TITLE: Liberals, Radicals and the Politics of Black Consciousness, 1969-76.

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Introduction: Two Political Traditions:

The period from the demise of the Liberal Party in 1968, following the introduction of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, to the 1976 Soweto students' revolt can be seen as an important transitional period in South African politics that requires re-evaluation by students of contemporary history. These years mark in particular the eclipse of a tradition of paternalistic welfare liberalism in South Africa stretching back to the inter-war years and the foundation of the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1929. At the same time they also pinpoint the re-emergence of a tradition of democratic radicalism anchored around the Freedom Charter after its initial suppression at the time of the State of Emergency in 1960 and the banning of the P.A.C. and A.N.C. (1). These two traditions have often confused in the minds of some analysts and a recent volume of essays has effectively sought to claim most of the recent phase of liberalism in South Africa in terms of a programme of democratic participation, despite the refusal of the Liberal party to take part in the organisation behind the Freedom Charter in 1955 (2).

At points the two traditions interlocked in South African politics, though they also came on occasions into antagonism despite having a common enemy in a segregationalist white state. The two traditions in some respects represented extensions into South Africa of European political thought. The first strand derived broadly speaking from a nineteenth century vision of a common culture anchored around hierarchy and order: Disraeli's vision of one nation. The other strand derived from a tradition of democratic struggle for citizenship rights which, from the 1880s, fed into the nascent trade union movement and into the democratic socialism of the British Labour party. Significantly both traditions sought access to political power at the centre and to capture the state from within. In the South African instance this would lead both to reject a programme of violent class or racial war or the appeal to outside intervention (3).

The progressive eclipse of the tradition of paternalistic welfare liberalism was in part due to its failure to misread the central trajectory of post 1948 politics in South Africa. As Legassick has observed, the highpoint of this strand of South African liberalism was the Second World War when it appeared that the logic of industrialisation was beginning to break through the barriers of racial segregation. The resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism after 1948 appeared to many of these liberals to be an atavistic throwback to a pre-industrial era governed by an anti-capitalist racial ideology derived from the frontier (4). The tradition continued to enjoy an extended lease of life, due in part to the international reputation enjoyed by the Institute, though it was still the case that it failed to generate significant degrees of financial support from organised business. By the 1960s the Institute's membership settled down at the modest figure of some 4088 members in 1961, while by 1973-4 it was still only 4300.

The weakness of the mainstream conservative paternalists also derived from a more basic structural weakness at the local level of South African politics. In the English case liberalism had been able to
evolve out of an aristocratic Whig ideology in the nineteenth century and widen its appeal in the twentieth by becoming effectively the English ideology (5). Despite the tendency of many South African liberals to look to the English model, a better parallel lay with nineteenth century Germany where liberalism was based on a set of informal ties cultivated by local urban Honoratioren possessing a secure position within their own provincial societies. These notables proved unable to adapt to the demands of a rising social democracy while their political legitimacy became undermined by the bureaucratisation of urban government. As a consequence the urban liberals forfeited the claim to embrace both national and local issues (6). In the South African instance, various efforts were made at the local levels by liberals and "friends of the natives", especially through the missions, to take a lead in social and economic issues by the inter-war years. In the Eastern Cape, James Henderson, the Principal of Lovedale, sought to mobilise concern on reclamation of the reserves while at Mariannhill Bernard Huss sought to mobilise interest by the state in African cooperative credit societies. But such efforts were usually ad hoc ones and the individuals and groups involved failed to achieve the same status as local dignatories as the Honoratioren (7).

The generally narrow political base of this conservative strand of welfare liberalism meant that by the post 1945 period it became increasingly necessary to form an alliance with more radical political groups. Those in control of the Institute hoped this could be effected on an agenda over which they had control, for there was a legacy of conflict with critics of the Institute's ostensibly apolitical position such as The Friends of Africa, organised by William and Margaret Ballinger, in the 1930s (8). By the middle 1950s, however, the dominant position of the conservative paternalists within the South African liberal establishment began to come under increasing challenge with the emergence of a more mass based Congress movement under Albert Luthuli. The formation of the Liberal party after 1953 served in some respects to divert attention away from the work of more conservative liberal bodies like the Institute as the party performed the two-fold task of attacking the policies of the apartheid state as well as the left-leaning Congress of Democrats (C.O.D.). Cold war politics and anti-communism ensured that the mainstream liberals avoided close political contact with the Charterists in the 1950s. Political mobilisation within the A.N.C. during the decade helped crystallise ideas of a future multi-racial society that was envisaged as superseding the existing apartheid regime. All this, though, was to be sharply truncated by the 1960 State of Emergency following Sharpeville and the banning of the A.N.C. and P.A.C.

In the early 1960s the Institute continued to reaffirm its "historical and accustomed role, serving as a clearing house of ideas and a channel of communication between groups" (9). The period, however, was notable for the emergence of a more militant black radicalism in exile Congress politics that sought a severing of the ties with liberal and reformist bodies. It was to be the intrusion of a new radicalism in the form of Black Consciousness doctrines which was to renew the schism between the conservative paternalists and the radical democrats in the early 1970s. The origins and development of these clearances will thus form the substance of this paper.

Liberals and the Institute of Race Relations:
The issue of the relationship of the conservative paternalists to Charterist movements in exile did not immediately surface within internal South African politics in the years after Sharpeville. The disappearance of the Liberal Party in 1968 however began a re-evaluation by a number of bodies within the South African liberal establishment of their political role now that the party’s buffering function had been removed. Many activists in the English-speaking churches as well as the South African Institute of Race Relations had been able to take a somewhat detached position vis a vis the political process so long as the Liberal Party had been in existence. The Party’s conferences, newsletters as well as Contact had provided a focus for political debate even though there appeared virtually no hope of ever being able to win any form of electoral representation in the House of Assembly. The party’s very existence appeared to confirm the continuation of a “liberal spirit” rooted in ideals of human rights and parliamentary and democratic liberties that gave an added legitimacy to the less overtly political forms of welfare work and empirical research conducted by the Institute. Many of those involved in the Institute were, furthermore, liberals with well established credentials. Leo Marquard, a past president, confidently proclaimed in 1963 that the Institute was “a liberal body” whose “only fear need be that it will cease to be liberal” (10). Broadly speaking the Institute’s 1954 statement of its overall goals Go Forward In Faith reflected the thinking of a considerable section of post war South African liberals in its emphasis upon economic growth eventually leading to some form of “racial integration” into a common multi racial society (11).

