THE RISE AND FALL OF SOMALIA'S ISLAMIC COURTS UNION (ICU) 
AND IT'S IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE 

(Critical Reflections on the Role of Exogenous 
Interventions in Peace Creation in Somalia) 
2006-2008 

(Research Report as Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for 
Completion of a Master's Degree in International Relations) 

Supervised By 
Professor Gilbert Khadiagala 

Submitted By 
Gashaw Teshome Mengesha 

Submitted To 
Faculty of Social Sciences 

University of Witwatersrand 
November, 2008
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Statement of Declaration

I declare that all the works contained herein are original and represent the results of my academic investigation.

04th November 2008
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command (US)</td>
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<td>AIAI</td>
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<td>AL</td>
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<td>ALSHABAB</td>
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<td>ARPCT</td>
<td>Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (US)</td>
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<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CUD</td>
<td>Coalition for Unity and Democracy</td>
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<td>DAG</td>
<td>Development Assistance Group</td>
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<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front</td>
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<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariff and Trade</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGASOM</td>
<td>IGAD’s Peace Support Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>PSM-AU</td>
<td>Peace Support Mission of African Union</td>
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<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rahenweyne Resistance Army</td>
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<td>SDM</td>
<td>Somalia Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>SDR</td>
<td>Somalia Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somaliland National Movement</td>
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<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)</td>
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<td>TPLF</td>
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<td>WB</td>
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Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Carter Centre</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Contact Group</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>NSSP</td>
<td>National Security Stabilization Plan of TFG</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>The United States of America</td>
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Acknowledgements

My sincere thanks go to Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of Department of International Relations, University of Witwatersrand, without whose transformative supervision and guidance this Research Report would not have been possible.

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Last but not least, I express my gratitude to all those who contributed to the positive outcome of my academic endeavours.
INTRODUCTION

Currently, ‘Somalia’ is facing the worst humanitarian and security crisis in its history. Despite several internationally sanctioned peace and state building efforts, it tops a list of ‘world wide index on failed states’. In the most recent security deterioration, more than 1 million people have been displaced internally, tens of thousands have fled their country to become refugees in neighbouring countries, and from 2006 up to the time of this report, by conservative account at least 6,000 civilians have died and 3.5 million people fall under direct humanitarian assistance. (Financial Times Report of August, 2008; during interview with prime minister of Ethiopia). The latest crisis started when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) were removed from power. The end of military dictatorship in 1990, instead of putting the country on a democratic track, marked Somalia’s ‘implosion’ into fratricidal warfare. The absence of central government since then created a life that increasingly became ‘so short and brutish’ for more citizens, to borrow Hobbs’s scenario (Leviathan: 1651/2000:304). The eclipsing of a ‘world security environment’ with the advent of the ICU attracted an array of actors in Somalia; and its present ‘ungovernable permeability’ supplied the imperatives for varied forms of international concerns and interventions.

The main theme of this essay is, therefore, the ‘rise and fall of the Islamic Courts Union’. Two fundamental reasons justified selecting this research topic: first, the debate around these forces and the implication it has on regional and international peace is topical and highly pertinent to human security. However, in-depth research is yet to be conducted on the subject. Early assessment for writing this report showed that views of intellectual dissenters on the issues seem to have received less documentation, or in some instances constitute the missing elements. Picking up the above topic for research with some reflections on the role of international cooperation in peace creation in Somalia will hopefully contribute to the understanding of the operating variables in the region.

*see also: United States of America's Foreign Policy and Security Strategy Document, 2006
Second, recent development in the Horn of Africa, especially the crisis after the ICU’s demise is fundamentally different from other peace problems that Somalia has seen to date. Moreover, it has literally posed a formidable challenge to the validity of different theories regarding causes of conflict, their management and prevention. The case studies would serve as a good experiment to make close scrutiny and in-depth analysis of the crisis in relation to conceptual orthodoxies of international co-operations.

The main task of this research report is to posit some of the relevant points of argument around the fall of the Islamic Courts Union by raising a fundamental question; whether the ‘courts union’ were a threat to peace or a lost opportunity for it?*

The methods used to conduct this research (report) were initially, a germination assessment made on the trend of Somali internal conflict. It depicted the chronology of conflicts with sedimentary character (it originated from a fight for power, clan-based micro-civil war, then followed by war lordism, lately religious motivated warfare, and currently turned out to be a liberation struggle). There are varying opinions, but initial conversations with Somali subjects, expose that 2006 represented the peak of the ‘safety curve’; the majority of them replied affirmatively for having entertained the idea of making a trip back home. Then, from such observations it was found that 2006 was the time when most of the southern part of Somalia was under effective control of the

* The Islamic Courts Union is a force that controlled Mogadishu and most of south-west Somalia, in June 2006. According to BBC’s November 8, 2006 news report (which was prepared by Mohammed Sheik Nor, AP staffer): these forces were reported to be established by Somali businessmen who wanted to impose law and order, their gunmen were termed the strongest fighting forces. On another description, by John Nbaria,(AFP) on December 4, 2006, the ICU were also incorporated clan-based respected local Sheiks supported by leading traders in the community. In 2008, the ‘al Shabab’, a youth league of Militias’ attached to ICU, is labelled as a ‘terrorist organization’ by the US, Department of State, and the ICU as an ‘Islamic extremists’ group.
ICU; it was also the time of a noticeable shift of strategic relevance of the Horn of Africa region; and it put the country at a cross roads. It was necessary to telescopically see such a brief interval in the vicious cycle of wars in order to verify the ‘popular view’ against ‘international opinion and decision making’. After such an investigative line was established, the viable approach to complete the research report was determined.

The best approach to study the ICU’s case, was to consult different sources, from literature review to individual discussions. After that, a two-year follow up on the day to day developments in Somalia, has been routinely undertaken to form a body of record by itself. This, in turn, made the analysis and inferences manageable. It also helped to identify and observe the traits of the peace problem in Somalia.

The above methodological phases resulted in singling-out one important player at the domestic level: the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Therefore; the preliminary findings squarely defined the ‘object’ of the analysis and a central gravity, for this research within the conceptual parameters, to revolve around these forces. Indirect interviews and direct interviews were used for verification of the ‘theses. Basically, owing to security reasons it was difficult to do empirical research basing oneself in Somalia. However, the ‘two-year-long’ day to day follow up through ‘subject networking’ has given this research a quasi-empirical flavour.

Structurally, this research report would have the following outlook. ‘Part I’ lays the ground for establishing the theoretical contexts through which it would like to analyse the realities in Somalia. The drive to get the right resolutions for conflicts has been the real equation, different explanations for root causes of the problems necessitates an examination of the relation of the ‘decision making process’ at international level to peace in the region. Various models have been revisited in light of the subject under discussion, from a ‘science of meddling through’ to a ‘rational actor model’; from an ‘idiosyncratic’ to an ‘organisational values system model’ that help to explain the behaviour of various actors whose decisions have ramifications on human security in the Horn of Africa.
However, before that, different views about 'sources of conflicts' have been touched upon. It is crucial to determine the nature of the conflict by tracing its deep-seated causes; if the peace creation efforts, in most conflict-resolution endeavours, are to succeed they need to involve such discussions. Therefore, attempts will be made to relate applicable theories of conflict for the Somali case, and at the same time how the international decision making process also affects peace creation in the country, the emphasis is on decisions that were specific to the ‘fall of the Islamic Courts Union’.

‘Part II’ deals with live issues related to the emergence of the ICU, the reasons that made these forces undesired factors for peace in Somalia and the region in general, the processes that ruined their ‘little Empire’, and the intervention by regional players and its impact are looked into. The international involvement in the new crisis in Somalia appears to have three layers: the bottom constitutes the regional players; the EU and Arab-League represent the middle layer; and the US, UN and other important actors occupy the top layer of involvement in the Horn of Africa. Especially, Chapter Four, will deeply investigate the role of the international players in the conflict.

‘Part III’ puts forward the findings and tries to contextualise peace creation in the region within the frames of recognition of indigenous factors; hence, recommendations are put forward to that end.

Key words:

Peace-creation
Terrorism
Somalia
Conflict
International decision making
Islamic Courts Union
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PART I
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter One
Theories of Conflict and Models of ‘International Decision Making’ -
In Relation to the Current Peace Problem in Somalia

1. Ideas on sources of conflicts

The research observes the absence of a unified, comprehensive and distinguishable theory of conflict. Hence, for the purpose of scrutiny, from the available literatures, quadruple explanations could be constructed about sources of conflicts that are applicable to the social realities of the Horn of Africa and the world in general. These include: Depredation, Neo-Malthusian view, Structural/Institutional view and Alternative view on sources of conflicts.

1.1. ‘Depredation’ theory
The quest for understanding why human society lost more than 150 million people during the First half of the 20th Century, and the Horn of Africa being the major contributor to this loss to this day, some academics have attributed the ‘demon’ to the nature of ‘man himself’. ‘Conflict and violence, even poverty and degradation are the reflections of ‘the predatory nature of our own species’. Although not a theory of conflict as his main subject of investigation, Oswaldo De Rivero, marvellously depicted the romanticisation of ‘war’ by all civilizations during all social systems that human history witnessed beginning from the history of Homo Sapiens. For him, man is still a predator of his own species. By glorifying war in the ‘civilized world’ or in most ‘barbaric societies’, it is taken as the legitimate ‘means to bringing to fruition the ambitions of the tribe, the clan or the nation-state. Hence, his saying goes:
"Depredation among humans has been and still is a historical constant, one that has not yet been tamed by great ethical or religious current... It is rooted in an innate tendency of homo sapiens to consider his own group (family, tribe, clan, ethnic group, nation, religion or culture) different and superior to other groups, thereby dividing the human species between them and us. Doing this means we do not share our humanity with other human beings who belong to different ethnic groups, creeds or cultures, and we go so far as to treat them as a different species, thus endangering the concept of 'the enemy'.

In addition to his theory, he used the wording of the German ethnologist Eibl Eibesfeldt to describe the above 'predatory rationalisation' as 'pseudo-speciation'. His most pertinent explanation that connects his idea to the realities of Somalia in particular and the Horn of Africa in general, reads this way:

"In recent years, television has shown innumerable scenes of 'national' depredation, civil wars, drug financed guerrillas, terrorism and extreme delinquency. We are even witnessing the way in which quasi-nation-states of the underdeveloped world, instead of developing, have been imploding into violence as ungovernable entities, converting themselves into a kind of aborted 'Leviathan', engulfed in infernal struggle, and infected by an emotional plague of 'pseudo-speciation', in which rival groups deny each other's humanity.”

His analysis does not rule out, however, the possibility of taming the nature of 'man'. Other theoretical traditions have given way to put this human nature in constant check. Some believe in 'justice', 'law' and the genuine application of rules, while others suggest the relevance of having the upper hand in every conflict situation to enforce peace.

The conventional argument behind the causes for the current Somalian crisis has been 'micro-speciation', to take Revero's assertion one step deeper. In Somalia, speciation is not about belonging to a different tribe or race, rather it is about belonging to the same tribe but belonging to a sub-clan. Within the clan again one could see fratricidal conflict in sub-sub-clans. The undercurrent of the peace problem lies on the above factors, however, the war after 2006 is increasingly receiving extra clan causes, these include: ideological/religious, liberation struggle, and consequently the fight to secure power and recognition by the international community. Therefore, even though the validity of the convincing argument for 'speciation', the war in Somalia is getting beyond mutual treatment as different species.
The other shortcoming of the assertion, nonetheless, is that it overlooks the behaviour of human beings who are passionate and cooperative having ‘good’ spirit. The factors that transform ‘the good man’ into ‘evil’ are external and environmental. The sadistic explanation to human nature is refuted by the idea that people are forced to behave in certain ways by conditions and other variables. Hence, the following view gives the externalities of causes for conflicts.

1.2. ‘Darwin-Malthusian’ views on conflict

The classical Malthusians* see conflict as the mechanism that nature uses to check on population growth, that if remained unchecked through these vices, it depletes resources and sustaining life would be difficult. Therefore, sources of conflict either in the region which is subject of this study, or universally, are caused not out of a conscious plan for its own sake, but as imposed by preconditions of ‘survival’. It links conflict to the fatal competition for control of resources whose outcome minimizes population pressure on resources. The research has come across Mirjam de Bruijn’s and Han Van Dijk’s writings that explained the relation of ‘Natural Resources and Conflicts’. The piece of work can be seen as a neo-Malthusian strand in theories of conflict. The other literature on conflict with similar themes puts forward a thesis that ‘population growth and subsequent depletion of resources, the fear or its actual occurrence, and the competition for existing ones results in conflict to enable nature to check on population pressure, by leaving the most adaptive to the situation, to prevail’. Patric Chabal and colleagues have studied the clash of the herders and farmers in Africa. Their conclusion carries elements of Neo-Malthusian views. Sub-Saharan Africa, they argue, lies in the decreasing or finite availability of natural resources in combination with increasing population pressure resulting from, for example, the immigration of groups of different ethnic origins. This is leading to a scarcity of resources and increasing competition for any of those that are available: Violent conflict is the inevitable result entailing ‘survival of the fittest’.

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* Malthus (1766-1834) was an economist well known for his pessimism on population increase (his essay of 1798). In this he argued that the human race tends to reproduce in geometrical progression, while food supplies can only at half-rate of population growth. Because of this ‘law of nature’, humanity would breed surpassing the limits set by food supply. The inevitable consequence of this natural growth would be: wars, famine, pestilence, extreme poverty, etc. This problem can be resolved only by two factors ‘war’ and famine
The fight for resources has been, of course, one of the reasons that conflicts are not resolved easily. Control of strategic ports for fishing and gainful engagements, fight over grazing lands, competition for water, all have their contribution to Somali tribal war. However, the main problem, when it comes to the latest conflict, emanates from non-resource questions.

The limitation of the neo-Malthusians assertion on the sources of conflict seems to give less account on the potential of human beings to preserve their environment if proper policy and practices are implemented. Desertification, deforestation, the issue of land, water, oil, all could be harnessed for human society sufficiently and conflict cannot be the inevitable result, rather other problems are the reasons instead of scarcity or population pressure as such. The Chinese growth and the Scandinavian countries which are situated in the most hostile environment and with limited resources are stable countries, meaning Africa’s problem of peace emanates from other factors. In Somalia, despite belonging to the third world, the country had potential to be a trade outlet for Africa, and is sparsely populated with mostly nomadic life style. Conflicts for the sake of resource are less fundamental than other causes as the patterns of a decade and half of disorder depict. The other view about conflict relates it to institutional structural problems, to the ‘absence of equity’ in society in general. The following sub-section will look into some of these arguments.

1.3. Institutional/ Structural/view

The issue of poverty, exclusion from the economic gains, absence of good governance (in a generally acceptable way), lack of democratic institutional mechanisms in a society to ameliorate conflicts, and the inappropriate configuration into the international developmental system are unadjusted structures that contribute to causes of conflicts.

When the economy lacks viability to meet the needs of its people, it has a ripple effect and that is observable in the recent intra/inter-state and other conflicts in the the Horn of Africa in general and Somalia in particular. The philosophical argument behind welfare systems is that satisfaction of basic needs and a certain degree of social participation for citizens creates harmony in the society,
whereas existence of discrepancies in living conditions would generate conflict especially during poor performance of the economy. Bad economic structures coupled with ethnic, cultural, and religious resentments all exacerbated by the intensification of globalizing forces makes the non-viability to convert itself into causes of conflict. A prolonged period of impoverishment precludes violence – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are among the cited examples.

Some institutional viewers propose that every conflict has to do with the issue of genuine democracy and good governance. For instance, the neo-idealist version of IR theories hold that good governance, which is a base for human rights protection, is a necessary ingredient in cooperation and harmony. IMF’s and WB’s governance principles spring from this notion of the connection between democracy, peace and development. The ‘deconstruction and reconstruction’ of economies and institutions, to make them viable, were motivated by an objective of having a harmonious global society with minimum occurrence of conflict. Nevertheless, adjusting these systems has created dislocations and conflicts to the disillusionment of most that were involved in the process. Some of the conflicts seen in today’s developing world are the deformed implementation of the agenda of Britton Woods institutions, even though the intentions were sacred. Governance issue and economic structural problems are sound reasons for the inherent peace problem in Somalia.

Other groups of structuralists argue that divisions among groups ‘instead’ of ‘shared experience’ of being incorporated in the same ‘state’ (structure). From this perspective the state is seen as ‘an alien construct and imposed framework’ characterised by ‘discriminatory domination’ that has become a ‘source of deep rivalry between competing segments of the indigenous population’. Therefore, the religious and ethnic conflicts are partly the result of the carving out of modern states in Africa, and the world.

The formation of state structure based on territories inherited from colonialism’s partitions plans has resulted in the mutilation of ethnic groups in between different newly formed states resulting in resentment and revolt when the dominating structure becomes progressively suppressive. Ethnic overlap, absence of clear territorial demarcation among states, the malfunctioning of socio-economic structures are prime causes of various conflicts in the region of Africa’s Horn, and in Somalia in particular. For instance, losses of strategic sea outlets, tribal and ethnic nationalism are major
sources of conflict in Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The 1998 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the debilitating tribal warfare in Somalia are results of these factors. Most historians could agree the present day conflict in Somalia has some contours of scourges of colonial legacy.

1.4. Alternative views on sources of conflict (in the Horn of Africa)

The impressive assertion is that most rivalries and conflicts that are going in structurally dilapidated social, economic and political frameworks; be it state and quasi-state entities, between states or within them, are motivated by the need to get attention and ‘flow’ of international aid as a form of peace settlement. 11

According to this theory, the coming of conflict resolution, packages of rehabilitation for ‘victims’ of the conflict, re-integration of the conscripts back to the society after conflicts, compensation and the flow of remittance from Diaspora for fanning war, etc. and including other track two solutions by the international community, have been awkwardly the motivation for some actors in different parts of Africa as sources of conflict.12

The issue of governance, which is increasingly becoming the central value of foreign policies of powerful countries in the world as their basis for cooperation as indicated in the previous chapter, has become a bone of contention and conflict itself. That emanated from ‘double standards’ in the application of rules of these prerequisites for support.13 Of course, some question the nature of the international system itself as being undemocratic and complicating conflict situations around the globe and the Horn of Africa as well. True to this logical deduction, democracy, be it as result of its

* International and domestic economic crisis cause conflicts. For instance, World War II considered a result of depressions of 1930s that was precipitated by ‘mercantilism’ and other structural/institutional/ rigidities in international system. In July, 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA, major global financial and development institutions were established. Their half a century preoccupation has been restructuring political and economic structures internationally and locally. The belief behind such moves is avoiding conflict: the ‘freedom from want doctrine’ of the Roosevelt/Truman era foreign policy objective, pronounced to be, to put developing countries on the road to peace and development. But later, the infamous SAP (Structural Adjustment Programmes) have their own effects on peace problems, as entrenchments constituted a source of discord. The Horn of Africa has experienced economic and social upheavals that are attributable to institutional and structural problems. The evidence is that recently 14 million people need direct food supply, according to UNFP, estimates.14 (Alan Thomas x Ed, 2000.p293), and (Ethiomedia: September, 2008, for last figure)
inherent nature, at global level or within states is regarded by some theoreticians as fictitious and a myth itself.

