SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONSOLIDATION OR FRAGMENTATION: TERRITORIALITY, NATION STATES AND THE BORDER QUESTION
THE CASE OF SWAZILAND

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GLOBALIZATION: CONSOLIDATION AND FRAGMENTATION

The world has become, in important respects, a single social system, as a result of growing ties of interdependence which now virtually affect everyone. The global system is not just an environment within which particular societies ... develop and change. The social, political and economic connections which cross-cut borders between countries decisively condition the fate of those living within each of them. The general term for the increasing dependence of world society is globalization (Giddens 1989:520).

Globalization should not be seen as a uni-linear and uni-dimensional process which can be explained only in terms of consolidation and continuous interdependence. Such a conception would lead us into a fallacious assumption that globalization as a process can or would be complete or that it would come to an end. This is because globalization is a multi-farious process with many dimensions which include a process of consolidation and fragmentation. The intention here is not, however, to counterpoise the two processes in a dialectical fashion whereby fragmentation could be held as an anti-thesis of consolidation but to view them as integral elements complementing each other at different moments in different forms.
The process of consolidation and fragmentation is very well represented in the history of Europe (because of its well documented nature) whereby as Europe consolidated itself there was a rise and fall of empires (which I describe elsewhere as hegemony and decline see Russon 1993) for example the Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire, Habsburg Empire, United Provinces of the Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain (see Held 1992, Chase-Dunn 1989 and Wallerstein 1984). Global consolidation saw the emergence of the United States and later the Union of Soviet and Socialist Republic as world powers thus ushering the world into a bi-polar system. This marked an important era in the consolidation of the world system so did it for its fragmentation.

The period of American hegemony which Wallerstein (1984) describes as the beginning of a crisis for the global system marked a beginning of a period when "hegemony itself became a fragmented process, a process whereby the locus of power in the world system no longer rests in one cubicle but is spread among countries and certain institutions' although with a visible hegemonic structure the US (Russon 1993). Giddens (1989: 520) stated that "it would be a mistake to think of globalization simply as a process of growth of world unity". Globalization, I contend is "unity of disunity; a unity of fragmentation"
TERRITORIALITY AND NATION STATES

One important difference between hegemonies or empires of the pre-capitalist era and the present world order is the organisation of the state. Hegemonies at that stage meant physical occupation and domination by a single overarching state apparatus which made territorial claim under one unity. With the emergence of the modern global system there was a disintegration of these empires and a creation of an interstate system. This process of the fragmentation of the state into smaller nation states with defined territorial claims was at the same time a process of consolidation of the world system because it would have been impossible to have an overarching state powerful enough to impose imperium over the globe. The global system had to consolidate itself through a fragmentary process (Russon 1193).

By the end of the 17th century, for example, Europe was no longer a mosaic of states because as each state consolidated its sovereignty and territory it meant that it had to respect the sovereignty of its neighbour and as a result, as Giddens (1985) stated "consolidated independent sovereignty of each individual state was at the same time part of a process of overall inter-state integration" (cf Held 1992:85). This new fragmented order of states referred to as the "international society of states" or the Westphalian model after the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 (ibid) has become an integral institutional structure of the global system.
In Africa like the rest of the colonised world, boundaries were imposed through agreements between colonial masters without any consultation with the indigenous people in the majority of cases. Boundary delimiting in Africa was largely influenced by the balance of power between the contending colonial powers. For example, the British managed to get away with large territory for Tanganyika whilst Belgium received a smaller piece for Rwanda.

Lakes, rivers and mountains were used to delimit boundaries with little regard to other forms of national symbols and identities. This could possibly been based on a Eurocentric bias at the time that Africans were just tribes without national symbols and identities.

The following examples are to demonstrate the potential magnitude of the boundary problem in Africa.

The boundary between South Africa and Swaziland was agreed upon between the British and the Boer Administration of the Transvaal in 1881 through the Pretoria Convention and Swaziland lost some territory. The boundary between South Africa and Lesotho was agreed upon by the two colonialists in 1869 through the Sand River Convention and Lesotho lost between 30 and 50 miles of territory (Prescott 1987:252). The boundary between Mozambique and South Africa was agreed upon by Portugal and the British in 1869 using the Lubombo mountains as the boundary line (ibid). British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were united to form the Republic of Somalia in July 1960 bringing together people with different histories and languages.
British Togoland was united with the Gold Coast in March 1957 to form the independent state of Ghana bringing an end to the Anglo-German boundary which separated the two. The British Cameroons, north and south were split into two with the north joining Nigeria and the south joining the French Cameroon in 1960 (ibid).

