Chapter 3

Beyond Rivalry: The Making of a Common Afro-neoliberal Consensus

Introduction

The making of a neoliberalised Africa in national spaces spanned two overlapping conjunctures: (i) the defeat of actual and potentially radical post-colonial state-led development projects; and (ii) the debt crisis and national adjustment. These conjunctures were spawned by the uneven and haphazard process of decolonisation and struggles for national liberation. The neoliberalisation that ensued in national spaces did not resolve Africa’s organic crisis. A disciplined Africa was not a sufficient condition to produce structural change and a successful Afro-neoliberal capitalism. Instead a trend of reversal, degeneration and failure characterised a neoliberalised Africa. Africa’s great transformation of market-led development produced a human and ecological disaster. Hence, the need for structural change to address Africa’s under-development persisted. With Africa disciplined the initiative for change resided with the US-led transnational historical bloc and an incipient transnational fraction of Africa’s ruling class. As a result the struggle over Africa’s adjustment to transnational capital entered a third conjuncture: the conjuncture of continental restructuring (1989 until the present). This chapter places into perspective the dynamics of this conjuncture and how it produced an Afro-neoliberal project to restructure Africa on a continental scale.

The conjuncture of macro-restructuring was shaped by various attempts to find a continental solution to Africa’s failed neoliberalisation. As part of this process, a pro-African paradigm of self-reliant and self-sustaining development increasingly gave way to transnational neoliberalism. At this intersection a process of hybridising transnational neoliberalism with a home grown African development paradigm began to happen.
Spurring this evolution were numerous macro-restructuring initiatives that came to the fore in the course of the 1990s. Many of these initiatives reflected the politico-ideological agenda of an incipient African transnational class fraction and these initiatives further clarified the social agency and class formation of this fraction. These initiatives are brought into view as part of understanding the development of an Afro-neoliberal concept of control for Africa’s macro-restructuring.

It also assists with understanding how the transnational fraction of Africa’s ruling class began redefining the basis for its rule on the African continent. The search for a new continental order - new ideas, institutions and material capabilities - culminates in the AU-NEPAD. The intra-class battles to achieve this and to ensure the reproduction of the transnational fraction as well as meet the requirements of transnational capital are brought into view. This assists with explaining how the AU-NEPAD represents not just an attempt at regionalisation nor debt driven adjustment, but actually represents a strategic project to ensure the general interests of Africa are synonymous with the interests of transnational capital.

The Conjuncture of Macro-Restructuring: Implications of a Disciplined Africa

The conjuncture of macro-restructuring (1989 until the present) is the third conjuncture that has shaped post-colonial Africa. This conjuncture overlaps with and has its roots in the other conjunctures that have shaped a neoliberalised Africa; it is a conjuncture that has been produced by a disciplined Africa. In this conjuncture the historical structures of Africa’s political economy in national spaces have been remade. Based on the analysis from the preceding chapter the following implications can be drawn out for Africa’s historical structures and its new conjuncture of continental macro-restructuring. First, Africa’s ‘great transformation’ has happened through passive revolutions such that relations of force have ensured Africa is governed in the interests of transnational capital. The deterritorialised and disembedded market is at the centre of organising development and national economies. Linked to this has been the rise of a ‘politics of poverty’ from the US-led transnational historical bloc in response to failing neoliberalisation on the
continent and growing mass pressure against austerity. The politics of poverty has an ameliorative impact in national political economies and is tied directly to deepening donor control. ‘Good governed’ African states are at the vanguard of the MDG experiment (Harrison, 2007; Moore, 2007c).

At the same time, the discourse on poverty reduction through the MDGs has been able to deflect mass pressure by accommodating some demands from African civil society. This has served to blunt the leading role of mass initiative from below and has further fed into the evisceration of post-colonial movements for democratisation. In general ruling classes have imposed the non-hegemonic rule of transnational capital through structural adjustment, new state forms that are increasingly orientated to be ‘globally competitive’ through ‘surveillance based good governance’, discourses on poverty alleviation and truncated multi-party democracies. This co-exists with the ‘disciplinary dictatorships’ of Africa’s illiberal petro-states in which market liberalisation coexists with authoritarianism. These are not expressions of passive revolution. Instead, as threats to liberal Africa, Africa’s illiberal states are being coaxed into and assimilated into Africa’s Afro-neoliberal passive revolution. This comes through explicitly in the context of AU-NEPAD macro-restructuring. In the main, Africa’s great transformation of market-led development has globalised Africa through national passive revolutions in most instances.

Second, neoliberalism has been given African characteristics within national spaces. By the end of the 1980s it was estimated that about 35 African countries had taken on board World Bank and IMF-led stabilization and adjustment programs (Adedeji, 2004: 276). This number increased as more African countries experienced economic decline in the 1990s and as the World Bank and IMF pressed on with these prescriptions as the solution to Africa’s organic crisis. The neoliberalisation experienced by African countries displaced other radical development projects and alternatives in the context of the disciplining of Africa. Hence, Afro-neoliberalism was rooted as an evolving ideological and historical structure shaping the development of Africa in national spaces. In both its liberal and illiberal manifestations it limits the development choices available to African
countries. It locks African countries into an ‘external centred’ or globalised model of development as opposed to ensuring development stems from internal priorities and needs.

Third, Afro-neoliberal capitalism has structurally transformed African economies. The era of ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisies’, ‘comprador bourgeoisies’, and ‘military bourgeoisies’ fabricated in the context of national accumulation strategies has been receding and increasingly giving way to the transnationalising of relations of production. This side of structurally determined class formation happened over almost three decades of neoliberalisation. Various Afro-neoliberal accumulation strategies of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation have disrupted national capitalist class formation and the trajectory of nationally based monopolies. This increasingly changed the embeddedness of national capital vis-à-vis the state. For instance, during Africa’s neoliberalisation in national spaces, World Bank and IMF-led structural adjustment and stabilisation programs privatised 3,672 public enterprises with a sales value of 7.28 billion (US$) (World Bank, 2005: 395). Moreover, the World Bank has consistently monitored the process of ‘doing business’ through the use of indicators that track the cost of starting and closing a business, registering property, details of contract enforcement and investor protection from expropriation (World Bank, 2005: 258 –263).

