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by: Tom Lodge

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Introduction.

At half past two, early in the morning of Thursday, November 22nd, 1962, 250 men carrying axes, pangas and various self-made weapons left the Mbekweni location and marched on Paarl. On the outskirts of the city the marchers formed two groups, one destined for the prison where the intention was to release prisoners, the other to make an attack on the police station. Before the marchers reached Paarl's boundaries, the police had already been warned of their approach by a bus driver. Police patrols were sent out and one of these encountered the marchers in Paarl's Main Street. Having lost the advantage of surprise, the marchers in Main Street began to throw stones at cars, shop windows and any police vans which they came across on their way to the police station. The police at the station were armed with sten guns and rifles in anticipation of the attack. At ten minutes past four between 75 and a hundred men advanced on the station throwing stones. When the attackers came within twenty-five yards of the station they were fired upon and two of them were immediately killed. The marchers then broke up into smaller groups and several were arrested or shot during their retreat. Some of the men who had taken part in the assault on Paarl police station met up in Loop Street with the group that was marching on the prison. These men regrouped and embarked on an attack on the inhabitants of Loop Street. Three houses and two people in the street were attacked: a seventeen year old girl and a young man were killed and four other people were wounded. According to police evidence, five insurgents were killed and fourteen were wounded. By five o clock, the Paarl uprising was over; police reinforcements had arrived from Cape Town and the men from Mbekweni were in full retreat.

This paper has two purposes. One is to provide an analysis of the causes of the Paarl disturbance. In the literature on black South African opposition movements, the events in Paarl are scarcely mentioned. This is at least partly because the participants were not politically very sophisticated or articulate; they are consequently difficult to write about. But the neglect of the events in Paarl is also attributable to a bias in much of the relevant scholarship: the emphasis of historical studies has been on black ideological response and has tended to focus on the most fluent articulants of black aspirations. There is a tendency for the history of black South African opposition to be intellectual history and to concern itself with the thoughts, responses and actions of an elite group (1.) The
popular dimension of protest is ignored or subjected to vague generalisations. However, though the Paarl events have only received cursory attention from academic writers, they were the subject of a government-appointed commission of inquiry. The incident after all involved a politically inspired insurrection taking place in the heart of an important regional town and directed against state forces.

The Snyman Commission report,(2) reflecting as it does the official ideological concerns of the time, has various shortcomings. The report concludes that there were two basic factors in the unrest at Paarl. First there were the problems stemming from inadequacies in the municipal administration. These included: deficiencies in consultative machinery; neglect of African affairs by the Paarl town council; the prevalence of corruption among location officials; cultural problems of 'modernisation' among the migrant community and the lack of any sympathetic guidance in a 'strange urban setting'; division of responsibility between the municipal and South African police forces; the mistreatment of the location's population by the municipal police. Most of the popular resentment in Paarl, claimed Snyman, was against municipal as opposed to state agencies. This situation, Snyman argued, provided a fertile environment for the spread of influence of the Poqo movement. Snyman declared that there was a direct correlation in meaning between the titles Poqo and Pan Africanist Congress; both were names for the same organisation. In the report Poqo is viewed as part of a national conspiracy also involving 'communists' and 'white liberals'. Snyman placed great emphasis on the atavistic, coercive and irrational characteristics of the organisation in its local context. The motivation of many Poqo activists, it is alleged, can be traced to their individual ambitions: they were men of little traditional status who in consequence repudiated and challenged traditional political hierarchies. Snyman went on to argue that actions directed against 'bantu people' (and their chiefs) formed a more important part of Poqo activities than 'crimes directed against the state or whites'.

Snyman, therefore portrayed Poqo as a fairly elaborate conspiracy, through which local conditions were exploited to further the purpose of, on the one hand, people whose personal political ambitions were not being promoted by the Bantustan structure, and on the other, a national political strategy devised by the Pan Africanist Congress leadership in Maseru and their allies, the white liberals and communists. The conditions Poqo sought to exploit were ones that were fairly easy to remedy with reforms, that in any case coincided with requirements of government ideology. What was needed was more centralised administration with a policy for:

'...the regulating of the influx of the Bantu people from their homelands into the industrial areas and the concomitant social difficulties to which it gives rise.' (3)

Social difficulties which would include:

'...In the circumstances some resistance from the Urban Bantu... It requires special effort to persuade them that these schemes are not intended to be oppressive but are based on social and economic needs; and that it is for the good of all that a mode of living must be evolved whereby all sections of the people can live in harmony and prosperity. The men to administer such a policy must be specially trained for the work.' (4)

On formulating these conclusions Snyman chose to disregard evidence submitted to the South African Institute of Race Relations. Their counsel
argued that first and foremost, dissatisfaction at Paarl derived from the
migrant labour system and the way of life that evolved from it, as well as
the threat to remove Africans from the Western Cape altogether. These basic
causes of insecurity were aggravated by a particularly harsh and corrupt
local administration. As far as the political movement was concerned, the
majority of Pogo members did not have to be coerced into membership but
joined voluntarily. (5)

Much of what is to follow will bear out the SAIRR's analysis. However,
a detailed study of the Paarl riots has an additional function to that of
offering an alternative interpretation to that provided by a fairly tendentious
government document. This brings us to the second purpose of this paper.
This is to make a modest empirical contribution to a current debate on the
sociology of liberation. In a recent article by Archie Mafeje, political
responses of migrant workers are explained with reference to the partial
nature of their proletarianisation:

'... it may be pointed out that the fact that the families of
migrants are back in the countryside, does create an important
structural predisposition. When confronted with a situation
such as Soweto, the first thing that migrants think of are
their families back at home and their hopes materially. There-
fore the decision to strike does not come easily to them. It
is even worse when we call to mind that in accordance with
their traditions every decision is an outcome of long and tedious
deliberations by all concerned. This is a far way cry from the
instantaneous and precipitous reactions of urban youth.' (6)

The stereotyped view of migrant workers as a politically apathetic and
conservative force has been an influential one among historians of South
African protest. For example, in Karis, Carter and Gerhart's From Protest
to Challenge it is asserted that most Pogo members in the Western Cape were
drawn from the young unemployed sons of African middle class and working
class families that had lived in urban centres from the 1920's. Pogo
activists, apparently, had tremendous difficulty in mobilising migrant
'countrymen', who resenting being 'terrorized' used to report Pogo organisers
to the police (7). Just where this information is derived from is not clear,
but the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests a very different situation.
For example if one looks at the careers of the thirty two men convicted of
plotting an uprising while working at the Jewish Old Age Home in Cape Town
in 1963 one sees that their ages varied between 21 and 63 but that most
were in their thirties, that over half the accused were married with their
dependents living in the Transkei and that with four exceptions all had
been born in the Transkei, mainly in the Tsolo district. The majority had
first come to work in Cape Town during the 1950's (8). Or, to take another
major Pogo trial, there was the group in Langa who took part in an attempt
to assassinate Chief Kaiser Matanzima: most of the twenty men lived in the
Langa single men's accommodation and had families in the Transkei (9).

