Socio-spatial politics of community safety governance in Johannesburg

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, for a Doctor of Philosophy Degree. At no other university or institution has it been submitted as a requirement for a degree or any other qualification.

Signature: [Signature]

17th day of May 2013
Abstract

Presenting evidence from Yeoville, Johannesburg, I argue that community safety governance is a field of socio-spatial micro-politics in which the crime, violence and safety governance agenda is sometimes superseded by other organisational, institutional and social group interests. More often than not, organisational, institutional, individual and social group actors compete or coalesce for legitimacy, honour, prestige, and economic resources. I observe that ‘ethno-national regionalism’ is one of the organising logics in community security initiatives. In Yeoville there was criminalising scapegoating and counter-scapegoating between some South African and African immigrant groups. Public perceptions, discourses and practices in the field of community security governance in Yeoville were territorialised. I argue that safety governance at neighbourhood level easily materialises into the discursive politics of appropriation, control and (re)ordering of place and space; which at once either promote or undermine the production of safety.

Following my empirical observations of the dynamics associated with community safety initiatives, I argue that community security governing organisations should not simply be viewed as security producing entities or spaces of creative community building micro-politics, but also as spaces and entities of socially debilitating and sometimes malicious informal or formal micro-politics. If debilitating or malicious, this micro-politics has the potential of undermining safety production and neighbourhood development.

I deploy, test and edify Bourdieusian “thinking tools”, using Yeoville, as my social laboratory for thinking the materialities, sensibilities and rationalities of the local politics of community safety governance. The testing of Bourdieusian thought in the study of urban safety is novel, not only to South Africa, but to elsewhere.

Methodologically, I employ a qualitative research design aimed at enabling an in-depth dissection of the anatomy of miniature politics associated with community safety governance; and developing a detailed narrative and theoretical account of this politics. The research methods utilised include participant observation, unstructured and semi-structured interviews and document reviews.
Dedication

To the memory of my grandparents Martha Hlekani Katsaura (1935-2012) and Peri Katsaura (1918-2010)
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List of Acronyms

ANC: African National Congress
ADF: African Diaspora Forum
CBD: Central Business District
COPE: Congress of the People
CPF: Community Policing Forum
CPTED: Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
JDA: Johannesburg Development Agency
RHD: Refugee Help Desk
SAPS: South African Police Service
VEC: Victim Empowerment Centre
YBCEC: Yeoville Bellevue Community Empowerment Committee
YBCDT: Yeoville Bellevue Community Development Trust
YCF: Yeoville Community Forum
YCPF: Yeoville Community Policing Forum
YS: Yeoville Studio
YSF: Yeoville Stakeholders Forum
1. Chapter One
   Introduction

“Fearfulness appears to have become a way of life in modern society. Many of us – or so we are told – are afraid to go out on the streets of our towns, at night certainly, but even during daylight hours as well. Yet staying at home carries its own threats: a whole industry manufacturing alarms, locks and surveillance mechanisms has been founded on our conviction that our homes are wide open to dangerous intruders. We view strangers with suspicion and the future with trepidation” (Tudor 2003: 238-239).

1.1. Setting the context

Fear of real or imagined violence and crime (and other urban disorders) has a huge impact on the spatial and social organisation of contemporary cities (Sandercock 2003; Tudor 2003). Spatial impacts include the creation of gated neighbourhoods, road closures and adoption of military technologies by residents seeking to protect their spaces (Davis 1998; Landman 2004a; Landman 2004b; Landman 2008; Murray 2011). Social impacts include the formation of safety governing community organisations, neighbourhood associations, mob justice and other preventive, adaptive or reactive individual or social group practices (strategies and tactics) (Armstrong, Francis and Totikidis 2005; Haefele 2002; Olima 2006; Totikidis, Armstrong and Francis 2005a; Totikidis, Armstrong and Francis 2005b).

As Sandercock indicates, there are multiple layers of fear affecting different categories of city dwellers similarly or differently (Sandercock 2003). For instance, unlike the “privileged urbanites”, the urban poor, over and above the fear of crime and violence, cumulatively bear the brunt of a myriad of urban problems such as joblessness, homelessness, social exclusion and political repression (Myers 2011; Sandercock 2003; Wacquant 1999a).

Fear is a ubiquitous perception of many cities’ residents, visitors, planners, managers and politicians, among other stakeholders (Body-Gendrot 2012; Dirisuweit 2002; Dirisuweit 2007; Sandercock 2005; Tudor 2003). In Svendsen’s (2008:48) words, “fear has become a way of looking at the world” - a “culture” (Svendsen 2008). Bauman (2006:2) formulates the concept of “liquid fear” to describe the fearsomeness of “diffuse, scattered, unclear, unattached, unanchored, free floating fear”; which has “no address” and supersedes rationality in influencing human action (Bauman 2006).

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1 See Appendix A for definitions of the concepts of fear, crime and violence.
2 For definition of community organisations, see Appendix A.
“Fear has become an emotion that controls the public and a number of social scientists now claim that today’s society can best be described as a culture of violence”, writes Svendsen (2008:12). The view that we are increasingly experiencing what Febvre describes as “fear everywhere, fear always” portrays common human emotions in many cities (Tudor 2003). Given this background, I argue that fear is a liquid institution (cf. Bauman 2004) - formless and permeative. Fear can therefore be conceptualised as a social fact (Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico 1982) - a reality that imposes itself on individual conscience\(^3\) (Charles 2006). It is against a backdrop of rampant fear of violence and crime (and other urban disorders) that community organisations emerge to fill gaps in safety production. Safety governing community organisations are reactive or proactive expressions of “urbanisms of fear”\(^4\). Fear is therefore to be conceptualised as a phenomena as old as the city itself. Sandercock (2005: 221) observes:

> “Planning and urban management discourses are, and always have been, saturated with fear. The history of planning could be rewritten as the attempts to manage fear in the city: generically, fear of disorder and fear of disease, specifically fear of those bodies thought to produce that disorder and disease - women, the working class, immigrants, gays, youth and so on” (Sandercock 2005).

Safety governance is therefore an integral aspect of city making and city living in a context riddled by fear of crime and violence.

At the behest of fear and the realisation of limitations of the state in the production of security, communities initiate self-help security initiatives (Bénit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 2012; Schärf and Nina 2001; Schärf, Saban and Hauck 2001; van der Spuy and Lever 2010). Some observers indicate that the state is supposedly “hollowing out” (Holliday 2000; Rhodes 2005), or “disoriented” (Artz and Lagendijk 2009) - increasingly disengaging from guaranteeing public safety (Baker 2004b; Baker 2005; Benit-Gbaffou 2008b; Schärf, Saban and Hauck 2001; Shearing and Wood 2003a).

South Africa has been academically, journalistically and publicly represented as a crime and violence ridden country (Schönteich 2000; Schönteich and Louw 2001;  

\(^3\) Reality \textit{sui generis} in the Durkheimian sense.  
\(^4\) I use the concept of ‘urbanisms of fear’ to depict the culture of fear that pervades urban societies.
Spinks 2001); and Johannesburg as a “fearful” and “violent” city (Boisteau 2005; Dirisuweit 2002; Schönteich and Louw 2001). Johannesburg’s imageries as a fearful city are mainly driven by (fears about) violence and crime in township and innercity neighbourhoods, with (fears of) spill over to middle class suburbs (Spinks 2001). The innercity of Johannesburg is particularly perceived as notorious because of increased urban decay, habitation by a huge African immigrant population and allegations of the existence of a strong “drug culture”, among other forms of socio-economic malaise (COHRE 2005; Legget 2002; Simone 2004a).

From an empirical grounding in Johannesburg’s innercity neighbourhood of Yeoville, I examine the socio-political contradictions associated with community organisation for safety governance. Yeoville is of interest because of its pan-African outlook - being a host to an African immigrant and South African population (Palomares and Quiminal 2012). Although it is noted that Yeoville is a predominantly migrant neighbourhood (Benit-Gbaffou 2006), the proportion of African immigrants to South Africans and the current population size of Yeoville are not precisely known and estimates are not always reliable. The population of Yeoville was estimated at 30 000 by the 2001 National Census (Palomares and Quiminal 2012). Because of high levels of population mobility, and the evasive nature of some immigrants, census data may not give a reliable picture on the demographics of Yeoville.

Given its social diversity, Yeoville presents a potentially interesting case for understanding the micro-politics of community safety governance in the city of Johannesburg. In a context of Yeoville’s co-habitation by a largely fragmented African immigrant and South African population (Katsaura 2012; Palomares and Quiminal 2012), one can question the efficacy of an invocation of “community” in safety governance policy and practice.

Yet the South African government has officially turned to community as a panacea to crime and violence confronting South African societies (Pillay 2008). The

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3 See Chapter 3 for detailed narrative about crime, violence and safety in Johannesburg.
4 See Chapter 3; subtitle 3.2.5.
5 See Appendix A for definition of micro-politics.
6 See Appendix A for definition of community.
government of South Africa, through the Ministry of Safety and Security, has observed that “80 per cent of violent contact crime occurs between people who know each other” and “that the police cannot solely prevent violent crime since they cannot be everywhere all the time …” (Pillay 2008: 147). Pillay (2008:147) states:

“This realisation has led to the current emphasis on the need to inculcate and transform the social norms, values and practices of citizens to reduce violent and property related crime. The emphasis is therefore on creating a ‘socially cohesive’ community where levels of trust engender more socially harmonious relations, and where rights and obligations are practical which are consistent with the laws which govern the country” (Pillay 2008).

However, in this thesis I show that “community” does not refer to a unitary and coherent entity as assumed in these invocations, but is rather, a constellation of multiple and often competing or coalescing social fragments. To rely on community in urban safety governance would require making peace with the socio-political fragments that it is.

1.2. The research problem

While literature examines the effects of fear of violence and crime on the making of urban places and communities (Body-Gendrot 2007; Radaelli 2007; Tudor 2003), it does not adequately examine the micro socio-spatial politics that ensues when people organise in response to fear of crime and violence. There is a need to go beyond analyses of trends, causes of fear of crime and violence and variants of safety governance practices. An in-depth analysis of the contradictions of the socio-economic and political consequences of fear of violence and community safety governance practices is warranted.

In this case, I observe that there is a dearth of analysis of i) stakeholder politics, ii) ethno-national regionalist politics and iii) territorialist politics - discursive and practical - characterising the field of community safety governance (see Chapter Two; Chapter Three). Although I choose to focus on these three aspects of the micro socio-spatial politics of community safety governance, as informed by my research context, there could be other dimensions that I have no space to explore here.

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9 See Appendix A
10 See Appendix A for definition of community safety governance/community security governance
Also, the stream of literature that examines community safety governance initiatives and practices needs to be alerted to the textures of associated “social”, “political” and “moral” economies\(^{11}\) (Arnold 2001; Bouchard, Ferraton and Michau 2006; Sayer 2000). Below is how I structure the argument of this thesis to fill the identified hiatus in literature.

1.3. Research argument and question

In developing my argument, I begin from the premise that community safety governing practices, strategies and tactics are a product and manifestation of the \(\text{habitualisation}^{12}\), \(\text{institutionalisation}^{13}\) and \(\text{instrumentalisation}^{14}\) of fear of violence and crime (see Chapter Four). This takes the form of safety producing (and associated) socio-spatial practices that are repeated, formalised or patterned collectively or individually.

Overall, I argue that insecurity, among other urban disorders, can be institutionalised and instrumentalised as and in community organisation(s), creating a platform for a simultaneously socially divisive and unifying micro-politics - one in which agents in and outside community organisations compete and coalesce for various reasons. In this case I conceptualise community safety initiatives as ushering a micro-politics that is linked to, but goes beyond the safety production agenda. The field of community safety production essentially becomes a field of community power contestations - of coalescing or competing organisational, institutional, individual or social group interests. This micro-politics has not been given adequate attention in academic accounts of community safety governance in South Africa and globally. Following this line of thought, my key arguments respond to the main research question below:

### What is the nature and logic of socio-spatial politics concomitant with community safety governance?

In conceptualising this main research question and disaggregating the overall argument, I make three specific arguments that community safety governance: i) is a

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\(^{11}\) See Appendix A for definitions of the concepts of \textit{social economy}, \textit{political economy}, and \textit{moral economy} as used here.

\(^{12}\) \textit{Habitualisation} here refers to the reproducibility of a human action or behaviour with an economy of effort as a result of it being repeated frequently (see Berger and Luckmann 1966).

\(^{13}\) \textit{Institutionalisation} is a concept that describes the habitualisation, patterning and regularisation of human practices, customs and behaviours - enhancing the predictability of social life (see Berger and Luckmann 1966).

\(^{14}\) \textit{Instrumentalisation} depicts the reification and concretisation of fear materially or mentally.
field abound with socio-spatial discourses, “practices” and “strategies” (Bourdieu 1990; de Certeau 1984) of stakeholders competing for prestige, notability and socio-economic goods or services; ii) is an arena of ethnopolitics which structures social relations therein and; iii) is a field characterised by territorialist and territorialised discourses and practices. This three tiered argument is represented in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Three tiered micro-politics of community safety governance

I disaggregate the main question and key argument by posing the following specific research questions:

i) How do community security governing stakeholders relate to each other and with what logic?

ii) What are the manifestations and implications of ethno-national politics in community security governance?

iii) How does territorialist politics manifest in and influence community safety governance?

In exploring these research questions (and key argument), I deploy Bourdieusian concepts of field, capital, practice, habitus and symbolic domination (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu 1990), amongst others, to understand the social, moral and political economies and logics of socio-spatial practices and discourses in the community safety governance field (see Chapter Four). Below is a snapshot of research methods deployed in answering research questions and developing the research argument?

1.4. Preamble on method

This study is based on a qualitative case study research design. I relied mainly on a triangulation of purposive, snowball and availability sampling techniques to reach the targeted population (Burgess 1984; Yin 2009). The study is purposively and
conveniently based on the broader case of Johannesburg and anchored in the specific context of Yeoville. Such a design was desirable given the need to tap into the miniature everyday practices of individuals or social groups in and outside community organisations or institutions engaged in the enterprise of safety governance (Burgess 1984; Yin 2009). This involved my immersion in the local politics and everydayness of Yeoville for a period of two and half years; with fieldwork conducted over fifteen months (see Chapter Five; Appendix B). This immersion was both complete and precarious as my identity as an African and a Zimbabwean in a pan-African (multi-national) South African neighbourhood accorded me the tags of “indigene” and “alien” at once (see Chapter Five, subtitle 5.3.2).

The bulk of data were obtained through participant observation; complemented by unstructured and semi-structured interviews and document reviews (see Chapter Five, subtitle 5.2.2; also see Appendix B). Participant observation mainly took the form of attendance of community meetings and walks in the neighbourhood and in the city as both a resident and researcher (de Certeau 1984). Unstructured interviews involved conversations with key informants and other actors as initiated during my observations in meetings and walks in the neighbourhood (and greater city). Semi-structured interviews were mainly administered in an opinion and attitude survey conducted with the help of research assistants with the aim of capturing the voices of the generality of the population to include those not participating in community meetings. The collected primary and secondary data were analysed mainly through content analysis (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993; Tere 2006). I then present this thesis in the manner described below.

1.5. Organisation of thesis

This thesis is composed of nine chapters. The first four chapters (including this one) introduce the research, discuss the research gap, set a contextual background and explore theoretical issues relating to the socio-spatial politics of community security.

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15 More than 90 community meetings were attended; 60 key informants interviewed, 40 participants were interviewed in an opinion and attitude survey; 2 unstructured group interviews were conducted and I benefited from everyday walks in the city neighbourhood.

16 See Chapter 5; subtitle 5.2.3
initiatives. The remaining five chapters mainly present and interpret research experiences and findings.

Chapter 2 discusses the state of knowledge in the field of urban safety governance studies, setting the stage for this study. I then offer, in Chapter 3, an examination of what is known about safety governance in the South African urban context; further exposing the research hiatus that I fill. In Chapter 4 I search for thinking tools to understand the micro-politics of community safety governance in South African cities. I move on to Chapter 5 in which I narrate and examine my field research experiences - with a focus on my positionality in the micro-politics of community safety governance as both observer and participant. I present and interpret my research findings in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

In Chapter 6, I analyse the manifestations and logics of organisational, institutional and individualist politics associated with community safety production. Following this, Chapter 7 cascades into an analysis of ethno-national regionalist politics in community safety governance. In Chapter 8 I examine the territorialised discourses and practices in community safety governance micro-politics. Chapter 9 concludes this thesis; identifying openings for further research.
2. Chapter Two
Urban community safety governance: The state of knowledge

2.1. Introduction

This chapter develops an analysis of community safety governance that enables appreciation of the associated micro-politics. I note that while studies of urban violence and crime, or fear thereof, show how these are instrumentalised in urban spatial forms and institutionalised in urban social organisation (see Figure 7), they rarely, if at all, examine the concomitant micro-politics.

At a global level, scholarship has generally focused on i) describing and analysing trends of urban violence [and crime] (Block and Block 1995; Farrall 2008; UN-Habitat 2007); ii) explaining and describing its causes [and effects] (Deflem 2011; Moller 2004; Muggah 2012; Rodgers, Muggah and Stevenson 2009); and iii) describing and analysing strategies of its governance (Acosta and Chavis 2007; Baker 2004a; Baker 2004b; Baker 2004c; Caldeira 1996a; Caldeira 2000). While this analysis is useful, it does not fully engage with the socio-spatial micro-political implications of community safety production initiatives.

The corpus of literature that analyses the role of communities in local safety governance glosses over the intricate linkages between community safety initiatives and community politics. It largely omits an appreciation of community organisational, institutional, social group and spatial or territorial politics characterising community safety governance. Some studies that attempt to weave community politics into an analysis of neighbourhood safety governance largely reduce the enterprise to a comparison between community safety initiatives and state-driven local or national safety initiatives (Abrahamsen 2007; Lea and Stenson 2008; Rodgers and Muggah 2009; Schärf and Nina 2001).

Here, I examine the contents and shortfalls of contemporary safety governance literature; carving out my research agenda. I initiate this by offering a cursor of documented trends and causes of urban crime and violence and variants of urban safety governance practices.
2.2. Scholarly normatives in urban safety studies

Below, I attempt to unpack the normative themes in urban safety governance, paying attention to the literature that describes and analyses trends and causes of violence and crime and safety governance practices. I also focus on exposing gaps in this knowledge.

2.2.1. Global trends of crime, violence and fear

As some literature suggest, basically all cities grapple with meeting the security needs of residents (Sandercock 2005; Tudor 2003). This is projected as a more serious concern in cities of the developing world; which are also considered to be the fastest urbanising ones\(^\text{17}\) (Muggah 2012). However, this is not to suggest that cities in the developed world do not experience violence. Body-Gendrot and Wacquant write about fearsomeness, violence and crime in the banlieues of France and the ghettos of USA; characterising them as spaces supposedly inhabited by problematic, deprived populations or urban outcasts (Body-Gendrot 2000; Body-Gendrot 2007; Wacquant 2008d). In fact, the year 2011 in European countries like Greece, Italy and England, was characterised by waves of urban violence as people protested against marginalisation in the wake of global economic crisis (Idriss et al. 2010; Swyngedouw 2011a; Swyngedouw 2011b). Urban insecurity is therefore a global phenomenon, with regional and country variations in its gravity, form and repertoires.

Studies show that, globally, crime and violence have been on the increase in the absolute sense (Idriss et al. 2010; Muggah 2012; UN-Habitat 2007; UN-Habitat 2009; WB 2012). The UN-Habitat Report (2007: VI) shows that global crime incidences increased by 30% (from 2300 to over 3000 per 100,000 people) over the period 1980 to 2000. There were, however, variations in crime incidences between regions of the world. Crime rates in North America and Western Europe fell; whilst rising significantly in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and Eastern Europe (Ibid: VI).

These regional variations in crime and violence are more pronounced when specific types of crime are examined (UN Habitat Report 2007: VI). For instance, in the case of homicide, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean report double-digit rates, while

\(^{17}\) See Figure 2 and Figure 3
significantly lower rates are reported for Southeast Asia, Europe, Eastern Mediterranean and West Pacific (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Homicide rates by Word Health Organisation Region (2000)

At the national level, Colombia, South Africa, Jamaica, Guatemala and Venezuela have very high homicide rates, while Japan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Spain, Cyprus and Norway have considerably lower rates (Ibid 2007: VI; see Figure 2).

These global variations in crime and violence reflect the general observation made by others that “postcolonies in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America are haunted more by unregulated violence, un/civil warfare, and random terror than other twenty-first century nation-states” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: vii). Such instability is conceived as inherently associated with transitions to democracy (Caldeira 2006; Comaroff and Comaroff 2007; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006a; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006b; Malešević 2010; Roitman 2006; Spyer 2006). How are these increasing rates of urban violence and crime explained?

2.2.2. Causalities: a worthwhile or flawed search?

Some studies attribute the increase in violence and crime to rapid urban growth and increasing poverty and inequality (Idriss et al. 2010; Muggah 2012; UN-Habitat 2007; UN-Habitat 2009; WB 2012). For instance, in 2007 it was officially recognised that the greater proportion of the world’s population was living in cities and rates of urbanisation were very high in the developing world (Muggah 2012). One study has
shown that 60 per cent of urban dwellers in rapidly urbanising developing countries have been victims of crime over a five-year period, with victimisation rates reaching 70 per cent in parts of Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa (UN-Habitat 2007: VI). In Latin America, where 80 per cent of the population is urban, the rapidly expanding metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Mexico City and Caracas account for over half of violent crimes in their respective countries (Ibid 2007: VI). Homicide rates in Rio de Janeiro have tripled since the 1970s, while in São Paulo they have quadrupled (Ibid 2007: VI). In the Caribbean, Kingston, Jamaica’s capital, consistently accounts for the vast majority of the nation’s murders (Ibid 2007: VI).

Bauman and Wacquant suggest that globalisation and the development of a “consumer society” in a context of rising inequality, hyper-poverty and advanced marginalisation explain the rising fear of violence and crime (Bauman 1998; Bauman 2004; Wacquant 2008a; Wacquant 2008d). According to Wacquant, Marcuse and others, cities in “developed economies” are seeing the emergence of “advanced marginality”, and “extreme ghettoisation” of city spaces inhabited by the “urban poor” (urban outcasts18 or precariats) (Marcuse 1997a; Marcuse and van Kempen 2002; Wacquant 1993; Wacquant 1996; Wacquant 2008d). Resonating with the notion of “urban outcasts”, is the concept of wasted lives used by Bauman (1998) to describe the poor and disenfranchised of societies.

Bauman (1998) indicates that being poor in a “consumer society” is to be a “flawed consumer”. Such a consumer may be liable to adopting criminal strategies to access resources needed to participate in the “consumer society”. “To be poor is criminal”, writes Bauman (1998). While there is a drive to provide the poor with “conditions of dignified human existence”, it is overshadowed by the “expulsion of the poor from the universe of moral obligation” (Bauman 2004:77-78). Rather, there is a “criminalisation of the poor” by some wealthier populations who happen to control or influence “state machinery”19 (Bauman 2004; Bénit-Gbaffou 2006; Eick 2003). Bauman (2004: 93) notes that poverty is considered “a question of law and order;

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18 Urban outcasts (or precariats) are people who are not well integrated into urban economies or societies and considered as posing threats of resurgence of extreme forms of violence and criminality (see Wacquant 2008c).
19 “State machinery” here refers to government entities; including the police, correctional services and army.
and one should respond to it in the way one responds to other kinds of lawbreaking”. The perception that the poor are a threat to social order explains the concentration, by the state and other actors, on the policing of spaces of the poor and the very identities of the poor (Bauman 1998; Caldeira 2000). Of note is the fact that many state-oriented safety production practices target the poor. In this case the poor are treated as the problematic and potentially criminal category that has to be controlled for the production and maintenance of social order. Bauman (2004: 85) argues:

“The immediate proximity of large and growing agglomerations of ‘wasted humans’, likely to become durable or permanent, calls for stricter segregationist policies and extraordinary security measures, lest the ‘healthy of society’; the ‘normal functioning of the social system will be endangered”.

The prison therefore operates as a “waste disposal industry” or a “dump site” of “human waste” that keeps away the “unhealthy” and unwanted of society; or in theory aims to benevolently rehabilitate and recycle them back into mainstream society (Bauman 2004; Walker 2006). The wealthier members of society, in complementing state efforts or in covering up for state failures in producing safety, retreat into gated neighbourhoods - taking a distance from the poor (Atkinson and Flint 2004; Blakely and Snyder 1997; Clement and Grant 2012; Landman 2008).

It is also observed that some policing practices criminalise and target poor and vulnerable immigrants. Writing about policing in the *banlieues* of France, Bauman (2004: 64) notes:

“Seeking public Enemy Number One among the hapless immigrants of the *banlieues* and asylum seeker camps is considerably more opportune and expedient, but above all less troublesome. With more effect and less expense, the immigrant districts teeming with prospective pickpockets and muggers can be used as the battlefield of the great war of law and order which governments wage with great vigour and even greater publicity while not being averse to ‘subsidiarising’ and subletting to private security outlets and citizen initiatives” (Bauman 2004).

As observed by Bourdieu in France, as elsewhere, immigrants are targeted by the social control machinery of that state, not just as a security governance strategy, but as a populist politicking strategy (Bourdieu 1998b).
While the search for causalities of urban violence is potentially profitable, I observe that it is very elusive because it is difficult to establish cause-effect relationships with precision in our complex contemporary urban contexts. There are so many variables that probably account for violence and crime or lack thereof. It is very difficult, for instance, to convincingly explain why some societies are more violent than others (despite being all poor or being better off than others). In this context of increased urban violence and crime, there is literature that has focused on describing and analysing various safety governance practices.

2.2.3. Variants of safety governance practices

At a global level, literature classifies security governance strategies and practices according to their form and content. For example, Moser and MacIliwaine (2004: 186) analytically distinguish between top-down and bottom-up approaches to safety governance. Top-down approaches are those that are initiated and implemented by government or non-government agencies with little, if any, consultation with the public (see Moser and MacIliwaine 2004: 186). Bottom-up approaches are, ideally, those that are mooted and implemented by affected communities (Ibid: 186). The distinction between top-down and bottom-up approaches to security governance should not blur the fact that, in actuality, there are commonalities between government-driven and non-government initiatives. This is because the government, or its shadows, is present in community safety initiatives; while more often than not, community considerations are made (to some extent) in government safety initiatives. Hence, the distinction between government and non-government safety governance initiatives and between state actors and non-state actors can be treated as practically elusive and, at worst, fallacious.

While contemporary literature is able to describe and explain trends and causes of urban violence and crime and the strategies of safety governance, it has not deeply analysed the concomitant institutional consequences.
2.3. Fear and the risk society: instrumentalisation, institutionalisation …

The study of urban safety governance has not yet adequately tapped on literature about the “risk society” (Beck 1992b; Wendling 2011). Yet to live in fear and uncertainty is to live in a “risk society” (Beck 1992a; Beck 1992b; Beck 1999; Hollway and Jefferson 1997). A risk society is one in which fear is instrumentalised; one characterised by “security calculations” and a generalised “culture of danger” (Hollway and Jefferson 1997; Opitz 2011). Louw et al. (1998:3) indicate that “few cities and indeed urban areas […] are without crime and risk of becoming a victim is high for residents of most large cities”.

Reducing fear is integral for promotion of city liveability (Dirusuweit 2002; Shaw 2007; Skogan 1986b). Fear of crime has generally been identified to be a problem as big as crime itself; and Whitzman (2008:40) suggests that it is “as important as observable reality” (Whitzman 2008). Because of fear and the need to govern it, we see the emergence of collective and individual fear averting strategies. For instance, owing to fear, people in some circumstances avoid walking at night (Box 1; Figure 3).

**Box 1: Fear of the night as a global phenomenon**

| Percentage of respondents indicating that they 'feel unsafe walking home at night': comparative international survey (ICVS survey) |
| Brazil | South Africa | Boliva | Botswana | Colombia | Costa Rica | France | France | Germany | Greece | Germany | India | Indonesia | Italy | Japan | Korea | Mexico | Morocco | Nepal | Netherlands | New Zealand | Nigeria | Northern Ireland | Norway | Pakistan | Paraguay | Philippines | Portugal | Russia | Saudi Arabia | South Africa | Spain | Sri Lanka | Sweden | Switzerland | Tanzania | Thailand | UK | Ukraine | United States | Virginia | Vietnam | Zambia | Zimbabwe |
| 75 | 70 | 60 | 55 | 50 | 45 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 |

This graph is “based on ICVS20 and United Nations data and depicts the responses of people from 35 developing and industrialised nations when asked how safe they felt walking home at night. The highest fear was recorded in Brazil (70%) followed by South Africa (65%)” (UN Habitat Report 2007: 56).

20 International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS).
South Africa features prominently amongst the most violence, crime and fear ridden countries in the world (Boisteau 2005; Schönteich 2000); and vulnerability to crime is portrayed as an everyday experience and perception, (Harris 2001). In entrenching this, Pieterse and Parnell indicate that in numerous studies, safety and security is in the top three of concerns by South Africans across class and race boundaries (Parnell and Pieterse 2010). Johannesburg alongside Cape Town is considered as one of the South African benchmark of a violent city in South Africa and Africa in a non-war zone.


Observing the everyday-ness and normalisation of fear of crime, Caldeira (2000) refers to “talk of crime” in Sao Paulo. The notion of “talk of crime” depicts the fact that crime has become the subject of everyday public talk, including jokes.

It is because of fear of the risk of violence and crime that social groups and individuals are increasingly securitising (Chapter 1, 4). We are witnessing i) the formation and multiplication of safety producing community organisations (Olima 2006); ii) increased enlisting of private security (Carrier 1999; Shearing and Stenning 1983); iii) dependence on the insurance sector (Shaw and Gastrow 2001); iv) formation of gated residential developments (Morange et al. 2012); and v) deployment of surveillance techniques (Koskela 2000); among other strategies. All these signal the habitualisation, instrumentalisation and institutionalisation of fear (see Figure 7). In this respect, studies of community safety governance call for an empirical and theoretical analysis of associated institutional politics as played out at a miniature level.

2.4. Institutional politics of community safety governance

Contemporary literature (such as nodal governance literature) that attempts an analysis of relationships between various safety producing institutional agents remains rooted in an “anti-state monopoly” neoliberal discourse (Shearing 2011; Shearing and Brogden 1993). Nodal governance (also referred to as networked governance) literature celebrates the shift from government to governance (Crawford 2006b; Rhodes 1996) - and in this case a shift from police to policing (Loader 2000). This shift denotes the presence of a multiplicity of governance institutions executing the functions of governance; with, beyond or below the state (Lea and Stenson 2008). The shift from police to policing signals a break from state police’s monopoly of safety provision to a “pluralisation of security” provisioning players, including
community-based agents and the private sector (Shearing and Wood 2003a; Shearing and Wood 2003b; Wood and Shearing 2006).

This nodal governance analysis, useful as it is, remains macro-based and does not pay detailed attention to the relational micro-politics (including everyday politics) of community safety production. It falls within the trap of a vertical analytical bias that juxtaposes state and non-state safety providers - unrelentingly seeking to prove the inadequacies of the state in safety production.

Unpacking the largely ignored micro relational politics of safety production is the focus of this endeavour. In examining this relational micro-politics, there is a need for more nuanced empirical and theoretical analyses of the positioning of social groups in the field of community safety governance (see Figure 9).

2.5. Social group politics in community safety: ethno-nationalism

Literature shows the significance of social diversity, based on gender, age, race and ethnicity amongst other dimensions, in the configuration of community safety practices and discourses. The positions of previously ignored social groups, such as women, are increasingly being appreciated in contemporary analysis of community safety initiatives (Meth 2010; Meth 2011; Shaw 2005; Whitzman 2008; Whitzman et al. 2009). Whereas the focus of studies of violence against women has been on domestic violence, victim surveys and other studies have shown that women, alongside men, are victims of crime and violence in the public sphere (Fernandez 2008; Shaw 2005; Stanko 1995; Vetten, Dladla and Vetton 2000).

Also, youth is a critical subaltern social category in community safety governance studies - a category that has mainly been studied as a criminal one. Sub-cultural theories, as they were proposed by scholars such as Matza and Sykes, emphasise the criminality of youth sub-cultures and youth spaces (Matza 1961; Matza 1964; Matza and Sykes 1961; Sykes and Matza 1957). Accordingly, discourses that reflect and entrench notions of youth criminality pervade policing and urban planning discourses. Jacobs (1989) underscores the prevalence of exclusionary city planning that separates the youth from the older members of society. Creation of exclusionary spaces for the youth and for older people with the purpose of safety enhancement is
an old urban planning and governance practice (Fernandez 2008; Katyal 2002). The effectiveness of this practice in the generation of public safety is questionable. This is because it promotes age-based social discrimination in public spaces; reducing the chance for intergenerational social mingling and understanding.

While youths are perceived as prime perpetrators of crime and violence (Bazemore 2001; Diouf 2003; Steinberg 2001), they are also viewed as playing a critical role in defending neighbourhoods against crime (Barolsky and Pillay 2011; Barowsky and Pillay 2011; Bruce 2007a; Bruce 2007b; Burton 2007; Pain 2000). In his studies in Chicago, Forman shows that in their interaction with police, young males are likely to be disrespected by police and to be stopped and searched illegally (Forman 2004). The police also generally focus on policing spaces that are frequented by youths - streets, taverns and parks (Malone 2002). The media heightens the criminalisation of the youth by representing them as a “mindless and violent cabal” (Pain 2000: 151).

Contemporary literature offers detailed accounts of how ethno-national stereotypes and scapegoating inform crime profiling and influence police conduct or discretion. This is elaborately shown by literature on policing in the USA (Alderman, Erez and Shalhounds-Kavorkian 2003; Dottolo and Stewart 2008; Weitzer and Tuch 2005). Such literature indicates that there is crime profiling based on race and age, in which young Black males are targeted as (potential) criminals (Howell, Perry and Vile 2004). As Dottolo and Stewart (2008) show, in the USA context, Blacks are liable to being stopped and searched by police officers as they are suspected to be more likely to commit crime than other races. Howell et al (2004) state that criminal statistics in the USA feature Blacks as the main perpetrators of crime. These statistics reflect the practices and discretions of police officers and not mere fact (Howell, Perry and Vile 2004). In his studies in German, Albrecht (1997) suggests that police statistics that represent ethnic minorities as main perpetrators of crime are not to be trusted, but should be treated as reflective of public and police attitudes towards ethnic or racial minorities rather than as representative of mere crime facts (Albrecht 1997).

While literature demonstrates the effects of ethnic and racial profiling on official public policing, it does not explore how this profiling is incarnated in community-based safety initiatives and related practices. Contemporary studies also do not give
adequate attention to an analysis of the concoction of ethno-nationality, youthfulness and gender in the generation of everyday safety production practices and discourses. Entwined with ethno-national and organisational or institutional discourses or practices in safety governance, are territorialist and territorialised politics.

2.6. Territorial politics of community safety production: missing links?

The connection between crime and violence and place is well documented - violence and crime being conceptualised as spatial problems (Newman 1972; Sherman 1995; Spelman 1995; Springer 2011). There is an appreciation of the fact that violence and crime are mostly spatially located problems. Accordingly, there is a body of literature that emphasises the importance of governing place as a safety production strategy (Jacobs 1989; Jacobs 1995; Newman 1972). This literature stresses the need to identify crime hot spots and concentrate policing and crime prevention initiatives on these hotspots (Jacobson 1999; Pain 2000; Sherman 1998; Taangin, Flores and Emprador 2008).

Literature on community safety governance has either been bogged by an upholding of the social over the physical dimensions of safety initiatives or a reification of the physical over the social (Chapter 4). In my examination of the micro-politics of community safety governance, I resist the reification of either social or spatial dynamics of this politics; choosing to treat the two as mutual and even indivisible. I maintain that organisational, institutional or ethno-national regionalist politics in the arena of community security governance is, in many ways, sited in territory - in the neighbourhood in this case. The neighbourhood is here conceptualised as a political entity (Katsaura 2012); a micro-polity which can be defended against crime and violence.

A neighbourhood with a reputation for criminality, social disorder and violence scares away property investors, and is also likely to be characterised by flight of some residents, high levels of population mobility and reduced interest in community affairs by residents (Skogan 1986a; Skogan 1989). It faces socio-spatial decay. Greene (1995:45) argues:
“Destabilized communities are said to produce an environment of criminality, and result in acceleration in the exodus of local businesses and homeowners. Moreover, destabilized communities such as residential neighbourhoods are seen as places governed by fear and criminal victimization, furthering the spiral of decline, particularly in urban areas” (Greene 1998).

Physical infrastructural decay within a neighbourhood is inextricably linked to the decay of the neighbourhood’s social infrastructure (Simone 2004b; Skogan 1986a; Skogan 1989). Socio-spatial governance is required to maintain or improve the value of a neighbourhood. Lawson states that all urban governance is about spatial targeting and place management (Lawson 2007); the neighbourhood being the immediate arena of such targeting and management. It is considered as an elementary spatio-social unit of the city.

The process of defending a neighbourhood is, however, imbued with a splintering and unifying social politics which is inadequately examined in safety governance literature. An examination of this politics is beginning to be appreciated by scholars who examine the divisive and progressive role of party politics in community policing forums in South Africa (Benit-Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Benit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 2012; Fourchard 2012).

With the hindsight of this review of literature, I conclude this chapter by entrenching my research agenda.

2.7. Recapping the research agenda

As a step towards mapping a research agenda, I identify three generalised weaknesses in literature on safety governance. These are i) the failure of contemporary literature to adequately examine institutional, organisational (and associated individual) instrumentalised micro-politics in the community safety governance field; ii) inadequate analysis of ethno-nationalist discourses and practices in the arena of community safety governance; and iii) minimal attempts to show how territorial politics interlace with community safety governance.

Responding to these points of weakness, I set out to empirically explore and theorise i) the logic of stakeholder (organisational, institutional and individual) micro-political dynamics associated with community security governance; ii) the politics of ethno-
nationalist discourses and practices in community safety governance; and iii) the territorialist or spatialist discourses, practices and strategies by social groups and individuals engaged in community safety governance.

In addressing this three-tiered research agenda (see Figure 1); I deploy the concept of socio-spatial politics which simultaneously capture the sociological and spatial (or geographical) aspects of the micro-politics of community security governance. Socio-spatial reasoning helps me to overcome both “sociologism” and “spatialism” - reifications of either the social or spatial in urban community security governance thought. In Chapter 3 I follow up on this generalised review of literature with an examination of security governance literature within the context of South African cities (with a special focus on Johannesburg).
3. Chapter Three
Urban community safety governance in South Africa

“Crime, and fear of crime, is as old as South Africa itself, and, as unpopular as it is to say this around middle class dinner tables, our preoccupation with crime is testimony to how this country was stitched together with violence, to how we worry that malevolence is our most abiding pedigree. Fear in this country is saturated with politics; it is the product of generations of estrangement between races, classes and individuals” (Steinberg 2001: 2).

3.1. Introduction

As indicated by Steinberg (2001) in above quotation, fear of crime is a ubiquitous aspect of South African society - an everyday phenomenon. In fact, post-apartheid South Africa is inherently scripted and marked by the signifiers “crime and violence”; and the South African academe (or world academe) cannot afford to ignore these signifiers.

Thus, South African literature on violence and crime, like global literature, i) describes and explains trends of violence, crime and fear (Dirsuweit 2002; Harris 2003b; Kupe, Verryn and Worby 2008; Kynoch 2008; Kynoch 2011); ii) causes of violence and crime (Cronje 2008; Legget 2003; Legget 2004); and iii) various regimes of safety governance practices (Benit-Gbaffou 2006; Benit-Gbaffou 2008a; Benit-Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Benit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 2012; Boisteau 2005).

However, in the same vein as global literature, South African literature misses, or marginally addresses i) the positioning of stakeholder (organisational, institutional, social group and individual) micro-politics in urban safety governance; ii) ethno-national regionalist politics in urban community safety discourses, practices and strategies; and iii) discursive and performative territorialist or territorialised micro-politics of community safety initiatives.

This chapter reviews the state of knowledge on community safety governance in South African cities; analysing what is known and not (fully) known. The chapter starts by laying out what is known about safety governance in South Africa, cascading into the case of Johannesburg and then the specificities of Yeoville. I conclude by outlining what we do not (fully) know about safety governance in the South African context.
3.2. What do we know?

This section appraises the literature that describes and analyses i) urban violence, fear and crime trends; ii) causes of urban violence, crime and fear; and iii) regimes of safety governance.

3.2.1. Violence and crime trends: historicity, contemporariness and spatiality

Literature records and analyses the trends and histories of violence, crime or fear in the South African context. South Africa is inundated with high levels of violence and crime, which some observers consider to be carry-overs from apartheid (Kynoch 2008; Kynoch 2005; Kynoch 2011).

Crime and violence remain some of the biggest challenges facing the post-apartheid South African government and people; and has become a part of everyday life (Gordon 2006; Harris 2001; Parnell and Pieterse 2010). Insecurity in urban South Africa takes many forms, which include fear of armed robberies, homicide, politically motivated violence, gender-based violence, intra and inter-gangster fights, rape, neighbourhood fights or quarrels and xenophobic violence, among others (Altbeker 2005; Ashforth 2005; Burger 2007; Chipkin 2004; Harris 2002).

Violence, particularly violent crime, is considered a “livelihood strategy” and a “lifestyle” for some members of South African society who are unemployed, misemployed or underemployed. In terms of perpetrators of crime and violence, youth of Black and coloured origin are stereotypically viewed as the problematic groups (Jensen 2008; Kynoch 2011). The tsotsi label describes young Black (potential) thugs or criminals in Johannesburg and elsewhere in South Africa (Bank 2011; Kynoch 2001; Kynoch 2011) and the skollie label describes thuggish young coloureds in the Cape Flats, Cape Town and elsewhere (Jensen 2008).

Police officers, who are supposed to be protectors, are also implicated in escalating violence, crime and human rights abuses in South Africa (Bruce 2002; Bruce 2007a; Bruce and Neild 2005). SAPS\(^2\)\(^1\), with the assumption of office by Police

\(^{21}\) South African Police Service (SAPS)
Commissioner Bheki Cele in 2009, adopted a “shoot to kill policy” against (suspected) violent criminals (Farrell 2011). This policy came in the wake of increased killings of police officers by civilians and fear that crime would batter the image of South Africa, potentially undermining the hosting of 2010 FIFA world cup. Only months after the introduction of the shoot to kill policy, members of SAPS shot dead Atlegang Aphetamine; a three year old toddler for allegedly holding a pipe which they mistook for a gun (Smith 2009). This aroused popular public and media outcry and denunciation. Questions were raised regarding the observance of human rights by police officers and more generally on democracy and constitutionalism in South Africa (Bruce 2002). Hornberger raises questions about the efficacy of human rights based policing in South Africa, shedding light on the complexities that police officers face in simultaneously trying to reduce crime and respect human rights (Hornberger 2011). Post-apartheid police violence can itself be viewed as a new guise for or carry-over from military, racialised, political and brutal policing of the apartheid era which aimed at quelling dissent and sustaining the apartheid regime (Bruce 2002; Burman and Scharf 1990; Pillay 2005; Scharf 1990).

Security challenges in South African cities are further compounded by the spectre and reality of xenophobic violence. Since May 2008, xenophobic violence has stolen the limelight in contemporary studies of urban violence in South Africa (Misago 2011; Misago, Landau and Monson 2009; Monson 2012; Neocosmos 2008; Neocosmos 2010); overshadowing studies of other forms of violence such as violent crime, political violence and domestic violence. Threats of violence and real violence against African immigrants, as well as xenophobic stigma, are some of the major challenges facing contemporary South African society (Nyamnjoh 2010b). The xenophobic attacks of May 2008 graphically represent the extremities of “anti-foreigner” mob violence in South African townships - leaving an estimated 62 people dead and approximately over 100,000 people displaced (von Holdt 2011: 6). Having erupted in Alexandra (in Johannesburg); xenophobic violence spread to most townships in South African cities.

Violence against African immigrants continues to be a serious threat to local peace. In June 2011, a Zimbabwean man called Farai Kujirichita was killed by a mob in Diepsloot in unclear circumstances in which there were allegations that he was a
criminal (News24 2011). On the same note, in October 2011 there were broad-based threats of violence against African immigrants who were alleged to be staying in RDP houses that are meant for South Africans in Alexandra Township (Sapa 2011). The idea of inflicting bodily pain on the socially undesired or suspected criminals is therefore a part of public practices of some South Africans (Buur and Jensen 2004; Haefele 2002; Hayson 1990; Minaar 2007).

Of note is that crime and violence are associated with certain places or neighbourhoods (at least at the level of public perceptions and discourses). Township and innercity areas are considered as the most problematic; with townships like Diepsloot and Alexandra (Johannesburg), Cape Flats and Khayelitsha (Cape Town) being labelled as violence and crime hotspots (Kupe, Verryn and Worby 2008); and Johannesburg innercity areas considered as places of crime and ruin (Simone 2004b) - Hillbrow being branded as a “den of iniquity” (Legget 2002). The grime associated with spaces inhabited by poor urban dwellers in Johannesburg has earned them labels of zones of hyper criminal activity. Urban security governance in South Africa therefore takes the form of “governance of poverty” (Procacci 1991). If not aimed at containing the poor in marginal urban spaces, such governance is aimed at alleviating pauperism through programmes for social development.

Why are urban violence and crime such problems in South African cities?

### 3.2.2. Violence, crime and fear: elusive search for causalities

Some studies in South Africa labour to search for causalities of urban violence and crime. One conclusion reached by such studies is that violence is tied to struggles for access to economic resources. According to Cronje’s study, the redistributive failures of the South African economy, coupled with slow economic growth, are key causes of xenophobic violence (Cronje 2008). Frustrations with the lack of service delivery by government, with housing being one of the major challenges, is also cited as one of the major causes of xenophobic violence as African immigrants are the easiest

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22 To watch video visit: [http://www.news24.com/Multimedia/South-Africa/Mob-murder-in-Diepsloot-20110916](http://www.news24.com/Multimedia/South-Africa/Mob-murder-in-Diepsloot-20110916) - accessed on 2 April 2012. Be warned that the images are graphic and can be offensive to some people.

23 Reconstruction and Development Programme (South African government policy)
scapegoat for housing related challenges (Cronje 2008). The material realities of suffering and perceived poor service delivery are blamed on African immigrants in South Africa and politicians play a key role in the (re)production of this discourse.

Studies of urban violence in South Africa pick up sharpened social and spatial inequalities as some of the main causes of violence. The politics of access to urban social and physical space is amongst some of the drivers of crime and violence. Urban social and physical space in South Africa is muddled by fragmentation and polarity as reflected in high levels of wealth disparity, which are also configured in spatial disparities between rich and poor neighbourhoods (Bremner 2004b; Murray 2011; Murray 2008a; Murray 2008b). Post-apartheid South Africa inherited this divided society; a society which is inherently crime-generating (Gordon 2006; Shaw 2002).

An understanding of the history of crime and violence gives insight into their contemporary forms and repertoires. Kynoch (2011; 2008) argues that Johannesburg’s socio-economic and political histories as a mining town and the obtaining racialised relations of production and social control have functioned to (re)produce violence and criminality. He notes:

“The brutalising nature of the gold mining industry that employed the majority of Black workers, in concert with the incarceration of African men on a massive scale, established the foundations for a violent society in Johannesburg’s early decades. African mineworkers were exposed and participated in supervisory abuse, faction fights and gang activity” (Kynoch 2011: 463).