This shows that the consolidation of territory and sovereignty in Africa has been a complex process whereby national symbols and identities were created after the nation state not before. This has caused severe problems for the nation state in Africa because it could not command sufficient legitimacy and control over its subjects and this can be used to explain why most African states resorted to despotic methods of governance.

As a result of the complexity of the border problem, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its first Ordinary Session, held in Cairo on 17-21 July 1964 raised the question of boundaries and agreed that:

Considering that the border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension; conscious of the existence of extra-African manoeuvres aiming at dividing the African States; considering further that the borders of African states, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality;....; solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence. SARS 1982.
BOUNDARY PROBLEMS AND A NEW SOUTH AFRICA

The process of political transition through negotiations in South Africa was confounded with the problem of the nature of the state; federal or unitary. Both models required a process of boundary domestic demarcation since the latter model proposed a strong regionalism as well. The reincorporation of the homelands was no doubt a hot issue as some resisted and wanted to chart a sovereign way forward. All this demonstrated the volatility and delicacy of the question of space, ethnicity, power and sovereignty. Little if any mention was made of the boundary problem with the neighbouring countries.

On the basis of the above declaration by the OAU it can be assumed that South Africa's neighbouring states would not lay any claims to land. The OAU declaration does not however stand in the way of amicable and peaceful means to reach an acceptable settlement on the border question.

The Swazi case stands out as an obvious one where land claims will be put forward. King Mswati III, successor of Sobhuza II who initiated the process and died in 1982 having failed to achieve it, declared recently that "we won't rest until we get KaNgwane" (Swazi Observer 7/10/1993). The new Government of Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) in Lesotho, on the other hand, told visiting South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha recently that they wanted their conquered territory, the Orange Free State back (ibid) while Botswana holds the view that the Tswana people were separated by the British who
wrongly drew the borders thus leaving out a section of the Tswana nation in South Africa.

"Botswana has laid claims to the western Transvaal including the towns of Mafikeng, Zeerust and Rustenburg, the latter of the three being the richest town in the western Transvaal because of the steel mining operations" (Swazi Observer 7/10/93).

Pik Botha's response to Mokhehle's demand was that the issue will be decided by a new Government in a post-apartheid South Africa.

The case of the Walvis Bay which Namibia rightfully claimed and received from South Africa is a case in point to reflect a process already in motion.

The case of the BLS states is a clear representation of the problem around the border question in post-colonial Africa. Although sharing a common descent which can be confirmed by their linguistic codes, the southern African community had already started showing some elements of fragmentation at the time of colonialism although statehood and territoriality were in the process of being consolidated. But because the consolidation of national identities and nation states was interfered with from outside the whole process of nation building was bastardised reflecting the interests of the colonisers than the subjects of the region.
The boundary problem in Africa remains the most elusive and explosive question for the coming century and unless handled with the delicacy it deserves regional conflicts might be difficult to contain. The Rwandan situation is exemplary of the problems of imposed nation building in Africa whereby peoples who did not belong together were brought together and people who belonged together were separated without their consent. The delicacy of the boundary problem in Africa might require an urgent redress of the 1964 position adopted by the OAU, an update to review its relevance in a changing situation.

DEMOCRACY AND THE RIGHT OF CHOICE AND SELF DETERMINATION

The democratic wave sweeping through the continent is bound to catapult to the fore some very crucial questions which during the era of repressive governance were seen as prerogative of the people in power. Political and national symbols of the repressive era are bound to disintegrate and new ones developed. As discussed by Goulbourne (1988), many African states believed in one party state governance because they argued that it promoted national unity and that multi-party state governance was divisive and of European origin. Kaunda ruled Zambia on the slogan "One Zambia One Nation". After his fall from power many people could not continue to express such a sentiment because it reminded them of the antiquated past, a past many would not want to remember. People are advocating their rights as enshrined in the UN Declaration, right of choice and self determination.
Tilly (1975, 1993) suggested that the end of wars leads invariably to changes not only in territorial boundaries but national identities and nation states. I would like to add that social transition invariably leads to fundamental changes in people's perceptions. Globally, the end of the Cold War ushered new phenomena in terms of people's perceptions about themselves, their space, their identities etc which saw the collapse of the giant Soviet Union, the collapse of Yugoslavia etc. In Africa, the transition to liberal democracy is already showing signs of changes in people's views about themselves and their identities. If this thesis is anything to go by one would not be straying off the point to assume that Southern Africa will experience major shifts in national boundaries and national identities with the resolution of the national question in South Africa.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

