UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED SOCIAL RESEARCH

SEMINAR PAPER
TO BE PRESENTED IN RICHARD WARD BUILDING
SEVENTH FLOOR, SEMINAR ROOM 7003
AT 4 PM ON THE 18 SEPTEMBER 1995

TITLE: 'Render unto Caesar': The central state, local government and struggles over segregation in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, 1948-1962

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NO: 386
Map 1. Port Elizabeth Residential Areas and Municipal Housing Schemes, 1943.

Map 2. Uitenhage: Town and Locations, 1923
Map 3. Port Elizabeth Group Areas, in the period of high segregation, c. 1975

Map 4. Uitenhage Group Areas, c. 1970
I. INTRODUCTION

In early December 1968 the Town Council of Uitenhage began the first forced removals of African people from the 124 year-old inner-city location of Kabah to the new township of Kwanobuhle on the southern Municipal boundary. The removals were the beginning of a comprehensive plan to make Uitenhage conform to apartheid urban policy principles by removing Africans from Kabah, where they had historically lived side-by-side with coloureds, and reproclaiming the old location as part of the growing coloured Group Area of the town. However, in the two decades that followed these removals, Kabah was never fully conquered by the state. Both central and local governments perennially failed to realise the goal of comprehensive social engineering due to shortages of funds, bureaucratic inefficiency, continued migrations from Cape country districts, and the stubborn efforts of ordinary people to stake a claim to urban space. By contrast, in 1968 Port Elizabeth was well along the path of near-total segregation. A decade earlier Africans had been virtually entirely removed to proclaimed townships, and in the late 1960s the Municipality was embarking on a program of removing coloureds from "white" areas. The result of these programs was that Port Elizabeth soon became among the most segregated cities in South Africa.

The Kabah removal was the culmination of more than twenty years of policy struggles within the South African state, and explicit rejection by the Uitenhage Town Council of both the Urban Areas and Group Areas Acts. It is quite remarkable that at the moment of greatest National Party power in the 1960s it proved quite unable to remake the world according to its will. Not only did it face profound resource problems and resistance from below, rendering the "purist vision" of apartheid unattainable in the short term, but the institutional means available to the central state to enforce its policies required it to rely on relatively undependable local authorities as essential sites of delivery of services and exercise of control. In July 1961, as the Uitenhage Town Council was about to conceded to central state pressure, the local pro-Government newspaper Die Oosterlig reminded the Councillors, "'Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's' is a good idea for them to bear in mind."1

Local authorities were nominally responsible for maintaining immediate conditions of accumulation for industry and commerce, and for the reproduction of the white as well as black working classes. These tasks were conducted, if not more commonly avoided, under severe structural constraints of fiscal dependence on white ratepayers. This dependence would lessen after 1973 when the central state ultimately usurped authority over the townships, but until then the NP government ruled through local institutions to which it could not simply dictate. Local constituencies heavily shaped Municipal responses to central policies, and local officials varied widely in their ability or willingness to comply, especially within UP strongholds. A politics of accommodation was necessary in which policy outcomes were the result of a rough and tumble political process of coercion and concession, though increasingly on terms defined by the central state. Nonetheless, it was a process of accommodation, which introduced a considerable measure of variability in the application of central policies.

If the central state could, in the end, demand that local authorities "Render unto Caesar," this seemingly confident assertion of power reveals in fact its opposite. In St. Matthew's account, Jesus' reply to the Pharisees marks the difference between a merely earthly power with its essential limitations, and that of a transcendent, omnipotent God. Similarly, once confronted with a challenge to its authority the central state had little to fall back on other than a dictatorial exercise of power, even vis-a-vis its own institutions, revealing the shallow and fragile nature of its own sovereignty. In this respect the invocation of ultimate authority marks its very limitation, as ultimately the central state was forced to rely on these very same institutions to exercise its power. This paper looks backward from the Kabah removals, tracing the genesis of the segregation policies themselves to demonstrate the essentially contested nature of state power in South Africa.

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1 A previous version of this paper was presented in 1988 at the seminars of the Southern Africa Research Program at Yale University and at the Postgraduate Seminar of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. The paper is drawn from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, "The Factory Belongs to All Who Work in It: Race, Class, and Collective Action in the South African Motor Industry, 1967-1986," (Columbia University, 1994).
As such, the research is influenced in important ways by Deborah Posel's insights into the nature of the South African state, particularly in her assessment of the state as an actor in its own right "engaged in ceaseless processes of struggle and accommodation, both internally and with subordinate as well as dominant classes." It is curious that while her arguments about struggles over the meaning of apartheid have gained wide currency, there has been far less recognition of her invitation to investigate more thoroughly the coherence of the apartheid state itself.

This paper thus undertakes an institutional analysis of the development of policies of segregation in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. In addition to giving a sustained account of the evolution of such policies over the first decades of NP rule, it also self-consciously locates the discussion far away from the mainstream of debate on apartheid. Though both cities experienced rapid population increases throughout the period under review, the migrant labour system played a negligible role in the regional economy. In this respect, influx control and the contradictory relations between administrators, employers, and migrant and "urbanised" workers are relatively less important than in any other metropolitan area in South Africa. Instead, territorial apartheid and residential segregation was a far more central issue facing the central state and local authorities, as both attempted to deal with the racial ordering of space. Though this is an important issue elsewhere, arguably it is of greater salience in the Cape Province, given the enduring legacy of African, coloured, and Indian property (and franchise) rights. An immediate problem confronting the NP government after 1948 was reversing and eliminating patterns of residential integration, between whites and blacks and between those statutorily defined as Africans, coloureds, and Indians.

In this respect, the paper makes a departure of sorts by examining the virtually simultaneous enactment of the web of apartheid legislation in the two municipalities. Other analysts have tended to focus exclusively on either the pass laws, or the Urban Areas Act, and few have linked their implementation to the enforcement of the Group Areas Act. As a result scholars have missed the combined impact of these policies on localities.

II. URBAN SEGREGATION BEFORE APARTHEID

A. SEGREGATION IN COLONIAL UITENHAGE AND PORT ELIZABETH

Segregation in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage dates from their founding. Cape colonial towns were the realm of white settlers, but many different groups were present at their start. The black population included many Malay artisans and traders, as well as Khoi labourers, and initial residential divisions did not exclusively follow colour lines. AJ. Christopher argues rather that informal patterns of class and social differentiation characterized residential growth in Port Elizabeth: mixed-race people were free to own land and some people of colour clustered in new industrial areas where many white workers also lived.

However, white colonists did not consider the majority of indigenous people - "Africans" - to be citizens of the colony capable of owning property, and more importantly, viewed them as foreigners, temporary residents present only to labour. Africans were relegated to segregated, physically isolated "locations" on land deemed unsuitable for white occupation. In both Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage the first separate residential areas - initially for Khoi and later for Mfengu - were established on London Missionary Society ground close to the town centres. After being created as Municipalities in the 1840s both towns established formal locations close to these original LMS locations. Over time, these locations expanded and many entrepreneurs opened private locations to accommodate the increased African population.

By the time of Union in 1910 the pattern of segregation in Port Elizabeth diverged from that of its neighbour. The inner-city locations were the target of a sustained removal effort, perpetually delayed by the absence of funds to compensate site holders or to provide alternative accommodation in new areas. The removals finally occurred under the pretext of plague clearance, and most Africans in Port Elizabeth were moved to New Brighton, 8 kilometres from the centre of town. But a loophole in the new law - Africans could be compelled to leave town but not to enter the location - enabled many to avoid the heavily controlled and expensive barracks housing at New Brighton and to move instead to
Korsten, a land development beyond the Municipal boundaries.9

Despite population increases, Uitenhage's original locations - including the oldest, Kabah - were never forcibly removed.10 These were built on the periphery of the town, and did not impede the further expansion of either commercial or white residential areas. Furthermore, there was little upward pressure on land prices - an important stimulus for the white speculators behind the removals campaign in Port Elizabeth - as Uitenhage experienced a prolonged recession due to the chronic decline in the wool trade on which the town's economy was based.

Thus at the end of the colonial era in 1910, Uitenhage retained its first town locations on their original sites within the Municipal boundaries, the most important being the Kabah Location. By contrast, Port Elizabeth had passed through a period of prolonged struggle over the inner city locations, eventually leading to their destruction and the removal of the African population beyond the town border to the formal Location at New Brighton or to the growing squatter settlement at Korsten.

B. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN SEGREGATION BEFORE 1948

These differences in segregation patterns would increase as the two towns took steps to accommodate the rapid increase in the black population that accompanied industrialisation before and after World War II. Both Municipalities designed new housing schemes for African and coloured people, but these tended to reinforce the trends mentioned above. The Port Elizabeth Municipality built new housing for Africans, but within New Brighton; furthermore, its first foray into providing subeconimic housing for other workers yielded a series of segregated coloureds-only and whites-only housing schemes scattered throughout the city. The only exception to this pattern was Korsten. In Uitenhage, after consolidating four locations into the 'old location' at Kabah in 1936, Municipal housing schemes for Africans and coloureds were located either in or adjacent to Kabah. As a result, Port Elizabeth's policies promoted a more thorough-going segregation between coloureds, Africans and whites, while in Uitenhage the divide was drawn between blacks and whites.

1. Port Elizabeth

As Jennifer Robinson's research shows, local industrial development sparked by World War I was not an automatic or natural reflex to market conditions, but bore the imprint of an entrepreneurial local authority seeking to promote Port Elizabeth industry and seize whatever opportunities were open to them. The expansion of the footwear industry and the first investments by the automobile multinationals were heavily encouraged by a Council willing to assume large debts to fund the expensive infrastructure essential to manufacturing and to offer fully serviced industrial townships ready for development. The resulting growth in the manufacturing workforce also prompted the Council for the first time to provide housing for Port Elizabeth's working class, and the Council's policies for public housing and for administering New Brighton Location earned it a reputation (which its promoters eagerly sought to embellish) as a liberal, progressive city.

While relying on the physically separated racially exclusive Location, the "liberal" Council eschewed the familiar mechanisms of pass controls for Africans formalized in the 1923 Urban Areas Act in favour of a paternalistic and pacifying administrative system, codified in extensive regulations executed through a personalistic Superintendent backed by a network of African "headmen."

If the physical segregation of Africans within urban areas was accomplished through an inherited framework of colonial restrictions, culminating in the Urban Areas Act of 1923, separating whites from all other people of colour was a more complicated process. Some Africans, coloureds, Indians, and Malay possessed property and voting rights in the Cape. But following World War I, the informal processes of segregation which date from the earliest colonial times intensified as a result of two separate processes. First, new private housing developments, especially those aimed at white buyers, began featuring restrictive covenants in their title deeds. The new language prevented purchase by anyone other than the defined group, which in the vast majority of cases limited ownership to whites.11

The other factor heightening the extent of separation between white and coloureds was the character of state provision of working class housing. The 1920 Housing Act enabled municipalities to
construct "economic" and "sub-economic" housing, but it mandated that such schemes be constructed on racially separate lines. The Port Elizabeth Municipality developed a number of such housing projects between 1923 and World War II, during which time more than 1,400 houses were built for Europeans, 2,000 for coloureds, and nearly 4,000 for Africans.

