Title: USAID, The State, and Food Insecurity in Rural Zimbabwe: The Case of Gokwe.

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I. Introduction

The role of foreign assistance in the development process is complex and contentious. Bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), continue to infuse ideas and capital into extremely diverse socio-economic settings. A complicated series of interactions occurs between donor, state and recipient community. Contradictions and changes in policy affect the intervention's outcome. Different perceptions and ideological underpinnings shape the parameters in which the programme is finally implemented within a particular community. Recipient perceptions and reactions to the specific intervention transform the programme outcome, often in ways not foreseen by either the donor or the state. The process of accumulation within recipient communities can also be affected. Certain classes and institutions may be strengthened over others, and the development prospects of a particular country could be altered.

This paper examines the impact of a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) development intervention in the agricultural sector of Zimbabwe with these issues in mind. An initial overview of the United States development programme initiated shortly after Zimbabwean independence is presented. This is followed by an examination of the impact of the construction of marketing depots throughout the country which constitutes the largest segment of USAID's agricultural programme, and is targeted at Zimbabwean smallholders. Development interventions of this nature are never neutral, are constructed in a dynamic historical setting, and often have unforseen consequences. It will be argued that the benefits accruing to smallholders from the construction of such depots, while registering impressive figures at the national level, have actually exacerbated the insecure condition of rural consumers in food deficit regions of Zimbabwe. Food insecurity in these areas is a constant feature of Zimbabwean society despite the praise heaped upon the country for its agricultural achievements. This intervention has been especially devastating during periods of drought such as 1992.

The paper will concentrate on the impact USAID-funded grain depots have had on the residents of Gokwe, a vulnerable Communal Area that lies in the northern region of Midlands Province. Gokwe is classified under the agro-ecological Natural Regions III and IV, and was specifically mentioned by the Riddell Commission (1981: 36) as a priority area for marketing extension. Farmers in the region have access to four USAID-funded depots. Food shortages are a common occurrence. Households are predominantly male-dominated as most of the families who have come to Gokwe do so to engage in full-time agricultural production. Consequently, Gokwe serves as a valuable case study due to the community's reliance upon agricultural production for their livelihood. It is these farmers who were intended to be the principal beneficiaries of the depot extension programme.

Research has been conducted in the wider Gokwe region from February 1992 - January 1993. Informal interviews with local residents from different parts of Gokwe, including depot personnel, government and AGRITEX officials, Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) employees, and store-owners has been augmented by 157 formal interviews conducted on a random basis within the Gwanyika Plateau region of Njelele Ward III. This community of approximately 800 households lies between 50-70 kilometres from the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) depot in Gokwe centre. The paper attempts to move from the broad aspects of development policy to the specific context of Njelele in order to better understand how exogenous interventions of this nature affect recipient communities.

It will be suggested that, while smallholders throughout Zimbabwe wanted better access to markets following independence (see Bratton 1987), the problem was not simply that of marketing agricultural products and output, as USAID and the Government of Zimbabwe assumed. Through its assistance programme, USAID has expanded the scope of a particular state marketing system into rural areas which previously enjoyed greater autonomy from centralized authority. More importantly, the marketing system developed to serve the white farming community during the pre-independence era was not straightforwardly transferrable to the rest of the country. A major problem is that USAID and the Government have oversimplified the dynamics of both rural Zimbabwe and agricultural marketing without addressing the underlying problems associated with African poverty and insecurity. USAID's claims of "success" in registering impressive gains in agricultural production must be reassessed in light of the food insecurity experienced by many smallholders in areas of USAID-funded grain depots.
The Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assistance Programme

The problems faced by the newly independent state of Zimbabwe in 1980 were daunting. The nascent Government had the unenviable task of redressing the gross socio-economic disparities that existed between the majority African population and the relatively small white community that had received preferential treatment in all aspects of social, economic and political life during the colonial era. The economy, and particularly the agricultural sector, had been devastated and transformed by 15 years of civil war. The world economy entered a recessionary period which, combined with the effects of the 1982-4 drought, influenced Zimbabwe's ability to undertake much needed reconstruction and reform. Regional insecurity, largely perpetuated by South Africa, served to further destabilize the country during this period of reconstruction. It is into this situation that the plethora of donors, including the United States, intervened.

At the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), 36 bilateral and multilateral development institutions pledged over Z$1,000 billion to address the problems inherited by the state (Republic of Zimbabwe 1981: 25). The United States offered the third highest levels of assistance to the country, following the World Bank and Great Britain. The "development experiment" had begun in Zimbabwe as donors began identifying specific areas for assistance based upon a complicated assessment of Zimbabwean needs, donor interests and capabilities. Pledges were transformed into projects and programmes. Great Britain, unlike the U.S., fulfilled its Lancaster House promise to finance Zimbabwe's land resettlement programme. Germany initiated a rural rehabilitation programme, Australia targeted the livestock industry for support and the European Economic Community provided assistance for veterinary training. The World Bank devoted funds to a small farmer credit scheme, the rehabilitation of the country's highways and railway network, and the restoration of the Wankie Colliery Company (Republic of Zimbabwe 1981: 49-111; USAID 1982b: 13). The United States took the lead on agricultural marketing expansion through a programme designed to assist both commercial farmers and rural smallholders.

At independence, the Government of Zimbabwe believed that the disparities existing between the poorer African majority and the remaining white farmers would be reduced if those structures that had been of such significance to the success of the European farming community, such as access to marketing outlets, could be expanded to the African community as well. Funding for this initiative came from USAID. Initially, depots would be extended to the African community so that no farmer would be further than 60 kilometres from a centralized marketing authority. In the long-run, the Government hoped "to achieve the goal that producers [would] be able to dispose of their crops within a radius of 8km to 10km" (Republic of Zimbabwe 1982: 68). Losses generated by the Grain Marketing Board and other marketing agents stemming from the expansion of collection points to previously neglected regions would be accepted by the Government as the extension of marketing services was seen as a "social policy".

As Drinkwater (1992) demonstrates, however, the intentions of the post-independent administration of President Mugabe was also perceived as transformative. The Government inherited an intrusive system that it sought to
use to facilitate the transformation of the country towards a more socialist order. The state would serve as a modernizing influence in rural areas, through the extension of depots and the dissemination of agricultural advice and technologies. Smallholders would more directly contribute to the national economy and, in the process, escape the poverty that characterized their situation. The extension of depots must be seen in this light, as it allowed the state an entry point into communities that had previously existed with less government support.

The United States' approach to the development of the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe is inspired by the claim that the sector is dualistic in nature. On the one hand, there exists a vibrant "progressive" farming community that contributes disproportionately to the overall economy's health (USAID 1982b: 17). This sector is characterized by high yields and a sound infrastructure. Coexisting with this sector is the "neglected majority". Differences between the defined sub-sectors is "based on land holdings and tenure system" (USAID 1982b: Annex A). The two economies are separate, unequal and seemingly non-interactive. The market, therefore, needed to be brought to those communities largely outside the scope of the formal economy. Increased productivity and access to official markets is perceived as critical for smallholders whose previously limited participation in the economy is seen as a significant cause of their poverty.3

To address this situation, USAID's agricultural strategy was built around a Commodity Import Programme (CIP) and the Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assistance Programme (ZASA). Briefly, the United States imported US$37 million worth of agricultural equipment and spares over a six year period. The machinery was targeted at the large-scale commercial farming sector. The local currency generated by the sale of these inputs to the white farming community were used to finance ZASA. ZASA is intended to assist the Government in extending services to primarily benefit the smallholder community. Seven constraint areas affecting smallholders are highlighted for USAID funding: agricultural research, extension, credit, marketing and input supply, land and water use, agricultural manpower training, and policy planning.

Of these seven constraint areas, the majority of the funds generated from the CIP have been allocated towards the construction of depots, primarily for grain and cotton. Of this, the GMB received the largest percentages of local currency available from ZASA and 24 percent of USAID's foreign currency allotment (Odell et. al 1991: 88). USAID began funding the construction of depots in 1982, at a time when "Outside of U.S. assistance, via allocations from CIP counterpart funds and cash grant local currency generations, very little external support has been obtained" for such investments (USAID 1982b: 18-19). Since 1982, USAID has funded the construction of 24 primary, seasonal and rural depots for the GMB (see Map).

It is important to note that, at one level, there exists a contradiction in positions between the Government and USAID. The U.S. was becoming increasingly hostile to what it perceived as the excessive role of the state in developing countries like Zimbabwe. The Berg Report, published in 1981, offered a highly critical analysis of the detrimental aspects of government control over the economy; marketing boards were specifically highlighted as a principal constraint on farmers' incomes given its monopsonistic powers (World Bank 1981). USAID, more than any other bilateral donor, was at the forefront of policy dialogue and conditionality during the 1980s (see Mosley 1986). Yet, as discussed above, the Government of Zimbabwe perceived marketing boards as an important means to increase state control over rural communities. How was this apparent contradiction to be resolved?

To begin, one must look at the rules governing United States development interventions. When designing a programme, USAID personnel must ensure that the intervention can in no way assist the recipient state or sector to challenge U.S. trade in that particular field. As stated in a USAID Authorization Document, USAID's programme in Zimbabwe "will not have a demonstrable impact on agricultural exports that might compete with U.S. exports, much less cause harm to U.S. exporters in contravention of restrictions contained in the FY 1988 Continuing Resolution" (USAID 1988: 4). The funding of grain and cotton depots was allowed as Zimbabwean white maize and cotton lint does not compete with U.S. yellow maize and cotton. Tobacco is a different matter: "The only crop which competes directly with the U.S. international markets at a significant level is tobacco. USAID will not support the production of this crop" (USAID 1988: 30). As a result, the U.S. could fund the construction of depots without threatening domestic producers.
More importantly, the U.S. saw ZASA as an important means in which the USAID could increase its leverage over the Government. As stated in USAID's *Country Development Strategy Statement* (1985: 46),

C.I.P. and sector grant assistance have given [US]AID entrée for quiet yet effective discussions with the GOZ [Government of Zimbabwe] on devaluation, food subsidies, the budget deficit, agricultural pricing policies,... Most notable policy achievements have been more in the areas of agricultural producer prices, housing and population wherein [US]AID has worked closely and effectively with the GOZ and other donors to smooth the way for investment of resources and the establishment of positive government policies in these sectors.

The funding of depots, therefore, offered the United States an important avenue into policy decision-making in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector. Support for Government initiatives, through ZASA, also served to deflect criticisms away from an extremely controversial CIP that recapitalized large-scale commercial farmers at a time when the Government was trying to redress the agricultural imbalances it inherited from the Rhodesian era. Even Mr. David Hasluck, Director of the Commercial Farmers' Union and a recipient of a USAID CIP tractor, believes that "politically, [the CIP] is a very questionable programme".

Finally, the funding of depots did meet a certain ideological predisposition of the United States which favours
market expansion and production increases. It is here that USAID and the Government objectives once again merge. For USAID and the Zimbabwean government, the principal problem facing Zimbabwean smallholders was seemingly uncomplicated - African producers needed marketing outlets and technical assistance in order to increase output. The marketing system was sound, it only needed to be extended to previously neglected regions of the country. The Final Impact Evaluation (Odell et. al. 1991: 8) of ZASA states that by "increasing marketing and input supply facilities, a well-established and efficient marketing mechanism created for the commercial sector was transformed to serve smallholder needs, contributing to major increases in communal area marketed production". It is this significant aspect of USAID's ZASA intervention that is the concern of this paper.

III. Success?

The marketing programme in Zimbabwe has been judged a success by both the Government and USAID. In claiming that the intervention was a success for Zimbabwe, USAID highlights some impressive national figures. Since independence, the relative contribution made by smallholders to national agricultural output has increased dramatically. According to USAID (1988: 2),

"...in spite of the drought (1982-84), during which food grains had to be imported, Zimbabwe's policy to increase the levels of market participation by smallholders has been successful. This is shown most dramatically in the ever increasing percentages, now 57% and 45% respectively, of the nation's marketed maize and cotton crops which originate in the smallholder sector. Comparative figures for 1978 were 9% and 19% respectively."

