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TITLE: The Regulation of Working Conditions for Africans, 1918 - 1948
1) Introduction

By anybody's reckoning, the State has played a major role in the development of South Africa's mining and industrial economy. From the first discovery of diamonds at Kimberley, the State was involved in regulating the conditions of play—issuing licenses for miners, drawing taxes from the huge profits to be earned there, and assisting in controlling the black labourers who performed the menial work. Once the goldfields of the Transvaal opened up, Kruger's Republic, the British post-South African War administration, and, subsequently, the Union Government, sought to ensure that employers had the necessary supplies of, and control over, black workers, to sustain long term profitability. To this end, successive central authorities enforced contracts under criminal law, operated pass laws regulating the flow of workers, and sanctioned the importation of cheap, bonded, foreign labour from China and neighbouring territories. In 1911, the first Union Government created the Native Labour Bureau (GNLB) as a sub-department of the Native Affairs Department to coordinate this work.(1)

The 'control' function was only one side to the State's involvement in labour regulation. The other major goal was to guarantee the long term viability of primary and secondary industry by preventing clashes between workers and management, and by minimising the loss of human life. This involved setting up authorities to inspect working conditions, and to rectify the most dangerous and unhealthy features of industrial life. These were the aims behind the appointment of mines inspectors on the Rand in the 1890s, and, in part, behind the establishment of the GNLB. In both cases, the officials who performed these tasks were also expected to contribute to the efficiency of the enterprises they were inspecting, by advising the Government and employers on appropriate improvements. These two cadres of officials, together with the Factory Inspectorate, form the central subject of this paper. The latter organisation, founded in 1919, was not given such a wide brief. Here, the Government's intention was more purely geared towards improving conditions and applying health and safety regulations. The reasons for this, the ways in which it affected the working principles of the Factory Inspectors, and the ways in which those principles changed over time, are crucially important in explaining the State's relationship with labour in mines and industry during this period.

In order to understand the role of the State, it is essential to bring together both theoretical insights and empirical evidence. At one level, the State operated in the classic Marxist sense as a straightforward relation of production. The State existed to create the conditions in which mining and industrial capital could thrive. It took steps to provide employers with the 'differentiated' forms of labour which their respective production processes and cost imperatives demanded;(2) and it looked to the longer term interests of capital (in ways which
employers could not) by regulating working conditions through its various administrative departments. Yet this is hardly enough to explain the complicated nature of the State's interference in the labour market. After all, in the final analysis, anything the State does, short of actually confiscating the means of production, could be said to be in the long term interests of capital in one sense or another. From its inception, the State developed its own interests alongside those of individual employers and groups of industries. Pre-eminent among these was the preservation of the State's authority itself—an element which transcended the popularity of any one Government or political party. In ideological terms, this meant ensuring the legitimacy of the State among the voting public, and achieving at least a grudging respect for its powers among the rest of the population. Closely linked to this was the need to preserve the physical well-being of the State, a priority usually discussed under the heading, 'law and order'. The third element involved the fiscal security of the State, which was sustained through taxation, either of business enterprises or of individuals. For the most part, these aims could be achieved in accordance with the interests of the 'ruling classes' as a whole; but they were nonetheless considered distinct by those who saw themselves as holding the true interests of the State at heart.

To a large extent, those who saw themselves as giving expression to the State's interests were not the cabinet ministers, whose eyes were focused on the next election; but the civil servants. From Union in 1910 through to the advent of 'apartheid' in 1948, the South African State bureaucracy grew by leaps and bounds. At the same time, Parliament tended to frame legislation in very general terms, leaving it to the administrators to guide their ministers by adding long schedules to the acts. The rules could be changed at short notice and without reference to the House of Assembly, and represented a considerable usurpation of the powers of Parliament. Nowhere were civil servants given more latitude than in the field of 'native' administration, both in the reserves, and in urban and industrial areas.

For Karl Marx, "the key to understanding bureaucratic power lies in its location within wider social and historical processes".(3) In broad terms, these pertained to the class divisions which arose in industrialising societies, and the role of the bureaucracy in regulating class conflict. As we shall see, this feature is self-evident in the way the three departments under discussion handled working conditions. Officials exercised what Poulantzas describes as their "relative autonomy as a specific social category", in a conscious attempt to mediate class conflict.(4) In doing so, civil servants were comfortable in the idea that they were serving both the interests of the ruling (i.e., shareholding) classes, and those of the State itself. Once again, though, we must beware of thinking that we have the whole picture. In addition to these grand sets of interests, officials were moved by the sorts of internal pressures and unanticipated consequences which Max Weber identifies in any large bureaucratic
organisation. (5) Procedure, power, prestige and principles—like
the four 'p's of marketing, these factors affected the way
administrators formulated and implemented policy. (6) Under
procedure, one must consider the ritualistic over-emphasis on
rules, the adherence to codes of regulations which could take on
a significance of their own in the minds of officials, and work
against the introduction of innovative measures. Second,
officials concerned with their own career advancement and with
the wider reputation of their branch of the civil service were
often preoccupied with departmental power and prestige—a
'lightening of the load' of official duty was always feared,
while the ultimate bogey was that of professional embarrassment.
The idea that some officials were moved by principles or morals
is more difficult; but a residual sense of 'trusteeship'—of duty
to protect the African from the adverse effects of contact with
the white man—was still a part of the administrative psyche, at
least in the NAD.

As the following sections show, officials were capable of serving
several different masters. In some cases, the interests of
employers were purposefully advanced by the activities—or
inactivities—of State inspectors. Those interests could also be
served in a roundabout way, perhaps by bringing one or two rogue
employers to heel to salvage the image of the rest. However, at
other times, bureaucrats acted on behalf of what they saw as the
State's interests, or a sub-section of the State, or even on
behalf of a group of workers. Such cases do not necessarily
signify the malfunctioning of the State's constituent parts, or
even subservience to the long term interests of capital. They
indicate, rather, that branches of the State could be responsive
to other interests without bringing down the whole edifice.

There is a danger that, in moving away from a reified picture of
the State, we lose sight of the enduring harshness of the system
as it affected black workers. While official inspection did have
a significant impact in improving safety standards and curbing
some of the worst abuses, the average treatment meted out to
Africans in mines and industry remained very poor. One must take
into account the ways in which different officials regarded their
duty, and their structural position within the State, as
significant factors in determining the extent and impact of work
place regulation.
ii) Factories, Shops and Offices.

