Title: The Pogo Insurrection.

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This paper is about one of the least successful of South Africa's revolutionary movements. Several thousand Poqo insurrectionists were arrested during the course of the 1960s. The vast majority of these were detained and convicted before they had had a chance to strike a single blow. Fewer than thirty deaths can be attributed to the activities of Poqo adherents of whom nearly the same number were sentenced to death in South African courts. The history of the Poqo uprisings is a history without a climax. Its final act takes place in the courtrooms not the barricades. Perhaps for this reason the Poqo story has lacked a chronicler. This paper is an attempt to compensate for the perfunctory treatment Poqo has received from historians. It provides a narrative of Poqo's development and a description of its social following. It then attempts to assess Poqo's historical significance.

After the Sharpeville crisis and a confused period during which African politicians adjusted to new conditions of illegality a variety of insurgent organisations emerged. Of these the two most important were those linked to the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC). These were both dedicated to revolutionary transformations of society and were both prepared to employ violent measures to attain this but there the similarity between them ended. The PAC-oriented 'Poqo' movement and the ANC's military wing 'Umkhonto we Sizwe' reflected in their divergent strategies the fundamental ideological and strategic differences which had led to the fission in African resistance politics in the 1950s. As well as this the PAC insurgents were very much more numerous than the Umkhonto activists. Whilst the latter operated as an elite within the framework of a larger clandestine and sometimes less committed 'support organisation' the Poqo insurgency in certain localities attained the dimensions of a mass movement. Reaching the peak of its influence in 1963, the Poqo movement was still capable three years later of inspiring violent conspiracies: in 1966 in the Eastern Cape alone, 85 men accused of PAC activity were convicted in six trials. In terms of its geographical extensiveness, the numbers involved and its timespan, the Poqo conspiracies of 1962-1968 represent the largest and most sustained African insurrectionary movement since the inception of modern African political organisations in South Africa.

The word 'Poqo' is a Xhosa expression meaning 'alone' or 'pure'. The earliest known usage of the word in the context of a separatist organisation occurred when the Ethiopianist Church of South Africa was established. Its members would describe themselves as: 'Ndinum Topiya Poqo' (belonging to the Church of Ethiopia). The word was used sometimes in the Western Cape in 1960 as a slogan by PAC members to describe the character of their organisation in contrast to the multiracial dimension of the Congress Alliance. Leaflets allegedly circulated by PAC activists in Port Elizabeth in May 1961 opposing the ANC's call for a stay-away in protest against the government's proclamation of a republic bore the legend: 'May demos a fraud, Poqo, Poqo, Poqo'. The authorities and the press tended to employ the term to describe all PAC-connected conspiracies though only PAC supporters in
the Cape identified themselves as Poqo members at first. Here, for the sake of simplicity, the state's usage of the term will be followed, though, as will become clear, different regional concentrations of PAC/Poqo affinity had quite distinct social characteristics. The first moves towards the formation of a violent organisation came in the Western Cape and it is here that the narrative will begin.

The Western Cape, and in particular the Cape Peninsula, had been one of the areas of strongest support for the PAC. This could be related to the particularly fierce effects of influx control in the Cape Peninsula, the 'repatriation' of women and children to the Transkei, the refusal of the authorities to construct adequate housing and sharply deteriorating living conditions. In addition, in the early 1960s the imposition of Bantu Authorities and land rehabilitation measures in the Transkei also influenced the political responses of Africans in the Cape Peninsula and its hinterland. The Pan-Africanist Congress's rhetorical militancy, the incorporation into its ideology of themes drawn from traditions of primary resistance, and the immediacy of its strategic objectives made it especially attractive to the increasingly large migrant worker population of Cape Town. The Pan Africanists found an important section of their following in the 'bachelor zones' of Langa. However, of the thirty-one PAC leaders who were subsequently put on trial in Cape Town after the 1960 pass campaign, only seven men were from the migrant workers' hostels in Langa and Nyanga. Unfortunately, the trial documentation only contains full details of the backgrounds of a few of the leaders: they included a herbalist, a dry cleaning examiner, a domestic servant, a university student, a tailor and a farmworker and their ages ranged from twenty two to fifty five (the majority of the accused were over thirty). At least seven were former members of the ANC and one had once belonged to the Communist Party. The evidence suggests a not altogether surprising social pattern: a political movement with a large following amongst migrant workers, but with positions of responsibility held by men with at least some education, work skills and political experience.

During the 1960 pass campaign as well as before and after it, there was considerable contact between the local Pan Africanist leaders and members of the multiracial Liberal Party. This was despite frequent attacks on white radicals who had been associated with the Congress movement. Local Liberals were seeking a mass base and though wary of the racialist undertones of Pan-Africanist ideology, they sympathised with and were attracted by the PAC's hostility to left wing influences within the Congress movement. Cape Town PAC leaders, whatever their private feelings about the Liberals, were glad to accept offers of assistance that appeared to be without strings, and allowed certain Liberals to play an important intermediary role between them and the authorities during the 1960 troubles in Cape Town. Whereas this relationship had certain advantages at the time, it did have the effect of isolating the leaders from rank and file membership as well as the large informal following the campaign generated.

In the months following the crisis of March-April 1960, this gulf between leaders and followers was to widen and take on a factional form. Some of the main leaders, including Philip Kgosana, jumped bail and left the country towards the end of 1960. This considerably weak-
state witness evidence in a trial involving a member of Tshongayi's cell, there was an unsuccessful meeting to recruit people on a farm near Somerset West in February 1961. More successful in this context apparently was the establishment of a Poqo cell on a farm at Stellenbosch in October 1961 after a visit by three Poqo men from Cape Town. A Poqo group was active between March 1962 and April 1963 on a farm in the Elgin District.

Poqo's message was stated in simple direct terms. In December 1961 a leaflet in Xhosa was picked up in Nyanga. It read:

We are starting again Africans ... we die once. Africa will be free on January 1st. The white people shall suffer, the black people will rule. Freedom comes after bloodshed. Poqo has started. It needs a real man. The Youth has weapons so you need not be afraid. The PAC says this.

Sometimes the message was more specific: farm workers were told that Poqo intended to take the land away from whites and give it to Africans. Men in Wellington were told that one day they must throw away their passes and take over the houses of the whites. All who did not join Poqo would be killed along 'with the white bosses'. Men in Paarl were told there was no need for whites; the factories and the industries would carry on as usual, for was it not the black people who worked in them? Chiefs should be killed, for it was they who were responsible for the endorsement-out of Africans from the Western Cape. Sometimes Poqo members giving evidence would repeat some of the old PAC slogans - from Cape to Cairo, from Morocco to Madagascar, but often witnesses would claim that they knew nothing of the ANC or PAC. This may have been prompted by caution on their part, but what is noticeable is that many of the distinctive attributes of PAC speeches given at a popular level had disappeared: there were no references to Pan Africanism, communism or socialism and no careful clarifications of the movement's attitude with regard to the position of racial minorities. Ideological statements had been boiled down to a set of slogans: 'We must stand alone in our land'; 'Freedom - to stand alone and not be suppressed by whites'; 'amaAfrica Poqo; 'Izwe Lethu' (our land).

Poqo's lack of a 'political theory', the brutal simplicity of its catchphrases, the absence of any social programme save for the destruction of the present order and its replacement with its inversion in which white would be black, and black would be white, all this has helped to diminish its importance in the historiography of South African resistance movements. But because the slogans were simple does not mean that they were banal: they evoked a profound response from men who had been forced off the land, whose families were being subjected to every form of official harassment, as well as economic deprivation, who perceived every relationship with authority in terms of conflict: whether at the workplace, in the compound, or in the reserve. These were men who had no place to turn to. And hence the all-embracing nature of the movement's preoccupations, its social exclusiveness, and its urgency. The undertone of millenarianism, the concept of the sudden dawning of a juster era, the moral implications of the word 'poqo' (pure) - these are not surprising. For here was a group of men who were simultaneously conscious both of the destruction
that was being wreaked upon their old social world, and the hopelessness of the terms being offered to them by the new order.