These percentages have risen since 1988. African farmers' marketed sales of maize and sunflower to the GMB were 68 and 96-98 percent, respectively, for the 1990-91 season (Govereh et. al. 1990: 160). Smallholder contributions to national food supplies since independence has bolstered Zimbabwe's reputation as the "agricultural success of Africa". Exports of food to the sub-region have been a consistent feature of the post-independence era, and donors have suggested that other countries have much to learn from the "Zimbabwean-model".

Part of the explanation for the significant increase in smallholder production clearly relates to the greater marketing opportunities available to smallholders since independence. Another important factor that should be stressed is that large-scale commercial farmers have largely diversified their productive base away from poorly-priced food crops, such as maize, to higher paying crops such as tobacco and soya beans, and more recently horticulture and game ranching. Rohrbach et al. (1990: 104) claim that large-scale commercial maize production has declined by more than 40 percent since 1985. Sachikonye (1992: 90) demonstrates that this process of diversification out of maize production has accelerated in 1992 as the large-scale commercial sector had only planted 78,000 hectares of maize as opposed to 125,000 hectares the previous year. This diversification away from grain crops is significant as Zimbabwe's ability to remain self-sufficient in food is increasingly dependent upon Communal Area farmers in the more vulnerable regions of the country.

In addition to the above, a small sub-sector of African producers, largely concentrated in the better farming regions of Mashonaland Central, have contributed disproportionately to the African percentage of marketed maize and sunflower. According to Jayne et al. (1991: 16), Mashonaland producers "have accounted for 80 percent of per capita smallholder maize deliveries to GMB since 1980, even though they constitute only 22 percent of the smallholder population and 25 percent of the maize area planted in the smallholder sector" (also see Moyo 1986: 187, and Weiner 1988: 69). Only two of the 24 USAID-funded depots were constructed in Mashonaland Central - Rushinga and Kachuta.

What the national figures disguise, in addition to the relatively small percentage of African producers who have bolstered Zimbabwe's production figures, is the reality that vast areas of Zimbabwe are periodically unable to effectively meet local food requirements. Six out of Zimbabwe's eight provincial districts are consistently deficient in food supplies (Jayne et. al. 1990: 49). Chronic malnutrition, which afflicts 30 percent of Zimbabwean youth, is the largest killer of children between the ages of two and five (Rukuni 1990: 4-5; also see Republic of Zimbabwe 1991: 17).
Household vulnerability to hunger is the result of numerous inter-linking processes that will be elaborated upon below. What is important to stress is that alarming proportions of Zimbabwe's Communal Area households, especially in Natural Regions III, IV and V, deplete their food stocks well before the following harvest. This means that deficit households have to secure food through alternative channels, such as informal trade between households, purchases directly from GMB depots, procurement of urban-refined meal from local retailers, or a combination of the above. As will be demonstrated below, the extension of depots to previously neglected regions of Zimbabwe has primarily affected smallholder food security in two ways. First, in areas closer to urban centres and better served by tarred roads, the extension of depots has served to increase rural consumers' dependence on high-priced commercially-refined meal. This serves as a check on both household welfare and income as many vulnerable households spend a disproportionate amount of their earnings on food. Second, in more isolated regions such as Gokwe, food sold to the GMB is exported out of the area without mechanisms available to ensure the re-importation of reasonably-priced foodstuffs. As a result of Zimbabwe's imperfect marketing system, many rural households are unable to secure food at a reasonable price from alternative sources once their household stocks are depleted.

This results in a paradoxical situation, in which overflowing silos are juxtaposed with adverse hunger. It calls for a reexamination of the entire system, and a pause in USAID's claim to success. What must be determined is how the grain marketing system emerged over time, how it operates and what are the constraints on people obtaining adequate food. The argument here is that USAID did not simply assist the government in bringing neglected communities into the wider Zimbabwean economy through the construction of depots. It extended and strengthened a specific marketing system that operates to the detriment of vulnerable households in food deficit regions of the country. It is to this that we now turn.

IV. The Evolution of Grain Marketing in Zimbabwe

Government control over marketing in Southern Rhodesia was initiated during the Great Depression of the 1930s. While the events that precipitated the passage of the Maize Control Act of 1931 are beyond the scope of this paper, an overview provides context for understanding the evolution of maize marketing in Zimbabwe.

Settler agricultural expansion in Southern Rhodesia proceeded slowly as the colony's initial concerns lay in the development of a "Second Rand". Interest in farming was nominal among early settlers, and land was held as a speculative asset by different mining interests. As the dreams of a "Second Rand" diminished, however, settlers and the British South Africa Company became more concerned with agricultural production. By 1921, the number of whites engaged in farming exceeded that of any other productive or administrative occupation in the colony (Phimister 1988: 100). African producers, who were primarily responsible for the supply of food crops to the young colony, became perceived as a threat to European settlers who began to actively engage in farming. Agricultural prices were highly volatile, and calls to protect European agriculture from African competition gained strength. Over time, the foundations of African production were eroded by the settler state. Mechanisms employed against African cultivators included a plethora of taxes and increased efforts to move African producers into isolated Native Reserves. The ability of African producers to maintain the "peasant option" was increasingly undermined, forcing many to engage in the larger economy as migrant labourers.

The process of dislocation was by no means uniform, however. As many have argued, these processes affected different African communities, and different strata within those communities, in numerous ways (see Mosley 1983; Phimister 1988; and Ranger 1985). The white farming community was equally stratified, with small-scale farmers cultivating holdings of between 80-160 hectares coexisting with larger individual and company holdings of well over 40,000 hectares (Phimister 1988: 125). These complex and interactive forces served to impede the process of African accumulation in Southern Rhodesia at the time of the Great Depression. The recently established "Responsible Government", while increasingly influenced by the white agricultural community, had effectively withstood the impulse to become directly involved in issues of agricultural production and marketing. African farmers were still producing maize for the internal market, but the terms of these purchases, and the state's role in both production and marketing were to dramatically change with the onset of the Great Depression.

The Great Depression ushered in the Maize Control Act of 1931, thus dramatically increasing the state's direct role in Southern Rhodesia's agricultural system. The government's ability to withstand settler pressure to directly
engage in agricultural marketing and production was eliminated as the export price of maize fell from 11s. per bag in 1930 to 3s.4d. by April 1931 (Iliffe 1990: 84; and Palmer 1977b: 240). Production in the colony exceeded local demand which in turn served to further depress prices.

The Maize Control Board, established under the Act, became the sole buying and export agent in the colony, although the Board's original jurisdiction was limited to Mashonaland and Midlands. Maize was transferred from Control Boards to urban centres for processing. Centralised marketing provided white farmers with a guaranteed market and high producer price for their agricultural goods. At one level, the Act and the 1934 Amendments to the original legislation, ensured the survival of the white agricultural community by guaranteeing high producer prices for their maize. At another, more important level, the legislation served to strengthen local capital, in the form of small-scale white farmers, vis-a-vis both large-scale and African producers (see Phimister 1988: 174; and Yudelman 1964: 179). The overt subsidization of local capital was accomplished through the establishment of a two-tiered pricing and quota system.

The effect of this legislation on African producers was significant although uneven. Of greatest consequence to most African producers were new restrictions on trade promulgated under the Acts. African producers who had previously sold their surplus crops at the highest price offered in city centres, on outlying farms and at mines were now restricted under the new law. Surplus stocks had to be sold either to the Control Board or to approved traders. Traders subtracted transport fees, the costs of maize bags, and a handling fee from the guaranteed price. The final price received by African producers, once all these factors were accounted for, was nominal. African cultivators became more dependent on local traders as the latter solidified their position as the primary source of cash and credit in outlying areas.

Many African producers were forced to sell their maize to traders in order to meet the numerous cash needs of the household. Often, maize supplies earmarked for household consumption would be sold, only to be repurchased at the end of the year as household supplies were exhausted. Naturally, traders resold their maize stocks at inflated prices. The Native Commissioner of Ndanga noted that traders were purchasing maize at 5s. after the maize had been harvested and reselling it at the end of the year for 17s. as households finished their stocks (Iliffe 1990: 86). As Mosley (1983: 44) puts it, the Act "not only reduced the price they received but also increased their vulnerability to sharp commercial practices". Between 1934 and 1939, producer prices paid to African maize growers vacillated between 1s.6d and 6s.6d, while the European farming sector received prices that averaged over 8s. per bag (Phimister 1988: 185).

An important point to stress pertains to the role of African maize producers in the larger Southern Rhodesian economy after the passage of the Maize Control Acts. The ability of the state to subsidise small-scale white farmers, through the quota and pricing scheme established under the Acts, was contingent upon the continued delivery of African produced maize to Board depots. One way to ensure continued deliveries of African maize to Board depots was to allow for a small percentage of those deliveries to be classified under the higher priced "local pool". Without this supply of maize, the government would be unable to subsidise white farmers without incurring losses, and Southern Rhodesia's ability to export maize would become less certain over time. As Range (1985: 67) argues, the state had "to ensure that the tattered goose that laid the golden egg of subsidy for white farming was not killed off in the process".

While it is undeniable that these measures fundamentally undermined the ability of African cultivators to reproduce themselves, it is equally apparent that some African growers were able to sustain themselves under this discriminatory system. Differentiation among African smallholders accelerated as those who could deliver directly to the Control Board received higher prices for their maize and did not have to bear the direct costs associated with selling to isolated traders. Those who could secure direct access to depots were able to sustain their livelihoods to a far greater degree than those who were more dependent on approved buyers. Farmers in the more isolated regions of the country, such as Gokwe in the mid-1960s and 1970s, continued to sell through official marketing channels, even though the costs associated with such sales were high. The contribution of African producers to Southern Rhodesia's overall stockpile of maize remained small compared to that contributed by white farmers however. Much of this related to Control Board access, low prices, and transport costs, but an equally important reason was that many African producers activated and maintained a wider marketing network, especially in regions neglected by the official marketing system.

Between the late 1930s and the period of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Great Britain in 1965, other important changes occurred in the Southern Rhodesian countryside. A number of
modifications to the Maize Control Acts were passed. The two-tiered pricing system was officially amalgamated in 1944. In 1949, a ten percent African Development Fund levy on the value of all grain sales from African areas was imposed, further undermining the viability of the more vulnerable African producers and effectively re-established a two-tiered pricing system. The Grain Marketing Board assumed the responsibilities of the Maize Control Board in 1950. In addition to maize, the GMB became responsible for the marketing of a wider variety of crops including beans, rapoko, sorghum, millet and, a year later, groundnuts (Republic of Zimbabwe 1988: 9). In 1957 the GMB expanded its coverage to include Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but this dissolved with the Central African Federation in 1963.

Rhodesia's UDI from Great Britain further modified the agricultural marketing structure of the economy. Sanctions initiated against Rhodesia, though imperfect (see Lake 1976), forced the economy to become more inward-oriented. State control over the economy increased in an effort to mitigate the effects of Rhodesia's growing isolation. Food crops that could be produced in the country were favoured while export commodities such as tobacco were discouraged. In 1965, 57.2 percent of the total value of European agricultural output was concentrated in tobacco production, with small percentages being registered for maize and sugar. Production of crops such as wheat, cotton, soya-beans and coffee were negligible. By 1979, white agricultural production was more evenly distributed between all these crops, although tobacco remained the most important commodity (Shopo 1987: 198).

In 1966, the Grain Marketing Act was passed, and significantly, the Act remains in operation today. The legislation subdivided the country into two categories, Zone A and Zone B. The former included urban centres, commercial farms and some Purchase Areas of Rhodesia. Controlled products grown in Zone A areas had to be sold to the Grain Marketing Board, and could not be transported out of the designated area without the consent of the GMB. Farmers residing in the Tribal Trust Lands were subsumed under the Zone B category. Zone B farmers could sell their agricultural commodities within these areas without restriction, but could not transport their crops into or through a Zone A area. Crops that entered a Zone A area would have to be sold to the Grain Marketing Board (Republic of Zimbabwe 1988: 10). As before, grains sold to the GMB were transported to urban centres for processing. The processed foods were then resold in cities and within the immediate vicinity. The cost of urban-refined foodstuffs was, despite subsidies, significantly greater than the original price procured by rural farmers (Mosley 1987).