Besides the shifting structural relationship between the state and capital in globalising African societies, the link between national and global circuits of accumulation have been deepening through attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and export/import relations with transnational capital. This structural determinant of transnational class formation on the African continent has different impacts on different sectors and has been uneven and ongoing in the context of national adjustment and macro-restructuring. For example, the UNCTAD World Investment Report (1998: 170) shows that cumulative flows of FDI to Africa between 1982 and 1996 amounted to US $19.2 billion. Between 1989 and 1996, 40% of FDI inflows went into Africa’s primary sector, 30% into manufacturing and 27% into services. In 1997 alone FDI flows to Africa amounted to US $4.7 billion although this was the lowest share of total global FDI flows, at 3%. Moreover, the report makes
the observation that, ‘some 47 of the 53 African countries had adopted national laws governing FDI by 1997; 28 of these legal instruments have been amended or introduced in the 1990s. According to a recent survey of least developed countries, only six of the 29 least developed countries in Africa for which data is available still had a restrictive regime for the repatriation of dividends and capital’ (UNCTAD, 1998: 172). Besides changes in national FDI policy,

a large number of African countries have signed bi-lateral investment treaties, which numbered 326 in 1997. In addition, by 1998 the majority of African countries (41) had signed the Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) as well as the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (42); 40 African countries have adopted the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and 41 African countries have signed one or more agreements in the WTO relating to FDI, such as the TRIMS and TRIPS Agreements, under the umbrella of the WTO Final Act of Marrakech, although some countries are in the process of revising domestic laws and notifying the WTO (UNCTAD, 1998:173).

The increasing importance of privatisation as a means of attracting FDI also features prominently in the UNCTAD report (1998: 170). For example, in 1996 Egypt alone accounted for $1.2 billion in sales of public enterprises to foreign investors, in Morocco sales to a Swedish investor improved privatisation revenues and in sub-Saharan Africa, $299 million of a total of $623 million in privatisation sales was raised through sales to foreign investors. In some countries such as Ghana the approach to privatisation and FDI combines foreign partners with local capitalists through offering minority stakes on the stock exchange. In other countries there have been other permutations to foster a symbiotic link between domestic and foreign capital. However, besides the use of privatisation to attract FDI to Africa, export processing zones in Mauritius particularly in its clothing and textile industry were highlighted as important (UNCTAD, 1998:168). In addition to emphasising these various features of FDI on the African continent, UNCTAD declared eighteen Africa countries success stories and front-runners in attracting FDI (UNCTAD, 1998:178). These countries performed better than the average

---

1 These countries were: Angola, Botswana, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The absence of South Africa, the engine of Africa’s economy, is striking.
African country but also better than the average developing country.

By 2006 Africa achieved a new record level of FDI amounting to $36 billion (UNCTAD, 2007: 34). This was twice the 2004 level and reflected a 20% rise. FDI in 2006 was dispersed and rose in 33 countries, mainly in extractive industries and in some service related industries like transport, storage and communications. Most TNCs linked to developed countries and present on the continent expanded their activities into oil, gas and mining. Asian TNCs also entered the continent through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and green-field investments. Cross border M&As were valued at a record level of $18 billion and an estimated 442 green-field investments were undertaken in Africa in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007: 35). FDI inflows into African LDCs increased from $6 billion in 2005 to $8 billion in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007: 36). In Egypt, the top recipient of FDI in 2006, $10 billion of its inflows were in non-oil activities such as agriculture, manufacturing, banking and tourism (UNCTAD, 2007: 36). According to UNCTAD the main factors contributing to these inflows include: sectoral liberalisation, improvements in FDI promotion, tax reductions in some countries and specialised investment zones or parks in Botswana, Eritrea, Morocco, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. (UNCTAD, 2007: 38-39). However, besides FDI flows riding on the commodity boom in Africa, speculative capital activity has also intensifies. This has largely been informed by the shift in the risk environment for foreign investors and this has led to new stock exchange listings, an increase in Africa hedge funds and new Africa equity funds.  

Finally, the spatial aspect of structurally determined transnational class formation has also become increasingly salient on the African continent. African capital has begun to

---

2 The 10 major recipients of FDI among African LDCs in 2006 were (in declining order): Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, the United Republic of Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia, Uganda, Burundi, Madagascar and Mali. FDI grew particularly fast (by 50% or more) in Burundi, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, Madagascar, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Gambia and Sudan.

move beyond national markets and onto the continent and in some cases beyond. This is happening through trade relations and FDI flows on the continent and beyond through the activities of transnationalising African monopolies. Regarding intra-African trade it is generally assumed that South Africa dominates and intra-African trade is a one way street favouring South African exports. In 2006 South Africa exported goods and services to 53 African countries worth R53.1 billion, while in 2005 total imports from Africa amounted to R13.3 billion but this increased by 100% in 2006 to R26.5 billion. In terms of FDI flows South Africa is a leader in this regard and during the 1990s, South African monopolies developed a footprint in Southern Africa’s services sector such as retail and banking (UNCTAD, 1998: 186). However, in 2006 FDI outflows hit record levels and were twice the previous peak in 1997. Investors from South Africa accounted for four-fifths of this but not all of this went into Africa (UNCTAD, 2007:38).

For example, Anglo Gold Ashanti invested in a gold mining expansion project in Brazil (in Cuiaba) and in underground gold extraction development in Australia (at Sunrise Dam); and Ophir Energy invested in offshore oil exploration in the United Republic of Tanzania. AngloGold also established an alliance worth $58 million with Trans-Siberian Gold of the Russian Federation. In telecommunications outward movement happened from TNCs in Morocco, South Africa and Egypt. In 2005, for instance, Orascom Telecom (Egypt) acquired Wind Telecommunicazioni (Italy) for $12.8 billion (UNCTAD, 2007: 41). UNCTAD (2007: 38) also observed in the same period significant crossborder acquisitions by African firms. This took place in industries as diverse as health-care services, printing and media, and construction. This process of transnationalisation from within the continent is ongoing. African monopolies and TNC’s are increasingly operating with continental and transnational strategies or are being encouraged to do so.  

