

MANAGING FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING WITH RESPECT TO THE "TWO CHINAS"

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requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the
field of Public and Development Management).

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ABSTRACT

The deciding of foreign policy for any Government is complex. This report develops a framework to analyse this complexity with a case study of the key policy change by the South African government to date. The decision to switch diplomatic relations from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China involved the full range of ideological, political and economic dimensions. Data was gathered from interviews and documents, which was analysed by developing themes and using a coding and matrix system.

The study explores the traditional models of decision making, the "Rational Actor", "Organisational Process" and "Bureaucratic Politics", and argues that none alone can explain and predict foreign policy. It considers whether a hybrid model, combining all three, is a satisfactory framework in this case. It concludes that the decisive intervention of President Mandela cannot be incorporated into the traditional models and so a framework called model Z for convenience was developed. Whether President Mandela's (or his successor's) personality and leadership style will determine foreign policy into the millennium and therefore need to be permanently incorporated in a new theoretical model is not certain.

DECLARATION

I declare that this report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management) in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Shaplog', is written over a horizontal line.

SHIRLEY MARLENE CHAPLOG
15 DECEMBER 1997

DEDICATION

With thanks and appreciation to my Creator, parents, siblings,
friends and colleagues.

Shirley Chaplog

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GLOSSARY

The Two China's

The People's Republic of China (PRC), a. k. a. Mainland China,

The Republic of China (ROC), a.m. the Island of Taiwan.

The three traditional decision-making models explored:

The "Rational Actor" Model

The "Organisational Process" Model

The "Bureaucratic Politics" Model

The 'China' decision:

This refers to the decision by the South African government to reverse the Apartheid government's elevation of the ROC over the PRC by assuming diplomatic relations with the PRC and breaking off diplomatic relations with the ROC.

Decision

The decision means the prior recommendations to and the announcement of the President on the 27th November 1996.

Satisfactory Framework of Analysis

In this research, appropriate framework of analysis means the theoretical approach which most economically includes, describes and predicts the actions of individuals and organisations within the State.

A Hybrid Approach

A combination of the Rational Actor, Organisational Process and the Bureaucratic Politics model.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPS	The Centre for Policy Studies
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
FGD	Foundation for Global Dialogue
GNU	Government of National Unity
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NP	National Party
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SACP	South African Communist Party
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background to the research

During the 1990's, many changes took place in the world. Two of the most significant are firstly globalisation, notably the rise of trading blocks (e.g. European Union), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT/WTO) and the "economic miracle" of the Asian Giants. Secondly on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.

In the arena of international relations, these changes ushered in a new era. In many countries, security concerns based on ideological differences arguably lost their place as the chief determinant of the foreign policy of nations and economic interest became more important in foreign relations.

Internally, South Africa changed in the 1990's. The watershed elections of 1994 spelled the end of apartheid and ushered in a democratic dispensation in a new South Africa ruled by the Government of National Unity (GNU). Throughout this period, (the 1990's), South Africa focused on domestic issues. Examples of these domestic issues are the elections, delivery of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and the transformation of the civil service.

Externally, South Africa's international status changed from being "a pariah" (Mills: 1995, p.81), to being the toast of the world. It was no longer necessary for South Africa to buy favours from the rest of the world to

spend millions on defensive and offensive military ventures, or to drive a siege economy. A newly democratic South Africa, led by President Mandela, a person with international stature, could now proudly take up its rightful place as part of the international community.

1.2. Effect of changes on the department of foreign affairs

The changed internal and external conditions had a profound effect on the Department of Foreign Affairs. At the time (1995), the Department of Foreign Affairs and its minister, Alfred Nzo, were severely criticised by some academics and sections of the media for not effecting significant changes. Mr. Nzo was also criticised for not formulating a policy that could serve as a clear framework within which foreign policy decision making could take place. For example, "What is not clear is the bottom-line vision or position of South Africa's foreign policy" (Daniel: 1995,p.36), and "the new South African government is struggling to develop a firm, coherent and principled foreign policy orientation. Effective implementation strategies also appear to be lacking" (van Nieuwkerk: 1996, p.3)

For the first time in South African history, the foreign affairs budget (1995-1996) was hotly debated in parliament where the new political leadership questioned the principles and priorities underlying the budgetary allocations. Questions were asked as to why South Africa still had so many missions in Europe when it needed to align the expenditure of its limited resources with the new policy of closer ties with Africa. Within this context South Africa's diplomatic recognition of many countries were re-examined. South Africa's diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) instead of the People's Republic of China (PRC) surfaced as a debate within many organisations and in the media. (Mills: 1995; Cronin: 1996)

1.3. The dilemma for South Africa

Daniel (1995:158) explained the dilemma as: "should South Africa retain its official ties with an old ally (albeit one linked to the previous apartheid regime) with whom it has developed a[n] economically advantageous relationship or should it abandon that ally in favour of a government with a wretched human rights record but a market of immense proportions and [whose] economy is currently the world's fastest growing?"

The dilemma was further complicated by the fact that whatever decision was made, "South Africa's foreign policies toward the PRC and ROC respectively are inextricably linked" (Davies: 1996, p.117).

According to a number of writers (Kent-Brown, 1996; Sono, 1995; Mills, 1995; Suttner, 1995), the dilemma forced South Africa to choose between three alternatives:

- maintain the status quo (meaning that South Africa would continue its diplomatic recognition of the ROC)
- attempt dual recognition (meaning that South Africa would try to have formal diplomatic relations at the same time with both the ROC and the PRC)
- recognise the People's Republic of China (and downgrade diplomatic relations with Taiwan)

Choosing any of the first two alternatives would have resulted in South Africa maintaining ties with only the Republic of China as the People's Republic of China stated clearly that it would not tolerate dual recognition. "Dual recognition" as Kent-Brown (1996: 72) states, "has proved to be a futile policy proposal in the light of the historical experience of third states

who soon found out that the PRC would rather terminate relations than accede to this arrangement."

Choosing to switch diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People's Republic of China (PRC) was, according to many (Kent-Brown: 1996, Mills: 1995, Suttner: 1995), the best alternative South Africa had given its national interests. As it turned out, this was the alternative South Africa chose.

1.4. The announcement

On the 27th November 1996, President Mandela announced that South Africa would recognise the People's Republic of China. (Mandela: 1996)

Although this announcement was a summersault on his earlier position, since "As recently as September, [1996] Mandela gave visiting RoC Vice – Premier Hsu Li-Te categorical assurances that we would not switch allegiance." (The Star: 28.12.1996), many South Africans accepted it with a sigh of relief. For example, The Star (28.12.1996), stated that "At last South Africa has resolved its China policy"

This announcement was preceded by a debate about whether South Africa should have diplomatic ties with the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China. Most of the individuals and institutions engaged in the debate focused on the arguments for and against the recognition of the Peoples Republic of China or the Republic of China.

This paper examines two issues:

- How did the South African government manage the decision making process regarding the diplomatic recognition of either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China? and

- Could a **satisfactory** (see glossary) framework to analyse how the South African government managed the decision making process, be found?

1.5. The research problem

1.5.1. Problem statement

How did the South African government manage the decision making process regarding the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China?

1.6. The objectives of the research

1.6.1. Primary objective

The objective of this research is to;

- Assess whether a 'Hybrid approach' (see glossary) provides an satisfactory framework of analysis for the decision making process engaged in by the South African Government, regarding the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China.

1.6.2. Secondary objectives

In order to achieve the primary objective, the research attempts to:

- establish who made foreign policy decisions during the period 27th April 1994 to 27th November 1997, in South Africa
- establish who influenced foreign policy decisions during this period
- establish what decision making process the decision maker/s engaged in
- identify the principle/s on which the decision makers based their decisions

- identify which priorities and whose priorities drove the decisions
 - establish the impact of the tensions between different principles and priorities on South African foreign policy decision making
- The core of this research centres on a decision. Every day, decisions are made in government. These decisions have profound effects on the lives of individuals, and the history of nations. For example:
 - The American decision to send American troops to Vietnam,
 - The effect of Hitler's foreign policy decisions on the history of the German nation and other nations in the Baltic area.

Decisions made in the foreign policy arena can influence the relationships between nations for decades. Even though they are important, many of these decisions are not made in a manner transparent to the observer. "It is like a black box" (Hilsman; 1993, p.52). One can see what comes out of it, but one does not know how the decision was made. "The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer – often, indeed, to the decider himself ... There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision making process – mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved" (Kennedy; speech 1962).

This research attempts to look inside this black box. It explains the basic three theoretical models of decision making as they apply to foreign policy decision making. It proposes that a hybrid approach, which is a combination of the three models, provides a 'satisfactory' framework to analyse the particular decision making process in the switching of diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China.

1.7. Scope of the study

This research report consists of seven chapters. The second chapter reviews the literature relevant to the unit of analysis (that is the management of the decision making process leading to the recognition of the PRC), the context of the research, and the theory underpinning the study. The third chapter contains the proposition and explores tentative solutions to the research problem. The fourth chapter describes and justifies the selected research methodology in detail. Chapter five presents the results as objectively and clinically as possible. The research results show overwhelmingly the existence of another framework, called framework Z for the sake of convenience (See Appendixes 5 and 7). Inadequate evidence was found to substantiate the proposition that a combination of the three models, a hybrid approach, provide the satisfactory framework of analysis of decision making on the 'China' decision.

The interpretation of the research results is covered in chapter six. This chapter focuses on the meaning of the results examined in the light of the proposition posed in chapter three.

The results are interpreted in the following way:

The decision making process on the 'China' decision had two phases

Phase 1: Arriving at the Recommendations

Phase 2: Arriving at the Announcement

For Phase 1, the Rational Actor model (related to and in some literature equivalent to the Realist Paradigm) shaped the thinking of most actors.

National interest formed the basis for the recommendation. Within organisations, the bureaucratic politics model was active (notably Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) & South African Communist Party (SACP)). Overall, the organisational process model had insignificant impact. After the conflict and debate within organisations ran its course, a 'democratic' majority decision making consensus was reached. The result of this consensus was accepted as the recommendation, which was used to 'lobby' the President.

For Phase 2, only framework Z was relevant. Only the President decided. His personality, sense of morality, values and worldview impacted. There is no evidence that any one of the other three models were active. None of the three or the proposed hybrid model can explain the delays, the specific timing of the announcement, etc. Phase 1 amounted to a futile exercise without Phase 2. But Phase 2 was not necessarily dependent on Phase 1. The President acted independently from Phase 1 but Phase 1 actors or agitators or managers could not act without him.

The concluding chapter seven attempts to provide additional insights and propose ideas for further research. Some of the ideas are based on the questions that could form the basis for future research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

In this section of the report literature on the context of the research will be reviewed. The broad context of the research is policy making in government and the specific context of the research is foreign policy making. The literature on the background will be reviewed as well as literature on the theoretical models used in foreign policy making. These models offer different explanations of how foreign policy decisions are made. Apart from looking at the three models used most often, I will also discuss a fourth, hybrid approach.

2.2. Context

2.2.1. General policy making in Government

Dunn (1994:185) defines public policy as " A complex pattern of interdependent collective choices, including decisions not to act, made by governmental bodies and officials". He further describes policy formulation as, "the development and synthesis of alternative solutions for policy problems." According to Dunn (1994:185), policy problems are extracted from problem situations by stakeholders whilst he defines a problem situation as " A situation or set of external conditions which, once experienced, gives rise to dissatisfaction, uneasiness, and a felt recognition that something is wrong" (Dunn: 1994, p.185)

Within the particular case examined in this research, the problem situation developed around the issue of whether South Africa must establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China or maintain diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China. Stakeholders in and outside of government recognised this situation as a policy problem and the debate for alternative solutions to this problem started in South Africa since before April 1994, and continues to be debated, despite the presidential announcement (Song, 1995, p.72).

2.2.2. Foreign policy making

Wallace (1971: 11) provides two definitions of Foreign Policy. The first is a stable set of attitudes towards the international environment, an implicit or explicit plan about a country's relationship with the outside world: a conscious image of what is or ought to be the country's place in the world, or some general guiding principles or attitudes determining or influencing decisions on specific issues.

As a young democracy South Africa was at the time of the announcement and during the decision making process, trying to define its image of what is or ought to be its place in the world. This added to the complexity of managing the decision making process.

The second definition he provides is

a field of related but distinct actions and issues, in which there neither is or can be foreign policy in general, in which policy is formed in a disjointed fashion, largely in response to immediate pressures and events, in a number of structures and issue areas

This second definition is very applicable to the 'China' decision. The Hong Kong hand over was an immediate pressure, and through the research it

was attempted to ascertain whether foreign policy formulation on this particular issue was disjointed.

2.2.3. The importance of examining decision making processes in foreign policy

Kegley, (1987:249) makes a strong case for the necessity of examining decision-making processes in foreign policy making. "Only by incorporating decision making level phenomena can domestic and international factors be causally linked to foreign policy behaviour".

2.2.4. The importance of the individual decision maker

This section draws attention to the influence of the individual in decision making processes. As much as individuals are part of organisations, and the decision are attributed to the organisation, the fact remains that individual actors within the organisation caused the decision to be taken.

Individuals have different personalities and leadership styles which enables innovation and creativity.

Kegley (1987: 249) emphasises the importance of the human decision maker and their perceptions in the formulation of foreign policy.

National and international circumstances do not make decisions and forge foreign policy ; decision makers alone do this. How decision makers perceive the positive and negative incentives of foreign policy options determines the ultimate course of action. In theorizing

about the sources of foreign policy behaviour, we should begin with individuals, because only persons think, prefer and act.

And

In asking us to take into account human actions, it demands that we escape the deterministic logic that has attempted to explain national behaviour abroad by reference exclusively to the political, social, and economic forces that influence decisions, but not by reference to the decision makers who, in the last analysis, do the deciding.

Merritt, (1975: p. 4) also argues for the importance of the individual to be acknowledged and highlights the influence of personalities. He states that decisions are made by individuals, each with a distinctive personality. The interplay of personalities of decision-makers, group dynamics as decision makers inter act, representative processes in the sense that top-level decision makers are tied into different bureaucracies and other social groupings. The qualities of the information-processing system determine the issues to which foreign policy makers pay attention and the goals they pursue in the international arena.

When Ferguson and Mansbach (1989:81) draws attention to the individuals and the groups through which the individual exert influence.

Ferguson and Mansbach (1989:81), state that "states do not act...individual leaders act, bureaucracies act, ruling elites act".

2.3. The nature of decisions

Toma and Gorman (1991:133-135), classify decisions made in foreign affairs, as macro, micro and crisis decisions. The macro decisions encompass the perceptions of the leadership, involve position statements

on major, ongoing policy issues and provide the guidelines for routine operations. Micro decisions are narrow in scope and are handled at the lower levels of the organisation because they do not require the attention of the authoritative decision makers. Crisis decisions involve high level decision makers and are necessitated by conditions or situations of threat or gravity.

Grindle and Thomas (1989:229), distinguish between crisis and non-crisis (politics-as-usual) decisions.

