Part II

Practices of the Transnational Fraction of the African Ruling Class
and the Deepening of Continental Passive Revolution
Chapter 4

Afro-neoliberalism and AU-NEPAD Macro-restructuring

Introduction

In the previous chapter, historicising the emergence of the AU-NEPAD reveals that the conjuncture of macro-restructuring produced an Afro-neoliberal consensus from within the African continent. This consensus was made up of various neoliberalised ideological shifts in Africa’s development thinking, regionalisation initiatives and conflict resolution approaches. However, none of these initiatives represented a rival project in terms of how Africa should respond to globalisation and transnational capital. While each of these initiatives emphasised a particular aspect of how Africa should relate to globalisation, within the AU-NEPAD this discourse reflected a commitment to a common project to take forward Afro-neoliberal macro-restructuring. Within this project and its concomitant ideological discourse the interests of the transnational fraction of the African ruling classes is expressed. This chapter brings into view the link between the interests of the transnational fraction of Africa’s ruling classes and how the AU-NEPAD operates as an Afro-neoliberal strategic project of this fraction. Moreover, this chapter explores how the class practices of this fraction are expressed through AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring and how this has adjusted Africa at a continental level from within, albeit unevenly, to transnational capital. It shows how the class practices of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring and its concomitant discourse has defined a globalised Africa in a particular way. This is a crucial aspect of Africa’s adjustment to transnational capital and the deepening of the continental passive revolution but this is an internally defined aspect. The external dimension is more fully explored in Chapter six.

To study the AU-NEPAD as an Afro-neoliberal strategic project necessitates the need to bring into view its various class strategies (discourses that promote particular concepts,
principles, policy approaches and continental practices). This is then studied at three levels. First, how these elements came into existence and the extent to which these class strategies draw on transnational neoliberal discourses and Afro-neoliberal thinking about Africa’s macro-restructuring will be explored. This assists with recognising that Africa’s development thinking, while largely imported, has also been indigenised within the context of the AU-NEPAD and through the agency of Africa’s transnational fraction. Second, the content of the key class strategies is unpacked. This is done to show how the content of each element takes on board the demands of transnational capital as expressed through the hegemonic ideology of transnational neoliberalism and its objectives. The final dimension of this analysis highlights how each strategic element is operationalised to advance particular class practices and discourses. The chapter further explores how these elements shift power relations away from progressive social forces while promoting conditions to reproduce transnational capital including its African fraction. It is through this kind of understanding of the AU-NEPAD that we also understand how macro-restructuring has its own specificities as an Afro-neoliberal project. It is not about a mechanical transplanting of national adjustment strategies to a continental level. Instead, the link between national adjustment and macro-restructuring comes through when studying how the specific practices of each re-inforce a globalising and externally oriented accumulation path for Africa. This is about trying to understand how a transnational fraction of the African ruling class is able to lead Africa’s integration into the global economy.

AU-NEPAD an Afro-neoliberal Strategic Project of the Transnational Fraction of the African Ruling Classes

Both the AU and NEPAD present themselves as instruments to confront the deep organic crisis of Africa. The AU Preamble (AU, 2000 :2) declares a determination, ‘ to take up the multi-faceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the world.’ The NEPAD is very explicit about its role and from its base document to its numerous implementation reports,
affirms that it is a, ‘vision and strategic framework for Africa’s renewal’ (NEPAD, 2004/5: 15). The scale and ambition of this macro-restructuring project is best expressed by the former Chief Executive of the NEPAD Secretariat, Nkulu, when evaluating four years of AU-NEPAD implementation (2005: 2):

Is there a change in the manner in which the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and national governments conduct their affairs? What about the implementation of NEPAD programmes and the performance of African economies? Has the nature and content of the relationship and dialogue with the industrialised countries and multilateral institutions changed?

In short, the ambitions and objectives of this strategic initiative are about fundamental structural change of Africa’s political economy in the context of global capitalism. By historicising the AU-NEPAD and its location within the dynamics of globalising Afro-neoliberal capitalism this study treats the AU-NEPAD as a Afro-neoliberal strategic project and more precisely a class project of the transnational fraction of the African ruling classes. As a class project it expresses the interests and identity of the transnational fraction of the African ruling classes. While such a fraction is structurally emerging within globalised accumulation processes on the continent, its long term politico-ideological interests, both to achieve conditions for accumulation on the African continent and integration into transnational accumulation circuits becomes more clearly defined through the practices of the AU-NEPAD. This strategic project provides a response to global capitalist restructuring and Africa’s ongoing organic crisis.

Landsberg (2008:212) suggests this amounts to a trade off: Africa secures peace and stability through sound governance, based on democratic principles and values, while at the same time this is reinforced by new commitments by northern powers in the form of financial assistance and efforts to enhance the continent’s capacities to consolidate peace and democracy. This study has a broader view of AU-NEPAD as a macro-restructuring strategy in which a reciprocal partnership is just one element of strategic engagement. Moreover, such a partnership is not just about a deal between countries on the continent and powerful countries in the North. In this process fundamental shifts are happening at a world order level, in which the balance between consensus and coercion are being
remade between a US-led transnational historical bloc and a transnational fraction of the African ruling classes. At the same time, Africa is being remade by the hegemonic responses of the US-led transnational historic bloc in the context of global capitalism. This element of strategic engagement is explored more fully in chapter six.

Beyond attempts at securing a partnership with the US-led transnational historic bloc, AU-NEPAD macro restructuring is made up of four other elements that foster a non-hegemonic practice and deepening of the continental passive revolution: (i) the discourse of the African Renaissance and Afro-neoliberal capitalism which appropriates and defines a new globalised version of Pan-Africanism; (ii) the imposition and construction of partnership on the continent; (iii) using peace and stability interventions not just to end conflict but to implant Afro-neoliberal societies and assimilate illiberal Africa; and (iv) consistent attempts at excluding and coopting mass social forces. The latter element is dealt with more extensively in the next chapter in terms of how consent for AU-NEPAD restructuring has been insulated from mass engagement. The AU-NEPAD Afro-neoliberal macro-restructuring concept of control reflects the political-ideological interests of a class actor that has redefined globalisation discourse to also remake the African order. This means Afro-neoliberal macro-restructuring also transforms relations of production, state forms, state-civil society relations and the continental power structure. In short, it engenders structural change mediated by class practices which affirm the ideological perspectives and interests of social forces that require an extroverted Africa and globalised African capitalism.

In understanding the AU-NEPAD as an Afro-neoliberal strategic project for macro-restructuring, led by a transnational fraction of Africa’s ruling classes, this study departs from most understandings of the AU-NEPAD in the following respects. First, while the AU-NEPAD have separate institutional mechanisms and are ostensibly driven by different forces these merely form two components of a common restructuring agenda. Both the AU and NEPAD advance and operate within a common Afro-neoliberal
paradigm with shared objectives.\(^1\) The extent to which tensions arise between a South Africa centred NEPAD secretariat and an Ethiopia based AU commission are not central in understanding how the AU-NEPAD has redirected African development and deepened the globalisation of Africa’s accumulation path.\(^2\) Second, treating the AU-NEPAD as a strategic project appreciates that it is more than state interests and individual ambitions at stake. It is about an expression of class consciousness and an attempt to utilise the AU-NEPAD to remake a new continental order in the context of neoliberal global capitalism. It is about new ideas, institutions and material capacities that are coming together to establish new historical structures to manage and globalise continental capitalism.

Third, in approaching the AU-NEPAD in this way the focus is not on outcomes or whether the AU-NEPAD has succeeded or failed. Instead understanding the AU-NEPAD as a strategic project for macro-restructuring means the focus is on understanding macro-restructuring as an expression of class practices and discourses. It is not just about recognising the AU-NEPAD as being Afro-neoliberal but about how it became Afro-neoliberal and how it works. How does the AU-NEPAD bring about Africa’s adjustment to transnational capital such that it is synonymous with Africa’s general interest? Fourth, macro-restructuring as class practices also deepens class formation. That is, the transnational fraction of Africa’s ruling classes moves beyond being a structural reality and championing narrow corporate and national interests. It begins to cohere through the implementation of the AU-NEPAD around building a continental Afro-neoliberal capitalism post the Cold War, post apartheid, after the end of colonialism and in engagement with a hegemonic transnational neoliberalism. This process of class formation deepens around a new consensus for Africa’s development and macro-restructuring when the AU-NEPAD agenda confronts the hegemonic practices of the US-led transnational historical bloc. It is in this process of finding consensus for a continental approach to transnational capital that Africa’s transnational fraction further defines a long

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\(^1\) Hence in this study the AU-NEPAD is treated as one project and is referred to as such.

\(^2\) The process of incorporating NEPAD structures into the AU over the past few years has tended to throw up tensions between the Ethiopia based AU Commission and NEPAD structures.
term strategic project for Africa. As mentioned above, this dimension is elaborated on in chapter six.

