Title: African Political Mobilisation in Brakpan in the 1950s.

by: Hilary Sapire
AFRICAN POLITICAL MOBILISATION IN BRAKPAN IN THE 1950s

Hilary Sapire

With the notable exception of Tom Lodge's recent work\(^1\), much of the literature which addresses itself to the turbulent decade of African politics of the 1950s focuses almost exclusively on formal political organisations and their national leaders\(^2\). Rarely do the roles and consciousness of local political figures and the "led" or rank and file come into view. The foreground is invariably occupied by national middle class African figures planning, forming alliances, overhauling the structures of their organisations and directing mass activity. Beyond this phalanx, we can barely make out the blurred and somewhat undifferentiated feature of the urban masses. Occasionally their profiles are illuminated in a "flashpoint" of class conflict or their actions may momentarily be sighted in a flare-up of rioting during one of the major political campaigns of the decade. But all too rarely are these moments of resistance situated in their immediate terrain. This absence of sensitivity to the sociology and social history of urban African communities of the 1950s is especially glaring, as it was in this decade that urban Africans were subjected to unprecedented measures of social restructuring and social engineering with the implementation of apartheid. Similar criticisms can be levelled at the writings of Marxist scholars who are concerned with the social composition and changing ideological discourse of the major political organisation of the period, the ANC\(^3\). Like the institutional historians, they fail to locate the growth of political organisations and the development of a mass-based politics within the changing sociological realities of South Africa's towns and cities, and thereby to probe their assumptions about the history of urban African societies and the class bases of political movements.

The institutional focus has also meant that a variety of urban constituencies, idioms of protest, ideologies and forms of consciousness which fed into the overall mass political culture of the decade rarely surfaces, while the social groupings which were neither reflected in nor embraced by the ANC, remain invisible in most accounts.\(^4\) The crucial role that "dummy" or "collaborationist" institutions, such as the Location Advisory Board could, and sometimes did play in mobilising African communities around the ANC programmes, for example, has been little understood. Conversely, although much direct action occurred outside the scope of formal organisation, many urban constituencies in which the ANC failed to strike strong roots, have been obscured or ignored altogether. The history of urban squatter movements in the 1950s is thus almost unknown. Finally, the institutional bias of historians has meant that the immense regional variations in political cultures and styles of protest have not been explained and that the notoriously uneven responses to the ANC campaigns of the decade have not been adequately understood. This paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive corrective but it is concerned, through the Brakpan case to point to aspects of urban social history which may enhance our understanding of the complexity and variability of black political mobilisation in the 1950s. It emphasises the value of examining the local permutations in the unfolding of the huge processes of industrialisation and African urbanisation and in the municipal administration of African communities for understanding popular responses to political organisation in the decade. Thus, this paper demonstrates the lagged industrial growth in Brakpan, the delayed implementation of apartheid social engineering and the peculiarly harsh administration of the "native
"location" had crucial implications for the social nature of political organisation and for the modes of resistance and protest employed.

In several respects, Brakpan of the 1950s was a typical East Rand town. Fathered by gold, its landscape was dominated by the mining dumps and headgear of Brakpan Mines, State Mines and Vlakfontein Mine. Up until and well into the 1950s, when the mines began to show signs of exhaustion, the bulk of the white male population were employed on the mines and lived with their families in the neatly laid-out rows of brick houses in the town's three suburbs. The overwhelming majority of African inhabitants were also employed by the mines, but were housed in the bleak compounds on the mining properties. A diminutive industrial sector which was almost entirely subservient to the needs of the gold mining industry and an equally small commercial sector had made their appearances by World War I. Together with domestic service and intermittent building projects during growth-spurts of the town, these sectors provided employment to the permanently urbanised African population, which was quarantined from "white" Brakpan in the municipal location adjacent to the town. Manufacturing and commerce, however, were comparatively insignificant sectors and social forces in the town, especially when contrasted with those of neighbouring East Rand towns. When the mines of Benoni, Boksburg, Springs and Germiston began to show signs of mutability in the late 1930s, the respective chambers of commerce and town councils had launched massive programmes of secondary industrialisation to wean the towns from their extreme dependency on mining. By the 1940s, as a result of these projects and the spurt given by wartime import substitution policies, Benoni and Boksburg could boast a dense concentration of heavy industry, while Germiston became an important centre of light industry by the 1950s. By contrast, the vigour and apparent longevity of the mines in the vicinity of Brakpan induced a sense of complacency in the city fathers, and well into the 1960s, the Brakpan town council showed little interest in diversifying the local economy. It was more concerned with retaining the image of Brakpan as the East Rand's "garden town", and by virtue of its prolific "State Mines", as its "jewel". Thus, by the 1950s, although three industrial sites had been established, there were a mere 25 industrial establishments, a relatively insignificant figure as the following table demonstrates.

### DISTRIBUTION OF THE TWO MAIN TYPES OF INDUSTRIES ON THE EAST RAND ACCORDING TO THE 1957 INDUSTRIAL CENSUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>METAL</th>
<th>CHEMICAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germiston</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>14,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boksburg</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brakpan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benoni</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springs</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4,359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The absence of a solid industrial base in Brakpan had some important consequences: it meant that like smaller Transvaal platteland towns, African cleaners, servants, messengers, watchmen, shop assistants and municipal labourers far outnumbered factory workers. As a result, trade unionism was to have a negligible impact on the political culture of the local African population. The limited labour needs of this industrially undeveloped town had another significance: it meant that in this period of rapid and intensive African urbanisation on the Witwatersrand, the local influx and social
controls were to be considerably tighter than those of the larger neighbouring towns.

Yet, despite the vigilance of the local influx control officer and labour bureaux, the size of the African population in Brakpan grew to a figure which far exceeded the town's modest labour requirements. From a total figure of 58 000 Africans in the area in 1948 (36 000 on the mines, 10 000 in the location and over 12 000 squatters on the peri-urban smallholdings) the total figure reached 64 000 by 1958. The ratio of between permanently urbanised Africans and migrants had also begun to shift. As mining activities in Brakpan and other East Rand towns began to wind down, the migrant population dropped by 6 000, while the number of permanently settled Africans living in the location increased by 2 000. By the middle years of the decade, the number of squatters on the surrounding smallholdings, farms and vacant mining land reached 22 000.5

Unlike the earlier surges of black immigration to the town in the 1920s and 1930s when the majority of workseekers tended to originate in the "white farms" of the immediate agricultural hinterland (Heidelberg, the Reef farms of Benoni, Springs and Nigel) and from the agricultural districts of Standerton and Natal9, from the war years, more and more African newcomers tended to come from the reserves and the protectorates. The damage inflicted upon rural society by the intensification of migrancy contributed to a haemorrhaging of Africans from these regions. Increasingly, women began to move to the East Rand on an individual basis to escape the grinding poverty and restrictive patriarchal controls in these areas. Although there is no precise information about the places of origin of the wave of women from the late 1930s, the cumulative impression from the evidence is that a disproportionately large amount of these women hailed from the overstocked and denuded areas of Basutoland.10 A significant proportion of women from areas other than the reserves and protectorates also streamed into the East Rand towns in these years. Simkins shows that the net inflow of women to the East Rand came principally from the Transvaal, while the Manager of Non-European Affairs of Brakpan commented that Ndebele women were pouring into the town at a rate "which alarmed me".11

While many of the male immigrants moved directly from the rural areas, a large number of African men who insinuated themselves into the urban area in the 1950s were ex-miners. Upon the completion of their contracts, or upon retrenchment as the mines in the region began to close, many miners elected to remain in the urban area, rather than return to rural slumdum. To the chagrin of the local authority, few ex-miners reported to the labour bureaux for placement in urban or agricultural employment. It was observed that the estimated average of 150 men who reported to the bureaux each month, represented a miniscule fraction of miners who remained in the urban area. Not only did ex-miners fail to report to the bureaux, but it was discovered by the municipality in the mid-1950s that several white residents engaged "foreign natives" (ex-miners) as domestic servants, gardeners and agricultural workers on the plots and farms without registering them with the authorities.12 The vast majority of newcomers in the 1950s migrated to the poorly policed smallholdings and farms on the outskirts of the town, and entered into a variety of tenant and employment relationships with white smallholders. The smallholders directly benefitted from these relationships: extortionate rentals extracted from African tenants went some way in augmenting the rather meagre incomes earned by white miners and artisan smallholders. Other Africans erected crude huts on vacant mining land and
settled there in large clusters. These "squatters", both on the smallholdings and on vacant mining ground had generally evaded municipal detection and tended to lead clandestine, shadowy existences on the periphery of the urban social order.

Other newcomers, gained employment in the town itself and accommodation in the location through a range of stratagems. Because of the scarcity of jobs and houses in the region, the acquisition of employment and municipal accommodation was usually dependent upon the operation of "houseboy" networks. Several informants explained that relatives or friends from their village of birth had organised jobs for them. Having first secured employment, these more fortunate newcomers claimed that their status as bona fide employees of the town, entitled them to municipal accommodation. For women, outside of the oversubscribed domestic service sector, it was well nigh impossible to secure employment. Many single women bypassed this problem by "canvassing" amongst the single men of town and contracting hasty "marriages of convenience", so earning the legal right to reside in the location.

