STATE STRATEGY AND TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES.

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The art of crisis management, now widely acknowledged to be the essence of statecraft, owes its vogue to the merger of politics and spectacle. Propaganda seeks to create in the public a chronic sense of crisis, which in turn justifies the expansion of executive power and the secrecy surrounding it. The executive then asserts his "presidential" qualities by conveying his determination to rise to crisis, whatever the crisis of the moment happens to be — to run risks, to test his mettle, to shrink from no danger, to resort to bold and decisive action even when the occasion calls for prudence and caution (Lasch 1985: 78).

Much of the contemporary debate on the transition from an apartheid to an apartheid free South Africa has primarily focussed on the question of class alliances and the possibility of socialism. This literature has not, in any detail, discussed the nature of the apartheid state and the prior question of how a transition is to be brought about. The important debates concerning the role of the working class in alliance with other classes do not put any suggestions forward as to how the apartheid state is to be transformed.

Recently, two positions on this question have emerged. First, John Saul (1986: 3-22) makes some interesting arguments concerning the relationship between the popular democratic and proletarian themes in the liberation struggle and the way they are reflected in the liberation movements. However, on the question of transition, Saul merely makes vague references to the 'overthrow of the apartheid state', the resistance movements 'forcing a transition to a democratic resolution of South Africa's crisis' and 'the smashing of the apartheid state'. All this is said in the context of his correct assertion that the 'brute capacity of the state to bottle up the challenge (to it)...has not been deeply threatened'.

Second, and more recently, Roger Southall (1987: 345-374) discusses the possibility of socialism as well as other scenarios in a post-apartheid South Africa. His argument is premised on the unclear assumption that a transition has occurred 'not (by) the revolutionary overthrow of the state but (by) its erosion from below'. Later on, he asserts that much of the argument about the ongoing struggle concerns 'the strength of the white state, and the supposition that it cannot be overthrown, only eroded'.

The problem with both these positions, excluding their vagueness, is that they do not seriously consider the institutional structure of the South African state, its power and its tactical responses to the recent wave of popular militancy in South Africa. In other words, the mechanics of transition are not rigorously examined as these authors have focussed their discussions on other themes, and it is to this
question, the question of transition and the state, that this paper is
directed. However, before examining the contemporary line up of forces
in the South African milieu, the way the liberation movements have
historically viewed the state and the tactics they have adopted to
effect a transition will be discussed.

LENIN ON IMPERIALISM AND THE STATE

At least three different conceptions of imperialism can be identified in
Lenin's (1977: 634-731) Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism
(IHSC). First, imperialism is defined in terms of the mere seizure of
territory. The second version is also descriptive as imperialism is
depicted as the monopoly phase of capitalism where finance and
industrial capital have become fused. This view of imperialism is also
characterised in terms of capitalism in transition to socialism due to
the contradiction between the forces and relations of production being
held in check in the metropole by a strong and repressive state.

The third version of imperialism, also the most well known, attempts to
explain the relationship between the metropolitan and peripheral
countries. In this version, the contradiction between the forces and
relations of production is (temporarily?) resolved by the exporting of
capital to the colonies where it is possible to obtain raw materials and
labour-power cheaply facilitating the accumulation of super-profits
which, when repatriated, are used partly to buy off the militancy of the
most militant and enfranchised sectors of the metropolitan proletariat.
This implies that, unlike the second version of imperialism, the
metropolitan country is characterised by inter-class consensus due to
imperialist ideology on the need for the metropolitan country to oppress
and exploit the colony. Because profitability in the colony can only be
maintained by the political oppression of the indigenous peoples a
situation of 'national oppression' arises. This results in resistance
which takes the form of rebellions or wars for national independence.

Thus, Lenin's IHSC does not contain a consistent definition of
imperialism nor an unambiguous view of conditions in the metropole. The
implications of this will become clear later.

While there are discrepancies in IHSC, there is no explicit theorization
of the state in the metropole or colony. Lenin, (1984: 1-114) however,
does theorize the state in State and Revolution (SR) although this
should not be seen as an attempt to redress the above mentioned lacunae.
Lenin's theory of the state is easily summarized. It is nothing more
than an instrument, a body of armed men, which the ruling class uses to
oppress the ruled classes. From this, a revolutionary strategy follows
whereby the dominated classes must seize and smash the state.
Parliamentary participation is seen to be pointless as the real affairs
of state occur behind the scenes while elections merely put into office
new representatives of the bourgeoisie who are intent on repressing the
masses. Finally in SR, Lenin endorses the second view of imperialism
with the state implementing repressive measures to maintain imperialism
in its highest stage.
Lenin (1977: 322) in *Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* (LWC), written some three years after SR, argues that although parliament from the perspective of world history is obsolete, it still needs to be overcome in practice. In this regard, Lenin advocates the participation of the revolutionary party in parliament to achieve a certain objective. He argues that because the party is weak and therefore unable to overthrow these parliaments, by participating in them, it will be able to change the consciousness of the masses who are duped into accepting these institutions. This will result in the strengthening of the party enabling the seizure of power. At no point does Lenin take the institutional structure of parliament seriously and participation is advocated as a tactic to win support for the seizure and smashing of these institutions.

Lenin's views on the state, strategy and imperialism are important as, with the rise of fascism in Europe, the Comintern (of which the Communist Party of South Africa was a member) selectively read Lenin's texts to analyse fascism as well as formulate a response binding on all affiliated parties.

**THE COMINTERN AND ANTI-FASCIST STRATEGY**

Originally, the Comintern understood fascism to be caused by low levels of economic development. However, with the emergence of fascism in Germany, a country with a highly developed economy, the Comintern revealed a volte face (cf Poulantzas 1974: 37-58). It now understood fascism in terms of Lenin's second model of imperialism where monopoly capitalism, characterised by the contradiction between the forces and relations of production, was maintained by the brutal repression of the working masses by the state. Thus, fascism was understood simply in terms of increased repression by a state acting in the interests of monopoly capital. In fact, the Comintern thought fascism to be intrinsic to, and the logical outcome of, capitalist development in any context.

Nonetheless, with this 'analysis' of fascism, the Comintern codified its anti-fascist strategy at its Seventh Congress in 1935. Lenin's warnings on parliamentary participation in SR were suspended and the recommendations of LWC implemented. At the same time, the Comintern put forward the idea of united and popular fronts (cf Poulantzas 1974: 163-4). The former referred to the co-operation of all working class organisations while the latter referred to an alliance of the working class and all other potentially democratic and anti-monopoly capital classes including the peasantry and petite-bourgeoisie. The popular front was to incorporate all those classes whose interests were threatened by monopoly capital, the cause of fascism.

This new strategic direction of the Comintern had important ramifications for the CPSA formed in 1921.

**THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE AND STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE 1935 - 1960**

Prior to this policy change, the CPSA had supported and implemented the Comintern 1928 resolution concerning the establishment of independent and anti-imperialist republics for colonial countries. Translated into
the South African context, this meant that the task of the revolution was to overthrow the rule of the British and Boer imperialists and the installation of a democratic and independent native Republic as a stage towards the final overthrow of capitalism in South Africa (Simons and Simons 1983: 390). However, as early as 1931, it appears as if the CPSA had begun to implement the new policy directives of the Comintern which were codified in 1935. The long term goal was still the overthrow of Anglo-Boer imperialism but in the shorter term 'the first objective now was to ward off fascism and war' (Simons and Simons 1983: 478). While it is clear that the CPSA adopted and implemented the Comintern's new policy, it is necessary to examine how this policy was implemented and the consequences that it had for local developments.

In 1925, Hertzog, as leader of the Pact Government which came to power after the 1924 election, announced his intention to remove blacks from the common voters roll in the Cape. This common voters roll began in the mid Nineteenth Century (Trapido 1980: 247-274) and in order to qualify, one had to be male, over the age of eighteen and a taxpayer. Hertzog's Bill became law in 1936 at the same time that the 1913 Land Act was modified against squatters on white owned farms. While blacks were removed from the common voters roll, three new institutions were established for them to make their wishes known to government (Roth 1986: 144). First, the Cape voters, who had been removed from the common roll, could now elect three white representatives to the House of Assembly. Second, the whole of the black electorate (that is, all males over the age of eighteen who were taxpayers in South Africa) could vote for four senators. Finally, this same electorate could also vote for the Natives Representatives Council (NRC) whose function would be to comment on all new legislation on black affairs. In other words, it was only an advisory body.

Nonetheless, in 1935 when it became apparent that Hertzog's bills would soon be passed into law, responses were formulated by the CPSA, African National Congress (ANC) and Non European Unity Movement (NEUM) which formed after a break-away from the CPSA (Alexander 1986: 3). This resulted in the formation of the All African Convention (AAC) in December 1935. At the same time, the League Against Fascism and War was established to 'defend civil liberties and the democratic ideal'. Simons and Simons (1983: 475) go on to argue that the CPSA's activities concerning the League and AAC were in accordance with the Comintern's Seventh Congress of 1935. Thus, it would seem as if the League and AAC would respectively focus on the European and local arenas.

The first elections for representatives to sit in these new institutions, as well as the urban advisory boards was scheduled for 1937. A debate arose within the AAC over whether or not to participate with the NEUM raising objections to participation on the grounds of Hindu religious doctrine and class independence (Alexander 1986: 4). In other words, the boycott, non-participation or anti-collaboration tradition in South African extra-parliamentary politics can be traced back to this point in time. Despite this disagreement within the AAC, the CPSA and ANC participated with the latter getting three of its members elected onto the NRC (Simons and Simons 1983: 497). The CPSA justified its participation in the elections by arguing that it would be better to have militants in these institutions who could then act in the
interests of, and consolidate among, their constituencies. Edwin Mafutsanyana, commenting on advisory board elections, made this position clear when he said that 'Radicals had blundered by allowing the urban advisory boards to become the agents of white municipalities. The proper course was to secure the election of militants who would conduct a struggle against high rents, lodgers' permits, beer brewing and other vexatious regulations' (in Simons and Simons 1983: 498). At the same time, it was argued that an election boycott must be universal to be effective. If candidates were elected in polls of one percent, they would still hold office. Thus, it was best for militants to stand for election who, when elected, could, as the Irish Republicans had done, refuse to take their seats making the boycott total (Roux 1978: 298). On the other hand, the ANC participated in the NRC elections because of its early history of sending deputations to government as well as reports that the NRC would become a parliament for blacks (Roth 1986: 144).

