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Title: The Construction of Johannesburg slums as a 'Native Problem' in the 1910s.

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The construction of Johannesburg slums
as a 'Native problem' in the 1910s

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Of the approximately 105 000 African people living in Johannesburg at the close of World War One, about half (53 432) were housed and employed by the mines. A further 4 000 resided in the municipal compounds and locations.¹ Of the remainder, approximately 30 000 comprised domestic workers living in the white suburbs.² The balance (estimated to be in the region of 17 000),³ the bulk of the industrial workforce together with the unemployed, lived in the city between the railway line and the mine dumps. Africans from within the Union, along with Mozambicans, Swazis and Batswana lived in Johannesburg's cosmopolitan slums with immigrants from Cyprus, the United Kingdom, India and Greece. Even racially conscious South African officials had no way of categorising the spectrum of human colour found in Johannesburg. In South Africa, the racial division of urban space, and indeed racial identity itself, arose out of the experiences of racial mixing that occurred in the slums.

The complexity of Johannesburg's emerging urban crisis was accurately assessed in a journalist's 1915 observation that "Public health, social life, labour efficiency, the question of poor whites, and a dozen other matters relating to Johannesburg's future, are wrapped up in the problem of Rand slumdom."⁴ Within the space of a decade, and after years disrupted by war, an epidemic, strikes and civil unrest, there emerged perhaps the most racially repressive legislation anywhere in the world aimed at eradicating slums and controlling the pattern and extent of African urban settlement. Given the importance of urban segregation in defining the location and conditions under which South African people live, comparatively little is known about urban policy and why African people became the specific targets of segregationist action. My first objective in this paper is to demonstrate how constraints on African urbanisation contributed to the cities housing crisis. Secondly, I show that there were important physical, technical and demographic variations in the
residential conditions of the inner city urban poor. Finally I try to explain why, in imposing modern standards of urban government on Johannesburg, all the residential components of the inner city were designated as slums, and why the ‘slum problem’ was then artificially equated with one section of the urban poor, Africans.

The origins of the Johannesburg slumyards

The dimensions of Johannesburg’s slum problem were shaped by local conditions. The discovery of gold on the Rand in 1886 attracted a motley collection of fortune seekers who settled in the sizeable, but ephemeral camp of Johannesburg. A sustainable gold extraction industry was not established until the 1890s when deep-level rather than surface mining was introduced. Gradually the tents and tin structures of the prospectors made way for brick houses of artisans and managers. Even then, the residential development of Johannesburg was distorted by mining, which until the Second World War, loomed large in the local economy. Marginal levels of profit obtained from gold meant that the mines depended on migrant labour housed in compounds for the majority of the workforce. Compound housing was simultaneously adopted by the municipality, the second largest employer of labour. A modified compound arrangement was subsequently embraced by private sector employers of migrant labour. Thus, by the turn of the twentieth century very little working-class housing stock existed in Johannesburg.

The dramatic growth of Johannesburg’s population which was associated with the early twentieth century rise of manufacturing (Table 1) was not accompanied by widespread speculative building or even the owner-building that occurred at this time in places like Toronto. Given the more secure future of gold in the twentieth century (a limited but growing industrial sector successfully provided engineering services to the mines and clothing to miners), it is surprising that there was no construction boom on the Rand in the 1910 or 1920s. One possible explanation is that African workers’ wages were too meagre to pay an economic rent that would support any building activity.
The shortage of working-class housing associated with the growth of dense, overcrowded slum conditions can be accounted for by the mine owners’ stranglehold on land rights along the Reef. The centre of Johannesburg was only walking distance from the early prospecting sites. In order to protect future prospecting options the mining houses acquired extensive freehold in areas close to town. Once the settlement grew, these sites were ideally suited to working-class housing. After it became apparent that this ground was not required for mining purposes, leasehold rights were sold in locations where the rapid erection of cheap dwellings attracted the poor who placed a premium on accessibility. Additional houses became available as the more wealthy abandoned their temporary wood and iron homes that were continually blasted by the wind and mine sand, for more desirable locations along the ridges to the north of the reef. Many of the poorest quarters of eastern Johannesburg developed in either the decaying structures of early Johannesburg or in the limited number of speculator’s buildings constructed on mine-leased land. The mines leased rather than sold their property as they were mindful of the speculative potential of their land holdings. The high cost of inner-city land, the inferior quality of initial construction and the insecurity of tenure were often cited as the cause of residential blight in early Johannesburg. One further respect in which mine control of extensive tracts of land allegedly affected the quality of life of Johannesburg residents had to do with the system of rating. Before major reforms to the municipal rating system passed in 1916, the burden of municipal taxation was carried by individual property owners rather than the large land-owning mines.
The matter of the revenue that entered the Johannesburg Council Treasury account was a major source of contention when it came to apportioning blame for the evolution of Johannesburg’s slums. These were described polemically as amongst the worst in the world, and were undoubtedly the worst in the nation. The Johannesburg Council repeatedly asserted that it could not be expected to provide housing for all the people that the central government allowed into the city without the consent of the municipality. What lay behind the local authority’s frustration was the fact that revenues from African pass fees were paid to the Provincial and not the Municipal Authority. A more fundamental reason for the persistent refusal to construct locations as an alternative to slums was the conviction that white ratepayers should not have to fund services of any kind for blacks. The demand that blacks be excluded from city expenditure was particularly strong between 1917-1919 and 1921-1923 when the Labour Party dominated the City Hall. In subsequent years, with the ascendance to power of the white Ratepayers’ Associations, a rather different logic prevailed. Although segregated locations were still supported in principle, the cry that they be built ‘anywhere but in my back yard’, and from national not local money, retarded any effective black housing programme in the city.

The paucity of housing provision for blacks, and the concomitant development of slums in Johannesburg in the first two decades of the twentieth century, is partially explained by the white supremacist attitudes prevalent in city government. Yet, even when the Council did motivate slum clearance, it encountered procedural obstacles regardless of the race at which the anti-slum action was directed. One reason was the bureaucratic muddle that surrounded urban planning. The post-Union administrative structure confused the issue of which level of government was responsible for anti-slum legislation. It took some ten years to establish that the Provincial Council could regulate conditions governing the closure of insanitary premises (achieved in the 1916 Transvaal Ordinance that greatly enhanced the Council’s powers to manage Johannesburg slums), while only Parliament could set urban ‘Native’ policy (the legal benchmark in this respect was the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923). The growth of slums in Johannesburg was not simply the product of inadequate management powers, it was also the direct consequence of the bizarre legal restrictions on African urban residence that were in turn an ad hoc response to the lack of housing provision in the city.
Under the 1906 Johannesburg Municipal Ordinance the Council had the power to force Africans to live in municipally controlled compounds or locations. Until World War One Klipspruit was the sole African location run by the Johannesburg Council. It was not a favoured place because of the long journey to the city and the appalling conditions in which people lived.  

