DEMOCRACY AND THE PARASTATAL: A CASE STUDY OF PACT (1990-93)

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1994 History Workshop Academic Conference
Democracy: popular precedents, popular practice and popular culture
The performing arts in South Africa have been state-funded for many decades. The exclusive recipients are the four performing arts councils (PACs) - one in each province. The largest of these is the Performing Arts Council of the Transvaal (PACT). Of the R80 million distributed to the PACs in 1993, PACT received about R35 million. PACT employs about 2 400 people and is situated in the heart of Pretoria in a modern, twelve-story building.

PACT (in Afrikaans, TRUK) was established in 1963, the heyday of Verwoesian grand apartheid, to serve the cultural interests of the white population. As an ideology production centre for the newly constituted Republic of South Africa, PACT's (unstated) task was to institutionalise and promote volkskultuur. In the spirit of Afrikaner Nationalism, PACT actively centred Afrikaner interests. PACT's State Theatre is a tell-tale sign: located on Strijdom Square in Pretoria, it is watched over by an over-scaled bust of J.C. Strijdom - the architect of apartheid - framed by a towering arc of concrete. The State Theatre is a monument to the culture of Afrikanerdom.

The purpose of this paper is not to argue that PACT was influenced by National Party policy and, as a result, assisted in the construction of the symbolic world of apartheid. Rather, premised to some extent on that assumption, the central task here is to ascertain how government hegemony was secured in PACT in the context of an attempt to understand the ways in which democracy functions, and is undermined, in a cultural parastatal.

This paper is not a history of PACT; rather, it is an analysis of contemporary PACT (1990-93). But, since the past informs the present so forcefully; since the latter day PACT cannot be accurately interpreted without an understanding of the history that shaped it; and since effective proposals regarding democratisation require a historical and evolutionary approach, aspects of PACT's history are analysed in some detail. This paper does not, therefore, attempt a comprehensive history; rather, it is selective and uneven in its detail because it explores only those historical strands that contribute to an understanding of the present.

The focus here is on one key aspect of a composite definition a democratic (cultural) parastatal: the relationship between the government and the cultural parastatal. While no attempt is made to construct an abstract definition of democracy in this context, it is inevitable, in the course of the analysis that follows, that some normative claims about the generic relationship between the cultural parastatal and the government are made.

The major claim is that while a cultural parastatal should be an "arm's-length" body that enjoys a high degree of autonomy, government intervention does not undermine democratic practice per se. Government has a role to play in ensuring that its
resources and finances are used to construct and maintain equality of opportunity - a fundamental tenet of democracy - within the cultural sector. This might entail biasing distribution towards disadvantaged and underdeveloped sectors. Interventionalism of this type is not tantamount to political manipulation of the arts - encouraging one form of cultural production at the expense of others. While government should not attempt to determine the content of cultural life, the assumption here is that it must, in pursuit of democracy, play a role in producing conditions conducive to artistic self expression and to public access and participation.

1. PACT's artistic policy - a brief background

Before turning to the analysis of how the government secured hegemony in PACT, a brief summary of the contents and political implications of PACT's programmes will be offered.

PACT privileged two art forms: original Afrikaans-medium drama and the nineteenth century European "high arts" (opera, ballet, and classical music). This dual focus is central to an understanding of PACT's ideological production, reflecting, as it does, the contradictions of an internal colonialist culture - of a people in, but not of, Africa. Afrikanerdöm, in attempting to define itself as "a distinct and separate nation with its own history, traditions, religion, philosophy, language and culture" (de Villiers, 1971: 367), had to distinguish itself from the imperial culture of the mother continent without identifying with the indigenous culture of the colonised.

Post-colonial theorists assert that as one of the processes of colonisation, the imperial culture is instituted as the norm while the culture of the colonised is marginalised. This normative culture is imbued with value--civilisation, linguistic and aesthetic superiority--in the process of constructing the culture of the colonised as its inferior, savage "other". The imperial culture denigrates the indigenous culture to justify its conquest and subsequent rule of the colony.

But the Afrikaner nation was both coloniser and colonised (by the British). Afrikaner culture, in establishing its hegemony, had to undermine African culture in order to assert itself as civilised. But, in the same movement, it had to establish itself as "indigenous". In this lay its contradiction.

Because it had no other cultural foundation from which to draw, the art forms its adopted were European. But because it was alienated from modern Europe (its political identification with modern Europe would have undermined it colonialist discourse), it adopted the remnants of another era, of a Europe before its perversion by post-war liberalism. Even in contemporary Europe, the "high arts" are strands from the
past, rarely living cultural forms. For the Afrikaner Nationalists who adopted them, the "high arts" represent an "imagined" (in Benedict Anderson’s sense) culture: an image of a long past phantom civilisation that is and is not European; is and is not African.

On the margins of the symbolic configuration of cultures that PACT helped to construct was indigenous South African performance tradition. As late as 1990, PACT's General Director betrayed his contempt for the full rich history of South African culture:

If all eurocentric art is to be removed from South Africa, there will be precious little left on which a new cultural norm or image can be built in a new South Africa. (PACT Annual Report 1990-1)

It is not surprising, then, that despite its privileged access to funds, PACT was never "at the cutting edge of cultural innovation in South Africa" (Louw, 1989: 109). The "explosion of indigenous theatre" (Orkin, 1991: 181) in the 1970s and 1980s, for example — the new directions and energies of Workshop '71; of the Black Consciousness theatre of Nkosi, Shezi, Manaka, Maponya; of the Market Theatre Productions — were in no way associated with PACT. Throughout its history, PACT used public money to encourage the European "high arts" to the detriment of indigenous South African drama.

2. Methodology

Anti-apartheid theatre historiography and criticism is located primarily within a marxist paradigm. This corpus, as Ian Steadman observes, foregrounds class and race relations in cultural practice. While this tendency might have been a necessary response to apartheid cultural discourse, it resulted in a paucity of criticism that explores other social relations and identities — gender, religious and ethnic, for example (Steadman, 1990a: 211).

The use of marxist theory, it is argued here, was responsible for further limitations in anti-apartheid cultural historiography. The major burden of Foucault’s critique of juridico-discursive conceptions of power is that western political thought, up to and including marxist theories of the state, has proved incapable of recognising the capillary network of power relations associated with the development of modern forms of government. This failure stems from that theory still envisaging power as emanating from a single source (as in the monarchical model). For Foucault, the systematising and totalitarian tendencies of marxist theory — its concern with power at central locations — has an inhibiting effect. Marxism posed the problem of power only in terms of the State apparatus:
the way power was exercised - concretely and in
detail - with its specificity and tactics, was
something that no one attempted to ascertain; they
contented themselves with denouncing it in a
polemical and global fashion. (Foucault, 1980a: 116)

Anti-apartheid cultural historiography, while offering the
finest documentation and analysis of South African theatre, is
undermined by this tendency. Take Robert Kavanagh's *Theatre
and cultural struggle in South Africa* (1991) and Orkin's *Drama
and the South African State* (1985) - two of the major works in
this corpus. Both contest official histories and perceptions;
they attempt to give voice to silenced texts and to recentre
marginalised traditions. Both, through rigorous historical
analysis, produce instances of penetrating insight: Kavanagh's
identification of apartheid segregationist discourse as a
catalyst of Gibson Rente's township theatre (1985: 113-122);
Orkin's rereading of H.E. Dhlomo as the first South African
dramatist to contest colonial versions of traditional

However, regarding the relations between culture and power,
both authors tend towards a monolithic approach. They seek,
in their analyses of the social conditions that produced
various theatres, simply to locate - often in broad terms -
the hand of the capitalist state. This leads, at times, to a
clumsy reductionism. Kavanagh, for example, makes a simple
link between the class position of an author and the
revolutionary potential of her or his play (1985: 187). And
with Orkin, the plays tend to serve a secondary role of
illustrating the historical analysis of state (and
oppositional) discourses. In both cases, the subtler
mechanics of power - the small local factors that produce or
inhibit theatrical production - slip through the wide net of
state-centric analysis.

Their textual analyses are also, at times, marred by a similar
reductionism. Plays tend to be evaluated in terms of the
extent to which they achieve Brechtian objectives - the
revelation of characters as products of their social
relations, for example. Hence Kavanagh criticises the Black
Consciousness dramatists of the 1970s for their class-
blindness and Orkin questions the contestatory power of
Fugard's existentialism - the search for some viable assertion
of "self" in a desolate world - insofar as it is part of
liberal discourse. This prescriptiveness fosters a
functionalist approach towards drama; the political efficacy
of drama is reduced to its ability to perform a marxist
critique.10

A monolithic view of the relations between power and culture,
evident in Kavanagh's and Orkin's criticism, obscures the
struggles located in the fine meshes of the web of power.
This analytical deficiency impacts on current debates around
PACT: in short, it creates the space for neo-conservatives to
oppose thorough-going transformation of the PACs. For, if
the power that shaped cultural practice emanated from the state, then the state’s transformation will lead to that of the PACs. Since the mechanics of power at the local level have not been thoroughly analysed (or taken simply to be the points of application of the state’s power), there is no apparent justification for overhauling specifics. To the contrary, the call for concrete transformation—of infrastructure, organisational structure, etc.—can be construed as an expedient politicisation of neutral terrain (see, for example, TRUK/PACT Info 3, 1992: 2).