An important aspect of this thesis, as advanced by Giddens, is the fact that boundary delimitation normally reflects the balance of power at a given time. South Africa is today a major economic power in the sub-region regardless of the political problems it has gone through. The BLS states presently depend on South Africa for a variety of imports and markets for their goods. For example 99% of Lesotho's imports come from South Africa and over 80% of her exports go there (Hoohlo 1990).
The labour market is another very significant area in this regard whereby Swaziland has about one fifth of its labour force as migrants in South Africa whilst Lesotho sends over two third.

It should be noted here that the cooperation that has existed between the BLS states even during the apartheid era reflects the economic imbalance and the indispensability of the South African linkage. In many ways the relationship between these countries was like that of a federal republic whereby there was a common currency, a common market i.e., the Customs Union and the grants given by Pretoria to the other member states were a meaningful source of income in real terms without which the budget of Swaziland and most importantly Lesotho would be very negligible.

Economic integration in the sub-region is a reality that occurred a long time ago especially with the agreement between the British colonial administration in the three Protectorates and the Union of South Africa on June 29, 1910 allowing for a Customs Union with the understanding that the Protectorates would eventually be incorporated into South Africa (Hoohlo 1990).

It is within the above factors that choices would have to be made between border adjustments, integration or cooperation or even incorporation.
It is not true that at the dawn of colonialism in Africa there was no process of state formation or nation building. This can clearly be demonstrated by a process of state formation in Southern Africa which involved wars and the movement of people. The Mfecane is an important historical fact to demonstrate that indeed the question of territoriality was becoming an important issue around which people could be mobilised and state formation be based. The example of the Zulu kingdom and its military prowess in the sub-region is another important indicator of the formation of nation states although at an early stage.

The consolidation of the Zulu kingdom under Shaka was a very important development towards the whole question of territoriality and state formation. This is because as Giddens pointed out that, the consolidation of independent sovereignty of each individual state is at the same time part of a process of overall inter-state integration. (c.f. D Held 1992:85). This means that once a single state delimits its boundaries i.e. of territorial consolidation it has to recognise the existence of other boundaries and in this way it at the same time helps in the consolidation of other states.

The Swazi state had started to consolidate itself around the time of the wars of Shaka and the Zulu. It was at this time that territorial boundaries started being an issue as Shaka was bent on conquering territory and people. Territoriality only becomes an issue once there is a threat of invasion.
The process of state consolidation in Southern Africa was closely related to the concept of national identities in the form of language, culture, common origin etc.

Colonialism interrupted and altered the process of endogenic state formation and nation building in Southern Africa as it did in the rest of the continent. As a result most African nations today can not effectively be defined in terms of national identities, language or common origin thus complicating even further our understanding of the concept nation. The only definition that is left in place is statehood, territoriality and in the majority of cases colonial history.

Charles Tilly in his numerous writings on this subject (see Tilly:1975 and 1993) has argued that statehood and territoriality are in most cases subject to wars and that the settlement of war provides an occasion for modifying the international system and national boundaries to reflect the new balance of forces. New states come into being as old ones disappear (Tilly 1993:9).

In Africa like the rest of the colonised world, boundaries were agreed upon between the colonial masters and boundaries reflected the balance of power between the contending colonial powers. For example, the British managed to get away with large portions of territory for Tanganyika whilst the Belgians received smaller a piece for Rwanda (Prescott 1987)
In Southern Africa, I will argue that, indeed wars and political changes have had and will continue to have a tremendous impact on the question of statehood and territoriality.