The problem was, though, how were these ideas to be advanced on the political plane and in what manner impressed onto an apparently intractable and impermeable body politic? Since the early 1950s many of the Institute liberals had emphasised the need for a more indirect strategy of trying to influence progressively minded sections of the Dutch Reformed Churches and the younger Afrikaner intelligentsia (12). Signs of an early form of verligtheid in these quarters had been apparent at the time of the debate in the DRCs on the Cottesloe Consultation in 1960 and it was hoped that a more independent minded group of dominees would emerge who would be less compliant to government dictats (13). Similarly, Leo Marquard attended the annual conference of SABRA in 1959 and reported the emergence of an “independent body of thinking men” in its midst despite being sceptical of its chances of freeing itself from government control (14).

This strategy of attempted koenadering with Afrikaner moderates did not go without criticism. For some of the more radical clergies in the Church of the Province such a Fabian effort at influencing government policy was doomed to failure. Bishop Ambrose Reeves of Johannesburg, for example, was strongly critical in 1958 of attempts by the Director of the Institute of Race Relations, Quintin Whyte, to intervene in church affairs and seek to promote a dialogue between the Dutch Reformed Churches and the Church of the Province. Accusing Whyte of acting as an “errand boy” for the D.R.C., Reeves pointed out that two thirds of the members of the Church of the Province were black who would exert a “strong reaction” to the Anglican communion meeting with the D.R.C. leaders at an all-white conference (15).

In 1960, however, Reeves was deported from South Africa and the Institute’s assistant director Fred Van Wyk played an important role in
organising the Cottesloe Consultation from December 7 to 14th of the same year between the South African member churches of the World Council of Churches. The silencing of a number of critical activists in the early 1960s provided the political space for the more conservative reformists to maintain some degree of control over the direction of political liberalism, one which was mainly conceived in terms of seeking to persuade the South African government to move towards a more accommodationist platform with regard to moderate black political leadership. The Institute though still acted as an important platform for traditional liberal criticisms of government apartheid policy. In 1963 Judge O.D. Schreiner, in the Institute’s annual presidential address, attacked the emphasis upon group as opposed to individual rights in South African liberal thought and argued for an evolutionary view of political change that would progressively widen the franchise and lead to the growth of political parties that would not seek a power base simply in ethnic ties (16).

Such sentiments however fell increasingly out of favour in the early 1960s as disillusion set in with progressive whig models of political decolonisation. A number of figures in the Institute began to look towards group-based political models in order to try and reform and humanise government policy from within. Quintin Whyte, especially, was concerned about the absence of any clear sense of direction among many of the political liberals. He had replaced J.D. Rheinallt Jones as Director of the Institute in 1946 and was strongly impressed by American discussions of race relations that emphasised the pursuit of an "educational" as opposed to a "moralistic" or "exhortatory" approach in pursuit of "inter-racial justice" (17). By 1963 he began to doubt the "strategy and manoeuvring" of the Progressive Party which, he thought, was in danger of reacting to government initiatives in an ad hoc manner. It already seemed apparent that the South African economy and polity was going to ride through the storm of international criticism and it seemed essential to start thinking out a longer strategy of accommodation with the Bantustan policy. "...why cry to high heaven that the plans of the Government in the Transkei are eyewash", he privately noted, "and say that the Xhosa people are having something imposed on them when the fact of the matter is that all the vast majority of the Xhosa people want independence" (18). He suggested in an Institute memorandum that liberals should seek to work within the framework of the Homelands policy and put pressure on the government to develop them further economically short of outright independence. Such a strategy was, he felt, in accordance with R.F.A. Hoernle’s argument in his 1939 Phelps Stokes lectures that total segregation was not incompatible with the liberal spirit. The important point was to shift away from being concerned simply with the means of government policy towards the ends involved (19). At the end of 1963 Whyte also suggested in a memorandum to Harry Oppenheimer of the Anglo American Corporation that a high level international team be formed on the basis of funds from the Ford Foundation to come and report on South African conditions and make recommendations. It was important "to plan changes which will take into consideration external opinion and internal realities" (20). The suggestion does not appear to have met, at this stage, with much enthusiasm, though the Ford Foundation eventually funded its own investigation South Africa: Time Running Out in 1981 (21).

The attempt to engage international experts was in some respects a reflection of the rather desperate mood that overtook a number of South African liberals in the early 1960s as the government clamped down on
political activity and drove a number of activists either into exile or silence (22). The effect of the government's intellectual terrorism under its Minister of Justice John Vorster was the partial destruction of the small cosmopolitan and politically radical intelligentsia that had emerged since the late 1930s. This intelligentsia had been committed to the application of rational analysis to historical and political processes. Even those intellectuals on the radical left had generally viewed the apartheid system as a mere historical anachronism and atavistic throwback and there was a widely held view that capitalist economic growth would in time assist in dissolving the structures of racial segregation. By the middle 1960s, however, such economic optimism appeared to be increasingly chimerical. One perceptive external observer, the South African liberal historian C.W. de Kiewiet, wrote in the American journal Foreign Affairs in 1964 that while liberal forces remained "the single most vital element of light in darkness and hope in despair" there was nevertheless the problem that "the cloud of resentment produced by South Africa's racial policies hides the liberal elements in its murk. They feel abandoned, and some have become bitter and angry" (23). Quintin Whyte in some degree reflected this mood of growing isolation and, following a visit to Britain and the United States in 1966, he became convinced that South African liberals had to go it alone. "The foreign experts have not been to South Africa and have no "feel" for anything", he wrote, "only a disembodied empathy with the oppressed. U.N. has had 18 years scarification of South Africa result -Nil" (23).

It was by no means clear to the Institute leadership in the middle to late 1960s where their overall political direction was leading. An attempt was made to smear the Institute in 1965 by a bogus organisation The League for Liberal Action which distributed a pamphlet stating that the Institute was "assisting liberalism" in the D. R. Church. Quintin Whyte was forced to deny that the Institute was attempting to "sow the seeds of discord in the Afrikaners churches" (24). Similarly the S.A.B.C. depicted the Institute in 1967 as standing completely outside the mainstream dialogue in South African politics and gloatingly concluded that "if the Institute wishes to take part in it, and to make a meaningful contribution, then it will have to draw nearer the main, though turbulent stream, of South African thought" (25). By 1969, Whyte confessed to de Kiewiet that growing Afrikaner political self confidence and the apparently new agenda initiated through Prime Minister John Vorster's "Outward Looking" policy indicated that "liberals will have to re-think themselves in light of all this and adopt new strategies to be directed towards the same general ends. But don't ask me what these should be!" (26).

By the end of the 1960s, therefore, a political impasse had been reached, especially as the demise of the Liberal Party enhanced the general sense of political isolation in the Institute. This became further evident as the Institute's position began to come under renewed attack from more radical forces both within its own ranks as well as externally from a militant younger generation of black and white intellectuals.

