

**PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE THROUGH WARD  
COMMITTEE AND TRADITIONAL COUNCIL  
STRUCTURES AT INTSIKA YETHU MUNICIPALITY**

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## **Abstract**

Participatory governance is a theoretical method within the deliberative and participatory democracy theories. These theories promote the participation of individual citizens in the political decision-making processes to ensure public reasoning and public voice. This research study explored how participatory governance is facilitated at Intsika Yethu Local Municipality (IYLM). It examined the dimensions of participatory governance as theoretical and conceptual frameworks. These include deliberations, decision-making, interactional justice, legitimacy and trust, and monitoring and accountability. Some of the aspects of these dimensions provided the thematic framework to craft research questions, to collect, analyse and interpret data based on theoretical propositions of participatory governance.

The research study established that participatory governance is facilitated at IYLM through ward committees lead by the ward councillors and traditional councils under traditional leadership. Ward Councillors working together with traditional leaders hold frequent meetings at ward and community levels. They both participate in the deliberations and decision-making processes through the municipal council meetings and council portfolio committees. Despite systematic and institutional discrepancies which lead to conflictual interactions at some levels, data presented a fair picture of collaborations and partnerships fostered at IYLM.

## Declaration

I declare that this report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in 50% fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public Policy), University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Julius Dantile', is written over a horizontal line.

Julius Jabavu Dantile

September 2020

## **Dedication**

To my great-grandfather,  
Inkosana uLongo kaDantile,  
for being a visionary leader that established a church  
and a school in the Ntlonze Location almost 120 years ago.

## **Thanks**

To my wife, Zoliswa Lilitha Zigqola-Dantile

## **To my sons**

Liyemicamagu Dantile, Zivilenalihlumelo Dantile & Tshenolo Chosi Mekgwe-Dantile,

"What matters is not to know the world but to change it."

~ Frantz Fanon

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Thanks to the Intsika Yethu Local Municipality for allowing me to conduct  
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To the Ward Councillors and Traditional Leaders, continues to allow researchers  
to engage you for the betterment of the municipalities, the province and the  
country.

Ukwanda kwaliwa ngumthakathi!

MAKWANDE!

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## **List of Abbreviations**

AG	Auditor-General
AR	Annual Report
CBP	Community-Based Planning
CONTRALESA	Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IYLM	Intsika Yethu Local Municipality
MEC	Member of Executive Council
TL	Traditional Leader
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SDBIP	Service Delivery and Budgeting Implementation Plans
VWCA	Village-Ward Community Assembly
WC	Ward Councillor

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## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

South Africa is regarded as the mecca of service delivery protests against municipalities with 237 recorded in 2018 alone and is regarded as increased with more than 25%, reports Municipal IQ of 16 January 2019. There are multiple causes to these protests which include among others, poor consultation, factionalism, conflictual relationships between the ward councillors and traditional leaders over legitimacy and genuine leadership of the rural people, lack of expertise, lack of social skills, lack of education, high levels of arrogance, unapproachability and self-centeredness of both traditional leaders and ward councillors, malfeasance, corruption and the non-compliant expenditure of municipal finances as per Auditor-General (Tshitangoni & Francis, 2015; Piper & Nadvi, 2010; Holland, 2012). Meanwhile, local government is tasked with basic services which are regarded as the fundamental provisions to improve the quality of life of all citizens with particular attention to the previously marginalised, excluded and impoverished rural residents.

This research study seeks to explore how the ward committee and traditional leadership structures interact to achieve effective participatory governance in the rural IYLM. The research study focuses on a category B municipality, which is characterised by the presence of at most one or two small towns (in this case, Cofimvaba and Tsomo) with communal land tenure, villages or scattered groups of dwellings and typically located in former homelands, in this case, former Transkei. It is limited to the practicalities and nature of the relationships and interactions between the ward committees and the traditional councils in ensuring participatory governance at local governance. It is contextualised and limited to the functioning of the municipal council whereby leaders of both rural governance structures interact.

Some local municipalities are characterised by two governance systems, the municipal governance which consists of elected representatives (proportional representative councillors and ward councillors) forming the municipal councils. On the other hand, they include unelected traditional leadership identified by the provincial Member of Executive Council (MEC) responsible for local governance and traditional affairs.

According to the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (hereinafter *Structures Act*), traditional leaders may attend and participate in any meeting of the municipal council but may not vote because they are not full members of the council. Section 81(3) of the Structures Act clearly demarcates traditional leaders' roles at the council as to deliberate but not to participate in decision-making. This can be categorised into the middle of the Arnstein's ladder of participation because traditional leaders are given an opportunity to express their views on developmental matters that affect their areas of jurisdictions. But, that does not mean their views will be heeded by the council (Arnstein, 1969) as demonstrated by in the research study through complaints voiced by the traditional leaders.

This may be regarded as one of the causes of conflict between traditional leaders and elected leaders arising from the limited statutory powers and functions compared to those of ward councillors while they are understood to be representing similar communities' interests. The conflict is further perpetuated by the fact that they both have the power to convene community meetings, consult at grassroots levels regarding development, manage development initiatives and monitor or lead the monitoring of service delivery (Tshitangoni & Francis, 2015, p. 50).

Furthermore, the acrimonious relationship between these rural governance institutions emanates from the reduced powers of traditional leadership which it had during the pre-colonial era and was adulterated by colonialism, imperialism, Apartheid and probably modernism and urbanisation (Beall, 2006; Williams, 2009; Turner, 2014; Mathenjwa & Makama, 2016). According to these scholars, the new democratic dispensation was expected to fully recognise traditional leaders instead of putting them into contestation with elected ward councillors and participate in the municipal councils with no decision-making powers. Mathenjwa & Makama (2016, p. 214) argue that this local governance model is incongruent with the spirit of the Constitution.

From a democratic theory perspective, the criticism levelled against traditional leadership is that they are less transparent and believed to follow a feudal and autocratic system (Mashau, Mutshaeni, & Kone, 2014). A chief is selected by the royal family and must be of the royal blood of the traditional leaders of that particular area. The chief then selects headmen and sub-headmen with village committees to run the affairs of the villages. The Traditional Leadership and Governance

Framework Act (TLGFA) 41 of 2003 sought to transform these perceived undemocratic practices by stipulating regular elections of the 40% of the members of the traditional councils while making sure that a third of them are women. According to the Centre for Law and Society (February 2015), most of the traditional leaders are resistant to these transformational and democratic stipulations based on the belief that their legal recognition bestows on them the sole right to represent the traditional communities on all its matters. Probably, they further argue that they have a constitutional right to partake in their cultural, socio-political and religious practices.

The White Paper on Local Government (1998) introduced the ward committee system to democratise and empower local communities through citizen participation in policy initiation, policy formulation, and monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and implementation processes. The Structures Act sets up participatory institutions such as ward committees to advise the ward councillor on matters that affect the ward and participatory practices of Integrated Development Planning (IDP), Community-based Planning (CBP) and Participatory Budgeting. The Municipal Systems Act (hereinafter *Systems Act* (No. 32 of 2000) outlines municipality as the government institution that consists of governing structures formed by the elected councillors, the administration composed by the appointed staff and residents forming the local community. This definition excludes traditional leadership as a structure of local government and contradicts certain sections of the TLGFA and Section 212 of the Constitution that recognises traditional leaders as a key shareholder in local governance, especially in the rural settings.

Piper & Nadvi (2010, p. 212) argue that the poor design of these new institutions of public participation (ward committees and traditional councils) in local governance and the lack of political will on the part of the political elites rendered the institutions meaningless. Modise (2017) echoes this sentiment contending that the participatory processes in local government are a mockery in South Africa with the ward committees and traditional councils not serving the interests of the public but those which are valued by politicians, service managers, professionals, and traditional leaders (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2012). Literature depicts public participation systems that are dominated by political parties (Modise, 2017; Piper & Nadvi, 2010) with decision-making processes closed and non-transparent. The literature raises concerns that these practises hindering the effectiveness of the ward committee and traditional councils' participatory governance systems.

These practices perpetuate the challenges of poverty and unemployment due to non-delivery of basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, health, education and transport. The focus of this research study is to explore how are the interactions between the ward committee and traditional council structures enable or undermine participatory governance at the Intsika Yethu Local Municipality.

## **1.1 The Problem Statement**

The literature raises concerns on the overlapping roles and responsibilities between the ward committee and traditional council structures (Beall, 2006; Mashau, Mutshaeni, & Kone, 2014; Mathenjwa & Makama, 2016; Ncapayi & Tom, 2015; Tshitangoni & Francis, 2015). The outcomes of this overlap are the unhealthy contestations between the traditional leaders and ward councillors to an extent that communities become confused as to who have the legitimate powers to represent them and whom to trust. Ncapayi & Tom (2015) argue that the overlap and contradictions in the roles and responsibilities of these rural governance institutions limit rural communities in articulating their constitutional demands for the provision of basic services.

Participatory governance is regarded as a distinct approach to incorporate public voice and public reasoning (Sen, 2004) into the activities of the local governance including policy formulation (deliberation), policy adoption (decision-making), policy implementation (monitoring), transparency and accountability (evaluation) (Fischer F, 2012; Johnson, 2013; Marais, Quayle, & Burns, 2017). Generally, participatory governance is referring to the creation of new engagement spaces for decision-making using radical democratic models from bottom-up perspectives (Fischer F, 2012, p. 2). It is grounded in the theory of participatory democracy and offers a theory and practices of public engagement through deliberative processes. These deliberative processes are designed to empower citizens providing them with platforms to express themselves in-between voting periods. The tentative outcomes of participatory governance include improved accountability, stronger norms of citizenship, more civic-minded public, increased voter turnover and more legitimate government (Johnson, 2013).

## 1.2 The Context of the Research Study




Figure 1: Map of Intsika Yethu Local Municipality with its towns

The research study explores viable conceptual and theoretical frameworks of participatory governance in ward committees and traditional councils of the Intsika Yethu Local Municipality. This is a category B4 municipality with two small towns of Cofimvaba and Tsomo under Chris Hani District Municipality, Eastern Cape Province (*Figure 1: Map of Intsika Yethu Local Municipality with its towns*).

According to Intsika Yethu Local Municipality Socio-Economic Review and Outlook (2017), IYLM serves a population of about 152 000 people of which 99.5% are black (*Figure 2: Racial breakdown*), residing in almost 36 000 households. 98.9% of this population speaks isiXhosa as the home language with the rest divided between Afrikaans, English, isiZulu and SeSotho.

Racial Breakdown




Figure 2: Racial Breakdown of IYLM

The education levels are very low with only 16% passed matric, 5% completed tertiary education and 18.2% is with no formal schooling at all. Due to communal land tenure, 92.1% of housing is owned by the villagers and most have no title deeds due to oppressive Apartheid laws continually perpetuated by the new democratic dispensation legislation allocating rural land under the authority of the traditional leaders. Only 1% of the toilets are flushed and connected to the sewerage system. 2.4% of the households have piped-water inside dwellings and 87% of the households are electrified. It further projects IYLM as a poverty-stricken municipality with almost 78% of people living in poverty and high unemployment of about 40% of the labour force in 2016. Proportionally, there are more women than men with sex ratio of 93.3 to every 100 females (48%/52%). 54% of the households are headed by women.

According to the IDP 2018-2019 and Annual Report (AR) 2017/2018 and in compliance with sections 16 and 18 of the Structures Act, the IYLM have established participatory governance provisions that encourage the involvement of the communities and community organisations in the decision-making of the municipality. Some of the provisions of participatory governance include the promulgation of public participation and communication policies that stipulate mechanisms of citizen's participation. These mechanisms are used during the review of the Integrated Development Plans (IDP) and Service Delivery and Budgeting Implementation Plans (SDBIP). The municipality claims to have functional ward committee system, and effective public participation with budget allocations of R10.4 and R17.4 million respectively in the next three years (2019/20 to 2021/22) financial years. Comparatively, the provincial government spends around R30 million per annum on about 14 chiefs and about 214 village headmen. Therefore, the government spends an estimated R50 million a year on these rural governance structures at IYLM.



The municipal governance structures are composed of 21 ward councillors elected through first-past-the-post voting ward system and other 21 proportional representation councillors are chosen from the party list in proportion to the total number of votes received by the party. Comparatively, the traditional governance structures consist of about 14 traditional councils which are led by an unelected senior traditional leader, iNkosi (chief). Several headmen (sometimes referred as iiNkosana) are under the iNkosi and mostly form part of the traditional council. The jurisdictions of the traditional leaders are not the same as those of the wards. In some instances, there are more than one traditional authorities in one ward or in some, there are no senior traditional leaders, but headmen and their sub-headmen. According to Turner (2014), the competing jurisdictions illustrate the concept of ‘citizen-subjection’ which she explains as the people under traditional authorities “nominally possess the political, civil and social rights to which all citizens are entitled but are concurrently and officially subject to unelected traditional leaders.”

### **1.3 Purpose Statement**

The purpose of this research study is to understand how interactions between the ward committee and traditional council structures enable or hinder participatory governance at IYLM. The research study seeks to establish whether the constraints articulated in literature occur at IYLM and how they can be mitigated and transformed into opportunities for an improved participatory governance. It will further explore how the two local governance structures may be integrated to form a comprehensive, accessible and responsive rural governance model which may be regarded as the ‘fourth sphere of government’, particularly in rural municipalities.

Participatory governance seeks to deepen deliberative processes by addressing the issues of service experience, inter-organisational and systematic nature of public services delivery, and exploring the role of residents as service users rather than customers, consumers or clients because such perspective is market-related and product-oriented. Residents are regarded as shapers and designers of their own solutions to their own needs working with both service managers and politicians (Osborne, Radnor, & Nasi, 2012) and additionally, with traditional leaders in the context of rural municipalities (Mathenjwa & Makama, 2016).

Following the principles of participatory governance which include equal distribution of political power in order to ensure iterative interactions between political parties, service professionals and residents as service users, the research study examined whether such distribution of power is equitable at all aspects of participatory governance. At which theoretical conceptual dimensions do traditional leaders participate at local municipal councils? Legislation prescribes traditional leaders' participation as at the levels of policy formulations which is characterised by deliberations in the planning phases of the policy. The question explored in this regard is whether the interactions between ward committees and traditional councils improve or not the functioning of the municipal council at IYLM.

The second dimension of participatory governance examined is related to policy adoption which is characterised by decision-making. The research study investigated whether the decision-making is inclusive of traditional leaders. Do the decision-making processes increase fair distribution of resources for social inclusion through co-designing, co-planning, co-producing and co-creating the public value for improved service delivery? (Osborne S, 2018; Osborne, *et al.*, 2012; Osborne, Radnor, Kinder, & Vidal, 2015).

The third dimension of participatory governance is policy implementation which relates to issues of management and monitoring. The research study probed how traditional leaders and ward councillors perceive their roles and responsibilities in terms of policy management and monitoring. In this research study, monitoring is not attended at the theoretical and conceptual levels of logical frameworks on operational activities, indicators, inputs and outputs. Monitoring is used at the basic levels of interactional outcomes and impact the interactions may have on each structure and the municipal council. It is more on interactional justice which ensures acceptability and legitimacy in order to improve transparent, access to information, institutional procedures and accountability.

Finally, the last participatory governance dimension looked at is policy evaluation which relates to issues of performance and accountability. Ostrom (2011, p. 16) argues that institutional arrangements must serve to increase accountability and to promote redistribution equity. The research study further scrutinised whether any institutional and systematic integration of the ward committee and traditional council systems might decentralise decision-making, might provide a

transparent exchange of knowledge and information to stimulate behavioural change between the ward councillors and traditional leaders (Osborne, *et al.*, 2012, p. 143). What are the practicalities of developing trust and mutual reciprocity between ward councillors and traditional leaders (Osborne, *et al.*, 2012; Fischer F, 2010)? Would an improve interactional model create legitimacy by and achieve accountability to, the residents? The research questions below explored these participatory governance dimensions in establishing theoretical and conceptual frameworks to be followed in this research study. It must be borne in mind that the nature of this research study is current and more futuristic in examining the current perceptions, the current institutional procedures and designs in comparison to the proposed hypothetical integrated rural governance structure.

## **1.4 Research Questions**

### **1.4.1 Primary Research Question**

How do interactions between the ward committee and traditional council governance systems enable or hinder participatory governance at Intsika Yethu Local Municipality?

#### ***1.4.1.1 Secondary Research Questions***

- 1.4.1.1.1 How do these rural governance institutions enable or retard participatory practices of deliberations, decision-making, monitoring and evaluation of implementation?
- 1.4.1.1.2 How do ward councillors and traditional leaders perceive their governance roles at IYLM?
- 1.4.1.1.3 What are the perceptions of the ward councillors and traditional leaders on the integrated platforms between the ward committees and traditional authorities? Do they think it will improve representativity, legitimacy, trust and accountability towards the residents?

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Introduction

This section introduces the concept of participatory governance in the context of rural governance. To establish a conceptual and theoretical framework for this research study, I will start by briefly defining public participation, representation and governance within the context of rural governance. Then that will offer us a conceptual and working definition of participatory governance providing the crucial dimensions to be used as measures of how interactions between the ward councillors and traditional leaders at the municipal council of Intsika Yethu propel or hinder participatory governance. The dimensions discussed in the context of rural governance are (i) deliberations, (ii) decision-making, (iii) interactions, (iv) legitimacy and trust, and (v) monitoring and accountability. They are linked to the institutional and systematic conceptual designs of the rural governance structures to identify theoretical and practical interactional gaps, if any, at the rural governance of IYLM. Some aspects of these participatory governance dimensions are used, first, to test whether what literature generally claims as confrontational and status competitive relations exist at IYLM; second, to explore the integrational concept of “Village-Ward Community Assembly” as an alternative rural governance model to mitigate power dynamics, deal with representativity issues, increase monitoring, ensuring accountability while building trust between these two rural governance systems and the communities they serve.

The dimensions of participatory governance assisted in the analysis and interpretation of data and the construction of findings and recommendations. They helped generate the thematic questions of the interviews (Appendix A: *Interview Questionnaire*). The dimensions further assisted in maintaining the criteria used when sampling the participants as participants had to have the basic understanding of how representation, deliberations, decision-making, monitoring and accountability processes ensure legitimacy and trust at the IYLM. Participants recognized their roles and responsibilities including an understanding of their fiduciary duties as chairpersons of both these rural governance structures. The focus of this research study therefore is on the nature of interactions which describes the character of the relationships more than the character of citizen

engagement itself (Fischer H. W., 2016). The character of relationships further enunciates the shared experiences of trust, legitimacy and representativity. Let's start by briefly defining public participation in the context of rural governance.

## **2.2 Public Participation in rural governance**

Slocum and Thomas-Slayer (1995) cited in (Marzuki, 2015) define public participation

“as means to convey individual and society's personal interests and concerns with regard to the development plans given that these planning activities would consequently affect the public generally and certain groups specifically.”

Maphazi, Raga, Taylor, & Mayekiso (2013) describe public participation as means to influence public decisions and as a component of the democratic decision-making processes. This concept is mostly used interchangeable with the citizen participation, public involvement or community participation (Maphazi, Raga, Taylor, & Mayekiso, 2013, p. 57). The Systems and Structures Acts provide for the mechanisms and procedures, and structures for the local governance in theoretical agreement with the definitions provided above. Maphazi, et al (2013, p. 57) recount literature as arguing that public participation should ensure the citizen's voice and should follow a people-centred development approach that emphasises aspects of involvement and reciprocal communications. They argue that meaningful participation should be undertaken at the stages of deliberations, decision-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

However, scholars (as cited in Marzuki, 2015, p. 24) contend that it is very difficult to implement a meaningful participation because of various constraints that hinder the processes. These include, amongst others, the administrative costs, a perception that public participation is time-consuming,

it slows down decision-making processes, it requires expertise for the implementer and knowledge for the consulted, sometimes it loses control or be captured by the elite and private interests. These constraints have implications for good governance and participatory democracy at rural governance. However, they are not thoroughly examined other than being mentioned as effects of the interactions as per perceptions of the participants.

### **2.3 Governance and Representation in rural governance**

Fukuyama (2013, p. 350) defines governance as “a government’s ability to make and enforce rules and deliver services regardless of whether the government is democratic or not.” He claims it is about execution. Fischer H. W., (2016, p. 111) argues that government’s ability depends on the local elected leaders playing a leading role in anticipating community needs, formulating responses and negotiating bureaucratic procedures. He argues that it is far more than the sum of citizen engagement. Local democracy must pay attention to representation. He uses the definition of Pitkin (1967: 209) that representation is to “act in the interest of the governed in a manner responsive to them.” And therefore, participation and representation are complementary aspects constituting democratic practices.

According to Theron, Van Rooyen and Van Baalen cited in Mayekiso, et al., (2013, p. 194) define governance as a process in which power and authority are exercised between and within institutions in the state and communities around allocation of resources. State institutions and resources have been implicated in local power dynamics that create possibilities of exclusions, marginalisation and disempowerment of the governed. Fischer (2016, p. 112) states that the

opposite of representation is exclusion to the processes of participation and neglect to the benefits of service delivery. Participatory democracy in South Africa presumes pro-poor policy approaches as a motivating factor for both local leaders and their constituencies to be involved.

## **2.4 Theory of Participatory Governance**

Participatory governance extends the participatory democratic theory by recognising the need to embrace public voice and public reasoning in deliberations, decision-making, monitoring of service delivery beyond the periodic planning, voting or elections. Participatory governance seeks to deepen citizen's participation to ensure transparency and equitable distribution of power amongst, local actors. At local government, participatory governance strives to decentralise decision-making processes for a fair distribution of resources (Fischer F. , 2012) maintaining a state equilibrium within the local government environment. Lastly, participatory governance establishes collaborative partnerships and inter-institutional dialogue for greater accountability and building of trust with residents in local governance.

