Title: The State and Agricultural Labour: Zanzibar after Slavery.

by: Frederick Cooper

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The march of capitalism into Africa is often made to appear inexorable. Indeed, some scholars have defined the possibility of a failure, a missed possibility of domination, out of existence: the survival of pre-capitalist modes of production are simply a way by which the costs of labor or cash crops are subsidized by subsistence cultivation. But how is one to tell whether the cultivator's access to the soil represents a dangerous autonomy, a tenacious resistance to becoming subject to industrial work rhythms and control over all aspects of a working life, or else constitutes a perfectly functional part of a superexploitative system?¹

The conditions of rural and urban workers in South Africa is likely to suggest itself in answer to that question. But the best of research in South African labor history has focused on the specific processes by which labor was controlled and has not neglected the persistence of resistance — in individual and daily behaviour in farms and factories as much as in collective action.² A look beyond South Africa emphasizes how elusive similar objectives could be, and how essential it is to ask just what kind of transformations capital and the state sought, how they tried to effect them, and what they were unable to do.³

Much of the literature on the "articulation" of modes of production stresses structural juxtapositions, not processes. And that gets away from the most basic if most difficult aspects of Marx's treatment of capitalism, that it was based on two quite particular and quite well masked forms of coercion: primitive accumulation — the permanent alienation of workers from the means of production — and the labor process itself — the daily struggle to make workers work. Primitive accumulation is not the mere amassing
of resources, nor is it legal title to land: it is the effective exclusion of acess to the means of production of an entire class. And to say that means to ask how they were kept away. The labor process itself entails distinct mechanisms—from supervision on the shop floor to the educational system—to control the pace and intensity of labor, which in turn foster distinct patterns of resistance. Our task is not to arrive at a rigid and pristine definition of capitalism, but to look at accumulation and the labor process as the specific and complex phenomena they are. They embody the action of people and institutions, and the consequences of such actions not being complete need to be taken seriously.

This study of Zanzibar looks at an attempt that penetrated to the heart of the labor process, an effort to make slave labor into wage labor. It involved non-white landowners and non-white workers in a British colony, but the division between landowners and workers was no less fundamental for the racial complexity of Zanzibar. British officials were clear that they wanted to make slaves into an agricultural proletariat, but they ended up with a complex system of labor migration, shaped as much by the ex-slaves as by the state or the ex-slaveowners. I have discussed the evidence and details of this process at length elsewhere; my aim here to to discuss some basic issues that it raises in terms that might suggest comparative perspectives.

In the early nineteenth century, immigrant Arabs from Oman developed a near monopoly of the world's clove crop on the fertile islands of Zanzibar and its adjacent dependency of Pemba. Connected by expanding trade routes to distant sources of slaves in central Africa and by largely Indian-dominated networks that channeled credit and produce throughout the Indian Ocean region, Omanis built up slave plantations that were vast even by West
Indian standards, with as many as hundreds of slaves. They worked in gangs under supervision, five days a week (seven in the harvest) on their owners' land, the rest of the time on small plots provided by their owners for subsistence cultivation. The extent of exploitation was limited above all by the weakness of the state and communal divisions of the planters and by the delicate nature of clove harvesting. Social, economic, and political dependence—all conceived of in terms of Islamic patriarchy—was as important to extracting labor as coercion.

When Zanzibar became a British Protectorate in 1890, officials were well aware that clove production was high and growing and that any transformation of how they were grown would be a large task, potentially threatening to revenues and order. And so action was delayed until 1897, when the colonial state had been consolidated. However, there was never any question that slavery had to be abolished eventually. Anti-slavery was a minor corollary to a major theorem. From the late eighteenth century, the contrast of wage labor with slavery had been crucial to articulating a point that was by no means obvious to wage workers in England: that free labor was economically and morally superior to any other. Work extracted through immediate threat and a wider pattern of violence was contrasted with the internalized discipline of the wage worker and the self-regulating nature of the labor market. And personal dependence, as much as personal tyranny, was incompatible with a capitalist social order.

