African Studies Seminar Paper
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COMPANY ESTATE, COMPANY TOWN: PILGRIM'S REST 1910 - 1932

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The struggle over land and over labour has been the driving force of South African history. Its power-house, at least for the last hundred years, has been the immense concentration of economic resources on the Rand. By the early twentieth century these had subordinated the whole of Southern Africa to their demands, leaving virtually no corner of the sub-continent untouched. The centrality of this gold mining complex to the South African economy, along with the sheer scale of the social engineering that accompanied its rise has tended to engross the attention of economists and historians. Contradictions between the needs of different sectors of the economy have been conceptualised in terms of conflicts between agriculture, industry and gold, and while efforts have been made to disaggregate the former two sectors, there has been an implicit but almost universal equation of mining with the Rand. Yet mining was far more diversified then this. Diamonds, coal, asbestos, platinum, and other centres of gold production all made significant contributions to 'mining's' fortunes in the twentieth century, although none have received more than cursory attention. Most of these other sectors moreover experienced even more acute profitability problems than gold which were often either made up of or compounded by the magnetic pull of the Rand. Real contradictions thus emerged within the mining sector which have been either overlooked or ignored. In the coal mines of Natal and the Transvaal, for example, the ruling prices of coal ensured that profit margins were even more slender than those existing for gold. Gold mines in Southern-Rhodesia were likewise disadvantaged compared with their more favoured neighbours further south. Ore bodies were irregular and scattered and subject to erratic fluctuations in grade, which inhibited larger-scale exploitation and left the companies that worked them
in a perpetually vulnerable position. Both industries responded by depressing the wages of black workers to rates substantially below those ruling on the Rand, and by shaving costs in the provision of accommodation, food, health and safety to dangerously low levels. The outcome was predictable. Labour dried up, as it was siphoned off to the higher paying regions of the Rand.  

To 'capture' labour which would otherwise drift to the Rand both industries had to resort to varying degrees of coercion or sharp practice. In Southern Rhodesia, where the mines had the benefit of privileged access to a separate state apparatus, the chibaro system was installed. Agents of the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau scoured the country for labour, either forcibly rounding up peasants, or pouncing on those who were trying to make their way to the higher wage zones further south. Once captured such unfortunates were forced to sign a 12 month labour contract, and eke out a miserable existence on the mines. In the northern Natal coal mines a more insidious and corrosive system was employed. Workers were encouraged to live on neighbouring farms and were deliberately enmeshed in a system of debt bondage operating through the 'token' credit system. Many never escaped. Wives and children left behind at their homes became, in the words of Chief Robert Kunene of Boschhoek, 'widows and orphans while their [husbands and] fathers are yet alive'. An important adjunct of the Natal coal-fields system was the freedom it allowed to miners to cohabit with women on neighbouring farms. A similar practice was followed in the Witbank coal-fields of the Transvaal. Although enjoying access to the recruiting monopsony of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, the Witbank mines still experienced shortages of labour because of the lower wages they paid. They therefore encouraged the informal stabilisation of the Shangane section of their labour force by allowing their wives and 'unattached' women to settle nearby. Beer brewing and prostitution were consequently common but this was
a price the mine managers were prepared to pay. As Chamber of Mines representative Mr. Bennett confessed to the Native Laws Enquiry Commission in 1947, 'The reason why the coal mines bring the natives and their families there is because they can't get them on the migratory system'.\(^7\) The Vereeniging Estates took this practice to its logical conclusion by attempting to draw labour for its coal mines from the squatter-tenant population resident on its farms.\(^8\) For reasons which are not entirely clear, this effort largely failed, and it was left to another sector of mining - the eastern Transvaal gold fields at Pilgrim's Rest - to develop this particular captive labour system in its most imaginative and systematic form. It is to this that the rest of this paper now turns.

THE TGME AND THE COMPANY TOWN

From the mid 1890s gold mining in the Pilgrim's Rest area was dominated by two major concerns, the Transvaal Gold Mining Estates, and its allied company Glynns Lydenburg. Of these the TGME was by far the larger enterprise operating the great bulk of the mines and owning freehold title to 32 farms. Although the two companies dominated 'the principal of the (Transvaal) Colony's gold fields away from the Rand' they were completely overshadowed by these rivals in the southern Transvaal.\(^9\) As with the Southern Rhodesian gold mines, mining in Pilgrim's Rest was a particularly hazardous and unpredictable exercise. Ore bodies ranged from vertical to horizontal, and they frequently folded and faulted. Narrow reefs and the limited lateral extent of the ore bodies demanded that a great deal of development be undertaken to yield a small quantity of ore. Erratic deposits together with the variable grade of ore, which spanned 7 to 18 dwts, made evaluation uncertain. All this combined with soft ground and the refractory nature of the ore to render mining in Pilgrim's Rest 'a geological jigsaw puzzle'.\(^{10}\) Transport and climate posed a number of other
problems. Even once the railway reached Graskop in 1914, supplies still had to be hauled over steep gradients for the last of twelve miles to Pilgrim's Rest. In neither winter nor summer could such haulage be guaranteed. Cold weather in winter repeatedly incapacitated the oxen, while in summer months heavy rain frequently turned the roads into quagmires or completely swept them away.\textsuperscript{11} Floods inundated Pilgrim's Rest in 1909, 1914, 1918, 1919, 1925 and 1939 sometimes bringing mining to a total halt.\textsuperscript{12} In 1909 a cloudburst swept every bridge away, destroyed Jubilee Power station, 'practically drowned out Elandsdrift mine' for 6 weeks, closed the central mill for 2 months and claimed 15 black lives.\textsuperscript{13} In February 1918 heavy rain caused flooding and numerous cave-ins, and again brought mining operations to a halt. In March 1925 torrential downpours collapsed workings in many mines, and affected Vaalhoek in particular for several months.\textsuperscript{14}

Intervening droughts, while providing labour, also created periodic power supply scares, since the company relied on the hydro-electric energy provided by the nearby Blyde River.\textsuperscript{15} In March 1921 Pilgrim's Rest was even visited by its own cyclone which bore off the Vaalhoek mine offices and swept every sheet of its records away.\textsuperscript{16}

Such geological and environmental hazards made mining in Pilgrim's Rest a precarious business, and ensured that control over costs and human labour, would, if anything, be more important than on the Rand. The company's solution to these problems was a South African variant of that practised elsewhere. It secured a company estate, on which it built a company town. The first was aimed primarily at securing an adequate supply of black labour. The second was directed towards imposing a similar grid of controls over Pilgrim's Rest's white population. It is to the latter that we shall first turn.

Five days after the sinking of the Lusitania on 7 May 1913, riots broke out in Pilgrim's Rest. Their targets were German shops of which many were
sacked and burnt, but as is common with outbursts of this kind, the riots gave expression to more deep-seated grievances and discontents. Prominent among these was the tight grip kept on the town's 900 plus white population by the TGME, and at one remove by Rand Mines, by whom the TGME were controlled. Although Rand Mines had its head offices in London and drew most of its capital from that source, it had a tenuous German connection through the person of Hermann Eckstein, and it was this linkage which gave Pilgrim's Rest's white residents the opportunity to launch an indirect attack on the company through the looting of German shops.