Johnson (2013, p. 3) defines participatory governance as “a distinct approach to incorporating public voice in the formulation of law and policy, often, in the oversight of its implementation, in conjunction with existing representative institutions.” Additionally, participatory governance establishes collaborative partnerships and inter-institutional dialogues for greater accountability and building of trust with residents instituting co-operative local governance model.

Fischer argues that participatory governance creates new spaces and shapes for various governance actors to shift from professional-dominated to more resident-orientated systems. This paradigm shift is dependent on the transparent exchange of knowledge and information for problem-solving by all government actors. Access to information by citizens in rural settings enhances opportunities for them to be able to engage in the decision-making processes creating a continuum of public reasoning (Sen, 2004). The reciprocal relationships established through participatory governance extends democratic spaces to be the central places in which free deliberative interactions are

guaranteed (Sen, 2004). This process becomes more than just consultation or manipulation or therapy as per the middle section of Arnstein's ladder of participation. But, it is about ensuring that delegated power and citizen control through being involved in decision-making processes are realised for improved governance outcomes.

However, it is important to understand that information is no panacea and is not sufficient (Kosec & Wantchekon, 2018, p. 5). While greater access to information may counteract government failures and improve rural service delivery and governance, information must be relevant to the recipient, individuals must have power to act on it and it must incentivise the recipients to act on it (Kosec & Wantchekon, 2018). While the research study did not concentrate on the role and quality of information provided in these interactional relationships between the two rural governance, a trend about access to information through both leaderships manifested from the descriptions of the nature of the interactions. It brought up principal-agent dichotomy which include the capacity of the recipients to utilise provided. Kosec & Wantchekon, (2018, p. 6) argue that the rural poor often lack the ability or capability to act on information they receive. That may not lead to meaningful change of individual and society's behaviour to bring about the desired governance and public service delivery outcomes.

Additionally, for the improved governance outcomes to be achieved, local governance structures should stop to be transactional where systems are about getting things done in a linear technocratic process. They have to adopt more transformational and systematic approaches which seek to change and influence the manner society and governance work in favour of social and interactional justice, equality and inclusion (Hickey and Mohan, 2004 cited in Holland, 2012). The interface between the residents and the state is challenged by participatory governance to improve the quality of governing which is embedded on the issues of legitimacy, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness (Beall, 2006; Fischer, 2010; Johnson, 2013; Ncapayi & Tom, 2015). When residents are able to deliberate, they have to be allowed to make decisions on what they deliberated on. They have to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the decisions they were part of formulating. In South Africa, public participation is emphasising deliberations in the planning phases without much focus on the collective decision-making, co-monitoring and co-evaluation aspects of democratic practices.



Sen (2004) argues that at the centre of participatory democracy, there are interactive processes through which the democracy functions and on which its success depends. These interactive processes shall be free of censorship, suppression and violations because in the definition of democracy, people govern through public reasoning to contribute to the decision-making processes. Local government is at the coalface of service delivery. In rural areas, local governments are probably the sole providers of basic services with limited to none, of any additional sources and suppliers of the basic services, if compared to the urban areas.

Therefore, local municipalities have to function at the best of their abilities or capabilities to ensure improved service delivery. In order to achieve that, they should be fit-for-purpose with respect to the rural environment. They should ensure acceptability to guarantee legitimacy and mitigate the political and administrative risks. According to Pitt, (2017, p. 31) this may be achieved through personal treatment which concentrates on the interaction between each member and the institution, and the interpersonal treatment between the members themselves. In this research study, I examine participatory governance through various dimensions emanating from the conceptual and theoretical enquiry above.

#### **2.4.1 Deliberation as a Dimension of Participatory Governance**

In accordance with Section 81 (3) of the Municipal Structures Act, traditional leaders may be afforded an opportunity to address the municipal council on matters affecting the traditional area of their jurisdiction. According to Kuper, (2018, p. 1) deliberative democracy espouses equality and non- coercive deliberation between the affected individuals to gain legitimacy. It discharges a fundamental duty of equal respect for the opinions and interests of others grounded in democratic decision-making. Kuper argues that deliberation is a talk-centric mode of decision-making that eschews coercive power in favour of reason-giving, fostering inclusive and egalitarian interactions claiming common good, showing respect and be prepared to change their minds when confronted by better argument (2018, p. 2).

However, deliberations are dependent on circumstances, personalities and context. In this research, I explore how ward councillors and traditional leaders interact to achieve the desired outcomes of deliberations which are legitimacy, knowledge and information sharing, tolerance and empathy, social capital and trust, and consensual decision-making taking into cognisance the middle section of manipulation in Arnstein's ladder of participation.

#### **2.4.2 Decision-making as a Dimension of Participatory Governance**

Decision-making as the dimension of participatory governance pertains to participatory practices and institutional systems. According to Ngah, Zakaria, Noordin, & Mustaffa, (2015, p. 3) decision-making is the process of choosing among alternatives in order to satisfy the objectives or meet the criteria of the decision goal. It is about who makes the decisions for whose benefit. What are the standards of those decisions and at what cost? The focus of this research study is on who makes the decisions and who participate in the decision-making processes at IYLM. The research study did not get into the quality and the cost of the decisions made by the municipal council. It explored the institutional and systematic aspects of the political model which defined the organisational and group decision-making processes. Organisational decision-making is mostly affected by the educational, political and socioeconomic conditions of those who participate. It involves the values of these people and those of the societal environment in which the organisation operates. While group decision-making is the process of ensuring that inputs from multiple individuals affect the outcomes and performance of the organisation (Ngah, et al., 2015).

In accordance with Section 81 (3) of the Municipal Structures Act, traditional leaders are not part of the decision-making processes at local municipal councils. Traditional leaders are not the members of the municipal council but are to be consulted before the council makes a decision. The full members of the council are the elected representatives, the councillors. This makes decision-making an elitist practise of economic and political groupings drawn from business and industrial circles that dominate the societies (Ngah, et al., 2015). This research paper explored who is involved in decision-making and for whose benefit at IYLM.

These questions were explored to evaluate whether the aspects of equitable distribution of power in decision-making between ward councillors and traditional leaders exist at IYLM. The research explored whether the choice of alternatives incorporates the pluralistic nature of the community particularly the suggestions made by the traditional leaders. This is explored because according to the IYLM 2018 Annual Report, traditional leaders sit in the portfolio committees of the municipal council and even those traditional leaders interviewed acknowledged that they are represented at the municipal council and are provided space to raise matters affecting areas under their jurisdictions. Then, I was fascinated to know whether in those committees where traditional leaders participate, are they part of the decision-making.

### **2.4.3 Interactional Justice in the Decision-making Processes**

Participatory governance creates new spaces and reshapes local governance institutions shifting from professional-dominated systems to more open systems (Fischer, 2012 & Pitt, 2017). In this regard, the IYLM has gone beyond the legislative prescripts of allowing traditional leaders to participate in the council meetings but to partake in the municipal council portfolio committees. What I sought to understand in this research study is whether there is interactional justice in those platforms? Interactional justice, in the context of rural governance, is concerned with how those participating in the governing structures such as traditional leaders, are treated (Pitt, 2017) especially by their fellow leaders, the ward councillors. Are they treated with the dignity and respect they deserve?

Interactional justice ensures acceptability and legitimacy because the outcomes of the decision-making at the municipal council shall be acceptable to the participants and their constituencies in the context of IYLM. Pitt (2017, p. 31) argues that there are two aspects of interactions, firstly, is an interaction between each member and the institution which involves personal treatment and, secondly, interaction is between the institutional members themselves which are about interpersonal treatment. The questions were designed in such a way that participants will voluntarily provide institutional relationship-related information more than personal treatment without much probing. However, follow-up questions were asked to get clarity on institutional interactions, where necessary.

#### **2.4.4 Legitimacy and Trust as a Dimension of Participatory Governance**

According to Arnesen & Peters, (2018, p. 879) legitimacy is the idea that something can be legitimate when it is acceptable according to certain criteria which in the context of local governance include transparency, efficiency, institutional procedures and accountability. Deliberations are intrinsic to legitimacy because they will induce individuals to support decisions probably they would have normally not agreed with (Kuper, 2018, p. 11). In this regard, deliberations will further garner popular support for a particular decision as long as it is perceived as deliberatively justified. Legitimacy is further generated when there are personal involvement and rational argumentation in the decision-making, argues Kuper. Legitimacy is the outcome of public participation and representation because through public participation, information and ideas may be gained, planning decisions may be supported, conflicts and costly delays may be avoided and the spirit of cooperation and collaboration may prevail between the principals and agents (Maphazi, et al., 2013, p. 60). Principals in this rural governance context are supposed to be the rural residents.

Taking into consideration the conflictual contestations between the elected and unelected representatives at rural governance systems, the research study explored who is perceived as the most legitimate and trusted representatives of the people between the two rural governance structures. In recognising the historical-political factors that involve traditional leaders, I explored how ward councillors perceive the traditional leaders' roles at the municipal council. I further wanted to know who do they think is trusted most by the people of the rural communities they serve and why. Who are they accountable to and who monitors service delivery?

#### **2.4.5 Monitoring and Accountability as a Dimension of Participatory Governance**

Information plays role in monitoring and accountability. Ideally, in democratic settings, citizens elect politicians to carry out certain roles, supposed to assess their performance based on the information made available to the citizens and either citizens decide to punish be not voting for the same politicians or reward them by voting them back into power (Kosec & Wantchekon, 2018,

p. 3). In the context of rural governance in South Africa, this ideal democratic setting does not exist. Citizens do not have direct access to relevant information to make informed decisions about the performance of an individual leader or even political party thereof. Citizens, sometimes, do not have ability or capability which is power to act on the information provided to make their rural leaders accountable. And lately, because of the electoral system in South Africa, rural communities do not have the incentives to act on the information they have. In the case of the elected leaders, it is their political parties that have direct power to remove failing councillors. With traditional leaders, no one other than the royal family may depose a sitting traditional leader. However, in terms of section 42(2) of the TLGF Act the provincial legislation must regulate the performance of functions of the traditional councils by requiring them to keep proper records, have audited financial statements, disclose receipt of gifts and adhere to the code of conduct establishing a vertical accountability.

There is an old saying that “Inkosi yinkosi ngabantu” meaning a chief is a chief because of people. This has been understood as that the chief has no power but its people have the power for self-governance through amaphakathi (councillors) who were regarded as the representatives of the people. This may be regarded as horizontal accountability of the traditional leadership in which they are accountable to traditional council than being absolute chieftains.

Similarly, the ward committees are to be held accountable through Municipal Systems Act, which includes, schedules 1 and 2, the code of conduct for councillors and through the Municipal Structures Act, which regulates the internal systems, structures and office-bearers of municipalities. Embedded in the questions posed to the participants were issues of monitoring and accountability with monitoring not used to its theoretical definition but in the essence of each rural governance structure keeping an eye on the other. Thus I concentrated more on vertical and horizontal accountability.

Furthermore, the questions on whom do they think to represent the communities better on development matters sought to explore the issues of capacity and capacity. Firstly, institutional capacity to mitigate competitive and conflictual interactions between the ward councillors and traditional leader. Secondly, it responded to the individual capacity as an element of self-evaluation

whereupon each participant had to take a self-introspection to the role he or she plays in community development through being the leader of one of these rural governance structures. And lastly, the socio-political environmental capacity of the surrounding political and civil society structures whereby these leaders are supposed to be challenged for their decisions.

Literature (Paradza, Mokwena and Richards, 2010; Mpehle and Kanjere, 2013; African Peer Review Mechanism 2007 all cited in Mello, 2018) is emphatic about the need for politicians and management of municipalities to have the requisite skills, competencies and knowledge. It has been argued that councillors who possess low academic and professional qualifications are ill-equipped to interrogate officials, critique their work and hold them accountable for their actions and inactions. This has been identified as the persistent challenge facing South Africa (African Peer Review Mechanism (2007:79) cited Mello, 2018). The ability to read, understand and write is being purported as the primary requirement for being a councillor. It may also be a requisite for rural residents to be able to monitor effectively and make their leaders to account. Interestingly, there is no such minimum requirement is purported for traditional leadership. Furthermore, the literature suggests that having a critical mind would also come in handy for these leaders to be able to discharge their monitoring and evaluation duties diligently.

## **2.5 Theory of Institutional Design of the Rural Governance**

The underlying question in this research study is whether social and human interactions between the ward councillors and the traditional leaders at IYLM advance or hinder participatory governance. As articulated above under the dimensions of participatory governance, to understand the institutional design of the rural governance in South Africa, we had to ask what are these institutions, what do they do, how do they work and to what consequences? That became the learning process of the institutions themselves, the rules that structure the interactions and how those operating within them behave. It shall be noted that this research study is not a behavioural study but conceptual, perceptual and theoretical policy research on how institutions, as structures and rules, have advanced or hindered participatory governance at the municipal council of Intsika

Yethu. We begin this theoretical process of rural governance institutional design by understanding what are institutions.

### **2.5.1 Defining Institutions**

Ostrom, (2005, p. 3) defines institutions as the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions. They are rules affecting the actions in an action arena establishing both tangible and intangible boundaries to be observed leading to consequences for those involved and for others. In this case study, I explore how leaders of rural governance structures interact. How do they cooperate in decision-making, implementation and monitoring? How these rural governance institutions affect rural communities culturally, socially, economically and politically through their institutional interactions? The research study deals with both their tangible and intangible institutional designs.

Describing human interaction, Ostrom & Basurto, (2011, p. 323) explain that it is composed of seven working parts:

“*Actors in positions* choosing among *actions* at particular stages of decision process in light of their *control* over a choice node, the *information* they have, the *outcomes* that are likely, and the *benefits and costs* they perceive for these outcomes.”

The action situation in this context is municipal council. Its actors are ward councillors and traditional leaders and their actions in ensuring a systematic control on the information about developmental initiatives for the likely developmental outcomes that will benefit their constituencies in whatever costs. The institutional working elements will be analysed from constitutional and legislative levels, from collective choice levels and from an operational level.

### **2.5.2 Constitutional and Legislative Frameworks for Ward Committees and Councillors**

Before the advent of democratic dispensation, local government in South Africa was racially demarcated with blacks not allowed to reside in the suburban areas mostly occupied by the whites. But the 1993 Interim Constitution followed by the revised and final 1996 Constitution reconfigured

local government with municipal councils being non-racial, non-tribal and inclusive of all races. The Constitution determined the developmental objects of local government as including a democratic and accountable government that promote social and economic development, promote safe and healthy environment to encourage community participation in the matters that affect community livelihoods. The Structures Act, Systems Act and Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) were promulgated to establish a new generation of municipalities and laying a foundation for a democratic and service-oriented local government (South African Local Government Association, 2011).

#### **2.5.2.1 Municipal Structures Act, Municipal Systems Act and Municipal Finance Management Act on Ward Committees**

These legislations were promulgated to set up the democratic structures, systems and transparent management of finances. In accordance with the Constitution, the Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) reconfigures, categorises and determine powers and functions of municipalities classifying them according to certain types and categories. These legislations provide the institutional and systematic arrangements to ensure public participation in the integrated development planning processes, monitoring and reviewing of municipal performance, preparation of the budgets and other strategic decision-making processes. To achieve participatory democracy as envisaged, the municipal council must follow two forms of democracy. Representative democracy where people elect representatives through their political parties on a proportional party list and a ward committee system where the chairperson of the ward committee becomes the ward councillor.

The focus of this research study is to examine if the current institutional designs and systematic models informed by the dimensions of participatory governance enhance access and public voice through ward councillor and traditional leader representativity in the decision-making of the municipal council. In terms of section 73 of the Structures Act, ward committees must act as advisory structures to the municipal council. Each committee consists of ten elected members from different sectors of the community in the ward. Their role is to advise the ward councillor who happens to be their chairperson and represents the ward in the municipal council. Ideally, the broad



object of the ward committee members and the ward councillor is to bring people's needs and problems into the municipal council's attention through consultations and building partnerships with the communities. Mayekiso, et al., (2013, p.193) view ward committees as key components of public participation and vehicles of engaging the communities in the municipal decision-making processes.

Contrary to the general perceptions and according to AR 2017/2018, ward committees have no formal powers. They are practically dominated by political parties especially the ruling party in the ward (Modise, 2017; Piper & Nadvi, 2010). This affects the participation processes as they become closed and non-transparent leading to ineffective community participation (Tshitangoni & Francis, 2015, p. 53). In this regard, the participants were asked whom amongst them represent the community better on developmental matters. The question is asked to prompt participants to talk voluntarily about their perceptions on the effectiveness of their representativity to the municipal council. The question is posed from a socio-political perspective about the elected representatives, the ward councillors, because they are local power brokers for their political parties and municipal bureaucratic actors. It is ward councillors that galvanise votes and in between elections, navigate complex village contexts in the implementation of decisions made (Fischer H. W., 2016, p. 112),

Another contributing factor to ineffective community participation at the level of the ward committees is the tension between the ward committee members and ward councillors (Hicks 2006 and Nyalunga 2006 cited in Tshitangoni & Francis, 2015) which emanates from the internal party political factionalism and scramble for the limited resources. Both human resources and the skill's capacity of the ward councillors and ward committee members further perpetuate the inefficiencies of the system, primarily, in the rural municipalities. Piper & Deacon (2009, p. 461) contend that the ward committee systems are too dependent on incompetent ward committee members and councillor with the dysfunctional municipal systems to entrench participatory democracy. Again, to probe the assertions of incapacity by the ward councillors, we asked them various follow-up questions relating to collective decision-making, monitoring and accountability.

Ncapayi & Tom (2015, p. 88) argue that the dual rural governance system overlaps and contradicts the roles and responsibilities of ward councillors and ward committees with those of traditional leaders and traditional councils. It paralyses both systems perpetuating conflicts over legitimacy and jurisdiction. This friction is instigated by the exclusive claim to legitimacy by the ward committees based on Section 5(3)(a) of the Municipal Structures Act that they are the “official specialised participatory structure” at local governance (Piper & Deacon, 2009, p. 418). This egocentric behaviour amongst the ward councillors and ward committee members is prolonged by the lack of knowledge and information by the residents on the workings of the ward committees and the municipality. This is at extremes in the rural municipalities. Thus, some people still rely on and trust the traditional leadership systems as it is perceived as closer and more visible through headmen and sub-headmen in the most remote areas of the Intsika Yethu Local Municipality and rural traditional committees of the world. This was clearly articulated by the participants when answering the question related to overlapping.

### **2.5.3 Constitutional and Legislative Frameworks on Traditional Councils and Leadership**

Traditional governance systems are regarded as the indigenous leadership practices that survived various periods of ideological and political onslaughts from the colonisers and conquerors. The systems endured colonial modifications that affected their cultural manifestations and their closeness to the cultural and religious identities of the people. In South Africa, and around the world, traditional governance systems have also been under pressure to reform from Western modernisation and urbanisation. In other circumstances, the systems had to adapt or co-opt the colonising and reforming ideological and institutional complexities. In this regard and in the African contexts, the effects of either resistance or assimilation by these traditional governance systems ended up in adulteration and/or contamination to assent to the coloniser’s ideological and political demands.

At the advent of national independence in African and the world over, these institutions were either partially recognised as independent institutions or fully incorporated into the local governance systems as in Ghana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Indonesia, China, United Kingdom and India (Sen, 2004; Honyenuga & Wutoh, 2019; Mathenjwa & Makama, 2016; Salim, Bulan, Untung, Laksono,

& Brock, 2017). In South Africa, traditional governance structures and systems are constitutionally and legislatively recognised as incorporated into the rural and local municipal governance structures.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) recognises traditional authorities by taking into cognisance their existence, status and roles. Traditional authorities follow customary law which dictates how they operate. However, section 211 of the Constitution stipulates that the application of the customary law must not be in contradiction with the Constitution. The traditional leadership and governance framework is set out in the White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance of 2003. It defines the historical roles of traditional leaders, interferences by the colonialist, imperialists and Apartheid regimes, how the institution was used for a divide and rule principle and challenges it is facing in the current institutional design of the democratic dispensation.

Mathenjwa & Makama, (2016, p. 205) argue that the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act does not define traditional governance and traditional leadership but defines a traditional leader as “any person who, in terms of customary law of the traditional community concerned, holds a traditional leadership position, and is recognised in terms of the Act”. The Act provides the functions of the traditional leadership pertaining to municipalities as to assist the municipality to identify community needs, facilitate the involvement of the traditional community in the development integrated development plans affecting the area, to be consulted in matters affecting their traditional jurisdictions, and to participate in the development of policies and legislation at local level. Other supporting legislation is the Municipal Structures Act which echoes the participation of traditional leadership in the local municipal council.

#### **2.5.4 The Critical Analysis of Traditional Leadership in Rural Governance**

The constitutional and legislative measures acknowledge the role of traditional leaders in the administration of rural lands, arts and culture, health, welfare, economic development within areas

in which they have jurisdictions. Both the Traditional Leadership Act and Structures Act stipulate these institutional roles in local municipalities as to assist the municipality to identify the community needs, facilitate development and make contributions to the development of the integrated development planning, budgeting and performance monitoring and evaluation processes (Mathenjwa & Makama, 2016). Comparatively, these are the same institutional roles accorded to the ward councillors and ward committees. This governance dualism becomes the turf for control of actions and resources which bring benefits to the governed creating contestation for legitimacy and trust (Ncapayi & Tom, 2015). However, as Williams (2009) argues Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act made it a point that only elected institutions that have exclusive rights to exercise power in a democracy and chieftains are not autonomous political entities that can exercise power separate from the elected institutions. In this regard, participants were asked about their perceptions on the powers, overlaps, roles and responsibilities accorded to them by constitution and legislation.

