
By

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Richard Ward Seminar Room (7003) @ 16:00 on Monday the 8th of May
Information enables any Organisation/Institution to function, regulate and/or coordinate activities and to respond to enquiries and challenges, but above all, to ensure proper control (E. Malutshana, Chief Director, Migration, Department of Home Affairs, 1997).

INTRODUCTION

The boundaries of modern nation-states delimit the territory controlled by the state. The designation of places or ports of entry on the borders of modern nation-states allows the counting of movement in and out. Immigration and migration statistics, however flawed, reflect the state’s desire to know who is entering and leaving its territorial jurisdiction. They are, therefore, part of the process whereby a state constructs knowledge about the people that inhabit its territory. Immigration statistics also indicate who the state is prepared to receive as new members of the nation, and on what terms. Accordingly, the collection and presentation of immigration statistics, and the categories used to classify and count, are deeply embedded in the national project and the construction of national identity.

When collecting information on those who enter, the state chooses what it wants to know. What and what it decides to count reflects what it sees as important information as well as its concerns and anxieties about itself and the nation. The way that the information is categorized, ordered and displayed provides further insights into the priorities and preferences of the state. Methods and categories of counting in South Africa, as well as the way these categories were ordered in immigration returns, changed over time. Change was particularly apparent at moments when the state was consolidating or seeking to reinvent its notions of national identity. Immigration statistics, therefore, also tell a story of changing constructions of national identity and the priorities and anxieties of the South African state.

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Immigration statistics are just as important for their silences, who they do not or cannot count. While the meticulous collection of statistics might suggest an almost obsessive desire to know and control people moving across borders, not all people entering and leaving states are counted. In South Africa, this is in part a function of the porosity of the country’s borders; people who do not enter at designated crossing points are not counted by the “frontier guards” of the state. Others have not been counted because the state lacked the institutional capacity to staff entry points. People who enter for reasons other than permanent immigration are never counted with the same assiduous degree of interest as immigrants. Some of those who the state fails to count, immigrants or otherwise, are ignored because it does not see them as potential new citizens of the nation. Therefore, they are, for the state at least, hardly worth counting.

This paper starts with a general contextual discussion of the relation between the gathering of knowledge by the modern state and the exercise of power and governance. It then examines how, in the South African context, categories of counting, and the way information was ordered in immigration returns, reflected a hierarchical index of authority as well as the shifting grammar of mutable national identity and immigration anxieties. Before concluding, the paper identifies the omissions and silences in South Africa’s official statistics and discourses around immigration; specifically, black migrants (and immigrants) and women immigrants and migrants.

categories of counting

The collection and collation of detailed knowledge about populations by the state is entangled with the execution of governance and authority and, therefore, power and control. The gathering and construction of knowledge takes place in commissions, research reports and task teams, as well as in the collection and display of quantified data in censuses and other statistical returns. There is a growing literature on the implications of the statistical knowledge gathered by colonial and other states through censuses and other forms of quantified and qualitative surveys. However, to my knowledge, no attempt has been made to look specifically at how immigrants have been counted or the insights provided by immigration statistics.

3 Cohen uses the term “frontier guards” to describe those who physically guard or control borders as well as those who make the policies which say who should be let in and who should be kept out. See R. Cohen, 1994, Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others. Longman: Harlow.
Foucault argues that the accumulation of information by modern institutions, including the state, reflects their concerns and anxieties, as well as the ways that they construct the people and things which they “know.” For Foucault, the gathering of knowledge is intrinsic to the exercise of institutional power and control, and is articulated through notions of surveillance and institutional practice. Administrative rule depends, in Posel’s words, on “particular forms of knowledge, which organize and comprehend social realities in the form of measurable units of population.” The counting and categorizing of “units of population”, therefore, becomes “both a discourse and technique of power” as it renders “the society amenable to bureaucratic modes of control” through the institutions of the state.

However, this does not mean that the gathering and display of knowledge is neutral, or that the “modes of control” are absolute. The relationship between power and knowledge can be untidy. The “exercise of power” does not necessarily mirror “its discursive construction.” However, the “discursive construction” and enumerative construction of knowledge creates illusions of knowledge and control and allows us to interrogate the ways that institutions construct and order the information that they accumulate. This, in turn, raises questions about how the categorization and ordering of knowledge and the way that it is displayed reflects how institutions construct themselves and the subjects of their investigations.

Corrigan and Sayer argue that the development of methods of counting were central to the development of the English state, and the construction of an English national identity by the state. Woolf makes similar claims for the relationship between the state’s counting of populations and the state itself when he examines the genealogy of statistics in European states. He argues that the descriptions of society portrayed in social statistics provide a

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5 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge.
7 Ibid., p. 4.
9 Ibid.
"premise for administrative action," while they also serve as "a channel of self-perception between the bureaucratic subjects and the social objects of enquiry."\textsuperscript{12}

Studies of the gathering of knowledge by colonial states as part of colonial projects of domination and governance draw similar conclusions. Said, for instance, examines how the gathering of detailed, codified knowledge about "the Orient" reveals the ways that colonial states constructed an Oriental "other."\textsuperscript{13} Mudimbe provides similar insights into the ways that the various institutions of the colonial state in Africa, including anthropologists, scientists and missionaries, constructed and ordered knowledge about Africa and Africans.\textsuperscript{14} Subsequent critiques show how Said's analysis, in particular, actually says more about the colonial state than it does about its colonial subjects.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, studies of the construction of the colonial "other" by colonial officials indicate the quest for knowledge of the colonized and their construction, but also suggest how colonial states saw themselves.

