



## ***The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11***

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## **Declaration**

I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of International Relations in the School of Social Sciences at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. To the best of my knowledge, it has not been submitted before any degree or examination in any other University.

.....LMK .....

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Date: 3 June 2009

**Abstract:**

A fragmented world of competing states is potentially very unstable. As rival states challenge each other militarily, the outcome will likely generate a very uneven distribution of power. For many observers, the political solidarity and economic prosperity in the post-second world war world would not have been as great without United States (US) leadership. The hegemonic project involves using political and economic advantages gained in a world war to restructure the operation of the world market and interstate system in the hegemon's own image.

The United States took the lead in opening markets, protecting allies, and promoting the stability of the non-communist world. Because of this great accomplishment, many people worry about the waning of American global leadership and the seeming unwillingness or inability of other states to step into the role. This research report will aim to provide evidence U.S. Hegemony is nothing to fear because since the end of World War II (WWII). U.S. hegemony has developed a system of complex interdependence that has immensely benefited the core states and the periphery. The security community that was fostered under U.S. hegemony will be the major factor in reducing the chances of great power war and also increasing the chances of peaceful conflict resolution.

### *Acknowledgements*

At this time I would like to give special thanks to my family and friends that supported my decision to get my Masters. My thesis supervisor Gwinyayi Dzinesa and friends and faculty at the University of the Witwatersrand were also extremely kind and caring. I owe them a lot also and dedicate this work to them. Special thanks to William Major Kromah, for really convincing me of the need to better myself.

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## **1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism
AU	African Union
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP	Gross National Product
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PSO	Peace Support Operation
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
U.S.	United States
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

# **Chapter I: Introduction**

## ***Background***

Since the end of World War Two (WWII) the United States (U.S.) has been enabled to maintain its leadership through its allies. U.S. leadership and hegemony is based on mutual consent by its allies: Japan, Germany and Western Europe. By institutional nature of U.S. hegemony the author is referring to how the U.S. leads by consensus among its allies and through international organizations and institutions. Despite the United States having overwhelming power capabilities in every sphere-economic, military, and cultural -it does not act unilaterally; a close survey of its history will show that multilateralism has been and will continue to be the main facet of its foreign policy. The period under examination is after World War Two to the end of George Walker Bush second term.

The legitimacy derived from U.S. hegemony allows the U.S. to remain a super power in what could potentially be a multi polar world. The liberal regime the United States help established at the end of World War Two is what ensures and secures its primacy. Institutions like the World Bank and United Nations are regimes that are conducive for the allies to forgo harmful competition and foster cooperation. The U.S. building institutions that provide its allies with security and as plateaus to foster cooperation is what this research report examines. With Iraq being the first post 9/11 test of this theory; it should be kept in mind that the hegemon will occasionally act unilaterally but only in rare instances. Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia is a recent



example. The case of Iraq further illustrates my point because after being in Iraq for five years, the Bush administration has seen the futility in unilateralism.

### **Research Problem**

In this research report I will prove that U.S. leadership is based on consent. Despite 9/11 terrorist attack the United States (U.S.), U.S. foreign policy will still be rooted in multilateralism. The benevolent regimes it created after WWII, such as the United Nations, World Bank Institutions, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, gives the incentive for nation states to cooperate. Since the end of World War Two the United States has been enabled to maintain its leadership by its allies. U.S. leadership and hegemony is based on mutual consent by its allies. The legitimacy derived from this allows the U.S. to remain a super power in what could potentially be a multi polar world. Multilateralism has always been the major tenet in United States foreign policy. The unilateral actions taken by President George W. Bush are transitory and not the norm after 9/11, such as pulling out of the Kyoto Agreement, and invasion of Iraq. In the last two years, 2006-2009, the administration back-tracked from its former unilateral stance and Bush Doctrine. It regularly consulted allies, international organizations, and various non governmental organizations. This is bound to continue under the new Barack Obama administration that has swiftly committed itself to multilateralism also; the first instance of this is returning the permanent representative at the United Nations to the rank of cabinet position. The foreign policy team of Obama are all committed multilateralists that believe in resolving global conflict through consensus with its allies and not against its allies. The period this research report focuses on is after World War II to George Walker Bush presidency.

U.S. hegemonic order is quite unlike the earlier British hegemonic order that was immensely unstable. Since the end of WWII the U.S. has built up a network of complex interdependence that will mutually reinforce U.S. hegemonic leadership. This includes building and promoting democratic institutions in countries like Japan, and Germany. The U.S. established the Bretton Woods Agreement to ensure free trade and open markets, international organizations, like the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), were seen as the best way of ensuring liberal institutionalism. This research report seeks to argue that U.S. leadership provided the stability and peace among the western powers WWII. To be sure, its overall material capabilities and power position have declined significantly since the early postwar years. Notwithstanding this, the proposed study seeks to provide evidence that the political institutions and structures of relations that were built under U.S. sponsorship after World War II still provide channels and routines of cooperation. America will not (and probably cannot) play the leadership role it did a generation ago, but that leadership has been reinvented in the form of a dense set of intergovernmental and transnational linkages among the major industrial countries and regions of the world.<sup>1</sup> These linkages will ensure the continuance of American leadership because it benefits the international system. It will also be used to prevent global conflict and ensure peace and prosperity despite the events of President George W. Bush's foreign policy, U.S. hegemony will continue to operate on Wilsonian liberalism. 9/11 will not change the course of U.S. foreign policy which is based on multilateralism. This research report will focus on the Post 9/11 failure of unilateralism and continuance of multilateralism.

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<sup>1</sup>Loc cit

I will test this hypothesis by examining the pre 9/11 structure of the U.S.-led collective security system, and also Japan, Germany's role in supporting and aiding U.S. hegemony in the financial and conflict resolution institutional framework.

### **Research Objectives**

The liberal faith in institutions to promote international cooperation and stability, suffered a major set-back after the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attack on America which was widely perceived to have changed the course of US foreign policy. President George W. Bush, for example, declared three months after the attack that “My vision shifted dramatically after September 11, because I now realize the stakes, I realize the world has changed”. This changed world had two significant manifestations for American foreign policy – a quick resort to military actions against Al-Qaeda carried out under the rubric of ‘war on terror’, and a disbelief in and gradual drifting away from global institutions to deal with global terror. In other words, militarism and unilateralism quickly replaced Wilsonian and Clintonian belief in multilateral institutions and became the hallmarks of American foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>

The research will show that the U.S reaction to the 9/11 attacks was the exception and not the rule. Since the beginning of its history, the U.S. has been a firm believer in multilateralism. Drawing on carefully selected cases mentioned elsewhere in this research report the study will demonstrate that the world has seen and will continue to see more U.S led multilateralism especially with Japan and Germany; as reigning hegemon America

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<sup>2</sup> Nuruzzaman, M. "Liberal Institutionalism and International Cooperation in the Post-9/11 World"  
[http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p179538\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p179538_index.html) 2007-02-28

will influence through consensus and not unilateralism. U.S. hegemony is really a process of leading through multilateral organizations and institutions with the consent and support of major allies (Japan and Germany).

### **Research Questions**

Why did the U.S. set about making liberal institutions after WWII?

Why Germany and Japan will remain steadfast U.S. allies?

Does Unilateralism always fail: Ethiopian invasion of Somalia?

Why does North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement continue?

### **Hypotheses**

U.S. hegemony is nothing to fear because since the end of WWII U.S. hegemony has developed a system of complex interdependence that has immensely benefited the core states and the periphery to some extent. The U.S. will resolve global conflicts with its major allies and great powers that have interests in the matter. Liberal internationalism will preserve U.S. hegemony because it will solve global conflict through consensus.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Both balance of power theory developed by Kenneth Waltz and balance of threat theory developed by Stephen Walt are essential for this analysis; the author uses parts of both theories to draw a picture of where U.S. economic and foreign policy will be going post cold war. There are two strands of hegemonic leadership; benevolent and coercive.

This research report will focus on how they interact with interest and capabilities. These theories help describe situations and cases of where collective action is strengthened and not depreciated by a hegemon even one in a declining state.

Hegemonic stability and Liberal internationalism are the main theories that best support and provide evidence for my thesis. The central idea of hegemonic stability theory is that the stability of the international system requires a single dominant state to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among the most important members of the system.<sup>3</sup> For a state to be a hegemon, it must have three attributes: the capability to enforce the rules of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a system which is perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. A hegemon's capability rests upon the likes of a large, growing economy, dominance in a leading technological or economic sector, and political power backed up by projective military power. An unstable system will result if economic, technological, and other changes erode the international hierarchy and undermine the position of the dominant state. Pretenders to hegemonic control will emerge if the benefits of the system are viewed as unacceptably unfair.

