CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“Despite the Constitutional requirement calling for a system of co-operative governance, and legislation providing for measures to facilitate this, the level of integration between the three spheres of government in the arenas of planning, budgeting and implementation has been far from satisfactory. Numerous attempts at bringing about greater integration in the spatial location of infrastructure investment and development spending have been embarked upon since the dawning of the new democracy in 1994, but to little avail” (Harrison et al, 2000:17)

1.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH

The anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the subsequent emergence of the post-apartheid state has been regarded as a political miracle due largely to its unprecedented nature in international politics. The process of State restructuring and decentralization which post-apartheid South Africa underwent brought a number of significant changes both to the form and function of government. Key among these was the Constitutional introduction of the three spheres of government, national, provincial and local as independent-albeit interdependent - spheres of government thereby eliminating the tier system of apartheid state governance.

The Constitution proceeds to allocate powers and functions to each of the three spheres of government. In doing this, education, housing and health services are identified as functional areas falling with the concurrent competencies of provincial and national government (Republic of South Africa, 1996). On the other hand municipalities were located at the direct point of interface with communities and therefore at the forefront of service delivery. As a result, the local sphere was tasked with a developmental mandate and Section 153 of the Constitution of South Africa, detailing this mandate, requires that the municipality must, among other things

Structure and manage its administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community (Op.cit: 84-85).

Noting the importance of health, education and housing to the well-being of communities, these services therefore are critical to the delivery of the developmental mandate that local government has been assigned by the Constitution. Since these are competencies of provincial and national government, there is a need for alignment in
the planning and delivery of these services among the spheres of government. This is more so in that support services such as electricity, storm water systems as well as water and sanitation services, are municipal competencies in line with schedule 4, part B, of the Constitution. By alignment, one refers to the integration and coordination of plans and policies of the various spheres of government around specific areas of common interest.

The first 15 years of democracy were marred with reports of sharp misalignment in the actions of the various spheres of government. Instances have often been highlighted wherein houses were constructed where there are no supporting health and education facilities. This occurred as various departments planned and implemented programmes in pursuit of various backlogs and targets, often independently of each other at both vertical and horizontal levels. In one of the various attempts to address the challenges of joint planning among the spheres of government, it was decided in 2006 that the Integrated Development Plan (IDP), which was conceptualized as an instrument for municipal planning, will be utilized as a tool of intergovernmental alignment and shall henceforth become a plan of all government (Mufamadi, 2006:1).

In spite of this, intergovernmental alignment is still largely perceived as one of the biggest challenges confronting effective service delivery. Describing the extent of the dysfunctional nature of South Africa’s intergovernmental development planning system, Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs - erstwhile DPLG - Sicelo Shiceka recently lamented that “Our system of co-operative governance can be compared to that of a choir where some will be singing bass, others baritone and others alto and soprano” (Shiceka, 2009:2). Evidence suggests that after 15 years and in spite of a great variety of innovative efforts, there continues to be a sense that intergovernmental alignment among the three spheres of government is poor.

This research is an attempt to examine how post-apartheid South Africa has responded to complexities associated with intergovernmental alignment among the three spheres of government, both vertically and horizontally, in the delivery of services. In particular the research examines the extent to which the shift in conceptualization of IDP, from a municipal plan to an instrument of intergovernmental alignment contributed to tackling the long-standing challenges associated with intergovernmental alignment among the spheres of government and what may be required to improve intergovernmental alignment.
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FOCUS OF RESEARCH: INTERGOVERNMENTAL ALIGNMENT

The post apartheid era in South Africa resulted in a shift away from centralized methods of planning and governance with the introduction of various spheres, some of whose modes of governance were still to be thoroughly articulated. One of the outcomes of this decentralization process was a significant growth in the number of governing entities planning and investing in the same geographical space and taking decisions on matters having a bearing on spaces outside their jurisdiction (Oranje and van Huyssteen, 2007:2). This was followed by a rigorous process of developing new forms of intergovernmental development planning at both procedural and institutional levels, so as to optimize the usage of the newly-created government structure. Practically, the implications of this was that intergovernmental processes of “prioritisation, resource allocation and implementation to achieve shared development objectives in the same territory/geographical space had to be conceptualised, codified, implemented and made to work” (ibid).

Achieving this ideal was never going to be an easy task due to, among other things, the structure of the apartheid planning system which had been employed for over 50 years. In apartheid South Africa, planning was carried out along clearly defined hierarchical lines and within distinguishably isolated envelopes created through legislation to give spatial effect to the apartheid ideology. Provinces and municipalities were tiers of government, organised hierarchically to service the aspirations and plans of a centrist and powerful national government. In addition to this, the functional scope of municipalities was further constrained by divisions based on race. As a result planning for African communities was done in a fragmented way both by national government and their subservient Bantustan authorities, while planning for white communities was conducted in a relatively integrated way guided by legislation influenced by British and North American planning systems (ibid).

The post-apartheid government was quite conscious of these spatial disparities and the need to put in place corrective interventions. To this effect, new forms of intergovernmental development planning at both procedural and institutional levels were created. In doing this, a number of Acts, policies, strategies, development planning instruments, integration mechanisms and structures were initiated. This was done with the view to ensuring that intergovernmental priority setting, resource allocation and implementation take place in an integrated, effective, efficient and sustainable manner (The Presidency, 2004). However, evidence points to very poor success in as far as intergovernmental alignment is concerned both at vertical and horizontal levels. After years of democracy, and in spite of a series of efforts, joint planning and budgeting
among the three spheres of government remains largely problematic. The Presidency, providing an overview of alignment and harmonisation in South Africa over the first decade of democracy, comes to the conclusion that:

One of the major challenges facing government in its quest to provide basic services to all its people, progressively improve the quality of life and life chances of all South Africans and eradicate the dualistic nature of the South African economy, has been the effective integration, coordination and alignment of the actions of its three constituting spheres (ibid).

The above is a manifestation of an acknowledgement of the inefficiency of systems and processes put in place to drive joint planning among the three spheres of government. It is for this reason that former President Thabo Mbeki in his State of the Nation Address on 03 February 2006, stated that “integration of planning and implementation across the government spheres is one of the prime areas of focus in our programme for the next term of local government” (Mbeki, 2006:1).

As part of a new a set of initiatives, it was decided that Municipal IDPs provide a potential platform for effective alignment of the plans of the three spheres of government. Former Minister of the then Department of Provincial and Local Government – now Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs - Sydney Mufamadi in his 2006 Budget Speech outlined this thinking as follows:

Whereas the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) of municipalities were originally conceived of as strategic plans specific to the municipalities concerned, we have come to regard the IDP as a potential fulcrum for raising issues to be attended to by all the three spheres of government. Clearly therefore, all the 3 stages of the IDP process starting from conceptualisation through to formulation and ultimately to execution, require joint and coordinated inputs (Mufamadi, 2006:1).

The above marked a new era in the evolving system of development planning in South Africa characterised by a shift in the conceptualisation of IDP from a plan of a municipality to a plan of all government. As asserted by Pieterse and van Donk (2008: 62) “one of the main components in the drive to restructure the planning system was the idea that in future, IDPs will be reflective of government’s investment and activities within the municipal space, as opposed to just being limited to local strategies and programmes”. Therefore the IDP was being re-positioned as a tool through which vertical and horizontal alignment in the delivery of government services would be pursued to ensure maximum impact.
The research is therefore an attempt to examine the extent to which this shift in the conceptualisation of the IDP has assisted in tackling intergovernmental alignment challenges among the three spheres of government. The research effort is built on a review of interventions and debates on challenges relating to intergovernmental development planning as well as empirical work on intergovernmental alignment within and among the three spheres of government. This is in the bid to test the following hypothesis:

*Intergovernmental alignment in the past 15 years has been pursued through voluntaristic methods, reliant on individual goodwill and forums. While this has been effective in some instances, it has also been a fundamental gap characterizing post apartheid South Africa’s intergovernmental development planning system, resulting in poor intergovernmental alignment among the three spheres of government in the delivery of services. As solution, legislative revisions are necessary to introduce an institutionalized system of intergovernmental alignment that is embedded within government and not reliant on goodwill.*

In order to adequately test the hypothesis, the research sets out to respond to the following research question:

*To what extent have recent shifts in the conceptualization of IDP contributed to addressing the challenges associated with intergovernmental alignment in post-apartheid South Africa?*

This in turn opens up space to break down the research into the following, more specific sub-questions.

- How has post apartheid South Africa attempted to tackle the challenges relating to intergovernmental alignment?
- What are some of the factors contributing to the perpetuation of challenges with regards to intergovernmental alignment?
  - Are the Constitutional separation of powers and state re-configuration contributing to this? Or are there unintended consequence of post-apartheid legislation and policies? Are there personalities, political, or other forms of territorial battles at play prohibiting alignment and integrated service delivery? Is it possible that the combination of some of these factors is the actual causal factor? And if so, which is it?
- What models of intergovernmental alignment exist within the international arena and what lessons can be learned from these?
• What future directions are likely to yield more effective outcomes with regards to intergovernmental alignment? Are some adjustments required to the current approach or should it be entirely re-oriented?

1.3. RESEARCH RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

Literature on intergovernmental development planning within the South African context is very limited, with much of the available academic work concentrated around Integrated Development Planning (see inter alia Harrison, 2001, 2006; Todes, 2004; Pieterse, 2004; Visser, 2001; Mabin, 2002). A body of recent South African development planning literature is however beginning to emerge to address issues of intergovernmental alignment (see Harrison 2008; Oranje & van Huyssteen, 2007 as well as Pieterse and van Donk, 2008 to name a few). This research seeks to contribute to the body of academic literature on intergovernmental development planning in South Africa. With this in mind, the objectives of the research are:

• To examine the origins of intergovernmental alignment challenges and how post apartheid South Africa has responded to them.
• Understand the underlying factors contributing the perpetuation of intergovernmental alignment challenges.
• To explore whether the IDP given its current location within municipalities and within the legislation, is an appropriate instrument to drive intergovernmental alignment.
• Examine various models of intergovernmental alignment from which South Africa can draw lessons and make recommendations on future directions.

The research departs from the following critical assumptions, all of which are informed by the review of policies and the available literature on intergovernmental alignment. In turn the assumptions inform the choice of research methods adopted in order to address the research question and sub-questions posed.

1.4. RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS

• The segregationist nature of apartheid era planning as well as the post apartheid state restructuring – through decentralization - and its resultant separation of powers, have both resulted in a need for intergovernmental alignment in the delivery of services in the post apartheid era.
• The persistence of challenges associated with intergovernmental alignment is not as a result of lack of initiatives from government in this respect.
• The IDP was originally conceived as an instrument for municipal planning. It was only when several initiatives aimed at intergovernmental alignment had failed to produce results that there was a shift towards making the IDP a plan of all government and as such an instrument of intergovernmental alignment.

1.5. RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Development planning interventions are always carried out through multiple intra- and inter-governmental interactions by actors within public administration. Policy development and review through multiple intra- and inter-organisational relationships has become more complex in the context of state decentralization as this introduces, among others, a need for strong focus on partnership-based service delivery arrangements (Turner and Hulme 1997; Manor 1999). These considerations make it essential to focus on inter-governmental relationships in development planning within the South African context.

The methodology for this research is, from the very beginning entirely qualitative, given its exploratory nature. The research was designed in line with the desire to examine intergovernmental alignment and how the IDP process has contributed to addressing challenges in this regard. It was therefore critical that the methodology selected enable a comprehensive analysis of the issues which would aid in responding to the questions posed. Furthermore, inter-governmental relations are inextricably interwoven with interpersonal relations. Thus it was also important for the methodological approach adopted to provide space for people’s personal views on matters of intergovernmental alignment and challenges thereof. It was for these reasons that qualitative approach was employed for this research. Babbie and Mouton (2001), define qualitative research as a generic research approach in social research according to which research takes its departure point as the insider perspective on social action. In addition to the cited reasons, it offered the following unique advantages:

• It took into consideration people’s interpretation and allowed for flexibility, which was critical for this research.
• It allowed for the selection of respondents by virtue of them meeting the criterion in accordance with the purpose of this thesis as opposed to random sampling.
• It enabled participatory observation, which in turn provided the research with a level of depth.

The above advantages of qualitative research methods were further optimized upon through the use of several instruments which, combined, produced the outcomes
presented and analysed in the next two chapters respectively. Below is a brief summary of elements of qualitative research that were employed, including case study and sampling.

1.5.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY

Attempting to address all issues relating to intergovernmental development planning in South Africa is a complex endeavour as these differ from one context to another. In order to enable an in-depth examination of these challenges, the research employed a case study method thereby opting for depth instead of width. This in turn enabled a more intimate and contextually focused exploration of the research question and sub-questions posed. Thus while the research deals with a very broad topic with national implications, the case study was essential to locate it with a context. The case study approach was also utilized in the bid to define the scope of the research and to respond adequately to the research questions posed.

Gauteng province was utilized as a case study for the research. Gauteng province, since 2006, has been working towards becoming a global city region. At the core of this vision is the aspiration to ensure that Gauteng municipalities cooperate internally so as to compete effectively with other world cities in the global space economy (Office of the Premier, 2005). Ekurhuleni is hailed as the transportation hub of the province due largely to its unequalled transport network including the O.R Tambo Airport. The municipality further boasts a competitive advantage in the manufacturing sector (Ekurhuleni, 2009). Tshwane is the home of Gauteng’s largest vehicle manufacturing sector. Lastly, the City of Johannesburg boasts strong capacity in the advanced producer services as well as the finance sectors. The GCR effort is therefore aimed at ensuring that each of these three Metropolitan municipalities exploits its unique advantages and cooperates with one other so as to enable Gauteng to compete better for investment and trade in the global economy alongside world cities such as London and Tokyo. It therefore becomes evident that issues of inter-governmental planning are particularly critical for Gauteng. The IDP, given its strategic location as the key planning instrument within municipalities, becomes an instrument through which inter-governmental planning should be carried out within municipal spaces in pursuit of the GCR.

The IDP-GCR interface is of particular interest due to its seeming underlying contradiction. The IDP, at least in its original conceptualisation, is geographically focused on the municipal space and developments therein. The GCR vision on the other hand transcends municipal boundaries to view Gauteng as one geographic space. Thus, another benefit of having three municipalities was the ability to examine the
extent to which the IDP is being utilized, through inter-municipal planning, to pursue the GCR.

Another reason for locating the research effort within the context of Gauteng is the fact that on the one hand Gauteng is the most populous province in the country, with about 10 million people (Statistics South Africa, 2007). On the other hand the province is the smallest geographically with a total land area of 17010 km², constituting a mere 1.4 % of the country’s total land area (Department of Local Government and Housing, 2009, 15). This implies that government in Gauteng has to find innovative means of delivering services, and cooperation becomes a critical ingredient. Furthermore, the research departs from an assumption that the geographic advantage, in terms of land size, makes intergovernmental cooperation much easier in Gauteng that elsewhere in the country.

Within Gauteng, three Gauteng Provincial Sector Departments, Health, Housing, and Education, were utilized as sub-components of the case study. This was due to the centrality of the work that these departments carry out on the delivery of local government’s developmental mandate. In the first instance, the development of housing, education and healthcare facilities is a provincial competence while the municipalities are charged with provision of services such as water and sanitation, which are critical to the effective functioning of these facilities. Secondly, alignment among these three departments is most critical in ensuring the delivery of integrated services, to the extent that housing delivery is accompanied by provision of schools and health-care services. The latter is an underlying principle of the Breaking New Ground (BNG) policy which was launched in 2004 with the view to introduce a conceptual shift from the mere provision of houses to the development of sustainable human settlements with all necessary amenities (Department of human Settlement, 2007). Utilising these three departments as elements of the case study also enables the examination of the extent to which they align their plans horizontally in pursuit of the BNG principles.

In addition to these, the research drew on three municipalities falling within three different categories (A,B,C) of Section 155 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa. Thus, a Metropolitan, District and Local Municipalities are utilized as a case study to represent local government. This was done as an attempt to gain adequate insight into the development planning dynamics across different types of municipalities. In an attempt to build a province-wide picture the thesis utilized Ekurhuleni Metro – located within the central interior of the province, Metsweding District Municipality – located in the north eastern part of Gauteng and Emfuleni Local Municipalities – falling within Sedibeng
District and located in the Southern part of Gauteng. This in turn offers a comprehensive geographic spread as can be deduced from the provincial map below.

**FIG 1: GAUTENG PROVINCIAL MAP**

Ekurhuleni is home to the highest number of informal settlements in the province and thus enormous housing backlog (IDP, 2009). On the other hand, provision of services to settlements such as Zithobeni and Rethabiseng within Metsweding remains largely problematic. This is due largely to the fact that the district and its constituent municipalities are highly reliant on grants and receive very limited equitable share from National Treasury (IDP, 2009). Lastly, provision of housing and other services in Emfuleni remains a challenge especially in areas like Evaton, wherein 65 000 households live in backyard shacks (IDP, 2009). These present a need for coordinated action among the spheres of government in delivering services within these municipalities.

**1.5.2. SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION**

As noted earlier, qualitative research enabled the selection of respondents by virtue of them meeting the criterion in accordance with the purpose of this thesis. The population for this research consisted of Municipal and Provincial Government officials. Within each of the municipalities, the respondents were the IDP managers as well as senior officials responsible for Housing, Health and Education, With regards to provincial
government the respondents were senior managers responsible for infrastructure planning within all the three departments. The combination of the case study with the sample in this manner enabled the researcher to address extensively the complex questions the research posed in a systematic way. Further insights were gained through discussions with academics, and other practitioners in the field of development planning drawn largely from within public sector institutions.

