South Africa’s Foreign Policy toward the DRC: From non-intervention to intervention 1998-2013

A research report submitted to the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations by course work and research

by

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Declaration

I, Dada Mbilisi Gbaya, declare that the content of this thesis is my original work. All sources that I have used have been duly referenced and acknowledged. It has not previously been submitted for any diploma, degree or examination at another university or faculty. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.
Dedication

To my children:

Jessy Bossekota Efole Gbay, Odiane Ongala Amba Gbaya and Thessy Amba Gbaya
Acknowledgments

Unlimited praise goes to Jesus Christ, my Lord and Saviour; with Him nothing is impossible!

My deepest gratitude goes to all those that supported me during this year, especially my supervisor, Dr Malte Brosig, for his valuable and constant suggestions, constructive criticism and encouragement from beginning to end.

I cannot find words to express my gratitude to my family and friends for their encouragement and support.

I would also like to thank Mary Hazelton and Dorothy Wheeler for editing this paper.
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<td>ADFL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BNC</td>
<td>Bi-National Commission</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (French acronym)</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investments</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
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<td>FNL</td>
<td>National Liberation Forces (French acronym)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment, and Redistribution</td>
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<td>G20</td>
<td>The Group of twenty major advanced and emerging economies</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>IGD</td>
<td>Institute for Global Dialogue</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MLC</td>
<td>Congolese Liberation Movement (French acronym)</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>PPRD</td>
<td>People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security</td>
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<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South Africa Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy (French acronym)</td>
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<td>RDC-ML</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy - Liberation Movement (French acronym)</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Union for Democracy and Social Progress (French acronym)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The resurgence of Africa, a key element in South Africa’s vision for the continent, cannot happen without addressing the internecine conflicts that have plagued Africa’s peoples. Our ability to overcome this legacy has made it imperative for us to become and remain engaged in resolving other wars and chronic instabilities.

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, May 2004¹

1.1 Background

In 2014 South Africa celebrated 20 years of democracy. As it rejoiced at the achievement of democracy and freedom, it also celebrated its elevation to global partnerships and to being a champion for the African continent. South Africa is currently the largest economy on the continent and a bridge builder between the North and Africa. South Africa was reintegrated into the international arena in 1994. Since then it has played a significant role worldwide, more specifically on the African continent. The international community expected the new democratic South Africa to play the role of a peacemaker in an Africa torn by intra-state conflicts. South Africa’s engagement with the international community can be seen through its involvement in the United Nations. South Africa held the chair of the Security Council twice, in 2007-2008 and in 2011-2012. It represents Africa in BRICS, the club of emerging economies which brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. South Africa is also a member of the G20, the group of twenty major advanced and emerging economies. Indeed, South Africa occupies an important position in the global realm and, most importantly, in Africa. Therefore, post-apartheid South Africa has formulated and implemented its African policy under transformed conditions from within and without.

One could reaffirm what Nelson Mandela stated in 2004² that the world was a very different place from that of 1994 and the next ten years would signal more profound changes. Today the international community is very different from that of late 1990s and early 2000s, especially in Africa. Currently the world places great emphasis on peace and security and on good governance as well as on poverty reduction. Therefore, South Africa made its foreign


²Ibid
policy an important tool for addressing the challenges of conflicts, poverty, corruption, underdevelopment and good governance on the African continent. Pretoria believes that dealing with these challenges will undoubtedly have an impact on South Africa’s own prosperity. South Africa will not become an “island of prosperity in an ocean of poverty”.

The new South Africa was seen as a key that would take Africa out of the marginal role it had played in the international arena. Indeed, with regard to the issues of security and peace, South Africa has risen to the challenge. It has played and continues to play a meaningful role in peace building, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, post conflict reconstruction and in conflict management in Africa, especially in Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, Darfur and Zimbabwe. South Africa prioritises Africa during the elaboration of its foreign policy. The White Paper on South Africa’s foreign policy states that South Africa accords central importance to its immediate African neighbourhood and the African continent; it emphasises that Africa is at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy. Therefore, South Africa should continue to support regional and continental processes that respond to and resolve crises.

In regard to its relationship with Africa Monyae attributes many roles to South Africa such as regional hegemony, middle power, the African voice, the leader, the negotiator and African Champion. To explain its peacemaking role in Africa, specifically in the DRC, this research looks at South Africa’s role as an emerging middle power. At the same time that South Africa was looking at its foreign policy, it was also looking at its economic expansion throughout Africa. South Africa has invested in more new projects in Africa than has any other country in the world and, according to a 2013 report by FDI Intelligence, the number of projects from this country has increased by almost 536% in the past decade. With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of ZAR 1.8 trillion (US$283 billion) – four times that of its southern African neighbours, and comprising 30% of the entire GDP of Africa, South Africa is currently the economic powerhouse of the African continent.

With respect to its relationship with the DRC, it can be said that South Africa’s foreign policy has shifted from non-intervention to intervention. On the one hand, in 1998, despite the fact

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that the DRC was a member of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), South Africa was reluctant to intervene militarily to rescue Kabila’s government. The DRC joined SADC in 1997 under Laurent Kabila’s regime. South Africa had made its position clear that it would not resort to military intervention to resolve the Congo’s war in 1998; it had opted for a diplomatic route. However, South Africa has played a significant diplomatic role in the DRC peace process. South Africa’s approach led to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue at Sun City in 2002 (ICD). The ICD is a forum which met for the first time during the Second Congo War at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2001. After several interruptions it finally led to the ratification of the global agreement, which included the participation of Pretoria, in 2003 at Sun City (South Africa). The agreement marked the end of the second war. It had brought together 80 delegates from the Congolese government (PPRD), the rebels (MLC, RCD, and RCD-ML), the political opposition and civil society with the aim of resolving the political side of the Lusaka Agreement which had not met since July 1999.

South Africa has been engaged in the peace process in the DRC since 2002. Despite the first and second elections held respectively in 2006 and 2011, the DRC is still unstable and insecure. The rebellion in April 2012 which became known as the 23 March (M23) represented a serious setback in the search for stability and development in the DRC. Therefore, on 28 March 2013 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2098, which established an Intervention Brigade with the aim of neutralising armed groups. The M23 was the armed group targeted. In 2013 Pretoria was involved militarily in the DRC’s war under the United Nations (UN) peace mission operation. South Africa supported the UN decision to use hard power to end the DRC crisis by sending in a contingent of peace enforcers. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is part of a 3 000-strong new “Force Intervention Brigade”, together with Tanzanian and Malawian contingents of MONUSCO.

It should be noted that, through its engagement in addressing the conflicts on the continent, South Africa has earned a reputation as a credible African peacemaker and peacekeeper. The recognition of South Africa as an important middle power in the South, its bid for political leadership in Africa and its attempts at economic integration with the continent have

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consistently implied that it should help to resolve African conflicts and play a more active role in peace missions. However, as has been noted elsewhere,\(^{10}\) economic prominence stems from a political and military presence. South Africa is no exception in this regard.

Given the limited time available, this paper will focus only on South Africa’s involvement in the DRC peace process and on the economic relations between the two countries.

The focus of this study is on the DRC because the conflict in the DRC is the most destabilising and complex recurrent conflict since 1996, involving as it does several African countries. This situation is troubling to the international community. Furthermore, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is currently the biggest UN peace building mission in the world.

1.2 Aim and rationale

This research examines whether the shift from non-intervention to intervention in South Africa’s approach to the conflict in the DRC is driven only by its role as a middle power to assure regional peace and security within the SADC region or whether it is driven by its economic interests, such as Inga Dam and the DRC’s minerals resources. In this context, this research probes whether there is a link between South Africa’s involvement in peace enforcement in the DRC and its economic interests in that country.

South Africa has been viewed as an emerging power, both economically and militarily, which could bring about stability in Africa, specifically in the DRC. Sustainable peace and stability could lead to the economic development of both countries.

While figures show that there has been much discourse on South Africa’s classic diplomacy toward the DRC, the shift from non-intervention to intervention has been neglected. Thus, this research aims to understand and explain this dramatic shift.

This study is justified because it seeks to contribute to the debate about the link between economic expansion and foreign policy. Both can be mutually influential and examined from South Africa’s perspective.

1.3 Research questions

This study will be addressing the following questions:

- What have been South Africa’s foreign policy drivers and motivations towards the DRC?
- Why did South Africa refuse to intervene militarily in 1998 but did so in 2013? What is the explanation for this shift in its foreign policy toward the DRC?

1.4 Limitation of the study

This study attempts to document and explain South Africa’s foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) within the parameters of the period 1998-2013.

This study has been limited by the inaccessibility of some official documents and records. Furthermore, there is a lack of documentation and literature dealing with the second period (2012-2013).

The study does not focus on the descriptive or narrative aspects of the DRC war since 1998, nor does it detail the involvement of other SADC members, such as Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe. However, it sums up the historical evolution of the DRC’s turmoil in order to better understand the topic being considered.

1.5 Research methodology

Since it is concerned with collecting and analysing information in as many forms, mostly non-numeric, as possible, this research is in the form of qualitative research. According to Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, qualitative case study methodology allows a phenomenon to be revealed and understood from multiple facets or through multiple lenses.\(^\text{11}\) This paper aims to understand multiple facets of the drivers of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa and specifically the DRC.

It uses an inductive research design. Van Evera defines inductive research as theory creation that looks at the interaction between phenomena; this is followed by enquiring about possible causality in the interactions or relationships.\(^\text{12}\) Inductive analysis is also referred to as a


“bottom-up” or a “backward-looking” approach. This research will begin with an observation about the outcome and the change in South Africa’s policy toward the DRC.

The data collection of this study was derived from a “desktop” study, for both primary and secondary data. Primary data includes official documents and speeches regarding the relations between the two countries presented by government officials from both the DRC and the South Africa. Secondary data comprises books, newspaper articles, internet articles and reports. Therefore, the contribution of this research to the body of knowledge in the field will be based on existing literature in the field.

This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 looks at South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy from Mandela’s administration to that of Zuma. This will help one to understand South Africa’s involvement in the DRC peace process. Chapter 3 focuses on the DRC’s second war (1998-2003) and South Africa’s engagement in that country during that period. Chapter 4 looks at the DRC’s third crisis (2003-2013) and South Africa’s involvement in peace enforcement in the DRC. Chapter 5 is the conclusion, which describes the findings of this research.
Chapter 2: South Africa’s post-apartheid Africa policy

2.1 The drivers of South African foreign policy

A country’s foreign policy is a very important strategic tool used to advance its interest abroad in the fields of politics and international relations. According to Clarke and White,\(^\text{13}\) foreign policy is the area of governmental activity which is concerned with relationships between the state and other actors, particularly other states, in the international system. While Vale and Mphaisha define foreign policy as the sum total of all the activities through which international actors act, react and interact with the environment beyond their national borders,\(^\text{14}\) Van Nieuwkerk\(^\text{15}\) describes foreign policy as a version of public policy, albeit with unique characteristics such as its cross-border focus and its wide-ranging influence on that process, and on a wide range of actors. Hughes, on the other hand, notes that foreign policy is guided by values and beliefs and not made only for securing countries’ real interests.\(^\text{16}\)

With this in mind, the drivers of South Africa’s foreign policy post-apartheid can be listed as the promotion of human rights, the need for peace and security, the promotion of democracy, the African renaissance and economic expansion. It is important to note that prior to 1994, South Africa used its military strength to pursue foreign policy objectives aimed at, among other things, creating instability in the region and preserving white minority rule.\(^\text{17}\)

In accordance with the old adage of divide and rule, apartheid South Africa attempted to control and dominates its neighbours.

The new South African policy makers were aware of the latter strategy but, because they had a different viewpoint, they chose a different direction for the democratic South Africa. This led the African National Congress (ANC) to compile seven new principles to guide their


foreign policy. In a document entitled “Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa”\(^\text{18}\) the following principles were stated:

- Human Rights which extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental;
- The promotion of democracy, worldwide;
- Justice and international law should guide the relations between nations;
- International peace is the goal for which all nations should strive. Where this breaks down, internationally-agreed peaceful mechanisms to solve conflicts should be employed;
- Foreign policy should reflect the interests of the continent of Africa;
- South Africa’s economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an independent world;
- Foreign relations must mirror a deep commitment to the consolidation of a democratic South Africa.

These principles emphasise that post-apartheid South Africa had made human rights and Africa the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Suttner stated that the question of human rights is a key aspect of the foreign policy projection found in the ANC foreign policy document of 1993, which speaks of the need for efforts to incorporate human rights in South Africa’s international relations and the necessity for a worldwide human rights campaign.\(^\text{19}\)

South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (formerly Foreign Affairs), Maite Nkoane-Mashabane, delivered a public lecture on South Africa’s Foreign Policy at the University of the Witwatersrand on 10 April 2014, in which she pointed out that, twenty years on, South Africa is no longer regarded by the world as a skunk nor as a pariah state but is now sitting centre-stage as a valuable and respected global player. “We have achieved this thanks to our principles and an independent foreign policy that is rooted on the


plight of our continent, and supported by strong South–South cooperation.”20 She further synthesised the seven principles that guide South Africa’s foreign policy in these terms:

These principles included a belief in human rights; a belief in the promotion of democracy world-wide; a belief in the rule of international law; a belief in the attainment of international peace; a belief that South Africa’s foreign policy should reflect the interests of Africa; a belief that South Africa’s economic development depends on the development of regional and international economic cooperation; and a belief that South Africa’s international relations must reflect a commitment to the consolidation of its democracy.21

She also emphasised that Africa is the centrepiece of South Africa’s foreign policy. This policy is rooted in the principle of a united, peaceful and prosperous Africa, a principle espoused by the African National Congress (ANC). Statements such as these set the tone and indicate that South Africa will always support the promotion of peace, security and economic cooperation in its relationship with other African countries in order to boost not only its own development but that of the entire continent. The reason why South Africa’s post-apartheid leadership has focused its foreign policy attention on Africa is to avoid the country becoming an “island of prosperity in a sea of poverty”, which would attract a massive number of economic and political refugees to its shores.22

Additionally, the role that Pretoria played in the formulation and promotion of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) enabled it to expand its own efforts to deal with the African Agenda.23 Habib and Selinyane argue that the policies of South Africa were partly determined by a capricious international order, an order configured by the rapid and volatile movement of capital. On the one hand, South Africa needed to placate and harness that force in order to finance the country’s reconstruction. On the other hand, it also needed to

21 Ibid.
establish solidarity with other similarly challenged states, particularly African countries. This desire was reflected by the creation of NEPAD.

Several analysts have stressed that South Africa gives prominence to the promotion of continental peace and security. Monyae argued that central to South Africa’s Africa policy is the desire to promote peace and security. Pretoria is committed to foreign relations directed by the principles of peace, justice and international law. However, its engagement with regional security was not a priority during its early years of democracy. This changed in 1998 with its military intervention in Lesotho and, later on, when South Africa entered the peacekeeping mission in the DRC. At the same time, South Africa has sought to build effective mechanisms to see that Africa gains a share of global political and economic power and benefits. South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has been perceived as a new foreign policy identity. Monyae identified four factors that influenced the quest for this new foreign policy.

The first factor was the new international order that arose after the collapse of the Union of Socialist and Soviet Republics (USSR), which marked the end of the cold war and the demise of apartheid in South Africa. The second factor was that post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy was defined in the context of an African continent embroiled in intra-state conflicts and suffering from poverty. The third factor was the legacy of apartheid, which questioned the position of the new South Africa in Africa. Apartheid South Africa had pursued a regional policy of destabilisation which caused massive loss of human and infrastructure capital. Some African states harboured fears of a hegemonic imposition from post-apartheid South Africa over military and economic issues. The last factor which influenced the new South Africa’s foreign policy was its confrontation with an identity crisis. Given the legacy of the apartheid-inspired foreign policy pursued over the years, the new democratically-elected leadership realised that the country required an urgent overhaul of its foreign policy.