Circumstances of crisis (actual crisis or perception of crisis) or politics-as-usual distinguish whether problems are pressing or chosen. Pressing problems are those that are forced on the policy makers through pressure from injured or interested outside parties; chosen problems are those that decision makers have picked out of the thin air as a result of their own preferences and perceptions

Grindle and Thomas (1989:229) continue to say that perception of crisis will raise the concerns policy elites had about political stability for example, and therefore caution them to assess the political and economic consequences of the options open to them.

These kind of conditions may lead to innovative changes, whereas mundane concerns lead to incremental changes. So according to Grindle and Thomas (1989:229), if the conditions preceding the 'China' decision was perceived by the policy elites as conditions of crisis it would lead to an innovative change on South Africa's policy towards the Chinas. If the policy elites considered it a mundane issue, only incremental change would have happened to the way in which South Africa relate diplomatically to both the ROC and the PRC.

2.4. Background to the research

2.4.1. History of the relations between the Republic of China and South Africa¹

Some political commentators assumed that after the elections an entirely new government with a new administration would be running the country. However, the Government of National Unity (GNU) inherited the administration of the old government. With it, the GNU also inherited the foreign relation partners of the previous government. Historically, the Republic of China and not the People's Republic of China had relations with apartheid South Africa. This South Africa–Republic of China alliance was a strategic alliance.

Taiwan was given diplomatic status in 1976, by the previous government (Feng; speech 1996). This was the year of the Soweto uprisings after which South Africa became increasingly isolated from the international community. At the time, Taiwan was also being increasingly isolated from the international community. In October 1971, Taiwan lost its seat in the United Nations. In 1979, the United States of America (USA) changed its policy to a "one China policy" (Davies: 1996, p.44). This meant that the United States of America recognised the People's Republic of China as the sole representative of the Chinese people. South Africa's alliance with Taiwan was forged in these circumstances of international isolation of both countries, when both countries needed each other. They developed "close relations collaborating on arms production and commercial exchange" (James: 1996, p.3).

¹ Refer to appendix 9 for a fuller chronology

2.4.2. History of South African relations with the People's Republic of China²

The Department of Foreign Affairs, with its "principle of universality" (Daniel: 1995, p.34), explored establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, whilst South Africa still maintained its diplomatic recognition of the ROC. The PRC refused to have diplomatic relations with South Africa whilst South Africa still gave the ROC diplomatic status (Suttner: 1995, p.6). Chinese officials viewed South Africa's recognition of the ROC as equivalent to China recognising any attempt at independence on the part of KwaZulu (Suttner: 1995, p.6).

2.4.3. The People's Republic of China view

The PRC viewed the ROC as a "renegade" province (Mills: 1995, p.87). "Peking maintains that Taiwan is part of China" (Moorsteen and Abramowitz: 1971, p. 3). As such, the PRC insisted only one China existed and only one China can have state to state relations as the true representative of the Chinese people.

For Beijing, the principle of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan as a matter of perceived national dignity, as a crucial aspect of political legitimacy for the government, and for strategic considerations - is of such primacy that it is not willing to renounce its right (Council on Foreign Relations-USA: 1995, p.10).

2.4.4. The Republic of China view

² Refer to appendix 9 for fuller chronology

The ROC does not dispute the fact that there is one China. It does however, plead the case for separate independent governments. It also operates like an independent entity. It has its own army, bureaucracy and even had its first democratic elections for a president in March 1996. "It has been noted that Taiwan is a de facto independent entity" (Lee: 1995, p.24).

2.4.5. The importance of the ROC and the PRC to South Africa

Radebe, J. (1995:9), briefly summarised South Africa's strong trade, investment and aid links with the Republic of China. "Taiwan is South Africa's sixth largest trading partner, with a two way trade of R4.4. billion in 1994, according to RSA customs figures. By ROC customs figures, it is R5.36 billion ...Taiwan has invested R1,5 billion creating over 40 000 jobs in over 280 factories ... agreements for trade, investment, technical co-operation and financial assistance total[ling] R1.1 billion". He continues to state that if all goes well with the proposed petrochemical project with the ROC, "It will be the largest foreign investment South Africa has ever seen" (Radebe: 1995, p.9). Besides, the Republic of China support for the RDP is larger than that of some G7 countries, totalling nearly R566million (Themba Sono: 1995, p.80). For example, Taiwan is the only country which has committed itself to co-finance with "the World Bank, a \$100 million loan to increase the competitiveness of small and medium sized light manufacturing industries in South Africa" (Business Day: 1996, p.3). The state of the South African economy, some argue, though not desperate, is embattled (20% devaluation in the value of the Rand³ from February to

³ The South African currency is called the Rand

December 1996) enough to do without the possible further negative repercussions of losing a valuable trade ally and RDP supporter.

On the other hand "weighing heavily on the collective mind of [a] heterogeneous group consisting of business, academics and the ANC, is the reality of the PRC as an awakening economic and strategic superpower (van Nieuwkerk: 1996, p.3)." If diplomatic links with the PRC are not established soon, South Africa might lose out on important trade and investment opportunities with "an emerging economic giant" (Mills: 1995, p.84). Mills (1995:96) argues, that in the future, the long term economic and political interests of South Africa lie with the PRC and not the ROC.

In most of the regional and international Interstate organisations to which South Africa belongs, the PRC is recognised and given sole diplomatic status (Suttner: 1995, p.4). Mills (1995:88) also raises the issue of the PRC's membership of the Security Council of the United Nations (UN). If South Africa wants to become Africa's representative on the UN Security Council, how can it expect success if it does not even recognise the PRC diplomatically?

The United States of America (USA), changed its foreign policy toward the Republic of China in 1979, recognising the People's Republic of China, which then replaced the ROC on the UN Security Council. South Africa, with its diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China, were clearly out of line with major international organisations, most of Africa, and the major G7 countries that are also South Africa's major trading partners.

2.5. The relevance of the research

The process of how the 'China' decision was made, and its basis, was of relevance to the future of SA relations with other countries of the world.

"The dilemma and its resolution [provided] a clear indication of which factors [were] primarily driving South Africa's "new foreign policy" (Daniel; 1995, p.159). Light will be shed on the relative importance of principles such as human rights, economic interests, security interests, the promotion of the Southern African Development Countries, and African interests.

On the other hand demands are made for South Africa to pursue moral and idealistic values in its foreign policy like with the Indonesia- East Timor issue. "How does the ... cosyng up to Indonesia and Morocco square with the African National Congress ... pledge ...to canonise human rights in our international relations?" (Daniel; 1995, p.35)

The first founding provision in the constitution of South Africa, as adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 May 1996, refers to the "advancement of human rights and freedoms" (Constitution of South Africa Act: 1995). By way of the Constitution, South Africa had committed itself to human rights as a basis for all its relations, internal and international. Also, people around the world expected this moral stance because of South Africa's struggle legacy and the image of President Mandela as a relentless fighter for human rights, justice, equality and freedom. Thus pressure is put on South Africa to pursue moral causes to the point of sacrificing its own economic interests.

2.5.1. The basis for foreign policy decision making

Kegley (1987, p. 250) provided a definition of foreign policy that resemble the Rational Actor model and Realist paradigm. He stated that foreign policy is "created by the articulation and aggregation of interests" (Kegley: 1987, p. 250). These 'interests' form the basis of foreign policy decision making. Decision making in foreign policy is based on what is termed "national interest" (Kegley: 1987, p. 250).

Sono (1995:73), quotes South African Defence Minister Joe Modise: "We have our own national interests and it is these national interests which must be satisfied. I am certain that the PRC will want to satisfy its own national interests first, before it thinks of any other interests". The question however for South Africa at this point in time is "what constitutes its national interest?" The South African Foreign Policy discussion document (South Africa Government:1995), does not address the issue of South Africa's national interests explicitly. It does refer to Africa, economic relations and political and security priorities, as South Africa's international priorities (South Africa government: 1995, p.17). The document outlines South Africa's foreign policy principles as a commitment to:

- the promotion of human rights;
- the promotion of democracy, justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;
- international peace and to internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts;
- the interests of Africa in World Affairs and economic development through regional and international co-operation in an interdependent world." (South Africa Foreign Policy Discussion Document: 1995, p.15).

These principles outlined in the South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, (1995, p.15) seems to be a combination of realism (or rational actor) and idealism. It defines South Africa's national interest (a rational actor or realist paradigm concept) as the promotion of ideals like human rights.

Added to the question of what constitutes the national interest of South Africa, is the question of time frames. "national interest, dictates the nature of a state's long-term effort in foreign policy and governs what it does in a

short-term context ... national interest provides the necessary measure of consistency to national policy " (Lerche and Said: 1963,p.7).

2.6. DECISION MAKING MODELS

For the purposes of this research, the formulation of the three decision making models as defined below were used. When scrutinising the literature on decision making theories, it appears that many other models exist. However the researcher sees these as other "names" or labels for the same basic three models. For example, Hilsman, Gaugran and Weitsman (1993:49), called the Rational Actor model the rational process model and also the traditional, strategic geopolitical point of view. Some 'new' models are variations of the basic three used below. (Toma and Gorman: 1991)

For the purposes of this study the three different decision making processes are identified by the comparative foreign policy school of thought. These are the rational actor model, the organisational process model, and the bureaucratic politics model. (Toma & Gorman: 1991:135)

2.6.1. The Rational Actor Model

According to Toma and Gorman (1991: 135), rational actors use the following process:

- they define a situation that calls for a decision after an objective consideration of facts,
- they specify the goals by ranking them according to priorities, and then consider all available means for reaching the objectives,
- they select the one objective that will maximise the goal achievement, and take well-calculated actions to implement the decision.

This model assumes that governments consist of united purposive strategists, who have full information, and can therefore calculate and

implement actions on the basis of how best to maximise power and security. This view assumes an ideal situation for decision makers. (Toma and Gorman: 1991)

The Rational Actor model assumes that irrespective of differences in the ideological beliefs of decision makers or the leadership of different governments, they will behave in a similar fashion: "the analyst does not need to know anything about the leaders of a state. They will behave the same no matter who they are ... It does not matter that one state was a monarchy and the other a communist dictatorship, for both behaved the same" (Hilsman et. al.: 1993, p.52).

Robbins (1991: p153-179), provides a detailed explanation of what the decision making process is as well as how it can be managed best. He states that decision making permeates every facet of a manager's job, so that it is not incorrect to say that decision making is synonymous with managing. He defines the decision making process as "a set of eight steps that begins with formulating a problem, moves to selecting an alternative that can alleviate the problem, and concludes with evaluating the decision's effectiveness" (Robbins: 1991, p153-179). The eight steps, typical of the rational actor model, are identified as:

1. Formulating a problem,
2. Identifying decision criteria
3. Allocating weights to the criteria
4. Developing alternatives
5. Analysing alternatives
6. Selecting an alternative
7. Implementing the alternative
8. Evaluating decision effectiveness (Robbins: 1991).

The critique of the Rational Actor model expressed by Toma and Gorman, (1991: 135) is that it ignores two very important constraints. The first constraint is dissent among policy makers and disagreements in the interpretations of costs and benefits based on ideological and cultural differences and the second constraint relates to those constraints associated with the broad determinants of human behaviour such as perception, socialisation, personality development, intelligence, attitudes and values. The rational actor model also assumes perfect information which is an assumption that is very difficult to realise.

Kegley (1987:253) differs with this rational actor model. He argues that individuals are often guided by a set of rules to help in decision making.

The environment for foreign policy makers is not conducive to pure rationality; it encourages decision making by deference to rules rather than by a cost benefit analysis of the relative merits of all possible options. Rationality is bounded, because the need to take short cuts in calculating decision costs encourages the acceptance of satisfactory rather than maximal options. Deference to sanctioned rules for choice thus serve policy makers interests, even though rationality is compromised.

2.6.2. The Organisational Process Model

This model argues that decision making is done in a quasi - mechanical way. The organisational model, "makes decisions through a quasi-mechanical reference to past decisions, precedence, routines, or governmental roles, based on standard operating procedures of governmental organisations" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p.137).

Toma and Gorman (1991:137), explain the assumptions on which this model is based as every government is made up of a conglomerate of loosely allied organisations. These organisations function according to standard patterns of behaviour and they are fairly predictable 'because of their bureaucratic nature.

The major critique of the organisational process model centres on the fact that individual behaviour cannot be standardised. It is inevitable that an individual's personal norms and values will influence an organisation's decision making (Toma and Gorman: 1991). "By the time the information from the field is processed through the organisations bureaucratic network and presented in a condensed form to the authoritative decision maker's, it very likely will include prejudices, biases, distortions and omissions" (Toma and Gorman: 1991: 137).

2.6.3. The Bureaucratic Politics Model

According to this model, governments are composed of many parts, including individuals and organisations and decisions are seen as "the products of the interaction, adjustment and politics of people and organisations. Foreign Policy is seen as a result of a political process consisting of bargaining, compromise, adjustment, arm twisting, favouritism and even unethical methods used for political or personal gain. A state's foreign policy is therefore not that of a monolithic actor whose participants in the process see everything alike" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p. 136).

If this definition of the bureaucratic model is accepted as true for the formulation of foreign policy, it does not come as a surprise then that the

"parliamentary foreign policy budget debate held in May 1995 demonstrated a lack of consensus in many areas of South Africa's foreign relations" (Mills: 1995, p.81).

This model does not only recognise the existence of the different actors, it also points out that the different actors play different roles and exert different levels of influence according to their position of power in the bureaucracy. "The players in the decision making process are playing different roles and exerting different influences on different types of decisions under consideration. The most important players being on top/ in the centre of the circle, the less important players will be lower in the pyramid or on the periphery of the circle" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p.137).

A different way of looking at the realist-idealist debate is looking at the issues of power and morality. Wallace (1971:12) provides two views as to what the foreign policy objectives of a country is. The first view holds that "whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. States pursue their national interests in foreign policy and their national interest can be defined as the maximisation of national power" (Wallace: 1971, p.12)

The second view, hold that "the pattern of objectives which policy makers pursue are more complicated, and less coherent. Considerations of prestige, economic gain, domestic advantage, as well as national security form part of ... the country's foreign policy. For these writers, it is more appropriate to talk of interests rather than single national interest, to look for a number of separate and often conflicting objectives rather than for a single overriding operational goal" (Wallace: 1971, p.12).

Hilsman et. al. (1993: p.ix) examines the specific roles and powers of the inner ring of power centres-both individuals and institutions. These inner ring entities, are those role players "who are directly involved in making defence and foreign policy" (Hilsman et.al.: 1993,p.ix). In a South African context one may classify this inner ring as the President, the deputy president, the departments of foreign affairs, trade and industry and finance. Possibly the party caucuses or powerful groupings within the African National Congress party caucus and the parliamentary portfolio committees on Foreign Affairs and on Trade and Industry can be included.