U.S. hegemonic stability is the foundation for the current international order which is based on institutions. I will briefly examine the British Hegemonic order; and compare and contrast it to the much more detailed U.S. hegemonic order, I will like to draw a picture of a more stable hegemonic period that will not destabilize via hegemonic war, but that will be reinforced by U.S. allies that share a common political, social, and

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<sup>3</sup> Gilpin, Robert, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, The Origin And Prevention of Major Wars, Vol. 18, No. 4., (Spring, 1988) p. 603

economic culture. Global conflicts will be resolved by U.S. leadership in concert with allies.

The term 'complex interdependence' was developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye and refers to the various, complex transnational connections (interdependencies) between states and societies.<sup>4</sup> Interdependence theorists noted that such relations, particularly economic ones, were increasing; while the use of military force and power balancing were decreasing (but remained important). Reflecting on these developments, they argued that the decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other forms of interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among states. The complex interdependence framework can be seen as an attempt to synthesize elements of realist and liberal thought. Finally, anticipating problems of cheating and relative gains raised by realists, interdependence theorists introduced the concept of 'regimes' to mitigate anarchy and facilitate cooperation. Here, we can see an obvious connection to neo-liberal institutionalism.

In international relations liberalism covers a fairly broad perspective ranging from Wilsonian Idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories and the democratic peace thesis. Here states are but one actor in world politics, and even states can cooperate together through institutional mechanisms and bargaining that undermine the propensity

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<sup>4</sup> Keohan, Robert, O; Nye Jr., Joseph., 'Globalization: What's New? What's Not?' (And So What?), Foreign Policy, No. 118. (Spring 2000) p. 115

to base interests simply in military terms. States are interdependent and other actors such as Transnational Corporations, the IMF and the United Nations play a role.<sup>5</sup>

Through various international organizations the U.S. promotes free trade, and international cooperation; which are important roles for a hegemon. Liberal internationalism is a very important aspect of the U.S. benevolent hegemony.<sup>6</sup>

### **Case Study**

This report will focus on the institutional nature of U.S. hegemony and why Germany and Japan will not try to compete with a U.S. led world system, but rather will stay subordinate and complement it.

PRE World War II to 9/11 Japan and Germany: After WWII the United States empowered the moderate and democratic forces within Germany and Japan and their democratic institutions. To ensure that these forces endured and both countries did not return to dictatorship and communism American aid was spent to rebuild their economies, and financial regimes were created to mitigate the consequences of free trade and the conflict brought on by zero sum economic competition. Since the end of WWII Japan and Germany have been steadfast allies that support U.S. hegemonic stability and have never challenged it.

Post 9/11 NATO enlargement: NATO enlargement represents the continual focus of bringing countries into the longest democratic military alliance in history. NATO is

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm>. (Accessed June 2008)

<sup>6</sup> Kagan, Robert, The Benevolent Empire, Foreign Policy, No. 111 (Summer, 1998), p. 27

credited for transforming Western Europe into the most peaceful region on earth. The hope is that countries will forgo the need to go to war with each other if they are members of NATO, and engage in peaceful resolution of conflict. NATO enhances cooperation among member states.

Ethiopian unilateral invasion of Somalia: to reemphasize the failure of unilateralism I will refer to Ethiopia's unilateral invasion of Somalia and the consequences. The main consequence is Ethiopia seeking UN, Africa Union (AU) and IGAD facilitation in resolving the security situation in Somalia.

U.S. hegemony and its continuance depend on liberal institutionalism and complex interdependence. As America declines in relative economic terms, Japan and Germany will take on a more active role in reinforcing and perpetuating American hegemony (complex interdependence, liberal intuitionism). By examining their past and current foreign policy behavior we will see that Germany and Japan will be most interested in the continuance of U.S. hegemony.

### **Methodology**

This research report is setting out to show that liberalism and multilateralism is the major trend in U.S. foreign policy. The process tracing approach will be applied here to find evidence that a pattern in the cases studied matches the theoretical explanations and confirms hypothesized causal connections. By collecting evidence from reputable Journals on foreign affairs, Op-eds, editorials written by foreign policy decision makers, academics and scholars. All the sources that were used in this research report are from reputable scholars foreign policy decision making. The author will provide evidence to



show the substantive nature of U.S. multilateralism. The author will also show that the world order the U.S. built after WWII is more durable than British order after the Napoleonic War.

This is a qualitative research report that relies on sources from journals and books. This research report will also rely on empirical data such as in journals and books and case study research. The case studies of the various conflict resolution Concerts that all include the U.S. having a dominant role will show this.

### **Literature Review**

The following authors are the most recent and pertinent on the subject of American leadership. They have all modified Robert Giplin's work on U.S. hegemony. This research will focus on the institutions and regimes that U.S. leadership has provided for the continuance of its leadership role. It will also highlight the security and peace these intuitions have provided.

Mastanduno describes U.S. security policy as "an effort to preserve America's position at the top of the international hierarchy" and as a "strategy of preserving primacy" or what Melvyn Leffler calls "a preponderance of power. He characterizes the current international system as "unipolar" and asserts that "the United States is now in a category by itself". American security policy is described as seeking "to preserve the United States' dominant position" with its allies and to integrate its Cold War adversaries "into a U.S.-centered international order". A more accurate description of the kind of behavior predicted by hegemonic stability theory would be hard to find. As Mastanduno

concedes, "the pursuit of primacy induces the United States to be the stabilizer of last resort", but is this not a defining expectation of hegemonic stability theory?<sup>7</sup>

Both, balance of power theory developed by Kenneth Waltz and balance of threat theory developed by Stephen Walt; are important theories that the author uses to draw a picture of where U.S. economic and foreign policy will be going post cold war.

The evidence neither fully supports nor fully contradicts either theory. It does reveal a striking pattern: U.S. post-Cold War security and economic strategies are each explained effectively, but by different realist theories. Balance-of-threat theory accounts for the dominant tendency in U.S. security policy: an effort to preserve America's position at the top of the international hierarchy by engaging and reassuring other major powers. Balance-of-power theory explains the dominant tendency in U.S. foreign economic policy: an effort to mobilize for national economic competition against other major powers. Since each theory provides a plausible explanation for a central aspect of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, it would be imprudent to follow the advice of realism's harshest critics and abandon the core paradigm.<sup>8</sup>

For evidence of balance of power behavior the author compares and contrasts U.S. behavior during the cold war and after. He uses the break up of Yugoslavia as an example. If Yugoslavia was going to break up during the cold war America and the Soviet Union vital interests would have been at stake. America would have supported its proxies in that war to the hilt, but since the break up of Yugoslavia happened after the

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<sup>7</sup>Sheetz, Mark S.; Mastanduno Michael, 'Debating the Unipolar Moment' in *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Winter, 1997-1998), p. 169.

<sup>8</sup> Mastanduno, Micheal, Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War, *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Spring, 1997), p. 51.

Cold War, America had the initiative to do what it pleased, with out worrying about any rival's counter move. As the hegemon it could dictate terms and not be subordinate to counter moves. But intervention in Yugoslavia was very slow. U.S. interventions' in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti all show similar slow responses. The author posits that American hegemony will not deter its close allies; the bulk of the evidence to this point, however, does not support balance of power theory and suggests that a stronger case might be made for the opposite of the theory's predictions. Rather than edging away from the United States, much less balancing it, Germany and Japan have been determined to maintain the pattern of engagement that characterized the Cold War. German officials continue to view the persistence of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and forward deployment of U.S. forces within NATO as the cornerstone of their national security strategy. Japan's official strategy continues to be oriented around maintaining and strengthening, for a new era, the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Neither China nor Russia, despite having some differences with the United States, has sought to organize a balancing coalition against it. Indeed, a main security concern for many countries in Europe and Asia is not how to distance from an all-too powerful United States, but how to prevent the United States from drifting away.<sup>9</sup>

Balance of threat implies states should act to reduce the threats with other states. U.S. hegemony will wane but if the U.S. reassures states of its benevolent intentions; that will slow the process considerably. Balance-of-threat evidence: U.S. security policy since the end of the Cold War has conformed, although not completely, to the predictions of balance-of-threat theory. U.S. officials have sought to preserve the United States' dominant position through efforts to convince the status quo states of Japan and Germany

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<sup>9</sup> ibid p.58.

to remain partial great powers, and to integrate the undecided states of Russia and China into a U.S.-centered international order. U.S. officials have emphasized multilateral coalitions and decision-making processes, particularly in cases of military intervention.<sup>10</sup> But it is through multilateralism that the U.S. is able to exert its dominant position in the world more convincingly. In security strategy, post-Cold War U.S. behavior has been more consistent with the predictions of balance-of-threat theory. In economic strategy, however, U.S. behavior has been more consistent with the predictions of balance-of-power theory.<sup>11</sup> During the Cold War the U.S. and its allies were economic nationalist; after the Cold War the U.S. with hegemon status has ensured an open market economic policy for all. In foreign economic policy the U.S. has allowed for a liberal market economy.