Black Consciousness and the upsurge of democratic radicalism:

The loss of direction in the S.A.I.R.R. occurred at the same time as a renewal of democratic radicalism in South African politics. There were a number of sources of this including the upsurge of student radicalism
in Europe in the late 1960s which encouraged the spread of militant ideas both in NUSAS as well as the black South African Students Organisation (SASO) after its secession from NUSAS in 1969 (27). The advance, too, of decolonisation in Africa during the 1960s and Fanonist ideas of anti colonial struggle aided the spread of Black Consciousness doctrines, while the spread of Black Power ideas from the United States in the late 1960s encouraged a distrust of white liberals, who were seen as a threat to independent black self assertion. These influences fused with an indigenous Africanist tradition in black South African politics stretching back to the Ethiopian church movements earlier in the century and the Congress Youth League of the 1940s (28).

The spread of Black Consciousness had a strongly radicalising effect on a number of white radicals who had become disaffected from the cautious line of the Institute in the course of the 1960s. In 1963 the Christian Institute had been established under the directorship of Dr Beyers Naude as part of a drive for ecumenism in South African churches following the Cottesloe Statement of 1960. For the rest of the decade, the general tone of the CI through its periodical Pro Veritate was a Reformed theology derived from the struggle for a Confessional Church in Nazi Germany. Thereafter, it came increasingly under the influence of liberation theology and Black Power (29). Though it had only a small membership of some 2000, the C.I. did seek to establish closer contacts with African churches, especially those that were organised by the Interdenominational African Ministers Association of Southern Africa (IDAMASA). Grants of R1000 from the World Council of Churches and R2000 from the Bantu Welfare Trust (organised under the S.A.I.R.R.) provided IDAMASA with a secretary and office assistant in 1964 and a number of young black churchmen began to be sent to the Federal Theological Seminary at Alice in the Eastern Cape on the basis of bursaries provided by the Theological Education Fund in New York. (30).

IDAMASA approached the Christian Institute for assistance in establishing a theological school, theological correspondence courses in African vernaculars as well as theological "refresher" courses. The C.I. saw this as an opportunity for developing "Black initiated agencies under Black leadership" (31), though in the case of Nyanga in Cape Town in 1966 it was still the case that little had been done to get white members to "come together" with the black membership (32). The C.I. assisted in the establishment of a Council of African Independent Churches (AICA) which had a membership of 261 by March of 1969 as well as a theological school at Alice and a Womens Association of African Independent Churches. In addition Fred Van Wyk and Beyers Naude acted as "advisers" to IDAMASA, though in January 1970 Van Wyk left to take over the directorship of the S.A.I.R.R. from Quintin Whyte. But the work with the independent churches was ultimately seen as disappointing as inadequate funding prevented any substantial organisation while the churches themselves were prone to fission, especially after the establishment of a rival to IDAMASA in the form of the Reformed Independent Churches Association (RICA) under a white minister of the N.G. Kerk, Rev N.J. Van Loggenberg. Beyers Naude encouraged AICA to become more independent financially as he tried to steer the C.I. away from any involvement with AICA's own internal splits or "a false image of AICA being created through its close association with the Christian Institute". No further financial assistance was given after 1973 and the link with the independent churches declined before the C.I.'s banning in 1977 (33).
The C.I. became more closely drawn to black student politics, firstly through the University Christian Movement and then SASO after its establishment in 1969. Black Consciousness was seen as challenging some of the central tenets of traditional white "welfare work" and by 1970 the C.I. leadership was "aware of the fact that more and more Black students and intellectually awakened youth will move into a position of Black power, rejecting all offers of assistance on the part of Whites to aid them in their struggle towards freedom" (34). Such considerations prompted a more general intellectual effort to think through new modes of political, economic and social change in South Africa and the degree to which there had emerged a "serving middle class" among Africans such as teachers, nurses, journalists, clergymen who could be the "pattern setters" for the rest of black society (35). This led to the establishment conjointly with the South African Council of Churches of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS) consisting of six study commissions embracing 150 academics and researchers in the fields of economics, education, law, the church, and the social and political sciences. The project was directed by a former officer of the Institute of Race Relations in Natal, Peter Randall, who had become disillusioned by the late 1960s in the SAIRR's general lack of political direction. The South African Council of Churches had been especially prompted to support the initiative following the 1970 Statement by the World Council of Churches consultation on racism. For many in the SACC the statement reflected the fact that the South African churches had failed, in the words of one executive member Calvin Cook, to "convince their brethren overseas of their bona fides, even where these may exist" (36). For many liberals as well as radicals it became increasingly apparent that a new course of action had to be thought through.

In its initial phase the work of SPRO-CAS represented to some conservative paternalists a useful location for testing the political potential of group-based models of liberalism. South Africa's "political ills", Quintin Whyte wrote to Randall, were "largely due to a completely false and outmoded idea of the nature of the nation or a group in society and its function". It was necessary "somewhere to argue the true nature of groups in society which are based on interests commonly held between members" (37). Such an approach was impressed on the work of the various commissions, especially on political change. To radicals, on the other hand, the work of the SPRO-CAS commissions appeared to confirm the degree to which Black Consciousness challenged many of the basic presuppositions of mainstream liberalism in South Africa. Even moderate black political leaders such as Gatsha Buthelezi wrote to Peter Randall to explain that:

Within the Church itself our people have had such a rebuff from the majority of white Christians that the Church has not become the effective instrument of change it could have been, had this been not the case. If the Church gave more opportunities for Christians of different racial groups to meet and if the Church became the forum for dialogue then one could have hoped that there were great possibilities. Bodies like the Institute of Race Relations and the Christian Institute offer the opportunity, but most Non-Whites are scared of making any use of these forums to meet and talk because of the persecution this can lead to (38)
For many Black Consciousness activists this apparent failure of the Churches to act as a forum for political dialogue was irrelevant. As one SASO document reprinted as a SPRO-CAS background paper declared, the whole notion of racial "integration" was pivoted around liberal "arrogance" and a product of "conscious maneuvre" rather than the "climate of the inner soul". "The myth of integration as propounded under the banner of liberal ideology must be tracked and killed" it continued, "because it makes people believe that something is being done when in actual fact the artificially integrated circles are a soporific on the blacks and provide a vague satisfaction for the futility stricken whites" (39). The SPRO-CAS project thus quickly found itself pivoted between rival liberal and radical political positions, making the task of formulating a generally acceptable middle political course a difficult one to achieve.