The two principal interests concerned, those of employers and employees respectively, are frequently in conflict and the Department, when called upon in the course of its statutory activities to decide a thorny point, must endeavour to choose a course of action calculated to promote the objects of the law and the well-being of those concerned.(7)

State supervision of workplace conditions was, like every other aspect of labour regulation, a thorny issue. Employers generally weighed every interference by State officials in terms of how it affected their profits, and resisted legislation which would force compulsory improvements. At the local level, ingrained habits of cutting corners and evading rules meant that factory inspectors had to be constantly on their guard against minor infringements, especially given the huge expansion of secondary industry in this period.

Factory inspectors were further preoccupied by two other considerations. From 1924, it was the express policy of the Government to promote the employment of civilised labour in secondary industry. This tended to lessen the Department of Labour's enthusiasm for enforcing too strictly unpopular regulations. The ability of many newly-created and fragile industries to bear careful scrutiny of their working conditions was untested—there was always the danger that inspectors would overload them with rules, and drive them out of business, with the loss of 'civilised' jobs. On the other hand, the department was pushed by an increasingly vocal white trade union movement to take action against wayward employers, and to improve conditions generally. This led to head-on conflicts between unionists and administrators in the Labour Department, who liked to think of themselves as doing their best for the working man. In his 1937 report, the Secretary for Labour complained about...

"...a stream of abuse which not only does disservice to the workers' cause, but inevitably raises doubts as to the sincerity of any future representations from that same source.(8)"

Despite this hostility, the Labour Department took protests from organised white labour seriously, investigating their complaints in full, and reporting back to the trade unions concerned.

The development of South Africa's industrial workplace legislation began with the long overdue Factory Act of 1918. This provided for the appointment of a cadre of factory inspectors under a chief inspector, with power of entry to any factory.(9) All factories had to be registered within six months of the act coming into force. Standards were laid down for ventilation, sanitation, lighting, statutory holidays, and the employment of
juveniles and pregnant women. A fifty-hour week was laid down for adult workers (reduced by the Factories (Amendment) Act 26 of 1931 to forty-eight hours), and pay for overtime was at time-and-a-quarter. The Minister could grant exemptions to the above regulations if the factory worked seasonally, or was subject to intermittent supply of raw materials. Voluminous regulations were published in December 1918, with further instalments in subsequent years. (10)

The Factories Act was introduced at a time when Governments around the world were beginning to compare their treatment of workers, and to set international standards. The International Labour Organization, which arose out of the Treaty of Versailles and whose conferences were normally attended by South African delegates, helped to focus the Union Government's attention on factory conditions. However, the 1918 act, although based on the British principles of centralisation and specialisation of the inspectorate, did not go as far as the U.K.'s Police, Factories (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1918, which was another stimulus behind the South African legislation. In another sense, the whole Victorian tradition of State regulation of working conditions, which stretched back to the Factories Acts of 1844 and 1847, was behind this act. (11) South African inspectors had a lot of catching up to do, and lacked the experience of their British counterparts. On the positive side, they were conscious of not having to cope with antiquated, dangerous plants dating back fifty or a hundred years. The bulk of the Union's industrial development still lay ahead of it.

In 1924, with the founding of the Department of Labour, the operation of the act was passed to that department. This does not appear to have aroused much animosity among the inspectors. Their work was largely separate from the rest of the Mines Department, so there was little chance of losing out on promotions within the department. The old Deputy Chief Inspector, HC Fowler, became Chief Inspector under the Secretary for Labour, CW Cousins. (12) The Inspectorate's powers were further increased in 1931, when the regulation of machinery under the Mines and Works Act was divided between the Mines, Labour and Agriculture Departments. (13)

This accretion in the duties of the factory inspectors, coupled with the rapid growth of the industrial sector after 1933, naturally increased the factory inspectorate's experience in the pre-Second World War era. In the process, the inspectorate was able to embellish its image as an organisation of experts, entrusted with the noble task of safeguarding life and limb, and in general promoting the care and welfare of the work force. Departmental reports portrayed the inspectors as scrupulously fair-minded and objective. In terms that could have come straight from the pages of Weber's "Theory of Social and Economic Organization", the Secretary for Labour, Ivan Walker, argued in 1941 that the inspectors were perfectly capable of handling the abnormally high level of delegated responsibility to be introduced as departmental regulations under the new act of 1941. (14)
Without wishing to cross swords with those who view with disapproval the modern tendency to govern by regulation, I must point out that this 'modern tendency' arises from the necessities of the present day world, and not from any desire on the part of civil servants to exercise their brief authority. (15)

The critics who troubled Walker hailed from both right and left. For Afrikaner Nationalists, the State's declared policy of non-discrimination in the application of the Factories Act was an easy rallying point for raising race-consciousness. Women's Congresses affiliated to the Provincial Agricultural Unions passed resolutions protesting against the employment of white women by Asiatics, of Africans in the same room as white women, and of Africans in enterprises which manufactured foodstuffs. This last point they linked to a concern for health and hygiene—it would be much safer, they argued, to reserve certain jobs in abattoirs, dairies and bakeries for whites, and thus also promote the 'civilised labour' policy. The Department of Labour rejected this for two reasons. Most importantly, neither Hertzog nor Smuts would agree to overloading secondary industry at one blow with a more expensive and untrained white labour force. Industrialists rejected this out of hand, and many businesses which already employed a percentage of white workers would have folded. In any case, such a move would have derailed the Government's longer term strategy of raising industrial wages very gradually, through the Wage Board.