Both Mudimbe and Said centre their discussions on the construction of non-quantified information. Anderson, although similarly occupied, also looks at the ways that institutions of the colonial state gathered, organized, categorized and quantified information in censuses (as well as in maps and museums).\textsuperscript{16} He demonstrates how these collations of displayed knowledge "profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion - the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry."\textsuperscript{17} He argues that the "demographic topography" revealed in censuses allowed the state to organize "the new educational, judicial, public health, police and immigration bureaucracies" on the basis of the "ethno-racial hierarchies" laid out in the systems of counting.\textsuperscript{18} He therefore sees social statistics first, as part of the development of systems of

\textsuperscript{13} E. Said, 1995 (reprint), Orientalism, Penguin: London.
\textsuperscript{17} B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 163-4.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 169.
administration and control, and second, as the way that the state "gave real social life" to its imagined categories.19

Census returns gather information about populations, divide them, and place and display them in named categories. Studies of the categories of counting displayed in census returns focus on the naming and construction of ethnic and racial categories. Hirschman, for example, examines Malaysian census returns from their introduction in 1971 through to the post-Independence era.20 He demonstrates how the re-naming and re-division of ethnic classifications "informs us of changes in ethnicity seen through 'official eyes'."21 Hirschman shows how changes in the nomenclature of counting also reflects the changing nature of "ethnic relations."22

Petersen takes the argument one step further.23 He uses Hawaiian census reports to examine how the state constructed racial classifications over time.24 Here the continuities and disjunctures in the naming of categories reflected changes in the national form of the state, especially following the annexation of the islands by the United States.25 He argues that the changes in naming express "the view that the politically dominant group has of the whole society."26 The naming and re-naming of categories of counting are thus related to changes in the national form, to the subsequent shifts in the project and priorities of governance, and to the construction of ethnicity, race and, I would argue, national identity.27

However, it is not only the continuities and disjunctures in the naming of categories that is significant. The ordering and indexing of categories may also provide insight into changing power relations and concomitant shifts in the construction of national identity. When a state displays quantified information, the categories of counting are indexed, placed in orders, structured into wider categories and hierarchies, or, what I will call "indexes of authority." These indexes of authority tend to place the most powerful, not numerous,

19 Ibid.; see also A. Appadurai, "Numbers...".
22 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 863.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 870.
27 Appadurai makes a parallel argument suggesting that the project of the census and enumeration in India unleashed categorisations of the population that became central to nationalism, nationalist politics and their interpretation (A. Appadurai, "Numbers...," p. 327.
categories of counting first, suggesting how the state sees and places itself. Hirschman, although he does not explore the question, indicates that the counting categories of Malaysia were ordered so that the populations with the most power were placed first and given the most detailed attention. In Malayan colonial censuses, the European population led the lists (broken down into no less than 17 categories). During the period of responsible government Malaysians were placed first, followed by Chinese and Indians, and only then were Europeans and “Other ‘White’” categories listed. After independence, the European population was relegated to the category of “Other”.

In their studies of colonialism in the Pacific Rim, both Stoler and Thomas demonstrate that ruling colonial populations were not monolithic or monocultural. They show how divisions within white colonial societies – by occupation, class, nationality, religion and “race” – were entangled with the discursive exercise of colonial rule and control. Hirschman and Petersen refer to the detailed categorization of white populations in the census returns of Malaya and Hawaii. Hirschman notes that Europeans “were put at the top of the list and sub-classified in obsessive detail, in spite of their relatively trivial demographic size.” While Petersen observes that the “dominant sub-nation, whether in numbers or power is given the most statistical attention.”

But, because their attention (and that of most studies of enumeration in colonial contexts) is on the sub-classifications of colonized populations, neither author explores the sub-categories created under the heading of European or white. Nor do they examine the hierarchies of classification established within them. However, if the categorization and indexing of colonized populations are important markers of the state’s constructions and priorities, surely the classification, sub-divisions and ordering of dominant population groups can be similarly interpreted. Thus the counting, categorizing and ordering of knowledge

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29 Ibid., Appendixes A and B, pp. 571-578.
30 Ibid., Appendix B, p. 577.
31 Ibid., Appendix B, p. 578.
33 For instance: between civil servants, settlers, missionaries and traders (see A. Stoler, “Rethinking” and N. Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture).
34 C. Hirschman, “The meaning and measurement”; W. Petersen, “The classification.”
35 C. Hirschman, “The meaning and measurement,” p. 562. His study shows that Jews seemed to be particularly difficult for the colonial state to classify and locate in the index of authority (p. 563).
about ruling populations may be just as revealing about internal contestations over race and national identity.

There is sometimes an assumption that the capacity of the state to count remains constant. However, both Posel and Thomas demonstrate that as a state develops, so does its institutional and bureaucratic capacity, and therefore, its ability to extend the tentacles of authority over its territory and to gather data.\[38\] Change in the data that is gathered may also be influenced by increased state capacity and ability to extend the spatial extent of counting. Furthermore, changes in the sophistication of data may reflect the introduction of new technologies which enable the state to count in new ways and with new levels of accuracy, or at least illusions of accuracy.

While the literature reviewed in this section examines the relationship between authority and the collection of quantified information, it does not interrogate the values that have been attached to quantitative information.\[39\] Feminist critiques of the construction of scientific knowledge suggest that quantified information has been given an authority of its own.\[40\] They argue that the “objective” and “scientific” status given to numbers invests them with authority and creates the illusion that they only represent material, not constructed realities. Therefore any discussion of social statistics and numbers should be seen within the context of broader critiques of the construction of scientific knowledge and the reification of quantified data.

The relationship between the accumulation of knowledge by institutions, control and power therefore lies in three areas. First, in the gathering of statistics as a system of surveillance and control. Second, in their use as a tool of administrative policy formation and practice and as an instrument to monitor the effects of institutional practices. And third, through the processes of enumeration and display, in the construction of the subjects of counting as well as the institution doing the counting. Attention now turns to how the processes and imperatives discussed above worked themselves out in the specific instance of South African immigration statistics.

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38 D. Posel, “Modernity and measurement,” and N. Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture.
39 Exceptions are D. Posel, “Modernity and measurement”; S. Woolf, “Statistics”
COUNTING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Very little attention has so far been paid to the ways in which the South African state counted its population. Given the well-documented modernist and social engineering projects of the segregationist and apartheid eras, there is a surprising degree of ignorance about how the state constructed knowledge through social statistics. Some attention has been given to the construction of discursive knowledge by the state in other arenas, particularly commission reports. But Posel is the first to look critically at the collection and use of social statistics by the state in South Africa.

Posel explores South African social statistics as part of her analysis of the institutionality of the South African state. She interrogates the relationship between the gathering of statistics by the South African apartheid state and the exercise of power and authority, or what she calls “statecraft”. By “statecraft” she means “the ways in which states represent themselves and their relationship to their subjects” as well as “the problems of governance.” Thus, she explores how social statistics were used to formulate and legitimate policies and their practice.

Posel argues that statistics were used to provide authority in the formation and practice of policy and to measure their effects. She suggests that in the policy making process the apartheid state in South Africa reified quantitative knowledge:

A host of official memoranda, correspondence, committee reports and commissions of inquiry, as well as political debates, suggest that politicians and bureaucrats felt the need to quantify a problem in order to comprehend it fully - as though social realities were somehow unknowable in the absence of quantitative measurement.