The work of SPRO-CAS One became, in the event, a highly academic one of debating various models of political, economic and constitutional change. Most of those involved were white male academics, though this was in part due to the reluctance of some long standing Liberal activists like Alan Paton to become involved and the apparent inability to find any significant black intellectual support for the project (40). The work of the Political Commission was especially significant for developing a debate on the political and ethical basis for a South African liberalism. The Director of the Project, Peter Randall, became considerably impressed by the work of the political scientist Andre Du Toit at the University of Stellenbosch who stressed the need for a group-based approached to liberal rights and duties. It appeared that a "parting of the ways" was at hand between those whom Du Toit termed the "doctrinaire liberals" and "those willing to look to new approaches and alternatives" (41). Alan Paton, though, was careful to warn Randall that "there could be no simple blueprint for a federal system in South Africa that incorporated group identities, even if this might be expected from the Project (42).

The Spro-Cas Political Commission contained the radical figure of Rick Turner from the University of Natal, though a banning order in March 1973 prevented him from fully engaging in the latter stages of its report South Africa's Political Alternatives. Turner's presence was significant for helping to shift some of the initial discussions away from the traditional liberal theme of how to change racial attitudes towards a more sociologically penetrating debate on the nature of the South African "plural society". Turner was generally perceived as a radical political figure, who was concerned with formulating a notion of "white consciousness" to meet the ideological challenge presented by the emergence of Black Consciousness doctrine. He stressed, though, that white liberals should not be perceived by radicals as a significant political force capable of overthrowing apartheid and that the term "white liberalism" as it had come to be emplyed by many BC radicals was "uselessly broad". It was necessary to categorise whites into groups of racists, liberals and radicals and these terms could equally be applied in black politics as well. Once these shared political perspectives were recognised, it should then be acknowledged that the notion upheld by many BC advocates that only blacks could talk to blacks was based upon an inadequate theory of communication. In essence there were differences of degree rather than kind between blacks and whites in South African and white radicals could, in particular, still make a useful contribution to the overthrow of the apartheid system (43).
Turner went on to develop this line of thinking in his work for the SPRO-CAS Political Commission. In a draft section on economics he stressed the importance of sociological models of pluralism derived from the work of the anthropologist J.S. Furnivall in Indonesia. In the original conception of pluralism the emphasis had been centred on the role of economic forces and the market place in determining social relationships. Turner sought to elaborate this on the basis of the theoretical work of the former South African sociologist John Rex, who explained the economic base of the South African "plural society" in terms of a neo-marxist model of colonial capitalism and the need for a ready supply of labour. This reinforced the argument that "group conflict" in South African society was underpinned by a conflict of economic interest while the roots of racial prejudice lay in "the objective relations of domination set up by the conquest and the institutionalisation of conquest, and they are not likely to be extirpated until this is pointed out, nor are they likely to stop rerooting themselves while the system of economic inequality persists" (44).

Turner's work for the Political Commission was significant for its attempt to shift the focus away from the simple issue of trying to redefine the liberal agenda in South Africa around group rather than individual rights. The final report, he suggested in some notes, should be concerned with the distribution of both political and economic power and should contain an ideal model "in terms of which the situation should be judged". Such a model should contain both ethical concepts as well as the form of their expression, meaning the "common society approach". The key to this notion was democratic control over social resources and whether it should be capitalist or socialist. It was at this point that the Commission should be concerned with "the problem of what to do about the situation", for it was possible analytically to distinguish between change in the direction proposed by "voting Christians" (ie whites) or changes by "non voters" developing the power to force it (45).

Turner's adoption of a radical notion of pluralism inhibited any focus on the state and its independent capacity to adapt to or resist change. This has remained a lacuna in South African political debate until quite recently (46). Nevertheless, his approach raised a number of important structural problems which the Commission in the event sought as far as possible to minimise, partly in the interests of seeking some form of common consensus amongst its members. It became clear in the course of 1972 that Turner's radical input added to an already complicated situation in which there was a considerable divergence between different parties to the Commission. On the one hand, there was a classical or orthodox liberal position held by the veteran liberal Edgar Brookes, who emphasised individual rights and considered the emphasis upon group rights as a new form of adaptation to segregation (which Brookes felt himself to have been guilty of in the 1920s before a slow shift in the course of the 1930s to a more conventional liberal position (47). On the other hand, Dennis Worrall represented a right wing and neo corporatist emphasis upon groups (to a degree that was to make him, for a period, a favoured figure in policy-making circles) and who dissociated himself from the "common society" approach in favour of "multi-nationalism" and some form of confederal political solution (48). Given these divergences, Peter Randall tended to support Du Toit's effort at a "middle course" that would emphasise both group and
individual rights. In the process, though, of preserving the "common society" conception more radical notions of a structural shift in the locus of economic power tended to get discarded.

South Africa's Political Alternatives did nevertheless show some signs of Turner's influence, especially in its discussion of plural society theory. The Report marked a significant break with the strand of post-war liberalism which had relied on economic growth as eventually inducing political change. It recognised that in its existing condition South Africa was a "divided plural society", though it contrasted this with the ideal of an American style "open pluralistic society": the question it then posed was how far was a transition from the first to the second possible. Turner's emphasis upon the structural underpinnings behind the cleavages in the plural society model and the demand for labour was downplayed in favour of a more authentically liberal discussion on the "complex interplay" of the processes of "integration" and "acculturation" (49). Black Consciousness was viewed as possibly presenting a "countervailing separatism" to that of the "imposed separatism" of government policy (50), leading to a discussion on the possibilities of what Hoernle had termed a "true separation" in contrast to the existing segregation that favoured white supremacy (51).

The Commission Report rested on traditional liberal concepts of the rule of law, personal freedom and civil liberties and equality of opportunity as opposed to equality of wealth. It expressed severe reservations on the applicability of a Westminster-style system of parliamentary government in South African conditions. The Christian concepts of "love and brotherhood" could not, like the negative claims of freedom and equality, be translated so easily into political arrangements and the Report sought to avoid any wide-ranging utopian social values in its ideals for a future South African society. It was far more concerned with developing a feasible model of a devolution of political power away from that of the administrative echelons of the central state in order to facilitate access by the unenfranchised majority to political power. Such an incremental approach led to a two-stage model of consociational bargaining between groups leading to the eventual attainment of an open pluralistic society on lines similar to a western political system (51). Short of advocating violent or revolutionary change, the Commission Report was presented as one possible way out of the political impasse that liberals found themselves in by the early 1970s, drawing upon rational models of bargaining from the social sciences. To some critics there still appeared to be an element of utopian idealism involved in the Report. The Argus, for example, viewed it as "yet another manifesto of radical, redemptive politics; yet another all-including socio-political system - a political idealism within which a new South Africa would arise purged from its inhumanities" (52). In Progressive Party circles, however, the Report began to lead to some rethinking. As Colin Eglin admitted to Quintin Whyte, the Party's policy of a federal solution for South Africa had led it to "play down the fact that it is committed to the redrawing of the Constitution and has ignored almost entirely any steps in transition from the present situation to the one it sets as its goal" (53). To this extent, the Report could be seen as contributing to a reassessment of pragmatic political action rather than a naive political idealism.
For radicals, however, the very top-down nature of the Report's consociationalism divested it of any major significance for long-run political and economic change. Rick Turner had been critical of it in its draft stage, arguing that its employment of a consociational democracy approach appeared to ignore the problems of economic conflict almost entirely (54). Turner refused to identify himself with the Report in its final form and proceeded to publish through SPRO-CAS a strikingly alternative utopian political vision for a future South Africa in the form of the essay The Eye of the Needle in 1973. The book managed to have a fairly powerful impact on political debate, selling 2000 copies before being banned by the government. It emerged at a time when the ideals of the Freedom Charter had faded to a rather distant memory and there seemed to be few clear conceptions of what kind of society a post apartheid South Africa would be. Turner's essay reflected an ethical socialism in a tradition that stretched back to such Victorian figures as John Ruskin and William Morris. Its concern, too, for shifting power away from the central state to local bodies was in keeping with the student radicalism of the late 1960s in Europe as well as a longer tradition that in Britain went back to the guild socialist movement during and after the First World War.