The attempts to impose this on different cultures, as we see in theocratic establishments, have become causes of resentment and revolt. The very idea of democratic governance as egalitarian is challenged as being a myth, this is because of the apparent fact ‘elites rule, either as an inevitable and desirable feature of social existence or as remediable and regrettable one’.15

So international exporting of democracy becomes problematic as it has self defeating practices of ‘double standard’ according some viewers. For instance, the grievance of classical theoretician on ‘democracy’ is found in the literature of Vilfrado Pareto (1876-1936) and Gaetano Mosca (1857-94). For them, ‘democracy was no more than a foolish delusion, because political power is always exercised by a privileged minority: then called ‘elites’. Pareto suggested: a cohesive minority will always be able to manipulate and control the masses, the qualities needed are that of a psychological nature that were similar to the views reflected also in Machiavelli’s letter to a prince – the ‘prince’. C. Wright Millis’s account of the power structure in the USA: Power Elite (1956) offered a portrait of a USA dominated by a nexus of leading groups, such as defence-related industries, the military, the political clique surrounding the president Making Liberal Democracy a ‘sham’ in which other actors have marginal influence.16 Even though his argument is contestable in light of some nature of ‘democracy’, it has damaged its reputation that entailed resistance for its exportation.

The attempt by intervening actors in the international arena and especially in Muslim dominated cultures has become a source of friction and conflict. Some frustrated societies by the elitist nature of democracy have resorted to ‘Fundamentalism’ as a defence to its expansion. Today’s conflict in Somalia is not an exception to this trend. Sheik Amhed Awyes, leader of the radical Islamic Courts Union, in a BBC interview once said; ‘democracy is not working and we don’t want democracy’. Sedimentation of the above stated factors as causes of conflict have a bearing on the case of the Somali peace problem. As regards conflict with the ICU, who have managed to eradicate warlords
within a short period of time and put up a religious police-state, their demise was induced externally triggering the worst humanitarian crisis after their downfall. Among the contributing factors to the current complicated conflict is the international intervention that emanated from either regionally or universally sanctioned resolutions. Therefore, this essay sees the importance of making a connection between the above reviewed points with the crisis in Somalia.

An understanding of foreign policy that dictates international cooperation cannot be seen separately from the process that makes it. Pertinently, the following part casts some light on the models of decision making generally, and the way polices are formed for intervention in the Somalia Crisis and the Horn of Africa.

2. Models of International Decision making and Crisis in Somalia

The proper scrutiny of the complexity of the crisis in Somalia and its regional and universal implications is better understood, in view of this research, through a comparison of the ways decisions are made at the source of international cooperation.

Andrew Heywood listed four models of decision making – Rational Actor model, Incremental Model, Bureaucratic Organisation model, and Belief system model. According to his explanations, the ‘Rational Actor Model’ is the process whereby decisions are based on ‘cost benefit’ calculations. It is related to the idea of Anthony Down’s (1957) public choice theory in economics. It tries to approach problems objectively in order to have the right policy output. Hence, the process should include for this model, problem identification, goal or objectives setting, and means are selected with their merits of advantage and disadvantages or ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’. On the other hand, in the Incremental Model, as an alternative to the ‘rational actor model’, decisions are made within the context of inadequate information and a low level of understanding, which discourages (foreign or international) decision makers from pursuing bold and innovative courses of action. As this theory seems pertinent to the case study, it is relevant to look at it further. David Bray Brooke and Charles Lindblom(1963) termed this theory- as quoted by Woods, as ‘Disjointed incrementalism’ or as Lindblom put it ‘the science of muddling through’. According to them, policy making process would become ‘a continuous exploratory process: lacking overriding (principles)
goals and clear cut ends, policy makers tend to operate within an existing pattern or framework, adjusting themselves in the form of feedback about the impact of their decisions. It suggests the ‘strategy of avoidance’ or ‘evasion’, policy or decision makers being inclined to move away from problems rather than trying to solve them.\textsuperscript{18}

Why the US couldn’t react immediately to the advent of the Union of Islamic Courts as a terrorist organisation in the initial months was a lack of information. At a later stage, the decisions which came under such conditions stacked, owing to still another lack of information as some argue (but the relation to this models and the facts on the ground would be explored later). Again, the narrow ‘counter terrorism’ as a primary agenda, than a broader solution to peace problems in Somalia and the sub region at large, is explained partly by the art of ‘meddling through’ wedded with the approach of ‘evasion’ of protracted engagement that involves the venture of overhauling the whole system, in Somalia a task no altruism finds it appealing.

The other theory of decision making, a ‘belief system model’ focuses on the role of ‘belief’ and ‘ideology’ on policy’s outcome and its process. It explains the degree to which ‘behaviour’ is structured by ‘perception’. In this analysis, what decision-makers understand is what their concepts and values allow, or encourage them, to see and understand. It is entrenched because policy makers do it unconsciously. Although they believe they are rational, rigorous and strictly impartial but their values act as a filter defining for them what is desirable and thinkable, etc.\textsuperscript{19} Within this line of thinking, Robert Jervis (1968) brought the issue regarding misperception on the part of decision-makers into international affairs, and the tendency of ethnocentrism as well.\textsuperscript{20} He cited the instance of Anthony Eden and the UK government to view General Nasser as a ‘Second Hitler’ during the 1956 Suez Crisis.\textsuperscript{21} In modern times, misperception occurs that is why one could observe, in the same country protecting the same nation and its interest, citizens differ in perceiving threats. The ‘Democrats’ and ‘Republicans’ sometimes don’t have similar perceptions of threats in the USA, or the Ethiopian public and the ones in government power don’t see threats in the same way, though they belong to the same territorial entity. Hence, belief system of the ones in power is more dictating than what actually is, causing resentments by itself and complicating issues in conflict situations.
In recent times, treating ‘Saddam as a terrorist’ rather than as a ‘dangerous dictator’ is the issue that relates decisions which are explained by this model. The same is true with the positive image and perception taken vis-à-vis Gaddafi—after he agreed to handover the ones accused of the Lockerby bombing, and renounced his ambition on the weapons of mass destruction. There seems little attention to him as ‘terrorist’ that paved the way for a flow of investment from Europe and American Trans National Companies; it was a result of perception that has already changed on the part of international decision making bodies. Likewise the catagorization of Islamic Courts Union as terrorist groups associated with value-based perception, of influential international actors, and exclusions made along those lines toughts.

A detailed account of how entrenched values of an organisation impacts on content and the process of decisions is explained in the next example. However, before moving to that it is pertinent to relate the above theory to the ground. International decisions are influenced by belief systems of decision makers as is clearly demonstrated in the case of Somali’s Islamic Courts Union. This would be seen in detail when the research deals with the issue of image and perception about these forces and how it affected the international cooperation in its efforts for peace creation.

‘Bureaucratic organisation’ model was different from the above models; and as Andrew Woods puts it, it is not ‘inside the black box’ decision making, but rather it is to show how process impacts on decision itself. The noted theoretician in this regard was Gram Allison who, after studying the USA’s decision making 1997, came up with the idea that ‘values’ of decision makers entrenched cultures of a government department or agency that make them impacting the decision itself. For example, even though the congress decides on certain human right issues and the executive to adhere to the ideal of America as noble state that should lead by example (Wilson), the bureaucracy may not implement it exactly in conformity with those values using its discretions. The problem associated with this kind of ‘group think’ is discrepancies exist between professed values and their implementation on the ground. The bureaucratic model refutes the fact that states are ‘homogenous entities’. The US involvement in Chile in the 1970’s, as critics had it, was against the democratically elected government, and similar symptoms of the views of different state apparatuses and their
independent actions gives the impression that every action taken outside of a given state is not the reflection of the nation’s position.

The views held by international community against Somalian Islamic Courts Union (ICU) do not necessarily reperesent the popular views or the views of majority of policy makers, but the views and values of most powerful organs in the decision making: like in CIA, Pentagon, State Department, etc. which are formalized through the legislature and beraucracy.

The action of powerful agencies within a state may not be changing as fast as change of administrations as well, as it is entrenched in certain organisation’s values that overstay the term of office of elected government giving it the leverage to do according to the established traditions of the bureaucratic organisations. There should be no wonder if the international community’s strong commitment to ‘allies’ continues in the Horn of Africa for sometime - unless a huge crisis erupts to induce new ways owing to values of organisations that make foreign policy. The shift of policy in the Horn of Africa by the incoming American administration is faced with overcoming the entrenched values of the powerful apparatuses of United States Government to represent new direction of peace creation in the region. One can note, the clash between the value that the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) stood for and the values of ,above mentioned agencies, international decision making had determined the fate of these groups.

Remarks on part one

The international cooperation in peace creation in the Horn of Africa in general and dealing with the Somalia crisis in particular is complex with its own paradoxes. It would be futile to attempt to get the ‘silver bullet theory or model’ that could shoot the troubles of easy comprehension: of how the interventions are motivated, executed, and even predicted. This partly emanates from the highly pragmatist nature of international cooperation and the fast changing international climate. Moreover, the ‘inside of the black box’ of decision making is normally inaccessible and is not an open system as states and different actors interact as closed entities influencing each other from the outside, making international relation highly dynamic that needs to be studied day by day.
The previous chapters attempted to shed light on the major theories of conflict, and even though understandable theories exist as guiding principles, the behaviour of international actors cannot be explained by their professed affiliation to certain ideals alone, spiralling the issue to another level of argument or perspective that constitutes the motives for looking into the decision making process as done above. Conducting routine ‘acupuncture’ on the spinal system of the international policy-making process seems the quick remedy to the ailment of peace in geographical place in question. This would be further investigated in close setting with the actual case studies, but the research has put problems associated with decisions also as a factor to help in resolving part of the puzzles in the whole paradox.

Conflict resolution, management and its resolutions can be made easy when causes of conflicts are known, despite the drive for good result being there, all actors involved in the region don’t have uniform perceptions, making resolutions difficult; ‘defining the problems’ are by themselves the points of departure of all the resolutions efforts. In getting the grasp of causes, the research learns from literature review and information inputs that actors with a similar theoretical or value framework define causes of conflict in Somalia according to their affiliations creating the common languages between them as indicated a kind of ‘group thinking’ formation. Here was observed the existence of a vertical solidarity (example between Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Ethiopia as a major regional player and the US and the UN on one hand; ICU, Eritrea, Syria, Iran, etc on the other).* Unfortunately, despite the strong attachment these actors might have to their perception and theories, it has little impact on solving the problems of peace in the region. For that,

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* Exclusive UN report on 12, November 2006, stated there was a ‘web of nations’ involved in Somalia’s current conflict, backing either to the ICU or TFG. Routers reported, based on such information the UNSC passed a resolution naming countries that transgressed the 1992 Arms embargo on Somalia. Eritrea, Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran, etc were on the ICU side; while Ethiopia, Uganda, and Yemen were supporting the Transitional Government of Somalia. The later group worked closely with the UN and the US along the official line with the backing of most regional intergovernmental bodies like: IGAD, AU, etc.
identifying the problem itself influenced by vested interests of the international actors and major players in the region of the case study. Hence, understanding the deep-rooted causes of conflict and the particular problems of peace in the Horn of Africa is indispensable, but making the venture value free is both a challenge and prerequisite to peace creation.
PART II

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ISLAMIC COURTS UNION (ICU),
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS AND
IT'S IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE

Chapter 2
The ‘Genesis’ of the Somali Islamic Courts Union (ICU)

2.1. Background

Somalia is commonly regarded as the most homogenous society in terms of religion, language, culture and broader ethnicity. The people of Somalia who share their country with 10% Bantu and Arab population (Gelawdios Araja: 2006) are known for their ascription to the liberal – Sunni Islam. In late 1980s and early 1990s, clan-based political participation was evident. The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the United Somali Front (USF), the United Somali Party (USP) and coalition of other 10 political parties, the United Somali Congress (USC), were cited as major players at that time.24

After the fall of Said Barre, 12 out of 16 political formations supported Ali Mahadi who proclaimed himself the president of Somalia in 1991.25 The rest aligned to Farah Aided, who later clashed militarily with United Nations Peacekeepers and the international community in the first humanitarian intervention in the country. The fratricidal war that crippled the nation started during these power struggles leading the conflict into its own turn and bounds.

Initially, the fight was directed against dictatorship with the spirit of democratisation being the central goal, then the ugly struggle for power and dominance became wedded with clan politics. The country becomes an ‘aborted leviathan’ owing to the lawlessness and the advent of rule of
warlords effectively making Somalia an ‘ungovernable chaotic entity’.

The quest for durable peace continued to these days by the international community, the people of Somalia and regional actors as well, yet it did not descend. The challenges of the 21st century have also twisted Somalia’s crisis to an international level integrating it into one of the battle fields for the perceived threat of terrorism in the geo-political setting that is close to the trade route for various strategic commodities including oil. The Somali peace problem evolved from domestic recalcitrant politics to an international agenda when failed states became an automatic concern and objects of international relations. The absence of central authority and the ungovernability of the Somali territory makes it imperative to deal with it more as an international case than a domestic one because of the nature of present global security paradigms.

From among various crisis of Somalia, the ‘rise and fall’ of Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union was significant and provided ample ground for micro-analysis to draw lessons in international relations. The perception of the ICU as major players as the ‘new Taliban’, before they actually were, in the Horn of Africa gave the crisis an international dimension: the seemingly local conflict for power within Somalia to get prominence as ‘development that endangered global peace’ and the current international order. This was not without reason, Somalia lies on the major trade route along the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea corridor; that would affect the interests of other states.

Who are Somalia’s Islamic Courts Unions? How did they manage to control power in the ungovernable vacuum? Why they were feared? And to what extent they were capable of affecting international peace will be looked into greater detail as follows.

Dr. Peter J. Pham of George Madison University in his presentation before US’s Congressional Committee on Africa linked the advent of the ICU in Somalia as a ‘development of Fundamentalism’ in the Horn of Africa. He argued that ‘militant’ Islam was marginal in Somalia, but eventually the involvement of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and lately of Iran has paved the way for Somalia to be open to fundamentalist ideology. For this he accuses the establishment of an Institute of Islamic Studies run by an Egyptian scholar from Cairo in Mogadishu who brought the Arabic language and curriculum into contact with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan al
Muslimin). The Egyptian organisations are regarded by many as emphasising a strict activism socio-political dimension of change. Pham relates the development in Somalia with that of Sudan with the emergence of Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood in 1970’s which gave birth to the party that is in power in Sudan. In 1970’s, according to his explanation, the Somali Islamic Brotherhood was visible, however, Said Barre forced it to go underground. Then it coalesced into two groups: The Somali Islamic Movement (Al-Islah) founded in Saudi Arabia 1978, and the Somali Islamic Union (Al-Itihad 1970s). Both sought ‘Greater Somalia’ and ‘political union involving Muslims in the Horn of Africa’ Al-Itihad, in 1991 after the collapse of Zaid Barre, found itself in conflict with Farah Aideed and, being defeated by it, went to Ethiopia, as his narration went.

Al-Itihad (which operated from Ethiopia basing itself in Ogaden, in the eastern part of Ethiopia, and in Somali refugees) was active with another domestic secessionist movement, the Ogaden National Liberation Front, ONLF. This was with the knowledge of the current government of Ethiopia, which by then was supporting this group with a view to mobilise support against domestic opposition for its agenda; some were allocated government posts in Ethiopia.

Peter J. Pham argues: the violence, chaos, dictatorship all contributed to the degeneration of Somali’s social fabric to allow Islamism as an ideological force. The other factor for the inception of extremism cited was the return of Saudi educated elites who brought with them ‘whabisim’ making ‘fundamentalism’ no more an ‘alien’. The other factor being the proliferation of Saudi Affiliated Charity organisations at its root and local agent, blamed by the analysis under scrutiny, was Al-Itihad. The need for securing the environment for businessmen’s interests created the condition for support for this group.

In general the main theme of this school of argument about the genesis of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia was that ‘the chaotic situation across the entire former Somali Democratic Republic (with the exception of Somaliland) created the precondition for the advent of the Islamists of Al-Itihad Al Islamia, which are the present day ICUs. Some dispute this assertion, as it would be seen later, and consider Al-Ithad as obsolete and defunct in the late 1990s having nothing to do with the latest ICU, except that a few persons were involved. But the assertion of Pham, representing a major theoretical ‘block’ on this live debate, makes the analogy that in the same way that the Taliban of
Afghanistan arose out of the country's anarchy as a force for order amid factious leaders and repressive militias 1990-1995, the ICUs gained ground and popularity for taming anarchy. The argument depicts the linkages discussed in the theoretical part of this research in a magnified manner between 'value'-perceptions'-decisions' and their implications for conflict resolutions in the current Somali crisis.

The other side of the story emphasizes that Somalis, in their traditions, have used Islamic courts for resolving community conflicts. Some argued that the ICU is not a new phenomenon, but rather the way they were projected by regional competitive actors. In 1996 under the pretext of bombing in remote regions of Ethiopia, Al-Ithad was attacked at its base and they disbanded themselves and gradually disappeared. This Al-Ithad group were blacklisted for the assassination attempt that they were accused of making against one Ethiopian government official in Addis Ababa. Abdul Majid Hussein.* As it can be deducted from interview of Herman Cohen, former Undersecretary for African Affairs, in the State Department, the 'Ethiopian government is feeding false information to advantage its own position in the region'. 22

Based on such assessment, it appears the regional players like Ethiopia must have used its vertical solidarity with the international decision makers to have effectively tinted the leadership of Al-Ithad Al Islamia because of the personal animosity they developed with players in the Horn of Africa. What Peter J. Pham puts forward as the background of the ICU is shared by regional actors like Ethiopia and the international community at large constituting the 'dominant group-thinking', in justifications of international interventions in certain pragmatic ways. The assertions which carry the attempt of tracing their roots (of the ICU) as forces that evolved from Al-Ithad is considered equivalent to loading the group with baggage that carries criminal records.

The opposing view, however, treats the group as independent and recently formed as a result of the chaos and some compelling circumstances that created objective conditions for its creation. The

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* Abdul Majid Hussein, former Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation of Ethiopia, was a Somali that worked so hard for the secession of Ogden and operated for a long time as a dissident from Somalia proper and later got a Ministerial post when TPLF, the current ruling party of Ethiopia, assumed power.
formation of the ICU was a reaction to the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia by the diplomatic manoeuvring of a regional player like Ethiopia (Abdulqasim Salat Hassen)\textsuperscript{30}, hence the popular discontent about this development has a role in getting support for a coordinated set up in and around Mogadishu. The ‘Courts’, which by then, got stuck in squabbling and accusation with TFG, remained ‘low-key’ until-2004. The place where it was formed was its latest leader (Awey’s) hometown at Galgudua, central Somalia. After effectively sidelining the support for the TFG in and around Mogadishu, Sheik Shariff Sheik Ahmed became Somalia Supreme Council of Islamic Courts’ leader (SSCIC). The TFG on the other hand suffered divisions giving impetus to the strength of courts union. The SSCIC used Islamic faith more to reconstitute and facilitate the unity of Somalis, as it has become the easiest unifying factor across clan and political divide. The Somalis who longed for peace finally appear to have it in 15 years, according to some commentators.

