TITLE: The UN’s Experience of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration in Southern Africa

BY: CHRIS ALDEN

NO: 411
THE ISSUE OF THE MILITARY:

THE UN'S EXPERIENCE OF DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

By

Chris Alden

Department of International Relations
University of the Witwatersrand
"What about the people who were at the battlefront during the liberation of our country, and who are not educated? What are we going to do? Many of us are illiterate people who only know how to fight. Now we are being threatened by intellectuals who were lucky to be sent abroad by SWAPO to study for the benefit of the Namibian nation."  

In early 1995, Boutros Boutros Ghali released an amended version of his now famous Agenda for Peace. According to the Secretary General, the composition elements of the United Nations' peace support programme consisted of preventive diplomacy, peace making, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building. More than any other single element in Boutros Ghali's typology, the military stands at the crossroads of all points on this peace continuum: it is the trigger of conflict, it is primary instrument of violence, it is the enforcement arm of international law and it is the ultimate symbol of reconciliation. From technical issues of disarmament and demining to the human dimension of reconciliation and reintegration into society, the question of the military ranks as the most complex and volatile components of any peace support operation. Devising an approach which takes into account both the multi-faceted nature of demilitarization and its varied time frame is one of the pressing challenges for the international community in the wake of the onset of peace.  

This article will analyse the United Nations' experience of demilitarization in Southern Africa with reference to the issues surrounding the transition from an emergency situation to a developmental context. The three UN peace support operations in Southern Africa, namely Namibia, Mozambique and Angola, will be examined to assess the international organisation's role in that process. In so doing, the article highlights a number of themes, including the importance of developing a regional approach to demilitarization; the imperative of cooperation both within the UN itself and with the international donor and NGO community as a whole; and the need to develop a greater understanding of the efficacy of "targeting" demilitarization programmes towards ex-combatants in light of the broader goals of demilitarization.  

I. Between Emergency and Development: Theoretical Parameters of Demilitarisation and Peace Building  

Demilitarisation of combatants, a process which encompasses the demobilisation and disarmament of troops and their reintegration into society, holds as its premise that combatants are particularly dangerous elements to interject into the fluid post-conflict situation. Both the perpetrators and, as often, the objects of brutalizing violence, combatants have the capacity to disrupt the fragile peace settlement, either by returning to open hostilities with their opponents or resorting to armed banditry
in the aftermath of formal peace. Accordingly, it has become a kind of cardinal principle that these self-same volatile elements and circumstances can be offset through a targeted programme which builds on the structured demobilization and disarmament of combatants in conjunction with some form of monetary and educational incentives designed to facilitate their peaceful reintroduction to civilian life. This two phased approach to the question of demilitarization of combatants is composed of both the short term objectives of emergency assistance and the long term objectives of development. As such, it is well-ensconced within the emergency/development continuum as it is currently manifested in peacekeeping operations and subject to all of the complexities inherent in that process.

The demilitarization programmes instituted by the UN have, in the main, recognized the necessity of extending the scope of demilitarization beyond the short term objectives of demobilization and disarmament. In the lexicon of the UN, peace building represents the transitional point between the demobilisation of combatants and their full reintegration into society.

Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace... (T)he concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as a counterpart of preventive diplomacy...4

Nevertheless, further conceptual clarity on the matter of emergency concerns and development imperatives, and their relationship to the objectives of demilitarisation, is needed if UN peace support operations are to act effectively in this area. In this same vein, it is therefore noted that the controversies which often attend project design and implementation in demilitarization are themselves a product of this disjuncture between the emergency and development ethos.5 Indeed, it is the contention of one SRSG that this disjuncture is one of the major failings of UN Peace Support Operations.4 More than a mere intellectual oversight, to be recognized and corrected, the gap between emergency and development ethos is rooted in and finds institutional expression in the differing UN agencies which make up peace support operations. Another element which further complicates the situation is the role of the international NGO community which itself is divided along the emergency and development fault line and, accordingly, acts with varying degrees of autonomy from the UN peace support operation. This has the Janus effect of, at times, contradicting the aims of the mission and, in other instances, ameliorating the oversights or failings of the UN.

II. The UN, Demilitarization and the Southern African Context
In the aftermath of colonialism and apartheid, intensified by the struggle to dislodge these elements through force of arms, Southern Africa is a landscape awash with the brutal legacies of conflict. Super power intervention further contributed to the immolation of the physical, social and indeed, spiritual terrain of the region. And while the conflicts in Namibia, Angola and Mozambique were often disaggregated into discrete confrontations, the common denominator of apartheid South Africa, a regional hegemon anxious to reshape Southern Africa in its own image, and an extensive ideologically-based external intervention, belies cognitive approaches (and the attendant policy implications) which are predicated on the inviolability of the state system. Demilitarisation, as it has become abundantly clear in the wake of UN involvement in Southern Africa, is not a national problem but rather a regional one.