In 1938, local events took a dramatic turn when the United Party (UP) was elected into office. This had two important implications. First, Smuts' pro-British policies resulted in the CPSA supporting him and the war effort in an attempt to defend Russia from a German invasion. Second, Smuts' pro-British stance led to the formation of the Ossewa-Brandwag (OB) an Afrikaner pro-Nazi organisation which mobilized support around the harsh experiences of the Anglo-Boer war. In any event, by supporting and co-operating with the UP over the war effort, the CPSA was acting in accordance with Comintern policy. However, this European focus nearly caused a split in the CPSA as it was felt by Mafutsanyana, the general secretary, that the party was losing support as well as neglecting its role in the liberation front. He claimed that the African people were betrayed by such action and that party meetings were not well attended due to Africans being mainly concerned with the oppression under which they lived (Simons and Simons 1983: 484).

In this regard, the twists in CPSA policy took a new turn. With the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939, the CPSA no longer supported the war in Europe as Russia was no longer threatened (Roux 1978: 308). The party therefore ceased co-operating with the UP government and began to focus its attention on the African masses by, inter alia, campaigning against their recruitment into the military. Thus, in June 1939, the central committee of the CPSA argued that the fight against fascism understood in terms of Afrikaner nationalism and its pro-Nazi implications should begin at home. It is important to note that the CPSA did not explain fascism in South Africa in terms of the contradiction between the forces and relations of production. Instead, fascism was understood as the importation and adaptation of Nazism to South Africa which was attractive to existing anti-British Afrikaner sentiment (Simons and Simons 1983: 483).

This turn to the African masses was, however, shortlived as Germany soon attacked Russia and the CPSA reverted to its previous position of supporting the UP. This redirection of attention towards the international arena had important local consequences, one of which was the consolidation of the non-collaboration grouping within the AAC resulting in it affiliating to the NEUM.
The boycott position grew and at the time of the 1942 NRC elections, calls from within the ANC were made for non-participation. After the elections, in which the ANC and CPSA participated with some success, young intellectuals in the ANC formed the ANC-Youth League (ANC-YL) in 1943. The ANC-YL called for non-collaboration, boycotts and a programme of positive action (Simons and Simons 1983: 546; Roth 1986: 157). The debate over participation came to a head in 1946 when the NRC was adjourned at the time of the miners' strike never to be reconvened although elections were scheduled for 1948. There was, however, no unanimous decision in both the ANC and CPSA to adopt a boycott position which was propagated by the ANC-YL (Roth 1986: 155). While the AAC did not participate in the 1948 elections, sticking to its 1943 resolution of a total boycott, the ANC and CPSA, for different reasons did put candidates forward. The former modified its December 1947 boycott resolution on the grounds that members of the NRC should be returned to office while new councillors be elected on a boycott ticket. It was also thought that to advise the electorate to abstain from voting would create confusion in, and divide, the masses. The ANC, in intensifying the boycott campaign thought this to be the most effective way to attain its objective (Simons and Simons 1983: 582). The latter reaffirmed its criticism of non-participation arguing further that the vote was a right not to be voluntarily suspended while advocating a boycott would enable the government to abolish all aspects of franchise rights on the grounds that blacks themselves did not want them (Roth 1986: 158).

These developments must be situated in the context of changes which had come about after the Second World War had ended in 1945. With the defeat of Hitler and the Soviet Union no longer threatened, the CPSA joined other organisations in directing all its energy towards local events. The main task which the CPSA set itself was to fight the NP seen as fascist by implementing Comintern anti-fascist policy locally (Turok 1972: 265). This meant supporting the UP, participating in elections as well as working within black working class organisations such as trade unions which had grown due to pre- and post war industrial development. At its annual conference in January 1948, the CPSA declared, inter-alia, that 'The primary aim of communists in the forthcoming general election would be the bring about the defeat of the pro-fascist Nationalist party' (in Simons and Simons 1983: 582).

While the NP narrowly won the 1948 election, the CPSA, which was already represented on the Cape Provincial Council, had its candidate Sam Kahn elected to the House of Assembly under the amended Cape Native Franchise Act. In 1949, in response to the NP's election, both the ANC and CPSA announced their plans aimed at removing them from power. The CPSA, at its annual conference, advocated a positive campaign both inside and outside parliament emphasizing the role of mass struggle at all times (in Turok 1972: 267-8). Thus, the CPSA had a flexible approach to parliamentary politics while, at the same time, it had no illusions as to what it on its own could achieve. It constantly stressed that the boycott was a tactic and not a principle. On the other hand, the ANC, at its annual conference, announced and adopted its Programme of Action which stressed extra-parliamentary peaceful protest and passive resistance along the lines of Gandhi's successful earlier anti-pass law campaigns. This Programme of Action was the foundation for the Defiance Campaign which began in 1952.
However, it soon became clear that the NP government intended to proscribe the CPSA with its proposed Suppression of Communism Bill. The CPSA, at its conference in 1950, decided to disband prior to the Bill becoming law. But, before disbanding, the CPSA presented a new analysis of South Africa. It was now argued that the 'distinguishing feature of South Africa is that it combines the characteristics of both an imperialist state and a colony within a single indivisible geographical, political and economic entity'. This led to the conclusion that 'the nationalist organisations must be transformed into a revolutionary party of workers, peasants, intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie...in alliance with the class conscious European workers and intellectuals' (in Davies et al 1984: 283). While the popular front strategy is again reaffirmed, other aspects of this conference resolution are most important. First, the CPSA appears to have shifted from its analysis of fascism in South Africa being an import and application of Nazism to South Africa by the OB and NP. Instead, it now seems to explain fascism in South Africa in terms of the Comintern analysis, which draws heavily from Lenin's IHSC. This interpretation will be substantiated later when other documents are analysed. Second, the conceptual framework for characterising South Africa in terms of 'internal colonialism' or 'colonialism of a special type' is set forth at the 1950 conference. Although the CPSA had disbanded, many of its former members continued to work in black trade unions while those who were members of the ANC as well devoted their energies to that organisation.

The Suppression of Communism Bill became law in 1950 and in 1952, it was used to expel former CPSA members from the Cape Provincial Council and House of Assembly. However, former CPSA members continued to stand for election in the Cape Western constituency and on each occasion won while the government used the Suppression of Communism Act in turn to remove them from the House of Assembly. More importantly, 1952 marks the state's response to the Defiance Campaign when it passed the Public Safety Bill into law. This legislation empowered the government to, inter alia, declare a state of emergency and suspend existing legislation.

In the midst of the Defiance Campaign was the impending 1953 House of Assembly elections and the NP had announced its intentions to remove 'coloureds' in the Cape from the common voters' roll. Although the UP had supported the NP in removing former CPSA members from parliament, the passing of the Public Safety Act and the removal of 'coloured' franchise rights, former communists continued to work with the UP. They acknowledged that the UP, the only opposition party, was hardly an alternative to the NP but argued that the immediate task of the struggle was to defeat the most 'reactionary, extreme right-wing element in the body politic of the country, namely the Nationalists...' (Yusuf Dadoo in Advance 29/03/53). Indeed, in 1953, former members of the CPSA decided to reconstitute themselves and the South African Communist Party (SACP) was formed and operated clandestinely until many of its members were arrested at Rivonia in 1963.

While the events of the Defiance Campaign will not be recounted here (cf Lodge 1983a:33-66) it is worth noting that the campaign articulated with mass based resistance in the urban and rural areas (cf Lodge 1983a).
which resulted from the government's attempts to impose betterment schemes, its tampering with traditional tribal structures, implementation of urban segregation policy and the imposition of passes onto black women. The climax to all these events came in 1955 when the Congress of the People accepted the Freedom Charter as the political and economic programme for a post-apartheid South Africa. The momentum of the masses and the liberation movements had slowed down somewhat after the events of the mid 1950's but rapidly accelerated in 1960 when both the Pan African Congress (formed after Africanists had left the ANC in 1959) and ANC announced their anti-pass campaigns in December 1959. As it turned out, the PAC's campaign, which began on 21 March 1960, precipitated the crisis that was to lead to the state of emergency being declared as well as the banning of both the PAC and ANC.

Such action by the state was to set a new phase of struggle in motion. However, the state of emergency and the banning of the liberation movements seemed to have been successful in halting the militancy of the masses. The reasons for this are complex but two factors were possibly very important. First, the liberation movements did not focus on grass roots level organisation and consolidation. The 'M Plan' was advocated in late 1953. It recommended that branches divide into cells, zones and then wards (Lodge 1983a: 75). However, this plan was only implemented in some parts of the Eastern Cape and Natal and in December 1955, the National Executive of the ANC reported that agitation was still confined to mass meetings and public gatherings while the building of small local branches was important although not advanced (in Lodge 1983a: 75). Part of the explanation as to why local organisation was neglected was the shortage of people to do this work as well as the lack of time due to the speed and magnitude of events. Second, the aim of the liberation movements had been to bring apartheid to an end and it was thought that mass based extra-parliamentary protest would indeed disorganize the system and make it unworkable. This would then facilitate a transition to a non-racial and democratic society. The state, however, illustrated its ability to withstand this assault as well as deal a severe blow to the liberation movements forcing them to rethink strategy.

ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE STATE 1961 - 1987

On 16 December 1961, nearly two years after the Sharpeville crisis, units of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) carried out bomb attacks against government installations in major South African cities. This turn to violent forms of struggle was not unanimously accepted by all the members of the liberation movements. Indeed, there is some controversy over the reasons for the turn to armed struggle (Lodge 1983a: 231-240; Davis and Fine 1985). Nonetheless, it marked a new phase in the liberation struggle accompanied by new conception of the state.

The sabotage campaign which began in 1961 and continued up to 1964 had a threefold objective. First, to spur the masses on to continue the momentum of the late 1950's and early 1960's. Second, to set in process, via mass based action, a guerrilla operation. Third, it was also an attempt to warn the government and its supporters that unless they changed their policies, confrontation would be imminent (MK in Carter et al 1977: 717). The ultimate aim of the liberation movements was now the seizure and smashing of the state which acted in the
interests of whites and monopoly capital to enable a transition to a state of national democracy.

These ideas were codified in the SACP's programme, The Road to South African Freedom (RTF) adopted at its fifth underground conference held in October 1962. In this document, the notion of internal colonialism as sketched out in 1950 is used to characterise the South African social formation. Thus, in RTF (nd: 28), the South African state is "On one level, that of 'White South Africa', there are all the features of an advanced capitalist state in its final stage of imperialism. There are highly developed monopolies and the merging of industrial and finance capital ... But on another level, that of 'Non-White South Africa', there are all the features of a colony. The indigenous population is subject to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation..." RTF goes on to argue that like imperialist rule elsewhere, the state relies solely on brute force and violence to maintain itself and the interests it represents. The cohesion of the white bloc is explained in terms of the white working class being a labour aristocracy who have been incorporated into an alliance with the monopolists by their receipt of rewards accrued from the super-profits derived from the exploitation of the non-whites. Consequently, RTF argues that there is a large degree of consensus in the white bloc with white workers having the vote while real power lies in the hands of the monopolists. This results in the state moving "increasingly towards the pattern of fascism: an open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary and racialist section of capitalists" (RTF nd: 3). Change, therefore can come about only by the overthrow of the 'colonialist state of white supremacy'.

It is clear that the ideas in Lenin's IHSC and SR as well as the Comintern's analysis of fascism have informed RTF. In this regard, the ambiguities in these texts have been reproduced in RTF. First, RTF implies that there is consensus in the white nation (metropole) while at the same time characterising the state as fascist suggesting that all non-monopoly classes are oppressed. RTF (nd: 52) even mentions the possibility of an alliance of all democratic and anti-monopoly classes. Second, and more importantly, RTF merely describes South Africa using Leninist categories, that is, it uses ideas present in the second and third model of imperialism in Lenin's IHSC to categorise South Africa. At no point does it explain why the South African social formation has taken its particular form. Lenin, in the third model, explains the relationship between metropole and colony in terms of the export of capital. However, because South Africa has these features in one geographic area, it cannot be argued that the crisis has been exported onto the 'black-nation' as capital, following the logic of Lenin's argument, is exported out of the country. It is in this context that Wolpe's (1972, 1975, 1980a) cheap labour-power thesis becomes important because it attempts to explain the specific nature of South Africa by using the migrant labour system and its functionality to capital as the mechanism which explains the relationship between the 'black and white nations'.

Nonetheless, what is important in RTF is the conceptualisation of the state as a tool for maintaining monopoly domination which must be seized as 'a mere change of government to another section of the white ruling class would make superficial concessions, while leaving the essence of
the colonial system and monopoly control intact' (RTF nd: 51). In other
words, the idea of prioritizing the removal of the NP from power as in
the mid 1950's has been replaced by the notion of the destruction of
white domination.

While RTF (nd: 54) vaguely mentions the formation of guerilla armies to
undertake armed resistance which will 'culminate in a mass insurrection
against white domination', Operation Mayibuye (OM) (in Carter et al
1977: 761) puts forward a detailed plan for the implementation of a full
scale guerilla war. OM had not been accepted by the MK High Command
when the document was discovered by the police at Rivonia in mid 1963.
The arrest of the leadership of the liberation movements occurred at the
same time as the Poqo insurrection in the Eastern Cape. However, the
subsequent collapse of the liberation movement's underground structure
meant that the struggle had to be planned by those who had previously
left the country and those who went into exile. It was only after
organisational consolidation in exile that the liberation movements
attempted to implement the strategy of guerilla warfare as set out in
OM. The object was for guerillas to infiltrate into South Africa and
consolidate among the rural population while sabotaging state and
economic institutions throughout South Africa so that the armed forces'
capacity to protect such institutions would be limited. With the
weakening of the state and the strengthening of the masses the seizure
of power was thought to be possible.

In 1967, guerillas on their way to South Africa were intercepted by
Rhodesian security forces and the mission not only failed but it also
resulted in South Africa sending members of its police force to Rhodesia
to prevent future attempted incursions. Despite the failure of this
mission, this notion of guerilla warfare was still considered valid and
was codified in the ANC's Strategy and Tactics Of the South African
Revolution (ST) accepted as policy at Morogoro in 1969. Furthermore,
not only is the internal colonialism characterisation of South Africa
reaffirmed in ST, but the idea of the seizure of the state now
understood as combining repressive and ideological aspects is presented.
This is important because ST (1972: 190-198) appears to follow the theme
in Lenin's IHSC that national oppression necessarily results in
resistance when it asserts that 'It is naive to believe that oppressed
and beleaguered people cannot be temporarily, even in large numbers, be
won over by fears, terror, lies, indoctrination, and provocation....'
and 'the national sense of grievance is the most potent revolutionary
force which must be harnessed'. Thus, because the theoretical analysis
of South Africa in terms of internal colonialism is thought to grasp the
reality of the situation it is thought that the masses would be
receptive to the guerillas who would then act as a catalyst enabling
latent conflict to manifest itself in the form of a mass based struggle
for national liberation.

Despite the obvious Hegelian undertones of this analysis and its
voluntaristic implications, later attempts by guerillas to enter and
consolidate in South Africa seem to have been unsuccessful and the
decade between Rivonia and 1973 probably marks the nadir of the exile
liberation movements. However, as Nolutshungu (1982: 147) points out,
'the emergence of the black consciousness movement (BC) was perhaps the
single most important development in the internal politics of South
Africa in the period 1967-76. While the relationship between BC and the exile movements is unclear, there can be little doubt as to the effect which BC had in setting in motion a new phase of struggle in South Africa. At the same time, the consequences of the Durban strikes of the early 1970's which were probably caused by low wages and high inflation (Du Toit 1981: 247) cannot be underestimated. Nonetheless, the Soweto uprising of 1976 (Kane-Berman 1978, Hirson 1979) and the subsequent spread of urban rebellion in South Africa is pivotal in making sense of more recent oppositional strategic thinking as well as state restructuring and tactics. Before drawing out these implications, Slovo's "South Africa - No Middle Road (NMR)" written in 1975 needs to be discussed.

Slovo (1976: 32) acknowledges that 'internal colonialism' is a convenient shorthand for describing the South African social formation while he explains racial domination in terms of the continuity of colonial institutions in a modern industrial economy. He does not, however, explain how and why the modern industrial economy modifies and preserves these institutions and their symbiotic relationship is asserted rather than demonstrated as Wolpe attempts to do. This reciprocal and mutually reinforcing view of the relationship between race and class has important repercussions for Slovo's analysis of the state. As Wolpe (1980b: 10) points out, within such a perspective, any state restructuring or constitutional change necessarily implies a fine tuning of the system of racial oppression and class exploitation. In other words, the effects of state restructuring are known in advance and therefore do not need to be analysed despite the way such restructuring redefines the political terrain for the opposition. Such a view has recently been presented by Deng (1985: 71) who claims that the proposals of monopoly capital and the idea of power sharing (that is recent state reform initiatives) simply mark the modification and perfection of colonial relations as opposed to their destruction. Ultimately, such a view of the state suggests an oppositional strategy premised upon the organisation of the masses outside of state structures (if this is at all possible) for the overthrow of the state.

While these theoretical debates are most important, the events of the last quarter of the 1970's were dramatic. With the student and township rebellions, and the efflux of youths out of the country to join the exiled liberation movements, an internal and receptive mass base for opposition politics emerged and the strategy of 'armed propaganda' was implemented (Lodge 1983b). It aimed to popularize the liberation movements and establish internal structures by sabotaging institutions or buildings which were symbolic of black oppression. This campaign appears to have been successful and laid the foundation for a new phase of guerilla and armed struggle in the mid 1980's when, due to grass roots township rebellions over rents and the establishment of unpopular local authorities by the government in 1982, the idea of 'people's war' emerged (Lodge 1986a). It was now thought that internal political opposition was sufficiently established after anti-local authority and anti-tri-cameral parliament campaigns to train and arm people in the communities as opposed to guerillas having to continuously infiltrate into South Africa. Part of the reason for this new approach is that natural conditions in South Africa are not conducive to classic models
of guerilla warfare (OM: 761-2) but, at the same time, the possibility of the South African security forces acting against bases in frontline states meant that internal consolidation of organization was a priority.

Clearly, the events of the mid-1980's mark the apex of the struggle for national liberation. Community organisations had sprung up throughout the country and unlike the 1950's, structures at street, local and area level were consolidated. At the same time, national organisations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and National Forum (NF) which formed in response to the tri-cameral parliament and Koornhof bills linked the community based uprisings into a national social movement. Similarly, the independent trade union movement which had grown rapidly in the mid 1970's and early 1980's made its presence felt in the political arena by participating in broad and off the factory floor campaigns. It is at this point that a crucial development seems to have occurred in the exile movements' strategic thinking: the idea of a negotiated settlement as opposed to the seizure of power emerges in early 1985 (The Guardian Weekly 10/02/85). The ANC is reported to have offered to suspend the armed struggle if the South African government committed itself to meaningful talks. This view was reaffirmed by Tambo in his 'Message From The National Executive Committee Of The ANC' dated January 8 1987 to mark the 75th Anniversary of the ANC where it was stated that 'We reiterate our commitment to seize any opportunity that may arise to participate in a negotiated resolution of the conflict in our country' (Star 25/04/87). This new position on negotiations is premised on the assumption that if the government does not enter into negotiations, the armed struggle will continue with the objective of forcing a negotiated settlement. The idea that the forces for change must still be organised from without the state is still present in this new position. Nonetheless, the significance of the emergence of negotiations on the liberation movements' agenda will be discussed later in the context of the Eminent Persons' Group (EPG) visit to South Africa in early 1986.

