The Impact of Migration on Emnambithi Households:
A Class and Gender Analysis

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A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Johannesburg, 2009

Abstract

This dissertation is a study of social reproduction in different classes of migrant households in Emnambithi, a town in northern KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. It traces the history of households in this community under the impact of racialised dispossession and migration, and illustrates how households were stratified into distinct classes. The three classes identified are a semi-professional, educated class, a migratory working class, and the marginalised, a segment of the "bantustan" population who never had the possibility of working in the capitalist economy during apartheid. The research then focuses on the gendered nature of social reproduction in households in the post-apartheid era, when this community continues to be shaped by migration. The research illustrates that class-based advantage and disadvantage are reproduced in post-apartheid South Africa. The dissertation analyses the different ways in which household members – predominantly migrant and resident women – deal with daily provisioning and consumption, education and care of the dependants of migrants in the absence of some members of the household. The study argues that social reproduction varies significantly in different classes of households. The class-based and gendered nature of social reproduction has implications for an understanding of developmental needs in post-apartheid South Africa, and this research opens up ways in which job creation and social policies could lead to class-based redress and gender equity.

Keywords: care, class, gender, households, marginalised, migration, racialised dispossession, social reproduction, work, working class

Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university.

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Khayaat Fakier

_____ day of _____, 2009

Acknowledgements

The four years I have spent on this dissertation is the most recent period in the ten years I have spent on tertiary education. In mid-1999 I joined the Sociology of Work Unit (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand as an administrator. Soon thereafter – in 2000 – I started studying towards an undergraduate degree. Over the last decade I have been fortunate to have the support and encouragement of my colleagues, friends and family. This space is inadequate to acknowledge them fully.

SWOP, which is now the Society, Work and Development Institute, continues to provide me with a supportive intellectual space within which to raise and test my ideas, through teaching and research, but also with colleagues who have contributed greatly to my intellectual development. Eddie Webster, Sakhela Buhlungu, Andries Bezuidenhout, Karl von Holdt, Jackie Cock, Anthea Metcalfe, Shameen Govender and Christine Bischoff have all contributed to the development of SWOP as a mentoring space. First, I would like to acknowledge my gratitude and respect for my supervisor, teacher and mentor, Eddie Webster. His unstinting generosity with time, ideas, resources and encouragement is an example for all of us to actively shape the academy with collegiality, passion and respect. Eddie's belief that I could juggle my academic endeavours with my other roles was affirming and strengthened my resolve to complete this project successfully.

Sakhela Buhlungu played an important role in encouraging me to continue my postgraduate studies at times when my energy and enthusiasm flagged. Andries Bezuidenhout first introduced me to Emnambithi. I am also grateful for his and Karl's supportive and critical comments of my work. Shameen Govender was wonderful and patient in making arrangements for my research trips and "holding the fort" while I was away. Jackie Cock deserves special mention for her guidance, the reading and writing we shared, and her support for my project. Through our involvement in SWOP, Anthea Metcalfe and I have become great

My parents, Omar and Magdia Fakier, provided amazing support by believing in me, teaching me from a young age to voice my opinion and being available whenever my children and I needed them. To my siblings and friends, I am thankful for their patience with my neglect and absence at many social events.

To Ameen and Ilhaam Bardien, my children, I am grateful that they accepted in good spirit the long periods I spent away from home and on writing my dissertation. I thank them also for keeping me grounded and "forcing" me to watch silly movies with them. Finally, I thank my partner, Ganief Bardien, for the space to love, talk, challenge, grow and be with each other.

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List of Abbreviations

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
CARs	Capital, Assets and Resources [approach]
CIAC	Crime Information Analysis Centre
COPE	Congress of the People [a political party]
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
COTP	Choice on Termination of Pregnancy [Act]
CPRC	Chronic Poverty Research Centre [Manchester, UK]
CSG	Child Support Grant
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa [later renamed SACP]
CSSR	Centre for Social Science Research
CWC	Core Working Class [Seekings and Nattrass 2006]
CWP	Community Works Programme
DG	Disability Grant
DITSELA	Development Institute for Training, Support and Education for Labour
DoL	Department of Labour
DMA	District Managed Area
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution [strategy]
GLU	Global Labour University
HBC	Home-based Carer
HEARD	Health Economics and HIV/AIDS Research Division
HETUS	Harmonized European Time Use Survey
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IC	Intermediate Class [Seekings and Nattrass 2006]

ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IILS	International Institute for Labour Studies
ILO	International Labour Organisation
KFC	KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
MAWU	Metal and Allied Workers Union
MWC	Marginal Working Class [Seekings and Nattrass 2006]
NREG	National Rural Employment Guarantee [India]
OAP	Old Age Pension
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PCAS	Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RIDP	Regional Industrial Development Programme
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SABT	South African Bantu Trust
SACP	South African Communist Party [previously CPSA]
SACTWU	South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADT	South African Development Trust
SANRAL	South African National Roads Agency Limited
SANT	South African Native Trust
SAPS	South African Police Services
SASSA	South African Social Security Agency
SER	Standard Employment Relationship
SPC	Semi-professional Class [Seekings and Nattrass 2006]
SPP	Surplus Peoples Project
STC	Short-term Contract [worker]
SWOP	Society, Work and Development Institute [formerly Sociology of Work Unit], University of the Witwatersrand
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign
UC	Upper Class [Seekings and Nattrass 2006]

UCT	University of Cape Town
UDF	United Democratic Front
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USA	United States of America

Preface

"Moving Away" – Class and Social Reproduction in Migrant Households

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Vignette: Moving Away

On the first day of May 2008, Nelisiwe Shezi[1] and her daughter, Londi moved into a two-bedroom townhouse in the centre of Ladysmith, a town situated in Emnambithi municipality.[2] For the two women, this day was an important occasion. The five years that Londi had spent studying and working towards her nursing qualification in Johannesburg culminated in this moment, when she was able to secure a bank loan to pay for their new home. However, the two women were also saddened at the loss of the ties with the nine-member household that they had left behind in Peacetown. They were both aware that when Londi returned to her job at a hospital in Johannesburg, Nelisiwe would be on her own, longing for her daughter's visits home.

The decision of Nelisiwe and Londi to start up a new household was not made easily. The death of Londi's grandmother, or *gogo,* as grandmothers are colloquially referred to in South Africa, "made me think a lot", according to Nelisiwe. On the death of her mother-in-law, all responsibility for the funeral fell on her and Londi's shoulders. She was disturbed that Gogo Shezi's children and grandchildren "grabbed some of the funeral money" for their own use. She felt that the burden that Gogo carried was too big. "Gogo Shezi only had her church and then she died. . . . She was too old, but they asked her for everything.[3] It made her so sad and tired. I can't do that, or they would ask Londi. That's when I knew we had to move away."

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[1] With reference to all household interviews cited in this study, pseudonyms are used and the identities of households are obscured.

[2] This vignette draws on interviews conducted with Nelisiwe, Londi and Gogo Shezi conducted on 14 March and 7 November 2007 and 26 May and 11 September 2008. See Appendix One for a full list of all interviews conducted.

[3] When I interviewed *Gogo* Shezi in March 2007, she expressed a similar sentiment. "*Cela Gogo,* always *cela Gogo,*" [Ask Gogo, always ask Gogo] was her response when I asked her what her unemployed children did if they needed anything (Interview: *Gogo* Shezi, 14 March 2007; Interview: Neli Shezi, 26 May 2008).

Research Topic and Questions

The extract above illustrates the main research questions addressed in this dissertation – an examination of the importance of class in social reproduction of migrant households in Emnambithi, a municipal area in northern KwaZulu-Natal. The occupations, incomes and physical infrastructure of the townships where all members of the Shezi household resided were considered in locating this household in the working-class category of households. Londi and her mother were poised to secure their position as members of the semi-professional class, while the "abandoned" household is relegated to the marginalised class. However, the decision to break away from their previous household was not only motivated by a desire to preserve and extend Londi and Nelisiwe's material resources, it was also a break from the burden of social reproduction that rested so heavily on the shoulders of Gogo Shezi.

The conditions of social reproduction in the Shezi's working-class household were such that the *maintenance* (daily survival) of household members took precedence over the *renewal* (the care of younger, older, and physically and mentally dependant members) of the household. Nelisiwe hopes that their new home will provide an ideal environment in which she and her daughter can not only maintain their daily needs, but also care for their physical, psychological, emotional and developmental needs. In their new household, the gendered expectation of domesticity is also transformed. When Gogo Shezi was alive, household responsibilities, such as procuring and distributing its scarce resources, were hers, while younger members of the household easily trampled on her authority when her decisions did not suit them. Nelisiwe and Londi hope to contain the reproductive responsibility of their household within its boundaries. Thus, unlike working-class and marginalised households that rely on support from other households, they hope to secure and rely on their own resources. Similar to Gogo Shezi, they realise that they cannot always rely on other members of the household to find firewood, collect water and travel the long distances on foot and by minibus taxi to procure their daily needs. That is, the *physical infrastructure*

and location of their home is as important a determinant of their class location as *income* and *occupation*.

It is indisputable that this move was made possible by the fact that Londi's occupation as a nurse provided adequate income to secure a house in an area where running water, electricity, and safe and adequate public transport to nearby schools and shops make daily living so much easier. Nelisiwe's decision was made easier by the fact that her daughter was educated and worked as a nurse, and that she could not bear that the excessive demands placed on them would cancel out the benefits of Londi's education. Thus, education is an important factor in ensuring the stability, and possible upward mobility, of working-class migrant households.

In order to investigate whether class matters in the social reproduction of migrant households, it was necessary to compare class locations, social reproduction and migration in many households. As suggested above, indicators of the class location of households were occupation, income, and the physical infrastructure and location of the homes. These indicators formed a subset of questions of the dissertation and provide a basis for a discussion of the conditions of social reproduction. Another subset of questions framed the discussion of social reproduction – daily renewal and maintenance, the practice of domesticity and containment within household boundaries.

Intellectual Departure and Rationale of the Dissertation

While internationally the literature on migration has addressed the feminisation of migration, the class locations of migrants have been ignored. In an analysis of household surveys in South Africa for the period 1993–1999, Posel and Casale (2003) found that by 1999 an estimated 34 per cent of African[4] migrant workers in

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[4] In South Africa, distinctions are made between Africans (of indigenous origin), whites (descended from Dutch, British, Portuguese and other settlers), coloureds (of mixed origin), and Asians (primarily of Indian and Pakistani descent). Currently, their shares of the population

South Africa were women. A report titled *A Nation in the Making: A Discussion Document on Macro Social Trends in South Africa*, released by the Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), an advisory body located in the Presidency, demonstrated the socio-economic effects of internal migration on South African society. The report stated, "… between 1992 and 1996, many more men than women migrated while by 2001 the number of male migrants was just marginally more than that of women" (PCAS 2006: 56). The report stated that provinces such as Gauteng and Western Cape were the recipients of migrants, with Johannesburg the main destination site for internal migrants. Children between the age of 5 and 19 tended to be sent back to their sites of origin to be taken care of while they were of school-going age (PCAS 2006).

These trends in migration are assumed in conventional literature to have serious negative effects on the originating and receiving sites of migration as increased pressure is put on settlements in urban areas (Kitaho and Landau 2006; Landau 2006), while already depressed social, community and traditional systems supported by older women at the sites of origin experience additional pressure (PCAS 2006). The increased movement of women to areas of higher productivity is thus summarily linked to an increase in crime, juvenile delinquency, HIV/AIDS, rural and urban decay; and moral breakdown in general. This leap in logic flows from the assumption that women are primarily, often solely, responsible for care as caretakers, cleaners, providing services for men and meeting basic human needs (Nakano Glenn 1992; Peck 1996; Hochschild 2003).

In the context of the European Union, Schwenken (2008) argues that there are two distinct discourses about women migrants. The term "beautiful victims" depicts a perspective of women as forced migrants or trafficked women, presented as eroticised helpless victims at the hands of evil male traffickers. "Sacrificing heroines" describes the view that women migrants are heroic, women who

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comprise 79 per cent, 9.6 per cent, 8.9 per cent and 2.5 per cent respectively. The Population Registration Act of 1950, in terms of which South Africans were classified according to population group, built on popular racial classifications and formalised these into rigid racial categories. Historically, labour market segmentation followed these categories, with coloureds in more skilled categories than Africans (Webster 1985). The Population Registration Act was repealed in 1991.

migrate on their own initiative and who remit home much more regularly and unselfishly than men, who tend be more self-interested and business-oriented in spending their money. Neither of these views, Schwenken suggests, provide an unbiased view of female migration. While women migrate on their own accord, individualised images of victims or heroines ignore the support and mutual reliance between the migrant and her networks and the household of origin. That is, heroic migrants are often supported by a strong network stretching between home and destination which makes her agency possible. At the same time, trafficked victims are studied in contrast to the men in the sex network, while women working in these networks as the agents of sex work are ignored.

Casting women migrants in these dichotomous roles of victim and heroine, Schwenken (2008) argues, ignores what their migrations have in common – the expropriation of labour, which capitalises on the distinct ways in which we view the migration of women. As a result, while gender-based organisations focus on migrant women as women – that is, on their gender – the conditions under which they work are neglected. Thus, the opportunity to combine the interest of, for example, migrant domestic workers with that of men migrants working under forced conditions in construction and the slaughterhouses of the European Union (EU), is lost.

Globally and locally the study of migration has focused on women migrant workers as victims who end up in low- or semi-skilled positions taking care of the gendered responsibilities of women of a higher class at destination sites (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). An exception to this literature is a South African study of women migrants from Phokeng to Johannesburg "for their own purposes" (Bozzoli and Nkotsoe 1991: 97). This study focused on the agency used by women drawing on their social resources to find work as domestic workers and to establish households of their own. In the context of contemporary South Africa – where since the mid-1960s opportunities for occupational mobility have increased for Africans, including women (Crankshaw 1994) – this study will

make an important contribution to current knowledge of the continued expansion of migration.

This dissertation demonstrates how semi-professional migrants maintain their class position and improve conditions for their households of origin through migration to Johannesburg. Similarly, the dissertation also focuses on the households of those primarily occupied in full-time semi-skilled or unskilled labour in Emnambithi and Johannesburg. However, the post-apartheid workplace is characterised by massive insecurity, as work restructuring has led to increased job losses and changes to the working conditions and contractual arrangements of workers (Webster and Von Holdt 2005). As a result, Barchiesi (2005) argues that wages are merely one of the forms of income on which working-class households are able to draw. This dissertation also focuses on the various forms of income and support the households of working people rely on to ensure their survival and renewal.

In addition to studying the impact of migration on semi-professional and working-class households, the dissertation examines the strategies and impact of migration by the "unemployed" or those commonly assumed to be the "underclass" (Wilson 1987, 1993; Murray 1990; Seekings 2003; Seekings and Nattrass 2006). This dissertation argues that the unemployed are actively trying to secure their livelihoods, albeit "outside the circuits of capital" or formal market relations (Sanyal and Battercharaya 2009: 37). I use the term "marginalised" to depict the historic and structural marginalisation of large numbers of people in the process of proletarianisation in South Africa.

While the research confirms the common-sense expectation that migration is more successful for semi-professional persons than for the working class and the marginalised, the conditions of social reproduction vary in the different classes of households. Drawing on literature on social reproduction by Bakker and Gill (2003) and Bezanson and Luxton (2006) I examine the impact of migration on social reproduction. While the research addresses long-standing concerns of the

impact of migration on children of absent fathers, it includes a focus on mother-child relationships as well as those between migrants and their parents.

The absence of women in households of origin does not necessarily lead to the disintegration of the household. For example, in a study of the households of women migrants in the Philippines, Parrenas (2003) demonstrates that some migrant mothers retain close bonds with their children and are perceived by them as both good providers and nurturers of their physical and emotional needs. She argues that the household is an adaptive unit, responsive to external forces, and whose members can cope with migration even if it requires "tremendous sacrifices" (Parrenas 2003: 51). In the light of such sacrifices – children growing up without their mothers, elderly parents bidding farewell to their grown daughters at a time when they rely on them for sustenance and wives absent from their husbands for long periods of time – a call for the return of women to their households is not the solution. Such a response would reinforce gender inequity inherent in the over-reliance on women in the household – that is the gendered ideology of domesticity (Parrenas 2008). Instead she suggests that additional research on households of origin is required to ensure that communities are able to cope with the special needs of migrant households.

Research on households in South Africa has become increasingly important for local policy makers as they have come to realise that social welfare payouts contribute not only to the livelihoods of individuals, but to that of entire households (Posel 2003b). However, Posel (2003b) argues that the size, nature and needs of households which are most in need of social support are also the most difficult to determine because of the fluidity that labour migration brings to households in urban and rural settings. This lack of information on the impact of migration on the households of origin is apparent in the census and household surveys.

The central statistics organisation in South Africa, Statistics South Africa, defines a household as:

a person, or group of persons, who occupy a common dwelling unit for at least four days in a week, and who provide themselves with food and other essentials for living. Basically, they live together as a unit. People who occupy the same dwelling unit, but who do not share food or other essentials are regarded as separate households. For example, people who share a dwelling unit, but who buy food separately and generally provide for themselves separately, are regarded as separate households. By this definition, live-in domestic workers who live in the same structure as their employers are usually separate households.

Conversely, a household may occupy more than one structure. If in the one plot or area persons eat together but sleep in separate structures (e.g. a room in a building at the back of the house for single young male members of a family), all these members should still be treated as one household. This arrangement is common in some rural areas where a cluster of huts or rondavels will often make up one dwelling unit (Statistics South Africa 2002: 50).

Posel and Casale (2003: 457) argue that if we focus only on those "who are normally resident in the household for at least four days of the previous week, [statistics exclude] migrant household members from their households of origin". This flaw does not only lead to an understatement of migrants in policy documents, but also an underestimation of their impact on their households of origin. The gap in policy makers' understanding of households points towards the need to reconceptualise a definition of households to include members, activities, obligations and links that transcend the physical structure of one house. The urban and rural working poor extend their network of relations beyond the walls of their homes, often spanning the rural-urban divide in order to boost reproductive needs – such as child care and nursing the sick – that the urban community is not able to sustain (Bezuidenhout and Fakier 2006).

This dissertation views the household as the unit responsible for basic and reproductive needs, where different kinds of "income" are pooled and redistributed in order to provide for these needs. Smith and Wallerstein (1992: 13) define the household as:

> … the social unit that effectively over long periods of time enables individuals, of varying ages of both sexes, to pool income coming from multiple sources in order to ensure their individual and collective

reproduction and well-being. We shall call the multiple processes by which they pool income, allocate tasks and make collective decision 'householding'.

This definition moves away from the common conception of a nuclear family to include the members who are not kin and/or do not necessarily reside in the same house, and therefore highlights the set of mutual obligations that characterises the household.

The household provides a "site of stability" for the poor in that it is a safe environment in which members of the working class can recuperate and restore themselves for their working conditions (Mosoetsa 2005). However, Mosoetsa (2005) also demonstrates that the stability of households should not be taken for granted, as households do not always operate as harmonious socio-economic entities. The stability of households is fragile when the pressures of a liberalising economy on household members generate gender and generational conflicts. Thus we need to reconceptualise the household as a flexible unit that is shaped by its context and without whose existence we cannot fully comprehend the activities of women and men in the labour market. "Flexible" households are those households which are most able to invest in non-wage activities, as they can increase their income by autonomously engaging in non-wage activities (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout 2008).

While it is important, especially in the South African context, to go beyond the notion of nuclear families and households, Smith and Wallerstein's (1992) definition of the household is also contestable as it provides an economistic view of the household. Mosoetsa (2005) argues that in studying households one needs to go beyond what is assumed to be "natural". She illustrates that not all households are homogeneous, and that while the household provides stability, that stability is fragile as it is subject to gendered and age-based power relations. In this way she collapses the notion (implicit in Smith and Wallerstein's definition) that household members work together harmoniously for the benefit of all.

Household decision making does not always follow the principles of economic rationality implicit in Smith and Wallerstein's definition of the household (Martin and Beittel 1987). Instead, the principles of reciprocity and redistribution that characterise resource allocation are *social* mechanisms rooted in kinship and community relations. While households may encompass family or kin, they should not be associated with kinship relations only. Yet, the presumption that all households are composed of patriarchal families persists as male-headed nuclear households are assumed to be a "characteristic of modernity, at the very pinnacle of the development process" (Baylies 1996: 76). Women-headed households constituted one-fifth of households world-wide at the end of the twentieth century (Chant 1998: 6), but they are still considered unnatural and symptomatic of "family breakdown" or "family crisis" (Baylies 1996: 76). The connection between single motherhood and social breakdown is so prevalent that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its 1994 Human Development Report, presented statistics on single-parent families alongside that of homicides and juvenile prisoners in a table titled *Weakening Social Fabric* (Moore 1994).

Households in South Africa, especially those of African families, have rarely conformed to the usual understanding of modern families. That is, instead of moving towards male-headed nuclear households, female-headed households are increasing alongside a decrease in the number of women who are getting married. Casale and Posel 2002: 176-80) state that the percentage of women of working age who are married had fallen from 38.7 per cent in 1995 to 34.5 per cent in 1999. While a decline in marriage was observed for all women of all age groups, the largest decline was among African women between the ages of 25 and 34 years. At the same time they observe that the proportion of female-headed households increased from 26 per cent in 1995 to 32 per cent in 1999 (Casale and Posel 2002: 177).

In previous research in Emnambithi with workers at Defy, a white goods factory, I identified a dual system of employment (Fakier 2005). Defy employed full-time workers whose conditions and wages were defined by the Standard Employment

Relationship (SER) alongside non-SER workers who worked on a contractual basis, also known as short-term contract workers (STCs). I showed that the search for security extends beyond the workplace to their households and their communities. In the household of STCs, livelihoods are made more secure by the important contribution made by older members, not only through the monetary assistance of their pension grants but also through the vital care they provide. This research also suggested that the dependence of households on their older members increases the potential vulnerability of the households, as these members are bound to need more care than they can provide as they become more frail.

The extended notion of the household does not only shed light on the additional financial and emotional support that flows into and within the household but also illustrates how one household contributes to the livelihoods of other equally – or even more – impoverished households. In this instance, Smith and Wallerstein's (1992) definition of household is held to be closer to the South African context. They show that more flexible households are much better equipped to secure their livelihoods. Yet, the household can only provide, as Mosoetsa (2005) suggests, a fragile stability and workers turn to social resources to improve their security. The livelihoods approach that includes the community as another important arena where workers secure their livelihoods is a challenge to Smith and Wallerstein's approach, which confines income and distribution to the household only. Workers and households draw on emotional and material support in their community to counter the insecurity they experience (Fakier 2005, 2006). In this instance, working people display a greater commitment to improve the conditions in their community, because they realise the threat to their material and physical security. The integration of community resources with work-based resources is what Polanyi (1957) called the "re-embedding of society in the market".

Methodology and Research Strategy

In this dissertation I have reconceptualised "the household" as:

- the primary site of social reproduction;

- a social unit where income is pooled and redistributed;
- a place where members provide and draw on non-material support for themselves and their communities; as well as
- a unit which is characterised by the temporary absence of some of its members.

This reconceptualisation has shaped the research methods and strategy of the research.

The research site Emnambithi, situated in the northern part of KwaZulu-Natal, was chosen because of my familiarity with the site. Because of previous research in the area, it was easy to re-insert myself as a researcher in this community. Furthermore, my previous research suggested a high rate of migration from this town to Johannesburg (Fakier 2005; Webster, *et al.* 2008). Emnambithi, re-demarcated and renamed officially in 2000, is a post-apartheid configuration. It comprises several entities: the town of Ladysmith, which was designated for white occupation only during the apartheid years; "black spots" (black-owned land in areas designated for white occupation), which were the focus of massive forced removals in the 1980s; an erstwhile "border" area where industry was created during apartheid so that businesses could benefit from state-provided subsidies, low wages and poor working conditions; townships of the erstwhile KwaZulu bantustan; and townships designated for occupation by coloureds and Indians. In Chapter Two I present a social history of Emnambithi. At this point, however, it is important to note that the high preponderance of cyclical or temporary migration was a major feature of social life in the KwaZulu bantustan. Since 2000, with the inclusion of previously underdeveloped areas into the new municipality, the dissolution of incentives to "border" industries and increased demands for equitable public service delivery, migration to urban centres with greater opportunities for employment has increased.

I have chosen one particular research site, or sending community, for this study of the relationship of migration to class and social reproduction, in order to fully explore the socio-historical context in which one community of households makes

a living and reproduces, and also understands their own biographies in relation to the history of their community. Thus in Chapter Two, I draw on a number of secondary and historical sources to sketch a social history of Emnambithi as it unfolded under the impact of colonial administration, apartheid rule and the force of land and labour legislation which combined to give rise to class formation and migration.

The extended case method

This study, an ethnography of class and social reproduction, is informed by a reflexive ethnography or the extended case method developed by Michael Burawoy (1998, 2003) in response to the critique by positivist scientists that the ethnographic approach is not scientific. Positivists suggest that case study methods do not expand theory as their findings emerge from particular cases or instances and can, therefore, not be generalised. However, Burawoy argues that the extended case method can contribute to theory if the method, the data and the theory reflect on each other at all times. In practice, the extended case method entails four concurrent and interrelated extensions on the part of a researcher. My research method will be described in terms of these four extensions.

Extending oneself into the world of the participant refers to the processes of interviews and observation of the participants of the study. I conducted a total of 117 interviews:

- 89 interviews with members of 23 different households in Emnambithi;
- 15 interviews with migrants in Johannesburg;
- 2 group interviews; and
- 11 interviews with local officials in Emnambithi – eight with local municipal officials, one with a member of the local historical society, and two with a local traditional leader, Chief Kaleni.

See Appendix One for a detailed list of interviews conducted.

In addition, I cite the material of three interviews I conducted in 2005 for a study in this area. The interview material, which provided insight into the perspective of participants, was elaborated by observation in the community and households of participants. The purpose of observation was to corroborate or elaborate the interview material as well as to point out contradictions between participants' declarations and reality. Observation provided a three-tiered perspective of the social world of the respondents – observing what respondents said, what they did and finally how they explained what they did (Malinowski 1944).

Most of the interviews were conducted in Zulu, which required the assistance of a translator, who also worked with me to arrange interviews. Ms Gugu Malinga, an Emnambithi resident, did a wonderful job of assisting me in this manner. While I was observant of the social conduct required in Zulu households – for example, it is considered respectful to look down when addressing an older man – I was also careful in how I conducted myself with, or "treated", Gugu. On return visits, participants commented on the way I approached my work with Gugu as a learning process and that she was treated as a knowledgeable person who had much to teach me. The consistency, mutual trust and respect of our interaction ensured the participation of many of the interviewees in the research.

In order to find households where migration existed, snowball sampling was used. Two "insiders"[5] of Emnambithi assisted greatly in discovering interviewees with households for the study (Albert 2008). In addition to Gugu Malinga, Mrs Elizabeth Hlatswayo – a retired nurse and volunteer organiser of home-based care – arranged access to households of migrant nurses in Ezakheni E-section. Mam Lizzy, who had assisted me with previous research in Emnambithi, was a valuable guide in getting to know the history of this particular residential area where she has lived and worked for more than 60 years.

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[5] Albert (2008) argues that drawing on the tacit knowledge and understanding of "insiders" (i.e., residents of a community) enhances a contextually sensitive understanding of a research site when a researcher is able to supplement fieldwork with historical and theoretical sources.

Secondly, *extending my observations and interviews over time and space* meant becoming familiar with the research setting and developing an understanding of how things change in a community. This provided a more than a static view of one particular community in contemporary South Africa.

On a practical level, this extension required "revisits" and research into the history of local politics. For the latter purpose, I had several interviews with local municipal officials in the municipal departments of Local Economic Development, Education and Social Development (see Appendix One). The "revisit" is a technique whereby the same participants (household members or officials) are interviewed and observed at different points in time (Burawoy 2003). Visits and revisits were conducted over a period of four years, from 2005 till 2008, resulting in a total of six months spent with participants. Revisits also allowed me to reflect on research I conducted in Emnambithi during 2005, as the purpose of revisits is not to replicate – that is, to arrive at the same findings – but to find "difference".[6]

Extending my study over time and space ensured that the study was sensitive to the social and historical context in which internal migration occurs and in which class and household relations are constructed and reconstructed. It was by means of a revisit to the Shezi household that I discovered Nelisiwe and Londi's "breakaway" household and could observe the contradictory feelings they had about this move. Revisits also helped in getting interviews with migrants who came home at different times. Thus, it was necessary to conduct only 14 interviews with migrants in Johannesburg, the site of destination.

The third extension of the extended case method is *the extension of micro-processes to macro-forces*. This involves relating the individual experiences of migrant households to the social history and structural conditions of contemporary South Africa. It requires the understanding that macro-forces, such as the

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[6] The relevance of finding "difference" is discussed under the third extension of the case method.

structural unemployment that South Africa is currently experiencing, do not have a homogeneous effect on all migrant households.

Fundamental to the method of the extended case is the notion of "internal comparison" (Burawoy 1998, 2003).[7] This means finding difference or variation between households within the study sample. The different class locations of the sample households was found inductively – that is, during the course of the research and not determined at the outset.

Looking for difference, Burawoy (2003) argues, leads researchers to *explaining* societal responses rather than merely describing them. To elaborate, during the course of the fieldwork, I realised that social reproduction differs between households. In trying to explain these differences, I realised that the social conditions of reproduction and the resources that households can rely on differ. This led to an explanation that class matters in the reproduction of migration. However, the class location of households in Emnambithi was structured historically and an explanation of the difference in social reproduction required an historical examination of the impact of racialised dispossession and proletarianisation (macro-forces) on households in this area. In using this method, I aimed to explain the ways in which social actors engage with dominant, sometimes oppressive, social policies.

The study of the relationship between social structure and agency is a well-established social science endeavour. Among others, this study was influenced by the work of Hart (2002a,b) and Webster *et al.* (2008). Hart argues that a study of a particular geographical area, such as Ladysmith-Ezakheni, is not only a study of the effects that broader social processes such as globalisation may have on a smaller locale. Instead, the activities at the local scale should be seen as implicated in the activities on the global scale. The particularity of the local means that global processes do not have straightforward consequences, but that the local

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[7] See also Burawoy (1972), where internal comparison is used to distinguish how and explain why Zambian mine workers are affected differently in post-independence Zambia.

has some leeway in determining its own trajectory. Thus she demonstrates that local studies contribute to a global picture. Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout (2008) use *contextualised comparison* to look at different responses to the global restructuring of the white goods industry in three different sites – Orange in Australia, Changwon in Korea and Ezakheni (in the Emnambithi municipal district) in South Africa. Contextualised comparison is also a research strategy that hones in on difference. One explanation they provide for the difference in societal responses in the three sites is the difference in household size and relations. This method relates to Burawoy's (2000) use of the term *global ethnography*, which contrasts two seemingly distinct and opposite terms. *Global* implies an overarching, broad view of social processes on a world-wide scale, while *ethnography* is understood to consist of micro-studies of specific cultures or locales. However, as Burawoy argues, if local studies are engaged with theory, then local case studies are able to make global arguments successfully.

The fourth extension of reflexive ethnography is to *extend theory*. This meant engaging with existing theory all the time while immersed in the field and when writing, as this method aims to transform, expand, refute or rewrite theory. At its basis, then, is a good grasp of existing texts, but also of how the research expands or transforms existing knowledge as the research unfolds. What this meant practically, was that I had to constantly analyse my interviews and observations in light of theory, and examine if what I was reading was reflected in the fieldwork. The method requires constant reflection and possible adaptation of the theory in light of the contradictions that social reality poses.

My attempts to reflect on my research and theory were greatly assisted by keeping a research diary. At first, my research diary was meant to be merely a description of my research activities, especially of what I feared I would forget, such as what I saw and felt while I was in the field. However, increasingly, I found it useful as a means of reflecting on and thinking through not only fieldwork material but also what I was reading by leading theorists and experts in the field of migration, class

and social reproduction. In writing this dissertation, I turned to my research diary to write up this work, which started in 2005.

This dissertation extends the theory of households by arguing that social reproduction differs according to the class of migrant households. The household is a more concrete category than the family, and is grounded in particular forms of labour (Smith and Wallerstein, 1992). Most of the unpaid reproductive labour performed by women in the household is done in their capacity as family members. The relationship between families and households is a complex one, particularly in a context such as South Africa with extensive migrant labour (Wolpe 1972; Walker 1990). As Connell writes,

> Far from being the basis of society, the family is one of its most complex products. There is nothing simple about it. The interior of the family is a scene of multilayered relationships folded over on each other like geological strata. In no other institution are relationships so extended in time, so intensive in contact, so dense in their interweaving of economics, emotion, power and resistance (Connell 1987: 121).

Smith and Wallerstein (1992) demonstrated the flexibility of African households, yet ignored the class location of households.

Outline of the Chapters

This dissertation consists of six chapters. In Chapter One, I present a review of scholarly engagements with class, migration and social reproduction, focusing on why it is necessary to use an eclectic approach in the study of class. Chapter Two discusses the history of Emnambithi from the time of first settlement and the eventual establishment of the town of Ladysmith, to when this area was officially re-demarcated in 2001 and named Emnambithi. Through a focus on the impact of land and labour policies introduced by the British colonial administration and further imposed by the apartheid government, this chapter illustrates how a

stratified society consisting of an educated class, a proletarianised migratory class and a marginalised sector of society emerged.

Chapters Three, Four and Five form the bulk of the dissertation and reflect on the research findings. These chapters discuss social reproduction in three different classes of migrant households in Emnambithi – the semi-professional, working class and marginalised. Finally, the Conclusion discusses the implications of the research and presents recommendations based on the class-specific needs of migrant households.

Chapter One
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

1.1   Introduction

This dissertation is about class structure and social reproduction of households in Emnambithi, a community in northern KwaZulu-Natal. It argues that migration to Johannesburg is one of the ways in which households attempt to move up the class ladder or to secure class privilege. This chapter presents a review of the literature and a theoretical framework pertinent to an understanding of the class location of households, social reproduction and their relationship to migration.

I start with the contemporary debate that class has become irrelevant as a tool for social analysis, and then introduce an eclectic approach to class location. Some argue that an eclectic approach suffers from a lack of "theory". However, as the proponents of this approach argue, the validity of an approach is confirmed by the explanation it is able to provide. I chose an eclectic approach because I combine Marxism – to understand work and its articulation with social reproduction in this contemporary era of capitalism – with Weberian influences – to understand the potential (life chances) migration holds for the class location of households – and a Bourdieuan understanding of non-material resources to explain the non-marketised relations of households.

This chapter illustrates the utility of Crompton's suggestion of using different approaches combining, for example, Marxist, Weberian and Bourdieuan analytical tools to explore class structure. The pragmatic approach is not a new proposal. It has been applied quite successfully in South Africa by Webster (1985), Crankshaw (1994) and more recently by Seekings and Nattrass (2006). Crompton

(2008) argues that the method and approach of studying class is less important than the *validity* of the statements emanating from research on class. As argued by Wright,

> The central point of trying to assign a class location is to clarify the nature of the lived experiences and material interests the individual is likely to have. Being 'in' a class location means that you do certain things and certain things happen to you (lived experience) and you face certain strategic alternatives for pursuing your material well-being (class interests). Jobs embedded within social relations of production are one of the ways individuals are linked to such interests and experiences, but not the only way. Families provide another set of social relations which tie people to the class structure (Wright 1997: 523-4).

The next section presents a review of literature on the intersections between class, gender and migration. The final section of this chapter presents a diagrammatic outline of the dissertation and discusses how it illustrates the hypothesis that social reproduction differs in different classes of migrant household.

1.2   Studying Class: The Need for an Eclectic Approach

This section provides a general overview of the current state of class analysis internationally. It is informed by the work of Rosemary Crompton (2008) who argues that the "cultural turn" in social sciences may give the impression that class analysis as a useful tool to study stratification has become irrelevant. I follow her lead by proposing that the study of class in contemporary society requires an eclectic approach to ensure an analysis of class which considers the social context as well as an approach which overcomes the criticisms that "traditional" class analysis neglects the erosion of Fordist, mass-based employment regimes and gender issues.

In the 1970s and 1980s the study of class structure was greatly influenced by two sociologists – American Erik Olin Wright and British John Goldthorpe, who are

seen as neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian[8] respectively. With the aim of strengthening the scientific rigour of sociological studies of class, both based their theories of class on large quantitative surveys. Goldthorpe (1980) developed a class scheme involving eleven classes grouped into three main categories – the service, intermediate and working classes. Wright's class scheme comprises twelve classes and is based on an understanding of exploitation in the relations of production, focusing on control over money capital and physical capital and over supervision and discipline in the labour process. Wright emphasises his preoccupation with the relations of *production* in contrast with Goldthorpe's concern with employment and *market* relations and the life chances of individuals. Despite the theoretical differences of the two approaches, both argue left politics as the solution to social inequality – "left democracy" (Goldthorpe 1980: 350) and "radical democracy" (Wright 1985: 287).

Wright's and Goldthorpe's work represent the "employment-aggregate" approach, the dominant – or "hegemonic" – approach to class analysis from the 1970s through the 1990s (Savage, Warde and Devine 2005; Crompton 2008). This occupation-based analysis of class structure is under threat of displacement by studies of individual choice and consumption (Crompton 2008). The "cultural turn" of which identity-based studies of consumption form a part is associated with the rise of postmodern thought in the social sciences. Harvey (1990) demonstrates that the current stage of development does not equate a complete shift of determinants from economic to cultural, but that the cultural turn is an outcome of the intensification of capitalism in the late twentieth century. That is, a crisis of accumulation in Fordist systems of production required a move towards a post-Fordist system of flexible accumulation, which led to flexible "labour processes, labour markets and patterns of consumption" (Harvey 1990: 147). Along with the increased insecurity of work, is the individualisation of society into consumers who are enticed to buy goods and services based on their

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[8] While Wright is avowedly Marxist in his orientation, Goldthorpe is uncomfortable being associated with the Weberian tradition and proposes that his class scheme is not theoretically derived and should be used as a research instrument.

originality and spectacle, rather than the need for such articles. In later work, Harvey equates the last three decades of the twentieth century with a turn towards neo-liberalism[9] – of which the importance of the consumer is but one feature – a project which from the start aimed to restore power to the ruling class (Harvey 2003: 16). Thus, he implies, while the academic gaze was lured away from class analysis, a class war was waged and won by global capital and its neo-liberal proponents, resulting in even greater inequality.

The reconfiguration of the standard employment relationship in the last two decades of the twentieth century also meant a decline in the significance of occupation as a basis of social analysis. In South Africa increasing flexibility and insecurity of work (Webster and Von Holdt 2005) and rising unemployment accompanied the declining meaning of employment as a source of collective identity and organisation (Mosoetsa 2005). As argued by Richard Sennett (1998: 148), increasing insecurity and the declining faith in the possibility of long-term careers have led to the breakdown of trust and the dissolution of relationships as human beings "no longer have deep reasons to care about one another".[10] However, even if the relevance of work may have declined as source of social identity, this dissertation shows that it remains the most significant determinant of material well-being for most people.

Another criticism of the employment-aggregate approach is that it fails to address gender issues within class analysis. The employment-aggregate approach is based on the Fordist occupational hierarchy, which assumed that the male breadwinner received a "family" wage. While the employment of women has increased since the 1980s, wage discrimination (i.e., lower wages for women) and job

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[9] Harvey (2003: 2) defines neo-liberalism as "a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong property private property rights, free markets, and free trade".

[10] It should be noted that the relationships Sennett refers to exclude family relationships. As he describes in previous work, *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (Sennett and Cobb 1973, cited in Crompton 2006), the family provides sanctuary to members of the working class suffering from "injured dignity". Crompton (2006) also describes how middle-class men find solace in their families from the insecurity of competitive labour markets.

discrimination (certain, occupations for women, e.g., "care" work) are still in place. In the case of married couples, women's location in the class structure was subsumed under the class location of their husbands. In the case of married and single women, the employment-aggregate approach does not consider factors outside the labour market, such as sexist prohibitions on education, which allocate women to certain occupations or that assign fundamentally lower status to women who occupy the same positions as male colleagues (Crompton 2008). While Goldthorpe and Wright[11] have argued quite explicitly that class and gender are analytically separate and "should be considered as distinct causal processes", Crompton 2008: 78-9) maintains that "gender relations are constitutive of employment relations and conditions, and this means that attempts to develop a 'theoretical' account of employment relations that exclude gender (as well as other attributes such as sex and race) will inevitably be partial".

The separation of class and gender in social analysis, and a continued focus on occupation as the basis of class, maintain the artificial boundaries between market and domestic labour (Bakker and Gill 2003; Bezanson and Luxton 2006; Crompton 2008; Parrenas 2008). However, labour markets, as all other markets, are embedded in social relations. That is, "the market" cannot operate in the absence of a parallel system of social relationships and institutions (Polanyi 1957). The cultural turn or the examination of extra-economic (cultural or social) relations focuses "on the meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes as well as the lived traditions and practices through which these meanings are expressed and in which they are embodied" (Hall 1981: 26, cited in Crompton 2008: 44). In other words, it is a focus on subjective understandings of people's material lives.

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[11] Goldthorpe and Wright differ in how they deal with gender because they use different units of analysis. Goldthorpe uses the "family" as the unit of class analysis and argues that the class position of the family should be taken to be that of the head of the household, who is usually a male (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Wright's unit of class analysis is the individual. In the case of housewives or other economically inactive members of a household, he introduces a "derived" class position – that is, a location which is derived from the location of the male "breadwinner" (Wright 1997: 246).

In an attempt to balance the importance of economic factors with cultural understandings, Bourdieu's (1986) theory of class – influenced by Marx and Weber – gained prominence from the 1990s. Bourdieu uses class as a general term to describe social groups stratified from others, based on the condition in which they live and corresponding sets of "dispositions". Classes all have different capitals – economic (material resources, income and property); social (connections, networks); cultural (cultural knowledge, credentials); and symbolic[12] (respect, social recognition and reputation). Different levels of capitals combine to form *habitus* – an acquired set of dispositions or competences which informs our thinking, behaviour and consumption (taste) (Bourdieu 1986; see also Lareau 2003; Savage *et al.* 2005; Seekings and Nattrass 2006; Crompton 2008,). "Fields" are constructed spaces in which people's actions are structured in relation to their competence or habitus. That is, one's competence to operate in a certain field (e.g., as an intellectual in the academy) is structurally determined by the nature and institutions of the specific field. The rules of the field determine behaviour and act as a constraint through the use of different forms of capital; classes close off entry for others to the field and/or change the rules of the field.

Bourdieu's work has particular importance for the study of social mobility as it lends itself to an analysis of how people use non-material resources to overcome material disadvantage. It has therefore gained prominence in sociological studies of the family and of education (Lareau 2003). The major criticism, however, of Bourdieu's theory on class is its tautological nature. As the different resources or advantages available to a specific class determine habitus, advantage is generated (or reproduced) by being in an advantaged position, and vice versa. That is, "individuals and groups … are locked into cycles of deprivation and disadvantage, as well as their opposite, and it might be argued that there can be little possibility of social change" (Crompton 2008: 102). However, Crompton goes on to demonstrate that certain aspects of Bourdieu's theory on class can still be used in an ethnography of class as a way of *describing* class formation and social mobility even if this theory cannot provide *causal* explanations of class. In a similar vein,

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[12] Symbolic capital corresponds closely to Weber's conception of "status".

Michael Savage (2009) uses Bourdieu to arrive at the CARs (capitals, assets and resources) approach to explain how class inequalities are produced. In an attempt to overcome Wright's dependence on the relations of exploitation – which does not aid an understanding of, for example, the unemployed, which in Wright's analysis are not exploited – Savage uses Bourdieu's notion of different forms of capital to illustrate that non-economic forms of capital have "the potential to accumulate and to be converted to other resources" (Savage *et al.* 2005: 31; Savage 2009).

Crompton argues that a socially relevant class analysis should include both an objective portrayal of material and non-material conditions as well as the interpreted meaning and value of lives lived under those conditions, as

> … the most fruitful way ahead in 'class analysis' within sociology lies in the recognition of plurality and difference (i.e., between different approaches to 'class'), rather than forcing a choice from amongst competing positions, or attempting to devise a completely new or revised theoretical approach (Crompton 1998: 203).

She suggests that this eclectic or pragmatic combination of the "cultural" with the "economic" – also known as "positive pluralism" – is most suitable for an ethnography of class structure within families (Crompton 1998, 2006: 658). Based on her own research on the reproduction of class in families, Crompton concludes that class locations are mainly generated by economic processes; however, ignoring intra-family patterns of reciprocities and obligation creates a gap in our understanding of how class is reproduced within families (Crompton 2008).

1.3 An Eclectic Approach to the Study of Class, Social Reproduction and Migration in Post-Apartheid South Africa

In 1994, at the time of South Africa's first democratic election, inequality *within* the different racial groups in South Africa was greater than *between* the races (Crankshaw 1994; Seekings and Nattrass 2006). Despite the continued inequality of many households, associated with access to property and jobs structured by

class and a well-established tradition of class study, there is a dearth of knowledge on contemporary class structure in South Africa.[13] The current state of class studies in South Africa is in sharp contrast to the many studies of class undertaken in the apartheid era, among others by Kuper (1965), Magubane (1979), Webster (1985) and Wolpe (1980).

Webster (1985: x) notes the "intense debate" in the 1970s in South Africa on "economic growth and its relation to social and political change". The polarisation of this debate was captured earlier by Fisher, Schlemmer and Webster (1978: 10-12) as a distinction made between the "conventional" viewpoint associated with liberalism and the "revisionist thesis" broadly associated with Marxism and its emphasis on political economy and conflict in society. The conventional view argued that that economic growth would result in the fall of apartheid and liberalisation of the South African economy and society. Revisionist literature, on the other hand, suggested that industrial development would further entrench "white supremacy" (Webster 1985: xi).

Nearly three decades later, Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 22-24) make a distinction between radicals and liberals, denoting the different traditions of analysis of the relationship between apartheid and capitalism. In brief, this distinction is based on how the traditions differed in terms of their political strategy to end apartheid, and their conceptualisation of whether apartheid capitalism was profitable and led to economic growth during apartheid. Currently, Seekings and Nattrass (2006) argue, the work of Bond, Marais, Terreblanche and those following in the Wolpe tradition focuses primarily on the political economy of South Africa, rather than the stratification of South African society into classes. Similar to studies of class globally, South African studies of class tend to focus on one particular class – primarily the working class by radical scholars[14] and the African middle class by liberal scholars.

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[13] With the exception of a current, on-going project on class by the Centre for Sociological Study at the University of Johannesburg.

[14] With the exception of Nzimande (1991), who focused on the African petit bourgoeoisie.

However, two previous studies of class are notable for the breadth of their focus on the relational nature of class (i.e., a focus on different classes) as well as for their innovation in using both Marxist and Weberian theories to situate class in the South African context. Webster (1985) used labour process theory to discuss exploitation and control of metalworkers at the point of production, and employs Weber to discuss the racialised segmentation of the labour market in metal foundries. More than a decade later, Crankshaw (1994), following in the footsteps of Webster's eclectic approach, also used Marxist labour process theory and Weber to discuss the racial division of labour on the eve of the demise of apartheid. This pragmatic approach – espoused by neo-Marxist Wright (2009), neo-Weberian Goldthorpe (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) and Crompton (2008) – uses class categories to inform a broader understanding of social class rather than confining itself to a "predetermined theoretical approach" (Seekings and Nattrass 2006: 28). In the words of Erik Olin Wright (1997: 37), "the empirical categories of analysis are *under*determined by the theoretical frameworks within which they are generated or interpreted" (emphasis in the original).

The inadequacy of restricting class analysis to one theoretical framework had previously been argued by Leo Kuper (1965) in *An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa,* when he asserted the difficulty of using a simplistic understanding of Marx to look at class relations in South Africa. Despite their lack of ownership of the means of production and little to no ownership of land, Kuper distinguished between an African bourgeoisie and an African proletariat. He used the term "bourgeoisie" to refer to members of "the 'upper' occupational strata of African society", specifically intellectuals, teachers, clergy, nurses and traders (Kuper 1965: ix). Kuper attempted to sketch a dynamic picture of the African bourgeoisie during apartheid by suggesting "a struggle by rising groups against privilege resting on the traditional basis of birth, the aristocratic prerogative of race" (Kuper, 1965: ix). He was especially interested in the significance of the African bourgeoisie from which "some of the potential

leaders in South African society, given a radical change in the structure of racial domination", would be drawn, (Kuper, 1965: ix).