The three cases from Southern Africa -- Namibia, Angola and Mozambique -- provide concrete examples of UN involvement in demilitarization, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of its changing approach in the region. Most notably, the UN refined its demilitarisation programme to include both short and long term components as well as moving towards an integrated and comprehensive approach to the issue of the military. In each case study, the following areas will be examined: the demilitarization programme as conceived in the peace settlement; the demilitarization programme as organised by the UN peace support operation; and the record of implementation.

**Namibia and UNTAG**

Established in the wake of the signing of the New York Accords in December 1988, Namibia was the first post-Cold War mission of the UN, the largest peacekeeping operation since the ill-fated mission to the Congo and the most complex ever undertaken by the organisation. As such it posed a series of challenges to the UN's capacity to conduct a multi-dimensional operation that incorporated elements of traditional peacekeeping as well as novel components in such areas as police and elections monitoring. Its successful resolution, despite some serious incidents, gave considerable encouragement to the international community as to the efficacy of extending the UN role in peacekeeping world-wide.

**A. The Peace Agreement and Demilitarization**

The agreement formally ending the conflict in Namibian had in fact been drawn up in 1978 under the auspices of the UN's Western Contact Group. Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), which called for the withdrawal of South African military and administrative control over the territory and democratic elections, formed the basis for the cessation of hostilities and the transition to independence. Following the assent of all parties to the New York Accords, the Security Council passed resolution 629 (1989) which officially established the mission to Namibia. Accordingly, the UN was charged with the supervision
of the cease fire, monitoring of the conduct of the South West African Police (SWAPOL) police and observing the election campaign. The time table for the operation was to cover twelve months and contained the following steps:

* a cease fire was to be formally established on 1 April;

* the disbanding of the SWATF and SWAPO and the reduction of SADF, from a high of 32,000 to nil by 8 November 1989;

* elections were to be held 16 November 1989.

All of this was to take place in tandem with the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, overseen by UNAVEM I (see below).

Overseeing the implementation of the entire process would be a Special Representative of the Secretary General and a South African appointed Administrator-General. To fulfil the stated aims of SC Resolution 435, UNTAG would be structured to include a civilian component, a police component and a military component. The civilian component consisted of the Special Representative's Office, which was supported by 42 smaller political offices established across Namibia's ten regions, and would provide overall direction and coordination to the mission, as well as prepare the foundation for UNDP involvement after the mission; an Independent Jurist who would arbitrate on matters relevant to the peace process; the UNHCR, which was responsible for the repatriation of refugees in advance of the elections; an electoral division, which would oversee voter registration and monitor the elections in November 1989; and a logistics division. The police and military components are discussed below.

B. UNTAG and Demilitarization

In the Namibian case, the UN mission's involvement in demilitarization was conceived wholly in terms of short term objectives, that is to say, the demobilization and disarmament of combatants. No provisions for reintegration of former soldiers were introduced into the programme, nor were they the recipients of any targeted projects, assistance or funding beyond that provided in the course of their stay in the reception areas.

The first aspect of the United Nations Transitional Authority Government's (UNTAG) role in demilitarization centred around the supervision of the confinement and withdrawal of South African troops from the territory and the concomitant repatriation of South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) guerrillas from their bases in southern Angola and Zambia. Linked to this was the monitoring of the cease fire between the former foes. To fulfil these objectives, UNTAG was to bring in a team of 200 military observers and 7,500 peacekeepers. Their task was to monitor the following:

With
* the restriction of the South African Defence Forces (SADF) to bases within Namibia by 1 April 1989 and their subsequent withdrawal from the territory, with the first reduction to 12,000 troops by 14 May 1989, 1,500 troops by 1 July 1989 and total withdrawal by 8 November 1989;

* monitor the dismantling of the SWATF, commando and ethnic units and their disarmament by 1 April 1989;

* monitor the disarmament and repatriation of SWAPO forces, including the confinement of selected forces to bases in Angola and Zambia;

* policing of official entry points into the country and reception areas for returnees.

The second aspect of UNTAG's role in demilitarization was the monitoring of the Namibian police and those elements of the SADF which had taken up civilian functions during the transition period. Complicating the situation further was the incorporation of the notorious counter-insurgency unit, Koevoet (Crowbar) into SWAPOL. With SWAPOL given the principal role in maintaining law and order during the transitional period, it would be the UN mission's 360 CIVPOL members job to ensure that it did not engage in acts of intimidation against the population during the run up to the election. The use of CIVPOL in fulfilling this task was one of UNTAG's innovations: no other mission had undertaken such a direct and extensive policing role.

C. Implementation

The implementation of the demilitarization programme was subject to the problems and constraints facing UNTAG. Despite having literally years to prepare for the mission, when it came time to implementing the objectives of SC Resolution 435 (1978), it was clear that little work had been done to realize the actual mechanics of the operation. In the first instance, delays in the passage of enabling legislation by both the Security Council, which only authorized the particulars of the operation on 16 February, and the General Assembly, which gave its approval two weeks later, cut an already narrow margin for deployment of UNTAG to the bare minimum. At the heart of these delays was a dispute over the mission's budget, which pitted SWAPO and African states anxious to see UNTAG maintain its full force strength in the event of a return to hostilities and the Security Council members, who believed that conditions had changed substantially in the territory to warrant a reduction in size and cost of the mission. Ultimately, the Security Council prevailed and UNTAG peacekeeping troops were decreased to 4,650 (while officially remaining at the original figure), reducing overall costs from US$700mn to US$446mn.