The principal effect of the Act was to reinforce the role of centralised marketing in the Rhodesian economy. The Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA), created in 1967, assumed overall responsibility for the pricing and marketing of all controlled products. The various marketing boards were thereafter required to purchase all produce delivered to them, thereby ensuring a buyer for the commercial farming sector. Prior to UDI, the total value of agricultural output procured through statutory marketing authorities was approximately 35 percent; by 1973 the figure increased to approximately 77 percent (Mosley 1987: 215; Shopo 1987: 203-4).

As indicated above, wealthier African producers who resided in areas of close proximity to the newly established marketing depots continued to sell surplus stocks of maize, and later, other agricultural commodities, to the statutory bodies. What is most important here is what transpired in the neglected areas where grain depots funded by USAID were constructed after independence in 1980. Between the passage of the Maize Control Acts and independence, wealthier African producers in the more isolated Tribal Trust Lands continued to activate marketing arrangements that enabled many master farmers, especially, to better maintain the "peasant option". The principal market for many surplus producers were deficit households, missions and shop owners (Riddell 1981: 36), while the GMB served as a secondary market for most farmers in more isolated regions of the country. Excess stocks above the community's requirements were sold to statutory authorities despite the barriers instituted against African farmers. Consequently, exchanges between households in the more isolated regions of Rhodesia ensured a greater degree of food security than is apparent today. As Iliffe (1990: 79) states, "Whereas early colonial famines centred where the European impact was least, later colonial scarcity concentrated where the European impact was greatest". Iliffe contends that pre-capitalist dearth was replaced by capitalist scarcity in Rhodesia, concluding that the threat of starvation was reduced "because the European economy had acquired greater capacity to relieve stress, thanks to surplus grain production, controlled marketing and better transport" (1990: 88).

Another important reason why the threat of absolute starvation in more remote areas was less than in areas more
directly affected by official marketing structures, overlooked by iliffe, is that the overwhelming proportion of isolated regions' agricultural crops remained in those particular areas. Centralised marketing and the sale of urban-refined foodstuffs occurred within a relatively small portion of Rhodesia. Isolated areas such as Gokwe were inaccessible during much of the year. Surplus households sold their agricultural goods within these areas because markets for agricultural commodities were clearly available; only afterwards were grains and oilseeds sold to the GMB and private interests outside of the area. In the process, wealthier farmers were able to accumulate, mills were established to process food grains, differentiation within these areas occurred, and food security was more assured.

This is not to argue that food security was always ensured in areas neglected by the official marketing system. Outright crop failure due to drought continued to threaten the survival of those in the more isolated areas of pre-independent Zimbabwe. For example, food had to be imported into the Sabi Valley region during the 1930s due to crop failures, forcing African producers to cull their herds in order to purchase maize meal (Moyana 1984: 117). Instead, it is posited that consumers residing in areas with limited official marketing opportunities were able to survive periods of reduced output through inter-household marketing arrangements that had been secured in those regions over time. In contrast, consumers who lived in regions that were more involved in the official marketing system became more dependent on higher priced urban-refined meal to meet household food requirements.

A starting point for the analysis of this phenomenon during the colonial era can be established by examining Grain Marketing Board Annual Reports between 1951 and UDI. The data demonstrates that only a small percentage of African maize was being sold to the Grain Marketing Board during this 14 year period. In 1956/7, 34 per cent of the estimated maize produced by African farmers was sold to the GMB, but this is somewhat unusual. The range of sales fluctuates between 16-25 per cent during this period, with the 1956/7 year being an anomaly. Despite the potential inaccuracies of Southern Rhodesian calculations pertaining to African production, the figures are telling - the overwhelming majority of maize produced by African cultivators was not sold to the GMB. During the last ten years of the civil war the percentage of maize sales to the GMB by African producers declined even further, stemming from the disruptions caused by the war and the withholding of grains from official marketing facilities by large segments of the African community (see A. Thompson 1988: 192-5). Given the degree of differentiation apparent within the broader African community, it can be assumed that wealthier farmers were predominantly responsible for the greatest share of both production and sale figures. The data above fails to show what was happening to the unaccounted surpluses. This is the subject to which we now turn.

Despite efforts by the state to limit the marketing opportunities available to African cultivators, trade within and between designated Tribal Trust Lands occurred. African farmers, especially master farmers who consistently achieved grain surpluses above the immediate requirements of the household, preferred to sell their surplus stocks in the immediate vicinity rather than to the GMB, although, again, sales through official marketing channels did occur. Yudelman (1964: 181-4) discusses the development of a "second market" in Tribal Trust Lands, concluding that the increased incidence of "illegal" sales resulted from the differential prices received by Africans under the discriminatory marketing system. As a result of such discrimination, alternative marketing channels continued to be activated.

One such market for African producers were white farmers themselves. Under pressure from the white community, the pre-UDI state liberalized its trading scheme to allow African producers to sell directly to white farmer-consumers, although the latter subsequently paid a "rake-off" tax to the Control Board (Mosley 1983: 46). This allowed white farmers to purchase lower cost maize for their labour force from African cultivators while simultaneously selling their maize at higher prices to the Board (Phimister 1988: 187). Missions scattered throughout the more isolated regions of the country offered a viable market for African produce as they required a regular supply of grains in order to feed their inhabitants. Such practices assisted African farmers who could take advantage of these marketing opportunities as they would receive higher prices from the farmer-consumers and missions than from approved buyers.

The most common market for African cultivators' excess grains, however, were deficit African households. In Karangaland, 92.1 percent of surplus millet, 71.4 percent of excess maize, over 60 percent of surplus ground beans and groundnuts, and 21.4 percent of sorghum were sold to deficit households within the area (Weinrich
Purchase Area farmers sold approximately 38 percent of their crops to deficit communities within Tribal Trust Lands as well, despite the restrictions on such trade promulgated under the Grain Marketing Act of 1966 (Weinrich 1975: 193). During the 1960s, Purchase Area farmers in Msengezi utilized alternative marketing arrangements with other farmers, as well as shops and schools. By 1973, one Purchase Area household was selling 300 gallons of peanut butter, produced from damaged groundnuts, to two boarding schools in the region, guaranteeing the family $630 per annum (Cheater 1984: 43). Another household was able to sell approximately one-third of their crops and cattle on the “internal market” (Cheater 1984: 102).

During periods of scarcity, the importance of surplus stocks remaining in the area was magnified. In Shiri-Ngara and Shoko, the decline in agricultural output during drought years was dramatic. During an average year, 40 percent of the crops cultivated by master farmers were sold to missions and deficit households within the Tribal Trust Lands. Poorer cultivators sold 13 percent of their output in the area as well. Productivity for both groups declined during the 1966-7 drought, but master farmers were still able to sell 14.1 percent of their total output, while other cultivators sold 5.9 percent of their crops in the area. Ten out of the 19 master farmers surveyed in these areas purchased food, while 106 of the remaining 144 poor households needed to purchase food. Food secured from within the area enabled deficit households to survive at a cost significantly lower than if they were required to purchase urban-refined meal through local traders (Weinrich 1975: 98-101).

In Gokwe, food security was also better ensured through exchanges between surplus and deficit households. Surplus producers had a viable market in the local area as many families were unable to consistently produce enough food for household consumption. Cash transactions and labour exchanges were the principal means by which deficit households were able to secure food during periods of shortfall. Poorer households could assist surplus families in the harvesting of maize, sunflower, groundnuts and cotton in exchange for food. These families received 2-3 bags of maize per hectare, depending upon the crop harvested. Once the local options were finished, surplus producers would transport their remaining stocks to Kadoma or Kwekwe for sale to the GMB. Another important source of income for Gokwe cultivators were direct sales of sunflower to Lever Brothers of Harare and United Soap in Bulawayo. Sales to these private companies, as well as cash transactions in the area and remittances from family members engaged in the wider political economy of southern Africa, were critical sources of accumulation for farmers in Gokwe. This income enabled them to diversify their economic activities into areas such as transport and milling. These transactions demonstrate, despite USAID’s assumptions to the contrary, that producers in neglected areas were involved in the wider Zimbabwean economy. Importantly, no interviewee in Gokwe who is consistently unable to produce enough food for the family could identify a year in which the household lacked adequate food prior to independence, a point that will be elaborated upon below.30

The sale of surplus agricultural commodities outside official marketing channels helped offset the costs associated with the purchase of urban-processed foodstuffs as the retail price for maize increased dramatically after the imposition of centralized marketing. Grain delivered to the GMB was sold to the millers, who in turn resold the maize at an increased cost. As Mosley (1987: 218) demonstrates, the price received by African producers for their unprocessed maize was between 24-43 percent below the final selling price, depending on whether an African producer was able to deliver directly to the GMB or not. By purchasing directly from African farmers, missions, deficit households and white farmers could mitigate the increasing cost of purchased food.

The benefit of such trading arrangements to African surplus producers was equally evident. In isolated areas, the price received for grains traded through buyers was extremely low due to transport costs, handling and bag fees, and the African Development Fund levy. Missions paid higher prices to African producers than both local traders or approved buyers. Further, the levy on African grains imposed in 1949 and not removed until 1979 could be avoided. Farmers who sold their surplus crops to households within the immediate community also benefited from selling later in the year, as deficit households terminated their stocks prior to the forthcoming harvest. Prices offered through either approved buyers, cooperatives31 or a central depot were uniform throughout the year. In contrast, farmers could secure larger profits if they withheld their stocks and sold to households in the area when local demand increased. Internal trade between wealthier farmers and food deficit households contributed to growing disparities between classes within the Tribal Trust Lands as the former effectively accumulated through the use of the “internal market”. African cultivators were therefore able to accumulate by using the official marketing channel as a last alternative rather than as the principal means for selling agricultural surpluses. Many wealthier farmers reinvested their earnings into improved agricultural inputs,
such as ploughs, fertilizers and to a lesser degree tractors. Grinding mills were purchased, and some became store-owners. Surpluses were also used to further political claims and solidify clientelist networks within the Tribal Trust Lands (Weinrich 1975: 104).

As mentioned above, poorer households secured food from surplus growers in a number of ways. Men and women who earned wages in town, on mines or white farms could use their incomes to purchase food from surplus households in the Tribal Trust Lands. Many poorer families would provide labour during planting or harvesting periods in return for food at later dates (Cheater 1984: 63-79). Households also became indebted to wealthier families in order to secure access to food during deficit periods. In areas such as Gokwe, the costs associated with trading outside of the area were high, thus enhancing the bargaining position of deficit households. As will be shown below, poorer families in Gokwe who depended on local trade for household consumption had their position undermined with the imposition of depots.

Mosley (1987) argues that the excessive costs associated with the purchase of maize meal contributed to food insecurity in urban areas such as Salisbury. He concludes that this evidence suggests that Bates's (1981) argument that African governments maintain low consumer prices in order to appease urban constituents is inaccurate in the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean context. In fact, Mosley argues that the opposite is more accurate as producers continue to be effectively subsidised at the expense of urban consumers. Skalnes (1989) concurs with Mosley, arguing that workers and urban consumers bear the brunt of Zimbabwe's bias towards producers.

What both Skalnes and Mosley fail to recognize is that Zimbabwean smallholders are also net purchasers of food. It must be remembered that grains have historically been siphoned out of rural areas into the major urban centres through the GMB. The introduction of a unidirectional marketing system that exports grains from rural areas to urban centres is particularly damaging if alternative sources of food are not available or the processed goods that re-enter the area are beyond the means of vulnerable households. By increasing the scope and operations of the GMB under a system that continues to extract grains from rural areas without ensuring that these areas are capable of securing food at a reasonable cost, USAID and the Government have directly increased the vulnerability of deficit households living in areas of USAID-funded depots. As will be shown below in the examination of a U.S.-funded depot in Gokwe, the result of this intervention has been especially devastating in 1992 as maize supplied to this depot had been removed from the area at a time when alternative supplies were simply not available.

