Title: Agrarian Class Struggle and the South African War, 1899-1902.

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In the immediate aftermath of the South African War, the British divided the Transvaal into five regions for the purposes of "native administration". Each of these regions was commanded by a native commissioner (NC). They were stationed in the following districts: Zoutpansberg, Lydenburg, Pretoria, Rustenburg and Waterburg and were responsible for the northern, eastern, central and southern, western, and north-western zones of the colony respectively. Thus, for example, the Lydenburg NC was responsible for the Eastern Transvaal generally (including such districts as Barberton, Carolina, Ermelo, Middelburg, Piet Retief and Wakkerstroom as well as Lydenburg itself). This point needs to be laboured for when, in the text, the NC of a particular district is cited referring to affairs within it, he will often be referring to the entire region under his command and not merely to the district by which he is designated.

Swaziland, which does not enter this study, was disannexed from the Transvaal in 1906.

This map has been amended from the Transvaal Agricultural Journal, Vol. VII, July 1909, No. 2 by Eliza Kentridge.
War and Class Struggle

The connection between war and class struggle, whilst complex and often circuitous, is close. The patriotic fervour unleashed by wars between nations can, and is often intended to, defuse class conflict at home. In his autobiography, Trotsky, writing of the "patriotic enthusiasm" engendered in the "masses in Austria-Hungary" by the declaration of war in 1914, attempted to explain the phenomenon: "Austria-Hungary was the very negation of any national idea", yet the Viennese crowd - composed of many nationalities and classes - displayed a sense of unity and excitement. For Trotsky, the "moving force" of this phenomenon was the "alarm of mobilisation" breaking the "monotony of hopelessness" in the lives of the oppressed:

I strode along the main streets of the familiar Vienna and watched a most amazing crowd fill the fashionable Ring, a crowd in which hopes had been awakened. But wasn't a small part of those hopes already being realised? Would it have been possible at any other time for porters, laundresses, shoemakers, apprentices...to feel themselves masters of the situation in the Ring? War affects everybody, and those who are oppressed...feel that they are on an equal footing with the rich and powerful.

In class society, social hatred and the desire for equality may be sublimated in the overwhelming emotions of patriotism. Trotsky himself noticed the "paradox" that "in the moods of the Viennese crowd that was demonstrating the glory of...Hapsburg arms" he "detected something familiar" from the days of the 1905 Revolution in Petrograd: "No wonder that in history war has often been the mother of revolution." 1

During times of war, the ruling culture of a state embraces those whom, in 'normal times' it despises. The sense of self-worth of the "porter, laundress, shoemaker" and others rises as their rulers proclaim their centrality to the defence of the realm. Ranks close. A sense of community grows up amidst the classes and is maintained - provided the war is victorious.

When defeat ensues, the sense of community created by the futile adventure dissolves and that which has been sublimated in it may cathartically be released. In the oppressed an acute consciousness of their real position in society arises; this combines with the discrediting of the class responsible for the ruinous conflict - and a period of revolutionary upheaval may follow. The Franco-Prussian War, which engendered in France the general jauntiness and patriotism described in the early chapters of Zola's *The Debacle*, ended in the catastrophic defeat of the French armies and the rise of
the Paris Commune, the first attempt at a socialist revolution in
to history. The 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War, embarked upon by the Czarist
regime quite self-consciously and unashamedly to prevent a revolu-
tion, helped spawn the soviets and the general class storm of 1905-7.
The Great War, too, patriotically-welcomed in Russia and effectively
shunting its revolutionary movement to the sidelines of its national
life, ultimately led to a "terrorised" new consciousness rising "in
the deep recesses of the masses, in the trenches and so on" which
helped lay the objective conditions for October.2

War, of course, does not necessarily lead to such revolutionary
dénouements. But the relationship between the class struggle in partic-
ular societies and external military interventions into them can
be direct and even decisive. The ancient world provides some illumina-
ting examples of this. The refusal of significant sections of the
peasantry of the Roman Empire to rally to its defence, when barbarian
invaders crossed its frontiers and initiated its final demise, has
recently been advanced as an important factor in the Empire's fall.
The most recent and exhaustive study of class structure and struggle
in ancient Greece and Rome - de Ste. Croix's - links this fact di-
rectly to the alienation of the Empire's peasants, "the merciless ex-
ploration" of whom "made many of them receive...at least with in-
difference, the...invaders who might...be expected...to shatter the
oppressive imperial financial machine." The slaves of Antiquity,
moreover, sometimes took advantage of war-time conditions to desert
their masters en masse, the most famous example of this being the
flight of more than 20 000 slaves from their Attican masters when
Sparta invaded Decelea in the fifth century B.C.3

For the exploited classes in certain societies, then, the arr-
ival of foreign forces can be the signal for revolt or general resist-
ance. When the mould of everyday-life is shattered, when the existing
rule of a class is threatened and when 'the balance of class forces'
is thrown into sudden disequilibrium, the alienation and resistance
of the oppressed - usually swaddled in paternalism, regulated by com-
promise and countered by direct coercion - may find an outlet which
allows for a freer and more direct expression of the basic antagon-
ism between the classes.

This study examines the sudden shift in the rural class struggle
attendant upon the arrival of the British Army in the Transvaal dur-
ing the South African, or Boer, War of 1899-1902; its foci are the
war itself and (especially) its immediate aftermath, when the task
of restoring landlord authority was undertaken by the new British
Administration of the Transvaal. For the Boer War had been an imper-
ialist war against a class of landowners. In fact, of all the guerrilla wars of the twentieth century, the Boer War is unique in that its guerrillas were rooted, not in a peasantry, but in an agrarian ruling class: the Boer Army whilst composed partly of Afrikaner tenant farmers, was commanded by landowners and a sizeable proportion of its rank and file were landlords as well. During the war, the British strategy came increasingly to concentrate upon destroying this class. The ferocious destruction and looting of Boer farms, livestock, crops and property; and the herding - there is no other word - of the landlord's families into concentration camps constituted an effective expropriation of the rural ruling class whose resources and command lay at the heart of the Boers' war effort.

This massive and decisive intervention into the world of the landowners, however, was an intervention into a world already riven with conflicts and antagonisms. These became transformed into things of a different order entirely. Rural workers were now afforded opportunities to participate in the destruction of their exploiters and to prevent their return. The Boer War, then, allowed the class struggle on the agrarian estate to emerge from its subterranean stream - where the cross-currents of master-servant relations eddied in theft, desertion, "laziness" and "insolence" - and to run an overt and vigorous course to the field of open combat against the landlords.

2. The Rural Underclasses

Before commencing the analysis, a note of clarification is necessary. The principal dramatis personae of this study are black rural producers residing on Boer farms and on communal lands at the turn of the century in the Transvaal. Dispossessed, to a greater or lesser degree, by Boer colonists throughout the nineteenth century, and subjected to the rule of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) - the nineteenth century Boer State in the Transvaal - these two distinct groupings often formed part of a larger community which owed allegiance to a single authority within the peasant world.

Most workers on Boer farms were tenants of various kinds, some were virtually slaves and a few were proletarians proper. On communal lands, black peasants lived in relatively independent communities. This relative independence, however, should not be taken to imply a freedom from exploitation. The social structure of the peasant village, analysed obliquely and intermittently in this study, ensured that such exploitation existed within the peasant community itself - although it was held within certain limits.

Moreover, hemmed in by the massive and increasing encroachments
of private property, peasants on communal lands found themselves the victims of exploitation external to the villages in which they lived. Increasing numbers of young men were forced into spells of migrant labour on mines or farms by the need to meet the fiscal exactions of the state, the subsistence and security requirements of peasantry whose economies had already been punctured by massive expropriations of communal land and, finally, by the need to pay tribute to the leading men in their communities. Blacks on communal lands were also subjected to the predatory activities of the ZAR state's functionaries - native commissioners and veldkornets, both in practice little more than representatives of the prominent Boer landowners in a particular district. These officials, whose briefs included the collection of taxes and the settlement of disputes between landlords and tenants, widely extended their activities so that at times they came to personify the process of primitive accumulation, looting a significant portion of the resources remaining to peasants. The seizure of captives and booty in wars against black rural communities, the imposition of forced labour and 'tax raids' which took the form of massive exercises in armed robbery formed part of their contribution to the pre-history of capitalism in South Africa.

It is these two groupings, then - black peasants on communal land and black labourers (of various kinds) on Boer farms - whose struggles are delineated in this study. General references to the "rural underclasses" or "agrarian workers" and affinal terms designate them collectively. The term "workers" indicates not simply proletarians, of whom there were very few on Transvaal farms at this time, nor merely labourers on farms but the primary producers of the rural world generally.

The one significant section of the rural underclasses excluded from this study is the Afrikaner rural poor. At first sight this may appear paradoxical since their war-time experience serves to illustrate some of the contentions made earlier in regard to the relationship of war to class struggle. Even before the Boer War, some Afrikaner tenants complained that they, the propertiless, were forced - and without remuneration - to protect militarily the property of others. And there were landlords who had to force their Afrikaner tenants into Boer military service during the war. The Boer forces began to disintegrate when their string of early victories snapped at Paardeburg where, in February 1900, they suffered their first major defeat. Within four months of this, the major Boer cities fell to the British. Once defeat was certain, a haemorrhage of deserters from the Boer cause began which no disciplinary tournequet
could stem: by July 1900, more than a quarter of all those liable for military service in the Boer Republics had laid down their arms. Still more worrying for the Boer commanders was the growing number of deserters prepared to turn their guns against their former comrades-in-arms. By the end of the war, in fact, the number of Boers in the service of the British military was equivalent in numbers to almost one third of the Boer Army still in the field. Aware of the local terrain and the way their former units were likely to use it, these deserters contributed to the Boer defeat in no negligible way - a fact emphasised by the Boer generals themselves. Significantly, the great majority of those who deserted the Boer cause and enlisted with the British - and there were thousands of these - were tenants and proletarians. Such people appear to have succumbed easily to British promises of land and post-war privileges: many of them were enlisted in units whose task it was to round up Boer cattle - the "looting corps" as they became known - and a percentage of this loot they were allowed to retain.

The complex skein of the class struggle between Afrikaner landlord and tenant and its refraction through the Boer War itself, however, will have to be unravelled elsewhere. A comprehensive exploration of it here might break the analytical unity of this study, which is concerned with the struggles of colonially-dispossessed working people. The Afrikaner rural poor, oppressed and exploited though they were, were part of a colonizing people. This fact necessitates addressing a series of questions which are not germane to the historical experience of the vast bulk of the people considered here. How, for example, did a common ethnic and political culture undermine the effectiveness of the class struggle fought by Afrikaner tenants and proletarians against their Afrikaner exploiters? How did 'hegemonic mechanisms', for example the Dutch Reformed Church, which ministered to both landlord and tenant, blunt the cutting edge of that struggle? Above all, how did the racism of Afrikaner workers and the presence below them of still more oppressed black workers, sometimes held in virtual bondage, distort and limit their struggles? "Labour in a white skin", wrote Marx, "cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin."

3. Selling Out the Ruling Class

Agrarian workers availed themselves constantly of the opportunities provided them to settle accounts with their exploiters by providing intelligence to the British Army. Their role in this - and in scout-
... and the importance of these for the Boer defeat, are now well-established. Workers spied and informed upon employers aiding the Boer cause and even planted incriminating evidence upon them. The treason courts, at which tenants and servants betrayed their landlords and masters, "mediated", writes Nasson, "a form of agrarian class conflict" "provoked" by "war conditions". Such activities were carried on on a scale sufficient to engender a general fear in those Afrikaner farming families sympathetic to the Boer forces and sometimes spawned a savage cycle of discipline and reprisal. The rural world was enveloped in a "sullen atmosphere of hatred and vengeance" which found its macabre carnival in the brawling which broke out between farm workers and relatives of the accused, in the burnings in effigy of Boer leaders by black workers, in the feting of firing squads and in the crowds of peasants and workers who cheered on the public executions of Boers. The centrality of class antagonisms to these events was recognised by the imperial army itself, one of whose officers described this particular historical process as one in which workers were "Doing down their Masters", and one of whose journals commented that: "Kleinbooi, Gentleman, Sixpence, February, or whatever his name is...seems quite intent on getting rid of his master".

A glimpse of the rapidity with which farm workers in the Transvaal grasped the opportunities to engage in intelligence work against the army of their landlords is provided by a community of tenants scattered across Boer farms in the Lichtenburg District. According to one of its representatives, Jantjie Mosiaan:

On the outbreak of...war we seized every opportunity which offered to render the British troops all possible assistance, and generally identified ourselves with the British Cause as against that of the Boers. Enrolling themselves as "Scouts and secret agents" with the British, and with some of these tenants "purposely" entering "the service of the Boer commandants", they kept imperial intelligence officers "well posted in the information they sought". The colonial administrator who initially registered a cynical scepticism as to these claims should have been convinced by the detailed information provided by Mosiaan as to where, and for which commander, these services were rendered and which British official could now corroborate them. The most cogent proof of the role performed by these tenants lay elsewhere, however - in the actions of their landlords. For the general eviction of these tenants by Boer landlords after the war - attributed by the tenants themselves to their collaboration with the British - suggests that, whatever the scepticism of the administrator concerned, the agrarian ruling class was convinced of the ver-
acity of Mosiaan's story and knew its significance for the rural order at whose apex that class stood. The organic link between Afrikaner landlords and the Boer Army pre-determined a link between the tenantry's intelligence work for the British and its violation of the social relations of the Boer farm.

4. "The Frankenstein Monster" Armed Blacks Against the Boers

Rural workers of various kinds, however, were able to engage in more dramatic activities against Boer forces than intelligence and logistical work for the British: it is estimated that between ten and thirty thousand armed blacks served with the imperial forces, and they were involved in such crucial operations as guarding blockhouses and the lines between them. Perhaps even more significant than this was the role played by armed peasants and farm workers, often not enrolled by the British in cutting off swarthes of territory, and their resources, from the Boer forces, thereby enabling the British Army to concentrate its fire whilst the noose of the blockhouses tightened around the commandos. Hundreds of square miles of the Boer states were "effectively closed to commando penetration" in this way, while attempts were sometimes made to cut off escape and supply routes in adjacent territories as well. In the north-western Transvaal, peasant communities made it gravely difficult for Boer commandos to obtain food: Kgatla peasants and tenants seized control of significant zones of the western Transvaal and shut them off from Boer guerrillas; rural blacks led by Malekuti prevented Boer incursions into the Middelburg District, north of the Blood River - their exploits included an armed engagement in which they captured over thirty Boers; peasants led by Micha Dinkwanyane, meanwhile, closed off the strategically-vital Waterval valley to the Boers, whilst - in the eastern Transvaal - the Pedi cut their heartland out of the Boer area of operations. Historians have only recently realised the centrality of such actions to the Boer defeat although it was discerned clearly enough by contemporary military commanders on both sides.

Direct attacks upon Boer commandos and laagers by armed peasants, whilst never decisive in themselves, were responsible for the harrying of Boer soldiers and the triggering of social fears which made them anxious for their families. Whilst such attacks were fairly general across the war zones and often resulted in fatalities, two were of salient importance: the Kgatla attack upon the Boer encampment at Deldenpoort in the Transvaal in November 1899, which engendered widespread fear in the Rustenburg Afrikaner farming community and
led to the recalling of all burghers in the district for service at Derdepoort; and the Zulu attack upon a Boer camp at Holkrans (until the British annexation of the Transvaal, part of the ZAR) which annihilated the commando stationed there and was sufficiently terrifying to Boer society at large for it to be used by General Botha as one of the reasons for a general surrender.\textsuperscript{14}

Attacks upon Boer forces by agrarian workers were sometimes undertaken independently of British command and must be located within the general class struggles attendant upon the colonial dispossession of a peasantry and the subjection of much of it in relationships of tenancy or, indeed, virtual slavery. The essential lines of connection may be followed in a sketch of the Ndebele peasantry from the 1880s to the Boer War itself. In the early-1880s, their heartland was conquered by Boer forces and parcelled out to the Afrikaner soldiers who participated in the campaign against it. Thus dispossessed, the peasantry itself was scattered across farms in the central and eastern Transvaal as "labourers and apprentices" in conditions "little short of slavery". Taking advantage of war-time conditions and "the absence of their landlords", "a very large number" of these people - "at least 300 kraals" - streamed back to the Middelburg District from which they had originally been dispersed. There they settled upon "ground" which had since become "private" and reconstituted their communal existence. Given their experience, it was perhaps inevitable that these people would take an "active part" in the war against the Boer commandos with whom they engaged in open combat on at least three occasions.\textsuperscript{15} For such people the war against the Boer Army must have been associated indissolubly, with an escape from bondage and the restitution of a world of which they had been dispossessed.