With regard to the actual mission, some problems emerged due to uncertainties as to UNTAG's chain of command. For instance,
while the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Martti Ahtisaari, was nominally head of the mission, given the specialized agencies institutional and financial independence from New York, initially there were difficulties in coordination. This was to impact upon the already problematic communication between New York and the field headquarters, as well as adversely effecting communication between the different components of the mission in Namibia. Unwieldy procurement procedures, which obliged UNTAG to forgo purchasing material from nearby South Africa so as to maintain adherence to international sanctions, and insufficient logistical arrangements in the field, was a further obstacle. Nevertheless, the overall picture of the mission was one of cooperation and successful coordination between the different elements of the mission.

The first and most dangerous crisis came in the early days of the UN mission with the unexpected infiltration of hundreds of SWAPO guerrillas from their bases over the border. As the SADF had been confined to bases, SWAPOL undertook to repel the incursion alone. SWAPO contended that the intention of the incursion was merely to move its forces into Namibia as part of the larger demobilization exercise while the South African officials declared it to be an outright violation of terms of the peace agreement. Though UNTAG had already been alerted to possibility of SWAPO incursions at least a month before it actually took place, it was clear that neither New York nor the field office in Windhoek had made provisions for this contingency. Faced with a choice of unilateral action on the part of South Africa and the implications of such action, UNTAG agreed to allow the SADF to suspend its confinement and respond to the incursion by releasing six battalions. Over 200 SWAPO members were killed and, after a meeting of the Tripartite Commission, Sam Nujoma announced that SWAPO would return to its bases outside Lubango, in Angola, under UNTAG escort. By 13 May, the cease fire was back in place.

Another issue which clouded the demilitarization process was the incorporation of Koevoet into the police force which had, inexplicably, won UN approval in advance of the UNTAG mission. With a deserved reputation for human rights abuses, there were fears that intimidation of the electorate would be effectively sanctioned in the guise of policing. Complaints by CIVPOL, whose task it was to pair up with SWAPOL, as to both the conduct of Koevoet and that of the police in general provoked a crisis. After much negotiation, Ahtisaari and Pienaar, the Administrator-General, worked out a compromise which saw Koevoet members leave the police and CIVPOL numbers increase substantially to 1,500. The last former Koevoet members left the police at the end of October 1989.

Much of the formal disarmament and demobilization process was effectively run outside of the UNTAG framework with the UN playing the role of observer or monitor. In the case of SWAPO, disarmament took place in Angola and Zambia followed by registration of repatriated refugees, inclusive of former guerrillas, at selected Assembly Areas over a seven day period.
As noted above, the SWATF disbanded in advance of the UNTAG mission and, though its arms were stored on South African military bases, the UN had difficulty gaining access to these facilities to verify their contents.\textsuperscript{14}

Despite continued reports of intimidation and covert South African assistance to an anti-SWAPO coalition, the elections went ahead on schedule. With nearly all of eligible Namibians voting, SWAPO was elected to power with 57\% support to rival DTA's 28.5\%, while the smaller parties picked up the rest of the votes.\textsuperscript{15} The UNTAG mission, the UN's first significant post-Cold War peace support operation, was viewed as a success.

\textbf{Angola and UNAVEM II}

In the case of Angola, the UN peace support operation was reconstituted three times, in the first instance because its mission was extended and later due to the failure of the previous effort. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) I, running from 1989 to 1991, was the complement to the UNTAG mission in Namibia, monitoring the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. UNAVEM II, created in the wake of the successful implementation of both UNAVEM I and UNTAG, was a more ambitious mission that undertook both a monitoring and, in some instances, facilitating role in what was to have been Angola's transition from war to peace. UNAVEM II's failure, exacerbated by a host of mitigating circumstances, cast a shadow over the UN's ability to conduct multi-dimensional peace support operations.

\textbf{A. The Peace Agreement and Demilitarization}

The signing of the New York Accords in December 1988, which included provisions for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and South African forces from Namibia, was to see the first direct UN involvement in Angola. Responding to a request by the Angolan and Cuban governments, on 20 December 1988 the Security Council passed SC Resolution 626 (1988) establishing a United Nations mission to verify the withdrawal process in Angola. In this capacity, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) oversaw the departure of 50,000 Cuban soldiers, a process which was scheduled to take 30 months. In order to complete its assignment, UNAVEM I was assigned a team totalling 70 military observers under the command of Brigadier General Pericles Ferreira Gomes, the Chief Military Observer. The first contingent of military observers arrived on 10 January 1991 and they began taking up positions across the country. Working from January 1989 to May 1991, the UN mission was able to complete the pullout of Cuban troops ahead of the established time table of July 1991.