Speaking about this new foreign policy identity, Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane asserted that, “when we finally witnessed the dawn of our freedom and democracy in 1994, we also

24 Habib and Selinyane, “South Africa’s foreign policy,” 49
27 Monyae, Learning to Lead, 2
marked the rebirth of our country’s foreign policy. A challenge of repositioning the country’s foreign policy was one of the great tasks ahead for South Africa’s leaders.”

South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has been criticised for drawing foreign policy goals without tactically delineating how its objectives would be realised and also for focusing on ideals rather than on pragmatism. A recent survey has shown that the drivers of South Africa’s foreign policy have become obfuscated over time. While some acknowledge that controversial foreign policy decisions, like the denial of the Dalai Lama’s visa in 2009 and a subsequent controversy in 2011 and 2014, are illustrations of a country still maturing into its role in the international arena, the vast majority of respondents felt uncertain as to what Pretoria’s foreign policy priorities were. Hudson criticised South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy as being “inconsistent”, “incoherent” and “schizophrenic”. In contrast, Spence described South Africa’s foreign policy as “coherent” and “goal-oriented”.

Before analysing South Africa’s foreign policy from Mandela’s administration to that of Zuma, the following section will look at South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power and at South Africa’s national interests, in order to understand differences in policy administration since 1994.

2.2 Literature on South Africa’s role on the African continent

When formulating their international relations agenda, post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy makers embarked upon a new and more transformative approach. They laid a firm foundation for South Africa’s foreign policy, deeply anchored in Africa. South Africa’s leaders perceived themselves to be morally accountable for playing a leadership role in Africa’s renewal. Carlsnaes and Nel argue that the main strength of South African foreign policy in the post-apartheid era has been its identification and engagement with the rest of Africa and with issues important to the continent’s leaders and citizens. This new orientation, they continue, has been more than declaratory. South Africa has also committed skills and

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28 Nkoana-Mashabane, Lecture on South Africa’s Foreign Policy
30 Lalbahadur, “Moving beyond trophy diplomacy” 2.
33 Carlsnaes and Nel, “Introduction” In Full Flight, 18
resources to addressing some of the major and seemingly intractable conflicts on the continent, for example, the fragile peace processes in the DRC, Sudan and Burundi.

Monyae\textsuperscript{34} has argued that South Africa’s foreign policymakers were aware, firstly, that efforts to contribute positively to Africa’s renewal should be informed by the democratic values and norms enshrined in the new constitution. Secondly, they understood that South Africa’s democracy would be secured only if peace and security were extended to the rest of the continent. Thirdly, they knew that the globalisation process required competitive and effective participation in the global economy of South Africa and the rest of the African continent. In all these areas, the foreign policymakers needed to redefine, reshape and redirect the country’s identity and priorities. They drastically shifted it from its general orientation of solely western alignment to being deeply rooted in Africa and aligned to developing countries.\textsuperscript{35}

In this study the literature review on South Africa’s role in Africa will be considered only from two different perspectives: emerging middle power and hegemon. On the one hand, it will look at the views of the scholars and analysts who articulate that South Africa plays the role of an emerging middle power and positions itself as a “garant de la paix” (peace maker) in Africa. On the other hand, it will consider the views of the scholars and analysts who argue that South Africa’s role in Africa can be seen as that of a hegemon.

With regard to South Africa’s role as an emerging middle power, Schoeman\textsuperscript{36} argues that South Africa has discharged its role as a middle power in the international arena admirably. It has been exemplary in its control of small arms, voluntary denuclearisation and the banning of anti-personnel landmines.\textsuperscript{37}Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu\textsuperscript{38} also support this view of South Africa as an emerging power. Their position is that, while post-apartheid South Africa is seen as pursuing a policy of non-hegemonic co-operation through multilateral organisations like the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the

\textsuperscript{34}Monyae “Learning to lead”, 34
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid
\textsuperscript{37}Habib, A. and Selinyane, N. 2004 “South Africa’s foreign policy and realistic vision of an african century” in \textit{Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future}, ed. Sidiropoulos, 51
Organisation of African Union (AU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Commonwealth. However, Habib and Selinyane have emphasised that multilateralism did not prevent South Africa from intervening in a hegemonic manner in the political crisis in Lesotho in 1998.\(^{39}\)

While those such as Habib and Selinyane stress that South Africa’s role should be seen as that of a hegemon, they note that on some occasions South Africa has acted in a manner to establish and guarantee stability, whereas in other cases when the need was equally great, it has hesitated to intervene. This leads one to describe South Africa’s foreign policy as schizophrenic.\(^{40}\)

Another debate among scholars and analysts is over the characteristics of South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa and whether it favours soft power versus hard power. Hard power politics encourages reliance on military interventions, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions in the conduct of foreign policy. In contrast, soft power strategies employ a non-confrontational approach.\(^{41}\) It has been argued that South Africa’s policy makers’ pronouncements, actions or inactions have tended to align with the soft power approach in its African policy, even though in some instances coercive power may have been the more appropriate response to instability in the region.\(^{42}\)

Monyae\(^ {43}\) affirms that South Africa, as a relatively developed African country with a functional economy and a stable political environment, has effectively used its strategic position as a leader with all countries. This position was particularly pronounced under Mbeki’s leadership, through initiatives such as the implementation of NEPAD, the Millennium Development Goals and the championing by Pretoria of Africa’s agenda in global forums. Habib and Selinyane argue that South Africa’s interventions to bring about peace in Africa, specifically in Lesotho, Angola and the DRC, have demonstrated a willingness to play a regional role.\(^ {44}\)

Monyae goes on to argue that, in its initial phase under Mandela’s presidency (1994-1999), Pretoria struggled to have a clear and coherent policy for Africa. This is explained by the

\(^{39}\) Habib and Selinyane, “South Africa’s foreign policy,” 52

\(^{40}\) Ibid. 54


\(^{42}\) Monyae. “Learning to lead”, 40

\(^{43}\) Ibid. 37

\(^{44}\) Habib &Selinyane. “South Africa’s foreign policy,” 51
manner in which South Africa handled the Nigerian crisis. In fact, in late 1995, President Mandela led a one-man campaign against Abacha’s government following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni activists.45 However, during Mbeki’s presidency (1999-2008) the country assertively implemented its Africa policy with varying degrees of success.

Others argue that Pretoria has used its economic expansion and political example to bring about peace and stability in the region. For example, Solomon46 argues that in 1997 when Pretoria was attempting to strike a deal between Mobutu and Laurent Kabila, it looked at the situation in Zaire (DRC) through lenses tinted by its own Kempton Park negotiation process to end apartheid in South Africa. That is why this negotiation was a failure.

With regard to South Africa’s role in the DRC crises, it has been argued that South Africa has taken two approaches to DRC’s turmoil for it has been engaged in both diplomatic and military action. With regard to its bilateral relationship with the DRC, South Africa chose soft power. When it came to peace-building by means of peace enforcement, South Africa has participated on a multilateral basis, within the UN peace mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).

Furthermore, Sidiropoulos and Hughes argue that South Africa’s handling of Zimbabwe has shown that there are limits to what can be achieved through a multilateral framework. South Africa has considered the establishment of an effective multilateral structure as being the best way of dealing with conflicts in Africa.47

South African foreign policy is often viewed as being highly value-driven and it is cast as contributing to Africa’s renaissance, good governance and peace and stability. However, foreign policy decisions are not simply a matter of applying ethics and values. Rather, these decisions are often complex and need to calculate the trade-offs between competing domestic and international imperatives, as well as short and long term interests.48

What is more, Carlsnaes and Nel49 argue that South Africa has been resolute in promoting the African vision of multilateralism as the appropriate institutional means for promoting

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46 Ibid,11
49 Carlsnaes and Nel,“Introduction” In Full Flight, 19
international co-operation and conflict resolution. Indeed, South Africa has been careful to promote an African agenda in multilateral bodies such as the Commonwealth and it has participated in the process for reforming the United Nations, even though this agenda may not have overlapped completely with its own interests.

With all this in mind, one can state that, like any other country that looks after protecting its national interests, South Africa has chosen a policy that maximises its outcomes and minimises its costs. Whether the approach is bilateral or multilateral, South Africa determines its policies towards the DRC according to its national interest or its role as a champion of Africa in the handling of crises. South Africa’s approach to the DRC crises cannot be contrary to South Africa’s national interest.

When explaining its role on the African continent, this research regards South Africa as an emerging middle power.

2.3 South Africa as an emerging middle power

South Africa’s role in Africa has provided grounds for contention among scholars and analysts regarding South Africa’s foreign policy. There are those who argue that Pretoria’s role in Africa can be seen as that of an emerging power and on the other hand there are those who locate South Africa as a regional hegemony on the continent. According to Myers, a regional hegemony is a state which possesses power sufficient to dominate and subordinate state systems. Myntae notes that South Africa’s economic and military might within the African context appears to be the main measurement used by most scholars when applying the term “regional hegemony” to Pretoria’s position in Africa. He emphasises that whereas apartheid South Africa maximised military and economic power to dominate the rest of the African continent, post-apartheid South Africa has tended to derive its power from co-operation with those same states. Foreign policy decision makers in the post-apartheid era have relied heavily on multilateralism as a way to advance South Africa’s objectives. With this shift in post-apartheid foreign policy, the term “middle power” gained prevalence.

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52Monyae. Learning to Lead. 47
Schoeman is one analyst who has championed South Africa as an emerging middle power. She emphasises that, in many ways, South Africa has adopted a middle power position in its foreign policy. Typically, a middle power places emphasis on the promotion of international peace and security and, therefore, high value is placed on participation in international organisations.\(^53\) Cooper, Higgott and Nossal,\(^54\) on the other hand, note that middle power leadership in the contemporary period is intimately related to the “hiatus in structural leadership in the international order” following the end of the Cold War. Keohane describes a middle power as “a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systematic impact in a small group or through international institution.”\(^55\)

The term middle power is used to denote, first, a position in a universal hierarchical order of states; second, size and rank in the international division of labour, which confers the opportunity to exert moral influence on the global system; and, third, an interest in a stable international order that does not seek to impose an ideologically preconceived vision of an ideal world order.\(^56\) In other words, in pursuing their national interests, middle powers are also Pursuing the general interest which leads to a more stable world order.

According to Cox,\(^57\) middle powers are to be found in the middle rank of material capabilities, both military and economic, and seek to bolster international institutions for cooperative management. Of the same viewpoint, Habib and Selinyane state that the emerging middle powers are regional. They shoulder responsibility for stability and order in all of their member countries and they are expected by the big powers to enforce the global rules of the game, and to exert influence in certain cases where pressure from the superpowers has proved ineffective. Contrary to Schoeman’s view, Habib and Selinyane are not persuaded that South Africa’s regional role is so prominent, despite the support and encouragement of both the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).\(^58\)

\(^53\)Schoeman, “South Africa as an emerging power in Africa”\(^3\)
\(^56\) Schoeman, “South Africa as an emerging power in Africa” 3
\(^58\) Habib and Selinyane, “South Africa’s foreign policy and realistic vision of an African century”\(^51\)
Nel, Taylor and Janis side with Schoeman, arguing that South Africa can conveniently be termed a middle power, in terms of both its position in a hierarchy of power and influence in world affairs and the specific nature of its diplomacy.\(^{59}\)

Carlsnaes and Nel\(^ {60}\) state that the notion of a middle power does not only reflect the position of low-middle-income countries such as South Africa in the global economic and political rankings. More importantly, it reflects the choices of its leaders about how South Africa should position itself on the international stage and what global role they foresee for this young democracy. That means that South Africa’s leaders wanted their country to be accepted and recognised as a well-behaved international citizen.

Schoeman\(^ {61}\) further noted that an emerging power should indicate and demonstrate its willingness and also, of course, its capacity or ability to assume the role of regional leader, stabiliser and, if not peacekeeper, at least peacemaker. She goes on to argue that, in many ways, South Africa has adopted a middle power position in its foreign relations and policies. Typical of a traditional middle power is the emphasis on the promotion of international peace and security and, therefore, it highly values participation in international organisations. It should be said that South Africa has shown sufficient proof of its willingness to shoulder regional and continental responsibilities in dealing with African crises.

Of the same view, Lotze, de Coning and Neethling\(^ {62}\) argue that South Africa’s engagements have been informed by its political efforts at conflict prevention and its view of itself as an emerging middle power. They note that South Africa has also deployed peacekeepers through a variety of regional or bilateral arrangements. South Africa’s intervention in Africa is usually on a multilateral basis, under the auspices of the UN, the AU and the SADC.

With regard to the DRC, Schoeman points out that South Africa’s contribution of troops to the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC seemed to indicate a new level of commitment and involvement.\(^ {63}\) One can argue that South Africa’s involvement in the search for sustainable peace in the DRC is in the mode of middle power leadership. In other words, South Africa’s role in the DRC crisis can be seen as part of its multilateralism approach.


\(^{60}\)Carlsnaes and Nel, in Full Flight, 20.

\(^{61}\) Schoeman, “South Africa as an emerging power in Africa” , 3-4


\(^{63}\) Schoeman, M. 2000 “South Africa as an emerging power in Africa”3-4.
The primary aim of foreign policy is to protect and defend the interests of the state in the world of politics.64 This simple definition applies to every state, including South Africa.

It should be noted that the key elements of foreign policy laid down by the first democratically-elected president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, in 1994, remain in place: the advancement of an African agenda, peacemaking, negotiated solutions and the upholding of human rights as a critical component of South Africa’s foreign policy goals.65 However, some analysts argue that South Africa should ensure that economic benefits accrue from its involvement in the stabilisation of Africa. They argue that the formation of coalitions and alliances whose purpose is to advance better trade and commercial linkages between South Africa and stronger economies are to be preferred to those that advance geo-political interests or political solidarity. They support the opinion that there was too much idealism in South Africa’s early foreign policy. If this was an extension of domestic policy, it also needed to be guided by clear economic and social interests.66

However, Aziz Pahad, the former Deputy Foreign Minister, had another viewpoint. He defined South Africa’s national interests as economic growth, the protection of the sovereignty of the state and the creation of a people-centred society. He went on to argue that South Africa’s national interests could not be seen in isolation from the interests of other peoples and countries in Southern Africa.67 South African policy makers and leaders were willing to interlink post-apartheid South Africa’s national interests with those of the other members of the SADC region. But some scholars and analysts argue that South Africa is pursuing its own self-interest as its business expands into various parts of Africa. The expansion of corporate South Africa into Africa intensified during Mbeki’s African Renaissance68 and has intensified even more during Zuma’s presidency.

With regards to a conception of South Africa’s role, most scholars and authors note that middle powers have certain distinct national roles. Among others things, this includes the role

67 Pahad, A. 1996. “We are not living in a dream world,” Towards Democracy, First quarter, 26-34.
68 Zondi, “The interest-versus-human rights debate in context: An overview,”
of a regional or sub-regional leader and the role of a bridge builder or mediator.  

According to Holsti, “national role conceptions are policy-makers’ definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions that pertain to their own states and of the functions their states should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings.”

South Africa’s role conception is explicitly normative. It can best be described as that of a norm-promoting middle power of the South. A central dimension of South Africa’s normative role has been its promotion of rules-based multilateralism as the appropriate institutional form for conducting international affairs. Therefore, South Africa's engagement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement has always been under the auspices of the SADC, the AU or the UN.

To understand the shift in South Africa’s foreign policy toward the DRC, it is useful to look at the role of South Africa’s leaders in that country during their respective administrations. Their personalities have also influenced their country’s foreign policy. It should be borne in mind, however, that from Mandela’s leadership to Zuma’s presidency, Pretoria’s foreign policy has been rooted in the principles espoused by the ANC-led government since 1994. Before analysing this, it is necessary to examine South Africa’s foreign policy-making process.

2.4 Post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy-making process

James Rosenau argues that the field of foreign policy has a central focus, namely the plans and actions of national governments oriented toward the external world. In countries where the president plays the role of both head of state and head of government, such as in the US, France and South Africa, the president makes foreign policy. The president is inevitably involved in the formulation of foreign policy and its implementation and often spends a large proportion of time on this process. With this in mind one can explore the context in which the South African government formulates its foreign policy.

