THE 'DOG OF THE BOERS': THE RISE, FALL AND LEGACY OF MANGOPE IN BOPUTHATSWANA

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"...national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods. In my judgement this is the area of national studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed today." E.J. Hobsbawm (1990).

"Such circumstances led Moiloa (the Hurutshe chief) to the disconsolate observation in 1852 that he was no more than a 'Dog of the Boers'".

Introduction.

Between the 3rd. and 12th. of March, 1994 South Africa witnessed, in dramatic media coverage, the fall of Lucas Mangope's regime in the homeland of Bophuthatswana. Within days an interim administration was put in place and in the democratic elections which followed in April the North-West province, consisting of a substantial portion of the former Bophuthatswana, voted overwhelmingly for the African National Congress (A.N.C.) which Mangope had for years prevented from operating in the region. His overthrow was the second attempt to oust him. The first, in 1988, failed partly because it was a military as opposed to popular uprising and because the 1988 coup attempt was crushed by the intervention of the South African Defence Force. By 1994 however a significant shift in political development had occurred, and the National Party intervened not to prop up Mangope but to oversee his departure from the political arena. The "mini-revolution" in Bophuthatswana is memorable for two events which captured the imagination of South Africans, if not the world. The first was the targeted looting of shops and organisations in which Mangope and his Cabinet had interests, which turned later to widespread looting. The second was the shooting, in cold blood, by a member of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, of white right wingers of the paramilitary Afrikaner Weerstands beweging (AWB) who had entered the territory to assist Mangope in quelling the uprising.

This paper traces the rise and fall of Mangope, a man who dictated the fortunes of over two million people for over a decade. It defines the ideological basis of Bophuthatswana and analyses the various tactics and policies Mangope pursued to legitimate and sustain his homeland fantasy. This essentially involved a reformulation of earlier apartheid ethnic discourse. Although there was, from the mid-1990's a steady erosion of Mangope's credibility and support we suggest that, in the period leading up to the elections he

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political order. This he did by seeking alliances with other ethnically-minded elites in the
region. The article also discusses how and at what point he overplayed his hand and placed
himself outside the bounds of legitimate political discourse and action.

Finally the paper examines the nature of the popular insurrection which toppled Mangope,
and assesses whether the populist nature of institutions which sprung up after his downfall
will sustain democratic practice in the former Bophuthatswana, which now encompasses a
large section of the North West Province. This however has to be balanced against the
political legacy of the Mangope era which retarded the emergence of a democratic political
culture to a greater extent than the South African white supremacist state managed to do
throughout the 1970's and 80's. This distinction between the Bantustan state and the
central South African state implies that we reject the view that the latter represented a
hegemonic force controlling totally its constituent parts. As recent events have shown the
homeland elites did not passively accept the functional dictates of the South African state
and succeeded, within constraints, to restructure their own set of political, material and
ideological interests.

Our main argument in the Bophuthatswana context is that an elite powerholding group
restructured earlier apartheid ethnic discourse vis-a-vis. the impending social and economic
transformation in South Africa hoping to capture regional resources, knowing that the
establishment of a central, unified state would precipitate a crisis of accumulation and a
relocation of labour and capital. Thus it will be shown that appeals to "regionalism" and
"federalism" were a disguised or truncated version of "nation" or, perhaps, "regional
nationalism" as a political response to South Africa's political and economic restructuring.
We will contend that the earlier discourse and policy of independence and Batswana
nationhood that characterised the Bophuthatswana state was conceptually and materially
sculptured and blended into a regional/territorial concept. Notably, there was a
deracialisation or cleansing of the old "apartheid" discourse of "corporate federalism",
though ironically its new allies of the far right white still cling to outmoded racist
ideology. Woven into this was an inherent and perceived fear of being "pressed into a
corner" by a more powerful and numerous "Xhosa dominated" ANC. As Hobsbawm has
argued in a comparison of nineteenth and twentieth century nationalism, many recent
"national movements" are "defensive reactions", not concerned with "political modernity"
but "time and time again...reactions of weakness and fear, attempts to erect barricades to
keep at bay the forces of the modern world."

This, we argue, is the context in which Mangope's initiative to establish regional alliances
such as the Southern African Tswana Forum (SATSWA) should be seen. It was hoped that

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4 There is a significant body of work on the relationship between the South African state and the Bantustans. See for
6 As Hobsbawm argues, in an examination of the development of twentieth century nationalism, there is a
psychological component (open to manipulation) that "fuels such defensive reactions...whether against real or imaginary
threats" in response to "fundamental and unprecedented socio-economic transformations". See *Nations and Nationalism*, p.165.
this forum would give him leverage in a situation where their case for independence and a form of confederalism would not find acceptance.

Allied with these objectives is the need to uncover precisely to whom did homeland policies appeal, for the homeland was not created in a vacuum and Mangope has had to seek some legitimization by appealing to elements within Bophuthatswana and beyond. The article seeks to examine the ways Mangope's support base changed over time, for its position within the South African political context determined to a large extent the way in which the "reality" of Bophuthatswana was represented. It will be argued that in the 1950's and 60's the base of his support lay in a rural constituency, but that this expanded, as independence assumed a material reality, to include other interest groups in the mining, agricultural and business sectors. The persistence of a rural based alliance has been rather overshadowed by these other interests, but needs to be borne in mind particularly as it provided the basis for Mangope's attempt to retain access to land in a regional dispensation. In addition the creation and consolidation of a large homeland bureaucracy helped enormously in broadening the social base of his support, though it was precisely the shedding of support by this sector that led to his downfall.

Towards a Periodisation

Mangope's conception and discourse of ethnicity and nationalism resonated with a sense of the Tswana past and reflected changing political developments and material conditions in South Africa over the past forty years or so. We have identified seven historical phases which are of importance. The earlier phases he employed to give supposedly rational arguments for his policies. These are

1) the precolonial period, characterised incorrectly as a time of Tswana unity and integration with a clear hierarchy of authority,
2) the colonial period from c. 1820, especially the last half of the nineteenth century which was characterised by Boer and British competition for domination of the Tswana,
3) the period marking his entry into politics during the apartheid era and the bantustan formation years of the 1950's and 60's,
4) the espousal of non-racialism and flirtation with "liberal democracy" between about 1977-84, summed up in the title of Mangope's book "A Place for All"8,
5) the late 1980's call for Pan-Tswanaism with Botswana and a reversal of the wrongs of colonialism,
6) the time of intense "go it alone" nationalism coinciding with global nationalism prompted largely by the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.in the 1990's and the resurgence of ethnicity on the political agenda and finally 7) the South Africa Tswana Forum or SATSWA option of March 1991 with its focus on a regional conservative alliance based on mining and agricultural interests and its manifestation in the form of the Concerned South Africans Group(COSAG). These are not entirely discreet phases; they often overlap and reflect the shifting and sometimes contradictory nature of official Bophuthatswana

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8 L. M. Mangope, A Place for All, Via Afrika, Johannesburg, 1978.
thought and discourse. To these phases we should add the final assessment of his fall and legacy.