The strategy of a general uprising logically developed from this vision. The twenty-one farmworkers of Stellenbosch put on trial in June 1962 were found guilty on a number of charges which included making preparations to attack a farm manager and his family, to burn the farm buildings and then to march to the town firing buildings on the way. For weapons the men sharpened old car springs into pangas.\(^\text{37}\) The initiative for this strategy was probably a local one: most of the national PAC leadership was in prison in 1961 and early 1962 and had only fully regrouped in Maseru in August 1962.\(^\text{38}\) But by late 1962, judging from the evidence of men involved in the Poqo attack at Paarl, Poqo members were conscious of a plan for a nationally co-ordinated insurrection, the directives for which would come from above.\(^\text{39}\) In March 1963, Potlakte Leballo, the PAC's acting president, told a journalist that he was in touch with Western Cape and other regional leaders.\(^\text{40}\) Despite this co-ordination of the Congress, there is a strong case for asserting that the insurrectionary impetus came initially from below and, as I have argued, can be directly related to the social situation of Poqo's local leaders and their followers. Certainly the violent impetus developed much earlier in PAC groups in the Western Cape than elsewhere, the first attacks on policemen or their informers beginning in Paarl in April 1961 and in Langa in April the following year. Before the end of 1962 several groups had travelled from the Langa migrant workers' quarters to the Transkei in efforts to kill the Emigrant Tembu paramount chief, Kaiser Mantazima and a full scale insurrection had taken place in the small Boland town of Paarl.

While the Western Cape Poqo cells had an internal dynamic and momentum of their own, elsewhere the movement, more systematically structured and more hierarchical than in the Western Cape, was motivated less by local causes of social tension and more by the strategic conception of those members of the PAC's national executive who remained at liberty or who had been released from prison. Partly for this reason it was less effective. Initially, with most of the main leaders in prison there were few signs of PAC activity. With the end of the emergency in August 1960 some important PAC men who had been detained along with Congress Alliance people were released. In particular, two Evatone leaders, both on the National Executive, were once again at liberty.\(^\text{41}\) One of them, Z B Molete, was delegated the task of presiding over the underground organisation while the other office-bearers were in prison, and he together with Joe Molefi, began reviving branches.

The first indications of the re-establishment of an operating PAC leadership was the circulation of a typewritten leaflet in September in the Transkei with the heading 'A Call to PAC Leaders'. The leaflet instructed PAC branches to divide into small units, cells. Branch leaders were instructed to establish contact with the national and regional executives in Johannesburg. Finally, the leaflet exhorted PAC members to 'prepare for mass disciplined action', for a 'final decisive phase' with the object of 'total abolition of the pass laws'. \(^\text{42}\) Obviously the leaflet's authors were still thinking of continuing the pre-Sharpeville strategy of mass civil disobedience. There was no explicit indication in the leaflet of the possibility of violence. That Molete and his colleagues did not at this stage share the insurrec-
tionary disposition which was developing in the Cape is also signified by their initial willingness to participate in the Orlando Consultative Conference of December 1961.

The Orlando Conference was prompted by a suggestion from the Interdenominational African Minister's Federation. Attending the meeting were representatives from the ANC and the PAC, as well as leading African members of the Liberal and Progressive Parties. At the insistence of PAC spokesmen whites and coloured were excluded. After several speeches, including an address by B Molete on 'The Struggle against the Pass Laws', the meeting resolved in favour of political unity, non-violent pressures against apartheid, non-racial democracy, and the calling of an 'All-in Conference representative of African people' to agitate for a national constitutional convention. A continuation committee under the chairmanship of Jordan Ngubane, a former Youth Leaguer and a member of the Liberal Party, was elected.

The work of this continuation committee was soon over-shadowed by conflict between the Liberals and the PAC on the one hand and the ANC on the other. Ngubane claimed that the ANC with financial assistance from the South African Communist Party worked to control the committee and the All-in Conference. Without consulting other committee members ANC people drafted publicity for the Conference to ensure its pro-Congress character. Though Ngubane's accusations were probably somewhat exaggerated it is likely that neither the PAC nor the ANC had a particularly sincere concern for unity, not if this required making concessions to the other side. By mid-March the PAC men and Ngubane had resigned from the continuation committee and the All-in Conference held in Pietermaritzburg on the 25th and 26th March, was, despite the attendance of delegates from 140 organisations, a characteristically Congress affair. Among the 1,400 participants were whites, coloureds and Indians from the allied organisations. Traditional ANC rhetoric, songs and slogans predominated. The highlight of the event was the appearance of a recently unbanned Nelson Mandela, who made his first public speech since 1952. In his address Mandela announced the first phase of the campaign for a national convention which would take the form of a three-day stay-at-home, the last day of which would coincide with South Africa's proclamation of a republic on May 31st. Preparations for the strike would include an ultimatum to the Government to call a convention.

At the time of the Orlando Conference it seems likely that the PAC leaders at liberty did not have a very clear conception of the future role of their organisation. Hence their somewhat unrealistic adherence to the concept of a pass campaign which required forms of mobilisation unsuited to the operation of a clandestine movement. That they were initially willing to participate in the Orlando Conference and the continuation committee established in its wake was another indication of their confusion. Their withdrawal from the committee was prompted apparently by a message from their imprisoned colleagues brought to them by Matthew Nkoana, a national executive member who was released early as a result of his fine being paid. Nkoana left prison with 'instructions to crush moves to unity'. Immediately he took the leadership out of the hands of Molete who, as he put it, was 'suffering from indecision' and rejected an initiative from Mandela to participate in the organisation of the anti-republic protest:
By late 1962 the headquarters of the movement had been transferred from its rather precarious situation on the Witwatersrand to Maseru. Potlake Leballo had arrived in August and armed with the authority of a letter from Robert Sobukwe, established a 'Presidential Council' with himself as Acting Chairman. From this point preparations for a popular insurrection began in earnest. But before examining these let us first look at the nature and the scope of the PAC's organisation and support that had developed by the beginning of 1963.

There are two main sources of information on the size and location of the PAC's organisation. These are firstly the often grandiose claims made by the PAC leaders themselves and secondly the evidence emerging from court cases. The former provide a rather exaggerated impression of PAC strength while in the case of the latter the evidence is incomplete. Despite the unsatisfactory quality of the evidence it is possible to reconstruct from it a picture of the surprisingly extensive network of PAC supporters.

PAC spokesmen in their claims about their organisation tended to depict it in terms of a formal bureaucratic hierarchy with clear lines of communication and control linking leaders with followers. In November 1962 Potlake Leballo stated in an interview that the PAC had sixteen regions, each with its own regional executive controlling a number of branches, themselves divided into cells. These regions embraced most of the country including the reserves. Patrick Duncan, echoing Leballo in an article in the London Times, wrote of 150 'cells' with it being 'not uncommon' for a cell to have 1,000 members. A London newsletter carried a report of twelve 1,000-strong cells in the Western Cape. These figures are likely to have been inflated. In December 1959 before its banning the PAC claimed a total affiliation of 150 branches with 31,035 members. Even this figure was a remarkably rapid expansion, bearing in mind the statistics given one month previously for 101 branches and 24,664 members distributed in the following fashion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even this quite modest claim should be treated with scepticism: according to the available evidence it is unlikely that membership in the Western Cape exceeded 1,000, and this seemed to be where the organisation was strongest. A claim by Robert Sobukwe that at the time of the launching of the Pass Campaign PAC membership totalled 200,000 should not be taken seriously. If before the banning of the organisation the PAC leadership presented inaccurate information on the size of their following then their membership claims produced after April 1960 were likely to have been no more reliable. Numerical calculations of membership, though, are misleading indications of a movement's capacity to mobilise large numbers of people. As in the case of the 1960 Cape Town disturbances, relatively small numbers of activists could function as catalysts for large scale unrest in a volatile social context. More important are the questions of where the organisation's members were situated, what sort of people they were, and what kind of social environment they lived in.
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It is possible to document the existence of sixty-eight Poqo groups as functioning in the April 1961 to April 1963 period (the two dates representing the period between the PAC's banning and the time of the projected uprising). These can be grouped in the following regional concentrations:

- Transvaal: 22
- Western Cape: 16
- Eastern Cape: 11
- Transkei: 14
- Natal: 4
- Orange Free State: 2

The table at the end of this paper provides a summary of the evidence upon which this data is based. Let us look at each regional concentration in turn, beginning with the Transvaal.

