UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED SOCIAL RESEARCH

SEMINAR PAPER
TO BE PRESENTED IN THE RICHARD WARD BUILDING
SEVENTH FLOOR, SEMINAR ROOM 7003
AT 4PM ON THE 4 OCTOBER 1999

TITLE: “THE CONUNDRUM OF DISCOURSES ON YOUTH: KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND STATE RESPONSES TO THE DUCKTAIL SUBCULTURE IN THE 1950s.”

BY: KATE MOONEY

NO: 448
The Conundrum of Discourses on Youth: knowledge, power and state responses to the Ducktail Subculture in the 1950s

By: Katie Mooney, Department of History, University of the Witwatersrand

the city "ducktail" is an inbred naturally bad person of idle and degenerate mind.

His, or sadly her, day usually starts at about eleven in the morning with a few dagga cigarettes and a brandy, during which a broken comb is drawn through their greasy locks. Washing is, of course, indicative of a "square". Then to King George, Bree, Nugget or Gold Streets if Joh'burg type. A supply of the cheapest brandy is obtained, and cash and dagga from the numerous Natives in that area easily, and practically openly exchanged. At least a hundred per cent profit has been made so more brandy is bought under assumed names. After a meal at a Greek cafe a stroll is made [in] the nearby open pieces of land such as Joubert Park or End Street Park for dagga smoking and drinking and other "ducktail" sports. Sleeping off the effects also occupy our heroes and heroines.

The President Street tea room bioscopes are a Mecca also for the "Sheilas" where a trade in prostitution and blackmail is carried on the best part of twelve days. The fact that these creatures are around these parks, tea room bioscopes and low cafes indicate that they have no set income from honest labour and no desire to engage in it, either...¹

The Conundrum of Discourses on Youth: Knowledge, Power and State Responses to the Ducktail Subculture in the 1950s

KATIE MOONEY, (Department of History, University of the Witwatersrand)

An experimental work in progress, please do not quote

The Ducktails were a white youth gang subculture, which emerged within post Second World War South Africa. They were rebellious, hedonistic, apolitical and displayed little respect for the law, education or work. There were different levels of belonging in the subculture, which took diverse and distilling forms and which could at times become conflated. For some, the Ducktail era was characterised by knuckle-dusters and bicycle chains, quiffs and Brylcreem, bioscopes and sessions, confrontations with the police and petty-criminal, whilst for others it represented weekend jolls, rock 'n roll and jiving, and 'stove-pipe' trousers and 'fifty-yard' petticoats. For the majority of Ducktails however it was a fashion movement. The latter group of ducktails did not present a real danger to 'conventional' society and engaged predominantly with the stylistic elements of the subculture. The former group ignited very real concerns and fears in public opinion due to their aggressive and violent behaviour, which was attached to the subculture as a whole. State responses to the subculture's identity was largely founded on specious information such as distortions, rumours, and stereotypes expressed on three interrelated yet different discursive platforms: government commissions, academic texts and the press. The result was the generation of a moral panic that demonised the movement branding it as amongst other things - the 'enendstert euwel'. Through this process 'juvenile delinquency' became a metaphor for exploring wider social concerns such as the family, child rearing, parenting, working mothers, marriage, entertainment and the state of the nation. The interrelated discourses (racial, patriarchal and religious) moral guardians relied on for their understanding of 'delinquency' were entangled in a web of an 'enveloping discourse, a grand murmur' on morality that intersected with hegemonic ideologies of apartheid. The effect of the discourses was the formulation of what the government wanted the white populace to be, namely conformist, nationalistic, law-abiding citizens who valued morality, Christianity and the belief in white supremacy. This paper hopes to explore ways of understanding and measuring the impact that distortions, rumours and suspicions have on the production of knowledge that is later utilised for designing state policies.

During the course of the 1950s, ways of perceiving white youths and 'juvenile delinquents' underwent a series of changes. Legislation was modified to deal with new forms of youth 'misbehaviour' and crime: the police force was given extra powers, punishment was redefined and parents were made accountable for their children's behaviour. A range of discursive practices - government commissions of enquiry, conferences, academic texts and increased press coverage on youths - led to this transformation and resulted in the production of new knowledge and 'truths' about youths and 'delinquency'. The major development signifying this change was the unfolding of a moral panic over 'Ducktailism' and 'juvenile delinquency' which was premised on specious information such as distortions, rumours and stereotypes. The discourses (racist, religious and patriarchal) used in understanding youths were produced by a variety of 'experts' and were considered to be 'true' reflections of social reality because they were legitimised and produced in 'respected' institutions and government departments. For the most part, the discourses shied away from theoretical discussions on 'delinquency' and collapsed into a description of the moral characteristics of such youths. The power of these particular discourses lies in the way in which legislation was rapidly transformed to deal with 'delinquent' and 'deviant' youths.

'Deviance' for Sociologist Howard S. Becker should be perceived from the point of view of those who define certain forms of behaviour as 'deviant'. For him, 'deviancy' is the result of a process of labelling by 'moral entrepreneurs'. Through this 'what started out as a drive to convince the world of the moral necessity of a new rule finally becomes an organisation devoted to the enforcement of the rule.' This process of rule creation is more often than not accompanied by the generation of a moral panic. Usually moral panics are based on the reaction of a few moral guardians to certain phenomena. These 'moral entrepreneurs' (including official and non-official authorities such as intellectuals, teachers,

2 A 'fifty-yard petticoat' is one comprised of a few layers of net which was usually stiffened with sugar water.

3 Danger here refers to physical and verbal abuse, assault and crime.

4 This is not a fixed division. Membership is probably viewed more accurately on a spectrum ranging from involvement on the periphery to direct participation in all aspects of the movement. The subculture itself was comprised of an aggregation of many different social groups.


7 It must be stressed that this 'social reaction' perspective is not intended to be a causative theory (i.e. labelling as the cause of 'deviance'); rather it is a perspective which insists on the role of social control in understanding 'deviance', H.S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, Free Press, USA, 1963.

8 Ibid., p157.

9 Pearson traces this back to England in the late Victorian era with the "garrotting panic". His study of "hooligans" from London indicates that there was an identifiable youth culture to be found amongst them. They all adopted the same dress style, most distinctive features were "bell-bottom" (narrow-go-wides) trousers, neck scarves, heavy belts, peaked caps and short cropped hair with a "donkey fringe". They even had their own slang for example, "coats and boots".

ibid.; p157.
bisophs, priests, editors, community leaders and politicians) united in opposition to the Ducktail phenomenon, and formulated policies to preclude the outbreak of similar activities. The prime actors that were involved in this process of rule creation and in initiating moral panics included: academics such as L.F. Freed10 G. Cronje and various members of the Department of Social Welfare, the South African Police and researchers affiliated to government research institutes such as the National Bureau for Educational and Social Research (NBESR).

The moral panic unfolded from three related yet distinct discursive platforms: government commissions of inquiry, academic texts and increased press coverage. Their commonality lies in the way in which they produced types of knowledge within their own institutional boundaries that at the same time distinguished them from one another, primarily due to the varied forces (exerted by individuals or the state) that controlled their functioning. Collectively however the moral panic was raised to new heights of hysteria, which had enduring consequences leading to changes in legislation, social policies and the production of new body of knowledge on youth. It is a major contention of this paper that 'Ducktailism' and white 'juvenile delinquency' more generally was utilised as a metaphor for exploring social problems, such as conflicts over popular culture, child rearing, marriage, working mothers, morality, the declining influence of religion, white identities and the state of the nation and its future. This resulted in the proposal of various 'solutions' that would effectively 'rescue and rehabilitate wayward youths and ineluctably curb 'Ducktailism' and by extension to define whiteness.

White youths11 have been the focus of a number of official reports, legislative measures and government interventions.12 They have also featured regularly in the local press and formed part of the research agendas of various academics. Despite this concern expressed about white youths and their activities, systematic studies focusing on them are a rarity within South African historiography. Even less has been produced on the process involved in the designing of policies aimed at monitoring the behaviour of certain members of the white community.13 The importance of exploring policies and research into youths specifically is twofold. Firstly, for the contribution it makes towards documenting a social history of youth and secondly for the way in which it provides 'a history of adults' preoccupations and panics - at least over certain groups of young people, and by certain groups of adults.14

The first part of this paper outlines the commissions that were initiated by the government to investigate the 'problem of youth'. The range of discourses that rule creators relied on for their understandings of white youths will form the bulk of the second part of this paper. Finally, the way in which illusive information was upheled as 'truths' will be unravelled in the context of a new body of knowledge on youths that was used to amend existing legislation and policies on youth. Overall, the paper hopes to provide a better understanding of the complex relationship that emerged between the government, academics, rule creators and other moral guardians involved in the process of designing youth policies and in the formulation of certain 'truths'. The paper will therefore make a small contribution towards the few studies that exist on the production of knowledge/truths, social research policies and government planning in relation to white South African communities.