1 Precolonial

Two forms of legitimatory discourse seem to have been articulated regarding the ethnic origins of "nations", both of which were applied by the homeland authorities and ideologues. The first has been identified by Debray ⁹ who points to two primary or anthropological determinants that define the social construction of "nation". These are the "delimitation of time" and the "assignation of origins". This fixing of a point of origin allows for ritualisation which legitimises and reinforces the social group's identity especially during periods of social, economic or political stress. This was most commonly employed by the proponents of Tswana nationalism to suggest the irreversibility of a Tswana "nation" built on a mythical past. This is encapsulated in a Tswana tradition that they arose from a bed of reeds at Ntswana Tdatsi (Where the sun sets). Thus, according to such ideologues, the Tswana were delimited within an enclosed and identifiable space from the origin of time. As was the case with the South African state's discourse of ethnos, the unity of the Tswana was simply asserted. This is a highly problematic claim.

The Tswana nation was taken as given and, so the argument goes, it was only the British who came and destroyed the fabric of Tswana nationhood in the colonial era. This view was strongly held by Mangope himself and became embedded in official homeland polemic. "The history of the Batswana nation", he is reported as saying to CODESA in 1992, "goes back to the 11th century when it inhabited the greatest portion of the country north of the Orange river and south west of the Zambezi. We lived here as a sovereign and free people until we suffered the fate of the northward expansion of colonial Britain". From this it is concluded that "Bophuthatswana is not the product of apartheid but the legacy of British imperialism and colonialism that went wrong."¹⁰ British disregard for the Keate Award of 1871, which gave recognition to the land rights of some Tswana chiefdoms, was generally regarded and presented as "an act of colonial betrayal".¹¹

The second ideological justification saw nationhood as being conferred through the granting of "independence" by South Africa. Thus an officially sponsored study claimed that "of major significance is the fact that while the Tswana lost their independence as tribes, they regained it {in 1977} as a nation, encompassed within a Tswana state".¹²

Though there is a certain commonality in the Tswana past built on the sharing of conditions, circumstances and language we argue that these are false conceptions of the Tswana past. Yet it has been the cornerstone on which Bophuthatswana has been built. In short there was no Tswana "nation" and attempts to revive or re-create it rest on a false

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¹¹ See Supplement to The Mafikeng Mail, 4 December 1992 under the heading "Bophuthatswana, A History of Colonial Betrayal."
assumption. While totemic forms of consciousness existed in precapitalist African societies, the incorporation of these societies into a wider capitalist world "yielded novel ethnic affiliations and groupings" of which the Tswana were one. As the work of the Comaroffs has shown, the idea of a self-conscious Tswana ethnic identity cannot be traced back to the mists of time. Tswana identity was constructed mostly from the outside by agents of colonialism who had a distorted view of the structure, organisation and cultural symbols of the people they classified. This process involved the participation of the indigenous people under the stimulus of the colonial order. Thus Tswana ethnic consciousness was a phenomenon that emerged and spread unevenly from the latter half of the nineteenth century, supplanting totemic forms of consciousness that existed within autonomous chiefdoms living in the area prior to the colonial period. It is ironic that these colonial agents, who provided a conception of the collective Tswana identity used to advance Tswana ethnic consciousness, were accused by Mangope of betraying the Tswana and depriving them of their rightful and historic homeland. Nationhood is however an emotionally powerful, credible and convenient rallying point and an argument which no doubt appeals to many audiences, a fact which perhaps explains why Mangope was allowed to address the United Nations Security Council.

What Mangope and others confused and conflated is this sense of commonality with a sense of community. As Pieterse explains "ethnic identity comprises many different modes along a wide spectrum ranging from objective markers to subjective identifications." There are then fundamental differences between ethnic category/group, ethnic community or ethnicity and ethno-nationalism. The first may be defined in terms of "objective cultural markers" (language, dialect, dress, custom, religion, etc.), the second is an ethnic category "that has adopted one or more of its marks of cultural distinctiveness and used them as symbols both to create internal cohesion and to differentiate itself from other ethnic groups". In this sense "ethnicity is to ethnic category what class consciousness is to class." Central to this process is ethno-nationalism involving the politicisation of ethnic community.

The constant reference to, and refrain upon the precolonial and colonial past thus was important as it provided a set of organising principles upon which to sculpture the new state. Central to this organisation was the institution of legitimate traditional authorities. In Tswana societies chiefs were the cornerstone of political organisation and activity and derived material power from their control of the land and other resources, particularly cattle. Chiefs were paid tribute (sehuba) but were expected to dispense patronage and to ensure that the needy did not suffer. Chiefs who overstepped the bounds of their authority and privilege or failed to carry out their duties to society could be forced out of office. The ultimate sanction against a recalcitrant chief was desertion by his followers.

16 Pieterse, "Varieties of Ethnic Politics", p. 5.
Mangope, as a traditional leader (though by no means paramount Tswana chief) had a profound sense of what he was owed with correspondingly little sense of his obligations. The constitutional power he wielded as President of a state with no official opposition meant that he could exercise his chiefly control with little threat - in short the kind of precolonial sanctions mentioned above were removed, giving him the best of both worlds. Employing a conception of the traditional powers vested in chiefs during precolonial times, Mangope frequently resorted to removing chiefs opposed to him from office. In Phokeng chief Lebone Molatlegi was deposed and his wife deported, and in Taung chief Mankurwane met the same fate. Both are paramount chiefs, no less senior to Mangope himself. In Braklaagte the Sebogodi family was ousted for opposing reincorporation to Bophuthatswana though they clearly held majority support in the village. These represent the most flagrant cases but other instances of interference also can be cited. Mangope thus was concerned about his rural constituency and determined not to let go his grip on rural affairs. The earlier “organising principles” of precolonial social structure were thus been carried through from the past to the era of modern apartheid and manipulated to suit the particular needs of the ethnically based state. This created a distortion of the nature of precolonial social organisation. As many scholars have noted, the Tswana meraka frequently absorbed groupings from outside, especially during the Difaqane period in the 1820’s, and showed widely divergent ethnic origins. Far from being exclusive, Tswana society was structured in such a way as to allow and cope with inclusion.

