CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN ZAMBIA

Godfrey Haamweela Nachitumbi Haantobolo

(Student Number 0407161F)

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Supervisor: Prof Gavin Cawthra, Director / Chair, Centre for Defence and Security Management.

Co-supervisor: Prof Bizeck Jube Phiri, Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zambia.

8th May, 2008
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Abstract

This study of civil control of the military in Zambia was undertaken in order to ascertain why in contrast with many other former British colonies in Africa such as Ghana and Uganda the military in that country has consistently supported the ruling elite and not sought to obtain political power for itself.

In answering the question why this was the case, this study used the qualitative methods and analytical concepts of coercive and consensual measures of control, although the two types of measures are often used in combination, as the main tools that determined civil control of the military in four periods, namely the colonial period, the immediate post-independence period, the period of one-party rule, and the period of reinstated multiparty democracy.

Using either coercive or consensual measures as our tools of analysis, comparative profiles were constructed of the nature, character and degree of civil control of the military in each period, and how these were reconfigured by the different political transitions that ushered in the four periods. This assisted in ascertaining which elements of civil control of the military remained constant, and which changed. Data was collected from primary and secondary sources, and verified in in-depth interviews with 20 role players.

The main findings are that Zambian governments used two main methods to exert civil control over the military.

During the colonial period (1900–1963), the dominant method was coercive measures which was reflected in the policies of racial discrimination and implemented through racialised structures like parliament, the executive and the judiciary. Consequently, relations between the government, the military, and white settlers were harmonious, while those with Africans were antagonistic and explosive.

Under the Independence Constitution of the First Republic (1964–1972), the use of consensual measures was manifested in the normative frameworks found in non-racial multiparty democracies and spelt out in the constitution and other specific legislation. In the Zambian case, this was supported by the new government’s motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’.

Under the One-Party Constitution of the Second Republic (1973-1990), the dominant method was largely through the use of coercive measures characteristic of one
party states in terms of which military and civil intelligence officers monitored the political activities of all military personnel as well as ordinary civilians. This helped to remove all anti-government elements from the military.

Under the Multi-Party Constitution of the Third Republic (1991-2004), the dominant methods were a combination of all good practices inherited from the previous republics but largely through consensual measures which were manifested in the reintroduction of strong parliamentary and executive oversight over defence expenditure and activities.

This study concludes that stable civil control of the military in Zambia in the 20th century was as a result of effective use of either coercive or consensual measures or the mixture of the two and this sets Zambia apart from many other African countries. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize one point on the relevance of this study’s findings for the study of civil-military relations. This is that despite that both these types of measures worked as a solution for Zambia, upon closer scrutiny, civil control of the military cannot be indefinitely secured by coercive means, and that the only sustainable way of securing civil control of the military is to maintain consensual relations between the core ‘triumvirate’ namely: the political authorities/government/ruling elite; the military and military elite; and the citizenry.
Declaration

I declare that the study entitled ‘Civil Control of the Military in Zambia’ is my own unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university.

Godfrey Haamweela Nachitumbi Haantobolo

8th May, 2008
Dedication

I dedicate this work to the past and future leaders of the government of Zambia, the men and women in the Ministry of Defence and all security institutions in Zambia, the past and future members of the Parliament of Zambia, and the general citizenry of that country. Their nationalistic tolerance and democratic consciousness created a peaceful country in Central / Southern Africa and among the former British colonies in Africa which created effective methods for maintaining civil control of the military. Together, they created a Zambia that became the envy of both its enemies and its friends. Hence this study.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Mr Amusaa Mwanamwambwa, Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia, and Ms Doris K Mwinga, Clerk of the National Assembly of Zambia, for giving me paid study leave to pursue this programme. I also wish to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Prof Gavin Cawthra, for his unreserved guidance and encouragement during the writing of this thesis. His intellectual sophistication in matters related to defence, security and peacekeeping and the constructive comments he made in the course of writing the thesis have been extremely rewarding. My thanks also go to Prof B J Phiri for his intellectual guidance and provision of logistical support in the process of writing this thesis. I would also wish to thank Dr Cecile Badenhorst for tutoring me in research methods. The practical applications of these methods have enabled me to produce this thesis.

My special thanks also go to the permanent secretary of the Zambian Ministry of Defence, who gave me access to primary and secondary sources at the Ministry of Defence Headquarters. The same office gave me clearance to interview eminent personalities in the field of the civil control of the military in Zambia. They included former president Dr K D Kaunda, Gen Malimba Masheke, first director of the Department of Military Intelligence; Lt-Gen Christone Tembo, former army commander, diplomat, and vice-president; Brig-Gen Timothy Kazembe, former director of military intelligence and army secretary; former members of parliament; and many others. I particularly wish to thank all the people who agreed to be interviewed for this study for their contributions enriched the study.

I also wish to thank Prof A W Chanda, Prof M C Musambachime, Mr F Chigunta, Dr B Siamwiza, Dr A N Phiri, Dr A van Nieuwkerk, Ms Shirley Magano, Lt-Gen Solly Mollo, Mr C J Banda, Mr M Mukelabai, and Mr K Kankansa for their constructive academic criticisms of my work during the course of my study. I also wish to thank Ms C Ngwira for typing the thesis.

My thanks are also due to the Southern African Defence and Security Management network for the scholarship that enabled me to complete this thesis with the minimum of financial difficulties. My thanks also go to my wife, Prisca Himakuni, and my daughter, Choolwe, for their support and resilience during the process of writing the thesis. I am grateful to all the others who contributed to this study in one way or the other.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQMG</td>
<td>Assistant Quarter Master General.</td>
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<td>BJTT</td>
<td>British Joint Training Team.</td>
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<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South African Company.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFRN</td>
<td>Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistics Office.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCG</td>
<td>Donor Consultative Group.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Director of Public Prosecutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forum for Democracy and Development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB£</td>
<td>British Pounds Sterling.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRZ</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Zambia.</td>
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<td>GSO</td>
<td>General Staff Officer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HP</td>
<td>Heritage Party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANC</td>
<td>Mozambique African National Congress.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multi Party Democracy.</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola.</td>
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<td>NAZ</td>
<td>National Archives of Zambia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAZ</td>
<td>National Assembly of Zambia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NER</td>
<td>North Eastern Rhodesia.</td>
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<td>NR</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRG</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia Government.</td>
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<td>NWR</td>
<td>North Western Rhodesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress.</td>
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<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Rhodesia Air Force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme.</td>
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<td>SR</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia.</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African Peoples Organisation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence.</td>
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<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>United Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPND</td>
<td>United Party for National Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA$</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank.</td>
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<td>WW1</td>
<td>World War One</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZA</td>
<td>Zambia Army</td>
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<td>ZAF</td>
<td>Zambia Air Force</td>
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<td>ZNS</td>
<td>Zambia National Service.</td>
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<td>ZPA</td>
<td>Zambia Privatisation Agency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union.</td>
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<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union.</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

The study of civil control of the military has developed since the 1950s and has attracted the attention of scholars such as Huntington (1957, 1968); Perlmutter (1977, 1980); Welch (1976); Hutchful (1988); Edmonds (1988); Decalo (1991); and Cawthra and Luckham (2002). Most of this attention has focused on South America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East, where many unstable post-colonial governments have been overturned by military coups d’etat. In this context, the maintenance of stable and effective civil control over the military in some former colonies – with Zambia a prominent example – is regarded as an anomaly.

Culturally and socially, it is difficult to understand how Zambia has managed to unite 73 ethnic groups in a stable political dispensation. It is also difficult to understand how successive Zambian governments have managed to maintain a co-operative and obedient military organisation that has refrained from intervening in domestic politics, in contrast with the military in other former British-ruled African countries such as Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria. In these countries, and many others in the third world, the military successfully overthrew democratically elected governments shortly after independence, and took over the reins of state.

In view of the foregoing, this study of civil control of the military in Zambia was undertaken in order to ascertain why in contrast with many other African countries after independence the military in Zambia consistently supported the ruling elite. Before we address this question, we need to examine the measures used by various civil political authorities to maintain control over the military. The study then finds that Zambia’s history falls into four distinct periods, namely, the colonial period between 1900 and 1964; the immediate post independence era which lasted from 1964 to 1972; the one party state era period from 1973 to December 1990; and the re-introduced period of plural politics between December 1990 to 2004. The latter three periods are known respectively as the First, Second and Third Republics.

The analysis of civil control of the military in Zambia in the four periods, has been carried out using two groups of concepts: namely the dominant use of coercive measures for the periods covering the colonial and one party state eras and predominately consensual measures for the periods covering the immediate post independence era and
that period after the end of the cold war. Little et al (1973: 403) define coercive measures as ‘the employment of force by government to suppress political disaffection and disorder’. For the purpose of this study, this concept will be applied to the use of the policies of racial discrimination and racist structures during the colonial period and the embedding of military intelligence in the military structures during the one party state eras. Mitchell (1968:41) on the other hand explains that the concept consensual is derived and synonymous with the concept consensus. In this study, therefore, consensual measures are defined as a democratic system of governance that provides sufficient agreement about the legitimacy of the main three institutions of governance, namely, the legislature, executive and judiciary visa-a-vis military institutions, more specifically, ‘the general rules and particular commands which they promulgate and execute and the distribution of roles, rewards and facilities which they influence and are held responsible’ (Mitchell 1968: 41). If there is a moderate degree of consensus in the execution of accepted tasks and widespread acceptance of allocation of rewards, a peaceful resolution of conflicts among institutions of governance, as well as the military and the citizenry, is possible, and conflicts can be contained and resolved, including through the maintenance of stable civil control of the military.