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71Carlsnaes and Nel, “Introduction” in Full Flight. 20.


The new South Africa’s democratic government established in 1994 introduced drastic policy changes. The socio-economic needs of the majority were targeted through an ambitious policy programme, namely, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).\textsuperscript{74} Van Nieuwkerk notes that policy-making was bounded by a new set of constraints which included the introduction of the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy of 1996, international economic factors, inherited state debts and budget deficits, weak state capacity, and civil service transformation issues; these constraints were to have a significant impact on the quest to restructure and transform the post-apartheid government’s foreign policy-making process.\textsuperscript{75}

Foreign policy making during the Mandela era was driven by a heady mix of idealistic and aspirational principles. It soon became evident that they would be very difficult to implement.\textsuperscript{76} When Mbeki took over in 1999, foreign policy ambiguity and vacillation was replaced by a stronger sense of purpose and vision. The driving forces behind this were two-fold. The new Director-General (DG) of Foreign Affairs, Jackie Selebi, led an initiative to reformulate the mission statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Security and wealth creation were identified as the DFA’s primary purpose. Security was to be pursued via compliance with international law and South Africa’s active involvement in conflict prevention, resolution and management. Wealth was to be created via a balanced and co-ordinated approach to globalisation, the enhancement of South Africa’s global image and the vigorous pursuit of trade and investments opportunities.\textsuperscript{77}

During Mandela’s administration, from 1994 to 1999, foreign policy had been managed by a small team comprising the Minister, the Deputy Minister, and the Director-General (DG) of Foreign Affairs. Because of bureaucratic struggles and personality clashes, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) experienced a high turnover of Directors-General (there were four in ten years). As a result, their work was complemented by three special advisers on legal, political and economic affairs in the Presidency.\textsuperscript{78}

Two years after Mbeki took office in 1999, Rev Frank Chikane described a new system of foreign policy in what was known as the Chikane Report, released in March 2001. The

\textsuperscript{74}Van Nieuwkerk,\textit{Foreign policy-making in South Africa: context, actors, and process.}, 40
\textsuperscript{75}Ibid
\textsuperscript{76}Alden, C. and Le Pere, G. 2006. “South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy,” in \textit{In Full Flight} 61
\textsuperscript{77}Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). 1999. “National External Security Strategy (NESS), draft input to Chapter Six of the National Growth and Development Strategy.” Occasional paper no.1
\textsuperscript{78}Van Nieuwkerk,\textit{Foreign policy-making in South Africa: context, actors, and process.}40.
Presidency, with a planned staff of 341, would function as a central secretariat or cabinet office, committed to the efficient and effective executive management of government by the President, together with the Deputy President and cabinet.79 Secondly, three key political figures, the President, the Deputy President and the Minister in the Presidency would be served by the same integrated administrative unit and managed by a single Director-General. Since 2001, the Presidency has grown in size and influence (especially in foreign affairs), leading to warnings that policy-making is being excessively centralised.80

Van Nieuwkerk concluded that the South African foreign policy process showed that the ruling elite, and particularly those closely associated with Mbeki, were committed to an ambitious agenda of intervention in the reform of South Africa, the rest of the continent, and the world. In their drive to implement this policy programme, they ran the risk of outstripping the bureaucracy and society at large.81 What is more, the strength of the inner decision-making circle, namely, the presidency, the cabinet and the ANC’s national executive committee (NEC), did not automatically translate into strength in policy-making and monitoring.82

The following sections will focus on South Africa’s foreign policy during the administrations of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma.

2.5 South Africa’s foreign policy from Nelson Mandela to Zacob Zuma

South Africa’s foreign policy under Nelson Mandela’s administration is characterised as a Golden Era. Under his administration South Africa’s foreign policy was perceived as having high moral authority and South Africa was the darling of the international community with its focus on a human rights agenda. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk83 state that, owing to his personality and international prestige, Nelson Mandela featured prominently in every foreign policy issue throughout his presidency. Under Mbeki’s administration, South Africa actively pursued an African agenda and a high level of involvement in African issues. It was characterised as an African Renaissance with its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric.84

79 Ibid, 43
80 Ibid
81 Ibid, 49
82 Ibid, 48
84 Lalbahadur, “Moving beyond trophy diplomacy”
Mandela’s government concentrated on the fundamental question of internal nation-building in South Africa and human rights while Mbeki championed a continental renaissance. When Mbeki took over in 1999 the policy was reconfigured and moved towards peace and economic prosperity in Africa in order to achieve an African Renaissance. Although the term African Renaissance was first introduced by Mandela in June 1994 in speech given to the OAU, Thabo Mbeki was the key driver of the African Renaissance.

While human rights was an important tenet of policy under Mandela, South Africa learnt, through its human rights fiascos in respect of Nigeria (the Abacha issue in 1995) and East Timor, that principled morality and idealistic leanings were difficult to sustain in a world where realpolitik and the champions of a free market held sway. Mandela called for the imposition of sanctions against Abacha’s regime following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 and advocated for the removal of Nigeria from the Commonwealth. Habib and Selinyane have asserted that South Africa lacked leadership in this case because it was quick to revise its position when the western powers rushed to support Abacha’s regime only a year later, while Adebajo, et al. argued that Mandela’s action failed due to the lack of African support. Habib and Selinyane further noted that, in cases where South Africa has been unwilling to act in a decisive manner to bring about stability (as, for example, in Swaziland and Zimbabwe), these countries have fallen prey to spiralling political instability.

Conversely, under Mbeki’s administration, the primary emphasis on human rights was gradually replaced by the notion that, where appropriate, South Africa’s advocacy of and support for democracy and human rights should occur through multilateral institutions and quiet bilateral diplomacy. Therefore, South Africa has extended its role in Africa to peace-building, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, which include the promotion of longer-term inclusive political solutions to the conflicts in the DRC, Burundi, and Ivory Coast. South Africa also undertook peacekeeping missions in Lesotho in 1998, in

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86 Van Nieuwkerk, “Foreign policy-making in South Africa: context, actors, and process.”., 41
87 Habib and Selinyane, “South Africa’s foreign policy and realistic vision of an African century” 49-51
89 Habib and Selinyane, “South Africa’s foreign policy and realistic vision of an African century” 49-51
91 Carlsnaes and Nel, “Introduction” in Full Flight. 18
conjunction with Botswana, under the auspices of the SADC. In Burundi, Jacob Zuma, who was then South Africa’s Deputy President, worked alongside the Gabonese Deputy Foreign Minister to salvage the power-sharing transitional government in November 2000. The first two South African heads of state opted for soft power in their relationship with some African countries. The most prominent case is the way that South Africa has dealt with Zimbabwe’s crises.

A survey confirmed that President Mandela’s leadership firmly stamped South Africa’s moral authority on the world. Similarly, President Mbeki is remembered as an African visionary who championed the African Renaissance. Under President Mbeki, it was felt, Africa began to take centre stage as he promoted many reforms on the continent.

There were two ways in which South Africa could meaningfully contribute to the African Renaissance: it could bully others, whether they liked it or not, or it could work through existing continental, multilateral structures to advance and support the principles and ideals that have been agreed to collectively. South Africa chose the latter route, and deployed its resources and political experience to advance and accelerate the implementation of the African Union and NEPAD. The realisation of Africa’s renaissance will be difficult to achieve without South Africa’s commitment to playing a role on the continent.

Monyae have noted that South Africa has had double standards in its policies. The first example was the response to the DRC crisis in 1998 and to Lesotho in the same year. With regard to the DRC, South Africa argued for a peaceful resolution of the conflict while in Lesotho South Africa used the military approach to bring about peace and stability. In the case of Zimbabwe, South Africa has preferred to use quiet diplomacy while the International Community perceives Zimbabwe’s tension as being related to human rights abuse. Most importantly, Mbeki’s African Renaissance led him to champion the cause of developing countries via a leadership role for South Africa in various multilateral institutions.

The changes wrought by Mbeki can be seen as having been inspired by a large dose of pragmatism and moderation when he recast South Africa’s role in a manner more

92Landsberg, 2002, Africa Emerging Continental Governance Regime. 110
93Habid and Selinyane, 49-51
94Lalbahadur, “Moving beyond trophy diplomacy: how to consolidate South Africa's position in the world.”
96Monyae, “Learning to lead”4
97Van Nieuwkerk, Foreign policy-making in South Africa: context, actors, and process.” , 40
commensurate with its size and resources. He established a new set of priorities and normative principles more in keeping with South Africa’s strategic interests and capabilities in the triangular configuration of its foreign policy thrust in the SADC region, Africa and the global South.98

Numerous analysts have argued that during Mandela’s administration, South Africa did not have a coherent foreign policy, and have long debated how this should have been rectified. They conceded, however, that formulating a new foreign policy was no easy task in view of the many challenges, both domestic and foreign, which the government faced simultaneously.99

Unilateralism under Mandela sought to challenge the established international norms on sovereignty (Taiwan) and human rights (Nigeria and Indonesia) through a series of policy stances emerging from the new social identity of post-apartheid South Africa. Thabo Mbeki’s embedded idealism represented recognition that the international structure would have to change if new norms were to have a chance of being successfully implemented.100 NEPAD is the best expression of this. Mbeki and his foreign policy team continued the heavy emphasis of the Nelson Mandela presidency on multilateral diplomacy as the cornerstone of post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy.101

Peter Vale noted the following to explain Nelson Mandela’s advocacy of human rights:

The mere example of the ending of apartheid, not to mention Nelson Mandela’s heroic 27 years in prison, positioned the country axiomatically on the pro-human rights side of the divide. It raised – certainly unfairly – hopes that South Africa’s transitional experience could be emulated elsewhere but the pro-human rights position so resolutely described by Mandela in his 1993 piece on the country’s future foreign policy was tripped up by pressures for more realist policies.102

Landsberg highlights that, by the time Mbeki left office in 2009, South Africa had been pursuing an “Africa first” foreign policy for several years and he left behind a practice of heightened peacemaking and peacekeeping. During his reign, South Africa was more

98 Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy”, 61
99 Carlsnaes and Nel, “Introduction” in Full Flight, 26
100 Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy”, 51
prepared than during Mandela’s to send peacekeepers abroad. This greatly increased the country’s credibility as a major geo-strategic player in Africa.\footnote{Landsberg, C. 2010. “Thabo Mbeki’s legacy of transformation diplomacy,” in *Mbeki and After* ed. Daryl Glaser}

It is important to note that South Africa’s reluctance to become militarily involved in the DRC crises in 1998 was under Mandela’s administration. Why South Africa chose not to intervene with its co-members of SADC, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola, will be explored in Chapter 3. The next chapter will also analyse South Africa’s involvement in the DRC crisis during Mbeki’s administration.

When Mbeki was “recalled” by the ANC, which led to the dissolution of the government, Kgalema Motlanthe was appointed as South Africa’s third president\footnote{South Africa history online, http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/kgalema-petrus-motlanthe} for several months before Zuma took over. He assumed the role of a caretaker president so his short reign and the terms of his mandate do not provide for a specific or proper foreign policy to view.

It is important to note again that South Africa’s foreign policy from Mandela’s administration to that of Zuma is underpinned by the principles of the ANC. Indeed, one can notice the continuity in South Africa’s foreign policy when reviewing the international relations resolutions made at the ANC’s National Conferences of 1994 in Bloemfontein, 1997 in Mafikeng, 2002 in Stellenbosch, 2007 in Polokwane and 2012 in Mangaung. These resolutions have determined the approach for all South Africa’s presidents since the end of apartheid. It can safely be said that Zuma will not depart from these principles, which all stipulate that South Africa’s engagement in African conflicts should continue to be by means of multilateral institutions and by fostering dialogue.\footnote{ANC National Conferences, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206#}

South Africa’s foreign policy under Zuma’s administration has been characterised as a holding pattern, a bit confused and therefore confusing. As declared by the respondents in a recent survey, when asked to provide impressions of South Africa’s foreign policy under the leadership of President Zuma, there is, seemingly, an increased focus on economic imperatives and a reduced focus on peace building.\footnote{Lalbahadur.,“Moving beyond trophy diplomacy: how to consolidate South Africa's position in the world.”} Other analysts argue that Zuma’s Africa policy does not deviate much from that of Mbeki’s, given the fact that both implement the policies of the ANC. The Zuma administration continues to prioritise Africa in its foreign
policies, at the same time, the present government wants to expand South Africa’s economic footprint in Africa, specifically in the DRC.

When Zuma took over, he placed much emphasis on domestic policies, whereas Mbeki had missed the opportunity to acknowledge that South Africa’s international projection should be in line with the needs of South Africa’s population. In 2009 Zuma stated that the government was committed to improving the lives of farm dwellers and workers by coming up with a comprehensive rural development strategy which would also bring about land reform and food security. The government was set to intensify the fight against crime, while creating decent work and sustainable livelihoods.\textsuperscript{107} At the international level, however, Zuma continued with Mbeki’s policy of prioritising Africa when pursuing South Africa’s foreign policy. Minister Nkoane-Mashabane noted that South Africa will continue to prioritise Africa because it is in Africa. South Africa will continue to engage with African countries in pursuit of Africa’s development, including the reconstruction of the DRC, and recognises that its destiny is inextricably linked to that of the developing world in general and to the African continent in particular.\textsuperscript{108} The fourth administration, under Zuma, has engaged with the African agenda, the principles of Pan Africanism, the unity of the African continent and the economic development and integration of Africa.\textsuperscript{109} In the following words the Defence and Military Veterans Minister, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, has reaffirmed that Africa remains the cornerstone of South Africa’s foreign policy: “Africa remains at the centre of South African foreign policy and the growth and success of the South African economy is dependent on enduring peace, stability, economic development and deepened democracy on the continent. She believes, as an integral part of the African continent, South Africa must develop together with its neighbours on the continent.”\textsuperscript{110} Under Zuma’s administration South Africa continues to play an important role in the peacekeeping mission. The SANDF has been deployed in Darfur (in Sudan), the Central Africa Republic (CAR) and the DRC under the umbrella of SADC, the AU and the UN. South Africa has also intervened militarily in the DRC, under the auspices of the UN peace enforcement mission, MONUSCO. I shall expand upon this further in the fourth chapter.

\textsuperscript{108}Nkoana-Mashabane, Lecture on South Africa’s Foreign Policy
\textsuperscript{109}Presidency, Republic of South Africa: “President Jacob Zuma”.
2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted South Africa’s post-apartheid Africa policy and its drivers, which will help to clarify South Africa’s foreign policy towards the DRC. Pretoria has made Africa the cornerstone of its foreign policy, as enshrined in the white paper. The chapter has shed light on South Africa’s foreign policy from Mandela’s administration to Zuma’s administration. Mandela’s policy focused on human rights and was a mixture of idealistic and aspirational principles at the same time as being characterised by a lack of clear economic and social interests. When Mbeki took over, South Africa’s foreign policy was imbued with realism and the pursuit of Africa’s renewal. This change helps to explain South Africa’s involvement in the DRC’s second war during the Mbeki and Zuma periods, which is the focus of Chapter 3. Given that both men have implemented the policies of the ANC, South Africa’s foreign policy under Zuma has not deviated much from that of Mbeki’s era. Nevertheless, South Africa’s foreign policy has become obfuscated, with more emphasis being placed on economic expansion. The latter will help in understanding Pretoria’s policy toward the DRC during the third war (2003-2013), which will be the focus of Chapter 4.

3.1 Introduction

This chapter elucidates the source and the complexity of the conflicts in the DRC, with more emphasis on the second conflict (1998-2003) and South Africa’s reluctance to intervene militarily, along with other SADC countries, to rescue Kabila’s government. It also clarifies South Africa’s engagement in the peace process in the DRC during the period under consideration.

The DRC is of strategic importance in terms of its size and geographical location. It is a vast territory of 2,345,406 square kilometres and is the second largest country in Africa after Algeria. The country shares its borders with nine other states in Central, East and Southern Africa: Congo-Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola, which makes it an important geopolitical country in Africa.