The first moves of the Vigilance Association which was formed immediately after the riots exposes this hidden and maybe only half articulated agenda. In a letter of appeal to the Governor-General of South Africa, the Association protested that

The conditions of living in this town are unique, and quite unparalleled in any other town which boasts the protection of that emblem of freedom, the British Flag. There is no local self-governing body, a system of which Your Excellency is so staunch a supporter; our destinies are entirely in the hands, and subject of the whims of the chief representative of the Transvaal Gold Mining Estates, ... Not only was the system of government by the company autocratic and despotic, [but] both freedom of speech and freedom of action have been discouraged in the sternest manner in years past, ejections from the town having taken place in punishment of some who had the temerity to displease the company. So much has the company terrorised the inhabitants, that it would take years of freedom from the yoke to eradicate the impression that the company is all supreme.

The Vigilance Association went on to itemise a long list of complaints: the failure of the company to provide sanitary facilities or to establish a health board, even though the company collected between £2 000 and £3 000 per annum from rents; insecurity of tenure; restrictions on who might settle in the village, excessive electricity, water and housing rents, the confiscation of immovable property erected on company ground without compensation to the owner, and control over the local press. In the
residents' minds, the 'octopus like tentacles' [sic] of the TGME 'constituted a serious menace' in the district and rendered living in Pilgrim's Rest 'almost tantamount to a state of slavery'.

The residents' appeals made scant impression. The Governor General's office acknowledged that it was 'well known that the TGME carry on affairs with a high hand at Pilgrim's Rest', but took no further action on account of the war. The residents met with equally little success in their efforts to have an official township proclaimed at Pilgrim's Rest. In February 1916 a proclamation by Government Gazette allowed for a township to be proclaimed, but then the whole exercise bogged down. According to the TGME's General Manager, R.A. Barry, 'legal difficulties barred the way' but if the Company's previous record is anything to judge by one can not discount the company's own hidden hand. A few concessions were admittedly won by the residents, but for the most part were of a relatively trifling kind: a Health Committee was formed which the General Manager recognised, water rates were cut by half, and the company was induced to make a small contribution towards building a recreation park. But on all the major issues the company won hands down.

The residents were not much better served by the chief workplace representative - the miners' worker's union. Barry categorically rejected a closed shop on TGME, and would neither recognise nor extend to Pilgrim's Rest the agreements reached between Chamber of Mines and the mineworkers on the Rand. As a result, in 1919 white miners were paid less than those on the Reef in 1916 despite the intervening period of massive inflation, while overtime rates were paid well below the standard time and a half. The miners were routed equally comprehensively on the question of racial ratios, the average being anything from 1:20 to 1:36 in Pilgrim's Rest compared to 1:8 on the Rand. The dismal record of the union can partly be explained by the 'entirely different' conditions which Barry so frequently invoked,
but other factors played an equally important part. 28 'Local men ... of
decent stock' seem to have been especially favoured by TGME presumably
because they were in one way or another 'tied' to the region, and less
likely to cause trouble. 29 So too were 'first stage Phthisis men from the
Rand', the reasons being more or less the same. 30 Strictly speaking the
company should not have been allowed to employ such workers after the
passage of the Phthisis Act of 1919. However so loud were its protests, and
so successfully had it become accepted as a law unto itself that it was able
to elude the net of even this piece of legislation. 31

Pilgrim's Rest did not possess the full attributes of a company town -
probably few 'company' towns ever did. 32 There was no payment in scrip and
no company store; nor could the TGME totally control access to the town or
shut off access to the state. Nevertheless the TGME did own the town - its
stores, its houses, its churches, hospitals and schools - and could make
life so unpleasant for its opponents, as to hold an effective power of
exclusion. Moreover, its domination of the areas' economy gave it
tremendous leverage over the local officers of the state. Except through
spontaneous bouts of Germano-phobia few therefore dared challenge its
commands. The Company extended an analogous network of controls over the
black workers on its mines, but despite boasting ostensibly even more
formidable powers over these workers it ultimately met with less success.
It is to these efforts that this paper now turns.

THE TGME AND THE COMPANY ESTATE

When the application of the Phthisis Act to the Pilgrim's Rest gold
fields had originally been contemplated the General Manager, Barry, had
immediately fired back the retort: 'the result would be disastrous. Costs
would be increased so as to imperil the possibility of working the mines at
all'. 33 In this case Barry was probably bluffing, but there was no such room
for overstatement as far as the costs of African labour were concerned. It was this problem that the company estate was designed to resolve. When the TGME was incorporated in 1895, it brought together not only the gold rights to 6 auriferous farms, but also the freehold rights to a further 32 more. On these lived a substantial black population which the company envisaged putting to work on its mines. In 1898 the Company sought to regularise its position by seeking exemption from the 1895 'Plakers Wet' which prohibited the residence of unemployed Africans on white owned land. The black population, the company requested, should be allowed to remain 'on condition that they work for a portion of the year in the service of this company'. The ZAR Government assented, and thus armed, the company was able to boast of an ample supply of labour in 1899. It was on this basis that the company was able to expand its operations in the years following the Anglo Boer War. Black homestead heads were given rights to cultivate the land on the farms in return for the payment of £1 a year rent, £1 for each extra wife (plus sundry minor charges), and the performance of 6 'tickets' of 30 shifts on the TGME mines. The latter was invariably represented as the obligation to work 6 months for the company, but in practice it meant spending appreciably longer on the mines, since the mines closed down operations on Sundays and this alone added on almost an extra month. If the experience of other districts is anything to judge by it probably took 7½ to 8 months to work off the requisite number of shifts, imposing a much heavier work burden than was immediately apparent.

The TGME was also able to derive other advantages from such an immediately accessible labour pool - it could acquire its tenants' sons' labour. According to the Mining Commissioner for Lydenburg District, W. Dyke Poynter, forty to fifty per cent of the TGME's 3 000 workers were under 18 years of age. The employment of juvenile labour enabled the company to accomplish a radical reduction of costs. Not only could these boys be paid
at a much lower rate than adult men, but they would also work much narrower stopes.\(^{39}\) Since the cost of mining was calculated, in part, according to the amount of rock that had to be mined to extract an ounce of gold, the narrowing of stopes could involve a massive saving in costs. Acting Director of Native Labour, H.S. Cooke, was later to exclaim on the 'extraordinarily small dimensions of TGME's stopes' which were commonly opened up to only 15-18 inches, and upon such narrow widths of stopes often depended the very existence of the mines. As TGME's General Manager, R.A. Barry, explained 'Many workings ... are ... not large enough to admit any but quite small boys and if enlarged would become unpayable'.\(^{40}\)

One last advantage conferred by the company estate was the attraction it exerted on labour from Mozambique. Under the 'modus vivendi' agreement entered into by the Union of South Africa and the government of Mozambique in 1901, no Mozambiquan male was able to enter into a mining contract in South Africa except through the agency of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA). The only exemption to this arrangement was made in favour of the district of Maputo and this the TGME soon learned to exploit.\(^{41}\) The company's farms lay relatively close to the Mozambiquan border, and substantial numbers of Mozambquans soon stole across to seek work on the TGME mines. The arrangement held advantages for both the company and the workers. For the company Mozambiquan workers not only made up a substantial proportion of the workforce but also helped stabilise their labour complement at a strategic time of the year. Between October and January the company always experienced an exodus of labour as its tenants went home to plough their farms.\(^{42}\) It was precisely at this time that Mozambiquan workers chose to return to the mines, thereby easing (though not solving) this recurrent constriction of labour supply.\(^{43}\) For Mozambiquan workers the arrangement had a double attraction. They could use the Pilgrim's Rest mines as a staging post to the Rand or they could marry local
women and settle on company land. Permanent settlement of this kind seems to have occurred on an increasingly large scale, and even embraced Nyasa workers over time. According to J.E.d.l.c. Travers' evidence to the Eastern Transvaal Land Commission of 1918 there was a substantial Shangane population in the district, most of which had come from Mozambique over the previous 20 years. Almost identical evidence was tendered by the Assistant Native Commissioner at Graskop to the Native Economic Commission some 13 years later. 'Large numbers of clandestine immigrants' had arrived from both Mozambique and Nyasaland over the previous decade who survived by mining or agricultural work. It seems likely that the TGME turned a blind eye to the origins of their labour, although the evidence is sparse. According to Christian Silikane, Shanganes 'only had a problem later after their chief demanded the return of his subjects' and 'the Portuguese wanted them to pay their taxes', while the company's official attitude was that 'when traced, the Portuguese authorities are informed, and tax collected'. 'When traced' was probably the significant proviso, and many Mozambiquan immigrants almost certainly escaped the net.

