The Role of Civil Society in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Child Soldiers:
Lessons Learnt from Angola

by

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my original and unaided work. It is being submitted for the award of the degree of Master of Arts (MA) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. To the best of my knowledge, it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university.

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Chapter One - Introduction

Children were actively involved in armed conflict in government forces or non-state armed groups in 19 countries or territories between April 2004 and October 2007.[1] Child soldiers are recognised as a 'vulnerable group' which by definition means that this group has specialised needs. Unfortunately, the prevalent attitude towards the problem of child recruitment is that this problem is just one of many issues in a post conflict setting and cannot be prioritised above another.

Drawing from the case study of Angola, this paper wishes to document the successes and failures of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in order to ultimately provide a list of working recommendation for future use by state and non-state actors. The lessons learned are based on the reintegration needs of specifically child soldiers and while these findings may be transferable to different states and experiences, each state will need to do their own local investigation and planning. This paper has been complied from the field research of UNDP, Save the Children, World Bank and UNICEF researchers. Their interviews, focus groups and official reports have been combined with my own desk research to produce a paper highlighting the best practises for the DDR of child soldiers in a post-conflict society.

Aim

The chief aim of this research paper is to identify and discuss the possible roles both local and international civil society groups can play in the DDR of former child soldier combatants.[2] After analysing the Angolan DDR attempts, it will become evident that major problems lie within the reintegration steps of most DDR programmes. Former child soldiers who have only known violence and war from as young as eight years old cannot be expected to simply put down their guns, their only form of security, and revert to a civilian way of life. My research will focus mainly on providing an evaluation and possible improvements, highlighted by the inclusion of civil society, in this 'third' and final step of structured DDR processes.

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[1] Countries with recorded use of child soldiers: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Uganda.
[2] This paper will not separate male from female combatants and all persons under the age of eighteen years will be considered a child.

<u>Rationale</u>

I have chosen Angola as my case study because "no other post conflict situation has been host to all the complexities of reintegration and the variety of experiences".[3] The protracted length and brutal nature of the Angolan civil war illustrates a worst case scenario for other countries seeking an outline of how to bring together local communities and alienated combatants. While Angola failed a number of peace-keeping initiatives throughout its estimated twenty-seven year conflict period, this country also yielded one of the first cases in which child soldiers were specifically recognised and included in the post-conflict programmes. While every DDR programme is context-specific, Angola has experienced two failed DDR attempts "under the auspices of first the UN and then national authorities".[4] An evaluation of these attempts will highlight the pitfalls of both government and civil society efforts to implement DDR. The successful reintegration of former combatants is a long-term goal that still eludes many post-conflict states. Research relating to DDR acknowledges the need for collaboration between government structures, international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) to bring about effective peacekeeping measures.[5] Most literature however stops short of outlining exactly what civil society can do to improve current DDR processes in general and the effective reintegration of former combatants (specifically child soldiers) in particular. The reintegration of former child soldiers must be seen as a priority of post-conflict governments and communities. Most of these children (under the age of 18 years) only know war and have been led to believe that survival is intertwined with conflict. The ineffective reintegration of these children will undoubtedly cause long term problems. This research would not only equip ordinary citizens with necessary information, but hopefully the tools to effect change within their own communities. Furthermore, the role of civil society is becoming increasingly important in a complexly interdependent world. Civilians are

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[3] Gomes, J and Parsons, I, "Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration" in *Institute for Security Studies*: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Issue Paper 27, February 2003, p. 5.

[4] Dzinesa, G, "Postconflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Southern Africa" in *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2007, p. 73.

[5] Gomes, J and Parsons, I, 2003; Meek ,S and Malan, M 2004; Verhey, B 2001.

now the main targets of violence and as they become more directly affected by armed conflict, "they develop a central interest in contributing to its resolution".[6]

After watching an *Invisible Children* documentary, based on the abduction and forced recruitment of child soldiers in Uganda, I became aware of the severity of the problem and began basic research into the international community's response to the violation of these children's rights. I have chosen to research the role that civil society groups can play in the solving of this problem as individual persons need to be able to identify how and through which channels they can actively affect change. Lessons learnt from Angola's successes and failures can provide the much needed information to prevent the further recruitment of child soldiers as well as providing a platform for the successful reintegration of former child soldiers in other countries struggling with DDR implementation. Unfortunately the recruitment and use of children in conflict situations is still a very current problem. The presence of children in armed groups targeted for demobilisation is about 10.8 percent of total combatants, with countries such as Sudan, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of the Congo even higher.[7] This study will also emphasise the need for the identification and allocation of 'vulnerable' or 'special' groups associated with warring factions (particularly women, children and the disabled). These particularly vulnerable groups should be provided with protective measures in the design and planning stages of DDR programmes.

Methodology

The data that I have collected thus far is inclusive of both qualitative and quantitative research. Analysis of the Angolan case study will inform the basis of my evaluation and suggestions regarding future DDR implementation however, statistical data needs to be used to show the magnitude of this phenomenon and the far-reaching consequences of the problem of child soldiers. Thus far, the data (ranging from personal testaments, official reports, workshop briefings, academic journals and IO relief programmes) is heavily reliant on the information provided by NGOs, IOs and other grassroots civil society groups. While the one-sidedness of these sources could

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[6] Barnes, C, "Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace", *Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)*, Issue Paper 2, September 2006, p. 7.
[7] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, DDR 2008: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in the World during 2007, Bellaterra: *School for a Culture of Peace* (Escola de Cultura de Pau), February 2008. p. 22.

be seen as problematic, this information comes from sources close to the conflict. In addition, these IOs and NGOs often have greater resources to collect and corroborate statistics and information as opposed to weak post conflict state structures. There is also the difficulty of translation of official state documents. The UN does possess official statements and reports which have been translated and efforts have been made to reference verified state material where possible.

Space constraints do not allow for an in depth analysis of international and domestic legislation surrounding the issue of child soldiers. I do believe however, that it is necessary to briefly outline the rights that these laws and conventions provide for the protection of children. Conventions and legislation on the rights of the child are highlighted[8] in the hope that these outlines will ultimately provide many of the goals that civil society groups should be working towards.

After outlining and contextualising the problem of ineffective reintegration of former child soldiers, I will introduce the case of Angola. The suggestions drawn from the analysis of this country's shortcomings will hopefully identify a more active role for both international and domestic civil society groups. Ultimately successful change can take place through the effective and efficient partnering of local and international actors. Concern is raised however on the point of sustaining this change and realistically reintegrating and supporting former child soldiers within post-conflict communities over a long term period. The problem of child soldiers cannot be motivated and addressed solely by the international community, close attention will be paid to the role that local civil society groups and regional structures can play in order to sustain a peaceful status quo.

Information detailing the history and DDR implementation of Angola is necessary as well as records of civil society's involvement in these processes. Naturally, accredited journal articles discussing the problems of child soldiers, their integration and the role of civil society will be included. IO and NGO sponsored material is current and of importance in explaining the interconnected nature of conflict and its consequences. Many local civil society groups were directly funded or fell under larger international

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[8]de Berry, J 2001; Druba, V 2002; Grover, S 2008.

affiliations. Where possible the work of local groups will be identified as well as the major international actors who were present throughout the twenty-seven year conflict period, contributing to emergency relief and the implementation of DDR processes.[9] The major international CSOs involved in DDR programmes in Angola were The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children (STC), Christian Children's Fund (CCF), UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The UN impact reports as well as the above mentioned organisations' research and briefing papers will be consulted. While international government organisations including the European Union (EU), World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are not civil society organisations, they can play a supportive role vis-à-vis national and international NGOs – as can be seen in the case of Angola – and will therefore also be listed.[10]

Structure of Study

Chapter Two

Firstly an outline of regime theory is given. This definition is followed by an outline of the theoretical perspectives surrounding regime formation and function. The discussion will then progress to the evaluation of DDR as an effective security regime. It is also necessary at this point to outline the general strategies of DDR while simultaneously using Angolan examples as a means to evaluate the DDR regime.

Chapter Three

The historical background of Angola's conflict is detailed. Specific focus is placed on its three separate attempts to broker peace agreements including the 1991 Bicesse Accord, the 1994 Lusaka Peace Process and the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding.

Chapter Four

The possible roles of IOs and CSOs within a post conflict setting will be discussed in chapter four. It is also necessary to specify both the positive and negative aspects that

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[9] Lari, A, "Returning Home to a Normal Life? The Plight of Displaced Angolans", *Institute for Security Studies*, Paper 85, February 2004, p.9.

[10] Amundsen, I and Abreu, C, "Civil Society in Angola: Inroads, Space and Accountability", CHR. Michelsen Institute Report, 2006, p. 17.

the involvement of transnational actors can bring to an unstable, insecure post conflict state.

Chapter Five

The reintegration of Angolan child soldiers is detailed. This chapter attempts to draw from both regime theory and previously stipulated civil society structures to highlight the importance of collaboration between state and non-state actors if effective, long-term reintegration is to be achieved.

Chapter Six

A number of lessons learned and suggestions are put forward to create better reintegration strategies for future child soldiers as well as children which have been physically and psychologically affected by war.

Chapter Seven

Concluding remarks are given to summarise the findings of this research report.

Chapter Two - Theoretical Framework: DDR and Regime Theory

This introductory discussion will firstly attempt to define what a regime is. Once an adequate definition has been established, it will be necessary to explore the differing theoretical perspectives concerning the roles that international regimes can potentially play. This discussion will include the conventional structural realist approach, the 'modified structural' approach and the Grotian approach to regime theory. While drawing strongly from Stephen Krasner's insights, this paper aims to expand upon his initial debate highlighting the roles of norms, principles and rules. Emphasis will be placed on how the above concepts converge to either form regimes or aid in the facilitation of international cooperation on an increasingly interconnected global stage. It will also be of value to further explain the associated concepts of cooperation, transaction costs, utility maximisation and customary practice, which aid in the establishment and continuation of regimes. While attempting to determine both the role and relevance of international regimes, this paper will introduce the concept of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) as a security regime which needs to be evaluated. Simply put, DDR is a series of structured programmes and procedures which are implemented in post-conflict scenarios in order to achieve long-term stability and security. If DDR is a security regime in itself then its effectiveness as a regime will be able to be evaluated accordingly. It will also be necessary to include a brief discussion of the potential effects regimes have on a state's domestic sphere. While the overriding purpose of this paper is to establish the role that transnational civil society (TCS) can play in the DDR of child soldiers, only cooperation between state and non-state actors will bring about effective and lasting change. In order to gain insight into the role civil society presently play as well as could potentially play, DDR must be located and unpacked as a concept within regime theory and the wider international relations discourse.

<u>What is Regime Theory?</u>

The most widely accepted definition of an international regime is that put forward by Stephen Krasner stating that, "international regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a

given issue-area".[11] He defines norms as standards of behaviour pertaining to rights and obligations. Rules are identified as pro/prescriptions for action and decision making procedures are practises put in place to implement collective choice.[12] While there is general consent amongst international relations scholars regarding Krasner's broad definition, this consent does not continue into discussions relating to the purpose of regimes and consequently if they matter at all. At this point it will be useful to introduce the three differing approaches to regime significance as one's answer to the purpose and value of international regimes will differ greatly according to the particular approach adopted. Scholars such as Oran Young, Raymond Hopkins and Donald and Puchala adopt a Grotian approach which assumes that regimes are an integral part of the international system, "no patterned behaviour can sustain itself for any length of time without generating a congruent regime".[13] Susan Strange and other conventional structuralists argue that regimes are an ambiguous concept that "obscures basic economic and power relationships". Structuralists also criticise other approaches for placing emphasis on the roles played by norms, rules and decision making procedures within the international system. Finally, the modified structural approach to regime significance adopted by Arthur Stein, Robert Keohane and Robert Jervis seems to adopt conventional structural assumptions about self-interested states within a chaotic international system. However, these scholars do recognise the important role international regimes can and have played in the event that individual action has failed to secure a desired outcome.

As previously mentioned, while many international theorists accept Krasner's definition of an international regime they still put forward their own understandings of regime formation and significance, tailoring the definition to emphasise specific aspects or functions they believe regimes should fulfil. Keohane and Haggard and Simmons explain that the study of regimes is born from a desire to understand international order.[14] Keohane and Nye define regimes as "a set of governing arrangements that

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[11] Krasner, S, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables" in *International Organisation*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, p. 185.
[12] Ibid. p.186.
[13] Ibid. p.185.
[14] Keohane, R, "The demand for international regimes" in *International Organisation*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, p. 325.

include networks of norms, rules and procedures that regularise behaviour and control its effects".[15] Donald and Puchala state that "a regime exists in every substantive issue-area in international relations…wherever there is regularity in behaviour, some kind of principles, norms or rules must exist to account for it".[16]

In his definition Haas similarly stipulates that a regime "encompasses a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules and norms".[17] As one can see at this early point, the focus of the definition depends largely on which theoretical approach the author has contextualised it within. Hedely Bull highlights the role that institutions play in establishing the rules and norms which ultimately sustain world order. A more restrictive definition put forward by Haggard and Simmons treats regimes as multilateral agreements between states "which aim to regulate national actions within an issue area".[18]

Regimes must be separated from arrangements. Regimes are not once-off arrangements that change with every shift in power or interests, but are created to facilitate agreements. Jervis reinforces this notion, explaining that regimes are not only norms and expectations that assist cooperation "but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self interest".[19] Therefore, international sanctions applied within a specific time frame and for certain behaviour will not constitute a regime as this action is based on short-term calculated interested. In contrast the forgoing of short-term gains and adherence to international laws of trade or sovereignty based largely on the principle of reciprocity is an example of states' observance of international regimes, which are aimed at providing long term cooperation. It is this "infusion of behaviour with principles and norms that distinguishes regime-governed activity in the international system from more conventional activity".[20] Krasner not only draws attention to the distinction between regimes and arrangements but also the fundamental difference between principles and norms on the one hand and rules and procedures on the other. Changes in rules and procedures reflect change within the regime, whereas a change in

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[15] Krasner, S, Op Cit. p.186.
[16] Haggard, S and Simmons, B, "Theories of international regimes" in *International Organization,* Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 1987, p.493.
[17] Krasner, S, Op Cit. p.186.
[18] Haggard, S and Simmons, B, Op Cit. p.495.
[19] Krasner, S, Op Cit. p.187.
[20] Ibid. p.187.

norms or principles is a change in the regime itself.[21] Krasner uses the example of the special and differential treatment principle afforded to LCD country members within the GATT. This departure from the stipulated rules can be seen as a weakening of, but not collapse of an established regime.

DDR Regime

It is very rare that countries moving from a stage of open conflict to a post-conflict setting possess the ability or resources to help themselves and often international assistance is required. The international community has developed a number of mechanisms and methodologies to aid stabilisation structures in often chaotic and unstable post-conflict situations. One of the most prominent of these security and stabilising structures has been defined as Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. The concept of DDR was created in 1989 and has subsequently become "an essential element of almost all peacekeeping operations"[22] The UN pioneered this three step programme as the answer to restoring peace and security to post-conflict countries. Currently, adopting or joining the DDR regime is a prerequisite of any donor assistance. It is at this point in the discussion that it becomes important to define DDR as a security regime and explore whether this regime is in fact the most effective solution to the safety and reintegration of child soldiers

Principles are "beliefs or facts, causation, and rectitude".[23] The principles of the DDR regime are the beliefs that peace and security will only be achieved through the effective disarming and demobilising of belligerents.