Turner urged a return to utopian thinking as necessary in order to develop a more theoretical attitude in South African politics, though at least one critic, W.A. de Klerk, argued that this had been precisely the problem with apartheid which had itself been based on utopian political thought (55). Utopianism for Turner was part of a wider project to engage more directly with the present as history, which could no longer be seen as something abstracted from contemporary processes. To this extent, his thinking was on similar lines to that of some other radical figures at this time in South Africa such as Nadine Gordimer who, in her novels The Late Bourgeois World (1966) and A Guest of Honour (1971) was also concerned with moving from what Clingman has termed the "liberal humanist" framework of earlier work towards situating her characters within a more immediate historical process that could look beyond the parameters of white rule (56). Turner looked towards a "participatory democracy" emerging in a future socialist South Africa, partly modelled on experiments such as Ujamaa villages in Tanzania as well as workers cooperatives in Jugoslavia. There was no recognition of the possibilities of an intricate neo colonial society emerging on lines broadly similar to Gordimer's mythical African state in A Guest of Honour. Even the remnants of the "communal and person-orientated" values of tribal society were seen as a possible "counterculture" to the effects of conservative socialisation, though Turner was careful to point out the flaws in current concepts of African socialism which relied on a mythical view of the African past as essentially classless (57). The importance of Black Consciousness was recognised, though Turner stressed its essentially middle class quality. Being black was not really a political programme and the Black Consciousness advocates had not as yet spelt out what new values were entailed by the doctrine (58). Despite its strongly socialist tone, the book was not hostile to the work of white liberals, whom Turner saw as important for possibly being able to steer the society away from a "final bloody showdown" whilst at the same time helping to "inject a greater element of rationality into white thinking" (59): such an assessment was doubtless one of the reasons why the book in its American edition earned warm praise from Alan Paton who considered it as an essay on the South African condition "as searching as any that has ever been written" (60). The essay can also be seen as marking the
tail end of a tradition of romantic radical idealisation of African society counterposed to western capitalism and ushering in a more hard headed reassessment of African post colonial politics in the course of the late 1970s and 1980s.

The Eye of the Needle's utopianism nevertheless led it to a commitment to what Turner termed a "transcendent morality" concerned with the ultimate purposes of human life as opposed to the more immediate "internal morality" of paying debts and not cheating or stealing. It saw capitalism as essentially an alienating and un-Christian form of social system and looked to a society that treated people not as means but as ends in themselves. This certainly put it at odds with the main thrust of South Africa's Political Alternatives and a number of the liberals involved in that project received the work somewhat coolly, though Peter Randall defended its utopianism on the grounds that it was essential to have an ideal yardstick by which to formulate "conscious goals for the improvement of our society". The work was, he claimed, "a serious attempt to relate the values of Christianity to the structures of our society" (61). At a seminar in Stellenbosch from 29 September to 1 October 1973 on strategies for political change Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert argued that the book's utopianism led it away from the path of feasible political action. Politics was "not the abstract universal search for a common good", he declared for it was the "process of synthesizing a variety of interests within a common policy, and only those interests which appear in the political process get included in the final policy" (62). It was not clear either where the increased awareness for the kind of society that Turner envisaged was going to come from, though other participants such as Geoff Budlender suggested that radical whites could accept the basic tenets of the Black Consciousness model and play an essentially supplementary role in helping black solidarity on the one hand and fragmenting the white power bloc on the other (63).

For Andre Du Toit, on the other hand, The Eye of the Needle's macro-political approach to change needed to be contrasted with the more micro-political approach of the SPRO-CAS Political Commission which was aiming less at "participatory democracy" than "effective participation in government". It was important not to resort to a "moral emigration" away from current social and political problems but to resort to political action to try and remedy them, action that should also be governed as far as possible by criteria of political effectiveness. For students to seek involvement on these lines the chief aim should be exemplary action, whose value could be quite high (64).

The broad thrust of the discussion indicated that there was some basis for organised action by white radicals extending beyond merely symbolic politics of the kind that had often been associated with student radicalism in Western Europe in the late 1960s. Pressure for such action made itself especially felt in the discussions on the SPRO-CAS Two Programme in early 1972 where there was strong pressure for staff-initiated projects that were not centrally controlled by the executive. Neville Curtis and Rick Turner urged a Youth Programme that would be directed at high school and university students, "young workers" and "opt outs". In addition, a Black Community Programme got off the ground after 1971 involving a survey of black organisations and a programme of consultation focussing on training in administration, committee operation and secretarial skills. The BCP was under the direction of a former worker in the YMCA, Bennie Khoapa, who helped gather together a
group of Black Consciousness radicals around the Programme, including Steve Biko and the trade unionist and journalist Bokwe James Mafuna (65).

The academically-inclined work of the Study Commissions since 1969 now started to lead to pressure for more coordinated action that would involve both the Christian Institute as well as possibly the SAIRR in a broadly based programme of radical change. SPRO-CAS staff met Fred Van Wyk, Clive Nettleton and Dudley Horner of the SAIRR to discuss coordination of their work (66). There was also strong pressure from within the BCP for autonomous control over its functioning. Khoapa made it clear to Peter Randall that the black staff on the project would find unacceptable any proposal for a joint steering committee to oversee the work of both the black and white-led programmes. For Khoapa and the BCP staff the only real obligation was one of communication to the sponsors of the projects in order for as full a degree of autonomy as possible (67). This position really emerged as a pragmatic response to a much harder stand made by some of the radicals within the BCP.