Hilsman et.al. (1993:ix) continue to examine the powers of the second ring-consisting of those individuals and organisations who are not officially part of government but whose principal purpose is to influence foreign and defence policy. This analysis deals with the influence of interest groups and the media. On the 'China' decision, this ring includes non-governmental organisations (NGO's) like the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the Centre for Policy Studies, academics, as well as journalists in the South African media who are important opinion makers and who regularly write about South Africa's economic and other interests. The outer ring consists of the electorate and public opinion. This outer ring of power can be very influential, as is demonstrated by the numerous successful protest marches in South Africa and around the world, for example, the anti-Vietnam war protests in America.

Yet, authors like Rothstein (1972: 22-23) is particularly severe in his summary of the historical influence of public opinion on Foreign Affairs issues. He states that, the "opinion of the mass on foreign policy issues has been apathetic, disinterested and decidedly unprofound" Rothstein (1972: 22-23). According to Rothstein (1972:23) the direct impact of mass opinion is felt only when one group or another believe that it is about to lose on a

crucial decision. This group then leaks information in an effort to redress the balance, or when the elite is so divided over ends and means that it cannot isolate outside opinion as irrelevant or uninformed. A long term disaster, in which the costs begin to pile up in the form of casualty lists or increased taxes, may also force the public from apathy to more proactive action. But, according to him, the most probable outcome of mass opinion is increased support for the government in power and increased hatred for dissenters.

The pronouncements of Rothstein (1972:23) on public opinion and foreign policy, is not borne out by the views expressed by the South African public in a recent survey. Markinor (an independent private sector research company) did a survey (November 1997), for the Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD). The survey tried to gauge the South African public's opinion on the Government's decision to switch diplomatic ties from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China.

Forty- four percent of the respondents judged the decision as 'right' compared to the 34 percent who said 'wrong'. The ANC and PAC supporters were generally in support of the decision. 36 percent of the former said it was right for economic reasons, and a further 16 percent said it was in line with international practice (overall support of 52 percent). NP and DP supporters had different opinions. 45 percent of NP and an overwhelming 70 percent of DP supporters were of the opinion that the decision was wrong. South Africans judge their government's handling of foreign policy as fairly mixed. For example, the decision to switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the PRC was judged with some cynicism. The overall impression gained from the survey data is that where South Africans do hold opinions on foreign affairs, they tend to be complex and sophisticated. Government policy is not merely accepted as

given, necessarily correct or automatically in the national interest. Both trade and human rights promotion, are seen as equally important and South Africans display a keen sense of international moralism. (Markinor: 1997, p.8)

The importance South Africans attach to upholding moral values in foreign policy is possibly linked to the nature of the South African democracy and the character of President Mandela. Regarding the switch, one can therefore expect that the South African public will weigh up the 'China' decision in terms of both its morality and economic benefits for South Africa.

Swift (1975:17), makes a strong case for the necessity of states to maintain moral standards in international relations. He argues that national interest, (forming the basis for foreign policy of states) should be invested with individual moral values. "Thinking in terms of the individual it becomes natural to incorporate into decision making moral qualms" (Swift: 1975, p.17).

Toma and Gorman (1991:139), argues that "there is ample evidence that foreign policy makers, especially at the top of the organisational hierarchy, use moral considerations in their deliberations. The Machiavellian maxim "the end justifies the means"" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p.139) poses a related problem. In a democracy, frequent application of the ends-justify - the means doctrine can be both counterproductive in foreign policy and damaging to the very foundations of the democratic system. The question is, "Can a democracy relinquish certain operations that sometimes require immoral acts, even if it means sacrificing success for morality in foreign policy?" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p.139)

2.6.4. The Hybrid Approach

The word 'hybrid' means a combination. The researcher is of the opinion that the three models i.e., the Rational Actor Model, the Organisational Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model are all important contributors to developing a holistic framework of analysis for decision making in general and with respect to the 'China' decision in particular.

The 'Hybrid' approach, according to this view, will then incorporate into its framework elements from all three the models. For example, to explain what happens within the organisation between individuals who are involved in the decision making process, one may expect different views. That is, one person may be pro People's Republic of China whilst the other may be pro Republic of China. Conflict may arise between these two people's views. This conflict is recognised as an aspect in decision making by the Bureaucratic Politics model. To resolve this conflict both people can agree to go to the rulebook or to follow the example of international precedent on the issue.

Both these 'solutions' are Organisational Process model 'solutions'. The two people, (bureaucrats) could have been part of a strategic, pre-planned and well-coordinated management process, a feature of the Rational Actor model. This example shows that it is not prudent to assume that the three models are mutually exclusive. Whilst they are distinct from each other, and each has its own strengths and weakness, if used together, the strengths the one have may make up for the weaknesses of the other models. Thus a possibility exists that all three models can be used in a unique combination to provide a satisfactory framework of analysis for the 'China' decision. The hybrid approach represents this unique combination.

2.7. Decision Making Tools

Frei and Ruloff (1989) examine the various ways used in foreign policy analysis to conduct planning and assess risks. They look at decision trees, decisional matrices, statistical analysis, trend analysis and time series analysis. They illustrate how decision trees can be used as a tool to investigate options and possible outcomes. "The objective of using the structured decision tree is to minimise the inclination to overlook and neglect some option and related outcome. The more detailed and carefully drafted a decision tree, the greater the advantage of making clear and purposeful selections" (Frei and Ruloff: 1989, p.201).

Of relevance to this research, was the need to determine whether the various departments use different decision making tools. Using different decision making tools may have lead to differing perspectives developing on the matter being addressed. For the same reason, it was important to ascertain if role players at the different power levels have used different decision making tools.

2.8. Summary of literature

This literature review explains the background and theoretical underpinnings of the research. The broad context (government's policy making), narrow context (foreign policy making), and specific context (decision making) have been defined and explained. The specific decision making models being the Rational Actor model, the Organisational Process model, the Bureaucratic Politics models, and the hybrid approach have been explained.

Decision making tools and how the use of different tools may lead to different approaches to the same problem have been explained. The role and influence of the hierarchy of powerful role players (inner ring, second ring and outer ring) have also been explored. Three decision making process models and the importance of the hybrid approach were explained. These models provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of the 'China' decision.

CHAPTER 3: PROPOSITIONS

3.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to apply the theory explained in chapter two to the following research problem:

How did the South African government manage the decision making process regarding the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China?

This chapter analyses each of the models in turn to identify what features they have and what one could expect if one applied them to the above mentioned problem statement. The assumption being that if most of the elements of the particular model was operative in the 'China' decision, the outcomes explained under the application could then be expected from the interviewee's responses. Completing the process for each of the models allowed the researcher to derive the proposition. The proposition is the approach expected to be operative in the 'China' decision.

The researcher identified six themes, (extracted from many authors for example Toma and Gorman: 1991; Hilsman et. al. 1993; Allison: 1969 and an understanding of what should be the basis of comparing the models) which together provided the framework within which to analyse each model. The themes are:

1. Nature of governance,
2. Basis of decisions,
3. Climate or context of decision,
4. Kind of decision,
5. Decision tool used and
6. Management

Essentially each model provides different answers (elements) to the questions put to it by the themes.

Matrix1: Matrix of Themes and Rational Actor Model

Themes	Rational Actor Model
Nature of governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United purposive strategists who are rational actors / individuals • No dissent among policy makers
Basis of decisions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rational steps • National interest which means that the goal is maximisation of economic benefits/ security /power
Climate/context of decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No uncertainty and full information • Cultural and ideological differences causes no differences in interpretation
Kind of decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consensus on maximising alternative
Decision tool used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost benefit analysis
Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manager: Combined efforts of rational policy making group • Management process: Pre-arranged, strategically planned process

Applying the themes to the rational actor model, the above result was obtained (Toma and Gorman: 1991; Hilsman et.al: 1993; Allison: 1969).

After applying the themes to the organisational process model, the following result was obtained:

Matrix 2: Matrix of Themes and Organisational Process Model

Themes	Organisational Process Model
Nature of governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conglomerate of loosely allied organisations • Standardised individual behaviour • Predictable behaviour • Bureaucratic nature
Decision are based on	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rules • Precedent
Context / climate of decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Certainty created by standard operating procedures
Kind of decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Routine
Decision tool used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standardised rule making
Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manager: Rulebook • Management of process: Standard organisational procedures

(Toma and Gorman: 1991; Hilsman et.al: 1993; Allison: 1969)

When applying the themes to the bureaucratic politics model, the following result was obtained:

Matrix 3: Matrix of Themes and Bureaucratic Politics Model

Themes	Bureaucratic Politics Model
Nature of governance	Lack of consensus among bureaucrats Different actors exist Actors with different roles Actors with different power and influence according to position power Hierarchy of power
Basis of decisions	Bureaucratic power and influence
Climate / context of decision	Minimal role for external influences from politicians or extra parliamentary groups and public opinion
Kind of decision	Deal
Decision tool used	Bargaining
Management	Manager: Bureaucrat Management of process: Resultant of bureaucratic politicking

(Toma and Gorman: 1991; Hilsman Et. al: 1993; Allison: 1969)

3.2. Analysis of models

The three decision making process models have different strengths and weaknesses. Some elements within each of the decision making models illuminate the research problem, whereas other elements are completely inapplicable to analysing the research problem.

3.3. The Rational Actor Model

If the rational actor model is operative in this situation it means that the assumptions of the model will be reflected in the set of results obtained from the interviews.

Therefore one expect the following outcomes under each of the six themes:

3.3.1. Nature of Governance

- The interviewees should identify that government actually consists of united purposive strategists, who are all rational actors and therefore have no disagreement about policy. All relevant government structures (i.e. Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Trade and Industry, The Defence Ministry, and National Intelligence; and institutions like the President's office, the deputy president's office, the parliamentary portfolio committee on foreign affairs, the parliamentary portfolio committee on trade and industry) should have one purpose. Each individual within those structures should subscribe to the same purpose, have the same understanding of the issue and therefore come to the same conclusion, as other individuals in the same structures.

3.3.2. Basis of decision making

This assumes that the basis of the analysis of the situation is the same- i.e. rational steps get taken to arrive at what the maximising alternative is. This means that:

- All players must identify national interest of South Africa as the basis for the decision
- All players should agree on exactly what the national interest of South Africa is on the 'China' decision. This could be defined in terms of economics (trade and investment) power and security (military) international

standing of South Africa (on bodies like the United Nations (UN), Organisation for African Unity (OAU)) For example:

- South Africa wants to be elected to represent Africa on the United Nations Security Council (in future), so it needs the vote of the People's Republic of China to realise its future international aspirations.
- South Africa recently gained membership of the OAU, SADC, the NAM etc. These organisations recognise the People's Republic of China and not the Republic of China. Therefore South Africa is out of step with the rest of the international bodies it sits on.
- At present, South Africa's trade with the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong combined outstrips its trade with the Republic of China. The trade between South Africa and the People's Republic of China is growing at a higher rate than the trade with the Republic of China. The People's Republic of China is a greater potential market for South African products than the Republic of China.
- The fact that Hong Kong reverted to the People's Republic of China on 1st July 1997, meant that South Africa had to recognise the People's Republic of China not to loose the landing rights for SAA, and risk negative impacts on its trade with and through Hong Kong.

- then one can deduce that they will also agree on which choice is the best choice.

If this scenario is true, it will mean that all players agree that South Africa must switch to the People's Republic of China.

3.3.3. Climate or Context of the decision

The model assumes that full information exists and that there is no uncertainty. Even if cultural and ideological differences do exist, they do not

Influence individuals interpretation of the issue and therefore no differences in the interpretation of the issue at stake result.

The South African nation consists of people from different racial, cultural and, political groups. Across the spectrum of organisations and institutions dealing or influencing the 'China' decision, there is enormous diversity. For example these structures include those with communist views, people with capitalist views, different religious outlooks, academics, etc. Even within organisations there are different ideological and political perspectives. If the model's assumption is correct it means that all these different kinds of individuals, should still choose the People's Republic of China above the Republic of China irrespective of their differences.

3.3.4. Kind of Decision

The model assumes that the kind of decision will be a consensus decision based on agreement on the maximising alternative. On the 'China' decision it means that all players should agree, that the South Africa should have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. It should be a consensus.

3.3.5. Decision Tool Used

The model assumes that cost benefit analysis should be used to weigh up each alternative and to arrive at the maximising alternative. This means that on the 'China' decision the players should have looked at the pro's and con's of South Africa recognising the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. Then they should have weighed up the benefits derived from each choice and compared it to the benefits derived from the other choice. They should also have compared the "costs" what could be lost by South Africa if she choose the People's Republic of China and not the

Republic of China and vice versa. After doing this kind of "balance sheet", the maximising alternative would then be crystallised. If the interviewees state that cost benefit analysis or balance sheet analysis was used, or that the decision was based on information/recommendations using this decision making tool, then it means that the rational actor model's decision making tool was used to analyse the alternatives on the 'China' decision.

3.3.6. Management

The model assumes that the decision making group consists only of rational actors. That is people who can clinically and objectively analyse the situation and come up with the rational choice. There is no room for emotive ties to a particular choice, friendship with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China or any moral issues. It also assumes that the decision making process was consciously managed in a step by step, strategically pre-planned manner. In other words there is no room really for an iterative process, for impulsiveness.

The model's assumptions are correct on this element if:

- the interviewees can identify exactly who managed the process (person or group)
- state that they were required to attend an interdepartmental / interstructural strategy meeting where tasks for each individual or structure was worked out and time limits set for feedback and reports
- state that this initial strategy meeting was followed by a series of similar meetings until eventually the maximising alternative was arrived at
- state that this maximising alternative was then just given to the President to announce, which he then proceeded to do, without his personality or preferences causing any impact

The rational actor model purports to lead to "the implementation of well calculated decisions" which is a situation all decision-makers hope to achieve. However, it is very difficult to behave in this rational way because most decision-making environments in foreign affairs are imperfect. No one can claim to have considered all the possibilities or maximised the goal with the decision that gets taken eventually. Most decision-makers strive for satisfactory, which is the alternative considered to be the best amongst all the other alternatives. Those responsible for the decision, choose the "satisfactory" alternative, (Dunin; 1994) because they think that it has the least drawbacks for the particular situation. It is not a perfect alternative. The rational actor model assumes that one policy making group makes the decision. Even though differences exist, these differences do not impact on the final decision, which is a consensus decision.

3.4. The Organisational Process Model

If the organisational process model is operative in this situation, it means that the assumptions of the model will be reflected in the set of results obtained from the interviews.

Therefore on:

3.4.1. Nature of Governance

The interviewees should identify that government actually consists of a conglomerate of loosely allied organisations with a bureaucratic nature. All relevant government structures form this conglomerate. They are the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Defence, the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service, institutions like the President's office, the Deputy President's Office, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry. Each of the parts of the conglomerate function as a bureaucracy. It would

mean that the same procedure would be used to resolve any problem. Whether it is the switch from the ROC to the PRC or deciding on the times for lunch or the budget allocations. Comments about the individuals employed in these organisations should provide evidence of the standardised and predictable behaviour of these individuals. This would mean that individuals use a set procedure to deal with any problem. For instance, if it is procedure to wait for a request from the minister before any research project is started, for example on the 'China' question, it means that the desk officer will only follow this procedure. Even if he/she is asked by someone else to start investigations he/she will refuse 'because the set procedure was not followed. Responses like 'I don't act on your instructions/requests only on the minister's instructions', would be forthcoming. The desk officer will also not initiate any project.