There were thus two black worlds in Brakpan: the sprawling settlements of squatters on vacant land, farms and individual plots, few of whom were legally entitled to remain in the urban area, and the settled core of location inhabitants, many of whom had lived there since its establishment in 1927. Despite the regular interchange between them, the two communities were remarkably discrete in character and evinced strikingly different trajectories of struggle in the 1950s. The smallholding squatters generally resisted extortion and exploitation by white landlords in a myriad of anarchic, almost preindustrial gestures of protest (stock theft, veld fires and gang activity). It was only for a brief moment, in 1953, that an act of organised, collective protest was mounted by the squatters. In this year, in protest against mass evictions of African tenants, a group of squatters, led by a formidable band of women, invaded vacant municipal land and established an informal "emergency camp" there. Yet once the municipality responded to their most immediate demands by providing some housing for squatters and by bringing a halt to the evictions, the militancy of squatters dissipated and the more individualistic, often criminal modes of protest once again reasserted themselves. By contrast, until the final years of the decade, the location was a highly politicised region and an important base of the ANC. The responses to both the ANC Defiance Campaign and Bantu Education Campaign of 1952 and 1955 respectively were tumultuous and dramatic. Because of the constraints of time and space, it is on the formal political mobilisation in the location that the remainder of this paper concentrates.

In order to understand the remarkable responsiveness of the Brakpan location dwellers to the blandishments and programmes of ANC organisers in the 1950s, three areas are examined in this paper. The first is the tradition of popular radicalism which had been spawned during the subsistence struggles and resistance against municipal controls during the war years which were conducted under the leadership of rejuvenated tenant organisations and by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The ANC branch of the 1950s, was in many ways, the legatee of the CPSA. It inherited much of its character and style from that of the communists of the 1940s. Secondly, the implications of the failure of the municipality to remove the location dwellers from the "inner city" location and resettle it in a remotely situated, ethnically zoned township in accordance with Verwoerdian dogma, until the 1960s are examined. The paper argues that the coherence and unanimity with which location dwellers responded to the ANC campaigns, at least in the early years of the decade, can
partially be explained by the fact that this community was spared the disruptive and traumatic effects of Nationalist social engineering until the 1960s. Thirdly, the paper examines the conditions of life in the location during the 1930s. The overwhelming and all-pervasive poverty, the endemic unemployment, the instability of urban existence, the authoritarian and austere character of the location regime and deterioration of municipal facilities - all ensured sustained high levels of discontent around bread-and-butter issues. To a large extent, it was because of the ability of local politicians to respond to the immediate, parochial grievances of the residents and to relate these to the broader structures of oppression in South African society that it was possible to fashion an effective protest movement in Brakpan.

POPULAR RADICALISM AND THE RISE OF THE CPSA IN THE BRAKPAN LOCATION. 1939 - 1948

In contrast to the decade which preceded it, the Brakpan location was in a state of constant ferment in the 1940s. Whereas a fundamentally accommodationist and defensive popular culture had prevailed and inhibited political organisation in the 1930s, the 1940s saw a dramatic rise of popular militancy and the emergence of the CPSA as the dominant political force in the location. There were many reasons for this shift in popular consciousness, one which was mirrored in several other towns during the war years. In this period, rural impoverishment - interspersed with major droughts - combined with the relaxation of pass controls and the local residential permit system to produce a massive increase in the African population of the town. Not only did this exacerbate the existing unemployment and associated social problems, but it heightened the dire housing shortage in the area caused by wartime shortages of building materials. During these years, prices soared, while wages failed to register a demonstrable increase. Moreover, under the impact of constant urbanisation, the quality of facilities and amenities in the location rapidly deteriorated.

The location residents reacted to the hardships and privations of the early war years in acts of spontaneous, and at times, anarchic protest. In response to the hiking of bus fares in 1942, for example, angry crowds stoned the municipal bus. Yet, unlike the previous decade, the location organisations, the Advisory Board and Vigilance Association, were able to tap this discontent and to shape it into a powerful social movement. Both organisations, which had hitherto championed the narrow, sectional interests of traders, clerks, interpreters and shop assistants, struck an accord with their more plebeian location co-inhabitants by evincing a heightened sensitivity to the hardships and struggles of the mass of location dwellers. The two organisations spearheaded and co-ordinated a range of campaigns against food shortages, inadequate education facilities and police raids. Both organisations were also strident and shrill in their demands for the redress of the residents' grievances. Through the medium of regular and well-attended report-back meetings in the location hall, a vigorous tradition of political accountability was forged. At these meetings, the residents elected their own chairperson, submitted their complaints to the Advisory Board members and listened to Advisory Board members' reports on the progress of their negotiations with the town council. While the Advisory Board enjoyed recognition from the town council (the original aim behind the establishment of the Board in 1927, had been to siphon off middle class African political frustration and to create a body of Africans loyal to and supportive of the location Administration), the Vigilance Association was constantly rebuffed by
the town council. The latter's history explains much of the council's attitude: it had been conceived and created in 1931 as an "opposition party" to the "traitors" of the Advisory Board and had adopted a policy of uncompromising criticism of the location regime as well as regularly challenging the legality of location regulations in the courts. In response, the council simply refused to accord the Association the status of a legitimate institution and to respond to any correspondence emanating from this body. By the 1940s, despite their earlier history of conflict, and under the influence of wider radicalising influences at play, the two bodies drew closer together in a common commitment to challenging the arbitrary and petty controls exerted over the lives of Brakpan's location dwellers. Indeed, by the early 1940s, the membership of both organisations tended to overlap.

The change in attitude of the location's elite, and their readiness to participate in radical politics was only partially due to mounting grassroots pressure from below. The wider currents at play had a profoundly radicalising effect on the classes from which the location leadership was drawn. Throughout the 1940s, in many areas, economic pressures and the political idealism of the war years produced a more politically aggressive outlook from petty bourgeois Africans countrywide. The local Advisory Board of the 1940s, for example, was almost exclusively comprised of schoolteachers, a social group on the Rand which had become politicised in the early war years in the "blanket" salary campaign, conducted under the auspices of the Transvaal African Teachers Association (TATA) of 1941 in which teachers marched through the streets of Johannesburg in protest against their pitiful salaries. Both David Bopape and Mr Nchabaleng, two prominent Advisory Board and Vigilance Association members were TATA stalwarts on the East Rand, and it was through the 1941 "blanket campaign", that David Bopape was first drawn into politics, becoming a member of both the CPSA and the ANC. The standing enjoyed by schoolteachers in an underprivileged community, in which education signified the passport to upward social mobility, was a significant factor in the growth of popular support for the Advisory Board. So too was the personal charisma of leaders such as Bopape, who apart from his position on the Transvaal ANC executive, was a much loved local figure and champion of residents rights.

The unprecedented activism of the Advisory Board and Vigilance Association in the seeking of redress for grievances was in large measure due to the policy and influence of the CPSA. From 1941, after a decade of decrepitude, the CPSA underwent a remarkable recovery. The better known aspects of the CPSA's role in these years are its involvement in white municipal politics and trade union activity amongst African and Indian workers. Less familiar is the image of the CPSA as an active political force in the locations of the East Rand. Through its strategy of involving itself in the parochial disputes of location residents, the Party gained widespread popularity in this region. The CPSA used existing location organisations, such as Advisory Boards (condemned by the ANC Youth League at the time as collaborationist institutions) and Vigilance Associations to establish footholds in location communities. Thus, for the duration of the decade, the elected half of the Advisory Board in Brakpan, were CPSA members, a situation which was mirrored in the neighbouring town of Springs. In Brakpan, the communists earned themselves the support and respect of the location dwellers by involving themselves in local disputes. In 1943, for example, the CPSA played a prominent role in the dispute between the council and municipal workers over wages and over the council's refusal to employ Africans other than "reserve natives" in its municipal labour force. The CPSA also intervened in campaigns against
police violence against residents and visiting miners patronising local 
shebeens, the reintroduction of the residential permit system, the popularity 
of the Ossewa Brandwag on the East Rand and the municipality's decision to 
extend municipal passes to women. Another factor which enhanced the CPSA's 
local standing was the support and legal services given to residents by the 
Bencomi attorney, Lewis Baker, the CPSA East Rand branch chairman. As a result 
of the above factors, the membership of the CPSA expanded rapidly during the 
war years, so much so, that the location was divided into three sections for 
the sake of "organisational simplicity".

News of Brakpan was regularly reported in the pages of the CPSA newspaper, 
Inkuluweko and the location was frequently visited by national CPSA figures 
such as Edwin Mofutsanyana and Josie Palmer. Mass meetings at which such 
personages spoke succeeded in attracting large audiences. It should be 
pointed out, however, that the overwhelming popularity of the CPSA arose from 
its leadership's tactical acuity in mobilising residents around immediate 
local concerns rather than widespread acceptance of its political philosophy 
or overall strategy of transforming South African society. As one informant, 
who was a member of both the CPSA and the ANC expressed it, "there was no real 
spirit of communism in Brakpan". He felt that its remarkable success was due 
to the failure of the other major political organisation, the ANC, to take up 
local issues and to move into the political vacuum. "The ANC", he observed, 
"was a bit slow. It was not acting enough, not active enough to make things 
grow." A Youth Leaguer of the time who had grown up in Brakpan explained:

The ANC missed out a great deal because it would not interest 

itself in the little things that bug the people... the 
popularity of the Communist Party in Brakpan was because they 
took up such things.

Although the ANC's presence in the location in these years was negligible, a 
branch had been established in the early 1920s and was not entirely inert 
because it was comprised of some Advisory Board and Vigilance Association 
members, who also belonged to the CPSA. But it was only after the mine 
workers' strike of 1946, which swept through the mines of the East Rand, that 
the ANC began actively campaigning for support in the East Rand locations. It 
was at this time, that an ANC Women's League was established in the location 
and that ANC mass meetings began to be staged. Until this date, the CPSA was 
the undisputed political force in the region.