By the late nineteenth century, abolitionism had become somewhat more conservative, more skeptical about whether ex-slaves would actually work and therefore concerned that the state and a class of owners and managers had to keep a close watch even as the labor system was changed. There was only one
such class around—the Arab slaveowners—and the state never considered that cloves could be grown without planters. So the state's effort was on the one hand conservative: it recognized the titles to land and clove trees of the slaveowners and sought to attach in some way the labor force to them.

On the other hand, the effort was radical. It sought a fundamental transformation of attitudes and values. Work should no longer come from threats of the whip or relations of dependence with an individual; it should become a central principle of the worker's life. The state used the civil law—contracts—to maintain social relationships between landowners and workers, meanwhile stressing that it was the institution of property and the legal power of the state—not the personal power of a lord—that lay behind the new form of social dependence. And it used the criminal law—prosecution for vagrancy and deviations from an orderly life on or off the job—to inculcate new values among the propertyless. Meanwhile, the state engaged in a far reaching effort at control, shaping where, when, and for what wages people worked. The colonial state was not simply seeking workers, but hegemony, not simply cloves, but control of the production process.

But if control of production implied hierarchy, authority, and supervision, it came up against the fact that the supervisors might have their own equally strong concepts of work. The Muslim planters of Zanzibar thought more in terms of long-term, multidimensional dependence than of contractual relationships and universal work values. What was crucial was not so much the differing cultural values of the state and capital in Zanzibar, but the relationship of both sets of values to the actual exercise of economic power. The slaves faced a double struggle: against the personal power of their owners, and against the rigid conceptions of labor of the state. If access to a labor market
might provide alternatives to dependence on one's own landlord, long-term access to land— intrinsic to dependence— might be a means of avoiding total reliance on wage labor. The divergence of state and capital was to provide a crucial basis for slaves' ability to maneuver.

Between 1897 and 1907, some 11,000 slaves went to court and received freedom certificates. Their masters received compensation. By 1900, however, fewer slaves were bothering to go to court. The claims of some made it less necessary for others of the perhaps 100,000 slaves of Zanzibar to make their claims in court. Ex-slaves were careful about leaving a slaveowner. They often waited until after the harvest. They were less likely to leave a rich landowner than one of modest means, and were most likely to leave a demanding clove planter. There occurred what one official called a "shuffling of the cards." Other slaves— continuing a process that began more with British takeover and the political decline of Arab planters than with legal abolition per se—went to remote areas of the islands or to plantations that the Agricultural Department had taken over from the Zanzibar Royal Family and could not supervise closely. Still others sought urban casual labor or railroad and porterage work on the mainland of East Africa. There thus ensued competition in what had been a tied labor system: plantation owners lined up outside the courts, seeking new resident laborers from newly freed slaves. And so terms of labor shifted in favor of the workers: five days per week under slavery became three, and then withered away. Landowners expected their resident laborers to work, but had to pay them daily for them to do so during the harvest.

The skill and timing of the clove harvest made planters particularly vulnerable. Cloves—buds that appear at the end of branches— had to be picked before they became overripe, and careless picking could damage the tree. Harvest labor thus became particularly competitive, and picking wages rose
rapidly during the course of each harvest.

But there was no crisis of clove production. With piecework wages, pickers picked. This did little to improve the image of ex-slaves in officials' eyes: "steady regular work is just what your slave or free slave dislikes very much." The problem was that harvest labor, characteristic of the task orientation in pre-capitalist economies, involved a burst of energy. Pickers, with piecework, could work as fast or as long as they wanted to. Slaves worked, but they were not workers. The crux of the problem was that they had access to land to grow food, for that is what the landlords—eager for residents on their plantations even if they could not get as much work out of them—had to offer. What happened on these plots, in British ideology, was not work.12