Those built for Africans were constructed as further extensions to New Brighton Location, known as White Location (310 houses begun in 1928) and McNamee Village (3,506 houses, built between 1938 and 1947). But the new Council houses designated for coloureds and whites were scattered around the city on available land, without reference to any overall framework of spatial separation of the races. These single-race schemes were often cited adjacent to one another, divided by a road or minor physical buffer strip, in contrast to the principles of broad racial zoning characteristic of later apartheid policies which saw whole sections of cities reserved for particular groups. Indeed, some of the Council housing schemes for coloureds were located in the southern and largely white residential areas of the city. These projects formed literal islands of racial occupation, with little intermixing between coloureds from the housing schemes and whites from the surrounding private developments. In 1936, while there were several areas in the city where substantial numbers of coloureds resided near whites, such as South End, North End, and Sidwell, (though rigid street-level separation predominated), there was only one area within the city boundaries where large numbers of Africans lived: Korsten.

Korsten's fast population growth and generally unregulated character contributed to the creation of a densely settled, unserviced area with high rates of disease and infant mortality. Officially Korsten was described as a slum, and the Municipal health department repeatedly lobbied the Council to have it removed on such grounds. Slum or no, Korsten was still a relatively attractive area for people who couldn't afford or obtain, or didn't want housing within New Brighton. It still lacked the more overt forms of Council control present in the location, and it was extremely close to industry. The very conditions which favoured settlement by Africans made the police anxious: they were worried by the absence of clear administrative jurisdiction over Korsten, by the irregular patchwork of wood-and-iron shack settlement making direct control difficult, and by the "intermixing" of Africans and coloureds which meant repeated violation of laws restricting liquor consumption by Africans. Many members of the Port Elizabeth City Council shared these concerns, and an additional interest: inspired by the expanding manufacturing sector, the Council eyed Korsten's central location as a prime spot for development of new industrial townships, converting "slums" into revenue-producing factory land.

Once Schauderville (for coloureds) and McNamee Village (for Africans) were launched in 1935 and 1938, the Municipality was able to begin condemning Korsten houses under the Slums Act and moving their inhabitants to the new segregated townships. But the removals never succeeded in emptying Korsten, nor in remedying the "slum" conditions which had nominally motivated the Council. In 1946 the population of Korsten had declined, but there were still 10,225 Africans and 3,614 coloureds resident in the area. Not only had the population of the town vastly expanded during the war, but according to Robinson many of the people who moved to McNamee Village and Schauderville were unable to afford the rents charged and ended up moving back to Korsten or to new squatter settlements even farther from town at Veeplaas, Kleinskool, Missonvale, and Bethelsdorp. In 1951 the African and coloured population in Korsten in fact returned to 1936 levels.

Thus, before World War II, the local government of "the Progressive city" had already embraced full racial segregation in its housing policies, albeit with important differences from the apartheid policies which would be enacted by the National Party government after 1948. The principle of segregation was applied to Municipal housing schemes, and tolerated, if not encouraged in the provision of restrictive covenants, but outside of the Location there was not yet a comprehensive vision of full-scale separation of residential areas. Certainly the scattered islands of racially exclusive housing estates created tricky planning problems in later years when central and local planners sought to create large, unified single race residential zones. But in its early embrace of separation between Africans, coloureds and whites, Port Elizabeth had a well-established tradition of segregation which would ease the Council's accommodation with post-1948 policies.

2. Uitenhage

In contrast with Port Elizabeth, the bulk of Uitenhage's industrial growth and population
increase occurred after World War II. Prior to that time the Council initiated no Municipal housing schemes, nor did it establish a formal African location. Furthermore, coloureds and Africans lived in the same Municipal Locations. In part Uitenhage’s anomalous development stemmed from its small size and its delayed manufacturing growth, both of which limited its fiscal base. Within the Locations a clear policy of laissez-faire characterized official policy regarding black residence. After isolating Africans and coloureds in areas separated from whites, the Municipality paid scant attention to even the minimal levels of investment and administrative attention required by the 'Location Strategy' used in Port Elizabeth.

In the 1920s blacks resided in four proclaimed Locations in Uitenhage: Kabah (the largest), Doornhoek, Gubbs, and Oatlands, situated respectively to the north, west, south, and east of town. [See Map 2] Between 1921 and 1936 the African population more than doubled from 3,187 to 6,588, while the coloured population grew by 42% from 3,052 to 4,334. For the first time in the town's history the 9,437 whites were not a majority of the population. The new black population, however, was not composed of migrants. There was no marked imbalance in gender ratios; in fact throughout the period there were slightly more women than men in the town. The indicators strongly suggest that the black population was not only becoming larger, but also more stabilized and permanently "urban."

Kabah had electric street lamps, central water hydrants, and daily rubbish removal from central points. But conditions were generally deteriorating through the 1930s, and were even worse in the three other Locations which shared none of Kabah's amenities. Depression and drought brought economic contraction, and combined with a steady inflow of people from the countryside contributed to a large increase in unemployment. The Locations expanded to accommodate the increased population, as residents built their own houses, with the more well-off securing Council loans for purchasing building supplies.

Against a background of growing population, unemployment, and uncertain finances, the Municipality sought means to cope with the continued movement to Uitenhage. It asked the government to proclaim influx controls under the Urban Areas Act, though it never applied its more draconian provisions. In 1936 the Council moved to reorganize the locations by demolishing the three smaller Locations and moving the residents to Kabah. Rather than incurring the expense of building a separate coloured residential area, the Municipality intended to separate the groups within the Location. Furthermore, the Council refused to subsidize new housing; instead, the new residents of Kabah would be encouraged to build their own homes with materials purchased from the Municipality on instalment. Both decisions would prove fateful for the future development of Kabah and segregation in Uitenhage. The Location would be out-of-step with evolving national policy regarding the separation of coloureds and Africans, and self-built housing would soon reproduce the slum conditions of the old locations.

The Councillors saw themselves providing a valuable service for African and coloured residents of the three locations. "In fact," wrote the Town Clerk, "the hutholder from Oatlands Location is moving from what is an unhealthy and badly laid out slum to what the Council hopes shortly to make into a model location." It was not to be. High death rates for Africans, especially a staggering rate of infant mortality testified to the grim conditions of life in the "model location."

The problems in Kabah prompted the Municipality's technical staff directly concerned with control over Africans to develop new policies aimed at bringing Uitenhage into line with Location administration elsewhere. In 1943 the Location Superintendent composed a lengthy memorandum examining Kabah's problems, highlighting the continued presence of coloureds (a violation of the Urban Areas Act) whom white officials believed contributed to the illicit liquor trade, and the "highly unsatisfactory" housing, which could only be overcome through provision of separate sub-economic housing schemes for coloureds and Africans. Embracing the principle of segregation, the Superintendent did not mention removal of the Kabah Location itself.

The Superintendent's policy considerations offer some insight into the views of the Municipality's Native Affairs bureaucrats. While he favoured segregation, he reminded the Council that it had resolved in October 1943 to make representations to the Minister for Native Affairs to amend the Urban Areas Act to allow Africans to acquire urban freehold property. As property holders, he reasoned, Africans would develop pride of ownership, and would be encouraged to erect suitable houses for themselves, freeing the Council from housing expenditures. The development of such a class of people would require
higher wages and right of freehold (within segregated areas), and recognition "that the detribalised urban Native is part and parcel of the urban areas...a member of a community separate from, but no less important than, the European urban population." 25

The same themes were echoed two years later in a joint report by the Medical Officer of Health, Acting Town Engineer, and the Location Superintendent. This time, however, their solution entailed the removal of the entire African population: Kabah lacked room for expansion, and it was too close to the white areas, diminishing housing values and blocking further expansion of the [white] town. The report introduced a whole new policy proposal: the Kabah Location itself would have to be demolished and moved to Sandfontein, a municipally-owned farm east of town. 26

The planning schemes of the Municipal technical staff remained on the drawing board for the duration of the Second World War. But their plans were extremely important in building an intellectual and policy framework for segregation in the post-war period, embracing the related ideas of extensive provision of freehold title, sub-economic [subsidized] public housing, separation of coloureds and Africans, and possible removal and resiting of the Location itself.

Towards the end of the war, the Uitenhage Council took two steps to secure the town's position in the post-war period, hiring a consultant to devise a general town plan and making an aggressive effort to attract industrial investment. The Council hired T.B. Floyd as its planning consultant, based on his reputation as one of the foremost participants in the town planning movement of the 1940s. 27

In Uitenhage, in addition to laying down recommendations for industrial, commercial, and residential zoning regulations, Floyd's plan dealt at considerable length with the long-running black housing problem.

Floyd's planning vision was more comprehensive than that of the local officials, and surprisingly conformed very closely to the principles of the future Group Areas Act. "The object of town planning," Floyd told a Uitenhage audience, "was, where possible, to zone a town in such a way that the European, coloured and Native sections of the population were separated by clearly defined natural barriers....Another principle was the elimination of situations which required the Non-European element to traverse the areas set aside for Europeans." 28

The Kabah location failed the test of both "principles": coloureds and Africans were mixed together, the location was separated from white areas by a single street, and it was located on the northern side of town, requiring workers to walk across Uitenhage to reach the heavy industries situated to the south. Floyd's recommendations incorporated many of the themes developed in the wartime reports by the town Council bureaucrats, most importantly, moving the location east to Sandfontein. Africans would be provided with sub-economic housing away from white residential areas and close to the factories where Africans provided unskilled labour. The coloured section of the location would remain in place, and sub-economic housing would be provided for them towards the west, away from the white and present African areas. 29

But his argument for removing Kabah was immediately attacked by various Councillors, and ultimately rejected. Many Councillors recalled the earlier removal of residents from Oatlands, Gubbs and Doornhoek Locations, and the Council's unfulfilled promises to provide a "model location." By an overwhelming vote the Council rejected Floyd's proposals for removing Africans from Kabah, and agreed to remodel Kabah on its present or an adjacent site, with emphasis given to developing a comprehensive sub-economic housing scheme. 30

With the advent of World War II housing construction came to a stop throughout the country, even as thousands of people flooded into the towns for jobs in industries stimulated by the war. Housing problems were a major cause of the urban protest movements of the 1940s, and to cope with the housing crisis the Smuts Government created the National Housing and Planning Commission. 31 Previously Municipalities were unwilling to build housing, as most Africans could not afford rent levels necessary for recouping the debt incurred in construction. Loans from the NHPC, however, came at a reduced rate of interest, and included a formula whereby the central state would assume a large percentage of the losses on a sub-economic scheme. 32

Following NHPC policy the Uitenhage Council solicited funds for creation of sub-economic
housing schemes for Africans, coloureds, and whites, as envisaged in the amended town plan.\textsuperscript{33} A plan for an African sub-economic scheme was approved by the Council in 1947, and early the next year the central Government approved a loan of £99,390 for construction of 320 pairs of semi-detached units in an extension to Kabah. The area would be named McNaughton Village after the Location Superintendent serving during the consolidation of the four locations in the 1930s, and officials looked forward to the eventual expansion of the scheme to include 2,000 semi-detached units (4,000 dwellings), half built by the Municipality and half by the NHPC. In addition, the Council hoped to have a large portion of the town commonage surveyed and set out into residential plots which Africans would be permitted to purchase outright for construction of their own homes.\textsuperscript{34}

Finally, funds would be sought for a sub-economic scheme of 100 units for coloureds in a newly cleared area west of Kabah, to be called Gerald Smith Township, and for a 60 unit sub-economic scheme for whites close to a new industrial area at the south end of town. The Council soon applied for a further sub-economic loan to expand McNaughton Village by 320 more semi-detached pairs. Thus, under the terms of the new NHPC sub-economic schemes, the Council agreed for the first time in its history to provide formal housing for its African population, and to provide racially segregated sub-economic and economic housing for coloureds and whites. It also developed a housing scheme for coloureds at Jubilee Park where plots would be available for purchase. Any removals would be voluntary with the promise of a better dwelling than that left behind in Kabah or the town.