The twenty-two Transvaal branches listed in the table represent those on which information is available, either from first hand testimony of former activists from the Transvaal organisation, or from the records of the trials of those groups arrested by the police. Obviously the data is incomplete but because of the inadequacy of the leadership's security precautions (see below) it is unlikely that many other active groups existed. The major areas of PAC activity in this period were first in Pretoria and then in the townships of the West Rand and the Southern Transvaal. Reflecting a previous pattern these were areas where the ANC had been relatively weak or inactive. The reasons for the PAC's success in expanding its following in Pretoria is the topic of another paper. Here our concern will be limited to forming generalisations about the movement's social character and quality of organisation. From the often sparse details provided by trial reports and newspaper reports it seems that the Transvaal membership was generally youthful - the vast majority being in their teens or early twenties - and if they were not still attending school were usually employed in white-collar occupations. A few examples will have to suffice. The eight men convicted of a PAC conspiracy in Daveyton included a clerical worker, a laboratory assistant, a caterer, an insurance salesman and a schoolboy. Their ages ranged from seventeen to twenty-three years. In Pretoria at least two groups consisted entirely or mainly of school children. This was the case in Atteridgeville Township, where a PAC cell led by two teachers existed at Hofmeyr High School as well as at Kilnerton High School. There was also a PAC cell (or branch?) at the Hebron African Teacher Training College. Four men imprisoned for their activities as part of a PAC conspiracy in Orlando, Soweto, included an unemployed clerk, an unemployed school leaver and an employee of the Municipal Pass Office. All four were aged twenty or twenty-one. In Dobsonville, Roodepoort, the twenty-nine year old editor of a religious newspaper was alleged to be chairman of the local PAC branch. The chairman of the PAC's Vaal region was David Sibeko, a young sports journalist. Even from this very impressionistic picture there are obvious contrasts with the movement developing in Langa described earlier in the chapter. Noticeable by their absence from the list of identifiable Transvaal PAC members are industrial or service workers and hostel dwellers. Here the PAC was a movement of the young, the urbanised and the lower middle...
class and when educational details are available they suggest that most members had had at least a few years of primary education and that many had attended or were attending high school. The last point is worth drawing attention to in a context in which African secondary school enrolment in 1960 represented less than 4 per cent of total African enrolment. The importance of schoolchildren as an element in the PAC's following was often attested to by PAC leaders in the early 1960s.

What evidence exists in the form of trials does not suggest an extensive PAC following in the 1960-1963 period in Natal. Efforts were made to rebuild the organisation after its banning in the Durban area in January 1961 and there were attempts to proselytise and recruit in Pietermaritzburg, Howick and Chesterville. According to an interview with Jordan Ngubane there was a PAC 'Task Force' at the Ohlanga Institute. In 1963 it received instructions to set fire to surrounding cane fields as its contribution to the uprising. From the limited information available to attempt even tentative generalisations would not be justifiable. The same is also the case with the Orange Free State, where only two branches can be identified as existing before April 1960, in Welkom and Bethlehem. The goldmining town of Welkom continued to be a centre of PAC activity with at least three groups being active after the banning of the organisation.

The Cape Province and the Transkei contained the main centres of PAC activity. In the case of the Eastern Cape, evidence from the 1960-1963 period suggests that there were PAC branches in the two main towns, East London and Port Elizabeth, in educational institutions (Bensonvale, Lovedale College and Fort Hare University College) and in several of the smaller towns as well: De_Aar, Grahamstown, Herschel, King William's Town, Molteno, Queenstown, and Steynsburg. With the exception of King William's Town there is very little information available on the 1963 Poqo groups in the smaller towns, though after 1963 teachers played a key role in Poqo conspiracies in those centres as well as in Middleburg and may have done so earlier. Bearing in mind the concentration of important African educational institutions in the Eastern Cape and the evidence of political activity within them it is a reasonable hypothesis that some of their graduates may have functioned as political catalysts in nearby communities. In King William's Town, for instance, one of the members of the local Poqo groups had recently been expelled from Lovedale. In King William's Town thirty-three men were accused in 1963 of taking part in a Poqo insurrection. They were led by three factory workers, local men who had grown up in the town's locations of Zwelitsha and Tshatshe. With the exception of seven men most of the accused were under twenty-five years of age and the oldest was only fifty. A similar picture emerges from a trial concerning four men from New Brighton, Port Elizabeth: they and the various other people cited in the trial as Poqo activists were young, with at most a few years of primary education, born in the locality, and if not at school employed in unskilled capacities in various factories: a steelworks and a car spring factory are specifically referred to in the record. For the Eastern Province there is most evidence of PAC activity in East London. One of the original nuclei of Africanists was in East London and the local PAC branch had been active in the 1960 pass campaign. One of the leading Pan-Africanists in the town, C J Fazzie,
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...times be based on a particular institution (e.g. a school) or locality within the township. In fact 'cells' often met together in large meetings to be addressed by branch and more senior members. Within each branch a 'task force' would be constituted from the younger men in the organisation. The 'task force' members would do guard duty at meetings, collect and manufacture weapons and explosives and in the event of the uprising undertake the initial attacks. Each branch would have a chairman and subordinate to him, a task force leader. There would also be 'block stewards' with recruiting functions within a certain area. A block corresponded to a cell. To communicate with the Maseru leadership a clumsy code was used in which PAC branches and their activity would be described with reference to forms of popular entertainment. Branches were football teams, cinemas or dancehalls and their offices and functions would be described accordingly. The police were the 'forces of darkness' or 'skins'. The uprising itself was called 'the twist session' or 'the jive session'.

Notwithstanding its subjection to the supervision of the national leadership and despite the efforts at secrecy it seems that the organisation in the Transvaal was weak and demoralised. An insight into the general state of the Witwatersrand is given in a letter dated 30th March, 1963 to the Maseru leadership from the Witwatersrand 'Football Club Manager' (Regional Chairman?) which was intercepted by the police. The letter provides a telling impression of an organisation preoccupied with personal feuds and internal suspicions, these exacerbated by the arrests of branch organisers whom the police had been able to trace through the Maseru's leadership's habit of using the post office as its main vehicle of communication:

There has been gross negligence with most of our players here instead of them leaving addresses with other people when they were at HQ they only supplied pseudonyms with their proper addresses leaving themselves open to such dangers. They talk too much. They are emotional and not very revolutionary in their behaviour.

We have withdrawn recognition of the Jabulani team. It was formed by people from Zola who did not want to respect their local leaders. Even most of the members of the team are from Zola and were being told a pack of lies into losing confidence and faith in their local management by people who do not want to be led by others. ... These people in order to destroy me dubbed me as an informer, exploiting the sensitivities of players towards skins. It is quite clear from reports I have been getting of the local intelligence that even the men I appointed as my captains believe these things. (The West Rand) ... are comparatively doing better than the central complex. They shouldn't at all be drawn into this seething cauldron of hatred and personal clashes which seems to be our disease.

Trial evidence suggests that the Witwatersrand officials accepted the uprising plans only reluctantly and this is corroborated by the circulars sent to the Transvaal by Leballo in February and March reprimanding branches for the failure to prepare for the uprising.
I must warn you very strongly that I shall not be intimated by your failure to obtain these arrangements. The Twist MUST just go on whether you have these things or not. It is not my own fault. You are to blame for that. I am going ahead with my plans for the Twist or the Tournament. What I do not like of you is not to tell me the truth. You talk too much but you cannot live up to your claims!!! You don't do hard work sufficiently.

The Eastern Cape more or less conformed to the Transvaal pattern of organisation and there were also signs of low morale in some of the branches. In New Brighton, Port Elizabeth, for instance, recalcitrant recruits (including a Task Force captain) were regularly punished with beatings for poor attendance at branch meetings. As in the case of Johannesburg groups the New Brighton Task Force was reprimanded for being behind-hand in their organisation. During 1961, incidentally, New Brighton's PAC members were under the leadership of Pearce Gqobose, the Eastern Cape regional chairman. Gqobose, an ex-serviceman and social worker, had been involved in Africanist politics since 1946. He fled the country in 1962 to avoid arrest and joined Leballo's 'Presidential Council' in Maseru.

