission, such as unfair dismissal or blaming a woman for her rape, which are forms of cultural domination (subjection to unjust standards of judgement) and disrespect (routine subjection to negative stereotypes) (Fraser, 1995). The most persistent theme of misrecognition arising in this research is the lack of public care offered to women in need, in relation to inadequate service delivery, institutional injustice, as well as the discourse of cultural injustice. The politics of needs interpretation means certain needs of women, such as reproductive burdens, or the impact of gender based violence, are often invisible, or misrecognised, and extend far further than just income/employment.

The nature of cash transfers means they are more efficient at delivering resources and other mechanisms are usually better at delivering recognition. In particular, social services are critical to the realisation of social citizenship because not only are they in themselves social rights, but they also enable the full use of civil and political rights by individuals (Leisering & Barrientos, 2013).

The social assistance programme in South Africa is in itself progressive and pro-poor. Therefore the policies themselves are not uncaring, but the structural, political and instrumental nature of social and welfare services is often uncaring. Cultural invisibility in particular begins with a lack of acknowledgement that poverty and the needs of poor people extend far beyond just a lack of income. So much effort has been expended on the cash transfer system at the expense of other services that the multidimensionality of poverty has been thinned out into a need for just cash; and the success of the delivery of cash blinds the state to the other very pressing needs poor people face. This is not to imply that the state is unaware of the sad shape of, for example, public healthcare, education, and housing needs; but their response is piecemeal, sectorised, unconnected, and does not constitute a service package that genuinely serves the needs of poor households. In addition, the state has vastly undermined the delivery and effectiveness of welfare services by focusing its efforts almost exclusively on social assistance as a response to poverty. Poor, missing and unintegrated welfare services misrecognises individuals and withholds needed care.
Cultural domination and disrespect are patently contained in experiences such as Jane’s dismissal from her job while ill; the accusation that Jane was fraudulently receiving the grant and its withdrawal; the lack of response from the healthcare sector to Nandi’s two experiences of rape; the lack of welfare service intervention when Louise was repeatedly molested as a child while child protection services were aware of her vulnerability. Overall, then, the lack of acknowledgement that poverty is expressed in reduced and constrained capabilities in general is a powerful form of misrecognition of needs outside income.

This period of investment in social assistance coincided with the growth of a pervasive neoliberal discourse of self-reliance and coping; what Hein Marais (2011) calls the ‘fetish of coping’. This process, not confined to South Africa but very well rooted here all the same, is really a push towards the ‘privatisation’ of social reproduction and support and the withdrawal of the state’s responsibilities in this regard. Citizenship conceived of in this way assumes that the only legitimate source of social participation is via paid labour (Sevenhuijsen, 2003b).

One important consequence of the lack of public care is a heavy reliance on private care, which is stretched thin and under strain, for the millions who cannot afford to buy care on the market: every one of the research participants experience this phenomenon, and the women themselves plus other household members continued to provide warm and attentive care in many cases, even in the face of zero supplementation from the public sector. Theorists working in the area of social reproduction have long established that the more privatised care becomes, the more political the issue really is, as many forms of private care are filling in for public care and recognition (Bezanson & Luxton, 2006; Folbre, 2008).

A pronounced example of this phenomenon is the rampant violence against women and the public response to this. Although some services, both NGO and state, do exist for survivors of violence, the evidence from this research shows how limited they are in relation to access and the effectiveness of their response. Both the experience of violence and abuse as well as the limited services and lack of coordinated service response, are a form of profound misrecognition for women in South Africa. Of course violence is a social phenomenon for which the state is not directly responsible, nonetheless the high prevalence and negative consequences of this demands state attention, which appears sorely lacking in the lives of the women in this study. As discussed in chapter 7, this is not merely a problem of inefficiency but the consequence of political conservatism and the social and cultural ambivalence about violence against women. These all translate to a state that does not appear to care in real terms about this kind of devastating violence being meted out to vast numbers of women and girls.
Along with a lack of care, other forms of misrecognition surfaced in this research. The first is the fact that the broader social contexts in South Africa are harshly judgemental of CSG recipients whose behaviour falls outside the ‘ideal’. The deserving vs undeserving discourse is strong and was raised in different ways by my research participants. Being labelled ‘undeserving’ is a perfect example of Fraser’s “institutionalised hierarchies of cultural value” (2007, p. 20), as her three types of misrecognition are all expressed here: being subjected to inappropriate standards of judgement, being rendered culturally invisible, and the disrespect of being subjected to negative stereotyping. As outlined in Nandi’s story in chapter 5 in particular, my argument is not that all uses of the grant income are equally desirable, but rather that grant spending or carer behaviour that is not in the best interests of the children they care for, should not be responded to punitively. Rather this should be understood as an expression of need for support and further help should be offered.

A second additional issue of misrecognition is how the agency of the individual women was regularly undermined by large, uncaring and unresponsive state structures. Agency and resilience are used to survive; women are not passively waiting for a grant – their lives are full and busy with survival and the tasks of reproduction. But even if you embody agency, against monolithic structures you may have little impact on the world you are trying to change, as was the case particularly for Jane, but also for Loretta, Thokozile and Cindy at different times in their lives. The undermining of agency is a form of misrecognition.

Thirdly, the CSG’s lack of ability to offer a form of freedom and hope for the future are forms of misrecognition. Poverty severely constrains people’s choices, and this limited set of capabilities limits people’s freedom. Freedom is the opportunity to choose between valuable options or alternatives, and the CSG is too small in monetary value to offer much genuine choice in issues such as household membership (especially for Cindy, Loretta, and Louise), income generation options (such as for Jane and Thokozile), optimum services and options for your children (for example, Cindy’s child who needs educational assessment and intervention, or Jane’s Downs Syndrome son Mandisi who needs education or income generation options for his level of need). Choice is not costless, and freedom for poor people requires more state intervention, rather than less state intervention than for those with monetary resources. Related to freedom is the notion of hope, which Duflo (2012) has presented as a capability: future plans, dreams and ambitions of the women in this research were sadly absent in many cases (Nandi and Cindy in particular). The CSG is too limited to contribute to hope as a capability. The design of the CSG never intended expansive cash delivery so that recipients can have freedom to choose whatever lifestyle option they wish; the criticism is that other services to complement the CSG are missing.
A further limitation of the CSG related to the nature of the service, is its inability to shift external conditions such as violence, social conflict and substance abuse. Again, the expectation that a cash transfer can produce such profound social transformation would be completely unrealistic. The criticism is rather that firstly there are not sufficient or effective services to fill that gap, but secondly we have expectations that once recipients receive the CSG they are no longer at the mercy of these highly intractable social issues.