D. Posel, “Modernity and measurement.”

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 4.


D. Posel, “Modernity and measurement”, p. 20 (her emphasis).
Posel focuses on the construction of knowledge about black South Africans. The apartheid state, as well as its predecessors, gathered detailed statistics about its subject populations. The South African state, as she suggests, was primarily concerned with the relative size of the black and white populations:

In fundamental ways, apartheid was elaborated in and along with continual efforts to count and classify the population, so as to try to measure - inter alia - the exact size of the African majority and the rate at which it reproduced itself compared with other racial groups.

Despite the utility of Posel's study, she ignores how the state counted the white population and its augmentation through immigration. Nor does she interrogate the ways that the state classified, categorized, ordered and displayed the statistical data it gathered. Therefore, she does not examine how the display of information, the categories used, their nomenclature, as well as the way that they are ordered in grids of knowledge, reflect the construction of categories and hierarchies by the state. By examining immigration returns and the way that the state displayed the knowledge it gathered, this paper attempts to contribute to understanding the use of statistics by the South African state.

Statistics about people entering South Africa for the purposes of permanent residence are found in the immigration returns published by the Ministry of the Interior (1910-1923) and Statistics South Africa (1924-1997). South Africa’s immigration returns record the entry of immigrants and the exit of emigrants. They also display the entry of temporary visitors, or people entering as visitors, business people, or people in transit. At their core, however, they are concerned with recording the entry of people who have the potential to become new citizens of the nation and who have declared their intent to live permanently in the country.

At their most basic level, South Africa’s immigration returns reflect the persistent concern of the state with the numerical imbalance between the size of the black and white populations of the country. The Director of Census and Statistics set the tone as early as 1921 when he commented:

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48 Ibid. But, she notes that the South African state often mired itself in a morass of useless information while, through administrative contestations, failure and oversight it failed to gather more relevant and useful information on its black population (p. 19).
49 Ibid., p. 2.
50 Statistics South Africa has also been called the Office of Census and Statistics, the Department of Statistics, Central Statistical Services, and until 1997 Central Statistics. The Ministry of the Interior is now called the Department of Home Affairs.
The European race can only hold its own numerically by seeking accessions from abroad. Failing this, it must forever abandon the prospect of maintaining a White civilization except as a proportionately diminishing minority and in the face of an increasing, and at last an overwhelming majority. It may then be forced to abandon its domination, or even to abandon the country. It may accept the solution of degeneracy, and perpetuate a Eur-african civilization; a course utterly inconceivable involving as it would do, the dishonouring of racial ideals tenaciously held by both of the great European races of the Union, or it may take timely measures to assure that in the progression of population the White race shall not be left behind, but will accept an obligation to provide here home for the surplus population in Europe.  

For most of South Africa’s history the state represented immigration and emigration statistics so that the net losses and gains in the white population through migration could be calculated. Ever since immigration returns were formalized in 1924, all reports have contained a table that shows the net gain, or loss, in immigration over emigration. Between 1960 and 1983, all reports remarked on the importance of immigration to the “population growth of the Republic.” Earlier immigration reports, census reports and the Official Year Books of the Union and the Republic, also comment on the importance of immigration to sustaining white population growth and to preventing the imbalance between the white and black populations from growing wider.

However, immigration returns record more than the state’s concern about the relative sizes of the white and black populations. They also chronicle shifting perceptions of national identity and the immigration anxieties of the South African state. From 1924 onwards, the South African state enumerated white immigrants (and emigrants) in detailed grids of knowledge. The meticulous records kept of the origins, marital status, occupation, and so on, of white immigrants and emigrants (never mind those which counted the entry and exit of transitory visitors) reflect the importance and status of the white population and its composition and growth to the state. The categories used to count white immigrants, and the ways that the data was displayed and ordered in immigration returns, reflected the ways the state constructed white South African national identity.

Unlike the socially-constructed categories of ethnicity and race in census returns, the nomenclature of countries in immigration statistics is relatively fixed. Immigration statistics gathered by the South African state have, since 1924, classified immigrants by their country

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of previous permanent residence, birth and citizenship. On their own, any one of these spatial fixes presents only a partial picture of the geographical history of an immigrant, so the state collected all three. The notion of "national origin" encoded a set of national "traits" and identifications and created a hierarchy of desirability according to the characteristics attributed to particular nations. The Director of Censuses' reference to the "great European races of the Union" indicates that the diversity of origin of South Africa's white population was clearly recognized, and that it was racialized. However, only some nations were "great," others clearly not. Immigrants from the "stamlande," or countries of origin, of the existing white population, were always seen as more desirable and compatible with South Africa's white population. Others, for instance immigrants from east and southern Europe, were seen as less desirable.

In the changing population maps of Europe and Africa of the twentieth century, a person's country of birth, permanent residence and nationality were not always the same. The country of "previous permanent residence" could at times denote a cultural and political affinity (or the opposite) with South Africa. By the late 1950s, country of previous permanent residence became the paramount category. If immigrants had been counted only by country of birth and/or nationality, it would have prevented the state from recording the entry of (desirable) whites from de-colonizing states in Africa or (undesirable) "Polish" Jewish immigrants from Germany.\(^{54}\)

Immigration returns also index and order nations. In South Africa, the first order of classification was by continent. Within the continental grids, nations were indexed in different ways, not always alphabetically. The way that nations were ordered in hierarchies reflects two concerns. First, as Hirschman's data and this chapter show, there is a tendency to place the most powerful categories first, thus creating an index of authority.\(^ {55}\) Second, they reflect the construction of national identity by the state. Variations in the way that countries were indexed could just reflect the geographical imaginations of South African

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\(^ {53}\) For instance, if I had arrived in South Africa as an immigrant I would have been classified British by nationality, Kenyan by birth, and Canadian by country of previous permanent residence.

\(^ {54}\) Recording by country of previous permanent residence only, would not have identified the national and birth origins of many immigrants arriving from de-colonizing African countries. Conversely counting by birth or citizenship only would have obscured the departure points of these immigrants which was instrumental in their acceptance by the South African state. People from Madeira held Portuguese nationality, but it was classified as an "African" country, and immigrants from Madeira were seen as even less desirable than those who had been born in Portugal.