Mangope’s construction of the ethnic state encompassed a view that corresponds closely with Brass’ idea of inter-ethnic struggle for resources, based on certain rights.¹⁷ At independence non-Tswana’s believed the Constitution Act and the Bill of rights would protect them but there has been since that time a consistent campaign against them. At the end of the 1970’s there was for example harassment in the form of police raids against non-Tswana’s opposed to independence in the Odi-Moretele region. The early 80’s witnessed further “official harassment” of non-Tswana’s in the form of denial of work permits, citizenship and pensions. The time from 1983 to about 1986 Keenan periodises as the "Nigerian" option¹⁸ - when two million migrants, mainly Ghanains, were expelled. Bophuthatswana amended the Land Control Act to redefine non-Tswana citizens as squatters to provide legal legitimacy for their eviction. From 1986 discrimination against non-Tswana’s has not been followed with any particular determination (though it did not stop) because the state’s attention began to focus more on the growing threat posed by the resurgence of forces within South Africa opposed to the Bantustan system.

The Colonial Period

An aspect of Bophuthatswana’s interpretation of its position rested on historical circumstances going back to the colonial period. Basically, this period was characterised by competition for the land and resources of the Tswana between the British and the Boers of

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the South African Republic. However the Tswana themselves were divided in their reaction to external pressures, some communities strategically allying with the Boers to settle old scores with their traditional rivals, some becoming total dependents of the Boer Republics, and others siding with British imperial interests. The Tshidi Barolong on the one hand and the Ratlou and Rapulana factions on the other became longstanding enemies due to the fact that the South African Republic attempted to advance its land claims through its allies, the Ratlou and Rapulana. Similarly, factions of the Tlhaping were torn even further apart by taking sides in the struggle between Boers and the British for control of the region. Other communities, like Moiloa's Hurutshe, were subject to intense demands for labour and tax, that led to the self-deprecatory remark, cited in the title, that he was no more than a "Dog of the Boers".

Ironically {in the light of recent initiatives to form an alliance with local Afrikaners} it was in Mmabatho, the stronghold of Bophuthatswana, that the Barolong people in the 1870's and 1880's were subject to the most intense pressure on their lands from mainly Boer freebooters. Moreover Tswana chiefdoms subject to Boer hegemony were forced to enter into complex and often contradictory relationships with their rulers that involved both co-operation and resistance. As will be seen later British\Boer conflict and the false notion of an uncomplicated and persistent Afrikaner\Tswana unity again have surfaced in the discourse and initiatives of homeland politics.

Bantustan Formation

Thus echoes of the precolonial and colonial past reverberated around the political arena and in the Bophuthatswana media to justify, explain or rationalise certain actions and policies. Ironically though Mangope cannot lay claim to significant chiefly status. Let us turn now to examine this key individual on whom the edifice of Bophuthatswana rested and around whom Tswana identity was built in terms of the Grand Apartheid system.

Mangope is from the Bahurutshe chiefdom, most of whom have long inhabited a reserve to the north of Zeerust. The Mangope clan was at one time a senior one amongst the Hurutshe but did not occupy land in the reserve. In the mid-nineteenth century the Mangope faction moved to modern Botswana. They returned some twenty years later but, having once departed the area, were obliged formally to accept the authority of the Bahurutshe ba Gopane who allowed them to settle in the reserve at Motswedi, within the area of their authority. Only in 1941 was the independence of the Hurutshe at Motswedi recognised, an act which offended the Gopane chiefs but which endeared the Mangope chiefly family to the government. Circumstances then played into the hands of the Mangope family. Though the Moiloa family based at Dinokana were recognised as the Hurutshe paramounts, in 1957-58 Abram Moiloa was in the forefront of the "Hurutshe revolt" against the taking of passes and was deposed and fled to Botswana. As most of the Moiloa family had supported Abram, and were A.N.C. members, the Bantu Affairs Department then cast around for a traditional authority that would administer affairs according to the dictates of Departmental policy. At this time the reserve had been earmarked to become the first Regional Authority in the Transvaal, a first step on the
route to the Bantustan policy devised by the architects of "Grand Apartheid". Thus it was doubly necessary to find a chief who would be compliant with state policy. The obvious choice was Lucas Mangope, father of the future president of Bophuthatswana, and chief at Motswedi. Not only was Mangope beholden to the government for conferring independent status on him, but he had openly sided with the government in the disturbances of 1957-58. He died before he could be appointed but on the 7 August 1959 his son was installed head of the Bahurutshe Tribal Authority. At the ceremony Chief Lucas "delighted his critics by imploring the Minister of Bantu Administration to 'lead us and we shall try to crawl'". This behaviour and simpering apologia was the apotheosis of the language of bantustan subservience.

Two key points thus emerge from this account of the origins of the Tswana bantustan and the Mangope family's role. First, Mangope's claim to paramountcy, even over the Bahurutshe, (let alone over other Tswana communities) has little validity. It is of course largely immaterial whether homeland leaders have legitimacy- even if they do it does not legitimate the system- but Mangope justified his control over tribal structures partly on the grounds that he is a chief of significant status. This status, as we have indicated, stems more from his appointment to head of the Tribal Authority than to genuine paramountcy.

The second point to note is that it is apparent that Mangope's position was created and underwritten by the South African state. From the very start of his career, he aligned himself with the South African authorities and was a key player in their plans for the creation of Bophuthatswana. In 1961 he became deputy of the Tswana Territorial Authority and in 1972 he secured enough support to become chief minister of the self-governing bantustan of Bophuthatswana.

Though Mangope's rise to power was due entirely to the policies of the South African government, the idea of forging a Tswana identity which could be promoted to advance the interests of Tswana people in relation to other ethnic groups had been rooted in a legacy of identity formation propagated by important figures in the nineteenth century. Thus the idea of a given Tswana "nation" is not only rooted in "traditionalist" thinking. As much literature on ethnicity in Africa has argued, it is a notion reinforced, often invented, by "cultural brokers", such as missionaries, intellectuals, anthropologists and others who provide rational argument or scientific "evidence" for peoples' definitions of self or social constructions of reality. Missionaries such as Moffat forged a sense of cultural identity, bearing the imprint of Christian Europe, by standardising the Tswana language and translating the Bible into Setswana. It was Moffat who coined the term "Tswana" to give a historical and social construct to the people among whom he worked. Tswana intellectuals in the early nineteenth century formed themselves into organisations such as the Barolong National Council and the Barolong Progressive Association to promote their...
broad interests under the banner of Tswana ethnicity. S.M. Molema, the renowned author and historian, in his later years praised Mangope for his decision to take independence.