The Anglo-Boer conflicts in Southern Africa can be singled out to have been the most decisive of factors with regard to territorial sovereignty and statehood. For example the boundary between South Africa and Lesotho through the Sand River Convention between the Boer administration of the Orange Free State and the British administration of the Cape, the boundary between Swaziland and South Africa was agreed upon through the Pretoria Convention between the British Government and the Boer administration in the Transvaal.

Due to the uncertainty over the status of Swaziland except as a buffer zone to stop the Boers from advancing to Kosi Bay, the administration of Swaziland kept changing hands between the British and the Boers of the Transvaal in South Africa. In December 1894, for example, the British gave Swaziland back to Boer administration in the Transvaal until the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the defeat of the Boers resulting in the annexation of the Transvaal. Through the Order in Council of June 25, 1903 Swaziland was placed under British administration. This meant that Swaziland was now to be administered by the British administration of the Transvaal. On the 1st of October 1904 Lord Milner exercising the powers conferred upon him by the Order in Council issued the Swaziland Administration Proclamation whereby, inter alia, the laws of the Transvaal were mutatis mutandis, and as far as applicable,
declared in force in Swaziland and were to be administered as if
Swaziland were a district of the Transvaal. Swaziland was for
all intents and purposes on the way to incorporation into the
Transvaal (Mashasha 1974). In December 1, 1906 however,
Swaziland was disannexed from the Transvaal as South Africa was
moving towards the Union in 1910.

It is on the basis of the 1906 Order in Council that Swaziland
can be said to have finally lost the pieces of land to the
Transvaal and became a British colony until independence in 1968.

THE SWAZILAND CASE

PROFILE:

Size 17 369.4 km. sq.

SOCIAL

Population 712 694 in 1986
Population Growth 3.4% per annum
Population Structure 97% indigenous, 3% of South
African and Mozambican origins.
Projections 1 093 000 people by year 2 000
Youth 60% is less than 20 years of age
Working Population 100 000

LANGUAGE Swati; a dialect of Zulu
### ECONOMIC

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<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>Emalangeni = S.A. Rand = 3.3 US $</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Deficit</td>
<td>E 109.7 million (1992)</td>
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<td>Foreign Debt</td>
<td>E 585 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Official Reserves</td>
<td>E 63.6 million (1992)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sales Tax</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highest Revenue Earner</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>90% from South Africa</td>
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### POLITICAL

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<td>Head of Government</td>
<td>Prime Minister (appointed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cabinet Ministers</td>
<td>all appointed by the King</td>
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<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Two Chamber (elected &amp; appointed)</td>
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### LEGAL

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<td>System</td>
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Swaziland is a small country located between the north-eastern part of South Africa and Mozambique. The history of the Swazi people is difficult to capture due to the movement of people in the sub-region in the 17th and 18th centuries.
It is however a noted fact that the Swazi are a close relative of the Zulu and this is demonstrated by the language and cultural traditions. Well known Swazi historian Matsebula tends to base Swazi history solely on the ruling Dlamini clan but does however confirm the fact that continued relations were maintained with the Zulu during the period of state formation in Swaziland. Matsebula's history indicates that the Dlamini clan originated from the Tembe in Mozambique. It should however be noted that the Tembe are presently split between Mozambique and South Africa around the Ngwavuma area. I therefore suspect that the Dlamini had a stronger leaning towards the Zulu than the Tsonga. This piece of information is important in trying to understand why Swaziland is claiming the Ngwavuma area.

SWAZILAND-SOUTH AFRICAN LAND DEAL;

Swaziland attained its independence on September 6, 1968 through a Westminster type of constitution without a settlement of the territorial boundary leaving many Swazis in South Africa. The first independence elections of 1967 put the traditionalist King's party the Imbokodvo National Movement in Parliament with no seat for the opposition. The period between 1968 and 1973 was a period of consolidation for traditionalist policies in Swaziland and the slight upset at the polls in 1972 which gave the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) only three seats in Parliament was sufficient to persuade the King to declare the constitution un-Swazi and repeal it on April 12, 1973. This is an important development in terms of trying to understand the politics of post independent Swaziland and in particular the question of border adjustments. The repeal of the constitution and the introduction of a state of emergency elevated the monarch into a position of absolutism. The opposition to absolutist rule beginning in the late 1970s made the monarch feel a bit insecure in terms of its domestic base and therefore sought legitimacy and support from outside. South Africa was the most possible ally, Mozambique on the other hand was not easily accessible because it had just obtained its independence from Portugal in 1975 and had adopted a socialist
On the other hand Swaziland was an important Cold War buffer zone between communist Mozambique and capitalist-apartheid South Africa more especially because Machel in Mozambique had committed himself to assist the liberation struggle in South Africa. The liberation movement was given the opportunity to have operational offices in Mozambique and the infiltration of guerillas was on the increase.