In 1943, as a consequence of the shift to more militant modes of organising, 
the emergence of the CPSA and the intransigence and assertiveness of the 
Advisory Board, the town council reappraised its entire system of control in 
the location. It was believed by councillors, that "laxity" on the part of 
location officials had given rise to the groundswell of discontent and to the 
"infiltration" of the location by the CPSA. In this year, in the interests 
of political stability, recouping the massive losses on the "native revenue 
account" and streamlining "native administration", the council established a 
separate Department of Non-European Affairs, and installed the Steilensosch 
anthropologist and Ossewa Brandwag "native expert", Dr. F J Language as 
Manager of Non-European Affairs. Such was the zeal with which Language and 
his new department set about restoring municipal control that almost 
immediately, residents found themselves subjected to the ruthless overhaul of 
influx controls, the intimidation of rent defaulters, the expulsion of residents who did not have permits to reside in the location, the persecution 
of local leaders and disruption of political meetings.
single-mindedness with which these changes were instituted ensured from the start, that the new department and its officials would be universally loathed. On one occasion, a "native" police spy informed the council that certain residents had called for the "assassination" of Dr Language at one of the mass meetings. Language certainly was a controversial figure. When he engineered the dismissal of David Bopape from his teaching post at the Amalgamated Mission School in July, 1944, the Vigilance Association organised a schools' boycott, and two weeks after that, a total stayaway of the entire location in protest against this action. The central demands of the strikers were the removal of Language from his post, the restoration of Bopape to his, and "direct representation" of residents on the town council. The strike was called off only after the council agreed to investigate Language's conduct, the possibility of reinstating Bopape and the amelioration of the abysmal living conditions. Instead of fulfilling these promises, however, from this date onwards, the council sought to tighten controls further. A ruthless campaign to enforce the residential permit system was launched and hundreds of rent defaulters and residents who were ineligible for permits were expelled from the location. Both the sense of betrayal, following the strike, and the unsympathetic manner in which the permit system was enforced (at a time of acute housing shortages Reef wide) rankled with the residents.

The council further undermined its own standing by its attempts to neuter the Advisory Board by reducing its "powers" and by making representations to this effect to the central government's Department of Native Affairs. In reply to the residents' demand for direct representation on the council, the councillors asserted that "natives" were not sufficiently "advanced" to participate in Western parliamentary institutions and that this "backwardness" explained their peculiar susceptibility to communism. In the same year, 1946, the council mounted a programme of intimidating local political leaders. The social worker, who was also a CPSA member, was dismissed while the location's church ministers were threatened with evictions if they failed to stop acting as "cats paws" of political organisations. Despite the attacks on location leadership from 1946 to 1948, with the assistance of Lewis Baker, the Advisory Board and Vigilance Association waged a determined campaign against the permit system. Both the intensity of this campaign and the intransigence of the local Non-European Affairs Department led to the Department of Native Affairs to intervene and to appeal to Language to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards permitless Africans at this time of acute Reef-wide housing shortages. By the end of the decade, after years of struggle against municipal controls and around bread-and-butter issues, both the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Association were more combative than ever and the Council was forced to admit that "every recrudescence of certain foreign ideologies... is echoed on the Rand."

The immense support for the CPSA and the intensity of the antagonism felt by residents towards the location administration was dramatically expressed in the May Day protests of 1950, organised by the CPSA. The planning of this day's stayaway protests coincided with the council's reformulation of location regulations, designed to facilitate tighter controls. Given the background of continual conflict between location officialdom and the residents over restrictions and regulations, it is not surprising that tension should have reached breaking point on May Day, 1950. Throughout the day, an enlarged police force, called in to maintain "law and order" roamed the dusty location streets. After an uneventful and peaceful day, a crowd of residents massed at the location gates at 6:00 p.m. and when ordered to disperse, stood their ground, hurling abuse at the policemen. In the face of the threatening
demeanour of the crowd, the police charged, scattering it in confused flight. In the "disturbances" which followed, three residents were injured by the police and were taken to hospital. 41 Although the council's investigations into the day's clashes between crowd and police placed the proverbial "anti-social fringe" at the forefront of the flare up of rioting, there is little corroborative evidence. The response of the crowd appears instead, to be the culmination of the frustration and resentment which had been simmering throughout the decade. It also stands as testimony to the CPSA's organisational strength.

Yet, while the May Day protest represented the apogee of the CPSA's success on the East Rand, it was also its swansong. In June 1950, in anticipation of the Suppression of Communism Act, the CPSA dissolved itself. Nevertheless despite the fact that it ceased to exist as an organisation with a public identity in several areas, and notably in Brakpan, its leaders remained politically active in the ANC. In Brakpan, the ANC branch was to assume many of the characteristics and functions of the CPSA of the 1940s over the next decade, while the Advisory Board and Vigilance Association were to serve as important forums of protest and organisation. To a great extent, it was because of the organisational foundations laid by the CPSA that the ANC of the 1950s in Brakpan was able to reorientate itself from an elitist organisation to one with a more distinctly plebeian identity.

BRAKPAN AND URBAN APARTHEID

A further feature of Brakpan which helps to explain the coherence and unanimity of the location dwellers' responses to the ANC, is the fact that it remained relatively unscathed by the more drastic aspects of Verwoerdisian social engineering which did so much to rupture and disrupt neighbouring African communities. Because of the local town council's failure to establish a new "model" township, based on the Nationalist blueprint, the location community remained intact for the decade.

By the war years, the African population was choking the location and had spilled over into the smallholdings and backrooms of the town. The council however, proved incapable of dealing with the housing crisis. Brakpan had been planned originally in 1912 as a suburb of the neighbouring town of Benoni, and hemmed in as it was by mines and mining properties, there was simply no land available to extend the existing location or to construct a new township. 42 Moreover, the expansion of the town towards the location meant that the existing location could not be extending without colliding with "white" Brakpan. As a result, all attempts at obtaining the necessary additional land in the 1940s came to nought. 43 Nevertheless, with the installation in 1948 of a government which was considerably more anxious to bring a halt to the housing crisis in the urban areas, investigations into a suitable site for a new joint township with other East Rand towns were undertaken in earnest in the early 1950s. From 1951 to 1955, the council negotiated with the Department of Native Affairs and the Mentz Commission, set up by the Nationalist government to plan African housing in the PW area, for a suitable site for Brakpan. The Mentz Commission recommended the construction of a joint township for Nigel and Springs on the farms Vlakkopiet no. 1 and no. 8, which bordered on Springs' newly developed Kwa-Thema township. 44 But these plans were thwarted by the Brakpan town Council's implacable opposition to the "Greater Kwa Thema" scheme. The site bordered on the Witbok smallholdings within the Brakpan municipal area where the white inhabitants were strongly antipathetic to the establishment of an...
adjacent African township. Local industrialists were also opposed to the site on the grounds of its remoteness from the industrial areas of the town. Indeed, many councillors themselves feared that the proposed Nigel and Brakpan townships at Vlakfontein would eventually merge and isolate Brakpan from Nigel, Dunottar and the entire south-eastern Transvaal and would constitute a major "black spot" in a white urban area. They also argued that the price asked for the land at Vlakfontein was prohibitively high and that in the absence of railway facilities between Brakpan and Vlakfontein, it would be impossible to "keep Africans off the National Road". Eventually, however, after protracted negotiations, the combined pressure of local industrialists who were later prepared to abandon their earlier reservations about the site as well as the pragmatic arguments of Dr Language in support of the scheme, the council agreed to establish a township at Vlakfontein. The change of heart on the part of industrialists and Dr Language followed close on the heels of Dr Verwoerd's injunction that no industrial development should occur in Brakpan until such time as conditions for "orderly settlement" at Vlakfontein had been achieved. Negotiations with the owners of the Vlakfontein farms were duly entered into in October 1956, but because of complicated and protracted issues concerning the railways and electricity department, it was only in May 1959 that the first permanent houses were completed and that the Advisory Board could congratulate the council on the "expeditious manner in which the establishment of Tsakane was carried out". Although settlement at Tsakane actually began in 1957 on a "site and service" basis to provide relief to the squatting crisis on the smallholdings, it was not before the early 1960s that removals from the "old location" to Tsakane began on a systematic basis. The delays in executing urban apartheid made Brakpan unique on the East Rand. The destruction of inner city locations and the resettlement of other East Rand African communities in large, austere, ethnically zoned townships not only ripped apart social and political networks, but speeded up the process of social differentiation as new openings for entrepreneurs and clerks became available in expanded township administrative structures. The sheer size of these new townships, the fragmentation of old communities, and the fact that their original inhabitants (squatters, ex-miners and new arrivals) were, to a great extent, impervious to the predominantly urban image and message of the ANC, inhibited African politicians from organising truly mass political campaigns in this decade. Thus, at the moment that classrooms stood empty in Brakpan during the Bantu Education boycott in 1955, the schools in Benoni's new township of Daveyton were packed. Similarly, in the women's anti-pass campaign of 1956, in which 2,000 African women in Brakpan participated, the women of Daveyton broke rank. The stay of execution or moratorium enjoyed by Brakpan's residents, allowed for a greater degree of internal cohesion. This factor, combined with a heritage of popular radicalism and strong organisation goes considerable way in explaining the robustness and vigour of Brakpan's African political protest in the decade.

UNEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY AND CONDITIONS IN THE BRAKPAN LOCATION 1950 -1958

Unemployment was a consistent feature in Brakpan and contributed in no small way to the instability and insecurity of urban existence. To some extent, the pervasiveness of unemployment can be explained by the small size of the industrial and commercial sectors and their consequent ability to absorb only a limited part of the deluge of African workers. Moreover, so half hearted were the council's attempts to promote industrialisation that by 1957, there were still vacant sites at Vulcania Extension no. 1. Verwoerd's refusal to permit the proclamation of the industrial area, Vulcania no. 2 until the
council had provided for the housing of the expected new industrial proletariat also impeded industrial growth in Brakpan.\(^{30}\) Such factories as there were, were themselves extremely small, undercapitalised and had limited labour requirements. The engineering factories, for example, employed African workforces of between 10 and 50 workers. In addition, there was an extremely small labour turnover in these concerns, and throughout the 1950s, many factory owners boasted of the stability and long service of their labour forces.\(^{31}\) There were, therefore, rarely vacancies in the engineering and pattern workshops of the town. Indeed, the bulk of the male African population worked as domestic servants, messengers, for the municipality, in the shops and in the building related concerns. But here too, new employment opportunities were circumscribed in the 1950s. The municipal labour force was drawn almost exclusively from "reserve natives" who the council believed were considerably more biddable than their urban counterparts, while, following the decline of mining on the East Rand in the mid 1950s and the large scale movement of the white mining population to the burgeoning gold fields of the Orange Free State, the commercial, domestic service and building sectors all began to contract. By the late 1950s, many pessimistic observers predicted that Brakpan was well on its way to becoming a "ghost town".\(^{32}\) The following table shows how the local economic downturn of the late 1950s limited the amount of urban employment available to local Africans and to newcomers.

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<th>VACANCIES</th>
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<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>Building Industry</td>
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<td>Hotels, Flats, Boarding Houses</td>
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<td>Domestic Service</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong>:</td>
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Source:- BMA : BMR 14/1/30 - Inspection of the Local Labour Bureaux, Brakpan, 28 September, 1957.

From the mid-1950s, with both the decline in building activities (which had previously been able to periodically soak up the unemployed) and the retrenchments from the mines, the number of unemployed African men in Brakpan was ever on the increase. To make matters worse, the council found itself incapable of dealing with the problem and in 1957 came under fire from the government for allowing "idle and undesirable" elements to remain in the urban area.\(^{33}\) Not only did the high rate of unemployment lead to the resurgence of the informal sector (liquor running, dagga smuggling, hawking and petty theft) but it saw the intensification of hard crime. More daring housebreaking escapades were undertaken in the white town and smallholdings, but much of the criminal activity of the decade turned in upon the location itself. "Tsotsi" gangs of the "idle and unemployed" were invariably held responsible. If the "tsotsi" gangs were feared by isolated white smallholders, they were regarded by the location dwellers as a highly dangerous and disruptive force. The increase in robbery, rape and violence in the location "by some tsotsi elements ... especially on the weekends on law-abiding citizens" was noted with alarm by the Advisory Board.\(^{34}\) The problem of unemployment was particularly pronounced amongst the location's youth, and contributed to the creation of a distinct youth subculture. Youth
unemployment and juvenile delinquency had become an issue of concern for community leaders since the late 1940s and in their annual report in 1948, the Advisory Board identified a "recalcitrant youth section" in the location. The council had similarly become aware in the late 1940s of the "emergence of a young generation of irresponsible Bantus who refuse to attend school or work and who pass the time in idleness, gambling and mischief to the detriment of the community". In the urban atmosphere, wrote Dr Language, "the youth tended to evade parental controls and to develop a work-shy complex". Yet, as closer scrutiny indicates, the root of this phenomenon was far more profound than the "urban atmosphere". Youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency arose for a number of reasons. Not only were there scant openings in formal employment, but, as the labour bureaux inspector commented, there was "little scope for youth in commerce and industry". In part, the absence of opportunities for young people was due to the wariness of local employers of engaging juvenile employees. Township youth was regarded as undisciplined, unreliable, dishonest and prone to absenteeism. More importantly, as Dr Language pointed out, it did not pay to employ juveniles "because the wage determinations do not discriminate between the rates for juveniles and adults". The attitude of the youth themselves played an important part in creating an image of unsuitability and irresponsibility as workers since they generally spurned the agricultural and manual factory work offered to them by the labour bureaux. Thus, the number of unemployed youths rose yearly as the schools disgorged school leavers who could not be absorbed in employment. Moreover, the schools themselves proved incapable of keeping the youth occupied. There was a severe shortage of classrooms and other educational facilities in the location. In the absence of jobs and adequate schooling, large numbers of bored young people whiled away their hours in the streets of the location, and it was here, as other commentators have observed, that the distinctive machismo youth culture, based on gambling and petty crime, was distilled. Although the "idleness" and petty criminality was disruptive and was viewed with alarm by location leaders, the youth were to provide an important new political resource for the ANC in the 1950s, and as research on youth culture and unemployment by Bonner suggests, youth culture could be a key factor in defining the limits and possibilities of political action in the decade. The almost total boycott of schools in the 1955 ANC Bantu Education Boycott, in Brakpan for example, was aided by the picketing and intimidatory practises of unemployed juveniles.

If there was little in the way of employment for men and male juveniles, there was virtually no work available to African women. Unlike larger East Rand towns, such as Germiston, where the establishment of light industry had increased the scope for female employment, outside of domestic services, the only alternatives available to women were to be found in beer brewing, prostitution and hawking. This, combined with tighter government and municipal controls upon female mobility and urban residence and the harsh actions taken against beer brewers and female hawkers, meant that women were extremely insecure. In 1950, a system designed to regularise the entry into and residence of women in the urban area was introduced, while in 1955, the council barred the entry of "foreign" women into the municipal area. As early as the 1930s and 1940s, a peculiarly female tradition of defensiveness of home, family and school had emerged, as exemplified in widespread female participation in subsistence campaigns, but this had tended to be episodic and spontaneous in character. In the considerably more hostile legal environment of the 1950s and in a context in which marriages were proving to be increasingly triable, women were drawn into national political organisations like the ANC on an unprecedented scale while their growing sense of
bitterness and urgency was to spill over into the communal and political campaigns of the day.

Perhaps the most striking feature of life in the location was the extreme depth of poverty. Not only did migrancy and the wage patterns set by the mining industry depress wages, but these also declined in real terms in the 1950s. In a South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) survey of 1950, the average family income in Reef towns was estimated at 12.6s.6d. It was broken down as follows:

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<tr>
<td>Man's average wage</td>
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<td>Wife's net contribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>1. 0. 0</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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While these figures represent an increase of 31% on the 1941 figures, the minimum essential expenditure was calculated at 1.18s.6d per month. Four years later, the SAIRR investigated the cost of living for African families in Johannesburg, and concluded that the gap between African family incomes and basic subsistence needs identified in 1950 had not displayed any signs of diminishing. Whereas income, including the basic wages had increased by 24% since 1950, the cost of the barest essentials estimated as necessary for African needs had risen by 32%. The cost of minimum food requirements had risen by 29% since 1950 (absorbing the equivalent of 94% of the family income) while the cost of men's clothing had increased by 84%. In the absence of evidence regarding wage rates and the cost of living in Brakpan, these estimates can only be taken as approximate. It is likely that, as in the 1930s and 1940s, the wage rate in Brakpan was considerably lower than that elsewhere on the Reef, as labour was in such abundance and as there were no trade unions capable of securing modest increases. The general economic plight of residents was eloquently expressed in 1952 in an Advisory Board request to the council to refrain from increasing the rentals.

In this urban existence, economic privation has all along been at the basis of the African family's disintegration with the most adverse social and moral effects. Malnutrition and reduced resistance to infectious disease, coupled with ignorance as to the importance of basic hygienic rules of living, are the most serious threat to the African community of today. ... the cost of living is today much higher than it has ever been before, while the African's wage level is too low to enable him to maintain a decent and coherent standard of living. The introduction of higher rentals will have the effect of hastening the further economic, social and moral deterioration of the African family.

When situated within this world of progressive immiseration, the constant ferment around increases in bus fares and rents, the expensiveness of municipally brewed beer and police raids on shebeens in the 1950s is readily understandable, and it was the ability of the ANC politicians to tap this reservoir of discontent which explains much of its success in building up a mass base in the location in the 1950s. Indeed, as with the CPSA before them, their attraction and strength lay not in their overall political programme,
but in their role as organisers of local opposition to municipal controls and as champions of the fast eroding "rights" of location residents.

The slowing rate of economic growth and the soaring cost of living also affected the better educated, skilled and professional Africans. However, they were most directly affected by a further set of circumstances - the restrictions on entrepreneurial and professional opportunities. Although the population increased and although the numbers of the self-employed (artisans, craftsmen, herbalists etc) grew commensurately, the council refused to make additional provision for shops and outlawed trading at the beerhall. Consequently, artisans, petty traders and craftsmen felt thwarted in their endeavours at capital accumulation.65 The situation for educated and professional Africans was no better. In the previous decade, many schoolteachers who had been obliged to teach in neighbouring townships - given the limited amount of schools in Brakpan - were forced to relinquish their jobs in order to retain their residential permits in the Brakpan location. The general lack of clerical work for educated Africans was compounded by the discriminatory employment practices of the municipality which refused to employ African clerks in the location's administrative structures. Professionals and trained persons such as teachers, the librarian and social workers all complained bitterly of inadequate salaries, while African nurses at the Far East Rand Hospital objected to the simplified syllabuses with which they were trained.66 In addition to the economic constraints on their advancement and actualization as a class, the petty bourgeois inhabitants of the location bridled at the council's increasingly stringent administration of the location. Since the 1940s, they felt that instead of "fostering proprietary rights, self reliance and self achievement" (classic African middle class values), the council's policies stifled such aspirations and nurtured a "spirit of servile dependence". This, they could not but "deprecate and condemn as aimed at oppression and exploitation."67

Thus, despite the potential lines of class cleavage in the location, the small size of the petty bourgeoisie*, the assaults upon their social aspirations and mobility and the unconcern of the local authority over the extent to which it alienated them, meant that the location's middle class leaders were remarkably receptive to the cares and concerns of the least privileged members of the location. Indeed, there were vast areas of shared experience with their working class neighbours: there was no separate area for "better class natives" in this location, and in most families, petty bourgeois and working class alike, one or more of the householders engaged in informal sector activity.