If the only way to insure that genuine workers were created was to control their entire working year, not just the working day, the state did not like the idea of paying for it. This contradiction was at the heart of ambivalent Victorian attitudes toward casual labor, in East London as much as in Zanzibar. As Gareth Stedman Jones has argued, casual labor was as dangerous as it was cheap.13 In an agricultural economy, the control of seasonal labor required either that the existence of peasant-workers be so marginal that they would appear whenever they were offered the chance, or that a web of coercion be drawn so tightly that they would appear on command. Thus officials bemoaned the fertility of Zanzibar, that allowed even a relatively dense population to grow its food, and faced the problem of how a state—convinced that a colonial society must be predictable and orderly—could exercise force.

The contract system was the first means to combine the exercise of coercion with the legitimating force of the law. Behind it lay the possibility
of making ex-slaves' needs for some cash—and hence a desire to work part of the year—into a legal requirement that they work all year. The intimidating atmosphere of the court where freedom papers were issued was at first used to pressure slaves into accepting contracts with their old or a new master, and for a time certificates were refused unless slaves agreed to contracts—although that proved to be too much for the anti-slavery ideology. Then vagrancy statutes and administrative harassment were used to induce ex-slaves to agree to the year-long contracts, under which the state was invoked to discipline bad work.  

There is evidence that the state mustered force to intimidate urban workers who shirked contracts. But to do so in rural areas was an awesome task, especially when there were only thirty white officials in Zanzibar. Laborers agreed to the contracts and then simply did not do the three days of weekly labor that they stipulated. During the bussle of the harvest, contractual obligations rapidly broke down as neighboring planters offered substantial daily wages. By 1904, the contract system had come apart. Landowners found little in it for themselves. The Government was too weak to evict people who did not agree to contracts or to catch evaders and shirkers, and it would have had to do so on a systematic basis to end competition for labor. Planters were too desperate to turn away someone who had reneged on a previous contract.

The legitimized coercion of contracts did not get to the heart of the matter. Power had to be exercised on the plantation and off it. For ex-slaves, mobility was the key to the undermining of older patterns of labor control and of establishing a bargaining position within the new patterns. At the same time, the withdrawal of labor time—as ex-slaves escaped the control over their previously working year and the compulsory obligations of harvest labor—added to the
competition. The contract system engendered its own forms of resistance—shirking and contract breaking.

If contracts and restrictive forms of tenancy agreements succeeded in other parts of the world in tying down a labor force, the case of Zanzibar suggests how important it is to focus on the actual operation of such systems, on evictions, on pass systems, and on the effective monitoring of what happens on a farm by people whose interests were congruent with those of the state.

The failure of the contract system left a squatter system that had been evolving all along. This system was extra-legal, involving the exchange of long-term access to land for non-specific services, which squatters were expected to provide but which had to be paid for. Labor rent withered away. Tenants got rights to use land, but not to plant trees, and the system was tolerable—if far from desirable—to clove planters in that it was congruent with the fact that most estates included ridges, where clove trees grew, and other kinds of land more suitable to ground crops like maize and cassava. Squatting had a social dimension as well: the landowner became a guardian under Islamic law and a resident population on the plantation contributed to his standing as well as provided a minimal labor force.

The system made sense in terms of Arab planters' ideology, stressing personal and long-term relationships rather than contractual ones. It also recognized that land was the one asset they had, as the threat of coercion or the offer of political protection had lost their impact. If the relationship of squatter and landlord, like that of slave and master, involved reciprocity, the terms of that reciprocity had now shifted in the squatters' favor. Still, an ideology of patriarchy rationalized economic necessity into benevolence.
The failure of the state to build an agricultural work force within
the estate led it to look outside it, a pattern that had helped to check
the increasing autonomy and decreasing labor time of emancipated slaves in
the British Caribbean. Officials first sought labor from Swahili-speaking,
Muslim peoples on the islands who had been pushed (especially on Zanzibar
Island) to the edges of the fertile zones. They had inferior access to
markets and inferior soil to the planters, but they were economically and
socially autonomous during the nineteenth century. At first, forced labor
was the heart of recruitment. In 1901 in Pemba and in 1904 in Zanzibar,
headmen in Swahili villages were ordered to recruit harvest labor. The
1905 and 1907 harvests—both excellent—proved the value of this labor.
By 1911, the role of village heads in recruitment had diminished, but the
harvest laborers were coming forth on their own.