Foucault’s remedy for marxism’s totalising tendency is a discontinuous, particular and local criticism:

> I believe that what this essentially local character of criticism indicates in reality is an autonomous non-centralised kind of theoretical production, one that is to say whose validity is not dependent on the approval of established regimes of thoughts. (1980: 81)

On this basis, while this paper recognises (and demonstrates) that PACT was strongly and consistently influenced by National Party policy, a variety of approaches is employed in ascertaining how government hegemony was secured in PACT. The role of specific individuals and infrastructure, for example, are considered in an attempt to locate the precise articulations of power within PACT.

In the main, it is argued, government hegemony was not the result of government interference. The government seldom issued directives, nor did it infiltrate ideological watchdogs into PACT. On the contrary, senior staff have always experienced a high degree of autonomy. They make their decisions freely—without, on the whole, consulting a guiding policy document or a more senior individual. And yet, in practice, they tend to conform to narrow policy.

Power in PACT, it will be argued, is not implemented in a top-down manner but, rather, via a series of internal mechanisms and practices. In this case, it is a tendency to employ senior staff who automatically confine themselves within the ideological parameters acceptable to the state. Senior staff need not be schooled in company policy; they police themselves.

The significance of this argument is twofold. Firstly, it informs a central guiding principle of this paper: that, while PACT served certain social interests directly and powerfully, this was not always a conscious process. The artistic directors did not, in 1963, set out to consolidate Afrikaner Nationalist achievements; rather, they endeavoured to nurture their art forms. Their personal sympathies—to the struggling Afrikaans actor or the culturally deprived rural town, for example—are as important a determinant of PACT’s Afrikaner Nationalist tendency as any government directive.
Box office returns as % of total expenditure

Source: PACT Annual Reports
Secondly, the observation that PACT's character is shaped by its staff's automatic, naturalised responses as much as by deliberate strategy, has far-reaching implications for the process of transformation: a simple change of policy and government directive is unlikely to be effective. If power is not - and cannot be - implemented in a top-down manner, then it is insufficient simply to make changes at the top. The attitudes of the staff who run PACT on a daily basis will not be transformed by new organisational policy. Individuals are vehicles of power, and not, as totalising theories would have it, its points of application.

In addition to the role of individuals, this paper gives careful consideration to the impact of PACT's infrastructure on its policies. Infrastructure, it is suggested, has the character of pre-selection and pre-decision: a hidden-hand function with its own inertia. Key elements of PACT's artistic and political character are determined by its centralised organisational structure - centralisation disposes PACT towards serving an elite sector of artists and audiences. Inversely, the drive towards the centralisation of infrastructure and control was fuelled by two major factors - a Eurocentric vision of the performing arts and an attempt to preserve PACT's domination by whites. Regarding PACT's transformation, then, it is necessary to consider the way in which current infrastructure might undermine PACT's capacity to implement new policy.

In exploring the operation of power in PACT, this paper employs a further aspect of (broad) Foucauldian methodology in its attempt to utilise local memories, subjugated and popular knowledges:

a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges located down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificty. (Foucault, 1980: 33)

In particular, the knowledges of the Performing Arts Workers Equity's (PAWE)'s constituency - the workers within PACT and the performing artists neglected by PACT - inform both general perspectives and particular arguments of this paper. An analysis of PACT's industrial relations (IR) policy, for example, combines the "naive knowledge" of the blue-collar workers with a broader historical analysis of South African IR. The resultant argument is that PACT's harsh IR regime - anomalous in the context of the IR profiles of other parastatals in the 1990s - was prompted by a perceived political peril. In its effort to preserve its white, Eurocentric orientation, PACT attempted to rid itself of unions that sought political, as well as industrial, transformation.

The popular perception that PACT, despite its recent proclamations of egalitarianism, fails to provide broad access
to the performing arts, is explored and substantiated in this paper. It is argued that PACT's production orientation inhibits access. The bulk of its subsidy (the only public money set aside for the performing arts in the Transvaal) is used to finance its venues, companies and administration; none of it reaches independent companies, producers or theatres. Only a handful of performing artists in the Transvaal (those employed by PACT) and their limited audiences enjoy subsidisation. It is proposed, on this basis, that a significant part of PACT's responsibility should be to allocate grants - that PACT should distribute its subsidy to groupings outside of itself.

3. Case Study

3.1. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

PACT is a public but non-governmental organisation. While its primary source of income is an annual grant-in-aid from the Department of National Education, it is not a government department or agency. It is registered in terms of Section 21 of the Companies Act of 1973, as an Association not for Gain.

PACT is autonomous from its sister PACs, the Cape Performing Arts Board (CAPAB), the Natal Performing Arts Council (NAPAC), and the Performing Arts Council of the Orange Free State (PACOFs). The four regional PACs are part of a coordinating body, the South African Coordinating Performing Arts Council (SACPAC). SACPAC has a solely advisory function towards the regional councils: it recommends a particular modus operandi or policy (usually in the sphere of personnel management and the circulation of productions). Its recommendations are given effect only if approved by the regional councils. SACPAC is therefore not an authoritative coordinating institution for the four regional councils.

PACT's activities are controlled by a non-executive Board of Directors. The Board is formally constituted as representative of the public to oversee the spending of public money. The sixteen-member Board is appointed by the Minister of Education ("Articles of Association of Performing Arts Council Transvaal", hereafter, "Articles of Association", 1986: 3).

The daily running of PACT is entrusted to the Directorate, comprising the General Director and the Deputy Director. The Directorate is responsible to the Board of Directors. The General Director is the most senior executive and administrative official of PACT.

The organisation comprises various arts and service departments that account to the Directorate. There are six arts departments, each of which confines itself to the presentation of a particular art form - ballet, drama, opera, orchestra, music, and contemporary dance (since 1989).
State Theatre - income vs expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'81</th>
<th>'84/5</th>
<th>'86/7</th>
<th>'87/88</th>
<th>'90/1</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Box office income</strong></td>
<td>238,300</td>
<td>177,637</td>
<td>277,952</td>
<td>502,621</td>
<td>1,027,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>2,082,742</td>
<td>3,858,934</td>
<td>5,406,365</td>
<td>5,752,327</td>
<td>10,748,769</td>
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</table>

*Source: PACT Annual Reports*

All amounts in Rands
## Staff complement - artistic vs non-artistic staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Artistic (full-time)</th>
<th>Artistic (part-time)</th>
<th>Non-artistic (full-time)</th>
<th>Non-artistic (part-time)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>'68</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>'72</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>'76</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>121</td>
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<tr>
<td>'79</td>
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<td>262</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>377</td>
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<tr>
<td>'81</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'84/5</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'87/8</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'90/1</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: PACT Annual Reports*
For the last few years, PACT has employed over two thousand people. In 1991, of its 2,338 employees, 834 were permanent and 1,304 were temporary; 1,436 were artistic staff and 902 were non-artistic staff.

PACT's Pretoria-based head office is a twelve-story building which houses the administrative, artistic and technical activities of the organisation. There is a Johannesburg office - based since 1983 at the Windybrow - which, working in close association with the Pretoria head office, is responsible for the English Drama Company and its productions. The Johannesburg office has its own technical and administrative staff and rehearsal facilities.

PACT controls the following theatre complexes: the State Theatre (Pretoria), which comprises six theatres, the Windybrow (Johannesburg), which comprises three theatres, and the Alexander (Johannesburg), which comprises two theatres. (PACT has an exclusive ten year lease on the Alexander - as of 1984). These theatres are centrally controlled from Pretoria: their budgets, artistic programming, industrial relations, etc, are determined and supervised by head office.

3.2. CONTROL

3.2.1. Relationship to government

(i) Legal relationship

The PACs were established by the National Party government in 1963. They fell under the aegis of the Department of Education, Arts and Science (later National Education), which issued the PACs' first grants-in-aid. The PACs are parastatal - intermediary bodies that (in theory, at least), using public money, are controlled by an independent Board of Directors rather than a government department.

The PACs' Section 21 status does not accord them independence from the government; rather, it implies that their operations are more commercially defined than those of a government department. The government, in fact, controls PACT in important ways.

Firstly, since its inception, PACT has been "owned" entirely by the state (through the mechanism of government appointed members)'. Secondly, the appointment of the Board of Directors, PACT's controlling body, is the responsibility of the Minister of National Education ("Articles of Association", 1986: 4). Hence, while the appointments themselves are not political', they are determined by the government. Thirdly, PACT's Memorandum of Association stipulates that the Board of Directors "controls... the Company [PACT]... subject to such directions as may be issued by the Minister of National Education ("Memorandum of Association", 1973: 6, my emphasis).
(ii) Government interference

Senior officials of the PACs have, without exception, always insisted that "as far as the artistic field is concerned, [the government] ha[s] not tried to interfere" (Anon, 1987: 8). With specific regard to PACT, Eghard van der Hoven, former General Director, contends that PACT suffered no government interference during his years as General Director (1967-1983) (Author interview, 09/12/1991, Pretoria). Most recently, Louis Bezuidenhout, in his capacity as PACT's deputy Executive Officer asserted that "the Performing Arts, as managed by PACT, has always distanced itself from politics" (PACT/TRUK Info 3, 1992: 2).

Yet since their inception, the PACs stand accused of being "the state's ideology-production centres" (Louw, 1989: 101) or, in the words of former SACPAC chair, Justice Kriek, "we are perceived as a government stooge" (Anon, 1987: 8).

PACT's government appointed Board is not in itself evidence of governmental interference. Many countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and, more recently, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Cuba, have arts councils whose policy makers are government appointees. The extent to which they represent the government, however, varies greatly. In the United Kingdom, for example, parliament, "by a self denying ordinance" (Lord Redcliffe-Maud cited in Fisher, 1987: 1), votes money to the Arts Council of Great Britain, but has no say in how it is spent.

