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Title: Keeping the Fires Burning: Militarisation and the Politics of Gender in South Africa.

by: Jacklyn Cock

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INTRODUCTION

> We in South Africa have a war going on. Those who have not realised it are foolish.[1]
> (Chikane, 1986)

> Women, at all times, have been victims of war, and not its perpetrators.
> (As, 1982: 359)

This paper focuses on the linkages between women and militarisation. Women are understood as a social category with distinctive and specific experiences. Such experience is structured not only by gender but by other social relations - most importantly those of race and class.[2] Militarisation is understood to mean the mobilisation of resources for war. The process of militarisation is one of the most dramatic characteristics of the contemporary global scene.[3] Militarisation is manifest in sharp increases in military expenditure, in the growing destructive capacity of military weapons, in the spread of the power and influence of the military and in the increasing number of people under arms. This process is evident both in global terms and more specifically in South African society.

The linkages between women and the process of militarisation are obscured. They are mystified by two opposing analyses - those of sexism and feminism. Both analyses exclude women from war on the grounds that women are bearers of 'special qualities'. Sexism excludes women from the ranks of the military on the grounds of their physical inferiority and unsuitability for combat roles. One variant of feminism similarly excludes women but on opposite grounds - that of women's innate nurturing qualities, their creativity and pacificism. The outcome of both positions is that war is understood as a totally male affair - the military is a patriarchal institution from which women are excluded, and by whom they are victimised.

> Women are victims in all wars. Men plan them, they train for them and they conduct them.
> (As, 1982: 355)

However, militarisation - as a global process - is increasingly using women as a military resource. Both manpower constraints and equal rights feminism have contributed to this process. Equal rights feminism has stressed women's rights to achievement, power and opportunity; women's rights to make both money and war. It is argued that equal rights implies equal responsibilities including the obligation of military service. Consequently some equal rights feminists demand the right of women to serve in the armed forces and claim that women are as capable as men for combat roles. A different variant of feminism argues the theme of exclusion; women's capabilities are understood to involve a creativity and nurturance which must be transformed into active support for the peace movement. Their argument is that women - especially wives and mothers - have a special concern with peace, with preserving rather than destroying life.

This paper attempts to undermine both these positions. It focuses on the connection between women and war, both theoretically and in relation to South African society. It argues that women contribute

to the militarisation of our society in both material and ideological terms. It attempts to show that these linkages are complex and reverberate with contradictions which are embedded deep in the peculiar social conditions of South Africa. Writing this paper - in the winter of 1987 - it is clear that the apartheid regime faces a major crisis - both in terms of external pressure through sanctions and increasing moves to isloate the regime, and internal pressure through rising black resistance which three states of emergency, large scale detentions and torture have failed to crush. Discontent and anxiety are apparent in all areas of our society. Against this background of pressing external and internal dangers to the regime, the state may introduce the conscription of white women in some form. It thus seems urgent - for both analytical and strategic reasons - to scrutinise the relation between women and militarisation.

With this end the paper proceeds in five parts. Part 1 examines militarisation as a contested concept; Part 2 attempts to delineate the militarisation of South African society; Part 3 outlines the different ways of conceptualising the relation between women and militarisation; Part 4 attempts to demonstrate this relation empirically in South Africa; and Part 5 points to some of the contradictions involved. The paper is tentative and exploratory but hopefully suggestive of further debate and research.

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PART ONE

MILITARISATION AS A CONTESTED CONCEPT

> Our whole social organism is riddled by the disease of militarism.
> (Bahro, 1982: 89)

An understanding of militarisation hinges on a clear distinction being drawn between three social phenomena:

1. The military as a social institution; a set of social relationships organised around war, taking the shape of an armed force.

2. Militarism as an ideology which values war and legitimates state violence as the solution to conflict.

3. Militarisation as a social process that involves mobilisation for war through the penetration of the military - its power and influence - into more and more social arenas, until the military have a primacy in state and society.

In the literature there is a good deal of slippage between these three phenomena. The conceptual confusion is captured in Merryfinch's observation that

> like electricity, 'militarism' can best be described by its effects. When military goals, values and apparatus increasingly dominate a state's culture, politics and economy, militarism is on the rise.
> (Merryfinch, 1981: 9).

In this conception the key to understanding militarisation lies in 'military values'. These are identified as "hierarchy, discipline, obedience and centralisation of authority"; "a commitment to organised violence as the most effective way to resolve conflicts, a glorification of 'hard' emotions (aggression, hatred, brutality) and a strict channeling of 'soft' emotions (compassion, love and suffering)." (Merryfinch, 1981: 9)

The tripartite distinction above implies that these values relate to militarism as an ideology. Andreski has pointed out that militarism is used in other senses as well: first to mean an aggressive foreign policy, based on a readiness to resort to war; second, the preponderance of the military in the state, the extreme case being that of military rule; third, subservience of the whole society to the needs of the army which may involve a recasting of social life in accordance with the pattern of military organisation; and fourth, an ideology which promotes military ideas. (Cited in Gould and Kolb, 1964: 429).

Smith and Smith use the terms 'militarism' and 'militarisation' interchangeably. They point out that the term 'militarism' is widely used

> to refer to a number of different things - high military spending, bellicose foreign policies and a propensity to fight wars, large arms industries, the promotion of military values in society, military dictatorships and government by martial law. These are often seen as if they are the heads of a Hydra-type beast. Militarism is then seen as a uniform, underlying and causative process which produces these various phenomena.
> (Smith and Smith, 1983: 10)

They are critical of this essentialist approach:

> because there is no such single process and no necessary relationship between the various phenomena. Some countries have relatively high military spending but not much arms industry. Others have military dictatorships which show little propensity to war. Many of the states which have most often resorted to war, like Britain, have never been run by the military.
> (Smith and Smith, 1983: 11)

For them the term 'militarism' is descriptive rather than analytic.

> It denotes the various things we have listed, in which the common keynote is the maintenance of permanent armed forces.
> (Ibid.)

This reduces the concept to describing a society which maintains a military institution. As maintenance of armed forces is nearly universal, this clearly does not take us very far.

Randle subsumes militarisation under the concept of militarism. He defines militarism as "the mobilisation of people and resources for organised warfare". (Randle, 1981: 62) Thee similary conflates militarism and militarisation, and uses the former as an umbrella concept which subsumes such "symptoms as the rush to armaments, the growing role of the military (understood as the military establishment) in national and international affairs, the use of force as an instrument of prevalence and political power, and the increasing influence of the military in civilian affairs." (Cited by Randle, 1981: 63).

Thee's understanding points to the problem of dualism endemic in much of the literature on this topic. Analysis hinges on a dualistic model of the 'civil' and 'the military' as two separate and independent spheres. Militarisation is then used to describe a process of intrusion or encroachment. For example, Enloe argues that militarisation is a process with both a material and an ideological dimension.

> In the material sense it encompasses the gradual encroachment of the military institution into the civilian arena ... The ideological dimension implies the extent to which such encroachments are acceptable to the population and become seen as 'common-sense' solutions to civil problems, such as in the case of army intervention to restore services in public sector strikes.
> (Enloe, 1983: 9)

One of the problems underlying this kind of dualistic analysis is that the military is conceptualised as a discrete institutional entity. While Enloe refers to 'the military institution', others have expanded the notion to depict a 'military industrial complex' (see Benghahn, 1984: 103) or even (more recently) "the military-industrial-technological-bureaucratic complex". (Eide and Thee, 1980). This is sometimes identified with the State. For example, Williams refers to the military-industrial complex as:

> an organised grouping of arms production, military, research and state-security interests which has, in effect, moved beyond the control of civil society and is the true contemporary form of the State itself.
> (Williams, 1985: 224.)

It has also been suggested that this complex constitutes the ruling class; that it operates

> beyond the controls of normal politics and that it is part of the virtually automatic system, based on the technical characteristics of nuclear weapons which is propelling us, beyond or against the general will, to mutual destruction.
> (Williams, 1985: 225.)

This is the process that E.P. Thompson has termed 'exterminism'; a deadly system, first of weapons and then of institutions and ideas which has slowly assumed a total and ultimately destructive control. In Thompson's view this process cannot be limited as neatly as the essentialist or dualistic analyses discussed above would suggest. He has criticised the use of concepts which attempt to delimit the problem.

> We speak of 'the military-industrial complex' or of 'the military sector' or 'interest' of the arms lobby. This suggests that the evil is confined in a known and limited place: it may threaten to push forward, but it can be restrained: contamination does not extend through the whole societal body.
> (Thompson, 1982: 21)

Contamination is the crucial insight in his analysis; "the USA and the USSR do not have military-industrial complexes: they are such complexes". (Thompson, 1982: 22).

Clearly different societies have experienced different levels of militarisation. Ideal type militarisation was approximated in Japan 1931-45 and Germany during the later stages of World War I. (Benghahn, 1984: 49-65). Enloe cites Nazi Germany during the 1930's as an obvious case because

> more and more civil institutions merged with or became dependent on the military, supported by an ideological militarism which identified manhood with soldiering and defined a woman's role as the mother of soliders.
> (Enloe, 1983: 10)

Whether one measures the level of militarisation through empirical indicators such as military expenditure, the size and sophistication of the weapons system, the scale of repression, or political influence of the military, South Africa is a highly militarised society. It will be argued below that the process of militarisation has its origins deep in our colonial past. Since then it has involved a process of systemic penetration whereby militarisation circulates throughout the entire social body "operating in a capillary fashion". (Foucault, cited by Smart, 1985: 122). The 'politics of gender', the power relations structured around opposing notions of 'masculinity and femininity', is a crucial part of this process.

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PART TWO

THE MILITARISATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY

> ... virtually every member of the white and black populations is immersed in the militarisation of (South African) society, either as wielders of coercive and restrictive power or as objects or respondents to that power.
> (Grundy, 1983: 10)

> It is a peculiar contradiction of this country that every white man is obliged to undergo military training while black youths who go and do military training end up in court.
> (Kuny, 1986)[4]

A number of writers have emphasised how militarisation is linked to repression. Randle defines repression to mean "government sanctions to deny basic human freedoms, and the use of inhuman sanctions such as torture". (Randle, 1981: 63). He argues that militarisation is related to repression at two levels - structural and instrumental.

> The instrumental level refers not only to the self-evident fact that the military in many countries are a major arm of repression, used directly to keep the population in subjection and carry out repressive practices, but also to the way liberties are threatened or infringed upon in the very process of raising and maintaining armed forces by such practices as conscription ...
> (Randle, 1981: 62)[5]

"Extreme repression is sometimes defined as a war conducted by a government against its own population." (Randle, 1981: 68). Thus the situation in South Africa has been defined as "a war between the forces of apartheid and the people". (Chikane, 1986). The important point here is that the army in South Africa has always been linked to repression.

> The South African military apparatus was never a defensive force. It developed as an instrument for conquest and repression, an instrument through which white settlers, and the imperial interests they served, established and maintained their political, economic and social control over the majority of the population.
> (Eide, 1983: 180)

This recognition means that the militarisation of South African society cannot be periodised as dating from 1984 when the SADF was first used in our black townships.[6] The process of militarisation extends back to the initial process of white colonisation (Seegers, 1986) and long before 1984 the role of the military was pervasive in South Africa.

> ... the South African military has a long tradition of participation in the social, if not necessarily political, affairs of white society ...
> (Frankel, 1984: 92)

However, the SADF has increasingly been used in the townships since October 1984 when army units joined the police in patrolling Soweto. This was followed by Operation Palmiet when 7 000 soldiers sealed off the township of Sebokeng, carrying out house-to-house searches and making at least 350 arrests. This represented a strategic shift away from a reliance on the police force alone to maintain law and order. Since that time the SADF has been used increasingly in internal repression. It has become omnipresent as the process of militarisation has penetrated every aspect of our society.

The scale of this penetration may be illustrated by pointing to the diverse areas of black experience in , for example, health, housing and labour, areas in which the SADF has been active in suppressing the struggles of the oppressed majority.[7] The army has been employed in evicting rent defaulters, and in attempting to break schools boycotts - (in August 1985, 800 children, some only seven years old, were arrested after a curfew was declared forcing Sowetan children to stay inside

classrooms and school premises during school hours).[8] In 1986 this was enforced by the occupation of black schools by white soldiers and "stories of children even having a military escort to visit the lavatory were not uncommon". (Hawarden, 1987). The SADF[9] has been involved in invading a health clinic to identify casualties,[10] in maintaining beach apartheid,[11] in removals,[12] in suppressing resistance to homeland independence,[13] in strike breaking in the case of bus drivers, and student nurses.

In the last case SADF personnel were brought in to help run Baragwanath Hospital (the biggest in the Southern Hemisphere and catering for the whole of Soweto and other black areas) where services faced collapse following the decision by the Transvaal Hospital Services to fire an estimated 1 800 workers - two thirds of the workforce.[14]

This penetration of the military is a concrete expression of the expanded concept of 'defence' that was formulated in the State's concept of 'total strategy' in 1977:

> The Defence of the Republic of South Africa is not solely the responsibility of the Department of Defence ... it is the responsibility of the entire population.
> (White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1984, p. 3).

Total strategy is designed to counter the 'total onslaught' which is 'an ideologically motivated struggle' emanating primarily from the USSR. (Ibid.) It is a neat mirror image of the view of militarisation as a process of saturation presented in this paper. Instead of viewing war as limited to military engagements bounded by a specific time and place, total strategy sees war as embracing all aspects of social, political, cultural and economic life. Whereas strategic thinking was previously concerned with the production and use of weapons in military engagements, this is now only regarded as the 'direct mode' of total strategy.

> In the 'indirect mode' total strategy uses all the means - politics, diplomacy, religion, psychology, culture, science and technology, finance and communications media - at its disposal. It endeavours to organise action in all these spheres within a comprehensive plan for maintaining the security of the state and achieving its national aims.
> (SACBC, 1985: 37)

However, the notion of 'total strategy' provides a broad overall direction rather than a detailed blueprint.

> "the total strategy of the South African military is actually far less coherent, less internally integrated and considerably less conspiratorial than at first appears to be the case. If many of the top officers experience difficulty in precisely identifying the features of their own total strategy apart from some loose and often caricatured concepts of the workings of domestic and international society, it is exactly because South Africa's total strategy is still basically viscerotonic, more of a mode composed of imperfectly linked semi-developed ideas than a sophisticated and carefully articulated formula for the direction of society."
> (Frankel, 1984: 53)

Despite presenting valuable and finely nuanced insights, Frankel underestimates the full nature of militarisation in South Africa. This is largely because his analysis is blinkered by concepts such as that of 'the garrison state' and a dualistic model of military and civil spheres.[15] For him

> It is not readily apparent whether today the Defence Force is militarising the values of white civil society or whether the civil sector is more significant in civilianising the military establishment. What is quite clear, however, is that the military is perhaps better situated to influence civil opinion than at any previous time in civil-military history. This is particularly true in relation to the growing number of white recruits passing through the military network at any given point in time, the national servicemen who have to be deeply educated in the norms, codes and values of the Defence Force if they are to be forged into a relatively professional fighting unit with the ability to contribute to state security.
> (Frankel, 1984: 95-96).

It is important to appreciate the extent to which the SADF incorporates white South African males directly. The most recent estimate is that the SADF's total mobilisable strength is in the region of 360 000 men and women of all races. (Financial Mail, special supplement on the SADF, July 10, 1987). According to the same source the SADF has about 76 000 full-time members. The SADF formally draws on two types of manpower - professional career-oriented soldiers constituting the Permanent Force and part-time manpower in the form of five categories:

(i) National service conscripts who since 1977 have to serve a two-year period of duty; (there are usually approximately 58 000 national servicemen serving their two-year period), Financial Mail;

(ii) Members of the Citizen Force - national servicemen who have completed their initial military training but are obliged to render periodic service to the SADF in the form of 720 days spread over 14 years;

(iii) Active Citizen Force Reserve members who serve 12 days annually for a further five year period; (according to the Financial Mail survey there are approximately 140 000 Citizen Force members);

(iv) Commando members who serve 12 days a year until the age of 55; (according to the Financial Mail survey the Commando Force also has approximately 140 000 members); and

(v) White males between the ages of 55 and 65 included in the ranks of the National Reserve.

