The Making of Apartheid in Springs During the Sixties: Group areas, urban restructuring and resistance

Noor Nieftagodien

396
The Making Of Apartheid In Springs During the Sixties:
Group areas, urban restructuring and resistance

By:
Noor Nieftagodien
(History Department)
Introduction

The term apartheid is now used in many contexts to denote systematic racial separation and exploitation. A long tradition in South African studies has sought to explain apartheid by reference to the changing forms and needs of capitalist exploitation, but comparatively little attention has been paid to the apparently more exclusive racial aspects of this policy. The Group Areas Act (GAA), passed in 1950, is a case in point. This Act became one of the cornerstones and arguably the flagship of the government's segregationist policies. The implementation of the GAA resulted in the forcible removal of hundreds of thousands of blacks from their homes and their relocation into racially exclusive areas. Much of the human misery caused by these policies has been well documented. The dismantling of integrated communities in urban and peri-urban areas such as the Western Areas in Johannesburg, District Six in Cape Town and Cato Manor in Durban have long captured the imagination of scholars and the general public. The removal of Sophiatown in particular has been the subject of numerous scholarly and popular works.¹

But aside from the one important piece by Alan Mabin on the origins of the GAA² our knowledge about its implementation remains limited. His study however only covers the period up to the early fifties. Surprisingly few studies have focused on the integral part played by this Act in the making of apartheid and the racial restructuring of the urban areas. There are clearly important gaps in our understanding of the GAA. One of these is the lack of clarity on the reasons behind the often long delay in the final implementation of group areas in many localities. In some cases, as this paper will show, group areas were only finally implemented in the 1970s. This is significant considering that at the time of the GAA's promulgation, the average urban area was already up to 90 percent segregated.³

The delay in the implementation of the GAA may even seem peculiar considering the fervent commitment of the National Party to racial segregation. The rule of the Nationalists, unlike that of its predecessors, was characterised by a singular determination to implement apartheid policies. It pursued its goal of complete racial segregation not only with greater co-ordination and planning but as its hold over the state became more secure, also with increasing coercion. Once in power the National Party promulgated a battery of laws designed to fulfil its broad aims: the Group Areas Act, Population Registration Act, Mixed Marriages Act, among others, signalled the apartheid government's determination to impose complete racial segregation and simultaneously to strike a blow against the radical opposition movement.

A serious shortcoming in the extant literature is the dearth of proper and detailed analyses of the 1960s. Most histories of the making of apartheid concentrate on the period up to 1960. Others focus on the re-awakening of the proletariat in the early-seventies and the ensuing struggle for freedom. The impression is left that the sixties was indeed a dark decade, characterised by the unbridled success of the Nationalists. This gap in the literature means that our understanding of the implementation of apartheid remains incomplete.

This paper attempts to address these issues through a case study of Springs during the first two and a half decades of apartheid, with a special focus on the sixties. The making of apartheid is viewed from the perspective of the implementation of the GAA, urban restructuring and the various forms of opposition to these plans. The GAA and the forced
removals of tens of thousands of black people were not merely consequences of the National Party's desire to enforce racial segregation, although this was of course crucial. The urban restructuring policies pursued by the Nationalists were a reaction to the socio-political consequences of a rapidly industrialising economy. The urban crisis of the late forties - massive overcrowding of locations and the increasing militancy of the nascent working class - demanded decisive action from the ruling class and the state. The desire to control the urban black population, to ensure a reliable supply of cheap labour for the growing needs of capital and the enforcement of racial segregation formed the basis of the plans to restructure the urban areas.

A study of the implementation of the GAA also allows for reflection on some of the key analyses on the making of apartheid. In particular, Posel's critique of the master plan approach has been extremely influential. Her writings have emphasised that the very notion of apartheid was contested within the state. Thus the implementation of apartheid cannot be viewed as a cumulative process, originating with the Sauer report. To a certain extent the implementation of the GAA confirms the wisdom of this approach. There was nothing in the Sauer report indicating how group areas would be enforced. In fact, during the first half of the fifties very little happened in the way of group area demarcations, largely because of shortcomings in the GAA. However, by the mid fifties the government had formulated a well-developed plan to match its ideological commitment to racial segregation.

From this point the restructuring of the urban areas was pursued, perhaps more so than influx control, with virtual unanimity throughout the state. Opposition from liberal-controlled municipalities was limited and was not directed against the political essence of this policy. Moreover, it does not appear that the conflict in the state over the meaning of apartheid made a fundamental difference to the actual implementation of group areas, forced removals, the creation of new townships and the general restructuring of the urban areas - all which were pivotal in the making of apartheid.

These plans were of course contested at the point of implementation, with varying degrees of success. It is at this level of the practical implementation of apartheid policies that the paper focuses. In so doing the paper necessarily highlights the experiences of ordinary black people.

A. PLANNING AND RESTRUCTURING URBAN AREAS

The Group Areas Act: from inertia to consolidation

The GAA was pivotal in the Nationalist's plans to enforce racial segregation. The government was determined not only to set racial segregation on a new footing, but also to reverse existing practices of racial integration. A fundamental aspect of these plans was the removal of the racially integrated locations found in numerous urban centres - the so called "black spots". These locations were problematic to the government because of their racial heterogeneity and because they had become major centres of black working-class mobilisation in the post-war period. Their continued existence thus posed a threat to the National Party's ideal of racial segregation.

The rapid and successful establishment of group areas was of paramount importance to a government committed to racial exclusivity. However, the promulgation of the GAA in 1950 was not followed by immediate success in its implementation. Between 1950 and 1957 the government faced numerous obstacles to and inadequacies in its own plans. The GAA was in fact quite weak in its exposition of practical plans of implementation. Six years after its
promulgation only five group areas had been declared.\textsuperscript{5} Meshtrie has argued that the government did not intend group areas proclamations to occur quickly. According to her the Act ensured that some time would lapse before a group area could be declared because of the lengthy procedures which had to be followed.\textsuperscript{6} But it is unlikely that the government would have planned or anticipated the kinds of delays experienced with the implementation of the GAA. Certainly, the ideologues of apartheid and their supporters would not have planned for the creation of group areas to take over two decades.

The implementation of the GAA was initially retarded by various administrative shortcomings. One of the first obstacles faced by the Land Tenure Advisory Board (LTAB), which was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the GAA, was uncertainty over the number of "racial groups" identified by the government. Racial group areas could of course not be created until the government had decided how to subdivide Indians and coloureds. Once this process was completed the LTAB could then declare an area controlled, specified or defined, the precursors to the full declaration of group areas. When an area was earmarked for group area demarcation permits had to be issued to those people who then resided in the "wrong" location. Similarly, businesses operating outside their designated group area also had to apply for permits. These permit applications had to be investigated, taking up a considerable amount of the LTAB's time. In 1951-52 the LTAB issued 581 permits but by 1958-59 this had escalated to 3395.\textsuperscript{7} The government was obliged to increase the size of the LTAB bureaucracy to deal with such details.

More seriously, however, was the opposition mounted by the South African Indian Congress (S.A.I.C.) which effectively used the administrative shortcomings in the GAA to delay its implementation. This was made possible because initially LTAB hearings to decide on group area demarcations, were open to all affected parties. In 1953, for example, the S.A.I.C. demanded that members of the LTAB sitting at Lydenburg should recuse themselves because they were not impartial. Although this was not acceded to, the LTAB was forced to test the matter in court. The result was a delay of nine months before the Board could proceed with its plans. Interventions of this kind occurred in most centres with Indian populations and frustrated the smooth operation of the LTAB.

Opposition from white local authorities also delayed the creation of group areas. The refusal by the Uitenhage Council to implement the GAA because it would adversely affect coloured, Indian and Chinese businesses delayed the creation of group areas in that town.\textsuperscript{8} Nationally there were some councillors who opposed the GAA in principle, but the majority of them, including liberals, supported the Act. Opposition to the GAA very often arose because Councils were reluctant to carry the financial burden of implementing group areas.\textsuperscript{9}

The initial successes scored by these forces in delaying the implementation of group areas was perhaps more indicative of the relative weakness of the National Party in the early fifties vis-à-vis the local authorities and the increasingly militant black urban population. At this stage the government still found it necessary to have open hearings, consult widely with local authorities and even tolerate objections from the black population. As its electoral position became more secure and weaknesses of the black opposition effectively to prevent forced removals became apparent after the implementation of the Western Areas Removal Scheme, the Nationalists were able to proceed more systematically with it plans.