Concurrently, peace talks were held under the auspices of the Portuguese government with the introduction of representation from the United States and the Soviet Union in the later stages of discussion. With the failure of the Angolan government's 1991 offensive against the Unita stronghold in the southeastern corner
of the country underscored the inability of either party to secure victory through force of arms. At the sixth round of the talks in early, the Angolan parties finally agreed to a comprehensive peace settlement which included a cease fire, demobilization and the country's first democratic elections.

The Acordos de Paz para Angola, or Bicesse Accords, were signed on 1 May 1991 in Portugal. They consisted of:

* a cease fire between the Government and Unita set to take effect on 31 May 1991 and to be administered by a Joint Commission staffed by both parties and monitored by the UN;

* the demobilization of Government and Unita troops and their integration into a unified national military, to be completed in advance of the elections;

* elections to be scheduled between September and November 1992 and monitored by the international community.

In a further agreement known as the "triple zero option", neither side was permitted to purchase new armaments and the international community (primarily in the form of the United States and the Soviet Union) was charged with ensuring that no transactions occurred.

In order to implement the peace agreement, the Bicesse Accords established a series of commissions to administer the introduction of its provisions. A Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM), staffed by senior representatives from the Government and Unita, was created to manage the overall implementation of peace agreement. The representatives from Portugal, the United States, and Russia were given observer status on the commission while the UN was confined to the position of "invited guest". Linked to it was the Joint Commission for the Verification and Control of the Cease-fire (CMVF), set up to oversee the cease fire process. The Joint Commission on the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA) was the third institution created by the Bicesse Accord. In addition, a number of working groups charged with overseeing specific tasks, such as demobilization, de-mining, the police, and humanitarian assistance, were established under the auspices of the commissions.16

The success of the withdrawal process encouraged the two main Angolan adversaries, the Government and Unita to request further UN assistance in the fulfilment of their own bi-lateral peace process. Though the UN had acted as an observer to the negotiations at Bicesse, its role in the structuring of the peace process had been severely circumscribed by one of the parties to the final agreement. Unita had wanted a strong UN presence in the country with substantial powers while the Angolan government, anxious to uphold its sovereignty, sought to limit the UN role.17 The end result was that the position of the UN in the process
would be, according to the plan, limited to monitoring and verifying a range of aspects of demilitarization of the conflict. These were:

* the end of hostile actions between the Government and Unita, including propaganda by 15 May 1991;

* the cantonment of all military forces to designated Assembly Areas by 1 August 1991;

* the demobilization of all military forces, including the collection and disposal of weapons;

* the creation of a new national army;

* and, the neutrality of the national police force, especially with regard to its fulfilment of provisions for human rights.

B. UNAVEM and Demilitarization

The demilitarization programme in Angola was essentially short term in emphasis, though there was some provisions made for long term components. The short term programme focused on the demobilisation and disarmament of combatants through a jointed supervised process which included a limited UN role as monitors. This heavily circumscribed role for the UN was one of the factors which contributed to both the collapse of the demilitarization programme and the popular perception of overall UNAVEM failure. As for the long term components of demilitarisation, provisional plans were made for targeted programmes that undertook training of ex-combatants, but these were neither integrated into a broad-based approach to reintegration nor (with the outbreak of fighting) were they allowed to operate.

UNAVEM's involvement in Angola's programme for demilitarisation centred on monitoring the cease fire, assuring the neutrality of the national police force, observing the process of demobilisation, and supporting the formation of a new national army. Marshalling its limited human and financial resources to this task, UNAVEM created teams of observers who were attached to counterpart teams of Government and Unita representatives established by the various commissions. Their role was to check if the Angolans were carrying out their work in a fair and unbiased fashion; there were no enforcement provisions as such provided for in the Bicesse Accords and certainly none directly available to UNAVEM. UNAVEM monitors were obliged to fan out across the six main regions of the country -- Luanda, Huambo, Lubango, Saurimo, Luena and Mavinga -- and take up positions in one of the eighty-two locations there.18 From this vantage, UN officials were to carry out their mission to monitor the fulfilment of the peace agreement.

The verification of the cease fire was the responsibility of the (CMVF). To fulfil this mandate, the CMVF sent teams to each of
the fifty Assembly Areas and the thirty-two "critical points". While the Assembly Areas had, where possible, UNAVEM military observers attached to them, the designated "critical points", ports and other areas which could serve as conduits for lethal material, were permanently staffed by UNAVEM observers. In addition, UNAVEM developed a mobile reaction team to investigate violations in either those areas which it had no permanent presence or places outside of its established monitors.

Monitoring the conduct of the National Police was another responsibility of the CMVF. The incapacity of UNAVEM to carry out its mission was perhaps most vividly underscored in this area. With only 89 monitors on hand, it was immediately obvious that UNAVEM would not be in a position to fulfil its stated duties. In a belated and inadequate response to these difficulties, the strength of the UN police observer contingent was increased in May 1992 to 126 personnel.