\(^ {55}\) C. Hirschman, "The meaning and measurement," Appendixes A and B.
statisticians; but they do suggest that at particular historical conjunctures the state ranked various nationalities in a continuum of distance from the dominant construction of South African national identity. Prior to 1961 and the declaration of a Republic, for example, the countries of Britain led the European tables. British colonies in turn led the African tables. After 1961, Britain and British colonies lost their pre-eminent position and were relegated to an alphabetical place in continental categories.

South African returns also counted immigrants in other ways, including gender, marital status and occupation. These categories reflect concrete and generally uncontroversial categories of knowledge. However, immigrants were also counted in other, more changeable, ways; for instance by language and religion. These other categories of counting reveal the shifting anxieties of the state around immigration, national identity and the potential of immigrants to build or contaminate the national body. In the 1920s and 1930s, for example, when Jewish immigrants were supposedly threatening South African national identity, immigration returns created special grids of knowledge to tabulate knowledge about Jewish immigrants.

Although immigration returns appear to construct a clearly-defined and objective reality, they do not represent a complete accounting of movements into and out of South Africa. Immigration statistics are presented by the state as complete records of entry and exit, but the gaps and disjunctures in the counting suggest that they create illusions of knowledge and omniscience, rather than total truths. The South African state has not always had the bureaucratic capacity to count adequately. It has never been able to completely control border crossings at points of entry, let alone along its boundaries. For instance, it was not until the late 1930s that the state had sufficient capacity to systematically count immigrants arriving by rail. Other points of entry have relied (and still do) on immigrants to identify themselves to officials (usually the police) after they entered the country. For

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56 Anderson suggests that the category of “other” in census was included to maintain “the fiction of the census that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one - and only one - extremely clear place,” (B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 166).

57 Official Year Book of the Union and Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. No. 7 - 1924, p. 891; see also Official Year Book of the Union. No. 1-1917, p. 162.

the most part, though, the missing immigrants were those who crossed the borders clandestinely, evading the counting and recording mechanisms of the state.

Statistics and data gathered by the state certainly reflect the operation of state power and control. However, they do not necessarily convey all there was to be known. Immigration statistics are only indicators, and present only a partial picture of movement in and out of the country. Not only do they reflect the particular concerns and priorities of the state, they convey important information about the state’s fragmentary reality. In this particular picture, only those who were seen as important were counted and then not always completely or accurately. The categories of counting and the way the information was ordered often says more about the South African state’s conceptions of difference than about the movement of people into, and out of, the country.

**Learning to count, 1910-1918**

The formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 created a new (dominion) nation-state out of four British colonies. The new state immediately started to discuss and implement measures to count its population and to control immigration. The second piece of legislation passed by the new parliament enabled the new state to count its population and conduct its first national census in 1911. After considerable debate, the Union government passed its first immigration legislation, the Immigrants Regulation Act in 1913. The Act laid out a framework to govern the entry of people into the Union, and established criteria for inclusion and exclusion which allowed entry only to white potential immigrants and migrants.

To further assist the task of accumulating knowledge about its population, the government passed legislation on the gathering of statistics in 1914. The areas of information-gathering laid out in the act covered almost every aspect of life and activity within the boundaries of South Africa, including “immigration” and “emigration.” The

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60 Act No. 21, Immigrants Regulation Act, 1913. Between 1910 and 1913 immigration to South Africa was regulated by each province.
61 Although, the Act allowed for the entry of black migrant workers from neighbouring states under specific conditions (see S. Peberdy, “Selecting immigrants...”).
63 I have enclosed “immigration” and “emigration”, as this is how they were referred to in the 1914 Statistics Act. However, what was actually recorded (until 1924) was the entry of new arrivals and people leaving the Union. Section 1 of the Act said that “statistics shall be collected annually” about “population”; “vital, social, educational, and industrial matters, including rates of wages, cost of living, prices of commodities and rents of habitations”; “local government”; “employment and non-employment”; “imports and exports”; “immigration and
regulations laying out how immigrants would be counted stipulated that from 1 January 1918, “every person not being an aboriginal Native of the Bantu Race” arriving by land or sea should complete a prescribed form. All non-Africans entering the Union had to provide information about themselves including: port of entry, race, sex and marital status, age, and occupation. From the first piece of immigration legislation passed in the South Africa, black African migrants and immigrants were denied access to formal migration and immigration processes. Black people crossing the border (legally or otherwise) were therefore excluded from the official counting.

The returns for 1910-1912 only show the total number of people who entered the country, including returning residents. After the Immigrants Regulation Act was passed in 1913 the statistics were divided into “returning residents” and “new arrivals.” Until 1924, no distinction was made between immigrants and temporary visitors. Furthermore, because the state bureaucracy was still weak, not everyone who crossed the land borders was counted. Until 1935, officials only counted people carrying one-way railway tickets.64 Other land border crossing points remained unstaffed.65

A nascent “index of authority,” or the ordering of the nationality of new arrivals in the migration returns, reflected the dominion status of the Union and the strength of ties between Britain and the Union. The category “British Subjects” led the lists followed by “Foreign Subjects”.66 These categories were subdivided further. The list of British subjects included those from the “UK and British Colonies”, “British Asiatics”, and “other British.”67 The list of “foreign” subjects listed new arrivals by nationality in alphabetical order.

64 The Annual Report on Statistics of Migration, 1938, p. v, reports that until 1935 railway officials (who acted as immigration officials) only counted people carrying single journey tickets. In 1935 officials started to “enumerate” all people crossing the border at Mafikeng (Botswana border) and all non-Union residents who crossed the border at Beit Bridge (Zimbabwe border). From 1937 all people crossing the border at Stegi (Mozambique border) were counted, but the single journey ticket system was still in operation at Nakop (Namibian border. See also, Official Year Book of the Union, No. 7 - 1924, p. 891, see also, Official Year Book of the Union, No. 1-1917, p. 162.
67 Ibid.
Despite the seeming attention to detail, the “immigration” statistics gathered prior to 1924 suggest that the new South African state did not have a clear idea of what differentiated immigration from migration, or else lacked the institutional and bureaucratic capacity to distinguish between people arriving in the Union. Although the new state certainly wanted to control who entered its borders, the exclusion of Indian people rather than the entry of white people was the main preoccupation at this time. However, the codification in the Statistics Act of information-gathering about people crossing South Africa's borders was powerful testimony to the new idea of South Africa as an autonomous and unified nation-state, as well as the extension of state territorial control.