The opposition from the S.A.I.C. and some liberal-controlled Councils also alerted the government to the shortcomings in the Act. As a result the original Act was amended on numerous occasions and in 1957 the Group Areas Amendment Act was passed, incorporating all the amendments made to the original Act. In addition the Group Areas Development Act was passed in 1955, which established the Group Areas Board. The cumulative effect of these
amendments was to give the central government, and the Group Areas Board specifically, greater power to ensure compliance from local authorities. These amendments prevented anyone who did not propose the establishment of a group area from attending hearings of the Board, thereby effectively excluding opposition groups. The 1957 Act represented a turning point in the establishment of group areas. In the next two years the number of group areas declared increased to 170. An important trump card held by the central government was its threat to withhold finance for housing, without which Councils would not have been able to tackle the black housing crisis. In this way it was able to force compliance from Councils.

Thus by the mid-fifties the government had overcome most of the legal shortcomings in the GAA and had laid the foundation for the speedy implementation of group areas. The consolidation of the GAA was accompanied by the formulation of clearer plans for urban restructuring.

Regional Planning

A key feature of the National Party's approach to urban restructuring was its emphasis on "proper planning". The early 1950s were thus characterised by the most serious attempts by any government to date to formulate a clear urban policy. Many commissions and studies were initiated by the government to achieve this aim. It was out of these attempts that the basic premises of the 'apartheid city' were derived, including the policy to eliminate "black spots" and to create regional townships. The emergence of these new townships, both in their structure and siting, epitomised the essential apartheid notions of social engineering and "grand planning".

An important feature of the government's modus operandi at the time was its greater reliance on internal and closed committees to formulate plans. These committees often did not have statutory powers and were accountable only to important government departments and influential ministers. Central in these schemes was the Native Affairs Department and especially its minister, H.F. Verwoerd, who preferred dealing with matters outside the public eye. Thus the nexus of power in matters dealing with national urban planning shifted to a smaller group of politicians centred around the likes of Verwoerd, W.M. Eiselen and T. Dönges. Key members from their departments such as Mentz, Moolman, Barker and Nel became the most influential figures in the regional planning schemes of the Witwatersrand. Between them they had a hand in most of the committees set up to develop policy on urban restructuring. These individuals shared a common political vision for the country's urban areas which they were keen to impose on local authorities.

The basic principles applied to the siting and planning of African townships were outlined by Verwoerd to the Senate in May 1952. They were:

1. The site should be at an adequate distance from the European town;
2. It should preferably adjoin the location of a neighbouring town, so as to decrease rather than increase the number of Native areas;
3. It should preferably be separated from the European area by an industrial buffer where industries exist or are being planned;
4. It should have provision for an adequate hinterland for expansion stretching away from the European area;
5. It should be within easy distance of the town or city for transport purposes, by rail rather than by road;
6. It should have a road of its own connecting the location site with the city, preferably running through the industrial areas;
7. It should possess open buffer zones around the proclaimed location areas, the breadth of which should depend on whether the location borders upon a densely or sparsely occupied European area; and
8. It should be at a considerable distance from main, and more particularly national roads, the use of which as local transport routes for the location should be totally discouraged. 12

These guidelines contain the essential aims of racial segregation in terms of the spatial separation between whites and blacks. Important too, however, is the recognition that new townships had to be sited favourably in relation to industrial areas. The latter, it was envisaged, could then also act as buffer zones between the different residential areas. Although these guidelines were not consolidated into official government policy they nevertheless served as the basic framework for the various commissions entrusted with the formulation of new urban plans. Here we will focus on the impact of the above guideline on the restructuring of the Witwatersrand and the East Rand specifically.

The Mentz Committee (also known as the “black spots” committee), formed by Verwoerd in 1952, operated very strictly within this framework. Ostensibly set up as a fact-finding body to investigate the “question of townships for Natives in the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging region”, the Mentz Committee became the de facto source of government plans to create regional African townships on the Witwatersrand. At the end of its deliberations, which consisted primarily of meetings with local authorities and businesses, the Committee proposed the removal of all “black spots” and the creation of regional townships. For the East Rand it suggested the development of two major township complexes: one based around Kwa-Thema (for Springs, Brakpan) and the other based around Katlehong (for Germiston, Alberton, Boksburg and Elsburg. These proposals created the basis for the present day complexes of KwaTsaDuza and Katorus. The government’s acceptance of the Mentz Committee’s recommendation in August 1955 represented a turning point in the reshaping of the urban areas and in the lives of the residents of integrated locations in particular.

The Mentz Committee was not the only body established to consider the future of the Witwatersrand. In December 1952 the acting Minister of Economic Affairs, J.F. Naude, announced the creation of the Subsidiary Planning Committee (SPC) under the chairmanship of Dr J.H Moolman, who was also a member of the Mentz Committee. 13 In his motivation to the press Naude indicated that the idea of a more permanent planning committee for the Witwatersrand area originated with Verwoerd at the time of the establishment of the Mentz Commission. 14 Although it was declared to be merely an advisory body, the SPC, like the Mentz Commission, actually formulated government policy pertaining to the regional restructuring and planning of the Witwatersrand. 15 At its first meeting held in January 1953, the chairman of the NRDC, F.J. du Toit explained to delegates the main purpose of the new committee:

In the past the one department or local authority seldom knew what its neighbours were planning and each one was just carrying on its own. This Committee will provide an opportunity for automatic consultation with the result that various aspects of development will no longer clash with one another. 16

The directive from the government was unambiguous - the ad hoc development of the Witwatersrand had to cease. Henceforth, proper planning and co-ordination would characterise the state’s attitude to urban development. It was envisaged that the SPC would play a key role in co-ordinating the planning of the Witwatersrand. The SPC considered all the key aspects of urban planning, namely, the future of mining, the location of industrial
sites and the creation of regional townships for blacks. From the point of view of the
government and the leading figures in these committees the SPC and the Mentz committees
would operate in tandem. In fact the proposals made by Mentz were incorporated into the
general plans of the SPC. The latter committee, one member proposed, "should aim at the
preparation of a master plan within which private enterprise can operate..."17 It was agreed
that "co-ordination can only be achieved through voluntary co-operation" but in the event that
such co-operation was not forthcoming the government threatened to proclaim an area a
controlled area, which would make consultation with the SPC obligatory.18

The SPC established various committees to investigate the different aspects of urban and
regional planning for the Witwatersrand. Two of the most important of these committees
were the Minerals and Mining committee, and the Group Areas committee. The latter was
chaired by M.C. Barker, another member of the Mentz Commission. This committee played
a crucial role in the division of the region into group areas for coloureds, Indians and whites.

In its report the Subsidiary Planning Committee explained its basic 'principles and work
methods', which not surprisingly coincided largely with those set out by the Native Affairs
Department. The committee aimed, in accordance with the GAA, to devise a system of
"planning that would allow each group the opportunity to develop on their own and at the
same time to ensure the most convenient transport to workplaces without the need for one
group to move through the area of another group to reach their workplaces".19 By the
beginning of 1955 the committee had completed its investigations and put forward very
detailed plans for the region. Its report on the East Rand included maps with clear
demarcations of group areas for the region as well as for the individual towns. The proposals
presented by this committee, as with the Mentz Committee, were profoundly to influence the
future planning and development of the East Rand. It proposed to establish a separate East
Rand regional township for Indians and coloureds. The residential plans for all black
townships were very closely linked to proposals about the siting of industrial areas to ensure
compliance with the government's basic guidelines.

It is apparent therefore that the National Party used the first few years of its rule to formulate
clear plans for the restructuring of the urban areas. This was especially true for the
Witwatersrand. Success in the economic heartland was vital. Failure in this region would
have dealt a serious blow to the government's apartheid schemes. The government thus
expended considerable energy and time to ensure that proper plans were formulated.

B. THE FIRST PERIOD: 1948 - 1962

The post war crisis in Springs

The founding and initial growth of Springs, like other Reef towns, was integrally linked to
the fortunes of the mining industry. Springs started as a mining camp and was initially
almost entirely dependent on the coal mining industry. For a time it appeared that the mining
camp would be short-lived as the prospects of coal mining dwindled. However, the
discovery of gold assured the permanency of the settlement and its development into a town.
The 1930s and 1940s were boom decades for gold mining in the region and some Springs
mines were among the most profitable in the world. In the 1940s, mines in the municipal
area produced approximately 25% of the country's gold and in the late 1940s the
Daggafontein mine was the largest single producer in the world.20 The mining industry
created the basis for industrial development. From the late 1930s the council also intervened
more directly in stimulating the development of secondary industry. Its efforts were
particularly successful in the late 1940s,21 as it succeeded in attracting national and foreign
The subsequent economic expansion transformed the town's industry from its parochial focus on mining to being rapidly integrated into the national industrial economy.

The industrial development of Springs resulted in a rapid growth of the town's population. In 1930 the total population of Springs was 34,455 but this nearly quadrupled over the next two decades to 124,100. Of the total population in 1950, Africans constituted nearly seventy percent and white about thirty percent. The combined Indian and coloured population in that year was just over 2000. In the early fifties the majority of Africans still lived in the mine compounds. The rest of the black population lived in the backyards of the white areas and in Payneville, the town's "black spot".