5. Agrarian Workers and the Expropriation of the Boer Landlord Class

Perhaps the most significant proof of the coalescence of class conflict and military operations against the Boers lies in the part played by the rural underclasses in the general expropriation of Boer landlords undertaken by the British Army. Rural blacks played an important role in the destruction and looting of farmsteads and crops and in bringing into the concentration camps families removed from Boer farms.\textsuperscript{16} It was, however, in the seizure of livestock from landowners and in the occupation of their ground that rural workers played their most dramatic role.
Livestock, fundamental to the sustenance of the farming families and the Boer Army in the field, as well as its mobility, was raided and looted on a massive scale by peasants and tenants. The importance of mobilising rural blacks into an assault on this basic element of Boer property was recognised by the British military and soon came to have a place in the imperial war strategy. Kgatla peasants were encouraged to plunder Boer cattle and promised 25%, perhaps 30%, of the booty; Zulu cattle-raid ers were formally organised under Colonel Bottomley and promised 10% of the livestock they seized, much of it from Transvaal Boers; by arrangement with General Walter Kitchener, Pedi peasants led by Sekhukhune, Mpisane and Malekutu, guarded Boer cattle driven into their strongholds by the British in return for at least 50% of this animate chattel.

The scale of cattle-raiding incited by the British was, however, very much greater than these more well-known instances suggest. In the Western Transvaal, for example, Gopane Sebogodi - leader of a community of over 2,000 peasants - was instructed "to loot everything" that could be looted from Marico Boers "carrying arms against the British" and given undertakings that all livestock so seized would become his property. When, after the war, Sebogodi attempted to prevent the return, to their original owners, of those animals his people had seized from Boer combatants, the Commissioner of Native Affairs himself drew attention to the fact that the difficulties of this particular case arose from a general British strategy:

This is only a type of many cases now arising all over the Transvaal in which natives acting under the verbal or written authority of Military Officers either seized or were given cattle and the owners are now marching about demanding them.

Indeed, one senior British official admitted that "sometimes leave" was "given to natives to keep all...Boer cattle they could capture."

Touring the Central Transvaal after the war, one functionary found "many farmers" complaining of losses of stock "alleged to be looted by Natives" and drew attention to those cases "where the Military Commandants...ordered Native Chiefs to collect Boer cattle into British Camps and...paid them with some of these cattle for their labour". In the wake of the war, in the northern reaches of the Middelburg District, and on payment of a small fee, peasants were prepared to return Boer "furniture and carriages" in their possession. "Stock and wagons", however, they regarded "on a different footing: these they were specially instructed by the military authorities to take from the Boers." In the Northern Transvaal, peasants were employed by
Peasants and tenants, however, did not merely act under imperial instruction in their expropriation of Boer cattle. The Kgatla, scourge of the western Transvaal, who on occasion could sack their way through Boer farms from the Bechuanaland border to the very district of Pretoria, provide clear evidence of this: they were described as having "committed extensive looting of stock... from the Boers during the war, for most of which", according to one official, "they had no authority." Zulu peasants engaged in such extensive raids upon Boer cattle in the south-eastern Transvaal on their own volition that British officials, fearful of the post-war results of such lawlessness, sought to put a brake upon their actions, if necessary by deploying troops against them. In the northern Transvaal, there were "hundreds" of "claims by Boers" against peasants "for cattle and furniture etc. taken during the war." The local native commissioner (NC) had evidently set himself the post-war task of forcing blacks to surrender such property as they "could not shew authority for having, and what the Boer could prove was his."23

There was a final way in which agrarian working people attempted to possess the cattle of those whom one historian designates the "landlords in arms".24 For, at the onset of hostilities, many Boers deposited their livestock with blacks (presumably tenants) for safe-keeping: their temporary custodians, however, sought to appropriate such livestock. The Secretary of Native Affairs, in fact, was to observe upon the phenomenon: and when one adds to this evidence - from the western Transvaal and the northern Middelburg District - of peasants attempting to retain livestock entrusted to them by Boers, one realises the scale on which this must have occurred.25

Whether expropriated under imperial instruction, looted under independent initiative or confiscated under cover of custodianship, the peasantry came to control vast numbers of the livestock of the landowning class during the war. Still more archival evidence could be cited of the "many cases" of Boer cattle in peasant hands in the Transvaal.26 The most striking proof of the scale of stock-seizure from Transvaal Boers, however, was to lie - in a sense - beyond the borders of the territory. The Kgatla and Zulu peasantry's more independent heartlands lay, respectively, in Bechuanaland and Zululand but numbers of both lived as tenants on farms in contiguous areas of the Transvaal. Arriving as organised raiders from beyond the Transvaal, Kgatla and Zulu parties could be reinforced by the local ten-
antry, who would be excellently-placed to provide intelligence as to locale and livestock, and then retreat with their booty and store it far from its original source. It is estimated that at least 10,000 cattle and a few thousand sheep were raided and rustled out of the Transvaal and into Zululand during the Boer War. The Kgatla case is even more striking. In 1904, their reserve alone held over 16,000 cattle, more than ten times its pre-war number. For some years after the war, cattle were so plentiful that beasts were slaughtered every night for feasting at the Kgatla's principal settlement, Mochudi. So widespread had their raiding of Boer cattle been that the Kgatla were able to eradicate utterly the effects of the Rinderpest which, before the war, had decimated their herds. The extent of this expropriation found a symbol in Bovine breeds: the tall, spindly cow of the pre-war Kgatla seems to have mutated into a thicker, shorter-horned animal akin to the Afrikander.

ii. Agrarian workers and the expropriation of Boer land

Clearly, the most crucial resource for rural people, and the one upon which all agrarian production depended, was land. Control of it before the South African War defined Boer landowners as a ruling class. Consequently, an effective expropriation of that class could not be carried through by the underclasses unless they executed a successful assault upon Boer property rights in land. For if they failed to fill the vacuum left by the British (and their own) removal of landlords from Boer farms, and if they failed to prevent the return of the landowning class and keep possession of its land, then - ultimately - working people would not put a decisive stamp upon the kind of rural society which was to arise in the Transvaal after the Boer War. To what degree, then, did rural blacks seize control of Boer land during the war and subvert it to their own purposes? And to what extent did they maintain that control after the war?

The Kgatla tenantry in the Western Transvaal, strongly reinforced by regiments from Bechuanaland, occupied the farms of their landlords (particularly in the Pilansberg area), part of the process which Warwick calls "the tenants' revolt in the western Transvaal". So widespread was this revolt, that when General Smuts entered the region of the western Transvaal whose tenantry was Kgatla, he found that almost every farm was deserted by its owner. And when those owners sought to return to their farms after the war, they found them occupied by the Kgatla - a discovery which engendered in the landlords a "general state of terror". A similar process was to be observed in the south-
eastern Transvaal (the area known as the new Republic, which the British were to annex to Natal). There, too, many Zulu tenants – reinforced by their armed kinspeople from Zululand – came to occupy the farms of their landlords and bring them under cultivation. In fact, according to one historian, similar events occurred throughout "areas of the northern and western Transvaal". From the former region, it was reported that with "many" of the farmers "away...the Natives...thinking the Boers would not again return, moved their kraals and gardens on to private farms." In fact, the geographical sweep of the occupation of Boer private property was to be far greater than this, comprehending the central, eastern and southern zones of the colony as well. From the Northern Middelburg District, for example, "a good deal of friction" was reported between the returning farmer and the local peasant, "the latter having ploughed lands of the former, during his absence, and in some instances...settled on the farms." According to the NC responsible for the eastern Transvaal, the cultivation of landlord's estates by peasants and tenants had "been done all over the country"; meanwhile, the NC in charge of the Pretoria and Heidelberg Districts noted the movement of "many Natives on to various picked farms" which they hoped to retain access to after the war.

iii. The consciousness of expropriation

Only in exceptional instances did the process of expropriation and occupation delineated above take the form of revolutionary struggle: in the Pilansberg, there is little doubt that Kgatla tenants viewed their actions as part of an offensive to liquidate the landlords for all time and regain the land of which they had been dispossessed. But it is important to note that, where occupations of Boer land occurred in other areas, those who subverted the land to their own purposes did not simply view this as a temporary enjoyment of a resource during an interregnum in which the rule of the rural ruling class was suspended. They believed that their appropriations (or, more correctly, their reappropriations) of land would be permanent.

The western Transvaal, the area in which the effects of the expropriations were to be most marked, is a convenient starting-point for an analysis of the evidence. Some months after the war had ended, the sub-NC of its Pilansberg region noted the "disappointment" of the Kgatla "that all...Boer farms in the Pilansberg"*, which they looked upon "as theirs by right of conquest", were "to be given back to the boers." "Having to leave the farms which a great many of them"
had "begun to occupy, during the absence of the Boers", was held to be one of their principal "grievances". To prevent the return of their landlords, in fact, these peasants had militant intentions: they drew a line at the Elands River and planned to prevent Boers from crossing it. From the north-western Transvaal, too, comes clear evidence that the underclasses believed landlords to have been expropriated. There, in the aftermath of the war, it was reported that blacks were "full of astonishment that the Boers" were "allowed to retain their farms" and tenants were described as expecting "a very good time by retaining" their holdings on such farms "for no rent". It was said that, in this region, the tenantry "generally thought" Boer farms were to be divided amongst it by the imperial administration. In the northern Transvaal, a similar consciousness can be discerned: from both Haenertsburg and Spelonken, Africans were described as perplexed by the British policy of allowing Boers "to return to" or "continue on their farms". Military operations in the region, wrote one administrator, appeared to have given "the Native" the "mistaken idea that when the Boer was...captured [,3 sent away and his farmstead destroyed...the land would revert to the original native occupiers"; consequently, the latter "promptly went back to it." Indeed, blacks in the northern Transvaal were reported to have "emerged from the war...with the idea that" its "object...had been to return them to their old lands, and that white owners had been expelled forever from their farms and habitations." In the eastern Transvaal, in his "travels around the country", the NC discovered a "general" belief amongst farm workers that the defeat of the Boers had led to their expropriation; and, in the northern Middelburg region - also under his jurisdiction - the same "idea" seems "to have got among" the peasantry. In the south-eastern Transvaal (i.e. the zone ceded to Natal), the Zulu tenancy believed that farms (which constituted land of which they had been dispossessed) would revert to their original Zulu owners, the Boer landlords being permanently expropriated. The central and southern zones of the Transvaal also provide evidence of this 'consciousness of expropriation'. The NC responsible for these areas observed that "the policy of the British Government in allowing the Boers to retain and return to their farms" "appears to surprise the Natives" - "in some cases" they conveyed "almost indignation" at it. They "did not expect" such a policy and had, in fact, anticipated "that the British Government would expropriate the farms and distribute them on payment". Consequently many of them had "moved on to various picked farms...hoping to claim prior consideration in case of redistribution."
The scale of the general belief of rural working people in the expropriation of the Boer landowning class, however, is conveyed better in the general observations of high officials and politicians than in such local data. The Secretary of Native Affairs, for example, alluded to "the prevalent idea in the native mind that the Boer has been displaced on the land in favour of the native." And as late as early-1903, in fact, Smuts was beseeching Chamberlain to "make clear" to the "many" tenants on Boer farms that such estates did not now belong to them, as they believed.  

Further evidence of the peasantry's belief in the expropriation of Boer landlords comes from its general expectation that its communal lands were to be significantly increased in the wake of the war to the disadvantage of Boer landowners. In some cases it appears that the imperial army fostered this expectation. The Kgatla, for example, were convinced that the British had promised them that "in peace" they "would be given the territory" (in the western Transvaal) that "they had controlled during the war." They had "fully" expected that "farms would be taken from the Boers and given to them". In the aftermath of the war, they were said to be "preparing to approach" the Government "on the subject of additional land being given them in consideration of the services they rendered during the war." In the north-western Transvaal, tenants evidently "expected great things in the way of free grants of land after the war." And, as has already been noted, in the northern Transvaal, rural blacks expected the return of ancestral lands appropriated by the Boers. In the eastern reaches of the colony, the Pedi peasantry sought the extension of its lands at the expense of the property of land companies to whom land had been alienated before the war. They considered that their "material assistance" to the British during the war "entitled" them to "the enlargement of their...Location so as to include a number of... adjoining farms." And in the Northern Middelburg District, an assembly of peasant leaders revealed that they too appear to have expected post-war grants of land which they immediately set about requesting. This may be the underlying reason why, for some months after the war there, the borders between certain locations and Boer farms - in effect, the boundaries between communal and private property - remained sites of "friction" between peasant communities and landowners.  

Many former farm workers, in fact, believed that they were going to be given land at war's end. Officials in charge of black refugees were thus instructed to make such people "clearly understand" that this was not the case and that they were not to "delay their return to their former masters in the hopes (sic) of obtaining farms of their
own. But this hope was clearly one of the major reasons for the general rallying of rural blacks to the British cause during the South African War.

6. The Flouting of the Terms of Tenancy

One index of the way in which farm workers used the conditions of war (and the new employment opportunities thrown up by it) to escape the alienation they suffered on agrarian estates is provided by the numerous instances in which they deserted their places of employment during the war, or simply avoided work on farms entirely. The scale of such desertion in the Boer states is suggested by the fact that, in them, farm workers were forbidden - under pain of imprisonment - from leaving their employers' estates for the duration of the war.

Such intimidation, however, was to be of little avail. During the war, the number of workers "who...left their Dutch masters' farms" without giving notice - and who "refused" "to return" to them when "called upon to" after the conflict - was great enough to spawn a significant legal struggle between landlords and former-tenants. A "very large number" of tenants, in fact, were to bring a "test case" to the Supreme Court to attempt (successfully) to quash a magisterial ruling that their actions had been illegal, despite the war-time absence of their landlords. Sotho refugees - who had previously been tenants on farms in the Krugersdorp, Rustenburg and Potchefstroom Districts - resisted returning to their landlords and sought recognised communal lands for themselves. The Commissioner of Native Affairs was quite correct to remark, in August 1902, that it was "common" for former-tenants (he designated them "the natives") to complain that they "cannot any longer live with the Boers". And voluminous evidence can be cited of the refusal of tenants and servants to return to their landlords and masters in the post-war Transvaal.

An outright refusal to labour for landowners (rather than desertion or a refusal to return to them) was perhaps the predominant method by which tenants withdrew their labour-power from their exploiters during and after the South African War. This was the potentially revolutionary method since it would generally be undertaken by workers living on the estates of landowners under relationships of tenancy. Desertion left the authority of landlords over their lands - and the realm of private property - untouched; the refusal to render labour service, however, struck at the heart of the landowners' world: the manifest disobedience of such an action undermined master-servant relations whilst, at the same time, the refusal to render rent in
labour threw back the claims of private property.