Detailed local case studies of the activities and social context of
political movements help to correct mechanistic assumptions about the
political behaviour of certain social groups. They also help to show us
how ideological formulations are interpreted at a popular level. The
historiography of African nationalism has tended to be the study of
intellectual traditions with little effort made to examine the ways in
which political ideas are understood at the social base of a political
movement. For these reasons a study of the revolt of the men from the
hostels at Mbekweni seems worth while.
Part I

The uprising apart, Paarl during the late 1950's and early 1960's, had a turbulent history. There were four important previous occasions when black resentment of authority crystallized into open confrontation. In mid-1959 there was a demonstration in Paarl against the issue of women's passes which apparently had the effect of delaying the local application of the law which required all African female employees to hold passes (10). A few months later, in November 1959, rioting broke out in the suburb of Huguenot. Thousands of people, both African and Coloured, stoned cars, burnt and damaged shops and attacked Whites. One person died in the riot. The crowds were reacting to a Government banning order which had been imposed on Elizabeth Mafeking, a Paarl resident and the president of the African Food and Canning Workers Union. These disturbances were followed a month later by tension in Mbekweni location: on several occasions municipal police were attacked during early morning searches for illegal visitors and an unsuccessful attempt was made to set fire the location's administrative offices (11). The following year, Paarl was one of the few urban centres in which there was a response to the Pan Africanist Congress's anti-pass campaign. Passes were destroyed and a school in the Mbekweni location was burnt down (12).

Paarl was not a very large town and its African population was small; the unusual intensity of opposition to the authorities is at first sight rather startling. For an understanding of the tensions that underlay these recurrent confrontations a knowledge of the development and changes in the town's economy and social structure is helpful.

Paarl lies in the heart of the Boland region, a rich agricultural area traditionally dominated by fruit growing and viniculture. The orchards and vineyards extend well inside the municipal boundaries to the middle of the town. Paarl is one of the earliest centres of white settlement in South Africa and with its population of 52,000 in 1961 the main town of its region. From the end of the second world war onwards Paarl experienced considerable industrial expansion both in its traditional industrial sector which had developed out of local farming activities, the fruit canning, wine and brandy and tobacco industries, and with more recent manufacturing which had no links with local agriculture. The late 1940's and 1950's saw the establishment of jute spinning, plastics, light engineering, textiles and packaging concerns (13) so that by 1962 the total labour force employed in the 102 factories in Paarl numbered 7000 (14). Paarl's population, according to Snyman, was composed of 17,000 whites, 30,000 coloureds and 5,000 blacks (15). Since 1950 the Black population had undergone an important structural change. Whereas at the beginning of the decade roughly two thousand African families had lived in and around Paarl, during the 1950's, the number of families had been systematically reduced, so that by 1962 Paarl's population included only four hundred families (16) and 2,200 migrant workers, who were housed in the Mbekweni hostels (17).

Let us look at the changing situation of African community in Paarl a little more closely. Until the post war period the municipality had had a negligible African population and no official arrangements had been made for black housing. Labour in the traditional industries was seasonal and the labour force and their families tended to squat on farm land surrounding the town providing an additional source of income for local farmers (18). However by 1950 the dimensions of the squatter population had begun to disturb the municipal authorities. Paarl had been one of the last towns to be proclaimed under the Urban Areas Act and for this reason had attracted
a large squatter population composed of the families of farm labourers employed in the Boland (19). The squatters were concentrated in four camps: Huguenot, Suider Paarl, Klein Drakenstein and Dal Josepahat. In 1950 with Paarl's proclamation under the terms of the Act the Municipality assumed control of African housing. The land the squatters occupied was destined for industrial development (20). The authorities were to rehouse the squatter population in two locations, both quite close to each other but over four miles from the town. The main location was Mbekweni, constructed in 1951. Mbekweni consisted of four blocks of barracks divided into rooms, each room intended to house six men. Each block had separate communal kitchens and washrooms. The blocks were furnished with beds and cement floors as well as an entrance at each end (but no interior doors) (21). In addition to these 'single men's hostels' Mbekweni had a group of small houses sufficient to accommodate thirty families. The two thousand-odd single men paid R2 20 a month, and the family units were rented at R4 40 a month. The rents, together with other revenue derived from the black population, paid for the costs of constructing and financing the location (22).

Langabuya was rather a different scheme. Designated as an 'emergency camp' it was intended to house, on a temporary basis, those people who could not be sent to the Mbekweni single quarters. Consequently, most of the squatters were moved to Langabuya with their families. Langabuya was a 'site and service' scheme; in other words the municipality provided refuse collection but little else. In the squatter camps, before their homes were demolished people were told they would be given building materials in Langabuya. These did not appear apparently and people had to buy them (23). But quite apart from the expense of building new homes (and inferior ones at that) the move was to involve long term costs. Langabuya's inhabitants had to pay R1 00 a month ground rent: previously they had paid no rent or had occupied very cheap houses near the coloured township in Suider Paarl. Langabuya's 1 200 inhabitants were going to wait a long time for proper houses: the municipality only began to provide family accommodation for more than a handful of people in the mid-1960's. In the meantime it was a squalid miserable place of tin shacks exposed to the wind on the top of a ridge. Despite this, it had certain advantages over Mbekweni for those who lived there. In comparison to the neighbouring location it was less easy for the municipal authorities to control and for that reason a high proportion of those who lived there did so without permits and passes (24). The demolition of the squatters camps proceeded in fits and starts through the 1950's and was bitterly resented and in some cases resisted. The first removals took place in the winter: people's houses were flattened by tractors and the families were taken in trucks and dumped out in the open. The first camp to be subjected to this treatment was at Dal Josepahat: many people from there were to join the African National Congress (25).

There was a special reason in Paarl why the move into municipally owned rented accommodation from private (and sometimes free) housing would be a recurrent source of bitterness. Much of the employment in Paarl was seasonal: the canning factories, the wine and brandy industry, and the farms had sharply fluctuating labour requirements throughout the year. The canning industry, in Paarl the single largest employer of African labour, only hired most of its workforce for a third of the year, during the summer. This meant that its employees could be assured of a steady income only for about four months. The rest of the time they had to rely on casual farm work. Opportunities for this were becoming increasingly limited in the course of the decade by the extension of the prison farm system around Paarl. In addition, because of mechanisation, the canning season was becoming shorter. Seasonal canning workers had been excluded from the Unemployment Insurance Act in 1949. It is not surprising, therefore that many people found it very
difficult to keep up with their rent payments. The authorities retaliated by arranging with employers for the arrears to be deducted from pay packets during the peak employment period. Sometimes municipal police would actually visit factories and arrest rent defaulters. (26)

Insecurity was not limited to economic issues. The 1950's was a period in which the state was in a process of tightening its control over labour mobility and implementing the first stages of a programme to expand and elaborate the migrant labour system (27). For ideological reasons, the Western Cape, an area in which blacks represented a relatively small proportion of the population, was to receive the first impact of the programme. Its effects were felt in Paarl quite early in the decade. In 1955 women whose husbands had not lived in Paarl for fifteen years (and who therefore did not qualify for permanent residence) began to be endorsed out and sent to the Transkei (28). Men who in the slack season registered as unemployed were told to send their wives away and move into the Mbekweni hostels (29). Women in Paarl, as mentioned above, did manage quite successfully to resist the implementation of the pass laws. This was all the more remarkable in the light of what was happening in the nearby Cape Peninsula where the process of regulating the presence of black women was energetically begun in 1953 (30). The existence of a strong trade union with many black and coloured women members may have helped. However, by 1960, with the government banning of Mrs. Mafeking, an important women's movement leader, as well as the proscription of the Women's League along with Congress, the battle had been lost. In 1962, the Mapheele case was to assume a considerable local symbolic importance, as an especially heartless example of official interference in African family life (31). The case involved the expulsion of a young wife from Paarl who had been living for all her married life illegally in Langabuya while her husband was compelled to stay in a hostel at Mbekweni. Apparently quite a lot of 'single' men of Mbekweni had their wives living in the nearby 'temporary' camps in constant fear of official harassment. There was also a considerable number of men who had not obtained passes and lived an anxious existence hiding in the bushes near the banks of the Berg river (32).