The location was divided into two. The main section, which was surrounded by a fence, was occupied by coloureds and Africans. The former were mainly found in a section known as Cape Stands (called such because of the assumption that all coloureds were from the Cape) but there was no formal racial segregation. On the contrary, the location was characterised by residential, social and religious integration between coloureds and Indians. A street separated this section from the Asiatic Bazaar (later known as Bakerton) where the Indian and Chinese population resided. This section was also the main commercial centre of the location. Kenny Madalane, who now leads the campaign to reclaim Payneville, vividly remembers the relationship between the residents from the different areas:

I was right there in Cape Stands where the coloureds were... We had a very good relationship with coloured families. We married one another, it was just mixed marriages. When you take it with the Indian community, we used to go and shop there. They used to come and sell bananas, samoosas and other things. They went house to house and there was nothing wrong. I don't remember having a problem with Indians and Chinese, who also came into the township with what we call Fafee.

Payneville was originally designed to accommodate 8000 people but by 1952 the number of residents had escalated to 33,000, making it hopelessly overcrowded. Between 1939 and 1951 the Council did not build any houses in the location, resulting in a proliferation of squatters and intense pressure on the existing resources. Banzi Bangani, trumpeter for the African Inkspots, recalls that his father's stand was filled by shacks. Not surprisingly under these conditions, poverty was pervasive: 47% of the population could not afford to pay rents without resorting to informal means of income generation. From the late forties the Council's medical officer regularly complained of the dangers of outbreaks of poverty related diseases. In 1950 there was an outbreak of diphtheria and about 800 people reported at the clinic with tuberculosis. In 1952/53 the infant mortality rate among Africans and coloureds was 383.77 and 166.66 per thousand live births respectively, compared to only 41.01 for whites.

In the post-war period these conditions became unbearable and underpinned many of the struggles waged against the authorities. One result of these struggles was the rapid growth in support in the location for the ANC and Communist Party of South Africa. The latter was particularly successful in gaining control of the Advisory Board. Under the leadership of Dinah Maile, the CPSA focused its attention in the mid forties on struggles against municipal beer brewing and the harassment of women brewers. In 1945 a clash broke out between women protesters and the police, resulting in numerous deaths. Protests against raids of illicit brewers and the high cost of municipal continued until the early fifties. By 1950 residents' anger over the lack of housing reached boiling point when more than a thousand people marched to the city demanding that the Council build houses. This increased militancy of Payneville's population clearly shocked the Council, business and the white population in
general. Under the pressure of these events the Council moved rapidly to establish an "emergency camp", known as Jabavu, to alleviate the overcrowding in Payneville.

Demarcating group areas for Springs

In 1939 the Council was already aware of the need to provide alternative accommodation for the black population. However, it took another decade before agreement could be reached about the siting of the new township. By the late forties the Council had already decided to create a new African township. Initially, therefore, the establishment of KwaThema did not yet form part of the central government's plans. Only when the Mentz Commission begun formulating its policies did the creation of KwaThema become an integral part of the regional plans for the establishment of African townships.

The key aspects of the urban replanning in Springs were the disestablishment of Payneville as an African location and the removal of all Africans to the new township, KwaThema; the imposition of tighter influx control to ensure that the African population in the municipality corresponded to the labour needs of industry, and the creation of group areas for Indians and coloureds.

Initially there was some division in the Council over the effects the GAA would have on the black population. Some Council members took their cue from the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA). For example, they found the input of V.G. Hiemstra, a strong supporter of the GAA, at a conference of SABRA on the Act, "a very useful analysis for future reference, as it sets out the main essentials of the Group Areas Act in an unusually clear and understandable form."30 Liberal Councillors (who generally took their cue from the South African Institute of Race Relations and the Joint Councils) initially objected to the impact the GAA would have on black people. However, they did not oppose segregation and proceeded to draw up plans for the establishment of group areas. In 1952 the Council proposed that KwaThema be the main African location and that Payneville should be retained as a location for all black people, albeit enforcing clearer segregation.31 At this stage it did not propose the disestablishment of Payneville and viewed the creation of KwaThema primarily as a means to ameliorate the congestion in the old location.

In 1954 the Council adopted the Mentz Committee's recommendations, the essence of which was the abolition of Payneville and the removal of all African people to KwaThema.32 This represented an important turning point in the restructuring of Springs and in the lives of the town's black population. The Council now proceeded rapidly to implement plans to remove Africans from Payneville to KwaThema, where housing construction was also accelerated. The removal of Africans from the old location would leave only coloureds and Indians. The Council therefore proposed that Bakerton and Payneville be declared group areas for Indians and coloureds respectively.

The Group Areas Board hearings in Springs to consider recommendations for the establishment of group areas took place in November 1957. Submissions from companies such as Anglo American Corporation were generally supportive of the government's proposals. The most important representation came from the Geduld Proprietary Mines, which owned parts of the land on which Payneville and Bakerton33 In its written submission the mining company indicated its preference for Payneville to be proclaimed a white group area. It objected to the continued provision of housing for coloureds and Indians in the old location because it meant that these people would have to travel through the town to get to the main industrial areas. In a thinly veiled threat to the Council, the company indicated it would want to be compensated if the land was used for anyone other than whites.34 At the hearings the
companies also supported proposal of the Mentz Committee that the development of locations for Africans should be dealt with regionally and urged the Board to take a similar approach in relation to coloureds and Indians.\textsuperscript{35}

The only serious opposition to these proposals came from the Indian community who were represented at the hearings by advocates Ishmail Mohamed (now Justice Mohamed) and Braam Fischer. Their primary concern was to emphasise the damage the implementation of group areas would have on Indian businesses, especially those located in the centre of the town.\textsuperscript{36} The lawyers arranged that all concerned businesses should make individual written submissions. The letters written to the Board reflected the desperation of small Indian businessmen:

\begin{quote}
I am tailor and hereby wish to place on record my objections the above notice on various grounds that the above ideas as proposed on map in town hall at Springs will have the result of depriving me of my livelihood and will ruin me altogether. It will drastically effect (sic) my wife and children and upset my brother and his wife and children in health and belonging.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

These appeals for the Council not to implement group areas fell on deaf ears. At the end of the GAB sitting in Springs, the Council, business and the central government had reached agreement on the basic racial division of the town: Springs would be declared a white group area, except for KwaThema and Payneville. The former would be exclusively for African occupation while the future of coloured and Indian residents would be dependent on the government's regional plans.

\textbf{The rise of KwaThema: reform and resistance}

Housing construction in KwaThema commenced in 1952. In the first two years 2226 municipal houses were built and the township's population grew to 13 894. By 1958 there were over 6000 municipal houses and the population had swelled to 34 838.\textsuperscript{38} The provision of housing was intended to ameliorate the living conditions in the old location. But the creation of new townships and the provision of housing were also part of the state's plans to assert greater control over the African population.

Between 1952 and 1957 Payneville's population experienced a precipitous decline from 33 000 to 9820,\textsuperscript{39} indicating a massive transfer of the old location's people to Kwathema. Significantly, these transfers were primarily voluntary, although some people who lost their houses in the tornado which struck the town in 1952 were not given any choice. To the thousands of people living in overcrowded conditions the provision of housing was viewed as an improvement in their lives. For the lodgers and squatters who were forced to cram into small rooms and corrugated iron constructions, and who were frequently the victims of unscrupulous landlords, the idea of living in their own house was a big step forward. Jimmy "5000" Jacobs was one of the last people to leave Payneville in the late seventies and therefore witnessed the decline of the location from the early fifties. For him the rush to get a house in KwaThema was understandable because "people would rather be a landlord somewhere in the bundu than be subservient to a landlord in the location."\textsuperscript{40}

Young men like Banzi Bangani were also keen to get their own houses in KwaThema and in that way escape the control of their parents. He remembers being extremely excited when he was granted a house in KwaThema. There was very little possibility of this occurring in Payneville. Not surprisingly, therefore, the official number of lodgers in Payneville declined by nearly 80% in the five years between 1953 and 1958.\textsuperscript{41} By this time the housing situation in the old location had improved considerably.
The Springs municipality boasted that KwaThema was a model township. It had conducted thorough research on housing needs and township planning before embarking on construction of the new area. KwaThema was also the first township to be built exclusively by African labour. The township was also one of the best lit in the country. These achievements made KwaThema the model for other local authorities to strive towards.

However, beneath this glossy veneer numerous problems began to arise. The Council's emphasis on finding a quick and cheap solution to the housing problem inevitably compromised housing quality. In 1955 the KwaThema Advisory Board complained that house walls started cracking less than three months after their construction. Board member, Mr Ngakane, articulated the views of many residents when he told the Council that "If perhaps these cracks came out after say a period of a year no one would have reason to complain. But the fact that the houses cracked as soon, almost, as the houses were completed, the Board felt that not much care was exercised in the building of the houses." The Council's response to this criticism was to promise the appointment of an inspectorate to investigate the matter. Most houses in the new township also did not have electricity. The official position was that only when 60% of people in area wanted electricity would it be provided. In addition it was estimated that the installation of electricity would probably cost about £50 per house, placing it well out of the reach of the majority of residents.