The world is weary of American hegemony, but actually derives great benefit from it. The commingled feelings of reliance on and resentment toward America's international dominance these days are neither strange nor new. The resentment of power, even when it is in the hands of one's friends, is a normal, indeed, timeless human emotion-no less so than the arrogance of power. And perhaps only Americans, with their rather short memory, could imagine that the current resentment is the unique product of the expansion of American dominance in the post-Cold War era. During the confrontation with the Soviet Union, now recalled in the United States as a time of harmony among the Western allies, not just French but also British leaders chafed under the leadership of a sometimes overbearing America. As political scientist A.W. DePorte noted some 20 years ago, the schemes of European unity advanced by French financial

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid* p.66.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*. p.73.

planner Jean Monnet and French foreign minister Robert Schuman in 1950 aimed "not only to strengthen Western Europe in the face of the Russian threat but also-though this was less talked about-to strengthen it vis-à-vis its indispensable but overpowering American ally."<sup>12</sup>

The world with out American hegemony will be less prosperous, less democratic, and less peaceful. To prove this point the author contrast the post war Soviet sphere of influence with that of the Atlantic alliance; specifically democracy, rule of law, rights being constitutionally protected. The uniqueness persisted. During the Cold War, America's style of hegemony reflected its democratic form of government as much as Soviet hegemony reflected Stalin's approach to governance. The "habits of democracy," as Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis has noted, made compromise and mutual accommodation the norm in U.S.-Allied relations. This approach to international affairs was not an example of selfless behavior. The Americans had an instinctive sense, based on their own experience growing up in a uniquely open system of democratic capitalism, that their power and influence would be enhanced by allowing subordinate allies a great measure of internal and even external freedom of maneuver. But in practice, as Gaddis points out, "Americans so often deferred to the wishes of allies during the early Cold War that some historians have seen the Europeans especially the British-as having managed them."<sup>13</sup> Due to certain liberal social systems developed domestically the American hegemony the world came to know after WWII was quite generous and benign. Even after the Cold War ended a large portion of American defense spending is to protect its NATO and other allies; like Kuwait ninety percent of the forces involved in liberating

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<sup>12</sup> Kagan, Robert, The Benevolent Empire, Foreign Policy, No. 111. (Summer, 1998), p. 26.

<sup>13</sup> ibid p. 28.

Kuwait from Iraqi occupation were American forces. Ever since the United States emerged as a great power, the identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defense policy. Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own well-being depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible without a broad measure of international security.<sup>14</sup> The author uses cases as NATO in Western Europe, Kuwait, and Bosnia as examples of U.S. benevolence. There are a lot of worries about U.S. hegemony but the reality is that there is no replacement for it. A return to multi polar international system will most definitely be less stable and more chaotic, i.e. pre WWI, that's why with all the griping about American Hegemony being overbearing deep down the world prefers the stable leadership that America has provided since the end of WWII.

In the Unipolar Illusion by Christopher Layne, the US will try to maintain its hegemony by not allowing any regional or global challengers. What is important is for Japan and Germany to remain subordinate partners and not seek to challenge the status quo. This strategy is not overtly aggressive; the use of preventive measures to suppress the emergence of new great powers is not contemplated. It is not, in other words, a strategy of heavy-handed American dominance. Rather the strategy of preponderance seeks to preserve unipolarity by persuading Japan and Germany that they are better off remaining within the orbit of an American-led security and economic system than they

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<sup>14</sup> Loc Cit

would be if they became great powers. The strategy of preponderance assumes that rather than balancing against the United States, other states will bandwagon with it. Important benefits are thought to flow from the perpetuation of unipolarity. In a unipolar system, it is argued, the United States could avoid the unpredictable geopolitical consequences that would attend the emergence of new great powers.

Unipolarity would, it is said, minimize the risks of both strategic uncertainty and instability. In effect, the strategy of preponderance aims at preserving the Cold War status quo, even though the Cold War is over.<sup>15</sup> As evidence the author uses pentagons leaked NSC 68 plan which calls for the U.S. to do all in its power to prevent the rise of new great powers. The author's theoretical framework is neorealism: states do all they can to undermine the hegemon. So the Unipolar moment right now is transitory. The author's theoretical argument is supported by an extensive historical discussion. A unipolar world is not terra incognita. There have been two other comparable unipolar moments in modern international history. The evidence from those two eras confirms the expectations derived from structural realism: (1) unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise because the hegemon's unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers; and (2) the entry of new great powers into the international system erodes the hegemon's relative power and, ultimately, its preeminence.<sup>16</sup>

Due to differential growth rates; states that are losing power have to contend with states that are gaining power. There are always potential great power emerging and trying to curtail their growth maybe futile. As Gilpin points out, "The critical

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<sup>15</sup> Layne, Christopher, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Spring, 1993), p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Loc cit

significance of the differential growth of power among states is that it alters the cost of changing the international system and therefore the incentives for changing the international system." Second, Gilpin observes, rising power leads to increasing ambition. Rising powers seek to enhance their security by increasing their capabilities and their control over the external environment. Third, as Kennedy explains, rising power leads also to increased international interests and commitments. Often times for great powers, geopolitical and military capabilities are the consequence of a process that begins with economic expansion. Economic expansion leads to new overseas obligations (access to markets and raw materials, alliances, bases), which then must be defended. SAMENESS. Waltz points out, "competition produces a tendency toward sameness of the competitors"; that is, toward imitating their rivals' successful characteristic". Such characteristics include not only military strategies, tactics, weaponry, and technology, but also administrative and organizational techniques. If others do well in developing effective instruments of competition, a state must emulate its rivals or face the consequences of falling behind. Fear drives states to duplicate others' successful policies because policymakers know that, as Arthur Stein observes, "failure in the anarchic international system can mean the disappearance of their states."<sup>17</sup>

Competition in an anarchic system makes states develop in ways that challenge the hegemon's preponderance. As evidence the author discusses two periods. France and Great Britain's hegemonic dominance; in both instances their leadership lasted for no more than fifty years, when various competitors began to challenge them. This is why he sees U.S. hegemony as transitory. Great Britain and Austria developed into great powers as a response to France dominance in the international system. In the nineteenth century

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<sup>17</sup> ibid p. 15.



it was Great Britain that was the hegemonic power and Germany the rival catching up at an alarming pace, so much so that Great Britain made peace with France and Russia in order to protect itself from the German juggernaut that was set on dominating the world, and replacing British hegemony.

John G. Ikenberry's *Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony* uses empirical and quantitative data from the end of WWII, the author constructs a picture of American hegemony being driven by European insecurities. This is overall qualitative research method. He uses cases studies of the post war period as evidence of this trend. To define American hegemony the author describes British hegemony the pillars that it was based on, open markets and freedom of trade. In its hegemonic decline he states that Great Britain could not maintain the open markets, freedom of trade that its hegemony depended upon so therefore lost its position as a hegemon and sparked a hegemonic war. The author uses the works of Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindleberger to emphasize his point of what hegemonic stability looks like. As evidence he sites British behavior in the nineteenth century and American behavior post WWII. To also highlight the differences between America and Great Britain the author uses their industrial output indices: The unprecedented nature of the American position is reflected in comparisons with British economic strength in the nineteenth century. While the British in 1870, at the zenith of their power, possessed 32 percent of the global distribution of industrial production, the United States held 48 percent of the global share in 1948. The scope of British and American power, in their respective eras, is often found to be similar; yet in terms of the preponderance of material resources, American power was much greater.<sup>18</sup> Although

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<sup>18</sup>Ikenberry, G. John, *Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony* *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104, No. 3. (Autumn, 1989), p. 380.

American power was predominate it had to accommodate to its allies; which although lacking in great power still had an essential say in creating the new world order: Closer historical scrutiny of the period suggests that the absence of success by the United States in implementing its liberal designs for order was more pervasive than the hegemonic account allows. American officials consistently were forced to modify their plans for a liberal, multilateral order; and they often found themselves at a loss in attempting to draw others into such a system. In the various commercial negotiations after the war, the United States was unable or unwilling to pursue consistent liberal policies. The most ambitious efforts at trade liberalization, embodied in the International Trade Organization proposal, were blocked by the United States Congress. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that did survive was less extensive, contained escape clauses and exemptions, and left agriculture trade outside the multilateral framework. In areas such as maritime rights and shipping, as Susan Strange notes, the United States also pursued less than liberal policies. Moreover, despite the unprecedented power position of the United States, holding the dollars and relief funds desperately needed in Britain and on the continent, American officials were less than successful in persuading Europe to embrace U.S. policies. In a recent study, Michael Mastanduno finds that the United States was surprisingly ineffective in convincing Europe to adopt its hard line East-West trade strategies. Moreover, the U.S. was unable to push the European governments toward full-scale economic integration, despite its continued efforts and the massive aid of the Marshall Plan.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> *ibid* p. 381.

Learning the lesson of World War I (WWI) the U.S.A. was determined to put in a place a multilateral system that would avoid the pitfalls of the post WWI economic regime. The problem was that the allies were not strong enough to cope with the multilateral economic regimes the U.S. planners had designed for them. The British economic planners put in stiff resistance to most of the plans that the U.S. put forward.