**Representation outcomes of the CSG**

*Representation*

Representation in Fraser’s (2009) trivalent framework is concerned with who ‘counts’ as a legitimate member of a specified community. While she focuses mostly on the global stage in her work on this arm of social justice, this is an important question to ask at the local level in South Africa. Representation is the inclusion or exclusion from a community entitled to make justice claims, in other words, a matter of social and political belonging (Fraser, 2009). The element of the CSG that is most persuasive in relation to the delivery of representation is the entitlement to the grant that is rendered by the Constitution, regulations, and policies that lay out the criteria for inclusion. As a right, once a person falls into the targeted category (in this case primary caregivers of poor children under 18 years), they have no further burden to prove their worth or to fight for the privilege of a cash transfer. This is a significant delivery of representational justice. Notably, this is one of the only aspects of the CSG that has offered a transformative remedy to women’s poverty. While earlier I noted that cash is an affirmative response to poverty, the entitlement to the support transforms women’s political status as carers. Interestingly, this was not a major theme in the findings of this study.

*Misrepresentation*

Misrepresentation is evident in the findings of this study in relation to three issues. The first is a return to the concern of violence against women. While I have discussed how violence misrecognises women, it also undermines their ability to claim rights as full citizens: misrepresentation. Because women are often blamed for the violence, expected to contribute to ending it, are not given services after it happens, and are expected socially to keep it ‘private’, women are treated as politically less important than men in relation to personal safety. There is formal representation in that our laws and policies are progressive and comprehensive, but South Africa falls short of offering these full rights in reality. The increasing conservatism mentioned throughout this thesis is speeding up the depoliticisation of violence against women, reducing women’s representation in this area.
Secondly, institutional injustice that was also discussed as a form of misrecognition, is clearly in addition a grave instance of misrepresentation. Using Jane’s experience of unfair dismissal and her being accused of grant fraud, this demonstrates an undermining of the benefits of CSG. It erases Jane’s rights as a citizen; she becomes a non-person, a perfect example of Fraser’s ‘ordinary political’ misrepresentation.

Finally I wish to suggest that the increasingly conservative and punitive social and political response to women who do not fit into the ideal embodiment of a perfect mother is also a form of misrepresentation. It is not just that women are stigmatised at times, or that as individuals they struggle to fit into unrealistic expectations of motherhood, but rather that these punitive judgements of their caring behaviour are a way of diminishing their social citizenship. Social citizenship can be understood as,

a multilayered process of social negotiation. It is constituted through the recognition and claiming of needs, the acknowledgement of claims as rights and the formulation of rights in specific social contexts (Dean, 2013, p. S2).

This notion privileges our sociality as interdependent human beings, and recognises that our group membership binds and protects us as much as it marks and disadvantages us. Therefore unpacking the political assumptions about the application and functionality of the CSG in people’s lives is a means of understanding the related ideological assumptions about the ‘ideal citizen’.

This ideal citizen can be assumed through the current government attitudes towards the poor which are ambivalent at best, derogatory and patronising and even denigrating at worst. It is perhaps surprising that this conservative and punitive discourse can exist in a country that has rolled out such an extensive and functional cash transfer programme, but this programme was developed in parallel with an economy based on market rules and policies, and “remains constrained by narrow conceptions of the state and by distrust of rights-based demands on state resources” (Hassim, 2005, pp. 3-4). In other words, while cash transfers are rightly a huge achievement in state service to its citizens, “the promotion of self-empowerment and community responsibility” in a context in which the boundaries of “obligations and entitlements... and the extent of support that is on offer” is narrow (Marais, 2011, p. 223). This perspective explains why discourses of citizenship really reveal that the state is impatient with chronic poverty.

The ideological result of this emphasis is that it is currently assumed that income support on its own will deliver the redistribution necessary for grant recipients. Therefore the ‘ideal citizen’ is conceived of as needing only a financial ‘hand-up’ in order to thrive, because the inequities of the past have been
substantively smoothed out and the barrier to well-being is ‘merely’ a lack of income. In addition, the ideology follows that individuals should be self-reliant and independent, and therefore do not need to, indeed should not, ‘wait’ for the state to provide work. “A kind of alchemy is envisaged. The ‘informal’ economy transmutes from a pool of unemployed strugglers into a site of economic growth and job creation” (Marais, 2011, p. 224).

Receiving the CSG for a care role does not provide the impetus to take the next ideological step: that giving and receiving care are critical dimensions of humanity, and requires some form of compensation (Sevenhuijsen, 2003b). The primary message appears to be that receiving the CSG ought to be enough to manage your life, and that the state has absolved its responsibilities to you. In the absence of transformative change, resilience and agency cannot solve poverty (Ballard, 2012). Indeed, even the most striking example of agency and resilience cannot in itself overcome the power of the state, class interests or assist people with basic services (Ballard, 2015). In addition, agency can have contradictory outcomes in relation to the state, such as reinforcing state expectations of self-help, also sustaining and lauding consumption based and capitalist accumulation goals, and even encourage regressive forms such as vigilantism (Ballard, 2015).

The discourse assumes a number of normative pathways to financial well-being, relevant for our discussion here are that: individuals need to complete secondary schooling, to have children only within wedlock after schooling is complete, and to subsequently independently create a space for sustainable self-employment in the spirit of entrepreneurship and hard work. In the absence of this trajectory, it is assumed that getting a CSG is a key intervention to change people’s lives. Capability is seen only in financially instrumental terms; all the other capability constraints are largely unacknowledged. The state expects that those getting a CSG “will find exit routes from poverty by making good health, education, and civic choices to become more capable of earning an income” (Ballard, 2012, p. 815).