Demobilization was the responsibility of a working group formed by the CCPM. The programme for demobilization called for the cantonment of the Government’s FAPLA and Unita’s FALA forces at 50 designated Assembly Areas by 1 August 1992. Once in place, the majority of the estimated 120,000 FAPLA troops and 65,000 FALA troops would be disarmed and brought into civilian life. At the same time, an equal number of soldiers from both sides, numbering 50,000, would be assigned to the new army, the Forcas Armada, Angolanas (FAA). Training for those selected for service with the FAA would be the responsibility of Britain, France and Portugal, under the overall supervision of the CCPM. UNAVEM officials, operating in teams of two, were to be posted at each of the Assembly Areas where FAPLA and FALA were to gather. Notably, while some financial support targeting the demobilized soldier’s integration into civilian life had been mooted amongst some elements of the international donor community, no concrete provisions for its dispersement had been developed at this late stage.

C. Implementation

The process established by UNAVEM for the investigation of allegedly cease fire violations proved to be inadequate. Compounding problems was the slow deployment of UNAVEM observers, caused both by delays in New York and difficulties created by the two parties, which meant that the verification of demobilisation and disarmament was not fully operational until 30 September 1991. All in all, there were sixteen incidents which, according the UNAVEM officials, in themselves could have resulted in a renewal of significant conflict. Nonetheless, open hostilities were by and large suspended during the build up to the elections in late September 1992.

The neutrality of the national police force was a source of major dissent between the government and Unita. The creation of the Rapid Intervention Police, popularly known as the "Ninjas", invoked severe criticism from Unita officials as they were outside of the established demilitarisation programme. Trained
by the notorious Spanish Guarda Civil, the Rapid Intervention Police were composed of several military units drawn from the army and the security forces and numbered approximately 4,000.

The actual demobilization of Angolan soldiers was a dismal failure. Conditions in the Assembly Areas were appalling, lacking all the pre-requisites for such an operation such as proper shelter, food and water. Rioting Government soldiers, protesting the absence of basic necessities in the Assembly Areas and the overall slowness of the demobilization process, threatened to demobilize "spontaneously". The unwillingness of the Government to provide the requisite transportation and foodstuffs for the assembled troops proved to be a major stumbling block in the demobilization process. Efforts by UNAVEM military observers to develop an accurate count of the number of demobilized soldiers were hampered to the extreme by the shortage of UN personnel. Insufficient controls for monitoring the movement of troops, causing UNAVEM military observers to resort to weekly estimates of encamped troops, rendered UN monitoring irrelevant.

In contrast to FAPLA, Unita forces remained largely disciplined and under central control. However, the leadership proved to be generally unwilling to engage its troops in the demobilization process. Unita cited the lack of preparation on the part of the international community for the integration of its troops into civilian life as a reason for withholding from the process. The difficulties of gaining access to Unita-controlled territory further impeded UNAVEM in its efforts to keep abreast of the situation in the field.

Despite these shortcomings, by May 1992 70 per cent of the 160,000 soldiers were in the Assembly Areas but of these, only 6,000 had actually been demobilized. By June the figure had increased to 20,000, with 85% of Unita troops in place and 37% of Government forces in the Assembly Areas. By 7 October (a week after the election) UNAVEM officials claimed that 96,620 FAPLA troops had been demobilised.

Accusations and counter accusations of violation of the demobilization process increased as the deadline for disarming Angolan troops neared. As noted above, Unita claimed that the Government converted several military units into paramilitary units and placed them under the control of the national police. At the same time, the Government reported that Unita was illegally holding 20,000 troops in reserve in Cuango Cubango province. A UNAVEM investigation team subsequently verified that several hundred unaccounted FALAA troops were in fact in that area but, due to the lack of UN personnel, were unable to bring them into the demobilization process.

Linked to the problems of demobilization were obstacles hampering the establishment of the new national military. These included lack of facilities (adequate or otherwise) for soldiers, apparently a result of both the illegal sale of government material by the military and the re-allocation of resources to
training and equipping the Rapid Intervention Police. Despite the failure to move forward on establishing a new national army, in order to maintain the facade of adherence to the Bicesse Accords, the Government and Unita held an official ceremony on 27 September inaugurating the FAA. As late as October, only two of the sixteen were rehabilitated for use and 8,800 soldiers had been integrated into the new national army.

Against this increasingly somber background, over 90% of the eligible Angolans voted in the election, with dos Santos winning 49.6% to Savimbi’s 40% in the presidential race, while the MPLA secured 54% to Unita’s 34% for seats in the legislature. Short of the requisite 50% for the presidency, the two leaders were obliged to conduct a run off election; this was never to happen. Savimbi, claiming fraud, remobilized his troops and began a military campaign to consolidate UNITA positions in early October. Within a few weeks, Luanda itself was gripped by fighting as the government launched a counter strike against Unita. Persistent efforts by UN officials to broker a cease fire between the two warring Angolan factions came to naught and, by the end of January 1993, the Secretary General observed that a state of civil war existed in Angola. The continued violations of truces forced the downsizing of UNAVEM II and with resignation of the Special Representative in May 1993.