Before colonialization, traditional governance systems enjoyed wide political powers including safety and security (Ntsebeza, 2002 cited in Ncapayi & Tom, 2015). However, during the Apartheid regime, traditional leadership had far-reaching administrative and judicial powers in terms of the Black Administration Act of 1927 and Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 (Houston and Somadoda 1996 cited in Ncapayi & Tom, 2015). Khonou (2009, p. 86) argue that the colonial, Apartheid and post-colonial governments use the institution of the traditional leadership as an important political instrument. Ntsebeza (2006: 15-16 cited in Ncapayi & Tom, 2015) argues the South African constitution and legislation recognised traditional governance structures and systems according them similar powers as they enjoyed under the Apartheid regime. That is, the 1996 Constitution provides for the continuation of both pre-1994 and various legislation issued in terms of the Interim Constitution including the old order legislation passed before 27 April by the homeland government (Khonou, 2009). However, Williams (2009, p. 205) notes that many traditional leaders believed that the final constitution and legislations did not do enough to entrench their authority especially that these legislations failed to ever mention the term ‘power’ with respect to their responsibilities.

According to Jacobs (2000), by 1988 the ANC declared in its constitutional principles that chieftaincy is obsolete and it would be abolished in the advent of democracy (cited in Beall, 2006). Turner, (2014, p. 32) argues that the African National Congress (ANC) shifted its stance towards the traditional leaders as it begins planning the post-Apartheid future trying to isolate Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) led by Inkosi Mangosuthu Buthelezi which believed to be the enemy of the liberation struggle and in alliance with the Apartheid regime. However, for the ANC, traditional leaders were strong and effective self-advocates throughout the transition influencing and shaping the final constitution and policy documents (Turner, 2014). According to Oomen (2005) cited in Turner (2014, p.33) traditional leaders presented themselves as authentic custodians of African culture, customs and identity by which they won the ‘struggle over the soul of custom’.

Consequently, literature questions the role of the traditional structures and systems in the democratic dispensation. In this regards, some scholars argue that traditional leadership systems are patriarchal and do not allow women some rights based on cultural and religious beliefs. These critics further state that traditional leadership is selected according to the customary values and systems which are undemocratic and despotic. The kings, queens or chiefs are selected by the royal family within the bloodline of the family in a non-transparent and autocratic manner. The headmen and sub-headman are appointed by the chief without consultation or engagement with the people. These practices are contrary to the deliberative and participatory governance envisaged in the constitution.

The assumptions of modernisation theory, as prescribed through the constitution and legislation, on women inclusion in traditional and rural governance structures depicts traditional societies as authoritarian and male-dominated. Visvanathan (1997, p. 18) cited in (Ndimande, 2001) argues that the modernisation theory on women in development generally stresses western values and targets individuals as catalyst for social change. Ndimande (2001) argues that such modernisation theories apply dependency theory in which women are viewed as not part of development and governance processes. Thus, according to Williams (2009, p. 207) CONTRALESA and CTL ended up adopting what Oomen calls negotiated law which is the combination of official law (constitutional and legislative prescripts) and the customary law when conceding to women

participation in traditional councils. However, CONTRALESA purported is as proviso of choice than espousing it as a legislative right for gender equality in the traditional councils.

Despite the fact that traditional leaders are unelected leaders, they still command respect and draw a huge following particularly in the rural areas. Practically, traditional leaders are even closer to the communities through village headmen and sub-headmen than the ward councillors and ward committee members who are dependent on the political party branch membership. The traditional leadership system consists of the traditional council lead by the chief with council members as advisors to the chief. The headmen lead villages. Some headmen lead through sub-headmen committee only while some have modernised to incorporate a village committee that is openly elected through nomination and voting where there is competition. Some headmen even establish both permanent and ad hoc committees for specific tasks. In most cases, these committees include women or are mostly dominated by women who chooses to participate.

Sen (2003) illustrates the nature of engagements in the village meetings by quoting Nelson Mandela's *Long Walk to Freedom* that

“everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form ... the foundation of self-government was that all men were free to voice their opinions and equal in their value as citizens”.

He argues that the championing of pluralism, diversity, and basic liberties which emulates the Western democratic ideals can be found in the history of societies such as India, China, Japan, Korea, Iran, Turkey, the Arab world and in Africa.

Conversely, in most villages, these meetings are dominated by men to such an extent that in some, women are not allowed to speak (Beall, 2006, p. 468) let alone being selected as headwomen. It's only recently that women can permanently be selected and appointed in traditional leadership roles other than being regents. As much as this is in compliance with the constitutional and legislative prescripts, the traditional governance system is still resistant to the coronation of women in kingship or chieftaincy because most African societies are patriarchal.

Notwithstanding the constitutional and legislative reforms empowering traditional leaders to participate in the local municipality through attendance and deliberations. Legislatively, traditional leaders are not part of the decision-making processes at the municipal council. In this regard, Mathenjwa & Makama (2016, p. 209) argue for the full recognition of the traditional leaders including them being able to vote on matters affecting their communities. They argue that such recognition must have some end other than conferral of esteem. Particularly, that traditional leaders are remunerated through the taxpayer's money. Probably, such recognition could level the political playing fields between the ward councillors and the chiefs. Mathenjwa & Makama (2016, p. 213) further recommend that it should be the 'local' House of Traditional Leaders that should select those who will participate as full municipal council members. That will further remove the power bestowed on the MEC to identify and appoint the traditional leaders who should participate in the municipal council ensuring the independence of this governance system.

Having explored the constitutional, legislative and institutional designs of these rural governance structures, I shall explore the nature of the interactional relationships between the ward councillors and traditional leaders.

### **2.5.5 Nature of interactions between Ward Councillors and Traditional Leaders**

In South Africa, the institutional designs of the rural governance are viewed by literature as confusing and frustrating to the governed in the rural communities because of the overlapping roles and responsibilities between the ward committees and traditional councils (Beall, 2006; Mathenjwa & Makama, 2016; Ncapayi & Tom, 2015; Tshitangoni & Francis, 2015). Ncapayi & Tom, (2015, p. 97) argue that the coexistence of the ward committees and traditional councils limit the ability of represented rural communities to effectively articulate their developmental challenges. In this regard, the research study sought to explore how the two rural governance systems advance or hinder the participation in the institutional decision-making at the rural local municipality of Intsika Yethu.

Participatory governance creates new democratic spaces and reshapes the institutional designs and systems for improved governance outcomes such as political efficacy, transparency and equitable

redistribution. The distinction between the practices and institutions of participatory governance becomes clear when analysing who participated and how they participated in the decision-making processes. The participatory practices focus on who participated while participatory institutions concentrate on how they participated in decision-making taking into consideration the institutional design (Piper, 2014, p. 55). In this context, participatory institutions are democratic spaces and opportunities created by the state, local government in this case, to engage local communities through either transfer of information, consultation, deliberation or collective decision-making (Piper, 2014).

This research study explored both the practices and the institutions to examine if the current institutional designs and systematic models of participatory governance at IYLM enhance access and the voice through ward councillor and traditional leader representativity in the decision-making (Piper, 2014). How these rural governance institutions improve access and voice for the historically marginalised and previously oppressed people of Intsika Yethu Local Municipality. Taking Piper (2014, p. 56) recommendation that to assess new participatory institutions and practices, we are required to unpack the internal processes in terms of who participates and how they participate in the deliberation, decision-making and implementation processes of the governance institutions. We further assessed whether the participatory outcomes are pro-poor by asking the participants about village oriented developmental issues. Do these developmental issues establish legitimacy, decrease the democratic deficit, improve transparency and equitable redistribution of resources (Johnson, 2013 & Piper, 2014)?

## **2.6 Village-Ward Community Assembly as an Alternative Rural Governance Model**

Mijiga argues that:

“in countries where the functions and duties of elected representatives and traditional leaders are not harmonized, the conflicts and overlap of their activities have become extremely detrimental to the local communities.” (1998, p. 6).

African and European countries such as Zimbabwe, Gambia, Ghana and United Kingdom, Spain, Holland, Sweden and Norway, have traditional leaders and elected representatives integrated with recognition of their critical roles, particularly in rural settings (Mijiga, 1998).



Mathenjwa & Makama, (2016, p. 213) recommends a model of integrating elected representatives with unelected citing international models adopted in the United Kingdom, Lesotho and Zimbabwe where unelected members have a right to vote and are full members of Legislative Assemblies and municipal councils. There is nothing anomaly with this model as it is practised internationally in countries such as Ghana, Malaysia and Indonesia (Honyenuga & Wutoh, 2019; Salim, Bulan, et al., 2017; Mijiga, 1998).

Sen (2004) emphasizes the participatory governance through the integration of the rural governance structures arguing that specific democratic institutions that have been developed in the West must be welcomed and put into practice. However, such a task requires an adequate understanding of the deep roots of democratic thought in Africa itself, he urges. This echoes Anthony Appiah's assertion that "ideological decolonization is bound to fail if it neglects either endogenous tradition or exogenous Western ideas" (cited in Sen, 2004).

The integration model proposed in this research study is suggested based on the descriptive and inductive premises. Mayekiso, et al., (2013, p. 187) defines a model as 'a schematic description of a system, a theory or phenomenon that accounts for its known or inferred properties and may be used for further study of its characteristics.' This model will illustrate different elements of an action arena, which is the municipal council in this context. It will strive to paint a picture of an alternative archetype on how the interactions between the ward committee and traditional council governance systems can be restructured and probably be improved. Secondly, it emphasises equitable redistribution of political power among those who participate in the integrated structure. Thirdly, it opens both democratic spaces and opportunities to ensure that they serve their constituencies not just in the best possible manner, but through different approaches on decision-making and information flow. Finally, the integrated rural governance model agrees with those calling for the full municipal council membership to the traditional leaders participating in the municipal council. This is provided that some of the ward committee members are allowed to contest seats in the traditional councils while traditional leaders are allowed to contest seats in the ward committees. This may be achieved through the 40% elected traditional council members. While both institutions maintain their independence, they can still converge the needs of their


constituencies at ward level to be consolidated at municipal council level as they serve the same rural communities.

### **2.6.1 The Operational Model of the Village-Ward Community Assembly**

Dye (1995) maintains that the efficiency of a model lies in its ability to order and simplify political life (cited in Mayekiso, et al., 2013, p. 187). In this section of the research study, the focus is on how interactions between the two rural governance structures can be improved. As the choices have been made and institutional designs have been established at local government in South Africa, how do we ensure representativity with a goal of inclusivity, congruence and acceptability to attain interactional justice (Pitt, 2017). Interactions are between the members and the institutions which relates to the personal treatment. They also between the members themselves within institutions and outside institutions, which is about interpersonal treatment.

The institutional design of this integrated rural governance model (*Figure: 3 Village-Ward Community Assembly*) below is an illustration of the proposed rural governance model. It does not exhaust the potential flows of information for improved decision-making processes and interactional justice for those participating in these rural governance structures. It is just an experiment adding to already proposed local government's decision-making processes (Nghah, et al., 2015) and public participation enhancement models (Mayekiso, et al., 2013). This model may not solve all the complex problems of governing at local level particularly dealing with the challenges posed by this dual governance system. However, I am of the view that it may provide informational justice whereby all stakeholders are able to voice their opinions and those lobbied for consideration in the decisions affecting their lives. Let's now unpack each level of the model sketching the decision-making processes and information flows.

Figure 3: Village-Ward Community Assembly



### 2.6.1.1 Bureaucratic Level of Rural Governance

This is not illustrated in the model but it is very important to briefly analyse the general internal institutional arrangements at municipalities. IYLM has the Speaker's Office supported by the municipal manager and an official responsible for public participation working with the ward councillors and ward committee members. In the public participation unit, there is a dedicated official liaising with the chiefs and the traditional council members at ward level. The current working scenario as IYLM seem to present better opportunities for the experimentation of Village-Ward Community Assembly (VWCA). The Community Development Workers (CDWs) and the Ward Committee members through the Speaker's Office, can be mobilisers for the VWCA from

the municipal and political side. The headmen and sub-headmen can be organisers from the traditional leadership side. They should encourage rural citizens to participate in deliberations, decision-making for improved public reasoning. The VWCA may be chaired either the ward councillor and/or a chief on rotational and/or shared-basis. The community development workers and the headmen remain resource persons for adequate and correct information flow from the villages. The deliberations and decisions at ward level must focus on planning, designing, implementation and monitoring of municipal services and other government provisions.

### **2.6.1.2 Village Level of Rural Governance**

The concept ‘village’ is generally defined as a group of people living in a definite geographical area, characterised by the consciousness of kind, common lifestyles and various intensive social interactions. In terms of the TLGFA, a traditional community is recognised as being under the traditional leadership observing the customary law. The legal English dictionary defines customary law as a traditional common rule or practice that has become an intrinsic part of the accepted and expected conduct in a community, and is treated as a legal requirement. Whereas the Customary Marriages Act of 1998 explains customary law as customs and usages that are traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which forms part of their cultures.

In this VWCA rural governance model, traditional communities are villages under the customary law. Johnson (2013, p. 13) describes community as prioritising mass participation via self-selection and selective recruitment for representativity. In the spirit of public reasoning, the dimensions of participatory governance, the villages / communities must have access and voice in the deliberations about their own needs. Residents’ needs mean to engage government and assess, through access to relevant and timely information, the extent to which it performs its responsibilities effectively and efficiently (Marais, Quayle, & Burns, 2017). Through this participatory governance institution, both elected and unelected representatives will be representing their constituencies in a transparent manner. In this model, the villages are represented through both structures and can get an opportunity to voice their needs by themselves influencing the quality of their representation. Alternatively, they may be able to consciously choose which

structure represent them most and/or force them to work together for the sake of community development at the ward level.

### **2.6.1.3 Ward Level of Rural Governance**

The integrated rural governance model is based on the institutional designs of public participation and decision-making at local governance which are dimensions or elements of participatory governance. Johnson (2013, p. 13) explains assembly as participatory governance institution that consist of a highly level deliberative mode of communication and a limited participants' selection with a fixed number of participants selected randomly. Ward committees are advisory structures to the municipal council and one of their function is to create formal, unbiased communication channels between the communities and the council. This role can be easily monitored by the traditional leaders and traditional communities through participation in the VWCA at ward level.

The VWCA can ensure that both rural governance structures engage each other at ward level before tabling any matter to the portfolio committees and the council. Probably, this may lead to ward level agreements between these key local governance stakeholders. The agreements may include community priorities and may have timeframes and budget estimates based on the information accessed by the ward councillors and the CDWs. The outcomes of such interactions may be an easily flow of information, coordinated activities and highly planned service delivery because villagers can easily understand how the municipality works. A similar system is practised in Zimbabwe where the ward councillor, all headmen and village heads in the respective ward are members of the ward assembly (Chigwata, 2016).

The current system in South Africa which is also practised at IYLM is that public meetings, iimbizo, public hearings and most community-based planning processes are mostly conducted at the village-community level. The practical defect of the current system is that, in most cases, villages are inadequately consulted. Some of the remote rural areas are mostly excluded particularly if there is less mobilisation in such communities. These communities probably know about municipal service delivery projects when decisions have been made at the council level and implementation has started. That is where the trouble starts. Therefore, with the VWCA, decisions

will be made jointly by the rural governance structures and be tabled to the committees for endorsements and then taken to the municipal council for approval. Participants were asked their views about the VWCA and their views were different with traditional leaders warming up to the idea while ward councillors were mostly reluctant to visualise an effective and efficient structure out of this model.

#### **2.6.1.4 Committee Level of Rural Governance**

Ngah, et al., (2015, p. 6) illustrate the decision-making processes by the committees of the municipal council as follows: depending of the complexity of the matter tabled, it can be referred to one committee or more, for endorsement by majority vote of the members of the council. This is probably a similar procedure followed at IYLM and other local municipalities. The only difference would be that at IYLM, there are traditional leaders involved and claimed to be part of the decision-making processes. With VWCA established, the work of the portfolio committee would be easier and more efficient because the bulk of political squabbles would have been eliminated by the time a development matter reaches the committees. VWCA further opens up more space for public participation particularly on providing more opportunities of engagement between the ward councillors and traditional leaders. At committee and council meetings, the agenda would be more on consolidating the endorsed proposals preparing them for implementation.

In conclusion, the participatory governance theoretical framework probably emphasises the interdependence between the ward committee and the traditional council structures and systems for the development of the same constituencies they represent. It further focuses on the ongoing interactions exploring the relational, conceptual and perceptual elements of those who participate and how they participate in the municipal council of IYLM. The findings below illustrate the need for this kind of institutional design where both leaders engage at the grassroots levels and represent their rural constituencies effectively and efficiently.

## **CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This section provides the type of research methodology preferred. It describes how the research study was undertaken. The research study is in the social context and derived from the reality that is socially constructed. The research study is a case study that adopts a descriptive qualitative research design because it considered the interactions within the municipal council context. The section presents the research paradigm, approach and design to establish a methodological framework to study the phenomenon.

Data was collected using semi-structured interviews. Ten participants were selected through purposeful sampling are five (5) ward councillors and five (5) traditional leaders. They were selected because of their expertise and experiences in the interactions with each other, both in the municipal council and in the ward level. Supplementary data were collected from secondary sources such as Annual Reports, Performance Management Reports and other local news sources. It must be categorically stated that these secondary sources were used to either verify what was said by the participants or search deeper to establish the validity and reliability of the information provided.

The section further presents how the researcher approached analysis and interpretation. How the research report was formatted? The ethical considerations such as personal disclosure and objectivity are also handled in this section. The participants were required to give informed consent while they were informed of their rights to anonymity and confidentiality.

### **3.1 Research Paradigm**

The research study's purpose is to understand the interactions between the ward councillors representing the ward committee members and the traditional leaders representing the traditional council members. Both these rural governance structures represent similar or the same rural communities but with different jurisdictions in the same geophysical spaces. Therefore, the purpose of the research study dictates that it utilises a case study methodology because it focuses

on analysing a small number of cases within their context. It seeks to study these interactions in five out of 21 wards of the IYLM. Each ward is regarded as a bounded case because it is expected to provide varying conceptual perspectives on the relationships between the ward councillors and traditional leaders. The interviewees are regarded as rich with information from the context of working with each other representing the same or similar rural communities. They were asked about their experiences and perceptions of these interactions within their natural context.

The interviewees in this research study were selected as data sources to address the research objective stated above. They told their own views and experiences on the existing rural governance model and then were asked how it can be improved. The participants were from different backgrounds within cases to emphasise pluralism more than relativism (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The research study applied the interpretive analysis of the views and experiences narrated using themes to get insights into the nature of interactions. Because the research study dealt with the understanding of the interviewee's subjectivity, it used interviews as a data-gathering technique. From the interview transcripts, the researcher used direct quotes and paraphrased participants to create anecdotes and narratives depicting a mental image for him and the reader to understand the nature of these interactions whether they facilitate or not participatory governance at IYLM.

### **3.2 Research Approach**

The qualitative approach was implemented in this research study because the research is interested in both the internal and external insights into the operations of the ward committees and traditional councils from participating individual's perspectives and experiences. The researcher is interested in discovering and interpreting how the interactions between the ward councillors and the traditional leaders are perceived to facilitate or constrain participatory governance at rural governance at IYLM.

Yin (2016, p. 3) argues that doing qualitative research is marked by the challenge of doing original research and pursuing transparency, methodic-ness and adherence to evidence as the objectives. The motivating force for undertaking this research study is a personal belief in the deepening of democracy through individual access to information, community involvement in decision-making



and people's understanding of how government works. The conviction is that both rural governance institutions have a role to play in ensuring that those excluded and impoverished in rural areas do contribute to the decision-making processes that affect their lives.

Qualitative research offers the researcher a chance to connect these principles to the realities narrated through the participant's views and experiences (Yin, 2016, p. 4). Also, the qualitative research approach allows the observation of these interactions at the intimate social settings where, as the researcher, I have to go beyond the words in these interactions. But observe issues of power dynamics, control and influences particularly when traditional leaders participate in the deliberations and /or decision-making at the municipal council. Therefore, the cases explored in this research study are interactions between ward councillors and traditional leaders as interpreted by them, which are believed to bring insights into the existing rural governance model that will allow the development of a revised concept (Village-Ward Community Assembly) that may assist to mitigate and improve the social behaviour (conflictual interactions between the ward councillors and traditional leaders as articulated in the theoretical section above) and shift paradigms (Yin, 2016).

### **3.3 Research Design**

Baxter & Jack (2008, p. 545) present the case as the same as the unit of analysis. Yin (1989) cited in Noor (2008, p. 1602) defines case or unit of analysis as a phenomenon being investigated within its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence. The case study design was preferred for this research study because the study sought to answer how the interactions between ward councillors and traditional leaders enable or impede participatory governance at IYLM. Further, in the case study, the researcher cannot manipulate the behaviour of the participants involved (Yin, 2003 cited in Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 545). This qualitative case study research does not intend to study the ward committees and traditional councils in their entirety. But to capture the views and experiences of the participants within their social, institutional, cultural and environmental contextual real-life conditions (Yin, 2016, p. 9) around the ward committees and traditional councils.

This qualitative case research study is a descriptive research because the intention is to depict a detailed picture of the relationships (interactions) between these rural governance institutions at IYLM. However, the research study could not separate between the context of the phenomenon and those involved in it. The ward councillors and traditional leaders are interacting with people through their committees and councils respectively. They also form part of the municipal council by virtue of serving on the ward committees for the ward councillors and by being appointed by the relevant MEC for the traditional leaders. Qualitative case study research uses different techniques of data gathering and analysis.