But none of my research participants conform to these norms of coping, survivors though they are. For example, a number of these women had ongoing struggles with the identity of carer or mother (such as Nandi and Louise), or found circumstances too overwhelming to behave in their preferred carer ways (such as Cindy and Loretta). This at times led to ambivalence about spending grant money on the child and the use of the money for purposes that were not in the best interests of the child (such as alcohol). Nandi typifies the caricature of a failure of citizenship as perceived by the state. Her case could be seen as a disappointing outcome of the CSG; her experiences could be pathologised as a result of her personal failings and lack of ability to take and use opportunities as they arise.
However, as the state has made explicit developmental obligations to the South African population, I claim that a punitive, disparaging, or judgemental response to cases like these, whether from the state or the public, are the undermining of the full political rights of these women, in effect, their social citizenship as conceived of by Marshall and those that followed (Jenson, 1993; M. Lister, 2005). In fact, “Since T.H. Marshall wrote it has been impossible to think of welfare without thinking of citizenship” (Jenson, 1993, p. 127). Civil, political and social rights are interdependent in a ‘Marshall-ian’ conception of social citizenship (M. Lister, 2005), which is by definition bound to the nation state, the most powerful actor in the citizenship landscape (R. Lister, 2003). Claims that this ‘tri-rights’ notion of citizenship has been criticised because the ‘social’ tends to be less well developed, understood, and explained than the political and civil arms (Dean, 2013) are corroborated by this study, that indicates exactly the danger of ignoring the social. Instead of this serious level of misrepresentation, carers who do not fit into the ideal carer model should be receiving parenting, relationship, and intimate bonding support and intervention rather than being relegated to the ‘disgraceful’ end of the social spectrum.

Conclusions

The value of using the combination of Fraser’s trivalent framework with the capabilities approach is demonstrated through the above compilation of findings. The more positive the CSG outcomes for women in relation to redistribution, recognition and representation, the more opportunities and capabilities are built; whereas the more negative the outcomes, the more opportunities and capabilities are weakened or undermined.

In addition, the findings also demonstrate the substantive differences between affirmative and transformative remedies: many of the positive outcomes of the CSG remain on the material and remedial side of the continuum of change, offering effective affirmative inputs. On the other hand, the failures of the CSG relate more to the non-material, especially structural, issues, especially in the way it connects with services, and transformative social change has been thin and patchy for participants in this study. This is not surprising as these are outcomes that are far harder to achieve, and require substantive shifts in social structures and power distribution.

Therefore overall these findings demonstrate that the CSG is making important inroads on the pathway towards a just society. There are, however, significant barriers to realising substantive social justice and enhanced freedom. These clearly stem not from the CSG itself, which is largely delivering what it set out to achieve, but rather from serious failures of the South African developmental state which does not offer a holistic package of support to poor households.
The failure of the state is not at face value an ideological one as policies are inarguably pro-poor and designed for a level of economic redistribution. The evidence here rather demonstrates that the failure of the state is a failure of recognition and care. The maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation identified via the lives of the women I interviewed are failures in creating pathways to development by the state, and misrecognition in the public or cultural sphere, not programme failures. I now turn to a consideration of the South African developmental state and then argue why it is failing in relation to these findings.

The construction of the developmental state

South Africa’s articulation of its economy and society as developmental has drawn from two distinct paradigms. The first, and weaker influence, is the idea of the developmental state, popularised by the incredible economic and social growth of the ‘Asian Tigers’ such as Japan, South Korea, and more recently Thailand, Malaysia and China. The attraction of the model used by these newly industrialised countries has been their rapid economic growth that has led to significant industrial changes in the economy and employment levels previously unheard of. In addition, the fact that the conventional model of capitalism, requiring that the state defers to the all-powerful market, is rejected in favour of a strong and effectual interventionist state which oversees and manages growth in a direct manner, is also alluring for a country shaped by an anti-apartheid movement based on socialist ideals (Marais, 2011).

The second, and stronger influence, is the social development approach to social policy, which emerged as a response to unequal and distorted development and was popularised by the UN World Summit for Social Development in 1995 (Patel, 2015). This was an approach built on the post-colonial political movements in Africa in the 1960s which were interested in strong independent economies, and redistribution and social investment in their populations. Indeed, the “proponents of social development argue that social investments in social programmes that enhance people’s welfare through their participation in the productive economy are the most effective ways of enhancing people’s welfare and achieving economic development” (Patel, 2005, p. 29). Embedded in this approach is the assumption that the best outcomes for society requires democratic ideals and strong civil society participation (Midgley, 1995). This is in contrast to the ‘Asian Tiger’ model whose success rests on authoritarian governments making decisions in the national interest with almost no consultation with or participation from civil society (Fine, 2010; Marais, 2011).

Overall, then, the developmental state “refers to a model of economic growth and social redistribution [and investment] in which the state acts, with varying degrees of autonomy, as a major variable
promoting that growth, determining its pattern and ensuring social development” (Marais, 2011, p. 339).

South Africa’s construction of itself as a developmental state rests on a 20 year commitment to redistributive policies and is strongly shaped by a rights framework (enshrined in the Constitution) and progressive social policies (Patel, 2014). The state perceives itself as an exemplar of a developmental state, that is, one that supports economic growth in a democratic context, offering substantial social investments to the population, which participates in governance through a strong civil society. The ANC government claims that their massive social spending on cash transfers plays out as progressive social protection, which is having an undeniable and widely lauded positive impact on poverty.

This vision of the developmental state has been strongly contested, not least by a rising number of social movements vociferously claiming marginalisation, lack of participation, and hostility from the state. This is reflected in the recent explosion of labour and service delivery action and protests, and exemplified by the 2013 establishment of Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters, a new political party with substantial support that claims to speak on behalf of those marginalised and left behind by the ANC’s development project. These movements assert that redistribution through social assistance is limited by the country’s continued faithfulness to liberalised economic growth, which constrains the ability of a large sector of the population to move out of poverty (Ballard, 2012; Desai et al., 2010). Desai, Maharaj and Bond (2010) even question the generally uncontested claim to improvements in poverty levels, saying urbanisation has been a stronger weapon against poverty than social assistance. Other objections to this characterisation come from the likes of Barchiesi (2011), Dubbeld (2013), Marias (2011), (Fine, 2010) and Hart (2013) , who argue that the state’s practices are not developmental in outcome.