Mozambique and ONUMOZ

The demilitarisation programme in Mozambique, in contrast to the Namibian and Angolan examples, adopted an approach which deliberately sought to link short term objectives with long term goals. Utilizing the international NGO community to a greater extent than in previous operations, and cognizant of the recent debacle in Angola, the UN mission to Mozambique (ONUMOZ) put together a coordinated effort which rivalled UNTAG in size but far exceeded it in breadth.

A. The Peace Agreement and Demilitarisation

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed by the Government of Mozambique and Renamo in October 1992 called specifically for UN participation in the areas of the monitoring of the cease fire, providing humanitarian assistance and monitoring of the elections. The SRSG, Aldo Ajello, in cooperation with the Western powers which had been party to the negotiations in Rome, convinced the Government and Renamo to formally establish the Supervising and Monitoring Commission (CSC) as the central authority overseeing the implementation of the GPA. The CSC’s mandate included the settling of disputes between the parties, any question of interpretation of the GPA and a coordinating role for the subsidiary commissions to be established. The Cease Fire Commission, the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilizing Military Personnel and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force were created to managed specific aspects of demilitarization.
The timetable set by the parties to the GPA was as follows:

* the cease fire to commence 15 October 1993;
* demobilisation to be completed by 1 April 1993 and the subsequent formation of a new national army;
* and elections to be held in October 1993.

B. ONUMOZ and Demilitarization

The demilitarization programme employed by ONUMOZ sought to integrate the international community's efforts in supporting short and long term demilitarization. Short term components included the monitoring of the cease fire and the supervision of the demobilization of combatants. Long term components focused on projects which targeted ex-combatants, including provisions for a two year subsidy, job referral and training programmes.

Underlying the UN's demilitarization plan was the desire to separate the demobilization process from that of the electoral process. And, in contrast to UNAVEM II, sufficient financial and human resources were made available to fulfil these ambitions.

Monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique, a condition Renamo had insisted upon at Rome, was the first task of the UN demilitarization programme in Mozambique. It was decided to bring 7,500 UN peacekeeping troops into the country to monitor their departure and take up positions along the transport corridors. The Cease Fire Commission (CCF), composed of the Mozambican parties, representatives of the international community and members of ONUMOZ, worked to ensure that peace was maintained in the rest of the territory. The terms of the Commission were specific: it was to investigate allegations brought to it of violations of the cease fire agreement signed in Rome.

The demobilization of combatants formed the second part of ONUMOZ's involvement in demilitarization. A specialized unit attached to the mission planned and implemented demobilization. A team of four UN personnel were assigned to each of the 49 Assembly Areas where they were to oversee the process, including the registration of combatants, disarmament, the selection of soldiers for the new army and formal demobilization. Education, entertainment and general logistical arrangements were also their responsibility.

The last short term component of demilitarization was the creation of a new national army. It was initially envisaged that the new army would consist of 30,000 soldiers, equally divided between former Government and former Renamo troops and trained by the British, French and Portuguese. The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force was to be the point of intersection between the Mozambican parties and key members of the international donor community.
The long term component of demilitarization, namely the Information Referral Service (IRS) and the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), fell under the auspices of the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC). These latter measures were to be integrated into the actions taken by the Commission for Reintegration (CORE), the institution established by the Rome Agreement to direct the process of re-integrating soldiers and refugees into civilian life. The IRS was conceived as a mechanism for providing demobilized soldiers with access to information on the job market as well as basic information on aspects of the reintegration programme. Originally falling under the auspices of CORE (which proved to be ineffective), its eleven provincial offices were actually run by IOM.30 Using a Trust Fund administered by the UNDP, the RSS was to provide demobilized soldiers with eighteen months of subsidies in the form of cash disbursements given at local branches of the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento.31 By providing a reasonable assurance of financial support for an extended period of time, it was hoped that the former combatants would find employment in their districts and, concurrently, integrate into the local community. To assist in this process, vocational kits consisting of agricultural tools, seeds, and food rations for up to three months were given to demobilized soldiers upon departure from the Assembly Areas. UNOHAC used a host of development and refugee support agencies to implement these programmes. For example, in the area of de-militarization, UNOHAC contracted out to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to organize transportation of demobilized soldiers while for long term assistance, UNOHAC turned to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) who, in partnership with the Ministry of Finance and IOM, put into play the RSS.

Finally, the monitoring of conduct of the election campaign was the responsibility of the UN's Civpol. Numbering 128 (later expanded to 1,114), Civpol was attached to Mozambican police units to assure that the electoral process was conducted in an atmosphere free of intimidation and, concurrently, that human rights of citizens were respected.

C. Implementation32

With a six month delay in bringing the mission up to full strength in Mozambique, a new time table had to be set which called for the concentration of troops in the Assembly Areas to begin in September 1993 with full de-mobilization completed in May 1994; the new army to be operational by September 1994; and the election to take place in October 1994.

The initial step in implementing the demilitarization programme was to bring in the UN peace keeping forces to monitor the withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops. Despite delays that held up their introduction until August 1993, a total of 6,000 peacekeepers were finally put into place. Concurrent with the introduction of UN troops was the monitoring of the cease fire between the Government and Renamo by the CCF. As the majority of violations involved unauthorized troop movements
rather than shooting incidents, the task of monitoring was confined to assessing claims of position and territory. In the interim, the GPA mandated separation of forces was abandoned as adherence to it would have delayed the peace process further.