If there was a body of intellectual backing for the idea of a Tswana nation there was also a more material source of support for the taking of "independence". This lay in the emergent elites which had established themselves in the Tswana reserves and appreciated the advantages to be gained from being the beneficiaries of commercial enterprises in the reserves which had formerly been the preserve of whites and Indians. Case studies reveal that this category of entrepreneur formed an alliance with certain chiefs and were supported by state officials of the Native Affairs Department in the 1940's and 50's. According to Clynick there was also an alliance between capitalising white Afrikaner farmers and the bantustan apparatchik that was later to pave the way for the entry of cooperatives into Bophuthatswana and a development model based on technocratic management of agriculture through Agricor, the parastatal set up to promote agriculture. The significance of this alliance has often been overlooked though it has not been disguised. Mangope himself was a active commercial farmer, as were many of his significant political supporters and this agricultural strategy has benefitted this class at the expense of the former African tenants thrown off white farms and relocated in the homeland. As will be seen later the idea of a Tswana\Afrikaner rural oligarchy {with the addition of a mineral exploiting component} was given more formal substance towards the end of Mangope's political career.

We contend therefore that there existed certain social forces and interest groups who sought, successfully as it transpired, to use the homeland edifice as a basis for further accumulation. There was during the late 60's and 1970's a growing economic chasm between this class and masses of dispossessed African producers thrown off black spots or white farms and resettled in the homeland.

At a later stage only did the Bophuthatswana regime consolidate and expand its support through the creation of a large bureaucracy whose support it was able to capture through job creation, fear and patronage. This never constituted a loyal constituency and this bureaucracy, as events proved, switched allegiances with little difficulty to the African National Congress which it believed could offer better opportunities. Initially Mangope's support therefore rested on mainly on a narrow rural elite and a questionable traditional authority on whom he counted and to whose interests he looked. This necessitated an ongoing and energetic propaganda campaign to unite the inhabitants of Bophuthatswana.

23 For the Barolong National Council see the work of T.Clynick, forthcoming. For the Barolong Progressive association see C. Murray.

24 Personal communication, Jane Starfield,1993. See also the Manuscript by S.M Molema on " History of the Barolong"; A.D.1 Molema Papers, University of the Witswatersrand, where he talks approvingly of Mangope's role in "creating an opportunity for a wider scope for service" by taking "self-rule".

26 This view is emerging in the work of Tim Clynick who is examining the evolution of the Tswana based reserves in the twentieth century.
under the banner of "Tswanaism", and to strive for international recognition on the basis that it constituted a nation.

"A Place for All"

After attaining independence the leaders of Bophuthatswana switched to a new line of argument in pursuance of recognition as a sovereign state. Independence offered the chance to establish a non-racial society at a time when South Africa itself was still in the grip of apartheid. Bophuthatswana was thus presented as "A Place for All", a haven of non-racialism. In respects this had some foundation but it also served as a propagandist opportunity. Accompanying this was an attempt to portray Bophuthatswana as a "liberal democracy" with a Bill of Rights with in-built protection for the rights of individuals. Central to this was the use of key ideological state apparatus, in particular formal education, to provide for the social and cultural reproduction of a form of Batswana identity and history, similar to the Botswana nation building Kagiso Education Commission. In particular geography and history text books provided the curricula foundations for the delimitations of space and time respectively. At the level of tertiary education the establishment of an Institute of African Studies at the University of Bophuthatswana for example largely provided for an ideological base for a particular type of Tswana studies affording cultural brokerage for government.27

This type of argument however could not be sustained, for two reasons. Firstly it was designed mainly to appeal to an international audience and had little relevance for the masses who, desperate for jobs and security, viewed outsiders or "foreigners" as competitors and were more likely to buy the notion of exclusive ethnic nationalism. The "place for all" strategy was thus inherently contradictory, particularly as it was pursued simultaneously with the denial of work permits, citizenship, and pensions to non-Tswana's.

Secondly it became clear that Bophuthatswana was not a place for political opponents as well. It was noted for example that the very last Section (18.1) in the Bill of Rights specified that other laws could override the Bill of Rights. These included the Internal Security Act and the Security Clearance Act which were increasingly used to suppress political opponents and organisations.28 Political repression in Bophuthatswana was thrown more sharply into focus by the rise of popular resistance, manifested by the formation and growth of the United Democratic Front, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and student organisations, which began to actively oppose the homeland system. In 1990 a state of Emergency was declared to enable the state to deal more effectively with the "threat" to Bophuthatswana's independence. Adding to this decline in the "democratic image" of Bophuthatswana was the exclusion of non-Tswana's and the eradication of rural powerbases opposed to Mangope's rule referred to earlier. The situation thus became reversed-as there was an increasing degree of political tolerance in South Africa there was a rising intolerance in Bophuthatswana. From about 1985 the rhetoric of free political expression ceased to be heard in Bophuthatswana ruling circles.

Pan-Tswanaism

By the late 1980's the idea of presenting Bophuthatswana as a liberal democratic state was no longer tenable and, with an upsurge of political activity in South Africa and the concomitant demand for a unitary state, Mangope turned in the early 1980's to embrace enthusiastically the notion of Pan-Tswanaism. Of course this derived from the idea of the all encompassing Tswana nation. But he used this concept to propagate an idea that was essentially novel. The British, by dividing the Tswana "Nation" in 1885 when the distinction was made between the Protectorate and British Bechuanaland (later annexed to the Cape and thus becoming part of South Africa), were now held responsible for depriving the Tswana in South Africa of the independence enjoyed by their kin in Botswana. While it was true that the British had laid down an arbitrary border it did not in fact divide a "Nation" though it certainly did divide certain chiefdoms, such as the Hurutshe and Rolong, from their kinsfolk. However this line of argument shifted the debate back to the colonial era, and exonerated the proponents and executers of segregation and apartheid. The shift to British colonialism provided the opportunity to re-assign the origins of the contemporary Tswana political condition in order to provide a legitimatory basis for three broad objectives.