In "British Hegemony and Major Power Wars, 1815-1939: An Empirical Test of Giplin's Model of Hegeomic Goveranance, Edward Speizo examines Robert Gilpin's model of "hegemonic governance" which represents one of the few attempts to establish explicit theoretical links between hegemony and international politico-military conflict. Specifically, Gilpin's analysis suggests that the frequency of international conflict is inversely related to the relative power of a hegemon. Gilpin's model of hegemonic governance offers a competing explanation for both the Hundred Years' Peace between 1815 and 1914 and the "long peace" that has endured since the end of World War II. Realists typically account for these periods of relative stability by pointing to the existence of a multi polar balance of power in the nineteenth century and a bipolar balance in the years since 1945 Gilpin's argument rejects these interpretations by identifying hegemony "as the fundamental ordering principle of international relations" since the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Hence, the subsequent pattern of major power conflict largely can be attributed to the ability of first Britain and later the United States to supply the public goods of security and economic order to the international system. Gilpin's perspective on hegemony and international conflict develops within the context of a general discussion of "international governance." The argument maintains that the international system is not a "spontaneous order" unintentionally formed through

the cooperation of functionally undifferentiated political actors. Rather, Gilpin conceives of the international system as a succession of "imposed orders" whereby "dominant states . . . reign over international affairs . . . [bringing] order and stability to the system"<sup>20</sup>. Historically, four ideal types of international governance have existed: imperial, hegemonic, bipolar, and multi polar.<sup>21</sup>

Thus the existence and maintenance of free-trade regimes in the mid- 19th and mid-20th centuries can be directly attributed to the leadership and burden bearing provided by dominant members of the international system, Britain and the United States respectively. This argument concerning the provision of a public good by a hegemonic actor is fundamental to hegemonic stability theory. The theory entails two significant yet separable conclusions. First, the presence of a dominant actor will lead to the provision of a stable international regime of free trade (more broadly, hegemons provide leadership for the emergence of international regimes in various issue-areas). Second, although the dominant leader benefits from this situation (i.e., it turns a net "profit" from providing the good), smaller states gain even more. They bear none of the costs of provision and yet share fully in the benefits. In Olson's terms the "small exploit the large" and the traditional view of hegemony in the international system is turned on its head<sup>22</sup>.

In other circumstances, when power is distributed asymmetrically but hegemony is exercised in ways that do not benefit all states, subordinate states will chafe under the (coercive) leadership. One obvious empirical implication is that in the former case smaller powers will continue to support a declining hegemonic leader; in the latter case

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<sup>20</sup> Speizo, Edward, 'British Hegemony and Major Power Wars, 1815-1939: And Empirical Test of Gilpin's Model of Hegemonic Governance', in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, 1990, p. 167.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid p. 167.

<sup>22</sup> Snidal Duncan, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory International Organization', in International Organisation, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Autumn, 1985), p. 614

they will work to hasten its demise. This illustrates how the theory may ultimately generate a rich set of empirical propositions-although it must do so as part of a rigorous elaboration of the theory. Hegemonic decline weakens both sources of power and strengthens the possibility of collective action by forcing states to cooperate if they wish to achieve reasonable outcomes. However, this observation needs to be balanced by the insight of the previous section that too precipitous a decline in the size of the hegemonic actor and other large states may increase the size of the requisite k-group and impede collective action.<sup>23</sup> The political solidarity and economic prosperity in the postwar Western world would not have been as great without American leadership. The United States took the lead in opening markets, protecting allies, and promoting the stability of the noncommunist world. Because of this great accomplishment, many people worry about the waning of American global leadership and the seeming unwillingness or inability of other states to step into the role.<sup>24</sup>

The literature on hegemony can be divided into two schools, systemic and realist, each containing two prominent theories; the two variants of the systemic approach are world economy theory and long cycle theory the realist variants are hegemonic stability theory, Gilpin, and power transition theory. In systemic theories, the unit of analysis is the world system as a whole, while in realist theories it is the nation-state. Systemic analyses focus on the effects of global structures and dynamics that result from the world capitalist and international political systems. Realist approaches concentrate on political relations among states, from which emerge the international political system and regimes. While realist analysis compares national economies, he often ignores the structure and

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<sup>23</sup>Snidal Duncan, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory International Organization', in International Organisation, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Autumn, 1985), p. 614

<sup>24</sup> Ikenberry, J Op. Cit, p. 385.

dynamics of the world economy. Thompson describes the effects of hegemony on major wars for the period of 1500 to 1986 and suggests that all theories converge on the following thesis: periods when economic and or military power is concentrated in a single hegemon are associated with peace, while periods of dispersed power are associated with war. Yet most of his and other empirical evidence has been relatively descriptive. The negative association of hegemony with major wars is frequently asserted in world-system studies, along with calls for further empirical research of the issues.

**Chapter II: The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony:  
Why Japan and Germany Support U.S. Leadership**

By examining the Japanese and German alliance under U.S. hegemony I will draw a picture of common trends and not so common outcomes. In the current international system, the United States is in the enviable position of not facing any state, or coalition of states, that combines great power capability with clear intent to destabilize the existing order. Instead, the United States faces two potential great powers whose international situation and foreign policy behavior suggest a preference for the status quo, Japan and Germany, and two others who sit on the fence, China and Russia, with foreign policy intentions and aspirations more uncertain. Perhaps the most important way in which the United States used its overwhelming power capabilities after World War II was in its occupation and reconstruction policies in Germany and Japan.

At the height of its hegemony after World War II, the United States used its immense capabilities to restructure these two just defeated enemies. Japan and Germany the two economic giants apart from the U.S. provide the critical mass that helps to perpetuate U.S. hegemony. Japan depends on other nations for nearly all of its natural resources, particularly energy: Japan imports its oil from Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab, Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Angola, Libya, Nigeria, Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia, making it reluctant to involve itself in controversial issues for fear of angering suppliers and being cut off from needed goods. Indeed, Japan's dependence on external resources fundamentally prohibits it from being hegemonic in the political realm. A good example of Japan's shying away from politics became evident after the 1973 oil crisis, when Tokyo made a concerted effort to curry the friendship of all nations, particularly those with resources vital to Japan. It did this by giving development loans



and grants to these countries and technical assistance through various non-governmental organizations. In terms of human rights issues in the United Nations, prior to 1982 Japan refused to take an active part in human rights activities as it did not consider it advantageous to expose itself to unnecessary position-taking. Recently, Japan has continued to remove itself from highly politicized issues. Japan constitution prevents it from taking a more assertive role, so it will do its best to prop up American hegemony; Japan foreign policy decision makers believe that the pacifist clauses in the constitution should remain and that Japan's security is best provided for by the United States security umbrella. As mentioned previously, Japan's Constitution, as well as its experience in World War II, make it reluctant to do more than assume a defensive military posture. It spends just over one percent of its GNP on defense, with approximately \$2.5 billion going to facilities used by U.S. servicemen stationed in Japan as well as for local personnel. Hiroko Yamane notes that the Japanese public is quite satisfied with economic prosperity and supports the antiwar clause of the Constitution.

Consequently, Yamane argues, the Japanese do not want the government to increase its defense spending or to get more involved in international politics. This sentiment places a fundamental barrier to Japanese hegemony in the military realm. Japan is playing a much larger role than previously in aiding developing nations, but the case studies of China and India reveal that Japan's willingness to increase its role does not extend substantially beyond its own interests for economic gain. Additionally, China and India both are reluctant to allow Japan to play a significantly greater role in their countries -China, because of past memories of Japanese dominance and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) desire to retain control over the Chinese economy, and India,

because of a firm commitment to independent development. Japanese potential in the cultural realm is also extremely limited, not merely by the strong cultural traditions of nations such as India and China, but also by Japan's intrinsic motivation -it does not desire cultural hegemony. Japan has been reluctant to export its culture en masse, and especially reluctant to foster any kind of Asian brotherhood. As was the case in the late nineteenth century, it often seems that Japan tries to distance itself from the rest of Asia, seeing itself as superior to its neighbors. Thus, even if Japanese culture begins to crop up with increased economic and commercial relations between Japan and other nations, Japan is unlikely to see the kind of success that Britain and the U.S. had in propagating their cultures throughout the globe, rendering Japanese cultural hegemony an impossibility. Externally, Japanese expansion and dominance is also limited by the rise of regional powers, particularly China and India. Japan is a newcomer to global politics, whereas China and India have been involved since the 1950s. Thus, neither China nor India is willing to consent to Japanese hegemony.<sup>25</sup>

Japanese potential for hegemonic dominance is limited both by internal shortcomings and external factors. This is why Japan will facilitate America's hegemonic role, because it cannot provide an alternative. Conscious of this internal psychological dilemma, yet faced with external pressures not to use Japan's growing financial resources "egotistically," Japanese leaders are in the process of forging a new conception of Japan's responsibilities as an international and regional power. The blue book, Japan's strategic defense assessment, urges the Japanese people to participate in shaping Japan's growing role in the international community, as well as reaping the

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<sup>25</sup> Ventura, Patricia. "CULTURAL LOGIC OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA", [http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0000816/ventura\\_p.pdf](http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0000816/ventura_p.pdf) ( May 14, 2008) p. 78

benefits of such a position. It further stresses the aims of "peace, stability and prosperity," first and foremost through Japan's membership in the "western democracies."<sup>26</sup> Japan is fully integrated into the American hegemonic system and stands to lose if this system is altered fundamentally therefore it will support U.S. led international system. The concept of U.S.-Japanese multilateralism is based on the doctrine of "Pacific Basin Cooperation," which was born in the context of the rising U.S. trade deficit vis-a-vis Japan in the late 1970s, and was expressed in the Carter-Ohira Joint Declaration of May 2, 1979.<sup>27</sup> Provisions were made then for U.S. to reintegrate Japan---an ally if indeed an economic rival- into its political and military strategy, which would be under U.S. hegemony. In other words, Japan would be expected to increase its contribution to the security of the region by playing the "non-military" role of cooperating with Asia-Pacific nations in economic development and educational, scientific, and technological exchange.