---


5 The Africa Report (February-March, 2009:67-89), a leading business magazine on the continent, conducted a survey of Africa’s top 500 companies and found the vast majority in energy, telecoms, mining, agro-industry, transport and tourism, and power and water had annual turnovers valued at over a billion dollars. While South Africa dominated most sectors, except energy, competition from other African...
Taken together, the shifting pattern of state-capital relations, the articulation of national and global circuits of accumulation and the spatial reach of African business, in the context of ‘open’ and ‘globally competitive’ economies has increasingly engendered, at a structural level, a transnational fraction of the African ruling class. In strict fractionation terms demarcating the transnational class fraction will limit it to managers and shareholders in corporations that benefit from adjustment. However, in the context of Africa’s political economy in which the state has been at the centre of accumulation, and given that most countries are structurally dependent on one or two primary commodities, it is necessary to extend the transnational class fraction to include government bureaucrats at the coal-face of adjusting national economies and political elites overseeing and promoting these processes including diplomats. Such a class fractions economic interests are realised through ‘globalisation’ and maintaining externally orientated national economies. This spans Africa’s primary commodity export sectors - agriculture, minerals, oil - as well as manufacturing, finance, tourism and new telecommunications sectors. Culturally such a class fraction has taken on the tastes and consumption patterns of a transnational class. The transnationalised fraction of the African ruling class is a product of transnationalised relations of production and consumption. It has turned its back on national development strategies and is at the vanguard of facilitating the new scramble for Africa. It is a product of a disciplined Africa and a structurally transforming Afro-neoliberal capitalism but also its own social agency.

6 This is different from Taylor’s (2006a, 2006b) concept of ‘transnationalising elites or fractions of the elite’. First, the concept of transnational fraction is not limited to a few relatively developed African countries. Second, the structural determinants of class formation are understood as integral to the development of transnational relations. Thus transnational class formation happens while adjustment happens, through FDI and expansion on the continent, for example. This is a dynamic structural process which affects the formation of the transnational fraction. Taylor does not analyse this as a process of class formation. Third, the ideological-political aspects of a transnational fraction have a specificity and are also processes of class formation. Merely recognising that NEPAD affirms neoliberal norms does not assist with understanding the NEPAD itself as an expression of an embedded transnational neoliberalism: Afro-neoliberalism. It also does not assist with understanding the development of an ideological-political project through class practices.
However, while a disciplined Africa’s political economy and historical structures have been fundamentally transforming in national spaces, this has not been deemed sufficient to ensure Africa ‘benefits’ from globalisation by the transnational fraction of the African ruling class. Actually, a disciplined Africa is far from being an Afro-neoliberal success story. A disciplined Africa has merely proved to be a necessary but an insufficient condition to ensure Africa’s adjustment to transnational capital. Africa’s passive revolutions have been strained through the 1990s as its organic crisis of structural underdevelopment was worsening. This registered in various secular economic and social trends (World Bank, 2005). Africa’s external debt had grown from $115 billion in 1980 to $309 billion in 1999. Its terms of trade index dropped from 156 in 1980 to 88 in 1999. Growth had not outpaced population growth in the 1990s and between 1985 and 1994 averaged 2.1%. Its income distribution gap was yawning between the richest and the poorest in its societies. Wealth was generally concentrating at the top. Moreover, at the end of the 1990s, Africa had the largest number of men, women and children living with HIV/AIDS estimated at 25 million. Accompanying the wave of post-Cold War democratisation in the 1990s has also been a trend of horrific violence and a political economy of resource based conflicts. Globalising Africa to resolve its debt crisis did not translate into development benefits for Africa’s people.

The response from the West was a recasting of Africa through a discourse of Afro-pessimism. This is a crucial aspect of the conjuncture of macro-restructuring. Africa in the 1990s was described as an ‘ill continent’, a ‘basket case’, a ‘nightmare’ and of course a continent in a state of ‘chaos’. All African countries seemed to be lumped together in the ‘dark hole’. Moreover, the infamous African ‘failed state’ gained currency as the most appropriate representation of the African state (Bilgin and Morton, 2002: 62 –68). According to Mathews (2002: 58-70) this Afro-pessimist portrait was painted both by the Western press and academia. She astutely summarises the material effect of this discourse. In her words, ‘the labelling of Africa as hopeless and despairing is indicative of Western pessimism regarding the African situation. From a Western perspective the

---

7 According to Adedeji (2004:286), at the close of the second decade of Africa’s adjustment, at the end of the 1990s, the World Bank itself at its highest echelons was bemoaning the failure of SAPS although not willing to concede that SAPS should be abandoned.
African situation is one of misery and Africa’s future is bleak… discourses function in part to construct reality. By declaring Africa hopeless, the West excuses itself from any blame for the African situation and implies cynicism for any African attempt to change the African situation. If Africa is understood to be hopeless then African attempts to end Africa’s domination will be viewed by the West as futile, allowing the West to dismiss these attempts and thereby obstruct the realisation of change in Africa’ (Mathews, 2002: 58-70).

It is in this context that the transnational fraction of Africa’s ruling class has attempted to ensure Africa’s adjustment to transnational capital on a continental scale and concomitantly the continental deepening of Africa’s passive revolution. However, this shift did not spring automatically from Africa’s national passive revolutions. Within the literature trying to explain this shift, a South Africa centric explanation tends to dominate most of the time which suggests that a neoliberalised South Africa was not only the harbinger of new asymmetric continental power relations but it also stymied a ‘radical Africa’ and its development alternatives. Alternatively, Africa is interpreted as a battle ground of states and ‘big men’ who shape the direction of the continent. In the shift to the AU-NEPAD these forces challenged each other around alternatives and hence the outcome that has prevailed. Finally, explanations are proffered which suggest the shift is merely represented as the eclipsing of rival projects to the AU-NEPAD. Put more sharply, if the AU-NEPAD did not come into existence Africa had alternatives which it could have utilised in its struggle against neoliberalisation. These alternatives were placed on the African agenda at particular historical moments and were valid for all times and all contexts. More importantly, it is assumed and asserted that these alternatives were never neoliberalised. To understand this shift on a continental level, this study historicises the various initiatives that came to the fore to constitute the AU-NEPAD consensus in the conjuncture of macro-restructuring. This will assist with critically engaging the dominant image and explanation of Africa as contested by rival macro-restructuring projects but eclipsed by the AU-NEPAD. We will return to this question and the literature at the end of this chapter.
The Search for an Afro-neoliberal Solution for Africa’s Organic Crisis

In Africa’s conjuncture of macro-restructuring it is necessary to trace how African elites on the continent, while internalising the new relations of force framing the conjuncture of macro-restructuring, began a search for solutions within the structural limits that this provided. Given the disciplining of Africa and the fact that a new transnationalising fraction was in formation, these elites were not willing to challenge the limits and constraints of a globalising capitalism to confront Africa’s organic crisis and ensure fundamental structural transformation. Instead of placing the needs of its people and environment first, these elites began looking for an easier way to widen the process of transnational class formation. They wanted a stake in global capitalism and hence they started framing a project based on the opportunities held out by global capitalism.