There were growing black suspicions over the nature and direction of the SPRO-CAS project and one activist, Rev Clive MacBride, accused both SPRO-CAS and the SAIRR of being "liberal organisations" that "get money on our ticket (blacks) and very little of the money really filters through to the grass roots". For others such as Steve Biko the issue raised broader questions over the relationship of whites and blacks in the SPRO-CAS programme and on the sources of the money that were financing it. Khoapa urged an acceptance of the fact that the programme as such had been sponsored and to work from that starting point. In the event, some broad agreement was secured around the idea that the BCP would create as few "structures" as possible and that the Programme would act as the "midwife" to "real community organisations which may or may not be created by the people themselves when the programme draws to a close". It was hoped that the black panels would be able to develop their own national panel which could act as a "guiding body in terms of broad policy principles and other recommendations that it deems fit" (68).

By the end of 1972 the emergence of Black Consciousness ideology was beginning to exert a major impact on the work of white-run liberal organisations in South Africa. The SPRO-CAS Programme had led to strong demands by its black members for their own autonomous area of political space for the formulation of specifically black political demands. This was significantly occurring at a time when there was a major political vacuum in black politics, though one that Gathsha Buthelezi in KwaZulu was hoping to try and fill at a time when his strategy of seeking to use apartheid platforms against government policy won considerable respect in liberal quarters. For a number of the more conservative figures in the Institute of Race Relations the challenge by both the white radicals and Black Consciousness activists was one that should as far as possible be resisted. The Black Consciousness radicals consciously adopted a policy of refusing to debate with whites the "pros and cons" of the doctrine and this in a sense reinforced the hand of the conservative critics who argued against a strategy of major concessions (69). Furthermore, the Institute's "old guard" clearly felt much was at stake in keeping open what thin lines of communication they already had with the government in Pretoria. Over the following year a strong line of resistance ensued which nullified the hopes of any form of political unity in the liberal camp. Such internal feuding, paradoxically, aided the growth of Black Consciousness thinking. This
ended up shattering any hopes at this stage of an alliance of white and black radicals operating outside the parameters of mainstream white-run liberalism in South African politics.

The Response from the Institute of Race Relations:

The conservative paternalists indeed proved quite adept at organising an effective resistance within the South African Institute of Race Relations against proposals for closer links with SPRO-CAS and the C.I. In the wake of the demise of the Liberal Party, the SAIRR was feeling itself in quite an exposed position, though it was considered by one observer, Horibert Adam, in the early 1970s to have emerged as "the most significant and almost sole representative of traditional liberalism in South Africa" (70). Its response to the new pace of political events in the early 1970s was somewhat protracted and still shaped by the general view of apartheid as an historical anachronism that had governed its thinking since the late 1940s (71). There was considerable opposition to allowing the younger Institute members forging links with radical organisations, a proposal which Leo Marquard likened to a form of "moral blackmail" on the older members. "The Institute might be compared to a good cart horse", he wrote to Fred Van Wyk, "bred for that purpose and doing a good job. The young people want it to be a race horse. If it tries to be one it will lose its character and will end by being neither a good cart horse nor a race horse". He strongly urged the maintenance of a fairly hierarchical organisation in which no staff members should attend meetings of the executive as of right and "should not take part in debate unless asked for an opinion, and should certainly not have a vote" (72).

Nevertheless some of the Institute's leadership recognised that the traditional strategy of trying to act as a bridge of communication between different racial "groups" was no longer working and that some reforms were necessary. Quintin Whyte urged shortly before his retirement in 1969 a "shaking up" of the Institute for "the effectiveness of liberalism, as it were, has declined here as in America. We are entering a new period when old ideas on all sides will have to be shaken up" (73).

The Institute's new Director Fred Van Wyk was sympathetic to such arguments, though he continued to emphasise the traditional white liberal areas of support such as voters for the Progressive Party. It was important, he maintained, for the Institute to continue seeking an "informed public", while at the same time maintaining a degree of "caution and care" in persuading the "older generation" in the Institute of the views of a younger generation that was emerging within it (74). Over the following three years, this cautious strategy continued to dictate Institute policy, which was confirmed in 1972 as being committed to a peaceful and non cataclysmic mode of political change (75). For the most part, the Institute's leadership was reluctant to be seen to bend before the challenge of Black Consciousness which Van Wyk saw as containing in many respects the same sort of racial separationism which the Institute had been fighting in the form of apartheid (76). This view was reinforced by the appointment in 1972 of Duchesne Grice to succeed William Nkomo as President of the SAIRR. Grice was a Durban lawyer with connections with commerce and industry and was widely viewed as a "middle of the road" figure who was anxious not to chart any new course or the Institute in the 1970s (77).
Ideological support for Van Wyk's position also came from Ellen Hellman, who had developed a strong influence on Institute policy making since the early 1960s and was notable for standing on a number of the Institute's committees including the one concerned with research. As an anthropologist trained in the "culture contact" school of Malinowski, Ellen Hellman had been concerned with emphasising since at least the late 1930s the power of acculturation in South African society. "All evidence", she had written in 1948 "points to the willingness of the Bantu to accept the admittedly superior western culture" (78). Throughout the 1950s she had fought for the idea of a "shared society" and common citizenship which she counterposed to the government's conception of "total territorial separation". She had, though, steered clear of the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter (79).

The Institute's leadership decided on a firm line in opposition to its radical critics when the issue emerged early in 1973 of whether or not to give evidence to the government's Schlebusch (later Le Grange) Commission of enquiry into universities, NUSAS and other liberal organisations. To Grice it seemed necessary to appear before the Commission since to do otherwise could be used as an excuse for government attacks on the body (80). Ellen Hellman also considered that recognition of the Commission was necessary and viewed the announcement by the Christian Institute of support for staff in SPRO-CAS who would refuse to appear before the Commission as mere "fun and games". "As far as the IRR is concerned" she wrote to Quintin Whyte, "I believe that the loss of 'activist' or radical young people and the disaffiliation of NUSAS as well is pretty well inevitable and not a tragedy at all" (81).

The Institute's decision nevertheless caused an embarrassing split within the white liberal establishment at a time when it could ill afford to be seen to be divided. Though some English language newspapers like The Star supported the decision, to a number of observers it appeared an indefensible cringing to government authority. Helen Suzman fell out with Ellen Hellman's stand on the issue after initially assuming that the Institute would side with the C.I.(82). Some of the Institute's younger members such as Michael Savage, Horst Kleinschmidt and Jonathan Paton announced that they would not give evidence to the Commission and the Reverend Clive McBride called for mass resignations from the Institute (83). Jonathan Paton called for a new body to replace the Institute and Peter Randall bitterly attacked it for being after 40 years a "white-led, white dominated, bourgeois organisation. It stifles black initiative. It is an obstacle to change and a hindrance to progress" (84). Patrick Lawrence in The Star detected a general attack from "radical liberals" on the Institute's standpoint (85).