V. Grain Marketing in Post-Independence Zimbabwe

At independence, the Zimbabwean Government inherited a marketing system that had been overwhelmingly geared towards the protection and support of the white farming sector. African producers were subjected to numerous taxes and restrictions used by the state to support this community. Although small segments of the African farming populace were able to minimise the losses incurred under such a system, it is clear that the discriminatory aspects of Rhodesian society hindered their ability to accumulate adequate resources to fundamentally enhance their condition vis-a-vis their white counterparts. The Government embarked on its depot extension programme with the financial support of USAID. The African Development Fund levy was terminated, and the producer price of maize increased by 41 percent immediately after independence (Mlambo 1989: 246). The response was overwhelming as African producers began selling their grains to the statutory body.

Numerous factors contributed to the dramatic increases in African sales to statutory marketing bodies, in addition to greater access to depots and higher producer prices. Areas ravaged by war, such as Gokwe, benefitted from the stability of the new order. Crops could be planted without the fear of them being destroyed in the cross-fire of the civil war. Households in areas such as Mangwende and Chibi established new holdings and replanted previously abandoned fields (Rohrbach 1988: 311). Seed and fertilizer packages were distributed free of charge to resettlement farmers, while improved seed varieties were made readily available to farmers in outlying areas. Agricultural extension agents began concentrating their efforts on Communal Areas. Sunflower and millet, crops predominantly grown by African farmers, were included as controlled crops in 1983 and 1984 respectively. The improved prices offered were further incentive to sell, and the initial two years of independence were characterised by above average rains. Areas which produced small surpluses contributed to the Communal Area aggregate total, although the principal beneficiaries of the expanded depot network continue
to be farmers located in Mashonaland Central. Another important point to stress is that, after independence, it was initially cheaper for farmers to sell their maize to the GMB and purchase subsidized urban-refined meal than to withhold stocks for household consumption and pay local grinding fees (see Table One). Standing and Muir estimate that close to 200 rural grinding mills closed during this period resulting from the proliferation of subsidized meal in many areas of rural Zimbabwe (cited in Blackie 1987).

### Table One: Producer and Selling Prices in Zimbabwe, 1979-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'79-80a</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Producer Price</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maize ($Z/mt)</td>
<td>60.50</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>120.00</td>
<td>120.00</td>
<td>120.00</td>
<td>140.00</td>
<td>180.00</td>
<td>180.00</td>
<td>180.00</td>
<td>195.00</td>
<td>215.00</td>
<td>225.00</td>
<td>270.00</td>
<td>550.00</td>
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<td>($Z/91kg bag)</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>10.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunflower (Grade AA)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>255.00</td>
<td>285.00</td>
<td>320.00</td>
<td>340.00</td>
<td>390.00</td>
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<td>78.50</td>
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<td>110.50</td>
<td>135.00</td>
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<td>Grain Marketing Board Selling Price</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maize ($Z/m)</td>
<td>63.00</td>
<td>63.93c</td>
<td>172/225</td>
<td>137.00</td>
<td>137/154</td>
<td>157/177</td>
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<td>222.00</td>
<td>222.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>($Z/91kg bag)</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>5.73/</td>
<td>8.01</td>
<td>12.46</td>
<td>14.6/</td>
<td>16.09/</td>
<td>21.73</td>
<td>20.18</td>
<td>20.18</td>
<td>23.19</td>
<td>25.82</td>
<td>27.73</td>
<td>32.70</td>
<td>67.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Controlled Retail Price</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roller Meal</td>
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<td>7.92</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>21.98</td>
<td>27.99</td>
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<td>45.55c</td>
<td>45.55</td>
<td>55.30</td>
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<td>Straight-Run Meal</td>
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<td>10.64</td>
<td>15.37</td>
<td>17.82</td>
<td>20.27</td>
<td>22.76</td>
<td>30.20</td>
<td>30.70</td>
<td>30.70</td>
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<td>34.11c</td>
<td>38.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Super-Refined Meal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.18</td>
<td>28.74</td>
<td>32.50</td>
<td>40.57</td>
<td>41.37</td>
<td>41.37</td>
<td>41.37</td>
<td>49.04c</td>
<td>65.55</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>202.59c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a - 1 April 1979 - 31 March 1980.
b - Gokwe cotton falls under the Grade B standard.
c - The second price indicates that the Grain Marketing Board changed the selling price during the season.
d - Only Straight-Run Meal can be purchased in a 90kg bag. Roller Meal and Super-Refined Meal prices based on the purchase of one 50kg bag and two 20kg bags.
e - Indicates that the controlled prices changed during the year. The last price is therefore given as this price is most relevant to deficit households.

Sources: Grain Marketing Board Annual Report, various years; Cotton Marketing Board; Government of Zimbabwe Control of Goods Order, various years.

Important aspects of the marketing structure did not change after the final Grain Marketing Act passed under the Smith regime. Grains purchased by the GMB continue to filter out of rural areas to the urban centres of Zimbabwe. The assumption that African cultivators produce enough maize to feed the household remains pervasive in the Zimbabwean psyche, but, as demonstrated above, it is somewhat misguided. In addition, the Government has maintained the inherited policies of pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing. Pan-seasonal pricing means that farmers receive the same price at depots for their commodities throughout the agricultural year. The principal effect of this policy is that it discourages farmers from storing their surplus agricultural commodities, and subsequently passes storage costs onto the respective marketing body. Pan-territorial pricing refers to the practice of offering a single depot price to producers throughout Zimbabwe, regardless of distance from the depot to the centre of the marketing system. Farmers in more remote regions of the country are effectively subsidised by more centrally-located producers, as the latter bear the transport costs of the former.
An important change to the overall marketing system deserves mention however. The Rhodesian government introduced pre-planting prices in 1976-7 in an effort to increase agricultural output during what turned out to be the final phases of the liberation war. At independence, the Government reverted back to the traditional practice of setting prices after producers had planted crops for that year (Republic of Zimbabwe 1988: 78). Pre-harvest prices, usually announced as late as April, have remained the norm until 1993, despite the Government’s assertion that “the timing of announcement of producer prices [will be] early enough to influence production in the year in which they operate” (Republic of Zimbabwe 1982: 69).

The Government’s rationale for pre-harvest as opposed to pre-planting prices is clear. With the extension of depots and their role as residual purchaser, the Government is vulnerable to large influxes of grains. The Government prefers to assess potential production levels before announcing the price it will guarantee in order to protect itself from large pay-outs to grain producers. Prices are therefore partially determined on what the Government believes it can afford to pay. This policy limits the flexibility available to farmers, especially those in the Communal Areas who remain undercapitalized and unable to dramatically alter their productive base in any given year. As a result, decisions on production in areas well served by commercially-refined foodstuffs are based more often on labour availability than producer price as the latter are not announced until five months after farmers have planted their crops. In contrast, production decisions in areas poorly served by urban-refined foodstuffs are often based on perceived household food requirements rather than on what would secure the highest return.

In his study of state autonomy in Zimbabwe, Herbst (1990) demonstrates that the state enjoys a large degree of autonomy in the setting of agricultural prices. The Government is lobbied by different agricultural interests, such as the Commercial Farmers Union and the (then) Zimbabwe National Farmers Union, but its pricing decisions are consistently made independent of these interests. Herbst further argues that the effect of lobbying campaigns in relation to the setting of producer prices is significantly enhanced if issues related to “peasant welfare” are emphasized, and that the state has demonstrated its responsiveness to African smallholders by setting high producer prices for predominantly African-grown mhunga, rapoko and sorghum.

But “peasant welfare” is affected by other Government decisions beyond the scope of Herbst’s study. In particular, one must also analyze the impact of controlled retail prices of urban-processed meal on rural households as, again, the perception that rural households’ food security is ensured is wholly inaccurate. In fact, for many deficit households in semi-arid regions of the country, the producer price is irrelevant as they are consistently unable to sell to the GMB. Instead, the retail price of maize is of far greater relevance. Additionally, because many areas of the country are poorly served by urban-refined meal, cropping decisions are often based upon perceived household food needs. Households in more vulnerable regions, such as parts of Gokwe, will devote disproportionately large areas of their land to maize, instead of cotton, sunflower and groundnut, which are higher-valued cash crops and more suited to the environment, as a result of the limited availability of urban-refined foodstuffs in the area. Survey data from Njelele found that 91 percent of the respondents devote more land to food crops, due to the distributional problems evident in Zimbabwe, than to higher-valued crops. This is especially harmful to poorer households who have adequate labour for higher-valued crops but, for completely rational reasons, instead decide to grow high-risk food crops. It also means that, because maize is both a cash crop and a food crop, poorer households who grow maize for rational reasons based upon an imperfect distribution network will often sell their limited maize supplies to meet short-term cash needs at the expense of household food security.

USAID has also demonstrated an interest in the producer prices established by the Zimbabwean state. It was shown earlier that the United States viewed the construction of depots under ZASA as an important entry point into the Zimbabwean policy decision-making process. C. Thompson (1991: 117-28) documents numerous examples of USAID efforts to reduce maize output in Zimbabwe on the premise that a democratic South Africa should be seen as the primary source of food for the sub-region. USAID therefore believed that producer prices should be reduced in order to dissuade farmers from producing maize. The impact of such pressure on Zimbabwean pricing decisions is uncertain given the findings of Herbst and the fact that these pronouncements occurred as the United States terminated its aid programme to Zimbabwe, thus reducing the United States’ leverage over Zimbabwean policy. What such pressure does suggest is, at the very least, a lack of coherence with the ZASA development effort to enhance smallholder incomes that USAID had been funding for the previous five years.
As a result of these numerous tensions, the initial euphoria over high producer prices after independence has waned as the Government's ability to maintain such prices has been diminished. Producer prices were stagnant between 1981 and 1984, and again between 1985 and 1988 (see Table One). Furthermore, the real value of maize has declined precipitously since the early 1980s (Mlambo et al. 1991: 64). As a result, farmers with greater financial, productive and land resources have shifted their productive base away from maize into export crops such as tobacco and horticulture. More importantly, as Table One indicates, the disparity between producer prices, GMB selling prices and controlled retail prices has risen dramatically since the early 1980s. Since 1985, controlled retail prices of maize meal are 80-200 percent greater than producer prices although rural households rarely purchase basic commodities at the Government-established price. Household vulnerability to food shortages has therefore been exacerbated by both high prices and the extraction of food crops from recently established depots in outlying areas of the country. Surplus grains that historically remained in the vicinity have instead been sold to the GMB in an effort by farmers to meet short-term cash needs brought about by changes in the wider political economy of Zimbabwe. Noteworthy in this respect is the extension of health facilities and schools to outlying areas, which has clearly increased the cash requirements of the household at a time when real agricultural prices are declining and off-farm income is decreasing.

Increased dependence on urban-refined foodstuffs by rural consumers since independence is apparent. Chisvo et al. (1990: 122) estimate that 50 percent of households in Natural Regions IV and V are net purchasers of grain, and evidence suggests that the percentages of commercially-refined meal purchases increases as the year progresses. Over 100,000 tonnes of commercially-processed maize is now consumed, per annum, in rural areas (Chisvo et al. 1990: 122). Research carried out in Mberengwa, Runde and Shurugwe during 1990 found that 38 percent of households surveyed depleted their stocks by December 1989. As a result, they were forced to purchase urban-manufactured maize meal and accept drought relief as local maize was unavailable in the area (Jayne et al. 1990: 43). According to the Grain Marketing Board, 211,663 bags of maize (91 kg) were removed from the three depots used by farmers in these areas - Charandura, Gweru and Tongogara - during this period. Both Charandura and Tongogara are USAID-funded grain depots, constructed in 1988.

Despite the increasing importance of subsidized meal in the household diet, the supply of commercially-refined maize is uncertain in the more isolated regions of Zimbabwe, especially during periods of country-wide scarcity. Outlying areas are often neglected despite the fact that much of the grain processed by commercial millers originated in these particular areas. The decline in the availability of locally produced foodstuffs has had a particularly damaging impact on deficit households in these areas who had historically secured food through inter-household networks established prior to the construction of the local depot. One such area in which this has occurred are the outlying districts of Gokwe.

VI. USAID-Funded Grain Depots in Gokwe

In Gokwe and the surrounding area, ZASA funds have been used to construct one Primary Marketing Depot in Gokwe centre (constructed in 1982/3), two seasonal depots in Zhombe and Nembudziya (both constructed in 1985/6), and a rural depot in Sanyati (1988/9). Preliminary findings on the impact of these depots, especially the Primary Marketing Depot in Gokwe centre, is the subject of the remainder of this paper.