The study of class in the global South is complicated by the predominance of the informal economy, as well as high rates of unemployment. Bernstein and Woodhouse (2006: 147) argue that studies of the South impose notions of northern forms of capitalism, instead of interrogating the social relations in "actually existing capitalism" which include "commodity relations in the country side, and the class and other social inequalities they inevitably generate". These commodity relations are activated and transmitted by and internal to "the circuits of social reproduction" which span subsistence production and formal work in both the countryside and urban centres. "Classes of labour" – as distinct from *the* working class – consist of "growing numbers who now depend – directly and *indirectly* – on the sale of their labour for their daily reproduction" (Bernstein and Woodhouse 2006: 158). In pursuit of their daily reproduction, working people in the South spread themselves "across the many sites of the social division of labour: urban and rural, agricultural and non-agricultural, wage employment and self-employment" and, I would add, market and domestic (Bernstein and Woodhouse 2006: 158). Bernstein and Woodhouse thus highlight the combined importance of how people make a living – through subsistence production and selling their labour – with the aim of securing their own and their dependants' reproduction.

Casting the many sites of labour in a historical framework of different systems of accumulation, chronologically following each other, is not clearly applicable in the Southern context (Sanyal and Battarcharaya 2009). Shanin (1986) summarises the complexity of relations of production in developing societies as follows:

> While in the 'developing societies' islands of pre-capitalism disappear, what comes instead is mostly not the industrial proletariat of Europe's 19th century but strata of plebian (*sic*) survivors – a mixture of increasingly mobile, half employed slumdwellers, part farmers, lumpen traders, or pimps – another extra-capitalist pattern of social and economic existence under capitalism … (Shanin 1986: 23-24).

The predominance of informal economic activities in the global South corroborates Shanin's characterisation of developing societies. The southern context is characterised by a situation where market relations are dominant, but not hegemonic – that is, commodified and non-commodified relations of exchange and reciprocity co-exist (Webster 2005). The articulation of capitalism with non-capitalist relations, through the system of migrant labour, is a crucial component in the development of capitalism in South Africa (Wolpe 1972, 1980). Along these lines, Sanyal and Battarcharaya conceive of a distinct class in the South, *a surplus labour force* whose traditional source of income has been destroyed and who now resorts to using their households as sites of production:

> This surplus labour force is categorically distinguished from (a) wage workers whom capital exploits, (b) the reserve army of labour which enables such exploitation to go on, and (c) non-capitalist producers tied to capital via subcontracting or out-sourcing and from whom capital extracts their surplus (Sanyal and Battarcharaya 2009: 38).

The surplus labour force is still dominated by market forces and has to engage in the monetary and market system of exchange for their consumption. The only option they have is to exploit themselves and the non-market resources at their disposal – social transfers, networks and unpaid work of kin. In other words, they are engaged in self-exploitation. In contrast to a Marxist explanation of the alienation of labour at the point of production, Polanyi (1957) argues, they have been "commodified" – that is, the worker has been turned into a commodity.

1.4   Migration, Class and Gender

In the South African context, relationships between and across the "social division of labour" have received much attention in the form of migration studies. Indeed, cross-border migration from countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and urban-rural migration in South Africa have been linked to the establishment and reproduction of the apartheid political economy (Wolpe 1972; Legassick 1975; Burawoy 1976). Migration during apartheid had been well-

documented, leading Jonathan Crush (2003: 13, cited in Posel 2003a) to state that the study of migration in South Africa is "one of the most researched and well-documented academic fields in the region". Citing the work of Arrighi, Wolpe and Burawoy, Seidman argues that this body of work

> … contributed to a new approach to migration… By the mid-1980s, sociologists were drawing on insights derived from South Africa to examine migration in cases as far flung as the West Indies, Europe and Mexico, looking at how states controlled the flow and circulation of migrants in terms of labor supplies and labor control, and at how migration flows are deeply intertwined with the racialization of labour streams (Seidman 1999: 424-5, cited in Arrighi 2007).

Internal migration was a feature of South African life preceding the institutionalisation of apartheid by the National Party. The segregation of South African society according to race into European and non-European, and residential occupation into "South Africa" and the "reserves", were introduced by the preceding colonial administration. The cultural shock of rural-meets-urban when the National Party came into power in 1948 has been recorded in books such as *Cry the Beloved Country* (by Alan Paton in 1948) and movies such as *Jim Comes to Jo'burg* (1949) and *Mine Boy* (1946) (Seekings and Nattrass 2006: 50-52). More than a decade before, 50 per cent of males of working age in the reserves were living and working away from "home" (Seekings and Nattrass 2006: 50-52). Clear class stratification was already discernible among Africans residing in the reserves, where, for example, schoolteachers possessed a range of material goods and property in excess of their neighbours' material possessions.[15]

The intensified reliance on migration as a tool to stimulate labour market supply is discussed in much greater depth in Chapter Two. However, it is important to note at this point that while, for many, migration was a path to social mobility – that is, to move from agricultural production to semi-skilled manufacturing – it sowed the

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[15] The land and labour policies that gave rise to the stratification of reserve and banstustan societies are described in greater depth and in relation to the research site, Emnambithi, in Chapter Two of this dissertation. Another interesting study of inequality in a reserve society was done in Keiskammahoek in 1952, where similar patterns of stratification were identified (Houghton and Walton 1952).

seeds for the great unemployment which South Africa consequently experienced. With apartheid the removal of Africans from white-owned farms and of unemployed Africans from "white" towns and cities increased. Evicted farm workers and the urban unemployed became the burden of homeland societies, where even less opportunity for employment existed. Increasingly, as mining and manufacturing companies "rationalised" their workforces during the global financial crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, even more African workers were plunged into unemployment with little recourse to petty commodity production in the homelands. In this context, the term "marginality" was coined by Peruvian Marxist Anibal Quinjano to describe the condition of large numbers of the urban unemployed and underemployed. The marginalised, he argues, were distinct from Marx's army of reserve labour as they were "a specific deformity of dependent capitalism" (Bethell 1984: 452).

The concept of marginalisation was used by Legassick and Wolpe (1976) to explain the outcome of capital accumulation in the bantustans. Quinjano argued that monopoly capitalism "articulates with and dominates" two poles in society, "a competitive capitalist sector, and a marginal pole which is itself produced as one effect of the dominance of monopoly capital", and which is characterised by a "lack of stable access to basic resources of production which serve the dominant levels of each economic sector", and operates "around residual resources and, for the most part, residual activities" (Legassick and Wolpe 1976: 90). The marginal pole is what became known as the informal economy. Those relegated to the marginal pole, Quinjano proposes, fell ever behind in the technological skill required by the "competitive capitalist sector" and eventually become unemployable (Quinjano and Westwell 1983). For Quinjano monopoly capitalism is highly dependent on technological advances and uses *skilled* labour, thus the unemployment of the unskilled in the marginal pole does not constitute a threat to wages and employment in the capitalist pole.

Legassick and Wolpe (1976) question the assumptions underlying Quinjano's argument and its applicability to the South African context. Firstly, they suggest

that Quinjano does not problematise the formation and dominance of monopoly capitalism, and they go on to argue how land-labour policies in segregationist South Africa resulted in partial proletarianisation of black people. That is, unemployment results not only from economic, but also from political and ideological mechanisms. Secondly, they question the *unemployability* of the structurally unemployed and suggest that the rural or bantustan unemployed constituted a *relative surplus population*, whose "crucial function was", as Wolpe (1972) argued previously, to maintain "the productive capacity of the pre-capitalists economies and the social system of the African societies" (Legassick and Wolpe 1976: 78). Thus, they illustrated how migration is implicated in the marginalisation of a certain segment of South African society.

In Wolpe's (1972) seminal article, *Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid*, he focuses on the interrelationship between the reproductive capacity of homelands and the making of a cheap, black labour force. He argues that because the migrant worker is separated, distant from his household, the apartheid capitalist system flourished on his labour power because his wage was supplemented by petty economic activities in the homeland. Thus, the migrant worker could survive on cheap wages paid by the urban workplace, not only because of the support from his household in the homeland, but also because he did not have to contribute to reproduction of this household located in rural society. The shift from "segregation to apartheid" is the result of the erosion of this alternate source of income and the evolution of a de facto social security system. It was the collapse of the reserves, he argues, that led to the rise of apartheid and the repression of a growing black working class (Wolpe 1972). However, the effects of the absence of men in their prime from the underdeveloped communities of South Africa's homelands were quite severe.

For migrant men the preservation of the rural homestead as the site of reproduction – biological, cultural and moral – remained a fundamental goal (Moodie and Ndatshe, 1984). Their work in the mines served to establish and preserve their rural homesteads. Moodie and Ndatshe (1984) illustrate that for a

significant period of time migrant male mineworkers replicated some of the features of rural "householding" in the mining compounds. "Mine marriages" between older and younger men involved the performance of household duties such as cooking and laundry by younger males who in their roles as "wives" also became the objects of non-penetrative sexual acts. Mine marriages reflected the patriarchy and gerontocracy of Tsonga and Nguni rural life and provided a system of household-like arrangements to fulfil basic needs such as eating, hygiene and sexual release for senior men. Mine marriages also helped prevent migrant men from being "led astray by townswomen" and abandoning their rural families, wasting their hard-earned money or contracting venereal diseases.

However, they were ever more distant in their ability to play an active role in their households. Instead women emerged as de facto household heads. One of the ways in which gender conflicts around the more integral role that women were playing in households was resolved was to bolster the male ego, further entrenching patriarchy in rural communities (Ramphele, 2000).

In his comparison of the systems of migrant labour in South Africa and California, Burawoy (1976) points out that making a geographical distinction between the productive and the reproductive activities of a migrant worker obscures the fact that certain reproductive activities occur in different geographical locations. Instead, he argues that the system of migrant labour in South Africa used a set of legal, political and economic arrangements which determined that the daily maintenance of the worker took place in areas of employment, and the renewal of the worker (e.g. the rearing of his children, retirement and healthcare) occurred in the homeland, while ensuring a connection between the two. In this manner, the system of migrant labour saved the apartheid state and economy the costs of educating and raising the migrant workers' children, and of caring for the worker when he got too ill or old to work. These costs could be "externalized" to the homelands, where "the requirements for a minimal standard of living was lower" while the migrant worker had to provide only for his own daily maintenance where "luxuries superfluous to the basic processes of renewal in the Bantustan or

Mexican town or village become necessities in Johannesburg or California" (Burawoy 1976: 1082). He concluded that while race was used to delineate "their different modes of insertion into the reproduction of labor power which determines their group characteristics", the same applies for gender. The system of migrant labour during apartheid could be related to which gender performed specific activities related to the reproduction of labour power and how social relations were structured around social reproduction.

In considering the relationship between patriarchy and capitalism, Bozzoli criticises Wolpe for "taking for granted" the subordination of women to undertake tasks such as "caring for the very young and very old, the sick, the migrant labourer in periods of 'rest'" (Wolpe 1972, cited in Bozzoli 1983: 145), activities which took place in homelands. She argues that by ignoring struggles in the "domestic sphere" Wolpe assumes that there is a straightforward "articulation" between capitalism and pre-capitalist gender relations. Instead, she proposes, the fact that the burden of reproduction was placed on women is the result of struggles within the household over internal factors such as income and land ownership, as well as over external influences such as the deepening of patriarchal ideology through capitalism. In a similar debate, Walker (1990: 177) argues that migration studies in the 1970s and 1980s in South Africa ignored the household as it was assumed that this entity constituted "a harmonious unit[16] in which all members were united in maximising resources and resisting threats to its integrity". In such households it would be "natural" for women to subordinate their will to the capacity of men to find waged work in the apartheid economy.

The nature of migrant households – which entailed reproduction in conflict-ridden circumstances, spanning rural and urban divides, with limited resources and visits by migrant workers limited to once or twice a year – led some researchers to denote these as "stretched" households (Spiegel, Watson and Wilkinson 1996). In these "father away" households, the role of men changed from benign patriarch to

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[16] See Mosoetsa (2005) for a critique of the assumption that the households of the poor and unemployed in post-apartheid South Africa "eat from the same pot" – that is, harmoniously collectivise and share their resources.

"father as provider". "If one could not get a job as a migrant worker on the mines or in some other sector of the modern economy, how could one feed one's children?" (Wilson 2006: 26). A much starker sexual division of labour emerged where the perception of men as providers and women as carers and nurturers delimited the possibilities of members of either sex to traverse these boundaries (Walker 1990).

While some of the literature written during apartheid assumed that it was mostly men who migrated, studies by Cock (1980), Van Onselen (1982), Bonner (1990), Walker (1990) and Bozzoli and Nkotsoe (1991) illustrate that African women moved to urban centres for work and independence since the early nineteenth century. Moodie, Ndatshe and Sibuyi (1988) describe the increasing flow of women in the 1980s to join their husbands because rural production dried up, to find "straying" husbands, to find work for themselves and to ensure that migrant remittances reached their children left in the country. The trend of female migration has increased in contemporary South Africa; by 1999 an estimated 34 per cent of African migrant workers in South Africa were women (Posel 2003b) while by 2001 the number of male migrants was just marginally more than that of women (PCAS 2006: 56). Indeed, while predictions were that internal migration would cease at the end of apartheid, it has increased significantly (Kok, O'Donovan, Bouare and Van Zyl 2003; Kok and Collinson 2006; PCAS 2006).

In a compelling study of migration, the life histories of 22 women migrating from what was then Western Transvaal to the Witwatersrand in the mid-twentieth century are documented by Bozzoli and Nkotsoe (1991). The authors argue that women migrating from Phokeng, a platinum-rich area north-west of Pretoria, from relatively prosperous backgrounds, actively pursued their own life strategies as domestic workers in Johannesburg. The women from Phokeng came to the city for their own reasons, and "raiding [it] for the resources they needed" to fulfil their own aspirations (Bozzoli and Nkotsoe 1991: 97). The authors suggest that these women were actively engaged in transforming their own lives, using the social skills they developed in rural missionary schools and their networks with

other women from the same Bafokeng background to enter into relationships and form households on their own terms in Johannesburg.

Implicit in this discussion is an objective analysis of class – that is, they identify how a relatively privileged group of Bafokeng women drew on available resources to realise their individual aspirations in the "slum yards" of an urban setting. To achieve these aspirations the women from Phokeng occupied working-class positions in Johannesburg – that is, they displayed relative downward mobility in relation to their previous position in Bafokeng society. However, as Bozzoli and Nkotsoe argue, while the women from Phokeng purposefully transformed their life trajectories, opportunities, upward mobility for women migrating on their own were severely limited by the racist and patriarchal policies of the apartheid state.

From the 1960s onwards, opportunities for occupational mobility for Africans emerged within the racial division of labour in apartheid South Africa (Crankshaw 1996). A new stratum of African semi-professionals emerged in the 1940s and 1950s as the South African state decreed the segregation of teaching and health facilities according to race. Segregationist policies created the demand for African nursing and teaching staff to work in segregated public sector workplaces, specifically hospitals and schools. Contradictorily, these policies created opportunities for social mobility for Africans who accessed nursing and teaching training colleges, and resulted in greater fragmentation among Africans in terms of income and occupation (Crankshaw 1996).

In 1990, 41 per cent of employment in semi-professional occupations was taken up by Africans and 45 per cent by whites. At the same time, African workers bore the brunt of rising unemployment, and the average income of African households fell between 1960 and 1990. As a result, the per capita household income inequality among Africans was almost as great as the income inequality between Africans and whites. The "occupational and income differences among Africans mean that racial categories are becoming increasingly inadequate for

understanding social differentiation in South Africa" (Crankshaw 1994: 162).
Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 330) note that "by the mid 1990s the African
population could be divided into discrete classes, including an underclass of
households doubly disadvantaged in that they had neither any employment nor the
social capital necessary to secure employment".

Significantly, Crankshaw's (1994:35) analysis of the racial division of labour is
gendered. In South Africa in 1990, 43 per cent of nursing jobs were occupied by
Africans, 38 percent by whites, 13 per cent by coloureds and 4 per cent by
Indians. However, African women comprised 40 per cent and African men 3 per
cent of the total employment in this sector. The distribution of workers by sex in
teaching is less sharp, but also illustrates a gendered division of labour: while
Africans occupied 54 per cent of teaching jobs, African women comprised 33 per
cent and African men 21 per cent of total employment in the teaching sector in
1990.

More recently, Burawoy (2006) argues that under new economic conditions we
need to change our assumptions about the nature of internal migration as the
economies of homelands – where migration originates – are even less able to
support and reproduce a migrating workforce. Cheap labour is now being
produced under new economic conditions. He argues that we need to shift our
focus to the importance of women in South Africa's changing political economy
as changing consumerism demands cheaper and more flexible labour in a service-
oriented economy. Burawoy (2006) argues that as the rate of unemployment
increases for men in the rural economy,[17] women travel to urban centres to find
work as domestic workers, hawkers or sex workers.

Globally, the increased migration of women is a well-established fact (Anderson
2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Parrenas 2005,
2008; Arat Koc 2006; Schwenken 2008). In this context of increasing migration

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[17] Currently, the rate of unemployment in South Africa is 24.5 per cent. With the inclusion of
discouraged workers this rate rises to 34.4 per cent (Statistics South Africa 2009).

by women, the focus of migration studies has turned to the responsibilities women leave behind when they leave their households and communities. The role of women in society is to all intents and purposes seen as private – that is, relegated to the household – and an extension of their procreative function. The assumption that women are naturally inclined towards (i.e., willing) and are biologically predisposed and have innate or socially constructed skills (i.e., able) to care for others underscores the expectation that women should be responsible for social reproduction (Chodorow 1999; Misra 2003; Douglas and Michaels 2004).

1.5 Social Reproduction: Migration, Gender and Class Implications

The definition of "social reproduction" has been varied and imbued with many different meanings. Katz summarises the flexible nature of this term as:

> the fleshy, messy, and indeterminate stuff of everyday life. … a set of structured practices that unfold in dialectical relation with production, with which it is mutually constitutive and in tension. Social reproduction encompasses daily life and long-term reproduction, both of the means of production and the labor power to make them work (Katz 2001: 711, cited in Roberts 2008: 545).

Broadly, social reproduction denotes "the processes involved in maintaining and reproducing people … on a daily and generational basis" (Bezanson and Luxton 2006: 3). In a more focused manner, Bakker and Gill (2003:32) define this concept in terms of three components. In the first instance, "biological reproduction … refers to the procreation of people" and includes an emphasis on the social context of and social importance we assign to motherhood. "Reproduction of the labour force" refers to "the daily maintenance of people" through subsistence, education and training". The "reproduction of provisioning and caring needs" refers to how the need for resources and care rely on paid or unpaid labour in the family and could be combined with services provided by the state or the market. As indicated earlier in this chapter, social reproduction remains "disproportionately reliant on the unpaid work of women and girls in the

family and community and the paid work of women employed by state agencies" (Elson 2004: 11).

As in most societies across the globe, social reproduction of households and families in South Africa remains the responsibility of women, whether they are co-residing with their families on a full-time or temporary basis. (Bakker and Gill 2003; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Bezanson and Luxton 2006). In the South African context of inadequate social provisioning by the state and the retraction of social benefits associated with employment, social reproduction is disembedded from economic production and placed within the household – the location of social reproduction in its "natural" place. The "privatisation" of social reproduction relies on the unpaid work of household members, the commercialisation of reproductive needs, or both (Folbre and Nelson 2000; Bakker and Gill 2003; Hochschild 2003).

The unpaid work of social reproduction is not easily replaced by market services, as an intrinsic component of reproduction is the relationship between the givers and receivers of care and the emotions that accompany such relationships. That is, while the sphere of reproduction is articulated with the sphere of production, and the one is integral to the other, work in the one sphere is qualitatively different to work in the other. Thus, Bakker and Gill (2003) argue that the relationship between production and social reproduction has a component beyond the prescriptions and limitations set by the different phases of capital accumulation and patriarchy. This affective component refers to the emotion and creativity which accompany childcare and care of the elderly. In this instance, emotional work does not refer to the manipulation of feelings in an interactive service-sector workplace as defined by Hochschild's (1983) concept of emotional labour. Instead, I focus on those care-giving activities, which cannot be wholly substituted by market-provided services, such as crèches or retirement homes, because they are suffused with emotions such as obligation, love and duty.

The responsibility of social reproduction cannot be shifted entirely to the market, because the production of human beings is, in the usual sense, not for sale or money (Polanyi 1957). Engels (1990, cited in Parrenas 2008) refers to "reproductive labour" as the work associated with sustaining the productive labour force, but procreation, caring for the young, sick and elderly, and maintaining familial life is not purely to produce productive workers, even if this is one of its outcomes. Bakker and Gill (2003: 18, 23) refer to social reproduction as "the practices associated … with the *human* constitution of species-being" – that is, involvement in the reproduction of human beings while we are enacting our own species-being: that which makes us human and distinguishes us from animals. The term social reproduction recognises that some of its components "are intrinsically different from other labor processes; that is, the cooking of a meal, the caring for one's children has a functional value but these activities also have intrinsic value that goes beyond the labor process" (Bakker and Gil 2003: 77-78). The intrinsic value that Bakker and Gill refer to marks the distinction between the human activity that could be appropriated and sold and controlled by the market – that is, labour – and work: a practice that is closely connected to human creativity and emotion (see Standing 1999: 3-30). Standing (1999) makes a succinct distinction between work and labour when he states, "We've made a mess of 'work', since we've made an ideal of labour" (Standing 1999: 3) For Standing 'labour' is the alienation of 'work' from its creative and social elements, and implies an 'onerous' burdensome activity.

The gendered nature of social reproduction is not peculiar to South Africa, or to developing countries (Hochshcild 1989, 2003; Folbre 1994, 2006; Bakker and Gill 2003; Bezanson and Luxton 2006). International literature on migration, however, identifies a transfer of the responsibilities of social reproduction *between* classes – from middle-class women to migrant working-class women working as domestic workers, carers of the elderly, children and disabled, nurses, and in other occupations by means of which social reproduction has been commodified (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Parrenas 2005; Folbre 2006). Care of the households of migrant women is then the domain of

remaining female household members, even in the presence of men (Parrenas 2005).

The study of social reproduction of migrants in the South is especially important as it focuses our attention on how employers at destination sites in more developed centres in the South and North benefit from migration of economically desperate workers. These migrant workers leave behind the responsibility of social reproduction in their communities and households of origin where it is shouldered by other women: mothers, grandmothers and sisters of migrants. Arat-Koc (2006) refers to this phenomenon as "stratified social reproduction".

The literature on the implications of migration for social reproduction focuses on two interrelated aspects of social reproduction – the devolution of the care responsibilities of migrants (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003), and notions of "domesticity" imposed on women wherever they work and reside (Parrenas 2008). The concepts "care deficit" and "care drain" are used to look at the impact of the migration of women on the care needs of sending and destination countries and communities. The care deficit refers to the migration of women from developing countries to developed countries in the North to take up low-paid, insecure positions in the homes, hospitals or service sector catering for the needs of citizens of the North. The care drain denotes the situation when these women leave their care responsibilities behind in order to fill a gap in the care economy of the developed world (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). These circuits of care are also evident in South-South migration – for example, in the migration of domestic workers from Zimbabwe to South Africa and Botswana, and the use of Philippina nannies in China and Korea, and Keralan nurses in the Gulf. Thus, the domesticity of southern women is circulated across the globe.

"Domesticity" refers to "the continued relegation of housework to women" and the persistent gendered ideology that care remains the domain of women in the labour market (as care workers, e.g., nurses, domestic workers, hostesses) and in the household (Parrenas 2008: 9). Thus, even if women gain economic

emancipation by entering the labour market, notions of domesticity erode their agency through the mechanisms of gender-segmented labour markets and the burden of social reproduction. The contradictory aspect of domesticity is clearly expressed in the households of migrants where women – both migrants and remaining female members – are responsible for household budgets and the allocation of resources, as well as care, yet their authority is contingent on the presence of men (Fakier and Cock 2009).

The discourse of domesticity disciplines women to care for children, grandchildren and other charges. In this vein, Parrenas (2005) shows how motherhood is inscribed in policy discourse and social practice in the Philippines context. In South Africa, post-apartheid social policy reflects an assumption that reproduction takes place in a "nuclear family setting" within communities able to support families in these responsibilities (Barchiesi 2005; Lund 2007; Hassim 2008). However, Hassim (2008: 110) argues that this emphasis on family and community "also leaves open the question of *who* in the family and community is or ought to be responsible for undertaking care work. Women's unpaid care work is superficially acknowledged (and at times celebrated), while there is no commitment to changing this pattern of responsibilities through public provisioning". Thus, she refers to "normative" elements in South African social policy, which rules out state-provided care for the very young and elderly as of lesser value than family-based care. However, in households and communities of the working class and unemployed, the struggle for survival crowds out the time and resources required to provide adequate care.[18]

Care can be defined "as the work of looking after the physical, psychological, emotional and developmental needs of one or more other people" (Standing 2001: 17). At a recent conference organised by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), a context-sensitive definition was developed:

> Care is commonly thought of as the activities that take place within homes and neighbourhoods, and structured by relationships of kinship

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[18]See also Mosoetsa (2005).

and community: caring for children and adults whether able-bodied, ill or frail. But unpaid care work involves many additional tasks, such as meal preparation, and cleaning of homes, clothes and utensils, which are particularly time-consuming in many poorer countries where access to appropriate infrastructure and labour-saving technology is limited. Care has also increasingly shifted outside the home toward market, state and non-profit provision (UNRISD 2009: 1).

In an attempt to provide a definition describing the diffuse activities involved in caring for others, Razavi (2007) uses the term "unpaid care work" to refer to unpaid direct and indirect care activities such as care of family members and housework. This dissertation focuses narrowly on "direct unpaid care activities" (such as feeding a person, bathing a person, reading aloud to a child, or teaching a child) and on *supervisory responsibility* for family members that constrains the time, attention or availability of a caregiver.

In reflecting on the work involved in caring for others, Nancy Folbre suggests that because of the characteristics of this kind of work it is undervalued by the market.

> Care involves personal connection and emotional attachment … often 'co-produced' by care providers and care recipients (e.g. parent must elicit cooperation from child, teacher must inspire student to study, doctor or nurse must encourage patient to adopt healthy habits). … Indeed, the sense of 'being cared for' is an important byproduct of inherent value.
>
> Recipients of care benefit from the cultural construction of caring obligation, as well as from the personal connections and emotional attachments that often grow out of the care process itself. But workers are rendered vulnerable by it. Their work does not take the form of a simple exchange; as a result, it is difficult for them to threaten to withhold it. They become, in a sense, prisoners of love (Folbre 2006: 3-4).

Similar to Bakker and Gill (2003), Folbre (2006) points to the gendered nature of these practices and argues that women recognise the "productive" value of caring for children and other dependants as activities that contribute to "collective well-being". By recognising the value of reproductive work, its importance to the productive sphere is brought to the fore and is less likely to be treated as an

activity "for which virtue should be its own reward" (Folbre 2006: 18). As more women participate in the labour force, care work – which with some exception is not shared by male household members or supported by social services – is privatised within the household or relies on the paid work of poor working women.

Furthermore, paid caring activities are highly stratified and because it is usually "undervalued, invisible, underpaid and penalized", it is relegated to those who lack economic, political and social power and status (Nakano Glenn 2000). Thus racialised and subordinate groups are often assigned caring roles while their own needs for care are neglected (Nakano Glenn 1992). There is a need, it has been argued, to turn our understanding of production and reproduction on its head, by arguing that it is the production of life itself that is the basic production process, without which extended production is unthinkable (Dietrich 1996: 344). Thus economists such as Folbre (2006) argue that care is a public good.

In South Africa, black women take up employment as domestic workers and home-based carers (Hunter 2007; Parenzee and Budlender 2007) in attempts to secure livelihoods and to support community-based care initiatives while their (and their households') care needs are not recognised. As in the households in Parrenas's study (2005) in the Philippines, South African households also rely on households in their communities to support their productive and reproductive activities. Mosoetsa (2005) illustrates how households of the unemployed seek essential resources from their neighbours to fulfil their needs. In the same vein, Beall (2002) shows that the livelihood of one household relies on the economic participation of neighbouring households. However, Mosoetsa (2005) also argues that the needs of poor households strain the scarce resources of other equally desperate households. The containment of social reproduction within any one household could be the outcome of economic circumstances rather than personal choice. The social and cultural capital of African communities may exist in significant amounts but, as this dissertation shows, when economic capital is in short supply reciprocal networks may break down.

In these instances, our expectation that grandparents – *gogos* in particular – and other family/household members will step in to fill the care gap does not allow for the possibility that such resources may not exist, are inadequate and could even be abusive. Instead there is an assumption that grandmothers or *gogos* are present, willing and able to take care of migrants' responsibilities (Izzard 1985; May 2003). A study of *gogos* at the Agincourt research site concluded that "it was clear that the responsibilities associated with caring for the children left behind are great" and that most *gogos* expressed "feelings of being 'bound' to care for the children and stretched thin financially" (Schatz, 2007: 153). Kofman and Raghuram (2007) highlight the emergence of a deficit of care for the elderly because of the increased migration of women – the socially designated carers of the elderly in the absence of public-provided geriatric care. They state, "… while care for the child was accompanied by an expectation that the parents will in turn be cared for by the children in their old age … changing social norms around elderly care as well as increasing mobility means that the expectations and more importantly the delivery of reciprocal care have definitely loosened up, leaving a care deficit among older people in many countries" (Kofman and Raghuram 2007: 11).

Parrenas (2005) refers to the attempt at caring over long distances through telephone contact that is characterised by the heightened emotions of guilt and longing as "intensified mothering". She argues that the children of migrants often get adequate care from other female family members, if not their fathers. However, because there is a prevailing discourse in the Philippines of who it is that should mother, migrant mothers experience excessive guilt and children express severe and unwarranted resentment towards their mothers. Parrenas provides no solution to the distress caused by separation of parent and child. She also ignores the evident pleasure mothers and children derive from their interaction (although it socially constructed) as well as the longing to care and be care for experienced by both migrants and their care dependants.

In this dissertation, I develop the term *mobile care*. Similar to Parrenas and other feminist studies of migration, I recognise the gendered pressures acting on women resulting from society's idealisation of motherhood and the ideology of domesticity. However, with the term mobile care I wish to include the specificities of caring over a distance in the South African context. As the dissertation illustrates, the particular characteristics of migration in the South African context are, firstly, evidence that it is not only the children of migrants who require care, but also the parents of migrants. In the South African context, *gogos* or grandmothers are expected to care for the children of migrants despite the fact that they are themselves often frail or sickly. Thus, "adequate care from other family members", to which Parrenas refers, does not always exist. In addition, mobile care covers not only the relationship between migrants and their children, but also encompasses caring over a distance for the parents of migrants.

Secondly, the form of migration which I study in this dissertation, and which is embedded in the socio-economic history of South Africa is internal or return migration. This means that the distance covered by migrants is shorter than international migration and that, under certain conditions, regular visits to migration-sending communities are possible. Thus, mobile care involves regular visits home as well as the emotion-laden telephonic interaction that Parrenas refers to. However, trips home and telephone costs delve into the resources households have at their disposal. Despite the fact that mobile care relies on non-material resources, material inequality means that different classes of households are capable of different levels of mobile care.

Thirdly, with the term mobile care I wish to illustrate the joy, sadness and longing experienced by long-distances carers and those whom they care for. As Parrenas (2003, 2005, 2008) and Folbre (2006) demonstrate, these emotions contribute to societal expectations that care work should go unrewarded and render women "prisoners of love".

In migrant households the emotional exchanges between migrants and their carers associated with mobile care often provides solace to those who have to bear periods of separation. The expectation of love over a distance from migrant women is even greater in the households in the study sample where care from males – fathers, brothers, uncles and grandfathers – is absent. Mobile care represents one way in which women actively use the limited resources at their disposal to create caring environments for their children to develop and their parents to retire with some grace. It is evident of the great agency women display within a context of structured class and gender inequality, even though mobile care reinforces the ideology of gendered domesticity.

The creativity involved in mobile care coupled with the fundamental role of producing society itself is, as Bakker and Gill (2003) argue, one of the ways in which humans connect with their species being and overcome the alienation of exploitative labour. However, this balance is difficult to overcome when care and employment are separated from each other through migration. This dissertation argues that a stable multi-generational family, where markets, social policy and public provision are embedded within social needs, requires an in-depth understanding of how production is integrated with social reproduction.

1.6   Framework of the Dissertation

This dissertation argues that social reproduction in migrant households differs according to the class location of these households. Chapters Three, Four and Five elaborate on this statement and discuss the dimensions of class and social reproduction in semi-professional, working-class and marginalised households, respectively. In Chapter Two, I discuss how the articulation of land and labour policies and politics in Natal and the KwaZulu bantustan gave form to a distinct class structure in Emnambithi, the research site, and provides a historical picture of migration in the area.

1.6.1 Dimensions of class in the sample households

Seekings (2003) argues that using only the occupation and income of the primary breadwinner as an indicator of class obscures the class location of households as a whole. Instead, dimensions of class should be interrogated for all members of a household to illustrate the fragility of a specific class and the dynamism required to maintain or acquire class advantage. Using the household as a unit of analysis also allowed me to examine how gender relations are implicated in class relations. Thus, if the majority of household members were working as nurses and the male head was unemployed, the household was assigned to the semi-professional class rather than to the unemployed. Drawing on Crompton (2008), Harvey (2003) and Seekings and Nattrass (2006), I propose that the class of a household is not simply the product of members' position vis-à-vis the means of production. Instead, I relied on three dimensions of class: occupation, income, and geographical location and structure of households. The sample of 23 households was categorised into five semi-professional households, seven working-class households and eleven marginalised households.

Class variation within the sample of households of migrants in Emnambithi was arrived at inductively. That is, looking at the occupations of members of migrant households and the jobs that migrants occupy, I was able to differentiate between three classes of households; semi-professional, working class and marginalised households. The households in the different classes also displayed remarkably class-specific trends in terms of the sources and magnitudes of their incomes, as well as where their households were located, the physical structure of the buildings they occupied.

With some deviation, I draw on Seekings and Nattrass' schema of five class locations to locate the sample of households in the class structure of Emnambithi (Seekings and Nattrass 2006: 247-9, 335-9). They distinguish between the upper class (UC) comprising managers and professionals, the semi-professional class (SPC) comprising teachers and nurses, the intermediate class (IC) comprising routine white-collar, skilled, and supervisory workers, the core working class

(CWC) comprising semi-skilled and unskilled workers (except farm and domestic workers), and a marginal working class (MWC) comprising farm and domestic workers. In an attempt to apply this schema deductively to my sample of households, I was forced to discard some of their categories and make a fundamental amendment to the marginal working class category, which I have simply called the marginalised.

In my sample there was little to no evidence of upper-class and intermediate-class households as defined by Seekings and Nattrass (2006) and by Goldthorpe and Crankshaw on whom Seekings and Nattrass drew to define their class locations. The semi-professional and working-class households in my study conform to the criteria set out by Seekings and Nattrass (2006) for the semi-professional class and core working class discussed above. However, because Seekings and Nattrass, similar to Goldthorpe, Crankshaw and Wright, retain occupation as the primary criterion of class location, the unemployed and marginalised are left out of their schema. It is only when they start to question the reproduction of inequality in post-apartheid South Africa and consider the history, social and physical environment of the permanently unemployed or the "underclass" that they move beyond their preoccupation with occupation. As discussed below, the underclass is lumped with the marginal working class and treated as a residual category by Seekings and Nattrass (2006).

Using established criteria for class allocation, I distinguish between semi-professional, working-class and marginalised households. Firstly households in the semi-professional class are so designated because, in the main, members of these households have attained diplomas (rather than degrees) in nursing or teaching.[19] They are, with rare exceptions, not in positions of authority. In the working-class category, special attention was paid to the nature of members' employment contracts (Seekings and Nattrass 2006: 248). That is, in the main, they were employed on a full-time basis and enjoyed certain non-wage benefits as

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[19] Discussed in full in Chapter Three.

part of their employment.[20] The marginalised households provided a particular conceptual difficulty. In these households, members were on average unemployed or occupied in itinerant, tenuous employment relations, for example, as domestic workers or petty traders.[21]

The "permanently unemployed" present a conceptual problem for class analysis. Wright (1978: 93) argues that designating the permanently unemployed as an underclass is "not satisfactory … for it suggests that they have fundamentally opposed interests to the working class". However, he is unable to come up with an alternative formulation and states that, "As a purely provisional solution to this problem, the permanently unemployed can be considered a marginalized segment of the working class" (Wright 1978: 94). He also states that "the underclass consists of human beings who are largely expendable from the point of view of the rationality of capitalism" (Wright 1994: 49). Thus, according to Wright (1994), the permanently unemployed are oppressed but their labour is not exploited. The exploitative relationship between employer and worker, however, leads to an interdependence between the two parties, which provides a space for negotiation. Hence the existence and importance of trade unions. In the absence of such interdependence, the unemployed – reliant on state welfare – are framed as parasitic (Crompton 2008).

Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 252) also arrive at their conceptualisation of the unemployed as a residual category – that is, as an "undifferentiated 'other' category". However, in a chapter dedicated to answering this question, they wonder whether the unemployed constitute an underclass. They also assume that the employed and the unemployed have "fundamentally opposed interests", because the employed struggle to secure their working conditions and security of employment arrangements. The protection of the employed, they argue, results in

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[20] Discussed in full in Chapter Four.

[21] In Chapter Five I discuss why domestic workers, even though they are protected by a sectoral determination on minimum wages, are still included in this category. Chapter Two elaborates on the conceptualisation of the term "marginalised class" and how it is related to decades of "racialised dispossession".

a "rigid" labour market characterised by labour legislation aimed at protecting the employed. A relaxation of labour laws – for example, greater "flexibility" in hiring practices – they assume, would grant greater access for the unemployed to the labour market.

In its broadest sense, "underclass" refers to "those in persistent poverty, who are not able, for whatever reason, to gain a living within the dominant processes of production, distribution and exchange" (Crompton 2008: 139). However, moral undertones have crept into this discourse, where some, such as Murray (1990, 1994), have blamed welfarist regimes for the support provided to the structurally unemployed. He argues that this has led to a dependency on the state by a group of people unwilling to work, inculcating dependency in their children "whose values are now contaminating the life of entire neighbourhoods" (Murray 1990: 4). Wilson (1993), using the term, "the truly disadvantaged", focuses on how the social isolation of the unemployed in areas of great unemployment, and the lack of adequate affordable transport, cuts members of this class off from access to employment. The physical and social location and infrastructure of households are therefore important variables in the study of the class location of households.

Rex (1973) uses the term "housing classes" to suggest that in a society where a racialised system of differential access to housing exists, a class order which has particular racial characteristics develops. The coincidence of race, class and housing, he argues, is a feature of most colonial and colonised societies, and he makes special reference to South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA). Rex (1973) distinguishes between three privileged and three underprivileged housing classes. Privileged housing classes comprise owners of desirable property, occupiers of desirable property and tenants in adequately maintained publicly provided housing. Underprivileged housing classes are those who occupy slum property due to be demolished, tenants of rooms or housing in multi-occupant slum housing and those who rent out space while living with their tenants in dilapidated housing. Rex's formulation of housing classes combines an understanding of racism embedded in public urban

planning with a Marxist understanding of the disadvantage associated with relations of production.

Rex (1973) argues that the ruling class benefits from the existence of a powerless, disposable labour force (the underclass) in addition to unionised and protected workers. While he demonstrates the existence of an underclass housing class among immigrants in Britain and in the African American ghettoes of the USA, he argues that the system of housing classes reached its extreme form in the compounds, locations, and reserves of South Africa.

In this dissertation I use the term "marginalised" to denote the class of households that Rex (1973) and Wilson (1987) describe as a disposable underclass. By using the term marginalised, I aim to demonstrate the structural disadvantage of this class of households who are unable to make a living in the dominant processes of production, distribution and exchange. Yet, the marginalised are hard at work trying to secure the conditions of social reproduction, in their own households as well as for low pay in more privileged households. As I have argued above, instead of dual systems, production and reproduction are part of the same mode of production, as "they are interdependent processes of production and consumption that in combination generate the household's livelihood" (Bezanson and Luxton 2006: 367). Arguing that reproduction is integral to production[22] includes the often-unpaid work of social reproduction within the same system of accumulation as waged work in the formal arena of production. However, this class of households is unevenly integrated within the mode of production, as they are surplus to the demands of the labour market. The tenuous, itinerant relationship of these households to the labour market determines the conditions of their social reproduction.

Secondary class characteristics are also discussed, with respect to political affiliation, religious beliefs and education. Thus, I show how the political networks of the semi-professional class serve to entrench the advantage that this

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[22] See also Bakker and Gill (2003).

class enjoys. Working-class and marginalised households, however, draw on the social and cultural capital that their religious beliefs provide. This resource does not provide these households with any social mobility, but does serve to ameliorate the extreme conditions under which they live. In Chapter Five, I also argue that the pervasiveness of religious activities is in sharp contradiction to the illicit means through which some marginalised households try to make a living.

All the households in the sample see education as a means of social mobility.[23] Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 266) note that during apartheid "in African households, children in the semi-professional class had gone the furthest in school, further, that is, than children in the upper class. Having a teacher or a nurse as a parent was crucial for African children." However, while the cultural capital of semi-professional households serves to ensure the successful completion of school, the households in the other classes struggle with teenage pregnancies and from severe deprivation of material and care resources, most especially in child-headed households.

The main argument of this dissertation is that it is in social reproduction that the variation between the different classes of households emerges most clearly. A key finding of this research is that social reproduction remains the responsibility of women, regardless of class. However, in the different classes of households, the gendered nature of social reproduction is taken up by remaining members of the households in different ways.

The different aspects of social reproduction are refined and compared across these households in three strands: maintenance and renewal – which includes the care work of migrants' dependants; domesticity – which addresses questions of the division of labour in the household and the distribution of household resources; and containment of social reproduction – that is, questions such as whether households are able to draw on resources beyond the boundaries of the home and

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[23] See also Crompton (2008), Lareau (2003) and Seekings and Nattrass (2006).

whether social reproduction is contained within the households. Table 1.1 presents the main features of the dissertation.

Table 1.1   Outline of the dissertation

Dimensions of Class	Classes of Households	Dimensions of Social Reproduction
Occupation	Semi-professional	Maintenance and renewal
Income	Working-class	Domesticity
Location and physical infrastructure of the home	Marginalised	Containment within or beyond the household

1.6.2 Social reproduction in different classes of households

In semi-professional households, the conditions of social reproduction are relatively secure. These households are able to provide for most of the needs of their members. In comparison with the other households, the semi-professional household is able to ensure both the renewal and maintenance of its members. Intensive attention is given to older and younger generations by the middle generation. However, younger women express feelings of being left behind by their migrant siblings. They feel they have sacrificed careers of their own to care for children and parents of migrants. *Gogos* appear quite content with their lives and the care they are receiving. However, in this chapter the focus turns to the caring needs of the elderly. Despite a renewed interest in the study of care, the focus of migration and care studies is on the needs of children, while care of the elderly is left to the market (Kofman and Raghuram 2007). In these households, where a cultural knowledge of care reigns, sending elderly members to frail care facilities is unthinkable.

In these households, the women welcome domesticity. Their willingness to take responsibility and to care for others is explained by the term "caring about care". That is, the care work in which their parents and siblings are involved has

predisposed them to take care not only of their households but also to function as home-based carers in the homes of people living with HIV and AIDS.

However, domesticity is less burdensome in these households as they are exempt from the scrimping and scraping that other households endure. Semi-professional households are able to procure the services of domestic workers, thus their reproductive dependence is not contained within their homes. However, all other aspects of social reproduction, such as caring for the ill and children, are confined to their household space.

Security of migrants' jobs also enhances the stability of these households Despite, the intensive attention given to those who stay behind, longing for their migrant family is translated into a sense of distance or hurt at relationships which are disrupted by migration.

Mobility into a semi-professional location is phenomenally difficult. However, one of the households in the sample, the Shabangus, were able to move into this class, sending a migrant to work to pay for the education of younger siblings.In contrast, the tenuous nature of work signals a potential downward move for another semi-professional household, the Sibiyas, unless the children are able to pull the family out of a downward slide. (See Chapter Two.)

Comparatively, working-class households are in an intermediate position in as much as they share features of social reproduction with the semi-professionals and with the marginalised. However, working-class households in Emnambithi stand out in relation to the other households in the sample with regard to migration. This is *the* migratory class. In comparison, the semi-professional households are much more rooted in Emnambithi, in their political networks and because they are able to secure jobs even in Emnambithi, and the marginalised are unable to penetrate the labour market in Johannesburg for significant periods of time. Members of working-class households, however, migrate to Johannesburg more frequently to

find better-paying jobs with greater security. The stability of their households is undermined in the process.

In Chapter Four, I show again that a reliance on *gogos* to care for dependents is flawed. Similar to the semi-professional households, *gogos* in working-class households also require care and feel incapable of providing all the care needed by the children. Thus, conceptions of "mother" and "father", whether idealised or not, remain important to the children of migrants. In these households, migrant women resort to greater levels of mobile care of their children and parents to ensure maintenance and renewal of these households.

In working-class households, domesticity of women is accepted relatively unproblematically. While the female kin of migrants are primarily responsible for all household work and for the distribution of resources, there is also an acceptance that the woman who makes all these decisions has the authority to do so. However, strain is experienced in the households of male migrants when fathers return or "visit" and try to reclaim their authority as household heads. It appears, however, that these households are able to cope with the reconfiguration of authority when the father is present. The consistent use of the word "visit" to refer to men's trips home denotes the impression that their presence is temporary. "Visiting" men share the sense of being out of place.

Women from working-class households, like the women from marginalised households, are often involved in collective associations. Funeral societies and *stokvels* are, in the main, very informal in nature. That is, they do not require a monthly contribution; instead members contribute a small amount on the death of one the members (or their dependant kin). These associations ensure that households are able to provide a proper burial for their household and community members. Similarly, prayer meetings require a "small donation" and a group prayer, in the knowledge that death, need and misfortune visit everyone. These activities involve not only the spreading of the reproductive load beyond the households but also, by hosting meetings of these associations in turn, other

(younger) members of households are introduced to and inculcated with the humane ideals (cultural capital) underlying these networks.

As discussed in Chapter Five, the need for support from other households is even greater for members of marginalised households. Members of these households visit other households in the hope of finding a meal. However, building a supportive, caring society is under threat by the illicit activities some members engage in to secure income. Conflict is generated in households and in their communities around the growing and selling of marijuana, involvement in gangs and stock theft. Conflict around these illicit activities is not expressed in terms of its illegal nature, but rather as arguments about the personal safety of household and community members.

Similarly, while the weight of domesticity rests on the shoulders of grandmothers in the households of the marginalised, they are also targets of abuse from men and younger women, who prefer to spend household incomes on individual luxuries such as alcohol or clothing (Mosoetsa 2005; Fakier and Cock 2009). In the case of marginalised households, mobile care is not an easy option as travel between site of origin and destination, as well as mobile telecommunications, is prohibitively expensive. Household reproduction is relegated to the remaining members of these households, sometimes resulting in *de facto* child-headed households. These households are therefore only able to secure their maintenance with great difficulty, while renewal is nearly impossible. In Chapter Five I discuss the great commitment and care displayed in child-headed households. However, one has to factor in the possibility that, in the absence of guidance from adults, children may stray into anti-social behaviour with negative effects on society.

1.7 Conclusion

I conclude the dissertation with a discussion of the implications of my research for future studies, urging an extension of the focus of the impact of class on households to a much wider and quantitative scale. As the dissertation illustrates,

a focus on the class location of households has to be included in household studies. Such a focus would bring out the complexity of needs of households in different classes and could lead to policy formulation with greater impact.

A note of caution is re-introduced in the conclusion. The cultural and social capital of the poor is great, and enables them to use non-material resources to stem the commodification of social life. However, those resources are subject to exploitation. For example, while marginalised households are able to use their social capital to gain resources from their communities through their investment in funeral societies and prayer meetings, this form of capital is not enough to ensure that children and the elderly live in safety and with adequate care. Instead, the security of their households is dependant, and the care given by those who are themselves in need is sometimes exploited.