3.4.2. Basis of decisions

All decisions made will be done on the basis of rules or precedent. In this case it would mean that the desk officer had to look up the rule on what procedure should be followed if South Africa is faced with a situation where it had to choose between two entities like the Republic of China and People's Republic of China. If no rule existed, previous behaviour of the organisation will be the next guideline. In the absence of both of these guidelines the officer can then conclude that no decision can be made until a rule exists, or precedent exists that can serve as the guideline. The 'problem' will then be referred to management with a recommendation that a general rule get formulated to enable the solution of this problem and any similar problem that may arise in future. This is used in court cases. Judges

make new rulings only in the absence of a rule or precedent. Judgement then serves as the precedent for subsequent cases.

3.4.3. Climate or Context of Decisions

For this model the context/climate of the decision is certainty. This certainty is created by the standard operating procedures. It is 'safe' to give the decision to any employee because the employee will use the standard procedures and irrespective of who uses the rules the result will be the same as long as the individual adheres to the rules. If there was a rule stating that South Africa will never switch diplomatic ties from one entity to the other, irrespective of whether the President had to apply the rule or a secretary at DFA, it would have been impossible for South Africa to switch.

3.4.4. Kind of Decision

This model predicts that interviewees will classify the decision as a routine decision. This kind of decision would then be handled in the same manner as all other routine decisions, follow the same channels, take the same time to be completed, etc.

3.4.5. Decision Tool

Standardised rules should be identified as the decision tool. The interviewees should be able to point out a particular rule, or precedent. For example, a rule that forbids a decision-maker to switch diplomatic recognition from one entity to another can be used.

3.4.6. Management

- **Manager**

In this model the 'manager' is the rulebook. Even if a senior manager want to be innovative and use a different procedure or make a decision that suits the situation, but is not catered for in the rulebook, such initiative will be overruled by the rulebook. S/he may even face disciplinary hearings because s/he did not follow the rules.

- **Management process**

The management process is determined by a set of organisational procedures. These steps must be followed. This is the case with budgets and tenders. Quite rigid procedures exist to ensure that corruption is minimized. For example In foreign policy decision making a set procedure could make it impossible for any one of the entities to have direct access to the President to lobby him.

3.5. The Bureaucratic Politics Model

3.5.1. Nature of Governance

This model focuses on what goes on internally in government organisations. Thus it sees that government consist of bureaucrats, these bureaucrats do not agree with each other, i.e. there is a lack of consensus among them. They are different actors with different roles, different power and influence according to their position power and also a hierarchy of power. If these elements of this model is true, it means that interviewees will be able to identify the different actors and the different roles they played according to the position power they have. In this kind of decision making process information is power. For example the desk officer may influence the decision by virtue of the fact that s/he has a wealth of information from varied sources which gives him/her unique insights and facilitates his/her ability to make recommendations. A different actor e.g. the director general may develop other insights because he/she has access to classified information or sit in meetings that the desk officer does not have access to.

This makes it possible for different actors to play different roles according to the insights they have developed. Position power also makes it possible for some actors to have a veto right, to stop decisions from being taken or being implemented, or to delay decisions. Thus the roles played by the desk officer of information gathering on both the pros and con's of recognising either the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China can play a significant role. The minister by virtue of being the minister of foreign affairs participated in a number of discussions on the issue, led a delegation etc. These are the kinds of issues the interviewees would identify if the model were relevant.

3.5.2. Basis of decisions

The decisions would be based on bureaucratic power and influence. It is possible that the interviewees will mention that the position of power of a particular individual ensured that the decision was taken. For example, if the desk officer was pro Taiwan, his recommendation will be pro Taiwan and if the minister and president only base their decision on this input then the decision will be pro Taiwan.

3.5.3. Climate or Context of decision

The climate or context within which the decision is made is interdepartmental conflict. That simply means that these different actors have different views and each try to get his view accepted. Thus conflict can arise between different actors. For example if two desk officers work on this question and one is strongly pro Taiwan, whilst the other is strongly pro People's Republic of China debate and conflict can arise.

3.5.4. Kind of Decision

The model proposes that the kind of decision that emerges from this kind of conflict is a deal. It can be that the one bureaucrat decides to tone down his views. So let's say the pro People's Republic of China view becomes the recommendation. But in future, on an issue of Nigeria for example, the pro Taiwan bureaucrat's view will be used as the recommendation.

3.5.5. Decision Tool

The tool used between the bureaucrats in this model is bargaining. They settle the conflict by making a deal with each other.

3.5.6. Management

According to this model the manager would be the bureaucrat. His/her influence is so great that his superior's role is relegated to that of rubberstamping the decisions s/he as bureaucrat took. This model proposes that the management of the decision making process is actually the result of bureaucratic politics. The process bureaucrats engage in, including the debates and conflicts and the eventual deal becoming the result of the whole process.

3.6. A Hybrid Approach

A hybrid approach would incorporate elements of all the above. It does not assume a perfect world where decisions are made on full information. It accepts that at best satisfactory decisions can be made, as a result of the

uncertain, complex and transformational environment in which foreign affairs decision making takes place in the world, South Africa and the Department of Foreign Affairs. A Hybrid approach will be relevant if the interviewees identify all three the other models as relevant to a particular theme. For example if on the theme of the decision making tool, and the theme of the management the Rational Actor model, the Organisational Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics model was found relevant the hybrid approach will be considered relevant. The point of the Hybrid approach is that it takes all the elements of the three models into account. Thus it is proposed that it is better able to address the complexity of the decision making process on the 'China' decision. What is proposed therefore, is that the hybrid model provides the satisfactory framework for analysing the decision making process on the 'China' decision.

3.7. Proposition

Through a study of the decision making process the South African government engaged in to decide that from January 1, 1998, South Africa will have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and break diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, the following proposition will be tested:

A 'HYBRID APPROACH' provides the satisfactory framework of analysis of how the South African government managed the decision-making process regarding establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

3.8. Summary

This chapter states the proposition. This proposition was formulated after examining the theory and applying it to the research problem.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to cover two important aspects of the report. Firstly, a clear distinction is drawn between the unit of analysis and the context of the research and secondly, the research methodology used is described in detail and also justified.

4.2. Differentiation between Unit of Analysis and Context

4.2.1. Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis of the case study is the management of the decision making process the South African government engaged in to decide to recognise the People's Republic of China diplomatically.

4.2.2. Context

The broad context of the case study is policy making in government. The narrow context of the case study is foreign policy making, targeting foreign policy decision-making processes. The specific context of the case study is the debate on whether the Republic of China or the Peoples Republic of China should be recognised diplomatically by South Africa.

4.3. Research Methodology: Description and Justification

4.3.1. Case Study

According to Leedy (1993:p.125), all research methodology rests upon a bedrock axiom, which is, "The nature of the ... problem for the research dictate the research methodology." By examining the decision making process that led to the decision by the South African government to switch diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China, the nature of the research problem 'tries to illuminate a decision,' Schramm (in Yin 1994:22) provides the following definition of a case study "the essence of a case study...[is that it] tries to illuminate a decision" (Yin; 1994, p.22).

Yin (1994:29) explains that a how question is "likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories and experiments". Experimental design is inappropriate for this study because experiments require that the investigator have substantial control over the behaviour of the respondents. It is impossible for the investigator of this study to have any control over the individuals involved in foreign policy decision making in South Africa. Therefore the investigator chose a case study design because "the case study is preferred ...when the relevant behaviors (sic) cannot be manipulated."(Yin: 1989,p.19)

A history is also inappropriate because firstly, "Histories are the preferred strategy when there is virtually no access or control". Before proceeding, the investigator ensured that there is sufficient access to data and individuals to successfully complete the study. The second reason why a history is inappropriate is because "the case study is preferred in examining contemporary events." (Yin: 1989,p.19). The decision central to

this study, was announced on 27th November 1996, which means that contemporary events was examined.

The third reason why the history is inappropriate to this study, is the use of multiple sources of evidence, both documents and interviews. Only the case study design is appropriate because of the "case study's unique ...ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, ... interviews" (Yin: 1989,p.19),

The case study method is appropriate when investigators desire to

- a. "define topics broadly and not narrowly
- b. cover contextual conditions and not just the phenomenon of study
- c. and rely on multiple and not singular sources of evidence" (Yin: 1989, p. xi)

In this study each of the requirements outlined by Yin in the above quote is applied. For example:

- This topic is not defined narrowly. Even though this research does focus on a specific issue, i.e. the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, it uses a broad definition of the decision making process (defined above). If instead, a narrow definition of the decision making process is used, the danger exists that the research will be limited to such an extent that it may not be worth studying at all.
- The impact of the following important contextual conditions are recognised and described in the research.
 - Policy making in Government,
 - Foreign Policy decision making in Government,
 - the Internal (political, economic etc.) developments within South Africa,
 - South Africa's changed role in the world arena,

- The impact of International (foreign countries) influence on South Africa
- South Africa's foreign policy objectives, interests, and economy
- The debate on which of the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China should be recognised diplomatically and the reasons for and against each,
- The research relies on two sources of evidence, interviews and documents.

4.3.2. Justification of design as a single case study

This is a single case study, because it revolves around one decision the South African government made regarding one of its foreign policy issues. The use of the single case study design is necessary because "The single case study is an appropriate design in testing a theory... whether a theories propositions are correct... or whether some alternative set of explanations may be relevant." Yin (1994:42) The objective of this single case study is to assess whether a 'hybrid approach' is a satisfactory framework of analyses of the foreign policy decision making process the South African government engaged to decide which one of the " two Chinas " it will recognise diplomatically.

It is an explanatory single case study because this question deals with operational links traced over the time period 27th April 1994 to 31st December 1997. (Yin: 1989,p.18)

4.4. Data Collection

4.4.1. Description

Each method's favoured data collection and analysis techniques also reflect the method's initial orientation and its assumptions about whether to follow the rules of traditional scientific inquiry. The initial case study orientation is toward multiple sources of evidence. The case study evaluation can therefore include the use of documentary analysis; open and closed ended interviews. (Yin 1993,p.67)

For this research, the primary source of data collection will be the interviews based on open ended, semi structured questions. See appendix 2 for list of semi structured questions. The particular advantage of using this approach is explained by Yin (1984:p.83), who states that case study interviews are of an open-ended nature, in which an investigator can ask key respondents for the facts of a matter as well as for the respondents' opinions about events. In some situations, the investigator may even ask the respondent to propose his or her personal insights into certain occurrences and may use such propositions as the basis for further inquiry.

Therefore interviews with key people in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Trade and Industry, and other institutions of government were done. Though the South African business community were not very vocal in public on the issue, attempts were made to get a representative view from the business community by interviewing Mr. P.J. Botha who is presently employed by ABSA bank group. Besides his knowledge of the historical developments on this decision, even prior to 1994, Mr. P.J. Botha also serves as the chairman of the East Asia society, and interacts regularly with South African businessmen on business interests in Asia. (See appendix 3 for a full list of interviewees).

Yin (1984:83) continues to caution the investigator against becoming too dependent on a key informant, and advises the use of corroboratory evidence to deal with this pitfall.

The secondary data was gleaned from administrative documents, discussion papers, journals, seminar papers and newspaper articles on the Republic of China –People's Republic of China debate. This provided an overview of related events and opinions and assisted in drawing up the chronology in appendix 8. A database comprising of audio tapes of the interviews, summary matrix of the interviews and documentation, were compiled.

4.4.2. Justification of research questions

The focus of the research question does not lend itself to any quantitative research methodology and statistical analysis. It does require questionnaires to be done, but open ended and semi structured questions appropriate for the research. See list of open ended questions in appendix 1. Appendix 2 show the appropriateness of the research questions by "matching" the research questions to the various objectives. In this way, it is ensured that the questions forming the bases for the unstructured interviews resulted in reaching the stated objectives.

4.4.3. Justification of sample

The list of interviewees was compiled from looking at who deals with the decision making on the ROC -PRC question for South Africa. According to the classification used by Hilsman (1993:p.ix), they can be classified as inner ring; (president and departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry) second ring (interest groups) and outer ring/periphery (public opinion, media).

This is why the list includes formal institutions dealing with government decision making and implementation, as well as recognising the influence of political parties, and information gathered by academics and the views of the public as presented in the media. In the case of the media, a summary of the views expressed in various articles will be used. Thus each interviewee selected on the list is there because of his/her government position, or the role he/she played with respect to deciding on and or influencing the decision making regarding the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China.

4.5. Data Analysis

The data is analysed in the following way:

The themes characterising each of the decision-making models are isolated in appendix 4. To ensure comparability, the themes isolated answer the following six questions for each model.

- What was the nature of governance?
- What were decisions based on?
- In which climate or context were decisions made?
- What kind of decision was made?
- Which decision tool was used?
- Management
- Which "entity" was the manager?
- Which management process was used? or How was it managed?

The Appendix 9 matches the six themes to the secondary objectives of the research. As explained earlier the questions asked are matched to the secondary objectives in Appendix 2. This ensures that both the questions and the research themes are linked with the secondary objectives. It

increases the possibility that the responses to the questions will enable the researcher to reach the research objective. It also means that the responses matched to the elements of the themes will ensure that the research objective is reached.

Each model provides a unique solution to the above mentioned six critical issues. These are the elements, which the researcher will look for in the interviewee's responses. Each interviewee has his/her own understanding of how these questions were handled in the decision making process. Those answers were ticked off against the element of the model it resembles most closely. Thus a matrix of questions on the Y-axis, the models on the X-axis, was compiled. (Appendix 6, 7 and 8) The elements the interviewees identify, are indicated by a numerical number showing the place on the tape where the view is expressed. This is done in order to make it easier to verify. The matrix (appendix 6, 7 & 8) also provides a summary of the results of the interviews.

To isolate the elements identified by each interviewee, the following process was used.

- To get a sense of the whole, the investigator listened to each audio taped interview.
- The process was started with the most interesting interview, the one with Chris Landsberg. Care was taken to focus on both the literal meanings and the underlying meanings contained in the data.
- The data was coded according to the codes given to the elements identified in appendix 4.
- Each interview's results were written in the matrix.

4.6. Ensuring validity and reliability

The use of "multiple sources of evidence (interviews and documents)", establishment of a "chain of evidence", and key informant review of the draft case study report, will assist to ensure construct validity. I will not address internal validity because "internal validity is a concern only for causal or explanatory studies where the investigator is trying to determine whether event x led to event y." (Yin: 1989, p.43) As explained elsewhere (in the section on delimitation's), this study does not examine causality. External validity will be obtained by "analytical generalization" (Yin: 1989, p.43) where the results of the study will be generalised to the broader decision making theory.