In the colonial period the Northern Rhodesia civil political authorities used undemocratic coercive measures to maintain control over the military. This was characterized by the establishment of discriminatory and racist structures based on the principle of divide and rule at legislative, executive and judicial levels. This approach then made the colonial authorities create an army with two faces: one white and one black. In this environment, the essential role of the military was to protect the interests of the white settlers and the colonial regime and ensure the subordination and subservience of the indigenous African population. The study then argues that the two-faced nature of the colonial army made its relations between the white political and military elite harmonious; and those between the military and the African population antagonistic. As Welch has remarked, ‘The apolitical nature of the colonial army in fact served a profoundly political purpose: maintenance of British rule, in its genesis and continuation (1978: 159).

In the First Republic under the post-independence constitution (1964 to 1972), civil control of the military in Zambia was guided by what this study terms ‘consensual measures’. These are defined as those created by the normative frameworks found in non-racial multi-party democracies. These positive and consensual values are normally spelt out in the constitution, carried out in more specific legislation and implemented in
practice through government policies by most stakeholders in the governance system of a country. Under these measures civil control of the military in Zambia took the form of fundamental structural reforms involving the careful use of recruitment, training, promotion, retirement and budgetary policies by the government of the day, which resulted in the development of a military culture that bred loyal and trusted officers. The study then argues that this was supported by the effective use of structures such as the executive, parliament, Office of the Commander in Chief, Ministry of Defence, Defence Counsel and Office of the Command Secretary.

In the Second Republic under the one-party constitution (1972 to 1990), civil control of the military in Zambia reverted to undemocratic coercive measures characterized by the introduction of punitive patterns of recruitment and behavioural controls over the military similar to those found in a socialist state. However, the study argues that these measures changed their nature and characteristics from the discriminatory racist structures of the colonial period to embedding intelligence officers in military units through party structures for purposes of surveillance of the military’s political activities. The study then argues that like in some socialist systems of government, security personnel provided the political leadership with information about the beliefs and behaviours of each military officer, as well as sentiments among the rank and file. This allowed the Defence Council and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces to assess the loyalty to the ruling party and government of any military officer before any decision was made to promote, demote, suspend or retire them. The same punitive institutions were used to defuse any plans for attempted military coup d’états, as well as popular uprisings.

In the Third Republic, under the multi party constitution (1991-2004) brought about by the 1989 end of the cold war era, and characterized by the collapse of most socialist states in Eastern Europe, civil control of the military in Zambia took more consensual forms. In this period, the study argues that, learning from experience, civil control of the military embedded most of the positive aspects of the previous regimes. Therefore, civil control of the military depended on a combination of parliamentary oversight over defence budgetary allocations and programmes, executive and judicial powers, as well as the loyalty of the military to the government of the day.

In concluding the introductory section, the study argues that the answer to why all the political regimes in Zambia in the 20th century managed to stave off successful coups in contrast to many African countries after independence lies in the successful, use
of a mixture of coercive and consensual measures described in the four periods above. Zambia, to a large extent, also managed to diffuse the problem of ethnicity through the practical implementation of the motto ‘One Zambia One Nation’ in its recruitment and deployment policies in all the sectors including the military. Upon further scrutiny of events in both the colonial and one party eras in Zambia the study demonstrates that civil control of the military cannot be indefinitely secured by coercive means. The most likely sustainable way of securing civil control of the military is to maintain consensual relations between the core triumvirate namely, the political authorities/government/ruling elite; the military and military elite; and the citizenry.

In view of the above statements of the core question to be investigated and the brief examination of the two concepts that dominated the four periods of study, it is now important to contextualize our investigations in terms of the background to and the objectives of the study.

1.2 Background to and objectives of the study

The history of civil-military relations in the territory later known as Northern Rhodesia began in 1891 with its colonisation by Britain, through the British South Africa Company (BSAC). In terms of the ideology of modernisation, all precolonial African societies in the region were regarded as underdeveloped, and their traditional cultures were to be replaced with a superior western one of enlightenment characterised by modernity (see Crush 1995:2-6). Traditional or pre-modern societies were characterised as ‘largely rural, agricultural, religious, small populations, homogenous, superstitious, ignorant or non-scientific, pre-capitalist or early capitalist’ (Clough and Rapp 1975:43). Nineteenth-century Europeans believed that

ignorance and superstition were the mainstays of traditional society and were characterised by authoritarian government, customs, the simple outlook of farmers and peasants, traditions and myths and were an obstacle to freedom, happiness and human progress (Hollinger 1997:2).

It was believed that the colonisation of these societies by superior western and modern societies would replace ‘ignorance with knowledge, scientific power, control and prediction which, in turn, would pave the way for endless human progress’ (ibid:7). Modern society, on the other hand, was characterised by the ‘late 18th and 19th Centuries Enlightenment intellectual movement associated with the growth of urban areas,
capitalism, democracy, science, technology, cultural and political heterogeneity’ (Clough and Rapp 1975:160).

Armed with this superior philosophy, the BSAC established a police force in both North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia whose purpose was to protect its commercial and financial interests. This force consisted of

one hundred and thirty troops, all of them volunteers raised by the Indian Colonial government from India. In 1893, this force was replaced by the Makua natives of Mozambique and Atonga natives of West Nyasaland with English officers seconded from the English Regiment (Brelsford 1949: 3-4).

Following the establishment of this force, the company proceeded to colonise Northern Rhodesia by force. African chiefs such as the Litunga of Barotseland, who were aware of the power of the Europeans as a result of the conquest of Lobengula in Matebeleland in 1894, chose to collaborate. The Litunga accepted the colonisation of his area of influence in North-Western Rhodesia by signing the Ware Concession of 1889, the Lochner Concession of 1890, and the Corrindon Treaty of 1900 (Hall 1965:64-71). These concessions gave the BSAC administrative and mineral rights and powers in the territory of the Barotse nation, including all subjects and dependent territory, covering the Zambezi-Congo watershed and land further east along the course of the Kafue River (Hall 1968:71). Chiefs who resisted colonial intrusion, such as Chief Mpezeni of the Ngoni, were defeated by company troops in 1898. The Ngoni were required to pay a fine of

twelve thousand head of cattle. The British Administration was then extended to Ngoniland and Fort Jameson, the Capital for North-Eastern Rhodesia was built on one of Mpezeni’s Induna’s village formerly known as Kapatamoyo and this led to the colonisation of North-Eastern Rhodesia by force (ibid:90-91).

In 1911 the British government combined North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia into one territory known as Northern Rhodesia. In 1924 it terminated the BSAC’s rule in Northern Rhodesia and assumed direct control of the territory. The new government established a legislative council, executive, and judiciary. These institutions of governance adopted and implemented coercive policies and laws that led to the removal of Africans from Crown land to native reserves, the introduction of
discriminatory pay for whites and blacks, and many other racist measures. In the face of protests from affected sections of the African communities, the colonial regime used the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Police Force to ensure that African communities complied with government directives.

The introduction of colonial rule in the territory resulted in the establishment of a colonial military force that derived its legitimacy from the coercive discriminatory political, economic and social policies of the colonial system. Civil-military relations were controlled by the governor of Northern Rhodesia, who was also commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This resulted in the emergence of a police force which performed both policing and military functions and whose primary role was to protect the lives and property of white settlers. Despite this drastic and invasive role of the military, especially its involvement in the conquest of indigenous or native societies, very little has been done to investigate the impact of British conquest on civil control of the military, and particularly its role in determining the relationships that developed between the colonial government, colonial military personnel, and conquered Africans in Northern Rhodesia.

It is argued here that the coercive discriminatory policies and laws adopted during the colonial period in Northern Rhodesia served the interests of white settlers as well as the imperial political and military elite. However, the non-recognitioh of the rights of Africans to own land, vote, enjoy freedom of movement, strike, and belong to political parties of their choice did not encourage harmonious relations between Africans and the political and military elite. Therefore, up to 1964, the relationship between the white political and military ruling group on the one hand and the indigenous African population on the other was largely antagonistic.

After attaining political independence in 1964, the new Zambian government was faced with the task of reshaping the civil-military relations inherited from British imperialism to suit the new dispensation. This called for consensual measures that resulted in the introduction of structural changes to the military establishment which were commensurate with the creation of a society that provided equal opportunities for all regardless of race, tribe, sex and creed. How the new post-independence government managed the transition of civil-military relations from colonialism to independence will be dealt with in chapter 5.

The immediate post-independence period is doubly significant, given that it was marked by a spate of rebellions and tensions. For example, in 1964 ‘a series of violent clashes occurred between the security forces and the followers of Alice Leshina’s Lumpa
Sect in the Chinsali, Lundazi, Isoka and Kasama Districts’ (Mulford 1967:165). The impact of these disturbances on civil-military relations in Zambia will be investigated. Furthermore, the failure by the new government to deliver the fruits of independence to the Zambian people led to growing rivalry between the ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and the opposition African National Congress (ANC). This was further exacerbated by growing rivalries within UNIP that resulted in the party losing a significant number of seats in the House of Assembly during the 1968 parliamentary elections (Chikulo 1997:202-203). In 1972, prompted by fears of being voted out of power, UNIP leaders declared Zambia a one-party state. How this changed the mostly consensual methods in terms of the nature, character and degree of civil control of the military from objective methods tailored by the British independence constitution to more coercive subjective methods under a one-party dispensation is examined in chapter 6. For the purposes of this study, subjective methods of control are defined as non-constitutional-legalistic methods used by both political and civil authorities to ensure the ongoing obedience and compliance of armed forces. Such methods include party penetration of the leadership echelons of the armed forces, and ethnic manipulation of the composition of the officer corps (Williams 1998:26).