Discursive Platforms: Government Commissions, Academic Texts and the Press

Research institutes are principally engaged in the production of 'knowledge' and new understandings on a variety of themes and topics. In the South African case, the state has played a central role in this process by providing interstices in the form of research institutes for researchers and academics to generate ideas. Within the context of the continued popularity of social history, the history of ideas has in recent years been regarded with suspicion due to the tendency of focusing on a few ideas of 'great men and women'. Nevertheless, it is a field of central importance particularly with regard to documenting a history on the production of knowledge, truths, and of measuring the impact that intellectual and political history makes at the national level.15 Similarly, an exploration of social research entities, universities and government commissions is important for what is revealed about intellectual trends and the way in which types of knowledge are considered to represent the truth. Despite this, 'intellectual' history is a relatively under researched area

10Freed is a fascinating character and was a key player in the creation of a moral panic concerning ducktails and youth crime. Besides being a specialist in juvenile delinquency', he was also an expert in sexually transmitted diseases. In addition, he was a lecturer in psychiatry and social medicine at the University of the Witwatersrand.

11A comparative analysis between the treatment of black and white youths is essential. Unfortunately, it is not within the scope to discuss these issues.

12For example, Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Administration of the Children's Protection Act (1929); Committee to Enquire into Institute, Neglected and Deinquent Children and Young Persons (1934); Memorandum on Juveniles and Juvenile Adults Charged Before the Juvenile Courts on the Reef (1935); Bantu Juvenile Delinquency Conference (1938); Commission into keeping Juveniles out of Prison (1944); Special Problems, Crime, Juvenile Delinquency and Penal Reform (1945-7); United National Organisation, Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Juvenile Offenders (1950); Juvenile Delinquency, Extant, Cause, Prevention (1943-1960); Jeugmisdad Kinders in Bioskoop-Kafees en Kafees (1957-9); Inter-African Conference on the Treatment of Offenders (Juvenile Delinquents) (1959); Inter-Departmental Committee Report for Juvenile Crime, with Regard to the Nature and Extent of Juvenile Delinquency (1958); and finally Report of the Commission of Inquiry with Regard to Undesirable Publications (1957).

13However, much can be learnt from studies, which explore the formulation of apartheid policies. The major authorities on policy and apartheid include the work of Deborah Posel and John Lazar. The latter deals with apartheid policies in relation to African communities whilst the former analysis is based on policies of economic and social upliftment in white communities. These works are illuminating for what they reveal about the role of different government departments in the formulation of national policies. See D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991 and J.W. Lazar, 'Conformity and conflict: Afrikaner Nationalist Politics in South Africa, 1945-1961, PhD, Balliol College, Oxford, 1997.

14G. Griffin, Representations of Youth, p. 23.

in South African historiography, with the work of Miller, Fleisch, Rich and Dubow being the major exceptions. Even then, the major focus of their studies is on the evolution of ideas held by individual academics, R.F.A. Haemle and E.G. Malherbe for example, and how their individual modes of thought and ideas have contributed towards creating segregationist and apartheid policies.

With the exception of Adam Ashforth's *The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth Century South Africa* and the papers produced for the TRC: Commissioning the Past conference held in June this year, government commissions of inquiry have been patchily researched in South African historiography. In particular the way in which government commissions, research units, academic texts, and the media collectively legitimise knowledge and produce 'truths' (about a range of social phenomena) which are then transmitted by increased press coverage and accepted in public opinion as truth-values has been neglected. This is surprising since one of the most common state practices is the publication of reports written from official investigative inquiries, departmental and interdepartmental committees set up to probe into perceived social, economic and political 'problems'. Committee members are appointed by ministers and are classified as 'experts' in the field. The main function of these commissions is to produce information and knowledge that is used in various government policies of social engineering and restructuring. It is important to stress that 'the ritualized proceedings of commissions are not just modes of scientific investigation but are also performances which serve to authorize a form of social discourse[s].' As will be shown later government officials relied on a range of discourses that served to convert their ideas into truths which in turn became absorbed into a body of knowledge on Ducktails and white youths.

These government commissions provided a more official platform for members of government departments to work alongside prominent intellectuals and other so-called 'experts' in the formulation of policies on youths. In the context of designing policies, this alliance reveals much about how 'state institutions enable and constrain the powers of various state actors, in historically specific ways.' The government played a major role in influencing the production of knowledge and setting the parameters of research into youths primarily because they funded such research projects but also as they monitored and set agendas for projects. Relations of power and knowledge were acted out in the spaces provided by government commissions of inquiry and articulated through the discourses utilised by moral guardians. As Foucault succinctly argues:

> power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

The 'field of knowledge' on youths drew on quantitative and qualitative methodologies and data including: statistical studies, press cuttings, surveys, empirical and ecological studies with the central object being the formulation of policies that would instil, in rebellious youths, discipline and an appropriate moral system. Central to an understanding of this knowledge field is unravelling the 'the process of the production of a discourse.' Before focussing on this process the spaces in which they unfolded needs to be sketched.

Between 1955 and 1960 four major enquiries were commissioned by the government to investigate 'idle', 'lawless', 'deviant' and 'delinquent' youths. The first enquiry was initiated by the South African Police (SAP) suggesting that government departments enjoyed a certain amount of independence to probe into what they considered potential 'social problems'. In 1955, the Commissioner of Police approached the Department of Social Welfare to recommend that article 14 of the Law on Work Colonies Act (No 25) of 1949 be amended to increase the police's power to deal with 'ledige, losbandige en wanordelike persone'. Members of the Department of Social Welfare and the SAP fiercely debated this issue with the former group playing a more dominant role. A commission of enquiry resulted in which the Department of Social Welfare played a leading role. They conducted a regional survey which established that besides unemployed adults and criminal offenders a high proportion of the 'types' with which the SAP were concerned comprised youths and Ducktails. Thereafter the survey method became a trademark of the Department of Social Welfare's research methodologies and repertoire.

After a 'thorough analysis' of the data, they concluded that existing legislation should be revised and new policies

---

17 The TRC: Commissioning the Past conference co-hosted by the History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (11th - 14th of June 1999) was the first conference that placed government commissions at the centre of investigations.
19 The TRC: Commissioning the Past conference co-hosted by the History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (11th - 14th of June 1999) was the first conference that placed government commissions at the centre of investigations.
23 This group of rule creators believed that in order to eliminate this "dreigende gevaar" (imminent danger) the Work colonies Act (No 25) of 1949 be amended to grant the police power to arrest suspects without a warrant, take their fingerprints and send them to the magistrates court.
25 A broader aim of my dissertation will be to trace the various research methods which government departments considered as reliable and valid.
formulated and implemented to bring 'lawless [and unemployed] youths' under strict government control. Their argument was accepted more readily than that of the SAP due to the 'scientific' methods they utilised. Due to the conflicts and differences in opinion between this group of rule creators (SAP and the Department of Social Welfare) the question of amending existing legislation was delayed and only revived again in 1958 when the whole question of work colonies was raised at the ministerial level. These delays in dealing with what the SAP considered to be a 'problem' reveals how the formulation of concrete policies is not a steadily unfolding, seamless process but is rather more jagged and complex, characterised by contradictions, fluctuating power relations and a diversity of opinions.

Simultaneously, delinquency was also investigated by the National Advisory Committee who concluded that youth crime in South Africa occurred more frequently than in the United States, Canada and England.26 This concern with 'delinquency' received attention at the International Conference on Social Problems in Munchen, Germany, in 1956. In fact in the 1950s, 'delinquency' was placed on the research agendas of government's across the globe.27 This increasing concern (expressed by those who held more power in the government) over 'delinquency' and 'deviant' youths both locally and internationally was another contributing factor towards the creation of a moral panic. Agitation by moral guardians resulted in further actions to combat this 'dreigende gevaar' on a national basis. Therefore, the moral panic over white youths expanded drawing in more rule creators from a diversity of government departments, organisations, research institutes and universities.

For example in March 1956 the first major regional conference28 devoted exclusively to white youths was convened in Johannesburg. This was one of the largest conferences of its kind at which over two hundred delegates (representing ninety welfare, charity and government organisations) participated under the directorship of Dr. Graham C.B. Bain.29 This conference on the 'Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency', was sponsored by the Johannesburg City Council, the National Council of Women and the Johannesburg Youth Council.30 Dr. Bain was highly qualified (holding a BA, LLB, MA, PhD) and was considered to be one of the leading 'experts' on the subject of 'delinquency' at that time. He was also former Chief Probation Officer of the Union government. He ensured that both the opinions of the government and academics were considered, thus continuing with the tradition (initially formalised by the work of the Carnegie commission) of applying social research to national problems. The conference extended over three days where the findings and recommendations of the subcommittees on the home, schools, employment, leisure time, the press and the probation system were discussed. The major focus of the conference was to ascertain means to prevent 'delinquency' nationally.