### **3.4 Data Collection**

Qualitative case study research acknowledges the value of collecting, integrating and presenting data from a variety of sources of evidence. The phenomenon is complex and various sources of evidence were explored which warranted interviews to be conducted. Interview questions were semi-structured because they provided the researcher with pre-prepared questions. Semi-structured interview technique further provides flexibility allowing both the researcher and participants an opportunity to refine the questions and answers (Horton, Macve, & Struyven, 2004, p. 341) while not compromising the quality of the content of the question asked. The technique allows the researcher to weigh up the credibility of the responses for himself and explore some of the underlying motives more directly. They were further chosen in order to allow the participants a degree of freedom to explain their thoughts and to highlight their perceptions while narrating their experiences and expressing their views. The answers to interview questions were collated into thematic patterns which were used to examine if what literature claims as conflictual interactions and unhealthy contestations between the ward committees and traditional councils obstruct participatory governance at IYLM. If so, how and why?

The interviews started with the introductory statement and then questions followed, by sub-questions for clarity or confirmatory statements where necessary. Interviews were recorded with the informed consent of the participants. The researcher translated the questions and had both English and Xhosa versions readily available for better understanding and allowing the freedom of choice by the participants. This was to provide a stress-free environment where participants feel

free and confident to speak in any languages of their choices as long as the researcher understands. The researcher conducted the interviews in both languages as he is conversant in both and can codeswitch, where necessary. He personally transcribed and translated the recordings as he is competent to do so. It shall be stated that out of 10 interviewees, only one chose English as a preferred language and attempted to answer all questions through English.

Data from primary and secondary sources were studied to validate certain information extrapolated from the interview transcripts. The primary sources were documents such as media releases and news reporting (especially local newspapers) while secondary sources consulted were IDPs and SDBIP, ARs and Impact Reports. The researcher examined the interview transcripts for the manifest and latent meanings to understand the perceptions, attitudes, ideologies and beliefs the ward councillors and traditional leaders have towards each other and about each other.

In this regard, for instance, the researcher might verify the validity of ward councillors and traditional leaders' responses by comparing their data with the local news stories about the interactions within that particular ward. The representativeness of the contents of the interview transcripts is how the interviewee interpretation of events predominates to the exclusion of others (Silva, 2012). The researcher continuously checked if the interview transcripts are not inclined towards projecting a particular perspective more than present a balanced view of the relations.

### **3.5 Sampling**

In the context of a case study, sampling refers to the selection of cases and data sources that assist to understand the case or cases (Gentles, Charles, Ploeg, & McKibbin, 2015). Cited in Gentles, et al., (2015, p. 1776) Yin 2014 argues that sampling implies a desire to achieve statistical generalizability. That is not the aim of sampling in case study research. He explains that in case study research which is qualitative, the aim should be to achieve analytic generalizability whereby generalisation should be at the conceptual and perceptual levels rather than a specific case.

The cases and data sources were selected using a sampling strategy called purposeful sampling. It is a non-probability sampling technique which is used to select the sample based on the

characteristics of the population. Purposeful sampling relies on selecting information-rich cases for in-depth analysis. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about the issues of central importance and yield insights and in-depth understanding, argue (Gentles, *et al.*, 2015, 1778). The target populations in this research study were the local government actors that were highly involved in the governance structures of the IYLM. These are ward councillors and traditional leaders.

The selection criteria used to select the participants is based on the purpose of the research study which is to get insights and in-depth understanding of the interactions between the two rural governance systems. Yin (2016) defines purposeful sampling as the selection of participants based on their anticipated richness and relevance of information in relation to the study's research questions. The different selected participants from the population were perceived to be able to provide rich experiences, deep insights and broad personal observations of the interactions between these two rural governance systems because they are involved. Therefore, studying through the narrations of these participations presented information-rich cases which provided insights to the interactions between the ward committee and traditional council governance systems as to whether they propel or impede participatory governance at IYLM.

Subsequently, the selection criteria for these participants is that they are involved at the municipal council. They are perceived to be knowledgeable and would be able to articulate their experiences and views bringing to the fore the insights on the relationships between the ward councillors and traditional leaders. The researcher interviewed ten available, but willing participants. The availability and willingness criteria should be distinguished from the convenience sampling which seeks to do things fast and conveniently. These criteria in this context were employed to maximise efficiency and validity. They were deployed to guide against arbitrary claims of saturation as the research had to ensure that at least the targeted number of interviews is reached. This is because purposeful sampling in qualitative research aims at acquiring information that is useful for understanding the complexity, depth, variation or context surrounding the interactions (Gentles, *et al.*, 2015, 1782).

In accordance with a commonly proposed sample size of case study research, the researcher categorised the participants as follows:

1. Group 1 were the five ward councillors from five different wards (5 x participants);
2. Group 2 consisted of a traditional leader from any ward of the municipality (5 x participants).

It became very cumbersome to allocate and sit down ward councillors according to the traditional leader's areas of jurisdiction due to both costs, time constraints and availability. The researcher also could not sit down five of the eight traditional leaders currently serving as the municipal council but was able to interview three currently serving and two that previously served at municipal council. The questions were not rephrased or adjusted in any manner that made sense to the participant. The questions remained the same. The motivation for the purposeful sampling is that the municipal has 22 ward councillors and the number selected was on the basis of availability and willingness to participate in the interviews. A municipal administrator organised the willing and available ward councillors while another municipal administrator also facilitated access to the traditional leaders. The interviews were conducted over three days. It shall be stated that the researcher did not interview one group and followed by the other, that is, start with ward councillors and then traditional leaders. The researcher interviewed any available and willing participants at that random time or previously arranged interview schedule.

Furthermore, the municipal council has eight traditional leaders and each participates in the eight portfolio committees of the municipal council (IYLM Annual Report, 2017/2018). It should be noted that the fact that the researcher selected the equal number of participants (five of ward councillors and traditional leaders), but not the same percentage, did not prejudice any of the population as quantities are not the focus of the research. It is the perceptions, observations and experiences of the participants that are the most critical to making the findings on the interactions between the two rural governance structures. To prevent rehearsed answers, the researcher did not provide questions prior to the interviews. All questions were provided during the interviews and responses were expected immediately while participants were informed of their right not to answer questions they do not want to answer. The researcher frequently reminded the participants that there were no right or wrong answer as these were their personal opinions and there is no one will

know s/he has been interviewed other myself and the municipal officials facilitating access to them for me.

According to Laher & Botha (2012, p. 94) qualitative research is less concerned about making statistical inferences from a sample to a population and more concerned about individual understanding, meaning and reliability of results. The transferability of results in this research study did not assume the quantitative external validity tool of ecological validity (Laher & Botha, 2012), but whether the results could be compared to the context of the reader. That is, can the reader be able to understand the nature of the study, its design, procedures and results and evaluate whether these apply to contexts they are familiar with (Laher & Botha, 2012).

Consequently, the researcher conducted these interviews at the municipality offices in Cofimvaba for most ward councillors and at the Great Places and the Cofimvaba Resource Centre for traditional leaders as they held a meeting at the Resource Centre.

### **3.6 Data Presentation – Report**

The reporting format to be followed in this study is the APA reporting format for qualitative data interpretation. From the qualitative perspective, I will tell the story of the findings from data supporting it with trends emanating from interpreting answers from interviewed participants and consulted documents. This process reminds the reader of the key assumptions, research questions and what are the research findings.

### **3.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation**

This research study is a qualitative case study research collecting data in a semi-structured rather than structured interviews. The semi-structured interview is a technique that allows some flexibility when asking questions while providing the participants with an opportunity to answer in any manner they prefer. Questions followed a thematic structure which started with a brief introductory statement followed by questions and probing follow-up questions, where necessary. The themes followed in the interviews included questions on the specific topics. For instance,

Question 1 was orientated towards interactions; Question 2 was on power dynamics (deliberation vs. decision-making); Question 3 was on representation (legitimacy and trust); Question 4 was on (overlapping roles and responsibilities), and Question 5 was about the integrated platforms (Village-Ward Community Assembly). These themes were utilised to formulate an analytical and interpretive frameworks seeking to address the purpose of the research study which is to understand whether the ward committee and traditional council governance systems facilitate or not participatory governance at IYLM. These themes also informed the patterns that emanated from the data using them as units of analysis.

The units of analysis were identified through a word, a phrase, a sentence and a couple of sentences from the participants' answers (Kawulich & Holland, 2012). The unit of analysis identified the topic discussed through a particular question. For instance, question 1 focused on the description of the interactions. Therefore, the researcher scouted for units that describes the character and depicts the nature of the interactions in the answers. The researcher brought together these units of analysis using their similarities or differences to create a pattern or patterns based on the relationships. The researcher further looked for the frequencies and sequences on the statements through deductive methods to refer back to the themes corresponding with each question.

Kawulich & Holland (2012, p. 231) advise for the use of a constant comparative method which is about the use of codes in the answers of the participants. For example, the description of the interactions was coded as the Relationship Code in which all the answers related to the description of the interactions could be allocated to this code. Other codes that were used in this study are conceptual and perspective codes. The research study could not utilise characteristics and contextual/setting codes as they were deemed not significant to the purpose of the research study. Some of the codes could be further subdivided into segments. For instance, an initial code for question 5 were subdivided into four segments such as reasons for working together or not working together, kinds of structures, perceptions about future cooperation, improved rural residents' participation in decision-making, increase accountability and improved monitoring. Most of them were perceptual codes describing how participants perceived the imaginary structure.

Probably, the more data was coded the more patterns emerged from the data linking perceptions, reasons and concepts forming categories of meaning (Kawulich & Holland, 2012, p. 231). For instance, grouping together all descriptions of interactions back into one category projected a particular descriptive finding of the interactions between these two rural governance systems at IYLM. These categories were then used to formulate the conceptual and theoretical findings on the nature of interactions. They were further used to establish whether the revised concept of Village-Ward Community Assembly (Kawulich & Holland, 2012, p. 331) was supported or rejected. Both primary and secondary documents were used as references to verify the relevance, significance and meanings of some of the participant's interviews, where applicable.

To eliminate the researcher's influence and errors, the researcher ensured content validity by constantly referring to the conceptual and theoretical elements and units of analysis as reviewed above as theoretical dimensions of participatory governance.

### **3.8 Ethical Considerations**

#### **3.1.1 Personal Disclosure and Objectivity**

In the interest of credibility, trust, integrity, objectivity and elimination of the bias in this research study, I disclosed that I have no personal links with IYLM other than having a homestead and being raised in one of its villages. I have been residing outside the area for more than 20 years with very limited interactions with the municipality and the traditional leaders. Going through the IYLM AR 2017/2018, I can categorically state that I do not have any personal relationship with any persons in the potential populations of the participants. I firmly believe that no influence, whatsoever, I presented during data collection and interpreting thereof. I abide by the ethical and legal principles that govern research at the Wits School of Governance.

#### **3.1.2 Informed Consent**

For fairness and openness, I abide by the guiding principles of the informed consent which stipulates that it's the individual's personal right to agree or not agree to participate in the research study after fully understanding the total research processes and participation consequences, if any



(Ogletree & Kawulich, 2012, p. 68). Some of the Informed Consent principles adhered to are, (i) the participant can withdraw from the study at any time, (ii) participation is voluntary, and that (iii) participation may have an emotional effect to the respondents as they may feel that they are being interrogated about their handling of personal relationships, competencies and aptitude to serve their constituencies.

However, such details were part of the contents of the Informed Consent Form and Information Leaflet accompanying an invitation to participate in the research study. These details of the Informed Consent Forms and Information Leaflet included the purpose of the research, estimated duration of conducting the interviews, what was expected from the participant, any potential risks or benefits to the participants, issues of anonymity and confidentiality, how records will be handled and stored, contact details of the researcher, supervisor and Wits School of Governance Research Ethics Committee for any answers to questions, concerns or participatory rights (Ogletree & Kawulich, 2012, p. 69). All this information was made available and explained to the participants prior to agreeing for being interviewed.

### **3.1.3 Anonymity and Confidentiality**

General ethics in research dictate that researchers guarantee anonymity and/or confidentiality of the participants. In this research study, anonymity was not possible as the research study was targeting a particular type of participants who had to confirm some credentials to ensure that the participants were the actual persons targeted. Also, interviews were conducted in person at the participant's comfortable space or a neutral venue.

However, confidentiality has to be guaranteed as the researcher understood that participation was based on trust and in public interest. The researcher did not use pseudonyms. The researcher did not describe participants beyond their roles of being ward councillors and traditional leaders. The researcher allocated labels to these two groups of participants categorising them as follows, the first ward councillor to fifth were labelled as "WC01" to "WC05" while traditional leaders were labelled "TL01" to "TL05" respectively. Dates and times in the interview form were used by the researcher to handle and categorise the data.

## **CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

### **4.1 Introduction**

In this section I will present the research outcomes through data analysis. Barbour, (2014, p. 498) argues that in comparison to quantitative data analysis, qualitative data analysis remains elusive because of the broad range of qualitative approaches. Quantitative data analysis criteria can include validity, reliability, replicability and generalizability (Barbour, 2014).

To analysis data in this research study, I have adopted a methodic-appropriate criteria which include ensuring that transcripts are simple and readable (Kowal & O'Connell, 2014), data is trustworthy, credible, dependable, transferrable and confirmable (Barbour, 2014). The data is presented following the thematic structure also used in the interview questions with responses for both groups summarised and compared for a consolidated reply to the questions. However, minor statistical differences and/or contradictions about a theme or sub-theme in each group will be highlighted and discussed in the following chapter.

### **4.2 Transcribing and Translating Interview Data**

The interviews were conducted between the 07 – 10 November 2019 (Appendix B & C: Transcripts). There ten participations that were interviewed. All ward councillors interviewed were women and are hereinafter coded as WC and a number from 01 to 05 (WC01 to WC05). It shall be noted that the researcher did not deliberately select the participants but was interviewing

whoever was available at the time. Male ward councillors did not avail themselves at the time of scheduled interviews. All traditional leaders were men and are hereinafter labelled as TL and a number 01 to 05 (TL01 to TL05). Kindly note that the number was randomly allocated.

The meaning of gender dichotomy on the interviewees may demonstrate progress made in gender equitability and women activism in the municipal ward system. IYLM seem to comply with ANC Gender Policy of at least 50% of gender balance in every sphere of political representation. Whereas, the male dominated participants on the traditional leadership may portray underlying resistance to change as prescribed by the constitution and legislation. It shall be noted that the research study is not a gender or behavioural study but a governance research. The research did not seek to engage any gender related issues such as whether there may be any effects in the interactions if these structures were either dominated by any gender or there was equitable representation. While it may be argued that the current progressive trends on women empowerment directly affect these rural governance structures, such topics are beyond the scope of this research study.

Immediately after conducting interviews, I embarked on transcribing. Transcription refers to any graphic representation of selective aspects of verbal, prosodic and paralinguistic behaviour (Kowal & O'Connell, 2014). I shall state upfront that my transcription did not provide prosodic and paralinguistic components as this research study does not take into consideration the behavioural attributes such as non-verbal displayed by the participants. Suffice to say that some interviews were more challenging on conceptual understanding to the participants than others while some

were very interesting and very articulate in their responses showing sufficient understanding of these rural governance structures.

I listened to the audio record and translated the utterances trying to maintained the Xhosa pragmatics and semantics as much as possible to ensure that latent meanings are preserved. I further kept some of the Xhosa idiomatic expression while literary translated them into English. Again, I will not dwell on the verbal changes from the Xhosa audio into translated English version of the transcript as that does not have any bearing in this research study. Suffice to mention that there were some deletions especially of repetitive utterances where such utterances are deeming unnecessary to illustrate or transcribe or translate. There have been additions and/or substitutions here and there to ensure that the phrases and sentences do make sense in English. This then talks to the rearrangements and relocations of the linguistic units to ensure that the English transcripts make sense to the reader.

#### **4.3 Analysing Interview Transcripts**

The analysis of transcripts was done by the researcher. He considered the fact that he is representing people's lived experiences, perceptions, opinions and beliefs. He is contributing to interactional (social) justice and has to project the understandings of the topics by the participants (Roulston , 2014). The interview data followed a theoretical and thematic format whereby themes and sub-themes were identified through literature reviews above. These themes include the nature of interactions which informs question 1; power dynamics examined in question 2; representativity

observed in question 3; roles and responsibilities investigated in question 4; and integration model conceptualised in question 5.

Each question is classified into a number of conceptual labels derived from the participatory governance conceptual and theoretical frameworks that provided the dimensions of participatory governance as units of analysis and model as conceptual experiment. Question 1 is subdivided into the description and the nature of the interactions which illustrates interactional justice at IYLM. Question 2 is split into three dimensions of participatory governance, deliberations, decision-making and monitoring, Question 3 is segmented into legitimacy and trust to test aspects of transparency, efficiency and institutional procedures. Question 4 is broken up into overlapping, status recognition and causes of conflict which form part of monitoring and accountability.

And lastly, Question 5 focuses on the integration model and is sectioned into four labels connected to the subthemes. Each subtheme dealt with perceptions on working together, the format of the structure, improved participation, and increased accountability which are aspects that describe information flow and decision-making processes in the proposed VWCA. Roulston (2014) argues that this process of initial code labels is used to conceptualise the properties and dimensions of the codes while assisting with the development of theoretical framework. It further assisted with the linking of thematic descriptions to the overarching theory of participatory governance.

## 4.4 The Findings

The data presented and consolidated in the thematic outline following the question structure explained above. This is illustrated by the deductive inferences descending from the theoretical and conceptual frameworks derived from literature reviews linked to the levels of interview statements presented by the participants as summarised below.

### 4.4.1 In your view, how is the interactions (relationships) between the ward councillors and traditional leaders at IYLM?

The ward councillors described the interactions as ‘very good’ while traditional leaders are labelling them as just ‘good’. The nature of the interactions is regarded as warm, cooperative and conducive for working together. Traditional Leader 04 (TL04) illustrates the nature of the relationships as follows:

*“Then I will say it is good. There are some challenges here and there. However, we end up having to work together because we have to ... with people. We have to work about and with the people. Even if we are in conflict with the ward councillors, we have to work together with the ward councillors.”*

These erratic relationships between these rural governance structures are further confirmed by TL05 when saying; *“... it is sometimes right and other times not right”*. WC04 places the estranged affairs between them and traditional leaders *“in the past, [where] there were conflictual disagreements on the manner we worked.”*

The data illustrates the justifications for this description and nature of interactions as the results of the incorporation of the traditional leaders into the municipal council. WC01 describes

*“The relationship between the ward councillors and traditional leaders [a]s good because we discuss all the developmental issues together, in so*

*much that, in our [municipal] council we have traditional leaders who have council meetings with us, where we take decision of this municipality together.”*

The Integrated Development Plan (IDP) for 2018/2019 mentions that traditional leaders are one of the critical stakeholders, as such, they are part of the development with the municipality. They are forming part of the council and partake in the initiation programmes, participate in the war rooms where government and state institutions come together to deal with service delivery. Ward Councillor 01 (WC01) elucidates the quality of the interactions by saying:

*“If you want me to dwell on how at local level do we communicate. At local level, our meetings as ward councillors, the venue for our meeting are held at the Great Place - that is the Chief's Place for the community. Most of them do attend the meetings whereas they are ward councillor's meeting to give you the support. In other locations where there is no Chief's Great Place, the meetings are held at the Headmen's or sub-headmen's places. If you are going to hold a meeting and that location is may be at [name of the place], the sub-headman must be there, because as ward councillor you will be using his home for the community meeting. So there are good relationships in so much that they are included when undertaking IDP roadshows. They are also part of our standing committees.”*

According to most ward councillors and municipal council documents, there are eight traditional leaders particularly chiefs representing ‘amaKomkhulu’ (the Great Places) in the municipal council. WC03 was very specific with the number and who the traditional leaders at municipal council represent by saying:

*“Therefore, as the traditional leaders lead according to certain traditional council's jurisdictions. Each traditional council is being represented in the*

*municipal council. Thus there are eight traditional leaders. We do everything in cooperation. We do not do anything without each other."*

Both leaders applaud national government for allowing traditional leaders to participate in the municipal councils as that eliminated contestation of the turfs and reduced conflicts between these two rural governance leaders. They further attributed the successes in the nature of interactions to broadened access to information, the consultative platforms in the wards and the dealing with issue of “*iinkunzi ezimbini ebuhlantini obunye ziyalwa*” literally meaning ‘when two bulls are in the same kraal, they fight’ explained TL01. WC04 echoes this sentiment by describing the past nature of interactions between the two rural governance structures as changed:

*“There has been a lot of change since there traditional leaders are participating in the municipal council. It is not as it was before. In the past, there were conflictual disagreements on the manner we worked. Now that we are together in the municipal council, we work together. We understand the law. Each person tows his/her line. So we are working together better than before.”*

**4.4.2 Do you think that the participatory governance institutions at IYLM facilitate public deliberations, decision-making and monitoring of the implementation processes? Who makes the decisions on the ward-developmental matters between the ward councillors and the traditional leaders at IYLM?**

In contrast to the legislative prescripts that limit participation of traditional leaders to deliberations at the municipal council, the traditional leaders at IYLM do participate in deliberations and decision-making of the municipal council. Traditional leaders participating in the municipal council are also part of the portfolio committees and do participate in decision-making. TL02 explains their participation in decision-making processes as follows:

*“We are involved in the decision-making process because in each and every meeting that sits, the chiefs are present. There is no meeting that does not involve chiefs. As they are present in the municipal council, there are many*



*of them taking part in the decision making. Therefore, there are chiefs involved in the decision-making at the council.”*

Interestingly, traditional leaders were very specific and positive about their participation in the deliberations, decision-making and monitoring of the municipal council. TL01 said *“we become advisors to the municipal council.”* However, TL03 viewed the advisory role from a different perspective saying:

*“when you explore the ward committee system, the traditional leaders consider ward councillors as “amaphakathi” [councillors to the chief] elected to serve the people of the chief in the land of the chief.”*

While the other articulated how these meetings create platforms for the residents to conceptualise their needs with both leaderships which make it easier to escalate the people’s wishes for the attention of the municipality. Both types of leaderships were very articulate about the concept of ‘war rooms’. They regarded them as the best consultative model where almost every sector is represented.