The Legal and Institutional Arrangements of the AU-NEPAD
On the 9th September 1999 African leaders collectively decided to establish the African Union at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, in order to advance the realisation of an African Economic Community. On the 11th July 2000, at Lome, Togo, the Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the OAU. The Act provides the legal and institutional basis for a new system of continental governance. The main priorities of the Act are synthesised into fourteen objectives contained in Article 3. Within the fourteen objectives outlined there are three underlying tensions. The first relates to what Makinda and Okumu (2008: 35-37) refer to as statism. They argue that objectives that ‘promote unity and solidarity’ amongst African peoples, ‘popular participation’ and the ‘protection of human and peoples rights’ can easily be trumped by the objective of defending ‘sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member states’. They argue that this objective has been the main obstacle within the practice of the OAU that ensured non-interference and marginalised the interests of the people. This is an issue we will return to in the next chapter.

A second tension running through the AU objectives relates to Pan-Africanism. While the objectives promote the achievement of ‘greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa’, the ideological basis of contemporary Pan-Africanism is left vague. In the context of global capitalism what is the purpose of pan-African unity? Is this a pre-given unity by virtue of race and geographical location? Are there contradictions in contemporary Pan-Africanism? These are the issues we will return to below when discussing the African Renaissance. A third tension relates to how the economic role of the AU is envisaged. Various objectives relate to ‘integration’ of the continent, ‘international cooperation’ and the establishment of the ‘necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international organisations’. However, the ideological content of this role is defined
elsewhere, that is, between the social forces that make up the transnational fraction of the African ruling classes. Hence the need to understand the relationship between the Afro-neoliberal consensus fostered in the conjuncture of macro-restructuring, since 1989, and the AU’s role within Afro-neoliberal restructuring.

The Constitutive Act’s Article 5 envisages a minimum of nine organs that organise the activities of the AU, provides a continental governance framework and assists in realising its objectives. These are the Assembly of the Union which is the supreme body of the AU and is comprised of Heads of State and Government or their representatives. It makes the decisions which are implemented through the other organs of the AU. The chairperson is elected from among the Heads of State and Government for a period of one year, a term which is renewable under certain circumstances. The Assembly meets in ordinary session twice a year (January and July) and can be triggered to meet in extra-ordinary sessions if requested by a member state and approved by at least two thirds of its members. The Executive Council is the next most important organ of the AU and is accountable to the Assembly. It comprises the Foreign Ministers or any other minister designated by a member state. It also meets twice a year and has a provision for special sittings. The Executive Council is empowered to make decisions on a wide range of issues facing the continent such as foreign trade, humanitarian issues, water resources and mineral resources. It is also empowered to delegate its powers and functions to Specialised Technical Committees. While the Executive Council has decision-making latitude in certain areas, it only has the power to monitor the implementation of intervention decisions made by the Assembly.

The Pan-African Parliament is the third important AU organ which was inaugurated on March 18, 2004. It sits in Midrand, South Africa, and has two sessions a year with five legislators nominated from each AU member state. Unlike the Assembly and the Executive Council the Parliament does not have decision-making power. Rather it has a consultative and advisory role within the AU governance system. The fourth important organ of the AU is the African Human Rights Court which was established on May 2, 2006. It has judicial and advisory powers with 11 judges chosen by the Executive
Council and endorsed by the Assembly. The judges serve for a period of six years, renewable once. The African Human Rights Court is located in Arusha, Tanzania.

The fifth important organ of the AU is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Council was formed in 2004 and comprises 15 members. All members are selected according to a fixed criteria and 10 members serve for two-year terms and five for three-year terms. The Peace and Security Council is at the centre of the peace and security framework of the continent. As per the *Protocol* establishing the PSC, provision is made for a Panel of the Wise, an early warning system, an African standby force, a military staff committee and a peace fund. The PSC and the AU Commission (through its chairperson) are meant to manage the envisaged security architecture including its instruments for conflict resolution. The sixth important organ is the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), established on March 29, 2005 with the objective of providing an institutional space for civil society organisations to play a role in AU-policy formulation and decision-making. It has an advisory competency vis-à-vis the AU and is meant to establish sub-regional and national structures. The seventh important organ is the AU Commission. It embodies the administrative capacities of the AU and serves as the secretariat of the Union. The commission has a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and 14 commissioners, representing different sub-regions. The other AU institutions such as the specialised technical committees, the permanent representatives committee and the financial institutions are also important organs of the AU.

The NEPAD document was adopted in October 2001 at the Lusaka summit of the AU. It was hailed as an African-led initiative and was adopted as the official economic policy agenda for the continent and the AU. The NEPAD document is organised around the following themes: ‘Africa in Today’s World’; ‘The New Political Will of African Leaders’; ‘Appeal to the Peoples of Africa’; ‘Program of Action: The Strategy for Achieving Sustainable Development in the 21st Century’; ‘Conditions for Sustainable Development’; ‘Sectoral Priorities’; ‘Mobilising Resources’; ‘A New Global Partnership’ and the ‘Implementation of the NEPAD’. Section 67 defines the long-term objective of the strategy for achieving sustainable development as follows:
To eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process. To promote the role of women in all activities.

In section 68 the goals of the strategy are spelt out. It aims to achieve an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 7 per cent per annum for the next 15 years and aims to achieve the Millennium Development Goals on the continent. In section 69 the strategy further defines the outcomes: economic growth, development and increased employment; reduction of poverty and inequality; diversification of productive activities, enhanced international competitiveness and increased exports; and increased African integration.

The NEPAD is managed at three levels (NEPAD, 2002b: 9-10). First, at the political level NEPAD is led by a Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC). This committee derives its mandate from the OAU Summit held in Lusaka on 11 July, 2001 and is comprised of 15 Heads of State, representing the five regions of the OAU (i.e. three states per region, plus the AU Chair). The purpose of the HSGIC is to ‘provide dedicated political leadership and to set the policy and program priorities to be pursued’ (NEPAD, 2002b:9). In short, this committee provides the political will and direction for the NEPAD. The Chairperson of this committee also provides an annual report to the AU, in addition the Chairperson of the AU and a representative of the AU Commission are ex-officio members.

The second level of management of the NEPAD is the Steering Committee (NEPAD, 2002b: 9). This committee is composed of the personal representatives of the five initiating Presidents (i.e. Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt), but also meets as an extended committee with representatives of the other Heads of State. This committee is tasked with concretising the work of the HSGIC by developing terms of reference for identified programmes and projects and by overseeing the work of the Secretariat. Over the past few years it has held numerous workshops to further elaborate on the key initiatives of NEPAD and to ensure integration. The third level of
management of the NEPAD is through a Secretariat comprising a small team of full-time staff tasked with the functions of liaison and coordination, administration and logistics. The Secretariat is located at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, in Midrand, South Africa.

**Strategic Elements of AU-NEPAD Macro-restructuring**

Having discussed the institutional characteristics of the AU-NEPAD, we now shift our attention to how the AU-NEPAD constitutes an Afro-neoliberal macro-restructuring agenda, how it defines a discourse on globalisation and how it works as class practices that express particular class interests as the general interests of Africa. To look at the AU-NEPAD this way is vastly different from seeing it as a regionalisation initiative, or a set of priority focus areas or as a development initiative intended to leverage resources from the industrialised countries of the North. Rather in this section I argue that the AU-NEPAD practices of macro-restructuring define how Africa adjusts to transnational capital and how a globalised capitalism is being made on the continental scale. This is done by going inside the AU-NEPAD process to bring into view how power operates within this framework as the key macro-restructuring thrusts of the AU-NEPAD are operationalised. It shows how the structural and direct power of the transnational fraction expresses itself through various class practices within these strategic thrusts. Such class practices include concepts, principles, discourses, policies and tactics deployed inside AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring. In short, the study aims to show how a transnational fraction articulates its general interests as the interests of Africa as a whole and how this reflects the non-hegemonic rule of transnational capital.

**I. The African Renaissance and Afro-neoliberal Capitalism**

The concept of the African Renaissance has a long history and place within Pan-Africanist discourses. It has been synonymous with various calls for change such as ‘revival’, ‘rebirth’ and ‘renascent’, for instance. Many trace the roots of the idea of a reawakening for Africa to the first wave of Pan-Africanism which emerged as a reaction
to slavery and colonialism. \(^3\) It was very much an intellectual movement which later evolved into a political movement with continental ambitions in the process of decolonisation. The formation of the OAU is an important expression of the second wave of Pan-Africanism. Maloka (1997:38) traces the biography of the African Renaissance concept to the 1937 work of the Nigerian Nnamdi Azikiwe entitled: *Renascent Africa* in which an argument is made for a philosophy of the new Africa. Subsequently, in the 1960s Leonard Barnes’s book the *African Renaissance* was published in which he called for a ‘Positive Policy’ to bring about the Renaissance of Africa.