The committees' recommendations were only implemented in the late 1950s after the 1956 conference organised by the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CTCASS) in Kampala.31 This was the second research entity in Africa that ensured international co-operation between different countries. One of the first major conferences organised by them was the 'Inter-African Conference on the Treatment of Juvenile Offenders' held in Kampala in 1956.32 In South Africa, preparation for the commission began in September 1955 under the guidance of Mr V.R. Verster (the Director of Prisons) with the Departments of Justice, Education Arts and Science, Social Welfare, Native Affairs, and External Affairs also participating.33 This conference confined itself to a discussion on the treatment of youth offenders in which the legal, penological and administrative aspects were given precedence. The Kampala conference is of importance because of the far reaching consequences that it had for the formulation of youth policies, research and knowledge on youth in South Africa. Immediately after the South African delegates returned home, the Port Elizabeth Committee for Combating Juvenile Delinquency and the Ringskommissie vir die Bestryding van Maatskaplike Euwels, were established alongside a permanent advisory board - the Interdepartemtete Adviserende Komitee insake Jeuwegrendag (IAKJ).34 The latter was created for the purposes of closely monitoring the behaviour of white youths in South Africa. One of their first projects was to investigate the nature and extent of white 'juvenile misdemeanour', the efficiency of existing legislation in combating the problem, and the desirability of additional legislation and new policies. The interdepartmental committee was composed of a range of pedagogues including prominent educationists, psychologists, sociologists, jurists and members of

26CAD, VWN, 402. SW615/55 Memo to the Minister of Social welfare outlines paper put together by the National Research Bureau, Department of Education Art and Science: Oaanpasbare en onbeheerbare Jeugdiges.
30Dr. Bain was also highly qualified and held a BA, LLB, MA and PhD.
32The CTCASS was created by the signing of an agreement, in London, between the governments of Belgium, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, France, Portugal, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom on the 15th of January 1954!See CAD, NTS, 884/400 (4) (1) – 884/400 (8), Explanatory Memorandum on the Agenda. The major goal of the agreement was to ensure co-operation between member governments and to administer the Inter-African Research Fund and the Inter-African Foundation for the exchange of Scientists and Technicians. The CTCASS convened annually and was funded by the member governments. They also worked in conjunction with the Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (SCASS) which was established in 1950 (The establishment of the CSA was also stimulated as a result of the Johannesburg Scientific Conference held in 1949, see CAD, NTS, 1840, 894/400 (4) (1) – 894/400 (6), "Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara")
33CAD, VWN, 751. SW109/4, ENL/1125, CCTCA, Second meeting of the Inter-African Conference on the Treatment of Offenders (Juvenile Delinquents), Kampala, Uganda, October 1956.
34The IAKJ was comprised exclusively of Afrikaans speaking members. The minutes of meetings and reports produced were all in Afrikaans.
government departments including Education, Arts and Science, Social Welfare, Justice, Labour, Police and Prisons. It was through this official, permanent committee that the relationship between the government, social scientists and other moral guardians solidified. As a result, finally in 1957 the Senate adopted a resolution expressing their concern at the extent of juvenile delinquency amongst Europeans* and requested that the government give serious attention to the matter. From 1957 onwards, government departments embarked on the process of collecting evidence on the extent of 'delinquency'. The Department of Social Welfare played a pivotal role in this process and was a role they were to continue with well into the 1960s.

In 1958, the government instructed regional representatives of the Department of Social Welfare to write detailed reports on the extent of 'juvenile delinquency' with a particular focus on the 'Eendertst euwel'. The interlocutors reported that the Ducktails presence was visible in the major urban centres including Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London, Bloemfontein and Kimberly. However, the extent to which the Ducktails presence was considered disruptive varied from one area to another. The process of formulating policies was therefore subject to conflicts and shifting power relations between policy designers and rule creators. These official reports were later utilised as evidence in the projects undertaken by the IAKJ.

As mentioned earlier, the IAKJ was established as a direct result of the CTCASS's conference. This permanent body was instructed to work in conjunction with the National Bureau for Educational and Social Research who would perform an advisory role. The first major investigation that this team of 'moral entrepreneurs' and rule creators undertook was to establish the nature and extent of 'jeugwangedrag en die wenslikheid van wettiging in die verband'. Although the members of the committee were drawn from government departments, members of the NBESR were present at all of the meetings. Mr P. Grobbelaar (Department of Education, Arts and Science) headed the committee with Prof. H.J. Venter, Dr P.J. van der Walt, Prof. B.F. Nel and Prof. G. Cronje representing Universities. All of these members were prominent intellectuals based at Afrikaans medium institutions such as the University of Pretoria and UNISA. In the late 1950s, the government instructed the NBESR along with the Department of Social Welfare and the SAP to thoroughly investigate 'juvenile delinquency'. The inclusion of academics effectively elevated the findings of research projects to the status of truths that were absorbed by the public via the press.

At the same time between 1951 and 1957, the NBESR conducted their own independent research into crime with at least one study being produced and published annually. In 1964 a series of publications were released, J.D. Venter's The Incidence of Juvenile Crime in South Africa: An Analysis of the Problem based on Available Information being one of the first in the series. In the same year, J.M. Lotter's research, 'In Ekologiese Onfolding van Misdaad in Pretoria' (funded by the NBESR) was also published. Other titles included 'Die Etologie van Jeugmisdaad', 'Die Shoplifter: 'n Psychologie-Sociologiese en Psychologies-Ethologiese Studie van die Oorsake. Besondere behandelmetsodes', 'Die invoel van die rolprent en lektuur op die houdings en gedrag van Jeugdges' were also. Other influential studies, which received partial approval from the NBESR, include Dr L.F. Freed's study, Crime in South Africa: An Integralist Account and G.K. Engelbrecht's study – 'Jeugmisdaadareas en Aanvante Verskynsels in Johannesburg'. The

32 CAD, VWN, 751, SW103/4, vol. Ill, letter from Mr. J.J. Seifontein (Minister of Education, Arts and Science to the editor of the Cape Times, 11/06/1958.
34 CAD, VWN, 751, SW109/4, vol. Ill, letter from Mr. J.J. Serfontein (Minister of Education, Arts and Science to the editor of the Cape Times, 11/06/1959.
35 The NBESR (originally the National Bureau of Education) was formed by the government in 1929 with E.G. Malherbe as director. The NBESR was financed by the government and also received external funding from the American philanthropic Carnegie Corporation. See UG57-'37 and CAD, VWN, 529, SW81/6, CAD, UCD, 1773 E1139/2-E1137/4.
36 H.J. Venter (an ex-student of Cronje's) was appointed as the first lecturer and in 1960 and later became the head professor and head of the Department of Criminology at the University of Pretoria. Like Cronje, his career extended beyond the boundaries of teaching. Besides being a member of the NBESR, he was also the leader of the committee on road traffic safety and head of the Department of Coloured Affairs in Pretoria and between 1973-74, he was the mayor of Pretoria.
37 Prof. P.J. van der Walt was head of the Department of Criminology at UNISA and was also Mayor of Pretoria for two years. His academic career and particularly his studies on 'juvenile delinquency' led him to travel extensively. As a result of his research, he was selected to be a member of the American Society of Criminology.
38 Prof. Geoff Cronje played a pivotal role in the development of sociology and criminology as disciplines in South African universities. Not only was Prof. G. Cronje a prominent intellectual but he also regularly featured in government affairs and in particular in the creation of Afrikaner nationalist ideology and apartheid policies. He presented evidence at the at the 1944 F.A.K. Volkstongres on Afrikaner racial policy. He is best known for producing 'scientific' evidence that 'miscegenation led to racial decline' (see Moodie, T.D, The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976, p.248). He also contributed much to the notion of white supremacy founded on so-called scientific principles. For example, in 1935 he wrote a series of publications, which elaborated, on Apartheid theory and which were widely read (see S. Dubow, Illicit Union: Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa, Witswatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1995, p.229). A central theme in his work is the idea of racial purity and showed his abhorrence of miscegenation. These notions of the 'preservation of the white race' reverberated in his and others work on 'juvenile delinquency' in the 1950s.
39 CAD, VWN, SW103/4, Circular: Vroeggestelde Prosedure vir die ToekomsMarch, 1958.
40 A list papers were obtained in the evidence presented for the 1958 conference on juvenile delinquency, CAD, VWN, 749, SW109/4.
consequences of increased government interest in youths and of the emerging moral panic are that these anxieties infiltrated into research agendas endorsed by various university departments most notably in the disciplines of Sociology and Criminology. Criminology was a relatively new discipline within South Africa with UNISA's department taking the lead. Academics at the forefront of this new discipline gained reputations for producing 'reliable' studies on 'delinquents'.

Academics played a pivotal role in the IAKJ's first major research project on the nature and extent of youth crime and measures to control youth offenders and 'disorderly youths' particularly the Ducktails in 1958. After collecting evidence and testimony, the members of the committee submitted their findings. Amongst the plethora of 'causes of delinquency' that it identified a lack of parental control and discipline, declining moral standards, working mothers and the diminishing influence of institutions such as the church and the school were highlighted. After seven meetings, the committee made numerous proposals, which they believed would solve this national 'social problem'. They felt that it was necessary to increase the responsibility of the parents by bringing them under legislative control. They also called for measures to be introduced which would deal with youths that were not involved in crime but who were perceived as a direct threat to the 'proper functioning of society. The committee's recommendations were only considered in 1960 when the Children's Act was redesigned.

Whilst the commissions of enquiry were taking place the 'problem of youth' received increased coverage in the press. Moral guardians used certain press cuttings as 'evidence' for their inquiries. Sensational articles were translated into 'scientific knowledge'. At the same time, the discourses that members of commissions expressed were reproduced in the press and assisted in the formation of public opinions on youths. The press presented the Ducktail youth subculture as a monolithic entity which, by the mid-1950s, was equated with criminal activities and 'juvenile delinquency'. Distorted, exaggerated information written in melodramatic language was relied on. Headlines such as 'Hooliganism in the Transvaal'; 'Thieves Ravage Benoni Stores'; 'Brutality Near City Hall'; 'Bands of Youths'; 'Clean up the City's Jackals'; 'Hooligans Terrorise Dancers'; 'Youth Gangs are a Grave Threat to the City'; 'S. Suburbs Gangsterism'; 'Gangs of White Youths Beat up People'; 'Youth Crisis in Union'; 'Eenendertbendes Anti-Christelik' reflect this predisposition. The role of the press in the dissemination of truths' and in this case of moral panics is widely recognised, as Cohen notes:

The media have long operated as agents of moral indignation in their own right: even if they are not self-consciously engaged in crusading or muck-raking, their very reporting of certain 'facts' can be sufficient to generate concern, anxiety, indignation or panic. When such feelings coincide with a perception that particular values need to be protected, the preconditions for new rule creation or social problem definition are present.