What is striking with regard to the PACT Board of Directors is not, therefore, that it is appointed by the government, but rather that its composition has, throughout its history, reflected the composition of the National Party government. Between 1963 and 1987, when government policy advocated racial exclusivity, PACT's Board of Directors was strictly whites-only. In 1987, soon after the government adopted the Tricameral constitution that brought coloureds and Indians into parliament, PACT's Articles of Association were amended to allow for a multi-racial Board, and a limited number of blacks were subsequently co-opted.

The composition of PACT's Board is clearly influenced by government policy of the day. It would appear that the government has appointed Boards of Directors that reflect its own composition and interests rather than those of PACT's constituency. Since 1963 then, PACT's Board been almost exclusively white, Afrikaans and male - a configuration that reflects the racial, gender and linguistic bias of the National Party. The government has attempted to ensure, via the process of appointment of the Boards of Directors, that PACT is controlled by non-government individuals who nonetheless share its world-view and interests.
Rural vs urban performances

Note: covers performances for all art forms

Source: PACT Annual Reports
resource), it has also meant officiating over the
techniques and aesthetics that compose an actor's
formation. Rethinking who can be considered
professional... makes it possible for performance
skills to respond to particular dramatic problems as
they are developed by emerging theatres. (Martin,
1990: 54-5)

49. The prototype of the arts council is the Arts Council of
Great Britain which was established in 1946. It was the model
for the system of similar councils which come into being
throughout the world. The observations on arts councils that
follow are largely based on these art councils. (See Sullivan
(1988) for a detailed account and comparison of arts councils
internationally).

50. The right to freedom of expression is not always simple. The
promotion racial or sexual violence, for example, can undermine
other rights. While an arts council should be sensitive to these
issues, its task is to facilitate the expression of the artist—
not to serve as moral or social watchdog.
Apart from appointing sympathetic Boards of Directors, the government has, it will be argued here, interfered with PAC policy in more direct ways. PACT’s racial policy, for example, its most contentious feature, has, throughout its history, been determined by the National Party government.

PACT’s initial policy of racial exclusivity was, in effect, a government directive. At their inception, in order to qualify for government funding, the PACs had to adhere to a fourteen point government document that, *inter alia*, disallowed the presence of black people either on the stage or in the audience (Anon, 1987: 8). PACT’s desegregation, in the 1980s, resulted from the advent of the Tricameral Parliament. At this point, the government instructed the PACs to cater for all races.

The funding relationship between PACT and the government is another area of interference. Most governments internationally, in a bid to ensure that the constitutional principle of freedom of expression is not compromised through economic censorship, adopt the "arm’s-length" principle whereby the state is legally obliged to provide funding to the arts, but has no (or limited) say in how it is allocated. The arts bodies which distribute the funding do have to account, however, for the expenditure of the money in annual financial and narrative reports.

The South African government never established an "arms-length" relationship with the PACs. This was the major reason, argued the government-appointed Schutte Commission of Inquiry in 1984, for the "politicisation" of the arts in South Africa: the artistic community’s distrust of the parastatals, based on its perception of government interference and control, and the consequent wide-spread boycott of the PACs by many local artists (Report of Commission of Inquiry into the promotion of the creative arts, hereafter, Schutte Commission, 1984: 69). Schutte recommended, therefore, that the PACs be replaced by a National Arts Council: "an independent, autonomous umbrella organisation for the promotion of the arts in South Africa" (Ibid: 8), in relation to which the government adopts an "arm’s-length policy" (Ibid: 69).

Instead, in 1987, the government implemented the "Stumpf formula" which provides a financial incentive for the presentation of the European "high arts" by positively weighting the amount of subsidy that opera and ballet (and, to a lesser extent, symphony orchestra) generate (Department of National Education, 1986: 12). It is not, therefore, compatible with the "arm’s-length" principle; on the contrary, it impacts strongly on the PACs’ artistic policies.
3.2.2. Internal Control

PACT has never enjoyed autonomy from the government. National Party policy and strategy strongly and consistently influenced its policy. This was, in part, the result of government interference. To a large extent however, government hegemony was secured in PACT not through direct intervention but, instead, via a series of internal mechanisms and practices. This argument crucially enriches our understanding of the ways in which democracy functions, and is undermined, in a cultural parastatal.

(i) Internal Control: senior staff

PACT’s Board of Directors is non-executive: it oversees, but does not partake in, the administration and management of PACT. The senior staff, the Directorate and the departmental heads shape PACT’s character in the daily decision-making process.

The Board has the authority, in theory, to reverse the decisions of the Directorate and departmental heads. It can even alter the content of specific productions. The Directorate submits all its major decisions to the Board for ratification: the production schedules and budgets of each department, proposed purchases of assets or property, suggested policy amendments, and so on (Eghard van der Hoven, Author interview, 09/12/91, Pretoria). The Directorate’s decision, in the late 1970s, to partially desegregate PACT, for example, could be implemented only once the Board had given its approval (Ibid).

But, in practice, the Directorate is a self-determining and sovereign body. Van der Hoven recalls that, during his term of office, the Board intervened just once or twice, and even then, it was only in order to prohibit the use of certain swear words on stage (Ibid).

Similarly, PACT Drama is managed and guided, without significant interference, by its departmental heads. Its policy guidelines were formulated internally rather than by the Directorate or the Board, and were circumscribed only by the government’s initial mandate to PACT to provide a secure home for artists and to present professional productions. This policy document, as opposed to PACT’s Articles and Memorandum of Association, for example, has provided direction to PACT Drama" (Pierre van Pletzen, et al, Author interview, 13/11/1991, Pretoria).

PACT Drama plans and budgets for its own yearly artistic programmes. Pierre van Pletzen, artistic director of Drama since 1989, claims that "the Directorate has never questioned our choice of productions". It might decrease a budget or postpone a major purchase, but it does not intervene on substantial issues" (Ibid).
The State Theatre's location and luxuriousness was controversial even among PACT management. Van der Hoven wanted a Midrand location so as to include Johannesburg audiences (Author interview, 09/12/1991, Pretoria); van Pletzen was opposed to the centralisation of PACT's resources that the State necessitated (Author interview, 13/11/1991, Pretoria).

Van der Hoven was, in fact, reiterating one of PACT's founding policy principles, "to provide a fixed income to performing artists and associated theatre staff in the country..." (cited in Schutte Commission, 1984: 54).

I have substantiated this argument elsewhere (Steinberg, 1993: 53-72).

The Schutte Commission of Inquiry (1984) implicitly accepted that the line drawn between amateur and professional performing artists acted as racial barrier. Noting that the opportunity for blacks to professionalise was restricted by lack of training facilities (Schutte Commission, 1984: 59), Schutte suggested that his proposed "Arts Council of the Republic of South Africa" serve both "established professional artists" and "young (amateur) creative talent" (Ibid: 12).

This recommendation was the logical consequence of the major objectives of the Schutte Report: the promotion of the full spectrum of South African artistic traditions; the decentring of the "high arts"; the deracialisation of the PACs; and the adoption of a developmental approach towards South African arts. In short, Schutte recognised that in order to redress the racial and Eurocentric biases of the PACs, the amateur/professional divide in the performing arts must be bridged.

In 1992, for example, the PACT Drama Company employed nineteen actors, five directors and two designers (Programme note). PACT, as a whole, employed 2 358 (854 full-time, 1 504 temporary) in 1991 (PACT Annual Report 1990-1991: 31).

There are some exceptions, for example, the ad-hoc artists employed by PACT; the participants in the Windybrow Festival; the odd company that borrows PACT's combis, lighting equipment, etc.

Martin makes a similar point about decentralisation and deprofessionalisation with regard to the recent (post 1989) revolution in Cuban cultural policy:

The decentralization results not in eliminating planning altogether, but rather in shifting the emphasis from building theatrical institutions to making available the resources for creating theatre...

...theatre has to be deprofessionalized before it can be deinstitutionalized. If professionalization has insured that certain skills are imparted so that actors can fit interchangeably into a national network of theatres (thereby rationalizing the use of a scarce
32. The argument here is not against centralisation per se. Management theory stresses the relative value of centralisation. Child has formulated (or summarised) generally accepted points in favour of both centralisation and decentralisation (cited in Kakabadse, et al, 1988: 336-339). Kakabadse, et al argue that the choice to centralise can only be made in the light of specific conditions and circumstances—both internal and external to the organisation (1988: 339). Handy argues that an organisation's structural design is necessarily heterogenous and that the balance or mix of organisational cultures requires constant assessment (1986: 75-107).

33. "The directive of the Department of National Education (at that time Education, Art and Science) was that PACT should offer opera, ballet and drama on a professional basis in the Transvaal".

34. "The organisation set itself the goal of bringing these arts to the whole Transvaal, cities as well as rural areas, for the youth as well as adults, and for English- as well as Afrikaans-speakers."

35. "The Breytenbach Theatre... was totally inadequate for building opera and ballet sets."

36. "The artistic standard of the performances was generally not as would have been desired although there were certainly high points. The lack of necessary experts and professional artists was a great drawback. Programmes were also shortchanged by the almost total lack of trained and experienced theatre staff (stage managers, lighting people, joiners/cabinet makers, decor painters and costume makers)."