In fact, the refusal of rural workers to labour for returning Boer landlords was a general phenomenon in the aftermath of the war. "The question of labour on farms", wrote the NC responsible for the northern Transvaal, "seems one that the natives are quite agreed upon to resist". 58 In the eastern Transvaal, Sekhukhune instructed his Pedi followers not to work for returning landlords; and in this region, farmers seem to have been exasperated by the refusal of tenants to labour for them. 59 In the south-eastern Transvaal, a similar phenomenon was manifest. 60 The NC in charge of the South and Central Transvaal, meanwhile, noted that "natives at first appear to be willing to do anything rather than work for the Boers" and in the months that followed he chronicled the attempts of blacks to flout their contractual obligations to labour, or to escape tenancy entirely. 61 In August 1902, a police report from the western Transvaal reported that, around Ventersdorp, blacks were "unwilling to work for Burghers". 62 The north-western Transvaal provides its compliment of similar evidence: there the refusal to labour for landlords was great enough to threaten a season's crops. 63 In fact, in the Waterburg District, the "spectacle" was to be observed of the tenants "residing on private property", sowing crops which they were certain they would reap and "doing nothing in return." 64

Africans "all over the country...despise Boers and...refuse to work for them"; "The general complaint against...squatters is that they will not now work for the Boers on their farms." These statements - of the Secretary of Native Affairs and the South African Constabulary (SAC) respectively - were delivered in August 1902. 65 A few months later, a journalist was reporting in a similar vein. 66 And, in fact, well into 1903, a magistrate could complain that blacks thought they had "a right to squat on farms and do no work for the farmer." 67 The refusal to render labour-service to the returning landlords was connected to the widespread belief amongst rural workers that the Boer landowning class had been expropriated - a connection explicitly made by at least one NC. 68 Such workers appear to have been confident that "there would not be the necessity to perform" such "work as they performed under Boer rule." 69 They "generally thought that after the war it was the intention" of the British Government to have "cancelled" "all their engagements" "to their landlords". 70 A world without landlords, then, appears to have been both the hope and expectation of rural working people in the aftermath of the war. Indeed, some black tenants were explicit in formulating this: in the north-western Transvaal, there were those who "expressed...their idea of the future" as one in which "they were to work for
There is a sense in which the refusal of agrarian working people to labour for returning landlords points to the fount of their alienation on the Transvaal farm in the early-twentieth century. And it should not be forgotten that, for example, in the north-western Transvaal, it was a "majority" of tenants who "absolutely refused to work" for such landlords in the wake of the Boer War until, at length, they were forced to realise "that there was no middle course between complying...or being evicted". For Marx, "work" (or "labour") - the transformation of the natural world into useful objects - is the fundamental characteristic of humankind: the "process" by which human beings (and societies) "mediate, regulate and control the metabolism between themselves and nature" transforming it and "appropriating" its materials in "a form adapted to their own needs". It is this incessant transformation of the environment, in effect altering the world in which people live, which lies at the core of the incessant transformation of human nature itself. On the landlord's estate, however, "work" - the stamp of humanity - becomes the badge of oppression. For rural workers on it, labour ceases to be the process, under their command - by which they come to regulate and control the natural world. Indeed, it becomes the very inversion of this: "the process of production has mastery over" them "instead of the opposite". The refusal of workers to labour for landlords after the Boer War, then, can be seen as an attempt to restore "work" to a more logical place in human existence.

7. The General Overturning of Master-Servant/Landlord-Tenant Relations

The war-time expropriation of the Boer landlord class, and the role played in this by the rural underclasses, had turned the Transvaal rural world upside down. A contemporary newspaper noted that returning farmers were sometimes "offered violence" by blacks in the districts of Vryheid, Waterburg and Rustenburg, "peasants and tenants forcibly resisted the return of Boer families to their homes"; and this resistance was to find a powerful symbol when the very commander of the Boer forces, Louis Botha, was run off his farm by his workers who told him that he "had no business there" and that he "had better leave". Moreover, aside from the refusal to render labour-service already described, there was considerable resistance to paying rent of any kind. In the Northern Transvaal, where the returning landlords were merely broaching the matter, the "question of private rents" was said to be "worrying" tenants "a good deal". The NC responsible for
the region was convinced that "a good deal of difficulty" would "be experienced" "when, and if" "back rents" accumulated "during the war" were collected. It appears, in fact, as if the tenants concerned sought to quarantine themselves entirely from contact with the landowning class: "the chiefs....living on farms", wrote this NC, "mostly ask to have locations set apart for them." In the north-western Transvaal, the NC was - more than two months after the end of the war - encountering a few cases of tenants who had "so far, refused to pay" their landlords "either in rent or labour contrary to their old agreements". In the Pretoria and Heidelberg Districts, the attempts of landlords to retrieve their unfortunate circumstances by raising rents were creating "difficulties". What seems clear is that, after the Boer War, many landlords were to find - as did J. P. Meyer on his farm "Cypherskuil", south of Nylstroom - tenants claiming "a perfect right to live on farms without paying rent."78

The attempts to prevent the return of landlords, the withdrawal of labour-power, the refusal to pay rent or fulfill contractual obligations, the occupation of Boer land - these were general phenomena on Transvaal farms in the wake of the war. Together they constituted a very considerable disconnection of the circuits of exploitation by agrarian working people. It is for these reasons that landlords returning to their farms were to find a transformation of human relationships attendant upon the upheavals of war. Farmers found "a recalcitrant spirit" amongst their workers; reports of rural blacks being "above themselves" and "impudent" to Boers were common; "great insolence" was another complaint. There were reports of workers flouting the authority of landlords and "roaming about" without passes, "refusing to obey orders". It can therefore come as no surprise that, early in 1903, Boer representatives - in a supplication in which the word "native" would more correctly read "worker and peasant" - informed Joseph Chamberlain of the "grave character of the native question". Considering it "their duty to point out" that the "political and social upheaval" attendant upon the war had created a consciousness ("a spirit and feeling") "which must be...of grave consequence to the white population", they requested that it be made "plain to the natives" that the war had left relations between themselves and whites unchanged.83

8. The Restoration of Private Property and the Landowning Class

If the British Administration (with its coercive apparatus) had left the returning Boers and the agrarian workers to their own devices on the farms, if it had not intervened in the class struggle between
them, then the Boer landowners - the fundamental rural ruling class of the Transvaal - may have been unable to restore its existence. So sweeping had its expropriation been, so crushed was it by the war, and so armed (as we shall reveal) were agrarian workers that this was a real possibility in 1902. In effect, the state and productive power of the Boer landowners had been utterly broken: the 'republican' writ ran nowhere in the Transvaal by the end of the war; agrarian production directed by landlords on Boer farms was virtually nil: access to land, labour-power and livestock - the basic factors of production - was effectively denied the landowners, in great part through the actions of rural workers themselves.

It was at this point that the character of the state from which the imperial army was sent - and the deep, underlying reasons for which it fought the war - became decisive. The broad historical field of force which produced the Boer War has recently been the subject of a seminal essay by Stanley Trapido and Shula Marks. Its essential aspects are known well-enough. The incompatibility of Paul Kruger's ZAR with - and its fettering of - the precocious capitalist development directed by the Randlords: the contradictions within British capitalism itself which drove it increasingly into its role as the finance (rather than the industrial) capital centre of the world; Britain's need, consequently, to control the Transvaal's gold resources - the refraction of all these through the local politics of the Transvaal and the strategic plans and ideological discourse of British imperialism made war inevitable. The cardinal reason for the war was to restructure the Transvaal state so as to make it appropriate to the needs of mining capital and to integrate that state into the political, financial and commercial network of the British Empire.

But if the war was fought against a somewhat archaic ruling class of landowners, whose state was manifestly unable to meet the demands of the most sudden and dynamic industrial revolution on the continent of Africa, it was not a war fought against private property. The British Army had encouraged the rural underclasses to flout Boer property rights - to sack and destroy farmsteads and crops, loot livestock and drive landlords off their land. But the (capitalist) world which the British sought to make in the Transvaal had as its primary prerequisite the creation of a proletariat. And basic to the creation of such a class is the progressive separation of peasants from the means to sustain themselves independently: in short, the expropriation of the peasantry. The rise of a class of landowners in the Transvaal, who conquered peasant lands and parcelled them out under the feet of their original inhabitants was fundamental to this process of expropriation.
To have not reconstituted this class, to have left its property unrestored and in peasant hands would have been tantamount to reversing the process of proletarianisation that Boer primitive accumulation had begun. The post-war administration of the Transvaal had not merely to cease mobilising agrarian workers against a rural ruling class; it had actively to refound a world of capsized class relations: the restoration of livestock, land and labour-power to Boer landowners was crucial to this, as was the disarmament of rural working people.

1. Livestock

By the Treaty of Vereeniging, Boers were permitted to keep livestock they had looted from blacks during the war. Almost immediately after this treaty was signed, it appears to have become government policy to restore to Boer farmers cattle looted from them by the peasantry. These two policies now combined to detonate an acute struggle over livestock between landlord and peasant. One observer predicted "serious trouble" before the "question" was "settled". Peasants in one region were reported to be "very dissatisfied" over the matter and it was feared that the area might become enflamed by the issue. In the Central Transvaal, despite being escorted by SAC troopers, Boers seeking to repossess livestock appear to have encountered a successful resistance on the part of armed peasants. In the Lydenburg District, meanwhile, Pedi peasants - fearing having to give up cattle looted from Boers - engaged in the slaughter, consumption, sale and disposal of such "great numbers" of captured cattle that the new government was forced to call a halt to the butchery until it could ascertain how the unfortunate beasts were obtained.

Perhaps the most cogent proof of the general discontent with which the British had to contend on the issue lies in the delicacy of the strategy which they devised to implement their policy. Compensation (up to the full value of the beasts concerned, sometimes) was offered to encourage peasants to return expropriated livestock; and ultimately the peasantry was offered compensation for animals of theirs which they could prove were in Boer hands. The functionaries who arranged the transfers of livestock were aware of the patience and caution with which they had to proceed: one drew attention to his adoption of a "conciliatory attitude" in such matters and his avoidance of "stringent and severe methods"; another advised Boers seeking the return of their cattle to approach the matter diplomatically through "Chiefs" rather than bring cases against individuals - a strategy which brought success in "many instances". Generally, the British were too wary of its possible repercussions to provoke the peasantry (which was well-
armed at this time) by deploying armed force in attempting to re-
store cattle to the Boers. Where this occurred - around Bronkhorst-
spruit - it almost triggered an armed conflict and the local NC was
quick to instruct the local SAC detachment not to "interfere or en-
quire into any cases of Boer cattle in the possession of Natives".92

The British Administration's investment in a policy of caution
and compensation appears to have brought some dividends. There is
some evidence of the new government overseeing the restitution of
of Boer cattle to its original owners, as well as tenants returning
property which they had concealed for their landlords during the
war.93 But ultimately, British policy in this regard was to be ov-
erturned by the resistance of agrarian working people. So great was
their dissatisfaction with the livestock-restitution arrangements th-
at, in order to resolve it, native commissioners were instructed to
attempt to induce Boers to surrender to blacks cattle they had seized
from them - although this instruction was hastily withdrawn on the
grounds that Boers were entitled to keep such livestock under the
Treaty of Vereeniging.94 In the end, the post-war government was forc-
ed to set aside its policy and transform the whole question into one
"of legal process for either Boers or Natives to establish their case
in a Court of Law for restoration of any cattle claimed by them to be
in illegal possession of others."95 What led to this outcome was the
intention of one peasant leader (Malakute in the Northern Middelburg)
to contest the legality of the British policy in the High Court and,
if necessary in the Privy Council itself. This led to the fear that
the policy might be declared invalid (after all, peasants had often
looted cattle under British instruction; Boers had no such authorisa-
tion and yet they were not required to restore their loot to its orig-
inal owners). Such a decision, moreover, would shake the authority of
of the post-war administrators in the eyes of the peasantry.96

In effect, the class struggle had cancelled one aspect of the
post-war Administration's design. The peasantry made felt its dissati-
sfaction, its "strong feeling of injustice",97 in regard to the inten-
ded restitution arrangements. Active resistance to the restoration of
Boer property was much in evidence and it could run to the outright
destruction of Boer chattel. The threat of armed conflict over the qu-
estion was ever-present: in fact, the SAC had to patrol constantly be-
tween the Boer and Kgatla communities at Soulspoort to prevent blood-
shed arising from Afrikaner attempts to reclaim livestock looted from
local landlords.98 "Rumours of unrest" amongst the peasantry were re-
ported from the Pretoria District where the Boers' forcible repossession
of stock was "resented" by blacks.99 So great was the resistance
across the Transvaal that those officials most intimately connected with the peasantry - the native commissioners - began to agitate against the policy which they were initially instructed to carry out. The class struggle over cattle, then, took on significant proportions. The intense, sometimes brutal, struggle of the peasants pushed their case through successive levels of authority - passed the landlords and constabulary to the NCs, then beyond those officials to their commanders and thence to the Lieutenant-Governor. When they threatened to reach out to London, to the still more illustrious Privy Council and hold the military authorities to their war-time word, the Colonial Administration called a halt to the administrative restoration of expropriated Boer stock. In the end, peasants surrendered only a few hundred beasts to their pre-war owners in terms of the initial British policy of livestock restitution. A multitude more than this remained in peasant hands.

ii. The ideological offensive to restore private property and landlord authority

If the landlords were to be restored as a class then the consciousness, which had been created in agrarian workers by the expropriation of the Boers and the role of such workers in this, had to be liquidated. It was the native commissioners who were given this ideological task. The NCs toured the countryside, holding meetings with peasants, disabusing them of the notion that the Boers had been expropriated for all time. The Lydenburg NC, for example, informed the Pedi that their "general impression" in regard to this was incorrect: "the land belongs to the Boers as before the war. You must understand", he reiterated, "that the land is still the property of the Boers". And similar information was conveyed at other meetings in the rural Transvaal. The idea (or hope) that peasant lands would be extended, or that rural workers would be able to begin farming on their own account, was quickly dispelled. Black refugees were amongst the first to have their hopes dashed in this regard; whilst, in the Western Transvaal, the local NC "discouraged" the Kgatla from approaching the Government "on the subject of additional land" and stressed that the new administration would "not appropriate Boer farms for their benefit." By late-October 1902, the Secretary of Native Affairs could remark, quite correctly, to higher authority that the "prevalent idea" amongst blacks - that Boers had "been displaced on the land" in their favour - was "being rapidly removed from their minds." And by early-1903, the native commissioners reported the successful execution of this task.
A sustained propaganda-offensive was also launched to restore the authority of the landlords. From district after district comes evidence of the NCs and others informing rural blacks that if they wished to live on private property then they had to strike agreements of tenancy with the owners of that property. There was, moreover, a campaign to end the rural working classes' withdrawal of labour-power from landlords and the general transformation of master-servant relations that were such notable phenomena of the agrarian Transvaal in the aftermath of the war. Farm workers, one newspaper reported in September 1902, were "being made to understand that the fortunes of war" had "nothing to do with the mutual obligations of master and servant". Refugees being repatriated were instructed to "serve their old and new masters" "faithfully". In the northern Transvaal, the refusal of "people... to work for Boers returning to their farms" led "the Commissioners" to summon local "Chiefs" to a series of "Indabas" on the question. Only with "considerable difficulty" was it "impressed upon" them that tenants had to "work or quit the farms." In the Pretoria District, when faced with a general desire on the part of rural blacks to escape labouring for Boers, the NC firmly exhorted "them to apply themselves diligently to labour either at farms, on the Mines or at Public Work". And in the Lydenburg District, where Sekhukhune had instructed the Pedi not to labour for returning farmers, the NC lost no time in informing the Pedi leader, and his followers, that he had "no right over persons on private property." In other ways, the new British administration facilitated the restoration of labour-power to returning Boers. The head of the Native Refugee Department considered the aim of his department "from the beginning to look upon the natives as an asset of the farming industry, and to preserve them...for this industry". The refugee camps were liquidated as soon as possible: from September 1st 1902, the price of maize sold to its inmates was doubled; and by November only 3,000 out of more than 55,000 black refugees in the Transvaal camps remained to be repatriated. "Every assistance" was given to employers to get their workers "away speedily" so that delays would not be caused to returning farmers. Outside the camps, officials were equally zealous in aiding farmers with their 'labour problems'. The NC of the Eastern Transvaal was "rendering" returning landlords "every assistance to get their servants back at once"; that of the north-western Transvaal was generally "doing" his "best to get" tenants "on to the old farms again" - and where workers in the region were successful in resisting the labour-exactions of landlords, he sought to assist farmers "by importing labour". The NCs were indeed crucial to restoring re-
The relationship of tenancy. A contemporary journalist was correct to note their "insist(ance) upon" resistant labour tenants "carrying out the letter of their contract[s] of tenure." And their role in this is confirmed by archival evidence.  

In this process of re-establishing relationships between employers and workers, the British administration appears, as far as possible, to have avoided coercion, preferring diplomacy and mediation to rash measures which might have summoned forth yet more resistance from working people. The same may be said of this administration's attempts to resolve problems arising from the tenantry's cultivation of the lands of its masters. The Commissioner of Native Affairs himself considered this "a matter in which more is to be done by judicious arrangement than by any set of instructions." The reimposition of landlord authority - let us not forget it - involved the reimposition of relationships in which labour assumes an alienated character: in it, wrote Marx, the worker experiences "a loss of his self" since his labour does not belong "to him but to another" and therefore "in it he belongs not to himself but to another." A total and immediate re-imposition of such relationships in the aftermath of the Boer War might have touched off a period of acute class struggle. And the British initially held down the level of alien labour (sometimes mediated through a rent-in-kind) in which the Transvaal tenantry was submerged. In the eastern Transvaal, for example, tenants occupying their landowners' estates were permitted to reap the crops they had sown, give to the landlord a (relatively-favourable) third of the harvest and only then either "hand" the "land back to" its "owner" or a strike a contract of tenancy for the following year. In the north-western Transvaal, meanwhile, the "farm servant or tenant, refusing to work or to fulfil his part of the contract" was given "three months notice to quit." Most of these workers "refused to work during this three months" (sic). Only under threat of eviction, were they to "generally" agree to a fresh contract with the landlords. The resistance to alien labour, however, was to cost the landlords dear. "There is no doubt," reported the NC concerned, "that a certain loss in...crops has arisen from the refusal of Natives to work for farmers until the three months notice was up."  