First to absolve his own collaborative role in the reproduction of the apartheid state, second to provide an expedient and identifiable discourse and rationale for his claims to international recognition, articulated in such fora as the United Nations and the British House of Commons, and lastly to provide a basis for the forging of an alliance with conservative interests in the region who have a common abhorrence for British colonialism and a belief that nations have a right to self-determination. In addition to these legitimating objectives, this rhetoric helped to counter internal pressures against Bophuthatswana's independence.

The appeal for independence based on Pan-Tswanaism failed, primarily and most ironically because it was rejected by the very people with whom Mangope felt himself historically embraced - the Tswana of Botswana. Botswana, though recognising language and other cultural links between its citizens and those people resident in Bophuthatswana, refused to recognise Bophuthatswana's independence. This led to an ambivalent attitude whereby on the one hand Bophuthatswana appealed to a sense of common Tswana identity whilst on the other it exerted pressure on Botswana to force that country into low level diplomatic contact and negotiations. In 1982 for example Bophuthatswana constructed a dam which drew water from the major source for the Gaborone dam. In the arguments which followed Bophuthatswana insisted that Botswana negotiate directly with her instead of South Africa, calling in addition for "a round table conference ... with the

29 This point is made by Drummond. "According to this line of reasoning Bophuthatswana was not a child of apartheid but rather the bastard offspring of British colonial rule in Southern Africa", Drummond J. 'Reincorporating the Bantustans into South Africa: The Question of Bophuthatswana', Geography, 76, (1991), PP. 379-373.
30 In 1977 President Seretse Khama referred to Bophuthatswana when it attained independence as a "child of Apartheid", Mophong Mafu, 1 July 1977.
In 1986/87 Bophuthatswana took advantage of its geopolitical situation in southern Africa to exert pressure on Botswana whilst simultaneously maintaining its calls for diplomatic links. On this occasion Bophuthatswana placed a visa restriction on Botswana citizens which effectively closed the border and severely disrupted road and rail links between Botswana, Bophuthatswana and the R.S.A. The rationale behind this action was made abundantly clear when Mangope warned at the annual Independence celebration that "if Botswana cannot change its foreign policy on Bophuthatswana and continues with its mud-slinging, then Bophuthatswana will have no option but to retaliate."32

A further reason why the idea of a fully united Tswana state failed was because it is the stated policy of the Organisation of African Unity that the colonial boundaries should remain as they were at the time of independence of the member states. Thus with the pan-Tswanaism concept fairly well dead and buried (though not entirely; its appeal is to strong for certain die hard nationalists) the homeland regime sought new arguments to legitimise its continued existence.

**Global Nationalism**

Fortuitously the events precipitated by the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the revival of nationalist sentiments and actions in the various republics gave added impetus to arguments for nationhood and ethnicity. Though this was never a clear or fully separate phase of a search for respectable political discourse, there was nevertheless a regular searching for other examples or political arguments for nationhood, of which the growth of nationalist sentiment and movements in the Soviet Union was just one, albeit powerful, justification for status as an independent nation.

Israel’s determination to preserve its identity and status as a nation was seen as a source of inspiration for the newly created Batswana nation in Bophuthatswana. For example the Minister of Information at an independence day celebration at the Bophuthatswana Trade Mission in Israel drew comparisons between the two countries. He noted that the "similarities between the founding of Israel and those of the Botswana in regaining their promised land are truly remarkable."33 This explains the close relationship that grew between Bophuthatswana and Israel. Since 1977 there were regular exchanges and national development initiatives. Israeli advisors and businessmen frequently visited and were given favourable positions and contracts in Bophuthatswana.

Similarly dignitaries arrived from the Ukraine at the Bophuthatswana Independence celebrations in 1992 to "foster goodwill" and to "teach us about the newly independent Ukraine", and its struggles to distance itself from the Russian state. In 1992 a trade advisor, 

33 Mafikeng Mail, 4 Nov 1992.
doubling as an "ambassador", was sent off to Riga to form relations with the newly independent state of Latvia. Subsequently in July 1993 Mangope and some advisors visited Latvia to strengthen this link by the opening of the Information Service of Bophuthatswana (ISOB). In an address to the Latvian Foreign Affairs Committee, Mangope proceeded to lay an ideological foundation for a possible future relationship based on drawing out historical similarities between the two. He noted that they "have many things in common - including the fear of communism, which in South Africa is a threat in the form of the A.N.C." He concluded that the irony of their two histories will not be lost on the Latvians when I tell you that the masterminds behind the sinister plot to seize total power in our region are drawn from the ranks of the South African Communist Party (and) ...the the African National Congress who are still committed to classic communist doctrine in spite of its disastrous consequences and its abject failure wherever it has been allowed to poison society."

This East European ethnic discourse and policy captured the imagination of the Bophuthatswana media. An editorial noted Yugoslavia's release from the "yoke of communism" and the fact that this led not to "rejoicing" but a "bloody war between different ethnic groupings in the territory". It lauded what it saw as "a democratic solution to the problem by the United Nations to stop this warring between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims." The solution, it observed, is based on a "brokered ceasefire in terms of which the country will be broken up into ethnic states." Significantly convoluted and crude analogies are made with the "National Party arguments in favour of apartheid and the division of ethnic groups" premised historically on the fact that these ethnic groups "did not get on and separation would prevent violence." However events within South Africa, especially from 1990, tended to focus attention more on national as opposed to international developments. The resurgence of global nationalism did however provide a useful background to Bophuthatswana's later attempt to find respectability and the chance for continuity as a separate ethnically based nation.

**SATSWA-The Southern African Tswana Forum.**

Bophuthatswana's SATSWA initiative must be seen against the background of Mandela's release, the CODESA negotiations, and the reality of South African restructuring leading towards a unitary state dispensation. Behind the scenes activity and informal debates about this imminent restructuring led, on the 15 March 1991, to the first official meeting of interest groups in the region to explore a wide range of issues including agriculture, mining, business, education, health, social services and rural development. This provided the basis for a conference on regional government convened on 23 March 1992. The social basis and support for this initiative comprised 320 Bophuthatswana government and

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34 Malitele, Mail, July 9, 1993.
35 Quoted in Malitele, Mail, 9 July 1993.
36 Malitele, Mail, 7 May 1993.
parastatal officials, academics from the Universities of Bophuthatswana and Potchefstroom and also regionally based farmers and businessmen, including some mining interests.