To take on these opportunities two pre-conditions had to be realised at a continental level. First, the African paradigm of development evolving at a continental level and its alternatives had to be surrendered to neoliberalisation. This was made easier by the fact that the paradigm of ‘self reliance’ was already defeated by ongoing national structural adjustment. Nonetheless, the surrender of the self reliance alternatives for Africa had to be done in a way that did not suggest a complete abandonment, but rather its incorporation into the new even if this meant paying lip-service to it and giving it a place in the rhetoric of macro-structural change. At the level of AU-NEPAD discourse it meant transnational neoliberalism had to be constructed as the means to achieve ‘self reliance’. This further gave African characteristics to transnational neoliberalism within macro-structural change. Second, the transnationalising class fraction could not realise its interests without a continental macro-restructuring project. This project had to deepen and shore up failing national passive revolutions, while at the same time it had to open up the African market and deepen Africa’s integration into global circuits of accumulation.

Historicising this process is important to understand the remaking of Africa post the Cold War, post apartheid and post colonialism. It is through this kind of understanding we can

---

8 This is more fully realised within the discourse of the African Renaissance.
come to grips with how the conjuncture of macro-restructuring engendered an ideological and political shift to the Afro-neoliberal paradigm of macro-restructuring, the AU-NEPAD. This historicising is also necessary to assist an understanding of how transnational class formation was deepening on the African continent and producing a new historical subject that could lead change and mediate globalising capitalism. In short, the process of ideological-political formation of Africa’s transnational fraction was further deepened in the process of finding an Afro-neoliberal solution to Africa’s organic crisis at the continental level.

(i) The UN-ECA: Embracing SAPs and the Global Compact with Africa

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa is a regional economic commission that was established in 1958 and has been at the vanguard of developing Africa’s development thinking for the past few decades. Five years after the establishment of the ECA, the OAU was established and the lines demarcating responsibility on economic policy matters for Africa were initially very blurred, which affected economic cooperation negatively (Yassin and William, 1984: 176-177). However, soon a division of labour and agreement was reached. By 1969 the ECA accepted the principle of the political pre-eminence of the OAU and this improved relations. The OAU affirmed its hierarchical position and then allowed the ECA to take initiatives to promote African economic development. The lack of technical capacity in the OAU also served to give it a subordinate position to the ECA on economic policy matters.

In the 1970s with the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) defining the struggle between the North and South, Africa joined the struggle of the global South by attempting to find a way of implementing the NIEO demands on the African continent. This was supplemented by the ECA’s search for an African development strategy. The Monrovia Strategy, the Monrovia Declaration of Commitment, the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980 –2000 and the Final Act of Lagos are the quartet that provided a framework which defined an African paradigm of
self-reliant development. However, this package (the LPA agenda) was defeated by the rolling back of the demands of the NIEO. On the continent it was attacked by the World Bank through the publication of its study of development in sub-Saharan Africa in 1981 entitled: *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*. This report stymied the ideological advance of the ‘self reliance’ package by placing the emphasis on ‘the external market and the continuation of the colonial export orientated economic structures inherited at independence’ (Adedeji, 2004: 266). Moreover, the LPA agenda failed to strike roots on the African continent despite the individual and collective commitments made by African leaders. According to Adedeji, the Executive Secretary of the ECA at the time, the LPA agenda failed because ‘this consensus was not followed by action – either by African governments or by the donors and the international community. Instead of implementing the structural transformation policies…structural adjustment programs were put in place with funding from the international community’ (2004: 266).

Faced with this defeat the decade of the 1980s was a lost decade not only in terms of the failures of SAPs, but also in terms of African initiative to lead development on its own terms. By the close of the 1980s the disastrous consequences of SAPs were visible: Africa’s external debt was ballooning, the structural roots of Africa’s underdevelopment were not tackled and hence commodity price shocks debilitated many African economies and the social cost of adjustment threatened the long term prospects of the continent. By 1988 the World Bank itself was willing to acknowledge failure but by 1989 a joint World Bank and UNDP report entitled: *Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s* showed a strong recommitment to SAPs. The ECA responded with an open engagement with the World Bank and their counter-attack successfully exposed the manipulations of data and misrepresentations of how SAPs failed in Africa (Adedeji, 2004: 277-278).

The World Bank responded with the convening of a ‘peace meeting’ in Washington, D.C. on May 10, 1989 with the UN. Adedeji was part of this meeting and the discussions centred on finding common ground and consensus on African development strategy and policy. The joint UN/World Bank statement on *Africa’s Long-term Development* reveals an interesting convergence (Adedeji, 2004: 279-281). It reveals the ECA conceding
ground to SAPs in terms of the following. First, SAPs were not rejected, but needed to be
designed on a country specific basis and through ownership by African countries.
Second, SAPs were accepted provided provision was made to protect vulnerable groups.
SAPs needed a human face. Third, agriculture was given priority but not linked to
industrial development. Fourth, instead of a ‘developmental state’ approach of the LPA
agenda, the promotion of the private sector was seen as vital. These concessions to SAPs
contributed to changing the African paradigm of self-reliant development into an Afro-
neoliberal framework.

The ‘Washington consensus’ of 1989, between the UN and World Bank, was a
fundamental turning point for Africa’s conjuncture of macro-restructuring. The echoes of
this shift came through in the ECA’s African Alternative Framework to Structural
Adjustment Programs (AAF – SAP) (1989) and its conception of ‘adjustment with
transformation’. The convergence was further bolstered by the World Bank’s Sub-
Saharan Africa – From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective Study
(Adedeji, 2004: 285) but this did not affect the Banks commitment to the fundamentals of
SAPs. Instead, it opened the way to the final defeat of the African paradigm of
development at a continental level. Even with the ECA’s efforts to mobilise civil society
through the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and
Transformation (1990) SAPs continued to be implemented as the economic policy
prescription for Africa’s underdevelopment.

Through the 1980s long crisis the United Nations played a crucial role in trying to build
consensus around a partnership in solidarity with Africa. This conception of partnership
was kept alive throughout the 1990s within global development discourse and was
foregrounded by the ECA’s Executive Secretary, Mr. K.Y. Amoako, in November 2000
when he called for a ‘New Global Compact with Africa’. He did this at ECA
Headquarters at the Eighth Session of the ECA Conference of African Ministers of
Finance, which was attempting to develop an Africa approach to the planned UN High-
Level Meeting on Financing for Development and the Third United Nations Conference
on Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The new Global Compact with Africa envisaged
a partnership of reciprocal action. According to Mr. Amoako, ‘if the rich countries are willing to invest the necessary resources, through aid, debt relief and market access to give African economies the jump-start they need, much of Africa should be able to put in place the necessary political and economic reforms to ensure that their economies take off’ (ECA, 2000:1). However, given that the process to develop the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Program (MAP) was underway the compact idea was subsumed into the MAP process as a technical input to further elaborate the content and implementation of MAP and was published in April 2001 as the Compact for African Recovery: Operationalising the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program (Maloka, 2006: 100).