Thus the structure of the SADF shows an extensive reliance on conscripted manpower.[16] Frankel points to two important implications of this:

> First the perennial infusion of civilian influence into military institutions and the subsequent circulation of personnel between the civil and the military sectors of society reduces the capacity of the military to socialise its members into strong corporate affiliations ... Secondly, while the extensive national service system provides channels through which military influences can be projected into civil society, the network functions reciprocally to erode the insulating barriers between military and civil society. The net effect is a situation where it is relatively difficult to immunise civil society from military intrusion on the one hand, and, on the other, to isolate the Defence Force from civilian intrusion into military affairs.
> (Frankel, 1984: 12)

Frankel's reliance on a dualistic model blocks him from acknowledging the extent of the process of militarisation in South Africa. This is clear not only in the expanding spheres of SADF activity, but also in the extremely broad powers of the Defence Force as laid down by the Defence Act, No. 44 of 1957 (Satchwell, 1986),[17] and the extent to which the SADF enmeshes every white male in some form of military service from the age of 16 to 55. Campbell points out that

> with the addition of the various police and armed administrative functionaries in the society, up to 25% of the active white male population is directly under arms to defend apartheid.
> (Campbell, 1986: 19)

This involvement is not only physical (in the sense of providing the SADF with manpower) but ideological in that increasing numbers of white males are exposed to the SADF's understanding of South African society, eg. the threat of communism, and the importance of racial differences.[18]

But it would be mistaken to see direct involvement in the SADF as the only source of militarist thinking and values. In fact, these contaminate the entire society and are spread by diverse institutional apparatuses at a number of different levels. Analytically three of these can be delineated:[19]

1. **The economic level:**

At the economic level militarisation is reflected in increasing expenditure on defence, an expanding armaments industry and growing linkages between the SADF and the private sector. South Africa's defence budget has risen dramatically in recent years, and now absorbs a large percentage of total government expenditure.

> Since the beginning of the eighties, roughly 20% of total government expenditure has been fed into the Defence Force.
> (Frankel, 1984: 73)

In June 1987 the Defence Budget was increased by 30% over that of 1986 to R6,683 million. However, Gavin Evans has calculated that the real total is much larger. He argues that the total security force budget must include the R1,53 billion police vote (43% increase), the R198,2 million secret services vote (17,3% increase), the R9,2 million

allocated for detained people (73,8% increase), the R2 million control of security measures within the Department of Development Aid (100% increase), as well as the millions allocated to defence housing and buildings under the Public Works vote. This brings the total to R8,76 billion. But he points out that defence expenditure always exceeds the estimate contained in the defence budget (by 7% in 1986) and the same applies to the police vote. He estimates that official security force expenditure should be around R9,5 billion by the end of the financial year. Furthermore he points out that the defence and police votes do not include certain hidden items of security force expenditure such as the amount placed in the Special Defence Account, the 'independent homelands' defence and police budgets (Foreign Affairs vote), and the budget for the South West Africa Territorial Force (Finance vote). Adding these amounts to the official security force budget he arrives at a total of between R11 and R12 billion - 25% of the budget and over 8% of GNP. There is a clear link between this level of military spending and poverty and deprivation in the rest of the social order.

Under the pressure of an arms embargo and increasing sanctions, a local armaments industry has been developed since 1961. In 1977 the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) was established and is now the third largest corporation in South Africa. South Africa is the tenth largest arms producer in the world and during 1981 produced R1,400m worth of defence equipment. (The Star, 31.3.1982.) It has assets of at least R1,300m (Financial Mail, 11.9.1981) and employs thousands of people.

> The Corporation ... ranks as one of the Republic's largest all-round employers of labour ... at least 100 000 South Africans must today be considered working elements in the Defence Industry.
> (Frankel, 1984: 84)

In addition many private companies are involved in the defence industry and it has been estimated that over 400 companies rely to a significant extent on defence force contracts. (WIP, 1982: 19). Institutional links are clear in the Defence Advisory Council which deals with armaments production and has included representatives from Anglo american, Barlow Rand, Tongaat and SA Breweries; the Defence Manpower Liason Committee; the Defence Research and Development Council, which links specialists in the private sector with military research needs; and the National Key Points Committee that oversees protection for non-military installations that are considered vital for state security. (Frankel, 1984.)

Such institutional co-operation and defence contracts are not the only important links between the SADF and private industry. There is also the question of salary payments to employees serving in the SADF. Subsection 4 (2) of the Defence Act (44 of 1975) makes it clear that an employer cannot be required to pay salaries, wages, sick leave or vacation leave to an employee who "is absent from his work for the purpose of carrying out any service" under the Act. However, this is a widespread practice. For example, the E.G. Barlows Manufacturing Company Limited Conditions of Service (member of the Barlow Rand Group) dated, January 1980, states as follows:

> Employees called up for the initial period of compulsory military training of 24 months, provided they have had at

> least six months continuous service within the Company, shall be paid by the Company during their absence on military service, the difference between full basic salary or wage, and military pay, less normal deductions.

Employees called up for shorter subsequent periods of military service shall also be paid a full salary/wage less the basic military pay. Benefits such as pension fund, medical aid fund membership and Christmas bonus payments also largely continue.

Recently, the Anglo American Public Affairs Division Director, Mr Zac de Beer, hinted that South African businesses might have to reconsider the practice of paying the balance of national servicemen's salaries now that troops had moved into black townships. (Quoted in Business Day, 10.6.1986.)

The close links between the military and capital are also clear in the range of companies and products advertised in the official SADF publication, Paratus. Furthermore, a militarised society confers privileges on soldiers such as a 50% reduction at Holiday Inns throughout the country, R300 off the purchase of a Mazda vehicle, etc.

These links may become even closer as the SADF is considering privatising more of its functions. According to Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, "the private sector already provides the SADF with about 75% of all manufactured equipment and services". (The Star, 16.5.1986.)

The situation is captured in the preamble to a November 1985 conference on 'Security - A National Strategy', organised by the Sandrock Austral Security Academy (Pty) Ltd. They list one of the factors in South Africa's favour as "a security family in the Private Sector whose members either serve in the Citizen Force, Police Reserve or alternatively are ex-members of these security forces", (p. 2). As early as 1980, P.W. Botha said in Parliament:

> I want to unite the business leaders of South Africa ... behind the SA Defence Force. I want to unite the private sector behind the SA Defence Force. I think I have succeeded in doing so.

Such success is largely due to an ideological penetration of South African society.

2. The ideological level

An ideological offensive is a key component of total strategy rooted in 'the military's belief that ideas are as potent as weapons in the conduct of counter-revolutionary warfare". (Frankel, 1984: 58.) At the level of ideology, militarisation involves the development of a particular ideological configuration - militarism. This has several components: the acceptance of organised state violence as a legitimate solution to conflict; the glorification of war in terms of which actors and encounters are portrayed in heroic terms; an acceptance of the power of the military and its encroachment into civilian areas. In Enloe's view the ideological dimension of militarisation (what is here termed 'militarism') implies the extent to which such encroachments are acceptable to the population and become seen as 'common sense' solutions to civil problems. (Enloe, 1983: 9.) Part of this conventional wisdom

is the 'common sense' idea that wars are inevitable in human affairs and are often explained by theories of innate aggression.[20] Militarism also implies a certain reverence for the position of the army in politics and society. Troeltsch would go much further,

> ... Militarism means furthermore that the military organisation rubs off to a certain extent on our entire civilian life ... Militarism finally implies that we do not just cherish and uphold our Army because we are impelled by rational calculations, but also because we feel an irresistible compulsion within our hearts to love it.
> (Troeltsch, cited by Berghahn, 1984: 31.)

The process by which this ideology of militarism is inculcated and legitimated involves three apparatuses: The educational system, the media, and Civic Action programmes.

The educational system

The increasing militarisation of the white educational system has:

> involved the conscious creation of a social atmosphere that makes military service seem attractive, military responses to policy issues sensible, and greater military strength and expenditure seem acceptable - one which in general prepares the population for conditions of siege and war.
> (Grundy, 1983: 109.)

This aim was stated explicitly by the then Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, in 1976: Our education system must train people for war". This training is attempted through a number of arrangements such as SADF registration, cadets, youth preparedness programmes and veld schools.

The practice of compulsory SADF registration at the age of sixteen for white males through schools has been described as using schools as "recruiting bases". (Letter to The Star, 07.04.1987.) In terms of Section 63 of the Defence Act, No. 44 of 1957 (as amended) all white male South African citizens must register for national service between the first day of January and the last day of February of the year in which they become sixteen. This process of registration is usually completed by members of the SADF visiting schools and registering all Standard Nine boys. One parent complained:

> This method of recruitment is yet another example of the increasing militarisation of our society. Do other parents feel concern about their sixteen and seventeen year old sons signing away two years of their lives without even a family discussion?
> (Letter to The Star, 07.04.1987.)

Refusals to register appear to be rare - perhaps because pupils have already been exposed to paramilitary training through the school cadet system. The school cadet system was officially launched in 1976 and is co-ordinated by the SADF and the various provincial education departments. It involves pupils devoting a proportion of their week to marching and other neo-military activities. The cadet programme was described by Captain Willem Steenkamp as "not a case of brainwashing,

but rather an attempt to cultivate the military spirit", (quoted by Evans, 1983: 273); and a "positive attitude to the SADF", (quoted by Evans, 1983: 284).

> Cadet training services a number of distinctively useful purposes when viewed from the perspective of the military. It periodically exposes young men to martial routines, it serves as a nursery to national service, it stimulates patriotism, and ... creates a favourable climate in respect of national defence.
> (Frankel, 1984: 99.)

Girls are not totally excluded. In recent years voluntary cadet training for white girls has been introduced at some schools. They are encouraged to participate in drum majorettes which are closely integrated with the cadet programmes. (Evans, 1983: 284.) This tradition continues into some university communities. Sharon Shulke, 'drummies' leader at Wits, described the military aspect of drum majorettes as "fun".

> Drummies is the only military sport that girls actually have, besides a few schools which have girl cadets.
> (Quoted in Wits Student, Vol. 39, No. 5, April/May 1987, p. 6.)

Cadets are part of the Youth Preparedness Programme, a compulsory subject in white schools. This emphasises military preparedness, discipline and patriotism. Introducing the programme to teachers in 1972, the Transvaal Director of Education said,

> Today there are such calculated forms of treason that it is often difficult to identify it. But there is something going on in the world today which I would like to identify and to give a name, and that is the treason against youth of some intellectuals, writers, thinkers and philosophers ... We have to be physically and mentally fit and on the alert to weather the storm ... You have already seen the sirens which are to sound the warning when the bombs start falling ... If we fail we can say goodbye to Western civilisation as we see it today and to all the values that have been characteristic of our civilisation throughout the ages.
> (HAP, 1986.)

Some of the compulsory components of Youth Preparedness are emergency planning, fire fighting, drilling and marching, shooting, self defence, vocational guidance and moral preparedness. Moral preparedness includes the theme of 'citizenship' which deals with "the official emblems of the RSA", "our national holidays", "the strategic position of South Africa to the rest of the world", "the Bantu", etc. (Christies, 1985: ??.)

The 'veld school' is an outdoor extension of this programme. The schools are run on military lines and activities include inspection and flag raising, survival training, tracking and camouflage, marching and practical field training as well as group discussions, lectures and films. The pedagogic content involves discussions of the 'communist onslaught' and the need for a military response.[22] The veld school programme is an extension of the general education programme that

> is concerned with the inculcating of a nation's values and norms in the individual's philosophy of life.
> (Liebenberg and van Zyl Spies, 1979: 1.) (Cited by Ratcliffe, 1983: 68.)

In all these arrangements in white schools the role of the teacher in creating a military environment is crucial.

> The male teacher is expected to encourage a positive attitude towards security forces, to be positive about his own military obligations, to be proud of his cadet officer uniform, to cultivate patriotism in the pupils and not denigrate the authority of the government and the leaders of the state.
> 'The motivation role of the teacher - a military perspective' by Captain Charles Cox (CF). Cited by Frankel, 1984: 100.)

The military environment has become more marked over time. During 1987 it became known that the Transvaal Education Department (TED) had instructed certain teachers to carry guns (but to keep this secret from pupils); more forbidding fences, barbed wire and high walls have been built around many schools - all of which instil fear in pupils.

In summary, the aims of the system mirror those of 'military-patriotic education' in the USSR.

> Military patriotic education is called upon to instil a readiness to perform military duty, responsibility for strengthening the defence capability of the country, respect for the Soviet armed forces, pride in the Motherland and the ambition to preserve and increase the heroic traditions of the Soviet people. Military-patriotic education is carried out in the teaching process in secondary and higher educational establishments, in the system of political education, by means of propaganda in the press, on radio and television, and with the help of the various forms of mass-political work and of artistic and literary works.
> (Official USSR policy cited by Holloway, 1980: 153.)

Likewise in South Africa the news and entertainment media, particularly the state- owned and operated radio and television networks, have promoted the ideology of militarism. Their romanticisation of military encounters, and glorification of war and war 'heroes' is part of what Raymond Williams has termed 'consumerist militarism'.

> We have become accustomed to the integral militarism of the modern nation-state, at its most formal and official levels. It is not surprising that this has spread to stain the whole society. But we may also now be facing something worse than this: a vigorous, spectacular and consumerist militarism, extending from the toy-missile flashes of the children's shops and the games arcades, to the military tournaments and air displays of general public entertainment and finally to the televised images of safely distant wars.
> (Williams, 1985: 239.)

in South Africa this spectacular and consumerist militarism is very much in evidence. For example, war games are advertised as "the family game of the future". A demonstration by two of South Africa's top war games teams advertised for Pietersburg in July 1987, promises "an ideal opportunity to experience a war-type situation and to have fun at the same time". Experiences include "leopard crawl through the bush" and "hunt a terrorist". (Northern Review, a Johannesburg newspaper, 3 July, 1987.) (See Appendix 1.) Consumerist militarism is symbolised in a 1978 cover of the Financial Mail which showed a birthday cake in the shape of an army tank. It is clear in the burgeoning private security industry and a kind of siege mentality in the white community, whereby people retreat to a privatised, defensive core.[23]

The final apparatus through which an ideology of militarism is inculcated and legitimated is the Civic Action Programme operated by the SADF. In line with the view that the military contribution to the defence of apartheid only constitutes 20% of the total, the SADF is itself committed to an active scheme to "win the hearts and minds of the people". This scheme is a centrally co-ordinated civil action programme (CAP) whereby the SADF renders material assistance to the local population in an effort to buy the latter's support.

Essentially the CAP consists of the deployment of military servicemen in non-military forms of service but always as members of the SADF. After basic training and a six-month CAP course, participants in the programme are seconded to other government departments or to the governing bodies of the various bantustans. Under the direction of these institutions they work as engineers, mechanics, sport organisers, tourism directors, teachers, university lecturers, doctors, dentists, veterinarians and agricultural, legal and financial advisers. Soldiers involved in the CAP are required to wear military uniform and carry weapons. The idea behind this is:

> to project an image of the solier as a man of action but who is nonetheless a friend of the Black man and who is prepared to defend him. We want the national serviceman to teach the Black man whilst his rifle is standing in a corner of the classroom.
> (COSAWR Fact Paper No. 1, 1982, p. 21.)

3. The political level

At the political level there are two different ways of conceptualising the process of militarisation: the first is the narrow institutional sense relating simply to the increasing prominence and power of the military authorities. This is the approach adopted by Frankel:

> Militarisation is always measured by the appearance of soldiers as public decision-makers and the growing influence of the South African military is finally, and perhaps most importantly, reflected in the penetration of top government institutions by Defence Force personnel, on either a formal or informal basis.
> (Frankel, 1984: 103.)