As many as 10-15,000 Swahili from Zanzibar went to Pemba—which had
more clove trees—during each harvest. Women and children went along with
men to pick. Yet even though the Government offered free transport home
if they worked a minimum number of days, most returned on their own. If
wages were below what they expected or if they caught owners using false
measures, laborers were quick to leave. The Government—into the 1920s—
thus remained frustrated even as harvests were good, and it tried various
schemes—from incentives to contracts—to keep workers on the job longer.
The police were used to discipline people for working poorly, above all
for branch-breaking. None of these efforts was successful.

Officials estimated that the cost of labor (per unit of output) rose
150 per cent between the 1880s and 1920, and it spurted again in 1919-21. In 1924, when clove prices fell, the state began a new assault on wages.
The state organized committees of planters to fix wages. The scheme was a partial success, but many planters surreptitiously paid higher wages. Picking costs were driven down by about 20 per cent, but prices were then falling even more.

The clove pickers—both migrant Swahili and ex-slave squatters—were using access to land to obtain some control over how much and under what conditions they worked and to resist efforts at regularizing their terms of labor. They did so even at the cost of transport subsidies and longer periods of earning wages. But by the 1920s, some period of work in a clove plantation had become part of life throughout Zanzibar and Pemba.

But neither resident ex-slaves nor island-dwelling migrants were willing to work on clove plantations year-round, for that—above all—would interfere with their own cultivation. Even as cloves were picked, plantations were going unweeded and were deteriorating seriously.

Zanzibar had long been part of a wider economic system embracing the interior of East Africa. Hence, the differing pressures on people to work in various parts of this region affected the labor situation in Zanzibar. Migrants from Tanganyika—above all Nyamwezi—began to arrive, seeking cash and trying to avoid German employers. By 1909, the weeding problem had been solved. They worked for monthly wages, and many stayed as long as three or four years.

Officials exempted Nyamwezi from their scorn of ex-slave workers. One ex-agricultural officer told me that a Nyamwezi with a hoe was like Yehudi Menuhin with a violin. What such distinctions meant had to do with how amenable particular workers within a differentiated labor system were to work discipline. Nyamwezi had come to Zanzibar to work, not to live. They
had paid substantial migration costs and could not move back and forth between different economic activities. The main issue for them was not balancing such activities and maintaining control of the rhythm of their lives, but how much money they could take home. This became clear during the wage cutting episode of 1924. When officials told Nyamwezi headmen of the impending wage cuts, they warned that cutting wages would lead to large-scale desertions. Instead, headmen and officials negotiated a speed-up in lieu of a wage cut. The daily weeding quota was raised and wages remained the same. Unlike pickers, weeders did not struggle over how they would work. ¹⁸

Unlike the case of the West Indies, immigrant labor did not undermine the ex-slaves, who continued to squat rent free, working for wages in the harvest and maintaining a dependent population on the plantation. The migratory labor system had not been desired or planned by British officials. It evolved out of their failure to extract labor from ex-slaves and the varying needs, strengths, and weaknesses of different peoples within a vast and inter-connected region. However, the separation of economic roles—resident labor, weeding, and picking—and the reinforcement of this separation by the distinct ethnic categories that predominated in each role, made each aspect of the productive process dependent on the others, with the planter being the one person in a position of coordination. The atomization of the labor process was thus crucial to maintaining planter control. ¹⁹ The state—whose labor bureaux helped to distribute weeders and pickers and which discriminated in favor of larger plantations—was essential to maintaining the plantation system, although it was not the plantation system it had sought. The atomization of plantation labor was a result of the laborers' economic strength and a cause of their weakness.
The most radical dimension of the state's labor policy was its attempt to redefine the boundaries of permissible behavior in Zanzibar, creating a culture built around property and work. Criminal law was its principal instrument of redefinition.

