Title: Creating a National Park, 1910 to 1926

by: Jane Carruthers

This paper may not be quoted without the permission of the author
Creating a National Park, 1910 to 1926
JANE CARRUTHERS

Introduction
Popular histories of nature protection in southern Africa usually portray the prelude to the passing of the National Parks Act in 1926 as a contest between the forces of 'good' (those in favour of national parks) and 'evil' (those antagonistic or apathetic to the idea).1 In southern Africa the development of national parks has not been dispassionately evaluated and dedicated modern conservationists have constructed what might be described as an 'appropriate' history - indeed a proselytising one - ignoring considerations other than current conservation preoccupations. This romanticised view of past nature protection policies and attitudes is more akin to folklore than to history and it has distorted the paradoxical origins of protectionist endeavour. Such simplistic and inaccurate interpretations beg closer examination and a more objective and critical explanation is needed, one which takes cognisance of the complexities of the South African political economy at the time.

The creation of national parks - anywhere in the world - can only be understood in the context of the time and place in which this occurs. Fundamentally, the founding of a national park concerns the allocation of certain natural resources and for this reason it is a political, social and economic issue more than a moral one. What was accomplished in the mid 1920s in South Africa was not so much the acceptance that the principle of a national park was morally correct, as the acceptance by white South Africans of the philosophy that the viewing and studying of game animals constituted a legitimate, and financially viable, form of land use and that the state should provide land for this purpose.

Many circumstances intertwined to make the national park a reality. It was not merely accidental that the passing of the National Parks Act in 1926 took place at the same time as demonstrations of an aggressive, though perhaps still nascent, Afrikaner nationalism.2 Other manifestations of the Afrikaner nationalist thrust included the adoption of Afrikaans as an official language, the revival of interest in Voortrekker traditions, the resurgence of republican sentiments and the loosening of ties with imperial Britain. Moreover, it also represented a facet in the search for a common white South African national identity. The growth of this common white identity can be seen, for instance, in the compromise over a new South African flag and national anthem. At this time too, increasing economic state intervention took place and parastatal industries were established.

These outbursts of political and economic nationalism coincided with the
waning of the attitude that game was a purely economic object - at least, for whites - and with the entrenchment of a sentimental, romantic and aesthetic view of nature. This change of outlook was due to the fact that hunting, whether for commercial nor sporting purposes, was no longer possible on an extensive basis because of the decline of game outside of game reserves. But it can also be linked to a shift in attitudes of the predominantly English-speaking group of sport hunters and to the urbanisation of many ‘poor white’ rural Afrikaners who had formerly hunted game. Since game protection in the Transvaal had always been propagated by the dominant class, it may not be stretching the point too far to see the establishment of the national park also in terms of the growing class coalescence among Afrikaners and the desire of nationalist politicians to permit all Afrikaners to share the benefits of the ruling class.

An interpretation which emphasises nationalist sentiment accords with the explanations which have been offered for the establishment of national parks in countries such as the United States and Australia. For example, in the United States ideas about the preservation of areas of scenic beauty were mobilised to promote American national feeling and to emphasise the distinction between North America and Europe. In Australia, too, the ideology of nationalism both fed upon and also encouraged the romanticisation of the Australian frontier experience. National parks thus appear to be connected to a country’s cultural evolution and in this way serve to weld together different, and perhaps disparate, groups within it. That this is true of South Africa in the mid 1920s can be seen in the groping for a common identity between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking whites. Their creation of a national park played a role in the process of unifying these two culturally different, but economically converging, groups.

There is, however, another crucial aspect of the South African experience which should also not be ignored. In their search for common ground whites excluded Africans and the establishment of national parks can be seen as part of the process of the systematic domination of Africans by whites. National parks constitute yet another strand in the consolidation of white interests over black, and in the struggle between black and white over land and labour. The white heritage which national parks commemorated was the sentimental and aesthetic aspects of wildlife; early commercial hunting practices by whites were ignored. The function that Africans had earlier played in the Transvaal as hunting partners of whites was in this way completely overshadowed by their new roles as ‘poachers’ or labourers.

Game protection in the Transvaal until 1910: the background
At the time when whites first settled in the Transvaal both they and the
African population of the region pursued wildlife for many purposes, such as profit, subsistence and sport. When game species diminished during the course of the nineteenth century and groups began competing with one another for access to them, regulations were instituted and it was then that ‘self-justification and mutual recrimination’ began. Although the prevention of waste of a valuable commercial resource was one reason for the introduction of early game protective legislation in 1846 and 1858, there was a concurrent desire to restrict access to that resource to the group which wielded the most political and economic power. In the event, this conservation strategy failed in both respects and more extreme preservation measures in the form of game-reserve creation followed from the 1890s. Within these reserves the rigorous preservation of specific examples of wildlife took place. ‘Vermin’ species—such as lion, leopard, cheetah, wild dog and all raptors—were, however, killed whenever they were encountered in the belief that they were responsible for depleting ‘game’ species, particularly antelope. Game reserves were withdrawn from the economy altogether and the concept of the sanctity of these special areas remained dominant for almost a generation. Ultimately, in the transformation of the Transvaal Game Reserve (the former Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves) into the Kruger National Park in 1926, a reversion to conservationist principles occurred: wildlife was once more to be utilised for human ends and was again recognised as being a profitable resource to exploit, this time for recreational game viewing.

The intervention of the state in game saving has been evident at all times in the Transvaal. In fact, the legal status of game as res nullius in Roman Dutch law had the consequence in the Transvaal that game protection could be implemented only by the state, and initially it was this basic principle which brought game protection within the political arena. Because politically dominant groups wished to restrict access to game to themselves, they legislated against others who also desired to utilise it. Protectionism was therefore accomplished by prohibitive state policy.

The legal status of wildlife has also meant that in order to protect game, landowners have had to be assiduous in preventing members of the public from gaining access to it on their properties. This circumstance links trespass and poaching in South Africa, and it is in this regard that class relationships have been influenced by Transvaal game protection. Before land was formally allocated in the republican Transvaal attempts were made to restrict the hunting of game to members of the Voortrekker community. When wildlife on state land diminished, and as more and more land passed into private hands, those who did not own land began to lose rights to game. And after a short partnership between whites and Africans in commercial hunting activities, whites became powerful enough to withhold game from Africans
whether the latter were occupiers of land or not. There was a very brief period in the early twentieth century (when the Transvaal was governed directly by Britain) during which black and white landowners had some measure of legal parity, but local white attitudes towards Africans soon overturned this legislation once self-government was acquired in 1907.

Two manifestations of game protectionist policy have thus been evident in the Transvaal, namely, restrictions on hunting and the establishment of game reserves. Hunting legislation was ineffective in saving game and in the course of time numbers of game generally declined. Some species - rhinoceros and hippopotamus for example - almost became extinct. Conservationist legislation failed to save game because the law remained unenforced in republican times, and in the colonial and provincial periods the advance of agriculture and industrial development left little room for wildlife. Game reserves, the second thrust of the protectionist effort, were initiated in the 1890s after it had become evident that other legislation had been unsuccessful in achieving its objective. Ultimately, game reserves were to prove more effective than hunting legislation.

In 1910 four game reserves existed in the Transvaal. The oldest of these was the Pongola Game Reserve in the south-western corner of the Transvaal, first mooted in 1889. The townlands of Pretoria (and the adjacent farm Groenloof) as well as land in the eastern Transvaal (later to be known as the Sabi) were both discussed as suitable game reserve sites in 1895. Added to these republican reserves after 1900 was the large Singwitsi Game Reserve of the north-eastern Transvaal (in 1903) and the Rustenburg Game Reserve (in 1908) in the west. Of these, the most important were the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves on account of the variety of large mammals and the diversity of habitats within them. The purpose of these game reserves was to preserve species of game animals and augment their number and, for this reason, hunters and other visitors were strictly barred from entry.

Transvaal game reserves were generally located on land which was considered to be 'worthless', because of its agricultural infertility, its lack of valuable minerals or the presence there of endemic diseases like nagana (sleeping sickness), horsesickness and malaria. The removal of such localities from the agricultural or mining sectors of the economy did not, therefore, create conditions of hardship or deprivation for any white group.

In the 1920s, however, the principles underlying such 'worthlessness' came to be re-interpreted and national parks have proved to be a lucrative, as well as an ecologically appropriate, form of resource exploitation.

Despite their importance to the protectionist effort, game reserves were never established by the highest legislative organs in the Transvaal - the Volksraad, the Legislative Assembly or the Provincial Council. These bodies
transferred their powers in this respect to the executive. For this reason, all reserves were established by proclamation and could just as easily be deproclaimed; nothing that would today be called a 'national park' was ever established by the successive governments of the Transvaal, or indeed it seems, in any part of Africa or India at this time. Easy abolition was the fate of the Rustenburg Game Reserve in 1914, the Pongola Game Reserve in 1921 and portions of the Sabi Game Reserve in 1923. Only in 1926 did the Transvaal game reserves acquire some legal security when the National Parks Act was passed by the parliament of the Union of South Africa.