This economic-based approach to the well-being of the Asia-Pacific region, termed "comprehensive security," was what allowed Japan to make its presence increasingly accepted in the region without becoming involved in military or political issues. Peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region depend essentially on finding political solutions to complex problems. In turn, finding political solutions for areas of high tension in Asia-particularly in Indochina, the Korean peninsula, and potentially even Taiwan--depend largely on two elements, the status of Sino-Russian relations and the status of US.-Russian relations, both areas in which Japanese leaders assert that they have

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<sup>26</sup> Hiroko Yamane , 'Japan as an Asian/Pacific Power' in Asia Survey, Vol. 27, No. 12, (Dec., 1987), p. 1308.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid* p. 1308.

no political leverage.<sup>28</sup> In the past, the postwar leaders of Japan have used their comparatively apolitical position as a means of fostering the economic expansion of the country. Even today Japan continues to hide behind its defeat in World War II as a rationale for pursuing its own and somewhat isolated economic ends. Attempts to appease both the United States and Japan's Asian neighbors, often through public self-effacement, would seem a continuation of this policy, which is based on passivity and allows little opportunity for the political maturation of the Japanese people.

Above all, it is ultimately Japan itself that will be the victim of such a policy. Japan's foreign policy strategy, which is based upon adopting a relatively submissive posture due as much to the importance of the U.S. market as to widespread domestic satisfaction with the politico-economic status quo, has begun to cause some Japanese skeptics<sup>29</sup> to wonder just how long the Japanese can hide their national pride. In the final analysis, the shape of Japan's future role as a dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region is a matter that can only depend on domestic Japanese political sentiment. In any case, it is clear that the danger of Japan sliding into the role of a regional military power backed by ultranationalists who have been disappointed by Japan's piecemeal, apologetic policies is real. For the time being, political and intellectual debate slumbers on in Japan, overwhelmed by the thrill of prosperity. For the growing number of Japanese who are able to find channels of expression whether they are personal, cultural, or political--only by way of money, the consequences could be unhappy and dangerous if ultranationalist have their way and have Japan play a more aggressive role in the region.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Hiroko Yamane , 'Japan as an Asian/Pacific Power' in Asia Survey, Vol. 27, No. 12, (Dec., 1987), p. 1308.

<sup>29</sup> Loc cit

<sup>30</sup> Loc cit

Perhaps the most important way in which the United States used its overwhelming power capabilities after World War II was in its occupation and reconstruction policies in Germany and Japan. It was acting on a lesson learned from the disastrous 1919 postwar settlement within Germany-that it was dangerous to leave in place the defeated and humiliated military and political elites that had fought and lost the war. In a less direct way, the United States was also acting on an argument made by Woodrow Wilson and other liberals during the earlier world war- that democratic and liberal capitalist states pose fewer threats to each other, and that they are more likely to cooperate together in a peaceful political order. In effect, the most consequential act of American hegemony after 1945 was to reorient the "social purpose" of the other major states. From the perspective of fifty years later, it was the political reorientation of Germany and Japan (and to a lesser extent the other Western industrial states) that mattered most. The transformation of the social purpose of these states -how these states define and express the purpose and goals of politics and society -seems to have most altered the course of Western history. It was the transformation of "aims" more than the management of "arms" that most shaped our recent past. But this brings us to the last issue. If the social purpose of the leading states has been transformed, perhaps the world does not need hegemonic leadership in the way it did in the past. In the 1940s, the great powers of the world were a heterogeneous complex of authoritarian, socialist, autocratic, and liberal democratic states.

Today, there is still a mix, but it is ultimately a much more homogeneous complex of states. Perhaps America's liberal hegemonic work has largely been accomplished at least the work that requires the most concentrated use of material capabilities and military

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power.<sup>31</sup> Rather, we should ask whether, when predominance in the power base declines, the basic regime (the network of rules, norms, etc.) weakens or the ability of the preponderant state to determine rules lessens.<sup>32</sup> The United States was the world's foremost military power, and only it had the nuclear "winning weapon." While U.S. preponderance was not so overwhelming as to enable it to set all the rules for the entire world system, it did permit it to establish the basic principles for the new economic order in the over 80 percent of the world economy controlled by capitalist states and to organize a system of collective security to maintain political and economic control over that 80 percent.<sup>33</sup>

A final major gain to the United States from the Pax Americana has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States. This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures revived. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership; post war reconstruction of Germany and Japan exhibit all these features. Moderates were giving a great voice in the way government business was done.

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<sup>31</sup> Ikenberry, J, Op. Cit., p. 401.

<sup>32</sup> Russett, Bruce, 'The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?', in International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 2. (Spring, 1985), p. 213.

<sup>33</sup> Loc cit

Constitutions in these countries were changed and amended to ensure democratic practices and martial elites were prosecuted. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that has come to bear the label "coca-colonization."<sup>34</sup>

After WWII the U.S. established organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and others. In each these new regimes it made Germany a member and eventual an integral partner. Germany's freedom of movement has been limited by domestic institutional constraints overlain by a dense network of external institutional constraints on autonomous decision making in the domains of security and economy. Thus a powerful combination of constitutional design, membership in integrative international institutions and the continued division of Germany achieved the post-war American objective of 'security for Germany and security from Germany'.<sup>35</sup> Others are even more sanguine about the prospect of an active German hegemony. One body of literature, such as Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, 'Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?' *International Affairs*, 72 (1996), 9-32., focuses upon the constraining effects of Germany's 'exaggerated multilateralism' or a reliance upon

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid* p.229

<sup>35</sup> Sperling, James, 'Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post Cold-War', in *Europe British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31, No. 2. (Apr., 2001), p. 393.

'indirect institutional power'." The institutionalization of German power has produced an empowered but non-threatening Germany that sets the European agenda and dominates the institutional evolution of the European Union (EU) and its governance structures.<sup>36</sup> The cornerstone of German security policy is the perpetuation of NATO, including the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe and the U.S. nuclear guarantee. In 1994 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl described the U.S. presence as an "irreplaceable basis for keeping Europe on a stable footing," and that sentiment is echoed routinely by high German officials. German participation in the Western European Union and the Eurocorps has been based on the presumption that European military forces must be integrated into NATO rather than standing as autonomous units.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Loc cit

<sup>37</sup> Mastanduno, Michael, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War', in International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Spring, 1997), pp. 49-88.



## **Chapter III: The Nature of U.S. Hegemony Post Second**

### **World War**

## **The Nature of U.S. Hegemony Post Second World War:**

For industrial societies, the Second World War destroyed more wealth than it created because it disrupted the global trade on which wealth had come to depend. No longer could states gain in wealth by seizing territory and resources from each other as they had done during the mercantilist period in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. WWII broke the world power of the Western European states. Even without the advent of nuclear weapons, it drove home the lesson of the First World War that the major European states could no longer wage war amongst themselves without bringing about the political and physical impoverishment of their societies, and perhaps destroying them completely.