More serious, however, was the difference in rent between the two locations. The socio-economic survey commissioned by the Council in 1952 concluded that most of the residents earmarked for removal to KwaThema would not be able to afford sub-economic rentals. This was simply ignored by the authorities. Rather than build affordable houses for everyone the municipality built economic and sub-economic dwellings irrespective of whether people could afford the rents. In October 1955 the government passed legislation stipulating that no African person whose annual income exceeded £180 was entitled to sub-economic housing. Moreover, the Director of Native Affairs in Springs reported to the KwaThema Advisory Board that after the construction of 1979 sub-economic houses in KwaThema the Council could not get any more funding for such houses and that it would only be able to build economic houses.

At that stage sub-economic rentals varied between £1.2.6 to £2.2.6, whereas economic rentals ranged between £2.15.0 and £3.00. In Payneville the majority of occupants of municipal houses paid less than £1.18.0 per month. For lodgers, who constituted the majority of new tenants in KwaThema the increase in rentals was dire. The estimated average income of a black male in 1955 was about £11, meaning that the majority could not afford to live in economic houses. Even those who earned in excess of £15 a month (£180 per annum) found it difficult to pay economic rentals. The government's calculations did not take into account that many families only had one wage earner and that £15 was far below the cost of subsistence for a family which was calculated to be about £20. In addition KwaThema residents had to bear the extra costs of transport to town and their workplaces. By the beginning of 1957 there was growing discontent in the community. At a joint meeting of the Payneville and KwaThema Advisory Boards Absolom Khumalo and Dinah Maile tabled a motion proposing that the Council should discontinue building Economic Leeting (sic) houses for the simple and obvious reason that they impose an unnecessary financial burden on the occupants of such dwellings. Occupiers of such houses are unable to pay high rentals. The reason why some of the people hardly occupy the houses for at least six months and why arrears in rent in Kwa-Thema reach a sum of £2,600 should be obvious to the Council. It would be reasonable enough if the wages of the people could be brought
to what the government at present as an Economic level (i.e. £15), or else the line of demarcation for a person to qualify under the Economic group be at least £25 ... the high rents imposed on ill-paid people cause an unsettlement in the location. 51

Many simply defaulted on rent payments. The authorities responded by expelling people from the township but found it very difficult to replace them with people who could afford the rent. In 1958/59 a total of 224 people were forced to vacate their houses. Of these 59 people were expelled from the location and 111 were transferred to cheaper houses. In addition 104 people were transferred from economic houses to sub-economic houses because of rent defaults. 52

The mounting problems faced by the residents of KwaThema influenced the attitude of the remaining people in Payneville, who became more reluctant to leave the old location. As a result the population of Payneville increased for the first time between 1957 and 1958 since the development of KwaThema. 53 This was partly because fewer houses were built in KwaThema but was also the result of the return by some people to Payneville, especially those expelled from KwaThema. In 1959 the Council reacted by proposing an increase in rents by as much as 100% in Payneville. It hoped in this way to make Payneville less attractive economically and thus weaken the growing resistance to the removal of the location. 54

The growing discontent over economic rentals, the poor quality of houses in KwaThema and the deteriorating conditions in Payneville were some of the key factors underlying the renewed struggles in the late fifties and early sixties. The conditions in Springs reflected the national situation. Opposition to the authorities was mainly centred in the old location but it came from various quarters. 55

The Payneville Advisory Board campaigned in the interests of the small elite. The Board wanted assurances from the Council that traders, taxi-owners, professionals such teachers, nurses and ministers of religion, and people who made a living from sub-letting would be able to carry on with their livelihoods in the new township. 56 They also requested that freehold rights be granted to those who moved to KwaThema. Fearing that they would lose their means of income Payneville's elite threw their weight behind the demand to oppose the disestablishment of the location. 57

An important area of conflict between the authorities and the African population was the former's stricter application of influx control. In particular, from the mid fifties the Council resolved to enforce section 10 of the Urban Areas Act and to restrict the influx of women into the municipal area. Pass harassments escalated over the next few years, despite the objections of the Advisory Board and numerous women's delegations. In 1958 alone more than 2000 women were issued with passes. This sparked off further protests by women from the location. The Council and police banned a pass protest meeting, fearing that such a mobilisation could affect the whole location. 58

These protests coincided with the resurgence of protests nationally. However, the struggles in Springs remained sporadic and ineffective. The black population of Springs does not appear to have been heavily involved in the post-Sharpeville political mobilisation. There were attempts by Congress activists to gain support for the General Strikes but these met with little success. There is no record of any serious political mobilisation in KwaThema. The key Congress activists, such as Maile, still resided in the old location. They continued to concentrate their activity here, effectively cutting themselves off from the majority of black residents who lived in the new township. By the early sixties the radical black opposition in
Springs had been silenced.

C. THE SIXTIES - DECADE OF UNCERTAINTY

At the beginning of 1958 it seemed that the proclamation of group areas in Springs would be completed quickly. Agreement had been reached about the racial restructuring of the town and in November 1959 the municipality sought ministerial approval for the final disestablishment of Payneville. However, the proclamation of group areas in Springs only occurred in 1964 and then only for white areas. Throughout the sixties and up to the mid seventies the future of Payneville and its residents remained in the balance. From the early sixties the National Party-controlled Council rigorously pursued the implementation of the central government's plans. In particular it wanted the Payneville proclaimed a white group area. This caused tremendous uncertainty among the residents of the old location. Various forms of resistance caused delays in the government's plans. Despite the increasing dominance by the National Party in localities throughout the East Rand, the government could not succeed in the sixties to implement its grand restructuring of the region as it set out to do from the mid fifties. This section discusses some of the reasons behind these developments in Springs.

Transformation of local government

In the early sixties important changes were brought about to the structure of Transvaal's local authorities. The Local Government (Administration and Elections) Ordinance of 1960 introduced Management Committees as the key bodies in the Councils. Until then Councils operated by means of various standing committees which were responsible for carrying out the different functions of the Council. From the beginning of 1961 the functions of these standing committees were all taken over by the Management Committee. The old system was regarded as cumbersome and inefficient. The running of Council business would now become the responsibility of the five members of the Management Committees who were to be elected by the Councillors after each municipal election. The new system also allowed for council election only to be held every five years instead of the existing three years.

The stated aim of these changes was to ensure greater efficiency at local government level. The longer period of office for Councillors meant that they had more time to get settled in their positions and to carry out their mandates efficaciously. However, these changes also lent a certain permanency to Councillor's positions and thus tended to make them less responsive to the electorate. More seriously perhaps was the concentration of power into fewer hands. Although the Council retained the power to pass a motion of no confidence in the Management Committee, the latter nevertheless had the propensity to act as a cabinet without regular reference to the rest of the Council. Meetings of the Management Committee were closed unless it gave permission to other councillors to attend. In early 1961 there was considerable enthusiasm about the new system. However by the end of that year the editors of Municipal Affairs, a prominent magazine for local authorities, complained that "The statutory powers given to management committees are such that they, easily become dictatorial powers - indeed, signs of a dictatorial attitude here and there have not been wanting." The balance between dictatorship and accountability depended largely on the composition of the Management Committees.

When the new system was introduced the Council and Management Committee were dominated by UP Councillors but by early 1962 the National Party had gained control of the Council. Up to this period the Springs Council was controlled first by South African Party and then by UP members. From 1929 Springs elected SAP and UP members to parliament.
and as late as 1961 L. Taurog from the United Party was returned unopposed. However, in the first elections held in March 1962 under the new local government system the United Party lost its majority to the National Party. The National Party ran the election under the banner of the National Action Committee, but all the candidates were well known and leading National Party members, locally and regionally. As a result of their decisive victory the National Party was able to take full control of the Management Committee (only NP members were elected onto it). Councillor F.F. Deysel, a leading Nationalist, was elected chairman of the Management Committee. The political stance of the latter was perhaps best illustrated by his objection in 1961 to a Council resolution affirming loyalty to the Republic. He strenuously opposed the inclusion of phrases such as “brotherhood of man” and “irrespective of race, colour and creed” because these “inferred equality between all races”.