Within the Institute, an effort was made by the group of younger radicals to give their criticisms of the leadership some focus. Clive Nettleton, the organiser since 1970 of the Youth Programme and a former NUSAS activist, urged a number of changes in Institute policy in a memorandum in May 1973. It was essential, he argued, to get away from "white, middle class academic values" and to develop publications with a wider audience appeal. The Institute still operated on a moral and humanistic level and failed to challenge the basic structures of South African society. "The question is important", he wrote, "because the lesson of Germany is that if one waits for the dramatic, gas chamber
type legislation the possibility of stopping the rot is too far gone by the time the need for active resistance becomes unmistakeable". It was especially necessary, he continued, to recruit more black staff and move away from the negative image which most blacks had of the Institute.

The radical whites, though, had a generally shaky political base to mount an attack on the Institute conservatives. The issue in some ways recalled the previously unsuccessful effort to goad the Institute leadership into a more political standpoint by Douglas Buchanan and Alfred Xuma in 1942-3. Outside the Institute the work of SPRO-CAS One was already complete while the community-based work of SPRO-CAS Two had forged an uneasy alliance with the black radicals led by Biko and Khonpa. Some of the most committed of the radicals such as Horst Kleinschmidt had already resigned while it became clear towards the end of the year that the Institute conservatives led by Ellen Hellman were determined to resist the demands for major change.

To Ellen Hellman the white radicals were only interpreting what they thought were "Black Power demands or stances", while the Institute itself had received no direct calls from blacks with the exception of Clive MacBride. She disputed Clive Nettleton's urging of a more populist publications policy, pointing out that previous efforts in this direction had been unsuccessful and the material pulped.

Further backing for this view came from Professor Hendrik Van der Merwe of the Centre for Inter-Group Studies at the University of Cape Town, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Natal and Professor A.S. Mathews of the University of Natal. A very strong series of institutional supports thus began to come into play behind the position of the conservatives and the radicals found themselves increasingly isolated. Even cautiously sympathetic activists at the local level, such as F.O. Joseph, the Regional Secretary in the Cape, felt impelled to point out that "a factor that always has to be borne in mind is that the existence of the Institute, as it is presently organised, depends on the goodwill and generosity of benefactors - mainly large industrial and business enterprises and mining houses. We must, unfortunately perhaps, take this into consideration in contemplating any change". Clive Nettleton, too, found himself further isolated after a security police raid on the Institute's headquarters at Auden House in Johannesburg on November 15 1973 led to an accusing finger being pointed at him for informing the press, who arrived within twenty minutes of the event.

By the time of the Institute's Council meeting in January 1974 the radicals had been effectively marginalised. A programme of cautious reform was agreed to involving attempts to increase both Afrikaner and black membership, though it was accepted that there should be "no need for any drastic changes in the Institute's approach and work". The Institute's Youth Programme continued for another year under the control of Clive Nettleton, but in a reduced form and at the of 1975 Nettleton left the Institute. Links with business, especially the mining industry, tended to become closer, especially after June 1974 when Alex Boraine, a labour practices consultant for Anglo American and a member of the Institute's executive, was elected as a Progressive Party M.P. for Pinelands in the Cape. The 1975-79 Fund raising Campaign got off to a good start in its endeavour to raise R1 million by gaining the sponsorship of Harry Oppenheimer. This ensured an income of
R150,000 a year and helped to make up some of the gap in income as the aid from the Ford Foundation fell from some R750,000 in 1974 to R260,000 (93).

The increased influence of Anglo-American in the Institute's funding was a probable factor in the growing interest by the Institute's leadership in consociational methods of political reform. The period of 1974-75 was one of growing talk of "detente" in the wake of the April 1974 coup in Lisbon. The Prime Minister, John Vorster, told the Senate in October that the country was "at a crossroads" and the cost of confrontation would be "too high for southern Africa to pay" (94). The Institute's Council discussed in early 1975 a number of papers outlining models of political change. In particular Andre Du Toit introduced some of the basic ideas behind the SPRO-CAS Report South Africa's Political Alternatives in a paper outlining the idea of a "common area" in South Africa. This gave political substance to the long-held Institute ideal of a "common society" except that Du Toit now held it up as the terminus ad quem of a strategy of "pluralistic devolution" of powers away from the centre towards bodies like the Coloured Persons Representative Council and the Urban Bantu Councils (95). The paper was an important indicator of the manner in which ideas discussed originally on the peripheries of white politics in the early 1970s started to be moved quite rapidly towards becoming taken up in mainstream political discourse.

The Institute of Race Relations in effect had begun to adopt a policy of seeking to influence the direction of policy in Pretoria rather than seeking to meet the challenge of Black Consciousness head on. Its continued search, however, for some form of "dialogue" with the white state, which had kept its hopes alive even in the bleakest years of the 1960s, further underlined the isolation of the black radicals in SASO and the BPC. Such a separation from the ideological influences of white liberalism created a vital political space which, as Sam Nolutshungu has pointed out, "made it easier for Blacks to submit their sense of their powerlessness to the force of their hope, the belief in their own ultimate victory" (96). The unleashing of such forces was to prove critical for the course of South African politics in the years ahead.

Black Consciousness and the 1976 Soweto Revolt:

The development of Black Consciousness doctrines occurred at an uneven rate in the early 1970s. The appeals of being Black, acting Black and thinking Black gained most support amongst the growing secondary school and university intelligentsia, though an effort was made at a more nation-wide process of political conscientisation after the establishment of the Black Peoples Convention (BPC) in 1972 (97). For many of the BC radicals such as Steve Biko the appeal of the doctrine lay in its challenge to "common society liberalism" and its reinforcement of the notion of black self reliance without the intervention of paternalistic white do-gooders. The period was one of relative fluidity in political discussion as a new political generation sought to cut for itself its own distinct path. "We blacks must sit down to examine the various power groups in our midst", declared Njabulo Ndobele in 1972 at a SASO symposium, "with a view to finding out which of these groups can be most effective and relevant towards our necessary, and hence natural, struggle for a meaningful participation in the shaping of our country's destiny" (98). Unlike
many BC rhetoricians, Ndebele stressed the political potential of the peasantry in addition to black urban workers, whilst also pointing out the economic base to apartheid. "Apartheid is no longer a pseudo ideology", he argued, "it has become an economic principle. This is an important development for the black person. It means that the black man must be careful of concentrating on the racial struggle, to the detriment of the economic struggle, because the latter may have become more important than the former" (99).

Nevertheless, the thinking behind Black Consciousness at this time was rather ragged, though for one American analyst, Nigel Gibson, this was a period of intellectual creativity compared with the aridities of "scientific socialism" that later overtook the doctrine when it was appropriated by AZAPO and the National Forum in the early 1980s (100).