**New grids of knowledge, 1920-1938**

After the First World War, the South African state moved to consolidate its identity as well as its bureaucracy. At the same time, new racial fears about Jewish immigrants emerged. Consequently, the state introduced measures to control Jewish immigration. They included changes to administrative practices between 1920 and 1924; an Immigration Quota Act in 1930; and the Aliens Act in 1937. The first two measures were directed at Jewish people arriving from Eastern Europe, the latter at the exclusion of German Jews.

Reflecting its growing interest in immigration matters and its developing bureaucracy, the state introduced new methods to count immigrants in 1924 which allowed it to gather “far more information concerning migrants” than previously. Importantly, the new annual reports created distinctions in the category “new arrivals,” separating arriving immigrants from people in transit and people entering for holiday or business purposes for the first time. The information was also broken down into more detailed grids of knowledge and “European” and “non-European” arrivals were entirely separated in the reports. For both categories, the reports broke down the immigration statistics into nationality, country of birth,

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68 See BNS 1/1/354 111/74, 1912-1914 and 1919-1951 “Immigration officer and conduct of immigration work at Komatipoort.”
69 Act No. 8, Immigration Quota Act, 1930; Act No. 1, Aliens Act, 1937.
71 Ibid. The incoming categories were “business visitors”, “holiday visitors”, “assuming domicile”, “resuming domicile” and “in transit.” Outgoing categories were “business completed”, “holiday completed”, relinquishing domicile”, “temporary absence” and “in transit.” The system did not account for those who changed the purpose of their visit after arrival.
and country of previous permanent residence. White immigrants were also counted by
gender, marital status, age and occupation (and various combinations of these categories). 72

Indicating the state's racial fears of the 1920s and 1930s, the biggest departure from
the old methods came in the counting of Jewish people. From 1924, Jewish immigrants (or
"Hebrews") and emigrants, although included in the general category "Europeans", were
also counted separately. They were counted by their country of previous permanent
residence, birth and citizenship, as well as by their age, gender and marital status. Jewish
immigrants were often accused of lacking financial resources on arrival, and the new returns
recorded the financial resources of "European" immigrants by nationality. Concerned that
cast European Jewish immigrants were entering as naturalized British citizens, the new
methods also listed the previous nationality of naturalized "assuming domicile" immigrants,
thus allowing British nationals of east European origin to be identified and enumerated.

Suggesting the construction of both a British and an African identity, even if a
colonial one, the returns also made changes to the indexing or ordering of nations. The tables
showing the nationality and country of previous permanent residence were led by the
category "British" and the "British Isles" respectively. The nationality tables then listed the
Americas, followed by Europe. European countries were broken down into west and north
European countries, followed by east European countries, and concluded with southern
Europe (including Turkey and Syria). Thus, the nationality table constructed a sort of
continuum of distance from British identity within the racialized mind of the South African
state.

The tables showing the birthplace and country of previous permanent residence
suggest that the state identified itself as a British dominion, and associated itself with the
formal colonies of the British Empire in Africa. In the permanent residence tables, for
example, the British Isles were followed by South West Africa, Rhodesia, "Africa British"
and "Africa non-British" before moving on to Australasia, the United States, Europe and
Asia. The birthplace table was led by the Union itself, South West Africa, Rhodesia and
"other British Africa" before moving on to the countries of the United Kingdom. 73 These
were followed by other European countries in alphabetical order, and then the countries of
Asia, America and Australasia.

72 The returns also recorded the port of entry and whether new arrivals travelled by land or sea.
73 The inclusion of people born in South Africa and South African nationals in immigration statistics started a
tradition which extends to contemporary statistics.
The immigration returns of 1924 to 1938 clearly articulate the immigration anxieties of the Union government about Jewish immigration and the associated changes in South Africa's immigration policies and practices. The new systems of counting introduced in 1924 with their myriad of cross tabulations and grids of knowledge, delineate the burgeoning interest in knowledge about immigration and the development of the government's bureaucratic and administrative capabilities. The pole position of British nationals and British colonies reflect the Union's status as a dominion of the British empire. The leading position of the Union and other British colonial African countries in the birthplace and permanent residence tables suggests that the state of the Union also located itself in Africa, albeit British colonial Africa.

Intermittent knowledge, 1945-1994
The election of 1948, the subsequent consolidation of National Party power, and the declaration of the Republic in 1961, re-shaped the definition of South Africa's national identity in significant ways. These events had a profound effect on immigration policies and practices. Between the end of the Second World War and the declaration of the Republic, the racial anxieties about Jewish immigration that had dogged the 1920s and 1930s fell away. They were replaced by contestations over immigration policy between the "two main white races" of South Africa, the English and Afrikaner. The immigration returns for the years between 1945 and 1986 fall into two phases. The first, between 1945 and 1960, reflects the different policies pursued by the United Party and the National Party governments; the second, the impact of the formation of the Republic in 1961.

Although the state continued to collect statistics, the war interrupted the publication of annual reports on immigration and no returns were published at all between 1939 and 1950. In 1950 the Office of Census and Statistics published a report based on the old series which covered the years 1939-1948. Reflecting the often hostile, and certainly ambiguous, attitude of the National Party government to immigration, no reports were published between 1950 and 1965. Between 1965 and 1975 migration statistics were only published at irregular intervals. The publication of annual reports only resumed in 1976.

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly why the state failed to regularly publish the knowledge it gathered about immigration. The state certainly continued to monitor and count the entry and exit of non-nationals and nationals. And, after the hiatus of the war, it also published statistical returns in other arenas. However, the contrasting immigration policies of the 1950s, which were largely exclusionary, and of the 1960s, which were largely inclusionary, were highly contested - if from different quarters. So, while the state collected statistics for its own use, to exert control and monitor the administrative practice of immigration policies, it seems it may have restricted their display to minimise public comment. Certainly, after the less contentious policies of the 1960s were introduced following the formation of the Republic, the state started to publish its immigration statistics more regularly, and in a different form.

The most significant changes made to the post-war (and post-1948) immigration returns were, the replacement of the nomenclature of “European” by “white” and shifts in the indexing of nations in the tables. The returns published in 1950 still referred to “Europeans” in English but changed from the pre-war “Europese” (Europeans) to “blanke” (whites) in Afrikaans. From the publication of the next report in 1965, after the formation of the Republic in 1961, all reports used “white” and “blanke”. The republican South African state had cut its symbolic ties with Europe and was in the process of constructing a white African identity.