Game reserves 1910-1914

Although wildlife protection in the mid 1920s came to play an important part in expressing an evolving white national psyche, the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 initially deprived the Transvaal game reserves of some of the governmental support they had previously enjoyed. While responsibility for game protection was placed in the hands of the four provincial authorities, the allocation of state land was the task of the central authority and conflict between the two tiers of government over the game reserves in the Transvaal resulted.

The wavering of support for game protection owed much to a general commitment to economic development and modernisation in the newly-formed national state. Mining activity was being followed by the creation of secondary industry and large scale commercial farming and the country was set on a course of becoming an industrial society. In such a society, no niche existed for independent peasants or hunters with values of economic self-sufficiency.

The first casualty of the changed atmosphere in the Transvaal after Union was the Rustenburg Game Reserve. Although the immediate cause of its demise in 1914 was the poor calibre of its administrative officer, capitalist farming activity was equally responsible. When the reserve was founded in 1909 – on the personal initiative of Smuts, the Colonial Secretary at the time – its establishment was an innovative measure because it included not only privately owned land but even inhabited farms.

Before proclaiming the reserve Smuts had not consulted the Transvaal Game Protection Association or even the landowners of the district. Although the Transvaal Land Owners' Association had pronounced itself strongly in favour of game protection in the Transvaal, from the outset it had had serious misgivings about the future of the Rustenburg Game Reserve. The association was troubled about the lack of supervision which was envisaged for the large reserve. The district was also potentially rich in minerals, and suited to white settlement, and they were also concerned that economic development of
the western Transvaal might be retarded by the existence of the reserve. In addition, the association feared that the principal causes for the depletion of game in the region—which it regarded as emanating from itinerant hunting parties from the adjoining Bechuanaland Protectorate and from the traditional hunting activities of resident white farmers—were not going to be addressed merely by the creation of a reserve. The Rustenburg Magistrate gave the project very faint-hearted support, and the Transvaal Game Protection Association advised the Administrator that it too felt the establishment of the Rustenburg Game Reserve to be inappropriate and that a more suitable area in the province should be selected for this purpose.\textsuperscript{11}

African resistance to the Rustenburg Game Reserve was intense, but seems to have come principally from inhabitants of the Bechuanaland Protectorate rather than from within the Transvaal itself. The Transvaal-Bechuanaland boundary bisected the land which had traditionally been in the hands of the Kgatla and border regulations were difficult to control because people regularly moved across the boundary. Game hunting in the Rustenburg district proved attractive to the Kgatla because wild animals were abundant there as a result of earlier successful protectionist efforts in adjoining Bechuanaland and the Transvaal. Violence erupted frequently over access to game: in April 1912, for example, a son of Linchwe, the Kgatla chief in Bechuanaland, having been caught killing an impala near Olifants Drift within the Rustenburg Game Reserve, disarmed a police constable who had attempted to apprehend him, and then threatened to shoot him. In August 1912 an even more serious incident took place when a member of the police force killed one of Linchwe’s men who had been hunting game within the reserve.\textsuperscript{12}

The failure to prevent African hunting was attributed to the warden of the reserve, P.J. Rickert. The Transvaal Land Owners’ Association had opposed his appointment in March 1910 on the grounds that he had previously antagonised Africans in the district and that he would thus never gain their co-operation in protecting game; moreover, he was generally known as a ‘poacher of considerable attainments’.\textsuperscript{13} From 1911 to 1914 strong dissatisfaction with the administration of the reserve was expressed by officials of the district, the Transvaal Game Protection Association and the Land Owners’ Association.\textsuperscript{14} In reply to this criticism, the warden insisted that he had executed his duties as well as he could.\textsuperscript{15} But by 1914 the clamour to remove Rickert had become so great that an investigation into the Rustenburg Game Reserve and its management was launched and the complete overhaul of the structure of the reserve was recommended.\textsuperscript{16} However, the investigation came too late to save the reserve, for in July 1914 the Union Defence Force voiced its suspicion that the warden was smuggling firearms across the border with Bechuanaland and other officials were concerned that the Rickert clan was ignoring the
Despite all this, Rickert was not relieved of his post until November 1914; days later, members of the Rickert family, including the ex-warden himself, were arrested on account of their involvement in the ill-fated rebellion of 1914. The Rustenburg Game Reserve was deproclaimed in December 1914.

The game reserves of the eastern Transvaal, the Sabi and Singwitsi, although referred to by one source as 'sacred ground', were also not spared from the effects of post-Union economic imperatives. White opposition to these reserves was spearheaded by farmers who cast covetous eyes upon the grazing potential of the land on the western boundary of the Sabi Game Reserve. The matter was raised in the Provincial Council in 1911 when a petition was presented asking that the south-western portion of the reserve be deproclaimed and opened for grazing purposes. The matter was discussed by the Provincial Council but in the end it evaded the issue and referred the petition to the Executive Council. Presumably reluctant to alienate these farmers and run the risk of losing their votes, and also mindful of the drought conditions which prevailed, Rissik, then the Administrator of the Transvaal, agreed to the petitioners' request for grazing concessions, although not to deproclamation.

The settlement of whites in rural areas of the Transvaal had been a prime objective of Transvaal governments since 1902 and this continued to be so after Union. In its search for suitable land which would lure white settlers the Department of Lands was also eager to limit the size of the Sabi Game Reserve. The completion of the Selati railway line at the time of Union had given access to a part of the eastern Transvaal hitherto poorly served by communications, and in 1913 the department asked the Transvaal provincial authorities to excise that portion of the game reserve adjacent to the railway line. The request was refused on the grounds that the changed boundaries of the reserve would become very complex and difficult to enforce. In 1916 the Department of Lands once more broached the subject of settling farmers in the Sabi Game Reserve, only to be rebuffed again.

Another central government department which contested the prohibition on the use of resources within the game reserves was the Department of Mines. In 1910 the Mining Commissioner at Pietersburg reported that rumours were rife of mineral wealth within the game reserves and warned his superiors that they faced a clear choice, either to protect game or to permit prospecting and mining. There was some debate within the department as to whether valuable minerals were in fact to be found within the reserves: some argued that there was nothing other than coal or copper which was abundant elsewhere. While agreeing that the existence of game reserves should not be permitted to interfere with the exploration for and exploitation of mineral resources, the
provincial administration did not countenance the withdrawal of game protection for mining purposes. Senior officials of the Department of Mines adamantly opposed the province in this respect: the Acting Under Secretary for Mines, for example, declared that game reserves were merely 'sentimental objects' and were far too large in area. 

Capitalist farming interests were also antagonistic and provided a powerful lobby for reducing the size of the reserve. These interests comprised those landowners - principally landowning companies attached to mining houses - whose ground had been included within the boundaries of the Sabi Game Reserve in 1902 and 1903. As time passed and circumstances changed, these owners wished to exploit their farms and contended that they were prevented from doing so freely because of the game protection agreements they had signed when handing over their farms to be administered by the game reserve authorities. The agreements had initially covered a five-year period and were extended for a further ten years. When the expiry of the renewed agreements drew near, the Transvaal Land Owners' Association gave its attention to the fate of the land in question. When re-proclaimed after the South African War the task of the Sabi Game Reserve had been to nurture herds of game in order that, eventually, sportsmen might pay landowners or the state for the privilege of game hunting, and the Land Owners' Association was disappointed that this financially rewarding scheme had not come to fruition. In 1913 the agreements between the parties were renewed for just one year, during which time the province promised to formulate a definite policy as far as the future of the reserves was concerned.

By 1916 no progress in this connection had been made and the Transvaal Land Owners' Association indicated that it was now anxious to arrange an exchange of land with the government so that the game reserve could become wholly state-owned and private interests and profits would no longer be jeopardised. James Stevenson-Hamilton, the influential warden of the Sabi Game Reserve, had little sympathy with the land owning companies, declaring in 1913 that he did not 'think we need to be at a lot of worry and trouble to please people who really have never done anything except acquiesce in our looking after their property for them.'