In 1962 there was an added ingredient to people's worries with the onset of a well publicised debate concerning the total removal of Africans from the western Cape in conformity with a Government policy that had been first elaborated in 1955. Despite the fact that influx control in the western Cape had been extremely stringent since that time and had been accompanied, as we have seen, by a systematic restructuring of the African community into a largely migrant population, this apparently was not enough. In August, Verwoerd announced the formation of a special action committee to stimulate employers to replace their unskilled black labourers with coloured workers (who were at that time mainly employed in skilled capacities). The programme was justified in economic terms with the argument that it would encourage employers to mechanise and in so doing to raise productivity (33). In October 1962 a concerted drive was begun in the African townships in Cape Town to send African women to the Transkei (34). Paarl employers, despite their political sympathies, did not favour the government policy. They maintained that quite apart from being cheaper, African labour was more productive and efficient than coloured labour (35). Most of the labour force, both on the farms and in the factories, was African.

The implications of the policy were probably fairly clear to the African community in Paarl. Employers worries would have probably filtered down, there was plenty of press coverage to the debate, and both the Mapheele case and the Langa and Nyanga expulsions in October 1962 would have aroused fears. Two of the Pogo members who gave evidence to the
commission mention the proposed removals as a source of general anxiety as did other witnesses (36).

Let us summarise the situation as it had evolved by 1962. In Paarl there existed a fairly small black community which within the previous decade had experienced an exceptionally sharp decline in its economic prosperity and social security. Black people had lost the degree of independence they had enjoyed in deciding where they should live: for many this loss represented a significant rise in the cost of living with the move into municipal accommodation. Many families were no longer permitted to live together. Seasonal workers were finding that their opportunities for employment during the slack period had diminished while their economic obligations had increased. And in 1962, with the removals debate, even migrant labourers were confronted with the threatened prospect of being thrown back into the pool of landless and unemployed in the reserves. To an extent these were factors which were common to all urban black communities in South Africa. However in the Western Cape towns the effects of overall tendencies in the development of South Africa's political economy were magnified and exaggerated by ruling class ideological preoccupations. And in a small community, such as Paarl's, the structural changes would have been especially obvious to the people experiencing them.

A major source of tension was provided by the venal behaviour of the municipal administration. Considerable attention was paid to this in the Snyman report. The Director of Bantu Administration at Paarl (a post appointed by the Town Council) was a former police sergeant in the Transkei, J.H. le Roux. Le Roux had held the post since the inception of municipal administration of the African population in 1950. Evidence was submitted to the Commission which suggested that for a very long time, both le Roux, and a black colleague, the senior clerk Wilson Ngcukana, had been using their power for private purposes. Accusations included the selling of passes, endorsing out of men to create employment vacancies for which passes could be sold, the employment of those who could not afford the going rate of twenty rands per pass on le Roux's private farms, the enforcement of substantial fines for trivial infringements of regulations, and various instances of brutal behaviour by municipal employees (37). Le Roux had actually been charged and tried for corruption in 1960: his subsequent acquittal provoked great dissatisfaction (38). During the trial le Roux apparently succeeded in bribing or intimidating many of those witnesses who were supposed to appear against him (39). People were completely powerless to act against le Roux; it was believed that a complaint to the authorities could easily result in the withdrawal of official permission to live and work in the area (40). A report made during le Roux's temporary suspension in 1960 noted an 'unprecedented degree of hostility to location officials' as well as an ebullient attitude among Africans in Mbekweni: 'they now regard themselves as being in a position to put whites in their place'. The report also mentioned a massive illegal liquor trade, R4 000 outstanding rents and an ever increasing number of illegal residents (41).

What should be stressed is that the extent of corruption in the Paarl administration was not merely the result of the individual weaknesses of the personalities involved. Nor was it going to be remedied necessarily by their substitution with the 'dedicated, kindly and human officials' from the Department of Bantu Administration and Development as recommended by Snyman (42). The point was that the prevalence of corruption in Paarl's municipal administrators, was, if not inevitable, at least made very likely by certain structural conditions. First, the municipal control over influx and endorsement out procedures made its officials extremely powerful.
with regard to the employers who depended on them for the supply of most of their unskilled labour. Consequently industrial and agricultural interests would be unlikely to use their influence in the town council to act against any abuses by these men. (43) Secondly, the seasonal nature of much of the employment greatly added to the power of officialdom to regulate people's lives and so considerably increased the opportunity for official venality. Thirdly, the political environment, which gave tacit approval to the harassment and disruption of the lives of Western Cape blacks, created an ideological climate for the illicit actions of location authorities such as Paarl's (especially when they were appointed by a staunchly Nationalist town council).

Small as it was, the African population in Paarl had a fairly complex social structure. At the apex of the community were the people who, by virtue of the nature of their employment or because of the length of residence in the area, enjoyed a degree of status and security. The group included black employees of the municipal administration, artisans and skilled workers. From this group were drawn members of the advisory board. Some of them inhabited the family accommodation in Mbekwēni. Two members of this group gave evidence to the Commission. Mr. Kleinbooi Sokweba, aged fifty four, a father of twelve children, and a resident in Paarl since 1938, had taken part in 1960 in a delegation to the authorities to complain about the noisy behaviour of the inhabitants of the Mbekwēni hostels. Mr. Wilson Sonyani, a carpenter and lay preacher, who lived with his family in Mbekwēni, was a member of an Advisory Board delegation which had tried to warn the authorities of the spread of Pqo's influence in mid-1962. Sonyani was also the Chairman of Mbekwēni School Board.

Then there was the residual group of former squatters living in Langabuya with families, numbering altogether about 1200 people. Other family groups were scattered in various squatter camps still awaiting demolition. The fortunes of these people would have varied very widely according to their legal status: but all were subject to the fear that they would no longer be permitted to live together as families in Paarl.

Thirdly there were the migrant labourers, some of whom, as we have noted, were former squatters and who had managed to find illegal accommodation for their wives in the emergency camp. Among the migrant workers there were also more recent arrivals to Paarl, drawn there by the expansion of employment in the new manufacturing industrial sector which had developed in the 1950's. Judging by the evidence submitted to the Snyman Commission by the Food and Canning Workers as well as the contents of the union's reports it seems sensible to conclude from the Union's evident concern over living conditions in both the squatter's camps and the single men's hostels, that its members, and hence workers in the 'traditional' industrial sector were to be found among both the migrant and the 'settled' sections of the African population. Therefore employment patterns in Paarl did not coincide with residential divisions and the commission evidence suggests that strong social links existed between the hostel inhabitants and Langabuya. However there was considerable tension between the migrant workers and the elite group described above.