Norms are described as "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations" [24] The norms surrounding DDR regimes include the notion that if the principles of DDR are followed, conditional aid and developmental assistance will be received.

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[21] Ibid. p.188.
[22] Meek, S and Malan, M, "Identifying Lessons from DDR experiences in Africa: workshop report" in *Institute for Security Studies Monographs*, Issue 106, 2004, p.2.
[23] Krasner, S, Op Cit. p. 185.
[24] Ibid. p. 185.

Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action and decision making procedures are "prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice"[25] In other words a regime's formal instruments are its written rules, and procedures for monitoring compliance and adjudicating disputes. DDR stipulations are contained within the signed peace agreement and monitored by the state or organisation overseeing the DDR process.

The question of whether DDR is a successful regime is difficult to answer. While this regime is not supported by international legislation, a peace treaty does act as a binding agreement which comes with consequences if it is broken. In addition the recalling of aid can be seen as an enforcement mechanism. Power factors are particularly relevant to the supply of international regimes: regimes involving enforcement can only be supplied if there is authority backed by coercive resources. As we have seen regimes themselves do not possess such resources-states must belong to the regime.[26]

Both state and non-state actors should look to international humanitarian law as a way to effect further change regarding the problem of child soldiers. International law provides a basis for a rule of "non-recruitment and non-participation of child soldiers" however non-ratified treaties, inadequate international oversight, exceptions of 'national emergency' and lack of recourse prevent the effective implementation of these rights of the child.[27] The system of international humanitarian law relies heavily on national legal systems to codify and implement basic human rights laws. In the case of child soldiers, states are expected to prohibit the participation of children in conflict situations as well as prevent their forced recruitment. Unfortunately, poor enforcement mechanisms and the frequent refusal of states to prosecute their own nationals indicate that human rights are still secondary to state sovereignty.[28] Presently, the UN (and its subsidiary bodies) provides the best platform for state and non-state actors to highlight and debate possible solutions to the transnational issue of child soldiers. Despite providing formal channels of communication, current monitoring bodies and grievance procedures tend to be

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[25] Ibid. p. 185.
[26] Keohane, R, Op Cit. p.344.
[27] Cohn, I and Goodwin-Gill, G, *Child soldiers: the role of children in armed conflict*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994, p.149.
[28] Ibid. p.155

protracted and recommendations remain unimplemented. Ultimately the transnational problem of child soldiers will have to be addressed on a domestic and international level through the collaborative attempts by state and non-state actors

The Purpose of Regimes

Now that an adequate definition has been discussed, attention must be given to outlining the purpose of regimes. The theoretical perspective through which one views regimes will determine their primary function or purpose. Regimes play an important role in facilitating cooperation between international actors "regimes are examples of cooperative behaviour, and facilitate cooperation, but cooperation can take place in the absence of established regimes".[29] It is also important to differentiate between international regimes and international institutions, "all international organisations are characterised as regimes, but not all regimes are viewed as international organisations".[30] In her article Helen Milner highlights the notion that it is international organisations opposed to regimes that are foundational, "regimes can only exist where previously international organisations have been developed".[31] This statement would corroborate other structuralists' beliefs that scholars should focus on the study of international organisations and abandon regime theory altogether.

Keohane believes that international regimes will continue to be created and maintained in so far as there is a demand for them, "if international regimes did not exist, they would surely have to be invented".[32] His calculations of demand are premised on the need for clear legal framework establishing liability for action, the cost and accessibility of information and high transaction costs. In other words, according to Keohane international regimes will facilitate better cooperation between international actors if they can meet the following functions: "provide frameworks for establishing legal liability, improve the quantity and quality of information available to actors; or reduce transaction costs, such as costs of organisation or of making side-payments".[33] Krasner

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[29] Haggard, S and Simmons, B. Op Cit. p.495.
[30] Milner, H, "International regimes and world politics: Comments on the articles by Smouts, de Senarclens and Jonsson" in *International Regimes and World Politics,* UNESCO, USA: 1993, p.491.
[31] Ibid. p.494.
[32] Keohane, Op Cit. p.355.
[33] Ibid. p.338.

depicts international regimes as intervening variables, positioned between basic causal variables (such as power and interests) and outcomes and behaviour.[34] This depiction assumes then that international regimes do affect, albeit it in a small capacity, international actors' behaviour and potential outcomes. However, the degree of independent impact regimes play as well as how they develop is a contentious issue that is answered very differently depending on the theoretical approach taken.

Susan Strange represents the conventional structural theorists and subsequently the first approach to regime significance that will be elaborated and evaluated in this discussion. Strange questions the contribution regime studies make towards the better understanding of world politics or international political economy. Upon proclaiming international regimes ineffectual, she suggests that the concept of a regime may in fact have negative influences, "confusing instead of clarifying and…concealing bias instead of revealing and removing it".[35] Strange challenges the validity and usefulness of the concept of regimes on five counts or "dragons", firstly the study of regimes is a fad - preventing a long-term contribution to knowledge. Second, it is "imprecise and woolly".[36] Third, it is value-biased. Forth, the study of regimes distorts information by overemphasising the stagnant and downplaying the constantly changing nature of international relations. Finally, Strange believes that the concept of regimes is "narrow-minded, rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits vision of a wider reality".[37] The world is made up of rational, self-seeking actors whose primary aim is to improve their own position within the international power structure. Regimes are therefore merely a reflection of actors' interests, whether these are individuals, firms, groups, classes or states. In short Strange is concerned that the concept of a regime, which is not independent of actor control, is masking the real power play and control of the internationally influential and strong. Kenneth Waltz goes even further in his neo-realist assumptions of self interest and states that behaviour is a function of the distribution of power among states, "when power distributions change, behaviour will also change".[38]

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[34] Krasner, S. Op Cit. p.189

[35] Strange, S, "Cave! Hic dragons: a critique of regime analysis" in *International Organisation*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, p.479.

[36] Ibid. p.479.

[37] Ibid. p.479.

[38] Krasner, S. OpCit. p. 191.

The second and prevailing orientation to regimes is a modified structural approach, reflected in the writings of Keohane and Stein. Modified structuralists adopt many of the same assumptions as conventional structural realists, viewing states as self-interested sovereign entities who are concerned chiefly with self preservation and maximisation of power.[39] Regimes do not materialise from their own accord but are the result of voluntary agreements between actors, "in a world of sovereign states the basic function of regimes is to coordinate state behaviour to achieve desired outcomes in particular issue-areas".[40] Keohane is quick to note that regimes do not at present "establish binding and enforceable legal liabilities…[regimes] are much more important in providing established negotiating frameworks and in helping to coordinate actor expectations".[41] As previously alluded to, regimes become effective when more can be gained through cooperation and coordination opposed to individual action. Haas suggests that the role of regimes will grow as our world becomes increasingly complex an interdependent, in which "individualistic calculations of interest could not possibly provide the necessary levels of coordination".[42] Due to the significant increase in international actors as well as the advancements in technology, communications and trade Haas states that cooperation between states will not only be more common, but also more desirable. States recognise that the cost of self reliance is far higher, and often unsustainable, in comparison to solutions of cooperation, this should also lead to "greater reluctance to use force in the solution of economic disputes"[43]. It is also interesting to note that regimes cannot be relevant for zero-sum situations, in which action is carried out in a 'once off' fashion where rules, norms and procedures often do not apply. Modified structuralism therefore recognises the potential impact of regimes, but only under restrictive conditions.

The third approach to regimes moves beyond a realist interpretation of how the world works and identifies regimes as a pervasive phenomenon located within an increasingly complex and interdependent system. This Gotian approach identifies regimes in all

[39] Ibid. p.191.
[40] Ibid. p.191.
[41] Keohane, R. Op Cit. p338/9.
[42] Krasner, S, Op Cit. p. 191.
[43] Haas, E, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes" in *World Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 3, April 1980, p. 357.

aspects of international relations, therefore while the modified structural approach does not view the perfect market as a regime – because action is based on competitive self-interest – the Gotian approach will label the perfect market as a regime. Their reasoning will be based on the notion that a market is not sustained by competition alone, but embedded in a broader social environment that sustains and reproduces the conditions necessary for continued existence.[44] Young emphasises that patterned behaviour inevitably generates convergent expectations which in turn leads to conventionalised behaviour and later recognised and institutionalised norms. It seems then that instead of questioning the affect of norms, rules and procedures on behaviour, regime significance is evaluated according to one's basic assumption about the normal state of international affairs; structural realists view regimes as phenomena that need to be explain, Grotians view regimes as data that needs to be explained.[45]

For both modified structuralists and Grotian scholars (conventional structuralists' interest in regimes ends at this point) the next logical step in evaluating regime significance would be identifying the conditions that lead to regime creation, continued existence or disintegration. If scholars understand why regimes form they can offer better insight as to why regimes facilitate cooperation in some situations and not in others. The causal variables associated with regime existence are egotistical self-interest, political power, norms and principles, habit and custom and knowledge.[46]

Regime Existence

The most popular explanation for the existence of international regimes is the desire of individual states to maximise their self-interest. Modified structuralists such as Stein and Keohane explain the formation of regimes under conditions of common interests and common aversions.[47] In other words rational, self-seeking actors will only coordinate a regime if they realise that they can achieve more, or resolve a given issue by working together. In terms of a DDR regime, actors acting in self interest have produced both positive and negative effects on the international community. Keohane reasons that by improving the quality and quantity of information available to actors, or reducing their

[44] Krasner, S, Op Cit. p. 193.
[45] Ibid. p. 194.
[46] Ibid. p.195.
[47] Ibid. p.196.

other transaction costs it will be in their self interest to join. The benefits provided by regimes are likely to outweigh the costs of its formation or maintenance when there is asymmetric information, or it costs an actor more to not belong. [48] As previously indicated the DDR regime is currently seen by more powerful actors as the only regime able to ensure stability in the aftermath of conflict and the joining of which is a prerequisite for receiving aid. The problem appears when one of the actor's benefits of remaining within the regime is outweighed by the individual gain of leaving the regime. UNITA used admittance to the DDR regime to stall the peace process and secretly rearm. Future military gains such as winning the war and taking control of the state outweighed international financial aid and the peaceful resolution of hostilities. The success of DDR regimes lie in the participation of all parties that took place in the conflict. The incentive of financial aid is another motivation for actors to adhere to the norms, rules and principles of DDR regimes. Ultimately if this security regime is to be of beneficial value, it is not up to the UN to make it attractive to join but political will must motivate actors to seek out peace.

The works of Puchala and Young also identify the self-calculated action of actors in regime formation however; they stress the growing importance that regimes are playing in the increasingly interconnected international system. International regimes aim to reduce uncertainty and risk by "linking discrete issues to one another and by improving the quantity and quality of information available to participants".[49] By increasing open communication and information, actors should feel less insecure and vulnerable. Furthermore, the linking of issues deals with potential deception; while it may be easy for international actors to free ride or cheat in a 'one off' game, deception is far less profitable in a continuous game.[50] Kenneth Oye reinforces Keohane's argument highlighting the difference between a once-off decision where there is constant temptation of quick unilateral gain, as opposed to expectations of continued future interaction [51] Oye believes that regimes not only reinforce and institutionalise

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[48] Ibid. p.196.
[49] Keohane, R, Op Cit. p.346
[50] Ibid. p.346
[51] Oye, K, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies" in World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, October 1985, p.11/12

reciprocity, but significantly increase actors' ability to lengthen the 'shadow of the future'.[52]

The second major causal variable used to explain regime development is political power. Power can either be used to secure optimal outcomes for the system as a whole to promote joint maximisation (the common good) or power is used to promote the interests of certain actors within the system.[53] The former use of power to create international regimes is based on the notion of "the good of all from the selfishness of each".[54] International actors possess different and varying degrees of power, however they will cooperate – if cooperation yields greater benefits than going it alone. Regimes tend to enhance the national value of hegemons, which in turn have an interest in the maintenance of the system that gives them power.[55] However, there are also many examples of the creation and maintenance of regimes that preference powerful actors. Young puts forward the concept of an imposed regime, identifying the use of both sanctions and incentives by powerful actors to compel the weaker "to act in conformity with a particular set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures".[56]

An additional causal variable and defining characteristic of any regime are norms and principles. They do not only influence a regime but can also be seen as the explanation for why a regime was created in the first place, such as the principle of sovereignty which undoubtedly regulates the behaviour of states.[57] The last two causal variables affecting regime development, namely usage, custom and knowledge, cannot generate a regime on their own but reinforce the above-mentioned causal variables. Usage and custom refer to regular patterns of behaviour and long standing practises that can become 'infused with normative significance' and later assume legitimacy of their own.[58] Usage and customs often develop initially at a domestic level and then through continual adherence grow into international norms and principles. Andrew Cortell and

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[52] Ibid. p.12.
[53] Krasner, S, Op Cit. p.197.
[54] Ibid. p.197.
[55] Ibid. p.199.
[56] Young, O, "Regime Dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes" in *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, p.284.
[57] Krasner, S, Op Cit. p.202.
[58] Ibid. p.202.

James Davis focus their research on the effects regime formation and actions have on the domestic sphere of states. The norms states derive and embed on a domestic level can and do potentially influence international relations. While not all international rules and norms will resonate in domestic debates, scholars recognise that "domestic salience is crucial to many states' compliance with international norms".[59] Furthermore, the authors contend that the effects of international norms are conditioned by domestic structures - which condition access to policy making and privilege certain actors in policy debates.[60]

Regimes and International Cooperation

While it would be difficult to deny that regimes play a positive role in facilitating cooperation between international actors in general and states in particular, this issue of power and its asymmetrical distribution remains a hindrance to cooperation. Haas and Puchala raise the valid point that the world is becoming increasingly connected and interdependent, making increased interaction between actors inevitable. While regimes can facilitate better coordination between actors and reduce transaction cost, states will still be concerned with the expected behaviour of member states as well as questioning whether this regime is affording preferences to the more powerful. A serious shortcoming of current regime literature is the insufficient attention given to the measurement of norm legitimacy on a domestic level, more focused research should lead to "a better understanding of the domestic bases of support for international institutions".[61] In order to contribute to the expansion of regime theory in the future, scholars will have to look to interdependence literature and the diminishing boundaries separating international and domestic politics, "growing interdependence means that groups at a domestic level increasingly have regime interests".[62]

While this discussion has illustrated that international actors can and do benefit from the creation and continued existence of international regimes, it would be a mistake to assume that regimes eradicate uncertainly altogether. International regimes are created

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[59] Cortell, A and Davis, J, "Understanding the Domestic Impact of the International Norms: A Research Agenda" in *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 2000, p.67.
[60] Ibid. p.66.
[61] Ibid. p.87.
[62] Haggard, S and Simmons, B, Op Cit. p.515/7.

to diminish both the effects and feelings of uncertainty experienced by single states in a continually changing international environment. However in joining a particular regime, actors remain uncertain as to whether other members will always adhere to their stipulated commitments. Herein lies the continual problem of power play and unequal structures, which forms an integral part of the international system. A ceasefire and the disarmament and demobilisation of warring factions is a requirement of DDR regimes. All parties to the conflict expect the other to adhere to this regime framework. Should all parties agree - a state of post-conflict peace will be achieved, however there is always the possibility that one party might 'cheat', or worse leave the regime completely as UNITA demonstrated on two separate occasions. Cooperation is not always fair or mutually beneficial; one international actor may very well come out of an agreement better off. The signing of the Lusaka protocol resulted due to the threat of further sanctions being levelled against UNITA should they not enter into the DDR regime. UNITA joined the regime at a power disadvantage which later translated into less political bargaining power than their opposition. In the absence of an overarching world institution to regulate and enforce equality, it is impossible to eliminate power play from any aspect of international actor and state interaction.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

Angola is the case study for this paper and therefore all references and examples will be drawn from this particular country's conflict history, one should remember however that because every state and its individual capacities differ, "the crafting and implementation of DDR should be informed by a context specific strategic evaluation of its feasibility".[63] Throughout this paper, a child soldier will be defined as male or female persons under the age of 18 years who has been recruited for combat or associated activities. References to state actions throughout the paper will indicate the decisions and strategies adopted by the country's incumbent government and its official bodies. In the case of Angola this will usually refer to the FAA, however any change in government make-up will be clearly noted. For the purpose of clarity, if not specifically identified - all IOs, NGOs and CSO on both a national and international level are classified as non-

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[63] Dzinesa, G, Op Cit. p. 74.

state actors. In certain sections of analysis the state will be the primary or only actor and all the above mentioned entities will fall under the role of non-state actors. The specific roles of CSOs within the DDR will be discussed at greater length in a later chapter. In addition IOs such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) will be highlighted at a later point in this paper as these IOs are not easily classified as a state or non-state entity. The UN's advisory and implementation bodies are concerned with the activities of states, yet much of the UN's studies and recommendations are also produced by its global civil society network and NGO affiliates.