However, on both groups, there were those who did not mince their words about the appalling behaviours of the others. TL04 said *“in honest truth, the ward councillors are driving their own personal missions.”*. WC01 said traditional leaders lack knowledge and they are not trained to the same levels as municipal councillors:

*“... there is a guiding document from the municipality that guides you on how to lead the people. You do not just lead the people as you wish. You shall be guided by the laws of the municipality. You are also guided by the workbook provided during training by the municipality. You will be charged if you transgressed the guide. So we do not attend such training together with the traditional leaders.”*

#### **4.4.3 Who do you think is representing better the rural communities on development matters between the ward councillors and the traditional leaders (chiefs and headmen) and why?**

As explained above, this question was asked to get perceptions on each group by the other. Interestingly, both groups were generous of their opinions that there is no better structure representing the people than the other. Both, ward councillors and traditional leaders emphasised the different roles each type of leadership plays. WC05 explains that:

*“In my ward, there are no disparities. Although, our leadership responsibilities and roles are different. We lead development as ward councillors. Chiefs are leading on culture. However, there is cooperation.”*

Nonetheless, each group did try to project itself as the most legitimate and trusted rural governance structure. The ward councillors regarded themselves as legitimate leadership because they are voted into power and bring development to the people. WC01 argues that:

*“No they are not the same. Because it is too much for the ward councillors alone. As I said, the traditional leaders mostly fit in land administration, giving people building sites, attending to dispute cases of the people at local level. So the ward councillor is looking after developmental matters of the communities through the municipal services. There is an overlap on what the municipality is doing.”*

Traditional leadership stressed the fact that they stay amongst the people. They are the ones who keep order, adjudicate disputes and allocate land to their people. This is explained by TL03 saying

*“The traditional leaders are for bringing order, oversee issues related to traditions and customs ... ward committee develops the people of the chief in the land of the chief.”*

It came up several times that traditional leaders, particularly chiefs, are the owners of the land. Therefore, it is them who should make decisions on land and developmental matters than being

told by the ward councillors what developmental initiatives are coming. Answering this question, TL05 responds:

*“The way I view this, the most relevant to developmental leadership is the traditional council. Because, first, the reason I am saying this is that, it is the chief that has the land. The land belongs to the chief. Then, it is the chief that as the final decision on what to do with his/her own land. The ward councillor does not have land. Therefore, the ward councillor does not have powers to make decision/s on the use of land while s/he does not have the land. Therefore, s/he must first start by consulting with the chief or ask the chief for the land. Ward Councillor does not have the land. it is the chief that has the land.”*

The ward councillors projected themselves as leading service delivery and representing people in a democratic government. WC03 argued that the current government is “*government of the people by the people.*” compared to the previous regimes where traditional leaders were ruling alone in the rural areas. “*People would come together and raise funds to get some sort of development happening.*” she compares. She claims that that is no longer acceptable as the current government brings services to the people. This is a fact emphasised by the TLGFA that no traditional community shall be compelled to make involuntary contributions to towards either community development or a traditional leader or a family member of the traditional leader.

#### **4.4.4 Do you think the developmental roles and responsibilities accorded to ward councillors are the same to those of the traditional leaders? Do you think they overlap and create conflict between these rural governance structures?**

These roles and responsibilities are viewed as not the same by both groups of rural governance structures with two ward councillors viewing them as the same because they lead the same people. Furthermore, TL01 argued that the end results of these roles and responsibilities are the same contending that “*zisengela thungeni linye*” (literally meaning “cows are milked into the same bucket”). He articulated that the main objective is to develop black communities particularly rural communities that were marginalised by the colonial and Apartheid’s regimes.

However, TL05 brought different perspectives to this question when answering that:

*“In my view, the roles and responsibilities of the chief and ward councillor are different, because it is the chief that have more powers. It is the chief that has the land, the ward councillor does not have the land. That is the basis of the difference.”*

Emphasising this difference, TL03 argued that:

*“Then when we explore the ward committee system, traditional leaders consider the ward councillors as “amaphakathi” [councillors of the chief] elected to serve the people of the chief in the land of the chief. The difference is that the ward committee develops the people of the chief. Then the chief monitors how its people are developed. Then there is a difference there.”*

On the other hand, WC01 equated their status to that of a chief saying:

*“I remember one time, the headman calling me saying “you must come to my place to my meeting”. I said No. You are not at my level. I am in the level of the chief. If you want something just request “Ngendlela e.. in a good manner”. So that I can come and clarify what you want to be clarified... otherwise, I am not under you.”*

The statements above demonstrate how status conscious these rural governance leaders are and how serious do they perceive their social / political roles at the ward level. Monitoring and accountability as a dimension of participatory governance talks to the vertical and horizontal accountability in which social status shall not be an issue as long as the other rural governance structure seeks engagement with the other. However, both groups were sceptical of being equitably accountable to each other citing issues of encroachment and articulating their own reporting lines. TL02 stated that overlapping and/or encroachment is caused by the manner they work.

*“You will find that the ward councillor takes duties that are not his/her but belong to the chiefs. For example, death certificates are done by the chiefs. Then you find that ward councillors do them. But the person was living with*

*the chief. Then the ward councillors have encroached to the jurisdiction of the chiefs. It is the chief that knows the deceased. How the deceased was.”*

WC04 viewed the roles and responsibilities as “*same because we are leading the people.*” While WC03 perceived them as similar. Both agree that they differ mostly on the focus of their duties. “*Traditional leaders ... their focus is on traditions and customs.*” argues WC03.

#### **4.4.5 If government may integrate the two rural governance systems (governance through the ward committees and traditional councils):**

##### **4.4.5.1 Do you think they can work together to ensure village development and why?**

Ward councillors believe that integration of these two rural governance systems will not work. They rejected the concept arguing that these structures provide totally different types of leaderships and appointed differently. WC03 argues that:

*“No. According to me, there would be conflict because we are talking about two different things here. There are totally different to each other at all levels and characters. This is because the traditional leader is not voted in. The traditional leader is by birth. And the traditional leadership will not be changed because s/he is not being voted in or out. Actually, the one that is voted for is sent by the people. It is important that s/he serves the people. The traditional one has to be served by the people. I, therefore, do not understand if they can be integrated into one structure that there will be no conflict. There will be conflict. With regard to service delivery, I believe that there may be acute failures that would be very hard to work together with them. As I have said, one brings his/her traditional perspective while the other brings the political and governmental perspectives. We then bring these together to work with each other. But if they can be put to one person (structure), I do not believe that can work well.”*

Traditional leaders are selected from the bloodline of the royal family and are permanent. The ward councillors are elected for a 5-year term and /or re-elected for one additional term only. The ward councillors alleged that traditional leaders are not bound by any ethical regulations. They are not accountable to anyone but themselves and they are not trained compared to the ward councillors. WC01 articulates her rejection of integration as follows:

*“Why? Because if some of the headmen are invited to a meeting through the ward committee members by writing them letters indicating that the municipal council is going to have a meeting in the village. What they (some of the headmen and/or sub-headmen) come in a meeting drunk. So, unless they can be trained. I don't know. But the way they behave (indlela abaziphethe ngayo), because, as leader you can't go into a meeting intoxicated (unxilile).”*

However, traditional leaders, except TL03, were of the view that an integrated structure may work very well because all leaders in the ward will be under one roof, reporting to one leader - who shall be the chief. TL03 provided a different perspective that

*“The honourable, in my view, there is no way that they can be integrated into one structure. The reason I am saying that. When you talk about traditional leadership, there is no politics. In politics, people are viewed in terms of their political affiliations. In the traditional leadership system, there is no distinguishing on political grounds. Then if there could be fusion of the political structures with the traditional leadership, then there may be conflictual and problematic issues in the manner in which people are developed.”*

TL04 could not conceptualise the question even after examples were provided. However, he was supportive of collaborations and the argument that traditional leadership must chair the integrated structure based on the fact that chiefs are permanently appointed. Traditional leaders will close the void in leadership lull during the transition period from one elected leadership to another.

#### **4.4.5.2 What kind of a structure that may be formed?**

Traditional leaders are of the view that such a structure must be led by the chief who is deputised by the ward councillor and be equally represented in a form similar to the ‘war rooms’. The war room model is also proposed by WC03 when saying *“it can be a structure that looks like a war room”*. TL02 responded as follows in follow-up questions:

TL02: *Even in the manner it is now, there will always be the chief in the leadership because you do not vote for the chief.*

Researcher: *So you are suggesting that it must be led by the chief?*

TL02: *It must be led by the chief. Because the chief will still continue even if the ward councillor's term has come to an end. The chief will be able to provide guidance as to where the issues were and what direction they should follow. Therefore, there is nothing that will slip through the cracks because of the lull in leadership. Everything will go according to the plans as they were suggested by the people.*

Researcher: *In your view, if I am following it up. How do you think the structure should be in representation? 50/50, 70/30, in terms of the representation*

TL02: *It should be 50/50.*

Ward councillors responded to the question even though they disagree with the concept saying if such a structure should be created by national government, only the chiefs should be part of it. WC01 argued as follows:

*“If they want to make it one system, I see, e-ehe!. There is too much that can be done. Because, it can be easy if they just take the chiefs only. Because, for example, in our council now we are having chiefs, who are traditional councillors or who represent traditional leaders. We do not have a problem with those people because they are matured, more experienced and the chiefs of today are educated. That means a lot. If these structures can be integrated, I do not think they can work. But if they can take chiefs only.”*

#### **4.4.5.3 Do you believe that such a structure could improve participation of rural residents in the decision-making of the IYLM?**

Both, the ward councillors and traditional leaders believed that such a structure may improve public participation in decision-making at IYLM. They believe that an integrated structure will eliminate the ‘two centres of power’ that divide the rural communities into preferring one form of leadership than the other. TL05 illustrated the situation as,

*“Yes, I think it is the most definite in decision-making by people. Because, what we find as chiefs, is that, people in the rural villages are divided. There are those who attend the ward councillor’s meetings and those who attend the chief’s meetings.”*

WC04 suggested that there is a desperate need to have conversations on such a structure particularly in eliminating the two centres of power in rural governance. She argued that:

*“No, if it happens, we can really work. It may also end these divisive elements of preferring to listen to this one than the other. Are you getting me sir? Because now it looks like there are two centres of power, which is wrong.”*

TL02 argues that integrated structure will mitigate excessive and meaningless consultations *“because there will be no reason to go around consulting too much. It will be of just working together.”* TL03 echoes this sentiment elaborating how to deal with two governance systems:

*“Yes, because people will be focused into one structure. People will understand and believe in one structure which they would know that they are represented in that one structure. This is unlike the current two governance structure system where people are divided into two structures. People say this to this structure and say something different to another structure. Then once, it become one structure, that would lead to dealing with one structure that serves them.*

#### **4.4.5.4 Do you believe that such structure would increase accountability by both rural governance systems to the residents and improve service-delivery monitoring by the residents?**

Agreeing with the ‘two centres of power’ concept, traditional leaders viewed this kind of structure as the one that will provide accountability to the people because there will be one leader providing a shared vision and easily creating coordinated programmes. TL02 perceived the integrated



structure as one that *“will improve service delivery a lot”*. TL03 says *“should people see their representation as per their interests in that one structure, then their belief and trust will increase as much as possible”*. TL05 thought *“it is the most definite that can improve all those processes.”*

Ward councillors went into details on how they are accountable to the people. They said they hold monthly and quarterly reporting meetings at ward level while they account to the speaker of the municipal council. The Speaker is further accountable to the people through his/her political affiliation and that Speaker is councillor elected by the people. The excerpt below captures the perceptions by WC01 on monitoring, reporting and accountability by the traditional leadership:

“WC01:        *No, I don't think so.*

R:                *Why?*

WC01:        *Why? I don't believe, as I said to you, on that side, they are demanding, or giving rules, not working. I don't know how to put it (Andiyazi ukuba ndiza kuyibeka kanjani).*

R:                *Just put it as is (Yibeke nje)*

WC01:        *You understand that they believe that they are of royal blood, so they cannot listen to the people. They just do what they want to do. They just give orders. At the municipal level, that is local government level, there are some rules. There is a guidance. Rules. You are held accountable.*

R:                *By?*

WC01:        *By the speaker.*

R:                *Okay*

WC01:        *So each and every month as a councillor, you submit a report. Of what is happening in your villages, of what you have done this month, this quarter. And there are ward committee members who on that side are in the level of sub-headmen. Those ward committee members also submit reports on monthly basis. So the sub-headmen do not submit report to*

*anyone. They are not held accountable. So I do not think it can work.”*

Notwithstanding the shared view on the concept structure creating accountability opportunities for both leaders, ward councillors were very critical of the traditional leaders (be it chiefs, headmen and sub-headmen) as not reporting to anyone as per conversation above. WC03 described traditional leadership as ‘*by birth*’ right and “*not voted in or out*”. WC03 argued that “*it is important that [a ward councillor] serves the people. The traditional one has to be served by the people.*” This notion of subjectification of the rural residence is sustained by the traditional leaders’ that “*people belong to the chief and reside in the land of the chief.*” as believed by TL03 and TL05. Traditional leaders claim that because chiefs have the land and the people, “*it is the chief that have more powers.*” (TL05).

In conclusion, data presented in this chapter projects different perceptions and understandings of the roles and responsibilities of rural governance in IYLM in particular and in South Africa in general. The data provide trustworthy, credible and dependable accounts of perceptions about the various dimensions of participatory governance. Dominant views of the ward councillors on the behaviours of some of the traditional leaders reveals issues of social and political hierarchies that exist in rural governance settings. Ward councillors perceive themselves as servants of the people while they perceive traditional leaders as being served by the people.

The conceptual and theoretical aspects of participatory governance such as deliberations, decision-making, interactional justice, monitoring and accountability in the rural governance settings of the IYLM came through the participant’s responses to research questions. These responses provide indications and evidence that participatory governance at IYLM is advanced through the two rural governance structures despite the challenges being encountered. Evidence suggest that there has

been a great move towards entrenching participatory democracy through existing participatory structures.

However, an integrated model for the rural governance seemed to be a pipe dream unless experiments can be undertaken by researchers working with these rural governance structures. There is evidence that there is great need of capacitating both rural governance structures particularly the traditional leadership in order to ensure continued empowerment opportunities for both structures.

In the next chapter, I interpret and discuss in detail the various dimensions of participatory governance linking them to the responses provided by participants in order to answer the research question of whether the rural governance structures at IYLM advance or hinder participatory governance.

## **CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF FINDINGS**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This section focuses on analysing and interpreting research findings linking them to research problem and purpose statements. The research questions are also connected back to the dimensions and abstract concepts of participatory governance derived from the literature review above. In the previous chapter, I presented the research findings using the question structure in which the concepts of public participation and aspects of participatory governance have been validated through the participant's responses. In order to provide logical answer to the primary research question, secondary research questions were further unpacked into nine interview questions following a thematic structure.

The purpose of this research is to understand how interactions between the ward committee and traditional council structures advance or hinder participatory governance at IYLM. It further explored what literature points as hindrances or constraints to ensuring participatory governance at rural municipalities in South Africa. The frequently mentioned constraint, among others, are the perceived conflictual interactions and erratic relationships between ward councillors and the traditional leaders in rural local governments. In this research study, I followed five theoretical dimensions constituting the theory of participatory governance. The primary dimensions of participatory governance discussed in literature review are deliberations, decision-making, interactional justice, legitimacy and trust, monitoring and accountability. Deliberations have outcomes such as knowledge and information sharing, tolerance and empathy, and social capital

and trust which are unpacked below as individual concepts of participatory governance to ensure a detailed but logical answer to the primary research question.

The decision-making dimension encompasses aspects of equitable distribution of power amongst the situation actors. This can be elaborated by looking at power dynamics within the action arena which is the municipal council in this case. Equitable distribution of power ensures that there is interactional justice whereby those who participate in the interactional spaces are treated with dignity and respect they deserve. Interactional justice leads to acceptability, legitimacy and trust. Legitimacy follows the criteria that include issues of transparency, efficiency, institutional procedures and accountability. For an institution, such the municipality, to be transparent and accountable, it has to ensure that the information it provides is relevant to the recipient, the recipient has power and incentive to act on it. All these dimensions and aspects of participatory governance have been logically and thematically utilised below to draw answers to the primary research question of how interactions between the ward committee and traditional council governance systems enable or hinder participatory governance at IYLM.

While exploring the interactions, the research study added the perceptions of the participants on a concept of village-ward community assembly model for an improved participatory governance at rural municipalities of South Africa. The model is designed using Ostrom's (2005) definition of institutions, the current constitutional and legislative archetypes of the local governance structures (Beall, 2006; Maphazi, et al., 2013; Mijiga, 1998; Mathenjwa & Makama, 2016; Piper & Deacon, 2009; Turner, 2014; Tshitangoni & Francis, 2015), the decision-making processes (Nghah, et al., 2015) and public participation enhancement models (Mayekiso, et al., 2013).

In the ten cases of these two distinct groups of rural governance leadership types, I have established an analytical generalisation using themes mentioned above as unit of analysis. The objective of this research study is to understand how interactions between the two rural governance systems enable or hinder participatory governance. To achieve this objective, the research study adopted a theoretical framework derived from the participatory democracy theory. This theory is based on conceptual and theoretical propositions such as that (i) deliberations are talk-centric modes of (ii) decision-making (Kuper, 2018) which ensures that inputs from multiple individuals affect the outcomes and performance of the organisation (Ngah, et al., 2015) encouraging (iii) interactional justice that promotes acceptability and (iv) legitimacy (Pitt, 2017) building trust that is generated when there is personal involvement and rational argumentation in the decision-making (Kuper, 2018) creating (v) institutional, individual and socio-political capabilities that determine the levels of monitoring and accountability.

Within these theoretical propositions, there are abstract concepts that emerged from data presentation above and became pertinent to the purpose of the research such as the nature and description of interactions which are linked to deliberations, the overlapping roles and responsibilities which are associated with equitable distribution of power in decision-making, status and levels of leadership positions are related to interactional justice. The notions of working together, the format of the structure, the improvement of public participation and increased accountability are derived from the proposed Village-Ward Community Assembly model. They were used to explore the current archetype of rural governance subtle comparing it to the proposed rural governance model. Below are the interpretations of the findings.

## **5.2 The Interpretations of Findings**

The research findings presented in the previous chapter provide evidence that explains how the two rural governance structures either enable or hinder participatory governance at IYLM.

### **5.2.1 Description of Interactions**

Contrary to the popular view that there are conflictual relationships between the ward councillors and traditional leaders (Holland, 2012; Ncapayi & Tom , 2015; Tshitangoni & Francis, 2015), the interactions at IYLM are described as good and warm conducive for working together. These interactions, as per claims by the participants, are encouraged by the national government through legislative measures that allowed the traditional leaders to participate in the deliberations of the municipal council. TL03 concurs with WC05 in putting emphasis on the ‘ward meetings are held at the Great Places.’ WC03 describes these interactions as “*very good*” to such an extent that “*we do everything together in cooperation. We do not do anything without each other.*”

### **5.2.2 Nature of the Interactions**

According to the participants, the nature of interactions is cooperative and consultative whereby both leaders sought to cooperate in every aspect of their engagements. TL02 explains that “*ward councillor does not hold a meeting without the chief knowing that.*” WC04 further explains the nature of the interactions saying: “*Now that we are together in the municipal council, we work*

*together. We understand the law. Each person tows his/her line. So we are working together better than before.”*

However, there was a trend picked up in the data that these interactions are explained as top-down whereby mostly ward councillors seem to have a right to call community engagements. All most all ward councillors articulated the calling of the meetings and other community engagements as their initiatives with WC01 describing the nature of these interactions as:

*“At local level, our meetings as ward councillors, the venue for our meeting are held at the Great Place - that is the Chief's Place for the community. Most of them do attend the meetings whereas they are ward councillor's meeting to give you the support. In other locations where there is no Chief's Great Place, the meetings are held at the Headmen's or sub-headmen's places.”*

Traditional leaders expressed displeasure if not informed or invited to the community meetings organised by ward councillors in their traditional communities. According to some traditional leaders, they want to be informed about the agenda of the meeting prior to the public consultative or reporting meetings by the ward councillors and ward committees. TL05 labels the tendencies of *“the ward councillors [to come] with development without telling the chief [as] causes the conflict.”* To mitigate this conflict, WC04 says *“... if I am leading service delivery, then the person that I first contact is the chief no matter what I am coming with.”*



On the other hand, ward councillors did not even mention any concern with regard to attending any meetings called by traditional leaders. They just mentioned that they attend these meetings when invited. This is expressed at the concerns raised by the TL05 that:

*“... if there is a meeting called by the ward councillor and ward committee members, a lot of people attend in number... what we find as chiefs is that, people in rural villages are divided. There are those who attend the ward councillor’s meetings and those who attend the chief’s meetings.”*

In contrast, local media and local activists project a different story of fracas and melee in the public meetings. For instance, various articles published in 2019 by Ground-up present some acrimonious relationships between the rural communities and the municipality due to lack of service delivery. A case in point is the public meeting held at Magwala village between the community and Mayor, Mr Cengani; Speaker, Ms Mdleleni and Ward Councillor, Mrs Rotyi which ended up with them being kidnapped by angry residents unless they promise to deliver on a specific date. The incident was reported by Ground-Up on 25 March 2019 with the Mayor promising that the work will start on the 02 April 2019. While the work started on the promised date, it stopped a month later without completing the road which resulted to the people of this community taking to the streets in August 2019.