Finally, there was a transient population of particularly vulnerable people: those who had recently arrived to seek work without any official sanction.

As we have seen black response to deteriorating conditions had on occasions been expressed in the form of prolonged and violent riots. But
Africans had also defended their interests through a variety of formal organisations. The oldest of these in Paarl was the African National Congress, a branch of which was founded towards the end of the 1920's by two communist activists within the Congress, Ndobe and Tonjeni (47). This was a period when the Communist Party had adopted a policy of close collaboration with the ANC and its members in the Western Cape were quick to exploit the wave of social unrest which accompanied the sharp fall in world agricultural prices which occurred at the turn of the thirties. The ANC in Paarl was also to pick up membership during the early 1950's as the result of popular anger and resistance to the squatter 'removals. The fact that people actually destroyed their passes in 1960 suggests that they were acting in accordance with Luthuli's call for people to burn their passes, rather than the Pan Africanist Congress directive which told men to leave their documents at home and surrender themselves at police stations without them (48).

But probably more important for its political influence by 1960 was the Food and Canning Workers Union. The FCWU was founded in 1941 with an African and Coloured membership: the AFCWU was formed in response to the requirements for registration under the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1947. Paarl had been an important centre for the Union since the establishment of a branch in 1941. The FCWU and the AFCWU during the 1950's were generally effective in protecting and promoting the economic interests of their members. For example, in Paarl in 1957, an increase was conceded by the major canning employer after a brief strike organised by the union (49). But the two unions did not merely confine themselves to economic objectives. Both organisations were affiliated to the South African Congress of Trades Unions, a member of the Congress Alliance. In conformity with other SACTU affiliates, the canning workers unions linked the struggle for immediate economic benefits with long term political goals. Their leading officials often held important posts in other Congress Alliance organisations. The benefits could be reciprocal: though the nationalist movement could draw on union organisation to advance political strategies, at the same time individual unions could find their bargaining power considerably increased by political alliances. For example in 1959 the ANC was attempting to organise an international trade boycott. The fruit industry, especially dependent on overseas markets was understandably fairly nervous. The FCWU and the ANC were able to extract from the Langeberg cooperative (an important Boland agricultural and fruit processing employer) an agreement which included recognition of the AFCWU and a promise not to assist the government to enforce the Urban Areas Act. In return, the Langeberg Cooperative would be left off the boycott list (50). The Paarl branch was the major source of income for the union's headquarters. The AFCWU branch had about four hundred members, 200 of whom lived in the Mbekweni hostels (51). With its willingness to take up issues not directly related to the workplace (living conditions, rents, provision by the municipality of certain services, etc.), the local branch of the union was an important political force in the community.

Considerably less influential and effective, was the Bantu Advisory Board, appointed by the municipality's Bantu Affairs Committee on the advice of the Director, le Roux. Its members were drawn from the most privileged members of the black population. Not surprisingly the board members had accomplished little in the way of improvements or even in reflecting community grievances. As one black witness testified to the commission: 'We no longer go to the Bantu Advisory Council because it is they who push us around' (52).
Having sketched in the social, economic and political environment that Paarl's black population lived in during the early 1960's we can now turn to the development of the Poqo movement in the area.

Part 2

In this section we will first look at the origins and development of the Poqo movement in the Western Cape, paying attention to the nature of organisation, ideology, strategy, social base and activity, before examining the growth of Poqo in Paarl itself.

The Western Cape, and in particular the Cape Peninsula, had been one of the areas of strongest support for the Pan Africanist Congress. This I have related elsewhere to the particularly fierce effects of influx control in the Cape Peninsula, the 'repatriation' of women and children to the Transkei, the refusal of the authorities to construct adequate housing, and sharply deteriorating living conditions (52). The PAC's rhetorical militancy, the incorporation into its ideology of themes drawn from traditions of primary resistance, and the immediacy of its strategic objectives made it especially attractive to the increasingly large migrant worker population of Cape Town. The Pan Africanists found an important section, if not the majority, of their following in the 'bachelor zones' of Langa (53). However of the thirty-one PAC leaders who were subsequently put on trial in Cape Town after the 1960 pass campaign, only seven men were from the migrant workers' hostels in Langa and Nyanga. Unfortunately the trial documentation only contains full details of the backgrounds of a few of the leaders: they included a herbalist, a dry cleaning examiner, a domestic servant, a university student, a tailor, and a farmworker and their ages ranged from 22 to 55 (the majority of the accused were over thirty). At least seven were former members of the ANC and one had once belonged to the Communist Party (54). The evidence suggests a not altogether surprising social pattern: a political movement with a large following amongst migrant workers, but with positions of responsibility held by men with at least some education, work skills and political experience.

During the 1960 pass campaign as well as before and after it, there was considerable contact between the local Pan Africanist leaders and members of the multiracial Liberal Party. This was despite frequent attacks on white radicals who had been associated with the Congress movement. Local Liberals were seeking a mass base and though wary of the racialist undertones of Pan-Africanist ideology, they sympathised with and were attracted by the PAC's hostility to left wing influences within the Congress movement. Cape Town PAC leaders, whatever their private feelings about the Liberals, were glad to accept offers of assistance that appeared to be without strings, and allowed certain Liberals to play an important intermediary role between them and the authorities during the 1960 troubles in Cape Town. Whereas this relationship had certain advantages at the time, it did have the effect of isolating the leaders from rank and file membership, as well as the large informal following the campaign generated (56).

In the months following the crisis of March-April 1960, this gulf between leaders and followers was to widen and take on a factional form. Some of the main leaders jumped bail and left the country towards the end of 1960. This considerably weakened the degree of influence of those who remained. Accounts by two Cape Town journalists tell of a struggle in the Cape Town locations between 'moderates and extremists' (57). The 'extremists' identified the 'moderates' as those PAC men who had flirted with the Liberal Party. They were 'Katangese, the treacherous ones who are playing the same role as Moishe Tshombe in the Congo' (58). These accounts are substantiated.
by some of the trial evidence. In the Jewish Old Age Home trial two of the accused in their statements to the police (possibly made after they had been tortured) mention a dispute within the PAC in Cape Town. One group was led by two Nyanga leaders, both former members of the regional executive of the legal PAC, Christopher Mlokoti and Abel Matross (59). Mlokoti and Matross were the PAC men who had made the initial contact with the Liberal Party in late 1959 (60). The other faction was allegedly led by Mlami Makwetu and Wellington Tshongayi (61). Makwetu had been branch secretary at Langa New Flats in 1960 and was a docker (62). Tshongayi also belonged to the PAC in 1960 and was secretary of the Crawford Branch. He was imprisoned after the pass campaign (63). What the evidence suggests is a struggle for dominance of the underground movement in early 1961 between upper and lower echelon leadership with the latter, by virtue of their stronger links with migrant hostel dwellers, becoming ascendent.