Between the end of the war and the accession to power of the Nationalist government in 1948, the Uitenhage Town Council had approved a vision of development which rejected forced removals and aimed instead at stabilization of the African population in Kabah and a slow, voluntary segregation between Africans and coloureds. With the provision of central government funds through the NHPC the Municipality hoped to achieve what the earlier location reorganization had failed to accomplish: the establishment of serviced, hygienic, and above all low-cost housing for Location residents in compliance with the segregation provisions of the Urban Areas Act. Aside from receiving approval for their project and technical advice from the NHPC and the provincial townships board, the Council planned the future of the Location virtually without participation by representatives of the central state.

Rather than developing a long-term plan, the Council decided to look into the immediate problems of Kabah, hoping that "by the time we have dealt with the more urgent problems of Kabah, the land ownership question should be much clarified."\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, after the election of 1948 the land ownership question would be solved, but in a manner not much to the Council's liking. But even as the Council dedicated itself to a plan to carry the town into the 1950s, its own industrial program was generating conditions which would foil all its efforts at control.

Between 1945 and 1946 the Council's industrial drive yielded dramatic results, transforming the political economy of the town forever.\textsuperscript{36} The former key industries, woolwashing and the railway workshops, were now overshadowed by two representatives of the newly expanding automobile industry. The town's fortunes, linked to the Cape Midlands hinterland and to external markets since the widespread development of wool production in the 19th century, were now tied firmly to the premier twentieth century international growth industry.

The immediate effect of the boom was to provide employment. For the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan area total black industrial employment increased from 36% of the industrial workforce in 1935/36 to 56% in 1949/50. In absolute terms, the black industrial workforce increased from 4,288 in 1935/36 to 17,215 in 1949/50, an increase of over 300%.\textsuperscript{37} Though no figures are available for Uitenhage alone, an estimate of the town's black industrial workforce in 1949/50 would be approximately 2,500. The industrial workforce thus grew at a much faster rate than the African population as a whole, which increased from 6,588 in 1936 to 16,942 in 1951, or by more than 150%, with the fastest growth coming in the five years after the war when the new factories came on line.\textsuperscript{38} While the population of Kabah swelled, the number of Africans outside the Location doubled from 1,177 in 1947 to 2,127 in 1951, as families crowded into lodgings in the western end of town.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite the introduction of limited influx controls in 1933, the African population had become the single largest group in the town. But the African population growth was part of a general migration to the town, which included a sharp increase in the coloured and white population as well. As was the
case in the 1930s, the increase in population was not a function of formal migrancy; indeed, the evidence suggests that whole families were moving to Uitenhage, or that families would soon join a husband who had found work in town.40

The pressing task for the Municipality was the straightforward issue of building enough houses and overcoming the squalid conditions in the Location. But as early as 1947, as the contours of Fagan-inspired policy were becoming clear, the Departmental Executive Committee cast serious doubts on the likelihood of the policy ever succeeding. "The number of applications from employers to the Location Superintendent asking for plots to be allocated to Native employees grows daily more formidable."41 Unemployment had virtually been eliminated, and employers complained about the limited availability of labour in Kabah and pressed the Municipality to allow them to bring in more Africans from outside. Indeed, a Council committee recommended the repeal of the limited influx control measures enacted in the 1930s.

Industrialization brought about what the Municipality had long sought to avoid: a sharp and uncontrolled increase in the black population. By 1948 the Council had to act quickly to implement the now modest looking project agreed upon two years before, when it optimistically hoped to demolish sub-standard dwellings and relocate African and coloured occupants to separate Municipal schemes. In the months before the National Party electoral victory, the Council lacked a viable long-term plan for accommodating its burgeoning population, resources to build houses, and the power to regulate the town's population growth. A Departmental Committee of Enquiry into the administration of Kabah argued that such processes were natural, "and without turning a location into a concentration camp, it seems impossible to prevent it."42 It was the intention of the National Party - in spirit at least - to do just that.

III. 1948 AND BEYOND: THE CENTRAL STATE, LOCAL COUNCILS, AND POPULAR RESISTANCE TO APARTHEID

The United Party Councillors in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth entered the 1948 elections hopeful that the national housing question would soon be solved along lines amenable to their local policies: that the Fagan recommendations would be given statutory force upon the re-election of the UP Government. But the 1948 election changed the political calculus almost completely, as the National Party's narrow electoral victory cleared the way for enactment of apartheid legislation. Locally, HNP members were elected to Parliament and to the Councils, which remained, however, in UP hands. The shift was a small, but nonetheless significant watershed. For the first time since Union in 1910, the Uitenhage district did not elect a UP/South African Party member to Parliament.

A. THE GROUP AREAS ACT

The NP campaigned on an electoral platform advocating a fundamental departure in urban policy, especially regarding the reproduction of African labour power. According to Hindson, the short term policies expressed in the UP's Fagan Report and the NP's Sauer Report had much in common, but their "long term trajectories were radically different." Where Fagan accepted the inevitability of African urbanization, seeking to channel influx through "restrained" transitional segregationist measures, Sauer "wished to reverse African urbanisation and to build up reserve economies so that they could support the entire African population."43 In response to the urban crisis of the late 1940s, the Sauer Report advocated a compulsory national system of labour regulation and labour control.44

The new legal framework which the NP rushed to create in its first years in office gave statutory force to many of the recommendations of the Sauer report.45 These laws, jointly linked, aimed at regulating and limiting the movement of Africans to the cities, encouraging long-term shrinkage of African presence in the urban areas, and strengthening social and political segregation between all race groups. Amendments to existing legislation tightened influx control by linking it to controls over employment. African labour contracts would be registered, employers would be forced to pay a Native Services Levy into the local Native Revenue Account, and a reorganized labour bureau would be established as the institutional means for limiting movement from rural areas and distributing labour between the various sectors of the economy."46
Urban policies after 1948 were not merely a function of the political struggles over migratory labour, however. Municipalities and the central state developed initiatives to reorder, redistribute, and control urban populations as a whole, whether migratory or settled, African or "non-African". Rather than viewing the pass laws and the Urban Areas Act in isolation as a response to the problems of migrant labour, it is important to see how they intersect with other central state policies, especially with the Group Areas Act [GAA].

In repealing a contradictory patchwork of provincial legislation, the Group Areas Act sought a comprehensive system of segregation which would affect all race "groups," including whites, by imposing control throughout South Africa over inter-racial property transactions and inter-racial changes of occupation. The law depended on the prior identification of every citizen in terms of the Population Registration Act, and the placement of all individuals within designated racial groups. These groups would be assigned to a specific, racially homogeneous physical space: the group area. It specified a series of stages through which control would be progressively tightened leading to the ultimate declaration of full group areas, racially pure in terms of both ownership and occupation. The Land Tenure Advisory Board [LTAB], a legislative holdover from an earlier effort to control Indians, later reconstituted as the Group Areas Board, was given extremely broad powers under amendments to the Act to inquire into proposed group areas and to recommend proposals for proclamation by the Minister.

The impact of the Act was profound: it not only gave the state dramatic new powers to remake the full physical field of urban life, but it universalised the systematic mechanisms of separation which were formerly wielded only against Africans. The "pure" segregated residential areas were to be separated by great distances and wide "buffer strips." Finally, the Act posed a major threat to the stability of the Indian and coloured petite-bourgeoisie, by limiting their access to trading stands or factory sites in central cities.

For local Councillors convinced of the efficacy of gradual and voluntary segregation and an integrated commercial sphere, the implications of the Act were profound. But the full power of the Act cannot be grasped when it is viewed in isolation: its awesome powers operated (admittedly unevenly and sometimes contradictorily) in the evolving thicket of apartheid legislation. In combination the GAA and the Urban Areas Act created enormous new state powers. If the latter Act carried the authority for segregating and controlling the movement of Africans, the former defined how the segregated areas were to be cited vis-a-vis all other racially defined sections.

B. THE POLITICS OF NON-COMPLIANCE IN UITENHAGE

Kabah - where it was planned at all - developed according to a vision quite at odds with the newly-evolving apartheid framework. In 1951 the 4,200 coloured residents of Kabah made up nearly a quarter of the Location population, and accounted for more than 60% of the coloured population of Uitenhage. The remainder of the coloured residents lived in the town itself, interspersed with poor whites and Africans in the older western sections. On its eastern side the Location was separated from the white sections of town by a single street, while another road on its south-western side divided Kabah from the proposed coloured sub-economic scheme which the Council had been shepherding through the national bureaucracy since 1947.

Not only were coloureds and Africans living in close proximity in Kabah, not only were coloureds and Africans living in the town itself, but the Location was too close to the white sections of town and too close to the proposed coloured sub-economic scheme. Coloureds would have to be removed from Kabah to satisfy the requirements of the Urban Areas Act, and they would have to be moved a suitable distance away from Kabah and from the soon-to-be-declared "white" town to satisfy the buffer zone requirements of the GAA; furthermore, the Kabah Location itself would have to be moved. The wide gap between the legal ideal of racially pure areas and the incompatible conditions on the ground defined the terrain of the local political struggle over national urban policies.

How would the systematic policies be brought to bear on a seemingly intractable situation on the ground? The policy changes after 1948 were not meant to be instantly implemented. Hendrik Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, accepted that no one would consider "stopping the development of South
As Posel makes clear, in distinguishing between "purist" and "practical" interpretations of policy, there were limits on the purist approach, the extent of which would be established through real political struggle. Since local governments were the primary apparatus of the state for intervening in the labour market, such bodies became a major site of conflict.

As a first step toward achieving its national goals, the Government enacted subtle, but extremely important changes in its legal relationship with local authorities. Under 1945 amendments to the Urban Areas Act the Minister was empowered to proclaim controls on African entry into an urban area "if requested to do so by a resolution...of any urban local authority...." Some municipalities, such as Port Elizabeth, had opted out of the system, and remained "open cities" where Africans were not subject to the pass laws. Uitenhage's limited influx control measure from 1933 was never seriously enforced, and the Council looked forward to its repeal.

The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 reversed the scope of application of influx control: rather than being applied only where local authorities had requested it, influx control was automatically instituted throughout the Union. Under the new law the local authority was limited to asking for an exemption from influx control, and even then, the Government could refuse. The same Act provided for a compulsory national labour bureau system for all urban and rural areas, repealing a 1949 provision for voluntary establishment of labour bureaux. Local authorities were stripped of an extremely important statutory power, while influx control was legally, though not yet in practice, extended from a piece-meal program to a national system.