The electoral victory for the National Party was indicative of a general shift on the East Rand away from the UP. By the mid 1960s most members of parliament from this region were Nationalists. The increasing dominance of the National Party at all levels of government meant that there was greater co-operation between the different tiers of government. The weakness of the opposition parties also ensured unanimity between these levels of government on most political issues. This decade was extremely difficult for the black population. The Springs Council was more uncompromising in its attitude towards them and by the late sixties showed its willingness to use coercive measures to remove people from the old location. The increasing political cohesion within the state did however not immediately translate into successful implementation of apartheid policies, even with the threat of coercion constantly hanging over the heads of black people. What then were the main obstacles confronting the Nat-controlled Council in Springs?

Opposition from mining

One of the major stumbling blocks to the disestablishment of Payneville as an African location was the 'strenuous opposition' of the Grootvlei and Geduld mining companies to the use of the land for residential areas for coloureds and Indian people. The Grootvlei Proprietary Mines informed the Council that,

the attitude of [the] Company is that it is opposed to your Council's proposal to use the land for Asiatic and Coloured occupation. Furthermore, it is felt that, as the original purpose for which your Council was granted the right to occupy the land, viz. a Native Township, is being abandoned, it is only right that [the] Company should now regain the use of its own property for which it never received any compensation from your Council.

... there is a distinct possibility that the ground to the east of the present Payneville Township will be required for mining purposes and purposes incidental thereto.

There is no evidence to indicate that the mining company was serious about using the land for mining and it seems more likely that its real motivation for opposing the Council's proposal was that it preferred the land to be used for white occupation only. At this stage the Council remained adamant that Payneville should be used for occupation by coloureds and Indians, but it was forced to recommend that the deproclamation of Payneville as an African location be delayed pending a decision about the future use of the land owned by Grootvlei Mining Company. This was because in the event of the location being deproclaimed, ownership of the land would revert to the mining companies, which would give them sole authority over the future use of the land.
In spite of these problems, the Council still planned that coloured families should occupy houses vacated by Africans. It reserved 300 and 100 houses for coloureds and Indians respectively. The Council’s determination to house coloureds and Indians on this land was confirmed by its repeated petitioning of the central government to support it against the mining companies. Some councillors even suggested that the land in Payneville not owned by the mining companies be proclaimed as group areas. The Council feared that Grootvlei mining company might want to sell the land directly to coloureds and Indians, which would mean the Council would not be compensated for the investments it had made in the location since 1923. The objections of the mining houses did not prevent the Council from pursuing its policy of removing Africans from the location. This was not the point of contention with the mines. On the contrary, they concurred that African should be moved to the new township. The Council wanted to ensure that the deproclamation of Payneville as an African location should occur only when its reproclamation as a group area for coloureds and Indians was guaranteed. The conflict between the Council and the mining companies over the future of Payneville delayed the finalisation of group areas demarcation until the mid-sixties.

**Pressure from coloureds and Indians**

While faced with these problems the Council came under increasing pressure from the coloured and Indian communities to improve and develop their respective areas. In 1960 the Coloured Welfare Committee rejected the proposed rent increases and the imposition of a levy fund for the erection of a school in the location. According to them, the coloured community did not benefit from improvements made in the location and would therefore only pay the increased rents under protest. The Welfare Committee was created by the Council to serve as a liaison between it and the coloured community. This body consisted of prominent members of Payneville’s coloured population, such as J.D. Jacobs and D.S. Isaacs. Official recognition by the Council and the absence of alternative community organisations, made the Welfare Committee the de facto representatives of coloureds.

However, the leadership of the Welfare Committee were primarily interested in furthering the specific interests of the aspirant coloured middle class. Thus their main objection was against the restrictions faced by coloureds who wanted to open businesses in the location. In a letter to the secretary of the Department of Community Development they complained that

> ... because Payneville is a Native location, Coloureds are not allowed to trade or own taxis. These rights are enjoyed exclusively by Natives... The Natives are able to trade in Payneville and in KwaThema, their new location, and we are forced to buy from them and use their taxis.

> We respectfully ask you to do everything in your power ... to proclaim Payneville a Coloured area, as soon as possible.

For these leaders a major benefit deriving from the creation of group areas would be the elimination of competition from African and Indian businessmen. In a group area, coloured businessmen would have almost exclusive access to the purchasing power of the coloured community. Apartheid limited the development of the coloured middle class but it also offered them some protection from the competition of other black businesses. However, the demands for improvements in Payneville also arose because of the rapid decline in living conditions of all the people. From the time that the government decided to deproclaim Payneville, no improvements were effected there. As African people were being removed their houses were destroyed. Thus while the overall population of the old location declined dramatically, the
overcrowding in the remaining houses persisted. Throughout the sixties the National Party controlled Council made no attempt to improve the living conditions of the residents.

The Indian residents of Bakerton were also becoming impatient with the lack of development in their area. As in Payneville, living conditions were deteriorating rapidly. By the early sixties overcrowding had. Between 1939 and 1969 Bakerton's population nearly doubled without the construction of a single new house. The removal of Payneville's residents posed a serious threat to the viability of many of Bakerton's businesses. Some shopkeepers even resorted to transporting miners from the hostel to do their shopping in Bakerton. Indian residents were faced with rapidly deteriorating living conditions and a serious threat to their livelihoods.

The Council also refused to even consider making improvements in that area. In 1960 M.R. Khan and A.B. Gani applied for a stand to open a cinema "for the sole purpose of entertaining Asiatics and Coloureds". The Council refused their request because it did not necessarily want Indians to stay in the municipality and favoured their relocation to a regional township. From the perspective of the authorities any improvements would be a waste of money. Indian people would therefore have to live in overcrowded conditions until it was finally decided to relocate them to a regional township.

In the early sixties the Council favoured keeping coloureds in Springs. United Party mayor, Jack Ellis, believed that

it might be to the advantage of Springs if all the Coloureds were to establish themselves in Springs. Coloureds had attained a higher level of development and were more reliable than natives. Coloureds usually earned higher wages and would accordingly have a greater purchasing power.

However, by 1963 the new Council rejected this argument. It now firmly supported regional townships for Indians and coloureds. In an interview with government officials, including the secretary of Community Development, the mayor of Springs, Mr. Deysel, argued that the Council initially thought that coloureds should be retained in Springs as replacement labour for Africans. However, it was now of the opinion that coloureds would never be beneficial in the industrial development of the town. Furthermore, he noted that the upgrading of facilities in the old location would be very expensive and preferred that a totally new place should be found for coloureds. Bearing these considerations in mind, he supported the removal of coloureds to the regional location planned in Boksburg. The only problem the Council would then face would be whether it would be required to make a financial contribution to the Boksburg Council.

Meanwhile in 1965 the Council, under pressure from the Coloured Welfare Committee, agreed that those coloured families living as lodgers in the location and in white residential areas would be accommodated in municipal houses left by African families. This "concession" did not amount to much. By 1967 coloured and African lodgers in Payneville were still living under the same conditions because no new houses were being built in KwaThema. This meant that municipal houses in Payneville were not being vacated by Africans. Coloureds from the location further complained that they were constantly raided by the police, were refused permits by the Superintendent and wanted to be treated as a separate group from the African people. In a memorandum sent to the Council in March 1967, the Welfare Committee urged that action be taken urgently:

on behalf of the community, the committee humbly requests to proclaim Payneville or any other area in Springs as a coloured 'group area' to give the
people an opportunity to develop as an independent nation with its own identity. The inexplicable delay in the proclamation of an area for our people has now become unbearable. We have reached a point where we can no longer exercise any patience. We feel, and you cannot blame us for this, that you have neglected your role as guardians over us... For over 40 years we have been legally exploited by the Natives... We therefore require urgent assistance and protection.\textsuperscript{75}

The Council responded by agreeing to allow coloureds to occupy owner-built houses bought by the Council from African residents. These interim measures became more urgent because the regional township located in Boksburg, viz. Reigerpark, could not yet accommodate the coloured population from Springs.

**Regional obstacles**

As discussed earlier in this paper the regional plans formulated by the government formed an important part of the restructuring of the East Rand. All Councils in this region were committed to regional planning and their respective local plans were integrally linked to the regional schemes first announced by the Mentz Committee and the SPC. By the early sixties the Springs Council faced the dilemma of not being able to complete the racial balkanisation of its municipality because of delays in the implementation of regional plans. In 1963 the secretary of Community Development enumerated some of the reasons for the delay in the proclamation of 'group areas' in Springs:

1. The biggest section of the proposed coloured and Indian area forms part of proclaimed mining land;

2. It would be uneconomical to purchase mining land for the purposes of a coloured 'group area', which would in any event have to re-planned;

3. 'Group areas' cannot be proclaimed in Springs until the Indian regional area in Benoni had reached a reasonable point of development.

4. The replanning and development of the Indian regional township in Benoni cannot be proclaimed until the coloureds living there were removed.

5. The removal of coloureds from Benoni to Boksburg was dependent on the removal of Africans from Stirtonville and Galeview.