Objective factors, on the other hand, are those that refer to the level and legitimacy of formal political and civil organisation within a society, the role of parliament and its various committees and mechanisms in ensuring civil oversight over both the State in general and armed forces in particular, and the existence of formal control mechanisms within the government designed to ensure the acquiescence of the armed forces (Williams 1998:25-26).

Immediately after the declaration of a one-party ‘participatory democracy’, a rebel group in the North-Western Province known as the Mushala gang rose against the government. The government used the defence force to crush the rebellion. Almost no research has been done on the causes, course, and results of the Mushala rebellion, especially its impact on civil-military relations.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the one-party state experienced economic hardships that led to the introduction of new coercive subjective methods for controlling the
military. This study examines how the use of coercive controls such as military intelligence and party controls at places of work affected the relationship between citizens, the military, and government in the period leading to the attempted military coups d’état in 1980, 1988 and 1990, and the food riots in 1986.

This study also examines how the reintroduction of multiparty politics and consensual measures in 1991 affected civil control of the military. First, the consensual and coercive controls over the military developed by the first two republics had to be amended to suit the new democratic dispensation. The resultant reorganisation, aimed at professionalising the military, led to the retrenchment or retirement of some military personnel. Moreover, strong executive and parliamentary oversight over defence and other security institutions was introduced. Delays in the payment of retirement benefits for military personnel, and the general socioeconomic effects of the reintroduction of plural politics in the context of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), resulted in some junior officers in the military staging an unsuccessful coup in 1997 (Mulenga 2000:190; Chigunta 2003:200). This study investigates how the Third Republic used the re-introduced consensual measures to develop harmonious methods for controlling the military.

The assessment and interpretation of these facts helps to explain why, in each period of history in Zambia, the nature, character and degree of civil control of the military were reconfigured to suit different political transitions and stave off successful coups.

Against this background, the main objective of this study is to investigate why, in contrast with many other African countries after independence – the military in Zambia under different constitutional regimes, has largely supported the economic, social and political ideals of the ruling elite.

Its more specific objectives are to:

1) assess how the coercive measures of racial structures practised by the Northern Rhodesian colonial government influenced the oversight of the military by parliament, the executive and the judiciary on behalf of the white settler community up to 1964;

2) examine how, in the First Republic, more consensual measures in civil control of the military were introduced which suited the new Zambian state;
3) assess how, in the Second Republic, the introduction of coercive subjective measures such as behavioural control through military intelligence and party controls in all military establishments ensured the acquiescence of the armed forces;

4) examine how, in the Third Republic, the re-introduction of consensual measures characterised by the good aspects of structural policies; behavioural controls; parliamentary, executive and judicial oversight of defence expenditure; and other measures contributed to civil control of the military;

5) assess the role of parliament in ensuring civil oversight over the state in general and the armed forces in particular, and how this facilitated civil-military relations in the four republics;

6) examine the role of the judiciary in administering legislation that determined the roles and responsibilities of the armed forces, and monitored their activities, in the four republics operating;

7) examine the measures that guided the recruitment of military personnel in the four republics, and how these personnel carried out their responsibilities in relation to the citizenry; and

8) examine the roots of the tradition of interaction between the citizenry and the political and military elite, and how this helped to ensure relatively harmonious civil-military relations in the four periods under review.

In pursuing these objectives, this study provides a comprehensive assessment of how Zambia’s first government after independence used consensual measures to reshape the coercive British imperial tradition of civil-military relations to suit the new Zambian state. It also shows that Zambia has been relatively peaceful since independence because, in contrast with some other former British colonies, it developed stable methods of civil control of the military. The non-intervention in domestic politics by the military in Zambia could also be explained in terms of concepts and theories of civil-military relations developed over the past 60 years.

1.3 Area and period of study

This study is rooted in the discipline of civil-military relations, in the context of political and social history. It is confined to the Republic of Zambia, a land-locked state
in southern-central Africa. This country is bordered to the north by Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo; to the east by Malawi and Mozambique; to the south by Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia; and to the west by Angola. The climate is tropical, modified by altitude, with average temperatures ranging from 18 to 24 degrees centigrade (65 to 75 degrees Fahrenheit). The main languages are Tonga, Bemba, Lozi, Nyanja, Lunda and Luvale. The official language is English. Christians make up a large proportion of the population, and are roughly divided between Protestants and Roman Catholics. Most Asians are Muslims, and the rest are Hindus. Some Africans follow traditional animist beliefs. The national flag (proportions 3 by 2) is green, with a canton in the lower fly having equal red, black and orange vertical stripes, surmounted by an osprey in flight. The capital city is Lusaka.

This study is divided into an examination of four periods. Copans (1978:19) points out that ‘periodization aims at bringing to the fore two different kinds of phenomena; the historical and social context of the theoretical development, and the ideological and theoretical configuration of concepts’. The first period is 1900–1963, when the country was under British colonial rule. Civil-military relations caused antagonism between European settlers and Africans. This was because the executive and the legislative council used coercive policies and laws that favoured the economic and political interests of white settlers as against those of Africans. The second period is 1964–1972, when the country was a multiparty democracy, and civil-military relations were governed by consensual measures under the British-tailored independence constitution. Politically, after 1968, this period was characterised by

inter-party rivalry organised along ethnic lines between the ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and opposition parties on one hand and intra-party rivalry within UNIP itself which threatened the very survival of the State (Chikuyo 1975:202).

For these reasons, the UNIP government decided to introduce coercive methods of civil control of the military through a semi-socialist system, and declared Zambia a one-party state. Therefore, the third period is 1973 to December 1990, in which Zambia was governed as a ‘One-Party Participatory Democracy’ under the 1973 One-Party Constitution. In this period, power was concentrated in the hands of the president and other party leaders without any significant opposition. By the end of the 1980s, the government’s economic policies had led to deteriorating standards of living. These problems coincided with the end of the Cold War, which was characterised by the
collapse of the communist bloc and other one-party regimes other than Cuba and China, and their replacement by the capitalist bloc and its multiparty democratic political system. These world-wide political changes and the local economic and political problems made the people of Zambia agitate for the abolition of the one-party state and the reintroduction of multi-party democracy. The fourth period is December 1991 to 2004 when the multiparty democracy and consensual methods of civil control of the military were reintroduced under a new constitution that abolished the one-party system.

1.4 Civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1963

The conquest of what became Northern Rhodesia was influenced by the Berlin conference of 1884–5, where European powers decided how to divide Africa among themselves. Consequently the British government used the British South African Company (BSAC) under John Cecil Rhodes to conquer North-Western Rhodesia through collaborative treaties with Chief Lewanika of the Lozi people. In North-Eastern Rhodesia the conquest took the form of collaborative treaties as well as the military defeat of the Ngoni people under Chief Mpezeni.

This conquest was followed by the establishment of European institutions of governance comprising an executive, a legislative council, and a judiciary, which served the interests of the colonial regime and the British Imperial government, and implemented coercive discriminatory policies which were enforced by colonial police – the forerunner of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. This amounted to an undemocratic dispensation that fundamentally violated Africans’ economic, political and social rights. Consequently, after attaining independence in 1964, African nationalist movements struggled to replace this with a democratic system of government based on more consensual measures. Welch (1978) examines the nature of civil control over the military and the role played by the colonial armies in the former African British colonies. He argues that, since colonial rule in Africa was undemocratic by nature, character and degree,

the colonial armies mixed police and military roles. Their responsibilities were primarily domestic, although the world wars resulted in a temporary change of duties. Particularly in Africa, border protection was less important than subduing internal dissent (Welch 1978:157).

He also points out that the
apoliitical character of colonial armies in former British colonies in Africa served a profoundly political purpose of the maintenance of external rule. The military supported British rule in its genesis and in its continuation. This led to a profound chasm between armed forces and the society. As a result of this, very different civil-military relations existed from those in Great Britain and Africa (ibid:160).

How the use of the military to enforce coercive colonial policies and laws impacted on civil control over the military in the colonial period is relevant to our research, and is the subject of this investigation.

1.5 Civil control of the military in Zambia: The First Republic, 1964–72

As noted earlier, Zambia’s geopolitical position at the time of independence was precarious in that it was surrounded by hostile colonial states that detested the new government’s foreign policy of providing bases to liberation movements fighting for the independence of their countries. Hall (1969:25-26) explains that there were reports in the South African newspapers that the South African Army was drawing up plans for ‘Israeli-type strikes’ against guerrilla holding camps in Zambia, and Vorster, the Prime Minister of South Africa, said he might hit Zambia hard, [and] that Zambians would not forget it.

Sir De Villiers Graaff, leader of the United Party, the official parliamentary opposition in South Africa, also urged Zambia and Tanzania to stop providing refuge to guerrillas operating against the colonial regimes in Mozambique, Angola, and Southern Rhodesia. The Zambian president, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, responded to Vorster’s threats by advising him that the Zambian government would not change its principles (ibid:26). In this situation, in the period 1964 to 1972, the Zambian government was compelled to take the threats of its hostile neighbours seriously, and thus embarked on an expansion of its military institutions and forces.