The language utilised by the press to describe the ducktail phenomenon was emotional drawing on various forms of symbolism and imagery. Disease imagery featured regularly. 'Ducktailism' was compared to a 'malignant' 'social cancer' which was going to 'infect' youths throughout the country. An example of this disease imagery is found in a statement made by Rabbi Harris Swift to the Natal Mercury in 1953: 'no one reason can be found for this startling increase in the number of youths...'

Alongside the employment of symbolic and emotional language was the tendency to use inaccurate information, in particular statistics that were published frequently in the press and at times repeated in later issues. For example, in 1953, Rev H.P. Junod expressed concern at the increasing rates of 'delinquency'. He professed that about 10 000 youths are sent to prison annually. However, youths in South Africa (and especially white youths) were only sent to prison in rare cases. According to the Children's Act of 1937:

The Act sets its face against sending children of various age groups (particularly under 19 years and generally in respect of the group 19-20 years) to gaol to associate with hardened criminals.

Similarly in 1956, Dr. Bain asserted that for the period 1945-1953, convicted 'juvenile delinquents' under twenty had increased by 60 per cent and in the age group, seventeen to twenty-three had been an increase of at least 90 per cent. These figures were reproduced by most newspapers in the country and were cited extensively. However, in the age group seven to sixteen years, the rate of increase in the number of convictions in respect of all offences over the same

44Minutes of meetings of the interdepartmentele /Komitee Inlake Jeugmisdaad" in CAD, VWN, SW109/4.
46 Cohen, S., Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, Paladin, Great Britain, p. 16.
48 Rand Daily Mail, "This is Crime", 2/03/1956.
50 Kampala Conference, p. 44.
The most 'persuasive' institutions are schools, universities and the mass media. T.A. van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Sage publications, p. 112.

Anti-Social Bandits, Politics here is used according to Glaser's definition of the term which was widened to incorporate culture and ideology. R. L. Rosnow, G.A. Fine, Rumor and Gossip: The Social Psychology of hearsay, p. 17.


Pretoria News, 23.2 per cent. Where convictions did increase was for offences against the Driver's Licence Legislation (code 087). This amounted to 50 per cent of all crime committed by white 'juvenile adults' in this period. Whether Bain or the press were responsible for the inaccuracies is hard to establish. What is clear however is that this garbled data suited the press's agenda at the time and that they were at no pains to correct false impressions.

In 1958, the Pretoria News asserted that 'South Africa was facing a Youth Crisis in which the Ducktail element was a major factor.' The press gave the impression that through the adoption of Ducktail style the road to 'delinquency' was embarked upon. Mr J.A.B. van Zyl (magistrate of the Johannesburg juvenile court) maintained that a 'juvenile delinquent', is a 'youngster who won't stay at home at night'. This was based on his observations of three youths 'who stood before him in court writhing uncomfortably in their padded jackets, creeper shoes and bright socks'. The way in which moral guardians relied on stereotypes in their representations of ducktails is clear. The process of stereotyping not only serves to homogenise the individual or group that is being stereotyped but is also 'one of the major discursive strategies that ensure that differences between people are recognized.' Leyens et al argue that, 'stereotypes are shared beliefs about person attributes, usually personality traits but often also behaviours of a group of people.' In this case, a process of negative stereotyping based on erroneous assumptions and generalisations was utilised. Following Leyens et al, a stereotype is a 'category-based judgement' they 'are generalizations based on the membership to a category, i.e. beliefs that derive from the inference that all members of a given category share the same properties and are, therefore interchangeable.' By using stereotypes, members of the ducktail subculture were isolated as a specific and 'distinguishable social type' that became equated with 'delinquency' and youth crime. Although there was a criminal element to the Ducktail subculture the majority of members were not involved in crime. The adoption of the style of the Ducktails was seen as a 'symptom' and a catalyst for criminal activities. Once the phenomenon has been labelled the 'devils shape can be identified.' Stereotypes reveal much about those involved in creating the stereotype. The conservatism of moral guardians is clear in their disapproval of the ducktails.

Like stereotypes, rumours 'in retrospect can reveal much about the culture where it flourished and about the nature of truth in that culture.' Most of the rumours surrounding ducktails were initially opinion that later became 'facts'. Specious information, rumours and stereotypes were not refuted but were rather considered to represent the 'truth' as they were legitimised by 'experts' from official platforms such as government commissions and universities. As Ashforth notes:

These inquiries have sought to fashion workable schemes of policy by devising coherent schemes of legitimation - sets of principles capable of explaining the problems faced by the state and justifying, by virtue of those explanations, the actions deemed necessary for the future of the state.

The 'sets of principles', in this case, were a range of discourses utilised for understanding the ducktails whose actions were perceived as a political threat to white control in all spheres. In a sense through their rebellious actions, the nation's future on the economic, political and social level was under threat as youths are ultimately bearers of the future. It is surprising that moral guardians did not express any concern at the violence that permeated the subculture in the form of inter-gang fighting and numerous assaults of African and homosexual men. Rather these youths were perceived as a threat to the hegemonic culture's values, morality and ideologies. The discourses that will be discussed below, expressed apartheid ideologies. The institutions that 'organize[d] ideological practices' took the form of commissions of inquiry and government initiated research institutes discussed earlier. What started out as research into youths collapsed into an exploration of wider social concerns where the family, child-rearing, parenting, marriage, working mothers, religion, morality, leisure and the state of the nation itself came under question. On another level, the government was embarking on a project, which would institutionalise and set the boundaries between 'appropriate' and 'inappropriate' behaviour not only of white youths but also of whites in general. The grand murmur of morality was articulated in all of the discourses that were used to unravel the 'problem of youth'.

53 Pretoria News, "Youth Crisis in Union", 8/05/1958.
55 Stereotype analysis is closely linked with research in 'person perception which has been conducted most notably by social psychologists. For more information on this field see J. Leyens, V. Yzerbyt and G. Schadron (eds), Stereotypes and Social Cognition, Sage, London, 1994.
57 Their emphasis, J. Leyens, V. Yzerbyt and G. Schadron (eds), Stereotypes and Social Cognition, Introduction, p. 3.
58 Ibid., p. 17.
59 S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, p. 193.
62 Political here is used according to Glaser's definition of the term which was widened to incorporate culture and ideology. Anti-Social Bandits, p. 112.
Racial, Religious and Patriarchal Discourses in the Web of Morality

These multiple discourses - racial, religious, patriarchal - were intertwined with each other and entwined within the web of a grand multidisciplinary, or meta-discourse on morality. In his historiographical overview of discourse studies, Fairclough notes that discourse is socially constructed 'constituting social subjects, social relations, and systems of knowledge and belief, and the study of discourse focuses upon its constructive ideological effects.' However, in this case it seems that the reverse is true namely: that discourses are shaped by and express ideologies as opposed to constructing them. Therefore in agreement with van Dijk, 'the fundamental role of discourse' is in the 'expression of ideology as social cognition and in the reproduction of ideologies in society.' This is quite a common feature of discourses:

The expression of ideology in discourse is usually more than just an explicit or concealed display of a person's beliefs, but mostly also has a persuasive function: speakers want to change the mind of the recipients...

Whilst providing an understanding of the workings of society, ideologies also serve to 'regulate social practises' becoming more forceful when certain phenomena (resistance or rebellious behaviour for example) are encountered.

The discourses expressed Apartheid ideologies and were ardently articulated because the identities of members of the ducktail subculture were antagonistic to certain characteristics and principles espoused by the architects of Apartheid. The paper will now turn to a discussion of the 'varied discourses or discourse units' which moral guardians utilised in their explanations of 'delinquency'. The power of these discourses lay in the way in which they informed policies on youths and the way in which they became embedded in public opinion via the press.

Discourse has become a popular term within academic circles and has been used to refer to bodies of knowledge, paradigms, and thought processes. Since the 1960s discourse and 'discourse analysis' has become an interdisciplinary field drawing upon contributions from literature, philosophy and politics. However most the texts are of a philosophical and technical nature written in esoteric language which at times obscures them. Previous scholars have amply critiqued 'discourse' (as a body of 'knowledge') but it is not my intention to offer an overview or critique of 'discourse analysis' in this paper. Rather, I shall discuss discourse within the historical context of the 1950s with a view to showing how discourses on white youths expressed and reproduced elements of Apartheid ideology. Here discourse will be defined broadly to refer to a series of interrelated and overlapping discussions which embody sets of knowledge and act out relations of power. Recently these new perspectives and paradigms have influenced history. Most notably it has taken a 'linguistic turn, or, more polemically, the descent into discourse.' As Palmer warns, what needs to be avoided in utilising discourse as an analytical tool is 'the tendency to reify language, objectifying it as unmediated discourse, placing it beyond social, economic, and political relations, and in the process displacing essential structures and formations to the historical sidelines.' From this point of view, discourses cannot be studied in isolation from the historical context in which they are produced and reproduced. The discourses on white youths were in part a product of the 1950s and the ubiquitous force of social engineering that accompanied the implementation of apartheid. Due to the National Party's slim victory in 1948 (they won seventy seats whereas the United Party won sixty-five seats), their initial concern was with maintaining power. Both Posel and Lazar argue that 'Apartheid' had been a useful electoral slogan, but that it was not a practical and consistent blueprint on policy. In its attempts to consolidate power, the National Party attempted to augment its support. This entailed a policy of 'economic patronage' bestowed upon their main political constituencies - farmers, financial capitalists and the working class -. It was also in this period that aspects of Afrikaner nationalism infiltrated into all spheres of South African society. Apartheid was a doctrine that sought to dominate Africans whilst privileging all members of the white community - regardless of ethnic affiliation. The NP's rise to power therefore, afforded white South Africans, and in particular Afrikaans speaking whites, a more privileged position in the labour market and in the wider social, cultural and political spheres. Simultaneously the new government encountered a powerful resistance from the very people they were trying to repress. African nationalism adopted a policy of overt resistance visible in the defiance campaign, the freedom charter, and the congress alliance. To ensure the reproduction of this dominant position in society Apartheid ideologues could not allow a group of apolitical, 'immoral' white youths to rebel on any level.