This penetration will be demonstrated below. The second approach conceptualises the process of militarisation at the political level in terms of function - the extent to which the military is used for political purposes. This is directly linked to the function of repression discussed above. At the political level the SADF is clearly a racially exclusive instrument used to maintain white minority rule. The SADF has been used (increasingly since 1984) to suppress resistance in the townships and homelands in arenas as diverse as education, health and labour.

In this process of repression one cannot draw a meaningful distinction between the SADF and the South African Police (SAP).[24] As linked agencies, the security forces have used unrestricted force against defenceless people in peaceful protest. For example, in Uitenhage in 1986, in Mamelodi in 1986, and in the tragic events in Crossroads which involved conflict between residents and 'witdoeke', vigilantes assisted by the SADF. In the case of Mamelodi, the SADF are alleged to have fired at defenceless people from helicopters. (Nadine Gordimer, quoted in The Star, 01.12.1985.) The ideological legitimation for this type of action is the concept of 'national security', the means being the military's intimate relationship with the state. This concept legitimates the SADF's internal role as an army of occupation in many black townships, as well as its external role in terms of which it has carried out bombing raids, infiltration and attack raids on Maputo, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Angola.[25]

Several writers have indicated that the most distinctive aspect of the military as an institution is its intimate relationship with the state - with the central government and the laws and ideologies which sustain its authority.

> No other public or private institution comes so close to being the sine qua non of a state.
> (Enloe, 1983: 11.)

Clearly this close identification of the military with the state gives it a rare kind of influence and privilege.

> The military can use this extraordinary status in relation to the state to define 'national security'. This concept - 'national security' - in turn has been used to define the 'social order' supposedly necessary to ensure that national security. In this circular process, 'national security' can come to mean not only the protection of the state and its citizens from external foes, but perhaps even primarily, the maintenance of the social order.
> (Enloe, 1983: 11.)

This privilege is clear in that the government is headed by a former Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, and it is generally agreed by analysts that the military are positioned at the centre of power. (Jaster, 1985; Grundy, 1983; Frankel, 1984.)

> The South African police state of the 1960's and 1970's ... has become the military state of the 1980's.
> (Frederickse, 1986: 68.)

The most significant site of this power is the State Security Council (SSC). This has replaced parliament as the most influential decision-making body.

> This council appears to have superceded the Cabinet and the councils of the National Party itself in importance in planning and co-ordinating South Africa's military posture. (Grundy, 1983: 07.)

It was the 1983 constitution which diminished the role of parliament and allowed military authorities more direct access to the executive. The State Security Council is composed of select cabinet ministers and the chiefs of defence and security and forms a kind of inner cabinet able to over-rule other cabinet decisions. The Minister of Defence and the Chief of the SADF are both permanent members. The secretary of the SSC is General Pieter van der Westhuizen, the former chief of the SADF Department of Military Intelligence. He replaces another military man, General A.J. van Deventer.

The SSC is at the core of the National Security Management System which gives the military direct influence in decision-making down to local government.[26] At a regional level this operates through twelve Joint Management Centres (JMC's) which co-ordinate local strategies to deal with potential security problems; of the twelve JMC chairmen, eleven are SADF officers. There are sixty sub-JMC's which work alongside the Regional Service Councils, and 448 mini-JMC's at the local level. According to Lt-General van der Westhuizen (the secretary of the State Security Council), the JMC's act as "a highly mobile mechanism to defuse revolutionary unrest". (Cited by Hawarden, 1987: 05.) Thus the reality is a massive network of some 500 secret committees operating under the control and direct chairmanship of the military and the police.[27]

The SADF's intervention in political affairs is most recently and dramatically illustrated by its acknowledgement of involvement in a propaganda offensive against the African National Congress through the distribution of thousands of anti-ANC booklets and postcards overseas. The booklet 'ANC - The Inside Story' contains photographs of 'necklace' and bomb blast victims while the anti-Oliver Tambo (ANC leader) postcards feature miniature 'necklace tyres'. (The Star, 29.06.1987.)

This schematic discussion of the militarisation of South African society at the economic, ideological and political levels is intended to demonstrate that:

> in white South Africa, as in Israel, the distinction (between democratic and military rule) does not apply. Increasingly the entire society is becoming militarised. (Adam and Moodley, 1986: 66.)

We cannot therefore employ concepts which delimit the power of the military such as the 'military-industrial complex' or even the 'garrison state', or a dualistic model of 'civil-military relations'. The military in South Africa, as a structure of social relations organised around war, has a primacy - a political, ideological and economic dominance - which is refracted through the entire society. White South Africa is "genuinely a nation in arms". (John Keegan, quoted in The Star, 19.03.1987.)

The role of white women in this process has not been subject to any analytical scrutiny. This role has been obscured by two contradictory perspectives - by a sexism which marginalises women because 'manpower' is conceptualised in patriarchal terms; and by a feminism which similarly marginalises women because war is conceptualised as a male affair and the military as a patriarchal institution from which women are excluded and by whom women are often victimised. The next section scrutinises the theoretical relation between women and war.

* * * * * * *

PART THREE

WOMEN AND MILITARISATION

> Men should be trained for war and women for the recreation of the warrior.
> (Nietzsche, cited by Brownmiller, 1977: 48.)

Analytically, a feminist perspective recognises gender as a significant social category which shapes the social world so that women have distinctive and specific experiences.[27] Politically feminism is splintered by deep divisions. The main line of cleavage is between liberal or equal rights feminists who want equality for women with men within the existing order, and those who want an alternative order. The last category has generated an intense debate between radical feminists who envisage this alternative order as based on 'female values' and Marxist feminists who see it based on socialism.

Within pacificism there is a similar dichotomy between those who accept the status quo and those who do not. (Stephenson, 1983.) The division is between those who conceive of peace primarily as the absence of war and direct violence (Boulding, 1978), and those who fuse peace and social justice (Galtung, 1969, 1971). In the latter conception there is an absence not simply of direct violence but of indirect, structural violence, i.e. violence which is inherent in the structures of society such as racism, sexism and other forms of exploitation. These contrasting conceptions have been termed 'negative peace' and 'positive peace'. Some writers posit a necessary link - both theoretical and historical - between feminism and pacifism. However, a number of different feminist positions on the relation between women and militarisation may be identified.

Equal rights feminism stresses women's rights to achievement, power and opportunity (within the world as it presently is constructed) - the rights to make both money and war. Equal rights implies equal obligations and responsibilities. In this sense compulsory universal military service is tied to the concept of citizenship. Consequently liberal or equal rights feminists demand the right of women to serve in the armed forces and claim that women are as capable as men for combat roles. They deny any linkage of women with 'peace', asserting that women are no more or less peaceful and compassionate than men. Elshtain has pointed out that this position has generated a tendency for American feminists to look to the state as their protector.

> By looking to government as the new 'Mr Right' to protect them, guarantee their equality and clean up their messes, many American feminists locked themselves into a position from which it has become difficult to reject 'equality' through the state, even if that includes military service.
> (Elshtain, 1983: 347.)

Such 'statist' feminism then comes to embrace armies and the state monopoly on violence.

In contrast to such equal rights feminism, radical feminism asserts that women have 'special qualities'. Such qualities - rooted by some writers in biology, and by others in social practices - mean that women respond to war and violence very differently to men. According to the 'special qualities' thesis women are significantly different from men. Women, as women, have "nurturant and pacific traits" (Assiter in Thompson, 1983: 202); women are "the mothers of the race" and therefore "the peace-loving sex". The crucial assumption is that there is a necessary link between mothering and a tendency towards peacefulness and responsibility to others. Therefore there is an incompatibility between mothering and militarism.

Ruddick, for instance, points to four characteristics of maternal practice which she believes to be

> "incompatible with the military mind. ... mother's preservative love, female maternal sexuality, female maternal cognitive holism, and a maternal pacifist philosophy of conflict.
> (Ruddick, 1981: 16.)

All these qualities imply a natural caring for creatures whose wellbeing is at risk.

But an obvious question arises: why - if all mothers have access to these 'maternal practices' - have they not been a consistent, coherent force in opposition to state war-making practices and powers? Elshtain (1982) explains mothers' large-scale absence from resistance to war in terms of the tensions within maternal thinking and socialisation practices. She argues that women frequently feel compelled to emphasise the social value of acceptability. They train their sons for obedience and their daughters for forbearance. Mothers thus inhibit resistance by teaching their children a conformity to authority. Another line of explanation could be the way in which women's exclusion from power has stifled their resistance generally. Alternatively there could be a conjunctural consistency between maternal thinking and militarism if women accept that the latter is anchored in notions of 'security' and 'freedom' which need to be defended.

This 'special qualities' thesis was eloquently argued by Virginia Woolf. In Three Guineas (published in 1937) she argues that the emotions of aggressive pride and arrogant patriotism which, in her view lead to war, do not take hold of women as deeply as they do men. This is rooted in women's exclusion from male-dominated institutions and values. The rallying cries to defend 'our country' do not have the same resonance among women, precisely because women have too little stake in the country's wealth and power to consider the sacrifice of lives to be justified. This exclusion from power and wealth thus equips women for resistance to militarism. Thus "no people are more fitted than women to take a leading role in the nonviolent struggle for peace" and to

challenge the human addiction to violence. (Solomon in Thompson, 1983: 134.) Women are uniquely fitted because of

> the peculiar resilience and courage which they share, perhaps just because they have not, as yet, got into a habit of using the gun as a means of attack or defence. (Ibid.)

Writers such as Solomon and Woolf anchor these 'special qualities' in sexism - it is sexism which leads to women's exclusion from power and their socialisation into submission and forms of passivity. Other writers, who anchor these special qualities in women's reproductive capacity, may be accused of an inverted sexism which excludes men. For example, Soper gives women a special authority on these grounds:

> ... by virtue of their role in human reproduction, their (women's) statements are given the authority of experience that men do not have. Some of these experiences match in their crude biological vitality the crude wreck of biology that would be the experience of nuclear war. The starkness of the contrast between the event of conception and the event which irradiates the womb, between the act of giving birth and the act which evaporates the child: this is something which women owe it to the world to talk about. (Soper in Thompson, 1983: 170-171.)

An irony in this kind of feminist thinking is that it may easily slide into the kind of sexism that excludes women from militarism on the grounds of their biological capacity to "stay home, have babies, and keep the home fires burning for the boys on the border". This biological view posits women's child bearing capacity as of over-riding importance. Reproduction is women's incomparable and unique contribution as citizens to their state. There is a biological reductionism at work in both the sexist and feminist arguments here.[28]

Other feminist writers who espouse women's special qualities, but root them in women's socialisation rather than biology, see a specificity in men's socialisation which gives women a material interest in pacificism. This approach conceives of militarism as woven into the very fibre of maleness. The link is violence against women by men, a violence[29] that is pervasive in countless cultures and historical periods. This approach thus connects "the incidence of wife battering" to "the percentage of the government budget devoted to arms". (Enloe, 1983: 210.)

There is an emphasis on the links between violence against women and the male violence involved in militarisation. The most common form of direct physical violence in many societies appears to be violence by men against women. Similarly the most severe consequences of indirect structural (systemic or institutional) violence are suffered by women. (Galtung, 1969.) Thus Roberts has argued that

> if peace is to mean more than 'the absence of war', then violence against women must become a peace research issue. Ending 'war' will not bring peace if half the human race is subject to physical violence at the hands of the other half. (Roberts, 1984: 196.)

Roberts illustrates the extent of this physical violence by pointing to North American material. Child sexual abuse affects one out of four girls by the age of eighteen and the most common abuser is a father or father figure; wife abuse is widespread and one estimate for Canada suggests one out of ten; the incidence of rape and sexual assault has been estimated to involve one in five Canadian women at some point in her life. (Roberts, 1984.) Many writers locate the genesis of much of this violence in male socialisation patterns. Clark and Lewis (1977) argue, for example, that normal masculinity is a personality and behaviour pattern conducive to rape.

A number of arguments similarly connect militarisation with such 'normal masculinity'. For example, Orr writes (echoing Woolf fifty years earlier,):

> One of the purposes of the Campaign (Against Militarism) is to examine the psychology of those who believe that war is worthwhile because it gives the winner power and status, increased authority, territory and security. All these are an integral part of a political and social system loaded against women and are synonomous with characteristics traditionally defined as 'masculine', such as aggression and competition. In order to hold on to this kind of power, a 'male dominated' state has a military force backing it up. So in wanting to free themselves from men's oppression, women must oppose this military force too. That this military force is essentially 'masculine' in character is acknowledged in the advertising which the armed forces use for recruiting purposes - 'let the Army make a man of you'. (Orr, 1983: 05.)

The reasoning here is that women have a material interest in anti-militarist struggles. This connection - between militarism and violence against women - is behind the historical feminist pacifist alliance in the West.

This alliance was both organisational and ideological. At the ideological level Stephenson suggests that the linkage between feminism and pacifism was not peripheral but linkage on a core which is still central to each movement.

> This is the linkage of those feminists who reject the 'male value system', with its emphasis on dominance and power, i.e. power over or against, with those pacifists for whom non-violence includes a rejection of both direct and structural violence. The central commonality between feminists and pacifists is their opposition to oppression, whether that oppression be sexism, racism or any other oppression. This opposition to oppression is based, in both cases, on the empowerment of the individual, on power which is constructive rather than destructive. (Stephenson, 1982: 291.)

In this approach there is a theoretical consistency between feminism and pacifism based on this empowerment of the individual and the opposition to oppression and violence in whatever form.

At the organisational level the appeal was often made that because of women's peaceful qualities, giving the vote to women would

bring about a more peaceful world. Early in 1919, for example, when military tribunals began to hear the cases of conscientious objectors, many feminists were active in the struggle against militarism. For example the Women's International League vehemently opposed the principle of conscription and, in this fight - as in the broader opposition to the war itself - it joined with other women's groups to combat a growing militarism. However this historical alliance between feminism and pacifism was not a smooth and harmonious one. There were deep divisions among feminists - Christabel Pankhurst and her mother toured the country warning of the evils of Bolshevism, pacifism and 'shirkers'.

At the level of organisation, another connection between feminism and pacifist struggles refers to political styles

> Feminism as a value system is the antithesis of militarism ... The non-coercive, non-hierarchical organisation models being developed by feminist groups offer the most promising alternatives to militarism and other patriarchal structures. (Reardon, 1983: 08, cited by Roberts, 1984: 198.)

Clearly the relation between militarisation and women is a complex one; a relation about which many women feel an acute ambivalence. All that is attempted here is an effort to peg out the field, to identify the different positions and ways of conceptualising this relation. All that is asserted is that militarisation is a feminist issue. Arguing this point Chapkis writes:

> While there is a growing awareness in various national women's movements that militarism is a feminist issue, there has been relatively little attention paid by feminists to the specific issue of owmen in militaries. When response is heard it is often in the form of attacking the military for sexism in excluding women from the ranks and thereby denying them equal opportunities.
> (Chapkis, 1981: 07.)

It will be argued below that the relations between women and militarisation goes much further than the specific issue of women in the military - although this is the most obvious, direct and concrete way in which white women are increasingly incorporated in the process in South Africa.

* * * * * * *

PART FOUR

WOMEN AND MILITARISATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA

> Shooting comes as naturally as baking in the kitchen.
> "Ouma" Marina Hogenboezen, Paratus, Vol. 38, No. 2, February 1987, p. 12.)

Womanpower is winning power.
Paratus, vol. 36, No. 4, April 1987.

> On the battlefield quite like on the Elizabethan stage, only men have been permitted to be fully-fledged actors. Any war narrative will teach us, however, that there are a considerable number of supporting roles which get handed out to members of the female sex and which are essential to the unfolding of the plot.
> (Huston, 1982: 274.)