As it can be observed from the above explanations, there are two lines of characterisation as their genesis is concerned. The first explanation, which is resonating widely, seems to represent views held by effective executives of the major international decision makers and players in the peace creation in Somalia, the USA, i.e. by the State Department, the Pentagon, the Intelligence community, and regional powers like Ethiopia and other ‘Realist’ theoreticians and think-tank groups. They trace the roots of the ICU to that of Al-Ithad Al-Islamia that was accused for a number of assassination attempts and accused and linked to bombings in East Africa going back to the 1990s. This is not with out reason as it gives credence to the labelling of the group as extremists that engaged in terrorist activities. That includes the US embassy bombings, and attacks on Israeli interests in Mombassa, Kenya, etc. This view gives much emphasis on certain individuals who are fewer in number than the whole members of the courts union obscuring the real nature of the organisation that could have benefited from a ‘leap of faith’ towards the group on the part of the International community.

The alternative to this view is supplied by Matt Bryden, a consultant in the International Crisis Group. He projects the Islamic Courts Union as ‘having a well thought out military strategy for taking control and stabilising the chaos-ridden nation’\textsuperscript{31} According to this assertion development of
the ICU and their strength emanated domestically through cumulative military victories scored on war lords, once favoured by the CIA, and each time they secured victory over militias loyal to war lords, they not only acquire heavy weapons and vehicles of the enemy, but also ensure that their forces attain military dominance in an area. He portrays them as potent powers that maintain a low profile but are able to respond rapidly to any threats. 32

The realist international decision makers have criticised this view that gave a ‘human face’ to Islamists. Ethiopia even expressed its anger over the ICG with the ministry of foreign affairs press statement depicting how touching the view was to the ‘vertical solidarity’ that exists between domestic and international players making, by posing a challenge that might dislodge model of case building against ICU. However, the normative perspective on this issue, true to its idealist principles that reflect the moral responsibility, put forward the need to implement democratic ideals at global stage, even in Somalia, whether it results with some actors coming to power which are not favoured by great powers.

The balancing view described the ICU as non-vindictive and embracing fighters that surrender. The court system as it is embedded in the Somali clan-based jurisprudence – in 1994, a similar type of Courts structure was set up in Northen Mogadishu; another, the Bleled Weyene court initiated in 1996. However, the current ICU evolved though 1998-2000—being established through union clearly departing from ‘realists’ assertions which traces the roots of the ICU to late 1980’s and early 1990s, dislocating the case building put forward by the realist view about international intervention in the Horn of Africa. Different locally operating courts that were more or less functioning as separate entities formed this new ICU, according to the assessment of ICG scholars. 33 Owing to the prevailing situations, the courts sensed the relevance of working together through joint committee concerning local security. The four courts that decided the formation of the joint committee for domestic security purpose were: Ifka Halan, Circolo, Warshadda and Hararyaak. 34 Their goals were to harmonise their security activities to exchange criminals from different clans to integrate their militias. The ICU leader Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys is regarded as a pioneer of this process of courts integration.
After the courts took several measures that won the hearts and minds of the Somali public, such as helping the needy, cleaning the streets, punishing criminals, even fighting sea pirates, they tried to get a good perception by the domestic and international community. The courts, nonetheless, used 'sharia and 'alshurea'/megli al/ for decisions on crimes and judgement. Some regarded the courts union as a mere domestic force that evolved through its own trails, and could not have the capacity to export their beliefs to the region at that moment, let alone the whole of the former Somalia Republic. Even if they were fundamentalist, they were not the only ones as friendly countries like Saudi Arabia and others are the source of 'wahabism' and extreme Islamic ideology, and it officially beheads persons in public.

The seemingly small incident between the Mogadishu warlord, Bashir Raghe, in which Bashir devastated one of the businessmen who supported the ICU, then he declined to give back confiscated properties. This triggered the war between the war lords and the ICU whose victory over the war lords gave the ICU an impetus to become a real force. Motivated by such a windfall advantage, they started to envision a Somalia under their domination. The ICU are a small group of Somalia business and clan leaders that used traditional methods to resolve conflict and started to stabilise almost all of South Western Somalia. Most of their advances were without bloodshed as they relied on convincing the public to understand their missions, they welcome the warlord militias to put down their arms and join hands, most did and jumped on the band wagon without a problem, therefore, their organisational strength was not military alone but the reputation they built in the Somalia public and the support they got. Some also put the fact that the military capability of the ICU, whose number of soldiers does not exceed ten thousand, have no ability to destabilise the whole region and become the threat for global peace. If this is the reality, then what made international cooperation take positions against these small forces in its well-mean't mission of creating peace and putting the area 'under effective democracy'? The answer to this question will include the issue of image crisis in which the ICU found itself, which deserves to be seen in better detail as follows.
2.2. Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union: ‘Thalibanism’ and ‘image bankruptcy’

‘The moderates in the ICU expressed a willingness to communicate and perhaps cooperate with the US. Washington seems to lack both the will and the way to do so’, said Stanley A. Weiss in his article and report under the title, Somalia: old nightmare, new danger which was posted in the International Herald Tribune of Nov. 24.2006.36

The temporary pose on the US stand and even by the international community at large when the ICU was galvanising support and gaining momentum could be explained by the decision-making channel and the way formal positions are held on the issue in the US. It appears, even though the US doesn’t have any readily available information about the ICU as they are new developments, it has to wait for the positions of regional allies like Ethiopia to provide sufficient detail. ‘The US under secretary for African affairs admitted the problem of getting information as there is no diplomatic representation in Somalia the US has to seek the cooperation of other regional countries for ‘intelligence sharing’, this has been further confirmed by the speech of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia during his presentation to parliament that the cooperation with the US is mainly on information sharing on the issues. Therefore, by the time the ICU gave out their offer for cooperation with the international community and the US for cordial relations, it got the cold shoulder. That possibly emanated from US misguided involvement in supporting the warlords and the way they were defeated, however, the ICU did not use so much force to defeat them, the problem is part of the nature of ‘Maficary’, the warlords betrayed the CIA and most of them surrendered to the ICU, burning the hand of international cooperation once more. However, the way these new forces conducted themselves was acceptable for the Somalia public, that should have been picked up.

Clandestine CIA support for warlords blamed for galvanising support for them, moreover the presence of the Ethiopian troops in Baidoa, the former seat of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, all contributed to the complication of the problem and made solutions difficult.37 In the
early stages, the US’s position was aloof to the bones of contention between Ethiopia, the TFG and
the ICU, even advising the former not to get drawn into the conflict so much. However, the fast
movement and series of victories for the ICU made things get serious; Ethiopia wanted to remove
these forces by all means.

One of the challenges that the ICU faced was the concerted international and regional media attack,
including interviews given to them for further spins and misinformation where they were not
prepared and experienced in managing information, their statements contributing at times to the case
building against them. The first six months of their existence (June –November, 2006) was the time
the media played a greater role in establishing the image as extremists that could bend on
‘terrorism’, of this group at international level. The regional powers, such as Ethiopia, used its
government-owned information outlets to give the name for ICUs as the ‘New Taliban in the Horn
of Africa, officials started to give interviews that could be easily quoted by the international media
which are determinant to the image of these powers. They were categorised as a new danger in the
‘fight against terrorism’. This was partly justified by the metaphor, ‘Somalia lawlessness being used
for planning the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in 1988, and for the attack on
Israeli Tourists in Mombassa, Kenya in 2002’. It was claimed that it had been the refuge for suspects
in the 2000 attack on the US destroyer Cole in nearby Yemen.38

Hence, already by this time their image had received the verdict that ‘the leaders of the ICU were in
the lists of US wanted men’. However, most could not understand that if Somalia’s lawlessness was
the breeding ground for ‘terror’, it could be inferred that they were doing a good job of stabilising it,
which according to this logic should deny that chance for ‘terror’.

The propositions that ‘chaotic entities like Somalia are a safe haven for terrorists’ is contestable for
some argue that ‘terrorists as observed by the network of the ones involved in the 9/11 attack,
the latest discovery of the involvement of professionals like ‘doctors’ in Europe, are well-educated
and middle class that have dissent life style and even stable families. Hence, they need a safe and
stable country like any other person which could be a guarantee for their underground work and to
hide with reliable partners when they have problems, making the metaphor that ungovernable
chaotic entities would be a safe haven for terrorists ‘a myth’ which confuses ‘crime’ with
‘terrorism’. Therefore, Somalia by the measurement of this outlook is not appealing for terrorists as anybody who needs money could hand them over to the international community to get the bounties that the ‘CIA’ and Interpol put on their head.

The argument, which labelled ICU as completer terrorists, is devised by regional states to get better attention and support from the international community by deliberately propagating the strategic significance of the Horn of Africa. This is what is discussed in the theoretical part that some conflicts are created to get attention from donor agencies. The image manipulation of the ICU by neighbouring countries was aiming at this ‘track two’ package of assistance to stabilise the region. According to Jendai Frazer’s statement, the US spent 85 million in 2006 to fight extremists surrounding the ICU that included support for war lords, Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries like Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and the TFG.39 The real issue, some argue, is about getting the bigger share between players. That made the regional peace at stake and projecting the ICU as ‘terrorist group’ as the latest fashionable agenda that drew the attention of the international community. Some calculated risk and military incursions were affordable, by regional governments, compared to the aid that would flow, as is well stipulated in the ‘causes of conflict’ section of this research. This would not be possible unless the ICU are portrayed as threats to international peace, ICU become the escape goats, as most analysts saw it. Regarding this, Matt Bryden again said:

If the international community acquiesces and approaches this problem as another war on terror, that will become a self-fulfilling prophecy’ (40)

That means that if the ICUs are misunderstood, it had partly to do with the image crisis created by themselves, and by the deliberate manipulation of information about these forces by the powers in the region to best serve their own vested interest. Another point was put forward this way:

‘I Think the US government panicked, they saw an Islamic group; they said, ‘the Taliban is coming’, said Herman Cohen, former Undersecretary of State for African Affairs in his interview with Margaret Warner of PBS. He continued, ‘...also, there are friends in the region, like the Ethiopian Government, who probably are feeding false intelligence about terrorists being hidden...that sort of thing...so they want to keep the Islamic(Courts) out of power, and for that they will bring the US into it,’(posted on Ethiomedia, by Haile Kassahun :Out Sourcing the Somalian war,
November 26, 2006

The election of Aweys, who is still accused of involvement in the attack on US interests, (by some media reports, still this might be the result of deliberate labelling in previous times and he himself requested an independent international enquiry about this case and expressed a willingness to be investigated) has created an indisputable image problem for the courts. Even though Sheik Aweys is dependable for Somalia interests, by the view of ordinary people that supported ICU and experienced peace for first time in their towns, he could have played it low key in such a situation, (not to mention that the international community was demanding the handover of ‘Terrorists’ which made solutions difficult.)

The issue is complicated because of the fact that some of the members of the ICU were part of the Kenya/Nairobi peace process and have adversaries who, any time, internationally criminalise them not to get foreign assistance by the west. The middle men of the region tarnished the image of the ICU easily since 1991 as they have been already criminalised since 1995, all involves their engagement against Ethiopia, though. The international intervention has been criticized for creating ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ despite the facts on the ground favoured the new forces. The ICU were exposed as soft targets for a huge and sophisticated ‘anti-terror’ propaganda establishment, which is famous for crumbling the ‘Iron curtain’ during the Cold War. Providing a debilitating blow to the image of a ‘weak formation’ like the ICU was easy for these establishments so as to render them powerless inside Somalia.

Image crisis can be seen resulting from two angles: first, news sources, self-motivated and out of its own genuine concern about the need to ‘blow’ issues and inform the public and policy makers about terror spots as its responsibility; second, the other angle is the news channels themselves become the target of some powerful actors for their promotion of pre-set objectives, hence feed the media ‘processed’ information, that involved both the local and international media. Some state players in the Somalian conflict used fear-tactics to disseminate information about the ICU. The research observed that even the most powerful medias didn’t put up news cast with out a frightening tag on it that undermined the image of the ICU’s at international level. (This will be investigated in the role of the media in detail).
The Ethiopian government that played a major role, according to most analysts, to discredit the ICU have perfected the tactic of ‘image building’ as they are positively regarded as an ‘ally in the fight against terrorism’. The main reason for the first gesture from the ICU for partnership with US did not work, as a result of the ‘entrenched’ misinformation network between regional powers and the International community, as disputed by the ICG.

The research also understands the fact that the ‘selection of Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, as head of the Ifka Halane Court of the Habr Gidir/Ayr as the chairman of the new councils’ legislature’ of the ICU was the most disastrous for them in terms of image – their inability to dissociate themselves from such persons was a ‘coup-de-grace’ supplied to their image by their own actions.

The image problem effectively denied the ICU a right to evolve as Somalia’s legitimate authority. The internal power balance was upset by international cooperation as it was solely favouring the power which has the support next to none within the Somalia public i.e. the TFG. The genetic modification of power in Somalia by the international community is the core of the peace problem in present day Somalia, which was precluded by the image crisis of the ICU*.

Mr. Sherman, in the US Congressional Committee for Africa, asked the following, if the blame on the ICU was actual: ‘the ICU have an important role before and after the attacks on the USS Cole and US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, have we listed the ICU as a terrorist organisation or have we listed any of the constituent Islamic Courts as a terrorist organisation? 42 The answer to this

*As explained at the beginning of this report, ICG explains, the composition of the ICU was openly admitted to be from local people who had a vested interest in peace, as most of them were for ‘stability’. The initiative to exchange criminals among themselves was challenged by warlords, the victory of which gave Islamists powers to reckon with. Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was part of this process, was spotted as a weak link to label the Courts Union. Unlike the conventional wisdom, the courts structures between 2005 and 2004, their membership rose to 11. Most operated as normal peace and order structures, in the ungovernable chaotic situations in most parts of Somalia.43 (The Ethiopian factor In Somalia’s Crisis; Article posted by ICG, on 05/12/2006)
question given by Dr. Jendaiye Frazer, Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, was ‘No’. Therefore, one can infer from this fact that the problem of the ICU might be that of a ‘diplomacy’ and public relations fiasco as they did not address the blame against them since its start and they were the underdogs compared to their Ethiopian and other neighbouring countries that were involved to win the hearts and minds of the international decision makers.

They have, however, the support of the Somali public behind them and that is a powerful element for the future struggle; they have started to garner nationalism already perusing insurgency, therefore, the demise of the ICU is not the end of their story rather the beginning of another conflict in the Somalia Liberation Struggle against international occupation.

Apart from the media’s role and their image crisis, there are other factors that made the ‘little empire of the Islamic Courts Union crumble, why this was so? How was its relation with TFG characterised?

What was the role of regional powers like Ethiopia in this process, the al-Qaeda connection and the military incursions that took place and others will be examined in the next chapter to see the decline of the ICU.

Chapter Three
The Demise of Somalia’s Islamic Court Union

3.1. Its Adversity with the Transitional Federal Government
Following the peace agreement between various warring factions in Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government was established, in Kenya January 2004. Attempts were made to make it have representation based on the ethnic resemblance model, in which a cross-section of actors were invited. Ahmed Abdulahi Yusuf, former factional leader from Punt land, was sworn in as new president of the Federal Republic of Somalia. He is equally criticised by Dr. Pham for the alleged assassination attempt on Somaliland’s President, and still argued against him as another terrorist
president, and Ali Mohamed Gedi became its Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{46}

The Transitional Federal Government has a parliament of around 274 representatives, some of its members are from the ICU or factions that defected from it.\textsuperscript{47} The scenario that pro-Ethiopian actors have the upper hand on the way the TFG constituted to serve the interest of Ethiopia made members of parliament and even the public reject the TFG as a puppet of Ethiopia and the International community. The labelling of the ICU as extremists stems from the fact that they refused to accept the legitimacy of the TFG in Somalia. Relocating it from Nairobi to the capital Mogadishu became difficult because of the squabbles between the two over the role of neighbouring countries, hence the polarised environment was created. Failing to shift to Mogadishu, the TFG constituted itself in a sympathetic location in Northern Somalia at Bidaa.

Ethnic politics as it is a contagious (element) and divisive factor that has roots in the influential country of the game, Ethiopia, also become problematic in Somalia’s new government formation. The division went as far as clan - sub clan lines instead of their agenda for the resurrection of Somalia as a sovereign entity. The TFG despite the existence of some individuals – excluded the dominant Hawiye clan from its summit and based itself on the Darood clan. Hence, from the beginning the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia was marred with divisions and conflicts. It is unpopular in Mogadishu and several of its representatives abandoned it. Sheekh Sharif Hassen Aden, speaker of the Parliament, was ousted because of his alleged link with the ICU, in January 2006.\textsuperscript{48}

More than 14 attempts to restore a functioning government in Somalia have failed.\textsuperscript{49} The formation of the TFG was the last one (AFP), but for the first time indigenous and organically evolved power was the ICU and its ability to control, through conviction and few coercive methods, the whole of South western Somalia was a unique development.

Bryn, the analyst in the International Crisis Group, emphasised the Ethiopian factor for the ‘TFG’ split in faction with ‘Mogadishu group’ headed by speaker of the House.\textsuperscript{50} All these factors put the ICU in a comfortable position vis-à-vis the Transitional Federal Government approval in the eyes of the Somali Public.
The other dimension, the formation of the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism, which brought embarrassment for US policy which was the result of a misleading regional advice, further weaken the neutrality of ‘international cooperation’ in the region. The warlords were defeated in lightning speed by the ICU forcing the other options to operate mainly the plan of ‘aggression by the Ethiopian government. On the other hand, the Islamic Courts Union braced themselves to launch a wider campaign for control of Somalia motivated by the euphoria after each and every victory. The Ethiopian government under its own terms within the framework of considering the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia as the sole legitimate government of the country, embarked upon fierce negotiation in Dubai, London, and Nairobi, finally Khartoum but failed to convince the forces as it has already taken side with the TFG for long time. 

This signalled that the ICU was not accepting the TFG as the Authority over the entire Somalia. The leader of the ICU demanded that foreign actors be neutral and keep their hands off the negotiation if it has to bear fruit, he was quoted by the BBC as saying that ‘let’s talk means let’s make peace. If we Somalis talk among ourselves, we make peace’ implying that the involvement of foreign elements didn’t help the process. The TFG met the US undersecretary for Africa, Dr. Jendaiye Frazer, in Nairobi, Kenya before they departed for the final negotiation in Sudan’s capital.

The failure of the Khartoum peace negotiation owing to lack of seriousness on the part of the TFG and the involvement of other powers on either side of the parties, and the deadlock on issues, such as the TFG asked the ICU not to expand its control over of territories, while the ICU demanded the immediate withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Baidoa, the base of the TFG. These situations made open military confrontation with the TFG an inevitable scenario. The attack, afterwards, on ‘Dinsor’ which was so close to Baidoa made the escalation a reality. 

The ICU ambushed the Ethiopian military vehicles killing a dozen soldiers, on a certain occasion they also advanced to the closest out posts to Baidoa, creating panic and a compelling situation for rescue efforts who recognised the legitimacy of the TFG.
The other problem which contributed to the decline of the ICU’s little empire was their alleged advance or claim over the relatively peaceful south eastern Somalia. The home of the present TFG president Abdulahi Yusuf, which is called Puntland- was claimed to be attacked by the TFG. The ICU had the plan of unifying Somalia, which was further interpreted as irredentism by other forces. The Islamic Courts Union have been accused of having claim over Somaliland, which using the chaos of 1991 declared independence after the fall of Zaid Barre, and its present leader, President Dahir Rayale Kahine, was a target of Abdualhi Yusuf as stated earlier.