Second, any shift towards Government-sponsored racial demarcation in factories would have encountered fierce opposition from the left in South Africa, and from overseas. It would have completely exposed the department's veneer—thin as it was at times—of being non-discriminatory in its administration of labour legislation. Department of Labour officials were anxious to avoid the impression that their aim was to break up what little working class solidarity there was in the inter-war years. By the same token, they could not be seen to be creating the conditions for a low wage policy in industry based on the exploitation of cheap black labour. The department, after all, had been established in part to persuade white workers of the Pact Government's commitment to their welfare and advancement. To this end, Labour officers went to great lengths to present themselves as unbiased—even to the point of denying any knowledge of unfairness, other than the 1911 Mines and Works Act—"which I understand", wrote Walker disingenuously, "contains a colour bar of this nature". (16)

Consequently, Labour Department officials had to fend off the right wing, by pointing to the immense practical difficulties that would be involved in keeping whites in separate rooms from blacks, and arguing that this would ultimately limit the scope of employment for whites in factories. The final compromise came in the Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act of 1941.
appease both right and left, Section 51 allowed the Governor-General to insist on segregated rest rooms, eating areas and so on for the different races. As Walker insisted in a letter to a white trade union:

The Minister wishes me to point out that the Bill does not contain any provision under which any class of labour could be excluded from any occupation on the grounds of race or colour and it is, therefore, considered incorrect to refer to the Act as containing a colour bar.(17)

The white unions were not only concerned by the prospect of being undercut by black workers who could be treated as inferior employees. The general operation of the Factories Act was also a point of issue. In 1939, the General Secretary of the Trades and Labour Council claimed that the failure to pass a new Factory Act that year was a blow to thousands of workers. The act was out of date, he argued; employers openly flouted it, and inspectors were too willing to grant exemptions. There was an urgent need for new provisions for annual leave, rest periods, night work, child birth, breaks in employment, and protection for the young.(18)

Labour Department officials were piqued by the implication that they were not doing their job properly. In response to the TLC's protest, an in-house investigation was carried out in all the major industrial centres to furnish proof that inspectors were administering the regulations to the best of their ability. However, South African industry had undergone major changes since 1918. Of 5754 factories registered under the act in 1939, 3597 had been established since 1933.(19) Moreover, the report indicated serious problems to do with overtime regulations, visiting factories in outlying areas, and the powers given to management once exemptions had been granted. These difficulties, plus the passing of the U.K.'s Factories Act of 1937, encouraged departmental officials to lend their full support to the Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act of 1941.

The British act extended the definition of 'factory', expanded welfare services for workers, and enlarged the staff of the inspectorate.(20) South Africa's legislation moved in a similar direction, though in some respects at a slower pace. The definition of a factory was extended, ordinary hours of work reduced to forty-six per week, and overtime pay raised to time-and-a-third. Paid holidays were introduced, and the minimum age for employment rose from fourteen to fifteen. A range of other general safety measures concerning the operation of machinery, the fencing of electrical apparatus, floor space, ventilation, and lighting were also tightened up.

The new Factories Act took its place alongside the Shops and Offices Act of 1939, which extended similar protection to workers in those sectors for the first time.(21) Again, the act left the Department of Labour with wide powers to be defined later in the
form of administrative regulations. Both pieces of legislation looked impressive on paper, and there can be no doubt that they were considerable, if belated, steps in the right direction. But the impact of the new laws on black workers was limited for several reasons. In the first place, the 1941 Factories Act was not applied until September 1945. This was intended to allow industry to work unimpeded for the war effort, and may well have been due to personal interference from Smuts. The benefits of the new act for African workers were further reduced by the regulations drawn up under section fifty-one. Blacks and whites working at the same benches were supposed to be as far apart as possible, and separate conveniences were to be provided. And finally, the act excluded labourers working within the precincts of a factory (such as packers and handlers), the vast majority of whom were Africans.

In these subtle but important ways, the Department of Labour operated laws which treated white and black workers differently, while maintaining the fiction that their administration was free of discrimination. The purpose behind the non-discrimination principle was something more than public relations. As in any sphere of industrial relations, to push special regulations for whites too far would cause wholesale displacement of whites by blacks, who already in the 1930s and 1940s were gaining a foothold in semi-skilled positions. This was coupled with the commitment of the State as a whole to promoting the profitability of industrial capital and, from 1939, to maintaining productivity for the war effort.

It is tempting to see the regulations enforcing racial and gender segregation at the workplace as strategies to forestall the development of a united proletariat, both by the Nationalists who demanded it, and by the Labour Department which enforced it. Yet the idea that the Labour Department was party to a conspiracy of this nature does not fit with its wider policy statements on labour legislation. The original Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts had been intended to buy off the white working class; but the department had soon found how difficult it was to leave black workers out in the cold. It was much easier for Labour officials to encourage the incorporation of blacks into the white trade unions and the I.C. Act, rather than to make completely separate provision for them, and then face opposition from the left and from employers. The Factories Act had never really been intended to apply discriminately, except where public pressure, particularly that stirred up by Afrikaner Nationalists, made some form of segregation a political necessity. The fact that the Government in its legislation, and the Department of Labour in its regulations, bowed to that pressure in the 1940s, is more a reflection of prevailing social values and their manipulation for political ends, than it is proof that this branch of the capitalist State was hell bent on the bifurcation of the working classes.
iii) Down the Mines

The State's powers of control over working conditions in the mines were defined in the Mines and Works Act of 1911. This laid down certain basic standards—no women or boys under sixteen (later changed to fourteen) to work underground; no work to be done on Sundays, except maintenance, emergencies and milling of ore in mills established before 1911; a maximum working day of eight hours; and a maximum working week of forty-eight hours. (27) It was left up to the Department of Mines to draw up regulations for the duties of managers and overseers, the safety and health of employees in mines and works, the provision of ambulances and medical aid, and granting certificates for blasting, engine driving, engineering, overseeing, surveying and management. These jobs were reserved for white workers in the notorious 'colour bar' enshrined in Regulation 285.

The act was administered by the Mines Division of the Department of Mines and Industries. This was split into three sections— the Mining Commissioners and the Registrar of Mining Titles, who issued licences for prospecting and mining titles; the Geological Survey; and the Engineering Branch, headed by the Government Mining Engineer. His authority extended over the Inspectors of Mines, Machinery and Explosives, the last of whom came under the Explosives Act of 1911. (28) Unlike the Factory Inspectorate, the GME's responsibilities were twofold—to ensure the physical safety of those working on the mines, and with machinery or explosives; and to advise the Government on technical mining matters. He was thus placed in the potentially awkward position of having to serve two masters—the immediate demands of health and safety; and the wider requirements of the State in its relationship with the mining industry.

The crux of the argument in this section is that the GME and his inspectors did indeed take both imperatives into account. Their work was complicated by the fact that the industry was hugely important in the political arena, much more so than secondary industry for most of this period; and by the peculiar nature of the production process in mining, with its many, varied and constantly changing points of production underground, and its 'ad hoc' approach to the geological, financial and labour-related problems which it encountered. At no point could mines inspectors concentrate solely on the relatively simple task of ensuring the physical well-being of workers, as even the most basic health and safety issues had immediate political and economic overtones.