Apart from the all-pervasive poverty an additional strain on urban life was caused by the acute housing shortage which had surfaced in the previous decade and about which precious little had been done. Although the council had converted the Apex Coal Mine compound into a hostel for single men in 1952, and although 300 new houses were completed in 1954, the council was never able to redress the housing shortage.65 By 1959, 12,000 people lived in the location in an area designed to accommodate a considerably smaller population. In this situation, 2,000 lodger families were crammed into the matchbox houses of permit holders. Some site owners permitted their tenants to construct shacks in their back yards and this inevitably multiplied existing problems over water supply, sanitation and domestic artisan and craft industry.68 The admission of lodgers also placed additional stresses on what were already fragile family structures. The impecuniousness of the municipality (which derived little of the wealth generated by the gold mining industry) meant that
the council was prepared to provide only the barest essentials necessary for
the reproduction of their African labour force. The location consequently
became more squalid and depressed than ever. It stood in striking contrast to
the new townships mushrooming all over the Reef, which although
architecturally stark and representing a loss of the neighbourliness of the
"old location", showed a dramatic improvement in physical living conditions.
The Brakpan location stood as a shabby relic of an earlier age of township
planning and an age of a relatively more leisurely pace of urbanisation.
Overcrowding and over-crowding led to the creation of slum areas, while the
"backward and unhealthy" "bucket system" was held responsible by residents for
the prevalence of disease.70

Not only did residents live in squalor but facilities such as transport were
grossly inadequate to the community's needs. Although the location was
situated nearer to the industrial areas than the new townships, bus fares were
high and drove remorselessly into delicate household economies. Bus accidents
were frequent: there were no buses travelling to and from the location after
10 p.m. and "bad relationships" prevailed between white bus drivers and
location dwellers.71 At the same time, location residents were subjected to
tighter legal controls and restrictions on their freedoms of choice and
movement. This was most marked after 1953, when the Nationalist government
consolidated its parliamentary strength. From this date, the pace of social
restructuring accelerated and measures enacted by the previous parliament were
implemented with greater alacrity. This new edifice of laws was bolstered by
an armoury of local government regulations, the aim of which was to contain
political organisation and to freeze further urbanisation. In 1950, a fresh
set of regulations with tighter provisions with regard to trading, the keeping
of animals, the entry of non-residents and residential rights were
promulgated. In addition, from this time onwards, the council refused to
register workseekers who were in arrears with their poll taxes and they
expelled old people whose tax indemnities indicated that they came from areas
outside of Brakpan.72 The Advisory Board was appalled at the regulations
which seemed to fly in the face of their appeal that the amendments be
promulgated "in accordance with the principles of justice and equity" and that
"they respect the individual's sanctity and the family's right to liberty and
privacy".73

"The new regulations", warned the Advisory Board in 1950, "are, in the main,
retrogressive, oppressive and exacting in nature and the greatest regret of
the Advisory Board is that they will eventually invariably have the most
harmful effects on the relationships between black and white". As the
Advisory Board predicted, the inflexibility and insensitivity with which the
regulations were framed and later implemented, exacerbated the tensions
existing between officialdom and the location dwellers.

Although the regulations were declared ultra vires in court in mid-1951, the
amendments of 1952 were no less "oppressive and exacting" in nature. Between
September 1950 and November 1952, 3 429 residents were prosecuted by the
council for contravening the regulations.74 Moreover, the regulations were
brutally enforced by "blackjacks" (African municipal policemen), who
tyrannised the location. "Blackjacks" raided beer brewers and the men's
single quarters and these invariably violent intrusions were justified by the
council as necessary to "maintain order and moral integrity."75
The residents were also not able to seek redress from local officialdom, whose unsympathetic conduct was regular cause for complaint. In response, an official retorted that residents bother officials for "trivial reasons." From the late 1940s, the council also attempted to intimidate location leadership and to throw it into disarray. From 1948 onwards it nominated the more conservative location leaders to the Advisory Board and occasionally appointed unpopular residents. These council nominees generally preached moderation and were anxious to distance themselves from the CPSA and later, the ANC elected members of the Board. As the political temperature of the location rose in the early 1950s and as the polarisation between the two halves of the Board became starker, the council exploited the ideological tensions in an attempt to neutralise the influence of the ANC members. In 1955, for example, the council provided the resources, protection and propaganda for the nominated members who opposed the ANC-organised Education Boycott. Beyond that, the council refused to consult the board on major decisions of location policy. As the Advisory Board's nominated member railed when presented with the new regulations for their approval in 1950, the Town council hasn't thought it necessary to consult the Advisory Board on basic principles in the Administration of the location. This was brought out clearly in the town council's intention to take over the registration of service contracts, the establishment of a market and milk bar. In each case, the Advisory Board was consulted merely for the purposes of approving estimated proposals and not on principles themselves. What is going to undermine completely the significance of consultation is the continual disregard of the Advisory Board's recommendations where any consultation has been sought as shown ... in the way the Town council handles annual estimates and also in respect of the new location and Village regulations which are now law.

The cavalier treatment of the Board's recommendations, opinions and representations on the residents' behalf engendered widespread anger and resentment and from the council's viewpoint proved counter productive. Paradoxically, the Board retained its popular stature and was able to rally the location community around both local and political campaigns.

THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF THE ANC IN THE BRAKPAN LOCATION 1948 - 1958

Although the CPSA had been the dominant political force in the location in the 1940s, the ANC had always maintained a presence. Many prominent local communists such as David Bopape and Gideon Ngake were also members of the ANC. Yet, it was only towards the end of the decade that its presence came to be felt. Internal changes within the ANC national body at the time, brought about by the dominance of a younger generation of urban-based intelligentsia who rejected traditional ANC constitutional protest in favour of mass political mobilisation resulted in a change in the ANC's profile in many Reef locations. In Brakpan, this was due in no small measure to the role of David Bopape, one of the few ANC Youth Leaguers who was both a member of the CPSA and who supported the CPSA's strategy of involving themselves in parochial location disputes in the 1940s. Bopape was also a key national figure in the ANC and was chairman of the combined CPSA-ANC anti-pass campaigns of 1944 and 1946, which had evoked an impressive local response in Brakpan. In 1946, a series of ANC mass meetings were hosted by the Advisory
Board and in 1948, an ANC-organised "day of prayer" was held in the location. By the end of the decade, although the actual membership and extent of local support for the ANC was negligible in comparison to that of the CPSA, residents were exposed to evocative and powerful nationalist speeches from ANC leaders, which more explicitly than ever, linked the deprivations suffered by residents in the location to the wider world of domination and oppression in South Africa. At one meeting in 1948, for example, an ANC spokesman addressed his audience thus:

The Africans are the underdogs of all underdogs in South Africa. The discrimination and restrictions as well as humiliations against them should challenge them to rise as one man in a campaign to remove all their disabilities. All other race and national groups, with their friends... are fighting for freedom... The time has come that all self respecting African men and women must join in the struggle for their own liberation. All liberty loving people, men and women of goodwill of all races must join this struggle.51

Thus, by the time the CPSA was banned in 1950, there was a strong enough nucleus of ANC supporters in the location around which the local branch could be built. The communist Advisory Board and Vigilance Association members remained politically active, and from 1951, used these tenant bodies to campaign for membership of the ANC. The secretary of the ANC branch, Gideon Ngake for example, used the Advisory Board "Report Back" meetings as a means of campaigning for the Defiance Campaign in 1952.62 Thus, while 1951 and the first half of 1952 saw the national ANC body retreating from political activity and into a series of debates and planning sessions63, the Brakpan ANC branch was gradually built up by the elected Advisory Board members and the Vigilance Association which continued to organise around, and to champion the local grievances. There was no shortage of local dissatisfaction to fuel this drive. The frustrations and bitterness the municipal regulations brought in their train were compounded by intense dissatisfaction with the deterioration of location facilities and the proposed hiking of location rentals.64 Although an Advisory board appeal succeeded in staving off the rent increase, the council paid little attention to the bulk of complaints and demands of the residents. As a result, relations between the location dwellers and the local authority reached a new low in 1951. Contrary to the council's assurance to the Secretary of Native Affairs (who was anxious to see "the restoration of goodwill between location authorities and location dwellers") that it enjoyed close contact with the residents and their representatives, the tension between residents and the location authorities remained acute.

While much of this was expressed in informal and incoherent fashion, such as the regular brushes between residents and the police and with local officials, the Advisory board chambers resounded with attacks and counter-attacks between the Board and council. At almost every meeting held in 1951, Board members railed against the council's unsympathetic attitude towards the location dwellers and the obstacles it had created for newly arrived workers.55 To the annoyance of location officials, elected Advisory Board members accompanied aggrieved residents to the office of the location superintendent to lodge complaints. So taxed was the patience of this official by this practice, that, on one such occasion, he ordered an elected Advisory Board member out of his office. He later explained that while he was quite willing to listen to the Board members speaking on behalf of the residents, he "would not permit members just standing around like police."56 Such encounters acted
as constant irritants to the raw and sensitive relations between Advisory Board members and the council.