37. As Mannie Manim observed in 1976:

_We have only to look at what has happened in the White country districts to see how constant use has improved the venues for theatre in even the tiniest and most poverty-stricken towns._ (cited in Calburn, 1976: 40)

38. I have discussed the politics of PACT's outreach programmes elsewhere (see, Steinberg & Meintjies, 1992).


40. The ratio of PACT's artistic to non-artistic permanent staff (see Appendix B) is higher than that of the Royal National Theatre in London, for example, (Morgan, 1992: 2); similarly, PACT's box office returns are comparably low (see Appendix D).

41. Bhekisizwe Peterson estimated in 1991 that in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area alone, more than one hundred groups, largely amateur, were actively involved in workedshopped drama productions (cited in Holloway, 1993: 17).
Within the organisation, PACT Drama functions with virtually complete independence, its only answerability being on the level of artistic quality. ("PACT Drama in the 90s", n/d: n/p)

The need for supervision in the PACT hierarchy is clearly at a minimum. Senior staff act autonomously from the structure to which they account. This is not, it will be argued here, due to a flexibility and liberalism within the organisation. Rather, it is the function of a like-mindedness among the senior staff and a consequent shared vision with regard to the role of the organisation. PACT, under the watchful eye of the government-appointed Board of Directors, selects its senior staff - in part, at least - according to their ideological outlooks. This, it will be further argued, is the primary means by which government hegemony is maintained in PACT.

The first indication of the homogeneity of PACT's senior staff is its "group-think" condition: PACT is too like-minded and cohesive to challenge assumptions, to check out facts or to explore new options. "Group think" is the function of a management that tolerates and nurtures "one set of people, one philosophy; that distrusts outsiders, dislikes conflict and expects continuity" (Handy, 1990: 126-7).

There is evidence of PACT's "group-think" condition throughout its history. One example is a statement from the General Director in 1979. "The face of the theatre has changed since the beginning of this decade", argued Eghard van der Hoven, "the theatre can now say almost anything (within reason) in any way it likes" (PACT Annual Report 1979: n/p).

The 1970s was a decade in which the concept of a racially integrated theatre space - like the recently established Market Theatre - contravened the law (the Group Areas Act). Drama performance itself was, for the state, a site of overt repressive action: plays - like Shezi's Shanti and Kente's Too late - were banned by the Publications Control Board; several Black Consciousness theatre groups - like the Theatre Council of Natal and the People's Experimental Theatre - were destroyed by government action; theatre workers were harassed, detained, arrested, placed under house arrest and banned (Orkin, 1991: 130-2).

Yet van der Hoven thought it credible, in 1979, to claim that censorship in South Africa was at a minimum. This is an indication of the ideological environment from which he was writing: one of consensus and unchallenged assumption. Van der Hoven's statement suggests that firstly, PACT was insulated from state repression due to its avoidance of artistic-cum-political transgression, and secondly, and more surprisingly, that the senior staff were oblivious to it.

A more recent example of PACT's "group-think" condition lies in its response to its critics. When PAWE and the ANC suggested, in the early 1990s, that PACT's artistic policies
had political underpinnings and implications, Louis Bezuidenhout accused them of "trying to coax PACT into the political arena" (PACT/TRUK Info, 1992: 2). Bezuidenhout was assuming that PACT - and art more broadly - exists outside of political processes. Even the act of contesting this assumption is, for Bezuidenhout, an unnecessary and expedient politicisation of art. This attitude surely arises from an environment in which concepts of art, culture and politics are uncontested and naturalised.

The second indication of the like-mindedness of PACT's decision-makers is its staffing policy. PACT's senior staff, with rare and recent exception, come from white petit bourgeois backgrounds. Of its 21 senior officials, as at March 1991, all were white (PACT Annual Report 1990-1991: 18-9). Employing people from only one narrow section of the South African population serves, in itself, to restrict the range of political and artistic views within the organisation. In addition, the government appointed Board, who has a hand in selecting senior staff, has, no doubt, played its part in ensuring that PACT's decision-makers reflect the composition and the views of the government.

PACT does not, therefore, need to school its senior staff in company policy or police them in this regard. Government and internal censorship are at a minimum: those empowered to make artistic choices automatically confine themselves within the ideological parameters acceptable to the state. This has far-reaching implications for the democratisation of PACT: a simple change of policy and government directive is unlikely to be effective. If power is not - and cannot be - implemented in a top-down manner, then it is insufficient simply to make changes at the top. The attitudes of the staff who run PACT on a daily basis will not be transformed by new organisational policy. Individuals are vehicles of power, and not, as totalizing theories would have it, its points of application.

At the other end of the scale, PACT's black employees have, throughout the organisation's thirty year history, been confined to the lower echelons of the organisation's artistic, technical and administrative hierarchies. Van der Hoven justifies this with the claim that there has never been a black person of sufficient skill and competence to occupy a senior position (Eghard van der Hoven, Author interview, 09/12/1991, Pretoria).

Many of the black stage crew have worked for PACT for two or three decades (Bulbulia, 1991: 13). It is improbable that they all failed to accumulate the level of experience necessary for senior technical positions. More likely, black staff were overlooked for promotion, blocked from assuming more skilled and influential positions in the organisation.
begun the process of transforming their society into a
democratic, non-racial, non-sexist society;

BE IT RESOLVED that the FIA condemns--the abhorrent
labour relations practices of the Performing Arts Council
of the Transvaal (South Africa), their obstinate refusal to
recognise PAWE as a legitimate union, and their persecution
of the PAWE members;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the FIA condemns the
reticence of the South-African [sic] Provincial Arts
Councils to democratic change, and notes with dismay the
unwillingness of these institutions to negotiate in good
faith with representative democratic cultural
organisations. (FIA, 1992: n/p)

27. The Directorate accounts to the Board of Directors. But the
latter is a non-executive structure and de facto control resides
with the Directorate.

28. For a discussion about the way in which different
organisational structures affect different organisational
cultures and philosophies, see Handy (1990), pp.99-100.

29. Handy (1986) delineates four major organisational cultures
which he names after four Greek gods.

30. There are many more incidents that reflect PACT's poor labour
relations with its artistic staff. Its handling of the Gaynor
Young tragedy is a case in point. In December 1989, actress
Gaynor Young was seriously injured when she walked off a stage
during a PACT production of Camelot. PACT's subsequent response
to her claim for compensation, coupled with its reaction to the
allegations that it does not adequately provide for the safety
of its employees in terms of section 24(1) of the Machinery and
Occupational Safety Act of 1983, demonstrates the organisation's
inhumane and cavalier attitude towards its employees. (See

31. I have argued for Pact's fearful reaction to the demands of
transitional South Africa elsewhere:

PACT refuses to go out and meet the new South Africa;
it opts rather to turn inward and take up a defensive
position.

It is this fear which prevented PACT from engaging
with the August 7 protesters in a less legalistic and
more open-minded manner. It also explains PACT's
refusal to take part in public debates. In the last
few months alone, PACT turned down invitations to take
part in scheduled discussions on Agenda and Radio 702.
They also ducked out of a COSAW panel discussion on
the future of the performing arts. (Steinberg &
Meintjies, 1992: 13)
a significant agency within the PACs" (Louw, 1989: 115).

21. This is laid down by the Labour Relations Act (No. 28 of 1956).

22. Although PACT's labour relations with SAFTU were by no means progressive, they were not hostile. PACT certainly attempted to weaken and undermine SAFTU. For example, PACT withdrew from the South African Association of Theatre Managements (SAATM) and hence from industry level negotiations in July 1990 at the point at which SAFTU's revised and fairer standard theatre contract was to be adopted by the SAATM. But PACT recognised and dealt with SAFTU: it never attempted to rid itself of the union.

23. A PAWE discussion paper argues that

As PAWE begins to negotiate with PACT about the shop floor grievances of its members, it is important for us to develop a broader set of demands and guidelines with regard to the PACs... if PAWE is to become an equity that participates in the shaping of theatre policy in a new South Africa, it is necessary for us to think beyond our immediate problems, like poor wages and working conditions, etc... it is our belief that these immediate problems cannot be solved until the PACs undergo a fundamental restructuring process... For it is obvious that our working conditions can never be satisfactory while we work for an apartheid institution that defined its policy without our interests at heart and without consulting us. ("PAWE discussion paper on Performing Arts Councils (PACs) policy", n/d: 1)

24. PPWAWU and PAWE reached an agreement in 1990 whereby the former would organise the blue collar workers and the latter the performing arts workers. The two unions nurture a relationship of mutual co-operation and support. For example, PAWE spearheaded the media campaign for the re-instatement of the 299 dismissed PPWAWU workers.

25. The role played by the Board of Directors in the strike will not be explored here. Suffice to say that the Board did not--although it was entitled to--override the Directorate's decisions with regard to the PPWAWU saga.

26. This point was made by the Federation of International Actors (FIA), an umbrella body comprising equities from 39 countries in August 1992. FIA unanimously adopted the following resolution at its International Conference in Montreal:

WHEREAS the Government subsidised Provincial Arts Councils of South Africa have long been the guardians of apartheid culture and have grossly neglected the aspirations of the majority of South Africans;

AND WHEREAS the people of South-Africa (sic) have
This view is supported by PACT management’s racial attitude, manifest in a myriad tell-tale signs. For example, PACT’s Annual Report of 1981 lists the names of the organisation’s employees —categorised, as was PACT’s practice since 1963, according to race. While the white employees are catalogued according to their surnames and initials, the black employees are catalogued according to their first names only. This illustrates the Directorate’s attitude, in 1981, towards its black staff: they are perpetual menial labourers rather than people acquiring skills in order to advance their careers.