Situated on a disused sewerage works, Klipspruit was unpopular with employers as well as employees. The distance and the infrequent train service (only twice daily) meant it was unrealistic to expect African staff who lived at Klipspruit to work a long day or overtime. In an effort to accommodate the demands of the manufacturers and traders for a flexible workforce, the Council evolved a plan of granting exemption certificates to African employees who worked before 7 a.m. or after 6 p.m. In addition, African workers were allowed to live on employers’ premises without permits, providing the Council had approved the standard of proposed accommodation. A loop-hole in the regulations meant that “employers’ premises” included any employer-hired venue. Africans were therefore effectively excused from living at Klipspruit not only to live on factory sites, but to reside at any address where an employer hired rooms for his or her workforce.

By 1918 some 6 000 Africans were housed on factory sites by their employers and therefore required no exemption certificates (see Table 2 for 1915 figures). A minority of employers allowed Africans to find their own accommodation and facilitated this process by applying for exemption certificates for them. More commonly, Africans were left to find their own lodgings without the protection of employers supporting their permit applications. The permit itself cost only one shilling so it was an unlikely deterrent to employer support. Perhaps the burden of the paperwork was greater than the inconvenience of having workers arrested and prosecuted for illegal town living. As far as the City Council was aware, few employers “cared a damn” where their labourers lived as long as they arrived at work on time. In 1915 only 369 of the 7 500 Africans enumerated in the Johannesburg yards had permission to hire private rooms. Almost half these were located in the slum districts of Ferreirastown, Marshalls, and City and Suburban that lay between the mining ground and the city. The balance of exempted Africans, bar very few inner-city residents, lived in the Doornfontein area. The largest concentration of cheap private rooms was in the Malay Location, despite the fact that no permits were issued to Africans to live there (Fig. 1).
Table 2: 1915 Survey of African and 'coloured' occupation of slumyards.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Type of accommodation</th>
<th>Permit</th>
<th>No Permit</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>4279</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>women</td>
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<tr>
<td>total</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Africans on premises hired by their employers</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>180</td>
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<tr>
<td>women</td>
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<td>men</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>2492</td>
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Especially after 1913, unless African men could prove their marriage under Christian law, they generally refused permits and were directed to the Salisbury and Jubilee compound. The Council struggled to fill the 2 500 beds, even after housing its own employees. The slums were more expensive (about three times the price of the compound), but were nonetheless more desirable places to settle than the locations and compounds. The majority of African town residents were therefore illegal (Fig. 6.2). Compared to the inconvenience of Klipspruit and the constraints of the Salisbury and Jubilee compound, the slumyards, even when tainted by the threat of police harassment, were an attractive destination for urbanising Africans. For single women there was little
choice but to eke out a survival in the city, for there were no African women’s compounds until 1929, and Klipspruit only offered housing to nuclear families. Demand explains the high densities, but not the low quality of the accommodation available to blacks in ‘white Johannesburg’.

Figure 2: Proportion of Africans living in yards with permits, 1915.


Slums evolved because the exemption system was widely abused. Although most manufacturing firms (some of which employed as many as 200-300 people), did provide rudimentary housing for their staff, few of the cartage, warehouse or retail businesses did so and
this segment of the labour force was over-represented in the illegal yard population. There were instances in which prospective landlords manipulated the exemption clauses by posing as an employer to ensure tenant 'legality' outside the location and to encourage Africans to pay the inflated rentals. Alternatively, rent was supplied as part of a contract to hawk liquor or other illegal merchandise for the landlord. Even the Council abused its own condition that Africans only occupy sanitary housing.

The case of Ridgeway's yard in City and Suburban is a fairly typical example of how abuse of the exemption certificate system bred slum conditions in Johannesburg. In September 1907 an application was lodged for 'Sam', a watchman employed by the South African General Mission, to live in town with his wife and child so he could open the hall for evening religious meetings. A satisfactory sanitation inspection report was submitted and it was established that a white supervisor lived on the premises. After two months the Council granted the exemption "provided no well founded complaint" of Sam's family's behaviour was received. In the intervening weeks Sam had taken occupation of one of Mr Ridgeway's rooms where he quickly brushed against the law for living illegally outside the location. Despite the presence of illegals like Sam, the City Council continued to issue permits for Africans to let rooms in Ridgeway's yard. Six months after Sam's application, Littlejohn's Carriageworks employed a striker, but as their own compound was already full, applied for the Smithers family to be housed at Ridgeway's yard. It does seem though, that before 1910 the practice of granting exemption for the Ridgeway rooms was carefully monitored and applied sparingly. Even the police allowed some of their staff to move out of staff quarters to move into Ridgeway's yard.

Ridgeway's premises became popular and soon he expanded the number of people living on site. The yard must have held considerable benefits: an African named "Philemon" rated moving into the yard more important than keeping his job, possibly because it meant he could live with his family. Philemon's employer opposed his exemption because she wanted him to live on her property where she could supervise his movements, and so the Council refused his application. Philemon left his job and took illegal occupation of one of Ridgeway's rooms. Despite this, Philemon's wife, Evelina, was given a three month permit to live with him in Ridgeway's yard.
Council vigilance in restricting yard occupation to Africans who were employed in the city, and who could be assured of clean quarters, had begun to slip.

The African practice of renting rooms in yards, even without permits, became more common as the demand for shelter became more acute with the growth of industry in Johannesburg. As greater numbers of women migrated to Johannesburg, fewer legal shelter options were available and the yards became a more important source of housing for Africans. Deteriorating sanitary conditions cannot, however, be ascribed simply to illegal African settlement in Johannesburg. Not all African yard residents were illegal. For example, the Council continued to issue permits for Ridgeway’s yard and must therefore have approved the sanitary conditions encountered during routine inspections of the property. Periodic raids at the request of the police identified unexempted Africans who were prosecuted for transgressing the law. If the case of Ridgeway’s yard is in any way indicative, the Council appears to have chosen to ignore the growing density and declining standards of the yards until conditions finally reached unacceptable levels of filth, disease and/or crime. Less than ten years after the MOH issued the first known permit for an African to reside in Ridgeway’s yard, the property was condemned as unfit for human habitation. The three 50 x 50 foot stands that made up the yard were found to have 25 wood-and-iron rooms of such defective structure that total demolition was required.