The previous section pointed to the different positions on the relation between women and militarisation - all of which focused on women's **exclusion** from war. It will now be argued that this exclusion is more apparent than real.

The points or roles into which women have historically been incorporated into war are sketched out by Huston (1982) as follows:

1. In a passive, indirect sense women can be the pretext for war - the Helen of Troy syndrome. As Huston points out, women can be "a valuable that needs to be defended, but they can also represent value itself, an ideal incarnating peace and virtue". (Huston, 1982: 275.)

   It is in this sense that women have been termed:

   > the ultimate cause of war. [The justification for fighting is] woman: the virtue she represents for the warrior, the love she bears him, the tears she will shed when he is slain. Without this certainty somewhere in the background, war might be recognised for the profound stupidity it is. But the more one advances into Evil, the more necessary it becomes to idealise what is Good and to safeguard its purity: purer and purer, farther and farther away from the horror. Woman reappears in the final analysis as the ultimate cause of war. ((Huston, 1982: 279.)

2. As wives and prostitutes - women can fulfill Nietzsche's injunction to provide for the warrior's rest and recreation.

3. As entertainers - they can provide diversion.

4. As victims - "They are more and more numerous among those bit parts known as casualties". (Huston, 1982: 275.)

5. As sympathetic nurses - the Florence Nightingale syndrome.

6. As seductive spies - the Mata Hari syndrome.

7. As cheerleaders - "running along the sides of trains and waving goodbye to the departing men in uniform".

8. As "castrating bitches who belittle and berate men for refusing to become macho murderers". (Huston, 1982: 275.)

9. As miracle mothers providing sources of cannon fodder.

10. "As treacherous tramps who are aroused by the sight of flashy uniforms and therefore tempted to find the invading armies sexier than their own", and

11. As co-operative citizens "suddenly developing quasi-masculine stamina for field and factory work, which will just as suddenly evaporate when the war is over". (Huston, 1982: 275.)

It will now be argued that white women are incorporated into the militarisation of South African society in all these roles. These points of incorporation will be discussed in two main sections - direct and indirect incorporation. The direct incorporation is clear in the increasing use of white women within the SADF in a variety of roles from nursing through to radar, intelligence work and cartography. Indirect incorporation is also extensive as women provide a considerable degree of support - both ideological and material - to members of the SADF.

The distance between these direct and indirect linkages cannot be drawn in clear terms. One of the defining features of South Africa as a fully militarised society, a society engaged in a 'civil war' (as viewed by the black majority) or in defending itself against the 'total onslaught' (the view of the state and the majority of whites), is that the battlefield is the entire society. A clear demarcation of the battlefield is the fulcrum of the connection between militarisation and the politics of gender. If the military are viewed as a bastion of male identity, then

> it must categorise women as peripheral, as serving safely at the 'rear', on the 'home front'. Women as women must be denied access to 'the front', to 'combat' ... The military has to constantly define 'the front' and 'combat' as wherever 'women' are not.
> (Enloe, 1984: 15.)

In a civil war or struggle such as that being waged in contemporary South Africa, the landscape of combat is redrawn as the experience of war is dispersed among the general population. In this process an important breach in the ideological constructions of gender is threatened. As Ruddick has written

> Dividing the protector from the protected, defender from defended, is the linchpin of masculinist as well as military ideology.
> (Ruddick, 1983: 472, cited by Schweik, 1987: 552.)

Therefore it will be argued below that considerable efforts are made to avoid this breach and elaborate a traditional but expanded notion of femininity for women within the SADF.

(a) **Indirect linkages - material and ideological**

The most remote connection between women and militarisation lies in the mother-providing-cannon-fodder role identified above. Writing of Nazi Germany, Mason has pointed out that

> all racialist movements which take the biological, pseudo-scientific elements in their ideologies seriously, are bound to attach particular importance to women's procreative role.
> (Mason, 1976: 88.)

In South Africa, as in Nazi Germany, the state attaches a particular importance to family, domesticity and child bearing in the white community. As with the Nazis, the raising of the white birth rate has an important place in the strategy to maintain white racial supremacy. M.C. Botha's famous appeal to whites to redouble their reproductive efforts lives on.

> A Johannesburg doctor recently published a book arguing that family planning is a plot by South Africa's enemies to reduce white strength. Mrs Bessie Scholtz, a Nationalist MP and mother of eleven, called for more white children. Newspapers like The Citizen regularly run plaintive wails from readers about the decline of the white birthrate.
> (Beckett, 1982: 11.)

This implies a celebration of women's domestic role as mothers and wives; an equation of femininity with domesticity. Women's role is "to keep the home fires burning", to stay at home, produce babies and support "our boys on the border".

At the indirect material level, there are three linkages between women and war, or three ways in which white women contribute materially to the militarisation of South African society: firstly, they are active in support organisations such as the Southern Cross Fund which provides food parcels and recreational services for "the boys on the border", and Operation Ride Safe which used to organise lifts for national servicemen; secondly they are active in Civil Defence and Commando units; and thirdly they are engaged in armaments production for Armscor.

The Southern Cross Fund is an important agency through which white South African women provide material support for the SADF. Their work was described by Mr Pik Botha, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, as "memorable, inspiring and dignified". (Paratus, Vol. 37, No. 71, July 1986.) The Southern Cross Fund works for both the SADF and the SAP and their motto is "They are our security". It has 250 branches throughout the republic and raises money for the security forces on a full-time basis. Since its inception in 1968 it has raised over R14 million. (The Citizen, 31.05.1986.) The money is used for humanitarian purposes, particularly to provide aid and comfort to soldiers in the operational area. For example, it has donated recreational facilities such as snooker tables, swimming pools and television sets, as well as sending parcels to conscripts.

> Basics can't be all that bad, not with the useful packages handed out by the Southern Cross Fund ... the parcels consist of an elegant brief folder in which one can find writing paper, envelopes, a pen knife, a tin opener, nail clippers, pens, cleaning utensils and many other useful artifacts that the troopie would find a need for during his Army service.
> (Paratus, Vol. 38, No. 5, May, 1987.)

They also visit hospitalised soldiers at No. 1 Military Hospital near Pretoria regularly. According to Frankel:

> the actual effect of Southern Cross activity is to market militarisation in a way which encourages public identification.
> (Frankel, 1984: 98.)

Organising lifts for national servicemen was also an important expression of support, reflecting a similar ideology.

> "They keep us safe in our homes. Let's give them a safe ride to theirs."

The 'Bel-en-Rynas' organisation was started in 1977 and involved seventy-nine ladies nationwide in fifty-two towns from Beaufort West to Zeerust. (Paratus, Vol. 38, No. 5, May, 1987.)

White women are increasingly active in commando units and civil defence organisations. The Civil Defence Programme was consolidated by the Civil Defence Act of 1977. The aim of the programme is to

> ... provide, by means of planning and provision of emergency measures, with a view to an emergency situation, the RSA and its inhabitants with the greatest measure of protection and assistance and to curtail civilian disruption in the most effective manner.
> (White Paper on Defence (1977) p. 36.)

Local authorities bear the primary responsibility for the implementation of the programme. They have the responsibility to establish an effective organisation that can

> ... go over to organised action with a view to saving lives, protecting property and maintaining the essential services necessary for the survival of a civilised community.
> (Ibid.)

Industries, commercial undertakings, schools and universities are also expected to create their own civil defence organisations that can co-operate with the local authority. At a local level in urban areas the programme is co-ordinated by a block co-ordinator who can mobilise volunteers in the area. Volunteers are expected to serve at least ninety-six hours a year; they can be called on at any time and are expected to be ready for duty. Regular drills are done and the SADF has a rating system by which it rates the various civil defence organisations depending on the state of their emergency plans, their speed of mobilisation and their level of preparedness. Civil Defence involves people in various aspects of work such as traffic control, fire fighting, first aid, drill, fieldcraft, crowd control, explosive identification, weapon training, roadblock routines, anti-riot procedures and lectures on internal security. One such course in Bloemfontein in 1987 aimed sepcifically at women included warnings from an SADF lecturer on "the revolutionary onslaught" and the comment,

> Men get involved in the defence of the country through national service but womenfolk do not get even half of this exposure.
> (Paratus, Vol. 38, No. 4, April, 7.)

The Civil Defence Programme provides such 'exposure' and attempts to mobilise the general civilian population for the military defence of the apartheid state. It fits neatly into the overall programme of total strategy.

While white women are increasingly active in Civil Defence organisations operating within urban areas, their involvement in Commando Units in rural areas is also intensifying. In 1982 provision was made for men who had done their national service to be put on the controlled reserve for five years and then be liable for allocation to their local commandos. Men who have had no training at all are allocated into the national reserve. Both reserves can be called upon to do commando duties in certain 'primary areas' which correspond roughly with the country's border areas. These include the whole of northern Natal and a number of northern and western Transvaal areas.

The commando units are aimed at counteracting counter-insurgency in these areas, and white women are an increasingly useful part of this process.

> My men cannot be everywhere at once but by training farmers **and their wives** [my emphasis] in the use of weapons and communication systems we have an answer to terrorism in the area.
> (Col. Swanepoel in Paratus, Vol. 38, No. 2, February 1987.)

In this process of incorporation traditional notions of femininity are restructured and expanded. For example, in the Soutpansberg Military Area Commando members gathered recently for an evaluation.

> In the past two years the Soutpansberg Military Area Unit has concentrated on taking counter-insurgency skills to the farming folk in the area, turning Oumas and housewives into trained auxiliaries of the Defence Force.
> (Ibid.)

On this particular occasion:

> Ouma Marina Hogenboezen strode into the evaluation with a rifle under her left arm and picknick (sic) basket in her right hand, and said, 'Shooting comes as naturally as baking in the kitchen.
> (Ibid.)

It is important to stress that traditional notions of femininity are not abandoned in this restructuring. For example, on this occasion the day's programme included a fashion show.

> Bidding to take the best dressed category the women's teams paraded in a variety of colourful outfits. Red bush-hat cum stetson, safari suit pulled in with red leather belt and red pumps was about the best.
> (Ibid.)

At the indirect material level, the final linkage between women and militarisation in South Africa is the involvement of women in armaments production for Armscor. In terms of indirect connections, the material contribution of women to the militarisation of South African

society is most important in the sexual composition of the defence industry workforce.[32]

Armscor has twelve nationalised subsidiaries whose activities are controlled by the corporation. It distributes work to over 1 200 private industry contractors and subcontractors. It claims not to trespass on the field of private enterprise so its subsidiaries are responsible for those weapons systems regarded as of especial strategic importance and those which are uneconomical for private production. So its subsidiaries produce weapons, ammunition, pyrotechnical products, aircraft, electro-optical instruments and missiles, while private contractors produce armoured vehicles, other vehicles, vessels, radar and computers, telecommunications, weapons electronics, maritime technology and warfare electronics. (Ratcliffe, 1983: 77.)

The defence industry employed 105 000 people (29 000 in Armscor subsidiaries and 76 000 in private industries). (Financial Mail, 11.09.1981, cited by Ratcliffe, 1983: 77.) Many of these workers are women. For example, Pretoria Metal Pressings is an Armscor affiliate which produces a large variety of ammunition and employs a high percentage of women. (Ratcliffe, 1983: 81.) So does Naschem, an Armscor affiliate which fills and assembles large calibre ammunition and bombs, and produces explosives and propellants. Lyttleton Engineering Works makes guns and components for guns, cannons and mortars. "Its workforce consists mainly of women who are increasingly replacing men in production." (Ratcliffe, 1983: 83.)

It is extremely difficult to gain any detailed information on the workforce in the armaments sector. However, Ratcliffe (1983) has identified a clear pattern in which women appear to be the predominant sector of the Armscor workforce. He suggest this is because

> Women are one of the weakest sections of the workforce. Women are perceived to be less militant than men and are thought to have greater dexterity for intricate assembly line production.
> (Ratcliffe, 1983: 85.)

The increasing and extensive involvement of women in such 'militarised work' is a global phenomenon.

> In the 1980's women are being called back to serve the national security strategists. But the present-day 'Rosie' has traded in her confident smile and healthy biceps for obedient concentration and nimble fingers. She is the backbone of the militarised micro-electronics industry.
> (Enloe, 1983: 190.)

Enloe points out that an estimated 40% of a new navy cruiser is composed of electronics in which women are the predominant workforce.

> Roughly speaking, this means that 40% of a navy cruiser is dependent on women's labour.
> (Enloe, 1983: 195.)

However, much of this work is distanced from the eventual weaponry so that the military connection between women's daily work and killing is obscured.

This was not always the case. Women have, at various periods in the history of the West, been conscripted into armament production to meet serious manpower shortages.[33] At present in South Africa extra-economic forms of coercion propel women into providing an important source of labour power for the defence industry. This is not to say that the conscription of women into industry, administration or the armed forces might not be likely in the future. But evidence from such mobilisation in World War II suggests that this will not fundamentally restructure gender ideologies. The mobilisation of women during World War II and the way their gains were eroded as the post-war social order was re-established along patriarchal lines is familiar ground. What is important to appreciate is that the propaganda used by several governments to mobilise women workers reveals that there was no intention to permanently restructure such ideologies or their material base - the sexual division of labour. For example, the film 'The Life and Times of Rosie the Riveter' shows clips from 1940s American government films aimed at the 'mobile woman' - all of them white. Women are shown using electric tools to make holes in aircraft wings as the narrator reassures the audience, "this is just like punching holes in our scouring powder tins". And, for women welding fighter planes, their work was "just like sewing".

It will now be argued that the second indirect linkage or point at which **women** are incorporated into the militarisation of South African society, is that they **provide a crucial source of ideological support.**

The importance of this ideological support has been articulated by many SADF leaders on numerous occasions. Its function in maintaining soldier's morale is expressed by General C.L. Viljoen, the chief of the SADF at the time:

> My congratulations to all those who worked so hard to make this exercise (Exercise Thunder Chariot) the success it was. I would especially like to thank those who stayed at home to keep the fires burning while the men were at the P.W. Botha Training Area. Without the support of their loved ones at home the men on the ground would not have been as successful as they were. The support from their loved ones is an important factor for the morale of the men who took part.
> (Paratus, Vol. 35, October 1984.)

Col. L.J. Holtzhausen, Officer Commanding the Seventh Division's Mobilisation Unit, gives even greater significance to women as a source of ideological support. He believes women to be "the mightiest weapon against the current threat".

> It's not just the man who has to vasbyt (stand firm), but also the wife, mother and girlfriend ... A woman can do a lot to influence her husband, son or boyfriend. She must understand the implications of his duties and she must be prepared herself to pay the highest toll. A man whose wife overwhelms him with household problems cannot work effectively. The woman whose man is in the operational area must make him feel he's doing something for her and for his country. A border soldier's senses are definitely affected by his wife's attitude to him and his work.

But gender roles must remain intact in this process:

> Remember the woman must remain a woman and keep on allowing her man to feel like a man because the men are fighting throughout our country not for material things but for their women, children and loved ones.
> (Paratus, Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1984.)

Women are "the mightiest weapon" and each is enjoined to develop these manipulative qualities in order that the SADF may reach her man. A good deal of effort is invested in this process of indirect recruitment. For instance, a girl's school was asked to supply partners for conscripts serving in a Parachute Battalion in Bloemfontein. Afterwards this group of girls, and their mothers, were invited to visit the unit. The wife of the Officer Commanding explained the rationale.

> We want to reach the woman and try through her to work on the man. A mother has influence over her son and a girlfriend over her boyfriend.
> (Paratus, Vol. 34, No. 9, September 1983.)

The importance of "working on the man" is that it "is never easy for the armed forces to acquire the manpower they claim they need". (Enloe, 1983: 75.) In South Africa manpower is acquired directly by the conscription of white males into the SADF, and indirectly through an ideological conscription into militarism. It is in this latter respect that white women are crucial. They elaborate an ideology of gender roles which link masculinity to militarism. In this process they are a vital source of emotional support and incentives to men to "act like men" both in battle and during their national service.