Mine politics in the twenties and thirties have been carefully scrutinised from other perspectives by Rob Davies and David Yudelman. The latter has unearthed some interesting information on the two GMEs, Sir Robert Kotze (1908-1926) and Dr. Hans Pirow (1926-37). According to Yudelman, both appointments were political—Kotze's at the instigation of his old friend, General Smuts, and Pirow's through unnamed members of the Pact...
Government. He praises both men—Kotze "represented the most intelligent and knowledgeable part of the state bureaucracy", while Pirow is described as young and inexperienced, but very able. Yudelman falls into the trap of judging his subjects according to how well they understood his theory of a symbiotic relationship between state and mining capital (Creswell is condemned for misunderstanding it completely). On the other hand, his assessment of their part in mine politics is sound. Kotze played a key role in opposing the white labour policy of Creswell and the white trade unions in the 1910s and 1920s. He also did little to improve underground working conditions, and instead, lent his considerable experience towards promoting the profitability of the big mining companies.

Kotze's ability to do business with the Randlords was most strikingly illustrated when he chaired the Low Grade Mines Commission in 1919-20. William Gemmill and Evelyn Wallers, respectively Joint Secretary and President of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, were also members. The commission's report considered ways of dealing with the unprofitability of the low grade mines, and of alleviating the shortage of cheap black labour on the goldfields. The idea of raising African wages was roundly condemned—the report showed uncharacteristic concern for secondary industry here, arguing that this would merely draw labour away from other sectors, and precipitate an industrial crisis. On the other hand, lifting the "colour bar" was recommended to allow management more room for manoeuvre in its organisation of the labour process. Here again, the report sounded spuriously pious, appealing to principles of "abstract justice" on behalf of black workers. The third major proposal was again guaranteed to outrage white workers—that of opening up further catchment areas for recruiting migrant labour. The commission further bolstered the mineowners' case by arguing that it would be no bad thing if some low grade mines closed down.

On the related question of accidents underground, Kotze at first denied that the increasing rate was due to changes in the ratio of whites (supervisors) to blacks in the early 1920s; but was then forced to agree that the reduction of supervision over jackhammer teams contributed to the rising number of misfire accidents. He accepted under pressure that less accidents would occur if there were more inspectors, but did not demand a larger staff.

In his lack of concern for safety, Kotze was no more extreme than his successor, despite Pirow's years of safety-related research in London. In 1930, Pirow drew up suggestions for the Low Grade Ore Commission which would have done his old boss proud. Pirow argued that the best way to save money and make millions of tons of low grade ore profitable was to remove as many whites from underground as possible. White miners who had worked for ten years would be found surface work. This would serve one health function, as it would cut down the incidence of phthisis, and thus also save money. The flow of migrant labour would also be
augmented, as underground labourers would fill more semi-skilled positions, and so have the opportunity of earning higher wages—though obviously not the wages previously paid to whites. (38)

Although the Kotze Commission opposed the legalised 'colour bar', both GMBs excused the overt discrimination on the mines by referring to the crude racist stereotypes common in society at that time. For example, Kotze stated boldly that Africans had reached the limit of their abilities doing semi-skilled work on the coal mines. (38) Pirow later argued that two white men had to be present when precious metals were handled because one could be surer of the honesty of a white employee than a black one. While such prejudices certainly existed among members of other state departments, it is unusual to find them used so blatantly as arguments in official documents. The contemptuous, utilitarian attitude which Kotze and Pirow showed towards black workers was of a sharper, more vicious order than that of most civil servants of the period.

The attitudes of more lowly Mines Department officials were exposed in the disputes over staff ratios in the mid-1920s. From 1924, the presence in the Cabinet of several Labour Party members triggered renewed efforts by white miners to reverse the trend towards fewer white overseers and falling real wages. The South African Mine Workers Union (SAMWU) supported the findings of the Mining Regulations Commission of 1924, which attributed the rising accident rate to the increasing responsibilities being shouldered by white miners. (40) The miners took their stand on the issue of health and safety, and condemned the record of the mines inspectors:

The Deputation then remarked on the futility of the inspection conducted by the Mining Engineering Department. It is useless and quite ineffective. The number of inspectors is quite insufficient and there is too much sympathy between the mine management and the inspectorate who have no sympathy with the miner. (41)

Colonel Creswell then took up the struggle, calling for a report on the dismissal of white miners, and urging the use of the inspectorate to prevent the emasculation of the underground supervisory staff. (42) Most inspectors responded that there was no appreciable diminution of the white staff, and that the general practice was not to overload men with work. However, Charles Gray, the Inspector of Mines for Johannesburg, admitted that supervision of drilling had fallen off, and that the greatly increased speed of drilling was causing a rise in misfire accidents. (43) He went on to describe his job as being near impossible. Overlapping shifts made it extremely difficult to tell what a particular miner's job was. Conditions down the mine varied from day to day, and the inspector received little support from the workers; who were afraid of gaining a bad reputation
with mine officials. In any case, it was left up to him to decide whether a work load was reasonable—there were no objective standards. This involved weighing efficiency against safety, and neither of these criteria had been defined. His evidence was borne out by a deputation from the Witwatersrand White Miners' Association to the Ministers of Mines and Labour. T.C. Hynd claimed that he knew cases where one man supervised sixteen drilling machines on several levels at once, and with the task of charging up to 150 holes in an hour. He agreed that the inspector's job was hard—miners generally knew when an inspector was coming, so he rarely saw a mine working normally. 

Gray's outburst suggests one reason why working conditions underground were not regulated as carefully as in secondary industry—the shifting nature of the work and the many points of production complicated the task beyond the comprehension of a factory inspector. Yet for the most part, mines inspectors did not complain about their duties. They busied themselves with promoting the efficient working of the mine, and presented accident rate statistics in the best possible light. They did not dispute ratios of supervisors to labourers, and did not call for more inspectors to make their jobs easier. In general, they supported the policies of mine management against the protests of Creswell and the white trade union movement. They acted, in a sense, as a Trojan Horse for the mining industry within the State.

Yudelman portrays Kotze as the consummate civil servant, the official who realised instinctively where the true interests of the State lay. For Yudelman, these centred on the profitability of the gold mines, the defeat of the white miners, and the docility of the mass of unskilled, migrant black workers. Looked at in comparison with the Factory Inspectorate's handling of working conditions in secondary industry, one must ask why these two departments saw the needs of the State (or, to take a more crudely Marxist line, those of the 'ruling classes') so differently. R.H. Davies would probably argue that it related to the relative strengths of various 'fractions' of capital. Yudelman might see it more in terms of the pre-eminent position of the gold-mining industry in the economy. As he shows, the weakened position of white workers after the Rand Revolt allowed the mines to extend the retrenchment of white labour; the election of the Pact Government in 1924 brought little relief for white miners, despite the promises of the Labour and Nationalist parties. Others might bring up the comparative strengths of organised workers in the two sectors in the 1920s, and their differing capacities to insist on better working conditions. Or again, one might refer to differences in the production process, or to the exigencies of profit-making at near impossible depths beneath the ground, or in competition with cheap foreign imports.