Blessed with relatively varied and flexible sources of labour, TGME was able to pay its workers considerably less than the going rate on the Rand. In December 1918 TGME's Elandsdrift mines paid an average of 1/3d a shift or £1.18.0. per month as compared with an average 2/2d per shift or £3.05.0. a month on the Rand at the time. Juvenile labour was of course paid appreciably less. The company estate was indeed a sound investment for the mines.

THE TGME AND THE NATIVE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

The TGME could not have derived such benefits from its estate without some degree of official acquiescence. A familiar feature of the company town is the absence or atrophy of state authority, and for much of this
period Pilgrim's Rest existed insulated from any effective government control. Local officials occasionally sought to intervene in some or other TGME related matter, but once stirred, soon relapsed into helpless inactivity when faced with the broadsides of criticism which such action invariably evoked. As the Native Commissioner for Lydenburg later confided, the 'Mining community ... [was] always anxious to get a hold upon the officials' and if thwarted were liable to engage in vituperate personal attacks. R.A. Barry, General Manager from 1915 to 1930, was particularly adept at exerting this kind of pressure, despatching hectoring letters to whoever dared cross him, or orchestrating vicious campaigns in the TGME owned press.

The central authorities were if anything even more inclined to leave the TGME well alone. Pilgrim's Rest was too remote, and the mining magnates too crossed to invite close attention to its affairs. Only when major scandals erupted was the government spurred into action, but even then a standard sequence of events would ensue. Culprits would be excused if not exonerated, minor reforms would be made and once the immediate furore had subsided, official attention would quietly lapse.

In most matters the TGME was therefore left to do much as it liked. The Native Labour Regulation Act (No. 15) of 1911, for example, which was the first systematic attempt to regulate recruitment and terms of service of black labour in South Africa left the Pilgrim's Rest district more or less untouched. Section 4 of the Act which prohibited the recruitment of rent-paying tenants by landlords was quietly ignored. Even when H.S. Cooke, the Acting Director of Native Labour was despatched to Pilgrim's Rest in December 1918 to examine complaints and accusations flying between the company and local officials, he contented himself with the bland observation that 'there is no arrangement with this department in view of the definition of recruiting under the Act in terms of Section 4 of the Act' and left the
matters at that. Provision for the registration of workers was equally lax. Soon after the 1911 Act was passed regulations were made which allowed for the voluntary recruitment and the voluntary registration of labourers, the onus for each falling on the labourer and employer respectively. Employers in the Pilgrim's Rest area however would not avail themselves of this facility, partly because of the 1/- fee that was demanded, but mainly, it would seem, because it would expose them to official surveillance. Freed of any official control, employer abuses mounted and by 1912 the new sub-Native Commissioner Cross was reporting increasing numbers of cases of the withholding of wages and the flogging of tenants to force them out to work. The Director of Native Labour in Johannesburg responded by framing new regulations in 1913 which made provision for compelling such employers to register labourers in their employment and to pay a 1/- fee. At this point however familiar pressures began to make themselves felt. When Cross proposed to proclaim Pilgrim's Rest a labour area in terms of the new regulations he was bombarded with complaints from employers about the difficulty of registering workers spread over such a large area, and, on the grounds of practical difficulties, the Director of Native Labour backed off. The abuses continued, the TGME now assuming the role of leading culprit, as it sent out its mine police to flog recalcitrant tenants living on its estate. Exactly how long this persisted or who was involved is unclear. In May 1915 the Estate Manager of TGME was protesting in injured tones that these assaults had ceased 16 months before, but three years later Colonel Truter, the Commissioner of Police was still claiming that the police had been requested 'to flog natives and burn their huts'. Whatever the precise details, the Department of Native Affairs was once again shaken of its inertia, and the Secretary for Native Affairs was despatched to investigate the matter. As a result of his visit another approach was tried. A new and more determined sub-native commissioner (Hemsworth) was
despatched to the Graskop office with instructions to enforce the provisions of the pass laws, and to oblige all employers to keep a register of workers. The system had worked well in nearby Barberton, but here it scarcely got off the ground. Hemsworth was immediately the target of abuse. Excoriated by Barry and 'howled down' in the local press, he soon deemed it wiser to retire to the front. The Director of Native Affairs, now suddenly appraised of the unavailability of suitable staff, cited practical difficulties and ordered a fresh retreat.

Hemsworth's replacement, J.C. Arbous, was a man more suited to Barry's tastes. He was junior, he was inexperienced, and he was insecure: he compensated by confining himself almost exclusively to the collection of tax. This he did with unexampled vigour, embarking on a virtual campaign of terror to swell the level of receipts. Lashing of poll tax defaulters occurred on almost a daily basis, with as many as six being lashed at a time. The lashes '[were] inflicted with a piece of heavy old harness trace about 3 feet 6 inches long, nailed onto a heavy kaffir stick about 18 linches long'. Besides this, his assistant H.G. Soames recorded, the stirrup leather used by his predecessor Hemsworth for such purposes was 'a joke'.

The flogging of poll tax defaulters was technically illegal, without the matter having been brought to the attention of the magistrate first. So too was the arrest of wives of tax defaulters until their defaulting husbands paid up. It was illegalities such as these, along with a range of other minor misdemeanours such as assisting labour touts to recruit arrested tax defaulters, which prompted H.G. Soames, Arbous' assistant temporary clerk to expose his activities in the Natal press. Writing under the title 'Black Justice' Soames' indictment proved so powerful that it prompted Secretary of Native Affairs John X. Merriman to order a magisterial enquiry. In the five day hearing that followed Soames' accusations were
found to be substantially correct, although the investigating magistrate went to great lengths to find mitigating factors to excuse Arbous' misdeeds. The flogged defaulters, the magistrate argued, were extravagantly in arrears, in one instance as far back as the Anglo-Boer war; the flogging of women was 'not severe'; aiding labour recruiters was 'an established practice in the department', and Arbous had not used his position for personal gain. Yet although the Magistrate was able to pronounce Arbous neither 'dishonest' or 'cruel' he could not completely absolve him of guilt. Arbous was 'a victim of the system' but he still had to go. On 24 January 1919 Arbous resigned. Another sub-native commissioner for Pilgrim's Rest had come to grief.