This split in the underground movement (which was accompanied by fighting between the different groups) (64) was followed by a period of extensive recruitment and organisation by the dominant faction. It seems that it was at this point that the 'cell system' was established (65). Within Langa, and elsewhere in Cape Town, recruitment and organisation was often done by forming groups composed of men who had come from a particular rural region. Although this flowed naturally from a situation where migrant workers would often choose to live with friends or relatives from their homeplace, there was an element of self consciousness in the way it was done. For example in Langa, there was a special 'Lady Frere' group drawn from men who lived in Zones 19, 20, 23 and 24 of the Langa single men's quarters (66). This would have obvious advantages when Poqo began to extend its influence into the Transkei (67). It also meant that Poqo cell members would not only live in close proximity with each other, they would also probably be employed together (68). Theoretically each cell was composed of ten men: in fact they were often larger and in any case individual cells would combine for larger meetings often involving over a hundred people. Similarly large groups would sometimes accompany recruiters on their rounds (69). Each cell would have a leader.

Langa seems to have been regarded by other Poqo groups as the local head-quarters of the movement: certainly it was recruiting teams from Langa who played the most active role in spreading the influence of the movement. There are recorded instances of Langa activists establishing cells or branches in different parts of Cape Town. Men living in compounds seem to have been a favourite target for recruiting operations: the Jewish Old Age Home trial also involved workers from a nearby hotel. Another trial, which collapsed through lack of evidence, involved staff from the Brooklands Chest Hospital (70). Poqo activists fanned out from Cape Town to the smaller urban centres and the farms surrounding them, either starting new cells or reactivating PAC branches. Considerable effort seems to have been devoted to building cells among farmworkers: according to state witness evidence in a trial involving a member of Tshongayi's cell, there was an unsuccessful meeting to recruit people on a farm near Somerset West in February 1961 (71). More successful in this context apparently was the establishment of a Poqo cell on a farm at Stellenbosch in October 1961 after a visit by three Poqo men from Cape Town (72).

Poqo's message was stated in simple direct terms. In December 1961 a leaflet in Xhosa was picked up in Nyanga. It read:

We are starting again Africans... we die once. Africa will be free on January 1st. The white people shall suffer, the black people will rule. Freedom comes after bloodshed. Poqo has started.
It needs a real man. The Youth has weapons so you need not be afraid. The PAC says this (73).

Sometimes the message was more specific: farmworkers were told that Poqo intended to take the land away from whites and give it to Africans (74). Men in Wellington were told that one day they must throw away their passes and take over the houses of the whites. All who did not join Poqo would be killed along 'with the white bosses'. Men in Paarl were told there was no need for whites: the factories and the industries would carry on as usual for was it not the black people who worked in them (75)? Chiefs should be killed for it was they who were responsible for the endorsement out of Africans from the Western Cape (76). Sometimes Poqo members giving evidence would repeat some of the old PAC slogans— from Cape to Cairo, from Morocco to Madagascar (77), but often witnesses would claim that they knew nothing of the ANC or PAC (78). This may have been prompted by caution on their part, but what is noticeable is that many of the distinctive attributes of PAC speeches given at a popular level had disappeared: there were no references to Pan Africanism, communism or socialism and no careful clarifications of the movement's attitude with regard to the position of racial minorities. Ideological statements had been boiled down to a set of slogans: 'We must stand alone in our land' (79); 'Freedom to stand alone and not be suppressed by whites' (80); 'amaAfrika Poqo'; 'Izwe Lethu' (our land). Poqo's lack of a 'political theory', the brutal simplicity of its catchphrases, the absence of any social programme save for the destruction of the present order and its replacement with a negative image in which white would be black, and black would be white, all this has helped to diminish its importance in the historiography of South African resistance movements. But because the slogans were simple does not mean that they were banal: they evoked a profound response from men who had been forced off the land, whose families were being subjected to all forms of official harassment, as well as economic deprivation, who perceived every relationship with authority in terms of conflict: whether at the workplace, in the compound, or in the reserve. These were men who had no place to turn to. And hence the all-embracing nature of the movement's preoccupations, its social exclusiveness, and its urgency. The undertone of millenarianism, the concept of the sudden dawning of a juster era, the moral implications of the word 'poqo' (pure)— these are not surprising. For here was a group of men who were simultaneously conscious both of the destruction that was being wreaked upon their old social world, and the hopelessness of the terms being offered to them by the new order.

The strategy of a general uprising logically developed from this vision. The twenty one farmworkers of Stellenbosch put on trial in June 1962 were found guilty on a number of charges which included making preparations to attack a farm manager and his family, to burn the farm buildings and then to march to the town firing buildings on the way. For weapons the men sharpened old car springs into pangas (81). The initiative for this strategy was probably a local one: most of the national PAC leadership was in prison in 1961 and early 1962 and had only fully regrouped in Maseru in August 1962 (82). But by late 1962, judging from the evidence of men involved in the Poqo attack at Paarl, Poqo members were conscious of a plan for a nationally coordinated insurrection, the directives for which would come from above (83). In March 1963, Potlake Leballo, the PAC's acting president told a journalist that he was 'in touch with Western Cape and other regional leaders (84). Despite this coordination of the movement with the surviving political hierarchy of the Pan Africanist Congress, there is a strong case for asserting that the insurrectionary impetus came initially from below and, as I have argued, can be directly related to the
social situation of Poqo's local leaders and their followers.

Let us now narrow the focus and look at the history of the Poqo movement in Paarl itself. A branch of the Pan Africanist Congress had existed in Paarl before the organisation's banning (85). The earliest record of revived activity by PAC members in Paarl is documentation from a trial of three men convicted for recruiting on behalf of an illegal organisation. All three were originally from Cofimvaba, in their twenties, and lived in migrant workers' hostels. Two worked in the Bakke plastics factory and one at Rembrandt Tobacco. Their recruiting activities, which took place between February and October 1961, were concentrated in the Mbekweni and New Town locations (86). Recruiting was a simple procedure: men would be approached, told of Poqo, 'an organisation which stood alone' and asked to pay an initial subscription of twenty five cents (87). State witnesses at Poqo trials tended to emphasize a coercive aspect to recruiting: they would claim that they were given little option but to join, for if they did not, they were told, they would be killed or at the very least, would have to leave the location.

However, such people would naturally be anxious to disassociate themselves from the organisation. One Poqo member (who did not seem to be aware of the legal implications of turning state evidence) said he joined because:

'I saw that a lot of people were supporting the Poqo organisation at Mbekweni location. That's why I joined, because a lot of people I know also joined.' (88)

Social pressure there may have been, but this does not amount to coercion.

New members were told that the subscriptions (as well as the twenty five cents, members paid an additional ten cents a month) (89) would be used by the leaders in Langa 'to buy guns' or for burials and the support of the dependents of the dead and arrested (90). Each new member was organised into a cell of ten people (91) the members of which would sometimes live in the same rooms (92). Once a week the members of the cell would meet in their cell leader's room (93). Less frequently there would be much larger meetings involving members of several Mbekweni cells (94). According to age, the Poqo members would also be placed either in a 'Task Force' (if they were under twenty five) or a 'general Force' (95). The younger group would be in the vanguard of any attack as well as performing any defensive operations. Members of both forces would attend parades together in a plantation near the location. Sometimes outsiders, believed to be from Langa, would join the proceedings. Here the recruits would drill like soldiers in preparation for the great day when they would fight for the return of their land (96).