RETHINKING THE STATE AND OPPOSITION

The object of the preceeding discussion has been to illustrate the changes in strategy and tactics in the thinking of the liberation movements. The most important change was that of the turn to armed struggle in 1961 which was, in retrospect, justified in terms of revolutionary as opposed to constitutional politics with the latter fostering illusions (Slovo 1973: 325; Turok 1972: 282). In other words, revolutionary forms of struggle were associated with the seizure of the state while constitutional avenues were considered to be not only ineffective but also a hinderance. This idea of relegating constitutional forms of struggle to a lower level is reinforced by the idea that all state restructuring is merely the 'fine-tuning' of the system. In what follows, an alternative explanation of state restructuring will be presented and the question of participation will be raised.
VERWOERD, VORSTER AND THE RISE OF BOTHA

Conventional analyses of the reform era of South Africa, that is recent developments, tend to associate the impulse to reform with P.W. Botha who emerged as the leader of the NP in 1978. However, in order to fully comprehend the changes which have occurred, it is necessary to briefly characterise the government and state of the Verwoerd and Vorster eras.

The Verwoerd administration (1958-66) was, according to Giliomee (1983), characterised by ideological clarity which was the result of the NP's moral vision of separate development. At the same time, after consolidating his power in the party, Verwoerd became an authoritarian leader who forced through major changes. He was 'a towering personality, he overruled ministers on departmental matters and in general created the impression that he alone was making all the decisions'. Moreover, under Verwoerd, the state bureaucracy reflected the policy of separate development, with the establishment of departments such as Bantu Administration, Coloured Affairs, Indian Affairs, Community Development etc. while it became a stronghold of the defenders of the policy. Verwoerd imbued the bureaucracy with his own particular political vision and, according to one commentator, 'attracted not pliable servants but like-minded ideologues'. The bureaucracy during the Verwoerd and Vorster governments remained cohesive and committed to the policy of separate development and were hostile to any attempts at reforming Verwoerian blueprint. This point is illustrated in the way Bantu Administration officials refused to deviate from the policy of blacks being 'temporary sojourners' in 'white' South Africa when, with the help of M.C. Botha, the Minister of Bantu Affairs, they obstructed the Urban Bantu Councils for which legislation was passed in the early 1960's (Giliomee 1983: 227).

However, the most important changes in the state during the Verwoerd era were the restructuring of the security and intelligence gathering agencies. This process occurred mainly in response to the mass based protests of the 1950's and early 1960's and the turn to armed struggle although it later gathered a momentum of its own.

Between 1948 and 1963, the Special Branch of the Police was entrusted with ensuring internal security. It was only in 1963, during Vorsters' tenure as Minister of Justice, that the Security Police was established under the leadership of Colonel van den Bergh who was nominated by Vorster and approved by Verwoerd (Grundy 1983: 12). Soon after the establishment of the Security Police, a new clandestine body was set up, Republican Intelligence (RI). It was an extension of the Security Police and was established to relieve it from the burden of intelligence gathering. The head of RI was van den Bergh whose reputation, after being transferred from the Security Police, grew with the growth of RI as well as his close friendship with Vorster both of whom were interned by the British during the Second World War.

The military in this period had not been a pivotal institution as the police and security police were strengthened to act against threats to the state. However, important developments did take place when the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) was established in 1960 and when P.W. Botha became Minister of Defence in 1966. Recently, President
Botha (SAUK TV NETWERK 29/05/88: 20H00 Hrs) in an interview recounted how he was appointed to this post. He said he was summoned by Verwoerd soon after the election and asked what portfolio he wanted. As he already was the Minister of Community Development and Coloured Affairs he suggested the Social Welfare and Pensions portfolio. P.W. Botha went on to say that Verwoerd offered him the defence portfolio stating that arms embargoes were expected and that local production in co-operation with the private sector should begin. This, he said, marked the beginning of Armscor. Soon after Botha’s appointment as Minister of Defence, Verwoerd was assassinated and B.J. Vorster became Prime Minister, a post he held until 1978.

Vorster’s administration was very different to that of Verwoerd’s. Whereas Verwoerd asserted his authority in most spheres of administration and policy formation, Vorster, according to Gilliomee (1983: 202), granted the various departments of government a large measure of autonomy. He adopted a “Chairman of the board” approach to government while pursuing pragmatic, tentative and experimental policies due to him not having a master plan as did Verwoerd. Furthermore, Vorster’s main concern was the maintenance of unity which was established through a process of accumulating accord by patient listening, persuasion and building of support.

Vorster’s style of government had two important consequences. First, a proliferation of cabinet committees, finally reaching twenty, at the time of his replacement as Prime Minister. Secondly, and more important, it facilitated the emergence of cliques within institutions which resulted in intense inter-institutional tension and rivalry. This is illustrated in the institutional restructuring of the security apparatus. In 1969, the covert operations of RI came into the open when the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) was established with van den Bergh at the helm. Latent tensions and conflicts between it, DMI and the Security Police became manifest. DMI thought that BOSS was trying to assume control over it and BOSS did have a section for military evaluation (Grundy 1983: 12). On the other hand, the Security Police were concerned with BOSS’ intrusion into their areas of operation and its recruitment of Security Police personnel.

These interdepartmental conflicts, which had more to do with in-fighting rather than different responses to social conflict as the 1960's and early 1970's marks the nadir of black apposition politics, led to Vorster appointing Justice H.J. Potgieter to head a Commission of Inquiry. Potgieter recommended the establishment of a State Security Council (SSC) which came into effect through the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act (No 64 of 1972). The SSC was empowered to formulate and implement policy concerning the security of the Republic and determine intelligence priorities. It was, in effect, created to demarcate the spheres of activity of the various security institutions thereby eliminating overlap and therefore conflict. In this regard it failed as, in the same year of its establishment, DMI (now renamed Military Intelligence Section, MIS) was empowered to engage in covert counter-intelligence operations inside South Africa thereby invading Security Police (and BOSS) turf (Grundy 1988: 43). Indeed the conflicts between MIS and BOSS in particular and the Security Police were aggravated and played out in the SSC. Officially, MIS was supposed
to report to van den Bergh who was the Prime Minister's security advisor. Instead, it circumvented the head of BOSS and reported directly to P.W. Botha, the Minister of Defence, who in turn reported to the SSC. This led to intense rivalry between Botha and van den Bergh (Grundy 1983: 12).

In 1973, an investigation into the shortcomings of the state's security machinery resulted in a report on the National Security Situation being completed by the Public Service Commission in September 1975 (Grundy 1988: 52). Most of the recommendations of this commission were accepted and included, inter alia, the establishment of an active security management system to link national, interdepartmental, departmental and subdepartmental levels of operation; a full time national security staff; the creation of regional and area committees to facilitate co-ordination and the identification of 15 functional areas of concern within the security field with committees for each. The wide-ranging areas covered virtually every facet of state policy, from culture to civil defence, from economy to manpower (Grundy 1988: 53). Thus, the National Security Management System which is closely connected to the SSC and whose structure was set in place in 1979 has its origins in this 1975 report.

Another aspect of, or a factor aggravating, the conflicts between the security apparatuses related to the differing views on foreign and local policy. As early as 1967, Vorster, van den Bergh and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) embarked upon the policy of detente in Africa and began to establish diplomatic links with the newly independent states. This strategy gathered momentum in the mid 1970's when the Department of Information, using secret funds, began to aggressively marked South Africa in cladenstine ways. In other words, foreign policy at this stage revolved around 'seeking international support in return for ideological compromise' (Adam 1983: 75). On the other hand, the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, as early as March 1973 (the same year Malan became Chief of the Army) in a White Paper on Defence articulated the elements of total strategy. He identified South Africa as 'a target for international communism and its cohorts -- leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism, and related ideologies'. In addition, the RSA, for Botha, had been singled out as a 'special target for the by-products of their ideologies, such as black racialism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans employed against us on basis of double standards' (RSA 1973: 1). In the context of this 'global back-ground', Botha outlined the basis upon which the Government was developing its policy. He stated that 'Traditionally a country's policy structure comprises of three basic elements -- internal policy, foreign policy, and defence policy. The last is determined by the preceding two, but these, in turn, cannot be developed properly unless they are sustained by a sound and adequate defence policy'.

This emphasis on defence was important because defence policy was seen in terms of 'offensive' defence as illustrated by the Angolan intervention in 1975. According to Grundy (1988: 92) the military initiated the intervention in Angola to prevent the MPLA from assuming power. After much confusion while in Angola, Grundy suggests that BOSS was successful in ensuring the withdrawal of South African troops on the
grounds that their presence resulted in some African countries, previously unsympathetic to the MPLA, changing their position. Furthermore, according to Grundy, there were other allegations of clashes between van den Bergh and Botha over defence and foreign affairs. Vorster was reported to have taken a conciliatory line on the Frelimo government in Mozambique and offered aid to repair the railways and harbours. In the meantime, Botha allegedly was backing counterrevolutionaries from a base near Komatipoort. Van den Bergh, on hearing about this apparently sent some of his men to Nelspruit and Komatipoort to immobilize equipment destined for Mozambique. Similarly, Dr. Eschel Rhodie reported that Botha attempted to send troops to Rhodesia after Vorster had distanced South Africa from Smith's government and was foiled by van den Bergh who informed Vorster. Thus, van den Bergh had 'openly challenged the man who was to become the next Prime Minister on matters of intelligence, strategy and foreign policy' (Grundy 1988: 43). This situation probably had much to do with the antagonism between Botha and van den Bergh which erupted in the "Information Scandal".