6. The proposed area for coloured and Indian occupation in Springs cannot be effected until Africans were removed from there.\textsuperscript{76}

Clearly, it was taking some time for the regional plans of the government to come to fruition. The Springs Council found it difficult to make any long term plans until the other parts of the regional jigsaw puzzle fell into place. In 1962 the government informed the Council that according to the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, coloureds living in African locations had to be resettled by the end of that year. However, it conceded that in the absence of alternative accommodation they should be allowed to remain in Payneville until such time as finality was reached about where they would be settled.\textsuperscript{77} At this stage the Council officially supported the idea of regional locations for coloureds and Indians, and wanted Payneville to be considered as the regional area for coloured occupation. The prevarication of the Council and the contradictory positions of its various members aggravated the uncertainty experienced by the residents of Payneville and Bakerton. This was particularly disconcerting because at no
stage were they consulted about the changes in the Council's position. Residents were most anxious to see improvements in their living conditions, whether this occurred in the old location or in the new regional townships. More importantly, they wanted these changes to occur as quickly as possible. But they were to be disappointed as the government and the Council continued to vacillate over the future of Payneville.

On the 21 February 1964 the government officially proclaimed Springs as a white group area. At the same time the Payneville/Bakerton complex was provisionally proclaimed as a 'controlled area'. Indians businessmen operating in town were allowed to continue trading there but had to find residential sites elsewhere. These proclamations did little to ease black people's anxieties. They had hoped the proclamation would lead to a speedy resolution of their problems. The municipalities responsible for the development of regional townships for Indians and coloureds, namely, Benoni and Boksburg respectively, indicated that progress was slow in this regard.

At this stage the Nat-controlled Springs Council again changed its position about the future of Payneville. It now recommended that Payneville and Bakerton be declared group areas for whites. The Council believed that acceptance of its proposal would deal with the objections of the mining houses and simultaneously ensure the removal of the black population from the area. In making this recommendation the Springs Council reached another important turning point in its policy regarding Payneville and its residents. It no longer entertained the idea of having Indians and coloureds in its municipality and wanted the old location to be used for the exclusive benefit of the white community. According to the new plan KwaThema would be the only area in Springs for black occupation. The residents of KwaThema would take care of the town's labour needs and the people not essential to industry, that is to say, the coloured and Indians could be disposed of and moved to another town.

In May 1968 Bakerton was advertised for proclamation as a coloured 'group areas' by the GAB. I have not been able to locate the records of the GAB for this period and therefore do not know what motivated it to suggest this. The Council records do not reveal whether they were even consulted on this matter. Nevertheless, the Council was strongly opposed to the idea because they wanted the whole Payneville/Bakerton complex to be proclaimed a white group area. The main reason cited by the Council for the change in its position was that coloureds and Indians were to be accommodated in other towns on the East Rand. But what was probably more significant was the concern of the Council and central government that Payneville was located too close to developing white areas and a main road connecting two white residential areas. By 1971 the central government had not taken any action with regards to the above proposal and the Springs Council became anxious that a proclamation be passed speedily. This was partly because residents of Payneville and Bakerton were demanding improvements and development in their respective areas.

By 1971 the proposal to proclaim Payneville a white group area had the support of the Springs Council and the Departments of Indian and Coloured Affairs, as well as from Mining and Development. In a detailed memorandum outlining the motivation behind the proposed proclamation, the Department of Development argued that the proclamation of Payneville as a white group area would accelerate the resettlement of the location's residents to their rightful townships on the East Rand, that is to say, Indians in Actonville and coloureds in the new township in Nigel. In February 1973 a top level discussion was held between the Springs Council and the ministers of Planning, Community Development and Indian Affairs to consider the future of the location. The meeting confirmed that the cabinet supported one residential area for Indians on the East Rand, namely, Actonville. However, due to the lack of facilities there it appeared likely that the residents of Bakerton would have to reside in the old location until the late seventies. Similarly, the new location for coloureds in Brakpan, Withok, was not
nearing completion and it was anticipated that they would have to remain in Payneville for at least another three years. In October 1973 some of these proposals were rescinded. At a meeting between the Group Areas Boards and the Departments of Planning, Mining and Community Development it was decided that the Indian communities from Springs and Nigel should not be moved because there was not sufficient space for them at Actonville. Extensions to the latter township were opposed by the Brakpan Council and the Department of Mining. This marked a shift from the state's previous insistence that all the Indian people from the East Rand should reside in one location. The relentless pressure from the affected communities for improvements in their lives also affected the outlook of the government. By early 1973 it acknowledged that any further procrastination could potentially lead to a souring of relations between the government and the Indian community. Under these circumstances the National Party felt that it could deviate from its policies developed in the early fifties and agree to the creation of more Indian townships on the East Rand. It was also agreed not to oppose the possible creation of a coloured township in Alberton. These decisions were endorsed by the cabinet in September 1973.

The question of what should happen to the coloured people from Payneville still remained unresolved, however. In February 1973 the Council undertook a social survey of the location and in particular of the living conditions of coloureds (at that point there were only a handful of African people left in the location). They found that "there is a considerable amount of dirt and filth scattered around" and the toilets in the hostel were "dilapidated... to an extent that it would be impossible to clean...properly." According to the Council the required improvements to make the location habitable would be too expensive and suggested that temporary dwellings be constructed for coloureds in KwaThema until such time that they could be moved to Withok. This proposal was supported by the Minister of Coloured Affairs and the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Punt Janson. However, the coloured community rejected the proposal. Although no reasons are cited for the Welfare Committee's opposition, it would be safe to assume that they remained opposed to living so close to African people. The Council accepted their objections and agreed to invest in minimum upgrading, such as the installation of pans and the improvement of street lighting. These improvements did not make much difference, and when Helen Suzman visited the location in the late seventies she described it as "the worst slum in the Transvaal". At this stage the terrible conditions in Payneville were threatening to become a political embarrassment to the government and it hastened the process of relocating the coloured people. However, the idea of moving them to a township in Nigel had been abandoned and they were then moved to the new coloured township in Brakpan, namely, Geluksdal.

By the early seventies the government's commitment to regional plans formulated in the early fifties was seriously challenged. It was unable to implement its grand regional plan in the sixties and was now forced to abandon key aspects of that plan. The central government focus on "bantustan" development in the sixties meant that less resources were directed to urban township development compared to the fifties. The consequent slowdown in urban housing provision meant that residents from the old location could not be moved to the new townships as quickly as was initially hoped. The resistance against removals in the early sixties also played an important part in further delaying the government's plans. The paper will finally focus on some of these important aspects.

Forced removals and resistance

In the first six years of its existence KwaThema rapidly grew into one of the biggest African Townships on the Reef. By 1960 close to 6000 houses were built and the population of the township rocketed to about 37 000. As discussed earlier in the paper, lodgers and squatters
were keen to move to the new township. The same did not apply for the legal occupants of municipal houses and homeowners. They were reluctant to leave Payneville because many of them had invested a considerable amount money and time on their homes over many decades and were not impressed with the alternative accommodation in KwaThema.\textsuperscript{93}

In the sixties the homeowners represented primarily by the Payneville Advisory Board became the main opponents to the removal schemes. The Board raised various objections to the Council's plans in an attempt to delay the final removal of the location. In 1958 the Board expressed its shock that the Council had advertised Payneville to be proclaimed a group area for coloureds and Indians.\textsuperscript{94} When a similar advertisement was placed in the Advertiser in 1959 the Board was confronted by angry residents who accused them of being "sell outs" because it was assumed that they were aware of and consented to the Council's plans.\textsuperscript{95}

The main area of contention between the residents of Payneville and the Council was over the compensation to be paid to homeowners on their removal to KwaThema. The Department of Native Affairs set out the guidelines for such payment in a memorandum, which recommended the appointment of assessors to determine the value of properties.\textsuperscript{96} The basis of compensation approved by the Minister of Native Affairs was that owners would be paid the standing value of the house less the value of any material retained by them. In addition people would be compensated for costs incurred for the demolition of the building and transport to the new township, unless these were carried out by the local authority. The government's on compensation stipulated that the amount paid to residents could not exceed 25\% of the value of the house and recommended that only 15\% be paid because of the "inflated value of properties". Municipalities could also pay homeowners a \textit{consolation fee} "for the loss of the home which is demolished and in consideration of the inconvenience and expense incidental to removal".\textsuperscript{97} This was mainly to be paid to people deriving income from subletting.

From the outset the Payneville Advisory Board campaigned to secure the best compensation deal for residents and aimed to use the process of valuations to cause further delays in the disestablishment of the location. When asked by the Council to appoint an assessor to represent the people of the location, the Board resolved to postpone this by a month to allow it "adequate time to consider the matter fully."\textsuperscript{98} In January 1960 the Board presented the Council with a detailed memorandum outlining its major concerns about the removal of Payneville's African residents. Some of the most important questions raised for the consideration of the Council were the following:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] As we belong to the poorest paid section of the Community, we would like to know how are we then expected to finance the building of our new homes at Kwa-Thema. This point troubles us very much and we consider other factors in this regard to be of secondary importance. We, therefore, suggest that a loan system should be introduced by Council, payable under reasonable terms and conditions.