All these factors are important in analysing the ways in which administrators approached the issue of work-place regulation. However, in the Mines Division as in other state departments, one
must refer to the social background and attitudes of the administrators to understand why they supported a particular policy, and how they reacted to external pressures. In the case of the GME and his staff, it was not simply a question of blindly obeying Government directives. Both Kotze and Pirow actively participated in drawing up strategies to improve productivity and circumvent opposition from white labour. In doing so, they interpreted very broadly their administrative function of 'advising the Government on technical mining matters'.

In part, their close association with the drive to improve efficiency may be explained by their background as engineers and scientists. The GME's staff held professional qualifications; if they had not found posts in the civil service, they would have been working for the same mines they inspected. As engineers, they were trained to seek ways of overcoming technical difficulties, and in the department, they were encouraged to apply their knowledge for the sake of the mining industry. The issue of how to deploy the labour force was so important for the industry and was so bound up with the more technical and mechanical matters, that inevitably, inspectors found themselves dealing with questions which directly affected pay, staffing levels and working conditions. At the same time, mining inspectors were not expected to think like social workers; unlike their colleagues in the factory inspectorate, they were not privy to the nineteenth century, British, reformist tradition of caring for the material comfort of the labourer as a worthy goal in its own right. The Mines Division was established in the days of the Kruger Republic, at a time when state intervention in working conditions was minimal; it had struggled alongside the mineowners and their managers and technical staff to overcome the huge physical obstacles which threatened to bar the way to profitable deep level mining in South Africa. For purely experiential reasons, it was therefore unlikely that mining inspectors would formulate and implement stringent regulations which might drive some businesses under. On the other hand, it was not so surprising that Kotze, on leaving the Civil Service, became a director of De Beers, while Pirow was appointed consultant at Corner House. (46)
iv) Working Conditions and the Native Labour Regulation Act

I must naturally keep in touch with native labour conditions from the four points of view from which I have to approach it; in the first place I advise the Government on matters of policy in connection with labour; I have to see that the mining industry and employers of labour who employ agents get fair play from their employees in so far as it comes under Government control, and I have to see that the labour agent's interests in so far as they are legitimate are properly protected, and to ensure that the native labourer gets a square deal from the two.(47)

The Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 was passed to help ensure an adequate supply of migrant labour for the gold mines, and to centralise State control over African workers in industrial areas. The act empowered the Director of Native Labour to issue licenses to labour recruiters and employers who hired recruited labour. Compound managers, who supervised large numbers of Africans on mines and 'works' (where machinery was used), were also obliged to obtain licenses. The DNL was in charge of Inspectors of Native Labour (INL), who were to act as the 'protectors' of labourers, inquiring into grievances, but also fining workers whom they judged to be not fulfilling their contracts. Contracts were supposed to be attested before an officer of the NAD, who would ensure that workers understood the terms. Most INLs operated in the Transvaal, though others were appointed for the Kimberley and Barkly West (for the river diggings), in Natal (for the coal and sugar areas), and in the Free State (for the diamond and coal mines). Labour districts were proclaimed under the act, again mostly in the Transvaal, in which tighter pass laws were applied. These areas were governed by special regulations for housing, feeding and hospital treatment. Municipalities had the power to operate their own regulations for compounding under the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923.(48) The DNL retained his powers of inspection in places where machinery was used.(49)

The history of the NAD's sub-department of Native Labour was not entirely a straight line, although the DNL was enforcing substantially the same regulations at the end of the period as he was in 1918. The Native Labour Bureau received a major shake-up alongwith the rest of the department in 1923, at the hands of the Public Service Commission (PSC). The thrust of the Commission's report was that the DNL's staff should be cut.(50) The old command structure did not permit proper supervision of staff, and left INLs and Pass Officers working independently of each other. In any case, the report argued, such close control over mine labourers' working conditions was no longer necessary. Mining operations had shrunk, and employers now treated their workers much more sympathetically. The report recommended cutting the number of labour districts on the Rand from eight to four, with a
net saving of L2568 per annum. The DNL's salary would be cut from L1500 to L950, and his office combined with that of the Johannesburg sub-Native Commissioner, and the Native Commissioner for the Witwatersrand. (51)

Saul Dubow ably describes the political manoeuvrings of the hard-liners within the South African Party, who felt that the 'old guard' administrators in the NAD were too lenient on Africans to deal with post-war militancy among Africans, and to apply repressive counter-measures. (52) This sentiment was by no means universal; the cuts to the NAD faced widespread opposition, notably in a series of articles on 'Native Administration' by E.H. Brookes. (53) From within the State, the outgoing SNA, Edward Barrett, fought a bitter but ineffectual battle to keep his position. Yet the sub-department of Native Labour did not attempt a similar defence of its operations. The chief reason for this was that the DNL, Colonel S.M. Pritchard, wanted to take early retirement. (54) Pritchard gave the commission the evidence it needed to reduce the sub-department's staff, and then took credit for raising the efficiency of his operation, and allowing sweeping economies. (55) The PSC rewarded him by permitting him to retire in January 1924, and making Herbert Cooke DNL and Chief Native Commissioner for the Rand. (56)

The new DNL remained in office for eight years. He was well suited to operate a system which kept black workers firmly in place, while arguing that the entire structure was to their benefit. Before the Mills and Holloway Commissions, Cooke painted a very rosy picture of the services the sub-department provided for Africans. He argued that NAD officials were becoming more and more sensitive to the needs of the African worker. (57) The department's officers remitted money urgently needed by distressed families back in the reserves. They handled the estates of deceased migrant workers; instituted inquiries for men worried about their relatives; and even induced employers to 'liberate' a worker if his wife was seriously ill. (58) In 1931, Cooke presented the Native Economic Commission with a memorandum listing the advantages of the act for Africans. Under cross-examination, he claimed triumphantly that strikes and disputes were a thing of the past: labourers now had so much confidence in NAD officials that they counted on them to settle grievances, amicably and equitably. (59) Before both commissions, the DNL appears to have been given considerable latitude by the SNA, Major Herbst, whose opinions were generally similar to Cooke's.