By 1945 it was clear that all out war had become an irrational instrument in relations among major powers. Almost no conceivable national objective short of last-ditch survival justified the costs of undertaking it. This lesson was as manifestly true for revolutionary workers' states like the Soviet Union as it was for conservative, bourgeois, capitalist states like Britain and France.<sup>38</sup>

A final major gain to the United States from the benevolent hegemony has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States.<sup>39</sup> This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic

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<sup>38</sup> Buzan, Barry.: An Introduction to Strategic Studies Military Technology & International Relations, The London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1987, p. 3

<sup>39</sup> Bruce, Russett, Op. Cit, p. 229.

elements of those cultures revived. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that has come to bear the label "coca-colonization."<sup>40</sup> *After WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to facilitate peace.* The hegemonic project involves using political and economic advantages gained in world war to restructure the operation of the world market and interstate system in the hegemon's own image. The interests of the leader are projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world. The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project.<sup>41</sup>

Since wealth depended on peace the U.S set about creating institutions and regimes that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution. U.S. benevolent hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII. The upshot is that U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable political order that

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<sup>40</sup>Loc cit

<sup>40</sup>Chase-Dunn, Christopher; et. al., Op. Cit. p. 364.

the world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order, Kant's Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic states to press claims and resolve conflicts, *the system will perpetuate itself peacefully*. A state such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it.<sup>42</sup> This view of the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on U.S. leadership in the traditional sense. U.S. leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving disputes not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems.<sup>43</sup>

America as a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is considered legitimate by the other states. *It is not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is based on reciprocal consent.* It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and

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<sup>42</sup>Huntington, Samuel P., 'Why International Primacy Matters' in International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Spring, 1993), pp. 70.

<sup>43</sup>Ikenberry, G. John, The Future of International Leadership, in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 3, (Autumn, 1996), p. 394.

compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power.<sup>44</sup> So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well, it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas: colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards.

Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger.<sup>45</sup> It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security and economic strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. We must first discuss the three pillars that U.S. hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony. If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the

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<sup>44</sup>ibid p.396.

<sup>45</sup> Chase-Dunn C, et. al., Op. Cit. p.362.

rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2) Institutional leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more important role."<sup>46</sup>

Institutional management is important and can generate results that are internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual

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<sup>46</sup> Sheetz, Mark S.; Mastanduno Michael, 'Debating the Unipolar Moment' in International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Winter, 1997-1998), p. 168.

expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state interests, and thereby transforms existing relations. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic war.<sup>47</sup>

*Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates.* It is assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining and rising powers<sup>48</sup>, but I see a different pattern: the U.S. hegemonic stability promoting liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief abnormality from this path, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism. Hegemonic states are the crucial components in military alliances that turn back the major threats to mutual sovereignties and hence political domination of the system. Instead of being territorially

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<sup>47</sup>Loc cit

<sup>48</sup> Gilpin, Robert, 'The Theory of Hegemonic War' in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 p. 596.

<sup>48</sup> Chase-Dunn Christopher; et. al., Op. Cit. p. 363.

aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They aspire to be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality.<sup>49</sup> The nature of the institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the years immediately after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to establish institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to resolve global conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in terms of the theory of collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the United States, in so doing, was providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially) collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with "national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals. Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on non-capitalist principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans.<sup>50</sup> For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic

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<sup>50</sup>Bruce, Russett , 'The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?' in International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 2. (Spring, 1985), p. 223.



alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony; *"A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs"*.<sup>51</sup>

I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macro political system-a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony.<sup>52</sup> If the U.S. retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world –and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’ –a global vacuum of power.<sup>53</sup>

Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant leader politically, economically and military. But its leadership as been unique; it has not been tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has forgone absolute gains. The difference lies in the exercise of power. The strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of the world economy,

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<sup>51</sup> Kagan Robert, ‘The Benevolent Empire’, in *Foreign Policy*, No. 111. (Summer, 1998), p. 26.

<sup>52</sup> Ikenberry, J *Op. Cit.* p. 387

<sup>53</sup> Ruddin, Lee P., “ It’s not ‘revolutionary,’ stupid! Bush Foreign Policy (2001–2004) and the International Security Corollary”, in *49th Parallel*, No.17, Spring 2006, p.5

the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions. That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such.<sup>54</sup>

Leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of politics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end.<sup>55</sup>

By validating regimes and norms of international behaviour the U.S. has given incentives for actors, small and large, in the international arena to behave peacefully. The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable international system. Woodrow Wilson's zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a quasi world government; It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the

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<sup>54</sup> Kagan, R Op. Cit p. 26.

<sup>55</sup> Ikenberry, J Opt Cit. p. 388.

theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and reducing the costs of transactions, institutions can permit cooperation to continue even after a hegemon's influence has eroded. Institutions provide opportunities for commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments.

Such opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum situations, as gaming experiments demonstrate. Declining hegemony and stagnant (but not decaying) institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of desired outcomes, although the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to deal with new problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic. Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation.<sup>56</sup>

In restructuring the world after WWII it was America that was the prime motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATO's making Western Europe secure for the unification of Europe. It was through NATO institutionalism that the countries in Europe were able to start the unification process. The U.S. working through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to unite and benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the

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<sup>56</sup>Russett, B. Op. Cit., p. 222.

identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defence policy. *Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own well-being depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible without a broad measure of international security.*<sup>57</sup>

I see a multi-polar world as one being filled with instability and higher chances of great power conflict. The Great Power jostling and British hegemonic decline that led to WWI is an example of how multi polar systems are prone to great power wars. I further posit that U.S. hegemony is significantly different from the past British hegemony because of its reliance on consent and its multilateralist nature. The most significant would be the UN and its various branches financial, developmental, and conflict resolution. It is common for the international system to go through cataclysmic changes with the fall of a great power. I feel that American hegemony is so different especially with its reliance on liberal institutionalism and complex interdependence that U.S. hegemonic order and governance will be maintained by others, if states vary in size, then cooperation between the largest of the former free riders (and including the declining hegemonic power) may suffice to preserve the cooperative outcome. Thus we need to amend the assumption that collective action is impossible and incorporate it into a fuller specification of the circumstances under which international cooperation can be preserved even as a

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<sup>57</sup>Kagan, R Op. Cit., p. 28.

hegemonic power declines.<sup>58</sup> If hegemony means the ability to foster cooperation and commonality of social purpose among states, U.S. leadership and its institutional creations will long outlast the decline of its post war position of military and economic dominance; and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of particular administrations.<sup>59</sup> U.S. hegemony will continue providing the public good that the world is associated with despite the rise of other powers in the system “cooperation may persist after hegemonic decline because of the inertia of existing regimes. Institutional factors and different logics of regime creation and maintenance have been invoked to explain the failure of the current economic regime to disintegrate rapidly in response to the decline of American predominance in world affairs.”<sup>60</sup>

Since the end of WWII the majority of the states that are represented in the core have come to depend on the security that U.S. hegemony has provided, so although they have their own national interest, they forgo short term gains to maintain U.S. hegemony. Why would other states forgo a leadership role to a foreign hegemon because it is in their interests; one particularly ambitious application is Gilpin's analysis of war and hegemonic stability. He argues that the presence of a hegemonic power is central to the preservation of stability and peace in the international system. Much of Gilpin's argument resembles his own and Krasner's earlier thesis that hegemonic states provide an international order that furthers their own self-interest. Gilpin now elaborates the thesis with the claim that international order is a public good, benefiting subordinate states. This is, of course, the essence of the theory of hegemonic stability. But Gilpin adds a novel twist: the dominant power not only provides the good, it is capable of extracting contributions toward the

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<sup>58</sup> Snidal, D Op. Cit. p. 595.

<sup>59</sup> Ikenberry, J Op. Cit. p. 386.

<sup>60</sup> Snidal, D Op. Cit. p. 585.

good from subordinate states. In effect, the hegemonic power constitutes a quasi-government by providing public goods and taxing other states to pay for them. Subordinate states will be reluctant to be taxed but, because of the hegemonic state's preponderant power, will succumb. Indeed, if they receive net benefits (i.e., a surplus of public good benefits over the contribution extracted from them), they may recognize hegemonic leadership as legitimate and so reinforce its performance and position. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century several countries benefited from British hegemony particularly its rule of the seas, since WWII the U.S. has also provided a similar stability and security that as made smaller powers thrive in the international system. The model presumes that the (military) dominance of the hegemonic state, which gives it the capacity to enforce an international order, also gives it an interest in providing a generally beneficial order so as to lower the costs of maintaining that order and perhaps to facilitate its ability to extract contributions from other members of the system.<sup>61</sup>

The economic regime that is best characterized by American Hegemony is the Bretton Woods Agreement; the term "Bretton Woods system" incorporates WTO as well as the IMF and World Bank, because the Bretton Woods Conference looked forward to the creation of an ancillary institution that would reduce obstacles to international trade and give effect to the *principle of multilateral nondiscriminatory trade*. Although the initial plans for the Havana Charter and the creation of an International Trade Organization were not carried out, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (which later led to the WTO) emerged as a multilateral agreement embodying commercial policy provisions essentially similar to the Havana Charter chapter on commercial policy. While the IMF was intended to repair the disintegration that had

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<sup>61</sup> *ibid* p.589

befallen the international monetary system prior to the War, and the World Bank was designed to stimulate and support foreign investment, which had declined to insignificant amounts, *the WTO was intended to reverse the protectionist and discriminatory trade practices that had multiplied during the prewar depression years*. The Fund and WTO were to collaborate on exchange policies and trade policies.' In combination, the Fund, the Bank, and WTO were designed to help the advanced industrial countries achieve the multiple objectives of full employment, freer and expanding trade, and stable exchange rates.<sup>62</sup> The glue that made the post WWII economic environment prosperous for the allies and paved the way for continual U.S. dominance was the Bretton Woods Agreement.