The significance of this connection between masculinity and militarism should not be under-estimated. According to William James the main function of war is "preserving manliness of type". He points to a pervasive anxiety about the construction of masculinity, the fear that martial experience alone can make a man, that war is necessary to the social construction of masculinity.[34]

This connection between masculinity and militarism is mediated by women. They socialise men into a particular definition of masculinity that is violent. They do so from an early age through the provision of war toys and the censure of emotional experience. The army then carries this process to an extreme.

> A soldier must learn to dehumanise other people and make them into targets, and at the same time to cut himself off from his own feelings of caring and connectedness to the human community. His survival and competence as a soldier depend on this process. Military training is socialisation into masculinity carried to extremes.
> (Roberts, 1983: 197.)

This process has been detailed by Eisenhart (1981) who describes how a masculine identity is incorporated into military performance in the US Marine Corps basic training.[35] While no comparable research data is available in South Africa, accounts from conscripts suggest the same linkage. For example:

> ... the South African army cultivates this macho, tough boy image.
> (Steven Louw, giving evidence in mitigation for Conscientious Objector Phillip Wilkinson, Weekly Mail, 22.05.1987.)

This linkage between militarism and masculinity is frequently the subject of emotional appeals. For example, earlier this year the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, in a pre-election speech attacked the End Conscription Campaign and described the male members of the ECC as "mommy's little boys". (Eastern Province Herald, 16.04.1987.)[36] Military training is often legitimated in terms of its appropriateness in teaching masculine independence and discipline.

> ... do bear in mind that soldiering is, after all, a task for a man and the army has to train and discipline our sons to this end.

This end includes sons achieving:

> the ability to stand on their own feet and become independent individuals able to cope with their own lives.
> (Letter to The Star, 24.04.1987.)

This letter urges "anxious army mums (to) give your sons all the moral support you can and help them to adopt a positive attitude to their training". This support is crucial to the conscript's adjustment.

"Holding on to his girlfriend's washing powder present and Mom's biscuits, he (the national serviceman) looks around the place that is going to be his home for the next two years". (Supplement to Fair Lady, 08.11.18.) Clearly, 'mom' and 'girlfriend' are critical sources of support. They also provide an ideological legitimation as "the defended", and "the protected".

> " I'm Proud to Be a Soldier
>
> In defence of our homes, our wives and children.
>
> Our liberty, our lives ... our God.
> I'm proud to wear a uniform
> proud to take up arms,
> to guard my home and loved ones,
> to keep them from all harm.
>
> I'm proud to be a soldier;
> a link in our defence.
> To heed the call to battle,
> I'm proud, in every sense.
>
> I'm proud to meet the challenge,
> proud to make a stand.
> In defending you: South Africa:
> My dear: beloved land. "
>
> (A national serviceman, Paratus, Vol. 35, No. 12, December 1984.)

However, it as wives that women are the most important source of ideological legitimation and emotional support. Wives of serving members of the SADF automatically belong to the Defence Force Ladies Association. This Association strives to promote

> sympathetic understanding and active support for the husband's duty as defender of the Republic of South Africa. (White Paper on Defence, 1982, p. 51; cited by Ratcliffe, 1983: 70.)

Their key attribute is loyalty to the point of incorporation into their soldier-husband's role.

> Loyalty is the most important feature that binds us together.
> (Mrs Viljoen, quoted in Paratus, Vol. 34, No. 9, September 1983.)

Loyalty has the following components:

1. **A knowledge of communism:**

> ... Knowledge of communism remains of the utmost importance ... because ... communism leads to disloyalty.
> (Mrs Viljoen, National President of the Defence Force Womens Association, quoted in Paratus, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 1983.)

2. **Meticulous grooming:**

> Soldiers do enjoy a status in the community and their lady friends should be an asset to them, even if they are only doing shopping together. Certain standards are expected of him when wearing his uniform and the same applies to the woman accompanying him.

Therefore the following is recommended:

> For a formal dinner ... a light material (chiffon) long dress, little jewellery, court shoes in either gold or satin and matching handbag. For visiting town ... a neatly tailored outfit. Court shoes and handbag. Sandals can be worn if feet are well looked after and carefully manicured.
> (Mrs Emsie Schoeman, in an address given to the SA Army Ladies Organisation at Buffelspoort in 1980. Supplement to Paratus, Vol. 31, No. 5, May 1980.)

This meticulous grooming implies an elaborate cultivation of 'femininity', so as to mirror the soldier-husband's status in the community. This clearly illustrates Virginia Woolf's insight in A Room of One's Own where she argues that women serve as 'magnifying mirrors' which show men at twice their natural size. Such mirrors she claims, "are essential to all violent and heroic action". (Woolf, 1957: 35-36.)

3. **Self knowledge and sophistication:**

> Happiness always has a woman in the picture. In the first place happiness is a woman who knows Who has made her. She is the crown of creation and no afterthought or accessory. Happiness also is a woman who knows why she was made. For that reason it is important to be still and ask yourself, 'Who am I?'

Mrs Viljoen's own answer to this question is:

> I am a woman and a human being in my own right.

However:

> **Happiness is also a woman who knows to whom she belongs.** [My emphasis]
>
> This radiates from her own family, to the community and then the nation. The easiest way to break a nation is to break bonds. That is why a mother is so important. Happiness is also a woman who is not naive about an enemy's attack on the Republic of South Africa.
> (Mrs Viljoen, wife of the then Head of the SADF, quoted in Paratus, Vol. 34, No. 7, July 1983.)

4. **Optimism:**

> We must prevent thinking that we could lose. What we are dealing with is total onslaught - it is a total war on all aspects of our lives.
> (Speaker at a two-day conference hosted by admiral's and general's wives, quoted in Paratus, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 1983.)

5. **Shared values:**

> The loyal wife is bound to her husband by a shared love of your fatherland, people and Provider.
> (Ibid.)

6. **Domestic competence:**

> The wife must know where her husband's salary is paid out, and where accounts must be paid. She must be able to drive a car. She must be able to fix fuses and taps. She must assume responsibility for locking doors and windows and for turning off water and electricity after use ...
> (SADF Booklet While He is Away, cited in HAP, 1986.)

7. **Regular correspondence:**

> It's up to you to make sure that your letters and actions while he's away show him beyond any doubt that you love him just as much as always, and you're going to wait for him, no matter how long. One very important way to show your love

> for your man is through the post. A family that does not write weakens the whole platoon.
> (Ibid.)

8. **Responsibility:**

> The wife of a man in uniform has to show responsibility to her calling as wife, believer and citizen. The first phase of the psychological war takes place in the home as the smallest unit of the population. If the enemy succeeds in winning the wife away from her task then half his battle is won. Therefore the wife has to form her own opinion and has to develop in a dexterous manner, to cope with all the demands that are presented.
> (Mrs Naude, wife of the Chaplain-General, quoted in Paratus, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 1987.)

9. **Commitment:**

> Being a wife implies being supportive of her husband in all areas. It implies a job and is hard work. The current life style with its tendency towards democratising and questioning of authority, pessimism and lack of concern are little pricks which work on us daily and lead to **disloyalty.** [My emphasis] We are confronted with a choice between loyalty and disloyalty. This is no longer a simple and logical choice, but a personal one. Disloyalty is the neglect or disobeying of the human calling to be part of a particular situation and to do within that situation what is appropriately adult.
> (Speaker at the two-day conference hosted by admiral's and general's wives, cited in Paratus, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 1983.)

These interpretations of loyalty as the key quality of the solider's wife all emphasise an ideology of domesticity - the importance of the home is emphasised particularly in the official formulation of 'total oslaught'. (See p. 08 above.) Furthermore they suggest a notion of an 'incorporated wife' (Callan and Ardener, 1984) who is entirely submerged in her soldier-husband's role, lacking any autonomous identity. While the prescriptions of that role are onerous, at the end of the day the woman is simply a mirror or shadow.

> Agter elke man is daar 'n vrou.
> Behind every man there is a woman.
> (Paratus, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 1987.)

The extent to which the wife is incorporated in her soldier-husband's role is best illustrated by the Johannesburg City Council's decision to restrict paid maternity leave to women employees whose husbands were presently doing or had done military service. Those to be excluded were "specifically the wives of religious objectors" as well as all blacks, coloureds, Indians and single women.[37]

However, the incorporated wife is only one source, albeit crucial, of the ideological legitimation and emotional support which

connects women to the social process of militarisation. Other crucial sources are women in their roles as mothers, though here the ultimate point is the theme of sacrifice,[38] and as providers of entertainment and diversion.

Much of the content of this entertainment reinforces an ideology of domesticity in which women and 'loved ones' provide a rationale for the soldier's privations. The message is conveyed through radio and television programmes, such as 'Forces Favourites' and tours of the 'operational areas' on the part of female entertainers. Probably the most famous such personality in South Africa was Perla Gibson, the 'lady in white' who sang to over three million young soldiers who passed through Durban on their way to remote battle fronts during World War II. (Paratus, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1986.) Currently, women such as Esme Everard, Patricia Kerr and Diane Chandler fulfill this function. Their contribution to maintaining soldiers' morale does not go unrecognised. July 1987 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the popular radio programme for soldiers - 'Forces Favourites'. For the past twenty years this has been prepared and presented by Patricia Kerr. Her commitment earned her 'The Order of the Star of South Africa for exceptional service of military importance'. (Paratus, Vol. 38, No. 4, April 1987.) Her programme sends messages of love and support to and from soldiers, makes pen pal arrangements, etc. Many of these messages reinforce the ideology of gender roles referred to above. Gail Adams, who was producer of the Sunday evening radio programme 'Salute', reports that she "fell in love about forty times" on her four hour visit to seventeen base camps. After this experience she planned to "feature girls regularly, in the form of a 'radio centrefold' which could be a chat-up with a reigning beauty queen". (Paratus, Vol. 34, No. 2, February 1983.)

This 'centrefold' type use of women is a further component in the linkage between masculinity and militarism. A sexist abuse of female sexuality is evident in at least two different ways: the indirect visual abuse of women as sex objects in 'pin up' illustrations, and the direct physical abuse of women in the case of rape. As regards the former it is interesting that Paratus used to have a monthly 'pin up' page. A photograph of a woman, either fully clothed or in a bathing costume filled the final page of every issue of Paratus until mid 1977. (Fine and Getz, 1986: 30.) This clearly reinforced a splintered and contradictory image of woman - an image fractured between the extremes of moralism and sexuality, 'Damned whores and God's police'.[39]

Unfortunately it is as 'damned whores' that women frequently suffer at the hands of soldiers. Historically rape is often associated with war.

> War provides men with the perfect psychological backdrop to give vent to their contempt for women. The very maleness of the military - the brute power of weaponry exclusive to their hands, the spiritual bonding of men at arms, the manly discipline of orders given and orders obeyed, the simple logic of the hierarchical command - confirms for men what they long suspect, that women are peripheral, irrelevant to the world that counts, passive spectators to the action in the centre ring.
> Men who rape in war are ordinary Joes, made unordinary by entry into the most exclusive male-only club in the world. Victory in arms brings group power undreamed of in civilian

> life. Power for men alone. The unreal situation of a world without women becomes the prime reality. To take a life looms more significant than to make a life, and the gun in the hand is power. The sickness of warfare feeds on itself. A certain number of soldiers must prove their newly won superiority - prove it to a woman, to themselves, to other men. In the name of victory and the power of the gun, war provides men with a tacit licence to rape. In the act and in the excuse, rape in war reveals the male psyche in its boldest form, without the veneer of 'chivalry' or civilisation.
> (Brownmiller, 1977: 33.)

Brownmiller's statement of the relation between women and war-time rape is controversial. Many dismiss her radical feminist stance as an overstatement which under-estimates legal penalties for rape. One could also point to contradictions in the passage quoted - if women are peripheral and unimportant, why then does any male superiority need to be demonstrated to them? But the historical evidence is incontrovertible - rape has always been a common act of war. The explanation of this lies in the connection between militarism and masculinity.

Men's insecurity in relation to their masculinity may become exacerbated by the physical dangers of combat. In these situations rape may be used to try and improve morale. For example:

> In 1966 an American patrol held a nineteen-year-old Vietnamese girl captive for several days, taking turns at raping her and finally murdering her. The sergeant planned the crime in advance, telling the soldiers during the mission's briefing that the girl would improve their 'morale'. When one soldier refused to take part in the rape, the sergeant called him 'queer' and 'chicken'; another testified later that he joined in the assault to avoid such insults.
> (Komisar, undated: 53, cited by Vogelman, 1987: 144.)

In some war situations rape has been extremely widespread. For example, during the Bangladesh conflict it has been estimated that some 200 000 women were raped by Pakistani soldiers. (Brownmiller, 1977: 79; Medea and Thompson, 1972). Rape is not widespread in the type of war presently being waged in South Africa but it does occur, as the following case study shows:

> **Statement by Lena Rasmen made to Brian Frances Bishop, 70 Molteno Road, Gardens, Cape Town**
> I live with my husband at 71 Mazosiwe Str, Lingelihle, Cradock. On Saturday 3 August 1985 I saw two vehicles patrolling the streets around my house. I think they are called hippos. In the late evening I walked to a relative's home. I was alone. A hippo drove up behind me and stopped. Two white soldiers jumped out. One said "Here walks a bitch, alone at night, probably looking for a man. We'll help her." The words were in Afrikaans. One soldier lifted me by my shoulders and one by my ankles. I struggled and said: "Where are you taking me?" The same soldier said, "You'll see." There were other soldiers in the hippo, but I

don't know how many. The hippo drove to the national road and went towards Port Elizabeth. The soldiers did not speak or interfere with me, but the same two held me. A few kilometres away the hippo stopped. The one soldier jumped out and the other pushed me out. The two soldiers lifted me over the fence and climbed over. The hippo drove in the same direction. I can identify the spot. The two soldiers were very young. The one held my arms while the other lifted my dress and removed my slip and panties. I said, "What are you doing, children?" The one replied, "Ons gaan jou naai. As jy nie wil, gaan ons jou doodmaak." (We are going to fuck you. If you don't we'll kill you.)
They then pushed me down with my hips on a big stone. The one soldier held my arms over my head on the ground. The other soldier (who had done all the talking) raped me. He was rough and I was bleeding when he finished. The other said, "Maak gou. Ek is haastig. Ek wil ook naai." (Hurry up. I'm in a hurry. I also want to fuck.) The two men switched positions. The one held my hands over my head. The other raped me. He was also rough.
The two soldiers then walked away towards the road but more towards PE than direct. The first soldier asked me "Sal jy vir ons ken?" (Will you recognise/know us?) I said, "Ek sal nie vir julle ken." (I will not know you.) I pulled my dress down, left my slip and panties, and walked to Michalsdal. I was too afraid to go home and went to my brother's house, and told him. He wanted to take me to hospital but it was dark and I was scared that the hippo soldiers would see us. It was about 9.00 pm. My brother gave me coffee and put me to bed with hot water bottles. I was in pain and still bleeding. The next morning my brother fetched my husband, who hired a car to go to hospital. I told the admissions clerk and a doctor and nurse that two white soldiers had raped me. The doctor treated the pelvic area, gave me pills, and discharged me. He advised me to go to the police the next day. I went home and to bed. I am still in pain (a week later). I have an appointment at the clinic on Monday 12th.
On Monday 5th August I went by taxi to the police station. It was early. In the charge office was one white man in civilian clothes. He heard my story in Xhosa and told me to go to SANLAM - the normal term for security police headquarters. (Local branches of the security police often have offices in privately owned buildings.)
I saw one coloured and one black security policeman together and told them the story in Xhosa. They recorded the facts and asked questions. I was not asked to sign anything. They asked if I knew the soldiers or the hippo number. They said they would contact me but have not done so. The coloured policeman was flippant.