In the conjuncture of continental restructuring in the 1990s a new impetus was given to find a vocabulary that expressed the intentions of various political leaders to advance a renewed effort of regional integration and development. The various continental and sub-regional initiatives championed inaugurated a new political discourse about continental change and a new African order (Keller, 1993). An event hosted by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research (CODESRIA) in Africa, in March of 1996, called for an African Renaissance in the new millennium (Bongmba, 2004: 297). While the concept of the African Renaissance has a long history on the continent, the political leader who advocated it most articulately was the South African President, Thabo Mbeki. Most analysts and commentators point to two defining speeches that prompted a search to give meaning to the African Renaissance. The first was the poetic *I am an African* speech in May of 1996 (given on the occasion of the adoption of the new Constitution for South Africa). The second was a speech given by Mbeki as Deputy President of South Africa in 1997 to the Corporate Council on Africa in the USA entitled: *Attracting Capital to Africa*. Scholars generally agree that the rationale for the concept was largely informed by the need for South Africa to find a doctrinal basis to engage with Africa. \(^4\) Various diplomatic initiatives on the African continent left South Africa isolated and embarrassed. In the main, a post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy position vis-à-vis the rest of


Africa was largely ambiguous, uncertain and ineffective. Democratic South Africa was struggling to find its place on the African continent.

For Mbeki and his government the African Renaissance became a linchpin for South Africa’s foreign policy. In its initial expression it called for programmatic initiatives around a common intellectual and cultural agenda (including African bids for the Olympic Games and World Cup), strengthening democratisation, the development of a new democratic leadership and the restructuring and repositioning of regional, continental and international institutions (Mavimbela, 1998:32-34). The South African debate on the African Renaissance went further and translated the African Renaissance concept into a key foreign policy principle and it spawned various legal and institutional mechanisms to buttress South Africa’s efforts to promote an African Renaissance. This includes the *African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund Act No.51*. The important consequence of this thrust in South African government policy is that it placed South Africa within the African context and clearly recognised that South Africa’s future was integrally bound up with that of the continent.

However, despite translating the concept into policy instruments within South Africa, the concept of the African Renaissance has become central to the ideological construction of the AU-NEPAD. For Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South Africa (1999 – 2008) and the main protagonist of an African renaissance, this concept was ideologically many sided. Within the South African debate and analysis of the African Renaissance this is confirmed by the various interpretations of the concept. Vale and Maseko (1998) recognise a globalist aspect which promotes economic globalisation and political liberalisation. They also recognise an Africanist aspect which is very much about retrieving African ways of understanding and engaging the world. It is about a return to ‘African roots’. Linked to this is a pan-African moment essentially renewing Pan-Africanism for the 21st Century. In short, it is a third wave of realising African unity in the context of global capitalism.
However, while Mbeki has been placed within the globalist frame a closer reading reveals an Mbeki championing the African Renaissance through all three frames. Hence in affirming the link between the African renaissance and the AU-NEPAD it has been useful for Mbeki to evoke different aspects of the Renaissance discourse at different times. For example, at the launch of the African Union Mbeki’s speech is vintage Pan-African in affirming the virtues and necessity of Pan African unity (2002: 184 – 188). It chimes with the idealistic language of the African Renaissance which is best captured in the title of his address: *Africa’s Moment of Hope*. On the other hand, when Mbeki spoke to the Association of African Central Bank Governors his address, *Towards an African Renaissance*, used language that was strongly Africanist. For example, it was Africanist in how he affirmed the authentic African origins of the AU-NEPAD (although he still used the term MAP to refer to NEPAD). He said:

> I am convinced that the all- Africa agreements on the AU and MAP constitute a historic landmark in the evolution of our continent. They affirm and confirm a thesis that has characterised African thought for centuries, both on our continent and in the African diaspora, that as Africans we share a common destiny. They are also important because they are a product of independent African thought, a true expression of the sentiments of the peoples of our continent. They do not represent perspectives elaborated by consultants from the developed world, paid for with overseas development assistance extended to us by the countries of the North (2001: 126).

In short, the African Renaissance discourse while contradictory in its formative years and popularised by the former South African president and forming a pillar of South African foreign policy, has been a key visionary concept that has underpinned the creation of AU-NEPAD. In its evolution many commentators have linked the vision of the African Renaissance directly to the macro-restructuring agenda of the AU-NEPAD. Within the NEPAD base document itself the concept is also evoked. It states (2001: 27):

> The African Renaissance project, which should allow our continent, plundered for centuries to take its rightful place in the world, depends on the building of a strong and competitive economy as the world moves towards greater liberalisation and competition.

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Thus it has become a common sense understanding that the AU-NEPAD forms a programmatic basis for the African Renaissance and for its realisation. However, the link between the African Renaissance, the AU-NEPAD and the interests of the transnational fraction of the African ruling class has to be teased out more clearly. That is, we must question how the African Renaissance discourse through its articulations and content affirms power relations in favour of Africa’s transnational fraction and against contending social forces. Put differently, how does the discourse of the African Renaissance provide an ‘Afro’ dimension to continental neoliberalism by embedding it within the macro-restructuring vision of renewal and change for Africa. The ways in which this is achieved through the African Renaissance discourse are explored below.

*Rejecting Afro-pessimism*

First, the discourse of the African Renaissance openly rejects Afro-pessimism and affirms ‘hope’, ‘self determination’, ‘African solutions to Africa problems’ and the need for African leadership to overcome its problems. As refracted through the AU-NEPAD it sees Africans and Africa taking up the opportunities provided by the end of the Cold War, globalisation and the widening of the democratic tide (NEPAD, 2001: 25). In short, participating in global capitalism is understood as an imperative and accepted as the means to overcome Africa’s marginalisation. In some quarters the rejection of Afro-pessimism has been confused with anti-imperialism. This has further enhanced the appeal of the African Renaissance for many and has had the effect of dividing and confusing progressive social forces.\(^6\)

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Appropriation and Redefinition of Pan-Africanism

Second, the affirmation of Pan-Africanism has been achieved through appropriation and redefinition within African Renaissance discourse. This is evident from the evolution of the African Renaissance discourse from its early debates triggered by Mbeki in South Africa in the mid-1990s and later as it expressed itself through support for the AU-NEPAD. Actually, through the AU-NEPAD contemporary Pan-Africanism has been subsumed by the globalist aspect of African Renaissance discourse. For instance, Pan-Africanism pre-1990 attempted and envisaged economic self-reliance for Africa, as well as, African socialism as its alternatives. Pan-Africanism also affirmed political unity and African solutions to African problems through the OAU by respecting national sovereignty. Tragically this included non-interference in the internal affairs of dictators and tyrants. The Pan-Africanism of the African Renaissance is different in two important respects. First, the economic alternative of Pan-Africanism is now continental capitalism and most importantly a continental capitalism with an external orientation to meet the requirements of transnational capital. Two of Mbeki’s speeches illustrate this point very clearly. In a speech to the Corporate Council on Africa, in the USA, entitled Attracting Capital to Africa, Mbeki affirms Africa’s external orientation and commitment to global capitalism:

The world investor community has understandably asked that as Africans we must establish the conditions to enable them to take rational business decisions to make long term investments in Africa. We are saying that many African countries are doing precisely that… In addition to the social and political issues we have already addressed, sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the continent have also embarked on a process of economic reform, which is necessary and vital if the continent is to succeed in attracting a growing slice of foreign investment (1997:36).

Mbeki’s speech to continental central bankers amplifies this further. In a globalist moment he accepts key prescriptions of neoliberal restructuring by confirming the independence of central banks and insulating monetary policy from ‘the vicissitudes that necessarily confront ruling parties’ (Mbeki, 2001:128-129). Hence the AU-NEPAD, a

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project of the African Renaissance, is central in re-enforcing national neoliberal
adjustment through a continental effort to create the conditions to deepen this process.
Within the AU-NEPAD implementation process this is clearly articulated and affirmed
and is elaborated on below. The AU in the preamble of its Constitutive Act affirms that it
has to accelerate the implementation of the ‘Abuja’ or African Economic Community
Treaty (AU, 2000: 2-3). This treaty as pointed out in the previous chapter was crucial in
defining the continental conjunctural shift in the 1990s and affirmed a shift away from
self reliance and national development to an Afro-neoliberal paradigm. Within NEPAD
its commitment to competitiveness, market efficiency and market-led integration are
ubiquitous. More boldly it asserts, ‘while globalisation has increased the cost of Africa’s
ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed integration
present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and poverty reduction’
(NEPAD, 2001:22). This is a dubious assertion given that post-colonial Africa already
globalised and integrated with global capitalism in the conjuncture of the debt crisis and
national adjustment. Rather what is apparent is the NEPAD’s ambition to deepen Africa’s
globalisation despite the already dismal outcomes for Africa.