Discourse in this paper is broadly based on a definition outlined by Burton and Carlen as, 'a discrete set of statements/knowledges/modes of knowing, that has a specific structure' which 'can be shown to derive from a set of relationships which have both discursive and extra-discursive forms and effects' that are realised as subjective effects: author, reader, object, Other and Imaginary.' F. Burton and P. Carlen, Official Discourse: On discourse analysis, government publications, ideology and the state, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, pp. 31-32.


However, it must be noted at this point that the Nationalist government did not implement all demands made by the capitalist sector. Thus the government, contrary to O'Meara, Wolpe and Legassick's argument, was not sensitive to general capitalist development. Rather, their immediate interest was satisfying its electoral base.
As stressed earlier, discourse, ‘has a special status in the reproduction of ideologies... Various properties of text and talk allow social members to actually express or formulate abstract ideological beliefs, or any other opinion related to such ideologies.’74 Discourse as discussed below, is limited to the written word where ‘sets of “intertextually” related discourses’,75 exist. In other words, there is a multiplicity of discourses expressed by different interlocutors making it increasingly difficult to distinguish where one ends and the other begins. Ideologies are ‘mapped on to different levels and dimensions of discourse, each with its own structures or strategies.’76 An attention to discourse therefore facilitates firstly a ‘social account of subjectivity by attending to the linguistic resources by which the socio-political realm is produced and reproduced’,77 and secondly an historical account of the production of knowledge on subjects such as ‘juvenile delinquency’ in the 1950s.

The way in which political values, beliefs and ideologies underlie the language used is a central element in discourse. Much can be learnt from what is not said. In this particular case, discourses reveal more about the speakers than their ‘objects’ of inquiry. Common to these discourses is the way in which youths are characterised as a ‘problem’ whose solution must be urgently sought in order to save the nation from moral degeneration and to maintain white dominance. The implication is that certain whites have moral standards and ‘Others’ do not. Using such discourses the Nationalist government and its instruments formulated what they wanted white citizens to be and how they should behave. Strategies of cognition and discourses on the ‘problem of youth’ followed a similar pattern: i) moral necessity; ii) national rhetoric; and iii) negative characteristics of Others (working mothers, youths).

One of the dominant discourses that intellectuals and government officials utilised in understanding the root causes of ‘delinquency’ was a racial one which was underpinned by notions of racism, civilisation and superiority. In South Africa race has been a principle element in shaping white identities. Surprisingly little has been written on white racial identities.78 Rather, studies on race have become synonymous with examinations of black racial identities. However, racial identities ‘are not only Black, Latino, Native American and so on: they are also white. To ignore white ethnicity is to redouble its hegemony by naturalising it.’79 Much can be learnt about race from studies produced by US labour historians and their exploration of the intersection between race and class. Wellman, for example, makes an important contribution in his call for the need to account for the ‘process through which whiteness gets invented’80 by stressing the dynamic nature of the ‘construction of whiteness’ which has ‘multiple meanings...produced by interaction between groups and ideas.’81 Racial identities are therefore socially constructed. Roediger’s work on the ‘invention of whiteness’ is illuminating due to his insistence of the social construction of race. As Teun van Dijk warns racism, ‘is not just in the streets nor the exclusive reaction of ordinary white folks in a social or economic impasse’ but it is also ‘enacted and preformulated by various elite groups and their discourses.’82 In the South African context churches, schools, the media, government legislation and intellectual traditions all played a role in shaping white identities although this has barely been explored.

This ideology of white supremacy and the negative stereotypes that accompanied it were generated to have a long and enduring history, which can be traced back to at least 1875.83 In the 1950s they were articulated in commissions of enquiry that were set up to investigate various ‘social problems’ most notably ‘juvenile delinquency’ and drug abuse facing the white community. Racial discourse expressed in this manner reveals what the government wanted white citizens to be. By expressing the importance of believing in white supremacy moral guardians and rule creators were also mobilising a national white identity, which cut across linguistic divides between English and Afrikaans speakers. Another notion that was consistently expressed was the fear of whites ‘degenerating’ into the ‘black masses’. This display of ethnocentrism, white chauvinism and overt racism underpinned this ‘construction of whiteness’. However, there are multiple types of racism, as van Dijk stresses:

racism does not consist of only white supremacist ideologies of race, or only of aggressive overt or blatant discriminatory acts, the forms of racism as it is currently understood in informal conversations, in the media, or in much of the social sciences. Racism also involves the everyday, mundane, negative opinions, attitudes, ideologies and the seemingly subtle acts and conditions of discrimination against minorities, namely, those social cognitions and social acts, processes, structures, or institutions that directly or indirectly contribute to the dominance of the white group and the subordinate position of minorities.84

---

75 Ibid., p. 195.
76 Ibid., p. 200.
78 The construction of white identities (besides those of Afrikaners) has rarely been explored. The broader aim of this project is to make a contribution towards a better understanding of white identities in South Africa.
81 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
83 V. Bickford-Smith, Ethnic Pride and Racial Prejudice.
84 T. A. van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism, p. 5.
The idea of race, latent and explicit, was consistently invoked indicating how racist ideology permeated research institutes and government commissions. This is hardly surprising since government commissions and research entities were coloured with an ethnic bias. The role of academics in these institutes gave them a rostrum to further their own areas of interest via government initiated research projects. Most of the head researchers were Afrikaans speaking and intellectually and politically supported white supremacist ideology as reflected in the discourses they used for understanding youths. The moral guardians support of such ideas reveals how individual commissioners’s areas of interest (in moral decay for example) overlapped with the government’s policing of the boundaries of white behaviour. In doing so, these moral guardians became advocates of racist doctrines through their complicity with the racist paradigm of the state. As Dubow notes:

Ideological racism may be an intellectual response to, or formulation of, popular racist sentiment. It may at the same time help to construct and maintain such attitudes. In the case of segregation and apartheid, racist ideology both reflected and grew out of already existing notions of human difference. But in helping to systematise and rationalise such assumptions, it also worked to entrench them legislatively and ideologically.

This was especially evident where the fear of racial contamination, miscegenation and the ‘threat’ of racial degeneration arose. Here the ‘reproduction of racism is essentially geared toward the maintenance of white group control’. In his remarks on the 1956 conference on juvenile delinquency Dr Bain observed:

I am glad this Conference is confined to European delinquency. Sometimes I think we spend too much time talking about the Non-European and his needs, and too little about the needs of our fellow Europeans. In any case, I feel we are talking too much about the Non-European’s rights and grievances, and too little about his obligations, his responsibilities and the many good things he enjoys and has been given by the white man.

The racist discourse was expressed in the language of morality, nationalism and leadership. Dr Bain’s comments on the necessity of combating the ‘social evil’ of ‘juvenile delinquency’ echoes this refrain:

Apart from all moral and religious consideration, the white man’s economic, social and political status in this country demand that we do everything possible to prevent moral decay undermining the white man’s leadership. If we do not we shall be committing racial suicide. For generations to come, the Europeans will continue to be the custodians of millions of our citizens now emerging into the light of new opportunities and new ways of living. And this will remain the white man’s responsibility and challenge no matter what social, economic, or other changes may occur in the meantime. But the European shall not maintain such leadership and shall have no moral claim or right to retain such leadership if they become morally decadent. The white man’s position in South Africa will be maintained not by legislation alone, although certain legislation will always be necessary, nor by force of arms, but rather by the strength and durability of his moral status. We cannot therefore allow juvenile delinquency or any other social evil to weaken that status. And we shall prevent any weakening of our nation’s moral strength only by facing up to our social evils, fairly, squarely and honestly, and by working together to remove these evils...Here as Europeans, we are all one, all South Africans, working for one common goal – the welfare of our youth, that is, for the future of South Africa we all love.

Racial discourses were expressed under the guise of a national rhetoric warning the public that a solution needed to be sought for the good of ‘our’ country otherwise the ‘white man’ would occupy subordinate positions. Dr. Bain’s comments also indicate the type of citizen which the government sought to create. It is this shaping of whiteness that has been patchily researched. White identities for them should be characterised by a high moral code and the belief in white supremacy and the nation. Most would agree that an underlying component of Apartheid ideology was Afrikaner Nationalism, which was founded on notions of the volk and groepsgebondenheid (group attachment). An individuals growth to full humanity was thought to be possible only if people identified with their nation. As Diederichs phrased it:

Mankind is not merely called to be a member of a community; it is also, and especially, called to be a member of a nation. Only through his devotion to, his love for and his service to the nation can man come to the versatile and harmonious development of his full personality...The nation is the fulfilment of the individual life.