Founded in a context of legalised and racialised symbolic and physical violence of, on and by the bodies of Black mine workers, Johannesburg remains ensnared within a cycle of violence which has arguably incrementally taken the form of a “culture of violence”. The role of the mining compound and prison in generating a “culture of violence” is remarkable (Kynoch 2003; Kynoch 2008; Kynoch 2011).

The apartheid history of disenfranchisement of a majority of the Black population also influences the form of contemporary violence (Kynoch 2003; Kynoch 2008; Kynoch 2005). Whereas the violence of apartheid South Africa was associated with the repression of anti-apartheid movements by government; contemporary violence
is associated with frustrations with unfulfilled post-apartheid promises, widening poverty, inequality and marginalisation of the poor who happen to be predominantly Black (von Holdt 2011). The South African National Planning Commission points out that one of the main challenges facing South Africa is that it is a “divided society” - referring to racial, class, ethnic and spatial divisions (NPC 2011).

In their diagnostic report and national plan, South Africa’s National Planning Commission (NPC) singles out the challenge of youth unemployment (especially of Black youth) as a time bomb (NPC 2011). Relatedly, Richards (2010: [back cover of book]) argues:

“Crime and growing unemployment remains the Achilles heel of the new South Africa. The apartheid government refused to fix it. The democratic government seems incapable of doing so. A miracle is desperately needed” (Richards 2010).

The unemployment challenge in South Africa is linked to poor educational outcomes mainly undermining the employability and life chances of young people (NPC 2011).

I argue that, whilst useful, the searches for explanatory causalities of violence and crime in South African cities sometimes miss the point. This is because it is scientifically difficult to correlate violence to neat causal factors with precision (see Chapter 2, subtitle 2.2.2). This literature on causalities is useful, but at best it remains quite speculative. What can be noted, with precision is that South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world24, and that with those inequalities come huge socio-economic and political problems; with violence, crime and fear being some of them.

In the next section I review the strategies of producing safety in this context scripted by the signifiers “violence and crime”.

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24 South Africa’s Gini Coefficient was at 0.67 in 2005 (NPC 2011: 8). Johannesburg currently ranks as one of the most unequal cities in the Africa and the world, with a Gini Coefficient of 0.75, alongside Cape Town with 0.67, and Lagos with 0.65 as documented in the UN Habitat Report (2012:69) – See UN-Habitat. 2012. "State of the world's cities 2012/2013: Prosperity of cities ". Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat).
3.2.3. Regimes of safety governance: the descriptions and explanations

Safety governance scholarship shows that the community policing model, which has been in circulation across the globe, is officially adopted and transplanted to the South African context (Benit-Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Benit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 2012). Public policing has historically been regarded as a preserve of state authorities, but there has been an increasing global recognition of the importance of community (and private players) in policing (Baker 2002; Baker 2004a; Baker 2004b; Baker 2004c; Baker 2005; Baker 2007; Benit-Gbaffou 2006). This is associated with the shift from “military policing”\(^{25}\) to “community policing”\(^{26}\) (Benit-Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 2012).

Community policing in South Africa involves creation of a partnership between the police service and communities (through representatives) (Benit-Gbaffou 2006; Bénit-Gbaffou 2006). The end of apartheid called for a reform (symbolic at least) of the South African Police Force (SAPF) to South Africa Police Service (SAPS); signifying abandonment of military policing and adoption of community policing (Benit-Gbaffou 2008b; Jensen 2008). The thrust of the apartheid police force was on policing government’s political opponents, including anti-apartheid activists (Brown 1993; Woods 1993) and this had to be changed with the onset of post-apartheid “political dispensation”. The adoption of community policing in South Africa has therefore, in part, also aimed to redress historical injustices embedded in the policing system.

It is in response to the need to restructure safety governance in South Africa that the government rolled out the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) in 1996 to redress apartheid policing and security governance (van der Spuy 1990). Through the 1995 Police Act, and reinforced in 1996 through the NCPS, the government statutorily institutionalised the establishment of Community-Police Forums (CPFs). Following the provision of NCPS, there was, in some instances, the establishment of

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\(^{25}\) Military policing is characterised by the use of force by police officers who deploy excessive force and reified as professionals capable of reducing crime on their own through their expertise (with little or no wilful cooperation of members of the community).

Community Safety Forums (CSFs), with early experiments in the Eastern Cape and Western Cape provinces (Griggs 2003).


“Social crime prevention aims to reduce the social, economic and environmental factors conducive to particular types of crime”. (1998:12)

In the same vein, social crime prevention is defined by the International Crime Prevention Commission (ICPC) as any initiative or activity that reduces crime, violence and insecurity by tackling identified causal factors (paraphrased) (Waller, Welsh and Sansfacon 1997)\(^\text{27}\). In some circles, social crime prevention is referred to as crime prevention through social development (UNODC 2010). Crime prevention through social development (CPTSD) involves a range of social, educational and health training programmes targeting groups that are vulnerable to fall into the trap of criminality (UNODC 2010: 9); thereby preventing crime in the long run. The South African government deliberately seek to promote social development and this is epitomised in the 1996 national constitution. The 1996 constitution, thus, places the responsibility for social development with local government (Ndlela 2008; Parnell, Swilling and van Donk 2008); yet local government neglects crime prevention (Louw et al. 1998), which should also be at the core of local social development initiatives.

This is in a context where the South African government is under pressure for immediate delivery in terms of crime reduction and other development challenges considered to be urgent (Louw et al. 1998; Parnell and Pieterse 2010). Increased pressure derails the long term social crime prevention approach as it prompts the government to pump out resources for immediate solutions; including the re-adoption of military policing practices. The focus on military policing entails a deployment of lesser resources towards addressing the major crime generating socio-economic problems such as poverty and inequality, poor education and

\(^{27}\) Waller \textit{et al} on behalf of ICPC.
unemployment amongst others (Samara 2011). Politicians specifically focus on getting immediate results because of pressure to win over the electorate and consolidate their political positions. Owing to these challenges, South Africa has been trapped in a cycle of a really never-easing crime and violence burden.

At city levels, there have been efforts to deal with urban crime by rolling out programmes of urban renewal and regeneration. In Johannesburg examples of efforts at urban renewal include the Alexandra Renewal Project and continuous efforts to revamp the innercity neighbourhoods such as Joubert Park, Hillbrow, Berea, Yeoville and Bellevue, amongst others. Inner city neighbourhoods have been targeted for creation of City Improvements Districts (CIDs)28 (Benit-Gbaffou 2008b). In Cape Town, under the auspices of neoliberal redevelopment, the CBD was redeveloped and renewed (Samara 2011). Urban renewal efforts, while improving the city environment and reducing crime, tend to drive out the poor due to increases in rent and create exclusive spaces occupied by the middle class in the renewed city - thereby creating another social challenge (Samara 2011).

While the government at national, provincial, city and local levels has tried to adopt a variety of social and spatial initiatives for crime governance; there was also a turn towards attempts to promote moral regeneration as a crime management and prevention initiative. This is because high levels of crime and violence in South African society are attributed to deep-seated moral breakdown dating back to the apartheid era (Rauch 2005; Rauch 2011). Social entrepreneurs, including politicians, religious leaders and social commentators, came together in 1997 to find ways of addressing the breakdown of morality as a panacea to the violence and crime problems (Rauch 2005; Rauch 2011). This meeting culminated in the launch of the Moral Regeneration Movement in April 2002 (Rauch 2005; Rauch 2011). The output of this campaign is however difficult to evaluate given the elusive nature of issues of morality and their linkages with crime prevention. All that can be stated is that moral regeneration was ideally geared to improve social solidarity and social control; and reduce “anomie and normlessness” (Rauch 2005).

28 CIDs are city zones that are improved with the aim of (re)attracting business and creating liveable spaces (see Samara 2011)
In line with the multilateralisation of security provision, associated with neoliberal order (Loader 2000), South African cities have enrolled non-governmental players into crime prevention initiatives through metropolitan council safer cities programmes (Louw et al. 1998). In Johannesburg for example, the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Safer Cities Programme was initiated in March 1997, with international support (Louw et al. 1998). It aimed to bring together local government, the police, non-government organisations and community groups in responding to crime and violence (Louw et al. 1998). While it was ideally desirable, the safer cities programme is criticised as “running the risk of being nothing more than window dressing” in practice (Ibid: 4). The programme, like other crime prevention programmes in Johannesburg and South Africa at large, suffered from a lack of crime information and accurate data (Ibid). Data from crime statistics recorded by SAPS have historically been questioned for accuracy as people’s experiences and perceptions tend not to tally with these statistics (Shaw 2002). Although their accuracy is limited, these crime statistics cannot be unilaterally dismissed.

Given the continued failure of government at national, provincial and city levels to deliver the promise of creating safer cities, people devise atomised and collectivised responses to crime and insecurity. In this case, the poor have historically responded to crime and fear through various means including mob justice, vigilantism and community courts (Harris 2001; Schärf and Nina 2001). Wealthier citizens have embarked on road closures and gating of their neighbourhoods, employed private security and use of surveillance technologies, among other initiatives (Benit-Gbaffou 2008b; Harrison and Mabin 2006; Landman 2004a; Landman 2008).

Now I zoom into an understanding of safety issues and safety governance practices within the specific context of Johannesburg, against a background of the above discussion of the broader South African case.

### 3.2.4. Johannesburg in safety governance studies

Johannesburg is conceptualised as a city of contradictions; one epitomising the bifurcated nature of South African society and its ills (Mbembe 2004; Metileni 2011; Murray 2011; Nuttall and Mbembe 2007). There is a common perception that
Johannesburg is a violence, crime and fear ridden city (Dirsuweit 2002; Dirsuweit 2007; Hook and Vrdoljak 2001) - one where the imminence of “terror” or “catastrophe” hovers (Bremner 2004a). The city therefore battles with labels such as “crime capital of the world” (Boisteau 2005; Schönteich 2000), “the most violent city in the world” (Louw et al. 1998) and “fearful city” (Dirsuweit 2002). It is not surprising, therefore, that Johannesburg is considered as South Africa’s “test case for controlling and preventing urban crime”; one in which success would “boost the confidence of both the public and police in the attempt to reduce crime” (Louw et al. 1998:4).

The negative image of Johannesburg has driven the city administrators to consider crime as a development issue. In a policy document entitled Joburg 2030, the City of Johannesburg states:

“First, one must accept the fact that the perception of Johannesburg citizens is that their city is not safe. Second, one must accept [...] that a culture of violence and contempt for the law has been entrenched and [...] crime has become a typical non-linear problem. This implies that a critical mass of interventions is the only method of substantially challenging the problem and that piecemeal approaches will only displace crime. Thirdly, one must understand that different groups in Johannesburg perceive and are victims of very different safety and security experiences” (CoJ 2000: 20) [sic].

This is a direct acknowledgement of the dire security situation and liveability challenges within the city. The aspirations of City of Johannesburg toward a “World Class City” status are seriously dented by the negative perception of the city as a city of crime, violence and all kinds of horror. While Johannesburg grapples with the challenge of violence, cities the world over are burdened by the same challenge (Mabin 1999); albeit in varying degrees, proportions and forms.

As observed by Shaw (2002:9), “crime has probably prevented some investors from bringing their money to the country (South Africa), although this may have much to do with a package of factors including labour market flexibility”. Shaw (2002:9) goes on to state that “crime has almost certainly prevented the growth of tourist trade to its fullest potential given the society’s reputation for violence”. Crime reduction is one of the policy priorities of the City of Johannesburg (CoJ 2000). The Joburg 2030 document outlines:
“In 2000, the World Bank published a report on international constraints to private sector business growth in 100 countries. None of the surveyed countries listed crime as a category of constraints to doing business. However, in a survey of 360 Johannesburg firms (2000), 70 per cent mentioned crime as a major obstacle to growth. Twenty five per cent said it was a moderate constraint and 5 per cent said it was no constraint at all. Sixty two per cent of all firms interviewed said that addressing crime is the biggest contribution the Johannesburg Council could make to growing the local economy. Thus South Africa appears to be unique in seeing crime as a negative determinant of business growth” (CoJ 2000: 20).

The security and safety issue is therefore a big challenge for the image of the city, its prospects for economic growth and its “World Class City” aspirations. Attempts at effective crime governance at city level are therefore driven by economic logic; the desire to attract and retain foreign investment (Shaw 2002).

The major “crime and violence problem areas” in Johannesburg are “high density and poor areas” such of the township and innercity (Coj 2000: 20). The innercity presents a complex challenge of urban decay, street and commercial crime. It has seen capital flight and relocation to “relatively secure” shopping complexes and business security villages (Murray 2011). Beavon shows that the settlement of Blacks in the innercity starting during the apartheid era and intensifying in the post-apartheid era resulted in the area being labelled as a “grey area” (Beavon 2001); signifying the official perception which problematised such settlement. Murray (2011: 148) describes the innercity of Johannesburg as an “outcast ghetto”; “a temporary sanctuary for refugees fleeing war and political repression, and for undocumented immigrants escaping famine, socio-economic deprivation, and oppression in their countries of origin”.

The correlation of the “invasion” of the innercity by Black South Africans and African immigrants with “urban decay” is common in discourses about Johannesburg (Beavon 2004; Beavon 2001; Crankshaw and White 1995). It is obviously a problematic and potentially fragile discourse - a racially and ethnically driven one for that matter. What is of note here, however, is that over the years, innercity neighbourhoods such as Hillbrow, Berea, Betrams, Yeoville and Bellevue

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29. This perception shows the racial politics that characterise South Africa’s social fabric; a racial politics that problematises and at worst criminalises blackness; especially when it comes along with poverty.
have been rocked by rampant social ills including prostitution, drug dealing and violence - with Hillbrow being considered as one of the most notorious places (Legget 2002; Simone 2004b). Unless the city addresses the underlying causes of crime and violence in township and innercity spaces, the “World Class City” aspirations will remain “unlikely” as Mabin (2007) puts it. The innercity, which is the focus of this study, is therefore an important locus of attention for the City of Johannesburg’s image management or rebuilding drives.

The neighbourhood of Yeoville is the social laboratory from which I write about Johannesburg and the world. I describe, in the section below, the crime and violence histories and trends as well as socio-economic conditions of Yeoville.

3.2.5. Research site(s): reading Johannesburg and the world from Yeoville

The area loosely referred to as Yeoville in this thesis incorporates the neighbourhoods of Yeoville (proper), Bellevue and Bellevue East30. Yeoville is an innercity neighbourhood located peri-centrally to the eastern side of Johannesburg City Centre (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Map of Johannesburg showing case study area

30 Yeoville, Bellevue and Bellevue East geographically and politically constitute a single entity as they have a common economic hub in Rockey-Raleigh Street. Unless clearly indicated, this study shall refer to the area comprising Yeoville, Bellevue and Bellevue East as Yeoville as is the tradition.
It is a low-income neighbourhood characterised by a long history of community activism, local and international migrancy and a vibrant, and yet “problematic”\textsuperscript{31} micro-economy of street trade (Benit-Gbaffou 2006; Harrison 2002). Observatory, which is a middle income area adjacent to Yeoville, is part of this study given that it falls in the same policing zone as Yeoville; being served by the Yeoville Police Station and by the Yeoville Community Policing Forum (see Figure 5). Although not the primary thrust of my study, I find fruitful a reflective relational analysis of the politics of community safety initiatives in an inner-city area (Yeoville) and a middle income suburb (Observatory). For a view of the study area, see Figure 5.

\textit{Figure 5: Map of Yeoville and surrounding areas: study area shaded in dark grey}

Yeoville was selected because it typifies the ethno-national diversity, “socio-spatial deprivation” and socio-economic “fractality” characterising socio-spatial cityscapes of Johannesburg. What is so particular about violence, crime, fear and socio-spatial organisation in Yeoville?

\textsuperscript{31} “Problematic” in that the city tries to stop street trade in Yeoville, generating tension with the traders. Street trade is also considered in many circles as criminogenic and contradicting the designated use of public space.
3.2.6. Yeoville’s socio-economic, crime, violence and fear histories

Yeoville is a suburb whose history coincides with the early history of the founding of Johannesburg and is only 4 years younger than Johannesburg (YBCDT undated). “Yeoville was proclaimed a suburb in 1890 by Yeo Sherwell who came from Yeovil in the United Kingdom” (Ibid: unpaged). According to the YBCDT:

“The area was advertised as a ‘sanitarium for the rich’ in which the air was purer because it was up on a ridge overlooking the dirty, smoke-filled mining town that had sprung from nothing out of the (then) Transvaal bushveld. However, the rich did not buy into the suburb. Instead it became a multiclass area, one to which many poorer people living below the ridge in Doornfontein aspired. It was also a place which attracted many of the waves of migrants from abroad that came to South Africa seeking a new life” (YBCDT undated).

Being an apartheid suburb, Yeoville was created to accommodate a mainly white, middle class population (Ibid). In the 1970s, Yeoville became a mainly Jewish suburb and an epitome of Jewish culture. At that particular time, Yeoville was designated as a “white only” area (Ibid). Over the years, Yeoville metamorphosed into a cosmopolitan suburb where racial mixing became acceptable despite apartheid (Ibid). In the 1980s Yeoville is shown to have shifted into a cosmopolitan suburb where Blacks and whites co-resided; and it has largely retained this cosmopolitan urbanism as it hosts a largely migrant population from different parts of Africa and South Africa. Yeoville’s population shifted from being 85% White in 1990 into being 90% Black by 1998 (Ibid).

Also, Yeoville is a suburb with a long history of activism against apartheid and the activist culture has been carried over to the post-apartheid era (Benit-Gbaffou 2006). Benit-Gbaffou (2006:303) observes that Yeoville is known to have quite a “vocal and energetic” Community Policing Forum because of the long history of political activism in the area.

Accentuating the representation of Yeoville as a lively neighbourhood is its history of conviviality. Yeoville has lively public spaces and elaborate drinking cultures; being host to many taverns and night clubs. Although now tainted by an element of criminality, the streets and public spaces of Yeoville remain spaces of conviviality and public connectivity; judging from the crowds that throng Rockey-Raleigh Street.
everyday (my observation). The YBCDT (undated) describes the emerging convivial culture in Yeoville in the early 1990s as follows:

“The establishment of a small, discreet club by a well-known music producer called Patric van Blerk resulted in the main business street through the two suburbs, named Raleigh St in Yeoville and Rockey St in Bellevue, becoming the bohemian cultural centre of South Africa, with a number of night spots and restaurants moving from nearby Hillbrow, till then the night-time entertainment Mecca of Johannesburg. Within two years, the high street was transformed from a quiet community street serving the local residents to an internationally-known cultural centre with restaurants, jazz bars, bookshops, arts and crafts outlets, trendy clothing outlets and record shops. On the down side, drug dealers and a criminal element also moved into the area, taking advantage of the opportunities arising out of the almost 24 hour buzz of activity in the street”.

The history of fear of violence and crime in Yeoville is sometimes co-related to white flight in the 1990 and the concomitant occupation of the neighbourhood by a largely Black population (cf. Beavon 2004). White flight and associated fears of violence were justified on events that took place during the 1990-1994 period of political transition from apartheid to post-apartheid South Africa (YBCDT undated). This period marked changing perceptions of Yeoville from one of a safe haven to one of a troubled space. The YBCDT notes:

“The death knell for that period was, ironically, the death of a Black Jamaican. Ridley Wright had married a South African exile and returned with her after 1990. He was owner of Crackers Deli, a popular cafe, and head of the Yeoville Trader's Association. In an altercation in which he attempted to protect a street corner drug dealer's wife from being abused by the drug dealer, he was fatally stabbed. It was downhill from there and by 2000, all of the shops and restaurants that gained fame in the 1980s were gone or transformed unrecognisably” (YBCDT undated).

Perceptions of Yeoville as a violent and crime ridden area have resulted neighbourhood disinvestment and urban decay (Ibid). Increasingly, Yeoville, alongside other Johannesburg innercity areas like Hillbrow, Berea, Joubert Park and Betrams, has come to resemble what Murray (2011) describes as an outcast ghetto.

Crime statistics of Yeoville reflect the neighbourhood as inundated with violent crime. Table 1 shows the crime and violence situation in Yeoville by analysing statistics for murder, attempted murder, assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (GBH) and common assault.
Table 1: Yeoville crime statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected crime</th>
<th>Average number of victims per annum from April 2003 – March 2011</th>
<th>Number of victims from April 2010 – March 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Murder</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (GBH)</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common assault</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Analysed from SAPS crime statistics**

These crime incidences are quite high, given that they took place in an area of 10 km² with an estimated population of 40 000 people as of 2011.

The image of post-apartheid Yeoville is connected to the general image of Johannesburg, Gauteng and more generally, South Africa as places suffused by crime, violence and fear. The April 2010 to March 2011 security situation in Yeoville in relation to the situation in the Gauteng province sheds more light on the extent of violence (Table 2).

Table 2: Yeoville crime statistics versus Gauteng province crime statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected crime</th>
<th>Yeoville's contribution to Gauteng province total (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault with attempt to cause grievous bodily harm (GBH)</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common assault</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Analysed from SAPS crime statistics**

As a neighbourhood, Yeoville is arguably disproportionately visible in statistics on contact crime in the Gauteng province. For the size of its area and population, Yeoville arguably contributes a lot towards violence and crime in Gauteng. While Yeoville is only 10km², Gauteng province is 18 179 km².32 While Yeoville has an estimated population of 40 000, Gauteng province has a population estimated at 11 191 700 by Stats SA in 2010. Yeoville therefore contains a population of about 0.4% of the population of Gauteng.33 The statistical significance of the situation of violent crime in Yeoville is not only for the Gauteng province, but for South Africa, given that Gauteng has the biggest provincial population in South Africa,

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33 See GCRO report - ibid.
contributing 22.4% to the national population. These statistics qualify Yeoville as a crime and violence ridden area. Given this, it is urgent to examine community responses to fear of crime and violence in the neighbourhood.

3.3. What do we not know?

As hinted in Chapter 2 and detailed in this chapter; contemporary South African literature successfully examines trends in urban violence, crime and fear, attempts an exploration of causalities and describes variants of safety governance initiatives. What this literature misses, or marginally addresses is: i) the link between community safety governance and community politics; ii) the role of local ethno-nationalist politics in community safety governance; and iii) the discursive and practical territorial or spatial politics of community security governance.

I build into few recent attempts to examine the role of party politics and leadership politics in community security initiatives in urban South African contexts (Benit-Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Benit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 2012; Fourchard 2011; Fourchard 2012). These recent attempts crave for an approach that goes beyond party and leadership politics; to explore organisational, institutional, individual and ethno-national regionalist micro-politics concomitant with community safety governance.

On ethno-nationalist politics of community security governance, contemporary South African studies have mainly shown the entrenchment of xenophobic sentiments and their expressions in “anti-foreigner” violence (Misago 2009; Misago 2011; Misago, Landau and Monson 2009). Yet, what has been missed is how ethno-nationalist sentiments, discourses and practices manifest in the organisational, institutional, individualist politics of community safety governance. And, through a case study of Yeoville, which is a multinational neighbourhood, I show how this politics is entrenched (Chapter 7).

The micro-level territorial or spatial discourses, practices and strategies associated with community safety governance and their link to organisational, institutional, individualist and ethno-nationalist politics also deserve academic attention. In a quest

34 See GCRO report - ibid.
to explain the micro-politics of community safety governance, I develop my thoughts by conversing with Bourdieu’s social thought, amongst other thoughts (Chapter 4).
4. Chapter Four
Understanding socio-spatial politics of urban community safety governance

“Bourdieu is primarily a theorist of order and its production. We confront this Bourdieu with the argumentative, unruly and violence-laden social realities of South Africa – with, precisely the Johannesburg moment” (von Holdt 2012b: 5).

“…Bourdieu’s concerns with symbolic domination seemed far removed from the South African situation where physical violence seemed far more salient – something about which Bourdieu has little to say beyond some of his early writings in Algeria. My original intention was to try and show the significance of Bourdieu to the new South Africa …” (Burawoy 2012: x).

4.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses my search for “thinking tools” to understand the socio-spatial politics of urban community safety governance. I propose to apply and test Bourdieusian thinking tools; setting a stage for the development of novel thoughts.

I briefly review theoretical ancestry to community safety governance thought, from the Chicago School to place-based theories. I then introduce Bourdieusian thinking tools; defining them and highlighting their utility in my quest to unpack the micro-politics of community safety governance. I move on to explain why it is important to think community safety governance “with”, “against” and “beyond” Bourdieu (Brubaker 1985; King 2000). Briefly, I show the status of Bourdieusian thought in South Africa, setting up a snapshot conversation with Burawoy and von Holdt (Burawoy and von Holdt 2012).

This chapter elaborates on the utility of Bourdieusian and other thinking tools in the understanding of socio-spatial micro-political dynamics in the community safety governance field. My argument starts from the premise that fear of crime and violence, amongst other urban disorders, is institutionalised and instrumentalised in community organisation and other safety producing collective or individual practices (strategies and tactics) - ushering an arena for a concurrently socially divisive and unifying micro-politics.

My view is that this micro-politics takes the form of stakeholder, ethno-national and territorial politics, among other manifestations. I show how Bourdieusian and other “thinking tools” fare in light of the argument that the community safety governance
field is; i) one of stakeholder (organisational, social group and individual) contestations and coalitions; ii) an arena of ethno-national regionalist politics; iii) abound with discursive and practical territorialist politics (see Figure 1). In my discussion, I tweak in a myriad of Bourdiesuan thinking tools including field, habitus, practice, symbolic violence, social space; inviting other thinkers to this thinking enterprise. By necessity, my theoretical approach strives to be interdisciplinary, although drawing mainly on urban thought in the sociological, geographical, urban planning and criminological sense.

I inductively deploy “open concepts” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) by putting them to work empirically. My position is anchored in Bourdieu’s view that “concepts have no definition other than systemic ones, and are designed to be put to work empirically in systemic fashion” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96).

I start my search for “thinking tools” to understand the socio-spatial politics of community safety governance by i) briefly reviewing theoretical ancestry to urban safety governance studies; ii) and positioning Bourdiesuan thought therefrom.

4.2. From social disorganisation to place-based theories to Bourdieu

Theories of social disorganisation, commonly known as the “Chicago School” are some of the early attempts to understand urban crime and deviance. This, of course, came after early sociological attempts by Durkheim, Merton and others to analyse urban social challenges - using concepts such as “normlessness” and “anomie” (Hilbert 1989). Using the City of Chicago as a research laboratory, Sociologists such as William Foot Whyte (Whyte 1943) observed that levels of social disorganisation are diametrically linked to crime modes and frequencies. In this regard, those unstable areas with a poor sense of community (of collective efficacy) are regarded as more prone to crime than those in which the inhabitants have a sense of community (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997).

35 My use of “open concepts” is a way of rejecting deterministic reasoning and over-positivism in which empirical reality is made subservient to theoretical constructs (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Rather, theoretical constructs are to be deployed as just “thinking tools” to be put to be put through the empirical grinder.
Another stream of thought has generally been place-based - rooted in the idea of defensible space\(^{36}\). This scholarship borrows significantly from Jane Jacobs’ classical work - *The Life and Death of Great American Cities* (Jacobs 1989). In this work, Jacobs explores the importance of having many eyes on the streets in the creation of safe cities or neighbourhoods in which vulnerability to crime is minimal.

Connected to the concept of defensible space is the notion of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). CPTED proposes that it is important to design the physical environment to prevent crime. Related to CPTED is the concept of situational crime prevention, which focuses on reduction of the rationale for criminal acts deploying the environment in ways that make it these acts riskier (Gronlund 2000). In a similar vein, *broken windows theory* is premised on the view that the generalised degeneration of the physical environment creates an environment that favours the flourishing of civil incivilities, including more serious crimes, illegalities and violence (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Wilson 2000). Environmental rehabilitation, referred to as “fixing broken windows” (Crawford 2006a), is considered essential for successful crime prevention.

While I appreciate place-based and social disorganisation theories, I am concerned about harmonising and edifying social and spatial elements within these respective ways of thinking - a pursuit I attempt through the notion of *socio-spatial politics*. The *spatial determinism* of place-based theories and the *sociologism* of the social disorganisation theories obstruct them from appreciating the indivisibility of the spatial from the social and *vice versa* (Simmel 1997). Social relations (including fear of violence and criminal others) can author the configuration of place, while place has the propensity to contain, anchor and channel social relations. In my approach, I resist falling into the trap of *over-spatialism* and *over-sociologism*; hence I compact the two ways of thinking through the concept of *socio-spatial politics*.

Mike Davis attempts to bridge the artificial binary between the *social* and *spatial* in his analysis of crime in Los Angeles. He used Burgess’ concentric zone model to map out crime in the city of Los Angeles; coming up with the concept of “ecology of fear” (Davis 1998; Tonkiss 2005). In this mapping, Davis depicted a “spatial

\(^{36}\) The concept of defensible space is based on the view that space, in the physical sense, should allow for natural surveillance to prevent crime (Newman 1972).
economy of no-go-areas, highly administered and policed spaces, edge cities and the fortified zones of gated neighbourhoods and ex-urban *gulags*” (Tonkiss 2005: 36). Davis’ analysis entrenches the idea that urban problems of crime, violence and fear have spatial configurations and manifestations.

From here I move on to introduce Bourdieu’s thinking tools, hinting on their potential significance to urban safety governance studies.

**4.3. Preamble: sifting through Bourdieu’s theoretical toolbox**

In thinking about the micro-politics of community safety governance, key Bourdieusian thinking tools I can immediately pick are those of *field, capital, practice, habitus* and *symbolic violence*. A field, according to Bourdieu, is a system of “social positions” and a “social arena of struggles” in which agents, institutions or stakeholders compete over the “appropriation” of “certain species of capital” (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1990). The suppleness of the concept of field calls for flexibility in defining and conceptualising it, as it “does not provide ready answers but has to be rethought anew every time” when one puts it to work empirically (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 109). In this regard, it is not just an abstract concept (Benson 1999).

As an entry point to my analysis I conceptualise community security governance as a *field* containing various sought-after capitals, for which various stakeholders strategically position themselves. *Capital* is what is taken to be significant or what is at stake within any particular field (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1986). *Species of capital* at stake in the community safety governance field include *political, symbolic, social, economic, cultural, moral* and *spatial capitals* (Bourdieu 1986; Casey 2005; Lars 2008) [see definitions of these forms of capital in Appendix A]. These forms of capital are mutually convertible and cannot be treated as isolated from each other (Bourdieu 1986).

Struggles for acquirement of various capitals in the field are influenced by the *habitus* of competing, coalescing and struggling stakeholders. *Habitus* according to Bourdieu is a concept that describes mental dispositions of people - a kind of cognitive map that informs behaviour. Bourdieu states:
“The habitus, the durably installed generative principle or regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus” (Bourdieu 1977: 28).

Bourdieu argues that there is a dialectical relationship between habitus and field, and it is the interface of the field and habitus that produces practice (Bourdieu 1990). The habitus is a structured structure; that is a product of the field; and it is also a structuring structure, meaning that it configures the field (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1990). The habitus, like the field, is lithe and transposable (Bourdieu 1990). The concept of habitus helps to explain stakeholder practices and strategies in the community safety governance field.

Practices are actions, behaviours or attitudes of agents which are repeated over time to the extent that they become habitualized (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Bourdieu 1990; Burger and Luckmann 1966). Often, practices take the form of strategies and tactics through which stakeholders navigate their spatial and social environment (Bourdieu 1990; de Certeau 1984) - in this case navigating and responding to fear of crime and violence. Practices (strategies and tactics) of stakeholders in the community safety governance field can be simultaneously socio-politically contentious and unifying. I propose that they may take the form of symbolic violence committed by organisational, institutional, social groups and individual agents with, on and against one another. Symbolic violence, according to Bourdieu “is the process whereby in all societies, order and social restraint are produced by indirect, cultural mechanisms rather than by direct, coercive social control” (Jenkins 1992: 104). This definition is rather conventional, and I use it to also describe and explain symbolic dimensions of organisational, institutional, individual and social group relations in the course of competition and coalition in the community safety governance field. “Like many of Bourdieu’s ideas, the notions of symbolic power and symbolic violence are rather flexible notions which were worked out in specific research contexts, and hence they are best explained by reference to his more concrete anthropological and sociological studies” (Thompson 1991: 23).
I argue that contestations and coalitions within the community safety governance field are influenced by unwritten (and sometimes written) rules, constituting what could be described as *doxa*. *Doxa* refers to aspects of social existence that are taken for granted or generally viewed as self-evident (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1984). It is *doxa* which enables *habitualisation* (and is also a product of it) and makes *social reproduction* possible (Throop and Murphy 2002).

Why appropriate and apply Bourdieu’s thinking tools in trying to understand the socio-spatial politics of urban community security governance in South Africa?

4.4. Why Bourdieu?

One of my biggest motivation in applying Bourdieu’s thinking tools is that his thought is scarcely deployed in urban studies and urban safety governance studies; not only in South Africa, but globally. Bourdieu, although generally considered a French and Western theorist, is not foreign to Africa. His key thinking tools of *practice* and *habitus* were born out of research in Africa; in Kabylia, Algeria (Grenfell 2006). My endeavour to converse with Bourdieu, about an African city, should therefore not really be considered awkward or as simply falling into the trap of Westocentrism; as is the charge with most western theories imported to South Africa and Africa in general. One, however, should note that the conditions in colonial Algeria cannot be considered as akin to the social conditions in post-apartheid South African cities. Let it be noted that the idea is to critically test and edify Bourdieusian thinking tools in the context of a South African city that is bedevilled by anxieties about safety; rather than to impose these thinking tools on South African realities in a suffocative manner.

Besides, urban studies have not contended adequately with Bourdieusian thought; hence, it is profitable to posthumously bring Bourdieu to urban studies in South Africa and hopefully into the world through my own understanding of him. Mike Savage rightly characterises the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu as “the lost urban sociology” (Savage 2012). Amongst the few scholars who have tried to invigorate the urban sociology in Bourdieu’s work, is Loic Wacquant in his studies of urban challenges in the USA, France and Brazil (Wacquant 1998; Wacquant 2008b; Wacquant 2008c; Wacquant 2008d; Wacquant 2009). Yet more can be done to
engage Bourdieu’s sociology in urban studies. The theoretical tools developed by Bourdieu can be useful for understanding our cities; and in this particular case, South African cities.

Bourdieu’s concept of field is particularly relevant to an analysis of modern and differentiated societies which are configured around “semi-autonomous fields” (Burawoy and von Holdt 2012; Thompson 1991). Which societies are more modern and differentiated than urban ones? Which city in Africa and South Africa is more modern and differentiated than Johannesburg? Since Bourdieu’s conversation with place (in the spatial sense) is considered inadequate, will it not be a worthwhile endeavour to spatialise his “thinking tools”?

Bourdieu was concerned with unpacking the reproduction of social order and domination (Bourdieu 1991a). Why not put him to use in understanding the contradictions, fractalities and utilities of institutions or instruments of social order? Surely, one would wonder how Bourdieu’s thinking tools of habitus, field, and capital; and associated concepts of practice, symbolic violence or symbolic domination, amongst others, would fare in the context of Johannesburg, South Africa.

As an initiation of my attempts to converse with and utilise Bourdieu’s thinking tools, I highlight the positioning of Bourdieu’s thoughts in the South African context in section below.

4.5. Bourdieu in South Africa: thinking with and against Burawoy and von Holdt

Bourdiesian thinking tools are new to community safety governance studies, and relatively but not entirely new to the South African context (Sitas 2012). The first fairly extensive official attempt to think South Africa through a conversation with Bourdieu was done by Michael Burawoy and Karl von Holdt (Burawoy and von Holdt 2012). Whereas Burawoy and von Holdt usefully interpret Bourdieu as a theorist of order and question his applicability to the South African situation that they describe as characterised by “unruly and violence-laden social realities”37 (Burawoy and von Holdt 2012; von Holdt 2012a; von Holdt 2012b; von Holdt

37 See von Holdt (2012b:5)
I find his thinking tools applicable in explaining how the institutions of social order in South Africa work and in unravelling the contradictions in and logics of operation of these institutions. I also find the interpretation of South African societies as characterised by “unruly and violence laden social realities” as providing an “alarmist” version of South African societies, as there are considerable levels of social order. If anything, the unruly-ness and violence laden-ness of South African societies can be conceptualised as episodic; albeit with a higher frequency in comparison to other societies across the world. In the South African context, as elsewhere, understanding the production of violence and disorder is as important as understanding the production of social order.

While Bourdieusian thought may have limitations in the analysis of the broader South African social conditions characterised by violence and crime, its focus on the reproduction of order is useful in enabling an understanding of the functionality of agents of social control. This study is both an answer to Burawoy and von Holdt’s questions regarding the applicability of Bourdieu in South Africa, and an attempt to show how the struggle to generate social order is as fragmented and contradictory as South African society itself.

How applicable are Bourdieu’s concepts in understanding the socio-spatial dynamics of community safety governance? Although some of Bourdieu’s concepts were developed in the French context and some in the Algerian context, Bourdieu had a dream of universalising these concepts elsewhere. He notes:

“Situations where I have attempted to show foreign publics the universal validity of models constructed in relation to the specific case of France have perhaps allowed me to address, in these lectures, what I believe to be the most essential in my work, that is, its most elementary and fundamental characteristics, which, no doubt through my own fault, often escape even the most well-intentioned readers and commentators” (Bourdieu 1998a: vii).

In many ways, this thesis advances and questions this Bourdieusian project, testing Bourdieu’s concepts in contexts outside France or Algeria.
4.6. Understanding community safety governance by reading Bourdieu and others

In the following section I seek ways of thinking the *socio-spatial* micro-politics of community safety governance “with”, “against” and “beyond” Bourdieu (Brubaker 1985). I find it profitable to converse with Bourdieu, given his commitment to the use of “open concepts” and his rejection of inflexible theoreticism (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Jenkins 1992).

A critical theoretical move that I take in deploying Bourdieusian thinking tools is to conceptualise community security governance as a field. Figure 6 shows my thoughts about stakes and dynamics in the community security governance field.

![Diagram](source: Author)

**Figure 6: Thinking the community security governance field**

Partly deriving from thoughts displayed in Figure 6, I make a series of hypothetical propositions about the micro-politics of community safety governance. I start by analysing how fear of violence and crime (and other urban disorders) materialise into
community organisation, contentious social group relations (ethnopolitics) and territorialism - generating a space for urban micro-politics.

4.6.1. Institutionalisation and instrumentalisation of fear: consequences

Can Bourdieu’s thinking tools explain the institutionalisation and instrumentalisation (Burger and Luckmann 1966) of fear in the city? Figure 7 suggests that fear of crime and violence (and responses thereto) is institutionalised or instrumentalised in the form of community organisations, everyday practices or rituals (spatial or social), ethno-national regionalist politics and territorialist or territorialised practices and discourses. Instrumentalisation of fear and responses to violence and crime has to do with how these are concretised or habitualised into observable material reality; taking the form of institutions, organisations and everyday practices. Burger and Luckmann (1966: 70-71) argue:

“All human activity is subject to habitualisation. Any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be reproduced with an economy of effort and which, *ipso facto*, is apprehended by its performer as that pattern. Habitualisation further implies that the action in question may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort. This is true of non-social as well as of social activity” (Burger and Luckmann 1966).

Showing the connection between habitualisation and institutionalisation, Burger and Luckmann (1966: 72) further argue:

“Institutionalisation occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualised actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an institution. What must be stressed are the reciprocity of institutional typifications and the typicality of not only the actions but also the actors in institutions. The typifications of habitualised actions that constitute institutions are always shared ones. They are available to all members of the particular social group in question, and the institution itself typifies individual actors as well as individual actions” (Burger and Luckmann 1966).

The argument that I make (as represented in Figure 7) is that fear, among other urban socio-economic challenges, is institutionalised and instrumentalised in the form of community organisations and institutions (government and non-government) and galvanises and polarises social groups. I argue that the
institutionalisation of fear ushers an environment conducive for a simultaneously progressive and retrogressive micro-politics (see Figure 7).

Collective and individual practices that are evoked by fear (of violence and crime) take a particular pattern, including organising, and in many other cases collective action such as road closures, gating neighbourhoods and vigilante justice amongst others. Due to their typification, fear and violence can be conceptualised as social institutions in their own right (Burger and Luckmann 1966). Following Figure 7, I find it profitable to think of the city as a social and territorial field of fear because perceptions of risk, fear and danger are so common in the city; with the nights being dreaded more (Body-Gendrot 2012; Tudor 2003).

The institutionalisation and instrumentalisation of fear in cities justifies the description of the city as a fearopolis and securopolis. I formulate the concept of fearopolis to describe the city as a space of fear. Adaptation to life in a fearopolis is constituted by attempts at governing and minimising risk and danger. I coin the concept of securopolis to capture the city as a securitised and increasingly securitising space; a space where citizens and residents are obsessed with aversion of danger and risk. The securitisation of the city of Johannesburg takes place in a context where residents’ lives are ordered around perceptions of the imminency of danger, violence and crime. Johannesburg dualises as a fearopolis and a securopolis in that it is a “fearful city” and a “secure city” at once. The concept of fearopolis depicts fear as a ubiquitous

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emotion in the urban landscape, while that of *securopolis* describes the increased securitisation of cities and of the minds (habitus) and practices of urbanites as a response to fear of imagined or real violence and crime.

Life in a *fearopolis* or *securopolis* is characterised by a fear-ridden public habitus and a consciousness about security - what I refer to as *habitus of fear* or *securitised habitus* respectively. My account of adaptation to life in a *fearopolis* or *securopolis* is not rooted in an Afro-pessimistic tradition. I seek to avoid unnecessarily projecting Johannesburg, as a space of chaos, savagery, anachronism and catastrophe - as is the tradition in many studies of African cities (Davis 2006; Mbembe and Nuttall 2004; Mbembe and Nuttall 2008; Oldfield, Parnell and Mabin 2004; Pieterse 2008). Rather, I show that urban Africans have their ways, problematic as they can be, around fear of crime and violence - as much as they flexibly adjust to many other exigencies of urban life (Simone 2005; Simone 2008).

Johannesburg has been described as “fearful city” (Dirusweit 2002), “city of fragments” (Murray 2008a), and “city of ruins” (Simone 2004a). In all these representations, Johannesburg, like many other cities of the South, is depicted as an apocalyptic city - a city of catastrophe and disaster where citizens and residents live in fear (Myers and Murray 2007; Pieterse 2008). However, Johannesburg is also projected as a city of opportunity, a city full of prospects for a good life given its promising economic base and relatively better economic opportunities within South Africa and the African continent (Mabin 2007; Mbembe 2004; Todes 2011).

The main weight of conceptualising Johannesburg as a *fearopolis* is in that fear tends to be a key element that defines its history (Kynoch 2011), influences the form, content and organisation of everyday life (Dirusweit 2002; Dirusweit 2007; Dirusweit and Wafer 2006), and is inscribed into its built environment (Landman 2004a; Landman 2008; Landman 2009; Landman and Liebermann 2005). This is, of course, not unique to Johannesburg as similar observations are made in Los Angeles (Davis 1992; Davis 1998), Sao Paulo (Caldeira 2000), California (Blakely and Snyder 1997), London (Atkinson and Flint 2004) and many other cities. Fear is therefore
habitualised, institutionalised and instrumentalised – becoming what I refer to as a *liquid institution* (following Baumanian reasoning39).

My main interest is in analysing the socially contentious-unifying stakeholder, ethno-national regionalist and discursive or practical territorial politics associated with the institutionalisation and instrumentalisation of fear of violence and crime. I unpack my argument through a conversation with Bourdieu, myself and other thinkers. I start off by conceptualising the argument that community safety governance is a field of stakeholder (organisational, individual or social group) contestations and coalitions for acquirement of various forms of *capital* - a field of power and micro-politics.

**4.6.2. Field of power: stakeholder politics in community safety governance**

I make two arguments here. The first argument is that community safety governance is a *field of power* (De Nooy 2003) or, specifically, of *micro-politics*. Stakeholders (organisations, institutions, social groups and individuals) in the field of community security governance compete and coalesce for notability (recognition, honour and prestige), economic resources, power, local knowledgeability, local and translocal support amongst other profits or capitals to be found in or brought to the community safety governance field. In essence, I view the field of community safety production as an arena of contestation and coalition for political, social, economic, cultural, and moral; amongst other capitals deemed important (see Appendix A). However, “action is not always an outcome of conscious calculation” or profit seeking (Thompson 1991: 16).

Bourdieu argues that the field is “the locus of relations of force – and not only of meaning - and of struggles aimed at transforming it, and therefore of endless change” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 103). The community safety governance field can therefore be conceptualised as a battlefield for access to various kinds of capital or profits and as a space for agents’ positioning for various types of interest and stakes.

The field of community safety production, while it is to be conceptualised as a field in its own right, is positioned in relationships (of power - competition and complementarity) with other fields. Importantly, Bourdieu conceptualises society as

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differentiated into a number of semi-autonomous fields (Benson 1999). He uses the concept of homology to denote and analyse connections and similarities between different fields (Bourdieu 1991a; Thompson 1991). He conceives society as “made up of relatively autonomous but homologous fields: interrelated social systems with competition for accumulation and monopolisation of field-specific forms of symbolic capital” (Stokke and Selboe 2009: 62). In this case, Bourdieu emphasises the homology between fields, arguing that there is a broad correspondence between power constellations and practices in different fields (Ibid: 63). For instance, there are general “homologies” across fields where those who are in dominant positions in one field also dominate other fields (Ibid: 63). The boundaries between various fields interlace, such that the community security governance field intersects with the political, economic, juridical, religious and other fields; and struggles and capitals have potential to circulate between fields.

I conceive the community safety field as intrinsically linked to the political field, or as a subfield of the political field. If one is sensitive to geographical or sociological scale they can, for example, refer to the concept of community security field when describing dynamics related to peace and stability within a neighbourhood and to security field when describing higher levels of security governance or when being deliberately oblivious of scale.

Analysing the form of struggles in the community safety governance field, I argue that as stakeholders therein compete and coalesce for the various kinds of capitals, interests or stakes, they engage in multiple economic, social, political, cultural, moral and spatial practices. The field of community safety governance can on its own be viewed as a miniature of political, social and moral economies (Arnold 2001; Bouchard, Ferraton and Michau 2006; Sayer 2000). It is therefore an arena for the economy of practices (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992); a space for a constellation and juxtaposition of interests and stakes. Relatedly, Warde (2004: 12) expresses that “the field operates like a game”, wherein agents adopt strategies (and tactics) in competition for status. These strategies and tactics include the exercise of symbolic violence by competing and coalescing stakeholders.
Central to the idea of practice is the notion of strategising. The concept of strategising encompasses the assumption that actors have “goals” and “interests”. The idea of strategy in Bourdieu’s view is designated to locate the source of actors’ “practices in their own experience of reality – their practical sense or logic - rather than in the analytical models which social scientists construct to explain that practice” (Jenkins 1992: 72). The practitioners and strategists in the community safety governance field are community organisations, social groups, individuals and institutions such as the state and private sector amongst others (Figure 6).

Practices in the field are informed by some rules (unwritten and written) - what Bourdieu refers to as doxa. I argue that the micro-politics of community safety production follows a particular logic informed by the habitus of involved stakeholders. In making this argument I indicate that the collective or individual behaviours of actors in the community security governance field are informed by their histories and cultural grounding - that is their habitus. The habitus of individuals and collectivities structure socio-political and spatial practices, habits, perceptions and relations between agents in the community security governance field.