The successful completion of this research was reliant on the collection of information regarding the planning processes of both local and provincial government. There was thus a strong need to call upon secondary data, defined as “......information that has already been collected for another purpose but which is available for others to use” (White, 2003, 67). This, along with the interviews conducted, enabled a thorough interrogation of the some of the major stumbling-blocks towards intergovernmental alignment in Gauteng. Documents reviewed include:

- Municipal IDPs for 08/09 and 09/10 Financial Years.
- Reports produced for and by the Gauteng Department of Local Government and Housing, CoGTA and The Presidency.
- Municipal and provincial budgets for the 09/10 financial year.
- Minutes of structures in place to drive joint planning and budgeting at a provincial level.

Analysing the IDPs was intended to examine the extent to which they reflect the plans and projects of Departments of Education, Health and Housing. This would serve as useful indicator of the level of interaction and joint planning between the sector departments and the municipality. The research therefore moved from an assumption that where there is consensus on projects to be implemented within a municipal space, these would be given expression in the municipal IDP. In an attempt to analyse trends and changes in this regard, the IDPs analysed were for both the 08/09 and 09/10 financial years. Reports on the state of intergovernmental alignment produced for and by various government departments also served as a vital source of data. Lastly minutes of IGR meetings were considered so as to get a sense of the kind of issues these meetings grapple with and the kind of decisions they take.

Interviews are perhaps the most widely-employed method of conducting research. Through interviews, the research is able to reflect on the challenges of intergovernmental alignment as well as potential solutions from different perspectives. Against this backdrop, the interviews were conducted in a manner that is responsive to the research question and sub-questions through questionnaires. However, it was vital to also provide space for reflection on any other issue that the questionnaires might
have omitted which bears a significant impact on alignment. Accordingly the interviews followed a semi-structured approach which Longhurst (2003, 117) defines as a “verbal exchange where one person, the interviewer attempts to elicit information from another person by asking questions”. The first interview was conducted with the Presidency, with the view to get an understanding of perspective of the Presidency on how joint planning and budgeting should be pursued. This was also necessary to gain insight into the potential future shifts in the ever-evolving development planning system of South Africa. This was followed by a series of interviews with IDP managers/coordinators as well as officials responsible for housing, education and health within each of the municipalities and provincial departments. In order to trace trends and draw linkages, the interviews tended to focus on a similar set of issues as captured in the questionnaire. Discussions with various practitioners and experts provided further insights.

1.5.3. PARTICIPATORY OBSERVATION

Kitchin and Tate (2000) provide a useful account of the researcher as an active agent in the research. This method, known as participatory observation, remains undefined and therefore has no clear criteria. This method is particularly useful in as far as it allowed space for observation of the various dimensions of intergovernmental development planning from different perspectives. This in turn made it possible to draw certain conclusions regarding political, professional and personal factors having a bearing on joint planning and budgeting at different levels of government.

The researcher is currently employed by the Gauteng Department of Local Government and Housing (DLGH), and tasked with, among other things, provision of support to municipalities with regards to the development, review and implementation of credible IDPs. By locating the research within a theoretical and conceptual context, it was ensured that objectivity is maintained. Furthermore, participatory observation contributed a small fraction to the broader research since much of it was based on document review and interviews. Most importantly, the crux of this research was to evaluate the success or otherwise of the initiative to utilise the IDP as an instrument through which intergovernmental alignment will be pursued. As Patel (2001) correctly hints, the temptation to research an area of study one is familiar with comes with an inherent risk of certain biasness. However, the manner in which the research was approached was such that very little space was available for it to be influenced by one’s perceptions and experiences as a result of positionality. This was done through rooting the research within a particular theoretical and conceptual framework which was employed as a tool of analysis.
1.5.4. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH

As is the case with any academic research project, this research has a few limitations. There has been an expectation that the IDP could occupy a central role as an instrument of intergovernmental coordination (Harrison, 2001; Oranje and van Huyssteen, 2007). However, the idea of utilizing the IDP as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment only began to take shape and became a government stance in 2006 following pronouncements both by the then President Mbeki and Minister Mufamadi cited earlier. It may therefore be too soon to make a fair assessment of the impact this has had on joint planning and budgeting. Half way towards the end of the second generation of IDPs, several municipalities are still battling to produce IDPs that meet requirements of the MSA, as evidenced by the CoGTA IDP ratings of 2009 (CoGTA, 2009). Much of the focus may therefore have been towards ensuring that IDPs are credible and comply with the legislative requirements enshrined in the Municipal Systems Act, with little focus on using the IDP as an instrument of inter-governmental alignment.

Secondly, being a case study means that the findings of this research are not representative of the national picture but rather a Gauteng scenario. Significantly, the research coincided with the fourth democratic elections of national and provincial government. Upon victory, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has set out to restructure government at provincial and national levels in the bid to improve efficiency and delivery. One of the key focus areas of the new administration is the idea of centralised planning. The establishment, both nationally and in Gauteng, of Planning Commissions located in the offices of the President and Premier respectively, is one of the indicators of this phenomenon. The Green Paper on Strategic Planning, whose purpose is to provide conceptual clarity on the form and function of the National Planning Commission is still being debated. Thus, in its current form, the Green Paper cannot be drawn upon in trying to make an assessment of possible directions in relation to development planning.

Further, the Green Paper is highly focused, in its current form, on economic planning, shedding very little light on the current thinking in relation to spatial planning and inter-governmental alignment in particular. It therefore remains unclear as to whether the idea of employing IDP as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment will be retained or if some new innovations will be brought to the fore through the national and provincial Planning Commission. This does not take away the need to make an analysis of the contribution that the IDP has made as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment. This is more so in that the recently developed CoGTA’s Local Government Turn-Around
Strategy suggests that the IDP will continue to serve as a critical planning instrument (CoGTA 2009).

1.5.5. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

As a means of conclusion, it is vital to reflect on key ethical considerations that were critical in guiding the development of this research. Notwithstanding the fact that the research never drew on interviews with vulnerable groups, the researcher had to have discussions with respondents within his own professional practice. As a result, one had to interview some respondents who already knew the researcher’s views on the subject-matter. Thus, while this opened up access to the most relevant and senior public servants, it also brought to the fore a possibility of respondents holding particular preconceptions about the researcher’s expectations. In a bid to remain as objective as possible, the following principles were overarching and adhered to:

- DLGH was alerted of the intentions of this research and ethical clearance was sought.
- It was always stated in advance at every meeting and interview that the interview was for academic and not professional purposes and the outcomes of the meetings will be utilised purely for academic ends.
- All respondents were allowed to decide independently whether to participate or not and they were provided the opportunity to terminate participation at any time.
- Names of respondents are kept confidential and coding is utilized in presenting the findings.
- All data used for the research is thoroughly referenced.

1.6. STRUCTURE OF REPORT

The first chapter has unpacked the topicality of the research as well as the rationale of the study. A motivation was provided for the importance of examining the long standing challenge of intergovernmental alignment among the three spheres of government in post-apartheid South Africa. The latter paved the way for the structuring of the research question, followed by a series of more detailed sub-questions which provide the logic for structuring the report in the 6 chapters. Having introduced the research methodology, case study and key research assumptions, the chapter concludes with a reflection on the limitations of the research as well as the ethical considerations.

Chapter two provides the context for intergovernmental development planning in post-apartheid South Africa. The chapter begins with an overview of apartheid planning and the extent to which it entrenched a fractured planning system which laid the ground for a
myriad of intergovernmental challenges post-apartheid South Africa currently faces. Having done so, the first part of the chapter seeks to examine the hypothesis that intergovernmental alignment in South Africa has been voluntaristic and reliant on goodwill. This is done through a review of the existing legislation guiding intergovernmental alignment, mainly the Constitution and the Inter-Governmental Relations Framework Act, as well as a narrative on the structures emerging out of this legislation.

The second part of chapter two utilizes the legislative context laid out in the first part to examine how post apartheid South Africa has sought to address the challenges of intergovernmental alignment. This is through a narrative of the various post apartheid initiatives that have sought to ensure intergovernmental alignment. This in turn confirms the assertion that challenges of intergovernmental alignment in post apartheid South Africa are not as a result of lack of initiatives from government, which provides the basis for examining the causes for their continued existence. The chapter concludes by introducing the IDP, both in its original conceptualization and the shift towards making it a plan of all government. This is helpful in affirming the assertion that it is only when other initiatives had failed to produce the expected results that focus was shifted towards the IDP as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment.

Against the backdrop of the contextual framework in chapter two, the third chapter serves as a theoretical and conceptual base. Within the context of the state restructuring process that South Africa underwent, the chapter will seek to examine mechanisms of power sharing through decentralisation on the one hand, and intergovernmental alignment on the other. The first part of this chapter unpacks the theory of decentralization, to the extent that characterized the state restructuring process in post apartheid South Africa. The aim is to trace processes and systems of power-sharing among the three spheres of government as manifested in the Constitution. Having done so, the second part of the chapter explores mechanisms of intergovernmental alignment within the context of shared power. Given the nature of this research, the concept of Joined Up Government (JUG) will be utilized as the conceptual frame within which a comparative reflection of various models of intergovernmental alignment will be made.

Two chapters are then devoted to presenting and analyzing the findings of this research, with chapter four presenting the findings. The findings are presented in a manner that responds to the main question as well as the sub-questions in chapter 1. In doing this, the chapter reflects on the contribution made by IDP in strengthening intergovernmental alignment in Gauteng and presents key causal factors for continued misalignment. Chapter 5 summarises the key findings and debates with the view to
highlight potential solutions to challenges of intergovernmental alignment. The final chapter will then be devoted to concluding remarks.

In summary, this research investigates the evolution in the post apartheid South African development planning system with specific focus on the long-standing challenge of intergovernmental alignment among the three spheres of government. This is done through responding to the critical question of whether the shift in the conceptualization of the IDP has aided in tackling challenges of intergovernmental alignment. In order to cover adequate ground, the research attempts to tackle alignment both at horizontal and vertical levels utilizing Gauteng Province as a subject of analysis.

1.7. SUMMARY

This chapter set out to unpack the methodology employed in conducting this thesis. With the first three chapters as a context, the current chapter unpacked the research strategy. The research is designed in line with the research focus around intergovernmental alignment. The chapter proceeded to unpack the research strategy as well as sampling methods. A reflection was also made of the research strategy, limitations as well as ethical considerations. The chapter concluded by providing a detailed outline of the structure of the report.
CHAPTER 2

CONTEXT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN POST APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The problem statement in chapter 1 provided a schematic overview of the apartheid era development planning which is useful in locating the origins of the intergovernmental planning challenges government currently confronts. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to provide the contextual framework for intergovernmental development planning in the post apartheid period. Essentially, the chapter seeks to respond to the sub-question posed in chapter 1 regarding the initiatives put in place by post-apartheid South Africa to address issues of intergovernmental alignment. In doing this, the first part of this chapter examines the hypothesis by investigating the voluntaristic nature of intergovernmental alignment in South Africa. This occurs through reviewing the existing legislation on intergovernmental alignment as well as the structure that have been established as a result thereof.

Drawing from this legislative context the chapter proceeds to providing a narrative of the various post apartheid initiatives that have sought to ensure intergovernmental alignment. This in turn confirms the argument that challenges of intergovernmental alignment confronting post apartheid South Africa are not resulting from lack of initiatives from government. This then provides the basis for researching the factors for continued existence of intergovernmental alignment challenges, given the government initiatives that have sought to tackle them. The IDP will then be introduced both in its original conceptualization and the shift towards making it a plan of all government.

2.2. THE VOLUNTARISTIC NATURE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ALIGNMENT

The foundation for the transition into a democratic state was laid with the adoption of the 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa which was a product of negotiations with the Federally-included National Party and an attempt to secure the Natal-based Inkatha Freedom Party’s participation in the 1994 elections (Oranje and van Huyssteen, 2007). This was followed later by the adoption of the final Constitution in 1996, which was to serve as the primary law of the country according to which the country would be administered. Significantly, the Constitution introduces a decentralized system with the shift away from tier system of governance by asserting each layer of government as an independent sphere. This decentralisation marked a departure from hierarchical forms of government which characterized apartheid state, towards a more cooperative system of governance. Ensuring intergovernmental alignment within this ‘cooperative’ system of
governance becomes paramount. In dealing with this question, the Constitution sets out principles largely anchored around mutual engagement and voluntary alignment among the spheres of government. Section 41(1) (G–H) requires all spheres of government to carry out their duties and utilise their powers in a manner that:

a. Does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere
b. Ensures cooperation with one another in mutual trust and good faith by
   i. Fostering friendly relations;
   ii. Assisting and supporting one another;
   iii. Informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest;
   iv. Coordinating their actions and legislation with one another;
   v. Adhering to agreed procedures; and
   vi. Avoiding legal proceedings against one another.

Perhaps as a result of the apartheid past, it seems to have been assumed when developing the Constitution that the three spheres of government in post apartheid South Africa would work towards a common vision of ridding the country of its apartheid legacy and the challenges it has left. To this effect, spheres of government were expected to establish values such as mutual respect and foster friendly relations thereby cooperate with each other voluntarily. This voluntaristic approach towards intergovernmental alignment found further resonance in the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act No 13 of 2005, which is the primary piece of legislation guiding intergovernmental alignment. The main purpose of the Act was to establish a framework for intergovernmental alignment within the context of the Constitutional principles of cooperative governance alluded to earlier. In doing this, the IGR framework Act establishes a number of forums at national, provincial and local spheres (IGR Framework Act, 2005. What follows is a brief narrative of forums established to give effect to the Constitutional principles in pursuit of intergovernmental alignment.

2.2.1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORUMS

This section summarises forums established with the aim of addressing intergovernmental alignment at both political and administrative levels. One of the first post apartheid initiatives to drive alignment was the Intergovernmental Forum (IGF), made up of national cabinet, provincial government and organized local government. The core focus of the forum was to bring together all stake holders in the intergovernmental development planning system. As a result of its unwieldy size, the IGF failed to bear fruit and in its place emerged the President's Coordinating Council in
1999 (Layman, 2003). The latter is made up of the President, the Minister of Provincial and Local Government and Premiers as prescribed by section 6 of IGR Framework Act. The PCC is intended to serve as a consultative body dealing largely with cross-sectoral issues while offering an opportunity to provinces to impact on national policy development and ensure the coordinated and integrated implementation of national policies and programmes at provincial level.

Since the mid ‘90s a number of informal forums formed along sectoral lines at a political level have been established. The latter consist of national ministers and the provincial Members of Executive Council (MECs) within specific sectors and are thus named MinMECs. Only the departments of finance and education have gone as far as to formalise their structures into statutory bodies (ibid). The main purposes of MinMECs include: information sharing; mutual supervision by the different spheres over specific issues and progress in this regard; and an attempt to align national plans with those of lower spheres. Where local government issues have been discussed, SALGA has represented organized local government in these forums (ibid).

The Budget Forum was established in line with Section 5 of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act No 97 of 1997 (IGRF Act). The forum is made up of the Minister of Finance, nine provincial MECs for finance as well as organized Local Government. The core focus of the forum is to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation and consultation in relation to budget processes. Section 6 of the IGFR Act unpacks at length the various responsibilities and functions of the forum in effecting its mandate. Alongside the political IGR forums are the numerous technical forums, the most important of which is the Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD). The latter is made up of provincial and national Directors General (ibid).

Lastly, intergovernmental forums have also proliferated in the provinces and district municipalities. Various provinces have established intergovernmental planning forums, convened either in the office of the Premier, as is the case in Limpopo or within the provincial departments of local government, in provinces such as Kwa-Zulu Natal, Free State, Mpumalanga and Gauteng. These are mostly convened in line with Section 21 of the IGR Framework Act and are made up of sector departments – and in other instances a combination of sector departments, municipalities and parastatals. There are also district-wide IGR Forums coordinated by District Municipalities in accordance with Section 24 of the IGR Framework Act. There are often overlaps in the work carried out by Provincial and District Forums and the distinctions are not always clear (CoGTA, 2008). The National Development Planning and Implementation Forum, discussed in detail later in the chapter, is the most recent of the various initiatives aimed at alignment.
2.2.2. SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ALIGNMENT

As noted earlier, apart from establishing forums, various departments have put in place various systems and processes in an attempt to drive intergovernmental alignment. Layman sums up mechanisms of intergovernmental alignment by pointing out that “Apart from the forums that developed, intergovernmental relations take place through a dense network of informal task teams, workshops, conferences, interpersonal telephone and e-mail communications” (Layman, 2003: 14). An overview of these is critical for this research and therefore follows below.

Following the 1994 elections the ruling African National Congress set on a path to build South Africa as a developmental state. A central pillar of this approach, at least when drawing from how it was conceptualized in Asia where it originates, is the ability of the central state to define a developmental agenda which other spheres of government must implement. In South Africa, this was pursued by introducing the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was conceptualized in the RDP White Paper as:

…… an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework. It seeks to mobilise all our people and our country’s resources toward that final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future (Republic of South Africa, loc.cit)

In terms of this programme national government would drive the reconstruction and transformation from the centre, while provinces and municipalities take up an implementing and support role (Oranje and van Huyssteen, op.cit). After the 1994 elections the government instituted the RDP Office to co-ordinate the work of various sectors involved with the delivery of the RDP Programme. The RDP Office established an intergovernmental structure named Forum for Effective Planning and Development (FEPD). The latter was tasked with the development of “a more comprehensive national system of integrated development planning that would align different planning and development systems within different spheres of government in a single coordinated framework” (Layman, 2003: 14).

It was hoped that through the RDP office, the developmental agenda of national government will be implemented and intergovernmental alignment would follow naturally. This optimism was based on the assumption that there was enough goodwill in the country to rally behind a collective unifying vision (Republic of South Africa, 1994:1). This resulted in reliance on individual goodwill and voluntarism in pursuing the development.
In the years that followed, government put in place a number of legislative and policy interventions in the bid to drive the said reconstruction project and spatial alignment. A highlight in this regard was the Development Facilitation Act of 1995 (DFA), which sought to introduce a number of normative principles, which had until then not been existent, to guide all planning and land development actions. Furthermore, chapter four of the DFA made provision for municipal strategic planning by requiring municipalities to develop Land Development Objectives (LDOs) (Republic of South Africa, 2005). The core purpose of LDOs was to utilise space as an instrument of redressing disparities and inequalities resulting from apartheid planning.