The Bretton Woods Agreement is the result of a long process of negotiation between the British and U.S. experts; subsequently adhered to by the delegates of forty-four countries at Bretton Woods. The gist of the agreement is that if this country will create and maintain the conditions necessary for multilateral trade in a reasonably free exchange market, England will undertake, after a transition period of three to five years during which exchange control and bilateral currency arrangements are permitted, to relinquish her controls and join a multilateral exchange system. The agreement, however, carefully states that, even after the five-year period, the member country itself shall be the judge of whether the conditions are right for relaxing its controls. In weighing the

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<sup>62</sup>Meier ,Gerald M., 'The Bretton Woods Agreement -- Twenty-Five Years After', in Stanford Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 2. (Jan., 1971), p. 237.

adoption of the Fund, the essential question is whether there is a fair prospect that this bargain can be consummated.<sup>63</sup>

These institutions were to coordinate exchange rates, control the world economy, insure free and fair trade, in order to avoid the pre war protectionist regimes and basically rebuild its member's economies. The alliances of the United States with Japan and with the Western European countries in NATO rested on three fundamentals: shared political and economic values; common economic interests; and the Soviet security threat. Without the last of these three, the alliances would never have come into existence. Now, however, the Soviet threat is gone, and common economic interests are giving way to competing economic interests. *Shared political and economic values remain the principal glue holding together the grand alliances of the Cold War.* Those common values are real, and they mean that wars are most unlikely between these countries.<sup>64</sup>

The pillars that will maintain U.S. hegemony are the countries that have most to gain from it Japan and Germany. These two countries were the defeated powers in WWII and the two powers that benefitted the most by the benevolent nature of U.S. hegemony. The anticipated decline of American power into the late 1970s and the seeming inability of Germany and Japan to adopt a political profile commensurate with their perceived economic power generated the conventional belief that Germany emerged from the defeat of the Second World War as one of the world's two 'zaghafte Riesen' or timorous giants - a sentiment captured by the description of Germany as an economic giant, but political

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<sup>63</sup> Williams, John H. 'The Bretton Woods Agreements- Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science', World Organization: Economic, Political and Social, Vol. 21, No. 3., (May, 1945), p. 314.

<sup>64</sup> Huntington, S, Op. Cit. p. 71.



dwarf.<sup>65</sup> In two attempts to gain hegemonic status Germany failed. Under the US security umbrella the German export driven economy has surged and through intuitions like NATO and the EU, the security dilemma it caused for its neighbors in the past has been mitigated. A weak German economy would have been a liability for the Western alliance, undermining political stability and opening up opportunities for Soviet maneuvers. Because of the integrative features of the Western alliance, the faltering economy of one partner in the alliance would have weakened all, with negative consequences also for military preparedness. The tensions of the Cold War created an atmosphere in the West that was generally in sympathy with German aspirations to restore a viable economy. Economic recovery was skillfully complemented and underpinned by Bonn's policy on political recovery, and by extension its policy on security and rearmament, on which the whole construct rested. In such mixed political and economic ventures as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic Community (EEC), political and economic gains went hand in hand and were achieved through a coordinated strategy that advanced German demands in the name of European and Atlantic unity rather than of a discredited German nationalism. The restraint of Germany through international organizations and treaties was at the core of Washington's postwar European policy of double containment: the containment of the Soviet Union at arm's length and of Germany with an embrace.

Every major event in the postwar history of Europe follows from this: the rearmament and economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic within the restraints of international organizations, the development of NATO from a loosely organized mutual

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<sup>65</sup> Sperling, James, 'Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post Cold-War Europe', in British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 2. (Apr., 2001), p. 392.

assistance pact into an integrated military alliance, American support for Western European integration, and the solidification of Europe.<sup>66</sup>

The post WWII reconstruction of Germany was so thorough and far sighted that it was able to turn a recent enemy to a strong ally: Germany's freedom of movement has been limited by domestic institutional constraints overlain by a dense network of external institutional constraints on autonomous decision making in the domains of security and economy.<sup>67</sup> Thus a powerful combination of constitutional design, membership in integrative international institutions as allowed Germany to achieve the post-war American objective of '*security for Germany and security from Germany*'. Germany's macroeconomic role in Europe has been classified as ranging from simple predominance to asymmetry to dominance. German predominance is supported by some empirical studies, yet German power in this domain is dependent upon the level of German independence from the structure of global (read U.S.) interest. German monetary autonomy and power in Europe has depended upon a stable and benign U.S. macro economy. Without that external environment made by U.S. hegemonic stability the German juggernaut could be revisionist. One consequence of the German violation of the laws of warfare was the multilateralization and institutionalization of German power - Germany was largely constrained over the course of the post-war period from undertaking unilateral foreign policy initiatives, with the notable exception of the Ostpolitik. German foreign policy was (and remains) constrained and constituted by its

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<sup>66</sup> Hanrieder, Wolfram F., 'The Foreign Policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-1989', in German Studies Review, Vol. 12, No. 2. (May, 1989), p. 315.

<sup>67</sup> Sperling, J. Op. Cit. p 419.

membership in and formal surveillance by integrative institutions like NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), and the EU.<sup>68</sup>

By restructuring Germany after the war and providing markets for German goods the US was finally able to assuage German aggression. Within the confines of the American security umbrella, *the Germans achieved security, sovereignty, prosperity, and a stable democratic political order.*<sup>69</sup> U.S. hegemonic stability offered free markets and a security that enabled Germany to prosper without resorting to war and aggression. Since 1871 Germany has been looking for security; it was only after WWII that it has found a rightful place within the hierarchy of nations, and that is only due to US hegemonic stability. As the relative power of the US declines Germany will contribute more resources to maintain the status quo and continue to prop up the American hegemon. Japan will continue its partnership with the US hegemon for economic and strategic reasons. The nature of the Japanese economy; with its high ratio of trade to GNP the economy remains, and will continue to remain, highly vulnerable to the cutting of its sea lines of communication of the sort so effectively imposed by the Americans during the Second World War. Additionally, and this was not the case in 1930; *Japan is now a major player in the liberal international economic order.* Its prosperity and its economic security are deeply and increasingly entangled in a global web of financial, production and trading interdependence. In this respect Japan is almost a demonstration case for those who argue that economic interdependence raises the costs and reduces the incentives of the resort to force. The incentives for war are reduced not only because of the cost of disrupting vital economic relations, but also because the very existence of

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<sup>68</sup> Loc cit.

<sup>69</sup> Hanrieder, W. Op. Cit. p. 313.

complex interdependence offers states a whole range of more efficient and finely tuned instruments for influencing each other's behavior. Strategically: The outcome of the Second World War in the Pacific was definitive for Japan. The window of relative military advantage and therefore of opportunity that opened for it between 1895 and 1945 has closed forever. East Asia is no longer composed of vulnerable European colonies and the decaying remains of an old Chinese empire. Japan can never again dominate the region militarily, and even its most enthusiastic re-armers could only hope to make it one of the four military great powers permanently engaged in the region. One can conclude that a revival of militarism in Japan is highly unlikely, and that if it did occur there would be no opportunities for its expression comparable to those of the 1930s and 1940s. The economy is the foundation of a state's security and prosperity. As its economic power increases, so does the range and variety of its national interest, the more so for a country like Japan whose economy depends on a high turnover of imports and exports. In Japan's case, the sheer size of the economy, the second largest after the U.S., means that its trade, investment and financial interests are widely spread throughout the international system. Since the smooth running of the world economy ultimately depends on political order i.e. U.S. hegemonic stability, Japan's national interest is automatically entangled in the major questions of world politics, both East-West and North-South, by its economic involvement in them. The risk to Japan that a weakly led international economy could slide towards competitive protectionism is much too great for it to contemplate with complacency. During the 1930s and 1940s Japan learned the hard way that it had no workable solutions to the problem of maintaining its own security and prosperity in a neo-mercantilist international environment. No country of Japan's weight has ever

escaped this basic security logic of life in the international anarchy, that great powers are driven by self-interest to assert themselves politically in the international system in proportion to the extent of their global engagements. Japan cannot live in the shadow of the Second World War forever. Eventually it will have to decide what sort of role it wants to play in the new international era that is replacing the old postwar order. That role will be a continual partnership with the US to continue the public goods that it has received since the end of WWII. Any change in the status quo, multi-polar world where the U.S. is a minor power would be disastrous for Japan.<sup>70</sup> Japan and Germany will continue to support its U.S. ally and continue to pay the cost that will ensure U.S. dominance and leadership in the World.

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<sup>70</sup> Buzan, Barry, 'Japan's Future: Old History versus New Roles', in International Affairs (Vol. 64, No. 4., (Autumn, 1988), p. 561.