The second way in which the Pan-Africanism of the African Renaissance is different
from its earlier incarnation is in its understanding of who it is opposing. The ‘enemy’ of a
globalised Pan-Africanism is no longer the ‘white oppressor or colonialist’. Within the
African Renaissance and the process of implementing the AU-NEPAD all who inhabit
the geographic space of Africa are Africans. African is not defined according to race,
tribal or ethnic criteria. However, within African Renaissance discourse the unity of all
Africans has to be turned against illiberal Africa. This is the dark side of Afro-neoliberal
capitalism which still has to embrace a liberal politics; hence an African Renaissance
approach to pan-African unity is qualified. In Mbeki’s words, ‘Nor has Africa need for
the petty gangsters who would be our governors by theft of elective positions, as a result
of holding fraudulent elections, or by purchasing positions of authority through bribery
and corruption’ (1997: 38). Within the AU-NEPAD this supplies a warrant for other

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9 Mbeki’s *I Am An African* speech brought this to the fore.
crucial concepts like liberal democracy, good governance and a particular approach to security issues which will be discussed further below.

*Invite to Mobilisation from Above*

The third way in which the African Renaissance discourse embeds neoliberalism at a continental level is through what Vale and Maseko (1998: 6) refer to as its ‘invitation to mobilisation’ so that it can take on a clearer policy and mass character. According to Mavimbela (1997: 32), a political advisor to Mbeki, the key motive forces of the Renaissance would be the ‘new proletariat’ and the urban middle class. Mbeki himself threw the net wider to intellectuals, business people, youth and women activists, trade unionists, religious leaders, artists, professionals ‘to join the mass crusade for Africa’s renewal’ (1997: 40). This call has also enabled a serious debate in the South African context involving a cross section of intellectual strata. It has also spawned the African Renaissance Institute (ARI). According to Okumu (2002: 265), ‘following Thabo Mbeki’s speech in 1996, a few African strategists and intellectuals held consultations with a view to formulating pragmatic operational strategies for mobilising and networking Africa’s human resources in terms of intellectual wealth and enterprise for an African Renaissance in the third millennium’. In addition, there have been at least three African Renaissance festivals at which this concept has been debated in dialogue with leading intellectuals from the continent and the diaspora. However, within the AU-NEPAD the main protagonist of the Renaissance is reduced to one agent of change: a privileged role is given to capital and in particular the promotion of the private sector.

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10 The ARI is an advisory think-tank convened in Gaborone, Botswana, in August 1998. Former Ambassador Kapembe Nsingo of Zambia was appointed founding president and Chairman of ARI’s Executive Board. Five other founding executive directors with regional responsibilities were appointed. In addition the ARI structure includes a Council of Elders (former Heads of State and Government who have pioneered various development initiatives of major significance on the continent and in their own countries), the Council of Patrons (comprising carefully selected current Heads of State and Government spearheading transformation programs in their countries), the leadership of the National Chapters of ARI and, the core programs of the institute. The ARI has also been involved in establishing African Institute for Training and Research on Peace (AITROP) and has linked with the African Foundation for Research and Development (AFRAND). The latter institution is a research and development fund to finance science and technology programs in Africa. At the founding of AFRAND, sixteen African states were represented by ten heads of state, two prime ministers, one deputy prime minister and ninety-three official ministers (Okumu 2002: 265-280).
This is consistent with the way the ‘invite to mobilisation’ was extended from above. A point discussed further below regarding the concept of partnership and in the next chapter.

II. Partnership

The notion of partnership with Africa precedes the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process. Such a concept found expression in global and continental discourses as a means to assist Africa confront its challenges as far back as the mid-1980s. Within the UN system calls were made to ‘support the efforts’ of African countries in 1984 as part of the UN Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa. Later with the UN Program of Action For African Economic Recovery and Development (1986–1990) there was a more explicit call for ‘mutual commitment and cooperation’ to support the determined efforts of African countries at national and regional level and to bring in the international community to ‘support and compliment the African development effort’ (UN, 1986: 210).

By the early nineties, the UN’s New Agenda for the Development of Africa is grounded in the principle of ‘shared responsibility and full partnership’ (UN, 1991: 332). Through the 1990s a partnership-centred approach to a disciplined and neoliberalised Africa is amplified by other voices and initiatives from within the US-led transnational historic bloc. Many bi-lateral and multi-lateral initiatives began casting themselves in the rhetoric of partnership. This includes the USA under President Clinton calling for partnership with Africa in the late 1990s regarding trade and the World Bank’s new Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), invented in response to its president James Wolfensohn’s frank admission in the late 1990s that Bank policies failed. Also the IMF’s poverty reduction strategy papers place a premium on African ownership and partnership. In Europe the neoliberalised Swedes were also talking the language of A New Partnership for African Development (Kifle et al, 1997). It is in this context that AU-NEPAD takes on board its conception of partnership with Africa and the world.
The strategic principle and concept of partnership within the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring initiative operates at various levels. Within the NEPAD base document it foregrounds ‘A New Global Partnership’ with industrialised countries and multi-lateral organisations. This is central to the class practice of the AU-NEPAD, but is not explored in any detail at this stage. More complicated is NEPAD’s partnership with Africa - at continental, sub-regional and national levels - and with African capital. NEPAD does not have the instrumentalised conditionalities of a national stabilisation or structural adjustment program to drive Africa’s accumulation path in a globalised direction. It has not worked with the controlled and phased introduction of neoliberal reforms in the same way that stabilisation programs and SAPS have at a country level. On the other hand, the AU-NEPAD has not had the legal ‘lock in’ mechanisms of the Maastricht Agreements and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that drove European monetary integration as part of building the European Union (Gill, 2001: 47 –69). This begs the question: how has the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process induced partnership within Africa? How has it advanced non-hegemonic class practices to ensure the implementation of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring?

A superficial reading of the NEPAD base document tends to suggest that the moral commitment of Africa’s reformist leadership is what drives AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring. The opening sentence of the NEPAD base document (2001:17) states, ‘this New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by Africa leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic.’ This pledge by African leaders championing NEPAD claims a moral authority and declares genuine intentions beyond the corrupt ‘big man’ politics of previous generations. This pledge suggests that on the surface it is the decisive ingredient to bring change to Africa. Moreover, the pledge is complimented by

11 There is a mountain of literature that has studied the role of World Bank and IMF-led stabilisation programs and SAPS on the African continent and how it has worked in national spaces. This includes Cheru (1993), Sandbrook (1993), Ferguson (1994), Widner (1994), Semboja and Therkildsen (1995), Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) Van de Walle (2001) amongst others.
the ‘new political will’ of a new liberal African leadership committed to a partnership based on ‘African ownership and management’. This is asserted as sufficient to guide the policy practice of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring.\textsuperscript{12} For Jahed (2005) the new political will is what explains the technocratic and top-down implementation of the NEPAD.

Political will has been important for the social and policy agency of Africa’s transnational fraction. However, in itself it has not been sufficient. From studying the implementation of the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process it would seem that partnership was constructed in various ways on the continent, in sub-regions, in countries and with African capital. From within the implementation process of the AU-NEPAD, power relations had to be shifted in favour of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring for it to find traction. This was realised through various class practices and concomitant shifts in patterns of authority at the legal-political level.

\textit{Narrowing the Scope for Initiatives Outside of the AU-NEPAD Process}

First, narrowing the scope for external or internal initiatives outside of the AU-NEPAD process has been key in shifting power relations. This meant placing the AU-NEPAD initiative, from its inception and through its implementation, at the centre of Africa’s engagements. This was expressed at various points by the NEPAD HSGIC. At the HSGIC inaugural meeting, it was decided that ‘all other initiatives promoted by individual countries should be subsumed under the NEPAD process, to represent a basis on which Africa can collectively and effectively cooperate with its development partners’ (2001:5). This was re-iterated even more sharply when the HSGIC declared, ‘as a framework, NEPAD provides the policy and programme direction within which states, sub-regional bodies and continental structures can operate’ (2002b: 4).

In practice this approach to implementing AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring had serious consequences for concentrating power in the AU-NEPAD process. Individual African

\textsuperscript{12} A whole section of the NEPAD base document is dedicated to explaining the dawn of new African leadership and a new political will (2001:24–26).
countries, sub-regions and even collective continental engagements were now directed by the imperatives of the AU-NEPAD agenda. This was not about displacing initiatives or direct control but about bringing all engagements by and with Africa into the ambit of a consciously directed ideological and strategic process. As a result various initiatives and concerns of African countries were placed on the AU-NEPAD agenda. From the meetings of the HSGIC various issues stand out. This ranged from the needs of Africa’s small island states, which came through by the third meeting of HSGIC and which recurred at various moments in the work of this committee, as well as, a briefing in the third meeting of the HSGIC on the Africa Trade Insurance Agency, an initiative taken by East African states.¹³

Regarding Africa’s external engagements, the approach of concentrating the AU-NEPAD as the focal point also meant a serious shift in power relations in favour of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring. In the first NEPAD progress report (2002b: 5) it states, ‘there are many initiatives and processes on the ground already, e.g. the UN Millenium Declaration, the G8 Okinawa Declaration, the Copenhagen Declaration, the Cotonou Agreement, the EU/Africa Cairo Plan of Action, the AGOA, TICAD, the Sino-Africa process etc. NEPAD does not seek to replace or compete with these, but rather to consciously establish linkages and synergies between NEPAD and these initiatives, and to were each initiative can make the greatest contribution’. Again the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process was not standing in the way of these initiatives, but was intersecting to harness these for its own objectives. A good example would be the Japan-JICA initiative that was actively engaged with in the AU-NEPAD process. By 2006 this initiative was firmly aligned around the AU-NEPAD infrastructure thrust and 38 projects were being funded by the Japanese government (Mucavele, 2006: 3).