Economically, Congo has enormous wealth in natural resources. The country has a wide range of mineral resources, ranging from cobalt, copper, cadmium, petroleum, industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, and germanium, uranium, radium, bauxite, and iron ore, to coal and hydropower potential. Congo is one of the three countries which produce important strategic materials needed for the twenty-first century, together with Russia and China. Its abundant natural resources make it internationally coveted prey.

When the head of the DRC solicited SADC’s military intervention after the outbreak of the DRC’s second war, South Africa refused to back Kabila militarily. This chapter analyses South Africa’s response in that period. As an emerging power seeking to bring about international peace and security in the region, South Africa had made Africa the cornerstone of its foreign policy; it therefore chose the mediation approach to resolving the conflict in the DRC. Thus, South Africa played a significant role in the DRC peace process. In this context, South Africa’s stance in the DRC during the second war was one of soft power rather than hard power.

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3.2 Background to the DRC crises

The Belgians originally colonised the DRC (known then as the Congo Free State) as a personal fiefdom of the brutal Belgian monarch King Leopold II (1885-1908), and, subsequently, as a colony of the imperial government of Belgium.\footnote{Ibid, 25-46}

The centrality of resource extraction led the colonial administrations to deliberately expropriate land as they desired. Large scale expropriation in the DRC was contrived for both mining and agricultural plantations.\footnote{Ibid, 26-27} The Belgian colonisers encouraged a steady influx of Banyarwanda (literally, people from Rwanda) into the Congo as guest labour on the vast plantations and mines, leading progressively to a large settlement of Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in the North Kivu region bordering Rwanda. As a result, the Banyarwanda greatly outstripped the indigenous Congolese populations in what should be the latter’s ancestral homeland. Today, a tripartite conflict fault line exists in North Kivu between the Banyarwanda and the minority indigenous Congolese communities on the one hand and within the Kinyarwanda-speaking community (between Hutus and Tutsis) on the other.\footnote{Ibid, 6-7}

Given its huge economic interests in the country, Belgium was not prepared to grant independence to the Congolese without entrenching a local political faction that would guarantee its neo-colonial interests.\footnote{Ibid, 34} Kabemba argues that the decision by the Belgian government in January 1959 to grant the Congo its independence found the Congolese unprepared to assume control of the state. Brussels granted freedom to the Congo on 30 June 1960 and, in elections that month, two prominent nationalists won: Joseph Kasavubu of the ABAKO Party became head of state and Patrice Lumumba of the leftist Mouvement Nationale Congolais (MNC – a nationalist party disliked by the West) became prime minister.

During the colonial period, from 1908-1960, Belgium had devised a system based on economic exploitation by brutal means. For instance, it was Belgium who gave the Congo’s uranium to the United States to produce the first atomic weapons – the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.\footnote{Nzongala-Ntalaja, G. 1998. “From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” \textit{Current African Issues.} No 20. NordiskaAfrikainsitutes, 15.}
The Belgian administration only permitted cultural organisations based on ethnic identities; they banned political parties transcending ethnic groups or ethnic affiliation and they banned political mobilisation. Kabemba argues that the Congolese found it too difficult to perceive the new world of competitive politics in anything other than predominantly ethnic terms. This has been a dominant characteristic of Congolese politics since independence. Currently, most of the political parties are either regionally or ethnically based, from the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), to the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RDC) (the abbreviations are of the French names). It should be noted that Banyamulenge has become disputed terrain in terms of citizenship and was one of the causes of the DRC’s second war.

The Tutsi-Hutu wars in Rwanda and Burundi, and especially the genocide in Rwanda, had a devastating impact on neighbouring DRC. The ascendance of the Tutsis and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda forced many refugees and genocidaires, including the notorious Interahamwe (Hutu extremist militia), across the border into the eastern Congo. Conveniently displaced Hutu militias and political dissidents then used the territory to launch vicious cross-border attacks to destabilise Rwanda and possibly unseat the RFP government. The Rwandan government repeatedly countered with cross-border raids against the renegade militias.

On the other hand, Mobutu’s pro-Western dictatorship had plundered the country for thirty-two years, thereby setting the context for the civil war in 1997. As the head of Zaire, Mobutu created his own empire in one of Africa’s most resource-rich states. His leadership was characterised by corruption, nepotism, ethnic conflict, an absence of democracy, economic stagnation, environmental degradation and foreign intervention.

During his reign, Mobutu supported Habyarimana in Rwanda and the genocidal regime that succeeded him. Rebel groups operated with impunity in eastern Congo and their destabilising incursions into Rwanda prompted the government of Paul Kagame and his long-time ally, Paul Kagame, and his long-time ally,
President Museveni of Uganda, to support an insurgency aimed at overthrowing Mobutu.\textsuperscript{122} Laurent Kabila (Mobutu’s Congolese adversary) led the Kagame-Museveni-backed rebel movement, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), in the proxy war against Mobutu. Mandela’s use of peaceful diplomacy, aimed at a negotiated settlement towards a government of national unity, failed. On 17 May 1997, Kabila took control of what was then Zaire, renamed it the DRC and became its president. South Africa recognised Kabila’s regime a few days later, among several African countries.\textsuperscript{123}

The war that ousted Mobutu is called the first Congo war to differentiate it from the second Congo war, also known as Africa’s world war. The latter lasted for five years (1998-2003) and will receive further elaboration in the next section. In the context of this research, the DRC turmoil from 2003 to 2013 has been dubbed the DRC’s third war. It will receive more elaboration in Chapter 4.

It should be noted that there are significant external viewpoints associated with the Congo wars. The predation of Congolese natural resources has cast doubt on the real motives claimed by all the interventionists. Diamond and timber deposits have been regularly exploited (both legally and illegally) by multiple sides in the conflicts, to pay for military expenses, resulting in the DRC being one of the major supplies of “conflict diamonds”.\textsuperscript{124}

3.3 The DRC’s second war (1998-2003)

A. Introduction

The date of 2 August 1998 marks the beginning of an armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo that had an internal and an external aspect. Although it took place entirely on Congolese territory, it had two important external features. One was the participation, alongside national actors, of an array of foreign actors; the other was its close links to the extra-territorial implementation of belligerency with other conflicts in the states neighbouring the eastern DRC, mainly Uganda and Rwanda.

Rwanda and Uganda\textsuperscript{125} had attempted to overthrow the DRC’s head of state Laurent Kabila, with whom Kagame and Museveni, presidents of Rwanda and Uganda respectively, had

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid, 43
\textsuperscript{124}Ibid, 43
\textsuperscript{125}Ibid, 43
fallen out. They were determined to control Kabila’s government. These two countries sponsored the Tutsi-dominated (Banyamulenge) rebel and militia movements in the eastern part of the DRC to join the anti-Kabila campaign. To protect his fragile regime of only 14 months Kabila called in external military support, especially from SADC members. Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola responded positively. These countries fought on the side of Kabila along with Sudan, Libya and Chad and ultimately prevailed. More than four million people died in the war. Several peace agreements to end the hostilities were signed by various parties in cities such as Pretoria, Luanda and Lusaka. Other rebel forces and non-governmental militias that had been involved in the war did not sign the peace agreements. Consequently, insurgencies by rebel forces and attacks on ethnic minorities continued sporadically, especially in eastern Congo. On 16 January 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, was named his successor.

If these countries had not supported Kabila at the time, the Kagame-Museveni coalition-backed rebel movement would have succeeded. They saved Kabila’s regime, while SA refused and opted for a diplomatic route. Nonetheless, it should be noted that South Africa’s diplomatic approach led to the conclusion of a global accord at Sun City that included the formation of a government of national unity and, consequently, the end of the DRC’s second war.

B. The outbreak

The failed coup d’état orchestrated by Bugera during Laurent Kabila’s trip to Cuba from 24-25 July 1998 was the genuine detonator of the cessation of co-operation between the DRC and its neighbours, Rwanda and Uganda. Bizima, Bugera and other Banayamulenge working in the public service immediately left the country. On 27 July 1998, to the euphoria of the people countrywide, President Kabila announced the end of the presence of all foreign troops in the DRC and, with manumilitari, brought James Kabarebe and 800 Rwandan troops to the N’djili International Airport to board for Kigali. Kabila’s order for all foreign troops to leave the DRC threatened the political control of Rwanda and Uganda. These tensions,

combined with the complex security situation on the ground, are what had provoked the rebellion.\textsuperscript{128}

While Kabila called the second war an aggression, the international community regarded it as a rebellion. On 2 August 1998, General James Kabarebe commanded an airborne operation that brought Rwandan troops, ammunition and weapons from Goma to Kitona in West Congo, with the aim of launching a flash-war that would topple President Kabila from power within a few days. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), a Rwandan-backed anti-Kabila rebellion, was created after this operation. However, owing to the intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, who stood by Laurent Kabila, it did not succeed. Within a few weeks the war had become international, involving nine African countries. The countries directly involved in the Congo second war were Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi who backed the rebels and Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan, who backed the DRC. The rebel groups backed by Rwanda and Uganda were the RCD, the RDC-ML and the MLC. The DRC’s second war was a struggle to control the DRC politically and economically. Kabemba argued that the Banyamulenge in the government and army were there to ensure that Laurent Kabila did not escape the Rwandan-Ugandan sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{129} The fact of the matter is that the global capitalist forces that govern the world economy have strategic interests in the DRC. The natural resources of the DRC are critical for the industries of the advanced capitalist countries (ACCs) of the North and for the DRC’s resource-starved eastern neighbours. As a result, the sponsorship of a rebellion through Uganda and Rwanda was the only way of ensuring that these interests were secured, especially after Laurent Kabila reneged on deals for the extraction of Congo’s natural wealth.\textsuperscript{130}

The second war was also a battle to control Congo’s minerals heartland. The ICG analysis reveals that the war was commercialised and exploited by both sides as a money-making venture. It states that Congo’s vast natural resources were used to finance both coalitions to develop the economies of the external players in the war and create personal enrichment for many.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{128}Kabemba, “South Africa and the DRC: Is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo?” 12
\textsuperscript{129}Ibid
\textsuperscript{131}International Crisis Group, 1999, Africa’s Seven-Nation War, Democratic Republic of Congo Report, no 4, 22
C. The international community’s response

When the DRC was attacked on 2 August 1998 by its eastern neighbours, in this case Rwanda and Uganda, the international community broke its almost absolute silence up to that point by calling for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. For instance, the first resolution of the Security Council of the UNSC, namely, resolution 1234 dated 9 April 1999, urged “foreign states to end the presence of non-invited forces in the DRC; it condemned the actions of armed groups, ex-Rwandan Armed Forces, Interahamwe and others.” On 24 February 2000, UN Security Council resolution 1291 called for the sending of a contingent of 5,537 troops to the DRC.

D. SADC’s response

When Laurent Kabila took power, South Africa and Namibia were the first to pursue a strategy in support of the DRC joining SADC. The DRC was officially accorded SADC membership in 1997, while it was twice refused to Mobutu during his reign on the basis of the dictatorial nature of his regime. Landsberg, a foreign policy analyst, argues that the rationale for the DRC’s inclusion in SADC was that Pretoria would have better control, and thus influence, over Kabila.

Shortly after the outbreak of the DRC’s second war, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia intervened militarily to give back-up to Kabila. They justified their intervention as a SADC action to defend the Kabila regime from external aggression. The defence agreements which bind SADC members rule that the community’s member states have to support any member state facing aggression from one or several foreign forces.

The SADC summit at Victoria Falls in August 1998 led to the decision by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia to intervene militarily. It was not, however, regarded as a SADC-sanctioned initiative by South Africa’s President Mandela, who was the SADC chairperson at the time. The first country to announce its intention to intervene in the DRC was Zimbabwe. As a justification for Zimbabwe’s involvement on the side of Laurent Kabila, President Mugabe, who was then the Chairman of the SADC Organ of Politic and Defence Security (OPDS),

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132 Lanotte, *Guerres Sans Frontières*, 242-251
133 UN Security Council Resolution 1291, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/resolutions/SC00/1291SC00.html
argued that, since the DRC was a member of SADC, Kabila was entitled to a collective self-defence of its territory by the whole region.\textsuperscript{136} Mandela did not support this argument. Instead he appeared to support the Ugandan and Rwandan interventions and invasion of the DRC. Nadudere notes that South Africa was understood to be supplying weapons to Uganda and Rwanda, especially after the 1994 genocide.\textsuperscript{137}

South Africa’s refusal to join Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in propping up Kabila’s government militarily was the first and major reason for divisions within the SADC. This contributed to what some analysts have termed the “thankless diplomacy” conducted by Pretoria.\textsuperscript{138}

According to Landsberg and Kornegay, SADC became deeply divided as a result of Africa’s internationalisation of the civil war in the DRC, with its members falling into two distinct axis groups. One group comprised South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, while the other, led by Zimbabwe, comprised the DRC, Angola and Namibia.\textsuperscript{139} Field and Ebrahim considered that this division set a negative precedent for any future SADC action and collaboration and highlighted the lack of appropriate conflict management mechanisms and structures to guide communal efforts in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{140}

Cedric de Coning referred to the so-called SADC forces’ entry into the DRC as “neo-interventionism”. He claimed that they did not enter as peacemakers but were aligned to one side of the conflict with the aim or goal of influencing the balance of power.\textsuperscript{141} Other analysts argue that the SADC intervention was legitimate in terms of international law. The three SADC members justified their intervention in those terms. Segaren Naidoo noted that SADC is a regional agency for collective self-defence, as described in articles 51 and 52 of chapters seven and eight of the United Nations Charter. According to the provisions of the Charter, nothing shall impair the right of countries, either, individually or collectively, to engage in self-defence “if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations”. He claimed

\begin{footnotes}
\item[137]Ibid
\item[139]Ibid, 3
\item[140]Shannon Field and Ebrahim\textsuperscript{140}.
\end{footnotes}
that the SADC allies were coming to the assistance of a SADC member whose security was immediately threatened by two neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{142}Nadubere argues further that the two neighbouring countries were attacking the legitimate government of the DRC which had been accepted by the UN and the Security Council; it was therefore quite in order for SADC to render assistance under international law. It was also clear that, had the SADC allies not come to the immediate assistance of the DRC, the invading forces would have effectively dislodged the government of the DRC within weeks.\textsuperscript{143}

Another factor that exacerbated division within SADC was Pretoria’s failure to stop the activities of South African-based mercenaries; this not only undermined its peace-making role in the DRC but deepened the divisions between South Africa and other SADC member states.

E. Peace resolution efforts

The first peace effort to end the DRC’s second war was the Victoria Falls Summit held from 7 to 8 September 1998, aimed at the immediate cessation of hostilities. At this summit Kabila was asked to deal directly with the Rwandan and Ugandan delegations. He refused to talk to the RCD and the MLC (the rebel groups). His attitude was that negotiating with the rebels would imply acknowledging that the second Congo war was an internal issue – a civil war – whereas it was, in fact, an aggression by Rwanda and Uganda.\textsuperscript{144}

Some scholars, such as Richard Banegas, term the Victoria Falls Summit an “African Yalta” because, without expressing it, the warring parties divided the DRC into three parts: the West under the jurisdiction of the Kabila government, the East controlled by Rwanda and Uganda, and the South serving as a security zone for Angola and economical zone for Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{145}

Another summit, the Sirte Summit, was organised under the auspices of Libya’s President Muammar Gaddafi on 19 April 1999. An agreement was signed by President Kabila of the Congo, President Museveni of Uganda and President Idriss Deby of Chad. The agreement envisaged the withdrawal of all external forces involved in the conflict as well as the deployment of an African force.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{142}Nabudere, “Conflict over mineral wealth”
\textsuperscript{143}Ibid., 55-56
\textsuperscript{144}Lanotte, \textit{GuerresSansFrontières}, 108.
\textsuperscript{145}Richard Banegas quoted by Lanotte, \textit{Guerres Sans Frontières}, 108.
\textsuperscript{146}Lanotte, \textit{Guerres Sans Frontières}, 131
The most important summit for the resolution of the conflict was the Lusaka Summit, which was littered with stumbling blocks. Frederick Chiluba was designated by SADC as mediator. Initially Kabila refused to talk to the rebels but later changed his mind and sought to hold direct talks with the rebels in Lusaka. Another stumbling block was the disharmony between Rwanda and Uganda over their Congo policy and the fragmentation of the RCD into the RCD-Goma and the RDC-Liberation Movement. The former was reluctant to take part in the summit while the latter was more willing to do so.