Implicit in anti-slavery ideology was the idea that the reliance on the whip in slave labor had made slaves into disorderly and lazy people. A complex of crimes was closely linked to slaves and to idleness. The lumping together of these attitudes and fears is clear in one official's observations:

The slaves, especially in the northern part of Pemba won't work... They are often dancing day and night. The cocoanut trees are cut for toddy in defiance of the masters, and much drunkenness and quarrelling ensues. The Walis and Jemedars have many cases of cutting and wounding brought before them, and the immorality is frightful. House-breaking and stealing are the natural consequences of the excess and have been numerous.

The first decade of abolition thus witnessed a strong attack on this complex of crimes—vagrancy, assault, theft, drunkeness and adultery—all explicitly associated with ex-slaves. In 1906, one African in twenty in Zanzibar town was convicted of some petty crime, one in fifty in the islands overall. At the same time, sale of native liquor—exceeding the ban on imported spirits imposed by all colonial powers in accordance with the Brussels Convention—was prohibited, and the authorities undertook a vigorous campaign against dancing. Permits were required to hold dances in private homes and public dancing was banned altogether. The attack on petty crime, drinking, and dancing was not a direct attempt to make people work; it was an assault on the social complex of idleness.

Two types of prosecution which obsessed the Government in the first decade of the century were directly connected with work. The first was
vagrancy, often a favorite in labor repressive economies. Up to 912 vagrants were prosecuted in a single year after abolition, and stricter statutes were enacted in 1905 and 1910. But they did not work effectively. Vagrants were put to work—on clove plantations or roads—but they left.

The other crime that obsessed officials was the theft of agricultural produce. Officials' views on this subject reflected the extent to which the category of squatting merged into idleness and idleness into crime. As the Director of Agriculture put it in 1902, the Zanzibari "can settle on anybody's land, cultivate a small vegetable patch at his leisure and help himself, under cover of darkness, to coconuts and fruit in his vicinity." But behind the concern with produce theft was an attempt at redefining property rights. In fact, it was very much in question whether tenants or landowners had rights to plantation fruit. Officials were concerned to substitute a rigid dichotomy between property and propertylessness, distinct from notions of unequal but shared rights implicit in any dependent social system, be it slavery or squatting. What ex-slaves may have regarded as their rights, the Government wished to define as a crime.

But the Government's efforts to define property narrowly and work, for those without property, rigidly were doomed to failure. For a ruling class to obtain hegemony, as Antonio Gramsci has argued, the exercise of repressive power by the state must operate in conjunction with the redefinition of culture and social norms by the dominant class. But the state's normative concepts were at variance not only with its ability to exercise force in rural areas but with the ideas of the planters it was trying to help.

Planters were trying to manipulate the very relationships the law was attacking, and the rigid owner-worker dichotomy was for them ideologically
irrelevant and practically impossible. Seeking plantation residents, planters could not impose overly rigid labor requirements, and thus rendered the notion of vagrancy inoperable. The very danger of produce theft made planters all the more eager to have plantation residents who would keep away outside thieves, and therefore had to give residents rights within the plantation.

By the 1920s, the state had given up. A myth of rural tranquility replaced a myth of turbulence. The campaign against vagrancy, produce theft, and petty crime at most added a little to risks of wandering around without a patron. In 1920, officials were still saying that ex-slaves "live a life of vagrancy and indolence on Arabs' plantations." At most the state's efforts to redefine attitudes to work and property had led ex-slaves to lead such a life on plantations rather than off them.