The LDOs were, in line with DFA, subject to provincial approval. Some have argued that this was done intentionally, partly in response to the reality that a large number of interim municipal councils were still dominated by conservative white political parties (Oranje and van Huyssteen, op.cit). While it made political sense to subject LDOs to provincial approval, this reinforced the ‘big brother’ attitude that characterised the relationship between local and provincial government in the apartheid era. Oranje summing up the outcomes of the DFA intervention concludes that:

Running diametrically opposed to the positive intent of the Act, the DFA resulted in a ‘New Regionalist furore’ around the powers and functions of provinces vis-à-vis those of national government in the two provinces that were not ANC-controlled at the time - the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. This led to an intergovernmental squabble and intensive debate on the right of provinces to pass their own planning legislation and the pros and cons of such actions (Oranje, 2003: 79-80).

What stands out about this narrative is the fact that intergovernmental alignment was not going to be a conflict-free environment as had been envisaged by section 41 of the Constitution. This was largely so in that intergovernmental relations in the post-apartheid era had to cater for various interests. Thus, post-apartheid government was awoken to the reality that it was not accurate to assume that there is a shared national vision, especially where there are different political interests involved. This was just a beginning of more complex intergovernmental challenges that were to follow. These challenges would be more complex because they would not be founded on political differences among governing parties since they present themselves within departments and municipalities administered by the same ruling African National Congress (ANC).

In 1996 the national Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) introduced an initiative called Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs). The purpose was to coordinate infrastructure investment initiatives of government in areas considered to be having
growth potential in order to eliminate duplication and to ensure maximum impact. DTI also hoped, through SDI, to encourage private sector investment in infrastructure development (ibid). At the core of this policy option was a view that economic growth is a key pre-requisite for massive infrastructure development. It was also hoped that the development lessons drawn from the SDI areas would be useful in developing the areas with lesser potential. Again there were intergovernmental challenges, with provincial and local government arguing that the SDI initiative was prepared without engaging them (ibid). The intergovernmental tension caused by SDIs transcended the political boundary and saw rebellion from provinces and municipalities belonging to the ruling party. At about the same time, the RDP office introduced National Physical Development Framework as another intervention meant to improve spatial integration in infrastructure investment initiatives of the three spheres of government, especially between provinces and national government.

This framework was essentially little more than a GIS-map indicating the location of major current and envisaged public investments by provincial and national government. The initiative ground to a halt, largely as a result of a lackluster attitude towards the process from the side of provinces. At play here was a clear indication from provinces, barely three years old, that they were willing and able to flex their muscles, in this case by shuffling their feet in intergovernmental relations when and where it did not suit them (Oranje and van Huyssteen, 2007: 3)

What was beginning to present itself, when looking at the interventions discussed above, was a weakness caused by lack of communication and consultation which was to haunt post-apartheid state for years to follow. It was also becoming evident that given the constitutional separation of powers, it will be very difficult for South Africa to pursue a developmental state at least in the East Asian model, characterised by strong central planning from the national government.

By early 1996 the idea of centralised planning began to fall out of favour due to several factors. To start with, the new national constitution of 1996 laid the ground for intergovernmental model of co-operative governance which ran contrary to centralised and hierarchical approaches (Harrison, 2005). Furthermore South Africa’s position within the global economy was shifting the focus of government away from the kind of co-ordinated planning advocated by the RDP Office in favour of fiscal prudence. One of the results of this shift was the replacement of the socially-inclined RDP with Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) in 1996 whose central feature was the pursuit of economic growth as a basis for development. Lastly, there were dissenting views from sector departments regarding the so called ‘interference’ of the RDP Office in their terrain (ibid). As a result, the RDP office was closed in April 1996. However the
essence of reconstruction and development remained dominant within the ruling ANC as well as the aspiration to build a developmental state. The idea of a developmental state took a different path, with the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, whose section 41 introduced principles for cooperative governance anchored on collaboration and engagement. As hinted by Harrison (2002) central to the new conceptualisation of the development state were the following tenets:

- The notion of decentralized development planning, accompanied by:
- The policy intention of ensuring collaboration, coordination and integration among the three spheres of government.

In 1999 the office the Deputy President undertook an initiative aimed at investigating and addressing the challenges resulting in uncoordinated infrastructure and investment spending which in turn perpetuated the apartheid spatial configurations (Oranje and van Huyssteen, 2007). The product of this initiative was a draft set of *Spatial Guidelines for Infrastructure Investment and Development* (SGIID). These guidelines contributed in the development of a National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP) in late 2003 (NSDP, 2003). The NSDP, which drew much of its influence from the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), was conceived as a development perspective that would receive Cabinet approval but not legally binding. This further entrenched the voluntaristic approach towards intergovernmental alignment.

Key to the NSDP are twin principles of *potential* and *need*. The NSDP departs from a premise that the South African economy is skewed in favour of more urbanized areas. Against this backdrop, the NSDP then argues that government investment should be channeled towards areas with great development potential. Where such development potential does not exist, government needs to then put interventions in place to ensure the well-being of communities living in such areas (NSDP, 2006). In brief, the NSDP sought to provide national planning guidelines that would ensure more coherent and integrated infrastructure investment and do away with the tendency of spending resources on the basis of administrative boundaries or political expediency (The Presidency, 2004). The NSDP’s favouring of economic forms of potential – and therefore certain spaces – over others led some resistance, particularly by those who are not identified as having ‘potential’. This, along with limited understanding at other spheres of government on how to apply NSDP principles, resulted in a lack of alignment between the NSDP and the IDPs. A scan of the IDPs revealed that municipalities merely list the NSDP as one of the guiding principles in their planning without any programmatic interventions to give effect to the principles of the NSDP.
Development planning in the provincial sphere was to occur through the Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDSs), developed either through the Office of the Premier or a delegated department within provincial government. Unlike the IDP, the PGDS is not a legislative requirement but rather an attempt to foster collaboration and alignment within provinces. Oranje and van Huyssteen (2007) provide an account of how the PGDS failed to drive alignment, both vertically and horizontally. On the one hand, the PGDSs tended to be developed by one of the sector departments in the province and thus have no binding force on ‘sister departments. On the other hand, municipalities rejected the PGDS as another imposition from Province, claiming not to have been consulted in the development of PGDSs. This narrative affirms further the voluntaristic nature of intergovernmental alignment in South Africa. As a result, in spite of all these initiatives, inter-governmental alignment remained poor. The Presidency, providing an overview of alignment and harmonisation in South Africa over the first decade of democracy, came to the conclusion in 2004 that:

One of the major challenges facing government in its quest to provide basic services to all its people, progressively improve the quality of life and life chances of all South Africans and eradicate the dualistic nature of the South African economy, has been the effective integration, coordination and alignment of the actions of its three constituting spheres (The Presidency, 2004:1).

It therefore became evident by 2004 that new and more innovative solutions were necessary to tackle the intergovernmental alignment challenges the country faced. It is within this context that it was realised that IDPs, originally conceived as local government planning instrument as outlined in chapter 1, provide a potential platform for effective alignment of the plans of the three spheres of government. A brief overview of the IDP in both its original conceptualisation and the shift towards a plan of all government follows.

### 2.3. INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLAN (IDP)

The history and origins of IDPs is well theorized and documented by, among others, Pieterse (2004) on the notion of integration as well as Harrison (2001) and Mabin (2002) on the origins of IDP. Further contributions include Todes (2004) on IDP and sustainable development and Visser (2001) on IDP and social justice. What comes out of these contributions is a logic according to which the IDP emerged largely as a response to the developmental mandate which the constitution has issued municipalities. The IDP is prepared by local, district and metropolitan municipalities for a five year period which coincides with the term of the elected council. Its primary focus is
to direct and shape investment and planning decisions of the municipality for the
duration of the political term of office.

The idea of integrated planning was first introduced to the South African planning
system in the Local Government Transition Act, (Second Amendment Act 97 of 1996)
making it a legislative requirement for municipalities to develop IDPs. In March 1998 the
then Department of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development released the White Paper on Local Government whose main purpose was to set a framework for the new system of local government, which was to be introduced post the second local government elections of 2000. In outlining the content and focus of the IDP, the White Paper stressed the significance of the IDP as a means of providing a long-term vision for a municipality. It also detailed the role of the IDP in outlining priorities of an elected council while also linking and co-coordinating sectoral plans and strategies. In addition, the IDP was to be critical in aligning financial and human resources with implementation needs and the strengthening of focus on environmental sustainability while providing the basis for annual and medium-term planning and budgeting (Harrison, 2004). Lastly, the White Paper sought to link the IDP to a broader set of interventions such as include performance management tools, participatory processes, and service delivery partnerships (ibid). Later in the same year the department appointed the Council for Industrial and Scientific research (CSIR) to develop guidelines on the development of IDP, which were released in 1998. This manual, 437-pages in size, offered guidance on the methodologies and techniques for integrated development planning. Between 1996 and 2000, which was the transitional period of local government, most local authorities prepared some form of IDP. This took place in a difficult context which Harrison sums up succinctly in the following paragraph:

the lack of clarity as to the nature and purpose of IDPs; the inexperience of newly
elected municipal councils in the field of planning; the confusing array of demands on
these new municipalities; and, the very limited resources to prepare and implement
IDPs. Understandably, many of these IDPs were seriously deficient. In many cases
municipalities handed over the preparation of IDPs in their entirety to consultants, who
themselves were often poorly equipped to deal with this new form of planning. Many
reports were of a low quality, and municipalities had little sense of ownership over the
IDP process. There were also serious difficulties in achieving meaningful integration
between sectors and spheres of government, with the link between local and district
planning being especially problematic Harrison (2003, 6).

The new municipal planning system, built around the IDP, was not without hurdles as
significant number of the then 843 local municipalities had not technical skills and
capacity to meet the requirements of this new planning system. Although this first round of IDPs may have failed in achieving the integrationist purpose for which it was meant, it provided much needed lessons for future, more coherent IDPs. One of the interventions put in place by the then Department of Constitutional Development to support municipalities with the necessary skills was the establishment of the Decentralised Development Planning (DDP) programme in partnership with the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ). On the other hand the then Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) began working on a series of laws aimed at effecting the new system of local government enshrined in the White Paper for local government (ibid). Key among these was the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, the Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998, and the Municipal Systems Act, 2000.

The Municipal Demarcation Act resulted in drastic reduction in the number of municipalities from 843 to 284 of which 47 were district municipalities, 6 metropolitan municipalities and 231 local municipalities (Oranje and van Huyssteen, 2007). Another key highlight was the integration of rural and urban areas within municipal boundaries, as part of efforts to reverse the apartheid spatial disparities. The Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (MSA), was particularly significant within the context of the emerging system of integrated development planning as it specified the minimum contents of IDPs, and established the principles for the IDP process. It was through the introduction of the MSA that the IDP was crystallized and institutionalized within municipal planning processes. Section 25 of the MSA requires each municipality to develop an integrated development plan which will:

- Link, integrate and co-ordinates plans for the development of the municipality
- Align the capacity and resources of the municipality with the implementation of the said plan.
- Form the policy framework and general basis on which annual budgets must be based
- Be compatible with national and provincial development plans, especially those binding on the municipality legislatively.

The MSA went further to stipulate the following nine components of the IDP:

- The Municipality’s vision for the long term development with particular focus on the most critical development and internal transformation needs:
- A developmental status quo analysis which must include an identification of communities without access to basic municipal services;
- the municipality’s development priorities and objectives for the electoral term, inclusive of local economic development aims
As stated in the legislation, IDP was to cater for national and provincial plans only to the extent that they were binding on the municipality. This narrative is important for this research as it affirms the argument that the IDP was originally conceptualised as a planning tool specifically for local government. Thus, the IDP was not conceived as binding towards other spheres of government, resulting in voluntaristic participation by other spheres of government in IDP processes. It was only when other initiatives seem to have failed to bear the expected results that focus was shifted to the IDP towards making it a plan of all government and an instrument of intergovernmental alignment. Former Minister of the then Department of Provincial and Local Government Sydney Mufamadi in his 2006 Budget Speech outlined this thinking as thus:

"Whereas the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) of municipalities were originally conceived of as strategic plans specific to the municipalities concerned, we have come to regard the IDP as a potential fulcrum for raising issues to be attended to by all the three spheres of government. Clearly therefore, all the 3 stages of the IDP process starting from conceptualisation through to formulation and ultimately to execution, require joint and coordinated inputs." (Mufamadi, 2006)

Harrison (2006:3) affirms this by hinting that “Although the IDP was initially conceived of as an instrument of local planning and co-ordination, it is now linked, in an intergovernmental planning system, with instruments such as national government’s Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) and the Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (PGDS)”. This discussion lays a basis for the assertion that the decision to utilise the IDP as a plan of all governmental and as such an instrument of intergovernmental alignment marked a shift in the conceptualisation of the IDP. The latter is a fundamental point of departure for this research. But how has this shift in conceptualization of the IDP contributed in tackling challenges of intergovernmental alignment? This is the central question this research seeks to answer.
The Department of Provincial and Local Government Cooperative Governance (DPLG), which was renamed, Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), has been at the forefront of initiatives aimed at making the IDP a plan of all government. In 2005, the Department convened IDP hearings, a process through which Provincial and National sector departments met to analyse the municipal IDPs with the view to assessing the extent to which these are aligned with Provincial and National plans (DLGH, 2005). The latter has since become an annual exercise, unfolding in April to coincide with the public consultation process required by chapter 4 of the MSA into draft IDPs - which are approved in March - before final approval of IDPs in May as prescribed by Chapter 4 of the Municipal Finance Management Act.

More recently, the National Development Planning and Implementation Forum (NDPIF) was been established in 2008. The latter is a forum convened by CoGTA and made up of Provincial and National Sector Departments as well as District Municipalities across the country, with the view to drive intergovernmental alignment through IDPs. The NDPIF also seeks to coordinate the work of Provincial and District development planning forums alluded to earlier, which are established in line with Sections 21 and 24 of the IGR Framework Act. The Forum meets once every quarter to address issues of intergovernmental alignment, by exploring means of ensuring improved synergy among the spheres of government through IDP processes (CoGTA, 2009).

In summary, post apartheid South African government was aware of the complexities associated with intergovernmental alignment resulting largely from the hierarchical apartheid era planning on the one hand and the decentralization process that followed the dawn of democracy on the other. In dealing with these, the Constitution laid out principles of cooperative governance which largely pursue voluntary forms of intergovernmental alignment. The IGR Framework Act has taken this voluntary approach by establishing a series of political and administrative forums at different levels of government to tackle challenges of intergovernmental alignment. In addition, several departments have taken various initiatives to drive intergovernmental alignment but the results were poor and intergovernmental alignment remained weak. It was for these reasons that the focus was shifted towards the IDP, originally conceived as a local government planning tool, towards making it an instrument of intergovernmental alignment and a plan of all government. Again in effecting the latter, a number of forums have been established, most significantly the NDPIF, to drive intergovernmental alignment among the spheres of government through the IDP.
CHAPTER 3

PERSPECTIVES ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL ALIGNMENT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Against the backdrop of the context laid out in chapter two, focus shifts in this chapter towards the development of a conceptual frame within which to systematically respond to the research question and sub-questions. The first part of this chapter provides an understanding of the state restructuring process and its resultant power sharing. The latter is an important point of departure as, in a hierarchical and centralised system of governance, there may be very little challenges associated with intergovernmental alignment since decision-making is centralised and other tiers of government merely implement the plans of national government. Apartheid South Africa was an example of the latter.

However, within a decentralised system where decision-making power is shared among various spheres, challenges of intergovernmental alignment become prevalent. This chapter therefore attempts to bridge the gap between power-sharing on the one hand and alignment on the other. In doing this, the chapter begins with an overview of the state restructuring process in post apartheid South Africa so as to develop an understanding of its power-sharing, which marked a departure from hierarchical apartheid-era planning. To achieve this, the chapter draws from the policy approach of decentralization, which forms the basis of the first part of this chapter. Having done this, the chapter draws on the concept of Joined Up Government (JUG) to reflect on various models of inter-governmental alignment. The focus of the second half of the chapter will be towards exploring mechanisms of knitting government together, given the decentralised system wherein power is shared.

In essence, this chapter sets up a conceptual framework for intergovernmental alignment by which to assess the Gauteng case study. This will in turn enable an assessment of the state of intergovernmental alignment in Gauteng as well as the successes and gaps thereof.

3.2. POST APARTHEID STATE RESTRUCTURING AND DECENTRALISATION: SHARING DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY.

One of the highlights of post apartheid South African state restructuring was the shift away from the apartheid era hierarchical form of governance to a cooperative system. Section 40 (1) of the Constitution spells out that government is constituted as national,
provincial and local spheres, all of which are “distinctive, interdependent and interrelated”. In doing this, local and provincial spheres of government went through a transition from tiers to spheres of government, which eliminated a vertical mode of government to a horizontal one. It was as a result of the state restructuring process that the powers and functions were allocated to each of the three spheres of government through schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. To this effect, it is critical for this research to understand the state restructuring process that post apartheid South Africa underwent, as this provides the basis to research intergovernmental coordination and integration.

Decentralization provides a helpful frame within which to discuss the state restructuring process, particularly from a power-sharing point of view. White (1953, 23) defines state decentralization as the “transference of authority, legislative, judicial or administrative, from a higher level of government to a lower level”. In the South African context the latter would imply the shifting of powers and functions from national government in favour of provinces and municipalities. Various efforts have been made to pin down the many strands of decentralization.

Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) speak of three forms of decentralization: deconcentration, devolution and delegation. De-concentration shifts administrative power from central government to regional and local levels through the establishment of field offices of national departments and transferring some level of decision-making authority to these. Devolution on the other hand attempts to strengthen local government by granting it “authority, responsibility, and resources to provide services and infrastructure, protect public health and safety, and formulate and implement local policies” (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007, 3). Lastly, delegation refers to an approach through which national government transferred authority for management of certain functions to structures such as semi-autonomous or parastatal agencies, state enterprises, planning and development agencies etc (ibid).

Heller (2001) draws on Kerala, South Africa and Porto Alegre as points of reference, to provide another useful analysis of two strands of state decentralization, namely the technocratic or administrative and anarcho-communitarian (AC) or democratic decentralisation approaches. For the technocrats, decentralization is equated with the task of creating appropriate institutions. In technocratic decentralization, “the agent of change..................becomes a state elite committed to the imposition of a single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the application of instrumental rational techniques” (Heller, 2001,135). This administrative form of decentralisation implies however that decision makers must be largely divorced from political influence, which is the biggest flaw of this approach. This form of decentralization manifests itself through interventions such as the development of technical, managerial and organizational capacity at local
government level to enable it to effectively manage resource and deliver services, making local government a state within a state. Political influences on joint planning and budgeting among the three sphere of government were also researched and are reported upon in chapter 5.

The second strand is that of democratic decentralization as advanced by anarcho-communitarians (AC), whose view is that the emergence of democracy on its own falls short in addressing the centralist and elitist structure of the post-colonial state. Effective decentralisation from this perspective can only be achieved with the supplementing of formal representative institutions through a vibrant and participatory civil society. In essence "decentralization for the ACs must be driven by the prefigurative actions of social movements- building up local capacity, grassroots institutions and extra parliamentary arenas of participation" (ibid). Thus, whereas the former argues for institutional development, the latter views decentralization as best pursued through the strengthening of social movements and participatory civil society.

Another strand is what Oldfield (2002) terms ‘embedded autonomy’. In this approach, the central government delegates service delivery and democratic power to local government. However central government wields sufficient power to put in place incentives and disincentives so as to keep local and provincial government in line with national priorities (ibid). Thus whereas local government is independent, its autonomy is embedded within the national government’s influence and control. This form of decentralization is particularly evident in the South African case. While local government emerged as a sphere in the post apartheid era, national government put in place legislative and policy conditions binding local government with overarching national priorities of democracy, development, and distribution. This kind of decentralization is further manifested through mechanisms such as conditional grants, which are transferred to municipalities for implementation of specific projects viewed by national government as priority projects.

Analysts are divided on the desirability or otherwise of decentralization, particularly for developing countries. Cheema and Rondinelli point out that from the 1970s international aid agencies promoted decentralization as “part of a process approach to development that depended primarily on self help by local communities and local governments” (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007: 3). Thus decentralization has emerged as a critical pillar and an epitome of good governance and a more democratic political culture.

Pro-decentralisation arguments are often founded upon a wider critique of central state planning, which holds that large and centrally-administered bureaucracies represent an inefficient and potentially destructive means of allocating and managing resources within society. To give substance to assertion, several arguments are advanced, first of
which is the contention that centrist states are likely to lack the “time and place knowledge” necessary in developing and implementing policies that reflect people’s ‘real’ needs (Johnson, 2003:1). York and Reddy (2003) argue that decentralization would lead to the unblocking of an inert central bureaucracy and facilitate access to government and vice-versa. York and Reddy further advance that effective service delivery can be carried out effectively by the jurisdiction having sufficient control over the minimum geographic space and thus able to account directly for the failures of delivery and reap direct benefits thereof.

However, the literature on decentralization points to several challenges, key among which is the assertion that the devolution of power to lower spheres may not necessarily improve their performance and accountability. Johnson identifies cases in which decentralization “has simply empowered local élites to capture a larger share of public resources, often at the expense of the poor” (ibid). Thus, decentralization may result in corruption. More significantly Johnson points out that decentralisation, especially in the form of devolution of power to local government, has the potential to pose problems of co-ordination and planning. He concludes that “as the Kerala experience has shown, too much devolution can lead to major duplications of effort and gaps among different government agencies” (Johnson, 2003:7).

Patel and Powell (2008) advance a view that local government has an inherent challenge of resource constraints, which makes the transfer of total service delivery and democratic power to local government inappropriate. In substantiating this view, they refer to the poor management of the New Orleans disaster following Hurricane Katrina due to the decentralized nature of USA government. For them, this is indicative of the importance of stronger coordination in the actions of the three spheres of government. The argument is therefore that instead of decentralization, the approach should rather be one of shared spaces in which the three spheres of government set up policies, strategies and approaches of working collectively for greater impact on the local space (ibid). This thinking also manifests itself in some elements of South African planning. The main indicator of this approach is the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, which encourages collaboration among the three spheres of government and sets up structures to be used for IGR purposes. The very notion of municipal IDP as ‘a plan of all government’ is itself embracing this kind of thinking which advocates for coordination of the actions of the three sphere of government for greater impact in the municipal space.

The South African state restructuring process has elements of each of the three forms discussed. The state restructuring process has largely taken the form of devolution of authority to provincial and local government. Furthermore, the state has established
parastatals and State-owned entities, such as Telkom and Eskom, with authority to manage particular functions. Lastly, within the spheres of government, particularly provincial government, departments have established regional offices, mainly within municipalities, to carry out particular responsibilities. Thus, deconcentration can be seen, for instance in the efforts by the provincial departments of health, education and housing to establish regional offices across the province through which to deliver services. This research on intergovernmental development planning therefore unfolds within the context of a decentralised state and seeks to examine how the decentralized state has sought to ensure integration and coordination.

3.3. JOINED UP GOVERNMENT (JUG): IN PURSUIT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ALIGNMENT

Within a decentralized system, intergovernmental alignment, as expressed through Integration and coordination of plans and policies, becomes critical for the effective functioning of the state. Notions of coordination and integration, which are core to this research, are often used interchangeably to communicate various messages. Perri (2004) provides a helpful frame within which to draw a distinction between coordination and integration. Coordination is used to refer to the development of ideas regarding “joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, processes of planning, and making decisions” (Perri, 2004:106). Integration on the other hand refers to the actual execution or implementation of the products of coordination, through the development of common organizational structures and merged professional practices and interventions (ibid). Coordination therefore refers to joint planning while integration relates to joint implementation of the plans developed collectively. Drawing form this frame, the shift in the conceptualization of the IDP towards a plan of all government can be viewed as an effort to improve the coordination and integration among the spheres of government.

Joined up government (JUG) provides a helpful frame within which to discuss the establishment of systems and processes in pursuit of coordination and integration. The notion of JUG is largely attributed to Britain’s Labour Party through its then leader and former Prime Minister Tony Blair. JUG gained prominence through Blair’s modernisation of public administration in the United Kingdom (Victoria State Services Authority, 2007). The Blair Government introduced the concept as a way to develop a more integrated approach to tackling complex issues facing government (ibid).

There does not seem to be a universal definition of JUG. It is however critical to have a working definition for purposes of conceptual clarity. Pollitt (2003: 35) offers a useful starting point for this research by defining JUG as “a phrase which denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontally and vertically coordinated thinking and action”. The shift in the conceptualization of the IDP towards making it an instrument of
intergovernmental alignment is a manifestation of JUG-oriented thinking. Joined up government is largely concerned with improving integration within a geographic area. The scope and application of joined up government is wide and can mean initiatives across different government boundaries and for different government responsibilities (Victoria State Services Authority, op.cit: 3). Joined up government initiatives can manifest themselves across portfolios or departments within a sphere of government; different spheres of government (national, provincial and local); Government and other sectors (private, NGOs etc) (ibid). At a horizontal level JUG is seen as a solution to what Richards and Kavanagh (2000) have termed “departmentalism”, a practice through which political officials pursue narrow departmental priorities instead of broader government objectives. Instances cited in chapter 1, of houses being built without support infrastructures are an example of departmentalism in South Africa.

Hunt (2005:4) identifies four forms of JUG first of which is the intra-departmental, which is concerned about coordination within the department. The second is inter-departmental and relates to horizontal coordination among various departments within the same sphere. Thirdly is intergovernmental, which relates to vertical coordination among the various spheres. The fourth focuses on coordination of governmental and non-governmental activities. This thesis will largely concern itself with the inter-departmental and intergovernmental modes of JUG, since these relate to horizontal and vertical alignment.

Pollitt discusses the four motives that are advanced for governments to want to pursue JUG. The first has to do with the desire to eliminate contradictions and tensions between different policies with the view to improving the effectiveness of such policies. A case in point in this regard is the decision by the UK government in the ‘90s to initiate a policy that sought to intensify performance management at schools. As an unintended consequence, the policy led instead to high rates of exclusion of pupils and increasing levels of crime among young people (Pollitt, op.cit:35).

The second motive has to do with the aspiration to make better use of resources through eliminating both contradictions and duplications between and among different programmes. For example, school buildings lie unused over weekends and holidays and could perhaps be used for other community activities, thereby saving these the need to hire or build other accommodation. Sharing buildings, skills, information or equipment can ensure better and more efficient use of resources (Ibid). Thirdly, JUG may be driven by the desire to improve coordination among various stake holders in a specific sector through the flow of good ideas and cooperation which will result in synergy. For instance when tackling crime “joint working between the police, local authority housing departments, schools, local shopkeepers and residents associations may generate innovative and more effective approaches” (ibid). The fourth motive, and
most important for this research, is the desire to produce a more integrated or seamless set of services (Ibid). Within the context of this research, this would mean putting systems and processes to ensure that housing development is accompanied by supporting infrastructure such as schools, clinics etc. Through its emphasis on partnership and inclusiveness, JUG emerged as a political answer to the contemporary fears about the ‘hollowing out’ of British central government (Pollitt, 2003) as a result of decentralization on the one hand, and new regionalism in through formation of European Union on the other.

Many of the benefits of JUG have to do with the motives discussed above. Literature on JUG identifies the following as among the key pre-conditions for effective joining up of government.

- Working towards clearly defined common goals that are mutually agreed
- Monitoring and evaluation of progress towards the achievement of the set goals
- Having strong leadership, directing the initiative towards the goal
- Working well together with a sense of shared responsibility and mutual respect (Victoria State Services Authority, 2007).

Davies’ (2009) political analysis points to one of the biggest short-comings of JUG, which is the overlooking of ideological differences. Davies draws on scholars such as Friend (2002) and Perri 6 (2004) to make a point that policy coordination is a political process and thus requires political will and consensus. For Davies, JUG seems to clash with pluralism, as it pre-supposes an agreed vision and approach among various partners, “enabling like-minded partners to get on with the sensible business of problem solving” (Davies, 2009:83). Having made this point, Davies concludes that “thus, politics should be a central problematic in research on joint up government” (ibid). On the other hand Pollitt (2003:40) observes the following as some of the potential disadvantages of JUG:

- Blurred lines of accountability for policy and service delivery;
- Greater difficulty in measuring effectiveness and impact due to the need to develop and maintain more sophisticated performance measurement systems;
- Direct and opportunity costs of management and staff time spent establishing and sustaining cross-cutting working arrangements;
- Organizational and transitional costs of introducing cross-cutting approaches and structures.

In giving effect to JUG the British government introduced action plans, developed from the Cabinet Office set out a range of initiatives to support joined up working. The British
government explored several initiatives with the aim to joining up government, key among which was adoption of a cross-cutting model to policy making in pursuit of which Policy Action Teams were set up by the Social Exclusion Unit within the Cabinet Office. Furthermore, a process was put in place to ensure cross cutting reviews of spending as well as the establishment of cross-cutting units “to cover issues such as social exclusion, rough sleepers and neighbourhood renewal, where multiple departments are involved and the policy issues have been difficult to solve” (ibid).

Other practical interventions included the management of joined up working through seminars and networks such as the New Local Government Network. Further activities to join up implementation of policies were pursued through employing tools such as training and support in project management and implementation, the establishment of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, the consolidation of local structures as well as coordination of purchasing through the Office of Government Commerce and the integration of services through portals such as UK Online (ibid).

The outcomes of JUG in Britain have been mixed. On the one hand there is evidence to suggest that notable progress has been made, and that alignment is accepted as essential for government. Initial efforts were channeled towards achieving more joined up working at senior levels of the public service but focus has shifted towards entrench joined up government in implementation and service delivery at the front line in government (ibid).

On the other hand, other analysts lament the ‘confusion’ that has resulted from institutional initiatives meant to join up government. Professor Peter Hennessy, addressing the British House of Commons Select Committee on Public Administration laments that “This is the most disjointed government I have ever observed. Trying to work out who is in the lead and where the overlaps are is almost a life’s work. It changes each time and is extraordinarily messy” (Richards and Kavanagh, op.cit:8). At the same session, Sir Peter Kemp, a former British Treasury official for more than 20 years, described the government’s JUG initiative as “more gummed up than joined up” (ibid).

The definition provided by Pollitt and the discussion that followed provide a basis for an assertion that JUG, is a phrase that is used to refer to initiatives aimed at intergovernmental alignment among the various spheres of government within a country. Thus, whereas the phrase was coined in Britain, the British model outlined above does not serve as a yardstick for effective implementation of JUG since, as earlier noted, there is no universally agreed definition and prescriptions for implementing JUG. This research therefore utilised the concept of JUG to refer to any
system of government, particularly within decentralized statutes, that seeks to ensure intergovernmental alignment among the various levels of government. In essence, JUG, is used to refer to a model aimed at bridging the gap between decentralization and alignment in state governance.

### 3.3.1. MODELS OF JOINED UP GOVERNMENT

Against the backdrop of this context, focus now shifts to exploring various international models of intergovernmental alignment under the rubric of JUG. It should be stated upfront that the role of legislatures and judicial policy-making as they impact on intergovernmental coordination and integration will not be addressed here. Secondly, literature on the outcomes of the various models of JUG is very scarce and as such this was not the basis for selecting the models presented. Rather the models were selected on the basis of the potential they bear as possible alternatives for South African, given the challenges of intergovernmental alignment it faces.

As pointed out earlier the state restructuring that South Africa underwent resulted in the shift from a hierarchical system to a cooperative one in which there are three spheres of government. One of the results of this was the devolution of planning authority from national government to provincial and local spheres. The example cited earlier about housing being a provincial competence, while water and sanitation are local competencies is but an example of this devolution. Thus, the models presented here were firstly selected on the basis that there is devolution of planning authority in countries within which they apply. This is critical in drawing out lessons for South Africa.

Devolution, as a selection indicator, also became critical because within centrist states, planning is done by national government and others implement the plans of national government. As a result, inter-governmental alignment does not become a challenge. It is within devolved states that intergovernmental alignment is a concern and it is from there that best practices can be identified. However it is important to point that fiscal and political decentralisation do not always go together. Thus the examples of political decentralisation - i.e. the provision for power-sharing - presented here do not always go along with fiscal decentralisation - i.e. the transfer of revenue-generating power and spending decisions to the lower spheres.

Apart from the above, ‘planning’ is understood differently within different contexts and may be used in fields ranging from economic and financial, to environmental and spatial. It thus became critical that the models selected for presentation in this research are those which discuss planning from a point of view of intergovernmental integration and coordination. Given the focus of the thesis on intergovernmental coordination, the
models presented in this research had to distinguish planning from other government functions through placing emphasis on inter-sphere and inter-sectoral elements. Harrison and Oranje (2000:7) provide a helpful frame of reference to this effect:

In many parts of the world planning is still used mainly to refer to land management, and many of the policies that have been produced relate to this issue. In other contexts, planning is also being used to refer to inter-sectoral and inter-governmental integration and co-ordination. In many developing countries, including India, Indonesia and Malaysia [and Brazil], this integrative planning is known as “development planning”, whilst land management is dealt with in terms of a separate system of physical planning. In states such as New Jersey and Oregon, the planning system has a strong emphasis on both integration and land management.

Having made due consideration to all of the above factors the models selected were those drawn from the countries of the developing world, namely India, Malaysia and Brazil. However, an innovative model exists in the United States of America’s State of New Jersey which will equally be reflected upon. What follows is an overview of the structure of each of these countries as well as the form of decentralisation within which they can be categorized. In terms of planning, a reflection will be made of the agent responsible for planning as well as the process involved in planning. Most significantly, within their devolved systems, a reflection is made of the linkages between the plans of the various spheres of government within each of the countries.

3.3.1.1 MALAYSIA

Malaysia is a federation of thirteen States, the equivalent of provinces, and two federal territories. In terms of Constitutional configurations, the states have a wide range of powers while the federal government retains significant legislative, political and fiscal powers. Local government is a creation of the federal state and derives its power from the centre and planning is a concurrent competence (ibid). Thus while there are elements of devolution, in the form of planning powers shared by states and local government, “the Malaysian Federalism is highly centralized in terms of revenue powers…” (Anuar, 2000: 1). The Malaysian system therefore fits well within Oldfield's notion of embedded autonomy.

In terms of planning, Malaysia hails itself as the first third world country to have developed a long term plan:
“Malaysia is one of the earliest countries in the world—and clearly the first developing country—to have spelled out the development aspiration and goals within a 30-year development perspective. “(Presidency, 2007:19)

The above statement refers to the 30 year vision (1991-2020) which sets out the policy framework. The latter is then updated every ten years through the development of the Outline Perspective Plan as well as the five year development plan (ibid). The Federal Government then develops programmes and strategies in pursuit of the objectives set out in the long, medium and short term plans. States and Local Authorities prepare plans and projects that address local needs to complement the national plans.

The Economic Planning Unit (EPU), located in the Prime Minister’s Office is responsible for long term and medium term development planning. States participate and provide input into planning policies developed by the Federal government through an extensive and iterative top-down and bottom-up process. This collaborative model of policy development includes a process through which the formulation of policy on functions falling within exclusive legislative competence of State are also engaged at the federal level. Local authorities are required by the Town and Country Planning Act of 1976 to prepare Structure Plans and may, if they choose to, also prepare Local Plans (detailed zoning plans) and/or Action Area Plans (Harrison and Oranje, op.cit). While each level of government has distinctive legislative powers, the Federal and the State governments have the power to coordinate local planning initiatives and to ensure, through various mechanisms that these are in line with their objectives (ibid).