4.7. Limitations of the research

The research does not make a case as to whether the recognition of ROC or the PRC was the best choice for South Africa. Although it draws on research of the pros and cons of South Africa choosing one or the other, it does not focus on that aspect. It also does not focus on the general set of problems a government can experience in making policy. This research does not attempt to develop an understanding of international relations between nation states. Therefore the international relations theory and paradigms described so succinctly by McGowan (1995: p7-27), was not reviewed in this research. The theory underpinning the research centres on decision-making theory or frameworks of analysis. A further limitation of the research is a limitation related to the research methodology. The case study methodology makes extrapolation difficult (Yin: 1994). Therefore a limitation of this research was the difficulty in extrapolating from the 'China' decision to general foreign policy decision making in South Africa. Even though a

chronology is included in appendix 8, this is not a historical report on how the situation between the ROC and PRC developed, at what stage it is at the moment and how this influences stability in the East Asia region. Although only fourteen interviews were completed key players representing a wide spectrum of organisations and institutions were interviewed (refer to appendix 3). Another limitation was the time frame of the research. This timeframe excluded any decision made before 27 April 1994 and after 27 November 1997.

What is of essence in this research, is how the present South African government managed the decision making process regarding the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China. The time period of the research is 27 April 1994 to 27 November 1996. On the 27th April 1994, the new government was voted into power and many observers expected it to change foreign policy in general and in particular switch from the ROC to the PRC. This research focus on the decision-making process for the decision announced on the 27th November 1997. Any decision made outside these dates therefore falls outside of the scope of the research.

4.8. An exemplary case study

This research will attempt to follow Yin's (1984:140), characteristics of an exemplary case study. These are:

- The case study must be significant. This means that the case should be of general public interest, which the Republic of China -People's Republic of China issue is at the moment in South Africa. Also the

underlying issues, e.g. decision making, should be nationally important in theoretical terms or in policy or practical terms.

- The case study must be complete. Which means that the boundaries of the case, that is the distinction between the phenomenon being studied and its context, are explicit.
- The complete case study should also demonstrate that the investigator has extended exhaustive effort in collecting the relevant evidence.
- The case study must consider alternative perspective i.e. alternative interpretations should be advocated.
- The case study must display sufficient evidence so that the reader can reach an independent judgement regarding the merits of the analysis.
- The case study must be composed in an engaging manner i.e. a clear writing style that entices the reader to continue reading the case study from beginning to end.

4.8. Summary

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of how the investigator goes about doing the research. A clear distinction is made between the unit of analysis and the context of the research. Then the investigator provides a step by step explanation of the research methodology. A number of research methodologies can be used in research. When one chooses a specific research methodology one does so based on the "judgement calls" one make about the nature of the research and the most effective, efficient and appropriate ways to reach the goal of solving the research problem.

The term judgement call " refers to all those decisions... that must be made without the benefit of a fixed, "objective" rule that one can apply, with precision, like a template..." (McGrath, J.E., Martin, J., and Kulka, R.

1982;p13) Because these judgement calls has a profound effect on the solution of the research problem, "...the cumulative results of such judgement calls often determine the outcome of research", (McGrath, J.E., et al.,: 1982,p13), the investigator also justifies the choices made with respect to the research design, data collection, data analysis and testing.

Based on research theory and the researcher's "judgements", the following decisions with respect to the study was made:

- The research methodology most applicable is the case study methodology
- A single case study design is used
- Unstructured interviews will be done based on the questions outlined in appendix 2.
- Each question was linked to each objective of the research, appendix 3, to ensure that the objectives of the research will be achieved.
- The interviewees and documents were selected according to a set of criteria outlined above.
- The data analysis will be conducted using coding and matrix construction.
- Validity and reliability are addressed as outlined above
- This case study will aspire to emulate Yin's (1984:140), characteristics of an exemplary case study.

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

5.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the research.

As explained above, the primary source of the data was obtained from the interviews. Fourteen people were interviewed. Their views are detailed below. The quotations used were selected because they most clearly expressed interviewees thinking on the theme. Appendix 7 is a synthetic presentation of the views expressed in all the interviews as they relate to the themes. This chapter looks at each of the following questions developed from the six themes and presents the interviewees' responses.

- What was the nature of governance on the 'China' decision?
- On what was the 'China' decision based?
- In which climate or context was the 'China' decision made?
- What kind of decision was this 'China' decision?
- Which decision tool was used to make the 'China' decision?
- With regard to the management of the 'China' decision
 - Which entity was the manager of the 'China' decision?
 - Which management process was used? or How was the 'China' decision managed?

5.2. Nature of governance:

5.2.1. Different actors exist

An important characteristic of the nature of governance on this issue was that different actors existed. The primary actor is the President, then the deputy president, Department of Foreign Affairs, the parliamentary portfolio committee on foreign affairs, within government and outside of government the SACP, COSATU, academics, NGO's like SALLA. One interviewee explained the existence of these different actors as follows:

- "There's several key overlapping forums and structures all of which have a bite at and wrestle with foreign policy. First of all is the President, then it's the deputy president, then it's the Department of Foreign Affairs. Then there's the parliamentary portfolio committee, [which is] a multi-party structure but dominated by the African National Congress and the SACP members. Then there's the other departments Finance, Home Affairs Defence, many of them impact on Foreign Policy. Then there's the alliance, the ANC first, with its Department of International Affairs. [Then] the party [meaning SACP] which has been very active on foreign policy and COSATU and the ANC Youth League" (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).

5.2.2. Actors with different power and influence because of the position they hold.

The roles of these actors are defined according to the positions they occupy for example and they exert power and influence largely as a result of the positions they occupy. For example one interviewee explained the power and influence the desk officer had as follows:

- "If the minister doesn't know much about an issue the desk officer will supply a memorandum. The memorandum might amount to a recommendation, and because the minister doesn't know much about the issue and ... it's not a hot issue yet, the minister might just follow that" (Raymond Suttner, personal communication, December 4th, 1996).

One interviewee points out that the influence of the desk officer extend much further than the Department of Foreign Affairs itself because structures outside government also utilise the memoranda prepared by the desk officers at Department of Foreign Affairs to make decisions on foreign affairs issues. "Even ANC comrades rely on briefing papers by DFA " (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).

5.2.3. Actors with different roles

The kind of decision that has to be made will also determine to a large extent what level of government needs to bear responsibility for the decision. For example according to two of the interviewees the roles of actors depend on the level of the decision:

- "Very important decisions go to the President, issues that are almost important go to the minister and the deputy minister ... run of the mill decisions are taken by the director's general and deputy director's general and other desk officers" (Raymond Suttner, personal communication, December 4th, 1996).
- "Routine decisions are taken by the Director General and Director's ... line function ... diplomatic and high level decisions are taken by the President and Cabinet" (Kate Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997).

5.2.4. Competing centres of power (autonomous elite groups inside and outside of government; public opinion)

The actors who played different roles and exerted their influence based on position power did not operate in isolation. They interacted with each other in such a manner that they represented different elite groups or centres of power that competed with each other.

Most respondents explained that the governance of this issue consisted of competing centres of power that used their power to exert influence on the decision. For example the influence exerted by the Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Foreign Affairs inside government and powerful elite groups within the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress, and the SACP ensured that a recommendation to switch was forwarded to the President and to cabinet.

"The National Executive Committee (ANC), the Department of Trade and Industry, the Economic Transformation Sub-committee of the National Executive Committee (ANC) makes an input on foreign policy issues. Then it gets taken to cabinet" (Blade Nzimande, personal communication, December 3rd, 1996)

5.2.5. International opinion and precedent

Many interviewees referred to the importance of international precedence on the governance of the 'Cllna' decision. This indicates that international opinion and precedence had an important impact on the reasoning of decision makers. The comments interviewees made were as follows:

- "International law [UN Resolution 2758 of 1971] prescribes and you cannot get away from that therefore we followed international

precedence on this issue [the 'China' decision]" (Machiel van Niekerk, personal communication, November 20th, 1997).

- "The world reacts in a particular way towards Taiwan ... this [the decision] would be consistent with world opinion" (Matthew Phosa, personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).

The following evidence that the President discussed the matter with an international opinion maker was found in a Department of Foreign Affairs document.

- "The President said that he had discussed the matter with Dr. Boutros Boutros-Gali [on 28-04-1996]" (DFA document-minute of president's meeting on 30/04/1996 with Madame Wu, the PRC minister of foreign trade and economic co-operation).

5.2.6. No dissent among policy makers

In general, at a political level, the majority of policy makers agreed on the 'China' decision. This comment was made by one of the interviewees, indicating that even within opposition parties like the National Party, there were a majority of policy makers who agreed.

- "People like Leon Wessels were already saying in 1994 we must go for Mainland China. You'll find the views across parties. You did not hear the National Party really making noise about it." (Matthew Phosa, personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).

5.2.7. Lack of consensus among bureaucrats

But at the level of the administration, although a majority supported the 'China' decision greater evidence was found of conflict and disagreement amongst bureaucrats. One commentator (who did not want to be named) admitted that there was considerable conflict within the Department of Foreign Affairs on this issue. S/he stated that "there was a tug-of-war on the 'China' decision. For those of us in the middle of it all, it was very unpleasant"

One of the interviewees made a quite strong comment on the prevalence of conflict and disagreement within the Department of Foreign Affairs.

- "The Department of Foreign Affairs [is a] pretty divided outfit at the moment" (Rocky Williams, personal communication, November 30th, 1997).

5.2.8. Hierarchy of power

All government departments have a hierarchical structure. The organograms given by Interviewees working in government departments illustrated this fact. See Department of Foreign Affairs example below.



5.2.9. Conglomerate of loosely allied organisations

- One interviewee clearly identified the different government departments and the way they worked with each other as a conglomerate of loosely allied structures. She said that "This process started seriously by the end of 1995. Department of Trade and Industry did economic analysis including inputs from industry, Department of Foreign Affairs political analysis. The Portfolio committee engaged in the missions." (Kate Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997).

5.3. Basis of decisions

5.3.1. National interest:

All the interviewees identified the national interest of South Africa on this particular issue, as the basis for the decision. They mentioned the following economic, political, long term, trade, dissatisfaction with the Taiwanese, international standing of the PRC in the UN and the pressure of the Hong Kong hand over as reasons for the switch:

- "Realpolitik, others for economic and commercial reasons diplomatic reasons, the other factor was the Security Council" (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996)
- "The two very important points regarding China is the political angle. China is a permanent member of the [UN] Security Council and you cannot discard that very important [fact]. Secondly we were out of step with the world. Thirdly trade has improved [with PRC]. Trade is of course [very important] you are working with 1.2billion people- if you sell a toothbrush to one [each] you're a billionaire" (Johan Kotze, personal communication, January 16th, 1997)

- "Long term interests of South Africa is the most important, not short term. China doesn't have any [investment money in the short term]... but in the long term that economy is growing in a very serious way" (Matthew Phosa, personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).
- "We realised that what the Taiwanese were saying they were doing ...and what was actually happening is two different things ... for example Australia had a greater citrus quota than us, yet Australia did not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. We do not owe the Taiwanese anything. Since 1989 one of my prime objectives was to ensure that we could maintain our Hong Kong office post 1997. I was pretty sure that we needed to talk to Beijing." (P.J. Botha, personal communication, December 13th, 1996).
- "In its own national interest South Africa had little choice but to follow ... all the major countries to recognise it [the PRC]. The immense growth potential of the PRC and its political clout as a permanent member of UN Security Council, ... and fears that the PRC would close our valuable mission in Hong Kong when it takes over ... [made this] decision necessary" The Star (November 29, p.16).

5.3.2. Consensus (reached after) crisis, conflict and debate

Many interviewees agreed that consensus was reached. But they explained that the process to reach this consensus included discussions, debate, conflict between those who had differing views on the matter and extensive consultation.

- "There were discussions within departments, across departments, with ministers, with Members of Parliament, and Cabinet memoranda" (Kate Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997).
- "There was an open debate within the ANC about this" (Matthew Phosa, personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).
- "There was a real and extensive debate within the party [SACP]... that was brought to a head in a focused debate that lasted a good hour and a half, ... and different views were represented ... in the end we argued for a one China policy [the People's Republic of China]. ... -Which was accepted. ... With that mandate, we engaged the ANC." (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).
- "Yes, we consulted. It is the policy of the department (DFA) to consult. As recently as last week we had a workshop with various academics ... people from SAILA, Centre for policy studies ... on foreign policy making. On this [the 'China' decision] we also consulted with a wide range of people inside and outside of government"(Iaan Basson, personal communication, November 29th, 1996).

One interviewee explained that the decision making process includes negotiating of the recommendations with other political parties. "[it is] also negotiated with other parties" (Blade Nzimande, personal communication, December 3rd, 1996). This consultation and negotiations seems to indicate that a democratic process was used to arrive at the recommendation.

"then the ANC might find other opposition parties so opposed to it then they will have to renegotiate ... The information that leads to that [the decision]

comes from a whole variety of places. Like. The presidency itself does play a role."

5.3.3. Information gathering (including information on international precedence)

Most interviewees stated that information gathering does take place.

- "There were information gathering debates within organisations and recommendations by organisations." (Kate Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997).
- "DFA prepares information and the missions (to PRC and ROC), also generated information." (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).
- One interviewee questioned whether this information was used to make decisions.

"The fact of the matter is that information gets compiled and filtered through ... but there is no guarantee that that information does ever impact on a decision. The information from Asia over the last two years convinced the Department of Foreign Affairs ... to go for the mainland. However, the President just could not be bothered by that kind of analysis because of his own view that Taiwan was the most important one" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996).

The information gathered includes information on international precedents on the issue

- "We followed the precedence of other countries" (Machiel van Niekerk, personal communication, November 20th, 1997).

5.4. Climate / Context of decision:

5.4.1. No uncertainty and full information

One interviewee explained that the president understood the issues because he had many and varied inputs on the matter.

- "The President has understood the issues very well for a long time ... and a number of reports has gone to him, a number of memoranda probably from the Department of Foreign Affairs, from the delegation that went to Beijing and Taipei, I myself have written at least two memoranda to him ... representing ANC structures, so he's had input from a variety of sources" (Raymond Suttner, personal communication, December 4th, 1996).

5.4.2. Cultural and ideological differences causes no differences in interpretation

One interviewee explained that ideological differences among political parties did not prevent a majority consensus across party political lines that the People's Republic of China must be recognised.

- "You'll find the views [that South Africa must recognise the PRC] across parties" (Matthew Phosa, personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).

5.4.3. Interdepartmental conflict / debate

One interviewee made a strong statement to explain the extent of conflict within the Department of Foreign Affairs on this issue. He said that

- "Department of Foreign Affairs is divided" (Rocky Williams, personal communication, November 30th, 1997).

Although other interviewees did not put it so strongly, they explain that the debate within the organisations were serious and intense indicating that the conflict on this issue extended across organisations.

- "There were ... debates within organisations" (Kate Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997).
- "We debated quite intensely at a central committee level [SACP], and even some of the members of the central committee believed that we should pursue a two China policy ... it is not a straight forward issue" (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996)

5.4.4. Minimal role for external influences from politicians or extra-parliamentary groups and public opinion

One interviewee explained that a political and parliamentary structure had a minimal role despite the fact that rules were made to prevent this from happening. He describes the lack of interaction between the bureaucracy and the representatives of the electorate in parliament.