In the case of the Western Cape and the Transkeian groups there is less evidence to suggest a formal defined hierarchy of leadership and the structure of the organisation was influenced by pre-existing social networks provided by 'home-boy' groups, burial associations and rurally oriented resistance movements formed in the wake of the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act independently of the nationalist political organisations. These included the Dyakobs, the Jacobins, and the Makuluspan. Such bodies served to transmit information and ideas between the Western Cape and the Transkei. It seems likely that in the Transkei itself the Poqo groups were started by migrant workers from Cape Town. The more autonomous character of the movement in these areas tended to protect it from police interference: a great deal of police information resulted from the indiscretions of the Maseru leadership and its communication system. A final distinguishing feature of these Poqo groups was their resort to magical protective measures. This last point testifies to the major contrast that can be drawn between the Transvaal/Eastern Cape groups and the Western Cape/Transkei groups. In the case of the former the movement was constructed around the organisational conceptions and strategic ideas of a small and socially removed group of leaders. At base level the Poqo groups had very little vitality of their own: their members' main activity was to attend meetings at which they were alternately harangued or exhorted to make themselves ready for the great day of the uprising. Little was said at such meetings which was directly relevant to their specific circumstances. The movement's constituency was predominantly youthful, often with a limited range of social experience. In the case of the latter the movement developed organisationally from the bottom up, adapting itself to the social institutions it found around it, generating its own ideas and fuelled to a much greater extent by locally relevant anxieties and preoccupations, particularly those emanating from the countryside.
To return to our narrative, by the last three months of 1962 preparations for a national insurrection had begun in earnest. Poqo task force members were instructed by their leaders to gather materials and manufacture weapons and task force leaders and branch chairmen were urged to step up recruitment. A thousand recruits were needed for each 'hall' (cell or block). The weapons were very crude. Bombs were improvised from petrol-filled bottles and tennis balls filled with ball-bearings, permanganate of potash, glycerin and match heads. Swords were fashioned from filed-down pieces of scrap metal. Recruitment methods were no more sophisticated. A group in Port Elizabeth were told:

We must organise right through the towns and in the buses. When you sit in a bus, the man next to you, you must tell him about this organisation.

Perhaps to compensate for the rudimentary quality of these preparations many task force members were encouraged to believe that on the great day help would come from outside: weapons had been promised by Russia, one of the New Brighton task force leaders claimed, though more commonly it was asserted that the assistance would be African:

The African States would assist us in the Revolution by coming in aeroplanes and various war vehicles. The independent states are with us - they are going to help us. Ben Bella has promised assistance. They will come with aeroplanes.

We would be supplied with arms and ammunition from the African States from the North and we would also be assisted by their soldiers.

The promise of external aid was a recurrent theme in Leballo's talks to the groups of branch leaders who were summoned to Maseru in February and March of 1963. In November 1962 Leballo had left Basutoland for a few weeks to visit the United Nations offices, stopping off on his return home in Ghana and it is possible that some of the urgency of his subsequent communications to his followers was inspired by assurances of support from Ghanaian and other African government spokesmen.

Task force members all seem to have had a broadly similar conception of how the uprising would begin. In each centre different groups would be assigned to attacks on police stations, post offices, power installations and other government buildings. Groups should then turn their attention to the white civilian population which they were to kill indiscriminately. The killing should go on for four hours and should then cease, when the insurgents should await further instructions. Most of the features of this plan were attributable to the instructions contained in Leballo's talks to branch leaders and they formed the basic elements in an insurrectionary concept shared by PAC conspiracies throughout the country. Exactly when this uprising was to take place was not revealed to rank and file. It would be in 1963 for that was the original date set by Sobukwe for the attainment of South African 'independence', but as for the exact date this would be appointed by the leadership in the near future. In the Eastern Cape
some branches were told that the date of the uprising would coincide with Sobukwe's release from prison so that he would once again be able to direct the struggle. This reflected a more generalized attribution to Sobukwe of prophet-like qualities of leadership. Only in April were task force members given a definite date and this merely a day or two before the chosen time. Branches and regional leaders were sent letters at the end of March giving them instructions for an uprising in early April. The addressed letters were intercepted by the police when they arrested the courier sent from Maseru to post the letters in Bloemfontein.

By the end of March the police had a fairly accurate idea of the nature and scope of these arrangements. In November Poqo insurgents acting on their own initiative had staged an attack on the small Western Province town of Paarl and the following month several groups travelled from Cape Town to the Transkei to assassinate Matanzima and were intercepted by the police. In March several branch leaders returning to the Cape and the Transvaal from Maseru were arrested and detained. On March 24th Leballo gave a press conference in which he announced the PAC's intention to mount a general uprising, claiming that over 100,000 armed followers were waiting for his signal. Final instructions had to be given to twenty-three branch chairmen who were now on their way back to South Africa. In the last week of March South African police, aided by the list of addresses they were able to assemble from Leballo's correspondence, began to detain key local activists in the Transvaal. On April 1st the colonial authorities in Basutoland arrested those PAC leaders they could find in Maseru and closed down the PAC's office confiscating a quantity of documentation including membership lists allegedly containing 100,000 names and addresses. Leballo prudently went into hiding. According to affidavits the Basutoland police raid was carried out in the presence of South African security policy and the colonial government was later accused of supplying the South Africans with information. In the first week of April hundreds of arrests took place throughout South Africa. In May the Minister of Justice announced that 3,246 Poqo suspects had been arrested. Despite the arrests Poqo groups mounted attacks in several centres in the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal.

In King William's Town at 2.30 on the morning of the 9th a group of fifteen men entered the courtyard of the office building which contained the police station and Commissioner's office. Their first objective was to free Poqo suspects held prisoner before launching a general insurrection. They were part of a group of sixty men armed with incendiary bombs, knives and clubs. These men threw their bombs through the charge office windows and advanced on the cell doors before being driven back by police gunfire. They thereupon dispersed and subsequently many were arrested and tried en masse. One of the accused, incidentally was called Bomwana Biko.

In East London the police successfully anticipated local PAC preparations. On the same night as the King William's Town attack two to three hundred men walking in groups of four to eight congregated in the open veld outside the old section of Duncan Village. Many carried homemade swords and axes in haversacks and bags. From the moment the men began assembling, at 6.30 on the evening of the 8th, they were being watched by police several of whom had arrived at the rendezvous before them. Apparently an informer had betrayed the Poqo men. At
about 10 o'clock when the last men had arrived the police watchers sent for reinforcements but the advent of these was noticed by a task force patrol which fired on the police. After an exchange of shots the meeting broke up, eleven men being arrested immediately and over a hundred later. Subsequent trials confirmed that the men were about to launch an uprising in East London according to a pre-formulated plan. The police reinforcements interrupted them while they were waiting for petrol. Children evidently played an important role in the preparations, young teenage boys being given files, hacksaws and motor springs and told to fashion these into swords (the task of producing one blade took two days). Some of the youths were recruited by women. In both this trial and the King William's Town trial there was evidence that many of the young auxiliaries were reluctant conscripts rather than highly motivated volunteers.132

The following night three small groups of young men travelled from Orlando to Johannesburg. Two men from one of the groups broke into a clothing store while others stood guard and using petrol bombs set alight counters in the old section of the building. A similar attack was intended on a sportswear shop but the insurgents were interrupted by a police patrol after breaking a window. A third group marched to the premises of Shell (SA) Pty which accommodated some oil storage facilities. Finding the main gates locked and on encountering a night watchman the members of the task force decided to go home. These events were part of a larger conspiracy for which there is no evidence of any comparably serious attempts to implement objectives which included the destruction of Orlando police and power stations. The targets in the Johannesburg central business districts were well chosen. They were old or by their nature highly inflammable and they were situated in an architecturally congested part of town where the likelihood of a well established fire spreading was high. These arson attempts in Johannesburg were the climax of several days of hurried preparation including several meetings being held in the week before the attack at which fresh recruits were inducted (some of whom participated in the Johannesburg task force) and an all day bomb making session on the 8th. Task forces were informed of their targets only immediately before setting out to attack them. There is evidence to suggest several other Poqo conspiracies in Soweto, and it should be remembered that many of the Rand PAC groups had already been arrested. The last minute character of the preparations, however, and the fact that the events took place one day later than in the Eastern Cape, and the manner in which the attacks were implemented, helps to strengthen the impression that many of the Rand insurgents were less than totally committed to the conspiracy.133

This view is corroborated by details from the trial of David Sibe-ko, the Chairman of the Southern Transvaal region. Though the evidence of state witnesses was discounted in court and Sibeko was acquitted, in exile he subsequently confirmed in broad outline the truth of the prosecution's case. One witness claimed that he was nominated at a meeting in the Vereeniging area to travel to Maseru. In Maseru he was given instructions concerning the uprising. On returning to Vereeniging he was told that the date of the uprising was arranged for April 7th. On April 1st he was told to collect some bombs from a woman in Pretoria. These were going to be used in an attack on Vanderbijlpark police station and the Escom power installation. He allegedly failed
to find the woman and returned empty handed. The bombs were collected on the 7th by Gabriel Sandamela, one of the members of the regional executive. The witness was informed by Sibeko on the 7th that the uprising had been postponed for a day because of the police being aware of the conspiracy. However, when he next saw Sibeko and Sandamela they were busy preparing to travel to Dar es Salaam via Bechuanaland. There was no uprising in Vereeniging.