In fact, public participation is central to drama (practices and strategies) in the community safety governance field. Micro-politics of community safety governance is playable in spaces of participation. How can Bourdiesian “thinking tools” help us understand participatory safety governance? What is the link between public participation in community security governance and symbolic domination? I maintain that participatory safety governance is fraught with concealed and explicit power dynamics that undermine its very purpose and essence. Following Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic domination, I argue that participatory safety governance is an arena of subtle and outright domination of weaker social institutions or organisations, social groups and individuals by the more powerful (see Figure 8).
Figure 8: Participatory safety governance and relational politics

In this case I analyse two heuristically distinguished spaces of participation in community safety governance - that is the invited and invented spaces. Invited spaces of participation are those whose setting up is sponsored or mandated by government or private agents (Bourdieu 1977; Lefebvre 1991), while invented spaces of participation are those that are spontaneously created or claimed by people at the grassroots levels (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001; Gaventa 2004; Gaventa 2006; Gaventa and Valderrama 1999). At its practical level, participatory security governance is considered as “deliberative” or “communicative” (Barnes 2011; Dryzek 2003) - in this case involving meetings by neighbourhood residents for discussions and debates on matters concerning neighbourhood safety.

As observed elsewhere and reinforced here, participation is sometimes, if not often times, a fallacy. This is because of the dynamics of (symbolic) domination (by the elite or state agents) of the citizenry that are weaved into its processes (Arnstein 2011; Katsaura 2012; Swyngedouw 2011a). Using the concept of misrecognition, Bourdieu argues that the dominated are (actively) complicit in their own domination because they tend to misunderstand the system that dominates them; thereby perpetuating their very domination (Bourdieu 1991a; Webb, Schirato and Danaher 2002). It is

40 In my view, the distinction between invented and invited spaces of participation is only heuristic and the issue of grassrooted-ness is a myth. This is because there is always a power behind the invitation of people to participate in these spaces.
possible therefore, in reading Bourdieu, to argue that participatory safety governance is an instrument for domination of the citizenry; an arrangement which reproduces socio-political domination (and repression) rather than liberate the citizenry (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003).

By sharing the thought of participatory democracy and being habitualised (subconsciously or consciously) to evaluate society through the lenses of lay or intellectual democratic thought, it is possible that subaltern groups “share a system of organising and evaluating society that works against them” (Thompson 1991: 23). The *habitus* which is a product of accumulated history, a history of domination in this case, can produce and reproduce practices that sustain the citizenry’s submission to the established order (reproducing habitus of submission) (Bourdieu 1991a; von Holdt 2012a). However, “dominated individuals are not passive bodies to which symbolic power is applied, as it were, like a scalpel to a corpse” (Bourdieu 1991a: 23). “The dominated can exert a certain force of resistance to domination” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 81). Von Holdt shows that this resistance is encapsulated in *bodies of defiance* - defiance against authority (von Holdt 2012a). Such “bodies of defiance” operate in the realm of *insurgent citizenship* (cf. Holston 2008). I use the concept of “insurgent citizenship” to describe community security governance initiatives that operate outside the prescribed state arena, in opposition to or alongside it (Holston 2008). This means that communities have potentials to create their own *local moral orders* which may be insurgent (von Holdt 2010).

At a micro-level, there is a possibility of the elite to accumulate, concentrate and pocket the means of local social influence (Katsaura 2012); thereby domination the community safety governance field. This can undermine the values of democracy, generating what I conceptualise as an “anti-democracy of democracy” - a democracy that unwittingly or wittingly undermine the very democratic intent as stakeholder interests takes precedence over the common good. Similarly, writing about the decline of urban politics and role of civil society, Swyngedouw (2011) and Ferguson (2006) suggest that civil society, which is generally celebrated as creating and nurturing democratic space, should be viewed through lenses that unpack “anti-democratic” tendencies within it (Ferguson 2006; Katsaura 2012; Swyngedouw
Spaces for the community governance of security can therefore be analysed as epitomising the “contradictions” of democracy (Holston 2008).

Further undermining the democratic intent in the community safety governance field is the possibility of political dispossession of masses. This happens because the articulation of the collective agenda is sometimes done by or through delegates. Such individuals (delegates), if elected, are considered to possess delegated political capital and if they lead out of their heroism or charisma, are considered to possess personal political capital (Bourdieu 1991a). As they claim to speak for the collective, some delegates may also engage in double dealings (Bourdieu 1991a) or multiple dealings (Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012); pursuing personal interests, sometimes at the expense of collective interests, in the process (Wacquant 2004). In some or many cases, leaders (delegates) are complicit in state activities. Because they are the power behind the mobilisation of people to participate in community safety governance, leaders articulate agendas that may be pro-state, sometimes to the detriment of the citizenry.

The state, multifarious as it is, has a tendency to dominate spaces of participatory safety governance (directly or at a distance); sometimes undermining the very intentions of safety production or the core goals (articulated goals) of these participatory spaces. I am sceptical that the state, being inscribed in human minds and habitualised in human practices, always finds its way into spaces of deliberative community safety governance; symbolically or outrightly dominating these spaces. The symbolic domination of the state is buttressed by its attempt to monopolise the capital of physical force (for example, through the police, army and intelligence) (Bourdieu 1998a). Of the state, Bourdieu writes:

“The state is a culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instrument of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural capital or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital. It is this concentration as such which constitutes the state as the holder of a sort of metacapital granting power over other species of capital and over their holders” (Bourdieu 1998a: 41).

The state’s presence and influence in the field of community safety governance should therefore not be a surprise. Being a bank\footnote{Not necessarily the ‘central bank’ that Bourdieu makes of it.} of symbolic capital, a centre of meta-
capital or statist capital; the state has the propensity to dominate the socio-political world - influencing people’s thought patterns, social worlds and their everyday practices. Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of that state entrenches the idea that the state does not exist only “out there” in the guise of bureaucracies and authorities; it also lives “in here” (in people’s habitus and daily encounters). It is ineffaceably engraved in persons in the form of state-oriented mental categories acquired via schooling and different mechanisms of socialisation through which “humans cognitively construct the social world”, so that they already “consent to its dictates prior to committing any political act” (Wacquant 2004: 8). However, in some circumstances, rather than think “through” and “with” the state, residents think “against” it, viewing it as a dangerous presence – kleptocratic, criminal and violent (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006a; Voronin 1997).

As my presupposition goes, like schooling, participatory safety governance bonds human beings to the state, inculcating the state into them. This is because the modalities, content and form of participatory safety governance are influenced, if not shaped, by the state or the “thought of the state” (Bourdieu 1998a). It is not surprising that when it comes to community security governance, citizens tend to “think through the state”⁴², “with the state” (Bourdieu 1998a) and sometimes against the state. They possess a statised or statist habitus - evaluating their safety and other situations in terms of the failures, successes and obligations of the state. The state is therefore “fetishised” (Bourdieu 1991a).

Theoretically exploring the positioning of social groups in the community security governance field, I focus, through deploying Bourdieusian thought, on unpacking dynamics of urban ethno-national regionalist politics?

4.6.3. Ethno-national regionalist politics and community safety governance

Social groups, based on their ethnic and national origins, could be excluded from participating in community organisations and be accused of causing anomie and disorder (Barry 1998; Brubaker 1992; Elias and Scotson 1994; Kymlicka 2001; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Nyamnjoh 2010b). I argue that ethno-nationality (and

stereotypes thereof) constitutes a rule (or *doxa*) (mainly unwritten and sometimes written) for inclusion or exclusion in spaces of participation in community safety governance activities and discourses (see Figure 6, Figure 8).

If not deliberately excluded, ethno-national minorities can choose to isolate themselves due to their (acceptance of the) perception that they are different and do not belong (Barry 1998; Brubaker 1992; Kymlicka 2001). Ethno-national minorities, if poor, easily occupy the status of *margizens* (Schuilenburg 2008), *urban outcasts* (Wacquant 2008d) or *pariahs* (Goffman 1963b) - people with no or limited access to public goods or services (including safety), suffer isolation, rejection and vilification by mainstream society. This typifies what Comaroff and Comaroff (2009:118) refer to as “the identity economy” – a socio-economy in which ethnic identity becomes a rule for access to economic, social and political resources. In referring to the status of African immigrants in South Africa, I deploy the concept of the *other other*[^43] to depict their multilayered social isolation or exclusion based on the stitched notions of ethnicity, nationality, race, class and gender, amongst others.

Processes of *other othering* and, imaginary or real, *group making or unmaking* and ethno-national “boundary maintenance” (Barth 1970) are akin to what Bourdieu conceptualises as *regionalisation* (Bourdieu 1991a). Regionalisation is characterised by struggles over classifications and definitions of regional and ethnic identity and the properties (stigmata or emblems) linked to ethno-national origin (Bourdieu 1991a). In the community security field, this is played out in *ethno-national regionalist* discourses and practices – otherwise construed as “ethno-talks”, “ethno-practices” or “ethno-consciousness” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). Such discourses name, divide and rally social groups (Bourdieu 1991a) – creating divisions between “the established” (insiders) and the “outsiders”[^44] (Elias and Scotson 1994; Nyamnjoh 2006). The

[^43]: The concept of “*other other*” is used by Susan van Zyl to show the persistence of a differentiating and differentiated citizenship in postcolonial or post-apartheid South Africa despite attempts to wish away racism, classism sexism and other discriminatory classifications. I therefore develop this concept to analyse the exclusion or discrimination of non-South African blacks in South African public life, including participation in civic bodies like the CPF. See van Zyl, Susan. 1998. "The other and other others: Post-colonialism, Psychoanalysis and the South African Question." *American Image* 55(1):77-100.

[^44]: The “established” are those neighbourhood residents that have been there for a long time and in this case, being South African citizens, while “outsiders” are the non-citizens (the African immigrants)
discourse of Kwere Kwere\textsuperscript{45} is a typical example in the case of South Africa (Landau 2010; Landau and Freemantle 2010). The linguistic market of the security governance field, where such discourses are fermented, serves to generate and perpetuate stereotypes about crime and violence - its perpetrators, victims, spatialities and everyday-ness. This is reflected in what Caldeira, based on her studies in Sao Paulo, refers to as “talk of crime”\textsuperscript{46} (Caldeira 2000).

Ethno-national regionalist politics takes place in social space and the task of mapping its form and content on paper (and in reality) is one that the social scientist should be able to do without gratuitously concretising or reifying the imagined or probable (Bourdieu 1985). To this end, Bourdieu classifies sociology as a “social typology” (Bourdieu 1991a: 229). He states:

“Apparently, directly visible beings, whether individuals or groups, exist and subsist in and through difference, that is, they occupy relative positions in a space of relations which although invisible and always difficult to show empirically, is the most real reality (the ens realissimum, as scholasticism would say) and the real principle of the behaviour of individuals and groups” (Bourdieu 1998a: 31).

Faced with ethno-nationalist othering, social groups are likely to engage collective and individual strategies of protecting themselves. I refer to these as counter-otherisation tactics and strategies.

Overall, I suggest that the community safety governance field in multi-national settings is pregnant with what Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) refer to as “ethno-discourses”, “ethno-talks” and “ethno-practices”\textsuperscript{47} – as aspects of its everydayness and structure.

In the section below, I make a case for thinking about the territorial (of spatial) politics of and in community safety governance. The next section opens a theoretical minefield from which I try to dig out Bourdieu’s spatial sociology in a bid to understand the socio-spatial politics of community safety governance.

\textsuperscript{45} The phrase Kwere Kwere is a South African derogatory term referring to people considered to look foreign and strange and to speak languages that one cannot decipher.
\textsuperscript{46} That is everyday talks and legends about crime.
\textsuperscript{47} Ethno-discourses – ideas or debates informed by ethnicity or perceptions thereof/ ethno-talks – speeches informed by ethnicity or perceptions thereof/ ethno-practices – actions and rituals informed by ethnicity or perceptions thereof.
4.6.4. Spatio-social politics of community safety governance: what can Bourdieu offer?

Bourdieu rarely wrote about physical space and took minimal effort to show the connection of his notion of social space to physical space. It is only later in his career in his books *The Weight of the World* and *The Social Structures of the Economy* that he makes statements about the importance of place in the organisation of society and human action (Bourdieu et al. 1999). According to Bourdieu, “the social world can be represented as a space (with several dimensions) constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution …” (Bourdieu 1985:723-24). Bourdieu (2000a: 134) maintains that social space is defined by the mutual exclusion or distinction of the positions which constitute it. These positions can be construed as constituting a structure of distribution of various kinds of capital. He writes, “In this way and in the most diverse contexts the structure of social space shows up as spatial oppositions, in which the inhabited (or appropriated) space functions as a sort of spontaneous symbolisation of social space” (Bourdieu 1999c: 124).

It suffices to argue that there is a dialectical relationship between the spatiality and sociality of the genesis or governance of crime and violence in the city (Figure 9). Citing Jameson and Soja, Daylight (Daylight 2008:7) states that “mutations in built form have a more than independent relationship with social forms” (Daylight 2008). The concept of socio-spatial politics suggests that physical space and social space are important shapers of community security governance (Figure 9).

Following what is presented in Figure 9, I make two arguments here. Firstly, I argue that social space intersects with physical space in influencing the genesis of violence, crime and fear and the community governance thereof. Secondly, I maintain that social agents’ location in social space is concretised in their location in physical spaces of the city. This has implications on the social agents’ vulnerability to fear, crime and violence as well as their capacities for and modes of safety governance. Figure 9 below graphically represents the intersections of social space and physical space in the community safety field.

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Elaborating the first argument, I observe that the spatiality of the genesis of crime, violence and fear makes a case for the employment of community interventions focusing on the reorganisation of physical space as a way of reorganising society for effective safety governance. The common view that the decay of physical space or spatial malfunctionality\(^9\) in the city results in the decay of the social fabric or “social infrastructure” (Simone 2004a) and increase crime makes a case for the importance of place governance in the maintenance of social order (Power and Wilson 2000; Wilson and Kelling 1982).

Attempts at place governance for safety promotion can become the epitome of urban struggles over place; as communities or social groups or individuals try to (re)claim streets, parks and their residential places in a context of fear of crime and violence. These struggles are repeated to the extent that they become habituated into the cognitive maps (habitus) of individuals and collectives; and are reflected in the (individuals and collectives) trajectories of spatial traversal or habitation of the city. I conceptualise the everyday practices (strategies and tactics) of actors engaged in the governance of places for fear, violence or crime aversion as constituting socio-spatial practices. In coining the concept of socio-spatial practice I merge Bourdieu’s concept of

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\(^9\) Malfunctional spaces are those that are ‘abandoned’, ‘condemned’ or ‘ruined’
“social practice” (Bourdieu 1977) with de Certeau’s concept of “spatial practice” (de Certeau 1984).

*Spatial practices* are the everyday strategies and tactics employed by people as they transect and transit through space (de Certeau 1984). Spatial practices are reflective of residents’ structuring of the perceptions (or images) of the city into “recurring elements such as paths (along which movements flow) and edges (which differentiate one part of the urban fabric from another)” (Lynch 1960:98). Violence and other urban disorders configure such images – images about dangerous or safe paths, spaces or neighbourhoods which create mental maps influencing individuals or social groups’ navigation and classification of city spaces. Some spaces of the city are therefore feared, avoided or disowned, while others are claimed and owned by individuals and social groups (as reflected in territorialist discourses and practices).

Security (or lack thereof) is conceptualised as related to space and territory (Bigo 2008). For instance, Yarwood (2007) argues that a better understanding of policing contributes to a better understanding of the ways in which power shapes space. That is, an understanding of dynamics of *spatial governance*. The control and sanction of human behaviour (including violence and crime prevention) is increasingly being done through *spatial regulation* or *governance*. Spatial governance is meant to control human bodies (populations) and other objects transecting through city spaces - a form of “bio-power” (Agamben 1998; Fassin 2001; Lemke 2011; Reid 2006).

The urban environment, in many cities, is endowed with *liquid surveillance* (at symbolic and physical levels) given the increased fear of crime (Lyon 2010). City spaces are abound with symbolic and real panoptic idioms which constantly remind law breakers and anti-socials about the possibility of detection and punishment. Surveillance technologies such as CCTV are therefore part of what Foucault refers to as the “technologies of government” or “apparatuses (*dispositifs*) of security” (Saar 2011); playing a role in spatial governance (Foucault 1991; Foucault 2007; Robins 2002).

Physical space has to be treated as an *embodied site* (Low 2011) of social relations and generation of socio-spatial activity including violence, crime and governance thereof (cf. Bourdieu 1999a). These technologies of government are vividly represented and
framed in urban architecture as demonstrated by Kim Dovey (Dovey 1999). In this case architecture is viewed as capable of restricting and enabling human action, acting as a social control mechanism or creating behaviour-slackening environments; thereby producing and reproducing place-acclimatised social practices within city spaces (Dovey 1999).

The political geography and built form of a neighbourhood is here considered important in the governance of crime and violence. Urban architecture frames human behaviour in ways that discourage or cover-up criminality and violence (Dovey 1999). The physical space of an urban locality is considered as intertwined with the social space and in essence, with its social infrastructure (Simone 2004a). This social infrastructure is responsible for shaping and or regulating human interaction and therefore plays a major role in normatively reducing crime and violence and the fear thereof. It is acceptable, as Bourdieu (1999a) observes, to view human beings as inherently “situated in a site(s)” and occupying places; meaning that their behaviours are authored (and can be governed) in site or place.

Spatial governance sometimes operates antithetically to spatial freedom and spatial democracy; especially in cases where human beings are increasingly subjected to intrusive surveillance. This is true in cases in which individuals and groups seek security through spatial enclosures and use of surveillance technologies; undermining the rights of other individuals and social groups (Madanipour 2010). This generates what Lehnen describes as “disjunctive urbanisms” (Lehnen 2012) - ones that spatially separate citizens on the basis of social differences including class, race, ethnicity, creed and gender.

Following the foregoing demonstration of the arbitrary surveillance of place; I argue that place can be used as an instrument of symbolic domination (Bourdieu 1991a). Urban planning and policing practices can foster social domination rather than real freedom if they serve sectoral interests of the wealthier at the expense of the poor. Whatever benefits accrue to the poor can be viewed as mere “nurofen”; addressing challenges of the poor just at a superficial level (Baeten 2001).

Taking on the second argument, I observe that physical space is a concretisation of socio-structural factors that position people in different localities of the city, with
implications on their safety. Bourdieu stresses that social agents are constituted in (relationships to) social space; concretised as positions sites or places (Bourdieu 1999a; Bourdieu 2012). The positioning of individuals or social groups or institutions in the field of community security governance (and in the fields of politics, economics and cultural production etc.) is therefore concretised in physical space. Every site or place occupies a position in social space that is relative to other places (above, below, between), and has a (social, political, cultural or economic) distance from those other places (Bourdieu 2000b; Bourdieu 2012).

Physical space can therefore be considered as constituting the localisation and materialisation of the being, positioning and rank of social agents (collective, institutional or individual) in a social or spatial order (Bourdieu 1999a: 123). For instance, certain places in a city could be occupied by specific ethnic groups or classes separated from and competing with each other (Bourdieu 1999a; Bourdieu 2000b; Wacquant 2007; Wacquant 2008d). Bourdieu (1998a: 6) notes that “spatial distances on paper are equivalent to social distances”. Relatedly, he points out that “social space tends to be translated with more or less distortion, into physical space, in the form of certain spatial arrangements of agents and properties” (Bourdieu 2000: 134). It follows then that all divisions and distinctions in social space are really and symbolically expressed in the organisation of physical space; as in the distinctions between smart upper class residential or commercial areas from the working class ones (Bourdieu 1999a; Bourdieu 2000b; Bourdieu 2012).

In elaborating this, Bourdieu makes the argument that the poor, those with no or less capital, “are chained to place” (Bourdieu 1999a: 127); meaning that their positioning in social space is represented and reproduced in their positioning in physical space. Possession of capital enables individuals or social groups to appropriate certain physical space, whereas those who possess poor capital have a diminished capacity for appropriating physical spaces of the city (Bourdieu 1999a); becoming objects of spatial control as they traverse the city. Spatial governance in cities expectedly targets bodies of the (rejected) poor; who are often treated as wasted lives (Bauman 2004) and find themselves occupying peripheral social, economic and spatial positions in the socio-physical spaces of the city.
In line with this Bourdieusian analysis, I state that the socio-spatial location of the poor in urban spaces arguably influences their reaction to crime within the limitations of available resources, capacities and capabilities. Urban public spaces and the built environment as well as the urbanites’ socio-spatial location therein are reflective of the politics of identity and the social representation of citizenship and belonging. In this case, different locations in the city have different socio-economic values - what Lars refers to as spatial capital. Positioning in the economic field, as determined by and reflective of capital possessed by individuals or groups, allocates them to different physical spaces; that is housing estates, offices or shopping malls. This generates different levels and forms of security and fear for those with more capital (the wealthier) and those with lesser capital (the poorer) (Bourdieu 1999a). Physical spaces of the city, in turn, confer either positive or negative symbolic and social capitals on their occupants; with those in deprived spaces becoming liable to negative criminalising labels, while those from advantaged physical spaces gain honour, prestige and access to economic and social opportunities and privileges (for example privileges in the labour market). That is why some areas, due to concentrations of either positive (e.g. wealth) or negative (stigmatising [e.g. poverty, vice, crime, violence) properties, are considered affluent or problematic respectively (Bourdieu 1999a; Marcuse 1997b; Murray 2011; Wacquant 2007). Bourdieu, in his own words, refers to this as an outcome, influence or constitution of spatial profit, profits of occupation, profits of position or rank (in and of social and physical spaces) or locational capital (Bourdieu 1999a). Physical space, the neighbourhood or city in this case, is to be conceptualised as both an economic and social commodity.

Having outlined my conversation with Bourdieu and other invited thinkers, I briefly discuss the advantages and a disadvantage of Bourdieu’s thinking tools.

4.7. Some merits and demerits of Bourdieu's thinking tools

Bourdieu’s thinking tools meet substantive criticism on a number of grounds. For instance, Bourdieu is criticised for not adequately showing the empirical connection between the concept of practice and field (Warde 2004). It was only later in his career that he attempted to show the link between field and practice in his book Distinction and the Social Judgement of Taste; where he offers a formula showing the interconnection of
these concepts. The formula goes: \((\text{habitus}) (\text{capital}) + \text{field} = \text{practice}\) (Bourdieu 1984). Yet, this formula presents an over simplistic view of his thinking tools. This is because as much as habitus, capital and field are structured by practice, they also structure practice and therefore practice is not solely just an outcome of the interplay of habitus, field and capital; but also actively produces them. The relationship between these concepts, as one tries to pin them down, is not linear or formulaic but a mishmash that should be unpacked with due consideration of contextual contingencies.

On the lack of clarity on the connection between practice and field, Warde (2004:4) notes that Bourdieu “does not make it clear if there are many practices in each field, or one practice per field” and “it is not clear whether it is practices or fields which have logics; whether they are similar or different logics”. What Bourdieu only makes clear is that “practices are performed in fields and that many diverse practices and fields are part of a process whereby profits are realised” (Warde 2004:4). The merit of my thinking is that I bring together Bourdieu’s seemingly disparate, but highly connected concepts of field and practice, in explaining behaviours and actions in community safety initiatives.

Citing Calhoun (1995), Warde (2004: 9) questions the applicability of the concept of practice in the analysis of the operation of social affairs in an “industrialised and highly differentiated society”; citing that it is more applicable in “analysis of comparatively undifferentiated societies where understandings of appropriate conduct are shared”. Warde (2004) then designates the concept of practice as one attuned to an analysis of aspects of traditional societies such as rites, rituals, gifts and honour. In my view, although it may have limitations, like any other concept, the concept of practice is still useful in explaining behaviour even in industrialised societies. In my particular study, analysis of the activities and behaviours of collectivities and individuals within the field of community security governance is a worthwhile endeavour.

The idea of habitus as a structured structure has invoked a criticism of the concept and of Bourdieusian thought as mechanistic, tautological and tantamount to sociological objectivism or reductionism, one that limits the agency of humans and sidesteps social change (Atkinson 2010; King 2000; Noble and Watkins 2003; Throop and Murphy
Bourdieu is also charged with removing consciousness from the acquisition of the habitus (Noble and Watkins 2003); rendering humans passive recipients of mental and social dispositions imposed by social structures. Defending the concept of habitus, Bourdieu emphasises that it is supple and transposable (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Explaining the litheness of habitus, Bourdieu highlights:

“Habitus is not the fate that some people read into it. Being the product of history, it is an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences; and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structures. It is durable but not eternal. Having said this, I must immediately add that there is a probability, inscribed in the social destiny associated with definite social conditions that experiences will confirm habitus, because most people are statistically bound to encounter circumstances that tend to agree with those that originally fashioned their habitus” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 133).

Despite these noted weaknesses, “the habitus provides a convincing account of social reproduction” (King 2000: 427) - a reproduction of order and power. Perhaps it is Bourdieu’s formal definition of habitus in his book *Outline of a Theory of Practice* which invites the criticism of the concept as deterministic and mechanistic (King 2000). In light of this criticism, Bourdieu emphasises that the concept of habitus, like his other concepts, is an open one and therefore one that cannot be pinned down by professorial definitions; but can only be tested by being put to work empirically (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). In fact, in his numerous writings, Bourdieu offers “countless definitions” of the concept (Throop and Murphy 2002). The habitus should therefore not be condemned to circular and mechanistic reasoning as it is quite supple and adaptive. Any static interpretation of the concept of habitus is considered to be tantamount to misinterpretation (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 135).

Although Bourdieu’s thinking tools have singularly and aggregately come under criticism from various perspectives, some of which are highlighted in the foregoing discussion, I indicate here that some of the criticisms are flawed as they engage with the legacy of Bourdieu in a sectorial, and sometimes myopic, way. Any appropriation, understanding, application or testing of Bourdieu’s thinking tools that separates the *habitus* from *field* would be fundamentally flawed, as the habitus cannot be
understood or assessed without an appreciation of its relationship to field or the field
without an appreciation of the habitus. In fact, on their own, the concepts of habitus
and field are rendered theoretically obsolete. In fact, Bourdieu himself emphasises
that what he offers through his thinking tools is a relational philosophy; and to rid it of
relationalism would be to undermine its essence and potency for proffering an
acceptable account of social reality. Separating the habitus from the field or
downplaying one of the two in any analysis that thinks with or against Bourdieu is to
de-relationalise Bourdieu’s thinking tools and social reality as well.

In fact, some critics of Bourdieu have committed the fallacious act of separating
these “key thinking tools”; thereby carrying with them a toolbox with missing tools
into the critical scientific voyage to discover social reality with, against or beyond
Bourdieu. This kind of fallacious act would be tantamount to what I call theoretical
Bourdieuicide. Although I do not charge them with theoretical Bourdieucide, Burawoy and
von Holdt (2012), for example, engage an “overplay” of the concepts of habitus and
symbolic domination in a fashion that largely technically ruptures them from the very key
concepts of field and capital. To avoid unwarranted undermining of Bourdieusian
thinking tools, one ought to employ a socio-genetic reading of Bourdieu (Grenfell
2011); that is reading Bourdieu with due regard to the context in which he developed
his thinking tools. It is therefore important to engage in constructive criticism of
Bourdieusian thinking tools with due consideration of the relational indivisibility of
the key concepts of field, habitus and capital.

The cluster of issues relating to urban community security governance discussed in
this thesis are the “empirical grinder” into which the Bourdieusian concepts are made
to go through with the hope of critically testing, edifying or complementing them
(Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9). In my empirical deployment, testing and review of
Bourdieusian thinking tools, I heed Bourdieu’s advice that “concepts such as habitus,
field, and capital can be defined only within the theoretical system they constitute,
not in isolation” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96). These three concepts work
like a theoretical machine and cannot be separated from one another if one is to

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50 I use the notion of theoretical Bourdieucide to denote a situation or condition in which Bourdieu’s
thinking tools are undermined or distorted unwarrantedly.

51 Bourdieu himself did not believe in rigid definitions of concepts, what he referred to as professorial
definitions, but in customised empirical definitions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).
avoid gross misinterpretations of Bourdieu’s work or of social reality. In this thesis, Bourdieusian “thinking tools” are set up in conversations with other relevant theoretical tools in the field of local safety governance studies. Below, I wrap up my theoretical propositions, here made.

4.8. **Fusing Bourdieusian thinking into urban safety studies: a conclusion**

This theoretical search settles on the view that an application and testing of Bourdieusian thinking tools to understand the socio-spatial micro-politics of urban community safety governance is a worthwhile endeavour. It departs from the premise that that fear of violence and crime, among other urban fears, is institutionalised and instrumentalised in the form of community organisations, local institutions and collective or individual socio-spatial practices (strategies and tactics) working (genuinely or pretentiously) in the service of safety and security production. However, this creates an avenue for the practice of a micro-politics that goes beyond and supplants safety production. Firstly, I argue that community security governance is a field of micro-politics in which stakeholders (organisations, institutions, individuals and social groups) compete and coalesce for various species of capital - profits, stakes and interests. Secondly, I make the hypothesis that the arena of community safety activism in the South African context can degenerate into a field of ethno-national regionalist practices and discourses. Thirdly, I propose that organisational, institutional, and ethno-national politics of community safety governance is also played out as territorialist politics.

Committing to deploy and test Bourdieusian thinking tools in this study, I get myself into the project of redeeming Bourdieu’s urban and political sociologies (Savage 2012; Wacquant 2004). I seek to enrich Bourdieusian thinking tools by testing them against empirical reality, developing novel ways of thinking in the process. Chapter 5, which follows, details my emersion into the everyday realities in a context of fear (and governance) of crime and violence in Yeoville and more broadly in Johannesburg – it is a reflection on my methodological and research experiences and an acknowledgement of the role of my social and intellectual habitus in the course of engaging “the field”. The chapter is rooted in attempts to learn from and develop the
Bourdieu's notion of *reflexive sociology* or *reflexive research* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Wacquant 1989).
5. Chapter Five
Experiences of conducting community-oriented research

“... Basic to the conduct of field research is the development of relationships between the researcher and those who are researched. Field researchers have, therefore, to take roles, handle relationships, and enter into the commerce and conflict of everyday life” (Burgess 1984: 5).

5.1. Introduction

There is a wide body of literature, from the classical to the contemporary, which discusses the political nature of fieldwork; especially the everyday politics of ethnography. This literature is both theoretical and empirical - it is based on researchers’ theoretical orientations and their accounts of real, sometimes fabricated, experiences in the field. Despite the existence of this literature, there is still need for more accounts of fieldwork experiences. This is because researchers, research experiences and research settings differ. Every story is unique and is worth being told. While the handbooks of social research that we read warn us about the complexities of field research, they blatantly lack a clearer emphasis on the role of the researcher’s intuition, and the effects of realpolitiks of everyday life on the conduct of fieldwork. Existent theoretical literature basically offers organised, even step by step accounts, of how fieldwork ought to be conducted; which are useful, but tend to oversimplify a very complex and amorphous process.

Based on my own fieldwork story, I make three arguments that: i) the methods of field research, that are taken to be technical and scientific in the strict sense of the notions, are also in fact very political; ii) fieldwork in communities is intricately immersed into the realpolitiks characterising everyday life in those given communities or settings; iii) while the commitment to science is cherishable, balancing it with a commitment to humanity and positive social transformation is enviable.

These three claims are informed by political challenges, social dilemmas and thrills of conducting community-oriented research. I analyse, in sections below, the strategies and practices I employed to navigate a politically charged research environment.
5.2. Who said the scientific is not political?

Like some who have written before me, I dismiss the idea of casting politics off the discourses on research methods and processes, as is normally done under the banner of objectivity. Despite the position I am selectively taking here, I note that other than being political, research methods also ought to be treated with due regard to the technicalities and values of validity, reliability or representation. In this particular instance, however, I argue that the choices of sampling techniques and approaches, data collection methods and data collection processes, are all socio-spatially political; especially in the context of community-oriented research.

5.2.1. The politics of sampling: place, institutions, people …

Firstly, the choice of a research site or case study is a reflection of socio-spatial politics, at the level of the researcher’s intellectual habitus or spatial cognitive map; which is his/her stock of knowledge about places and what they could mean. In this research, I depended on a single case study. Why? My choice was informed by the need to consistently focus on the everyday-ness and minute dynamics of community safety governance “within a real life context” over a prolonged period of time (cf. Yin 2009). This could not have been doable had I taken many field sites. As observed by Burgess (1984: 59 - 60):

“Many field studies appear to be located in a single site: a factory, a hospital, a school or a town. Yet each of these sites may include numerous sub-sites whose choice may influence data collection”.

Whereas Yeoville is my main unit of analysis (see Chapter 3, subtitle 3.2.5), Johannesburg, community organisations, sub-territories, individual stakeholders are also important units of analysis. Delimiting a unit of analysis is complex. Yin (2009: 50) points out:

“The same single-case study may involve more than one unit of analysis. This occurs, when, within a single case, attention is also given to a subunit or subunits”.

Yeoville is a socio-spatially complex place which called for sub-sampling to capture this complexity. On the significance of single cases, Bourdieu stated his experiences and views as follows:
“My entire scientific enterprise is indeed based on the belief that the deepest logic of the social world can be grasped only if one plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated, but with the objective of constructing it as a “special case of what is possible”, as Bachelard puts it, that is, as an exemplary case in a finite world of possible configurations” (Bourdieu 1998a: 2).

Consistently focusing on the specific locality of Yeoville and “plunging” myself therein over an extended period of time allowed me to obtain a deeper understanding of the particular “social rhythm, the pattern of events” (Burgess 1984: 60), local social routines, behaviours and local challenges. Rather than aiming at statistical generalisation of my findings to populations and universes, my aim was to make particularistic empirical explorations and make theoretical statements or generalisations about them (Flyvbjerg 2011; Yin 2009).

Why Yeoville? I invite Burgess to this question:

“The selection of research sites is, therefore, more complex than might at first appear. Five criteria can be identified in the selection of a research site (Spradley 1980). First, simplicity; that is a research site that allows researchers to move from studying simple situations to those which are more complex. Secondly, accessibility; that is the degree of access and entry that is given the researcher. Thirdly, unobtrusiveness; that is situations that allow the researcher to take an unobtrusive role. Fourthly, permissibleness; that is situations that allow the researcher free or limited or restricted entry. Fifthly, participation; that is the possibility for researchers to participate in a series of ongoing activities. However it is impossible for the researcher to be able to meet all these criteria in selecting a social setting and therefore some compromise is essential, depending on the substantive and theoretical interest of the researcher together with the constraints on his or her work” (Burgess 1984: 61).

Selecting Yeoville as my research site was indeed a complex and subjective process. I selected Yeoville because it provides a “typical case” (Yin 2009) for understanding local organisational and multinational dynamics in the community safety governance field (see Chapter 3, subtitle 3.2.5). Also, Yeoville was convenient because the School of Architecture and Planning at University of Witwatersrand, where I was enrolled for my doctoral studies, was officially engaged in research in Yeoville under the banner of Yeoville Studio when I started my studies there in 2010. It was relatively easier to obtain useful contacts for my study, and to be accepted as a researcher.

52 Indeed, Bourdieu depended on the single case study method in his studies of the Kabylia in Algeria and in the village of Béarn in South-western France.
within the community. More so, being an African immigrant in South Africa, Yeoville which is inhabited by a huge cohort of African immigrants made me feel at home within a broader context marred by the imminent danger of xenophobic violence or treatment.

I initially wanted to conduct field research in Diepsloot, Johannesburg. However, my interest in Diepsloot was overshadowed by fear, especially after learning of the killing of John, a Zimbabwean I had earlier met in Yeoville in June 2010. According to my housemate, John was killed by a group of people in Diepsloot after he drove there and accidentally scratched a parked car. This resulted in an altercation and his assault, leading to his injury and death. This story coupled with many other incidences of anti-foreigner violence, dissuaded me from venturing into Diepsloot for a prolonged period to conduct field research. Diepsloot also struck me as an area overloaded by research on violence, being one of the focuses of attention for many researchers. Hence, I found it profitable to focus on Yeoville to avoid parroting and duplicating already existing research efforts in Diepsloot.

Yeoville became my social laboratory and my home, in which intensive observation took place. When I came to Johannesburg, Yeoville was my port of entry and became my place of residence during the entire period of field research and thesis writing. In essence, here I am writing Johannesburg, South Africa and the world from Yeoville.

And now, I turn to the politics of spatially mapping out the study area. The mapping of Yeoville, Bellevue and Bellevue East (commonly referred to as Yeoville) is not standardised (see Figure 5). There are different maps produced for different reasons. For policing reasons, Yeoville incorporates Bellevue, Bellevue East and Observatory (see Chapter 3, subtitle 3.2.5). The fluidity of the mapping of Yeoville posed some challenges on the physical delimitations of my study. I therefore mainly focused on the area incorporating Yeoville and Bellevue, while remaining interested in understanding the effects of the relationship of this area to Observatory (a middle income suburb) on the local geopolitics of community safety governance. Coming with spatial complexities of delimiting the neighbourhood, were the social complexities influencing sampling and research processes.
I observe, from my experience, that the sampling of research participants is a political process, rather than a simply objective process. In this research I depended mainly on a mix of purposive, availability and snowball sampling, which are non-probability sampling techniques to gain access to research participants (Durrheim and Painter 2006). The delicate operation of entering the field, locating suitable observation sites and making fruitful contacts necessitated non-random selection of participants (Durrheim and Painter 2006; Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). The choice of non-probability sampling techniques was informed by the observation that the fluid and haphazard nature of human behaviour and interaction makes conventional probability sampling a sophisticated, if not impossible endeavour in this case. Also, my goal was not to seek universal generalisations but to excavate particularistic narratives and only make analytical generalisations; and so probability sampling was neither really necessary nor mandatory.

Furthermore, purposive sampling was preferred because it allowed me to conduct research with informants or participants who were actively involved in community-based security governance and could provide rich information on the subject matter. I complemented purposive sampling with availability sampling, which is a technique that allowed me to focus on those participants who were not only present, but also willing to participate. Key informants enhanced the application of the referral sampling technique of snowballing, allowing me to further access information rich cases (Durrheim and Painter 2006; Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). Thus, the non-probability sampling approach adopted was multi-stage and acclimatised to the dictates of the research environment.

Institutional mapping - identifying key local safety governing organisations, was also a political process. In my initial plan, I had a wide array of organisations that I wanted to include in the study, but when I initiated fieldwork the number of these organisations narrowed down as new unanticipated organisations and dynamics were discovered in the field. Yeoville is a politically vibrant neighbourhood, characterised by the presence of multiple community organisations, most of which are stakeholders in the community security field. There were quite a number of challenges in properly mapping out the relevant institutions for the study.

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53 A community case study is one in which the community is the unit of analysis.
Community based organisations and institutions noted to be important in the security governance field of Yeoville are presented and briefly described in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Safety governing organisations or institutions in Yeoville

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation or institution</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community organisations/ non-government organisations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. YCPF – Yeoville Community Policing Forum / CPF – Community Policing Forum</td>
<td>It is a partnership between elected community members and South African Police Service. The main focus of YCPF is to help reduce crime in Yeoville. YCPF holds monthly meetings with members of the police to discuss the local crime challenges in Yeoville. They also hold occasional public meetings as and when necessary. They are the link between the police and the community, facilitating communication between the two. They also co-supervise and co-organise the street patrollers in conjunction with the police. I use abbreviations YCPF and CPF interchangeably in this thesis, the former being used where there is a need for specificity of the CPF being referred to and the latter is used in general terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SCFs – Sector Crime Forums</td>
<td>Sector Crime Forums are sub-forums of the CPF. There are 3 sectors in the Yeoville policing precinct – Sectors 1 (Yeoville), Sector 2 (Bellevue) and Sector 3 (Observatory). Conducting monthly meetings at grassroots levels in policing sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. YSF - Yeoville Stakeholders Forum</td>
<td>It is an affiliation of 22 community organisations in Yeoville, operating as an umbrella body of these organisations. It was formed in 2004 at the behest of the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) as a contact community organisation during the period when JDA was implementing an infrastructural development programme in Yeoville's Rocky - Raleigh Streets. YSF conducts monthly meetings bringing together representatives of community organisations and other stakeholders in Yeoville. It is a platform for information sharing and solution seeking about and on local challenges in Yeoville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. YBCDT – Yeoville Bellevue Community Development Trust</td>
<td>It is a local non-governmental organisation working on community projects aimed at socio-economic development in Yeoville. YBCDT facilitates African festivals to bring people together in a convivial environment so that they learn each other's cultures. This is hoped to contribute toward attempts to reduce xenophobia (eg Africa Week Festival 2010, 2011). Runs a community newsletter (Yeovue News) to inform and educate people about many issues including crime and violence (rates) in the neighbourhood. It lobbies against the granting of new liquor selling licences in Yeoville and against illegal liquor outlets and shebeens which are blamed by the local population and police for increased violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Street patrollers

They initiate education programmes and awareness campaigns to improve tolerance and co-living between South Africans and non-South Africans.

6. YCF – Yeoville Community Forum

It is an organisation created by a group of South Africans living in Yeoville to respond to the housing situation by lobbying the municipality and government to address the challenge of lack of housing, high rentals and the issue of hijacked buildings\(^{54}\). During the early days of its inception in 2010, the YCF threatened militancy and violence in responding to the issue of hijacked houses.

7. ADF – African Diaspora Forum

ADF was formed in 2008 to respond to xenophobic violence that rocked South African in May 2012. The ADF claims to have about 23 migrant organisations affiliated to it and claims a membership of over 1000 members. The knowledge base of ADF relates to the challenges faced by international (mainly African) immigrants living in South Africa. It initiates education programmes and awareness campaigns to improve tolerance and co-living between South Africans and non-South Africans.

8. YBCEC – Yeoville-Bellevue Community Advocacy Committee

YBCEC is a community-based lobby group aiming at dealing with issues of urban governance revolving around the governance or liquor outlets and land rezoning in Yeoville.

9. YS – Yeoville Studio

Yeoville studio is a community-based research initiative of the School of Architecture and Planning, University of the Witwatersrand. YS claims possession of academic knowledge on urban issues and also seek to influence social transformation in Yeoville.

10. VEC – Victim Empowerment Centre

The Victim Empowerment Centre is a body that is supposed to be co-managed by the CPF and the police. VEC deals with cases in which victims of crime are traumatised. They mostly deal with cases of domestic violence and other traumatic criminal cases. They mainly deal with counselling matters. Most of the personnel at Victim Empowerment Centres are volunteers from the community.

11. Ward Committee

Ward committee is headed by the ward councillor. The focus of ward committee is to promote participatory local development; including public safety.

12. Youth Desk

The Youth Desk is a youth organisation mainly housed at police stations. The Youth Desk deals with youths as a way of promoting social crime prevention. Youth Desks respond to challenges affecting the youth and are educative arm of the CPF that specifically targets the youth.

13. Street Committees

Street committees are the most elementary structure of community policing. In Yeoville, the only street committee that was known to be functional is the Muller Street committee. The establishment of

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\(^{54}\) Hijacked houses are those houses that have been unlawfully occupied and are under the unlawful control of an individual or group without the consent or approval of the owner.
street committees in Yeoville has been a matter bedevilled not only by procrastination but also by lack of political will by community stakeholders. Street committee formation has been a subject of lip-service in most Sector Crime Forum meetings and CPF meetings that I attended during my more than one year of fieldwork.

14. RHD - Refugee Help Desk
It is a Refugee/Migrant service centre dealing with challenges faced by refugees in South Africa. It was stationed in Yeoville at the time of research.

State entities

15. SAPS – South African Police Services
SAPS are the state policing agents. They are stationed in Yeoville at the Yeoville Police Station.

16. Gauteng Department of Community Safety
It is a Gauteng Provincial Government department in charge of community policing forums and of helping the generation of government policies that promote public safety.

Source: Fieldwork, Katsaura (2010 - 2012)

The processes of sampling were therefore complex and defied the logical and bookish step by step sampling techniques. Real sampling, on the ground, signifies a move from the ivory tower into the realpolitiks of social, political, economic, cultural and spatial organisation of the world.

My early fieldwork experiences created a need for me to revise my schedule of the research process as documented in my research proposal. For instance, I had to drop the use of focus group discussions in favour of community meeting attendance; as doing both could have been a duplication of efforts. In the process of doing research, I also understood that it was not possible for me to pretend to be a neutral observer, but better to acknowledge the activeness and politics of my presence in a community. With all these complexities of social research I had to contend with, I employed specific research methods to get the job done and these are presented and discussed below.

5.2.2. Research methods and realpolitiks of fieldwork

The choice of particular research methods over others, although it is to be justified, is a heavily subjective and even political process. The processes of deploying specific methods to obtain data are also highly political. Regarding this, Burgess points out:

“Accounts by researchers have revealed that social research is not just a question of neat procedures but social processes whereby interaction between
researcher and researched will directly influence the course which a research programme takes .” (Burgess 1984: 31).

I briefly consider, below, the methods of data collection I deployed. I relied mainly on primary sources of data based on participant and direct observation techniques, unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews. I also relied on a review of existing documents, which included local newsletter, city and government documents.

i. Participant observation

A key research technique that I mainly relied on is participant observation. Participant observation entails being involved for an extended period of time in the daily lives of people (or social groups) under study (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). In this study, participant observation was based on the sustained attendance at and participation in community meetings, such as those of Yeoville Community Policing Forum, Yeoville Stakeholders Forum, Ward Committee, African Diaspora Forum, and Sector Crime Forum over a period of more than 15 months (see Table 3 & Appendix B). This was possible because I stayed in the area where my research was anchored.

In meetings I attended I was largely an observer as participant, although I shifted between continua of complete observer - observer as participant - participant as observer, depending on the dictates of the situation at hand and relationships established with stakeholders and members in community organisations. My primary aim was to observe and record proceedings in such meetings within the social milieu in which they occurred. I therefore participated in and observed ninety meetings of community organisations during the course of this research (see Appendix B). Observation of meetings is a method that is time consuming and requires patience, listening and recording skills. Being present in people’s meetings can be an uncomfortable arrangement. Sometimes holding papers and a pen, recording proceedings, raised eye brows of participants some of whom would mistake me for a journalist. In this case I always had to explain that I was a researcher from Wits
Mentioning Wits University generally made the participants not ask further questions, perhaps because of the respected local profile of the University.

An important aspect of participant observation is direct observation. I directly observed human activities in public spaces of neighbourhoods of Yeoville. Direct observation also involved “walking in the city” as a research method and not just an aspect of everyday practices. “Walking in the city” enabled me to observe, listen and identify different zones of criminal and violent activity and moulds of community responses thereto. Related to and entwined with observation are unstructured, semi-structured and group interviews.

### ii. Unstructured interviews

I carried out unstructured interviews with key informants and ordinary community members so as to elicit their experiences, perceptions about community-based community safety governance. Sixty unstructured key informant interviews and conversations were conducted with participants who are strategically positioned within the community organisations engaged in crime and violence governance (see Appendix B). Such informants provided rich information on the subject matter. Two unstructured group interviews were conducted to further introspect into group dynamics and their influences on community safety governance. Group interviews complemented meeting observation by allowing me to influence discussions and freely pose questions, a privilege that I did not necessarily enjoy during observation of meetings of community organisations. I conducted group interviews with street patrollers and selected migrants so as to explore their collective experiences and perceptions.