¹³ Despite setting up the AU-NEPAD as the framework for Africa’s engagement with the external partners this did not proceed smoothly. It would seem that once African governments got into the AU-NEPAD framework they were willing to act in the framework but bypass the HSGIC. Hence the HSGIC (2003b:6) noted, ‘that all international engagements and involvement on initiatives with relevance to NEPAD by Heads of State and Government should be communicated to the Chairman of the NEPAD Steering Committee for coordination purposes.’ A constant policing of parameters was required.
Developing Common African Positions

The second class practice that has shifted power in favour of the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process relates to the development of common African positions vis-à-vis Africa’s external partners. This practice concentrated the bargaining strength of Africa and ultimately entrenched the centrality of the AU-NEPAD. A high profiled example in this regard is the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). Africa went into this summit with a common position. In the words of the NEPAD Progress Report (2002b: 21): ‘NEPAD will form the basis of Africa’s engagement at the WSSD in South Africa in August’. A post-WSSD evaluation by the HSGIC claims a positive impact on the WSSD outcomes. The NEPAD Secretariat report (2002f: 3) tabled at the HSGIC explains that the WSSD Plan of Implementation, ‘incorporates NEPAD’s main principles and priorities, and emphasizes the concept of global partnership. The WSSD had a strong focus on Africa and provided an enabling environment to promote and mobilise public and private resources for the AU-NEPAD’.

Placing AU-NEPAD at the Forefront of all Critical Issues Facing Africa

Flowing from the practice of developing common positions has also led to the AU-NEPAD being placed at the forefront of all critical issues facing Africa. For example, the AU-NEPAD became the main platform from which most African countries could challenge the G8 countries on debt cancellation. In light of the debt burden carried by numerous African countries, this gave the AU-NEPAD an unparalleled importance and gave it leverage over these African countries. Moreover, the AU-NEPAD agenda became central in championing market access for Africa countries within the WTO process. For instance, the AU-NEPAD approach to engaging the Doha Development Round is clearly captured in the HSGIC Communique (2003a: 4) which recognised, ‘the importance of these negotiations and called for greater flexibility on the part of trading

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14 The same report (NEPAD, 2002f: 3) also sets out the AU-NEPAD objectives vis-à-vis the WSSD and the role of type 2 Partnerships for Sustainable Development and the extent to which NEPAD is already engaging these partnerships.

15 This is explored further in chapter 6.
partners in granting much needed trade preferences, both special and differential, including substantial market access. It called on the African Group of Ambassadors in Geneva and the African Ministers of Trade to intensify their efforts at ensuring that all such issues of interest to the continent, including the previous commitments, are fully considered at their subsequent meetings and engagements with trading partners’.

Re-aligning Development Partners on the Continent

Another crucial consequence deriving from developing collective African positions has to do with re-aligning development partners on the African continent. From the time of formulating NEPAD through to its implementation various development partners operating on the continent such as the AfDB and the ECA were drawn in. These institutions have played a crucial role in providing technical capacity to Africa’s development efforts. Prior to the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process these institutions, and in particular the ECA, were crucial in driving Africa’s development agenda. With the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process this changed such that the ECA and the AfDB, together with other development agencies operating on the continent, became increasingly subordinate to the strategic direction of the AU-NEPAD. The technical edge of these institutions has been increasingly harnessed to support AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring imperatives and in this process the role of these institutions has been transforming. Both the ECA and AfDB, and other institutions, have been embedded within the AU-NEPAD process. This was firmly put in place at a NEPAD Implementation Workshop in Addis Ababa, in August 2002 at which ‘the development agencies pledged their support to the NEPAD initiative and emphasized the need for structured collaboration between themselves in support of the NEPAD process, based on the comparative advantages of each agency geared towards the effective utilisation of resources and services. They agreed on the need to facilitate the mobilisation of other international organisations in support of NEPAD, as well as to internalise NEPAD, promoting, through funding conditions, projects that are within the NEPAD framework’ (NEPAD, 2002f: 2).
The AfDB best illustrates the extent to which the role and positioning of development partners on the African continent have been changed to fit in with the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process. In this regard, it became the lead agency for driving the AU-NEPAD infrastructure thrust (Mucavele, 2006: 3). By 2004 it began undergoing a major transformation in terms of its institutional make-up to discharge this role. Two key institutional dimensions were added to the AfDB. First, the AfDB established a NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (PPF), which received funding initially from the Canadian Government for Can $10 million with various other development partners adding to it (HSGIC, 2004a: 6). The President of the AfDB, Omar Kabbaj, stressed the importance of this arrangement and the role of the AfDB when he briefed the HSGIC and highlighted ‘the fact that the gestation period for regional infrastructure projects is very long, in part due to issues of peace and security, and harmonisation of regulations; and partly because of the need to ensure that projects meet international standards of technical and financial analysis’ (HSGIC, 2004c: 5). Second, the AfDB set up a financing facility for infrastructure projects for the purpose of implementation. Within the period 2002-2005 it financed sixteen projects, amounting to US$629.1 million and mobilised about US$ 1.6 billion through co-financing of these project through development partners (Mucavele, 2006: 3). In addition to these institutional arrangements the AfDB also played a crucial role in restructuring the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to ensure effective implementation of infrastructure projects (HSGIC, 2004c: 9). This will also be looked at more closely below.

*Deepening African Ownership*

A third class practice that has lured African countries into the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process has to do with deepening African ownership. This is a core principle of the AU-NEPAD process and has been operationalised through various platforms and initiatives. While the Afro-neoliberal consensus underpinning the AU-NEPAD was shared by most African countries, this was not sufficient to ensure Africa practices adjustment to transnational capital. Moreover, given the failure of SAPs the Afro-neoliberal strategy of macro-restructuring had to be anchored in national spaces but in a
manner that was consistent with ensuring the AU-NEPAD was the overarching framework for Africa’s development and consistent with developing collective African positions. Thus, the deepening of ownership was not necessarily about genuine ownership but rather was about incorporation, particularly of African states. It required developing national interlocutors who could champion the priorities and thrusts of this project. In this regard three practices stand out. First, utilising Ministerial platforms to ensure NEPAD priorities are ‘internalised’ within national policy frameworks. In this regard, the public service initiative and the environmental plan stand out. In terms of the public service initiative this came through as the outcome of the 4th Pan-African Conference of Ministers of Public Service held from 4-7 May 2003 in Stellenbosch, South Africa. Essentially, ‘the Committee of African Ministers, inspired by NEPAD, have adopted a comprehensive supportive capacity development programme that would be delivered over the next three years and that would go a long way to address the challenges of establishing the required state capacities for effective, efficient and responsive governance’ (HSGIC, 2003c:8). The Environment Action Plan of NEPAD was developed at the Special Session of the African Ministerial Conference on Environment held from 9-10 June 2003 and was presented to the AU Assembly for adoption (HSGIC, 2003c:9). These initiatives, together with other AU-NEPAD strategic macro-restructuring thrusts, have been crucial in reshaping the form and deepening internationalisation of the African state.

Second, NEPAD programs, projects and sectoral priorities were directly implanted into national development plans and agendas. By 2004 a serious push was made from within the HSGIC to achieve this. At its November Summit (HSGIC, 2004c: 7) HSGIC adopted a fast track NEPAD implementation plan which included the task of getting African

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16 See Dezalay and Garth (2002) in which they study how international strategies are brought into national spaces in the context of Latin America.