- " We have the agreement of parliament ... to increase the role of committees ... there are rules in place ... but its very difficult to translate those rules into a process whereby a parliamentary committee makes a definite impact in terms of foreign policy making. In order to make a contribution to foreign policy making we need information. Information is often supplied after a decision was made, so we don't have the opportunity to make a contribution before the decision is made. ... How do you get the Department of Foreign Affairs, the minister of foreign

affairs ... to give the foreign affairs committee the opportunity to make such input. To seek our advice on important issues- they seek our advice on unimportant issues. ... so these are ... the factors where I don't feel that we as a committee are very successful. We get briefings on some issues, we sometimes make recommendations but we don't really have an ongoing relationship with the department of foreign affairs which is constructive" (Raymond Suttner, personal communication, December 4th, 1996).

5.4.5. Minimal role played by some government structures and bureaucrats. Greater role played by certain government structures and individuals, political allies, and civil society.

Some interviewees felt that a political organisation outside of government e.g. the SACP played an important role,

- "The party [SACP] is very active on foreign policy issues. We stated that that [the one China policy] was our policy and we will seek to influence the movement and government. We engaged the African National Congress with that mandate [one China policy]. The party decision was ... 1995, and end 1995 was the ANC decision ..." (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).

Whilst other interviewees felt that the Department of Foreign Affairs played a less important role. For example;

- "Department of Foreign Affairs really just tender ... advice ... if and when they ... get [an opportunity to provide] input." (Rocky Williams, personal communication, November 30th, 1997).
- "Our role is advisor. Policy is made at that level [cabinet]. We're not involved on the timing ... how everything came together. We put forward

the information, then they decide on the basis of that information" (Iaan Basson, personal communication, November 29th, 1996).

5.4.6. Uncertainty, risk, secrecy, imperfections and confusions

Many interviewees identified uncertainty and secrecy on especially the timing of the announcement. For example on the timing of the announcement interviewees responded as follows:

- "I'm led to believe by very senior members in the Asian department that they were taken by surprise, ... they were not told ... as much as we all were taken by surprise so were members in government taken by surprise .. " (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996).
- "But this is often the case you know, decisions are made at cabinet level we don't know when its going to happen ... I'm not really in a position [to comment on the reasons for the timing]" (Iaan Basson, personal communication, November 29th, 1996).
- "I'd be speculating, I don't know, I don't know. I don't know if Thabo Mbeki was involved ... [in deciding on the timing of the decision]" (P.J. Botha, personal communication, December 13th, 1996).

5.4.7. Pressures from a number of competing interest groups

Most interviewees indicated that competing interest groups made input.

- "There are various organs of civil society that now make input on foreign policy issues ... like SACOB ... there are COSATU, SACP, Anc. There are particular interest groups for example ... environmental groups, lawyers for human rights, on China Taiwan individual actors have made input e.g. Greg Mills of SAILA, Themba Sono, John Daniels, Deon

Geldenhuys, Peter Vale, myself" (Raymond Suttner, personal communication, December 4th, 1996).

5.5. Kind of Decision

Most interviewees agreed that it was a personal decision by the President. E.g.: "it was a personal decision and not a well thought out decision based on proper analysis" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996).

The differences among the interviewees related to the characterisation of the decision. For example one called it "an informed and practical decision" (Nitesh Dullabh, personal communication, December 4th, 1996), another called it "unstrategic, emotive, arbitrary timing" (Kate Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997), yet another called it a principled decision. "It's a principle of the ANC ... to have diplomatic relations with the PRC " (Raymond Suttner, personal communication, December 4th, 1996). Jeremy Cronin (personal communication, December 5th, 1996), called it "Realpolitik".

One interviewee pointed out the almost complete agreement (consensus) on the maximising alternative. For example, "On the China thing ... Thabo, and the department the DIA and therefore the ministry all agreed ... it was really Madiba and one or two individuals in the ANC who disagreed" (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).

5.6. Decision tool used:

- To arrive at the recommendations:

Some interviewees clearly stated that the Department of Trade and Industry used cost benefit analysis to arrive at the recommendations.

- "The Department of Trade and Industry used cost benefit analysis in terms of quantitative and qualitative elements" (Kate Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997).
- "Department of Trade and Industry resorts to cost benefit ... Department of Trade and Industry works on maximisation of returns ... Department of Foreign Affairs? I doubt [if they use any tool]" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996).

Considering the Department of Foreign Affairs, some questioned whether the Department of Foreign Affairs used any tool at all

- "very adhoc decision making process no tool used, there is a lack of a tool in Foreign Affairs" (Rocky Williams, personal communication, November 30th, 1997).

Whilst one interviewee explained that the Department of Foreign Affairs used a balance sheet approach.

- "On the China issue –ROC issue ... foreign affairs did a balance sheet ... weighed up our interests in terms of our relationships with the mainland and ... the same with the ROC" (P.J. Botha, personal communication, December 13th, 1996).
- To arrive at the decision:
Some interviewees believe that Presidential decree / power was used as the decision making tool.

- "The presidency itself does play a role because certain questions are very sensitive they have got actually to have the stamp of the President" (Blade Nzimande, personal communication, December 3rd, 1996).
- "At the end of the day it is presidency decision making in Foreign Policy. It's the President not only deciding on foreign policy but deciding when, where, how" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996).

5.7. Management

5.7.1. Manager.

Some interviewees strongly believe that the President is South Africa's Foreign policy manager e.g.:

"It is not the Department of Foreign Affairs. It's the President ... it was Mandela doing his own thing" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996).

"In the parliamentary sphere this was recognised that this was very much an executive decision" (Rob Davies, personal communication, February, 18th, 1997).

"It was executive action by the President" (Matthews Phosa, personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).

"The President" [is the decision maker in Foreign Policy] (P.J. Botha, personal communication, December 13th, 1996).

"The President said that the majority of the leadership of the ANC (not just GP or COSATU), were in favour of establishing relations with China "now". [but] that he had been more cautious, he had asked his comrades to "handle this cautiously" (Department of Foreign Affairs document. Minutes of President Mandela's meeting with Madame Wu.

One interviewee gave equal importance to the President and deputy president as joint managers e.g.:

"The most important personalities would be Madiba and Thabo" (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December, 5th, 1996).

Whilst others downplay the role of the President. For example:

"The President was following a decision of the NEC [National Executive Council (NEC)] of about a year ago, ... the President was merely deciding on the timing" (Raymond Suttner, personal communication, December 4th, 1996).

"The President acted on the recommendation of Foreign Affairs, but when it comes to the timing of the decision, ... the timing was that of the President. ... And when it comes to who should know about it before the public announcement [the President] decided" (Joel Ntshitenze, personal communication, November 26th, 1997).

One interviewee provided the following reason why the President was the manager of foreign policy in South Africa:

"The reason why Mandela is because of his big personality, with a big aura, everybody just thinks his great you don't tread on his turf you just believe everything he says" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996).

"Due to his powerful personality, president Mandela plays a large role in determining South Africa's foreign policy orientation" (van Nieuwkerk: 1996, p.3).

5.7.2. Management of process:

One interviewee 'admitted' that the process was not managed within the Department of Foreign Affairs. For example:

"The Department of Foreign Affairs did not manage the process, the management was done outside of the department (DFA)" (Machiel van Nieuwkerk, personal communication, November 20th, 1997).

Another interviewee explained the reality of the impact of the President's personality on the management process. For example:

"The reality is that the personality of Mandela looms quite strongly on some issues and on this one it has, even in the flip-flops there had something to do with Mandela's personality itself. It is a part of the explanation for how the policy making work. It's Mandela's personality. It's a real reality in this situation. So you can have formal decisions which impact on the process but how they spin out has something to do with [his] personality" (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).

Most of the interviewees felt that the process of foreign policy decision making was badly managed. Both in general and on this case in particular. For example:

"I don't think that there is proper coordinated, structured decision making. It is not well thought out and to the extent that it is thought out it is the President's thinking. When it comes to China-Taiwan it's the President " (Chris Landsberg, November, 11th, 1996).

"It worked in a very erratic manner ... A lot of it depends on the whim of the President" (Rocky Williams, personal communication, November 30th, 1997).

"Its arbitrary ... there is no specific process, there is consultation, information gathering and a decision by the President" (Kate Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997).

"It is not a planned process, it is an accidental process, you simply muddle through foreign policy" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996).

"CICIR (China Institute for Contemporary International Relations) officials during the meeting were also outspokenly critical of South Africa's foreign policy on the PRC and ROC and referred to the many conflicting and even contradictory statements. ... They also posed the question as to who is in charge of and who takes decisions on South Africa's relations with the People's Republic of China" (DFA document: message received from mission in Beijing, September, 1996).

The management process is characterised as

- individualistic e.g.:

"Crucially individualistic and personalised, highly personalised style of foreign policy [management]" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996).

- impulsive

"I think that the President is very impulsive. He makes decisions to the outside world and they (Department of Foreign Affairs) are left to pick up the pieces after he's made these decisions ... he literally wakes up one morning and makes the announcement ... like the Libyan thing ... the

Indonesian thing" (Rocky Williams, personal communication, November 30th, 1997).

5.8. Summary

This chapter presented the results of the research. Many interviewees identified elements from the Rational Actor Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model. A few interviewees identified elements from the Organisational Process Model. The research results show that the overriding influence that President Mandela had on the management of the decision making process and the implementation of the decision indicates that none of the models nor the hybrid approach, provide a satisfactory framework of analysis.

The following matrix is a synopsis of the results.

Matrix 4: MATRIX OF RESULTS: THEMES AND MODELS

Themes	Rational Actor-Model 1	Organisational Process-Model 2	Bureaucratic Politics-Model3	Hybrid M1+M2+M3
Theme 1: Nature of Governance	Relevant	Relevant	Relevant	Relevant
Theme 2: Basis of decisions	Relevant	Irrelevant	Irrelevant	Irrelevant
Theme 3: Ultimate Context of Decision	Very relevant	Irrelevant	Very relevant	Irrelevant
Theme 4: Kind of Decision	Relevant	Irrelevant	Irrelevant	Irrelevant
Theme 5: Decision Tool Used	Relevant	Irrelevant	Irrelevant	Irrelevant
Theme 6: Management Manager:- Management Process:-	Irrelevant	Irrelevant	Irrelevant	Irrelevant

Key to matrix: Irrelevant: none of the interviewees support any of the elements of this theme for this model; Relevant: One or two of the interviewees support elements of this theme for this model; Very relevant: Most of the interviewees support the elements of this theme for this model

This matrix shows how relevant the models were in relation to the themes. For example, The Rational Actor model (model 1) is relevant for the nature of governance (Theme 1). This means that one or two of the interviewees described the nature of the governance for the 'China' decision as characterised by no dissent among policy makers and as consisting of united purposive strategists who are rational actors / individuals (the elements of the Rational Actor model). The Rational Actor model, the Organisational Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics model are irrelevant for Management: the manager (Theme 6).

This means that none of the interviewees identified the manager as a bureaucrat or a rulebook or a rational policy making group working in a combined coordinated way. Rather the manager is identified as the President precisely because he made the final decision and he had the final say on the 'China' issue. The researcher used the term very relevant to indicate that more than two interviewees expressed the same opinion. The hybrid approach is marked irrelevant for all the themes. The reason is that for the hybrid approach to be relevant, the Rational Actor model, the Organisational Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics model must be relevant for a particular theme. On only one of the six themes were all three the models identified as relevant. On the other five themes the hybrid approach were identified as irrelevant.

CHAPTER 6: INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

6.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to interpret the results presented in chapter five. The relevance of each of the theoretical models and the hybrid approach is assessed then the overall interpretation of results is given.

Statement of result: No conclusive evidence was found to substantiate the proposition that on all six themes, a combination of the three models, a Hybrid approach, provide the satisfactory framework of analysis of the decision making process on the 'China' decision.

Rational Actor model

On the 'China' decision the facts available contradict many of the Rational Actor model's assumptions. The differences between the different actors in this debate, led to differences of opinion on which one of the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China should be recognised. Even though there eventually was consensus on the fact that South Africa should switch and recognise the PRC and not the ROC, differences of opinion were evident in most of the structures and institutions that dealt with the issue directly and even indirectly. Some academics argued strongly that diplomatic recognition should remain with the Republic of China (Themba Sono), whilst others (Greg Mills), believed that diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China was the best alternative. Within the parliamentary portfolio committee, the African National Congress, the

National Executive Council (ANC), the Department of Foreign Affairs and many other structures, most individuals agreed to switch to the PRC, but some still held the view that the status quo should remain.

The rational actor model is not able to adequately explain the decision making process used by the South African government in the diplomatic recognition debate on the 'China' decision, because many of the assumptions of the rational actor model is not applicable.

Organisational Process Model

One element of the Organisational Process model's definition of the nature of governance is that government consists of a conglomeration of loosely allied organisations. The interaction between the various government departments on the 'China' decision was evidence of this fact. The organisational process model relies on rules and precedents. This model's reliance on rules, makes it a less adequate framework of analysis in understanding the decision making process on the 'China' decision. This kind of problem is too complex and dynamic for sensible rules that are inherently standardised. There has been no precedent in the history of South Africa, and no rules were written on how to handle this kind of situation. International precedent could be used as an example. Yet the conditions prevailing now are different from the conditions prevailing when a number of other countries took the decision to switch to the People's Republic of China. The specific choices each of these countries made, (who did switch from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China) also varies substantially from each other. The examples provided also shows that the model in itself may be too rigid. A president cannot lead unless he is allowed a high level of flexibility. Cabinet must have the flexibility to access the evidence and information and according to the definition of South Africa's national interest at the time, make a decision.

That does not mean that the President and cabinet will have *Carte blanche*, the constitution does provide constraints within which both the President and cabinet must govern.

Bureaucratic Politics

The bureaucratic politics model has the strength of being able to explain the differences of opinion amongst the different departments, and different actors in government. Some felt that South Africa should remain with the *status quo* (Republic of China), others felt that the sooner South Africa establishes diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China, the better. However, this model excludes the role played by outsiders (those not part of the bureaucracy), assumes less influence from the politicians on the decision and assumes that only from the interdepartmental and "intrabureaucratic" (Toma and Gorman: 191, p.136) tug-of-war, foreign policy decisions get made.

The evidence in South Africa on the 'China' decision seems to contradict this view. Politicians (President Mandela, and Alfred Nzo) did play a significant role, as well as outside parties, like academics (through conferences and numerous discussion documents) promoting either the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China or dual recognition.

Although there was strong evidence of an "intrabureaucratic" (Toma and Gorman: 191, p.136) tug-of-war, this was not the overriding influence. The overriding influence on this foreign policy decision was the personality and leadership style of the President.

A Hybrid approach

On the theme of the nature of governance on the 'China' decision it can be deduced that:

- There was conflict amongst the different actors. Actors expressed conflicting views in the media. Thus this element of the bureaucratic politics model can prove to be applicable for the 'China' decision.
- The decision was according to the President's press statement taken because of South Africa's national interests. This is an element from the rational actor model. If the results concur, it means that this element of the rational actor model contribute to the understanding of the issue.
- Different government departments were involved in the compiling of data. At least two departments definitely co-operated on the 'China' decision. The Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Trade and Industry played significant roles. This means that government does consist of a conglomerate of loosely allied organisations, which is an element proposed by the organisational process model under the nature of governance.