All the above factors led to the survival of the ICU being problematic, however, nothing is more damaging than the claim that connected them with the ‘international terror network’ and the involvement of regional actors that determined, which had detrimental effect on the fate of the ICU. These will be looked into the next sub-sections.

3.2. Regional Involvement and the Al-qaeda Connection

‘The militia commander of the Islamic courts union, Adan Hashi Ayro*, is said to have taken training in Afghanistan with al-qaeda before returning to his country after 9/11. He is believed to have been a ‘cold blooded’ killer with a number of kills to his credits: Four foreign aid workers in Somaliland, an Italian nurse, Analiea Tonelli, (Borna, Somaliland, oct.03); British teachers Richard & Erina Eyeington, Oct. 21, 2003, and Kenya Florence Chamnly, etc. another Al Ithad Leader al-Takfir wal-Hiya a group which is so extreme that it wanted to kill Osama Bin laden, who was in Sudan by then, for being moderate, 1996’(Dr. Pham). The bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack against Israeli Tourists in Mombassa in 2000, and the attack on the US destroyer Cole, in nearby Yemen was blamed on Somalia as a base for planning the attack.(International Herald Tribune, Nov., 2006, Stanly A Weiss)

*Recently it is declared by media and regional government officials, that the ‘Ayro’ to have been killed by the US air strike on his hideouts inside Somalia.
Hence the UICC's (Union of Islamic Courts Councils) leader, sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, is wanted by the US for his ties to Osama Bin laden. Once the AFP quoted the Ethiopian prime Minister as saying: 'he is technically at war with the ICU and they are jihadists', however the opposing view comes from the Eritrean president, Isayas Afeworki — 'that the connection of the ICU with al-Qaeda is literally false'. (AFP, Addis Ababa), Gulf News – Ministry of Information.

The UK and the US are among the international community that played an important role in declaring Somalia a safe haven for terrorists linked to al-Qaeda. (John Nbaria, December 4, 2006: The Ethiopian factor in the Rise of Union of Islamic Courts).

The United Nations Commission on violation of the 1992 arms embargo on Somalia depicted that a network of different countries and armed groups was fuelling Somalia's conflict. (Reuters UK, B. Nov, 2006, a Web of groups, countries supplying weapons to Somalia.) The report was intended for presentation to the Security Council – Both the TFG and the ICU received significant quantities of armaments. The connection of the ICU is towards Syria, Eritrea, Iran, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia all sent either military personnel, weapons and supplies including food and medicine. Hezbollah is believed to have provided training for militias in Somalia. Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen have all sent weapons and military equipment to the Somalia Federal Government in Baidoa (UN Report).

The report further accuses of anti aircraft missiles, multiple rocket launchers and second generation infrared guided anti-tank weapons all designed to counter Ethiopia's military. (c. Bryson Hull, Reuters, UK, Nov. 2006). The Iran motive is considered to get Uranium for its nuclear ambitions and this report was compiled by Belgian experts, the US, Kenya and Colombia. Iran, according to this view, had a connection with the leader of the ICU in his hometown: 'at the time of the report's writing, there were two Iranians in Dusa Mareb engaged in matters linked to Uranium in exchange for arms'. (C. Bryson, Reuters, Nov., 2006). Somalia's TFG accused 'al-Qaeda of provoking an all out war' (Steve Bloomfield and Anne Pendeth, the Independent, Nov. 2006)
The Transitional Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said 'warning the Islamist forces in the country are receiving support from al-Qaeda' MFA of Somalia. He accused the UIC of bringing a large number of foreign fighters from al-Qaeda. They come by ship, they are from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Yemen, and Chechnya.

The other forces, 2000 Eritrean are believed to have been in Somalia. 'Eritrea has not been playing a constructive role in Somalia. They continue to fund, arm, train and advise the insurgents', Jendaiye Frazer, US Undersecretary of State. The ICU alleged links to al-Qaeda revolves around the claim by regional and international powers that three al-Qaeda leaders indicted in 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed of Comoros, who figured on the FBI's 'most wanted list'; Salah Ali Salil Nabham of Kenya, and Abu Taha al Sudani of Sudan are being sheltered there in Mogadishu. The accusation some made an analogy to the 'Iraqi's Weapons of Mass Destruction', but it is reality that it had serious consequences for the ICU's fate.

The ones who doubt the credibility of the claims on the ICU as a terrorist organisation wonder why the international community declined the gesture to have the inquiry about the case, and the ICU expressed readiness; the other puzzle was there was no terrorist arrested or confirmed dead, hence was it not better if the international community made the ICU a friendly entity to secure the arrest of the suspects than having an adversary approach. Some go as far as saying if the al-Qaeda elements are for sure believed to have been is Somalia before during the ICU rule, why something of the 'Entebbe raid' didn’t take place as these people are a real threat to international peace? This points to, according to viewers, a conclusion that, it is part of the case building, to avoid ICU as an undesired force in Somalia. The exponents of this idea, as expressed earlier, accuse that the international community was deliberately misinformed about the ICU. 'I am a Somali nationalist fighting for a free and united Somalia, and this is considered by the US administration to be terrorist'. (Sheik Aweys, leader of ICU) (Islamists in Somali alliance plan, 12 September 207, BBC News)

3.2.1. Ethiopia's Military Incursion in Somalia

Beginning from late December 2006, the talk of regional war as a consequence of the rise of the ICU in Somalia and the subsequent confrontation with the transitional Federal Government of
Somalia which was formed 2004 that has the backing of the international community, wrongly or rightly, became elevated.

TFG’s lack of ‘Somalia’s popular will’ on its side or the military muscle and the sacrifice that getting authority required, demand an extra boundary intervention. Being mindful of its vulnerable position in all its forms, or as a necessity for ‘imposed government, the TFG drew a National Security Plan (NSSP). And it was discussed in the highly polarised environment outside of and inside its structure, and the plans stipulated the need for Foreign Troops or international peace keepers’ to stabilize Somalia and to effect the relocation of the TFG which was formed in Nairobi to be erected in Mogadishu, the international troops requirement was 20,000 strong. This provided both a point of cooperation and conflict with the international community and regional powers.

Despite the fact that the document invited foreigners, it did not specify countries, hence, it is important to unlock the reasons why Ethiopia took military intervention in Somalia and its impact on the strategic positions of the ICU.

3.2.1.1. Causes of Ethiopia’s military involvement in Somalia

The views on the reasons of Ethiopian military incursion in Somalia are divided, as usual, along international theories line. Putting aside, conspiracy theory, the causes for Ethiopia’s action were explained by the current government of Ethiopia as follows.

Some would prefer to connect causes for the invasion to the historical relations of the two countries. However, the current confrontation has short range causes that appears to have no deep rooted reasons that is embedded in the history of the region. Most of all, until recently, Somalia had a friendly government in Ethiopia for the last 15 years. This partly could be explained by the fact that most of the politicians who are in power in Ethiopia were harboured by Zaid Barre in 1980’s to have a military operation against the former Ethiopian government even acclaimed the ambition of Zaid Bare on South Easter Ethiopia. This effectively undermines the attempt to relate the causes of invasion to the long past. In principle, the present government does not oppose the self determination of Ogden Region, if they wish to do so-the current constitution in Ethiopia, article 39,
provides that hence the fear of irredentism (by Meles and his groups) as reason of his invasion of Somalia is not a totally convincing reason, making the attempt to put the crisis in the historical context highly contestable.44

Nonetheless, the official reasons given for the invasion by the government of Ethiopia, were: 1) the accumulation of jihadist forces around the Ethiopian border; 2) the expansion of the ICU and their rise to power; 3) the responsibility of Ethiopia to play its part to relocate the TFG to Mogadishu; 4) the terrorist activities of Eritrea in the border and in Southern and their attack on cross border targets – the terrorist opposition groups like OLF and ONLF have used as spring board to attack Ethiopia.

‘There is a danger looming (in Somalia), the jihadists are massing their forces near our border’, Mr. Meles said, ‘if this activity continues, and if found to threaten our national security, then our defence forces will have the right and obligation to defend (the country).44

The accumulation of foreign jihads forces which includes Eritrean forces, by the time it was accused of having more than 2000 troops inside Somalia.45 At the height of the propaganda war between Eritrea and Ethiopia – the issue of Al Islam (which was active in the late 1990’s in the Ogden region of Ethiopia) is said to have resurrected itself and it has linkage with ONLF, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)*, they attacked in eastern towns and seen as the destabilisation of Ethiopia and this run against the ruling party’s core interest. As it was a threat that needs to be avoided by strong action.

* OLF, the Oromo Liberation Front, has been a secessionist movement inside Ethiopia that claims that ‘tyranny and dictatorships of successive regimes in Ethiopia have denied the democratic rights of the Oromo people, therefore, it argues for secession from Ethiopia. Most argue it has no historical, legal, and internationally acceptable justification for secession or absence of democracy. The issue of democracy could and must be addressed within the existing state structure. In the recent OLF split the pro-independence force have been sidelined and most of OLF members declared their commitment to solve the Oromo question within the Ethiopian state context. ONLF (Ogden National Liberation Front) is still a military active secessionist movement which wants to remove the whole of South-eastern part, where ethnic Somalis live, out of Ethiopian territory.
However, this was not the first time that Ethiopia militarily engaged Al-Ithad Al-Islamia; in 1996 it was claimed that this organisation made an assassination attempt on one Ethiopian official, Abdi Majid Hussein, who was ethnic Somali himself. As revenge to that attack Ethiopia destroyed the military base of Al Ithad Al-Islamia in Doulo, close to the Ethiopian border. Most analysts agree that this attack was a decisive blow to the survival of the group and forced it to disband itself. The claim that it exists in the ICU now, as explained earlier is debatable.

The ICU rise to power and their continued expansion was another reason. The Ethiopian government has objected to the rise of this group as illegitimate from the perspective of the African Union, and International Communities cooperation to solve Somali crisis. For them the only legitimate authority in Somalia is the TFG, which was created in Nairobi, Kenya, 2004. The UIC is therefore, a threat and unacceptable authority that falls outside of the comprehensive peace accord put forward by regional organisations at different times especially by IGAD and AU. Hence, Ethiopia as the immediate and most concerned nation about Somalia it took that the military advance and rise to power of ICU as an unacceptable development, and argued that it was contrary to the rules that formed the TFG, the US and the UN Security Council also recognizes the TFG. This, according to observers, is both the consequence of Ethiopia’s diplomatic campaign against the ICU and the reason for its military action.

Some prefer to see the reality differently as follows; the root cause of the conflict and military invasion is connected to Strategic factors. The Ethiopian Government, which is led by Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (the Core of Ethiopian Peolpes Revolutionary Democratic Front) is basically an ethnic minority in the estimated 70 million people of Ethiopia. It also went through the trauma of domestic upheaval following the brief ‘opening’ of democracy, after the 2005 election. The Ethiopian pro-democracy forces, with their peaceful struggle strategy, were not posing any military threat to the government, giving it a free hand to deal with the military oppositions that hide inside Somalia. The ICU’s coming to power will undoubtedly help the Ethiopian military oppositions by being a launching pad that could overthrow the Ethiopian minority government as it is sitting on a time bomb because of the controversy around the increasing dictatorship of the government. The pre-emptive strike against the ICU at their early stage is considered the best.
option, hence, whatever the ICU nature is, it will have little meaning to this reason as the Tegerean Peoples Liberation Struggle. The TPLF’s survival is dependent upon the control over Somalia that, otherwise, could provide a base for military opposition to the present Ethiopian government. The Prime Minister of Ethiopia, in his speech to parliament, indicated that the oppositions sheltered in Somalia will have military operations against Ethiopia if they are allowed to do so, the ICUs demise is vital to avoid the future threats to the TPLF power in the Horn of Africa.

Another explanation of the causes axioms the deep-buried case of animosity between competing regional forces and surrounding the border issue. Hence, as the conventional wisdom has it, Eritrea is involved in Somalia to stretch Ethiopia tin to pressurise its claim from the north. However, the issue of Eritrea to its relation to terrorism is more serious than that, some argue that the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front – EPLF has been historically involved in terrorist activities since its inception. It also ascribes to the Saudi’s Wahabism and became instrumental in making the Red Sea an Arab Sea by dismembering Eritrea and making it a member of the Arab League. Moreover, it was accused of using a terrorist means to come to power and even now, according to the state departments latest report regarded as a ‘mafaticratic’ terrorist state. Hence the claim that Eritrea only wants to get its border issue to be dealt with is not strong from this angle.

Eritrean presence in Somalia has without doubt motivated Ethiopia to have military operations as one reason, but the involvement of Eritrea can be explained in two ways: first, as is touched upon in the theoretical part, the reasons for conflict in the Horn of Africa (ideas on sources of conflict, Part one of this report), the motive is to get international attention. However, not to get aid from the West, as the two are at odds, but from the Arab world (probably as a defender of Islam) in the name of supporting the helpless ICU which represent ‘whabist’ interests, as explained by Dr. Pham, in the earlier chapter, Saudi Arabia being its ideological source. That will benefit the Eritrean government to get a huge flow of financial support. The subsequent flow of foreign jihadis, as it is accused by the international media, once again, Asmara not only has received the fleeing ICU authorities, but also a number of international terrorists in its country. Therefore, the Eritrean involvement, which is driven by the intention to get foreign aid, and the nature of the historical root of the government itself as a ‘vicious predatory’ political force that has destabilised the area for the last 40 years, has contributed to Ethiopian’s military actions in Somalia.
Ethiopia’s motive in Somalia is also partly explained by the above argument. It is keeping in mind the support of the International community in its venture in Somalia and it is a motivation by itself; while Eritrea is aiming for the Arab finance, Ethiopia is aiming at the IMF and World Bank’s loan as a reward for its role in Somalia, and at the US government budget, too. The immediate declaration of the WB to Ethiopia more than 228 million loan, even though there is a US legislature attempt to impose sanctions on Ethiopia for its human rights record and the attack on democratic forces at home (Bill 2003 at congress), after its role in rooting out the ICU in Somalia. This is a clear indication of the interplay of variables that are explained so far; the way decisions are made at an international level, the problem of double standards, the ‘phenomenon’ of networking with influential powers in the world, how it undermined good governance and accountability, which is also the precondition for our human security in the 21st century. As a result, how peace creation is getting tough, victimising the Pan-African agenda which dreams of a conflict-free and prosperous continent.

Idealists or pacifists object to any cause or explanation given by the Ethiopian government to invade Somalia as it will cause long-term problems on the regional peace, among these groups the majority of Ethiopian intellectuals and the public at large and the international think-tank groups like the ICG could be mentioned, whereas in the realist camp one can find the acceptance of the ‘right of Ethiopia to defend itself’ (its interest). Here it is consistent with their tendency for less emphasis on universal principles and laws (the sovereignty of Somalia has taken second degree positions, the US traditional inclination to the ‘underdog’ and the defenceless seems to have less significance in today’s pragmatism, which gave the green light to the Ethiopian mighty military to attack the ICU). One media outlet has asked ‘is the US becoming a rogue state?’ The tacit approval for the behaviour of the Ethiopian government in the case of the Somalia crisis is one factor that caused the flagrant invasion of Somalia irrespective of the principle of the UN charter over non-interference in domestic affairs, and respect for sovereignty of a nation be it alive or a ‘failed state’.

What happened then? Ethiopia, because of the above professed and implicit reasons, invaded Somalia through the cooperation of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and effectively controlled the capital Mogadishu in early January 2007. The victory took a one-week full-scale
invasion which was helped by heavy artillery, fighter jets, and ground troops. The unofficial 
estimate put the level of military personnel to be close to 50,000 troops. While Ethiopia claims it 
has 10,000 troops stationed in different parts of Somalia. The invasion also swept the ICU, and 
most of its militias were disbanded and went back to their clan base. Most of the leaders of this 
group fled Somalia in the face of huge advancing Ethiopian government forces. These are the hard- 
wear of the issued military action, but what are the soft-wear impacts of the invasion? The answer to 
this question will constitute the next part.

3.2.1.2. The impact of Ethiopia’s invasion on regional peace

Military deployment inside Somalia and the continued presence of these forces has far reaching 
consequences. These effects could be seen in light of the short and long term stability of the region 
and in relation to the international peace in general:

Short term impacts, as it is stipulated in the professed reasons for the military action by the 
Ethiopian authorities: it has removed the ICU from power in Somalia, it has relocated the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia from its besieged- Baidoa base to the Capital 
Mogadishu. The suspected presence of Ethiopia’s armed resistance groups like Ogaden National 
Liberation Front, The Oromo Liberation Front, the massive presence of Eritrean Troops have been 
either dismissed or their presence were imaginary, but the effect has been the whole territory is 
under Ethiopian forces, which logically denied room for these force; not much information on the 
number of causalities of these forces, or their massive arrest, or any form of comparison which 
casted the invasion was made. The al-qaeda elements, whose suspected presence triggered 
quabbles over the issue, were not found in their predicated conditions, but the Ethiopian force’s 
presence in Somalia will clear this fog and the argument that Somalia will be used by international 
terrorists will terminate (or it could be still converted to the claim of ‘guerrilla terrorists’ as the 
government of Ethiopia is ‘romanticising’ its fight against ‘terror’ as rewarding engagement, it 
prefers to catch the attention of big powers, as it is blamed).

The military operation could be considered successful as Ethiopian forces managed to control the 
last stronghold in Kismayu, and chased the ICU out of the country or forced them underground
making their visible operation come to an end. The Ethiopian government's interest i.e., removing the ICU from power and with it minimising the threat of armed opposition and disrupting the coming of strong power from the south has been well served.

From the concern of the international cooperation point of view, there is a division on the evaluation of the engagement of international actors in the episode. This divergent view on the achievements made in the interest of global peace and fighting terrorism is both at a domestic and multilateral level. In the US, as the 'group thinking' theory has it, nodded for the incursion, the department of State saluted the efforts of Ethiopia and took it as a step in undermining international terror in the Horn of Africa by denying them ground. However, this conclusion itself emanates from the original premises that there was 'al-Qaeda' in Somalia prior to the invasion. It is an acceptable scenario that having friendly governments in the area will help peace, but there is huge difference in installing the friendly government in the area when the objective conditions and the citizens from which it normally draws its legitimacy resist it as a 'stooge' and not serving their interests. The action which goes to the 'genuine' principles of 'Democracy' in every international intervention has a counter-productive effect. What helps al-Qaeda is the resentment of the people and the double standards, hence the conclusion that the presence of al-Qaeda is minimised in Somalia by the military action of Ethiopia, as Bryden Said, is still a self-fulfilling prophecy. The realist camp in this intervention, which approves the use of force to serve the interest of countries involved, like Dr. Phan- put forward a reservation on the idea of 'helping the TFG for the fact that it is rejected by the Somali public'.

The congressional Research Report, different specialists on interstate relation in the Horn, argued that the reason of engagement for international cooperation, in the military sense, and the implications that Somalia was a haven for terrorists was considered a flawed case that did not warrant the US' direct military involvement that included the air strike, the naval blockade, and support for Ethiopian forces, yet no concrete measurement is made explicit in terms of hitting the targets. All point to the fact that the US was used by the regional actors to their own advantage, including maintaining their power grip.
The invasion brought the Maficrats or warlords back to the arena again. It created insurgency converting the ICU to go underground, it gave birth to a new Somalia nationalist movement, and the youth militia, called the al-shabab army, started its operations multiplying the problems. Some pointed out the coming of ‘real terrorist’ cells motivated by the symbolic violence administered by the Christian-dominated state of Ethiopia against a Muslim country like Somalia, converting the fictitious causes to be the reality.