Signed and sworn to me at Cradock, this 10th day of August 1985, the deponent having acknowledged that she knows and understands the contents of this statement to be true, that she has taken the prescribed oath and that she considers such oath to be binding on her conscience.

> M. Blackburn (Mrs)
> Commissioner of Oaths
> Member of the Cape Provincial Council
>
> Mrs Rasmen does not know her age. Mr Goniwe and Judge Jones (US Federal Appeal Court) estimate it at 70. She has 8 children and "many" grandchildren, who are at high school. Mrs Rasmen knows her age as "Mgijima" but we could not identify that term. Mrs Rasmen has received a state old-age pension for two years.

Clearly a connection between masculinity and militarism is operating here. It might be thought that this linkage would be eroded by the increasing incorporation of women directly into the armed forces - a process that is occuring both globally and in South Africa. However, in the next section it will be argued that this incorporation preserves the ideology of gender roles; that the definition of femininity is expanded rather than fundamentally re-worked.

(b) The direct linkage: the increasing incorporation of women into the SADF

In global terms women are increasingly used as a military resource.[40] This may be related to a number of factors such as manpower constraints stemming from falling birth rates, a general militarisation of many different societies, and ironically the rise of 'equal rights feminism'.

Armed forces everywhere are distinctively partriarchal institutions. "The military, even more than other patriarchal institutions, is a male preserve, run by men and for men according to masculine ideas and relying solely on manpower." (Enloe, 1983: 07.) The patriarchal nature of many societies smoothes or facilitates the connections between the armed forces and other institutions. For example, Enloe writes of the military-industrial complex as a patriarchal set of relations thoroughly imbued with masculine-defined militarist values. The network "depends on male bonding, male privilege, and militarily derived notions of masculinity". Several dimensions of the intimate relationships that are cultivated between military officials, arms industry executives and scientists are only comprehensible "if they are examined as one more manifestation of militarism's reliance on and perpetuation of a gender ideology that constructs 'maleness' in a peculiar fashion". (Enloe, 1983: 193.) 'Maleness in this ideology of gender is a relational concept - it implies a dichotomous relation between opposing sets of qualities which constructs 'femaleness'. Militarism is structured upon this dichotomy. As Mason describes it:

> ... militarism is an organising principle of social life which necessarily magnified the distinctions between the sexes and was predicated upon overt or total male supremacy. (Mason, 1976: 87.)

It is this dichotomy which explains women's exclusion from combat roles.[41] However, this exclusion may be eroded under the pressure of 'manpower' constraints and shortages. When this occurs there are usually attempts to keep the ideology of gender roles intact.

For example, in 1985 the Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini of Iran announced that Iranian women should receive military training and be sent to the front. The following year it was reported that Iran had given military training to one million women and 100 000 of these had left for the Iran-Iraq warfront. Although Iranian women "carry guns (they) are normally covered from head to foot in black 'chadors', all embracing wrap-around sheets that leave only the face and hands exposed". (Eastern Province Herald, 22.02.1986.)

A similar attempt to preserve the ideology of gender roles, despite the direct incorporation of women into the armed forces, occurs in Israel. Approximately 65% of Israeli girls serve in the army through their two years of compulsory military service. (Jerusalem Post, 08.11.1986.)[42]

> CHEN, the Hebrew acronym for Women's Corps, as a word means 'charm' and indeed CHEN adds to the Israeli Defence Force the grace and charm which make it also a medium for humanitarian and social activities.
> (IDF Spokesman, 1980: 01.)

In South Africa there are frequent injunctions to women not to allow their role in the SADF to contaminate their femininity. Physical appearance must be carefully cultivated.

> With good grooming any woman can look as good in her uniform as out of it.
> (Paratus, Vol. 30, No. 5, 1979.)
>
> Once a woman, always a woman.
> (Ibid.)

The important point is that despite the increasing direct incorporation of women into military structures in South Africa, the ideology of gender roles is not seriously breached. It is largely maintained by a sexual division of labour whereby the vast majority of women are ghettoised in subordinate positions. They are mainly employed in back up jobs such as secretarial work or catering, with very few women in the top levels of policy and decision-making. This sexual division of labour is reinforced by the elaborate cultivation of a superwoman image whereby these women are encouraged to combine non-traditional jobs with their domestic responsibilities as wives and mothers. Both mechanisms are clearly apparent in the SADF.

According to the most recent estimates available there are now about 1 000 women in the Permanent Force. In other words, women constitute a significant proportion of its 18 000 members. (Financial Mail, July 1987.) This proportion has increased steadily in recent years. For instance, by 1977 the percentage of women in the SADF had increased from 0,6% of the total force to 7% (SAIRR, Annual Survey, 1980.) In 1981, 12,5% of the full-time permanent army were women. (HAP, 1986: A1.) The Deputy Minister of Defence has said that the use of women in this way has reduced the burden on Permanent Force members and has freed national servicemen for other tasks. (Hansard, No. 11, 1980, Col. 5310.)

Women's exclusion from combat roles is legitimated on a number of different grounds:

1. **Women are instinctively unable to kill.**

> It's the task of women to give life and to preserve it. Women can provide invaluable assistance in the support services. I know there are women who could cope but, generally, the female has no place on the battle front.
> (Col. Hilda Botha, Senior Staff Officer Women, quoted in the Rand Daily Mail, 18.03.1980.)

2. **Women's socialisation is inappropriate.**

> Women encounter nothing like the extreme physical discomfort and danger of combat in their everyday life so they're not taught to cope with this sort of thing. The men on the other hand experience something like it with blood sports.
> (Psychologist, Alma Hannon, Ibid.)

> Firstly, without a training programme that could successfully reverse the cultural training women experience from birth, it would be extremely difficult. The normal female role is not an aggressive one but rather caring and sympathetic. As the instrument of life it would be difficult for her to overcome these feelings **but with the right psychological preparation it could be done.**
> (Ibid.)

3. **Women are incapacitated through physiological function such as menstruation.**

> Some women suffer from premenstrual tension and, at this time, they may be less mentally agile and well co-ordinated than at other times. A percentage are also more accident prone during this time. If this sort of thing were not checked at the outset it could put certain women at a definite disadvantage on the front lines.
> (Senior Consultant in Gynaecology at the Johannesburg Hospital. Ibid.)

4. **Male chivalry.**

> It would be very difficult to use women in an operational task. The physical implications like toilet and sleeping facilities would create endless difficulties. Men would find it difficult to prevent themselves saying things like "after you" or "I'll take that, it's too heavy for you".
> (Commander Jurie Bosch, Commanding Officer of the South African Irish Regiment. Ibid.)

This exclusion from combat roles is essential to maintain the ideological structure of patriarchy. It is essential because the notion of experiencing military 'combat' is central to the social construction of masculinity.

> ... To be a soldier of the state means to be subservient, obedient and almost totally dependent. But that mundane reality is hidden behind a potent myth: to be a soldier

> means possibly to experience 'combat' and only in combat lies the ultimate test of a man's masculinity ... 'Combat', however, is usually left conveniently vague in definition. Are bomber pilots, a thousand feet above their helpless targets, engaged in manhood-testing combat? Is an infantryman, shooting in blind frustration at an enemy he can't see in the distant foliage, engaged in combat? Are sailors, sitting in front of a computer control panel aboard a ship in a war zone, doing something that qualifies as 'combat'? The myth of combat dies hard. In today's highly technological societies, there is still the widespread presumption that a man is unproven in his manhood until he has engaged in collective, violent, physical struggle against someone categorised as 'the enemy' - i.e. combat. For men to experience combat is supposed to be the chance to assert their control, their capacity for domination, conquest, even to gain immortality.
> (Enloe, 1983: 13.)

Although women in the SADF are not used in combat they are no longer relegated to the traditional female roles of medical and welfare work, and are involved in telecommunications and signals, logistics and finance, military police and instructional activity.

The women volunteers are trained at the SA Army's Women's College opened in George in 1971. Volunteers must be under 22, have matric or its equivalent, be bilingual, never have been married and be physically fit. Initial basic training lasts one year which is divided into two phases. For the first six months the women undergo training at the College in George. They are allowed to specialise in different fields according to their interests. Telecommunications, Cartography, Administration and Stores Administration are some of the courses offered by the College. (Paratus, Vol. 34, No. 2, February 1983.) The Swans - women in the SA Navy - are given eleven weeks of intensive training. The emphasis is on girls who can present the image of women in uniform positively. (Paratus, Vol. 35, No. 9, September 1984.) The crucial theme is that there is no contradiction between femininity and serving the SADF. Thus the ideology of gender roles is preserved.

Other inducements to women to serve in the SADF are posed in terms of appeals to a mixture of patriotism and self improvement:

(1) Learning self discipline, independence and self reliance.
(Interviews with eleven graduates from the George Army Women's College reported in Paratus, Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1984.)

(2) Patriotic duty

> The defence of this country cannot be regarded as an exclusive male prerogative. We women have to come forward and stand by our men against the multi-faceted onslaught against this country. We have already made our mark, that's clear to see. So much so, that I am quite convinced that more and more opportunities are going to be created for women in the SADF and that more women will be attracted to the Permanent Force.
> (Captain Fiona Coughlan, Paratus, Vol. 30, No. 12, December 1979.)

(3) Job satisfaction and career opportunities

> I regard my work as dynamic, intelligent and fulfilling. The decision I made to join the SADF is one which I'll never regret. I have total job satisfaction ... Not only that, my job also gives me the constant feeling that I'm doing something significant for our country.
> (Ibid.)

However the image of women serving in the Permanent Force tends to be inflated to 'Superwoman' proportions. The SADF Superwoman usually combines her highly responsible job with domestic responsibilities in the shape of husbands (often SADF personnel) and children. These women tend to be physically active, and enjoy 'robust' hobbies such as sports and orienteering. They have boundless energy and enthusiasm for their jobs and are often portrayed as extremely attractive. All enjoy cooking, for example, 'the master (sic) of bobotie'. In short the definition of femininity operating in this image has been expanded rather than fundamentally restructured - the domestic role has not been abandoned but enlarged to include martial as well as domestic skills.

The following may be cited as examples of such SADF superwomen:

(1) Attractive Sergeant Major Lauretta Corcher of Signals Unit, Orange Free State Command, has made quite a name for herself in the provincial blathalon arena, but few realise the superfit 29 year old is a veritable 'superwoman'. In an apron she is a master of bobotie. In the garden she has the flair that lifts every marigold head and at work she runs an efficient operation, overseeing two dozen people. All this the slim sergeant major shrugs off as merely "a busy schedule". What is important is the enjoyment she says. "There's never a dull moment in the Defence Force."
(Paratus, Vol. 38, No. 5, May 1987.)

(2) Captain Fiona Coughlan - a translator with Directorate Language Services - also reads a lot, ranging from fiction to international politics. She is at home in five languages, and has a working knowledge of a further three. She is fond of horse-riding, swimming, walking (as a routine she walks over three miles a day) and cooking.
(Paratus, Vol. 30, No. 12, December 1979.)

(3) Captain Lyn Potgieter is a personal Staff Officer to a Commanding Officer. The mother of three children she is also an athletics officer, treasurer of the Windhoek SADF Rugby Club, a member of the Officers Club Committee and a member of an Afrikaans Language Committee. Her many commitments "Keep me young - I haven't got time to get old."
(Paratus, Vol. 34, No. 5, May 1983.)

(4) Captain Esterhuisen is a nurse at Military 1 Hospital. The mother of four school-going children she wrote

> exams at the same time as her children.
> (Paratus, Vol. , No. , August 1983.)

These 'examples', plus the inducements discussed above, such as self improvement, patriotism and career opportunities, point us towards an explanation of why women volunteer for the SADF. Such an explanation is necessary in view of what we know of war as usually awful and often meaningless.[43] More often than not, soldiers have to be coerced into war.

> ... why do the men who are called upon to do the actual fighting do so? In large part it is because of coercion. In wartime men are drafted. They are punished if they refuse to serve. Their basic military training is highly compelling and intended to teach unquestioning obedience, compliance, submission, i.e. coercion is used to make coercion unnecessary.
> (Stiehm, 1982: 371.)

This coercion includes socialisation into an ideology of militarism which compels both men and women.

It is significant that the increasing incorporation of women as a minority of the armed forces has not seriously breached the ideology of gender roles or the sexual division of labour. The most common function women fulfill in militaries are clerical, administrative and servicing. These are jobs highly similar to those held by women in the wider labour market. They do not contaminate the ideology of femininity which reinforces the sexual division of labour. It is therefore difficult to see how this increasing use of women as a military resource can be hailed as advancing equality between the sexes.

> ... women's participation in the military has failed to challenge traditional and very basic sexist ideologies. It reinforces a sexual division of labour sharper and more rigid in the armed forces than in civilian life.
> (Ibid.)

The almost universal exclusion of women from direct conscription resonates with the much wider question of women's subordination and exclusion from power and prestige. This exclusion is necessary to maintain the existing ideological order. That is why the SA Defence Force devotes so much attention to deflecting any potential contradiction between 'femininity' and participation in the SADF. In this process they ignore a much wider set of contradictions upon which the South African state is impaled. One of these surfaces in the fact that while the majority of white women contribute to the process of militarisation, a small minority of them are a source of resistance to it.

* * * * * * *

PART FIVE

CONCLUSION

> We are planting a tree so that our children can enjoy the shade.
> (San Juan, 1983: 256.)

The linkages between women and war, the incorporation of women both directly and indirectly, materially and ideologically into the militarisation of South African society, are not smooth, uniform processes. The linkages are complex and straddle contradictions which are embedded deep in the peculiar social conditions of South Africa. While white women are contributing to the process of militarisation, white women are more active than white men in the extra-parliamentary struggle against apartheid. Of course the high level of women's participation in such groups has to be set against the high degree of passive acceptance and support for the apartheid regime among white South Africans generally. However women's participation is shaped by the politics of gender in contradictory ways. This will be illustrated by point to white women's participation in two organisations: the End Conscription Campaign and the African National Congress.

The struggles of the banned ANC are the other side of the militarisation coin in South Africa. The ANC has an estimated 8 000 to 10 000 trained guerillas in its Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) structure. An estimated four out of every five black militants who leave the country because of harrassment join the ANC. (City Press, 12.01.1986.)

Among the small number of whites convicted in South African courts for furthering the aims of the banned ANC, women form a significant proportion. There have been a number of famous cases - for example, Barbara Hogan, Helene Pastoors, Jansie Lourens, Trish Hanekom and Marion Sparg.[44] The latter is a twenty-nine year old former journalist who, in 1986, was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment on charges of high treason and arson. She is the first white South African woman known to have served as a member of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. Pleading guilty to all the charges against her, Sparg admitted planting the limpet mines which exploded in Johannesburg's police headquarters and an East London police station in 1986. She said she knew it was possible policemen or civilians would die in the blasts.

> But my motive was not to injure or kill people. It was one of a soldier in Umkhonto we Sizwe, a military army. I followed orders just like any other soldier.
> (Weekly Mail, 07.11.1986.)

The politics of gender were used to deny and trivialise the validity of such choice and commitment. Shortly after her arrest in March 1986 several South African newspapers depicted Sparg as a failed woman; as a lonely, overweight, unattractive female who had turned to revolutionary politics not out of commitment but out of a desire to belong and win acceptance. She was depicted as a failed woman rather than a revolutionary. Paradoxically she was still a woman and so ipso

facto could not have acted independently. As a woman, she had to be manipulated by a man of special persuasive powers. Sparg was described as acting under the influence of one such a man, Arnold Geyer, whom Major Craig Williamson of the South African Security Police described as "a sort of Carl Manson figure". (The Observer, Weekend, 31.03.1987.) A similar theme from the politics of gender has been used in the media to attempt to denigrate the activities of Barbara Hogan, now serving a ten year sentence. She was described as:

> an academic and trade unionist who was the first person convicted of high treason without committing violent acts. She had run an ANC cell for ten years after being recruited by her black boyfriend, Pindile Mfeti.
> (Ibid.)