### **5.2.3 Deliberations**

Evidence coming out of the findings points to compliance with the constitutional and legislative stipulations that rural communities must be provided with opportunities to deliberate about the

affairs of the municipality in order to influence its operations and service delivery modes. This is illustrated by the TL02 when explaining war rooms model:

*“War rooms that involved residents in that local community. It is made of government, municipality and chiefs. That means such interactions do take place as the decisions are taken with the people who identify what they want or express their wishes. Then it will come back to the bigger meeting in town because we are the ward that includes the town. We then conceptualise what we want and what is our wish. That is where the inputs are refined and people still make contributions. I then support the inputs as the chief that what they are proposing is valid and is still in the manner it was proposed.”*

Access to information is emphasised by the ward councillors as strategy to deal with democratic deficit, to encourage transparency and monitoring of municipal service delivery models. WC04 emphasises access to information as: *“we should start by sharing information and not leave each other behind.”*

In the incident described above, the Ward Councillor, Mrs Rotyi reported that the road has been completed which made the community very angry as that was not the case. This illustrates a contemptuous situation whereby what is in the municipal records and reported by ward councillor, that is, the road was complete is conflicting the reality on the ground. Access to information by both rural governance leaders and the rural community they serve is critical to facilitate participatory governance at IYLM.

#### 5.2.4 Decision-making

Data presents an involved rural governance leadership at IYLM. Both, the ward councillors and traditional leaders do participate in decision-making by the municipal council through engaging in the council and its portfolio committees. WC04 was quick to mention that: “...*in our municipality we have eight traditional leaders that are part of the municipal council.*” They emphasised that they are working together and relationships have improved particularly with the traditional leaders that participate in the municipal council representing traditional councils and traditional communities. WC01 was very pleased to have these eight traditional leaders participating in the municipal council saying:

*“... in our council now we are having chiefs, who are traditional councillors or who represent traditional leaders. We do not have a problem with those people because they are matured, more experienced and the chiefs of today are educated. That means a lot.”*

However, the research study did not explore the quality of the decision-making processes and its consequences. It limited its focus on who participates in the decision-making by the municipal council. Traditional leaders do participate in the municipal council’s decision-making processes which goes beyond the legislative prescriptions of being part of deliberations. TL02 explains this involvement in decision-making very well when saying:

*“We are involved in the decision-making process because in each and every meeting that sits, the chiefs are present. There is no meeting that does not involve chiefs. As they are present in the municipal council, there are many*

*of them taking part in the decision-making. Therefore, there are chiefs involved in the decision-making at the council.”*

Thus, WC01 emphasises the leadership maturity for those who participate in the municipal council arguing that:

*“To those who are not open-minded, it causes conflict because they think that you are trying to be chief, you are trying to be a headman or sub-headman. But to those who understand the service delivery, the politics, know that you are just assisting or helping the people.”*

Data presents that due to traditional leadership and ward councillor’s participation in the municipal council decision-making processes, the relationships between these rural governance structures have improve tremendously. TL01 narrates the transition from previous conflictual conditions to the current cooperative interactions as *“we come a long way. And we just recently have the genuine link with the municipality.”* The data indicates attainment of participatory governance outcomes such as increased tolerance and empathy, growing equitable distribution of power and seeking of consensus at IYLM.

### **5.2.5 Monitoring and Accountability**

The data presents an involvement of the rural communities in the planning, implementation and monitoring of service delivery by the municipality. Ward councillors reported that they engage communities on frequent basis, that is, monthly and quarterly, while bring back people’s concerns

to the attention of the municipal council through the speaker's office and participating in the municipal council meetings. Evidence for keeping an eye on each other may be extrapolated from the constant and conscious surveillance by each group not to encroach into each other's operational jurisdictions. TL02 explains this surveillance by arguing that *"...ward councillors have encroached to the jurisdiction of the chiefs"* pertaining the issuing of death certificates. Both groups were very clear as to what is each group's mandate and each must keep in one's turf. WC04 puts it bluntly that *"each person tows his/her line."*

However, monitoring and evaluation of municipal service delivery and performance may require competent and knowledgeable rural residents to ensure citizen empowerment. Arnstein (1969) defines citizen power as the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens to be deliberately included in development initiatives. Demonstrating the issue of capacity and capability discussed above, in a R45 million toilet construction saga at Ntsingeni village in Ward 2 of IYLM, an acting Municipal Manager: Chris Hani District Municipality (CHDM) which include IYLM, was quick to mention that,

*"The contractor has already been introduced to the community where the project will be taking place, and the appointment of the community project steering committee has also been done to ensure that the community plays its part in monitoring the project."* (Daily Dispatch, 18 December 2019)

It is appropriate and suffice to simple quote the same newspaper article saying, *"Residents did not want to speak on record about the project, as they fear for their safety."*

Kosec & Wantchekon, (2018, p. 2) argue that “information alone is insufficient.” The fact that Ntshingeni residents had information about the toilet project was not enough. Kosec & Wantchekon contend that individuals with information must have power to act on it. They argue that individuals must have capabilities and mandates that allow them to meaningfully change their behaviour in response to the information they have. Individuals must also have incentives to act because the information they have may payoff.

In the incident mentioned above, Ntshingeni residents did not have the power to act and had no incentives to act on the information they may have about the toilet contract. Probably, even the members of the community steering committee on this project could not act on the information about the non-delivery of the toilets. Here, their actions would be to seek truth and expose malfeasance if they are not implicated themselves. Instead, they demonstrated low capacity to receive, understand and act on information but focused on putting their safety first. The latter has become the actual reality at local government and across all government institutions whereby whistle-blowers are victimised or even killed in South Africa.

### **5.2.6 Legitimacy and Trust**

Both leaderships claimed legitimacy to lead rural communities with ward councillors claiming being elected leaders while traditional leaders claimed their legitimacy through constitutional and legislative recognition. Tshitangoni & Francis (2015, p. 49) argue that although the Constitution does not articulate in detail the roles and responsibilities of traditional leadership in local government, section 20(1) of the TLGFA explains these roles and responsibilities as to traditional

authorities to promote socioeconomic development, healthy and habitable environment, cultural and judiciary developments, among others.

Comparatively, both the Structures Act and Systems Act stipulate a system of participatory democracy with more focus on the nature of community participation. They delegate the powers and the functions of the ward committees to the discretion of the municipality guided by the SALGA Guidelines. SALGA guidelines propose, among others, that ward committees must advise the ward councillors on policy matters affecting ward, identifying the needs and challenges that wards face, receiving complaints about service delivery and communicate information to wards on budgets, IDP's and service delivery options.

As much as the two rural governance leaderships accord respect to each other by emphasising the differences in their roles and responsibilities. Both leaderships demonstrated a limited understanding of the legislations governing their roles and responsibilities at local government. The TLGFA broadly provides that traditional leaders have a say in the service delivery in addition to cultural and customary roles, the administration of justice, safety and security, and land administration roles. They are expected to contribute to the following developmental sectors, namely, agriculture, health, welfare, economic development, environment, tourism, disaster management, the management of natural resources, the dissemination of information relating to government policies and programmes, and education.

Therefore, the fact that ward councillors project themselves as elected and development leaders as claimed by WC03 saying: *“but the difference with the traditional leaders is that their focus is on*

*traditions and customs.*”. And also, the legitimisation of this narrow view that “*the traditional leaders are for bringing order, oversee issues related to traditions and customs*” as claimed by TL03, is misguided. Their advisory roles overlap and shall adopt a co-operative model for rural governance.

Moreover, the political and social roles accorded to both leaderships elicit claims to political and social statuses where political and social hierarchies are frequently mentioned. TL03 claimed that “*the traditional leaders consider the ward councillors as “amaphakathi” [councillors of the chief] elected to serve the people of the chief in the land of the chief*”. Therefore, in terms of social and customary accountability, the chief is of higher status compared to the ward councillor. However, generally, political fraternity in South Africa does not recognise the political and social statuses of the traditional leaders except for their traditional and customary roles. This becomes worst with headmen and sub-headmen. This can be evidenced with the utterances of WC01 who claimed to be at the level of the chief and cannot be summoned to a community meeting by a headmen or sub-headmen. Even so, these are advisory roles and not powers as each group presumes.

### **5.2.7 Overlapping of Roles and Responsibilities**

The roles and responsibilities were viewed as totally different. This is in contrast to the constitutional and legislative prescripts, as articulated above, accord both leaderships the similar developmental roles and responsibilities at rural governance. Again, the issues of statuses and levels were presented as a variation of the roles and responsibilities. Traditional leaders viewed themselves as having more powers than the ward councillors as claimed by TL05 saying: “*it is the chief that have more powers.*” TL04 contented that “*in fact, it is us that are ruling. People depend on us with everything here. There is nothing that can take places without us.*” As quoted above,



traditional leaders described ward councillors as “*amaphakathi enkosi*” elected to serve the people of the chief in the land of the chief. This cultural interpretation presents a complex challenge of social status linked to the interactional justice dimension of the theory of participatory governance which encompasses the equitable distribution of power amongst social actors. In this regard, issues of social and cultural norms, social and cultural values and social and cultural beliefs may be viewed as causing perpetuating the misunderstanding, exacerbating conflict and contestations between these two rural governance systems.

Social and cultural roles and statuses create social hierarchies that are dependent on social gratifications or sanctions. In this instance, literature (Tshitangoni & Francis, 2015; Khonou, 2009; Ntsebeza 2002 cited in Ncapayi & Tom, 2015) claims some traditional leaders felt that the introduction of ward committee governance system while the traditional leadership governance system was already in existence resulted into the conflictual relations and confusion among these stakeholders. It challenged and redefined the roles and responsibilities of the traditional leaders allowing ward councillors to encroach into their turf. This is observed from data that each group alleges that the other group is either incompetent when it comes to community engagements / public participation or ignorant of the law and policies governing local governance structures.

### **5.2.8 Integration and Working Together**

The concept of working together or being cooperative with each other has been frequently mentioned in the data even before the question on integration of these rural governance structures. While ward councillors did not believe that the integration of the rural governance structures could work as WC03 explains:

*“No. According to me, there would be conflict because we are talking about two different things here. They are totally different to each at all levels and characters”*

The traditional leaders imagined a well-functioning structure with both leaderships under one roof, reporting to one leader (which is traditional leadership) and driving a shared developmental vision in the villages.

It is observed that not a single participant thought about the consequences of the integration of these rural structures beyond leadership and social status challenges. Both, were more concerned about who will lead the proposed integrated structure or present themselves as the best suitable candidate for the leadership of the structure. Issues of how ward demarcations and traditional leader's jurisdictions were never highlighted. Theoretically, the integrated model may seem feasible to facilitate participatory governance. But practically, as each group wants to lead, it creates a challenge on the equitable distribution of power amongst these local governance actors. This challenge is further exacerbated by the misconceptions of their roles and responsibilities. They did not perceive themselves as doing a similar job but accept that they represent the same people.

It may be argued that perceptions of these rural governance actors may result into democratic deficit whereby basic service delivery and community development suffers because these leaders are egoistic more than pursuing altruism as the profess.

### **5.2.9 Format of the Structure**

The overarching opinion on the format of the conceptual structure was that it should be balanced taking into consideration the equitable distribution of political power. However, ward councillors viewed it as impracticable structure due to different types of leadership whereby ward councillors

are transactional and elected leaders while traditional leaders are governmental and unelected. Transactional leadership is observed as being able to change either at the end of a defined term or when circumstances dictate so. It is mostly elected representation for a particular purpose of distributing social and development benefits over a specific time. It plays conduit role between the state institutions and the people these state institutions have to serve.

The traditional leadership is bureaucratic and unelected because its personnel is derived from the customary methods of selection whereby a leader shall come from the genealogy of the royal family regardless of its competences or character. Only the royal family can install or depose a leader in the current regime comparable to ward councillors whose term is predefined and may be removed through some political systems if circumstances dictate so. Ntsebeza (2006: 15-16) argues that the inclusion of unelected and unaccountable traditional leaders in a democratic system is inconsistent and contradictory and such an arrangement compromises the democratisation of rural governance. (cited in Ncapayi and Tom 2015)

Each leadership viewed itself as capable and competent to lead such a structure. Traditional leader justified their leadership arguing that they are permanently selected into positions of traditional leadership and therefore would close the gap during elections and transition to another administration. TL02 explains as follows:

*“It must be led by the chief because the chief will still continue even if the ward councillor’s term has come to an end. The chief will be able to provide guidance as to where the issues were and what direction they should follow. Therefore, there is nothing that will slip through the cracks because of lull in leadership. Everything will go according to the plans as they were suggested by the people.”*

### 5.2.10 Improvement of Public Participation and Increased Accountability

Both leaderships believe that such a structure may improve the participation of and increase accountability to the rural residents in the decision-making processes if implemented at local governance. TL02 asserts that *“it will improve service delivery a lot.”* Asked to justify his answer he said:

*“It is because when integrated with the municipality, we can work together and fight this problem in the municipality. We cannot fight the battle because one views himself/herself as better than the other.”*

They believe that it may eliminate the ‘two centres of power’, reduce conflict and contestation and ensure that rural communities are not divide between the two rural governance structures. WC05 argued that:

*“It will improve service delivery because what is important when you are leading, leading the same people, leading the same community. Remember that saying that says, “together we can do more”. It should not be a conflictual relationship.”*

As a follow-up question, participants were asked why and how public participation may be improved and accountability may be increased by the integration. The answer by TL03 was:

*“should people see their representation as per their interests in that one structure, then their belief and trust will increase as much as possible.*

*Respect will be easily accorded to the leadership that they can trust to serve them as much as possible.*

Notwithstanding their beliefs, WC01 was very critical of the traditional leaders as not being accountable to anyone comparatively arguing that:

*“So each and every month as a councillor, you submit a report ... those ward committee members also submit reports on monthly basis. So sub-headmen do not submit report to anyone. They are not held accountable.”*

They allege that traditional leaders are served by the people unlike ward councillors who serve the people. On the one hand, this demonstrated that ward councillors have the moral and ethical misconceptions about the traditional leadership which is based on the historical fact that “colonial and post-colonial governments recognised the institution of traditional leadership as an important political instrument.” (Khonou, 2009, p. 84). Those misconceptions may not be constitutionally and legislatively valid in the current dispensation as Khonou argues that “the transformative constitutionalism is well established in South Africa ... [with] remarkable features of transformation of traditional leadership ... that gender equality has been progressively advanced.”

For instance, it is not true that traditional leaders are not accountable to the people but to themselves. That they are not ethical bound and moral obliged to anything. The constitution and legislations related to the traditional leadership does provide ethical and moral framework. Traditional leaders have to adhere to section 20(2)(c) of TLGFA which ensures that the allocation of their roles is consistent with the Constitution and applicable legislation. Traditional leaders have

to adhere to a code of conduct promulgated in terms of section 27 of the same Act. As demonstrated in the conviction of Thembu King His Excellency Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo that traditional leaders are not above the Constitution and the law.

### **5.2.11 Causes of Conflict**

Throughout the data, I have observed different causes of conflict. The data confirms the misconceptions about the limited statutory powers of traditional leaders in this democratic dispensation as compared to the colonial and Apartheid regimes have led to confrontations and contestations. It is observed that further misconstrued claims on legitimacy at ward level may be perpetuating the conflictual relationships. Each group believes in distinctive roles and responsibilities while the Constitution and relevant legislations blurry view such differences.

Control over development initiatives is highlighted as the another source of disputes. TL05 illustrates this concern very eloquently when saying:

*“there is conflict. Because, the reason I say that, the ward councillor usually comes with the development without telling the chief. That causes conflict because the land belongs to the chief.”*

A case in point of such conflict is the R14.5 million filling station built by PetroSA in Qamata near R61 between Queenstown and Cofimvaba which is gathering dust for the past four years now due to the land ownership dispute. Chief Nyangilizwe Mathanzima and group of former

Transkiean government employees are in dispute with the Intsika Yethu Local Municipality over the ownership of the land in which the filling station is built (GroundUp of 11 July 2019).

In addition, the arrogance displayed by the municipal councillors, that is, the then Mayor Ms Kholiswa Vimbayo and former Municipal Manager, Mr Zamuxolo Shasha, as narrated by Chief Mathanzima, implies a continued disregard of the traditional authorities. Chief Mathanzima quoted in GroundUp saying, “When I refused, they told me that they will not take orders from me as I was offering them a different piece of land. They said they are the government after all.”

Another contributing factor to conflict in rural governance is posed by the notion of subjectification of the rural people under the authority of the traditional leadership. Data presents that rural residents remain subjects as they are said “*to belong to and are people of the chief.*” This is in contradiction with section 3 of the Constitution (Act of 1996) that enshrines equal citizenship for all in which everyone is entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship. Ncapayi and Tom (2015) argues that legislations allow that “rural residents remain subjects.” by giving powers to unelected and unaccountable traditional leaders. According to Foucault (1982), “subject” means to be subjected to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Rural residents are subjugated to the rule of traditional leadership, not by choice, but by cultural affiliation and geopolitical positioning premised on the Apartheid’s formation of artificial black nations or homelands in reserves (Khonou, 2009, p. 24).

Data may further insinuate that even ward councillors do regard rural residents as subjects. This can be extrapolated from WC01 perceiving that ward councillors are at “*the level of the chief*” and

therefore cannot be summoned into a meeting by a headmen or sub-headmen. In terms of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) Code of Conduct for Ward Committees, a ward committee member which the ward councillor is, must act with integrity without fear, favour or prejudice. The attitude demonstrated by WC01 discriminating over the headman or sub-headman that called the ward councillor to a community meeting, is evidence that some ward councillors do view rural residents as “liberated subjects”.

Despite these systematic and institutional flaw highlighted above, data presents that ward committees under ward councillor and traditional councils lead by traditional leaders at IYLM, do advance participatory governance. Evidence presented in this chapter collaborate some of the theoretical propositions that deliberations and decision-making may favour reason-giving, foster inclusivity, generate legitimacy and trust increasing interactional justice while building capacities and providing powers to the rural citizens to participate in participatory governance structures.



## **CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This research study established that ward committees under ward councillors and traditional councils lead by the traditional leaders, chiefs to be specific, do facilitate participatory governance at IYLM. Data analysis provide evidence that at IYLM there are collaborative partnerships between the municipal council and traditional leadership which have led to greater accountability, legitimacy and building of trust with improved interactions compared to the recent past where traditional leadership was not part of the municipal council. The adopted cooperative model seems to be viable and effective on interactional justice. What this research study did not explore is whether those improved interactions translate to the benefits of rural communities they represent.

The dimensions of participatory governance provided theoretical and thematic frameworks assisted in interpreting data, creating patterns and grouping them into categories that informed findings. The research study proved the relations (interactions) between ward councillors and traditional leaders still have a long way to go. Misconstrued constitutional and legislative measures by both these rural governance structures perpetuate inequitable distribution of political power with ward committees enjoying more systematic and institutional considerations than traditional councils.

It shall be commended that the traditional leadership at IYLM is provided with opportunities not just to deliberate at municipal council, but to contribute to the decision-making processes by being involved in the portfolio committees which goes beyond the legislative prescripts. Traditional leaders fully appreciate these opportunities but feel they are still inadequate. This is further caused

by them (traditional leaders) accepting to be relegated to the fringes of administration of cultural and customary laws while their legislative mandate goes beyond that to socioeconomic and natural environmental developments.

Another interesting element of equality observed in this research study is the divide between the gender of the ward councillors and traditional leaders participated. Participation was voluntary. It was based on the availability at the time I was at the municipality or with arranged appointment organised by three different municipal officials. I had no control as to whom should be interviewed and when. I depended on the scheduled times by the municipal officials assisting me.

While there were male ward councillors were willing to be interviewed, two of them left before an interview session was complete. Some males could not wait as they said they were rushing to other commitments. It may be argued that traditional leadership has not yet transformed to the levels of having female traditional leaders at IYLM. Everyone I was referred to was a male. I did not research whether IYLM has any female traditional leaders installed and to my best knowledge of the area, I have not heard that even a female headman has been appointed.

Critical issues emerged from this research and require further attention and speedy resolution for the development of rural communities include, amongst others, clarity on developmental roles between the ward councillors and the traditional leaders; the clear definition of the role of the traditional leadership in decision-making at the municipal council; the empowerment of rural citizens on the functioning of their municipal structures and how they can monitor and evaluate them; the subjectification of the rural residents by both ward councillors and traditional leaders;

the political and legislative clarity on land custodianship and land ownership by the traditional authorities, rural people and the municipality; and lastly, the experimentation of the concept of integrated Village-Ward Community Assembly.

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## Appendices

### Appendix: A INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Questions:

After providing all the necessary research study background with the rationale of the research study, the researcher asked the following questions on IYLM's participatory governance. Participants were guaranteed their privacy, anonymity and confidentiality as per Research Ethics of Wits School of Governance. It approximately took between 20 to 35 minutes for the interview.

### **DEMOGRAPHICS**

<b>PARTICIPANT</b>	<b>LABEL</b>	<b>INTERVIEW DATE</b>	<b>INTERVIEW PLACE</b>	<b>INTERVIEW TIME</b>
First ward councillor	WC01	07/11/2019	IYLM Offices	12h10
Second ward councillor	WC02	08/11/2019	IYLM Offices	10h31
Third ward councillor	WC03	08/11/2019	IYLM Offices	09h20
Four ward councillor	WC04	08/11/2019	IYLM Offices	11h03
Fifth ward councillor	WC05	08/11/2019	IYLM Offices	11h35
First traditional leader	TL01	07/11/2019	Cofimvaba Resource Centre	13h30
Second traditional leader	TL02	07/11/2019	Cofimvaba Resource Centre	13h55
Third traditional leader	TL03	07/11/2019	Cofimvaba Resource Centre	14h20
Fourth traditional leader	TL04	09/11/2019	Great Place	12h00
Fifth traditional leader	TL05	09/11/2019	Great Place	11h00

## INSTRUCTIONS / IMIYALELO

PLEASE REMEMBER THAT YOU MAY STOP PARTICIPATING IN THIS INTERVIEW AT ANY TIME YOU WISH TO DO SO. YOU ARE NOT OBLIGED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTION IF YOU DO NOT WANT. PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY.