The granting of exemption permits began as a pragmatic way of mediating between the principle of segregated African locations that had long been accepted in Johannesburg, and establishing a steady supply of labour to Rand industry. Official condonation of compound-like residential quarters servicing the factories, mines and shops of the cities established a nucleus of yards in the central Johannesburg area. Some of these compounds were at the rear of factories; other compound accommodation was established close to the place of employment. Monitoring the health and safety of both types of shelter was the responsibility of the employer rather than the Municipality. By contrast, if an employer did not run a factory compound, s/he could endorse a worker’s application to rent rooms in a ‘private yard’ under the exemption system. Exemptions failed to cater for more than a minority of Africans, and most African residents of private yards were illegal. These yards grew as fast, if not faster than the compounds attached to work places. Together, the compounds
and the yards, and to some extent the doss houses favoured by poor whites, constituted Johannesburg's slums.

The presence of so many black people in the inner-city of white Johannesburg undoubtedly lay at heart of white Johannesburg’s demands that government solve the ‘native housing problem’ and clear the city slums. The resultant framework of urban African policy laid down under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 survived some 60 years with only minor amendments. Current town planning practice has its antecedents in the anti-slum legislation forged in the opening decades of this century. Unquestionably, the form of legislation drew heavily on the Johannesburg experiences in the 1910s. In order to fully understand the nature of the protest against urban Africans it is useful to establish a clearer picture of the social and physical conditions of the slumyards of Johannesburg.

Conditions in Johannesburg’s backyards

Despite the prevalence of yards and compounds in Johannesburg, few of the city’s affluent had much sense of where black people lived in the city. A shopping expedition to respectable downtown department or specialist stores avoided the worst residential blight that was concentrated around the rim of the city centre (Fig. 3). The slums were not hidden just because of their predominantly industrial locations; even in an appropriate district, a casual observer may not have been fully aware of the extent of slum quarters. A contemporary journalist warned:

You may pass them every day and never notice them. You may see an iron fence on one side of the street, and cut in that fence an unobtrusive little door; or you may observe a little alleyway, apparently leading to the back of a private house or shop. Follow it up, or pass through that little door, and you are in a different world... In the yards are hidden the girls who have run away from home, the women who have left their husbands, the victims of the passions of white men, the low Indian trader, the magician, the purveyor of infamous photographs, the ubiquitous liquor dealer.

Typically, the worst slum properties were situated to the rear of a more formal structure, either a house or a factory. Rows of wood-and-iron rooms, often with a separate entrance for each, were erected around the perimeter of the stand. Normally each room was individually let, but
extortionate rentals encouraged sub-letting. In fact the letting of rooms in yards was allegedly the most lucrative form of property dealing in Johannesburg. One year’s rental was generally greater than the value of the entire property. The corollary of the huge profits made by landlords and owners was that blacks paid at least half their monthly income on rent or were forced to supplement legitimate earnings with illegal work in order to pay the rent.

Figure 3: Location of pre-World War One yards.

In return for a monthly rental of between 10s and £1, a white person was guaranteed a boarding house bed. For the same money a black family could expect a ‘private’ room with shared cooking, cleaning and sanitary facilities. In the open courtyards fires were lit and this was the space used for the brewing, selling and consumption of liquor. Poor construction meant that partitions between the tiny rooms (on average 9 x 9 feet, but often smaller) rarely reached the hessian ceilings. A regular complaint of both inhabitants and health officials concerned the poor drainage of the yards. Spectacular highveld thunderstorms brought downpours that would cause water to rush into
the rooms whose floor levels were below that of the outside courtyard. As many floors were made from mud or dung, flooding was both inconvenient and unhealthy.

The quality of life in the cell-like structures that made up the slums was further inhibited by poor ventilation. Reporters and inspectors often complained of the dangers afforded by the cramped and overcrowded conditions. Police too objected to the maze of quarters through which they were expected to wander in order to find suspects. Yet it is clear that many slum residents kept their homes remarkably clean, especially given the adverse conditions under which they laboured. There was, however, a general problem with refuse removal and sewerage connection. Yards were rarely connected to the municipal sewerage system and even if they were, the large number of illegal occupants meant the system was severely overloaded. Likewise, the compounds built for non-residential purposes were inhospitable domestic establishments.

Slum dwellings varied enormously. Some properties that were condemned had as few as 3 outside rooms. More typically a 50 x 50 foot stand would have 10-12 rooms. Really large yards that stretched across several stands with 80-100 rooms were not uncommon. The large yards were often named after a proprietor, as in the case of Malcolm Reid's yard or Thornton's. Other yards were named after functions with which their occupants were associated. The 'Evening Chronicle' or 'Congress' yards are two examples. The most important differences between slums depended on whether it was a 'compound' run by an employer, or if it was one of the 'private' yards that were generally run by immigrant Jews in the eastern and central region, and Indians in the Malay Location.

One difference between an employer's compound and the private yards was their location. By far the most important cluster of private rooms was in the Malay Location; other concentrations were in the southern swathe of Ferreirastown, Marshalls, and City and Suburban, as well as the northern and southern suburbs. To a limited extent, the near eastern districts around Doornfontein and the city centre were also noted locations of private yards. In other portions of the city, notably Braamfontein, Burghersdorp, Jeppestown, North Doornfontein and Berea, there was virtually no private residential letting. These townships assumed a more uniform commercial or industrial
land-use, and so compounds were the more common residential form. The Malay Location was
the largest single slum area, but the districts that abutted the CBD to the south and east were almost
as populous. In both these regions the occurrence of compounds and yards was approximately the
same (Figs. 1 and 3).

Across the city the pre-World War One slum population was divided roughly equally into those
who lived either on their employers' premises (or in rooms hired by their employers), and those
who hired rooms themselves. The racial occupation of compounds and yards varied significantly.
The former were occupied predominantly by Africans. In 1915 less than ten per cent of the residents
of employers' yards were not African (the census enumerated only 455 coloureds relative to 5 004
Africans). Officially these quasi-compounds were also overwhelmingly male. The 1915 survey
makes clear the dominance of migrancy and the very minimal allowance made by private sector
employers for African family life outside of the location. Of the 6 000 Africans living in employer
controlled yards, just over 300 were female (Table 2).