In the 1990s, while the more obvious signs of racial bias have, to a large extent, been eradicated, the racial stratification of PACT remains unchanged: blacks are confined to the more menial forms of labour. Their promotion to more senior posts would, it is suggested here, profoundly destabilise the environment of consensus and compliance on which PACT relies in order to maintain its preferred ideology.

(ii) Internal control: Industrial Relations (IR)

The autonomy and artistic freedom enjoyed by PACT’s senior staff is increasingly curtailed as one moves down the organisational hierarchy. For, as the demographical profile of its workforce becomes more reflective of South African society, so PACT’s hegemonic control weakens and, in direct proportion, its IR regime harshens.

This section will explore PACT’s attitude towards its black workforce — those confined to lower grade, more menial, jobs and, to a lesser extent, its artistic staff. To this end, two recent — and characteristic — incidents will be explored: PACT’s dismissal of the 299 Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union (PPWAWU) workers, and its refusal to recognise the Performing Arts Workers Equity (PAWE).

PPWAWU, a Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) affiliate, approached PACT for recognition in February 1990. By May, the union had furnished PACT with the stop-order forms verifying its majority representation. PACT contested recognition on the grounds that PPWAWU was not registered as representing the performing arts. This objection has no legal basis. PACT refused to provide stop order facilities on the basis that firstly, it required leave from the Department of Manpower (which, legally, it did not), and secondly, that certain signatures on the stop order forms were inauthentic. In July PPWAWU declared a dispute with PACT in respect of these issues (and others).

During lunch hour on 23 September 1990, some seven months after the union’s initial request for recognition, the PPWAWU workers engaged in an illegal "wild cat" strike. The stated cause of the strike was PACT’s failure to provide the workers with stop-order facilities. After about one hour of work stoppage, PACT, represented by Attorney van Deventer, summarily dismissed the 299 strikers with immediate effect.
The union informed PACT, twice, that their members were prepared to return to work. These offers were rejected.

PPWAWU contested the dismissal of its members in the industrial court in August 1991. Magistrate Bulbulia found that

the illegality of the strike was far outweighed by the rather unfair and cavalier manner with which the respondent dealt with the strikers. (Bulbulia, 1991: 22)

His ruling was punitive: he ordered the reinstatement of the workers with full back-pay - that is, retrospective for six months.

PACT appealed the case and did not reinstate the workers. The Labour Appeal Court heard the case in September 1992 - two years after the dismissal - and Judge van Zyl upheld Bulbulia's finding, extended the period of back-pay, and denied PACT leave to appeal. He described the dismissals as "precipitate and ill-considered" (Van Zyl, 1992: 17). PACT did not reinstate the workers but, instead, petitioned the Judge President who, in November 1992, granted PACT leave to appeal.

In November 1993, the Appeal Court - the highest court in the country - found in favour of PPWAWU. It ordered PACT to reinstate the dismissed workers with back-pay retrospective from 16 December 1991 - the date of the initial industrial court ruling.

PAWE first requested recognition from PACT in 1990 on the basis that it represented most of the PACT Drama Company. After prevaricating for several months, PACT's attorney, van Deventer, broke off negotiations in September 1991 on the premise that PAWE was not a bona fide trade union:

We have a problem in the sense that in the May 1991 edition of the newsletter of SAFTU it was disclosed that PAWE is a political organisation. That statement was signed by your Chairman... If you are indeed a purely political organisation kindly inform us on what basis our client must then attend to collective bargaining with you. (Van Deventer, 1991: 1)

Van Deventer was referring to a PAWE position paper that describes the equity as "non-aligned": "political... but... not party political" (cited in SAFTU News Update/Bybringblaadjie, 1991: 1). PACT's wilful misconstrual of this statement was a clumsy prevarication tactic. An organisation is, by law, disqualified from union status only if it formally affiliates to a political organisation. South Africa's black trade union movement has, particularly in the last decade, effectively and lawfully married IR and political
art forms and aesthetic standards, and the resulting marginalisation of the indigenous.

9. The object of this paper is drama; the other performing (and creative) arts and their management by PACT are discussed where they overlap or affect drama. This is quite extensive: PACT’s Eurocentric character - its centring of the European "high arts" - impacts fundamentally on its management of drama.

10. See Steinberg (1991) for a fuller version of this argument.

11. This position is held by the local press. Barry Ronge, for example, one of South Africa’s most influential cultural critics, fears that the transformation of the PACs means a "cultural bloodbath" (Ronge, 1993: 17). The *Weekly Mail*, more surprisingly perhaps, expresses a similar prejudice in its coverage of the Natal Performing Arts Council’s (NAPAC)’s recent financial difficulties (Tyler, 1993: 25).

12. My work in PAWE (of which I am a founding executive member) over the last four years has entailed representing to management - as accurately as possible - the views of PACT’s blue-collar workers (and, to a lesser extent, PACT’s Drama Company); I have run numerous in-house PAWE workshops on the future of PACT. As a result, this paper does not rely on formal interviews with PAWE members and organisers; rather, my experiences as participant observer in PAWE are infused into the fabric of this paper.

13. The members are listed in PACT’s Memorandum of Association.

14. Before 1986, the Transvaal Administrator was the *ex officio* chair.

15. ACT had started to desegregate its audiences and casts, *de facto*, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.


17. In fact, the directors of the Drama Department claim that they have never even read or been told about policy guidelines other than those contained in their own document.

18. The Drama Department directors surmise that should they alter the Department’s vision extensively, the Directorate would probably intervene. But, they add, such a situation has never occurred (Pierre van Pletzen, et al, Author interview, 13/11/91, Pretoria).

19. The only change to this profile is the 1993 appointment of Walter Chakela to the position of Assistant Director of Drama.

20. Of course there might be individuals in PACT who do not share the dominant organisational vision. The point is that alternative and oppositional views "do not seem to have become
ENDNOTES

1. Both PACT and the Department of Education and Science insisted on PACT's racial exclusivity until the late 1970s. In 1972, for example, the General Director noted PACT's attempts to satisfy all tastes and to provide constant opportunities for people from all levels of the white population. (PACT Annual Report, 1972: n\p)

2. Nowhere does the iconography of power emerge in a South African context with greater clarity than in the piazza of the State Theatre in Pretoria... Steynberg's over-scaled Strydom (sic) head with its sundial shadow must surely be one of the most naked and banal expressions of political power to dominate any public place. (Dubow, 1984: 117)

3. I have argued this elsewhere (Steinberg, 1993: 28-150).

4. Broadly defined, an "arm's-length" body is a statutory body that, on the one hand, is financially accountable to parliament, while on the other, manages its funds on terms of its own choosing. The "arm's-length" body therefore, in theory, acts as a buffer between politicians and artists.

5. PACT always allocate the largest proportion of its budget to the European "high arts" - opera, ballet and orchestra. In the 1970s, its orchestra received a larger slice of the subsidy cake than any other department (see, for example, PACT Annual Report 1970). In the last few years, the opera department has consistently received the largest budget (see, for example, PACT Annual Report 1990-91).

6. Internal colonialism is a "special type" of colonialism since both the coloniser and colonised occupy the same territory. In other words, the typical features of colonialism exist, but there is not the geographical separation of metropole and colony.

7. See Ashcroft et al, 1989, for a summary of the major post-colonial cultural theorists.

8. In this article, "Eurocentric" and "indigenous" are polarised for conceptual clarity. In practice, however, the two categories are often blurred. "Indigenous" signifies locally written/workshopped/choreographed/conceived, rather than non-Western. It is not a purist concept. Hence, Sarafina is "indigenous", even though it is derived from the Broadway musical genre and may play in a proscenium arch theatre (much like the European Cubist movement derives its inspiration and style from African art). The point is that Sarafina was made by South Africans and represents an aspect of South African experience. "Eurocentrism" signifies, by contrast, the mimicry of European
agendas.

PACT's attitude towards PPWAWU and PAWE can be described as "uniophobic", that is, "an employer's abnormal fear of trade unions and their activities" (Industrial Court ruling cited in Steadman, 1990: 3). But, significantly, PACT's "uniophobia" is partial: it does not extend to other unions on its shop floor. By 1990, PACT had, for some years, recognised the Entertainment Workers Union, the PACT Staff Association (the in-house union established shortly after PPWAWU requested recognition) and the South African Film and Theatre Union (until its incorporation into PAWE in January 1992)

PACT's "uniophobia" emerged only in 1990 with the appearance on its shop floor of political unions. At its formation, PAWE tacitly aligned itself with the anti-apartheid unions (COSATU and NACTU) in arguing that it must eradicate the apartheid legacy from the performing arts industry as well as - and in order to - address shop floor issues. PAWE and PPWAWU, as a COSATU affiliate, were natural allies - in terms of their IR and political agendas - on PACT's shop floor.

PACT's ultra-conservative IR practices were, it is argued here, largely a response to a perceived political peril. Throughout its history, PACT was despised for its apartheid practices. In the early 1990s, it stubbornly resisted the winds of political change. The anti-apartheid unions, like PPWAWU and PAWE, therefore constituted a frightening threat - way beyond the level of shop floor issues - from within.

PACT's apparently irrational behaviour towards PPWAWU can be understood only from this perspective. Management, it seemed, was determined to rid itself of a loyal and experienced workforce. Most of the dismissed workers had given PACT many - as much as twenty-six - years of service (Bulbulia, 1991: 13); they were not a recalcitrant workforce - this was their first work-stoppage; and they had developed considerable expertise over their years of service - PAWE members complained that after the dismissals, the State Theatre stages became increasingly hazardous due to comparative lack of skill of the "scabs". Yet PACT would risk losing almost R3 million in back-pay and at least R30 000 in legal fees (Pamela Stein [PPWAWU attorney], Author Interview, 16/09/1992, Johannesburg) rather than reinstate these workers.