During the early twentieth century bourgeois and urban sport hunters had been prominent in both the private and public sectors and had been in positions to ensure that game protection was pursued in their sporting interests. An important change in attitude took place among sport hunters in the years following Union, which was in all likelihood as much connected to the general depletion in numbers of game throughout the province and the consequent lack of sporting opportunities, as it was to the emerging philosophy of protecting of game for sentimental and scientific reasons. At
an annual general meeting in November 1911, the Transvaal Game Protection Association announced that the aim of saving game was not to pander to the selfish pleasures of sportsmen, but to preserve wildlife for posterity. Two years later the President of the association, E.F. Bourke, reiterated the desirability of game protection for the benefit of future generations, adding that it was necessary for 'scientific' purposes as well.²⁷

Unanimity was difficult to achieve among members of the Transvaal Game Protection Association when this new principle became prominent. The farming and landowning interests of some members blunted their enthusiasm for game protection. The Lydenburg branch of the Transvaal Game Protection Association, for instance, unanimously requested that land along the ill-defined western boundary of the Sabi Game Reserve be excised from the reserve.³¹ This land comprised the most suitable agricultural land within the reserve and much of it was privately owned. There were close links between the Transvaal Land Owners’ Association and the Transvaal Game Protection Association and it was these ties which were demonstrated by the association’s resolution.³¹ At Stevenson-Hamilton’s urging, the Provincial Secretary refused the latter’s request.³²

Despite these mounting demands for excision, before the outbreak of the First World War the boundaries of the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves were in fact extended and not reduced. The reserves were not contiguous: the northern boundary of the Sabi Game Reserve being the Olifants River and the southern boundary of the Singwitsi Game Reserve being the Groot Letaba River, there was thus a substantial gap between them. Although Stevenson-Hamilton had the authority to protect game in the intervening region, the area did not formally become part of the reserves until the situation was rectified by proclamation in 1914.³³ When the amalgamation was first suggested in February 1913, the Department of Lands refused to permit the extension, considering the matter to be politically sensitive and being swayed more by the arguments which were then being advanced for the reduction and not the enlargement of the reserve. Evidence no longer exists in the records of what efforts were made behind the scenes to persuade the Minister of Lands to change his mind, but by December 1913 he agreed to the extension.³⁴

If economic interests appeared antagonistic to the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves, natural circumstances appeared to conspire to reinforce this opposition. Between 1912 and 1916 recurrent drought and the consequent lack of breeding habitats for the vectors of horsesickness and malaria gave rise to the impression that the land in the game reserves was agriculturally viable and therefore not as ‘worthless’ as had originally been thought. In addition, the fact that a few whites - mainly wardens and rangers - had lived in the lowveld for many years seemed to indicate that the region was not
climatically hostile to white occupation. More importantly, however, an outbreak of nagana in Natal evoked an over-reaction in the form of calls for the destruction of all wildlife in South Africa. Nagana had disappeared from the Transvaal and Natal with the outbreak of rinderpest in 1896. Leading entomologists had speculated that because so much game had died from rinderpest, it was the lack of a game host which had been the critical factor in eradicating nagana and subsequently that the burgeoning numbers of game within the Natal game reserves were responsible for its return. Stevenson-Hamilton was extremely worried about the effect that the situation in Natal would have on his reserves and wrote to F.C. Selous in 1911:

This ... is a most hazardous time for big game ... the sleeping sickness has aroused a kind of panic even in regions where the appearance of the disease is outside practical politics ... many will take advantage of this panic and turn it to their ends of game extermination. His fear ultimately proved to be unfounded: the disease did not erupt in the Transvaal and the head of veterinary services in the province maintained in 1918 that it was 'no use our shooting or killing off game in any of our reserves, which to my mind are not threatened at all.'

Resistance offered by Africans to being controlled by game reserve authorities and to the withholding of game as a food resource was overt and almost continuous in the decade after Union. Much of this resistance came not from residents within the reserve, but from neighbouring Mozambicans and people who lived outside the Sabi Game Reserve in the south-west. Stevenson-Hamilton had felt entitled to control the lives of Africans who lived within the reserve and resented having to share authority with Native Commissioners who were frequently more sympathetic to African interests than were game reserve staff.

Game reserve officials were, however, pleasantly surprised at how little game was killed by Africans resident in the reserves. The absence of poaching by African residents seems to have been due primarily to the fear of losing their land and being forced into so-called African 'locations' or into having to labour for white farmers. In 1911, for example, Stevenson-Hamilton reported that

Although the ranger [Fraser] has not initiated any prosecutions,
he states that in the case of several kraals which he strongly suspected of poaching but could get no evidence about, he managed, in co-operation with the local police and other authorities, to get them removed from the reserve. In many ways the fear of this acts, it is found, as a better deterrent than either fine or imprisonment.40

By 1913 desiccation of the land was so severe that many resident Africans were dying of starvation, but they were not, by law, permitted to hunt game in order to survive. However, by 1918 the continuing food shortage, possibly coupled with the realisation that owing to the war the number of white staff in the reserve had been reduced, encouraged Africans within the reserve, particularly those south of the Letaba River, to embark on what A.A. Fraser, then the acting warden, called ‘a wave of insubordination’. Fraser complained that ‘the class of natives forming the vast majority of residents in the reserve has no sense of the disgrace of fine or imprisonment. The fine he very seldom pays and ... imprisonment ... merely means regular and full meals’. Although small in number, Africans living on the private land within the game reserve were also ‘becoming increasingly difficult to deal with’.41

While residents seem to have poached only sporadically, Africans living outside the reserve on the southern bank of the Crocodile River, being desperate for food, participated in considerable ‘poaching’ activities at this time. In addition, Mozambicans had taken to killing game in the reserve on a large scale. Armed Africans made deep forays into game reserve territory and police posts were established on the Mozambican side of the border in order to prevent illegal border crossings. This step appears to have been unsuccessful: in 1915, the acting warden reported poaching so widespread that the situation was considered to be uncontrollable. Poaching parties from Mozambique were large, well organised and accompanied by many dogs. They also had firearms; the African staff of the game reserve who carried only assegais were powerless against them. The acting warden lamented that, ‘it is not difficult to forecast what manner of "no man’s land" this part would become if constant supervision were not maintained.’42

While there can be no question from the comments concerning
'insubordination' that Africans were using poaching as a means of protesting against white domination, it is equally clear that game was nevertheless essential for subsistence when destitute rural dwellers were faced with starvation. In conditions of drought it must have been very tempting for people to avail themselves of the expanding numbers of game close at hand. Moreover, if whites were unsure about the ultimate purpose of game reserves at this time, how much more confused must Africans have been to see a valuable food resource apparently going to waste. The gulf between the attitudes of Africans, who were poor and who subsisted on game in order to survive, and of whites, who were generally sufficiently affluent not to be affected by the withholding of this resource, seems to have widened after Union.

**Game reserves after the First World War**

Many officials of the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves had been on active service during the war and the administration of the reserves had all but collapsed. Stevenson-Hamilton returned to South Africa only in 1920, and was depressed at what he considered to be a chaotic situation.

The system of control, carefully built up since 1902, has been seriously impaired since I left in 1914. In that year we held an excellent command of the natives and of the reserves generally, and administration proceeded by routine perfectly and easily ... on the whole the impression I receive [in 1920] is that there has been a general retrogression, bringing the state of things now obtaining back to about the position occupied in 1904. Stevenson-Hamilton was disappointed in more than the circumstances in the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves at this time. He wrote that it was generally a time of 'a "slump" in faunal preservation, a condition which may in part be attributed to the general slackening of the fibres of civilisation due to the late war'. Game protection in South Africa certainly did seem to be under attack from many quarters. In three of the four provinces of the country, various game reserves were deproclaimed and certain wildlife populations were almost exterminated.
The Transvaal was affected in that the Pongola Game Reserve was disestablished in 1921. This small reserve in the south-eastern Transvaal had never been regarded as a success, but it had not been deproclaimed earlier simply because no better usage for the land could be devised. Official neglect of the Pongola Reserve had begun in about 1905 and continued after Union: neither a warden nor game rangers had been appointed and funding for the reserve had ceased. However, the Transvaal Game Protection Association was concerned about the reserve and was not indifferent to its fate, but could not render any tangible assistance.

There was a short revival of interest in 1920 when the Magistrate at Piet Retief arranged for F.E. Marx, an employee of the Native Affairs Department, to visit the Pongola Game Reserve. Marx discovered that about sixty African settlers had moved back into the reserve. Although it was frequently alleged in many quarters that Africans exterminated game wherever they found it, Marx commented on sightings of a variety of wild animal species within the reserve. Marx discovered traps and snares, but it appears that the hunting activities of the residents in the game reserve had had no appreciably detrimental effect on the numbers of wild animals, nor it seems, on their behaviour, because Marx reported that all the animals appeared tame.

Although the Pongola Game Reserve had lacked white supervision for many years, game protection measures had been carried out by voluntary African rangers. After they had been retrenched when funding of the reserve ceased, two rangers, 'Nondwaai' and 'Majwaba Tipia', remained in the reserve and acted in an honorary capacity. Nondwaai had been instrumental in bringing to justice two parties of poachers and the ranger's regular patrols may also have eliminated some poaching. After the disestablishment of the reserve, Nondwaai was awarded an honorarium of £10 for a decade of voluntary protectionist duties.

As a result of Marx's report, the Magistrate of Piet Retief was inclined to resuscitate the Pongola Game Reserve but the authorities did not cooperate. On the contrary, moves to abolish the reserve were initiated in
October 1920. At that time the Union government was involved in resettling demobilised soldiers and the Minister of Lands, H. Mentz, asked the Administrator of the Transvaal if he could re-assign the Pongola Game Reserve for this purpose. Perhaps to defuse objections from protectionist quarters, Mentz suggested that an exchange of land might be considered, whereby additional farms on the western boundary of the Sabi Game Reserve could be included within that reserve to compensate for the loss of the Pongola Game Reserve. This proved to be an unnecessary gesture because the Transvaal province was glad to rid itself unconditionally of the Pongola Game Reserve. That the instrument of decproclamation was drafted and published so promptly and with so little discussion indicated the relief experienced in provincial circles at having, at last, established a sound reason for vacating the area.