Family life was not uniformly restricted in all Johannesburg slums. In the southern suburbs
where more than two thirds of African slum occupants lived on their employers premises, the sex
ratio was approximately even (45:51). There were 51 children enumerated in the district. However,
the census in this case included the black freehold suburbs of Sophiatown and Newclare (Fig. 1),
and so it may well have been that the 'employers' were in fact landlords, although it is possible that
black employers were more sympathetically inclined to housing dependents. Similarly, in the other
officially black quarter of the Malay Location the numbers of African women and children relative
to those of men were considerably higher than those of the Johannesburg yard average which was
approximately 6:1 (Table 2).

Among the occupants of the private yards the ratio of African men to African women was
notably higher than in the employer-controlled housing, however it was by no means equal.
African women's later and slower arrival in cities, as well as their predominance in the slums,
reflects their exclusion from the formal capitalist labour force and accounts for their influence on
the informal economy of the city. The economic and social position of coloured women is more
difficult to assess. Washerwomen, prostitutes and domestic servants in the early twentieth century are all known to have included colou redes in their ranks, but it is unclear if they maintained these niches as African women entered the urban labour market. Within the slums they were a significant constituency, outnumbering coloured men. In the private yards there were as many coloured as African women. The large total coloured population in the inner-city (Fig. 6.4) suggests a relatively undisturbed pattern of family life within the slums.

Figure 4: African and coloured population of slumyards, 1915.

Unfortunately, the Council's 1915 survey of slums, despite its detail, did not include whites or Indians. From other sources it would seem sensible to conclude that single young whites, men and women, would have been overly represented in the yards. Indian families, due to the racist restrictions placed on their residential and trading location, would have lived in the poorest sections of town (Fig. 5). Among the Johannesburg Indian community there were, however, both landlords and tenants.

The degree of control in employers' compounds should have been high as workers risked losing both their job and their shelter through any misdemeanour. Curiously, as employers needed no permit to house their own staff, roughly 5 per cent of the African population on employers' properties were illegal because they did not have permits. Presumably these were friends or family of workers, unless the employers were letting out spare capacity illegally. Under the 1906 Municipal Ordinance employers were not subjected to health inspections in the same way as commercial residential concerns once they had obtained permission to house workers and had the premises inspected. In consequence, the conditions of these employer-supervised yards was often as poor as those run by slumlords. Industrialists argued that as the future of this housing arrangement was insecure they could not be expected to invest in costly, formal-quality structures for workers. Descriptions of conditions that were unfit for animal, let alone human habitation, were applied as readily to employer compounds as to slumlords' yards.

Unlike the compounds, many of which were no more than poorly adapted industrial sheds, the private yards were more residential in character and were marked by racial heterogeneity. In 1938 the clustering of multi-racial slum housing was described thus:

Ferreirastown and Prospect Township degenerated to such an extent that few respectable European persons would rent any of the ramshackle, filthy hovels which make up the large area of these slums. They became the dwellings of aliens - Assyrians, Chinese, Indians and Peruvians, and eventually natives.

The status of 'respectable European' rather than 'poor white' seems to have hinged on whether or not one escaped the slum yards or lived in the doss houses. Whites clearly did live in the slums and
their numbers were sizeable, though not as high as the Labour Party projected in their campaign for white housing assistance. Of the 2 000 people living in condemned buildings in 1918, a quarter were white. Like the coloured population, which was numerically larger than even Africans living in yards, whites were rarely housed by private sector employers unless they were compound supervisors.

Although there is very strong evidence of ethnic clustering among Indian and coloured families who were the registered occupants or owners of houses (Fig. 5), within the slumyards there appears to have been considerable racial mixing. Miscegenist paranoia fed off reported incidences of "promiscuous herding" of Indians, Malays, whites and "kafir people" all apparently "living in friendly terms". White men sometimes married or co-habited with coloured women in slums where the cost of living was lower than in the suburbs, and where social pressure to conform to racially homogenous living was certainly less. Surveys of individual yards reveal that although it was common for Indians or coloureds to live in the same yards as Africans, they generally occupied their own rooms. In Posel's yard on Marshall street, for example, a white family occupied the cottage fronting onto the street. A kitchen and room behind the cottage was let to "a white man" and similar facilities to the rear were let to a family of six "Syrians". To the west of these buildings were individual structures that housed 4 coloureds, 2 Indian men, 5 French speaking "Native Madagascans", a coloured women, 4 Africans with permits, and the owner's domestic servant. There were also two unoccupied rooms.
The problems of the slums

Objections to the slums were numerous. Complaints centred on the proximity of blacks to whites, and there was widespread anxiety about health, crime, labour productivity and political instability. Each of these concerns was voiced by a range of organisations and individuals, but particular people placed different emphasis on why the slums should be removed. Reflecting the shifting local and international political climates, there were distinct periods in which either crime, health, or the labour question were the primary objections raised to the persistence of the slums.

Racism infused almost every complaint about the poor suburbs, but until the 1920s it was rare for overt cultural prejudice to be expressed publicly without supplementary evidence being cited about either the lazy ways, unhygienic habits or drunken behaviour of the offending group. A notable exception was the case made by the infamous attorney, Col. Stallard, who argued for the removal of an African ‘compound’ from the affluent northern suburb of Orchards on the grounds
that "a congregation of natives in a spot constitutes a nuisance per se, even though the conditions are not insanitary". Racial attitudes hardened so dramatically that by 1923 Stallard's were not minority opinions and African settlement in urban areas was made conditional on total physical separation and also the legal constraint of impermanence.

In the early twentieth century, the principle of residential segregation was not a morally contestable position. Liberal whites and even Africans agreed on its inevitability and even desirability. What was at stake were the conditions under which black people were to live in the cities. During the 1910s the almost exponential growth of the urban African population greatly influenced attitudes to the desirable outcome of segregation policies. Slums came to be seen as African enclaves and as an African problem, though demographically Africans were not even in the majority in urban slums in Johannesburg.