Alan Barry was not the kind to miss the chance of kicking a man on the ground, especially if it served to pin the responsibility for labour problems on somebody else. Having given no previous hint of dissatisfaction with the acting sub-native commissioner's regime, he now proceeded to rain blows on the prostrate Arbous. In November 1918, for example, he was the leading voice in a deputation to the Director of Native Labour which denounced the office of the sub-native commissioner. Among the central complaints raised about Arbous and his predecessors was that he was 'in effect merely a tax collector to the prejudice of his other duties. Instead of being regarded by the Natives as the Administrator and Father of the District, they look on him as the man who extorts money from them'. To make things worse, there was 'no registration of natives, and the (Tax) Register [was] beyond description and not correct. There was an absolute lack of business methods as well as lack of staff'. Arbous in particular had 'had a disastrous effect on the District. In the enquiry which was held ... the man admitted to the flogging of women, etc. which has weakened the hand of the white people. Things could not be worse than they are'.

Things certainly were in a sorry state, but slack administration had
been the last thing about which the company had been bothered before: its principal aim for the past decade had been to keep it as remote and feeble as possible. As for taxation, this was one of the few administrative functions in which the company saw any virtue at all. Tax collection drives which began every March customarily made up the labour deficits with which the company was plagued from the beginning of each planting season. Barry himself made the point in a report to the TGME secretaries in December 1917:

There is a marked shortage in the native labour supply. Every effort is being made on our part to secure labour but unless the Government can be induced to bring pressure to bear on the large idle supply of natives lying below the Berg - which can be done by a vigorous insistence on the part of the Government in connection with the payment of taxes due by the natives, - little immediate improvement can be looked for.

So what now was agitating Barry? Unless he was mouthing pure hypocrisy or was practising the rankest of opportunism, something had changed.

The key to the company's change of heart was almost certainly the devastating influenza epidemic which scythed through South Africa's black and white population in 1918. In Pilgrim's Rest as elsewhere it wrought its main damage during 'Black October' 1918. From this point forward the company's fortunes were on the slide. After a decade of boom profits and a relative abundance of labour, Spanish 'flu ushered in an era of declining yields, dwindling profits and labour unrest. It was to remedy this situation that the company now sought the government's active intervention and heaped all the blame for current ills on the head of the unfortunate Arbous.

Spanish 'flu reached Pilgrim's Rest on 14th October 1918. The first mine to be infected was Ponieskrantz North after the unannounced and unauthorised visit of 'a boy from Johannesburg'. By 22nd October the disease had already reached epidemic proportions as the number of cases on Central Mines swelled from 4 to 500. Three weeks after the outbreak 'drie dag siekte' had claimed the lives of 50 people at Central Mines, 60 at
Vaalhoek and 70 at Elandsdrift, but even this represented only the tip of the iceberg. Countless numbers of others died on the roads and on the farms. As soon as those infected were able to walk they bolted back to their homes. Neither the mines nor the local offices of the native administration had the personnel or the resources to stem the flow. The make-shift compounds erected on the mines were open and impossible to control so that parties of workers constantly slipped out in two's and three's. At the height of the epidemic a sudden panic caused wholesale flight. In a major misjudgment of their credibility R.A. Barry, the General Manager of TGME, G.A. Whitelaw, the local magistrate, and D. Hook, the new sub-native commissioner, toured the TGME compounds urging their inmates to stay and be helped. On the following day 'large numbers of the very ones addressed in this manner had flown'. Many were in 'a pitiable state of debilitation' and collapsed and died on the roads. Those fortunate enough to survive all too often set up a new cycle of infection once they reached home. Christian Silikane who was a young worker at the time still retains a vivid impression of the scope of the scourge: 'I remember it because when it passed I was alive'. July Sedibe confirms the plight of those 'who tried to run away but died on the road' while for Silikane a gruesome detail still sticks in his mind. Most of those falling by the wayside 'were eaten by dogs and pigs where they died'.

The epidemic was not only physically debilitating but also had demoralising psychological effects. No one knew where it came from or whether it would return (a number of minor outbreaks did subsequently recur). Rumours spread in an atmosphere charged with uncertainty, which had already been partly fostered by the war. Christian Silikane 'heard that the Germans dropped bomb which resulted in the epidemic. After the bomb exploded the smell comes over and spreads the disease'. Many still weak from the disease were consequently reluctant to return. In January 1919 the
TGME was filling only about half of its complement of labour, and by February the number had only crept up to about 70%. For three months prospecting work was entirely halted, and there were labour shortages at Elandsdrift as late as 1920.

With its labour supply shrivelled and its profit margins slashed, the TGME was faced with the need for some radical re-thinking. The conclusion it reached was the need for a major stiffening of support from the state. Barry went about achieving this goal in his usual peremptory and domineering manner. He hectored Whitelaw and Hook 'to exert what authority they [could]' to restore labour and stop desertion, and when Whitelaw was not sufficiently responsive, he complained directly to the Secretary for Native Affairs, and began a campaign to have the administration of African labour amended 'in every direction'. Although Barry could not have known it at the time, this was to be the watershed in the TGME's fortunes, as the company now entered an era of dislocation and decline. Its effects were soon felt in the company's system of labour relations, and in the daily lives of its African tenants, but before proceeding to that it is first necessary to look at the 'under' side of the company's labour relations in this period of plenty, since without having a firmer grasp of that, it is difficult to comprehend the changes that followed.

THE TGME AND ITS GOLDEN AGE

The 'Golden Age' of the TGME was based on an adequate grade of ore and a plentiful supply of African labour. While the company could for a time take the former for granted, its supply of labour was always potentially subject to serious fluctuations: it was presumably only the dimmest of the company's shareholders that had to be reminded in the 1912 Company Report that 'the future success of your company's operations depends almost entirely on an adequate supply of unskilled labour'. To secure the steady
supply of labour that was so vital to its operations the company was
prepared to twist the arms of local officials and to apply a range of other
physical sanctions to wayward tenants on its farms, yet what conferred a
degree of stability on the company's labour supply in this period was not
just coercion but also a measure of acquiescence and consent. Consent was
contrived through the interaction of a number of factors some of which the
company perhaps did not fully grasp itself. Key among these was the
facility to desert. By common consent desertion was rife on the TGME mines.
When Acting Director of Native Labour, H.S. Cooke, undertook an
investigation of the TGME's labour problems in December 1918 he discovered
that 'few mines require the production of a travelling pass when a native is
engaged', and found 'no case of it being retained during the contract'.
In the absence of an official system of registration, this meant that
desertion could take place virtually unchecked.