17 Other Ministerial initiatives to take forward NEPAD implementation(South African Government, 2005a:8) include: the Africa productive capacity initiative of the Conference of the African Ministers of Industry, the African strategy for the development of tourism considered and approved by Ministers of Tourism, A strategy for the development of science and technology approved by Ministers of Science and Technology, an initiative by Ministers of Mining that have placed NEPAD at the centre of their strategy for transforming the sector and attempts by Ministers of Information Technology to implement NEPAD ICT projects, the Digital Solidarity Fund and the World Summit on Information Society.
states to take on board the AU-NEPAD framework. It declared, ‘the need to develop the
capacity of national governments to internalise NEPAD values and principles and to
integrate these into national development agenda and plans, as well as a review of
national budgets with a view to ensuring compatibility with NEPAD priorities so as to
facilitate the ability of countries to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’
(HSGIC, 2004c: 7). Speaking at a NEPAD implementation workshop in South Africa on
the Role of States in Implementing NEPAD, R. Mkandawire then part of the NEPAD
Secretariat specified that in implementing NEPAD programs states are required to do the
following (2005: 6):

deepering ownership, self reliant development and strengthening leadership at
national level through the internalisation of NEPAD values and principles;
establishment of NEPAD focal points (persons and institutions) to deepen
ownership and the mainstreaming of national NEPAD programs; accelerating the
adoption of NEPAD programmes as frameworks and guidelines for national
development plans and for PRSPS and also ensuring that each African country
takes full advantage of the G8 Africa Action Plan; complying with REC and AU
major resolutions linked to the implementation of NEPAD programmes;
deepening engagement of private sector and civil society in the implementation of
NEPAD programmes; engaging Ministers of finance to commit adequate
resources in the implementation of NEPAD priority programs.

In Ghana, for example, this approach to internalising AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring
led to the formation of the first Ministry specifically focusing on Regional Co-operation
and NEPAD in March 2003 (South African Government, 2005a: 2-4). This Ministry
took on a specific role which included regional integration in West Africa and focusing
on NEPAD activities in collaboration with other countries. Practically Ghana has been
involved in the e-schools project, the NEPAD school feeding program, the West Africa
Gas Pipeline project and the West Africa Power Pool as part of fitting into the NEPAD
framework. South Africa also took steps to align with NEPAD. South Africa
conceptualised its NEPAD Implementation Strategy (NISSA) to ‘serve as a framework
for South Africa’s engagement with the NEPAD process, guiding the work and defining
the roles of all stakeholders, namely the Cabinet Clusters, Departments, Provincial and
Local Government, Parliament, State Owned Enterprises, civil society, labour and
business…finalise the elements of NISSA relating to engagement with the NEPAD
process at the national, regional, continental and international levels’ (South African Government, 2005b: 2).

Third, the AU itself has been used as an important platform to deepen African state incorporation. Besides the AU receiving reports from the HSGIC, about Ministerial initiatives supporting NEPAD and adopting various implementation initiatives of the NEPAD, it has also been a platform to deepen incorporation.\(^\text{18}\) The second AU Summit in 2003 was utilised effectively to entrench AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring. The theme of this summit was ‘Implementation of NEPAD’ and the HSGIC resolved to table an AU Declaration on Implementing NEPAD (HSGIC, 2003c). This declaration not only deepened incorporation of African states it also strengthened the integration of the NEPAD and AU by resolving to tighten institutional arrangements and linkages (HSGIC, 2003c: 16). By 2005 the AU-NEPAD implementation process was very much about designing and planning NEPAD into the AU such that NEPAD programmes were fully integrated into the AU strategic plan and work plans (South African Government, 2005a:12). At this stage the AU itself was firmly locked into AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring processes (Nkhulu, 2005: 3)

**Organising African Capital into the AU-NEPAD Process**

A fourth class practice has been the active organising of African capital into the AU-NEPAD process. Within the NEPAD base document this is expressed as a strong commitment and is given a central place, despite AU-NEPAD’s claim to be on behalf of all the people and based on African ownership. The NEPAD base document (2001: 35-49) not only promotes the private sector through its sectoral priorities, which includes the promotion of public-private partnerships, removing structural constraints to encourage private investment and lowering risk perceptions by creating appropriate investment environments. But within the NEPAD base document there is an interventionist approach vis-à-vis the private sector to foster its growth and development.

\(^{18}\) For example, at the first AU Summit in July 2002, Durban, the NEPAD Initial Action Plan was endorsed and it resolved to encourage Member States of the African Union to adopt the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and to accede to the African Peer Review Mechanism.
This is envisaged as happening through positioning the private sector as a key agent of achieving an export-led growth model. This comes through in the NEPAD base document (2001: 59-60) under its ‘market access initiative’ in which it provides for a big push for organising the African private sector through: building its technical and managerial capacities; strengthening its chambers of commerce, business associations and networks; organising a dialogue between government and the private sector to foster a ‘shared vision of economic development strategy and remove constraints to private sector development’; and through fostering micro, small and medium scale industries by improving access to financing schemes. Moreover, within the implementation framework of the NEPAD base document (2001: 67) there is an emphasis on fostering the private sector at a national level through business incubators which draw on international best practice.

In short, the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring envisages a process of organising African capital, particularly the private sector into its process. In terms of class practice this has amounted to promoting NEPAD business chapters in various African countries and fostering the creation of the NEPAD Business Group, which initially represented 200 companies doing business in Africa. These companies signed the Business Endorsement of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in June 2002, which firmly articulated African capital’s support and interest in the realisation of the NEPAD. By 2004 this was taken further with the conversion of the NEPAD Business Group into the NEPAD Business Foundation (NBF). Its mission statement captures the convergence of African capital’s interest with AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring very clearly. It states that the mission of the NBF is to deliver on the NEPAD ideals which are to alleviate poverty, to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and to fully integrate Africa into the global economy. This will be done through the delivery of

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19 By 2002 South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya had already established NEPAD business chapters (Nkuhlu, 2005: 10). In addition information on the NEPAD Business Group is available on the website of the NEPAD Business Foundation the successor of the NEPAD Business Group. The website address: www.nepAfDBusinessfoundation.org

20 Available at http://www.nepAfDBusinessfoundation.org/nepad/mission-vision.jsp
sustainable projects for the benefit of the African people and the prosperity of the African continent. Further, the organisation will develop a body of interested and affected businesses, who have a common purpose, to identify and pursue multiple opportunities in Africa. This is to be done by the establishment of sectoral committees who provide a contact point for business within each industry. Further these committees will meet to network, identify opportunities, disseminate information and ultimately bring projects to fruition’.  

To take this mission forward three crucial institutional mechanisms have been established within the NBF. The first is a secretariat with six objectives: bringing about greater trade synergies and strategic coordination of the continent’s free trade and economic development zones; provision of a continental program for common protocols, rules and ethical practices among member countries; act as a marketing tool; provide trade information and data service for members; facilitate exchange of technologies, practices and experiences to member countries with the view to maintaining competitive advantages of trade in Africa; and to promote policy innovations within member countries to effect greater integration of NEPAD within their respective heartlands. The second mechanism is the project management office (PMO). The essence of this mechanism’s strategic function is to connect members directly with NEPAD projects. Its role ‘emanates from the NBF’s quest to create invaluable linkages within Africa that will benefit all sectors, with the aim to provide information and knowledge on NEPAD projects, facilitation and coordination of projects, partners and programs across sectors’. Currently it is working on two investment corridors along a North-South axis in Africa and in Central Africa to lure in more investment.

The third important institutional mechanism within NBF is its sixteen sectoral groups and their sectoral contact points. A good example of how these groups work would be the

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21 Ibid.
22 Available at http://www.nepAfDBusinessfoundation.org/nepad/secretariat.jsp
23 Available at http://www.nepAfDBusinessfoundation.org/nepad/pmo.jsp
stock exchanges sector. It is convened by the Executive Director of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and promotes global standards among African exchanges, corporate governance and integration. It is envisages the three African exchanges that are linked to the World Federation of Exchanges – the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), the Cairo and Alexandra Stock Exchange (CASE) in Egypt and the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) – are the benchmark for the rest of Africa. In addition, it envisages working with the twenty African countries that are part of the African Stock Exchanges Association (ASEA) to improve its role in developing capital markets on the African continent.

Finally, the stock exchanges sectoral group of the NBF envisages itself playing a role in harmonising the listing requirements of ten stock exchanges within SADC, utilising the JSE as a base. This process of harmonisation is happening through the Committee of SADC Stock Exchanges (CoSSE), established in 1997. In addition, there is concerted effort to integrate the stock exchanges as expressed through the region’s Financial Investment Protocol which has been agreed to by the Heads of State in SADC. All these mechanisms within the NBF firmly bring together a symbiotic link between the AU-NEPAD process and African capital’s interests. It ensures African capital is firmly organised into and embedded within AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring to ensure its interests can be realised.

Harmonising Standards and Regulatory Policy Frameworks

A fifth class practice asserting AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring has been through harmonising standards and regulatory policy frameworks. With the NEPAD base document reference is made to harmonisation in terms of policy standards and regulatory frameworks with regard to most of its envisaged sectoral priorities (2001: 35-49).