  \item[b)] ... the Board is of the opinion that people resident in Municipal dwellings, who have effected improvements in the form of additional rooms, be compensated for improvements made.

  \item[c)] ... we are of the opinion that Kwa-Thema is so planned that when fully developed will be a big modern Township, and we do not visualise its removal being contemplated within the foreseeable future... In the circumstances, we, therefore, request very respectfully the Town council of Springs to consider the request of allowing us the right of freehold tenure, or alternatively a 99 year lease.\textsuperscript{99}
\end{itemize}
The Council was amenable to the proposal of making loans available to those who wanted to build their own homes. Loans of up to 95% would permissible if the value of the house did not exceed £250. However, the Council rejected the other proposals arguing that residents of municipal dwellings already had the benefit of their improvements and could not expect to be paid for those improvements when they left. Also, the government opposed the granting of freehold to Africans. The maximum period of a lease was 30 years. The Board also questioned the underlying reasons for the removal of the location, stating that they could not see how this action accorded with the government and Council's claim to "give the Native satisfaction". The UP dominated Council argued that the removal of Payneville was an instruction from the government which they were obliged to carry out. The Board also proposed a formula for the valuation of properties which would increase the amounts received by owners and declared the Town Engineer's valuation of properties carried out in 1956 to be null and void. This was rejected by the Council which accepted the valuation method outlined by the government. The response of the Council to the memorandum did not satisfy the Board and for the next few years it continued campaigning for its demands.

After the completion of valuations, the Council decided that homeowners should be offered a price not exceeding two-thirds of the valuation of their properties. Furthermore, it kept the location's residents in ignorance of the original valuations so that homeowners did not know what offers to accept from the Council for their properties. The Board objected accused the Council of disregarding the guidelines as set out by the government. The Board's unhappiness reflected the mood of residents. By mid 1962 only seven people had offered to sell their properties to the Council. By the end of that year the number of people offering to sell their properties had increased to 59 and the Council anticipated to spend R34 923 on these properties. However, this figure represented less than 5% of the R900 000 the Council expected to pay to residents.

In 1961 the Payneville Board appointed attorneys to assist it in dealing with the local authorities. The Council agreed to meet a deputation consisting of the Advisory Board and its lawyers "for the sake of good relations". At the end of 1962 the same attorneys demanded that the Council make available the valuations to the Board and homeowners. Failing this, the Board threatened to take the matter to the Supreme Court. The Council, now under the control of the National Party, dismissed the demands of the Board and argued that the problem rested with the Minister of Bantu Affairs. At a meeting of the Advisory Board the acting Director of Non-European Affairs stated that valuation would only be disclosed "when a forceful disestablishment was underway". For the Board this attitude could only be interpreted as an attempt by the Council to minimise the amount paid to homeowners. Board member, W. Sokhupe, berated the Council for their selfishness:

Today we are told of a new thing, that people were moving voluntarily. Why were valuators employed? Why is Council refusing with the valuations? Why does the Council want to buy our houses? The Springs council is a surprising body, it would not do anything that could benefit its Non-European Community. It is monopolistic in that it wants to own all the business interests in the townships. We want our valuations as we may lose them with the march of time.

In January 1964 the Board requested the Department of Bantu Administration to withdraw the authority it had granted to the Council to deal with the above matters. However, these objections were ignored and the Council proceeded with its plans. By the beginning of 1964 only 82 homeowners were paid out by the Council, representing an increase of only 23 over the 1962 figure. The decline in the rate of removals from Payneville caused the Nationalist-controlled Council considerable irritation. In June 1964 it concluded that forceful measures
would be necessary to move occupants of municipal houses to KwaThema. The Council was prepared to undertake these measures even though they acknowledged that the main reason for people's unwillingness to leave the old location was because they could not afford the higher cost of living in KwaThema.

The rate of the removals was affected by the slowdown in the construction of houses in KwaThema. The natural increase of the township's population also placed demands on the new houses. This was acknowledged by the authorities who agreed that the 832 houses built in the early sixties would probably mostly be taken up by the residents of KwaThema rather than those removed from Payneville. It was only in the late sixties with the construction of a further 800 houses that the removal from Payneville regained momentum. Between October 1961 and mid 1968 only 287 privately owned houses and 199 municipal houses out of a total of 879 and 565 respectively, were demolished. Between 1968 and 1969 a further 102 private homes and 139 municipal houses were demolished. This indicated the availability of new houses in KwaThema.

Most importantly, however, was the determination of the Council forcibly to remove residents from the old location. As in other locations the Council would pin notices to the doors of people to be removed, often giving them only a few day's notice. Municipal trucks would come into the location and collect their belongings, whether they were ready or willing to move or not. By the late sixties the Springs Council was anxious to proclaim the location a white group area and wanted the quick removal of the black residents. In the face of the Council's determination to use force to remove residents, the Advisory Board could not offer effective resistance. As a result residents were forced to accept the compensation paid by the Council. Today, this issue has come back to haunt the Springs authorities as people claim that they were robbed by the Council and are demanding proper compensation for their lost properties. Kenny Madalane's mother was paid only R560 for her house in 1969. According to him the house which had five rooms, a pantry and outside rooms was worth much more than that.

The continued oppositional stance of the Payneville Advisory Board was an important features of the sixties and was in sharp contrast to the conservatism of the KwaThema Advisory Board. On the one hand, the Payneville Board represented the interests of homeowners who faced tremendous losses and the remnants of the location's elite whose sources of livelihood were threatened by the removals. The latter had no guarantee of maintaining their position in the new township. The KwaThema Board, on the other hand, represented the narrow interests of its own members and the elite of the new township. Hence it was concerned mainly with matters such as trading licences and the acquisition of more shops. Many of them had benefitted from the establishment of KwaThema and were desperately keen to ensure their privileged position.

However, the Payneville Board was by no means radical, as its call for KwaThema to be declared a "Bantu Homeland" shows. In a certain sense the Advisory Board acted in much the same way as the Coloured Welfare Committee, which worked exclusively in the interests of coloured people, even if it was to the detriment of others. In 1963 the Payneville Board objected to the fact coloured people were given preference to occupy houses vacated by African people. It argued that the local authorities favoured coloured residents who even came from other areas to occupy houses in the location. This meant that African people who qualified in terms of the Influx Control Regulations could not find houses in Payneville, in spite of the fact that the location was specifically designed for Africans. The Board proposed that coloureds people should not be allocated houses in the location unless all Africans were housed.

This was indicative of the deteriorating relations between the people in Payneville. The apartheid policies of the government and the declining living conditions brought about by those policies, tended to polarise the community along racial lines over the struggle for dwindling
resources. In the absence of an organisation to direct the discontent of the people against the state, the people turned against each other. The heightened racial consciousness was exacerbated by the middle class leaders who saw in segregation and separate development an opportunity for their own upward social mobility. Under the circumstances existing in the sixties it seemed as if people could only advance as racially defined groups. In any event the government would not tolerate anything else. The sense of community and integration (and at times even working class unity) which had existed from the mid-twenties were torn asunder by the success of apartheid in the sixties.

Mass opposition to the Group Areas Act and forced removals was virtually absent in the sixties, precisely at the time when thousands of people suffered as a consequence of their implementation. The crushing of the liberation movements had a devastating effect on the consciousness of the population. Moses Magudulela remembers that "everyone in the location was afraid. Very few people tried to do something but they failed." The fear of detention and even death forced people into acquiescence. The Springs Council also threatened people with deportation to the "bantustans" and a handful of residents accepted this rather than be moved against their will to KwaThema. Businessmen in Bakerton were hard hit by the removals as their clientele base was virtually wiped out in the sixties. But they also felt powerless to oppose the authorities.

In the absence of effective opposition the authorities could proceed with the racial restructuring of Springs and the whole East Rand with virtual impunity. The lack of development in the Payneville/Bakerton area resulted in a terrible deterioration of living conditions which the Council seemed mainly unperturbed by. In 1972/73 the last African families were forcibly removed from the location and for the next few years Payneville was exclusively occupied by just under two thousand coloured people. They were finally removed in 1978/79, leaving only Bakerton with its original residents.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to argue that when the National Party came to power it did so with a strong ideological commitment to racial segregation. However, in the first few years of its rule it had not yet worked out precisely how to achieve its goals. The promulgation of the GAA was perhaps more a declaration of serious intent than a blueprint for racial segregation. The details on how to enforce racial segregation were formulated in the early fifties. So too were the plans to restructure the urban landscapes. By the mid fifties the government had overcome numerous obstacles and had devised a very clear plan for the restructuring of the Witwatersrand. These plans were strongly infused by a commitment to impose "proper planning" and co-ordination of the development of urban areas. From the mid fifties to the early seventies the government and local authorities would remain strongly committed to the implementation of these plans.