Gokwe has seen large influxes of people into the district since the mid-1960s as the threat from tsetse fly was reduced. Households from more crowded Communal Areas continue to come to Gokwe, and an underground market for land is clearly evident although rarely discussed. The influx of families from various parts of the country also makes Gokwe somewhat unique as one finds an interesting mix of Shona, Ndebele and Tonga speakers closely integrated within the community. As a result, political and social relations in Gokwe have been articulated in a manner that differs from other parts of the country which are not as "ethnically" integrated.

Household production varies but the principal marketed crops are maize, sunflower and cotton. Other crops grown in small quantities include sorghum, groundnuts and soya beans. The overwhelming majority of families interviewed in Gokwe supplement their diets and incomes with small vegetable gardens, which are largely controlled by women. Fifty-two households in the Gwanyika region have recently constructed fish ponds. These
ponds are currently used for the domestic consumption of bream, but many are planning to expand their operations in order to market fish to the local community. Bee-keeping is another potential source of income, although few Gwanyika households have directly engaged in this productive activity.

Social differentiation within Gokwe generally, and Njelele in particular, is clearly evident. Two percent of Njelele residents are considered wealthy, 15 percent comprise a relative "middle class" in the area, while 68 percent are considered poor or extremely poor. The remaining 15 percent are classified by Njelele residents as *simbe* households, which loosely translates as lazy. Wealthy farmers are well capitalized, have access to greater resources and land than their neighbours, and usually engage in activities that mitigate their dependence upon agricultural sales, such as transport or the ownership of a store. "Middle class" households depend disproportionately upon agricultural production for their livelihoods, and are generally surplus producers. Their condition is tenuous though. Many express a desire to further diversify their productive base away from agriculture but are consistently unable to do so for reasons that will be elaborated upon below. Poor and extremely poor households occupy most of the worst land in Njelele, are undercapitalized, and the majority are consistently unable to meet their yearly food requirements. Historically, family members subsumed under these categories have sold their labour within the area to meet their subsistence shortfalls. Poor and extremely poor households overwhelmingly grow food crops as opposed to more valuable cash crops such as cotton, sunflower and groundnuts. *Simbe* households often have large holdings but their plots are rarely cultivated. The local kraal-head occupies 13 hectares of land that remains idle. His importance in community matters is decreasing as decisions on land allocations, which historically fell under his jurisdiction, are being decided through direct sales in the community or through the local Village Development Committee (VIDCO). Remittances to Njelele have dramatically declined as urban costs have increased and household members outside of Njelele have been retrenched. Importantly, many members of the community formerly employed outside Njelele have returned as alternative employment opportunities diminish, thus increasing the pressure on already limited food supplies. Families that historically used remittances to pay for local food are fundamentally affected by these changes in the wider political economy of Zimbabwe.

Land in Njelele is of poor quality and, as indicated above, is highly concentrated in the hands of more wealthy households. The poorer members of the community quietly contend that land must be redistributed here as well as within the wider Zimbabwean context. Household plots range from one hectare to over 80 hectares, but the average is between 4-10 hectares. There is a wide range of soils evident in Njelele, but the plateau areas are extremely rocky and therefore difficult to cultivate. Water resources are scarce and undeveloped.

Relations between the Government and residents of isolated Communal Areas following independence continues to evolve. The bureaucratic infrastructure of Gokwe has been enhanced, which has served to displace kraal-heads and chiefs, although they are trying to regain some of their influence. The introduction of marketing points throughout Gokwe, and the control the Government exerts over producer prices, has important ramifications for farmers who depend disproportionately on agricultural production for their livelihoods. A constant, but negative, reminder of the influence of the State in the area is the extension of Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) agents to isolated communities. People have disappeared. The notorious Fifth Brigade was stationed in Gokwe following their activities in Matabeleland, reinforcing the physical image of the new State’s relations with the Gokwe.

But in important ways, the State is quite "weak". Residents of Njelele have little access to Government representatives. The local MP is never in the region, and the administrative infrastructure established at Gokwe Growth Point has very little impact on the lives of Njelele farmers. There is, in fact, little dialogue between the State and rural farmers. The most visible sign of the State for most Gokwe farmers is AGRITEX. AGRITEX is understaffed and overextended however, thus limiting the amount of extension advice that is being disseminated in the wider Gokwe region. Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) activity in Njelele was nonexistent until recently, when an irrigation scheme was constructed by the District Development Fund (DDF) with funding from an unnamed British donor. The irrigation scheme has elicited a great deal of anger within the community as the plots were allocated to the local councillor’s village only. Yet farmers cannot identify channels through which such grievances can be addressed. Credit is simply unavailable, as the sub-branch Manager of Gokwe’s Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) office confirmed in a recent interview. Even if credit were available the interest rates serve to deter the overwhelming majority of households in Njelele, as
"(we) are afraid of the interest". Another concurs, arguing that "(there is) no profit from AFC loans".

Njelele is therefore experiencing numerous changes brought about, in part, by the introduction of a centralized marketing facility in the region. While farmers throughout the Communal Areas clearly wanted better access to centralized markets at the time of independence, the type of marketing system that has been imposed on Gokwe residents is now seen as harmful. Residents of Njelele have a more holistic conception not only of markets but also of the causes of their poverty than either USAID or the Government. While there is no single answer to the question of what a market is, as one's position in Njelele as well as one's age and gender clearly affect the response, some general points are discernable. To begin, there appears to be a greater appreciation by respondents of output as well as consumption. As one respondent stated, "we sell [to the GMB], but there is nothing here to buy". Women especially point out that the supply of basic commodities (from foodstuffs such as beans, cooking oil and maize meal, to necessities such as clothes) are rarely, if ever, available in the wider Gokwe area. Family members must travel to Gokwe centre to secure these goods, if they are available. Such trips require a full day as transport in the area is limited to one ZUPCO bus that leaves at approximately 6:30 AM and returns by 9 PM, at a cost ranging from Z$2-3.71 each way. If the goods required are unavailable in Gokwe, the day has been wasted. The manager of Gokwe's Farmers Co-Op cites numerous instances of farmers making the journey into town to find that no seed, fertilizer or foodstuffs are available. Njelele residents concur. As one farmer states, "These occasions are a lot. We can't get maize at the shops [in Gokwe centre], especially in October when we usually run out of our maize". The trip must subsequently be repeated at great cost in both time and money.

There is also a sense among surplus producers who used to sell their excess produce within the local community that they have lost control of their surpluses since the imposition of a depot facility in the region. Marketing options that previously existed are perceived to be no longer available. As one respondent argued, "we used to have a say in the sale of maize, but farmers do not have a say now". At one level, such comments reflect the changes in the local political economy since independence that necessitate the sale of crops through state-controlled marketing channels rather than in the local community. With the increasing cost associated with school fees, health care, agricultural production and daily upkeep, households who produce surpluses and had historically sold in Njelele instead are selling to the GMB out of necessity. "What choice do I have? Maize is our bank. If a child becomes sick, or school fees are due and we need cash, we have to sell."

At a more significant level, however, farmers are expressing anger over the loss of their sunflower market to the GMB. Gokwe consistently produces the largest volume of sunflower in the country. Before the 1983/4 season, Gokwe residents sold their sunflower to representatives of Lever Brothers and United Soap, as mentioned above. Once the GMB became the sole buying agent of sunflower in 1983/4, this market disappeared. "We used to sell to [Lever Brothers or United Soap], but now there is only the GMB." Prices for sunflower are now determined in Harare rather than between private interests and Gokwe smallholders; farmers have subsequently lost an important marketing alternative. This highlights how bilateral development support channelled through the state is never neutral. The state is not only able to extend its influence into outlying areas with the assistance of bilateral donors, but more importantly, the state is able to subvert local initiatives through the operation of the particular development effort, in this case the local GMB depot.

Significantly, the extension of price stimuli, through the GMB, to previously uncontrolled crops such as sunflower, was a condition attached to ZASA by USAID. Unless the conditions applied to ZASA were adhered to, the second and third tranche of USAID support would have been withheld (USAID 1982a: 2-3). In an evaluation of ZASA, USAID (1988: 3) commended the government for the "addition of new smallholder crops to the list of controlled commodities, which gives them a guaranteed market". Yet Gokwe farmers already had a secure market. Ironically, the former relationship between Lever Brothers, United Soap, and Gokwe farmers exemplifies what USAID purports to endorse. USAID support for government-set producer prices is extremely inconsistent with Agency policy elsewhere.

Households who do sell to the GMB are frustrated by their inability to accumulate adequate resources to secure their family's economic and social foundations. The price offered for maize has not kept pace with inflation, the rising cost of living and the increased expenses associated with agricultural production. As one respondent declared, "when [we] sell to the GMB there is no money." Another concurs, "there is no money at the GMB." No household interviewed whose primary source of income is the GMB had bought an agricultural
implement, such as a scotch cart or a plough, for over five years, even if they identified the lack of such implements as a major constraint on their ability to increase production. In fact, many poor and extremely poor households have been slowly selling their productive assets, such as cattle and agricultural implements, in order to send their children to school or to eat. More permanent, rectangular houses with tin roofs were predominantly constructed in the 1970s, and the last automobile bought by a "middle class" producer in Njelele was purchased in 1982. Accumulation in Njelele appears to have been checked since the early 1980s.

Finally, deficit households in Njelele have clearly become more susceptible to food shortages since the introduction of the GMB depot in Gokwe. Prior to independence, food deficit families offered a viable market for surplus producers as the costs associated with the sale of grains to the GMB in Kadoma or Kwekwe were excessive. Some of these costs have been offset by the introduction of a depot in the area, although transport fees remain high. Deficit households in Njelele who had relied on these supplies to sustain their families have seen the erosion of this option without reasonable alternatives filling the void. Of those farmers interviewed, 32 claimed that they sold food crops within the area prior to the introduction of the GMB depot in Gokwe. Today, only three are consistently able to sell their food in the community. In effect, deficit households have seen their market for foodstuffs dramatically reduced.

One reason for the increased vulnerability experienced within Gokwe generally and Njelele specifically is the slow erosion of inter-household links which have historically been utilised to ensure local food security. The disintegration of inter-household trading networks is the result of larger processes affecting farmers throughout Zimbabwe. With the introduction of school fees and health care costs, the dramatic increase in costs associated with daily expenses and agricultural production, and reductions in employment opportunities outside of Gokwe, rural households increasingly require cash from agricultural sales to meet their expenses. Large-scale commercial farm diversification away from food crops has increased the country's dependence on food crop production and sales from vulnerable Communal Areas, such as Gokwe. Food crops sold to the GMB in Gokwe are therefore transported out of the area at a faster rate in order to satisfy the food requirements of the nation. Unfortunately, the fulfilment of these requirements is at the expense of deficit household food security in areas such as Gokwe.

As a result of these changes in the political economy of Zimbabwe, many households that historically supplied foodstuffs to deficit families have instead been selling their surplus stocks to the Grain Marketing Board. Nick Amin notes that the implementation of the 1982/3 stabilization programme, under the stewardship of the World Bank and IMF, facilitated increased sales to the GMB from Communal smallholders as a means to offset wage freezes and the increased cost of food. The result was greater food insecurity in Communal Areas (cited in Friedmann 1992: 381).

It is critical to demonstrate who is selling to the GMB, however, as evidence presented above seems to suggest that the number of households selling their surpluses within the local area has dramatically declined over the past ten years. In Njelele, research indicates that the "middle" and poor strata of producers, whose alternative sources of income are constrained and who therefore depend disproportionately upon agricultural production for their yearly income, are primarily responsible for the Njelele contribution to the Gokwe GMB. Efforts by farmers to enhance their condition by devoting more land to higher-valued cash crops are consistently frustrated by poor weather and inadequate access to processed food. Seventy-seven percent of those interviewed who have tried to increase the amount of land devoted to sunflower, cotton and groundnuts over the past three years have reverted back to low-value food crops following the 1992 drought. Some poor households with little outside sources of income sell to the GMB in order to meet short-term cash requirements, even if these sales fundamentally threaten household food security. Respondents continuously claim that they have "no alternative" but to sell to the GMB. Tragically, some households which produce nominal surpluses, or poor households with already deficient supplies of food, have been selling grain supplies in excess of what would be required to sustain the family until the following harvest. When it is pointed out that such sales result in the household's inability to adequately meet its own requirements at the end of the season, many explain that this is unavoidable. Consequently, households will either reduce food intake, become dependent upon erratic Government relief, or sell productive assets to acquire food which subsequently undermines their future agricultural viability. "There is nothing we can do (about this)," one farmer contends. "We have to sacrifice to get food."