The consensus-based measures that led to structural changes in the military establishment were also part of a broader effort to introduce effective administration, and address the challenges of new nationhood. The government sought to assume effective control over Zambia’s geographic, linguistic, ethnic, and military challenges in order to maintain external and internal stability, law and order, national coherence, and the
legitimacy of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) government, led by Kaunda. The situation was complicated by an internal rebellion led by Alice Lenshina (Regina) Mulenga’s Lumpa Sect Church that had wide support in the Chinsali, Lundazi, Kasama and Isoka districts. Acting in accordance with Article 265 (Section 7) of the independence constitution, the president declared a state of public emergency.

Four other steps were taken. The first was to implement constraints facilitating civil control of the military enshrined in the new constitution. For instance, Article 49 provided for the

command of the armed forces in Zambia by the President who has had formal control over appointments and promotion of military officers to the highest ranks and the designation of elected civilians as constitutional heads of the Ministry of Defence (GRZ 1964:44).

The second was the expansion of the Zambian army and air force. Thirdly, the president assumed direct control over the defence budget, which was therefore not subject to parliamentary debate and oversight. The fourth was to send Zambian defence personnel to socialist countries for training in addition to opportunities offered by the British government.

The introduction in 1971 of voluntary and compulsory military training through the Zambia National Service enabled Zambia ‘to tap the most intelligent and energetic population through partial military training’ (Welch 1976:12). This enabled the government to develop an effective nationwide defence system consisting of citizens who could be called on at any time to assist the military in the defence of the state as and when the need arose. It further broadened the widened the sphere of responsibility assigned to the military.

Between 1968 and 1971, governance was complicated by two main factors. The first was the country’s severe inter-party and intra-party rivalries and secondly, Zambia’s provisions of bases and other logistics to nationalist movements from neighbouring countries struggling to get their independence and end apartheid rule in South Africa. On 22nd August 1971 Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe and other senior Bemba speaking politicians and ministers resigned from UNIP and formed the United Progressive Party (UPP). The formation of UPP resulted in intra-party rivalry within UNIP with ‘Senior Bemba ministers accusing non-Bemba colleagues of tribalism, embezzlement and rape’ (Sardanis 2003: 261). In order to save UNIP from collapse, on 4 February 1972, Kaunda
used his powers under the ‘Preservation of Public Security Regulations to ban UPP and detained its president Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe and 122 others bringing the total number of detainees to 238’ (Sardanis 2003: 202). These detentions were used by the party and government leadership as solutions to intra-party rivalries. In order to avoid these problems becoming a reason for domestic military intervention, as had happened in Ghana and Nigeria, the Zambian government decided in 1973 to introduce a one-party participatory democracy. This will be examined in the next section.

1.6 Civil control of the military in Zambia: the Second Republic (1973-91)

In December 1972 a one-party participatory democracy was introduced in Zambia. The, then, existing legal opposition political parties such as the African National Congress under Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula were outlawed, and any future initiatives to establish opposition parties were prohibited. This meant that the ruling party controlled all government institutions, including parliament and the military. The rationale for this step was that at regional level one-party state rule would give the Zambian leadership undivided attention to its support for liberation movements in the neighbouring countries (Kaunda, Interview, 2005). At local level one party state rule would enhance popular participation in the country’s economy, thereby accelerating peace, economic progress, and stability. However, Mushinge (1991:4), for example, argues that

in Zambia, architects of one-party rule sought to establish democracy by removing political choice, eliminating political contestation, eroding the significance of Parliament and the Judiciary, and stifling of press. Instead, arrangements were put in place that greatly contradicted the official rhetoric about popular participation and democracy.

In the light of this argument, this study examines the implications of the new dispensation for military governance, and particularly steps taken to ensure continued civil control of the military.

By 1980 the country was experiencing endemic shortages of essential commodities such as soap, cooking oil, maize meal, and milk. Supplies for the military were also affected. As a result, two unsuccessful military coups d’état were staged in 1980 and 1990, and food riots occurred which spread from Lusaka to the Copperbelt. This study will investigate the causes of these events and their impact on civil control of the military.
The attempted coups called for a serious re-examination of relations among the ruling party, the government, and the military. As outlined by Kolkowicz (1982), the government reacted by creating Soviet-style controls over the military, including a military intelligence unit and parallel party organs in the defence and security establishments comprising officers of all ethnic groups. These organs were not under military control; their role was to oversee, report on, and control the activities of the military on behalf of the UNIP Central Committee and the president, who was also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. These organs strongly influenced the interaction between the civil government and the military.

This study examines in detail how the party used these coercive measures and structures as its ‘eyes and ears’ within the military, and also to ensure that the military remained under civil control. It further establishes that the appointment of a number of senior army officers by the president as high commissioners, ambassadors, cabinet ministers, members of the central committee, governors, and heads of parastatal organisations was influenced by the positive relationship between the military and the government, and enabled the latter to survive all attempted coups d’etat. This section concludes by examining how these control mechanisms turned into anti-democratic practices that undermined relations between the government, the military, and the citizenry. Following the end of the Cold War, the coercive measures that defined civil control of the military in the one-party era had to be redefined to suit the new consensual measures in a multiparty era, which is the subject of our investigation in the next section.


Following the abolition of the one-party system of government and the reintroduction of multiparty democracy, this period saw the reorganisation of measures for controlling the military, including the reinstatement of parliamentary oversight. All the previous colonies surrounding Zambia had attained majority rule. Zambia now began introducing security sector reform programmes aimed at the creation of a professional army.

Research for this period was aimed at investigating how the hostility and competition between the military and party-controlled instruments of control were dissipated by the new consensual measures in the process of creating a professional army, and how this influenced civil–military relations. It is also important to note that the state
of emergency in Zambia was lifted in 1991. The National Assembly regained formal control over the military, and was allowed to debate and vote on budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Defence. This study concludes by examining how the new consensual measures have effectively made the National Assembly use its oversight functions over the defence budget, and the impact of this on Zambia’s civil–military relations.

1.8 Organisation of the thesis

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one comprises an introduction, and a section setting out the background to the study. Chapter two contains the statement of the problem, and sets out the research methodology. Chapter three reports on the literature review. Chapter four examines the colonial period of Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1963 in which the country was governed under coercive measures that determined its antagonistic civil–military relations. Chapter five examines the period 1964-1972 in which Zambia was governed under a British-tailored Independence Constitution that ordered civil–military relations in terms of the British model using mainly consensual measures. Chapter six covers the period 1973-1991 in which Zambia was governed under a one-party constitution. Chapter seven covers the period 1991-2004 during which Zambia was governed under a new constitution that reintroduced a multiparty system of government. During this period, the nature of civil control over the military changed significantly as a result of structural reorganisation, the reintroduction of democratic methods of control, and institutional changes. Chapter eight provides a conclusion as well as recommendations for future civil control of the military, and some suggested areas for further research.
2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Statement of the problem

This study examines the control mechanisms introduced by various governments in Zambia to manage the relationship between the military, the government, and the citizenry. The period covered includes the colonial era, marked by discriminatory laws and policies; the immediate post-independence era, under a democratic constitution; the era of one-party rule; and the era of the re introduction of the multiparty democracy after the end of the Cold War. During all these periods the Zambian military consistently worked to support the economic, political, and social ideals of the ruling elite. Any deviation from this ideal by military leaders via attempted military coups d’etat was consistently exposed by military intelligence, and crushed by loyal troops. This made the country experience relatively harmonious civil–military relations as compared to other former British colonies in the four periods under review. Hence the need for this study to ascertain why civil control of the military in Zambia was such that in contrast with many other African countries after independence the military in Zambia consistently supported the ruling elite.

2.2 Significance of the study

It is argued that this study is significant for four main reasons. First, as Decalo (1991:67-68) points out, while the literature pays much attention to civil–military strife in Africa, academics have spent far less time on analysing civil–military stability in some African countries. While coups d’etat have taken place in many African countries, some states have managed to avoid them. The question of how these states have managed to avoid coups is far more significant than asking why coups have taken place in others. Furthermore, ‘not a single book on a case study from Africa has yet addressed in depth the generic issue of the sources of stable civilian rule in Africa, and only indirectly have a number of articles explored the area’ (ibid:67). Hence the significance of the study of the Zambian case as argued in the introduction.

Secondly, given the widespread interstate and intra-state conflicts in southern and central Africa, especially after the Cold War, Zambia, with its four distinct periods of governance, is an excellent case study of civil–military relations. It is important for Zambians themselves to record their history by examining the measures used by civil
governments in civil control over the military adopted during the different periods noted earlier, establishing how successful they were, and also why the state decided to adopt them. It has also become important to examine how Zambia’s experiences in civil–military relations could be used to resolve future conflicts. Moreover, the relative peace the country has enjoyed cannot be taken for granted. Hence the peculiarity of the Zambian case.

Thirdly, not much has been written about how the Zambian government and other role players managed to maintain relatively orderly civil–military relations under conditions of encirclement and bombardment by minority regimes pursuing guerrilla fighters based in Zambia. This study will seek to fill this gap by explaining how the government and military in Zambia complemented one another in managing foreign and domestic economic, political and other policies, reflected in the recognition of the principle of concordance, or high a high level of integration between the political authorities/government/military elite; the military and military elite; and the citizenry.

Last but not least, given its pioneering research on civil control of the military in Zambia, the study will provide a scholarly foundation on which other scholars can build in conducting further research in this field, especially with respect to Zambia’s contribution to the liberation struggle in the Southern Sub-Region in the face of apartheid South Africa’s destabilisation campaign of post independence States.