PACT's attitude was retrogressive even in the context of South Africa's racist labour relations; it was out of kilter with other parastatals. As early as 1980, there were no legal obstacles to dealing with black unions, and from the late 1980s, the state's resistance to unionism in the public sector was crumbling. Even the railways - one of South Africa's most regressive and conservative sectors with regard to IR - had, by 1987, conceded the necessity of recognising the independent black unions. With regard to industrial relations then, PACT lagged behind the most conservative of the managements in the most conservative of sectors.
A comparison between the 1987 railway workers strike and the 1991 PPWAWU strike illustrates this contention. The parallels between the two strikes are marked, despite the difference in scale: the South African Transport Services (SATS) dismissed 16 000 striking South African Railway Workers Union (SARWU) workers. Both companies are parastatals; both angered workers with their racial inequality with regard to wages, hierarchy, etc; in both, recognition was the underlying issue. Like PACT, SATS' hostility to COSATU was motivated by its perception of the federation's political agenda, and, again like PACT, this manifested in a "desperate attempt to maintain the in-house union system" (Baskin, 1991: 174) - the PACT Staff Association in the case of PACT; the Black Trade Union in the case of SATS.

Baskin further argues that the SATS strike elicited differing responses from the "reformers" and the "hardliners" in senior management strata. The former argued that SATS had to "move with the times and negotiate a settlement" (Baskin, 1991: 180); the latter saw COSATU "as a threat to the apartheid status quo on the railways" (Ibid). PACT, it would appear, was also at the mercy of a small group of hardliners intent on maintaining the apartheid status quo. Judge van Zyl made specific reference to the behaviour of Dennis Reinecke, PACT's General Director at the time of the dismissal, and more particularly, of Attorney van Deventer, implying that they were personally responsible for PACT's "precipitate and ill-considered" behaviour. The role of these individuals cannot be discounted in the attempt to explain PACT's retrogressive labour relations.

The 1987 SATS strike led to "a fundamental rethinking of the position of workers in the public sector" (Ibid: 171). In a short space of time, the railway workers' demands - most importantly, the right of their union to be recognised - were echoed and won by Post Office workers, the electricity workers, the health workers, the educational workers, and the police and prison warders (Ibid: 183).

What is most disturbing and striking about the parallels between the SATS and PACT strikes is that the former predates the latter by five years - a period in which another IR and political era was ushered in. PACT's refusal to recognise its unions coupled with its unwillingness to negotiate broader issues of transformation locates it on the far right of the political spectrum.

It has been argued here that PACT's harsh IR regime was prompted by a perceived political peril. In its effort to preserve its white, Eurocentric orientation, PACT attempted to rid itself of unions that sought political, as well as industrial, transformation. As Steadman argues with regard to the PACs,
The history of PACT, it was argued here, is one of a drive towards centralisation. The outcome is an organisation that is geared towards the production of the European "high arts" and serves an elite white constituency. The transformation of PACT from production house to grant-allocation agency - an arts council - would whole-heartedly and forcefully redress that legacy.

4. Conclusion

Any attempt to transform PACT in a top-down manner (a simple change of policy and Board of Directors, for example), the proceeding analysis suggests, would prove ineffectual. Transformative processes would have to take account of the role of middle management, of organisational culture, of IR policy and of infrastructure. These factors, crucial in determining the character of the organisation and the way in which it manages the arts, are, in turn, shaped by the relationship between the arts council and government.

In creating a democratic arts council, there is no simple formula for this relationship. While the autonomy of the arts council is surely a necessary condition of a democratic arts sector in the South Africa context, government has an obligation to attend to apartheid legacies; correct the maldistribution of resources, skills and infrastructure in the arts; and integrate cultural activities into broader social development programmes. In order to fulfil this role, it is suggested here, a subtle - partial - application of the "arms-length" principle is required. On the one hand, the council should negotiate its policy with government; it should work with government to integrate cultural development into broader social development; and it should account to parliament on the level of policy. On the other hand, the council should operate, in accordance with the "arm’s length" principle, as a buffer between political bureaucracies and the arts. It should, like its international counterparts, uphold and promote the right of persons to freedom in the practice of the arts. Within the parameters of its policy, and with recourse to a court of law, it should distribute its funds as it sees fit.
employees was contingent on its racial and Eurocentric biases. PACT created the environment for a handful of professional (mainly "high") artists to "polish and improve [their] craft" (PACT Annual Report 1977, n/p); the majority were denied access to state funding.

A company of approximately twenty-five artists has been the major beneficiary of state subsidy for drama in the Transvaal each year. In this context, perks such as PACT’s housing subsidy scheme - a considerable "financial burden" amounting to approximately R574 000 in 1984 (PACT Annual Report 1984-1985: n/p) - are inappropriate luxuries and not, as PACT would have it, the artist’s right.

In the 1990s, PACT Drama Department’s "three main functions" are to:

- provid[e] a platform for graduates and a measure of security for senior artists as well as maintain[ ] a balanced core of actors. (PACT Annual Report 1987-1988:11)

This orientation, it has been argued, favours trained and established - and therefore, white - artists. It ignores the underdevelopment of the South African theatre industry; it was forged, perhaps, with an advanced European country in mind. If PACT Drama is to achieve its self-proclaimed goal of redressing apartheid imbalances (and, in doing so, nurturing South African theatre), it must scale down its support of professional theatre and increase and mainstream its developmental activities. This entails a dual process of shrinking the professional companies while training and funding amateur and semi-professional companies.

To take this a step further, a developmental approach would entail limiting PACT’s role as a producer and increasing its capacity to fund and support independent companies; shifting its focus from administering theatre complexes to actively fostering the performing arts.

PACT’s production-orientation is anomalous among (performing) arts councils internationally. The traditional role of the public arts agency is that of grant-allocation: the distribution of public funds to organisations and individuals - companies, theatres, producers, writers, etc - outside of itself. The rationale is two-fold: accessibility and diversity. By distributing its funds as widely as possible, the arts council hopes to maximise the number and range of artists who can access public support for their work. The arts council is not, therefore, responsible for public theatre complexes and their resident companies. These are administered, instead, by the city or a board of trustees accountable to the government.
For the 1990s... it will be virtually impossible to achieve any more than minor adjustments in [working] conditions unless there is a radical initiative related to the political developments in the wider arena. (Steadman, 1990: 1)

(iii) Internal Control: centralisation

Integral to PACT's ability to maintain internal control and to implement its policies is its highly centralised organisational structure. PACT's operations - artistic, administrative, technical and personnel - are centrally controlled and coordinated. The State Theatre, the Windybrow and the Alexander (while it is leased by PACT) are administered by the Pretoria head office. In respect of drama productions, the Drama Department administration draws up their budgets and plans their yearly production schedules; the Personnel Department hires and fires their staff. Since all departments account directly to the Directorate, power converges at a single point in the organisation.

PACT's stated rationale for the centralisation of control is financial. Centrally planned production schedules, for example, can facilitate the sharing of productions between Pretoria and Johannesburg. This is cost-effective, argues the Drama Department, in that it cuts down the number of productions, but not performances, that PACT mounts. In addition, productions that originate - are rehearsed and mounted - at the Windybrow "piggy-back" on the technical and administrative structures and personnel of head office. This reduces their costs considerably. Centralisation therefore serves to streamline the organisation by avoiding duplication of activities and resources (Pierre van Pletzen, et al, Author interview, 13/11/1991, Pretoria).

This argument is prima facie spurious. PACT could devolve its structures of control without creating superfluities. The Windybrow, for example, could enjoy a high degree of artistic autonomy while continuing to both utilise Pretoria's facilities and exchange productions with the State Theatre. PACT's major - and unstated - rationale for centralising control, it is argued here, is not financial, but political.

Throughout its history, PACT served a narrow political agenda - to secure Afrikaner and later, white supremacy - while fervently disavowing all political influence (Steinberg, 1993: 33-72). As an instrument of the apartheid state, PACT has, since its inception, been opposed (to varying degrees) by large sections of the public. Centralisation facilitated an organisational culture that helped PACT to insulate itself from and combat this hostility.

PACT's organisational culture is "Apollonian": the god of order, rules and tight control reigns supreme in the corridors of the State Theatre complex. PACT assumes and demands predictability and stability; it codifies operations and sets
down patterns. Its employees are part of the machine, the interchangeable human parts of Henry Ford's dream. The role, the set of duties, is fixed. The individual is he, or she, who is slotted into it. That the individual has a name is irrelevant, a number would do as well. That he [sic] has a personality is downright inconvenient, because he [sic] might then be tempted to express his [sic] personality in his role and so alter the role. (Handy, 1986: 21)

Key examples of PACT's Apollonian culture have already been discussed: senior staff are like-minded and compliant; the black workforce is subjected to a harsh IR regime. Even the artistic staff are dealt with in an authoritarian manner. Their terms of employment, for example, include the "semi-official secrets act" (Eichbaum, 1983: 3): a clause precluding their communication with the press - even about a current production, for example - without first obtaining the written permission of management. The 1992 directive from Dennis Reinecke, then General Director, forbidding all employees from discussing politics on PACT's premises is another case in point.

These are the strategies - and symptoms - of an organisation that is threatened by the broader society in which it operates. Centralisation facilitated this strategic approach. It maximised PACT's ability to cope with crises generated by either internal or external pressures: decision-making occurred amongst a small group; senior management had a broad perspective on developments within the organisation and could maintain conformity of already established policies.