Within the Pongola Game Reserve it is clear that poaching by small and unarmed parties of Africans had little significant effect on the growing numbers of game. This appears to have been true for the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves as well. Although poaching was mentioned in every annual report of these reserves, it seems that this activity was not responsible for very much game destruction. In 1915 - the first year for which adequate breakdowns are available - there were only 27 arrests under the game laws, but for offences other than those related to game, principally for trespass, there were 493 arrests. The following years show the same pattern. Stevenson-Hamilton went as far as to suggest that the deproclamation of the game reserves would not mean the extinction of game but, more importantly for him, it would entail 'the abolition of all law and order from the low veld.' The activities of Africans seem to have been abhorred by game reserve officials not so much because of the danger they presented to wildlife, but because they represented freedom of action on the part of Africans and therefore a corresponding lack of white supremacy. A game warden in Natal confirmed that Africans used poaching in game reserves to express their 'outstanding grievance' - the fact that they had been deprived of land which they
considered to be their 'rightful inheritance'.

From the time of the establishment of game reserves early in the century, reserve officials had considered the interests of any industry to be inimical to game protection. There was however an exception to this, namely, the mining industry. The Witwatersrand mines required large contingents of unskilled labour and in the provision of manpower game reserves co-operated with the mines. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was allowed to construct a road through the northern section of the game reserves in 1918 so that labourers recruited in Mozambique and elsewhere could make their way easily to the mines. The miners were effectively supervised as they traversed the reserve and no cases of poaching were reported.

Although co-operation with the Witwatersrand mines did not afford labour directly to the game reserves, it did so indirectly in the way that it attracted illegal immigrants into South Africa, particularly from Mozambique. The system which seems to have operated in the game reserves at that time was that the illegal work-seekers were either arrested or reported themselves as trespassers to the warden, as the Special Justice of the Peace, and then consequently received a fortnight's imprisonment, this being the appropriate sentence for the offence. When their sentences ended, the men received permission (a 'pass') which entitled them to seek work in the Transvaal. These prisoners were not incarcerated while serving their sentences, however, but laboured instead in the game reserves 'on road making or anything else', at the same time receiving rations 'supplemented by meat obtained by them from game killed by lions.'

It was perhaps inevitable that such a casual system of imprisonment would be abused. In 1919 the Department of Customs complained about Fraser's behaviour as acting warden, and the Department of Justice expressed concern about the laxity which attended the keeping of criminal records at Sabi Bridge. During the time that both Stevenson-Hamilton and Fraser held the office of Special Justice of the Peace, prison labour was used by the Sabi and Singwitsi Reserves; however, after Fraser's retirement the Department of
Justice refused to extend Stevenson-Hamilton's jurisdiction in this respect into the northern area. Game reserve staff appear to have ignored this refusal and simply used trespassers in various parts of the game reserves for purposes of labour without any formal sentence having been passed on them. When this illegal action came to the notice of the Native Affairs Department, it was stopped, and all prisoners thenceforth had to be taken to Sabi Bridge to be detained there for a fortnight under conditions that provided for trial and imprisonment - 'a foolish arrangement and very unpopular with the natives.'

Another means of obtaining African labour in the game reserves was by means of labour dues. African so-called 'squatters' on white-owned or state land in most of South Africa were bound to pay rent, in money or crops or in the form of labour. However, because farmers adjoining the reserves were anxious to obtain labourers and accused neighbouring game reserves of appropriating the labour they regarded as rightfully theirs, prison labour appears to have been considered a preferable alternative for the reserves. Moreover, only a small number of Africans was resident in the game reserves and these people the warden noted would 'disappear' when free labour was being sought.

The evolution of a national park

It has been said of the American national parks that tracing their genesis is 'like nailing jelly to the wall,' and this remark applies also to the South African situation. Over the years certain individuals, particularly Paul Kruger (who was president of the South African Republic at the time of the proclamation of the first game reserves in the Transvaal), have been given the credit for introducing to South Africa the idea of a national park. However, as is the case with the origins of many ideas, it is impossible to pinpoint the precise moment of inception. Much of the difficulty lies in defining precisely what constitutes a 'national park' and what differentiates it from a 'game reserve'. On the one hand, if a national park is a reserve proclaimed by the highest legislative body of a country, then Natal achieved
Many people at the time considered this to be the chief characteristic of a national park which set it apart from a 'game reserve'. On the other hand, if the aim of a national park is to serve a large region, to attract tourists and capital and in other ways to bear some comparison with the national parks in the United States, then, it seems, the concept was first aired publicly in the Legislative Assembly of the Transvaal by A. Woolls-Sampson in 1907 who desired the establishment of an entity like Yellowstone National Park. The progress of the national parks in the United States was carefully monitored by those in the Transvaal; Stevenson-Hamilton, for example, was on friendly terms with President Roosevelt and was thus influenced by events in north America. However, the creation of national parks in any country has wide implications and it would seem to be more productive to explore the various factors contributing to its evolution than to search for individual actors.

Stevenson-Hamilton claimed that he had initiated the national park idea and that he had raised the question of the nationalisation of the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves at the time of Union in 1910, but he did not mention the incident in his diary at the time. He certainly broached the subject with the Provincial Secretary in February 1913, writing of a wholly state-owned, 'permanent game sanctuary', and he also corresponded privately with the Administrator about the matter.

But Stevenson-Hamilton was not alone in calling for the establishment of a national park at this time. In 1912 the Witwatersrand branch of the Transvaal Game Protection Association suggested the nationalisation of the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves. This motion was carried at the annual general meeting of the association in January 1913, and was supported by the Western Districts Game Protection Association in the Cape. The Transvaal Land Owners' Association also favoured nationalisation, and had put out feelers in this connection to the provincial authorities believing that they, too, were 'generally in favour of nationalisation'.

While the officials of the province may well have been so, their views were
not, it seems, shared by many of the elected legislators. The question of a
national park in the Transvaal was raised in the Provincial Council in June
1913, when the member for Soutpansberg, T.J. Kleinenberg, announced that the
'the time has arrived when the Sabi and Singwetsi [sic] Game Reserves should
be nationalised and that the Union government be urged to take the necessary
steps to accomplish this.' His colleagues in the Provincial Council were not
spurred into immediate action, nor did they demonstrate much enthusiasm for
the motion. After a short debate the matter was adjourned until the following
day, but although at every subsequent meeting during the rest of the session
the motion appeared on the agenda, it was never discussed again. When the
session was prorogued in September 1913 the national park issue was dropped
without any further ado.69

Although the Transvaal Game Protection Association did make a public
statement in 1915 that it still favoured nationalising the game reserves,70
it was an antagonist who was responsible for instigating the next move. S.H.
Coetzee, the member for Lydenburg, forced the issue in the Provincial Council
in March 1916 by introducing a motion asking the Administrator of the
Transvaal to urge the Union government to reduce the area of the Sabi Game
Reserve.71

The central government was becoming increasingly involved in the Transvaal
game reserves: not only were the reserves the subject of correspondence in
the files of the Departments of Lands and Mines regarding their economic
exploitation, but as early as 1914 the matter of national game reserves was
being informally discussed at high levels of government as well. In May 1914,
Smuts, then Minister of Finance and Defence, had asked to be kept informed of
game protection matters in the Transvaal and in November he had written
directly to Rissik:

... there appears to be a grave risk that the future of the
Reserve may at any time be imperilled by the establishment of
cattle ranching in that area ... it would be a thousand pities to
endanger the existence of our South African fauna. It has been
suggested that the best way of obtaining the object in view would
be to constitute a portion of the existing reserve as a National
Sanctuary on the lines of similar institutions which exist in the
United States and in other parts of the world, and set it aside for all time for the purpose. If you agree generally with my views, I think the first course to adopt is to appoint an impartial commission to go over the ground. 

On 17 March the Provincial Council had adjourned any debate on Coetzee's motion but discussed the matter fully on 6 April when G. Hartog, the member for Parktown, introduced another motion asking that a commission of inquiry be appointed, and the Council agreed to this. This decision thus met the recommendations of Smuts and the Transvaal Game Protection Association and in June 1916 members of the Commission were appointed.

That such a commission was appointed during war-time indicates the importance of the interests which were affected by the existence of game reserves. Taking each of these interests into account in turn, the Commission concluded that white farmers were in need of additional land for livestock and that the system of issuing grazing licences in the game reserve should therefore continue. As far as the land companies were concerned, the Commission sympathised with what it called the 'public-spirited attitude' that they had shown in allowing their land to remain within the reserve for so many years, and recommended that the government acquire these farms and compensate the companies accordingly. The commission also considered the effect of the 1913 Land Act on the issue of land for African settlement: the Native Affairs Administration Bill had allocated the infertile Singwitsi Game Reserve to Africans for this purpose. The Game Reserves Commission did not visit the Singwitsi Reserve and, apart from remarking that the area was probably unsuitable for any human settlement, it was suggested that a thorough inspection of the region was required before a final conclusion could be drawn.