Although the tensions between the security apparatuses were the most publicised, there were other conflicts within the state and NP during Vorster's administration which proved to be very significant. As early as 1967 two groupings had emerged, the 'verligtes' and 'verkramptes' (Giliomee 1983: 217). The former group 'advocated greater white unity and harmonious race relations through mixed sport and the abolition of petty apartheid measures' while the latter 'championed undiluted Afrikaner domination and racial exclusiveness'. Furthermore, the verkramptes, while they were still members of the party, formed an internal opposition within a whole range of institutions against the cautious, more open policy of the leadership.

Modifications to the separate development blueprint had become necessary in the light of rapid economic growth during the 1960's as well as the emergence of anomalies in the policy with certain features of South Africa not fitting into the model. Thus, attempts were made to modify job reservation and with the widespread strikes of 1973 in Durban, the process of restructuring labour relations was set in motion. At a constitutional level too, important changes were proposed and the origins of the present tri-cameral system can be traced back to this period.

In February 1975, Vorster (Hansard 1975: Cols 383-5) outlined NP policy over the last three decades. The first decade involved separating groups who had over the years been allowed to intermingle. The second decade focussed on separate development while the third decade marked the policy of multi-nationalism. This involved consulting with leaders from Black, Coloured and Indian communities premised on the preservation of white sovereignty. Vorster (Hansard 1975: (Col. 390) went on to restate his position on Coloureds and Indians which was put forward in Parliament in 1954 when Coloureds were disenfranchised by stating that "We are going to be faced with a dilemma in this connection in future; we are going to create Parliaments for the Coloured and the Indians and we are going to be faced with the dilemma that sovereign Parliaments cannot exist side by side in the same country." In other words, for Vorster, the mid 1970's marked the time to confront these questions head
on, and stated (Hansard 1975: Col. 392) that "they (Coloured and Indians) had every right not only to ask that (for meaningful political power) from me but also, in fact to demand it from me....".

In this same session of Parliament, Vorster (Hansard 1975: Col. 394-7) made reference to a Cabinet Committee as well as other boards such as the Economic Advisory Council in which Coloured and Indians would be represented. It was a month after these announcements in Parliament that Vorster (in Kriek 1976: 77-8) at public meetings clarified these proposals. He stated that while each group (Coloured, Indian and White) would decide on issues which affected it, there were also issues of mutual concern which would be decided by a proposed Cabinet Committee on which all groups would be represented. He later, in October, said that if there was no consensus on the Cabinet Committee, then the Chairman, in line with Cabinet procedure would formulate the final decision.

Soon after these announcements, South Africa was rocked by the eruption of Soweto in June 1976. Although this event marked a turning point in Black resistance and the state's response to it, the impulse to constitutional change had already begun. Furthermore, toward the end of 1976, the Cabinet appointed a Cabinet Committee under the chairmanship of P.W. Botha, the Cape leader of the N.P., the Minister of Defence and previously the Minister of both Coloured Affairs and Community Development (1961-66), to investigate adjustments to the existing constitution. In August 1977, a new constitutional plan was announced at an NP caucus meeting and was endorsed by the four NP provincial congresses while the proposals had been presented to the Coloured Representatives Council and South African Indian Council. Because the new constitutional plan was announced so close to the appointment of the Cabinet Committee, it would be fair to assume that a set of concrete proposals had been circulated some years previously among influential state functionaries whose opinions had to be canvassed and their consent granted. Indeed, a Broderbond document dated September 1977 (in Strydom and Wilkins 1980: 173) stated that the new constitutional proposals had been 'presented to responsible friends long before the plans were announced'.

The close proximity of the new proposals to the Soweto Uprising has led some commentators (Stultz 1983: 289, Lewis 1987: 279) to suggest that the latter was the cause of the former in that it forced Whites to consider the need for constitutional change. However, because the search for a new constitution had begun prior to June 1976, this process can only be explained in terms of the logic of separate development. Thus, the policy of separate development was premised on the understanding that there were geographic areas which were the traditional territories of the different African peoples and it was in these areas that the various groups were to pursue their own social, cultural and economic development. The position of 'Coloureds' and Indians, in this framework was anomalous as there was no fixed geographic area which could strongly and historically be linked to the 'Coloured' and Indian communities. The new constitutional plans announced in 1977, were an attempt to resolve this anomaly within the framework of separate development by attempting to incorporate the Coloured Representatives Council (CRC) and the South African Indian council (SAIC) into some national governmental framework.
The proposals were rejected by both the CRC and SAIC soon after their announcement and it is worth presenting them in outline to facilitate a comparison with the 1983 tri-cameral constitution. They entailed the establishment of three separate Houses of Parliament, for Whites, 'Coloureds' and Indians which would be empowered to legislate on matters of their individual concern. On the other hand, matters of mutual concern would be dealt with by a Council of Cabinets on which all three groups would be represented with legislation being adopted by consensus. In terms of population figures, a ratio of 4 (White): 2 (Coloured): 1 (Indian) was put forward for membership of all new bodies. At the same time, power would be placed in the hands of an Executive President who would be elected by an Electoral College of 88 members, 50 of whom would be White, 25 'Coloured' and 13 Indian. The members of the electoral college would be elected by majority vote in each house thereby enabling the majority party in each house to dominate this institution. Clearly the dominant party in the 'White' house would be able to elect the President although each separate house would have its own Prime Minister all of whom would have the same status and receive the same pay. Other aspects of the proposals referred to the constitution of a President's Council, a non-parliamentary advisory body, made up of 20 members elected by the White parliament and 10 and 5 by the 'Coloured' and Indian houses respectively. A further 20 members would be appointed by the State President on the basis of their expertise in the various fields. The President's Council would replace the Senate while the Departments of Coloured Relations and of Indian Affairs would be abolished. It was also suggested that White Provincial Councils would be phased out and replaced by White regional councils while 3 'Coloured' and 2 Indian regional councils would also be established. Finally, each area or town that qualified for municipal status would have 3 separate municipalities for the 3 racial groups, each with its own mayor and administration.

In terms of urban Africans, 1978 was to mark the year when the policy of separate development was to have been completely implemented. However, it is worth noting that Vorster (Hansard 1975: Col 386-7) with the Minister of Bantu Administration had already met with some urban Africans to discuss issues such as commerce, home ownership and freedom of movement after which the Prime Minister promised to investigate ways of loosening the restrictions on freehold property ownership.

Although the Soweto Uprising had little to do with the new constitutional proposals, it certainly forced a major rethink of policy towards urban Africans. In October 1976, some three months after the uprising, Gerrit Viljoen (in Strydom and Wilkins 1980: 202) in his chairman's address to the Broederbond acknowledged that Africans were a permanent feature of urban South Africa and stated that 'No matter how successful the homelands are, there will still be hundreds of thousands of blacks in white cities' locations and certain minimum comforts are essential such as home ownership, a better physical environment, services like lights, water, sanitation, trading facilities, sport and recreation. The cost can be covered by taxes, rents or the money paid for houses and it is not necessary for everything to be given to them.' This statement marked a decisive shift from previous policy concerning urban Africans and the restructuring of township government began in 1978.
The government suspended the reform initiative due to the proposals being rejected by the CRC and SAIC, its attempts to stabilize the townships and, most importantly, infighting within the NP and state. Conflicts which had been brewing since the early 1970's erupted in 1977/8 when Vorster instigated investigations into the abuse of secret funds which was made possible by his 'chairman of the board' approach to government facilitating departmental autonomy. Prior to Vorster's resignation in October 1978, van den Bergh retired, after being firmly castigated by the Erasmus Commission. However, before retiring van den Bergh used the Official Secrets Act to intimidate reporters working on the case and on the eve of the election of the new NP leader was, at the last minute, prevented from announcing that his investigations had shown no irregularities in the Department of Information. Such an announcement would probably have cleared the way for Mulder in the election (Gilliomee 1983: 204, 208; Day and Rees 1980: 71-7) although P.W Botha finally won by a mere 24 votes.

Within one year, P.W. Botha began to reorganize the structure and institutions of the state. However, before discussing these developments, it is important to note that this process institutionalised the informal centralization of power in the executive of the last twenty years (cf Gilliomee 1983: 206). Moreover, Botha's ascendancy in the party marked a return to the Verwoerd style of leadership - strict hierarchies and command structures. According to Gilliomee (1983: 205) Botha, unlike Verwoerd and Vorster, bound people to him through their commitment to the machine and 'ultimately to him as its personification'. Furthermore, Botha has a reputation (from his rise in the Cape branch of the NP) for being an 'authoritarian leader with a zest for overpowering or eliminating his opponents politically'. Botha was also reknown for organizational and administrative ability. Gilliomee's comments, made a decade ago, have been verified by, especially, the most recent actions of P.W. Botha, now the State President.

P.W. IN POWER

Between 1978 and 1983, Botha consolidated his position and oversaw state restructuring as well as policy proposals. This period is often referred to as the reform era characterised by 'Total Strategy'. What follows will suggest that in fact this period marks the implementation of policies and ideas (not without some changes) whose origins can be traced back to the 1960's. Three main areas of restructuring can be identified: administrative, security and constitutional.