Despite the apparent intensity of Advisory Board opposition to the council, the Board was sharply divided between council nominees and the elected ANC members throughout 1951 and 1952. While the nominated members supported many of the demands of the elected members in principle, they recoiled at the stridency and aggressiveness with which they were made. They were discomfited by the elected members insistence on relaying residents grievances to council representatives at every single meeting. An irritated nominated member, Mr Malepe complained of the "undesirability of members bringing up complaints of this nature as it places the Board in an invidious position as it is manifestly impossible to decide one way or another." But most perturbing for the nominated members was the lively and tumultuous character of report back meetings and the use made by elected members of this platform, to promote the aims and programmes of the ANC. In mid-1951, the nominated members attempted to curb the volatile mood of residents meetings by insisting that the established practice, whereby residents elected their own chairperson should be abolished and that only Advisory Board members should preside over meetings in future. The resultant conflict this caused within the Board prompted the council's intervention. From mid-1951, the council refused to hand over the keys of the location hall to elected members for the purposes of convening report back meetings. Yet, this tactic backfired on the council, for rather than attend the formal report-back meetings chaired by the unpopular nominated members, the residents increasingly flocked to the "clandestine", informal meetings held by the elected Advisory Board members and the vigilance association.

It was in this situation of tension over petty restrictions, the proposed new regulations and the council's refusal to allow elected members to call and control official report back meetings that preparation for the Defiance Campaign was undertaken in the early months of 1952. This massive campaign of civil disobedience has been discussed extensively elsewhere and requires no further reiteration here. Although it is unclear as to the numbers and precise social nature of Brakpan volunteers in the Campaign, most reports note the ebullience and triumphant mood of the campaign and the prominence of women amongst the volunteers. As in most other Reef centres, in July August and September of 1952, residents broke the curfew laws and regulations, cheered volunteers from other centres who entered the location without permits, packed the magistrate's courts when protestors were tried and marched through the streets of the location, and, on one occasion, the streets of the white town, singing the ANC anthem. Unwittingly, the council spurred on the Campaign in August when they dismissed Gideon Ngake, the Defiance Campaign organiser from the Advisory Board. A conflict between Ngake and the council had been threatening since the council presented amended location regulations to the Board for ratification in 1952 and had refused to accede to the elected members request for an interpreter for the Board. When Ngake objected to the "irregular lines" along which Advisory Board meetings were run and stormed out of an Advisory Board meeting in disgust, the council seized the opportunity to expel their most "truculent" and "arrogant" opponent from the Board. In protest, the two remaining elected members resigned, claiming that without Ngake, the board was no longer representative of the local community.

Consequently, the council decided to suspend the Board for the remainder of the year and to abandon the pretence of consultation with location leadership over location policy. All matters concerning location administration was
henceforth to be referred to the local Non-European Affairs Department. As a result, for the remaining months of 1952, the local ANC branch became the location's centre of organisational gravity. The elected members continued to organise residents meetings and it appears that the redoubling of their efforts bore fruit in the following month. In October, the local ANC branch was catapulted into national prominence when Brakpan volunteers formed the first "UNO" contingent (the first protestors after India's motion in the UNO General Assembly that South African should be debated). On this occasion, the 10 o'clock curfew was defied. A week later, a further 25 Brakpan residents contravened the curfew regulations.

Although the Defiance Campaign petered out in the latter months of 1953 and although it failed to achieve its stated objectives, participation in acts of protest had an important catalytic effect. Support for the ANC widened, as is evidenced by the overwhelming victory of the three former ANC members of the Board at the polls at the end of the year.

For the next two years, the energies of ANC organisers were absorbed in mobilising the location community around the issues of rents, transport, police raids and "apartheid" at the beerhall. While the struggles around beer-brewing, the beerhall and bus fares culminated in successful and unanimous beerhall and bus boycotts in October, 1954, the rents struggle proved to be far more protracted, diffuse and inconclusive. To a certain extent, the partial reversion to parochial issues in these years was due to the harassment and persecution of ANC leadership both nationally and locally. David Bopape had been arrested during the Defiance Campaign and was reincarcerated and banned soon afterwards, while Gideon Ngake was later banned and banished from the urban area. Because of the initially less overt political character of these struggles, the nominated members were prepared to collaborate with their elected counterparts. In January 1953, for example, a combined delegation of Advisory Board members attempted to persuade the council to disregard the Department of Native Affairs' injunction that new rentals be calculated on the basis of residents incomes. By the end of 1954, as the ANC national body began to revive in preparation for the anti-Bantu Education and "Western Areas" campaigns, the language of local protest was increasingly infused with nationalist, and at times, anti-white rhetoric. By the end of 1954, speakers at meetings not only inveighed against the brutalities of the local location regime, but harangued against the Government and exhorted their audiences to join the ANC in its struggle against the apartheid order. In December 1954, Dr Language was alerted to a rash of meetings which had taken place during the last few months of the year and which had been addressed by "certain members of the Advisory Board and African leaders from outside". As he informed the council, "natives from elsewhere" were "trying to sweep up the masses over grievances."

Some speakers have openly incited their hearers to acts of violence against natives who do not support the ANC. The location residents have been asked to defy the so-called unjust laws. At meetings, certain cabinet ministers are singled out for the most slanderous attacks. The Town Council and Manager of Non-European Affairs have been defamed and clearly it is the intention of certain speakers to create an anti-white feeling among the location inhabitants. Facts about non-European administration are continually being distorted and natives are taught to distrust the town council officials.
Furthermore, Dr Language appealed to the Department of Native Affairs for the authority to put "agitators ... behind bars" and to restrict ANC and Advisory Board report-back meetings, but the Secretary of Native Affairs proved unwilling to extend such powers to the local authority. The council thus found itself impotent in the face of the intensification of political activity in the latter months of 1954 and early 1955.96

THE BANTU EDUCATION BOYCOTT IN BRAKPAN, 1955

In the ANC anti-Bantu Education Boycott of 1955, Brakpan, along with the East Rand towns of Germiston and Benoni, emerged as one of the most militant and resilient centres of the boycott movement.97 It was also one of the locations in which the ANC's conduct of the campaign was to divide and disrupt location politics by giving rise to a vocal minority anti-ANC group.

There were many reasons why the boycott evoked such a tumultuous response in Brakpan. From the start, organisers were campaigning in a community whose experiences of success in the bus and beerhall boycotts of 1954 had generated a mood of euphoria and sense of invincibility. By the end of 1954, visiting ANC personages such as Robert Resha would congratulate Brakpanners on their participation in the rent struggles and exhort them to continue their "struggle" by way of participation in the Bantu Education Boycott.98 The radicalisation of schoolteachers was another crucial factor responsible for the success of the Boycott. Teachers had been mobilised by TATA as early as 1951 around the findings of the Eiselin Commission, upon which the Bantu Education Act was based. Indeed, as demonstrated earlier, education had been one of the prime issues of concern amongst location residents since the early 1940s. In the latter half of that decade, the Advisory Board launched a determined campaign for the improvement of educational facilities and for the establishment of night schools, which, it was hoped, would go some way in eliminating juvenile delinquency.99 The wholehearted involvement of women in the Boycott was another reason for its resilience and strength. Through the Defiance Campaign, the boycotts of beerhall and buses and rent struggles, more women were drawn into location political life. As it was the women who were generally at home in the location during the day, they were able to co-ordinate and orchestrate the day-to-day running of the Boycott. Apart from the boycotting scholars themselves, the unemployed, streetwise juveniles were active in sustaining the Boycott movement and the machismo culture of the youth was in evidence in the aggressive picketing, intimidation and incidents of arson in the latter part of the Boycott. Indeed, the Brakpan location community was so effectively prepared for the Boycott that when the ANC executive decided to postpone it, considerable local discontent was unleashed. The local leaders, together with their Benoni counterparts resolved to abide by the original plan by calling school-goers out on the 12th April, as originally planned, in defiance of the National Executive's decision.100 By the end of the week, there were 3,000 Brakpan school-goers out of school, the highest figure for any single location.101 When Dr Verwoerd announced that any schoolchild absent from school by the 25th April would not receive further education, the response was not one of abatement, but of renewed commitment to the Boycott. Despite police action, only 40 Brakpan children returned to the secondary school and a handful of children to each of the primary schools. From this time onwards, the Boycott began to take on somewhat violent overtones when several attempts at arson occurred.
Daily, loudspeaker vans patrolled the streets of the location, calling upon
parents to keep their children at home. The spectacle of this sustained,
militant and mass based action profoundly disturbed the local white residents
and the councillors who saw intimidation and violence as the hallmarks of the
Campaign. The Brakpan Herald published sensationalist and lurid descriptions
of the protest. They painted scenes of "hundreds of children roaming the
streets", "unruly elements and tsotsis", "detachments of brawny adult women
wielding buckled belts", "new teachers" with their fists thrust skywards,
bellows of cries of "Afrika" and hostile crowds "hissing" at the police who
stood by to "protect law-abiding natives from the threats of agitators." 102

While all the council and white citizens could see in the Boycott was anarchy
and bullying pressure tactics, this Campaign spawned one of the most organised
and effective "culture clubs" or alternative ANC schools. The Hrukpuii club
was run by a Mr Maboea, a teacher who had been dismissed as a consequence
of his part in the Campaign, and was widely supported by the community which
provided the financial resources necessary for the running of the school. 103
In fact, it was so well supported, that it endured for well over a year after
the Boycott, until it was forcibly disbanded by the council.