Pressure from the SADC, the Security Council, UN special envoy to the Congo Moustapha Niasse and the OAU helped to overcome these stumbling blocks and led to the Lusaka agreement, which was the first strong peace process. It was signed on 10 July 1999 by the leaders or representatives of all the countries directly involved in the war, namely the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola. The signatures of the Ugandan-backed MLC’s Jean-Pierre Bemba and of 50 representatives of the Rwandan-sponsored RCD followed on 1 August 1999 and 3 August 1999 respectively.\(^\text{147}\)

The implementation of the Lusaka agreement failed. Firstly, Kabila rejected Ketumile Masire as the facilitator. Instead, he proposed that a French-speaking co-facilitator be appointed, which was rejected.\(^\text{148}\) Secondly, although the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement provided for the deployment of UN troops to monitor peace implementation in the Congo, Kabila blocked the deployment of the MONUC contingent.\(^\text{149}\)

On 16 January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated. His son, Joseph Kabila, was appointed as his successor. Until his death, Kabila senior had constantly rejected and undermined the efforts of the mediator, Sir Ketumile Masire. He had refused to start a process of political dialogue with the rebels and had stalled the UN peacekeeping missions. One can say that Kabila senior was perceived as being the stumbling block to the peace process in the DRC. Responsibility for his death has not yet been established, but many scholars and analysts support one of two theories, a palace revolution or an American-Angolan conspiracy.

The first theory holds that Laurent Kabila was the victim of a broad plot involving different high profile figures in his entourage (Justice Minister Jeannot Mwenze Nkongolo, Colonel

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\(^{149}\) Lanotte, *Guerres Sans Frontières*, 134
Eddy Kapend, Adviser Emile Mota, etc.) and one of the allied countries (Angola or Zimbabwe). Remaining hidden in the shadows, these strongmen of the regime favoured the rise of Laurent Kabila’s son, Joseph, deemed to be a self-effacing and inexperienced young man through whom they secretly hoped to rule.¹⁵⁰

The other theory is that Kabila senior’s assassination was orchestrated by the US and Angola. The United States is suspected of having signed a deal with Luanda, the terms of which were as follows: the Angolan authorities were to physically remove their protégé, Laurent Kabila, whose security largely depended on them after the failure of the Rwandan blitzkrieg. In return, the Clinton administration which, by means of American satellites, knew of all the positions and movements of Jonas Savimbi, was to facilitate the location and killing of the UNITA leader by the Angolan armed forces.¹⁵¹ According to analysts such as Lanotte, the palace revolution theory is the more plausible.

In contrast to his father, when Joseph Kabila took power he observed the Lusaka Agreement unconditionally, especially in relation to holding the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). The MLC and the RCD were obliged to follow his example.

A pre-ICD conference took place in Gaborone from 20 to 25 August 2001. The debut of the ICD was scheduled for 15 October 2001 in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia.¹⁵² Failure to reach consensus on the composition of the delegations to the ICD led to the Addis Ababa Conference being a fiasco. Ketumile Masire then scheduled an ICD conference for 25 February 2002 at Sun City in South Africa.

3.4 South Africa’s foreign policy in the DRC’s second war

A. South Africa’s policy of no military intervention in the Congo

During the second Congo war, South Africa’s stance was at first that of ambiguous neutrality.¹⁵³ Nelson Mandela opted for peace negotiations and rejected Mugabe’s resolution to send a Southern African military contingent to the rescue of the Kabila regime, as requested by Laurent Kabila. South Africa’s foreign policy during the DRC second war may be described as one of quiet diplomacy.

¹⁵⁰Ibid, 150
¹⁵¹Ibid, 178
¹⁵²Radio Okapi, the Monuc media station, Archive, Newsletter of Friday, 25 August 2002, 13:00; contact newsletter@radiookapi.net
¹⁵³Lanotte, Guerres Sans Frontières, 264
South Africa’s position was heavily criticised. In fact South Africa had not hesitated to invade Lesotho in order to prevent a coup aimed at overthrowing the monarchy. It was argued that South Africa refused to side militarily with the DRC because it was continuing to furnish arms to Rwanda. Critics also view Mandela’s position as arising from his determination to punish Kabila for the latter’s reconsideration of the accord signed during the South African liberation struggle by continuing to allow South Africa’s mining companies to exploit the Congo’s minerals during the AFDL regime.154

At the August 1999 Victoria Falls Summit, Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, then Chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), responded positively to Kabila’s request for military support in terms of SADC charter. Despite the fact that South Africa was represented at the Victoria Falls Summit by its High Commissioner to Zimbabwe, it did not recognise this summit. The then spokesperson for Mandela, the late Parks Mankahlana, said: “There is no way that the people who met at Victoria Falls and Harare can have met under the auspices of the SADC. But I am not saying South Africa disapproves of that meeting and whoever went to it. They just were not SADC meetings”.155 From this statement, it can be argued that South Africa refused to recognise this meeting because it stood for a resolution of the crisis by diplomatic means such as peace talks. Engagement in any military intervention could only be undertaken on a multilateral basis. This meant that if South Africa had recognised the Victoria Falls Summit, it would officially have agreed to intervene militarily. This implies that as far as South Africa was concerned the military intervention in the DRC by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC was not considered to be on a multilateral basis. For this reason it could not have been a participant.

South Africa’s foreign policy objectives during the second war can also be seen in its stance during the first Congo war. South Africa sought only a peaceful resolution of the conflict during the first war and this stance remained unchanged during the second war. South Africa remained firm in its stance even though Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia used the SADC Organ of Politics, Defence and Security to intervene militarily on Kabila’s side. Mandela, the then SADC chairperson, refused to follow them, preferring a political solution instead.

154 Muntara quoted by Lanotte, Guerres Sans Frontières, 57
The South African Deputy Foreign Minister at the time stated: “We consistently maintain that there is no military solution possible, we need to bring a political solution to all the conflict on the African continent.”\textsuperscript{156} However, South Africa’s foreign policy was regarded as being inconsistent, because one month after the SADC trio had intervened on the side of Kabila, South Africa intervened militarily in Lesotho. This undermined its position \textit{vis-à-vis} the DRC. In the case of Lesotho South Africa intervened to bring about stability for multilateral considerations, while it had refused to recognise the intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC as being on a multilateral basis. South Africa deployed its military might to restore order in Lesotho under the banner of SADC and remained actively involved when the government of Lesotho was rendered powerless by protest action over the election results in 1998. It therefore seems that the motive for the military intervention was not political nor to protect human life but directly linked to the country’s interests in Lesotho’s water resources. Acting South African President, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, explained that the military intervention in Lesotho sought to achieve three objectives, namely to secure the Inga dam, to restore order in the security establishment and to clear protestors from the Royal Palace.\textsuperscript{157} For this reason, Mugabe, Kabila, Dos Santos and Nujoma accused South Africa of promoting “regional apartheid”. The move by South Africa was interpreted as one of double standards.\textsuperscript{158}

Another factor which hindered South Africa from intervening in the DRC was the tension between Mandela and Kabila. The latter had made a bad impression during the first Congo war when Mandela had been the mediator between ex-President Mobutu and the ex-rebel, Kabila. Mandela had been deeply frustrated by the fact that Kabila did not honour his promise to take part in the second meeting on 12 May 1997 aboard the Outeniqua, a South African warship, where it had been intended to find a dignified ouster for President Mobutu. Gravely hurt, Africa’s most venerated man firmly condemned Kabila’s lack of political culture and respect for heads of state and elders.\textsuperscript{159} This was considered to be an affront for which Kabila, the ex-rebel who became the DRC President, would pay by the refusal of Mandela’s government to back him militarily.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{156} SouthScan, 13(17), 21 August 1998, 129
\bibitem{158} Ibid, 8
\end{thebibliography}
It can be argued that South Africa’s leaders embraced the view that its own experience of emerging from an apartheid conflict situation and establishing a progressive democratic country made it well positioned to assist other states in similar conflict situations. South Africa was determined to apply the negotiated settlement solution as a means of addressing conflicts.

South Africa’s decision to intervene diplomatically in the DRC, as it had during the first war, was closely linked to Pretoria’s Africa policy. South Africa’s leaders held the view that the war in the DRC should be ended by facilitating the creation of a democratic system of governance. The foreign policy objectives of South Africa in the DRC conflict were to encourage and facilitate a peaceful resolution of conflict between the belligerent parties. South Africa had made it clear from the outset that a military resolution to the DRC conflict was not on its agenda.

South Africa maintained this position until the end of Mandela’s presidency. When Mbeki took over from him, South Africa continued to favour peace talks in opposition to military intervention. It stated that it would not resort to using guns as a means of resolving conflicts. This claim lacked consistency, however, because during the same period South Africa had used military force in Lesotho. The next section explores Pretoria’s mediation in the DRC second war.

**B. South Africa’s engagement in peace talks in the DRC**

Kornegay and Landsberg suggested that in assessing South Africa’s policy towards the DRC; attention should be paid not only to the Congo but to Pretoria’s regional policy in general. They argue that South Africa’s policy stance was strongly influenced by dynamics. Firstly, for a long period of time the entire Great Lakes region had been unstable as a result of the permanent features of conflicts (intra-state and inter-state in nature and character). At the inter-state level, apart from the conflict in the DRC, Uganda was at war with Sudan, and Eritrea and Ethiopia were fighting. At the intra-state level there was conflict in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Angola and Somalia.

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162Ibid.
Once the Western powers had disengaged themselves from African issues, responsibility for resolving Africa’s crises lay on Africa’s leaders. As an emerging regional power, South Africa was expected to play an important role in resolving the crises in Africa, especially in the Southern region. Thus, many initiatives to resolve the DRC crisis have been undertaken by SADC, the AU and the UN, particularly by South Africa.

Immediately after the outbreak of the second Congo war on 2 August 1998, South Africa sought to play a peacemaking role. Mandela sent the late Alfred Nzo, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joe Modise, the then Minister of Defence, and Sidney Mufamadi, the then Minister of Safety and Security, on 7 August 1998 to Lubumbashi (DRC), in order to hear Kabila’s own assessment of the origins of the conflict as well as possible solutions. The trio of ministers also went to Kigali (Rwanda) and to Gulu (Uganda) on 17 and 18 August 1998, with the aim of finding out the assessments of the conflict in the DRC from the political leadership in Rwanda and Uganda, especially in the light of accusations emanating from Kinshasa that the two countries were involved as invaders.\(^{163}\) South Africa chose the diplomatic route but failed to assume the leadership role of mediator, as it had in the first war. Landsberg argues that South Africa’s first mistake was its failure to condemn the rebellion. This made Kabila accuse South Africa of partiality in the conflict.\(^{164}\)

In early 1999 South Africa suggested a plan that stressed the need for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal. It recommended the holding of a conference of reconciliation and reconstruction, the installation of an all-inclusive transitional government, a new constitution and the holding of general elections. In November 1999, South Africa pledged R1.2 million towards a joint military commission in the DRC.\(^{165}\)

Given the tensions within the SADC described cited in the last section, South Africa did not take on the leadership role of mediator in the DRC peace process in the first instance. At the annual summit held in Mauritius on 24 September 1998, SADC mandated Zambia’s President Frederick Chiluba to take on the leadership role in the peace effort, although it had been initiated by Mandela’s government.

However, while Zambia was officially regarded as the mediator in the DRC peace process, South Africa remained the de facto mediator, because the need for a third party capable of

\(^{163}\)Nzo, Address on Crisis in DRC
\(^{164}\)Landsberg, “The impossible neutrality”, 7
\(^{165}\)Habib and Selinyane, “Africa’s foreign policy and realistic vision of an African century”
applying non-coercive and coercive incentives remained constant.\textsuperscript{166} From the fact that Mandela had sent his ministers to the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, one can argue that South Africa viewed the second Congo war in a regional context. For this reason South Africa sought a peaceful resolution by promoting political dialogue between the belligerents instead of choosing the militarily option. Because of the promises made by the government on its readmission into the international system, South Africa was expected to make a huge contribution towards continental peace and security.\textsuperscript{167}

South Africa became more involved in the DRC peace process in 2002. Mbeki was the Deputy President during Mandela’s government. When he took over the presidency, his foreign policy objectives in Africa showed consistency with those of his predecessor, namely, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and the prevention of conflicts and the promotion of peaceful resolutions to disputes.\textsuperscript{168} For Mbeki, the war in the DRC was seen as an integral part of all the phenomena acting against the realisation of the African Renaissance, such as maladministration and corruption, the absence of a democratic culture and rule of law, permanent conflict on the continent and HIV/AIDS.

Once Mbeki was in power, his prime challenge was to bring about peace in the DRC; however, South Africa’s refusal to participate when Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola intervened in 1998, coupled with Mugabe-Mandela tensions over the SADC organ, had caused Pretoria to be politically isolated by Kinshasa and its allies. Mbeki conceded that South Africa’s foreign policy towards the DRC was in need of a major overhaul.\textsuperscript{169}

Scholars and specialists held divergent views on South Africa’s policy toward the DRC at that time. Some suggest that a government of national unity cannot be the only solution to the DRC crisis, while others hold the view that a government of national unity is the only solution. The former view was expressed by Peter Vale in these terms, “South Africa’s propensity to go for a government of national unity as the only solution to problems like that in the Congo suggests that there is something fundamentally flawed in our policymaking.”\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{167}SAGI: South African Government Information. 1996. South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document (green paper)
\textsuperscript{169}Landsberg, “The impossible neutrality,” 12
\textsuperscript{170}Mail and Guardian, 28 August 1998. www.mg.co.za
John Stremlau however stated that “South Africa’s support for negotiations leading to a transitional government of national unity was the only sensible course to be followed in the Congo”. 171

To show his determination to bring about peace in the DRC, in August 2002, Mbeki announced a 90-day target for bringing peace to the DRC after Paul Kagame and Joseph Kabila, the Rwandan and DRC presidents respectively, had signed a deal on 30 July 2002 brokered by Mbeki and Kofi Annan. This intervention led to the conclusion of a final agreement in December 2003, and in June the transitional government was sworn in, which signalled the end of the DRC second war.

It important to note that two factors undermined South Africa’s efforts as peacemaker in the DRC’s second war. Firstly, the role of South African mercenaries in para-military activities in the DRC weakened South Africa’s efforts. Contrary to the South African government’s denial of involvement of South Africans in the conflict, wide arrays of South African military-related companies have played a counter-productive role in the DRC crisis. 172 Secondly, allegations were made by Kabila and General Bantu Holomisa that Pretoria was arming rebels who were against the DRC government. 173

Nonetheless, South Africa’s contribution to the DRC peace process during Mandela’s presidency was regarded as a relative success, as the Lusaka Peace Agreement was an effort of Mandela’s administration. “Unlike the proposals of Zambian president Chiluba to simply obtain a cease-fire and hope it would hold, the final accord, under heavy South African influence, sought to inject some realism into the peace process: The idea was to get Rwanda and Uganda, the principal backers of three rebel groups, to spell out their security concerns and then create short- and long-term systems for dealing with those concerns.” 174 So the Lusaka Peace Agreement not only included a cease-fire but also addressed security concerns in the great lakes region. This was due to the effort of Mandela’s government.