Other preparations included the fashioning of crude weapons and, for those who could afford it, the scarification of their foreheads as a measure believed to ensure their invulnerability against the police. This was carried out by one of the main leaders and he would be paid ten rands for the operation (97).

There are no firm indications as to how many people belonged to Poqo in Mbekweni or Paarl as a whole. At the final meeting before the attack, and in the march on the town, witnesses suggest that there were about three hundred participants. This was the figure the authorities believed at the time to have represented the local strength of Poqo. From the backgrounds of some of the defendants and state witnesses in one of the trials that took place after the uprising the following generalisations can be made. These
were fairly young men who had come to work and live in Paarl since the mid-1950's. They were mainly employed in the new manufacturing industries, in services or at the cigarette factory. They lived in one or other of the migrant workers' blocks at Mbekweni (with no noticeable concentration in any one block). Despite testimony from witnesses to the Snyman Commission that the leaders were 'educated men' (98) this feature does not emerge from the records of the trial (99). From these rather sparse details a few tentative points can be made. Poqo's local leaders were drawn from the men who formed the most recently arrived section of Paarl's population. The absence of any employees from the traditional industrial activities in Paarl is interesting; it would suggest that the AFCWU had succeeded in influencing the political loyalties and the ideological outlook of its membership. Though the Poqo men in the trial would not have had experienced all the hardships described in preceding sections of this paper (the removals from the squatters' camps and the fluctuations of employment arising out of involvement in a seasonal industry) they did come from the group which felt the severity of the system most intensely. They were unable to have their wives and children living nearby save illegally, they themselves were the most stringently subjected to influx control restrictions, and they had the most intimate knowledge of deteriorating conditions in the reserves. It is also reasonable to assume that the general insecurity of the community and the violent tradition of social protest in Paarl would have contributed to their motivation.

Before the uprising there had been at least eight instances of violence in Paarl which were eventually attributed to Poqo. On the night of 21st January, 1962, eleven men took part in the murder of an employee of the municipal administration, Klaus Hosea. Hosea was believed by local Poqo leaders to have been an informer. He was seen writing down the numbers of lorries which had transported Poqo members from Paarl to a meeting in Simonstown. Four of the men functioned as look-outs and seven took part in the killing of Hosea. The murder took place between Mbekweni and Langabuya (100). Nearly three months later on April 14th, the police were told of a plan to burn down the houses of municipal employees and kill the inhabitants. Early on the morning of the 15th, a strong police patrol was sent into Mbekweni. In the middle of the location they came across a crowd of about 120 men who were singing. On being intercepted the men attacked the police wounding three constables and their commanding officer. According to reports at the time, guns as well as sticks and stones were used in the attack (101). The police were to react by raiding the location in strength on the night of May 6th. The raid involved 162 constables led by eight officers. By now the police were aware of the extent of Poqo's influence, but in spite of arresting a few suspects were able to do little to check the movement: they were unable to persuade anyone to come forward to incriminate those they had arrested (102). From this time police raids became increasingly frequent in Mbekweni.

Two more suspected informers were to be killed by Poqo in the following months and in both cases their ending was terribly brutal. Then in the middle of June Poqo members dragged four women out of various rooms in the hostels and took them to the nearby plantation. Three of the women were hacked to death, one managed to survive her wounds and the attempt to set her body alight. The day after, a pamphlet written in Xhosa was found pasted to one of the kitchen block walls. It read:

'Here is something important to all of you. Girls must never be present again in our single quarters, even the individual they may be visiting will not be innocent of such charge. Never again must any preacher be heard making a noise in our single quarters.
by preaching. One who wishes to do so must go and do it in town.

Those who are going around here with pamphlets of Watchtower it must be their last week-end, going about approaching people with this nonsense.

People collecting washing for local laundries must cease to be seen collecting money in the single quarters. We will take our washing to the laundry ourselves.

Christians will be allowed only this Sunday, June 24th, after which and until December 1963, never will any existing church which is calculated to oppress be allowed. There will only be one national church. All the above things will be abolished from next week until December 1963.

You are being told. These are the last warnings of this nature. Therefore please tell or inform each other. The time itself tells you. It shines to each and every one, but you teach or preach falsehood to us so that the nation must remain oppressed forever' (103).

Then on September 22nd a white shopkeeper was killed in his shop in Wellington. According to police evidence he was attacked by a Pogo group from Paarl 'to show (the movement's) determination to kill whites'. The group used firearms and emptied the cash drawer (104). Finally on October 28th a witness, who was helping the police in their investigation of the storekeeper murder, was killed in a similarly brutal fashion to previous victims.

By the end of October, the police had arrested twenty five men whom they believed to have been involved both in the murders and in Pogo (105). Concern over the apparent extent of the movement's power had also affected the Bantu Advisory Board and the location's administrators. There was a history of antipathy between the members of the Advisory Board and the inhabitants of the single hostels. Several of them owed their position on the Board to the influence of le Roux's headman, Wilson Ngcukana. Board members had acquiesced in the system of pass selling and had supported measures taken against people who were behind in their rent payments (107). In 1960, the Advisory Board had sent a deputation to the Mayor of Paarl to complain about the single men's behaviour (108). This was during the period of le Roux's suspension, when control of the location was for a period loosened. At the weekends large numbers of women and children came into the hostels and lively parties were held. The Board members asked for the appointment of block supervisors, and more recently requested the erection of a fence to prevent unauthorised entry to the location. In May, 1962, a deputation, composed of 'leading members of the Bantu Community' alarmed by the recruiting and the drilling activities going on obviously quite openly in the location, complained to the police district commandant of 'unlawful meetings' and 'unlawful visitors'. The commandant took up their complaints with the location administration. The administration's officials seemed to have been rather piqued that the deputation did not channel their complaints through them and Ngcukana went so far as to compromise deputation members by publicly warning them that Pogo was looking for the people who had betrayed them to the police (109). At the beginning of November, the Board asked the administration for permission to send a second deputation to the police, but despite the urgency of the request, no more was heard of the matter (110). Obviously the municipal officials were anxious to maintain their power within the location and did not want to rely on external...
assistance.

However, by this time, the municipal authorities were ready to act. Ngcukana had for some months been engaged in a series of brutal interrogations of various suspected Poqo members. At least one of the Poqo witnesses at the Snyman Commission had been in touch with the municipal police since the middle of the year (111). Ngcukana had also been building up his own client group in the location: there was talk of a group of Mpondo who had been brought into the location recently, other members of this group included very young and recently arrived migrant workers who had just bought their passes (112). On Sunday 18th November, at a meeting held at Wilson Ngcukana's house during the morning, the decision was taken to isolate the Poqo members by driving them out of their hostels and forcing them to occupy rooms in Block D of the location. The removals took place straight away. Men from Block A (who apparently composed the major force of Ngcukana's following) (113), dragged men out of their rooms, beat them up, threw their belongings out after them, and then herded them into Block D. The municipal police played a leading part in this operation and apparently used the occasion to pay off a number of old scores (114). These removals did not occur all at once but carried on until they were completed on Tuesday (115). The municipal police then set to work on the new inmates of D Block and by Wednesday had succeeded in discovering three men allegedly involved in the murders which had taken place during the preceding months. These men were handed over to the South African Police (116). With this blow, the stage was set for the Paarl uprising.