3.3.1.2 BRAZIL

Is a federal country made up of a Union Government, twenty-seven State Governments and about 5400 Municipalities (Op.cit: 16).The Union Government and the States share concurrent legislative competence in wide range of fields, including city planning law, the environment and economic matters. Both State and Local governments develop their own planning legislation, but the states do not prepare plans, leaving this to local governments (Loc.cit). Furthermore Brazilian municipalities generate their own revenue, largely through collection of local taxes, making for a highly devolved system of governance. Furthermore, practices such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, are demonstrative of democratic decentralization to which Heller refers.

In line with Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, the Federal Government is required to produce a Plano Plurianual (PPA), which is a three year plan for the country. The da Silva administration has, since 2002, adopted a somewhat longer term and strategic approach in relation to PPA to utilise it “as part of the suite of planning, budgeting and
management instruments to achieve a longer term approach under the rubric of an Agenda for National Development” (Presidency. 2007:7). Thus the PPA has been used as an instrument for implementing the long term development strategy outlined by da Silva. Headed by the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, work is in progress to develop the Agenda for National Development, which will serve as the long term plan towards the year 2022. (ibid)

Municipalities are the key players in the Brazilian planning system. The latter produce their own planning legislation and prepare Land Use Master Plans (Harrison and Oranje, 2000). State governments may assist municipalities in their planning through interventions such as capacity building and technical assistance, as well as funding in the form of loans (ibid). Lastly, there are legislative requirements for the central government to consult with stakeholders, including lower spheres of government, in the development of the PPA (Presidency, 2007).

3.3.1.3 INDIA

India is the most populous quasi-federal country in the world, consisting of 25 states and seven union territories that have strong links to the central government. Over the past few years there has been some effort to ensure fiscal decentralization to lower levels, but India remains largely centrist. The States have limited powers and have to exercise these within national laws and frameworks which reflects a somewhat bureaucratic system. The Presidency, in its 2007 comparative study of strategic planning observes:

Tensions [within Indian government] are still evident between attempts to keep resources at central level (through Federal programmes and conditional grants) and an overall trend to fiscal decentralisation. In this regard, the mid-term review notes that the equity based formula, which has been in place for over 30 years, has not seen a notable change in regional imbalances.

However, further decentralisation from State to local government level appears to have stalled over almost a decade in many areas, highlighting the gap between policy and implementation and the impact of politics on practice (Presidency, 2007: pp12-13).

There are, however, elements of devolution within the Indian state. The States were initially in charge of local planning until a Constitutional Amendment in 1992 was enacted to make provision for significant devolution of functions - including that of urban
planning, land use regulation and planning for social and economical development - to “urban local bodies” (Harrison and Oranje, 2000:15). This Amendment also made provision for the establishment of Metropolitan/District Planning Committees in all metropolitan areas tasked with preparing a development plan for their respective areas.

There is a National Planning Commission, established in March 1950 and chaired by the Prime Minister and comprising economists, statisticians, and each State’s Minister for Planning and Finance. The Commission produces five-year National Development Plan as well as the annual plan and oversees their implementation (ibid). More recently, long term vision 2020 has been developed to provide a long term planning perspective. Once approved by Cabinet, these plans become primary guidelines and policy document for planning and policy development by the Central and State Governments (Harrison and Oranje, op.cit).

The central government established a Town and Country Planning Organisation to “advise State Town Planning Departments and local bodies in all urban and regional planning matters, to undertake research, and to prepare and give advice on planning policy at all three levels of government” (ibid). This ensures that plans developed at State and District levels are aligned to the national five year plan. Finally, the National Institute of Urban Affairs was established as an autonomous body enjoying support from the National and State governments. The latter “researches and publishes its findings on issues affecting an urban area - which is a valuable source of information - and assists States in training/capacity-building” (op.cit: 25).

3.3.1.4 THE AMERICAN STATE OF NEW JERSEY

The United States is a Union of 50 states. In terms of Amendment 10 to the Constitution all powers not allocated to the Federal Government, or not prohibited in terms of the Constitution, are reserved for the States (ibid). Planning is not a power allocated to the Federal Government and as such it is a State competence. The structure of the United States model best locates it within a devolved system.

The State of New Jersey, which is made up of 28 Counties - equivalent of district municipalities - and local municipalities, is of particular interest for this research. The State Planning Act of 1985 gave the authority to the State Planning Commission to prepare, revise, and readopt the State Development and Redevelopment Plan - known as the State Plan - every three years (New Jersey Planning Commission, 2004:5). Thus, unlike Brazil and Malaysia, New Jersey delegates planning authority to the State Planning Commission. The state policies are contained in this State Plan, whose first section is called the State-wide Policy Structure and is structured to reflect the state-
wide policy goals along with strategies detailing how each goal is to be achieved (Harrison and Oranje, 2000: 43). The State Planning Act makes intergovernmental coordination mandatory by requiring that:

in preparing, maintaining and revising the State Development and Redevelopment Plan the State Planning Commission shall solicit and give due consideration to the plans, comments and advice of each county and municipality, state agencies designated by the commission and other local and regional entities (New Jersey State Planning Commission (2004:7).

In giving effect to the above, the State employs a process called cross-acceptance through which “planning policies are reviewed by government entities at all levels while providing an opportunity for the public to influence the development of these policies” (ibid). Cross acceptance is a legislated process and is defined by the State Planning Act as:

a process of comparison of planning policies among governmental levels with the purpose of attaining compatibility between local, county and State Plans. The process is designed to result in a written statement specifying areas of agreement or disagreement and areas requiring modification by parties to the cross-acceptance (ibid).

The State plan is therefore a product of a rigorous process of engagement and consensus building among all entities of government within the State. Harrison and Oranje (2000:43) comment that due to the interactive nature of cross acceptance, “Policies are binding because of mutual agreements and commitment and not because of directives issued through a hierarchical structure of authority”. The main highlights of the models presented above are summarised in the table below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Country</th>
<th>Form of Decentralisation</th>
<th>Planning Authority</th>
<th>Mechanisms of intergovernmental Alignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Devolved planning authority with centralized fiscal authority, resulting in embedded autonomy</td>
<td>Economic Planning Unit responsible for producing a 30 year plan, the 10 year Outline Perspective Plan and five year plans.</td>
<td>Federal government influences planning of lower spheres through annual development budget allocations and the five year development plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spatial Planning Authority is a concurrent competence between States and Local government who prepare plans and projects within the framework provided by the medium and short term plans of Federal Government.</td>
<td>Federal government and the State governments have the power to coordinate local planning and to ensure that this is in accordance with their plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>States engage and input into planning policies developed by the Federal government in a iterative top-down and bottom-up process</td>
<td>States engage and input into planning policies developed by the Federal government in a iterative top-down and bottom-up process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Devolved planning authority with strong fiscal decentralization. Participatory budgeting reflective of democratic decentralization.</td>
<td>The Union Government and the States share concurrent legislative competence city planning law.</td>
<td>State Governments assist municipalities in their planning through interventions such as capacity building and technical assistance, as well as funding in the form of loans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both State and Local governments develop their own planning legislation.</td>
<td>Legislative requirements for the central government to consult with stakeholders, including lower spheres of</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The states do not prepare plans, leaving this to local governments</td>
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</table>

*IDP and Intergovernmental Development Planning in Post Apartheid South Africa*
Federal Government produces a *Plano Plurianual (PPA)*, a three year plan for the country.

- Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, is developing the Agenda for National Development (Long term Plan towards 2022)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>India</th>
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</table>
| • In spite of attempts at fiscal decentralization, India remains largely centrist. States have limited powers and have to exercise these within national laws and frameworks.  
  • Devolution of planning authority to local government through Constitutional Amendment in 1992.  
  • National Planning Commission produces five-year National Development Plan as well as the annual plan and oversees their implementation.  
  • Once approved by Cabinet, these plans become primary guidelines and policy document for planning and policy development by the Central and State Governments  
  • More recently, long term vision (vision 2020) has been developed to provide a long term planning perspective  
  • Metropolitan/District Planning Committees prepare development plans for their respective areas.  
  • States exercise their powers within national laws and frameworks.  
  • A Town and Country Planning Organisation has been set up to advise State Town Planning Departments and local bodies in all urban and regional planning matters so as to ensure that plans developed at State and District levels are aligned to the national five year plan.  
  • The National Institute of Urban Affairs was established assists States in training and capacity-building in pursuit of intergovernmental alignment. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Jersey</th>
<th>Located within a highly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amendment 10 of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative requirement for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Constitution states that all powers not allocated to the Federal Government, or not prohibited in terms of the Constitution, are reserved for the States. Planning is not allocated to the Federal Government and as such is a State competence.

- In line with the State Planning Act, the State Planning Commission prepares, revises, and readopts the State Development and Redevelopment Plan every three years.

- The State is required to consult lower spheres in the development of the long term plan through cross acceptance.

- State policies are negotiated with local authorities through cross-acceptance. As a result policies are binding because of mutual agreements and commitment.

What stands out from all of the four different models presented here is the fact that planning is a highly contextual practice, and each country pursues it in a manner deemed most appropriate to its environment. However, drawing from the international models as well as the literature presented in this chapter, there are valuable lessons for South Africa in relation to intergovernmental alignment, key among which may be the following:

- Intergovernmental alignment is not a sectoral activity due to its multi-stake-holder nature. Effective management of intergovernmental alignment is therefore pursued through a super-structure (mainly in the form of a Planning Commission as is the case in India and New Jersey) with no sectoral interests.

- Bureaucratic, top-down, forms of intergovernmental alignment tend to fail, as is the case in India. On the other hand, states and countries with iterative top-down/bottom-up planning models (such as New Jersey and Malaysia) have tended to attain more successful results in relation to inter-governmental alignment.

- Even within a devolved system such as that of South Africa, some form of a national framework for planning is essential in guiding planning by other spheres of government. Most significantly, a long term plan at a national level is important.
to serve as an ‘end state’ in pursuit of which all spheres of government can develop their prioritization, planning and resource allocation.

- In pursuit of inter-governmental alignment, it is critical to align the *processes* of planning (as is the case in the New Jersey’s *cross acceptance*) as opposed to the *products* of planning. This is also vital in protecting the integrity of all spheres of government when planning so as to give effect to the principles of cooperative governance.

3.4. SUMMARY

In summary, the relationship between decentralization and alignment is critical for effective integration and coordination. The chapter has sought to explore models of decentralization, with a specific focus on sharing of fiscal and political authority. This was followed by a presentation of various models of intergovernmental alignment, under the rubric of JUG. An attempt was made, especially in the second part of the chapter, to bridge the decentralization-alignment dichotomy by locating each of the models presented within a particular model of decentralization before examining how intergovernmental alignment is pursued. In essence, this chapter set up a conceptual framework for intergovernmental alignment by which to assess the Gauteng case study.
CHAPTER 4:
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ALIGNMENT IN GAUTENG: PRESENTATION
OF FINDINGS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The chapter presents the findings of the research, which are analysed in the next chapter. An overview of the approach to preparing the interview questions is offered, before unpacking the context within which each of the interview questions were posed and the intention thereof. Having done so, the chapter proceeds to presenting the findings under each of the posed questions. The results are presented in a manner that responds to the main and sub-question the research posed in chapter 1.

4.2. THE APPROACH TO PREPARING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRES

As noted in the previous chapter, the research drew on interviews form three groups, the first being provincial and municipal officials involved in infrastructure planning. The second group was made up of IDP managers/coordinators within municipalities while the last comprised experts and development planning experts drawn from government and academia. The first group of interviewees was interviewed with the view to gather data on the state of intergovernmental alignment in Gauteng drawing on practical experience. IDP managers/coordinators were interviewed to develop an understanding of the extent to which the IDP process is able to pull together various actors within the realm of development, in the bid to make the IDP a plan of all government. The last group was also interviewed with the view to get a perspective on broader intergovernmental alignment challenges confronting Gauteng and South Africa as well as possible solutions thereto. Three sets of interview questions were therefore prepared.

4.3. CODING AND FINDINGS

A total of 12 interviews were conducted within this category, with the respondents ranging from municipal/regional and provincial officials responsible for housing, health and education within each of the municipalities. With regards to municipal/regional officials there was an important dichotomy which must be noted on the onset. On the one hand there were municipal official responsible for education, health and housing employed by the municipality. Where these did not exist, there were regional officials responsible of any of these three employed by provincial government and located within these municipalities. Thus while there would be municipal officials responsible for health and housing for instance, education would be a responsibility of a regional official.

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1 See annexure 1 for a list of interview respondents

IDP and Intergovernmental Development Planning in Post Apartheid South Africa
employed by provincial government and located within that municipality. For confidentiality purposes the codes are employed in presenting the findings. These codes were also designed to cater for the municipal-regional dichotomy alluded to and are explained in the table below.

**TABLE 2 RESULT PRESENTATION CODES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PO-1 – PO-3</td>
<td>Officials within Provincial government responsible for infrastructure planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO-1 – MO 6</td>
<td>Officials employed by the municipalities responsible for education, housing and health.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO-1 – RO-3</td>
<td>Regional Officials employed by provincial departments of education, health and housing and located within municipalities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3.1 GROUP 1: PROVINCIAL, REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS

What follows is an account of the interview questions and the responses thereto. Each of the questions is accompanied by a brief overview of the context within which they were posed, before responses are presented.

*How does the department/municipality ensure horizontal alignment with other departments/municipalities? Is it*

- a) *Through forums (what is the frequency, membership, rank etc)*
- b) *Participating in strategic planning sessions of other departments*
- c) *None*
- d) *Other (please specify)*

The question was posed with the view to establish an understanding of the horizontal linkages that exist both within departments and among municipalities. At a provincial level, the question sought to understand the kind of systems and processes employed by provincial government in pursuit of policies such as BNG. At a municipal level, the question sought to establish if any significant progress is being made with regards to inter-municipal planning.
At a provincial level, the respondents pointed to the existence of several initiatives aimed at alignment. One official hinted that “there is a provincial planning forum established in 2006, convened by the Department of Local Government and Housing, and comprised of departments such as education, health and transport. The key focus of the forum is for the department of Housing to share with other departments the future developments and to source cooperation in terms of committing schools and healthcare facilities to these projects” (PO-1).

While the official concerned was pleased with the outcomes of the forum thus far, officials in other departments were lesser optimistic. Another respondent reported for instance that “We are not happy with the provincial planning forum as it is merely a platform where housing tell us their plans and we have to link up with them, with little regard to our own plans and the commitments that our MEC would have made” (PO-2). The third official also echoed the same sentiment that the forum’s housing-orientation was a fundamental flaw.

At a municipal level, the responses on the question of how horizontal alignment is pursued among health, education and housing presented sharply varying outcomes. In Ekurhuleni, a municipal official reported that Housing and Health form part of the social cluster through which alignment among the departments is pursued. Through the cluster, where the department of housing intends building houses, health commits a clinic such as was the case with Dan Khubeka Clinic between Springs and Daveyton (MO-1). Another municipal official reported that:

This is currently very poor, but we are working towards addressing it. There is a proposed institutional transformation which will result in the department of housing changing to be the department of sustainable human settlements, giving it the coordination role. The problem at the moment is that you don’t have anyone coordinating the whole notion of sustainable human settlements. However through communication there has been some success. For instance the department of education re-prioritized a school that was initially meant for Tsakani ext 8 and built it in Ext 9, to cater for the close to 6000 families relocated from the mining belt into the nearby Ext 10 (MO-2).

While municipal officials employed by the municipality sounded positive, regional official deployed by provincial government within the region sounded lesser positive. A regional manager reports for instance that “We would just be told that houses have been built and we have to make provision of support infrastructure but would have not been informed about such plans to build houses. Engagement with other sectors within the municipality is poor and project based such as was the case with the Bontle ke Botho with GDACE” (RO-1)
Responses within Metsweding on the same question painted an even bleaker picture. A municipal official reported that “We just see in their plans that they have allocated a stand for a school or clinic but we don’t know how they came to these conclusions” (MO-1). The latter sentiment was echoed by regional officials one of whom hinted that:

There is poor horizontal coordination. We just see developments being built and we have no information about whether provisions have been made for schools or not. In Rethabiseng proper we asked for a site to be allocated for a school but only to find that site is not serviced so a school could not be built. In Zithobeni, the secondary school is overcrowded, we requested a site for a new school but none has been made available as we were told that the department of housing is coming to make an assessment and we will then get a site, but to date no site has been made available (RO-1).

Emfuleni reported outcomes almost similar to Metsweding. A regional official pointed out that there are no formal systems of engagement with sister departments within the municipality. As a result, he has to ask other departments of their plans each time when compiling a priority list for submission to province for budget allocation. Municipal officials reported similar results. One line manager reported that in the preparation of township layout plans, sister departments are consulted and asked for comments since the proposed layouts will also include clinics and schools. However this, the responant hinted, happens at provincial level since schools and clinics are provincial competencies. This implies no formal interaction at the municipal level. Finally another municipal official reports:

When Evaton Renewal project started we used to meet [with other departments within the municipality] on a monthly basis to update each other on progress regarding projects and plan together. This has since stopped and we do not share information anymore. As a result Tshepisong had been developed 3 years ago but there is no clinic that has been planned for that area (MO-2).

On the question of inter-municipal planning, all the respondents hinted that no concrete initiative is in place to drive this. Thus, while there are some advances at a provincial level to drive horizontal alignment, the latter remains a huge challenge at a municipal level. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the provision of education, health and housing facilities is a provincial competence, which may explain why a level of progress is made at a provincial level as opposed to locally.

There was particularly a noticeable gap in the level of interaction between municipal official responsible for housing, education and health, and regional official deployed by provincial government. Thus, there were instances were municipal official responsible for health and housing reported positive outcomes in terms of alignment, as was the
case in Ekurhuleni, while a regional official responsible for education within the same municipality lamented poor alignment.