In summary, despite the Mandela administration’s reluctance to intervene militarily, it is important to note its positive contribution to peace efforts in the DRC. First, South Africa was the first country to place the DRC conflict on the global agenda. It did so during the 12th

171 Ibid
172 Ibid
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit held in Durban, at which Mandela called a meeting of the belligerent parties in the DRC conflict, SADC members and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Second, the acknowledgement by the Ugandan government on 21 August 1998 of its involvement in the DRC war was a result of the efforts of South Africa, as previously Uganda had denied its involvement. Third, Paul Kagame, the then Deputy President of Rwanda, admitted in South Africa on 6 November 1998 that Rwanda was directly involved in the war. Fourth, the Pretoria Declaration of August 1998 (drawn up by the South African Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki), formed the basis of the Lusaka Peace Agreement signed by the belligerent parties.\textsuperscript{175} For these reasons, South Africa’s efforts on behalf of the DRC peace process during Mbeki’s presidency can be seen as considerable.

According to Claude Kabemba, South Africa’s involvement in the DRC is viewed in some quarters as preparing the way for a deeper penetration into this enormously resource-rich country by South African mining companies and other corporations.\textsuperscript{176} He further notes that South Africa’s involvement in the DRC may also been seen as testament to Mbeki’s wider vision of an African Renaissance, as expressed notably in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which viewed the resolution of conflicts and wars in Africa as a fundamental basis for good governance, democracy and economic growth.\textsuperscript{177} Kabemba was referring to South Africa’s involvement in the DRC’s second war. This remained true, however, for South Africa’s involvement in the DRC’s third war.

In its engagement in the DRC’s second war, South Africa adopted an approach that emphasises negotiated settlement over military solutions in dealing with conflicts.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has thrown light on the DRC war from 1998 to 2003. This war, also known as Africa’s world war, was complex in the sense that seven African countries were fighting on the soil of one African country, the DRC. Therefore this war had internal and international implications. This chapter has elucidated the response of the international community (the UN) and the regional response of SADC and, most importantly, South Africa’s involvement. At first South Africa was reluctant to intervene and refused to back Kabila militarily.


\textsuperscript{176}Kabemba. “South Africa and the DRC: Is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo?” 12

\textsuperscript{177}Ibid.
Subsequently, from 2002, South Africa chose quiet diplomacy to bring about peace and stability in the DRC. South Africa played a role in bringing an end to the war by being directly involved in a number of mediation talks that resulted in the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement (a global and all-inclusive peace accord) on 17 December 2002. This paved the way for the DRC’s first democratic elections in 2006.

However, it should be noted that although South Africa’s approach of quiet diplomacy was successful in bringing the war to an end and in the formation of a government of national unity, which led to the first democratic elections, instability continued, and after a period of relative peace another war broke out. The next chapter will focus on the relapse into crisis in the DRC from 2003 to 2013 and South Africa’s continued engagement to bring about peace in that country.
Chapter 4: The DRC’s third crisis (2003-2013) and South Africa’s involvement

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will consider the third conflict in the DRC, from 2003, when the one-plus-four formula or the transitional government which officially ended the second war was implemented, to 2013 when the M23 rebel group in the eastern DRC was defeated. It will also look at South Africa’s involvement in the DRC during that period including its intervention.

Since the conflict broke out in August 1998, the warring factions have entered into numerous negotiated settlements only to renege on the deals and resume hostilities, thus maintaining an atmosphere of insecurity and conflict. The failure of the numerous peace initiatives aimed at resolving the DRC conflict, such as the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in July-August 1999, the DRC-Uganda-Luanda agreement signed in September 2002, the Pretoria Accord signed in December 2002, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (known as the Sun City agreement) signed in April 2003 and the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement signed in July 2009, brought the value of such peace processes into question as much as it did the intentions of the belligerents to end the war.178

Yet, the Sun City agreement of 2003 initially appeared to have succeeded and the implementation of the one-plus-four formula brought about relative peace in the DRC. However, several irregular armed forces continued to fight for local resources, especially in the eastern part of the DRC, and crimes against humanity were commonplace. In January 2008, the DRC government and 22 armed groups agreed to a ceasefire. The signatories to the Goma Agreement committed themselves to maintaining human rights and protecting civilians, but hostilities resumed within months. Following further peace talks in 2009, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) militia agreed to become a political party and its armed wing was integrated into the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC). Despite efforts to strengthen democracy and disarm militia, clashes between the government,

rebel groups and other irregular forces flared up again in 2010. In November 2011 national elections were held in a climate of increasing instability.\textsuperscript{179}

In addition, the immense mining riches of the DRC, the size of its territory, and its geo-strategic position have made it a most important objective for big multinational corporations and their host governments, a battle ground for regional states, and an arena for political contestation and economic predation by local actors.\textsuperscript{180} In this context, this chapter also looks at South Africa’s economic relations with the DRC.

4.2 The DRC’s third war

This section will look at the period from 2003 to 2013, which in this paper is referred to as the DRC’s third war, and will include all conflicts and crises which arose after the end of the DRC’s second war and the implementation of the transitional government. During these ten years there was plenty of intermittent and resurgent conflict ranging from the Ituri conflict (1999-2007) and the Kivu conflict (2004-2013) to the M23 rebellion (2012-2013). Apart from M23, the key rebel groups operating in the DRC ranged from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) to the LRA.

The FDLR, made up of Rwandan Hutu extremists who had entered the Congo following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, has repeatedly attacked civilians. It has also been involved in the recruitment of child soldiers.\textsuperscript{181} Thus, though it has been weakened in recent years, the FDLR remains an important element of the conflict in the DRC. Currently, the FDLR operates with around 2,000 troops.\textsuperscript{182}

Other groups are the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), both Ugandan rebel groups and the National Liberation Forces (FNL), a Burundian, Hutu-led group.\textsuperscript{183} The Mai-Mai Sheka, another rebel group, has contributed to the violence in the DRC by attacking not only civilians, but also UN peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{184} The Ugandan-led Allied Democratic Forces has existed since the mid-1990s. While it is relatively small, the


\textsuperscript{180} Naidoo, “Ending the war economy in the DRC”, 90


\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
ADF has abducted Congolese nationals and is known to have links to the terrorist networks of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. The Ugandan-based Lord’s Resistance Army is led by Joseph Kony, the infamous warlord known for his recruitment of child soldiers. In December 2009, LRA soldiers killed over 300 people and abducted a further 250 more over the course of four days in Makombo, located in north-eastern DRC. However, the most important rebel group was the M23, which will be discussed in the section below.

4.3 The M23 rebellion and its defeat

The M23 which was renamed the “Congolese Revolutionary Army, which had previously comprised the Congrès Nationale pour la Défense du People (CNDP), was supported by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, charges both countries strongly denied. It is a rebel movement consisting mainly of Congolese Tutsis, an ethnic minority in eastern DRC. It was formed by defectors from the Congolese army in late March/early April 2012 amid pressure on the government to arrest its alleged leader, General Bosco Ntaganda, the so called “Terminator”, who was wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The M23 claimed that the head of state, Joseph Kabila, had failed to live up to the 2009 peace agreement signed by the DRC government and the CNDP. The reason for the rebellion was the obvious failure of the integration of elements of political-military movements into the Congolese armed forces. The CNDP was established in December 2006 and its armed wing was officially integrated into the national army. From 2009 to 2012, Ntaganda’s former rebels operated under their own chain of command within the FARDC, an army within an army, and were able to consolidate control over eastern Congo’s natural resources (namely, the mining of conflict minerals in areas rich in tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold).

When it was ‘decided’ that Bosco Ntaganda should be carted off to The Hague, he fought back. However, this brought out the ethnic dynamics in a small ‘Rwandaphone’ region hitherto generalised as homogeneous. The Banyamaisis (supporting Ntaganda) fought the Banyejomba (associated with General Laurent Nkunda). The Banyejomba group won and

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184 Eberhard, *Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo*
186 Ibid.
chose Bertrand Bisimwa as the new M23 political leader. Bosco Ntaganda voluntary surrendered to the ICC’s custody on 22 March 2013.

On 1 April 2012 close to 300 soldiers from the former CNDP deserted the Congolese army, spreading panic in the North Kivu eastern province of the DRC. Within three months M23 had captured the town of Bunagana near the border with Uganda and Rutshuru, a town located just 70 kilometers north of North Kivu’s capital Goma, and threatened to march Goma if attacks against Rwandophone civilians did not cease. Some 600 DRC troops fled across the border and took refuge in Uganda. The M23 issued a statement calling for peace talks with the government. They claimed that their aim was for the terms of the peace agreement to be respected.

Despite the fact that Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame agreed at the AU summit on 15 July 2012 to work with the AU to establish a neutral international force that would patrol the border and dismantle the FDLR and the M23, the hostilities did not stop. The M23 fighters captured the city of Goma with little resistance from the army or UN peacekeepers. The UNSC had backed a unanimously-adopted resolution calling for sanctions against the M23 leadership and demanding an end to external support for the rebels. The M23’s seizure of Goma was condemned by the UNSC, which passed a resolution demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities. A week and a half later, the M23 agreed to withdraw its forces and negotiate with the FARDC. The withdrawal was negotiated at a conference in Uganda, where heads of state in the region, including Rwanda and Uganda, were present. During negotiations, the M23 attempted to push for conditions that would need to be met in order for it to leave the town, including that the Congolese army would also disarm its troops in Goma, and that various Congolese political prisoners would be released. Despite these conditions not being entertained, M23 had no alternative but to pull out of Goma, which they eventually did in December 2012.

After numerous human rights and UN investigative reports had pointed out that Rwanda was the main source of support for M23, key governments suspended parts of their aid programs and made strong appeals to Rwanda to cease all support for the M23, support which Rwanda

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189 Ibid.
190 Eberhard, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
has consistently denied providing. The international community, therefore, came together in
an unprecedented way to demand an end to external support for M23.\textsuperscript{191} M23 announced that
it would disarm and pursue political talks just hours after government forces had driven its
fighters out of their last two hilltop bases of Tshanzu and Runyoni. A two-week UN-backed
offensive had cornered the rebels in the hills along the border with Uganda and Rwanda.\textsuperscript{192}

On the weekend of 25-26 October 2013, with both sides claiming that the other was
responsible for initiating the violence, M23 rebels and the Armed Forces of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (FARDC) attacked each other near Goma. The FARDC was helped by
MONUSCO’s new Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), with participation of the South African
National Defence Force (SANDF). The following week, the UN announced that, after a
strong push by the FARDC, the M23 rebels were “all but finished”. On 30 October 2013 the
M23 was finally driven from its last stronghold in the eastern town of Bunagana, and five
days later it declared a cessation of hostilities. On 5 November 2013 the M23 rebels
surrendered completely and a peace deal was signed on 12 December 2013, facilitated by the
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and SADC.\textsuperscript{193}

The M23 committed atrocities across eastern Congo such as raping, kidnapping and
murdering civilians. According to a UN group of experts, comprising US and other
governments’ intelligence, the M23 was largely fuelled by direct support from neighbouring
Rwanda and by their control of conflict gold.\textsuperscript{194}

One can argue that the defeat of the M23 is a great achievement for the FARDC and
MONUSCO but it cannot be seen as the end of the war in the eastern DRC, given that other
military forces continue to operate in the eastern region, such as the FDLR.

4.4 The UN mission in the DRC: From peacekeeping to peace enforcement

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are among a range of activities engaged in by the
United Nations in order to maintain international peace and security throughout the world.
Peacekeeping operations in the first place aim to maintain peace and security, in particular

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/07/how-congo-defeated-the-m23-rebels.html#
\textsuperscript{192} Aljazeera. 2013. “DR Congo army defeats M23 rebels,” 6 November 2013
\textsuperscript{193} Eberhard, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
\textsuperscript{194} Enough Team. 2013. “The M23 rebellion is over,” 6 November 2013 http://enoughproject.org/blogs/m23-
rebellion-over
providing security and political and peace building support to help countries make difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. Currently, peacekeeping operations are multi-dimensional, as the United Nations is called upon to facilitate the political process, support the organisation of elections, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. Peace enforcement requires the explicit authorisation of the United Nations Security Council and involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force, in order to restore international peace and security where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or against an act of aggression.

The UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC has repeatedly failed to end the continual wars in that country after almost 15 years since its first operations. Reasons offered for this failure range from a misdiagnosis of the roots of the conflict to the inability to come up with a suitable exit strategy.

It took two years for the UNSC to act when a ceasefire was agreed upon in terms of the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement of 1999. This agreement was the basis for the UN Security Council to establish the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in terms of Resolution 1291. Contingents from South Africa, Uruguay, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia were dispatched to implement MONUC’s mandate of safeguarding the UN’s installations and equipment, ensuring the secure and free movement of personnel, and protecting civilians from the imminent threat of physical violence. Since the more than 5 000-strong UN Observer Mission to the Congo (MONUC) lacked the necessary mandate to enforce peace, it failed to protect civilians that were being slaughtered by the warring factions battling for the most lucrative sites in the Ituri region. In 2003, due to the ongoing violence, the UN requested additional international assistance. India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Morocco then sent their contingents, bringing the number of MONUC peacekeepers to 10 415. This figure was increased to 16 000 in 2005 for the supervision of the 2006 election. Although more troops were sent subsequently to manage the deteriorating humanitarian

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198 Ibid.
199 Naidoo, “Ending the war economy in the DRC,” 86
situation, the UN did not prolong MONUC’s initial mandate, scheduled to end in 2008. Therefore, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in 2010 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1925 to establish the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). In support of the objectives of the Framework for Peace, Security and Co-operation for the DRC and the region, it was then proposed that a dedicated intervention brigade be established within MONUSCO. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2098 on 28 March 2013, which established a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander, with responsibility for neutralising armed groups. It has been argued that this more robust engagement in peacekeeping in the DRC was necessitated by the incapacity of the existing UN mission to control the various rebel movements.

It should be stressed that the complex operation to contain the Congolese conflict has been one of the largest and most expensive in the UN’s history. However, according to Menondji, a mission of this size and scope has inevitably met with difficulties: holdups in funding contributions; delays between the UNSC’s authorisation to deploy personnel and their actual deployment; and, worse, lack of a common language and training methods. Since 1999, the UN peacekeeping effort in the DRC has cost approximately $8.7 billion. More than thirty nations have contributed military and police personnel. Large peacekeeping missions of the UN and regional organisations with more than 20 000 troops are currently deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Malte Brosig has noted that peacekeepers increasingly operate in situations of severe insecurity and violence, peace enforcement globally and the use of offensive military capabilities is often not the exception but forms an essential part of the mission mandate. The DRC is a notable example of this. Despite the UN mission in the DRC for many years, the unrest never seems to end, which is why the UN has sent a force of some 3 000 well-equipped troops with a tougher mandate than that of any other peacekeeping force, tasked with disarming and “neutralising” the rebel forces in eastern DRC. Their use of helicopter gunships against the rebels is credited with having made a huge difference, paving the way for the army to retake the territory seized by the rebels in 2012.

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200 Menondji, Problematic Peacekeeping in the DRC
201 SA & DRC Bilateral Relations
202 Brosig, “African solutions to African problems or meddling in your neighbour’s conflict?”
203 Menondji, Problematic Peacekeeping in the DRC:
204 Ibid.
205 Brosig, “African Solutions to African problems or meddling in your neighbour’s conflict?”
206 Ibid.
With regard to MONUSCO’s contribution to the defeat of M23, its offensive began on 24 October 2013 when Congolese army units, aided by the new Force Intervention Brigade, advanced into territory north of Goma held by the rebels. MONUSCO supported the Congolese troops with helicopters and infantry units. The offensive began with the expulsion of the rebels from the towns of Kibumba, Rutshuru, Kiwanja and Rumungabo, all situated on a 60-mile stretch of highway heading north from Goma. Less than a week later, the M23 was forced out of Bunagana, its operational headquarters near the border with Uganda.\(^{208}\) The success of this offensive can be attributed to a great degree to the overhaul of the notoriously ill-disciplined army through MONUSCO intervention. A second factor was that Rwanda seems to have stayed out of the fighting as a result of pressure from the US. Both John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, and William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, had telephoned Paul Kagame separately and insisted that he stay out of the conflict.\(^{209}\)

It is important to note that the Intervention Brigade has thus far predominantly focused on M23 rather than on the FDLR, which was complicit in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This has created further skepticism and opposition in Kigali, which has now accused the UN of applying double standards.\(^{210}\)

Moreover, the defeat of the M23 cannot be seen as the end of the almost two decades of conflicts in the DRC. Numerous other armed groups continue to operate in the eastern part of the country. At the time of the writing of this paper, Major General Jean Baillaud, MONUSCO Force Commander \textit{ad interim}, states that “they are prepared to fight all armed groups and protect civilians”. He further argues that military success has clearly shown the capacities of the FARDC and MONUSCO to conduct joint actions and their common determination to neutralise all armed groups.\(^{211}\) Nevertheless, many still argue that the solution for peace in the DRC should not be by military action alone. As Severine Austerre\(^{212}\) has noted, the failure to keep the peace in the DRC can be explained by the erroneous “labelling of the Congo as a post-conflict situation”, and the “conceptualisation of international intervention as exclusively concerned with the national and international


\(^{209}\)Ibid.