Elsewhere the story was much the same: large numbers of arrests frustrated some local conspiracies and demoralised others. The Maseru leadership was either in hiding or in prison. Robert Sobukwe, probably ignorant of the uprising plan, on completing his prison sentence was detained on Robben Island for a further six years. In June the Minister of Justice claimed that the Poqo movement had been destroyed. By June the following year 1,162 Poqo members had been convicted under the Sabotage Act.

Notwithstanding the Minister's claim, Poqo groups continued to be active for some years to come, the last recorded incidence of a Poqo conspiracy being in Welkom in December 1968. There was no comparably ambitious effort by a central leadership to organise a national insurrection: Poqo activity after April 1963 was very localised in character. Until 1965 there was some effort by Maseru-based leaders to coordinate the activities of different PAC/Poqo branches. Despite a shift which developed in the course of 1964 in the external leaders' conception of strategy away from insurrectionism in favour of protracted guerilla warfare, surviving activists within the country continued to plot apocalyptic local uprisings. On the Witwatersrand, for example, a regional committee was formed towards the end of April 1963. It was led by two professional golfers and a boxing manager. It succeeded in re-establishing links with the Maseru group and conceived a plan to mount an uprising on December 16th, the Day of the Covenant. Whites attending nationalist festivities in Pretoria were to be attacked by bees. Unusually, for a Rand conspiracy, the participants intended to deploy witchcraft, though they also tried to obtain hand grenades from a man who worked at the Drill Hall in Johannesburg. The conspirators were encouraged by Edwin Makoti and Leballo (who reappeared in Maseru in September 1963) for the rising would coincide with the United Nations session at which they hoped to mobilise international support. Makoti visited Johannesburg in October to make arrangements for the the passage out of the country of recruits for guerrilla training but was informed by the committee that they had failed to find people willing to leave the country. Lack of transport facilities and a failing confidence in the powers of witchcraft persuaded the conspirators to abandon their plans. Meanwhile in May 1963 a group in Lady Frere (Glen Grey district) plotted attacks on the magistrate's home and the police station followed by more generalised arson and killing. Elsewhere remaining PAC groups in Cape Town, Durban and East London contented themselves with recruiting and sending men abroad for military instruction.

The next phase of internal activity followed the conception of a plan in July 1964 by the Presidential Council for a Lesotho-based guerrilla operation. The plan seemed to have two separate sources of inspiration. While, in conformity with previous PAC strategic thinking it argued that:
Insurrection or even minor skirmishes of an effective nature, well planned, are sufficient to set in motion a full scale revolution any time in South Africa.

it went on to state:

Our struggle is bound to be a protracted one. We must not reckon in terms of lightning warfare and an immediate victory. Apart from the unpredictable nature of warfare itself, the enemy is fully aware of our intentions and has been preparing himself accordingly for a number of years. Ours is a guerilla form of warfare against regular army forces. Our indispensable condition in these circumstances is to wear down the enemy systematically, hitting him hardest where he is weakest and then retreating where he is strongest.

The document comprised mainly of detailed plans for launching a guerilla insurgency: it discussed escape routes, training programmes, the use of explosives, logistics, lines of communication, and the role of external diplomatic representatives of the movement. Initial operations would have two dimensions. Careful clandestine activity would complete the groundwork for a long-term rural guerilla insurgency. An operational base was to be established in Qacha's Nek, a village on the Lesotho border with the Transkei. A boat purchased in London would offload arms on to the Transkeian coast. PAC trainees would form a nucleus of a locally recruited insurgent force. While these preparations were in progress, support for the movement would be generated by a campaign of terrorism which would include assassinations of important white politicians, kidnapping of school children, the destruction of symbolically important buildings, as well as the seizure of gold bullion, money, arms and ammunition.

It is difficult to ascertain how seriously the Maseru group regarded this plan. Later it was suggested that the main purpose of the document outlining it was to persuade the Organisation of African Unity's African Liberation Committee to allocate funds to the PAC. The equivalent of R100,000 was handed over by the ALC to Potlake Leballo in late 1964 and subsequently Leballo was charged with fraud when he could not account for a large proportion of this sum's expenditure. Despite this possible motive it seems that various efforts were made to implement parts of the plan. A Transkeian based Poqo cell active in the Mqanduli district was instructed to locate hiding places for arms and insurgents. In September 1964 activists from East London were taken to various houses in the Quthing area and shown how to make firearms. Two members of the Presidential Council, Letlaka and Mfalsa, were later found in a Maseru trial to have administered a guerilla training camp near Quthing. Lectures, physical training and weapons construction were part of the curriculum. Cape Town based Poqo groups were delegated the tasks of reconnoitering the Hex River railway tunnel with a view to derailing the 'Blue Train' Johannesburg to Cape Town express and searching for guerilla hiding places in Namaqualand and the mountainous area near Paarl. It seems that since 1963 a new regional organisation had been established in Cape Town under much closer control of the Maseru leadership than the pre-
vious Poqo network. In the Eastern Cape rural centre of Molteno a PAC branch was revived in April 1964 by a local school teacher, Harry Mathebe, after he had attended a meeting with a member of the Presidential Council in Herschel. In the course of 1964 Mathebe succeeded in recruiting thirty. The branch held its first meeting in December 1964 at which plans for a local uprising were discussed. Before these were to be implemented it was resolved that a trip should be made to Johannesburg to buy guns. Conspirators were allegedly told that after the uprising they would be able to 'stay in the white houses'. Most of the new branch's members were arrested in February. A group with similar intentions was discovered in Steynsburg. Once again it was led by a school teacher. His fifty-odd followers included a shop assistant and a shoemaker but mainly comprised illiterate unskilled labourers.

On 29th April, 1965 the Maseru based members of the Presidential Council were taken into custody by the Basutoland authorities and shortly afterwards put on trial (Potlaki Leballo was not amongst these, he had left Maseru in August the previous year and was not in Dar es Salaam). The Maseru group was acquitted on appeal (it was found its members had committed no crimes in Basutoland). Some of them subsequently joined the other PAC principals in Dar es Salaam, others fell victim to the leadership feuds which plagued the movement and were expelled by Leballo, and one, John Pokela, acting national secretary, was captured (allegedly kidnapped in Buthe Buthe, Basuto) in August 1966 by the South African authorities and convicted.

From 1965 remaining PAC groups inside the country functioned independently: there were no longer any lines of communication with any leadership centre outside the country. Their activity conformed to the established insurrectionary pattern: groups in Laingsburg, Graaff Reinet, Victoria West, Middelburg, Steynsburg in the Cape and Umzinto and Esperanza in Natal were discovered in the course of their preparations for local uprisings. In addition insurrectionary PAC cells were formed among convicts by previous Robben Island inmates of Gamkaaspoort, Baviaanspoort, Bellville and Leeukop prisons. With the exception of the convicts about whom no sociological detail is available from the trial evidence, most of the other conspiracies apart from their common strategic intention had a strikingly similar social composition: leaders were usually teachers or clergymen and their following normally consisted of unskilled labourers. A few examples must suffice. In 1964 Jonathan Hermanus arrived in Graaff Reinet location as Methodist Minister. Initially he was active in efforts to improve the prevalently poor local conditions in the location. To this end he formed a Wesleyan Guild for church youth. In early 1966 increasingly disenchanted with social work he began to recruit people for a Poqo branch. He was transferred in 1967 and the movement died out. As well as Hermanus, church elders and a school teacher were later tried for leading roles in a violent conspiracy. In Victoria West a minister, a school principal and various service workers - garage attendants, milkmen, shop assistants, messengers and hospital labourers - were involved in plans to obtain weapons to attack police stations, cut telephone wires and poison water supplies. According to one state witness, it was said at one of the meetings:
When the whites come to Victoria West, they soon had a house and a new car. They enjoyed better wages and privileges and that was why whites had to be killed. In this way the fatherland could be regained for the non-whites.