The next phase of demilitarization, the demobilization of Government and Renamo troops, proved to be exceedingly problematic. In an especially ambiguous passage, the GPA had allowed for "dual administration" of territory controlled by the Government and Renamo (which was to be reconciled before the elections through a joint commission on territorial administration), thus giving way to conflicts over everything from internal movement to taxation. In addition, the clash over siting of Assembly Areas, which fell victim to strategic manoeuvring the Government and Renamo, was only brought to a close through a compromise brokered by the SRSG. As a result it was not until November 1993 that twenty of the 49 Assembly Areas were officially opened to receive troops while the rest did not become operational until February 1994. The slow pace of demobilization, a product of lengthy indecision and confrontation by the Mozambican parties, fuelled dissent amongst combatants housed within the Assembly Areas. Months of confinement in the monotony of the camps gave way to demonstrations and riots, targeting both local military and UN officials.

With pressure to commence the demobilization from both the international donor community and the soldiers themselves, spurred in part by the approach of newly established deadlines for the mission, ONUMOZ decided that the first demobilizations should take place mid March 1994. The assembly phase was completed on 15 August, in spite of uneven cooperation from the Government and Renamo, with the final total of registered soldiers being over 86,000. Nevertheless, approximately 5,000 Government troops and 2,000 Renamo troops remained outside of the official demobilization process.

The establishment of the Forcas Armadas de Defensa de Mocambique (FADM) was another contentious aspect of the demilitarization programme. Training of trainers was slow to start, while joint command of the new army was only agreed upon in January 1994 and 80 officers were appointed in June to command the newly created infantry battalions. Delays in the supply of new equipment and the renovation of inadequate training facilities, coupled with the prolonged process of identifying new soldiers forced the compression of training into six weeks. Unhappiness over the prospect of being forced to continue in the military brought about strikes and desertions. By election time in October 1994, less than 10,000 soldiers had completed their training and Mozambican officials were lowering the target size for the FADM to 15,000 at arms.

The long term component of demilitarization, introducing measures for the long term maintenance of the demobilized troops, was taken up by UNOHAC's IRS and its RSS. With the able assistance of IOM (which played the principal role in reintegration as CORE failed to materialize), the transportation of demobilized
soldiers and their dependents to their chosen destinations occurred with minimum problems. The subsidy scheme commenced without significant hitches while the IRS offices received numerous enquiries and assisted in job placement.

The elections of October 1994 were marred by one last crisis. The Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, pulled his party out hours before the polling was to begin; however, concerted pressure on the part of the Western powers and the SADC leadership caused him to reverse his decision. The result was a turnout of over 85% and the election of the Government's candidate, Joaquim Chissano, to the presidency by a margin of 53% while Dhlakama received 33%. In the legislative elections, the Government party, Frelimo, won 129 seats to Renamo's 112, with the rest of the seats going to smaller parties. Declaring the mission a resounding success, ONUMOZ withdrew from Mozambique by late December.

III. The Future of Demilitarization and UN Peace Building

If the Southern African cases cited here are to serve as any guide, it is principally to suggest that the issue of the military and the UN's role in the demilitarization process deserves renewed consideration on a number of levels.

First, demilitarization knows no boundaries. To cite but a few examples, some of the demobilized soldiers from Koevoet were to re-appear as Unita soldiers after the collapse of the Angola peace agreement. In Mozambique, official disarmament proved to be hopelessly inadequate, with a further 22,000 arms unearthed from amongst 146 undeclared weapons caches, and many arms finding their way into neighbouring South Africa and Zimbabwe. The successful transformation of the regional heritage of conflict, especially those issues of a military nature, requires an atmosphere of active and institutionalized cooperation between the states of Southern Africa. An approach which is predicated upon an understanding of economic asymmetry and porous borders in the region would in all likelihood stand a better chance of minimizing post-conflict problems than one which treats each conflict as a discrete, state-based situation. To cite two examples, programmes which seek to coordinate the disarmament phase of demilitarization in one area with an increase in cross-border surveillance would, hopefully, act to stem the traffic in small arms; equally, it is reasonable to assume that economies of scale could be achieved in developing a regional approach to the costly task of demining. The preliminary structures emerging out of the SADC framework are a significant step towards providing a forum for devising regional strategies to the address post-conflict management issues. In this regard, it is possible in future settings for the international community and in particular the UN system, through the initiation of a short and long term demilitarization programme integrated across state boundaries, to make a stronger commitment to the promotion of an enabling environment for tackling the post-conflict problems of demilitarization on a regional basis.
Second, implementation of demilitarization programmes requires not only conceptual clarity as to the emergency/development continuum but ongoing coordination between the UN, the international donor and NGO community. Clarity between emergency and development is, with a few exceptions, well understood in terms of actual conceptualization of demilitarisation programmes; this can be readily seen in the sophisticated approach to demilitarisation applied during the ONUMOZ mission. However, translating that into a coordinated approach that effectively pools the resources of the relevant UN and non-UN agencies as well as the host government and donors, is still proving to be problematic. In fact, while the three case studies cited here seem to present a picture of deepening cooperation and coordination both within the UN system and the NGO community, events in Angola indicate a disturbing trend away from that approach. UCAH, the local coordinating body established by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Luanda, maintains its distance from UNAVEM III while the NGOs are at pains to ensure their independence of action from UCAH.42 Enduring institutional biases which range from considerations of mandate to more prosaic matters keep the international community from acting effectively in collaborating together in demilitarisation. Furthermore, the perchance for UN and NGOs to introduce elements into demilitarisation programmes which can only be construed as self-serving (e.g., promoting the inclusion of a component into the demilitarization programme whose sole virtue is that it matches the institution's selected expertise), endangers what is already a volatile situation.