The notion of teaching whites the importance of retaining their dominant position is clearly illustrated further in J.G. Strijdom’s admonition:

If the European loses his colour sense, he cannot remain a white man...On the basis of unity you cannot retain your colour if there is no apartheid in everyday social life, in the political sphere or whatever sphere it may be, and if there is no residential separation...South Africa can only remain a white country if we continue to see that the Europeans remain the

88 Fleisch discusses this issue for early members of the NBESR and their project on the ‘Educability of Native’.
89 S. Dubow, Illicit Union, Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa, p. 6.
90 T. A. van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism, p. 10
93 Within the literature there are debates as to whether or not this was actually neo-Calvinism. However, it is not within the scope of this paper to outline them, see H. Gilliomee and L. Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation Building, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1989.
94 H. Gilliomee & L. Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation Building, p. 44.
These examples reflect how intellectuals and public figures accepted racism and served to reproduce racist ideology into public opinion. In another example, Dr. J.H. van Eden (the major of Vereeninging) at a conference on juvenile affairs convened by the Juvenile Affairs Board, believed that:

There is little doubt that in our multi-racial society the Europeans are obsessed with the fear that our position of authority and leadership will be usurped by the far more numerous non-Europeans whose thirst for knowledge is becoming more and more apparent. That fear which is either actual or sub-conscious is understandable because we, as the more civilised section, have every right to expect to control the non-whites who are far less civilised. 92

Fears of occupying a subordinate position of power were expressed through racist imagery that drew on notions of civility. The implications were that the African majority was 'uncivilised' and incapable of effective governance. Literary devices in particular repetition stressed these negative features of the Other in this case, of the African majority. The use of rhetorical devices such as repetition also has a persuasive function. Imagery of whiteness being swamped and drowned by blacks featured regularly. For example Die Vaderland, believed that in a country where whites are surrounded by a "black sea" they could not afford to allow the youth to become useless:

Suid-Afrika met sy klein bevolking, in 'n omringende swart see, kan dit die minste van almal bekostig dat 'n deel van sy jeugdige mensmateriaal die weg van totale onberuikbaarheid bewandel. 94

By continually counterposing whites to the 'Other' the characteristics between Them (blacks) and Us (whites) are articulated. They are characterised by 'Our' 'negative mirror image...Whatever values and principles We share, They don't have them'. 99 Bipolar oppositions such as superior – inferior, respectable – not respectable, civilised – uncivilised, intelligent – stupid were relied on. Racial discourse became one of the dominant discourses utilised for explaining 'delinquent' and 'deviant' white youths. Misbehaviour was perceived as a type of degeneration into immorality that was perceived as a characteristic of black behaviour. In order to reproduce white domination the government and its moral guardians could not risk letting a group of recalcitrant, apolitical, 'immoral', 'deviant' and hedonistic youths undermine their beliefs because the future of the country and volk depended on these youths. Intertwined with their concern for the state of the nation and the importance of sustaining white superiority was their consistent questioning of morality articulated further through a religious discourse.

Moral decay was equated with 'race suicide'. In order to prevent this rigorous moralising as well as a re-assertion of Christian principles were deemed necessary. The subcommittee on the Church, at the 1956 Conference on Juvenile Delinquency, proclaimed that 'the present weakening of moral fibre results from the lack of religion in our society today. They believed that the church should 'get men to accept, religion, thereby establishing a basis for morals.' 97 They would achieve these goals further by the formation of a public morality council under the guidance of the Church. 97 Christian-Nationalist ideology was central to Apartheid and was comprised of a range of different yet interrelated ideas including Dutch neo-Calvinism and German Romanticism. The major progenitors argued that the 'Christianization' of an ethnic group enriched its national identity. Lazar notes that this principle demanded that children should love their culture, tradition and nation. The teaching of Christian principles was commonly proposed a solution to 'delinquency'. 98 Members of the NG kerk in the Transvaal denigrated docktails as 'anti-Christ'. In fact, the whole movement was labelled 'antichristelik en ateeistie'. 99

 Attempts to re-assert Christianity were initiated in August 1950 when branches of the International Child Evangelism Fellowship launched a campaign to 'reform young gangsters'. 100 Youths organised the meetings themselves, which were usually held on the streets. Members of the community also made calls for the increasing role of the Church and spiritual guidance. For example, in a letter to the Pretoria News a 'sympathetic mother', felt that:

It is time every redeemed soul should enlist in the battle against Satan and sin to save our youth in the name of Jesus Christ. Let us return to God's word, to God's remedy for sin, let every saved soul get down on our knees and weep and pray and have pity for the lost. 101

---

93 Rand Daily Mail, "Tolerance and Goodwill Should be Taught to Young South Africans", 18/06/1955.
95 T. A. van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism, p. 291.
By invoking images of Satan and demonising the ducktail subculture, this religious discourse justified policies of religious indoctrination where 'virtuous' Christian principles were imposed on aberrant white youths. In this case the 'redeemed' become proselytisers on a mission to save 'lost' souls from the perils of sin. Mr J.A. Ridder, Secretary of Social Welfare, argued that, 'Only the churches, with the backing of the resources of the state and the co-operation of parents who would themselves set a moral code of behaviour, could deter South Africa's youth from following the pattern of unruliness and contempt for authority'. He believed that increasing 'delinquency' was the 'biggest social problem of the day'. He contended that reformatories and national conferences would not solve the problem. He argued further that, 'if the boppers, ducktails and even the less blameworthy youth that crowd our public places break public sanctions and outrage public opinion, then we must ask ourselves: is our own moral standard high enough?' He then went on to argue that it is the church's duty to prevent further 'delinquency'. Christianity was seen as the most effective means for inculcating youths with a more appropriate morality.

Besides advocating an increased role for the Church and a re-assertion of Christian virtues, the structure of the family was also questioned in which parents and particularly working mother's were sharply criticised for their poor skills of child-rearing. Parallel to the religious and racist discourses was a patriarchal discourse. Numerous calls were made to confine the activities of women in the domestic realm. This patriarchal discourse was not exclusively held by men who wanted to re-establish patriarchal control over women. Rather, this 'the cult of domesticity was a crucial, if concealed, dimension of male as well as female identities – shifting and unstable as these were – and an indispensable element both of the industrial market and the imperial enterprise.' For example, a woman made one of the earliest calls for an enforcement of patriarchy. In her paper, presented at the Conference on Alcoholism in 1951, Gael Fraser argued that, A mother's place is in the home! No woman, with young children should be allowed to leave her under twelve year old children in order to go out to work to supplement the home budget! These unfortunate youngsters are left in the charge of irresponsible native or coloured servants, or more frequently left to fend for themselves. These children become uncouth, slovenly, foul-tongued brats. These "motherless" children have no one to supervise them during their playing hours and thus the delinquent is born.

At the centre of this patriarchal discourse was the 'cult of domesticity' in which it was believed that a woman's place was in the home. 'If they went out to work they were considered to risk moral corruption.' Instead, they were expected to stay at home and confine themselves to domestic duties thereby fulfilling the roles of wifehood and motherhood. For N.M.J. van Rensburg the role of women as wives had altered:

Lewe ons vroue vandag nog soos dit Christenvroue betaam? Gehoorzaam hulle hul mans, en gedra hulle soos 'n hulp vir die man? Nee op elke gebied in die lewe ding hulle met die man mee, en in menige huis is die man die hulp, en die vrou reger en verdryf die man as't ware met haar manneljiesagtheid. Elke vrou moet haar wetregen onderdanig wees. Die Here beveel dit en dit moet so wees...Die fout is in die ouerhuis en wel in die sin dat die Woord van God nie meer die rigsnor is nie. The disapproval of mothers working was in response to the increased independence that women enjoyed during the World War Two. As noted by Hyslop, the newly found independence of women weakened patriarchal authority. Working mothers (and fathers to an extent) encountered a range of problems when balancing the role of motherhood and work. One such problem was that after-care facilities, such as nursery schools and crèches, were not only scarce but also expensive. One way of alleviating the difficulties of balancing work and parenting was to place children in the care of domestic workers. However, this practice was also sharply criticised. For example, in a letter to the editor of the Argus "Vigilant of Constantia" maintained that, the wife took on a full-time job and 'no one cares for the children, except, perhaps, a Native maid. That is problem one. Problem two is the example set by the parents.' Once again a woman also supported such arguments, Thelma Brown contended that mothers:

...cannot get out to work quickly enough, leaving their children in the hands of incompetent Natives whose intellectual abilities and mental development are considered far below the standard of their superior masters...we are creating in our midst a ruthless mob who will eventually cause of a reign of terror among respectable citizens. We face a problem; we parents must now try to train our children ourselves - not leave them to the willy-nilly care of Natives at home, nor thrust our responsibility on our overworked schools. The onus of our children will fall mainly on the mother. This is her job – not

102 The Cape Argus, "Juvenile Delinquency is the responsibility of the churches, says high welfare official", 29/01/1958.