I also discuss the need for a decent work framework in South Africa, which would entail the progressive realisation of a decent work agenda. A decent work agenda would recognise that "the production of life itself" is the responsibility and to the benefit of all South Africans – regardless of class, gender and age (Dietrich 1996: 344). To illustrate this point, policy should be aimed at recognising the significance of carework for all households in order to ensure that adequate support for households is provided in those areas where public support is missing, such as childcare for pre-school children and after school hours, and care for the elderly and infirm.

The reproductive needs of migrant households differ according to the gap in resources that households class locations afford them. In the conclusion, I argue that marginalised households are most in need of paid work close to their homes to sustain their households, materially and emotionally. Once they are members of the working class, they would also require public and social support which the workplace cannot extend. That is, the public provision of affordable utilities such as electricity, sanitation, clean and running water and safe transport is essential for

marginalised and working-class households given the nature of the neighbourhoods where they currently reside.

Finally, recommendations are made for socialised care for the young and the elderly – the latter is a special need identified in the households of semi-professional migrant households – to ensure not only the maintenance but also the survival of South African society.

Chapter Two
Class Formation and the Gender Order in Emnambithi

I left school in 1986 at the end of Standard 5 [Grade 7] because I was 17 years … too old for school. I had to work on the farm and couldn't read a lot. For three years I could work hard on the farm. When we were chased off the farm in August 1989, we came to Matiwane's Kop and I started working in a fletcraft[24] factory in Danskraal [an industrial estate]. Four months after I was married my husband told me to stop working. A year later, in 1991, he died and I left Nombuso [daughter] with my mother and went to work in iGoli. I was chased from that job six years later when I asked for leave to visit my children. I braid people's hair now, but it is difficult here. If I could work in iGoli I would, just for the money…. I love it for the money, but I love Emnambithi for my children (Interview: Grace Ndaba, 23 May 2008).

2.1   Introduction

Emnambithi forms part of the Uthukela district in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), a province of South Africa (see Figure 2.1). Uthukela is the third-largest of ten municipal districts in KwaZulu-Natal. Situated in the northern part of the province, it is midway between Johannesburg and Durban. This district spans approximately 11 500 km^2 and encompasses five local municipalities – Emnambithi, Indaka, Umtshezi and Imbabazane, Okhahlamba, and the Giants Castle Game Reserve District Managed Area (or DMA as it is known in the

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[24] Fletcraft are fabricated tin sheets used to construct temporary structures but more generally used by squatters. They were also used by the apartheid government to construct dwellings for victims of forced removals. Often, these temporary dwellings became permanent because they were the only form of accommodation (Surplus People's Project [SPP] 1983a).

district) (Uthukela 2004). Emnambithi is home to 33 per cent[25] – the largest proportion – of Uthukela's population.

Source: Uthukela 2004: 15

Figure 2.1: Uthukela District, 2004

Emnambithi is one of the four local councils in the greater KZN province where most of the province's income is generated; the others are Durban-Pinetown, Newcastle-Madadeni, and the Richardsbay-Empangeni area (Uthukela 2007). Despite this, unemployment is high in the municipal district – 59 per cent for Uthukela, and in Emnambithi relatively lower at 49 per cent.

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[25] The population of Emnambithi is estimated at 225 000 people, while Uthukela's population is approximately 714 908 (Statistics South Africa 2005a, 2007a).

In 2001, the area was re-demarcated. The town of Ladysmith was amalgamated with the Emnambithi bantustan of the apartheid era as well as several "black spots" created by South Africa's history of "racialised dispossession". (Both these apartheid constructions are shaded in black in Figure 2.) The "new" local municipality was renamed Emnambithi. Emnambithi now officially includes townships such as Peacetown and Watersmeet, which were part of the KwaZulu bantustan. These townships retain vestiges of previous land legislation. In the transition period, just before South Africa's first democratic elections, the Zulu king struck a deal with the transitional government to secure control over bantustan property. After several amendments to appease traditional leaders who feared they would lose control over their areas of rule, the KwaZulu Natal Ingonyama Trust Land Act was passed in 1998 and came into effect in 2000. The Act transferred the approximately 2 300 000 hectares of land which were previously administered by the South African Development Trust. Traditional leaders (*amakhosi*) control residence, and while there are prescriptions in the law for the collection of rates, most people live there without financial cost. However, a new round of contestation was unleashed over the delivery of basic infrastructure by the local state.

Figure 2.2: Emnambithi prior to re-demarcation, 2001

As discussed below, there is little to no access to water, electricity and public transport. Demands are made on the local council, which does not collect rates or taxes in these townships, yet the local council experiences opposition from traditional leaders.[26] New cleavages in the community cohere around two groups with changed identities. Traditional leaders are seen as illiterate and hampered by tradition, while local ANC councillors are the new elite, educated and seen as a modernising force.[27]

The population of Emnambithi numbered approximately 225 500 people – 90 per cent African, 1 per cent coloured, 5 per cent Indian and 4 per cent white – according to the 2001 national census. At the time, 50 529 household were

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[26] Interviews: Assistant Town Planner, 4 July and 28 October 2007.

[27] Interviews: Assistant Town Planner, 4 July and 28 October 2007; Chief Kaleni, 16 March 2007; Mrs Mazibuko, 10 March 2007.

estimated to be spread over 25 wards. An age distribution of Emnambithi citizens reveals that the 37 per cent (the largest proportion) fall in the 15-34 years age group, while the smallest proportion, 4 per cent, is in the over-65 age group (Table 2.1).The fact that the over-65 age groups is so small is significant as the old age pensions of R870 per month that these citizens are able to draw on make a big a difference to the 24 per cent of households in this area where there is no income. In addition, in the total of nearly 83 000 people unemployed is at 49 per cent, well above the national average.

Table 2.1   Male: female ratio by age, Emnambithi, 2001

Age	Males	Females	Male: Female Ratio
0-4	12 465	12 360	1.01
5-14	25 934	26 645	0.97
15-34	39 783	43 711	0.91
35-64	23 682	31 658	0.75
0ver 65	3 106	6 115	0.51
Total	104 970	120 489	0.87

Source: Statistics South Africa (2005a).

Table 2.1 also shows a startling disproportion in sex in the age groups 35-64 and especially over 65 years. While the 0.75 male to female rate in the 35-64 age group signals a higher male than female migration in the area, in the over-65 age group there is an indication of the effects of non-return by male migrants. This was also confirmed in interviews.

The relative absence of men over the age of 65 is also an indication of the high mortality rate of men younger than 65 years, specifically in the 40-64 year age group, in South Africa as a whole. A statistical study of mortality rates in South Africa from 1997 to 2003 shows that there were more male deaths than female dates, averaging 53:47 respectively (Statistics South Africa 2005b). Although the sex ratio of deaths has equalised from 2000, the general pattern reveals that male

deaths in the 40-64 year age group significantly exceed the deaths of women. The sex ratio of deaths for the seven-year period showed that in the 40-64 age group, on average, 157 men died for every 100 women who died. The sex ratio was highest for deaths in the 50-54 year age group, where over the 1997-2003 period 172 men died for every 100 women who died (Statistics South Africa 2005b: 17). As the biggest population group in South Africa, it is not surprising that the highest number of deaths were recorded in the African population. However, this study did not aggregate the mortality rate into age *and* population group variables. The study does suggest that the high death rate of relatively young African men could be linked to tuberculosis and HIV (Statistics South Africa 2005b: 45).

In an earlier study I examined the impact of industrial restructuring on households and society in Ezakheni/Ladysmith by focusing on the restructuring of work at Defy, a white goods manufacturer in Ezakheni (Fakier 2005). The research found that, as a result of employment restructuring, there were two groups of workers at Defy. One group of full-time workers, highly unionised, predominantly male and older, gains from the benefits of a new, racially equitable industrial relations system in post-apartheid South Africa. Another group of younger, un-unionised, often female workers are hired on short-term contracts at lower wages with little access to the social wage in the form of pensions, paid sick leave and health benefits that full-time workers enjoy. Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout (2008) argue that while these workers perform the same tasks, working side by side, the difference between them can only be determined by looking at conditions in the "hidden abode of reproduction", the household.

The study of households and community in Emnambithi poses fundamental contradictions. On the one hand, there are the opportunities presented by a new democratic dispensation, and on the other, "a sense of fatalism and frustration" as the working class continues to struggle in post-apartheid South Africa (Webster *et al.* 2008: 126). Because their study was focused on restructuring at a specific workplace, it did not capture the dynamics of households of the unemployed and migrant worker.

To understand the problems of unemployment and migration in Emnambithi, this chapter draws significantly on the concept of "racialised dispossession" to illustrate how African households were deprived of land through successive racial land and labour policies of the colonial and apartheid governments (Hart 2002a). However, I depart from Hart's analysis in two ways. Firstly, Hart refers to the history of forced land removal in Natal as a "process of accumulation", to illustrate that dispossession was the result of a range of different policies, some of them successful, others severely contested and sidestepped by the people of Emnambithi. I will plot this argument alongside a history of Emnambithi and demonstrate that, along with changing exertions of power by different actors, *class stratification*, which still exists today, was forged.

Racial segregation, which laid the foundations for and eventually culminated in apartheid, was a process of accumulation and dispossession. This chapter shows how the articulation[28] of land and labour policies and politics in Natal and the KwaZulu bantustan gave form to a distinct class structure. Zulu society was characterised by a Zulu monarchy constantly trying to assert its authority, tribal chiefs exploited by colonial and apartheid governments, an emerging educated class – the *kholwa* – and a peasantry coerced into wage labour as a result of forced removals. Innes and O'Meara (1976) and Legassick and Wolpe (1976) distinguish even further between unemployed and marginalised sub-categories within a reserve army of labour. Using these concepts, the chapter discusses a history of class formation in Emnambithi.

The second way in which I depart from Hart is to examine the current conditions of social reproduction in households in Emnambithi. Hart (2002a: 13-14) argues that the history of racialised dispossession and the current neoliberal policies of the post-apartheid government, which have been devolved to the local state, are constitutive of the conditions of social reproduction. She also strongly opposes the

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[28] Borrowing heavily from Hart's formulation, I use "articulation" to demonstrate how two or more concepts relate and combine, and to speak about (articulate) such a combination. Hart draws on the work of Antonio Gramsci and Stuart Hall in her use of the term.

dichotomies expressed in "globalization discourse". When we contrast terms, such as male-female, local-global, rural-urban, she argues, the assumption is that one of the terms has supremacy and acts *upon* the other. In the examples above, male, global and urban dominate the terms female, local and rural, which are seen as passive receptors of power exertions.

However, she suggests, these arenas are populated with people expressing agency in their everyday lives. The local, rural and female are all contested spaces and should not be seen only as affects of larger social processes; they are constitutive of a globalising society. Discourses of globalisation are disabling as we ignore the power inherent in some of the most important, yet ignored, spaces of society. Yet Hart does not examine or illustrate the "conditions of social reproduction" in one of the most important spaces where social reproduction takes place, that is, in households. By neglecting the "hidden abode of reproduction" (Martin and Beittel 1987; Webster *et al.* 2008), she in turn renders households as passive receptors of the power of the state (local or national), the economy and a racialised geography. In this context, migration can be seen as an active strategy by households to secure their reproduction and to retain occupation of their homes in their areas of choice. The household, this dissertation argues and illustrates, is a very active space where production and reproduction are secured.

Webster *et al.* (2008) refer to the "retreat into the household" by workers when workplaces are threatened by global imperatives to restructure, but they do not look at the internal dynamics within the household nor do they examine class dynamics across households. In the same vein, this dissertation is also a critique of Smith and Wallerstein's (1992) proposal of flexible households in developing economies. While they show how households actively manipulate their income pooling and distribution mechanisms and activities, especially in times of economic stress, they are unable to explain the different abilities households display to weather external pressure. That is, they ignore class differences across households.

This chapter also introduces the notion that work articulates with social reproduction. This articulation occurs within a specific gender order – constructed socially and historically – which refers to the nature of power relations between men and women (Connell 1987: 98-99). Connell argues that interactions of the state, family and capital give rise to specific structures of power, labour and emotion, which in turn structure the experience of gender. I draw on the historical work of feminist writers such as Bozzoli (1983), Cock (1990), Gaitskell (1990), Hughes (1990) and Walker (1990), who argue that an ideology of domesticity pre-existed the imposition of colonial rule and was further entrenched by Christian education and South Africa' migrant labour system. The articulation of class and gender provides a context in which to analyse work in relation to how paid and unpaid contributions to households are constructed. It speaks to the esteem with which household members are perceived in their households and community, and the extent to which they are able to exert power within their relations to others (Connell 1987).

This chapter draws on secondary literature on the area, historical work on class and gender in reserve and bantustan economies, as well as some data from 92 interviews I conducted with nearly 40 interviewees about Emnambithi. An important issue that arose in the interviews has been the nomenclature of the area. While Emnambithi went through different formulations – starting as the Klipriver basin, the establishment of the town of Ladysmith, removals from land reserved for African use to freehold farms, the bantustans and Ezakheni – the Zulu people continued to think of this area as Emnambithi. I chart below the shifting geography of Emnambithi and how this predominantly Zulu community was stratified. The final part of the chapter is an introduction to the current conditions of social reproduction in households in Emnambithi.

2.2 Early Class Structure: Chiefs, *Kholwa* and Peasantry

The history of Emnambithi is said to have started with the occupation by the San people of the Klipriver basin as early as the Stone Age. This nation of people retreated into the nearby Drakensberg when threatened by the activities of Shaka, the Zulu king, and his army (Harrison 1990; Uthukela 2004). Indeed, the area is deemed to have been named *Emnambithi* by King Shaka in the 1820s when, after a long trek, drinking the sweet water of the Klip river, he pronounced it *mnambitheka*, meaning tasty or sweet-tasting.[29]

Two decades later the Voortrekkers occupied the Klipriver basin and in 1843 declared an independent Klipriver Republic. However, this small state soon collapsed in 1847. With the retreat of some of the Afrikaner settlers, the British colonial government – which annexed Natal in 1845 – established Ladysmith as a frontier town to control the Zulu population (Harrison 1990). Ladysmith was proclaimed a town on 20 June 1850 and for the rest of the nineteenth century British settlers flocked there. A railway station was established in 1886, making Ladysmith an important stopover between the Witwatersrand and Durban harbour.

From the 1840s a range of recommendations by a commission headed by Theophilus Shepstone set the trend for British administration in Natal. Shepstone, the "British Diplomatic Agent of the Native Tribes residing within the District" was the architect of the colonial administration in Natal and set in place policies – at first contested – which eventually laid the foundation for segregation[30] in South Africa (Welsh 1971; Marks 1978). The Shepstonian system relied heavily on harnessing the authority of Zulu chiefs to control their people in favour of British rule and policies. Shepstone's recommendations to the British colonial administration had four important components.

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[29] http://www.zulu-culture-history.com/emnambithikwazulunatal.htm. Last accessed 22 October 2007.

[30] Legassick defines segregation as "restrictions on permanent urbanization, territorial separation of land ownership, the use of traditional institutions as providers of 'social services' and means of social control" (Legassick 1975: 250, cited in Marks 1978: 174).

First, there was the system of "divide and rule",[31] which aimed to split African people in Natal into different clans, thereby preventing a united attack on white power. Importantly, this component led to the allocation of reserved lands for African tribal occupation. Secondly, taxation aimed to raise revenue, force Africans into the labour market and effect social change. Social change, Shepstone intended, would result from revenue extracted from Africans and ploughed back into educating African people in industrial schools in reserves and by upgrading the status of women by formally recognising marriages and divorces among Zulus. However, the third element prescribed that Zulu customary law would not be entirely "abrogated" and would be upheld "except where the law was repugnant to the general principles of humanity and decency recognized throughout the whole civilised world". The fourth component was the encouragement of the education of Africans in Christian missionary schools. These Christian Africans (the so-called *kholwa*[32]) would be exempted from customary law (Welsh 1971: 12-13).

The immediate outcome of Shepstone's recommendations was the relocation of Africans to locations or reserves[33] for the purpose of keeping ethnically based tribes (including those who preceded the Zulu people in Natal) separate and thus maintaining peace between black and white. However, these recommendations

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[31] Mamdani (1996) uses the term "indirect rule" to refer to a system of colonial rule over Africans in rural areas by using existing chieftainship structures. He argues that in urban centres rule was direct between the ruling administration and colonial (white) citizens. In rural, more traditional, areas African subjects (i.e., those denied citizenship rights) were ruled by chiefs who sought to maintain their power over their people and who thus aligned themselves with the reign of the colonial powers.

[32] The literal translation of *kholwa* is "believers", signifying the importance of Christianity for this class (Welsh 1971: 50).

[33] A note on terminology is required at this point. The terms "reserve", "bantustan" and "homeland", while all referring to land designated for African use, ownership and control, have different meanings in South African history. Reserves refer to such land in the pre-apartheid period. Bantustans and homelands represent how these constructions evolved as policy and practice of the apartheid state and "refer to various ethnic political constructions that have been created on the basis of previous reserves" (SPP 1983a: x). Thus the Zululand reserve became the KwaZulu bantustan. As in the SPP reports, this thesis uses the term bantustan. The term homeland and its other formulation, "national state", "present an image of these territories as economically viable, politically separate entities that are the only true and traditional 'homes' of the African people of South Africa, themselves divided along ethnic lines, and thus serve to justify the apartheid policy" (SPP 1983a: x).

met resistance from both colonial administrators and farmers. The former succeeded in cutting up the reserves into fragmented, unproductive pieces of land to limit agricultural production there. Farmers objected to agriculture in the reserves because they wanted cheap labour, which would be undermined by independent production in the reserves. "Africans, in their [Natal farmers'] view, had no right to exist as an independent peasantry…. They valued their independence and self-sufficiency, and took employment when necessity drove them to do so" (Welsh 1971: 179-82). As a result, in 1875 Shepstone opposed the purchase of land by tribes or communities, implying that it was unsuitable for educated Africans to return to farming.

However, an African landowning class had already been in place in Natal since the 1850s, in the form of the *kholwa*, who had become a prosperous, Christian, educated section of Zulu society; with their income from the sale of agricultural products, they were able to purchase land. The Surplus People's Project (1983a: 24, citing Etherington 1975: 4) states, "The first *kholwa* purchases were not motivated by a desperate search for food, but by an opportunistic desire for good land held on secure tenure and located, if possible, near ready markets". The *kholwa* represent another layer in the stratification of Zulu society, previously structured around a Zulu monarchy to which Zulu chiefs paid deference. This petty bourgeoisie class originated from Christian missions and is referred to by Marks as "the despised, the disparaged, and the disaffected, drawn to the mission stations by the prospects of land and security" (Marks 1986: 45, cited in Hart 2002a: 74).

The *kholwa's* relationship with missionaries enabled them to buy land in Christian missions or to use missionaries to purchase land on their behalf. In 1867, a group of 30-40 *kholwa* men purchased a block of farms north of Ladysmith, known as Driefontein.[34] The Driefontein *kholwa*, who ascribed to mid-Victorian ideals of liberalism and progress, distanced themselves from Zulu tradition and political

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[34] Even today this area is refered to as Abantungwa-Kholwa (Interview: Assistant Town Planner, 28 October 2007).

rule by chieftains, sided with the British and fought against the Zulus during the 1879 Anglo-Zulu war (Marks 1978; Hart 2002a). They became known as "the amambuka-traitors to the white man" (Marks 1978: 191).

The Zulu people paid an additional price for their defeat at the hands of the British. In return for their support of the British, the Boers claimed 800 farms, which were part of the Zululand reserve. By the time Britain handed over control of Zululand to the Natal administration in 1897, the area was open to white settlement. As a result, in the last decade of the nineteenth century there was a decline in African land ownership, which had a concomitant effect on the fortunes of the African peasantry. This period heralded the start of rapid racialised dispossession in response to the need of white farmers for cheap labour on their farms and the labour requirements of the burgeoning mining industry. Agricultural production experienced a massive boom as a result of diamond and gold mining, and the demand for cheap farm and mining labour set the stage for a range of tax, land and mobility laws, controlling African movement and restricting their access to land, forcing blacks into waged labour (SPP 1983b). The foundations of the migrant labour system of South Africa, cohering around land-labour policies, were laid.

By the end of the nineteenth century Ladysmith became a major site of another battle, this time between the British and Boer armies in the Anglo-Boer War. The siege of Ladysmith lasted four months, during which great damage was done to the town's infrastructure and economy. Relieving Ladysmith on February 1900 signified a moral victory for the British. The battle and the siege made Ladysmith a main attraction on the "Battlefields Tour" of the area, which commemorates the history of these events for many international visitors. Hart (2000a) illustrates how the siege is ingrained in the memories of Afrikaner and English descendants of the war when she describes how an Afrikaner councillor left a public meeting after taking offence at the use of English to the exclusion of Afrikaans (Hart 2002a: 256). However, the reification of the Anglo-Boer War through the work of the Ladysmith Historical Society, in collaboration with Ladysmith Tourism and

the Siege Museum, serves to exclude the history of the Zulu people in Emnambithi to a large extent.

In 1910 Natal became part of the Union of South Africa (SPP 1983b). Hart suggests that the co-existence of Afrikaner and English was made possible by a "rapprochement between British and Boers at the end of the war [which] came about through the political exclusion, economic exploitation, and further dispossession of black South Africans" (Hart 2008: 693). However, the Surplus Peoples Project (1983b) suggests that the Boers and the British co-operated prior to the Anglo-Boer war to dispossess the Zulus of their land, through their combined efforts to defeat the Zulu people from 1879-1887. At the end of the Anglo-Boer war land, such as in the Klipriver basin, was not returned to the Zulu people but remained in the hands of the Boers. To stem the power of Dinizulu, king of the Zulu people at the time, who was imprisoned after the war, Britain handed over Zululand to the Natal Administration and opened up the area even more to white settlement (SPP 1983b).

While the 1913 Land Act, which prohibited the purchase of land by Africans, had already made inroads in the settlement patterns of African people in the area, African landowners were still able to hold onto their property and provide tenancy to others evicted from white farms and those resisting removals to the Zululand reserve (SPP 1983b; Hart 2002a). A *rentier* class of African farmers emerged. African freehold property, providing some harbour to other African labour tenants, became known as "black spots"[35] during the apartheid period. What was clearly emerging in the area was a sharp class division between educated, relatively wealthy *kholwa* with access to land; and an African peasantry, denied property ownership and rapidly forced into wage labour in the face of shrinking livelihoods.

Well-known African nationalists such as Selby Msimang from Driefontein and

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[35] "Black spots" is an official term used by the apartheid government to refer to freehold land acquired by Africans prior to the 1913 Land Act and which was situated in what were considered "white areas".

Chief Luthuli from Groutville were *kholwa*, indicating the importance of this class for the history of South Africa (SPP 1983b: 25). These African freehold owners "formed something of an elite within the wider African society, linked to each other by a complex network of marriage alliances, a common, staunchly mission-Christian culture, often highly educated and independent of traditional tribal structures and institutions" (SPP 1983b: 25). The need for wives who were equally or appropriately educated was met by missionary schools. In 1869 the first girls' seminary was established in Inanda to "train students to be Christian wives and mothers … and had a special course for run-away kraal girls escaping from polygamous marriages" (Horrell 1963, cited in Welsh 1971: 50; Hughes 1990).

Seminaries, such as Inanda, were crucial in transmitting the ideals of Christianity to *kholwa* women within a gendered understanding of what womanhood entailed. Not only were social norms such as monogamy preached, but also major subjects such as "dressmaking, embroidery, music, drawing and some grammar" defined the role of this class of women in the household (Hughes 1990: 198). The education of *kholwa* women was not only racially distinct, but also had a clear class basis. The education of African women for domesticity had two clear components[36] – on the one hand, *kholwa* women were educated in "the management of girls' own future households as Christian wives", and, on the other hand, young African women from the other classes were trained "for service in white households as domestic workers" (Cock 1990: 76).

The employment of Xhosa women in domestic service preceded such employment of other African women in the rest of South Africa (Cock 1990).However, an increase in domestic work among African women coincided with attempts to eradicate labour tenancy on farms. In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, labour tenancy was a significant feature in the Klipriver basin and in Natal as a whole. While the majority of Africans were living and working as tenants on white-owned farms, *kholwa* farmers also formed a significant

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[36] In Chapter Three I discuss how certain African households used the decision to train their women as nurses for African hospitals as a means of upward social mobility.

proportion of land ownership in the area. Forced removals of peasants from their own properties and white farms to land owned by the *kholwa* established this category of the African petit bourgeoisie as a *rentier* class (Hart 2002b). The *kholwa* had in the meantime grown closer to tribal chiefs, and formed syndicates in an attempt to acquire more land to sustain accumulation (Marks 1978). However, growing resistance from white farmers, who began to see labour tenancy as the de facto acquisition of land by African tenants, combined with severe droughts and agricultural losses and increasing pressure from the state shrank the incidence of peasant farming (Hart 2002a).

Land-labour resistance found a voice for a brief period in the Industrial and Commercial Union Workers (ICU) in the 1920s. Bradford (1984) remarks on the strength of labour tenants employed in casual work compared to workers drawn from the reserves. Labour tenants were less willing to work for low wages in jobs more strenuous than their usual agricultural labour and drew strength from the limited security provided by agricultural production. This limited security was even further reduced in the face of the ever-shrinking quality and quantity of land that African homesteads had in their possession. At the same time, opposition to the ICU by the Zulu monarchy, tribal chiefs and the *kholwa* was strong. Combined with opposition from white farmers, industry and the government, the ICU soon folded. Bundy (1987) blames the urban bias of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) for not including rural land issues in their political agenda.

The 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act had a significant effect on the land-labour characteristics of South Africa, and in particular on African's control over access to land. The act had two important dimensions. First, it legislated the "geographical dimensions" of existing and new reserve land and of land in South Africa opened up for African occupation through individual, group or Trust purchase (SPP 1983b). The result was that areas such as the Klipriver district were redefined and some parts of what used to be freehold African land became part of reserve land, sections of what used to be reserve land were opened to white

occupation, and African occupation of some portions of land outside the reserve was legalised. The second dimension of the Act inscribed into law the system of Trust tenure, which had been introduced in Natal by the Shepstone commission. The South African Native Trust (SANT) became a legal body "in which ownership of African reserves in South Africa was vested" (SPP 1983b: 31). The SANT evolved into the South African Bantu Trust (SABT) and eventually the South African Development Trust (SADT) in the 1970s. Almost a century later, the roots of segregation, planted by Shepstone, were still bearing fruit. Later in the chapter I will discuss the notion that these policies formed a template for apartheid.[37]

In the meantime, Ladysmith, the mostly white town, recovered from the war. By the 1920s it was a major link in South Africa's rail system, employing many of the town's white residents. In 1948 the first cotton mill was opened and manufacturing overtook the South African Railway Services as the biggest employer in the town (Harrison 1990). Frame Textiles was one of the first companies to benefit from a cheap supply of (mostly male) black labour and opened its doors in Ladysmith in 1950.[38] However, labour unrest soon struck at Consolidated Cotton – Ladysmith's first cotton mill – and many workers left because of the low wages and poor working conditions to take up jobs in Durban or Johannesburg (Hart 2002a: 137-8). While some migrant workers saw land and labour issues as intertwined, many, especially women, saw work in urban centres as an escape from back-breaking farm labour and traditional patriarchal authority.[39]

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[37] Vestiges of the SADT are evident in post-apartheid South Africa, in the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act of 1997, discussed later in the chapter.

[38] Almost six decades later, Frame Textiles continued to operate in Emnambithi. Threats of imminent closure were used to counter workers' demands for better conditions. Finally, in November 2008, Frame closed its doors for good.

[39] In a similar vein Bozzoli and Nkotsoe (1991) dispel assumptions that women were passive to patriarchy when they discuss the migration of Bafokeng women in search of livelihoods on their own terms.

This was also the period during which the National Party came to power. After its election in 1948, this government created the bantustans with a series of laws. In Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 were introduced around the notion of ethnically based bantustans located in existing reserves (SPP 1983a). The period also marked a time when white farmers in the Klipriver district strongly opposed the acquisition of more land as provided for in the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act – for the occupation of Africans that were to be removed from black spots. Ironically, these protests stalled the removal of black spots until other land was acquired. The first removals in the Klipriver basin took place in 1963, after a decade of resistance (Desmond 1970; SPP 1983b; Hart 2002a).

Forced removals were given impetus by the amendment in 1956 of the Trust and Land Act of 1936. This amendment prohibited white farmers from allowing Africans to "squat" on their farms – that is, to be purely rent-paying occupants on white-owned land – and to register all labour tenant contracts with the aim of getting rid of all African farmers in "white" South Africa (SPP 1983b) A report by the Du Toit Commission described the continued existence of African landownership and occupation on white farms as "*die beswarting van die Platteland*",[40] pointing out the absentee landlord system of white farmers, while leaving their farms in the management of "non-White" managers and sharecroppers – a phenomenon which was prevalent in Natal (SSP 1983b: 45).

A farm bought in 1908 at Khumalosville outside Ladysmith was the first black spot focused on in the Klipriver district in the 1950s. Desmond (1970) reports how the people from Khumalosville engaged the authorities in a protracted legal battle to fight their removal. Despite promises of bigger plots and compensation for their land, they refused to move. Eventually, under the threat of arrest, removals took place. The farmers from Khumalosville were handed "a tent and half a bag of mielie meal", and faced the prospect of buying property half the size of their previous land at double the price of the compensation they were given

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[40] Blackening of the countryside. (SPP: 1983b: 45)

(Desmond 1970: 68-9).

According to Hart (2002a: 97), black opposition in the area cohered around "less elitist" principles of the ANC, fundamentally influenced by the presence of Govan Mbeki in the area. However, Elias Mngadi – quoted at the beginning of this chapter and cited by Hart (2002a) and the SPP (1983b) – who was a Liberal Party organiser and previous landowner in Roosboom in Emnambithi, cited the involvement of other organisations in the resistance to removals from Khumalosville. In addition to the Northern Natal African Landowners Association, formed by the ANC and the Liberal Party, a local party, the Umviko (Protection) Party was formed around the protection of Khumalosville. However, this organised resistance crumbled when it met the full force of the apartheid state and removals of Africans from black spots and white farms were enforced.

Desmond (1970) also points to confusion within the apartheid state over the implementation of removal policies. When he visited the Klipriver district in the early 1960s, the people of Roosboom, Driefontein, Watersmeet and Burford lived under the threat of removals. Yet, "the Department started making new roads near Watersmeet and even started building a school, miles from existing houses; therefore it was thought that more people were to be moved into the area" (Desmond 1970: 67). He argues that the "demoralizing uncertainty" of removals around Ladysmith was exacerbated by "the government's assumption that Africans, like cattle, do not need to be consulted … the government see no need whatsoever to be even consistent in the application of their policy. People who have been moved once into a 'homeland' can be moved again arbitrarily (Desmond 1970: 68).

The continued removal of Africans from white-owned farms did not get unqualified support from farmers in Natal. They opposed the disruption of what had become an "insecure [farm] labour supply" and the cost of what increasingly became a "fulltime wage-labour system" in the face of labour tenants increasingly leaving their farms for the reserves or industrialising metropoles. To capture and

gain from a proletarianised African labour supply, Ladysmith was designated a Growth Point by the South African government in 1968. Although an industrial estate already existed at Danskraal, economic and employment growth was stagnant. Harrison (1990: 117) shows that in the 1970s, while the local economy gained from an increase in manufacturing, decreasing outputs in the agricultural, commerce and transport sectors often outweighed these gains. African residents of the Klipriver basin were to face another massive policy exercise. The creation of the KwaZulu bantustan became official at the end of the 1960s.

2.3 Emergence of Proletarians and Lumpen Proletarians

Demand and supply of labour was of great concern to policymakers, farmers, farm workers and households at the time. At the end of the 1960s labour tenancy was abolished in Natal (SPP 1983b). In the 1970s the forced removal strategies of the apartheid state hit Natal and KwaZulu with a vengeance, more than a decade later than in the rest of the country. Segregation in Natal had taken on a distinct form based on the Shepstonian system. This was "the allocation of reserved lands for African tribal occupation; the recognition of customary law; administration through acceptable traditional authorities; the exemption of Christian Africans from customary law; and the attempt to prevent permanent African urbanization through the institution of a togt labour system" (Marks 1978: 174).

The strengthening of tribal authority had a contradictory effect on land removal in Natal. The class divisions that emerged between the Zulu monarchy, tribal chiefs, the *kholwa*, peasant farmers and a growing migrant labour class created a template of divide and rule for the apartheid state. However, peasant farmers who resisted being drawn into farm labour aligned with the Zulu monarchy, which was attempting to prevent land under its control being forcibly taken over. These characteristics of the Natal region meant that the KwaZulu bantustan came into existence much later than any of the other bantustans in South Africa (Marks 1978; SPP 1983b).

The establishment of KwaZulu was a result of the rapprochement between the Zulu king and the *kholwa* – both parties wanting to enforce authority and modernise the Zulu people. In the early part of the twentieth century, chiefs were seen as "'government boys' while the royal family could in some sense be seen, like the people, to be the victims of the colonial administration" (Marks 1978: 187). *Inkatha ya ka Zulu*[41] was founded in 1923 based on an alliance "between the Zulu royal family and the Natal *kholwa* …. as a deliberate attempt to reduce the tensions which had arisen as a result of the growth of internal social stratification" (Marks 1978: 190). The *kholwa* had found a platform from which to ensure the modernisation of the Zulu people, while the Zulu royal family found a way to assert their authority over tribal chiefs and the Zulu people, and to get assistance from the prosperous *kholwa* to pay off their debts.

Marks (1978) argues that in the 1920s the authority of the Zulu royal family was severely threatened by the popularity of the ICU. An alliance between the royal family and the *kholwa* had a common purpose as the *kholwa,* who were also guilty of exploiting labour tenants, also saw the ICU as a threat. This alliance was met favourably by the colonial administration, which encouraged the growth of this movement based on cultural and racial unity rather than class and labour interests, and saw this as a way to entrench traditional administration.

Inkatha ya ka Zulu was eventually transformed into *Inkatha yakwa Zulu* (known as Inkatha), the National Cultural Liberation Movement founded by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1975. Cope (1990) linked the growing Zulu petit bourgeoisie[42] in the area straddling Emnambithi – formerly known as Northern Natal – to the emergence of a cultural nationalism and the establishment of the Inkatha cultural organisation in the 1920s. These movements were eventually consolidated in the launch of the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in 1975 and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in 1990. Inkatha was to coalesce the

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[41] Literally, "a grass coil place on the head [of the Zulu people] for carrying a load". The use of the term is a conscious iteration of Zulu culture.

[42] The *kholwa* of Northern Natal comprised primarily teachers, nurses, clerks and clergymen.

power of chiefs, Zulu royalty and a growing Zulu petit bourgeoisie in one cultural movement. The apartheid government seized this opportunity to overcome opposition to their policies in Natal and in 1970 – prior to the establishment of Inkatha – the KwaZulu bantustan came into existence with territorial authority vested in the Chief Executive, Gatsha Buthelezi. KwaZulu never became fully "independent" as did the Transkei, Venda and Bophutatswana and Ciskei. Buthulezi claims this to be his role in the anti-apartheid struggle. Indeed, he did resist independence successfully, but then in 1979 the ANC, under pressure from the internal resistance movement, turned against Buthulezi (Callinicos 2004).

With terms such as "national states" and "self-determination" the apartheid government implied that life in the bantustans was under the control of its relocated population. Yet, the ownership of land in the bantustans was in the hands of chiefs who had the power to assign residence to people or take it away based on obedience to tribal rule. The quality of farmland had deteriorated because of overpopulation, soil erosion and stresses of communal farming, to the extent where farming became nearly impossible (Desmond 1970; Clarke and Ngobese 1975; SPP 1983b). The higher cost of living – because households were dependent on imports from outside – in a hostile environment meant a great proportion of young men migrated to wage-labour in "white" South Africa. The male to female rate of 37.5 to 62.5 in KwaZulu in 1975 illustrates this pattern. The effect of migration on household structure is further emphasised by the fact that in some areas of KwaZulu in the 18 to 55 years age group only 0.72 per cent (i.e., 7.2 in 1,000) of men were living with their households on a permanent basis (Clarke and Ngobese 1975). In these households, characterised by a high preponderance of small children, children under the age of 10 were seen as an economic burden. Needing more and intensive childcare, young children prevented women and older children from fully engaging in farm work. Unlike in the rest of South Africa, "illegitimate" children in the bantustans were not provided with state assistance.

Household income comprised state-provided old-age pensions, cash from home

industry or agricultural activities, cash wages earned in the bantustan and migrant remittances. Of these income streams, remittances on average provided more than 60 per cent of household income. Pensions, the second greatest contributor, added 18 per cent to household incomes. Older members of households were seen as important to households; the favoured form of household headship vested in senior unemployed males. Aged members provided a cash income in the form of their pensions and were seen as social assets in "preserving family discipline and training children" (Clarke and Ngobese 1975: 27). However, erosion of this patrilineal society was evident in the fact that 75 per cent of households had no males present. These were the households that had the least income, with 18 per cent receiving no income from migrant workers, leading to the gradual increase of women migrating from KwaZulu (Clarke and Ngobese 1975).

The proletarianisation of women, Walker (1990) argues, was not as straightforward as the proletarianisation of men. While men were coerced into wage labour because they were forcibly separated from the means of production, women were never in control of their production. Similar to Bozzoli and Nkotsoe (1991), Walker argues that women left their households, as "a personal choice", fleeing from patriarchal controls hailing from pre-colonial society and the deterioration of rural life under the impact of colonial and apartheid rule (Walker 1990: 189).

Bozzoli's (1983; Bozzoli and Nkotsoe 1991) and Walker's (1990) arguments about the agency inherent in female migration are in sharp contradiction with Wolpe's (1972, 1980) "reserve-subsidy thesis". I discussed in Chapter One Wolpe's argument that the cheap labour power of African migrant workers was assumed to be supported or subsidised by the reproductive activities of women in the reserves. Bozzoli's contention with this thesis is illustrated in this quote:

> It was not simply the men's *absence* that placed the burden of domestic and agricultural labour on the women; nor is it just that male tasks had been undermined by the destruction of African states; it was *also* that these societies possessed a capacity to subordinate women's labour. Indeed, one might even suggest that the giving up of migrant labour by these societies partly rested upon their capacity to

subordinate women's labour, and that it is in this capacity that the resilience of these systems to 'full proletarianisation' may have rested" (Bozzoli 1983: 151, emphasIs in the original).

In other words, African women carrying the reproductive load in migrant households was a response to racialised dispossession as well as a continuation of the patriarchal order. This combination was so oppressive for some women that it led to migration. In addition, implicit in Bozzoli's critique is the criticism of an urban bias, that the "reserve subsidy" thesis neglects the resilience and struggles that constituted rural household reproduction. Bozzoli's argument resonates with Hart (2002a) who argues that the gendered nature of the migrant labour system illustrates the agency of women in a patriarchal society attempting to resist proletarianisation. With her intention to "turn the reserve subsidy thesis on its head", Hart (2002a: 15) proposes that "racialised dispossession under apartheid severely eroded the social wage".[43] That is, the inability to generate adequate livelihoods to ensure social reproduction in the bantustans dispels assumptions that there was an uncomplicated relationship between urban production and rural reproduction.

However, a race-class articulation about the bantustans contributed significantly to an understanding of how class divisions were constitutive of the establishment of KwaZulu and how society was even further stratified in the bantustan. Freund (1984: 54) argues that the creation of bantustans and the Group Areas Act of 1950 aimed to remove "dangerous classes [the unemployed and surplus people] out of the ken of the segregated neighbourhoods of the [white] bourgeoisie". Bantustans were ruled by an elite who assisted in their creation in return for power over a great mass of people. Class divisions in these areas sharpened as African peasants were further divested of land, and land ownership was transferred to those who had access to state office. Freund (1984: 56) draws attention to the malevolent nature of Inkatha when he reports on "ill-defined groups of youths used to terrify

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[43] Hart (2002a,b) argues that the unsuccessful resolution of the land question in post-apartheid South Africa erodes the social wage to an even greater extent and is a symptom of a neo-liberal government.

opposition to the dominant clique. Such thuggery exists within KwaZulu's Inkatha and has parallels in the less well-known Inyandza organisation of ka Ngwane and Intsika ye Sizwe in Ciskei".[44]

Rent-seeking by the ruling elites in bantustans involved further depriving African people from access to land by holding onto freehold land, by encouraging a dependence on pensions and by freezing the youth out of new land allocations. As a result,

> resettlement projects in the Bantustans involve the people in essentially urban settings, however deficient they may be in the necessities of urban life…. Thus the whole resettlement programme, it is extremely important to note, has not taken Africans from white-owned cities and farms to return them to a rural setting, however limited in viability. They have been expelled to bleak and isolated but essentially urban and proletarian settlements where no farming or stock herding is possible. Half the 'homeland' population is now effectively urban[45] (Freund 1984: 58).

Bantustan households were unable to sustain themselves, and children and adults suffered severe malnutrition, stunted growth and starvation in KwaZulu (Clarke and Ngobese 1975).Opportunities to escape these conditions were limited to leaving households to take up jobs as unskilled or domestic workers, with the little benefit that these jobs entailed. The probability of finding semi-skilled jobs was limited by the unpredictable and haphazard nature of the Labour Bureaux. The costs of registration with the Bureaux were so exorbitant that potential migrants in KwaZulu bypassed this state-linked institution at the risk of arrest, imprisonment and being "endorsed out of town" (Clarke and Ngobese 1975:30).

Education or training in the KwaZulu bantustan did not provide a way out of unemployment, either. Training facilities were in acutely short supply, while the

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[44] See Innes and O'Meara (1976) for a discussion of the potential and related struggles of class politics, the creation of a reserve army of labour and the marginalisation of African peasantry in Transkei. However, according to Legassick and Wolpe (1976: 87), Innes and O'Meara neglect "class relations existing within the African (or Black) group as a whole".

[45] Areas are designated "urban" or "rural" based on a number of variables, e.g., main economic activity, population density and infrastructure. This distinction does not always hold.

cost of education – at R91 per annum per child for school fees and clothing in households where the annual income was R760 – made it completely unaffordable (Clarke and Ngobese 1975). Of that time, Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 330) comment,

> the most disadvantaged [of the African society] were the families of farm workers evicted from white-owned farms in the 1970s and dumped in remote bantustans at a time of high unemployment; resettled without any access to agricultural land and lacking education, non-agricultural skills, access to schools or contacts in urban areas, they and their children were sentenced to enduring poverty.

In a study of class relations in the Transkei, Innes and O'Meara (1976) distinguish the "reserve army of labour" in that bantustan into two categories, the proletarianised and the marginalised. "The proletarianised … [are those]… freed from possession of their means of production and forced to sell their labour power in order to subsist" (Innes and O'Meara 1976: 75). The marginalised are

> a by-product of the process of proletarianisation, i.e. the process of separating producers from their means of production and commoditising their labour power. Thus while the development and extension of capitalist relations of production frees agents from their means of production, it leaves a proportion of these without any possibility of functioning in capitalist production. It thus creates a relative surplus population: a social category of dispossessed and broken individuals, superfluous to and discarded by the system which created them. These agents are not incorporated in capitalist production relations (not even part of the reserve army of labour – those on stand-by for capital). They exist as a type of rural lumpenproletariat on the margins of capitalism, close to starvation and dependent for subsistence on hand- outs, scrounging, theft, prostitution etc. The acute poverty and degradation of such dumping grounds as Dimbaza and Limehill[46] reflects this process (Innes and O'Meara 1976: 75-6).

Legassick and Wolpe (1976) extend this argument by suggesting that the marginalised constitute a "relative surplus" in the supply of labour, and that pushing a number of the unemployed to the periphery of industrialisation displays

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[46] Limehill is situated in Emnambithi.

more than the force of the apartheid state and capital; it displays the *extent* to which a state-capital combination could use force and coercion to discipline a reserve army of labour. Bantustan administrators and their attendant labour bureaux became the agents to whom apartheid capitalism could delegate, on the cheap, the social control of a reserve labour supply. Thus, Legassick and Wolpe argue that during apartheid the state-capital nexus was able to manipulate the labour market to meet demands for labour, emanating from the change from a mineral-based economy to secondary manufacturing. The creation of a border industrial zone in Ezakheni, with its adjacent relocation township 25 kms from Ladysmith, illustrates this point.

The most rapid economic growth in northwestern Natal occurred in the 1980s, with the most significant factor being the development of Ezakheni industrial estate (Harrison 1990). The creation of the industrial estate and the residential township, both named Ezakheni, were the result of apartheid South Africa's socio-economic policies and a clear example of the interrelationship between land and labour policies. The creation of Ezakheni township was to provide a relocation site for those forcibly removed as well as a labour pool for the industrial estate. While highly critical of forced removal, Platzky and Walker (1985: 341) conceded that Ezakheni, compared to other relocation areas in South Africa was

> relatively well endowed. The 50 000 people living there have a modern post office and telecommunications centre, a garage, two eating-houses, three beer halls, a bottle store, one resident doctor, several primary and high schools, two full-time clinics. Not everyone however has a house. Seven years after they first moved there, large numbers of people are still living under 'temporary' conditions in a site-and-service section.

This quote illustrates that, while possibly better off than other relocation areas, conditions in Ezakheni were harsh from the start. Platzky and Walker (1985: 359) state that in 1985 the unemployment rate in Ezakheni was 21 per cent (28 per cent for women and 16 per cent for men). However, they argue that at the time the expectation of finding work was still high among Ezakheni dwellers. This expectation was realistic due to Ezakheni township's close proximity to the

burgeoning industrial estate.

In 1983 Ezakheni industrial estate was declared an Industrial Development Point and run by the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation (KFC) (Harrison, 1990). By the end of 1984 Ezakheni boasted 14 factories employing 4 000 workers, and by 1989 Ezakheni had 70 factories employing 10 500 workers, 66 per cent of whom were female. Foreign investment from the start played an important role. The US company, Tidwell, which manufactured mobile homes, was one of the first companies to locate there, and was soon followed by Taiwanese companies. Ladysmith enjoyed economic spin-offs from the rapid expansion of Ezakheni. A total of R215 million was invested in Ezakheni between 1983 and 1989, by the KFC and by businesses locating their operations there at an average cost of R20 500 per job. Harrison (1990) notes that Ezakheni's industrial growth was artificial and highly dependent on the Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP).

Once again, sharp distinctions emerged in the Klipriver basin. In Ladysmith/ Ezakheni, as the area was known at the time, economic growth in Ladysmith lagged behind Ezakheni. In the 1984-1989 period a total of 58 projects entailing investment of R46.3 million to create 4 050 jobs were approved in Ladysmith compared to 156 projects, R452 million and 25 864 new jobs in Ezakheni (Harrison 1990: 119). Labour was increasingly centred on manufacturing, and employment in agriculture decreased dramatically. The decrease in agricultural production was not only due to an uptake of manufacturing jobs, but was also related to the poor conditions for farming. Harrison (1990: 122) states that the Klipriver basin suffered from "low rainfalls, high temperatures, poor soil and advanced erosion". These conditions, combined with the eradication of freehold land, made reliance on agriculture – in the form of cattle farming – as a form of economic and social security virtually impossible. Table 2.2 illustrates the relative importance of different forms of employment in the area.

Table 2.2   Employment per sector, Klipriver and Emnambithi, 1985

District	Klipriver		Emnambithi		Total	
Sector	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Agriculture	2 853	13.5	1 195	4.5	4 048	9.0
Mining	307	1.5	224	0.8	531	1.2
Manufacturing	3 103	14.7	8 255	31.1	11 358	22.9
Electricity	158	0.7	294	1.1	452	0.9
Construction	822	3.9	1 928	7.3	2 750	5.6
Commerce	2 507	11.9	2 233	8.4	4 740	10.2
Transport	2 237	10.6	1 532	5.8	3 769	8.2
Finances	598	2.8	145	0.5	743	1.7
Services	5 405	25.6	4 528	17.0	9 933	21.3
Unknown	3 093	14.8	6 232	23.5	9 325	19.1
	21 083	100	26 566	100.0	47 649	100.0

Source: Harrison (1990: 119)

From Table 2.2, dependence of Emnambithi residents on manufacturing jobs in Ezakheni is obvious. The racialised labour market is further explained by a breakdown of employment with regard to race. Harrison (1990) states that 41 and 20 per cent of jobs for whites were in the services and transport sectors, respectively; Indians featured predominantly in commerce sector jobs – 34 per cent.