What is DDR?

DDR processes are often described as a 'final' stage of the wider strategy of peace building, setting the political stage for reform and the new beginning many post-conflict countries are looking for.[64] This paper hopes to show that DDR processes should in fact be viewed by participants as only the beginning of a long-term goal that demands careful monitoring and decisive planning. As previously stated, DDR is the acronym for the three phase post-conflict containment and development plan consisting of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

Disarmament is defined by the UN as "the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone".[65] Disarmament usually occurs in assembly areas or specified cantonment/quartering sites, weapons are either confiscated or voluntarily handed over by former combatants and stored for the new national army or destroyed. In order to effectively disarm combatants and prevent rearmament a number of best practises should be observed: the timing of weapons collections and disposal as well as the location of cantonment sites is of great importance, development of a regional approach to disarmament, efficient management of weapons collection and/or disposal, implementation of a weapons 'buy-back' programme to ensure complete disarmament as "reducing arms levels is a prerequisite for attaining peace and stability in fragile states".[66]

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[64] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, 2008, Op Cit. p. 3.
[65] Hitchcock, N, "Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration: The Case of Angola" in *Conflict Trends*, Issue 1, 2004, p.37.
[66] Edloe, L, "Best Practises for Successful Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)" in *New Voices in Public Policy*, Vol. 1, Spring 2007p.3.

Demobilisation is the "formal disbanding of military formations and, at an individual level, is the process of releasing combatants from a mobilised state".[67] Demobilisation must occur as swiftly as possible in order to prevent regrouping or unrest; peacekeepers should educate former combatants about the merits of peace and the financial assistance available to those who register, peacekeepers/officials should also organise orientation programmes to aid former combatants in their transition back to civilian life.[68] While all aspects of DDR programmes are important and crucial to the effective maintenance of peace, the reintegration of former combatants in general, and child soldiers in particular, is of immense concern. The disarmament and demobilisation phases are usually completed fairly quickly and are easier to plan for and implement, however reintegration is the most time-consuming, complex and costly phase.

Reintegration refers to ex-combatants' and their families' return to civilian life and the potential social and economic opportunities that will help them reintegrate into civil society.[69] This 'concluding' step in the above-mentioned three part process has been more effectively described as "open-ended" and is also the step which requires the most collaboration between state and non-state actors in order to ensure long term success.[70] It is imperative that the overseers of the reintegration phase develop programmes "that extend beyond the short-term objectives of disarmament and demobilisation and embrace long-term goals of peace and stability".[71] Reintegration programmes must also aim to reintegrate former combatant at a social and economic level which will be of benefit to the country's economy. And finally, but most importantly, the needs of vulnerable groups such as women, children and the disabled must be acknowledged and met.

Child Soldiers

Traditionally, peace processes have paid little attention to the demobilisation of child soldiers and allowed their reintegration to fall under standard DDR measures. The British based organisation *Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers* 2008 report

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[67] Hitchcock, N, Op Cit, p.37.
[68] Edloe, L, Op Cit, p.4.
[69] Dzinesa, Op Cit. p.75.
[70] Kingma, K, "Demobilisation, Reintegration and Peace Building in Southern Africa" in Batchelor, P and Kingma, K (eds) Demilitarisation *and peace-building in Southern Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, 182.
[71] Edloe, L, Op Cit, p.4.

acknowledges the work that governments are doing to stop the practise of child soldiering, however go on to state that "they are not doing enough to support children transitioning back to normal lives".[72] The UN and other specialised agencies have highlighted the need to treat child soldiers as a special interest group when states are drawing up DDR programmes. On average 10.8% of total combatants (this percentage is higher in Sudan and Uganda) in recorded armed conflicts are children.[73] Compounding the problem of reintegration is the protracted length of many civil wars which see children recruited as minors and then demobilised as adults with very little if any 'conventional' family socialisation.[74] It is a known fact that child soldiers' involvement and constant exposure to extreme violence "may desensitise them and make them more likely to commit violent acts and separate themselves from society".[75]

Actor Participation in DDR

Post-conflict DDR programmes are led by either an overseeing international organisation (IOs) such as a UN peace delegation or alternatively the process is owned and operated locally.[76] In the case of Angola's post-conflict programmes, both the UN in 1992 and the Angolan government itself in 1994 failed on separate occasions to control or effectively implement DDR objectives. Irrespective of which parties lead DDR processes, post-conflict states often do not have the financial resources necessary to fund the entire process and will have to rely on other international actors for assistance-either through direct aid or the securing of loans. The successful implementation of DDR programmes requires communication amongst UN members and agencies, international donor(s), host government, local and international CSOs and the humanitarian NGO community in order to devise an "integrated technical mission" that effectively pools resources.[77] The UN has adopted the lead role in most single-country DDR programs in Africa however various IOs, NGOs and TCS groups are also noticeable contributors. UNICEF and Save The Children (STC) focuses specifically on child DDR and is aided by the World Food Program (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), ActionAid,

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[72] Wagner, C, "Stopping the Use of Child Soldiers" in *The Futurist*, March-April 2009, p.9.
[73] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, 2008, Op Cit. p.23.
[74] Ibid. p.23.
[75] Wagner, C, Op Cit. p. 9.
[76] Dzinesa, G, Op Cit. p. 73.
[77] Edloe, L, Op Cit, p.8.

and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).[78]The MDRP, which is administered by the World Bank in conjunction with forty other Western and African governments, NGOs, and regional organisations, coordinates and oversees the largest number of African DDR programs.[79]

This multitude of agencies can often create confusion and management conflicts leading administrators to call for a transfer of work form "international groups to national commissions that coordinate the efforts of all international partners".[80] This increased emphasis on national commissions means that international agencies are actively working to transfer skills and involve local communities in the DDR process.[81] While this may very well present itself as a viable alternative to unwanted international influence, national commissions can also be inefficient as can be seen in the two failed attempts at DDR implementation in Angola. The first DDR attempt was conducted under the administration of the UN, once this failed national authorities attempted a home-grown DDR approach two years later. Even with numerous international monitoring agencies present, the DDR attempts failed because political commitment is required from all parties involved.[82] Former UNITA soldiers were offered no protection from the state and limited economic support from the then inexperienced international donor system contributed to a resurgence in hostilities which claimed the lives of 3 percent of the Angolan population.[83]

Powerful states can also play a role in addressing this problem. As an example the United States is pressing harder on countries to protect their children, threatening to withdraw military assistance and training from governments involved in the use of child soldiers.[84] There have also been calls for stricter aid conditionality agreements between donors and receiving states. International donors, whether state or non-state initiatives, are encouraged to work through grassroots organisations which can redistribute aid

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[78] Hanson, S, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa", Backgrounder, 5 December 2008, (Accessed at: http://cfr.org/publication/12650/).
[79] Ibid.
[80] Hanson, S, Op Cit.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Dzinesa, G, Op Cit. p.73.
[83] Kingma, K. Op Cit. p.189.
[84] Ibid. p.9.

effectively. The most prominent child rights movement attempting to address the issues surrounding child soldiers is *The Coalition To Stop The Use Of Child Soldiers*. This international non-state coalition comprises of many member organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Defence for Children International and others.[85] These national coalitions are made up of local and national NGOs containing a depth and web of resources and contacts that are not always possessed by state entities. Financially, the international community must make a long-term commitment to post-conflict economic reconstruction and development to rebuild the economies of war-torn states. Adequate funding for reintegration programs is therefore vital and must be planned for.[86]

Regional strategy meetings condemning the use of child soldiers not only draws attention to the problem but identifies potential security threats that neighbouring states face in terms of refugees and weapons proliferation. As previously alluded to, the problem of child soldiers has wide reaching consequences that are not restricted to state boundaries

The Importance of the Reintegration Process
The most effectively recorded reintegration programmes have followed a two-pronged approach, combining "short-term objectives of emergency assistance with long-term objectives of development".[87] A common complaint regarding reintegration programmes centres around the belief that they should last longer. As previously alluded to, reintegration is the least developed phase of current DDR programmes. While both state and non-state entities attempt to fight the stigmatism of ex-combatants, the high unemployment rates of many post-conflict states mean that even newly trained individuals will struggle to find work. Additional problems of social reintegration, as seen in Angola, included a lack of government involvement in the process despite the existence of abundant financing, governmental inability to carry out projects, lack of

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[85] The Coalition To Stop The Use Of Child Soldiers, http://www.child-soldiers.org/coalition/the-coalition, (accessed on 8 June 2009).
[86] Ozoukou, D, "DDR & War Termination Stratergies", *Continental News*, May 2009, p.1.
[87] Edloe, L, Op Cit. p.19.

financing for educational projects despite ex-combatants opting for professional training and educational programmes.[88]

Community participation in the DDR process and the participation of ex-combatants in reintegration activities centred on community may also play a key role in post-conflict transition.[89] Presently, reintegration programmes are aimed at either exclusively benefiting ex-combatants or communities. A balance must be struck between the support given to soldiers and community members to prevent creating discontent or animosity between the two groups. Hopefully with the creation of a midway point, future programmes will aid communities in identifying their needs as well as the planning and distribution of funds while simultaneously preventing the marginalisation or alienation of former combatants (a problem experienced with a more general focus on reintegration). This said reintegration success is largely dependent on the ability of a post-conflict state to secure aid and financial assistance. Most DDR programmes are planned without knowing precisely how many people need to benefit from it, as well as to what extent the international community is prepared to contribute resources. The 2008 DDR Analysis Report estimates the cost per demobilised person at $1434.[90] Resources usually come from the international community by means of the following six generic systems: rapid-reply funds, the budget of United Nations Peacekeeping, voluntary contributions by donors, other contributions, programmes and funds of United Nations agencies, and World Bank funds.[91] To date, private enterprise has played a secondary role in DDR, however "faced with scarce resources for reintegration because of fund diversions to prior DDR phases or because of poor planning, the private sector may be an interesting alternative for job creation".[92]

While it is evident that DDR programmes meet Krasner's definition of a regime, this also means that these programmes are open to the same scrutiny and possess many of the same faults as other regimes. There still remains a need understand and contemplate the DDR process in a more holistic manner with two specific issue areas highlighted for

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[88] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, 2008, Op Cit. p.30.
[89] Ibid. p.28.
[90] Ibid. p.23.
[91] Ibid. p.24.
[92] Ibid. p.30.

change. Firstly, the process of DDR must be viewed as "a continuation of the political dialogue and not purely as a programmatic undertaking".[93] Secondly, it is important that the concept of demobilisation be expanded to include "the transformation of the organisation in question, as well as the requirements of individuals".[94] In other words, the members of an armed insurgent organisation such as UNITA will need specialised assistance if they are to hold a future role in a peaceful society. Naturally the needs of special or vulnerable groups such as child soldiers are even greater as they arguably play a more extensive and potentially lengthy role in the rebuilding and development of post-conflict society

Chapter Three - Historical overview of DDR in Angola

The people of Angola have been subjected to numerous types and durations of conflict. The country has sustained a war for independence, become a proxy station for conflict during the Cold War as well as entered into a civil war – which was only resolved in 2002. This protracted era of constant insecurity and conflict represents a twenty-seven year period during which many citizens know no other way of life.

Angola's war for independence from Portuguese colonialists began in 1961. Three rebel groups namely; The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), led the fight for national independence. However these liberation groups would soon turn on each other once an independence agreement

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[93] Knight, M, "Expanding the DDR Model: Politics and Organisations" in *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2008, p.1.
[94] Ibid. p.1.

with Portugal was reached in 1975.[95] The international polarity of communism versus capitalism greatly affected the newly independent country's political landscape. Cold War rhetoric and the promise of military support led these groups to adopt conflicting ideologies, further fuelling existing party factions. The MPLA was largely supported by the urban elite and adopted a Marxist ideology, a decision which translated into substantial military aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba.[96] While FNLA had historical ties to Zaire and the United States, the staunch anti-Marxist agenda of UNITA members soon overshadowed FNLA, and UNITA gained its military resources from the United States and South Africa.[97]

Bicesse Accord 1991-1992

By the late 1980's the declining power of the Soviet Union was becoming more evident. The Soviet Union was struggling to contain and prevent its impending economic collapse as well as secession attempts by union states, thus leaving little in state coffers for proxy war spending. The inability of the Soviet Union to continue financing the MPLA, coupled with the South African Defence Force's (SADF) defeat at Cuito Cuanavale signalled what would become the end of external support in Angola. As part of the resolution of the Namibian conflict, that affected the south of Angola, the estimated 50 000 Cuban troops deployed to Angola would begin to withdraw in 1988.[98] In light of a changing political landscape and the international push for peace, MPLA softened its ideological outlook. The Bicesse Peace Accord, signed by the MPLA and UNITA in May 1991, would bring a short period of conflict-relief in Angola.[99] The Lusaka agreement in 1994 would be structured very similarly to the Bicesse peace agreement, which called for the demobilisation of both MPLA and UNITA troops and their swift reintegration into the unified FAA. The demobilisation process was 'self managed' by the Angolan military and subsequently left the UNAVEM II with a very

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[95] Verhey, B, "The Prevention, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: Angola Case Study", *World Bank Working Paper*, 2001a,
        (Accessed at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/882274-1111741856717/20626585/angola+case+-+july+2001+final.pdf.)
[96] Ibid, p.8.
[97] Ibid, p.8.
[98] MacQueen, N, "Peacekeeping by Attrition: The United Nations in Angola" in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.36, No.3, 1998, p. 400.
[99] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.9.

limited mandate of monitoring and verification.[100] The demobilisation process as well as formation of the new FAA was proving to be a far lengthier process than was anticipated - resulting in a rushed FAA creation just days before the September 1992 elections in order to meet the pre-election requirements.[101] Despite stipulations in the Bicesse peace accord, both the government and UNITA were actively recruiting new combatants throughout the two year lull in open hostilities. Violence again erupted in September 1992 when UNITA refused to accept electoral defeat. The number of refugees and internally displaced people soared to 1.2 million, accompanied by an inflation rate of 1, 838 percent by 1993.[102] UN agencies estimate that war-related deaths rose to "as high as 1000 people per day", making the period from 1993-1994 the most savage in Angola's civil war history as well as leading UNICEF to report "Angola to be the worst place in the world to be a child".[103] UNAVEM II was a hard lesson for international peacekeepers to learn, not only should elections not be held before demobilisation had effectively taken place and successful monitoring and peacekeeping missions would not come cheap.