From this evolved the idea of regional consolidation referred to by the Star as a "Tswana-Boereland superstate." This plan would lead to a region which would be the second largest in size, encompassing most of present Bophuthatswana, large portions of the Orange Free State, including Bloemfontein, parts of the Northern Cape, including Kimberley and Upington. {See Map} Provision was also made for the farming areas and agricultural interests of Ellisras, Thabazimbi and Nylstroom in the north-western Transvaal. As Drummond notes the aim of SATSWA was "to promote a 'greater Bophuthatswana', which would incorporate and guarantee white farming interests, against an envisaged centralist state". The population of the area was projected to be about 6.3 million inhabitants (56% Tswana speaking). It would have a Gross Geographic Product (GGP) of 239 billion Rand comprising, inter alia, 60% mining interests, 11% commerce and industry and 3% agriculture. The mining interest was based on large geological studies on mineral deposits of platinum, chrome, iron, manganese, gold, asbestos, tin, diamonds, copper, zinc and lead.

Mangope's presentation to a meeting of the Forum on the 26 March 1992 was both informative and instructive in its construction of Batswana history and in its attempt to forge a new set of material interests for the region.

At the outset his address was concerned about the tendency to homogenise the TVBC states. He lamented the trend to generalise in lumping all the TVBC states together as if they were a "homogenous group or single entity." The adoption of the notion of ethnic difference from the other states is clearly spelt out and perceived in terms of "history", "development", "economy", "achievements" and "apart from other reasons, because we are a democracy." Most important Mangope claimed emphatically that "we are an independent nation" and "not a product of apartheid". His historical grounds for this interpretation is premised on the "fact" that in 1977 "we regained the independence which the British so treacherously took from us at the turn of the last century".

The appeal for regionalism was constructed and argued against a perceived fear of the "idea of one unitary state based on a "one man one vote situation and the winner takes all" alternative. Mangope argued that a "logical solution" to this fear is "the devolution of power to regional governments." The basis and success this regionalism rested on the notion of bringing together "groups of people who share the same basic values, norms and beliefs".

37 The Star, March 27, 1993.
39 See The Mafikeng Mail, 4 December 1992. "There is no doubt that in the minds of all South African leaders, that Bophuthatswana is seen as uniquely different from any other in the former or present homelands. It occupies a special place."
40 These quotations come from President Mangope's address to the SATSWA Forum.
At this point Mangope's address significantly shifted its tack by employing Afrikaans as a linguistic medium. The "Afrikaner en die Batswana" are seen "in vele opsigte dieselfde waardes, geloof, en norme handhaaf" [In all respects to have the same values, beliefs and norms]. These "same values" are grounded in beliefs of "Christlike-beginsels" {Christian principles}, "vreedsame naasbestaan" [peaceful co-existence], "onderskryf deur beginsels van die vrye mark stelsel" [commitment to the free enterprise system] and faith in "waarde aan ons tradities, ons taal en ons geskiedenis" [worth in our own traditions, our language and our history].

While the material bases and anticipated social support for this regionalism was not evident at this juncture of the address Mangope did make a strong psychological appeal to both perceived and imaginary threats to this co-existence. He for instance made reference to a "n ou Tswana spreekwoord" [an old Tswana saying]; "Fifing go tshwaranwa ka dikobo" translated into Afrikaans as "waneer dit donker is moet ons aan mekaar se komberse of klere vashou" [when it becomes dark we must together hold on to each others blankets and clothes.] This darkness was metaphorically projected into the then South African political crisis and debates around a unitary South Africa:

"Breer vertaal sou dit kon beteken dat, in tye van nood en gevaar, moet ons mekaar se hande vat en saam die toekoms aandurf. Ek glo dat nou, meer as ooit tevore die tyd aangebreek het dat die Afrikaner en die Batswana in die Westlike gebiede van Suider Afrika mekaar se hande moet vat en met moed en geloof aan 'n nuwe toekoms werk" {Broadly translated it can mean that in times of need and danger we must embrace each others hands and embrace the future together. I believe that now, more than ever, the Afrikaner and the Batswana in the western part of Southern Africa must take each others hands and with determination and conviction work towards a new future.}

This response to political darkness and future uncertainty was not limited by Mangope to the contemporary South African political crisis. Indeed Mangope referred to the "seventiende eeu" [seventeenth century] when "n teen woordigheid en beskawing in die gebied Suid en Wes van die Zambesie gevestig het". It was as a result of this threat that the Batswana "saam men Griekwa en Voortrekker moes ons veg teen vyandige boorlinge en impis wat ons Christelike geloof en beskawingspeil bedreig het." {The Batswana stood together with the Griqua and voortrekkers against the enemy tribes and regiments that threatened their Christian belief and civilisation} Against this historical interpretation Mangope, in addition to assuming a typical colonial discourse, guaranteed his audience that they could rest assured "u kan gerus" that this historical period was a clear indication of the "noue bande wat daar in die verlede tussen Afrikaner en Tswana bestaan het." {The close bonds that have existed between Afrikaner and Tswana.}

The documents presented at SATSWA which provided the reasoning and various justifications for it, require comment on two levels. Firstly, historically one can detect again the falsification to suit particular ends. The Tswana are presented as a homogenous entity who acted with one intention and with one interest. In fact the various chiefdoms assumed differing attitudes and tactics to the imposition of white domination. Moreover by the beginning of the twentieth century, if not before, Tswana society had become
sufficiently differentiated for separate groups and classes to act independently towards white farmers and capitalists. In addition the notion of Tswana/Afrikaner unity in the past is presented as given and uncomplicated, whereas relationships were fraught with conflict and contradiction. Certainly collaboration, even co-operation, was one tactic resorted to by Tswana chiefs. But these tactics were not based on any notion of a common identity. Rather they were short-lived, pragmatic and accommodating, and Tswana leaders were just as prone to follow a path of opposition and noncooperation. However in the SATSWA discourse this presumed unity was elevated to a truism while at the same time the differences between the Tswana and other major African chiefdoms, especially the Zulu and Xhosa, are exaggerated and highlighted to preserve a regional identity in the face of the threat of absorption into a unitary state dominated by more powerful and numerous forces.