The DNL may have exaggerated to counter the image of the NAD as the poor sister of the Civil Service, a department of cranks and liberals which served no real purpose other than to complicate the higher work of Justice, Mines and Agriculture officials. In addition, he may have felt the need to defend himself from the more progressive elements on both commissions—especially Bill Andrews and Frank Lucas in 1925, and the latter again in 1931. Likewise, the wider image of the NAD as an organisation which managed to couple paternalist care with even-handed
administration of severely restrictive legislation was always important to its members. Whatever his reasons, he also made clear his acceptance of the whole apparatus of State control—the pass laws, the masters and servants laws, compulsory compounding and repatriation on the completion of a contract—and his opposition to major changes in the migrant-labour system. In this, he appears to have been moved in equal measure by concern for mining profits, fear of the social consequences of an ever-increasing urban African population, and anxiety at how the NAD could deal with such a problem in administrative terms. If mine labourers were stabilised on the Rand with their families, it would put up working costs. It would also promote venereal disease and the sale of illicit liquor, which would bring down productivity. The wider problem was that when an industry closed down, the urbanised African and his family had nowhere to go. Missionary education lifted them above the level of the labouring class, but left them without any marketable skills. Thus, the NAD was left to deal with large numbers of unemployed people who lived by their wits. Migrant labour was the lesser of two evils; its only drawback was the 'unnatural vice' it encouraged among mineworkers.

Unlike the Factories and Mines Inspectorates, Inspectors of Native Labour were first and foremost concerned with the living conditions provided by employers. This did not mean, however, that they placed an intolerable burden on the employers. On the Simmer and Jack Mine in the 1930s, for example, the DNL only took action when the Tuberuclosis Research Committee pointed out that poor facilities for Africans could rebound on the health of white workers. The local Member of Parliament, C. Potgieter, took up the issue, protesting that the NAD had no right to allow Africans to be employed under such degrading conditions, and that profits should not take precedence over health.

The main problems on Simmer and Jack were overcrowding, plus the long distance labourers had to walk to the main shaft. The DNL ignored the evidence that the mine was easily profitable, and took the part of the mineowners. He argued against the opinion of the GME—that there was a danger the company would close the mine if forced to invest in new housing accommodation. "You will readily realise that Mining companies are averse to spending money on new compounds for which in a few years they may have no use", he pleaded to the SNA. A report by a Public Health Department officer that conditions in the compound were "very unhygienic", and complaints put direct to the Minister of Native Affairs, finally forced the DNL to approve a plan for eighty additional rooms. But the company was able to stall until 1934, when a new manager won acceptance from the new DNL for a much reduced plan for twenty-five rooms. At no point did the DNL invoke his powers under regulations issued in 1911. By the time the work was underway, countless thousands of mineworkers had passed through the compound, enduring slum conditions when off duty, and then having to walk miles to work each day. The mine, meanwhile, produced profits of L198,095 in 1931 alone, of
which L41,604 was distributed as dividends.

Besides political pressure from workers and interested whites, the other major factor which galvanised the DNL to improve compound conditions was the effect this had on the labour supply. The DNL inspected the Natal sugar and cotton estates in 1918, after which inspectors were appointed to supervise housing and feeding. But the NAD took no real interests in the situation until the mid-1930s, when the sugar estates were struggling to keep up their labour complements. On the basis of a departmental report, the DNL blamed the shortage on conditions and wages on smaller estates. A few employers were then pressured to improve conditions for the sake of the industry's reputation.

On the mines, INLs were occasionally forced to step into the GME's arena was to protect black miners from physical violence. Each month, the DNL drew up a table of assaults on labourers by white miners, and the punishment inflicted on the latter. These usually only involved fines of a few shillings or pounds, and in most cases the offender was not discharged. The vast majority of cases inevitably went unreported, and a regime of subordination built on fear of the overseers was maintained. Most inspectors appear genuinely to have regarded violence as unnecessary and counter-productive in controlling black workers. When mines policemen, indunas and even compound managers were found guilty of such behaviour, the INLs normally pressed for their dismissal. GNLB officials accepted violence as a last resort, as in the many cases from the later 1930s and 1940s when they called in the South African Police with fixed bayonets; but for the most part, they favoured compound managers who retained at least a modicum of respect from his charges, beyond merely dreading his appearance with a sjambok.

Underground, though, the INLs' capacity to limit violence was minimal. Beatings of labourers by 'boss-boys' and white supervisors were everyday occurrences, a part of the labour process, by which the supervisor drove the black miners to fulfill the day's work quota. GNLB officials neither understood this process, nor had easy access to it. They received little help from the Mines Inspectors or from management, and preferred to play down the incidents they encountered. It was left up to the labourers themselves to protect themselves from attacks as best they could, with little help from the law or their supposed 'protectors'.

The task of 'controlling' black workers by preventing them from disrupting production in mines and works or antagonising the white population in general was fundamental to the very purpose of the GNLB. This was not a function which concerned either the GME or the Factory Inspectorate. Their duties were primarily concerned with white workers, for whom higher intelligence and 'civilised' standards were their own restraints. African workers were not supposed to possess those advantages, and by consequence, had to be hedged around with various repressive
measures to keep their minds on the job. Besides, African workers' lack of political power allowed the State to apply legislation which employers, at least in the wake of the Rand Revolt, might have been happy to see extended to all employees. These measures included the penalties contained in the masters and servants laws, the Native Labour Regulation Act, the Urban Areas Act, and the Native Service Contract Act for African workers who broke their contracts, whether by striking, desertion or otherwise. The GNLB was responsible for enforcing section fifteen of the Native Labour Regulation Act, which prescribed two months with hard labour or a L10 fine for breach of contract by a "native labourer". (69)

The importance of compounds in the minds of Native Labour Bureau officers can hardly be underestimated. The very existence of the cheap labour policy, which kept hundreds of thousands of supposedly 'raw natives' on the Rand, with numerous legitimate grievances, in close proximity to settled white populations, could only continue so long as African mineworkers were kept as isolated as possible from white residents. Moreover, as Cooke explained to successive commissions, this was the only way to avoid desertions, falling efficiency, and the contamination of black mineworkers through unlicensed access to drink and women. As van Onselen has shown, the mines provided unparalleled opportunities to control and coerce migrant workers in a way that superintendents of urban locations could only dream about. (70) Of course, the system also encouraged the development of a community of feeling amongst the workers, as events in 1920 and 1946 showed. (71) In time, the compound itself could be turned to the workers' advantage, as they demonstrated most recently in 1987. But that was what the DNL and his staff were there to prevent-their public image and professional status within the Civil Service all depended on their self-projection as experts who were intimately aware of the climate of opinion in the compounds, ready to step in, mediate, and pre-empt major problems before they mushroomed. The mineowners were generally prepared to tolerate this where it did not expose serious maltreatment of the workers, and where the demands on their resources were minimal. (72) To them, the INLs served a purpose which they could not perform themselves, and which was infinitely preferable to direct, formalised representation by the workers.