Three of the conspiracies were composed of farmworkers, those in Natal and at Laingsburg. The Natal conspiracies were located on sugar estates and were led by a PAC activist from Durban. The Laingsburg movement was led by a lay-preacher, R Ndoylo. He appeared at a Saturday bible meeting attended by the workers from one farm and chose as his text a passage from Lamentations: ‘Our skin was black like an oven because of the terrible famine’. He went on to ‘explain to us that it was difficult to get food and water and that our land was being taken away from us. At Vleiland (the farm) we got very little money. We were paid 70 cents a week and that was very little ... He said according to Poqo they should be paid 70 cents a day’. Ndoylo later told his followers that after the arrival of weapons from the Congo they would participate in an ‘uprising which would take place simultaneously all over the country on an appointed day. Ndoylo would tell the people at Vleiland when that day was’.

In Welkom a departure from this pattern occurred in 1968 when J Ramoshaba, a former student of Fort Hare, a social worker employed on the goldfields, and a member of the Thabang Township Urban Bantu Council, presided over a revival of the local PAC branch. He and his confederates attempted to raise funds to send people abroad for military training. With their arrest PAC activity inside South Africa was to cease until the mid 1970s.

In an analysis of the Poqo movement some useful starting points can be drawn from the literature on general theories of collective action. Existing treatments of South African insurgent movements have on the whole been influenced by the social theory emerging from the United States in the 1960s. Edward Feit and Fatima Meer both seem to share the premise that ‘order is the normal state of things and that disorder is very difficult to sustain’. As Meer puts it: ‘Revolution, though dependent on the populace, is not a popular cause. The security of a familiar system, even if limiting, is invariably preferable to the risks of change’. In such a context collective violence is viewed as pathological and hence irrational:

The picture of a mass ready for the final plunge to liberate itself is deceptive. It is observed by abstracting the motifs of rebellion scattered through a tapestry, which otherwise speaks of reasonable peace and quite. While spontaneous uprisings are clear indications of deep sores, they are certainly no indication of people's intelligent, rational and conscious awareness of these sores. They are rather symptoms of mass psychosis, and like the psychotic who is unable to see the root of his passion beyond the immediate trifle which provoked it, so too, is the vision of the mass shallow and blurred.
When these latter start infringing on local rights and resources a second generation of popular violence manifests itself. This the Tillys term reactive violence, essentially acts of resistance to attempts from the centre to control the periphery. Tax rebellions, food riots, Luddism, and the evasion of enclosed land are examples of reactive violence. With the triumph of the state and the national market a third set of struggles ensues as groups make claims for rights and resources not previously enjoyed. Here collective action is geared to attempts 'to control rather than resist different segments of the national structure'. The insurrectionary strike would be an example of what the Tillys call 'proactive' collective violence.

Ostensibly social breakdown analysis would seem easier to apply to the Poqo disturbances. The movement was drawn from groups which were peripheral rather than central to the development of a modern industrial economy, or from people who had not been totally socially encapsulated by that process. The roles of unskilled migrant labourers, farmworkers (in an increasingly capital intensive agriculture), service workers in small rural towns, and even school children can be conceptualised thus. The conjunction in the movement's constituency between groups threatened with or actually undergoing a process of marginalisation and such middle class elements as teachers, clerics and office workers might be explained with reference to both the morally disorienting effects of rapid social change for the former and a crisis of rising expectations for the latter. The inclusion of magic and witchcraft in Poqo/PAC tactics, the impracticality of its insurrectionary concept, the millenarian undertones of the movement - its belief in an apocalyptic 'great day', its investiture of Sobukwe with biblical attributes of leadership, its strategic dependence on external intervention - all these features could be employed to explain the movement's emergence and following in terms of the transient social dislocations introduced as a by-product of modernisation. In such a scheme the 'irrationality' of the movement would reflect the hysteria of victims of social progress.

There are problems, though, with such an analysis. Examining the movement in its different contexts its appeal at times is far more general than such an argument might suggest. In Lady Frere, for example, in 1963, a Poqo conspiracy involved a major proportion of the adult African men in the location. The superimposition of Poqo on earlier resistance organisations in the migrant society of the Western Cape and the peasant communities of the Transkei and its drawing upon well established networks and local ideology again does not suggest a movement based upon morally disoriented people in a situation of anomie. The violent Poqo conspiracies took place in a context of much wider incidence of collective violence than is obvious from the academic treatments of South African insurgencies cited above. To take one example: in the time when Poqo cells were being established among school children (and in some cases their teachers) African rural schools were periodically shaken by waves of pupil violence. In 1963, for instance, in three months there were reports of rioting, arson, strikes and mass walkouts or suspensions at five leading educational institutions in the Eastern Cape and the Transkei: Lovedale, the Faku Institute, Flagstaff, Bethal College, Butterworth, Sigcau High School, Flagstaff and Healdtown. Once again, this does
not suggest, at least in its local context, that Poqo's violence was that of the socially deviant.

A more helpful approach may be found in the second group of writers referred to above and in particular from the conceptions derived from the Tillys' work. Poqo's social complexity does not permit easy causal generalisations; its regional variation in both constituency and organisation embraced very different political responses which were different at least partly because they were responses to different things. The political preoccupations of migrant workers in Cape Town were to an extent shaped by events in the Transkei; despite their involvement in the urban economy they still had residual links with rural culture. In the Transkei itself peasants (who themselves often had experience of migrant labour) were engaged in defending their rights over land and their notions of land husbandry against intensifying efforts by the state to control and modify these. In such a context Poqo drew its strength largely from what the Tillys would call reactive and competitive movements though its initial inspiration was proactive as would be the case with any nationalist organisation. Elsewhere I have attempted to reconstruct the movement's following in the local contexts of the Transkei and Paarl. Here the actions of its participants were influenced by a communal matrix of struggle and within the limits of the knowledge available to them their behaviour was rational enough: it can be explained without recourse to notions of mass psychosis.

But this is not the whole story. The involvement of Transvaal groups in the Poqo conspiracy did not stem from reactive concerns nor did it seem to represent such a popular constituency: here the movement's following was much more narrowly socially defined. The same too could be said for the Eastern Cape groups: unlike the Transvaal organisation they included industrial workers but these were commonly very youthful. At this point the existence of another violent insurgent movement needs to be born in mind, Umkhonto we Sizwe, which was most active in the two main Eastern Province towns, in Durban and in Johannesburg and Pretoria. Umkhonto was a much smaller organisation than Poqo, technologically more sophisticated in its methods, tactically more effective, and its strategy reflected an intellectually more complex analysis of South African society. While Poqo in its areas of strength drew on locally evolved resistance movements Umkhonto benefited from the modern organisational framework created by a much more powerful nationalist organisation than the PAC as well an allied trade union movement. Though Umkhonto was in its conception and performance an insurgent elite nevertheless it was itself the product of a decade of mass-based proactive struggles. In two centres, Port Elizabeth and East London, there is evidence of a substantial support base for the Umkhonto insurgents. The local leaders here were men who had been at the forefront of communal political assertions since the 1940s. In this context the nature of Poqo's constituency in such centres as Port Elizabeth, East London or even Pretoria becomes more understandable: it was composed of people who though affected by a communal history of revolt belonged to groups which were not easily incorporated into the increasingly proletarian following of the ANC, or who were too young to have been involved in the pre-1960 struggles. In the case of young school children a study made in 1963 may be of some relevance. From samples of future autobiographies
written by African high school students in 1950 and 1960 it is possible to trace a declining interest in individual economic and social aspirations and a sharp increase in commitment to political activity. A survey conducted among professional people, ministers, teachers, clerks and students and school children in the Transvaal showed the PAC to be the most popular group among the sample and support for the PAC tended to correlate with acceptance of violence. Within the sample endorsement of violence or some type of force reflected the view of a large minority — forty-three per cent. As in the case of the Transkei and the Western Cape, the Poqo conspiracies in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape should not be examined in isolation, for apart from the activities of other insurgent movements, there is evidence of quite widespread sentiments which while not providing proof of a popular willingness to participate in violent revolt does indicate that violent actions were widely seen as legitimate. This will become clearer in local case studies. The comparative weakness of the Transvaal/Eastern Cape impulse to violence in contrast to the behaviour of the Western Cape/Transkeian groups can be attributed to the predominant organisational features of each. In conformity with the Tillys' thesis, the former proactive movement depended on the mobilising capacity of a modern political association whilst the latter partly reactive movement drew to a much greater extent on communal bases for political action. Earlier in this chapter the contrast was described as one between an organisational structure imposed from above and a movement which had developed organically from the bottom up. Given the state imposed barriers confronting black efforts to create large scale political associations it is not surprising that the 'organic' movement provided the strongest response.