My own argument starts with the claim that the developmental nature of the South African state is far more complex and tenuous than the vision they publically assert, and that even in the case of just one input, social protection in the form of cash transfers, the outcomes are by no means unambiguously developmental. I do not take issue with the use of cash transfers as a social protection measure. Indeed, the CSG is efficiently and well spent, and the positive impacts are undeniable, as demonstrated. The point I wish to make, is that cash transfers alone do not constitute a developmental state. A developmental state is far more than cash hand-outs, especially the cash hand-outs in South Africa which, in the case of the grant with the largest reach, the CSG, are very small in monetary value and do not change the status of the poor.

South Africa’s vision of development embraces both equality and well-being, drawing from the framework of constitutional rights that shapes all post-apartheid social policy, but these outcomes are
patchy or missing in so many interventions. I suggest that to achieve these goals it is critical to consider the care of the state as an under-recognised feature of social justice. In this argument, I align myself with feminist theorists who talk about care as critical to frameworks of welfare and social protection (Folbre, 2008; Sevenhuijsen, 2003a), and social justice as the ultimate goal of social protection (Adesina, 2011; Devereux & McGregor, 2014; Ulriksen, Plagerson, & Hochfeld, in press).

A caring state

In her argument about care as a public good and good care provision as a prerequisite for genuine gender equality, Nancy Folbre (2008, p. 375) makes the case for the “complementarities between the intrinsic merits and public benefits of care commitments” as well as “the need to consider the financial costs of caring for dependents and their implications for government fiscal policy”.

She draws on feminist theorists (such as Kittay, 1999, 2002; Sevenhuijsen, 1998, 2003a; Tronto, 1993, 2010) who claim the issue of care is a critical element in an ethical society, in relation to both the right to care and the right to be cared for. Their work embraces the substance and importance of relations of reciprocity, rather than autonomy, as a basic element of care ethics (Reddy, Meyer, Shefer, & Meyiwa, 2014). Folbre situates care in the context of a just society, as opposed to limiting the issue of care to private individual lives. Everyone deserves good long-term care, not just those who are lucky to have caring individuals in their lives or those who are able to pay for it on the market, therefore a society that cares about care provides good social insurance that “pools risk, encourages reciprocity, and increases solidarity” (Folbre, 2008, p. 381). She explains that care can offer both intrinsic merits as well as public benefits, and both are important. She asserts that financial costs of care should not be borne by individuals alone, and makes a case for fair care remuneration in Western contexts. What is useful about this argument for South Africa is her insistence that care is a productive, investment, an insurance activity rather than a purely consumption activity, as it contributes to the public good in real and meaningful ways. The transformation of care notions, behaviours, and policies can hence have a substantive impact on gender and other inequalities in both public and private spheres.

Following Folbre (2008) and others (Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Tronto, 1993), in this thesis I understand care in a broad way, focusing not only on the individual care activities of social reproduction (caring for), but also encompassing caring about. That is, I wish to ask: in what ways does the state care about its citizens? This implies conceptualising care theoretically not only as a labour (behaviour), but also as an attitude (caring about) as well as a ‘virtue’ (moral value) (Kittay, 2002). Because care is structured not only by private relationships in families, households and communities, but also by social institutions and various forms of power relations (Reddy et al., 2014; Tronto, 2010), it has to be a
“central analytic in social policy: a point at which social and cultural transformations meet with changing relations of welfare” (F. Williams, 2001, p. 470).

In response to analyses that make care visible (Reddy et al., 2014), and especially expose the extent to which care is under or unpaid (O’Brien, 2012), feminists such as Folbre (2008) argue that a caring state must take into account the financial costs of individual care, and compensate in some way for this. While some have argued that the CSG is individual compensation for the cost of caring for children (Chopra, 2014), as the amount is so little, it does not adequately recognise the substantial inputs caring for children requires. Any increase in the grant value would obviously make a positive impact, but I believe that there is a bigger issue at play here with regard to the state’s responsibility to care.

The argument I put forward in three of the chapters specifically, but which is a theme across the study, is that state and NPO services limp along in fragmented, often ineffective or dysfunctional ways, and these do not nearly fulfil the deep needs for care. By services I refer in part to broad social services such as education and health which are exposed as having major gaps and problems in this study, but overwhelmingly the evidence relates specifically to the failure of welfare services. These are the services which exist to assist people who are battered by social, economic and personal circumstances and need care in order to survive, and they were almost completely absent in the tough circumstances of these women’s lives.

The state in South Africa sees the delivery of welfare as necessarily pluralist (Department of Welfare and Population Development, 1997). It offers cash transfers as its primary care activity, and plays a small role in some direct welfare service delivery. For welfare services, it relies largely on the non-profit sector to serve the greater population, and funds these services as an expression of its obligation to the welfare needs of South Africans. However, the chronic underfunding of these organisations results in fewer services delivered to fewer people. Finally, the state allows the market to deliver excellent care to those who can pay. Therefore the actual caring for as well as caring about responsibilities lie to a large extent in the family, the NPO sector, and the market (Patel, 2014). The huge care gaps constitute a key basis for the ‘crisis in social reproduction’ (Bakker & Gill, 2003a; Bezuidenhout & Fakir, 2006; Hunter, 2011) that stems from the insurmountable barriers against people surviving through monetary or social wages, leading to a life of precariousness and risk (Standing, 2011). My argument is not against pluralism: this is a necessary and welcome approach to welfare in a developing context with huge demands on the state. The issue is that pluralism in South Africa has allowed the state to withdraw, indeed, abandon, its responsibility as the primary institution responsible for social investment and care. The imbalance in its funding to the two arms of welfare strongly implies that the state believes it is fulfilling its mandate by providing social assistance; while
welfare services are seen to be largely the responsibility of the NPO sector along with families and communities. This demonstrates the state’s failure in an attitude of care (caring about) as well as care as a virtue (moral value) in relation to welfare services.