The most significant outcome of the Game Reserves Commission, however, was on matters of protectionist philosophy. In this respect, the Commission was 'not a little struck by the uselessness of having these magnificent reserves merely for the preservation of the fauna', and advocated a more conservationist stance – in fact, the 'creation of the area ultimately as a
great national park'. For the first time, the objectives of and arguments for a South African national park were provided in detail:

We think that ... greater facilities should be offered to scientists, naturalists, and the general public to make themselves acquainted with a portion of their country which should be of the greatest natural interest for the following reasons:
(i) Here one may view and study conditions once generally obtaining throughout large areas of the Union, but which, owing to the advance of civilisation, are now rapidly disappearing and must eventually disappear altogether.
(ii) As a training ground for the scientific student, whether in botany, zoology, or other directions, the area is unequalled.
(iii) It is becoming more and more difficult for the town dweller to gain knowledge of the natural conditions of the country, and with the gradual extinction of game and other animals that is steadily going on, even to see the fauna of the country other than in the sophisticated surroundings of a zoological collection.
(iv) Here and nowhere better can the natural surroundings and habits of South African fauna be really studied, unaffected as the animals are by the instinctive dread of the huntsman, which in other parts of the country tend completely to alter their habits.
(v) The area has a grand climate in the winter months and is generally free during those months of fever.

This manifesto of the Commission expressed some novel principles as far as South African game reserves were concerned. What was new in southern Africa, were the principles that the wildlife in the natural conditions of game reserves should be observed and studied by visitors and students, and that the natural habitat of wildlife was as much an aesthetic and recreational experience for humans as it was vital to the existence of the animals themselves.

The Report of the Game Reserves Commission was published in 1918 and in the following year the Transvaal Game Protection Association gave its support to the Commission’s recommendations. In 1919, too, the Transvaal Land Owners’ Association took the initiative by meeting the Administrator and asking him to free the private land within the reserves. Agricultural land, the association contended, was even more valuable than it had been before the war, and private interests, as well as railway development and agriculture, were being hampered by restrictions on the private farms in the game reserve. In September 1920 the Provincial Secretary formally advocated the nationalisation of the game reserves and prepared a memorandum for discussion by the Executive Council which detailed the issues which had to be resolved...
before this could take place.

The problem regarding the privately owned land in game reserves was principally of a financial nature. The Game Reserves Commission had recommended that owners should receive compensation in land or cash if their farms were to become part of a national park.

The difficulties raised by central government interests were threefold. Firstly, the Native Affairs Department sought land for African occupation. The question of African settlement in the eastern Transvaal and white access to labour there had become critical after the war due to increased white agricultural activity and settlement in the White River district. Africans who refused to work on white farms in the vicinity demanded land of their own, while white settlers resented the fact that Africans were able to withhold their service by living, albeit clandestinely, in the game reserves. Secondly, the province also had to contend with the Department of Mines which now desired to exploit the coal deposits in the Sabi Game Reserve and, thirdly, with the Department of Lands which wished to allocate certain farms for white settlement. The Provincial Secretary saw no way out of the impasse but to hold a meeting of all the parties so that these issues could be ‘definitely and finally’ resolved. 77

In December 1920, this proposal was accepted by the Executive Council, and the conference which had been suggested took place on 25 February 1921. 70 Everyone who attended was in agreement with the principle of establishing a national park in the eastern Transvaal, and without exception all considered the existing area of the game reserves to be too large. The conclusion reached by the conference was that the Sabi Game Reserve should be contracted on the western side. Some of the land would be allocated for black settlement and many of the private farms that had hitherto been part of the reserve would be excluded, reducing the number of exchanges or sales which would have to be conducted accordingly. 77

It seems that the demands of private landowners within the reserve were being met to some degree in that suitable exchanges of land were already
being arranged before the conference met. However, because landowners saw these exchanges as a means of making a substantial financial profit, there was 'a good deal of difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory arrangement ... owing to the question of the value those owners attached to their land'. By February 1922 the Minister of Lands still considered the question of a national park to be so contentious, particularly in connection with the land exchange programme, that he was 'not anxious to touch it while the [parliamentary] session is on'. By November that year, however, a compromise seemed assured, and the Secretary for Lands was informed that Smuts, the Prime Minister, intended to introduce legislation for the establishment of 'a National Park and Game Reserve' during the next parliamentary session.

However, in the following month, when Smuts requested a meeting to conclude matters with the Transvaal Land Owners' Association, he discovered that the association still had reservations about the financial offers which had been made to them in return for their game reserve farms. Smuts had no option but to postpone the introduction of legislation. Having delayed the promulgation of legislation in 1923, the landowners were confronted a year later with a change of government and a new Minister of Lands, P.G.W. Grobler. It seems that Grobler was able to take a firmer stand with the landowners: although he was concerned that insufficient finance would be available for exchange, he, nevertheless, managed to locate suitable unoccupied land in the Transvaal which the landowners finally accepted at the end of 1925. It may well be that the landowning companies realised that the Pact government, with its lack of sympathy for Johannesburg business interests, would not negotiate any further and that expropriation of their land would have been the result had they not been willing to compromise. It has been suggested that some land companies, particularly the Transvaal Consolidated Lands Company (which was the principal private landowner in the game reserve), were disillusioned with the Smuts government and happier to co-operate with the National Party.
Although public opinion in Johannesburg appears at first to have favoured the landowners, whites generally seem to have been amenable to the creation of a national park. It is likely that the creation of the National Park Service in the United States in 1916 and the success of the tourist industry to national parks in that country had awakened South African whites to the democratic and economic possibilities of the game reserves in South Africa. Whereas Americans had been permitted to visit their national parks for many years, in pursuing a policy of strict preservation for the benefit of the animals white South Africans had denied themselves that privilege. It has also been suggested that whereas no stigma attached to a country before 1914 if it did not have any national parks, after 1919 it was shameful not to have established such institutions. Many South African politicians capitalised on this changing public opinion, and when the establishment of a national park seemed probable, began to participate in the project. Support from Smuts was not new, his involvement in game protection having been evident early in the century. The public association of other national politicians with game protection either began or intensified in the 1920s. The principal reason for this can be found in the growing aggressiveness of Afrikaner nationalism which culminated in the election victory of Hertzog’s National Party in 1924 and the formation of the Pact government.

Interest in Voortrekker culture became widespread in the mid 1920s. This was epitomised in the struggle to have Afrikaans recognised as an official language, evidenced in the elevation of Voortrekker leaders to the status of national heroes and in celebrations of Voortrekker festivals, and enshrined in visual depictions of the Voortrekker way of life. Recently it has been convincingly demonstrated that Afrikaner nationalism at this time was being provided with an historical context and that romanticised notions about Voortrekkers were being manipulated to form a national mythology. In this connection, the work of G.S. Preller, an Afrikaner nationalist historian and influential newspaper editor was very important.

Reverence for the Afrikaner pioneering past which was being constructed
grew apace in the 1920s and 1925 marked the centenary of the birth of Paul Kruger. Although not a supporter of Hertzog, Deneys Reitz, who was the Minister of Lands after 1920, provides an example of the trend towards linking Afrikaner heroes with a love of nature. Reitz had close connections with the republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal and had a sentimental attachment to the frontier history of the Afrikaner. He idealised the national park proposal as the realisation of 'Paul Kruger's dream' and stated that it was a national duty to preserve the landscape of the park 'just as the Voortrekkers saw it.' The Transvaal was credited with being the first state in Africa to have conserved its wildlife and that the creation of a 'volkspark' would be a fitting tribute. A politician who was an active Afrikaner nationalist and who had even closer connections with the Transvaal Republic was Grobler, who had replaced Reitz as Minister of Lands in Hertzog's cabinet. Grobler declared that 'it is due to the farsightedness of the late President Kruger that we are today able to establish a park.' Grobler was related to Paul Kruger and thus proud to be associated with what he considered to be the ideals of his forebear. Politically this was advantageous for him: as was pointed out by Stratford Caldecott, an artist who became the self-appointed chief propagandist for the national park campaign, 'the scheme can only give him [Grobler] popularity.' Grobler, in fact, claimed that the Kruger National Park had been founded on his initiative alone. Another nationalist politician who endorsed the project was Oswald Pirow.

In addition to attaching an Afrikaner cultural tradition to game protection, the Voortrekkker past was used by National Party politicians in order to gain the support of 'poor whites', whereas before Union poor Afrikaners were often accused of hunting out game to supply meat to urban markets, now their role was recast. Having been a divisive class issue during the existence of the South African Republic, game saving served to unite factions and classes within Afrikaner society in the years after the First World War. Although evidence abounds for enormous and irresponsible
destruction of game by early Boer settlers in the Transvaal, the emerging myth stated that 'Onder die verantwoordelike Voortrekkers was daar geen "biltongjagters" nie.'