*NCEDA UKHUMBULE UKUBA UNGAYEKA NANINI NA UKUTHABATHA INXAXHEBA KOLU DLIWANONDLEBE XA UNQWENELA UKWENZA NJALO. AWUNYANZELEKANGA UKUBA UPHENDULE NAWUPHI NA UMBUZI XA UNGAFUNI. NCEDA UQONDE UKUBA UTHABATHA INXAXHEBA NGOKUZITHANDELA.*

## QUESTIONS / IMIBUZO

- 1 In your view, how is the interactions (relationships) between the ward councillors and traditional leaders at IYLM?

*Ngokwembono yakho, ingaba lunjani unxibelelwano (ubudlelwane) phakathi kooceba beewadi kunye neenkokheli zemveli eIYLM?*

- 2 Do you think that the participatory governance institutions at IYLM facilitate public deliberations, decision-making and monitoring of the implementation processes? Who makes the decisions on the ward-developmental matters between the ward councillors and the traditional leaders at IYLM?

*Ingaba ucinga ukuba amaziko olawulo ngokwentatho-nxaxheba eIYLM ayaziququzelela iinkqubo zeengxoxo noluntu, zokuthabatha inxaxheba koluntu xa kusenziwa izigqibo nezokubeka iliso kwiinkqubo zofezekiso lweenkonzo? Ngubani owenza izigqibo ngophuhliso kwiiwadi phakathi kooceba beewadi kunye neenkokheli zemveli eIYLM?*

- 3 Who do you think is representing better the rural communities on development matters between the ward councillors and the traditional leaders (chiefs and headmen) and why?

*Ingaba ngubani ocinga ukuba umele uluntu lweelali ngcono kwimiba yophuhliso phakathi kooceba neenkokheli zemveli (iinkosi nezibonda) kwaye kutheni ucinga njalo?*

- 4 Do you think the developmental roles and responsibilities accorded to ward councillors are the same to those of the traditional leaders? Do you think they overlap and create conflict between these rural governance structures?

*Ucinga ukuba iindima noxanduva lophuhliso ezinikwe ooceba beewadi ziyafana nezo zeenkokheli zemveli? Ingaba zigqithisile ezoceba beewadi zangenela kwezeenkokheli zemveli ke ngoko zidala ungquzulwano lwezi zakhelo zolawulo kumaphandle?*

- 5 If government may integrate the two rural governance systems (governance through the ward committees and traditional councils):

*Ukuba urhulumente angadibanisa ezi ndlela zimbini zolawulo kumaphandle (ulawulo ngokweekomiti zeewadi namabhunga eenqila kumakomkhulu)*

- 5.1 Do you think they can work together to ensure village development and why?

*Ucinga ukuba ooceba beewadi bangasebenzisana neenkosi nezibonda ukuqinisekisa uphuhliso lweelali, kwaye kutheni ucinga njalo?*

- 5.2 What kind of a structure that may be formed?

*Ingaba luhlobo luni lwesakhelo esingamiselwa?*

- 5.3 Do you believe that such a structure could improve participation of rural residents in the decision-making of the IYLM?

*Uyakholelwa ukuba eso sakhelo singaphucula intatho-nxaxheba yabantu basezilalini kuthatyatho-zigqibo nguMasipala waseNtsika Yethu?*

- 5.4 Do you believe that such a structure would increase accountability by both rural governance systems to the residents and improve service-delivery monitoring by the residents?

*Uyakholelwa ukuba eso sakhelo singandisa uniko-ngxelo zezi nkqubo zolawulo kumaphandle kubahlali kwaye ziphucule ubeko-liso kukuhanjiswa kweenkonzo ngabahlali*

## **APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS: TRADITIONAL LEADER**

### **Traditional Leader 01**

Researcher (R): Good Day sir. How are you?

Traditional Leader (TL01): We are fine, sir (sign of respect). How are you?

R: There is nothing much, father (sign of respect). My name is Julius. There is no reason to identify yourself. As you have said that you were once working inside the municipal council.

TL01: Alright.

R: Please indicate which language must we use, English or isiXhosa or we mix.

TL01: We can use our indigenous language.

R: Okay.

TL01: Even if we mix. But let us use more the indigenous language.

R: Okay.

TL01: I do not have a problem.

R: Okay, thank you. Q1

TL01: I can say that, in my experience, as you know that we come a long way. And we just recently have the genuine link with the municipality. In the past there has been conflict. (deep figurative idiom “*iinkunzi ezimbini ebuhlantini obunye ziyalwa*”



literally transcribed as) When bullocks get into same kraal, they fight with each other. However, as the time goes on, we have reach a stage on understanding each other. Thank you.

R: Can you say, it is at a good or bad level?

TL01: I can definitely agree that the interaction is at a conducive level. I can assure you that whenever I have a complaint or raise any concern to the municipality, the municipality of Intsika Yethu especially the Speaker, it the person that listens and pay particular attention to what you are saying. She understands that you are not raising this for yourself but for the benefit of the people of Intsika Yethu. Thank you.

R: Q2

TL01: Yes. I can definitely say. Pertaining to your question, as person from royal family, who has been deployed into the municipal council by my (name of the) Great Place. That has assisted us a lot because all those matters that are discussed in the municipal council, we became advisors to the municipal council. We were to ensure that if there are failures, we advise when the change is required. This is because we know that the municipal council's responsibilities are not to develop themselves but to develop the rural villages. I can definitely praise the efforts of such interactions because it leads to improved interactions amongst us all starting with ward committees that exist according to areas, up until the ward councillors that leading those wards who I believe I elected by us. I will accept

to say that the cooperation is going very well. There are not seriously challenges for now. I fully understand that these interactions will never be complete smooth sailing. But what is important is that when you raise your voice someone is listening. The challenge that we used to have was that, even if you raise your voice you were ignored. But by the steps taken by government to have traditional leaders participating in the municipal council, that really assisted us.

R: Okay. Q3

TL01: Between the two structures, I will not definitely say there is one better than the other. This is because the government that we voted for decided that there should be cooperation in the areas we are living in. Because of that, I will give these to structures, 50/50 on the cooperation. There is nothing to complain about. Its 50/50. We play our roles equally to develop the lives of South African people especially in the areas we are living in. Thank you.

R: Thank you, father. Q4.

TL01: The responsibilities allocated to the ward councillors and the responsibilities allocated to the traditional leaders is the same responsibility as there is no difference. There is no one better than the other. This is because, at the end, (metaphor - zisengela thungeni linye meaning) they are working towards the same goal of developing the black communities. They are working in the same manner. There is no one better than the other. They have the same responsibility of developing the black communities in South Africa. Thank you.

R: Q5.1

TL01: I am definitely sure if government can integrate them, they can work together.

They will definitely be able to develop villages in the sense that we can acknowledge the bad situation we were in before. That is, high unemployment, poverty which is the most problematic in this country. But if we can work together. Poverty and unemployment will be alleviated. The level of poverty amongst blacks in South Africa will be reduced.

R: If they can work together?

TL01: Yes. If they can be integrated into one structure.

R: Q5.2

TL01: Please repeat.

R: My question is if they can be integrated in one structure working in the same space, in your view, what kind of a structure that may be formed? Its format?

TL01: About this question is when they may be integrated into one structure, the most important is that there should be 50/50. It should balance. There should be no one above the other. No 70/30. It should be 50/50. There shall be no one having power more than the other. If government can make 50/50.

R: Q5.3

TL01: I have already said that I am sure that such a structure will develop them rural communities. Because the most impoverished people are the ones in rural areas.

I am sure that such a structure can bring progress in this country. Thank you.

R: Lastly, Q5.4

TL01: Such a structure will be more accountable to the people. Compare if they are separate.

R: Thank you. We are done.

TL01: Okay.

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END

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## **TRADITIONAL LEADER 02**

Researcher (R): My name is Julius Dantile. I am interviewing a traditional leader. I will ask you 5 questions, but I may ask follow-up questions to get clarity or more explanation. Which language must we use, English or isiXhosa or codeswitch between the two.

Traditional Leader 02 (TL02): Let us use isiXhosa.

Researcher(R): Thanks very much. My first question is **Q1**

TL02: The interaction is good, because the ward councillor does not hold a meeting without the chief knowing that. The ward councillor starts with consulting the Great Place to give the report (notice) that I want to hold a meeting for this. The s/he explains what s/he wants to the Great Place. Then the chief calls the people. Then a meeting sit to discuss the matter at hand. We explore how helpful is the matter and how it will assist the community. Most of the meetings are held together as I am a chief that participate in the municipal council. The interaction is good because even there we are working together in the manner that the traditional leaders wish for.

Researcher(R): Q2

TL02: Yes, that does take place.

R: Please continue.

TL02: Because there are war rooms that involve every resident.

R: War rooms?

TL02: War rooms that involved residents in that local community. It is made of government, municipality and chiefs. That means such interactions do take place as the decisions are taken with the people who identify what they want or express their wishes. Then it will come back to the bigger meeting in town because we are the ward that includes the town. We then conceptualise what we want and what is our wish. That is where the inputs are refined and people still make contributions. I then support the inputs as the chief that what they are proposing is valid and is still in the manner it was proposed.

R: Whom do you think makes decisions at the municipality?

TL02: Decisions by the municipality?

R: Yes, who takes the decisions at the municipality? Are the chiefs involved in decision-making?

TL02: We are involved in the decision-making process because in each and every meeting that sits, the chiefs are present. There is no meeting that does not involve chiefs. As they are present in the municipal council, there are many of them taking part in the decision making. Therefore, there are chiefs involved in the decision-making at the council.

R: Q3

TL02: If I select one, I will be seen as demoting one and promoting the other.

R: Just present it in your own view.

TL02: But let me answer it. I do not want to pass it. Please repeat the question.

R: Repeating the question

TL02: It usually be the ward councillor that thinks s/he has powers.

R: But in your view, who represent the people better?

TL02: In my view?

R: Yes, in your view.

TL02: In my view, it's me as the chief

R: Why?

TL02: Because people stay with me. It is me who is waken up at 12h00 midnight to go and solve their conflicts. The ward councillor is not there. The ward councillor will only come during the day. Almost all night long, I am the one whom is with people no matter what is the incident. Then the ward councillor is not there but will only get the report in the morning. Even with thieves, it is me chase after thieves. Ward Councillor does not chase after the thieves. Therefore, it should be me who is able to make decisions about them because I am with them in the hearth. You will find that ward councillors stay in Komani (Queenstown) or in town. For me I live with the people in the rural villages.

R: Q 4

TL02: They are not the same.

R: In you view, which side overlaps with the other? Is there a time where you think that ward councillors encroach into the jurisdiction of the chiefs or the chiefs in the jurisdiction of the ward councillors?

TL02: It is in the manner of us doing the work. You will find that the ward councillor takes duties that are not hers/his but belong to the chiefs. For example, death certificates are done by the chiefs. Then you find that ward councillors do them. But the person was living with the chief. Then the ward councillors have encroached to the jurisdiction of the chiefs. It is the chief that knows the deceased. How the deceased was. These are the challenges we faced with.

R: Do those challenges cause conflict?

TL02: Yes, those challenges do cause conflict. Now we have to resolve those problem which were not supposed to take place in the first instance.

R: Q5

TL02: 5.1 They work every well. If they can be integrated.

R: Why?

TL02: Because we will not be confronting each other in front of the people because we be talking the same thing and interpreting the same thing. That will it is easier to progress. Because there won't be anyone between the two whom will push his/her agenda. There will be no one who will come and say, "I am sent by the municipality who mandated me to say" or "I am sent by the chief". We will say we are both sent by the government to develop people. Then what we will say will be the same and

it will be correlating. We will say the same to the people we are representing. Then people will be able to see that we can work together. They will understand that there is no reason to think that this leader is better than the other. This issue of one being better will diminish.

R: 5.2

TL02: That will be the best structure.

R: What format do you think that structure must take?

TL02: Even in the manner it is now, there will always be the chief in the leadership because you do not vote for the chief.

R: So you are suggesting that it must be led by the chief?

TL02: It must be led by the chief. Because the chief will still continue even if the ward councillor's term has come to an end. The chief will be able to provide guidance as to where the issues were and what direction they should follow. Therefore, there is nothing that will slip through the cracks because of the lull in leadership. Everything will go according to the plans as they were suggested by the people.

R: In your view, if I am following it up. How do you think the structure should in representation? 50/50, 70/30, in terms of the representation

TL02: It should be 50/50.

R: 5.3

TL02: It will be a huge assistance to the people. Because there will be no reason to go around consulting too much. It will be an issue of just working together.

R: 5.4

TL02: It will improve service delivery a lot.

R: Can you give reasons for your answer because a structure of this kind does not exist? Can you then justify your answer?

TL02: It is because when integrated with the municipality, we can work together and fight this problem in the municipality. We cannot fight the battle because one views himself / herself as better than the other.

.....  
END

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### **Traditional Leader 03 (TL03)**

Researcher (R): Q1

Traditional Leader 03 (TL03): The honourable, the state of interaction or cooperation it looks warm. It is good. There is cooperation. If you want me to give examples, you will say so.

R: Yes, you can give me just one or two examples.

TL003: A good example is this, as these ward committees' functions in the traditional council's jurisdictions, ward meetings have to happen with the interactions between the chiefs and ward councils has to happen. Most ward meetings are held in the traditional great places here in Intsika Yethu. Even the assistance of the chiefs, for example there are those who sitting in the municipal council being sent by their regions, have created a conducive environment for an improved working relations.

R: Q2

TL03: The honourable. The answer is YES. That does take place. Like in the example I gave earlier, when I was speaking about the chief and then the ward councillor, I am talking about a chief with his/her traditional council. The ward councillor has a ward committee.

R: So they do work together?

TL003: Yes, there is a lot of cooperation.

R: Q3



TL003: You see, this becomes interesting. First of all, leadership is with people. In most cases, the ward committee is being viewed as the better structure to represent people because of the services they bring to the people. Services are like benefits to the people. Then you will find that ward committees are the one which frequently call meetings. Then, the traditional council structures seldom call community meetings. This has created a view at that traditional councils for holding order. Then when people I've been called to those meetings if they think that they are being called for petty crime related issues. Then you find that people perceive the ward committee structure to be the better because most developmental issues are discussed in those meetings and those developmental issues become the interest of the people.

R: Q4

TL003: The answer in my view, they are not the same. The traditional leaders are for bring order, oversee issues related to traditions and customs. Then when you explore the ward committee system, the traditional leaders consider the ward councillors as *"amaphakathi" [councillors of the chief]* elected to serve the people of the chief in the land of the chief. Then the difference is that the ward committee develops the people of the chief. Then the chief monitors how its people are developed. Then there is a difference there.

R: Q5.1

TL003: 5.1 The honourable, in my view, there is no way that they can be integrated into one structure. The reason I am saying that. When you talk about traditional leadership, there is no politics. In politics, people are viewed in terms of their

political affiliations. In the traditional leadership system, there is no distinguishing on political grounds. Then if there could be fusion of the political structures with the traditional leadership, then there may be conflictual and problematic issues in the manner in which people are developed.

R: Q5.2

5.2 The format of such a structure if such an idea could be implemented will have to consider how ward committees and traditional are being elected. They are not elected in the same manner. First, we will have to explore different sectors so that those that closely related are clustered for a representation in such a structure. We will have to ensure political organisation representation in each region where sectors are representing community interests. That could be such a formidable structure that is able to serve the people in that region or ward.

R: Its composition?

TL003: We must ensure that traditional leaders are represented, ensure that communities have been given a chance for example, women are represented, youth is represented, churches are represented. And they consider the political organisations in the area that are represented. And then you can add the traders and businesses particularly in agricultural businesses.

R: Q5.3

5.3 The answer is yes.

R: Why and then how?

TL003: Yes because people will be focused in one structure. People will understand and believe in one structure which they would know that they are represented in that

one structure. This is unlike the current two governance structure system where people are divided into two structures. People say this to this structure and say something different to another structure. Then once, it become one structure, that would lead to dealing with one structure that serves them.

R: 5.4

TL003: The answer is yes. As I said, should people see their representation as per their interests in that one structure, then their belief and trust will increase as much as possible. Respect will be easily accorded to the leadership that they can trust to serve them as much as possible. Short I just plug in the question be your different I'm very happy

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END

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## **Traditional Leader 04**

Researcher (R): Q1

Traditional Leader (TL04): Will I answer briefly on you want me to go deeper?

R: As much as you can, bawo! (respect for the chief, meaning father)

TL04: Then I will say it is good. There are some challenges here and there. However, we end up having to work together because we have to with

people. We have to work about and with the people. Even if we are in conflict with the ward councillors, we have to work together with the ward councillors.

R: Q2

TL04: No. In honest truth, the ward councillors are driving their own mission. I am done.

R: Do you think that people participate in the decision-making processes in these two structure about their own development?

TL04: Yho. In a certain way. (doubting).

R: Thanks

R: Q3

TL04: That is the one that I lead.

R: Why?

TL04: Why? Is the 'why' there or you are just asking yourself, 'why'?

R: Yes, it is there as "why".

TL04: Oh! Is that the fourth question?

R: No. It is a follow-up question.

TL04: Ask the question fully and do not ask why?

R: I am sorry.

TL04: Then you will follow with why so that I can explain to you.

R: Do I have to repeat the question?

TL04: Which one? The why question?

R: No. No the third question.

TL04: You may repeat this question.

R: That's fine.

TL04: (*interjecting*) Why should be the follow-up question?

R: Okay. My question is, Q3

TL04: Between the ward councillors and traditional leaders.

R: (*emphasising*) Between the ward councillors and traditional leaders.

TL04: In fact, it is us that are ruling. People depend us with everything here.  
There is nothing that can take place without us.

R: Q4

TL04: Please repeat the question.

R: My question is, Q4

TL04: In my view, they are conflicting because ward councillors are changed every term while traditional leaders are always there.  
Ward councillors that come, come with their own different opinions. But the traditional leader is permanently there.

R: Q5 Here we talk about something that has not happened or it may happen. 5.1

TL04: Do I think ...

- R: *(interjecting to emphasise the question)* do you think they can work together to be an integrated structure if government may say let us integrated them because both have governing powers in the local government?
- TL04: If we join them, what do we want them to do? Who are they?
- R: To be one structure...
- TL04: *(interjecting)* Which is?
- R: I am talking about something that has not happened.
- TL04: Which kind of structure between the traditional leaders and ward councillors?
- R: Where they can work together.
- TL04: We do work together even now. What kind of the structure this should be?
- R: Let me give an example of the structure as follows. In the ward, the jurisdiction of the ward is demarcated to suit the traditional leader's physical jurisdiction. Then the chief leads the structure with the ward councillors being part of such structure. That is the kind of structure I am talking about. Such structure does not exist now. My question is that, if the structure can exist.
- TL04: Other than the manner we are working together?
- R: To expand /improve the manner you are working. That is the aim.

TL04: No. I do not understand. Probably, I do not clearly understand your question.

R: Okay. Let us proceed.

R: In your view, how do you think the cooperation between the traditional leaders and ward councillors can be improved?

TL04: It's communication. There is nothing else.

R: Which one between the traditional leaders and ward councillors are more accountable to the people?

TL04: The traditional leaders because we are staying with people here in the grassroots.

R: Thanks, we are done.

.....

END

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### **Traditional Leader (TL05)**

Researcher (R): My question is, please do not use your name and I will not use it. Q1

Traditional Leader (TL05): My view on the interaction between the ward councillor and the traditional leaders, is that, it is sometimes right and other times not right. Because sometimes we [traditional leaders] hear that they have called meetings which they did not tell us about.

R: Is your interactional communication working or not? The relationship between you and the ward councillor.

TL05: I view the relationship between us as working when we have asked to meet. It becomes very cooperative where we discuss in unison. The only challenge that causes conflict is when they call a meeting with people without telling us. But is they have asked us to come and we work together, then the relationship between us becomes good.

R: Q2

TL05: In my view, they encourage because if there is a meeting called by the ward councillor and ward committee members, lot of people attend in numbers. Then we made clear decisions on the matter that has been discussed.

R: Do you think that people are able to monitor service delivery by the municipality during those contact sessions?

TL05: A lot. People are able to monitor service delivery by the municipality.

R: Q3

TL05: Thank you. The way I view this, the most relevant to developmental leadership is the traditional council. Because, first, the reason I am saying this is that, it is the chief that has the land. The land belongs to the chief. Then, it is the chief that as the final decision on what to do with his/her own land. The ward councillor does not have land. Therefore, the ward councillor does not have powers to make decision/s on the use of land while s/he does not have the land. Therefore, s/he must first start by consulting with the chief or ask the chief for the land. Ward Councillor does not have the land. it is the chief that has the land.



R: Q4

TL05: Between the two leaders, there is conflict. Because, the reason I say that, the ward councillor usually comes with development without telling the chief. That causes the conflict. Because the land belongs to the chief. Investors come to the chief for development. The chief then sit down and discuss with them. After an agreement with the investors, the chief then calls the ward councillor to give the report that there were investors who want this and that. Then we discuss and reach an agreement with the ward councillor. However, when the councillor brings the development, s/he does not want to consult with the chief. The chief hears or sees the ward councillor attending to development initiatives without the chief agreement. Then that cause conflict between the chief and the ward councillor.

R: Do you think that the roles and responsibilities of the chief and ward councillor are the same or are different?

TL05: In my view, the roles and responsibilities of the chief and ward councillor are different, because it is the chief that have more powers. It is the chief that has the land, the ward councillor does not have land. That is the basis of the difference.

R: My fifth question is divided into four: Q5 = Q5.1:

TL05: I think that will be the best solution if government can integrate them. The conflict will come to an end. Because the will always be at the same space discussing the issues and attending the meeting at the same time. It will deal with the challenges of always conflicting views. If we can be in the same space, we can then end the conflict and that would the solution. That is my opinion.