**How does the department ensure vertical alignment with counterparts in other spheres? Is it**

- **a) Through forums (what is the frequency, membership, rank etc)**
- **b) Participating in strategic planning sessions of other departments**
- **c) None**
- **d) Other (please specify)**

The question sought to uncover the initiatives in place to ensure vertical alignment between provincial and local government. This was done in the bid understand the extent to which projects being implemented in the municipal space are a product of consensus among the two spheres. This is particularly significant in two respects firstly consensus is necessary since local government is responsible for services such as water and sanitation, which must accompany the construction of houses, education and health facilities. Secondly, while provincial government is responsible for the construction of these facilities, local government takes charge of their maintenance thus consensus is needed on their provision. The first two questions were also posed with the view to assess the extent to which the respondents would refer to the IDP as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment at both vertical and horizontal levels.

Responses reflected a myriad of systems and processes. The Department of Local Government and Housing employs an instrument called the Municipal Housing Development Plan (MHDP), which details the housing needs of the municipality and the plan to fulfill these. These plans are developed by provincial government in collaboration with local government, before being sent to the Municipal Council for approval (PO-1).

While provincial government views the MHDP as a key instrument of vertical alignment, municipalities presented somewhat different outcomes. According to municipal officials, vertical alignment within housing unfolds differently across various municipalities. A municipal official reported for instance that:

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In 2002 we developed a migration plan which identifies all backlogs and informal settlements, reviewed annually. We then conduct a desktop study to determine whether a piece of lands is suitable for development. Having done this we then say which pockets must be in-situ developed, which must be relocated etc. The emigration plan is linked with a multi-year budget forecast, whose vision is to ensure that plans and projects are tied to resources. Province then takes the migration plan and deals with the
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actual implementation of projects through conducting feasibilities and appointing Professional Resource Teams (MO-1).

An official in another municipality referred to long-standing challenges wherein the provincial department of housing used to construct houses without informing the municipality. Following lengthy periods of interaction and persuasion a system of vertical alignment was put in place through the establishment of the Provincial Resource Team (PRT) comprising of provincial and municipal representatives (MO-2). All developments that province wants to implement in the municipal space are discussed in this forum. As a success story, province wanted to build houses at an area near Johan Deo clinic in Sebokeng which is in Emfuleni Local Municipality. The municipality had identified the same land for a cemetery, through PRT an agreement was reached that a cemetery is more needed and was thus provided (ibid). Lastly, all feasibility studies go through the municipality for input before townships can be developed.

On the contrary, the last municipal official provided lesser positive results on vertical interaction with province. The latter hinted that while there is an MHDP in place, the municipality was never consulted when projects are conceived and developed since the provincial department is largely focused on relating to locals instead of the district. As a consequence vertical alignment is poor. Driving the point home, the official contended that provincial government has a tendency of rushing to districts towards the end of the provincial financial year to spend as much money as possible so as to avoid budget cuts as a result of failure to spend. As a result of this fiscal dumping it was argued, there is very little consideration of the need to engage with municipalities.

Respondents within the Department of Education provided a similar set of responses on the question of vertical linkages. Annually, districts are required to compile a priority list of a district identifying the most pressing developmental needs, with priority 1 being the highest. Province then reconciles these needs to produce an annual plan. The district list is informed by factors such as requests that are submitted by schools or communities as well as developmental needs identified by the district.

Department of Health had somewhat mixed and complex outcomes due largely to the current provincialisation process, through which provincial government is taking over the provision of primary healthcare, formerly located within municipalities. Apart from this there is the District Health Plan, which like the MHDP, is developed in collaboration with municipalities and serves as a critical instrument of alignment. The findings reflect that while a level of vertical interaction is maintained with local government, decision-making largely lies with provincial government. All of the provincial departments, in spite of consultative processes, are the ones making final decisions as to which projects will be financed.
What are some of the main challenges encountered in relation to horizontal and vertical alignment and how do you think they can be addressed?

With the responses to the first two questions as a context, this question sought to dig deeper into challenges of intergovernmental alignment. Having departed from the assumption that intergovernmental alignment remains largely problematic, this question sought to examine the causal factors for continuation of intergovernmental alignment challenges in order to respond to the second sub-question the research poses in chapter 1.

At provincial level officials referred to several challenges, ranging from lack of political will, to poor communication and engagement. One official, lamenting the poor political will, insists that “the only time there ever coordination both vertically and horizontally was with the 20 Priority Township Project as this was a Premier’s project and all MECs and Mayors were thus held to account for it” (PO-1). Other officials lamented the fact that there is too limited engagement between provincial and local government. The last challenge raised was the fact that politicians would go to communities and make undertakings to deliver on services not part for the annual plan which would lead to budgetary revisions.

At municipal level, there were numerous challenges elevated, many of which had to do with the ‘failure’ of provincial government to engage with local government on planed projects within municipal spaces. An official pointed out that

In Rethabiseng, there is a sewer pond wherein all waste is disposed into. There is no machinery to clean the waste before it gets disposed off into the stream into which the pond feeds. As a result, waste is transferred as it is from the pond into the stream and directly into the catchment and then the river and gets purified and recycled as drinking water. This once off purification is inadequate and poses potential health risks. A sewer pond is not a sustainable thing and what is needed is a sewer treatment system. However, the department of housing has built houses without informing the district, as a result of which the sewer treatment system, which must be provided by the district, is not part of the district’s plans (MO-1).
Further on poor communication, another official reported that in August 2009 about 600 families were relocated from Gabon and Wateville informal settlements into Chief Albert Luthuli Settlement. The Department of Housing wanted to avoid invasion of these houses and so hastened to relocate the families but the Department of Education had not yet built schools in the said settlement so the children of reallocated families had to utilise nearby schools, causing overcrowding and disruptions since it was in the middle of school term (MO-2).

Lastly on the issue of communication, a respondent reported that in 2002 a budget of more than R1 million was allocated towards building a clinic in Zone 17 Sebokeng. Consultants were sent by province to do assessments and communities were informed of the clinic. The budget was re-allocated to Pretoria academic hospital, which had been non-operational for a while after construction (MO-3). As corroborated by a provincial official, pressure had been mounting on provincial government to operationalise the hospital, as a result of which funds were withdrawn from various projects, including the Zone 17 clinic, to operationalise the hospital (PO-1). Officials within the municipality were later accused of having squandered the R1 million by angry communities.

Elsewhere, the fact that province allocates budgets without allowing locals to motivate their priorities was cited as a causal factor. For instance in 1999 when Palm Springs was developed there were 5 sites identified in Evaton West to build schools but the land

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2 Due to lack of vertical alignment, these houses are being built where there is not sewer treatment system.
is owned privately so an interest was expressed to the owner. Ten years later, no school has been built in that area (RO-1).

An official at another municipality points out that a decision was taken nationally that provinces will serve as the housing development agents. The municipality requested province to enter into a transfer agreement - pre-provision of funds for housing in advance - but province refused. The municipality then decided to provide the top structures, which are a provincial competence - from own budget and province would pay back the money. However province ended up owing the municipality R50 million for which the municipality got audit opinion from the Auditor General for being in violation of the Municipal Finance Management Act. The municipal Council then resolved not to build houses anymore but to provide core services only, servicing between 10 000 and 14 000 stands annually. However the Department of Housing does not have enough resources to provide houses to those stands as a result there is a gap between servicing stands and providing houses. There are about 60 000 stands serviced without houses at the moment, with potential for invasion by informal settlers. As a solution, many of the respondents, particularly within regional and municipal administrations, motivated for the dissolution of provinces and the direct transfer of resources to regions or municipalities. A respondent argued “located at the local level, we know better what the challenges in relation to housing or health or even education are. So we should be given the budget to handle them without having to go through provinces” (RO-2)

How are issues of joint planning and alignment factored into the IPMS?

The aim here was to establish whether officials get measured on matters associated with intergovernmental alignment or if they do it out of goodwill. This would enable an examination of the extent to which decision-makers are held accountable for intergovernmental alignment. Almost all respondents interviewed in this category hinted that issues of intergovernmental alignment are not factored into their individual PMS. One municipal official hinted that there is some reference to the need to ensure alignment in carrying out his work, but the provision was “vague, immeasurable and fairly insignificant in terms of points allocated” (MO-1). As a result, a number of the respondents pointed out that intergovernmental alignment suffers since people do not get measured on the extent to which they have performed towards ensuring alignment. Another respondent argued “I would want to focus on outputs on my PMS firstly to ensure that I do not risk losing my job as a result on non-performance but secondly I want to get a performance bonus, which you will only receive if you meet target set out in your contract” (MO-2). The latter sentiment was echoed by almost all the respondents in this category. This exposes a fundamental gap towards ensuring intergovernmental alignment.
In your view, how effective has the notion of IDP as a plan for all government been?

Given the focus of the research, the question was meant to source subjective views on whether the idea to utilise the IDP as a plan of all government is bearing fruit. The responses here would help develop an understanding of whether the IDP, given its location at local government, is capable of serving as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment. This would enable a reflection on whether the current approach should be retained or if fundamental changes are required so as to respond to the last component of the final sub-question posed by the research in chapter 1.

All the respondents in this category reported that the idea of the IDP as a plan of all government was not effective for various reasons. At a provincial level, it was indicated that the IDP is legislatively binding on municipalities and as such is viewed in provincial government as peripheral. A provincial official reported that the manner in which the IDP is put together, as well as the kind of consultation therein is very poor, with municipalities continuing to treat it as their unique plan, in isolation to other spheres. Furthermore, the lack of political leadership at a provincial level to make the IDP a plan of all government was identified as another factor prohibiting the effectiveness of this notion. At a local level, an official responded:

This has failed since IDP is supposed to be a tool reflecting plans of all government. Our IDP does not reflect the plans of education, and I’m sure education does not have a copy of our IDP, so how do we identify their developmental priorities? IDP meetings tend to become complaint sessions where communities lament things like ‘my tap has no water, I don’t have a house etc, instead of engaging communities on strategic issue of development (MO-1)

Another official reacted that this idea is ineffective since IDP forums are too broad and are unable to deal with the actual detail of each of the projects. What is needed is small focused forums made up of Housing, Eskom, Transport and Education within the municipalities (MO-2). A regional official, also echoing the same sentiments, laments “You ask for information on how many people are located in various settlements and the municipalities will fail to tell you, and this is the kind of data we need for our planning” (RO-1).

The findings herein went to the crux of the research question, by confirming that the shift in the conceptualization of the IDP has not assisted government in tackling the challenges of intergovernmental alignment it faces. There are a variety of reasons, ranging from the structure of the IDP, to legislation and political leadership, cited to explain why this has been the case. As an alternative, almost all of the respondents pointed to the need for an institutionalized system for vertical alignment that is not
reliant on voluntarism as a solution to the many challenges identified above. Secondly, a significant number of the respondents had a strong sense that budgets and decision-making should be decentralised to local level, as there is no real role for provincial government, especially in Gauteng. This was particularly a sentiment among regional and municipal officials, who have come to view provincial government as a layer of bureaucracy with no real use.

**Linked to the above, how does the department relate with the IDP office within each of the three municipalities? Is it through?**

- **a) Direct engagement with the IDP office**
- **b) Engaging with the line department in the municipality which in turn engage with the IDP office to share information**
- **c) Participation in District IGR Forums (where applicable)**
- **d) All of the above**

Aimed at provincial and regional managers, the question sought to establish the extent of the involvement of other spheres of government in the actual development of the IDP. If the IDP is to become a plan of all government, collective action is required in its development so the question sought to examine the extent of the participation of provincial and regional managers in municipal IDP processes such that the end product is truly reflective of a plan of all government. This would in turn enable a reflection on whether in practice there has been a shift in the conceptualisation of the IDP, or does the shift remain theoretical while in practice the IDP remains the municipal planning instrument as opposed to a plan of all government. Lastly the responses from line managers would enable an assessment of the extent to which the IDP occupies a strategic position as a central planning instrument at least within the municipality itself. This would expose whether the IDP is collectively owned by all, at least, within the municipality or whether it is simply a document compiled in isolation by the IDP manager to comply with the legislative requirements.

Provincial respondents pointed out that there is the Gauteng IDP Technical Steering Committee (TSC), established in 2006, like the provincial planning forum alluded to earlier, it is convened by the Department of Local Government and Housing. The core focus of this forum is to effect the idea of the IDP as a plan of all government by ensuring engagement among the spheres of government through the IDP process. The provincial departments utilise this as a platform through which to partake in IDP processes. The forum’s inability to foster collective accountability among members coupled with lack of political leadership, were cited as factors inhibiting its effectiveness.

Regional officials reported very poor participation in IDP processes. One reported that he engages with IDP when invited to a meeting which happens very seldom. Echoing
this sentiment, another regional official pointed out that “Early this year we were invited to a meeting that emphasized the importance of working together but I have since never been invited to the IDP meetings despite the fact that the IDP managers know the kind of work that I do. The only time we engage with IDP managers is when they require information on the education needs to add to the IDPs” (RO-2).

The above was also the case with some municipal officials, who indicated that they share information with the IDP office when required but are not involved in the actual development of the IDP. Other municipal officials reported that they are involved in the development the IDP through the IDP technical committee, which is a structure made up of the IDP manager and all manager within the municipality whose focus is to assist the IDP manager in the development of the IDP (MO-1 and MO-2). Even where there are no formal structures, the municipal officials reported that they are intimately involved in the development of the IDP and form part of the public participation meetings through which they identify issues to inform their sector plans (MO-3 and MO-4).

4.3.3. GROUP 2: IDP MANAGERS/COORDINATORS

A second group of interviewees was the IDP managers/coordinators, within each of the three municipalities. The core focus of the interviews was to source perspectives on the level of cooperation and participation in the IDP process both by provincial and municipal officials. While reading the municipal IDPs for the 08/09 and 09/10 financial years, one found very poor expression of provincial projects being implemented within municipalities. IDPs reflected largely on the plans and projects of the municipality without detailing the work that other spheres of government are doing within these municipalities. Against this backdrop, this set of interviews sought to examine whether this was as a result of poor vertical alignment with provincial government or if it resulted from lack of engagement between the IDP manager and other municipal officials. The following questions were therefore posed towards IDP managers.

- How do the departments of education, health and housing (within the municipality) participate in IDP processes?
- How do the departments of education, health and housing (in the province) participate in IDP processes?
- What explains the poor expression of plans and projects of these departments in the IDP?
- In your view what are the biggest challenges on intergovernmental alignment and how can they be addressed?
- The idea of using IDP as a plan of all government was intended to assist government in addressing alignment challenges, in your view how effective has this been? If not effective, what are some of the causes of this none-effectiveness and how can they be addressed?
Responses to the above questions would also aid in getting a different perspective in responding to the main and sub-questions that the research poses. Once again coding was utilized in presenting the findings with IDPO-1-IDPO-3 used to represent the responses provided by each of the three IDP managers presented below.

**How do the Departments of Education, Health and Housing (within the municipality) participate in IDP processes? Is it:**

a) By partaking in forums (i.e IDP task team)

b) They provide information when required and not active in the actual process of developing the IDP

c) No participation

d) Other (please specify)

This was asked as a means to determine the extent to which these departments are active players in the actual development of the IDP with the view to take collective ownership and re-affirm the IDP as a central planning tool of the municipality. In Emfuleni it was noted that information is constantly requested when developing the IDP and is provided by the departments as requested. This applies mainly to housing, since there are municipal officials responsible for housing and employed by the municipality whereas the latter is not the case with education and health. These two are engaged through the District IGR Forum, which has not been convened for a while. There is also an IDP steering committee comprised of all Heads of Departments (HoDs) within the municipality which meets about three times a year to guide the development of the IDP and input. Metsweding District Municipality also utilizes the IDP Steering committee, made up of all HoDs within the municipality as a platform through which line departments partake in the IDP process. On the other hand, guided by the Growth and Development Strategy (GDS 2025) as the primary planning tool, the Ekurhuleni line departments are actively involved in the IDP process in pursuit of the vision set out in the GDS.

**How do the departments of Education, Health and Housing (in the province) participate in IDP processes? Is it:**

a. By partaking in forums (i.e IDP task team or other forums)

b. They provide information when required and not active in the actual process of developing the IDP

c. No participation

d. Other (please specify)
The second question sought to examine the activeness of other spheres of government in the development of the IDP, which is a key ingredient to making it a plan of all government. This would also aid in examining whether in practice there has been a shift in how the IDP is conceived or if it remains a municipal planning tool, with little participation from provincial government. Emfuleni and Metsweding utilise the District IGR structure to engage with other spheres of government on IDP matters. Ekurhuleni, on the other hand, makes use of the provincial IDP processes, such as the Gauteng IDP Technical Steering Committee alluded to earlier. All municipalities also draw on the provincial IDP analysis processes to engage other spheres of government and source participation into the IDP development. The IDP analysis is a process wherein provincial government assesses the draft municipal IDPs, in April, with the view of examining if their plans and projects have been expressed in the draft IDPs.

A challenge with district IDP task team, especially in Sedibeng district wherein Emfuleni belongs, is non-attendance by sectors. As a case in point, a meeting convened on the 17th of September was attended by only one representative from the Department of Labour, with other departments having confirmed attendance but failing to do so. Thus, while on the one hand regional and provincial officials lamented exclusion from IDP processes, the IDP managers insisted that other spheres of government were actually invited to partake in IDP processes but were simply not interested.