(ii) The CSSDCA: A Strategic Vision for Africa

The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) was championed by Nigeria’s former President, Olusegun Obasanjo, in the late 1980s through his Africa Leadership Forum (ALF) and later through the Kampala Movement. Various concerns underpinned the initiative: the lack of political cooperation to achieve economic integration, the role of Europe as a trading bloc, the shifting attention of developed countries to countries in the former Eastern Europe, and the failure to achieve a peace dividend after the Cold War that flowed to the world’s poorest countries. Besides these concerns, Deng and Zartman (2001: 110-111) highlight the importance of an ALF conference organised in Paris, in April 1990, on the consequences for African countries of the diversion of aid and capital flows to Eastern Europe. They highlight the conclusion ‘that Africa would continue to be marginalised in the world economy and in the international system unless a composite and pervasive solution was found to Africa’s interconnected problems. Participants agreed that Africa’s predicament derived as much from the perpetual state of insecurity and instability as from economic circumstances linked to its history. They concluded that the continent collectively should create stable conditions for development, which would also make it a viable partner with the rest of the world’ (Deng and Zartman, 2001: 110-111). Out of this conference the proposal for the CSSDCA was placed on the agenda.
The CSSDCA initiative is considered to be a comprehensive antecedent of the African Renaissance concept (Botha, 2000: 25). At the first brainstorming meeting for the CSSDCA in Addis Ababa, November 1990, involving thirty African scholars and politicians a core principle of this process was established: ‘African solutions for African problems’. Moreover, in his opening address Abasanjo called for a ‘New Deal’ for Africa and a new normative framework for the African order built on an interconnected triad: security, pluralism and economic cooperation (Deng and Zartman, 2001:111-112). At the first Steering Committee Meeting in February, 1991, in Addis Ababa, to prepare for the CSSDCA it was agreed that the process will be guided by its goals, it would be an African initiative and talk to themes organised into ‘Calabashes’ (Deng & Zartman, 2001:113-114). It was also felt that the principles should be negotiated in the process. At a second planning meeting held in Cologne, in March, 1991 as an International Roundtable Meeting it was agreed that Africa could learn from other experiences. However, despite the attempt to use the Roundtable to reach out to the West no commitments of support were received from European and North American policymakers (Deng and Zartman, 2001: 114).

The CSSDCA was convened in Kampala from May, 1991, by the Africa Leadership Forum, the OAU and the ECA. There were roughly 500 participants in attendance to deliberate on the principles of the proposal (Deng and Zartman, 2002: 115). Among these participants were serving and former heads of state: Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, who hosted the conference, Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda, Botswana’s President Quett Masire, Sudan’s President Omar Hassam Ahmed al-Bashir, and Mozambique’s President Joaquim Chissano. Former heads of state included Obasanjo, Aristedes Pereira from Cape Verde and Julius Nyerere from Tanzania. The rest of the attendees were diplomats, scholars, business executives, representatives from students and women’s organisations and activists from various sectors of civil society.

---

9 Although Botha does not point to a direct link to Mbeki, Deng and Zartman (2002:114) point to Mbeki’s involvement in the build up process to the CSSDCA when he participated in an International Roundtable Meeting in Cologne in March 1991, in his capacity as ANC foreign secretary. This roundtable was a crucial preparatory step leading up the CSSDCA in Kampala in April of 1991.
The main outcome of the CSSDCA was a new strategic vision for Africa grounded in a set of new principles and encapsulated in the Kampala Document (Maloka, 2006: 99-100, Deng and Zartman, 2002: 135-124 and Botha, 2000: 25-30). The CSSDCA was not envisaged as a finished framework but as an ongoing process. Within its four calabashes of security, stability, development and cooperation it set a new direction for thinking about African norms. Unpacking the conceptual approach in each calabash was supplemented by concrete policy proposals. Within its security calabash it challenged the narrow view that equated security to protecting sovereignty from external threats. Conceptually it began to frame security as multi-dimensional, internal-external and state and individual centred. The softening of the orthodox conception of sovereignty that this concept of security envisaged had important implications for allowing for a collective conception to come to the fore. In other words, ‘the security, stability, and development of every African was described as linked with those of other African countries and instability in one country was seen to affect all others’ (Botha, 2000: 27). At a practical policy level one of the suggestions made was for an overhaul of the OAU’s Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

On stability it brought to the fore the imperative of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘good governance’. Practically it proposed, amongst other measures, the need for countries to adopt a Bill of Rights. The development calabash affirmed the LPA agenda of self-reliant development, but practically proposed that African countries should adopt liberal economic policies that will attract capital (Botha, 2000: 29). It firmly asserted the need for ‘operational common ground’ between structural adjustment programs and the African alternative (Deng and Zartman, 2002: 121). In short, it continued the neoliberalisation of the self-reliant African development paradigm.

The cooperation calabash envisaged unity as being achieved through cooperation. It envisaged cooperation operating in various directions and levels on the continent and beyond: inter-African, South-South and South-North. Practically it envisaged a streamlining of African inter-governmental institutions. Its relationship with the
developed North was seen as important for sourcing financial and industrial capital as a means to enable a structural change in Africa from primary export dependence to manufacturing. Finally, the cooperation calabash viewed regional integration as a necessary condition for achieving cooperation and development.

The Kampala Document with its emphasis on the multi-faceted nature of the problems facing Africa and the inter-connectedness of safety, stability, development and cooperation was presented to the OAU Council of Ministers and Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June, 1991 in Abuja. The document was not adopted, but deferred with the aim of soliciting responses from member governments. By February 1993 there were no responses that could be tabled and the deliberation on the document was deferred again indefinitely. The failure of the OAU leadership to take on board the proposals of the Kampala Document are revealing about the treacherous and complex nature of consensus building within inter-governmental processes on the African continent. In the case of the Kampala Document various factors worked against it (Deng and Zartman, 2002: 122-136): a lack of political will and an unwillingness of the leadership to confront each other by the normative standards of the document. For instance, Libya and Sudan opposed the initiative at the Abuja meeting and there was no real defense put forward of the document. In addition perceptions of it being a ‘Western initiative’, its presentation being done in a confusing way to the forum, a lack of diplomatic engagements to build support for the document, perceptions of personal power games and the possibility of a threat to the OAU secretariat all played themselves out. However, this was not the end of the road for CSSDCA process and its Kampala Document.