Therefore on the theme of the nature of governance a hybrid approach is relevant. But on the other five themes one or more of the organisational process model or the bureaucratic politics model or the rational actor model is irrelevant. Therefore on these five themes a hybrid approach is not relevant. In finding of the research is that a hybrid approach does not provide a satisfactory framework for analysis of the 'China' decision.

6.2. Interpretation

The decision making process on the 'China' decision had two phases

Phase 1: Arriving at the Recommendations

Phase 2: Arriving at the Announcement

This above-mentioned result makes it necessary for the researcher to clarify the term decision used in this research report. The decision includes both the recommendations and the announcement.

6.2.1. Phase 1: Arriving at the recommendations

For Phase 1, the Rational Actor model (or paradigm) shaped the thinking of most actors. National interest formed the basis for the recommendation. Within organisations, the bureaucratic politics model was active (notably DFA & SACP). Overall, the organisational process model had very weak impact. After the conflict and debate within organisations ran its course, a 'democratic' majority decision making consensus was reached. The result of this consensus was accepted as the recommendation, which was used to 'lobby' the President. This phase had different managers. Within each organisation and structure a particular individual, sometimes a group, ensured that the organisation or structure decided to switch. These 'actors or elites' managed the process within their particular structure or organisation. However none of them had any real power to influence Phase 2.

6.2.2. Phase 2: Arriving at the announcement

For Phase 2, only the President decided. His personality, sense of morality, values and worldview impacted. There is no evidence that any one of the other three models were active. None of the three or the proposed hybrid approach can explain the delays, the specific timing of the announcement etc. Due to his position power and personality the President was crucial to this decision. Phase 1 amount to a futile exercise without phase 2. But Phase 2 is not necessarily dependent on phase 1. The President can, and does (according to many interviewees) follow his whims and pronounce on foreign policy issues. He acts independently from phase 1 but phase 1 actors or agitators or managers cannot act without him.

Even though the Department of Foreign Affairs sent the recommendation to the President (via the official channels, two years before the announcement, they were taken by surprise completely by the timing of the announcement. The academics those who were pro-People's Republic of China and those who were pro-Republic of China were surprised. Even members of parliament and cabinet were surprised. Members of the SACP were also caught unawares. The announcement was kept secret. It had top secret treatment. According to Joel Ntsitenze, the President took the decision seven days before the announcement. He alone decided on who would know before hand. He only had consultations with the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China's representative's two days before the announcement. The Republic of China's ambassador was also caught off guard by the announcement. (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996) and The Star 28-11- 1996).

6.3. The realist paradigm

It appears that South Africa's foreign policy is dominated by a realist paradigm⁴. The results show that every interviewee identified that South Africa's national interest⁵ was the reason why the decision was made. It was the rationale behind the decision. Many actors from different organisations, with different views (pro or anti the People's Republic of China) displayed agreement on the fact that Foreign Policy should be made

⁴ The term realist paradigm is used here in the sense as explained by McGowan (1995: 27) of a neo realism that focuses on social and economic security issues and not the old kind of realism that focused on traditional national military security issues.

⁵ By national interest the interviewees meant economic interest. The reasons often quoted was the large market in the PRC and trade and investment from Hong Kong combined overshadow completely the trade and investment from the ROC.

on the basis of the national interest of the South Africa. Most of them also agree on what the national interest of South Africa was on this particular issue. Therefore most of them came to the same conclusion, (i.e., South Africa must switch to the People's Republic of China).

It is true that most of the elements of the Rational Actor Model as defined by the researcher, was not identified as relevant by the interviewees. However, it does seem that the interviewees strongly agreed on two aspects of this model, firstly there is general agreement in principle that national interest should form the basis for foreign policy decision making in South Africa. Secondly there is agreement on what the national interest of South Africa is on the 'China' decision.

Agreement on these two aspects led to the 'consensus on the maximising alternative' (an element taken from the Rational Actor model) which in this case was switching from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. If one understands the decision in this context, it makes it easier to understand why the "different alignment of forces within the African National Congress, its alliance partners and Thabo Mbeki" agreed with the decision. Even those (within the African National Congress and its alliance partners and within the National Party-opposition party), who felt that South Africa should continue to recognise the Republic of China "knew that it was inevitable" (Matthew Phosa, personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).

Diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was the only choice South Africa could make. Those dissenting seem to have only wanted South Africa to stay with the Republic of China for a longer time period. So the surprising phenomenon happened in South Africa where a majority of individuals from different creeds, colours, political persuasions, etc. agreed on the switch. The differences were on the timing.

It appears that it was difficult to balance the probability of economic advantages from diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, that is, "Realpolitik" (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996) with issues of morality, (for example the human rights record of the People's Republic of China).

6.4. The Personality of the President

It appears that the foreign policy decision making process in South Africa allows space for the impact of personalities. It allowed for the personality of the President and the "benignly autocratic, stubborn impulsive erratic" leadership style of the President (various interviewees). Therefore the humanness, (the human faults in one respect) of the President, his larger than life aura" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th, 1996) and his image in the minds of the international community impacted strongly on the 'China' decision.

The President's "autocratic style" (according to one interviewee) regarding this matter is difficult for the researcher to clarify. On the one hand he finally subjected himself to the democratic process and the decision that was arrived at through this democratic process, within the African National Congress, its alliance partners and within the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Trade and Industry and many other departments. Even though the South African Defence Force wanted the status quo to remain, they agreed on economic benefits (arms sales) as the prime basis for foreign policy decision making.

On the other hand, the President, "stubbornly refused" (according to one interviewee), to implement the decisions made by the African National Congress National Executive Council (ANC) around end of 1995. The

numerous recommendations by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the recommendations coming from the groups that went on the fact finding missions was "ignored" (according to another interviewee).

Possibly if one could identify what belief system drives the actions of a leader one could then explain his apparently "erratic" (Kate Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997) behaviour. Van Nieuwkerk and van Wyk, 1989, tackled a similar problem by using Holsti's typology of political beliefs as a framework of analysis. They show that PW Botha displayed a typical B-type foreign policy belief system which was compatible with the realist paradigm and which had consequences for South Africa's foreign policy during his (PW Botha's) term as president of South Africa. They isolated PW Botha's beliefs about the nature of political life and his beliefs about the adversary. This analysis explained why Botha pursued pragmatic foreign policies at the cost of human rights (e.g. destabilisation of the SADC region).

The fact that none of the Rational Actor model, the Organisational Process model, the Bureaucratic Politics model nor the hybrid approach provide a satisfactory framework of analysis led to the development of a different framework of analysis called model Z⁶ for the sake of convenience. The researcher identified the elements of this different framework (model Z) by taking judgement calls based on knowledge of the decision making process on the 'China' decision, the responses of the interviewees, and literature for example Toma and Gorman: 1991; Hilsman et.al.: 1993; and Allison: 1969.

⁶ Model z is not a completely developed theoretical model like the Rational Actor model. It is merely a way of looking at the data that can form the basis of a future model or framework of analysis.

The elements are Model Z's answers to the questions posed by the six themes developed previously in chapter 2.

The different framework of analysis (model Z) is summarised in the following table:

MATRIX 5: MATRIX OF THEMES AND MODEL Z

Themes	Model Z
Nature of governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competing centres of power (e.g. autonomous and competing elite groups) inside and outside of government; public opinion • International opinion or precedent
Basis of decisions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consensus (reached after) consultation, crisis, conflict and debate
Climate or context of decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pressures from a number of competing groups • Minimal role for some institutions (government departments / individuals); greater role for political party structures and allies
Kind of decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level, politically sensitive
Decision tool used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidential decree
Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manager: Different managers at different stages of the process. The President/ presidency decides. (ultimately the buck stops with the President / presidency) <p>Management process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unplanned, iterative, muddling through • Choice and preferences of president / presidency prevails

6.5. Summary

The President overshadowed the decision making process regarding the 'China' decision. The centre for foreign policy making on the 'China' decision was not in the Department of Foreign Affairs but rather in the President's office. The rational actor model / realist paradigm is used by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Trade and Industry and other structures and organisations to arrive at the recommendations. From that point it depended on the President whether he listened to these recommendations which essentially constitute a "lobby".

CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction

This chapter firstly summarises the report and secondly spells out the conclusions the researcher has reached. Chapter one introduces the problem, situates it in its particular context and states the objectives of the research. Besides reviewing the writings of various South Africans on this diplomatic dilemma, the theoretical underpinnings of the research are detailed in chapter two. The three decision-making models described in chapter two are the Rational Actor model, the Organisational Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics model. The researcher develops a proposition from examining the three models and applying it tentatively to the research problem. This proposition is detailed and substantiated in chapter three. The researcher postulates that none of the three theoretical models, on its own, is able to provide an satisfactory framework for analysis of the complex management of the decision making process to switch diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. Therefore the researcher proposes that a combination of the three models, called a hybrid approach, can provide a satisfactory framework of analysis. The research methodology used to examine the problem and 'test' the proposition is case study methodology that is explained in chapter four. Chapter five presents and analysis the data. The views of the fourteen people interviewed are presented as fully as possible in this chapter. Analysis of documents and interviews were used to draw up the chronology that appears in appendix B. The researcher's interpretation of the data

comprises chapter six which leads to the conclusion and additional insights detailed in this chapter.

7.2. The decision making process

Essentially the decision making process was not one complete process. It consisted of two phases. Phase 1 led to the development of a reasonably large consensus on the recommendation. This recommendation was that it was in the national interest of South Africa to transfer diplomatic relations from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. The second process, called Phase 2 by the researcher, led to the announcement on 27th November 1996 and was overshadowed by the personality and leadership style of the President.

In essence the researcher's proposition that a hybrid approach is a satisfactory framework for analysing the decision making process of the decision to switch diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China, was proven false by the data.

7.3. Ideas for future Research

Many unanswered questions remain. Neither models (Rational Actor, Organisational Process, and Bureaucratic Politics) nor the combined (Hybrid) approach explains the timing of the announcement. None of the models or a combined (Hybrid) approach explains the contradictory statements by the President, the "flip-flops" (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996). This is one aspect of the research where the researcher could not find any answers, not even from one of the President's advisors, Mr. Joel Ntshitenze.

It appears that the models and hybrid approach used in this study has important inadequacies. It does not explain how the worldview of a leader like President Mandela impacts on his management of a decision making process. It does not explain how his personal decision making structure work. It does not explain on what basis he makes decisions, nor the belief system underlying his actions.

Therefore a future study need to look at the following questions:

- What will happen to foreign policy making regarding sensitive issues if President Mandela is not in office any more?
- Will the deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, continue to have the same influence on foreign policy making in general?
- In particular, will he continue the practice of making the decision on sensitive issues?
- Will he continue to completely overshadow (at least in the eyes of the public) the minister of foreign affairs?
- In other words, is this research result 'accidental' because of the specific circumstances and the present President's personality?
- Or is this a trend that will continue to characterise South Africa's foreign policy decision making process?

A future study could use the methodology used by van Nieuwkerk and van Wyk (1989), or further develop the framework of analysis called model Z in this study into a new theoretical decision making model. The new model could then be used as a framework of analysis alongside the three traditional ones (The Rational Actor, Organisational Process and Bureaucratic Politics models). These ideas can form the basis of a very interesting study in future.

7.3. Conclusion

The models and approaches utilised, or described in this study, only explain a small percentage of the complexity of managing foreign policy decision making processes. Possibly other models, or development of new ones based on model Z, can be used to develop a deeper understanding of a decision like the 'China' decision. This framework could then be used to explore why President Mandela maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China from the beginning of his term in office in 1994, until December 31st, 1996. It could possibly also explain the suddenness of the announcement of the 'China' decision on 27th November 1996.

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APPENDIX 1 List of open-ended semi-structured questions

1. In terms of South Africa's relations with the People's Republic of China /Republic of China how does the foreign policy decision making process work?
2. Who in your opinion, are the decision makers in this regard?
3. Who prepares the data and information needed to make the decision?
4. What is the structure in the department (reference to organogram and hierarchy). Where are you placed in the structure? What is your role in the decision making process? (for those interviewees within government departmental roles)
5. Who in your opinion influences the decision making process? How is influence exerted?
6. What criteria were used by decision makers in this regard?
 - a. Historical facts/relationships?
 - b. political factors?
 - c. economical benefits for South Africa?
 - d. Trade
 - e. Investment?
 - f. human rights
 - g. loyalty to old friends/ present friends

- h. Strategic (what is your definition of strategic considerations?)
- i. Short term and medium term interests of SA? (Can you identify at least 5 most important criteria you consider to be in the short term and medium term (1996-1999) interest of SA?)
- j. Long term interests of SA? (Can you identify at least the five most important criteria in the long term interest(1999 and beyond) of SA that impact on this decision?
- k. In your opinion, which of the three i.e. short term, medium term or long term criteria, will weigh heaviest in the making of the final decision?
- l. any other criteria that you think is important?

7. How can one characterise the decision making on the 'China' decision? As crisis management / consensus seeking? If so- Why? If not which "term" can be used?

8. Do you think that wide consultation on this matter is necessary? If not Why not? If so, Why? Which interest groups, organisations or individuals not necessarily in government, should be consulted?

9. Do you think that sufficient role players and stakeholder opinions are canvassed (If not, which stakeholders and role players do you think should be included?) Do you think that the inputs from stakeholders and role players will be taken into account to formulate the medium to long term decision?

10. In your view how are long term consequences taken into account in formulating the decision?(?)

11. Are you using a particular tool e.g. decision trees to arrive at the decision?

APPENDIX 2 The relevance of the research questions to the achievement of the research objectives

- to establish who makes foreign policy decisions in 1994-1996 South Africa
- 2. Who in your opinion are the decision makers in this regard?

- to establish who influences foreign policy decisions in 1994-1996 South Africa

3. Who prepares the data and information needed to make the decision?
4. What is the structure in the department (reference to organogram and hierarchy) Where are you placed in the structure? What is your role in the decision making process? (for those interviewees within government departmental roles)

8. Do you think that wide consultation on this matter is necessary? If not Why not? If so, Why? Which interest groups organisations or individuals not necessarily in government should be consulted?

- to establish what decision making process the decision maker/s engage in.
- In terms of SA's relations with the PRC/ROC how does the foreign policy decision making process work?

1. What is the structure in the department (reference to organogram and hierarchy) Where are you placed in the structure? What is your role in the decision making process? (for those interviewees within government departmental roles)

8. Do you think that wide consultation on this matter is necessary? If not Why not? If so, Why? Which interest groups organisations or individuals not necessarily in government should be consulted?

9. Do you think that sufficient role players and stakeholder opinions are canvassed (If not, which stakeholders and role players do you think should be included?) Do you think that the inputs from stakeholders and role players will be taken into account to formulate the medium to long term decision?