A final comment on the role of teachers in Poqo will help to underscore the argument concerning the movement's communal legitimacy. As we have seen teachers figured prominently in Eastern Cape Poqo conspiracies as well as in the Transkei. In this region teachers had been uncharacteristically active in political organisations: an example of this can be found in the political history of the Cape African Teacher's Association as a constituent of the All African Convention. With its radicalisation in the late 1940s CATA could provide an organisation based on the dense network of mission schools long established in the region. Teachers themselves had their security and status threatened by the Bantu Authorities and school boards systems and may also, suggests Colin Bundy, have been radicalised by the pupil disturbances in the region which accommodated some of the largest African schools and colleges in the country. Teachers were especially influential in the countryside and small towns where illiteracy rates were high and other middle class elements often absent. Bearing in mind their poor pay and recent interference by the state in their profession it is not surprising to find radical rural opposition movements gravitating around them as leaders. In the Eastern Cape small town and rural communities were unusually subject to the influence of the political organisations. As well as the narodnik dimension of the AAC's activity, Fort Hare and other colleges served as local disseminators of political ideas. Interviewed in the late 1960s Tennyson Makiwane remembered:
Then I got to Fort Hare where the Youth League was very well established. And there was the period when the Defiance Campaign was being launched and this attracted tremendous interest among the youth and we used to go to the neighbouring villages and organise people to the Defiance ... as far as King William's Town, Adelaide, Beaufort and Port Elizabeth. We used to go to them at night and sometimes over weekends to address meetings of villages. ... In our area we touched most of the villages. 196

Also relevant in this context were the activities of the Herschel branch of the Congress Youth League in 1949. This branch ran an education class for twenty-five herdboys in Ndunga. It also had plans for adults and children's literacy classes in the Bluegums area and 197 administered a cooperative saving society which had accumulated £60. The presence of PAC branches at a significant number of Eastern Cape educational institutions a decade later may help to explain the part played by teachers in small town Eastern Cape Poqo groups.

The historiographical neglect of the PAC can be related to the issues discussed above. The influence of social breakdown theory directly or indirectly has affected much of the analysis of Black South African politics. Movements of what might be diagnosed as collective madness are not considered worthy of sustained analysis by writers concerned with what they see as the mainstream of Black political response. Even Gail Gerhart, a scholar who handles theoretical issues with extreme caution, explains Poqo's behaviour with reference to a Fanonist-need for catharsis, 198 rather than in terms of the specific situation of socially coherent groups. For a writer whose preoccupation is with the development of anatavistic black political tradition Gerhart shows a surprising lack of curiosity in one of the few popular expressions of her chosen theme. The lack of interest of Gerhart and other authorities in Poqo is mainly attributable, though, to their preference for writing about organisations rather than social movements, particularly those organisations which produce an abundance of documentation. Much of the historical writing about African politics is therefore the history of leaders, not followers. Meticulous and scholarly as some of this work is it discusses at best superficially the greater social conflicts which underlie the biographical and organisational developments which form the main focus of study. In this survey it is hoped that the historical significance of the Poqo movement is made clear. It was a response to crisis of a varied but distinctive set of social groups. Its strategy and ideology only becomes comprehensible when these groups and the situation with which they have to contend are clearly identified.
### TABLE: PAC/POQO GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1960-1968

**CAPE PROVINCE (EAST)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1963</td>
<td>FORT HARE University</td>
<td>Author's interview with former branch chairman, Neshtedi Sidzamba.</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>HERSHEL</td>
<td>Black Star, May 1963, report on 57 arrests</td>
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<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>LOVEDALE COLLEGE</td>
<td>State vs. Mtshizana, transcript, SAIRR; Interview with Sidzamba.</td>
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<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>MOLTENO</td>
<td>PAC Newsletter (Maseru), Report on State vs. Mathebe and 13; Evening</td>
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The Poqo Insurrection

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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>QUEENSTOWN</td>
<td>Contact, 27 November 1964, report on State vs. Gwabeni and 1.</td>
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**CAPE PROVINCE (WEST)**

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<td>CAPE TOWN</td>
<td>Contact, May 1965, report on State vs. Mkhalipi and 3.</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>CAPE TOWN, Saint Columbus House</td>
<td>State vs. Mandla and 31, lawyer's notes, Sachs papers.</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>CAPE TOWN, Windermere</td>
<td>Cape Times, 8 February 1962, report on police interruption of PAC meeting.</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>CAMPS BAY, Rotunda Hotel</td>
<td>State vs. E Dudumashe and 1, charge sheet, SAIRR.</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>DURBAN</td>
<td>Natal Witness, 10 June 1964, report on State vs. Shabalala and 3.</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>DURBAN</td>
<td>Contact, October 1966, report on State vs. Mbele.</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>OHLANGA INSTITUTE</td>
<td>Interview with Jordan Ngubane, Karis and Carter microfilms, Reel 13A 2 XN 32: 94.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>ESPERENZA, sugar estate</td>
<td>Contact, December 1966, report on unspecified trial of 8 farmworkers which ended in acquittal.</td>
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**ORANGE FREE STATE**

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<tbody>
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<td>1960-1965</td>
<td>WELKOM</td>
<td>State vs. Tangeni, transcript, SAIRR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The Poqo Insurrection

1968

**WELKOM**

Bloemfontein Friend, 30 July 1971, report on State vs. Lebese; Bloemfontein Friend, 8 September 1971, 14 October 1971, 16 December 1971, reports on State vs. Coetzee and 5.

### PRISONS

<table>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>BAVIANSPOOT</td>
<td>State vs. Mabuso and 13, transcript, SAIRR; Contact, October 1966, for report on State vs. Bahole and 15.</td>
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### TRANSVAAL

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<td>1961-1963</td>
<td>CARLTONVILLE</td>
<td>Author's interview with former chairman of PAC's Vaal region, David Sibeko.</td>
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</table>


1961-1963 | PRETORIA, Kilnerton High School | Author's interview with Tommy Mohajane.

1963 | PRETORIA, Eastwood | State vs. Masemula and 15, transcript.


1963 | PRETORIA, Vlakfontein | State vs. Masemula and 15, Transcript.


1961-1963 | SASOLBURG | Sibeko interview.


**TRANSKEI**

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<td>1963</td>
<td>GLEN GREY district, Lady Frere, Ngqoka location</td>
<td>State vs. Manisi and 2, transcript, CSAS, York University.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>IDUTYWA district</td>
<td>Makiba location</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>NGQUELENI district</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>ST. MARKS district</td>
<td>Cofimvaba, Qitsi location</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

1. This paper is adapted from chapter four of a Ph.D thesis entitled: "Insurrectionism in South Africa", University of York, Centre for Southern African Studies, 1984.


5. 'On the meaning of Poqo', Interpreter's note, Albie Sachs papers, AS 31/19, ICS, University of London. In Albert Knopf, Kaffir-English Dictionary, (Alice, 1913), the meaning of Poqo is given as 'completely (adv.), a religious denomination that refuses to have anything to do with white men (noun)'.

6. 'Poqo' is used in the slogan ending a letter in Xhosa written by P Z Joli to Meshack Mampunye, secretary, Kensington PAC branch in October 1959. Karis and Carter microfilm, Reel 6B, 2 DPI: 41/10.


10. See for example notes on speeches by C. Mlokoti on 3 March 1959 and W Phuza on 11 October 1959, AS 31/6.1 and AS 31 31/6.4 in Albie Sachs papers.