In the same period migration of males from KwaZulu was high – evident from the male: female ratio in households. While the rate in Natal was higher with regard to African males at 1.06, in KwaZulu as a whole it was 0.76. With respect to the study area in the Klipriver basin, there was a high preponderance of white males at 1.21 compared to African males at 0.87. However, in Emnambithi the migration of men is evident in a high preponderance of women where the male: female rate was 0.76 (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3   Male:female ratio per population group, 1985

Area	Group			
	White	**Coloured**	**Indian**	**African**
Klipriver	1.21	0.9	1.0	0.87
Emnambithi	–	–	–	0.76
Natal	0.96	0.9	0.97	1.06
KwaZulu	–	–	–	0.82

Source: Extracted from Harrison (1990:13).

Drawing on Todes' (1997) study on migration in nearby Newcastle, Hart (2002b: 8) argues that relocation townships had assumed the role ascribed to the bantustans, "as a 'home-base' of social security from which selected household members – predominantly men – make forays in search of employment and income elsewhere, while women perform reproductive labour as well as generating income". Todes argued that access to services and infrastructure was higher in the African townships in Newcastle, which made residence for children, grandparents and wives a better option. However, Klipriver and Emnambithi residents were less fortunate.

Drawing on a study by the Centre for Social and Development Studies at the erstwhile University of Natal, Harrison (1990) ranked 12 areas in northwestern Natal in terms of relative deprivation. While Newcastle ranked first – that is, residents were least deprived – Klipriver ranked sixth, despite the importance of Ezakheni in the region as a whole. Harrison (1990: 19) reports that "Klipriver has a relatively low ranking despite having a well developed economic base because of the large number of people in areas such as Driefontein and Matiwane's Kop who do not have adequate access to basic services and economic opportunities." Emnambithi had an even lower ranking – eleventh and second lowest – because its economy was unable to sustain a population that was growing rapidly due to ongoing removals.

From these conditions of deprivation, a strong and cohesive civil society emerged in the Klipriver basin. Hart (2002a) ascribes this to continuous resistance to forced

removals and a successful articulation of land-labour resistance. Resistance to land removals in Klipriver was stronger than in the Newcastle/Madadeni area because Emnambithi were more rural and had a longer history of occupation by Zulu people than Newcastle.[47] In the African population in Emnambithi, the *rentier* class had been eradicated through the dispossession of land and a much more homogeneous proletarianised class emerged at the forefront of the community.

Steven Sithebe, who had gained support in the Klipriver community because of his opposition to relocation, turned the tide against Inkatha by violently attacking Ezakheni residents in the late 1980s. The brutal killings by this Inkatha warlord and his *amabutho*[48] caused the community to banded together in defence units to protect themselves. When the ANC managed to reach a peace accord with Inkatha in this area in the early 1990s, support for the ANC increased not only among ordinary community members but also among local church leaders (Hart 2002a: 121).

At the same time, industrial workplaces such as Frame Textiles, Dunlop and Defy became spaces of worker organisation, where strong union structures enabled shop stewards to tackle land issues with the same tactics that they used in the factories. For workers at Dunlop, who were drawn primarily from Matiwane's Kop and Driefontein, the successful struggle for union recognition in the 1980s and ongoing organisation in the workplace facilitated their struggles in the community around forced removals. In addition to the South African owned firms mentioned above, Ezakheni increasingly attracted investment from Taiwan. The Taiwanese firms, importing labour practices from China, employed women workers from the area. Hart (2002a) shows how the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation manipulated the ethnic identities and migratory status of workers' labour in the 1980s in order to contain worker resistance in Ezakheni. In

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[47] On one of my first visits to Driefontein in March 2007, upon hearing where I was heading, the taxi driver said to me, "Welcome to the land of our fathers. This is where we were born and made". Observation: Driefontein, 05 March 2007

[48] Warriors.

a workplace dominated by the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU), all MAWU members were summarily dismissed and Inkatha-linked men from KwaZulu were brought in to squeeze out unionisation. In the textile factories, the KFC encouraged the migration of women from Lesotho, but was met with opposition from the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU). However, despite the bans on unions in the industrial estate, firms such as Defy and Dunlop, who had links with unionised branches in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, entered into recognition agreements. Unionisation quickly spread to other workplaces.

Assuming that South African women are subject to the same levels of social control exerted by their families as in China, Taiwanese firms preferred to employ women in their textile factories (Hart 1995; 2002a). By the end of the 1990s clothing factories provided most of the employment in Ezakheni (40 per cent of total employment in the industrial estate), and the employment of women at 66 per cent of total employment in Ezakheni exceeded that of men by far. Strong leadership by SACTWU provided not only strong workplace organisation but also a link to local politics for the women of Emnambithi. "All women ANC members elected to the Ladysmith/Ezakheni local council in the 1996 local elections were former shop stewards" (Hart 2002a: 124).

In the next period under discussion, land-labour politics experience a brief period of prominence, but by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, land issues were becoming sidestepped as post-apartheid South Africa underwent restructuring.

Residents of Emnambithi, like most citizens of South Africa, were jubilant at the capitulation of the apartheid state in 1990. In local elections in 1996 the ANC won by a 62 per cent majority vote in a resounding victory over the IFP, which until then had had control of the Transitional Council (Hart 2002a). In the early years of democracy, Ladysmith/Ezakheni experienced a period of participatory democracy emerging from its involvement in land-labour politics during

apartheid. Thus, Hart (2002a) reports on open, hotly debated meetings between local councillors and community members, where the community tried to ensure that local economic development in post-apartheid South Africa met the needs of Emnambithi as a whole. These meetings signalled the emergence of two very important issues for this community – the importance of the local state and the restructuring of the industrial geography.

In 1991, industrial subsidies through the RIDP were drastically slashed. This revision to the RIDP, Hart (2002a: 155-7) argues, "formed part of a broader consensus that South Africa's post-apartheid future lay in main metropolitan centres". Between 1990 and 1994 the number of firms in Ezakheni decreased from 75 to 62 and employment fell from 13 758 to 10 790.[49] A report by the Uthukela District Council – created in 2000 – states that the local economy has been in a state of general decline since the early 1990s because of "the demise of the protectionist policies" of the RIDP and the impact of trade liberalisation on local agriculture (Uthukela 2004: 96). As a result, the report argues, unemployment, poverty and informal work have increased in Emnambithi.

As capital investment and employment in erstwhile industrial development points such as Ladysmith/ Ezakheni fell, the pressure on local governments increased. Between 1995 and 2000, local government restructuring took place. The effect was that,

> with only 10 per cent of municipal budgets coming from central government coffers, local authorities are responsible for raising 90 per cent of their revenues locally (mainly from property taxes and service fees). At the same time, both central authorities and local constituents are placing growing demands on the local state (Hart 2002b: 19).

Battles with local government took place around the reduction of power and function of traditional leaders who were replaced by elected local councillors, and over access to and control of resources (Hart 2002a; Mosoetsa, 2005). The

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[49] Most of the employment lost was in the clothing sector, where seven firms closed, cutting employment from 4 600 to 2 300 (Hart 2002a).

creation of "local developmental states" meant that the national government devolved an array of developmental responsibilities to local governments, assuming that they would function more democratically and efficiently. At the same time, fiscal austerity has meant that the resources available to these local governments are minimal, particularly in areas outside major metropolitan centres (Hart and Sitas, 2004: 36).

Struggling local governments were pitted against each other, attempting to wrest foreign investment from investors with whom there was a historical relationship. However, local workers and communities objected to the wage and labour conditions imposed by Taiwanese or "amaChina" [50] industrialists in Ladysmith/ Ezakheni.[51] Hart (1995: 43), in a brief and incisive article, contrasts the wages of South Africans with those of Asian workers and argues that, in the case of the latter, "these highly diverse states have secured the conditions of social reproduction of the large majority of the population". In the case of China, for example, the surpluses extracted from rural industries are controlled and reinvested in local communities by the central government. In this context, where rural households have access to agricultural livelihoods and social distributive mechanisms, the cost of living remained low. With reference to her research in Newcastle and Ladysmith, Hart states,

> Conditions in South Africa are the opposite of those that formed the basis of rural industrialisation in East Asia. Instead of broadly-based systems of access to land, brutal dispossession has stripped people of the associated social and economic security. Low wages in decentralised industries are not backed up by systems of support as they are in Asia. On the contrary, the cost of living in places like Newcastle is not much different from Durban. In addition, workers who travel from adjacent townships into Newcastle pay high transport

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[50] "amaChina" literally means Chinese people. In this context it refers to the fear that wages and conditions will be driven down by international competition from investors from the Far East (Fakier 2005). The Emnambithi Local Economic Development Council actively courted investment from China and Taiwan, despite the implications of lower wages and working conditions which characterise Taiwanese workplaces in Emnambithi (Interview: Mr Themba Qwabe, Manager of Local Economic Development of Emnambithi Local Municipality, 21 September 2005). See also Hart (2002a) and Fakier (2005).

[51] Objections to working in workplaces owned by Asians still exist today. See Webster *et al.* (2008).

costs, which eat up a larger proportion of workers' wages than in Durban (Hart 1995: 45).

Hart also compares the Chinese workforce with South African workers and states that the former are predominantly young unmarried women who maintain links with their households that continue to engage in agrarian activities. Yet, she states, little is known about similar workers in KwaZulu-Natal apart from her impressions that they comprise "many older women who probably bear the major responsibility for raising children, and may well be providing the bulk of support from their painfully low-wage jobs" (Hart 1995: 45). However, as argued at the beginning of this chapter, Hart does not investigate how these conditions of social reproduction constitute the daily lives of Emnambithi residents.

Based on her research in Ladysmith/Ezakheni, Hart (2002a,b, 2008) argues that the resolution of land distribution – an issue taken up briefly in the new, democratic South Africa and then surprisingly dropped – is essential for a general policy on a social wage. She suggests that land distribution not be viewed narrowly in relation to agriculture alone, but seen as an important social resource for workers in low-wage jobs. The process of dispossession meant that less than 4 per cent of households in this area had access to land in post-apartheid South Africa. In addition, the policy of cost-recovery for services such as water, sanitation and electricity imposed new costs on households. Hart completed her study of local governance in Emnambithi when through a process of participatory budgeting, Emnambithi residents and the local council were trying to find ways to keep the cost of public-provided services, such as water delivery, to a minimum, as "any increase in service charges would be an impossible burden" (Hart 2002a: 286).

Hart concluded her study on Ezakheni/Ladysmith at the end of 2000, as a new system of municipal demarcations was announced and local elections were approaching. New demarcations entailed the official renaming of the municipal area as Emnambithi and the inclusion of townships previously located in the now-

defunct bantustans under the control of the local municipality of Emnambithi. While Emnambithi has been re-unified, there are "new" citizens – an erstwhile reserve army of labour, including the unemployed and the marginalised – with attendant rights and demands placed on the local state.

2.4   Current Social Structure in Emnambithi

In this section I draw on statistics published by Statistics South Africa – the national statistics body – in 2005 on data provided by the 2001 national census. I also use data from previous research I conducted in the area and from interviews with households located in five different townships in Emnambithi. The townships where fieldwork was conducted are Peacetown, Elandslaagte, Watersmeet, Ezakheni C-section and Ezakheni E-section.

Table 2.4 illustrates that the greatest proportion of households in Emnambithi (24.7 per cent) had no income in 2001 and the second highest percentage of households (20.86 per cent) had an income between R400 and R800 per month.

Table 2.4   Annual household income, Emnambithi, 2001

Income (Rand)	Number of Households	Percentage
None	12 832	24.73
1 – 4 800	5 141	9.91
4 801 – 9 600	10 820	20.86
9 601 – 19 200	8 201	15.81
19 201 – 38 400	6 708	12.93
38 401 – 76 800	4 040	7.79
76 801 – 153 600	2 684	5.17
153 601 – 307 200	1 004	1.94
307, 201 – 614 400	257	0.50
614 401 – 1 228 800	89	0.17
1 228 801 – 2 457 600	68	0.13
Over 2 457 600	36	0.07
Total	**51 880**	**100.00**

Source: Statistics South Africa (2005a).

Subsequent chapters demonstrate that social grants make a significant difference to the daily lives of Emnambithi dwellers. In August 2007 a total of 102 197 Emnambithi residents received social grants – 21 427 people received old age pension (OAP) grants, 28 300 received disability grants (DGs) and 46 816 child support grants (CSGs) were disbursed.[52] Beall (2002) observes that in Latin America, as well as in South Africa, this form of income provides crucial support in the households of the working poor. The financial assistance through pension grants, as well as the childcare and domestic care that older members provide, heightens their value in households. This perspective recognises the agency of older people as valuable members of society. However, what is ignored is what happens when these older members get too old or infirm. While the household continues to draw on their pension grants, taking care of the old adds an additional burden to the household.

At present nearly 40 per cent of South African households get child support grants, old age pensions and disability grants (Statistics South Africa 2007a). Particularly significant in working-class and marginalised households is the child support grant. This was introduced in 1998 to assist children living in poverty. It pays carers earning less than R1 410 a month a stipend of R200 per month. By August 2007, 46 816 children were receiving this grant in Emnambithi despite considerable administrative difficulties (South African Social Security Agency [SASSA] 2007). However, the majority of these children continue to live in poverty. In Emnambithi the situation is aggravated by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

In the Uthukela District, policymakers express great concern about the level of HIV infection in Emnambithi:

> Recent statistics for KwaZulu-Natal estimate an average HIV/AIDS infection rate of 34%. HIV/AIDS will impact on all aspects of development in Emnambithi. It is important that a co-ordinated programme be developed to address HIV/AIDS. It is speculated that the high level of infections in these age groups will result in an

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[52] Interview: Mr V Singh, Manager: Grants Administration, South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) 1 November 2007.

increase in AIDS orphans and child-headed households, a decrease in the economically active population and the potential labour force as well as an increase in the burden of people in the older age categories, particularly retired people. The latter is due as a result of orphaned children moving to grandparents and other relatives after the loss of both parents (Uthukela 2004).

The mayor of Emnambithi, Ms Duduzile Mazibuko, echoes this concern at the rising number of "AIDS orphans" in the area. She estimates that there are between 5 000 and 10 000 orphans in the area.[53] The research found that the most significant changes in households in Emnambithi over the preceding three years have been due to the death of one or more of the household members. A local priest[54] states that between January and September 2005 he had officiated at approximately 100 funerals, which he assumed to be due to HIV/AIDS. A research report by the Health Economics and HIV/AIDS Research Division (HEARD 2005) estimates that between 4 and 5 per cent of children in the Uthukela District have lost at least one parent to HIV/AIDS. In Emnambithi approximately 5 500 households receive Foster Care Grants of R620 a month on behalf of dependent children generally (SASSA 2007).

The strain experienced in this community of poor households burdened by unemployment, limited resources and the need to care for their children and elderly, including those who become destitute as a result of the AIDS pandemic, weighs heavily on women in Emnambithi. According to the mayor, herself a single mother of two who needs to care for her sickly mother, these strains find an outlet in conflictual, often violent, marital relationships. An analysis of crime reported in Ladysmith from 2001 to 2006 (Crime Information Analysis Centre [CIAC] 2006), shows that while crimes such as murder, theft (of various sorts) and arson have decreased over the period, crimes of a more interpersonal, even gendered, nature are difficult to curb. That is, the incidence of rape, culpable homicide and indecent assault has increased (Figure 2.3).

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[53] Interview: Ms Duduzile Mazibuko, Mayor of Emnambithi, 18 October 2005.

[54] Interview: Fr Benan Fahy, Catholic priest, Ezakheni Parish, 21 September 2005.

Reported Crime: Uthukela (KZN)

Legend:
- Neglect and ill-treatment of children
- Indecent assault
- Common robbery
- Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm
- Attempted murder
- Rape
- Murder

Source: Source: CIAC (2007).

Figure 2.3: Reported crime Uthukela, KwaZulu-Natal, 2000-2006

A significant point about these statistics is the increased reportage of child neglect since 2000. It is especially worrying that family members are involved in child and elder abuse. A senior manager of social services at the Uthukela Department of Social Welfare and Population Development consulted the official statistics of this district and stated that from January 2005 till October 2007 36 cases of physical and sexual abuse of children were reported. Of the 26 cases of sexual abuse of children, in 16 instances male family members or "friends of the family" were the perpetrators. In the same period, close family members reported 15 cases of abuse of the elderly, in all instances physical or sexual abuse.[55] However, the Department of Social Welfare is aware that these statistics do not fully reflect all

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[55] Interview: Mrs G Koopman, Senior Manager, Social Development Department of Social Welfare and Population Development, 5 November 2007.

instances of household violence and abuse. Indeed, the mayor said that she was often called in by neighbours to mediate "domestic fights" in the hope that her presence would shame husbands.

As in the rest of the country, Emnambithi households are also struggling with rising food prices. My research with workers at Defy showed that short-term contract workers spent a third of their income on food, while full-time workers' expenditure on food accounted for 43 per cent of their total monthly expenses. The working poor survive by "limiting" themselves. But limiting oneself implies that there are margins within which one's consumption can be cut.

The food consumed in most of the migrant households is severely lacking in nutritional quality. Two of three meals per day (breakfast and lunch) comprise of either maize porridge and vegetables or bread and tea. Bread is consumed daily. One household of 12 people consumed 21 loaves a week; nine of the households consumed more than ten loaves per week. None of the participants baked their own bread for a variety of reasons such as the cost of flour, the shortage of fuel, lack of time and not having a stove with an oven. Although nearly all the households in Peacetown, Elandslaagte and Watersmeet have chickens or ducks, the slaughter and consumption of these animals are reserved for special occasions, such as the return of migrants or thanksgiving feasts. Chicken, on the rare occasion when it was bought, was of the poorest, toughest sections, such as chicken feet and purchased in R2 packs. These cheaper cuts of meat require longer cooking which is tiresome and costly to those lacking access to affordable energy and with limited cooking facilities. This illustrates Pearson's (2000: 394) proposal that poor households suffer by having to consume cheaper, less healthy food requiring more time to prepare, and placing an additional burden on women "generally economizing on household expenditure by replacing it with their own time".

A patriarchal gender order that is hierarchical and requires a display of deference from women was illustrated in the interviews. Many of the interviewees linked the

gender order in Emnambithi to being Zulu. While some of the women said that the men in their households "were just being Zulu men", older women referred to Zulu royalty. Mrs Zungu, when commenting on her husband's demand that the choice pieces of meat should be reserved for him, said, "Zulu men are just like that; they think they are kings". In the same vein, Mrs Ndimande complained that while she was "in charge" when her husband worked in Johannesburg, he immediately assumed complete control when he "visited". She said, "He thinks he is a Zulu king, but I am the queen". The only benefit, she felt, of having him at home was that "the house is respected when it has a man", demonstrating her community's gendered expectations.

However, a gender order, as Connell (1987) argues, is context-specific. In Emnambithi there is evidence of how the gender order is negotiated when there are changes, for example, in the labour market. Young boys are sometimes given the responsibility of cooking and cleaning, although this is generally defined as women's or children's work. Change of this nature is slow and could erupt in open conflict among household members. One participant, who returned to Emnambithi after working in Johannesburg for 25 years, felt that the increasing number of women migrating and "becoming more independent" was the cause of marital and household conflict, but "that is natural. Zulu men have been raised to be in charge. People will become used to this as time goes on. People get used to many things over long periods of time. Now we even have a female chief. Yes, the chief of this area is a woman!"

Although there has been some reconfiguration of power and authority relations within African working-class households (both in relation to gender and to generations), women still take responsibility for domestic work and feel that it is their imperative to care for, protect and provide for their families. Motsemme (2007: 382), writing about contemporary South Africa, refers to "the erosion of patriarchal power" as a "myth, since both urban and rural women are increasingly running households". In this vein, Ramphele (2000: 115) observes how African women

tread a fine line between affirming the manhood of their men-folk and supporting themselves and their children. The myth of the man as supporter, protector, provider and decision-maker were (*sic*) carefully nurtured in an attempt to protect the family and community from ethical breakdown.

The division of labour in the household defined by the dominant gender order means that women are responsible for household consumption, which includes obtaining water for washing, cleaning and cooking. The post-apartheid state inherited a pattern of extreme inequality in water access. In 1994 some 12 million South Africans did not have access to clean drinking water. However, water access in South Africa has improved dramatically. In 2005 8.7 million households had piped water on site, compared with only 5.6 million in 1996. In many of the former bantustans, though, people do not have water on site and have to obtain it from natural sources – dams, rivers or wells – which are often polluted. Women in rural areas still have to walk long distances to fetch water from rivers and dams with 20-litre buckets carried on their heads.

Citizens of Emnambithi should not suffer from the lack of water delivery. After all, Emnambithi was named after the sweet water of the Klipriver. However, access to water in the "industrial" township of Ezakheni distinguishes it from Peacetown, Watersmeet and Elandslaagte. Though there is electricity in the latter three, water is drawn from either communal taps located in one household's backyard and accessed by other households when needed, or from borehole pumps that service between 50 to100 houses. Communal taps draw water from a water tank on a nearby hill and often (three to four times a year) this system breaks down for as long as two months at a time. Yet, it seems that residents prefer this system as they are able to lead pipes from communal taps to a tap in their backyard. Residents say that the water from the water tank is often dirty and sometimes has rust particles floating in it. It is believed by some to cause diarrhoea.

Borehole water, drawn from an underground reservoir fed by the Tugela River, seems healthier, but the inconvenience of walking a few hundred metres to the collection point means that residents are more likely to use specially contrived taps. There is no charge levied on either of these forms of water provision. At the same time, there is no sewerage system and pit latrines are dug, over and over. Firewood is collected in the surrounding hills.

Currently, many people use paraffin to cook with as the newly installed electricity (a meter card system) is too expensive for cooking and is only used for TV, radio and lighting. School-going boys, girls and older women collect water, and once a male starts his own household his sons, daughters or wife take over this responsibility. Wood fires are used when there is no paraffin and young boys and girls collect firewood. Increasingly, as men are unemployed or retrenched, older boys or young men who are unable to move out on their own take on (or are given) these responsibilities. This indicates how the traditional gender order, which defined water and wood collection as women's work, is changing. These changes are embryonic and do not coincide with a transformation of the gender ideology more broadly. However, these pragmatic adjustments may eventually lead to a different gender order in Emnambithi.

2.5   Conclusion

Emnambithi, a community in KwaZulu-Natal, experienced a history of racialised dispossession officially emanating from nineteenth-century Shepstonian policies on segregation. This system laid the foundations for the apartheid architecture of South Africa, a legacy with which we are still grappling in the twenty-first century. The argument this chapter makes is that history shaped class location in Emnambithi. In this chapter I have provided a social history of emerging and changing class divisions in Emnambithi alongside changes in its social geography as various land and labour policies impacted on the area. Linking current conditions in households to its history of class formation, I began my argument that class matters in the social reproduction of migrant households.

Drawing on Hart's proposal that the "local" or micro-level is not merely affected by broader social structure but adjusts to contest and/or engage with it, I tried to demonstrate that all residents of Emnambithi are constitutive of its current form. In other words, this chapter aimed not only at providing a history of how this area was reconfigured through a succession of colonial and apartheid policies, but also how residents actively engaged with and adjusted to these policies and their patriarchal history. Pre-colonial Zulu society was characterised by patriarchy and rule by chiefs. Colonial and settler regimes captured these structures in order to dispossess African people of the means of production and to create cheap labour power. However, the rise of the *kholwa*, proletarianisation of women and the progressive increase in women's migration provided ways in which Zulu society could wrest opportunities from an oppressive environment. These engagements gave rise to a society characterised by class and gender stratification. As a result, power is unequally distributed in this community, with women and children in marginalised households least able to wrest advantage from the democratic dispensation in post-apartheid South Africa.

This dissertation is concerned with the current impact of this history of class and gender articulation on households in Emnambithi in contemporary South Africa. I now proceed with chapters on gender-class articulation in the households of semi-professional, working class and marginalised migrants. In Chapter Three, I discuss the migrant households of semi-professionals – the heirs of the *kholwa* legacy – who used the apartheid policy of the racial segregation of public institutions such as schools and hospitals to train as nurses and teachers.

Chapter Three
Class and Social Reproduction in Semi-professional Migrant Households

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Vignette: Intensive Attention in the Mabena Household[56]

At 05:30 every morning, Thuli Mabena is woken by the murmurs and sounds coming from Elizabeth Mabena's room. Thuli gets up and goes to Elizabeth's room where she washes her face with a warm, moist facecloth and changes her diaper. After she has fed Elizabeth her cereal, she carries her to the bathroom and gives her a bath. Once Elizabeth is dressed Thuli places her gently on the couch in the living room and switches on the television. In the background, Sindile, Thuli's sister, is getting ready to go to work at Ladysmith General Hospital. She greets Elizabeth on her way through the living room to the front door.

During the course of the day, Thuli will clean and change Elizabeth's diaper, feed her and change her position. While Thuli is ministering to Elizabeth, she chats and jokes with her. Elizabeth responds with badly formed words and facial expressions, all of which Thuli seems to understand. Mid-morning she reads Elizabeth one or two articles from the local newspaper. Elizabeth's eyes follow Thuli wherever she goes, and she makes sharp noises to draw Thuli's attention to something exciting on television.

Thuli Mabena is a 45-year old unmarried woman with three children and Elizabeth Mabena is her 73-year old mother. They live with Thuli's three children and Sindile in a well-furnished three-bedroomed house in Ezakheni C-section. Elizabeth spends her days on a couch in the living room, excited by the daily visits and one-sided chatter of her brother, Michael Khumalo. She is incapacitated by a severe stroke from which it is doubtful she will ever recover fully. Although her eyes signal understanding and interest, her speech is incomprehensible and she is unable to walk. She is in diapers and every 30 minutes Thuli has to change her position to prevent sores from forming. Thuli carries her mother from room to room as the need arises. Elizabeth is emaciated, which makes carrying her easier, but it is a cause of concern about her general well-being as well as the increased likelihood of bedsores. At night, Sindile, a nurse "guards" her. Sindile is getting married soon and will move into her husband's household in Johannesburg. Elizabeth Mabena's two sons are not involved in the care of their mother at all as "they have their own homes".

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[56] This vignette draws on observation in the Mabena household and on three in-depth interviews with Thuli Mabena on 15 March 2007, 7 November 2007 and 27 May 2008.

In November 2006 Thuli moved out of her mother's house and enjoyed having her own place to go to at night. However, as she feared, her siblings asked her to move back with her mother. As the only unemployed daughter she was always called in to care for her mother who cannot stay on her own. Her two sisters are both nurses – Thembe at Denel Military Hospital in Tswane and Sindile in Ladysmith. Sindile has already secured a position at Johannesburg General Hospital. A third sister died and her daughters, Thuthuka and Thembe, work as an office manager at McCarthy Motors in Johannesburg and a nurse in a mobile clinic in Vosloorus. Thuli feels that her two sisters think she is inferior as they are "professionals" and she is not. Mrs Mabena needs the help of a healthcare professional. It is ironic that while Thuli has not trained as a nurse, she should have to provide this form of care to her mother.

Thuli was able to move out on her own because "someone my mother knows got me on the list" to take occupation in a house provided by the South African government. She could support herself and her children with the social grants for her three children and a disability grant for herself because she is HIV-positive. She feels migration is "good for some. Then they can come home and be proud [arrogant] with people who don't have anything. They have other ways and nice cars and clothes. It [migration] is not good for others that have to do everything at home."

Thuli's siblings expect her to meet her and her children's needs with the household income. This comprises Gogo Mabena's retirement pension and the R500 that Thembe, Sindile and Thutuka each contribute. However, Gogo Mabena's funeral policy, her medical needs and the salary of a domestic worker who was employed to take care of the cleaning and laundry take up a significant chunk of the money. Thuli says the domestic worker is kind enough to help her to carry Gogo Mabena, but that she is solely responsible for her mother's care "even weekends or when Sindile has to rest". She wonders, "Rest? When do I rest?"

To some extent the burden of caring for her mother is alleviated by the pleasure Thuli gets from spending so much time with her mother and "knowing her". Gogo Mabena's children all attended boarding school and Thuli feels that the intensive attention her mother now requires means they are able to make up for the time they spent apart. She feels that if her siblings were closer to their mother, they would be delighted to visit her more often.

3.1   Introduction

The Mabena household is one of five semi-professional households in the study sample. The vignette presents a picture of household dynamics common to this class of migrant households. Mabena household members are semi-professionals

who have completed tertiary training and occupy positions as nurses in Emnambithi or in Gauteng. Gogo Mabena's job as a nurse meant that this household was able to occupy a house in Ezakheni C-section. This area was designated for nurses, with easy access to a bus service, and its houses are supplied with electricity, hot and cold running water and inside bathrooms. These features of the area, as well as employing a domestic worker, eases the load of domestic work in the Mabena household significantly, especially compared to households in other townships in Emnambithi. In addition, living in Ezakheni C-section, means close proximity to the households of prominent ANC local councillors, including the household of Emnambithi's mayor, who are also semi-professionals or the offspring of teachers and nurses. Familiarity with local politicians – a social resource – helped Thuli Mabena to secure a government-provided home. She is now able to add rental income to her range of material resources.

By combining their income, the Mabena household is able to fulfil their daily needs and distribute their resources according to the needs of their household members. However, one resource this household needs is in scarce supply; that resource is care. Because of the absence of Thuli's sisters and the lack of involvement of her brothers, caring for their mother rests solely on Thuli's shoulders.

A discussion of semi-professional households and their reproduction is the focus of this chapter. This chapter argues that the class location of semi-professional households is a primary determinant of the nature of social reproduction in these households. The first part of this chapter concentrates on three aspects of class – occupation, income, and physical location and infrastructure of households[57] – which are particular for this class of households. The second part of the chapter focuses on how these class characteristics are implicated in the daily provisioning and consumption of households, how semi-professional households care for their

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[57] See Chapter One for a discussion of the social and physical infrastructure of "underclass neighbourhoods" as proposed by Wilson (1987) and "housing classes" by Rex (1973).

dependants, and to what extent reproduction in these households relies on support from the rest of the community. To argue that class matters in social reproduction, the social reproduction of semi-professional households has to be compared to that in the other classes of households. A discussion of class and social reproduction in semi-professional, working-class and marginalised households is undertaken in this chapter as well as in Chapters Four and Five. These three chapters form the bulk of this dissertation and develop the argument that social reproduction differs according to class in migrant households in Emnambithi.

3.2 Class Location of Semi-professional Migrant Households

3.2.1 Overview

In designating a household as semi-professional, I refer, firstly, to the occupation of most if not all of its members. I draw on Seekings and Nattrass (2006) and Wright's (1997) conceptualisation of semi-professionals, which refers to those who have achieved tertiary education and have diplomas or certificates (rather than degrees) qualifying them to work as nurses, in this particular instance. They are, with rare exceptions, not in positions of authority in their workplaces and work under the supervision of others. However, as argued by Wright, cited in Chapter One,

> Being 'in' a class location means that you do certain things and certain things happen to you (lived experience) and you face certain strategic alternatives for pursuing your material well-being (class interests). Jobs embedded within social relations of production are one of the ways individuals are linked to such interests and experiences, but not the only way. Families provide another set of social relations which tie people to the class structure (Wright 1997: 523-24).

Therefore, in this chapter I discuss the occupations, income and physical location and infrastructure of households.

3.2.2 Occupation

Table 3.1 shows the occupations of household members of semi-professional migrant households in five of the 23 households in the study sample.

Table 3.1   Occupations in semi-professional migrant households

	Household Name				
	Shabangu	**Sibiya**	**Mabena**	**Shabalala**	**Ngubane**
Individual adult household members and occupations	*Baba* Shabangu – pensioner. Thoko Shabangu – Youth Ambassador (HIV/AIDS counsellor). Thandeka Shabangu – nurse, migrant. Thembiso Shabangu – graduate researcher, migrant. Lumkile Shabangu – articled lawyer, migrant.	*Gogo* Sibiya – retired nurse. Hlengi Sibiya – volunteer home-based carer. Frank Sibiya – documentary maker, migrant. Sophia Sibiya (wife of Frank) – unemployed, migrant. Zinzi Sibiya (daughter of Hlengi) – student in Durban.	Elizabeth Mabena – retired nurse. Thuli Mabena – unemployed. Sindile Mabena – nurse at Ladysmith Hospital. Thembe Mabena – nurse, migrant. Thuthuka Mabena – administration manager, migrant.	Emily Shabalala – retired nurse, returned migrant. Sindy Shabalala – legal secretary.	*Gogo* Ngubane – retired nurse. Lindiwe Ngubane – Department of Health official, migrant. Dorothy Ngubane – senior ANC councillor in Emnambithi. Felicity Ngubane (daughter of Dorothy) – student in Durban.
Child members of households	Sizwe Shabangu (age 7) - son of Lumkile Shabangu and Sibongile Mathebula.	Frank's two sons (ages 12 and 15).	Thuli Mabena's three children (ages 16, 12 and 10).	Cynthia Shabalala (age 12) – daugther of Sindy.	Dorothy's two children (ages 9 and 12).
Migrants' contribution to household	R1 000.00	R0.00	R1 500.00	R0.00	R500.00
Migrant remittances as % of total household income	26.5	0.0	25.0	0.0	3.1
Total household income	R3 780	R4 670	R5 990	R7 000	R16 280

From Table 3.1 it is evident how important nursing (and teaching to a lesser extent) as an occupation is to these semi-professional households. As argued in Chapter One, these households benefit from opportunities for occupational mobility which emerged for Africans in the early 1970s within the racial division of labour in apartheid South Africa (Crankshaw 1994). At the time of Crankshaw's study, a focus on class differences among women was neglected (Marks 1994). Therefore, it is significant that Crankshaw's (1994) analysis of the racial division of labour illustrated gender difference. In South Africa in 1990, Africans occupied 43 per cent of nursing jobs, while 38 per cent were held by whites, 13 per cent by coloureds and 4 per cent by Indians. Of the Africans in nursing, women comprised 40 per cent and African men 3 per cent of the total employment in this sector.

The history of nursing in South Africa, Marks (1994: vi) argues, illustrates "the intensity of the dynamic of race, class, and gender" in South Africa. In the 1950s and onward, the training of African nurses to tend to the health needs of African patients was a way of curbing intimate, physical interaction between white nurses and black patients. For African women, nursing was one of the few careers open to mission-educated women and an avenue for middle-class respectability. In the transfer of skill between predominantly middle-class white nurses and their African trainees, "western" values and attitudes were transferred, which further distinguished nurses from African workers and peasants (Marks 1994).

However, Marks (1994) continues, African nurses were not wholly assimilated and accepted into the nursing sisterhood dominated by white nurses and doctors. While nurses struggled to assert their professionalism and authority in the face of domination of the medical field by doctors, they were divided among themselves on racial and class lines. The nursing sisterhood was divided by the status that white nurses enjoyed as healthcare professionals, while African nurses were seen as "health attendants" – that is, as workers. These lines of conflict were not clear-cut, as white nurses subscribed to a non-racial view of healthcare along with deep-

seated assumptions that the cultural values that black nurses held would lead to a lowering of professional nursing standards. The emphasis on maintaining high standards across racial barriers, however, meant that African and coloured nurses were members, though subordinate, of non-racial nursing associations (Marks 1994).

The professionalisation of nursing meant that African nurses underwent the same, but parallel,[58] training and the rejection of a "substandard" African curriculum. Marks (1994) argues that internalising white middle-class values embedded in nursing training created a divide between black nurses and the population of poor, "undeserving" black patients in their care. This class divide, she concludes, was exacerbated in the 1990s as nurses struggled with budgetary cuts in the face of a growing number of patients.

In post-apartheid South Africa, while public hospitals are undergoing major changes, nursing qualifications also provide nurses, such as Lindiwe Ngubane[59] – a member of a semi-professional household in Emnambithi – with geographical mobility. Overburdened by massive healthcare needs, hospitals and the healthcare system in general are under-funded, unable to provide basic supplies, equipment, staff and salaries. The restructuring of fourteen racially divided health departments into one ministry and nine provincial departments has yet to bear fruit for nursing staff (Schneider, Barron and Fonn 2007). Inadequate hospital management, little opportunity for promotion and conflictual relationships between staff exacerbate the situation for nurses (Von Holdt and Maserumele 2005). In light of the current AIDS pandemic, management inefficiency, overburdened nurses and doctors, inadequate resource allocations and poor labour relations, adequate care for patients and workplace conditions for healthcare personnel suffer severe stresses (Von Holdt and Murphy 2007). As a result, many South African nurses migrate to the United Kingdom, Australia and countries in the Middle East (Fakier 2007).

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[58] Parallel training prevented interaction between African nurses and white patients.

[59] Interview: Lindiwe Ngubane, 2 September 2008.

In the 1990s, Lindiwe Ngubane thought that a stint in Bahrain would secure her future financially.[60] As a 30-year old with no dependants and living in housing provided by the Bahrain government, she felt she would be able to save most of her income and on her return engage in voluntary work. However, after working there for 18 months she returned without having saved enough to retire from waged work. Her return was precipitated by the death of her older brother. When she could not secure leave to attend his funeral, she started thinking about the sacrifices she was making working so far from home. As soon as her contract came up for renewal she returned home, and when she could not find a suitable post in Emnambithi, she started working at Johannesburg General Hospital in Gauteng, "a few hours' drive from home in case of an emergency".[61]

This interview with Lindiwe illustrates an importance difference between international and internal migration with regard to migrants' involvement in the social reproduction of their households. Although, Lindiwe was able to earn more money overseas, working closer to home – that is, in South Africa – means that she has greater emotional security. She is currently employed by the Department of Health, where she feels she is able to make an even greater contribution to public health in South Africa.

A similar commitment to the overwhelming healthcare needs of South Africa is evident in the Shabalala and Sibiya households as well. Emily Shabalala, a retired nurse, immersed herself in training home-based carers (HBCs) on her retirement.[62] Mrs Shabalala often leaves her home at 4:00 a.m. to visit farms or far-flung townships to meet with or recruit HBC volunteers, only to return late in the afternoon. Hlengi Sibiya's ambition to become a nurse like her mother is frustrated because she has a congenital heart condition. Zinzi, Hlengi's daughter, is training as a nurse, and Hlengi is encouraging her daughter to seek employment

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[60] Interview: Lindiwe Ngubane, 2 September 2008.

[61] Interview: Lindiwe Ngubane, 2 September 2008; Interview: Mrs Celestine Ngubane, 10 March 2007 and 27 May 2008.

[62] Interviews: Mrs Shabalala, 2 July 2007, 6 November 2007 and 27 May 2008.

overseas. In the meantime Hlengi has become a volunteer home-based carer and, like Thoko Shabangu, she is involved in community work dealing with the impact of HIV/AIDS on their communities.

Thoko is a "Youth Ambassador" who counsels high school students, while Hlengi is a home-based carer caring for AIDS sufferers and their dependents in their homes. While their work is deemed "voluntary", for these women their work is a career; they attend training, develop skills and hope to move on to more responsible positions in this sector. Thoko, who is outspoken about her status as a person living with AIDS, is passionate about the opportunity to prevent the spread of AIDS among the youth of Emnambithi.[63] Their "stipends" of approximately R1 000 a month, though intended to cover the expense of conducting their work and for transport and sustenance during training, are seen by both of these women as salaries contributing towards their household income. Thoko Shabangu's mother was able to ensure that her eldest daughter, Sibongile, completed her teacher's training. Sibongile Shabangu, on qualifying and working as a teacher in Durban, contributed to the education of her younger brothers, thus ensuring that the support her mother gave her benefited the entire household.[64] The Shabangu household could be classified as an emerging semi-professional household, as its first members in professional occupations are much younger than in the other households.

Thoko, Hlengi and Mrs Shabala feel confident about their ability to conduct care activities in their communities and know that fellow volunteers and their communities appreciate them. In contrast, surveys of home-based care in KwaZulu-Natal (Hunter 2007) and the Western Cape (Parenzee and Budlender 2007) portray HBCs as desperate, ill-equipped for and overwhelmed by the burden of AIDS care. The three women's sense of fulfilment as volunteer carers should be seen in the context of Emnambithi, where such positions are rare and sought after. Hlengi feels that home-based care is one avenue through which she

[63] Interviews: Thoko Shabangu, 12 March 2007, 31 October 2007, 29 May 2008.

[64] Interview: Thoko Shabangu, 31 October 2007.

could express her frustrated desire to nurse others,[65] and Mrs Shabalala sees her involvement as a continuation of her own nursing career. However, this ethic of care (Tronto 1993) or "caring about care" (Misra 2003) is exploited in the South African context of an underfunded public healthcare system which relies on the unpaid or voluntary care work of women in their households and in the households of people living with AIDS. As stated by Misra (2003: 387), "care work reinforces inequalities of caregiver and care recipients, including devaluation of the care that racial/ethnic minority women provide".

With the exception of the two volunteers and Frank Sibiya, an aspirant documentary worker, all the employed members of the semi-professional households are in stable, full-time employment. That is, they are not only able to enjoy secure employment but also the social benefits that go with it. Upon retirement, they and their household members can rely on adequate pensions which provide for their daily living expenses, and live in houses paid off with the help of subsidies provided by their workplaces. However, caring for the dependents of migrants is not as straightforward and will be discussed later in the chapter.

Frank Sibiya's continuous search for secure employment in Johannesburg demonstrates vulnerability in the class location of semi-professional households in Emnambithi. Frank attended a short course on documentary making paid for by his mother.[66] He set off to Johannesburg in 1995 hoping to make a career in television. While Frank calls himself a documentary maker, it is more an aspiration than a reflection of his current occupation. In an attempt to find a foothold in the industry, he does "piecework" for the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), mostly assisting on documentaries. He also records videos of weddings, birthdays and other celebrations. His income is very insecure and he is unable to make a documentary on his own because of a lack of funds. He is embarrassed by his struggle to make a living and pretends to his wife, family in

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[65] Interviews: Emily Shabalala, 15 March 2007, 6 November 2007 and 27 May 2008.

[66] Interview: Frank Sibiya, 13 September 2008.

Emnambithi and potential employers in Johannesburg that he is financially well-off. But while he manages to fool everyone in Emnambithi because they do not need remittances from him, the deception is much more difficult to sustain in Johannesburg.

At first, Frank and his wife, Sophia, rented a house in Auckland Park, a middle-class neighbourhood where the SABC is located. After a few moves to lower-class neighbourhoods, they now live in a backroom in Soweto. Frank says his greatest "humiliation" was when he asked his wife to do part-time domestic work for an acquaintance at the SABC. After a day's work she walked out of this job and refused to return. Members of semi-professional households are more likely to employ domestic workers than work as them. As Mrs Ngubane, a member of a semi-professional household, states quite emphatically about domestic workers, "our kind doesn't really know that kind".[67]

3.2.3 Income in semi-professional migrant households

Interviews with the five households in the semi-professional class revealed some variation with regard to their monthly income. See Table 3.2.

Table 3.2   Monthly income in semi-professional households

	Household Name				
	Shabangu	**Sibiya**	**Mabena**	**Shabalala**	**Ngubane**
Members receiving social grants	*Baba* Shabangu, OAP. Thoko Shabangu, DG. Sizwe's CSG is retained by his mother.	Hlengi Sibiya, DG.	Thuli Mabena, DG. Thuli's three children, CSGs.	None.	None.
Social grants	R1 780	R890	R1 490	R0	R0
% of total household income from social grants	47.1	19.1	24.9	0.0	0.0

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[67] Interview: Celestine Ngubane, 10 March 2009.

Migrant remittances as % of total household income	26.5	0.0	25.0	0.0	3.1
Total income	R3 780	R4 670	R5 990	R7 000	R16 820

Notes: OAP = Old Age Pension; DG = Disability Grant; CSG = Child Support Grant

The Ngubane household has the highest income because Dorothy Ngubane, a former teacher, occupies a high position on the Emnambithi local council. The Shabangu household has the lowest income because their highest-earning members are migrants who send remittances – that is, they do not contribute their entire salary to the household. At the same time, remittances make up more than a quarter of the Shabangu and Mabena household incomes. In contrast, in the other households – Sibiya, Shabalala and Ngubane – dependence on remittances is minimal, if not non-existent.

In general, the dependence of these households on social grants is higher than their dependence on remittances, although less so than in the working-class and migrant households discussed in Chapters Four and Five. Only the Mabenas receive the Child Support Grant for Thuli's three children, as the threshold income to qualify for this grant is R1 490. Thuli applied for CSGs when she was living on her own and did not have to account for the contribution her mother's pension and her sisters and nieces' remittances made to her household income.

The private pension of retired nurses is a main contributor to their household incomes and a source of financial security for their households as a whole. At an average annual income of R90 528, these households fall in the top 10 per cent of annual income earned in Emnambithi.[68]

3.2.4 Household structure and location of semi-professional households

In the main there was some difference between the four households in Ezakheni and the one in Watersmeet. With the exception of the Shabangu household, the semi-professional households are located in Ezakheni C-section (Table 3.3).

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[68] See Table 2.4: Annual Household Income In Emnambithi, KwaZulu-Natal, Chapter Two.

Table 3.3   Location of semi-professional households

	Household Name				
	Shabangu	**Sibiya**	**Mabena**	**Shabalala**	**Ngubane**
Location of household	Watersmeet	Ezakheni C-section	Ezakheni C-section	Ezakheni C-section	Ezakheni C-section

Ezakheni C-section is an area designated in the 1980s for occupation by nursing staff. The Shabangus differ from the rest of the group because they live in a house in Watersmeet, which used to form part of the KwaZulu bantustan. However, the Shabangu home stands out among the other houses in Watersmeet; it is a replica of houses in C-section.

In C-section the houses all have three bedrooms, a lounge, a fitted bathroom, kitchen and dining room. The houses where we conducted our interviews were all beautifully furnished, and had tiled floors and knotty pine ceilings. They also had gardens in which pumpkins, squash, cabbage and spinach were growing. All had fierce-looking fences with spikes and all gates were locked with heavy chains. The exterior surfaces of the houses were constructed differently and painted in bright colours or covered in decorative bricks.

The houses of the semi-professionals are owned by one of their inhabitants. Presently, households are run by retired nurses, whose children have left Emnambithi to find employment in metropolitan centres, often in nursing – some overseas. These are the wealthier people of Ezakheni and are subject to many house robberies. They are very aware of a higher class status than other Emnambithi residents.

Unlike other houses in Watersmeet, Peacetown and Elandslaagte, the Shabangu house is locked and unlocked every time anyone enters or leaves the house. The

only difference between this house and those in C-section is that the Shabangus have hundreds of metres of land available for Baba'Mkhulu (Thoko's father) to plant vegetables.

Because C-section was started as a "nurses' location", it used to be well-serviced by a municipal bus service specially instituted for the transport of nurses to Ladysmith town where the Ladysmith General Hospital is situated. However, in post-apartheid South Africa most C-section dwellers, like residents of the other townships in Emnambithi, use mini-bus taxis as their main form of public transport.

Political support for the ANC[69] is another common characteristic of semi-professional households. All of the semi-professional households are linked to senior local members of the ANC. Ms Duduzile Mazibuko, the mayor of Emnambithi, is a close relation of Mrs Ngubane and a neighbour of the Shabalalas, Sibiyas and Mabenas. Nande, Emily Shabalala's daughter, and Duduzile Mazibuko are both teachers and very good friends. Duduzile often consults Mrs Shabalala about her impressions of local community issues, and in 2007; Mrs Shabalala was awarded a "citizen of the year" award by the Emnambithi municipality.[70] Hlengi Sibiya secured her position as an HBC on Duduzile's recommendation, and Thoko Shabangu was recommended for a position as a youth ambassador by her uncle, the ANC ward councillor of Watersmeet. A local ward councillor helped to facilitate Thuli's brief stay in a government house. Instead of signing up on a list of potential beneficiaries and waiting for years to be granted a house, her mother spoke to a family friend and Thuli jumped the queue. When she moved into her mother's house, Thuli "rented" her house to a family desperate for a place to stay at a nominal rent of R100 a month.

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[69] Information about the political affiliation of households was gathered before the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE), a political party formed by a splinter group of the ANC. The research did not explore the possibility of this group of households aligning themselves with COPE, which portrays itself as the political choice for educated, middle-class South Africans.