103 A. McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, gender and sexuality in the colonial context, Great Britain, 1995, Routledge, p. 5

104 Another interesting theme to explore is the overt racism expressed by the wider public when dealing with delinquency. In addition, the above quote highlights the phobias that emerged due to changes in the structure and roles within the family. This is another area which needs further research but what must be emphasised that the moral panic surrounding the Ducktails was not simply due to increases in youth crime but also about the changing roles of women in society. CAD, VWN, SW17/18, paper on alcoholism submitted by Gael Fraser as evidence for the 1951 Conference on alcohol abuse.


108 The Cape Argus, "When Adults live in a whirl of excitement Juveniles suffer", 26/03/1956.
the job in an office or shop which pays a few pounds, but the greatest job of all times, paying us dividends by creating healthy-minded, sensible citizens of the future."\textsuperscript{109}

Notions of us ('Europeans') versus them ('natives') were invoked yet again by using bipolar oppositions such as superior-inferior, respectable-indescent, skilled-unskilled. Here racial and patriarchal discourses are intertwined characterising the 'native' as 'inferior' and 'stupid'. McClintock's observations of colonial society ring true for post World war Two South Africa. She argues that the:

"invention of race...became central not only to the self-definition of the middle class but also to the policing of the "dangerous classes": the working class, the Irish, Jews, prostitutes, feminists, gays and lesbians, criminals, the militant crowd and so on.\textsuperscript{110}

Consequently in 1955, Mr G.F. Olivier, Chief Government Social Welfare and Probation Officer for Johannesburg advocated the compulsory supervision of children after school hours as a solution to increasing "delinquency."\textsuperscript{111}

Similarly, Mr J.A. de Ridder (the Secretary for Social Welfare) believed that the primary cause of delinquency was "the disruption of the family, especially when the mother is out of the home for the greater part of the day". According to the \textit{Rand Daily Mail} this was sanctioned by the report that there is "little delinquency in smaller towns and none at all on the farms, where mothers are usually at home."\textsuperscript{112} Mr. R. Whiteford principal of the South African College High School believed that, 'the danger of juvenile delinquency lies in the more prosperous families in which the mother is away from home all day.'\textsuperscript{113} The criticisms of women and mothers working resulted in a commission of enquiry under Prof. Geoff Cronje.\textsuperscript{114}

By 1956 this patriarchal discourse manifested itself into an intensified opposition to mothers working when calls were made to legally confine women in the home as it was believed that the 'mother at home is the basis of the emotional stability of the child'\textsuperscript{115}. At the 1956 Johannesburg conference on Juvenile Delinquency, the subcommittee on the home, chaired by Mr J.H. Coetzee, suggested that:

a) Attempts should be made to reduce financial disabilities as far as possible so that mothers are not forced to go out and work
b) Mothers should be encouraged to stay at home during the first six years of her child's life.
c) Married women should not work in the afternoons and non-working mothers should not leave their children uncared for in the afternoons, when children are home from school.\textsuperscript{116}

The education subcommittee, likewise, proposed that the 'adequate family allowances' be introduced 'to allow the wives of wage earners in the lower income groups to remain with their children.'\textsuperscript{117} This condemnation of working mothers reflects the government and their moral guardian’s attempts to enforce patriarchal control more strictly in order to sustain the structure of the 'ideal' family in which the male would function as the breadwinner. Wife-hood and motherhood were portrayed as the supreme virtues of women.

The patriarchal discourse reverberated further into the field of marriage and parenting. The subcommittee on the 'home' felt that prospective marriage partners should be trained in relationships and child rearing. It was further recommended that ministers be given the power to prevent couples from getting married if they were not adequately prepared and that measures to make divorce more difficult be introduced. Calls were also made to punish and treat 'defaulting parents', as it was believed that 'parents are the most important cause of the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency.'\textsuperscript{118} Similarly, the Port Elizabeth committee resolved that married couples should be trained in the methods of child rearing in order to discipline their children in the 'habits of self-control, courtesy, obedience and proper behaviour'.\textsuperscript{119} They also called for churches, schools and welfare societies to 'use their influence to arouse the consciences of parents to the vital necessity of bringing up their children in the proper manner.'\textsuperscript{120}

Academics also held similar views regarding parenting. For example, Prof. B.F. Nel (director of the Child Guidance Clinic in Pretoria) blamed "the modern parent for the ducktail problem in South Africa." He believed that present day

\textsuperscript{109} The Star, "Parents blamed for acts of hooliganism by their children", 14/09/1951.
\textsuperscript{110} A. McClintock, \textit{Imperial leather Race, gender and sexuality in the colonial context}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{111} The Star, "Get Children off the Streets, says Welfare Chief", 12/05/1955.
\textsuperscript{112} Rand Daily Mail, "Don't Blame the Parents", 14/09/1958.
\textsuperscript{113} The Cape Argus, "The Parent of Delinquency", 15/05/1959.
\textsuperscript{115} CAD, VWN, 2510, SWC74, letter from C.M. Anderson secretary of the Port Elizabeth Committee for Combating Juvenile Delinquency to the Secretary for Justice, 24/10/1956.
\textsuperscript{116} CAD, VWN, 2510, SWC74, letter from C.M. Anderson secretary of the Port Elizabeth Committee for Combating Juvenile Delinquency to the Secretary for Justice, 24/10/1956.
parents needed to be educated, especially in spiritual guidance - first before the problem is solved.\textsuperscript{121} Dr D.G. Steyn (of the Department of Sociology at the University of Pretoria) in an address to the Bond van Dieneresse van die N.G. Kerk gemonste in Pretoria, believed that parents must take the blame for delinquency:

\textit{Aan ouers is sekere pligte opgedra en sekere eise word aan hulle gestel. As hulle dit versaak, kom wangedrag by die kinders voor... die gesin volledig met vader en moeder moet wees. Die ouers moet geestelik-en liggaamlik-volwaardig wees en die regte peil van opvoeding, sedelikheid en godsdiens be.}\textsuperscript{122}

A Johannesburg QC felt that a wider interpretation of the Children's Act be employed to force parents to be responsible for their children's 'delinquency'.\textsuperscript{123} In a similar vein Mr W.R. Retief (a probation officer of the Department of Social Welfare), at a meeting of parents and teachers in Johannesburg, felt that it was the parents duty to alleviate the national problem of delinquency. He argued that a constructive approach was, 'the marriage guidance movement' which could become 'a powerful factor in training young people for proper parenthood.'\textsuperscript{124} On the fourth of April in the senate Mr. Serfontein (minister of Social Welfare) maintained that, 'juvenile delinquency was regarded as a serious problem, not only by his department but by the government.' He suggested that jail sentences be imposed on negligent parents, tightening up of reformatory conditions and the extension of Social Welfare services.\textsuperscript{125} In March 1958, Minister of Justice Mr Swart requested that parliament approve a recent piece of legislation which gave extra powers to the police to arraign delinquents before a magistrate. Thereafter the parents would be called in to take some of the responsibility. If parents could not control their children then they would be placed in some sort of battalion or institution.\textsuperscript{126}

By collapsing into discussions on parenting, child rearing, marriage and working mothers, it is clear that moral guardians used 'juvenile delinquency' as a metaphor for exploring more widely perceived social fears. The moral panic was raised to new heights through the formulation of a range of discourses enmeshed in the web of a grand discourse on morality. Common to all discourses was an argument that attempted to convince the public that the 'problem of youth' was a moral one. Morals discourse lead to an investigation of popular culture, leisure and entertainment. Morality for Hunt is a collection of ideas that evaluate human actions and, on the basis of its evaluation of these acts, also evaluates the agents who do them.\textsuperscript{127} In this case, it was argued that places of entertainment bred immorality and members of the subculture that frequented these places were branded as immoral, criminal and dangerous. Entertainment (especially unsupervised entertainment) has always been of great concern for the government and parents. However, in the 1950s these anxieties increased due to the expansion of popular culture visible in the establishment of new forms of entertainment. Early complaints were articulated in August 1937 when the Provincial Consultative Committee expressed concern at 'the problem of 'Pin Tables' and similar automatic machines.'\textsuperscript{128} They believed that:

\begin{quote}
The government is therefore urged to introduce legislation to prohibit the manufacture, import and use of machines in the Union, as in the opinion of the Board such gambling machines are detrimental to the moral welfare of the young.\textsuperscript{129}
\end{quote}

Many other forms of entertainment were considered to be 'dangerous' to the moral standards of youths. These included films and places of entertainment such as the bioscope, and fashion trends. For example, in 1950, the prosecutor of the Pretoria Juvenile Court informed a reporter of the Star that 'in most of the cases that came before the court, the motives for the crimes were not material gain but rather the emulation of gangster methods shown in the cinemas.'\textsuperscript{130} Likewise in 1953 Rev. H.P. Junod claimed at a meeting of the Pretoria Nursery School Society, that, 'another great cause was the provocation of youth by the immoral, pornographic and nerve racking influence of the cinema, cheap literature and detailed press reports of crime.'\textsuperscript{131} Films and frequenting the cinema was isolated, by moral guardians, as a principle cause for African 'delinquency' (in the form of tsotsis) in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{132} In the same period in the United States of America, the media was identified as a cause youth crime. For example, Alastair Buchan (a reporter) contended that, 'the most potent cause is the deification of violence and crime through the radio, television and the cinema.'\textsuperscript{133} Similar concerns at youth's 'misspent free time' were expressed at Dr Bain's 1956 conference. They concluded that the

\begin{footnotes}
\item [122] Die Transvaler, 'Groot Inkomste en Baie Geleenheid Waarborg nie kind se Opvoeding', 12/08/1959.
\item [123] The Star, "Action Against Delinquents would bring home the responsibility to parents", 12/08/1955.
\item [124] Rand Daily Mail, "Juvenile Crime and Vice 'well-organised business' in City", 28/02/1956.
\item [125] The Star, Minister says delinquency is task for the State, Church and the community", 19/04/1956, Die Burger, "Jeugmisdaade deur Eerste Minister Censorsoek, 31/05/1956.
\item [127] This definition is based on Hunt's explanation of Nietzsche's 
\item [129] BNS 624 7/8/85 - 14/8/85, Provincial Consultative Committee: Gambling. Facilities in Cafes: Prohibition Letter to Secretary of Education from Secretary of Justice.
\item [132] The Star, "Films have great influence on the Tsotsi gangs", 27/04/1953.
\end{footnotes}
frequenting of bioscopes, café-bioscopes, billiard rooms, roadhouses and dance halls was ‘immoral’ and ‘unconstructive’.