By proclamation 27 of 1901, the British Administration had restored the contractual obligations of tenants to Transvaal landlords and specified that lessees were to pay rent from 9th October 1901 - or from the date of "beneficial occupation" if it was later than that date. But the precise date from which such obligations were restored to landlords appears to have been considerably after that date: the evidence in above paragraph comes from long after it. Rent once over-
thrown is not easily restored.

iii. The use of coercion in the restoration of the landlords

Diplomacy, propaganda and the mere presence (or threatened use)\(^\text{125}\) of imperial coercive machinery, however, proved themselves insufficient to restore the class rule of the landlords. Where they failed actual force was employed. In the Pilansberg region of the western Transvaal, effectively under Kgatla control, no landlords felt safe enough to return to their farms during 1902; in 1903, however, "relying on the South African Constabulary", some were able to. The gradual, though by no means complete, restoration of Pilansberg farms to their white owners was ultimately to depend in no small measure on the SAC.\(^\text{126}\) And the same may be said for other regions of the Transvaal: according to one historian, "much of the work of the South African Constabulary during 1902 was devoted to making possible the resettlement by Boer families of their lands."\(^\text{127}\) Its role in the reconstitution of master-servant relations was no less important: in the aftermath of the war SAC detachments were despatched to areas - such as Hamanskraal, Doornkloof and Roos Senekal - where blacks were reported "above themselves"; and, by August 1902, the Constabulary was already active in settling "small differences" between the classes on farms.\(^\text{128}\)

Joseph Chamberlain himself assured the Boers that "the power of the Government" would be used to compel recalcitrant tenants to fulfil their contractual obligations - and he considered the SAC an essential component of that power. The Constabulary were the "friends" of Boer landlords, a force "to help you through your troubles"; in dealing with the insubordinate, farmers were instructed "not" to "hesitate to apply to the S.A.C." It was "a police force for your production (sic)" - the typographical error which rendered "protection" as "production", in fact, made for the clearest possible statement of a central function of the police in the post-war rural Transvaal: to restore to the landowning class its command of the productive activity carried on on private property.\(^\text{129}\) And it was not only the SAC which was used in this task: on occasion, the defeated landlords were themselves permitted to take up arms again in order to possess contested land.\(^\text{130}\)

Moreover, once the network of NCs and pass officers was effectively in place in the rural Transvaal, those officials - armed with punitive powers - could also coerce workers into accepting the restoration of their exploiters' control: farm workers who brazenly flouted the authority of their employers and left their estates without passes - such as the workers on the farm "Rooikrantz" in the Krugersdorp District - might get hauled before the local Pass Officer and sent off
to the police with a recommendation that they be proceeded against. The NCs evidently kept a close watch on such offenders: in the months after the war, for example, the NC at Rustenburg ensured that a score of " Petty cases, such as Contravention of the Pass Law" were "adjudicated upon" and "disposed of". For those who fell foul of the pass laws, it is doubtful that they viewed the cases against themselves as "petty": they could result in offenders being sentenced to six months in prison. Meanwhile, tenants refusing to pay rent - such as those on J. P. Meyer's farm in the Waterberg District - could always be instructed by the local NC to strike agreements with their landlords or leave their properties.

iv. The disarmament of rural working people

By the end of the South African War, there were very many more thousands of armed blacks than armed Boers. In the giant Waterberg District, more than one out of every three African men was armed; in the Lydenburg District, "nearly every male" black person was "armed with some gun" and "a great many" had "Lee-Metfords and Mausers in their possession." In the northern Transvaal, the scale of peasant armament was extraordinary. Writing in October 1902, the NC at Pietersburg could report that in a single fortnight 12 000 blacks had been to his office "to deliver up arms". And by the time he had made this report, peasants in the Spelonken and Haernetsburg districts had "handed in" "about 6 000 to 7 000 arms." The "general complaint" "from outside districts" in the northern Transvaal in early-September 1902 was that areas in which peasants were concentrated bore very much the character of military camps whose inhabitants were arrogant and truculent." Once the process of disarmament began in the region, the peasantry displayed its armed might with a certain martial flair: "Morning after morning there file[d] through" Pietersburg "troops of armed natives, who" were "not content to pass unnoticed, the sound of their marching songs...compelling the attention of the inhabitants." In fact, there is a mass of evidence suggesting the degree to which peasants were armed, and often openly-armed, in the post-war Transvaal. Some of their weaponry they may have acquired before the Boer War but some of their rifles were, no doubt, "pilfered, purchased or found during the war" itself. The magnitude of peasant armament is suggested by the number of weapons blacks ultimately surrendered to the British (and such a number does not include secreted weapons). This figure was to run to more than 50 000; and whilst only just over 12% of these were adjudged "modern", the others - breech-loaders though they were -would...
have a fatal effectiveness at close quarters, the distance at which altercations with landlords had to occur.  

In almost all aspects of class relations, whether or not rural workers possessed arms at war's end was decisive. In the Eastern Transvaal, for example, tenants on the farms "Rooival" and "Uitzoek" who were refusing to labour for their Lydenburg landlords were noted - again and again - to be "armed with rifles." In at least one report, the SAC noted that where blacks "declined to work" they were also "armed" "to a great extent". Again it was the "well armed" followers of Mathebe who prevented the restitution of cattle to a party of Bronkhorstspruit Boers. And it would have been armed rural workers who would have been most successful in preventing the return of landlords. As a contemporary newspaper noted: "The causes which led to the determination of the Government to disarm the natives were that they were becoming a positive danger to the Boers returning to...farms."

Given these facts, the disarmament of rural workers became a matter of urgency for the new British government of the Transvaal. And those officials most concerned with the restoration of landlord authority - saw the issue as "a burning one". Disarmament called for "undelayed attention", they informed higher authority, and it would be "watched with great anxiety by the Dutch". By the Transvaal Arms and Ammunition Ordinance (No. 13 of 1902), then, the complete disarmament of black people was decreed. They were given two (later extended to five) months from August 7th 1902 to surrender weapons or face draconian penalties: summary arrest and up to a year's imprisonment with hard labour. Peasants greeted the disarmament order with sullenness and dissatisfaction and resistance to it was expected: in at least one case, armed revolt was anticipated. There is no doubt that instances of secretion took place: in the Western Transvaal, the Kgatla secreted large numbers of their rifles across the border in Bechuanaland and, indeed, such attempts were expected to be made generally along the Transvaal's border with that Protectorate; the Pedi were expected to conceal some weapons; and evidence from Districts as far apart from one another as Barberton, Middelburg and Waterburg could be cited of the peasantry's secretion of weapons. But such instances were not, in the end, historically typical or significant. The "characteristic tendency towards secretion", initially spoken of by the Commissioner of Native Affairs, appears not to have eventuated.

The tendency, in fact, appears to have been quite the opposite. From district after district, came reports of a basically unproblematical disarmament of the peasantry - even from areas in which resistance had been expected. How is this to be explained?

Firstly, the administrators presiding over the disarmament did so
with considerable skill; a blundering, coercive policy might have led not only to the widespread secretion of weapons but to actual armed revolts. NCs were warned that disarmament was a "difficult question" and they were expected to display "watchfulness and discretion" in its resolution. The punitive sections of the disarmament ordinance must have been made clear to armed blacks but there seems to have been a reluctance to bring them into play. The initial granting of two months to blacks to surrender their arms legally (and its extension by a further three later on) also suggests that the imperial administration was concerned not to provoke a struggle over the issue. And NCs were warned against - and, where necessary, prevented from - using armed coercion in their disarmament efforts. These were to be conducted "in a quiet and cautious way" and higher authority was to be consulted in the event of resistance. The Commissioner of Native Affairs could well congratulate himself - and did so - on the wisdom of this policy of using his departmental officials to disarm blacks rather than relying on "Military or Police" intervention to do so. He knew well-enough the warnings "received from all sides" "that any attempt to disarm the natives" would be a "dangerous experiment" which was "certain to lead to war". By avoiding the unnecessary combustion of martial displays, and by despatching diplomats rather than bullies to control it, he made the experiment much less dangerous than it might have been.

Where necessary, areas in which resistance to disarmament was expected could be (temporarily) passed over in favour of those where acquiescence was predicted. Peasants in a particular region would thus be given a 'lead' of submissiveness rather than defiance; whilst those who intended to resist would be progressively isolated and weakened as the collective armed strength of their class was sapped. Such a strategy was used to great effect in the northern Transvaal. The NC there was careful to avoid rushing through disarmament in an area, like the Woodbush region, where considerable antagonism might have been encountered. Bridling his efforts there, he spurred them on in "the Pietersburg ward first", knowing that the peasantry's acquiescence there "would be closely observed and followed by the other districts." Almost with an equestrian's sense of his skill, this official could ultimately remark: "By pressing the willing horse first, I think we succeeded."

To smooth the transition to full disarmament, moreover, blacks were paid for each weapon they surrendered: ultimately more than £66 000 was paid out to Africans in compensation for weapons and ammunition surrendered; and such money could - and was to be - put to good use in paying taxes which might otherwise only have been met thr-
ough a spell of wage-labour. The disarmament ordinance, too, revealed some subtlety in its exploitation of the structure of power and authority in the peasant village: its section 29 provided for "Chiefs and Headmen to receive a licence to be in possession of arms". NCs were advised to grant these in "exceptional cases" since it might induce peasant leaders "more readily and promptly" to cooperate "in securing surrenders from...people under them" and in checking the secretion of weapons. In the end, scores of weapons were left in the hands of leaders of rural blacks in this way.

Ultimately, however, it was neither careful treading and compensation nor kowtowing to the village elders which was to prove the single most decisive factor in ensuring the disarmament of rural blacks. That factor was the presence of brute coercive force. The law on this matter (with its draconian penalties) must have been made abundantly clear to the peasantry, with whom countless meetings on the disarmament question were held. The year in prison with hard labour that an offender against the law might suffer could be augmented with a fine of £250 - almost equivalent to many a farm worker's wages for ten years. Moreover, given the wide powers of search allowed officials if they suspected the illegal possession of arms by blacks, it would have been difficult to conceal arms successfully; and those officials entrusted with supervising disarmament proved themselves adept at monitoring infractions of the law. In fact, so confident of his Department's ability to track down and punish illegally-armed blacks was the Commissioner of Native Affairs that, early in 1903, he could smugly remark that, whilst some peasants "may have secreted" some arms - and "perhaps a little ammunition" - they would "never" be able to produce them "without fear of confiscation and punishment." "Meanwhile", he continued, "those kept back will get rusty in caves or underground."

Most important of all, looming behind the disarmament ordinance was the imperial army. Massed across the countryside, and poised to strike at any point, in the Transvaal, it was undoubtedly the decisive factor in the disarmament of the peasantry. And those overseeing the process of disarmament were alive to this fact: in August 1902, the Lydenburg NC - dismayed at the impending withdrawal of the Royal Irish Regiment from his district - stressed the need to keep it stationed there in view of the disarmament ordinance "now in force" in the region: within days, this NC's fears were allayed by the information that his superordinates had "arranged" for the "maintenance of" a "sufficient garrison at Lydenburg". Troops, however, do not appear to have been used much in disarming blacks: in the Barberton District, Steniak-
er's Horse "practically disarmed every native" once "peace was proclaimed"; but there do not appear to be other examples of this kind. However, it was not so much the actual, as the threatened or possible, use of armed force against rural workers which convinced them to give up their arms. From zone after zone of the Transvaal comes evidence of peasant leaders informing their followers and compatriots of the punishment that could be meted out if they refused to surrender arms:

- from the northern Middelburg region: "Government will punish those who refuse to hand in arms";
- from Sekhukhuneland: "We must obey and not bring trouble upon ourselves... all guns must be handed in."
- from the Pietersburg District, a speech by one peasant leader, echoed by others: we are "to obey the command"; we have "all quite recently seen the might of the Government giving the order". (163)

Given the fact that they did not possess a coordinated strategy, few rural blacks could have doubted the ability of the British to carry out the threat delivered by one official: guns held back, he declared, "we will simply seize". And, as was known by all, such seizure could take a very violent form. In congratulating his commander on the timing of the disarmament order, one NC wrote:

> It was done whilst everything the Native had recently seen during the War was freshly imprinted on his mind and he thoroughly understood the absurdity there would be in attempting, even by a passive way, to resist the order. (164)

The giant "army" of Transvaal peasants under arms was reduced, very rapidly, from more than 50,000 to (officially) just over 100. These soldiers, moreover, were of the most conservative kind, being all "chiefs, chieftainesses" or "headmen". (165) The process by which rural workers in the Transvaal were disarmed illustrates the fact that in class society, every ordinance and law is underpinned by what John Foster - in another context - has called "the ultimate military sanctions of class rule". (166) Such sanctions, as has been revealed, do not necessarily have to be applied to be effective. But they must be present.

The disarmament of the peasantry was fundamental to restoring the class rule of the landlords. Writing in mid-October 1902 - by which time almost 10,000 rifles had been surrendered in the eastern Transvaal - the Lydenburg NC reported that the "Boers say quite a change has come over the Native and he is now quite civil again, and are (sic) going back to the farms to work." (167) In the northern Transvaal - the area in which the peasantry had been described as "arrogant and truculent" - the "effects and result" of the surrender of over 30,000 arms were marked: once deprived of "the moral effect and power" of their arms, "a tone of independence" had "perceptibly disappeared from the
people" concerned. 168

In the end, the peasantry's target - once the disarmament process began - was not to be landlords or state functionaries. The imminent surrender of their rifles rendered their ammunition redundant and they squandered it, almost orgiastically, upon the wildlife of the Transvaal. The countryside echoed with the sound of their gunfire. 169 By late-July 1902, the "destruction of game" in the Waterburg District appears to have been "very great". "The buck", more than one Northern Transvaal African remarked (with notable understatement) on surrendering arms, "have earned a long rest". And, in the eastern Transvaal, so "ruthless" a "destruction of game" was reported that the NC in charge of the region was forced to ponder the problem of "game preserving". 170 Ammunition, which could later have been used to keep peasants outside the orbit of the landlords' world, was instead discharged into the natural world.

v. The role of the native commissioners in restoring Boer landowners

Fundamental to the process of restoring landlord authority in the countryside was the establishment of a new and efficient Department of Native Affairs. With it rural working people were subjected to the apparatus of an effective capitalist state. Gone was the old rule of the veldkornets, almost whimsical in its arbitrariness and heterogeneity. Now the Transvaal was divided into 25 zones, each controlled by a sub-native commissioner. 171 The activities of these administrators within their respective areas were coordinated by the grid of authority immediately above them: the five native commissioners, whose designations - Zoutpansberg, Lydenburg, Pretoria, Rustenburg and Waterburg - are misleading. Between them, these five functionaries comprehended all rural regions of the Transvaal.

The pre-war Volksraad had, in 1885, created a system of NCs under a Superintendent of Native Affairs. 172 But the post-war administration was only too aware of the inability of this system to function as it was intended to. Soon after the war, the new NCs were warned of the "disorder" they would find: "everything" - it was said - had been "complicated by regulations" "partly made" by various authorities. And the pre-war native commissioners were described as officials who were "mostly local farmers" and who "suited things to their own ends". 173 Such officials, obviously, were inadequate to the task of implementing national policies in regard to taxation, communal lands, eviction and labour-control. 174 After the war, however, the NC was a professional administrator aided by a staff of clerks, interpreters and constables. These constables, moreover, were distinct from the SAC forces station-
ed throughout the country - and with such forces the local native commi-
ssioner could work "splendidly".175

The 'teeth' of the NCs were strengthened and sharpened by the conferment upon them of "judicial powers" "at least equivalent to the powers of Resident magistrates in Civil and Criminal cases between Na-
tives"; and by their "special jurisdiction" to repress cattle theft. Empowered to fine offenders (up to £10), imprison them (for up to six
months) and evict tenants (under the Squatters' Law), the NCs very ra-
apidly became a powerful arm of landowners.176 And they were intend-
ed to be such. As the Commissioner of Native Affairs noted:

...it is a part of my system that farmers and land
owners in each District feel that on application to
any Native Commissioner they will immediately get
complaints...attended to."(177)

It was these officials - the NCs - who as we have shown, played the
crucial role in disarming rural workers and restoring private proper-
ty in the countryside. In those earlier, much more confident days of
South African capitalism, these functionaries could be - and were -
unashamed in the role they played. Indeed, the documents they wrote
are suffused with the energy, zeal and even delight that they brought
to their task.