Jennifer Cooke, Coordinator for African Programme of Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggested that the US should distance itself from the perceived (actual) strategic alliance with Ethiopia (which is damaging to US’s credibility both in Somalia and more broadly in Africa). The US needs to work through the international community and regional states on building a comprehensive approach toward Somalia that goes beyond narrow counter-terrorism concerns.

The insurgency is in progress, everyday there is an attack on the Ethiopian peacekeeping forces of Uganda, the TFG, and the civilian population resembling the condition of Iraq. ‘We are going to turn this place into another Iraq’ said, Hashi Abdo, a construction worker who admitted that he is part of the underground movement to fight Ethiopian government forces in Somalia and its puppet TFG.

When they were at Ras Chiambori, the base of the ICU in Southern Somalia around Kismayu, their forces numbered only 3000 (Yusuf Ibrahim, AP) (New York Times Dec 30, 206) by Gefrey Gentlemen. But at present it is imaginable that the international cooperation in Somalia is facing a huge number of disaffected public, insurgency movements, and other military resistance dwarfing the previous challenge, constituting the long-term effect on the peace of the region.

The research report will deal with the US and its international role in the Somalia peace problem in greater detail later, however, to the consumption of this part, the US and other international actors are deliberately lured into this conflict, which should not have taken much direct involvement as it serves more the interest of the regional forces than the US interest.
The human aspect of the impact of the Ethiopian invasion is huge, Somalia saw the worst
dislocation of the civilian population from its capital since 1991, the civilian death from the cross
fire is increasing, a huge number of the population has fled to neighbouring localities and countries
again, the United Nations Higher Commission on Refugees has appealed for help to avoid a crisis,
the social conditions have highly deteriorated inside Mogadishu which has forced 400,000 people to
flee and it is having difficulty in attracting residents to start a normal life as they are traumatised by
the war. 33 BB, News, sept 2, 2007- Somalis oppositions meet in Eritrea to form broad collision,

The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, the TFG, is struggling to institutionalise itself.
Initially it put a plan of disarming the militias and illegalises the ownership of guns, which Somalis
relied on for years for self protection during the 15 years of the maficarctic rule of the warlords. It
called the public to surrender their personal arms, then elected the Mayor for the city who was the
former war lord, called the national reconciliation conference which is still hanging on a balance as
no one from the opposing TFG on the other besides ICU is specifically excluded putting the process
on a precarious footing. It has requested financial assistance from the international community as the
track two solution is a logical sequence in a conflict situation, which in the case of the TFG,
Ethiopia will have unofficial but effective say on its allocation. Despite the nominal representation
of the cross section of the Somali clan including the rival Hawiye clan, as some posts like the mayor
and others have been occupied by this clan, convincing the people to come forward for peace and
stability has been problematic due to the lack of legitimacy of the TFG in the eyes of the public
though for the international community it is legitimate as it is created by it. The complexity of the
situation bringing different variables to the conflict, including the issue of ‘terrorism’ as opposed to
the mere struggle for power at its initial stage between the ICU and war lords, now Somalia found
itself stuck once more in conflicts that will have long term consensus on the peace of the Horn of
Africa in general as the players have become many and they aren’t going anywhere. Genuine peace,
development, and democratic transition are causalities including Africa’s interest for harmony
among its people.
Chapter Four
International Intervention and ‘Peace’ in Somalia

Somalia’s recalcitrant domestic politics and the fratricidal war that consumed thousands of lives put the country in a black hole of humanitarian crisis and instability for the last two decades. Beginning from the overthrow of the Zaid Barre government in 1991, and the subsequent clan war, the international community has tried to help the people of Somalia to come out of the peace problem in which they found themselves. The initial ‘Operation Restore Hope’ by the international community, especially by the US, to make the humanitarian aid reach the population of Somalia that was in dire need of assistance was truly humanitarian in its nature. However, the engagement found itself in unfortunate circumstances, which was a conflict with one of the dominant war lords, Farah Aideed. His attack on a Pakistani regiment of the UN Peace Keeping Mission (UNSOM) and the subsequent man hunt changes the intervention to an undesired level resulting in the ‘Black hawk incident’ in which 18 US rangers were killed. This triggered immediate disengagement of the US forces from Somalia and the following apathy to have direct military involvement in the area since then. To date the international community, including the US, prefers to deal with Somalia indirectly, with the main role being played by the regional powers and organizations like the OAU (AU), the IGAD, or bilateral relations to advance common interests.

The recent developments in Somalia, and the change of mindset on the international scale after the barbaric attack of 9/11, once again obliged the global players to focus on the region and get engaged. The concern that al-Qaeda after long hovering in the shadows, establishes itself in Somalia and the possibility of the ungovernable chaotic entities like Somalia could become the breeding ground for terror drew international cooperation to avert the looming danger that would engulf the whole of the Horn of Africa.

The response of the international community to the Somalia crisis involves three types of engagement: the bottom being the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a sub-regional body; the middle layer, carrying the response of the African Union (AU), and a peripheral actor like the Arab League; the top layer involving the global players spearheaded by the US, its
western allies, and the Universal Organization like the UN’s response. This chapter will deal the above levels of international cooperation in light of an effort to bring peace and a functioning government in Somalia.

4.1. Multi-lateral Interventions & peace in Somalia

4.1.1. IGASOM: as a sub-regional response

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, whose members include immediate neighbours of Somalia like: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea was the first multilateral organisation in the Horn of Africa that was seriously concerned with peace in Somalia surrounding the present crisis. However, the majority of the members have had unilateral involvement at different times motivated by their own interests. The 1996 engagement of Ethiopia militarily against the Al Ithad Al Islamia when attacking its base in Dallo, Djibouti’s involvement in Somaliland in the early 1990s, Eritrea’s unilateral support for Somali forces since 1992 etc. are an indication that the IGAD countries have stakes in Somali Peace and Stability. Therefore, it was natural for the sub-regional organisation to respond to the current crisis in the country precipitated by the rise of the ICU.

Avoiding the spill over effects of the crisis, to effect regional economic integration or development related activities, combat diseases and poverty alleviation agendas, to meet various internationally set development goals, such as the ‘millennium development goals’ at the regional level, for trade and prosperity, and common human security all require peace in Somalia. Therefore, the IGAD member countries took it as their collective responsibility to help Somalia come out of the peace problem in which it found itself. Kenya and Ethiopia, the latter being the biggest recipient, have been affected by the influx of the huge number of refugees when crisis struck Somalia. The regional development has been hostage to the peace problem in the area; hence the existence of genuine concern for social, economic and security situation in Somalia is undeniable, though it is relative to other calculations too.

Since the 1990s, IGAD has had a role to play in assisting international involvements in Somalia on several occasions, lately the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in
2004 in Nairobi, Kenya was the most coordinated one and was determined to erect some form of administration inside Somalia, consistent with the new development in the US after the 9/11 demands. The TFG initially supported by IGAD countries nonetheless owing to the clash of interests which sprung from the unilateral involvement of the members in Somalia; opinions as to how to form the government and how to institutionalise it become a hot subject. Despite the existence of a rift within itself, the IAGD continued to play a constructive role in resolving the Somalia peace problem. In this, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda become active players, while Eritrea increasingly become at odds with the sub-regional organisation, blaming that it has been used by Ethiopia to legitimise its involvement in Somalia.

At the beginning of 2005, the Heads of States of the IGAD member countries met to discuss the Somalian security situation. They passed a resolution that put the ‘road map’ of peace and security in the country. (Communique of January, 2005 Resolution). The Honourable Amama Mbabazi, the Ugandan Ministry of Defence, put forward at the 24th Ordinary session of the Council of Ministers 17-18 March, 2005, Kenya, Nairobi, Resolution, and the council of ministers of Defence put forward the deployment plan for the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia. 26

IGASOM (IGAD’s Peace Support Mission in Somalia) was born and its objectives were:

1. to provide support to the Transitional Federal Government in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia;
2. to guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of IGAD peace process; and
3. to assist with the re-establishment of peace and security. 27

The member countries then approved the plan of having IGASOM as a sub-regional response. However, the road to Somalia for IGASOM was not an easy drive, as indicated in the earlier paragraphs, it become the bone of contention because of the difference in motivations of members in at least two opposing camps. The way decisions are made at the organisational level, and the way the IGAD’s mandate applied became contestable, some being accused of using it to advance their own interests.

Eritrea, which has a strong reservation to IGASOM, argued that the regulation that established IGAD does not provide for military deployment within member countries and showed its
disapproval by being absent from the meetings of IGASOM discussions and finally withdrew from IGAD. 25

Ethiopia effectively utilised the mechanism to advance its own interest despite the opposition from member country like Eritrea. Sudan may not have had a different opinion from Eritrea but because of its precarious position vis-a-vis the 'terror' issue, had to keep a low profile on the whole process. Ethiopia has secretarial upper hand in the organisation and used this leverage also to cover its agenda with multilateral legitimacy.

At the early stages of the Somali crisis, Ethiopian direct involvement was seen with scepticism; 'the US undersecretary of State advised it to take restraint on the situation. By then the IGAD competence was not upgraded and the diplomatic manoeuvring was yet to be intensified by Ethiopia. IGASOM was constrained by the UN arms embargo on Somalia making deployment difficult. At the later stage, however, it got support from international actors and the momentum for it gained.

IGASOM traces its relevance to the Somalia Transitional Government's Security Plan. It provided that the government request the cooperation of sub-regional, or regional and international cooperating to help pacify some areas as it is legitimised by it to institute itself in the Somali Capital, hence it officially requested the IGAD and the AU to deploy forces in the country. The member countries with the obvious reasons of their concern about the threat from the ICU, and the growing crisis inside Somalia responded positively for the request of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, which is considered by domestic oppositions and foreign powers as its 'creature' and imposed structure on Somalia people therefore consisting of the core reasons of conflict and confrontation in Somalia. As it is indicated in the theoretical part, the state being an alien construct caused friction.

IGAD apart from giving IGASOM for solving the Somali peace problem, become the central forum for international cooperation. It outshined the Arab League's role, which is regarded as a counter part to IGAD as it constitutes Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Eritrea and even Somalia for being the former member of the organisation. Although no agreement was signed, the initiative to
bring the warring factions of the ICU and the TFG to the negotiation table in Khartoum was a notable effort of this group.

The ICU rejected the role of IGAD citing the involvement of Ethiopia for sending troops in Somalia to support TFG which doesn’t have popular support in Somalia, making IGAD a party by its actions than effective conflict resolution mechanism. The involvement of Eritrea on the ICU side and Ethiopia on the TFG side boils down to the unfortunate coincidental relation of two powerful groups in the history of the Horn of Africa; these are the Tigreans Peoples Liberation Front and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, both of which control state power in partitioning the oldest African polity. Through their historical relations, as the grievance has it, never developed the art of compromise and consensus with out the use of force; the border stalemate, the Somalia case, their ruthlessness against the domestic democratic dissenters and never coming to power through peaceful means, obviously made major a ‘break through’ difficult in peace creation effort so far.

The Khartoum peace negotiation could have been possible if it were not embedded in the nature of playing actors in this situation and the complacency that dominated the scene slimed this chance. It was a third attempt to resolve the problem of the ICU and the TFG in Khartoum, but as Steve Bloom Field (the independent) put it, 'the blame is on the TFG for the failure of the talks; they weren't serious, they knew that Ethiopia will back them up if the ICU attack 'Baidoa', and Ethiopia in turn knew that the US is backing it.29

Because of this observation, he went further to suggest that the international community should recognise the ICU. However, this was an impossible scenario as the regional powers like Ethiopia and the international community who support the TFG have already laid a solid legal foundation for the TFG since 2004, so the recognition cannot come out of short notice. Of course, the peace process and power sharing or election could make that change, but the temptation to resolve problems with force and bloodshed seemed the irreversible trend, the theory of depredation and the realist thinking dominant psychological setting in this conflict.

After it successfully cleared the barrier on its deployment with the ban on Somalia by the UN and getting the necessary legal ground, the UN passed a resolution authorising the IGAD and the AU
force in Somalia. After a brief waiting period for the coming of the AU forces passed, it used it as motivation to constitute the IGASOM forces solely to be from the Ethiopian side. The initial plan prohibited the deployment of neighbouring countries and limited their role to doing only logistics and training of the TFG forces, which Ethiopia did first by sending a few military advisors and supplies to Baidoa, the seat of the ‘government’. Then using the last phase of the provision coupled with the request of the TFG, Ethiopia took action out of its own interest. With blurred clarity on the composition of IGASOM, then its necessity as a different contingent seems to have faded; the fashionable force turned out to be AMISOM (African Union Peace Keeping Mission), this will be touched upon in the proceeding part.

4.1.2. The Response of African Union

The role of the regional organisation came to play regarding the ICU’s rise to power and the subsequent conflict with the TFG which the AU backs and recognise it as a legitimate authority in Somalia. The 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of African Union on Somalia, 30-31 January, 2005 in Abuja, Nigeria was the legal framework that laid the involvement of the organisation to the issue of the crisis. Its role was to give legal cover for the sub-regional intervention in the area like IGASOM by IGAD member countries, and producing its own direct peacekeeping missions. AU has been a channel to legitimise regimes in Somalia, and being as liaison with Universal Organisation like the UN and its Security Council.

The Abuja communiqué approved the role of regional players like the IGAD, along the role of the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda line to engage in peace creation in Somalia. It mandates IGAD to deploy peace support mission in Somalia pending the deployment of the envisaged African Union Peace Support Mission in Somalia (PSM). This also required the AU to request the United Nations Security Council to waiver the Somali Arms Embargo that would pave the way to the deployment of IGASOM and another African Peacekeeping Mission.

‘Based on the requirements of the chapter 8 of the UN charter this stipulates the procedure of regional initiatives for peace mission and the need for authorisation by the United Nations.’

58
The AU pledged to help in budgetary contribution to IGAD countries. Through this plan, Uganda and Sudan planned to send troops to Somalia in Phase one, while the rest of the neighbouring countries were to help in logistics. However, the Phase one and Phase two action plan become problematic when none of them put forward troops immediately against the time factor in the face of rapid advancement of the ICU towards Bidaa (the seat of the TFG) making the Ethiopian unilateral involvement a real option, as the procedure is slow.

The issue of troops contribution was dragging the agenda; the number of the international parties who are willing to send troops to Somalia were limited to regional states only. As most African countries have problems of their own, such as countries like Nigeria, Sudan, etc. realising the promises took some time, frustrating Ethiopia.

The AU envisaged deploying an 8000-strong peace keeping force to also be a multinational force in its compositions. However, after a protracted procrastination, Uganda sent a team of 1400 soldiers to Somalia. It was welcomed by a rain of rockets, bombings, and mortar attacks which made it lose 4 soldiers to the fighting showing that ‘keeping peace’ with out ‘peace being created first’ is a self-defeating venture at an international level and vividly demonstrated the problems to come in its engagement.\[1\]

The deteriorating security environment in Somalia, even after the fall of the ICU, as Somlia’s naturally evolved power, the insurgency is escalating, more and more countries loose the appetite to send troops as peacekeepers in Somalia, as some analysts put it, ‘there was no peace to keep’.

The African Union is a thinly stretched organisation in terms of peacekeeping, and there are a number of bubbling humanitarian crisis around the continent; still finds it difficult to send troops to Somalia.
Darfur is another attraction as the talk of a UN /AU-EU (Hybrid) peacekeeping mission is envisaged with the earmarking of 2 billion dollars, everyone seems to have put eyes on the bigger cake surrounding Darfur than Somalia making the area under Ethiopia’s influence for the time to come still at the expense of peace in Somalia.\[4\] As discussed earlier to the theoretical part, the drive to ‘aid’ or foreign financial intervention is making ‘mafia-like’ powers in the region use every
opportunity to have a share in this piece. Ethiopia’s dramatic pledge to sent 5000 troops to Darfur shows how Peacekeeping and conflict is ‘commodotised’. The AU business in this fashionable intervention in Sudan, its role in Somalia will be taking second class leaving lots of room for chances of Ethiopia’s extended stay in Somalia. The withdrawal of Ethiopia is possible had it been that the TFG conducted reconciliation with all clans, pledge election shortly or effect it immediately to satisfy the public, disband itself as a liberating force leaving room to a democratically elected body without delay, or the need to become decisively the dominant force military imposing stability in the country, neither seem to appear in the horizon. However, whether it can manage or not has resorted to the last option as itself constitutes the ‘realist camp’ as put in the analytical part of this research. Nevertheless, it couldn’t deliver rule of law and the prospect of peace in Somalia the same way peace become difficult in Iraq after international intervention with Maliki’s government.

Ethiopia’s presence and the AU’s inability to substitute it with multinational force could help convert the TFG rule to authoritarian, but creating peace would be difficult in such unilateral foreign powers presence; the way international decision making is controlled by the marriage of ‘purpose’ of the major players is one of the problems, ‘the right decision’ is the missing element to create peace, the AU/OAU is usually known to make few of them in its history of conflict resolutions.

The sub-regional grouping (COMESA) which falls under the plan of regional integration (according to the Lagos plan of Action), conducted its 7th Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 13-14 November in Djibouti, the Somalia peace problem was discussed. It was evaluated in light of its membership of the grouping, still the venue was used to give note to the role of regional players to address the problem, though the AU’s forum was approved. As the tip of all diplomatic manoeuvring narrows toward the IGAD as the executing body then at its core lay power - Ethiopia.

4.1.3. The Arab League and Crisis in Somalia

The organisation that unites the Arab world in various international agenda is historically an ally to Somalia in its own relation with Ethiopia. This stems from the fact that Somalia was a member of the organisation on the other; even if it is an ‘aborted leviathan at this stage’ it is part of the Islamic world that has become the target of its ‘universal altruism’. It has the unity of purpose in this regard
in advancing the welfare and security of the Muslim world. The Arab league was the supporter of Somalia in its War against Ethiopia in the early 1970s.

The role of Saudi Arabia in the creation of Islamic fundamentalism through the scholarship it offered to Somali youth is cited by DR. Pham as a factor in loosening the social fabric that protected the country from sliding into extremism. Therefore, as its own agenda for countering the advance of any social transformation that threatens the values of ‘whabism’ as an Arab Version of fundamentalist, probably the democratization of Somalia is against this vision and the international powers already made their plans ‘no secret’ about converting Somalia to ‘democracy’. The Saudis, who have influence on the Arab league have a countering position on other interventions. The other point is that the countries that support the ICU are mainly from this organisation giving the impression that major ideological orientation, the Samuel Huntington’s speculations, and the theory of conflict to be tenable in this respect.