Unstructured interviews are defined by Minichiello et al (1990) as interviews in which neither the question nor the answer categories are predetermined (Minichiello et al. 1990). Patton (2002) describes unstructured interviews as a natural extension of participant observation, because they so often occur as part of ongoing participant

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55 Commonly used shorthand for University of the Witwatersrand
56 This is a notion used by De Certeau. See de Certeau, Michael. 1984. *The practice of everyday life*. Berkeley CA: California; University of California Press.
observation fieldwork (Patton 2002). In my case, many of my unstructured interviews initiated as informal conversations with both key informants and ordinary community members. Unstructured interviews are hailed for exposing the researcher to unanticipated themes and thus enabling a better understanding of the interviewees’ social realities from the interviewees’ perspectives (Seidman 2006). The fact that unstructured interviews do not use predefined questions and answers does not mean that they are random and directionless. In conducting unstructured interviews, I kept in mind the purpose and general scope of issues under study and probed issues that were important to my study. Complementing unstructured interviews were semi-structured interviews.

iii. Semi-structured interviews

In cases where research assistants were employed, I commissioned them to conduct semi-structured interviews so that I could influence the flow of the interviews even in my absence. This is because the research assistants may not have been as conversant with my research as I was; hence the need to guide them by way of a detailed aide memoire (interview guide or agenda). An aide memoire is a broad guide to issues that might be covered in the interview and is supposed to be open-ended and flexible (Briggs 1983; Burgess 1984). The use of an aide memoire enabled consistency of questions asked by employed research assistants during the qualitative opinion and attitude survey. The qualitative opinion survey accessed 40 participants with whom long qualitative interviews were conducted (see Appendix B). The logic was that the qualitative opinion and attitude survey could reduce the biases of researching people who deliberately participated in community security governing organisations. The opinion and attitude survey was done in the public domain with people randomly and purposively picked from the streets, public spaces or their homes.

To complement primary data from participant and direct observation and unstructured and semi-structured interviews, I conducted document reviews.

iv. Document reviews

The review of existing documents involved an analysis of the academic publications, local newsletter, minutes of community organisations’ meetings, non-governmental
organisations and city or national government departments. Document reviews relied on the technique of content analysis; which is used to analyse the “symbolic content” of any communication (Singleton et al 1993: 381). In the section below, I discuss the (politics) of the techniques and processes of analysing research data.

5.2.3. Field politics behind the laptop: data analysis and interpretation

In the analysis of both primary and secondary data, I employed thematic content analysis techniques. According to Singleton et al (1993: 381), “the basic idea in content analysis is to reduce the total content of a communication to a set of categories that represent some characteristic of the population under study”. Content analysis involves an analysis of visual, verbal and non-verbal documents (Ibid). It calls for engagement in a critical selection and definition of content categories. The categories that were thematically relevant to my study were analysed based on frequency and intensity of appearance in a text and there deemed significant for the study (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). Through content analysis, I examined narratives collected from participant observation, direct observation, unstructured interviews, structured interviews and secondary documents. In deploying content analysis, I took into cognisance the socio-political context within which the observations and recordings were made.

Thematic content analysis aggregately and singularly employed a series of qualitative analysis techniques such as: context analysis, conversational or discourse analysis, semiotic analysis and quasi statistics or ethno-statistics. Context analysis involves the scrutiny of micro and macro social environments of human interaction. It involves the interpretation of the situational meaning(s) of texts; the environment in which the pieces of information are produced and recorded (van Manen 1990). In this way it seeks to describe a social situation and the cultural patterns surrounding it. All community security governance practices learnt during interviews were weighed against their socio-political, cultural, institutional and historical contexts during analysis (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993).

Discourse or conversation analysis involves a linguistic analysis of the flow of communication (Gee 1992). It calls for an interpretation of the competing perspectives portrayed in communication, be they written or tape-recorded.
Conversation analysis was more suitable for the analysis of material from observed meetings, group interviews, structured and unstructured interviews. The frequency of competing stand points could indicate the pattern of interaction and reflect on the strength or significance of particular themes in the data. Semiotic analysis involves an analysis of written as well as acted signs or texts (Manning 1987). It was useful in the analysis of spatial practices and socio-spatial emblems observed during “walkings in the city”. Quasi statistics or ethno-statistics use the approach of counting the number of times something is mentioned in field notes as a very rough estimate of frequency (Gephart 1988). This kind of enumeration is used to provide evidence for categories created or determine if observations are contaminated (Gephart 1988). High frequency of occurrence of a theme suggests its strength as a matter of concern for participants, while staggered and erratic occurrence of a theme would justify its rejection during analysis. This method was particularly useful in extrapolating and interpreting data from the qualitative opinion and attitude survey.

In analysing collecting, collating and presenting data, I tried to consistently demarcate the voices of my participants from my voice? Since this is both an empirical and theoretical endeavour, I needed to make sure I do not suffocate the voices of my participants in the service of pursuing a theoretical agenda. I learnt from Clifford Geetz in this regard. Clifford Geetz differentiates between experience-near concepts and experience-distant concepts (Geetz 1974). An experience-near concept, according to Geetz is one that research participants can naturally and effortless use to define what they feel, think, imagine and can readily understand when similarly applied to others (Geetz 1974: 28). Therefore, experience-near concepts constitute the everyday language of research participants. On the other hand, experience-distant concepts are ones used by the researcher or the scientist in his or her intellectual or academic practice - that is his/her theoretical or conceptual lenses (Geetz 1974: 28). In analysing, interpreting and discussing my research findings, I make extensive use of boxes to present primary data (mainly extracts of community meetings; demarcating the voices of the participants from my voice (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). In this way I endeavour to present the voices of my participants as “discourses that speak for
themselves” (Bourdieu 1999c); although I acknowledge my influences in arranging, formatting and presenting them following a particular logic.

The extent to which discourses of research participants speak for themselves can be questioned on the basis that the transcription of interviews or meeting proceedings from oral to written form entail a loss of meaning, “the voice, pronunciation (notably in its socially significant variations), intonation, and rhythm” in one way or another (Bourdieu 1999e: 622). Transcription is therefore a political process that can be tantamount to appropriation of meaning or what Bourdieu (1999) calls “rewriting”; with potentials for loss of originality. Perhaps that is an issue that all written field research has to contend with; although efforts have to be made to more correctly capture the words of research participants.

All the observed material was subjected to correspondence analysis or relational analysis, which I deployed to critically explore the politics of the location and positionality of various community organisations, institutions, social groups and individuals in the social space (field) of community safety governance and in related fields in the broader political, social, and economic spaces. Doing fieldwork and data analysis, I kept in mind my obligation towards ethical conduct.

5.2.4. “Navigating the field ethically”

In the conduct of fieldwork, I was bound by the ethics of social science research, and also by the moral codes of humanity. Every social science research, if it is not to hurt the participants or social science profession, should be bound by rules of research conduct which are here referred to as “research ethics” (Erickson 1992). The principal issue in ethics is that researchers should avoid infringing on the rights of participants and undermine their welfare (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993; Wassenaar 2006). This is important because research may involve “making participants’ private worlds public”, sometimes revealing confidential statements

57 This strategy involves the use of headings and sub-heading taken from phrases in the interview or community meeting proceedings as headings or subheadings in the presentation and interpretation of research findings (cf. Bourdieu 1999). I adopt that method in Chapters 6, 7 and 8; and where I use my own titles, it is clearly demonstrated that they are mine.

58 This is a Bourdieusian approach to the analysis of the social world. See, for example, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Bourdieu 1999a etc. Also see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the notion of correspondence analysis.
made in a context of a relationship based on trust (Bourdieu 1999b). During interview processes and participant observation, I was conscious of the need to minimise committing (any kind of) symbolic violence on my participants by exerting myself over them as the “knower” and treat them as mere “knowables” (Harding 1991). I presented myself as a learner and them as my experts and teachers on local security and safety issues.

In light of my ethical consciousness, I conformed to the requirements of the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Witwatersrand, to which I applied for ethics clearance as a pre-condition for the conduct of my fieldwork. I committed to abide by principles of informed consent, debriefing, and confidentiality as well as giving of feedback to research participants amongst others.

The principle of informed consent dictated that I avoid intrusive research and seek the voluntary agreement of participants to participate in my research (Wassenaar 2006). I informed participants of their right to withdraw from participating in the research should they deem so. Every participant had the privilege of signing a consent form if they were comfortable with participating in the research. I debriefed all participants who agreed to participate in my research; explaining the purpose and utility of the research (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). Having debriefed my participants, I guaranteed their confidentiality by promising the use of pseudonyms where identity had to be concealed to protect them (Bourdieu 1999c; Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). Except one participant who opted to have his real name used in this thesis, all other names are pseudo. The participant whose real name I use authorised this in a conversation I had with him:

“I don’t want to hide my name. I am not afraid of criticism. If anybody gives me a good reason not to do the work I am doing in Yeoville I would gladly accept their view. You are free to use my real name in your document”
(18/08/2012)

As a way of being accountable to the research participants, I promised to do feedback workshops in Yeoville; given the means to do so. As much as there are ethical precautions to be taken in conducting fieldwork, sometimes the everyday politics of fieldwork require pragmatism in navigating the associated social interaction and dynamics.
5.3. Fieldwork and the politics of everyday life

Conducting fieldwork involves immersing oneself into the everyday lives of people being researched and interacted with. In this section I offer a narrative of the social politics of my presence in the daily lives and daily spaces of individuals, groups and organisations of concern to my research. I show that the conduct of fieldwork is a process of everyday negotiation, social interaction and social commerce.

5.3.1. Negotiation: the diplomacy of access

One of the main challenges of any research is how to gain entry and be accepted by stakeholders and community power-brokers in the social settings the fieldwork is conducted (Moser and MacIliwaine 2004; Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). Gaining entry into the field is a question of managing one’s impressions; a question of self-presentation (Neuman 2000). I disclosed my status as the starting point of negotiating for permission and acceptance to participate in community meetings and activities (as an observer). This was particularly important under circumstances where community meetings were a major source of information.

Social research contexts may have gatekeepers. This means that a series of negotiations and compromises may take place before adequate access to the field is gained. I grappled with gate-keeping at the individual, group or organisational levels. Being accepted in meetings of community organisations required some negotiation with those running those organisations. In the same vein, securing appointments was a process of negotiation and renegotiation, sometimes with no success. Research is therefore a political process of a series of negotiations, and gaining access is never a once off thing (Neuman 2000). Writing about the complexities of negotiating access in public entities, Burgess claims:

“Finally, there are public settings such as towns, football matches, church services, school assemblies and parents’ evenings when access cannot be successfully negotiated with all participants. In each instance, there is no opportunity for the researcher to have full permission to observe for research purposes in such settings. Indeed, even if formal announcements are made or negotiations conducted with town councils, football managers, the clergy or head teachers it still leaves vast numbers of people outside the research bargain. Negotiating directly with those on whom researchers intend to focus
their studies is a difficult requirement to fulfil in public settings” (Burgess 1984: 49).

Nurturing and maintaining social relationships with participants is integral to negotiation for (maintenance of) access and sometimes one has to make do with denial of access. An example in which full access was denied was the attendance of YCPF executive meetings. YCPF executive meetings are those in which executive members do strategic deliberations and make tactical decisions. In a conversation with the YCPF secretary general, I asked if I could be allowed to attend YCPF executive meetings and this was his response:

“No, you won’t be allowed. The executive will be strategising and they wouldn’t want you to attend as they strategise” (Conversation, Zweli [YCPF Secretary]: 06/11/2010).

I pleaded with him and he agreed to negotiate with the rest of the executive on my behalf so that I could be allowed to attend this meeting. This, however, ultimately failed. One day, before in a YCPF public meeting, for which I had come earlier, the YCPF executive guys had a small caucus meeting. I attended this meeting by default. In the meeting, one YCPF member, acting on my behalf, asked the YCPF chairperson to allow me to attend YCPF executive meetings. He responded:

“He is not welcome here. He has already attended now. He has eaten the butter already. He can attend the CPF broader meeting, CPF public meetings and Sector meetings, but not our executive meeting” (Conversation, Lehlohonolo [YCPF Chairperson]: 06/11/2010).

Following this statement, Zweli re-negotiated on my behalf and then the chairperson and his deputy chairperson Bongani agreed that I can attend. Bongani said: “You can attend, but you keep quite. You don’t contribute anything”. Despite this, they later on reneged, completely blocking my access to this meeting.

So, there was some censoring of what kind of information I could access directly from the YCPF executive. In another case, in an interview, the chairperson of the YCPF preferred to read out information from a strategic plan document, rather than give me a copy which I had asked for. Perhaps the reading of the document was selective and was meant to ensure the censoring of information perceived to be too sensitive to be shared with me.
The challenges of gaining access to participants or research settings are further underscored by the incident in which one of my research assistants was attacked and nearly got beaten by the husband of a woman he was interviewing. The research assistant reported:

“When I saw the respondent, she was relaxed and basking outside along the pavement in Muller Street together with her children who were also playing outside. As I interviewed the woman the interview was disturbed towards the end as the husband came in and told me to get away and started beating up the wife. He also wanted to attack me but I was very fortunate as the woman during the interview kept on mentioning a member of the CPF who stays across the street and during the interview he was sitting in his car and everything that was taking place was in his view, hence I had to run to him for safety. The member of the CPF managed to handle the situation with ease as he somehow commanded respect and also knew the husband and the wife, he also knew about the research which made it easy for him to come to my aid. That also confirmed the information that the woman gave during the interview to be correct and truthful” (Opinion and attitude survey: participant TB12, 2011).

This experience shows the cultural complexities of male researchers conducting interviews with women, especially within an androcentric setting in which men as husbands, fathers or brothers take guardianship of women and girls. This particular case demonstrates that accessing a (female) respondent requires payment of attention to the cultural or situational setting. Here the researcher got himself into trouble by not accessing the woman for interview with the approval of the husband. Again, the beating of the woman by her husband is a matter of ethical concern, yet what is relieving is that a YCPF member stopped the husband from beating his wife.

Sometimes gaining and maintaining access was enabled by key informants who treated me as a friend and eased my welcome into their organisations; making it easier for me to converse with their colleagues. For instance, in a conversation after a YCPF broader meeting, Mr. Thabang introduced me to some participant:

“You see this gentleman. He must the properly introduced in these meetings. Do you know that he will be called doctor soon? In simple terms, I can say he is doing a PhD in CPFs and community safety. He needs to be properly introduced” (Conversation, Thabang: 09/04/2011).

This statement was said after I had spent nine months in the field. One would hope that I would be known by most local people participating in community meetings, but that was not the case. In Mr. Thabang’s view, there was still a need for me to be
“introduced properly”. This confirms the fact that entering the research field is a process of continuous negotiation and renegotiation given the complex nature of social groups.

I managed, in one way or another, to consolidate myself within the complex socio-political context of my study area. I felt freer to engage with my research participants, both South African and non-South African. As a non-South African researcher I felt at home because, at least in rhetoric, leaders of community based organisations welcomed non-South African Blacks participating in their activities. Most local activists and leaders frequently spoke about the importance of having non-South Africans participating in their activities, citing that Yeoville was a pan-African community and ought to be inclusive.

Some research participants hinted, in various ways, that they expected to benefit from having me hang around them. There was subtle, but mounting pressure, for me to engage with the participants in ways that made them benefit from my presence. During an interview a leader of the YCF asked for a favour:

“We are looking for lawyers to assist us in our fight against hijackers of buildings in Yeoville. Can you assist us get some Lawyers” (Zondi: 10/08/2010).

I did not promise to get them a lawyer, but he kept on, over the days, asking me how far I had gone in that endeavour. So this is a task I got for hanging around a community organisation as a researcher. My research participants, in cases such as this, treated me as an important contact - a friend and advisor. One therefore inevitably assumes political positioning amongst the communities he conducts fieldwork.

5.3.2. “Subjective” socio-political positioning acknowledged

As a researcher, I was positioned in the scientific field and the social field at once; inevitably being a socio-political being (Bourdieu 1991b; Bourdieu 2003). I took positions in these two fields and had to juggle the associated contradictions.

In attempting to understand my positioning in some of the power fields in Yeoville, I narrate here my first stokes of emotions such as fear and excitement, amongst others.
When I came to Johannesburg to stay and conduct research, I initially worried continuously. This was because of the horrible stories I had heard about crime and violence in the city of Johannesburg, more so in the innercity and townships. Places such as Hillbrow, Johannesburg CBD, Yeoville, Diepsloot and Alexandra, as I had heard about them were havens of violence and crime; places abound with blazing guns and glittering or blood-dripping knives. My research was to focus on one or more of these areas.

As if it was a self-fulfilling prophesy, my first experience as I entered Johannesburg was horrible. As I arrived at Park Station, coming by bus from Harare, I was robbed of my money. This happened as I was making a phone call at a public telephone booth to get a friend to come and pick me up. While making the telephone call, a man who appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, came to me and asked “ngiceli imali” (give me money). He was speaking Zulu, a language I barely understood at the time. All I realised was that I was in danger. Having realised that I could not speak Zulu, he spoke in English:

“Man, give me money. Be fast. If you do anything stupid, my friends will come here and you won’t like it. They are watching right now” (Robber [Park Station - Johannesburg]: 16/01/2010).

I tried to pretend not to hear or understand him. The man then stretched his hands towards my pocket, presumably in search of valuables. Before he reached my phone, I handed him R50 and he left me instantly. This was a scary experience. I wondered what kind of life I was to live in Johannesburg. I got worried about how I was to successfully conduct a study on urban violence and crime in such a city. Such was my introduction to the city of Johannesburg.

Being present in meetings organised and led by South Africans was not always an easy experience. This is because in community meetings, there was a constant affirmation of the discourse that most community problems in Yeoville were a result of the presence of African immigrants concentrated in the area. Apparently, Zimbabweans, Nigerians and Congolese were commonly regarded as the most problematic groups. At one point I had to abort my participation at a YCF meeting when an invited speaker uttered xenophobic statements much to the ululation of the participating crowd:
“Some foreign nationals are coming here running away from dictators. Some of them engage in serious criminal activities here. We have more than three million Zimbabweans here in South Africa. They should go back home and solve their problems. They should go and vote out the dictator, simple” (Majola, YCF Meeting: 26/08/2010).

I left the meeting fearing for my safety, although I also found the encounter amusing. I left because I had introduced myself to the members of the forum and I was sure that most of them knew I am Zimbabwean. One of the leading members of the forum constantly looked at me as this man uttered his statements about Zimbabwean nationals in South Africa. This issue was linked to the need by members of this forum to deal with cases of hijacked houses and illegal collection of rent from tenants, which they alleged, was an enterprise dominated by Zimbabwean nationals.

The ambiguity of my position is further illustrated by the fact that some leaders of community organisation insisted on wanting me to attend all their meetings. This, in a way, made me feel obliged to attend their forums. At some point leaders of YCF registered displeasure if I missed their meetings and this was both positive and straining in terms of time and being able to delineate my role as a researcher. There was a time I consecutively missed four meetings of the YCF and when I met one of the YCF leaders we had the following conversation (Box 2).

**Box 2: “Why are you not coming to our meetings ...?”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zondi: Why are you not coming to our meetings these days? Are you confused or something?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Me: I have not been in town in a long time, but now that I am back, I will resume attendance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zondi: Things have been happening man. There has been a split in the forum. Our secretary and deputy chairperson have abandoned the forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me: Ah! Why did they leave?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zondi: I am sure they have been influenced by those people who dislike this forum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Date of conversation: 30/11/2010**

Following the conversation on Box 2, I observe that the insistence on me to attend meetings could have been a sign that the YCF leader considered me to be of utility to him and his organisation. This brings forth the idea that the field researcher can be an asset to the community, individuals or places where he conducts his research.
5.3.3. Field research and community politics: profit-seeking, manipulation…

As a researcher, the perceptions that participants had about me bordered between those depicting me a resource in their socio-economic and political struggles to those that depicted me as a liability. Some participants saw in me an important connection in pursuit of their organisational, social group and individual goals and others hoped that the findings of my research could be published to the world and reach stakeholders in government and other circles of concerned stakeholders who could empathise with their situations.

Because I am a Zimbabwean, some of the leaders and members of community based organisations expected me to be a conduit through which they could reach out to the Zimbabwean and other non-South African population in Yeoville (Benit-Gbaffou and Mkwanazi 2011). A YCF leader said:

“We would appreciate having you attend the YCF and other community meetings in Yeoville. Maybe that can assist us boost the membership of YCF. There is a serious problem of foreigners being negative towards the YCF and other community forums and meetings” (Conversation, Zondi [YCF Chairperson]: 08/08/2010).

The other challenge is that in some cases, I was being pressured to give something back to individuals and community forums or organisations, just for being allowed to hang around them as a researcher. In one scenario, a leader of the YSF wanted me to provide him with information on the proceedings of meetings of the YCF (Box 3).

**Box 3: “Why don't you spy for me?”**

YSF Leader: I know there is a meeting that takes place under the tree every Sunday here in Yeoville. I know you attend that meeting. What is happening there?

Me: Yeah. They are trying to deal with the issue of hijacked buildings there.

YSF Leader: What do they discuss there? I hear that we are being attacked there. Why don’t you spy for me? It would be good if you can give me feedback about what is happening there.

Me: Most of the issues discussed there are discussed in Zulu, which I don’t understand very well. I am also almost always at a loss. I am audio recording the proceedings.

**Interview date: 19/08/2010**

I interpret the request for me to spy on another organisation as an attempt by some community stakeholders to enrol me into positions where I become their ally in their political games of competition and contestation for legitimation. However, divulging
information about other organisations was potentially dangerous in that it could result in my image and role as a researcher being tarnished and reduced to that of a spy. Needless to say this could undermine my research. In light of these kinds of situations, Burgess advises:

“Researchers should not conduct research in order to spy on the activities of others on behalf of the gatekeeper” (Burgess 1984: 51).

I handled my position in a way that guaranteed that I would not jeopardise my relationship with leaders and members competing within and between community organisations. To avoid being labelled a spy, I kept confidential all information obtained from all meetings and interviews.

In some circumstances, people in organisations that I was researching and whose meetings I attended viewed me as a potential resource for their internal operations. On several occasions, I was asked to prepare minutes for organisational meetings. I took meeting minutes for the YCPF broader meetings and YCPF public meetings, Sector Crime Forums and African Diaspora Forum59. Writing and organisational skills that I was perceived to possess were a form of knowledge capital that those running community organisations wanted to tap on. At the same time this knowledge capital that I was perceived to possess was a source of symbolic capital; of recognition and honour as a researcher and as a person.

Being a researcher within the community security governance field, I found myself being unwittingly placed into a complex web of power politics involving different organisations and activists (Chapter 6). In this case, community organisations enrolled me as a useable human resource/capital, while I enrolled them to access the information I needed. It was therefore a relationship of mutual dependence and exchange; which however had implications on my obligations to both society and science.

59 I was a deputy secretary general and subsequently secretary general of African Diaspora Forum during and beyond the time of conducting fieldwork and writing this thesis.
5.4. Scientific self-guardianship and political involvement

Conducting social research comes with the complexities of balancing the need to abide by the principles of scientific scholarship and our subjective desires to contribute to society. It is important to strike a balance between the ethics of scientific practice and the moralistic ethics of social engagement. In this case, navigating the boundaries of involvement is a community as a researcher, resident and/or activist was not an easy endeavour for me.

5.4.1. “Renting rather than tenting”: ethnography beyond Malinowski

Staying and participating in daily activities in Yeoville, I can safely claim that my position as a researcher was not always visibly detected and I could make claims about being part of the community (a resident) rather than an outsider. This is unlike Malinowski’s experience of having to establish a tent in a place where there were pole and dagga houses, when he got involved in ethnographic research among the Omarkan villagers of the Trobriand Island (Wax 1972). By renting, I signified a claim of belonging to the community I was engaging with. And being a Black African, unlike Malinowski who was visibly non-native in Omarkan, I could easily relate and sometimes blend with my participants; identifying with them as Africans. No matter how much he tried to be part of the native Omarkan, establishing a tent, and not staying in the pole and dagga houses, was a stark mark of difference.

Doing research using prolonged participatory methods pose dangers of overly identifying with the community one works in and with. Of course, in my case, it was not tantamount to going native in the Malinowskian fashion, as I was already a “native”, by virtue of being a Black African, even before I conducted field research. As soon as I inserted myself into the field through attending meetings and being increasingly visible in community meetings and more generally on the local socio-political landscape, my presence ever more became obligatory. Missing a meeting became an issue for which leaders convening these meetings could question me (Box 2). In light this, I find it imperative to discuss my activist endeavours during the conduct of fieldwork.
5.4.2. Is this a scholarship with commitment?

As a researcher with a vested interest in seeing improvement in the recognition and welfare of African immigrants in South Africa, I found myself in a social and scholarly dilemma; recognising the limits of what I could do in social activism as a researcher. I found solace in my reading of Bourdieu (2000:40, 41, 44):

“The question that I would like to raise is this: Can intellectuals and especially scholars intervene in the political sphere? Must intellectuals partake in political debates as such, and if so, under what conditions can they interject themselves efficiently? What role can intellectuals play in the various social movements, at the national level – that is, at the level where the fate of individuals and societies is increasingly being decided today? Can intellectuals contribute to inventing a new manner of doing politics fit for novel dilemmas and threats of our age? First of all, to avoid misunderstandings, one must state clearly that researchers, artists, or writers who intervene in the political world do not thereby become politicians [...]. They become public intellectuals, that is people who invest in a political struggle their specific authority and the values of their craft, such as the values of disinterestedness and truth – in other words people who enter the terrain of politics without forsaking their duties and competencies as researchers…Today’s researchers must invent an improbable combination: scholarship with commitment, that is, a collective politics of intervention in the political field that follows, as much as possible, the rules that govern the scientific field …” (Bourdieu 2000a)

In light of Bourdieu’s recommendation, I involved myself in struggles of African immigrants.

My political positioning as a researcher, my identity as a non-South African and the political nature of my subject of investigation put me in politically complex roles and situations. While doing research, I had an internal urge to do something, however small, to improve the situation of African immigrants. In the course of my explorations and attendance of community meetings, I got involved with an organisation called African Diaspora Forum (ADF), and I was appointed its Deputy Secretary in February 2011, got elected into this position in June 2011 and became a substantive Secretary in February 2012. ADF is an organisation that aimed to reduce xenophobia in all its violent and symbolic manifestations in South Africa. Its work at the time of research was concentrated in Yeoville.

While my membership of the executive of ADF was morally fulfilling as it gave me a sense of purpose emerging from contributing something to the African immigrant
community, it opened a very useful network for the conduct of my research. By virtue of my association with ADF (and Yeoville Studio), most of my participants were willing to talk to me and participate in my research. As I sat in YCPF broader meetings involving the management of the police in Yeoville, I was regarded as an *ex-officio* member of the YCPF, representing ADF and also conducting research. In the YCPF, I also successfully applied for membership on the basis of being a resident of Yeoville. This membership gave me voting rights, although I did not have an opportunity to participate in any YCPF election. In YSF meetings I was also equally accepted as a member of Yeoville Studio and as time went on as an ADF member.

Having made some observation in Yeoville over a relatively long period, I contributed an article in *Yeovue News* (local newsletter) encouraging South Africans and non-South Africans to be tolerant towards each other and participate meaningfully in community matters (Chapter 7). To this article there was a response which dismissed my call for tolerance, arguing that non-South Africans were responsible for the urban decay in South Africa. This response was not only disheartening to me, but was interpreted by other contributors to the debate as “xenophobic”. My article and Majombozi’s attracted responses from successive *Yeovue News* issues. I had to officially withdraw from this debate, whilst proceeding to counter Majombozi’s article under the pseudonym Nkulumane and through ADF (Chapter 7). At some point I felt bad about initiating this debate, but realised that it was not only a rich source of information for my research, but a learning process for me and possibly other people involved in or following the debate.

It emerged that during and after the conduct of my fieldwork, I had become politically involved and engaged. In fact, there is a realisation that scholars should intervene in public life and contribute to social transformation without compromising their position as scientists or intellectuals (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu 2008). Describing his own quest for political involvement and intervention, Bourdieu (2008: xiii) stated:

“I run the risk of shocking those [researchers] who, opting for the cosy virtuousness of confinement within their ivory tower, see intervention outside the academic sphere as a dangerous failing of that famous ‘axiological neutrality’ which was wrongly identified with scientific objectivity […] But I am convinced that we must at all costs bring the achievement of science and
scholarship into public debate, from which they are tragically absent” (Bourdieu 2008).

The value of science and its contribution to positive social transformation can only be realised if intellectuals get involved in the project of social change and development. Hence I found myself obliged, as an immigrant, to do something at a minute level to improve the situation of African immigrants who suffered discrimination in everyday social life in South Africa.

5.5. Field research as political enterprise: concluding note

From the story of my field experiences, I make a series of points about the politics of community-oriented field research. Firstly, I argue that far from being simply technical, sampling, selection and deployment of research methods and data analysis or interpretation, are political and subjective enterprises that cannot be easily standardised.

Secondly, I conclude that the conduct of community oriented research enmeshes the researcher into the realpolitiks of everyday life in which access to communities or participants has to be continuously negotiated and renegotiated. It also entails a long period of excitement, stress, depression and fear at times; especially in cases like mine where a researcher has to conduct research in a context that is different from the one he was used to before. Being located in a politically vibrant community may entail that the researcher faces the challenge of being bogged in and by manipulative politics - which may either be petty or much more serious.

Thirdly, the field researcher faces a dilemma of guarding the scientific enterprise whilst also remaining a social being; as he or she is a social being, even before he or she is a researcher. By renting accommodation in the neighbourhood I was doing field research, I marked my political presence and became a part of the everydayness of the neighbourhood and community - attending community meetings and participating in civic structures. My participation took the form of community activism - as evinced by my joining of ADF, becoming its Deputy Secretary General and later its substantive Secretary General. This entails a scholarship closer to what Bourdieu refers to as a “scholarship with commitment” (Bourdieu 2008). In the next chapter, I discuss the nature of community politics in the neighbourhood I
conducted research - a community politics that I had to navigate in the conduct of my research.
6. Chapter Six
Stakeholder politics and community safety governance in Yeoville

Box 4: “Everything is done for a reason”

| OK: Do you harbour any political ambitions outside of the YCPF? |
| Lehlonolo: Of course. I was deployed here. Most people you see in CPF structures are deployed by the ANC. I am a member of the ANC. |
| OK: Do you hope to become a politician one day? |
| Lehlonolo: (laughs). Of course. Everything is done for a reason. No one can just volunteer |

Conversation, YCPF Chairperson, Lehlonolo: 17/04 2012

6.1. Introduction

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, accounts of community security initiatives, globally and in South Africa, tend to gloss over or ignore the role of stakeholder politics in configuring these initiatives. I argue that the field of community safety governance is characterised by a constellation of coalescing and competing interests of community stakeholders (organisations, institutions, individuals and social groups). These interests are linked to and go beyond the safety production agenda.

This chapter argues that the provision of safety has become a business where various kinds of economic, social, political, moral and spatial capitals or profits are sort after. This is so in a context where safety and security is considered to be in the top three of concerns of South Africans (Parnell and Pieterse 2010). In pursuing this argument, I examine the logic of stakeholder interests, practices, discourses, strategies and tactics in the community security governance field. In this way, I unpack the micro social, moral and political economies of the field of community safety production (Arnold 2001; Bowles and Gintis 1998).

I conceptualise the field of community safety governance as a field of micro-politics and micro-economies of stakeholder contestation and coalition. This chapter examines the i) shifting nature of organisational relations; ii) coalition of community organisations; iii) organisational and individual contestations (pointing of fingers); iv) the circulation of actors and concentration of local social influence; v) the positioning of state and community actors and lastly; vi) the infusion of local electoral politics.

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60 See Table 3 for a list of organisational and institutional stakeholders involved in safety governance in Yeoville.
61 See Appendix A for definitions of social economy, moral economy and political economy.
into the field of community safety governance. Through this analysis, I unpack political actions and position-takings of stakeholders in the community safety governance field.

6.2. Power and profit seeking: organising, competing, coalescing …

Box 4 above demonstrates that actors in community security governing organisations have a purpose, and seek gain in one way or another as “everything is done for a reason”. The Chairperson of the YCPF, suggested that he was not just an executive member of the YCF, but was “deployed by the ANC” in the YCPF - meaning that he was in YCPF to safeguard ANC interests (Box 4). This shows that stakeholders involved in safety governance operate in a complex environment and have converging and diverging interests. Community security governance is therefore a field of micro-politics and can be considered as a sub-field of the political field (Bourdieu 1991a).

In this section I narrate and interpret the forms and logics of socially unifying and contentious stakeholder politics in and of the community security governance field in Yeoville. Figure 10 shows multiple dealings by community organisations, social groups and individuals involved in community security governance; pursuing their interests. Stakeholders compete and coalesce for political, symbolic, moral, social, economic or cultural capitals (Katsaura 2012). These capitals are pursued under the banner of public interest or public good - the reduction of crime and violence being the most publicly or institutionally saleable and buyable one in this case (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Constellation of interests in the field of community safety governance
I describe and interpret, in sections below, narratives about contestations and coalitions in the field of community safety governance in Yeoville, with special reference to stakeholder contestations and coalitions.

6.2.1. Shifting community safety governance landscape

Yeoville’s local political landscape saw the emergence of YCF in February 2010. Box 5 shows an excerpt of proceedings of a YCF meeting in which the goals of YCF were highlighted.

Box 5: “We need to take Yeoville back”

| Zondi: There is a great concern with the hijacking of buildings in Yeoville. There is unlawful control of buildings by specific individuals or groups, who are then collecting rent from tenants. |
| Nomfundo: Yes. The people who are hijacking buildings are foreign nationals. I am not shy to indicate that. This is what is causing xenophobia. How would you feel as a South African when you pay rent to a foreign national who collects rent that is not due to him? These hijackers are criminals. The problem of hijacking of buildings is one of the biggest ones in Yeoville. |
| Participant: As a forum we need to identify these hijacked buildings and do something. |
| Zondi: Housing shortages are a serious problem. There have been many promises for the improvement of the housing situation in Yeoville and nothing has been delivered. People are living in squalid conditions and it is unhealthy and unacceptable. Apart from the problem of hijacking of buildings, crimes such as robberies, rape, etc. are a big problem in Yeoville. |
| CPF Chairperson: There is need to map out the hotspots of crime in each of the sectors of Yeoville. This is because every space has its own crime problems. This mapping is important because it will help us determine how we deploy street patrollers. You cannot deploy street patrollers in spaces that have no crime. |
| Zondi: We need to take the forum seriously. We need to voice the problems of the community rather than have decisions being imposed on us from above. The voicing of our concern have to be done through community structures. For example, we should reject the proposal of the Municipal Demarcation Board to divide Yeoville and Bellevue in preparation for new elections. |

62 The first community meeting that I attended upon getting into Yeoville for my research was the YCF meeting. I attended my first meeting on the 8th of August 2010. It is therefore no coincidence that the YCF is my entry point in my analysis of the local politics of Yeoville.
of the local government elections. We need to take Yeoville back if we are to operate fully as a forum. We therefore need to be united, because without being united we cannot succeed in this.

Gazilami: We need to raise funds to support the running of the forum. We need money for airtime and transport to enhance the smooth running of the forum. All forum members should contribute money in this regard.

**YCF meeting: 08/08/2010**

One can read the YCF as a space of *insurgent citizenship* (Holston 2008), an *ethno-national regionalist* space (Bourdieu 1991a; Nederveen 2007) and a space of solace, association and social mobilisation for a group of people who can be described as *urban outcasts* (Wacquant 1993; Wacquant 2008d) or *margizens* (Schuilenburg 2008).

I interpret YCF as a space for *insurgent citizenship* (Holston 2008) because of i) the emphasis on “taking Yeoville back”; ii) its need to “identify” “hijacked buildings” and take action on them; iii) emphasis on the voicing of community problems; and iv) the “need to map out of hotspots of crime” (Box 5). YCF was a space in which frustrated community members attempted to take issues into their own hands in attempting to resolve their challenges. I also consider YCF as generating an *invented space* of citizen participation in which established authority was challenged (Benit-Gbaffou and Mkwanazi 2011; Katsaura 2012). In this case, there was a pledge to resist the “imposition” of decisions from above.

Whom did they want to “take Yeoville back” from? In my observation it was about “taking Yeoville back” from i) African immigrants accused of hijacking the neighbourhood and causing social malaise; and ii) from allegedly un-delivering politicians. Being a gathering of mainly frustrated South Africans using their native languages (mostly Zulu, Xhosa and Sesotho) and fanning anti African immigrant discourses, the YCF can be described as an *ethno-national regionalist* entity and space.

As a space of solace for people marginalised from the housing market and mainstream economy, fatigued by waiting for the delivery of social housing by the state, congregating a mainly aged female constituency (see Photo 1, Box 5); the YCF can be described as a social space for *urban outcasts* (Wacquant 2008d), *wasted lives* (Bauman 2004) or *margizens* (Schuilenburg 2008) trying to attain justice and reconstruct their lives by engaging in “politics by other means” (Karlan 1999). The
struggle for housing, which was at the core of the YCF agenda was tantamount to a struggle for *spatial capital* (Lars 2008) and for associated honour or pride - for *symbolic capital* (Bourdieu 1986).

Because of the marginalised standing of its constituency and its delegates, the YCF can be viewed as an outcast organisation in Yeoville’s socio-political space. They lacked economic resources (capital). Recognising this, a YCF leader insisted on the need to “raise funds” (Box 5) to ensure the smooth running of the organisation. However, one of the main capitals possessed by the YCF was the capital of (the threat of) violence, to be deployed on some building-hijacker African immigrants, and the capital (of the threat of) defiance or insurgency against local socio-political order and authority in Yeoville (Holston 2008; von Holdt 2012a).

Shedding light on the relationship between YCF and other local organisations is the statement uttered by the chairperson of the YSF, an established organisation in Yeoville at that time:

> “There is a meeting that is held every Sunday under the tree in the park. Our organisations are being attacked there. Those convening this meeting are claiming that they want to give people houses. How can you get a house from an organisation that operates from under the tree, an organisation that cannot even house itself? I launch a huge onslaught on this organisation. It is reported that an executive member of the ANC is involved in these meetings. I have never been to any of these meetings for political reasons” (YSF Meeting, Thabang: 21/10/2010).

This statement suggests a dismissal of the YCF as a naïve organisation without much potential to change the situation in Yeoville. Most importantly, it indicates the fear that YCF would undermine existing local organisations. The “under the tree meeting” phrase in this statement became a real label used to refer to the YCF over time - symbolically representing YCF as an outcast organisation run by outcast people with a deplorable agenda. The YCPF chairperson who used to participate in YCF meetings (Box 5) even shifted his stance, denouncing the YCF also. I asked him why he was no longer attending YCF meetings and he laughed and replied:

> “Do you mean the under the tree meeting? I realised that those people have no direction. I am not interested in their activities anymore” (Conversation: Lehlonolo, 01/11/2010).
He had distanced himself from the YCF, also enacting on it, the “under the tree meeting” label.

In response to their sidelining in the local political landscape in Yeoville, YCF actors kept on “voicing” their concerns in public forums such as ward public meetings (see Box 6).

**Box 6: “Which forum are you talking about?”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zondi: Our community forum requires space in the community hall so as to be able to function properly. How can we gain access to the hall for our meetings?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward Councillor: Which forum are you talking about? If there is anyone who wants to use space in the hall, they are free to do so as long as they can pay for it, there is nothing that can stop them from booking. They don’t have to come to me, but they should go to the manager. Maybe you should arrange a meeting with me so we can have a discussion about this forum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ward public meeting, 09/10/2010

By asking “which forum are you talking about?”; the ward councillor meant either her lack of knowledge about the existence of the YCF or lack of recognition of the forum, among other possibilities. After the initial dismissal of the YCF leader, the councillor indicated the possibility of meeting YCF leaders for “a discussion about the forum”. To the best of my knowledge, during my more than two year stint in Yeoville, no such meeting took place between YCF actors and the ward councillor.

I observe that the militant and outrightly xenophobic approach of the YCF in responding to local challenges of “hijacked houses” placed them in tumultuous relationships with other organisations in the Yeoville. This was displayed in deliberative public forums where contributions from YCF members were dismissed or rebuked (see Box 7).

**Box 7: “Is he the chief of the mamas?”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YCF member: Our mothers are suffering. They are being ill-treated by these hijackers of houses. It is a very painful situation. When are we going to solve this problem?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YSF member: Why don’t these complaining mamas come to this meeting to present their problem? Is he the chief of the mamas? (Mamas means mothers) (This statement provoked a burst of laughter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ward public meeting, 11/09/2010
The question levied against the YCF leader by the YSF member reduced him to a caricatured “chief of the mamas”. It implied that the YCF leader had no mandate or legitimacy to speak on behalf of these mothers. This exchange reflects the broader polarities between the community security governing organisations and individual stakeholders in Yeoville.

I also observe that due to its outcast status, the YCF failed to attract funding or enough material support for its activities. In November 2011, the YCF rebranded to Yeoville Housing and Development Forum (YHDF) and registered as a non profit organisation - with the hope improving its institutional standing and attracting funding.

How can the unfolding micro-political dynamics associated with the emergence of the YCF in Yeoville be interpreted? The YCF increased the competitiveness of Yeoville’s micro-political landscape - creating an arena for stakeholder political battles and counter-battles. In these battles, the YSF, YBCDT and Ward Committee trio teamed up against YCF - dismissing it as an “under the tree” organisation. In return, the YCF dismissed the trio as ineffective, un-delivering and run by politically self-interested stakeholders.

What were the political practices and strategies of the YCF and how effective were they? Consider Box 8 for highlights of YCF’s political activities.

**Box 8: Messages to government**

1. “Asenzela lutbo eYeoville”. (Nothing is done for us in Yeoville)
2. “Siyaphela yinkunzi esitratweni nasemaglatini. Please Yeovue News help us”. (We are being mugged in the streets and in the flats. Please Yeovue News help us)
3. “We want homes”
4. “We have been waiting for houses for 15 years”
5. “Safa bo Msholozi, siza bo”. (We are dying Msholozi, help us. [Msholozi is the nickname of the incumbent South African President, Jacob Zuma])
6. “Viva Msholozi, singabakho, viva!” (Viva Msholozi, we are yours, viva!)
From this demonstration, it emerges that the YCF sought to build political and symbolic capitals to be able to successfully compete with other community organisations in Yeoville (Box 8). Despite their march in the Johannesburg City Centre, to the Gauteng Department of Housing and Department of Home Affairs, none of their complaints were addressed.

Against this backdrop, I argue that making demands from the state is evidence that YCF stakeholders could not escape the thought of the state or thinking through the state (Bourdieu 1998a). The practices and strategies of the YCF display mimesis and mimicry of the state agenda. They are informed by a statised habitus and a politics of longing to access the state. There was an engraving, in the YCF stakeholders minds, of belief in the state - further reifying the state as a concentration of capital or the central bank of capital (symbolic, political, economic etc.) (Bourdieu 1998a). The state was perceived by YCF members as a potentially reliable entity - one that can provide houses, reduce crime and offer better life chances to socio-economically and spatially marginalised South Africans.

By staging a demonstration, the YCF rebranded itself as a potentially more militant voice in Yeoville; thus, creating a platform to dismiss other organisations such as the YSF as mild and politically compromised. “In this way YCF, to some extent, managed to claim a position within the landscape of community representation and activism in Yeoville” (Katsaura 2012: 333) - thus accumulating some political and symbolic capitals.

The key messages of the demonstration were to ask the government to do “away with evil hijackers”, deliver homes and govern crime (Box 8). I posit that in making these requests from government, the YCF demonstrators invoked their citizenship and belonging to the South African polity as a justification of their entitlement to services; hence the claim “viva Msholozi, singabako, viva” [viva Msholozi, we are yours, viva] (Box 8). In my view the statement that “we are yours” indicates a clamour for entitlement and special treatment ahead of the non-South African Black other. This
shows the presence, in the minds of some South Africans, of a disjunctive public habitus that separates deserving South Africans from undeserving or invading Black non-South Africans who are depicted as including “evil hijackers” amongst them.

Now I examine the manifestations and logics of stakeholder cooperation and coalition.

6.2.2. Cooperation and coalition of community organisations

At some point, from 2010 to early 2012, the YBCDT provided office space and associated facilities to ADF and YCPF. Asked about the motivation for having ADF and YCPF share an office, the YBCDT Director replied:

“For us to deal with the challenges in Yeoville, we need resources, we need a place to work from and we need access to communication and other useful resources. I thought of providing space for community organisations so as to ensure that these organisations begin to understand each other and to network. It would also help members of the community to easily access these organisations if they are all pooled in a single space. I actually have a vision of acquiring a bigger space where all organisations can have tables. The space in the library on Rockey Streets could be ideal. As you can see, this office brought together the ADF and the CPF, organisations that could be potentially in conflict. Now they have a way of working together” (Interview, Maurice: 28/02/2012).

By bringing the YCPF and ADF closer to him geographically, Maurice created an opportunity for him to frame or influence the agenda for socio-economic development in Yeoville. Bringing of the YCPF and ADF into shared office space created a platform for possible mutual understanding between potentially conflictual organisations. The YCPF was towing xenophobic lines, while the mandate of the ADF was to respond to and prevent any forms of xenophobia.

The YCPF had plans to engage in policing activities in ways that prejudiced, stereotyped and criminalised African immigrants (Katsaura 2012). It had, in its programme of action for year 2010, plans to conduct citizen verification and police hijacked buildings, which targeted African immigrants. Maurice, who was incorporated into the YCPF as the treasurer in 2010, was able to tone down this approach and to gradually divest the YCPF of its open expression of xenophobic
sentiments (Katsaura 2012). The toning down of the YCPF’s xenophobic discourses is evinced by this statement by the YCPF chairperson:

“It is difficult for us as CPF to deal with this issue (hijacked houses). It has to be handled legally. You must know that the power of CPF is limited” (SCF1 meeting, Lehlonolo: 22/09/2011).

In another context the YCPF chairperson stated:

“In cases of hijacked houses, we as CPF can do very little. What we can do is to advise the complainant to go to the housing tribunal, which will adjudicate over the case. One thing is that the housing tribunal will be having many cases to take care of and for them there is no urgent case. The case can also be taken to MEC housing at province” (Conversation, Lehlonolo: 06/11/2011).

Maurice claimed to have influence the YCPF to reduce its xenophobic overtones and undertones. Asked why he was appointed YCPF treasurer, Maurice responded:

“It is because they see that I am doing something for the community” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010).

Maurice claimed to be grooming the YCPF leadership:

“I […] was appointed to be the treasurer of the CPF. I need to begin a process of giving confidence to the current CPF. That can only come through an understanding of their role by themselves. There is also need to clarify the role of the street patrollers and reduce the mistrust that is there between patrollers and CPF” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010).

He also indicated that he had a vision of creating a network of organisations working together to improve socio-economic conditions in Yeoville. Talking of representatives of other local organisations in the YCPF broader meeting, Maurice suggested:

“We are looking forward to having representatives of community organisations in this meeting. If we succeed in mobilising, we will have 45 participants. This would mean that we would need to use the Yeoville Recreation Centre for our meeting. We also need to have in this meeting, all our four councillors who have something to do with Yeoville” (Maurice [YCPF broader meeting]: 01/06/2011).

The YBCDT therefore sought to play a central role in enhancing the networking and cooperation of local organisations in helping improve the socio-economic standing of Yeoville.
The central positioning of YBCDT in the network of organisations in Yeoville was threatened by dwindling resources. Towards the end of 2011, the YBCDT’s financial status became precarious. In a conversation Maurice indicated the persistence of financial precariousness in the YBCDT, stating:

“YBCDT is facing a funding challenge. I don’t know if we will be able to continue. Did you see the email I sent out? I am appealing to individuals to help us with contributions - at least monthly contributions of 200 rand. I wish we could have 200 reliable contributors. So far we are having 50 people who have indicated their pledge to contribute. Some of them have pledged to pay 500 rand per month. Of these 50, most are waiting to see if others contribute before they also contribute. I am however seeing that people generally don’t want to give. I don’t understand why people don’t want to give. I learnt of this system of individual donations from my research on the Green Peace Movement. They are sponsored by more than 1.2 million individuals across the world – they do not take money from corporates. The system gives non-profit organisations independence. It’s a good strategy only if people are willing to give” (Interview, Maurice: 28/02/2012).