Many English-speaking game protectionists - many of them former sportsmen - made use of these Afrikaner sentiments to lobby for the creation of a national park, a particular case in point being the issue which centred on the naming of the proposed park. In December 1925 Stevenson-Hamilton wrote to H.B. Papenfus, a Transvaal politician, that the 'Kruger National Park' would be an excellent name 'and would carry an atmosphere with it [that was] attractive and highly popular'. He asked whether this suggestion could be relayed to Grobler.

Privately, Stevenson-Hamilton was less tactful:

The man who really was responsible was R.K. Loveday ... but the "Kruger stunt" is I think of priceless value to us, and I would not for the world do aught but whisper otherwise ... I wonder what the old man, who never in his life thought of wild animals except as biltong, and who, with the idea that it did not matter much one way or the other, and in any case would not affect any one except the town sportsmen, gave way under strong pressure exercised by Loveday and one or two others and allowed the reserve to be declared. I wonder, I repeat, what he would say could he see himself depicted as the "Saviour of the South African game!!!"

Stevenson-Hamilton had been appointed to the post of warden of the government game reserves after the South African War and was thus acquainted with the many representations which were necessary before President Kruger put his signature to the establishment of a game reserve in the eastern Transvaal. The chief lobbyist in this connection had been R.K. Loveday, the Volksraad member for Barberton, who had badgered the President tirelessly to establish the reserve.

How the suggested name of the proposed park was publicised was also politically loaded. The name 'Kruger National Park' had been put forward formally at a meeting of the National Monuments Commission in December 1925 where it was considered that the 'suggestion would come gracefully from the opposition [English-speaking] press.' Some English-speakers were not appreciative of a politically opportunistic name for the park, preferring the title, 'South African National Park'. The comment was even made that 'if any person's name is to be used, a "National Milner Park" would be more
Grobler, of course, had no reservations on this score, and advised the Senate that 'in proposing to give the name of Kruger National Park to the reserve, Hon. Senators will agree with me that it is the right thing to connect President Kruger's name with the institution.'\textsuperscript{106} Kruger was not a particularly keen conservationist - he had been given the power to establish game reserves by proclamation but did not make use of this power until public pressure after the depletion of game by rinderpest had mobilised public opinion in favour of protection - but invoking the name of the republican president certainly touched the right emotional chord at the right time.\textsuperscript{107} Not only was the Hertzog government republican and Afrikaner nationalist, the name was also consistent with the Afrikaner view of saluting national heroes by naming monuments or institutions after them. For the English-speakers, the matter of the name was not seen as an important issue, except in so far as it served to whip up support for the establishment of the park itself.\textsuperscript{108}

Stevenson-Hamilton could not ally himself publicly with the national park campaign because neutrality was required of him as an official of the provincial government; he also fully expected to lose his job once the national park had been proclaimed.\textsuperscript{109} However, in Caldecott, who had no personal vested interest in the game reserve or national park, Stevenson-Hamilton found a mouthpiece. The two men had met when Caldecott had visited the Sabi Game Reserve in August 1925 in an endeavour to publicise railway tours of South Africa - one of which incorporated a trip through the game reserve.\textsuperscript{110} Caldecott also took up other 'national' causes: he was a member of the government commission concerned with the design of a new South African flag in 1926, he fought for the preservation of historical buildings and he was also involved in the establishment of a nation-wide wildlife protection society.\textsuperscript{111} He 'threw himself into the affairs of the new society [The Wildlife Protection Society of Southern Africa] and gave all his time and attention to it...'.\textsuperscript{112}

In an article in November 1925, Caldecott linked the names of an 'English
gentleman' (James Stevenson-Hamilton) and 'the great Afrikander' (Paul Kruger) suggesting that both had had a hand in fashioning a suitable site for a national park in South Africa. Associating these two men together demonstrates the desire of Caldecott and others to use the national park scheme to merge English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans by striving for a common ideal and in this way putting a divided past behind them. The newspapers concurred with this ideal, the Cape Argus noting that 'South Africa first' was one of the mottoes of the government and that the national park plan offered a good opportunity to put this ideal into practice. The Rand Daily Mail claimed that the national park question was not a party political but a 'national' question. Protectionism and the national park thus benefited from being able to advance the interests of both the separatist nationalist Afrikaners and the more reconciliatory movement to unite what was then known as 'both races'. On one occasion rivalry between the two groups surfaced when Afrikaners felt that the English-speakers were getting too much of the credit for initiating the idea of a national park. In order to overcome this problem, which threatened to jeopardise the campaign, Stevenson-Hamilton suggested to Caldecott they highlight English opposition. The two men were certainly deeply conscious of the political implications of their campaign.

All the daily newspapers in the country seem to have welcomed the formation of a national park and even vied with each other to be the scheme's greatest supporter, stressing the common heritage and values which wildlife represented for whites and how these could strengthen national unity. At the same time it was noted that the park would gain international recognition for South Africa and 'enhance and invigorate our prestige in foreign lands.' It was pointed out, too, how the South African 'character' had to some extent been moulded by the experience of hunting the wildlife of the region. Other appeals - reminiscent of the Transcendentalists in the United States - were to sentiment and the need for a 'fairyland' in which 'spiritual regeneration' could take place.
Caldecott, almost singlehandedly, orchestrated a massive national press and publicity campaign in order to win over public opinion. If anything, his efforts erred on the side of idealistic over-enthusiasm, and Stevenson-Hamilton at one time warned him not to ‘exaggerate too much’ or people would tire of the propaganda and actually be repulsed. Once the ball was rolling, however, publicity was self-generating and many newspapers and periodicals gave the national park issue extensive coverage. Organisations too, lent their weight to the project, for example the Boy Scout movement and the game protection associations around the country. Game protection associations played their part in marshalling sport hunters behind the national park and the national park issue eventually led to the federation of regional associations into a national protection society.

The involvement of Stratford Caldecott, an artist, in the campaign for a national park illustrates, too, how themes of nature were beginning to permeate South African aesthetics. He wrote, ‘Our civilisation spares so little beauty, and after all, beauty, to an artist, has more importance than, say economics’. Literature, rather than painting, was, however, still the chief expression of natural themes, the imperial tradition of the nineteenth century having been followed by hunting adventures in both English and Afrikaans. Afrikaans nationalistic poetry of the time dealt with the landscape more than wildlife, but poetry which celebrated the external influences on the Afrikaner character naturally also evoked to some degree the sentiments which facilitated the creation of the Kruger National Park and are encapsulated in the words of the national anthem of South Africa.

Having been dominated by the European indoor tradition, the visual arts in South African were being increasingly influenced at this time by the South African landscape. Wildlife photography made its serious debut during these years, although it might be argued that the growing ‘hunting’ for wildlife photographs was replacing sport hunting more than providing a means of creative expression.

The practical and financial advantages of a South African national park
were no longer disputed and augmented the sentimental, aesthetic and nationalistic arguments which were advanced in its favour. Aware that his party needed the support of rural Transvaalers, Grobler stressed that the land to be included was agriculturally unproductive and that the national park thus presented no threat to the economy.126 Whereas earlier arguments against the game reserves had focused on the value of the land, the economic emphasis now moved away from land values to the capital which could be generated from the exploitation of the wildlife it supported. Traditionally, African game had been considered lucrative only on account of the hunting fees, trophies and wildlife exports it could raise and recreational viewing (facilitated by the increasing popularity of private motor transport) was thus a novel form of resource utilisation.127 Following upon this, it was suggested that the creation of a national park would encourage rather than retard economic growth in the lowveld.128 The attraction of large numbers of tourists had been proved to be commercially rewarding in the United States and the probability that this would also prove true of South Africa was pointed out strongly both in parliament and in the popular press.129 The 'Round in Nine' tour of the eastern Transvaal offered by the railways had proved very successful and it was felt that the national park would offer unrivalled attraction to visitors, provided that as soon as possible an infrastructure was created to 'enable the South African and overseas public, under conditions of great safety and comfort, to view wild life as it existed in the sub-continent previous to the arrival of the white man.'130 Overseas visitors were considered to be most desirable, it being calculated that if ten thousand Americans visited each year the revenue to the park would be in the region of £1 million, 'a sum which should appeal to all South Africans' - according to Paul Selby, an American mining engineer stationed in Johannesburg and a keen conservationist.131 Other economic arguments which were used suggested that the national park would facilitate the domestication of elephant and eland, and would also lead to an increased supply of venison.132
Science was also to benefit from the creation of a national park in that extinctions of species, such as that of the quagga and blue antelope, would be prevented in future. As a group, however, scientists in South Africa had not facilitated game protection over the years and now did not express themselves publicly in favour of the park. Opinions came mainly from veterinarians at Onderstepoort who linked the existence of game with diseases of domestic livestock. They argued that patriotism and sentiment were behind the desire to save game and that the advance of agriculture was a more important goal. Stevenson-Hamilton was particularly worried by this because he was unable to convince these entomologists that nagana did not occur in the Sabi or Singwitsi Game Reserves and that the reserves were not merely a reservoir for cattle diseases. Stevenson-Hamilton thought that the agriculturally-orientated entomological lobby might be strong enough to influence adversely the farming members of the House of Assembly. Stevenson-Hamilton at one stage declared that he had lost all respect for scientists because of their behaviour in this connection. However, privately it seems that these scientists did not actually contest the founding of the park, but felt it their professional duty to sound a warning about the hazards of stock diseases, so that if outbreaks of such were to occur, they should not be blamed for having earlier remained silent. While scientists might have entertained reservations about game saving at this time, the irrevocability of animal extinctions, the amateur study of nature and the benefits of life in the countryside were emphasised in the Afrikaans press.