The term desertion, in this context, conveys what may be a slightly
misleading or overstated impression. 'Facility for desertion' was no doubt
'the only safeguard which the native ha[d] for decent treatment' as the
Mining Commissioner for Pilgrim's Rest insisted in 1919, but there are
indications that for much of the time desertions were not quite such self
consciously corrective or desperate acts. Cooke noted in the report
mentioned earlier that 'desertions were reported in only a small number of
cases and when natives who have deserted resume employment even after long
absences the offence is condoned and the wages earned up to the time of the
desertion are paid as a matter of course'. Desertions in such instances
thus seem to have been a rather casual affair, indulged in for routine
agricultural needs or family affairs. At one point in the agricultural
cycle this was certainly the case, for the TGME's recruitment from its farms
almost invariably plummeted in the ploughing season between October and
January each year.
Desertion of this kind was but one aspect of the latitude and flexibility induced in the TGME's labour regime as a result of the close association of farms and places of work. It was almost certainly this close proximity (as well as the blind eye of the Department of Native Affairs) which encouraged the employment of youths. One reason why it has been possible in this study to interview men who had worked on the TGME mines in the late 1910s and early 1920s has been because they began working so young. Their recollections help explain why juvenile labour was so widely condoned. July Sedibe, for example, started work in 1920 at the age of 14-16 on the TGME's Duke Hill mine. Sedibe lived on Vaalhoek farm which was some distance from the mine, and used to return to his family's homestead each week-end, after the mine had knocked off on Saturday at 1.00 p.m. \(^{84}\) Christian Silikane began work in 1919 at the age of 12-15. His job was leading mules: other children worked on machines, on 'plank-stopes' or lashed (i.e. shovelled rock). Silikane lived sufficiently close to the mine to go home every night, and remembers working 'into the night' in order to knock off on Saturday at 11.00 a.m. or 12.00 noon. \(^{85}\) Tiger Mashile began his working life a year earlier in 1918 on Ponieskrantz mine. His first job was on a ventilating machine which he tended from 7.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. without a break. He received 'a tickey a day'. He later graduated to lashing, and remembers working the same uninterrupted hours on narrow cramped stopes. Like Silikane, Mashile returned home each night, and he recalls many workers at other mines doing the same. At Waterval, Ledouphine and Bourkes' Luck men travelled by bicycle to work, the more energetic or family-minded leaving at 3.00 or 4.00 in the morning to arrive in time. \(^{86}\) Clearly, such proximity, and the capacity to return relatively often to the family homestead, must have served to diffuse opposition to those youngsters working on the mines. A measure of protection could still be afforded by the family, while both elders and juniors derived mutual gain. The young
boys could earn money to buy clothes, minor luxuries and cattle, while the family could displace some of its labour obligations on to the shoulders of the young.

Those boys who lived in the compounds during the week, shared huts specially set aside for the youth, in which three would normally bed down. By contrast to the Rand, these living quarters were open and largely uncontrolled. The TGME's attitude in the matter was dictated mainly by cost. The huts were built by the workers themselves, and no facilities were provided besides food. As sub-native commissioner D. Hook observed early in 1919, 'the tendency [has been] to philosophically accept the aboriginal labourer as a working force, pay, and feed, him, but for the rest to allow him to come and go at leisure, and to solve for himself such vital questions as housing, sanitation, etc.' This relative freedom of the compounds proved a major drawcard for the TGME's workforce, and provided partial compensation for the lower wages they earned as compared to the Rand. Workers could 'flit around as they liked' grumbled Barry, as he vented his newly-found sense of grievance at government inaction in November 1918. They could live their lives to some extent as they chose. Workers were also free in other ways. Wives could stay with their husbands in the huts, and since the company made little effort to verify marriages, other women were smuggled in at will. 'Mapulanas, Pedis, Shanganes ... women who didn't have money' thronged into the compounds. Many brewed beer which they hid in adjacent forests; others engaged in quasi- or 'open prostitution'. Among 'the hundreds of women who [left] their families [in the Pilgrim's Rest district] preferring a loose life in the compounds, many seem to have ventured no further than the TGME mines.

Access to women and to beer added further lustre to the mines at Pilgrim's Rest, especially for the Mozambiquans and Nyasas who began to make up an increasingly significant part of the company's labour force. While
many used Pilgrim's Rest as a staging post to the Rand. Others became ensnared by these casual pleasures, and stayed more or less permanently in the compounds of the TGME. Nyasa workers were supposed to have held a peculiarly fatal 'fascination' for local women, which led to much trouble. Their local reputation for 'stabbing one another' perhaps reflects this prowess. When loose liaisons with local women matured into more permanent relationships, the male partners sometimes secured access to land on the farms, thereby adding impulse to the cycle out of which the liaison originally sprang. More immigrants meant less land for the existing inhabitants, more poverty, less polygamy, and less capacity to provide for or control the younger daughters in the family home. The process of domestic dissolution was gathering pace.

One last attraction which may have arisen from the sprawling and informal character of Pilgrim's Rest's compounds was a lower rate of mortality than that prevailing on the Rand. When H.S. Cooke undertook his investigation of TGME in December 1918 he expressed shock at the standard of accommodation provided by the mines: the huts were too small, there was no running water, and sanitary arrangements were either 'primitive or non-existent': His overall impression was one of 'squalor and discomfort'. R.A. Barry made a surprisingly feeble attempt to defend his company against these charges, arguing, among other things that 'improved types [of hut] have been tried but it is doubtful whether they are or will be appreciated' and that 'the porous nature of the walls means that ventilation is better than on the Rand'. However, Pilgrim's Rest's Mining Commissioner put up a more spirited defence. While agreeing with Cooke's strictures on a number of key matters, he took issue with Cooke's rigidly Rand-centric view of accommodation. 'Living conditions' he argued 'are excellent', adding that 'scientific compounds would be an absurdity here'. It is difficult to judge between these conflicting opinions, but a
case at least could be made out that it was the relatively lax and informal conditions at Pilgrim's Rest that so offended Cooke, rather than any lower standard of health. Whether or not Pilgrim's Rest's compounds were more healthy than those on the Rand, the TGME mines were certainly safer. Mine managers congratulated themselves on several occasions on the lower mortality rates prevailing on their mines as compared to the Rand, and while this was no doubt due to the different depths at which the mines were being worked, this must have provided a further marginal attraction to workers.\textsuperscript{100}

The relative freedom and laxity of the TGME mines clearly softened the edges of a harsh labour regime, but an even more powerful factor in manufacturing consent was fairly generous access to land. This had both material and ideological force. The scanty evidence which we have been able to gather on this subject suggests that the 1900s and 1910s were a period of relative prosperity for the TGME's squatter tenants. Over half of the TGME's labour requirements were supplied by the region 'below the Berg'.\textsuperscript{101} Of this a full 50\% was drawn from the TGME's 87 000 morgen land-holdings in the area of Bushbuckridge, much of the remainder coming mostly from nearby land company farms.\textsuperscript{102} Perhaps the most important company holding farm in this area was the Transvaal Estate and Development Company, whose manager painted a picture of relative affluence of his tenants when giving evidence to the Eastern Transvaal Land Commission in 1918. Tenant holdings he claimed were substantial and the overwhelming majority of homesteads were polygamous, 'many' to the tune of 10 wives.\textsuperscript{103} There is no obvious reason to assume that conditions on the TGME's lowveld farms were much different. Certainly, evidence for their farms above the Berg, in the neighbourhood of Pilgrim's Rest, bears out the same impression. July Sedibe, whose father immigrated from Lekokoto near Nelspruit to a farm named Frankfurt just north of Pilgrim's Rest, remembers his family ploughing a large plot and reaping 10 bags of maize. He recalls an abundance of cattle at Frankfurt, with most
households owning a plough. As in the lowveld polygamy was common, his own father marrying two wives by whom were born 8 and 7 children respectively.\textsuperscript{104} The chiefly lineage of Mogane paint an even more idyllic picture, which had no doubt been brought into sharper relief by their recent forced removal from the TGME farms.\textsuperscript{105} For them, the reign of chief Kobeng, who died in 1915, was the time of their greatest happiness and prosperity. Land was ample, they harvested rich crops, and cattle were plentiful. Ironically, this too was their 'golden age', from which nostalgia tinged songs still survive, to be sung at festive occasions, - and when the occasional field researcher drops in.\textsuperscript{106}