The United Nation’s Somalia Arms Embargo Monitoring Commission issued a statement listing the countries that contravened the ban, these were: Syria, Egypt, Eritrea, Yemen, Libya, and non-states actors in the Middle East, such as Hezbollah, are accused of involvement in the current crisis by supporting, supplying arms, financing, and training the ICU. Though the international body itself is accused of only ‘face saving’ the mechanism for the victorious powers when they wanted to have their unilateral agenda packed with multilateral brand, its accusation of these countries was and the report was plausible by independent observers who have seen the ‘cargo planes’ of Eritrea and others unload equipment and supplies to the ICU controlled Somalia. The immediate opening of the Mogadishu airport by the ICU was not free from these calculations, the Arab League support. Iran’s support to the group cannot be seen outside of the framework of its ambitions to counter Arab domination of the area and wanted to invest in the future, its ambition for uranium, as stated earlier, is less palatable, but some do not dismiss it.

The Arab League officially engaged in facilitation in Khartoum and even the first attempt to bring the Ethiopian authorities and the ICU in Dubai, and other attempts were observable. The peace process is the way to follow up issues of conflict, it is not necessarily from naïve motive that states offer their good office but to have access to the core of the issues and the actors involved. Whatever
its agenda was its role could be regarded positive in this regard. The interest of some Arab League members like Egypt is attached to the obvious historical adversity with Ethiopia that the latter is the source of the 21st century strategic resource ‘water’. It is always following up what Ethiopia is doing in the region hence the question of the ‘Nile’ as a source of conflict rather than cooperation in this case has been one of the operating variable in the whole ICU-related peace problem in Somalia.

The issue here is that the Arab League has played a lesser role compared to its proximity and its leverage on the actors involved, however, it is not pushing as much owing to its predicament in the present international order. Nevertheless, the Arab League is not going to be a permanent friend for the Ethiopian government. Its role is not of the past but of the future, its intervention is to correct the imbalance created as a result of Ethiopia’s involvement being backed by western forces, this leaves the yeast for future sophisticated but enhanced engagement of the Arab League in Somalia.

Before the research embarks upon the investigation of the powerful international unilateralist intervention in the Horn Africa focusing the Somali crisis, it is relevant to just to have brief look at the other dimension of multilateral intervention which centres on Europe; it belongs to the top layer of international cooperation in the model of the explanation stated above.

The EU has focused to address this issue through the UN channel. The role of individual states has been great. The UK and others which are involved in the ‘Somalia Contact Group’ are playing a positive role. Usually, the presumptions that ‘the west is the US’ is the constant that international relations should overcome to understand the increasing trans-Atlantic division in the executing of the fight against the new war. There is no marked or outrageous opposition for what the US is following in the Horn of Africa as the issues are peripheral and the powers involved are less significant in posing security threats to the well being of the European states as such; it is keeping away itself from contentions, choosing low-profile approach. The German foreign minister’s statement on the meeting of the ‘Contact Group’ ruling out the role of a ‘peacekeeping mission’ indicates that Europe has said ‘Time-out’ from this international intervention.

Contrary to that above, the dominant positions of some countries like Italy, Norway, and a few have a strong attachment to the crisis in Somalia and Horn of Africa in general. The latter being the
supporter of 'border' demarcation and different Ethiopian opposition forces, while the former is historically engaged in colonisation of the area and responsible for the conflicts root cause, hence has a vested interest. The involvement of private companies in sugarcane production and the issues related to that is a factor that brings the 'old nightmare' and its actor 'the ghost' to the scene of the conflict, Somalia. Ethiopia's expulsion of six Norwegian diplomats from Addis Ababa is the proof of heated interaction between regional players and European individual governments.

The transatlantic divide on the international intervention is also based on the issue of 'governance' as a criterion of cooperation. This was clearly seen when the EU penalised the Ethiopian government on its human right abuse on the aftermath of the election which the opposition claimed to have won, and the question of 'genuine democracy' as a foundation for peace, hence requiring the 'double standard' approach held by the other side of the Atlantic for the sake of 'fighting terrorism alone'.

The EU delegation head for the election in Ethiopia, Miss Anna Gomez, was an ardent supporter of democracy in the Horn of Africa, and consistently asserted the responsibility of the international community in 'practicing what it preaches' and realise the democratic aspiration of the Ethiopian people, which is the power house in the region. This clearly departed from the US position that entertained the minority government, according to most opposition view and analysts, and countenanced tyranny.87

4.1.4. UN System, Britton Woods Institutions, and peace creation in Somalia

Some held the view that the United Nations is about 'faces' for the US, it is used whenever deemed necessary to assuage the unilateral intention with multi-lateral cover.88 The impotence of the world body amid the chaotic situations in Africa, from Darfur to Somalia, from Angola to Liberia, Sierra Leone to Nigeria, etc. to resolve problems of peace in time with decisiveness, has damaged its reputation for long. That is why it was mentioned earlier that the UN is one of the crippled legs of the international order that is purposely made to be, or owing to its undemocratic nature of its charter, that gives everything to the victors of WW II.

Darfur, which hosts a living humanitarian crisis, could not be resolved because of the Chinese factor that made sanctions difficult as it is involved in the oil business in Sudan. This is the result of the
structure of the UN Security Council that made decisions difficult.

The UN involvement, when it happens, happens with a framed approach that entertains the members of the security council’s plan rather than resolving the real problems objectively, making its solutions a temporary fix. For this there are number of proofs, but to mention that which is related to the case study, ‘a resolution 1727 which endorsed the deployment of African Peace Keeping Mission from countries already involved in sidelining the ICU and become party to the crisis was considered problematic. The bone of contention is that the United Nations already recognised the Nairobi-made government for Somalia, which is the source of discontent for major players in the scene of the conflict in the country. It becomes a party automatically rather than a neutral arbiter, as the wordings of the UN resolutions and its pillars of provisions are similar with that of US’s position; it gives the impression that there is a strong solidarity in international decision making that creates barrier for new and innovative ideas that fall outside the network.

The IMF and the World Bank’s role that helped Ethiopia for the job done in removing the ICU from power could be observed from the immediate release of loan package more of than two hundred million dollars is interpreted by observers as a reward for effectively removing the group rather than development oriented decisions. This might be indirect financing of the occupation. The other time the IMF and the World Bank saved the government of Ethiopia was when the EU and the UK withheld the direct budgetary support to the government after the post elections crack down on the highly popular pro democracy and pacifist forces that resulted in massive arrests, the massacre of 193 protesters on one day in the streets of the capital, and thousands wounded that outraged donors. The EU withheld 360 million in aid while the UK froze close to 50 million pounds, but the US declared its unilateral support for the government of Ethiopia citing its good relation with it. Most, especially in the congress and Ethiopian American societies in the US termed it as a ‘double standard’ of involvement in supporting ‘dictators’ rather than democracy, which is the core of all uncertainties and problems of peace in the regions. Shortly afterwards, the World Bank’s former president Wolfwitz, during his 7-countries tour, declared the support for the Ethiopian government in the name of protecting ‘Basic Services’.
A former pentagon official and general who understands the mission of ‘fighting ‘terror in the Horn of Africa appreciated the necessity of not cornering the Ethiopian government. As the research observes, the way international decisions are made, the narrow strategy on fighting only terrorism in the Horn of Africa, not including fighting tyranny, maficracy, poverty, etc. and postponing problems has been part of the reasons that complicate peace creation in Somalia and the Horn in general. (The ‘Bureaucratic Organization model’ applies here, as the ‘group thinking in these structures is similar and affects international decisions; the Ethiopian government looked pretty lucky when the WB got its president from the ‘realist’ camp)

Most conflicts and their following aid package, as it is observed above, and the theory of ‘commoditisation of conflict’ or a drive for aid, has been the motivation is a plausible argument in the way international cooperation and international funds are allocated. Ethiopia alone got close to 300 million-worth of aid after the violence in June, 2005. It got close to 250 million after the invasion of Somalia, and it is going to get another share to get involved in the Darfur conflict that is earmarked for 2 billion; the money matters are part of the conflict and their causes. The IMF and World Bank, including the UN System which has been an intergovernmental organisation has no mechanism to listen to the views of the people in conflict-ridden entities. The preamble ‘we the people..’ in the UN charter has to reflect that solving conflicts in the interest of the people could complete the jigsaw puzzle in the equation of peace creation in the Horn of Africa. Listening to what the only governments say, in the case of Somalia, does not bring peace, and it is profitable for the international cooperation to make these governments finance themselves not at the expense of international tax payer money, as some would like to argue. The exodus of money back to Europe is the scenario where there might be strong alliance, international decision makers the regional players making aid two ways dependent, conflict might not be terminal when these unfortunate situations prevail. The Britton Woods instantiations are yet to prove that their intervention helps peace rather than complicating problems on the ground by supporting repressive entities in conflict situations and neglecting the popular desire.
4.2. Unilateral Interventions in and impediments for state and peace building in Somalia

4.2.1. US Intervention: an opportunity for peace?

The US’s war on ‘terror’ had the pouring of international support form all corners of the globe. Except a few that might have a connection to it, the world was outraged with what happened on 9/11 in New York. As it is well debated, even in the US domestic forum, the coming to play of the Iraq war was a bone of contention as most opposing camps have it since the invasion. According to the John Kerry 2004 presidential campaign, debate was focusing on the issue of the ‘Iraq war’, it is going to be in 2008 too, the seemingly unified international opinion against the culprits, began to crack when the war started. The ability to comprehend the ‘war on terror’, its strategy, and its application was new for conventional wisdom. The pro-invasion camp has strongly argued that the world has ‘completely changed’ after 9/11, requiring a different mind-set that emphasised pre-emption. Therefore, dangerous dictators with the capacity to sponsor ‘terror’ should be dealt with as ‘terrorists’ themselves.

But the other camp seems to have cool blood and wanted to see terrorism as part of the world system that needs to be addressed collectively with the international system, involving other countries big or small, in a sober way even though the US was attacked. They also doubted how consistent this policy could be as there are countless dictators around the world that have to be addressed; can the US be the world police in this regard? It is not doable to rely on military options, rather winning hearts and minds is the best way to kill terrorism in the minds of those who think about it before they implement it.

The debate is far from over, the world does not exactly know which is the correct path to world peace and security, and in the view of this research, the discipline of international relations has been a causality in this respect as the issue has become so sensitive that academic freedom or open debate on ‘terror’ is about to reach ‘taboo’ proportions, endangering solutions to the world peace problem; hence it is not only peace which is challenged with ‘Terror’ but the academy of IR itself. There are few who understood ‘terror’ except the US, partly is because of the fact that the 9/11 attack signalled the US as a target of the illusive enemy. Whether it is called by any other name, it is an
enemy that is ready to attack at anytime when the conditions permit. Therefore, as the enemy is not clear, America has no option but to be extra vigilant at an international level. But some state actors must have understood this better than others in the present Horn of Africa crisis, a phenomenon, whose verification constitutes the ‘end’ of this research report.

The confusion on ‘who’ is a terrorist and what is ‘terrorism’ has been rooted in other theatrical divisions on the world stage. Idealists still stick to their traditional approach that is the international law and universalism (multilateralism), and in leading by example, while the realists rely on defending unilateral national interest by all means. Keeping this background of the global system, the US is either being dubbed by the regional powers to see the Somalia problem as terror related development (as most opposing camps argued earlier), or out of its own well-thought strategy plan, has increased its role and interest in Somalia since the ICU came to power.

The focus of this part is not to dwell on the history of US involvement, but a brief background on the US effort to bring peace to Somalia deserves some bird-eye view accounting. Then motivated by the mission to end the suffering of the Somalian people that resulted as a consequence of the end of Cold war, partly as a mission of clearing the debris of the ‘global collapse of cold war confrontation’, the US had double and simultaneous engagement in the area. The one in Ethiopia involving facilitation of the ‘Soft landing of the TPLF as a rebel force which come to power through undemocratic means and ruling Ethiopia since then, which effectively managed to be regarded as an ally on fighting terror in the Horn, and institutionalising it as it is trying to do the same with TFG’, on the other, the humanitarian intervention in Somalia which went through clan warfare that decimated the state into anarchy.

The US humanitarian intervention brought with it better attention to the plight of the people of Somalia, the operation restore hope, then the UNSOM II were the mechanisms that led to engagement in Somalia. As discussed earlier, the ‘black hawk’ incident forced the US to abandon Somalia for more than a decade. The era of uncontrolled warlords rule that reigned Somalia between the time span of the US departure and the advent of the ICU, as Pham argued, created a condition for a breeding ground for terror by ‘degenerating the secular fabric of Somalia society’.
The post 9/11 world order, as realists would like to project it, necessitated the importance of putting the ungovernable chaotic entities into 'effective democracies', however, the involvement in Somalia was founded on a pragmatic approach to serving its national interest rather than idiotic principles stipulated in its strategic guidelines for its foreign policy. In February 2006, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) formed by warlords. 'Among these: Muse Sudi Yalahow, Mohammed Qanger Afrah, and Omar Finnish, (Ted Dagne (CRS)).

The CIA, according to this presentation, which hoped that the secular warlords would undermine the chance of the rise of the ICU' to power, didn't materialise. Within six months time the ICU gained control of Southern Somalia, forcing the US into new options in the country. The absence of detailed information on the composition of the ICU and hesitation about what to do next created a temporary pause on the US policy and action in Somalia in 2006. The US intervened in already polarised positions between the TFG and Ethiopia on one hand, and the ICU on the other side, and there was a real challenge to verify the information about the ICU. The media indulged in the criticism of the deal with the 'mafiaocratic' war lords putting a mark for 'no return' on its involvement in Somalia. Hence, whatever the US does now is already in the lame light of the media and the world, creating the necessity of full justification for its every action that should also satisfy domestic policy scrutiny.

The US role in Somalia had its own turns and bounds by the time of the ICU's rise to power; it was not certain if the ICU sheltered Al-qaeda elements (BBC). This was admitted during the formation of 'Somalia Contact Group' in New York by the US, the Under- Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Frazer.

The US concern, apart from reaching the point of no return once the foreign policy debacle is made public owing to the failure of the above clandestine deal with 'War Lords', was there was a logical fear that Islamic Fundamentalism 'Talibanism' would gain ground in Somalia once the ICU come to power, threatening the strategic trade route leading to Middle East. To protect this as the argument went, the legitimacy of the ICU was used to prevent them from power. Then the bitter stage was when the ICU were eventually blamed for being a 'terrorist' organisation, which were involved in different attacks on the US interests in the Horn of Africa. The Embassy bombing in 'Tanzania' and
Kenya, the attack on USS Cole, and the attack on the Israeli interests in Mombassa, Kenya, and others cases brought against the ICU making it a ‘must to avoid force’ to the international cooperation in peace creation in the Horn of Africa.

The goals of US involvement changed several times. The decisions were similar to examples ‘the incremental model of decision making as explained in the theoretical part of this research, its modus operandi is pragmatic. However, as the nature of realism itself it based itself on its own idea that appears universalistic at its face value, but practically that serves only to divert attention so as to have effectiveness on the ground. ‘Exporting democracy’ and ‘creating peace’, such ideals are moralistic and idealistic in their nature. The US pragmatic involvement does refute them, as it is observable from the 2006 strategic document of US Foreign Policy, however, it contradicts its ideals when it neglects the views of the public and never consults the Somalia civic and citizens on the ICU question. Given the US leverage in the area, missing that was the possibility according to public opinion in Somalia. The US supported the TFG despite its ‘imposed’ structure which fulfils the reasons to be a cause for conflict (theory of conflict), hence framing the whole involvement in light of enforcing this positions throughout the process.

The US reacted to the growing ‘crisis in Somalia’ by establishing the ‘Somalia Contact Group’, which took various initiatives to have meetings specifically on Somalia issues. The ‘German foreign Minister suggested the African Union peacekeeping would be the best scenario ruling out the EU involvement in military aspects. German was by then the chairman of EU.24

The AFP reported in November 2006 that the US backed the peace keeping mission’s deployment to Somalia(New York). The then ambassador of America, John Bolton, submitted a draft to the UN Secretary General, which includes the provisions of supporting the TFG, easing of the 1992 arms embargo on Somalia to allow supplies of weapons and military equipment and technical training and assistance solely for the support or use by the IGAD force.( Michel Nagle, AFP)25

December 15, the Security Council unanimously approved a Qatari-sponsored resolution calling on the former UN Chief, Annan, to extend the term of the commission that monitors Somali arms shipment. This was decided after the ICU attacked Dinsor, 125 KM South of Baidoa. Both the US
and its international contact groups set a goal to encourage positive political development and engagement with actors inside Somalia to support the implementation of the Transitional Federal Charter and its Institutions. The National Security and Stabilization Plan NSSP) approved and exempted for the UN arms embargo to facilitate peace missions IGASO deployment. The International Contact Group on Somalia- recommended The Be nadir Triangle around Mogadishu being ruled by Mr. Adde Gabon, to be legitimate.26

If one observes the decisions that are made at the international level, they are highly suggestive of the predetermined positions than results of negotiated process. The international community is party to the conflict in Somalia trying to ‘meddle through’ to get its positions maintained by the agreements at a multilateral level. It was less receptive to the new approaches and ideas that are alien to the network; the vertically integrated decision making channels. The UN Security Council’s Resolutions No.1725- that stipulated the support for African Peace Keeping Mission to secure the Bidaa-based weak government of Somalia, is described by the critics that it was ill advised. 27 (International Crisis Group: Somalia Conflict Resolution Alert, Nov. 27, 2006.)

Ambassador Bolton was at the centre of the criticism from the school that suggested it would escalate the conflict and doom the US into the greed lock with the UIC. Herman Cohen’s critique of the decision making process being misinformed by regional powers is something to remember here, the ‘tail is wagging the head’. If the US looks for easy and cheap options, there is the possibility for continuous follow up is a likely scenario like in Iraq. The problem with the strategy of supporting ‘African Peacekeeping’ was that it misreads the power of the ICU, which is rooted in not so much in their military strategy, but in their popular support.(Jeffry Getteman and Mark Mazzetti, Dec. 14, 2006).28

Reluctance to intervene militarily gave way when the US Air Force AC130 attacked the fleeing ICU. It was claimed that the targets were: the three al-qaeda suspects, who were responsible for the US embassies bombing and the 2002 attack on Israeli targets in Kenya individuals like: Fazul Abdullah, Mohammed Saleh, Ali Salih Nabhaa, and Abu Taha al-Sudani ( DR. Pham).29 The absence of independent confirmation on the case has minimised the credibility of the claims as Amnesty International accused most forces that engaged in Supporting the TFG for violation of
Human Right laws by attacking the civilian targets. In the case of the air strike, it was not clear whether it hit the target or not. The US also provided a naval blockade to deny the suspects escape. The guided missile cruisers, USS Bunker Hill and USS Anzio, and the Dock landing Ship USS Anzio's halyard was jointed by USS Carrier Eisenhower, according to the notable supporter of US military action in the Horn of Africa, Pham’s statement of Feb. 2007, ‘The Return of Nigerian Taliban’.

The 9/11 commission has identified Somalia as one of the six areas of the world where potential or current terror is sanctuary. The bipartisan committee is credited for its neutral report and objectivity, points to the Horn of Africa as a place for the US strategic focus, the tactics of conduction of the war is ‘the point of departure’, however, for different doctrines in resolving the peace and security issue in the area. The professed objectives of the US involvement in the Horn of Africa are: counterterrorism, support for effective governance, addressing the humanitarian needs of the people, and improving regional stability. It also engages in giving military training to the regional powers, like Ethiopia, which is accused of using the US armoured vehicles to crush ‘pro democracy demonstrators’ in the streets of Addis Ababa, which resulted in the ban on the sale of the armoured vehicles to the government of Ethiopia.