[70] Interviews: Ms Duduzile Mazibuko, Mayor of Emnambithi, 18 October 2005 and 7 November 2007.

Compared to the households in other classes, semi-professional households have access to a broader range of resources. Residence in this section of Ezakheni, which was designated for an educated, Christian segment of the homeland population, meant that these households have long been able to enjoy the benefits of homes with electricity, a functioning sewerage system and piped water. In post-apartheid South Africa, these households are able to draw on their social network to extract political resources from the ruling ANC. The social capital provided by their affiliation with the ANC as well as their connectedness to the mayor and other local councillors accrues to these households not only because of their class location, it is also used to entrench and maintain their class status. Similarly, these households employ religion and Christian values to distinguish themselves from other households in Emnambithi.

Similar to working-class and marginalised households, semi-professional households subscribe to both Christian and traditional religious beliefs. However, they differ from the other households in which system of belief is primary in their hierarchy of beliefs. That is, all the semi-professional households state that ancestral beliefs are subordinate to Christianity. With the exception of the Shabangu household, whose members say they do not subscribe to ancestral beliefs,[71] members of semi-professional households say that they believe in the ancestors, that the ancestors are the creation of God and that speaking to God would appease the ancestors. God and the church are at the top of their hierarchy of beliefs with the ancestors having to follow God's will. Mrs Ngubane summarises this when she says, "First we are Christians; God created us and the church. God also created the *amadlozi*,[72] so the *amadlozi* have to obey God and the Church".[73]

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[71] The Shabangus are also the only people in the study sample who are *opposed* to ancestral beliefs.

[72] Ancestors

[73] Interview: Mrs Celestine Ngubane, 27 May 2008.

Despite their tolerance and continued support of ancestor worship, members of these households are quite adamant that subscription to *only* ancestral belief is a sign of ignorance. In their estimation the *amadlozi* exist because of God, and therefore belief in the *amadlozi* can only be realised through a belief in God that is, Christianity, first and foremost. The lower order assigned to the *amadlozi* in their hierarchy of beliefs is also evident in the structure of their houses. Unlike houses in Elandslaagte and Peacetown, houses in Ezakheni have no designated space for ancestor worship or rituals. Only in dire circumstances – like with the death of two of her children – did Mrs Ngubane feel obliged to speak to the ancestors. She did this without the customary ritual of having cattle slaughtered or burning a specific kind of grass. "I can do it from this chair," she said.

The Ngubanes and Shabalalas attend the Catholic Church, the Mabenas and Sibiyas the Anglican Church, and the Shabangus the Seventh Day Adventist Church.

With the exception of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, these churches are well-established, controlling significant resources. In Ezakheni, the local Catholic parish owns a hall and provided Elizabeth Shabalala with access to the Catholic Bishops Conference to fund the activities of the HBCs which she organises. I discuss later in this chapter how important the Anglican and Catholic Churches were in the education of semi-professionals. The Seventh Day Adventists Church also provides its members with resources important to migrant members. This church welcomes migrants at destination sites and provides access to a valuable, supportive network of believers who ease migrants into foreign communities. Thus, the Shabangus feel that even though they are geographically separated, they still "pray as a family" through their common membership in the church.[74]

According to Gaitskell (1982, 1990), church membership has served as a link in maintaining family values across the boundaries that separate migrants from their homes. Involvement in, for example, prayer unions do not only allow women with an outlet to express their frustrations with "city" and working life, it also

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[74] Interviews: Thoko Shabangu, 31 October 2007; Mr Shabangu, 29 May 2009.

reinforces Christian controls over the behaviour and sexuality of migrant women who have escaped the traditional controls of their families. As a result, Christian notions of celibacy and the role of women as homemakers are transmitted, what Gaitskell (1990) refers to as "devout domesticity". Similarly, George (2005) shows how the church subordinates women in migrant households to male authority. George argues that Keralan women nurses achieve a higher status in their migrant families in the United States because their nursing skills determine their families' economic success. Their husbands, however, are forced to assume a subordinate role in the labour market, because they are less equipped for the American labour market. The men also adopt a subordinate role in the household as their wives become the dominant decision makers and as the men have to attend to household duties in the absence of their wives who work long hours. The church, with its ban on women leadership, therefore becomes the space in which migrant Keralan men assert their authority and leadership. The women, George argues, fall in line with this prescription as part of their religious belief, but also to preserve male egos and ensure peaceful households.

What is evident in my research is that the church provides a space (albeit gendered) in which migrants retain a connectedness to their families and certain social values. As Mrs Sibiya states, "If Frank [her migrant son] sticks to the [preachings of the] Anglican Church, he will live in Johannesburg with dignity and he doesn't need me to show him [how to lead his life]".[75] Similar to political affiliation, Christianity is used as a resource. I show in Chapters Four and Five that it is even more of a social resource for working-class and marginalised households who have very little other resources available in their communities.

3.3 Social Reproduction in Semi-professional Households

3.3.1 Overview

In Chapter One I discussed social reproduction using Bakker and Gill's (2003) formulation. To illustrate class-based differences in migrant households in

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[75] Interview: Mrs Felicity Sibiya, 27 May 2008.

Emnambithi, social reproduction in relation to three aspects – daily consumption and provisioning; education; and care for children, the sick and elderly members of households – will be discussed in this section on semi-professional migrant households.

3.3.2 Daily consumption and provisioning in semi-professional migrant households

The Shabangu and Mabena households are the only ones in this class who depend on remittances from migrants for their daily survival. The average monthly remittance of R1 000 by Lumkile, Sipho and Thandeka comprises approximately 42 per cent of this household's total monthly income. In the Mabena household, 36 per cent of their income is in the form of migrant remittances. These households would struggle without this money, and Thoko Shabangu and Thuli Mabena express resentment at the irregularity of this income.

On the whole, the semi-professional migrant households are able to fulfil their daily physical needs. With respect to when and where food, clothing and furniture are bought, all of these households gave similar responses. Food is bought on a monthly basis at big chain stores – either at Pick 'n Pay or Shoprite. Furniture and clothing are bought on account from chain stores as well, showing that these households have access to formal credit providers, unlike some of the marginalised households where loans are obtained through informal moneylenders at exorbitant rates.[76] The allocation of loan and credit accounts through formal institutions, such as banks or chain stores, depends heavily on proof of regular income – monthly salaries or pensions – and regular payment of utility accounts such as water and rates. Semi-professional households are able to provide documentation to this effect.

A survey of the diets of these households illustrated that the Sibiya household, with its regular consumption of fresh fruit and vegetables, had the healthiest diet

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[76] Discussed in Chapter Five.

of all the households in the study sample. Mrs Shabalala, who is active in the community garden a few hundred meters from her house, also employs a gardener to work in her vegetable garden. Like Gogo Sibiya, she cites her knowledge as a nurse to account for her household's good eating habits. Mrs Ngubane, however, mentioned her inability to stick to a strict diet for diabetics every time I interviewed her. Mrs Ngubane's daughter buys her and her mother's clothes at boutiques in Johannesburg. The Ngubane household is the only household which owns a car. However, when Sipho and Lumkile Shabangu visit Emnambithi they rent expensive automobiles which impress their household and community members. Frank Sibiya also refers to the expectations that members of his household have on his return. He says,

> It is expensive to go home. First I have to ask someone to use their car because I can't arrive by [minibus] taxi. Even if I don't have a car, at least I know people who do…. Then there's the meat or other special things [food] and the toys for my children…. I miss them and want to show something special when I go home. I have to show them I can more than just provide for them. (Interview: Frank Sibiya, 13 September 2008),

There are also other signs that semi-professional households are willing to pay more for certain services. The households of the Mabenas, Sibiyas and Ngubanes employ full-time domestic workers. The women are reticent about discussing their relationship with their domestic workers, whom they refer to as "Aunts". Mrs Ngubane refers to her "aunt" in a trite manner as "one of the family". However, she distances herself from domestic work when she tells me how she dropped out of school when she was a teenager because she wanted to earn money "to buy shoes … I always loved shoes". She quickly returned to school, she says, when she realised that the only option at that time was for her to become a domestic worker. Yet, during the course of one interview it emerged that both her sisters were domestic workers. Mrs Shabalala's domestic responsibilities are taken care of by her *makoti*,[77] and in the Shabangu household the services of neighbourhood women are procured when Thoko needs it.

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[77] Daughter-in-law.

Clearly evident in these households is that cooking, cleaning and shopping for their households are women's responsibility. In part, this is the result of the high prevalence of unmarried women in these households. In Zulu culture, on marriage a woman moves out of her childhood household into the household of her husband (Marks and Rathbone 1983 and Jones 1993). It is the responsibility of senior household members to ensure that male offspring are able to start a household on their own. Thus, new households are started when men get married, or else adult children continue living with their parents. Even when male heads are absent or migrant, households are seen to be theirs rather than of the female heads. Mrs Ngubane, as a result, did not object when her late husband "brought home" the son he had with another woman in Johannesburg, for Mrs Ngubane to raise. She says, "He was the child of this house, until he started his own".

In the Sibiya household boys are not excused from what is known as women's work. They have to participate in all the household activities and are called upon to wash the dishes and laundry, look after younger children and cook. Hlengi says, "Once they got to know me, they realised that they just have to do it [house work]. I don't take this excuse that they are Zulu men".

That the semi-professionals are able to meet their basic needs has implications for the other aspects of social reproduction in their migrant households. I discuss below the intensive attention given to education in these households, while the final discussion concentrates on how semi-professional households, with all their resources, still suffer from a lack of emotional resources due to migration.

3.3.3 Education in semi-professional households

An emphasis is placed on education in all the households in the study sample. However, in semi-professional households, there is greater success in ensuring the continuity of education. Mrs Shabalala, Mrs Sibiya, Mrs Mabena and Mrs Ngubane are 68, 70, 71 and 72 years old, respectively. They attained their professional qualifications as nurses in the early 1960s, when the training of

African women as nurses was in full swing. These four elderly nurses say that because each of their childhood households occupied the same house for their entire childhoods, they were able to complete secondary schooling. From the interviews it emerged that the stability that long-term occupation of a house provides could help explain why these women were able to achieve higher levels of education than the other women in the study sample.

Mrs Shabalala, the daughter of a migrant from Lesotho, was born and raised in Orlando East, Soweto. Mrs Mabena, Mrs Sibiya and Mrs Ngubane, like many of the women in the other class categories, were born and raised on farms in the Emnambithi area. However, the parents of the semi-professional *gogos* owned the farms they lived on – that is, they owned "black freehold" property. Their gender was an advantage; because they are women and had brothers they were considered unsuitable for farm labour. That is, they were freed to attend school. Unlike the other women in the sample, none of their families were evicted from the farms where they lived and none of them moved permanently from where they were born until after they had all married. Their consistent school attendance and successful completion of secondary schooling prepared them for nursing training. With reference to Chapter Two, these women are the descendants of the *amakholwa*. Their class location is evident in their marital choices – they all married equally educated, semi-professional partners – their ownership of property, their great attachment to Christianity, and their strong commitment to education as a means of securing their class location.

These four women all left their homes to study nursing. In the 1960s most African women who wanted to train as nurses had to leave their homes for training in the "22 general nursing, 11 midwifery, and 7 mental nursing schools" that existed in South Africa at the time (Kuper 1965: 218). The security of their homes provided significant emotional support to them while living in the "strange city". Mrs Ngubane, who trained at Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto, Johannesburg, got involved with "the wrong Jo'burg company", fell pregnant and returned to the "peace of home" to give birth before she continued her studies. It

is conceivable that her family also helped to obscure her pregnancy as at the time "should an unmarried trainee become pregnant she is immediately dismissed" (Kuper 1965: 230). Mrs Ngubane claims that the encouragement she received from her household at the time prepared her to deal with her daughter's "mistake at 15". When Doris fell pregnant during her teens, Mrs Ngubane urged her daughter to return to school. Doris became a teacher and eventually a senior political figure in Emnambithi.

Similarly, the Shabangus had occupied their home for the past 50 years. Their uncle, now an ANC ward councillor, was prominent in the KwaZulu homeland administration and ensured that they retained tenure of the property their household has occupied for more than five decades. The three semi-professionals in the Shabangu household are of a younger generation, ranging in age from 30 to 42 years. They all attended the same school in the 1980s and 1990s. Thoko Shabangu said that the enthusiastic support their parents gave to their firstborn, Thandeka, encouraged her to become a schoolteacher and developed a competitive spirit between the siblings to further their education. An additional spur for the Shabangu and Mabena children's education was that both families could relate to family members who were very successful in the erstwhile Transkei higher education system. Both households refer to the example of maternal uncles who were rectors (principals) at nursing training colleges in the Transkei. These role models were not only examples of the value of education but also provided the children of these households with a place to study and to reside while they were doing that. The importance of education in semi-professional households is unmistakable.

The school-going children in these households attend "good, Model C schools in the white areas".[78] Currently, children attend Egerton Primary School in the prestigious Egerton suburb and Monument Senior Secondary School. In the 1990s children attended Windsor Senior Secondary School in the historically Indian suburb. At the time, African children "were not welcomed in the white schools"

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[78] Interview: Mrs Shabalala, 27 May 2008.

and the level of teaching in the Indian school was considered of a better quality than in "our township schools".[79] In the 1980s the Shabangus, Mabenas, Sibiyas and Ngubanes sent their children to St Chad's which, although a government school at the time, was considered to have retained many of the qualities that made it "a good Anglican school".[80] While the Shabalala's male children went to St Chad's, the girls went to St Dominic's in Newcastle, linked to the Catholic Church, and when it came under government control in the Model C system, "the first school that opened to black children".[81]

These households do not depend only on "good" schools to educate their children. Mrs Ngubane, Mrs Shabalala, Hlengi Sibiya and Thoko Shabangu were involved in the schoolwork of the children left in their care, and knew the study material covered by their children at school. Mrs Ngubane, especially, got involved with their homework. Mrs Shabalala, although she was not always with her daughter because she was a migrant and later sent her daughters to boarding school, asked about their schoolwork and whether they had completed their homework. While Mrs Ngubane and Mrs Shabalala felt they were not able to help their grandchildren with their schoolwork, they knew enough to comment on the difference in the syllabus covered by their children. Thuli Mabena said that although she was mostly occupied with tending to her mother, she supervised her children's homework. She felt able to complain to her daughter's teacher about the heavy load of homework she had to complete because her father was a principal and she knew about the education system.

The strong focus on education in semi-professional migrant households relates to the notion of "concerted cultivation" noted by Lareau (2003) in the households of semi-professionals in the United States of America. Lareau argues that parents with professional qualifications are better able to prepare their children to engage

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[79] Interview: Hlengi Sibiya, 27 May 2008.

[80] Interview: Thoko Shabangu, 29 May 2008.

[81] Mrs Shabalala is wrong in assuming that this was the first multi-racial school in South Africa. But more notable is her motivation to send her children to a school which she believed was so good it was the exclusive domain of white South Africans.

with institutions because of their familiarity with the demands of professional workplaces and their appreciation of educational institutions. That is, they have the social capital to prepare their children to engage with the education system. In the Emnambithi context, where unemployment is high, the intensive attention given to children's education is also partly due to the recognition by members of semi-professional households that secondary education is not enough to secure employment.

3.3.4 Care of the dependants of semi-professional migrants

As discussed in Chapter One, "care work" in households – that is, looking after the physical, emotional and development needs of other people (Standing 2001) – covers a range of tasks and activities, from physical tasks such as changing diapers and cooking food, to supervising homework and showing concern when others are sick, sad or infirm. In a paper on the implications of migration for gender and care in the Global South, Kofman and Raghuram (2007) argue that it is essential to include an investigation of the "sites of care" in an analysis of care regimes. Such an investigation is fundamental, they argue, in understanding changes and difference in care regimes, where there have been shifts "from institutional settings to domestic settings in community care" (Kofman and Raghuram 2007: 9). These shifts denote the privatisation of care from the state, private and public institutions such as hospitals, retirement homes and crèches to households.

In the South African context, while there are extensive financial resources allocated to providing those in need of care – the young, elderly and disabled – with social grants, there is very little public investment in the actual *activity* of care. The gender order in Emnambithi informs expectations that female household members assume responsibility for care in migrant households. Across the globe household care providers are not expected to have formal skills; instead their ability and propensity to care "are derived from natural and feminine dispositions" (Kofman and Raghuram 2007: 10). In the previous section I discussed the existence of "caring about care" in semi-professional migrant households, a

prevailing ethic which should serve to provide quality care to the dependents of migrants. However, in the interactions in households between caregivers and care recipients an affective component – comprising emotions of love, resentment, obligation and sacrifice – fundamentally modifies perceptions of care received and provided.

In the Mabena household, a household of nurses, caring about care is best exemplified by Thuli Mabena, the sister who does not work as a nurse. Although caring for her mother is a full-time, exhausting occupation, Thuli sees this as an opportunity to express and deepen her love for her mother. Thoko Shabangu views the care she provides for her brother's son as an opportunity to express her love for children as she is likely to remain childless due to her HIV status. She sees herself as the better carer of Sizwe (son of her migrant brother and a woman from a marginalised migrant household) because she provides physical care and emotional stability to a child "confused" by the intermittent presence and inconsistent care of his parents.

> You know what, a child needs that comfort. He needs to stay with …
> he needs a mother to stay with [him] always. So, Mpho, now she is
> here, tomorrow she is there. And when he comes back, he's displeased
> with my food. She buys only sweets and juice. You can see that a
> child is eating these things and not real food. Sizwe needs real food.[82]

Thoko's ethic of care also finds expression in the community, where she works among the youth. However, these women's evident joy in looking after their parents or the children in their care should not obscure the sacrifices they are making in order to sustain migrant households. Thuli misses the relative independence of living on her own, if not the opportunity to make a career of her own choosing. She also feels that her sisters think less of her because she is not as educated as they are. Even a word of thanks, she feels, would show their appreciation for her. Thoko says that the possibility of her migrating is curtailed

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[82] Interview: Thoko Shabangu, 31 October 2007. Later in this interview Thoko said that Mpho was incapable of caring for a child because "from the beginning Mpho was not living with her parents, both. So maybe that was a disadvantage here and there". Mpho's perceptions of growing up without her migrant parents are discussed in Chapter Five of the dissertation.

by the need to care for her father. While she could take Sizwe with her, her father would not cope with city life or living with her sister. She had to cut short a previous attempt at migration when her mother fell ill six months after she left to work in Cape Town.

In South and southern Africa there is an assumption that grandmothers or *gogos* are present, willing and able to take care of migrants' responsibilities. In Chapters Four and Five I discuss what happens in working class and marginalised migrant households when this source of care is unavailable. What is clear is that a care deficit for the elderly exists because of the increased migration of women – the socially designated carers of the elderly in the absence of public-provided geriatric care. As argued by Kofman and Raghuram (2007),

> [In the global South]…while care for the child was accompanied by an expectation that the parents will in turn be cared for by the children in their old age … changing social norms around elderly care as well as increasing mobility means that the expectations and more importantly the delivery of reciprocal care have definitely loosened up, leaving a care deficit among older people in many countries (Kofman and Raghuram 2007: 11).

In the Ngubane, Sibiya and Shabalala households, where the elderly members of the household are not yet in need of intensive attention, care is focused on the younger children. Greater income means that some care services can be bought, such as consulting private doctors, paying domestic workers and for better schools and crèches. The use of domestic workers is significant for the elderly women mentioned earlier in this chapter, as they can delegate the physical tasks of care as they struggle with the effects of strokes and diabetes on their health. Thoko Shabangu and Hlengi Sibiya are freed to take on community activities and spend time playing with children, teaching them to cook, supervising their homework and having meals together. Parrenas (2005) describes similar care arrangements in the Philippines. In her study, fathers in middle-class families relied on domestic workers, kin in other households, and older daughters or sisters in their own household. This phenomenon is also described as "other mothering" and denotes that care remains the responsibility of women, albeit non-biological mothers

(Schmalzbauer 2004, cited in Kofman and Raghuram 2007: 17). Kofman and Raghuram (2007: 17) state that "[migrant] mothers may contest the myth of the male breadwinner but retain the myth of the female homemaker".

Distinctive about the semi-professional households in the study is that migrant members are able to visit regularly as they own cars or are able to draw on friends with cars. The Shabangu sons hire cars at Johannesburg/Durban airport. Sipho Shabangu is a great influence on his nephew, Sizwe, and often visits his father and sister in Emnambithi when he flies via Johannesburg on his research that takes him across the southern African region. At the same time, Sipho and Frank maintain contact with their homes through regular mobile phone communication. In contrast, Mrs Mabena's inability to communicate verbally expands the distance with her migrant children and sons.

Mobile care[83] – the giving and receiving of care by migrants through telephone, specifically, mobile telephone, communication and on the occasion of visits to Emnambithi – is one of the forms of care in semi-professional migrant households. However, because migrants perceive remaining members of their households – especially their siblings – to be providing adequate care for their dependants, mobile care is exercised at a lesser degree than in working-class migrant households. While semi-professional migrants go to some length to maintain contact and care with their households, distress caused by the separation of parent and child and husband and wife is clearly evident. Mrs Ngubane describes the distance that developed in her marriage to a now deceased migrant worker as "coldness". Although, Mr Ngubane was a devoted father, caring for his children when he came home, their marital relationship suffered. At first, Mrs Ngubane says, they were excited to see each other. Gradually they had less to talk about until "a coldness crept in that stayed until he died".[84] Mrs Sibiya's husband never bridged the distance with his household. When he retired he returned to his clan home in QwaQwa in Free State

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[83] Discussed in greater depth in Chapters One, Four and Five.

[84] Interview: Celestine Ngubane, 27 October 2007.

Nande, Mrs Shabalala's daughter, is a 30-year-old school teacher who lives on her own with her twin children. When Nande was five years old her parents "left" to work in Newcastle, leaving her and her four siblings with their paternal grandmother. Nande's experience of rejection was exacerbated by her stay at a boarding school when she started secondary school and the fact that she was sent, along with her siblings, to spend their December holidays with their maternal grandmother in Soweto. In response Nande rejects her mother. She says:

> Till today I am not close to my mother. I was closer to my father because he would visit us often as he visited his mother. My mother and *gogo* argued a lot so my mother did not visit often. Sometimes we would not see her for months at a time. I felt that she loved her job more than she did us. She also loved her pride [not wanting to see the mother-in-law] more.

> Today, she wants us to stay with her. Now she wants us to do things for her because we [are supposed to] love her. I do it because it is my duty. Even my son gets along with me much better than my daughter, because I don't know what it is to be a daughter. I won't even go to the church of my mother, because she never took us there when we were small. I respect her because she paid for my education, but I am not close to her. Even now, she won't look after my children even though she's retired. I hired someone when they were small. She wasn't a real mother; how could she be a grandmother? I will give her everything she needs, but I am not close to her.

The migration of Nande's parents paved the way for their children's current location in the semi-professional class of Emnambithi. The sacrifice of parental care causes resentment and strain in the parent-child relationship which may have repercussions beyond just one generation. For Nande the solution is not to be separated from her own children for too long. While she refers to the difficulty of teaching in an under-resourced school on a farm close to Emnambithi, she says that she would not move elsewhere, where childcare arrangements may be more complicated or inadequate.

3.4 Conclusion

The first part of this chapter discussed the class dimensions of semi-professional migrant households. Although there was slight variation within the category between households in Ezakheni C-Section and the Shabangu household in Watersmeet, most dimensions were common across these households, which has implications for the conditions of social reproduction in these migrant households. Firstly, these households have the highest incomes of all the households in the study sample, which also means that most of their physical needs are met. Secondly, most – if not all – members of these households are engaged in semi-professional work, which encourages an ethic of care in even its unemployed members. Thirdly, these households occupy, in the main a certain, desirable (Rex 1973) section of Ezakheni, and enjoy publicly provided infrastructure, which lessens the burden on their household incomes, as well as the burden of domestic work. Linked to this is the fact that their neighbourhood allows them to draw on the political and social resources which emanate from their political connectedness to the ANC.

The semi-professional migrant households distinguish themselves further in relation to the dominance of religion in their social lives. Religion is used pragmatically as a means of staying in touch with migrant members, ensuring migrants' upkeep of the same Christian values as their households of origin. However, the dominance of Christianity over ancestral beliefs is also a symbolic means of distinguishing themselves from lesser-educated households.

Conditions of social reproduction in the migrant households of semi-professionals ensure that intensive attention is available for its needy members. Intensive attention is given to older and younger generations by the middle generation. This form of caring is possible because other needs are taken care of with the resources available to these households. To some extent greater access to resources ameliorates the effects of migration on social reproduction in semi-professional households.

Gogos appear quite content with their lives and the care they are receiving. Security of migrants' jobs also enhances the stability of these households. However, younger women express feelings of being left behind by their migrant siblings. Thoko, Thuli and Hlengi have sacrificed careers of their own to care for children and parents of migrants. Despite the intensive attention given to those who stay behind, longing for their migrant family is translated into a sense of distance or hurt at relationships which are disrupted by migration.

Fluidity in the class location of these households is illustrated by the Shabangus, who were able to move into the semi-professional class. However, the tenuous nature of Frank Sibiya's work signals a potential downward move for this household, unless their children are able to pull them out of a downward slide. Thirdly, prior knowledge of education increases the ability of these households to ensure that their children receive quality education and progress to tertiary education. Recognition that education is the vehicle to professional employment and fundamental in securing and maintaining their class position means that children are encouraged in their schooling to ensure that these households are able to hang onto or expand their relative privilege.

The main claim that this chapter makes is that social reproduction in semi-professional households differs from that in households of other classes. In concluding this chapter, I draw out three specific features of social reproduction in semi-professional households. It proposes that the material and non-material resources that semi-professional households have at their disposal secure not only their daily maintenance, but are also drawn on to ensure the renewal of household members. That is, resources in the migrant households of semi-professionals do not only secure the daily survival of these households; they are also used to reproduce and maintain the class privilege these households enjoy. In the main, this dissertation argues that social reproduction remains the responsibility of women – that is, the ideology of domesticity prevails.

However, domesticity in semi-professional households has a specific generational effect. In semi-professional migrant households the impact of migrants' absence is borne by migrant's siblings – that is, by the middle generation. This reliance on members who are present in the household means that semi-professional households are, to a great extent, reliant on their internal resources and able to contain social reproduction within their households. However, attempts to secure their class position and to move further up the class ladder extend beyond the household in the arena of local politics and through voluntary work in the community. These attempts at class maintenance and mobility revolve around local politics and local needs – that is, the social reproduction of semi-professional households is rooted in the local environment, Emnambithi.

The class specificity of social reproduction can only be illustrated comparatively – that is, in relation to the social reproduction of other classes of households. This chapter should, therefore, be read in contrast with the subsequent chapters on social reproduction in working-class and marginalised households.

Chapter Four
Class and Social Reproduction in
Working-class Migrant Households

**Vignette: Precarious Work, Precarious Households –
The Radebe Household[85]**

Nomsa is 26 years old, very pretty, soft-spoken and dressed in the latest fashion. She lives in Watersmeet in a two-roomed, mud and thatch structure painted a bright blue on the inside. One room is a combined kitchen and living space and has two fridges, KIC and Kelvinator. The other room is a bedroom. The floors are made from cow dung and the whole house is neat. Nomsa is in Emnambithi on a visit and lives with her mother, a factory seamstress, in Ivory Park, an informal settlement in Midrand, Johannesburg. When she's in Watersmeet, she lives with her grandmother, *Gogo* Duma.

Nomsa's 8-year old brother, Siphokazi, lives with *Gogo* Duma, Xolani (*Gogo's* grandson and Nomsa's cousin) and Xolani's four younger siblings ranging in age from 3 to 13, while his mother and sister work in Johannesburg. At 29 years old, Xolani is unemployed and takes care of all the household duties. He cooks, bathes and dresses the five children. He also washes their clothes and does light cleaning. Nomsa's mother pays someone to do the ironing and intensive cleaning on weekends. *Gogo* Duma is 84 years old and can hardly walk or see. Yet their backyard is a hive of activity with women brewing beer in preparation for a feast for the ancestors on Sunday. Nomsa feels that her male cousin looking after these children "is just not right. He should be working". The other women[86] in the family echo this sentiment: none of them sees what Xolani does as work. However, if Xolani does not take care of Sipho, his siblings and *Gogo* Duma, his mother, who lives elsewhere, will not provide him with food and clothes.

In 1994, when Nomsa was 12 years old, her mother, Tina, moved to Johannesburg. At the time, Tina realised with great concern that her job as a seamstress in Emnambithi was under threat. She was newly divorced and thought that the higher wages and full-time employment that Johannesburg offered would

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[85] A three-hour long interview was conducted with Nomsa Radebe on 8 March 2007. The vignette also draws on interviews with Nomsa's mother, grandmother and aunt, and a subsequent interview with Nomsa on 25 September 2008.

[86] Interviews: Tina Radebe, 8 November 2007 and 19 May 2008; *Gogo* Duma, 17 March 2007 and 8 November 2007.

mean that she could take better care of Nomsa. Nomsa still remembers clearly how devastated she felt when her mother left. Confused by her parents' divorce, she felt that her mother did not love her any more and was leaving her like she had left her husband.[87] Nomsa stayed with her father and although she knew her father was a good parent, it did not ease her pain and longing for her mother. Her father was indeed remarkable. He was a shift worker at a textile factory and when he was at home he cooked and cleaned their home. But Nomsa remembers more clearly how he joked with her, helped her with her schoolwork and explained why her mother had left her behind. He would get angry when he spoke about their marriage but also tried to make her understand that Tina thought she was being a responsible mother by trying to find a more secure job. Mr Radebe took in the daughter of his brother when he died and told Nomsa that her cousin came to stay with them to be her friend. In 1998 Mr Radebe died. His kin asked a destitute couple to move into the house where Nomsa was staying to "guard" her. The harsh treatment of these caretakers at a time when she was mourning her father was more than Nomsa could bear. In 1999, when she was 18 years old and about to complete secondary schooling, Nomsa walked out of her father's house, took a taxi to Johannesburg and, after getting lost for many hours, found her mother's shack in Ivory Park. She completed matric at the end of 2000 and, with her mother's help, found "piece jobs" in various factories in Johannesburg. Since her move she has not spoken to her father's family.

When Nomsa arrived in Johannesburg, her mother had given birth to Sipho a few months before. Nomsa and Tina dote on him; his *gogo* also thinks he is "a blessing". Tina's love for her "only son" deepened after the death of his father in 2001. A few months later the two women and Sipho moved to Thembisa. When Sipho was 7 years old, while being taken care of by a neighbour, he ran into the street and was run over by a car. Tina says, "He is slow now," and, as a result, "Life in Thembisa is too busy for him." They cannot afford to "send him to a special school" because of the dearth of public provision of schooling and daytime care for children with special needs. Sipho was sent home to be cared for by *Gogo* Duma and Xolani. Nomsa says it makes her very sad to leave her brother behind, but she cannot convince her mother and *gogo* that life would be better for him in Johannesburg. There, she feels, he would be able to go to a better school and learn many languages and skills, which could help him to lead a more active life. But most importantly, he would have a mother who could guide him. Nomsa knows many young girls whose mothers have left them behind and are unhappy. Often they go to "bad places and because their mother is not there to warn them, they fall into bad company". She knows girls who ended up working as prostitutes or who have become alcoholics. She is adamant that she would never leave her children behind if she should have children. Her mother is building a house in Watersmeet, but if she had money she would build a house in Johannesburg where they could all live together.

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[87] See Parrenas (2005) which describes similar sentiments expressed by the children of migrant women.

A few months later: An interview with Tina Radebe

Tina is on leave and visiting her mother and son in Watersmeet. Although she misses home, she prefers her job in Johannesburg as she has "a contract" and earns R500 a week compared to the R180 seamstresses earn in Emnambithi. Tina's home (discussed above) was destroyed by vandals and she is staying with her mother, who is asleep on a mattress in the room where the interview is conducted. Eight people live in this two-roomed structure, so Sipho was moved to Tina's sister's home.

She feels that her sister cares well for him in her absence and that *Gogo's* love for him provides a secure environment. *Gogo* is unable to help with Sipho's physical care because she is ill and weak, but loves playing with him and telling him stories. She gets agitated when anyone suggests that Sipho should move to Johannesburg. A cousin, Hlengiwe, has moved into the household to care for *Gogo* and will be staying "for as long as she wants". Xolani is less involved in the housekeeping and care of the children and *Gogo* Duma as the women pressured him to find a "real job. Because he has too many children in other houses, he must now work for *lobola*".[88]

While Tina is sure her sister cares well for Sipho – "I don't suspect anything [wrong]" – she worries about him constantly. She says, "I worry all the time … did he eat, did he bath, will anyone hurt him? Njalo, Njalo, Njalo.[89]" She phones him every day and they "laugh a lot and joke" over the phone. During the day, she tells her co-workers about him and thinks of things to tell him. While she is at home, he plays outside, and regularly checks to see if she is still there. She teased him about this and he changed tactics; now he comes inside all the time to draw pictures for her. She is tearful at the thought of having to leave for Johannesburg that weekend.

4.1   Introduction

The Radebe household is a working-class migrant household. One of the ways in which household members attempt to secure adequate resources for household reproduction is to send some of its members, such as Tina Radebe, to Johannesburg to work. The low wages paid by textile factories in the area, and the constant threat of retrenchments in this sector, meant that a job in Johannesburg was more attractive than staying with a garment factory in Ladysmith. Tina

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[88] Lobola is the Nguni term for bridewealth paid to the parents of a prospective bride, often comprising cattle, but also in the form of money.

[89] *Njalo* means "every day". The repetition of this term signifies the intensity of her feeling of concern.

Radebe's move to Johannesburg meant that she could increase her salary by more than 250 per cent. However, she first had to leave her daughter, Nomsa, and eventually her son, Sipho, behind in Emnambithi. Tina cannot rely on her mother, *Gogo* Duma, to care for her children, as the frail, elderly woman requires care herself. As a result, the daily care of Sipho is left to his aunts. However, Tina's absence and the distance which separates her from her mother and son does not prevent her from being intensively involved in their care.

I refer to the commitment to remain actively involved in the lives of her loved ones as *mobile care*, a concept which is discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. I argue that mobile care is a context-specific form of care in which working-class migrant mothers engage in Emnambithi. The class location of the Radebe household and others like it is implicated in the resources these households have to reproduce themselves. Thus, their occupations as factory workers, income earned in Johannesburg, as well as the characteristics of their township, Watersmeet, are crucial factors in determining how the Radebe household members are able to reproduce.

Seven migrant households – the Zungus, Radebes, Shezis, Mhaules, Khuzwayos, Mabuzas and Ndimandes – fit into the working-class category. One of the primary bases whereby households were allocated to this category is the fact that in the main, household members were occupied in full-time, low-skill or semi-skilled jobs. In contrast to marginalised migrant households, incomes are derived from <u>full-time work</u>. However, there are also other differences in the character of the class location of working-class migrant households. As in Chapter Three and Chapter Five, this chapter will first discuss the dimensions of class of this category of migrant households. In the second section of the chapter, I will discuss the conditions under which social reproduction occurs in this particular category of migrant households.

4.2 Class Location of Working-class Migrant Households

4.2.1 Occupation in working-class migrant households

Table 4.1 illustrates the spread of occupations in the households of working-class migrants. These workers, comprising factory workers and shop assistants, all have permanent jobs.[90] Although they fear the factories closing down and complain about low wages, the consistent nature of their employment provides some measure of stability for these households. However, to increase their financial sustainability, it is necessary for some members of these households, often the highest income-earners, to work in Johannesburg.

Two of the households, the Mhaules and the Shezis, had migrants with semi-professional occupations. While incomes from the nurses' jobs contributed greatly to these two households, members in both households expressed fear that the potential for upward mobility was under threat because of the excessive demands placed on migrant households. The decision by Neli and Londi Shezi to break away from these demands was introduced in the preface and will be discussed further later in this chapter.

Security guard, Doreen Zungu, feels relatively secure because she has been working for a security company for three years, but feels trapped having to accept night shifts, being moved from one site to the next, and not being able to stay with her boyfriend.[91] She regularly remits money home, so her own disposable income is very low and she fears being retrenched, as has happened to many of her female colleagues over the past 18 months.

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[90] Obviously, there is no work for life. The kind of jobs referred to are legally defined as "indefinite", that is, not for a fixed term lasting until retirement.

[91] Interview: Doreen Zungu, 12 September 2008.

Table 4.1   Occupations in working-class migrant households

	Household Name						
	Zungu	**Ndimande**	**Radebe**	**Khuzwayo**	**Mhaule**	**Mabuza**	**Shezi**
Individual adult household members and occupations	Mrs Zungu – unemployed. Mr Zungu - shop worker, Johannesburg. Mpho Zungu - security guard, Johannesburg.	Mrs Ndimande - sells food to high school. Mr Ndimande - shop assistant at a butchery, Johannesburg. Cynthia Ndimande - factory worker, Emnambithi. Sylvia Ndimande - student at UKZN, Durban.	*Gogo* Duma - old age pensioner. Tina Radebe - seamstress in factory, Johannesburg. Nomsa Radebe - factory worker, Johannesburg. Xolani Duma - unemployed grandson of *Gogo* Duma - cares for children in household.	Mrs Khuzwayo – unemployed. Mr Khuzwayo - shop assistant, Emnambithi. Xolile - shop assistant, Johannesburg. Gugu – waitress, Emnambithi.	*Gogo* Mhaule - old age pensioner. Patricia Mhaule - nurse at Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital, Johannesburg. Nomfundo - factory worker, Emnambithi. Neo - factory worker, Emnambithi.	*Gogo* Mabuza - old age pensioner. *Baba* Mabuza - old age pensioner, returned migrant. Nhlanhla - works at candle factory, Emnambithi. Phindile - looking for work in Johannesburg. Nkosinathi - shop assistant, Johannesburg. Andile - looking for work in Johannesburg.	*Gogo* Shezi – old age pensioner (died during course of research). Neli – factory worker, Emnambithi. Londi (Neli's daughter and *Gogo* Shezi's grand-daughter) - nurse, migrant. two sons of *Gogo* Shezi – unemployed. *Gogo* Shezi's daugther - mentally disabled.

Child members of household	Zungu daughter 15 years old. Two children of Mpho, ages 3 and 5.	Son of Cynthia Ndimande, age 7.	Sipho Radebe, age 8. Four of Solana's siblings, ranging in age from 3-13.	Two children of Xolile, 14 and 8. One child of Gugu, age 7.	Three children of Nomfundo and Neo, ages 5, 8 and 9.	Three children of Nhlanhla, Andile and Nkosinathi, ages 8, 1½ and 7.	Three children of two brothers, ages 6, 7 and 9.
Migrants' monthly contribution to household	R450	R1 200	R1 000	R350	R1 000	R800	R1 500
Migrant remittances as percentage of total household income	42.9	50.0	36.5	12.7	32.6	25.2	45.5
Total income	R1 050	R2 400	R2 740	R2 750	R3 070	R3 180	R3 300

Mr Ndimande and Mr Zungu (Doreen's father) are both "shop assistants" – that is, they do general work in retail businesses. However, there is an interesting contrast between their working conditions and sense of security about their jobs. Mr Ndimande has worked as an assistant in a butchery in downtown Johannesburg for 15 years and currently earns R3 200 a month.[92] Although he has no formal contract of employment he feels relatively secure in his job. He relates his sense of security to the fact that he has become "part of the family" that owns the butchery. He suggests that because there is a personal relationship with his employers he has more autonomy in his job, and knows most of the patrons and the business very well. A major benefit is that he can take off-cuts of meat home, helping him to save.

In contrast Mr Zungu, who has also worked for 15 years at Shoprite-Checkers in Johannesburg, has a full-time contract of employment, yet he feels less secure.[93] His sense of insecurity stems from the fact that branch managers often refer to a slowdown in the economy and that many of his colleagues are employed on temporary contracts. As a result, Mr Zungu fears the total loss of his job or being put on "short-time". Workplaces such as Shoprite are regulated by managers' discourse of shrinking markets, which could lead to dismissals or restructured contracts. Mr Zungu's compliance with the company's regulations is ensured, although he suffers distress at the ever-looming threat of dismissal.[94] He believes that the only reason he is a full-time employee is because of the length of time he has worked for Shoprite. Another threat to his employment is the constant change of management, which he feels puts him at the mercy of inconsistent and exploitative management practices. As a result, he says, Shoprite workers – using the trade union network – make sure that they have information beforehand about the person when they hear a new manager is about to start working at their branch.

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[92] Interview: Mr Ndimande, 9 September 2008.

[93] Interview: Mr Zungu, 10 September 2008.

[94] See Kenny (2005) who uses the term "market hegemonic workplace order" to describe workplace control based on market fundamentals.

Nomsa Radebe, introduced in the vignette at the beginning of this chapter, works in a clothing factory in Fordsburg, Johannesburg, with her mother, Tina. Tina is a seamstress and feels that her job is relatively secure because her skill is recognised and in demand.[95] Nomsa, however, is an "all-rounder" – that is, she does all kinds of jobs from basic sewing to sweeping, trimming and ironing of clothes. She suggests that she will be able to hold onto her job as the factory owners would not want to upset her mother – who has received countless job offers from other clothing manufacturers – by letting her go.[96] Nomsa hopes to continue working at this workplace for long enough to get to the same level of skill as her mother.

Mrs Khuzwayo and Mrs Mabuza are both unsure about the kind of work in which their migrant children are engaged in Johannesburg. While other members of their households are employed in Emnambithi and their migrant daughters hand over their child grants and remit some money, they feel that the migrants' financial responsibilities are taken care of.[97] Thus social grants act as an important stabiliser in insecure households of working-class migrants. See Table 4.2.

4.2.2 Income in working-class migrant households

In my previous work on the households of full-time and short-term contract workers (STCs) at Defy in Emnambithi, I discovered that in the households of STCs much time was spent on generating additional income beyond factory work and that STCs were more likely to save money for when their contracts ran out (Fakier 2005, 2006). These migrant households do not engage in additional work nor do they report saving any of their income, signalling a precarious situation in the context of shrinking employment. In the current context, with constant threats of factory closures[98] and restructuring of

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[95] Interview: Tina Radebe, 19 May 2009.

[96] Interview: Nomsa Radebe, 25 September 2008.

[97] Interview: Mrs Mabuza, 13 March 2007; Interviews: Mrs Khuzwayo, 8 November 2007 and 16 May 2008.

[98] On every visit to Emnambithi since 2005, I have heard rumours of the imminent closure of Frame Textiles, one of the biggest employers of textile workers.

employment contracts, it is questionable whether these forms of work will continue to provide income to households in Emnambithi.

Table 4.2   Sources of income in working-class migrant households

	Household Name						
	Zungu	**Ndimande**	**Radebe**	**Khuzwayo**	**Mhaule**	**Mabuza**	**Shezi**
Members receiving social grants	Mpho's two children, ages 3 and 5.	Cynthia Ndimande's son, age 7.	*Gogo* Duma. Xolani (Tina Radebe's son), age 8.	Xolile's two children, ages 14 and 8. Gugu's child, age 7.	*Gogo* Mhaule. Nomfundo and Neo's three children, ages 5, 8 and 9.	*Gogo* Mabuza. *Baba* Mabuza. Three children of Nhlanhla, Andile and Nkosinathi.	Three children of two brothers, ages 6, 7 and 9.
Social grants	R400	R200	R1 740	R600	R1 270	R2 340	R600
% of total household income from social grants	38.1	8.3	63.5	21.8	41.4	73.6	18.2
%of total household income from migrant remittances	42.9	50.0	36.5	12.7	32.6	25.2	45.5
Total income	R1 050	R2 400	R2 740	R2 750	R3 070	R3 180	R3 300

The low wages of textile work in Emnambithi compared to "iGoli wages" is what motivated Tina Radebe to move to Johannesburg to work in a factory.[99] Even though she is on a flexible contract, with her higher wages Tina is able to sustain herself and her household during those weeks when she is not working, and can spend time with her son in Emnambithi. In contrast, it is the income earned in Emnambithi by the factory worker in the Mabuza household and the shop assistants in the Khuzwayo household which makes the low and intermittent remittances sent by their migrants bearable.

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[99] Interviews: Nomsa Radebe, 8 March 2007, Tina Radebe, 8 November 2007.

In contrast to the pooling of income in semi-professional and marginalised migrant households – discussed in Chapters Three and Five, respectively – working-class migrant households are much more dependent on migrant remittances (see Table 4.2). This, combined with the greater success in finding work in migration sites, establishes these households clearly as a migratory class in relation to the other classes of households.

However, it is obvious that social grants are a key source of income in working-class migrant households. Table 4.2 illustrates a consistently higher dependence on social grants in working-class migrant households compared to the households of semi-professionals (see Table 3.1 in Chapter Three). Public financial support, in the form of grants, is a crucial component of the income working-class households needs to survive. However, in the section below and in the section on social reproduction it is made clear that the lack of publicly provided infrastructure such as water provisioning, sewerage systems, roads and transport undermines the value of social grants.

4.2.3 Household structure and location of working-class migrant households

The homes of working-class migrant households are spread over three townships in Emnambithi. Four are located in Peacetown, two in Watersmeet and another in Ezakheni E-section (see Table 4.3).

Houses in Peacetown and Watersmeet are of a similar structure. Peacetown is 11 kilometres from Ladysmith town centre. Some houses are built with commercial bricks, but most are made from bricks that residents make themselves with mud and water, dried in a special mould. Residents feel that homemade bricks are better as they are better able to withstand rain, wind and even bullets. Most of the homes comprise three to four separate buildings on one plot. The main building is used by the women and houses the kitchen, while the outbuildings are used by men or to store equipment. Inside, the houses are very cool, even when the outside temperature reaches 32^0C. Residents say this is because their homes are built of the bricks made from mud, which they find in their

backyards or at the nearby riverbank, and the roofs are constructed from thatch found at the riverbank. Most houses have a few chickens scratching around, and a crop of mielies (though some mielie crops have died because of lack of rain). Few households have cattle as these could be stolen and sold in Durban where no one can trace them.

Table 4.3: Location of working-class migrant households

Houshold Name	Twonship
Zungu	Ezakheni E-section
Ndimande	Peacetown
Radebe	Watersmeet
Khuzwayo	Watersmeet
Mhaule	Peacetown
Mabuza	Peacetown
Shezi	Peacetown

Watersmeet is 27 kms outside Ladysmith proper – 16 km further along the road to Peacetown. The settlement is 15 minutes' walk from the taxi drop-off point. All houses are built from homemade bricks and, despite residents' impression that these are stronger than "bought bricks", parts of some of the houses are washed away. Noticeable, though, is the absence of mielie crops. The township has electricity and one borehole pump that services about 50 houses which are spread over an area of about six kilometres. Residents say that the increase in crime is the most significant change in Watersmeet over the past 20 years.

Ezakheni is situated 25 kms outside central Ladysmith. The difference between Ezakheni and the other townships is significant. There are clear differences within Ezakheni township, specifically between E-section and C-section. E-section is one of the sections which was originally built to supply labour to Ezakheni industrial estate, so all the houses are made from mass-manufactured bricks or concrete, and some are painted. The properties are smaller than in C-section. Workers in E-section work as unskilled or semi-

skilled labour in the textile and other small factories in Ezakheni industrial estate. The two favoured workplaces are Defy or Dunlop, which for workers and their households symbolise secure work under better conditions than working for "amaChina". Many of E-section residents, however, have been retrenched or are working on short-term contracts.

In E-section all the houses look the same. Most of them are unpainted and comprise four rooms, three leading off the living area. None of the internal doorways have doors, and we were able to see directly into the two bedrooms and the kitchen. These structures are small and cramped – three people barely fit into the living area. There are no ceilings and one can see the zinc sheets covering the roofs. The gardens in E-section are small and very few households grow vegetables, although there is a community vegetable garden tended by a young man. These houses are badly insulated against weather conditions – nearly unbearably hot in summer and extremely cold in winter.[100] Mrs Zungu says the biggest change in Ezakheni E-Section over the 13 years she has lived there is the installation of flush toilets at the beginning of 2007.[101] These toilets are outside the house. I observed a repair truck driving around the area and was told that its purpose is to repair the sewerage system which breaks down on a daily basis, sometimes more than once a day. Yet, the dignity afforded by a modern sewerage and plumbing system should not be underestimated. Residents of another part of Emnambithi, namely Peacetown, were highly embarrassed by the fact that they did not have "proper" or "decent" toilets.