It is on the basis of the above political developments that we can try to locate and even understand the land deal between South Africa and Swaziland in 1982.

WHY LAND DEAL?

"With the degree of secrecy surrounding the Swaziland South African land deal, and the extent of conscious manipulation of the media and the facts, it is impossible to come to any final and confident conclusions on some of the puzzling aspects of the issue." (SARS 1982:3)

The initial Swazi claim for the disputed territory was made in the 1960s although at the time South Africa's position was more towards the incorporation of the BLS states.

The land deal between South Africa and Swaziland came at a time when South Africa was battling with the question of homelands to try and prolong apartheid policies by dividing communities on the basis of ethnicity. Giving away pieces of land that had been cut out for Swazi speaking people was more in line with this strategy.

South Africa was experiencing unemployment problems as many workers were retrenched due to the recession and the mechanisation of agri-business. This superfluity of labour was reaching a crisis point and it seemed easier to embark on a strategy of exporting it.
The question of a buffer zone between Mozambique and South Africa was possibly another reason whereby a longer stretch of buffer would be more workable. This was more of a security question and coupled with the signing of the secret Pretoria Accord between Swaziland and South Africa in 1982 one can sustain this argument. The Pretoria Accord was a security agreement between the two countries whereby they both committed themselves to combating insurgency and it is widely speculated that the land deal was to be some form of compensation for effective control of ANC combatants from entering South Africa. It came as little surprise that the Swaziland Government actually engaged ANC combatants military in 1983/4 whereby some were actually killed and others handed over to Pretoria, similar to what they had done in Mozambique during the liberation struggle.

Although Swaziland had made land claims in the 1960s the question is about the timing of these claims. It is speculated that the land locked kingdom could have wanted to have access to the Indian Ocean through Kosi bay which had not been developed by the South African government in favour of Richards Bay. Although not clear what function this bay would have served for Swaziland it is speculated that it would have served a military function with the USA providing both the enormous capital and expertise needed, as well as the warships. (SARS 1982). Although the US state department denied such involvement it is clear that the Swazis could not have been able to develop a harbour like Kosi bay without the assistance of an economic power and moreover there was speculation that the USA was to its Indian Ocean base at Diego Garcia. (ibid).

This land deal actually meant that Swaziland would be importing a total of about 850 000 people with barren, less productive and scattered pieces of land (see map on annex. I).
On June 18, 1982 proclamations in the Government Gazette of South Africa formally abolished the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly (KNLA) and excised the Ingwavuma district from the administration of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) in preparation for the transfer to Swaziland.

**KANGWANE**

The dissolution of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly was a product of intense struggle between the South African Government and the people of KaNgwane involving lengthy meetings and a petition signed by 17 chiefs rejecting incorporation (SARS 1982:7). Incorporation had initially been supported by only two chiefs in KaNgwane but over time the number increased as the Government continued to lobby, for example, in February 1982 Dr. Piet Koornhof who was then Minister for Co-operation and Development (CAD) tried to sell unification with a great deal of money for development (ibid).

Two factions had emerged around this question of unification, one led by Enos Mabuza then Chief Executive Councillor for KaNgwane and the other led by David Lukhele who had previously rejected unification. The Mabuza faction rejected incorporation on the basis that they would lose many their right they had struggled for in South Africa;

Mabuza further stated that Swaziland's political system was not suitable because it did not allow for an opposition and that unemployment was rife. (SARS 1982)

Mabuza demanded a referendum to decide the question of incorporation which was rejected by Pretoria.

Lukhele on the other hand argued that incorporation would allow for "an acceptable citizenship of a politically stable country, an escape from Bantu education, and economic advantages." (cf SARS op cit).
The issue was ended when Mabuza took it to the Supreme court and the South African Government decided to reach a settlement out of court putting the matter to rest.