\(^{210}\)Brosig, “African solutions to African problems or meddling in your neighbour’s conflict?”

\(^{211}\)UN News Centre. “UN Mission chief applauds joint operations against armed groups in eastern DR Congo”

\(^{212}\)Severine Austerre, quoted by Menondji, in “Problematic Peacekeeping in the DRC”
realms”. The mistaken understanding of the DRC as a stabilised post-conflict environment has led to equally mistaken conclusions regarding adequate strategies for intervention.

4.5 South Africa’s economic relations with the DRC

One can locate South Africa’s policy towards the DRC within South Africa’s Africa policy. Sidiropoulos\textsuperscript{213} argues that South Africa’s engagement with Africa rests on three pillars:

1. Strengthening Africa’s regional (the South African Customs Union, SACU and the Southern African Development Community, SADC) and continental (the African Union, AU) institutions by enhancing South Africa’s proactive participation in these bodies aimed at promoting integration and development;

2. Supporting the implementation of Africa’s socio-economic development programme, NEPAD, and of SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the regional expression of NEPAD.

3. Strengthening bilateral relations through effective structures for dialogue and cooperation. This includes support for peace, security, stability and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives and South Africa’s participation in the implementation of Africa’s peace and security agenda and the management of peace missions.

South Africa’s engagement in the DRC has its foundation in these three pillars. What follows illustrates South Africa’s involvement in the peace process in the DRC, especially the contributions of Mandela and Mbeki.

According to Stephen Gelb, the adoption of NEPAD represented the clearest expression thus far of South Africa’s national interests on the continent. He claimed that the successful implementation of NEPAD would lead to sustainable development, economic growth and more integration of Africa in the global economy.\textsuperscript{214} South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Co-operation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, has emphasised the need for economic development on the African continent in the following words: “We believe that

\textsuperscript{213}Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth. 2007. “South Africa’s regional engagement for peace and security,” Madrid, Spain: FRIDE, 3

\textsuperscript{214}Adelzadeh, A. 1999.“The cost of staying the course,” Ngqo: An Economic Bulletin of the National Institute for Economic Policy, 1(1) 4
greater intra-regional trade will produce considerable economic gains for Africa, accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty, and enhance food and energy security.”

South Africa is currently regarded as Africa’s first economic power, accounting for 40% of sub-Saharan Africa’s combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP). What is more, South Africa’s strategy has advanced the proposition that “there can be no successful peace-building without socio-economic development and political and economic stability, and conversely there can be no sustainable development and political stability without a successful comprehensive peace-building initiative”. It should be noted that the expansion of corporate South Africa into Africa intensified during Mbeki’s African Renaissance and has intensified even more during Jacob Zuma’s presidency.

South Africa’s economic relations with the DRC should also be understood within the context of peace, stability and security and sustained renewal, growth and socio-economic development for the African continent. Furthermore, South Africa is committed to efforts for post-conflict reconstruction and development in the DRC that are aligned with those of the African Union and NEPAD. Hence, its assistance to the DRC is broadly focused on three key areas, namely,: security sector reform (SSR), institutional capacity building and economic development. South Africa’s business interests in the DRC range from mining, construction, energy, fisheries, communication and agriculture through to trade and information technology. South Africa and the DRC have signed several agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), such as the Trilateral MoU between South Africa, the DRC and Sweden on co-operation in the area of public service administration, the MoU between South Africa and the DRC government related to co-operation on capacity-building for the Congolese National Police Force, the convention between the SA and DRC governments for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to taxes on income, the agreement on co-operation between SA and the DRC in the field of agriculture, and the agreement between SA and the DRC regarding mutual assistance between the customs administrations. The General Co-operation Agreement signed

215 Nkoana-Mashabane, Lecture on South Africa’s Foreign Policy
216 Alden and Soko, “South Africa’s Economic Relations with Africa”
219 Department of International Affairs and Cooperation. 2007. Press comments made by South African President Thabo Mbeki and President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Joseph Kabila, Tuynhuys, Cape Town, Thursday, 14 June 2007
220 Ibid
by South Africa and the DRC on 14 February 2004 has served to strengthen bilateral political, economic and technical cooperation and made provision for the establishment of a Bi-National Commission (BNC).221

South African businesses in the DRC are G4 Securicor, African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited, SRK Consulting, Standard Bank DRC, Ruashi Mining, Hermis Transport, Group Five, Vodacom, F.H. Bertling, AngloGold Ashanti, Shoprite, PG Glass, BSI Steel, Motor Engineering, South African Express, South African Airways, Bell Equipment and Global Paints and Chemicals.222 Despite the fact that the UN Security Council had accused a dozen South African companies of illegally “looting” the DRC during the turmoil in the late 1990s,223 in mid-2002 South Africa, the DRC and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) arranged for a “bridge loan” to the DRC of Special Drawing Rights totaling about R760 million. Within 18 months, Mbeki had forged a $10 billion deal with Kabila for trade and investment and had gained access to $4 billion worth of World Bank tenders for South African companies.224

There are two South African groups in the mining sector. The first group operates independently of the government; it includes Ashanti Gold and De Beers, Anglo Vaal, BHP Billiton, JIG Mining, Metorex Kumba Resources and Mwana Africa. La Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA) and De Beers signed a joint venture agreement to exploit diamonds in the DRC on 23 November 2005, and BHP Billiton signed an agreement with the Congolese government to invest US$ 2.5 billion in an aluminum plant in the Bas Congo province. It was also reported that six companies operating under AngloGold Ashanti’s exploration of the Kilo Moto gold belt were involved in gold mining.225

The second group of South African companies that are doing business in the DRC is those who have entered with the South African government. The South African government signed a bilateral co-operation agreement with its Congolese counterpart on economy, infrastructure, and finances. These parastatals include: Mintek, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the South African Diamond Board and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC).

222 Ibid.
225 Financial Mail, 23 December 2005
With regard to hydro-electrical power, the South African government is in need of alternative sources of energy for its growing economy. Minister Nkoana-Mashabane has stressed that a major achievement towards the goal of economic gains for Africa was the signing of a crucial treaty on the Grand Inga hydropower project by South Africa and the DRC, could eventually become the largest hydro-electric project in the world, with the potential to power half of the African continent. Under this agreement, signed on 29 October 2013, South Africa will consume 2 500 MW of the total production of Inga III. An amount of 1 300 MW will be used for mining in Katanga and 1 feasible when South Africa committed itself to purchasing more than half of its production. In the hydro-electric field, the DRC has the potential to generate 100 000 MW, mainly through the Congo River basin. By itself, the Inga site represents 44% of the national potential.

South African and DRC trade relations have increased considerably although bilateral trade is heavily skewed in South Africa’s favour due to the limited capacity for production on the part of the DRC’s economy. Currently, Pretoria is the DRC’s biggest supplier of foreign goods and services, providing 21.6% of the country’s total imports. In 2012, South Africa’s exports to the DRC amounted to R12 142 billion whilst its imports from the DRC amounted to only R67 million, resulting in a trade surplus of R12,074 billion for South Africa (a 65.7% increase from the figure of R7 934 billion in 2011). The table below also shows how the total exports from South Africa grew and slumped and grew again over the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports to SA from DRC</th>
<th>Exports to DRC from SA</th>
<th>Total trade balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>47 768 011</td>
<td>2 479 644 104</td>
<td>2 431 876 093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>54 034 126</td>
<td>4 369 539 310</td>
<td>4 315 505 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>43 239 861</td>
<td>9 203 936 291</td>
<td>9 160 696 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>72 354 386</td>
<td>4 829 931 726</td>
<td>4 757 577 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>72 354 386</td>
<td>6 318 722 965</td>
<td>6 218 211 954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>106 500 768</td>
<td>8 040 664 774</td>
<td>7 934 164 006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67 436 251</td>
<td>12 141 678 103</td>
<td>12 074 241 853</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


226 Nkoana-Mashabane, Lecture on South Africa’s Foreign Policy
228 SA & DRC Bilateral Relations
These figures reflect how South Africa’s economic interests in the DRC have substantially increased. Apart from this, it can also be noted that South Africa has invested heavily in the democratic process in the DRC. For instance, for the DRC’s 2006 democratic elections, it is estimated that South Africa spent over R50 million assisting the process.229 Mbeki’s government provided electoral assistance through the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa. Again, in November 2011, the South African Government contributed approximately R126 million to ensure that the elections took place and that the DRC consolidated its democracy.230 The SANDF transported a total of 1 863 tons of electoral material, such as ballot papers printed in South Africa, to 13 transit points in the DRC, on 39 flights.231

Another factor that revealed South Africa’s economic interests in the DRC was the Khulubuse Zuma affair. Kabila, the DRC’s head of state, set off a legal dispute between a leading European oil firm and Khulubuse Zuma, the South African president’s nephew, when in 2010, he awarded two exploration blocks to companies owned by Khulubuse Zuma. The DRC’s government had previously allocated these exploration rights to Irish oil major Tullow, and South Africa’s Divine Inspiration Group. This dispute pointed to the fact that President Zuma had been personally involved and that South African diplomacy in the DRC had certainly aided such deals.232

4.6 South Africa’s military intervention in the DRC’s third war

South Africa’s engagement in international peace missions is informed by its White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, which was adopted by Parliament in October 1999. It committed the country to supporting the initiatives of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, where applicable, that are aimed at the prevention, management and resolution of international conflicts.233 Prior to 1999 South Africa had not decided how it would be involved in peace missions on the continent. In other words, South Africa’s foreign policy embraced the notion of multilateralism in 1999 when its parliament adopted the White Paper mentioned above.

230 SA & DRC Bilateral Relations
232 Ibid.
South Africa’s leaders held the view that multilateralism was an important tool when addressing the challenges facing the world. South Africa learnt about the importance of multilateralism after the issue of Sani Abacha, when Mandela had unilaterally spoken out against Nigeria. Gwcxe emphasised that this unilateral approach led to the isolation of South Africa, while Pretoria took home the lesson that African countries do not humiliate each other in international fora.234

Sidiropoulos235 noted three factors that shaped South Africa’s foreign policy with regard to conflict resolution and peace missions. The first was identity. The most outstanding feature of foreign policy in the post-apartheid era was, indeed, South Africa’s identification and engagement with the rest of Africa. South Africa had an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spillover effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood. The second factor was the evolving nature of conflict and security challenges, primarily but not exclusively, on the African continent. State collapse, migratory diseases, trafficking of arms, drugs and people, ethnic violence, interstate warfare, crime and transnational terrorism combined in a conflict matrix far more complex than that of the Cold War. In the logic of consequences South Africa noted in its White Paper notes, “a radically altered post-Cold-War security environment has seen the transformation (or mutation) of classical peacekeeping operations into complex, multidimensional conflict management activities”. Sidiropoulos further argued that South Africa’s self-identification as an African state and the vastly transformed nature of local and international conflicts underpin the country’s foreign policy philosophy.

The third important factor noted by Sidiropoulos with reference to the White Paper of 1999, which is specific to South Africa’s approach to conflict resolution, was the country’s own experience of peaceful transformation from apartheid to democracy. As the White Paper states:

South Africa provides the international community with a unique example of how a country, having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development. The South African approach to conflict resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history and this national interest

235Sidiropoulos, “South Africa’s regional engagement for peace and security,” 7-8
and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts compels it to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts.236

This to say, South Africa sought to resolve conflicts by referring to its own experience. However its leaders did not take into account the complexity of some African conflicts, in this case the DRC conflicts. While one may agree with Sidiropoulos that South Africa’s conflict resolution model rests on three pillars, namely, preventative diplomacy, peace-building and peace-making, one can argue that South Africa’s conflict resolution model also needed to incorporate a peace enforcement aspect, as seen in the current peace enforcement in the DRC under MONUSCO. South Africa, along with SADC, pushed strongly for the establishment of the FIB within MONUSCO.237

In its post-conflict strategy, South Africa has placed particular emphasis on the DRC, Burundi, Sudan, and the Comoros. South Africa’s strategy has advanced the proposition that “There can be no successful peace-building without socio-economic development and political and economic stability, and conversely there can be no sustainable development and political stability without a successful comprehensive peace-building initiative”.238 This currently applies to peace enforcement in the DRC. In addition, South Africa’s Department of Defence is playing a vital role in the upgrading of military training centres, the training of military personnel and the provision of medical assistance. The majority of the operations are being carried out in partnership with MONUSCO, the Netherlands, and the DRC Defence Force.239

Despite the fact that South Africa lost soldiers in Central Africa Republic (CAR) the SANDF has not been frightened off from its deployment to the DRC. South Africa’s stance regarding this deployment can be seen as ambiguous because there is no direct threat to South Africa’s national security. However, Pretoria does have interests in the DRC. For instance, it has signed a contract in relation to the Grand Inga Dam and President Zuma’s nephew,

236 Ibid
Khulubuse Zuma, has natural resource assets in the DRC. Malte Brosig has stressed that, as regular Congolese troops moved into former rebel positions, tensions with Rwanda increased, resulting in an exchange of heavy gun and artillery fire in early June 2014. Kagame’s firm hand on the domestic opposition, including the execution of opposition members in South Africa, also led to a severe cooling down of diplomatic relations between Kigali and Pretoria. With the extensive economic interests of South Africa in the DRC and its leadership role within the FIB this situation bears considerable political weight.\(^{240}\)

The SANDF’s presence in the DRC in support of MONUSCO consisted of three military observers, 25 staff officers and a contingent of 1,345 personnel, those in the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). “Rooivalk\(^{241}\) combat support helicopters were deployed for the first time and played a pivotal role in the defeat of M23 rebel armed group in eastern DRC’.\(^{242}\)

On 24 February 2013, South Africa, along with ten other African countries as well as the UN, the AU, the ICGLR and SADC, signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region. “This is arguably the most important international effort to date to resolve the challenge of the recurring conflicts in eastern DRC.”\(^{243}\)

South Africa is still engaged in the DRC peace process and determined to help the DRC in its post-conflict reconstruction. At the time of writing this thesis, five South African Infantry Battalions are supporting Congolese troops in driving the remaining Mai-Mai rebels into a cordon in the mountains north of Masisi and preparing for a final ground and air assault.\(^{244}\)

### 4.7 Conclusion

This chapter reveals that South Africa is still heavily involved in the DRC. Its initial stance of resolving conflict through peaceful resolution and dialogue has shifted to one of heavy participation in peace enforcement under the UN umbrella. The nature of South Africa’s participation may be seen as not altruistic given that its interests in the DRC economy have

\(^{240}\)Brosig, “African solutions to African problems or meddling in your neighbour’s conflict?”