From 1932 through 1948, the office of DNL changed hands every few years. It has been suggested that the sub-department's importance diminished in this period. One reason may be that the growing significance of other authorities for black workers, such as the municipalities and the Department of Labour, as well as the much-discussed idea of giving recognition to African trade unions-may have proportionately reduced the influence of the GNLB. Secondly, it is possible that E.W. Lowe and C.P. Alport, who were successive DNLs in the 1940s, did not enjoy the full confidence of the Secretary for Native Affairs. This is borne out by Smit's demand that he be immediately informed of any confrontations between black workers and their employers.
However, the declining importance of the G.N.L.B. may to some extent be more illusory than real. A false impression is given by the lack of archival material from after about 1935. This is not because the records were housed at the NAD's central office—the DNL still kept separate files—the problem is simply that these have not been available to researchers. Far from being less busy, the DNL was more active than ever in the war years and after, dealing with a greatly expanded mining and industrial sector, and a new militancy among African workers. By the 1940s, Herbert Cooke's boast that large strikes and disputes involving black workers were a thing of the past must have sounded like a bad joke to administrators. In this context, it was perhaps inevitable that the task of handling this threat should be taken up at the political level—frequently, in fact, by Smuts himself. Though the political importance of the GNLB does appear to have declined in the process, this did not amount to a complete rejection of the policy of governing African workers through a separate, powerful, strongly paternalistic administrative structure. Whatever the notions being debated in the 1940s, the period closed with the migrant labour system and the body which administered to it still intact.
v) Conclusion

At the present time where a matter concerns one Department that Department gets to work and handles it, but you have things which concern more than one Department, and each Department is liable to look after its own affairs, and to busily engage in them without that intimate touch with other Departments interested in the same matter which is usual and necessary in industrial life. (73)

There were, naturally, certain features of the regulation of working conditions which were common to all branches of the State bureaucracy. For one thing, they all administered regulations which they had drawn up in consultation with the industry, and which were designed to protect the life and limb of the labour force. Each department divided its staff territorially under a senior officer. Inspectors were expected to become regional experts, and to remain in close touch with local employers. Given the paucity of staff members and the large regions they had to cover, these officials had to be allowed a considerable degree of autonomy. Yet, there is little evidence that inspectors in the same division differed much in their attitudes to their work. The explanation for this lies in a sense of 'esprit de corps', or commonality of purpose which developed within the division, as well as the overall structure of the economy, and the wider relationship of the State to the sector concerned.

On the other hand, we have seen how the variances in the attitudes of officials in different divisions were significant. The effort made by the average factory inspector to improve working conditions was of quite a different order to that of his counterpart in the Mines Division. Why was this so? The answer lies partly in the position of the respective sectors in terms of economic and political muscle. Throughout the period, the gold mines were of primary importance to the material welfare of the State and the country as a whole. The mineowners exercised their political influence moreconcertedly and more effectively than the captains of secondary industry. The Randlords therefore had the power to block any attempt to enforce decent standards in working conditions if the State ever attempted to do so. It is significant that when major changes did at last come in mines working conditions in the 1970s and '80s, it was the companies' group administrations themselves that overcame individual mine managers' opposition to doing anything which might raise costs.

Second, there is the question of the nature of the production process in mining and secondary industry. It was always easier to make life safer and more pleasant in a factory or shop environment than thousands of feet below the ground, where the point of production was constantly shifting. But this does not explain the harshness of conditions in compounds which, of course, are just as stationary and easy to inspect as a factory
assembly line. For sure, mines occasionally closed up along with their compounds; but that is hardly an explanation for the lack of expenditure on the accommodation and feeding of black mineworkers. The slow, uneven advances that were made in diet, sanitation, overcrowding, and so on, in this period, had little overall impact on the enduring grimness and degradation of life in the compounds.

A third argument, put by the DNL himself on occasion, was that the cost structure of the gold mines could not support the luxury of mollycoddling its workers, either underground or on the surface. But an analysis of the dividends paid out to shareholders would hardly support this. Deep level mining was far from easy, but there were viable alternatives to the cheap labour policy. The fact that the mines did not attempt these was because they believed they could make more money with a bonded, poorly paid, migrant workforce. What was more important here was not the fact that the mines could not have survived a change in policy, but that their propaganda succeeded in convincing many people that this was true.

A more plausible reason why inspectors in mines, factories and the GNLB saw their role differently, involves their understanding of their function. To put it crudely, their attitudes were primarily determined by who they saw as their most important constituency. Mines Inspectors were under no illusions that they were there to help the gold mines to produce ore, and to do so cheaply, efficiently and safely. Factory Inspectors, by contrast, believed that their first duty was to white workers. This did not mean that they wanted to hand the means of production over to labour lock, stock and barrel; they accepted the constraints which the existing capitalist system placed on them. But they did not think in terms of forestalling revolution by partial concessions. They really believed that the regulations they operated were a meaningful contribution to the well-being of the white working classes.