Similarly Jansie Lourens, now serving a seven year sentence for sabotage, was said to be influenced by her boyfriend (now husband) Karl Niehaus.

The revolutionary commitment of these women is eroded by the suggestion that, as women, they could not have been acting autonomously. However, their status as white women also provides a degree of camouflage. It has been suggested that white women attract less attention than men, and under the guise of their femininity are able to travel more freely around the country fulfilling vital roles in the underground war, a role which is likely to expand in the near future. (Major Craig Williamson in the Observer, Ibid.)

Another source of challenge to the militarisation of South African society in which white women are extremely active is the peace movement generally and the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) specifically. Started three years ago, the ECC has become a national coalition with fifty-two member organisations, branches in ten centres and thousands of active members and supporters. Many of these are white women. The organisation's aim has always been to call for the government to change the law regarding military service, but it has also run a number of campaigns against the broader process of militarisation. For example, over Christmas 1986 Pretoria, Durban and Pietermaritzburg's ECC campaigned against war toys.[45]

The growth of the ECC is remarkable given intense state harrassment and repression. In 1986 about seventy ECC members were detained under the State of Emergency regulations for periods between one day and seven months, and twenty-six members were served with restriction orders.[46] In December 1986 the State of Emergency Regulations were tightened up to prevent anyone from "discrediting or undermining" the system of compulsory military service. The penalty is a R20 000 fine or ten years imprisonment.

Women are an extremely important source of commitment and energy within this organisation at a leadership level as well. During the three years of its existence the Johannesburg branch of the ECC has only this year (1987) elected a man as chairperson. Previously the ECC has had women at the helm - Benita Pavlicevic and Claire Verbeeck.

It is paradoxical that many women ECC supporters are moved by their maternal role - by their sense of responsibility to their children. It is often their role as mothers that generates their challenge to militarisation. For example, a letter to a local Johannesburg newspaper urged mothers to organise to demand better army treatment for their sons.

> The South African way of life allows a great many myths to exist in our society. One of the greatest of these is the one that goes 'the army will make a man of your son' ... we allow the might of the army to swallow the boys we, as mothers, have spent eighteen years turning into civilised human beings, caring and considerate of others, and in two years turn them into efficient, largely unthinking, killing machines.
> (Letter to The Star, 15.04.1986.)

Clearly this issue generates conflict for mothers. A local study reported

> the dilemma experienced as a result of the mothers' opposition towards conscription and their simultaneous feelings that, as mothers, they should be committed to supporting their sons.
> (Feinstein, et al, 1986: 77.)

It is significant that in this study

> The issue of conscription was hardly discussed by the families. Discussion between mother and son on the issue of conscription was almost non-existent. All mothers felt that their sons should be informed, but distanced themselves from the process.
> (Ibid, p. 76.)

Women's resistance to militarisation has often been rooted in their maternal roles. Sometimes the content of that resistance has echoed and reinforced such roles. For example, the wording of the appeal from the International Women's Suffrage Alliance in 1914 to avoid war:

> In this terrible hour, when the fate of Europe depends on decisions which women have no power to shape, we, realising our responsibilities as the mothers of the race, cannot stand passively by. Powerless though we are politically, we call upon the governments and powers of our several countries to avert the threatened unparalleled disaster.
> (Cited by Orr, 1983: 11.)

Frequently also, such resistance resonates with deep maternal feelings:

> ... the child at once serves as an inspiration to fight on ("We are planting a tree so that our children can enjoy the shade") and a temptation to quiet down so that she may be with him to watch him grow.
> (A young mother imprisoned in the Phillipines, cited by Juan, 1983: 256.)

While the politics of gender is often used to deny the validity of women's independent, autonomous political action, paradoxically it also gives them space for such action. There is no white male equivalent of the white women's civil rights organisation, the Black Sash, currently nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Their silent protest stands are reminiscent of the 'Mad Mothers' of the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires since 1976.

> The women of the Plaza de Mayo, having not been able to obtain any response to repeated requests for information about their disappeared relatives, found that only elderly women demonstrating in silence were not liable for immediate arrest; and thus became with their white headgears to identify their mute protest, the vanguard of public opposition to the Argentine Government's policies ...
> They found one loophole enabling them to act non-violently in a situation that blocked any legitimate expression of protest.
> McLean, 1982: 326.)

Similar protest from white women in the Black Sash, the ANC or ECC are not the only forms of resistance to militarisation at the present time. There is a growing realisation in the white community of both the economic and human cost of a military solution to maintaining the apartheid regime. The human cost is indicated by Professor Green of the Institute for Development Studies in Sussex, who estimates that as a proportion of the white South African population, the number of white South Africans whose lives have been lost in fighting Swapo amounts to more than three times the number of American lives lost in Vietnam. (The Star, 02.11.1987.)

The scale of human cost demanded by increasing militarisation is provoking a number of very different responses in the white community. These may be categorised in terms of compliance, retreat and challenge. The response of **compliance** to militarisation is evident in increased support for the ruling political party and those to the right of it, such as the Conservative Party. This was clear in the 1987 general election. It is also evident in the dramatic increase in arms sales which makes white South Africa one of the most heavily armed communities in the world. In 1986 there were 220 221 applications to possess a firearm (135 382 in 1985), bringing the number of persons licenced to possess a firearm to 1 061 281. (Inside South Africa, May 1987.)

The response of **retreat** is evident in the increasing numbers emigrating from South Africa. Emigration on the part of white South Africans is increasing and 'the brain drain' reached headline proportions earlier this year. For example, 'Govt figures show massive brain drain' (The Star, 20.02.1987). According to statistics released in Parliament in February 1987, a total of 2 164 professional people emigrated in 1986. While 1 026 immigrated, the net loss for the country was 1 138 or, on average, just more than three a day. More than 47% more professional and technical people left the country than during 1985. (The Star, 04.03.1987.) This is often a response to militarisation in the form of the conscription issue.

> While the motivations underlying emigration vary from the political to the most intensely personal it is significant that many of the younger white English speakers are moved to action by the prospect of extended military service.
> (Frankel, 1984: 139.)

At present many young white South african males obtain deferment from their military service for university study. However, there are hints in the Geldenhuys Commission appointed in 1984 that such deferment will no longer be obtained too easily.

> The advantages and disadvantages of national service, prior to tertiary training, were studied, and the Committee came to the conclusion that it would be preferable if military service were made compulsory before tertiary training.
> (White paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1986, p. 07.)

However, the sharpest and most direct **challenge** to the increasing militarisation of South African society is the growth of the End Conscription Campaign and the increasing numbers of white South Africans resisting military service. This resistance involves elements of retreat (seeking political asylum abroad), passive or personal resistance (in the form of not reporting to the SADF) as well as applications for alternative service and (in a very few cases) serving a prison sentence in preference to military service.

It has been reported that 1 000 objectors to military service were granted political asylum in Britain between 1977 and 1981 (Total War in SA, 1984). Increasing numbers of young white South Africans do not report for military service. It was reported in Parliament that 7 589 conscripts failed to report for duty in the SADF in January 1985, as opposed to 1 596 conscripts in the whole of 1984. (At Ease, ECC Newsletter, May 1986.) The SADF challenged the former figure as incorrect on the grounds that it included some students and scholars. In January 1986 General Magnus Malan refused to reveal in Parliament the number of people who had failed to report to the SADF. (The Star, 03.03.1986.)

Retreat shades into challenge in the case of the increasing numbers of people applying to the Board for Religious Objection for alternative service as 'religious objectors'.[47] By December 1985 the number of conscripts applying for religious objector status had increased by 35% according to statistics supplied by the Board. (Eastern Province Herald, 18.12.1985.) Between July 1984 and May 1987, 755 applications were considered by the Board. (Weekly Mail, 19.06.1987.) This is a small minority of those who are conscripted.

On the whole there is little support for such objectors.

> With the noteworthy exception of a few organisations and individuals, South Africa's public displays little sympathy for conscientious objection.
> (Frankel, 1984: 134.)

Frankel attributes this to the fact that the militarisation of South African society

> works in the direction of producing individuals who have partially absorbed militarist values prior to their embarking on formal military service, who regard their period of conscription in strong patriotic terms and who generally see military service as a desirable part of their individual growth.
> (Frankel, 1984: 134-135.)

However, Frankel was writing prior to the use of the SADF in South Africa's black townships, a process which dates back to October 1984. This has changed many people's attitudes towards conscription and exacerbated manpower problems within the SADF. At the same time, "the internal unrest situation has increased manpower requirements". (White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1986, p. 04.)

One important response to manpower problems is that the ideological construction of defence force 'manpower' as 'white' is being restructured. There are reports that more coloured and Indian people are applying for voluntary service than the SADF can handle. (SAIRR, 1985: 417; The Star, 28.04.1986.) However, the 1986 Defence White paper clearly envisages extending conscription to coloured and Indian people in the long term.[48] It suggests taking coloured and Indian people through the same stages of military service as whites, i.e. a voluntary system (1946-1951); followed by the ballot system (1952-1969); followed by compulsory military service for extended periods. At present the inclusion of Africans within the SADF is primarily tied to Bantustan independence.[49]

> For both the Full-time Force and Part-time Force, the SADF is mainly dependent on the white male as a source of manpower. The escalating threat makes greater demands on the RSA's manpower resources, and white males can no longer bear the security burden alone without harming the economy. The SA Defence Force will therefore be increasingly reliant on other manpower resources.
> (White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1986, p. 17.)

The obvious question that arises is whether the ideological construction of 'manpower' will then be restructured to include white women. There has been some talk of extending conscription to white women since 1981. In that year the Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, said:

> Compulsory national service for women might be instituted in the distant future.
> (Cited in HAP, 1986.)

However, the question of conscription for white girls is not an issue of frequent debate in South Africa. When the issue is raised it has, on occasion, taken a somewhat bizarre form. For example, the leader of the Rightwing Kappiecommando organisation, Mrs Marie van Zyl, has expressed concern that young white girl conscripts could be used as prostitutes. She issued a statement challenging the then Prime Minister, Mr P.W. Botha, to guarantee that if young girls were "forced" to join a multi-racial army, it would not be "for the purpose of prostitution". Her concern does not only relate to the possibility of inter-racial sex. She has also been reported as saying that "only lower class women" joined the Defence Force during World War II and were "used for prostitution". (Rand Daily Mail, 24.03.1982.)[50]

Generally, conscription for women is still rare anywhere. Despite assertions of equality there are few states (Israel, Mali and Guinea) in which women are conscripted into the armed forces. Everywhere women are in the minority in such forces. (Enloe, 1983: 127-131.)

> ... in no contemporary army, be it a liberation army, a national army or a professional army, do women participate in percentage terms to an extent even approaching that of men. In most cases women constitute no more than 5-7% of military personnel, often much less.
> (Yuval Davis, 1981: 33.)

However, one of the intentions of this paper is to place the issue on the agenda. Future policy will hinge on the tension between the need to mobilise women as soldiers under the pressure of manpower shortages and increasing resistance), and the need to avoid any contamination or dilution of the ideological construct of 'femininity'. This construct is crucial as a source of legitimation for the connection between masculinity and militarism. The identification of manhood with soldiering is of such ideological importance that it cannot be breached. This paper has attempted to demonstrate this and to show that even without direct coercion into the SADF in the form of conscription, white women contribute both directly and indirectly, both materially and ideologically, to the militarisation of South African society. In a number of different senses, they "keep the fires burning".

* * * * * * *

FOOTNOTES

1. Frank Chikane, a Transvaal vice-president of the United Democratic Front, speaking at the funeral of seventeen victims of the unrest in Alexandra in February 1986. Quoted in The Weekly Mail, 07.03.1986.

2. Women are not here conceptualised as a homogenous social category. See Anthias and Yuval Davis, 1983.

3. Most writers agree that the period since World War II has seen a process of global militarisation with devastating consequences. For example, Randle points to four consequences: the proliferation of wars costing several million lives; the impoverishment and oppression of millions of people; the spread of military governments, especially in the Third World; and the widespread erosion or suppression of liberties in the name of national security. (Randle, 1981.)

4. D. Kuny, SC counsel for Andrew Zondo who received five death sentences for planting the Amanzimtoti bomb. (The Star, 11.04.1986.)

5. Randle emphasises that there is not a one-for-one relationship between militarisation and repression. One cannot look at the extent of militarism in a given country - whether judged in terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GNP, the number of soldiers per head of population, or the size and sophistication of the weapons system - and draw any automatic conclusions about the intensity of repression there. "The United States is more heavily armed and has a higher number of soldiers per head than Guatemala or Haiti or Indonesia; yet repression and social exploitation is far more intense in these countries than it is in the US." (Randle, 1981: 86.)

6. Some understand this to be a formal declaration of civil war. For example, Frederickse writes, "October 1984 marked the first public admission that the SADF was fighting its own people." (Frederickse, 1986: 179.) On that day at 2.00 am seven thousand soldiers and para-military police went into Sebokeng. They searched every one of the townships 20 000 houses. Residents were not allowed out of their homes until the soldiers had finished each search, dipped people's fingers in red dye and stuck orange stickers on their houses and cards reading, "Co-operation for peace and security - I am your friend - trust me." 354 people were arrested by the brown-uniformed force which blacks termed "the boys from the border". The Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, has reported that during 1985 a total of 35 372 troops were deployed in ninety-six townships. No SADF member had been allowed to refuse township duty. (The Star, 09.05.1986.) The role of the SADF was to support the police (the SAP) in the suppression of internal disorder. Affidavits from residents contain allegations which include the killing of innocent

people, assault, damage to property, entering homes without a warrant, harrassment and intimidation. (Application by the Krugersdorp Residents Organisation for relief from alleged wrongful and unlawful acts on the part of the security forces to the Rand Supreme Court. The Star, 24.04.1986.)

7. This occured in Katlehong, near Germiston in December 1985, for example. Goods were thrown out of houses. "When the army arrived they destroyed my bedroom door and damaged my crockery and other items." (Katlehong resident quoted in The Star, 05.12.1985.)

8. The New York Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights reported that soldiers maintained a campaign of terror against black children. "In the past year a terrifying pattern of abuse has emerged in townships with a heavy military presence: soldiers pick up children on the streets, load them into casspirs and hold them for several nightmarish hours. Inside the casspirs the children are threatened, intimidated and assaulted before being turned out to make their own way home." The report charges that in some cases children were taken to fields where they were assaulted. And in some townships children were abducted by soldiers, kept at temporary barracks outside townships and subjected to torture. Named in the report are barracks outside Soweto and near Daveyton. (The Weekly Mail, 18.04.1986.) The role of the SADF in attempting to break the schools boycott varies from distributing pamphlets - for instance in 1984, 3 000 troops moved into Tembisa and distributed pamphlets saying "Back to school ... education is the key to the future" - to intimidation. For example, in May 1986 members of the SADF raided Immaculata High School in Diepkloof, Soweto, allegedly breaking their way through locked security gates and ransacking the principal's office and classroom, took her files, searched cupboards, tore pupils' books and broke windows. (The Star, 16.05.1986.)

9. In February 1986 during the Alexandra unrest SADF and SAP men surrounded the Alexandra Clinic, effecting a virtual blockade; they entered the clinic to try and identify unrest casualties, interrogating staff and photographing unrest victims receiving treatment. (The Star, 18.02.1986.)

10. In March 1986 a security presence of SAP and SADF maintained a presence on Port Elizabeth's beaches "to prevent a confrontation between races". (Sunday Star, 02.03.1986.)

11. In April 1987, 800 squatters threatened with eviction at Wielen's Farm, north of Evaton, were allegedly raided by members of the SADF. One squatter claimed that he was made to strip naked by the troops who also threatened to take his car. (City Press, 19.04.1987.)

12. For example, in 1986 in suppressing resistance to independence in KwaNdebele. In May two people died and scores were injured when members of the SADF and the police allegedly hurled teargas cannisters into buses returning from a mass meeting. (The Star, 15.05.1986.)