The lives of my research participants illustrate the huge gaps in care provided by the state. Further, the pernicious outcomes of this imbalance in the care diamond are that vulnerable households are forced to absorb the state care deficits. Jane is a good example: she services a key caring role not just for her own children, but for others too. Two young people have been taken into her family who would otherwise fall right through the social services cracks: Thenjiwe, her addict sister’s seven year old daughter, and Nondumiso, her adolescent orphaned relative. Jane is serving a caring function on behalf of the state; she doesn’t question this because they are kin and as a woman she doesn’t doubt her role as a carer. In addition, her son, Mandisi, who has Downs Syndrome, is a young adult with no prospects and no available services; again she cares for him, not questioning the lack of state options. We should be offering far more support to someone like Jane. We don’t want people like Thenjiwe, Nondumiso, or Mandisi to fall into state care, because they will receive better care with Jane, who can offer not just the caring for, but also the affective caring about these young family members. In addition, the cost of caring for these people in state institutions is far more than the costs associated with staying with Jane.

There are some key interventions that would offer substantial support to someone like Jane. But the state’s perception of obligation begins when private support breaks down. By only stepping in as a last resort, the state is demonstrating its assumption that private care should be adequate, and that cash transfers are sufficient as a state response. This observation is not new, and in fact has resonance with many different mixed welfare systems with a global pull towards the residual models of welfare (Bakker, 2003). What is significant here is that South Africa’s approach is couched in developmentalist language. Of course the delivery of income support is a developmental intervention, but this in itself does not mean the state is a caring state. Giving money does not offer care; it offers income security.

The failures that create such enormous challenges for these women are structural and state failures, the challenges are not caused by inherent individual deficits in women’s lives, but do result in deficits. In addition, there is an ideological failure I want to point out in relation to violence against women. This ideological failure is not in the state’s perception of its responsibility to redistribute resources to the poor, which is ideologically consistent with both the long-standing redistributive policies of the ANC and the broader social policy agenda to respond to poverty. Nor is it in the progressive and comprehensive legislation against violence against women. Rather, I argue that by responding to gender based violence with increasingly shrill cries of moral panic rather than addressing the deep
gender conservatism and misogyny that exists, not only in the broader social context of South Africa, but also amongst the highest echelons of political and religious power, the state completely absolves itself of responsibility for both the violence and the care of survivors of that violence. Ongoing or repeated experiences of violence not only deeply affects a person individually and personally, but also acutely shapes their political and social subjectivity, how they relate to the outside world, the state, and the community, and how entitled they feel to be a free agent in the social context. Overall, therefore, my argument is that a developmental state in the way that the South African government has conceived of it, is not a caring state, nor a state that believes itself to be responsible for care.

In addition, it is important to be cognisant of the political benefits of the CSG for the state. Politically, the CSG does three seemingly contradictory things that in reality advances the political project of the ANC: the CSG overtly advances their pro-poor commitments, but at the same time, it is also useful to appease the conscience of the elite as well as, thirdly, to defuse the concerns and active protests of the poor (Ballard, 2015). This does not have a long term future: economic survival of ordinary people is very much a political process (Ballard, 2012; Barchiesi, 2011) and we can see via social protests and the changes in social movements that the left is in disagreement with the ANC as a caring state; and is concerned about what it sees as its elitism and its rejection of socialist models. Progressive state practices and support in relation to care requires not only a strong civil society and labour movements, but also a state that is responsive to their concerns (Hassim, 2008a).

A just state

The state’s belief in itself as developmental “obscures important truths such as how poverty is produced, and how women are burdened with the responsibilities for poverty” (Ballard, 2012, p. 817). Therefore while at a macro-level we can see there is progress, at a micro-level ordinary people are living in a constant state of crisis, and never know whether they are going to survive or not.

A truly caring society will consider not only redistribution as fair, but also recognition and representation. The CSG does offer redistribution which gives significant relief of the worst desperations of poverty. But the CSG transforms nothing for people who get it. They continue to live in appalling circumstances of difficulty: financial difficulty, social difficulty, economic difficulty, familial difficulty. Even if the CSG is spent in the most normatively responsible ways, their social conditions do not change. How can we expect the CSG to assist Jane to access services, Nandi to heal the difficulties of her past, and Loretta to keep her son protected from violence, drugs, and crime? Our expectation and hope that it can make an impact on these women’s social conditions is unrealistic and inappropriate. It is an important but narrow economic input; it is income support in a context where really the state has no influence over how people’s lives will play out.
In addition, an important point is not just that the CSG is limited to redistribution, but that the unintended and perverse consequences of the expansion of the grant was a reduction in recognition through the lack of investment in social services. We do not have a social protection system that protects people socially.

These criticisms should not be confused with a standard conservative argument against the expansion of cash transfers as a social investment: my objection is not to the principle of social protection; it is rather to the investment in one form at the expense of others. While conservative commentators are right the system is failing in some critical ways, my remedy would be diametrically opposed to their usual solution of rolling back the state; I would advocate a transformative remedy requiring more not less investment, moving beyond financial inputs towards commitment and leadership and programme development to integrate forms of social protection to address misrecognition and misrepresentation too. While they argue that less state leaves more space for the individual to flourish, I contend here that a more present, competent, functional state would make significant differences to women’s lives which are currently not individually ‘free’ but rather neglected and ignored, leading to less freedom, not more. Welfare services in particular are necessary to make an impact on women’s lives.

Turning to the other side of the political spectrum, I also take issue with the argument that the ‘left’ often makes regarding the ‘danger’ of the surveillance state; they claim, using the notion of Foucault’s governmentality, that too much state control means the state inserts itself into the lives of citizens in order to mould them into perfectly subservient beings (Ballard, 2015; Marais, 2011). My own discomfort with the inevitable reduction of privacy as technology enables the state more surveillance capabilities are largely middle class concerns: I have the luxury of worrying about surveillance just as the larger population are invisible to the state. We need more state, but only more effective state. currently we have a technocratic state which can manage huge biometric systems of identification, but which fails at delivering certain kinds of services (Breckenridge, 2005).