Similarly, changes to the index of authority in the tables showing country of previous permanent residence, birth and citizenship indicate the re-invention of South African national identity by the state and its political separation from Britain in 1961. The 1950 report was the last to place Britain at the head of any table. From the next report published 1965, British nationals and the countries of the United Kingdom no longer led the lists in any category. The continent of Europe was relegated to a position behind Africa and was followed by Asia, the “Americas” and “Oceania” (previously Australasia). With the exception of Africa, the


See S. Peberdy, “Selecting immigrants....”.

I am grateful to Peter Alexander for raising the significance of this name change with me.


Statistics of Migration, 1948.

countries of each continent were listed alphabetically. All of the African tables were led by South Africa followed by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The National Party government's antipathy to British domination permeated their immigration policies of the 1950s. A new category was therefore created to count immigrants and emigrants by the language of their country of birth. The table placed emphasis on whether immigrants were born in an English-speaking country or not. As fears about Jewish immigration fell away, the 1950 report was the last to count Jewish immigrants separately. New countries were inserted into successive migration reports, and others were taken out, but these revisions seem to mirror changing patterns of migration rather than any particular anxiety. The creation of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei as "independent" homelands in the 1970s is also represented. From 1978 they were included in the tables showing the country of previous permanent residence, birth and citizenship of immigrants.

After 1987, during the last days of apartheid, the ordering and display of categories of counting in immigration returns no longer provides the same insight or conveys the same certainties about the construction of South African national identity. From 1987 onwards, continents and countries are listed alphabetically in all immigration returns. The returns of the period of 1986 to 1994 reflect the changing patterns of immigration resulting from the lifting of racial barriers to entry in 1986. For the first time since 1950, “non-white” immigrants were included in the published returns.

The intermittent publication of immigration returns between 1950 and 1975 suggest the contestations over the widely different immigration policies of the period. The changes made to the way that the statistics were named and ordered in a new index of authority which prioritized South Africa and Africa and pushed Britain into Europe indicates the shift in national identity to a white African identity that accompanied the formation of the Republic. It also shows how the display of immigration returns can be contingent on the way that the state constructs national identity.

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84 Statistics of Immigrants and Emigrants 1924-1964, p. 12. This was the only time this category appeared in the reports.
85 Statistics of Migration, 1948.
87 Despite the restrictions on the entry of black, Indian and Asian immigrants and migrants, in specific circumstances, specific individuals were granted permanent residence.
Contested knowledge, 1994-1997

The new state of the "democratic" South Africa remains firmly committed to the collection and collation of statistics about its population. Its nation-building project is tied to development and the Reconstruction and Development Project. This, as Posel observes, suggests that the new nation-building project is in many ways a modernist project. 88

Certainly, one of the new government's first acts was to initiate a Census of the population. 89 And, within the arena of migration statistics, the state remains welded to the notions of science, objectivity and accuracy when looking at numbers.

This is not such a problem when the state looks at formal immigration statistics, which have remained unchanged in their published display. However, the new state, unlike its predecessors, is pre-occupied with trying to place a figure on the number of African undocumented migrants. This preoccupation is one of the most indicative features of the change of priorities around immigration in the post-1994 government. Since 1994, state and public discourses around immigration have centred on what the state sees as an "influx" of African undocumented migrants. These attempts to quantify undocumented migration echo Posel's comments about the apartheid state, where "social realities were somehow unknowable in the absence of quantitative measurement." 90

Since 1994, Home Affairs estimates of the number of undocumented regional migrants living in the country have ranged from 2 million to 12 million. 91 In 1997, Home Affairs regularly cited a range of 2.5 to 4.5 million undocumented migrants. The latter figures are based on a reports published by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and produced by authors firmly rooted in the "fortress South Africa" policy framework. 92 Although these numbers are constantly invoked by the state as "scientific results," the methodology used to obtain them is highly suspect and has not been questioned by the state. 93

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90 D. Posel, "Modernity and measurement," p. 20. The researchers who have come up with these numbers were also active social scientists for the apartheid state. However I am not trying to equate the national projects of the apartheid and post-apartheid governments.
93 The highest figures are drawn from two studies by the HSRC which have been criticised for their suspect methodology and the wildly varying figures which they have produced, see: A. Minaar and M. Hough, Who goes
Other numbers collected by the state have also been used in the debate around undocumented migration since 1994. Repatriation figures and the number of people detected crossing the electric fence on the border are often cited as indicators that regional undocumented migration is growing. In 1994 the number of people repatriated was 90,962; in 1995 it reached over 157,000; and in 1996 reached 180,713, but fell in 1997 to 176,317. Of those repatriated the majority (almost 85 per cent) were from Mozambique, and over 98% were from the region. In 1996, 17,967 people were detected trying to cross the fence and 36,362 people were arrested at the border. The state does not acknowledge that these figures include people who have been removed more than once within the year, and that the number of people repatriated largely depends on the enthusiasm with which they are sought out by the Home Affairs officials, the police and the army; nor do they account for returning migrants.

Therefore, despite the authority with which they are cited, these figures cannot indicate whether the number of undocumented migrants entering South Africa is increasing. They are used, nonetheless, in the exercise of power and control by the new South African state as a basis for formulating and implementing policies and practices to control undocumented migration.

However, despite its not unnatural commitment to gaining knowledge through social statistics, both the census and immigration and migration statistics have been challenged from both inside and outside the state. Significantly, for what is perhaps the first time in South Africa, the methodology of counting, or the process of "creating" immigration and other statistics, is being questioned. Unlike previous challenges it is the veracity of the
system of counting, not the results or rationale of counting that is being challenged. The figures attributed to undocumented migration have mainly been challenged from outside the state. However, Statistics South Africa mounted a critical inquiry into the formula used in the 1991 census to estimate the “true” population. This was after the 1996 Census found the population to be significantly smaller than estimated in the 1991 Census. Thus it seems that the new state, while committed to quantification, does, at times, have a more critical approach to the objectivity of social statistics than its predecessors. However, as if confirming the knowledge/power nexus contained in social statistics, it is significant that the challenges to statistical knowledge have so far only occurred at those points where they challenge the interests of the state.