The need to optimise use of scarce resources can inform the coalition and networking of organisations for the purpose of pooling resources. The pooling and sharing of resources can also reduce organisational tensions as they learn to co-work and co-reside.

In 2010, YBCDT, YSF, ADF with the support of the YCPF worked together to manage a pan-African festival, named the Africa Week Festival, held mainly in Yeoville and New Town in Johannesburg. Again in May 2011, the ADF held a concert entitled “Many Faces, One Africa”. The concert was held with financial support from the Foundation for Human Rights and involvement of a private entity called Community Media for Development (CMFD). During this concert, the YCPF provided security and cleaning services through street patrollers.

In narrating the importance of the networking of community organisations in the community security governance field, one should note that some community security governing organisations are networks in their own right as much as they are sites of communication. The YSF, by its very nature, is a site of communication between various organisations affiliated to it. This communication however is not always smooth (see Box 9).
Box 9: “... information is not reaching the organisations”

Mashaba: There has been a problem since the formation of YSF. It seems that information is not reaching the organisations that are being represented in the YSF. What can we do to improve communication? YSF is the umbrella of all organisations in Yeoville. When we are here, we are one, we are YSF. When we visit organisations, the aim is to strengthen our relationship and build and work with each other. What we need to have is a strong YSF. What we need to understand is that we are trying to build relations.

Joe: Every organisation that is here is here because of a reason. Why did your organisation join YSF? With the question that we are raising now it’s like questioning why the organisation exists in the first place. Should we revisit our constitution? I understand that YSF is a voice of the community, working with the City of Johannesburg.

Mashaba: Not every child we send to school passes. So what it means is that not all organisations’ representatives here are properly doing their job of representing the community.

Lebogang: The problem is that some of the people who are here are not reporting to their organisations.

Tracy: I agree with what Lesiba is saying, but not totally. I send many letters to organisations so they can participate in objections to new liquor licence applications and the response was pathetic. When you even call these organisations they don’t respond. If you call 20 organisations, maybe only 4 responded.

Man X: Maybe if we are to use a proper term, what we are talking about is coordination. You can only coordinate through communication.

Brian: We need to communicate as organisations and make sure that in whatever we do, our approach should be comprehensive. For example, people were discussing the issue of demarcation. While people here seemed to have been against demarcation, but as COPE, we supported the new demarcation because we believed that the ward is too big for one councillor, so the division is good.

YSF meeting, 27/01/2011

The passages in Box 9 indicate the importance of inter-organisational information sharing. The YSF was conceived as a “voice of the community” to the City of Johannesburg; implying that it considered itself a legitimate community representative organisation in Yeoville. In reality, of course, there were many other organisations claiming to be voices of the community (see Table 3).

ADF, which claimed to be a federation of 23 African migrant communities, was considered by its members as the main African immigrant representative organisation in South Africa. This made it a site for sharing of information on the challenges faced by various groups of migrants living in South Africa. In an ADF meeting, a leader of Ethiopian Diaspora Development Association reported:
“Ethiopians do not speak nice English. They are using their own language. When they are beaten (by police officers) they can’t answer. There are more than 200 Ethiopians in Lindela. Our permits are not being renewed. That is the problem. The problem is that they (police officers) can identify the faces of Ethiopians. They always ask for money from us. It’s very bad. There is a lot of corruption. It’s a problem. Please, put the Ethiopian Diaspora on the meeting with the public protector” (Njera, ADF Meeting: 03/03/2012).

Ward public meetings hosted by the Ward Committee also operate as a networked space. They provide slots for YCPF, YSF and other organisations to report their activities to the public. In a ward public meeting where YCPF leaders were not present to give a report, the councillor complained:

“We don’t have a report from CPF. There is no one to report. We included them last meeting, but there was no one to report. I feel that CPF should always give a report at the public meeting because that’s where they get their support. The Ward Committee Safety and Security portfolio is the one that should be provide the link with CPF” (Ward Public Meeting, Councillor: 11/09/2010).

The Ward Committee itself had a portfolio on safety and security which was supposed to work with the YCPF and other organisations in Yeoville.

Why did community safety producing organisations network? I observe that they network for pooling of resources, sharing of knowledge capital or informational capital - resulting in them exerting symbolic influence over each other. The sharing of office space under the sponsorship of the YBCDT described above is a case in point. Organisations that command more economic resources and knowledge than others tend to sometimes dominate the local political arena (as was the case with YBCDT). For instance, by virtue of possessing economic capital, the YBCDT was able to influence the agenda-setting processes of YCPF, subverting its xenophobic stances. Economic resources are therefore convertible into political capital for the benefit of safety production, amongst others. While economic capital can be the basis of coalitions, it can also be the logic behind contestations – “pointing of fingers”.

6.2.3. “Pointing of fingers”: contentious politics

The community safety governance field in Yeoville was an arena, not only of cooperation, but of conflict. One conflict that I observed was over the rehabilitation of Yeoville Victim Empowerment Centre (VEC). The VEC faced challenges
including poor staffing, dilapidation of VEC building and crumbling furniture. Describing the VEC situation, Maurice stated:

“The walls of the VEC are in shambles and the VEC chairs are broken. It shows no respect for the victims. The offices of the VEC are used as a lunch office. One of the VEC volunteers was attacked by a victim in the centre and the police were busy laughing instead of helping. We have formed a VEC committed to deal with the VEC issues” (SCF2 meeting, Maurice: 26/10/2010).

In a YSF meeting, a participant jokingly stated:

“Instead of being a Victim Empowerment Centre, it has turned into a victim intimidation centre” (YSF Meeting, Brian: 27/01/2011).

Something had to be done. The Ward Councillor once observed:

“We have a VEC, but it needs financial injection. It’s a very important centre, but it’s not supported” (Ward Public Meeting, Ward Councillor: 13/11/2011).

A local activist also explained:

“The VEC has been there since 2005. We have been soliciting for help from CPF and YSF. People do not really understand how the VEC works. We have created a committee to deal with the VEC. We need to improve the physical outlook of the centre by painting it among other things. If you are victims of crime, you also need good space that makes you good and recognised” (Ward Public Meeting, Evelyn: 13/11/2011).

The VEC building, therefore, was a physical space with symbolic importance; one that was supposed to make victims feel at ease and “intimidated”. It needed to be physically rehabilitated is it was to aptly play its role. The YSF came to the forefront to raise resources for the VEC, creating a steering committee in 2011 to fundraise for the VEC. The steering committee successfully raised funds that were used to renovate the VEC building and secure new furniture.

Now began contestations over control of the sourced VEC funds. A member of the VEC steering committee complained:

“We volunteered and did a lot of work at the VEC. We sourced funds as a team, managed to have the VEC building renovated. But look at what we get. After the job is done, people start pointing fingers at us, they no longer want us. I am not going to the VEC again. Now that we sourced funds, people at the VEC (working there) have become greedy. They no longer want the
steering committee because they felt that the committee was trying to control
them. Maybe it’s because of the money. Where there is money, people always
do that. Sooner rather than later all the money will be finished. There is only
R7000 left. We had planned that we were going to buy a fridge, a heater and an
electric kettle with the money, but it seems that the volunteers at the VEC are
no longer interested in that. All they are interested in now is the money”
(Conversation: Evelyn [VEC steering committee]: 27/01/2011) [sic].

Why did this tension, between the YSF created VEC steering committee and the
VEC volunteers, ensue? In my view, the YSF stood to benefit symbolically by
boosting its institutional legitimacy and standing (political capital) in Yeoville as a
representative of the community. Individual VEC steering committee members also
stood to make symbolic and political profits by being associated with successful
fundraising for the benefit of the community.

Due to competition for political, economic and symbolic profits in the community
safety field, members of the VEC steering committee were eventually set up for
conflicts with VEC volunteers and YCPF stakeholders over the management of
VEC funds. Some VEC volunteers indicated the desire to work independently as
before and shunned what they thought was a continued presence and interference of
the VEC steering committee in their work. At the same time the YCPF leaders
claimed that they were the ones mandated to oversee the work of the VEC, not the
YSF (and its steering committee). They therefore wanted the VEC finances which
were in the YSF account to be transferred to the YCPF account. At the same time,
members of the VEC Steering committee desired to monitor how the money they
had sourced would be spent. They had planned to use the money “to buy a fridge, a
heater, and an electric kettle” for use at the VEC.

The desire by YCPF to oversee the use of VEC funds was indicated in a letter
addressed to the YSF as follows:

“We are aware that the VEC support committee initiated by the YSF and
responsible for some excellent support work for the VEC has come under fire
from various quarters and proposed withdrawing and disbanding. It has come
to the attention of the CPF that it has statutory obligations in respect of the
VEC. We are busy investigating what these obligations are, but we have seen
that in other police precincts, it is the CPF which has established a VEC
support committee. If it is indeed true that CPF has this responsibility, we will
take steps to re-establish a support committee which hopefully will not be
challenged in the same way as the current support committee. If we do, we will
gladly invite members of the current committee to join and continue their good work. The SAPS and Ikhayalethemba, the community safety structure responsible for VEC, have said that they cannot receive funds for individual VECs. If we are responsible for supporting the VEC, we will open a bank account into which funds for the VEC can be deposited. We will therefore let you know what happens in that regard so that the remaining VEC funds in the YSF account can be transferred” [sic] (signed by YCPF chairperson, 27/02/2011).

To this YCPF letter, some VEC steering committee members reacted with contempt. They raised a lot of questions, with one of them rhetorically asking the question: “Where was the CPF when things went wrong at the VEC?” (YSF Meeting: Lesiba, 27/01/2011).

Regarding the creation of the VEC steering committee, one man, representing COPE63 questioned: “Why are people from YSF filling all these positions?” (YSF meeting, Brian: 27/01/2011). To this question, the deputy chairperson of YSF responded:

“People just volunteered. There is a lot that happened here. Fingers are being pointed at us at the VEC when we were working there. The VEC steering committee is no longer in existence now. We have a letter from the CPF here” (YSF meeting, Mashaba: 27/01/2011)

Another one reasoned:

“What we should do here is to be very thankful that the job was done. It’s not important to say the job should have been done by X of Z of Y. What is important is that the job has been done. When you are in the YSF you need to relinquish your political stance, your identity, so that you contribute towards constructive dialogue. This meeting is different from an ANC meeting or a CPF meeting. We are invited to this meeting not for a political reason. At the end of the day it’s not politics, its governance; governance of our resources, our schools and our neighbourhood” (YSF meeting, Participant: 27/01/2011).

The question “why are YSF people taking all positions?” directly challenged the legitimacy of the YSF-created VEC Steering Committee. It attests to the circulation of actors and concentration of socio-political power in the hands of a few stakeholders in the Yeoville security governance field. It was however dismissed as a retrogressive “pointing of fingers”.

63 Congress of the People (COPE) – a South African political party.
In a fashion comparable to the questioning of YSF involvement with the VEC, there were tensions about the existence and legitimacy of YBCDT. Maurice of the YBCDT alleged:

“I experience a lot of problems here. People want to pull me down and undermine what I am doing […]. People would want to pull down a development structure like YBCDT for no other reason than the expression of power […] that is for political reasons” (Maurice, Yeoville Studio-YBCDT meeting: 02/03/2011).

The legitimacies of YBCDT, Yeovue News and Maurice’s activities in Yeoville were questioned in public forums such as ward public meetings (Box 10).

Box 10: “The editor of this paper was arrogant in previous public meetings”

**Background:** There was a complaint that Yeovue News was in some cases misrepresenting issues – publishing misleading information. The currently published Yeovue News was (incorrectly) alleged to have published incorrect maps for ward boundaries of Yeoville. There were questions regarding issues of accountability of the YBCDT that were raised following this issue relating to Yeovue News. Some participants stressed that despite this challenge, Yeovue News remains an important source of information in Yeoville. There was a proposal that Yeovue News should have an editorial committee composed of people from the community to assist the editor of Yeovue News in editing the newspaper. The councillor was asked to have a meeting with the editor of Yeovue News over this matter.

Gazilami: Since this paper is having a lot of misleading information, I don’t think it reflects what the community wants. The editor of this paper was arrogant in the previous public meetings. He also never used to attend the public meetings.

Dhlodhlo: We must not mix issues. The issue of errors should be treated as such. The councillor said he will deal with the issue. This paper is informative.

Woman X: With all due respect, the publisher of this paper should make sure he publishes correctly. The editor of this newspaper has his own agenda.

Renilwe: In this paper Maurice is not representing the community as long as this paper is being edited by Maurice. We must make sure he doesn’t do it alone.

Mkokheli (Ward Councillor): This paper is published using public funds and Maurice has never hidden that from us. YBCDT is not a private company; it’s funded by the Development Bank of Southern Africa. If we have a problem with the way the YBCDT is run, we can hold the executive officer accountable. Maurice is not here and has apologised.

Man: In order for Maurice to get information to publish correctly in this newspaper, he should have people around him to help him. I don’t know how he works. Is he alone or is he having people he is working with?

Gazilami: We have been having a problem with the way Maurice has been operating. This is the first meeting of a new councillor. He is supposed to be here. We need to ask him questions.

Renilwe: There must be an editorial committee. We don’t even know members of his Board
of Trustees. We don’t know them and they don’t even stay in this ward.

Man D: I think the issue that we have is one of institutional arrangement. It has to be clear who Maurice is accountable to. Maybe as our councillor you can have a meeting with Maurice and discuss the newspaper issue.

Mkokheli: Maurice thinks I am his friend, but if anything is wrong, I don’t care. I don’t care even if the person who has done it is my wife or friend. If something is wrong its wrong.

Ward public meeting: 27/08/2011

In response to allegations of lack of accountability of the YBCDT and Yeovue News, Maurice published an article in Yeovue News explaining:

“I did not attend the Ward 67 Public Meeting (see main story). I gave my apology to the councillor. But I did ask someone to attend and perhaps give me a story. He gave me a couple of pictures and a very short input - not really a full report of the meeting. He did, however, give me a report on a discussion about Yeovue News that took place at the meeting… The other issue raised at the meeting in relation to Yeovue News was the question of accountability - a very important issue. Firstly, though, I would like to stress something. The Yeoville Bellevue Community Development Trust (YBCDT) is not a structure representing the community. It is an NGO, a service organisation. Yeovue News also does not claim to be the ‘voice’ of the community. It is primarily a source of information. I hear people in the meeting agreed that it was playing an important role in this regard… Yeovue News would welcome ideas from the community on how best this could be done. The main thing is to not compromise the role of the paper as a source of information. The other is the issue paper should remain independent of political parties and of sectional interests. It should, as far as possible, be sufficiently independent for everyone in the community to be able to relate to it” (YN 2011a)[sic] .

I observe that Maurice’s position as a white man attempting to do “community work” in a largely Black neighbourhood was generally precarious. This was vividly revealed in a YCPF meeting held on the 2nd of June 2012. This meeting happened after Maurice had resigned from being treasurer the YCPF; citing the lack of moral values by the YCPF executive members who, he alleged, were involved or complicit in illegal and violent acts – yet they are supposed to lead by example. The immediate story recited by Maurice was the grievous assault, by the chairperson of Sector Crime Forum 1, of a lady who was then reported to be in a comma battling for her life in a Johannesburg hospital having suffered brain damage from the beating. This assault, according to Maurice, happened at a Shebeen in Yeoville in the presence and possibly with the active participation complicity of the YCPF Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson who were drinking in the company of the Chairperson of Sector
Crime Forum 1 at the Shebeen. And, in a separate incident, the Deputy YCPF chairperson of the YCPF was suspended from the YCPF because he was facing charges of fraud and had also been previously arrested on charges of armed robbery although he was later acquitted.

Despite his resignation, Maurice claimed to have been asked to act as an advisor to the YCPF by those responsible for the CPF at the Gauteng Department of Community Safety. The meeting, on the 2nd of June 2012, was meant to address the challenges faced by the YCPF and Thabo, a representative of the Department of Community Safety was there. However, the tables turned against Maurice in this meeting, as some members of the public questioned his previous appointment as the treasurer of the YCPF and his current appointment as advisor. One man during this meeting publicly questioned:

“I wish to know how people get in and out of the CPF. How does this happen. We just hear that Maurice was appointed as treasurer and now he has been appointed as advisor. How does that happen without our knowledge as the community? Who is responsible for this?” (YCPF public meeting, Gazilami: 02/06/2012).

Following this, there was a heated debate in the meeting in which the legitimacy of Maurice’s position in the YCPF was questioned. There was a fracas in which some meeting participants verbally attacked Maurice and threatened physical violence against him. This led to Maurice public resignation from position of YCPF advisor. I argue that Maurice’s position in Yeoville and in local civic bodies was precarious, mainly because he was considered as not representing the public and also because of his racial positioning as a white man in a poor Black neighbourhood. Maurice had no capital of delegation or representation from below - what he had is personal political capital, that is his networks in government circles (Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012); as in this case with officials in the Gauteng Department of Community Safety. By getting a mandate from the Department of Community Safety it could be observed that Maurice’s personal political capital is convertible to capital of delegation from above (Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012). As a white man, the questioning of his positionality in civic bodies and involvement in civic activities in Yeoville was a kind of symbolic attack or even symbolic victory by a section of the poor Black South African
population that has suffered a long history of racial segregation and prejudices of apartheid.

The precariousness of Maurice’s position, at some point dramatically took the form of threats of violence against him and his family. On the 19th of July 2012 he received the following mobile phone text message:

“It has come to our attention that you want to rule this area disturbing our business, we will not allow that, so we are going to make sure that you move out of this area, watch and see! we know where your wife works we know the car she is driving (polo blue) registration known, your son is driving a volkswagen kumbi, your son is @ randburg we know where he is studying, we know your office and people who are working for you, we are giving you a month to leave this area starting from today, this is the area Black Africans, you are left alone, people like you are staying at sandton, leave before you see the wrath of Black people, we are warning you, mother fucker!” [sic].

The ADF chairperson pledged his sympathy and support to Maurice and wrote an email to the ADF executive committee stating:

“Dear all. The message […] was sent to Maurice Smithers, we don’t know who did it. In ADF we don’t close eyes on discrimination. We will include this in our agenda tomorrow …” (Fagbibo: 20/07/2012) [sic].

Responding to the threat, Maurice wrote on his blog:

“I've dealt with a lot of hostility over the years that I have worked in Yeoville Bellevue. That's 14 years of dealing with all sorts of negativity and bullshit from community members, political parties, councillors and city officials. But, hell, I never thought I'd get an SMS such as this: [text message above]… But I did. Get such an SMS. After recovering from the shock of it, I took whatever steps were necessary to protect my family. I also consulted widely in the community and reached agreement with others in a meeting on Saturday 21 July that we should go for big publicity to get the story out there while, at the same time, working with the authorities to track the perpetrator down. We feel it is important to ensure that people are reminded of the old slogan: 'An injury to one is an injury to all!' A threat of this nature is a threat to all right-minded people who care about making Yeoville Bellevue a better place. I still don't get this Sandton stuff though. Why Sandton of all places? First of all, I don't like Sandton. Kanyi Mbau still lives there which is good enough reason to stay away. Secondly, I cannot afford to stay in Sandton, even if I wanted to. I'm not going to be one of those moegoes boasting a supposedly prestigious address, but not being able to afford to buy bread. Besides, this grammatically-challenged purveyor of threats clearly doesn't understand why I live in Yeoville Bellevue and not in Sandton. He or she may be here under sufferance, but I am here out of choice. And I'm not going to leave just because some unknown
entity has decided I should and would happier with me being in Sandton rather than working to develop Yeoville Bellevue. What he or she doesn't realise is that I am not necessarily intending to see out my days in Yeoville Bellevue. I might, but I could just as easily not. But if I do leave, it will certainly not be to go north to Sandton. I have more respect for myself than that” [sic] (23/07/2012).

What could have driven the threats against Maurice? One community leader explained:

“This is an area for poor people and Maurice’s problem is that he seems to be working to pull poor people out of Yeoville and replace them with a middle class. That’s why he gets these kinds of threats” (Fagbibo: 21/07/2012).

I interpret the threats to Maurice as reflecting broader struggles in the economic, political and social fields in South Africa - operating here at a miniature level. The issue of economic and political dispossession of the Black population is at stake, and in this case coming out as racial and class politics. Maurice then becomes a white “middle class” face in a predominantly “poor” Black community in which the suffering of the Black population is (partly) interpreted in racial, ethno-nationalist and, sometimes, class terms.

In explaining this “pointing of fingers”, I invoke the argument that the community safety governance field is marked by dynamics of posturing and competition amongst stakeholders. These stakeholders compete and coalesce for access to economic, political, symbolic, political, social and moral capitals. These capitals are convertible to capital of security or security capital which is of service to the community; if they are not selfishly personalised or institutionalised. The statement by the YCPF chairperson that “everything is done for a reason” and his expression of interests in becoming a politician, sustains this view (see Box 2).

Despite the “pointing of fingers” between actors in the community security governance, circulation of actors and pocketing of local socio-political are discernible.

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64See http://yeovillebellevue.wordpress.com/2012/07/23/on-my-way-to-sandton-if-anonymous-has-his-or-her-way/, accessed on 23rd July 2012.
6.2.4. Circulation of actors and concentration of local influence

An analysis of community activism in Yeoville reveals that there was a network of political and social power brokers that dominated the community security field. The same activists circulated between different community organisations within the neighbourhood; resulting in concentration of local socio-political influence (Katsaura 2012). Figure 11 shows, in concentric form, the key local actors in Yeoville. These key actors were both gate keepers and access points into community security governance field in Yeoville. Figure 11, however, simplifies the reality of community security governance politics in Yeoville.

![Figure 11: Local socio-politics of influence in Yeoville](source: Author)

The density of localised social power was reflected in the composition of YBCEC\(^{65}\), an organisation that was formed during the time I was conducting fieldwork in Yeoville in 2011. The composition of this organisation basically reflected the structure of the YCPF. The YBCEC chairperson was the deputy chairperson of YCPF and his deputy was the treasurer of YCPF and executive director of YBCDT. This was questioned publicly (see Box 11).

**Box 11: “What is the structure of the committe that you are talking about?”**

| Lehlonolo: The Yeoville Bellevue Community Advocacy Committee was formed to deal with the issue of liquor and other issues affecting the community. It meets every second Wednesday at 5 pm at 24 Rockey Street. |

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\(^{65}\) The Yeoville Bellevue Community Empowerment Committee (YBCEC) was initially referred to as the Yeoville Bellevue Community Advocacy Committee (YBCAC). That is why in Box 6.12 it is referred to as YBCAC and I generally refer to it as YBCEC in my writing.
Maurice: The YBCAC is not a CPF structure. It is a community structure and the CPF part of it. We have members of YSF who are part of it and we also have ordinary members of the community who are part of it. We also deal with issues of spaza shops and illegal rezoning of property. We meet every second Wednesday at 5 o’clock.

Captain Ndaba: What is the structure of the committee that you are talking about?

Lehlonolo: At the moment we only have an interim structure.

Captain Ndaba: You guys are already holding positions in CPF and YBCDT. How are you going to manage when you have many things on your plates?

Colonel Tshabalala: I agree with what Ndaba is saying. You need to be an objective structure. The community should not see it as a structure for particular people, but as a structure for the community - their structure.

Participant A: Did you inform the councillor about this committee?

Lehlonolo: She doesn’t know about it.

Maurice: We have written about is many times in Yeovue News. It is not a government structure. We do not really need to ask anybody’s permission to do that. We are free to do that.

Thabang: Could you update us on the progress on the work done or to be done by YBCAC?

Lehlonolo: We are planning to arrange meetings with the liquor board so that we can understand the different types of licenses and understand why we have not been invited for hearing in some of the Liquor license hearings for those licenses that have been granted.

YCPF public meeting: 04/03/2011

The formation of the YBCEC aroused contestation between the ward councillor and Maurice (founding local activist). In this case the legitimacy of the YBCEC was questioned by the councillor, with the support of sections of the audience in a ward public meeting. The accusation levelled against Maurice was that he did not consult with the community before forming the YBCEC. This resulted in a public fall-out in which Maurice walked out of the meeting; supposedly in anger or frustration. He then became the subject of discussion for a couple of minutes after he had left. One meeting participant admonished him:

“Maurice has not right to undermine you. You are a councillor. He needs to account for his behaviour. We need to say it in front of this forum. He should apologise” (Ward Public Meeting, Renilwe: 10/03/2010).

The “pocketing” of local social power and social influence by a small clique of actors shows that political capital can be monopolised (Katsaura 2012). There was a small group of actors, including the YBCDT executive director, YSF chairperson, YCPF
chairperson and ADF chairperson, which had more influence in the arena of community safety governance in Yeoville.

Within this whole socio-political matrix, what was the positioning of the state?

6.2.5. State-community security co-production challenges

As a starting point in dealing with the preceding question, I note the statement below:

“The CPF is a government structure [...]. CPF represents the community. As CPF we don’t just deal with crime. We deal with many issues, some of which might be the causes of crime [...]” (Sector Crime Forum 1 Meeting, Lehlonolo [YCPF Chairperson]: 27/07/2011).

The Chairperson of YCPF, in another scenario, explained:

“The CPF was meant to help the police in terms of fighting crime. Since we are the residents of this area, it is our responsibility to give information about crime to the police” (Interview, Lehlonolo: 05/08/2010).

In this case, YCPF was ideally supposed to conduct joint operations with SAPS; co-setting and co-defining the local policing agenda (see Box 12).

Box 12: “The function of the CPF is to assist SAPS prevent crime”

Colonel Mkulili: Weekly, we do have operations, even if it is not a big operation, for example, last week we had a joint operation with Metro, targeting drivers who drive under the influence of alcohol. We have a matrix of operation, but it’s not in the public domain because we don’t want people to be forewarned. We also identify hotspots and deploy police officers there.

Maurice: Does it mean that as CPF, if we have a proposal about operations we can do that.

Colonel Mkulili: In fact, that’s how things should work. The function of the CPF is to assist SAPS to prevent crime.

YPF broader meeting: 09/02/2011
Participation of the community in policing is considered as integral for success in crime reduction. A senior Yeoville police officer explained:

“You need to know the community that you are working with. It is important that as police we participate in community initiatives for crime prevention. Last time I asked guys from the CPF to give me a list of all the streets that do not have street lighting so that I report the matter to the City of Johannesburg Department of City Power” (Conversation, Col. Tshabalala: 09/02/2011)

The relationship between the public and police was evaluated as a success by the communications officer of Yeoville SAPS when he indicated:

“We have the community policing forum which is a partnership between the community and the police. We have the Yeoville Stakeholder forum, Africa Diaspora forum, Youth Desk. They help the community to accept one another and treat each other humanely. Our relationship with CPF is bringing good results. We want the community to start to take charge of their safety and integrate them in our effort. In some of the cases of possession of drugs and firearms, we get tips from the CPF. We conduct meetings with the CPF once a month” (Interview, Constable Mbuli: 18/08/2010).

However, in reality, the idea of community – police joint security provision is muddled by power politics in which SAPS officers treat YCPF civilian members as inferior partners; while YCPF members view SAPS officers as corrupt. Box 13 shows how in attempting to do joint operations, civilian street patrollers are not allowed in police vehicles, making it difficult for the two to work together.

**Box 13: “I think we are losing the plot here ...”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bongani: I remember in December we had a patrolling project on the 31st of December 2010. The street patrollers were not allowed to get into the police kombi to patrol with police. The patrollers then felt segregated and undermined. That’s why we end up losing patrollers.</th>
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<td>Colonel Mkulili: The reason why we cannot have street patrollers in police vehicles is because if something happens to the patrollers for example an accident, what then happens to the person. The matter becomes complicated. Police work is very dangerous and we normally have police officers wearing bullet vests and they have guns. And to patrol with someone who is unarmed in the car is too risky.</td>
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<td>Maurice: Let’s be clear about the matter. I know that there are times that street patrollers travel in police vehicles. Sometimes we have VEC people moving in police vehicles. So there is no consistency on this matter.</td>
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<td>Colonel Mkulili: You are right; there is no consistency because some police officers are not fully aware of the matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zweli: I think we are losing the plot here. How do we work together with the police when...</td>
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Adding on to these challenges was the complaint that street patrollers did not get adequate support from SAPS members. There were allegations that SAPS members were not patrolling with the volunteer street patrollers as required by law and this exposed and predisposed the volunteer patrollers to risk and mal-practice (Box 14).

**Box 14: “In other areas, the patrollers go out with police ...”**

Zwel: In other areas, the patrollers go out with police, but here in Yeoville they go out alone. It is possible to get street patrollers being accompanied by police? This is because we will have problems with street patrollers’ lives being endangered.

Colonel Tshabalala: What we have got in terms of stuff is very limited. At one shift we can have 18 or 19. The provincial MEC, at any given time wants us to have 6 cars outside, patrolling. I don’t have enough manpower at Yeoville Police Station. I would have loved to be fully staffed, but unfortunately the situation doesn’t allow. The patrollers know the area. We need the patrollers. They give us directions on how to hit areas that are problematic. When I report success, I don’t claim the success of the street patrollers to be my success. I indicate that street patrollers have done A, B, C.

Captain Ndaba: We need to have a date where we talk to street patrollers. We should arrange a meeting with street patrollers and come up with decisions of issues affecting them and affecting the community. In each sector we have two vehicles. If the street patrollers have phone numbers of officers in the vehicles, the patrollers can meet the police officers every 10 minutes in the course of patrolling.

Zwel: The patrollers are complaining that they are using their air time and it will take time to reach police officers whilst their lives will be in danger.

Captain Ndaba: It’s not their responsibility to call. If they buzz a police officer, it’s the responsibility of the police officer to phone them.

Police-community security co-production in Yeoville was compounded by the fact that the management of street patrollers was a question in which the responsibilities of YCPF and SAPS were not clearly understood or spelt out. In one YCPF broader meeting, the need for YCPF to actively get involved in the management of street patrollers was emphasised (Box 15).

**Box 15: “... they are failing to control the patrollers”**

Maurice: The CPF receives complaints from members of the community complaining that street patrollers are operating alone without police. There are even complaints that street
patrollers are soliciting for bribes from members of the public.

Phezulu⁶⁶: Do these patrollers sign in and sign out? If they sign in then the sector vehicle can easily manage them. Isn’t it? It is important that they sign in and sign out. Remember that we pay for their injuries. If they don’t sign in and sign out then that would be difficult.

Dorcas: It seems the patrollers do not want to patrol with the police. Most of them don’t want to attend the parade. They stand outside the police station. They don’t even come back to report to the Crime Prevention Unit of the police.

That’s why we have been proposing that we suspend them all.

Maurice: Maybe what we need to do is to suspend the street patrolling system and start afresh.

Col Mkulili: Why don’t you as CPF have a meeting with them and deal with the matters instead of simply suspending them. I understand your position but don’t suspend them.

Phezulu: What the CPF is saying if I hear properly is that they are failing to control the patrollers and I don’t sit down well with that. What you need to do is to identify the problematic members and deal with them, instead of starting another problematic group of patrollers. We need to do a workshop. A workshop will take 2 and half hours or more on a weekend. I am suggesting that we meet on the 3rd of September from 9 am to 11:30 am. The workshop will focus on CPF-SAPS relations.

YCPF Broader Meeting: 17/08/2011

The workshop proposed by Phezulu took place on the 3rd of September 2011. At this workshop, Phezulu clarified that the CPF and SAPS should co-manage the street patrollers and the VEC (Box 15). Regarding the management of street patrollers, Phezulu indicated that the CPF is responsible for “mobilising street patrollers”, while SAPS were responsible for “deploying them into the streets for patrolling”.

Even before Phezulu’s clarifications, there was already sense of responsibility over the street patrollers by both the YCPF and SAPS. For instance, the disciplining of street patrollers drew the YCPF and SAPS together at some point (see Box 16).

⁶⁶ Phezulu was representing the Gauteng Department of Community Safety in this meeting. The Gauteng Department of Community Safety is the one mandated to oversee CPFs and street patrollers at a provincial level.
Box 16: “Nobody wants to dismiss anybody”

Colonel Tshabalala: Street patrollers said they don’t report to CPF, they report to the MEC, not even to the SAPS. We need to set up a commission composed of 3 police officers, 3 CPF members and 1 chief patroller, to investigate the matter of these suspended patrollers. We need evidence before making an accusation against a patroller. Perhaps we need a witness to indicate: I saw you taking money from a member of the community.”

Zweli: One of the witnesses said he cannot testify because it could be a problem because he might be targeted.

Maurice: I think an important issue here is that nobody wants to dismiss anybody. The purpose of the disciplinary committee will be to make the street patrollers understand their role. The fact of the matter is that we need to rehabilitate them. As pointed out, some of the patrollers say they don’t recognise the CPF, but only the MEC. Perhaps we need them to understand that the CPF are the mothers and fathers of the Street Patrollers. We don’t want the street patrollers to harass the community.

Colonel Mkulili: If you are suspended, you are not allowed to exercise your power. If a street patroller has been suspended, the police should stop working with them. If the police themselves are suspended, they are not allowed to execute their duties. Even if the police officers believe that these people are innocent, let them go through a hearing and let them be exonerated before they come back to be street patrollers again. The law allows everybody to do citizen arrests, whether they are street patrollers or not or CPF members or not.

YCPF Broader Meeting: 03/11/2010

Although the YCPF and SAPS worked together, there was animosity between the two entities. Some SAPS officers resisted the oversight role of YCPF. In a YCPF broader meeting, a senior police officer contended:

“The police do not have to work at the pace of someone else. We are trained people and can’t be told what to do by civilians” (YCPF Broader Meeting, Colonel Tshabalala: 03/11/2010)

To this, a YCPF executive member responded:

“The CPF is a statutorily recognised body that has a right to question how the police are working. They don’t have to work at their own pace” (YCPF Broader Meeting, Maurice: 03/11/2010).

The contentious nature between the YCPF and SAPs raises questions about the efficacy of community-police security co-production. In a YCPF public meeting, a YCPF member expressed his wishes and frustrations:

“There should be no problem between police and CPF, but the police are resentful of the CPF. The police say ‘we are trained people and you can’t tell us how to do our job’. So the relationship between CPF and police is not that harmonious. In an ANC meeting of 2008, they agreed that they need to change the way CPF works. About YBCDT, we work on development issues. Investment will not come to South Africa when we have the problem of crime.
So we won’t get investment in Yeoville when we still have the problem of crime. That is the reason why YBCDT is working here” (YCPF Public Meeting, Maurice: 06/11/2010).

In the same meeting a street patroller questioned:

“Why is SAPS not supporting the CPF? You need to have a good relationship like a father – son – mother - daughter relationship. We have a lot of intelligent youth in Yeoville, but they are not contributing much to the community. We know that money is everything these days, but sometimes learning and community service is okay” (YCPF Public Meeting: Street Patroller, 06/11/2010).

One community activist claimed:

“The police regard the CPF as encroaching on their turfs. They are undermining them. Maybe it’s because they are young people. The police have an attitude towards the ANC Youth League and they dislike this YCPF because its leaders are members of the ANC Youth League …” (Interview, Thabang: 16/08/2010).

There was also a belief, among some police officers, that the YCPF was under SAPS management. This became a matter of debate in a YCPF broader meeting (Box 17).

**Box 17: “We are treading on dangerous ground”**

**Context:** We were sitting in a YCPF broader meeting and a participant questioned why the YCPF is not officed at the police station. In that meeting the YCPF chairperson explained:

“We all know that the police station is short of office space. That’s why we are operating outside of the police station. It’s not statutorily binding for a CPF to have an office in the police station. The office is funded by YBCDT”.

And the Station Commander of Yeoville SAPS further explains:

“The CPF cannot be accommodated just as detectives are not accommodated. The provincial commissioner has indicated that if there is no space, then the police station cannot be expected to provide an office for the CPF. I am unable to provide an office to the CPF. That’s why I can’t ask why they have an office elsewhere. But that doesn’t mean that they should do their own thing in the name of the police. We are overcrowded in the offices at Yeoville Police station”.

Maurice interjects:

“I don’t know why we should be asking this question. The Law doesn’t state that the CPF should be officed at the police station. There is nothing that says the CPF is under the police. The role of the CPF is to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of the police. The CPF should have a level of independence to be able to do this. Hopefully, when we get a new police station CPF would have an office at the police station. CPF are not part of the police. If they become a part of the police it’s a problem. In fact, when the MEC visited us he said this CPF office is the best CPF office in Gauteng region. It’s the most secure and vibrant offices present. I am not
Colonel Tshabalala also responds:

“We are treading on dangerous ground. I don’t know what Maurice means when he says the CPF is not under the police. I think this means that the Station Commander must shed me of my duties and responsibilities”.

And Maurice answers:

“I wonder if there is any document saying that the CPF is obligated to have an office in the police station. According to the Police Act and the CPF constitution, the CPF is supposed to be in partnership with the SAPS, looking after the interests of the community in relation to policing. It is important for everyone to familiarise themselves with documents and facts before raising issues”.

Ward 67 Councillor Mkokheli adds:

“The CPF does not work under the directorship of the police. They work hand in hand”.

**YCPF Broader Meeting: 13/07/2011**

While some SAPS members disregarded the YCPF, there were members of the YCPF who dismissed SAPS officers as corrupt. Some even suggested that police officers worked in cahoots with criminals. Consider the following statement:

“Sometimes you have a case of a hijacked house. You have the case reported to the police. The hijacker runs away and then the police can take over the home and collect rent. This is based on speculation. We don’t have proper evidence to this. We need to investigate this matter further” (Conversation, Lehlonolo - YCPF Chairperson: 06/11/2010).

Allegations of corruption of SAPS officers were an issue raised by some YCPF members (see Box 18).

**Box 18: “I want to know if Yeoville police station is working as a police station or as a court”**

Bongani: I arrested a guy who smashed a car in Rockey Street and stole a cell phone. He sold the cell phone to a Palestinian shop owner. I arrested them and in a few days, I found them back on the streets and they said they had paid R2500 and R500 respectively. I had handed over the criminals to Col. Mkulili. I don’t know if this money was for bail or something else.

Participant B: The point raised by Bongani is interesting to follow up what the money is for.

Bongani: When I went to the police station, there was a parade and Colonel Mkulili was not even concerned about the case. I met the Gogo whose grandson stole the phone and she said she went to the police station and the police said she can pay R500 and they would release the boy. I want to know if Yeoville Police Station is working as a Police Station or as
On the question of the positioning of the state in the community security governance field, I observe that its presence compounds the local web and dynamics of stakeholder contestation and coalition. Contestations for power and legitimacy (political and symbolic capitals) configured the relationship between the YCPF and SAPS. SAPS members claimed possession expert knowledge; cultural capital – with some openly indicating that they “don’t work at the pace of anyone”. SAPS also acted state agents, with power (political capital) as an organisation and individuals delegated to maintain peace and order in communities. Allegations of police corruption were, however, a direct question on the legitimacy and capabilities of SAPS officers. There were, therefore, processes of de-legitimisation and misrecognition of one another between CPF members and SAPS officials.

I observe that that was a tendency by the state, through its agents such as the Gauteng Department of Community Safety, including SAPS, to the field of community safety governance. One elaborate example of this is the imposition of a constitution on the CPF by the Gauteng Department of Community Safety. The same constitution governing the Gauteng Provincial Community Police Board (GPCPB 2010) is the one imposed on all CPFs in the Gauteng Province. Surprisingly, this arrangement was not questioned by the public in Yeoville, despite generalised claims to participatory democracy in South Africa. In a YCPF public meeting held on 2nd of June 2012, members of the public demanded copies of the CPF constitution from the Gauteng Department of Community Safety without really questioning content or source:
“We are confused. We received a constitution that was circulated to our emails some time ago and we thought it is the one. Now we hear that there is another constitution. Which is which? Could you please circulate to us the current constitution so that we deal with this confusion once and for all?” (YCPF public meeting, Jenny: 02/06/2012)

An official from the Gauteng Department of Community Safety, who was in attendance, pledged that he would make sure that copies of the current CPF constitution would be printed and made available to members of the public. What does this mean in a context in which the CPF is considered a participatory forum? This issue, and others, show that the state infiltrates, dominates and sometimes suffocate deliberative security governance forums directly and indirectly.

The power of the state in infiltrating and suffocating spaces of deliberative security governance stems from its concentration and command of various forms of capital that matter in the security governance field. The police as government workers and public servants are “knowledge workers” (Ericson 1994). They are knowledge workers because they possess knowledge about crime and violence and governance thereof. By virtue of their perceived possession of knowledge and as agents of the state, the police also possess “symbolic power” in the eyes of the public (Loader 2006). To further canvass knowledge, police officers also engage the community, and in the case of Yeoville, attend community policing forum meetings. Attendance at these community meetings, as much as it is a knowledge canvassing strategy, is a governance strategy by the police officers claiming to act on behalf of the state. It is a way of canvassing intelligence for the state and a strategy of entrenching the state’s symbolic domination of the populace.

How applicable, then, is Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the state as a concentration of capital in understanding community-state security co-production politics? Does the state really monopolise symbolic capital and the capital of physical violence? The answers are both yes and no. This is because there are generalised expectations of protection and guidance from the state by social groups in South Africa, yet at the same time there is dissatisfaction with the lack of adequate guarantee of community and individual safety by the state. This dissatisfaction is saliently expressed in complaints about the failure of the policing enterprise amidst increasing crime and violence and
accusations of police corruption; which have all contributed to public distrust of police (Box 18).

Regarding monopoly over the capital of physical violence, the South African state seems to be in a unique position of not monopolising this violence as South African groups and individuals tend to relentlessly dispense this violence, especially on African immigrants and suspected criminals, even against the official orders of the state, or in complicit with it (see Chapter 8). Worse still, studies have indicated that there are more firearms in the hands of civilians than in the hands of the aggregated state security machinery (that is the police and army) (Keegan 2005; Kirsten 2007). How then can the state effectively guarantee social peace or social order in a society hampered by high levels of crime and violence? What we notice is a normalisation of violence as an everyday practice within South African local and national moral orders (von Holdt 2013).

As the central bank of symbolic capital, the state influences the means of political and symbolic production (and reproduction); as in the case of generating the CPF constitution and imposing it on the CPF and members of the public who participate in the CPF in one way or another. The state, therefore, in this case is considered as a possessor of pedagogic authority. And, the members of the public and members of the CPF are complicit in their own domination - they uncritically accept a CPF constitution imposed from provincial government in a way that is typical of what Bourdieu refers to as misrecognition. It shows that members of the CPF and of the public look up to the state; think with and through the state and cannot escape the trap of the thought of the state - that is, they possess a statist and statised habitus. This confirms the weakness of the CPF in engaging the state.

The state or the thought thereof, is ever present in spaces of community security governance; and to further show this, I narrate how delegates and representatives in community security governing organisations pursue statist or state-yearning political goals.
6.2.6. “Are you going to vote for me?”

There is evidence of use of local security governance platforms by (aspiring local) politicians to advance political agendas or the hijacking of political party politics into local security governance initiatives. An example of this is the hijacking of YCPF elections by members of the ANC Youth League in September 2009. In this case, youths, who belonged to the ANC Youth League, were able to take over control of the YCPF, deposing the older members of the previous YCPF and subjecting them to shame. There are allegations that the elections were conducted without following proper procedure. The mobilisation strategies of the winning candidates depended on their ANC party networks and this opened room for the questioning of the legitimacy of the resultant YCPF executive. The YCPF treasurer said:

“People are elected into positions in CPF in a public meeting of approximately 50-100 people. Those people that are there on that particular day are the ones that vote. This electoral process is flawed and there is need to reinvent the process. It would be important to have people representing the YSF, NGOs, political parties, schools and faith based organisations in the CPF. I have been trying to find out what to do with the CPF. Last year there was gonna be an election. Before the election, the ANC Youths became too militant challenging the police and the existing CPF. Till today, the station commander does not attend public meetings. He wants an apology from the youths. The youths voted new people into the CPF on the basis of ANC strength. There was no handover between the current CPF and the older CPF [...]” (Interview, Maurice: 27/09/2010).

In one YCPF meeting, Maurice further brought to question the legitimacy of the current YCPF, claiming:

“The current CPF was appointed under the constitution of the previous CPFs (going back to the CPF of the early 2000s. The MEC’s office has issued later versions and we are in the process of ensuring that the current CPF is completely compliant. It will then be submitted to the MEC’s office for approval” (YCPF broader meeting, Maurice [YCPF Treasurer]: 13/07/2011).

And a senior police officer said:

“It is possible that the election of the current CPF was not properly done – the CPF is investigating that and will report back on it. This is not being done to say that the CPF has no right to exist. It is merely to show that we should ensure that all our documentation is in order so that the CPF and the Sector Forums can move forward properly and fulfil the mandate they have been
given in terms of the Police Act” (YCPF broader meeting, Col. Tshabalala: 13/07/2011).

However, there was another perspective regarding the September 2009 YCPF elections. According to one of the elected YCPF members, there was nothing wrong with the elections and the YCPF was not really hijacked by members of the ANC Youth League. A YCPF executive member contended:

“Let me clarify something. I am a member of the ANC [...] And I am a member of the ANCYL as well. I am not going to be biased here…The ANC youth League didn’t hijack the CPF. The ANCYL did not do such a thing…everybody said it was fair. If you are not able to mobilise people, why should you complain. People vote someone whom they know. Let’s not get there because people always want to disturb what is working properly. The previous CPF was composed of disgruntled members. They were criticised in a public meeting…How can you resign if you are criticised in a public meeting? If you resign it means that you are not a leader and it shows lack of maturity. The community comments, the community criticises. You can’t please everyone, but you can at least try to keep them happy. Because of that same meeting, the station commander Mkulili has stopped attending all public meeting. He says he wants a public apology” (Interview, Zweli: 05/10/2010).

The competitive politics within the community security governance field mutates into a vicious politics of power. Spaces of local security governance are convertible into spaces for electioneering for political office in government. For instance, some office bearers of YCF attempted to campaign for councillorship in Yeoville and the surround areas during the May 2011 local government elections in South Africa (Box 19).

Box 19: “... Are you going to vote for me?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomfundo: Are you going to vote for me?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Me: I am not eligible to vote. If I was eligible I was going to vote for you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomfundo: Which papers are you using?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me: I am using my passport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment: She had forgotten that I am Zimbabwean, or perhaps she thought that I was a Zimbabwean with South African papers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversation with Nomfundo after YCF Meeting: 29/01/2011

Explaining their political ambitions, the chairperson of YCF indicated:
“We are trying to ensure that we are given control of councillorship in Yeoville, so that we would be able to solve its problems. We can only be able to solve the problems of Yeoville if we can take over the office of the councillor. As things stand, it’s difficult for us as a forum to influence decisions about Yeoville. People need houses, and we can only solve that problem if we get access to power in council. Here we have councillors who don’t stay in Yeoville; councillors who don’t stay with the people. How will they be able to solve the problems of the community? How can they understand the people? Councillors should stay with us. These are the kind of councillors we want to encourage” (Conversation, Zondi: 06/02/2011).

For YCF actors, the issue of hijacked houses and the housing question in general provided a platform for the gaining of political capital by community activists including local (aspiring) politicians. The campaign manifesto of YCF politicians was centred on housing issues and poverty. It read:

“As an independent candidate, I will focus on stopping evictions from residential properties, a housing and building audit, full home ownership with title deeds, and end to overcrowding, write-off of electricity and water arrears, relocation of street traders, a youth and community centre, skills development, community and school safety, illegal liquor outlets, a designated taxi rank, making provisions for the poor and vulnerable and promoting integrated community building. Local government is not a politician’s ‘battlefield’, but for service delivery” (Yeouv News 2011), Vol. 4, Number 14, page 2-4)

The glaring fact of lack of housing delivery in Yeoville became a point of reference and of departure for those seeking to gain access to political office. It became the political rallying point of YCF’s independent candidates. The housing audit mentioned in this manifesto is a direct response to the allegations that there are hijacked buildings in Yeoville and other areas in Johannesburg.