\(^{241}\)South African Air Force. 2013. “Rooivalk helicopters have been attached to the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade”


\(^{243}\)SA & DRC Bilateral Relations

grown considerably since the early 2000s. These interests range from mining corporations through to telecommunications and, among other things, the signing of the Great Inga Dam deal. At the same time South Africa has been engaged in contributing to peace and security in the region through a negotiation approach. The next chapter will examine why South Africa shifted from its stance of no military intervention in 1998 to military intervention in 2013, and it still militarily active even during the writing of this paper.
Chapter 5: South Africa’s policy toward the DRC: From non-intervention to intervention

5.1 Introduction

The object of this chapter is the defence of the standpoint that South Africa’s foreign policy toward the DRC can be found in its policy toward Africa. Even though economic relations between Pretoria and DRC have increased, South Africa’s contribution to the peace process in the DRC has been seen as a quest for peace and security in Africa as a whole, and particularly in Southern Africa; conflict remains the greatest challenge to Africa’s development. In other words, South Africa, as an emerging middle power, can be expected to play a role of peacemaker in the region, which is why it remains involved in the DRC. South Africa is aware that due to its strategic and geopolitical importance, most importantly its abundant resources, the DRC could boost not only its own development but also that of the entire continent.

However, the recurrent and persistent wars in DRC since 1996 have had a negative impact on the African continent in general and Southern Africa in particular, politically, socially and economically. Congo has become a never-ending nightmare, one of the bloodiest conflicts since World War II, with more than five million dead. Furthermore, it has undermined the security of Southern Africa and the whole continent. The international community, especially the Western powers, believed that South Africa was best placed to play the role of peacemaker on the continent, most importantly in Southern Africa. Given that the new democratic South Africa was being singled out by the international community, including most African countries, as the best candidate to enforce peace on the Africa continent and given its foreign policy objectives in Africa (namely the African Renaissance), South Africa could not have remained aloof from the DRC crisis. On the other hand, South Africa’s economic interest in the DRC has increased drastically over the two past decades, which makes one question South Africa’s shift from non-military intervention to military intervention.

South Africa’s policy towards the DRC may be seen from two perspectives, political and economic. Politically, South Africa’s role in the DRC can be understood as part of South

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Africa’s policy towards the continent as a whole. As stated in its foreign policy white paper, Africa was the cornerstone of South Africa’s foreign policy. Additionally, South Africa as an emerging middle power was committed to promoting peace and security in Africa, especially in the southern region.

Secondly, South Africa’s engagement in the DRC can also be seen as driven by economic interests, as South Africa has increased its economic involvement in the DRC over the past two decades, as shown in Chapter 4. One can argue that South Africa’s engagement in the DRC second war could be seen as looking to access the DRC’s enormous natural resources, while its involvement in the DRC third war could be seen as aimed at increasing its economic interests and securing them. South Africa’s economic relation with the DRC is based on a bilateral approach, in contrast to its engagement in peace enforcement, which has a multilateral basis.

This chapter summarises and analyses South Africa’s shift in foreign policy towards the DRC from ‘no military intervention’ to military intervention. Then it gives the overall conclusion.

5.2 Explaining South Africa’s non-intervention in 1998

South Africa’s reluctance to intervene militarily to back Kabila in 1998 is believed to have been motivated by its adherence to its doctrine of democratic peace and peaceful resolution of disputes. However, Pretoria’s military involvement in Lesotho in September of that year in an attempt to prevent a coup weakened its stance towards the Congo war. This was seen by Kabila and its allies as applying double standards and promoting regional apartheid policies.246

SA refused to back Kabila, stating that it would only go for a political and diplomatic solution. Some analysts argued the intervention by the SADC trio (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) should not been seen as a peacemaking mission but rather as a neo-interventionism phenomenon. With its non-intervention during 1998-2003, South Africa sought to end the DRC war through diplomatic means, while in the third war, South Africa sought to use a diplomatic approach alongside a military presence within the UN peace enforcement mission. The diplomatic approach as opposed to military intervention was opted for by South Africa in the DRC second war, while many scholars and analysts argue that it should have been the

other way round, claiming that were it not for the intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, Kabila’s regime could have failed within a week, given the countries who brought Kabila into power, namely, Rwanda and Uganda, knew his weakness and thought they would obviously succeed in their operation, but they did not because of the SADC trio military intervention. South Africa’s pronouncements, actions and inaction were part of the soft power concept in its Africa policy, even though in some instances coercive power might have been the more appropriate response to instability in the region.247

As described in Chapter 3, South Africa’s refusal to intervene militarily in the DRC’s second war can be attributed to two factors. The first was the tension and lack of trust between Mandela and Laurent Kabila. With regard to the first Zaire/Congo war, Mandela wanted to punish Kabila for his lack of consideration towards his elders and his refusal to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner. Even though South Africa recognised Kabila’s government quickly, it thought that Kabila would easily opt for a government of national unity and respect human rights, but Kabila chose to neutralise all Mobutu collaborators. Another tension was the revaluation of South Africa’s mining contracts. One can argue that South Africa could not back the DRC militarily because of both of these factors.

Another reason South Africa did not back Kabila militarily was the tension between South Africa and Zimbabwe regarding leadership in the region, as well as the differences between the two countries over the DRC’s economy and trade, characterised at one time by accusations by the Zimbabwean business community that South Africa intended to de-industrialise their economy in the DRC.248

However, when Mbeki took power in 1999, South Africa became intensively involved in the DRC peace process, changing its position from a reluctance to intervene along with other SADC countries to a willingness to back Laurent Kabila. President Mbeki’s policy approach toward the DRC crisis, as in other African conflicts, was different from Mandela’s to the extent that it was more multilateral. Nelson Mandela’s unilateralism in approaching the crisis had brought South Africa’s pride and credibility into question, particularly with reference to the Sana Abacha issue.249 Mbeki managed to bring South Africa back into the process by relocating the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) to South Africa. South Africa’s commitment

247Monyae, Learning to Lead
248Landsberg, “The impossible neutrality,” 111
to the DRC could not be isolated from the economic concerns of Southern Africa.250 South Africa invested heavily in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue held at Sun City in February 2002, but this mediation effort was suspected to be coloured by self-interest. South Africa contributed peacekeeping troops, committed its support to the development of the DRC’s public sector and invested millions of rand and years of diplomacy to bring stability to the DRC. These efforts were insufficient, as the DRC continued to experience wars and insecurity, mostly in its eastern part.

5.3 Explaining South Africa’s military intervention in 2013

South Africa’s involvement in the DRC peace process has brought mixed reactions. Some argue that Pretoria’s interest in preserving peace and stability are driven by the need to access the DRC’s resources, while the head of the DRC expressed his appreciation of South Africa’s efforts to promote peace and democracy in his country in these words: “The government of South Africa has invested so much in a solution to a crisis that has affected my country for so long.”251

South Africa’s engagement in the DRC third war can be understand as engagement in a peace mission; as noted in the foreign policy white paper, South Africa is committed to supporting any initiatives of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, where applicable, aimed at the prevention, management and resolution of international conflicts.252

Even though South Africa’s leaders and politicians had initially been adamant that they would not participate in a military solution, and that they needed to bring a political solution to all conflicts on the African continent, South Africa came to realise, together with the international community, that to bring about sustainable peace in the DRC, there was a need for peace enforcement. That is why South Africa sent its contingent to MONUSCO for peace enforcement, and followed a multilateral procedure.

Some analysts hold that South Africa should indeed ensure that economic benefits accrue from its involvement in the stabilisation of Africa. They would argue for the formation of coalitions and alliances the purpose of which is to advance trade and commercial linkages

250 Ibid.
between South Africa and other African states, and build stronger economies, rather than to advance geo-political interests or political solidarity.  

5.4 Analysing South Africa’s shift from no military intervention to military intervention

The debate continues as to the main characteristic of South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa, namely soft power versus hard power. Hard power politics encourages reliance on military interventions, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions by foreign policymakers in the conduct of foreign policy. Contrary to this, soft power strategies are those that employ a non-confrontational approach. Carlsnaes and Nel argue that South Africa has been resolute in promoting the African vision of multilateralism as the appropriate institutional means for promoting international co-operation and conflict resolution.

With regard to the DRC, Pretoria had chosen the soft power approach. Peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement happens on a multilateral basis, under the UN’s wings. At the same time its engagements can be seen as privileging the economic aspect of its relations with the DRC at the expense of security and peace in that country.

During Mandela’s era, South Africa did not have a specific peace mission policy. South Africa’s peace missions began and were accentuated during Mbeki’s presidency. While Mandela’s foreign policy was marked by idealism and human rights, South Africa’s foreign policy shifted to a more realistic approach and neo-liberalism under Mbeki.

One can detect a continuity of foreign policy in some aspects from Mandela’s to Mbeki’s presidency, but during Zuma’s presidency a clear change in dealing with conflict resolution may be seen. South Africa’s foreign policy toward the DRC has shifted from soft power to hard power. At some point economic interests have influenced Zuma’s presidency in dealing with the DRC third war.

With regard to continuity, in reference to the ANC National Conference of 1999, one notes that dialogue and peaceful resolutions were conceived as essential tools in addressing conflicts, in order to ensure that a just and suitable order was created in Africa and the world. The ANC conferences from that of 2002 in Stellenbosch to that of 2007 in Polokwane all

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254 Wagner, “From hard power to soft power?”

255 Carlsnaes and Nel, “Introduction” in In Full Flight, 19.
reiterated that South Africa would still encourage dialogue to resolve Africa’s conflicts. This approach is deep seated in South Africa’s own story. This is stated in South Africa’s white paper on foreign policy as follows:

South Africa provides the international community with a unique example of how a country, having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development. The South African approach to conflict resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history and this national interest and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts compels it to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts.256

With this in mind, it makes complete sense that in dealing with the DRC in the second war South Africa chose peace talks over militarily intervention.

But by 2013, South Africa’s foreign policy toward the DRC has changed, from being reluctant to intervene militarily in 1998, to being more active militarily than even by 2013; even during the writing of this paper South Africa remains actively involved militarily in the DRC. South Africa’s foreign policy has changed from dialogue and negotiation as the only tool for resolving conflicts to a kind of mix of dialogue and hard power.

South Africa’s willingness to intervene through a multilateralism approach can be seen in its engagement in the DRC. South Africa’s role conception is explicitly normative, and can best be described as that of a norm-promoting middle power of the South. A central dimension of South Africa’s normative role has been its promotion of rules-based multilateralism as the appropriate institutional form for conducting international affairs.257.

With regard to the DRC’s war of 2012-2013, one could argue that the international community, in particular South Africa, understood that the DRC crisis needed more than soft diplomacy; to put it clearly, a military intervention was needed to bring about an end to the M23 rebellion.

Even though South Africa’s recent military intervention in the DRC can be justified as being on a multilateral basis, and therefore in accord with the principles of the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, one notices that when the interests of a country are at stake, that country does not hesitate to opt for a hard solution. In other words, where the economic interest is to be preserved and secured, the state is more likely to intervene even militarily to secure its national interest. In contrast, when the economic interest is lower or non-existent, a country is more reluctant to intervene even when the situation is more critical. For instance, in 1998 when Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola was claiming to back Kabila through a multilateral process, under the umbrella of SADC, South Africa categorically refused to be part of it. This could be because South Africa did not have sufficient economic interest in that country at the time, as Kabila had reviewed South Africa’s mining deal with the DRC. Comparing South Africa’s stance towards the DRC second war and her involvement in Lesotho the same year, 1998, one could argue that South Africa applied double standards in its foreign policy. This weakened South Africa’s stance for dialogue as the *sine qua non* condition for conflict resolution. South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho was seen as motivated by its need to protect its strategic resources, mainly the supply of water to its industrial and commercial hub, Gauteng. At that time South Africa had no equivalent economic reason to back Kabila, as the latter had already reviewed South Africa’s mining deal in the DRC.

It seems odd that South Africa is currently militarily involved in the DRC, and even more that it was the one who pushed for the adoption by the UN Security Council of the FIB; the SANDF as the robust contingent inside the FIB. At the same time, one notices an increase of South African economic interest in the DRC, ranging from mining to the signature of the Grand Inga Dam contract. One may argue therefore that South Africa’s economic interest in the DRC has influenced its engagement in the peace process.

One can also argue that the DRC has become a strategic country for South Africa’s interests, given the increase of South Africa’s investment in that country particularly as the Great Inga Dam project can be viewed as the “saviour” of South Africa’s current shortage of electricity. Electricity shortages pose the biggest risk to South Africa’s economy, and in the long term “South Africa cannot dream of reaching a higher-growth path without an increase in base

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258Hadebe, “South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho, 1998”
load capacity”.259 Given this similarity to the Lesotho issue described above, which concerned the crucial need for water, it makes sense that South Africa would opt for a strategy that will preserve its national interest in the DRC. That is, it makes sense that South Africa pushed for peace enforcement in the DRC third war, in order to bring about sustainable peace and security in the interests of both countries. As emphasised by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane in her lecture at the University of the Witwatersrand, on 10 April 2014, a better world is not only about peace, but also development.

This research has set the base for further research in the new era of South Africa’s participation in the DRC peace mission and its future perspectives on dealing with conflict in the African continent. One can also leave for future research the continuation of South Africa’s current involvement in the DRC to cast out the remaining rebels and whether South Africa’s current military intervention under the umbrella of the UN will bring about sustainable peace and security in the DRC, and even in the entire Great Lakes region.

5.5 Conclusion

South Africa’s hope and intention was to resolve all conflicts in relation to its own experience; however, the background and complexity of the DRC conflict is very different from the South African situation. Therefore, unless they deal with the root cause of the crisis, any solution will be fragile, and the Great Lakes region, especially the DRC, will continue to have recurrent conflicts. South Africa alone cannot shoulder the weight of peace enforcement or peacekeeping in the region. These must be addressed by all relevant parties: the UN, the OUA and most importantly SADC. But SADC does not have the finance or equipment to provide a strong peace enforcement presence to resolve the conflict in the DRC once and for all.

Even though South Africa’s shift from no military intervention to military intervention in the DRC seems to reflect South Africa’s economic interest in this geo-strategic country, this is not the prime reason for the shift. Although South Africa’s interest in the DRC has indeed increased, one can locate this in South Africa’s desire to see the African continent move out of its marginal place in the world since the final arrival of freedom in the region. However, as South Africa has many FDIs in the DRC, persistent instability in that country would put

South Africa’s investments at risk. Any country in the world would protect its economic interests once their existence was at stake, and this may be the case with South Africa.

It should also be stressed that South Africa along with the international community understood that the long and intermittent DRC crisis had to come to an end. All political and diplomatic efforts had failed to bring about sustained peace and security. In contrast, peace enforcement could end the crisis, which undermines the development not only of the DRC but of the whole continent. This potentially rich country could be a starting point for the development of Africa, if its resources are used legally and fairly.

The defeat of the M23 is a small step for regional peace, but a giant leap for Congo’s confidence that united internal action backed by unified external support can result in huge progress.260

With regard to South Africa’s foreign policy toward the DRC, one may argue that South Africa’s reluctance to intervene militarily in the DRC second war was a result of not having sufficient interest to do so and of its preference for a peaceful resolution of all conflicts because of its own experience, while its involvement in the peace talks at that time during the second war, could be viewed as somehow opening the way for greater penetration of the DRC’s enormous resources by South African corporations. Similarly, South Africa’s involvement in peace enforcement in the DRC third war may be seen as securing South Africa’s economic interest, ranging from mining to the biggest achievement, the Grand Inga Dam contract, while at the same time, it may be seen in the context of South Africa’s engagement in Africa, which views the resolution of conflicts in the continent as a vital basis for democracy, good governance and economic development. It is perhaps too soon to assess the record of a country that is still militarily involved in bringing about peace and security in another country; what one may assert is that the drivers of South Africa’s foreign policy can be understood as its national interest and its role as an emerging middle power.

Ultimately, South Africa’s aim during both the second and the third wars in the DRC was to build a bridge for sustained peace and stability in the Great Lakes region, particularly in the DRC. Even though South Africa’s involvement has been guided by Pretoria’s overall African policy and the economic interest of South Africa in the DRC, this involvement will be of inestimable value to the durable future peace and stability of the DRC. Development of the

DRC may bring about development in the whole Southern Africa region, even in the entire Africa continent.
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