Section 3

At 9 o'clock, on the evening of May 21st, the Poqo leaders called a meeting in D Block. By now they were thoroughly alarmed and were convinced of the need for a decisive counter attack on the authorities. The meeting was told that they should prepare for an attack on Paarl police station and the prison later that night with the immediate purpose of freeing the Poqo men arrested earlier. Another object of the attack would be to obtain weapons and ammunition for the movement. Despite Snyman's assertion that the ultimate aim was to launch an attack on the white people of Paarl that night, the evidence is rather confusing with regard to what was supposed to happen when Poqo was in control of the police station and prison. But it was stressed by the speakers, that that night was not the great night when all Poqo groups were to launch a general insurrection throughout the country. However, it was planned to coordinate the assault with the Poqo cells at Langa whom, it was hoped, would launch a diversionary attack on the police and prevent Cape Town from sending reinforcements to Paarl (118). Three men immediately left Mbekweni in a taxi to contact the Langa people for this purpose. While they were away, the meeting broke up and people returned to their rooms to collect their weapons and get some sleep. The last routine police patrol occurred during this lull and the police saw nothing to arouse their suspicions that anything unusual was going on (119).

In Langa, there seems to have been some reluctance to fall in with the plans of the Paarl group. The Langa Poqo leaders first of all suggested that the Paarl men should merely kill Ngcukana, but this suggestion was rejected by the visitors. Ngcukana slept out of the location and wasn't easily accessible, and in any case was working hand in glove with the police. By now things had reached a stage where the killing of a senior clerk would not in itself provide an adequate solution. But, said the Langa men, there were not adequate numbers of Poqo members at Paarl to launch a successful attack on the police station. Then, Damane, the leader of the Paarl deputation, said 'If we are dead, then we are dead' (120), and the force of this
argument seems to have convinced the men in Langa for their visitors left them with the assurance that the Cape Town police would have plenty to occupy themselves with in Langa that night (121). On their return, the Poqo members were marshalled for another short meeting and then at half past two, on the morning of November 22nd, the march on Paarl began.

The events of the march have been described at the beginning of this paper and are detailed at length in the Snyman Commission Report. Just two points about them will be made here. First, the sudden transformation of the march from a disciplined attack on the police station and gaol into a general attack on any whites in the path of the marchers requires comment. The fact that Poqo members actually went into houses in Loop street to kill their occupants suggests that this was not merely a panic stricken defensive reaction but rather involved an extension of the objects of the attack as it was originally conceived in the minds of the participants. Poqo members had for months discussed and planned for a general uprising. An insurrectionist strategy, as I have suggested earlier in this paper, arose quite spontaneously in a situation where men were caught in a web of pressures and tensions, in which neither the present nor the future held out any source of hope. At the point when the marchers turned upon the inhabitants of Loop street, the attack which had been primarily a defensive operation, turned into an insurrection, and followed the lines of a preconceived model.

The second point worth making here is that, in the short term, the march on Paarl very nearly succeeded in attaining its immediate objectives. If it wasn't for the observation of the marchers by a bus driver on his way to the location and the failure of the marchers from stopping him from alerting the police it is quite likely that the thirty nine policemen in the Paarl district (122) (many of whom were off duty) would not have been able to cope with the attack. It took over three quarters of an hour for reinforcements from Cape Town to arrive (123). The Paarl uprising still represents the occasion which came closest the apocalyptic ideal of Poqo and many other movements before them: a black insurrection carried into the heart of the white cities of South Africa.

Conclusion

Both government reports and more socially compassionate liberal analyses tend to view political violence in South Africa as the result of psychological trauma, hence the emphases is on the apparent irrationality of such actions, an irrationality which can only be due to an abnormal mental and emotional crisis in the minds of the participants. Snyman in his report refers to the cultural problems of modernisation and the stresses it could create:

The migrant Bantu do not understand the ways of the white man... They are steeped in the customs and habits of their tribal life... What the Bantu people needed in this to them strange urban setting was a sympathetic and patient administration intent on explaining and persuading them of the need for regulations... The great difficulties which confront the migrant Bantu in adapting himself to an urban life escape the mind of the average white man. He does not realise that the Urban Bantu is in urgent need of sympathetic guidance in adapting himself to the circumstances of urban life... South Africa's industrial development has thrown up tremendous and diverse problems for it in its inter-racial relations. The easy going and generally accepted practices of separated existences for White and Bantu as obtaining under rural conditions have had to be revised and
adapted to the more complicated conditions arising in urban areas...

Less sententiously, the SAIRR counsel pointed to the:...

...housing of men in 'single quarters', cut off from the stabilising influence of family life and forced to practice an unnatural continence - which is bound to lead to mental and emotional tensions and frustrations (125).

At a simpler level, a member of the Interdenominational African Ministers' Fraternal testified to the Commission that the 'riot' was 'not political' and caused by 'the silliness of children'.

Whilst not disregarding the social distress that provided a crucial contributory cause of the uprising, in this paper I have attempted to demonstrate the rationality of the events as far as the viewpoints of the Poqo members were concerned. Just as it can be argued that the behaviour of a rioting crowd has an implicit rationality to it, so too with the marchers. The terrible events of the night of November 21st grew out of an insurrectionary characteristic of the Poqo movement. For their members the reversal of the present social order was the only alternative to its perpetuation on increasingly intolerable terms (127). There was nothing irrational nor unbalanced about their perception of the world around them.

Tom Lodge
September 1979
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1 A recent example of this sort of study is Gail Gerhart's *Black Power in South Africa* (University of California, 1979). At a more popular level, the daily series of cartoons with captions by Alan Paton in the Johannesburg *Star* can also be classified in this category.


3 Snyman Commission, para. 166.

4 Ibid. paras. 168-169.


9 See *State vs. Ngconcolo and 19 others*, September 1963. Transcript held at University of York, Centre for Southern African Studies documentation project.


12 Submission of Counsel for SAIRR to Snyman Commission, p.28.

13 Supplement to *South African Industries and Trade*, May 1964, pp. 21 - 22.

14 *Cape Times*, 14 8 1962.