Conclusion
The creation of the Kruger National Park was thus not the result of a moral victory of the forces of enlightenment, but a combination of the political, social and economic circumstances of the time. Game protectionist attitudes reflected the prevailing concerns of the dominant classes and it was those which had once more become pre-eminent. On this occasion, however, it was aesthetics and sentiment, rather than the commerce or sport of earlier
decades, which had triumphed. In a show of solidarity, the National Parks Act was passed unanimously by both houses of parliament in May and June 1926.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{v}

The debate consisted largely of applauses and adulatory comments on the roles that Kruger and Stevenson-Hamilton had played in the inception of the park, and gratitude was also expressed to 'Providence that we have been given that locality to establish a national park in the interests of the preservation of our fauna.'\textsuperscript{140} In giving his blessing to the bill, Smuts, the leader of the opposition and always an expansionist, expressed the hope that the area of the park would eventually extend as far north as central Africa.\textsuperscript{141}

While politicians were congratulating themselves on the national park, idealists who had worked hard for this outcome — particularly Stevenson-Hamilton and Caldecott — were apprehensive and Caldecott wrote to the warden,

I understand that you have no stomach to see the place full of rubberneck waggons and tourists, but it was vulgarisation or abolition, I suppose, and it was at that price only that the animals could be saved. Perhaps a time of finer living and thinking is coming for those who will follow us and they will be thankful for that beauty saved for them.\textsuperscript{142}

As well as reflecting conditions in the mid 1920s in South Africa, in that the name 'Kruger' in the title was indicative of the cultural and class heritage which was being given expression in establishing the park, and the description 'national' being synonymous with 'white', the foundation of the Kruger National Park also heralded changes in environmental thinking. The vague ideas which had latterly underpinned the management of the game reserves were now made explicit: the concept of a national park was not preservationist, but conservationist. Henceforth the area would be managed for the benefit of white tourists and not purely in the interests of increasing the numbers of animals.

In addition, for the first time the physical environment was given consideration, and not just the game species which inhabited it. Ecological thinking which incorporated the notion that all species have a role to play in the natural environment had still to evolve fully, but in 1920 Stevenson-Hamilton, for example, began to feel repugnance for destroying some of what were then regarded as vermin species, particularly lion, remarking 'now I
think the nearer to nature the better in a reserve, so when I see a lioness
with her children, I feel like saying, "good luck to you"; and I think that
the ideal should be to show the country and the animals in it to the public
as God made both." Visitors agreed with him, and when the Kruger National
Park was opened to the public, it was generally the sight of lion which
proved to be the greatest attraction.

It was envisaged that visitors would be attracted to the park in order to
see wildlife in its natural habitat, and would thus experience to some degree
the frontier or pioneering past. It seems therefore to be true that in South
Africa, as in other countries, national parks were used as fantasy worlds,
enshrining the olden-day values of romantic nature by which society as a
whole could no longer afford to live. In many respects too, they represent
tokens of atonement for the killing of wildlife which had been done in the
past.

In exploring the idea that whites romanticised their past through the
natural landscape and its wildlife, one has to take cognisance of the fact
that whites chose to disregard the role that Africans had played in that
past. Black attitudes and interests were ignored altogether in the creation
of national parks. One can, however, argue in this respect that what the
national parks did accomplish as far as Africans were concerned was to deny
them the usage of a large portion of the Transvaal, a portion which was not
agriculturally useful at the time, to be sure, but which could nevertheless
have been used to supplement the very small area of land which was allocated
for their settlement. In South Africa it appears that the considerable black
resistance to the game reserves may actually have accelerated the formation
of the national park precisely because tighter central administration was
considered to be a deterrent to African occupation or usage of the area under
consideration. The new park must therefore be regarded as a means of
providing more effective control over both neighbouring Africans and the few
employees who resided within the park.

The establishment of the Kruger National Park came at a time when black and
white attitudes to game had polarised. Important though this observation is, it is possibly more significant in the final analysis that creating the national park provided tangible evidence of the unity of whites on game protection for the first time. The divisions of opinion which had been apparent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries between sportsmen, the landed and monied classes and 'poor whites' had been publicly resolved by declaring wildlife to be culturally and sentimentally important to all whites in equal measure and game viewing to be a legitimate form of resource exploitation. This protectionist conviction was generally moulded by the industrialisation of the country, the improved material circumstances and urbanisation of whites and the lack of opportunities for sport or commercial hunting on state land. Consequently, the foundation of the Kruger National Park represents a measure of the adoption by the white lower classes - those former biltong and subsistence hunters - as well as profligate sportsmen, of the views which were those of the elite. In this way, the establishment of the national park manifests an advance in political expediency as much as progress in conservation strategy.

2. D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme* (Johannesburg, 1983), p.16, argues that the full flowering of Afrikaner nationalism took place only after the economic depression in the early 1930s.


6. 'Conservation' may be defined as the management and utilisation of any resource in such a way as to ensure its perpetuation, while 'preservation' attempts to protect such a resource from all human intervention.

7. See Carruthers, 'Game protection in the Transvaal.


12. SAB [Union Archives] JUS [Department of Justice] JUS 3/671/11, District Commander, Rustenburg to Secretary Transvaal Police, 23 Apr. 1912, Imperial Secretary to Governor-General, 14 Aug. 1912.

13. TA TPS11 TA3087, vol. 1, Record of a meeting between Rustenburg Reserve Sub-Committee of the TLOA and Assistant Colonial Secretary, 18 Mar. 1910.

14. TA TPS11 TA3087, vol. 2, TLOA to Secretary to the Administrator, 18 Dec. 1911; vol. 3, TLOA to Administrator, 12 June 1912, Commissioner of Police to Provincial Secretary, 22 July. 1912, Rustenburg Magistrate to Provincial Secretary, 14 June 1912.


23. TA TPS7 TA3054, Stevenson-Hamilton to Provincial Secretary, 12 Feb. 1913, Provincial Secretary to Secretary for Lands, 11 June 1913; SAB LDE [Department of Lands] 288 3081, vol. 2, Secretary for Lands to Provincial Secretary, 10 Aug. 1916.


26. JPL TLOA Sub-Committee Minute Book, Minutes of 26 Sept. 1916. Elsewhere in the Transvaal land owning companies preferred to sell their unproductive farms rather than to attempt to develop them, see Morrell, 'Rural transformations', pp.36-9, pp.134-5.


30. WLS TGPA Minutes 1902-1920, Minutes of 7 Dec. 1910; TA TPS7 TA3054, TGPA Minutes of Annual General Meeting, 7 Nov. 1911.


32. TA TPS7 3054, Stevenson-Hamilton to Provincial Secretary, 26 Nov. 1911, Provincial Secretary to TGPA, 23 Feb. 1912.
33. Proclamation 48 of 1914 made provision for the area between the Groot Letaba and Olifants Rivers to be added to the Sabi Game Reserve, but the land was later transferred from the Sabi to the Singwitsi Game Reserve. By Proclamation 71 of 1923 the combined area was called the Transvaal Game Reserve.

34. TA TPS7 TA3054, Secretary for Lands to Provincial Secretary, 4 Feb. 1913, 4 Dec. 1913.


37. Report of the Game Reserves Commission, p.8

38. Stevenson-Hamilton, South African Eden, p.131; see also TA TPS8 TA3072, Sub Native Commissioner to Warden, 15 Oct. 1919.


40. TA TPS8 TA3006, Stevenson-Hamilton to Secretary to the Administrator, 13 Mar. 1911.

41. TA TPS8 TA3075, Annual Report of the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves for 1918.

42. TA TPS8 TA3075, Annual Report of the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves for 1912, 1913 and 1915.


45. The deproclaimed reserves were in Namaqualand in 1919, Gordonia-Kuruman in 1924, Umfolozi in 1920; the animal populations concerned were the elephant at Addo and the wildebeest of Natal: see H.H. Curson and J.M. Hugo, 'Preservation of game in South Africa', South African Journal of Science, 21 (1924) p.405, pp.414-16.


47. TA TPS5 TA3018, Report of the TGPA for the year ended 30 Sept. 1912.


49. TA TPS5 TA3037, Native Commissioner Piet Retief to Provincial Secretary, 27 Jan. 1921, Marx to Piet Retief Magistrate, 10 June 1920.