Some members of the community complained about the power hungriness of local leaders, neglect of the needs of the community and lack of attendance of community meetings (Box 20).

**Box 20: “They are sucking the same lollypop that was sucked by those before them”**

| Jola: We had a CPF meeting on Wednesday. The councillors were there at the meeting and I asked them to come over to this meeting to help us. They are not here. Apologies do not build a community. |
| Jenny: If we ask a question about this political leadership. Is it staying in Yeoville? They are living in Sandton where there is 24 hour security. We are living here with our children. We need to make this a healthy community [...]. This is not the first incident from our councillor. They are sucking the same lollypop that was sucked by those before them. |
Man: I think there is a problem. If people are put into power they tend to take people for granted. Nevertheless we shouldn’t stop. If he doesn’t cooperate he has to be pushed out. If someone is put for a shorter period he performs, but if he is put for a longer time he doesn’t perform, he sleeps.

Mduduzi: I am glad that men and women are saying the train must move forward. Despite his apology we must move forward and he gets us wherever we will be.

What is the positioning of individuals within the matrix of power in the community security governance field? As evidence suggests, there is a possibility of individual or collective pocketing of local social power and social influence for purposes of getting-crashing into the state by local (aspiring) politicians doubling and genuine social or community activists. The political capital of a local security governing organisation or conferred by it can be individualised and fuel individual political ambitions. The YCF leaders, for example, tried to get into local government structures using the YCF ticket and on the back of clamours for resolution of the challenge of hijacked houses. One of them even went to the extent of asking me: “are you going to vote for me” (Box 19).

This shows that the field of community security governance is one that is composed of bodies influenced by the habitus of profit; in this context political profit. Shaping the dynamics of these attempts to pocket social power are struggles to access, influence or be part of the state by the capital seeking individuals or stakeholders (cf. Bourdieu 1998a). In this case, (potential) local elites try to tap on or access statist capital and pocket it to enhance their local socio-political influence in the context of the neighbourhood. They are therefore engaged in political double-dealings (Bourdieu 1991a) or multiple-dealings (Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012) in the community safety governance field.
I conclude, below, by offering a verdict on whether or not community safety governance should be considered as competitive socio-moral and politico-economic business.

6.3. Community safety: socio-moral and politico-economic business?

Community safety initiatives take place within a context in which organisational, institutional, social group and individual interests can be interpreted as based on the struggles, competition and coalition for accumulation of or access to political, symbolic, moral, economic and social profit or capital, amongst other logics. Community security governance is therefore a field of micro-politics; articulated to political and economic among other fields (Bourdieu 1991a). While players in the community safety governance field (compete to) accrue various forms of capitals, I wish to avoid unrelentingly representing them as always consciously calculating entities or beings. Competition for capital in the community safety governance field does not necessarily result in the conversion of these capitals into the capital of security or security capital, which is a public good whose generation is the main official agenda of some community organisations (for example YCPF and ADF).

Community organisations or individuals coming into the safety sector do not always have safety improvement at the core or their mandates or interests, but nevertheless come into the sector because it is politically and economically profitable. The community safety sector is politically profitable for aspiring politicians because safety or crime reduction is one of the key concerns of ordinary South Africans; who are also voters. It is economically profitable because if it considered as fundable; with potentials for grants from government and donor agencies to community based organisations or local non-governmental organisations.

The multiplication of organisations or interest groups in the community security sector may increase competition and sometimes lead to duplication of initiatives and efforts; all of which can lessen the effectiveness of safety initiatives, sometimes resulting in a waste of human or economic resources. This duplication, however, may bring checks and balances as organisations can police one another; as in the case of the collective organisational (YSF-YBCDT-Ward Committee driven) rebuke of the
YCF which was deemed as having potential to fan xenophobic violence and other forms of violent insurgency.

Through a procedural analysis of the empirical realities of community participation in security governance, I conclude that public meeting attendance in dialogical spaces of security governance is a matter more of ritual than of concretised security promoting outputs. I maintain that while public participation is a potentially useful tool for security governance, it is liable to being hijacked by state interests that tend to annihilate the local safety governance matrix. Security governing deliberative spaces are in essence here conceptualised as spaces in which the state canvasses local knowledge about community dynamics, whilst enabling the management of social anger and social frustration without necessarily addressing or resolving the real challenges faced by the citizenry.

Urban security governance theory and practice therefore necessarily needs to treat local security governance as inherently political and characterised by agents with multiple, clashing and polycentric agendas. Community safety governance should be considered as an arena in which socio-moral and politico-economic business is cooperatively and contentiously conducted by stakeholders - organisational, institutional, individual and social group. I expand this analysis in the next chapter, where I analyse the role of ethno-national groups and associated discourses and practices in the making of the community safety governance field (Chapter 7).
7. Chapter Seven
Ethno-nationalist politics in community safety governance: Lessons from Yeoville

“The CPF Executive and the SAPS in Yeoville and the Department of Community Safety must work together to find constructive ways of getting the involvement of the migrant community as full participants contributing to the fight against crime. Migrants are a large part of our community and we will not win the war against crime without the cooperation, assistance and involvement of the migrant community” (Smithers et al. 2012).

7.1. Introduction

This chapter examines ethno-national regionalist politics in community safety governance. This is against a backdrop in which urban safety studies in South Africa overlook the importance of ethno-nationality in the configuration of local discourses, practices and strategies of community safety production (see Chapters 2, 3). The South African body of literature demonstrates connections between ethnicity and xenophobic discourses and practices in the public domain (Harris 2002; Kupe, Verryn and Worby 2008; Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Gavatri 2005; Neocosmos 2010; Nyamnjoh 2010a; Nyamnjoh 2010b); yet there is a dearth of literature on how these discourses and practices percolate community-based safety initiatives. I respond to this scholarly gap.

I explore dynamics of ethno-nationalist posturing, exclusion and isolation in the socio-political space of urban community safety governance – taking the form of “ethno-talks”, “ethno-practices” and “ethno-discourses” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). I briefly relate ethno-nationality to other identities such as race, age and gender in my analysis. Although peripheral in this study, race, gender and age are categories that require a more nuanced analysis in the future; given another space and time.

This chapter argues that the field of community security governance generates a socio-political space in which various ethno-national groups mobilise, take positions and jostle for recognition or protection. I examine three elements: i) the representations and manifestations of the politics of ethno-national otherness and othering in the community security field; ii) ethno-national regionalist discourses, practices and strategies in arenas of participatory community safety governance; and iii) the concoctive entwinement of ethno-nationality with other cartographies of identity such as age and gender in the making of community safety politics. Below, I
describe and interpret dynamics and discourses of *ethno-national regionalist* scapegoating in the community safety field.

### 7.2. “The easiest people to blame …”

Perceptions of and about African immigrants in Yeoville, like in the broader South African context, are loaded with stereotypical problematisation and criminalisation of their very identities and beings (Landau 2010; Nyamnjoh 2006). A community activist in Yeoville underscored:

“The easiest people to blame are foreigners. People who are illegal migrants get into criminal activities because they can’t work. The responsibility of the state is to protect people from each other” (Interview, Maurice: 22/09/2010).

Commenting on relations between South Africans and African immigrants in Yeoville, an African immigrant stated:

“The relationships between foreigners and South Africans are not good. However, foreigners are still tolerant towards the behaviours of South Africans. They have never changed. The problem is with South Africans seeing us as invaders. We as foreigners accept them, but for them to accept you it’s a problem. They accuse us of taking their jobs. This behaviour is probably like that because most South Africans have never travelled. Those who have travelled have a different approach. The ones who went outside are friendlier to foreigners” (Participant, group interview with migrants: 2011).

In many cases African immigrants are scapegoated as the causers of rising socio-economic problems in South Africa, including crime and violence (Landau 2006a). They are viewed as a category deserving containment if further decay in South Africa’s urban spaces, societies and economies is to be curbed (Hornberger 2011) [see Figure 12].

![Figure 12: Connections of ethno-national regionalism and community safety governance](image-url)
African immigrants are, from my observation, viewed from three perspectives as i) posing threats in and to public places, ii) distorting and criminalising the housing market, iii) and as unwarranted socio-economic competitors or economic criminals.

7.2.1. Ethno-nationalist imageries of crime, disorder and place

At the level of perception, the genesis of crime, violence and other urban disorders in innercity Johannesburg is, in many instances, associated with some regimes of city space occupancy by African immigrants (Legget 2002; Vetten and Sadiyya 2005). Their trajectories in city spaces are abound with scapegoating and criminalising legends (Simone 2004a). In Yeoville, some South African public discourses, classify criminal activities or potentials on the basis of stereotypes about ethno-national groups. A ward councillor in Yeoville expressed:

“Nigerians are known for drug dealing. Zimbabweans are known for committing robberies. I was once mugged whilst coming from a meeting with other women. We were robbed of our purses. There I lost my ring of 31 years of marriage. Perhaps they sold the ring for 5 Rand. It was in Dunbar Street. The guys who robbed us were Zimbabweans” (Interview: Ward Councillor Noma, 16/08/2010).

A YCPF leader maintained:

“The people who commit violent crimes are mostly Zimbabweans and Zulus. These ones use guns and knives. The Nigerians normally commit technical crime: electronic money transfers. Zimbabweans for crime are number one and Zulus as well. Mozambicans are good in muti67. They make you sleep and come to collect everything in your house. Hey! Hey! We are in a shit… Everybody is coming here …” (Interview, Mduduzi [YCPF member]: 08/08/2010).

He further narrated:

“I had some tension with one Congolese national who was my neighbour and making a lot of noise […]. I ask him where you coming from. He says this is my house. I tell him I am not asking whether this is your house, but where you come from, how you came to South Africa. He said Congo. I tell him, when you are in South Africa you must follow the South African law. After 12 midnight, everybody must be sleeping, people working, children studying […] and people should not make noise. We are not saying South Africans are 100%. They also have their own problems. It’s not like foreigners are the only

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67 Muti is an African name for charms or traditional medicines.
ones who have a problem” (Interview, Mduduzi [YCPF member]: 08/08/2010) [sic].

The association of criminality with particular ethno-nationalities was confirmed, with some reservations, in an opinion and attitude survey (Box 21).

**Box 21: Nationality and crime**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40% of participants indicated that there is a relationship between nationality and crime perpetration or types of crime committed. 52.5% stated that they do not believe that there is a link between perpetration of crime and national identity. 5% could not make introspection into the relationship between nationality and criminal activity. 2.5% did not respond.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of those who saw a connection between nationality and crime were South Africans (85% of South African participants). However, 95% of non-South African respondents mainly did not see the link between criminality and nationality.

**Summary of responses**

In terms of the nationalities who were considered as involved in criminal activities in South Africa in general and in Yeoville in particular, Zimbabweans top the list, followed by Nigerians and South Africans. Zimbabweans were generally associated with crimes such as muggings, robberies, petty theft, fraud and domestic violence. Nigerians were associated with drug dealing and fraud, while South Africans were associated with use of fire arms and robbery. Other nationalities mentioned include Mozambicans who were associated with carjacking and use of firearms. Congolese were associated with domestic violence. Generally, nationalities from West Africa were associated with fraud. Those who did not see any correlation between nationality and criminality indicate that they would not want to pinpoint any nationality, that crime is sometimes committed by syndicates composed of various nationalities including South Africans and that they were no experts in that and the police would know better. Those that did not respond could have found the question highly political and therefore simply evaded it.

**Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011**

While the association of criminality with African immigrants was common in public discourses, there was also public scepticism about it. Asked if there was a connection between nationality and crime or violence types, a senior police officer responded:

“Our nationality? I cannot just say a particular nationality, because Yeoville is a multi-national community. So we can not single out a particular nationality. Even South Africans are being arrested. For example, in January our team arrested 13 youths for carjacking and robbery. All of them were South African
nationals. A week after that, we arrested another four, who were part of the syndicate of the arrested 13. I cannot just make a correlation between crime and people’s nationality. If we speak about fraud, people say Nigerians are the ones who do fraud. But I do not agree with them, because we arrest South Africans and charge them for fraud, Cameroonian, Congolese, Zimbabweans and Nigerians. So we cannot just single out a particular nationality. All nationals are committing fraud. There is a general perception that Nigerians are the ones dealing in drugs, but I do not believe that, because they infiltrate the locals. South Africans are also involved. There of course are Nigerians involved in drugs, but there are others engaging in honest business” (Interview, Constable Mbuli: 18/08/2010).

In the same vein, a local politician emphasised:

“Crime was always there in Yeoville, but then the crimes that are now being committed here; foreign nationals are also committing them. The crimes that are committed here are muggings, committed by foreign nationals. I don’t know how to put this, but also my car was broken into and my radio was stolen. Someone just opened my door and stole my radio. My radio was not stolen by a foreign national. It was stolen by a South African. We have a high proportion of foreign nationals in Yeoville, but South Africans, even though they are a small number, are visibly committing crime...Buildings are hijacked by foreign nationals, but also mostly by South Africans. Mostly I am afraid of young boys of foreign nationality who grow up here and get used to the situation of engaging in crime” (Interview, Mpho: 08/02/2011)

In public and academic perceptions, innercity decay in Johannesburg is correlated to the immigration of a pan-African cohort from inside and outside South Africa (Simone 2004a). Innercity decay, in Yeoville, was considered as concomitant with “white flight” in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Chapter 3, YBCDT undated). Long time Yeoville resident and community activist narrated:

“I have always lived more or less around this area through the seventies and eighties when I was a political activist. Since about 1998 I began to look at development issues in Yeoville. There was a major transition happening. Yeoville was a traditionally white area. By 1990 Yeoville was 85% White and most of the Blacks who were here were domestic workers. By 1998, Yeoville was 99% Black. This transition was a very unmanaged one. This is an area of migrants. Suddenly within a space of 8 years, we have a whole bunch of people from all over South Africa and eventually all over Africa. Nobody is telling them the rules; nobody is telling them how to do things. They don’t know. There is no communication. The city doesn’t know how to do it. So there has been a steady erosion of management in this area. This has resulted in people engaging in anti-social activity, anti-social behaviour including violence” (Speech, Maurice: 19/08/2010).
Ethno-national stereotypes about crime and violence in Yeoville also had some territorial or spatial overtones. African immigrants were considered as occupying specific physical spaces, turning them into spaces of criminal commercial and social activities. In Box 22 I summarise a community activist’s characterisation of various places in Yeoville according to occupancy by various ethno-national groups, whose activities he suspected to be illegal or criminal.

Box 22: Narrative of conversation with a key informant during a tour of Yeoville

In Yeoville, specific streets or street corners are viewed as criminogenic spaces inhabited and utilised by foreign nationals of African origin. During a key informant interview, Mr Thabang described how the various spaces in Yeoville’s main business street have been appropriated by various groups of migrants for various purposes. He indicated that corner Raymond and Rockey Street was a hub for Zimbabwean. At that corner, he indicated that there was a building called the green house where a crowd of Zimbabweans was found. Most of these Zimbabweans, according to him used cell phones to rob people and defraud banks and they also robbed shops and sold stolen goods.

Mr. Thabang characterised Corner Hunter Street and Fortesque as a little Kinshasa. He stated that there were people who illegally produced passports, South African ID books and death certificates. At corner Grafton and Raleigh Street, according to him, there were Nigerian drug dealers who were always dressed in expensive clothes and drove expensive cars. According to him, Times Square, at corner Raleigh Street and Fortesque, there were many Zimbabweans. Behind Times Square, as he stated, there were lots of Ethiopians and Somalians. This place, according to him was a port of call for trafficked humans. He indicated that there was a big truck that came there at night to drop off trafficked Ethiopians and Somalians.

He stated that Corner Hunter Street and Kenmerre Street was a place for Ghanaians. He alleged that these Ghanaians committed internet crimes together with Nigerians. He expressed that Nigerians were the masters of internet crime. In Raleigh Street, between Kenmerre Street and Bedford Street in front of Shoprite, according to Mr. Thabang, there were lots of young men hanging closer to ATMs. At that spot pin numbers were memorised and money was being withdrawn fraudulently. At corner Raleigh Street and Bedford Street, as Mr. Thabang narrated, there was a cohort of Tanzanian dagga dealers doing business there. Corner Cavendish and Raleigh Streets, according to him, was highly populated. There were Nigerian heavy drug runners. This place was also an adult entertainment area. Also, the area in Raleigh Street, anchored by Kenmerre and Cavendish Streets was considered at the business node of Raleigh – Rockey Street.

The area at corner Raymond and Rockey Street was characterised by Mr. Thabang as the
criminal corner of Yeoville. This is because, as he alleged, there was a big drug syndicate there. According to him, people sat there day and night selling dagga and heavy drugs such as Cocaine and Heroin.

At the same corner (Rockey and Raymond Streets), Zimbabweans were alleged to be selling stolen goods and cell phones. It was also characterised as the corner having a high density of Nigerians. That corner, as Mr. Thabang puts it, was a zone where people drink 24 hours.

The place in Rockey Street, between Raymond and Bezuidenhoudt Streets was described as an area with a very high concentration of internet cafes. At that spot, as described Mr. Thabang, marriage certificates, passports and tertiary institution diplomas were printed and sold.

The area on Rockey Street between Bezuidenhoudt and De La Rey streets was characterised as derelict. This was the place, according to Mr. Thabang, where some criminals hide.

Tour of Yeoville with Thabang: 25/08/2010

In a bid to verify Mr. Thabang’s description of ethno-national geo-strategies and spatial occupancy of street corners in Yeoville, I note that his characterisation was grounded in his “common-sensical” observations of everyday socio-economic spatial trajectories of ethno-national groups. His characterisation was by and large simplistic given the maze of population mixing and criss-crossing characterising Yeoville. This maze makes it difficult, if not impossible, to confidently pinpoint the occupancy of a particular street corner by a specific ethno-national group.

What was a bit obvious, however, was a conglomerated network of business groupings based on ethno-national similarity or proximity; operating as cultural-economic enclaves (Caldeira 1996b; Kahera 2002; Marcuse 2005a; Marcuse 2005b). These cultural-economic enclaves were, however, not always readily clear-cut as they tended be a hotchpotch people that was not easily readable.

Such cultural-economic enclaves, apart from being enclaves of commerce, were also represented or labelled as criminal enclaves. A local activist stated:

“There are certainly more serious crimes being committed in Yeoville such as bank fraud. I can talk about the various spaces and clusters of criminal activities associated with particular nationalities in Rockey-Raleigh Street” (Interview, Thabang: 25/08/2010).

These ethno-national enclaves were perceived as criminogenic and the occupying African immigrants as potential or real criminals – referred to as crimmigrant bodies.
(Aas 2011). Ironically, these enclaves can also be considered as spaces of collective safety for African immigrants (Harris 2003a).

Territorialised *ethno-nationalist* groupings are a part of individuals’ and social groups’ safety provisioning *spatial strategies* (de Certeau 1984). African immigrants’ grouping into physical spaces of Yeoville can be described as generating or reflecting on territorialis ed *ethno-national regionalist* politics (see Figure 9). This becomes very sensitive and acute in South African cities if it shifts into a “public politics of the house”.

### 7.2.2. Ethno-nationalised housing politics, fear, crime and violence

Ethno-national scapegoating or criminalisation of African immigrants in everyday discourses and practices were associated with struggles for housing in Yeoville (see Chapter 8, subtitle 8.4.1). The presence of the Black African immigrant was considered, by some disenfranchised and disgruntled South Africans, as one of the causes of housing shortage. It was alleged that the presence of Black non-South Africans contributed to increases in housing rentals, overcrowding and attendant social problems. Another accusation was that non-South Africans were culprits in the hijacking of residential buildings. An executive member of YCF stated:

> “I will be open with you. Zimbabweans and Nigerians are the ones that are hijacking houses here. I won’t be shy about that” (Conversation, Nomfundo: 08/08/2010).

This statement reflected the common view of many Black South Africans disgruntled by lack of (affordable) housing in Yeoville. Consider the following statement by a South African participant in a ward public meeting:

> “*Viva Bablali Viva!* Thank you for the opportunity to come to this meeting. The need of South Africans is the pride of the roof. You have to pay a big amount of money as rent. People are paying between 1 500 rand to 2 000 rand for a room in a house owned by a foreigner. Can you go to Nigeria and own a house and make them pay rent to you? South Africans are suffering” (Ward Public Meeting participant: 13/11/2011).

The field of housing in Yeoville and more generally in South Africa, is characterised by contestation and competition; often taking an ethno-nationalist slant and even an outrightly (violent) xenophobic one (see Chapter 8). Struggles within the housing field...
are struggles for spatial capital and the associated symbolic capital, that is the “pride of the roof”. The housing field, is therefore intricately connected to the field of security and more generally, to political and economic fields. Below, I examine how the criminalisation of African immigrants mirrors contestations within the broader economic field.

7.2.3. Safety and socio-economic dimensions of ethno-national politics

Writing in Yeovue News, a South African contributor describes the economic and spatial implications of the presence of African immigrants as problematic:

“Every self respecting migrant should abide by the laws, by-laws, rules and regulations in their host country, in this case, South Africa. Migrants must not expect to do in a host country what they were doing in their original countries or, indeed, things they were not allowed to do in their countries because of stricter law enforcement…The reality we must boldly face is that most migrants in Yeoville Bellevue come from unplanned, underdeveloped cities with little infrastructural development and no effective by-laws or enforcement. Migrants need to orient themselves to life in South Africa. They need to understand by-laws, environmental health standards and other basic requirements for safe and healthy living. Yes, having so many migrants causes overcrowding. Yes, many people do not have basic property maintenance skills. I cannot try to be politically correct here when reality dictates otherwise […] Education around such things needs to take place without ill feelings. Do not use South Africans as scapegoats for your shortcomings” (Majombozi 2010).

The typical “African immigrant” is publicly represented as one who hails from an anarchic African country and as ignorant and disrespectful of South African laws. Many African immigrants, by virtue of fleeing economic or political crises from their countries of origin and seeking better economic opportunities in South Africa, are viewed with contempt and as endangering others (Landau 2010). See excerpt below (Box 23).

Box 23: “I really get annoyed …”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Councillor (Noma): There is a Nigerian hair salon that employs Nigerians only. How do we fight xenophobia if things are like that? People are not working together. Foreigners do not want to work together with us.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman A: They don’t want to employ us. They say we South African are poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman B: Cultures are different. I really get annoyed to see someone standing on the streets, blocking people’s free movement (one respondent on the bench)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman C (ANC member): Perhaps we need to change the word xenophobia for another</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Box 23 shows the *us and them* schema (Nyamnjoh 2006) in relationships between South Africans and African immigrants in Yeoville. Some public economic discourses in Yeoville projected African immigrants as problematic economic beings. There were, for example, complaints such as “they do not want to employ us”, “foreigners don’t want to work together with us”, or “our brothers need to share resources” (Box 23). Competition over the use of public space is another factor contribution to the negative perception of African immigrants in Yeoville by some members of the South African public. One South African here bitterly complained “I really get annoyed to see someone standing on the streets, blocking people’s free movement” (Box 23).

Reflecting the economic dimension of the criminalisation of African immigrants, a Yeoville ward councillor underscored:

“If you are a refugee, we find you getting a car. Where do you get money to get a car when you are a refugee?” (Ward Public Meeting, Noma: 09/10/2010).

Yet some African immigrants complained about their economic marginalisation, which they claimed, lent them gullible to criminality of make them easy scapegoats for the crime and violence situation in South Africa:

“There is more chance to rejection than integration for migrants in South Africa. An African migrant is seen as an extra person in the society and as a threat. The presence of a migrant is minus one job, it is minus one accommodation and it is a threat to medical service. Don’t blame the effects, blame the cause. The people who are coming to South Africa do not come to be criminals, but because they were rejected, they end up committing crimes. The fact that migrants are responsible for committing crimes in South Africa is not true, that is just a perception. Many foreigners are into illegal business and petty crime. Most organised crime is done by South Africans, for example ATM bombings”. (Interview, Yonga-Yonga: 08/04/2011).

It follows then that African immigrants were liable publicly perceived as a governmental category - one to be controlled or contained. One South African emphasised:
“[…] I am still stressing on the control of immigration in this country. If the government can be able to identify all the people that live in the country (South Africans and non-South Africans) they can pretend to fight or stop crime. Instead of having too many public holidays, the government can effectively use these days to deal with this issue of identification of people or documenting people. They must work hard and they need a proper planning. We don’t need useless holidays. This is nonsense” (Opinion and attitude survey participant T9A, 2011).

It is not surprising that “African immigrant” is already a targeted “object” of everyday policing in innercity neighbourhoods of Johannesburg (Hornberger 2004; Hornberger 2011). This ethno-nationalised policing is potentially abusive of African immigrants as evidenced by the fact that police officers, who are supposed to protect the public, are even alleged to be harassing African immigrants and extorting bribes from them (Hornberger 2011). A migrant human rights activist complained:

“The law enforcement agencies are promoting crime. They are taking bribes. If you see someone getting arrested, they won’t be having a bribe to give to the police” (Interview, Yonga-Yonga: 08/04/2011).

A South African local politician confirmed:

“The police go to foreign nationals when they want money, demanding documents and asking money from them if they do not produce those documents. The JMPD are also not addressing the traffic situation in Yeoville. I have reported this to the MMC for safety and Security, but nothing was done. I also feel that the Yeoville Police Station is very small. If only we have a bigger police station, I think it will go a long way to solve the problems” (Interview, Mpho: 08/02/2011).

Consider the story of a Rwandese migrant:

“The problem is that sometimes you don’t know who is who. Yesterday I met someone in Rockey Street at 1 am. He said he wanted to search me and I asked him who he was. Then I saw volunteers come and they said let him search you. He searched me and took my bank cards and credit cards. He took me to the police station to verify my cards, but later he just gave me back my cards and didn’t explain anything to me if there is anything I had done wrong so that I won’t do it again” (YCPF Public Meeting, Rwandese migrant: 06/11/2010).

The generalised dislike and criminalisation of African immigrants by some South Africans in Yeoville was therefore linked to the perception that they bring economic competition and are involved in “criminal economies” (Friman 2004).
Some South African public discourses therefore ethno-nationalise criminality and violence; representing some Black African immigrants as posing unnecessary economic competition against Black South Africans. These discourses also stereotype the African immigrant as an “economic criminal”, “trespasser” and “socio-economic saboteur” - a category that needs to be controlled and contained for the production of safety.

7.2.4. “Let’s unite and go and remove these people …”

Sometimes, in public forums, there were expressions of anger over the presence of African immigrants in Yeoville and, more generally, in South Africa. See excerpt in Box 24.

**Box 24: “Let’s unite and go and remove these people”**

| Context: | There is a man who demonstrates anger over the blocking of pavements by street traders. He stresses that these traders are mostly foreigners and he indicates the need to physically remove these people from the street. His complaints is that the pavements in Yeoville are unwalkable and he cannot freely do shopping. He stated: |
|———|———|
| | “Let’s unite and go and remove these people and make Yeoville clean”. |
| This sparked a debate on the matter of street trade, environmental cleanliness and crime in Yeoville. Below are extracts of some of the statements uttered in this meeting: |
| Bambanani: | The only thing is that crime is covered by Xenophobia. Once you start this, you are on the wrong side of the law; it will be xenophobia. |
| Sibanda: | I think we need to be sober minded in whatever we do. You could do the right thing but in the wrong way. I am from Zimbabwe, but I am attending this meeting because I am interested. Let’s not do things in anger, but we need to go forward and solve the problems with a sober mind. |
| Mr X: | People must understand that selling on the street is illegal. I know they need to survive, but it’s not allowed. |
| Thabang: | Colleagues, friends and brothers, I think we are going the wrong way. You are going the xenophobic way and that is totally wrong. All of us when hawkers do their meeting we should attend those meetings and raise our issues with them. We need to have street committees. When we come to the next meeting we need to know how many of us have established street committees; how many of us belong to street committees. |

**Sector Crime Forum 2 meeting: 17/02/2011**

From meeting conversation in Box 24, I detect three elements characterising relationships between South Africans and African immigrants in Yeoville. There are ethno-national regionalist politics, ethno-nationalist insurgency and the contradictions
between the law and \textit{local moral orders} (Holston 2008; von Holdt 2010). \textit{Ethno-national regionalist} discourses and practices created imageries of the legend of the immigrant African street trader as littering the environment, contributing to \textit{spacio-cide}^{68} (Hanafi 2009) and undermining “street conviviality” and “walkability” (Karner and Parker 2011), by “blocking” pedestrian flow on pavement. These spatial mal-functions or illegal land-uses were publicly considered as contributing to crime and violence in Yeoville (Box 24).

In light of the imageries of the non-South African street trader as a \textit{spatial assailant} contributing to \textit{spatial disorder} - street chaos, crime and violence - there was an urge towards violent and forceful insurgency to address or contain these perceived challenges. The clamour that “let’s go and remove them and make Yeoville clean” attests to the potential for this kind of forceful or violent insurgency against street traders and the enterprise of street trade (Box 24).

Also, there was awareness of the potential limits of such violent insurgency among participants in the meeting excerpted in Box 24. The participants recognised that (threats of) violence against street traders, who were mainly African immigrants, could clash with the law or be interpreted as xenophobia or indeed could turn out to be xenophobic. Hence the statement: “once you start that you are on the wrong side of the law” (Box 24). Responding to the call for forceful removal of street traders from the streets, a South African activist warned: “that is not the way to go” (Box 24). A Zimbabwean participant in this meeting also counselled the meeting participants “to be sober minded” and “not do things in anger” (Box 24).

There were frustrations among some South Africans who wanted to use violence against the “problematic immigrant criminals”. One South African complained that “crime is covered by xenophobia” (Box 24). In another context the same South African stressed:

“Sometimes you see someone breaking the law and if you try to stop them, then it becomes xenophobia. Anyone who breaks the law in a country should be punished irrespective of their nationality (Sector Crime Forum 2 meeting participant)” (Ntate, 02/06/2011).

\footnote{The killing of space or the built environment.}
This shows that there is sometimes a potential clash between the law and local moral orders (von Holdt 2010). Such local moral orders are characterised by doxic\textsuperscript{69} invocation of “anti-foreigner” violence by some South Africans in attempting to deal local challenges perceived to be emanating from the presence of African immigrants.

In understanding the criminalisation of African immigrants, one should note African immigrants are not just victims, but are proactive social agents. The section below narrates the counter-otherisation and counter-criminalisation practices, strategies and tactics (Bourdieu 1977; de Certeau 1984) collectively and individually employed by African immigrants.

7.3. Counter-criminalisation and counter-otherisation practices

The association of criminality with African immigrants was dismissed by some Yeoville residents (African immigrants and South Africans included) as not fact, but a matter of just scapegoating. A migrant activist questioned:

“These people behave as if there was no crime before 1994 in South Africa. When someone breaks the law they write foreigner and the magistrate will know that you are a foreigner. It’s not easy for migrants to get bail. That’s why we have a significant number of Zimbabweans, followed by Mozambicans, Nigerians and Congolese in prison. The types of cases are different. Having the majority of people in prison as migrants doesn’t mean that migrants are committing too much crime. The fact is that South Africans can easily get bail” (Interview, Omokoko: 08/04/2011).

One migrant activist proposed:

“How do we get migrants to be accepted in South African communities and their contribution to the country and the communities they live in to be appreciated? I think it is important for us to publish profiles of migrants contributing towards the well-being of South Africa and we can do this through the proposed Diaspora News. We might also need to have ADF business cards with logos of the organisation in order to have a professional appeal. We might also need to prepare and distribute to the public, leaflets showing the mandate and activities of ADF in various languages so that we appeal to the wider community of migrants, highly educated and less educated” (ADF Meeting, Yonga-Yonga: 26/02/2011).

\textsuperscript{69} I refer to these invocations as doxic tendencies because they are habitualised as everyday practices. See chapter 4 for a discussion of the Bourdieusian concept of doxa.
This was a proposal for use of the media to reconfigure the public representation and image of immigrants; profiling their progressive contributions to the economy and society. The ADF used to have a newspaper insert called *African Diaspora Forum News* in The Star newspaper in 2009. In this newspaper they profiled the socio-economic contributions of immigrants in South Africa and communicated migrant issues in general [see: (Benit-Gbaffou and Kisakye 2010)]. Also, in 2012, ADF created a Media Task Team. The terms of reference for the ADF Media Task Team read:

“The media task team should be involved in publication of material for purposes of improving the public perceptions of foreign nationals in South Africa. In this regard, they will need to work with prominent South African media (newspapers, radio, TV) so as to reach a large South African audience, which is the primary target. They should initiate sustainable educative media projects aimed at reducing or fighting xenophobia, first and foremost challenging the dominant idea that: Foreign nationals are a burden to South Africa (showing concrete examples of migrants’ contribution to economy and society); Foreign nationals are only “victims” (showing concrete examples of their agency, initiatives, rich and diverse cultural lives)[…].”

Lobbying activities played a role in attempts to improve the perception of African immigrants by the South African public. On 3 March 2012, ADF created a task team to deal with policing issues affecting migrants. The task team was expected:

“To work in cahoots with the SAPS and CPF structures to encourage inclusive policing in relation for foreign nationals living in South Africa… This involves in particular regular participation in CPFs (meetings, activities, executives) in areas where migrants are numerous, and/or where there are specific issues of xenophobic policing… This task team should formulate, jointly with policing bodies or on its own, projects that address the challenges of xenophobic policing…”

Such lobbying was meant to encourage and promote migrant inclusive and friendly policing by SAPS.

Activism against police harassment of immigrants involved other civic organisations. Box 25 narrates an incident where a Yeoville resident and migrant activist was unfairly arrested by SAPS officers; resulting in joint migrant rights activism by a variety of community and civic organisations condemning the arrest.
Box 25: “My family will ask me what happened to me in South Africa”

**Context:** As detailed in the statement of complaint by the arrested activist, Omokoko, he was arrested on the 17th of August 2011 after skirmishes with a taxi driver and rank marshals. The incident took place in the CBD of Johannesburg. In this case, Omokoko had a problem with a taxi driver after he was accused of paying taxi fare using a fake 100 rand note. According to Omokoko, the accusation by the taxi driver was trumped up. Fearing for his safety, Omokoko called the police to come and help him. Upon arrival, the police failed to clearly get a statement from Omokoko who had called them. Instead of getting a statement from Omokoko, the police ended up having a conversation with the taxi driver in Zulu language, which Omokoko did not understand. After that conversation, Omokoko was surprised as the police officer arrested him. Omokoko indicated that the way he was handled by police and the searching by police was abusive. They referred to him as a criminal despite the fact that he had not been convicted. He was then detained at John Vorster Police Station for two nights until the 19th of August when he was due to appear before a magistrate’s court. According to Omokoko the prosecutor declined to proceed with the case citing lack of incriminating evidence against him. Omokoko was then released on the 19th of August 2011. He describes his experiences and his thoughts as follows:

“I know that some South Africans don't like us. They are not helping us also to bring peace, democracy and justice in our country like we helped them during the apartheid era. One day without their help we will go back to our country with many injuries. My family will ask what happened to me in South Africa. I will for sure tell them that I was injured by my fellow Africans who are South African simply because I'm another African. My family, my children and future generations will remember this may be forever. I am very surprised to see that how some South African till today have not learnt that Afriphobia is bad. This undermines the efforts made by the people like Oliver Tambo, Walter & Albertina Sisulu, Steve Biko, Joe Slovo (who was a Migrant) and Nelson Mandela to fight against apartheid and any forms of discrimination. It undermines the spirit of ubuntu and South African democracy and Justice. It is very clear that South Africans with xenophobic attitudes are practicing exactly what they fought against” (Email conversation with Omokoko on the 27th of August 2011).

**Consequences:** The incident of Omokoko’s arrest resulted in a meeting of human rights activists from Amnesty International, CoRMSA70 and ADF on the 26th of August 2011. The aim of the meeting was to find ways of responding Omokoko’s case and similar challenges faced by migrants in their daily lives and interaction with the police in South Africa. In this meeting, the participants resolved to a) release a press statement and do a media briefing as a way of protesting against police abuse of migrants and raising public awareness of police misconduct and xenophobia; b) take a legal route in seeking recourse for the suffering that Omokoko experienced at the hands of police and send a message to discourage police from harassing migrants; c) engagement with Minister of Police and Minister of Transport on matters of the safety and security of migrants.

In the face of identity-based adversity, African immigrants have also adopted blame-shedding strategies in public forums; campaigning against being scapegoated for local problems, including crime. In a YSF meeting a migrant claimed:

“Wrong is wrong. Let’s not think of whether it’s South Africans doing it or foreigners doing it” (YSF meeting participant: 21/10/2010).

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70 Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA).
Some (African) immigrants have mobilised and organised to protect themselves from xenophobic discourses and practices. They created their own forums, such as ADF, in response to fears of real or perceived xenophobic practices (including violence) and discourses. The ADF Chairperson explained:

“When the xenophobic violence started in May 2008, the government didn’t do anything. We thought that the government would send the police of army to stop the violence, but it didn’t. That’s why we formed ADF to respond to this violence and to lobby government and other stakeholders to act. I had to use my own network, being a leader of the Ivorian community, to make sure that this endeavour was a success. As ADF, we work with migrants and we want to work with the South African community to combat xenophobia. We had projects in Alexandra and we worked with the police and CPF to deal with the people, educating them about other African countries… We have a strong network. We have a relationship with high ranking police officers. This helps us when members of the migrant community are arrested unfairly we can deal with the matter easily. We can make phone calls to these high ranking people so that we get assistance. We also work closely with councillors and other local politicians who are useful to us” (Interview: Fagbibo: 26/08/2011).

He also explained that ADF also work on litigation in cases involving abuse of immigrants by police officials. He explained:

“Many people can be arrested because they are not carrying their passports. They might be carrying certified copies of the passport – certified by the police. They ask for the original document and threaten to arrest you if you don’t pay a bribe. We have assisted many migrants who were arrested like that. We have also assisted several of our members in litigation cases. For example, our ADF member, Cyprian was arrested in Hillbrow being charged for loitering. It was an unfair arrest. He has won a case against the Minister of Police and has just got paid R30 000 as compensation” (Interview, Fagbibo: 26/08/2011).

Also engaging in work to help immigrants in South Africa and stationed in Yeoville was the Refugee Help Desk (RHD). The Chairperson of RHD described his work:

“Myself, I am a migrant. Since the xenophobic attacks, we don’t want people to talk for us as migrants. I feel what migrants feel and I understand them. My Job is to provide refugees with necessary information which can make them have an impact on the socio-economic development of migrants in South Africa. As refugee help desk we help migrants with identity documents and permits, do advocacy and lobbying for migrants and source essentials such as blankets and food for vulnerable migrants[...]. While we deal with xenophobia, we are organising awareness campaigns, training workshops …” (Interview, Omokoko: 08/03/2011).
African immigrants were therefore not passive bodies or groups upon which criminal and othering labels simply stuck. They engaged in counter-criminalisation and counter-otherisation practices and tactics. In doing so, they organised themselves to create systems of mutual support and defence. The cases of ADF, Refugee Help Desk’s attempts to foster the acceptance of African immigrants in South African societies bear testimony to this.

Counter-otherising strategies also take place at individual levels as people live, transverse or “walk in the city” (de Certeau 1984); prioritising self-protection against potential violent and non-violent xenophobic practices in the process.

Through such collective and individual practices, African immigrants gain a special kind of street knowledge or “street science” (Corburn 2005) which they use to navigate the fearopolis that Johannesburg is. I refer to this kind of knowledge as part of the capital of security, accumulated through everyday practices and discursive exchanges, and usable in everyday navigation of the city. Safety governing practices, strategies, tactics and discourses are shared, in the case of Yeoville, within the arena of participatory spaces. I therefore focus, in the next section, on examining the ethno-national regionalist dimension of these discourses, practices, strategies, tactics and the implications thereof.

7.4. “These people don’t come to meetings ...”

Non-South Africans faced exclusion from official positions in the CPF and related bodies. In its specifications of persons who should not hold positions in the Gauteng Provincial Community Police Board (GPCPB) and the CPF, the GPCPB constitution of 2010 states:

“Persons who are not citizens of the Republic of South Africa” [section 22, subsection 22.2.5 (GPCPB 2010)].

Box 26 below shows an excerpt of a discussion between ADF delegates and General Mdubuli who managed Johannesburg’s Region F policing cluster (which includes Yeoville, Hillbrow, Berea, Jeppestown, Joubert Park and Linden).

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71 The Gauteng Provincial Police Board is the one that oversees the establishment and running of all CPF in the Gauteng Province.
Box 26: ADF meeting with senior police officer

Fagbibo: We are here so that we discuss with you the problem of police harassment of foreign nationals. Just recently the police have arrested Congolese nationals in Yeoville. I wish to propose that we work on creating a small committee to work together for promoting policing that is friendly to migrants. We wish to have foreign nationals participate in Community Policing Forums also.

General Mdubuli: The problem is not with the CPF. You are blaming the wrong people. There are always leaders. If my memory serves me well, the issue is that the migrants cannot be part of CPF executives, but they can be part of the CPF subcommittee. We can have a more formal meeting to discuss these issues.

Context: I was present in this meeting as the Secretary General of ADF. The meeting involved me, Fagbibo and General Mdubuli. In this meeting, we agreed to set up a date where we would discuss this matter in the presence of all station commanders in Region F, all CPF representatives, interest groups and academics.

ADF meeting with General Mdubuli at Hillbrow Police Station: 29/01/2012

This meeting (Box 26) culminated in a meeting of the Region F policing cluster police station and CPFs representatives and ADF. ADF was invited to be part of discussions on the inclusion of migrants in community policing initiatives. During this meeting, the Chairperson of the Gauteng Provincial Community Police Board explained:

“We can have a sub-forum that involves migrants and deals with issues of xenophobia. This sub-forum can be led by a South African. Migrants cannot be in the executive of such a forum and the chairperson should be a South African by necessity. Our brothers from other lands in Africa cannot hold executive positions in the CPF or Sector Crime Forums but can be members” (ADF-SAPS meeting, Malinga: 17/03/2010).

A resolution was then passed to include migrants in Community Policing Forums, as only ordinary forum members, in all policing zones of Region F, Johannesburg. The written version of this resolution was however not made available to ADF members in due course. This meeting had been framed as an ADF-SAPS meeting, but after the passing of the resolution the rest of the meeting unfolded as a SAPS-CPFs meeting.

ADF members had gone there hoping to create a structure that fosters or oversees policing activities and promote migrant friendly policing in the Region F policing cluster. They had their own proposal in this regard; although they did not have an opportunity to really present it. In light of the failure of ADF to make an official presentation of their proposal due to lack of space and time to do so in the meeting, an ADF member that I was sitting next to during meeting proceedings mumbled:
“Is this what we are here for? It seems the aim of the meeting as we know it is being brushed aside” (ADF Member, 17/03/2012).

After the meeting as I conversed with the ADF chairperson about the way the meeting went, he said:

“At least they passed a resolution. It is something. You cannot come to ask for something and get it all. The situation is tough. Anyway, we have created a platform from which we can strategise going forward”.

This event largely shows the engrained exclusionist attitude of officials (including those who drafted the CPF constitution) and sections of the South African public towards African immigrants in South Africa. In fact, this exclusivist attitude is part of public doxa influencing relationships between South Africans and African immigrants in both official and non-official contexts.

Although, there was institutional or official exclusion of “foreign nationals” from holding positions in the CPF and Sector Crime Forums, there was a case in Yeoville where the chairperson of Sector Crime Forum 1 was a Zimbabwean. It is apparent, however, that this was because the YCPF was not aware of the constitutional exclusion of non-citizens from holding executive positions in the CPF and its sub-forums.

Given the embeddedness of othering behaviour at governmental and grassroots levels, it was not surprising that there was a low level of attendance of YCPF and other (South African dominated) public forums by immigrants in Yeoville. The lack of participation of immigrants in YCPF meetings became an issue for South Africans running these institutions. There were allegations, by participating South Africans, that African immigrants were disinterested in participating in community initiatives. A South African YCPF member complained:

“These people don’t come to the meetings. People from Congo and Nigeria don’t come to meetings. The only people who come are South Africans and Zimbabweans” (Sector Crime Forum 1 meeting, Mduduzi: 02/06/2011).

In an interview, a community activist explained:

“Yeoville is a multinational society, it is not a community. People are not working together. There is conflict. The Nigerians themselves are not working together, for example the Ibo don’t recognise the Hausa and Yoruba” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010).
Writing in the *Yeovue News*, I noted:

“… South African citizens […] have the view that international migrants: do not want to participate in community dialogues and initiatives to deal with the challenges of the area; are generally responsible for most of the community’s problems including crime, illegalities (such as street trade), overcrowding and environmental littering in the area; and do not care about the area and are mainly concerned about making money. My concern in this piece is to dispel these allegations and to encourage people to work together to improve the community irrespective of their origins. I believe that, in this community, all residents share responsibility for the negligence and decay in the area. By the same token, responsibility for maintaining and upgrading our area lies with us all, irrespective of our citizenship status. We all belong to Yeoville-Bellevue and Yeoville-Bellevue belongs to us all who live in it. If we see a person throwing rubbish onto our streets, pavements and parks, we should take action as residents. If we see a man urinating on the pavements in front of our kids and wives, we ought to confront him. If we witness a thief pick-pocketing on the streets, it’s our responsibility as residents to take action […]. To “indigenous” members of the South African community living in Yeoville-Bellevue, I say: embrace your African brothers and sisters from other parts of the African continent and help each other rebuild the image of our Yeoville Bellevue” (Katsaura 2011).

The call for unity and for participation that I made in this local newsletter met with a response in *Yeovue News*:

“Migrants need to orient themselves to life in South Africa. They need to understand by-laws, environmental health standards and other basic requirements for safe and healthy living. Yes, having so many migrants causes overcrowding. Yes, many people do not have basic property maintenance skills. I cannot try to be politically correct here when reality dictates otherwise. Education around such things needs to take place without ill feelings. Do not use South Africans as scapegoats for your shortcomings. Visit Soweto, Soshanguve and compare the standards of environmental cleanliness there. But some migrants become aggressive when they are challenged on these things, even saying ‘this is a free country, I can do what I want […]’. South African migrants in other countries are in small numbers, mostly on assignments by their companies or in other gainful employment. Most of our exiles who left during struggle years have returned, their mission accomplished. Very few felt the need to stay on in their adopted countries…” (Majombozi 2010) [sic].

The main point raised in this response is that most African immigrants are undeserving intruders. Implications are that they were responsible for the social problems in Yeoville and not worth of participating in community meetings as equals with South Africans. About this response, the editor of *Yeovue News* wrote:
“Last week we carried a piece by Obvious Katsaura, a Zimbabwean student who made some points about migrancy in South Africa. This week, there is a strong response from Thembi Majombozi, a South African resident in Yeoville Bellevue. Obvious and Thembi agree on some issues - for example, they both say that migrants are not involved enough in broader community issues. Both have said that migrants are usually not well-represented at community meetings, e.g. ward public meetings, YSF meetings and CPF meetings. Thembi speaks strongly on a number of other issues. Some would say that she is being xenophobic. Others would say that what she is saying is correct” (YN 2011b).

The next Yeovue News issue carried a collection of responses to my article and Majombozi’s, as excerpted in Box 27 below.