However, one of the most ambitions and serious initiatives to harmonise standards that

25 Available at http://www.nepAfDBusinessfoundation.org/nepad/stockexchange.jsp
26 Due to the slow pace of this process the JSE has planned the launch of an Africa Board for companies that have a presence on the African continent and who want to organise capital through the JSE. This point came through as part of the concluding remarks made by Geoff Rothschild, Director: Government and International Affairs, JSE and stock exchanges sectoral convenor/sectoral point person in the NBF at Frontier Advisory seminar, ‘Africa in 2009’, JSE Auditorium, 3rd February 2009.
accord with Afro-neoliberal standards of macro-economic management has been NEPAD’s *Framework for the Implementation of Banking and Financial Standards*, which was a key thrust within NEPAD priority Action Plans (NEPAD, 2002c: 15-18). The approach to harmonisation and its recommendations have important implications for remaking the form and role of the African state within the global economy. The approach to harmonisation encourages African states at a national level to adopt these ‘internationally recognised standards.’ This also brings in a role for the APRM.

The implementation of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring, to ensure harmonisation with international banking and financial standards, envisages ‘the importance of taking into consideration certain factors in the assessment and design of implementation of standards, including variation in implementation of the different standards, the establishment of certain key preconditions, particularly macroeconomic conditions and legal and accounting framework, complexities due to interconnectedness of the standards, and country-specific factors’ (NEPAD, 2002c: 16). The main thrust is to ensure countries take on board these standards so that their financial systems promote ‘the attraction of investment, better resource allocation and more efficient provision of financial resources. The standards themselves also provide policymakers with guideposts or benchmarks for implementing structural reform, building institutional and supervisory capacity and promoting an enabling environment for investment’ (NEPAD, 2002c: 15).

Another expression of this class practice and approach to harmonising policy and regulatory standards has been through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) developed between the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and other development partners. This framework was adopted by the HSGIC as its lead initiative on agriculture and by 2003 it called on ‘all member states of the African Union to take effective actions to implement the Programme, in line with the NEPAD goals and objectives’ (HSGIC, 2003a: 6). By 2004 African states were encouraged to incorporate CAADP into national development plans, coaxing national governments to meet the target of 10% of budget for agriculture in the next five years and increasing the role for Ministers of Agriculture (HSGIC, 2004a: 5-6). By 2006
harmonising agricultural policy standards and regulations with AU-NEPAD restructuring was given a boost by the United States government’s contribution of US$200 million per annum for a period of 5 years. This was also re-enforced by World Bank support for a US$60 million fisheries seed fund (Mucavele, 2006: 5). The role of external development partners in incentivising support for AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring is explored further in chapter six.

Another ambitions intervention to harmonise standards and regulatory policy frameworks at a sectoral and state level has been through NEPAD’s mining sector initiative. The extent of this class practice is best captured by W.L. Nkuhlu (former Chief Executive of the NEPAD Secretariat) (2005: 10-11):

private sector investment in mining has increased significantly over the last few years and we have seen new interest in a diverse range of minerals. Both multinational and junior mining companies are back in Africa in large numbers, with active exploration activities in a number of countries, including Botswana, the DRC, Tanzania and Mali. Associated with these developments are accelerated policy and regulatory reforms and improved collaboration by African Ministers of Mining. They have established a forum to promote harmonisation of policies, increased investment and enhancement of the skills that are required for development of the sector.

Through these attempts to harmonise sectoral policy and regulatory standards the process of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring has not only been changing the role and form of the African state, but has also has been responsible for the internationalisation of the African state. The class practice of harmonising standards through AU-NEPAD restructuring processes has almost reduced the African state to a ‘conveyor belt’, which has further entrenched power relations in its favour.

Capacity Building Interventions

Finally, the sixth class practice that has been central to remaking continental institutions has been capacity building interventions targeted at Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Within the NEPAD base document (2001: 68) regional integration is envisaged as happening through infrastructure development. In the implementation phase of AU-
NEPAD restructuring this important role for RECs was emphasised consistently within the HSGIC. Initially the emphasis in the approach was to work with priorities set by the RECs. In late 2002 the HSGIC observed the self initiative by RECs to align with AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring. The record of the HSGIC meeting (2002c: 7) noted, ‘that RECs have a key role to play in the implementation of NEPAD programs and projects. It applauded the various summits and workshops organised by RECs in the various subregions to identify their roles in the implementation of NEPAD. In this connection, the RECs were called upon to play a leading role in the implementation of infrastructure projects at sub-regional level’. However, by 2004 the HSGIC placed a greater emphasis on fast tracking NEPAD implementation but the lack of capacity within RECs became a serious constraint. As a result, capacity building within RECs became a critical priority as part of fast tracking AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring (HSGIC, 2004c:7) and this also changed the approach to the RECs.

The HSGIC (2004c:7) resolved to ensure ‘establishment of NEPAD Implementation Task Teams in every sub-region following the SADC example. These task teams are to include NEPAD steering committee members. The task teams will work strategically with the Steering Committee members to determine the capacities of RECs as well as ensure the implementation of identified projects’. Increasingly RECs have been restructured from above to ensure alignment not with their priorities but with AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring priorities. This has also shifted power relations in favour of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring. The weaknesses of RECs have been used as the basis to instrumentalise them and bring them into the AU-NEPAD restructuring process. RECs are now appendages of this process and are now firmly driving market led and open integration while trying to realise AU-NEPAD priorities.

Partnership within Africa for the AU-NEPAD process has not been secured through moral claims and political will by a new reformist and liberal leadership. Instead, partnership had to be constructed in a manner that linked the interests of countries, sub-regions and African capital with this process. This had to be done through the social agency of the transnational fraction of the African ruling class. The class practices of this
fraction were not based on organising hegemonic consent to lead macro-restructuring. Instead it entailed shifting power relations to induce African countries, African capital and sub-regions to recognise that their interests are synonymous with the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring process. Partnership and support for AU-NEPAD was made into a necessity. The practice of inducing partnership is also central to the AU-NEPAD approach to liberal democracy and good governance. This is discussed in the next chapter to further highlight how the form of the African state has been transforming in the AU-NEPAD restructuring process.

III. Peace, Security and Stability

The third strategic element of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring is the peace, security and stability approach and agenda. The development of the AU-NEPAD peace and security architecture has been influenced by three crucial historical factors. First, the collapse of Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War brought an end to super power rivalry on the continent through proxy forces and changed the relationship between a US-led transnational historical bloc and Africa. Africa lost its strategic leverage in Western capitals while at the same time a new wave of resourced-based wars, particularly at an intra-state level, took place. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola all stand out as stark examples of this kind of ‘new war’ in which war was fought for private gain (Cawthra, 2004:31). Moreover, ethnic factors expressed themselves through these conflicts like in the Rwanda genocide in which close to a million people were killed in 1994. Even in this context the US-led historic bloc was not willing to provide support to conflict resolution. Increasingly Africa was forced to turn on itself to resolve these conflicts and in most instances the UN had to step in.

Second, the failures of the OAU and it inability to respond effectively to peace-making and peace-keeping forced a rethink of the African security paradigm. In the CSSDCA process, for example, the state-centric framework of protecting sovereign states was problematised such that humanitarian intervention became recognised as a crucial qualification to the fiction of absolute state sovereignty. This meant states violating the
rights of its citizens through genocide and violence could not hide behind territorial integrity and sovereignty. Humanitarian intervention provided a basis for direct intervention. Moreover, in the CSSDCA process the concept of security was widened to include human security. Thus, threats to the security of states were problematised as too narrow and a wider conception embracing individual citizens and their basic needs, their rights to participate in the full affairs of their societies, and their fundamental human rights came to the fore. In addition, Africa had become a victim of terror attacks before 9/11. Terror attacks on US diplomatic missions in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania in August 1998, led to the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism by the OAU in 1999 (Makinda and Okumu, 2008:82).

Third, Africa’s inability to produce successful neoliberalizers spawned failed democratic transitions in many instances and increasingly created the discourse of the failed African state. For the World Bank in particular the solution of fixing the ‘failed’ and ‘defective’ African state became crucial to ensure structural adjustment succeeded in the 1990s and beyond (World Bank, 2000:48-83). This led to the World Bank’s governance agenda. However, in the context of conflict and war torn societies this approach to fixing the failed African state spawned a post-conflict reconstruction agenda. According to Moore’s (2007d: 387-411) analysis of the World Bank’s booklet Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank, it amounts to creating ‘market friendly’ opportunities on the levelled playing fields assumed by ‘post-conflict’ discourse. More pointedly Moore highlights (2007d: 387) that, ‘the World Bank and similar agencies are able to enter the killing fields even during conflict to lay the seeds of – or ‘embed’, to use a reversal of Polanyian perspectives – individual property rights and other aspects of neoliberal economic, social and political good governance. Perspectives from ‘social capital’ discourse also buttress this view. Such ideologies coincide with and justify the diminishing resources allocated to a more traditional humanitarian agenda for post-war reconstruction, as well as sidelining alternatives’.