The colonial state had sought to transform slaves into wage laborers. For it, the immediate problem was not the actual payment of wages or the development of a true market in labor—the state had no such purist illusions. and transformation

The key was the maintenance of supervision and control, of authority within the workplace and of stability and order within the society as a whole. Whatever dislike the British had of Arabs as managers and landlords was exceeded by the danger of a society without managers and landlords at all.

The problem became one of maintaining class power while transforming its basis, replacing the personal tyranny and climate of violence associated with slavery with a system based on the legitimacy of law, state enforcement of contracts, internalized discipline, and the idea that a life of labor was the lot of the propertyless. The importance of labor tenancy as a transforming institution has been stressed in a comparative context by Alan
Richards and in the case of South Africa by Mike Morris. It eased the break from access to land for the workers, while vested the real power over when and how labor was done in the landowner. It maintained a personalistic form of social order and did not strain so greatly the coercive resources of the state, as would complete alienation of land. And by making part of the remuneration in the form of access to land for subsistence cultivation or grazing, it eased strain on owners' cash resources. In other words, Richards and Morris emphasize that however much world market conditions favored landlords taking direct control over production in order to intensify it, the limitations of the power of state and landowners could keep them from making their control over land and labor complete—allowing workers their own, small sphere.

At the time of abolition, the colonial state wanted to stabilize ex-slaves' attachment to the estates, but through year-long contracts and an atmosphere of state-controlled intimidation rather than by a life-long bond and violence. Such a plan differs from current descriptions of the relationship of capitalist production and precapitalist reproduction in that both aspects of life took place within a single estate. But production of marketed crops was carried on under the direct supervision of the landowner, and production of subsistence crops, as well as child-rearing and other aspects of reproduction, were carried out by the tenant. Nevertheless, both spheres were theoretically under the eye of the landowner, with his power of eviction and a variety of other sanctions. It was the slaves, not the state, who were interested in cash wages and the mobility implicit in the idea of a labor market; the state stressed control of work, the planters power over people.
On a descriptive level, the labor tenancy sought by the British and the secure squatting arrangements sought by the slaves resemble one another. The difference is in the actual relationship of land rights to labor obligations. The state wanted labor obligations to be fixed and uniform, standardized to three days per week and enforced by the court. But once the ex-slaves had proved their ability to avoid the enforcement of the labor obligations, they had detached the continuity of tenancy from continuous control over labor. Landowners might control labor during the working day, but not the working year. Still eager to get what labor they could from resident workers—whose help was particularly valuable in the early days of a clove harvest when labor demands were still too low to attract the wave of migrants—and still seeking to keep off thieves and demonstrate that they had a peopled plantation, landlords had to concede security of reproduction to their tenants with only minimal control over production.

The unoppressive quality of the squatter system had little to do with its legal or formal nature and much to do with the exercise of power. The old bases of slaveholder power had been undermined: protection was irrelevant, whipping prohibited, mobility possible, alternative patrons and alternative income sources available; planters could no longer reproduce their labor force through the slave trade. The withdrawal of labor time and mobility were the keys to the slaves' reaction to the new situation. But what the new, legalistic and systematic structure envisioned by the state required was wholesale evictions, tight supervision on plantations, and a strong police force in the country as a whole. So a system that was supposed to be cheap and orderly could only be created by measures that were expensive and dangerous. Other states—even other British colonies—
have taken that plunge, and it is important for scholars to remember just how much of a plunge it is. In Zanzibar—partly because the planters were not white, partly because cloves were not gold—chose instead to manipulate a system of cash wages and migrant laborers that they the ex-slaves had forced them to accept. The planters—largely because they had to pay their workers—could barely keep up with their Indian creditors.