As a second step, the central government shuffled the bureaucracies responsible for specific urban policies. The impact of the shifts quickly became apparent to local officials. In late 1951 S.B. Featherstone, the Uitenhage Town Clerk, received notification from the Secretary for Native Affairs in Pretoria that funding for the Municipality's proposed coloured sub-economic housing scheme would be delayed due to its "close proximity to the proclaimed Native location." The coloured housing scheme, laid out under the housing policies of the previous Government, was cited outside the African area, in compliance with the Urban Areas Act (1945), but was just across the road from the Location, in violation of the new GAA.

Featherstone was incredulous. The Department and the Municipality both sought separation of Africans and coloureds in Kabah, "And yet you tell us summarily that the proposed site for a Coloured Housing Scheme is no good because it is too near the Native Location. Under existing conditions coloureds and Natives live together in the Location. Surely it is better to develop a separate area for coloureds alongside the Location even if it is near the Location."

The Town Clerk's anger was heightened because the Council had expected rapid approval of its proposal. It had already purchased materials and hired labour, and delays increased expenditure for storing supplies and retaining workers. More importantly, the Municipality had received a formal circular a mere four days before receipt of the Secretary's letter announcing that the Native Affairs Department now had authority to review Housing Commission plans and possessed veto power over the choice of sites for housing schemes. Previously such power was vested only in the National Housing and Planning Commission. The day before the Secretary's letter was written the Town Clerk had received an undertaking from the Technical Adviser to the National Housing Commission that he would personally discuss the matter of the coloured housing scheme with the Native Affairs Department. The adviser was Adolph Schauder, architect of Port Elizabeth's "liberal" Location Strategy and a prominent figure in the UP; yet he was not informed of the content of the Native Affairs Secretary's letter. The Municipality confronted a new and bewildering rearrangement of bureaucratic forces, linked into power networks to which the UP Councillors enjoyed little or no access. In January 1952 the Council reached agreement with the Commissioner for Coloured Affairs and with the Native Affairs Department on the provision of a buffer strip between the proposed coloured scheme and the Location. Over 2,000 people would have to be removed and 300 houses demolished to make way for the buffer strip, which the Town Clerk derided as "the task which the Government Departments concerned have imposed upon the Council in return for the right to build a Coloured Housing Scheme...."

If the fight over buffer strips was the preliminary bout, application of the GAA was the main event. The Council's role in the application of the Act was essential and the Land Tenure Advisory
Board began wooing it in 1951. The LTAB lacked detailed information about the town, and the Council’s participation would legitimate the group areas project in the eyes of many local constituencies who were suspicious of the policy.

As a first step the Council accepted the task of conducting a survey of the town to establish the precise racial character of ownership and occupation. "This is...the only thing which we as the local authority should do at this stage," Featherstone, the Town Clerk reported to the Finance and General Purposes Committee. He hoped that conducting the survey would satisfy the central state that the Municipality was cooperating while buying time for the Council. "I do not think we should allow ourselves to be rushed into action," he wrote, "My attitude is not an apathetic one but I am not keen that we should be the first in the Cape to invoke the machinery of the Act and make what might prove costly blunders due to ignorance of all the implications."

On 17 October 1951 the entire Cape Province was declared a "specified area" in terms of the Group Areas Act, essentially freezing existing conditions. The proclamation was a central state initiative further depriving local authorities of discretion in responding to the GAA. For the next year the Municipality refused to take the initiative in a series of minor dealings with the LTAB. Then in August 1953, the Secretary of the LTAB in Cape Town asked the Council whether it had reconsidered its position on the next stage of implementation, declaration of "defined" areas. In defined areas the level of control over "interpenetration" would be increased: unoccupied property could not be built upon nor existing buildings extended without ministerial approval.

The step was a particularly dangerous one for the Council to take. "Specified" areas, the freeze on inter-racial changes of ownership and occupation, had been established from above by the central government in a province-wide proclamation in which the Council had no part. But because Municipal officials possessed the most accurate understanding of conditions on the ground, the Government expected them to play a major role in "defining" individual properties owned or occupied by individuals of one race in an area to be reserved for another. By participating in efforts to define areas, the Council itself would directly harm vested interests in the town, especially black businesses in white areas. At the end of August the Council’s Finance and General Purposes Committee decided to accept the LTAB’s request and directed the Town Clerk to report to the Committee any cases of "possible penetration."

But a curious lobbying effort began at the next full Council meeting where the members were to vote on the Finance and General Purposes Committee recommendation. During the meeting, the Council received an urgent letter from the Uitenhage Indian Congress, asking the Council to refrain from making any decision on the question to allow them time to study the Committee’s proposals. Application of the Act, the letter warned, would "have grievous detrimental and widely devastating effects on...properties and the very existence and destiny of the future of the Indian community." Three of the four authors were shopowners, and the Vice Chairman, D.R. Lalla, owned four properties. Their request was accepted, and the matter was referred back to Committee.

At its next meeting the Committee received the deputation from the Uitenhage Indian Congress, including the four shopowners. The group stressed "the cordial relations which have always existed between the Indian community and other sections of the community in Uitenhage," and said that the Indians living or trading in town had been present there for more than fifty years, a presence which they did not regard as "penetration." The group asked that since the Act placed sole authority for racial zoning in the hands of the LTAB, which would eventually make its own representations to the Minister, "the Council should wait until this happens and not take the initiative...." After considering the deputation’s arguments, the Committee decided that the Council should defer the matter indefinitely, "to remove any suspicion on the part of the non-European sections of the community that the Council is acting against their interests...." The next week the Committee’s new recommendation was carried by the full Council.

The Council learned the Government’s response within two weeks of the decision. The Finance and General Purposes Committee received notification from the National Housing and Planning Commission that the NHPC and LTAB had decided not to consider any applications for housing funds whatsoever until the LTAB had granted approval for the planning of group areas. Whether or not the LTAB meant what it said, the local officials who had just refused to cooperate with group areas
legislation were on notice that in the future they would have to seek approval for all housing plans from the very authorities they had just snubbed, and Uitenhage had numerous housing requests pending before the NHPC.

The LTAB approached the Council again in June, 1954, but in two years of debate Councillors could not decide whether "to take the initiative to see that people were treated in the most humane way possible" or to refuse to participate in applying a law likely to cause the "economic strangulation of the Chinese and Indian traders...." In support of the latter position, Councillor Gerald Smith "objected to the very principle of the Act and...did not think the Council should take the lead...[A]s responsibility for the Act and its administration rested solely with the Government it should be left to them to apply it...." When neither the full Council nor a special subcommittee could break the deadlock members essentially threw up their hands. In March 1956 the Council decided to "leave the problem to be handled by the LTAB." The position became the official policy of the Council for the next six years.

At the meeting in October 1953, when the Council originally rejected cooperation following the protest by the Uitenhage Indian Congress, the leading NP member, Councillor Frans Conradie, reminded the members that Indians were but 1% of the town's population. Speaking in Afrikaans, he "could not understand why the Committee had so quickly turned around as a result of formal objection against the move which had been put forward by the Indian community." Indeed, why did the Council reverse itself after meeting a single Indian organization?

The Act would surely cause hardships, and the Councillors knew that they would fall most heavily on a small but important group: Indian, Chinese, and coloured businessmen and property owners. The question of removing coloureds from Kabah was no longer a policy issue: from the 1940s the body had accepted that goal. Councillors rationalized residential segregation on the grounds that hardships inflicted on blacks by removal were minimized because families received better houses in the new schemes than those they left behind in Kabah.

But the Group Areas Act's limits on ownership and occupancy threatened to deal a mortal blow to the economic well-being of those owning businesses in town. A 1959 Municipal survey identified 34 Chinese and 29 Indians as property owners in the town, holding at least 100 properties with a taxable value of more than £200,000. A 1955 survey identified more than 340 black-owned dwellings and nearly 80 shops. Furthermore, as a result of the historical patterns of development on the western end of town whites owned at least 107 dwellings and 18 shops in likely coloured, Indian, Chinese, or Malay Group Areas, and would suffer hardships under the Act. Thus the holdings of a number of individuals - black and white - were rendered insecure. To expropriate all or part of these properties the Council would lose part of its tax base, be forced to pay compensation, and face the prospect of lengthy and costly litigation.

Indian, Chinese, and coloured businessmen were not only property owners, but voters, as well. Though in 1956 the NP succeeded in its protracted constitutional battle to remove coloureds from the parliamentary voters' roll, they did not fully disenfranchise them: coloureds and Indians in the Cape remained eligible to vote in local elections into the 1970s. A 1959 survey of "non-white" voters listed 950 "coloureds," amounting to 19% of the registered electorate. In a town where the Afrikaner electorate was increasing, and voted almost exclusively for the NP, a UP Councillor needed all the non-Afrikaner votes he could muster, and would be ill-advised to be seen threatening Indian, coloured, or Chinese interests. If the Uitenhage Indian Congress and other bodies had special access to the Council, it was indeed, as Councillor Conradi emphasized, not because of their numbers, but because of their economic influence and political weight.

C. APARTHEID IN PE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMPLIANCE

1. The Urban Areas Act: Defiance, Riots, and the End of the Liberal "Experiment"

Port Elizabeth, like Uitenhage, emerged from World War II with a severe housing crisis. The town's population had grown almost as rapidly as Uitenhage's and for the same reasons: economic expansion during and immediately after the war, and from drought in the hinterland. The population expansion, and the near absence of Municipal construction had contributed to a housing problem far
worse than that which prompted the program of removals and segregated housing schemes of the late 1930s. Indeed, the efforts to remove Africans from Korsten in 1937 had temporarily reduced the number of people living there, but only slightly, and Africans continued to constitute the overwhelming majority of the population. By 1951 there were actually more Africans resident in Korsten than before the removals. The City Council reaffirmed its pre-war Location strategy, and refused to comply with the new national influx control legislation. Yet, as Robinson shows, these policies were increasingly out of step with post-war reality.77

Most importantly, the City Council faced a new threat from below: the increasingly organized African working class in Port Elizabeth, led by a resurgent African National Congress and Communist Party. Economic downturn in the late 1940s exacerbated the problems of social reproduction, especially as the motor industry was hit by restrictions on CKD material imposed to redress the national balance of payments crisis. The deteriorating social conditions, and especially the apartheid proposals of the National Party Government generated a resurgence of black political protest, which was as strong in Port Elizabeth as in any other area of the country.