As Grundy (1988: 35) points out Vorster's rule was an organizational and administrative nightmare. There were twenty permanent cabinet committees which met on an ad hoc basis and thirty nine government departments. Because Vorster did not assert his control there was institutional autonomy and the lack of co-ordination of activities as well as severe in-fighting. Botha reduced the number of cabinet committees to five and later four, National Security (SSC), Constitutional Affairs, Economic Affairs and Social Affairs and regularized their meetings. Unlike the SSC, the other cabinet
committees were not constitutionally constituted and their composition is not publicly known. Geldenhuys and Kotze (1983: 39) go on to argue that since 1979, cabinet committees have been empowered to make decisions and therefore are not mere advisory bodies to the cabinet but integral components of the highest decision making machinery. At the same time, Botha reduced the number of government departments from thirty nine to twenty two although at present there are around thirty.

The security apparatuses were also restructured by Botha although many of the recommendations of the earlier commissions, especially the establishment of the NSMS and Joint Management Centres (JMC's), were implemented in 1979. In the same year, the structure of the SSC was also modified when a secretariat was instituted. A working committee of the SSC was established consisting of senior representatives from the departments permanently a part of the SSC. The secretariat, headed by the secretary of the SSC as well as the working committee are able to 'shape agendas, develop position papers, formulate alternatives, take and circulate minutes, and, once the SSC and the cabinet have acted, to see to it that each operational department and bureau knows what is expected of it, that decisions are circulated to the relevant officials, and that co-operation and co-ordination are assured' (Grundy 1988: 53). The secretariat has 4 branches: Strategy, National Intelligence Interpretation, Strategic Communication and Administration. Finally, under Botha, the SSC meets fortnightly and its meetings precede cabinet meetings. Furthermore, the SSC meets when Parliament is in recess and when the cabinet is inactive.

As soon as Botha became Prime Minister, he assumed control of the Department of National Security (DONS) the new name for BOSS and began to downgrade its influence as it was the power-base of van den Bergh. In 1980, DONS was renamed National Intelligence Services (NIS) and Niel Barnard, a Professor of Political Science from the University of the Orange Free State, was made its head (cf Financial Mail, 04/07/82). Botha also demarcated the areas of activity in which the intelligence institutions operated and this had crucial implications for the SSC. MIS, although empowered to operate internally, was given foreign affairs as its priority. The Security Police focussed on gathering intelligence on internal security. Both these organizations were supposed to give their intelligence to NIS which acted as an interpretation unit. The fact that it does not officially engage in intelligence gathering indicates the way that it has been downgraded. Grundy reports that even to this day, there are deep antagonisms between the 3 apparatuses concerning status, areas of operation and the withholding of information. The establishment of NIS is important in that it, as announced by P.W. Botha in 1984, dominates the secretariat of the SSC although the secretary over the last decade has been associated with MIS. This is important as the secretariat acts as the link between the SSC and the outside world and, if the conflicts between the intelligence gathering agencies are as intense and competitive as reported, then, due to the possibility of information being held within certain apparatuses, the SSC acts with uneven information at its disposal (Geldenhuys and Kotze 1983: 40). Nonetheless, as Geldenhuys and Kotze point out, the SSC is the most important decision making institution in the state and its field of concern has been broadened to include just about every sphere of internal and external concerns.
In emphasizing the importance of the SSC, it is important not to ignore a whole range of other institutions which influence the formulation and implementation of policies. The various cabinet committees have already been mentioned. Also important are the various government departments, the Presidents' Council and its various sub-committees especially the committee on constitutional affairs, the judiciary and parliament. While there are a number of SADF personnel on the SSC, it is important to bear in mind that because the SSC is the only committee established by Parliament it is still legally responsible to Parliament. At the same time, one should not underestimate the professional ethic of the military whereby it claims to separate itself from civilian affairs. At the same time, the tradition of white parliamentary politics should not be ignored as a constraint on the military actually intervening in politics. There is no doubt that Botha has firm connections with the military due to him having been Minister of Defence from 1966 to 1980 (as well as head of MIS until October 1980 and in charge of National Security until March 1980) when he was succeeded by General Malan. However, this does not mean that the military necessarily plays an important role in policy formation although it does play an important role in supporting and implementing policy.

This point is illustrated when examining the constitutional proposals culminating in the tri-cameral parliament. As Grundy (1988:40) points out, the constitutional proposals go beyond the military and its manpower needs and should be situated in the context of the larger issues of political structure and executive authority. This process, as argued previously, can be identified in both Verwoerd and Vorsters' administrations. Similarly, it has been argued (O'Meara 1982) that the reforms announced in the early 1980's mark the merger of the NP with big business with the former implementing policy to satisfy the demands of the latter. The Carlton and Good Hope Conferences (November 1979 and November 1981 respectively) are cited as evidence of this rapprochement.

However, as Gilliomee (1983: 131-4) shows, these meetings in no way indicate business pressurizing government for reform as they promised their co-operation without specifying demands nor requesting information on future proposals. Indeed, Nolutshungu (1982: 105-9) insists that private capital had not vigorously agitated for change and that 'If the bourgeoisie rules in South Africa, it is only in the sense that all South African governments have sought, and now seek, to maintain and defend the system of capitalism ...'. In other words, business, historically, has operated within the confines of NP policy implying that the interests of Afrikaners and whites as well as those of business are, in a tension ridden way, protected by the state. As long as the state has the institutional means to secure its tax base it need not be overly sensitive to the needs of business and, similarly, capital need not necessarily be unhappy with state policy so long as it is able to accumulate. In any event, there is no necessary reason why political reform should translate into economic growth.

Thus the new constitution needs to be analysed in the context of the anomalies in the policy of separate development and conflicts within the state and NP. In early 1978, Vorster suspended the 1977 proposals drawn up by the Cabinet Committee chaired by P.W. Botha on the grounds that
wider consultations be engaged in (Stultz 1983: 291). This event has been interpreted as a sign of Vorster and his close associates backing down on reform in an attempt to hold the NP together (Gilliomee 1982: 11). However, after the 'Info Scandal' had erupted with P.W. emerging as the new Prime Minister, the new cabinet was more sympathetic to the proposals which were referred to a parliamentary select committee.

This committee was soon transformed into the Schlebusch Commission which, after hearing evidence and receiving memoranda, submitted an interim report in May 1980. It modified the proposals of the Botha committee and made four recommendations, the most important being the decision to pass the proposals onto a new advisory body to be called the President's Council which would replace the Senate and came into being with effect from January 1, 1981.

The President's Council, under the chairmanship of Denis Worral, began work on a new constitution and, after processing the written memoranda and oral testimony submitted to it, accepted a First Report in May 1982. In July, Prime Minister Botha announced at the Federal congress of the NP that the government, after long consultations, had a constitutional plan which it was prepared to back. In November, the President's Council submitted a Second Report 'on the adaptation of constitutional structures in South Africa'. These constitutional proposals were introduced in Parliament in May 1983 and in November, the opinion of the white electorate, by way of a referendum, was surveyed. The proposals were soon enacted into law by Parliament and elections were held in 1984 in terms of the new tri-cameral constitution.

There is a large amount of overlap between the 1977 proposals and the 1983 constitution (cf Stultz 1983: 295-6). Instead of three separate governments operating at a national level, each of the legislative chambers are part of the same parliament. This change could be seen as an attempt to circumvent the problems of separate parliaments identified by Vorster in 1975. Each house now would be able to legislate on matters specific to it called 'own affairs' while a general consensus was required for matters of general concern, 'general affairs', to be enacted. Instead of a cabinet committee with white veto rights, as in the 1977 proposals, which would resolve differences, a restructured President's Council would act as arbitrator. The 1982 split in the NP with the Transvaal leader Andries Treurnicht leaving and subsequently forming the Conservative Party should be understood in terms of the new constitution enabling non-whites to have a say in white affairs. This was not the case with the earlier three parliament proposals accepted by all the provincial NP caucuses. Nonetheless, the President's Council was constituted in accordance with the 4:2:1 formula as in the early proposals and was empowered to resolve disputes as well as establish committees to advise the President on a whole range of issues.

Under the new constitution, the State President would be elected by an electoral college consisting of all three houses, again according to the 4:2:1 formula, thereby insuring that the House of Assembly and the ruling party within it would in all likelihood dominate the electoral college and get its candidate into office. The State President, now P.W. Botha, need not be a member of parliament and he is empowered to appoint representatives not only to the President's Council but also to
the cabinet and such appointees also need not be members of parliament. Indeed, the tri-cameral constitution consolidates the process of executive government which had begun with the restructuring of the cabinet committees and the security apparatuses in that those who hold high positions in government are not directly elected by voters.

The idea of White, 'Coloured' and Indian regional councils mooted in the 1977 plan were suspended and the idea only becomes relevant with the establishment of regional services councils later. However, although Africans are excluded from constitutional restructuring at a national level, important developments were occurring at a local level.

Institutions, such as the Bantu Administration Boards and Community Councils had been established in the early and late 1970's respectively to facilitate township administration. The Community Councils were representative bodies and elections were held in 1978 although the polls were low indicating that the state's attempts via the Department of Co-operation and Development to legitimate local level government after the Soweto Uprising had not succeeded. This, as well as the way the Councils were ultimately subordinated to the Boards, resulted in a new formula being attempted in the Bantu Local Authorities Act of 1982. The Black Local Authorities (BLA's) were intended to be more autonomous from central government concerning the generation and allocation of resources and this fitted in with some of the Riekert Commission's recommendations on demarcating between permanent urban dwellers and outsiders.

BLA elections were scheduled for 1983 and coincided with the announcement of broader constitutional reform. The percentage polls in these elections were slightly higher than the 1978 figures although too low to signify any form of legitimacy for these structures. Furthermore, soon after entering into office, rents and services charges were increased to enable the provision of further services as the long established principle of African townships being self-financing was entrenched in these new institutions. The imposition of this new structure of township administration sparked off the most sustained and intense rebellion of Africans against local level government - a rebellion which was fuelled by national anti-tri-cameral organizations such as the UDF and NF.