Secondly, in a contemporary sense this "unity" is projected into the present to provide the basis for regional cooperation. Thus the documents refer to the regional sense of communality or regional loyalty which "should be taken into account". Ethnicity is not obscured; in fact it is the point of reference for the regional dispensation. While admitting that in the historical past the "criterion" of ethnicity "achieved mixed success" and, "because of its racial connotations...should be avoided in future demarcation considerations", the documents however add that the "fact is that ethnicity cannot be ignored and that culture, language, religion and traditions need to be taken into consideration in any future demarcation". Or, as one senior Bophuthatswana official put it, the "ANC wants to play down the difference of ethnic groups...but we cannot accept that". The threat of losing control of access to jobs and material benefits was strongly stated as a justification for a regional dispensation. For example the fear of possible loss of jobs in the bureaucracy to returning exiles is expressed by senior officials in the Public Service Commission. The ANC Regional Proposals, which advocate a region comprising the present Transkei, Border and Ciskei are interpreted as an attempt to hold on to an ethnic powerbase and are advanced as a reason to allocate resources on a regional and ethnic basis to Bophuthatswana. The ANC and National Party "alliance" was seen as operating "primarily for the benefit of an urban bourgeoisie and the Xhosa ethnic group" and "all others would be excluded from full participation in the benefits of political patronage."

The Bophuthatswana/Conservative Party alliance was then seen as being counterhegemonic to the ANC/NP alliance. The SATSWA option was a purely functionalist and manipulative exercise, prompted by material threats and justified on spurious and questionable grounds. It obscured obvious class divisions which existed in the region and assumed a kind of consensual homogeneity. At the same time however the initiative was aimed at creating a form of inter-ethnic class based cooperation.

42 See SATSWA document 1, "Regional Government for the Western Transvaal, Bophuthatswana and the Northern Cape, and Document 2 "SATSWA Regional Demarcation Proposal."
43 Cited in Jeffrey, Conflict in Bophuthatswana,p.183.
This flirtation with right wing politics was taken a step further with the formation of the Concerned South African Group (COSAG), comprising broad conservative interest groups including the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Conservative Party and Parties in the Ciskei. This alliance was formed to oppose emergent and more powerful political forces. This eventually coalesced into the Freedom Front to fight the A.N.C. on the one hand and the National Party on the other. By late 1993 Mangope had firmly placed his future in a nationally based right wing alliance.

Towards The Insurrection of March 1994.

As the crisis deepened in Bophuthatswana the government's actions became more and more politically extreme, undermining the very basis of its previously rational and seemingly "fair" contestation for the region. The main reason for this irrational extremism lay in the growing opposition to the government from within and the shrinking social base from which the state operated. At the forefront of opposition were students and school pupils who in the first half of 1993 mounted strong protests against the Mangope administration. The University was at varying times closed or was on strike and Colleges of Education, Manpower Training Centres and the Technicon likewise were plagued by unrest and were periodically shutdown. An unscheduled closure of schools took place from the 15 to 20 June to pre-empt planned student protests during that period. Mangope refused to concede that this opposition came from "his" people, blaming the A.N.C. and its alliance members for infiltrating Bophuthatswana in order to destroy it from within.

Mangope, between May and July 1993, on three occasions called his civil servants to warn them not to listen to A.N.C. propaganda and not to transfer allegiance to the organisation. When dissent was expressed he called the civil servants "drunken pigs" and sent them home. Finally, on the 23 July, in a move which the SABC called "another blow to freedom of political expression in the country", he warned that any civil servants joining the A.N.C. of S.A.C.P. or sympathising with them would be fired. The management structures of BOP Broadcasting and the AGRICOR parastatal were restructured in an attempt to accommodate the interests and to buy the favour of a section of BaTswana whose paths to power were blocked by the existing, mainly white, top hierarchies. A major rucus developed between Mr. Andrew Khutsoane, Head of the Bophuthatswana National Library Services, and the government, after Khutsoane made public allegations concerning the integrity and honesty of Mr. Rowan Cronje, a long serving Cabinet Minister and Bophuthatswana's negotiator at the World Trade Centre. There were indications too that business interests were increasingly uneasy about future prospects if Bophuthatswana clung tenaciously to its independent status.

These developments were accompanied with an almost hysterical and anachronistic rhetoric that linked the A.N.C. to a communist plot to destroy the country, expressed graphically by the statements made by Mangope on his visit to Latvia. Thus these excesses painted a picture of a state loosing credibility and desperately trying to maintain its ground. They also undermined the reasonable and acceptable option of regionalism that the Mangope administration has worked so hard to present. By the start of 1994 Mangope's actions and attitudes had clearly begun to alienate intellectuals, students, civil servants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie whose support Mangope depended.
Despite these signs the suddenness of his fall took most people by surprise. However, as the comments in this introduction indicate, there could be no mistaking the deep seated antagonism felt towards his rule and his policy of alliance with the far right.

Mangope’s Legacy and Democratic Practice

In the period following Mangope’s overthrow there was a collapse of authority which could be described as a semi-revolutionary situation. From the outside the Transitional Executive Council in South Africa assumed control, sending in the South African Defence Force and establishing an interim office of the “Joint Administrators” to administer the region. On the ground there was an effloresence of “Staff Associations” formed in government and parastatal structures in twenty-eight districts of the former homeland to give expression to local demands and grievances. These structures grew out of “people’s fora” who allegedly elected them to represent them. They subsequently merged into a structure known as “The Joint Staff Association” which began to advise the office of the Joint Administrators and to make demands for the suspension of Mangope’s senior staff. Subsequently, Mangope’s cabinet and senior civil servants, army and police officers were removed. Unpopular chiefs were forced out of office and banished one’s returned. Some reorganisation of management structures in parastatals and the University began to take place to give expression to these democratic impulses. In short, it appeared that the region was experiencing a far more radical break from the past than was the case in South Africa where the ANC and De Klerk’s administration were forging a power sharing arrangement leading to negotiated democratisation.

However it began to become evident that civil servants’ concerns centred as much, if not more, around the issues of parity in wages and discontent over expatriates or seconded South African officials than around notions of democratic representation or transparency in government. The Joint Administrators found themselves facing the same hostile reaction over salary issues as did Mangope’s Ministers, despite President Mandela’s assurances that civil servants in the various administrations in the country would be given parity in wages.