SILENCE AND STATISTICS
Silencing African migration

The 1913 Immigrants Regulation Act created a two-tier system which persists today. The Act denied access to immigrant status to virtually all African people. But to ensure the supply of labour to the mining industry and commercial agriculture, it included an exemption clause. This allowed contract workers from neighbouring countries to enter, but with no rights to claim domicile, permanent residence, or to change employers. The clause entrenched the migrant labour system in South Africa’s legal framework.

Before 1986, only white people, with the exception of certain categories of Indian, Chinese and Japanese people and black individuals, could become permanent residents. Black Africans could only officially enter South Africa as contract workers, or unofficially as

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100 Ibid.
102 Census ‘96: Preliminary.
103 Ibid.
undocumented migrants. The extensive and complex history of black African migration to South Africa warrants a major study in itself. However, the exclusion of black African migrants from the state’s collection and display of statistics on cross-border migration does require comment.

The exclusion of black migrants from the official statistics hides the long history of migration of black African contract workers and undocumented migrants into and out of South Africa. Since the turn of the century, black African migrants have formed a substantial (and often the majority) component of the workforce on South Africa’s gold and other mines. They have also worked as contract and undocumented workers in the agricultural sector. The majority of these migrants came from countries in southern Africa: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, and, to a lesser extent from Namibia, Angola and Zambia. A review of archival records of the Department of Native

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106 For an overview of the history of contract and undocumented migration as well as the presence of refugees in South Africa see, S. Peberdy “Obscuring history?” For a generalised view see, D. Duncan, The Mills of God. Witwatersrand U. Press: Johannesburg, Chapters 2 and 3.


109 For migration from Mozambique see: P. Harries, Work, Culture, R. First, 1983, Black Gold: The
Affairs suggests that, for the majority of this century, the attitude of the state towards undocumented migration from neighbouring states veered between encouragement, acceptance, ambivalence and more rarely, hostility.\textsuperscript{10}

Table 1. Black population born outside South Africa enumerated in censuses, 1911 to 1991.\textsuperscript{11}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>229,207</td>
<td>279,650</td>
<td>333,777</td>
<td>605,992</td>
<td>586,043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>516,043</td>
<td>677,160</td>
<td>315,482</td>
<td>920,913</td>
<td>549,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* includes whites born in “SADC countries and the “Rest of Africa”

In contrast to the meticulous counting and documentation of the lives and habits of black South Africans in censuses and other social statistics, the entry and egress of black immigrants and migrants was virtually ignored by the enumerators of the state. Under the regulations of the Statistics Acts all black Africans were excluded from immigration and migration statistics until 1986. No category of labour or migration statistics gathered by the state counted or recorded the entry of contract workers. Outside the census reports, only one

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\textsuperscript{10} For a brief discussion of the archival evidence see, S. Peberdy, “Obscuring history.” For some archival references see, NTS 2072 144/280 vol. 5; BAO 3208 C43/1; BAO 3210 C43/1/1 vols. 1-2; BAO 3211 C43/2 vol. 1; NTS 2092 216/280; GNLD 407 60/17-66; BNS 1/2/57 A2225-A3900; GNLD 406; GNLD 407; BNS 1/1/359 1/123/74; BNS 1/1/377 194/74.


\textsuperscript{12} No explanation is provided for this low figure.
attempt was made to calculate the number of non-South African black people in the country between 1910 and 1994. Census reports did count the black population by place of birth and therefore provide an indication of the number of non-South Africans resident in South Africa at any one time (see Table 2.1). However, South African censuses, particularly after 1951, are notoriously inaccurate and, with the exception of the 1991 census, probably underestimate the non-South African black population.

The silencing of black migration in South Africa's statistics stands in stark contrast to the colonial states of the countries of origin of these migrants, which documented the exodus and return of contract workers, and which attempted to count the movement of undocumented migrants. These silences sometimes came back to haunt the South African state at those moments when it became concerned about the number of "foreign Bantu" in South Africa. So, the Froneman Commission, which was appointed to enquire into the presence of "foreign Bantu" in South Africa just before the formation of the Republic in 1961, had no statistics on which to draw. It resorted to looking at school enrollment statistics and asking police chiefs to estimate the number of "foreign Bantu" in their area.

One reason why some black migrants states of origin may not have been counted was because the South African state firmly believed for the first half of the century that the incorporation of several neighbouring states into South Africa was inevitable, if not imminent. Until 1963, black and white citizens of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland (BLS states) and South West Africa were treated as if they were South Africans, with the same rights, privileges and obligations under the law. From July 1963, as a direct consequence of the formation of the Republic and separation from the Commonwealth, citizens of BLS states lost their privileged status and were treated like other African

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114 Because the 1991 census did not go into all "black areas" it used a formula to calculate the size of the black population. The preliminary results of the 1996 census suggest the formula overestimated the size of the black population (Census '96: Preliminary, p. 17).
115 J. Crush, "The Struggle"; GNLB 406; GNLB 407; BNS 1/1/359 1/123/74; BNS 1/1/377 194/74.
117 Ibid.
migrants. Furthermore, the movement of black non-South Africans within South Africa fell under the same legislation which governed the movement of black South Africans within the country.

However, this does not account for why all other black migrants were also excluded from state statistics. Anderson suggests that colonial powers expanded their categories of counting and the extent of their counting as their control expanded. Those who were not seen as part of the colony or nation were not counted. A similar argument can be made in South Africa. The exclusion of black migrants from immigration legislation and statistics speaks to the racialized construction of South African national identity by the state. The “imagined community” of the South African nation had no space for black people. Immigration statistics conveyed the terms of access to that community. African migrants and immigrants were silenced because, like black South Africans, they were forever outside the state’s imagined boundaries of the nation.