9. A Class Restored and Mutated

Hence it was that the class of Boer landowners, brought to the very
edge of extinction by the war, was restored. In the northern Transva-
al, the most recalcitrant of the peasants who had occupied Boer land
were punished and the NC of the region was "pleased" "to report" that,
by early-1903, such "cases" had "practically come to an end and (that)
the natives" were "learning to respect the private ownership of land." Somewhat earlier than this - by September 1902 - "Master and Servants' cases" were "being satisfactorily dealt with" in the north-western Tr-
ansvaal; and a few months before, the NC for the Eastern Transvaal was
congratulating himself on "doing distinctly good work by assisting the
farmers with their labour difficulties." According to Trapido, most
tenancies were "re-established relatively soon after the war" in the
Transvaal. Indeed, police reports from the Eastern Transvaal suggest a
rapid success in such re-establishment in the area around Lydenburg.
The NC responsible for the Pretoria and Heidelberg Districts, meanwhi-
le could report that the initial "difficulties" arising from the refu-
sal of "many" tenants "to serve under the Squatters' Law" were being
generally "overcome": one of his subordinates commented "very favour-
ably" on the reconstitution of relationships of tenancy in his
area; and, early in 1903, the NC himself could remark that "generally"
farmers were "satisfactorily supplied with native squatters" in the area under his jurisdiction. The comprehensive campaign of the new British Administration to restore the landowners was evidently a great success. Little wonder that one NC could register his conviction that blacks in the region of his command "fully" understood "the obligations due by" those "living on private properties."\textsuperscript{178}

Restoring the claims of private property and the authority of the landlord, however, were not sufficient to restore the existence of a class whose property had suffered such massive destruction during the war. These had to be supplemented by material aid. Very swiftly, then, the British arranged to secure 25 000 cattle and 1000 mules and, for the "sole purpose of restocking" Boer farmers, the authorities "arranged to grant loans to burghers" for up to £200. By the end of October 1902, the government had informed a "delegation of influential farmers" in Pretoria that it "was willing to set aside...half a million" pounds to aid landowners in their efforts to replenish their livestock.\textsuperscript{179} The Repatriation Department, moreover, proved to be an able and energetic agency for laying anew the basis for the renewal of production on Boer farms: it supplied returning landlords and their families with rations, materials for the rebuilding of houses, livestock (for draught and breeding purposes), seed, agricultural implements, and actual ploughing contingents where farmers proved unable to organise ploughing themselves.\textsuperscript{180} In fact, well over a million pounds was spent on materials provided to Boers in their initial repatriation to their farms - more than seventy times the amount spent on blacks repatriated to their lands. A massive sum in compensation was to be awarded the defeated Boers. Initially, it had been intended that this figure would not exceed £3 000 000; ultimately, it was more than trebled to £9\textsuperscript{\textfrac{1}{2}} million - almost twenty times the sum given blacks for their war-time losses in both the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.\textsuperscript{181}

But if the world of the landowners was restored in the aftermath of the Boer War, it was not quite the same world. A series of mutations were engineered within it. The local NC, whilst crucial to landlord authority, was no longer simply synonymous with the prominent landowners in a particular area. He could no longer "mingle administrative duties with personal enrichment" and mete out "inconsistent treatment" to the various "Chiefs" under his jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{182} Local policies were now to be meshed into the much wider programme by which the full development of capitalism in the Transvaal was to be achieved. Within class relations themselves, changes were wrought of momentous importance for the future. The post-war NCs knew well-enough the archaic nature of the regime of the landlords, its dependence upon various forms of unfree labour. "So many illegal things have been done in the
"past by the Native Commissioners and Field Cornets", wrote one of them, "that it is a little difficult to reconcile the Dutch farmers to the law as it really stands." Under the "late Government", wrote another: a farmer interpreted to suit himself the amount of labour to be contributed by each Native residing on his farm... and doubtless his interpretation held good in the Courts of Law, i.e. if any cases of disagreement went further than the arbitrary adjustment of a Field-Cornet...

The NC in charge of the Eastern Transvaal, meanwhile, wrote in a similar vein: "The natives in most cases under the old Government were compelled by the Native Commissioners to provide labour for the farmers and in many cases to go and live on the farms." 183

What was now foisted upon the landlords was the law of contract, and this clearly struck a blow against the arbitrary exactions of labour so prevalent in the pre-war Transvaal. In the eastern Transvaal, the NC - aware of the absence of "properly" defined contract - was zealous in "impressing upon all Dutch farmers the urgent necessity of coming to a clear understanding with their... tenants" as to the "terms" of their tenancy; he was also endeavouring "to get them to register their agreements" at his office; in the northern Middelburg region, also under his jurisdiction, he informed peasant leaders that sub-NCs were "quite willing" to "assist" tenants in arranging "terms of residence" with their landlords. 184 For the Pretoria NC, the "only solution" to "our greatest worry" - how to restore the obligations of tenants to landlords - lay in having agreements between them "in writing", a process which he had initiated in the area under his jurisdiction. 185

Before the Boer War, some landlords had benefitted from social relationships akin to slavery, especially in regard to their personal servants. 186 When, therefore, the Native Refugee Department gave all black refugees (many of whom were the personal servants of Boers) 187 the right to refuse to return to a pre-war employer and gave them "the option of taking service with new masters", 187 it gave those who had been held in bondage the rights of the 'free' wage labourer. (And, indeed, after the war, the British were active in attempting to liquidate relationships akin to slavery.) 189 Former-tenants appear to have exercised their new rights immediately: "Where any native objected to return and live under his former landlord", reported one NC, "he was met in his wishes as to where he preferred to live." 190

Nevertheless, there were clear limits to the restructuring of relations on the farms - an apparent knowledge that an immediate transition to fully capitalist social relations was impossible and should not be attempted. When, for example, the Waterburg NC proposed to pre-
The new administrators had to proceed cautiously. They could (and did) act against some of the elements of forced labour in the countryside. Not only did they bridle it, to some degree, on the part of the landlords, they abolished the rights of veldkornets and others to commandeering labour. The encouragement of written and registered contracts, moreover, provided some of the legal forms appropriate to capitalist relations. But a revolution in production itself was required for the massive agrarian estates of the Transvaal to become capitalist enterprises. This still lay in the future, though not the distant future. But, in its immediate actions, the vanquishers of the ZAR signalled to the fundamental classes of the countryside the direction in which they were to go. In those first actions against forced labour, the Transvaal's new overlords ushered the farm worker towards the freedom of wage slavery.

10. Aftermath

After the tremendous struggles of 1899-1902, both exploiter and exploited confronted one another with wariness. Initially, the Boers returned to their farms in fear - particularly of the surrounding peasantry. Returning farm workers, meanwhile, were aware of the retribution wreaked upon blacks caught aiding the British by Boer soldiers: summary execution was a common penalty. Some tenants who had aided the British feared being "murdered in cold blood" and sought communal lands for themselves. Such murders do not appear to have occurred but other vengeful acts were committed by the landlords. Tenants who had engaged in intelligence work for the British - such as those led by Jantjie Mosiaan in the Lichtenburg District - might be evicted. In the Barberton District, tenants on the farm "Hermansberg" appear to have had their rents radically raised by a landlord who sought to "teach them a lesson" for having acted as "Scouts(sic) for the British". Between 1899 and 1902, quite obviously, the class struggle had intersected with the military conflict in the Transvaal. Now that conflict was over. The class struggle remained. But it could no longer be waged by workers in the favourable conditions of the war years. The imperial army, massed in the countryside, was now manifestly being used to intimidate a class other than the landlords'. Not surprisingly, farm workers felt that they were being returned to their masters in a rather defenceless condition. Writing of many refugees, the Commander
of Native Refugees stated: "Having borne arms or taken an active part
in the War against their former employers they are afraid to return to
them." 197

Subjected to the rule of their landlords, disillusioned in their
hopes for more land, rural workers nevertheless did achieve some gains
from the immense struggle against their exploiters in which they en-
gaged. Wages appear to have been driven up - in the Heidelberg District,
for example, they were a third higher than their pre-war figure. 198
The newly-won right not to return to an employer enabled some workers
to avoid farms which had been sites of "bad treatment". 199 Without
doubt, tenants became more assertive: their threats to leave landlords
enabled them to negotiate more favourable terms of tenancy in the nor-
thern and western districts of the Transvaal. Many tenants, moreover,
were able to convert their labour- into rent- tenancies: this was
"prevalent" in those zones of the Transvaal ceded to Natal; and in the
Pietersburg District, there were "many cases where" resisting labour
tenants were able to achieve a similar metamorphosis. 200

The advantage of such a conversion lay not so much in minimising
the degree of exploitation (which may have remained the same) as in
transforming its kind. The exploitation of the labour tenant was sec-
ured through the direct command of his or her labour by the landlord;
in the case of the rent tenant, it was secured through the periodical
extraction of products or their money-equivalent. The organisation of
production and the actual intensity of labour in the latter case re-
mained under tenant control, although the need to secure a given rent,
tax and subsistence delimited certain boundaries in this regard. Rent-
unlike labour-, tenants had some measure of control over the labour
process through which they were exploited. Within the tenant family,
there was a patriarchal command of female and child labour and the
head of an extended family might himself not engage in labour at all;
but the oppressions within such a community were far fewer that those
within the landlord's economy and would have been mitigated by family
ties.

The conversion of labour- into rent-tenancies, the ability to ne-
gotiate more favourable terms of tenancy, the driving up of wages -
all these were gains for rural working people; at the same time they
were symptomatic of the weakened landlords' need to make concessions
in order to regain the services of people, many of whom had - shortly
before - been fighting for a world without them. For the 'balance of
class forces' to be tilted once more decisively in the landowners'
favour, not a little compromise was needed.
There was, however, one zone of the Transvaal where the problems of restoring the landlords were to prove particularly intractable: those westerly regions occupied by the Kgatla tenantry. In the Pilansberg, in fact, the effects of the Kgatla expropriation of the Boers was to be felt for decades. Hundreds of Boer landowning families "departed the area for all time... and many of their farms stood vacant" (of landlords?) "and unsold for twenty years." It was only after World War I that the "second Boer colonization of the Transvaal north of Rustenburg got underway." For two decades, Kgatla herds could graze on either side of the Marico and Crocodile Rivers and, in Soulspoort, much private property was converted to communal use.201

The reasons for the Kgatla success are not hard to seek. These people were not simply isolated tenants throwing off the yoke of their landlords spontaneously. They were the principal constituent of a larger community (of 30,000) led by Linchwe. Originally located at Soulspoort in the western Transvaal, the Kgatla peasantry was - in the mid-nineteenth century - dispossessed of its land and subjected to the rule of Boer landlords under harsh terms of tenancy. The result was the flight of a significant minority to Bechuanaland where they established a 'reserve' recognised by the British. The tenants left behind in the Transvaal increasingly looked upon the leader of their more independent kinspeople across the border as "their only hope of easing, if not escaping Boer rule." With this consciousness of dispossession, this hankering after a relatively more autonomous peasant existence, with the proximity of this tenantry to the redoubt in Bechuanaland from which peasant regiments could be sent, it is not surprising that at "the outbreak of war the brittle relationship between landlord and tenant in the Western Transvaal shattered." Within a year, the Kgatla had driven the landowning class off the farms on which it was the tenancy, not least by engendering in Boer families "the fear that regiments from across the Bechuanaland frontier might come to 'liberate' their people."202

The struggle of the Kgatla tenantry was both revolutionary and backward-looking: revolutionary, because its objective was the "reclaiming" of "ancestral land in the Transvaal" and the creation of a world in which "the Boer" (i.e. the landlord) "ceased" "to farm or reign supreme";203 backward-looking, because it sought to restore that which was lost - a communal existence which itself had its oppressions (of youth and women in production, for example). The world they would have re-created in the western Transvaal if left to do so can be glimpsed in Isaac Schapera's classic anthropological works on the Kgatla. In Bechuanaland, where their communal lands were to remain intact and where they refused to recognise capitalist private property amongst
themselves ( in 1943, the sale of a hut amongst them was described as "rare" and rent unknown), their differential access to cultivated land was marked. In a sample study of 133 families, Schapera found the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of families</th>
<th>Amount of cultivated land to which they had access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 42%</td>
<td>0 - 10 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 25%</td>
<td>11 - 20 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 15%</td>
<td>21 - 30 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 9%</td>
<td>31 - 40 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 7%</td>
<td>41-50 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 2%</td>
<td>51+ acres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If, as one historian argues, the Kgatla in the Transvaal, sought a "social revolution", it was not one which would have constituted a decisive break towards a new society.

12. Conclusion

The refraction of the preceding analysis through the theoretical considerations with which this study opened suggests the following. The onset of war in the Transvaal in 1899 was not marked—amongst the vast majority of agrarian working people—by a wave of patriotism that temporarily submerged class antagonisms: the fact that those people were the victims of colonial conquest and dispossession cancelled any chance of this. There are examples of blacks (some of them servants) aiding the Boers but these were neither historically typical or significant: had they been, the British would not have had to fashion and implement their elaborate programme to restore the class rule of the landlords. The immense intervention of the British Army, which so dislocated the society of the landlords, enabled rural workers to transform class struggle into class war. It was the British Army and the rural working classes which expropriated the Boer landlords during the South African War.

This class war—sheathed within the Boer-British conflict—helps to account for certain features of Boer strategy such as the sending of a "strong force under Commandant Klaas Prinsloo" to the heartland of the Pedi peasantry so as to guarantee the security of "the white farming community in Lydenburg district". Moreover, the large-scale massacre (during the war) of blacks caught aiding the British appears to have been the action of a class fearing extinction, a class (as Smuts wrote of the Boers) fearing "an eventual debacle of society". Indeed, the socio-neurotic fears of the 'landlords-in-arms' conveyed this. One of their commanders wrote of "armed native and colour-
"ed boys" traversing the Boer Republics seeking "to pay off old scores", of armed "coloured servants" boasting that they would possess the farms of Cape Boers and marry their wives. These fears did not drop, as it were, from the sky. They grew, quite literally, out of the ground - site of the agrarian class war of 1899-1902. The Boers feared because they had much to fear. The workers' struggle against them had sometimes been carried to the very point of physical extermination: around Orighstad, in the eastern Transvaal, there appears to have been a particularly ruthless campaign against the landowners with farm workers sallying forth in the darkness to "murder and plunder".

But once the defeat of the Boers had been secured, the British - for the reasons discussed - disarmed rural workers, reversed their expropriationary drive and restored the social and material existence of the landowing class. The character of the invading force, then, was crucial to the outcome of the class struggles of 1899-1902: that it was the imperial army of a bourgeois state decided that it would intervene (ultimately) to restore private property. This latter point may be stressed by analogy: in 1945, in Eastern Germany, the fact that the Red Army was the occupying force was decisive for ensuring "the expropriation of the Prussian Junkers, the landlord class" "with whom the German Left had wrestled unsuccessfully for over a century."