And third, further analysis of the long term component of demilitarisation needs to be undertaken. Studies by the World Bank and private consultancy firms do not as yet provide sufficient evidence to state unequivocally that the utilization of a targeted approach to reintegration is the most efficacious policy.43 These preliminary findings, especially as they rely heavily on case studies whose reintegration programmes are very much in progress, should be treated with caution. The selection of target groups, which spill over into the post-conflict development process, can act to re-affirm the ex-combatants identity and give him a sense of entitlement and expectations that is beyond the means of the post-conflict state. At its most egregious, the Namibian government's belated formulation of Development Brigades, with their severe cost implications and attendant social problems, is a marked failure of targeting.44 At the same time, it is readily understood that for many soldiers, resort to arms -- whether in the form of military service or banditry -- is the only real means of "employment" available to them. A programme which actively responds to the immediate financial and employment deficiencies of former combatants while recognizing the longer term imperative of social integration would be ideal. An earlier version of Mozambique's Reintegration Support Scheme, which provided incremental financial assistance over a set time period and linked such support, effectively, to a fixed domicile, was one effort to couple targeting concerns with the promotion of integration into the local community.45 Still, given the centrality of
demilitarisation to the peace process and its sustainability, it behooves the international community to develop a better understanding of this process.

With the future of multi-dimensional peace support operations of the kind cited in this paper in question, perhaps it is important to re-affirm a central point about the UN and demilitarisation. Succinctly put, should UN peace support operations be involved in the long term component of demilitarization? The answer is a qualified yes. The overlap between short and long term components of demilitarisation, whether it is in the area of the linkage of the demobilisation process to reintegration measures or developing local capacity to manage long term reintegration projects, necessitates integrated planning at the earliest possible moment in the demilitarisation process. And, it is logical to assume that a coordinating authority such as the UN would serve as an integral part of that process. However, with its uneven record in Southern Africa and elsewhere, the logic of the centrality of UN involvement is less appealing. For demilitarisation to succeed against all odds, and the post-conflict state is rife with crippling problems, it needs a better UN than the one we have today.


5. Undoubtedly the clearest expression of this overlap between the immediate concerns of peacekeeping and those of development can be found in the area of demining.


7. It should be noted that disarmament and confinement to bases was organized through UNAVEM I while repatriation was linked to the UNHCR's programme.

8. UNTAG: Description and Analysis of the Mission's Operational Arrangements 9 September 1991 (draft), pp.265-266.


10. Private communication.

11. The Tripartite Commission was established by the Brazzaville Protocol of 1988 and included South Africa, Angola and Cuba, with the United States and the Soviet Union serving as observers.


14. Interview with Omar Halim, Deputy Chief of Staff, UNTAG, 16 March 1996.


December 1993, p.497.
22. Ibid., p.110.
28. Interview with Ton Pardoel, Chief Technical Unit Officer, 26 May 1994.
31. Each Government and Renamo soldier received six months of their regular salary plus bonuses (with a minimum of 75,000 meticais) from the Government, with half of that given to them at the point of official demobilisation and half given to them in the district of resettlement. Upon completion of the Government subsidy programme, the a donor established provided a further eighteen months of support.
32. For a full account, see C. Alden, "Swords into Plowshares? The United Nations and Demilitarization in Mozambique" International Peacekeeping 2:2, Summer 1995.
34. J.P. Borges Coelho and A. Vines, "Pilot Study on Demobilization and Re-integration of Ex-Combatants in

35. An additional difficulty was the issue of the Government's para-military forces, something not adequately addressed in the GPA. Estimated to number 155,000, Government militias were scattered across the rural areas, often only nominally under the authority of district or provincial officials. It was only in January 1994 did they actually begin to disarm with two-thirds of their number demobilized by July. Interview with Colonel Pier Segala, Cease Fire Commission, 14 September 1994.


38. Ibid., p.4; interviews with senior ONUMOZ officials.


42. Interview with senior UCAH officials in Luanda, 12 August 1995; interview with NGO officials in Luanda, 12-14 August 1995.


45. This clause was changed in the final version, allowing ex-combatants to change the bank which administered their subsidy to accomodate those individuals who wished to move residence.