**Chapter IV: The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11 the  
Failure of Unilateralism**

## **The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11 the Failure of Unilateralism**

The well-documented invasion of Iraq, and the Bush Doctrine marked a significant change in U.S. foreign policy; U.S. foreign policy seemed bent on going against the will of its allies, France and Germany, and unilaterally invading countries. A unilateral America is a transitory phenomenon; the acts of September 11, 2001 were so heinous that a majority of the foreign policy decision makers were willing to condone unilateralism. But after seven years of unilateralism the Bush regime has realized its error and reverted back to multilateralism. Allies have been consulted on a regular basis; international organizations have been approached in order to solve conflicts ranging from Somalia, Iraq, and Georgia; such as the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Bank, and European Union.

NATO enlargement represents the best case of continual U.S. multilateralism. After 9/11 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania have entered NATO. Croatia and Albania are scheduled to join in 2009. Although essentially a military alliance; NATO membership offers humanitarian aid, conflict resolution mechanisms, and economic aid. Since NATO is viewed as the catalyst that rebuilt Western Europe. The new members feel that it will do the same for the Eastern European countries that are now entering by providing security guarantees against a revisionist Russia and much needed development aid and access to Western European and American markets and grants. President Clinton was the first to voice this opinion: that NATO and not European institutions like the European Union and EEC had turned Western Europe

into “a source of stability instead of hostility,” and that NATO expansion could do for Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West: Prevent a return to local rivalries. In other words, stability requires a hegemon, which is why “America remains the indispensable nation” and why U.S. policy is driven to extend the frontiers of stability, so that “a gray zone of insecurity [does] not reemerge in Europe”<sup>71</sup>

Perhaps the most recent example of the failure of Unilateralism and the return to multilateralism by the United States is the handling of the Somali security crisis. Alarmed at the Islamic Court’s growing strength and popularity, in early 2006 the CIA began supplying significant quantities of arms and money to a coalition of secular Mogadishu warlords under the name Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT). The CIA program had been a poorly conceived attempt to hunt down the small number of al-Qaeda affiliated individuals involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, then thought to be hiding in Somalia. But the operation failed disastrously and, according to reports, ‘the payoffs added to an anarchic situation that led many Somalis to turn to the Islamic Courts for protection’.<sup>72</sup>

After building a critical mass and routing the ARPCT the Islamic Courts gained control of South Central Somalia. The Americans and Ethiopians were horrified and once again opted for the military option and invaded Somalia unilaterally; in the Horn of Africa Ethiopia is the regional hegemon. The Americans felt the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) were hosting al-Qaeda, and the Ethiopians were fearful of the UIC because of their revisionist claims and support for the Ogaden rebel movement. However, the Islamic militia stayed clear of areas close to the Ethiopian border, which had become a place of

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<sup>71</sup> Sheetz, M *Op. Cit.* p.170.

<sup>72</sup> Blood, Matthew, Somalia: The War on Terror – Third Front Revisited 19 Dec. 2008.



refuge for many Somalis including the Transitional Federal Government itself, headquartered in the town of Baidoa. Ethiopia said it would protect Baidoa if threatened. On September 25, 2006, the ICU moved into the southern port of Kismaayo, the last remaining port held by the transitional government. Ethiopian troops entered Somalia and seized the town of Buur Hakaba on 9 October 2006, and later that day the UIC issued a declaration of war against Ethiopia.<sup>73</sup>

On 1 November 2006, peace talks between the transitional Government and the ICU broke down. The international community feared an all-out war, with Ethiopian and rival Eritrean forces backing opposing sides in the power-struggle. Fighting erupted once again on 21 December 2006 when the leader of UIC, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys said: “Somalia is in a state of war, and all Somalis should take part in this struggle against Ethiopia”, and heavy fighting broke out between the Islamic militia on one side and the Somali Transitional Government allied with Ethiopian forces on the other. In late December 2006, Ethiopia launched air strikes against Islamic troops and strong points across Somalia. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi then announced that his country was waging a war against the UIC to protect his country’s sovereignty. “Ethiopian Defense Forces were forced to enter into war to protect the sovereignty of the nation and to blunt repeated attacks of Islamic Courts terrorist and anti-Ethiopian elements they are supporting,”<sup>74</sup>

In 2006 it was felt that the best way to stop the ICU was by a unilateral military intervention, so the Bush administration gave the green light to Ethiopia to restore the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Mogadishu. After two years of occupying

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<sup>73</sup> “Carnage as Somalia ‘in state of war’”, CNN (December 22, 2006). Retrieved on 2 January 2007.

<sup>74</sup> “Ethiopia declares war on Somalia”, Al Jazeera (December 25, 2006) Retrieved on 2 January 2007.

Somalia Ethiopian forces are withdrawing back to Ethiopia, the TFG is widely unpopular and lacks legitimacy, the moderate UIC has been replaced by the more extremist al-Shabaab that has regained all the territory that it lost when Ethiopia invaded. The invasion was supposed to restore peace and provide for a more stable Somalia the opposite has happened and the once moderate UIC has been replaced by a revisionist and extremist al-Shabaab. The primary aim of the U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion that installed President Yusuf and the internationally recognized transitional federal government was to dislodge a relatively diverse Islamist movement that had taken over Mogadishu. But two years later, the most radical wing of the ousted Islamist movement has emerged stronger, more battle-hardened and better-financed than ever.<sup>75</sup>

Seeing the error in their ways both the U.S. and Ethiopia are seeking multilateral ways of resolving the crisis. The African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the United Nations have been approached to help resolve the crisis. At the International Contact Group on Somalia meeting Secretary of State Rice stated that Somalia continues to face enormous challenges despite the political process represented by the Djibouti Agreement; despite progress, security remains tenuous and requires immediate action. U.S. views the deployment of a United Nation peacekeeping operation as vital. The international community must support a resolution that will re hat the current A.U. Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which will allow for a coordinated withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. AMISOM is unable to sustain themselves in the current circumstances. With a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation the chances for the Djibouti peace process to succeed are greater. A multilateral effort is what is needed now

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<sup>75</sup> McCrummen, Stephanie, "President of Somalia Steps Down Amid Pressure" Washington Post December 30, 2008P A10.

to save Somalia from the current turmoil.<sup>76</sup> Since making these comments on the 16 December 2008, the U.S. has been busy engaging allies, the United Nations, IGAD, and the African Union, to help support their efforts on resolving the conflict in Somalia. The failure of the unilateral approach has seen the restoration of multilateralism in solving global conflict.

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<sup>76</sup> Secretary of State Dr. Rice at the International Contact Group on Somalia, 16 December 2008.

## **Chapter V: Conclusion**

**Conclusion:**

The maintenance of U.S. primacy matters for the world as well as for the United States. First, no other country can make comparable contributions to international order and stability. The security consequences of a multi-polar world have been dramatically evident in the dismal failure of the major European powers to deal with the Yugoslav catastrophe on their doorstep. Leaders and publics throughout the world recognize the need for an American presence and American leadership in maintaining stability in their region. These are, as the prime ministers of Japan and Korea said, "Indispensable" to Asian security and world security.<sup>77</sup>

The fear is, instead, that Americans may well turn isolationist again and do exactly that. The ability of the United States to provide international order is obviously limited and, despite the constant demands, the United States cannot settle every dispute in every part of the world. Yet the fact remains that, as General Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it, one of the fondest expressions around here is that we can't be the world's policeman. But guess who gets called when suddenly someone needs a cop. As Bosnia, Somalia, and many other places evidence, the answer to that question is obvious. And, given the nature of the world as it is, is there any remotely plausible alternative answer or better answer? If the United States is unable to maintain security in the world's trouble spots, no other single country or combination of countries is likely to provide a substitute. A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in

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<sup>77</sup> Huntington, S Op. Cit. p.83.

shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.<sup>78</sup> Since the end of WWII the U.S. has build an international system that rest on liberal institutions and regimes. With its predominant position the U.S. as sought to achieve a benevolent hegemony in partnership with its European allies and Japan. As U.S. hegemony wanes countries like Japan and Germany will do all that is possible to continue the status quo. They will work hard to tie in rising powers like India and China in to the current liberal institutional framework. The rising emerging powers will be tolerant of the U.S. because of its benevolent hegemony and its 'special' qualities-its provision of global public goods, its exercise of power through rules and institutions, and the allowance for weaker states to have 'voice opportunities'.<sup>79</sup> This specialness of U.S. benevolent hegemony I feel is the main catalyst that will perpetuate it, there will not be a hegemonic war like the one that ended the British hegemony. There will be a gradual reliance on allies such as Japan and Germany that will be the main supporters of continued U.S. hegemony.

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<sup>78</sup> Loc cit

<sup>79</sup> Mabee , Bryan, 'Discourses of Empire: The US 'Empire', Globalization and International Relations' in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 8, (2004), p. 1363

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