There was no clear political programme before the upsurge of protest in the schools in 1976 and in a number of ways the black intelligentsia who had started off by disseminating the BC doctrine allowed it to run out of control. In part this can be ascribed to the continuing difficulties of political organisation in the early 1970s, with continued bannings and a massive diversion of energy into the trial of BC activists tried under the Terrorism Act in 1976 (101).

There was also, though, a somewhat naive faith in various forms of economic black self reliance, whether in the form of cooperatives, shops, farms or factories or simple "buy black" campaigns. In a curious sense, many of the ideals inculcated by a number of pre-war white and black missionaries and "friends of the native" of maintaining black economic subsistence in the reserves linked to cooperative enterprises in the towns began to resurface in a somewhat different guise (102). This suggests an important set of links between a mission-influenced black folk memory at the local level in both the townships and the reserves and ideas that began to be crystallised by the BC intellectuals. Marxism and methods of class analysis had been effectively peripheralised in the course of state repression in the 1960s and would only start to make a renewed impact in the late 1970s in the course of the development of the black trade union movement and more militant methods of struggle in both the factories and the townships. The BC intellectuals tended to turn inwards towards more romantic concepts of anti-capitalism, though this did not mean a simple regurgitation of the nationalism of Anton Lembede and the Congress Youth League of the middle 1940s based upon agrarian self reliance as Gail Gerhart has suggested (103). In essence, the BC intellectuals sought a strategy of racial reassertion in an era when Pan Africanism had declined in its political appeal. They did not seek an heroic golden age, but simply the ideal of black national unity which C.M.C. Ndamse called "the new day". Even here, though, the older liberal notion of racial "integration" may be said to have survived, albeit in a different sort of political language. "No member of the white community in any part of South Africa", Ndamse continued, "can harm the weakest or meanest member of the black race without the proudest and the bluest blood of the nation being degraded" (104).

Whites were inextricably part of the common national society, though one no longer governed by notions of "western civilisation" and colonial trusteeship as the older liberal doctrine had presumed. The language of racial biology, though, was also being resurrected at precisely the time when it was beginning to be discarded by a more cosmopolitan Afrikaner intelligentsia.
These idiosyncrasies would doubtless have been progressively ironed out by the BC intellectuals if time had been added to the political space which they found so essential for independent thought. The impact of black theology, especially from the writings of James Cone in the United States, was important at this time for stressing the need for black collective pride in liberation and in the notion of a black Christ. This also led to a rejection of the idea that blacks could only be liberated when whites came to "love" them. However, it was still difficult to break completely from the mainstream Christian message of loving one's enemy as well as oneself and Cone admitted too that "the presence of Black people in America...is the symbolic presence of God and his righteousness for all the oppressed of the land" (105). At the Black Renaissance Convention in December 1974, many of the tensions between different factions of BC radicals began to surface as there were worries that the doctrine could end up being treated either as an intellectual curiosity or as the basis for a cultural rather than political revival (106).

By this stage a pattern of organisation had already been established at the school level through the South African Students Movement, which had had its first general congress at Roodepoort in March 1972. In contrast to the rather rambling pattern of organisation through the Black Community Programmes or the Black Peoples Convention, a network of school branches was linked to regional executives, aided in 1976 by a R4000 overseas grant for a full time organiser (107). SASM was by no means the simple creation of SASO despite the importance of BC ideas in galvanising it into political action. It was the SASM Action Committee, elected on 13 June 1976, which formed the basis for the Soweto Students Representative Council. The movement within the schools thus ran considerably ahead of the BC intellectuals in SASO and the BPC, which were only banned a full year after the June 16 revolt in Soweto. The first phase of BC radicalism had by then come to an end, as the moral and intellectual impact of BC thinking had been demonstrated, especially in breaking former links with white liberals. It was clear, though, that in many ways BC thinking had inherited many assumptions of liberalism and these would feed into a new debate that would begin to emerge in the late 1970s and early 1980s surrounding the upsurge of unrest among black labour and the emergence of new political organisations such as the U.D.F. and N.F. in 1983. By this time, some of the ideas for top-down consociational political reform held by a number of white liberals in the early 1970s had begun to permeate the thinking of the state itself leading to plans for a new constitution based on a tricameral parliament. To this extent, the ideological debates of the early 1970s were an important phase in the emergence of more mass-based political struggles in the following decade as well as a catalyst for an effort at rethinking and remoralising liberal ideas in South African politics.

University of Bristol, May-June 1989.
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Quintin Whyte Papers, AD1502 Ba5 Quintin Whyte memo dated 5 November encl in Q. Whyte to H.E. Oppenheimer 5 November 1963 (marked "By Hand and Confidential").


23. Quintin Whyte Papers, Ba 8, Quintin Whyte, "Some Notes on Trip to the United Kingdom and the United States of America", 1966, p. 6. Other liberals, though, took a different view and Leo Marquard had earlier found himself "moving towards a belief that what is called "pressure" from overseas may be a vital element in our situation", Leo Marquard Papers, BC587 E1.155 L. Marquard to Q. Whyte 20 May 1960.

24. Die Vaderland 6, 7 and 8 May 1965.


37. Quintin Whyte Papers BC627 E7.1.5 Q. Whyte to P. Randall 3 September 1969.

38. SPRO-CAS Papers, Church of the Province Archives, University of the Witwatersrand, A835 1Ad(v) G. Buthelezi to P. Randall 6 August 1970.


40. It was also felt by some of those involved such as A.S. Mathews that the Spro-Cas project "should not in my view invite African representation just for the sake of having them", SPRO-CAS Papers, 835/Ad6v A.S. Mathews to P. Randall 10 August 1970.


42. Ibid., A. Paton to P. Randall February 3 1970.


45. Ibid., R. Turner unpib handwritten memo n.d.

46. See the important essay by David Yudelman, "State and Capital in South Africa" in Butler, Elphick and Welsh op. cit., pp. 250-70.


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62. SPRO-CAS Papers, A835/B11.iii, Report on a seminar on strategies for change held at the Ecumenical Centre, Stellenbosch, over the weekend 29th September to 1st October 1973. The convenor was Neville Curtis, p. 7.

63. Ibid., p. 11.

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68. SPRO-CAS Papers, A835/B10iii Minutes of Joint Meeting of Black Panels held in Johannesburg 27 July 1972.


71. See for example the Presidential Address by I.D. MacCrone, The Price of Apartheid, Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1970, for a restatement of this view.


73. Leo Marquard Papers, BC587 E1.242 Q. Whyte to L. Marquard 3 January 1969.


87. White Power and the Liberal Conscience, pp. 73-76.

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99. Ibid., p. 20.


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