The more vulnerable households in Njelele are resorting to numerous practices, beyond more historically-utilized
coping strategies (see Matiza et al. 1988), in order to sustain themselves. As is true in other parts of Africa, women are often most affected by reductions in food availability as they will reduce their caloric intake in order to feed their children. This has important ramifications for the household. Children who are still breast feeding will experience declines in the mother’s milk supply and quality, and household duties that are considered the responsibility of women, such as fetching water, basic upkeep and agricultural work, will be affected by reductions in consumption. Fewer girls attend secondary school, and those that do are often the first to be withdrawn from school if a household can no longer afford to pay fees for all their children. Finally, many desperate families are manipulating traditional practices, such as lobola, in order to secure resources necessary to sustain themselves. A Marondera resident recently travelled to Gokwe in an effort to gain custody of his twelve-year-old daughter. His wife’s family had demanded an additional Z$4,000, despite the fact that he had paid lobola twelve years earlier. When he could not pay, the family “reclaimed” his wife, who is now married to a wealthy individual in another part of the country.

In the final analysis, only a handful of producers in Njelele are able to consistently withhold grains from the GMB, as their ability to reproduce themselves is enhanced through practices outside of farming. The primary source of food for deficit households in Njelele is one household, whose ability to sell surplus stocks to the community at the end of the season is due to the household head’s virtual monopoly on transport in the local area. Farmers in the community must employ his services to transport maize and sunflower to Gokwe and cotton to Kadoma. This service was secured prior to independence. Transport fees range from ZS$3-6 per bag for maize and sunflower and from ZS$25-35 per bale of cotton, depending on the locale of the homestead within Njelele. Transport costs can consume over ZS$4,000 per household in an average year, especially if the household devotes larger percentages of their plots towards the production of cotton. His plot of over 80 hectares was secured by “buying people out”, and resentment against his dominance of the local economy is tempered by people’s dependence on him for transport. He and another wealthy farmer dictate VIDO decisions in the area, and ensure that their candidates are elected to important posts within the Committee. He is the only significant source of employment in the area, hiring eight full-time employees and four seasonal employees. The rest of the labour is supplied by the members of the two families that live within the homestead.

As more farmers are forced to sell to the GMB, the transporter’s position is further enhanced. His wealth, secured through the community’s dependence on his transport services, allows him to sell grains to deficit households at a premium price. Food can be secured through credit arrangements with him, further strengthening his position in the community. As a result, he does not have to sell to the GMB at the established producer price. Rather, he can wait until the end of the year and charges higher prices for unprocessed maize. In 1992 he was selling maize at ZS$105 per 91 kg bag while the GMB producer price was established at ZS$50.

Other sources of local food include a former government official, who is opening a bottle-store in the local township and has recently invested ZS$16,000 into a grinding mill, indicating that this remains a lucrative business in Njelele despite evidence to the contrary in other regions of Zimbabwe. Maize is still processed in Gokwe because urban-refined meal is unavailable and households must therefore devote most of their land to maize production. This does not ensure food security though, and effectively lowers potential household income. Only one other household surveyed consistently sells maize in the area, instead of to the GMB, but his supplies are generally quite low. There was greater competition between surplus households in the area prior to the introduction of the USAID-funded depot as food supplies were initially sold in Njelele. With fewer farmers able to withhold their surplus stocks, the cost of locally produced food has risen dramatically. Equally as important in relation to food security, the loss of “middle class” and some poor strata surpluses from the area has not been made up by the handful of wealthy farmers who continue to sell in the area.

The terms of exchange between surplus and deficit households has been transformed as well. Numerous respondents from deficit households indicated their desire to work for food, but they are unable to secure employment as the priorities of surplus households have shifted away from labour-arrangements for food towards a greater dependence on cash. As one poor farmer stated, “they (‘middle’ and wealthy farmers) no longer hire us”. Some surplus producing households which have historically exchanged food for labour would like to continue with such practices, or sell to deficit households, but their ability to engage in this type of interaction is constrained by their desire to meet short-term cash requirements. A stall-owner in Gokwe centre indicated that he can not afford to wait until later in the year to collect what poorer households owe him. Food for labour agreements, while benefiting both in the long-run, have short-term costs that many cannot afford. The stall-
owner instead sells to the GMB despite his preference for other alternatives. Another option available to deficit households is to become financially indebted to the handful of wealthier households, who can afford to withhold their surplus stocks, or to shop-owners, in order to meet their food requirements at the end of the season.

This situation is compounded by the fact that commercially-refined meal is not available to Njelele store owners. National Foods and the Midlands Milling Company, the principal suppliers of maize meal to Gokwe, only transports refined meal along the KweKwe to Gokwe road. No delivery has ever been made directly to Njelele, according to local store owners. This is confirmed by transport information provided by National Foods. Deficit households who cannot afford local maize must therefore travel to Gokwe centre to purchase small quantities of urban-refined meal. The erratic supplies of urban meal that has been brought into Gokwe centre is currently being sold at shockingly high prices. As is evident elsewhere in Africa, few actually pay the controlled price established by the government for basic commodities. In Zimbabwe, the official selling price for a 20 kg bag of Roller Meal was Z$15.02. In Gokwe centre, the selling price ranges from Z$24-30; in Zhombe the price at local stores is Z$31.58. In Nkayi, one store owner argued, "Do people think I am the U.N.? I must travel to Gweru to buy maize meal. How can I sell it [at the controlled price]?"] In effect, households who sold 91 kg bags of maize to the GMB last season, at Z$24.55 if they could deliver it directly without the services of the transport families, cannot even purchase a 20 kg bag of refined meal from the money they received. The official retail price of maize meal was once again increased, which will place the staple out of reach of the most insecure households. Desperate households are currently eating roots, grass and dogs in the larger Gokwe area (Sunday Times, 17 May 1992). A teacher in Nembudziya indicated that many families in the area were adding grass to the limited amount of maize meal they had in order to add "substance" to their food. Many households in Gokwe will be forced to sell productive assets and reduce intake in order to survive until the forthcoming harvest.

But some, including USAID, may claim that these are forces beyond the immediate purview of marketing. Surely USAID cannot be blamed for the changes in the political economy of Zimbabwe that necessitate the sale of grains to depots at the expense of deficit households in Gokwe or Njelele. In fact, it could be argued that the establishment of a depot in the area has been beneficial to local residents, beyond the obvious advantages it has meant for local transporters. In the final analysis, the GMB has become an important source of income for families who need to meet short-term cash requirements related to school fees, health care and general household expenses. It should also be remembered, however, that one of the main reasons many Gokwe farmers lack alternative sources of income from agricultural production is that the Government expropriated the sunflower market.

This argument can be questioned at a number of levels however. First, such an argument masks the larger issues of food security in the country. As argued earlier, the grain marketing system is designed to channel maize out of rural areas to urban centres. Consequently, urban consumers are fed with grains from deficit regions at the expense of food security in rural areas of Zimbabwe. White maize, secured from areas such as Gokwe, was available in Harare well after reports began to circulate of Gokwe residents eating grass. Table Two illustrates the magnitude of the withdrawal of maize from the USAID-funded depots in the Gokwe area since their construction after independence. It is this aspect of USAID and the Government's intervention that warrants criticism. The market for food that had historically been available to deficit households has been eliminated as a result of USAID's support for the extension of markets to neglected regions of the country without anything filling the void. One cannot simply construct a depot and neglect issues of distribution. USAID and the Government of Zimbabwe cannot be absolved from responsibility in this regard.

The impact of USAID's intervention has become clearer this year as the 1992 drought has significantly affected the local community. Agricultural output is a fraction of what would be considered normal, and many households in the area had depleted their meagre stocks by September. The few households that sold their surplus stocks within Njelele earlier in the year stopped in October as their supplies are now threatened. Large supplies of maize which are desperately needed in the area have been removed from the local USAID-funded grain depots in order to feed urban consumers. As the full magnitude of the 1992 drought in southern Africa became apparent, efforts to secure desperately needed maize increased. Depots that still had maize were targeted by businesses, farmers in other regions, and entrepreneurs who recognized the value of maize during a period.
when stores in the urban centres had to enlist the assistance of riot police in order to control hungry crowds. Gokwe was one of these depots, as the GMB was in the process of transferring the maize to commercial millers. A large majority of the 7,389 bags of maize listed under the 1992 "balance" in Table Two was inevitably shipped out of Gokwe. Spot interviews with private lorries leaving the Gokwe depot indicated that the maize would be going to areas as far as Binga, Masvingo, Bulawayo, Harare and even Namibia. In addition, Shirichena Milling Company, recently established at Gokwe Growth Point, was processing maize for consumers in Gokwe centre, Bulawayo and the Harare high-density suburb of Highfields. The loss of 177,073 bags of maize from the Gokwe area and the erratic supply and prohibitive cost of replacement meal from commercial millers is exacerbating the tenuous condition of smallholders in the area.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table Two: Maize Intake and Outflow, 1982-1992*</th>
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<td>Gokwe</td>
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<td>Nembudziya</td>
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<td>intake</td>
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<td>Zhombe</td>
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<td>balance</td>
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<td>Total Outflow</td>
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* - 91 kg bags of maize
@ - denotes agricultural year beginning 1 April 1981 and ending 31 March 1982
Source: Grain Marketing Board

Technically, individuals can purchase bags of maize directly from GMB Primary Depots, although it is important to stress that individuals cannot procure grains from rural and seasonal depots such as Nembudziya, Sanyati and Zhombe. Producers in those areas must travel to the Primary Depot in order to secure a bag of maize for household consumption. The ability of households from Zhombe and Nembudziya to purchase grains from, in this case the Gokwe Primary Depot, is contingent upon the availability of maize at that point however, which is rare given the increased pressure on the GMB in areas such as Gokwe for national food requirements. In addition to the increased strain the loss of food from the area places on poorer households, it has also elicited anger as members of the community are aware that the GMB depot in Gokwe was "full" early in the year. By this, respondents are claiming that the maize they had delivered to the GMB last year was available for...
purchase at the beginning of the season. "I know it (maize) is no longer there because I tried to buy at the GMB (in April)." In an earlier interview, a local farmer expressed concern over the cost of local maize from the transporter. He decided it would be cheaper to buy from the GMB. In a follow-up interview, he explained that the GMB "had none [maize]" and that he had to sell one bull in order to buy local maize.

This is more than simply a question of distribution however. The extraction of food crops from Gokwe has not been replaced by reasonably priced and readily available processed foods. This highlights the danger associated with addressing one aspect of a perceived problem (marketing) in isolation from the larger issues of distribution and the political economy of the affected area. Such interventions can often exacerbate an already tenuous condition. Significantly, if the issue of distribution were rectified, and Njelele residents could secure access to foodstuffs at a reasonable price, the GMB would effectively become a "white elephant". Njelele residents consistently express their preference for growing cotton, groundnuts and sunflower, but do not fully engage in this productive activity for rational reasons linked to the limited food that is now available in the area. As one respondent claimed,

Selling maize, the price is not that satisfactory. The seasons are not suitable for maize. People here do not like to grow maize but we have to. I would only grow sunflower and cotton if I could buy maize at a fair price in the shops. Its far much better to grow crops that will generate income.