For agrarian workers, then, the class war of 1899-1902 ultimately failed in its objectives, although the landlords emerged weaker and shaken from their ordeal. The reasons for this failure are three-fold. First, and most obviously, the brute fact of the British intervention. Second, and less importantly, the nature of Transvaal peasant societies whose structures of power and authority appear to have undermined effective resistance. It was no accident that the British bribed the village elders with gun-licenses to spur them into encouraging their followers to surrender their arms: the NCs were clear about the positive role the chiefs played in this and when they encountered, in the Waterburg District, peasants who appeared to have retained their weaponry, they considered that their chief (Zebedela) had departed from the norm: "had he exerted the proper influence of a Chief, the taking of arms in his Location would have been more than doubled." Once the policy of restoring the landowners became evident, resisting it effectively would have entailed - at the very least - a violent and protracted confrontation with the British. Such a confrontation could only be directed by a leadership rooted in the poorer sections of the agrarian working class - i.e those with least to lose and most to gain. The chiefs, with their assured privileges within their own communities, had most to lose in such a confrontation: the logic
of their own position dictated their recoiling from such a prospect. They themselves were already imbricated in the increasingly-capitalist exploitation of their people. Stanley Trapido has suggestively argued that one of the reasons for the rapid re-establishment of the rural order in the Transvaal after the war was the re-introduction of labour-recruiting which made "chiefs more willing to collaborate once more". In fact, in at least one case, a chief set about such a ruthless exploitation of young men (by incessantly indenturing them to labour recruiters who paid him fees) that he appears, in effect, to have lost his following and been deposed. Nevertheless, it would be an error to over-stress the exploitation within peasant societies in regard to some of the important concerns of this study: quite obviously, for example, the interests of the entire peasant community - a community profoundly conditioned by communal property - could coincide in an attack upon landlords which would increase the land and livestock to which the community would have access (even if some members of the community were to enjoy more favourable access than others).

Third, rural workers were unable to ensure a final expropriation of their exploiters because their struggle was overwhelmingly uncoordinated and spontaneous in nature. The militant Kgatla tenants in the western Transvaal were not interested in struggles beyond the Pilansberg; and there is evidence of conflicts between peasant communities themselves during these years, for example over livestock. This spontaneity and lack of coordination rendered agrarian workers unable to vault over the two conditions of their failure mentioned above. It is a commonplace - but a truism - that the underclasses lacked revolutionary organisation and strategy. Only these would have given rural workers - whether on farms or on communal lands - the weapons with which to continue fighting for a world without landlords. That world they temporarily achieved, but often simply by following in the direction that their alienation and spontaneous acts of resistance led them. They could not hold on to that world, or prevent its retreat, without an idea of a new society and the organisation requisite to materialise that idea.

It is here that a comparison with the history of the Vietnamese peasantry is most instructive. For, in Vietnam too, war and class struggle powerfully combined. The German defeat of France (the colonial power in Indochina) in 1940 and the Japanese occupation of Vietnam were crucial for the advance of the revolutionary movement there. Once French rule was restored in Vietnam after World War Two, attempts to disarm the peasant-guerrillas and liquidate their desire for a new society (also without landowners) proved impossible. Forces - far
more massive than those mustered in the Transvaal in 1902 — attempted the task, climaxing in the final futility of the American assault upon South-East Asia. What made the Vietnamese Revolution possible, writes Benedict Anderson, "was 'planning revolution'" — a project itself dependent upon the anterior historical experience of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions upon which the Vietnamese drew. It was this that was missing in the Transvaal at the turn of the century.

2. For the relationship of the Russo-Japanese War to the 1905 Revolution, see S. Galai The Liberation Movement in Russia 1900-1905 (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 195-272; for the initially disastrous effects of the Great War upon the revolutionary movement in Russia, see Trotsky My Life, p. 241 and "Discussions with Trotsky", p. 54 in C. L. R. James At the Rendezvous of Victory: Selected Writings (London, 1984) - the quotation in the text comes from this source; finally, the importance of Russia's military debacle for the revolutions of 1917 is, by now, a commonplace. "The war of 1914", wrote E. H. Carr, an historian who recognised the immense difficulties the conflict at first created for revolutionaries, "was destined to serve as the forcing-house of revolution." E. H. Carr The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol. 1 (Harmondsworth, 1984), pp. 76-7 & 81.


4. For this, see S. B. Spies Methods of Barbarism? Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer Republics, January 1900 - May 1902 (Cape Town, 1977)

5. For the intricacies of migrant labour from the peasant village in the Transvaal, see Peter Delius The Land Belongs To Us: The Pedi, the Boers and the British in the Nineteenth-century Transvaal (Johannesburg, 1983), pp. 62-82 & 223. The necessarily cursory comments in the text do not detail all the factors which propelled peasants into migrant labour.

6. The exploits of this type of functionality are explored in Peter Delius's essay on Abel Erasmus to be published in Beinart W., Delius P. and Trapido S. Putting the Plough to the Ground (Johannesburg, forthcoming).

7. This paragraph is constructed from evidence and analysis provided by Albert Grundlingh's compressed but important study "Collaborators in Boer Society", chapter 11 in Peter Warwick and S. B. Spies (eds.) The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 (Longman, Harlow, 1980).


9. See W. R. Nasson, "'Doing down their Masters': Africans, Boers and Treason in the Cape Colony during the South African War of 1899-1902", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12, 1, 1983. In this essay, Nasson is overwhelmingly concerned with the Cape but he implies, on p. 3, that his argument applies to the "occupied Transvaal" as well. In fact, the spying and informing there is likely to have been carried on on an even greater scale than in the Cape, the Transvaal being the core area of the war. For further information on the role and importance of the rural underclasses in providing intelligence and scouts to the British, see Peter Warwick Black People and the South African War (Cambridge and Johannesburg, 1983), pp. 5, 21-2, 33-4, 47, 93, 31 & 87 (the latter two are references to the Transvaal, specifically). Still more evidence of spying by workers, some of them artisanal, can be found in W. R. Nasson's "Abraham Esau: A Calvinia Martyr in the Anglo-Boer War", Social Dynamics, 11 (1) 1985, p. 68.


11. This passage has been constructed from Transvaal Archives Depot, SNA (Archives of the Secretary for Native Affairs, 1900-1911), Vol. 46, File: NA 1519/02. Mosian (alternatively, "Mosiani") to the Secretary for Native Affairs dd. 28/7/1902 & 15/11/1902. Hereafter,
references to this archive will omit the designations "vol." and 
"file" - the volume number always precedes that of the file. The 
above reference would thus read SNA, 47, NA 1519/02, etc. Secretary 
of Native Affairs will read "Sec. NA".

In his letter dd. 28/7/1902, Mosiaan described the community 
he represented as "Banogin natives hitherto living as Bywoners & 
Squatters on private farms, in the Lichtenburg District, of Boer 
Burghers."

12. General Jan Smuts’s term for armed blacks with the British Army 
during the Boer War. He used it in his public letter to W. T. Stead 
in 1902. The letter is published in full in Hancock, W. K. and van 
der Poel, J. Selections from the Smuts Papers (Cambridge, 1966), 

13. The evidence in this paragraph, as well as further information re-

garding Britain’s use of armed blacks during the Boer War, can be 
found in D. Denoon, "Participation in the Boer War: People’s War, 
People’s Non-War, or Non-People’s War?" in Bethwell A. Ogut (ed.) 
War and Society in Africa (London, 1972), pp. 111-12; R. F. Morton, 
"Linchwe I and the Kgatla Campaign in the South African War, 1899-
1902", Journal of African History, 26 (1985); W. R. Nasion, “Mov-

ing Lord Kitchener”: Black Military Transport and Supply Work in the 
South African War, 1899-1902, with particular reference to the Cape 
Colony”, Journal of Southern African Studies (JSAS), Vol. 11, No. 1, 
October 1984, p. 35; and Warwick, pp. 5, 20-7, 40-1, 46-7, 51, 87, 
90-2, 96, 100-1, 123-4, 157, 179-80: quotation and statistics from 
pp. 5 and 25 of this work. The information concerning Malekuti’s 
capture of more than 30 Boers can be found in SNA, 106, NA 489/03, 
Sub-NC Phokwane’s "Report" for January 1903.

14. See Warwick, pp. 40-2, 45-6, 90-3, 101, 107, 180-1: Morton, gen-
erally, but especially pp. 176-182; Denoon, pp. 111 and 113; and 

The above references include information regarding attacks upon Boers 
by their tenants and servants.

15. For this information and the quotations, see SNA, 97, NA 226/03, 
Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 9/1/1903 and "Report of...Sub Native Commiss-
ioner, Middleburg (sic) on...proposal [re]...Location [for]... Jafi-
ta Mahlungu..." dd. 5/1/1903; and SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Hogge to 
Sec. NA dd. 19/2/03. The peasantry concerned is referred to various-
ly as "Matabela" and "Mandebele". They were, however, Ndebele and 
their heartland was in the Middelburg District: see the entries un-
der "Mapoch" and "Mapoch War" in Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern 
Africa, Vol. 7 (Cape Town, 1972)


17. See Warwick, pp. 22, 45-6, 48, 51, 69, 87-8, 89-90, 93, 97, 101, 

18. One British administrator described General Walter Kitchener’s 
soliciting of peasant aid in depriving Boers of their cattle in the 
Lichtenburg District as designed to "hasten the end of hostilities": 
see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 18/8/1902. Later, the 
same official referred to military instructions given "Chiefs" to 
loot Boer cattle as "given with a view to depriving the enemy of 
his meat supply." See SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 
19/2/03.

Warwick 30%, as the figure promised to the Kgatla raiders. For Kitch-
ener’s offer to the Pedi paramount, see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Copy. 
of Kitchener to "Head Chief Sekukuniland" dd. 10/4/1901, enclosure of 
Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 18/8/1902. According to Kitchener’s intelli-
gence officer and interpreter, however, the General informed the Pedi 
that "they might keep all stock captured by them from the enemy". See
Hogge's comment in his letter to the Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902 in *Ibid.*

20. For this case, see SNA, 48, NA 1644/02: Warwick to Sec. NA dd. dd. 26/8/1902; Chief Gopane to Lagden dd. 2/8/1902; "Affidavit of... Gopane...11th Aug. 1902"; Sub-NC Zeerust to NC Rustenburg dd. 13/8/1902; Griffith to Sec. NA dd. 25/8/1902; "Memorandum for submission to Members of Council from Commissioner of Native Affairs" dd. dd. 3/9/1902 (the final quotation comes from this document; all other quotations come from the second document in this list). The peasants are referred to as "Buhurutse".

21. SNA, 40, Na 1302/02, "Circular to NCs" from Sec. NA. Draft: N.d.

22. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902; SNA, 88, NA 87/03, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 7/1/1903; SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Wheelwright to Sec. NA dd. 24/2/1903 and Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/03.

23. For the Kgatla, see Morton, pp. 183 and 185; and SNA, 62, NA 2160/02, Driver to NC Rustenburg dd. 26/9/1902: quotation from the latter. For the Zulu, see Warwick, pp. 87-8: much of this raiding took place in the New Republic, the area which the British ceded to Natal. For the northern Transvaal, see SNA, 27, NA 895/02, Wheelwright to Sir Godfrey dd. 13/9/1902.

24. Warwick, p. 45.

25. See SNA, 40, NA 1302/02, Draft "Circular to NCs" from Sec. NA. Nd; SNA, 24, NA 745/02, Report No. 12 of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, Erskine to General Manager dd. 26/8/1902 (Western Transvaal evidence) and SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd.6/10/1902 (the northern Middelburg evidence).

26. SNA, 42, NA 1363/02, "Extracts from Inspector General's Diary Referring to Natives in the Waterburg & Zoutpansberg" - see the August 25th (presumably 1902) entry for Warmbaths. For further evidence of the peasantry having seized scores of Boer cattle - this time in the Central Transvaal - see SNA, 100, NA 297/03, Taberer to Lagden dd. 19/8/1902.

27. See Warwick, pp. 48 and 89; and Morton, pp. 187-8.


30. Warwick, pp. 91, 93 and 165.


32. SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Wheelwright to Sec. NA dd. 24/2/1903.

33. SNA, 88, NA 87/03, Armstrong to NC Lydenburg dd. 3/1/1903.

34. *Ibid.*, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 7/1/1903.

35. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902.

36. See SNA, 62, NA 2160/02, Copy of Driver to NC Rustenburg dd. 26/9/1902; SNA, 106, NA 491/03, NC Rustenburg to Sec. NA dd. 18/2/1903 and Trapido, p. 45. Quotation from first document cited. The Kgatla, in fact, claimed all territory between the Crocodile and Elands Rivers.

37. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Scholefield to Windham dd. 12/7/02; SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/1903; Trapido, p. 45 and Warwick, p. 165. Quotations from SNA documents.
38. SNA, 42, NA 1363/02, "Extracts from Inspector General's Diary Referring to Natives in the Waterburg & Zoutpanseberg" (see the August 20th and 22nd entries for Haenertsburg and Spelonken respectively); Wheelwright to Sec. NA dd. 24/2/1903 in SNA, 106, NA 491/03; Transvaal Administration Reports, Report of the Native Affairs Depart- for 1903, p. 18 - quoted in Warwick, p. 165. See also Trapido, p. 45.

39. See SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, "Minutes of a meeting...at...Sekukuni's...5th September 1902": enclosure of Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/9/1902 & Minutes of "Meeting held at...Malakuti's...10th Sept. 1902 Middel-
burg..."

40. Trapido, p. 45 and Warwick, p. 165.

41. SNA 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902; SNA, 106, NA 491/03, "Report by Native Commissioner, Pretoria and Heidelburg Districts", dd. 21/2/1903. See also Trapido, p. 45. Quotations from the documents cited.

42. SNA, 67, NA 2336/02, Sec. NA to Acting Private Secretary to the Lieut.-Gov. dd. 25/10/10, my emphasis; and The Star, 8/1/1903, special ed., p. 7, col. 7.

43. Morton, pp. 185 and 189.


45. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Griffith to Sec. NA dd. 27/8/1902. For further evidence of the Kgatla seeking to increase the size of their communal lands (including through the creation of a reserve between the Crocodile and Elands Rivers in the western Transvaal), see Warwick, pp. 49 and 182.

46. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902.

47. For the Pedi, see Warwick, pp. 101-3 and SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 18/8/1902. Quotation from the latter.

48. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Minutes of a "Meeting held at...Malakuti's...10th September 1902..."

49. See SNA, 88, NA 87/03, Armstrong to NC Lydenburg dd. 3/1/1903 and enclosure; and NA 91/03, Armstrong to NC Lydenburg dd. 2/1/1903. Some of this contested land appears to have been seized from the peasants concerned before the war - see "Statement of Mokhale (Magalie)..." dd. 24/12/1902 in NA 87/03. Although the documentation does not specifically refer to the effects of the war upon the land claims referred to, the timing of both the friction and the attempts to increase the size of the locations suggests a connection between the conflict and the claims.

50. SNA, 45, NA 1473/02, "NATIVE REFUGEE DEPARTMENT. Circular L:38" dd. 12/7/1902. See also Warwick, p. 160.

51. Apart from the evidence already cited, see Warwick who, on p. 177, quotes an illuminating passage written by an African in the South African Outlook of 1906 which gives as one "strong incentive" for blacks to aid the British during the Boer War, the desire to reclaim land of which they had been "despoiled".

52. See Warwick, p. 138 & Nasson, "Moving Lord Kitchener", pp. 31 and 49. Both historians relate the desertions to living and working conditions on the farms (Nasson's evidence is entirely from the Cape). See also the Diamond Fields Advertiser Weekly Edition (hereafter: DFA Weekly), 6/9/1902, p. 14, "Notes from Douglas". Black workers, this newspaper reported, prefer "the...pay and excitement of military em-
ployment for a short time to (the) monotonous life and low wages off-
ered...them as farm labourers...". My brackets.

53. Martin Murray, "Agrarian Social Structure and Rural Class Relat-


55. SNA, 48, NA 1657/02, Britten to Magistrate, Native Court, 1902. Some of this resistance appears to have been born of a tenant fear (alluded to in this document) of Boer reprisals for these refugees having aided the British during the war. The resistance, however, cannot be reduced to this since many of these resisters had been tenants "on the farms of Englishmen".

56. See the comment by Lagden (dd. 15/8/1902) on folio 83 in SNA, 46.

57. See (for the Pretoria District), SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902; for the western Transvaal, SNA, Vol. 81, folio 15 (a loose document). Copy of CNA to NC Rustenburg dd. 13/2/1903. For circumstantial evidence of black refugees refusing to return to their former-employers after the war, see SNA, 45, NA 1458/02, O.C. Native Refugees, Tvl & ORC to Sec. NA dd. 21/7/1902: this official expected a "considerable number of families" to be left "on our hands after we have repatriated all...natives...willing to return to their former-employers...". Moreover, where returning landlords adopted a threatening attitude to their former employees (who were refugees) these people refused "on any account to serve their former masters." (See SNA, 45, NA 1473/02, Native Refugee Department Circular L:38 dd. 12/7/1902 for the latter). And, finally, in the north-western Transvaal, the local NC was wont to "fancy" that "many" tenants would leave Boer farms once he had made it clear to them that the defeated landlords had not been expropriated.