Despite the fact that houses in Peacetown are much bigger and have sizeable property attached to them, which is used to build additional rooms as households require, *Gogo* Shezi wanted to move to housing in Ezakheni because she wanted to be in housing connected to the sewerage system and "inside toilets". She complained of having to push a heavy wheelbarrow because her grown, unemployed son refuses to fetch water from the borehole pump about 500 metres from their home. At the time of the fieldwork, Mrs

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[100] Interviews: Mrs Zungu, 27 May 2008, Mrs Hlanganani, 26 May 2008.

[101] Interview: Mrs Zungu, 15 March 2007.

Shezi was a frail, 70-year-old woman who found it difficult to negotiate her way on the narrow, bumpy track leading to and from her house.[102]

Gogo Mhaule was the only person who expressed no desire to move to "the locations". However, like the late *Gogo* Shezi, she saw state-provided housing as a right of South African citizens when she said, "It is what we deserve, but not the way it is [referring to the poor quality of housing in some of the townships]". The lack of a fixed abode emerged as an important factor for these households. The older members of the households in this category reported constant moves from farms in the surrounding areas until they settled in townships in Emnambithi. In this vein, *Gogo* Mhaule and *Gogo* Shezi listed their personal biographies as ones of constant moves from one farm to the next until they eventually settled in Peacetown. Although *Gogo* Mhaule only completed three years of schooling, she ensured that her two daughters finished school and attended college afterwards. Her determination stemmed from her childhood when her family was – like the families of the other working-class migrant households – more than once "kicked off the *plaas* because there were no sons to work the land".[103]

As discussed in Chapter Two, the fate of families evicted from farms in this area, was to end up in labour-supplying townships for border industries such as in Ezakheni, or to unproductive homesteads in the KwaZulu bantustan. Because rural agriculture was below subsistence level in the bantustan, households resorted to migration as a means of reproducing themselves. Racialised dispossession, the attempt to dispossess a segment of African society from the means of making their own living, thus actively produced these migrant working-class households. However, the gender order had varied effects in different classes of households. As discussed in Chapter Three, being female "released" women in *kholwa* households from doing farm work, which meant that their schooling and training as semi-professionals were undisturbed. In contrast, women of the other classes had to boost household income through petty agricultural activities in the absence of male migrant workers, or find non-agricultural employment.

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[102] Interview: *Gogo* Shezi, 14 March 2007.

[103] Interviews: *Gogo* Mhaule, 16 March 2007 and 30 October 2007.

The household structure of working-class migrant households illustrates a difference in the importance given to Christianity in their system of beliefs, as compared to the households of semi-professionals. Distinct from the semi-professionals households and similar to the marginalised households, working-class migrant households subscribe to both ancestral and Christian beliefs. They propose that the two belief systems are equally important. When asked about the relationship between the *amadlozi* and Christianity, the common response was "50/50" or something to the effect that the two were of equal importance and could co-exist side by side. As a result, these households in Peacetown, Watersmeet and Elandslaagte have designated spaces to commune with the ancestors, and households in E-section have to clear rooms of their many occupants for this purpose.

All of these households reported affiliation to various churches, predominantly pentecostal in nature, such as the Seventh Day Adventist Church, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and the Zion Church. Church attendance appeared to be sporadic in nature, with most of the households reporting attendance at services on a monthly basis. However, attendance at church-organised, community-based activities was much higher – as often as twice a week, while Mrs Mhaule and Mrs Khuzwayo listed as many as three different church activities a week. These activities revolve around praying for the special needs of their communities, such as drought or unemployment, or for individuals – for example, in cases of sickness, death or poverty – and involves "contributions" from each person attending.[104] Prayer meetings, costing a minimum of R10 per member, are relatively expensive for poor and unemployed households, yet time and money is sacrificed to attend and pray for sick and departed congregation members. In this way a chain of reciprocity is started based on the expectation that death and disease visit all households (Mosoetsa 2005).

In some of the households, the women are seen to be more inclined towards the Christian faith and the men more in favour of ancestral beliefs. Mrs Khuzwayo and Mrs Ndimande see their involvement in Christian church-based activities as a way of strengthening

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[104] Interviews: *Gogo* Mhaule, 14 May 2008, and Gogo Khuzwayo, 16 May 2008.

society. As Mrs Khuzwayo stated,"Men are not so much interested in [social] issues. Women are. In our church meetings we talk about poverty, health and other problems".

The rituals and customs of the ancestral belief system also has communal importance. The ritual slaughtering of animals, which is accompanied by great feasting and drinking, is open to all members of a community. In this manner one household provides much colour and joy to a township and ensures that most members of the community have a good meal. These activities are of twofold value. First, they enact the notion of unified society combining around a positive experience. During the week, there is much talk among young and old about attending these activities over weekends, as it is seen as a great opportunity to socialise with Emnambithi residents who come from Johannesburg or other parts of Emnambithi to attend. Secondly, it accrues to the household a form of insurance. The households who host these functions and those who support them in spirit as well as financially and with the physical labour that these activities entail are all noted by those who attend. In the end, those who attend or host these events – whether they are Christian or ancestral events – can rely on the support of others when they need it. As Mosoetsa (2003:12) argues, those "households that are known for supporting others get more support from the community than those who do not".

It appears that working-class migrant households find greater support and validation as a community through religious activities than in political affiliation. The reticence and apathy with which interviewees in working-class and marginalised migrant households responded to questions about national and local politics is in sharp contrast to the enthusiasm with which they discuss their involvement in religious activities. What did emerge is that the stance of semi-professional migrant households towards local political structures is quite distinct from that of the other classes of households. This distinction will be discussed further in the next chapter on marginalised migrant households, the households which are most in need of public resources, yet divorced from local political processes and, as a result, even more reliant on community solidarity.

4.3 Social Reproduction in Working-Class Migrant Households

4.3.1 Overview

Social reproduction in working-class households is distinct from semi-professional migrant households. While there are more resources available in these households compared to marginalised migrant households, intra-household conflict around consumption, the battle to educate and care for the children of migrants and their parents, and the dire need for adequate child care and elderly care in working-class migrant households are evident.

An important motivation for migrant households is the need to establish a household for their children, especially in cases where the children of unmarried mothers are estranged from their paternal line. However, establishing, for example, "a house for the Ndimandes"[105] compensates for the absence of male migrants and provides a physical abode in which a family line can continue. This entails finding a vacant plot and building a house from mud and thatch for their sons. Zulu households in Emnambithi aim to do this for each adult son, while daughters are expected to join the households of their spouses or the households of those bearing their spouses' "name". Mrs Ndimande links the importance of a family name with the existence of a physical structure when she says that the only advantage of having her migrant husband home is that "then our house has a name". The patrilineal nature of this community has implications for how households reproduce themselves. While men give their name to households, women are engaged in the work that social reproduction entails without the authority men have.

4.3.2 Daily consumption and provisioning in working-class migrant households

Despite a combination of income from work in Emnambithi, remittances by migrants and social grants, working-class migrant households are barely able to meet their daily needs.

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[105] Interview: Nancy Ndimande, 5 March 2007. This position was also reiterated in interviews with Mpho Mathebula, Mrs Shezi, Nombuso Ndaba and Martha Ndaba.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the food consumed in the households of migrants is severely lacking in nutritional quality (Fakier and Cock 2009). Less conflict surrounds the distribution of food in working-class migrant households compared to the migrant households of the marginalised to be discussed in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, gender conflict raises its head in these households. As described in the vignette at the start of this chapter, Xolani Duma cares for the children in the Radebe household. He cooks, cleans and bathes the children, and ensures that they complete their homework. However, his mother – who lives in a separate household in Emnambithi – Tina and Nomsa Radebe, and *Gogo* Duma are not comfortable with this situation. Tina, Nomsa and *Gogo* Duma report that they argue with Xolani, urging him to find a job so that he can support the children "he has in other households" and to save money for *lobola,* to start his own household and settle down with one woman.[106]

Despite the fact that he does not regularly contribute towards his household income, when he "visits" Emnambithi Mr Zungu makes excessive demands on his household's resources. He demands that Mrs Zungu slaughters a chicken, of which he consumes almost the entire body while the rest of the household gets to eat the chicken's feet and innards. Mrs Zungu hopes that her son will be a "different kind of husband" as he cooks and cleans in their household. Mrs Ndimande similarly resents the excessive authoritarianism displayed by her husband when he "visits". During his monthly visits home, Mr Ndimande questions and disputes most, if not all, the decisions made by Mrs Ndimande during his absence. Migrant men see this conflict over decision making as a loss of their "parental authority" (Webster 1985:271). The wives and children of migrant men become accustomed to making their own decisions in the absence of the male head, and men, on their return, feel superfluous in the daily activities of their households.

The women in Watersmeet and Peacetown townships are faced not only with the need for daily provisioning and distribution of food in their households. They are also burdened with inadequate provision of basic public utilities, such as malfunctioning sewerage systems, poor water and electricity provision, and insufficient or expensive public

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[106] Interview: Tina Radebe, 19 May 2008.

transport. As a result, women and children have to dig pit latrines on a weekly basis, forage for firewood and fetch large amounts of water on a daily basis, and walk long distances to travel on privately owned, often unsafe, mini-bus taxis. These conditions of social reproduction are also part of the daily lives of marginalised migrant households. It is incontestable that in bigger households - such as the Shezi household, which comprised nine members – where young children are unable and men are unwilling to carry out women's work, these conditions become unbearable.

In contrast to many households where overburdened women are unable to leave because of a lack of alternatives, Nelisiwe Shezi decided to break away from her late husband's household after the death of her mother-in-law in May 2007. She says the death "made me think a lot". On the death of her mother-in-law all responsibility for the funeral fell on her and Londi's (her migrant daughter's) shoulders. She was disturbed that *Gogo* Shezi's children and grandchildren "grabbed some of the funeral money". She felt that the burden that *Gogo* carried was too big. "*Gogo* only had her church and then she died…. She was too old, but they asked her for everything.[107] It made her so sad and tired. I can't do that or they would ask Londi." A month after the funeral Nelisiwe moved to her present home in Ezakheni E-section, which has a mortgage in Londi's name.

Nelisiwe's decision was made easier by the fact that her daughter was educated and worked as a nurse, and that she could not bear that the excessive demands placed on them would cancel out the benefits of Londi's education. Thus, education is an important factor in ensuring the stability, and possible mobility, of working-class migrant households.

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[107] Interview: *Gogo* Shezi, 14 March 2007; Interview: Neli Shezi, 26 May 2008; Interview: Londi Shezi, 11 September 2008.

4.3.3 Education in working-class migrant households

While the older generation in working-class migrant households were less educated than their peers in the professional category, great attempts were made to ensure that their children completed a minimum of secondary schooling. *Gogo* Mhaule, with great sacrifice, ensured that both her daughters qualified as nurses. The Shezi household, despite its large number of unemployed, used the money from Mr Shezi's life insurance policy to pay for Londi to complete her training as a nurse.

Migrant men, like Mr Ndimande and Mr Zungu, were able to secure jobs in unskilled occupations, despite their inability to complete secondary school. However, they clearly state the importance of education for their offspring. Mr Zungu, despite intermittent support to his household, feels that his duty was done by his daughter when he supported her during her school years and paid for her training as a security guard.[108] Despite the growing distance between Mr Ndimande[109] and his household, he finds satisfaction in the fact that his older daughters have now completed secondary school – one working in a textile factory in Emnambithi and the other studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban.

However, ensuring that their children remain at and complete secondary training is difficult in working-class migrant households. *Gogo* Mabuza's son, Andile, dropped out of school and left for Johannesburg. At first, she thought that it was because he could not cope with his father's authoritarian manner when Baba Mabuza retired. However, Mrs Mabuza discovered that her son had fathered a child only when his girlfriend brought the child for Mrs Mabuza to care for a few months after his departure.[110] It is probable that Andile dropped out of school, despite no prospects of a job, because of a combination of factors – his father's return and his girlfriend's unplanned pregnancy. What is clear is that

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[108] Interview: Mr Zungu, 10 September 2008.

[109] Interview: Mr Ndimande, 9 September 2008.

[110] Interview: Mrs Mabuza, 13 March 2007.

it is difficult to ensure the successful completion of education in migrant households with insecure resources.

Reproductive needs are catered for by household incomes which are made up of salaries earned in Emnambithi, remittances and social grants. However, these contributions are often not enough to ensure that the children in these households attend school. For instance, during one of the interviews with the Khuzwayo household,[111] the school-going children were at home during school hours. Mrs Khuzwayo said they stayed at home because their school uniform did not dry after she had washed it the previous day. However, the rainy weather had another implication for school attendance. From the Khuzwayo home, one has to walk across muddy ground and traverse dongas,[112] which become muddy or filled with water as the result of rain.

Gogo Mhaule thought the stability of a household in Peacetown, while her daughter was working as a nurse in Johannesburg, would ensure that her two granddaughters would complete school and embark on tertiary training.[113] She is visibly disappointed that the girls dropped out of school because of pregnancies. It is a sore point because she went to great trouble, as in semi-professional migrant households, to send them to "the Indian school, Windsor [Senior Secondary School] in Ladysmith and the other to a Model C school in Johannesburg". Later in the interview she says that South Africa should revert "to the white man's rule, when there was no child grant. Maybe then we'd have fewer pregnancies". She expressed the notion of halted mobility when she said, "I thought we were going up. Both my daughters[114] are qualified. Now these ones are dragging us down". The two young women in the Mhaule household eventually returned to school and have completed secondary school. However, the low grades they achieved made tertiary training impossible.

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[111] Interview: Mrs Khuzwayo, 16 May 2008.

[112] Dry riverbeds

[113] Interviews: *Gogo* Mhaule, 16 March 2007 and 30 October 2007.

[114] *Gogo* Mhaule's other daughter is a registered nurse working at a retirement home. Interviews: *Gogo* Mhaule, 16 March 2007, and Patricia Mhaule, 14 May 2008.

Mrs Ndimande, on the other hand, is very optimistic about her household's trajectory. Since our first meeting in March 2007 she has been plagued by pains in her legs, which appeared very sore and excessively swollen to me.[115] She struggles to cook the food she sells to children at a nearby school during their break. While she appears fatalistic about her health, she says that she pushes through the pain and will rest once her daughter finishes her course at university in Durban. Mrs Ndimande scrimps and saves money from her income and the salaries of her husband – who works as an assistant in a butcher's shop in Johannesburg – and her factory worker daughter to pay her middle daughter's fees and living expenses. "She will lift us all up and sacrifice like we did for her".

4.4   Care of the Dependants of Working-Class Migrants

4.4.1 Gendered care

Compared to men, migrant women are thought to be more consistent in the remittance of their income in order to ensure the social reproduction of dependants and also to finance the economic development of their communities of origin (Dodson 2000; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002; Arat-Koc 2006). Interviews with members of working-class migrant households illustrate that migrant women attempt to sustain caring relationships with their households of origin, albeit over a distance.

In contrast, in the Ndimande household, as in the other father-away households, it is very clear that Mrs Ndimande is responsible for caring for the children, while her husband works in Johannesburg. He sends money home regularly, visits regularly, and does repairs and gardening when he's home. She sells food to a local school. Their eldest daughter works at a local textile factory, their second daughter is at a college in Durban and her youngest is in high school. She is happy with having to take total responsibility for the household while Mr Ndimande is away and actually resents his presence because she feels he is very critical when he is home. He seldom speaks to his children and is very

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[115] Interviews: Mrs Ndimande, 5 March 2007, 30 October 2007 and 14 May 2008.

distant. He feels that they are well cared for and that Emnambithi is the best environment in which to raise children. However, when he goes home he finds it difficult to adjust to life in Emnambithi and feels pressurised by all the maintenance that the house requires.

Male migrants are more assured that their children are well taken care of by female carers in Emnambithi. However, in the working-class migrant households, there is a subtle conception of *father* as a constant and consistent member of the household, as illustrated in the extract by Nomsa Radebe's relationship with her father. In the Shezi household, Neli's late husband and Londi's father is remembered as a "good father and provider". In the Mabuza and Shezi households the presence of older fathers – though their involvement is sporadic and often a strain – is seen as giving the house "a name". In the Khuzwayo household, Baba Khuzwayo is commended for his involvement in the care of the small children of the migrants. There is a relationship between Gugu (daughter of migrant, Xolile) and her father even though the relationship between the parents broke up. In fact, Gugu often "runs away" to her father's house when she falls out with her *gogo*. Like Nomsa, she finds a replacement for her migrant mother with her father rather than with her *gogo*. In the Mhaule household, *father* is a much more distant figure, because Baba Mhaule died many years before and the daughters' father died before the second one was born.

In addition to the biological fathering of children, Rabe (2007) distinguishes between "economic fatherhood" and "social fatherhood" of migrant mineworkers. The first refers to the maintenance of financial obligations towards children. Social fatherhood refers to the active caring by a man for his own children or other children who are considered to be in his care or in the care of his household. Rabe argues that the differences in caring by migrant fathers for their biological offspring correspond to combinations of social and economic fatherhood. She concludes that migrant fathers are more likely to care for the children living with them, and that fatherhood is strongly influenced by "the relationship between a [migrant] mineworker and his current wife/wives/girlfriend" (Rabe, 2007: 174).

During the course of an interview with Mr Zungu, it emerged that he has a long-standing relationship with a woman in Johannesburg and has fathered two children with her. He explains the sporadic nature of his remittances by alternating on a monthly basis his contribution to either the household in Johannesburg at the expense of his Emnambithi household or vice versa. His conceptualisation of duty to his households is fulfilled in this manner. Mr Ndimande also conscientiously maintains his wife and children, yet like Mr Zungu, social fatherhood is less his concern, as parenting is seen as his wife's domain. The wives of migrants do not contradict these expectations and concur with their husbands that Emnambithi is the best place to raise children. Indeed, Mrs Zungu suggests that despite its hardships caring is best done by women as "a woman is like a chicken; she cares for everyone under her wing".

However, not all mothers and fathers are willing to care for their children. In the Mabuza household, Andile migrated to escape social and economic fatherhood completely when he realised his girlfriend was pregnant. In the face of her son and his girlfriend's unwillingness to care for their child, *Gogo* Mabuza took on this responsibility in addition to caring for six other children and her husband who returned from Johannesburg with tuberculosis.

4.4.2   The role of gogos

In the case of women migrating, reliance on *gogos* to care for children increases. That is, domesticity is gendered even when women migrate. However, *gogos* are not always able to care for their charges. *Gogo* Mhaule, at the age of 70, is an "active *gogo*" according to her granddaughter, Nomfundo, who preferred to stay in Emnambithi with her grandmother rather than with her mother in Soweto. This decision was a great disappointment to Patricia. Patricia and *Gogo* Mhaule feel that the time and effort *Gogo* Mhaule put into caring for her granddaughters is overshadowed by the fact that she could not prevent them from falling pregnant. In the same vein, *Gogo* Khuzwayo visibly enjoys caring for her smaller grandchildren. Xolile, the mother of the children, confirms this and

refers to the games *Gogo* and *Baba* Khuzwayo play with the children. However, Xolile's 14-year-old daughter often runs away in an attempt to join her mother.

Gogo Duma is physically incapable of taking care of children. The Duma clan relies on two sisters who live in Emnambithi to care for their mother and Sipho Radebe. *Gogo* Duma supervises the care of her grandson and plays games with him. She especially enjoys telling him stories about her youth and making up riddles to teach him Zulu words. However, Sipho's care is constantly on his mother's mind. Tina also continues to provide emotional support to her mother and physical care on her trips home. Tina is not unusual in providing care over a distance in addition to the non-material resources she is able to draw on. Similarly, Xolile Khuzwayo, Mpho Zungu and Patricia Mhaule continue to provide *mobile care* to their mothers and children. Thus, similar to the semi-professional migrant households, the middle generation in working-class migrant households retains a great responsibility for caring for their dependants. An importance difference, though, is the fact that in the case of working-class migrant households, the carers are migrants.

While very little research has been done on the quality of care provided by *gogos* and the impact it has on households, caring *gogos* have become legend in South Africa (May 2003; Schatz 2007). In 2007, LoveLife – an organisation dedicated to educating South Africans about sexuality, HIV and AIDS – in collaboration with the national Department of Health ran a "*gogo*-getters" programme which donated R350 a month to *gogos* caring for others living with AIDS. This project organised

> a network of 500 grandmothers across South Africa who support teenagers and their younger siblings to develop a sense of purpose and belonging in life. As part of LoveLife, the grandmothers help keep young people at school, access social grants, prevent sexual and physical abuse and increase access to food (Harrison 2009: 1).

However, many *gogos* reported that the R350 the programme provided was not enough to sustain the aims of the programme. One "*gogo*-getter" reported that she used the money for transport to ask businesses and households for more donations to take care of her nine

dependants (Harrison 2009). Thus far, the *gogo*-getter programme has only been implemented in Eastern Cape and southern KwaZulu-Natal, so its effects on households in Emnambithi cannot be estimated. However, the strain of care on older women should not be underestimated. A study of *gogos* at the Agincourt, a significant migration-sending community established as a research site, concluded that "it was clear that the responsibilities associated with caring for those sick with HIV/AIDS and the children left behind are great" and that most *gogos* expressed "feelings of being 'bound' to care for the children and stretched thin financially" (Schatz 2007: 153).

4.4.3 Mobile care

Parrenas (2005) refers to the attempt at mothering over long distances through telephone contact that is characterised by the heightened emotions of guilt and longing as "intensified mothering". She argues that the children of migrants often get adequate care from other female family members, if not their fathers. However, because there is a prevailing discourse of who it is that should mother, migrant mothers experience excessive guilt and children express severe and unwarranted resentment towards their absent mothers.[116]

However, in the context of Emnambithi it is obvious that there are no alternative sources of care for the children of migrant women. The absence of fathers is one of the aspects contributing to a lack of alternative forms of care. In contrast, the care of Nomsa Radebe by her father – as described in the vignette – stands out. Nomsa remembers clearly how he joked with her, helped her with her schoolwork and explained why her mother had left her behind. However, this is a rare case and more commonly children are left in the care of their *gogos*. In interviews when the care of children of migrants was discussed with local government officials in Emnambithi, a unitary response was that *gogos* would care for the children of woman migrants.

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[116] In a subsequent book, Parrenas (2008) went on to argue that assumptions that women are primarily responsible for care – in the home and the workplace – form part of the ideology of domesticity.

What is evident from my research is that *gogos* are themselves in need of care, and that the remaining household members of migrant women cannot, solely, provide the care required by *gogos* and children. As a result there is a continued reliance on women to care for their parents and children, *especially* when they migrate. As discussed in Chapter One, there are limits to the applicability of the concept, *intensified mothering*, especially with regard to the material conditions of care. Describing this situation as intensified care is not sufficient, as it emphasises the burden of domesticity on migrant women and ignores the joy which gives these relationships special meaning and makes the effort and expense which go into caring over a distance worthwhile.

Tina Radebe, introduced at the beginning of this chapter, is one example of a mobile caring mother. In similar fashion, Xolile Khuzwayo, Patricia Mhaule, Londi Shezi and Mpho Zungu display the same level of mobile care in their near-daily telephone conversation covering casual chat, instruction and the exchange of information and fortnightly trips home. Migrant women, their parents and children look forward to these interactions and report that they derive great pleasure from them. The love from *gogos* for children such as Sipho Radebe, and the children of Xolile Khuzwayo, Mpho Zungu and Patricia Mhaule, is indisputable. However, migrant mothers creatively use resources such as their telephones, regular visits home and their interactions with other people and situations at their origin site to continue to care for their children and parents. Migrant women of Emnambithi employ mobile care by phoning their dependants on a daily basis and visiting as often as they can manage. Both sides store up anecdotes of daily life, reminders of daily duties and jokes to tell the other when they see or speak to each other. Participants in this relationship struggle to deal with their own and the other's longing to be together. At the same time, there is much joy in their interaction with each other.

Mobile care refers to the care of children and parents in which migrant women engage using mobile communication and on their regular visits home, which is characterised by sadness and joy experienced by both caregiver and care recipient. Mobile care also refers to the a particular context in which migration occurs, where the migrant is *able* to visit home on a regular basis – as in the case of internal migration – and where alternative sources of adequate care do not exist.

The use of mobile telecommunication and intercity transport are both essential components of mobile care. However, when the incomes of households are limited, these expenses become unaffordable. In Chapter Five we look at marginalised migrant households, where the lack of material resources has a fundamental impact on the ability of households to care for their dependants and reproduce themselves.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter discusses the characteristics of the class location of working-class households and argues that class has a particular impact on how these households reproduce. In order to find a better-paying job with greater security, Tina Radebe – like the other migrants in this category – moved to Johannesburg. The stability of her household was undermined in the process. These households are just barely able to secure their daily needs through the pooling of income from different sources. The reproduction of households does not depend solely on migrants' remittances; it is also supported by the income from work in Emnambithi and from social grants. To a certain extent, income pooling provides households with a minimum of financial security. However, this sense of security is worrying as there are constantly signs of looming dismissals in Emnambithi (Fakier 2005; Webster *et al.* 2008). In addition, while the national state supports these households through social grants, the lack of infrastructure in their townships burdens their day-to-day living.

The fluidity of the working-class category is illustrated by three of these seven households. In the Mhaule household, despite much effort by *Gogo* Mhaule and the example of Patricia Mhaule and her sister who are registered nurses, Patricia's daughters dropped out of school because of pregnancies. As a result, *Gogo* Mhaule regrets that the mobility of her household to a semi-professional location has been halted. In contrast, breaking away from their other, more needy members means that Neli and Londi Shezi may well make that transition, while they relegate the rest of the household to the marginalised class. The Ndimandes also feel that investing money and care into their

daughter's education will ensure that they all benefit from the sacrifices of migrant labour, and may secure their position as a working-class household.

In working-class households in Emnambithi great emphasis is placed on the education of children. There is a realisation in these households that completing secondary school leads to more secure jobs. However, because of the absence of parents and economic strain, it is difficult to ensure the completion of schooling In addition to the threat of childhood pregnancy, the leisure time of children is taken up by travelling to town on behalf of frail *gogos* and by fetching water. Given the shrinking of full-time work and the difficulty in keeping children at school, these households' grip on their class location appears to be under threat.

As in the previous chapter, this chapter demonstrates that a reliance on *gogos* to care for the dependents is flawed. *Gogos* also require care, and feel incapable of providing all the care these children need. Thus, conceptions of "mother" and "father", whether idealised or not, remain important to the children of migrants. However, in the households of male migrants (Zungu, Mabuza and Ndimande), additional strain is experienced when fathers return (ill in the case of the Mabuzas) or "visit" (Zungus and Ndimandes). These households are able to cope with the reconfiguration of authority when the father is present, because the use of the term "visit" implies that their presence is merely of a short-term nature. The sense of "being out of place" is shared by the men. At the same time, these households comply with Zulu prescriptions of patrilineality.

In contrast to migrant men, migrant women in working-class migrant households continue to provide care for their children and mothers. I argue in this chapter, that the mobile care employed by migrant women is a context-specific, creative way in which working-class migrant households attempt to overcome the deprivation resulting from the departure of mothers and daughters. The extent of mobile care is one of the ways in which social reproduction in working-class migrant households differs from other classes of households.

Working-class migrant households also share some similarities with households in other class locations, such as their commitment to the education of children. Another similarity is that they inhabit some of the same townships as marginalised households, and therefore share a struggle with the same lack of infrastructure. However, there is a distinctiveness about social reproduction in working-class migrant households.

Firstly, incomes in these households are barely sufficient to cover household member's daily needs. That is, daily survival is secured, but the renewal of these households is severely under threat. Some households, who have managed to ensure that their younger members embark on tertiary training, feel relatively optimistic that they will continue to reap benefits of full-time, secure employment. Households – such as the Khuzwayo, Zungu and Mabuza households, where migrants, like their peers in Emnambithi, are feeling the threat of retrenchments, – fear that they may slide into unemployment and sole dependence on social grants.

Within the working-class category, there is a difference in how households deal with the absence of migrants according to the gender of the migrant. In the case of male migrants, remaining women and wives assume control of their households. In these father-away households, everyone is clear that the wives and mothers of migrants provide domestic labour. However, the migration of women means the removal of a caring resource from the household. While, working-class households are similar to semi-professional households in as much as domesticity is the responsibility of the middle generation, there is a fundamental difference in terms of *which* members of the middle generation retain their caring responsibilities. In contrast to semi-professional migrants, working-class migrant women cannot divorce themselves from the care of their mothers and children, and resort to stretching themselves over time and distance to fulfil their obligations.

Thus, the social reproduction of working-class migrant households spans distance and is not contained within the physical boundaries of a house. Equally the involvement, especially of women, in the religious activities of their communities expands the field in

which social reproduction takes place. Not only is there a reliance on other households to support religious events, an understanding of reciprocity between households prevails.

In Chapter Five I discuss how members of marginalised migrant households draw on the social obligation shown by other households, in contrast to some illicit activities which prey on other households in the community or hide the real need of marginalised households when the need for secrecy prevails.

Chapter Five
Class and Social Reproduction
in Marginalised Migrant Households

Vignette: - Stunted Reproduction - Lindi Sibanyoni[117]

Lindi Sibanyoni is a 17-year-old girl. She has known for months that she is pregnant. It is impossible for her to have and raise a child. She lives with her 18-year-old stepsister, Manta, taking care of their siblings who are 15, 11 and 8 years old. She desperately wants this pregnancy to go away. All she wants is for the five of them to stay together.

Her late father's sister was supposed to care for them when her stepmother died less than a year after her father committed suicide. But Sindile[118] never offered them a place in her home in Elandslaagte. She must have realised that Lindi and Manta were not going to hand over the foster grants and care of their siblings to her. Grace, their grandmother's sister, is always checking on them, wanting to give advice and stay over with them for a few days. Grace had done her duty and registered the younger children in her care. She draws their foster money and hands it over every month on Lindi and Manta's demand. They try their best to prevent Grace from interfering in their lives. But Grace has her hands full with her own children; the oldest has dropped out of school again after giving birth to her second child.

Lindi asked everyone she trusted for advice on how to get rid of the unborn child. Speaking to any of her teachers was not an option as she feared they would inform the local Department of Social Development that the household lived without an adult. She did not approach older people for advice because they would have told her to give birth to the child and then deal with the problem. But Lindi did not want to give birth to the child. She had heard of girls giving birth and then drowning the child or leaving it in the veld.

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[117] The bulk of this vignette is based on an interview with Lindi Sibanyoni conducted on 15 May 2008.

Parts of the vignette draw on interviews with Lindi's half-sister, Manta, her surrogate mother, Khanyile, her grandmother, Silvia, and her cousin, Grace.

[118] Sindile Shicego is also unemployed and lives with her two young children, her sister who is at school and her sister's daughter in the home left to them by their mother. Their mother Sylvia died in June 2007, shortly after she returned from Johannesburg where she had worked as a domestic worker for 25 years (Interview: Silvia Shicego, 6 March 2007; Interview: Grace Ndaba, 20 May 2008).

She had to get rid of it before it was born. If the child died unborn then it would not know she did not want it.

One friend told her of a *nyanga*[119] who makes *muthi* for unwanted pregnancies. She went to him and took the tea he made for her, but all it led to was diarrhoea. A friend told her to squirt a mixture of water and household cleaner into her vagina. She tried that with a syringe, "but it still stayed". Manta suggested that if she tied a piece of cloth really tight around her stomach maybe "it would choke". That did not help either. She heard that she could go to Johannesburg to get an abortion, but she had already spent a big amount of money [R500] on the *muthi*. She knew that no nurse in Emnambithi would do it – not at the hospital, a clinic or at home.[120] So she went to the house of a woman whose baby had died during childbirth to find out what had happened. This woman told her that when her labour did not progress a nurse "broke her water with a thing that looks like a crochet hook", but it did not work and the baby was born dead. Lindi thought she had the solution, but without Manta's help she found it physically impossible to reach the amniotic sac with a short crochet hook.

Lindi then borrowed R500 from a moneylender and visited one of the women who advertised their "private and confidential … same day [abortion] services" all over Ladysmith town. The woman she consulted was not interested in the age of her pregnancy and after a quick external examination of Lindi's stomach gave her a batch of tablets. Lindi swallowed four tablets every four hours for one day. In the evening she started getting severe cramps. The pain convinced her that this attempt would be successful. She wanted to get painkillers but thought that if the pain stopped the abortion would not be complete. When she saw that her bed was covered in blood, she asked Manta to phone an ambulance.
At the hospital, the nurses treated her with suspicion, knowing what she had done. They left her alone, unaided, to give birth to the foetus, which had already died in the womb. They phoned Grace to fetch the foetus and bury it. No one at the hospital spoke to her, but they gave her angry looks and spoke of what she had done among each other and with other nurses. Lindi did not care what they thought or said because the child was gone and she could go on with her life.

5.1 Introduction

Lindi Sibanyoni's decision to terminate her pregnancy is an illustration of the difficult decisions members of marginalised migrant households have to make. Termination of pregnancies of less than 12 weeks, and under special circumstances between 13 and 20

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[119] A *nyanga* is a traditional healer who specialises in herbal remedies. *Muthi* is medicine prepared by a traditional healer.

[120] In all probability, Lindi's assumption that a nurse would refuse to conduct an abortion is correct. See Varga (2002) and Walker and Mckenzie (1995).

weeks, is allowed on the request of mothers under the 1996 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (COTP Act) (Cooper *et al*. 2004). The COTP Act specifies that the special circumstances warranting termination beyond 12 weeks' gestation include "when the continuation of the pregnancy poses a risk to the woman's social, economic or psychological well-being" (Cooper *et al*. 2004: 75) However, the intent of the legislation is hindered by nurses and health care providers who are unwilling to provide this service, asserting their right to conscientious objection against this act, as well as strong social disapproval. Varga (2002), in a study of perceptions about abortion in a Zulu community, notes that the termination of pregnancy at the request of an *adolescent* is especially frowned upon. That is, legal abortions are more likely when young mothers are instructed by their parents or urged by their boyfriends. In the absence of active encouragement, approval and support from others, adolescent mothers are more likely to opt for illegal abortions or to abandon newborn babies. In this context, where procreation is socially sanctioned by older people and men, illegal and unsafe terminations of pregnancy are still rife despite progressive laws that provide for abortions on request of pregnant women. As a result, when many young South African women decide to terminate their pregnancies, they have to undergo illicit abortions at great financial, emotional and physical expense (Walker and McKenzie 1995; Varga 2002; Cooper *et al*. 2004)

Despite the difficulties of obtaining an abortion, the conditions under which Lindiwe and her household live compelled her to prioritise the survival of the household over that of the unborn child. That is, Lindiwe, the de facto head of a child-headed household, decided that bearing a child would increase the reproductive burden of this household to unbearable proportions and, thus, an illegal abortion was the only practical way to resolve the dilemma. Lindi and her siblings hide the fact that there are no adults living with them, in fear that their household may be broken up and taken into foster care. Their great-aunt, Grace, helped them to deceive local government officials by registering them in her care, claiming their foster-care allowances and handing the money over to Lindiwe and Manta. Similar to other marginalised households, social grants are often the only income and means of survival. Lindi knows that education may lead to better opportunities for herself and her siblings, and she is determined that all of them should complete secondary school

and undertake further training. However, at the school the household risks exposure to the authorities. As a result, speaking to teachers requires more deception. This household resorts to illicit behaviour not only to survive but also to stay together.

In the eleven households in this category, migrants or members of their households have little to no employment. Those who do work, work on an itinerant basis and have very low incomes, especially in the instances of domestic work (Table 5.1). Domestic work, though covered by the Labour Relations Act, which prescribes employment contracts and minimum wages, is vulnerable to instant and arbitrary dismissal. In Chapter One I presented the proposal by Seekings (2003) and Seekings and Nattrass (2006) that there is a growing "underclass" in South Africa. Although they acknowledge that the term is pejorative,[121] they use it because they recognise that members of this class are unemployed and find it difficult to find work in the South African economy (Seekings 2003).

I prefer the term "marginalised" to describe this class of households. With the term, marginal, I aim to demonstrate the contradictory nature of this class of households. Wright (1978: 93) argues that designating the "permanently unemployed" an underclass is "not satisfactory… for it suggests that they have fundamentally opposed interests to the working class". However, he is unable to come up with an alternative formulation and states that, "as a purely provisional solution to this problem, the permanently unemployed can be considered a *marginalized* segment of the working class" (Wright 1978: 94, emphasis added). Later he states that "the underclass consists of human beings who are largely expendable from the point of view of the rationality of capitalism" (Wright 1994: 49). This perspective is shared by Rex (1973) and Wilson (1987, 1993) who argue that the underclass is disposable – that is, not needed by capitalist production.

However, members of unemployed households are hard at work trying to secure the conditions of their social reproduction, in their own households as well as for low pay in

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[121] Seekings (2003: 40) argues that the term underclass would lead to the "stereotyping of people whose only 'crime' is to have suffered systematic disadvantage".

more privileged households. Domestic workers are also included in this category of the marginalised. Although minimum wages, working hours, number of leave days, and termination rules are prescribed by Sectoral Determination: 7 (Department of Labour [DoL] 2008), there is little adherence to it. All of the domestic workers in the sample were paid below the minimum wage of R1 166.50, reported long working hours and being given leave at the whim or preference of their employers, and described their departures from employers as arbitrary, summary dismissals. Dilata (2009) also reports that domestic workers in Johannesburg, specifically townships in Soweto, are typically paid between R800 and R1 000 per month. In addition, she reports that employers of domestic workers state that their method of dealing with disputes with their employees is to dismiss them. These violations of labour regulations are made possible by the fact that domestic work is in the private realm of the household, a social space which unions find difficult to organise and where patriarchal notions of who should be responsible for domestic work reign[122] (Ally 2006, 2008; Schwenken 2009)

The adult members of these households are not formally employed. They do not get a regular income from work – that is, they are not "earning a living" (Webster 2005: 57). However, they are "making a living" in the sense that they are actively engaged in activities to secure income and resources for their households' survival. However, "livelihoods depend not only on wages, but also on the unpaid work that reproduces the labour force over time and across generations" (Razavi 2009).

Bezanson and Luxton (2006: 367) argue that instead of being dual systems, production and reproduction are part of the same mode of production, as "they are interdependent processes of production and consumption that in combination generate the household's

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[122] Ally (2008) argues that post-apartheid labour legislation, which includes Sectoral Determination 7, has had the contradictory effect of introducing the legal imperative to improve workplace conditions and wages, yet has demobilised and depoliticised domestic workers unions' efforts to prevent contraventions of this determination. She says, "The democratic state has displaced the union as the articulator, representative, and protector of the collective interests of domestic workers. Reduced to an auxiliary and supportive role to the various agencies of the state, the union of workers has been effectively stripped of a broad political function, a process it has actively allowed in return for the strategic, practical, and symbolic benefits (Ally 2008: 19).

livelihood". Arguing that reproduction is integral to production[123] includes the often-unpaid work of social reproduction within the same system of accumulation as waged work in the formal arena of production. However, as I have demonstrated in Chapter Two, a section of the population in Emnambithi is unevenly integrated within the mode of production, often "outside the circuits of [economic] capital" (Sanyal and Battercharaya 2009), as they are marginalised from the demands of the labour market.

The tenuous, itinerant relationship of these households to the labour market influences the conditions of their social reproduction. This chapter argues that the marginalised class location of these households mean that their social reproduction differs from that of the other classes of households.

5.2   Class Location of Marginalised Migrant Households

5.2.1 Occupations in marginalised migrant households

There are eleven households in the category of marginalised migrant households. I have included the households of returned migrant workers – Silongo, Sibanyoni, Grace Ndaba, Sithebe and Shicego – who currently have no migrants. The Gumede household is also the household of a returned and retired migrant; however, her daughter and granddaughter are both migrant domestic workers in Johannesburg and Cape Town, respectively.[124] In the other returned migrant households in this category, while the resident members are unemployed, the returned migrants ply their trade on the roadside of Ladysmith town, either trading wares such as small jars of petroleum jelly, glycerine and packets of potato crisps, or preaching for money or, in one instance, plaiting people's hair.[125] Their desperation for income is so severe that Mrs Sithebe and Mrs Ndaba

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[123] The interrelationship of production and reproduction is discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. See also Bakker and Gill (2003).

[124] Interviews: Ellie Gumede, 8 March 2007 and 19 May 2008.

[125] Observation: 10 March 2009, Emnambithi Central Business District.

constantly asked about the possibility of domestic work in Johannesburg, and on my last trip to Emnambithi I was told that Mrs Silongo had returned to Johannesburg.

David Hlanganani stands out among the migrants from marginalised households. He works as a technician for Telkom on a full-time basis and is able to upgrade his technical skill continually through working for this company.[126] He enjoys his job, especially the fact that he's not office-bound, and says because he installed telephones in many different suburbs, he got to know Johannesburg very well. Some of his work peers have started their own companies, providing technical support to Telkom on an outsourced basis, but David is cautious about this. It is "too up-and-down" for him, referring to periods of intensive activity followed by long bouts of no work and no income which his ex-colleagues have to endure. David's fear of working on an outsourced basis is not unfounded. Telkom is South Africa's partly-privatised telephone provider. Since it sold 30 per cent of its shares to Texan and Malaysian companies, "it has slashed its workforce from 64 000 to 24 000. Of these, 13 000 workers were supposed to be included in outsourced entities, but only 2 000 of even these jobs still exist" (Legassick 2007: 126).

Sophia Hlanganani, David's mother is very proud of her son and relies on his monthly remittance of R500. Sophia was retrenched from her job on the assembly line at Dunlop Tyres in Ezakheni more than six years ago and has since been unable to find another job. Her husband, on retirement from his job in Johannesburg, moved to Nqutu, a rural area in KwaZulu-Natal, and does not contribute towards the upkeep of this household, where his children are still living. Sophia feels that her older daughter, Felicity, has also deserted them. Shortly after Felicity moved to Durban, she fetched her daughter and, after an argument with her mother, was never heard from or seen by this household again.[127]

According to Joy Mfeka, her sons, Malusi and James, sell fruit in Jules Street, Johannesburg.[128] In my attempt to interview the two of them, one of the traders in Jules

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[126] Interview: David Hlanganani, 19 September 2008.

[127] Interviews: Sophia Hlanganani, 15 March 2007 and 26 May 2008.

[128] Interviews: Joy Mfeka, 5 March 2007 and 14 May 2008.

Street told me that James "has gone away" – that is, has gone to prison. James was reported to the police for stealing the mobile phone of one of the other traders. The police found him with a mobile telephone, which "he could not open, because he did not have the password for the phone" and took him away. He has not been seen there since. However, Malusi – who introduces himself as "John", says this story is not true. Instead, he says, "The others didn't like him, so he's somewhere else".[129] It appears that John does everything but sell fruit. At the time of our interview he was "guarding" the sweets stall of one of the other traders. When I ask him about his own table, he points vaguely and refuses to be any more specific. During the course of the interview he often jumps up to "direct" motorists into parking spaces and passersby to some of the stalls, jokes with men and shouts comments to women, loudly advertises the wares of other traders and sells sweets and "loosies" (single cigarettes) from his own packet of cigarettes. When I asked him what he does for a living, his response is "anything I can find". He gives the same response to my questions about where he lives and where he eats.

Mpho Mathebula's life is similarly insecure.[130] In September 2008, she was standing in for her Zimbabwean friend who went home to have a baby. She was torn between taking this short-term position and a longer-term option of working for a household for two days a week, but she needed the income and hopes to find full-time work. When she has some employment she lives with friends in Orange Farm. However, she often moves from one friend to another to avoid being asked to move on. When she is not working she has to survive on the R200 she claims as her son's child grant, and she "visits" people and waits for them to offer her something to eat. When she has money, she buys goods such as handbags or clothes and sells them in Emnambithi.

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[129] Interview and observation: Malusi Mfeka, 20 September 2008.

[130] Interviews: Sibongile Mathebula, 11 and 12 March 2007, 5 November 2007, 13 and 19 May 2008, and 9 September 2009.

Table 5.1   Occupations in marginalised migrant households

	Household Name										
	Mathebula	**Ndaba**	**Hlanganani**	**Shicego**	**Gumede**	**Ndaba (Grace)**	**Langa**	**Sibanyoni**	**Sithebe**	**Mfeka**	**Silongo**
Location of household	Peacetown	Elandslaagte	Ezakheni E-section	Watersmeet	Watersmeet	Tsakane	Peacetown	Tsakane	Tsakane	Peacetown	Tsakane
Individual adult household members and occupations	Sibongile - unemployed migrant domestic worker, sometimes engaging in trade.

Mr Mathebula - driver in Richards Bay. | *Gogo* Ndaba - old age pensioner.

Dorcas Ndaba – migrant, domestic worker. | Sophia - retrenched, worked on assembly line at Dunlop Tyres.

Felicity – migrant, unsure of occupation.

David – migrant, technician at Telkom.

Denise – unemployed. | Sindile - cooking at a stall. | Phumzile - returned migrant.

Mary - migrant domestic worker (Phumzile's grand-daughter). | Grace (returned migrant) – hairdresser.

Sam Mtshali - Grace's boyfriend, cleaner. | Mavis - old age pensioner, returned migrant.

Cynthia - unemployed.

Mandla - unemployed. | Mpho (18 years old) – unemployed.

Lindi - school-going. | Jabu (returned migrant) - petty trader.

Gogo Sithebe - old age pensioner

Nomsa - unemployed.

Mbali – unemployed. | Joy - seamstress.

Phumla Malusi - petty trader in Johannes-burg.

James - petty trader in Johannes-burg.

"Music" Mfeka - general labourer, often unemployed. | Rose - returned migrant, lay preacher.

Mr Silongo - lay preacher.

Gift - unemployed.

Nomfundo - unemployed. |

Child members of household	Thula Mathebula - son of Sibongile Mathebula and Lumkile Shabangu - resides here sometimes when Sibongile is home.	Mzwandile, Sakhile and Samo - sons of Dorcas (ages 8, 11 and 14). Philani – age 16, mentally disabled son of *Gogo* Ndaba's deceased son Ben. Occasionally Nombuso Ndaba and her two children live here.	two children of Felicity – ages 3 and 6. Son of David, age 6.	Ntombi – age 17. Sindile's two children. Ntombi's son.	None.	Nombuso, age 17. Susan, age 12. Nombuso's two children, ages 1 and 2.	Two children of Cynthia – ages 8 and 10. One son of Mandla, age 8.	Sifiso, age 15. Neo, age 11. Hope, age 8.	daughter of Nomba, age 1. Two children of Mbali, ages 4 and 7.	Two sons of Phumla, ages 5 and 6. Daughter of James, age 3.	Children of Nomfundo, ages 10 and 5.
Migrants' contribution to household	R150 to R800	R0 to R900	R500	0 (migrant deceased)	R330	0 (migrant returned)	0 (migrant returned)	0 (migrant deceased)	0 (migrant returned)	150	0 (migrant returned and deceased)
Migrant's contribution as percentage of household income	42.9% to 80%	0% to 45%	45.5	0.0	27.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.4	0.0
Total monthly income	R350 (Thula's child grant) to R1 000	R890 to R2 000	R1 100	R1 200	R1 220	R1 280	R1 490	R1 740	R1 790	R1 790	R1 800

Another migrant domestic worker, Dorcas Ndaba, was fired once for going home too often but was rehired by the same family.[131] Before she found this position she had spent many months looking for a job and a place to stay in Johannesburg. She says that she endures the long hours of cleaning up after her adult employers because they provide her and her boyfriend with a room to live in. She developed a slow pace of working because if she had free time during the day her employers would put her to work at their place of business as well.

In contrast, Grace Ndaba, Jabu Sithebe, Rose Silongo, Mavis Langa, Ellie Gumede and Sylvia Shicego were nostalgic about their time as domestic workers in Johannesburg. Grace Ndaba remembers that the money she earned there was much more than she is able to earn in Emnambithi as a hairdresser.[132] Jabu Sithebe was able to boost her income in Johannesburg by finishing her work early and then selling refreshment at the nearby Wanderers Stadium.[133] Rose Silongo remembers the wider audience she had on the trains and buses and in Soweto to whom she could preach the message of her church, the Tower of Hope.[134] However, when Grace and Jabu's daughters fell pregnant in their teens, their mothers – who were responsible for the care of these young women – demanded the migrants' return to care for their children. Rose returned when her mother could not cope with her son's drug addiction. Mavis Langa and Ellie Gumede returned when they turned 60 and were too old to continue working, while Sylvia Shicego was told she was too sick to work.[135] Six months after her return, Sylvia died of AIDS-related complications, waiting for the pension payout her previous

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[131] I interviewed Dorcas on 3 July 2007, when she was on leave from her domestic work, on 31 October 2007 when she had been fired from her position, and on 5 September 2008 at her place of work, a few months after she was rehired.