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27 Bilgin and Morton (2002) show how the representation of the ‘African failed state’ was developed within the social sciences.
The peace, security and stability agenda of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring emerges from these historical factors. The AU’s approach to regional security, through the framework of the PSC, has been characterised as a collaborative security and collective security approach (Cawthra, 2004: 34). It is a multi-lateral framework that attempts to limit the role for strong states to dominate. Within the AU Constitutive Act, on the one hand, it affirms non-intervention by affirming ‘sovereign equality’, ‘respect of borders’ and ‘non-interference’ (Article 4: a, b, g). On the other hand, the Act also affirms a ‘common defence policy’, ‘peaceful resolution of conflicts’, ‘the right of the Union to intervene […] in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ and the ‘right of Member States to request intervention […] in order to restore peace and security’ (Article 4: d, e, h, j). This approach is practically institutionalised through the PSC and its governing protocol. Within NEPAD, the base document advocates a short-term and a long-term approach as part of its peace and security initiative.

In the short term NEPAD envisages a strengthened role at a macro-regional and sub-regional level for conflict prevention, management and resolution; peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement; post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction and combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines (NEPAD, 2001: 30). In the long term, as part of addressing the root causes of conflict, NEPAD presents its substantive agenda as contained in the Political and Economic Governance Initiatives, the Capital Flows and Market Access Initiatives and the Human Development Initiative as the solution (NEPAD, 2001: 30). In short, the AU-NEPAD espouses an Afro-neoliberal approach to peace, security and stability on the African continent such that peace and security are not ends in themselves, but part of a defined Afro-neoliberal accumulation framework; peace, security and stability are necessary pre-conditions, together with liberal democracy, governance, human rights and conservative macro-economic management to ensure the advance of this strategic project. However, resolving the peace and security problematic through this framework has also engendered class practices as part of shifting power relations.
Asserting a Consistent Agenda

The first class practice through which AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring has shifted power relations in the context of peace, security and stability has been through asserting this agenda consistently. Africa’s macro-regional security has become synonymous with this approach and class practice. While it has failed dismally in relation to Darfur and Zimbabwe, for instance, it has consistently shown the willingness of Africa’s transnational fraction to isolate illiberal Africa. The African solution to these African problems has not necessarily amounted to the resolution of conflicts through the AU-NEPAD but has managed to present a bifurcated Africa to the rest of the world: liberal versus illiberal. This contributes to shifting power and aligning particular social forces in its favour.\textsuperscript{28}

Capacity Building and Resourcing for Afro-neoliberal Peace

The second class practice that has shifted power relations has been expressed through capacity building and resourcing for an Afro-neoliberal peace. This has been a central thrust within the NEPAD base document (2001: 30-31). Alongside the development of the AU’s peace and security framework, the NEPAD initiative has worked consistently to re-enforce this. In essence this process has been about re-engineering Africa’s entire peace and security architecture. An example of the scale and ambition of this process comes through in the first six months of 2002 before the AU Summit in July. At the first HSGIC meeting in October 2001 various task teams were created for priority areas including a task team created solely for the purpose of capacity building on peace and security (HSGIC, 2001). At the same meeting the HSGIC established a sub-committee on peace and security, with South Africa as its chair. By January 2002 at a planning workshop in South Africa a clear intervention was developed to overhaul the entire peace and security architecture in Africa.

\textsuperscript{28} South Africa’s diplomatic response to Zimbabwe, for example, has been within the AU multi-lateral approach. The quite diplomacy/preventative diplomacy of Mbeki’s government has been severely critiqued in public debate but it has been embraced and supported by academics and policy experts in some quarters. For a perspective supporting preventative diplomacy see Solomon (2003).
A focused initiative was developed and programmatised to unfold over a six month period. This included: policy formulation around a new agenda for conflict prevention, management and resolution; a security policy review involving the OAUs Peace and Security Organ; deepened consultation as part of re-aligning RECs around the new policy approach to peace and security; assessments of strengths and weaknesses of RECs and in order to bring all of this into a strategic framework document with input from the G8 (NEPAD, 2002a, 17-19). By the time of the AU Summit in July 2002, AU-NEPAD-led restructuring was shaping Africa’s peace and security architecture at two levels: a technical and financial level and at a political level. The latter was encapsulated and presented to the AU Summit as a HSGIC peace and security sub-committee agenda which entailed: enhanced capacity to conduct thorough and inclusive strategic assessments of situations affected by conflicts; support efforts to develop early warning systems at continental and regional levels, including the development of strategic analysis and database systems; support for post-conflict reconstruction and development in all affected countries; support efforts to curb proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa; support efforts for democracy, good governance and human rights through appropriate policy and institutional reforms; and assist in resource mobilisation for the African Union Peace Fund (NEPAD, 2002b: 15).

This class practice has continued as part of the implementation of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring over the past few years. It has evolved and has added new policy elements but in general Africa’s peace and security architecture has increasingly become grounded in the principle and doctrine of ‘non-indifference’ (Mwanasali, 2008: 41-62). While the record of intervention based on ‘non-indifference’ has been disastrous and Africa’s efforts at self pacification have been constrained and faced many challenges, it has broadened a consensus for an Afro-neoliberal peace from above. It has done this through AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring of Africa’s peace and security architecture through capacity building and financial support such that it has succeeded in presenting itself as the only alternative to the violence and brutality of illiberal Africa. In short, Africa has an Afro-neoliberal peace and security framework in which an Afro-neoliberal peace is about
creating the conditions for a globalised African capitalism. It is now deeply embedded in Africa’s regional security approach such that it has contributed to shifting power in its favour.

*The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Agenda of the AU-NEPAD*

A third class practice contributing to shifting power relations has been through the post-conflict reconstruction agenda of the AU-NEPAD. This agenda is contained in a document entitled *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*. This document was adopted in 2005 and has guided AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring in relation to war torn societies. In many ways it takes on board the World Bank’s agenda of embedding transnational neoliberalism, but claims an African pedigree as suggested by its title. More precisely, this agenda is Afro-neoliberal. The operationalising of this framework shifts power in favour of AU-NEPAD macro-structuring in three respects. First, it provides for a technocratic and ‘programmatised’ approach to post-conflict reconstruction. It envisages three phases (emergency, transition and socio-economic development) based on achieving five features: (i) security; (ii) political transition, governance and participation; (iii) socio-economic development; (iv) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and (v) coordination, management and resource mobilisation. Such an approach requires high levels of capacity for coordination and planning a national government strategy (as envisaged in the framework). In this regard the framework provides for an AU-NEPAD post-conflict Unit. Such a Unit is expected to house the necessary technical capacity to support such an intervention (NEPAD, 2005:27). In providing such capacity the AU-NEPAD skews the process in its favour and ensures it can contribute to engineering post-conflict African societies from above.

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29 This document was developed in 2004 and its formulation process was led by the NEPAD secretariat supported by the South African think tank ACCORD. This process involved inputs and consultations from various stakeholders (NEPAD, 2005:3).

30 See Moore (2007d: 387-412) for an incisive analysis of the World Bank’s Booklet on *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank*. The AU-NEPAD African agenda for post-conflict reconstruction takes on board the implanting of a liberal social order from above, macro-stabilisation, conflates civil society to social capital and ensures capacity building locks in Afro-neoliberal reforms. Very similar to the World Bank approach. This is elaborated on further below.
Second, while the policy framework is not prescriptive it does suggest that the AU-NEPAD should play a key role in resource mobilisation (NEPAD, 2005: 28). This is expected to happen at three levels: (i) through a reconstruction fund; (ii) through garnering diplomatic support for project support and (iii) through mobilising technical support and expertise. Again this places the AU-NEPAD in a strong position to influence the direction of post-conflict change.

Third, the post-conflict framework envisages a process in which a ‘new constitutionalism’ locks in macro-stabilisation (NEPAD, 2005:10). It also envisages a process of capacity building to ensure appropriate resource absorption. This means, ‘in general, this translates into programming those elements of the assistance package that are not aimed at emergency relief and recovery over a longer-term, and directing more of the assistance initially to building the capacities that would be required to absorb downstream assistance. The World Bank has suggested that internal actors are best placed to absorb programmes in year 4 to 7, in other words, towards the end of the transitional period and the beginning of the development phase’ (NEPAD, 2005: 23). Simply put, capacity building further re-enforces and locks in an Afro-neoliberal approach to macro-economic management. At the same time, civil society is fitted into the programmatised approach as social capital and is depoliticized (NEPAD, 2005: 27). This is further coupled with ‘scaling down’ external roles and ‘scaling up’ to ensure local ownership after Afro-neoliberal lock-in has happened (NEPAD, 2005: 21). In short, the AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring approach to post-conflict situations is about deepening the continental passive revolution and ensuring the transnational fraction of the African ruling class retains the initiative from above to lead Africa’s adjustment to transnational capital.