INGWAVUMA

INGwavuma falls under Kwazulu in Natal and from the very onset there was clear rejection of incorporation. The claim of the INgwavuma area is closely related to the fact that the ruling Dlamini clan in Swaziland is said to have originated from the Tembe tribe situated around the present borderline between Swaziland, Mozambique and South Africa. The Tembe tribe was divided by boundary demarcation in such a way that some went into Mozambique and others remained in South Africa (SARS op cit). Because Swaziland had targeted Kosi Bay in Natal, Sobhuza II sent a delegation to Chief Tembe in 1978 asking him to secede from Kwazulu. He was invited to go on a research tour to England to get archival information to prove the claim on Tongaland (part of Ingwavuma district). When confronted by the Kwazulu cabinet in October 1978 on this issue Tembe confirmed the Swazi secret initiative and from that day opposed incorporation (ibid).

Although having given his daughter to King Goodwill Zwelithini in the mid 1970s Sobhuza’s move had generated sufficient hostility from the Zulu so much that when he sent a delegation to Kwazulu on September, 14, 1979 the request for incorporation was rejected outrightly (ibid).

Negotiations with Pretoria on the Ngwavuma area without the consent of the Kwazulu cabinet did not promise to deliver as the voices of opposition started getting louder. Chief Minister of Kwazulu Gatsha Buthelezi actually threatened a violent backlash if the negotiations proceeded regardless of the fact that he had been promised some land in exchange of Ingwavuma. Buthelezi argued that Ingwavuma had always been a Zulu area and that Dingane was actually buried in the area.
To emphasise his point he actually announced that a tombstone would be erected in memory of Dingane in Ingwavuma, to emphasise the Zulu territorial claims and to indicate to Swaziland how sensitive an issue it would be to take over land where Dingane was buried (SARS 1982:10).

On June 18, 1982 Ingwavuma was excised from Kwazulu in preparation for the transfer to Swaziland regardless of the rejection and the matter was immediately taken to court by Kwazulu Legislative Assembly.

On June 25, Justice Shearer ruled that the Ingwavuma deal was illegal "on the grounds that insufficient consultation has been done with the Kwazulu Cabinet" (cf SARS 1982:13). This judgement put to rest the whole question of transfers of South Africa's homelands to the independent neighbouring states of Botswana for whom Bophutatswana was earmarked, Lesotho for whom Qwaqwa was earmarked and Swaziland for whom KaNgwane and Ingwavuma were earmarked.

CONCLUSION

The above example has demonstrated the complexity and emotional nature of the border question. The threat by then Chief Minister Buthelezi, to invade Swaziland if the deal went through is evidence of the potential riotous nature of this matter. In the KaNgwane case tensions within the disputed territory emerged as two contending parties were ready to fight it out. In Swaziland as well there were divisions on the issue as university students took to the streets in protest around 1982/83. Even the major underground opposition the People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) rejected the land deal and privately endorsed closer integration or even incorporation.
Border adjustment or integration would mean a closer look at the nature of the state in South Africa and the contending countries. As already evident in the case of KaNgwane, issues of democratic governance and human rights were raised by Mabuza in opposing incorporation to Swaziland. The important question here becomes: would the people in the disputed territories be willing to change loyalty. What would this mean in terms of their rights and possibilities of life chances. In a recent survey, the Star e.g. reported that many Swazis in the disputed territory would not want to be incorporated into Swaziland.

Would integration or corporation be meaningful under a federal, confederal or unitary state and to what extent can the neighbouring states influence such a process.

Border adjustments will without doubt be a very contentious issue as observed by the OAU way back in 1964. A more contentious part of border adjustments would involve claims for compensation and reparations which in this case might not arise.

Cooperation would possibly not necessarily change the boundaries except that structures and institutions of cooperation like the SADC, SACU and the CMA would have to be reviewed in such a way that would not lead to relations of super-ordination and subordination.

The border question is one of the most sensitive of questions in Africa and possibly the world today and will possibly become the most contentious issue for the coming century. Swaziland’s initiative for border adjustments with apartheid South Africa was frowned upon in the continent because she was dealing with an illegitimate Government on very sensitive national issues and most importantly because this attempt was seen as legitimising South Africa’s attempt at ethnic divisions.
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