Yet, if the vibrancy and durability of the boycott testified to the
overwhelming support for the ANC, it was also spurred on and given its often
bitter edge by the emergence of an opposition movement. From the beginnings
of the boycott, there were parents, many of whom had been ANC supporters, who
became increasingly uneasy about this campaign because of their fears that the
ANC would not be able to deliver its promise of feasible alternative
education. As one disquieted nominated Advisory Board member informed the
Bantu World:

> When the boycott started, we called on the ANC members to tell
> us what the position was. We asked them what alternative
> plans there were for the children. They said there were none
> and they had received no instructions from the Head Office
> about that yet. In the meantime, nothing would be done. 104

There were also parents who informed the Brakpan Herald that they had never
understood the reasons why the ANC felt that their children should be taken
out of school in the first place. But it appears that it was really the
subsequent expulsion of student and the alleged intensification of
intimidatory tactics of "loafers" and "tsotsis" after this event which
transformed the sense of unease and disquiet into open opposition against the
ANC. 105

Together with the three nominated Advisory Board members who were resolutely
opposed to the elected ANC members' promotion of the Boycott, these parents
and a handful of teachers formed a school committee and began to openly oppose
the boycott. One of the first actions taken by the school committee was to
petition Verwoerd for a pardon for the expelled children. Soon afterwards,
the school committee expanded to form the Brakpan Civic Protection Society
(BCPS) which in effect became an opposition "party" to the ANC and to the
elected ANC members. 106 While it is difficult to discern the social
composition of the BCPS members as a group, it was chaired by a nominated
Advisory Board member and the key leadership positions were held by four
schoolteachers and three school principals. These educators had initially
supported the boycott; it was only after they were dismissed for their parts
in the Campaign that they joined the school committee and began to oppose the ANC.107

Most members of the BCPS justified their opposition to the ANC on the grounds that bringing an end to the boycott was in the best interests of their children. They argued that they had initially tried to oppose the Act through participation in the Campaign, but that, in the face of police brutality and government action, this battle could best be fought within the established structures provided for by the Act.105 The newly formed BCPS and nominated members submitted an application to the Department of Native Affairs requesting permission to establish and register a private school in the location as a temporary measure until such time as the Minister was prepared to allow the banned children to resume their education.109 Both the council and the Department welcomed this request as the BCPS's actions were seen as a means of driving a wedge into the boycott movement in one of its major strongholds. The council thus made a room at the location swimming bath available to the BCPS for the purposes of this school and pledged their support to the Society in its task of the "reclamation of the location". The BCPS school, however, only managed to enrol 230 students, less than half the number of those attending the cultural club.110 This suggests that although the BCPS may have enjoyed the patronage of the council and the government, it was effectively insulated from the concerns and opinions of most of the location dwellers. The disdain and active opposition of the BCPS to a near-unanimous ANC-led bus boycott in the following year further demonstrates this point.111 Nevertheless, despite the lack of support for the BCPS, its very presence reflected and contributed to the discord and divisions which manifested themselves in the location in the following years. ANC supporters, for example, threatened BCPS members who enjoyed police protection during the bus boycott, while the BCPS launched an equally bitter attack on the ANC and their supporters.112

Although the bus boycott and Federation of South African Women's anti-pass campaign of 1956 enjoyed widespread support, from this time onwards, community and political campaigns were no longer characterised by the coherence, unanimity and expansiveness of the protest movements of the early part of the decade. Not long after becoming a genuine social movement and significant political force in Brakpan, the ANC branch began to flounder. From the end of 1956, responses to ANC campaigns were partial and were marred by confusion and hesitancy. To a great extent, this can be accounted for by the intimidation of local leaders and the promulgation of local measures designed to inhibit political organisation, notably, a renewed ban on Advisory Board report-back meetings. Certain leaders were singled out for special attention. Mr Mahoeri, the teacher who ran the cultural club, for example, was banished to the "native territories".113 At the end of 1956, the cultural club was the first target of the council's offensive against the ANC. Not only had the cultural club provided an alternative view of reality, in itself, a profoundly subversive and political process, but it acted as a means of sustaining and co-ordinating ANC action. The council was thus determined to eliminate the club and proceeded to do so by forcing the youthful members of the club to report to the local labour bureaux for placement in employment. When 23 cultural club youths who had been prominent in the boycott refused to do so, despite several warnings from the council and labour bureaux, 10 of their number were arrested and brought before the native commissioner's court in December 1956.111"
This action was viewed by the residents as an unequivocal attempt to destroy what remained of the Boycott movement, and at a mass meeting organised by the parents of the youths in January, 1957, it was resolved that they would gather at 4 o'clock that day at the office of the location superintendent to protest against the arrests. It was also resolved that all workers would stay away from work on the 28th February. On the 27th February, however, at a further meeting, the residents decided against withholding their labour power on the following day, but to launch another bus boycott instead. The reasons for this decision are not clear. It is likely that the strike was called off after the Department of Native Affairs announced its decision to investigate the affair.\footnote{115} No doubt, the widespread confusion caused by the council's ban on meetings and the threats of intimidation undermined the confidence and resolve of the leaders. The council had intimated that firm action would be taken in the event of a strike and as Dr Language made it clear, it was the opinion of the council that,

If any strike, demonstration or boycott is undertaken by Brakpan natives in the near future, it will ... not be because ten native youths were arrested but just because of the opposition of the ANC to white authority and control.\footnote{116}

Whatever motivated the decision to call off the strike, the residents decided that resistance to the council's attack on the cultural club would best be waged through legal channels. On the 9th February, 1957, one of the 10 juveniles who had been arrested, David Piale, was charged with contravening the labour bureaux regulations. Piale appealed against his conviction in the supreme court. This resulted in the postponement of the other nine cases pending the decision of the Piale case. The case assumed the importance of a test case and its outcome was anticipated with keen interest by both the council and residents. The council alerted both the Department of Native Affairs and the Attorney General to the importance of the case.\footnote{117}

While the issue was fought out in court, the anger and frustration which followed the cancellation of the strike erupted in a spontaneous demonstration in the location streets. On the 25th March, a group of women and youths gathered around the secondary school buildings and hurled stones at the school and at certain homes of the school. The police were summoned to quell this upsurge and two residents were arrested.\footnote{118}

On the 23rd April, the judge president of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the supreme court dismissed the Piale appeal and refused to consider an application for leave to appeal. This legal victory in turn opened the council's way for the prosecution of the other 9 youths and for the dismantling of the cultural club.\footnote{119} The successful first round of the council's offensive against political organisation, combined with with the bans on meetings and the "endorsing out" of residents from the location, probably explains the lukewarm response of the local women to the anti-pass campaign of 1958 and the chaotic, confused conduct of the anti-rent increase struggles of 1958 and 1959. Not only was the latter campaign hampered by direct harassment, but, because of the absence of meetings, no clear strategy could be communicated to the residents. The campaign was also fraught with internal dissension. Although ideological and strategic differences between the Vigilance Association and the BCPS were submerged in a "gentleman's agreement" to ensure that the Advisory Board of 1957 was retained for the following year in anticipation of a full-scale campaign against the rent increase, a faction opposing the elected Advisory Board made its
This grouping was led by Mr Namo, an ANC member, who opposed the ANC's advice to residents to pay the new rentals "under protest" pending the outcome of an appeal case of Johannesburg residents contesting the legal standing of the increase in favour of an all-out boycott. The confusion caused by the emergence of rival poles of allegiance and the elaboration of competing strategies was heightened by the council's threat to instruct employers to deduct 25% off wages in order to cover the rents arrears. By the end of 1958, clarity had still not been reached. Many residents refused to fill out the income assessment forms or to pay the new rents, while others, following the advice of the Advisory Board, continued paying the rents "under protest". It was in this atmosphere of confusion that the elections for the Advisory Board for 1959 were held. Residents who had not paid their rentals were barred from voting and from standing for election. This ruling prevented men like the popular Vigilance Association secretary and veteran ANC Advisory Board member, Mr Pakade, from contesting his "seat". Thus, from the start, the Advisory Board of 1959 failed to win the trust and support of the residents. At a rare public meeting, permitted by the council in December 1958, a vote of no confidence in the newly elected Board was taken.

By this date, with leadership in Brakpan in disarray, the early removals of lodgers to the site and service scheme at Tsakane was set in train and large numbers of residents were evicted daily for failing to comply with the residential requirements. The mood of despondency and demoralisation became even more acute when the news broke in December that the Johannesburg rent case had been dismissed in the supreme court with costs. The rent boycott in Brakpan, along with other Reef townships, now cracked and thousands of tenants streamed into the township offices requesting more time in which to pay their arrears. Not surprisingly, these developments had powerful depoliticising effects. Thus, in April 1960, when several African townships were swept by protest, the Brakpan Town Council could report that Africans of the town had been "calm" and that this situation was due to the "composed and competent guidance from the Advisory Board". The "orderly and impassive behaviour of the Bantu people in Brakpan", the council repeatedly remarked "is acknowledged and accredited to the sober leadership of the Advisory Board."