A renewed ANC with local leadership drawn from the ranks of working class residents protested proposed rent increases in 1945 and 1947, and in 1949 staged a militant four-month boycott of a steep rise in bus fares by South African Railways and Harbours.78 The Eastern Cape, and especially Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, were also the centres registering the strongest response to the ANC’s 1952 Defiance Campaign.79 The growing political mobilization around the campaign, and the intensification of both the central and local state’s police response led in October to a violent riot. At the New Brighton train station a Railway policeman shot a man whom he suspected of stealing a tin of paint. The angry crowd which gathered at the scene killed a passing truck driver, and moved on to destroy white-owned properties in the township, killing 3 more whites in the process, while the police killed seven Africans.80

The National Party disingenuously laid responsibility for the riots at the door of the Port Elizabeth City Council and its “liberal” policies. The importance the government attached to its attack on the Council is shown by the prominence of its chief spokesman: none other than Hendrik Verwoerd, apartheid’s architect as Minister of Native Affairs, who would later serve as Prime Minister during the most brutal period of NP rule. The riots provided Verwoerd with a convenient opportunity to discredit resistance to his Native Affairs policies in the run-up to the 1953 elections, in which the NP was in no sense assured of success.81 Four days after the riot he travelled to Port Elizabeth for talks with NAD and SAP officials, pointedly snubbing the Mayor and City Council by sending a departmental official to convey his views. That night, in a public speech at an NP rally, Verwoerd pronounced the liberal “experiment” a failure, and threatened to impose influx control himself if the Council failed to act.82

In the aftermath of the riot Port Elizabeth came to resemble a military zone, with Permanent Force armoured convoys carrying out “routine training exercises” on the city streets.83 Armed police were placed on every bus travelling to New Brighton, more armed policemen were on duty at the bus terminus, and the vehicles stayed out of the township, letting off passengers half a mile away. The ANC called for a transport boycott until the police were removed, and the following day the boycott was virtually total. Four days later the SAR&H System Manager met ANC leaders, the police were removed, and the action called off. But that very same day the City Council made decisions which would give the ANC far greater cause for concern.84

On 28 October, ten days after the riot, the City Council voted by an overwhelming majority to request the Minister of Justice to enforce the Riotous Assemblies Act banning all open-air meetings by Africans in the city and to request the Minister of Native Affairs to impose a curfew.85 Ten days later the powers were granted by the Minister of Justice, who also banned 52 African leaders in the Eastern Cape under the Suppression of Communism Act, and invoked War Emergency Regulations giving the police power of summary arrest. The emergency restrictions applied not only in Port Elizabeth, but in Uitenhage, Peddie, King William’s Town, and East London, all of which were important centres during the Defiance Campaign.

As Robinson points out, in the face of pressure from the central government and its local supporters - including a growing proportion of PE voters - liberal Councillors could retain belief in the
benevolence of their policies by laying responsibility for the rising tide of protest on agitators rather than on the material conditions Council policies had themselves spawned. At the October 28th Council meeting Urban Areas Commissioner Brand’s presentation of the pass laws strongly emphasised their utility in weeding out undesirables, an act of salesmanship keenly attuned to the Councillors’ own self-justifying perspective.⁸⁶

By its actions the City Council may have hoped to preempt the central state from imposing an even more draconian response, but the moves only heightened the crisis. In response to the ban and curfew, the ANC Eastern Cape Regional Committee called for a stay-at-home on November 10, “to continue until God Almighty has changed the hearts of the City Councillors.” In the days before the stay-at-home police reinforcements rushed to Port Elizabeth, while the Council, local employers and senior representatives of the SAP and Ministries of Native Affairs and Labour hammered out common strategies. The City Council and Government departments threatened to dismiss any employees taking part in the action, though local industries adopted a more lenient approach of “no work, no pay,” perhaps as a result of experience gained from months of strikes sparked by dismissals of workers arrested in the Defiance Campaign. Before the stay-at-home, the local Executive Committee of the ANC negotiated with the Mayor, and agreed to limit the strike to one day in return for the Mayor’s promise to reduce the curfew to three months and the ban on meetings to one month.

The protest, like the bus boycotts and the Defiance Campaign before it, was a total success in both Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage as nearly all African workers stayed away from work. Retribution was swift, however, as approximately 5,000 Africans were fired, with the harshest responses coming from Government departments.⁸⁷

The central government blamed the stayaway on the Council’s “liberal” policies, and in its aftermath made renewed calls to apply influx control. As noted above, the amended influx control legislation removed local discretion in its application, and through a Parliamentary proclamation made the laws automatically applicable in all towns with more than 20,000 African residents, including Port Elizabeth. Though the Council had requested an exemption from the legislation, Verwoerd rejected their appeal. Instead he accused the Council of “dereliction of duty” in failing to carry out obligations under the law, such as inaugurating a labour bureau and registering African service contracts.⁸⁸

Central ministries in Pretoria were closely monitoring events in Port Elizabeth, and applying pressure to force compliance with their aims. When Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs heard press reports about the Mayor’s promise to the ANC to rescind the curfew and ban, he rebuked the Town Clerk for the Council’s ignorance of the emergency laws they had themselves invoked, which could only be altered by the national Government. After informing the Town Clerk that Verwoerd would not recommend withdrawing the restrictions, “even when the position has returned to normal,” [emphasis added] Eiselen warned the Council “not [to] compromise itself or the Honourable the Minister by making any promises which may not accord with the desires of the Minister.”⁹⁰ Once mounted on the tiger of political repression, the Council found it very difficult to avoid ending up inside.

On 15 January 1953 the Council agreed to implement the influx control provisions of Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act and authorized establishment of a local labour bureau.⁹¹ Clinging to its legacy of liberalism while caught between a militant black resistance movement and an increasingly interventionist central state, the Council justified its capitulation on grounds that it would administer the restrictions more fairly. It asserted that the laws would allow greater control over the “tsotsi [gangster] element,” and increased protection for “bona-fide” Africans against those from outside flooding the job market. The draconian provisions of the Urban Areas Act would therefore be administered in the best interests of Port Elizabeth’s Africans!

2. Group Areas

In contrast to the intense political fight over the Urban Areas Act, the Council had far fewer qualms about compliance with the GAA. Despite the Council’s preoccupation with the local emergency and influx control, city agencies had been busy for over a year conducting the initial research for planning group areas. Rather than rebelling against the GAA, as had the Uitenhage Town Council, a majority of the Port Elizabeth Council saw the legislation as a logical extension of a long-standing Municipal
segregation policy.

In mid-1952 a Joint Town Planning Committee was established, consisting of representatives of the Port Elizabeth and its adjacent Walmer Municipality, the Port Elizabeth Divisional Council (governing the unincorporated area of the Port Elizabeth magisterial district), and representatives of central state ministries. The Joint Committee developed the first proposals for Group Areas with a view to coordinated planning for the entire metropolitan area.⁹²

In December 1952 the Committee forwarded its proposals to the Land Tenure Advisory Board. As a result of years of local segregation - especially in the proliferation of racially restrictive covenants in new housing developments - the Committee felt that many areas in the city could be declared group areas immediately. There were a number of "problem" areas, however. Though coloureds had been segregated in Municipal housing schemes, these were scattered like islands throughout mostly white residential areas, so there was no single zone of coloured residence in the city.

To accommodate these areas, the Council deviated from the principles embodied in the Act and pursued by the LTAB, which sought to create wide zones of single-race residence with sufficient land for expansion, and separated by broad buffer strips.⁹³ By contrast, the Council's initial proposals minimized the disruption and tremendous expense which would ensue from moving people from the many scattered areas and rehousing them in a single zone.

First, its definition of "coloured" included Malay, Chinese, and Indian people, though the Population Registration Act defined these as separate groups, and the GAA stipulated that each "group" be accommodated in a separate area. Furthermore, it declared Group Areas wherever large concentrations of coloureds were already living, whereas the Act demanded that they be relocated to a single, large group area. The plan established "free areas" in zones where large numbers of coloured and Indian businessmen already owned shops. Finally, in an effort to soften the blows on present citizens, the proposals envisioned segregation as an extremely long-term process, and granted families 60 years to move if they lived in an area specified for a different group.

Ultimately the LTAB (renamed the Group Areas Board in 1955) overrode all these deviations, and in 1960 submitted its recommendations to the Minister of the Interior. The scattered islands of coloured residence, including South End, Fairview, Lea Place, Stuart Township, and the pockets in North End and Korsten were declared part of the white group area, though evictions were to be deferred for the time being. Proposals for free areas for coloured and Indian traders were rejected, and all were to be moved to the border of the coloured group area. With minor exceptions the recommendations of the Group Areas Board served as the basis for the final group areas proclamation in Port Elizabeth on 30 May 1961, eight years after the first proposals were submitted to the LTAB. Notwithstanding the local officials' rationalizations that cooperation with the government would permit a fairer application of the Act, their proposals were uniformly rejected in favour of a pure vision of segregation dictated from above. [See Map 3]

The rather abstract process of planning did little to change the immediate conditions. Despite differences between the Council and central government over the disposition of areas like South End, both bodies agreed that Africans resident in the town must be removed to New Brighton, and that coloureds be removed from Korsten to the existing coloured schemes in Schauderville. Actual removal and - more important - funds for building alternative accommodation in the officially "preferred" residential area were far more intractable problems.

3. Forced Removals

The Urban Areas Act and Group Areas Act gave the Municipality interlocking legal authority and powerful new state institutions to remake Port Elizabeth on the Procrustean bed of apartheid social engineering. To conform with the new vision of racial planning, the local and central state would have to destroy the residential checkerboard which had resulted from generations of piecemeal official and private segregation. People living or owning property in areas defined for other "groups" were to be moved to the "proper" area, where alternative accommodation would have to be provided to prevent further squatting. Korsten and nearby Dassiekraal were the state's first targets in its effort to transform
Port Elizabeth into an apartheid city.

Unlike the removals and housing schemes of the late 1930s, these policies were meant to bring wholesale changes in residential and commercial ownership and occupancy, permanently altering the urban map. The earlier removals from Korsten had been hampered by the slow provision of housing in McNamee Village, and by the limited authority to evict Africans under the Slums Act. By contrast, the second action against Korsten was bolstered by the provisions of the amended UAA, making it an offense for Africans to live outside of a formal location. Not only could Africans be moved en masse, but the enhanced repressive arsenal provided by new pass laws and labour bureaux could prevent them from returning, and passes could be used to differentiate between "illegal" Africans and legitimate coloured residents. Furthermore, the Government's acceptance of "Site and Service" housing in the Kwazakhele extension to New Brighton enabled it to move people at a rate unencumbered by the slow pace of house construction. Finally, Africans owning property in Korsten would ultimately be expropriated, not under the UAA, but under the provisions of the GAA, which prevented ownership by persons outside of their prescribed group area.

The Korsten removals began in April 1956, and by the end of 1957 more than 28,817 people had been moved to Kwazakhele. Little resistance was offered, despite the strength of ANC organization in Port Elizabeth. By 1960 there were slightly less than 2,200 Africans living in Korsten.

As Taylor points out, the Korsten removals signified "the conclusive containment and control of the majority of the identified working class...." In 1951 31% of Africans in Port Elizabeth lived in the "wrong" area, outside designated Locations. By 1960 the figure was reduced to 16%, and by 1985 to 4%. The greatest increase in segregation of Africans in Port Elizabeth during the twentieth century occurred over the period of the second Korsten removals, so that by 1960 segregation between coloureds and Africans was almost as thorough as between whites and Africans. Despite the massive population growth for both coloureds and Africans over the period, the removals policy succeeded in "canalising" such growth into racially segregated areas defined and controlled by the state.

The state's preoccupation with removing Africans to Kwazakhele had postponed any attempts to address the backlog of housing for coloureds. The natural increase of the population was enough to cause considerable overcrowding in Schauderville, Dower, and other coloured housing schemes. These housing projects were inadequate to start with, but the huge migration of coloureds to Port Elizabeth during the 1950s came at a time when very few houses - and no sub-economic schemes - were built by the Municipality for coloureds. The proclamation of group areas in 1961 added immensely to the problem, as coloureds living in South End, North End and other parts of the city would have to be rehoused in the new coloured group area stretching north from Schauderville.