Box 27: Newsletter exchanges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Freedom Charter, so valuable and important a part of our development, cannot be adopted by Obvious Katsaura and others to suit the needs of migrants who are desperate because they have no legal standing in our country … Joyce Ozynski.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… I urge South Africans participating in community forums to continue trying to create a friendly environment in which migrants can contribute to dealing with the problems faced by Yeoville Bellevue without fear. This could be done through avoiding hate speeches against migrants, and rather promoting constructive engagement … Nkulumane, Yeoville Bellevue resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World-wide, there is no country without foreign nationals. Foreign nationals can be immigrants, refugees, business people or embassy representatives, etc. In term of (migrants) violating and disrespecting the law, rules and regulations, please report to us and other migrant bodies for (attention) and let us work together on law enforcement with Yeoville Police Station as well as other authorities concerned […] Mr. M. Moussa Dominique; Activist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The ADF interpreted Majombozi’s article as xenophobic and responded officially through Yeoville News:

“As ADF, it is our view that the ‘us and them attitude’ dominating the article in question, as well as the very common misperceptions concerning migrants contained in it, do not profit the South African community. They undermine the spirit of coexistence and are against the principle of a rainbow nation that is supposed to bind South Africa together, irrespective of people’s colour, creed, society, and it would be a very positive step to have volunteers to teach migrants the local languages, as many countries in Europe are currently doing …” (ADF 2011).

This newsletter exchange exposed the silent and salient tensions and intolerance between African immigrants and South Africans in Yeoville.
Despite the general lack of participation by African immigrants in security governing initiatives dominated by South Africans, some African immigrants consistently participated in these forums. A Zimbabwean who was the chairperson of Sector Crime Forum 1 declared his Zimbabwean identity stating:

“[...]. You heard me telling them that I am Zimbabwean. I am not afraid to tell them that I am Zimbabwean. I was just trying to help them do things” (Conversation, Sibanda: 17/02/2011).

The lack of participation of African immigrants in community safety initiatives was not just a result of forced exclusion but a question of “self-isolation” (Barry 1998). Asked why he did not participate in YCPF meetings, a Zimbabwean immigrant staying in Yeoville responded:

“Because I don’t care about that. It doesn’t give me food on the table. I have better things to do. I am not permanent here, so I have got nothing to contribute to the community and my days are numbered. I am just a tenant here and I will be leaving the area” (Interview, Reggy: 12/02/2011).

On the question of whether his lack of participation had something to do with his nationality, he replied:

“No, I could go despite being a foreign national. It’s just that I came here to look for money. I cannot be wasting time on meetings. I feel that it’s a waste of time. There is nothing that I will say that will change this area” (Interview, Reggy: 12/02/2011).

In another incident, I asked a Zimbabwean migrant and friend of mine who stayed in Yeoville to go with me to a YCPF meeting and he yelled and asked: “To do what?”

Public discrimination was therefore not solely responsible for non-participation of African immigrants. Some South Africans in the CPF executive indicated that they would welcome immigrants into the forum:

“As a CPF, we accommodate everybody as long as the man has got a passport. We give the person the job. As a person is doing the job, he searches the wrong people and takes money from them. The people report to the police and the person gets arrested” (Interview, Mduduzi: 18/08/2010).

He continued:

72 Conversation, Inyandezulu: 09/04/2011.
“I think you have published an article in Yeovue News to explain to people about CPF. We need to have a box where people can put their written complains. Some people do not speak the same language as us. They are scared. People must stop calling each other Kwere Kwere” (Mduduzi: 18/08/2011).

This echoes the desire by some South Africans in Yeoville to nurture a spirit of tolerance and co-relation between South Africans and African immigrants; encouraging African immigrants to participate in community safety initiatives. The participatory environment was therefore not always unfriendly, although some African immigrants could have made the choice not to participate.

The conditions in the participatory forums could also have (unwittingly) isolated some African immigrants. The use of local languages in spaces of public participation was a constant cause of the isolation of “foreign nationals” in these meetings. Although some or most of the organisations officially use English as their main language of community engagement, many times South African speakers would switch to Zulu, Sotho or Xhosa; to the exclusion of some African immigrants. Even some South Africans did not understand these South African languages. In a ward public meeting (27/08/2011) a coloured South African lady kept interrupting the councillor who was speaking in Xhosa retorting: “I can’t understand anything! Is everybody Xhosa?”

Language as a means of human association is therefore an inherently political tool, one that is deployable to confirm and entrench of socio-political difference. It can be a tool for the exclusion of particular groups of people who do not share the same language, by those whose language and cultural group is dominant.

Language, however, can be progressively used to foster social integration. In this case, there were calls for people to “stop calling the Black others Kwerekwere”. In a ward public meeting, the chairperson of the ADF had this to say about the issue of language:

“I think you are touching very important issues, issues affecting the community. I am busy learning the local languages. We want to participate and contribute as well, but we don’t understand everything if you use the local languages. Somebody here said they are from Rwanda, another from Uganda and I am from Ivory Coast. Can you speak in a shared language please?” (Ward Public Meeting, Fagbibo: 14/08/2010).
About the effects of language on the participation of African immigrants in the YCPF, a local politician said:

“The issue of language is a barrier to participation. With the language issue, it’s not like South Africans are doing it wittingly. People in meetings want to speak their local languages such as Sesotho and isiZulu” (Interview, Mpho: 08/02/2011).

He suggested:

“As South Africans, as CPF in Yeoville, we should go out and speak to our fellow Africans to participate. CPF is supposed to be the eyes and ears of the community, so we need to attract the public. We also have a problem of language. Some people are French speaking and South Africa is English speaking, so it’s difficult to communicate. Some people speak in Sotho or Zulu, so some people should interpret or translate” (Interview, Mpho: 08/02/2011).

Practically, African immigrants were excluded because if they attended participatory spaces of security governance they were constantly reminded of their outsider status and had to sit through discussions in which they were scapegoated and criminalised during the drama of public participation. Linguistically, they were excluded as South Africans dominating these spaces preferred to speak their native languages, particularly isiZulu, isiXhosa and seSotho. Also, some “foreign nationals” were economically calculative and found no motivation to attend meetings leaving their economic activities. Hence the statements that it was a “waste of time” and that “I have no time for that (attending community meetings) because I came here to look for money”. In light of this, I conceptualise most African immigrants as having a *habitus of profit*, as opposed to a *habitus of volunteerism*.

Recognising that ethno-nationality as a variable does not stand alone in explaining the dynamics of social exclusion or isolation of African immigrants in the field of community safety production, I use the section below to show the entwinement of ethno-nationality, age and gender in the construction of otherness.

### 7.5. Concoction of ethno-national regionalism and other identities

In light of the findings of previous research which examines crime, violence and fear and their governance as class-based, race-based, age-based and gendered issues, I show how these are entwined with ethno-nationality in influencing discourses and
practices in community safety governance. I do not wish to parrot already existing accounts of how class, age and gender affect crime (and violence) profiling and governance (see Chapter 2). These accounts show that youth are a vilified category in discourses on criminogenesis, and women are a subaltern category, being considered as “defenceless victims of crime”. In this section, I selectively relate how security governance and criminogenic accounts conflate identities of youth and gender with ethno-nationality.

7.5.1. Youth and crime (governance): ethno-nationalist politics

Although there was a tendency to blame crime in Yeoville on the presence of non-South African youth, the overall view from the attitude and opinion survey was that one cannot precisely connect the nationality of youths to criminality or violence (Box 28).

**Box 28: “This is out of question ...”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 14: Is there a link between the presence of immigrant youth and criminality and violence?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comment**

The majority of opinion and attitude survey participants (62.5%) believed that there was no link between the presence of non-South African youths and crime in Yeoville. 27.5% participants believed that that the presence of non-South African youths in Yeoville was related to increasing crime an in the area. 5% indicated that they had no idea and 5% did not respond to this question.

However, it suffices to point out that this is reflection of the sample which was 57.5% non-South African and 42.5% South African, not by design but by default (see Appendix C). Most non-South Africans saw no connection between youth nationality and criminality or violence, whilst quite a number of South Africans saw a connection.

**Selected quotes**

**Yes, there is an effect:**

“Yes, I think the Zimbabwean youths and also those from Mozambique have increased the crime as they are involved in the stabbings, drugs and the muggings” (participant TB15).

“Yes there is a strong link. Because those non South African youths come in south Africa with a huge hope to achieve their lives dreams. Once arrived in south Africa
most of the time things do not go the expected way (e.g. unemployment), then they start to find any way to survive include committing crimes” (participant T34D).

“Yes, because you young non South African youths cannot get job easily in South Africa. Many of them are unemployed. When facing socio economic difficulties they can be led to commit crime and find money to survive” (participant T38D).

No, there is no effect:

“Uhhhhmm! I wouldn’t say that because they are very mixed and it’s difficult to determine where the South African youth is and where the non-South African is. Remember that they attend the same schools, they play together, they gather together …” (Participant T8A).

“Naaaah! This is out of question. People are very mixed. How would you know that this is a South African youth and this is non-South African?” (Participant T9A).

“No, both South African and non-South African living around are committing crime. The fundamental problem resides at the level of lack of job. They don’t like to do jobs like security, car watch, bouncer. South African youth committing crime around come from locations like Thembisa or Soweto. They commit crime around and go to hide in the location. Non South African youth who commit crime here don’t go to school” (Participant T26C).

Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011

The reasons cited to sustain the view that non-South African youth were responsible for rising crime in Yeoville warrant attention here. The main reason was that non-South African youths were perceived as generally unable to access the formal job market due to their immigrant status, and thereby liable to turning to crime for survival. They therefore, as suggested by this view, mainly belong to the underclass or at worst, “the precariate” (Standing 2011). The positioning of non-South African Black youth as precariates (Standing 2011) in the economic field also makes them urban outcasts (Wacquant 2008d) in the urban social field. This position is compounded by the tag of “other other” which they carry as a result of their non-South African nationality and blackness. This view, however, overlooks the non-criminal livelihood strategies and innovations of non-South African youths. In fact many have been able to crack into the labour market quite easily due to their sound qualifications or skills and the preference of non-South Africans by some employers.

Now I turn to the entwinement of gender and ethno-nationality in community safety governance politics.
7.5.2. Local ethno-nationalist discourses on gender, violence and crime

Non-South African women from other parts of Africa were described as the main victims of domestic violence in Yeoville. This description was based on the fact that most of the women who frequented the VEC in were African immigrants. In an interview, a VEC volunteer underscored:

“Most of the victims of domestic violence and abuse that we attend to are Zimbabweans and Congolese. If they are South African, they are normally married to a foreigner. This is either because their men are more violent or because they do not have any other family support system. But we do not normally receive cases of abuse from Nigerian women or local women married to Nigerians. Nigerian men are gentlemen” (Interview, Dorcas: 22/09/2010).

This statement rang in my mind not as a mere truth, but as an *othering* utterance. It was, to me, expected for the VEC to receive more cases of victimisation involving “foreign nationals” than South Africans in Yeoville because there is, as anecdotally believed, a higher non-South African population. So the statistics of the VEC are a reflection more of the population composition of Yeoville than a display of the semi-civility or barbarism of non-South African men who abuse their spouses, sisters or daughters. Furthermore foreigners, more than South Africans are likely to rely on the support of such organisations because they mostly do not possess abundant *social capital* of family and other related kin-support systems. The statement by the VEC coordinator reflects common belief amongst many ordinary South Africans that cultures of African immigrants are “less civil” than South African cultures. Also consider this statement by a South African activist in Yeoville:

“…In Yeoville we have people from all over Africa. Some of these people are very sexist [...] they are Muslims. One day we were in a meeting and there was a Moroccan Muslim guy. One of the participants who is Ivorian said this to him: ‘Don’t talk like a woman’. The Moroccan became very angry. According to him that was the biggest insult” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010).

The victimhood of non-South African Black women specifically is confirmed by the higher number of victims visiting the VEC in Yeoville, compared to South Africans. A key informant had this to say about victims visiting the VEC for help:

“We mainly have Zimbabweans and Congolese and to a lesser extent Nigerians. The age is between 18 and 30 and mainly female [...] 99% female” (Interview, Dorcas: 22/09/2010).
It is however important to explore the reasons behind the bigger number of non South Africans visiting the VEC. A former volunteer at the VEC in Yeoville indicated:

“When foreign nationals have problems, they really come to the VEC. This is because they do not have adequate family support systems. There are very few volunteers of foreign nationality that come to the VEC” (Interview, Evelyn: 15/09/2010).

Non-South African femaleness was therefore associated with vulnerability to abuse by non-South African Black men who are stereotypically considered as violent, rowdy and disrespectful of women. Non-South African masculinities are therefore pictured as problematic and as requiring taming by the South African law; a law considered as more progressive and liberating that the laws of countries from which these men came.

How can one position ethno-nationality in the context of other identities in the making of the community security governance field of Yeoville? I deploy an analysis based on the notion of *multiple subalternisms*. In this case I conceptualise the othering of youth and females of foreign nationality in the security field as multilayered and complex. They suffer multilayered *otherness* in which their nationality, blackness, youthfulness or femaleness aggregately condemn them to criminal profiling, victimisation, and sympathy at once. The blaming of youth of foreign nationality as the prime criminals indicated that on top of suffering the enactment of criminal profiles on the basis of being young, this profiling is entrenched by their tag of foreign nationality. Women of foreign nationality were represented as the prime victims of domestic violence in Yeoville and were considered to be coming from societies where the rights of women are not respected and, if they are South African, to have a husband of foreign nationality who was violent and semi-civil.

Below, I recapitulate the view that *ethno-national regionalism* is a “reality of community safety governance” in contexts characterised by sharp ethno-national diversities.
7.6. Ethno-national politics as a reality of community safety governance: conclusion

This chapter, through the notion of *ethno-national regionalism*, suggests community safety governance is a field of “ethno-discourses”, “ethno-talks” and “ethno-practices”\(^73\) through which ethno-national groups pursue and defend their interests. Overall, the chapter confirms the argument that xenophobia is a part of public culture in South Africa (Nyamnjoh 2010b); with the state being complicit in the generation and sustenance of this public culture (Neocosmos 2008). What is unique in the foregoing discussion is the observation that this public culture has percolated community safety initiatives in a multinational neighbourhood which never recorded a single fatality during the May 2011 xenophobic violence in South Africa. I therefore maintain that ethno-national regionalist perceptions are as important as ethno-national regionalist actions or practices, in the making of dynamics of community safety initiatives in multinational contexts. I argue that the exclusion of African immigrants from spaces of participation in safety initiatives should not be taken as just a softer or symbolic version of xenophobia; but as potentially articulated to its more physical violence oriented versions.

The imageries of African immigrants as major culprits in the genesis of local crime and disorder make Yeoville a neighbourhood that lives at the border of cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism (or counter-cosmopolitanism) – of peace and ethno-national conflicts. The criminalisation of (poor) African immigrants in Yeoville corresponds to Caldeira’s (2000:53) observation, in her Sao Paulo studies, that criminals are publicly represented as people “from the fringes of society, humanity and polity”.

While poor African immigrants are represented as the *scum of the city*\(^74\), within the ranks of the criminalised *scum of the city* also, are the South African poor. Suffice to point out that the South African poor also inhabit the margins of the city, often in informal settlements with little or no basic services from government; and the

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\(^74\) I develop and modify this notion as adapted from Koestler, Arthur. 1968. *Scum of the Earth*. New York: Macmillan.
wealthier South African population often encloses itself in gated communities and security villages. This process often takes a racial as well as a class twist.

The linguistic market of the local security governance field in Yeoville is generally ethno-nationally exclusionary. The language used in spaces of participatory safety activism is unfriendly to African immigrants who could not fluently speak or adequately understand local South African native languages. When African immigrants attend community meetings on matters of security governance, they have to sit through discussions that stereotypically criminalise them and in which their contributions are not taken seriously. Therefore, in these meetings, when African immigrants participate, they tend to occupy a position of what I call the absent present - as their presence is rarely appreciated or respected. When they do not attend, they still remain the subject of criminalising talk - occupying a position of what I refer to as the present absent. Spaces of deliberative community security governance can therefore be conceptualised as sites of performative symbolic violence against African immigrants. It is also important also to note that some African immigrants isolate themselves from participation in community safety activism because they see more value in pursuing their economic interests.

Given the political dynamics of exclusionary ethno-nationalism in the community security governance field described above, one is bound to ask questions about the value, saleability or utility of this finding to those interested in urban security governance practice and theory. Safety governance in this context requires an appreciation and understanding of the role of social diversity on shaping or influencing participation or social group placing in the community security field. One has to be cognisant of the dynamics or potentialities of conflict and contradictions in such a context. An understanding of the anatomy of the social infrastructure of the neighbourhood – sometimes casted in the dichotomy between the “established” (insiders) and “outsiders” (Elias and Scotson 1994; Nyamnjoh 2006) - is an important first step for any intervention in or review of the security governance situation at a local level in situations characterised by migrancy and poor levels of collective efficacy and responsibility (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997). Above all I stress, as an epilogue to this chapter, that a theorisation or understanding of social diversity is central to profitable scholarship on urban dynamics; especially in
cases of urban community mobilisation and organisation in response to urban challenges.
8. Chapter Eight
Territorial politics in community safety governance:
Reflections from Yeoville

“For the last ten years, people have been afraid to come to Rockey-Raleigh Street. This is an area where most violence was taking place. There was a shop that was selling babe clothes and it closed because of the fear of crime which undermined its potential customer base. We can’t sort out Yeoville without sorting out Rockey-Raleigh Street. We have to find ways of marketing the street …” (Speech, Maurice: 18/08/2010).

8.1. Introduction

In this chapter I argue that the micro-politics of community safety governance has a territorial dimension, just as crime and violence are authored in and also author territory or place (Springer 2011). This argument, as shown in Chapter 2, comes in the wake of an inadequate analysis of the spatio-social discourses, practices and tactics of or in community safety governance from a micro-political perspective. It comes against a background of the sectoral treatment of the social on the one hand (Bruce and Gould 2009; Palmary 2001) and the spatial on the other (Newman 1972; Pain 2000), in the analysis community safety governance dynamics (see Chapter 4). In this regard, this chapter embarks on an empirical and theoretical project of spatialising Bourdeusian “thinking tools”.

I analyse narratives about place, crime and violence as emanating from community meetings, representatives of community organisations, social groups and individual residents in Yeoville. These narratives show how the micro-politics of community safety governance is informed by everyday experiences and perceptions about place, crime and violence. Place, in this study, is conceptualised as a territorial or spatial entity and as socio-politically relational, dynamic, fluid and amorphous. My conceptualisation of place is informed by Massey’s view that place is not dead, or fixed, but relational and highly political (Massey 2005). While place has physical attributes, it is not to be reduced to an objectified and fixed state because social relations, including violence, crime and socio-psychological perceptions such as fear are authored and inscribed in places. Daylight (2008:13) confirms this, arguing that “mutations in the built form have a more than interdependent relationship

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75 Foucault earlier dismissed the idea of place or space as a fixed object, but as highly eclectic and this idea has been further propounded by scholars such as Soja and Massey amongst others.
with social forms and meanings”. I therefore maintain that the community security governance field is homological to the *territorial field* (Bourdieu 2005).

The aim of the chapter is to give a *spatio-relational*\(^6\) account of practices, strategies and discourses in the community safety field. I interpret narratives about: i) community attempts at neighbourhood image (re)generation; ii) community governance of public places and; iii) community safety production through involvement in housing, land and environmental governance.

**8.2. “… a vision for the area …”?**

Some public perceptions of Yeoville portrayed the neighbourhood as a dangerous and homely place or space at once. Talking about the need to rehabilitate Yeoville’s image, a community activist said:

“We need to look at development from a holistic perspective. We need to have a vision for the area. What do you want Yeoville to look like in a few years’ time? Yeoville has been reinventing itself. In the 1980s Yeoville was one of the most attractive areas to live in. It was a beautiful area, but now it has deteriorated. This area will be gentrified, but that will come with its own problems. The poor will be forced out. The city won’t care because that’s one way of dealing with the problem. And the private property developers won’t care because that’s one way of making money. Once the place is gentrified, the middle class will come in, because the place is strategically located. If this place was well run, they would come in” (Speech, Maurice: 18/08/2010).

Given the myriad of challenges that Yeoville faced, there was a drive from city managers and residents to promote socio-economic and spatial regeneration. It was hoped that this would also address issues of crime, violence and fear, which were some of the major challenges facing the neighbourhood.

**8.2.1. “Bleeding community”?**

As a prologue to my exploration of territorial discourses, practices and strategies in community safety governance, I narrate a story of the “blatant and shocking” killing of a man in full view of the public one evening in Raleigh-Rockey Street (Box 29).

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\(^6\) The concept of *spatio-relationalism*, as I coin it, reflects the idea that place is politically dynamic.
Box 29: Murder in Raleigh-Rockey Street: an observer’s narration

I went to Raleigh - Rockey Street at around 9 pm on the 11th of September 2011 in the company of a friend. I wanted to buy pizza for supper. When I reached Debonairs pizza on Rockey Street, I found that it was closed and there was a crowd of people in front of Shoprite. Somebody had been murdered there. The dead body was lying in front of Shoprite and police officers were attending to the scene.

The murdered man was a young Zimbabwean street trader who used to trade in front of Shoprite. He used to register people’s mobile numbers there. People there said this guy was very good in fighting and used to beat people. They said that now the people he had beaten before ganged up to come and revenge. They then slit his throat with a knife and that is how he died. I had also previously seen this guy brutally and lethally beating someone in front of Shoprite.

On the 29th of October 2011, I asked a Zimbabwean man, who was also a trader working in front of Shoprite and an eye witness of this incident, about the murder. He explained that the deceased had an altercation with some guys. He indicated that the deceased was drunk and the perpetrator was also drunk. He stated that the deceased had insulted the perpetrator using some obscene language. The perpetrator then went away and then came back with a knife and slit the throat of the deceased.

The case was being investigated by police officers at Yeoville Police Station during the time of the research. This incident, coupled with many others that I heard about but never witnessed, raise questions about how (organised) community stakeholders in Yeoville and Bellevue manage its environment to reduce the occurrence of criminal incidents.

Also, some police officers generally described Yeoville as violence and crime ridden.

One senior police officer stated:

“I am afraid that the community is becoming very violent. There is one case of a guy who was thrown from the second floor. He was cut by the glasses and he lost all his fingers. In some other case, a lady was thrown outside a flat and she is in hospital. For the month of October 2010 only, we have 61 assault GBH cases, 34 cases of common assault, 15 cases of theft out of motor vehicles, 20 housebreakings. At one point, the colonel was shouted at, at Province. In the whole of October, we had 187 recorded crimes, of these, sector 1 had 113. With 40 cases of assault GBH, 21 cases common assault, Sector 2 had 53 cases of crime and sector 3 only had 7 cases. If I am buying a house, I would go to sector 3. There were no cases of assault GBH and no robberies. In percentages we had 60% of crimes in sector 1, 28% in sector 2, and 12% in sector 3. Most

77 Meaning assault with intend to cause grievous bodily harm.
of the crimes are happening on Saturdays, followed by Fridays and then Sundays. They normally happen between 14:00 hours and 00:00 hours. We need to deploy our officers strategically […]” (YCPF Broader Forum meeting, Col. Tshabalala, Yeoville SAPS: 03/11/2010).

He depicted violence and crime as increasing phenomena:

“One of my biggest problems is assault. This morning it was looking good. Today in the morning there were 7 cases, yesterday there were 14-15 cases. When I come Monday morning, Yeoville will be quiet, but crime stats will make me cry. One pregnant woman came to the police station after being stabbed. How on earth can someone do that? When someone is hurt, they rush to the police station. We are not doctors. I am not skilled in medicine. People should go the clinic or hospital first. We had one or two residential robberies”. (Sector Crime Forum 2 meeting, Col. Tshabalala: 17/02/2011).

Organised crime was pointed out as a major challenge. A senior police officer described the problem of car-jacking in Yeoville:

“Last week we had a case of a hijacked Toyota Condor which was brought to Yeoville. We found the suspects busy trying to remove the satellite tracking. We managed to arrest 3 suspects and two ran away. We need to work with the community. The community should be cooperative. We also recovered a truck that was hijacked elsewhere and brought to Yeoville. We caught them while trying to remove tracking system. We have another case of a large amount of ammunition that was confiscated. In both cases, suspects were arrested as a result of community members reporting” (YCPF Broader Meeting, Col. Mkulili: 13/07/2011).

There was an urge for the community, in conjunction with the police, to take action to reduce crime and violence. A senior police officer expressed:

“A happy couple makes a happy family and happy children and ultimately a happy community. We have a problem all over South Africa because of assault cases. Every Monday, when you look at the crime stats, assault is a big problem. It comes out that we are turning out to be a very violent community, which means we need people to look over us. We need street patrollers and police officers. I have had a case of a 13 year old girl whose mother complained that she is drinking and sleeping outside. I have a 13 year old boy and I said to his mother, if my boy does this, I will beat the hell out of him. In Soweto a 13 year old person cannot drink and do all sorts of things in front of a community member. They will report him or her to the parents. Here in Yeoville a 13 year old can go into Time Square and no one will come to interrogate her. We stay together but we don’t know each other’s children. The social issues here are more problematic […]” (YCPF Public meeting, Col. Tshabalala: 09/04/2011).
This shows that reducing crime and violence is not simply a duty of the police service, but should start at the family level. The family constitutes what Hunter (1985) describes as the private sphere of social control. As a basic element of society, family could be the starting point for social control initiatives (Carr 2005; Hunter 1985).

About some of the social challenges in Yeoville, a local activist said:

“At the moment, nobody knows how many people live here. We have situations where more than 20 people are living in a one house. We can have about 8 – 10 people living in a bachelors’ flat. If you have an entire family living in the same room and then the people are sharing the same toilet and bathroom, and we have a 15 year old girl and a young man or older man living in the same house: imagine what can happen. We need to specify the challenges in the area. We have public meetings frequently, and everybody says pretty the same thing every time. They talk about employment problems, housing problems and crime. Housing is a big problem here” (Tour, Maurice: 17/08/2010).

The ward councillor also noted:

“The major development challenges in Yeoville include unemployment, housing shortage and crime. There is no space for social housing at all in Yeoville, it is overcrowded. The major crime problems include hijacking of houses, drug trafficking and so on” (Interview, Ward Councillor Noma: 16/08/2010).

The challenges of overcrowding, housing shortages and unemployment amongst others are therefore concocted with crime, violence and fear in generating and sustaining a package of urban disorders.

In explaining the portrayal of Yeoville as a prototype of innercity disorders of crime and violence; I argue that crime, violence and fear have been habitualised, becoming part of everyday practices (de Certeau 1984) of humans as they struggle to survive in the economic, social, political and cultural fields of the city.

In the economic field, there are struggles for access to or control of scarce resources – including houses, employment, property and basic needs (see Chapter 7). Struggles in social, political and cultural fields take the form of quests for social justice and assertions of belonging to South Africa (see Chapter 7). Unless the forces (housing shortage, unemployment, service delivery) behind these struggles are addressed, we are likely to
witness an escalation of violence and crime as means of self-expression and survival. Increasing crime, violence, fear and disorder would warrant the senior police officer’s description of Yeoville as a “bleeding” community - a “wounded neighbourhood” within a “wounded city” (Myers 2011).

The situation in Yeoville is, however, not perceived by some residents, police officers and other stakeholders as entirely bleak. The spokesperson of Yeoville SAPS optimistically stated:

“We do not have a very high rate of murder. We can get cases of murder…maybe one or two cases in three months. With the collaboration of community organisations and business, we are able to keep the crime levels as low as possible” (Constable Mbuli: 18/08/2010).

Portraying Yeoville as a “safe” haven for immigrants, an immigrant indicated:

“I heard that during the time of xenophobic violence, Yeoville was mainly safe for migrants and not for South Africans. South Africans feared for their lives and went out of Yeoville, while foreigners staying out of Yeoville came into Yeoville for safety. South Africans were afraid that they would be attacked” (Group interview with migrants, Jimija: 06/2011).

Also, the spokesperson of Yeoville SAPS claimed:

“Yeoville is one of the safest places that I would recommend for people to stay. One of the problem is that there is no that strict control of access to buildings by building managers. They just care about getting money. But generally speaking Yeoville is a safe place to stay” (Interview, Constable Mbuli: 18/08/2010).

Readings of Yeoville can be framed within a fear-safety continuum. Although Yeoville was sometimes described as a horrible place cluttered by crime, violence and urban decay, it is also described as a habitable, even safe place – a place where African immigrants were safer in the face of potential xenophobic violence (see Chapter 7).

Confirming the fear-safety duality discourse, participants in the opinion and attitude survey projected a mix of feelings of fear and safety in describing their habitation of Yeoville (Box 30).
Box 30: “...you can feel a bit secure, but not at night”

42.5% of participants in the opinion and attitude survey indicated that they felt safer in Yeoville. On the same note, 42.5% indicated that they do not feel safer in Yeoville. 15.0% expressed mixed feelings of fear and safety and were not very sure if really they are safe or unsafe in Yeoville.

Most of those who indicated that they felt safer in Yeoville based this on the fact that they have not yet suffered from any criminal activity in the neighbourhood and that Yeoville is much better than other neighbourhoods such as Hillbrow and Johannesburg Central. Such people indicated that the longevity of their stay in Yeoville and the nature of their daily activities have rendered them “streetwise” and sharpened their ability to avoid victimisation as they navigate the neighbourhood and more generally the city (Anderson 1995). Those that did not feel safer in Yeoville based their perception on the fact that they have suffered from crime in Yeoville before, or witnessed some criminal activities and that there were a lot of criminals living in the neighbourhood. Those who expressed mixed feelings about the security situation in Yeoville based their view mainly on the fact that in Yeoville they cannot really be sure about their safety, indicating that while during the day it looks safer, at night it turns out to be dangerous to be outdoor.

Selected opinion and attitude survey quotes

Feel safe. Why?

“I feel safe because this has been my home since I came to Joburg and I feel like I know everything here in Yeoville. Maybe I also qualify to be the mayor of this place. Also Mandela and other big shots including Thabo Mbeki and Frazer Moleketi stay close to Yeoville only a kilometre away though their community in Houghton is heavily guarded with armed guards carrying machine guns. I have been a taxi driver and know all the things that go down in Yeoville since I usually get home around 1am, so I fear nothing here in Yeoville” (Participant T11B, 2011).

Don’t feel safe. Why?

“I don’t feel safe at all. For these few years I have been here in Yeoville, I have experienced very nasty things. Two of my friends were stabbed right in my street, one of them was stabbed a block away from my house, my neighbours were robbed not long ago as their house was broken into before they had erected this wall and put on the spikes and opposite my house in that flat over there a friend of mine had his house broken into and his property was stolen. Personally, I was mugged in my own street at corner St Georges and Raymond Street when a group of five guys asked me to give them money and when I said I didn’t have they held me and searched me, although I managed to get away without injuries but it was a nasty experience” (Participant T13B, 2011).

Mixed feelings. Why?

Figure 15: Do you feel safe living in Yeoville
“Yes now you can feel a bit secure, but not at night because criminals are always here and they attack people. Crime still continues. Even people who come from Soweto to work here are complaining about crime. Last month, a young lady on her way from work was attacked by a 2 young men daylight at 4pm just next Eckstein Street-Louis Botha. They took her cell phone and hand-bag in which she had R500 to pay her rent. I met her crying when I was coming back from work” (Participant T28C, 2011).

There were perceptions that the neighbourhood’s safety situation has improved over the years. A community activist stressed:

“Rockey-Raleigh Street soon after independence was inundated with high incidences of robbery by thugs using guns. I remember that the owner of a shop opposite to the park was shot dead by robbers. At that time we had a white police commander who was not too helpful…Now things have changed in Rockey-Raleigh Street. We have a better police commissioner. Sectoral policing has improved and street patrols were introduced. Street patrollers started doing random body searches and have confiscated dangerous weapons in the process. At some point the street patrollers got uniforms. There were however complaints of rough handling of community members by the street patrollers. There was also the establishment of the Victim Empowerment Centre for the Counselling of victims of crime and violence. The YSF has also launched a campaign against shebeens. We have also lobbied for the improvements of street lighting, pavements and the surface of the tarmac. These developments made Rockey-Raleigh Street more open. Despite these achievements, the police stations still has problems. There are no proper offices at the police station. There are makeshift structures. Even the station commander is housed in a makeshift structure. There are other crimes that are not taken seriously, for example those crime regarded as petty crimes” (Interview, Thabang: 2010).

Although crime and violence were said to be reduced, their continued reduction was considered as key for socio-economic, spatial and infrastructural revival of the neighbourhood.

Given the rampancy of fear of crime and violence in the neighbourhood, I find it important to explore the reasons people stayed in Yeoville. As read from results of the opinion and attitude survey, people’s reasons for staying in Yeoville included convenience, existent social networks, affordable rent, perceived relative safety and business opportunities (see Box 31).
Box 31: Reasons for living in Yeoville

**Convenience:** Participants mentioned that they stay in Yeoville because it is located closer to their workplaces. These people mentioned that Yeoville is located closer to the Johannesburg CBD and generally has a good transport network than other places.

**Existential social networks:** Most people indicated that they ended up in Yeoville through their connections to friends and family members. Those that migrate from other parts of Africa into South Africa come to Yeoville as an entry point to South Africa. Most however settle there for considerable durations of time because once there they feel safer and enjoy the comfort of being closer to their country people and people from other parts of Africa. It is in light of the multinational nature of the suburb and its domination by a huge cohort of non-South Africans that Yeoville is considered as a safer place, free of xenophobic violence.

**Affordable rent:** Some participants indicate that they prefer to live in Yeoville because they can afford the rentals which they consider to be much more reasonable than rentals in other suburbs.

**Relative safety?** Most participants in the opinion survey indicated that they view Yeoville as a much safer area than places such as Hillbrow and most of the Johannesburg townships.

**Business opportunities:** Some participants indicated that they chose to stay in Yeoville because that is where they can operate their businesses vibrantly. Most such people were either shop owners or street traders.

In an interview during the public opinion survey, one participant summarised his reasons for choosing to stay in Yeoville as follows:

“I did choose to stay in Yeoville because I wanted to be close to people from my country. Yeoville is known as African multicultural area. And in addition, my children go to the schools in Yeoville and also my church is located in this area. So the greater part of my day life is in Yeoville” (Participant T31D, 2011).

**Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011**

Some people were forced by circumstances while others claimed to have made a relatively deliberate choice to live in Yeoville. Those forced by circumstances indicated that they would opt to leave Yeoville if their economic situation improves. One man stated:

“I would prefer to move to Sandton or Houghton Park if my financial situation improves. In those neighbourhoods I would feel much safer, unlike here where I am not sure about my safety” (Interview, Khumbula: 06/03/2012).

It therefore emerges that people’s positioning in the *economic field* corresponds to their positioning in the *territorial field* – that is their positioning in social space has homologies to their positioning in physical space (Bourdieu 1999a). Those with limited capital economically and socially find themselves “chained to place” (Bourdieu 1999a), as in the case of Khumbula who was tied to Yeoville despite
harbouring aspirations to live in the wealthier neighbourhoods of Sandton or Houghton Park. And, of course, each place or neighbourhood falls within a rank depending on its value - its spatial capital (Lars 2008), and consequently symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986). Neighbourhoods such as Yeoville are considered, in some ways, as places of “ruins” (Simone 2004a) or as waste lands inhabited by wasted lives (Bauman 2004). Crime, violence, fear, urban decay and spatial disorder are therefore viewed as Yeoville’s trademarks, alongside other innercity neighbourhoods like Hillbrow, Berea, Joubert Park and townships such as Diepsloot and Alexandra (Murray 2011; Simone 2004b). These are challenges that need to be addressed if there is going to be any spatial and socio-economic rehabilitation of such neighbourhoods.

8.2.2. “If only you solve your crime problem …”

There were attempts by community activists to rebuild the image of Yeoville through efforts at lobbying the municipality to help arrest creeping urban decay, reconstruct and improve the physical infrastructure. In public media, Yeoville was described as a rejuvenating area following the intervention of JDA. According to the homesgofast web page:

“The Johannesburg suburbs of Yeoville and its neighbour Bellevue were, in times past, popular places to live that were rich in cultural life with restaurants, jazz bars, book stores and more for the residents of the area and city. The Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) is working to revive the area with a multi-million rand facelift and stimulus for new building and development […].Community organizations are working to rebuild the area and drive new investment and capital into the long-popular suburb. The Yeoville Stakeholders Forum (YSF), a combination of interest groups that promotes change, development and quality of life in the Greater Yeoville area is one group that is working to help revitalize the area […].The JDA is upgrading Rockey-Raleigh Street, to make it once again an attractive, well-maintained and safe street offering a vibrant, mixed-use economy, according to the city. Also in the works are upgrades and renovations to the recreation centre, clinic, sport courts and relocation of the library to a new, larger space. The Yeoville Community Park has already been restored and welcomes residents and visitors”.

Organisations such as the YBCDT played a role in attempts to socially and institutionally revitalise Yeoville. The YBCDT’s attempts were tailored to attract neighbourhood investment, arrest creeping urban decay, restore the value of the neighbourhood, improve property prices and consequently attract a middle class.

Crime and violence reduction was part of the regeneration agenda in Yeoville. A local politician underscored:

“For me personally, If only you solve your crime problem, the area will be stabilised and people will come and invest here. That is why I would like to focus on crime if I become Councillor. As long as you have invaded buildings, you will never address the problem of crime. The criminals stay there. The reason why some of my tenants were attacked is because we had a hijacked building next door. But now it’s no longer the case” (Interview, Mpho: 08/02/2011).

In similar breath, a local activist stressed:

“Community stabilisation and neighbourhood investment will only happen if we deal with the issue of law enforcement. By-law enforcement I do not just mean criminal law, I mean by-law also. There should be a *modus vivendi* in Yeoville. *Modus vivendi* is about the basic principle about how people can live” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010).

In this case, Maurice stressed the importance of the rule of law and “moral regeneration” (Rauch 2011) in attempts to reinvent and rebuild Yeoville. I conceptualise attempts to rejuvenate or improve the image of Yeoville as amounting to an imaginary territorial politics – a politics of nostalgia for a middle class past. This imaginary territorial politics is also reflected in perceptions and narratives about public space.

8.3. Public space and community security governance

I identify three forms of territorial practices, strategies and discourses in the community safety production arena, including i) neighbourhood protectionism; ii) street and park governance; and iii) governance of adult leisure and recreation.

8.3.1. Protecting the neighbourhood from “potential threats”

There was a tendency for residents of Observatory to distinguish themselves from those of Yeoville through spatio-social boundary maintenance and protection of their
spaces. In this case, Observatory residents have developed gated neighbourhoods such as Urania Village and employed private security – asserting their middle class identities against residents of Yeoville considered to be mainly working class or under class. Box 32 below details excerpts of an interview with a neighbourhood activist in Observatory.

**Box 32: “... a potential threat”**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>OK: What initiatives are there in your neighbourhood to respond to fear of crime?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lloyd: People can create gated communities. Urania Village was created in accordance with the City Improvement Districts Provincial Policy. There are concerns about security in Observatory Park which is not used by any other community in the area. Observatory Park has the highest positioned Park in Johannesburg and has an Indian Monument. It has the highest panoramic view both North and South Johannesburg.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>OK: In your view, what are the social impacts of gating in Observatory given its positioning next to Bellevue which is a low income neighbourhood?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lloyd: Any community is diverse. There are a number of theories about a high level of civil awareness. For example, some people argue that CCTV impinges on civil rights. Anybody who doesn’t live in a particular neighbourhood is considered to be a potential threat. There is confusion between people who reside in their area in terms of perceptions of public space, compared to people who live in other spaces. People travelling through a specific area are perceived as a potential threat. It just tends to take a racial dimension in South Africa.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Interview: Sector Crime Forum 3 chairperson (Also Urania Village Chairperson), 2011*

What can be observed in this case is a politics of territorial protectionism – also a politics of classist regionalism. In this case residents of observatory try to protect their neighbourhood from urban decay creeping from Yeoville and also from unwanted and potentially dangerous intruders. This is aimed at maintaining the value of the area; thus preserving its spatial capital and the associated symbolic capital; that is the prestige and honour associated with living in Observatory (cf. Bourdieu 1999). This, of course, is juxtaposed against the “shame” of living in the waste-land and ruins that Yeoville was considered to have become over the years. But how do those living in Yeoville view the neighbourhood?

### 8.3.2. “I don’t feel safe …”: spatio-temporalities of fear

In Yeoville streets and parks were considered to be the most dangerous spots. Fear in, or of, the streets and parks was heightened at night as shown by the results of the opinion and attitude survey (Box 33).
Box 33: “...I don't feel safe walking at night on the streets because there is too much crime”

The majority of respondents in the opinion and attitude survey indicated that the streets of Yeoville at night are particularly dangerous. Most of them indicated that they do not like walking on the streets of Yeoville at night. Asked about whether they felt safe in public spaces at night, 85% of opinion and attitude survey participants indicated that they do not. 15.0% indicated that they feel safe being in public spaces at night in Yeoville.

Most of those who indicated that they do not feel safe walking in Yeoville’s public spaces at night based their view on the perception that there is too much crime in Yeoville. Some indicated that they have heard a lot of stories about people being mugged in Yeoville, while others indicate that they have been victims of crime in Yeoville’s public spaces at night.

**Selected quotes from the opinion and attitude survey**

**Unsafe:**

“No, I don’t feel safe walking at night on the streets because there is too much crime. Even those street patrollers don’t come to our streets. They only patrol on Rockey Street. Maybe if they can change these Yeoville police officers and bring other officers here” (Participant T2A, 2011).

**Safe:**

Much safe as I told you because I am more secured. I am not scared of anything. I can withdraw money at any ATM; I can answer my phone at any time I don’t worry about being robbed (Participant T3A, 2011).

**Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011**

The opinion and attitude survey results show that during the day, there was a tendency for people to feel safer, although caution always had to be exercised in navigating Yeoville’s streets, parks and other public places (Box 34).

Box 34: Safety during the day in Yeoville

The majority of respondents in the opinion and attitude survey indicated that they feel safe in the public spaces, 72.5% of opinion and attitude survey participants indicated that they feel safe in Yeoville’s public spaces during the day. 12.5% indicated that sometimes they feel safe as much as they feel unsafe. 5.0% indicated that they do not feel safe at all during the day. Those who indicated that they feel safe based this on the view that
during the day they feel safe because there are many people on public places and that reduces
the chance of criminal victimisation. Some of these participants indicated that despite feeling
safe during the day, they were selective about the public places they frequent. Some indicated
that they feel much safer on the streets than in parks, because in parks there tend to be many
people roaming around without specific activities they are doing. Such people are deemed
dangerous. Those who indicated that they feel safe and unsafe at the same time depending
on context based this view on the fact that crime can occur during the day as much as it
occurs at night. Some indicated that they can walk during the day, but they avoid places such
as parks and generally avoid overcrowded areas like the front of Shoprite in Raleigh Street,
Yeoville.

Selected quotes from opinion and attitude survey

Safer:

“Yes, if I want to walk during the day I would feel safe in the streets more than the
parks. I say the streets more than the parks because of the people who are always in
the parks most of whom are men who seem not to have anything to do” (Participant

Not safe:

“You cannot feel safe as long as I have the fear that the person next to you might just
be thinking of mugging you or tricking you into falling into a trap. It’s like you have to
be alert at all times be it in the evening or afternoon since the people around you all
the time are the ones who are the potential muggers or robbers” (Participant T17B,
2011).

Cannot be sure:

“Yes, I can walk around in the afternoon because most people will be moving around
but will just make sure that I avoid overcrowded areas like Rockey and near Shoprite.
If I am to be near those places I will have to be careful because you might be nicely
asked for money or just end up without your wallet without even noticing how you
lost it” (Participant T13B, 2011).

Opinion and attitude: April-July 2011

Assessing the safety situation in Yeoville’s public spaces at night, a local politician
stated:

“I think the streets and parks are relatively safe during day time, but then at
night it’s totally different. If you are walking at night, you shouldn’t carry bags
because they are assumed to be carrying valuables. It’s risky. If you walk at
night you shouldn’t carry your cell phone. I had a tenant from Ghana. He used
to move around at night. At some point he never came back home and we
have never seen him again. It’s very strange. He left all his belongings. There
are many maybes to this story. The police never took the case seriously because
he was from Ghana, you know. So the streets are not safe. But myself as a
motorist I have never been hijacked at night” (Interview: Sipho, 2011).

Poor lighting of streets and parks at night made these spaces into zones liable to (fear
of) instant terror and crime.
About the Yeoville Park, the Ward Councillor once lamented:

“We had a very beautiful park, but today it looks bad. We have a big recreation centre and a spacious library. People say I don’t work, but I am very proud of what I have done for Yeoville. As far as I am concerned, ANC has done a lot in this area. I am representing ANC here, not Noma (ward councillor). The pavements in Yeoville have been well maintained. I had a meeting with street traders and they say they also want space on the pavements; they want to be recognised” (Ward Public Meeting, Noma: 13/11/2010).

And a ward public meeting participant complained:

“We are not happy about city parks. City Parks has not been maintaining the Park. We need lights for the park. By-laws are not being enforced. It’s not just about Region F. People are making fire on the pavements” (Ward Public Meeting participant: 09/10/2010).

Streets and parks in Yeoville experienced decay. This resulted in them being publicly considered as spaces of safety that were endangered and become dangerous. Yet parks are supposed to be spaces where people can spend their leisure time without fear or exposure to dangerous criminal, illegal or drug sub-cultures. There were allegations that parks were spaces where illegal businesses took place. As we drove past the Yeoville Park in a YCPF executive member’s car, he claimed:

“You see all these people sitting in the park. They are doing illegal business. They are selling drugs. There is even Home Affairs there…some of those people standing there produce forged IDs and passports. And the police don’t seem to be able to do anything about it. It’s bad. Where will our children play now?” (Conversation, Mduduzi: 16/08/2010)

In Sector Crime Forums, community members discussed the most dangerous of spots in Yeoville’s public places and mooted possible reactive or proactive solutions. Stories about dangers in places in Yeoville played a big role in shaping the residents’ collective and individual spatio-temporal strategies of navigating the neighbourhood. Residents would avoid places tagged as dangerous; especially at night. In different but related contexts Caldeira (2000:310) posits that “as people move around the city, they use city spaces in individual and creative ways and as de Certeau reminds us, make fragmented trajectories that elude legibility”. In essence, inscribed in people’s minds – consciously or subconsciously – are mental maps based on their physical and symbolic understanding of the city (Lynch 1960); as informed by good and bad experiences or hearsays about these spaces.
As much as open public spaces were considered as generating insecurity, spaces of entertainment and conviviality were also considered problematic.

8.3.3. Nightlife and daylife socio-economies and public danger

Spaces of entertainment and business including liquor outlets, guest houses and gambling houses were regarded as contributing to high incidences of crime and violence in Yeoville. In community meetings and daily discourses, participants underscored the significance of the linkage between liquor outlets, liquor abuse and violence. The ward councillor narrated:

“One day I found someone with his intestines outside. He had been assaulted. If you have a business, it’s not just about making money; you need to make sure your customers are safe. He already said that people get drunk and commit crime. It’s your responsibility not to sell alcohol to people who are already drunk. I know that the tavern might be creating employment to 20 or so people, but it’s destroying the community. As a community, we have a right to reject any liquor outlet that we don’t want. We don’t want to know about how much employment they are creating. Our focus is on the unlicensed; those that are licensed are okay. The other thing is that we don’t want to threaten your job; our concern is about the community. We see women and school kids being robbed. You hear them screaming” (Ward Public Meeting, Councillor Noma: 13/11/2010).

About the connection between alcohol, crime and violence, a local activist said:

“One serious contributing factor to crime is alcohol. Alcohol is socially attractive in this country. There is a belief that you can’t enjoy yourself if you are not drinking. There is an unhealthy preoccupation with alcohol in Yeoville Bellevue” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010).