The Kampala document and its strategic vision was developed at a crucial moment. Its conceptual framework grappled with many real challenges facing Africa and therefore there was fertile ground for it to root itself within various macro-restructuring processes and initiatives (Deng and Zartman, 2002:154-158). Many of the conceptual ideas and proposals made their way into the formulations underpinning the Abuja Treaty which created the African Economic Community, it shaped the OAU’s initiative on conflict
management in the mid-1990s and at a sub-regional level it had a resonance in policy approaches to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security, as well as, in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in relation to Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 1999, Olusugun Obasanjo was elected President of Nigeria and he made the CSSDCA a cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy and ensured that it was placed on the OAU agenda. Eventually the CSSDCA was institutionalised within the OAU through the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) Solemn Declaration adopted in Lome, Togo by Heads of State and Government in 2000. The integration of the CSSDCA into the OAU also ensured its influence on the NEPAD base document (Maloka, 2006: 99) and the AU.

(iii) The OAU: Renewing Pan Africanism

The OAU was formed in 1963, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by 30 African Heads of State and Government. The creation of the OAU was an attempt to take forward Africa’s Pan-African aspirations. It was a product of the struggle for decolonisation and self determination. It was also largely moulded by the vicissitudes of the Cold War. The principles that grounded the OAU in its efforts were consistent with achieving its Pan-African vision and purpose. It entrenched the non-interference principle, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and upheld the idea of non-alignment. The realisation of these principles grounded the African order in a set of norms and legacies, including the idea and practice of searching for ‘African solutions to African problems’. As Makinda and Okumu (2008: 29-31) point out these legacies produced an institution incapable of producing economic cooperation, gave recognition to some of the worst tyrants on the continent and coexisted with some of the worst practices of

---

10 In the OAU Charter and Rules of Procedure (1992), Article II defines the purpose clearly. It espouses a Pan African ideology. Colonialism is clearly identified as a clear target of the organisation. The notion of the modern nation state and in particular the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence are ensconced within the overall purpose of the organisation. To this extent this institution was meant to contribute to state formation and building in the era of the Cold War and national liberation.

11 As contained in Article III of the OAU Charter.
corruption, nepotism and looting. Its role in supporting the liberation of Africa came to an end with South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994.

Hence, in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the OAU increasingly found itself out of step with the challenges facing Africa and the restructuring of global capitalism. In response the OAU began making crucial decisions and began embarking on various initiatives that would contribute to the remaking of the African order. These initiatives speak to global changes in the political economy and Africa’s own long crisis including the conflicts on the African continent. In July 1990 in Addis Ababa, the OAU summit adopted a declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World. As Maloka (2006: 96) highlights this declaration reflected a growing concern about Africa’s marginalisation and the need for a collective approach to understanding the problems and generating options. While also being concerned about the political consequences of conditionalities, African leaders also signalled a strong appreciation of the link between democracy and development and the need for international cooperation and solidarity in this declaration. This marked an important shift away from confrontation with the developed North and signalled a strong interest in wanting to find convergence.

In 1991, on the 3rd of June at Abuja, Nigeria, African Heads of State and Government adopted what is commonly known as the Abuja Treaty, but which is actually the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. This treaty is a blue-print for an African Economic Community in which an African common market is constructed, a common economic and monetary union established and a supranational political authority with various organs like a Pan African parliament put in place (OAU, 1991:349 –351). All of this was envisaged as happening in a transitional period not exceeding thirty four (34) years (OAU, 1991). Ikome (2007: 90 – 92) interprets the Abuja Treaty as ‘a first step towards lock-in mechanisms; a first step away from inward-looking regionalism’. In the first place he argues the LPA failed because it did not give regional institutions the powers to monitor or enforce compliance which then permitted free riders in the regional schemes. In contrast the Abuja Treaty gave authority to regional economic institutions to
sanction non-compliance and moreover there was an attempt to make decisions of the AEC binding on member states. Secondly, he argues a further break with the LPA by pointing to the regional initiatives spawned by the *Abuja Treaty* which were consistent with neoliberal norms of ‘economic openness and market efficiency’. The LPA’s inward looking regionalism was abandoned.

In 1993 the Cairo Declaration of the OAU spawned a new conflict resolution mechanism; the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution was established. As Makinda and Okumu (2008: 29) point out that while this mechanism enabled the OAU to respond to various conflicts it nevertheless came short and exposed its ‘persisting inadequacy and structural incapacity’. In June, 1995, at the 31st Ordinary Session of the OAU’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the African leadership of the continent continued rethinking the state of Africa and the need for intervention. Hence they resolved on and made a call for the *Relaunching of Africa’s Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action*.

This platform for action underlined and expressed the ongoing shift in development and political thinking amongst the continent’s leaders. First, the *Cairo Agenda* was grounded in an ongoing process of recognising changes in the global political economy and an acceptance of a neoliberalised world order. The leaders acknowledged a ‘growing tendency, especially in the developed countries to establish, strengthen and enlarge economic groupings in the form of trading blocs such as the Single European Market; the conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the establishment of the World Trade Organisation; and the further advances in information science and production technology. These developments have been buttressed by the dominance of the free market economic system based on competition, efficiency and productivity’ (OAU, 1995:389).

Second, while the *Cairo Agenda* recognised the relevance of a ‘self reliant’ paradigm of development it recognised the failure of implementation and called for a renewed commitment, but alongside a new vision and partnership with the world. The *Cairo
Agenda proclaims, ‘Africa must take new steps to ensure it becomes an active partner in the world economic system. In this regard, Africa must adopt a new vision for its development and translate this vision into appropriate programmes. This approach will place Africa in a position to fully participate, as a credible partner, in the world system. In this new spirit, Africa will be able to promote its fundamental interest and concerns’ (OAU, 1995: 389).