These removals occurred throughout the 1960s, and though the bulk of the coloured population had been relocated by 1970, some smaller areas were cleared only in 1984. The pace of removals was slowed by a number of financial and political problems. The central government's unwillingness to fund sub-economic housing schemes created immense stumbling blocks to the removals mandated by the GAA, while the Municipality was unwilling to subsidize the losses which would inevitably result from placing poor coloureds in economic housing where they couldn't afford the rent.

The removals were startling simply in terms of the magnitude of people moved: in 1985 290 people lived in Fairview, compared to some 10,400 in 1970. Of 6,556 coloured residents of South End in 1960, only nine remained twenty years later. By 1980 only 586 coloureds lived in North End where 1,695 had lived in 1960, and virtually of these people were gone within three years.

In the space of two decades the NP's apartheid policies reversed community patterns which had developed over 150 years in North End and South End. In the case of South End the term "erased" is literally appropriate: save for two mosques, the original buildings were razed; even the rectangular street grid was destroyed and a new curvilinear pattern superimposed on the old. The demolitions resulted in the devastation of vast tracts of the city to make way for racially acceptable "redevelopment," which arrived decades later. In the interim, areas subjected to group areas clearances stood empty and forlorn, mute monuments to apartheid. These systematic acts of destruction were aimed not simply at uprooting groups of people, but at destroying all vestiges of entire communities. These outlying coloured areas
were far from the centre of the city, often far from work, and were not only cut off from the African townships and white areas, but were differentiated by class and were also isolated from each other.\textsuperscript{101}

In remaking the residential map of Port Elizabeth, the removals orchestrated under the amended Urban Areas and Group Areas Acts also transformed social relationships within and between legally defined "groups." Coloureds and Africans were effectively physically separated in the Port Elizabeth municipal area by the late 1950s, while coloureds were gradually removed from white areas by the early 1970s. In spite of the tremendous surge in population after 1951, when the coloured and African population more than doubled, by 1970 these increases were almost entirely accommodated within the exclusively defined boundaries of segregated group areas and African townships.

D. UITENHAGE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE

1. Passes and Protest: Policies Towards Africans

At the same time that Port Elizabeth Councillors were collaborating closely with the LTAB in the further segregation of the city, the Uitenhage Town Council dug in its heels at every stage of the process. Of course Port Elizabeth was a more prominent target than the smaller city, and came under intense pressure from the central state to conform. The NP government was especially aggressive after the 1952 riots launched Port Elizabeth's local debate into the mainstream of national political struggles over Verwoerd's policies towards Africans. Such concerted pressure was not applied in Uitenhage until the late 1950s and early 1960s, a full decade after the Port Elizabeth Council agreed to cooperate. The delay is a crucial factor in accounting for differences in segregation between the towns. Where Africans were generally removed to distant New Brighton by 1957, the old Kabah Location remained intact well into the 1970s. Even more important, where segregation between Africans and coloureds in Port Elizabeth - well advanced before 1948 as a result of local processes - was virtually completed by the late 1950s, in Uitenhage such processes were just beginning by the late-1950s, and reached their peak only in the mid-1970s.

The UP majority on the Uitenhage Town Council was extremely sympathetic to the plight of Indian and coloured property owners under the GAA, and sought to exert local discretion where possible, but their attitude towards African residents of the town was considerably different. Much of the discretion in policy towards Africans had been removed from local authorities and transferred to the central state bureaucracy by the NP's amendments to the UAA. The Uitenhage body followed it's neighbour's traditional approach to African affairs, believing the influx of Africans could be successfully controlled by means other than the strict pass control regulations of Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act. In January 1951 the Native Affairs Committee, chaired by the liberal Councillor E.S. Rens, had resolved not to apply those elements of Government's labour control where local authorities were still allowed a measure of discretion.\textsuperscript{102}

It was still necessary, for example, in terms of the Native Laws Amendment Act for the Minister to consult with the local authority regarding establishment of labour bureaux. At first the Council agreed to study the question. But it was not until mid-1953, after Port Elizabeth established a bureau, that the Council agreed in principle to the creation of one in Uitenhage. But before the Council could act definitively, and without consultation, Government Notice no. 2004 of 1953 declared Uitenhage a "prescribed area" under the Urban Areas Act, unilaterally establishing a Native Labour Bureau.\textsuperscript{103}

Nor was it mandatory for Uitenhage to apply the Native Services Levy Act, as the original law [Act no. 64 of 1952, section 2] applied automatically only to towns with more than 20,000 African inhabitants.\textsuperscript{104} The Council did not desire proclamation of the Act in the town, as local industry was extremely hostile to its provisions.\textsuperscript{105} At the end of 1957 the Municipality was again discussing application of the Act to Uitenhage, and while the Mayor expected the law would be applied "sooner or later," the Council applied to be exempted from the levy.\textsuperscript{106} Opposition to these measures was never couched in terms of the infringement of rights of Africans. Rather the primary considerations of the Council were the costs associated with the projects, burdens imposed on business, and doubts about the effectiveness of the controls themselves.

Soon the Native Affairs Department would take a hard line on the Native Services Levy, but
only as a power play within a much more important fight: the removal of Kabah. The question of the Location's future had been a non-issue since the Council's 1945-46 commitment to upgrading Kabah. In a September 1955 meeting with the LTAB to discuss group areas planning, Council representatives very briefly referred to the Location, but all agreed that "at this stage it would be an uneconomic and impractical proposition to try and move the Location."107

But in July 1957, Brownlee, Chief Native Commissioner for the Eastern Cape, bluntly informed the Council that under new Native Affairs Department policy no housing loans would be granted to a local authority whose Location did not conform to buffer strip requirements. A 500 yard buffer strip would be required between Kabah and the white suburbs and between the Location and the new coloured sub-economic scheme.108 The Municipality had not cleared the buffer zones in 1952 when it was ordered to move 1,800 persons and 300 dwellings. In the interim many squatters had moved to those areas and the NAD was demarcating a far larger buffer zone, which would necessitate moving the most densely settled sections of the Location: over 11,100 persons and 1,242 dwellings.109

But Brownlee had something else in mind. Rather than go to the expense of creating a buffer strip, which would involve extensive compensation to those moved, while leaving Kabah intact, the Council, he suggested, should consider moving the entire Location. Brownlee recommended that the new Location be sited to the south, in the direction of Port Elizabeth, which the NAD was promoting as a point of concentration of black residential areas in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. The Chief Native Commissioner, perhaps unconsciously, fully resuscitated T.B. Floyd's 1945 town planning recommendations. To induce conformity, Brownlee offered to delay for one year the extension of the Native Services Levy Act to Uitenhage. Even so, in late October 1957 the Council rejected the unsolicited advice from NAD, on the grounds that the resiting of Kabah Location would be "quite impracticable."110

It did not take long for the other shoe to drop. In reply to the Council's action and without warning NAD announced in late October that the Native Services Levy Act would apply to Uitenhage retroactively as from 1 October. The Town Clerk applied to the Department to extend the period, as local officials had no means to begin collecting the levy, but Brownlee refused, and demanded that arrear service contract fees be collected from business or the Municipality would be held liable for the uncollected monies on its Native Revenue Account.111

The Council rapidly set to work investigating the potential costs for upgrading or resiting Kabah. In August 1958 the Council resolved in principle to acquire a farm southeast of the town for a new African location. The Town Clerk stated the Council's motives most succinctly: "the Council basically has no particular concern as to whether the Location remains on its present site, or is resited...the issue now has come down to one purely of finance."112

After a two-year dispute about which farm to purchase, the renamed Bantu Affairs Department [BAD] stepped in and persuaded the Council to purchase the farms "Boschoogte" and "Naroes," to the south-west of town across the Swartkops River. The Councillors were worried about the cost of developing the farms, and some reconsidered upgrading Kabah. In a meeting with the Council the Under-Secretary of BAD, Louis Smuts reiterated the Department's demand for the Council to relocate Africans and reserve Kabah for coloured housing, but dangled the carrot of financial support for the move. "If the Council and the Department worked together," he said, "the problem which appeared to be a major one would not be found to be so difficult."113 Still the Council hesitated. Some members favoured buying the two farms suggested by BAD, others championed another site, while some opposed relocation entirely. All were worried about embarking on a project riskier than anything previously attempted by the Council.

When Smuts returned for another session of the Council-in-Committee in November 1960, he laid down the law. "The Department," he informed the Councillors, "would under no circumstances allow the Kabah Location to be extended" and another site had to be found. The UAA, he asserted, provided that it was the duty of the local authority to provide accommodation on a site approved by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, and he would impose a decision if the Council did not act.114 Only one Councillor advocated retaining Kabah at its present site. In January 1961 the Council reversed its 1945 decision and subsequent determinations regarding Kabah, and agreed to remove the
The Council's decision cannot be separated from the climate of growing political opposition by blacks, but especially by Africans which developed in Uitenhage, as elsewhere in South Africa during the late 1950s. In contrast to the earlier deliberations on the application of group areas to Uitenhage, the decisions regarding resiling of Kabah were made behind closed doors, in secret Council sessions. Whereas prominent members of the coloured, Indian, and Chinese committees had the opportunity to address the Councillors, the Council welcomed no representatives of the African people. Some Councillors did indeed provide a channel of communication to the ANC, and were willing to at least tolerate its presence in the township. But these attitudes became unpopular as protest movements developed in the town through the 1950s. As their suffering grew under the repressive central state policies increasingly being enforced through the local authority, African residents mounted more direct forms of protest against apartheid and its institutional embodiments, both nationally and locally. Politics polarized increasingly between the ANC and the Government, with the Council drawn inexorably towards the latter.

Uitenhage was a stronghold of the ANC throughout the decade, and was one of the organizations' most active branches in the Cape. Uitenhage was one of the best-mobilized centres in the Eastern Cape during the 1952 Defiance Campaign. Unlike Port Elizabeth, where many protests occurred at the New Brighton train station, civil disobedience in Uitenhage generally occurred in the centre of the "white" town at the market square, railway station, and law courts. Yet these were generally peaceful protests and many of the criticisms of unjust laws were shared (at least privately - and unbeknown to the protestors) by UP Councillors. Whatever liberal sympathy might have existed for Africans, however, did not extend to subsequent Congress campaigns, which met a far less tolerant response.

The 1955 school boycott was extensive in the town, even after ANC provincial and national leaders distanced themselves from the campaign. The most serious confrontations occurred over the application of Pass Laws to women in 1957 when police violently dispersed anti-pass protesters, and made mass arrests. The education boycotts and pass protests were followed by the prominent 1958 General Election stay-at-home, and by a number of more localized strikes and protests.

In part, the change arose from the altered party composition of the Council. The newly-elected NP members of the Council made important political and ideological interventions on the body: bi-lingualism in all Council meetings and documents was first introduced in 1954 for example, and NP members led efforts to segregate town parks and the morning market.