Sanitary problems

Plague, tuberculosis and smallpox were only some of the life-threatening diseases known to have originated within the slum districts of Johannesburg in the early twentieth century. As the locus of poverty, the largely black slums became known as "nurseries of infection" whose continued existence was perceived to threaten not only public health, but also public morals. Around the time of the "Black Peril" scare of 1912, when several white women were attacked by black men, dozens of letters were written to the press on the subject. These white citizens, who styled themselves pretentiously with pseudonyms such as "Sanitas" or "Medico", sought to alert the white public, but more especially the Council, to conditions among urban blacks that they perceived to be endangering the quality of life of the white electorate. One or two contributors suggested the upgrading of black areas, but most sought redress in moving "the plague spots" as far away as possible from the centre of town. The miasmatic belief that disease was transmitted by physical proximity underscored the virulent European opposition to even segregated locations and compounds within the city limits.
In their outrage over the threat that the slums presented to their well being, the white public both blamed and implored the Council to solve the problem of insanitary housing.\textsuperscript{7,6} To some extent the Council, in the person of Dr Porter the Medical Officer of Health (MOH), was a receptive audience. The MOH, however, had a very rigid interpretation of the conditions which challenged public health. His concern to alleviate overcrowding and improve ventilation provided the energy to find a legal path that would allow the municipality to recover from numerous unsuccessful attempts to rid Johannesburg of slums.\textsuperscript{7,7} Yet, even after extensive research into appropriate planning legislation, successive amendments to Transvaal laws failed to allow the ready closure of buildings. In addition to consulting the English experts as he had done so often in the past,\textsuperscript{7,8} Porter began to exchange views with professionals in Johannesburg. In particular, he developed a close association with Dr Orenstein, the American-born sanitary officer employed by Rand Mines. They might well have met at the Rand Club which they both frequented and where Orenstein later lived.\textsuperscript{7,9}

Through his acquaintance with Orenstein, Porter came to be associated with the Citizen's Alliance for Liquor Reform and the Rand Social Services League,\textsuperscript{8,9} both organisations expressly concerned with urban African living conditions. In choosing these political allies Porter was forced to compromise on his belief that the slum problem could not be equated with an urban African problem. Nobody believed more firmly in the imperative of managing the non-Africans in the slums than Porter.\textsuperscript{8,1} Even in official reports, his contempt for the poor-white and coloured slum occupant was as poisonous as his dismissal of Africans:

This slum-like property swarms with low-class white and coloured people and their children; their habits are swinish in their filthiness ...the condition of a previously cleaned yard is often not altogether incomparable after 24 hours' subsequent habitation to that of a kraal in which a number of animals have been driven and kept for a similar period.\textsuperscript{8,2}

The compromise reached between the MOH and the reformers seems to have been that he would supply them with information required to authenticate their descriptions of urban African conditions, in return for supportive press coverage of his need for extended powers of slum
clearance. Porter edited several of the press releases issued by the reformers and supplied them with advance copies of his reports. Numerous press reports issued by the Citizen's Alliance and the Social Service League in 1915 balanced the critical picture they had painted of urban blight in Johannesburg by absolving the MOH "who has done all in his power", but who ought to have had "greater powers" to solve the slum problem.

The alliance between the MOH and the urban reformists was founded on mutual agreement that it was virtually impossible to keep Johannesburg healthy or to clear the city slums until location housing for the displaced African population was constructed. In this respect they challenged the Labour Party who refused to accept state funding for African shelter in Johannesburg. Yet there was not consensus between the Council's most influential full-time bureaucrat and the reform alliance on slum policies. Unlike the varied membership of the Reform Alliance which prioritised the resolution of the African housing problem, the MOH saw quite clearly that the slums would not vanish if cleared of Africans. He warned:

"Councillors and others interested in this question must bear in mind that even these measures (forcing Africans into locations and compounds) will not touch the "coloured" persons, nor the low-class whites, who are just as bad as the natives, and often worse."

Despite these admonitions, the English-language press increasingly promoted the relocation of African slum residents as the solution to the urban sanitary problem. The urgency with which this argument was presented intensified as there was virtually no provision of shelter until Western Native Township and Wemmer hostel were opened. Only then did the Public Health Committee instruct the MOH to lift the 1917 moratorium on the prosecution of Africans who had been evading the exemption permit system and were living illegally in the yards.

Paradoxically, renewed action to control the extent of slum development, as opposed to reducing the number of Africans in slums, also took place in 1917 when several properties were condemned under the long-awaited 1916 Provincial Ordinance. In his enthusiasm to ensure that this law would be upheld by the courts, Porter sought test cases from landlords whom he knew
would challenge the closure of their properties, and he returned from war service to testify personally in court. Ironically, after pushing so hard for others to acknowledge that slums would not disappear even if Africans could be excluded from all condemned property, Porter had to concede that the simple power to close buildings was useless in upholding health and housing standards. In the absence of alternative accommodation, the slum population of Johannesburg, and especially the illegal population of the Malay Location, expanded during World War One. In the major slum districts rent profiteering flourished and exacerbated the harsh conditions of the yards. The powers that Porter had fought so hard to obtain were selectively applied, usually in the marginally-respectable boarding-house districts in the north eastern sector of the city.  

Crime and labour productivity

The Cape Parliamentarian John X. Merriman once dubbed Johannesburg "the University of crime". The description stuck for good reason. The slum-underground thrived on illicit gold dealing, prostitution and theft, but the most lucrative of all forbidden activity involved the illegal brewing and selling of liquor. To date the literature on traditional liquor has emphasised the place of Africans who brewed and sold "skokiaan" and "cali", both variations on traditional beer made more potent through the addition of either sugar (generally in the form of golden syrup) or alcohol (brandy or methylated spirits). Yet, in Johannesburg the prohibited preparation of liquor for sale to Africans depended on white and coloured people who grew and ground malt. Commenting on the futility of targeting only distribution networks, the sub-Native Commissioner remarked:

I have seen yards equipped with vats for soaking the grain, drying floors for it to sprout, and oil engines which run mills which grind the corn...The chief reason so many Native women make a living by the Kaffir beer traffic is because of the facilities they have for procuring the malt ready ground.  