[132] Interview: Grace Ndaba, 7 March 2007.

[133] Interview: Jabu Sithebe, 7 March 2007.

[134] Interview Rose Silongo, 8 March 2007.

[135] Interviews: Mavis Langa, 6 March 2007; Ellie Gumede, 8 March 2007; Silvia Shicego, 6 March 2007.

employers had promised her. More than two years after she has returned, Ellie still waits for a similar payout promised to her.[136]

5.2.2 Income in marginalised migrant households

David Hlanganani, the only migrant with secure employment, is also the only source of consistent and significant remittances in this category of households. In the main, the migration attempts by members of marginalised households have not been successful and remittances, though desperately needed, are not significant contributors to household incomes. As a result the livelihoods of marginalised households are locally sourced. However, local unemployment is also high and therefore the dependence of these households on social grants is significant. See Table 5.2.

In the Sibanyoni, Ndaba and Langa households the dependence on social grants as a form of income is total. In *Gogo* Ndaba's household there was an increase in the income of the household when her son, Ben, died. Although Ben left his mentally disabled son, Philani, in *Gogo* Ndaba's care, he held on to Philani's disability grant. On his death, the disability grant was eventually channelled to the household where Philani lives. However, Dorcas Ndaba continues to claim her sons' child grants in Johannesburg, and only sends some of it home, when she has earned enough money herself. Similarly, Mpho Mathebula collects her son's grant and spends it as she sees fit while her son lives in his father's household.[137]

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[136] Interview: Ellie Gumede, 19 May 2008.

[137] Interviews: Sibongile Mathebula, 5 November 2007 and 19 May 2008. This issue was also raised by Thoko Shabangu, the paternal aunt and primary caregiver of Sibongile's son, in an interview on 7 March 2007.

Table 5.2   Income in marginalised migrant households

	Household Name										
	Mathebula	**Ndaba**	**Hlanganani**	**Shicego**	**Gumede**	**Ndaba (Grace)**	**Langa**	**Sibanyoni**	**Sithebe**	**Mfeka**	**Silongo**
Grant recipients	Thula	Mzwandile, Sakhile and Samo - sons of Dorcas (ages 8, 11 and 14). Phumlani - age 16, mentally disabled son of *Gogo* Ndaba's deceased son.	Two children of Felicity - ages 3 and 6. Son of David, age 6.	Sindile's two children. Ntombi's son.	Phumzile	Susan, age 12. Nombuso's two children, ages 1 and 2.	Mavis - old age pensioner, returned migrant. Two children of Cynthia, ages 8 and 10. One son of Mandla, age 8.	Sifiso, age 15. Neo, age 11. Hope, age 8.	*Gogo* Sithebe. Daughter of Nomsa, age 1. Children of Mbali, ages 4 and 7.	Joy. Two sons of Phumla, ages 5 and 6. Daughter of James, age 3.	Children of Nomfundo, ages 5 and 10.
Income from social grants	R200	R1 780 (currently). An additional amount is sometimes derived from the grants of Mzwandile, Samo and Sakhile when their mother sends it.	R600	R600	R890	R600	R1 490	R1 740	R1 490	R1 490	R400

% grants contribute to total income	20% to 60%	R100	54.55	50.00	72.95	46.88	100.00	100.00	83.24	83.24	22.22
Amount remitted to household	R150 to R800	R0 to R900	R500	0 (migrant deceased)	R330	0 (migrant returned)	0 (migrant returned)	0 (migrant deceased)	0 (migrant returned)	R150	0 (migrant returned and deceased)
migrants' contribution as % of household income	42.9 to 80	0 to 45	45.5	0.0	27.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.4	0.0
Total monthly income	R350 (Thula's child grant) to R1 000	R1 780 to R2 000	R1 100	R1 200	R1 220	1,280.00	1,490.00	R1 740	R1 790	1,790.00	R1 800

In a focus group interview with a group of teachers in Emnambithi,[138] they reported that one of the primary problems for schoolchildren in migrant households is the collection of child grants by the migrants at the destination site and then not reaching its intended recipients. A child grant is paid to a child's biological mother or a caregiver designated by the mother, in most instances the person who holds the child's birth certificate. The state's intention was meant to ensure the money reaches the child through the person who actually cares for the child and not spent irresponsibly. Mr Vukani Manyathi, who works for the Department of Education, liaising between schools and the Department in co-curricular activities such as sport, culture and youth activities, stated that often he is unable to register athletes in sport codes in their specific age groups because the child's birth certificate or identity document is with the parent in another town.[139] Unlike Sibongile and Dorcas, who hold onto their children's grants, most parents in the sample leave this money with the households where the children reside. While migration as a survival strategy is not very successful for these households, insecure employment means that few remittances are sent home. In the main, then, the only consistent "remittances" that marginalised migrant households can rely on are child grants. In the case of retired migrant domestic workers, their old age pensions of R890 per month is the only retirement insurance they are able to access after years of working in the city.

Similar to semi-professional households where members link up with churches to care for other members in their community, and working-class households where especially women are involved in prayer meetings to support more needy community members, marginalised households also draw on community activities to pool their resources and labour. Common to these households is involvement in prayer meetings, which *gogos* see as a way of educating the young about notions of social responsibility and solidarity.

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[138] Group Interview: Schoolteachers Guider's Training, Encgoboyesizwe School, 24 May 2008.

[139] Interview: Vukani Manyathi, Co-Curricular Activities: Sport, Culture and Youth, Department of Education,20 May 2008.

In addition, marginalised households are involved in funeral societies, which range from organised to informal in nature. *Gogos* Ndaba, Gumede, Langa, Sithebe and Mfeka belong to a locally organised funeral society, where each member contributes a small amount (R5 on average) on a monthly basis; funds are kept in a bank account until needed for a funeral of one of the members.[140] Other households are involved in more informal arrangements, where members contribute a small amount on the death of one of the members to support a funeral. Similarly *stokvels* operate on the same pooling system. Working-class households are members of *stokvels* where money is pooled on a monthly basis and one member of the group draws the total monthly amount on a rotational basis. However, marginalised households are not able to commit a monthly amount to *stokvels,* and are involved in a more informal pooling system where a number of households come together to buy a necessity, such as bricks or cement for a wall that has fallen down, with the understanding that the money will either be paid back over a period of time or similar contributions will be made when others are in need. Not only do these informal associations assist households to procure essential goods and services, but by hosting meetings of these associations and prayer meetings in turn, other (younger) members of households are introduced to and inculcated with the humane ideals underlying these associations.

In contrast, collective values are undermined by other livelihood activities, which are violent, hidden and illegal (Fakier 2005; Mosoetsa 2005). All the senior members of marginalised households reported crime as the most serious problem affecting their communities. Their perception that poverty is at the root of criminal activities is borne out by crime statistics in the area. While the murder rate had declined from a high of 87 murders a year in 1994, property crime has increased (Webster *et al.* 2008). Most worrying for the physical and material

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[140] Interviews: *Gogo* Ndaba, 20 May 2007; Ellie Gumede, 19 May 2008; Mavis Langa, 23 May 2008; Jabu Sithebe, 22 May 2008; Joy Mfeka, 27 May 2008.

security of Emnambithi residents is the fact that while burglaries at business premises have decreased from 88 to 53 per year, burglaries at residences in the community have increased from 244 to 382 per year from 1994 to 2004. In two of the marginalised households, *Gogos* Mfeka and Ndaba[141] expressed suspicions and fear that their sons or grandsons were involved in robberies and housebreaking. However, by no means is it proven that members of marginalised households are linked to the property crime in the area.

Teachers in Emnambithi report that children are "groomed into a culture of secrecy" in the many households where marijuana is grown as a source of income. Juggling the illegality with the necessity of these activities, "they don't speak outside the house".[142] In the same manner, grandmothers protect their charges who engage in theft from the law and the rest of the community. Not only do these activities develop and propagate values contradicting the law, they also subject already desperate communities to violence and loss of scarce property. The solidarity and collectivity, which are constantly being recrafted by households at great expense to their time and resources, are eroded by criminal activities that ensure the survival of some at the expense of others. The different ways that marginalised households actively try to secure income, resources and their survival also reproduces the norms and values which have contradictory effects on the maintenance and security of their communities.

5.2.3 Household structure and location of marginalised households

The eleven marginalised households are spread over Peacetown, Watersmeet, Ezakheni E-section, Tsakane and Elandslaagte (Table 5.3).

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[141] Interviews: *Gogo* Ndaba, 20 May 2008; Joy Mfeka,14 May 2008.

[142] Group Interview: Schoolteachers Guider's Training, Encgoboyesizwe School, 24 May 2008.

Table 5.3   Location of marginalised migrant households

Household Name	Location of Household
1. Mathebula	Peacetown
2. Ndaba	Elandslaagte
3. Hlanganani	Ezakheni E-section
4. Shicego	Elandslaagte
5. Gumede	Watersmeet
6. Ndaba (Grace)	Tsakane
7. Langa	Peacetown
8. Sibanyoni	Tsakane
9. Sithebe	Tsakane
10. Mfeka	Peacetown
11. Silongo	Tsakane

Six of the households are located in Peacetown, Elandslaagte and Watersmeet and have a similar structure, much like the houses of the working-class migrant households described in Chapter Four. They are built with mud bricks and thatch and comprise one rectangular structure which houses the kitchen and a room which is used during the day as a living space, where visitors are received and where the women and children sleep at night. Another structure, which takes the shape of a rondavel and has a thatched roof, is found outside. This room is used by men, and its round shape designates its main purpose – communing with the *amadlozi*. Nominal rental is due on these properties although only one household – the Mathebulas[143] – reported paying a rental of R60 a year in 2006.[144] These properties have enough space for small crops of vegetables to be grown, although no viable crops were noticed over the period of this fieldwork. Water is drawn from communal taps located in one household's backyard and accessed by other

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[143] Interview: Sibongile Mathebula, 12 March 2007

[144] According to Mdu Macingwane, assistant town planner, these properties are subject to the KwaZulu Ingonyama Trust Act, 1994, and the KwaZulu Ingonyama Trust Amended Act, 1997, whereby occupants are accorded tenure by traditional leaders. This land was previously known as Trust Land (see Chapter Two). Interview: Mdu Macingwane, Emnambithi Assistant Town Planner, 30 October 2007.

households when needed, or from borehole pumps that service between 50 and 100 houses. Communal taps draw water from tanks which collect rainwater, and boreholes draw on an underground reservoir fed by the Klip River. No charge is levied on either of these forms of water provision. There is no sewerage system and pit latrines are dug, over and over. Firewood is collected in the surrounding hills.

Elandslaagte is about 35 kms outside Ladysmith – along eight kms of gravel road. The taxi driver says it is a good thing to introduce "white people" to the "old nation's place – Elandslaagte". Elandslaagte is much more rural and buildings are more traditional - that is, built like rondavels. While there is one main gravel road used by taxis, households are reached along pathways created by the movement of people in their daily activities. People appear to be poorer than in Peacetown. The primary source of income here is social grants. There are more cattle, goats and sheep grazing. Many households have ducks, and people go to the nearby *koppie* to hunt for rabbits and buck. There are also many men standing around, congregating around the clinic-school-shop-tavern complex. Everyone is curious and friendly.

Political life in Elandslaagte is headed by a traditional leader (or chief) and an IFP councillor. Sibongile Mathebula, who lives in Peacetown, says that her community has an ANC councillor and therefore there is no need for a chief. She implies that her living place is more modern and therefore better resourced. Nevertheless, the councillor in Elandslaagte has a big house and the borehole pump is in his backyard. The chief has a beautiful home, too, but is said to be living in town with one of his wives. The chief gets a share of meat of any feast, and calls on households in this community to make "donations" when he decides to purchase, for example, a luxury vehicle. In return, the chief maintains a link between this community and the Zulu king, listens to and decides on cases of domestic abuse, and assists the local courts by giving advice on cases that require his knowledge of customary law. The fact that he is living in town implies a

desertion of the community. However, he is held in high esteem by older members of the community.

The modest houses in Tsakane and Ezakheni E-section – which are built with "bought" bricks and plaster and have running water and outside toilets connected to the sewerage system – are occupied by the marginalised. While these houses are desired by residents of Peacetown, Watersmeet and Elandslaagte for the dignity afforded by its sewerage system, these three-roomed properties are significantly smaller and cramped. Tsakane is a post-apartheid creation and comprises RDP housing. When the Sibanyonis moved to Tsakane in 2004, Khanyile told her children, "We are moving to electricity and running water [including inside toilets]".[145] While the households in the sample "rented" these houses from their owners, little or no rental was actually paid, the residents acting as "place-keepers" for the owners who lived in other parts of Emnambithi. The constant fear of being evicted from these houses with no alternative accommodation renders their occupation even more insecure.

The religious practice and beliefs of marginalised households mirror those of working-class households very closely. These households also subscribe to ancestral beliefs, and believe that the *amadlozi* are as important as God and Christian prophets. As described in Chapter Four, homes in Peacetown, Watersmeet and Elandslaagte have designated spaces to commune with the ancestors, while households in Tsakane and Ezakheni do not. Nombuso Ndaba (who lives in Tsakane) confirms this and says that ancestral beliefs are in decline because it is so difficult to conduct the required rituals in her neighbourhood.[146] However, other interviewees did not echo Nombuso's opinion of deterioration in the belief in the ancestors.

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[145] Interview: Lindi Sibanyoni, 1 November 2007.

[146] Interview: Nombuso Ndaba, 8 November 2007.

Sibongile Mathebula expresses her belief in the doctrines of the Seventh Day Adventist Church quite strongly, and is very critical of her father and others who subscribe to ancestral beliefs. However, she is concerned that she has not offered a cow to the ancestors since her mother's death. She estimates that this would cost her R4 000, an amount which is completely unaffordable.[147] With her current income she is unable to save towards this amount; she subscribes to a different system of belief, yet she feels immensely pressurised to do what her community expects of her as a duty to her late mother. Some of the younger women who grew up without their fathers regret that they have not been "introduced to the ancestors" by their fathers. Although, an older male member of their clan – or, in the last instance, an older woman – could perform this ritual on their behalf, the expense of such an event is prohibitive.

As in working-class migrant households, members of marginalised households were also reluctant to talk about their political affiliation.[148] Bonnin (1997, 2000, 2001) provides one explanation for the reluctance of people in KwaZulu-Natal communities to talk about their political ideals when she recounts the political violence that erupted in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the province. As discussed in Chapter Two, conflict between the IFP and ANC-aligned organisations[149] erupted in open war which devastated households on both sides of the political spectrum. People were unable to go in safety to their places of employment, women were raped, men were brutally killed, households were robbed, and romantic and platonic relationships broke up if they transgressed political boundaries. Bonnin argues that these communities where so much

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[147] Interviews: Sibongile Mathebula, 5 November 2007, 9 September 2008.

[148] I asked these questions from many different angles, with bluntness or jokingly, and reserved the questions until the end of the interview, all with little success. I cannot decide whether this was because of a genuine lack of interest in politics or due to reticence. This was in contrast to the study of Defy workers in Ezakheni in 2005, when political support (mostly for Jacob Zuma) was firmly stated (Fakier 2005; Webster *et al.* 2008).

[149] These were predominantly organisations affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF), as the ANC was still banned at the time and could not operate openly.

violence and loss were experienced are still characterised by a reluctance to speak openly about politics.

However, my earlier research on Defy workers illustrated that the fact that the ANC was most instrumental in bringing about peace in Emnambithi after its unbanning; meant that many Emnambithi residents aligned themselves with this party "who won the peace". Hart (2002a) also speculates that playing the peacemaker in Emnambithi contributed to the ANC's success in winning local elections during the 1990s. Webster *et al*.'s (2008) conclusion that citizens in this area are "disillusioned" with the local government because of the lack of delivery of public infrastructure and an inability to provide secure jobs is a more convincing explanation.

5.3   Social Reproduction in Marginalised Migrant Households

5.3.1 *Daily consumption and provisioning in marginalised migrant households*

Like in the working-class household of migrants, low income affects consumption in marginalised households. However, procuring the daily necessities for survival is even more difficult in these households where money often runs out. The desperation experienced when there is no money available was palpable in the Mfeka, *Gogo* Ndaba and Langa households.

At one point, *Gogo* Ndaba's household comprised seven members – *Gogo* Ndaba herself, five grandchildren and one great-grandson – trying to survive on *Gogo* Ndaba's pension. While child grants are paid in respect of all the children except for Nomduso who was 16 years old and visiting with her baby at the time – these grants go to the children's absent parents, who support their children sporadically. Dorcas Ndaba, mother of three of the children in *Gogo* Ndaba's care, works as a domestic worker in Johannesburg, but had not sent any money home for the past

six months. *Gogo* Ndaba said, "She never asks if there is food [when she talks to her son on the mobile phone she bought him, the means on which people in rural areas rely for communication], and only sends food with someone if they tell her they are hungry".[150] *Gogo* Ndaba's excessive responsibility means that she is constantly in debt. This 73-year-old woman uses *mashonisas* (informal micro-lenders) extensively. She was shocked when she realised that they charge R40 a month for every R250 borrowed.[151] She also buys potatoes on credit. By the time she gets her pension she owes almost R600 and falls back into the debt trap.

Ironically, on the death of her son, Ben, *Gogo* Ndaba's household income increased. Ben's son Philani lives with *Gogo* Ndaba and when Ben was alive, he claimed and retained Philani's disability grant in the household where he lived. On his death, *Gogo* Ndaba registered herself as the recipient of Philani's grant. Philani is a great support to *Gogo* Ndaba. She is very frail and her body is bent almost double.[152] Philani does the laundry and, before he leaves for school in the morning, he helps her to clear up. In sharp contrast, *Gogo* Ndaba says about her other grandchildren, "When I ask them for help, they run away. Always out, on the streets". *Gogo* Ndaba's suspicion that they are involved in criminal activities is discussed in the final section of the chapter.

In the Mfeka household of seven members, the only income was in the form of three child care grants, Joy Mfeka's old age pension and R300 approximately every second month (R150 in the form of remittances from two migrant sons and another R150 from Joy's sewing when this service is needed). Joy said, "*Sizodla inyama emsebenzini*". (We eat meat when we work.) Music, as the resident son is known by his neighbours because of his habit of playing music loudly, refuses to share his income with other family members when he finds work locally, painting houses or doing general repairs. In this household the distribution of food, the

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[150] Interview: *Gogo* Ndaba, 6 March 2007.

[151] This amounts to a staggering 16 per cent a month, and 192 per cent a year.

[152] *Gogo* Ndaba says that her spine, hands and feet used to be straight. The current deformity of her body appears to be linked to a poor diet.

responsibility of Joy, the mother and titular head, leads to open, often violent conflict. Joy Mfeka and her two daughters physically evicted the girlfriend of her resident unemployed son, "because she took too much from the pot". The son "regularly beats" his mothers and sisters when they ration his food intake.[153] Other Peacetown residents commented on this and the fact that his appetite for food was exaggerated by his abuse of marijuana grown and sold in the area.

A necessary expense in migrant households is the telecommunications to stay in touch with migrant members of the household. Between 1996 and 2001, the percentage of people with no access to telecommunications in Emnambithi dropped from 5.6 per cent to 1.2 per cent (Statistics South Africa 2005a). Nationally, the number of households with telephones rose almost threefold (Seekings 2007). The increase in access to phones is significantly due to the introduction of cellular (mobile) phones during this period and not to the extension of state-provided fixed lines. The partial privatisation of Telkom has pushed telephone costs in South Africa to "among the highest in the world – by no means to the benefit for the people" (Legassick 2007: 126). As a result the percentage of the South African population with telephone lines decreased from 34 per cent to 27 per cent between 1994 and 2002, and "today, even poor people – who can afford a cell phone on a pay-as-you-go basis – prefer it to a fixed line phone with high rental charges" (Legassick 2007: 126).

The use of mobile phones by migrant households facilitates contact between home and city, and has also given rise to more conflict in these households. In marginalised migrant households, mobile phones are a luxury and a status symbol, which distinguishes mothers of migrants from other equally poor women. Mothers of migrants proudly displayed their mobiles phones bought by their migrant children when I asked how they communicated with their migrant children. Mavis Langa's son bought her a mobile phone and phones her often when he misses her. However, her daughter appears quite resentful that Mavis owns the phone and

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[153] Interviews: Joy Mfeka, 5 March 2009 and 27 May 2008; Phumla Mfeka, 14 May 2008.

clicks her tongue in dismissal when Mavis finds it difficult to retrieve her son's contact details from the phone.[154] Dorcas Ndaba bought Samo, her son, a mobile phone and phones once a month to find out if her children are coping at school. *Gogo* Ndaba feels she should have the phone, as she is the *de facto* caregiver of the household.[155] In these households conflict over the possession of phones is not in the open but one of the features in the contestation over limited resources.

5.3.2 Education of children in marginalised migrant households

Of the migrants in this class of households, only Sibongile Mathebula and David Hlanganani completed secondary education. Sibongile's training as a call centre operator did not help her secure a job in this industry. David, however, managed to upgrade his skills with training and practical experience provided by Telkom. While some households had children at school, in all these households there were adult members who had not completed school.

At the beginning of Chapter Two, I quoted Grace Ndaba who said, "I left school in 1986 at the end of Standard 5 [Grade 7] because I was 17 years … too old for school. I had to work on the farm and couldn't read a lot." Mavis Langa, who is of an older generation, has a similar biography. She said,

> I was born on a *plaas* [farm] in Roosboom in 1934. I did not go to school. All I did was work on the farm. We were chased off the farm when I was 17, I don't know why because I got married then and moved to another *plaas* in Driefontein. My husband never came back [after he migrated to Johannesburg] and I was chased away. I had to leave my six children with my father in Peacetown to work [as a domestic worker] in iGoli (Interview: Grace Ndaba, 20 May 2008).

In a similar vein, members of these households reported having spent most of their childhoods working on farms and eventually dropping out of school. Eventually these families were completely evicted from farms, relocated to

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[154] Interview: Mavis Langa, 6 March 2007, and observation, 23 May 2008, Langa Household.

[155] Interview: *Gogo* Ndaba, 6 March 2007.

KwaZulu and, from there, they tried to gain entry into the South African labour market through unskilled jobs. The older generation in these households, *Gogos* Langa, Sithebe and Ndaba, report that at least one of their parents were also migrant workers. Mavis Langa, who is a returned migrant domestic worker, said that her mother was also a migrant domestic worker. The husbands of *Gogo* Sithebe and *Gogo* Ndaba were migrant workers.

In plotting their personal biographies, it becomes clear that these households experienced the ravages of racialised dispossession most severely. Their childhoods and adult lives were characterised by moves from one household to another, splitting and reforming along kinship lines, as their households became the targets of forced removals. Eventually, they arrived in the KwaZulu townships of Peacetown and Elandslaagte, deprived of land and with no skills or education, unable to find employment or eke out a living from the land. These disruptions meant that their education was interrupted and halted, but also strengthened their resolve to provide a stable home for the children in their care. In post-apartheid South Africa, the only material means these households have to make a living is through social grants.

Mrs Koopman, a senior manager in the Department of Social Welfare, Uthukela District, states that a child grant would serve its purpose if it ensured that the recipient child completed secondary school.[156] However, in households where the dependence on social grants is so high, ensuring secondary school education is very difficult.

Lindi Sibanyoni is the daughter of Simon and Khanyile, returned migrants who died in January and October 2007, respectively. At 17 years old, she is the nominal head of a household comprising herself and her siblings who are 18,[157]

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[156] Interview: Georgina Koopman, Senior Manager, Social Development, Department of Social Welfare and Population Development, 5 November 2007 and 28 May 2007.

[157] Even though she has an older sister, Lindi takes the lead in this household because the 18-year-old is mentally "slow".

15, 11 and 8 years old. They receive R1 740 as foster grants for the three youngest children and all of them attend school. Lindi says she loves school, especially her English classes, but she fears that they will not be attending school during the winter months. Even though they are able to buy food from their grants, she is unable to buy warm clothes and does not know how they would bear going to school inappropriately dressed in winter.[158]

Lindi recently had an abortion because she could not deal with the added responsibility of a baby, but in the Silongo, Sithebe, Ndaba, Hlanganani, Langa and Shicego households daughters dropped out of school because of teenage pregnancies and did not return to school after the birth of their children.[159] Various reasons are given for their refusal to return to school. First, they cite prejudice expressed by schoolteachers and their peers. Three of the teachers interviewed were adamant that young mothers should not be allowed to attend school, as other female students would become accustomed to the idea and pregnancies would then be "unrestricted".[160] Secondly, the young mothers felt that they needed to take care of their children themselves in the light of inadequate support from their households or the state. Thirdly, they felt that with their child grants and the expectation that the fathers of their children would provide financial support, it was not necessary for them to prepare themselves for jobs.[161]

However, in two of these households, young women who had to fend for themselves, decided that one sister would give up school and take care of household and financial responsibilities and the other would continue her education. In the Shicego household, Sindile did not return to school and works as a cook at a stall at the taxi rank, while her sister Ntombi went back to school as

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[158] Interviews: Lindi Sibanyoni, 1 November 2007 and 15 May 2008.

[159] In the middle-class households of the Ngubanes and the working-class household of the Mhaules, daughters returned to school at the end of teenage pregnancies.

[160] Group Interview: Schoolteachers Guider's Training, Encgoboyesizwe School, 24 May 2008.

[161] Interviews: Nomsa Sithebe, 11 March 2007 and 28 May 2008; Nombuso Ndaba, 11 March 2007, 8 November 2007 and 26 May 2008; Sindile Shicego, 20 May 2008; Sophia Hlanganani, 15 March 2007; Rose Silongo, 9 March 2007.

Ntombi was considered brighter - that is, she was getting better grades.[162] Lindi Sibanyoni and her stepsister, Manta, decided that Manta, who is eighteen years old and has not made much progress at school, would drop out of school as they found it very difficult to cope with the responsibility of their younger siblings.[163]

5.3.3 Care of the dependants of marginalised migrants

Similar to the other classes of migrant households, the care of children in marginalised migrant households is seen as predominantly the concern of *gogos*. The involvement of men in the direct care of children is noticeably absent. Children who remained in Emnambithi missed their mothers terribly, and often doubted their mothers' love. Their sense of desertion is exacerbated by the absence or neglect (possibly another form of desertion) of men.

Nombuso's father died in Johannesburg when she was one year old[164] and her mother migrated after his death. Jabu Sithebe, Nomsa's mother, also migrated after her husband died,[165] and so did Nombuso's mother, Grace Ndaba. In Mpho's case, her mother migrated to Johannesburg when her parents separated after a very bitter divorce.[166] The male figures that they did grow up with were unreliable in terms of financial, emotional and physical support for their reproduction. These children certainly had expectations of care from their male kin when they were around. However, these expectations were often frustrated. Mpho, who still lives in her father's home while he works in Richards Bay, says,

> …my father wanted nothing to do with me. He just left me with his family. He also had other children whom he didn't care for either. Today I live with him and his girlfriend. She is like a sister to me and he still does not give me anything.

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[162] Interview: Sindile Shicego, 20 May 2008.

[163] Interview: Manta Ngubani, 9 November 2007.

[164] Interview: Nombuso Ndaba, 11 March 2007.

[165] Interview: Nomsa Sithebe, 11 March 2007.

[166] Interview: Sibongile Mathebula, 11 March 2007.

Nombuso confirms this:

> My uncles never did anything for anyone. Sometimes they didn't even work and ate our food. All they did was drink *umqombothi*[167] come home and ask for food. Sometimes we didn't have food for ourselves because of them.... When I stayed with my mother's boyfriend, he was very cruel. If I was late from school he made me sit in the air [as if she was seated on an invisible chair] for long [stretches of time]. After a few days of this I would go back to my *gogo* [Ndaba].

Nomsa is quite clear that men cannot provide emotional care:

> It is better that fathers migrate, because you won't find Baba caring for a baby. They are too selfish and will never learn. I know this because I grew up with no man – father or grandfather. Just my brothers and they still don't do anything.

Mary Gumede succinctly summarises the difference between mothers and *gogos*: "A mother can work while a *gogo* cares for children". About her mother, she says:

> It would have been better if she [her mother] worked here. We would have grown together and get along with each other.

Nomsa is most in support of *gogos* taking care of children. Her feelings for her *gogo* are very clear:

> My *gogo* is the best person in my life. I love her more than my mother, sisters, brothers or husband. I have the biggest space for her. She has always given me the best advice. She respects me and when I ask her anything she tells me the good consequences and bad consequences and lets me make my own decisions. I could never ask her about boys. But I couldn't ask my mother either. I am what I am because of my *gogo*. I know that she's my mother [Jabu Sithebe], but we are not close.

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[167] *Umqombothi* is a beer brewed at home according to traditional methods. When bought in the informal market, it is cheaper than mass-manufactured beer.

However, Nomsa's reverence for her *gogo* is characterised by insecurity – the fear that her *gogo,* who is 97 years old, does not have long to live. She has feared her *gogo's* death since her mother first migrated when her *gogo* was in her eighties:

> I was always very scared that my *gogo* would die. She was in her eighties when my mother left. I am still scared.

In contrast, Sibongile's reverence for her mother is equally startling:

> We were more like friends. I learned to be a mother from her; that is why my son calls me Sibo and not Mummy. I am like his friend. Everyone in our community, Peacetown, and where my mother grew up [Elandslaagte], looked out for me and cared about me. They did this because I was my mother's daughter. My mother helped everyone and shared what she had. People say I am as kind as my mother and everywhere I go they are good to me. This is the best thing my mother could give me, her kindness.

> Her death [at the end of 2005] was the worst thing that ever happened to me. Who is going to love me now? Who is going to give me advice? Where is my son going to get a *gogo*? That was the worst thing about it [migration], that I had so little time with her. People tell me about her, how she helped them with money and at feasts. But she is not coming back now.

Nombuso gave birth to her first child when she was 15 years old and to her second two years later.

> I prefer my mother over *Gogo*. I want to be a mother like my mother. *Gogo* shouts and she is too strict. My mother is also strict but she listens to me as well. *Gogo* thinks a woman shouldn't wear trousers. My mother buys me trousers. She is a 'modern mama'. My boyfriend can talk to my mother. She talks to him, too, and tells him how to be a good boyfriend and a father.[168]

> I missed my mother terribly when she worked in eGoli. She visited at month ends. She never wrote to us. All I could do was wait to see her. I spoke to my cousin who is my age about boys, periods and school. I couldn't speak to *Gogo*; she's too strict. *Gogo* did everything for me, but I missed my mother. She used to wash me. *Gogo* didn't wash me. I missed that. A child has to be with her mother. When I was small, I wanted to make conversation with my mother, but she was not here.

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[168] The boyfriend is 18 years old and still at school.

Nomsa points out the vulnerability of young children "left behind". She gives an example of an incident in her township:

> My neighbours looked after his wife's three nieces when their mother went to eGoli. The man raped all of them. When they told their aunt she said they were lying. When they told their mother she moved them to their own place. They are too young [to take care of themselves. She thinks their ages range from 12 to16 years]. I don't know where they are now. Nothing good comes from migration.

In contrast to the views of their daughters, the returned migrants thought that migration was good for them and their households because it provided them with "many business opportunities"[169] and employment. In the words of Jabu Sithebe, mother of Nomsa, "Life in Johannesburg was civilised, I did not have to scratch to survive".[170]

However, their ability to make a living in Johannesburg did not compensate for the fact that they worried about and missed their children constantly. Jabu says that on her way to Johannesburg she would "panic" when she thought of her children's sad faces when she left. Rose Silongo, like the other migrant mothers, felt that her mother (*Gogo* Silongo) tried her best but she did not realise Rose's son was using drugs. *Gogo* Ndaba suspects her grandsons are creeping out of the house to engage in stock theft and house robberies. Telling Dorcas, their mother, however, resulted in an ongoing conflict between Dorcas and her mother. Dorcas, on the other hand, thinks that her mother's accusation is a sign that she does not love the child whom she is accusing of these criminal activities.[171] She recites a long list of events where she felt that her mother was unfair to this child in particular. Despite the high dependence on *gogos*, migrant mothers still need to stay involved in their children's care.

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[169] Interview: Khanyile Sibanyoni, 7 and 9 March 2007.

[170] Interview: Jabu Sithebe: 7 March 2007.

[171] Interview: Dorcas Ndaba, 31 October 2007.

Migrant mothers stay involved – as I have shown in Chapter Four – by employing mobile care, which comprises monthly visits and staying in contact through mobile telephones. It is recognised that mobile phones are an improvement on how people used to communicate by telephone. Before the introduction of mobile phones, appointments had to be made with those rare, neighbouring households where land phones were installed and with the person whom the caller wanted to contact. In emergencies this system was time-consuming and often useless. Currently, common practice is for the migrant to phone from a pay phone in Johannesburg to the mobile phone she bought for her household.

Mobile phone technology has revolutionised the ability of migrants to stay in contact with their households, especially in developing countries lacking the infrastructure required by landlines or fixed telephones. This technology has meant that for the first time the developing world is overtaking the developed world in the use of technology because there are more mobile phones in developing countries. The increase in mobile phone usage is the greatest in Africa, where between 2005 and 2007 usage has increased from 63 to 152 million (Koser 2007).

The high cost of mobile phone to mobile phone calls prevents straightforward communication, but it is still the preferred method of communication as it is immediate and convenient (Baldassar 2007). Nomsa, for instance, remembers writing to her mother when she missed her or needed her advice, but "her letters came too late and never helped". Mobile technology, however, is only one aspect of the mobile care relationship. As Joy Mfeka states, the weekly chat her grandchildren have with their fathers "soothes" them for a while, but she doubts whether it will continue to abate the effects of parental separation. The expense of mobile phone calls also limits their duration. Overall the children of migrants felt that telephonic communication is unsatisfactory, and that writing letters at least

gave them an opportunity to report on activities in their mothers' absence and to maintain closer contact with them.

In two instances, the use of mobile phones meant less visits by the migrant. When Silvia Sibanyoni bought her household a mobile phone she reduced her visits home to every second month instead of her monthly visits and stopped writing letters. David Hlanganani similarly cut down his visits home. While his son visits him in Johannesburg, his mother has to be content with her son's phone calls.

Mobile care is less effective in the households of marginalised migrant households, as these households are unable to afford consistent mobile communication, and even less so the R150 required to make a trip from Johannesburg to Emnambithi on minibus taxis. Privately owned buses charge even more. Using the train is significantly cheaper, but departure and arrival times in Emnambithi in the early hours of morning mean that this form of transport is not usually an option.

As a result, it is predominantly *gogos* who take responsibility for the children and try to provide physical, financial and emotional security. However, blame is passed between *gogos* and migrants for the higher incidence of teenage pregnancies and criminal activities in which the children of migrants engage. *Gogos* are not always able to care for all migrants' dependents. *Gogo* Ndaba, for instance, cares for the children of her son Ben and daughter Dorcas. However, she was not able to include Nombuso (daughter of Grace Ndaba) on a permanent basis and could only provide her with shelter when Nombuso ran away from the home where her stepfather resided. Neither could *Gogo* Ndaba provide even a measure of care to her daughter Silvia Shicego's children (Sindile and Ntombi) and grandchildren (Lindi and Manta Sibanyoni and their younger siblings).

When they were small, Lindi and Manta both moved constantly, first living with their respective maternal grandmothers, then being moved to the homes of other

kin and eventually settling with Khanyile Sibanyoni before she died. Similarly, Sibongile Mathebula, while nominally in the care of her uncle's household, felt unwelcome and picked upon in that household, and went "visiting" from household to household in Emnambithi, staying for meals and looking for friends. Mpho is replicating this lifestyle in her adulthood as she moves between Johannesburg and Emnambithi trying to find work.

5.3.4 Child-headed households

In the one migrant household where children were left in the care of their grandfather, resident adults provided little care or protection for the children of migrants. Cynthia Langa recalls how their grandfather ignored her and her siblings and the children of her mother's sisters while they were living in his care when their mothers migrated as domestic workers.[172] The different sets of children of Mavis Langa and her siblings organised themselves in sibling units, cooking, cleaning and caring for each other from as young as six years old. They also had to protect themselves and their younger siblings from physical abuse from a nephew whom she remembers as being particularly vindictive. Even though there was an adult present, the Langa children grew up in a *de facto* child-headed household. Mavis Langa, however, maintains that her father looked after his charges very well.[173]

Earlier in the chapter I recounted Lindi Sibanyoni's history, which has been marked by moving from one household to the next until she found a brief period of stability and consistency in the care of Khanyile Sibanyoni, the wife of her father.[174] Lindi construes the termination of her pregnancy as an act to preserve

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[172] Interviews: Cynthia Langa, 3 November 2007 and 21 May 2008.

[173] Interview: Mavis Langa, 23 May 2008.

[174] Lindi lived with her maternal grandparents in Estcourt for two years after she was born, while her mother worked in Durban. She was then moved to the household of her mother's sister until she was 8 years old. In 1998 she moved to back to her grandparents with her mother when she returned from Durban. In 2002, a year after her *Mamakwomamphele* (real mother) died, she moved in with Khanyile who had returned from Johannesburg to take care of her children (Interview: Khanyile Sibanyoni, 7 March 2007). In 2005 Simon returned from Johannesburg. At a time of

the fragile stability of the household she shares with her stepsister[175] and three half-siblings. More pressing on Lindi's mind is how she can ensure that her younger siblings have warm clothes to attend school in winter, because their social grants do not cover this. Lindi and Manta are adamant that they are able to take care of their siblings, and are intent on regaining and preserving the stability of their household. In fact, they refuse to let any of their paternal aunts get involved in most aspects of their household.

In Watersmeet, Lindi and Manta have aunts, Sindile and Ntombi Shicego, who at 19 and 17 years of age are the same age as their nieces in Tsakane. The two young women have also lived on their own for most of their lives, first with their older siblings until their mother returned from Johannesburg in December 2006. Barely six months later their mother died, leaving them on their own again, but this time without the additional income their mother's remittances afforded this household. Their lives are in sharp contrast with the luxury of the lives of the people that their mother, Sylvia Shicego,[176] spent almost two decades caring for.

Peter Ngubane, a friend of Lindi and Manta, lives with his five siblings not far from the Sibanyoni household, while his mother works in Johannesburg. He goes to school three days a week and does piece jobs, such as gardening, on the other four. His two sisters clean and cook, and they all help each other with schoolwork. He worries that his sisters skip school quite often, but does not know how to persuade them to stay in school. He has scolded and beaten them, but that did not work.

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intense conflict between Simon and Khanyile, Lindi moved into her boyfriend's household in Steadville. After separating from Simon, Khanyile persuaded Lindi to move back to their home in Tsakane. The children's brief period of stability was shattered by Simon's suicide, but even more so by Khanyile's death a few months later (Interview: Lindi Sibanyoni, 1 November 2007; Interview: Manta Ngubani, 9 November 2007). Lindi and Manta's histories of moving from one household to another are symptomatic of the lives of the children of migrants in South Africa. Similar patterns are discussed in Jones (1993).

[175] Khanyile gave birth to Manta before her relationship with Simon.

[176] Interview: Sylvia Shicego, 6 March 2007.

Child-headed households are seen as a consequence of the deaths of parents from AIDS-related illnesses. Bonnin's (1997, 2000) description of child-headed households as a result of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal points to other causes. In the South African tradition of migration studies, it is commonly accepted that kin, such as *gogos* and female family members, will care for the dependents of migrants. Internationally there is recognition that in developing countries children are caring for others while their parents are engaged in waged work and work in the informal economy (Heymann 2006; Dahlblom, Herrara, Pena and Dahlgren 2009). The physical and social threats to children reared by other children are many. One of the immediate effects is the danger of unsafe cooking and heating practices which Heymann (2006) notes is a special threat in households with limited access to electricity. Health deficits arise because children are unable to appropriately assess and minister to the health needs of their charges and to ensure their nutritional intake. Long-term physical effects are noticed in the stunted growth of some of these children. Socially, child carers and their charges suffer from isolation as they try to ensure their safety and to avoid detection by health care officials. Dahlblom *et al.* (2009) argues that child carers are locked into a cycle of sacrifice, as they forego time and attention to their own education and development in favour of the needs of the children in their care.

However, in Dahlblom *et al.* (2009) and Heymann's (2006) studies, parents return home at the end of the day after they have earned or tried to make a living. In migrant households, when all adults have migrated to find employment, children are left to their own devices for weeks at a time. The impact of long-term adult absence on the development of children is insufficiently studied. What is indisputable is that among the marginalised even non-commoditised resources that care requires, such as the presence of loving and affectionate adults, is in short supply and children are bound to care for themselves and others.

5.4   Conclusion

It is assumed that the unemployed are part of the working class because their interests are the same. That is, like students, if the unemployed found jobs they would embark on a class *trajectory*, in common with others who have a similar relationship to the means of production (Wright 1978). However, it is when one considers that a segment of society may never find employment, because they are marginalised from labour market demands and dispossessed of any means of production (Legassick and Wolpe 1976) that the need arises to conceptualise a different class location for the "permanently unemployed". In this chapter I have tried to conceptualise the conditions of production and reproduction of households in a particular class location, which I refer to as marginalised households. The historical conditions of marginalised households, which I have outlined in Chapter Two, make it very difficult for their members to initiate a working-class trajectory. When their labour power is required it is on a part-time and insecure basis. Those whose services are not needed any more because they are too old, have become ill or are overwhelmed by the care required in their households of origin, are ejected and returned to their communities of origin. Their communities and households deteriorate in their absence, and the possibility of members of this class entering productive jobs is eroded constantly.

However, this chapter has also tried to show that, despite the many hardships and structural inequalities that marginalised migrant households endure, there are attempts to change the class location of these households. Thus, it is very important in child-headed households, the most vulnerable of the marginalised migrant households, to ensure that the "brightest" siblings remain at school. However, studies of children growing up alone argue that a cycle of sacrifice – sacrificing one child's education to ensure favourable conditions for other children to go to school, which could go on for generations – locks some members of households into permanent unemployment (Dahlblom *et al.* 2009). Heymann (2006), who conducted an in-depth study of care for pre-school and school-going children in Botswana, Vietnam, Honduras and Mexico, argues that state support in

the form of proper housing, efficient transport and public pre-school and after-school care is essential to counteract a crisis of social reproduction. At a minimum, she suggests that state-provided care for children from birth into their late teens will combat the exploitation of the most vulnerable members of households; children and the aged.

The marginalised households discussed in this chapter share many of the social characteristics of their working-class counterparts. They inhabit some of the same townships, are involved in community-based activities to boost their scarce resources, have a commitment towards education, and share a dependency on social grants. But, the class location of marginalised migrant households also has distinctive features and specific implications for social reproduction. Firstly, despite attempts to enter jobs in Johannesburg, the sources of income of marginalised migrant households in Emnambithi remain *localised*. While social grants are the primary source of income in these households, marginalised households also try to secure additional resources by "investing" in community activities. In the process communities are reproduced and communal values are transmitted and maintained. However, severe deprivation creates the conditions for illicit activities such as stock theft, as well as the deception required by child-headed households to stay together as reproductive units.

Secondly, despite the many attempts to procure and pool resources, marginalised households are unable to secure the requirements of daily survival. The vulnerability of reproductive *maintenance* is evident in the deficient nutrition of these households' diets as well as the inability of these households to keep their children at school. As long as the daily maintenance of marginalised households remain insecure, renewal of these households is impossible.

Thirdly, *domesticity* is primarily the domain of *gogos*, whether they are willing or able to fulfil these obligations or not. As a result, *gogos* become the victims of abuse from remaining household members over the distribution of scarce

resources, as well as conflict with migrant women over the inability of *gogos* to prevent childhood pregnancies and criminal activities. *Gogos* are also the objects of great affection for daughters of migrants. Their dwindling health, however, is a cause of concern about their ability to continue to care for the children of migrants. At the same time, the need to care for *gogos* goes unrecognised and neglected.

While migrant mothers display mobile care for their dependants, the ability to perform care over a distance is severely hampered by the lack of resources to stay in telephonic contact with households of origin and to visit on a regular basis. As a result *gogos* remain the primary source of care. There is a recognition that "moving between different homes and different caregivers disrupt care relationships and undermine or negate the possibility of a stable child-caregiver relationship" crucial to the children's physical, social and cognitive development and adjustment to society" (Brey and Brandt 2007: 5). Given the great physical and social dislocation these households experience, *gogos* have become the most stable providers of care for marginalised migrant households.

In the absence of a caring older generation, child-headed households emerge, where children are left on their own for months at a time. These households are the most vulnerable segment of households in the marginalised class location. In this study the members of child-headed households displayed great commitment and care for each other. Significant attempts and sacrifices were made to ensure that younger members attended school. However, one has to factor in the possibility that, in the absence of guidance from adults, children may stray into anti-social behaviour, such as drug and alcohol abuse, promiscuity and crime, with attendant effects on their community.

Finally, in the absence of public and private resources, marginalised households rely greatly on the support of other households in their community. That is, *social reproduction is not contained within one household* but transcends household

boundaries into other households and the community. Households engage in creative, informal ways of providing and eventually drawing on the resources in other households. Social obligation is reproduced by providing a meal for someone who "drops in" over mealtimes, contributing to a community member's funeral and "chipping in" when another household is in need. However, reciprocity across households is under threat because of the secrecy necessary to maintain child-headed households or to obscure the illicit activities some members engage in to secure an income.

This chapter discusses the distinctive features of social reproduction in marginalised households. In Chapter Six, the conclusion to this dissertation, the findings of the research on social reproduction in the three classes of households will be summarised. What has emerged from the discussion thus far on the history of class formation in Emnambithi and the variegated implications for social reproduction of households is that class-specific policies are required to ensure the equitable reproduction of society. Such recommendations inform the final contribution this dissertation aims to make in the next chapter.

Chapter Six
Conclusion

6.1   Introduction: Stating the Main Argument

I argue in this dissertation that social reproduction varies according to the class location of migrant households. The study is situated within a body of literature on class, migration and gender in South Africa discussed in Chapter One, of which Wolpe's (1972) proposal that apartheid capitalism relied on the "underdevelopment" of rural areas or erstwhile bantustans is most notable. In Chapter Two, I have tried to contextualise this understanding of underdevelopment by using Hart's (2002a,b) notion of racialised dispossession, and I have used a study of Emnambithi to show how the various policies of racialised dispossession articulate with existing social hierarchies in Emnambithi to create a stratified society. Stratification of class in Emnambithi cannot be divorced from the history of this area. Over time, Zulu society in Emnambithi was divided into:

- an educated, Christian class – the *kholwa* – who owned land, actively pursued education and benefitted politically and materially;
- a migrant proletariat, dispossessed of land and the means of production – the working class – who migrated to industrialised urban centres for work while their social reproduction was relegated to their kin who remained in KwaZulu; and
- the marginalised, a segment of the bantustan population, also dispossessed from the means of production but who never had the possibility of working in the capitalist economy during apartheid, and as a result do not have the resources to be part of "the reserve army of labour".

In post-apartheid South Africa, the conditions under which different classes of households live and work have been complicated by contradictory forces as South African society attempts to democratise fully. The transition from apartheid to a democratising society has seen simultaneous, but often contradictory, processes of political democratisation, economic liberalisation and the deracialisation of society. Thus, the many dimensions to the South African transition resulted in a tension between political, economic and social forces (Von Holdt 2003; Webster and Omar 2003; Von Holdt and Webster 2005). This understanding of the broader changes in South African society have informed studies of intra- and inter-household dynamics as South African citizens engage with a transformed social, political and economic environment.

Bezuidenhout and Fakier (2006), Mosoetsa (2005), Webster and Von Holdt (2005) and Webster *et al.* (2008) demonstrate how the legacy of apartheid underdevelopment in a context where global imperatives to restructure workplaces and employment arrangements have shifted the burden of social reproduction onto households and their communities. Smith and Wallerstein's (1992) notion of households as income pooling and distributing units, which stabilises and supports household members, especially during times of global economic changes, provided a theoretical anchor to understand the effects of social transformation at the micro-level. Household studies also greatly helped to understand gender and generational effects, as an understanding emerged that the stability of households are fragile and subject to conflict over scarce resources (Mosoetsa 2005. See also Beall 2002, Fakier 2005 and Webster *et al.* 2008).