11. Lodge, ibid.


13. Howard Lawrence, 'Poqo - we go it alone' in Fighting Talk (Johannesburg), 17, 2, (February 1963), 4-6. This account may seem to be slightly romanticised but there is evidence that recent events in the Congo were discussed in at least one Poqo
cell in Cape Town in 1961 (see evidence of state witness Sontekwa in State vs. Mandla and 31 others, defence lawyer's notebooks, Albie Sachs papers, AS 69/7).


17. Contact, 16 April 1960.


20. Drum's report (February 1963) mentions an inaugural meeting in August 1961 by 750 Poqo activists in a hall between Paarl and Wellington, very near Mbekweni. I have come across no other reports to confirm this and it is not mentioned by Snyman in his Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the events on the 20th to 22nd November, 1962, at Paarl, RP 51/1963.

21. 'Sobukwe was Poqo leader', report in Cape Times, 4 March 1963, on Queenstown trial of men involved in unsuccessful assassination attempt on Chief Matanzima.


23. As in the case of the men who belonged to the Poqo cell at the Jewish Old Age Home in Cape Town.


31. Snyman proceedings, p. 348. Transcript of proceedings of Snyman Commission, CAMP microfilm held at University of York.
50. 'Let the People Know'. Leaflet signed by James Mangqekwana of Main Barracks, Langa. Patrick Duncan Papers, 8. 42. 9, University of York.


52. Nkoana interview. The BOSS defector Gordon Winter suggests that Nkoana was still in South Africa in July 1964 working as a 'secret police agent'. Apart from his own testimony all the available evidence (for example the document cited in note 57 below) suggests this was not the case: for most of 1964 Nkoana was representing the PAC in Cairo after a period spent in what was then Bechuanaland. Winter's book includes a mass of unreliable detail on the PAC and the ANC and should be treated with great reserve by researchers. See Gordon Winter, Inside BOSS, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1981, p. 94.

53. Nkoana interview.

54. State vs. G S Neconga, RC 37/65, transcript held at SAIRR, p. 44 and p. 96.

55. It seems that the decision was made independently of leaders still in prison. See note 136.

56. Because Leballo, the son of a South African Anglican priest, had been born in his father's parish at Mafeteng, Basutoland, he was entitled to Basotho nationality and residence. He was therefore permitted by the Native Commissioner at Ubumbu, Kwa Zulu, to leave his place of banishment to live in Basutoland. Cape Times, 15 August 1962.


62. The Africanist (Orlando), November 1959.

63. See Lodge, op. cit., p. 215.

64. The claim was made in court. See Regina vs. Majake, Neumane and Molete, 1960, transcript, p. 94, SAIRR.
Research for this currently in progress. Relevant factors include a very fragmented history of political organisation in the area prior to the launching of the local PAC and in particular the failure of ANC activists to capitalise on the trade union organisation accomplished by Communists during the 1940s; unrest in Pretoria's African high schools from 1960 onwards; freehold township removals which had a peculiarly disruptive effect in Pretoria on black communities; and the existence of a relatively substantial group of middle-class professional people (especially teachers) not involved in the ANC. All these contributed to the existence of a space in which the PAC could operate.

68. Cape Times, 12 April 1964.
69. State vs. Letsoko and 4, 1963, transcript, SAIRR.
75. According to a draft of an article by Benjamin Pogrund dated 16 January 1960, microfilm of South African Political Documentation held at SOAS, University of London, M 749.
76. The persistence of PAC efforts to organise in Welkom might be attributable to the passage of migrants between the Free State goldfields and Lesotho which may have facilitated contact between exiles in Maseru and PAC supporters in Welkom.
77. The Friend (Bloemfontein), 30 July 1971.
79. Author's interview with Neshtedi Sidzamba, Maseru, 1976.
82. According to an exile PAC publication, Black Star (London), May 1963, 57 PAC suspects were arrested in Herschel but I have found no trial evidence to indicate Herschel as a centre of PAC activity.


84. PAC Newsletter (Maseru), 15 May 1965.

85. Contact, 27 November 1964.


88. He gave state evidence at the trial of the King William’s Town group. Daily Despatch, 4 September 1963.


90. State vs. Neconga and 3, transcript, SAIRR.


94. Except in Glen Grey, then adjacent to the Transkei but not part of it.

95. See table.

96. For example, nearly eighty people were accused in a series of trials in December 1962 or organising meetings attended by over six hundred people in Ngwana, Ntlanga, and Ngombe locations, Mqanduli district. Daily Despatch, 19 January 1963.

97. Author’s interview with David Sibeko.

98. See State vs. Masemula and 15, transcript, pp. 269-272.


100. State vs. Jairus Ntsoane, case no. 295/63, transcript, p. 54, SAIRR.

101. Ibid., pp. 54-66.

102. Ibid., exhibit Y, pp. 271-278.

103. Rand Daily Mail, 23 May 1964. Report on State vs. Nkosi and 3. Here a state witness testified that the Witwatersrand area was
the least prepared for the April uprising. Rand Daily Mail, 21 June 1963, report on State vs. Mthimunye and 10. The accused claimed that as a member of the Wits. regional committee he had opposed Leball's conception of an uprising.

106. Ibid., p. 13.
108. Ibid., 23 February 1963.
110. This was the case, for example, with the group at Mputu location, Umtata district, responsible for the Bahsee Bridge killings. Daily Despatch, 3 December 1963.
111. Nkoana believes that by 1962 the national leadership was no longer in control of the movement in the Cape. Nkoana interview.
112. See, for example, State vs. Siyothula, report in Cape Argus, 23 December 1967 and 13 November 1967.
116. Ibid., p. 20.
118. Ibid., p. 79.
120. For example, see State vs. Masemula, transcript, pp. 166-167.
121. Ibid., p. 232.


139. State vs. Manisi and 2, case no. 326/63, transcript, CSAS, York University.

140. Natal Witness, 10 June 1964, report of Shabala and 3; Daily Despatch, 1 April 1969, report on State vs. Loliwe and 3; Contact, May 1965, State vs. Mkhalipi and 3.


143. Arrangements concerning the purchase of a second-hand motor torpedo boat are detailed in the Patrick Duncan Papers, 8. 48. 61. A plan for a Basutoland-based insurgency in the Transkei is discussed in correspondence in January 1963 between Duncan and the Maseru group (Patrick Duncan Papers, 8. 43. 6). Duncan discussed the plan with Robert Kennedy in Washington later that year. See C J Driver, Patrick Duncan, South African, Pan African, (London, 1980), 229.


145. State vs. Alex Nikelo and 1, transcript, CSAS, York.

146. Cape Times, 27 April 1965.

147. Contact, July 1965.


150. PAC Newsletter, Maseru, 15 May 1965.


152. Cape Times, 6 May 1967.


155. The Star, 4 September 1968; Daily Despatch, 19 October 1968.

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159. Contact, December 1966.
161. State vs. Mabuse and 13, transcript, SAIRR.
166. Cape Times, 3 October 1968.
170. Ibid., p. 140.
171. Feit, op. cit., p. 90.
174. See, for example, the Snyman Commission Report (RP 51/1963), paras. 161-165.
175. See, for example, SAIRR, Report by the Director on Visits to Port Elizabeth, East London and Kimberley in connection with the riots, RR 9/53, 12 January 1953.
179. Ibid., p. 85.
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181. Tillys, *op. cit.*, 52.


183. State vs. Fundile Maseko, EC/5/66, transcript, CSAS, University of York. Out of a black population of 200 sixty men were said to have belonged to Poqo.


189. cf. Hobsbawn, *op. cit.*, Chapter VI for a study of the Sicilian Fascii, an illustration of the 'complete process by which a primitive social movement is absorbed into a wholly modern one' (p. L 93).

190. For example: Raymond Mhlaba. For biographical details of this Umkhonto leader's early career see Lodge, *op. cit.*, 51-53.


193. Tillys, *op. cit.*, 70.


197. *Inkundla ya Bantu*, 7 May 1949, p. 5.

198. Gerhart, *op. cit.*, 15-16. In fairness to Gerhart it should be conceded that the PAC's Matthew Nkoana also has attributed a psychological function to Poqo violence:
... they had to prove not so much to others as to themselves that they in fact could do things ... they had to divest themselves of fear, the almost inexplicable fear engendered by the power that was symbolised by the white colour.