The critical ingredient in skokiaan was "white man's liquor", so-called because Africans could not purchase it from bottle stores. The flourishing black market was a major area of contact between Africans and whites in the slums. Prohibitionists and segregationists joined forces to announce that
miscgenation was enhanced by the illicit liquor trade and that the brewing of "Kafir beer" in the slums should be curtailed, preferably by removing the African women who brewed the beer and the African men who drank it.\(^9\)\(^3\)

Liquor syndicates were generally controlled by white men, but the face-to-face sales were the preserve of white women, "generally of the bywoner class".\(^9\)\(^4\) Extra money could be made by selling sex as well as drink. Surprised by this evidence, the Chairman of the Assaults on Women Commission asked a witness for confirmation: he assured the Commission that "they do a lot of it". Corroborating evidence was supplied by two law enforcement officials, one of whom revealed:

On the Rand, male and female Europeans of the lowest class are constantly traveling about the locations, and most of them are not traveling for any good purpose, but with the object of selling liquor to the natives and demoralising them. Sometimes this selling takes place in the evening where the native male and the European female will be alone, and what takes place between the two in a lonely place nobody knows.\(^9\)\(^5\)

The abuse of white women by black men, such as occurred in the "Black Peril" scare, was another alleged result of the sale of liquor to Africans. Some suggested that, having experienced white women who welcomed his advances, the "untutored" African would be unable to distinguish those white women who were not similarly amenable.\(^9\)\(^6\) Others objected to African liquor consumption because men, black or white, were allegedly unable to control their sexual desires when inebriated.\(^9\)\(^7\)

Once the frenzied white anxiety around the Black Peril died down, the tone of objection to African liquor consumption began to change. The mines in particular launched an attack on the uninhibited consumption of cali, the concoction that allegedly increased the incidence of pneumonia among Africans.\(^9\)\(^8\) The church, and a small, but active white philanthropic group, stressed the deleterious impact of liquor on tribal ways and advocated total prohibition.\(^9\)\(^9\) The loudest opposition to liquor came from the police and those responsible for crime prevention.
Limited policing powers and the prevalence of brewing meant that unusual measures were adopted in the fight to prevent brewing.

Anti-crime drives in the slum-yards were conducted under the guise of sanitary inspections during which the confiscation and prosecution for illicit offences was the major objective. The police required the presence of a health official before they could enter the yards. Quite often the police initiated the time and destination of the raids. This ambiguous role caused a certain amount of tension, as after a full day’s work the sanitary inspectors would have to go on a midnight expedition to the yards. If there was any reluctance from the Health Department to participate in the monitoring of yards, the police would notify the local white Councillor who would lodge a complaint. An obligatory inspection would follow. In late 1914 and early 1915 the load became so acute that the MOH requested additional temporary staff specifically to assist the police in liquor raids. When the yards were occupied by Africans with permits, or were in a satisfactory sanitary condition, the Health Department was technically powerless as these were the only two criteria on which the Health Officers could force evictions. Police brutality on late night raids when personal possessions were broken open “with considerable roughness”, caused hardship to African people. They also embarrassed the MOH who was eventually forced to withdraw his support of the sanitary inspectors following complaints from the Transvaal Native Congress. While the MOH appears to have recognised that the raids were futile in the light of minimal alternative housing for evicted Africans, on numerous occasions he acquiesced to police requests for raids and evictions.

In the case of Brown’s yard, a large Doornfontein property of 7 city stands with over 80 wood-and-iron rooms, the police recorded over 200 criminal offences (ranging from rape and theft to impersonation of the police and the evasion of location bye-laws) in less than a year. The yard, widely know as “one of the worst in the eastern district” because liquor was so freely available, was always clean. In cases like Brown’s yard, the MOH was nevertheless sympathetic to police requests to evict criminals and he therefore revoked the permits of the “worst families” on dubious technicalities. Better police access to Brown’s yard was also facilitated by the MOH’s insistence on the physical rearrangement of the yard into quarters, and by coercing the white owner into
co-operating with the police or risk losing all legal African tenants though the refusal and revoking of permits for the yard. In the 1914 purge of Brown’s yard the Council revoked 29 permits, and the landlord “voluntarily” evicted a further 17 families. Once police clearance was obtained, some of the Council’s initial evictions were overturned and several families were allowed to return to Brown’s yard.\textsuperscript{105}

Liquor was not only central to the problem of crime in the slums, it was also perceived to undermine labour productivity. In the early 1910s the impact of slum drinking and associated miscegenation was linked to the deterioration of the moral and physical fibre of white workers. By the end of the decade, once African men were more important in the mining and manufacturing labour force, only the moral consequences of white men’s drinking were of any concern.\textsuperscript{106} Conversely, with their increasing importance in the workforce, there was a dramatic escalation in the campaign to prevent African alcohol consumption. Indians and coloureds are almost totally absent from discussions about liquor, possibly because many were Moslem, but more likely because they were under-represented in the major formal-employment niches of Johannesburg.

On the mines, alcohol-induced absenteeism and accidents had long been a major problem. Between one and five per cent of staff were unable to work on Mondays. In the five years between 1913 and 1917 the mines lost an average of 2 206 shifts per month (1.35 per cent of the total worked) to alcohol abuse.\textsuperscript{107} Despite the ban on African consumption of alcohol, employers of more than fifty people were licensed to brew their own low-alcohol traditional beer. The importance of drink in attracting labour to particular mines meant that compound brewing was ubiquitous and many mine managers turned a blind eye to worker efforts to increase the strength of the brew. In 1913/1914, however, the labour unrest across the Rand provided police with an opportunity to clamp down on prohibition abuse on mine properties. Moodie argues that the success of the Native Affairs Department in forcing the mines to curtail brewing pushed tens of thousands of mine workers out of the mines and into the slums, especially on weekends. Previously miners seem to have preferred to spend leisure time with other miners on mine property.\textsuperscript{108} Once the liquor that was an integral part of African social life was more readily available in the town yards, miners began to frequent the slums.\textsuperscript{109}
It is no co-incidence that prohibitionist agitation and the demand for the removal of Africans from the slums intensified at the outbreak of the First World War. Police action against brewers escalated in the summer of 1914/1915. By winter, a major press campaign (ably abetted by the MOH)\textsuperscript{110} was underway to overcome Council inertia on the African location question. In similar fashion to the support lent to Milner's urban reconstruction programme after the Boer War,\textsuperscript{111} mining interests endorsed the campaign to rid the slums of brewers and consumers whose reduced productivity was costing them dearly. As Africans performed the bulk of the labour in Johannesburg, and Africans brewed and drank the beer in the slums, they became the target of residential control.

In a personal letter to Dr Porter, Orenstein, the most articulate and authoritative of the reformers, made clear his mission in participating in the public campaign to solve the 'native housing problem':

...my whole object is to help those who wish to bring about a reform in the housing of natives in Johannesburg. You know that I have no personal 'axe to grind'. I would have taken no part in the movement were I not invited by the Chairman of the company employing me.\textsuperscript{112}

By changing the powerful white public conception of the slum to a 'native problem', the reformists were able to define the task of urban renewal in narrow, cost effective terms. Instead of the slum yards, locations (large-scale public housing projects) would provide controlled, sanitary accommodation to permanent African workers and their families; temporary or migrant workers would live in regulated compounds. The slums would disappear miraculously. In practice the slums remained because their population was not entirely African. Moreover, the fervour for segregation notwithstanding, the Johannesburg City Council would not fund adequate slum rehousing for Africans. Consequently African occupation of slums was a dominant feature of the inter-war Johannesburg landscape.
Notes

1 IAD JGE 122 955, Town Clerk to MOH, 28 May 1915; IAD JGE 59 4574, MOH to the Chairman of the Public Health Committee, 8 June 1915; Town Clerk to MOH, 21 March 1919.