Turning to progressive analyses of the impacts of the CSG, it is important that we start asking hard questions about the grant system; not for the purposes of scrapping the programme, but ensuring we continue to strive towards more justice, not less. The pragmatic focus on areas of realistic wins is important, but we need to recognise the significance of the caring state as moving far beyond just income support. As identified in the notion of transformative social protection, income and livelihoods support is vital, and address the first three dimensions of transformative social protection, namely ‘provide’, ‘prevent’, and ‘promote’. However, the fourth dimension, ‘transform’, is about identifying and dealing with social or structural causes of poverty (Devereux & McGregor, 2014). This is a major undertaking politically, as it is about shifting the status quo and often upsetting powerful groups in
society. But “a transformative agenda for social protection asserts that while poverty can be alleviated with a cash transfer, it cannot always be solved with a cash transfer... All too often, social transfers merely offer partial material compensation for conditions of ill-being that are caused by structural inequalities and institutional injustices” (Devereux & McGregor, 2014, p. 307). My arguments in this study are aligned with this concern, that state intervention should be designed to do more than alleviate material discomfort, and that they should be evaluated on this basis. In truth, the state’s ambivalence about the conditions of the poor where it acknowledges the structural but still disapproves of those ‘dependent’ on grants (as if there were alternatives) is a reflection of the ambiguity of their redistributive framework (Hassim, 2006a). Policies of strong redistribution compete with policies more focused on neoliberal market solutions to poverty. These are some of the contradictions that lead to the powerful and confident South African state being “puzzled by the limits to its power in the development sphere” because their inarguable ‘will to improve’ is not matched by a ‘will to know’ the reality of people’s lives (Charlton, Unpublished, p. 2; Li, 2007).

Fraser offers a compelling argument on the failures of second wave feminism which, I believe, is valuable in understanding the disarticulation between the carefully crafted and progressive creation of the developmental state as the pinnacle of emancipatory success, and the messiness, emptiness and contradictory nature of its application. Fraser (2013a, p. 219) argues that capitalism’s dynamic nature and its ability to “periodically [remake] itself... in part by recuperating strands of critique against it”, has led to the co-option of certain language and aspects of feminism into conservative, neo-liberal agendas. This has meant that feminism has split into two constructs: while on the one hand it remains a social movement for gender justice and broader radical social transformation and emancipation, on the other, it is a broader ‘discursive construct’ that serves a depoliticised and tame form of identity politics and capitalist ends. This second form is,

...an empty signifier of the good (akin, perhaps, to ‘democracy’), which can and will be invoked to legitimate a variety of different scenarios, not all of which promote gender justice... As [feminist] discourse becomes independent of the movement, the latter is increasingly confronted with a strange shadowy version of itself, an uncanny double that it can neither simply embrace nor wholly disavow (Fraser, 2013a, p. 224).

This description bears a persuasive resemblance to the ideals of the liberation struggle and the disappointments of the current South African social and economic agenda: superficially consistent but worlds apart in materiality. What seems to have been lost is the connection of personalised subjection to a structural understanding of subordination, indeed, remembering that justice requires not identity recognition, nor superficial political representation, nor a generous but non-radical sharing of a slice
of the spoils of capitalism, but status recognition, genuine representation, and redistribution that upsets the status quo, that transforms the structures that keep people poor.


Charlton, S. (Unpublished). Confounded but Complacent: Accounting for how the State sees Responses to its Housing Intervention in Johannesburg.


Hochfeld, T. (2008). “Influencing... it is our role, it is our duty”: Revealing How Social Workers in South Africa Unintentionally Reinforce Conservative Ideas on the Family. Agenda(77), 92-104.


Appendix A: Household profiles and maps

Meeting Louise, Thokozile and Cindy

Three research participants were not given profiles in the text. Short profile summaries are provided here instead.

**Thokozile**, who is Zulu-speaking, lives with her boyfriend and their two children in a tiny, neat, one bedroomed flat in Sophiatown. She is 37 years old and a domestic worker working 4 days a week, two days each for two employers. Her boyfriend is employed as a full time security guard, doing day and night shift alternative weeks. She grew up in a remote rural part of KwaZulu Natal and is from a very poor family with 12 children. Her boyfriend is the mother of both her children, a boy of 14 and a girl of 4. She receives one CSG, for her daughter, as until I explained that the original cut-off ages had increased she thought her 14 year old was not eligible.

**Cindy** and her 12 year old son, for whom she receives a CSG, share a single bed in a very crowded house in Westbury. Nine people live in the 3 bedroomed home. Cindy, 31 years old, recently left her boyfriend of 15 years due to very serious ongoing domestic violence that has left her physically and emotionally scarred. At the time of the interviews, Cindy was engaged in a community health educator training programme at the Westbury Clinic, with a view to working as a health worker in the future. She had no income aside from the CSG and a small training stipend. While fully fluent in Afrikaans, Cindy speaks English to her son.

**Louise**, 30 years old, is the only white woman among my research participants. The household speaks a mix of English and Afrikaans. She lives with her mother, her brother, a young relative, and her 5 children in a crowded, messy and run-down house in Claremont that belonged to her late grandmother. Her children are aged 9 (a girl), 7 (a boy), 4 (a girl) and twins, two boys, aged 1 and a half years old. Louise has a new boyfriend, but her children are the result of two different previous relationships, one of them a marriage. Louise receives five CSGs. During the period of our interviews she got a debt collecting job which paid on commission, but she would probably still earn well below the CSG means test level.
Jane’s Household as at May 2011

- Jane (37)
  - Jane’s Brother
    - UK
  - Jane’s Father
  - Jane’s Step mother
  - Jane’s Sister
  - Jane’s Sister Homeless addict
  - Jane’s Husband
    - Deceased
  - Bongiwe
    - 21
    - Netherlands
  - Mandisi
    - 17
    - Downs Syndrome
  - Sizwe
    - 8
  - Noni
    - 7
  - Simphiwe
    - 3
  - Thembu
    - 1
  - Nathi
    - 29
  - Thembi
    - 7
  - Nokothula
    - 14
  - Thenjiwe
    - 7
    - Unknown

Nandi’s Household as at July 2011

Nandi
23

Sister
Sister
Andile
Brother

Previous
Husband

Siblings

Nandi’s
Mother

Nandi’s
Father

Nandi’s
Father’s
friend

Nandi’s
boyfriend
(Deceased)