UN records indicate that a disproportionate number of MPLA troops were demobilised and in turn received financial payments. While the Ministry of Defence had undertaken socio - economic profiling for the reintegration of former MPLA soldiers, the same data was not collected for UNITA soldiers-increasing already strained relations.[104] The Ministry's profiling proved to be helpful in estimating the number of child soldiers recruited; the report indicated that of 77 104 soldiers surveyed, 1 656 (2 percent) were under eighteen years.[105] To make matters worse, the Bicesse demilitarisation and demobilisation programmes did not correlate with reintegration needs. Allegations of fraud and mismanagement led to protests and political unrest. In the midst of this social turmoil special needs groups, such as child soldiers, remained unrecognised and unheard.

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[100] A series of United Nations Angola Verification Missions had been established. UNAVEM II verified the Bicesse peace accord and remained in Angola from 1991-1995; this period included the 1992 election unrest and the return to civil war.
[101] The newly formed FAA comprised of 8 000 soldiers opposed to the scheduled 50 000.
[102] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.9.
[103] Ibid, p.9.
[104] Ibid. p.11.
[105] Ibid. p.11.

Lusaka Peace Process 1994-1998

Significant military gains by the Angolan government, coupled with growing international pressure led to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on the 20 November 1994. In contrast to the Bicesse Accord, the UN maintained a central role in the negotiations leading up to Lusaka. The UN Security Council had already imposed sanctions against UNITA and Savimbi was faced with further sanctions should he refuse to comply with proposed measures for peace.[106] This peace agreement called for the demobilisation of both UNITA and government combatants. Due to failed demobilisation attempts during the Bicesse peace process, the Angolan government made their demobilisation contingent on the proven progress of UNITA demobilisation.[107] The 1995 - 1997 demobilisation programme in Angola was "one of the most excessive in the history of the United Nations".[108] A selection of UNITA and former government soldiers would now form the new national, unified armed forces and a number of UNITA officials were scheduled to become representatives in the new Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN). While this peace agreement, as so many others, was well drafted; the implementation of both disarmament and demobilisation was not carried out correctly or remotely along the lines of the stipulated document. Contrary to the order to scale down military operations, both UNITA and government troops began stockpiling weapons and re-recruiting soldiers. A trick used to give the appearance of cooperation, particularly successfully carried out by UNITA troops, was to drop off newly recruited and inexperienced children at quartering areas – the inflated numbers gave the appearance of compliance. The GURN was eventually established in April 1997, however the constant obstructions, delays and violations by both UNITA and government troops throughout the Lusaka peace process escalated in renewed conflict in December 1998.

The DDR of child soldiers following the Lusaka peace agreement was a gruelling and lengthy process, which required thorough advocacy efforts aimed at high-ranking UN officials, the Angolan government and UNITA commanders. Getting child soldiers

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[106] MacQueen, N, Op Cit. p. 405.
[107] Ibid. p. 406.
[108] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.5.

specifically included in DDR plans was the first step to recognising this group as a separate group with separate needs to a generally defined combatant. In February 1995, the JC (Joint Commission) - the legal body concerned with the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol - ruled that children would be viewed as a 'vulnerable group', and given priority during disarmament and demobilisation.[109] Vulnerable groups were defined as "war-wounded and disabled, children in the armed forces, widows, orphans and single mothers".[110] The special recognition of the role that children play in conflict situations was largely due to lobbing efforts made by the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) and UNICEF. While the recognition of child soldiers as a vulnerable group came fairly easily, children were kept waiting for another eighteen months as the disarmament and demobilisation phases were discussed. The UN agencies with specific mandates remained active in pursuing the needs of child soldiers throughout the waiting period - UCAH is concerned with humanitarian advocacy and UNICEF with child advocacy. Unfortunately, the advocacy efforts and programme planning was tainted by tensions between the two organisations vying for control instead of working together.[111] During the Lusaka negotiations it was decided that child soldiers would be demobilised from the regular quartering areas opposed to special centres. Additionally, family reunification would be stressed above being housed in a special centre or training facility.

It is important to note that FAA and UNITA demobilisation, including child soldiers, took place separately. Prior to demobilisation, the Angolan Ministry of Social Welfare (MINARS) was already conducting broad family tracing for all Angolan combatants. STC decided to collaborate with MINARS to address their mandate of family reunification. While the CSO added resources and skills to the partnership with MINARS the governmental institution remained sluggish and understaffed.[112] At this point the CCF identified the church as a community based network that may be able to bring together the resources of international CSO and the needs of the child soldiers and their communities.[113] Following the church hierarchy, provincial bishops supervised various *padres* who in turn were able to "ensure far-reaching work through a system of

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[109] Ibid. p.12.
[110] Ibid. p.12.
[111] Ibid. p.17.
[112] Ibid, p.28.

volunteer social workers or *catequistas*.[114] The catequistas network aided CSO not only in the tracing of family members, but also proved to be an excellent support structures for former child soldiers who were attempting to reintegrate into families and communities. In September 1996 the first group of 119 child soldiers, out of the 2 612 registered, were demobilised from UNITA quartering areas, the youngest child soldier was registered at nine years old.[115] By the end of 1997, 4 915 of the 8 613 underage soldiers UNITA had registered were demobilised and reunited with their families or relatives.[116] Because UNITA commanders were stationed in the same quartering sites as the underage soldiers, they were able to manipulate and frighten many underage soldiers into giving false destination details and lie about their ages.

After much stalling, the FAA finally demobilised a small group of underage soldiers in January 1997.[117] When representatives of UCAH, MINARS and STC arrived at the designated FAA quartering area, they discovered that the site had barely been prepared and many of the underage soldiers were chronically ill.[118] The children were relocated and treated while the CSOs began family tracing and providing basic education seminars. In July 1997, the FAA declared that all underage child soldiers had been demobilised, however it is believed that the demobilisation of 360 child soldiers was merely a token gesture and that many underage youths were still serving within the FAA.[119] The youngest FAA child soldier registered was eleven years old and there were no girls amongst the group.[120] Once war returned to Angola in 1998 children were again recruited by both FAA and UNITA troops.

Memorandum of Understanding/Luanda peace process 2002
The death of UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002 and the movements impending military defeat played a large part in explaining not only the end of Angola's war but the speed at which the military groups agreed on a ceasefire and began

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[113] Initially the Catholic Church took the lead in providing resources and support for family reunification efforts however later other denominations also became involved in the project.
[114] Ibid. p.30.
[115] Ibid. p.24.
[116] Ibid. p.24.
[117] Ibid. p.36.
[118] Ibid. p.36.
[119] Ibid. p.36.
[120] Ibid. p.36.

implementing DDR.[121] The signing of the 'Memorandum of Understanding for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol' (MoU) by military leaders from UNITA and the FAA on the 4 April 2002 put an end to the twenty-seven year long civil war. The MoU could be mistaken for a new peace agreement but it is in fact a continuation of the Lusaka Protocol.[122] The national ownership of the MoU process sets it apart from previous DDR attempts and also seriously reduced the role of the international community in the peace process. There was no provision for formal third party monitoring, although the Troika (Portugal, Russia and United States) and the UN were invited as observers.[123] Two institutional structures were created to manage and coordinate the stipulations of the MoU. The Joint Military Commission (JMC) was compiled of chiefs of staff of the two belligerents, observers from the UN and presided over by a military representative of the government (synonymous with FAA leader). The JMC was responsible for promoting and overseeing the application of the MoU.[124] In addition a Technical Group (TG) was also created with the responsibility of assisting the JMC in performing its duties, including the detailing of timetables and guaranteeing the application of the provisions if the MoU.[125]

The signing of the MoU brought formal peace to Angola; however social peace would prove to be a more elusive goal. The quartering, disarmament and demobilisation of UNITA troops began immediately after the signing of the MoU. The entire process was scheduled to take eighty days till completion. However, no one anticipated the number of soldiers and their family members that would report to the quartering areas. Provision was made for 50 000 UNITA troops. However on 27 July, a total of 85 585 UNITA soldiers were quartered in 35 cantonment sites and approximately 280 261 family members were gathered in family reception areas in 16 Angolan provinces.[126] The government and CSOs were unprepared for this major spike in the number of UNITA soldiers and family members, incidentally the number of family members rose to 350

[121] Lari, A, Op Cit. p.1.
[122] The MoU replaced annexes 3 and 4 of the Lusaka Protocol, updated military components governing the DDR of UNITA troops and stipulated new plans for the integration of the national armed forces.
[123] Gomes, J and Parsons, I, Op Cit. p.37.
[124] Ibid. p.38.
[125] Ibid, p.38.
[126] Ibid. p.39.

000 by 2003, which caused serious logistical problems. Concerns of an increase in criminal behaviour or the return of persons to their villages without being demobilised led the government to create a further eight quartering areas. In total 138 000 persons required demobilisation-of these, 105 000 were UNITA combatants and 33 000 members of the armed forces.[127] Prior to the MoU around 10 000 minors were recruited by armed forces, this figure accounts for 10 percent of military personnel.[128] Although UNITA soldiers would continue reporting to quartering areas well into August that year, a spokesman for the JMC announced on 21 June 2002 "that the tack of assembling and disarming Angola's formal rebels had been completed at a cost of $44 million entirely financed, by the government of Angola".[129] Large numbers of soldiers and family members arriving at quartering sites were presenting with symptoms of malnutrition and disease. These figures escalated as the number of people poured into quartering sites. Mortality and malnutrition rates were extremely high and in certain areas there was a famine situation.[130] Both the JMC and CSO's on the ground recognised the impending humanitarian crisis and doubled efforts to provide food and medicines. The UN and other CSOs were accused of not reacting fast enough and irresponsibly allowing the situation to get out of hand. In truth however, the UN as well as all TSC organisations had to secure government permission to enter quartering areas. The untimely reaction to this problem of malnutrition and disease can be partly attributed to the "government's reluctance to significantly involve the UN in the process after the experience of Lusaka", as well as the sheer remoteness and inaccessibility of a large number of the quartering areas.[131] The responsibility of assistance to former combatants rested solely with the FAA, however family members could be supported by CSOs. The World Food Programme took the lead in providing food aid, while other local and international CSOs such as UNICEF, CCF, STC, ICRC, the Catholic Church and others distributed non-food items, seeds and tools, family tracing and reunification.

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[127] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, "Angola: Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, 2002-2007". Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, p.3.
[128] Ibid. p.3.
[129] Gomes, J and Parsons, I, Op Cit. p.42.
[130] Lari, A, Op Cit. p. 4.
[131] Gomes, J and Parsons, I, Op Cit. p.42.

Despite the steady flow of former UNITA soldiers still arriving at quartering sites, the JMC announced on the 2 August 2002 that disarmament and demobilisation phases were complete and UNITA forces ceased to exist as they had now been administratively absorbed into the FAA while awaiting reintegration. Eye-witnesses reported that demobilisation was also far from complete and in reality many quartering sites were not logistically coping with the collection and verification of soldiers' personal information or the registration of weapons.[132] Outside observers where satisfied with the initial collection of about 30 000 small arms, however it was noted that there would be a need to review rations and the quality of weapons collected. Another major concern of disarmament is the number of weapons that were still circulating amongst the civilian population.[133] According to a 2003 interview in Luanda, close to 90 percent of UNITA's weapons had been collected during DDR, the remaining 10 percent "are thought to be in the hands of civilians and small groups".[134] DDR processes attempted to eradicate the proliferation of weapons. However this problem is synonymous with all post conflict countries and not only Angola. Angola's reintegration phase began in March 2004 and has still not concluded. The government has indicated that it wishes to continue financing reintegration projects when the World Bank funds are discontinued.[135] As part of the Angolan reintegration programme, former combatants received a lump sum of five months salary from the Angolan Armed Forces (AAF). It is estimated that by 2003, 80 percent of former combatants had received demobilisation documents and been paid their reintegration benefits.[136] It is presently estimated that the total cost of the DDR process in Angola has reached $261 million; $157 million of this was provided by the government of Angola - which single handedly financed its disarmament and demobilisation phases - $48.4 million by the MDRP, $38.2 million by the World Bank and $15.7 million by the European Commission.[137] Despite this seemingly vast amount of money, there have been complaints that the vocational training provided by the government was not helpful in transferring the necessary skills for job procurement. The allocation and delivery of resettlement kits, containing agricultural tools and seeds, is

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[132] Ibid. p.43.
[133] Lari, A, Op Cit, p.8.
[134] Gomes, J and Parsons, I, Op Cit. p.46.
[135] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, "Angola: Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, 2002-2007", p.5.
[136] Gomes, J and Parsons, I, Op Cit. p.48.
[137] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, "Angola: Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, 2002-2007", p.5.

slow and further hampered by the rainy season and inaccessible areas.[138] The relocation of former combatants and their families have taken too long and once temporary settlements have now become permanent. Currently, the UNDP estimates that economic support and vocational training programmes have reached 85 percent of initially identified target groups in Angola.[139] The 145 projects currently operational reach 68 263 beneficiaries; 9 percent of this total benefits women with a further 5.3 percent being received by disabled persons and 9.5 percent to former child soldiers.[140]

History and Pattern of Child Recruitment

Prior to analysing the issues associated with the reintegration of child soldiers, it is necessary to contextualise the problem itself. It is a fact that all groups involved in Angolan conflict, whether this be the struggle for independence or civil war, recruited women and children.[141]

A combination of factors contribute to the easy recruitment of children as combatants or conflict associates; poverty, displacement, family separation, proximity to active conflict, poorly documented age certificates and most importantly the blatant breaking of international legislation.[142] All of the above mentioned factors contributed to the recruitment of Angolan child soldiers, yet the patterns of recruitment by UNITA and the government differed in significant ways. FAA recruitment was characterised by the enforcement of military service. [143] Angolan law requires two years of military service from the age of twenty years with compulsory registration at eighteen years. Many Angolan youths attempted to resist military service which translated to very low voluntary registration figures. In a bid to increase numbers and enforce military service, FAA troops engaged in 'recruitment round-ups' at market places and school grounds. Persons were taken irrespective of whether they were underage or legally exempt from duty. This pattern of recruitment is still prevalent today.[144]

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[138] Hitchcock, N, Op Cit. p.40.
[139] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, p.8.
[140] Ibid. p.8.
[141] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.10.
[142] Ibid. p.10.
[143] The 1991 Bicesse peace accord stipulated that selected MPLA and UNITA troops were to be merged together into a united Armed Forces of Angola. Because the MPLA won the 1992 elections, the terms 'government' and 'FAA' can both be used to refer to Angolan government forces (comprising chiefly of MPLA soldiers).
[144] Honwana, A., "Negotiating Postwar Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola" in Bond, G and Gibson, N (ed) *Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories,* Colorado: Westview Press, 2002, p.2.