50. TA TPS5 TA33037, Provincial Secretary to Piet Retief Magistrate, 17 July 1920.

51. TA TPS5 TA3037, Minister of Lands to Administrator of the Transvaal, 23 Oct. 1920.

52. Proclamation 1 of 1921.

53. TA TPSB TA3075, Annual Reports of the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves for 1912-18.


56. KNP, H. Mockford, 'History of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association in the Kruger National Park'.

57. TA TPB784 TA3006, Stevenson-Hamilton to Secretary to the Administrator, 15 Feb. 1911; Wits A839, H.E. Schoch Papers, Db3, 30 July 1923.

59. SAB JUS294 3/710/20, Secretary for Justice to Provincial Secretary, 24 Sept. 1920.

60. Wits A839, H.E. Schoch Papers, Db3, 30 July 1923. In 1924 the problem was partially solved to the satisfaction of the game reserves by the introduction of 'movable lock-ups', these being transportable prison cells which could be moved around the reserve wherever labour was needed. This arrangement was ended in 1926 when an immigration agreement was concluded between Mozambique and South Africa which included an extradition treaty. Stevenson-Hamilton deplored this treaty, complaining that the reserve suffered in consequence from a labour shortage and that the steady stream of Mozambican trespassers had saved his reserve expenditure in the form of salaries of about £2 000 each year: KNP Opsiensersjaarverslae, vol. 2, Annual Report of the Warden, Kruger National Park, 1929.


65. Debates of the Legislative Assembly, cols 1425-1426, 24 July 1907.

67. TA TPS7 TA3018, Report of the TGPA for the year ended 30 Sept. 1912; WLS
TGPA Minutes 1902-1920, Annual General Meeting, 14 Jan. 1913; WLS WDGPA
[Western Districts Game Protection Association] Minutes 1886-1915, Minutes of
27 Sept. 1912.
68. TA TPS7 TA3054, Extracts from Annual Report of the TLOA, 1913; JPL TLOA
Sub Committee Minutes, Minutes of 13 Feb. 1913 and 13 May 1913.
69. Votes and Proceedings of the Provincial Council, 26 June 1913 to 25
Sept. 1913.
72. SAB LDE26 44/1, Smuts to Minister of Lands, 29 May 1914; TA TPS7
TA3054, Smuts to Rissik, 26 May 1914.
73. The commissioners were S.H. Coetzee, T.J. Kleinenberg (who was replaced
by J.F. Ludorf), A. Grant, C. Wade, F.A.W. Lucas and H. de Waal: Report of
the Game Reserves Commission, p.3.
75. WLS TGPA Minutes 1902-1920, Minutes of 15 Jan. 1919.
76. WLS H.B. Papenfus file, TLOA to Administrator, 19 Nov. 1919.
77. TA TPS7 TA3054, vol. 3, Memorandum of Provincial Secretary, 23 Sept. 1920.
78. TA TPS7 TA3054, vol. 3, Approval of memorandum by Executive Committee, 21
80. Rand Daily Mail, 15 May 1922; SAB LDE537 7748/1, vol. 1, Minute of
Department of Lands, 11 Oct. 1921.
81. SAB LDE537 7748/1, vol. 1, Private Secretary of the Minister of Lands
to Sommerville, 22 Feb. 1922.
82. SAB LDE537 7748/1, vol. 1, Secretary to the Prime Minister to Secretary
for Lands, 6 Nov. 1922.
83. TA TPS7 TA3054, vol. 3, Annual Report of the TLOA for the year ended 28
Feb. 1923; SAB LDE537 7748/1, vol. 1, Memorandum of the Department of
Lands, 19 Dec. 1922.
41

85. O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, p.34. Details of these land exchanges can be found in SAB LDE563-570.
87. Rand Daily Mail, 15 May 1922, 17 May 1922; TA TPS7 TA3054, vol. 3, Secretary for Lands to Provincial Secretary, 28 Sept. 1923.
90. O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, p.4, p.7.
91. I. Hofmeyr, 'Popularising history: the case of Gustav Preller', seminar paper presented to the African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Aug. 1987. It is significant that Preller was given a seat on the National Parks Board when this body was inaugurated in 1926.
94. House of Assembly Debates, cols 4366-4367, 31 May 1926.
95. CA [Cape Archives] A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(6), S. Caldecott to W.A. Caldecott, 4 Feb. 1926; House of Assembly Debates, col.4369, 31 May 1926.
96. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(4), Caldecott to Stevenson-Hamilton, 6 Mar. 1926.
98. KNP K5 KNPS, vol. 2, A.A. Schoch to Stevenson-Hamilton, 14 July 1924.
100. In connection with the divisive nature of protectionism, see S. Trapido, 'Poachers, proletarians and gentry in the early 20th century Transvaal', paper presented to the African Studies Institute at the University of the Witwatersrand, March 1984; and Carruthers, 'Game protection in the Transvaal'.

101. 'There were no biltong hunters among responsible Voortrekkers', see H.P.H. Behrens, 'Paul Kruger - wildbeskermer: aspek van president se lewe wat selfs sy biografe vergeet', Die Huisgenoot, 12 Oct. 1951, p.6.


103. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(4), Stevenson-Hamilton to Caldecott, 3 April 1926, the underlining is in the original.


105. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 1(1), W.A. Caldecott to S. Caldecott, 17 Jan. 1926; W.A. Caldecott to S. Caldecott, 14 Feb. 1926. Sir Lionel and Lady Phillips were vehemently opposed to the name, and Stevenson-Hamilton feared that Lady Phillips had 'ruined things' with Grobler by her objection; see Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(4), Caldecott to Stevenson-Hamilton, 24 Mar. 1926; S-HA, Diary entry 2 April 1926.

106. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(6), S. Caldecott to W.A. Caldecott, 4 Feb. 1926; The Senate of South Africa: Debates, col. 1079, 3 June 1926.

107. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(6), S. Caldecott to W.A. Caldecott, 4 Feb. 1926. See, Carruthers, 'Game protection in the Transvaal' for a full account of Kruger's role in the creation of game reserves in the Transvaal.
108. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(6), S. Caldecott to W.A. Caldecott, 4 Feb. 1926.


111. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(1), 4(1).


113. S. Caldecott, 'Create a national park!', *South African Nation* 2(85), 21 Nov. 1925.

114. Cape Argus, 11 June 1926; Rand Daily Mail, 21 Nov. 1925.

115. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(4), Stevenson-Hamilton to Caldecott, 23 Mar. 1926.

116. All four daily papers in the Cape favoured the formation of a national park; see CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(5), Caldecott to Wilson, 17 Dec. 1925. The Star, 20 Jan. 1926 also came out strongly in support, while the Pretoria News of 25 Nov. 1925 called the proposed park a 'national treasure'. Cape Argus, 11 Jan. 1926, letter from S. Caldecott.


118. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(4), Stevenson-Hamilton to Caldecott, 9 Jan. 1926; S-HA, Diary entry 22 Mar. 1926.

119. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(8), Baden Powell to Caldecott, 30 Sept. 1927.

120. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(4), Caldecott to Stevenson-Hamilton, 21 May 1926; see also volumes 2(5), 4(1), 4(2).

121. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection 2(4), Caldecott to Stevenson-Hamilton, 9 Jan. 1926.
122. The publication of J.P. Fitzpatrick's *Jock of the Bushveld* in 1907 had inaugurated this trend. An Afrikaans example is G.R. von Weilligh, *Dierestories*, but see particularly the work of A.A. Pienaar, who wrote under the name of 'Sangiro': see, J.C. Kannemeyer, *Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Literatuur* (Cape Town, 1978), pp.212-20.

123. For example, 'Die Vlakte' by Celliers: see Jan F.E. Celliers, *Die Vlakte en Ander Gedigte* (Cape Town, 1946) p.21.


125. The photographs of Paul Selby were widely distributed: see, for instance, *The Star*, 24 Mar. 1926.


129. *House of Assembly Debates*, cols.4367-8; *The Senate of South Africa: Debates*, cols.1080-2; *Die Burger*, 18 Dec. 1925, 25 Dec. 1925. While South Africans were familiar with conditions in national parks in the United States, Americans were not as knowledgable about South Africa. The Department of the Interior announced itself pleased with the 'formation of a great national Park and Gorilla Sanctuary in the Belgian Congo in South Africa': see National Archives of the United States, Record Group 79, Department of the Interior Memorandum for the Press, 10 Mar. 1924.


131. WLS H.B. Papenfus file, Selby to Papenfus, 4 Mar. 1926.


137. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(4), Stevenson-Hamilton to Caldecott, 10 Mar. 1926.


139. House of Assembly Debates, cols 4366-4381, 31 May 1926; The Senate of South Africa: Debates, cols 1077-1011, 3 June 1926.

140. House of Assembly Debates, col.4367, 31 May 1926.


142. CA A848, Stratford Caldecott Collection, 2(4), Caldecott to Stevenson-Hamilton, 22 June 1926.

143. S-HA, Diary entries 28 July 1920; 8 Jan. 1926.