Consistent with the new approach the Cairo Agenda provides for a set of responsibilities for Africa including the promotion of ‘national unity’, ‘good governance’, ‘democracy’, conflict resolution and the promotion of the private sector (OAU, 1995: 391). Regarding the structural change of African economies it calls for, amongst other measures, an industrialisation push in which the ‘industrial middle class’ is the engine of sustained development, where the development of the mineral resources and energy sector is driven by private sector investment, intra-African trade is based on trade liberalisation, domestic investment is mobilised through strengthening economic reforms that bolster the role of the financial system, FDI flows through a ‘favourable investment climate’ and regional integration is encouraged as a building bloc of the AEC (OAU, 1995: 394-399). Accompanying Africa’s commitments to its responsibilities the Cairo Agenda sets out what is required from Africa’s development partners (OAU, 1995: 400-403). Besides the call for democratising international relations, Africa’s development partners are asked to rethink aid and move towards increased resource flows through overseas development assistance (ODA) and FDI. On trade there is an appeal to ameliorate the negative effects of Uruguay round agreements and the case for reducing Africa’s external debt is linked to the success of economic reforms. In short, with the Cairo Agenda African leaders left behind the LPA and instead wanted to be responsible for and wanted to own the process of building a continental Afro-neoliberal capitalism. They were not questioning the globalised direction and logic of Africa’s development, but rather wanted to make its integration a little easier with support from its external partners.

The third aspect of the Cairo Agenda was its commitment to bringing in civil society and other social forces from above (OAU, 1995: 403-404). It envisaged a series of
consultations in and through government, national parliaments, civil society platforms and regional institutions like the ECA, the ADB and the RECs. In short, consultations on the *Cairo Agenda* were not about negotiating content but about legitimating an elite agenda. According to Maloka (2006: 98-99) the thrust of the OAU’s *Cairo Agenda* carried through into the OAU’s millennium summit in July 1999 and its *Algiers Declaration*. It also served to inform the OAU’s summit in Lome, Togo, in July 2000 in its search for a framework for ‘democratic governance’ and it served as a basis for the OAU and European Community to adopt the *Cairo Plan of Action* as a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between African and Europe. Moreover, alongside the *Cairo Agenda* process the OAU was also being engaged by Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi around the need to learn from the relaunched process of European integration and to revisit Nkrumah’s dream of a ‘United States of Africa’. Gaddafi was appropriating Nkrumah’s dream of a continental government, of one African military force, uniform trade and foreign policies and one leader representing all African states in their external relations (Makinda and Okumu, 2008: 32-33). Moreover, by the end of the 1990s there was a realisation that like the LPA, the *Abuja Treaty* was short on progress and concrete achievements. Hence these historical factors propelled 43 African leaders attending the extraordinary OAU Summit in Libya in September 1999 to agree to establish the AU.

**(iv) The MAP and the Omega Plan: Consolidating an Economic Agenda for Africa**

The origins of the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP), sometimes referred to as the Millennium Africa Renaissance Program, go back to a G8 meeting in July 2000 in Okinawa, Japan. At this meeting President Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mbeki of South Africa and Bouteflika of Algeria were mandated by the OAU to deliberate on Africa’s external debt with G8 leaders. At this meeting a wider discussion ensued on Africa’s development challenges and it was agreed that a wider approach and plan be developed for Africa. This agreement was further consolidated with an invitation extended to African leaders to
attend the G8 meeting the following year to follow up on these issues. From this flowed various initiatives, diplomatic consultations and processes. In parallel, a steering committee of experts was established in October with involvement from all the key countries leading the initiative. This process culminated at the OAU Summit of October 2001 in Abuja Nigeria. There the New Partnership for Africa’s Development was adopted as the economic recovery program for Africa.

However, the road to Abuja was not easy. Almost at the same time that MAP was being punted to the US-led transnational historic bloc Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal, unveiled what was widely perceived to be a rival economic program for Africa called the OMEGA Plan. This program was prepared by a team of experts and was not an alternative by all accounts. Both the MAP and the Omega Plan shared main common features. First, both initiatives shared common goals: poverty eradication, growth and the halting of the marginalisation of Africa. With regard to the latter, Wade was extremely clear: ‘At a time when financial markets are globalising and foreign direct investment is booming and both production networks are trade in goods are services are going transnational, Africa should be plugging into the new global economic deal. Globalisation is a major challenge that should be met with a global and comprehensive vision of African development that will speed up the sustainable economic growth of African countries within a perspective of regional integration’ (2001: 3).

Second, at a conceptual level both documents shared a commitment to an African approach to globalisation. That is the initiative must be ‘African produced, owned, led and managed’. Afro-neoliberalism was the ideological paradigm. As President Wade declared in the Omega Plan (2001: 3), ‘at the 19 July 2000 OAU Summit in Lome, and the more recent French-Africa Summit held in Yaoundé from 17 to 19 January 2001, the African countries reaffirmed their position on the major issues facing the international community, more specifically globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation. Africa made

---

14 Minute of Consultative Group for the Consolidation of the MAP and the OMEGA Initiatives into a Common Initiative for Africa, 21/6/2001, p.1
clear its full and total commitment to these principles and its intention not to be sidelined from the evolving pattern of the global economy’. Third, both documents shared an approach of prioritising certain issues at a sectoral level. The MAP was wider and it was not difficult to incorporate the four areas of the OMEGA Plan: infrastructure, education, health and agriculture. Linked to this and easily agreed to was a commitment to a methodology for assessing the needs in sectoral areas and sub-regional sectors but that these would start with a national level needs assessment.

However, two critical areas of difference prompted a great deal of back-room diplomacy to ensure the two plans glued together. The first relates to the ‘good governance’ approach of the MAP. Unlike the OMEGA plan the MAP tied financial flows to ‘good governance’ and the challenge of ensuring the African state was strengthened as a pre-condition for achieving other objectives. The OMEGA plan did not prioritise ‘good governance’. The second critical issue was financing of the continental initiative. President Wade envisaged one centralised authority for managing the financial resources channelled to the OMEGA plan (2001: 24). However, the MAP envisaged financial flows mainly being managed through mitigating ‘risk perceptions’. That is a favourable investment climate had to be created for financial flows.

Despite these differences the MAP and the OMEGA Plan were brought together by the July 2001 OAU summit in Lusaka. Besides endorsing the merger of the documents President Wade was asked to join the implementation process for NEPAD. At this meeting also the merged MAP and OMEGA Plan were renamed the New Africa Initiative (NAI). Without major changes the NAI was later changed to NEPAD at the October 2001 Summit of the OAU. In that same month the inaugural meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) on the NEPAD was held in Abuja, Nigeria. The HSGIC affirmed the importance of the NEPAD in two important ways: First, the chairperson President Obasanjo ‘drew attention to the prevailing environment in Africa, marked by, among other things, the emergence of a

---

leadership in Africa that is committed to economic renaissance of the continent, as encapsulated in the New African Initiative programme’ (HSGIC, 2001). Second the HSGIC (2001) emphasised, ‘that all other initiatives promoted by individual countries should be subsumed under the NEPAD process, to represent a basis on which Africa can collectively and effectively cooperate with its development partners’. These statements defined the existence of something new on the African continent in terms of Africa’s macro-restructuring and in terms of consolidating the Afro-neoliberal direction of Africa’s development path. Together the AU and NEPAD represent a deepening of Afro-neoliberal macro-restructuring of Africa in a continental conjuncture that began in 1989.