58. SNA, 27, NA 895/02, Wheelwright to Sir Godfrey dd. 13/9/1902. For further evidence of the refusal to labour for returning landlords in the northern Transvaal, see SNA, 24, NA 745/02, Report...12 of... WNLA dd. 1/9/1902.

59. See SNA, 47, NA 1569/02. "Minutes of a meeting held at...Sekuku-ni's...5th September 1902", enclosure of Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/9/1902 - an enclosure of Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/9/1902 and Ibid., Hogge to See also SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, Affidavits of H. Schoeman and C.L.W. van Zwiel, the former dd. 11/7/1902

60. See Warwick, p. 168 and Trapido, pp. 45-6; some of this evidence is from those parts of the Transvaal ceded to Natal.

61. SNA, 100, NA 297/03, Taberer to Lagden dd. 23/7/1902; SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 19/8/1902 & 9/9/1902. Quotation from the letter of 23rd July.

62. SNA, 48, NA 1608/02, "South African Constabulary...Western Transvaal. District Reports". Nd; covering letter dd. August 6th., 1902. During the war, of course, some Kgatla farm servants refused to serve their employers - see Warwick, p. 45.

63. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 26/9/1902. For further evidence of this refusal, see Ibid., Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902. See also SNA, 42, NA 1363/02, "Extracts from Inspector-General's Diary Referring to Natives in the Waterburg & Zoutpansberg", Aug. 25th Warmbaths entry.

64. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 26/9/1902.

6/8/1902. This division included the Pretoria, Middelburg, Lydenburg, Waterburg and Zoutpansberg Districts.

66. DFA Weekly, 11/10/1902, p. 27, with reference to the Transvaal.


68. See SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902.

69. SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Report by NC, Pretoria and Heidelberg Districts dd. 21/2/1903.

70. Ibid., NC Waterburg to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/1903.

71. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Scholefield to Windham dd. 12/7/1902.

72. SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/1903.

73. Quotations from Marx Capital. Vol. 1, pp. 175 & 283. At times I have altered the quotations slightly to allow them to relate to the plural nouns I use. For a subtle exploration of Marx's conception of "human essence" and the place of work within it, see George Markus Marxism and Anthropology: The concept of 'human essence' in the philosophy of Marx (Assen, 1978), especially chapter 1.

74. DFA Weekly, 11/10/1902, p. 27, "Native Labour". Jhb. report.

75. Warwick, p. 105.

76. See Trapido, p. 45; evidence from the Transvaal Labour Commission (1903).

77. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Wheelwright to Windham dd. 10/7/1902; Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902; Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 9/9/1902.

78. SNA, 55, NA 1957/02, Scholefield to Sir Godfrey dd. 15/9/1902. See this file generally for this case: there are many renderings of the farm's name.

79. DFA Weekly, 6/9/1902, p. 15, "Natives and Arms".

80. SNA, 48, NA 1608/02, "South African Constabulary: 'A' Division.... District Reports": report from Pilansberg. Nd: covering letter dd. 6/8/1902. See also Ibid., SAC "'B' Division....District Report". (This Division included the Pretoria, Middelburg, Lydenburg, Waterburg and Zoutpansberg Districts). The latter report noted "Natives...generally reported 'above themselves'...". For "impudence", see Ibid., SAC "'C' Division. District Reports".

81. DFA Weekly, 11/10/1902, p. 27, "Native Labour" report from Johannesburg. For native commissioners declining upon the problems existing between the classes on farms, see SNA, 100, NA 297/03, Taberer to Legden dd. 23/7/1902 and SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902 & 26/9/1902.

82. SNA, 71, NA 2480/02, Harries to Controller of Passports dd.6 Nov. 1902 (a report from the Krugersdorp District). For further evidence of a similar nature, see SNA, 59, NA 2106/02, Patten to NC Waterburg dd. 21/9/1902.

83. The Star, 8/1/1903, Special ed., p. 6, "What the Boers Want".

84. The essential theses of S. Marks and S. Trapido's article "Lord Milner and the South African State" in P. Bonner (ed.) Working Papers in Southern African Studies (Johannesburg, 1981). As they conclude: "the war and the reconstruction which followed it were intended to transform the nature of the class structure of the territory by hastening the development of a capitalist state." (p. 54) Their article has also been published in History Workshop Journal.

85. SNA, 64, NA 2255/02, Copy of telegram from Sec. NA to NC (five districts) dd. 21/11/1902; it drew attention to the provision in the Treaty which allowed Boers to keep livestock looted from peasants.
86. SNA, 24, NA 745/02, Report No. 12 of the WNLA dd. 26/8/1902 (with reference to the western Transvaal). In the northern Transvaal, "numerous cases arising out of the native-Boer cattle question" (with difficulties) were predicted: see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Extract from NC Zoutpansberg to Sec. NA dd. 10/7/1902.

87. The region was the northern Middelburg District. See, SNA, NA 2839/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/12/1902 and SNA, 88, NA 87/03, Armstrong to NC Lydenburg dd. 3/1/1903. Quotation from the former document.

88. SNA, 100, NA 297/03, Taberer to Lagden dd. 19/8/02. This resistance occurred near Bronkhorstpruit and involved the peasantry led by "Mathebe".

89. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, "Minutes of a meeting held at...Sekukuni's...5th September 1902" and Hogge to Sec. Na dd. 18/8/1902.

90. For details of the compensation offered, see SNA, 56, NA 1992/02, Sec. NA Circular No 1516/02 dd. 11/9/1902. For Boer animals given to peasants by the imperial authorities as payment for services rendered, full compensation; for beasts expropriated by blacks under military instruction, compensation equivalent to half the value of the beasts; for animals looted by peasants on their own volition, however, no compensation was to be given. For the granting of compensation to blacks for animals of theirs which they could prove were in Boer hands, see SNA, 80, NA 2770/02, CNA to Lieut-Governor dd. 12/12/1902.

91. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Sub-NC Hook to NC Pretoria dd. 18/8/1902 and SNA, 88, NA 297/03, Armstrong to NC Lydenburg dd. 3/1/1903.

92. For details of this dispute, which concerned the "well armed" followers of "Mathebe", see SNA, 100, NA 297/03, Taberer to Lagden dd. 19/8/1902 and SNA, 47, 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 9/9/1902. The same deployment of Boers and SAC managed to repossess a few score cattle in the hands of "Mashebe's" followers", however. In the surviving documentation, the dispute concerning "Mathebe" remains cloudy.

93. See, for the restitution of livestock generally, SNA, Vol. 76, folios 26-40 in File NA 2596/02; for the evidence relating to the tenants, see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Extracts from NC Pietersburg's report dd. 11/10/1902.

94. SNA, 64, NA 2255/02, Sec. NA Circular No. 2086/02 dd. 21/10/1902 & Copy of telegram from Sec. NA to NCs (5 Districts) dd. 21 Nov. 1902.

95. SNA, 86, NA 2862/02, Sec. NA Circular No 3063/02 dd. 18/12/1902.

96. This passage is constructed from SNA, NA 2839/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/2/1902; SNA, 80, NA 2770/02, CNA to Lieut-Gov dd. 12/12/1902. Hogge's letter made it clear that: "We shall look very small if the High Court or Privy Council decide that the natives are entitled to keep cattle given them for work done or taken under instructions of the military...". Nevertheless, the new policy put into effect was biased against the peasantry: NCs were advised that in "giving effect" to it, they were to "be careful not to hunt for native claimants". (see SNA, 86, NA 2862/02, Sec. NA Circular No. 3063/02 dd. 18/12/1902.

97. A phrase used in SNA, 86, NA 2862/02, CNA (?) to "His Excellency" dd. 22/12/1902.

98. Warwick, p. 48.

99. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902.

100. SNA, 86, NA 2862/02, CNA(?) to "His Excellency" dd. 22/12/02: the NCs "appealed against being obliged to perpetrate a manifest injustice."
101. See Ibid., "Particulars of Boer stock recovered from Natives in terms of NA Circular 1516." 11th September 1902. Total recovered = 327 (316 of them cattle). Only one wagon was recovered for which compensa-
was paid.

102. For example, the Boers failed miserably in their efforts to recl-
aim the multitude of cattle raided from them by the Kgatla and stored in Bechuanaland. See Warwick, p. 48.

103. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, enclosure of Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/9/02 entitled "Minutes of a meeting held at... Sekukuni's... 5th September 1902".

104. For other such meetings or references to them, see Ibid., Minutes of a "Meeting held at... Malakuti's... 10th September 1902 Middelburg District" and Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902.

105. For this - and for government policy in regard to black refugees generally - see SNA, 45, NA 1473/02, Native Refugee Department Circular L:38 and L:39, dd. July 12th and 18th 1902 respectively.

106. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02; Griffith to Sec. NA dd. 27/8/1902.

107. SNA, 67, NA 2336/02, Sec. NA to Acting Pvt. Sec. to Lieut-Gov dd. 25/10/1902.

108. See, for example, NC Waterburg to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/1902; "Report by Native Commissioner, Pretoria and Heidelberg Districts" dd. 21/2/1903; and NC Rustenburg to Sec. NA dd. 18/2/1903 (with reference to the Kgatla) dd. 18/2/1903. All documents in SNA, 106, NA 491/03.

109. For this, see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, "Minutes of a meeting... at... Sekukunis... 5th September 1902"; enclosure of Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/9/1902; Minutes of "Meeting... at... Malakuti's... 10th September 1902 Middelburg District"; Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902. See also Clause VII of Circular L: 38 dd. 12/7/1902 of the Native Refugee De-
partment (see footnote 105 for the full reference to it).

110. DFA Weekly, 6/9/1902, p. 15.

111. See the instructions on this given the officials in charge of su-
ch repatriation in SNA, 45, NA 1473/02, Native Refugee Department Cir-
cular L: 38 dd. 12/7/1902.

112. SNA, 24, NA 745/02, Report No. 12 of WNLA dd. 1/9/1902.

113. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/02. My brackets.

114. See Ibid., Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902 and "Minutes of a meet-
ing... at... Sekukunis... 5th September 1902"; enclosure of Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/9/1902. Quotation from the latter.

115. Quoted in Warwick, p. 144.

116. This passage is constructed from Ibid., p. 159: SNA, 45, NA 1473/02, Native Refugee Dept. Circulars L: 38 & L: 39 dd. July 12 & 18 respectively; SNA, 56, NA 2060/02, District Superintendent, Native Refugee Department to R. M. Heidelberg dd. 5/10/1902. Quotation from one of the Circulars.

117. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902; Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 20/7/1902 and to Windham dd. 31/7/1902.

118. DFA Weekly Ed., 11/10/1902, p. 27. For evidence of NCs giving ten-
ant to understand that they had to work for landlords, see SNA, 48, NA 1608/02, SAC "'B' Division.... District Report". Nd. But its cover-

119. For evidence of this diplomacy and mediation, see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902 & Hook to NC Pretoria dd. 18/8/1902. For instructions to.
those responsible for the repatriation of refugee-workers to employ.
tact and discretion" in the process, and to warn employers against adopting threatening attitudes, see SNA, 45, NA 1473/02, Native Refugees Department. Circular L: 38 dd. 12/7/1902.

120. SNA, 88, NA 87/03. See the relevant comments in copy of Sec. NA to NC Lydenburg dd. 14/1/1903.

121. K. Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844)" pp. 326-7 in Marx Early Writings (Harmondsworth, 1981).

122. SNA, 88, NA 87/03, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 7/1/1903 which followed a report from a Northern Middelburg official: see Ibid., Armstrong to NC Lydenburg dd. 3/1/1903.

123. SNA, 106, NA 491/03, NC Waterburg to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/1903.

124. SNA, 46, NA 1517/02. Tennant to Sec. NA dd. 7/8/1902.

125. Trapido (p. 46) argues that such threatened use was central to the restoration of relationships of tenancy.

126. This passage has been constructed from the following sources: SNA, 62; NA 2160/02, Copy of Driver to NC Rustenburg dd. 26/9/02; Rich p. 69 and Warwick, p. 49. The quotation comes from E. F. King South Africa After the War (1903), cited by Rich. As will be shown, Pilansberg farms were not always restored to their original owners and the process of restoration was to prove very problematical.

127. Warwick, p. 165.


130. See Warwick, p. 165 and Denoon, p. 116.

131. Passage constructed from SNA, 71, NA 2480/02 to Controller of Harries to Controller of Passports dd. 6/11/1902; SNA, 106, NA 491/03, NC Rustenburg to Sec. NA dd. 18/2/1903; SNA, 67, NA 2331/02, Sec. NA to Chief Staff Officer, SAC dd. 21/10/1902; and SNA, 59, NA 2106/02, Haurelle (?) to Sec. NA dd. 15/11/1902. The penultimate document cited makes clear that under Proclamation 37 of 1901, farm workers merely travelling within their own districts required passes.

132. For this (1902) case, see generally SNA, 55, NA 1957/02.

133. In the Transvaal alone, as this section shows, there were more than 50 000 armed blacks. By the end of the war, the total number of Boer soldiers in the field throughout South Africa was 17 000: see Grundlingh, p. 264. The figure for armed blacks provided refers to those independently armed: it does not include blacks enrolled by the British.

134. See SNA, 106, NA 491/03, NC Waterburg to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/1903; SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, DC Lydenburg to Sec. Tvl. Admin. dd. 23/6/1902: annexure A of NC Lydenburg to Sec. NA dd. 13/7/1902; SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Extracts from NC Pietersburg dd. 11/10/1902; and The Zoutpansberg Review and Mining Journal. 29/9/1902, "Disarming the Natives", Cutting in SNA, 38, NA 1299/02.

135. For further evidence of this, see SNA, 24, NA 745/02, Report No.12 of WNLA dd. 26/8/1902 (western Transvaal); SNA, 62, NA 2160/02, Copy of Driver to NC Rustenburg dd. 26/9/02: enclosure of Griffith to Sec. NA dd. 30/9/02 (Pilansberg); SNA, 47, NA 1569/02. Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/02 (north-western Transvaal); SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, SAC Pretoria.to CSO, SAC Jhb. dd. 2/7/1902 (eastern Transvaal); for evidence from the more central and southerly zones of the Transvaal, see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902 and SNA, 48, NA 1608/02, SAC "'B' Division....District Report", Nd. covering letter dd. 6/8/1902. In this District Report, see the references to Hammanskraal, Doornkloof and Roos Senekal.
136. DFA Weekly, 30/8/1902, p. 12.

137. The figures are from SNA, Vol. 38, Folios 11-12, "Schedule of Arms Surrendered to Native Commissioners". Nd (March 1903?) Hundreds of the surrendered rifles were impressed with the stamp of the imperial war department: see SNA, 87, NA 63/03, "Return of Service Rifles with War Department Mark" dd. 7/5/1903. In the SNA files on disarmament the effectiveness of the breech-loaders at close quarters is stressed.

138. See SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, "Affidavit of Herculaas...Schoeman...at Lydenburg...11th July 1902" and Affidavit of Carl Louis van Zwiel.

139. SNA, 48, NA 1608/02, SAC "'B' Division....District Report". Nd; covering letter dd. 6/8/1902.

140. SNA, 100, NA 297/03, Taberer to Lagden dd. 19/8/1902.

141. DFA Weekly, 11/10/02, p. 27, "Native Labour". Report from Jhb.

142. For the importance which the NCs attached to an early disarmament of blacks, see SNA, 100, NA 297/03, Taberer to Lagden dd. 23/7/1902; SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902; SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, NC Lydenburg to Sec. NA dd. 13/7/02; for a magistrate anxious to effect disarmament, see Ibid., copy of telegram from SAC Pretoria to CSO, SAC Jhb. dd. 2/7/1902: enclosure of Asst. CSO, SAC to CNA dd. 2/7/1902 (the telegram referred to the magistrate at Lydenburg). The former assistant district commissioner of the Lydenburg District also believed that disarmament was necessary: see Ibid., Knight to NC Lydenburg dd. 12/7/1902. Quotations from the first two documents cited.

143. For the ordinance, see SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, "Notice to the Public with Regard to...Arms...under Ordinance No. 13...". For the extension of the period of legal surrender, see Ibid., Assistant Colonial Secretary to Sec. NA dd. 24/9/1902.