Access to ample acreages of land for the TGME's tenants, and the proximity of the farms to the mines, underpinned and in a way legitimised the company's impositions in other respects as well. From a relatively early stage the company lent heavily on the authority of chief Kobeng to drum out labour from its Pilgrim's Rest farms. Kobeng's people had lived on or around what was to become the farm of Hermansburg since the 1850s or 1860s. Kobeng's own collaboration with white authority went back to the early 1880s if not before. Kobeng is supposed to have assisted the Boers in the Transvaal's war of retrocession in 1880-1, and certainly provided sanctuary and succour to Boer commandos in the second Anglo-Boer war. Tradition has it that it was in return for such assistance that Kobeng was helped to install himself as chief over his own Mogane rivals, and over the previously dominant Mashego lineage. Kobeng's co-operation carried over into the new era of the TGME, when the company resumed full-scale mining operations in the area after the Anglo-Boer war. As before the arrangement was to their mutual advantage. In return for helping with the provision of labour, Kobeng was allowed to enjoy considerable rights. He could allocate land; he could appoint headmen on other TGME farms; he could hear judicial cases, and he could organise initiation schools (which lasted a year, and
which of course inculcated respect for traditional values and obedience to
the chief).\textsuperscript{107} In a more direct way than perhaps anywhere else in South
Africa, the company thus sustained pre-capitalist relations of production,
to provide it with cheap and relatively docile labour power. A version of
the same arrangement may also have been applied to other farms 'below the
Berg'. In 1911, when faced with the first serious labour shortages for
several years, the then General-Manager, Aimetti, invited 35 local chiefs to
Pilgrim's Rest. Arising from their deliberations unspecified but 'very
satisfactory arrangements ... for the control and organisation of our
unskilled labour force' were made, which, along with a 'judicious
improvement' in rates of pay and rations resolved the company's labour
problems for several years to come.\textsuperscript{108} It was only in a period of mounting
labour shortage and turmoil in the late 1910s that these relationships came
seriously under strain, leading, in the early 1930s, to their total
collapse.

\textbf{THE TGME UNDER STRAIN}

The golden age for both company and labour tenant began drawing to a
close in the latter stages of World War I. Between 1911 and 1916 the
company enjoyed its highest profits ever, topping £200 000 in each of these
years.\textsuperscript{109} Henceforth, however, it set itself firmly on its subsequent
course of 'increasing tonnage and falling yields'.\textsuperscript{110} Between 1921 and 1932
working profit on the mines only three times exceeded £40 000.\textsuperscript{111} In 1929
Vaalhoek mine closed down operations and in 1930 the company was predicting
a 1-3 year age for a number of the central mines.\textsuperscript{112} Compounding the
underlying problem of yield in this period were recurrent labour
difficulties and escalating costs. From 1918 to 1920 the company found
itself in the grips of an acute labour shortage, beginning with the 'flu
epidemic, in October 1918, and culminating in a general strike at Pilgrim's
Rest in June 1920. From 1917, moreover, like other companies in South Africa, it was faced with steeply-rising costs induced by the war.\textsuperscript{113} The company’s response was to exert an ever tightening squeeze on its hapless labour tenants, leading to increasingly strained relations on its farms and on its mines. It was no doubt fortunate for the memory of Kobeng, that he passed away in 1915.\textsuperscript{114}

The 'flu epidemic brought the company’s problems to a head, prompting its General Manager, R.A. Barry, to lead a deputation to Pretoria to wait on the Ministers of Justice and Native Affairs.\textsuperscript{115} In these meetings Barry presented four main demands: that the SNC be 'more of a Chief and less of a Tax gatherer',\textsuperscript{116} and thereby gain the confidence of the African inhabitants in the district; that labour recruitment for outside districts be 'absolutely prohibited';\textsuperscript{117} that the 'disappearance of natives' be stopped through a modified pass system; and that police supervision be made efficient and extended in the district.\textsuperscript{118} In later discussions with Acting Director of Native Labour, H.S. Cooke, the TGME also submitted a further thirty recommendations on how to reduce labour 'wastage' and to secure the available labour for the mines. Amongst the most important of these were, to hunt down hut tax defaulters, to discipline beer brewers, to penalise land companies which allowed Africans to congregate on their farms, to stop illegal squatting, to compound women and to punish desertion heavily.\textsuperscript{119}

For a time it looked as if Barry had over-reached himself by his rash descent on the capital. Although Cooke was on the whole sympathetic to the plight of the company and endorsed most of its requests, other officials took the opportunity to settle a few scores with its overbearing Manager.\textsuperscript{120} Damant, the Native Commissioner, for example, recommended proclaiming Pilgrim’s Rest a labour district in terms of Act 15 of 1911, an issue carefully skirted by Cooke. He also expressed himself totally opposed to closing the district to outside recruiting, even on a temporary basis as
suggested by Cooke. Damant re-stated his position at a meeting between the Police and Native Affairs Department officials in Pretoria 2½ months later, on which occasion he found strong support from Colonel Truter, the Commissioner of Police. 'Natives were being swindled right and left' Truter argued, while mere 'picannins' were being sent underground. The 1911 Act, he believed, should be enforced, and children should not be allowed underground below the age of 16. Colonel Godley, the under-secretary of native affairs threw his hands up in horror at this turn of the debate. 'There will be shouting from the mine-owners' he exclaimed, and tried vainly to rally support for the weaker 'Barberton' option.

And shouting there certainly was. Once rumours reached Pilgrim's Rest that the Native Labour Regulations Act might be enforced on the district Barry both wired and wrote the Secretary for Native Affairs in great agitation. Enforcement he claimed 'would be a real hardship'; it would have 'serious results' and could 'do nothing but harm the district generally ... the Government interests, and ... the natives themselves'. Shortly after, a new deputation waited on the Mining Commissioner for Pilgrim's Rest. The threatened enforcement of the 1911 Act, Barry argued would 'severely jeopardise' the company's operations. A key problem was its restrictions on the employment of youths. Between 1 200 and 1 500 juveniles were employed by TGME, and these often meant the difference between profit and loss on the company's small low grade mines. Rather than exploiting child labour, he intimated, the mines were performing a valuable social service, since the youth would otherwise find 'an outlet in criminal and loafing channels'. A more sympathetic attitude from the Government was urgently required.

It is not clear from the evidence how this conflict played itself out, but it seems that Barry's protests and the Secretary for Native Affairs' caution were eventually enough to block any radical change. No 'fresh
regulations’ were implemented; the Company continued to enforce labour contracts without reference to the Native Affairs officials; and, throughout 1919, African men persisted in 'wander[ing] about the country in perfectly undisciplined manner'. The Company continued to insist that their labour shortages were due to problems of control rather than lack of potential employees. As Barry wrote in his quarterly report to the Secretaries in October 1919:

> There appears to be a considerable force of available but idle native labour in the district, which rigid native policy and some attention to administrative needs should place at the disposal of mines and other industries.

However, if a rigid native policy meant the application of the 1911 Act, Barry preferred to rely on his own resources. In the ensuing months he placed his compound police at the disposal of the sub-native commissioner to track down deserters, he attempted to discipline deserters by withholding wages, and he had squatters flogged to compel them to come and work on the farms.