13. In the Pietersburg area in 1986 a Lebowa bus company hit by a drivers strike was reportedly using Defence Force personnel to keep its buses on the move. (The Star, 24.04.1986.) The role of the SADF in strike breaking dates back to 1922 when it was used to quell the miners strike.

14. In November 1985 there was a strike at Baragwanath Hospital, in Soweto, of 940 student nurses and about 800 daily paid workers. The grievances of the student nurses included being locked in the nurses home at 8.00 pm every night; poor quality food served in the canteens; victimisation and unfair dismissals; and the violent behaviour of the Security Guards. (The Star, 16.11.1985.) The daily paid workers could earn as little as R150 per month. One woman who had worked in the hospital's kitchens for ten years earned R240 for a six day week from 7.00 am to 4.00 pm. Some of the daily paid workers had worked there for seventeen years but could still be dismissed with 24 hours notice and receive no pension benefits when they retired. All 1 800 strikers (two thirds of the workforce) were dismissed. The National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA) issued a statement alleging that the authorities were sacrificing the health of the Soweto community in preference to negotiating over the legitimate demands of the striking workers. (The Star, 21.11.1985.) Instead of negotiating, the SADF were called in. Citizen Force members of the SADF, particularly those attached to the medical corps were called up for duty at the hospital for two weeks. (The Star, 21.11.1985.) Civil Defence members and doctors and nurses drafted from private practice and other hospitals were also assigned to various wards. (The Star, 18.11.1985.)

15. As articulated by Lasswell (1941) the doctrine of 'the garrison state' implies a subordination to defence and a social system controlled by a combination of military and civilian leaders.

16. Frankel describes it as essentially a 'citizen military' that is fed by two different traditions - the British civil-military tradition anchored in the notion that military authority should be subordinate to the political authority of the civil state; and the Afrikaner commando model in which these lines cannot be so sharply drawn. He writes; "... the kommando differs from its competitor in its conception of soldiering and the dividing line between civil and military society: whereas the liberal model stresses soldiering as a discrete, permanent and professional activity of autonomous status in functionally differentiated society, the kommando emphasises the free flow of influences across the civil-military boundary personified in the citizen soldier." (Frankel, 1984: 25.)

17. Section 3 (2) of the Defence Act, No. 44 of 1957, states that "The SADF or any portion or member thereof may -

a) At any time be employed -
   (i) on service in the defence of the Republic;
   (ii) on service and the prevention and suppression of terrorism;
   (iii) on service and the prevention or suppression of

internal disorder in the Republic;

(iv) on service in the preservation of life, health or property; and

b) While employed as contemplated in paragraph (a), be used on those police functions mentioned in Section 5 of the Police Act as may be prescribed.

18. A set of instructions on Ethnology (Manual for the Soldier. Defence Headquarters, Pretoria, August, 1977) emphasises that "Blacks are different. Although they have become westernised to a considerable degree, and it would indeed be a mistake to refer to them as 'primitive Bantu', the distinctive culture of the Blacks has mostly survived. It will, therefore, be to the benefit of the soldier taking part in operations on the borders or in the homeland, to recognise and study these differences in culture. In what ways do they differ? They are never in a hurry, and to them time does not exist - tomorrow is yet another day. They are accustomed to lead a hand-to-mouth existence, producing just enough for their own use - only such work is done as is absolutely necessary ... He (the Bantu) has other values for the term rational and in more than one instance it is just opposite that of a White ... As compared to the analytical-scientific way of thinking and approach of Whites, the Bantu's thinking is of a mythological nature ..." (p. 24-25.)

19. This notion of levels is derived fron an anonymous article in Work in Progress, No. 24, 1982, entitled 'Militarisation in South Africa'.

20. For the innate aggression position as an explanation for militarism see, for example, Tinberger, Ardrey, and Lorenz.

21. University Military Units (UMU's) exist at Pretoria, OFS, UPE, Potchefstroom, RAU and Stellenbosch. Where UMU's exist, all students who have completed their initial military training automatically become members.

22. These veld schools are paralleled by militarised holiday "adventure" camps run for black children where participants are encouraged to develop "leadership, patriotism and military discipline".

23. Christopher Lasch sees this siege mentality infiltrating all aspects of cultural, social and political life in advanced capitalist societies. It is a mentality he attempts to capture in his concept of 'the minimal self'. "People have lost confidence in the future. Faced with an escalating arms race, in increase in crime and terrorism, environmental deterioration, and the prospect of a long-term economic decline, they have begun to prepare for the worst, sometimes by building fallout shelters and laying in provisions, more commonly by executing a kind of emotional retreat from the long term commitments that presuppose a stable, secure and orderly world." (Lasch, 1985: 16.) This response is dramatically evident among South African whites.

24. A White paper on Defence, tabled by Defence Minister Magnus Malan in April 1986 spells out the government justification for regarding the armed forces as part of the machinery for maintaining Law and Order. The use of the army in support of the police in combating "revolutionary onslaught" is not a practice that is confined to South Africa, according to the White Paper. Instead it is "accepted international practice". It gives as examples the use of the National Guard in the United States, citing the fact that 7 500 men of the national guard were mobilised to reinforce the 12 000 strong police force in Chicago during riots in 1968. "In the United Kingdom the British army has taken over total control of the unrest situation in Northern Ireland." (Weekly Mail, 25.04.1986.) A very different source has also pointed to the militarisation of police functions in advanced capitalist societies. (Randle, 1981.)

25. In fact the SADF invaded Angola some twelve years ago and has remained there ever since. However, a mass of legislation has created an ideological context in which knowledge, let alone criticism and free debate, about the role of the SADF is impossible. See Satchwell, 1986.

26. Swilling has argued that the National Security Management System "amounts to a dual state, one with all the trappings of democratic government (at least for whites, coloureds and Indians) and the other a quasi-military structure capable of co-ordinating and rationalising state action to meet the challenge of governing in revolutionary conditions. (Swilling, 1987.) "In the view of a number of analysts, the SADF is already at the centre of a complex system of control over the lives of more than 400 000 people who can be mobilised in the event of war but also over civilians in the wider society. Some even contend that South Africa is already ruled by a de facto military dictatorship: that beneath the facade of civilian rule the generals run the country, sharing power only with their peers in the police and intelligence service." (Weekly Mail, Vol. 3, No. 26, 3 July 1987.)

27. A feminist methodology thus involves an emphasis on lived experience. A feminist methodology examines the world from the perspective of women. "... it is not enough to include women

in the account. It is necessary to look out through women's eyes. For me a feminist methodology also presupposes that lived experience must be the basis of analysis and theory ..." (Roberts, 1984: 196.) This stress on experience and subjectivity creates tensions within Marxist-feminism because of Marxism's neglect of subjectivity. (Barrett and McIntosh, 1982: 107.)

28. Barrett argues that the slide into 'biological reductionism' is extremely dangerous. "It is regressive in that one of the early triumphs of feminist cross-cultural work - the establishment of a distinction between sex as a biological category and gender as a social one - is itself threatened by

an emphasis on the causal role of procreative biology in the construction of male domination. In practice, too, such an analysis may well lead to a feminist glorification of supposedly 'female' capac ties and principles and a reassertion of 'separate spheres' for women and men." (Barrett, 1980: 13.) Much of the writing on women and war is subject to this criticism.

29. There are large and important questions at issue here revolving round the relation between power and violence. Feminist research on violence against women has produced important explorations of the meaning of power and powerlessness. Male violence against women is clearly an expression and reinforcement of male power over women. "Power-as-dominance seems inextricably linked to violence: indeed the potential for physical, economic and psychological violence is almost the traditional definition of power." (Roberts, 1984: 197.) Yet "recent feminist-pacifist work has proposed the paradox that power-as-dominance is ultimately an expression of powerlessness. Research on violence against women supports this view. It may seem absurd to see a rapist/batterer as powerless. Yet violent men are usually crippled, pathetic and incompetent as human beings, unable or unwilling to take responsibility for their feelings or behaviour, or to take care of themselves, let alone others, in a nurturing way. If power is competence they have little." (Roberts, 1984: 197.)

30. The eugenic and procreative emphasis of many statements in South Africa is reminiscent of the Nazi appeal to Aryan women to be sensible of their duty to the race and to produce large numbers of healthy and intelligent children. Mason shows how a hysterical protective anxiety on behalf of guileless German women formed one of the most persistent themes in Nazi anti-semitic propaganda. "The purity of the blood, the numerical power, the vigour of race were ideological goals of such high priority that all women's activities other than breeding were relegated in party rhetoric to secondary significance." (Mason, 1976: 88.)

31. Some blacks also interpret family planning programmes as having a racist intent. For example, Deborah Mabiletsa has charged that the South African government "tells black women to have no more than two children, but white women are offered bonuses for having three or more". (The Star, 25.06.1987.)

32. Women employed in armaments production form only a fraction of the work that maintains militarisation. "Militarised work refers to any labour organised and exploited in the allegedly civilian sector of the economy to produce goods and services that military officials claim they need." (Enloe, 1983: 175.)

33. For example, in Nazi Germany the shortage of labour in the armaments industry was a serious obstacle. By 1940 a Nazi official described it as the crucial issue of the war. Women who did not work and had no young children were the only significant and immediately accessible reserve labour. However,

it was only in 1943 that women aged between seventeen and forty-five were required to register so that the authorities could check whether their family responsibilities allowed them to be drafted into work of one kind or another. This momentum soon lapsed as women conscripts proved themselves adept at fulfilling conditions for exemption. The mobilisation of women for war production was much more efficient in Britain. The compulsory registration of women was introduced in 1941 and on the basis of the register, women were selectively conscripted into industry, the administration and the armed forces. By 1943 "it was almost impossible for a woman under forty to avoid war work unless she had heavy family responsibilities or was looking after a war worker billeted on her." (Mason, 1976: 22.)

34. From this premise flows James's main argument: that military conflict will persist until anti-militarists find an adequate substitute (the 'moral equivalent') for this function.

35. The extent of this process of dehumanisation is best illustrated by the following incident: "On the last day of training before leaving for Vietnam we were ushered into a clearing where a staff sergeant stood holding a rabbit. He stroked and petted it. As soon as we were all seated, with no word of explanation, he crushed its head with a rock and proceeded to actually skin and disembowel the animal with his bare hands and teeth while showering the entrails on us. As we left the clearing he stood there with fur all around his mouth and blood runing down his throat. The intended message was that one was going into a war and civilisation and all its emotional vestiges must be left behind." (Eisenhart, 1975: 18.)

36. An ECC activist commenting on this - "Ridiculing members of the ECC in this fashion only serves to trivialise the crisis in this country and to mock the moral, political and religious dilemmas faced by many national servicemen." (Letter to the Weekly Mail, 30.04.1987.)

37. The Council decided that only women employees whose husbands are doing or have done military service would be eligible to receive up to ninety-six working days leave on full pay - on condition they pledged to work for the Council for a further year. All other women employees would have to apply for the normal government maternity allowance based on a percentage of their salaries. (Weekly Mail, 24.01.1986.) Controversy resulted but the Council's Staff Board Chairman defended the proposal saying it was "merely a gesture" similar to that made in wartime to women whose men had gone off to fight. (The Star, 28.01.1986.) After numerous objections were lodged the decision was dropped.

38. This theme of sacrifice was poignantly expressed after the 1973 Yom Kippur War in Israel by Naomi Zorea whose second son died in that war, (her first having died in the Six Day War of 1967). In an open 'Letter to the Daughters of Israel' she

spoke of women's role in Israel at war. "No, ours is not an impotent participation in the process of human history ... we bestow things that are as basic as sun and soil. We bestow life itself, and the first pleasures, food, feel, smell, the beginnings of the capacity to love." In her view "the mothers are the strong, the determiners of fate, not the determined." This was referred to by Yitzhak Rabin, then premier, as "the supreme sacrifice - not her own death, but that of her husband or son."; a necessary part of the role of the 'real woman' in Israel. Hazelton in Heschel, 1983: 83.)

39. As 'God's police' women are a source of moral authority; as 'damned whores' a source of dangerous sexuality. (Summers, 1975.)

40. In the United States of America, for example, women number approximately 12% of the armed forces. "In America women do their basic training in fully-integrated units alongside the men, drive 30-ton trucks, fire artillery missiles, fly helicopters, and jet aircraft in the Air Force, crew ships in the Navy, parachute and go into action with the crack 82nd Airborne Division, repair aeronautical and heavy vehicle engines in the Marines, build bridges and lay mines in the Engineers, and march, train and compete with the male cadets. ... The basic reason for this is simple: there aren't enough men." (John de St Jorre, Observer magazine, 18.03.1979.)

41. Stiehm points out that women are not the only social category excluded: "... there are certain groups which are generally excused from military service. They include: the young (who can later become protectors), the highly valued (superprotectors like the President, his cabinet and his advisers), the despised (homosexuals), the distrusted (communists in the USA), and women (who seem to be simultaneously highly valued, despised and distrusted by male rulemakers.)" (Stiehm, 1982: 369.) A peculiar twist to this is that in South Africa white male ballet dancers are now fgranted deferment from military service so long as they are employed by a State company. It is debatable whether this is because they are despised or highly valued.

42. The Defence Service Act of 1959 specifies a shorter period of compulsory military service for women than for men and different kinds of training and employment in service. It specifically exempts from any form or period of service all women who are married, or pregnant or have children. "Women's participation in the IDF and their sharing in the national defence burden is considered obvious in Israel where women enjoy equal rights, privileges and responsibilities with their men." (IDF Spokesman, 1980: 01.) The extent to which this speaks of the "liberation of Israeli women as a myth". "As the anonymous heroines of the myth, they have been assigned a symbolic existence. Their reality has been subordinated to the accepted image, and they have been relegated to the status of shadows." (Hazelton, 1983: 71.) (See also, Clapsaddle, 1983; Yuval-Davis, 1981.)

43. See Keegan, 1977; Orwell, 1952.

44. Other white women who became ANC activists have met a worse fate than prison. Jeanette Curtis and Ruth First were both killed by parcel bombs allegedly sent by South African agents.

45. Consumerist militarism seems to reach its zenith in South Africa at Christmas. For example, at the end of 1985 many Christmas crackers contained military and para-military toys. A South African was quoted as saying "I have travelled extensively in the world and I can't think of another country in the world where a festival of religious peace and hope would be marked by military toys." (Natal Witness, 28.12.1985.)

46. At the time of writing an ECC activist,Janett Cherry, had been in detention for over 400 days.

47. The Board for Religious Objection was constituted by the Defence Amendment Act of 1983 as a reluctant admission by the State that there are people with genuine convictions who are prepared to go to gaol rather than compromise their conscience. The penalties even for those who do qualify as religious pacifists are high - a six year period of State controlled 'community service' for the conscript who has done no military service at all. If a conscript is refused religious objector status by the Board and fails to report to the SADF for duty he faces a trial and a possible six year sentence.

48. Coloureds and Indians may be conscripted on the grounds that their newly acquired constitutional rights carry an increased responsibility in defending the country. Critics have pointed

out that these new arrangements with a Tri-cameral Parliament are an attempt to draw certain strata of coloured and Indian leadership into an alliance with the white ruling class.

49. The inclusion of rural Africans is done on a voluntary basis into homeland armies. The SADF has trained and established the Transkei Defence Force, the Bophuthathswana National Guard and the Venda and Ciskei Defence Forces. The SADF aims "to help the National and Independent States to maintain their security" through military agreements that are entered into when these states achieve 'independence' ". (White Paper on Defence, 1982, p. 3.) Urban Africans have an extremely limited role, e.g. 21st Battalion, the black unit at Lenz.

50. According to the national president of the Ex-Service Women's League in South Africa, her comments were an insult to the 28 000 South African women who took part in the war, and legal advice had been sought. (Rand Daily Mail, 24.03.1982.)

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APPENDIX ONE

OPENING SOON

Northern Review

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

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