The paradox that the international cooperation was constantly being used wrongly for strengthening the power base by some actors and the intervention is seen as less different as the local enemy. As with the temporary mix with ‘mafizaratic’ warlords or some governments’, which the US seems to have no real interest to be associated with them except its own interests (in international relations there are no permanent friends only interests) hence failing to understand this fact, different actors develop bitterness against the US despite it promotes its own separate interest from the regimes it supports in the Horn of Africa.

The establishment of a Combined Joint Task Force, the Horn of Africa (sample Monier) as a counter terror effort in the region is the most serious of the US engagement on the Indian Ocean front. This also overlaps to give support to the regional powers to get training, humanitarian activities, and as seen in the AC 130 involvement, it takes action when necessary against terror targets. The Combined Task Force (CTF 150), which coordinates the counter terror deployment, involves most of the western allies. The multinational naval command members are: US, France, Germany, Britain,
Holland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, and other allied ships currently commanded by a Pakistani Rear Admiral also operating in the Indian Ocean (Dr. Pham).

Counter terrorism centred intervention of the US is disputed by few scholars among them: Mr. John Prendergast, coordinator of the Africa Programme, the International Crisis Group has put forward as to how the international cooperation in peace creation should take form in the Horn of Africa he puts his proposal this way:

"The counter terrorism operations to date have suffered from lack of a broader strategy of engagement in Somalia. This has resulted in a lack of political guidance and failure to adapt to local context. In order to succeed in the future US effort to combat terrorism, which is the same objective, must be situated within a broader strategy of engagement, political, economic and social that makes it reality: government of national unity, single authority in Mogadishu, investment in social services, including others are vital steps to take."(101)

Currently the international community spearheaded by the US has respite after the fall of the ICU in Somalia. The downside of unilateralist and pragmatic interventions is its short term solutions, as it is not guided by 'some degree of nativity' in approaching decision making that focuses much is on how to 'keep the ship on course' and 'postponing' the problem has been the dominant feature of the international cooperation in Somalian peace creation efforts. The reality that the US and its regional allies are facing are an increasing number of insurgency/liberation struggle attacks on peacekeeping, the TFG forces and their Ethiopian allies. The 'ghosts of the 90s' have come back to the cities with their maficratic networks (warlords), and the polarisation is multiplied. Hence apart from temporarily crippling the ICU, whose real power was not military in the first place, as argued earlier, the Ethiopian invasion, the installation of a friendly government in Mogadishu, the whole effort of international cooperation in the Somalian Crisis since 2004 and afterwards appears to bring no durable solution.

The presence of the Ethiopian forces has created a breeding ground for a new form of resistance, which does not distinguish its 'mentor' from its 'client' when attacking, upgrading the contours of violence in the country. The TFG was not the result of democratic process; it was made in Nairobi, Kenya, processed by regional payers, and exported back to Somalia, which is creating peace with difficulty. The stalemate to peace negotiations and the attack on delegates and their recent vow of
the ICU leaders to fight back leaves huge doubt that if the peace creation in Somalia was successful, that it does not require continued international involvement. The pressure on the US policy to disentangle itself from self-serving regional powers is high including in the ‘law making body’ of the US government has repeatedly put forward this suggestion.192 Supporting illegitimate and dictators has been a historical ‘constant’ in US engagement in third world countries, hence to have success in the Horn of Africa’s peace creation the approach needs to correct itself once and for all; it is time to go back to the US’s lofty ideal of ‘genuine’ democracy having confidence in the majority of the public even though they don’t have the military powers. ‘Winning hearts and minds’ is still a crying subject, be it in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, etc. most recommend the need to reject minority and unpopular governments in all its foreign engagement to secure peace, that saves American lives and money. What else could be the interest of the country other than these concrete results? The TFG, TPLF, Warlords, EPLF, all will solve neither American concern nor the problem of peace in the Horn of Africa. The onus is on the great powers to rethink their modus operandi and the quid-pro-quo that they give to their partners need to be without compromising their professed sacred values.

4.2.2. Impediments for state and peace building in Somalia

The major impediments could be inferred by combining the above problems of decision related issues and the increasing focus on security matters than: structural (economic and communication); health and education; social justices and raising living conditions, and providing a functioning government. Apart from the conventional Somalia peace problems (clan conflict), the legitimacy of the TFG and external intervention made peace difficult which are preconditions for state building. Other variables are the creation of new ‘state like’ entities within greater Somalia, could be touched upon this way.

The fall of Zaid Barre’s government in 1991 brought with it the disintegration of Somalia unitary state. The Horn of African countries, especially Somalia and Ethiopia, felt the pinch of the consequences of the end of Cold War. When the latter’s break-away province, now Eritrea, became the state with no major viability to prosper by itself, Somaliland declared itself a state recognised by few in the world, breaking the homogenous former Somalia Democratic Republic into two major
The continued disintegration of African states and the formations of fragmented entities are contrary to the visions of Pan-Africanism, which considers the continent organically linked and fulfills the criterion of becoming a unified state. Converting partitioned territories in Africa, based on the bad mark of history ‘colonialism’, into independent entities helped nothing but complicated problems of peace and bloodshed as newly recognised states in the 1990s brought chaos, and war that became a concerted attack on the unity of the continent, through engaging themselves in squabbles rather than focusing on development. The vertical solidarity in regional and international decision making especially in the Universal Organization like the UN during the term of Butros Butros Ghali, an Egyptian, was the unfortunate eclipsing of bad fortunes for the region and Pan African agenda. The coming to power of governments that attach less significance to the organicism of states and national interest is considered, by some dissidents, as a cause for disintegration in the Horn.

In 1952, the UN made a decision on the reunification of Eritrea to its motherland Ethiopia. The same way Somaliland was united to Somalia (an Italian colony) when independence was granted in 1960. In the face of the same international community, African states further Balkanized in 1990s. The government’s reluctance to defend the nations interest in Ethiopia, which is still far from over, reflects the way decisions are made at the international level and especially in the leading countries as a factor. The lack of overriding principles, a character of ‘incremental’ model over the territorial integrity of states when they are in their difficult periods of defending their integrity, it should have been the concern of international intervention to avoid the disintegration of territories of former unified states. Indifference to this fact and making historically self-contradictory decisions, has been the challenge to peace in the Horn of Africa, the proof being the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war that came immediately after independence of the latter but didn’t bring peace, despite implementation of self-determination.

The fear factor has been the reasons of wrong decisions coupled with problem associated with its process. Pre-1991, the ‘fear of communism’ made the US support ‘terrorist groups’ in case of al-Qaeda, as Bin Laden was supported to be, the Che Guevara of the Arab world in helping Afghans with the support of the US to repulse the Soviets. Despite the US’s fear of ‘Communism’, the rebel
forces that used ‘Albanian communism’, the TPLF of Ethiopia, were allowed to assume power in Horn of Africa. According to the view of the domestic dissenters, the current dispute with the US and the Eritrean government is the reflection of short term ‘benefit driven’ policies of 1980s. The US mediator for the transition in Ethiopia in 1991, Herman Cohen, has expressed reservations to Ethiopian authorities about leaving the ‘port question’ out of the negotiation agenda, which latter become a bone of contention between the two forces. The present move to recognise Somaliland’s government as a sovereign entity is contrary to the Pan-African’s agenda that adversely affects feature peace.

The 1990 pragmatist approach to the legal and idiotic issues like territorial integrity and national unity of states didn’t give sufficient attention. The silence of the dismemberment of Eritrea under the EPLF’s rule was the biggest misgiving for the international interventions of the 90s. There is no doubt, given the problems they faced during the military dictatorship in Ethiopia which includes all people too, that Eritrean people were aggravated hence the referendum could not have met a different result with out healing period, but the issue of land locking 74 million people with the economy that has enormous potential, even though it has historical rights over the port of Assab which is southern tip and has no developmental value for Eritrea, was a historical mistake more than being Anti Pan-Africanist. Land locking the huge country in the Horn of Africa is still a permanent danger in comprehensive peace in the region by crying loud for rectification.

The fear of ‘terrorism’ which planted another government in Mogadishu, still by the international cooperation, is the same method applied to resolve the Horn Crisis at the beginning of new international order after the cold war. The same way as it is suggested during the dismemberment of Eritrea, now realist scholars like DR. Pham are trying to influence the decision making channel in the US to ‘recognise Somaliland’. Somaliland’s current status as a stable entity maintained with its separation from the much troubled south is positive from a human security angle, but getting deceived by the current situation and creating a new state is ill-advised in relation to Pan-Africanist agendas. The lesson of history for those who care about the future of mankind is a responsibility, hence the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia is the responsibility of international cooperation and should not be compromised for short term alliances with outgoing governments. The regional powers are still using the same tactics convincing the international community about
maintaining ‘islands of peace’ and giving them better status to make the other arm of world ‘governance’ the IMF and the World Bank to lend them development finance. However, creating new state entities is not a must precondition for assistance. Pan-Africanism, regional peace and development are going to be causalities in continued disintegration of Africa.

Realist’ think-tank’ groups in the US networked in the vertical solidarity of decision making have suggested looking into the way of recognising Somaliland as a beacon in the region. The major player from the region like Ethiopia is pressurised by the over-heating economy supports the idea of secession to utilise the sea outlet of Barbara, by becoming a ‘friend in need’ for Somaliland independence.

Rahanweye Resistance Army (RRA), the administration of Puntland, the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council formed the Transitional Government in 2000-2003, However, it was not effective. The dominant argument in the US’s intervention in the current Somalia crisis states that ‘Somaliland is one of the few solid bulwarks that the US really had in the Horn of Africa, by then against the ICU in Somalia. Hence, this group of scholars advise the international community needs to provide it ‘interim special status’ to allow it access the help of world Financial Institutions.(Dr. Pham). 103

The other opposing view is held by John Prendegrast – Coordinator , Africa Programme, International Crisis Group) he argued:

‘(..The attempt to give recognition to Somaliland), Stumbles with the Pan-African agenda, the suggestion is that balkanization of Africa is not a solution... and lookslike typical third party solutions’104

The problem of peace and unilateral interventions have been major impediments for Somalian state Building. The fragmentation of the country along clan lines with clashes of interests has been a real challenge of state re-formation.

The pro independence of the Somaliland argument is supplied by Saad Noor, Ph.D, representing the view of his country and he gave the background to the problem this way in his congressional testimony:-
the former British Somaliland got independence in July, 1960 after five days only it opted to join the former Italian Somaliland) and 1 August, 1960 United Somalia was formed.'165 According to his presentation, the unity turned to disappointment as two decades of political subjugation and 10 years of armed assistance against the Southern Domination. By 1988 the conflict got into full-fledged popular resistance headed by the Somaliland National Movement(SNM) in relation to Zaid Barre's forces. In May 1991 the struggle succeeded and Somaliland succeed from the South.

The 'Burao' conference, where all clans from 'British Somaliland Converged' and declared independence. He blamed the petrol Dollar propelled 'wahabism' that eroded Tariqas influence in the last 30 years.166 (Here there is similarity of argument with Pham signalling the existence of 'group thinking' in trying to make decisions in favour of independence, still using the fear tactic of 'terrorism', as communism was used to threaten and convince international cooperation to dismember the Ethiopian former province, Eritrea. Is history repeating itself?)

He related to the concern that exists to the ICU coming to power, and accused them of having three agendas in the Horn of Africa: first, to takeover all Somalia and declare an 'Islamic emirate' and use it thereafter as a base for expanded operations in the region; second, to infiltrate Somaliland, the only secular 'democracy' in the Somali-speaking region of the Horn, destabilize it and then take it over with the support of local elements; three, to 'topple' other secular states like Kenya and Ethiopia.

The research observes that there is a stark similarity of arguments in the justifications, promises used, and the methods applied to influence international decision making to get the job done. Somaliland considered to be the future ally of the US in the war on terror, as Eritrea was promised to be an ally for Israel, and the US in the Red Sea, but now Eritrea is one of the dangerous states for the US according to the latest State Department reports. But the government who advised the international community is still using the same method to convince further break up of the region, which is obviously a recipe for future disaster as war will be the next probability, as the lesson of
late 90's suggests, that Horn of Africa saw the worst war and lost hundreds of thousands of lives.

The blame on dictatorship and suppression is a 'vice' that African people have to overcome, not a reason for creating countless non-viable entities to satisfy the power thrust of networked groups in the regional landscape. The people interested in development, peace and good governance is a living issue that has to be addressed, hence partition is not a solution when conflicts arise out of the problems of unaccountable power centres. Capitalising on the image crisis of the ICUs and using the opportunity of the current crisis in South Somaliland, as it did it in 1990s when it declared independence, it is opting for getting full recognition, which will make the next generation of international decision makers and citizens of Somalia foot the bill that would normally involve lives and property.

Saad Noor is blaming the ICU as an irredentist group that have ambitions on Somaliland as if they are not citizens of that country who should not be concerned about the territorial integrity of their country. The conditions could permit and favour the government in the north-east part of the country to be used for its own advantage, giving the impression that the ICU have military capability to threaten the integrity of countries with a huge army like Ethiopia, Kenya, and even Somaliland at this stage was part of the concerted attack on the ICU to remove them from getting power in their country, which every party is allowed so long as the governed 'consents' which is also the essence of Democracy.

The demise of the ICU as naturally evolving forces, and the cementing of Somalia into two separate states is a threat to the future security of the Horn of Africa and determinant to the Pan-Africanist agenda.

4.3. International media and the ICU

Media is the biggest power player on the international stage. In the case of the ICU, it has great impact on its fate. As observed, the small empire of the ICU crumbled partly as result of the media projection of the forces as 'terrorists', 'Taliban', 'expansionist', and a threat to international peace. Most of the media outlets dealt the case as part of the 'war on terror', the ICU didn't get the benefit of doubt, as the debate went in previous chapters.
It is observable that the media was basing its information on the government sources like press releases, reports, and officials’ interviews, and other second hand information that might serve specified objectives rather than neutral and original projection of realities on the ground. Sticking to the official reports has been the tendency of some medias in order to avoid scrutiny by their governments, and the fear of losing access to government information when they don’t have favourable ratings.

The actors in the horn crisis around the current Somalia case seem to have mastered this craft, using the national and international media to influence decisions. The media has become the target to the intention of the involved actors from two angles: first, governments in the Horn of Africa use the ‘leaking’ tactics to hook the media so that the media picks it up with its obsession for leaked information has made it pray; the second, it takes government made information; and finally they also are attached to the issues and their values also plays a part.

The media’s ‘Iconoclasm’ directed against Somalis Islamic Courts Union as images of devil (Osama), disabled the critical view and constructed the images of these powers as threats to the international peace so that they could be faced with severe punishment. As the coverage was so strong, no counter positions have dominated the international cooperation in the horn of Africa.

Nullifying the actual positive jobs by the UIC, which could have lifted their face did not matter in the huge negative image constructed of them for the international public. The leak tactic has helped the regional actors to use the international decision maker to have positive decisions that favours them. Wrong information will result biased policy decision by contaminating the process.

The Transitional Federal Government Officials, some of them including Abdullah Yusuf, were once involved in an assassination attempt in Somaliland on the current appointed Police Chief in Mogadishu who was on the CIA payroll for some time (Abdi Hassan ‘qaybidid Awale, he served during the Farah Aideed time whose forces killed 18 US Rangers), said Mohad Elmi, Bengali McClateny News Paper, May 5, 2007
The media sometimes by underplaying these kind of biographies of TFG officials, saves the face of the powers. The unbalanced reporting and portrayals by the media obscures the true source of terrorism and defining who the real culprit is. To give an example, the research observes that powerful medias sometimes get influenced by the positions of their governments. The BBC once had to report the effort of the ICU; apart from demonstrating positive gestures for the international community, their offer for independent investigation to their claimed connection to the attacks on the US interests, this story could have helped them to get good image but the example shows how it was bent to suit official policies:

The ICU stormed and rescued the ship that was hijacked by the sea pirates that operate in the Indian ocean (where the Combined Joint Task Force located) the story goes on to say, the ship belonged to UAE named ‘Veesham one’. After arresting the pirates, the ICU declared the Ship will be returned to the rightful owners. The BBC’s report did not end with the positive note, it included that the ‘the Islamists said’ that their hands will be cut’ this has clearly damaged the positive job done sticking the minds of the international audience to the face that the Islamists as ‘Fundamentalists’ nullifying the job done that could have helped them to come out of the image crisis in which they find themselves.108

One interesting peace of news and an article that was cast on the Ethiopian Government website reads like this: ‘the terrorists have transformed from transitional to guerrilla terrorists’.109

This is clear that the government of Ethiopia is facing resistance from the different sources as no one could prove that the violence that is observed in Somalia is the result of only ‘insurgency of Islamic courts Union’. There is evidence of growing discontent on the presence of foreign troops, especially from the Ethiopian government side that giving the issue occupation related cover, knowing this fact the Media controlled by the government of Ethiopia has, as usual ahead of time cast this theory so that it could be picked by the international media. If the calculation goes straight for the government, ‘tomorrow international media could pronounce the Somalis quest for freedom, or Islamic comeback effort without giving room for the doubts, as ‘guerrilla terrorists’ then contaminating the whole information, even the once useful for international decision making.
Hence the international involvement in peace creation in Somalia needs to overcome the problems associated with misinformation which sometimes involves the west's most trusted news outlets in putting out distorted news which is designed to benefit some actors. A critical approach on the information and (that involves the invisible intelligence reports, need to be value free and putting the right solutions rather than serving political agendas) the solution for 'Horn's Peace' starts from this point too. 'Cross-and-cross' checking before considering it as 'policy' input.
The diversion of focus to other bubbling crisis like in Darfur or elsewhere, Somalia once again could be left to the chances of a deadly power struggle among different actors, which is the exact opposite to the ‘pre ICU’s demise in Somalia’.

From its inception to present stage prominent US’s foreign policy architects, including the former president Jimmy Carter, have a strong bias towards the TPLF, this association is getting to be lethal mix for peace in the region since Ethiopia was pushed to the communist block by the same quarter of international decision makers, hence the research finds out that the existence of vertical solidarity that disadvantaged independent and neutral way of conflict prevention, management, and its resolutions. Jendai Frazer, US Assistance Secretary of State for Africa, as explained earlier in this report, put the fact that the courts were not listed as a terrorist organisation before, which implies their prominence might have necessitated to do something about them, which as indicated above put the decision process to relay on the TPLF to give information which is value added and misled the international community in the area, the ICU, as Herman Cohen put it, are nothing except information about them might have exaggerated their inclination to Islamic rules. He knows the TPLF better than most decisions makers as he brokered the London peace and landed the TPLF in Addis Ababa, hence there is striking similarly with the case of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ which relied on second-hand information on Iraq’s dissidents (like Ahmed Chalabi). The government of Ethiopia is blamed by many as misinforming the international decision makers in the horn of Africa, the US seems to rely on the TPLF’s chief, Meles Zenawi, as Dr. Pham described him of having to know ‘Somali’ better than anybody. This seems a crux of the problem for the ineffective peace creation by international involvement in the Horn of Africa. The decision making process’s heavy reliance on self-interested parties in the region especially, the Ethiopian government in the case of Somalia Islamic Courts Union, could be termed problematic according to the finding of this report.