11. Are you using a particular tool e.g. decision trees to arrive at the decision?

- to identify on which principle/s the decision makers base the decision
- to identify which priorities drive the decision
- to establish how the tensions between different principles and different priorities impact on South African foreign policy decision making.

6. What criteria is used by the decision makers in this regard?

- a. Historical?
- b. political?
- c. economical-
- d. Trade
- e. Investment?
- f. human rights
- g. loyalty to old friends/ present friends
- h. Strategic (what is your definition of strategic considerations?)
- i. Short term and medium term interests of SA? (Can you identify at least 5 most important criteria you consider to be in the short term, and medium term(1996-1999) interest of SA?)
- j. Long term interests of SA? (Can you identify the at least 5 most important criteria in the long term interest(1999 and beyond) of SA that impact on this decision?)
- k. In your opinion, which of the three i.e. short term, medium term or long term criteria, will weigh heaviest in the making of the final decision?
- l. any other criteria that you think is important?

10. In your view how are long term consequences taken into account in formulating the decision?

APPENDIX 3 List of interviewees

Department of Foreign Affairs

- Mr. Iaan Basson- Acting Director-Department of Foreign Affairs-East Asian Desk,

Date: 29-11-1996

- Mr. Machiel van Niekerk – Deputy Director-Department of Foreign Affairs –East Asian Desk.

Dates: 20-11-1997 and 29 -11- 1997

- Johan Kotze – Deputy Director Department of Foreign Affairs – Latin American Desk

date: 16-01-1997

Department of Trade and Industry

- Key Informant-Kate Kuper-Deputy Director East Asian Desk. Presently Deputy Director Industrial Policy-Department of Trade and Industry.

Date: Friday, 29 November 1997.

- Nitesh Dullabh- Assistant Director-East Asia-responsible for: Republic of China, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Australia etc.

Date: 4-12-1996

Office of the President

Joel Ntshitenze

Position: Presidential advisor and Chief of communications in the office of the President

Date: 26-11-1997

Department of Defence:

Colonel Rocky Williams

Position: Director of the Policy Unit (South African National Defence Force)

Date: 31-11-1997

Provincial Premier

Mr. Matthews Phosa,

Position: Premier of the Mpumalanga Province

Date: 22-03-1997

Parliamentary Portfolio committee on Foreign Affairs

Mr. Raymond Suttner

Position: Chairman: Parliamentary Portfolio committee on Foreign Affairs

Date: 04-12-1996

Parliamentary Portfolio committee on Trade and Industry

Mr. Robert Davies- chairperson of the above mentioned committee.

Date: 18-02-1997

National Executive Council (African National Congress) committee on Foreign Affairs

Mr. Blade Nzimande- chairperson of committee

Date: 03-12-1997

South African Communist Party

Mr. Jeremy Cronin (Secretary of the Central Committee of the SACP)

Date: 05-12-1996

Non Governmental Organisations

Centre for Policy Studies

Mr. Chris Landsberg- Researcher responsible for Foreign Policy Issues

Date: 28-11-1996

P.J. Botha. Asia -Pacific desk ABSA and chairperson East-Asia Society

Date: 13-12-1996

APPENDIX 4: Elements of the decision making models

Rational Actor model

Nature of governance :

T1-1-a united purposive strategists who are rational actors / individuals

T1-1-b no dissent among policy makers

decisions based on:

T2-1-a rational steps:

specification of goals; ranking goals according to priorities; consider all means for reaching objectives

select objective that will maximise goal achievement; full information

T2-1-b national interest / goal is maximisation of economic benefits/security/power

Climate /context of decision

T3-1-a no uncertainty & full information

T3-1-b cultural and ideological differences causes no differences in interpretation

Kind of decision:

T4-1-a Consensus on maximising alternative

Decision tool used:

T5-1-a cost benefit analysis

Management

T6-1-a Manager: combined efforts of rational policy making group

T6-1-b Management process: pre-arranged, strategically planned process

APPENDIX 4 (continued)

Elements of the decision making models

Organisational Process Model

Nature of governance:

T1-2-a conglomerate of loosely allied organisations

T1-2-b standardised individual behaviour

T1-2-c predictable behaviour

T1-2-d bureaucratic nature

Decisions based on:

T2-2-a rules

T2-2-b precedence

Climate/context of decision:

T3-2-a certainty created by standard operating procedures

Kind of decision:

T4-2-a routine

Decision tool used:

T5-2-a standardised rule making

Management

T6-2-a Manager: rulebook

T6-2-b Management of process: standard organisational procedures

APPENDIX 4 (continued)

Elements of the decision making models

Bureaucratic Politics model

Nature of governance:

T1-3-a lack of consensus among bureaucrats

T1-3-b different actors exist

T1-3-c actors with different roles

T1-3-d actors with different power and influence according to position power

T1-3-e hierarchy of power

Decisions based on:

T2-3-a bureaucratic power & influence

Climate / context of decision:

T3-3-a inter departmental conflict

T3-3-b minimal role for external influences from politicians or extra parliamentary groups and "public opinion"

Kind of decision:

T4-3-a deal

Decision tool used:

T5-3-a bargaining

Management

T6-3-a Manager: bureaucrat

T6-3-b Management of process: resultant of bureaucratic politicking

Appendix 5- A Different Framework

Framework Z

Nature of governance:

T1-4-a competing centres of power (e.g. autonomous and competing " elite" groups) inside and outside of government; public opinion

T1-4-b international opinion or precedent

Decisions based on:

T2-4-a Consensus (reached after) consultation, crisis, conflict and debate

T2-4-b information gathering (including information on international precedence)

Climate /context of decision

T3-4-a uncertainty, risk, secrecy & imperfections

T3-4-b pressures from a number of competing interest groups

T3-4-c minimal role for some institutions, some government departments, individuals; greater role for political party structures and allies

Kind of decision:

T4-4-high level, politically sensitive

Decision tool used:

T5-4-a Presidential decree

Management:

T6-4-a Manager: different managers at different stages of the process but President / presidency decides ultimately.

Management process: -

T6-4-b Unplanned, iterative, muddling through

T6-4-bb choice and preferences of president/ presidency prevails

APPENDIX 6- ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS / THEMES

Th/ Int	I-1	I-2	I-3	I-4	I-5	I-6	I-7	I-8	I-9	I10	I11	I12	I13	I14
T1-1-a														
T1-1-b	X												X	
T2-1-a														
T2-1-b	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
T3-1-a			X		X									X
T3-1-b													X	
T4-1-a		X	X							X	X		X	X
T5-1-a	X						X				X			
T6-1-a														
T6-1-b														
T1-2-a														
T1-2-a														
T1-2-b														
T1-2-c														
T1-2-DFA														
T2-2-a														
T2-2-b														
T3-2-a														
T4-2-a														
T5-2-a														
T6-2-a														
T6-2-b														
T1-3-a		X	X			X	X							
T1-3-b	X	X												

	I-1	I-2	I-3	I-4	I-5	I-6	I-7	I-8	I-9	I-10	I-11	I-12	I-13	I-14
T1-3-c	X	X	X											
T1-3-d	X	X	X											
T1-3-e	X											X		
T2-3-a														
T3-3-a	X	X						X				X		
T3-3-b			X									X		X
T4-3-a														
T5-3-a														
T6-3-a														
T6-3-b														

APPENDIX 7 – Model Z

Th/ Int	I-1	I-2	I-3	I-4	I-5	I-6	I-7	I-8	I-9	I10	I11	I12	I13	I14
T1-4-a	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X		
T1-4-b	X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	
T2-4-a	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X
T2-4-b	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
T3-4-a	X	X	X	X			X		X		X			
T3-4-b	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X		
T3-4-c	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		
T4-4-a						X				X		X	X	
T5-4-a	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
T6-4-a	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X
T6-4-b	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X			
T6-4-bb	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X

APPENDIX 8: THE SIX THEMES MATCHED TO THE SECONDARY OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

- establish who makes foreign policy decisions in 1994-1996 South Africa
- Management: manager and management process-Theme 6
- establish who influences foreign policy decisions in 1994-1996 South Africa
- Basis of decisions – Theme 2
- Decision tool used-Theme 5
- establish what decision making process the decision maker/s engage in
- Basis of decisions-Theme 2
- Climate / Context of decision-Theme 3
- Kind of Decision-Theme 4
- Identify on which principle/s the decision makers base the decision
- Nature of governance-Theme 1
- Basis of decisions-Theme 2
- Management- Theme 6
- identify which and whose priorities drive the decision
- Nature of governance-Theme 1
- Basis of decisions-Theme 2
- Management- Theme 6
- establish the impact of the tensions between different principles and priorities on South African foreign policy decision making.
- Climate / Context of decision-Theme 3
- Basis of decisions-Theme 2
- Kind of Decision-Theme 4

APPENDIX 9: CHRONOLOGY

Date:	Event
1895/05/25	Local population on island of Formosa (Taiwan) resist Japanese takeover and declare independence after the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed by Japan and the Qing court (who were the rulers of all of China at the time) on the cession of Taiwan to Japan and declare an independent Republic of Taiwan
1895/10	Japanese suppress the resistance by the people on Taiwan and the Republic of Taiwan went out of existence
1943/12/01	Cairo declaration: Issued by China, the USA and the UK, stating that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914 and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu) shall be restored to China
1945/07/26	Potsdam declaration signed by China, the US and the UK- adhered to by the Soviet Union, reiterated that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out
1945/10/25	The ceremony for accepting the Japanese surrender to the allied powers. From this day forward Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago had again been incorporated formally into the territory of China and the territory, people and administration had been placed under the Sovereignty of China.
1953	First African National Congress delegation to PRC Led by Walter Sisulu (Yang:1997,p.4)
1960's	First groups of ANC recruits sent to PRC for military training
1960's	Sino-Soviet disputes impact on PRC ANC & SACP relationship. Leads to break in ANC & SACP relations with PRC (Yang:1997,p.4)
1968	Apartheid South Africa-Taiwan contact-establish consulates in each other's countries
1971	People's Republic of China recognised as only legal government for all of China by UN (UN resolution 2758 of 1971)
1976	South Africa-Republic of China diplomatic recognition
1979	USA de-recognises Taiwan
1986	Visit of Nzo to Beijing as ANC official
1989	Visit of Nzo to Beijing as ANC official
1989	Pik Botha then South Africa's minister of Foreign Affairs starts dialogue with PRC
1991	Negotiations between South Africa -People's Republic of China re Unofficial Missions to be opened; called Study Centres

1992/03	Opening of the South African Centre of Chinese studies-Beijing
1992/03	Pik Botha visit to Taipei
1994/03/27	Election for new South Africa government –ANC elected ruling party
1994/03/27	Inauguration of President Mandela ROC official delegation led by president Lee PRC low level unofficial delegation attends
1995/05	SACP decision taken that South Africa must recognise the PRC
1995/11	National Executive Committee (ANC) decision that South Africa must recognise the PRC
1995/12	National Executive Committee (ANC), request government to dispatch a delegation to China (PRC) "as soon as possible"
1996/01/20	Meeting held at home of deputy president Thabo Mbeki attended by top management of Department of Foreign Affairs and Thabo Mbeki, decided in principle to initiate negotiations on recognition with the People's Republic of China. The target date for recognition of the PRC set at this meeting was before 01-07-1997 [the Hong Kong hand over deadline]
1996/01/25	Courtesy call by Mr. Gu Xinger (new Director of Chinese Centre for South African Studies) to deputy minister Pahad
1996/02/03	Ji Peidong (PRC Assistant Minister for Africa and Middle East) stated that "South Africa already having a semi-official mission in Beijing, would not be allowed to have another semi-official mission in China [referring to the Hong Kong South African consulate]
1996/02/06 to 1996/02/07	DDG of Department of Trade and Industry, M. G. Breyl and Ms. Kate Kuper visit Beijing to discuss the contents of the proposed exchange of notes establishing an MFN agreement between South Africa and People's Republic of China.
1996/02/12 to 1996/02/17	Visit of People's Republic of China's Gu Xinger to South Africa. Meets with Rev. Frank Chikane, Zola Sweyiya, Alfred Nzo
1996/02/23	President Mandela hosts dinner for PRC's Gu Xinger in Cape Town. Other guests include R. Suttner, representatives from Cosatu and the SACP Gu Xinger makes following statement "a person should not be judged by his words, but by his actions."
1996/03/07	President Mandela informs various political institutions and trade unions that he will send a team to China to investigate the situation. This team will have a mandate to discuss breaking relations with either sides. Discussion will be on how to overcome the problem of having diplomatic relations with both Chinas. Communication received from Beijing mission advising Department of Foreign Affairs not to schedule Minister Nzo's visit to Beijing at

	the time when Taiwan is having their presidential elections.
1996/03/12 to 1996/03/20	SACP delegation visit Beijing led by general secretary of the SACP Mr. Charles Ngakula, others in delegation Arnold Stofile, Kay Moonsamy, Philip Dexter, Arthur Botha
1996/03/15	SACP delegation to Beijing met President and General secretary of the CPC, Mr. Jiang Zemin. A party to party meeting between SACP and CPC.
1996/03/23 to 1996/03/26	Presidential delegation to PRC led by Minister Nzo (Department of Foreign Affairs).
1996/03	Planning for Madame Wu's visit to South Africa during April 1996 and May 1996 Request received by Department of Foreign Affairs via mission in Beijing from De Beers and Nedbank, SAB and other companies, who wish to host Madame Wu during her visit to South Africa.
1996/04/28	Mandela discussed switching to PRC with Dr. Boutros Boutros-Gali (DFA document)
1996/04/29	Courtesy call on Min. Nzo by Madame Wu (PRC -Min. of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation)
1996/04/30	Meeting of Madame Wu Yi & President Mandela
1996/06/11	Aide Memoir to protest against PRC nuclear test on 7/6/1997 Handed to Mr. Gu, Xin'er, Director of the Chinese Centre in Pretoria by Ms. T.E. Mazibuko(DDG-DFA)
1996/07/04	Mandela press conference with French journalists during this week Where he announced that South Africa will not break ties with Republic of China
1996/07/04	Request for clarification of the statement attributed to pres. Mandela at a press briefing to French journalists that South Africa would not sacrifice its diplomatic relations with Taipei
1996/08/26 to 1996/09/03	ROC Trade and Investment Mission to South Africa -led by Vice -Premier Hsu Li-The
1996/06/30 to 1996/07/02	Presidential delegation to ROC led by Minister Nzo (Department of Foreign Affairs document).
1996/08/26	Mandela stated to media that South Africa will not break ties with Taiwan
1996/09/02	PRC Reaction to Mandela press statement on staying with Taiwan Made by Mr. Shen Guofang the PRC foreign ministry's press spokesman
1996	Invitation to chairman of Armscor and chief of SAAF by Mr. Wang Dawei, Vice-President of the China National Aero-Technological

	Import and Export Corporation
1996/09/20 to 1996/09/29	Xinhua News Agency send important delegation to South Africa to inspect Xinhua offices in Jhb, and interact with important South African news agencies
1997/04	Planned visit to PRC by western cape province led by premier kriel

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