Perhaps the most significant NP representative was Frans Conradie, who served between 1953 and 1957, when he was elected to the Provincial Council. His rise in the NP was meteoric: married to a prominent Afrikaans writer, he was a local and Eastern Cape Representative on the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, Member of the Provincial Council, then member of the Executive Council of the Cape, and later MP. But these positions were facilitated through Conradie's real connections, growing out of his membership in the Broederbond, where he served on the Executive, and from the early 1960s, as Convenor of its secret watchdog committee on Coloured Affairs, and as a member of the committee on Relations with English. These connections would prove invaluable for the NP and the central state in the upcoming efforts to extract compliance from the local Council. Conradie's law partner, G.J. Pieterse, was also a member of the Broederbond, and served intermittently on the Town Council from 1958 to the early 1970s. Pieterse was secretary of the first branch of the Afrikaanse Sakekamer to open in a town once dominated by English-speaking businessmen. It was these individuals who led the local attack against the Faganite tradition on the Council, and especially against the ANC. Their first major initiative was a 1954 attempt to thwart the planned annual meeting of the Cape ANC at Kabah even though a permit had been granted and the ANC had already paid the fees for the Location hall.

As in Port Elizabeth after the 1952 riot, the internal and external NP actors were able to intensify pressure on the UP Council by using the local "unrest" as a pretext to justify the increased restrictions provided through the UAA and GAA. Councillors who had previously opposed stronger controls now sought methods, including registration of service contracts, to eliminate such "undesirable
elements" from the town.\textsuperscript{121}

Where Indian organizations, which represented a mere 1% of the population, had been able to influence Council policy directly, African organizations, most especially the ANC, could mobilize large constituencies throughout the 1950s, but could not gain the ear of the Council. In contrast to both the way it handled the group areas legislation, and the manner in which it discussed T.B. Floyd's 1945 recommendations for removing Kabah, the Council agreed to the main lines the NAD policy without concern for the interests of those most affected, especially once the Government eased the Council's fiscal burden.

2. Group Areas, Again

When the Secretary of the East Cape Committee of the Group Areas Board (the transformed LTAB) saw press reports in mid-1961 that the Council had agreed to resite Kabah, he wrote to the Town Clerk to renew the campaign for group areas.\textsuperscript{122} Since Kabah would eventually be cleared, plenty of prime land would be opened up for possible coloured settlement. The thorny group areas problem could be simplified.

On 17 July 1961 the Council met to consider his request and a UP Councillor managed to push through a resolution declaring "that the Council does not wish to discuss the question...or to submit proposals..." But where in years past large majorities stood on principle in rejecting any participation with the GAA, by 1961 the Councillors lamely claimed to be too preoccupied with plans to resite the African location to take up such a vexing issue. And even then the resolution passed only narrowly. "Council snubs Group Areas Board," was the headline in the Johannesburg-based \textit{Sunday Times}, while the Port Elizabeth \textit{Evening Post} editorialized that "Most Councillors have stood firm against the great hardships which compulsory racial grouping would bring." But the pro-Government \textit{Die Oosterlig} interpreted events differently. "The constituency in which the town lies has sent representatives of apartheid to the Assembly and Provincial Council. The majority in the City Council is therefore a mere island in the political sea." The editorial concluded, "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's is a good idea for them to bear in mind."\textsuperscript{123}

The Afrikaans daily had a far clearer reading of the prevailing balance of political power. In the 1958 General Elections the NP greatly increased both its number of seats and its share of the popular vote. In both the 1960 referendum and the 1961 general election it won a majority of the (white) popular vote, which translated into a massive parliamentary majority. The local UP Councillors could hardly claim to be representing the majority of white opinion when their national party was being consistently beaten in election after election. In June 1962 the Council accepted without opposition a resolution to submit group areas proposals to the Department of Community Development.

However, agreement was possible only once a compromise had been forged to reduce the hardships for Indian and Chinese traders. The proposal came from none other than G.J. Pieterse, of the local law firm Conradoic, Pieterse & Campher. Through his past participation on the Council, Pieterse was well aware that the body had no objections to residential segregation, but that it balked at any restrictions on business, which "should be left undisturbed."\textsuperscript{124} The Council's position clearly contradicted the principles of the GAA, and would lead to permanent deadlock. But Pieterse identified a way around the impasse: he recommended that the Council petition the government to declare a free trade zone, allowing "non-white" businesses to continue in something like their current form.

Pieterse developed the strategy while preparing an application for a local Indian businessman who sought a group areas permit. His client was none other than A.S. Kooverjee, a landowner, businessman, and member of the Uitenhage Indian Congress. Kooverjee was also a central participant in the delegation which had successfully pressured the Council to reverse itself in 1953 and refuse to cooperate with the LTAB. Kooverjee had made a shrewd choice of lawyers. Pieterse's partner was now an insider in Broederbond and Cape provincial government policy-making circles; the lawyers' knowledge of the Council and their connections to the responsible central ministries made them extremely well-positioned to broker a group areas deal between the Council and the government.\textsuperscript{125}
With hopes of obtaining such an exemption, the Council’s major objection to the GAA fell away, and four months later it voted unanimously to cooperate with the central Government in the planning of group areas and agreed to submit formal proposals for application of the Act to the town. From that date until the proclamation of group areas in Uitenhage on 20 October 1967, the Council cooperated with the Government. [See Map 4] A familiar argument - well rehearsed in Port Elizabeth in 1952 - served as justification for its action: “Now...the Council has decided to prepare a plan, arguing that if it does not do so, the Government will intervene...and impose something far more drastic for the victims of the Act.”

By “trying not to be cruel,” as the Evening Post put it, the Council reversed its long-standing position of noncompliance with a centrepiece of apartheid legislation. An era of Municipal contestation of apartheid policy had come to a close.

Local Afrikaner notables had spun a new web of influence to the central state and to the NP, shouldering aside the old UP political network whose connections to the centre had been severed since 1948. Where Councillors and officials, especially the Town Clerk, had faced a decade of governmental coercion and brazen interventions, the 1960s promised a different mode of politics. The space for opposition had all but disappeared, and the new power brokers no longer had English surnames. The character of politics in the town was transformed more thoroughly than at any time since the reestablishment of British rule at the Cape in 1806.

Uitenhage Town Councillors, unlike their counterparts in Port Elizabeth, had consistently framed their choices as either noncooperation with an unjust policy, or working within the legal framework to apply the harsh regulations as fairly as possible: “trying not to be cruel.” At the end of the day, local defensive battles could delay but not reverse central policy. Faced by a central state willing to wield new resources in an effort to gain control, local officials accepted the second option, to work within the rules of the game as established by the NP, fearing that policies would be forced upon them, as occurred in Johannesburg and Cape Town. These rules were as much ideological as legal or bureaucratic, and they became the basic framework within which the Council would pursue policy towards Africans and coloureds until the 1980s.

In playing by the rules, however, the Council was aided by a compromise which carefully accommodated the one black constituency towards which Councillors could least afford to be cruel. Coloureds, Indians, and Chinese businessmen and property owners had access to the Council by virtue of property and the franchise, and they used their assets at key points to influence the Council. For Africans, no such avenues existed to the Council or to the state. Possessing neither property nor the vote, they had little to offer to the Council. Indeed, the issues motivating their growing protest movement in the 1950s could not be satisfied except through a transformation of a political system in which the Council itself played a crucial role, and which even the most liberal Councillor had no interest in altering. The few whites who were willing at least to entertain African grievances became increasingly isolated as the decade passed and the tide was running against their form of paternalism. Between 1957 and 1960 the fate of the Uitenhage’s century-old African community was sealed behind closed doors where economic efficiency and the tax burden to be borne by the largely white ratepayers were the only factors taken into account. Council hostility to the removals dissipated once the central state agreed to assist in the financial burden of relocation.

Not only did the Council agree to virtually the same policy they had rejected when it was suggested in 1945 by their own expert town planning consultant, but they revived another legacy of the town’s past. By purchasing the farms “Boschoogte” and “Naroes” for the new township, they unknowingly sited the new township, Kwanobuhle, “Place of Beauty,” on land used as a concentration camp during the Anglo-Boer War.

IV. CONCLUSION

A central theme of this paper is the growing central state control over local affairs, particularly over the reproduction of the urban black population. Before 1948 the Council was relatively unhindered by the central state in its efforts or (more accurately) non-efforts to house blacks. In practice the relative freedom meant inaction, as neither the Council nor the Government would supply sufficient funds for upgrading black communities. But through the 1950s, and especially after 1957 the space for local
opposition narrowed considerably. Three key factors account for this process.

First, the central state formally narrowed the scope of Municipal discretion in implementing central state policies; the respective Ministers came to wield virtually dictatorial powers to pursue policies over the heads of recalcitrant local authorities. The process culminated in the early 1970s when Municipalities were formally stripped of authority over their coloured, Indian, and African residents.

Second, the central state began to exert greater bureaucratic pressure on the Councils by reorganizing lines of authority. Central ministries which had not previously been involved in particular issues now held veto power over local decisions.

Third, the new bureaucratic machinery at the national level and the political will to use it gave the central state much greater power to manipulate local authorities' fiscal dependence, thus enabling it to force agreement with national policy. On the one hand, departments could threaten to withhold funds for completely unrelated projects to force compliance with directives of NAD or the LTAB. On the other hand, extraordinary grants of funds could be made to defray the cost to local authorities of implementing national policy, thus enabling the central state to buy compliance. These deals were brokered through a new stratum of Afrikaner political operators, replacing the old UP businessmen and politicians who dominated many Councils before 1948, and linking the local authority to the central state and National Party.

Over the previous decade the central state had reorganized important parts of the state apparatus, increased its penetration of the state as a whole, and had developed its legal/ideological and administrative capacities to intervene more directly in civil society in pursuit of its policy goals. By 1961-62 as the costs of opposition increased, as the benefits to be gained by cooperation increased, and as the likelihood that the NP would never be replaced by a UP government grew, Councillors wavered in opposition and quietly went ahead with implementing apartheid policy. In the end, however, the central state was able to force local authorities to comply with apartheid policy - "to Render unto Caesar" - but it could not remake the world in its own image. The Council's stalling efforts unintentionally succeeded in delaying proclamation of Group Areas in Uitenhage until 1967 (six years after Port Elizabeth, even though Uitenhage presented far fewer planning problems), and the removal of the Kabah Location did not start until December 1968. The removals to Kwandubule were continually stalled by funding problems, which delayed the construction of more houses, thereby further slowing group areas removals, since Africans had to be removed from the land in Kabah before housing for coloureds could be built. Both projects were thus consistently slowed so that through the 1970s there were still parts of town where coloureds and Africans lived either in the same area or very close together.

When the state was finally able to embark on the segregation project, it faced the new political economy of the 1960s boom: the expanding motor industry, and a burgeoning industrial workforce. These demands on local authorities were not accommodated in the central state planners' blueprints. As the UP Council had been caught in the late 1940s with a dated solution unable to cope with contemporary problems, so too the Government's agenda for reorganizing urban residential and commercial space could not cope with changes brought about by the economic boom of the 1960s.