2.3 Research methodology

Qualitative methods, using the concepts of coercive and consensual measures for the four different periods that were used for this study. This approach was chosen because the researcher was able to quantify essentially political issues that manifested themselves over a long period using the above concepts. More specifically, this method enabled the researcher to conduct interviews with key role players such as the first republican president, some former army commanders, and members of parliament.

Leedy and Ormrod (1989:147) define qualitative research as ‘research that encompasses two things in common. First, the methodology focuses on phenomena that occur in natural settings - that is, the real world. Second, the methodology involves studying those phenomena in all their complexity.’ Creswell (2003:18; 181-183) also defines qualitative research methods as ‘research that takes place in natural settings, uses data collection methods based on open ended observations, interviews, documents,
sounds and the research questions are emergent and are not tightly prefigured like in quantitative approach'. Creswell (2003:18; 181-183) further defines qualitative research methods as those that are fundamentally interpretative where the researcher makes an interpretation of the data, drawing conclusions about its meaning personally and theoretically, stating the lessons learnt and offering further questions to be learnt. This means that the researcher examines data as it was recorded during a specific social political and historical moments, and the method uses strategies of inquiry such as narratives, case studies etc.

This study explores the coercive and consensual methods used by the Zambian government to exercise civil control over the military in some depth. According to Denzin et al (2000:646), case studies should include:

1) an exposition of the ‘nature of the case’;
2) its historical background;
3) its physical setting;
4) other contexts, including economic, political, social and legal dimensions; and
5) interviews with key role players.

Case studies can also be classified as illustrative, exploratory, cumulative, and critical instance. Illustrative case studies are primarily descriptive, and typically focus on one or two instances of a certain type of event of situation. Exploratory case studies help to identify relevant questions and select types of measurement prior to a main investigation. Cumulative case studies rely on information about several sites at different times, and thus allow for greater generalisation. A typical example of a cumulative case study is Kiwanuka (1970). A critical instance case study provides information from one or more particularly significant sites. Its purpose is usually to examine a situation or instances of unique interest, or call into question some generalised or universal assertion. The study of Zambia is an illustrative case study.

2.4 The origins of qualitative methodology

Qualitative methods (or interpretative social science) originate from the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) and the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), who argued that there were ‘two fundamentally different types of science – one based on abstract explanation and the other rooted in an emphatic understanding of
Neuman further notes that

Interpretative Social Science is related to Hermeneutics, a theory of meaning that originated in the nineteenth Century. Hermeneutics means making the obscure plain and is largely found in the humanities. It emphasises detailed reading or examination of text in which the researcher gets the inside view of what is presented as a whole, and then develops a deep understanding of how its parts relate to the whole (Neuman 1997:68).

2.5 Data collection

Data for this study was collected from primary as well as secondary sources. Primary sources included material studied in the National Assembly of Zambia Library, the National Archives of Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the Ministry of Defence Headquarters of Zambia. Secondary sources included material in books, journals and magazines.

2.5.1 Primary sources

Primary sources include documents such as letters, memoranda, agendas, study reports, or any items that could add to the database. The validity of the documents should be carefully reviewed so as to avoid incorrect data being included in the database. Tellis (1997:8) notes that ‘one of the most important uses of documents is to corroborate evidence gathered from other sources’ even though one has to be careful to balance up reliance on documents and other sources when doing case studies. The potential for over-reliance on documents as evidence in case studies has been criticised.

Archival records consulted include service records, maps, survey data, personal records such as diaries, telegrams, and other documents written by both civil and military authorities on the daily relationship between the defence forces and the civil arms of government with regard to the implementation of government policies such as the alienation of land, industrial labour relations, and other relevant issues in the period under review.

Other archival sources include legal records, parliamentary motions, and questions related to defence matters tabled in the National Assembly by cabinet ministers.
and members of parliament and printed in the *Parliamentary Hansard* during sessions between 1925 and 2004.

For security reasons, between 1964 and 2004 the Ministry of Defence did not deposit either confidential or open files with the National Archives of Zambia. These are kept at the Ministry of Defence Headquarters, and access is restricted. However, the permanent secretary of defence and the director of the research department in the Ministry of Defence Headquarters gave this researcher access to these primary sources for all three periods under review. This material included letters, minutes, cabinet memos, Defence Council minutes, bills, reports by the Auditor-General’s Office, and annual estimates of expenditure by the Ministry of Defence by the members of the Defence Council and the commander-in-chief. Confidential documents, including minutes of Defence Council meetings, were made available to this researcher on the understanding that a copy of this thesis would be deposited with the Ministry of Defence in Zambia.

### 2.5.2 Secondary sources

Secondary sources included Brelsford (1949) who provided a practical insight into the origin and functions of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment up to the end of World War Two. Huntington (1968) and Perlmutter and Plave (1980) provided a theoretical interpretation of the nature and characteristics of potentially praetorian states in the Third World that have often led to domestic military intervention (‘Third World’ is used here to refer to poor or developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Horny 2000:1246)). Others include Schiff (1996), Mandaza (1996), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), Hutchful (1988), Cawthra (1997), Luckham (1998), Williams (1998), Omari (2003), Kolkowicz (1967), Welch (1976), Phiri (2003), and others who are all cited in the introduction or the literature review. These authors provide empirical and theoretical analyses of specific countries or regions. This gave this study a firm theoretical basis and conceptual framework for understanding the problems and dynamics surrounding civil control of the military in transitional states in Africa. It also contributed to formulating the research question of why Zambia, despite being a Third World country with the same problem as others in Africa, has enjoyed relatively stable civil–military relations and has never experienced successful military interventions in domestic politics.

The availability of both primary and secondary sources enabled the researcher to begin ‘coding and categorising data according to appropriate periods and themes’ (Ely et al 1997:165), and eventually to begin analysing the data according to the study’s
conceptual distinction and chapter outline. This is in line with the interpretative type of research which ‘is based on conceptual analysis and understanding and describing meaningful social action in accordance with the laws and policies passed by that government’ (Neuman 1997:83).

2.6 The interview process

An open-ended interview method was adopted in which informants were allowed to comment freely on government decisions that affected civil oversight over the military in the period under review. When conducting productive interviews for a qualitative study, Leedy and Ormrod (1989:159) suggest that ‘the researcher must make sure that interviewees are representative of the group and written permission for the interview is obtained. The interview should record responses verbatim’.

In line with this method, interviews were conducted with one former president, four former vice-presidents in their capacity as chairmen of the Defence Council, three former army commanders, three former military secretaries who worked as both military and intelligence officers, and five parliamentarians who served under different regimes. These interviews were aimed at establishing how they formulated and implemented policies relating to civil control of the military. The officers were chosen because they could provide a valuable perspective from the military side (see appendix 1). The interviews were conducted in the homes of the interviewees, where they were not distracted. The author first wrote to the interviewees, explaining the nature of the study and underlining its importance. Apart from asking specific questions related to the study, and also asking for clarifications where this was deemed necessary, the author behaved like a good listener. This enabled him to capture most of the responses. Hand-written notes and a tape recorder were used to capture the responses. Written or verbal consent for participation in the study and permission to record the interviews were obtained from the informants beforehand (see appendix 2). Each informant received a consent form that spelled out the nature and purpose of the study, the means of data collection, and his/her rights to privacy and confidentiality (appendix 2). Only those who signed the consent form were interviewed. The interviews were also authorised by the Ministry of Defence Headquarters and the University of Zambia Research and Ethics Committee (see appendix 3). The recordings were transcribed and used as primary data.
2.7 Data analysis and interpretation

Qualitative methods were used to organise, interpret, and analyse data collected from primary and secondary sources as well as the interviews, as described by Leedy and Ormrod (1989:160-161) and Creswell (1998:153-154). Leedy and Ormrod propose a four-step framework for analysing qualitative data. These involve:

First, organising the data using index cards. Second, reading through the entire data set several times to get a sense of what it contains as a whole. Third, identifying general categories or themes, and subcategories or subthemes as well, and then classifying each piece of data accordingly. Fourth, packaging the data into an organisational scheme chronologically and thematically (Leedy and Ormrod 1989:160-161).

Creswell (1998:153-154) proposes four additional frameworks for analysing qualitative data, namely, ‘First, a detailed description of the case and its setting in which multiple sources of data to determine evidence for each phase in the evolution of the case could be examined as in the case of Zambia that presents a chronology of events.’ Second, direct interpretation of events in different periods which gave our case study research an opportunity to draw meaning from the events. Third, from this the study established patterns and looked for correspondence between two or more categories. And lastly, the study developed naturalistic generalisations and concepts from analysing the data, which explained why the Zambian case is different or similar to others.

The principles outlined by these two sets of authors were used to organise, analyse and interpret the three types of data, and were applied as described below. Interpretation of the data further involved exploring the main and secondary objectives of the thesis. The analysis was also linked to the results of the literature review for each period of study.

2.8 Advantages and disadvantages of using qualitative methodology in case studies

The advantages of using a qualitative methodology for case studies are that the researcher obtains detailed information from all the sources mentioned above. Therefore, the use of interpretative methodology supported by concepts, themes and appropriate data provides a more complete picture of the subject matter than quantitative statistical
analysis, which simply tries to prove a hypothesis. Furthermore, qualitative methodology enables researchers to deal with complex issues using one or two concepts that are usually analysed in their historical context.