The organisational culture that PACT has cultivated undermines, however, the superordinate goals of a PAC. PACT's raison d'être is (should be) the cultivation of individual creativity and acumen; its organisational culture promotes sameness and compliance. The performing arts requires irregular working hours and high levels of self-motivation; PACT's IR regime is inflexible and harsh.

As long as PACT's current organisational structure persists, it may be impossible to create some of the other preconditions for a democratic PAC. Centralisation would frustrate a developmental programme, for example. PACT's responsiveness to the needs of the societies it serves would be blunted by a centralised structure in which, by definition, the centre commands the parts. Centralisation would, in addition, directly obstruct the organisation's capacity to empower - literally, to cede power and decision-making capacity to - performing artists and their communities.
(ii) The case against professionalisation

At face value, PACT's three reasons for centralising its human resources into large professional companies are seemingly sound. A more thorough probe, however, reveals the Eurocentric and racial biases that both informed and resulted from this process.

The National Party government attempted, particularly in the 1970s, to aggrandise ruling class Afrikaans culture by transplanting the nineteenth century European "high arts". PACT, in this ideological climate, focused on the "high arts" and targeted an elite constituency; its earlier commitment to promoting volkskultuur among the Afrikaner masses dwindled.

The government pre-empted this trend when, in establishing the PACs, it drew a sharp distinction between the professional and amateur performing arts. "PACT's function", decreed the Department of Education, Arts and Science in 1962, is limited to the fostering of the performing arts on a professional basis. The fostering of the arts on an amateur basis and the organising of amateur organisations are and remain the responsibility of NACAE. (cited in Niemand Commission, 1977: 82)

This distinction favoured the "high arts". Firstly, the "high arts" are well served by - and, unlike other theatrical forms, suffer without - large professional teams of artists and technicians. Secondly, the PACs, who were mandated to present the "high arts", became the major recipients of government subsidy.

South African performing arts traditions, on the other hand, effectively demoted to amateur status, largely fell outside of PACT's ambit, and instead became the responsibility of under-resourced dramatic societies. PACT's definition of providing a cultural service to the Transvaal entailed, therefore, the occasional visit from the ballet company or orchestra; the support and development of community or folk theatre was not on the agenda. The drive to increase the quality of PACT's ("high arts") productions by creating larger professional companies occurred, therefore, at the direct expense of the South African performing arts.

The amateur/professional divide also favoured white performing artists. Due to unequal training opportunities, most professional performing artists - let alone "high artists" - in South Africa were white. The PACs' exclusive focus on professionals therefore effectively excluded blacks. This, in turn, ensured that the bulk of state funding, earmarked for the professional performing arts, was spent on whites.

PACT's contention that professionalisation promotes the welfare of artists must be assessed within this context. For PACT's ability to normalise the working conditions of its
The Opera Department and Orchestra presented similar arguments (Quayle, 1974: 1-8). PACT’s second motivation for professionalisation concerned the welfare of artists. It was the duty of PACT, argued Eghard van der Hoven in 1976, to rescue actors “from the tyranny of long tours, of one-night stands” (cited in Calburn, 1976: 3). In addition, he continued, PACT must respect actors’ right to full-time employ[ment] and... pension and medical schemes, and paid holidays ranging from 28 to 42 days per year. Their salaries [should be] guaranteed, whether they perform or not⁹. (Ibid: 27)

Van der Hoven was arguing, in effect, that the only way to normalise the working conditions of performing artists was to create professional resident - that is, non-touring - companies. PACT inherited only a handful of full-time performing artists from the NTO in 1963. By 1976 over a hundred actors were employed on a full-time basis by the four PACs, and three full-time ballet companies employed about 130 ballet dancers (Ibid: 26-7). For van der Hoven, PACT had a moral obligation to performing artists to continue this process of professionalisation.

In the years that followed, PACT succeeded in expanding its professional staff. By the time the State Theatre was established, PACT employed more theatre personnel on a full-time basis than any other organisation in the country (PACT Annual Report 1981: 4).

In 1983, Scenaria, a local (pro-PACS) performing arts journal, singled out PACT Drama from all South African theatre managements for "special praise" with regard to its attitude towards payment and working conditions. "Virtually all actors who worked for PACT in recent years", reported Scenaria, "were unstinting in their admiration for PACT’s commitment towards the actors on their payroll" (Philoctetes, 1983: 14).

PACT’s third, and most recent, justification for its large professional companies is financial. The art departments must ensure - for PACT’s financial survival - that the State Theatre’s and Windybrow’s lights are on every night of the year. The safeguard for this is to schedule a programme of in-house productions - that is, produced, directed and performed by PACT staff - well in advance. A large permanent company of performers serves this end efficiently and cost-effectively: the company can perform one production while rehearsing the next. Van Pletzen claims that the cost of the Drama Department’s yearly programme would double if there was no permanent company (Author interview, 13/11/1991, Pretoria).
"Institutions", note Schmid and Reissert, function as filters for information and interests, as incentives for individual or collective behaviour, and thus immediately narrow the range of conceivable decisions and actions... Institutions thus have the character of pre-selections or pre-decisions... Once established, however, they take on a dynamic of their own and give rise to unplanned steering effects. On account of their hidden-hand function and inertia, they may clash with different decision-making situations, new power relations, or political intentions. (1988: 127)

3.3. THE POLITICS OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

PACT's origin and inheritance was the National Theatre Organisation (NTO). The NTO was administered from a small office in Pretoria (the Marais Centre), and owned one modest theatre (the 298 seater Breytenbach in Pretoria). The raison d'être of the NTO was touring - taking drama to the far-flung corners of the country to service a sparsely populated white South Africa.

Since the early 1980s, PACT has been synonymous with the State Theatre (and its satellite, the Windybrow): most of its activities - artistic, administrative and technical - take place in that complex.

The history of PACT is one of a drive towards centralisation. One of the primary ambitions of PACT's leadership over the years was to house all the organisation's activities under one roof, in a "modern, computerised giant". (PACT Annual Report 1981: 2). The State Theatre - the largest of the "plush palaces of the Performing Arts Councils [in which] audiences... on occasion have numbered less than the actors on stage" (Steadman, 1990: 1) - is the controversial triumph of the centralisation crusade.

This section will explore the ways in which PACT's artistic policy, organisational policy and infrastructure dovetail to mutually determine and compliment one another. It will be argued that key elements of PACT's artistic and political character are determined by its centralised organisational structure - that centralisation disposes PACT towards anti-democratic practice: serving an elite sector of artists and audiences. The inverse will also be argued: that the drive towards the centralisation of infrastructure and control was fuelled by two major factors - a Eurocentric vision of the performing arts and an attempt to preserve PACT's domination by whites.
3.3.1. Centralisation of infrastructure

PACT's initial policy directive contained a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand,

\[ \text{die opdrag van die Department nasionale Opvoeding (destyds Onderwys, Kun en Wetenskap) was dat TRUK opera, ballet, musiek en toneel op 'n beroepsgroondslag in Transvaal sou aanbied...} ^{33} \]

On the other,

\[ \text{die organisasie het homself ten doel gestel om hierdie kunste aan die hele Transvaal te bring, stedelijk sowel as plattelands, vir sowel volwassenes as die jeug en vir Engels sowel as Afrikaanssprekendes. (Van der Hoven, 1974a: 1)} ^{34} \]

PACT was required to present the European "high arts" - in accordance with European standards - and to take them to the remote districts of the (white) rural Transvaal. But the two functions conflicted directly.

The "high arts" require specialised performance venues in which large permanent professional companies perform in a few select theatres, serviced by substantial on-site technical and administrative teams. They are not conducive to one-night stands in the school and church halls of the rural Transvaal. Touring companies, on the other hand, are handicapped by a highly centralised infrastructure. They require, instead, a decentralised network of theatres and administrations and productions with simple, mobile sets.

This tension played itself out during the first two decades of PACT's existence. The fervent commitment to providing a cultural service to the entire white province, so enthusiastically voiced at PACT's formation, whittled away. PACT justified its process of centralisation - and the concomitant undermining of its egalitarianism - on the grounds that it was artistically and financially rational. It will be argued here, however, that centralisation served an anomalous Eurocentric dream and that it resulted in an elitist organisation severed from its constituency.

(1) Before the State Theatre

From PACT's establishment in 1963 until the opening of the State Theatre in 1981, a number of complaints were consistently voiced by senior management. These include the "tyranny of tours", the inadequacy of performance venues, the deficiency of the technical workshops, and the scattered nature of PACT's facilities. Underlying PACT's discontent was a single factor: the incapacity of the inherited NTO infrastructure to adequately service the "high arts".
In addition, PACT claims that it is the most cost-effective organisation of its nature internationally, and that nowhere else in the world is such a variety of performances and presentations staged annually by a single organisation as at PACT. (PACT Annual Report 1987-1988: 3)

The validity of these claims, although disputable is not the issue here. What is being argued is that PACT's distribution of its income is inappropriate and undemocratic. The government subsidy that PACT receives is the only public money set aside for the performing arts in the Transvaal. The bulk of this subsidy is used to finance the venues, companies, workshops and administration of the State Theatre. None of it reaches the myriad drama companies, dance groups and choirs of the Transvaal, nor the independent theatres or producers. Hence only a handful of performing arts workers (those working at the State and, to a far lesser extent, the Windybrow), and their limited audiences, enjoy subsidisation.