At the very moment when Africans and coloureds were moving into semi-skilled and skilled job positions in the expanding automobile industry, the state was running into extreme difficulties in its task to segregate the black working class in Uitenhage. In Port Elizabeth, the segregation between coloureds and Africans was completed in the 1950s, before the industrial boom, and subsequent growth in the working class could then be channelled into racially separate communities. In Uitenhage, the delays in the application of group areas and urban areas legislation meant that the 1960s expansion occurred in communities not yet reconstructed by apartheid planning principles. Working class formation in Port Elizabeth was thus fractured on lines of race between coloured and African workers, bottled up in spatially separate residential areas deliberately planned by apartheid bureaucrats to impede social interaction across communities. In this respect, the application of apartheid planning principles to Port Elizabeth intensified a pattern of racial segregation in place from the colonial era, and led to the almost total separation of races. Class became relatively less salient as a principle of residential ordering, and communities became differentiated on racial grounds.
By contrast, the pattern of segregation in Uitenhage was not nearly as well-ordered before 1948. While blacks and whites were generally separated, the Kabah location was a mixed race community, where most coloureds lived either with or in close proximity to African people. As a result of struggles between the central state and the City Council, and later due to financial difficulties in building suitable accommodation, the NP's racial policies did little to alter these patterns, at least not before the mid-1970s. As a result, working class formation in Uitenhage occurred on a terrain not fully defined by apartheid principles, not fully differentiated on racial grounds, which allowed possibilities for contact and coordination across racial lines in common communities. These social links created rich bonds of familiarity between coloured and African workers, and networks of social interaction in Uitenhage, while the more thorough application of apartheid in Port Elizabeth impeded the development of such bonds - indeed, was targeted at destroying them. Such bonds between African and coloured workers would soon give a powerful boost to the growth of non-racial trade unionism in Uitenhage from the early 1970s, when industrial organization revived.
NOTES


15. These demographic characteristics distinguish both Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage from almost all other urban areas in South Africa, where for the first half of this century the African population was overwhelmingly comprised of migrant workers.

16. CA 3/Uit 38 File 261 v. 12 August 1936-January 1937, letter from Town Clerk to the Secretary for Native Affairs, 19 August 1936, "Proposed Abolition of Oatlands Location".

17. Among adults, the unemployment rate in 1930 was less than 10%; in 1935, it had risen to 36%. CA 3/Uit 42 File 261o, Uitenhage Municipality Location Census, 23 June 1930 and CA 3/Uit 37 File 261 v. 9, July 1934-May 1935, Uitenhage Municipal Locations, n.d.
18. CA 3/Uit 38 File 261 v. 11, November 1935-July 1936, letter from Town Clerk, Uitenhage, to Town Clerk, Graaff-Reinet, 9 April 1936, "Housing Schemes for Cape Coloureds."


20. CA 3/Uit 38 File 261 v. 11, November 1935-July 1936, letter from Town Clerk to Town Clerk, Graaff-Reinet, 9 April 1936, "Housing Schemes for Cape Coloureds."


22. CA 3/Uit 38 File 261 v. 12 August 1936-January 1937, letter from Town Clerk to the Secretary for Native Affairs, 19 August 1936, "Proposed Abolition of Oatlands Location."


24. CA 3/Uit 4/1/225 Housing General 74 v. 1, March 1940-April 1945, extract from report of Location Superintendent, 7 December 1943.

25. Historical and Literary Papers Library [henceforth HLP], University of the Witwatersrand, Margaret Ballinger Papers, A410/B2.14.13 Correspondence, Native Affairs, Land 1941-1951, letter from A. Park, Mayor of Uitenhage to Mrs. M. Ballinger, 3 May 1944, "Right of Natives to Acquire Freehold Property within Urban Areas."


30. UM 13/1, Extract from Council Minutes, 17 September 1945, and UM 13/1, Minutes of Council, 19 November 1945, extract of Report of Native Affairs Committee, 12 November 1945.


34. UM, letter from Town Clerk to Mr. S.I. Misrock, 21 March 1950.

36. The first coup came with the decision by US tire manufacturer Goodyear to site its only South African factory in Uitenhage. In the same period the state-funded Industrial Development Corporation financed a new textile company, Fine Wool Products (Veldspun), employing more than 500 persons, and taking advantage of the town's proximity to the sheep farms of the Cape Midlands. The South African Railways began a phased expansion of the existing railway workshops, boosting employment well beyond 1,200, and a tanning company and another textile firm opened factories. Finally, in 1946, Studebaker formed South African Motor Assemblers and Distributors (SAMAD) to manufacture cars under license from the American parent, the first roots of the firm which would eventually become Volkswagen of South Africa.


38. Between 1936 and 1946 the African population increased 5.2% per annum, but between 1946 and 1951 rate jumped to 13.8% per year; the rate of increase between 1936 and 1946 exactly parallels the national average, while the rate for the following five years far surpasses the national figure of 6.6%. Hindson, *Pass Controls*, 67.


42. CA 3/Uit 4/1/184 M120 v. 1, Location Enquiry, June 1947-October 1952.


45. As Posel stresses, the report was less a bold blueprint than an unwieldy compromise between different interpretations of apartheid within Afrikaner nationalism. Not only did the report itself fudge the differences between "purist" and practical versions of apartheid, but the legislation derived from the Sauer Report was subjected to further concessions to the UP opposition and (if only indirectly) to the popular resistance mounted by the ANC, SACP and other forces in civil society. See Posel, *The Making of Apartheid*, Chapters 2-4.


57. UM 74L/1, letter from Secretary for Native Affairs to Town Clerk, "UM Proposed Coloured Township adjoining Native Location."

58. UM 74L/1, letter from Town Clerk to Secretary for Native Affairs, 7 November 1951, "Uitenhage Municipality: Proposed Assisted 3/4% Housing Scheme for Coloureds."


60. UM 74/5, 30 October 1951, "Report of the Town Clerk to Housing Committee."

61. UM, Town Clerk to Native Affairs Committee, 24 January 1953; Memorandum from Superintendent of Kabah to Town Clerk, 9 December 1952, "Proposed Coloured Housing Scheme & Buffer Strip."


63. UM Town Clerk's Report to Finance and General Purposes Committee 8 September 1951, "Group Areas Act."

64. By Proclamation no. 220 of 1951. The proclamation introduced "occupational control" and "control of acquisition" such that no one could acquire ownership of a property from an owner of a different racial group, nor could anyone occupy property which had been occupied by a person of a different group prior to the proclamation.

65. UM, Report of the Town Clerk to Finance and General Purposes Committee, 8 August 1953.


67. UM, Town Council Minutes, 21 September 1953.


70. UM, Report of Town Clerk to Finance and General Purposes Committee, 12 June 1954; UM, Record of meeting between the Government's Reference and Planning Committee and Representatives of the Uitenhage Municipality, 9 June 1954.


73. UM, Town Treasurer to Town Clerk, "Proposed Establishment of Group Areas in Uitenhage," 4 October 1961; UM 207/2, "Meeting of Subcommittee appointed to draft Proposals for Group Areas," 4 March 1955.

75. UM, Town Clerk “Concentration of Coloured Group in Uitenhage,” 30 October 1959.


80. In September 10 ANC Eastern Cape leaders were arrested in coordinated swoops, charged under the Suppression of Communism Act. The state action sparked a new round of protest as 350 people were arrested the next day defying segregation at rail stations, the biggest single protest since the Defiance Campaign began. Almost as a prelude to the October riot, a crowd gathering at New Brighton station grew angry when a Railway policeman accosted a woman defier, prompting the crowd to surge around the officer. Unlike the policeman who shot the suspected paint thief on October 18, this officer wisely "released the woman...and the crowd settled down." "350 Defiers arrested in PE 24 hour protest campaign," *Evening Post*, 12 September 1952. The event was but one of a growing number of such clashes between Port Elizabeth blacks and police reinforcements and army detachments that had been rushed to the area.

81. Even more violent riots had occurred in East London and on the Witwatersrand, where influx control was firmly in place, but Verwoerd used the New Brighton event as a pretext for a very public campaign against his opponents.


86. The position was reiterated in subsequent approaches to the Council by other state officials. The Native Commissioner for Port Elizabeth wrote to the Town Clerk that under the Native Laws Amendment Act only workers who are required for industries will be allowed to enter the town, while those who are removed will be barred from reentering. "What effect, if any," he wrote, "do you consider will the removal of a large number of unemployed and ‘won’t work’ natives have on the defiance campaign and crime in general?" PEM 169/7, Native Affairs in City, February 1952-November 1952, letter from Native Commissioner PE to Town Clerk, 5th November 1952.

87. PEM 169/7, Native Affairs in City, February 1952-November 1952, letter from G.X. Tshume, Secretary ANC Eastern Cape Regional Committee to Town Clerk, 3 November 1952; see also Lodge, *Black Politics*, 54.


90. PEM 169/8, Native Affairs in City, November 1952-December 1952, letter from W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs to Town Clerk, 1 December 1952.


99. Taylor, "South End and Fairview Removals."

100. Department of Geography, University of Port Elizabeth, and PEM 196/4, Union Government Census, 1960.


102. UM, Minutes of Natives Affairs Committee, 29 January 1951.

103. UM, Town Clerk's report to the Native Affairs Committee, 26 September 1953.


105. UM, Report of the Town Clerk to Finance and General Purposes Committee, 6 October 1956, "Round Table Conference with Industry."


107. UM, 207/3, Record of Meeting of Sub-Committee of Finance Committee with Eastern Cape Committee of Land Tenure Advisory Board, 30 September 1953.

108. UM, Report of the Town Clerk to Native Affairs Committee, 27 July 1957, "Visit of Mr. Brownlee."

109. UM, Committee Reports and Minutes, January-June 1958, Special Report of Town Clerk to Native Affairs Committee and to Finance and General Purposes Committee, "Further Development in Native and Coloured Areas and Associated Matters," 14-15; UM 74L/2, Memorandum from Superintendent of Kabah to Town Clerk, "Proposed Coloured Housing Scheme & Buffer Strip," 9 December 1952.

111. UM, Minutes of Proceedings of Native Affairs Committee, 27 January 1958, "Registration of Native Service Contracts: Date of Operation in Uitenhage."

112. UM, Town Clerk's Report to Special Committee Appointed to Investigate Further Developments in Native and Coloured Areas, 3 February 1960.


115. UM, Committee Reports and Minutes, Minutes of Finance and General Purposes Committee, 10 November 1952; and "Strike Hits Town's Textile Factories," Eastern Province Herald, 11 November 1952; "More than 600 strikers lose their jobs," Eastern Province Herald, 12 November 1952.

116. See Lodge, Black Politics, 126-128. UM, Committee Minutes and Reports, July-September 1955, Report of Superintendent of Kabah to Native Affairs Committee, 23 July 1955, "School Boycott ANC."


118. Ibid.


120. Though their main proposal was turned back by the UP majority, the NP councillors pushed the Council to grant the permit only on condition that the SAP be allowed to attend each session, and after the affair, the NP members successfully urged the Council to adopt strong regulations modelled on those in New Brighton to control meetings. Councillor Ernest Reds "pointed out that the African National Congress was in any event holding weekly meetings in the open in the Location and that as this was not an illegal organization their meetings could not be stopped." During debate on the issue, Councillor Conradie said, "We cannot close our eyes to the fact that we are giving hospitality to an organization which, although not declared illegal by the Government, is no friend of the White man." UM, Town Clerk's Report to Native Affairs Committee, 27 March 1954; Minutes of Native Affairs Committee, 29 March 1954; Minutes of Town Council, 20 April 1954. "Move to stop A.N.C. talks fails," Eastern Province Herald, 22 June 1954.


124. UM, Town Council Minutes, 19 February 1962.

125. UM, Town Council Minutes, 19 February 1962.