2 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/102, Porter to Pritchard, Director of Native Labour, 22 November 1921.


4 Rand Daily Mail, 28/05/1915.


9 CPSA AD881 Fa 9/7, 'The organisation of Natives in industry', no date. This point is taken up by Koch, E., 'Doomfontein and its African working class, 1914 to 1945', Unpublished M. A., University of the Witwatersrand, 1983.


11 IAD JGE 121 7969, Minutes of special committee appointed to deal with the housing of Natives, 16 March 1916; Report of the Transvaal Leasehold Townships Commission, U.G. 34-1919.

12 IAD JGE 121 7969, MOH to Town Clerk, 9 June 1915; Rand Daily Mail, 24/12/1915.


14 CPSA AD843, Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, Report of the Housing Committee, no date.

15 The Star, 04/06/1915. This point is made repeatedly in national enquiries. c.f. CAD GNLB 285 52/18/102, Witwatersrand Sub-Commissioner to Director of Native Labour, 26 March 1920.


17 The Province received 2s for each pass issued on the Rand, Rand Daily Mail, 11/09/1917; CAD GNLB 285, 52/18/102, Porter to Pritchard, Director of Native Labour, 22 November 1921.
Leader, 6/12/1915; The Star, 21/5/1915.

IAD JGE 121 7969, Federation of Ratepayers' Associations to Town Clerk, 8 December 1919; Rand Daily Mail, 07/11/1919; see also Maud, J. P. R., Johannesburg and the Art of Self-Government, Johannesburg, 1937.

CAD NTS 86 338/19/164, Deputation of 17 Klipspruit women to the Johannesburg Mayor re: expense and inconvenience of travel to Johannesburg, 29 March 1910; In 1915 there were numerous empty houses at Klipspruit; IAD JGE 122 955, Superintendent of Locations to MOH, 26 August 1915.

Under pressure from the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, the Native Location By-Laws were amended by Administrator's Notice No. 297, 1912; The Star, 22/05/1919.

IAD JGE 122 955, Adler Garage request for MOH inspection of premises, 6 January 1914; MOH to Mr. Curislen, 8 March 1915; IAD JGE 121, 7969, Minutes of a Special Meeting to deal with housing of Natives, no date.

IAD JGE 122 955, 'Town Natives', 22 May 1915.

IAD JGE 26 4321, 'Estimated number of Natives within the Municipality other than Natives living in locations and domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices', 30 January 1923.

IAD JGE 122 955, 'Accommodation of Natives (other than Mine Natives) employed in Johannesburg and not resident in locations', 9 June 1915.

Compiled from IAD JGE 122 955, 'Return of Native and Coloured Persons within the Municipality other than domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices', 23 June 1915.

Compiled from IAD JGE 122 955, 'Return of Native and Coloured Persons within the Municipality other than domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices', 23 June 1915.

Leader, 05/10/1914.

Rental in municipal compounds was only 5s per month compared to 30s in a yard. Rand Daily Mail, 13/08/1915.


Compiled from IAD JGE 122 955, 'Return of Native and Coloured Persons within the Municipality other than domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices', 23 June 1915.

The Star, 25/01/1915.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, 'Number of Natives housed by employers of Native labour, Johannesburg town', February 1918.

Rand Daily Mail, 05/02/1915; 24/12/1915.
Leader, 06/02/1915.

Numerous parties made this allegation, but it was reported in the press most actively following the release of the Report of the Citizens' Alliance for Liquor Reform, c.f. The Star, 27/05/1915.

IAD JGE 121 899, Walter Evans and Son to City Council, 17 September 1908; Acting MOH to Walter Evans and Son, 20 November 1908; Walter Evans and Son to City Council, 4 December 1908; Application form for exemption from W. Littlejohn, 5 May 1909; Application form for exemption for 'policeman', 3 February 1910.

IAD JGE 121 899, MOH to L. Dacre Tottenham, 4 March 1910; W. Reuter (solicitor and translator) to MOH, 19 March 1910.


IAD JGE 121 899, Application form for exemption for 'storeboy' from Ginsburg, 14 September 1909; Insanitary property, Stands 632/3/4 City and Suburban, 7 November 1917; 'Power of Council to Close, Cleanse and Demolish properties'; Town Engineer to MOH, 19 December 1917.

This exemption was provided for under the Native Location byelaw as amended by Administrator's Notice No. 297, 1912; The Star, 22/05/1915; Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Medical Officer of Health for the Year Ending 30 June 1914, Johannesburg, 1914.

Evening Chronicle, 02/04/1913.

The Star, 08/10/1928.

Leader, 06/02/1915; Rand Daily Mail, 24/12/1915 gave figures of a man who leased the block for £12 a month and earned £100 in rent. Average rent for blacks was 10s to £1 per month.

Compiled from Minute of 271st Meeting of the 27 August, 1912, 272nd Meeting (adjourned) of 24 September 1912; and CAD GNLB 285 53/18/72, ‘Number of natives housed by employers of native labour’, 1918.

The Star, 21/05/1915.

c.f. IAD JGE 49 678, District Inspector's report on Stand 131 Ferreiras, 17 January 1917; IAD JGE 120 847, Assistant MOH to Deputy Commissioner of Police, 12 December 1914; Report of District Inspector Symes, 4 December 1914.

Rand Daily Mail, 08/11/1918.


IAD JGE 49 687, District Inspector Cairns to Chief Sanitary Inspector, no date; Rand Daily Mail, 07/07/1912.
IAD JGE 121 899, Inspector Manion to Chief Sanitary Inspector, 7 January 1915.

The Star, 08/10/1928.

IAD JGE 59 4574, List of insanitary house properties, 2 August 1916; The Star. 24/05/1915. See also Hellmann, E., Rooiyard: A Sociological Survey of an Urban Native Slum Yard, Cape Town, 1948, for a detailed discussion of an unusually large yard in the 1930s.


IAD JGE 122 955, Fleishman vs Rex, 19 March 1915; Deputation of 7 Jewish landlords to Public Health Committee, 8 July 1917; see also Chapter Seven.