3.3.2. Permanent, professional companies

Concurrent with its drive towards infrastructural centralisation during the 1960s and 1970s was PACT's crusade for the centralisation of its human resources. Whereas the NTO had developed small semi-professional or amateur touring companies, PACT sought to establish large professional resident companies.

PACT's motivation for this trend was three-fold: that professional companies produce higher quality theatre; that they normalise conditions of employment for actors; and that they are cost-effective. It is worth exploring these arguments in some detail.

(i) The case for professionalisation

In its evidence to the Niemand Commission, PACT equated professionalism with standards of excellence. The quality of each company's productions, PACT claimed, was in direct proportion to the degree of its professionalisation. PACT Ballet, for example, accounted for its "period of stagnation" in the early 1970s as follows:

> With a company of 30 [professional] dancers we have to literally employ part-time amateurs when presenting the classics. These dancers, although keen, have full-time positions outside the theatre and are not available for rehearsals during the day. They cannot tour, resulting in the production suffering a reduction in numbers and loss of artistic standard when it moves from Johannesburg to Pretoria. ("Memorandum on the future development of ballet", 1974: 11)
tendency to try and achieve an international standard as far as glamour was concerned. But perhaps instead of spending a great deal of money on spectacular performances perhaps we should change our priorities and spend money on less ambitious productions while trying to achieve a higher artistic standard". (cited in Calburn, 1976: 32)

(ii) After the State Theatre

The State Theatre, under construction during the period of the Niemand Commission of Inquiry, put paid to the touring debate. On its completion in 1981, PACT could centralise its resources and activities, and neglect the outlying areas, in the name of public responsibility. (Appendix A) illustrates the decline in PACT’s rural tours during the period of the Niemand Commission and a further decline after the establishment of the State Theatre). In the words of Eghard van der Hoven, at the State Theatre’s inauguration:

The State Theatre must never become just another theatre in South Africa... Our activities in this building must always be worthy of its name: The State Theatre. We must guard against the idea that the theatre should be taken to the community; we must put most of our resources and energy into this building. We must centralise our activities. The State Theatre is a prize possession of the nation, of all our performing artists in this country. It could also be the pride of artists in the international field if we handle it well... (PACT Annual Report 1981: 7-8, my emphasis).

Elitism was the culmination - and the intention - of the inexorable logic of centralisation. From the inauguration of the State Theatre until the "outreach era" of the early 1990s, PACT was impervious, as the above statement reflects, to the exclusive nature of its audiences.

The financial imperatives of the State Theatre afforded PACT the confidence to repudiate one of its primary mandates as a publicly funded organisation: to service the majority. Widely regarded as one of the most luxurious theatre complexes in the world, the State’s construction costs amounted to a massive R34 million (in 1981). Its maintenance and running costs are enormous: PACT had to double its complement of full-time non-artistic staff in order to run the State Theatre (see Appendix B); the annual electricity bill alone amounts to about one million rand. In addition, the costs recovered by the State Theatre are consistently very low (see Appendix C).

In the State Theatre era, PACT’s notion of serving its tax base hinged on variety and quality - and explicitly excluded accessibility. It justified the State’s national status on the basis of its (ostensibly) multi-racial and multi-cultural character.
The Breytenbach Theatre's workshop, notes van der Hoven, "was heeltemal ontoereikend... vir die bou van opera- en balletstelle" (Ibid). In addition, the type of scenography required by the "high arts" could not be executed by inexpert locals:

Die gebrek aan die nodige deskundiges en beroepskunstenaars was 'n groot remskoen. Programme is ook gekortwiek deur die bykans totale gebrek aan opgeleide en ervare teaterpersoneel (verhoogbestuuders, beligtingsmeesters, skrynwekers, decorskilders en kostumiers). (Ibid: 2)

Further complaints with regard to the infrastructure included the lack of on-site storage space for decor and costumes and the fact that rehearsal venues (often church and school halls) were not in the same complex as the administrative offices (Ibid: 1). This grievance was echoed a decade later when PACT appealed to the Niemand Commission of Inquiry to have all its departments - artistic, administrative and technical - housed under one roof (Van der Hoven, 1974: 2).

The principle obstacle to PACT's proper functioning, however, was, in its opinion, a twin factor: unsuitable performance venues and frequent tours.

Touring with a ballet company on the Platteland is soul destroying... It means performances in school halls or unsuitable Town Halls...

The male dancer has only to execute one leap and he is in the opposite wing... A male dancer of six foot lifts his partner above his head and this results in her disappearance from the view of the audience. Her head has disappeared into the grid and, due to the borders hanging from the ceiling to mask the lights, only her legs can be seen. ("Memorandum on future development of PACT Ballet", 1974: 3-6)

PACT's insistence that rural touring compromised the artistic standards of its productions, as articulated above, was a central component of its evidence to the 1977 Niemand Commission of Inquiry into the performing arts. PACT Ballet and PACT Opera (incorporating the orchestra) submitted detailed memoranda to this effect (Ibid; Quayle, 1974: 3).

PACT argued that it could not afford to present "high arts" productions in the major cities (Johannesburg and Pretoria) and tour the rural circuit. The former, said PACT, consumed most of its budget. Opera, ballet and orchestra, in particular, are inherently expensive art forms: they require, inter alia, large permanent artistic companies and substantial teams of administrative and technical staff (Report of Commission of Inquiry into the performing arts, hereafter, Niemand Commission, 1977: 63). In any case, PACT argued, touring was a financial burden: rural performances had to be
cross-subsidised by city performances (Ibid: 67).

PACT’s memoranda to the Niemand Commission set up an opposition between quality and touring. And its priority, as expressed a few years earlier, was quite clear:

We must ask ourselves whether the time has not arrived for the Board to consider whether PACT should perform only at a few central places where the necessary facilities already exist and where productions of a high standard can be presented.

(PACT Annual Report 1972: n/p)

PACT was willing to sacrifice its initial ideal of ensuring that the performing arts become "the democratic right of our entire [white] community" (PACT Annual Report 1969: n/p) on the altar of Eurocentric notions of art and quality.

The Niemand Commission was ambivalent towards PACT’s bid to truncate its touring schedule. On the one hand, it condoned PACT’s attempts to "conform to a degree of excellence" (1977: 71) commensurate with European standards. "The theatre building in which operas, operettas, and musical comedies are to be presented", notes the Commission, "must satisfy certain standard requirements" - "overseas standards" (Ibid).

On the other hand, however, the Commission considered "anomalous and unacceptable" (Ibid: 23) PACT’s attempts to reduce touring:

The Commission understands the reasons and motivations for these steps, [namely, financial pressure and decline of artistic standards], but cannot find that they are in harmony with the stated objectives of the performing arts councils in regard to serving the whole country. (Ibid: 24)

The Niemand Commission was torn between two conflicting ideological imperatives. On the one hand, it was concerned to entrench the "high arts" in Afrikaner culture. On the other, it believed in cultivating a love of theatre among the whole volk - rural and urban. In the end, and in contention with PACT, the Commission leaned - if indecisively - towards the latter.

Niemand sought ways to render rural touring more viable. He suggested that PACT organise seasons in rural centres which have suitable venues for audiences within a radius of 100 to 200 kilometres, rather than take plays to scattered and isolated localities with little audience potential (Ibid: 24). The costs of maintaining these theatre venues, recommended Niemand, should be incurred by the provincial administration rather than by the PAC (Ibid: 73).

Niemand, unlike PACT, was willing to relinquish sophistication in order to bring theatre to the people. He proposed that
multi-purpose halls - town halls, school halls, church halls - erected with financial assistance from the government should be designed to... provide the minimum requirements for a stage performance. (Ibid: 72)

In his view, a multi-purpose hall "with a level floor and movable seats, a stage and dressing rooms" (Ibid: 72) was an adequate performance venue for any PAC production. Based on this principle, the Commission recommended "the establishment of a network of proper accommodation for the performing arts" (Ibid: 74).

This, in itself, was a viable suggestion. Partly due to PACT's influence, a solid network of reasonably well resourced theatres had been established in the Transvaal by the mid 1970s. Apart from the Civic in Johannesburg and the Piet van der Walt Theatre in Pretoria, Welkom, Springs, Vereeniging, Potchefstroom, Germiston, Pietersburg, Klerksdorp, Vanderbijlpark, and Sasolburg were all equipped with adequate performance venues.

Niemand undermined his recommendations, however, by refusing to relinquish the "high arts" tradition. He knew that touring "high arts" productions in rural South Africa was impractical. Local production costs are "relatively higher than in Europe", he noted, and in any event, "there is only a small (and scattered) population with a Western culture" (Ibid: 16). What Niemand should have suggested, then, was that PACT curtail its "high arts" productions and present other, "poorer", forms of theatre with which its infrastructure could cope.

PACT's resistance to Niemand's vision of a vibrant network of theatres was, in one respect, anomalous. Entrenching the performing arts in the culture of the white population was PACT's self-proclaimed goal and a prerequisite for its survival. PACT's reluctance towards touring, it is argued here, can be explained only by unyielding Eurocentricity.

If PACT could not present the "high arts" it would present nothing. Rather than forge a theatre appropriate to local conditions - available finances, venues, technical facilities, local talent, and so on - PACT argued, in effect, to withhold the performing arts from large sections of its constituency.

Jeanne Coetzer, reacting to Eghard van der Hoven at a South African Institute of Theatre Technology conference in 1976, castigated PACT for precisely this issue:

"at various levels we seem[ed] to be comparing ourselves with the Continent of Europe - with other countries. Mr van der Hoven said that we liked to present plays, ballet, opera of international standard, but what exactly did we mean by international standard? There seemed to be a
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