By these means a satisfactory supply of labour was gradually restored, and the issue of a 'more rigid native policy' slowly slid out of view. Other issues were in any case by now claiming the attention of the manager of TGME. When Barry had conducted his investigation in Pilgrim's Rest in December 1918, the one complaint that he had received from black labourers on the mines was over the issue of wages. Since 1917 the rate of inflation had soared, and black living standards had become progressively eroded. Faced with escalating costs for stores and equipment, the one thing the TGME wished to avoid were increases in black pay. In 1919, for example, there was a strong move among the shareholders of the company to cancel prospecting operations altogether as a means of cutting costs, which the chairman only barely warded off. Again the following year, when fears were abroad that the gold premium might suddenly drop 'considerable pressure' was brought to bear on Barry 'by the Chairman and others to reduce
expenditure and outlay, at the cost of stopping work that [Barry] thought to be necessary'. Clearly this was not the moment when wage increases for blacks would be readily conceded.

A small concession was made after the black mineworkers' strike on the Rand in February 1920. Although Barry spoke of the company's good fortune in having 'avoided serious native trouble such as that on the Rand' in the 1920 Company Report, he also took the precaution of granting a bonus of one month's pay to underground workers after six months' continuous work. However, this soon proved insufficient. The first intimation of impending trouble came from mines in nearby Sabie, which had failed to follow the TGME's example and had granted no increase of any kind. On 11th May, the Sabie branch of the Transvaal Native Congress approached sub-native commissioner Hook in his Graskop office to protest that black wages were the same as they had been before the war, and to request an increase in pay. Hook conveyed this message to the managers of Sabie's mines, but no immediate action was forthcoming, and between 17-20 May workers on all of Sabie's main mines came out successively on strike. With the exception of Buchanan Syndicate, the strikes only lasted one day, after workers were granted bonuses equivalent to those paid at TGME.

Buoyed up by this small victory the Transvaal Native Congress now spread its actions further afield, and began actively recruiting around Pilgrim's Rest. Jubilee Kok recalls the Transvaal Native Congress' brass band parading through the streets of Pilgrim's Rest location, and hundreds of residents purchasing the TNC's white membership card. The company meanwhile looked on in alarm. Local white opinion advocated harsh measures against the Congress, but ultimately wiser counsels prevailed. The TGME owned Pilgrim's and Sabie News counselled a policy of 'peaceful persuasion', on the grounds that 'in a district such as ours control by force is impossible'. Perhaps recalling the damage done by Barry's and others'
The name of 'Bob' Gardner, the company's estate manager, became a byword for brutality on the TGME's farms, as he flogged men and arrested women for not furnishing labour in the right quantities or at the right time. As the company strove to increase tonnage and reduce costs, Sunday work became common, which closed down further spaces that had previously helped humanise the labour regime. There are also signs that more and more tenants were squeezed on the company's farms. The only hard evidence is provided by Mabin, who speaks of the numbers of families residing on the company's six most densely settled Pilgrim's Rest farms rising from 395 in 1934 to 726 in 1945, but oral testimony suggests this may also have been happening before. 'This was when our lands were cut' says July Sedibe: henceforth polygamy, cattle and ploughs were gradually whittled away.

The old collaborative relationships could hardly survive in this hostile environment. In the late 1920s, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) began to recruit on the farms tapping this mounting discontent. 'The ICU told us not to pay rent and tax, and Bob Gardner chased them off' July Sedibe recalls. Along with scores of others he purchased a membership card. Reprisals were common - 'If Gardner found you [with a card] he would handcuff you' and take you off, but grievances abounded and many were prepared to take the risk. Even Chaana, Kobeng's successor turned a blind eye to the ICU organisers on the farm. It was perhaps because of the ICU's activities that 1929 was a year of such wild fluctuations of labour. However, as with other rural communities in the Transvaal, the ICU promised far more than they could deliver. 'They sang a song called "Africa"' but failed to do much else, and within months the agitation had collapsed. One legacy of its work is perhaps to be found in the deposition and exile of Chief Chaane in 1932, reportedly because he opposed Sunday work. With this, for the TGME's tenants, the old order had passed.
FOOTNOTES


3.

4. van Onselen, Chibaro, 25, 33, 91-127.

5. ibid, 91-127.


12. A.R.C. Fowler, 'Mining at Transvaal Gold Mining Estates', 296.

13. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1909, 16-18.


15. Ibid, 1908, 14, 28; 1910; 1924; 1927, 3.

16. Ibid. 1921, 3, 5. All deficiencies in this paper can be attributed to this.


19. CAD, GG 1411 44/25 J. Allies and A.A. Menkin Pilgrim's Rest Vigilance Association to the Governor General 29 May 1915.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid, Vigilance Association (2) to the Governor General, 26 May 1915.
22. Ibid., Minutes on the folder cover to the Vigilance Association's correspondence; ibid., minute 912 Prime Minister's Office, 20 July 1915.


25. TGME, Part of File 5EH, SAMWU, du Toit, Secretary, Miners' Union, Pilgrim's Rest to Acting General Manager, TGME, 29 Dec. 1919; ibid, Acting General Manager to du Toit, 30 Dec. 1919; ibid, du Toit to Normand, 3 Jan 1920; ibid, Barry to Secretaries, TGME, 23 Jan. 1920.


27. TGME General Notebook 3 May 1914-28 June 1926, Acting General Manager, Carter, to Secretaries, TGME, 4 April 1914.


30. Ibid., 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Normand to Secretaries, TGME, 8 Feb. 1919, 166.

31. TGME, part of File 5EH, SAMWU, Barry to J. Moyle-Phillips, Acting Honorary Secretary, SAMWU, 27 Sept. 1920; ibid, Barry to Moyle-Phillips, 4 Nov. 1920.

33. See Note. 31.


36. Minutes of Evidence to the Eastern Transvaal Land Commission UG32-'18, 39, 44.

37. CPSA, Evidence to the Native Economic Commission, 1931-2, BO+10, Reply to Questionnaire No. 64/276(4), from Zoutpansberg (n.d.); ibid, Magistrate and Native Commissioner Lydenburg, reply to questionnaire 24 March 1931.

38. Central Archives Depot (hereafter CAD), Government Native Labour Bureau (hereafter GNLB) 303 402/18/98, Dyke Poynter to Secretary Mines and Industries, 29 April 1919.

39. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F634, Barry to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13 March 1919; CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, H.S. Cooke Acting Director of Native Affairs to Secretary for Native Affairs, 31 Dec. 1918.
40. Ibid: A.R.C. Fowler, 'Mining at Transvaal Gold Mining Estates', 302;
    CAD, NTS 271, 1190/16/F634, Barry to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13
    March 1919.

41. A.H. Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy
    (Johannesburg, 1985) (Chap. 6).

42. TGME, Vaalhoek Mine, monthly reports, 7 June 1918-Dec 1925; Elandsdrift
    Mine Annual Reports 2A1 Dec 1918-April 1926

43. TGME, Elandsdrift Mine Annual Reports 2S1, Dec. 1918-April 1926, 4 July

44. Interview, Christian Silikane Shatale (near Bushbuckridge), 21 Feb.
    1985.

45. Minutes of Evidence to the Eastern Transvaal Land Commission, UG32-'18,
    40-42.

46. CPSA, Evidence to the Native Economic Commission, 1931-2, Box 10, Reply
    to General Questionnaire tendered by Assistant Native Commissioner,
    Graskop (n.d.).

47. Interview, Christian Silikane.

48. CAD, GNLB 402/18/98, to H.S. Cooke, 28 Dec. 1918.

49. Union of South Africa, Low Grade Mines Commission, UG.34-'20, para. 18.

50. CAD, NTS 271, 1190/16/F639 H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs
    31 Dec 1918; Interview, Tiger Mashile, Pilgrim's Rest.

51. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, F.H. Damant to Secretary for Nastive Affairs,
    8 April 1918.

52. For the ownership of the local press, see TGME, General Notebook, 10
    Sept. 1918-20 May 1919, Barry to Registrar, Transvaal Society of

53. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, Minutes of a Conference held at SAP
    Secretary Native Affairs to Secretary for Justice, 26 Feb. 1919.

54. CAD GNLB 402/18/98 Cooke to Whitelaw, 27 Dec. 1918.
55. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, undated memorandum re administration of Native Affairs at Pilgrim's Rest.
56. Ibid, Memorandum, initialled F.C.C. 27 March 1919.
57. TGME, General Notebook, 3 Sept 1914-9 July 1915, Estate Agent to General Manager, TGME 22 May 1915, 852; CAD, GNLB, 303 402/18/98 Minutes of a Conference at SAP headquarters, 24 Feb. 1919. See also note 55.
59. Ibid.
60. CAD NTS 271 1190/16/F639; Memo (by Soames) on illegal floggings by members of the NAD during 1916 and 1918; ibid report on alleged mal-administration at Graskop R.C. Cochran, Magistrate, n.d.
61. Ibid; Natal Advertiser 20 June 1918, 3 July 1918 (editorial); CAD NTS 271 1190/16/F639 Merriman to Botha 10 June 1918, Brebner to Dower 13 August 1918.
64. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, Notes of a meeting held between the Director of Native Labour and a Deputation of Residents of Pilgrim's Rest, 27 Nov. 1918.
65. BRA, TGME annual Reports, 1907.
66. TGME, Head Office Notebook, 11 July 1917-6 Nov. 1918, Barry to Secretaries TGME, 10 Dec. 1917.
67. For a general account of Spanish 'flu in South Africa see H. Phillips, TGME, Letter Book 16 Head Office 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Barry to Chairman 5 Nov. 1918.
69. Ibid, Barry to Chairman, 5 Nov. 1918.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, F.H. Damant Native Commissioner, Lydenburg to Secretary for Native Affairs, 1 Feb. 1919.


74. Interview, July Sedibe, Pilgrim's Rest.

75. Interview, Christian Silikane.


77. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1919, 4; 1920 (May) 4.

78. TGME, General Notebook, 10 Sept. 1918–20 May 1919, Barry to Magistrate, Pilgrim's Rest 31 Oct, 1918, 255-6, Barry to Shurink, 3 Dec. 1918, 344; CAD GNLB 303 402/18/98, Barry to Secretary for Native Affairs.

79. Barry, TGME Annual Reports, 1912.

80. CAD, NTS 271 119D/16/F639. H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs, 31 Dec. 1918

81. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, Trevar to Govt. Mining Engineer, 5 May 1919.

82. See note 80.

83. See notes 42 and 43.

84. Interview July Sedibe.

85. Interview Christian Silikane.

86. Interview Tiger Mashile.

87. Interview July Sedibe.


89. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, Notes of a meeting held between the Director of Native Labour and a deputation of residents of Pilgrim's Rest, 27 Nov. 1918.

90. Interview, July Sedibe.

91. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs, 31 Dec. 1918.
92. CPSA, Evidence to the Native Economic Commission, 1931-2, Box 10, Reply to General Questionnaire, tendered by Assistant Native Commissioner, Graskop (n.d.).

93. Interview Christian Silkane.

94. See note 92.

95. Interview, July Sedibe.

96. Interview, Christian Silkane.

97. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs, 31 Dec. 1918.

98. Ibid, Chairman of Deputation (Pilgrim's Rest) to Secretary for Native Affairs, 20 Feb. 1919.

99. CAD, GNLB, 402/18/98, Trevor to Govt. Mining Engineer, 9 May 1919.

100. BRA, TGME Annual Reports 1908, 13; 1909.

101. Ibid, 1910, 34.

102. Union of South Africa, Minutes of Evidence to the Eastern Transvaal Land Commission, UG.32-'18, 44.

103. Ibid, 41-2.

104. Interview, July Sedibe.

105. A. Mabin, The Land Clearances at Pilgrim's Rest.


108. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1911, 3, 6; 1912, 37.

109. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 'Summary of Results Since Commencement of Milling Operations', 1895-1932.

110. A.R.C. Fowler, 'Mining at Transvaal Gold Mining Estates', 296.

111. See note 109.

112. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1929; 1930, 6.

115. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs
    31 Dec. 1918; ibid, Chairman of Deputation to Secretary for Native
    Affairs, 20 Feb. 1919.
116. CAD GNLB 303 402/18/98 'Memorandum to Major Cooke ...' 3 Dec. 1918.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid, 'Notes re natives for discussion with Mr. Cooke, Special
    Commissioner, 5 Dec. 1918.
120. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639 H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs 31
    Dec. 1918.
121. CAD GNLB 303 402/18/98 Damant to Secretary for Native Affairs 11 Feb.
    1919.
122. Notes taken at a Conference held at the SAP headquarters, Pretoria, 24
    Feb. 1919.
123. CAD, NTS, 271 1190/16/G634, Barry to Secretary for Native Affairs 13
    March 1919.
124. CAD GNLB 303 402/18/988. J. Hartley to Under Secretary Native Affairs
    7 May 1919, encl. W. Dyke Poynter to Secretary, Mines and Industries,
    24 April 1919.
125. TGME, Head Office Notebook, Nov. 1918-Nov. 1920 General Manager to
    Secretaries, TGME, 9 April 1919, 177.
    Francis and Gold, 18 Jan. 1919, 529; ibid, Barry to Giles, 11 Feb.
127. TGME, Head Office Notebook, 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Barry to
    Secretaries TGME, 11 Sep. 1919; ibid, Barry to Secretaries, 7 Aug.
    1919.
128. Ibid, Barry to Secretaries, TGME 7 Oct. 1919, 422; ibid, Barry to


131. CAD GNLB 303 402/18/98, Memorandum 27 Mar. 1919. Initialled F.C.C.


133. A.R.C. Fowler 'Mining at Transvaal Gold Mining Estates', 293.

134. TGME Head Office Notebook 16, 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Barry to Chairman TGME, 20 Sep. 1920, 898.


137. Interview, Jubilee book.


139. CAD MNW 527 2338/20, Poyter, Mining Commissioner to Secretary, Mines and Industries, 6 July 1920.

140. Ibid.

141. TGME Head Office Notebook, 14 Nov. 1920-22 May 1922, Barry to Secretaries, TGME, 16 Feb. 1921.


143. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1921, 2; 1924; 1925, 13.

144. TGME, Head Office Notebook 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Barry to Chairman 20 Sep. 1920.

145. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1929.


147. Ibid, Annual Reports 1921-1932.

148. Ibid.

149.
150. Ibid, 1924, 1928, 1929; Interview Chief L.L. Mogane and others.

151. Ibid.

152. Mabin, 'The Land Clearances at Pilgrim's Rest', 404.

153. Interview July Ledibe.

154. Ibid.

155. Interview, Tiger Mashile.

156. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1929, 3, 5.

157. Interview, Tiger Mashile.

158. Mabin, 'Labour Tenancy and Land Clearances at Pilgrim's Rest', 9.; Interview, Chief L.L. Mogane and others.