However, what is missing from these studies is an understanding of how the class location of households shapes the social reproduction of households within the current context. In this dissertation I show, firstly, how 23 migrant households in Emnambithi can be located in three different classes, secondly, how social reproduction varies according to the class locations of these households and,

finally, how class-based advantage and disadvantage are reproduced in post-apartheid South Africa.

Below, I present the key findings of this study in terms of the class and gender effects of migration in Emnambithi. I examine, in turn, the class location of migrant households, and social reproduction in migrant households, I then go on to discuss theoretical and policy implication of the study.

6.2   Class Location of Migrant Households in Emnambithi

6.2.1 Overview

The thesis argues that social reproduction in migrant households differs according to the class location of these households. Drawing on Harvey (2003) and Wright (1978, 1994), I show that the class location of a household is not simply the product of members' position vis-à-vis the means of production. Instead I also rely on information about the different forms of income and their sources which households rely on. In addition, I draw on the work of Rex (1973) and Wilson (1987, 1993) to illustrate the important class implications that the location of a household in a specific neighbourhood has for their reproduction. A historical analysis of Emnambithi illustrates that residence in specific townships precedes *and* results from the class location of households. The sample of 23 households was categorised into five semi-professional households, seven working-class households and eleven marginalised households (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1   Dimensions of class in migrant households

Dimension of Class	Household Type		
	Semi-professional (5)	**Working-class (7)**	**Marginalised (11)**
Occupation	Mostly nurses and teachers in full-time secure positions	Mainly factory workers and retail assistants in full-time work	Mostly unemployed with little success in petty trade or part-time domestic work
Income	Secure income from waged work and retirement pensions; some income from social grants; limited remittances	Income from waged work, remittances and social grants	High dependence on social grants with little income from paid work
Location and physical infrastructure of homes	All homes owned by one member of the household, located mostly in Ezakheni C-section, with running water and electricity.	Homes spread over previous bantustan township, free tenure but no running water and sewerage.	Previous bantustand townships and RDP-housing township. Predominantly rent-free accommodation, but no ownership of property.

6.2.2 Occupation

The clearest distinction between the semi-professional, working-class and marginalised households is in their occupations. In the semi-professional households nursing and teaching positions dominate, while working-class members were predominantly occupied as factory workers or retail assistants, and the marginalised class was mostly unemployed. Historically, forced removals or relocation of their households played an important role in access and continued education and eventual employment of the older participants of the study. In the semi-professional households, retired nurses grew up on farms owned by their families, were relieved from farm labour, and completed school and nursing training before they settled in Ezakheni C-section. These are the descendants of the *kholwa*.

The class location of working-class and marginalised households shows a similar long-term generational trend. In contrast, the older generation in working-class and marginalised households reported constant relocation from one farm to the next, disrupted schooling because of these moves or because they were drawn into farm labour, until their families were evicted and forced to settle in the KwaZulu bantustan. Many of the working-class households reported that previous generations were successful in obtaining jobs in apartheid South Africa's industrial workplaces, while marginalised households described having to eke out livings in KwaZulu.

6.2.3 Income

The incomes of the different households also vary greatly, stretching across a range from semi-professionals earning incomes in the top 10 per cent of income earned in Emnambithi to the marginalised households where total household income is derived from social grants. In semi-professional and marginalised households, income in the form of remittances is significantly lower than income from other sources. While semi-professionals are less dependent on remittances because of the existence of private retirement pensions, migrant members of marginalised households are less able to find work, and therefore less able to remit money home. While all categories of households could not survive on wages only, the main form of income in the marginalised category is from state transfers. As a result, conditions of social reproduction in marginalised migrant households are more desperate, especially if migrants send no remittances. These households resort to a range of activities to assist their survival. Using their homes as sites of petty production, women are engaged in sewing and trading. Others sell goods at the roadside or at schools, drawing predominantly on social grants to get by and to buy the basics for their petty trade or production. Conflicts arise in these households when younger, especially male, members engage in criminal activities. While most members of these households are unemployed, they are actively exploiting their own labour and non-material resources, such as friendships, community and kinship ties, to access market-provided goods and

services. In contrast, in working-class households financial dependence is more or less equally spread across remittances, social grants and income earned in Emnambithi.

Evidently, social grants play a role in household income for households in all class locations, less so for the semi-professionals, but a primary source for the marginalised. However, the benefit of social grants is eroded by the lack of public infrastructure that households, especially working-class and marginalised households, have to endure.

While semi-professional households are predominantly found in Ezakheni C-section, working-class and marginalised households share townships such as Ezakheni E-section, Watersmeet and Peacetown. Marginalised households were also found in Elandslaagte and Tsakane. The latter is a post-apartheid creation comprising RDP housing. Watersmeet, Peacetown and Elandslaagte are characterised by a lack of public resources such as safe and adequate transport, running water and sewerage systems, which significantly add to the burden of social reproduction. The relative privilege that semi-professional households enjoy in the form of public infrastructure accompanies their commitment to local ANC politics.

Semi-professional households gain additional resources from their political connectedness and the resources provided by the churches they attend. As a result, non-migrant members of these households are able to occupy positions as volunteer workers organised by the Catholic Church or by family members who hold positions of political power. The middle generation also benefitted from the schooling provided by the Catholic and Anglican Churches.

6.2.4 Location and physical infrastructure of homes

With the exception of the two households located in Ezakheni E-section and the five marginalised migrant households located in Tsakane, households of the

working class and marginalised occupy their homes relatively rent-free. These homes are situated on what used to be Trust Land, governed by the Ngonyama Trust Land Act, which means that traditional leaders in the area determine who has tenure of occupation. There is little opportunity in Ezakheni E-section[177] and Tsakane to engage in subsistence agriculture, as there is no property on which to grow things or keep animals. The rest, who live in more "rural" areas such as in Peacetown, Watersmeet and Elandslaagte, have allocated spaces to grow mielies and have chickens and ducks. However, very few households could harvest their mielies because it was so difficult to water the plants.

6.2.5 Reliance on community resources

Marginalised and working-class households draw on and support their communities by pooling their scarce resources with the resources of other households. In this vein, these households engage in religious activities, such as "feasts" held to commune with the ancestors and prayer meetings, not only for their spiritual features but also to share food and money in a reciprocal manner. Feasts, for example, are occasions of great activity, where many members of different households gather to help with the slaughtering of cattle, cooking, beer brewing, praying and to share the company of others. The inability to host such an event due to a lack of resources causes great distress because it is believed that the ancestors will be displeased and the defaulting host will not be able to repay other community members for hosting her on previous similar occasions.

In a similar reciprocal manner, *stokvels* and funeral societies bring members of marginalised and working-class households together. These associations of the working class are of an organised nature and entail monthly subscriptions and depositing money into a common bank account until needed. In contrast, the associations of the marginalised are based much more on immediate needs and become active on the death of a family member or when someone needs to make

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[177] In Ezakheni C-section, retired nurses and old age pensioners started vegetable gardens to increase their consumption of nutritious foods.

an urgent, immediate purchase. In such events, a group of households will combine small amounts of money with the expectation that they will later be able to access a similar communal fund.

The semi-professional households are not involved in the type of associations on which the working-class and marginalised households rely. However, their involvement and support of local politics and churches, added to their independence from migrant remittances, imply that their resource-generating activities are locally based. Marginalised households cannot rely on migrant remittances and are very dependent on the resources that they are able to get from other households in Emnambithi. As a result, their livelihoods are also locally generated. In contrast, working-class households, given their history of migration as well as the significance of migration for their class location, are part of a migratory class.

Portes (2007) argues that the migration of semi-professionals and professionals is more beneficial for their sending communities, as migrants of this class are more likely to return and settle in the communities of origin, remit more than money but also progressive political ideas and become involved in the development of their sending communities. My study provides evidence that this may not be the case in all instances. The semi-professional migrants in my study desired the trappings of "modern" urban life for Emnambithi, such as movie theatres, health and beauty spas and McDonalds fast food establishments. In contrast, the common response from working-class and marginalised migrants was that they wanted jobs or secure employment. Modisha's (2006, 2007) research on the "corporate middle class" provides some corroboration of these findings.

Modisha (2007: 120) points out that semi-professionals "tend to cut ties with their former communities, while those who come from working class and trade union backgrounds tend to maintain links with their communities". He argues that African managers struggle to consolidate their location in the middle class against

racial prejudice from the white middle class. This struggle results either in an over-identification with the status and trappings of the middle class and a resultant rejection of one's working-class background, *or* a rejection of middle-class values, identification with the working class and enduring commitment to one's community of origin. However, Modisha does not consider how the affiliation of semi-professional managers to a particular class may be affected if a semi-professional comes from a semi-professional family.

6.3   Social Reproduction in Migrant Households

6.3.1 Overview

A key finding of this research is that social reproduction remains the responsibility of women, regardless of class. That is, class has little impact on the gendered division of labour in the households of migrants. This gendered nature of social reproduction is not peculiar to South Africa, or to developing countries (Hochshcild 1989, 2003; Folbre 1994, 2006; Bakker and Gill 2003; Bezanson and Luxton 2006). International literature on migration, however, identifies a transfer of the responsibilities of social reproduction *between* classes; from middle-class women to migrant working-class women working as domestic workers, carers of the elderly, children and disabled, nurses and in other occupations by means of which social reproduction has been commodified (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002; Parrenas, 2005; Folbre 2006). Care of the households of migrant women is then the domain of the remaining female household members, even in the presence of men (Parrenas 2005). See Table 6.2.

Table 6.2   Social reproduction in migrant households

Aspects of Social Reproduction	Household Type		
	Semi-professional	**Working-class**	**Marginalised**
Daily provisioning and consumption	Able to secure all needs	Struggle to secure needs	Survival by limiting consumption; conflict over scarce resources
Education	Intensive attention possible	Commitment to education difficult to sustain	Education disrupted by burden of care; sacrifice of one child's education to ensure progress of another child
Care of dependents of migrants	Care required by elderly provided by remaining female household members	Continued reliance on migrant women to care for their children and parents leads to mobile care	Mobile care impossible; excessive burden on *gogos* who are unable to cope

6.3.2 Daily provisioning and consumption

Looking at social reproduction of classes of migrant households in relation to each other, it is possible to highlight the variation in capacity of these households to reproduce themselves. The lack of public provision of services such as affordable and quality sewerage systems, running water and public transport diminish the contribution made by social grants in the households of the working class and marginalised. The struggle for survival in working-class and marginalised households in townships such as Peacetown, Watersmeet and Elandslaagte is exacerbated by this lack of basic physical infrastructure. Not being connected to the sewerage system and running water are factors of great humiliation, health concern and conflict in these households. Young men reluctantly – and they sometimes refuse to – dig pit latrines on a weekly basis and collect water on a daily basis; this is seen as the work of young boys and women. The expense of the basic requirements for such activities – buckets and chemicals – is a further drain on household resources.

A significant geographical feature of Emnambithi is that, in typical apartheid town planning, townships designated for the occupation of black people are under-resourced with regard to most basic amenities such as schools, clinics and retail stores. As a result, time, expense and safety of transport have to be factored into the day-to-day activities of these households. In a context where the management of the public bus service has been outsourced and the service is infrequent, inconvenient and expensive, 65 per cent of Emnambithi residents rely on mini-bus taxis (SANRAL 2007). All members of these communities – young, old and sick – spend hours walking to and from taxi points and pay a minimum of R7 a trip. In many instances, where people have to traverse the muddy landscape and cross running streams, children cannot attend school in the rainy season. Equally, the privatisation and resultant commodification of telephone services – an essential service for migrant households – adds to the burden of these communities.

Thus, Hart (2002a) argues that the local state is a key site of struggle in post-apartheid South Africa. The *de facto* commodification of these services implies an exclusion of working-class and marginalised citizens in post-apartheid South Africa. It follows that the privatisation of public services has a worse effect on households where there is little wage income. However, it is in the non-commodified sphere of direct care[178] that differences between the classes of households emerge more clearly.

6.3.3 Education in migrant households

Fluidity in the class location of these households is illustrated by the Shabangu household, who were able to move into the semi-professional class through education. Prior familiarity with education increases the ability of these

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[178] See Chapter One for a discussion of distinctions between care work – paid and unpaid – and direct and indirect care. Direct care cannot be provided by the market as it involves one-on-one interaction between caregivers and care recipients, characterised by feelings of love, duty and obligation, and are exemplified by activities such as talking and advising others, physical and emotional expressions of love, giving someone a bath, walking a child to school, and so on. Obviously, as the example of cooking a meal shows, a clear-cut distinction between direct and indirect care cannot be made for all activities of social reproduction.

households to ensure that their children receive quality education and progress to tertiary education. Recognition that education is the vehicle to professional employment and fundamental in securing and maintaining their class location means that children are encouraged in their schooling to ensure that these households are able to retain or expand their relative privilege.

A commitment to education is evident in all classes of households in the study. However, this commitment is difficult to maintain in working-class households. In four of the seven working-class households, young women had left school when they fell pregnant in their teens. Unlike in semi-professional households, where this also happened, these women found it difficult to extend their education beyond secondary schooling. In the marginalised households, women do not return to school after having had children as their options for household childcare are non-existent. Discussed in greater detail below is the incidence of three child-headed households among the 11 marginalised migrant households in the study. In these households, pragmatic decisions are made about which of the children will be able to continue their education and who will have to leave school to gain extra income and to take care of household responsibilities. It is very important in child-headed households, the most vulnerable of the marginalised migrant households, to ensure that the "brightest" siblings remain at school. However, studies of children growing up alone argue that a cycle of sacrifice – sacrificing one child's education to ensure favourable conditions for other children to go to school, which could go on for generations – locks some members of households into permanent unemployment (Dahlblom *et al.* 2009).

Peter Evans (2009: 113) argues that "the spread of education can be taken as a proxy for the general commitment to social provision of capability enhancing resources". That is, Evans argues, literacy levels and gross school enrolments could be a better measure of the spread of public provision than public expenditure in general, as public education is more likely to reach the full spectrum of citizens.

6.3.4 Care of dependants of migrants

Post-apartheid social policy reflects an assumption that reproduction takes place in a "nuclear family setting" within communities able to support families in these responsibilities (Barchiesi 2005; Lund 2007; Hassim 2008). However, Hassim (2008: 110) argues, this emphasis on family and community "also leaves open the question of *who* in the family and community is or ought to be responsible for undertaking care work. Women's unpaid care work is superficially acknowledged (and at times celebrated), while there is no commitment to changing this pattern of responsibilities through public provisioning". Thus, she refers to "normative" elements in South African social policy, which rules out state-provided care for the very young and elderly as of lesser value than family-based care. However, in households and communities of the working class and unemployed, the struggle for survival crowds out the time and resources required to provide adequate care (see also Mosoetsa 2005).

In Emnambithi, the gender order prescribes that *gogos* take on care when the mother is absent. However, the study clearly illustrates that this form of care is not always possible as most grandmothers are in need of care themselves. Infirmity associated with old age is an obvious hindrance, but also requires care from migrants. As a result, constant care, albeit over a distance, is required from migrant women from working-class households. I refer to this as *mobile care*. Mobile care refers to the care of children and parents that migrant women engage in using mobile communication and on their regular visits home. This form of care refers to the particular context in which migration occurs, where the migrant is *able* to visit home on a regular basis – as in the case of internal migration – and a context where alternative sources of adequate care do not exist. In the form of mobile care, migrant working-class women, have little choice but to continue their domesticity over a distance.

In contrast, securing social reproduction in semi-professional migrant households is relatively smooth. These households have a range of resources at their disposal. Relieved of the burden of housework and not having to struggle to secure their daily survival releases women to spend time on the care needs of their households and in their communities. Domesticity – or "caring about care" as it evolves in these households – has been inculcated in the female members of these households through their experience in and commitment to healthcare. Nursing has also provided these households with opportunities and capacities to achieve their lower middle-class location.

However, in these households it becomes clear that *gogos* – often retired nurses – are not all capable of the care work that is expected from them. Instead, there is a reliance on younger remaining female members to care for the children and parents of migrants. These young women feel that they have sacrificed their own training and career opportunities to care for the dependants of migrants. As a result, they argue, a distance grows between migrants and their households at the site of origin. Domesticity in these households rests on the shoulders of the middle generation – that is, the sisters left behind by migrants.

Migrant women of Emnambithi employ mobile care by phoning their dependants on a daily basis and visiting as often as they can manage. In marginalised households, however, mobile care is nearly impossible, because of the unaffordable nature of mobile telephone communication and inter-town travel. As marginalised households cut their consumption of food and other commodities required for daily survival, so do they cut the giving and receiving of care resources. One of the only reliable sources of care, then, remains *gogos*. In marginalised households, *gogos* have to shoulder the burden of domesticity. While *gogos* and their charges report love and affection in their relationships, *gogos* are incapable of fulfilling their *duty* to their grandchildren as they are unable to prevent teenage pregnancies and involvement in criminal activities.

The lack of care provided by family, community and the state is most evident in child-headed households. In these households pragmatic decisions are made with regard to which members continue schooling while another member of the household takes on a major part of the responsibility of earning a living and caring for younger members of the household. Child-headed households also illustrate the utility of "the household" as a unit of analysis. The household constitutes the interface between individuals and the world, in a context where insecurity erodes the boundaries of "family".

6.4 Theoretical Implications of the Study

6.4.1 Overview

The clearest theoretical implication of the study is that the class location of households matters in social reproduction of migrant households. In demonstrating this hypothesis, this dissertation contributes towards the study of related concepts – class, households and migration.

6.4.2 Implications for the study of class

In this dissertation, I have used an eclectic approach in discussing the class location of households. I have shown that the occupation of household members is not a sufficient measure of a household's class location. Instead, I have used the occupations, income and physical infrastructure of the townships where migrant households are located to assign the class location of 23 households in Emnambithi. In addition to these material conditions, I have looked at non-material resources such as the religious associations and political networks which households draw on to consolidate or improve their class positions.

Drawing on different intellectual traditions, I firstly used Marxist analysis, which looks at class stratification, with respect to how some households in Emnambithi

have been historically dispossessed from the means of production, locating them in different areas to other households who have managed to acquire and hold on to land in the face of the apartheid policies of racialised dispossession. The concept of marginality, coined by Peruvian Marxist Quijano and eventually adapted by Legassick and Wolpe (1976) was used to derive and analyse the class location of marginalised households. This class category is distinct from the conventional Marxist conception of a reserve army of labour as members of this class have, through the economic, political and ideological mechanisms of apartheid, been relegated to the underdeveloped KwaZulu banstustan economy and society. The process of racialised dispossession left a section of the bantustan population, which I describe as the marginalised, superfluous and unable to engage in capitalist production. The importance of class analysis in post-apartheid South Africa is highlighted by the greater class differences within the black African grouping than between races (Crankshaw 1994; Seekings and Nattrass 2006). That is, in post-apartheid South Africa class inequality is more significant than racial inequality.

Secondly, the Weberian approach was useful in describing how the migration of household members affected the life chances of households as a whole. In semi-professional households it became clear that the migration of nurses established their households within a specific class location which secured the livelihoods of these households at a local level. That is, by some members leaving their homes, their households were made financially secure and established their relatively secure positions in Emnambithi. Working-class households, dependent on migration for generations, appear destined to continue migration in order to maintain their current hold in the labour market. Marginalised households, in contrast, were never able to successfully gain a foothold in either local or distant labour markets. The probability of these households improving their life chances without significant social intervention is very low.

Thirdly, I drew on Bourdieu (1986) to show how working-class and marginalised households use non-material resources to overcome material disadvantage, while semi-professional households use these resources to consolidate or expand their class privilege. In all of the households, education is seen as an important resource to advance their households. However, it is only in the semi-professional migrant households – with their greater economic capital (in the form of material resources, income and property) – where their cultural capital means that they are accustomed to and knowledgeable about education, and ensures the successful completion of secondary and tertiary education. Working-class and marginalised households are rich in social capital in the form of the networks and connections they constitute and draw on in their community-based and religious activities such as feasts in honour of the ancestors, prayer meetings, burial societies and *stokvels*. However, the low economic capital of marginalised households means that their involvement in these associations is informal and inconsistent. Therefore, the social resources derived from these interactions provide merely temporary relief.

A fourth feature of an eclectic class analysis was demonstrated in the dissertation – that is, the importance of analysing the class location of households rather than individuals. However, as Crompton (2008) argues, class is not only reproduced through economic processes, and patterns of reciprocities and obligations cannot be ignored. Reciprocities between and within households and obligations to care are fundamentally maintained and upheld by the women in this study. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, involvement in reciprocal associations and the obligation women feel to maintain their households also entail the reproduction of society and social values in general. Thus, using household as the unit of analysis, this study integrates production and social reproduction in the recognition of the unpaid work of women. In addition, the study of household class location provides a composite picture of the productive activities of all the members of a household. A composite of occupations places the occupations of women on an equal basis with that of male members of a household, and the gendered "male breadwinner" model of class is discarded in favour of a more

contextualised picture.

6.4.3 Implications for the study of households

A consistent argument in this dissertation is that the micro-politics and socio-economic activities of household studies should be related to the class location of households. I also argue and show that, as in most parts of the world, the household remains the site of social reproduction, especially in a context where alternative sources of care have not been publicly provided. It has also been demonstrated that we should reconceptualise the definition of what and who constitutes households.

If we start with a definition of the household as "the social unit that … enables individuals, of varying ages of both sexes, to pool income coming from multiple sources in order to ensure their individual and collective reproduction and well-being" (Smith and Wallerstein 1992: 13), it becomes apparent that the current statistical definition of the household as "a person, or group of persons, who occupy a common dwelling unit for at least four days in a week, and who provide themselves with food and other essentials for living" (Statistics South Africa 2002: 50) is inadequate. The important contribution made by migrants to their households' sources of income, reproductive responsibilities and well-being is ignored in the latter definition. The fact that the significance of the contribution of migrants varies according to class illustrates that household studies should be contextualised according to their class.

As discussed earlier in the dissertation and in this chapter, the work of Bezuidenhout and Fakier (2006), Mosoetsa (2005), Webster and Von Holdt (2005) and Webster *et al.* (2008) demonstrate how households draw on a pool of resources to stabilise their members during times of economic and social upheaval. Households are able to act as shock absorbers because their pool of resources also consists of non-material resources such as love, care and duty.

This dissertation contributes to the study of households by proposing a reconceptualisation of "the household" as

- a social unit where income is pooled and redistributed,
- the primary site of reproduction,
- characterised by the temporary absence of some of its members,
- occupying a specific class location within the class structure, and
- where members provide and draw on non-material support for themselves and their communities.

6.4.4 Implications for the study of migration

One trend in migration literature has been to study migrants as individuals. Another trend has been to study them as members of one particular class. This study contributes to the study of migration by examining the impact of migration across classes and its effect on households as a whole. The household is a social and economic unit where material and non-material resources are generated, pooled and distributed (Smith and Wallerstein 1992). The study illustrates that the household remains the primary site of social reproduction, where one of the responsibilities is to socialise its members to participate in production. The interrelated nature of production and reproduction means that the resources available to a household determine, to a great extent, the depth of vulnerability household members will experience in the labour market; class is reproduced in the household. However, households also contain non-material resources such as love, duty, tradition and obligation, which are not focused on reproducing people for the labour market, and which go some way towards developing people as well-adjusted, socially-able individuals.

Feminist political economists see social reproduction as a "public good" (Folbre 1994), and as the first step in developing an individual's sense of responsibility and connectedness with the rest of humanity (Bakker and Gill 2003). When, migration – an attempt to gain entry to labour markets – deprives households of

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non-commodified resources, it does not only entrench the underdevelopment of sending communities, but of individuals and their households as a whole.

An additional contribution to the study of migration is the suggestion that there is a need to research child-headed households. Child-headed households are seen as a consequence of the deaths of parents due to AIDS-related illnesses. Bonnin's (1997, 2000) description of child-headed households as a result of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal points to other causes. During my research it became evident that migration of adults is another cause.[179]

Internationally there is a recognition that in developing countries children are caring for others while their parents are engaged in waged work and work in the informal economy (Heymann 2006; Dahlblom *et al.* 2009). However, in these studies, parents return home at the end of the day after they have earned or made a living (Webster 2005). In migrant households, when all adults have migrated to find employment, children are left on their own for weeks at a time. In my study the members of child-headed households displayed great commitment and care for each other. Significant attempts were made to ensure that younger members attended school. However, one has to factor in the possibility that, in the absence of guidance from adults, children may stray into anti-social behaviour such as drug and alcohol abuse, promiscuity and crime, with attendant effects on society.

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[179] I gathered more anecdotal evidence of the existence of child-headed households in discussions about my study. In a presentation to a Development Institute for Training, Support and Education for Labour (DITSELA) advanced training course in Women Leadership, I raised the incidence of child-headed households. During the discussion, the training facilitator said that she had been the *de facto* head of her household since she was 14 years old, when her mother migrated to work in another town and returned home on a monthly basis. This woman said that she knew of other households, which had the same arrangement "but we never knew it as child-headed households because it wasn't called that". At a more recent occasion, in September 2009, when I talked about my work to a group of five women at a presentation organised by ACTIONAID, three of the women also described how they were raised by older siblings ranging in age between 13 and 16, because their households had no adult members to care for the young when their mothers migrated.

6.5 Policy Implications

This dissertation has argued that social reproduction differs according to the class location of households. It follows, therefore, that social development should have a class and gender perspective. That is, the needs of households differ according to class and so does the contribution households are able to make towards a safe and equitable South Africa. In this final section of the dissertation I argue that the class-based differences in the social reproduction of migrant households require state-society interventions.

The approach required by South Africa, Evans (2007, 2009) proposes, is that of a capability developmental state. With his focus on human capability, Evans draws on the approaches of Amartya Sen (1999) and Martha Nussbaum (2000) to argue that development should do more than developing human capital – technical skill which has currency in labour, technology and financial markets. Instead, the human capability approach provides endless opportunities to improve human "well-being" holistically as the "foundations for the subsequent development of skills and technical prowess" (Evans 2007: 57-8).

While human capital focuses on market returns, Evans argues that developing human capabilities has wider-ranging social returns. However, "since the potential range of capabilities is almost limitless, development aimed at expanding capabilities could be many different things" (Evans 2009: 109). In other words, Evans suggests that the philosophical underpinnings of the capability approach make it difficult for policy makers to implement. One way in which to narrow the gap between the immediate need to create employment and a strong commitment to expand the infinite range of human capabilities – that is, to ensure the maintenance and renewal of society – is to create strong state-society interventions aimed at lowering inequality. The areas in which a capability developmental expansion would have the greatest social returns, Evans (2007, 2009) argues, are education, health and early childhood development. The institutional approach to capability expansion entails a strong commitment to

public provision by those in charge of public institutions simultaneously engaging with "a citizenry able to organise effectively and demand support for capability expansion" (Evans 2009: 114).

Evans (2009: 121) suggests that the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) who mobilised "urban youth against government denials and neglect" as well as "construct[ed] new self-identities and social connections for AIDS victims" represents the strong collective civil society mobilisation and demands required by the citizenry to engage with the state. What is missing in South Africa's current healthcare system is the public capacity to effectively deliver the drugs to all who need anti-retroviral treatment. In contrast, South Africa's Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), which includes the Home-Based Care Project, signals the state's commitment to care for those living with AIDS (Evans 2007). However, what this thesis demonstrates is that the state needs to extend its provision of care to all households to ensure social reproduction.[180]

One common feature of the 23 households in my study is that all of them see migration as an attempt to secure their social reproduction. However, modernisation theory sees leaving one's community of birth to find work in the "city" as part of the natural process of modernisation. This assumption is captured in the literature that sees migration as simply one of the factors of the rapid urbanisation of most societies and in the proposal to develop migrant receiving cities such as Johannesburg as "world class cities". While urban planners and city councils wrestle with issues of overcrowding, urban unemployment, lack of housing and the stresses on public service provisions, others wrestle with the depopulation of sending communities such as Emnambithi. The migration of women as a way of emancipating themselves from patriarchal communities and households is another perspective that captures the perception of the urban as modern and progressive (Bozzoli and Nkotsoe 1991). Viewing migrants either as

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[180] State-society co-operation in the form of the co-production of public goods (Ostrom 1996) is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

mere cogs in the relentless machinery of modernisation or simply as the agents of their own histories ignores their structural disadvantage and the conditions under which they reproduce and which fundamentally shape their decisions to migrate and structure their experience of migration (Schwenken 2008). Returned migrant women in my study said that life in the city was "civilised" and "dignified". On probing their nostalgia for iGoli, it emerged that what they meant was that in Johannesburg they were spared the indignity of scraping for a living, and having to live without indoor, flushing toilets and running water. This discussion has relevance for the development of communities in two ways.

First, migration to the city for work or emancipation can be seen as the enactment of agency in a context where structural dictates – such as massive and growing unemployment, the casualisation of work and a particular gender order – constrains the power of individuals to make decisions. That is, as David Webster (1977) argued, sending communities are trapped in cycles of social and economic underdevelopment from which the only alternative appears to be migration. However, remittances are merely a temporary alleviation of poverty, and increasingly more people have to leave, relegating sending communities to chronic underdevelopment, and forcing individuals to work for longer and longer periods of time away from home (Webster 1977).

Three decades after Webster's paper appeared, the dependency thesis of migration is also used by Portes (2007) to discuss the chronic underdevelopment of countries such as Mexico by the United States of America. The United States, Portes argues, does not only benefit from the cheap migrant labour Mexicans supply to American firms and households, but also from cheap rural labour in the *maquiladoras*[181] in northern Mexico.[182] While profits are made in destination sites, the migrants' communities of origin deteriorate at a pace which cannot be

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[181] Foreign-owned manufacturing plants situated in Mexico's border areas, employing low-paid labour and importing material from the United States duty free.

[182] See Burawoy (1976) for a comparison between migration from Mexico to the United States and cross-border and internal migration in South Africa.

compensated for by remittances. At the same time non-material resources, such as care for the elderly and children, are absent in migrant households.

Given the social disruption that results from migration as well as the persistent underdevelopment of communities, it is essential that we realise that migration is not an adequate solution to socio-economic problems. Instead, policy interventions should concentrate on creating jobs where people live. This implies a shift in policy making away from an "urban bias" towards the development of all communities, especially those undermined by the policies of apartheid. The pervasive nature of racialised dispossession is still evident in Emnambithi, where even its more skilled and educated residents such as nurses and teachers have to leave to secure their livelihoods.

It is the marginalised households which are most in need of the resources that accrue to households as a result of employment. Job creation is one of the direst needs of South African society. This imperative was captured more than five decades ago in the Freedom Charter, which had as one of the demands for a fair and free South Africa that "there shall be work and security for all" (Webster 2009: 12). At a current national rate of unemployment of 24.5 per cent – in the narrow sense of the definition, rising to 34.4 per cent if discouraged workers are included (Statistics South Africa 2009) – it is obvious that this goal has yet to be realised.

There is evidence that policy makers continue to have an urban bias in their planning as the unemployment rate of rural areas, such as Emnambithi's 49 per cent, exceeds the average national unemployment rate. In India, the National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG), a scheme which entitles every rural household to 100 days of work per year, aims to eradicate rural unemployment and poverty (Chakraborty 2007). The budget for this guarantee of employment in 2006/2007 was 0.33 per cent of GDP. Webster (2009) estimates that creating job opportunities in South Africa would be equally affordable.

The South African government is piloting the Community Works Programme (CWP) aimed at employing one million South Africans for two days a week on various public projects, such as rural road maintenance, environmental programmes, informal settlement upgrading, urban renewal activities and social programmes (such as home-based care) (Philip 2009). As discussed in Chapter Three, members of semi-professional households are already employed on social programmes as volunteers. Adequate measures need to be implemented to ensure that those most in need of the social assistance provided by the CWP are reached.

The CWP, however, "is not a substitute for sustainable employment; it is a supplement to other livelihood strategies. It contributes to income security, provides work experience, enhances dignity, and promotes economic and social inclusion" (Webster 2009: 49). Thus, there is still a special need for employment in rural areas.

Secondly, jobs which are created should entail decent work – that is, full-time employment with decent wages in safe conditions and with adequate provision for when workers and their dependants fall ill and grow old (Webster 2009). Conversely, when work is insecure, with low wages and in unpalatable conditions, residents migrate to other communities to ensure adequate income for social reproduction. However, the necessity to relieve the conditions of social reproduction in marginalised households implies that a first requirement is to create employment in the short term, with the "progressive realisation of decent work" as a long-term goal (Webster 2009: 38). Such a strategy would require the inclusion of job creation within a spectrum of social policies.

One of the indicators of decent work proposed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in September 2008 is to establish whether a particular job allows a worker to "balance work and family". The measurement of this indicator involves establishing whether working parents are present and caring for their

children, and whether children are forced to engage in paid labour to earn an income. One of the indicators of the ILO's conception of work-family balance is to assess the rate of employment of women with children below school age, to determine the extent to which young children are left unattended by their mothers. Clearly, the ILO conceives of care as the domain of women! An over-emphasis on women's time away from home ignores the important contribution fathers and male household members could make to the care of the young and elderly. As argued by Nussbaum (2000) and demonstrated in this dissertation, it is in the family that the most intense form of gender injustice is practised and reproduced. The potential contribution of men AND women to social reproduction is undermined by migration. The goal to balance work and family is very difficult to achieve in migrant households, and nearly impossible in the migrant households of the marginalised.

The impact that the absence of caring adults has on migrant households is demonstrated by this dissertation. In semi-professional migrant households social reproduction falls on the shoulders of remaining (non-migrant) siblings of migrants. However, the need for adequate, skilled care for the elderly is underestimated. Even in these households where certain domestic duties, such as cleaning and cooking, can be "bought", direct care functions are not easily substituted by commoditised resources. These households are still in need of mobile care, which, although easier accomplished with better household resources, is too easily shifted onto those remaining in destination communities. However, these households are able to secure their basic and long-term needs through political connectedness and social capital.

In working-class migrant households, migrant mothers demonstrate a high level of mobile care, which lessens the burden on *gogos*. Mobile care is made possible because resources are available for mothers and daughters to travel and phone home on a regular basis. These resources, however, are under threat because work is becoming more precarious. However, mobile care is a substitute for direct care,

and used by women because of their circumstances. Even though children feel more secure with these levels of care, the absence of fathers is still deeply felt.

In marginalised migrant households, the attempt to make a living means that household members migrate to find jobs, with little or limited success. The reproduction of these households rests fundamentally on the shoulders of the elderly, as adequate levels of mobile care are impossible with the scarce resources these households are able to secure. A decent work framework may not immediately alleviate the structural disadvantage these households endure, as the conditions of the neighbourhoods they households occupy impose even further costs on household budgets.

Therefore, thirdly, post-apartheid social policy should move beyond simply employment-based social provision. Barchiesi (2005: 274) points out that even in urban communities the growing "precariousness of work inside the workplace and rising commodification [of, for example, water provisioning and waste removal] outside" constrain the potential of waged work to secure household reproduction. When waged work cannot guarantee equitable conditions of social reproduction, the notion of worker-citizenship is drawn into question (Barchiesi 2005). An expansion of social policy would therefore benefit working-class households as well.

Insecure tenure and inadequate public utilities, such as sanitation and clean, running water, Brey and Brandt (2007) argue, undermine the creative effort that caregivers invest in caring for their charges. A consolidation of citizenshipis much more likely to emerge when services such as public transport, decent housing, affordable and quality provision of sewerage, waste removal, electricity, water and policing combine to ensure that workers and citizens can integrate work and reproduction in a dignified manner.[183] Improving the delivery of these services

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[183] These principles were contained in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP),, the election manifesto which secured the ANC-COSATU-SACP victory in 1994 in South Africa's

could be of even further benefit if the marginalised were employed by the state to ensure adequate labour power to perform this duty.

State-society provision of care is one way in which South African citizens and the state could be involved in what Nobel Prize Winner Elinor Ostrom calls "the co-production of public goods" (Ostrom 1996). Co-production of public goods denotes the "process through which inputs used to produce a [public] good or service are contributed by individuals who are not in the same organisation [In this process] citizens can play an active role in producing public goods and services of consequence to them" (Ostrom 1996: 1073). To elaborate, the state is commonly conceived of as the ideal and regular supplier of services such as health, education and sanitation. However, as argued by Folbre (2006), certain services, such as childcare, require the co-operation of the recipient (which could be the child or the adult responsible for the child). Co-production thus entails the socialisation of public goods by including the beneficiaries of such goods in the planning, implementation and provision of goods and services.

The examples provided by Ostrom (1996) are pertinent for the South African context. She focuses on sanitation and water provisioning in a peri-urban town in Brazil and on primary education in a number of villages in western, eastern, central and northern Nigeria. The different levels of success achieved by these state-society projects led her to identify a number of factors which could increase the probability of success of such projects. First, she suggests that the resources (e.g., skill, money and technology) which each party contributes should be complementary rather than substitutive. In other words, synergies are created when the parties contribute what the other needs. The knowledge locals have of their physical environment, their skills and time are all essential to increase the efficacy of the technical inputs of sanitation engineers and planners. Secondly, the regulatory or legal framework in which the project operates should be accessible to both parties. In the case of primary education in Nigeria, for example, the

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first democratic elections. However, the ANC has subsequently abandoned these principles in favour of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy.

project was hindered by long waits for planning permission to build school latrines, which hampered parental and community involvement and commitment.

Thirdly, the complementarity of inputs would be assured if the participants were able to build and demonstrate "a credible commitment to one another" (Ostrom 1996: 1082). This point, she argues, will be met by entering into legal agreements outlining the contributions made by each party. For example, when the local state in the Brazilian town reneged on its agreement and pipes were "shoddily constructed and poorly maintained", citizen commitment and involvement decreased significantly. Fourthly, Ostrom (1996: 1082) proposes, "Incentives help to encourage inputs from both officials and citizens". Incentives could be nominal, such as small fees paid by Brazilian citizens for their water pipes, or symbolic as in the case of the celebrations for Nigerian teachers when their pupils excelled. The Nigerian case, which over all was less successful than the Brazilian project, was negatively influenced by the apathy and lack of encouragement from the Nigerian national state.

Finally, Ostrom argues all of the factors identified would combine effectively if decision making and authority could be exercised at the local level rather than being monopolised at national levels. Such a "polycentric political system" means that a national commitment to co-production could work to satisfy the context-specific needs and requirements of specific communities within nationally identified priorities. These priorities should include "being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length: not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living" (Nussbaum 2000: 78-80, cited by Evans 2009: 109). Thus, care is not contingent on the life stage of an individual – that is, only for the young – but a need at all stages of human life (Nussbaum 2000).

In the same way, the "socialisation" of care[184] – the recognition that care for the vulnerable has a social purpose, is of immense social value, and is publicly

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[184] Folbre (1994, 2006); Gornick and Meyers (2003) Meyers and Gornick (2003); Hassim (2008).

supported and organised – could promote social justice and security and foster trust in a society that has been and continues to be divided along class, racial and urban-rural lines. This study shows that all migrant households – semi-professional, working-class and marginalised – need support for the direct care of their dependant members. The benefits of socialised care for the young are apparent from the rare example of state-provided crèches in Mexico, where Heymann (2006) found that even the school performance of children who did not attend the crèches improved remarkably. That is, older children, who usually cared for their much younger siblings, were able to improve their own school participation because their own and their younger siblings' care needs were being provided.

Public childcare policies in South Africa, Brey and Brandt (2007: 15) argue, should recognise the contribution that children and other family members make in caring for others. In other words, context-sensitive policies on childcare should include a focus on supporting existing forms of care which are structured around "physical proximity" – that is, care by those who co-reside with care recipients, such as grandparents and other children in migrant households – and "relational proximity" – the availability of other kin to provide care.

Multi-generational households are sure to persist in South Africa. The material resources (such as social grants) and non-material resources (such as care, love and solidarity) which children and the elderly contribute to households are indispensable. As with children, South Africa requires social policies which would ensure that the elderly, long the bulwark of households in need of care, should retire peacefully, in a healthy and safe environment.

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Appendix One
Interviews Conducted

List One:
Household interviews conducted in Emnambithi,
March 2007 – May 2008

Date	Household	Person Interviewed
13-Mar-07	Dlamini	Gogo Dlamini
13-Mar-07	Dlamini	Dlamini Ndebele
08-Mar-07	Gumede	Ellie Gumede
19-May-08	Gumede	Ellie Gumede
15-Mar-07	Hlanganani	Sophia Hlanganani
17-Mar-07	Hlanganani	Sophia Hlanganani
26-May-08	Hlanganani	Sophia Hlanganani
05-Mar-07	Khuzwayo	Xolile Khuzwayo
08-Nov-07	Khuzwayo	Gogo Khuzwayo
16-May-08	Khuzwayo	Gogo Khuzwayo
21-May-08	Langa	Cynthia Langa
06-Mar-07	Langa	Mavis Langa
03-Nov-07	Langa	Cynthia Langa
23-May-08	Langa	Mavis Langa

12-Mar-07	Mabena	Gogo Mabena
07-Nov-07	Mabena	Thuli Mabena
27-May-08	Mabena	Thuli Mabena
13-Mar-07	Mabuza	Gogo Mabuza
23-May-08	Mabuza	Gogo Mabuza
05-Nov-07	Mathebula	Mpho Mathebula
13-May-08	Mathebula	Mpho Mathebula
19-May-08	Mathebula	Mpho Mathebula
12-Mar-07	Mathebula	Mpho Mathebula
05-Mar-07	Mfeka	Joy Mfeka
14-May-08	Mfeka	Joy Mfeka
29-May-08	Mfeka	Joy Mfeka
09-Mar-07	Mhaule	Neo Mhaule
16-Mar-07	Mhaule	Gogo Mhaule
30-Oct-07	Mhaule	Gogo Mhau
14-May-08	Mhaule	Patricia Mhaule
20-May-08	Ndaba (Gogo)	Gogo Ndaba
06-Mar-07	Ndaba (Gogo)	Gogo Ndaba
03-Jul-07	Ndaba (Gogo)	Gogo Ndaba
03-Jul-07	Ndaba (Gogo)	Dorcas Ndaba
31-Oct-07	Ndaba (Gogo)	Gogo Ndaba
07-Mar-07	Ndaba (Grace)	Grace Ndaba
08-Nov-07	Ndaba (Grace)	Nombuso Ndaba
23-May-08	Ndaba (Grace)	Grace Ndaba

26-May-08	Ndaba (Grace)	Nombuso Ndaba
05-Mar-07	Ndimande	Nancy Ndimande
30-Oct-07	Ndimande	Nancy Ndimande
14-May-08	Ndimande	Nancy Ndimande
16-May-08	Ndimande	Nancy Ndimande
10-Mar-07	Ngubane	Celestine Ngubane
14-Mar-07	Ngubane	Celestine Ngubane
07-Nov-07	Ngubane	Celestine Ngubane
08-Mar-07	Radebe	Nomsa
17-Mar-07	Radebe	Gogo Duma
08-Nov-07	Radebe	Tina Radebe
08-Nov-07	Radebe	Gogo Duma
19-May-08	Radebe	Tina Radebe
16-Mar-07	Shabalala	Emily Shabalala
02-Jul-07	Shabalala	Emily Shabalala
05-Jul-07	Shabalala	Nandi Shabalala
02-Nov-07	Shabalala	Nandi Shabalala
06-Nov-07	Shabalala	Emily Shabalala
15-May-08	Shabalala	Nandi Shabalala
27-May-08	Shabalala	Emily Shabalala
12-Mar-07	Shabangu	Thoko Shabangu
31-Oct-07	Shabangu	Thoko Shabangu
09-Nov-07	Shabangu	Thoko Shabangu
29-May-08	Shabangu	Thoko Shabangu

30-Oct-07	Shabangu	Thembiso Shabangu
14-Mar-07	Shezi	Gogo Shezi
07-Nov-07	Shezi	Neli Shezi
26-May-08	Shezi	Neli Shezi
06-Mar-07	Shicego	Silvia Shicego
08-Mar-07	Shicego	Sindile Shicego
30-Oct-07	Shicego	Ntombi Shicego
20-May-08	Shicego	Sindile Shicego
07-Mar-07	Sibanyoni	Khanyile Sibanyoni
08-Mar-07	Sibanyoni	Khanyile Sibanyoni
16-Mar-07	Sibanyoni	Mpo Sibanyoni
17-May-07	Sibanyoni	Manta Ngubani
01-Nov-07	Sibanyoni	Mpo Sibanyoni
09-Nov-07	Sibanyoni	Manta Ngubani
09-Nov-07	Sibanyoni	Manta Ngubani
15-May-08	Sibanyoni	Mpo Sibanyoni
24-May-08	Sibanyoni	Manta Ngubani
24-May-08	Sibanyoni	Lindi Sibanyoni
15-Mar-07	Sibiya	Hlengi Sibiya
28-May-08	Sibiya	Gogo Sibiya
27-May-08	Sibiya	Hlengi Sibiya
09-Mar-07	Silongo	Rose Silongo
02-Nov-07	Silongo	Rose Silongo
07-Mar-07	Sithebe	Jabu Sithebe

22-May-08	Sithebe	Jabu Sithebe
28-May-08	Sithebe	Nomsa Sithebe
15-Mar-07	Zungu	Mrs Zungu
27-May-08	Zungu	Mrs Zungu

List Two:
Interview conducted with migrants in Johannesburg,
September 2008

Date	Household	Person Interviewed
02-Sep-08	Ngubane	Lindiwe Ngubane
05-Sep-08	Ndaba (Gogo)	Dorcas Ndaba
09-Sep-08	Ndimande	Mr Ndimande
09-Sep-08	Mathebula	Mpo Mathebula
10-Sep-08	Zungu	Mr Zungu
11-Sep-08	Shezi	Londi Shezi
13-Sep-08	Sibiya	Frank Sibiya
13-Sep-08	Mabena	Mabena
14-Sep-08	Zungu	Doreen Zungu
19-Sep-08	Hlanganani	David Hlanganani
20-Sep-08	Mfeka	John Mfeka
25-Sep-08	Radebe	Nomsa Radebe
30-Sep-08	Khuzwayo	Gugu Khuzwayo
30-Sep-08	Shabangu	Thandeka Shabangu

List Three:
Interviews conducted with Emnambithi local officials

Date	Name	Official Designation/Position
16-Mar-07	Chief Khaleni	Traditional Leader Driefontein
04-Jul-07	Chief Khaleni	Traditional Leader Driefontein
05-Nov-07	Georgina Koopman	Senior Manager, Social Development Department of Social Welfare and Population Development,
29-May-08	Georgina Koopman	Manager: Grants Administration, South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
02-Jul-07	Mdu Macingwane	Assistant Townplanner, Emnambithi Municipality
31-Oct-07	Mdu Macingwane	Assistant Townplanner, Emnambithi Municipality
09-Nov-07	Mdu Macingwane	Assistant Townplanner, Emnambithi Municipality
13-May-08	Mrs E Heron	Ladysmith Historical Society
01-Nov-07	Noma Mtshali	Manager: Local Economic Development - Uthukela District Municipality
01-Nov-07	Vishay Singh	Manager: Grants Administration, South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
20-May-08	Vukani Manyathi	Co-Curricular Activities: Sport, Culture and Youth, Department of Education

List Four:
Group interviews conducted in Emanmbithi, 2007 – 2008

Date	Group
11-Mar-07	Mpho Mathebula,Nomsa Sithebe, Nombuso Ndaba, Nande Shabalala
24-May-08	27 Teachers attending Schoolteachers Guider's Training, Encgoboyesizwe School, Ezakheni E-Section

List Five:
Selected interviews conducted in Emnambith, 2005[185]

- Father Benan Fahy, Parish Priest: Catholic Church in Ezakheni (21 September 2005)

- Mr Themba Qwabe, Manager of Local Economic Development of Emnambithi Local Government (21 September 2005);

- Ms Duduzile Mazibuko, Mayor of Emnambithi, (18 October 2005).

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[185] These are interviews I conducted in 2005 for an Honours research essay titled "Beyond Wage Labour? The Search for Security among Defy Workers, Ezakheni" (Fakier, 2005).