UNITA recruitment usually involved abduction. UNITA soldiers either took recruits by force or obtained them through their 'tax system', which involved the handing over of persons (primarily young children) by traditional leaders to UNITA in exchange for protection or simply to remain living on occupied UNITA land. Women and children were usually put to work in food stations, as well as given to disabled soldiers as 'helpers'. [145] Boys were either ordered to frontline fighting immediately or detained to be psychologically and physically abused in order to instil fear and obedience.[146] In order to ideologically separate children from their family and identity, children were taught that UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, was their 'father' and protector and they could only rely on him. Another noted difference between UNITA and FAA recruitment is that more women and children were found present in UNITA camps in comparison to FAA sites - this difference would present further complications when planning reintegration.

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[145] Verhey, B, 2001a, <u>Op Cit</u>. p.10.
[146] <u>Ibid</u>. p.10.

Chapter Four - International Organisations and Civil Society

Although Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) do not have the legal, political or military power of state, they do possess the power to persuade. The strength of civil society lies in their capacity to support changes in the way people respond to conflict as well as drawing attention to the underlying causes of conflict. Additionally TCSs are able to generate and distribute large amounts of information and raise awareness of both the costs of continued conflict and the benefits of political engagement. Negotiations and policy deliberations under all three of Angola's peace processes were lengthy and it was vital for advocacy efforts by CSOs and IOs to remain active and encouraged. UCAH used its position on the JC to continually advocate the plight of 'vulnerable groups' and UNICEF coordinated meetings with partners; SCF, CCF and Medicos International (MI), to discuss programme budgets.[147] International and local civil society movements recognised the importance of ongoing engagement, with all parties to the Angolan conflict, in order to keep the concerns and needs of former child soldiers at the forefront of political discussion.

While states do to a large extent still hold the monopoly on violence, they are not always in a position to protect their citizens, especially in a post-conflict setting. The growing complexity and interconnectedness of conflict means that no single entity on its own can ensure peace, "a comprehensive network of relationships and actions is needed".[148] Despite the international research and work done by CSOs to date, its role in the promotion of peace and security remains contested by some who see CSOs as either irrelevant or a threat to the sovereignty of states. This chapter will argue that civil society can play a pivotal role in changing the root causes of conflict as well as aiding in the facilitation of peace processes and the overall transformation of war-torn societies. It is important to note that civil society cannot replace the state.It would be very difficult for civil society to operate amidst lawlessness and therefore as most other organisations-function optimally in a secure and peaceful state. In order to address the structural causes of conflict, cooperation must take place between civil society actors at the local,

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[147] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.13.
[148] Barnes, C, Op Cit. p.15.

regional and global level and with governments, international organisations and in some cases businesses.[149] The importance of the constant collaboration of the above mentioned entities in their international and domestic capacities will be emphasised throughout this chapter. It is because of international collaboration that conflicts are resolved and post-conflict states can develop. While IOs are not always able to fit under narrow definitions of CSOs, they share many of the same characteristics as well as strengths and weaknesses. While the focus of this paper is to highlight the roles that CSOs play in the DDR of child soldiers, it would be impossible to simply leave out international organisations such as the UN and its many affiliates. Due to the fine line between the composition and functions of CSO, NGOs and IOs; a broader definition of civil society has been adopted with the notion that TCS is composed of many collaborating actors, with many overlapping functions, interests and objectives.

Nature of Conflict

Conflict is understood to occur when two or more 'parties' have, or believe they have, incompatible goals and this perception of incompatibility shapes their attitudes and actions towards one another.[150] Conflict is seen as negative but is should be noted that conflict typically emerges from real issues and differing interests. These underlying problems must be addressed before conflict will be effectively resolved. The nature of conflict has changed. The majority or armed conflicts today are intrastate, characterised by multiple armed groups and multiple grievances, and although civilians have always been casualties of war, "non-combatant civilians are increasingly the primary targets of war".[151] As has been shown in the case of Angola, the civilian population has been victim to armed attacks, forced removals, forced recruitment into both the government and UNITA camps, forced labour and heightened insecurity as neither government nor peacekeeping forces could offer protection from hostilities. This changing nature of conflict compels action, as ordinary people become directly affected by armed conflict "they develop a central interest in contributing to its resolution".[152]

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[149] While the business sector does play and should arguably play an even larger role in post-conflict development, this paper's focus is the role of civil society and therefore this sector is excluded from further analysis.
[150]. Watson, A, "Can there be 'Kindered' Peace?", *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 22, Issue 1, Spring 2008, 36.
[151] Ibid. p.16.
[152] Ibid. p.7.

Theoretical Approaches to IOs and CSOs

Prior to attempting assessment of the work done by international organisations (IO's), non-governmental organisations (NGO's) and transnational or global civil society, a brief definition of these international bodies will be given as well as locating them within their individual and global conceptual frameworks. Expectations of an organisation depend to a large extent on the theoretical lens one applies throughout the process of evaluation. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore identify two board theories concerned with the study of organisations; one is an economic approach that is rooted in "assumptions of rationality and efficiency concerns", the other is sociological in nature and focuses on "issues of legitimacy and power".[153] Naturally, these two different schools of thought focus attention on different kinds of questions regarding organisations and therefore provide insights on different problems. The economic approach influences neoliberal and neorealist debates which are concerned chiefly with the question of why IOs or CSOs are created in the first place. Informed largely by the works of Kenneth Walz, neoliberals and neorealists understand the international system to be "analogous to a market filled with utility-maximising competitors".[154] Within this conceptual framework, IOs and CSOs are seen as "welfare-improving solutions to problems of incomplete information and high transaction costs".[155] Neoliberals and Neorealists differ in their evaluation of regime significance; however both schools believe that IOs and CSOs are established by states essentially to better carry out their individual interests. Sociological approaches to the study of IOs and CSOs differ from an economic approach in at least two ways; approaches within sociology offer a new conception of the relationship between organisations and their environments, as well as providing the basis for the understanding of organisational autonomy.[156] Barnett and Finnemore adopt a constructivist approach (rooted in sociological institutionalism) to highlight both the power of organisations and their inclination for dysfunctional behaviour. Drawing on Weberian assumptions of bureaucracy, Barnett and Finnemore argue that the "rational-legal authority that IOs embody gives them power independent of the states that created them", in other words not only can IOs stray from 'efficiency

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[153] Barnett, M and Finnemore, M, "The politics, power and pathologies of international organisations" in *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 4, Autumn 1999, p.702.
[154] Ibid. p.702.
[155] Ibid. p.703.
[156] Ibid. p.703.

goals' but they "exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their creation".[157]

Through the adoption of this alternative perspective, Barnett and Finnemore believe that they offer three new debates within the study of IOs. Firstly, constructivism offers a different view of the power IOs possess and their role in international politics. IOs do not only facilitate cooperation, "they also create actors, specify responsibilities and authority among them, and define the work these actors should do, giving it meaning and normative value".[158] Furthermore, Barnett and Finnemore suggest that even without material resources, IOs can exercise power as they comprise and create our social world. Secondly, a constructivist approach provides a theoretical foundation for the conceptualisation of IOs as independent international actors - a position which directly challenges traditional neoliberal and neorealist assumptions of the state-centric nature of international relations. IOs can now be seen as the producers and controllers of social knowledge, hereby identifying them as agents rather than just structure.[159] Thirdly, constructivism offers a way in which to access the desirability of IOs. As previously mentioned, other theories suggest that IOs are created solely for the purpose of facilitation. However this assumption does not provide an explanation for the sometimes undesirable and self-defeating actions of these actors. Barnett and Finnemore's work indicates that "the very features that make bureaucracies powerful can also be their weakness", this sentiment is echoed in the writings of Giulio Gallarotti.[160] It is important to note that nothing in social constructivism implies that IO's are 'bad', Barnett and Finnemore wished only to suggest theoretical reasons for their sometimes undesirable behaviour as well as stipulate that a normative evaluation of IO behaviour "should be an empirical and ethical matter, not an analytic assumption".[161]

<u>What is Civil Society?</u>

The concept of civil society resists clear definition, especially when discussing its development on a global scale often referred to as transnational civil society (TCS).

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[157] Ibid. p.699.
[158] <u>Ibid.</u> p.700.
[159] <u>Ibid.</u> p.700.
[160] <u>Ibid.</u> p.701.
[161] <u>Ibid.</u>, p.726/7.

Every society possesses its own forms of social organisation, cultural and political norms and traditions as well as current state and economic structures-all of which develop a civil society with features pertinent to that particular society.[162] Broadly defined however, civil society refers to "the web of social relations that exist in the space between the state, the market (activities with the aim of extracting profit) and the private lives of families and individuals".[163] As was illustrated in the chapter on regime theory, variations in theorists' definitions of civil society affect the roles that these organisations are able to play within society. Many theorists incorporate a normative quality to their definition and view civil society as a space for highlighting 'civic' values and practises.[164] Some stress the political role of civil society groups, believing that this should be the forum for citizens to engage in public life and channel grievances through peaceful deliberative processes.[165] Civil society associations take on many forms and compilations, ranging from officially constituted institutions to small, informal community groups. The purpose of these groups is to give expression and direction to the socio-political, spiritual and cultural needs of its members. This paper will choose to adopt a broader definition of civil society as under this broad understanding official IOs, NGOs as well as informal, grassroots organisations can be grouped together and evaluated. When attempting to judge civil society peace-building efforts, it is also important to "understand how effects of a single initiative combine with other initiatives and contextual factors over time rather than evaluating them in isolation".[166] It is also of particular importance to include all CSO collaborations in the evaluation of Angola's post-conflict contexts in order to provide plausible recommendations for the future.

As previously discussed, conflicts are generated by the "interacting responses of individuals to the situations they confront".[167] It is because conflicts are shaped by human agency that they are "more susceptible to change than other sorts of structural or environmental conditions that generate stress in social systems".[168] In order to commence with conflict transformation it is necessary to firstly, change the attitudes and

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[162] Barnes, C, Op Cit. p.19.
[163] Ibid. p.7.
[164] Ibid. p.20.
[165] Ibid. p.20.
[166] Ibid. p.29.
[167] Ibid. p.25.
[168] Ibid. p.25.

behaviours which perpetuate conflict and secondly, mutually agree on the way in which the causes of conflict are going to be dealt with. It should be noted at this point that while the structure-agency debate will not take place, this paper accepts that people can create and change structures - structures can and do influence and shape the behaviour and interaction of people. Simply put, civil society groups wish to initially change the way people relate to each other in order ultimately to change the structures which reinforce hostility and conflict. This highlights the importance of successfully reintegrating former child soldiers. Because the youth possess "greater capacities for change than older generations", the psychosocial change in child soldiers can be passed on to future generations.[169] The targeting of the youth for the purpose of encouraging societal change is referred to as "next generation work".[170] A positive change in social behaviour and the way in which children perceive their environment and the 'other' will positively reinforce nation-building and peaceful development.

This paper also acknowledges that peace and stability is not simply implemented once an agreement has been signed. A continual commitment by conflict parties, TCS, IOs and NGOs, is necessary to address the underlying and upcoming problems faced by post-conflict societies. For this reason "a sense of public ownership of the peace process can be crucial to its durability", if the public has been included in the peace process - they are more likely to aid in its implementation.[171] While CSOs push for commitment from the leaders of the parties engaged in conflict, they should also be focussed on the individual and his/her needs.

Criticisms of IO's and CSO

Traditional International relations literature has been quick to recognise the positive contributions that IOs and CSOs have made in the past and could still potentially make in the future. The goals of most of the scholars represented in this chapter have been to draw attention to the idea that "for all their desirable qualities, bureaucracies can also be inefficient, ineffective, repressive and unaccountable".[172]In his writings on the role of IO's in international relations, Giulio Gallarotti attempts to provide solutions to the

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[169] Ibid. p.13.
[170] Ibid. p.13.
[171] Ibid. p.26.
[172] Barnett, M and Finnemore, M, Op Cit. p.726.

shortcomings of many organisations by identifying and then offering a critique of current organisational practises and structures. Friedrich Kratochwil, John Ruggie and Martin Rochester are in agreement with Gallarotti's assessment of traditional literature – they, as implied by Barnett and Finnemore, identify the major problem as being a focus on institutional origins and developments as opposed to "the effects of these organisations on international relations".[173] IOs can be counterproductive when they are either poorly managed or excessive in their execution. It has been argued that while the provision of financial aid to debt-ridden countries alleviates the short-term problem, debtors have fewer incentives to promote the economic and policy changes that would ultimately make them less reliant on foreign lending.[174] In the case of Angola, the World Bank's MDRP assistance was essential to the country's post-conflict development, however almost nine years later it is yet to complete the reintegration process of DDR. Similarly, food aid is said to add to the systemic problems of hunger and dependence by taking away the incentive to fix food production at a domestic level. Additionally, IO's become counterproductive when their expense grossly outweighs their significant effect on international relations. While the failure of IO's can be felt universally, it becomes a far more serious situation when IO's themselves make established or new problems worse and in effect become the destabilising force in the international system.

In actively taking a rather benign view of the process of multilateral management, traditional literature has been largely uncritical on a systematic and general level. According to functionalists the growth in technology and growing demands for higher material welfare creates the need for managerial leadership at a multilateral level.[175] David Mitrany links the increase in common international activities and interests with the need for "common administrative agencies that manage interdependence".[176] Likewise, neofunctionalists believe that as the pressures for integration is spreading laterally and vertically, "the level and the scope of international management must be expanded".[177] Ernst Haas identifies the solution to international security and

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[173] Gallarotti, G, "The limits of International Organisation: systemic failure in the management of international relations" in *International Organisation*, Vol. 45, No. 2, Spring 1991p.184.
[174] Ibid. p.183.
[175] Ibid. p.187.
[176] Ibid. p.187.
[177] Ibid. p.187.

development as the "upgrading of common interests" within countries, under the instruction of supranational institutions.[178] In order to achieve the benefits of interdependence, states will not only have to cooperate with each other, but accept "a degree of international regulation and control over their nominally domestic activities".[179] In identifying the following four failures of IO, Gallarotti wishes to highlight present problems yet ultimately offer solutions for change. First, IOs can be destabilising if and when complex, heavily interlinked systems are managed incorrectly.[180] Complexity and independence theorists such as Robert Keahone, Joseph Nye and James Rosenau explain that the feedback effects of an international system are often unpredictable and often have unforeseeable side effects. Complexity theory highlights the futility of attempting to provide linear solutions to essentially chaotic problems. This notion is coupled with the idea that most international problems are multifaceted and affect multiple actors due to the interconnected nature of the international system. For this reason the actions of an international actor are never acted out in isolation and often have far reaching and unintended consequences.