What explains the poor reflection of plans and projects of these departments in the ELM’s IDP? Is it:

a) That formation was not made available on time
b) The IDP is a municipal plan and must therefore not reflect on provincial plans
c) Sectors make commitments which they do not keep so we can’t add their projects in the IDP
d) Other (Please specify)

The poor reflection of project of other spheres of government would reflect either lack of alignment at a vertical level between provincial and local government or poor engagement between the IDP manager and other line official with the result that vital information does not reach the IDP office and thus fail to be reflected in the IDP. All IDP managers lamented lack of access to provincial information as a factor. One official reported for instance that “Information is not made available and sectors are not keen to take part in IDP processes of the municipality” (IDPO-1). Echoing this sentiment, another official lamented that municipalities only get access to provincial budgets once they are gazetted by Provincial Treasury, which is around February. This makes it impossible to include these into the draft IDP that goes to council end of March and has
to pass through a number of sub-committees within the municipality before reaching Council.

**In your view what are the biggest challenges on intergovernmental alignment and how can these be addressed?**

As was intended with first group, the question sought to source subjective opinions on causal factors for the perpetuation of intergovernmental alignment challenge, in spite of a plethora of initiatives to tackle this over the past 15 years. There were interesting similarities in the responses between this and the first group. Most of the arguments were built around lack of communication between provincial and local government. An official related an instance wherein the municipality had budgeted for a municipal court in one area, only to find that provincial government had already built two courts in nearby areas. The municipality was made aware of the existence of these recently-built provincial courts a mere two weeks before they were officially launched.

Another official pointed to the variations in the financial years between provincial and local government, arguing that “… as a result [of different financial years] the planning process of the three spheres of government does not take place at the same time” (IDPO-2). The last official attributed challenges of alignment to the fact that district municipalities, which are tasked by the IGR Framework Act to coordinated alignment, were failing to do so.

**The idea of using IDP as a plan of all government was intended to assist government in addressing alignment challenges, in your view how effective has this been? If not effective, what are some of the causes of this non-effectiveness and how can they be addressed?**

As custodians of the IDP, tasked with the actual responsibility of drafting the IDP as well as setting up systems and structures, the IDP managers were best located to clarify whether the IDP is best located to serve as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment. While other officials dismissed this idea as impractical, IDP managers were exceptionally optimistic of its potential success. The overarching view was that in spite of current challenges, the IDP presents a good opportunity to serve as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment. One official insisted that “the IDP is the business plan of the municipality so the idea of using it as a plan of all government can work effectively. The challenge is the non-participation of sectors in IDP processes” (IDPO-1). The second official asserted that to large extent, the system of IDP as a plan of all government is effective but there needs to be more coordination and commitment from all of government. The third official, equally optimistic, contended that “What is needed
is alignment of planning processes so that we know what province is planning, way in advance. There is beginning to be good cooperation as a result of interventions put in place by DLGH through: the Gauteng IDP TSC” (IDPO-3).

4.3.3. GROUP 3: PERSPECTIVES FROM EXPERTS AND PRACTITIONERS

The last of the three groups, this was made up of six respondents, four from government and two from academia. The core focus was to establish further insights on challenges of intergovernmental alignment and potential solutions thereto. This would assist in responding to some of the sub-questions the research poses in chapter 1. The following questions were posed towards this group:

- Why did the government opt for the IDP as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment?
- What, in your view are some of the factors that can be attributed to the continued lack of alignment among the spheres of government?
- What are some of the possible alternatives that can yield better outcomes regarding intergovernmental alignment?

The responses of this group are presented below with codes PR1-PR6 utilised to reflect on the perspectives of these practitioners.

Why did the government opt for the IDP as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment?

There were sharp variations among the respondents on this question. One respondent, located in academia, alluded to the fact that the IDP is an ideal instrument, given how it is conceptualized, to give effect to the Constitutional ideals of cooperative governance and deepening participatory democracy. Thus, the IDP is equally best located to coordinate all of government. Differing with this perspective, an official in government argued that national government has had no proper coordination and planning capacity for a while, which is manifested in the various initiatives outlined in chapter two which have failed to deliver alignment. Therefore noting the fact that the IDP was already legislated at a local government level government became opportunistic and wanted to utilise this as an instrument of coordination (PR-2). He concluded by arguing “For instance, when looking at much of the literature, we say that local government is the weakest in terms of capacity, also in terms of resources, yet we say that alignment must happen at that level, clearly there is something disingenuous about that?” (ibid).

A third perspective insisted that the IDP was originally conceived as an integrated plan of all of government within a locality. However, when drafting the legislation, that
understanding was lost, and a picture was painted that the IDP is a planning tool of the municipality only. Thus the current effort to make the IDP a plan of all government is not necessarily something new, but a re-emphasis of the original intent behind the IDP instrument (PR-3).

What, in your view, are some of the factors that can be attributed to the continued lack of alignment among the spheres of government?

Again there were stark variations in response. The first respondent attributed this largely to poor professional ethic within public service. He argues that people are well aware of what they must do but just choose not to do it since there are no concrete mechanisms to hold them accountable. Taking further this point, he draws on experience to point out how ‘lazy’ public servants run away from doing work in offices and go to forums and meetings (PR-1). Secondly, he pointed to the power dynamics within a municipality, hinting that “it is important to understand power, and how power dynamics play themselves out. You find an IDP manager being a young professional and having to coordinate the work done by other municipal officials who by the way are political heavyweights within the municipality and they will simply ask you who do you think you are to come and tell us what to do” (ibid). The last factor was attributed to failures in the legislation. The fact that the IGR Framework Act establishes structures and does not draw linkages among them was identified as a flaw. Having been involved in the drafting of the IGR Framework Act, the respondent alluded to the fact that a chapter devoted to drawing linkages among IGR structures and establishing reporting and accountability mechanisms was deleted from the IGR Framework Bill, resulting in the vague legislation that the Act became (Ibid).

The second respondent advanced two reasons. Firstly the fact that at a horizontal level, there is no leader of development was problematic. The Department of Housing, for instance, can make a point, as it does, that all development must follow housing as it is the biggest in terms of movement of people and influencing migration patterns. The Department of Economic Development can then advance that housing provision must seek to draw people closer to economic opportunities and thus housing must be guided by where economic development will go. By the same breath, Department for Environmental Affairs could then insist that all economic development must take account of environmental considerations and as such both housing and economic development must be informed by environmental factors (PR-2). The second issue, linked with the latter, is the absence of an explicit spatial policy, which guide development and priority-setting. As a result, each department plans according to own priorities and criteria without a level of coherence and desire to align.
The third respondent lamented the fact that there was little buy-in and participation by other spheres of government in municipal IDPs, which made it impossible for the latter to serve the role of an instrument of intergovernmental alignment. The respondent concludes “How can you have a plan that only the municipality buys into, whereas it is expected to pull together all of government? There are many areas within the municipality, such as education and public works that are outside the municipal control yet have a great impact on the municipal space” (PR-3).

The next respondent also lamented the poor professional ethic within public service as part for the causal factors for continued misalignment. He contends “If there is a housing project that does not have water running into those houses, how does it get funding? Should someone’s head be on the block for failing to check these basic things before granting funding for projects?” (PR-4). For him, the notion of alignment is often abused to hide basic failures as a result of lack of professional accountability. Linked to the latter, the respondent made reference to fundamental weaknesses in the current structure of the financial system. The manner in which the incentives such as conditional grants are structured condones planning in abstract. What is needed is a system wherein conditional grants are linked to delivery of sustainable human settlements (ibid).

The second last respondent alluded to several factors contributing the perpetuation of misalignment in Gauteng. Firstly, he contends that municipalities have not made a transition towards understanding the IDP as a management tool which must be used to ensure effective management of the municipality. This is reflected by the kind of content contained in the IDP. For instance communities will express a need for a clinic, and this will be reflected in the IDP before it even reaches the decision makers, such that what comes out of the IDP is projects that are actually to be implemented as opposed to ‘wish lists’ (PR-5).

The second issue had to do with the decision-making, in relation to development at a provincial level. To this the respondent argued “For instance I don’t think there is an HoD in all of Gauteng that can tell you where his department is spending money in the next financial year. These decisions are taken at a variety of levels using a variety of instruments” (ibid). The last respondent referred to the inability of government to ensure collective accountability as a critical factor. Departments can go to municipalities and make commitments for projects, only to pull out later. The instance regarding the Zone 17 clinic whose budget was re-allocated to Pretoria Academic hospital is perhaps reflective of this tendency.

*What are some of the possible alternatives that can yield better outcomes regarding intergovernmental alignment?*
The final question posed to respondents, as a means to develop a perspective on potential options for Gauteng and the country at large. The first respondent argued that what is required is a spatial policy that can guide all of government in terms of priority-setting and budget allocation. It must not be necessary, according to this view, for there to be endless meetings and forums in order to achieve alignment but it must come ‘automatically’ out of a process through which all of government plans in pursuit of one vision. The National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP) was identified as one tool that can serve to guide all of planning. Thus, according to this view, if all of government could plan in line with the NSDP principles, alignment would follow seamlessly.

Secondly, reference was made to the current initiative, headed by The Presidency and CoGTA, to align District IDPs with NSDP and PGDS. At the core of this work is the drive to locate the Districts as the theaters of intergovernmental planning. The District IDPs would henceforth play a coordination role of all of governments’ initiatives within municipalities belonging within the said district. The same logic is advanced through the National Development Planning and Implementation Forum coordinated by CoGTA and made up of district, provincial and national government officials (ibid).

The second and third respondents insist that alignment could not be achieved as long as the professional values and ethics within public service are not changed. For these respondents, alignment should come naturally since public servants are aware of ‘what is right and wrong’ (PR-2). Thus in planning a housing development, the official responsible must have take it upon themselves, driven by professional values and good ethics, to ensure that all support infrastructure is catered for, even though this may seem like an added responsibility.

On the contrary, the fourth respondent pointed to the fact that intergovernmental alignment is highly voluntaristic and reliant on goodwill, affirming the assumption that the research made in chapter 1. This, for him, was the biggest problem facing intergovernmental development planning in post apartheid South Africa. As a solution, he contends that legislation must set out to make alignment a legislative requirement. The latter legislation must further introduce a system of intergovernmental alignment not reliant on goodwill and forums. Driving the point home, the respondent indicated that due to legislation, IDP has brought a level of synergy within the municipality which does not exist in the province currently.

Thus province must align horizontally first to develop a provincial perspective on development, which can the serve as a basis for engagement with local government. The respondent was a strong advocate of the New Jersey model of cross acceptance (PR-4). Lastly a differentiated approach towards governance was advocated for. For the respondent, in a space like Gauteng given capacities of municipalities, it is sometimes
difficult to identify the role of the province, between local and national activities. Thus consideration must be given to dissolving provincial administrations in areas such as Gauteng, which is small in size and has fairly decent local government capacity.

The last respondent provided another perspective. For him, the fact that intergovernmental development planning has found a ‘home’ in the form of the Gauteng Planning Commission meant that much progress will be made in future. He advocated for an iterative system, through which the municipal IDPs would inform and be informed by provincial plans and priorities. This should then culminate into the long term vision of the province, broken down into short and medium term actions (PR-5). Ideally, according to the respondent, there should be the provincial IDP, detailing the provincial perspective on development, which will then be utilized to engage municipalities with the view to shape their own planning.

The last respondent echoed almost similar sentiments, also advocating for an iterative system. For him what is needed is a complex system that is able on the one hand to recognize the importance of national and provincial coordination, while providing space for local innovation thus striking a balance between top-down and bottom-up planning (PR-6). The latter system should be one in which where one sphere fails, another is able to intervene decisively. For instance “decentralisation must be linked with capacity within the municipalities. where there is no capacity, the focus should be on giving these municipalities the most minimal responsibility, ensuring that the national government is able to come in and intervene decisively” (ibid).

Finally, countering the view on considering dissolving provincial government, the respondent argued for a review rather of the role of district municipalities. While recognising the strategic role that District play in mobilising economies of scale for development, the respondent contends that the political role that districts play has led to much duplications and confusions of authority. Thus, District must be transformed to regional administration whose main function is to foster economic development at regional scale. They may also be utilized to mobilize scarce skills such as Chief Financial Officers to support struggling local municipalities.

### 4.4. SUMMARY

In brief, this chapter was devoted to the presentation of the findings from the field work. Three separate groups were interviewed, and each of the groups’ individual responses was reported upon. The interviews conducted were tailored to provide an understanding of the state of intergovernmental alignment in Gauteng. This in turn will be valuable to answering each of the research question posed in chapter 1. An analysis of these findings follows.
CHAPTER 5
REFLECTIONS AND ANALYSIS

5.1. INTRODUCTION

Against the backdrop of the findings presented in the previous chapter, the focus of the current chapter is to analyse and reflect on what these mean for the main research question and sub-questions posed. Structurally, the first part of the chapter will therefore utilise the findings in chapter 4 as well as the conceptual and contextual frameworks in chapters 2 and 3, to respond to each of the questions the research posed and highlight key themes. Having done so, the last part of the chapter will make recommendations on potential way forward with regards to intergovernmental development planning.

5.2. OVERVIEW AND INSIGHTS

The findings reveal that the shift in the conceptualization of the IDP has contributed very little to tackling challenges associated with intergovernmental alignment. Evidence from respondents in groups 1 and 3 actually suggest that this shift has been largely theoretical but the IDP in practice remains a plan of the municipality as originally conceived. As a result, intergovernmental alignment remains extremely poor, as evidenced by the results presented in chapter 4. In order to cover adequate ground, what follows is an attempt to pull together the findings both from primary and secondary sources as well as other data gathered in the research to respond to each of the sub-questions posed in chapter 1.

The first question to be answered had to do with examining how post apartheid South Africa has attempted to tackle the challenges relating to intergovernmental alignment. One of the fundamental assumptions the research departed from, was an assertion that challenges of intergovernmental alignment confronting South Africa are certainly not as a result of lack of initiative from government in this regard. Attempts ranging from Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI) and Spatial Guidelines for Infrastructure Investment and Development (SGIID) to the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP) bear testimony to this. The very shift in the conceptualisation of the IDP towards utilizing it as a plan of all government is reflected of a myriad of initiatives as discussed in detail in chapter 2.

What comes out of the review of available literature as well as the interview findings is the fact that the South African system of intergovernmental alignment in the post apartheid period has been tailored around voluntarism and goodwill, with no institutionalized mechanisms to foster alignment. This has resulted in what Richards and Kavanagh (2000) have termed, departmentalism, a practice through which political
officials pursue narrow departmental priorities instead of broader government objectives.

While several respondents sought to downplay the negative impact of this factor, by pointing to issues around work ethic, the voluntary nature of intergovernmental development planning is a fundamental systematic flaw which in turn confirms the research hypothesis. The most significant yet complex of the questions posed sought to examine some of the factors contributing to the perpetuation of challenges with regards to intergovernmental alignment. This was in the bid to understand, why, after 15 years and in spite of the many interventions have challenges of intergovernmental alignment continued to persist. The research may have not uncovered all the factors contributing to this. However, the literature and research findings reveal a combination of legislative gaps, institutional weaknesses and administrative failures all of which are discussed below.

5.2.1. LEGISLATIVE GAPS

Linked to the voluntarism challenge raised earlier, there was a strong sense that intergovernmental alignment needed to be better legislated, with particular focus on systems and processes. One of the fundamental interventions of the post apartheid South Africa’s Constitution was a departure away from the hierarchical forma of governance that characterized the apartheid state and the introduction of a cooperative system of governance. Section 41(1) (G–H) of the Constitution provides a frame within which cooperative governance must be carried out. Much of the focus provided by the said framework relies extensively on goodwill among the spheres of government to make cooperative governance a reality. The latter is perhaps a result of the reconciliatory and democratic spirit the Constitution sought to enshrine. There further seems to have been an assumption that given the apartheid past that the country had just emerged out of, all of government will work towards a shared vision and as such alignment will follow naturally.

The IGR Framework Act is to date the most significant legislation regulating intergovernmental alignment. The fundamental flaw with the Act however, is its reliance on the establishment of forums as a means through which intergovernmental alignment should be pursued. Sections 21 and 24 of the Act expand at length on the forums to be created at various levels of government. What is missing, however, is an attempt to set up a system through which the said forums should operate. Perhaps the removal of a chapter in the IGR Framework Bill that sought to establish this system has left a fundamental legislative vacuum as a result of which intergovernmental alignment has suffered.
The idea of employing the IDP as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment in itself seems to have been negatively impacted by lack of legislative reconfigurations to effect it. Even though there are views to suggest that the IDP was originally conceived as a plan of all government within a locality, the Municipal Systems Act (MSA) makes the IDP a legislative requirement towards municipalities. Thus, the shift towards making the IDP a plan of all government was not accompanied by amendments to the MSA to this effect as a result of which the shift still remains theoretical as all spheres of government continue to treat the IDP as a plan for the municipality.

Evidence from the preceding chapter suggests that municipalities do not make an extensive effort to source valuable participation from sector departments in IDP processes, as reflected by the large majority of sector respondents who lamented that they are not informed of IDP gatherings hence they do not participate. One the other hand sectors themselves continue to treat the IDP as a plan of the municipality and an additional responsibility to the work they do and as such fail to partake meaningfully in IDP processes. Data from IDP managers, especially the Sedibeng instance wherein a meeting of the 17th of September was attended by only one sector representative, provide evidence of this.

5.2.2. INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES

Institutional issues relate largely to the manner in which the state is structured and functions. The post apartheid state restructuring process results in elements of decentralization of power to other spheres of government. In particular, there was significant devolution of authority to provincial and local government. However political decentralization, through power-sharing did not always go along with fiscal decentralization - the transfer of revenue-generating power and spending decisions to the lower spheres. This resulted in a system described by Oldfield (2002) as ‘embedded autonomy’ where municipalities are autonomous and hold political authority but are bound to national and provincial priorities through various mechanisms. One significant mechanism has been the configuration of the financial system, of the country, resulting in municipalities relying on transfers and conditional grants from national and provincial government.

Several respondents in the previous chapter alluded to the fact that nationally and provincially, there is very poor horizontal coordination. The NSDP as well as the Provincial PGDSs have not succeeded in laying out the national and provincial perspective of development within various municipal spaces. As a result, the fact that municipalities rely largely on funding from provincial and national government has meant that the kind of funding that gets channeled to municipalities through conditional grants is in pursuit of narrow sector priorities instead of integrated development.
Departmentalism, as Richards and Kavanagh (2000) refer to this sector focus, has had a negative impact on intergovernmental alignment.