However, the authorities faced a number of obstacles to the implementation of its schemes, which in the case of Springs caused considerable delay in the final implementation of the GAA and removal of Payneville. Initially the creation of KwaThema was welcomed as an improvement in the living conditions of thousands of people. But by the end of the fifties the limits of this reform had already been exposed and the remaining residents of Payneville became more resolute in their opposition to the location's disestablishment. The Payneville Advisory Board, which represented the interests of the location's elite, was in the forefront of this resistance. The Board did not mobilise mass action against the removals. After the smashing of the liberation movement this type of action was probable not even contemplated. However, the elite did employ other delaying tactics which had a measure of success. But the
the balance of forces were heavily weighted against the black opposition during this period and from the late sixties the Nat-controlled Council was able forcibly to remove the last African families from Payneville.

The government's commitment to plans formulated in the early fifties came under tremendous pressure from the mid sixties, so that in the early seventies it was forced partially to amend its grand plan for the creation of regional locations. This was not a major retreat by the government because it had already largely achieved its main goal, namely, the creation of massive regional townships for the African population. Under these circumstances it was prepared to make minor compromises to the coloured and Indian populations.

A key aim of this paper has been to challenge what are perhaps unstated assumptions about the sixties. Undoubtedly, this was the golden period of apartheid rule. But to conclude from this that the ruling class achieved unbridled success over the black population would be a mistake. The sixties were crucial in the implementation of apartheid policies, which were largely formulated in the fifties. Thus in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics involved in the making of apartheid it is necessary that the veil be lifted from the sixties.

ENDNOTES

1. For example: Patel, E (ed) The World of Can Themba; Mattera, D Memory is the Weapon; Huddleston, T, Naught for your Comfort; Proctor, A., "Class Struggle, Segregation and the City: A History of Sophiatown"; Van Tonder, D, "Sophiatown: Removals and Protests, 1940 - 1955"


6. ibid, p.178

7. ibid, pp.185 -186


10. Meshtrie, U: "Tinkering and Tampering", p.178

11. Mabin, A: "Conflict, Continuity and Change: locating 'Properly planned native townships in the forties and fifties' "
12. ibid, pp.325-326

13. CAD, NTS 8056, 1039/400, *Aankondiging in verband met beplanning van Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging Gebied*

14. ibid

15. ibid

16. CAD, GGR 40, 14/1/5, *Notule van die eerste vergadering van die beplanninghulpkomitee vir die Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging gebied, gehou in kamer nr.123, Paulhof, Donderdag 8 Januarie 1953*

17. ibid

18. ibid

19. ibid, *Verslag van die ad hoc komitee vir groepsgebiede*


21. ibid, p.15


23. ibid

24. Interview with Kenny Madalane, 12 June 1995, Springs

25. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/39, *Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee, 4/7/1957*

26. Interview with *Banzi Bangani*, 01 July 1995, KwaThema

27. Germiston, East Rand Administration Board records, H5/51/14, *Final report of the socio-economic survey at Payneville location, Springs, undertaken to collect necessary data for the design of the new native township of KwaThema by the National Building Research Institute, July, 1953*

28. *Springs and Brakpan Advertiser*, 2 March 1950

29. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/31, *Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Preliminary report of the medical officer of health for the year ended 30th June, 1953*


31. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/29, *Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, October 1952*
32. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/33, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, May 1954, Letter from the Secretary of Native Affairs

33. CAD, BEP 221, G7/168, Verslag en aanbevelings van die Transvaalse en Vrystaatse komitee van die Groepsgebiedraad insake groepsgebiede in Springs

34. ibid

35. ibid

36. CAD, BEP 222, G7/168 (1), Rand Daily Mail clipping, 12 November 1957

37. CAD, BEP 221, G7/168, Written submissions to the Group Areas Board hearing from Standard Tailors

38. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/40, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Annual Report of the Non-European Affairs manager, 1957/58


40. Interview with Jimmy "5000" Jacobs, 20 June 1995, Geluksdal

41. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/40, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Annual Report of the Non-European Affairs manager, 1957/58

42. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/42, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Annual Report of the Non-European Affairs manager, 1958/59

43. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/34, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Minutes of the KwaThema Advisory Board meeting of 15 March 1955

44. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/39, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Minutes of the KwaThema Advisory Board meeting of 21 January 1958


46. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/40, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Minutes of the KwaThema Advisory Board meeting of 21 January 1958

47. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/37, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Annual Report of the Non-European Affairs manager, 1955/56

48. ibid

49. Gilfoyle, D:"An urban crisis", p.73

50. ibid

51. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/38, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Minutes of the Advisory Boards meeting of 21 February 1957

52. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/42, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Annual Report of the Non-European Affairs manager, 1958/59
53. ibid

54. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/37, *Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee*, Minutes of the Payneville Advisory Board meeting of 21 June 1956


56. ibid, Editorial entitled *Innovation in the Transvaal*

57. ibid, vol.27, no.313, September 1961, Editorial

58. Statistics from Weide, Ron and Susan: *Die volledige verkiesings uitslae van Suid Afrika, 1910 - 1986*


60. ibid, 2 June 1961

61. Weide, Ron and Susan: *Verkiesings uitslae*

62. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/42, *Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee*, October 1959, 'Letter addressed to Mining Commissioner'

63. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/42, *Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee*, 12 November 1959

64. ibid

65. ibid


67. Interview with Jimmy "5000" Jacobs

68. CAD, BEP G7/168/3, *Brief van Springs Kleurlingwelsynskomitee*, 5 December 1961

69. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/119, *Minutes of the Management Committee meeting*, Report of the Medical Officer, April 1970


71. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/44, *Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee*, 9 June 1960

72. ibid

73. CAD, BEP 223, G7/168/3, *Onderhoud in verband met die plasing van die Indiërs en Kleurlinge van Springs*, September 1963

74. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/54, *Minutes of the Management Committee meeting*, 9 August 1965

76. CAD, BEP 222, G7/168(2), Progress report of group area proclamations, 1963

77. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/1/14, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, Report of the Director of Non-European Affairs, May 1962

78. CAD, BEP 223, G7/168(3), Persverklaring deur Departement van Gemeenskapbou i.v.m. groepsgebiede: Springs, 21 February 1964

79. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/52, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, Report of the Director of Non-European Affairs, June 1965

80. ibid

81. Germiston Archives, East Rand Administration Board files, H5/57/5, Letter from the Secretary for Indian Affairs, 7 May 1965

82. Germiston Archives, East Rand Administration Board files, H5/57/5, Instelling van 'n groepsgebied vir die okkupasie en gronsbesit der lede van die blanke-groep: Bakerton en Payneville, Springs

83. Germiston Archives, East Rand Administration Board files, H5/57/5, Voorstel vir die proklomasië van die Bakerton-Paynevillekopleks, Springs, as 'n blanke groepsgebied, 13 December 1971

84. Germiston Archives, East Rand Administration Board files, H5/57/5, Notule van samesprekings: Hervestiging van Indiërs en Kleurlinge en inlywing van grond vir nywerheidsdoeleindes: 12 Februarie 1973

85. ibid

86. Germiston Archives, East Rand Administration Board files, H5/57/5, Minute van die Departement van Beplanning en Omgewing: Indiërs aan die Oosrand, November 1973

87. ibid

88. ibid

89. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/161, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, Report submitted by the Chief Technical Officer, March 1973

90. ibid

91. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/163, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, May 1963

92. Quoted in Springs and Brakpan Advertiser, 18 November 1994, From Payneville to Ongeluks-dal, by Cathy Stagg

93. Interviews with Kenny Madalane and Banzi Bangani

94. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/41, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, July 1958

95. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/43, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, June 1959
96. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/41, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, August 1959

97. ibid

98. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/44, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, January 1960: Report of Payneville Advisory Board meeting held on 23 November 1959

99. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/44, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, Report of the Payneville Advisory Board meeting held in January 1960

100. ibid

101. CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/46, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, January 1961

102. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/13, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, April 1962

103. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/21, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, November 1962

104. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/9, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, December 1961

105. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/24, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, Minutes of the Payneville Advisory Board meeting of January 1963

106. ibid

107. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/36, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, February 1964

108. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/102, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, Annual Report of the Department of Non-European Affairs, 1967/68

109. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/132, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, Annual report 1969/70

110. Interview with Kenny Madalane, Springs, 12 June 1995

111. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/91, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, May 1968

112. CAD, MSP 1/2/1/33, Minutes of the Management Committee meeting, Report of Payneville Advisory Board meeting held on 24 September 1963

113. Interview with Moses Magudulela

114. Interview with Kenny Madalane