Rival Projects for Continental Restructuring or a Common Afro-neoliberal Project?

As mentioned, there are three perspectives which suggest that rivalry and by implication alternative strategic projects were open to Africa in the conjuncture of macro-restructuring. First, a South African centric and ahistorical interpretation of the AU-NEPAD reduces the AU-NEPAD to a ‘South African sub-imperialism’ or to possible ambitions of a ‘Pax Pretoriana’. The narrative suggests that national interests of state policy are understood as symbiotic with white monopoly capital and with transnational capital. In short, South Africa was imposing a new round of SAPs on Africa, based on its own neoliberal macro-economic framework and the role of Mbeki loomed large in the process. Hence the AU-NEPAD is very much about South Africa versus the rest. Through historicising the Afro-neoliberal shift of Africa’s macro-restructuring it is evident that such arguments do not explain the AU-NEPAD but speak to one dimension of macro-level Africa. Essentially, these perspectives are grounded in a South African exceptionalism and are blind to the agency of transnationalising ruling elites on the continent and the neoliberalisation of Africa at a macro-level even before the neoliberal moment in South Africa. Africa’s elites had already surrendered, both at a national and continental level, and were not about to pose a challenge or provide alternatives to a US-led transnational historic bloc. The existence of an Afro-neoliberal democratic South

Africa affirmed its own capitulation and was merely affirming a right-ward continental shift.

The second perspective that suggests rivalry and possible alternatives tends to magnify the role of individuals and states. A version of this perspective tends to suggest a ‘maverick theory’ of how the NEPAD was developed (Adesina, 2006b: 58 and Taylor, 2006a: 71). A few African leaders broke ranks with the collective or a few neoliberal African countries, benefiting from FDI, developed NEPAD and this was then imposed on the wider AU. The argument tends to suggest a continent ripe with alternative possibilities and the struggles between these mavericks and the rest have defined the macro-restructuring outcome (Adesina, 2006b: 59). There is little evidence to support this position. A struggle between Mbeki/South Africa and Wade/Senegal was not about a fundamentally different macro-restructuring concept. Both the MAP and OMEGA Plan shared a common Afro-neoliberal framework, for example. Put more sharply, even if the OMEGA plan became the economic agenda for Africa it would not have determined a new direction for Africa. Moreover, while some countries might benefit more than others in terms of FDI it does not take away from the continental competition for FDI in which almost all African states are engaged. The AU-NEPAD converges with these interests across the continent.

A third perspective, suggests that prior to and alongside the AU-NEPAD there were other alternatives eclipsed. Owusu (2006:30) does not recognise the AAF-SAP as embodying a shift away from the ‘self reliance’ paradigm of the LPA agenda. He sees continuity in the ECA’s interventions, under Adedeji’s leadership, and the AAF-SAP as representing an alternative for Africa despite its embrace of SAPs. Adesina (2006b:56), also suggests ‘if there was a document the Heads of State thought was important for consolidating their development aspirations since the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, it was the CSSDCA’. Maloka (2006:102) challenges these approaches and argues that such positions are ‘based on a limited and selective reading of the development literature emanating from the OAU, especially since the 1990s’. However, Maloka (2006) himself does not go far enough in historicising the origins of the AU-NEPAD. Rather he ends up defending
South African government positions on the AU-NEPAD instead of understanding the emergence of an Afro-neoliberal consensus on the continent.

The evidence, however, shows that all the proposals support in various ways an Afro-neoliberal project. The UN-ECA’s embrace of SAPs and the Global Compact, the CSSDCA Strategic Vision for Africa, the OAU’s renewal of Pan-Africanism and the Omega Plan and MAP consolidation of an Economic Agenda for Africa, all embed transnational neoliberalism in Africa’s conjuncture of macro-restructuring. While all these initiatives attempt to address particular challenges facing Africa’s macro-restructuring they share four important features. First, all have embraced the realities of a globalising capitalism and transnational neoliberal restructuring. These developments are not viewed as a threat, but as opportunities for Africa to avoid its marginalisation. Second, there is a willingness to engage the US-led transnational historic bloc differently. Instead of confrontation or even counter-hegemonic challenge there is a willingness to find ‘partnership’ on the terms of the US-led transnational historic bloc. This is starkly reflected in the extent to which Africa’s development paradigm of self-reliant development was neoliberalised. At the level of Africa’s macro-restructuring African elites want to own their adjustment project, but provided partnership assisted this process.

Third, all these initiatives have not been developed through input from the African masses. They originate with elites, are championed by elites and are defined by elites. Africa’s relaunching of macro-restructuring from 1989 to the present has been pursued from the top. This practice of defining the African order is not about elites ‘talking left, but walking right’. In the context of the macro-restructuring of Africa it has been about Afro-neoliberalism; it has been about a reformist leadership surrendering Africa to global capitalism. It has been about talking right and walking right. In the next few chapters we will explore how this works as class practices through the AU-NEPAD and how this deepens a continental passive revolution.

Fourth, all these initiatives have been willingly subsumed into a macro-restructuring project for Africa; a common Afro-neoliberal macro-restructuring project. This reflects a
wider consensus than normally attributed to the AU-NEPAD, despite specific flash-points and differences amongst and between key actors. The consensus of the AU-NEPAD arising from these various initiatives actually reflects the deepening of the ideological-political project of the transnational fraction of Africa’s ruling classes. The differences, twists and turns, are intra-class differences and reflects a growing class awareness of a common trajectory for Africa’s development. In historicising shifts around Africa’s macro-restructuring it is patently clear that none of the strategic initiatives that have composed the AU-NEPAD claim any origins in African socialism, scientific socialism, or delinking, which have been Africa’s radical alternatives for confronting its underdevelopment. None of these initiatives claim to advance any of these radical alternatives. The new consensus that emerged around the AU-NEPAD is about a globalised path of capitalist development for Africa. Africa’s adjustment to transnational capital. In the next chapter we look at how this class project of Afro-neoliberal restructuring is constituted and operationalised.