The disadvantages of qualitative methodology are that it is difficult to generalise because of subjectivity and a dependence on context; that it gives rise to questions about the value of the data; and that, when dealing with sensitive issues such as the relationship between the government, the military, and civilians in a country such as Zambia, which hosted liberation movements, the authorities may regard the research as a threat to national unity and security. The research may therefore ‘face sanctions, political threat and even physical threats to the researcher’ (Scheurich 1995:1-17).

In conclusion, this researcher firmly believed that qualitative methodology, using the concepts of coercive and consensual measures would add significantly to the study of civil control of the military in Zambia in the four different periods. This is because it provided a clear theoretical framework, and effective methods of data collection and analysis. The author also sought to contribute to the knowledge of civil control of the military in Africa more broadly. However, this could only be done in the context of the current relevant literature published by various scholars at the international and regional levels. Therefore, the literature relevant to this case study will be reviewed in the next chapter.
3 LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

Since this study of Zambia is a pioneering one, this literature review relies heavily on works about civil-military relations in developed and other developing countries.

This chapter examines a number of works on the theory of civil-military relations. It first looks at the existing literature on Zambian civil-military relations. Secondly, it examines the theory of civil-military relations and civil control of the military as developed in political science literature since the 1950s. It cites works by Huntington, Perlmutter, and others that give precise definitions of a professional army, praetorian states, and professional revolutionary soldiers. Thirdly, it examines the relevance of these works to the study of civil control of the military using concepts of either coercive or consensual measures in analysing Zambia’s four different periods of study. Fourthly, it moves from general theory to the studies of civil-military relations and control in Africa since independence. Here it contextualises the concept of civil control of the military in Africa, as spelled out by scholars such as Nwabueza (1981), Shillington (1992), Mandaza (1996) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003). Fifthly, it cites authorities such as Hutchful (1998), Bathily and Hutchful (1998), Luckham (1998), Cawthra (1997), and Williams (1998) who explain the problems of post-colonial states and the reasons why some countries have experienced military coups and civilian dictatorships such as that of apartheid South Africa. The chapter concludes by examining the literature on civil-military relations in democratic transitions, and cite Kolkowicz (1982) in respect of communist states, Cawthra (1997) in respect of the South African Defence Force, Cawthra and Luckham (2002) in respect of transitional states, and Omari (2003) in respect of Tanzania.

3.2 Existing literature on civil-military relations in Zambia

Except for papers written for the African Civil-Military Relations Project 2000-2002, Network III, co-ordinated by Prof Abillah A Omari of Tanzania, no major study has yet been produced on the nature, character, and degree of civil control of the military in Zambia. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa has since published some of these papers (Williams et al: 2003). B J Phiri has published three articles on the
same subject. Phiri (2003:4) argues that ‘civil control of the military in Zambia has been premised on the military leadership’s acceptance and recognition of the civil control of the defence forces since the colonial period’. He states that since Zambia’s independence in October 1964, a conviction developed that the majority, subject to the rule of law, should decide public policy. Therefore, civil control of the military has developed a culture that ensures that ‘decisions concerning defence policy do not compromise fundamental democratic values’ (Phiri 2003:4).

Like this study, Phiri divides his study into four periods, namely the colonial period and the First, Second, and Third Republics. He then gives an overview of how the Zambian government, using objective and subjective instruments of governance, has managed civil control of the military in a way that has prevented domestic military intervention. This study acknowledges Phiri’s contribution to the study of civil control of the military in Zambia, since his is the first published work. However, it is important to note that first, Phiri’s journal and book articles were constrained in terms of number of words and scope of research. The result is that the articles have not been extensively researched as has been done in this thesis. Second, while Phiri provided a narrative of some events as they affected civil control of the military in Zambia in the four different periods, our study distinguishes itself in that it developed an original conceptual analysis which identifies the colonial and one party state eras as periods in which coercive measures became the dominant mode used by the state in civil control of the military in Zambia. The study also identifies the first post colonial period and the post cold war era in Zambia as periods that dominantly used consensual measures in the civil control of the military. It is the identification of these two elements that appeared in various ratios or mixes in the various eras under review, with one dominant in one era, and the other in others, which makes the study a pioneer of thought on civil control of the military in Zambia and why in contrast with many other African countries after independence the military in Zambia consistently supported the ruling elite.

3.3 The concept of civil-military relations: definitions

The definition of civil control of the military is highly contested in the literature. Welch (1976:35) defines it as a ‘continuum of interactions that exists between civilians and members of the armed forces, with the result that civilian control of the military is never absolute, nor military control of politics ever total’. This definition suggests a civil
regime that keeps itself in power with clearly defined policies towards and a clear legal and institutional understanding with the military.

Huntington (1957:86), on the other hand, defines civil control of the military as ‘governmental control of the military in which the armed forces accept subordinate roles in the political system’. This definition emphasises the subordinate role of the armed forces – that is, the civil government makes policies, legalises these policies by passing laws, creates a Ministry of Defence and armed forces, and decides when the military should go to war. While Huntington’s definition explains civil-military relations as they existed in developed Western States, especially in the United States of America, the same concepts failed to work for many African States shortly after they got their independence from their colonial masters in the 1960’s. Furthermore, for those countries that quickly realized the deficiencies of relying mainly on objective factors in civil control of the military, they adopted subjective methods of control under one party state which prevented domestic military intervention. This disproved Huntington’s definition as the classical one for all countries.

Chuter (2000:27) defines civil control of the military as

the obedience which military owes to the civis, the State. This is because the military is one of a number of instruments of the State, of which other examples are the police, the fire service, the diplomatic service and, in many countries, the medical service. Like these other services, the military has a duty of loyalty to the state, which employs it on behalf of the citizens and the taxpayer. The military, among its other functions, thus advises on the formulation of defence policy and helps to carry it out. But, it does not make defence policy.

This study uses Chuter’s definition as its operational definition because it recognises the rule of law and the existence of civil institutions such as the executive, legislature, and the judiciary, staffed by public officers who are empowered by voters and the constitution to decide how the country should be governed. Under this democratic arrangement the subordination of military views to the political will is the principal issue.

For the purposes of this study, Chuter’s definition is further compartmentalised – as Huntington did – by dividing civil control of the military into objective and subjective mechanisms. Objective mechanisms examined include constitutional, legal, budgetary, parliamentary oversight, the Office of the Auditor-General, and other measures adopted
by parliament and the executive and enforced by the judiciary that ensured the
acquiescence of the armed forces and the effective monitoring of their activities by the
civil authorities. The study examines the extent to which these measures were aimed at
ensuring that the directives issued by civil institutions in respect of the military were
implemented. It then examines how the military authorities report back to the civil
authorities. It takes note of the fact that although objective factors are external to the
military establishment, they have always embodied the political and constitutional
agreement entered into between the state and the armed forces.

The use of Chuter’s definition in the study of the civil control of the military in
Zambia is complemented by the theory of ‘concordance’ as expounded by Schiff who
challenged the practical application of Western theories of civil-military relations in the
developing world. The predominant Western theory, as argued by Huntington (1957),
emphasised the ‘subordination of the armed forces to a diversity of more traditional
Western-styled checks and balances emanating from regulations, military procedures, and
military command and control patterns and legislative oversight’.

However, Schiff challenged this tradition with her alternative theory of
concordance, arguing that

‘a major conclusion of current civil-military relations theory is that the
military should remain physically and ideologically separated from the
political institutions. By contrast, the alternative theory argues that three
partners, namely the military, the political elite and the citizenry should
aim for a co-operative relationship that may or may not involve separation
but does not require it’ (1995:7-24).

Schiff (1995:7-24) further argued that ‘concordance theory considers the
importance of context in studying the military and society. Some indicators, such as the
military style and the inclusion of the citizenry as a partner, deal with the norms, customs
and values of particular nations.’ The theory explains which

major aspects of nations should be in agreement in order to prevent
domestic military intervention. How a particular society achieves such an
agreement is largely dependent upon the nature of that society, its
institutions and its culture. That is what makes concordance theory unique:
it causally predicts conditions for domestic military intervention without
superimposing a particular historical or cultural context upon a nation (Schiff 1995:7-24).

In the Zambian geographical and cultural context, Schiff’s theory of concordance complements Chuter’s definition in two main ways in this study. First, is the general principle on the obedience which the military owes to the state (Chuter 2000: 27). Second unlike in Nigeria where the dominant ethnic group used its dominance in the military to overthrow civil governments, this study points out that either under coercive or consensual measures, the government of the day used the heterogeneous composition of its military personnel recruited from all its 73 ethnic groups to prevent military interventions, which is in line with Schiff’s arguments in her theory of concordance. These issues are further clarified by analysing the general theory of civil-military relations, to which we now turn.

3.4 General theory of civil-military relations

Huntington (1957) argues that the theory of civil-military relations in a developed Western State such as the United States implies that since the military is an instrument of the state, civil control of the military is premised on the effective use of objective other than subjective methods of control by the civil authorities. He stresses the professionalism of the armed forces as an objective form of control rather than a subjective means of maximising civilian authority over them. He cites objective methods of control as parliamentary oversight, budgetary provisions, and civil society operating externally to the military establishment and embodying the practical and constitutional pact between the state and the armed forces in terms of which formal control mechanisms within government are designed to ensure the obedience of the armed forces, and the activities of the armed forces are effectively monitored.