IAD JGE 26 4321, 'Estimated number of Natives within the Municipality other than Natives living in locations and domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices', 30 January 1923.

Eales, K. A., 'Gender politics and the administration of African women'; Gaiskell, D., 'Christian compounds for girls'.


Complied from IAD JGE 122 955, 'Return of Native and Coloured Persons within the Municipality other than domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices', 23 June 1915.

The Evening Chronicle, 04/04/1913.

The Star, 21/05/1915; 25/01/1915; Rand Daily Mail, 27/05/1915.

Wilson, A. N., 'The underworld of Johannesburg'.


Rand Daily Mail, 08/01/1918; The Leader 6/2/1915.

IAD JGE 29 4574, Special report by the MOH on insanitary properties, 25 April 1913.

IAD JGE 120 847, Assistant MOH to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, 12 December 1914.

Compiled from United Transvaal Directory, Johannesburg, 1915.
70 Transvaal Leader, 11/10/1912.


72 The Star, 07/10/1912; 02/11/1912; The Leader 29/01/1915.

73 van Onselen, C., New Babylon, New Ninevah.

74 Rand Daily Mail, 04/07/1912; 07/07/1912; see also The Star, 02/11/1912;

75 Rand Daily Mail, 28/05/1912; 15/06/1915.

76 IAD JGE 59 4574, 'Special report of MOH to the Public Health Committee re: Closing of slum property', 25 May 1915; Minute of the Mayor: Report of the Medical Officer of Health, 1913-1914, Johannesburg, 1914.

77 Rand Daily Mail, 29/05/1915.

78 IAD JGE 59, 4574, MOH to the Chief Librarian, 29 June 1915; Porter to London MOH, 3 July 1915; Porter to Manchester City Surveyor, 3 July 1915.


80 See correspondence between Porter, Orenstein and the League in IAD JGE 122 955.

81 IAD JGE 49 804, MOH to Chas Verity, 24 July 1914; IAD JGE 122 955, Report by MOH on 'The Slum Question', 8 June 1915. IAD JGE 121 7969, Minutes of the Special Committee appointed to deal with the housing of natives, 16 March 191

82 Minute of the Mayor: Report of the Medical Officer of Health, 1912-1913, Johannesburg, 1913, p. 3.

83 IAD JGE 122 955, Porter to Souter, 30 April 1915; Souter to Porter, 3 May 1915; Orenstein to Porter, 12 May 1915; IAD JGE 59, 4574, Porter to Souter, re: evidence to the Provincial Select Committee of 1911, 22 June 1915.

84 Rand Daily Mail, 28/05/1915.

85 Minute of the Mayor: Report of the Medical Officer of Health, 1912-1913, Johannesburg, 1913; The Star, 24/05/1915.

86 Leader, 06/02/1915; Rand Daily Mail, 27/05/1915; The Star, 27/05/1915.

87 IAD JGE 122 955, Report of the MOH to the Public Health Committee, 8 June 1915, p. 3. He also sent results of the 1915 survey to Souter, Bridgman, and the mining houses.

88 IAD JGE 120 847, Report by MOH to Public Health Committee re insanitary house property, 30 May 1917; IAD JGE 122 955, Extract of the Minutes of the Public Health Committee, 28 February 1921.

89 IAD JGE 59 4574, Porter to Chief Sanitary Officer, 19 July 1915
The Leader, 01/10/1914; Wilson, A. N., 'The underworld of Johannesburg'.

CAD GN'L 136 1756/13/54, Sub-Native Commissioner to Director of Native Labour, 24 October 1914.

The composition of the anti-slum caucus comprised representatives from The Rand Social Services League, the Citizens' Alliance for Liquor Reform, and the Joint Committee on Native Labour and Liquor and Housing (made up of the Transvaal Missionary Association, the Diocesan Board Missions, the Witwatersrand Church Council, the Rand Social Service League and the National Council of Women Workers, the National Temperance Union and the International Order of Good Templars); The Star, 31.01/1915.

CAD NTS K358, Evidence to the Native Affairs Commission, 2 February 1914.

Ibid.

The Christian Express, 01/06/1912.

CAD NTS K358, Evidence to the Native Affairs Commission, 2 February 1914.

CAD NTS 4 2427, Farrar (Rand Mines) to Pritchard re: brewing of cali by Natives, 30 October 1913.

The same people's names appear as members of the Joint Councils, the Citizen's Alliance for Liquor Reform and the housing utility companies. CPSA A881 Fa 9/7-9, 'Town and Country Natives', lecture delivered by Rheinallt Jones.

Local Government Ordinance No. 9 of 1912, section 68, para. (2).

IAD JGE 122 955, Inspector of Eastern Area to Chief Sanitary Officer, 18 December 1914; 6 January 1915; Detective Constable McKay to the Sub-Inspector, 19 October 1918.

IAD JGE 49 687, MOH to Councillor Scott, 27 March 1914.

IAD JGE 49 687, Extract of Minutes of Public Health Committee, 2 April 1914; IAD JGE 122 955, MOH to Town Clerk. The £450 accrued from fines over three months meant that there would be no problem paying wages.

IAD JGE 122 955, Deputation of Transvaal Native Congress to the Mayor, 3 June 1916; MOH to Chief Sanitary Inspector, 20 June 1916; MOH to Town Clerk, 31 August 1916; Minutes of the Public Health Committee, 21 June 1919

IAD JGE 49 687, 'Summary of cases from Brown's yard, Doornfontein', 18 February 1914; Detective Cooke to District Inspector, 8 February 1914; District Inspector to Chief Sanitary Inspector, 12 February; 27 March 1914; MOH to Deputy Commissioner of Police, 13 February 1914; Deputy Commissioner of Police to MOH, 19 February 1914; unsigned note to the District Inspector informing him of police decision to overturn some evictions, 18 March 1914; Chief Sanitary Inspector to MOH, 23 March 1914; District Inspector to Chief Sanitary Inspector, 27 March 1914.
106 Rand Daily Mail, 28/05/1915; 29/05/1915. See also Chapter 5 and articles in The Christian Express.


109 Ibid.; CAD NTS K358, Orenstein's evidence to the Native Affairs Commission, 2 February 1914.

110 IAD JGE 122 955, Souter to Orenstein, 3 May 1915; Porter to Orenstein, 12 May 1915.

111 van Onselen, C., *New Babylon, New Ninevah*.

112 IAD JGE 122 955, Orenstein to Porter, 12 May 1915.