Regarding one of the problematic liquor outlets, a local activist retorted:

“I want to address my brother from Chez Mangiza here. That place is a problem. We came there with environmental specialist and we could not even get in. That place is a bad place. We see children drinking outside that place. People are being robbed around that place. What is the name of that shebeen? … The police confiscated all the liquor three months ago and they closed down that place. There were truckloads of beer at that place and this was more than the allowed stock for a shebeen. The majority of people who drink there urinate on the streets. There is a lot of public violence there; people are assaulting each other with bottles. There are a lot of broken bottles outside the place …” (Ward Public Meeting, Thabang: 13/11/2010).
Apart from this one “problematic liquor outlet” discussed here, there were complaints that Yeoville was overloaded with liquor outlets - creating serious social problems in the area. In 2011, the YBCDT estimated that there were 140 liquor outlets in Yeoville - an area of about 10 km². Most of these liquor outlets were concentrated in or near Raleigh-Rockey Street. The opinion and attitude survey in Yeoville sustained the view that there is a strong link between liquor abuse, liquor drinking places and crime or violence (Block and Block 1995), at least in public perceptions (Box 35).

Box 35: Liquor and criminality or violence

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<td>Asked if there was any link between liquor abuse and crime and violence, 70.0% of opinion and attitude survey participants indicated that there is. 17.5% indicated that alcohol abuse does not necessarily lead to crime and violence. 12.5% did not respond to this question. Those who indicated that there is a link between alcohol abuse and crime and violence based this on the fact that alcohol abuse is associated with social crimes such as domestic violence and assault. Some indicated that there are criminals who use liquor as an inhibitor before committing criminal and violent acts. Liquor was also associated with addiction, including addiction to stronger drugs, which could lead people to commit crimes, such as property crimes (both petty and serious) to sustain their addiction. Liquor addicts are also characterised as easy prey for criminals, because when they are drunk they could be weak and might have poor judgement. Some people indicated that they generally feel unsafe around drunken people. Those who indicated that there is no link between criminality and violence and liquor abuse based their view on the idea that some people commit crimes although they do not take alcohol. An opinion and attitude survey participant maintains:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I don't think that there is a link because people commit crime even they are not drunk. And one is drunk he become weak and he cannot do something that needs more power and energy, as is the case with certain types of crime” (Participant T35D, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some indicated that a drunken person is normally weak and therefore cannot commit crimes that require power and strength. Some therefore emphasised that it depends on an individual and cannot be generalised.</td>
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Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011

79 Main business street in Yeoville
Liquor outlets were therefore targeted by community crime and violence prevention practices and discourses. A local activist suggested:

“We need to object to liquor licensing as an organisation. YSF is the right forum to do that. We need to object to both the gambling and liquor license applications. The problem in Yeoville is that we have too much alcohol and it’s not well managed. The problem is not alcohol per se” (YSF Meeting, Maurice: 11/2010).

The continued issuance of new liquor licences by the Gauteng Liquor Board was a source of contention involving Yeoville community activists, liquor traders and Gauteng Liquor Board. Community activists continually lobbied for the rejection of liquor license applications as a way of combating crime, violence and disorder in the Yeoville. An activist, who was one of the key players in the anti-liquor outlets initiative, explained:

“We did a survey on legal and illegal outlets. This was discussed with Liquor Board. They told The CPF and Advocacy and Empowerment Committee that illegal places are responsibility of SAPS. They must be shut down without negotiation. The Liquor Board only has responsibility for those outlets that have legal licenses or shebeen permits. So if there are compliance issues with legal outlets, this must be reported to the CPF or the Advocacy Committee or directly to the Liquor Board” (YCPF Broader Forum meeting, Maurice Smithers: 13/07/2011).

He described his strategy of monitoring new liquor trading, other business and land rezoning applications:

“I monitor newspapers such as The Times, The Gazette and there are currently no new applications for liquor licenses or for any town planning approvals of building rezoning. Last week in Yeovue News, there was an announcement that someone had applied for a license of a gambling machine and there were notices of liquor license applications …” (YBCEC meeting, Maurice: 25/05/2011).

In attempts to deal with the increasing number of liquor outlets, corruption was cited as a stumbling block:

“They pay to the Liquor Board. You cannot do anything. Yeoville is just a few square kilometres. How can we have this massive number of shebeens” (Sector Crime Forum 1 meeting, Maurice Smithers: 22/09/2010).

One question, however, is on whether or not drinking places are inherently criminogenic and violence-inducing. Evidence presented here suggests that drinking
places generate violence and crime. However, there is a view to the contrary. In her study of drinking-houses in medieval England, Sagui (2007) argues:

“If drinking-houses had simply been hotbeds of criminal activity, people would not have visited them and they certainly would not have paid more to drink there instead of purchasing cheaper ale on the street. People went to drinking establishments because they offered a convivial atmosphere …” (Sagui 2007: 30-31).

If anything, therefore, spaces of entertainment such as clubs do not necessarily spatter negative, criminogenic and violent energies, but are sociable spaces that are capable of generating social interaction and reduce social distance between different social groups. Such spaces could reduce mixophobic feelings\(^\text{81}\) between ethnically diverse people (Peters and de Haan 2011; Watt 2011), and therefore promote social tolerance - generating social capital rather than only violence, crime and other social vices.

The generalised fear in and of public spaces evinces the liquidity of fear (Bauman 2006) and how this fear has been habitualised to the extent of also assuming the status of a liquid institution in itself (see Chapters 1, 4). Negotiation of fear and anxieties by people transecting public spaces has become an everyday practice (de Certeau 1984), and a habit in its own right. Fear can be conceptualised as an institution because it is ontologically omnipresent, typified, shared and increasingly influencing everyday social discourses and practices. It is a reality sui generis (Charles 2006; Hilbert 1989; Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico 1982); imposing itself on the conscience of urbanites. Cities being spaces of uncertainty - or necropolises (Malaquais 2007) [places where the possibility of death is eminent] - inculcate a “culture of fear” (Tudor 2003). The consequence is the institutionalisation of this fear in various forms including community organisations and patterning of fear averting practices; amongst others (see Chapter Four). The city can therefore be conceptualised as abound with fear - formless and diffuse – “liquid fear” (Bauman 2006).

As testimony to its liquidity, fear (of violence and crime) in Yeoville percolated discourses about houses, land and the environment.

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\(^{81}\) Feelings of fear or dislike of mixing with strangers or those perceived to be different.
8.4. The house, land, environment and community safety governance

My findings reveal that housing space, public physical infrastructure, public waste management and noise control had direct and indirect (sometimes spurious) correlations with the propensity or non-propensity for public violence, crime and fear in Yeoville.

8.4.1. The house and community safety production

Housing in Yeoville was a sensitive issue with a potential to cause collective “anti-foreigner” violence or service delivery protests by a disgruntled South African population (cf. Chapter 7, subtitle 7.2.2). A community activist:

“I think the housing issue is an important one. It is raised in various public meetings. The issue of housing is a source of tension and conflict between South Africans and foreign nationals […]. We have areas in Yeoville which are in an advanced state of decay. The CPF has spent quite a lot of time over the past few years identifying hijacked buildings which are a source of tension in the community. We have identified 25 houses, in fact, close to 32 that have been hijacked. There is a house just around here. It is under the ownership of a Mauritian guy called Sumbion. I googled his name and found that this guy was arrested in 1988 on charges of drug trafficking. I also discovered that this house was bought about the same time. I talked to the guy staying at this building and he told me that the owner of this building disappeared saying he was going to Holland. What can we do about this house? Maybe we might need to set up a property trust to take control of the situation […]. There could be suspicion that some people might do a housing audit and then hijack houses. So we need to get a letter clearing us and authorising us to do the housing audit and track ownership. In Webb Street, there is a house that was abandoned 10 years ago” (YS-YBCDT meeting, Maurice: 2011).

A researcher from Wits University described the criminogenic aspects of hijacked buildings as we passed by a former bad building during a tour with Wits University students:

“This building had been hijacked before and had become a haven of criminals, but now it has been rehabilitated” (Tour: 19/08/2010).

Along with being an object spattering ethno-nationalist sentiments (see Chapter 7), the house was an object of security concern in itself. According to results of the opinion and attitude survey, housing type had a bearing on occupants’ perceptions of their susceptibility to crime, violence and fear (Box 36).
Box 36: Housing and criminality or violence

Comment

72.5% of opinion and attitude survey participants indicated that housing type has a bearing on real security and fear or lack thereof. 20.0% believed that there is no link between housing type and security and fear. 7.5% did not respond to the question pertaining to this issue.

The 72.5% who indicated that there was a link between housing type and vulnerability to crime based this on the idea that different types of housing have different levels of security or guarantees thereof.

There were competing perspectives, with some people saying that living in a free standing house is much safer than living in a house, while others claim that flats are much safer. Free standing houses were considered safer in that they are generally not as densely populated as flats and are of easily manageable sizes. It was made clear that those free standing houses that have security walls and gates and even manned by private security personnel are much safer than flats. At the same time some indicated that flats are generally much safer because they are almost always manned by private security guards. The 20.0% that believed that there is no link between housing type and security indicated so because they believe that any place can be secure or unsecure depending on the security measures that are put in place by those who live there or by owners. They also indicated that security of housing properties depend on where they are located. A house located in an area experiencing high levels of crime could be vulnerable irrespective of whether it is free standing or a flat.

Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011

The house itself was considered a relatively safe haven. The majority of opinion and attitude survey participants indicated that they felt safe at their places of residence (Box 37).

Box 37: Safety at residential places

Comment

Asked whether or not they felt safe at their residential places, 80% of opinion survey participants indicated that they feel safe. 12.5% stated that they do not feel safe. 7.5% did not respond to the question pertaining to this issue.

Summary of responses

Most of 80% of participants who indicated that they feel safe in their residential places indicated that they feel so because they have security measures such as wall, lockable gates and private security guarding among others. Some indicated that they feel safe because they have not been victims of crime yet.
Some indicated that they are now used to their neighbourhood and do not fear anything. Others indicated that they feel safe and in fact are safe because they avoid walking around at night. Of the 12.5% who indicated that they do not feel safe at all, some stated that it is because they stay in dangerous streets. Some indicated that they do not have security guards at their residential places. Some indicated that they do not feel safe because they have been attacked by criminals before. Others indicated that despite having high walls, they do not feel safe because criminals can still attack them.

Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011

Housing ownership was viewed, by some, as enhancing the participation of resident owners in community safety initiatives; while absent owners remained problematic, being always absent from community meetings. A YCPF executive member stated:

“Here in Yeoville, we have a problem, property owners do not show up for meetings. Perhaps, there are only 20% of people who would be the rightful owner of buildings. For example in Muller Street, from Joe Slovo to De La Rey, only 7 people could be the owners of those houses. That’s the problem in Yeoville. The property owners do not own up or come forward. Maybe they are afraid because they are not paying rent. What do we do now?” (People kept quiet) (Sector Crime Forum 2 meeting, Lehlonolo: 10/02/2011).

The opinion and attitude survey which suggested a strong link between housing tenurial conditions and likelihood of people to participate in community safety governance initiatives (Box 38).

Box 38: Housing tenure and effects on participation in community safety initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 21: Is there a link between housing ownership or tenurial types and likelihood or motivation of people to participate in community crime prevention initiatives?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- **Not response**
- **No response**
- **No**
- **Yes**

**Comment**

57.5% of participants indicated that there is a link between housing ownership or tenurial types and likelihood and motivation of people to participate in local crime prevention initiatives. 22.5% indicated that there is no linkage. 5% claimed to have no idea regarding this issue. 15% did not respond to this issue.

**Summary of responses**

Those who indicated that there is a link between housing ownership and likelihood to be concerned about crime and participate in crime prevention based this on the fact that those who own houses are interested in protecting their properties and their neighbourhoods because they are key stakeholders. In this regard, some noted that house owners are the ones that are most active in YCPF. Some home owners unequivocally stated that they do not accept criminals in their houses.

For some, the link between housing ownership or tenure and likelihood to participate in crime prevention initiatives is negative. These participants pointed out that some people are not willing to participate because they consider themselves temporary in the neighbourhood.
Those who indicated that there is no link between housing ownership or tenurial regimes and participation in crime prevention initiatives indicated that both tenants and property owners are affected by crime and all concerned about safety and therefore participate in local crime management initiatives. They indicated that even those people who do not own houses are concern about the security of their property and persons. Some indicated that most house owners do not stay in Yeoville, but in wealthier suburbs such as Sandton, Kensington and Observatory. Those who indicated that they “did not know” never explained their views.

Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011

The politics of housing casts itself as a politics of ethno-nationality - it is a source of tension between some South Africans and African immigrants. This happens against a backdrop of claims of entitlement to houses on the basis of South Africanness in a context of potential competition for housing space with an African immigrant population in Yeoville. Linked to house-associated ethno-national regionalist politics in the community safety governance field are regimes of land governance discussed below.

8.4.2. Responding to illegal land rezoning

There were attempts by some neighbourhood residents to participate in land rezoning initiatives, objecting to neighbourhood development proposals they did not like or which they perceive to endanger them and their habitat. Residents were legally expected to influence the trajectory of neighbourhood development, at least on paper. The reality was much more complex. One community church leader complained:

“If there is going to be a rezoning of a residential area into commercial stand such as a guest house, it has to be approved with consultation with people… They (council/government) start by doing something first, then they start justification. Some of these places are operating without licences. They continue operating without our consent, despite our objections. These people pay police officers”. (Ward Public Meeting, Ntate Muruti: 11/09/2010).

The same church leader complained about the prevalence of illegal land rezoning in Yeoville:

“There is a lot illegal building happening in Yeoville, for example 11 Muller Street, 49 Francis Street, 52 Francis Street. There are 3 shops being opened at 52 Francis Street. Most people doing this are not South Africans. If a South African does that, he will be squashed immediately” (YSF Meeting, Ntate Muruti: 16/09/2010).
Such illegal land rezoning was blamed for lawlessness and criminality.

Guesthouses and liquor outlets in Yeoville, many of which were regarded as products of illegal land rezoning, were considered to be community endangering spaces. Other scholars have referred to such spaces as “socioscapes” (Jansson 2002), “playscapes” (Chatterton and Hollands 2002) or “consumptionscapes” (Venkatraman and Nelson 2008). These spaces of pleasure were a source of community tension in Yeoville. The rezoning of residential places into guest houses in Yeoville was viewed by some residents as an elaborate example of criminogenic land rezoning. Most of the guest houses were suspected to be operating as “undercover” for criminal and clandestine activities, including drug dealing and prostitution. A police officer claimed:

“Last year we found stolen cars in yards of guest houses. The car-jackers were from Durban and they had many stolen cars in this guest house. Even this issue of cocaine is being done in guest houses” (Sector Crime Forum 1 meeting, Warrant Officer Mbaula: 02/06/2011).

And a community activist emphasised:

“There is too much complain about guest houses. There are little girls coming in at night and going out in the morning. There is a visible potential for prostitution. Guest houses should be little first item on agenda in the next meeting. On the 20th of November Yeoville studio will give feedback on studies on street trading. Today 21st October, street vendors met to organise themselves” (YSF Meeting, Thabang: 16/09/2010).

Guest houses were suspected to be operating as brothels and to be spaces where sexual crimes were committed; what Gaissad (2005) calls “sexual territories”. These “sexual territories” constituted a vibrant “nightlife” (Gaissad 2005) social economy of Yeoville, as much as they were part of daylife. Some community members registered suspicion about guest houses. One echoed:

“In the run up to the 2010, a lot of guest houses erupted. They are closed gates and you don’t know what is happening there” (Ward Public Meeting, Participant: 11/09/2010).

The issue of illegal land rezoning was of concern to the YCPF. The YCPF chairperson stated:

“As a CPF, we also have a challenge with these buildings. For us as a community, it is our duty to come together and solve our problems. As Sector 1, sector 2 and sector 3 have agreed that we should form street committees. At
“We need to create a database of liquor outlet ownership in this area. We also need to deal with schools operating on private house. It was stated that there was a school which accommodates about 450 pupils, yet it has only 2 toilets. They don’t have proper facilities. There is also a challenge of unlawful businesses. We need to deal with the owners of properties to deal with the establishment of spaza shops and businesses in residential places. We need to maintain the value of the area. This area is regarded as a suburb, not a township. So we need to deal with the illegal rezoning of buildings and illegal liquor outlets. We have a problem with both legal and illegal liquor outlets. Some legal liquor outlets do not comply with the requirement of their licenses” (Sector Crime Forum 1 meeting, Lehlonolo: 18/08/2011).

Contestations over land rezoning could be interpreted as an incarnation of struggles in the territorial field (Bourdieu 2005). In this territorial field, there are struggles for appropriation of space for business or residential use, with conflict between the two as in this case. Here, there is tension between the business man possessing economic capital and a populace that desire to accumulate spatial capital by gaining access to decent accommodation. Another form of territorial contestation takes place in spaces of participatory local environmental governance.

8.4.3. Polluting the environment, violating communities?

Responses to the question of whether there was a connection between environmental uncleanliness and crime or violence in Yeoville are summarised in Box 39 below.

Box 39: Link between lack of environmental cleanliness and crime or violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 22: Is there a link between environmental cleanliness and crime or violence?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of responses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and criminality based their view on the view that dirty places such as illegal dumping sites become hideouts for criminals. A clean environment is viewed as creating a convivial atmosphere and improves a sense of territoriality and belonging. Those in the opinion survey who indicated a link between environmental dirtiness and criminality based that on the view that criminals feel at ease committing crime in secluded and dirty places like rubbish dumps. Those opposed to this view believed that crime can occur even in cleaner places. See quotes below:

“Yes I consider these spaces to be dirty and I say that there is a link with crime and violence incidences because for most of crime makers, such spaces are at their advantages, they can kill someone or rape a woman inside there because they are aware that none will go in as it is a dirty space” (Participant T22C, 2011).

“Not at all. People steal anywhere regardless of the cleanliness of the area which is why security is everywhere including Observatory” (Participant T14B, 2011).

Was Yeoville considered dirty or clean by its residents? While some opinion and attitude participants described Yeoville as relatively clean, others noted that it was dirty. 52.5% of participants indicated that Yeoville was clean. 32.5% claimed that it was unclean. 2.5% indicated that it could be cleaner. 2.5% declined to comment. 10% did not respond to this question. One participant in the opinion and attitude survey indicated:

“Yeoville is dirty everywhere and in all ways. Nothing is done in terms of cleanliness. And also people need to be aware about cleanliness in this area because people leave rubbish anywhere they don’t know the importance of the dustbins implemented in the street” (Participant T32D, 2011).

Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011

Although the results (in Box 39) show that uncleanliness is criminogenic to some extent, they suggest that the connection between grime and crime is at best spurious. This is because most opinion and attitude survey participants suggested that there was no direct link between grime and crime; thus casting doubt on the presuppositions of the “broken windows theory” (Wilson and Kelling 1982). One could claim that not all unclean places are criminogenic and not all supposedly clean places repel crime and violence.

Some salvation to the broken windows theory came from the finding that noise pollution was viewed as a public nuisance with potential to generate violence and criminality. In a Sector Crime Forum meeting, a participant complained:

“We have problems with some churches making noise to people. We tried to talk to them nicely, but we can’t reach an agreement. These churches run from Monday to Sunday. They start making noise from 4 pm to 12 pm. Our children cannot read. We have reported this to police, but it’s not helping. There is a church at Corner Muller Street and Joe Slovo. They don’t listen.
They are playing a money game” (Sector crime forum 1 meeting, participant: 02/06/2011).

Noise governance (associated with liquor outlets and churches) proved to be an important issue in order maintenance and security governance. The issue of noise was considered to be a serious one, with potential violent repercussions as spill-over effects.

Community stakeholders, including the police, placed importance on maintenance of the environment as a way of governing local security. A SAPS officer described the strategy for noise policing:

“We talked about this matter in our previous SAPS – CPF meeting. We will deal with that with the Metro. We will try to help. We will confiscate the noise making equipment” (SCF1 meeting, Constable Phiri: 02/06/2011).

Street guardianship, involving both police and civilians was deemed necessary for successfully purging the streets of hawkers; who were accused of littering Rockey-Raleigh Street. It was noted:

“The Street Ambassador programme has never been properly communicated so most people do not know about it. He said he had heard from the Department of Economic Development in the City of Joburg that even if they employed Yeoville Bellevue people, they will not deploy them in the area to avoid bribery and people not doing their work. He said that this issue must be solved by good management. It cannot be used as a reason not to deploy locals to do the work” (YCPF Broader Forum Meeting, Maurice: 13/07/2011).

It was envisaged that street governance through civilian street guardianship, in which community members participate could help to effectively reduce littering of streets and other public spaces. However, it had potentials to heighten tensions between South Africans and non-South Africans; as those who would officially engage in street guardianship would be South Africans. Xenophobic tensions would be probable in an area like Yeoville, in which the majority of those to be policed by South African street ambassadors would be African immigrants.

The issue of environmental governance evoked anger and xenophobic sentiments from sections of the South African public in Yeoville. The littering of streets and public open spaces was construed as acts of problematic African immigrant litterers (see Chapter 7, Box 24). African immigrants, were scapegoated in some South African
public discourses as coming from “unplanned and disorganised” African cities - hence their “perceived” lack of environmental consciousness (Majombozi 2010). Thus, environmental governance is an arena of ethno-national regionalist politics.

8.5. On the centrality of territorial politics: concluding note

As deriving from the foregoing, I observe that community safety governance is an arena spattering an imaginary and nostalgic territorial micro-politics. Such a politics is imaginary and nostalgic in that it is associated with organisational, individual and social group attempts to recreate the image of Yeoville - often taking the form of yearning for a middle-class past in a neighbourhood that faces urban decay, crime and violence. I depict two forms of territorial regionalist politics in the field of community safety production. Firstly, there is ethno-national territorial regionalism in which the occupancy of Yeoville by African immigrants is perceptively co-related to the onset and entrenchment of neighbourhood physical and moral decay. This ethno-national regionalism takes the form of a politics of exclusion of non-nationals from public participation in matters of community safety. It also takes the form of counter-otherisation practices and discourses by African immigrants resisting their scapegoating as causers of local social problems. These African immigrants also find themselves forming ethno-national enclaves that become protective sanctuaries in an environment muddled by fear of xenophobic violence. Secondly, there is classist territorial regionalism in which wealthier neighbourhoods and individuals protect their spaces against perceived creeping urban decay and intruders.

Territorial regionalist politics also cascades into a politics of tension over the house, public land and public environment. In this case there were struggles to protect houses from break-ins. The politics of the house in Yeoville is specific in that there was tension over housing ownership and “hijacked buildings”. Again, this tension took an ethno-national regionalist dimension and in which the “criminal African immigrant” was perceived as the typical hijacker. The same anti African immigrant ethno-national regionalist politics pervaded discourses about the environmental litterer and noise polluter.

The politics (spatial and administrative) of matters regarding land rezoning was institutionalised. Ideally, residents were expected to participate in public forums,
especially ward public meetings, to deliberate on applications to the City for land rezoning - wielding the right to object to or endorse applications. In this case applications for rezoning of houses into guest houses (considered as disguises for brothels) and for liquor outlet licences became highly politicised; generating tension. In the next chapter I condense my key arguments, concluding this thesis (Chapter 9).
9. Chapter Nine
Consolidating a socio-spatial analysis of community safety governance

9.1. Preamble

Based on evidence presented and discussed in previous chapters, I reiterate the three arguments of this thesis. I maintain that community safety governance is i) a field of micro-politics involving community organisations, institutions, social groups and individuals in search of various species of capital (Chapter 6); ii) an arena of ethno-national regionalist politics (Chapter 7); iii) a field of territorialised discourses, practices and strategies of stakeholders (Chapter 8).

In sections below, I discuss the significance of my research findings and analysis and then conclude by pointing out a few areas for further thought and research. I start by summarising and re-examining the argument that community safety governance is an arena of stakeholder micro-politics.

9.2. Community safety governance: a field of stakeholder politics

This section nails the argument that community safety governance is a field of power politics involving community stakeholders (organisational, institutional, individual and social group). These stakeholders compete and coalesce for social, political, economic, and moral, among other resources or capitals at stake. I highlight my findings on the form and logic of contestation and coalition of these stakeholders and their practices in forums of deliberative community safety governance.

9.2.1. The form and logic of contestation and coalition

I maintain that community security governance is a field of micro-politics in which organisations, institutions, social (interest) groups or individuals compete and coalesce for political, moral, social, economic and cultural profit (Chapter 6). Chapter 6 maps out the positionalities of community organisations, institutions, individuals and social groups involved in community safety governance in Yeoville; unpacking the ensuing contestation and coalition.
The micro-politics resulting from stakeholder interaction in the safety governance field, I argue, is about and goes beyond safety production. There are contestations for local socio-political influence – the production of safety being the springboard for power-seeking endeavours. In Yeoville, for example, I observed the domination of the local socio-political landscape by a few individual stakeholders from the YBCDT, YSF, Ward Committee, ADF and YCF. Sometimes, in this concentration of socio-political influence, there was duplication of effort and activities as organisations replicated one another. Complexifying this mix was the presence of government agents, such as SAPS, JMPD and Gauteng Department of Community Safety, all of which had stakes in the field of community safety governance.

What I observed in Yeoville is that inter-stakeholder micro-politics, as much as it is geared for safety production, is also about gaining and retaining power. Some individuals seek to launch their political careers by getting involved in community safety activism. Some seek a livelihood (Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012). Safety production is therefore big business politically, economically, socially, morally and symbolically.

Explaining my observations, I argue that stakeholders in the community safety governance field struggle to acquire, marshal and access political capital (power, legitimacy and recognition), symbolic capital (honour and prestige), economic capital (material resources), social capital (personal networks), cultural capital (in the form of knowledge among other forms), and moral capital (satisfaction emanating from selfless acts). These capitals are by and large conceptualised as the defining capitals of the community security governance field. To the extent that these capitals are not deployed perversely or corruptly, I consider them as convertible to or as epitomising security capital or capital of security. Capital of security or security capital is any resource used to govern or reduce fear of real or imagined violence and crime. Observing the stakeholder contestation and coalition within the community safety governance field, I confirm Samara’s observation that the governance of security has become “central to urban politics” (Samara 2011: 13).

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82 There are potentials for perverse use of these capitals.
Analysis of community security governance as a field of competition and coalition for access to and control of security capital and other capitals is not unproblematic. While the concept of *capital* are useful in understanding the logics and dynamics of the micro-politics of community security governance, it risks reducing an analysis of community security governance to an otherwise simplistic deductive understanding that unrelentingly uses an explicit or hidden language of profit. One would question the fact that community stakeholders working in the community security governance field are inherently driven by a *habitus of profit* or *habitus of homo economicus* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992); one of political, social, economic, cultural, moral and symbolic profit. This is because there could be other non-calculative or non-profit motives behind volunteering in the community security sector?

In section below, I analyse the hidden or salient practices, strategies and interest in the arena of participatory safety governance.

### 9.2.2. Stakeholder practices and discourses in participatory safety governance

Some community safety governing organisations in Yeoville provided arenas of deliberative safety governance. These included the YCPF, YCF, YSF, Ward Committee and ADF, all concentrating on diverse mandates, including community safety. One of the main modes of operation of these entities was the holding of community meetings. I observe that more often than not, these meetings yielded no concrete resolutions, yet they continued to take place periodically. How could one explain this?

Community meetings can be interpreted as epitomising a *ritualisation* and *habitualisation* of public behaviour and helping resolve local social dualisms and tensions (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Giddens 1991; Goffman 1963a). In Bourdieusian terms, such habitualisation or routinisation of public behaviour is a product of *social practice* (Bourdieu 1977). The more people attend meetings, the more meeting attendance as behaviour is inscribed into their temporal and spatial cognitive maps; constituting their *habitus* (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu 2000b). Through creating an outlet for social frustrations, community meetings become a security governance strategy. Meetings play a dual role of both toning the probability of “perverse forms of social practices” against suspected criminals.
While meetings are an outlet for social anger, they could be arenas where social anger brews, with potential for generation of a socially perverse public habitus which often results in the stereotypical targeting of certain social groups, especially non-South Africans as criminals. Since the public “talk of crime” (Caldeira 2000) in meetings symbolically casts the non-South African and the youth as criminals, it creates a dangerous pathway which has potential to turn violent. Spaces of public participation in deliberations about local security are spaces in which both violent activities are mooted or toned down at the same time. CPFs and other local organisations in South Africa were implicated in the outburst of xenophobic violence in most places in South Africa (Misago 2011), yet at the same time they could play a significant role in managing local tensions, providing spaces for expression of social anger and reducing local violence.

What is the role of state actors in the arena of participatory safety governance in Yeoville? My findings show that community security governance is an arena of cooperation and contestation between community organisations and the state (Chapter 6). I refer to community-state contestations in the field of community safety production as epitomising the “state-community security co-production polemic”. This depicts contradictions emerging in attempts by the SAPS (and other government departments) and community to work together to deliver local safety.

Through Sector Crime Forums in Yeoville, SAPS officials attempted to engage in community-oriented policing. The Yeoville policing district was divided into three sectors, each under the management of a SAPS officer and a civilian Sector Crime Forum chairperson. All the three sectors, ideally, had police vans, with mobile numbers displayed on them, patrolling at any time of the day and night. Sectors are therefore sites of direct communication between SAPS officers and the public, through meetings and enablement of members of the public to report any cases or issues that SAPS officers were supposed to deal with.

The introduction of sector policing in South Africa can be interpreted as signifying attempts by the state to reproduce its hegemony in the security governance field. By getting involved in policing at grassroots levels, the SAPs officials able to tap on local knowledges (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). Sector crime forums (SCFs) are uncritically
viewed as sub-forums of the CPF (Steinberg 2005), but in real terms they give some leverage to the SAPS in the processes or safety governance at local level. I observed that, in Yeoville, sector managers wielded more power than civilian sector chairpersons whose responsibilities and duties can be described as ceremonial. The Sector managers were responsible for calling meetings and setting the agenda for the meetings, while the civilian chairperson was responsible for chairing meetings. While Sector Crime Forums offer SAPS officials room to exert influence in the arena of community safety production, they are also spaces that allow members of the public to hold police officers accountable for their actions.

Since police officers, in their interaction with the public, personify the state, such interaction enables the public not only to see, but “access” and dialogue with the state in some way (Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2011). SCFs provide a space for interaction between the public and SAPS officials. While SCFs are considered as spaces for community oriented democratic policing; they can be viewed sceptically as spaces in which police officers as lower level state officials “canvass information” about public frustration and anger for purposes of state intelligence that enables the state to manage this anger and frustration and thereby maintain, a perhaps undemocratic status quo (Katsaura 2012).

The local political dynamics of security governance are inherently articulated to and reflective of “supra-local politics”. This supra-local politics largely aims at the sustenance of the “existing neoliberal political-economic configuration”, while promoting “impotent participation and consensual good techno-managerial governance” (Swyngedouw 2011: 371). The government’s drive to promote public participation is driven by the broader project of sustaining the status quo, rather than promoting radical socio-economic changes. I observe that government promotion of public participation in security governance is to some extent a part of the broader agenda of public pacification, and minimisation of government expenses by tapping on local labour and local knowledge, whilst still managing to govern local security from a distance. In this case, public participation can be interpreted as entrenching the symbolic domination of the state, exercised on citizens and residents - sustaining a statist order. Public participation, especially in invited spaces, can therefore be viewed as a strategy by government to police the public, “through canvassing of popular
views” (Swyngedouw 2011:372) and (devising strategies of) managing public discontent.

I agree with Swyngedouw’s (2011:373) view that politics is increasingly being reduced to policing of the public. Given this, one is tempted to concur with the view that we are now living in a post-political, post-democratic world in which there is an “erosion of democracy and squeezing of the public sphere” (Swyngedouw 2011: 370). Questions regarding the genuineness of participation can be asked as some dismiss it as tokenistic and parasitic (Arnstein 2011).

Community safety governance should therefore be conceptualised as an arena of micro-politics if one is to capture the (hidden and open) social group, organisational and institutional dynamics there in. Ethno-national regionalist politics thickens fault lines in the field of community safety production.

9.3. Ethno-nationalist dynamics in the community safety governance field

Ethno-nationalist discourses in the broader social and political fields in South Africa tended to structure social relations at the local level of Yeoville; percolating local discourses and practices of safety governance.

9.3.1. Ethno-national regionalist discourses

This study suggests and proves that the social politics of community security governance in the context of Yeoville were characterised by ethno-national regionalist dynamics (Chapter 7). Ethno-national regionalist practices, perceptions and discourses seemed to be habitualised. This was observed in public meetings and other forums in which citizenship became a rule or guiding principle in the allocation of blame for local challenges of urban insecurity and disorder, including crime, violence and urban decay. In these discourses, there was a generalised perception of African immigrants as “criminals”, “invaders”, “job seizers” amongst others - all reinforcing the criminalisation of African immigrants. These views openly and subtly pervaded some of the practices in local organisations such as the YCPF and YCF. Facing this otherisation; African immigrants adopted counter-otherising strategies in groups and as individuals. This involved not attending local meetings (as silent protest), and creating their own forums to advance or protect their interests. I
consider activities of migrant organisations such as the ADF as falling in the ambit of counter-otherising regimes within the community security field of Yeoville.

One has to be cautious in attributing xenophobic and other forms of violence in cities to ethno-national diversity or cultural difference. Does ethno-national difference necessarily account for violence? Myers and Murray warn against casual reasoning in explaining the relationship between cultural diversity and urban violence (Myers and Murray 2007). They argue that “cultural identities and assertions of difference do not necessarily result in urban conflict” (Myers and Murray 2007:11).

There is increasing celebration of the formation of “post-border cities”; ones characterised by cultural hybridity, cosmopolitanism and diasporic transnational crossings (Malaquais 2007). However the idea of a harmonious cultural hybridity in cities is far-fetched, especially given the stark reality of violence, crime and fear which is heightening as cities grow fast. Massive immigration in the context of Johannesburg has generated a precarious social order; an order that is decorated by possibilities of imminent ethno-national regionalist violence and crime and associated fears. What we have seen in Johannesburg and other South African cities is the invocation of claims to autochthony (Geschiere and Jackson 2006), which has generated xenophobic violence and a xenophobic public culture (Neocosmos 2008; Neocosmos 2010).

The findings of this thesis confirm the propensity of some South Africans to exclude African immigrants from political participation in local communities, and at the same time blame them when things go wrong. In fact, everyday violence (criminal and vigilante) and crime in South Africa can be interpreted as ritualistic and symbolic expressions. This, in some way, qualifies violence as part of cultural practice. Yet Springer (2011: 90) finds it difficult to accept the view that violence is integral to cultural practice, given the frivolous and undue depiction of non-Western cultures, such as those of African, Asian and Islamic societies, as supposedly having an inherent predilection towards violence. This, to him, is a question of “geopolitical hegemony”. At a global level, Springer’s views are convincing, but at a local level the stark reality of everyday violence and crime suggest that these have become a way of life - cultural practices.
I also show how ethno-nationalist discourses influence stakeholders’ strategies and practices in the community safety governance field.

9.3.2. Ethno-national regionalist practices

Ethno-nationalist regionalist practices and discourses against African immigrants constitute the exercise of *symbolic violence* against them. I argue, in this case, following von Holdt’s (2012c) observation in his studies of violence in South Africa, that there is a thin line dividing symbolic violence and physical violence. Threats of violence against African immigrants (or those breaking the law) are here analysed as constituting performative statements or rituals affirming their perceived illegitimacy and un-belonging to the South African polity. The statement to the state or government is that they should take measures to reduce crime by tightening migration policy to control the influx of African immigrants. It is also a clamour by some South Africans to citizenship benefits, such as access to socio-economic goods or services provided by government, ahead of non-South Africans perceived to be illegitimate intruders bringing unnecessary or unwanted economic and social competition. My observation coincides with Springer’s (2011:93) argument that contrary to the perception displayed in media, “violence is not senseless at all” and is rather “scheduled and programmed through rationality”.

Stakeholder and ethno-nationalist politics associated with community safety governance is also performatively and symbolically expressed in perceptions of place and territory (nation, city, neighbourhood, streets, parks and houses etc.).

9.4. Territory and micro-politics of community safety governance

I argue, based on my findings, that community stakeholder and ethno-national regionalist politics in community safety governance is pregnant with discursive territorial politics - a politics of narratives about territory, place and space (Chapter 8). Some of these narratives demonstrate a politics of nostalgia about perceived better and safer days and a politics of yearning for neighbourhood image regeneration or improvement. Also embedded in these narratives is territorial or spatial regionalist politics that is pampered by classism and ethno-nationalism.
9.4.1. Territorial imageries of fear and safety (production)

Narratives from this study show that in the quest for safety production, some community stakeholders sought spatial or territorial image regeneration of the neighbourhood. The focus was on the transformation of Yeoville from an image of a neighbourhood i) fraught with social malaise such as crime and violence; and ii) suffering urban decay; to that of a more habitable neighbourhood (catering for the safety and other needs [of the middle class]). This came with efforts by local organisations such as the YBCDT to (claim to) promote the socio-economic and physical regeneration of the neighbourhood; amounting to attempts to (re)generate or raise spatial capital (Lars 2008).

At a more miniature level, in the imageries of the neighbourhood expressed by residents walking the streets, using the parks and staying in houses everyday, there was a politics of fear of certain places. This fear was particularly heightened at night. However, people continued to stay in the neighbourhood for reasons of convenience, inability to afford other areas and sometimes to be close to relatives, friends and members of their own tribes or ethnic groups.

9.4.2. Territorial regionalist practices

There are two kinds of territorial regionalist politics observed in this study - territorialised class-based, individual and ethno-national regionalist politics. Classist politics as practiced territorially or spatially takes the form of neighbourhood or property protectionism by members of the middle class. In this case, I notice the development of road closure initiatives and gating of spaces in Observatory, arguably to “stop the creeping of urban decay” from Yeoville; and also to secure their spaces against crime. Road closures and “community gating” is tantamount to taking a classist position in the territorial field of the city.

The same logic (although not necessarily classist) applies in cases (even in Yeoville) where individuals protect their housing spaces (private spaces) through walling or fencing. That can be analysed as a case of individualist or family or household based territorial regionalism – akin to taking and maintaining a spatial or territorial position in the territorial field of a neighbourhood.
Ethno-nationalised politics reflected on (and resulted from) the fear or contempt of social groups perceived as not belonging to the South African polity. Ethno-national regionalism is expressed and reinforced in everyday practices and public discourses - consequently becoming publicly habitualised. Such discourses and practices expressively percolate and are churned out in public forums such as the YCPF, YCF and ward public meetings (Benit-Gbaffou and Mkwanazi 2011). In the context of Yeoville, such discourses performatively otherised African immigrants; creating, generating and maintaining a platform for ethno-national polarisation. These discourses took the form of blaming of African immigrants for local problems - crime, violence and urban decay. An environment that was created was one in which African immigrants adopted counter-otherisation practices and discourses, individually or in organisations (such as ADF).

In light of all this, what are the key lessons of this study? What issues deserve further research and thought? Below, I wrap up with these questions in mind.

9.5. Recapitulation and openings for further research

In light of the foregoing, I propose a serious consideration of a socio-spatial agenda in professional urban practice and scholarship. This agenda transcends the spatialism and physicalism characteristic of mainstream urban professional practice and the sociologism that tends to characterise urban sociological thought. Neither approach, on its own, is profitable in urban safety governance, urban governance or urban planning. Physical infrastructures in a city should be squarely aligned to the city’s social infrastructures or social structures.

Urban thought and professional planning practice needs to appeal to diverse socialities within the city, including the needs of the poor or the margizens (Schuilenburg 2008) - what Greed calls “social town planning” (Greed 1999). “Social town planning may broadly be defined as any movement to introduce policies that take into account more fully the needs of the diversity of human beings who live in our towns and cities (which, many would argue, mainstream town planning has failed to do)”, writes Greed (1999:4).
In light of the practicalities and rationalities of urban safety governance I deal with here, I wrap up by asking: from this research whereto and so what? My brief response is futuristic. I note that, despite being a prominent social thinker of the 20th century, Bourdieu’s social thought is marginally integrated into urban thought. This thesis has attempted to redeem Bourdieu’s “lost urban sociology” (Savage 2012) and invoke Bourdieusian ideas in urban safety governance thought.

There is still a need for a sustained search for knowledge and for “thinking tools” to explain urban challenges and crises - including urban violence and crime. African cities, given their constellation of urban challenges, could be laboratories for developing new criminological, sociological, urban planning, geographical, anthropological and other theoretical insights about order and social control in contemporary cities. Even if western theories are invited to understand these issues, African cities can provide laboratories in which these can be tested, refuted and repackaged for rethought. This task requires more serious consideration by urban scholars; especially those in Africa or interested in understanding African cities.

Through this research, I open a vein for further research. As much as I integrate gender into my ethno-nationality oriented analysis, it would be interesting in the future to explore in detail the role of women in spaces of participatory safety governance. The positioning of youths in the community security governance matrix also deserves further analysis in a context of their “advanced marginalisation” (Wacquant 1993; Wacquant 2008d) in city economies and polities. Also important is a study of the role of faith-based organisations and their practices and discourses in the politics of urban community safety production.

On a conclusive note, I reiterate that the production of safety at a neighbourhood level is a social, political, symbolic, moral and economic business in which micro-politics is played out by involved collective and individual stakeholders. Any policy intervention at this level should, therefore, appreciate the miniature political economy of this business if it is to succeed. However, in conceptualising community safety governance through this lens, one has to be cautious with the use of the language of profit.
10. References


ADF. 2011. "We yearn for tolerant and peaceful co-existence of South Africans and migrants." in _Yeovue News_. Johannesburg: YBCDT.


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11. Appendices

Appendix A: Definitions and short discussions of some key concepts

**Community organisations**: are non-profit civil society organisations operating within a territorial unit, otherwise referred to as neighbourhood or loosely as community. The concept of community is a fluid and amorphous one (Sutlles 1972; Thorns 2002); and communities can be conceptualised as ‘imagined’ entities (Bauman 2002). In this study, I focus mainly on communities-of-place and communities of interest - groups of people living within or transecting the same geographical boundaries or bound by commonalities in interests (Vergunst 2006).

**Community politics** (sometimes used interchangeably with local politics), refers to action to deal with issues at the micro-level of neighbourhood and it also depicts the various constellations of local interests (Katsaura 2012). Micro-politics refers to the formal and informal power-seeking and power deployment as well as (often hidden) miniature processes of interaction within/between groups or by individuals within and outside (community) organisations (Barnes et al. 2004; McAreavey 2006).

**Community security governance** or community safety governance, depicts practices through which organised communities or social groups protect themselves and their spaces from violence, crime and fear thereof. In this case, I adopt the definition of governance as ‘self-organising, inter-organisational networks’ which ‘complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and coordination’ (Rhodes 1996: 652). In this case I focus on residents’ efforts at organising and coordinating themselves for the production of safety – a form of micro-governance of safety (Jentoft 2007; Kempa et al. 2002).

**Cultural capital**: comes in the form of cultural goods or knowledge (Bourdieu 1986).

**Economic capital**: is embodied in (and cashable as) material resources (Bourdieu 1986).

**Ethno-nationalism**: refers the allocation of differences, based on ethnic and/or national origin of a person or social group (Nederveen 1996; Nederveen 2007) – otherwise referred to as ethnopolitics (Fumagalli 2007; Jamal 2007).

**Fear**: is the anxiety experienced in anticipation of real or imagined danger; and it can be concrete (linked to real danger), formless (generalised feeling of being in danger) or diffuse (rooted in the social and economic context) (Bannister and Fyfe 2001; Silverman and Della-Giustina 2001). On the other hand, security, although it is a broad concept, is defined here as freedom from (the thought of) victimisation or fear. The opposite of which is insecurity.

**Moral capital**: is the moral prestige, whether of an individual, an organisation, emanating from a cause in useful service; not necessarily driven by self-interest (Casey 2005; Kane 2001).

**Moral economy**: is a concept that describes practices which purport to advance the values of virtuousness, fairness and justice, amongst others (Bowles and Gintis 1998) – perhaps selflessly contributing to the production of public safety.

**Political capital**: is defined in terms of access to power and useful political networks (Bourdieu 1986).

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83 This is an operational definition that I adopt for the purpose of this paper and I do not have space here to engage in a debate about definitions of community organisations, community and neighbourhood.

84 I have no space to engage in a detailed debate of what ‘community’ is.


86 The opposite of which is insecurity.
Political economy is, here, used to review the material logic behind power struggles, contestation and coalition of stakeholders engaged in community safety production (Sayer 2000).

Social capital is defined in terms of benefits that can accrue to an individual or group by virtue of being linked in particular networks or engaging in particular social relations (Bourdieu 1986).

Social economy, here, refers to activities of community stakeholders (organisational, institutional, social group or individual) working for, or at least claiming to work for, the public good (Kay 2006) - producing community safety in this case.

Socio-spatial politics refers to the dialectical interweaving of social dynamics and spatial dynamics. Through this concept, I capture the manifestation and dramatisation of the interlacing of social space and physical space in the micro-politics of community safety governance.

Spatial capital is a concept that captures the idea of value or saleability and utility of land and of place or physical space as it were (Lars 2008).

Symbolic capital is defined in terms of honour and prestige accrued within a specific field (Bourdieu 1986).

Violence and Crime: While analytical definitions of violence vary, I define it here as the ‘use of forceful acts motivated by the conscious or unconscious desire to obtain or maintain political, economic or social power’ (MacIliwaine and Moser 2004). I resort to a conceptual continuum that distinguishes between social, political and economic violence (Moser and MacIliwaine 2001). I note that concepts of violence and crime should not be used interchangeably as not all violent acts are criminal and not all criminal acts are violent (Moser and MacIliwaine 2004; Pillay 2008). Crime can be defined as behaviour that violates codified law (McLaughlin and Muncie 2001). Crime is ‘not a self-evident and unitary concept’, but a contested one (McLaughlin and Muncie 2001: 59). Its constitutions and definitions are diverse and historically, contextually, theoretically contingent (Ibid: 59).

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Appendix B: Summary of fieldwork activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Method</th>
<th>Frequency of deployment of method</th>
<th>Description of participants/ activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant observation and direct observation: Observation of community</td>
<td>90+ community meetings</td>
<td>Meetings of CPF, SCFs, YSF, YCF, ADF, and YBCEC were attended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informant interviews: one on one and group interviews</td>
<td>60 interviews</td>
<td>Community leaders: Leaders of organisations including CPF, YSF, YBCDT, YCF, SCFs, Youth Desk, Victim Empowerment Centre, ADF, YBCEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group interviews</td>
<td>2 interviews</td>
<td>One group interview was conducted with migrants and another one with members of street patrollers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interviews: Qualitative Opinion and attitude survey – Conducted by 4 research assistants</td>
<td>42.5% were South Africans and 57.5% were non-South Africans n = 40</td>
<td>Done with members of the generality of the population. Yeoville and Bellevue were divided into four block and each on my research assistants used snowballing techniques to identify participants for interviews. Forty people were interviewed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walks in the neighbourhood/ city</td>
<td>Almost everyday</td>
<td>The main aim was to observe various forms of interaction and practices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### Documentary analysis:

*Yeovue News*, government policy documents

Full collection of *Yeovue News* dating back to November 2009; national and city policy documents and research reports

All the relevant documents that I came across were pulled together and analysed. The most important was *Yeovue News*, which is the community Newsletter for Yeoville and Bellevue.

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**Appendix C: Nationality composition of opinion and attitude survey participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>%age of total participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawian</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivorian</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroonian</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambican</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwean</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>