Although the percentage polls in the 1984 tri-cameral elections for the 'Coloured' and Indian houses were low, the structures remained intact and were set in motion by those who had participated. This was not the case with the BLA's where councillors were attacked and forced to leave the areas resulting in their collapse.

This, as Humphries (1986: 105-118) points out, resulted in the state responding at two levels, constitutional and security.

The Regional Services council Act of 1985 is the cornerstone of the most recent attempt to restructure African local government. First, responsibility for monitoring the Black Local Authorities Act was given to the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (DCDP) with the Minister, Chris Heunis, in charge. Second, by integrating BLA's into a general affairs structure, the DCDP was hoping to improve the legitimacy of the BLA's. Third, there was a general consensus in
government that the BLA's needed resources to resolve their political problems. Thus, the DCDP took over and adapted the Browne Committee report of 1981 which was originally commissioned by the Minister of Finance to investigate the financing of white municipalities. The Browne Committee, working within the framework of separate White, 'Coloured' and Indian regional councils as set out in the 1977 constitutional proposals, called for the provision of 'services on a cost effective basis, while also advocating the redistribution of local government income from the White municipalities to Indian and 'Coloured' local authority structures.' Thus, the Regional Services councils (RSC's) are an attempt to incorporate Africans, Whites, 'Coloureds' and Indians into a decision making structure co-ordinating the activities of all local authorities as well as effecting a redistribution of finance for socio-economic development and the establishment of infrastructure.

The security response to the collapse of BLA's and township militancy is multi-faceted. First, it involved a high profile security force presence in the townships with the SADF being initially used in a supportive role under police supervision. Second, there were strong suggestions that the UDF was to be banned in late 1984 when the former Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, linked the UDF to the ANC and SACP (Die Beeld 6/10/84). The UDF later denied such links and reasserted its commitment to peaceful change (Die Beeld 11/10/84). There were, however, two reasons why the UDF was not banned at this point in time. First, office bearers of the UDF had canvassed support for the organization in Europe and the United Nations while the sit-in at the British Consulate in Durban highlighted the activities of the UDF. Second, and more important, the state accepted the proposals of the then Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, a Political Science graduate and part-time lecturer. He advocated a strategy of containment whereby organizations be continuously disrupted by removing leadership while exploiting tensions within in order to prevent such organizations from going underground where they could not be controlled (Star 31/05/87; Die Suid Afrikaan No 14 April/Mei 1988). This approach was unsuccessful and, in the light of the intensification of the township rebellions, a partial state of emergency was declared in July 1985 indicating a return to the more conventional methods of mass detentions and general repression.

Despite the state of emergency, members of the British Commonwealth, in October 1985, proposed a visit to South Africa in an attempt to set up a platform for negotiating a resolution of the political conflicts in South Africa. This idea was accepted by Botha in December with two provisos: First, that the Commonwealth Mission did not prescribe solutions. Second that it accept that the government was determined to proceed with its reform initiative premised on power sharing and subject to the protection of the rights of minority groups. Botha stressed that negotiations to achieve this end should begin in earnest (Commonwealth Report 1986: 148).

Thus, with both the ANC (February 1985) and the government agreeing to negotiate, the Commonwealth Mission came to South Africa in the form of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on 2 March 1986 and the state of emergency was lifted five days later.
In a nutshell, the EPG drew up a document which was first presented to the government on the procedure for legalizing the ANC in order to participate in negotiations after suspending the armed struggle. The government neither accepted nor rejected these proposals although Mandela, speaking as an individual, accepted the proposals as a starting point when they were presented to him on May 16. He argued that he could not speak on behalf of the ANC without consultations with other office bearers. Meanwhile, Tambo, in Lusaka, provisionally accepted the proposals when they too were presented to him one day later although he raised questions concerning the South African government's honesty. On the morning of May 19, two days after consulting with Tambo, the EPG heard a report on the radio that the SADF had successfully carried out raids on 'ANC bases' in Harare, Gaberone and Lusaka. The announcement of the raids was made immediately prior to the EPG's scheduled meeting with the Cabinet Constitutional Committee in Cape Town. The EPG acknowledged that the raids cast doubt on the government's attitude towards negotiation but still met with the Cabinet Committee. The EPG also noted that the government reasserted its demand for a one-sided renunciation of violence and that while talking about negotiations and peaceful solutions, it had been planning these armed attacks. Some ten days later, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Pik' Botha, sent a letter to the EPG where the government's position on negotiations was clearly outlined. It reaffirmed the principles of minority rights and power sharing and concluded by stating that 'The South African government is prepared to negotiate with South African citizens about a new constitutional dispensation which will provide for power sharing. It is not interested in negotiation about a transfer of power'. The EPG later acknowledged that further talks on negotiation would not 'lead anywhere in the current circumstances' (Commonwealth Report 1986: 101-125).

The collapse of the EPG mission brings to light underlying tensions within the state. Apparently, there were two camps on the question of legalizing and negotiating with the ANC: On the one hand were General Coetzee and the Foreign Affairs and NIS bureaucrats who favoured the unpredictable path of negotiation politics. On the other hand were the generals in the SADF as well as Security Police officials. Thus, the raids on the neighbouring states, authorised by P.W. Botha, wrecked the talks but also demonstrated the SADF's growing role in both domestic and regional policy making (Africa Confidential Vol 29 No 12: 17 June 1988). The aftermath of the EPG mission also resulted in the reform minded bloc within the state becoming marginalised.

Two weeks after the collapse of the EPG mission a second state of emergency was declared on 12 June 1986. This marked the final demise of General Coetzee (he retired one year early) who was blamed by some within the state for the township unrest because of his elaborate ideas. It was thought that if the UDF was 'nipped in the bud', the declaration of two states of emergency could have been avoided (Africa Confidential Vol 29 No 12: 17 June 1988; Die Suid Afrikaan No 14 April/Mei 1988; Star 31/05/87).

Nonetheless, the SADF had come to the fore with the second state of emergency with the then Secretary of the SSC, General van der Westhuizen and the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, giving an assurance that they would restore law and order in the townships if the military as opposed
to the police controlled this state of emergency (Die Suid Afrikaan No 14 April/Mei 1988; Africa Confidential vol 29 No 12: 17 June 1988). It was further reported that the SADF were not impressed by what they considered the Police's unimaginative, ill-disciplined and heavy-handed actions against unrest.

Soon after the declaration of the state of emergency, the UDF was declared an affected organization meaning that it was prevented from receiving foreign funds. This indicated the re-emergence of the view that the extra-parliamentary opposition should be restrained. The UDF later appealed against this measure in the Natal Supreme Court and it was overturned in May 1987. It was expected that the state would appeal although it never instituted proceedings (Natal Mercury 9/5/87).

Towards the end of 1986, a new theory of township unrest emerged within state circles. It was now thought that 'radicals' instigated unrest by mobilising communities around legitimate socio-economic grievances (cf Louis Le Grange in the Star 5/10/86; Magnus Malan in Die Suid Afrikaan: Winter 1986). This resulted in the elucidation of the three phase approach to counter-revolution articulated by the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok (Leadership vol 6 No 1 1987) although probably devised by NIS. The first stage was the re-establishment of law and order and the NSMS was activated and its various subcommittees were integral to this task. As one security official put it (referring to the NSMS) 'It was all there. All we did with the state of emergency was to hit the switch' (Newsweek: June 20, 1988). The second phase was socio-economic upliftment of the townships to improve the quality of life of residents as well as to remove the issues around which 'radicals' mobilised the communities. The RSC's were central to this aspect of the strategy as they were to provide the resources for this reconstruction. At the same time, various state departments and parastatals made resources available for this task. The third phase was constitutional development and, although no concrete proposals were put forward, this presumably meant moving in the direction indicated in 'Pik' Botha's letter to the EPG.

The first and second phases illustrate the JMC's role of co-ordinating the allocation of resources coupled with coercion in an attempt to remove volatile issues and situations in townships while buying political support at the same time. As one SSC general said "These people have their aspirations, of course, but they are really concerned about bread-and-butter issues - housing, schools, motor cars, 'the good life'. And if you want their support, you can buy it" (Newsweek June 20, 1988). Thus, while the DCDP attempted to legitimate local government through representative participation and the allocation of resources, the security people in the NSMS believed that legitimacy could be bought by simply, and in a clandestine way, allocating resources to satisfy the communities basic material needs.

The security forces' attempts to re-establish law and order coupled with the strategic allocation of resources began to show signs of success. By early 1987, the townships had stabilized quite considerably and Botha called an election for the House of Assembly. The NP fought a vicious security oriented campaign which severely affected its left-wing opposition. At the same time, the CP became the official opposition and
its programme of defending the rights of whites to determine their own future received much support, catching many commentators unawares.

Soon after the election, a CP Member of Parliament asked the Minister of Justice, Kobie Coetzee, to state whether the government was considering declaring the UDF an unlawful organization. The Minister responded by stating that the situation was being monitored by 'the government institutions and functionaries which are concerned with security matters' and that it will not be in the interests of effective handling of such cases to furnish the type of information requested (House of Assembly General Affairs, Question No 10 18 August 1987).

For the rest of 1987, the state continued to enforce the state of emergency while considering its tactical options vis a vis the extra-parliamentary opposition which had been severely affected by the concerted action against it.

In February 1988, the state made its move. Despite internal cleavages in the security apparatuses, with the 'Winning Hearts and Minds' (WHAM) faction in the military consolidating above the orthodox counter insurgency (COIN) group with the appointment of Charles Lloyd as Secretary of the SSC after van der Westhuizen was sent to Chile as South Africa's ambassador (Africa Confidential Vol 29 No 12, 17 June 1988; Die Suid Afrikaan No 14 April/Mei 1988), the state exhibited a large degree of coherence in its actions. It was also reported that the police began to assert themselves in the SSC and NSMS after Minister Vlok; the new Commissioner of Police; General de Witt and the Head of the Security Police, General van der Merwe, forcefully promoted the police with a new image in state circles.