In the rural areas the return to power of traditional leaders forced out by Mangope does not necessarily translate into the establishment of popular democratic practises or structures. Many might indeed be seeking to establish and entrench political and economic powers that they had lost in the Mangope years. Moreover Mangope entrenched the powers of chiefs (provided they supported him) during his rule. This was begun almost immediately after independence with the Weichers Commission which set in place tribal authorities with distinct powers. While “this was ostensibly done under the guise of decentralisation, community participation, rural development and democracy, the dominance of the state and its bureaucracy was, and remains, the paramount aim.” As has been noted rural people’s lives are shaped around the institution of chieftaincy, which, with its patriarchal and generational imbalances, is essentially repressive. As Richard Levin’s paper to this Workshop shows, there is in parts of the eastern Transvaal significant opposition in local communities to the role of chiefs in land allocation and development.

issues that sets the scene for local struggles over land allocation, tribal levies and labour
duties etc.\textsuperscript{45} The indications are that similar struggles are being replicated in the western
Transvaal. For example in Madikwe region, the ANC stalwart Philemon Mathole,
established in 1991 a civic known as the Committee of Ten to challenge the power of local
chiefs and to demand open governance from them. This example served as a model for
several other rural populist initiatives in the region.\textsuperscript{46}

It is apparent too that the democratic impulse was felt very differentially in the former
homeland. Whilst in Mmabatho and the urban areas of the homeland the insurrection did
capture the imagination of most people, it had little impact in remote districts. In Ganyesa
for example reports indicated that people were unsure of how to respond to Mangope’s fall
and did not offer any opposition to Mangope supporters.

Some reference needs to be made to the other communities in the region, especially
Mangope’s alliance partners, the white right. The severe setback they suffered and the stark
destruction of the illusion of a Tswana \textquoteleft Boere homeland has further embittered this
element. The abject failure of a cross ethnic alliance will undoubtedly cause them to fall
back on conceptions of popular democracy based on notions of a common and inherited
consciousness moulded by history, language and experience.

Finally it should be borne in mind that there was a very undeveloped political or
democratic culture in Bophuthatswana. As indicated whilst South Africa liberalised in the
late 1980’s, Mangope became increasingly authoritarian. The Trade Union movement was
never allowed to develop, nor was there the emergence of the “civic associations” that
mushroomed in the 1980’s, nor was there the same degree of student organisation in the
schools and tertiary institutions. As Lodge has noted these “communal organisations...did
help to change popular attitudes to unjust authority, to alter popular expectations from
government, and instill more egalitarian political values”.\textsuperscript{47}

Thus the legacy of Mangope is somewhat ambiguous. His extremely authoritarian regime
lead to a lack of local popular empowerment, yet its fall left a power vacuum that
institutionally could be exploited to radically challenge relations of power. His ethnic
minded approach created its own blend of Tswana populism which he propagated openly
and it remains to be seen how much appeal this will hold in rural areas within the old
Bophuthatswana.

Conclusion

In conclusion this paper has revealed the changing nature of ethnicity formation in an area
which has hitherto received scant critical attention. We have indicated the transition from
a crude formulation of ethnic identity in the bantustan formation period, based on a

\textsuperscript{45} R.Levin, \textquoteleft Participatory Research and Democratic Agrarian Transformation: The Case of the Eastern Transvaal

\textsuperscript{46} Mathole, a Treason Trialist and Secretary of the Transvaal ANC in the 1950’s, was banished to the region in the late
1970s. See South African Institute of Race Relations Oral Archive, Interview by A Manson, 1992, and a forthcoming
publication by M.Lawrence, focusing especially on his role in this community.

\textsuperscript{47} T. Lodge, “South Africa: Democracy and Development in Post-Apartheid Society”, Paper to Institute for Advanced
notion of precolonial organisation, to a more sophisticated reformulation to provide an acceptable post-apartheid discourse and political practice as a counter hegemonic strategy in an period when coalition and alliance politics appeared the order of the day. While not obscuring the material base of this initiative, it is obvious that the Bophuthatswana strategy was conceived to find resonance with the ideology of a besieged and threatened Afrikaner rural constituency itself steeped in decades of socialisation into a perception of politics premised on notions of ethnicity and nationhood. By presenting this proposal of political restructuring in an attractive ethnic package Mangope hoped to improve his chances of mobilising a greater, more respectable and significant constituency. This platform would then provide the basis from which to launch a serious challenge for rights, privileges and available resources.

Although the motives and explanations for this bid for power are questionable and flawed one could argue that it did provide at least a logical option, particularly as regionalism at that time was finding itself increasingly on the agenda of politicians negotiating South Africa's future.

Despite the growing opposition to his regime, the suddenness of Mangope's fall took most people by surprise. At what point precisely he lost control of the process he was engaged in is hard to pinpoint. Certainly his shift from regional to national politics could be seen as a crucial turning point in terms of political tactics. However it was the glee with which most Tswana viewed the shooting of the khaki clad AWB in front of a Mercedes Benz that best explains the failure of Mangope's vision and political strategy. For the masses in Bophuthatswana, Mangope's efforts to delve into nineteenth century history to explain the "kinship" between the Boers and the Tswana were implausible. For most Tswana's their experiences of life on the farms of the Western Transvaal, of redundancies and removals, made a mockery of Tswana\Afrikaner unity. For Mangope to align himself with far right Afrikaners was even more outrageous. It was, like his unfortunate precursor, Moiloa, to declare himself a willing "Dog of the Boers".

Why though did Mangope not see the folly of his actions? From all accounts he had placed himself beyond advice from even his cabinet who feared to openly challenge his actions. Quite clearly he was a victim of his own blinkered vision and believed the apartheid-created myth that he was a leader of a truly independent state. Incredibly it is clear that he seriously believed in the fantasies he spun and the opportunistic strategies he employed to legitimise and prop up his homeland fable. Most of the homeland leaders recognised the implausibility of this objective and ensured a semblance of a political future by declaring for the A.N.C. A leader like Buthelezi, on the other hand could ensure political revival because he proclaimed a message of ethnic-national unity which had a pronounced appeal to the Zulu. Mangope however could not overcome the obvious contradiction that a fully recognised Tswana nation-state existed right alongside the borders of Bophuthatswana, and the creation of a second, particularly out of an apartheid system, was an impossibility.

Liberal parliamentarianism may have been established in the former Bophuthatswana but the growth of a popular political culture and practise will depend on how successfully the organs of civil society can be built in a region. This will mean overcoming some limitations. Though not sealed off from the democratisation process, many of the
inhabitants of Bophuthatswana were not extended even the basic democratic freedoms such as free political expression and association, let alone afforded the opportunity of experiencing the habits and attitudes gained from engagement with a popular democratic political culture. In addition it will take some time to rid the region totally of the ethnic variety of populism expounded by the Mangope regime.