Second, IO's can also be destabilising when solutions they put forward or implement "discourage nations from pursuing more substantive or long-term resolutions to international problems".[181] Barnett and Finnemore have also highlighted the role of IO's in reducing the incentives of nations to think of and implement their own solutions. Another major problem pertaining particularly to the resolution of disputes through the UN, is the tendency to 'patch up' the problem and then absolve further responsibility when the recommended solution fails. In order for post-conflict states to obtain aid from the World Bank, they must adopt and implement this IOs DDR model as the only solution to development and economic recovery. Additional concern expressed about an IO like the UN is the power play which takes place within the organisation itself, not only can this play an adverse role in state development, but also create a platform for the marginalisation of weaker actors. The power struggle between UCAH and UNICEF

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[178] Ibid. p.187.
[179] Ibid. p.187.
[180] Ibid. p.192.
[181] Ibid. p.192.

during Angola's Lusaka peace agreement meant that children were not being efficiently attended to - at the expense of power play. [182]

Third, IOs are destabilising, particularly in situations of conflict, when they have the effect of intensifying disputes rather than resolving them. Because IO's can lend moral force to the foreign positions of nations it has the tendency to be used for the furthering of individual actor interest. As Yeselson and Gaglione have noted, throughout the Cold War and even at present the UN served as a platform to embarrass or 'gang up' against nations which has consequently resulted in the reluctance of states to bring disputes to the UN.[183]

The fourth and last destabilising effect IOs have on international relations is grouped under the title of moral hazard. These situations usually begin with the alleviation of a state's financial payments pertaining to its social, economic and political actions as "some protective scheme allows it to impose those costs onto other nations through risk sharing".[184] In other words in providing a degree of insurance or security for states, IOs discourage individual actors from adopting more responsible behaviour themselves. A good example of this would be foreign lending through the IMF or World Bank "the fact that trade deficits can be financed through external funds allows nations to over inflate without worrying about the adverse effects of high prices on their trade balances".[185] In his article Gallarotti suggests that the 'limitation of IO' through control mechanisms and regulation, will hopefully encourage and facilitate long term solutions to international problems – however he is careful to add that while "limited IO can be effective [it] does not mean that it will be".[186]

Some of the criticism pertaining to IO's can be applied to NGOs and CSOs. As previously mentioned, NGOs are not only the vehicles of but form part of TSC; these collaborations can achieve outcomes both positive and negative. Hailed as the upholders of grassroots democracy in action, "many NGOs are, in fact, decidedly undemocratic

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[182] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.17.
[183] Gallarotti, G Op Cit. p.206.
[184] Ibid. p.209.
[185] Ibid. p.209.
[186] Ibid. p.217.

and unaccountable to the people they claim to represent".[187] While NGOs are considered by many scholars as the 'new kids' on the international block, these actors are gaining in power and popularity which Simmons believes can be used to disrupt or create. In his article "Learning to live with NGOs" Simmons states that NGOs affect national governments, multilateral institutions and corporations through the setting of agendas, negotiating of outcomes, the conferring of legitimacy and the suggestion and implementation of solutions.[188] Intense competition among NGOs threatens the existence of smaller actors, especially local entities in developing countries. Concerns have also been raised about the effect that money and growing power might have on the internal structures and overall goals of established NGO's. While there will never be perfect democracy, institutions and NGOs and CSOs should strive to create formal but flexible systems during negotiations to facilitate long term communication between decision-making institutions and 'stakeholders'.[189] Furthermore, CSOs, NGOs, governments and IOs need to devise systems of public participation that are free of bureaucratic constraint yet possess the efficiency and resources to implement change. A well informed public produces a strong civil society, enhancing political responsiveness within the state and limiting the government's ability to impose arbitrary rules by force.[190]

While the above criticisms need to be acknowledged, one must also be aware of the good that can come from collaborative efforts between IOs, NGOs and CSOs. The best example of the above mentioned collaboration occurred during Angola's reintegration programme. Former child soldiers needed to be reunited with their families, however representatives of the IO involved were unable to speak local languages, were unfamiliar with rural terrain and not privy to some of the traditional 'cleansing' ceremonies children would have to complete before being allowed to re-enter communities. The CCF approached the Catholic Church in Angola as a prospective partner who had an existing community network which resources could be distributed through. The Church

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[187] Simmons, P, "Learning to live with NGOs" in *Foreign Policy*, No. 112, Autumn 1998, p. 83.
[188] Ibid. p.84.
[189] Ibid. p. 93.
[190] Clark, A, Finnemore, M and Hochsteler, J, "The sovereign limits of global civil society: A comparison of NGO participation in UN world conferences on the environment, human rights and women" in World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 1998, p. 2.

structure had a provincial base of bishops, who supervised various Padres "who in turn were able to ensure far-reaching work through a system of volunteer social workers" or catequistas.[191] The catequista network was trusted and respected by local people as well as having the advantage of knowing the landscape, culture and languages. The collaboration between the CCF and the catequista network enabled the reunification of former child soldiers and their families as well as creating a future support structure for follow up visits and psychological evaluations. There are a number of roles CSOs can play particularly in the prevention of conflict and building peace.

Key CSO Roles at Different Stages of Conflict

Firstly, in order to address the structural causes of conflict CSOs must make state/government structures more responsive to public dialogue and opinion. CSOs should alleviate social tensions by holding educational workshops and promoting constructive information sharing at a ground level as well as strengthening its capacity to mediate and resolve conflict situations.

Secondly, in the midst of violent conflict CSOs must simultaneously monitor unfolding events as well as collect information and raise awareness of the crisis at hand. CSOs should be continually formatting recommendations and attempting to engage in policy dialogue with conflict perpetrators. Engagement with fellow CSOs on a national and local level is imperative if the momentum of the movement is not to be lost. The creation of 'zones of peace' or safe havens will go a long way to bring safety to civilians in need, however these sections of land are difficult to obtain and manage without jurisdiction.

Thirdly, the role of CSOs during the peace-making stage involves developing a negotiation agenda and a plan to address the causes and consequences of conflict. CSOs must attempt to be present at all political negotiations - preferably in the role of a participant or facilitator - alternatively in an observatory role. International CSOs must strengthen and prepare their local affiliates to deal with conflict transformation and peace-building.

Fourthly, CSOs can also play a role in the prevention of renewed conflict and post-settlement peace-building. It is the job of CSO to educate the public about the nature of

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[191] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.30.

the peace agreement and the benefits derived from consolidating the peace process. CSOs also play a large role in laying down the groundwork for reconciliation through the reintegration of former combatants and the rehabilitation of war-affected relationships and communities.[192] CSOs are also able to monitor and contribute to transitional justice processes. At this final stage of conflict, CSOs are able to resume their usual duties of civic watch dog, monitoring good governance, encouraging reconstruction and development and promoting human rights.

Exercising force alone will not result in a sustainable resolution of conflict. Dialogue between all conflicting parties, establishing the basic terms under which they can co-exist, is essential to the long-term resolution of hostilities. It is impossible to "make peace by peaceful means without truly engaging with others across the conflict divide".[193] Engagement is essentially the first step of any peace process. However the way in which parties engage can either stimulate a conversation on peace or alternately worsen an already tense situation. Despite their faults, the engagement of TCS groups in the peace-building process can bring with it resources, information and the ability to remain motivated to change societal attitudes and behaviour. "While civil society as a whole is not necessarily a force for peace, the debates and initiatives cultivated by CSOs are often the motor for it".[194]

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[192] Barnes, C, Op Cit. p.28.
[193] Ibid. p.25.
[194] Ibid. p.13.

Chapter Five - Reintegration of child soldiers in Angola

It is of the utmost importance for those in change of reintegration programmes, whether this be aid workers or government officials, to recognise that this final stage of DDR must be a mental as well as social transformation. Many of these children only know conflict. In the case of Angola, political instability and conflict gripped the state for the better part of twenty five years. Children who grow up under these circumstances must be taught how to be a civilian as they have no reference point of memory from which to draw this information. Problems of reintegration have to be addressed in the planning stages in order to successfully ensure a positive future for former child soldiers. Given the young ages of former child soldiers, it is hoped that they still have many years ahead of them, emphasising the long-term implications of both positive and negative DDR programmes. The successful and effective reintegration of former child soldiers is dependent on the reintegration programme's addressing of three vital elements; family and community reunification, psychological support and educational opportunities. These elements will be outlined followed by an evaluation of the Angolan reintegration process itself.

The special or separate DDR of vulnerable groups can be seen by those involved in and outside of DDR processes as hopeless. Positive examples from the case study of Angola however, indicate that children who have previously been a part of conflict can in fact reengage with society and live productive civilian lives. The programme of reintegration is a long-term process which depends to a large extent on the political will and resources to include child soldiers in the peace process from the beginning and see their family and community reintegration through to the end. As previously mentioned, the reintegration of former child soldiers is not only the most lengthy and difficult stage of DDR, it is also the most expensive and contains the most number of problems, and therefore requires more attention.

The processes and procedures surrounding the reintegration of child soldiers will be the focus of this chapter. The developmental years a child loses to soldiering deeply affects his/her present and future identity, because child soldiers are deprived of "normal

cultural, moral and values socialisation gained from families and communities, they experience a process of asocialisation".[195] During the height of Angola's civil war, UNICEF estimated that one in every four Angolan children died before the age of five years. Angola was also recorded as being "one of the most heavily mined countries in the world", at one stage leaving less than four percent of the arable land cultivated.[196] With sixty percent of health posts and twenty-five percent of schools destroyed, the post conflict government would have to make the safety and future prospects of Angolan children a priority.[197] For these reasons, as well as many others that will be discussed at a later point in this chapter, former child soldiers must be identified as a vulnerable group with special needs during the DDR process.

As stated in previous chapters, a child soldier is classified as any person under the age of eighteen years who is part of any regular or irregular armed force or group.[198] This broad definition allows for the inclusion of adolescent participant irrespective of their function during combat or whether they joined voluntarily or were forcefully recruited. As can be seen from the Bicesse peace process, the definition of a child soldier played a large role in who would be eligible to receive reintegration benefits. While the Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulates that fifteen years is the minimum age for the participation in hostilities, Angolan law clearly stated that eighteen years was the minimum age for recruitment.[199] Once it was officially established that 'underage' soldiers were former combatants under the age of eighteen years, CSOs could begin formulating reintegration plans for this vulnerable group. Reintegration programmes represent the process of creating and establishing a new civilian life. This process is complex and includes a number of inter-related issues such as health and basic needs, psychological support, family reunification, rebuilding societal relationships and building skills to generate future income.[200] Former child soldiers will have to face the possibility that their family and community contexts have changed and must be prepared to adjust to these new circumstances. The balance of meeting both social and economic needs during

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[195] Verhey, B, "Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilising and Reintegrating" in *Africa Region Working Paper Series*, No. 23, November 2001b, p.1.
[196] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit, p.9.
[197] Ibid. p.9.
[198] Verhey, B, 2001b, Op Cit. p.1.
[199] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.21.
[200] Verhey, B, 2001b, Op Cit. p.15.

reintegration is particularly important to the future identity and wellbeing of the child. There are three elements which are fundamental to the successful reintegration of former child soldiers; family and community reunification, psychological support and educational opportunities.[201]

<u>Successful Reintegration Strategy:</u>

<u>Family Reunification and Community-Based Networks</u>

Research and experience has consistently proved that "family and community relationships are the most important factors in the reintegration of child soldiers".[202] It is for this reason that overseers of reintegration in both the Lusaka and MoU programmes opted for family reunification or alternatively placing children with relatives as opposed to initially housing them in special centres. It is true that in the aftermath of conflict the chance of locating family members, who may have since resettled or possibly even died, decreases exponentially. However, the case of Angola provides both hope that reunification for the majority of former child soldiers as well as good guidelines to follow. Despite the resumption of conflict between the Lusaka and MoU peace process, "only 6 percent of the thousands of former child soldiers whose cases could be followed up were living alone or with non-related foster families".[203] It should be noted that some of the former Angolan child soldiers chose to live alone because they had either married or had families of their own during the conflict period. The above mentioned possibilities must be taken into account when drawing up reintegration plans. One of the most important examples of new family support projects in Angola was a 'self-building project' in which support and resources were given to former child soldiers and their families to construct their own homes. In order to include and encourage interaction with the community, either family or community leaders were requested (were possible) to allocate or give former soldiers the land for their new homes.[204]

On the one hand this paper does not wish to give the impression that reunification always goes smoothly, pessimistic views that former child soldiers will not be accepted

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[201] <u>Ibid.</u> p.15.
[202] <u>Ibid.</u> p.15.
[203] <u>Ibid.</u> p.15.
[204] <u>Ibid.</u> p.16.

back into family units or the community can also be overemphasised. In the case of Angola, follow up visits indicated that sixteen percent of former child soldiers had left their original locations of reunification.[205] Some had moved in order to escape re-recruitment or look for employment, others moved due to family problems. International and local staff members have to prepare families and communities for the fact that the returning child soldiers are no longer the children they used to be and both parties will need to adapt to their new circumstances in order to successfully reintegrate. Cultural cleansing ceremonies also play a significant role in the reintegration of former child soldiers back into communities. Once former soldiers are 'cleansed' of their past actions it is as if the community has given them a clean slate to start over. These ceremonies can also act as a healing agent, especially for young girls who have been forced to be officers' 'wives'. Without cultural cleansing these girls and their children could be considered poor marriage prospects or social outcasts.[206] Those involved with the reintegration process in Angola soon realised that most families understood that the acts committed by child soldiers during conflict periods were the responsibility of the adults who had recruited them.[207]

The reintegration programme in Angola is also an example of successful cooperation between government and CSO, as well as effective collaboration between the different CSO. A particularly successful venture arose from the collaboration between international CSOs and a community based network of some 200 church social promoters called 'catechists'. The catechist network was able to achieve numerous family reunification and follow-up support despite Angola's size, poor infrastructure, political instability and the threat of landmines.[208] The catechists were a perfect vehicle for reunification efforts as they were familiar with the communities and Angolan terrain. They were perceived as neutral yet viewed by most community members as learned and morally upstanding persons, as well as the fact that because they came from local villages they could speak local languages and could provide a permanent support system for demobilising child soldiers.[209]

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[205] Ibid. p.16.
[206] Ibid. p.16.
[207] Ibid. p.16.
[208] Ibid. p.16.
[209] Ibid. p.17.

Psychological Approach and Traditional Healing

When attempting to evaluate a former child soldier's psychological condition, one must keep in mind that many of these children have been socialised to believe violence and aggression are normal and the way in which one obtains what you need or want. Many child soldiers are deprived of the "normal cultural, moral and values socialisation usually gains from family and community".[210] These elements have to be restored or re-taught during the process of reintegration in an effort to change a soldier into a civilian. Because identity formation takes place during adolescence, overseers of reintegration process have to move quickly to address the psychosocial health of former child soldiers. As previously mentioned Angola placed culture at the centre of its solution to addressing the psychosocial problems of former child soldiers; traditional healing and group counselling helped the children on both a psychological level as well as ensuring acceptance into the community. TCS organisations provided training and support to the local community networks which had the greatest access to demobilised child soldiers. The catechist network facilitated communication between the former child soldiers and traditional leaders and healers. They provided follow up visits and family mediation as well as helping children access education and training opportunities.[211] If the psychological identities of child soldiers are not successfully changed they could return to the violent and antisocial behaviour of conflict, adding to an increase in gangs and organised crime.