On February 10, Vlok announced that despite the success of the security forces in containing unrest, there was still a climate of revolution in the country (Star 11/02/88). Some ten days later, Botha announced the restrictions on seventeen extra-parliamentary organizations (Star 25/02/88). This announcement coincided with Botha's address to a by-election meeting in the Standerton constituency. There were two other by-elections scheduled and it was expected that the CP would win all three. Both Vlok and General van der Merwe justified the restrictions on the grounds that organizations had realised that armed conflict and violence would not achieve their goals and therefore began to implement other strategies such as mobilising the masses and making the country ungovernable (Star 25/02/88).

Now the state's own statistics had shown that the levels of township political activity had dropped considerably and that many of the activities mentioned by Vlok and van der Merwe were characteristic of the 1984-6 period and had not occurred for some time. Thus, the justification for the restrictions which effectively banned the organizations, although they could appeal for permission to engage in certain activities, is open to question and an alternative explanation can be put forward.

It is believed that there was unanimity in the Cabinet on the need for action against the extra-parliamentary opposition (Sundy Star 28/02/88). However, the restrictions should be seen as an attempt by the state to
prevent the re-emergence and consolidation of community organizations around a boycott of the October municipal elections thereby nullifying the effects of the state of emergency. After the 1983-4 experience, the state recognizes that the boycott is a powerful mobilizing tactic and wants to prevent a high profile anti-local authority campaign under the banners of the various organizations. The then Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Stoffel van der Merwe, did acknowledge that the possibility of extra-parliamentary groups participating in the elections was taken into account in implementing the restrictions. However, he later acknowledged that Archie Gumede had raised the question of participation and that 'that argument was not winning the day in the UDF' (The High Road April 1988). This statement confirmed the view, present at the time of the announcement of the restrictions, that participation was not on the oppositions' agenda at that moment in time (Sunday Star 28/02/88).

There are two facets to the imposition of the restrictions premised on the expectation of a boycott of local authority elections (cf Magnus Malan in The Weekly Mail May 20-26 1988), an expectation confirmed by the extra-parliamentary opposition after the announcement (Weekly Mail June 10-16 1988). First, the state wants to clear the way for those who wish to participate either as candidates or as voters in October to do so. The state wants to ensure that the elections are a success as they would then legitimate the restructuring of local government into RSC's. Furthermore, successful elections would facilitate the restructuring of township administration and more recently it was announced that African local authorities would act as an electoral college for representatives on proposed second tier governmental structures. Thus, the state wants to create and maintain by force a space for participation by excluding opponents. In this context, the 20:30:50 formula circulating in state circles whereby 20% of the population are seen as 'radical', 30% moderate and 50% undecided is informing state action (Die Suid Afrikaan No 14 April/Mei 1988; Africa Confidential Vol 29 No 12, 17 June 1988). The state believes that by isolating the 'radicals' it can draw the moderates in via the allocation of resources and propaganda resulting in many of the 'undecideds' following.

The second aspect of the restrictions is far more subtle. The idea of acting against the extra-parliamentary opposition has been around in state circles for some time. However, instead of banning the organizations outright, the state is attempting to force them onto the defensive. By claiming that at present they are engaged in activities which threaten public safety the state is saying that if they cease such activities and participate in democratic and legal activities they will be allowed to do so - hence the clause in the restrictions enabling permission to be granted for engaging in certain activities. Thus, the state is saying that only activities around participation will be acceptable knowing that a boycott was imminent enabling the state to claim that the extra-parliamentary opposition only has itself to blame for its effective banning. At the same time, by forcing the extra-parliamentary opposition to declare that it will not participate in the elections, the state can claim that it has no interest in negotiation and therefore is beyond the law.
This attempt to define 'politics' as participation in state structures means, by implication, that all other activities are illegitimate. This has important implications for the recently announced new constitutional proposals (the third phase) which, inter alia, allow for the appointment of Africans onto the Cabinet, the establishment of regional structures for Africans outside of the Bantustans and the setting up of a National Council to advise the government on the drafting of a new constitution which would protect the interests of minority groups on the basis of power sharing and non-domination. In other words, the state, at the time of the EPG Mission, did have some ideas on constitutional reform although it delayed announcing them until it had regained control of the townships.

At the time of the announcement of these proposals, Minister Heunis stated that 'those who wanted to negotiate with the government could do so while those who wanted to remain outside could stay there' (Star 22/04/88). The new Minister of Information, Stoffel van der Merwe, made a similar although more sinister and revealing statement when he asserted that 'once the perception that a black government is attainable in the near future - once that perception has been thoroughly crushed, it will become more possible to speak again about a common future' and 'what we are saying through our words and actions is that there is no future in black government in South Africa'. Finally, the Minister concluded by stating that 'In time we will get a sufficient number of prominent leaders to participate in the democratic game so that eventually those who still lust after revolution will become as irrelevant in South Africa as they are are in the US or Britain' (The High Road April 1988).

In other words, the state is making it quite clear that it is attempting to crush and marginalise all those who do not accept its constitutional vision for the future. The press restrictions and proposed Orderly Internal Politics Bill are further attempts by the state to isolate the opposition ideologically and economically as the latter would limit and control the amount of foreign funding for organizations. The state is clearly trying to force the opposition into a corner where it will have few, if any, options if it does not accept the state's proposals and it is in this context that the question of possible responses becomes important.

While the internal opposition is hamstrung with the redeclared state of emergency making it a serious offence to propagate boycotts of any kind, the ANC has vowed to disrupt the October elections. Chris Hani recently stated that 'We shall not allow puppet organisations to put up candidates' and 'We shall use revolutionary violence to prevent blacks from collaborating' (The Economist June 18, 1988). However, escalation of the sabotage campaign with a blurring of the distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' targets could result in a further hardening of white attitudes as well as alienate African support thereby setting back the diplomatic victories achieved over the past few years.

Indeed, the debate within extra-parliamentary groups on the possibility of participating in local authority and tri-cameral elections, as did the CPSA and ANC in a different context, is important in that such action would not only catch the state off-guard and disrupt its medium
to long term strategic thinking but it would also offer the movements institutionally protected space to operate within. Access to constitutional procedure could provide the organizations with bargaining power while it, as opposed to participants not sympathetic to the ideals of the liberation movements, could use the abundant resources made available by the state to consolidate a grass-roots support base. Unfortunately, it may be too late to change direction now as many years of boycott and non-participation have consolidated a political tradition among the masses which would require time and organizational as well as consultative space to redirect - commodities which the extra-parliamentary opposition do not at the moment possess. Nonetheless, the October elections mark a major event with the state determined to win a victory while the extra-parliamentary opposition is determined to ensure the failure of the state's plans. At this point in time, it is too early to predict who will succeed.

CONCLUSION

The main object of this paper has been to isolate the way the liberation movements have conceptualized the state and the strategies that they have adopted to effect a transition. Changes in strategy have been identified culminating with the view that the armed struggle coupled with internal mobilization should be pursued in order to force the government to the negotiating table. This was then compared with the state's response to the challenge to it which consisted of a sophisticated strategy of resource allocation, repression and redefining of the political terrain of activity. Indeed, the way that the state has successfully contained the opposition indicates that extra-state activity is no more advantageous than a strategy which is a combination of both external mobilization of support and the strategic intervention in state structures.
NOTES:

1. This legislation, with amendments, was recently used to severely restrict the activities of 18 legal extra-parliamentary opposition organisations.

2. More recently, the endurance of the extra-parliamentary opposition in the light of the state's offensive can, to a large degree, be explained by the focus on, and consolidation of, local level organisation structures.

3. This view was reaffirmed by Mandela (1978: 65) as late as 1958 when he said that 'The principal and most urgent task facing the Congress Movement today (1958) is the defeat of the Nationalist Government and its replacement by a less reactionary one. Any step or decision which helps the movement to obtain this task is politically correct'.


5. Own emphasis.

6. This view is present in Slovo (1973: 339).


8. Recently, Slovo (The Guardian Weekly 17 August 1986) has qualified, without shifting from, this view when he claims that 'In general, capitalist exploitation and race domination are not symbiotically linked. But the historically-evolved connection between capitalist exploitation and racist domination in South Africa creates a natural link between national liberation and social emancipation; a link which is virtually too late to unravel.'

9. Earlier Slovo (1973: 334) had asserted that 'the more official policy changes, the more it remains the same'.

10. It was reported in 1986 that Oliver Tambo described the establishment of Regional Services Councils in similar terms.

11. By early 1980, the Frelimo government in Mozambique had allegedly advised the ANC to focus on internal activity (Cf Lodge 1983b: 170).

12. This document was cited in the press as it was submitted as evidence in the Cape Town Supreme Court by the Commissioner of Police, Generaal Johann Coetzee.

13. The state refers to a system of institutions and apparatuses of administration, policy formation and implementation and repression. These institutions evolve historically in the context of a particular society and reflect and protect the
interests of a dominant group whether capitalist, ethnic or both in an uneven and conflict-ridden way. There are, furthermore, tensions and conflicts within institutions due to functionaries proposing different solutions to the problems of administration facing each department. There are also conflicts between institutions due to overlap in areas of administration and institutional competition and status. While the state impacts directly on all spheres of daily life (there is no distinction between state and civil society) due to its defining the parameters of social intercourse, it is also able to exclude groups from influencing policy and action mainly by excluding them from participating in certain processes. Thus, state restructuring refers to the process whereby there is a realignment and creation of new institutions which, in turn, formulate and implement new policies which modify the mechanisms of exclusion and social regulation.

This view of the state draws upon ideas present in Poulantzas (1980), Parkin (1979) and Vielle (1988).

14. This presentation of the new model is drawn from South African Institute of Race Relations (1978: 7-8).


16. For an interesting argument that the state is not structurally dependent on capital Cf Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988: 11-29).
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