Tlalefa
11

S’milo
6

Bussiwe
7

Kagiso
4

Gontlafetse
1
Household composition: Loretta

Loretta’s Household as at November 2011

- Loretta (28)
- Jaiken (12)
- Desandre (14)
- Shanice (20)
- Turiq (21)
- Warren (2)
- Loretta’s father (deceased)
- Loretta’s ex-boyfriend
- Loretta’s mother
- Loretta’s mother’s boyfriend
- Savvy
- Denile (25)
Louise’s Household as at May 2011

- Louise (30)
  - Father
  - Mother
  - Brother (28)
  - Boyfriend (19)
  - Ex-husband (Alcoholic, Sporadic contact)

- Lauren (9)
- Waldo (7)
- Jenna-Lee (4)
- Benjamin (1)
- Noah (1)
- Sophia (13)
Household composition: Thokozile
Appendix B: Research tools

Participant information sheet

Political Studies
School of Social Science
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
1 Jan Smuts Avenue
Braamfontein
Johannesburg

October 2011

Dear Child Support Grant Recipient,

I am a university student at Wits University doing research to get my PhD degree. My research is on women who get a Child Support Grant for one or more children in their care. I would like to talk these women to find out about their lives, how they survive, their relationships in the household, and how they manage all their responsibilities as caregivers and members of their households.

I would like to invite you to be part of this research. If you agree, I would be grateful if I can visit you a few times in your home (1 or more times over a few months) to interview you and find out more about your life. I would also be very grateful if you would allow me to talk to other people in your household, for example, your partner, your mother, your children, and so on.

I am not offering any services or information about the Child Support Grant. Also I do not work for the government and will not be telling them anything about the people I interview. I will not be paying any money to the people who take part in this study. You are free to decide whether you want to be a part of the research or not – nothing bad would happen if you do not want to take part. Also, if you do take part, you can stop any time you want to and are allowed to decide not to tell me certain things you don’t want to share.

When the research is finished, I will write about what women getting the Child Support Grant will tell me about their lives but I will not use anyone’s real name so no-one will know who said the things I write about. If you take part I will make sure you get a short report on what I found out in this research.

Thank you very much for taking the time to think about this request. If you would like to know more about this study I am very happy to discuss it, or you can contact my supervisor, Prof Hassim at Wits University (011 717 4364).

Kind regards

Tessa Hochfeld
084 617 4486
011 559 1906
Interview schedules

**Interview Schedule Participant**

The broad themes that will be covered in interviews:

1. Household composition
2. Family responsibilities (within and outside the household)
3. Physical / domestic responsibilities (e.g. housework etc)
4. Care responsibilities
5. Household relationships
6. Partner relationships
7. Use of the Child Support Grant
8. Perceptions of power in the household
9. Decision-making in the household

28 May 2010

**Interview Schedule Child**

I will ask children to take photographs using a disposable camera that I provide. The theme they will use is “This is how my family works”. The idea is to take pictures that depict usual family activities and relationships. When we discuss the photos I will ask questions about the following:

1. Household composition
2. Household roles and responsibilities
3. Household relationships (intra and inter-generational)
4. Use of the Child Support Grant
5. Perceptions of power in the household
6. Decision-making in the household

28 May 2010
Informed Consent Form: Women Receiving a Grant

I agree to be interviewed for the research being done by Tessa Hochfeld on women who get a Child Support Grant for one or more children.

- I understand that this might involve 1 or more interviews
- I understand that I am free to decide to take part in this research and nothing bad would happen if I do not want to take part.
- I understand that I can stop any time I want to and am allowed to decide not to tell the researcher certain things I don’t want to share.
- I understand I will not be paid or get any services or information for taking part in the research.
- I understand the researcher will not use my real name when she writes about this research

__________________________  _______________________
Name                      Signed

_________________________
Date
Informed Consent Form: Household Members

I agree to be a part of the research being done by Tessa Hochfeld on women who get a Child Support Grant for one or more children.

- I understand that this might involve an individual or group interview.
- I understand that I am free to decide to take part in this research and nothing bad would happen if I do not want to take part.
- I understand that I can stop any time I want to and am allowed to decide not to tell the researcher certain things I don’t want to share
- I understand I will not be paid or get any services or information for taking part in the research.
- I understand the researcher will not use my real name when she writes about this research

__________________________  _______________________
Name                      Signed

__________________________
Date
Informed Consent Form: Child Guardian

I agree for the child in my care to be a part of the research being done by Tessa Hochfeld on women who get a Child Support Grant for one or more children.

- I understand that this will involve the child in my care taking photographs and drawing pictures and explaining the photos and pictures to the researcher.

- I understand that I am freely giving permission for the child in my care to take part in this research and nothing bad would happen if I do not want this child to take part.

- I understand that I can stop this child’s involvement any time I want to and that the child is allowed to decide not to tell the researcher certain things they don’t want to share

- I understand I will not be paid or get any services or information for allowing the child to take part in the research.

- I understand the researcher will not use my child’s real name when she writes about this research

__________________________  _______________________
Name  Signed

__________________________
Date
Informed Assent Form: Minor

I agree to be a part of the research being done by Tessa Hochfeld on women who get a Child Support Grant for one or more children.

- I will take photographs and draw pictures and explain the photos and pictures to the researcher
- I can choose freely to take part in this research and nothing bad will happen if I do not want to take part.
- I can stop any time I want to and I can decide not to tell the researcher things I don’t want to share.
- I will not be paid or get anything for being part of the research.
- The researcher will not use my real name when she writes about this research.

__________________________  ________________________
Name  Signed

__________________________
Date
Consent to use photograph

I give permission for Tessa Hochfeld to use a photograph of me that was taken as a part of her research on women receiving a Child Support Grant in her report. I have been given her assurance that this photograph will be treated with respect and will not be used for any other purpose without my permission.

__________________________  __________________________
Name                        Signed

__________________________
Date
Consent to audio record

I give permission to Tessa Hochfeld to audio record our conversation during an interview for her research on women receiving a Child Support Grant. I have been given her assurance that this information will be treated with respect and will be kept safely.