R: No, you are not wrong. It is your opinion.

Q 5.2                ??????, what will be its format?

TL05:                Thank you. Then if such a structure can exist, I think it will be led by the chief, ward councillor, traditional councillor, ward committees,

R:                    Ward committee members?

TL05:                Ward committee members, then there shall be the secretaries of both traditional council and ward committee. Then the chairperson because a chief. Then the ward councillor becomes the deputy. I think that is enough for now in the format of the structure.

R:                    Q5.3

TL05:                Yes, I think it the most definite in the decision-making by the people. Because, what we find as chief is that, people in the rural villages are divided. There are those who attend the ward councillor's meeting and those who attend the chief's meeting.

R:                    Q5.4

TL05:                I think it the most definite that can improve all those processes. I do not think there is anything that could go wrong if we could have such a structure.

R:                    Thank you, we are done.

TL05:                Whoa! just like that. I was still enjoying this interview as it deals with the most pertinent and relevant issues to our plight as traditional leaders.

.....

END

## **APPENDIX C:       INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS: WARD COUNCILLORS**

### **Ward Councillor 01**

Researcher (R):           Q1

Ward Councillor (WC01):       The relationship between the ward councillors and traditional leaders is good because we discuss all the developmental issues together, in so much that, in our [municipal] council we have traditional leaders who have council meetings with us, where we take decision of this municipality together. If you want me to dwell on how at local level do, we communicate. At local level, our meetings as ward councillors, the venue for our meeting are held at the Great Place - that is the Chief's Place for the community. Most of them do attend the meetings whereas they are ward councillor's meeting to give you the support. In other locations where there is no Chief's Great Place, the meetings are held at the Headmen's or sub-headmen's places. If you are going to hold a meeting and that

location is may be at [name of the place], the sub-headman must be there, because as ward councillor you will be using his home for the community meeting. So there are good relationships in so much that they are included when undertaking IDP roadshows. They are also part of our standing committees.

R: Q2

WC01: As I said that since they are part of us - that is, they are in the leadership of the municipality, although they are not politicians. We take the decisions together because municipal decisions are taken in a council meeting. Whenever we are taking municipal decisions, we take them through the municipal council. That is where there are traditional leaders representing iKomkhulu (the Great Place), representing the king.

R: Are they representing the king or representing the people under their authority?

WC01: They are representing the people under their authority, because the king is king of the people.

R: So the decisions are taken together in the municipality?

WC01: Yes, we take them together in the municipal council meeting?

R: Q3

WC01: I think is the municipality because the municipality do provide services. For example, access road, water and all those things. Yes, the traditional leaders are assisting the community but the most assisting is the municipality. This is because the municipality is always within the people. Because each and every quarter there is a meeting. There is a councillor who is revolving in a ward attending meetings besides special meetings in which ward councillors attend community meetings collecting the needs of the people.

R: When the ward councillors are doing that, are they doing that with the traditional leaders?

WC01: No. They do that with ward committees - there are people who are called ward committee [members]. That is the people who stay in that village because ward councillors may have 10 villages. But ward councillor may be staying in one village. There is a person who is a ward committee member elected by the community from each village. That person is the one who is answering day to day needs of the people or questions or request of the people. This person attends monthly meetings with the community s/he is staying with.

R: Q4

WC01: No they are not the same. Because it is too much for the ward councillors alone. As I said, the traditional leaders mostly fit in land administration,

giving people building sites, attending to dispute cases of the people at local level. So the ward councillor is looking after developmental matters of the communities through the municipal services. There is an overlap on what the municipality is doing.

R: Does the overlap not cause conflict?

WC01: You see; people say little knowledge is dangerous. To those who are not open-minded, it causes conflict because they think that you are trying to be chief, you are trying to a headman or sub-headman. But to those who understand the service delivery, the politics, know that you are just assisting or helping the people. At first, there was a big query or argument because, I remember one time the headman calling me saying "you must come to my place to my meeting". I said "no". You are not in my level. I am in the level of the chief. If you want something just request "Ngendlela e... in a good manner". So that I can come and clarify what you want to be clarified.

R: Yes.

WC01: Otherwise, I am not under you.

R: Q5

WC01: 5.1 No, it won't work.

R: Why?

WC01: Why? Because if some of the headmen are invited to a meeting through the ward committee members by writing them letters indicating that the municipal council is going to have a meeting in the village. What they (some of the headmen and/or sub-headmen) come in a meeting drunk. So, unless they can be trained. I don't know. But the way they behave (*indlela abaziphethe ngayo*), because, as leader you can't go into a meeting intoxicated (*unxilile*).

R: Q 5.2

5.2 If they want to make it one system, I see, e-ehe!. There is two-much that can be done. Because, it can be easy if they just take the chiefs only. Because, for example, in our council now we are having chiefs, who are traditional councillors or who represent traditional leaders. We do not have a problem with those people because they are matured, more experienced and the chiefs of today are educated. That means a lot. If these structures can be integrated, I do not think they can work. But if they can take chiefs only.

R: Q 5.3

5.3 There will be no improvement. Because on that side, I do not see anything helping the people. This is because we are in different sides. If you talk

about the municipality, you are talking about service delivery to the people.

You are talking about people governing the world. If you are talking about the chiefs, you are talking about people ruling, mandating, no services are being delivered to the people by that side. So that means we are very much different.

R: Q 5.4

WC01: No, I don't think so.

R: Why?

WC01: Why? I don't believe, as I said to you, on that side, they are demanding, or giving rules, not working. I don't know how to put it (Andiyazi ukuba ndiza kuyibeka kanjani).

R: Just put it as is (Yibeke nje)

WC01: You understand that they believe that they are of royal blood, so they cannot listen to the people. They just do what they want to do. They just give orders. At the municipal level, that is local government level, there are some rules. There is a guidance. role. You are held accountable.

R: By?

WC01: By the speaker.

R: Okay

WC01: So each and every month as a councillor, you submit a report. Of what is happening in your villages, of what you have done this month, this quarter.



And there are ward committee members who on that side are in the level of sub-headmen. Those ward committee members also submit reports on monthly basis. So the sub-headmen do not submit report to anyone. They are not held accountable. So I do not think it can work.

R: Thank you, we are done with our interview.

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END

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### **Ward Councillor 03 (WC03)**

Researcher (R): Thanks *sisi* [*sister - as respect*]. My first question is ... sorry, which language must we use, English or isiXhosa or mix?

WC03: isiXhosa

R: [*Laughing*]

WC03: You can mix them because I see that you are going to struggle [*with isiXhosa*].

R: No. I will not struggle. Q1

WC03: That is very good, *bhuti* [*brother - in the sense of respect*] because they work cooperatively to such an extent that in our municipality we have eight traditional leaders that are part of the municipal council.

R: That's fine. Please continue.

WC03: Therefore, as the traditional leaders lead according to certain traditional council's jurisdictions. Each traditional council is being represented in the municipal council. Thus there are eight traditional leaders. We do everything in cooperation. We do not do anything without each other. Even if we are to hold meetings which are usually held at headman's and/or sub-headman's places. Our meetings are conducted with the traditional leaders. So that we can always be cooperative.

R: Q2

WC03: Yes, I think so. Because here at Intsika Yethu, every month we have ward committee general meetings where the ward committees go to the communities according to the villages and jurisdiction of the wards. They go back to report on service delivery that how is it progress. These ward committee meetings are conducted with the headmen because in the rural villages, these meetings are held at headmen's places. To such extent that the traditional leaders that here at Intsika Yethu go around with the ward councillors because the ward councillors have their own quarterly meetings where they go around with the traditional leaders that are part of the municipal council that are from the ward that they come from and in relation to the traditional councils they represent.

R: So the issue of public participation does take place very well?

WC03: It does take place, *bhuti*, and it take place monthly and quarterly.

R: Q3

WC03: Mostly, in matters of development, the structure of ward committee is the best one in representing people. Mind you, that this has service delivery and it came with the current government. If you compare with the era where traditional leaders were

the only one leading, people would come together and raise funds to get some sort of development happening. But now, with the democratic government and the government of the people by the people, it is the era where you find that service delivery has become easier. There is no reason to raise funds from the people as it used to happen in the olden days.

R: You mean to say that is the best?

WC03: Yes, the ward committees are the best.

R: Q4

WC03: There is no conflict. We can say that they are similar. But the difference with the traditional leaders is that their focus is on traditions and customs. We assist each other and work together, because we cannot say there shall be no traditional leaders. If we do that we would be getting rid of our customs. We also cannot say there shall be not government, that is the ward councillors, because both play their own different roles. But both are important.

R: Do you think there is any conflict between them particularly in relation to their roles and responsibilities?

WC03: No, there is no such here.

R: Q5 5.1

WC03: If they can be integrated?

R: These are two independent structures. Now, we are imagining that there shall be one structure that oversee all these developmental roles and responsibilities because even the chiefs do partake in your municipality?

WC03: No. According to me, there would be conflict because we are talking about two different things here. There are totally different to each at all levels and characters. This is because the traditional leader is not voted in. The traditional leader is by birth. And the traditional leadership will not be changed because s/he is not being voted in or out. Actually, the one that is voted for is sent by the people. It is important that s/he serves the people. The traditional one has to be served by the people. I, therefore, do not understand if they can be integrated into one structure that there will be no conflict. There will be conflict. With regard to service delivery, I believe that there may be acute failures that would be very hard to work together with them. As I have said, one brings his/her traditional perspective while the other brings the political and governmental perspectives. We then bring these together to work with each other. But if they can be put to one person (structure), I do not believe that can work well.

R: Q5.2

WC03: It can be a structure that can be similar to the war room. We have war room here in the Eastern Cape.

R. Okay.

WC03: I do not know where you come from, Wits or Gauteng. We have war room. It can be structure that looks like war room. The war room has all spheres of the community. It has traditional healers, nurses and other departments. I cannot categorise them one by one.

R: The sphere and sectors?

WC03: It has all the governmental sphere. So this structure could be a structure that is similar to the war room. That is, there is your traditional leader, there are political heads, because even in government, there is no one political party. So there are various types of political parties. And even in communities, there are different types of people that belong to different political organisations. The war room becomes the all-embracing structure in that community.

R: Q5.3

WC03: Yes, it can be of the structure similar to the war room.

R: Q5.4

WC03: Yes, as I said that we have the war room. So I see our war room is accountable to our people. This is because we undertake rounds according to the wards using the war room structure. Then we bring back all the complaints by the people about all departments. We then take back responses. This is unlike where people give in their needs and then are not immediately attended to. And if all government sphere come together, there are responses. For example, if there is a war room, there are people who identify that these school learners are into drugs and there is a problem. Then there will be strong interventions. You will find that there are operations that come such as Drug Abuse Awareness and others. You will find that each department did not know that there was such a problem in this community that it has to tackle. So if there is a war room, a lot of things come forth such as Child Headed Homes which are assisted by SASSA and Social Development, and other people are being assisted. You find that service delivery prevailed during this time of war room. So

if the structure would be like that of the war room, I think, in my own view, that will be the correct structure.

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END

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#### **Ward Councillor 04 (WC04)**

Researcher: *Sisi* (meaning 'sister' for respect) My first question is... Should we use English or isiXhosa or both?

WC04: Both.

R: The one that comes first. Okay, Q1

WC04: I can say that the interactions between us and traditional leaders in this municipality is very good. Because we do have eight chiefs that are participating in municipal council. And their participation in the municipal council assist with the others that are not part of the municipal council. There has been a lot of change since there traditional leaders participating in the municipal council. It is not as it was before. In the past, there were conflictual disagreements on the manner we worked. Now that we are together in the municipal council, we work together. We understand the law. Each person tows his/her line. So we are working together better than before.

R: Q2

WC04: Thank you, sir, As I have said it before, that since the traditional leaders have been part of the municipal council, there has been enormous change. It is clear that in the past, they were not accepting the ward councillors. But just because we work together and hold meetings together, traditional leaders are able assist even in the

communities more especially those traditional leaders that sits in the tribal authorities [traditional councils]. As a ward councillor, it is easy to distinguish between the chiefs that sit in the tribal authorities and those that does not. You will distinguish him/her by his/her behaviours. This is because, the people that we have in the municipal council are the people that are delegated by the tribal authorities. They report back to there. So we do not expect that there can be conflict. There can be conflict if it is the headman that does not attend the meetings that they have in the tribal authorities. All in all, the interactions are very good that we are able to hold meetings together in the municipal council. You see, I think it was just a simple misunderstanding between us because we were not influencing each other. That means it is important that you influence each by working together so that you can easily resolve your conflicts.

R: Q3

WC04: Please understand that here is the important fact as I have said before, as we sit in the municipal council, he [traditional leader] know who is leading service delivery. We have to understand who is leading the arts and culture sector.

R: Okay.

WC04: Do you understand? Because if we do not start by understanding that. That is, as a ward councillor I get involved in the allocation of sites. Then I have started to cause trouble. I should know I am elected for five years and my responsibility is service delivery - the development that goes to the people. Even if the development comes with the chief, because even here at the municipality, the chief can come and request services if the people did not ask it from me perhaps. I should not fight with the

chief because s/he is the one that asked. Even here at the municipality, the municipal council knows how to attend the chief's requests. There is developmental matter that can be given to the chief without the ward councillor knowing it. The Intsika Yethu Municipal Council knows that. The municipal council brings us together even if the matter was brought by the chief, we work together. This is because we do not hold our meetings around the same time. The ward councillor has her/his meetings and the chief has his/her own. Sometimes, our people do not differ at what to say in the meetings of the ward councillor and the meeting of the chief. As a chief, you will know that this one should be addressed through the municipality. It depends whether the chief wants to interact with the ward councillor. There is nothing wrong coming to the municipality bring issues you are given by the people you lead. But what I am sure of, when provided with the answers, you will be sitting with the ward councillor. We are working in that manner. We do not leave each other behind on the information sharing. We can differ on the manner of bring to the municipal attention. But when the information has to be delivered to the people, we have to work together.

R: But my question is which structure represent the people better, or you mean to say there is no structure that represent the people better?

WC04: No. Because both of us we are leading the people.

R: Okay.

WC04: We have to start there in not dividing the people. Where there is a better one than the other. We will be dividing the people if we will say that this one is bigger [better] than the other. But they should know that ward councillor has a five-year



term and the chief is there permanently. It is the royal house only that decides who to put now. Do you understand?

R: Yes.

WC04: Thus I am saying there should no conflict. Do you understand?

R: Yes.

WC04: I understand your question from that perspective. It is not that I am not understanding your question.

R: (*interjecting*) No. There is no right or wrong answer.

WC04: I am improving your question.

R: Q4

WC04: They are the same because we are leading the people. That is one. But they differ here. The ward councillor, for example, does not allocate sites. The ward councillor, for example, in the by-laws that are made by that tribal authority, cannot come in and disagree with them. These are by-laws that are decided with the community. Do you understand?

R: Yes.

WC04: Here is the example, there are still those traditional leaders that make people pay something for them to be allocated sites. For example, cooking for the people or pay an amount of R500.00. Do you understand? There are still places such as those that exist. But not all traditional leaders are like that. That is the reason that you will find different types of leaderships. Because as ward councillors, there is a guiding document from the municipality that guides you on how to lead the people. You do not just lead the people as you wish. You shall be guided by the laws of the

municipality. You also guided by the workbook given during training provided by the municipality. You will be charged if you transgressed the guide.

R: Okay.

WC04: So we do not attend such training together with the traditional leaders. That is why I cannot say we do the same thing. This because as the ward councillor, I do not have a right to say 'before you get the RDP house, you must pay R500.00.'. Do you understand? I do not say that for you to get the land from the traditional leaders you have to pay a bottle of brandy. There are still places like these.

R: Yes. Q5 My question is about something that has not happened yet but it is all about a vision if it can happen. That is the integration between the two structures. Q5.1

WC04: I will talk about me then.

R: Okay.

WC04: I will talk about and I am not afraid of that.

R: Okay.

WC04: The reason I say I will talk about me is that even if I am leading the service delivery, then person that I first contact is the chief no matter what I am coming with. Even if I will have the meeting, the first person to talk with is the chief of the place where I will hold the meeting in. This is because there is one ward councillor in a ward. You will find that while you the only ward councillor, you have six or seven traditional leaders without including the tribal authority. Do you understand? You will find that as a ward councillor, you have two tribal authorities [the ward councillor names the traditional authorities in the ward). No matter what service

delivery is to take place, I have to ensure that the chief understands. There is nothing painful and hurting than fighting because of the information.

R: Yes, okay.

WC04: That is the start of interaction. We should start by sharing information and not leave each other behind. Then we will be able to develop our people.

R: Okay.

WC04: Because once you [ward councillor] give the ward committee member the information without giving it to the traditional leader, that means you are demoting the traditional leader to be the servant of the ward committee member. Then the traditional leader that is not provided with the information s/he not be able to give his/her own subcommittee. For instance, the chief has headmen that forms a committee and the headmen has sub-headmen that form the headman's committee. So if I tell the ward committee members, also other subcommittee members must know the information. That then makes it easier for the information to flow making it easier to go to the people with the same information.

R: Okay. Do you think such as structure would work for the people?

WC04: Too much.

R: Q5.2

WC04: If it can be integrated, where there is no difference between ward councillor and traditional leader?

R: There will be no difference between the traditional councils and ward committees. It becomes the same structure.

WC04: There structures are joined.

R: Yes.

WC04: There can be difficulty. As I have said. Because in other places, the traditional leaders have not yet accepted the ward councillors. There shall be a conversation to create an understanding as I easily accept it just because I am working very well with the traditional leaders. Or just because I can discuss anything with them. But if you take another ward councillor whom may say 'do not tell me about that one [traditional leader] who is able to say this and that about me. You will find that there no protecting of each other as we work with the same people. You will find another ward councillor profusely rejecting working with the people. So I am talking nice because of the relationship between me and the traditional leaders that I work with. That is, it needs someone who would an expert to do the similar research as you do. So that the researcher finds what the majority wants. You should not take it as I put it all is well to all wards, or to all villages, or all municipalities. I think so.

R: So you do not have a format that you think can be followed?

WC04: It depends on the flexibility of the leadership as to how flexible are to each other. Because if I do not have transparency to each other, then there is going to be a challenge.

R: Q1

WC04: No, if it happens, we can really work. It may also end these divisive elements of preferring to listen to this one than the other. Are you getting me sir?

R: Yes.

WC04: We will then know that there is one leader that we must listen to. But then will depend whether which side it leans towards.

R: Okay.

WC04: Because now it looks like there two centres of power, which is wrong.

R: Okay. Q5.4

WC04: Yes. Because there will be one leader to be accountable. There will not be these comparisons of the other said while the other reported as such.

R: Thanks, sister, we are done with our interview.

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### **Ward Councillor 05**

Researcher (R): Q1

Ward Councillor (WC05): The interactions between the traditional leaders and ward councillors is very strong. There is great cooperation between the municipality and the chiefs. We cooperate both in the wards and in the internal affairs of the municipality.

R: How do you cooperate?

WC05: In the wards, for instance, if there are meetings, we host them at the Great Places. For instance, as there will be one chief over many villages, in a village with a headman or sub-headmen, we hold the meetings in their places. We do this so that we can meet with the people telling them about development issues we need to undertake, we do not side line the traditional leaders.

R: Q1

WC05: Yes, they definitely facilitate them a lot. As much as I do not want to give details, they do facilitate them.

R: Please give more details.

WC05: They facilitate them in the manner as I demonstrated above. There is nothing that we do without the traditional leaders knowing. Anything that the ward committee initiates in the ward, the traditional leaders have to know about it. We work with them through and through.

R: Who take decisions for village development?

WC05: In terms of the internal processes of the municipality, in the municipal council we do have chiefs that sit in the council meetings where we discuss everything with them. Chiefs do participate in the decision-making processes of the municipality.

R: They do participate in the decision-making?

WC05: Mhm!.

R: How do they participate?

WC05: They participate in the manner that if there is a vision brought to us by the leaders, we get this vision together at the same time and we discuss and agree. There is nothing that takes place here without agreement between the municipal council and traditional leaders.

R: Okay. Q3

WC05: For me, I would want to divide them. I would just join them. There is no better structure than the other. This is because all of us we are working by people. These

are people that are elected by the people because they trust them. That is why I cannot say that there is one much better than the other.

R: In representing the people?

WC05: Yes, in representing the people.

R: Q4

WC05: I will talk about my ward.

R: Okay

WC05: In my ward, there are no disparities. Although, our leadership responsibilities and roles are different. We lead development as ward councillors. Chiefs are leading on culture. However, there is cooperation. They have to come together where it is necessary to do so. For example, there is law that when a boy is about to go to initiation school, that should be reported to the traditional leaders. The is the work of the traditional leaders. According to the municipal council, there are ward councillors that are part of the Ulwaluko Committee.

R: Okay. Q5 has five questions in it. Q5.1

WC05: They will ensure village development. This can happen because even now, if there is developmental issue coming through the chiefs. The chiefs call us. We then become part of the programme. We listen and then participate working together.

R: Q5.2

WC05: I think it should go as we currently do now. Here at this municipality we have chiefs that are elected to represent other chiefs in all issues of the municipality.

R: Okay. Q5.3

WC05: It will improve it. This will be because there will be no one suspecting that one is not doing very well. This will be because both traditional leaders and ward councillors will be part of the initiations of the developmental initiatives. Everyone will understand that the manner this is done is the manner that one accepts as the appropriate one to assist that people develop.

R: Our last question

WC05: Yes. It will improve service delivery because what is important when you are leading, leading the same people, leading the same community development. Remember that saying that says, "together we can do more". It should not be a conflictual relationship.

R: Thanks mother, for this interview.

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END

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## **APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT FORMS**