This moral discourse was the driving force that sustained and propelled the moral panic over youths in the 1950s. As a whole the panic served to "clarify where the important but temporarily obscured borderline between right and wrong, between permitted and not permitted, should be drawn." Although youths were at the centre of this moral panic the behaviour of white adults was also questioned. Each of the discourses explicitly expressed an underlying concern that white working mothers and rebellious youths were crossing the boundary and degenerating into immorality. In this period immorality was clearly equated with racist notions on the ‘Native’. From this, it seems that moral panics set and policed the boundaries defining ‘whiteness’. Through the role played by moral guardians it seems that such panics are ‘not only a matter of societal, cultural, and moral boundaries but also of those involved in one’s own identity; perhaps one not only attempts to establish power over others but also over forces within oneself. The forcefulness of the panics and the vehemence of the actors indicate that the conflicts involved are very deep.'

Power therefore played a central role in this moral panic, it ‘traverses and produces things...forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body.'

Power, Knowledge, Truth: Effects of Discourse
The power of these interrelated and overlapping discourses is in the effects that were produced because they were widely circulated. Firstly, as discussed earlier they served to express and reproduce apartheid ideologies. Secondly, they were transmitted to the public via the press. Thirdly, they were raised to the level of truths that constituted a new body of knowledge on juvenile delinquency. Thereafter this knowledge was utilised in the process of amending existing legislation and transforming policies on youth. This was not a smooth process. The research conducted into youth extended over a period of five years and was only incorporated into legislation in 1960. Even though these discourses were founded on fallacious and at times garbled data they were accorded truth values as they were articulated by ‘experts’ and produced within the interstices of official and well respected institutions. As Foucault explains:

Each society has its regime of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

Similarly, Leps argues

the truth of a period corresponds not to the closest perception of a primary reality, but rather to the sets of information which, having been legitimized by institutions, organize the mode of being, the social arrangement, the historic reality of people and products. Thus, power is not a thing one can acquire or maintain by force, or at least, not by force alone; rather, power is both the result and the support of a complex system of production and distribution of knowledge which, one in circulation, acquires a truth value placing it in a position of domination...

As will be discussed below the discourses on youths fed into a new type of knowledge on delinquency and were later included in legislative amendments most notably to the Children’s Act. In such instances, ‘knowledge of other people’ becomes ‘an instrument of power over other people.’ This leads to yet another question, namely ‘whom does discourse serve?’ In this case, the discourses served the interests of the government and their moral guardians. The result was the transformation of the juvenile justice system, the shutting down of cinemas, campaigns to popularise Boy Scouts, Voortrekkers, Girl Guides, the initiation of Church Lad’s Brigades, increased regulation and the surveillance of youths’ behaviour by ghost squads and commissions. On a more subtle level, the state was formulating their vision of what they considered appropriate white behaviour to encapsulate. When considering the range of discourses mobilised for understanding the ‘problem’ of youth and the preventative methods and solutions imposed to curtail the outbreak of similar activities it is quite clear that these new modes of punishment functioned as ‘a political tactic’. The legislative modifications introduced by the government also reveal the state’s fluctuating positions of power which enabled them to develop, ‘power techniques orientated towards individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way.’

134 U. Boethius, ‘Youth, the media and moral panics’, in J. Fomas and G. Bolin (eds), Youth Culture in Late Modernity, Sage, London, 1995, p. 44.
135 Ibid.; p. 50.
137 Ibid.; p. 131.
138 M. Leps, Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of Deviance in Nineteenth Century Discourse, p. 4.
139 T. A. van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism, 1959, p. 156.
141 In Discipline and Punish Foucault stresses, that punishment must be seen as a ‘political tactic’. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan, 1979.
Most of the proposed solutions to solve the problem of youth were incorporated into the Children’s Act (no 33) of 1960. Under the revised provisions, a child was considered to be under the age of eighteen and not twenty-one as declared previously. This would give the justice system more power to deal harshly with youths over eighteen. A ‘child in need of care’ included children who suffered from ‘geestelike verwaarlozing’. When read in conjunction with Article 26 a ‘polisiebeampte of proefbeampte nou ook so ‘n van enige plek na ‘n veiligheidsplek bring om uiteindelik ‘n ondersoek na sy songbehoevendheid te laat hou’. Additionally, the responsibility of the parents was legally enforced. According to Article 31 a children’s court ‘ook nou gelaas dat ‘n kind se ouer of voog moet voldoen aan sodanige voorgeskrewe vereistes as wat die hof mag bepaal by gebreke waarvan hy gestraf kan word.’ The Minister of Justice believed that through these amendments ‘ledige en losbandig’ children including the ‘soegenaamde eendsterte’ would be controlled.\footnote{CAD, SAP, 476, 2/9/50, vol. I, Memorandum from the Minister of Justice to the Commissioner of Police regarding "jeugwangedrag", 24/09/1960.}

It was also in the 1960s that white boys were forced to undertake military training through the passing of the Defence Act of 1957. The defence act declared that, ‘all medically fit white male citizens of South Africa are liable to be called up to do National service in the year in which they turn eighteen’. It must be stressed that all white males (citizens or not) who resided in South Africa for five years were legally required to complete national service for twelve months or be sentenced to detention for 18 months.

The government believed that with these new measures in place, ‘delinquency’ would decrease and the ducktails would effectively be eliminated. The permanent committee would monitor the behaviour of youth: \textit{Interdepartmental Kommitee Insafe Jeugmisdaad}. The Committee’s work had been suspended to resolve the debate surrounding who the Committee should report to. The Interdepartmental Committee on Rehabilitation Services (the Gauche Committee) eventually recommended, in 1964, that it should be the responsibility of the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions. The committee resumed its duties of monitoring the behaviour of youths and children again in 1964.\footnote{CAD, VVN, 750, SW109/4, vol. II, Memorandum, 1964.}

The control of white youths, their identities and behaviour was part of the National Party’s wider projects: of the shaping of whiteness, social engineering, and the reproduction of white domination. The latter was related to another project that sought to bolster their support by lowering the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen. According to Lazar, this issue had been on the government’s agenda between 1953-58, but was only legislated in 1958 after the election of that year. The objective was to gain more votes. In 1955 it was estimated that 127 400 eligible voters were between eighteen and twenty.\footnote{J. Lazar, "Conformity and Control", p. 65} Thus, there was a strong need for the government to persuade recalcitrant youths to conform to their vision of appropriate white behaviour. The Ducktail’s hedonism, apolitical attitudes, anti-work ethic, disrespect for law, property, rejection of education and upward social mobility had to be contained and white youths were urged to conform in order to reproduce the government’s vision of white domination.

Conclusion

The ducktail subculture ignited real and imagined fears into the government and other moral guardians. The violent dimension of the subculture was never raised as a point of concern for moral guardians. Rather, they were concerned with the ‘immoral’ behaviour of youths. Their responses were based on distortions, stereotypes and rumours that resulted in the unfolding of a moral panic from government commissions, academic texts and the press. The racial, religious and patriarchal discourses (intertwined in the consistent theme of morality) used for an understanding of these youths led to a questioning of the status of working mothers, parenting, child rearing, religion, morality and the state of the nation. Discourses in this case were produced within the historical context of the National Party’s wider policy of social engineering. They also expressed and reproduced dimensions of Apartheid ideologies. The effect of these discourses is the way in which they were translated into truths and constituted a body of knowledge on juvenile delinquency that later transformed legislation and led to the establishment of a permanent committee set up to monitor the behaviour of white youths. Additionally the government’s attempts to shape white identities into being conformist, nationalist, law abiding citizens who valued the very principles of apartheid ideologies – morality, Christian-Nationalism and white superiority is revealed. From this it is evident that in the 1950s white youths were treated as a key indicator of the state of the nation itself: it is expected to reflect the cycle of booms and troughs in the economy; shifts in cultural values over sexuality, morality and family life; and changes in class relations, concepts of nationhood, and in occupational structures. Young people are assumed to hold the key to the nation’s future, and the treatment and management of ‘youth’ is expected to provide the solution to a nation’s ‘problems’, from ‘drug abuse’, ‘Hooliganism’ and ‘teenage pregnancy’ to inner city ‘riots’. The everyday operations of international capitalism or patriarchal power relations are seldom represented as the source of such ‘social problems’.\footnote{C. Griffin, \textit{Representations of Youth}, pp. 9 – 10.}