A renowned pundit, rent-seeking analysts, a network of government-sponsored lobbyists, the values of policy advisors and their convenience than the real issues on the ground have managed to obscure causes and their consequences in the ICU case and the way the international community dealt them is the result of confusing information flows and lack of managing information to get deep into the facts. The lack of patience on the part of international decision makers to observe these facts has made the situation and peace creation dire and desperate.
Islamic Courts Union are lost opportunities for durable peace in Somalia as they had the legitimacy and moral authority as seen by the way allegiance was gained. From the angle of the result of the assessment made on Somali Diaspora that the research conducted, Islamic courts union are the lesser evils that Somalia has seen after the fall of the dictator Siad Barre.

At the same time, most of them see the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia as an imposed structure that lacks the consent of the governed as being the recipe for continued resistance and conflict in the future and the finding is supported by the facts on the ground.

Mythical 'core' and 'periphery', which to date the developed world giving guidance and plans for their 'satellite governments' seems to be shifting and there is continued 'peripherization' of the 'core' – where advanced countries are having a marginal role in bringing peace than the regional small powers- and the peripheries are dictating the 'core' in certain instances.

The research has observed vertical solidarity in the operational cooperation and it appears that regional forces are installing a government of their choice, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) that is presently facing stiff resistance from the public. The increasing militarisation of development aid and focus on sole security issues in Somalia by the international community on one hand, and absence of peace on the other constitute the greatest impediments for peace and state building in Somalia.

5.2. Problems of International Decision Making

International decision making process relating to the Somalia Crisis: - the research observes that part of the complications emanate from the way decisions are made at a global level, even from local to the international. In Somalia, the actors 'warlords' and the 'UIC' make decisions in an 'unpredictable way' not democratically, in transparent fashion, the network of individuals decide on the fate of everyday peace of the neighbourhood and the state. Sometimes leaving no room for rationality, or even 'meddling through' to get positive results for the society but only for the benefit of these groups if that is not granted everything get destroyed- more than 14 attempts to bring peace to Somalia even the last one, with the internationally backed Somalia Transitional Government in Control of Mogadishu did not succeed owing to the way decisions are made in 'intra' and 'inter'
decision making systems.

Confrontation and conflict becomes inevitable in case of the ICU. It might have been possible to avoid confrontation with the international actors if they choose to put moderates on the leadership post so the image crisis should not have come to play. It is also possible that the international system could change its demand of the ICU, so long as they were not considered a threat from the beginning. In view of this report, the way decisions are made in characterisation of the ICU as a whole as a terrorist group, was not helpful in many ways: it put the international community in lengthy and less meaningful engagement with small entities like the ICU, even if they would grow as fundamentalist states the resource could have been used to cement their power so they convert themselves to constructive forces, however the decision to ally the interest of the international community with that of the vested interest of regional powers (like in the case of Ethiopian government) has been costly, once again diplomacy could have done more damage to the ‘ideology of terror’ in the horn of Africa, than the military option.

Regarding another bubbling area of conflict in the horn of Africa and its peace in general few points can be made how international decision making needs to be revisited to consider popular interests rather than chasing the claims of governments alone. For instance, the Ethiopia-Eritrea border issue, the way decisions are made from problem identification to the propositions of solutions there seems to exist a wide information gap either as a deliberate postponement of the problems leaving the coming generation to deal with it be it internationally or regionally, the art of ‘meddling through’ the challenge has been the character of international decision making. The border issue is a symptom of other problems that lie beneath it, the interest of both countries. Under the current state of affairs the ‘TPLF’ government with minority ethnic base releying only on military force and international backing cannot guarantee future peace, according to various intellectuals, EPLF the ruling force in Eritrea all need to be understood whether they are viable for peace in the region rather than unqualified support, hence the issue of ‘ports’ and ‘Eritrean people’s’ right to be Ethiopian need to be explored to have a real solution, but it looks tough at this juncture and the international community preferred to postpone the core issues of the conflict so the over emphasising of the demands of governments without due consideration of popular interests has been and will be the cause of the conflict in the area.
As theory of decision making has it, ‘keeping the ship on course’ has become the main feature of international decision making in the Horn of Africa. The TFG, how far it will guarantee peace, reconciliation, and democracy is not known; how long Ethiopia is going to stay in Somalia is not known. These are reflections of problematic decisions that are already made and the consequences are yet to be seen. Instrumentalism need to give way to idealistic and principled interventions to create peace in the regions.

Views held by some analysts that consider the ‘ICU as opportunities for peace’ in Somalia, appear to be true compared to the absence of it, since the TFG came to Mogadishu and since Ethiopian government forces entered the country. After the fall of the ICU more than a million people are displaced, the whole region including the South Eastern part of Ethiopia is in turmoil. Civilian death was not that big when warlords controlled Somalia, except it was dangerous. When the ICU came there were signs of state building and social activities making them the lesser evil that Somalia witnessed after it slide into chaos in 1991.

The fear of the UIC as a international terrorist organisation might be either a deliberate misrepresentation or paranoiac attitude created by the ‘theory’ of the ‘Clash of Civilization’ which itself became the reason for it than natural development in global peace and the reality of the Horn. Although the threat of terrorism is real and needs to be fought fiercely, anything that looks ‘terrorist’ in not necessarily ‘terrorist’. This illusion can be created through misinformation and missteps in decision making.

Treating the neighbouring Christian dominated state like Ethiopia as the land of Christians, overlooking that Ethiopia is an intersection for three major religions- Christianity, Judaism, and Islam is also other fear tactics employed by some to balance the actions of the international community. The attitudes of the ICU need to change and their decision to resist domination need to focus on governments rather than on the people who do not have any say under undemocratic rule.
As regards remarks on ideas on sources of conflict, few points could be put this way: the sources of conflict in the Horn of Africa, after investigating the competing problems in the area especially in the case of Somalian Crisis, is that the innate human nature, ‘as stated in the first part of this report that deals with ‘predation argument’, is observable such as in the war lords rule in Somalia as described by the 4th Ethiopian Development Studies Seminar in USA which was presented by assistant director of Africa in the Department of State. Pseudo speciation has been manifest in general in Somalia between the ‘Hawiyee’ and ‘Darood’ etc. to mention a few cases. Cruelty that makes peace difficult in the region is the mentality of groups in control of political power in major players in the region. ‘Predatory rationalisation’ is common throughout the interaction of the actors involved.

The neo-Malthusian view that argues the resource and population needs to check each other hence war, disease and other calamities are natural way of shading population pressure might have apparent truth as causes on conflict, but this could be addressed with effective policy on environment, sustainability, equity, and conscious utilisation of resources. It is not a natural sequence that one has to eliminate the other to thrive on the resources that seems a typical pre-modernisation state of conditions; but as industrialization has demonstrated that human society can satisfy his needs without resorting to violence, if peace prevails. Hence the deep of the argument is related to ‘structural issues’ the way access to resources are determined, the jam on population and resource development, the degree of comparative advantage, etc. Genuine democratic governance, the economic structures of countries in the region, and their non-viability of states is a plausible argument. Conflict in the case of resource depletion is not an ‘inevitable outcome’, in the view of this report, so long as structural issues are addressed.

The other side of structure related causes of friction and conflict in the Horn of Africa is the consideration that states being regarded as imposed structures on ethnic identities as causes of conflict is observable between ‘Somalia’ and ‘Somaliland’, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which is part of the ‘cold war’ induced outlook that historically caused guerrilla warfare in both countries. Nonetheless, in the present day global system this argument is less appealing as people are already disillusioned with power elites that controlled the state power in liberated societies, performed badly
by planting the seeds of various conflicts, in some instances, hijacking the popular quest for genuine
democratic governance and freedom. Yet the theory that states this could be seen as imposed
structure whether the claim is true or not have been causes of conflict, as explained in the above two
entities in the horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa in general, has witnessed ethnic overlap and
consequent conflicts. Examples, despite Eritrean independence, the Afar people who are partitioned
between the three states, who have their own historical identity and endogenous to the region have
been forgotten and are endangered human beings. They could be termed the Kurds of East Africa.
These groups have reason to be united and get independence for that they have raised arms
considering the ‘artificially created’ Eritrean State and part of Djibouti are under imposed state
structure. In every conflict the yeast for feature conflict is preserved and gets aggravated when the
international intervention is uninformed of the deep rooted highly camouflaged presentation of cases
that suits not the ‘demos’ but the ‘leviathans’ in the region, the solution is a paradigm shift in
international cooperation from supporting the later to supporting the former.

In case of the UIC and others ‘forced permeability’ was evident in their early state of existence in
Somalia however the international community declined to maximise the opportunity making
cooperation difficult. The ICU offer for investigation to previous involvement, their gesture in
accepting greater role by International community all were signs of open opportunities for better
cooperation to create peace.

The majority of the actors in Somalia are inclined to military options. However, in the case of
Ethiopia’s invasion and its realist agenda, it falls short of fulfilling a ‘just war’. Thomas Aquinas’s,
idealist theory of a ‘just war’, according to most analysts who oppose the idea of Ethiopia’s military
measure and presence in Somalia with its ensuing problems, to be lacking this element of
appropriate war. On the other hand, Ethiopia denies this and tries to demonstrate its causes are
justified. The opinion poll shows that the war on Somalia was to be ‘venting’ of greed was not to
avenge the wrong. Even among the realist camp, the Transitional Federal Government is not a
substitute to the ICU, Pham who showed the purpose of the war, is not unanimously agreed with.
Ethiopia’s involvement cannot be justified unless one brings the question of ‘selfish’ idiosyncratic national interest. If universal rules and international law are applied, it is counter to those principles of ‘sovereignty’, ‘unprovoked war’, and ‘attack on civilians’ are cases for that. Amnesty International’s 2007 report has blamed the Ethiopian government’s actions for atrocities in Somalia.

5.3. Recommendations

Various ‘think-tank’ and analysts, government and non-government strategic research making circles or institutes have, in their own way, put forward different policy recommendations about peace creation in Somalia regarding the rise and fall of the Islamic Courts Union, in particular and in general peace in the Horn of Africa. However, there is divergence in recommendations; the research observes the fact that recommendations are usually demands by themselves, reflecting the ‘values’ and ‘interests’ of the ones that make it rather than being ‘supply’. The real problems are getting peace proposals that are, objective, effective, which are made neutrally, which are motivated by genuine concern for ‘peace’ for its own sake. The problem of getting ‘value’ free ‘recommendations’ is the challenge of policy makers in the Horn of Africa. The stage of development of civic societies, research institutes, democratic rights, the exposure to continental decision making networks, are limitations of indigenous intellectuals making their real output ineffective, coupled with government blocks on such information sources makes right policy and intervention difficult. The chance for the external actors to be misguided is always there as a result of the imbalance of information from the civil and human right groups of endogenous origins.

As we have seen in the case of the ICU, advent to power and their subsequent ‘fall’ which is administered by international intervention was itself a result of recommendations made at various levels of the international decision making process, which was the ‘real problem’ according to this research observation; all actions were results of their respective recommendations. One can see two sets of competing recommendations on how to deal with the ICU and the peace problem is Somalia. First, was the one that ‘starts and ended’ with the allegation of the ICU as terrorist organisation that need to be denied to come to power in Somalia. The reasons were: they are going to constitute a
threat to international peace in the immediate future. It germinated from the regional policy round tables between governments which control the modern through lobbying mechanisms in a synchronised manner. The strategy of case building is observed and it was effective when one considers the problems faced by the ICU. The research throughout the materials it gathered has observed at least ‘Six myths’ about the ICU that crippled its potential to create peace in Somalia:

1- ‘Islamic Courts Union is connected to Al Qaeda’;
2- ‘they are threats to all countries in the region’,
   there will be peace in Somalia once these forces are defeated,
3- ‘Talibanisation of the Horn country will stop’
4- ‘Best chance for Somalis created for genuine democracy under Transitional Federal Government of Somalia’;
5- ‘International community will be victim if it remains neutral or bystander in the unfolding crisis in Somalia as result of the coming of the ICU’,
6- ‘Proxy war in Somalia between Ethiopia and Eritrea is inevitable, hence border issues need to be resolved’.

The opposing recommendation to the international community was given by another group of intellectuals that have the best explanations but not the best of the chance to effect policy change, but still constitute an alternative view over the issue. The main ones could be summarized like this:

- international community should pursue peaceful change in Ethiopia and Eritrea, to do this there needs to be an alternative to the traditional diplomatic means, including track II diplomacy, informal dialogue with civil society leaders, and non-governmental conflict resolution mechanisms;

- there should be comprehensive and long term engagement rather than ‘surgically ‘trying to operate on problems and narrow counter terrorism approach of international community. The international community should not be affected by conventional wisdom about the ICU;

- big powers like the US need to disentangle themselves from regional powers with vested
interest, which resembles the US’s interest but in actual fact has nothing to do with it.

Before still putting forward the recommendations of this research, it is worth adding other views in this regard: professor David Shinn, former Ambassador of the US in Ethiopia shared his view on how the Islamic Courts Union were not a threat to regional peace. First he argued that non-Somalis were involved in the 1998 terror attack against US Embassies in East Africa; second, he pointed out the Ethiopian military is so strong that the ICU cannot pose a real challenge to homeland or regional security; third, Ethiopia’s military incursion in Somalia, covered by IGASOM, or by any other name will turn over the area controlled by the ICU to the TFG and former war lords but doubt if they would eventually succeed in withstanding the attack by the ICU making the Ethiopian extended stay inevitable inside Somalia. Then Ethiopia’s presence is not helpful for Horn stability and US interests; fourth, hence negotiation with the UIC and the TFG has to take place to share power, the TFG might bring short term peace but even that is wishful thinking according to his evaluation.113

The existence of various proposals and with strategic implication they carry with them, as involving actors seem to concentrate on their own sources information, decision input, without the benefit of doubt for opposing ideas sometimes create myopic versions.

Even though it has no bearing on what is going on in Somalia, this report’s recommendation appear as follows:

- As the findings suggest, the competing ‘thinking’ in the international intervention, be it from idealist or realist perspective, need to have common ground in addressing the issue of peace in Somalia in a non-Partisan way (in the US case, a bipartisan approach is required in the Somali crisis) and in the venture of creating peace in the Horn of Africa. It is high time to synchronise and plan actions and strategy of peace that would serve the long objectives: peace and stability in Somalia or in the region;

- The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ theory that framed the minds of international decision makers especially from the realist camp need to be toned down and there needs to be an optimistic view that emphasises cultural exchange and living with difference of identities and ways of life. There seems less things as called ‘the right’ culture and the ‘right religion’ as all comparisons are ‘ethnocentric’,
the world needs to move away from confrontation, based on these yardsticks for causes of universal human security;

-As it can be seen from the growing insurgency, the ‘Transitional Federal Government of Somalia
(TFG) appears a ‘temporary fix’ rather than a base for a durable solution to the peace problem in the Horn of Africa. The idea of bringing back the ICU is a plausible argument, they have been excluded from the September, 2007 peace process that was conducted inside Somalia and still the problem stands as it is.

-International intervention in Horn of Africa has to aim for ‘peace creation’ as an objective first
and foremost agenda than any other unilateral or multilateral short term objectives. Peace creation cannot be achieved if the people of the country are not heard. The US and international community need to make a paradigm shift from helping the ‘leviathan’ or governments to supporting the ‘demos’ the people, in that the strategy of fighting terrorism will be served. As the people will cooperate denying the real safe haven. Governments are wrong partners in fighting terrorism anywhere in the world;

-International decision making has been problematic as seen in the report – to mitigate this shortfalls
the international community needs to devise a different mechanism that relies on its own objective assessment and value free proposals. Excessive reliance on ‘pre-processed’ or second hand policy inputs will end up producing contaminated outputs that help those who designed it, therefore, it is recommended that ‘trust’ the victims, not the ‘perpetrators’;

-Even though governments came and went, Somalia as a state has been a member of the UN, OAU, etc. unfortunately the power groups could not defend its interest, hence the international community should remember its responsibility to protect the ‘wills of dead states’, the desire for territorial integrity remains intact, national unity preserved, and good governance and statesmanship.
International intervention should include as its objective ‘defending the will of failed states’ as part of its moral obligation.
- The view that suggests the protracted Ethiopian military presence in Somalia need to be avoided and the ICU as evolving and endogenous powers have to be included in the powers sharing process is plausible in the view of this report and need to be implemented,

- Secularism is in the culture of Somali people, but the overemphasis on associating the ICU with terrorism will create stigma on the people which could have a backlash of making the people support the ICU as protectors of Islam, which is the official religion, than about 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism'. This needs swift change and creating partnership with these forces is may not be treated as dead case.

- Dissecting Somalia into two states also affects future peace and the international community should learn from the 'Ethio-Eritrea' conflict instead, encourage them live together as viable entities without risking cross border and interstate conflict that will have heavy loss rather than inter clan warfare. Full recognition of Somalia is a recipe for future conflicts that need to be avoided.
Postscript

The Somalian crisis is so deep and intertwined with other regional and domestic issues which go beyond the scope of this study. The research has focused on the case of 'Union of Islamic Courts' and an account of their brief existence. Moreover, it is bound by the time frame from 2006-2008. However, the Somali crisis is broad and embedded with its own history, in the historical nature and scale of Global intervention, and by Somalia's relation with other neighbouring countries. The civil war is still ongoing and the need for peaceful solution is still alive. After the completion of this research different events have taken place, but the validity of the arguments contained in it are valid.

The recent peace initiatives by the international community, especially by the United Nations Organization, have recognized the fact that Islamic Courts Union was lost opportunity for peace in 2006. The proof of this has been the reintegration of ICU leadership in current Somlian Government that came after the Djibouti peace process in 2009. The election conducted among the rival Somali political forces resulted in making Sheikh Sharif Ahmed the leader of ICU to be a new president of Somalia.

As the solution is made after two years of ICU's demise by the invasion of Ethiopia, and owing to infighting which was resulted from that crisis, the courts union has suffered from power split. The hardliner Islamists led by Shiek Aweys, still rejected the peace process and commands the allegiance of Al-Shaba militia. Apart from this other hardliner groups called Hizb al-Islamia (Islamic Party) is formed and from its inception has kept on rejecting the truce proposed by new president of Somalia.

The thesis of this essay has been vindicated by the realities on the ground and with the benefit of hind-site one can clearly observe the missed opportunities of peace in 2006 when ICU was integrated and internally evolved political force that could have overcome the problem of conflict in Somalia. By then it had better organization and enjoyed the popular support of peace loving
Somalis. Nonetheless, the incoming ICU which is basically only part of former group, is yet to regain its ground of support in highly polarized situations.

Questions like: How Somalia could durably be made peaceful? How the international cooperation should take form? How international intervention could induce democratic governance, as a basis for peace, in the Horn Africa and Somalia in particular? Can the current new government of Somalia which is led by the former leader of Islamic Courts Union, bring peace and stabilize the country? All are remained to be seen.

Ethiopia has withdrawn its forces, African Union peacekeepers are stationed in Somalia with restricted mandate, yet become the target of hardliners. A 3500 Strong peacekeeping draws its members from Uganda and Burundi. Other African states who pledged force for the contingent are yet to send their forces. The new president, Shiekh Sharif Ahmed has nominated Omar Abdirashid Ali sharmarke, as his new prime minister and called for truce and negotiation with the Al Shabab and Islamic party. Despite the culture of mistrust is there, the potential for peace in Somalia exists.

End.
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