Another potential hurdle to alignment lies in the two-tier system of local government. Chapter 5 made reference to a number of initiatives that are currently seeking to locate the district space as the zone of intergovernmental alignment. Projects such as the alignment of district IDPs with NSDP and PGDS as well as initiatives such as the National Development Planning and Implementation Forum are intended to advance this logic. It then follows that the district IDP would serve as instruments of coordinating government initiatives within the district space. However, there is a potential anomaly in the fact that the district and municipal IDPs are all developed and approved at the same time, in compliance with the MSA and MFMA requirements. As a result, the district IDPs may not be able to coordinate developments within various local municipalities belonging within the district.

5.2.3. ADMINISTRATIVE FAILURES

The last set of factors contributing to perpetuation of failures in intergovernmental alignment was around administrative failures, which refers to actions and decisions by individuals within government. A point was made earlier that intergovernmental relations and, thus alignment, are inextricably interwoven with inter-personal relations, since government is administered by individuals. Given the legislative and institutional vacuum that has already been alluded to, it was upon individuals within government to ensure that there prevails good alignment among the spheres of government both vertically and horizontally.

Evidence from the findings suggests strongly that the goodwill that is necessary to ensure vertical and horizontal alignment is poor. Interestingly, all of the respondents emphasized the importance of collaboration and coordination in delivery of public service. What is missing, however, is the ability to translate this intent into practice. Thus, while in theory the goodwill does exist, in practice, intergovernmental alignment remains a peripheral priority for individuals within public service and hence it remains weak. The fact that issues of intergovernmental alignment do not find space in performance management contracts appears to have contributed to this. Evidence from the preceding chapter seems to suggest that public servants are primarily concerned with the outputs in the performance contracts. Thus, since there is no measurement of performance with regards to intergovernmental alignment, the latter becomes an ‘add-on’ instead of primary focus in the daily operations within public service.

On the other hand the failure within public administration, to drive strong professional accountability is also exacerbating the poor ethic towards intergovernmental alignment. As one respondent pointed out in the preceding chapter, it is individuals who take
decisions to allocate funding for housing projects without ensuring that there is support infrastructure for such projects. Several of the respondents in chapter 5 even suggested that the system as it currently stands, needs not be amended but much focus needs to be devoted towards developing a professional work ethic and a set of values in public service which would deliver alignment.

Lastly, while the findings demonstrate weak vertical and horizontal alignment, they also exposed poor engagement between the municipal officials and the IDP offices. The fact municipal officials in certain municipalities only participate in IDP development by making information available when requested, implies that the IDP is also failing to occupy its strategic position as the key planning instrument within the municipality around which all officials must operate. A sense of collective ownership of the IDP may thus have been diluted, resulting in the IDP degenerating into a compliance document owned by the IDP manager.

Thus the shift in the conceptualisation of the IDP has not contributed much to tackling the challenge of intergovernmental alignment. Perhaps even more complex a question then becomes one around what are what future directions are likely to yield more effective outcomes with regards to intergovernmental alignment. Are some adjustments required to the current approach or should it be entirely re-oriented? In order to respond systematically to this question, the research combines a consideration of recommendations emerging from the interviews as well as the various models of presented in chapter 3.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FROM FIELDWORK:-

- Improved cooperation and participation
- Dissolving provinces
- Development of values and professional ethic
- Legislative amendment

5.3.1 IMPROVED PARTICIPATION

A significant number of the respondents at all levels alluded to the importance of improving cooperation, and improving participation in IDP processes. This view re-affirms the logic that IDP is the best instrument of intergovernmental alignment, but is hampered by poor sectoral participation, which, if improved, could result in good alignment. This sentiment confirms an observation made earlier that in theory there is willingness among spheres of government to cooperate and align their plans. In practice, however, this is far from being the case. The responses between provincial and local government officials were marred by accusation and counter-accusation wherein IDP officials accused sectors of not taking IDP work seriously, while sectors
lamented that municipalities continue to treat IDP as a municipal plan and therefore not involve them in IDP processes.

The past 15 years have drawn on voluntary communication and collaboration among the spheres to produce good alignment. The very idea of IDP as a plan of all government was also reliant on voluntary collaboration, utilizing the IDP as a vehicle. The findings of the research and evidence from available literature show fundamental failures as a result of this reliance on voluntary cooperation. There is therefore no evidence to suggest that cooperation will improve in a vacuum.

**5.3.2 DISSOLVING PROVINCES**

Regional and municipal respondents advocated strongly for the dissolution of province. This, they argued, would result in more expedient delivery of services since funds would flow directly from national treasury to municipalities. Another motivation was that in a small province like Gauteng, it is not always easy to identify a role for provincial government, especially given the levels of capacity that exist in metros. The argument is therefore to capacitate local government to deliver services and dissolve the province.

While this argument may be valid for other purposes, there is no evidence to suggest that dissolving provincial government would result in good alignment. Instead, given the poor state of inter-municipal planning, dissolution of provincial government may result in even worse levels of alignment at a provincial scale. Gradual dissolution of authority to municipalities were capacity exists should however be considered. This could be in the form of, for instance, accreditation of Metros and high capacity local and district municipalities to deliver housing, health care and education services. Provincial oversight would then be utilized to ensure that there is alignment within the municipal space.

**5.3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF VALUES AND WORK ETHIC**

A case is also made for the development of ethics and a value system that would entrench intergovernmental alignment within the daily operations of government. It has been argued that the perpetuation of alignment challenges does not result from the lack of initiative from government. Initiatives such as the National Development Planning and Implementation Forum as well as the Gauteng IDP Technical Steering Committee all emerged out of the desire to give effect to the idea of utilising the IDP as a plan of all government. The latter initiatives have yet not succeeded in bearing fruit due to, as one respondent pointed out in chapter 5, the inability to hold each other collectively accountable for decisions taken since these may not be binding on sectors and municipalities. The development of a value system, while it is a very important...
ingredient, may not on its own succeed in overcoming challenges of intergovernmental alignment.

The fundamental flaw that this research has uncovered is the reliance on individual goodwill and forums as a means of driving intergovernmental alignment. The lack on an institutionalized system of intergovernmental alignment has opened a systematic vacuum underpinning many of the challenges the research has reported. Alongside a value system, there needs to be an institutionalized system of intergovernmental alignment, not reliant on forums and goodwill.

5.3.4 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT

Evidence from indicators such as performance contracts get done because people have to do them. As much as the IDP has not succeeded in a number of areas, it has brought a level of stability with regards to integrated planning at a municipal level. Evidence from the pre-IDP era suggests that the IDP has transformed local government significantly this may be attributed to a combination of MFMA and MSA, both of which guide the development and adoption of IDPs. Equally, for intergovernmental alignment to be effective, reconfiguration of legislation such as the IGR Framework Act could be beneficial.

However, just as is the case with the value system, the legislative amendments must be in pursuit of institutionalizing a system of intergovernmental alignment, around which work ethics can be built. The conceptual framework in chapter 3 reflected on a number of models on intergovernmental alignment, under the rubric of JUG. The latter are drawn upon to reflect on the kind of institutionalised system of intergovernmental alignment that could yield better outcomes.

5.4 TOWARDS A SYSTEM OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ALIGNMENT: KEY LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conceptual framework in chapter three identified key lessons, which are employed as indicators towards the development of a system of intergovernmental alignment. Firstly, intergovernmental alignment cannot be treated as a sectoral activity due to its multi-stake-holder nature. Effective management of intergovernmental alignment can be achieved through the use of a super-structure such as a Planning Commission, as is the case in India and New Jersey, with no sectoral interests. The formation of the National and Gauteng Planning Commissions a step in this direction, and will ensure that there is an authority directly accountable for alignment, which is a critical ingredient to success.

Secondly, within a devolved system such as that of South Africa, some form of a national framework for planning is essential in guiding planning by other spheres of government. Most significantly, as is the case with India and Malaysia, a long term plan
at a national level is necessary to serve as a ‘end state’ and explicit spatial policy in pursuit of which all spheres of government can develop their prioritization, planning and resource allocation.

The recently-developed Green Paper on Strategic Planning has to some extent attempted to serve this purpose. What is missing however is a coherent horizontally-aligned national perspective on development within various municipal spaces, resulting in national funding being allocated to pursue sectoral priorities that are not aligned. Even at a provincial level, it is critical to develop a provincial perspective on development within each municipality, which could then serve as a basis of engagement at a vertical level with local government. This would ensure that provincial government speaks with one voice in engaging local government, which would make alignment more practical.

Thirdly, negotiating alignment within a cooperative system of governance is very complex. The embedded nature of devolution in South Africa has resulted in a somewhat bureaucratic system which is underpinned by the thinking that local government inherently lacks capacity and must be closely monitored. The manner in which the MFMA and MSA subject all municipalities, regardless of their capacity, to the same level of legislative requirements, is a manifestation of this ‘big brother’ attitude. Internationally, bureaucratic forms of intergovernmental alignment tend to fail, as is the case in India. On the other hand, states and countries with iterative top-down/bottom-up planning models - such as New Jersey and Malaysia – appear to have attained more successful results in relation to inter-governmental alignment drawing from the international models and literature presented in chapter 3.

What is therefore needed is a system which will on the one hand, recognize the need for national and provincial coordination, while also allowing space for local innovation in the execution of constitutional powers and functions. Linked to this, good inter-governmental alignment will result from a system that aligns the processes of planning as opposed to the products of planning. This is also vital in protecting the integrity of all spheres of government when planning so as to give effect to the constitutional principles of cooperative governance. The Indian model has elements of strong bureaucracy which makes it unsuitable for the South African context, given the cooperative nature required for good alignment.

While the Malaysian model is iterative and appears ideal, the fact that local government is the creation of the Federal government and derives its powers from the centre makes this model somewhat unsuited for South Africa, wherein local government is an independent sphere, deriving powers from the constitution. In Brazil on the other hand,
municipalities have exclusive authority over planning, which is not the case in South Africa.

The New Jersey’s cross acceptance model presents the most suitable option for South Africa. The idea of an IDP as a plan of all government is underpinned by an attempt to pull all of government together through one plan. Given the separation of powers, and the experience reflected in chapter 5, this has proven extremely difficult. Thus, while it would be most ideal to have one plan of all government, it is more practical to have various plans for a municipal space which are cross accepted between provincial and local government to ensure vertical and horizontal linkages. In this way, no projects could be implemented in the municipal space without the municipality’s knowledge.

Most importantly, cross acceptance would be useful in ensuring that provincial plans for various municipalities are informed by local contexts within those municipalities and vice versa. The key to tackling many of the intergovernmental alignment challenges facing Post apartheid South Africa lies in a shift away from reliance on goodwill and forums towards legislative review in pursuit of cross acceptance. The latter would ensure the creation of what Patel and Powell (2008) referred to as *shared spaces* in which the three spheres of government set up policies, strategies and approaches of working collectively for greater impact on the local space.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING REMARKS

6.1. INTRODUCTION

As a way for conclusion, the chapter summarises the focus on the research and the outcomes. An overview of the focus and approach towards the research is provided, followed by a brief summary of the chapters. The chapter concludes by summarizing the findings of the research as and linking these to the hypothesis.

6.2. FOCUS AND APPROACH:

This research sought to examine the state of post apartheid South Africa's intergovernmental development planning system. In particular, the research sought to investigate the extent to which the shift in the conceptualisation of the IDP has contributed to tackling challenges associated with intergovernmental alignment. In addressing this question, the research employed a case study method. Gauteng province was utilized as a case study and the provincial Departments of Education, Health and Housing served as elements of the case study. At a local government level, Ekurhuleni Metro, Metsweding District and Emfuleni Local Municipalities were utilized.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to examine the state of intergovernmental alignment. Interviews were conducted with officials responsible for development planning within the said departments and municipalities. Additional interviews were conducted with various experts and practitioners within the field of development planning. A conceptual framework was then developed, drawing on various models of intergovernmental alignment. This framework was critical in assessing the state of intergovernmental alignment in Gauteng and making recommendations on the way forward.

Structurally, chapter 1 introduced the topicality of the research and advanced a motivation for structuring the report in six chapters. Chapter 2 provided a contextual overview, which sought to detail how post-apartheid South Africa has attempted to tackle the issue of intergovernmental alignment. This in turn laid the ground for the introduction of the shift in the conceptualization of the IDP, from being a local government plan to serving as an instrument of intergovernmental alignment.

Chapter three served as the conceptual framework, with the first part of the chapter drawing on the theory of decentralisation to discuss the state restructuring process that post apartheid South Africa underwent. In the bid to draw linkages between power sharing and alignment, the second part of chapter 3 reflected on models of intergovernmental alignment, under the rubric of JUG, with the view to draw lessons for South Africa. Each of the models presented was in turn linked to a form of decentralization, with the view to developing a comprehensive conceptual perspective.
This conceptual framework was helpful in assessing the state of intergovernmental alignment in Gauteng.

Against the backdrop of the framework provided in the preceding chapter, chapter 4 presented the findings from the field work. Given the exploratory nature on this research, the interviews and findings presented in chapter 4 were tailored towards answering the research question and sub-questions posed while testing the hypothesis. To this effect, information was sought from municipal and provincial official involved in development planning. Further insights were sources form experts and practitioners in the field of development panning drawn from government and academia.

The following chapter was devoted to the analysis of the findings, based on which recommendations would be made. Structurally, the chapter was tailored to respond to the research question and sub-questions posed in chapter 1. Having done so, the chapter drew on reflections made by interviewees and insights drawn from the conceptual framework, to structure recommendations on potential way forward.

**6.3. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The research found that after 15 years of democracy and in spite of a myriad of initiatives, inter-governmental alignment among the three spheres of government remains poor. A number of respondents alluded to a variety of casual factors for the perpetuation of weak alignment among the spheres of government. Factors ranging from legislative gaps and institutional weaknesses to legislative failures were identified as reasons contributing to weak alignment among the spheres of government.

Most significantly, the fact that intergovernmental alignment relies on individual goodwill and forums, was identified a fundamental weakness of the post apartheid South African development planning system. This in turned re-asserted the argument advanced by the research hypothesis. While there are elements of success in the voluntaristic approach, there continues to be immense challenges associated with intergovernmental alignment. As a result, the shift in the conceptualisation of the IDP, towards making it a plan of all government, has not made any significant contribution to addressing these challenges. Furthermore, as the research has shown, this shift has no potential of addressing these challenges, given the vacuum in the intergovernmental development planning system resulting from voluntarism.

A number of recommendations were made by the respondents on potential solutions to the challenge of intergovernmental alignment. These ranged from improving sector participation in IDP processes to developing a professional work ethic in public service. Other recommendations included dissolution of provinces as well as legislative
amendments. Each of these recommendations was assessed individually, and a perspective was advanced as to their potential to yield better results.

It was then argued that what is required is an institutionalized system of intergovernmental alignment to be entrenched within public service. Most importantly, such a system should enable government to negotiate alignment in an iterative manner to give effect to the constitutional principles of cooperative governance. The research drew on the conceptual framework, with particular focus on the models of intergovernmental alignment presented. This was in the bid to explore potential, models that South African can employ, drawing from the lessons to be for international practices in this regard. Each of the international models were then analysed to assess their suitability within the South African system of cooperative governance.

The New Jersey’s model of cross acceptance was identified as presenting the best option for South Africa, given its iterative nature, which is critical to protecting and preserving the integrity of each of the three spheres of South African government and giving effect to true cooperative governance. It was argued that cross acceptance must be made a legislative requirement so that it is not reliant on goodwill, as is the case with the current system. The research therefore concluded by recommending legislative reconfigurations towards cross acceptance.
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Annexure A: Interview Respondents

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Khulekani Mathe</td>
<td>Policy Coordination and Advisory Services Unit: The Presidency</td>
<td>07 August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bertus van Zyl</td>
<td>Manager: IDP – Ekurhuleni Metro</td>
<td>14 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Official</td>
<td>Senior Official responsible for Housing in Ekurhuleni</td>
<td>14 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Imogen Mashazi</td>
<td>Executive Director – Health: Ekurhuleni Metro</td>
<td>16 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Moss Nonkonyani</td>
<td>Acting Regional Director – Education: Ekurhuleni Metro</td>
<td>16 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Official</td>
<td>Senior Official responsible for Housing in Metsweding</td>
<td>16 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felicity Human</td>
<td>Director – Housing: Emfuleni</td>
<td>17 September 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. David Mmushi</td>
<td>Physical Resource Planner – Education: Metsweding</td>
<td>18 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Lebo Mashile</td>
<td>IDP Coordinator – Metsweding</td>
<td>18 September 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Modise Mphalo</td>
<td>IDP Officer – Emfuleni</td>
<td>20 September 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Fikile Ngubeni</td>
<td>Facilities Management Unit Coordinator: Health - Emfuleni</td>
<td>20 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Yusuf Patel</td>
<td>DDG: Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs</td>
<td>05 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Mark Oranje</td>
<td>Head of Planning: University of Pretoria</td>
<td>13 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Philip Harrison</td>
<td>Executive Director – Development Planning: City of Johannesburg</td>
<td>26 October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. S’bu Xaba</td>
<td>Head: Gauteng Planning Commission</td>
<td>30 October 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. George Kanyika</td>
<td>Director Infrastructure Planning – Gauteng Department of Health and Social Services</td>
<td>17 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Official</td>
<td>A senior official responsible for Infrastructure Planning within Gauteng Department of Education</td>
<td>17 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Rashika Padarath</td>
<td>Director – Municipal IDP: Gauteng department of Local Government and Housing</td>
<td>20 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Andre van der Walt</td>
<td>Director – Infrastructure Planning: Gauteng department of Local Government and Housing</td>
<td>24 November 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Official: Respondents requested not to be named.