Education and Economic Opportunities

The third essential component to successful reintegration is access to education and economic opportunity. A balance must be struck between "the child soldier's need to earn income and their need to resume education".[212] When asked what supports they most needed from reintegration, child soldiers selected access to education as their immediate need.[213] Unfortunately, this support structure is often neglected due to insufficient budget allocation. Reintegration projects should aim to provide accelerated forms of formal education. Former child soldiers need educational opportunities "with

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[210] Ibid. p.17.
[211] Ibid. p.15.
[212] Ibid. p.18.
[213] Ibid. p.18.

flexible working hours and an emphasis on literacy and numeracy skills". Often former child soldiers are unable to attend formal schooling as they need to financially support themselves or families. There is the issue of inability to afford educational fees or the fact that some areas do not have teachers or school buildings. Much older children could also feel embarrassed about their low level of education as well as experience difficulty when enrolling for younger grades. Education regarding life skills, such as HIV/AIDS awareness, mental and physical wellness and the management of finances, would really go a long way in enabling children to be self-sufficient yet are missing from many reintegration programmes.[214]

Successful reintegration cannot be complete without former child soldiers receiving adequate vocational training in order to generate income. It is a concern that many current DDR reports state that reintegration programmes have not provided the meaningful skills or useful training needed by former combatant to successfully find jobs or generate their own income.[215] Angola's reintegration phase is yet to be completed. Thus far, the funds from 'Quick Impact Project' (QIPs) have enabled a number of former child soldiers and their families to rehabilitate small business. Individual provinces have also arranged a number of apprenticeships which proved more effective than vocational training schemes because they provided a quicker way of acquiring skills and income. The general misconception that education equates to a job must also be addressed. As Angolans would realise the acquiring of skills in order to possess a job is contingent on the strength of a post conflict economy, the type of market, the quality of transfer of skills and the need or demand for those particular skills.

<u>Evaluation of Reintegration Programmes</u>

<u>Bicesse Accord</u>

There is very little material available regarding the reintegration of child soldiers during Bicesse process. While DDR practitioners did get round to acknowledging the existence

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[214] Vencovsky, D, "Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants", *Conflict Trends* (ACCORD), Vol. 4, 2006, p. 36.
[215] Verhey, B, 2001b, <u>Op Cit.</u> p.19.

of 'vulnerable groups' as well as the need to include these groups in the DDR process, "this knowledge was not translated into implemented policy on the ground".[216] Due to continual stalling and lack of commitment from both UNITA and MPLA, conflict resumed before the reintegration phase began.

Lusaka Peace Process

During the Lusaka peace process the reintegration programme for underage soldiers was under the overall coordination of UCAH, with UNICEF proving additional programme coordination and technical assistance. The other principle CSOs involved during the Lusaka process all attended to different and specialised issue areas. The CCF worked as the primary implementing agency for reintegration, providing psychosocial support through their province-based teams.[217] UNICEF and Medico International (MI) aided CCF in the training of community representatives who would deal with the psychological recovery of child soldiers and their reintegration needs.[218] STC, the MINARS and the ICRC were responsible for family tracing and reunification. The International Organisation on Migration (IOM) coordinated and monitored the distribution of demobilisation kits and transportation requirements. The National Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (IRSEM) and the Community Referral Service (SeCoR) would make follow-up visits to former child soldiers and verify that benefits and vocational training was being received.[219]

The debate between UNITA and the government regarding the definition of an 'underage' soldier has already been detailed, however another debate concerning from which date a child would be considered underage. Both parties wished to minimise the number of their troops that would automatically be demobilised as underage participants and refused the UN's suggestion of considering the date of the signing of the Lusaka Protocol as the point at which soldiers would be considered underage. After months of tedious negotiations, UNITA and government representatives reached a compromise. 1996 would be considered the 'calendar year of demobilisation', therefore any persons born after 1 January 1978 would be considered underage, as well as those who were

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[216] Meek, S and Malan, M, Op Cit. p. 41.
[217] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.21.
[218] Ibid. p.21.
[219] Ibid. p.21.

presently eighteen years of age.[220] The problem with such an agreement is that the above dates do not recognise children who may have been recruited as underage soldiers prior to 1996 calendar year. Angola experienced over 35 years of conflict and some children have literally grown up as soldiers but because they were of a legal fighting age by 1996, they will not be eligible to receive the much needed psychological aid and basic socialisation training available.

Family tracing and community based networks

After being united with family or resettled, former child soldiers received follow up visits from either the CCF/UNICEF or STC/MINARS collaborations, to ensure that they had access to benefit and projects. STC/MINARS visits were part of the larger retracing programme and where irregular, CCF/UNICEF attempted to schedule visits every two months and focused on providing psychological support. Gradually CCF/UNICEF agents with the help of the catequista network began taking over backlogged MINARS cases until they were handing 85 percent of the overall caseload.[221] An end was put to this effective international and local CSO partnership when security and access deteriorated to the point where catequistas were threatened, tortured and imprisoned by UNITA commanders attempting to remobilise troops.

Psychological approach and traditional healing

As previously mentioned, CCF/UNICEF took responsibility for providing the psychological support of former child soldiers. Community beliefs and cultural healing was placed at the centre of efforts to address the psychosocial impact of conflict on children. Additionally, CCF teams prepared families and communities for the return of former child soldiers and helped to finance special materials needed in traditional ceremonies. By September 1998, this CCF project had conducted 172 training seminars for 4 894 adults who in turn arranged group exercises that reached 298 000 children.[222] Local churches provided all the training venues and lodging, CCF provided the training materials and food for participants.[223]CCF teams also held 88 public debates regarding

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[220] Ibid. p.23.
[221] Ibid. p.23
[222] Ibid. p.46.
[223] Ibid. p.48.

the needs of former child soldiers, broadcast their message over 65 radio and newspaper interviews and most importantly CCF teams documented the progress of their programmes for future use.[224]

Education and economic opportunities

Through IRSEM, former child soldiers received the standard reintegration package given to all demobilised soldiers consisting of government indemnities and UN material supports to meet immediate needs. Additionally, former child soldiers received access to a network of educational and vocational training to aid in their transmission to civilian life. Vocational training was headed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). While underage soldiers were to be given provisional access to short-term projects or QIPs (supported by UNDP), these projects were still not underway by mid-1998.[225] When QIPs did eventually take off, many underage soldiers did not meet the literacy levels required for training or funding.[226] Some of the most important ventures supporting economic opportunity for youth were thanks to the expansion of CCF programmes. CCF had not intended to manage QIP projects but the restrictive SeCoR administration regulations concerning the small, individualised projects needed by underage soldiers prompted the CSO to become an 'umbrella manager' for this vulnerable group.[227]

Memorandum of Understanding

While DDR programmes are designed as an integrated solution to a long term problem affecting an entire state, Angola has tended to emphasise "short time frames of transition through centrally managed programmes that narrowly target the demobilised".[228]. Ideally reintegration programmes should attempt to bridge political and economic disparities amongst the population while simultaneously offering benefits and opportunities to the demobilised military - however financial restrictions play a large role in the scope of a specific reintegration project. The Angolan government's reintegration plan was drawn

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[224] Ibid. p.46.
[225] QIPs were intended to support income generation through the creation of small businesses.
[226] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.53.
[227] Ibid. p.54.
[228] Ruigrok, I, "Whose justice? Contextualising Angola's reintegration process" in *African Security Review* Vol.16, No.1, 2008, p.84.

up during the MoU and then adjusted to fit the World Bank's MDRP. Incidentally 2002 was also the year that the World Bank decided to establish the MDRP - its answer to the development needs of many central African states in stages of both open war and post-conflict peace.[229] MDRP stresses that the route to political stability and economic recovery lie in a country's completion of DDR. In this process the World Bank acts as manager of the MDRP Secretariat, administrator of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and as co-financier of the national programmes.[230] Talks between the World Bank and Angolan government concluded in March 2003 with the establishment of the Angolan Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (ADRP). The IRSEM would retain its role as the reintegration implementing agency within MINARS and the Inter-Sectoral Commission for the Peace Process and National Reconciliation (CIPP) was created for the purpose of political management, however the World Bank wished the ADRP to integrate demobilisation and reintegration programmes into one national process. The Angolan government had already financed the disarmament and demobilisation phases, but the additional funding from ADRP could be used to demobilise FAA troops that were still awaiting benefits as well as uncompleted 'old demobilisation case-loads'.[231] The World Bank defined its role and intervention in Angola as a "short-term measure, intended to give a first push to recovery", indicating that projects and funding were limited in time. [232]

Family tracing and community based networks

The same actors involved with family tracing and securing the successful reintegration and reunification of former child soldiers during the Lusaka peace process were, and still are presently to a lesser degree, involved during the MoU process. Due to similar if not identical structures and practises, the functions and processes of these government institutions and CSOs will not be repeated.

Psychological aspects and traditional healing

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[229] In order to qualify for MDRP funding, African countries must participate in the regional peace process for the Great Lakes Region and implement DDR programmes and institutional structures under the guidelines of the MDRP.
[230] Ruigrok, I, Op Cit. p.87.
[231] There were still 191 400 combatants identified for demobilisation and reintegration under the two former peace processes.
[232] Ruigrok, I, Op Cit. p.89.

Although SeCoR was created under the new ADRP, the most effective and integrated psychosocial service offered to former child soldiers is still that of the CCF and catequista network. This partnership restarted family tracing prior to the signing of the MoU and gradually improved their efforts as UNITA area strong holds were defeated by advancing FAA troops. The collaboration between UNICEF, CCF and the catequista network followed the same pattern as detailed under the Lusaka Protocol and will therefore not be repeated.

Education and economic opportunities

The mechanics of the World Bank's MDRP was discussed in detail above as this provided the funding for Angolan education and economic opportunities during MoU reintegration. IRSEM would receive funding directly from the ADRP, which was meant to then be distributed to the respective reintegration projects via national and local partners, eventually reaching smaller local organisations and CSOs. Unfortunately, the reintegration programme's design did not translate into practise. The financing and resources promised to smaller organisations implementing ADRP at a local level came too slowly, resulting in the weakening of these local entities.

The ADRP placed emphasis on economic opportunities through revival of the agriculture sector; however it has been the WFP and CARE that have been supplying rural families with seeds, tools, training and technical assistance.[233] The ADRP recognised the need to create short-term, flexible and cost-effective training programmes which took the forms of traditional apprenticeships, on-the job training and formal training.[234] Training programmes were designed to "mirror local labour opportunities" and have been more successful in urban areas.[235] While the ADRP has attempted to assist with the various aspects of the reintegration of vulnerable groups, especially former child soldiers, it still relies on the financial support this sector receives from the child protection network.[236]

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[233] Gomes, J and Parsons, I, Op Cit. p.78.
[234] Ibid. p.81.
[235] Ibid. p.82.
[236] Child protection network comprises of UNICEF, CCF and catequista network, STC,ICRC and their local affiliates.

The question of who should be included in the final reintegration stage of DDR is always a contentious debate. When questioned in reintegration workshops, military personal opted "to deal only with armed combatants while the humanitarian/non military participants favour a wider definition" of who should be included in the reintegration phase.[237] The ADRP openly recognised that assistance to the reintegration of former combatants should be made beneficial to the wider community and "consistent with the support to over four million returning civilians and to broader recovery efforts at a national level".[238] In practise however the programme relied entirely on central government agencies with decentralised provincial directorates. Civilians should have received assistance under broader, national programmes however these benefits were often delayed or lost under a mountain of bureaucratic administration.[239] The support given to former combatants, albeit limited, makes a huge difference in a country where 68 percent of the population lives below the breadline.[240] Villagers' reactions vary but many do note the imbalance when interviewed and believe that former soldiers are being paid for making war.[241] CSOs have attempted to fill this gap. However aid fatigue and inaccessibility have taken their toll. In the same vein, former child soldiers were recognised by the ADRP as a vulnerable group with special needs but CSOs landed up funding and monitoring most of their reintegration process.

Current Reintegration Situation

In terms of 2009 reintegration and development, the IO currently most involved in Angola is the MDRP. UNICEF, CCF and STC also still have a presence in Angola monitoring the wellbeing of both former underage soldiers and the country's children. Most quartering sites were closed by mid-2003. Despite the measured successes of reintegration and reunification of child soldiers and their families, most demobilized combatants remained in urban areas instead of returning to their communities - for fear of being stigmatised.[242] General reintegration programmes also lacked corresponding

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[237] Meek, S and Malan, M, Op Cit. p. 37.
[238] Ruigrok, I, Op Cit. p.88.
[239] Ibid. p.95.
[240] Ibid. p.95.
[241] Alusala, N, "Rethinking DDR in Africa", *Institute for Security Studies*, September 2007, p.1.
[242] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, "DDR 2009. Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2008". Bellaterra: *School for a Culture of Peace* (Escola de Cultura de Pau), July 2009, p.28.

presence in all the provinces, making resettlement and the receiving of reintegration kits difficult. In June 2008, a survey was conducted on 10 500 former soldiers within three to six months of receiving reintegration support. According to the section on reintegration, 60 percent of ex-combatants were self-employed of their own creation, 5 percent worked in the formal sector, and 35 percent remained unemployed. 96 percent of those who were employed worked in agriculture.[243] IRSEM is still responsible for the yearly planning of the implementation and details of reintegration. Many of the aims displayed by Angola's country profile in the 2009 World DDR review report are the same as those mentioned above. In the chapter which follows an evaluation of Angola's progress will be given, followed by recommendations.

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[243] Ibid. p.28,

Chapter Six - Lessons Learned and Recommendations

<u>Lessons Learned from Angola</u>

Lessons learned from the Bicesse DDR process

- Enough time must be allocated for the adequate planning and implementation of all DDR processes, the time frame for the Bicesse process was too rigid. In the rush to meet demobilisation requirements, correct disarmament and quartering procedures were skipped-enabling UNITA to remain well armed and able to reopen hostilities.

- Elections in a post-conflict setting should never be rushed. In the case of Angola, the 1992 'winner takes all' elections were merely a continuation of the polarised military logic of war and "gave no way to deflect potential 'spoilers' of the process".[244]

- Poor quartering conditions and the slow roll out of benefits led to a mass self-demobilisation by soldiers, causing an increase in insecurity and political tension.

- Enough resources must be allocated to the particular DDR process. UNAVEM II was not only limited in its mandate of observation, but also in the number of personal and resources it brought to Angola. Furthermore the UN and other aid agencies were excluded from Bicesse negotiations and drafting of the peace accord.

- The reintegration phase under Bicesse is a stark example of what can happen if reintegration is not made an integral part of the grater DDR process. Sufficient reintegration of former soldiers was not taken seriously and in many cases UNITA soldiers were left out of the process completely.

- Child soldiers and other vulnerable groups were given very little if any attention-signalling to TCS and NGO groups that they would have to draw attention to the particular needs of child soldiers and push for special treatment.

Lessons learned from the Lusaka DDR process

- While it is true that DDR process should be flexible in the planning stages, agreed upon timetables should be followed as closely as possible.[245] The timetable for the

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[244] Gomes, J and Parsons, I, <u>Op Cit</u>. p.28.
[245] Bakwesegha, M and Chembeze, A, "Situation Report: Angola", *Conflict Trends* (ACCORD), Vol. 4, 2006, p.28.

completion of disarmament, demobilisation and quartering under Lusaka was too lax. As a result, UNITA was able to regroup and replenish their arms during the so called demobilisation period.

- Delays in the allocation and roll out of demobilisation and reintegration benefits weakened the confidence of soldiers in the DDR process. Irregularities and slow payments particularly to demobilising UNITA soldiers lessoned their inclination to cooperate and increased suspicion and mistrust of the other side.

- Although UNAVEM III was better equipped than its predecessor, this mission still did not possess the means to "effectively monitor disarmament or to prevent UNITA from rearming and regrouping".[246]

- The re-creation and normalisation of state administration is imperative to a functional economy and stable political landscape. The failure of Lusaka to do this heightened insecurity, complicated demobilisation and obstructed and severely delayed reintegration programmes.[247]

- The prevision of benefits and basic services to soldiers' dependents are an integral part of the DDR process. The reintegration of the family unit should be provided for in the peace agreement and financially covered by the reintegration budget.