The primary constituency of the GNLB was the African labourer, and the sub-department’s attitudes to him largely determined its performance as an inspectorate. In this context, the racism which was prevalent in society at that time must be taken as an independent variable. The NAD generally held that Africans would not perform responsibly as employees unless subject to a degree of control. Of course, one had to eliminate the most degrading and exploitative conditions, in order to improve efficiency, prevent resistance, and satisfy moral compunction; but there was a limit to how much the white man could be expected to do for the socially and intellectually inferior black worker, and that limit had effectively been reached (at least on the mines) before 1918. These factors were reinforced by the knowledge that African labourers were not the only constituency the NAD had to deal with. The ‘four points of view’ dilemma discussed above was a very real part of the ‘Weltanschauung’ of the Native Labour official in every field, and it was certainly present here.
One might see the NAD position partly in terms of a bourgeois ideal of service, which stood as an oppositional or alternative cultural ideal to the middle-class concept of individualism. As Raymond Williams argued for English society,

> The stress [on service] has been confirmed by the generations of training which substantiate the ethical practice of our professions, and of our public and civil service. As against the idea of 'laissez-faire', and of self-service, this has been a major achievement which has done much for the welfare of our society.(74)

In the inter-war South African context, the concept of service to the wider, disenfranchised community may be seen as a residual culture, existing beneath the dominant culture of segregation, and, towards the end of our period, facing new challenges from an emergent force based on 'apartheid'.(75) The idea of an official duty towards the bulk of the population was still well into the 1940s, shared by departmental heads such as Douglas Smit and W.G.A. Mears, and by like-minded DNLs, such as Johannes Brink. Yet as we have seen, this residual notion of service or trusteeship, was never strong enough to bring radical changes to working conditions for Africans.

In the last analysis, then, the perceptions which officials themselves developed must be brought into the picture in order to understand the ways in which the regulation of working conditions operated. Each branch of the bureaucracy furthered the interests of the State, and the State, for the most part, was at pains to serve the interests of capital; but beyond that crude formula, a host of disparate voices can be heard, which it behoves the researcher to listen to.
Notes

I am very grateful to Professor A.H. Jeeves for invaluable criticism and advice. The paper draws on a longer, more detailed chapter in my Ph.D. thesis (in progress). The thesis is entitled "State Bureaucracy and Black Labour in South Africa, 1918-1948".

1) The GNLB systematised and greatly expanded the work already being done under the Coloured Labourers' Health Ordinance of 1905.


6) Product, package, price and promotion.

7) U.G. 30-36, Dept. of Labour Report for 1937, p.3.

8) Ibid. p.3.

9) *Union Year Book* #8 (1925), pp.228-9.

10) Union Govt. Gazette, 2/5/19, 18/2/20, 19/11/20, 10/2/22, 22/B/24.


12) *Union Year Book* #9 (1926-7), p.1030.

13) MNW MM2426/22, A.A.M. Anderson, Notes on the welfare of workers in South African factories compared with the United Kingdom, 30/7/22.

14) "Experience tends to show that the purely bureaucratic type of organisation— that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense the most rational means of carrying out imperative control over human beings... For the needs of mass administration today, it is completely indispensable". M. Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation* (New York, 1947), p.337.

16) ARB 1132, Secretary for Labour to SNA, 1/2/44.


18) ARB C.F.2/0, General Secretary, South African Trades and Labour Council, to Minister of Labour, 31/1/39.

19) ARB C.F.2/0, Prepared answer to Parliamentary question, 14/2/39.

20) Djang, Factory Inspection, pp.75-6.

21) Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Act 41/1939.

22) Union Year Book #23 (1946), p.22.

23) During World War Two, the Government also adopted a more lenient exemptions policy from the 1918 act. Union Archives, K302 (Van Eck Commission Papers), Box 10. Dept. of Labour Memorandum on 2nd Interim Report of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission.

24) Union Year Book #23 (1946), p.27.

25) Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Act 22/1941 (Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act), Sec. 3.


27) Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Act 12/1911, Sec.6-9.

28) See Section ii.


30) Ibid. pp.143,220.

31) Ibid. p.219.

32) Ibid. p.175.


34) Ibid. para. 182.

35) Ibid. para. 152.

36) Wits Archives, A1882. Kotze's Evidence to the Economic and


39) Wits Archives, A1280. Kotze’s Evidence to the Unemployment Commission (1930), para. 5047-B.

40) U.G. 36-25, Report of the Mining Regulations Commission. The commission was chaired by William Pittman. The report argued that the ratio of whites to blacks had fallen from 1:7.7 in 1911, to 1:10.1 in 1923.

41) MNW MM2489/25 pt.1, Minutes of meeting between South African Association of Employees, SAMWU and the Minister of Mines and Industries, 24/11/25.

42) MNW MM2489/25 pt.1, Secretary for Mines and Industries to GME, 30/12/25. A misfire was an accidental explosion occurring during blasting.


46) Yudelman, *Emergence of Modern South Africa*, p.231. Yudelman expresses surprise at Kotze’s "very unusual" move from the bureaucracy into private business.


48) Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Act 21-1923, Sec. 11a.


50) GNLB 291/18/78, Report of the Public Service Commission Inspectors on the sub-department of Native Labour, 1922, pp.4-6.

51) GNLB 291/18/78, DNL to SNA, 27/11/23.


54) Pritchard had no intention of living out his retirement by the fireside. He put his experience as DNL to work in his new career as a labour recruiter for the Natal sugar and cotton estates. According to Public Health Department officials, he used his "very accurate knowledge of the care of Natives in Natal" to exploit loopholes in the housing regulations. GES 539/13, Assistant Health Officer, Durban, to Secretary for Public Health, 9/3/25.

55) GNLB 291/18/78, DNL to SNA, 8/10/23.

56) GNLB 291/18/78, DNL to SNA, 27/2/24.

57) Wits AD1438, Cooke's Evidence to the Holloway Commission, 4/5/31, p.727B.


63) NTS 697/40BC, DNL to SNA, 27/8/32.

64) NTS 697/40BC, Memorandum by DNL (A.L. Barrett) on Simer and Jack Compound, 5/10/34.

65) Union Government Gazette, Govt. Notice 1988, Sec.18, 30/11/11.

66) GNLB 64/23/9, Return of Assaults Committed Upon and Hardships Suffered By Natives for the Month of May, 1923, 3/7/23.

67) GNLB 69/23/154, Inspector of Native Labourers, Springs, to DNL, 19/2/23. "I am satisfied that both the Manager and Compound Manager are fully alive to the importance of stopping assaults on native labourers and are doing their best in this respect. The Compound Manager has had many years experience, is a good native linguist and well respected by the natives".
68) Some protection against underground violence was afforded by the recruiters, who feared that a bad reputation would make it difficult to recruit for a particular mine.

69) Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Act 15/1911, Sec. 14.

70) "It was the compound as an institution which provided the framework for the total exploitation of black workers". C. van Onselen, Chibaro (London, 1976), p.157.


72) "... it is the policy of the Company to avoid any expenditure, especially on the surface, unless it can be justified as being absolutely necessary for, and assisting in the continued working of the Mines". NTS 697/408C, General Manager, New Consolidated Gold Fields, to DNL, 27/10/32.