This date also marked the beginnings of the decades long process of dismemberment of the location, as section by section, neighbourhoods were destroyed and their inhabitants were shepherded into the austere rows of houses at Tsakane. Undoubtedly, the removals, the break up of social and cultural networks that this entailed, combined with the banishment of large numbers of residents to the "native territories" or "homelands", helps explain the political quiescence which characterised Tsakane until the early to mid-80s when Brakpan once again witnessed the outbreak of bus, rent and consumer boycotts. A further explanation is the fact that the earliest inhabitants and significant section of the population of Tsakane were ex-miners and squatters who had lived on the vast smallholdings surrounding the town. Not only had the ANC failed to intervene in and steer the spontaneous ferment on the plots in more coherent directions in the 1950s, but when the squatters' most immediate needs were met by the state in the form of massive housing programmes, the ex-squatters were to be the most impervious and complacent sections of the Tsakane population. Their passivity was to be amongst the many insuperable barriers faced by the ANC in the following decade.
<table>
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(5) F J Nothling, "The Story of Brakpan", unpublished manuscript, chapters 1, 2 and 12.


(13) BMA : BMR 14/31/15 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the Town Clerk, 5 November, 1951.

(14) CAD : BMR N2/10 Location superintendent to the Town Clerk, 16 August, 1938 and CAD : Benoni Municipal Records (MB) 1/4/2 Minutes of the Meeting of the Native Affairs Committee, 8 January, 1935.

(15) CAD : BMR N3/71 Town Clerk to the Secretary of the Finances and General Purposes Committee (FGPC), 12 September 1942.

(16) See for example BMA : BMR 14/3/2 native Location Advisory Board Minutes and Agenda from 25 October, 1944 to 16 February, 1948.


(19) T Lodge, Black Politics, chapter 1.

(20) T Lodge, Black Politics, chapter 11.


(24) CAD : BMR N3/1 Secretary of the Communist Party of South Africa (East Rand Branch) to the Town Clerk, 12 April, 1943.

(25) Inkululeko, 4 December, 1943 and 4 March, 1944.

(26) Inkululeko, 3 October, 1944

(27) For accounts of visits by national C.P.S.A., see Inkululeko, 2 July, 1944 and 29 January, 1945.


(30) Inkululeko, 4 March, 1944

(31) CAD : BMK N3/1 Minutes of the Meeting of the Town Council, 29 April, 1943.

(32) CAD : BMK 14/7/7 Allegations of the Natives to the Minister of Native Affairs re: the Ejectment of Natives from the Location and on Points raised by the Secretary of Native Affairs, circa November, 1947.

(33) For a full exposition of the views of Dr Language on "Native Administration", see P J Coerze, F J Language, B.L.C. van Eeden, Die Oplossing van die Natuurlikevraagstuk in Suid Afrika, Johannesburg, 1943; BMA : BMK 14/1/1 Evidence of Dr Language to the Native Laws Commission, 1946 and 1948 and Records of the SAILR, Box 30,0, Paper read by Dr Language, Manager of Non-European Affairs at the Third Annual Conference of the Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs in Southern Africa, Durban, 8 September, 1954.

(34) H Sapire "The StayAway of the Brakpan Location". See BMA : BMK 14/1/1 Senator Basner to the Town Clerk, 23 December, 1943.

(35) H Sapire, "The StayAway of the Brakpan Location".

(36) BMA : BMK 14/7/7 Undated letter to the Town Council from the Brakpan Location Joint Organisation Committee to the Minister of Native Affairs, 1 October, 1947.

(37) BMA : BMK 14/8/4 Statement by Councillor F C Davey before a meeting of Native Ministers of Churches in the Brakpan Location, 17 August, 1946.

(38) BMA : BMK 14/8/1 Statement by Councillor F C Davey before a meeting of Native Minister of Churches in the Brakpan Location, 17 August, 1946.

(39) BMA : BMK 14/7/7 Secretary for Native Affairs to the Town Clerk, 10 August, 1948.

(40) Brakpan Herald, 9 November, 1945.

(41) BMA : BMK 14/1/10 Minutes of the Meeting of the Finances and General Purposes Committee, 1 May, 1950.


(44) BMA : BMK 14/6/26 Minutes of the Meeting of the Finances and General Purposes Committee, 23 May, 1945.


(18) BMA : BMR 14/6/26 A C Rabotapi, Secretary of the Advisory Board to the Town Clerk, 25 July, 1959.


(23) BMA : BMR 14/1/30 Regional Employment Commissioner to the Chief Native Commissioner, Johannesburg, 19 December, 1955.

(24) BMA : BMR 14/7/8 Memo from the Secretary of the Advisory Board, 19GU.


(27) BMA : BMR 14/1/30 Regional Employment Commissioner to the Chief Native Commissioner, Johannesburg, 19 December, 1955.

(28) Paper read by Dr Language, Manager of Non-European Affairs, Brakpan, at the Third Annual Conference of the IANEASA, Durban, 18 September, 1954.


(30) P Bonner, "Family, Crime and Political Consciousness".

(31) BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Town Clerk to the Editor, Bantu, 26 July, 1955;
BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Statement on the Brakpan Location Schools Boycott by the Brakpan Advisory Board or section of the Advisory Board, 30 May, 1955.

(62) BMA : BMR 14/1/3 Town Clerk to the Native Commissioner, Benoni, 29 August, 1956.


(64) BMA : BMR 14/1/8 Memo submitted by the Brakpan Location Advisory Board re: Rentals and the Amendment of Location Regulations, 1955.


(66) BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Board, 22 June, 1949 and Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Board, 20 March, 1951.

(67) BMA : BMR 14/2/3 Memo of the Advisory Board, 20 April, 1949.

(68) BMA : BMR 14/1/38 Memo re: Proposed Discussion of Representative of the Town Council with Dr Eiselin, Secretary of Native Affairs, re: Apex Hostel and Squatters Camp, undated; circa 1953.


(71) BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Board, 25 May, 1949.

(72) BMA : BMR 14/7/8 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Board, 13 September, 1951; Brakpan Herald, 6 April, 1958.


(74) BMA : BMR 14/1/18 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the Town Clerk, 1 December, 1952.

(75) BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Board, 14 February, 1950.

(76) BMA : BMR 14/3/1 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Board, 27 April, 1958.

(77) BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Secretary, Brakpan Location Residents' Association to the Town Clerk, 15 November, 1948.

(78) Records of the SAIRR, Treason Trial Records, Copy of notes made by W/D Constable Clement Mabanya of a Meeting of the ANC held at Brakpan on the 22nd July, 1956.

(80) BMA : BMR 14/8/4 Statement by Councillor F C Davey before a Meeting of Native Ministers of Churches in the Brakpan Location, 17 August, 1946.

(81) BMA : BMR 14/8/3 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the Town Clerk, 1 November, 1948.

(82) BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Board, 7 March, 1952.

(83) T Lodge, Black Politics, chapter 1.

BMA : BMR 14/1/18 Memo of the Advisory Board, 9 March, 1952.

(85) BMA : BMR 14/3/1 See Advisory Board Minutes and Agendas for 1951.

(86) BMA : BMR 14/8/3 Minutes of Meeting of the Advisory Board, 24 April, 1952.

(87) BMA : BMR 14/8/3 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Board, 7 March, 1952.

(88) BMA : BMR 14/8/3 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the Town Clerk, 1 June, 1952.

(89) See, for example, Rand Daily Mail, 31 July, 1952.

(90) BMA : BMR 14/8/3 Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Board, 4 September, 1952 and 15 September, 1952.


(92) The three elected members campaigned on an anti-rents increase ticket.

(93) BMA : BMR 14/1/26 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the Town Clerk, 29 December, 1954; Rand Daily Mail, 22 November, 1954.

(94) Carter and Karis microfilm collection, Southern African Research Archives Project, copy held at the University of South Africa Library, 2 : XB23 96/1-6 David Bopape : Biographical Notes.

(95) BMA : BMR 14/1/24 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the Additional Native Commissioner, 4 February, 1955.


(97) T Lodge, Black Politics, chapter 5.

(98) Records of the SAIRR, Treason Trial Records, copy of Notes made by N/D Constable Clement Ntabanya of a meeting of the ANC held at Brakpan, 22 July, 1950.

(99) T Lodge, Black Politics, p.120 and BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Memo on the Administration of the Location submitted to the Town Council by the
Residents of the Location, signed by G Ngake, Secretary of the Joint Organisation Committee, 16 September, 1948.

(100) T Lodge, Black Politics, p.123.

(101) Rand Daily Mail, 13 April, 1955.

(102) Rand Daily Mail, 16 April, 1955; Rand Daily Mail, 20 April, 1955; Brakpan Herald, 22 April, 1955.


(106) BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Manager of Non-European Affairs to the Town Clerk, 31 August, 1955.


(110) BMA : BMR 14/3/2 Reprot of the Manager of Non-european Affairs, 17 October, 1955; Manager of Non-European Affairs to the Rev. D M Bottleman, 30 September, 1955.


(112) Records of the SAIRR, Treason Trial Records, Copy of the Notes made by N/O Constable Clement Mabanya of a meeting of the ANC held at Brakpan, 22 July, 1956, BMA : BMR 14/1/26 Town Clerk to the Manager of Non-European Affairs, 31 August, 1956.

(113) H Sapiire - interview with Mr Pakade, Tsakane, February, 1986.


(117) BMA : BMR 14/1/10 Director of Bantu Affairs to the Town Clerk, 1 April, 1957.

(118) BMA : BMR 14/1/10 Director of Bantu Affairs to the Town Clerk, 1 April, 1957.


(121) BMA : BMR 14/1/26 Minutes of the Residents Meeting, 28 September, 1958.

(122) BMA : BMR 14/1/26 A Rabotapi, Secretary of the Advisory Board to the Town Clerk, 28 September, 1958.


(125) BMA : BMR 14/1/10 Town Clerk to the Secretary of the Advisory Board, 11 May 1960.