Data collected from Gwanyika area appears to confirm this statement. Eighty-eight percent of the households interviewed would dramatically shift their productive practices away from maize to higher-valued cotton, sunflower and groundnuts, if they could consistently procure adequate foodstuffs from local shops. As discussed earlier, the inadequate distribution network is especially harmful to poor households with adequate labour who instead decide to grow vulnerable, low-value food crops such as maize. Some talk of the importance of establishing sunflower and groundnut processing industries in the area, which could have significant employment and income effects for Njelele. As one proponent of the scheme declares, "Why should we export our sunflower and groundnuts? We should be exporting cooking oil and peanut butter instead." Some Njelele residents are constructing development ideas which require significant changes in marketing, state-community relations, and distribution of food. The ability to engage in this type of rural industrialization is contingent upon sufficient capital, which is not available in the area, and adequate supplies of food. It is fair to argue that if an adequate distribution system were implemented, Njelele farmers would, over time, change their cropping patterns. This would have important ramifications for smallholder income as well as processing industries throughout the country.

The Government is therefore put in a difficult position. The private sector has proved unable to effectively distribute processed food to more vulnerable areas such as Njelele. Calls to deregulate retail prices would push the cost of basic foodstuffs beyond the means of most rural consumers. To address this situation may require greater state involvement in the distribution process, despite the Government of Zimbabwe's failings in such matters to date. It would also mean offering high producer prices to farmers in better maize producing areas so as to ensure that these regions produce adequate food for the country. Such a policy would allow farmers in vulnerable maize-growing regions to diversify into higher-valued agricultural production, which is better suited to their respective areas. The cost of food would have to be kept low, and the supply assured, in order for an effective shift to higher-valued cash crops to occur in areas such as Gokwe, implying higher government subsidies and transport costs. These ideas are fundamentally antithetical to the "free market solution" advocated by influential institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and USAID however. In addition, it is entirely contrary to the grain market reform programme USAID is currently trying to implement in Zimbabwe (USAID 1991). An informed discussion on the merits and demerits of such a programme will most likely not occur, despite the evidence which shows that Gokwe residents see this as a way to address their current condition.

The second, more significant, reason why the proposition that the depots are an important source of income for the affected communities is questionable is related to the first point. The principal goal of surplus producers in Njelele is to distance themselves from their reliance on the local depot. In fact, accumulation is better ensured if farmers can avoid the GMB. Most cannot. The few who are able to "exit" the official marketing system are dramatically increasing the economic gap between themselves and the rest of the community. The more secure households in the area can only maintain their reproductive capability through the pursuit of activities in addition
to farming, such as transport, informal milling, or ownership of a store. Households almost solely dependent upon agricultural production do not have this security. While no family is wholly dependent upon agricultural production in Njelele or elsewhere, the point being made is that, for many families, alternative sources of income outside of farming generally supplement the household's yearly income rather than serve as an alternative avenue for diversification. "Success" in Njelele is therefore defined as diversifying one's marketing base away from a reliance on the GMB. Farmers who are locked into the marketing system contend that they are unable to accomplish this goal or provide a more solid foundation for their families due to their reliance upon the GMB.

The desire of surplus producers across the socio-economic spectrum in Njelele to "exit" the official marketing system is readily apparent. As one respondent claims, "this drought has taught us. We will never give the GMB our maize." Another argues that "no farmer will ever sell to the GMB again." In fact, few surplus producing households in Njelele plan on selling to the GMB next season, regardless of the harvest and in spite of the high pre-planting producer price offered by the government. Households want to store two years worth of food crops; the remainder they want to resell in the area. There is a realization by many that it is better to withhold grains and resell in the area, as vulnerable households' condition heightens tensions between households in the community. Farmers are hoping to reactivate trading networks that had been utilized prior to the introduction of the Gokwe depot in 1982. As one "middle class" farmer explained, "there is a market here [in Njelele], we have just forgotten about it." The implications of such pronouncements cannot be underestimated. Zimbabwe's ability to rebuild its strategic stocks, let alone to ensure adequate supplies of processed food crops to those dependent upon such products, is contingent upon large sales of grains to the GMB by farmers in areas such as Gokwe. Large-scale commercial farmers will most likely grow more maize next season, but it is unclear whether they will sell to the GMB. As the Director of the Commercial Farmers' Union recently stated, "maize will be an extremely valuable commodity next year. It will be worth far more than ZS900 [per tonne]." If farmers in more vulnerable areas such as Gokwe are able to withhold their food crops, the urban food crisis evident at the beginning of 1992 may be repeated.

The ability of surplus producers, especially Njelele "middle class" and some poor farmers, to exercise this option is suspect however. Their economic foundations remain weak and the GMB will continue to be an important source of income for the community despite producers' desire to distance themselves from the marketing institution. One important alternative is emerging however. Prior to the 1992 drought, Njelele stores began purchasing maize from surplus producers. The maize was then resold, and milled, in the area, although at a high price. Store-owners may become a more important source of income for local residents if they are able to pay farmers at the beginning of the season and consequently offer farmers an alternative to the GMB. To date, sales to local store-owners has occurred because of debt however. Farmers were "selling" their last bags of maize to local store-owners at ZS15 (per 91 kg bag). One store-owner is now selling 20 litre tins of maize for ZS32. Few can afford this without further decapitalization. Store-owners will only become a viable alternative to the GMB if farmers in the area are able to re-establish themselves, an unlikely prospect in the short-term.

A development intervention should be judged, in the final analysis, by the amount of space it creates or eliminates for those most affected. Gokwe farmers have seen their marketing options decrease, through the expropriation of the sunflower market by the Government and the transformation in the nature of inter-household exchanges which historically ensured a greater degree of food security for deficit households. Accumulation appears to have been checked while a process of decapitalization is undermining the long-term viability of many poor households. But Gokwe farmers are by no means passive victims in the unfolding situation. While Gokwe farmers contend that space has been taken away from them, they are attempting to create space for themselves. Efforts to diversify, to distance oneself from the GMB, are being made, despite the constraints faced by most resource-poor households. Fish ponds are being constructed in the hope that this will become a viable marketing option in the near-term. Vegetable gardens are increasing in size, with important implications for women. Discussions on rural industrialization, though limited to a small number of people, are beginning to spread. Most importantly, questions pertaining to Government accountability are being raised.

Ferguson's hypothesis on the impact of donor-state development interventions must therefore be re-visited. In fact, developmentally-induced legitimacy works both ways. If schools are without adequate supplies, clinics without drugs, or fees introduced and increased, the legitimacy of the state is undermined and inevitably
questioned. Likewise, legitimacy is eroded when a government depot is increasingly viewed as robbing people of their food and their ability to accumulate adequate resources. ZANU (PF) credibility in rural areas, the supposed backbone of the ruling party, is eroding. President Mugabe's already tenuous popularity in the region has declined further during his recent "meet-the-people" tour in Gokwe. During his speech to members of the local Gokwe community, President Mugabe promised all destitute Gokwe farmers free ploughing services and crop packages. Gokwe was then allocated two tractors. AGRITEX officials assert that it would take two tractors over five years to accomplish the task promised by the President. Both tractors had broken down before any Njelele resident had received this service. Despite claims in the media to the contrary, crop packages have been inadequate. Njelele residents received enough seed and fertilizer for one hectare of maize. Over 55 percent of Njelele residents are engaged in "zero tillage" techniques, as their draught power has either been sold, has died, or is too weak to be used for ploughing. Only six of the 157 farmers interviewed will be able to utilize their entire fields in 1992/3 as seed is unavailable in the area. Resentment is increasing, despite the paucity of alternatives to the present regime.

The poorest households of Njelele, who have seen their ability to procure food from local sources diminish since independence, offer a complex explanation of their predicament that serve to reinforce this point. As discussed earlier, most of the poorest households are consistently unable to market any crops, regardless of the producer price. Usually their plots are too small, or their household requirements too large for them to sell. These families most often express concern over the decline in inter-household exchanges that historically sustained them during both good and bad years. They often claim that it was "better under [Ian] Smith". When asked why, the invariable response will be "because we could always eat." This statement, while instructive, should be interpreted cautiously. As Bozzoli (1991) demonstrates, consciousness operates at various levels and is articulated in numerous and contradictory ways. It is certain that such pronouncements do not mean that Njelele residents preferred the former system, although it indicates that the perception held by the Zimbabwean Government that it would play a transformative role in the rural areas is not shared by the residents of Gokwe. The statement does highlight some of the frustrations felt by many black Zimbabweans whose condition has not been fundamentally enhanced since independence. What this statement also indicates is that people believe that foodstuffs were always available in the area before the expansion of the grain marketing system to Gokwe. The GMB is seen as a significant source of government intervention in the community's life. Food security will remain tenuous, and people's ability to enhance their vulnerable condition will continue to be elusive. As a consequence, resentment and anger directed at both the Government and the GMB by Njelele residents grows. The loss of grains that is so clearly evident in Gokwe as a whole, and Njelele in particular, is readily apparent to the most vulnerable households in the region. They know that surplus households in the community sold grains to the GMB last season rather than to them, and that the GMB had grain early in the year. They also know it is no longer readily available, and that their condition will deteriorate further as the 1992 famine continues to unfold.

VII. Conclusion

Gokwe is only one area of Zimbabwe. One must therefore take cognizance of differences between regions within the country, and the effect that marketing has had on these communities. Evidence from Drinkwater (1992) suggests that some depots are used for residual purposes during particularly good years. Excess stocks can be sold at these depots without as grave a threat to food security characteristic of Gokwe. Further changes in the political economy of Zimbabwe may necessitate a re-examination of Drinkwater's findings however. The effects of the country's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) will require greater sales to the statutory body in an effort to mitigate the increasing costs associated with the programme. Rural communities dependent upon remittances from family members have been devastated by rising unemployment and the increased costs of urban living incurred by relatives. The decline or outright loss of this support could adversely effect food security as smallholders become increasingly dependent upon agricultural production for household income.

There are also suggestive indications from other parts of Zimbabwe that the problem of food insecurity and agricultural marketing are directly linked. Since 1985, USAID has financed a SADCC food security study that includes extensive analyses of the causes of food insecurity in vulnerable regions of the sub-continent. The overwhelming conclusion of the USAID-sponsored study in relation to the subject of this paper was that, despite differences between regions, the extraction of food crops from vulnerable regions of Zimbabwe has exacerbated...
the plight of deficit households. The evidence from Gokwe seems to add credence to these conclusions.

Importantly, USAID receives no blame for their role in the marketing programme. No respondent has been able to identify USAID as the funding organization despite their frustration with the U.S.-funded GMB depots. The development institution which dictates the terms of the intervention and funds the construction of these depots is removed from criticism because it is viewed by the recipients as a government initiative. Ms. Patricia Buckles, Director of USAID/Harare's Project Design and Implementation Division, claims that USAID played an instrumental role in increasing smallholder contributions to the national food supply yet refuses to accept any responsibility for the shortcomings of ZASA as it is a "GOZ [Government of Zimbabwe] project". Consequently, USAID is absolved from criticism and accountability due to the nature of donor - recipient assistance programmes. At one level, Ms. Buckles' claim is correct as the operation of the GMB is, in the final analysis, the Government's responsibility. But USAID has by no means been a benign actor in the unfolding marketing process. They have, in fact, been intricately involved in the evolution of the programme. USAID has attempted to influence pricing policy and has been involved in the siting of numerous depots throughout Zimbabwe. Yet the programme is a success for USAID. The Agency is able to show Congress impressive agricultural figures from Zimbabwe while demonstrating that the allotted money has been spent. Objects have been constructed that can be identified in photographs. The history and nature of grain marketing, and the affect of this intervention on household food security is irrelevant given the narrow goals and definition of "success" espoused by the U.S. In fact, USAID has succeeded within the absurd theatre of United States development assistance despite the silent costs to the recipients of this joint U.S. and state intervention.

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank Dr. T.S. Jayne for his insights into marketing and food insecurity at an early stage of this research, as well as P. Maposa and S. Dalu for their assistance in Njelele. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of the Witwatersrand's MA Seminar Programme, 23 September 1992.

2. Zimbabwe is sub-divided into five agro-ecological zones, or Natural Regions, based upon rainfall variability and agricultural potential. For a discussion of the differing characteristics of these regions, see Weiner et al. 1985.

3. What is startling about USAID's assessments of the Zimbabwean post-independence condition is how painstakingly they avoid issues of race. USAID prefers to base their intervention on a false dichotomy between "commercial" producers and "traditional" farmers en masse. To argue, as USAID does, that the differences between commercial farmers and smallholders is evidenced by differing land holdings and tenure systems is to negate 90 years of Rhodesian history predicated on race. For a further discussion of the application of USAID's dual economy model to Zimbabwe, see Breslin 1993.