__________________________  _______________________
Name                                    Signed

__________________________
Date
Consent to use verbatim quotes

I give permission to Tessa Hochfeld to use the exact words I have said during our conversations when she writes about her research on women receiving a Child Support Grant. I have been given her assurance that this information will be treated with respect and will not be written about in a way that will make it obvious to readers who I am.

__________________________  __________________________
Name                                Signed

__________________________
Date
Consent to take part in photovoice exercise

I agree to take photos for Tessa’s work. I will take photos of my family with the theme “THIS IS HOW MY FAMILY WORKS” and will tell Tessa what photos I took and why. She will give me copies of the photos to keep and she can write about my photos and use them for her work but she must not say my own name.

Signed:

Date:
Training notes for translator

**The role of the translator**

Translators play a vital role in any study. They are the link between the researcher and the research participants. The quality of the findings of the study relies heavily on excellent translation. It is therefore crucial that translators represent the conversation during an interview in a valid and reliable manner. The translator is NOT, however, just a technical tool. They are human and the research participant will respond to them as human. In fact, sometimes participants talk only to the translator and not to the researcher as the conversation seems to be generated by this intermediary. Translators need to understand that they are there to translate 3 things:

(a) **The spoken conversation** (both the researcher and the participants’ parts);

(b) **Non-verbal communication** (e.g. If a participant answers ‘yes’ to a question but does this in a very tentative way or her body language says ‘no’ while her verbal response says yes, the translator should indicate this to the researcher) and

(c) **Cultural interpretation** (e.g. idioms, expressions, dress code, polite manners, and other cultural norms that the researcher might not be aware of but the translator understands).

**What makes a good translator?**

A good Translator will do the following:

(a) **Listen** carefully to the researcher’s questions and the participant’s answers instead of assuming you know what will be asked or answered (even if it is the 100th time the translator has worked with this researcher on this project!).

(b) Reflect the **FULL answer** the participant gives and will NOT paraphrase to summarise the answer (e.g. if a participant says “Well that is an interesting question because I have never really thought about it before, I guess if I am really honest with myself the answer is mostly I do agree with that opinion” the translator should translate this whole thought process and not just respond to the researcher: “She said yes”)

(c) Translates the **TONE** of the researcher’s question as well as the actual words (e.g. if the researcher is asking about sensitive information and uses a quiet, sympathetic voice to ask it, the translator should mimic this tone and not sound disinterested)

(d) Understands the importance of **body language** and non-verbal communication (e.g. if the researcher leans forward to ask an intimate question the translator should follow the lead of the researcher and not turn away from the participant)

(e) Translates **prompts** appropriately as this is an integral part of the research process

(f) Will not be afraid to ask either party to repeat themselves or to check that they have understood the person correctly. This is far preferable to poor translation!
(g) Will **discuss any concerns or problems** with the researcher after the interview.

(h) Does **not use the space to ask his/her own questions** or to try and direct the conversation even if they are not sure why the researcher is asking what they are asking.

(i) Be **reliable, punctual, accountable and ethical**

**Conducting ethical research**

Ethics is defined as a set of moral principles which offers rules and behavioural expectations about the most correct conduct towards respondents. The fact that human beings are participants in a study brings unique ethical problems to the fore. Ethical issues are complex, since data should never be obtained at the expense of human beings. Researchers and translators need to be aware of what is improper and proper in collecting their data. The following ethical considerations must be noted by all researchers but they apply also to translators:

a. **Avoidance of harm**

Subjects can be harmed in a physical and/or emotional manner. Your role is to protect the respondents, within reasonable limits, from any form of physical harm. Emotional harm is more difficult to predict, but can have far reaching consequences for participants. To avoid harm at all costs, you should thoroughly inform the participant beforehand about the potential impact of the investigation. Such information allows them the opportunity to withdraw.

b. **Informed consent**

Obtaining informed consent implies that all possible information on the goal of the study, the procedures it will follow during the interview, the possible advantages, disadvantages, and dangers to which a participant may be exposed, be explained to the potential participant.

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and participants can withdraw at any time. Every questionnaire has a section where each participant MUST SIGN in order to declare informed consent.

c. **Deception of participants**

Deception of subjects is defined as “deliberately misrepresenting facts in order to make another person believe what is not true”. This could also include withholding information or offering incorrect information in order to ensure participation that would otherwise possibly have refused. No form of deception in any form whatsoever should be inflicted on participants.

d. **Violation of privacy/anonymity/confidentiality**

While this study is not anonymous, it is entirely confidential. Only the researcher and the translator is aware of the identity of participants. Please note that this is privileged information, and in no way are you allowed to distribute or share any of the data with another person.
e. **Debriefing of participants**

As a way to minimise harm, debriefing sessions can occur after an interview where participants get the opportunity to work through their experience and its aftermath. The easiest way to debrief participants is to discuss their feelings about the interview directly after it has occurred. Debriefing also includes rectifying any misconceptions that may have arisen in the minds of the participants. Termination of the interview must be handled with the utmost sensitivity.


**A note on respect**

We are going into participants homes and asking that they give us their time and intimate, personal information freely and for no benefit to them. Please remember at all times to treat all people you encounter with respect, even if they are not open or friendly. It is your role as the translator to treat the participant and the information they give to you in a respectful, appropriate and perceptive manner, being mindful that the participant is comfortable at all times.

Tessa Hochfeld

Updated 20 September 2011
Appendix C: Audit trail

The disc attached to this page contains the audit of the data analysis process for this study, for the purpose of external validation. On the disc are five folders containing files which have been saved as MS Word Documents for easy access and use, including exported outputs from the data management programme Atlas-ti. The folders are as follows:

1. **Chapter drafts**: these files are included in order to see the development of the interpretation of the data analysis process.
2. **Coding records**: both a list of codes developed and used as well as the quotations linked to these codes are saved in this folder.
3. **Interview transcripts**: each interview that was conducted is recorded here in full transcript form (for interviews that were conducted in a language other than English, only the English translation is saved here; original language transcripts are available for scrutiny).
4. **Research journals**: This folder contains the reflexive field work journal and research journal notes written up as an alternative data source.
5. **Supervision and other notes**: records of my supervisory sessions and meetings with others that contributed to my thinking, are all saved in this folder.