The complex labor process involving resident and short and long term migrant laborers was thus intertwined with the precise nature of the accumulation process. Landlords had effective control over trees, but their control over land was only useful in so far as they shared rights to it. But the question of trees reveals most clearly the tense limitations of the accumulation process. Trees are more controllable than land, for they have no alternative uses other than export production, and the narrowness of the channels of export production—and the social basis of import-export trade—gave tree owners a fighting chance to dispose of their tree products, although clove theft was a problem. The state in turn helped to organize the flow of labor to tree owners. The owners, while willing to grant squatters the right to plant ground crops, would not let them plant clove trees, for that would deprive them of both the chance to make the one investment they might control and the ability to get even a little labor out of squatters. And squatters did not want to plant trees—even non-clove trees—for fear that this would only tempt the landlord to expropriate them. The standoff was vividly expressed some decades later, when the possibility of independence brought the role of the state into question, by the slogan of the pro-squatter Afro-Shirazi Party: "The trees are yours; the land is ours." The cry was both an assertion and a concession.
Hemmed in by indebtedness, planters had no alternatives to continued clove cultivation, even when prices declined. Capital for them had no independent existence; it was literally rooted in the soil. Creditors had no desire to foreclose, for they could milk their debtors without worrying about the problems of actual production. The state had once been content with its clove revenues, but was stuck with an economic system that made diversification not only economically difficult but socially dangerous.

A class of landowners was sharply separated by land titles from squatters and workers. The landlords depended on the state for those titles to be enforced and for help in organizing labor and other resources around their ownership of clove trees. The squatters were counting on the unwillingness of the state to make a systematic assault on their access to land. A standoff ensued, and its terms became entrenched in cultural notions of reciprocal rights and limits, whose very expression suggested unease and impermanence. Any innovation that either landlords or squatters made threatened to upset the standoff. So landlords stuck to their clove trees—the division of labor built around it allowed them to maintain control, but provided no basis for a transition from clove production to production in general. And squatters stuck to cassava, a crop compatible with the needs for mobility and time to perform other economic activities that insecure tenants faced.

The partial autonomy of squatters within the estate and the partial involvement of migrant workers in plantation labor were quite sufficient to get trees weeded and cloves picked. Such was the success of this form of accumulation, and such were its limits. Social stability and economic stagnation had become inseparable.
Notes

1. Most questionable are attempts to see the relationship of capitalist production and precapitalist modes of reproduction as structural characteristics of colonial capitalism in general or the "Africa of the labor reserves." Such a tendency is evident in Claude Meillassoux, *Femmes, greniers et capitaux* (Paris, 1975) and Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: from Segregation to Apartheid," *Economy and Society*, 1 (1972), pp. 425-56, although Frederick Johnston, in *Class, Race and Gold* (London, 1976), adds that it is the total range of controls used by the state that makes for the superexploitation of labor.


8. These issues are brilliantly analyzed in David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1975).


10. Great Britain, Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Pemba, 1900, p. 11. This section is based on Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, pp. 72-84.


14. Quaker missionaries in Pemba objected to the contract system on the grounds that it encouraged workers to minimize the effort they expended. The Quaker critique represents a purist view of the labor market, while the more pessimistic state officials put more emphasis on maintaining order and social continuity.

15. For details of wages and other aspects of harvest labor, see Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, pp. 92-104.

16. Specific analyses are needed to suggest why particular peoples sought particular kinds of work. Young Nyamwezi men in the nineteenth century had been able to work as caravan porters or as henchmen to chiefs. Their prominent place in the early labor market of Tanganyika may have had less to do with land-hunger or other such pressures than with the elimination of earlier sources of income, which—among other things—may have enabled them to set up their own independent households. On labor in Tanganyika, see John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979).


19. The principal change in the structure of ownership was the increasing number of smallholders of Swahili origin in Pemba, a trend that in fact began before abolition. Unlike Zanzibar, Pemba had closely interspersed clove and non-clove land and hence of Arab planters and Swahili cultivators. Although some Swahili holdings resulted from Arabs selling off bits of their estates, much growth in Swahili holdings was new planting. Much less of this occurred in Zanzibar, which remained dominated by the Arab-owned large plantation. Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, pp. 145-48.

21. Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, pp. 112-14