5. It is important to point out that the U.S. is currently trying to dismantle the grain marketing system it spent ten years expanding under ZASA through a sectoral adjustment programme targeted specifically at the GMB (USAID 1991).

6. Malnutrition in Zimbabwe afflicts many population groups. Those most affected by malnutrition, in order of severity, are commercial farm workers, households in resettlement areas, households in the Communal Areas of Natural Regions IV and V, and low-income urban residents (Tagwireyi 1990: 63). See Loewenson (1992) for a detailed study on the condition of large-scale commercial farm workers in Zimbabwe.

7. Such households will be referred to as deficit households throughout the paper. Surplus households refer to smallholders who produce agricultural products above the yearly food requirements of the family.

8. The historical literature on Zimbabwe is vast. Of particular importance in relation to this study are Beach 1977; Chester 1984; Iliffe 1990; Kosmin 1977; Mosley 1983; Moyana 1984; Mumbengegwi 1986; Palmer 1977a and 1977b; Phimister 1977 and 1988; Ranger 1985; van Onselen 1976; Weinrich 1975; and Yudelman 1964.

9. An abridged list of taxes and fees includes the hut tax (doubled in 1904); poll tax (introduced in 1905); Private Locations Ordinance of 1908; Kaffir Beer Ordinance of 1912; numerous rents that had to be paid to the Chartered Company for those occupying unalienated land; grazing fees (1912); a dog tax (1912); and compulsory dipping fees for cattle (1914).
10. The first Native Reserves were established in 1894 by the British South Africa Company. Initially located in remote and inhospitable areas in north-western Matabeleland, the Gwaai and Shangani Reserves were regarded by the Ndebele as “cemeteries not homes” (Phimister 1988:65). The forced removal of Africans from European-designated land continued into the 1970s, although the context for these removals were differed from that of the earlier removals (see Riddell 1980: 7).

11. According to Ranger (1985), the “peasant option” refers to the ability of African producers to sustain their agricultural livelihood as an alternative to being drawn into the larger wage economies of Southern Africa.

12. Established in 1923, “Responsible Government” involved the transfer of power within the colony from the British South Africa Company to a Parliamentary system under the control of the settler community and tied more closely to Great Britain.

13. Maize purchased under the newly established Board was priced under a “local pool” or “export pool”. The former was 30-50 percent higher than the world price, while maize purchased under the “export pool” was considerably lower (Yudelman 1964: 179). Quotas for marketed maize were established in order to administer the pricing scheme. Individual European small-scale farmers were allotted a quota of 80 percent of their marketed maize under the “local pool” in order to bolster their vulnerable condition. Large-scale European interests received a quota of 20 percent of their maize under the “local pool”, the remaining 80 percent being priced under the “export pool”. African producers who could deliver their maize directly to the Control Board would receive the higher “local pool” price on 20 percent of their maize, the remaining 80 percent being priced under the “export pool”. Finally, the majority of Africans who had to sell to approved buyers in the more isolated regions of Mashonaland and Midlands only received the “export” price for their maize.

14. It should be noted that many traders preferred to trade in kind rather than cash.

15. The Maize Control Act of 1940 was replaced by the Grain Marketing Act of 1950, which was subsequently replaced by the Grain Marketing Act of 1957. These acts merely transferred responsibilities but did not dramatically alter the nature of marketing in Southern Rhodesia.

16. Purchase Areas were created under the Land Apportionment Act of 1931. Freehold leases were offered to farmers who wished to move out of the increasingly crowded Reserves. The intention was to officially prohibit the sale of European-designated land to Africans, thus completing, at least legislatively, the segregationist aspirations of many Southern Rhodesians. Purchase Areas were often designated as a buffer zone between Reserves and European areas in order to protect the latter from potential encroachment on their farms. Purchase Area farmers now largely constitute the small-scale commercial farming community.

17. Reserves were renamed Tribal Trust Lands in 1963.

18. Master farmers were designated by the state in order to promote a class of advanced farmers within the Reserves. These farmers received technical training, tended to have larger land holdings than their neighbours, and received preferential access to loans and water facilities. As a result of such treatment, their output of agricultural produce far outstripped their neighbours in the Reserves, thus contributing to further differentiation within these areas.

19. African production estimates were not offered by the GMB after 1962/3, as the government no longer supplied data on sales of grains to the statutory body by African or European farmers for political and strategic reasons. The declining trend in African maize sales to the GMB is nevertheless clear. The data is from the Republic of Southern Rhodesia’s Grain Marketing Board Annual Reports, various years.

20. Archival material on Gokwe, following the eradication of tsetse fly from the area, is not presently available. As a result, the author is dependent upon oral testimony.

21. For a discussion of cooperatives, which were confined to the Purchase Areas, see Yudelman 1964: 187-9.

22. Weinrich (1975: 60) demonstrates that 14 percent of all women in the Karangaland survey area were regularly absent from the Tribal Trust Land. They either accompanied their husbands or secured employment on white-owned farms or as domestic servants. For a discussion of the degree and importance of female wage labour in the current Zimbabwean household economy, see Adams 1991. On child labour within the household economy of the Zambezi Valley, see Reynolds 1991.
23. Tribal Trust Lands were renamed Communal Areas in 1982.

24. Millet (mhunga and rapoko) were decontrolled by the Southern Rhodesian authorities in 1963.

25. The overwhelming majority of the grains purchased by the GMB are transported to urban centres and sold to private millers. For example, in 1988/9 millers received 543,000 tonnes of grain crops from the GMB out of a total of 676,000 tonnes procured by the statutory body; see Grain Marketing Board 1989: 6. The remaining grains are delivered to the Department of Social Welfare, stockfeeders, poultry producers, brewers and Christian Care who are also located in the urban centres of Zimbabwe. See Grain Marketing Board 1991: 26, Figure One, for a breakdown of GMB sales between 1980-91.

26. Farmers begin planting controlled crops such as maize in November. Wheat, which is a winter crop, is not affected.

27. The United States suspended its assistance programmes to Zimbabwe in 1986 due to the famed "Carter incident" and certain objectionable votes in the United Nations against U.S. positions.

28. In 1986, the Government established a two-tiered pricing structure that discriminated against commercial farmers similar to the one established by the Southern Rhodesian state following the passage of the Maize Control Act of 1931. This system was inevitably modified, but this action further undermined large-scale commercial farmers' confidence in the state and strengthened their desire to diversify into uncontrolled crops such as tobacco and horticulture.

29. Gwanyika Secondary School, in Njelele, was opened in 1984.

30. While Sanyati is technically in Mashonaland West, many farmers in Gokwe utilize this depot as it is closer to their homestead than any of the other depots in the area.

31. The nearest Cotton Marketing Board depot is in Kadoma.

32. The kraal-head in Gwanyika is attempting to reassert his authority over land transactions in the area, with some success.

33. Discussion with interpreter, who is one of those feeding the kraal-head's children, 1 September 1992.

34. Some of the jobs that have been lost by Njelele residents over the past seven years include work on commercial farms, in mines (both Zimbabwe and South Africa), at the Rusape GMB (as a seasonal worker), and as gardeners, cooks or drivers.

35. Interview, Mr. J. Mangozho, 28 April 1992. There is an understandable reluctance on the part of Gokwe farmers to discuss their debts, although there are important indications that farmers in Njelele have incurred large debts from both the AFC and store-owners in the area. This will be discussed further below.

36. Interview 82, 3 September 1992.


38. Interview 97, 4 September 1992.


42. Interview 5, 19 May 1992.


46. Important indicators of the health of Gokwe residents are malnutrition figures. Unfortunately, there is not enough useful and accurate data to assess the nutritional condition in the region. Much of the hospital data is misplaced, while District Health Statistics only monitor the growth of children in school, who, in the final analysis, are less vulnerable than those who are unable to attend school for financial reasons. Finally, community-based surveys are crude as they are based upon access to clinics, which again fails to account for the poorest and most vulnerable households.

47. Eleven surplus households stated they had "no alternative" but to sell to the GMB. One farmer (Interview 36, 20 May 1992) stated that the "GMB is our only market".

48. There is evidence to suggest that farmers in other areas of the country sell their surplus stocks to statutory bodies on the assumption that they will be eligible for Government food relief at the end of the year. I found no evidence of this in either Njelele or Gokwe. In fact, no household in the area can afford to take this chance as the Government’s relief work is hopelessly erratic, if evident at all. It was announced on 2 September that, due to shortages of maize, which Government Ministers have continuously stated would not be a problem as Zimbabwe had already imported enough maize to last until the upcoming harvest, drought relief allocations would be reduced from 15 kgs to 5 kgs per person per month. Nobody in Njelele has ever received the original 15 kg relief packages, and few think that will change. As households within Njelele have slowly depleted their stocks, more and more men within the community have become involved in a Food-for-Work scheme. The road project has been operating for a number of months now, but participants had not been given food for their labour in over three months. When provided, the amount of food received was minuscule (less than one 20 litre tin of maize per month), causing a great deal of anger within the community.


50. For evidence of such practices in Mozambique, see Hanlon 1991: 147.


52. This household’s vehicles include five lorries, four tractors, one Land Rover and one Peugeot station wagon.


54. An indication of the magnitude of the current food crisis in Njelele is apparent from interviews with informal mill operators. In the past, millers have averaged between ZS200-300 in grinding fees for the months of July and August depending upon their location within the community. This year, they made less than Z$40 for the month of August.


57. While outside the scope of this paper, there are important parallels with the situation of Njelele deficit households and aspects of the "moral economy" argument offered by Scott (1976), although violence directed against richer families is not evident in Njelele, nor are the redistributive tenets of Islam as interwined in the world view of Gokwe residents, outside of assistance to the "belt of relatives" (Interview 127, 3 December 1992). Importantly though, even transactions between relatives is breaking down.

58. It should be stressed that areas beyond Gokwe centre and served by the main tarred road do not receive direct deliveries of commercially-refined maize meal. Sengwa Colliery (Ltd.) operates a coal mine approximately 125 km northwest of Gokwe. The mine is served by the main road. The mine’s store owner alleges that commercially-refined meal is never delivered to the area. This point is again confirmed by distributional data provided by National Foods. One of Sengwa’s lorries is therefore required to travel to Kadoma or Kwekwe once or twice a week (depending upon demand) to purchase maize meal and other foodstuffs, and then resell them in the area. At the time of the interview (24 March 1992) the cost of a 20 kg bag of Roller Meal was officially set at Z$15.02, but the store was selling it at Z$27 in order to pay for transport costs. The store owner indicated that few in the area, outside of those who work on the mine, can afford maize meal at this price, although the demand for food is high.

60. Interview, Mr. O. Machingura, 17 May 1992.


65. Groundnuts are to be decontrolled in 1993.


67. Ninety-one percent of male headed households indicated that they would switch to higher-valued crops such as cotton, sunflower and groundnuts, while 80 percent of the female-headed households would change their productive practices.

68. Interview 111, 2 December 1992.

69. The cost of processed food in the area would have to be low enough to ensure that the diversification into other crops was successful however.


73. Interview, Mr. David Hastuck, 20 August 1992.

74. One Njelele store-owner is selling locally-produced maize to residents for ZS32 per 20 litre tin. He procured the maize from a handful of indebted families at an extremely low price. The exorbitant price is maintained because the supply of maize to Gokwe is so erratic, and families are no longer able to spend money on a bus trip that may prove fruitless. The tragedy is that few can afford this price. The few who do procure maize from this store-owner are either falling further into debt, or selling more of their productive assets. This, naturally, has serious ramifications for the ability of these consumers to rebuild their already tenuous foundations. Interview with store-owner, 2 December 1992.

75. Interview 9, 19 May 1992.

76. Ironically, given their condition, Njelele residents are vulnerable to short-term, politically motivated interventions, such as the distribution of food under the ZANU (PF) banner, that could have important implications for the democratic process in the country.

77. Interview, 19 August 1992.

78. Interview, Mr. J. Mushauri, former USAID Agricultural and Natural Resources Development Officer, 28 October 1992.
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