144. For this (actual or expected) sullenness, dissatisfaction and resistance, see SNA, 37, NA 1266/02, Acting Commissioner "Secconiland" to Major Gough dd. 17/6/1902; SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902; Ibid., NC Lydenburg to CNA dd. 29/8/1902; Ibid., "Extrait from Weekly Report (23rd August) by NC Rustenburg": SNA, 38, Wheelwright to Sec. NA dd. 10/1/1903; SNA, 100, NA 297/03, Taberer to Lagden dd. 1/9/1902. Armed resistance was expected from the Pedi.

145. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Griffith to Sec. NA dd. 10/9/1902 and 17/9/1902; Warwick, p. 103; and SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, Sec. NA to Imperial Secretary dd. 26/9/1902.

146. See SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/9/1902 (the Pedi); SNA, Vol. 80, folio 89 in NA 2738/02 (Barberton); SNA, 84, NA 2839/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/12/1902 (N. Middelburg evidence); for secretion of weapons in the Waterburg District, see SNA, 96, NA 1731/02 (placed with NA 201/03), Sub-NC Waterburg to Res. Magistrate Waterburg dd. 1/8/1904; SNA, 96, NA 201/03, Allan King to Windham dd. 26/6/1904; & SNA, 97, NA 201/03, Allan King to Windham dd. 1/1/1905. See also Warwick (p.166): "undoubtedly some blacks successfully concealed their weapons".

147. SNA, 37, NA 1266/02, CNA to NCs dd. 18/8/1902.

148. For the relative ease in disarming the Pedi, see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/9/1902 & enclosures and SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, telegrams from NC Lydenburg to Sec. NA dd. 22/9/1902 & 4/10/1902. For this ease in other areas, see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer (NC Pretoria and Heidelberg Districts) to Sec. NA dd. 9/9/1902 & Extract from Weekly Report (23rd August) by NC Rustenburg & Griffith to Sec. NA dd. 10/9/1902 & 17/9/1902: in Griffiths area of jurisdiction, the Kgatla were something of an exception, although not a militant one. For further evidence of the easy disarmament of blacks, see SNA, 47, folios 136-46 in NA 1569/02.
The intended display of armed force to effect disarmament in the Lydenburg District was halted by higher authority; and following directly upon these events, all NCs were warned against such displays. For all this, see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 18/8/1902; SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, Sec. NA to NC Lydenburg dd. 21/8/1902 and Sec. NA to "The Native Commissioner" (see Vol. 38, folio 35 for confirmation that this was a general circular). Quotation from the general circular.

151. SNA, 39, NA 1299/02, Lagden to Lieut-Governor dd. 23/2/1903.

Passage constructed from SNA, NA 1299/02, Wheelwright to Sec. NA dd. 10/1/1903 and SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Excerpts from NC Pietersburg dd. 11/10/1902. Quotations from the latter.

152. For such meetings, see generally SNA, 47, NA 1569/02.

153. See SNA, 90, NA 119/03, "Expenditure on Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Natives" dd. 16/1/03. Figure calculated by combining the amount already paid out in compensation, the "Balance in Hand" and the "Further Sum" requested by the NCs "to complete payment". Warwick (p. 165) gives a figure just short of £61 000; it appears that his figure excludes the "Balance in Hand".

154. This was certainly the view of The Zoutpansbera Review and Mining Journal, 29/9/1902. "Still They Don't Like Work", cutting in SNA, 38, NA 1299/02.

155. See SNA, 37, NA 1266/02, CNA to Native Commissioner dd. 18/8/1902 and SNA, 80, NA 2738/02, "Copy of Firearms Register. 1903".

156. For the penalties, see SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, "Notice to...public with regard to...Ordinance No.13...". A common wage for Transvaal farm workers in the early-twentieth century was £1 - 10s. per month with food; see, for example, Transvaal Agricultural Journal, Vol. II, p.469 - 1904 evidence from Wolmaransstad; and TAJ, Vol. III, p. 169 - 1904 evidence from Krugersdorp. The value of food provided may be taken as 6d. per day, the calculation of one employer who paid his workers 1s. per day: see Agricultural Journal of the Union of South Africa, Vol.I, pp. 315-6, letter from Elphick dd. 20/2/1911. The wage including food, therefore, would be £2-5s. per month or £27 per year.

157. For the penalties, see SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, "Notice to...public with regard to...Ordinance No.13...". A common wage for Transvaal farm workers in the early-twentieth century was £1 - 10s. per month with food; see, for example, Transvaal Agricultural Journal, Vol. II, p.469 - 1904 evidence from Wolmaransstad; and TAJ, Vol. III, p. 169 - 1904 evidence from Krugersdorp. The value of food provided may be taken as 6d. per day, the calculation of one employer who paid his workers 1s. per day: see Agricultural Journal of the Union of South Africa, Vol.I, pp. 315-6, letter from Elphick dd. 20/2/1911. The wage including food, therefore, would be £2-5s. per month or £27 per year.

158. See the "Notice" cited in footnote 157.

159. This is suggested by the case concerning Jacob Sequalo Mamabulo's followers in the Haenertsburg area in early-1903: see SNA, 101, NA 317/03. Further evidence of this case, with a slight variation in name can be found in The Star, 11/2/1903, 3rd ed., p.6, "Expensive Procrastination".

160. SNA, 39, NA 1299/02, Lagden to Lieut-Gov. dd. 23/2/1903.

161. SNA, 38, NA 1299/02, Telegram dd. 21/8/1902 from NC Lydenburg to Sec. NA & Sec. NA to NC Lydenburg dd. 23/8/1902.

162. SNA, Vol. 47, folio 142, NC Lydenburg to Sec. NA dd. 15/9/1902.

163. These statements are drawn (respectively) from: SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 29/9/1902, enclosure: statement of "Letoli (Induna of chief Rahlana)at a "Meeting...at...Malakuti's...10th Sept. 1902" (as Hogges letter made clear, this was a general meeting with "chiefs of the northern part of the Middelburg district": Ibid., "Conference held at...Sekukuni's...6th September 1902", annexure of Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/9/1902 (quotation from Sekukhune himself); and SNA, NA 1299/02, Wheelwright to Sec. NA dd. 10/1/1903: the speeches were reported, though not verbatim, in this letter.

164. Quotations in this paragraph from, respectively, SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, "Minutes of Meeting...at Gun Hill, Middelburg, 2nd October 1902" & SNA, NA 1299/02, Wheelwright to Sec. NA dd. 10/1/1903.
165. See SNA, 80, NA 2738/02, "Copy of Firearms Register. 1903." Exact number of arms in the hands of rural blacks: 108; this figure, obviously does not take into account secreted weapons.


167. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, NC Lydenburg to CNA, "Extract from Report dated 13th October."

168. SNA, NA 1299/02, Wheelwright to Sec. NA dd. 10/1/1902.

169. For this liberal shooting, see SNA, 39, NA 1299/02, folios 133 (Pretoria), 166 (Waterburg), 170 (Zoutpansberg). The destruction of game may have preceded the formal implementation of the disarmament ordinance, since attempts at disarmament began immediately after the war. As early as June 1902, for example, the Lydenburg DC ordered peasant leaders to collect "breech loading arms...preparatory to handing them over to Government..." (see SNA, 37, NA 1266/02, Acting Commissioner "Secoconiland" to Gough dd. 17/6/1902.) Less than a month later, the "ruthless destruction of game" - alluded to a little further on in the text - began.

170. SNA, 47, File NA 1569/02, Scholefield, to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902 & NC Pietersburg to CNA dd. 11/10/1902; and SNA, 39, NA 1299/02, NC Lydenburg to Sec. NA dd. 13/7/1902.

171. The figure of 25 sub-NCs is from the DFA Weekly, 11/10/1902, "Native Labour" (Jhb. report). A figure of 18 sub-NCs can be calculated from SNA, 41, NA 1344/02, "Native Affairs Department Extract from Draft Estimates 1902-3". It is likely that such estimates would have been prepared very soon after the end of the war. The higher figure provided by the DFA probably includes sub-NC offices created in addition to those referred to in the "Draft Estimates". In my thesis, "Alienation and Class Struggle at the Transition to Capitalism: the Rural Transvaal in the early-twentieth century" (Oxford, D.Phil forthcoming) I will provide comprehensive details of the various sub-NC offices and settle the question as to how many of them were established, and in which locations etc.

172. See, SNA, Vol. 41, folios 162-6 & 179, for copies of the relevant ZAR laws and resolutions pertaining to the creation of it (File: NA 1344/02).

173. SNA, 41, NA 1344/02, "Memo." to NCs dd. June 18th, 1902.

174. In my thesis, I demonstrate this in a comparison of the efficiency of the state in such matters before and after the Boer War.

175. Information in this passage gleaned from SNA, 41, NA 1344/02, "Native Affairs Department Extract from Draft Estimates 1902-3"; SNA, 44, NA 1417/02, Mil. Sec. SA to CNA dd. 14/8/1902; and SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Extract from NC Lydenburg to CNA dd. 29/8/1902.

176. These powers, some of them in action, can be found in SNA, 41, NA 1344/02, "Memo." to NCs dd. 18/6/1902; DFA Weekly, 11/10/1902, p. 27 and SNA, 55, NA 1957/02 (re the power to evict).

177. SNA, 100, NA 297/03, Copy of Lagden (not signed, but very probably him) to Taberer dd. 24/7/1903.

178. Passage constructed from: SNA, 106, NA 491/03, NC, Zoutpansberg to Sec. NA dd. 24/2/1903; SNA, 27, NA 895/02, Wheelwright to "Sir Geoffrey dd. 15/9/1902; SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/02; Trapido, p. 46; SNA, 48, NA 1608/02, SAC "B Division"...District Report", Nd, covering letter dd. 6/8/1902 (see the comments pertaining to the area "near Lydenburg"); SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd 19/8/02 & Sub-NC Hook to NC Pretoria dd. 18/8/1902; SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Report by NC, Pretoria and Heidelberg Districts dd. 21/2/1903; and SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/02 (final quotation).
179. DFA Weekly, 18/10/1902, p. 18 & 25/10/02, p. 14. These figures most probably refer to both the colonies.


181. Statistics from Warwick, p. 161; DFA Weekly, 19/7/02, pp. 16 & 18; and p. 327 of The Milner Papers (South Africa) 1899-1905, Vol. II (London, 1933) edited by Cecil Headlam. It appears that blacks in the two colonies were paid out approximately £500 000 (a figure calculated from various sums provided by Warwick on pp. 160-1).

182. SNA, 106, NA 491/03. Report by NC, Pretoria and Heidelberg Districts dd. 21/2/1903. The NC did not refer explicitly to his pre-war counterparts here but it is almost certain that he had them in mind in making this statement.

183. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902 & Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902; SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 19th Feb. 1903. The first and third quotations are from Hogge (NC Eastern Transvaal); the second from Taberer (NC, Heidelberg & Pretoria).

184. See SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902; Ibid., Minutes of "Meeting...at...Malakuti's...10th Sept. 1902 Middelburg District": enclosure of Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 22/9/1902; and SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/1903.

185. SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 14/8/1902.

186. For this, see Peter Delius and Stanley Trapido, "Inboekselings and Oorlams: The Creation and Transformation of a Servile Class", pp. 53-88 in Belinda Bozzoli (ed.) Town and Countryside in the Transvaal (Johannesburg, 1983). Trapido and Delius's analysis is overwhelmingly concerned with the period up to 1875. But they provide evidence of the existence of virtual slaves in the 1880s and 1890s (see p. 76). In my thesis, I detail the new British Administration's actions against relationships of slavery which - as I demonstrate - lasted into the twentieth century.

187. See Warwick, p. 148 for the fact that personal servants of Boer families were also 'herded' into the concentration camps.

188. SNA, 45, NA 1473/02, Native Refugee Department Circular L:38 dd. July 12th 1902: Clause IV.

189. I explore this generally in my thesis. For some preliminary evidence, see SNA, 76, NA 2600/02, case concerning "Topsy".

190. SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Report by NC, Pretoria etc. dd. 21/2/1903.

191. See SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 31/7/1902 & to Windham dd. 20/7/1902. For the instruction to avoid such an "intercession", see Ibid., Sec. NA to NC Waterburg dd. 6/8/1902. See the marginal annotations on Scholefields 20/7 letter, for his superordinates' disagreement with his proposals. The Lydenburg NC appears to have desired a similar dispensation in his District: see SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/1903.


193. For this general fear amongst the returning Boers, see DFA Weekly 4/10/1902. "Lord Milner on Tour" (Western Transvaal evidence); SNA, 106, NA 491/03, NC Rustenburg to Sec. NA dd. 18/2/1903 (Pilansberg evidence); SNA, 48, NA 1608/02, SAC "'C' Division. District Reports." Nd. (south-eastern Transvaal evidence). The NC of the Pretoria and Heidelberg Districts spoke of "serious unfounded rumours of unrest among the natives". He dismissed these as "nothing more than the outcome of idle after dinner or Bar talk" (see SNA, 47, NA 1569/02, Taberer to Sec. NA dd. 19/8/1902). But the very fact that such fears were plaguing the leisure-hours of a colonial society is significant enough.
199. SNA, 48, Na 1657/02, Britten to Magistrate, Native Court, Jhb., (August, 1902?).

195. See the facts relating to this case in my section "Selling Out the Ruling Class".

196. For this case, see SNA, 77, Na 2639/02, Asst. Col. Sec. to Sec.NA dd. 27/11/1902; Extract from a letter dd. 5/11/1902 signed by a Major in D.A.Q.M.G. Intelligence; Terry to NC Lydenburg dd. 1/12/1902 & 4/12/1902; Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 17/12/1902; Sec. NA to Asst. Col."Sec. dd. 23/12/1902. Quotation from the Major's letter. The local sub-NC was hostile to the tenants concerned but, significantly, did not refute the claim that the rents were being raised because of their scouting work for the British.

197. SNA, 45, Na 1474/02, Lotbiniere to Windham dd. 23/7/1902. See also, SNA, 106, Na 491/03, NC Rustenburg to Sec. NA dd. 18/2/1903: "it must be borne in mind that as the natives assisted our Troops in every possible way against the Boers they are naturally timid and fear that if they return to the Boers to work their masters may retaliate by ill-treating them."


199. SNA, 106, Na 491/03, Hogge to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/1903.

200. See Warwick, p. 168 and SNA, 47, Na 1564/02, Extracts from NC Petersburg Report dd. 11/10/1902.

201. Morton, pp. 188-9

202. This passage has been constructed from Morton, pp. 171-4 & Warwick, p.45. The last two quotations are from Warwick; other from Morton

203. Morton, p.188.

204. See Isaac Schapera Native Land Tenure in the Bechuanaland Protectorate,(Lovedale Press, 1943), evidence from pp. 115, 116 & 135. But see this work generally for the communal (and differentiated) world of the Kgalagadi. An earlier and unpublished work of Schapera's offers a detailed description of the structure of power and authority amongst the Kgalagadi: see his "A Study of the Modern Kgalagadi Culture of Bechuanaland" (1935?), unpublished typescript, held in the Africana library of the University of the Witwatersrand.


206. For examples of rural blacks aiding the Boers, see Warwick, pp. 26, 72, 81-2. Some workers, with whom the Boers had exceptionally-strong ties of paternalism, remained loyal to their masters during the war(see Delius & Trapidio, p. 78). And it was common for landlords to take their personal servants to war(Warwick, pp. 26 & 48).


208. There is a massive body of evidence of such massacres. Here is some of it: the British blue-books Cd. 821 (1901), Cd. 822(1901) & Cd. 828(1902); Pakenham, p. 573; Graham Wallas Human Nature in Politics (London, 1962; first published in 1908), pp. 61-2; SNA. 15, Na 242/02, telegram from "Legality" to Sec. NA dd. 27/1/1902; DPA Weekly, 20/9/1902, p. 28 & 22/11/1902, p. 28; The Bloemfontein Post, 29/9/02, p. 3. A great deal more evidence could be cited.

209. All quotations from Smuts's letter to Stead; reference provided in footnote 12.


212. For NC’s praising the role of the chiefs in disarmament, see SNA, 106, NA 491/03, Report by NC, Heidelberg and Pretoria dd. 21/2/1902; for the Zebedela case, see Ibid., Scholefield to Sec. NA dd. 19/2/03.

213. Trapido, p.46.

214. The chief was Hans Masibi in the Waterburg District: for this case, see SNA, 96, NA 1731/04 (placed with NA 201/03), Sub-NC Waterburg to Res. Mag. Waterburg dd. 1/8/1904; Ibid., NA 201/03, Allan King to Lagen dd. 26/6/04; and SNA, 97, NA 291/03, Allan King to Windham dd. 1/1/05.