**Gendered silences**

Certain categories of counting, like gender, may seem to be incontestable biological realities. Yet, as Manicom argues, men and women are “defined and constructed within the particular discourses and practices of ruling.” By these she means “commission reports,

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120 Although black Africans were repatriated under the 1913 Act, their movements were for the most part regulated by the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act, the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act, and the notorious 1945 Urban Areas Act, and their amendments. See T. Davenport, 1969 “The triumph of Colonel Stallard: The transformation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act between 1923 and 1937.” South African Historical Journal. 2: 77-96; Report of the Native Laws Commission, 1946-1948, (Chair: H.A. Fagan), 1948, U.G. No. 28-1948, NTS 2072 144/280 vol. 5; BAO 3208 C43/1; BAO 3210 C43/1/1/1 vols. 1-2; BAO 3211 C43/2 vol. 1; NTS 2092 216/280. For the laws see for instance, Act No. 21, Natives (Urban Areas) Act, 1923, Section 5; Act No. 46, Native Laws Amendment Act, 1937, Section 8; Sections 12 and 14 of Act No. 5, Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945.
121 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 168-176.
122 Ibid.
123 Mamdani also raises this issue in his study of colonial and post-colonial constructions of citizenship, see M. Mamdani, 1996, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton U. Press: New Jersey. For a useful critique of the relationship between race, citizenship, and national identity in Britain, see P. Gilroy, 1987, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation, Hutchinson: London, particularly Chapter 2. Anthias and Yuval-Davis also argue that British national identity has been constructed as both white and male, F. Anthias and N. Yuval-Davis, 1992, Racialized boundaries: race, nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle. Routledge: London.
parliamentary debates, ... laws” and administrative procedures and practices. Thus, the meaning of the categories of “women” and “men” are not static but are historically situated. Other categories which are used by the state, and even the state itself, are gendered. As Manicom argues, “the very fundamental categories of state and politics - like citizen, worker, the modern state itself - are shot through with gender; they were in fact historically constructed and reproduced as masculine categories.”

South Africa’s immigration statistics carefully counted white women as well as white men. However, white women were conspicuously absent in official debates around immigration. For the state, for the most part, immigrants were seen as men. Women were their silenced spouses.

White women only appear regularly in official letters and memoranda on immigration immediately following the introduction of the 1913 Act and in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1913 Act gave married and dependent women privileges that were not given to men, as they could enter even if they were illiterate or not economically active. White women reappear in debates around immigration in the early 1960s when the state was trying to encourage immigration. A special brochure called “The immigrant housewife in the RSA” was produced to encourage the wives of male immigrants.

The secondary literature on immigration to South Africa is similarly silent about the migration of white women, with the exception of C. Swaisland, 1993, Servants and Gentlewomen to the Golden Land: The Emigration of Single Women from Britain to Southern Africa, 1820-1939. U. of Natal Press and Berg: Pietermaritzburg and Oxford and Providence. Swaisland provides an uncritical history of the migration of single women from Britain through emigration societies but she does not explore the questions raised by the migration of women to South Africa and the formation of emigration societies to manage women’s migration. See also, M. Bell, 1995, “Citizenship not charity: Violet Markham on nature, society and the state in Britain and South Africa,” in M. Bell et al. (eds.) Geography and Imperialism, 1820-1940, Manchester U. Press: Manchester.

Section 5(d), Act No. 22, Immigrants Regulation Act, 1913.

"if the immigrant wife in South Africa, the mother, is settled in and feels at home and happy, the family is settled in." When the state saw white women immigrants at all, it imagined them as wives and mothers, as stabilizing forces, whose contentment was essential to the male immigrant’s decision to stay.

Black women migrants and immigrants were almost completely silenced. Even more than their male counterparts, their entry and exit went unrecorded. However, in contrast to white women immigrants, black women non-South African migrants and immigrants, when they did appear in debates around migration and urbanization, were portrayed as contaminators and disrupters of the social order, as "undesirable women".

The state’s construction of the relationship between women, men, citizenship and nation was embedded in South Africa’s citizenship legislation. Until 1949, a woman who married a man with a different nationality was automatically assumed by the state to have taken the citizenship of their partner. This meant that South African women lost their nationality and citizenship on marriage to a non-South African. Similarly, non-South African women who married a South African citizen became South African citizens on their marriage. Until 1995, South African women could not confer citizenship on their children. Citizenship was awarded to children through their fathers and grandfathers. Although single women immigrants could, and no doubt did, become citizens in their own right through

132 C. Cockerton, “Documenting the exodus”; P. Bonner, “Desirable or undesirable.”
134 See Act No. 44, South African Citizenship Amendment Act, 1949. Under the 1961 South African Citizenship Amendment Act women who took their partner’s nationality had to actively renounce their South African citizenship (Section 11). This change may reflect the role of women in the nation-building myths of Afrikaner nationalism, see, E. Brink, “Man-made women”; D. Gaitskell and E. Unterhalter, “Mothers of the nation.”
naturalization, citizenship, the marker of national belonging, was essentially constructed as a privilege granted to women through men.

The silencing of the history and experience of women's immigration and migration to South Africa, is more than a missing historical and geographical record. The conflation of white women immigrants into the baggage of their male counterparts; their inclusion as wives, mothers and bearers of future citizens and the definition and determination of women's citizenship through men, reflects the way that South African national identity was, from the earliest years, constructed as male. The silencing of women immigrants and the construction of a gendered South African citizenship followed inevitably.

CONCLUSION

South Africa's immigration returns not only tell a story of the changing patterns of immigration to the country. They also relate a narrative of the shifting immigration priorities and anxieties of the state. Their very production was a function of the state's attempts to control, manage, select and measure the entry of new citizens into the country. They were an essential part of the project of governance and reflected the changing conceptions of national identity.

Changes in the categories of counting, and more importantly, continuities and discontinuities in the indexes of authority turned on conceptions of national identity and the inclusionary and exclusionary selection policies and practices of the state. Before 1961, South Africa's connections to Britain and the British Empire prioritized British immigration and the ordering of immigration returns. "Undesirable" populations, those threats to the national body, were also intensely scrutinized by the statistical frontier guards. The ascendance of Afrikaner nationalism in 1948 brought changes to the representation of immigration statistics, initially through silence. However, the realization of the Republic in 1961 brought marked shifts in the actual categorization and representation of immigrants in immigration returns. There were further changes again in the 1980s.

The intermittent publication of immigration statistics after 1948 mirrors the ambivalent attitude of the National Party government to immigration until the formation of the Republic in 1961. The changes made to the index of immigration in the reports published after 1961 "demoted" the categories of British and colonial British immigration and moved Africa and South Africa to pole position. Equally important was the language shift from
“European” to “white.” White South Africa claimed independence from its European authority and laid claim to an autonomous white African national identity. The attempts by the re-invented post-1994 South African state to count undocumented migration indicates the new priorities of the multi-racial post-apartheid state.

While immigrants who were potential new citizens were carefully counted, the failure to count other immigrants and migrants suggests that they were ignored because the state did not see them as potential new citizens of the nation. For the state at least, they were not worth counting or discussing. The gathering of statistics and their silences indicate how South African national identity has, for the majority of its history, been seen by the state as both white and male, but that not all white potential new citizens were equal - or part of the national vision and identity of the South African state.