He further stresses that ‘it was better for the armed forces themselves to be prompted to promote military efficiency whilst recognising their subservience to the state, than impose civil values and directives to the probable detriment of military efficiency and ultimately national security’ (cited in Edmonds 1988:79). He further states that in terms of this relationship the institutional dimension of civil-military relations should be based on the premise that the military should remain physically and ideologically separated from political institutions, which he refers to as the ‘institutional separation model’ (ibid).
Under these arrangements the creation of harmonious civil-military relations is based upon the existence of objective instruments employed by parliament, the executive and the judiciary. Importantly, Huntington was writing about the factors that provided harmonious civil-military relations in the United States of the 1950s.

It is important to note that shortly after independence, most African countries such as Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria and others that attempted to apply Huntington’s objective instruments of civil control of the military experienced frequent military coups. This means that this model of civil-military relations did not prove all that useful to the above countries. However, in the case of Zambia, this study argues in chapter 5 and 7 that the dominant application of objective (mostly consensual) measures as expounded by Huntington and the diffusion of the problem of ethnicity through the National motto of ‘One Zambia One Nation’ enabled the Zambian government develop strong civil control over the military. This, therefore, largely differentiated the Zambian case from other African countries who suffered military coup d’etats.

Perlmutter (1977) looks at the relationship between praetorianism and military professionalism. He rejects the determinist and idealist view of distinctions between the military and the civil functions of state that previously characterised the analysis of the relationship between the armed services and society. He appeals to a ‘fusionist theory, which recognised an overlap based on a symbiotic relationship between armed services and other state institutions in the determination of national security policy’ (ibid:4). He stresses that

the old vertical relationships between governments and armed services have been replaced by horizontal ones, and conflicts occur not between the services and civilians but between corporate organisations in contention over the direction on national policy, resource allocation and political orientation (ibid:5).

He concludes by observing that whatever the prevailing political regime or ideology, armed services are involved in the political affairs of all nations. Depending on the nature of their involvement, they can be classified into three broad groupings: ‘the strictly professional, the praetorian, and the revolutionary. Each rises in response to the type of civilian institutional authority’ (ibid:9).

Perlmutter’s fusionist theory with its three types of military forces is relevant to this study, because it provides an effective conceptual framework for describing and
analysing potentially praetorian states such as Zambia from the time of independence to the reintroduction of the multiparty democracy after the end of the Cold War. However, in the transition from one party state to multipartism after the end of the cold war era, Perlmutter’s fusionist theory becomes useful as the Zambian government adopted all the good practices of the colonial period, first and second republics and added a strong aspect of parliamentary oversight in its consensual methods of civil control of the military. The detailed analysis on how and why these measures were implemented are explained in chapter 7.

Perlmutter (1977) also argues that, true to the colonial legacy, military forces in the European colonies in Africa were oriented towards external conquest and domination. ‘The military type represented two extreme faces; one of separation between the military organisation and the colonial subjects, and that of integration with the white settler community’ (ibid:92). In his analysis of the praetorian army and the praetorian state, Perlmutter further argues that praetorianism occurs in a state that lacks social cohesion, where personal desires and group aims frequently diverge. This critical analysis of how the colonial government used the military in the management of its racist structures through coercive measures is fundamental in understanding the methods of civil control of the military in Zambia during this period. The above analysis by Perlmutter of the use of coercive measures as a means of civil control of the military by the government and how it affected both the African and European settlers in Northern Rhodesia has been explained in details in chapter 4. The results of these coercive measures produced a synthesis which enabled the oppressed people gain their independence through the democratic governance.

Perlmutter and Bennett (1980:9) define a praetorian state as one that ‘lacks stable and sustaining political institutions, structures and procedures, and collapse of executive power is imminent when the civilian government comes to a standstill in its efforts to achieve such goals as unification, order, modernisation and urbanisation’. They further state that an organised political force, one of which might be the military, may exploit the above regime’s vulnerability (Perlmutter and Bennett 1980:9).

These officers intervene in politics as a result of the politicisation of a significant segment of the officer corps, in three main ways. First,

a few politically or ideologically committed officers or civilians may infiltrate the military in search of army collaborators for a ‘civilianistic’ coup. Second, a new global ideology such as fascism, socialism or
communism may be sweeping the world and become a cause for a coup. And third, dramatic events that tend to politicise entire generations, such as anti-colonial struggles or independence movements also become major causes of military coups (ibid).

In this situation the decision to intervene in politics or perform a coup d’etat is both political and tactical, depending on factors internal and external to the group involved. Here Perlmutter and Bennett’s interpretation of a potentially post-colonial praetorian state like Zambia is fundamental in understanding how and why the Zambian government’s manipulation of both coercive and consensual measures in civil control of the military during attempted coup d’etats and the transition to multipartism were fundamental to the stability of the civil government. As is explained in chapter 6, the use of coercive measures in the one party state era came as a result of the leadership’s lack of unifying solutions to the problems of the intra-party and inter-party rivalries. The study explains in chapter 6, as Perlmutter and Bennett do above, how a few ideologically committed civilians infiltrated the military in search of army collaborators for civilianistic coups.

Perlmutter and Bennett’s above analysis of the relations between a praetorian state and coup d’etats and dramatic events that tends to politicize the entire generations such as the independence movements become more relevant when this study looks at the events leading to the re-introduction of multipartism in December 1990. In Chapter 6 this study demonstrates that the twin forces of the 1990 attempted coup d’etat and people’s pressure through food riots and pro-democracy activists to change the government through violent means were defused using peaceful although coercive measures. This enabled the government to manage the transition from a one party state system to multipartism peacefully as compared to other African countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Perlmutter and Bennett (ibid:199-208) also argue that the ‘existence of fratricidal social classes, coupled with an unconsolidated middle class, is frequently considered a pre-condition for praetorianism. This is because the middle classes are small, weak, ineffective, divided and politically impotent.’ In these types of States a weak middle class emerges because the top group is usually divided between the rich peasants and commercial farmers and the ‘corporate manager who have adopted modern technology and manage large foreign owned industrial enterprises where the urban worker elite are employed’ (Perlmutter and Bennett 1980:199-208).
Because of the benefits that this elite receives from the system, it is little inclined to suffer the deprivations that the political actions designed to benefit its less privileged brethren may entail. Yet it is precisely these elite workers, concentrated in large enterprises, who are not well ‘organised’ who are responsible for the creation of a weak middle class and widened the gap between the rich and the poor (ibid).

Perlmutter and Bennett conclude their analysis by pointing out that in a praetorian state cohesiveness, articulateness and social-economic power constitutes the foundation for the political influence of middle class. A struggle for power among the different strata of the middle class - the class, which historically has acted as the stabiliser of civilian governments during modernisation, creates conditions beneficial to praetorianism (ibid).

This analysis of the role of the middle class in creating stable civil control of the military in a transitional state such as Zambia is relevant to our study. This is because at the time of independence the country did not have a viable middle class. This study therefore investigates how the post-colonial state addressed the problems of illiteracy among its people, including those employed in the defence force. It further examines how the government solved the dichotomy between educational outputs and employment opportunities through the nationalisation of private companies. How this helped to build a viable middle class between 1964 and 1991 is investigated. After 1991 the new government privatised three-quarters of the former nationalised parastatal organisations, which led to massive retrenchments. The economic hardships that the middle class went through brought cohesiveness of this class in Zambia who campaigned to prevent president Chiluba from going for his third term of office as president contrary to the provisions of the constitution. This point is argued in chapter 7.

Huntington (1968:194-197) also argues that in praetorian states social groups and social institutions are highly politicised. He states that ‘those societies in these states lack political autonomy, coherence, complexity and adaptability. All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics’ (Huntington 1968:194-197). He cites studies of the military in modernising countries that naturally focus on its active political role, which distinguishes it from the military in more advanced societies. He also points out that ‘studies of labour unions highlight “political unionism” as the distinguishing feature of labour movements in modernising societies’ (ibid). Huntington’s coining of the concept of political unionism in the study of the political activities of labour unions is relevant to the study of the political pressure that the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU) leadership put on the leadership in Zambia which lead to the abolition of the one party state and the re-introduction of plural politics in 1990. Larmer (2006: 296) explains in detail the prominent role trade unions played in the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) whose leadership took the reins of power in Zambia in November 1991. In chapter 6, this study explains in detail the events that led to the collapse of the one party state system.

Huntington further argues that ‘studies of religious organisations stress the extent to which the separation of church and state remains a distant goal’ (ibid). This observation is important for this study in the sense that after the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1991, the government declared Zambia a Christian nation. The government even established religious departments headed by military chaplains in all the security institutions in the country. The use of these personnel in the military intelligence units in the third republic and how this affected civil control of the military under plural politics has been thoroughly investigated in chapter 7.

Huntington further states that the involvement of these interest groups is not peculiar to the military or any other social group, but is pervasive throughout society. This is because in a praetorian system social forces confront each other ‘nakedly: no viable political institutions or corps of professional political leaders is accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflicts. Equally important no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts’ (ibid). He further observes that in these states ‘not only are the actors varied, but so are the methods used to decide upon office and policy. Each group employs means that reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities: the wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military stage coups’ (ibid). The techniques of ‘military intervention are more dramatic and effective than the others because, as Hobbes put it, when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps’ (ibid).