15 Snyman Commission, para. 176.


17 Transcript of proceedings of Snyman Commission, CAMP microfilm held at University of York, Morell Library, p.600. (henceforth: Snyman proceedings)


21 Snyman proceedings, p. 518.
22 Snyman Commission, paras. 136 - 138.
23 Snyman proceedings, p. 626.
24 Snyman proceedings, p. 649. A portrait of the location is provided in
Frank Barton, 'Condemned to nowhere' in Drum, July 1963.
26 Snyman proceedings, pp. 519 - 520 & 558 - 563, and FCWU Annual Report,
1961, p. 5.
27 See Martin Legassick, 'Capital accumulation and violence' in Economy
28 Barton, op cit.
29 Institute of Administrators of non-European Affairs, Records of Proceedings
30 Anon, 'Inside Pogo', Drum, February 1963.
31 Barton, op cit.
32 Snyman proceedings, p. 584.
33 See Verwoerd's statement in 'Bantu to quit Western Province' in
Cape Times, 29 8 1962 and statement by Professor Sadie in 'African
removals rejected at symposium' in Cape Times, 12 10 I 1962.
34 'African wives, children, told to go home' in Cape Times,IO IO I962.
35 'Paarl factories' mainstay is African worker' in Cape Times, 26 7 I962.
36 Snyman proceedings, pp 265 & 276 & 464.
37 Snyman proceedings, pp 312 - 316 & 491 & 644 and Submission of Counsel for
SAIRR to Snyman Commission p. 6 and State vs Makatezi and 20 others, March
1963, transcript held at SAIRR (I/63), p. 90.
38 Snyman proceedings, p. 620
40 Ibid, p 316.
41 Rand Daily Mail, I9 2 I963
42 Snyman Commission, para.170.
The self-serving behaviour of a Bantu Affairs Department-staffed bureaucracy
is well illustrated in J. Kane-Berman's analysis of the West Rand Administration
43 Evidence of employers' willingness to cooperate with municipal Bantu
Administration officials is the extraordinary arrangement that existed in many
factories in which rent arrears were collected through pay deductions.
See for examples: Snyman proceedings, p. 528 (Letter written from FCWU to Paarl Town Clerk, 23 9 1962 re. conditions in Mbekweni). Minutes of 2nd quarterly delegates conference of AFCWU, 6 7 1952 (re. demolition of workers' homes in squatters' camps) and Minutes of AFCWU 10th annual conference, 14 9 1957, p. 2 (re. rents in Langabuya and Mbekweni), FCWU papers, University of the Witwatersrand.


'SA UK canned fruit trade in danger' in Contact (Cape Town), Vol 2 no 20, 3 10 1959, p.5 and FCWU Annual Report, September 1959, p.9.

Snyman proceedings, p.513.

Lodge, op cit. pp221 - 223.


Reg. vs Madlebe and 31 others, transcripts of PAC meetings, AS 31/6. 4.

For a fuller description of the relationship that existed between Pan Africanists and Liberals in Cape Town, see Lodge, op cit.


Howard Lawrence, 'Poqo - we go it alone' in Fighting Talk (Johannesburg), Vol I7 no.2, February 1963, pp. 4-6. This account may seem to be slightly romanticised but there is evidence suggesting that recent events in the Congo were discussed in at least one Poqo cell in Cape Town in 1961 (see evidence of state witness Sontekwa in State vs. Mandla and 31 others, defence lawyer's notebooks, AS 69/7).

State vs. Madlebe and 31 others, statements by accused nos. 21 and 23, AS 69/8 and Reg. vs Synod Madlebe, AS 31/11.


Contact I6 4 1960.

State vs. Madlebe and 31 others, defence lawyer's notebooks, AS 69/7.

Contact, 29 II 1962.

Drum's report (see reference 31) mentions an 'inaugural meeting' in August 1961 by 750 Poqo activists in a hall between Paarl and Wellington, very near Mbekweni. I have come across no other reports to confirm this and it is not mentioned by Snyman.

'Sobukwe was Poqo leader'. Report in Cape Times, 4 3 1963, on Queenstown
trial of men involved in unsuccessful assassination attempt on Chief Matanzima.


68 As in the case of the men who belonged to the Pogo cell at the Jewish Old Age Home in Cape Town.

69 State vs. Matikila and 3 others, March 1962, defence lawyer's notebook, Albie Sachs papers, AS 35/5.

70 State vs. Budaza and 3 others, August 1963, Albie Sachs papers, AS 70.

71 State vs. Xintolo, n. d., defence lawyer's notes on evidence, Albie Sachs papers, AS 83/14.

72 See report in Drum (February 1963) and Lawrence op cit, as well as Cape Times reports of the trial, 28 6 1962 and 5 7 1962.

73 Quoted in Rand Daily Mail, 23 3 1963.

74 Cape Times, 28 6 1962.

75 Snyman proceedings, p.348.


77 Snyman proceedings, p 329. Evidence of state witness X3. (Evidence is remarkably detailed and fluent and suggests careful briefing of witness beforehand).

78 Cape Times, 28 6 1962 and Snyman proceedings, p. 38.

79 Ibid, p. 271.


81 Cape Times, 5 7 1962 and 28 6 1962.

82 'Leballo did not escape' in Cape Times, 15 8 1962.

83 Snyman proceedings, p. 283.

84 Draft of article on interview with Leballo in Maseru dated 24 3 1963 on microfilm of South African political documentation held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

85 State vs. Matikila and 3 others, defence lawyers notebook, notes on evidence of Lieut. S Sauerman, AS 35/5.

86 State vs. Matikila and 3 others, AS 35/5.

87 Snyman proceedings, p. 251.

88 State vs. Makatezi and 20 others, SAIRR I/63, p. I10. Snyman was told by one Pogo witness that many people joined the movement willingly. See Snyman proceedings, p. 348.

89 Ibid, p. 251.
91 Snyman proceedings, p. 350.
92 Ibid, p. 92
93 Ibid, pp. 251 & 344.
94 State vs. Makatezi and 20 others, SAIRR I/63, pp. 77 - 79.
95 Ibid, p. 344.
96 Snyman proceedings, p. 255.
97 State vs. Makatezi and 20 others, SAIRR I/63, p. 54, and Snyman proceedings, p. 247.
98 'Marked man tells of Pogo initiations' in Cape Times, 8 2 1963.
99 State vs. Makatezi and 20 others, SAIRR I/63.
103 'Court told of 13 grievances at Paarl' in Rand Daily Mail, 24 1 1963.
104 Snyman proceedings, p. 242.
105 Ibid, pp. 244 - 245.
106 Rand Daily Mail, 28 1 1963.
107 Ibid.
109 Snyman Commission, paras. 213 - 217.
110 Cape Argus, 19 2 1963.
111 Snyman proceedings, p. 342.
115 State vs. Makatezi and 20 others, SAIRR I/63, p. 131.
116 Snyman Commission, para. 264.
117 State vs. Makatezi and 20 others, SAIRR I/63, p. 88.
118 State vs. Makatezi and 20 others, SAIRR I/63, p. 147.
119 Snyman Commission, para. 276.

120 State vs. Makatezi and 20 others, SAIRR 1/63, p. 147.

121 Ibid. They were to be disappointed. In Langa there was to be no uprising that night.

122 Snyman Commission, para. 316.

123 Ibid, para. 311.


125 Submission of Counsel for SAIRR to Snyman Commission, p. 5.

126 Snyman proceedings, p. 380.

127 In this context the socially disruptive effects of land rehabilitation measures in the Transkei (especially fierce in Emigrant Tembuland where many of these men came from) were significant. See Lodge, T. 'The Rural Struggle: Poqo and Transkei Resistance' in Conference on the History of Opposition in Southern Africa, Witwatersrand Development Studies Group, January 1978.