- Community-based reintegration programmes can be very successful, particularly regarding customary cleansing and healing, but they are also context specific and need to be monitored.

Lessons learned from the Memorandum of Understanding

- Both the Angolan government and CSOs, were caught unprepared when a much larger number of UNITA soldiers and their family members reported to quartering sites after the signing of the MoU.

- While this logistical nightmare could not necessarily be completely avoided as UNITA commanders themselves were unsure of exact numbers, organisers should not stick to rigid figures and must be able to provide for excess persons.

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[246] Ibid. p.36.
[247] Ibid. p.36.

- Greater collaboration between the government, the UN and CSOs when high levels of malnutrition and disease were first noticed at quartering sites, could have addressed the humanitarian situation sooner and with less red tape.

- Reintegration is both a family and community affair. Reintegration programmes should benefit both former soldiers and the communities they are being reintegrated into, in an attempt to discourage former conflict related tensions.

- The reintegration phase is a long-term project and an unclear reintegration framework presents both immediate problems after demobilisation as well as problems in the future.

- More emphasis should be placed on the collection of weapons from civilians.

General Recommendations for DDR

In summation the following four lessons have been derived from the experiences of DDR in Angola and can be used as recommended points for attention in future situations of a similar nature.

Firstly, "early and persistent advocacy is essential at the highest levels".[248] As can be seen from the Angola example, early advocacy attempts enabled child soldiers to be recognised as a separate and vulnerable group which has special needs. However this recognition was only the beginning of a long struggle to persuade leaders to stick to the guarantees they had given and persistence was key to achieving separate demobilisation and reintegration packages. Angola's experience also highlights the importance of communication and collaboration between national and domestic actors. Without this coordination, aid and remuneration packages are untraceable and often do not reach the necessary persons.

Secondly, emphasis must be placed on clearly defining terminology and strategy layout in order to ensure effective and committed collaboration efforts. During the Lusaka peace process, reintegration efforts were stalled by debates over the terminology and date by which child soldiers were to be defined.[249] Deliberation and debate surrounding policy and collaboration are often lengthy and it is that much more helpful for

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[248] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.7.
[249] Ibid. p.7.

international and domestic CSOs to already have suggestions and strategies in place prior to the signing of peace agreements.

Thirdly and very importantly, "child soldiers must be protected during the demobilisation process and assured effective separation from military authority".[250] Exclusively separating child soldiers for the entire DDR process is not advised as this might make these children feel as if their role during the war is being lessoned. There is also the issue of financial restrictions, which prevent complete separation unless additional aid and resources are earmarked for this particular cause. Enforcers of DDR must however recognise the need to protect children undergoing demobilisation. During Lusaka, child soldiers were physically and emotionally abused and manipulated throughout the ten month waiting period in un-separated cantonment sites.[251]

Fourthly, preference should be given to the reintegration of former child soldiers into a family context as opposed to an institutional structure. Making the transition to civilian life often requires the support of family and the acceptance of the community. As can be seen in the cases of Angolan child soldiers, traditional cleansing ceremonies played a large part in their transition and acceptance. This ceremony could only be performed by community leaders and keeping children at a separate reintegration site would have made these traditional terms and conditions of re-admittance to the community impossible. The reintegration of former child soldiers is therefore more effective within a family and community environment.

Specific Recommendations for the Reintegration of Child Soldiers

While the focus of this paper has been the role of CSO in the reintegration of child soldiers, the key theme of collaboration between international and local actors has been highlighted in every chapter thus far. It can be derived from both the Lusaka and Luanda peace processes that the successful reintegration of combatants, internally displaced people, refugees and child soldiers is depended on the collaborative partnerships between national and local government, IOs, NGOs, CSOs.[252]

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[250] Ibid. p.8.
[251] Ibid. p.8.
[252] Sesay, A (ed), *Civil wars, child soldiers and post conflict peace building in West Africa*, College Press & Publishers Ltd.: Ibadan, 2003, p. 197.

Multi-actor coordination

While the UN and its agencies have gained much experience in the field of DDR in the past two decades, better cooperation and planning is needed to structure, monitor and manage DDR operations.[253] Cooperation between international and local IOs and CSOs must start before DDR programmes commence in order to draw up integrated strategies and plan the most effective routes for advocacy initiatives. It is important to always remember that "national ownership is the foundation for a successful DDR programme".[254] National partners cannot simply manage the peace process DDR requires the buy-in of all parties to the conflict. Political control of DDR processes should be in the hands of a civil administration.[255] While collaboration with local state and non-state actors can be a tedious and highly political process, a 'quick fix' by international donors can often have adverse effects.[256] It is true that it is perceivably better to stipulate a set about of aid or loan money for the purpose of implementing DDR, but today's missions should go beyond securing peace and recognise the long-term implications of rebuilding collapsed states and economies.[257] Furthermore, an initiative cannot be sustainable if it has no local foundation or established pathway for aid and resources. CSOs must be utilised as more active partners in coordination. These organisations bring a wealth of resources and information as well as often establishing the link between local communities and international organisations.

On an international level, there is no formal punishment for states that do no fully implement agreements, treaties or conventions regarding the rights of children. In order to irradiate the use of children in conflict situations, enforcement mechanisms must be included in regimes - to ensure that states implement the policies that they have agreed to in various treaties. It is also the responsibility of local CSOs to place pressure on governments to ensure that their national legislation reflects an acknowledgement and commitment of the needs and rights of children.

Vulnerable Groups with special needs

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[253] Meek, S and Malan, M, Op Cit. p. 45.
[254] Ibid. p. 46.
[255] Ibid. p. 26.
[256] Ruigrok, Op Cit. p.91.
[257] Meek, S and Malan, M, Op Cit. p. 47.

Vulnerable groups generally include women, children and the disabled. While these groups are often recognised as vulnerable groups with special needs, "this knowledge has not been translated into implemented policy on the ground".[258] DDR organisers must allow for greater flexibility pertaining to the time taken, allocation of resources and long-term needs of vulnerable groups.[259] Children participating in conflict represent a unique challenge and must be prioritised. Specialised IOs and CSOs such as UNICEF and STC should be included in DDR planning and implementation. Above all, the reintegration of former child soldiers must also be seen as a community-orientated process. Where possible, the reintegration experiences of vulnerable groups should be monitored and recorded in the hope of creating a better reintegration model in the future.

Reintegration Packages

As was previously explained in chapter five, entrepreneurial opportunities and training workshops could often not be accessed by former child soldiers. In these cases individuals often relied on the reintegration packages allocated by the government and UN assistance programmes. Despite cautions, the Angolan government decided to pay out a lump sum of money opposed to smaller cash payments over a longer period. This cash injection immediately saw a rise in market prices, disadvantaging those who did not receive reintegration packages and creating an expectation that further payments would be made.[260] Former child soldiers were an easy target for robbery and manipulation. Extended relatives agreed to house and look after former child soldiers but would renege on their obligations once the money ran out. Cash payments are designed to aid former combatants in their reintegration process and must rather be paid over a period of time.

Transfer of Skills

Instead of an automatic and often excessive focus on vocational training in the area of entrepreneurial business, overseers of reintegration programmes should identify skills that are needed by the communities which the former combatants are being reintegrated into. As an example, training in the areas of teaching, social work and basic health care

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[258] <u>Ibid.</u> p. 41.
[259] Ibid. p. 42.
[260] Gomes J and Parsons, I, <u>Op Cit</u>. p.70.

could help to reintroduce skills back into communities and provide relative job security.[261] Apprenticeships also provided a source of skills transfer and income generation to former child soldiers, especially those in more rural areas which might not be able to attend workshops. As an example, Angolan tailors, brick-layers and farmers were offered equipment at a reduced rate in exchange for taking on an apprentice.[262] If skills are identified in this context specific way; not only will the needs of people at a community level be met, but the costs of attaining these skills by trainee and state will be absorbed within the economic profile of the country.[263]

This context specific approach might also help in the prevention of growing tension between former combatants and their surrounding community. Resentment between the two groups might lessen if the community can see that the training being afforded to former combatants, which is often not offered to civilians, is being channelled back into the same community. In this way reintegration programmes are able to create a starting point for former combatants adjusting to civilian life and simultaneously acknowledge the needs of people at the community level.

Current state of play

By 2008, over three-quarters of states-including Angola-have now signed, ratified or acceded to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.[264] Angola also ratified an accompanying declaration stipulating that only persons twenty years of age will be included in the Angolan Army, and the minimum age for voluntary enlistment is eighteen years.[265] The signing and keeping of this convention can be attributed in large part to the local and international pressure applied by CSOs and IOs. As was previously highlighted in chapter two, the international Convention on the Rights of the Child might not be enforceable legislation but it is never the less a regime around which actors' expectations converge. International and domestic pressure was placed on Angolan authorities to firstly acknowledge the problem of child soldiers and thereafter sign and

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[261] Meek, S, "Confidence-Building measures as tools for Disarmament and Development" in *African Security Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2005. p. 20.
[262] Verhey, B, 2001a, Op Cit. p.53.
[263] Meek, S and Malan, M, Op Cit. p. 26.
[264] Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008"
[265] Ibid.

adhere to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (and additional protocol) which would prevent further recruitment or exploitation of children. DDR as a security regime is reinforced by the continued beliefs and support of the international community. It is this support which established DDR as a preferred solution to post conflict peace and gave this process its entrenched regime status. While DDR compliance is possibly easier to monitor, it presently remains difficult to monitor actor compliance in terms of child soldiers and their individual rights. Treaties or conventions within a regime are left to the specific state to interpret and apply according to that state's domestic laws. If states do not disarm and develop according to the stipulated DDR model, much needed funding can be withdrawn. However in the case of the recruitment of child soldiers or their effective reintegration, a state's sovereignty often blocks most avenues of recourse. It is therefore necessary to recognise the importance of effective reintegration and make sure the reintegration of former child soldiers is not only effectively incorporated into the DDR regime but also highlighted as a crucial developmental stage.

Since 2004 long-running conflicts (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) have drawn to a close. The conflict might have subsided but there has been limited if any long-term provision for the reintegration of former child soldiers and internally displaced children.[266] Angola has still not completed the reintegration phase of DDR due the narrow targeting of benefits, the lack of involvement by local government, the absence of any form of national reconciliation and the emphasis of economic integration in a climate of extreme poverty and social exclusion.[267] *The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers* reports that post conflict planners still neglect children despite published material and lessons learned about the priorities and needs of children during DDR. In their 2008 Global Report, *The Coalition* identifies Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Guinea, Liberia and Southern Sudan as having made inadequate provision for the long-term reintegration of former child soldiers. While most present DDR programmes make provision for children, the long-term financial and political support needed to successfully reintegrate former child soldiers is often lacking and community programmes have not been well supported.[268]

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[266] Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme, "Final MDRP Fact Sheet", country profile last updated August 2009,
     (Accessed at: http://www.mdrp.org/angola.htm).
[267] Ruigrok, I. Op Cit. p. 84.
[268] Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008".

Chapter 7 - Conclusion

This paper has hopefully highlighted the importance of bridging the gap between conceptual development and operational realities.[269] The case of Angola is proof that a post conflict state's reintegration needs extend far beyond the signing of a peace agreement or the drawing up of a DDR programme. The current problems facing the implementation of DDR efforts in post conflict states have been discussed. Recommendations pertaining to both DDR in general, and the specific reintegration of former child soldiers, has been detailed in an attempt to identify practical steps IOs, CSOs and governments can take together to ensure sustainable peace and effective reintegration.

DDR programmes need to be routinely monitored and evaluated in order for the information, gained from previous endeavours, to be rerouted into the future planning and development of better, more effective security regimes. It is important that DDR must be viewed as both a continuation of the political dialogue as well as a concept that should be expanded to encompass "the transformation of the organisation in question, as well as the requirements of individuals".[270] Individual security can only be achieved once a post conflict state is stable and possesses a well planned DDR programme.

Presently, there is no clear correlation between the existence of precedents and good development of DDR. Despite previous experience, it is common to find failed programmes, or programmes experiencing difficulties.[271] Current DDR processes are not absolute and should be open to improvement, especially in light of special interests groups such as women and child soldiers. Despite the United Nations' efforts to develop integrated DDR standards there is still a great need for further research and more efficient long term implementation. Currently reintegration programmes remain poorly funded, and this lack of research has prevented practitioners from developing better reintegration programs.[272] It has been shown that DDR is a recognised security regime,

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[269] Meek, S and Malan, M, Op Cit. p. 52.
[270] Knight, M, Op Cit. p. 1.
[271] Caramés, A and Sanz, E, 2009, Op Cit. p.17.
[272] Hanson, S, Op Cit.

however the protection and reintegration of former child soldiers is still being neglected. The two most recognised legal frameworks specifically protecting children's human rights during conflict settings are; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (12 February 2002) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1 July 2002).[273] This international legislation recognises the recruitment of child soldiers as an international war crime. While individuals and groups can now be prosecuted for the recruitment of any persons under the age of eighteen years, legal proceedings are often slow and costly.[274] The UN does have a number of monitoring bodies which monitor state compliance but efficient enforcement mechanisms would be more effective. It is the responsibility of international and domestic communities, organisations and individuals to make the rights of the child an international norm. In the same way that financial aid can be withdrawn form post conflict states for non-compliance, enforcement mechanisms must be put in place to acknowledge the plight of post conflict children and their specialised needs.

While the situations in Angola and other post conflict states are often different, there are also similarities in the roles that CSOs can and are playing. Coordination and communication between state and non-state actors still appears to be the major obstacle to efficient and more effective collective action. It is very rare that one single organisation or state structure will be able to provide strategies and solutions for all the problems post conflict states present. This paper has attempted to show how state structures, IOs and CSOs on both an international and local level must identify their individual strengths and then work together in addressing the many issues a post conflict state faces. True collaboration will require a state to loosen its grip on sovereignty at the same time as IOs and CSOs strive to administer aid, share information, transfer skills and simultaneously respect the domestic laws and customs of each particular country.

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[273] Druba, V, "The Problem of Child Soldiers" in *International Review of Education*, Vol. 48, No. 3-4, July 2002, p.274.
[274] Druba, V, "The Problem of Child Soldiers" in *International Review of Education*, Vol. 48, No. 3-4, July 2002, p.274.

Acronyms

AAF –	Angolan Armed Forces
CCF –	Christian Children's Fund
CIPP –	Inter-Sectoral Commission for the Peace Process and National Reconciliation/
	Comissão Nacional de Reintegracão Social e Productiva dos Desmobilzados e Deslocados
CSOs –	Civil Society Organisations
DDR –	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
FAA –	Forcas Armadas Angolanas/ Armed Forces of Angola
GURN –	Government of National Unity and Reconciliation
ILO –	International Labour Organisation
IOs –	International Organisations
ICRC –	International Committee of the Red Cross
IOM –	International Organisation on Migration
IRSEM –	National Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
JC –	Joint Commission
JMC –	Joint Military Commission
MI –	Medico International
MINARS –	Ministerio de Assistência e Reinsercão Social (Ministry of Social Welfare)
MoU –	Memorandum of Understanding
NGOs –	Non-governmental Organisation
SeCoR –	Servico Comunitário de Referência (Community Referral Service)
STC –	Save The Children
TCS –	Transnational Civil Society
UCAH –	UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit
UNICEF –	The United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA –	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola/ National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
QIP –	Quick Impact Project

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