Huntington concludes his analysis by observing that in a praetorian state, authority over the system as a whole is ‘transitory, and the weakness of political institutions means that authority and office are easily acquired and lost. Consequently, no incentive exists for a leader or group to make significant concessions in the search for authority’ (ibid). The transfer of ‘allegiance from one social group to another thus imposes the changes which individuals make, rather than by broadening of loyalty from a limited social group to a political institution embodying a multiplicity of interests’ (Huntington 1968:194-197).
Again, while this is true of those post-colonial states in Africa that experienced successful military coups (such as Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo), and those that destroyed their governments (such as Somalia), this study seeks to demonstrate the extent to which the Zambian case was different. In all four periods under review, government authority over the system was managed using either coercive or consensual measures. Civil rulers never lost their authority; instead, it was passed on to the next group after each presidential and parliamentary election.

Stepan (1980:254) argues that in the case of Brazil and most Latin-American countries, ‘societies are semi-elitist, semi-mobilised and semi-developed. The Church, labour movements and students are highly politicised. Political institutions are weak and the military is highly politicised.’ Therefore, since the society is praetorian, various groups attempt to co-opt the military in order to augment their political power. Under what he terms the

moderating pattern of civil-military relations, this constant co-option of the military into politics rules out Huntington’s concept of a professional army as developed in Western countries even if hierarchical structure, internal differentiation and promotion patterns have been retained in these armies (ibid).

Under this model, military intervention is not seen as representing the decomposition of the political system as expounded by Perlmutter, but a normal method of composition in political life. It is a system that has ‘evolved, is open and characterised by dual responses of civilian and military elites to particular political crises, in which both civilians and the military look to the military for the resolutions of the crisis’ (Stepan 1980:257). He justifies the moderator concept by citing the Brazilian constitutions of 1891, 1934 and 1946 which stated that the role of the military in the Brazilian politics was twofold: Firstly, the military was a permanent, national institution specifically charged with the

task of maintaining law and order in the country and of guaranteeing the continued normal functioning of the three constitutional powers: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Secondly, the military was obedient to the executive, but significantly stated that they should only be obedient ‘within the limits of the law (ibid:260).
Stepan’s constitutionally backed moderator model of civil-military relations for most praetorian Latin American states is important to note. However, the study of civil control of the military in Zambia in the period 1964 to 1972 will take into consideration that Zambia was a British colony and that constitutions in Commonwealth countries provide for the supremacy of civil authorities over the military.

Welch and Smith (1974) argue that the following principles are at play in exploring the concept of civil-military relations:

First, no armed services are apart from a nation’s politics. Second, every State has armed services and a police force. Third, the needs of armed services for resources to fulfil their tasks are extensive, which make them powerful political actors. Fourth, armed services in order to fulfil their custody tasks are organised, cohesive, and disciplined. Fifth, the political influence of armed services differs between states but in each the critical question is not whether there is influence, but how much, or what kind, when it is exercised (Cited in Edmonds 1988:91).

Using five main variables, Welch and Smith categorise and explain the relations between armed services and society in different states. The five variables are the extent of popular participation in decision-making; the strength of civil institutions; the political strength of the armed services; and the relationship between the military and civil institutions, expressed in terms of the degree to which they are separate, with integral boundaries, or overlap, with fragmented boundaries.

Welch and Smith are then able to construct a matrix by cross-referencing levels of political participation and the political strength of the military against the relationship of civil-military institutions in both praetorian states, with weak civilian institutions, and states with civil politics where civilian institutions are strong. The strength of their theory lies in its ability to explain the whole spectrum of armed services’ role in politics, from the exercise of influence along recognised channels to the overt, direct and total replacement of government by military violence. Welch and Smith ‘achieved a general, comprehensive theory of armed services and society’ (Edmonds 1988:91).

Welch (1976:1-38) then suggests that the five means of civilian control of the military have been devised and successfully utilised by various states as follows:

1) maintaining relatively small armed forces with narrow responsibilities, where geographic and historical factors allow this;
2) exploiting ascriptive factors (e.g., class and ethnicity) affecting relationships between civilian and military leaders;

3) utilising party controls, possibly by creating parallel hierarchies of commands;

4) introducing constitutional constraints on the political impact of the military; and

5) delineating a clear sphere of military responsibility, leading to the widespread acceptance within the armed forces of an ethic of subordination (Welch 1976:5-6).

Welch (1976) above matrix of the five means of civilian military control of the military from selected case studies in the world is used for this study for three main reasons. First, this study establishes the fact that during the colonial and one party state eras in Zambia, one of the coercive measures that were used by these governments as weapons for civil control of the military were the requirements for the qualifications to be recruited into the military. In chapter 4, this study points out that during the colonial period, ethnicity determined one’s qualification for recruitment into the Northern Rhodesia regiment. The chapter, then, explains the coercive roles the regiment played in civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia during this period. Similarly, during the one party state era, recruitment into the Zambia army depended on whether one had a party membership card regardless of which ethnic origin one came from. Therefore, exploiting ascriptive factors as a factor in civil control of the military has been fundamental in the study of civil control of the military in Zambia.

Second, the concept on the utilization of party controls by creating parallel hierarchies of commands has also been useful in understanding the coercive measures used by the Zambian government in the control over the military. Chapter 7 explains how the establishment of military intelligence units in the military in Zambia facilitated civil control of the military in this period. Third, the concept of the introduction of constitutional constraints on the political impact of the military has also been found to be a useful consensual measure that determined civil control of the military in the First and Third Republics as explained in chapter 5 and 7. In these chapters the study spells out how parliament executed its legislative function of law making which in turn delineated the powers and responsibilities of both the civil authorities and the military. The observance of these constitutional obligations in turn facilitated effective use of consensual measures of civil control of the military in Zambia in these periods. This led to the widespread acceptance within the armed forces of an ethic of subordination to the civil authorities. For these reasons, this study found Welch’s interpretation of some
methods of civil control of the military useful and uses them in interpreting the Zambian case.

In the case of the Soviet Union, Kolkowicz (1967:19) argues that the dynamics between the Communist Party and the military establishment were characterised by severe curtailment of professional freedom and authority. Protect the State and the regime and to put down challenges to the Party’s hegemony within and without. Accept and to tolerate the presence of party functionaries in its midst even at the expense of interference with military efficiency and authority.

As a result of these policies, substantive disagreements emerged between the military and the party. These were that while the

party maintained multiple control networks in the military establishments with the aim of securing information, indoctrinating and manipulating the military with the communist ideology, controlling the professional and private activities of anti-party officers, the military resented and sometimes directly opposed any excessive pressure that substantially interfered with the military performance of professional duties (ibid:21).

Whereas, during Stalin’s era,

politically aligned military officers were appointed to sit in the highest party councils such as the Political Bureau, Central Committee and the Central Auditing Committee, during Khrushchev’s era these were reserved for professional officers who had demonstrated courage and ability during wars and were close to Khrushchev (Kolkowicz (1967:21).

Since these officers came from different ranks, the party leaders created elements of uneasiness and distrust by allowing low-ranking officers to publicly criticise senior officers during party meetings.

The party also maintained military intelligence units in all military forces, tasked with preparing daily reports on the private and professional activities of every soldier. These reports were used to determine the promotion, demotion, suspension, or expulsion of military officers. Kolkowicz concludes by pointing out that while the party attempted to place political military officers in commanding positions, it also recognised the importance of military professionalism.
Kolkowicz’s analysis of the relationship between the Communist Party and the military authorities in the Soviet Union is relevant to our study because, after Zambia became a one-party state in 1973, the government changed its policies on military training and weapons procurement. More officers were sent for military training to the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist countries. At the same time the Communist countries supplied Zambia as well as the liberation movements based in that country with sophisticated military equipment. This relationship, amongst other domestic factors, made Zambia adopt measures of civil control of the military that were similar to communist ones, as we explain in chapter 6.

In line with Kolkowicz’s observations, we will examine the use of coercive measures by the ruling party to extend its political control over the military and its officers during the one-party era. The impact of the Zambian government’s shift from alignment with the West to the East on party-military relations during that era will also be investigated. Kolkowicz’s observations in respect of the Soviet Union, where he recorded the creation of paramilitary organs within the military, such as the military intelligence and party organs, which acted as eyes and ears of the civil political authority, will be used as a guide to analysing the Zambian situation in the one-party era, during which the government survived three military coups, due largely to the activities of military intelligence, which supplied the president with timely information.

Having examined the applicability of the professional, communist, liberal and aristocratic models as expounded by Huntington (1957), Kolkowicz (1967), Welch (1976) and Perlmutter (1977) respectively, the next section of the literature review examines the relevance of Zambia’s civil-military relations to Africa.

### 3.5 Civil-military relations in Africa

The nature of civil-military relations in transitional African states since the beginning of decolonisation has been based on the premise that military intervention frequently outweighs the electoral process as a means of regime change. As such, every African post-colonial leader had to ‘grapple with the complex and delicate process of nation building, since the post-colonial State itself was a nation in the making’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003:21).
The post-colonial state was also fragile and based on poor political, economic, and social foundations. As such, its first priority was its ‘security, or rather the security of those who assumed power’ (ibid). Moreover, the post-colonial state faced the challenge of constructing a nation state from people of diverse ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. This meant that it had a mammoth task of facilitating a situation where hitherto previous enemies could co-exist and identify themselves with the new nation in the making. The poignant reality is that the post-colonial state is prone to conflict by its very nature, particularly intra-state conflict … Given this fragility and insecurity where the security of the state itself rather than the people was the priority, it would have been over-ambitious to expect genial civil-military relations (ibid).

This study takes note of the fact that Mandaza and Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s analysis of a post independence state was viewed largely through the political developments that have characterized the post independence Zimbabwean state under President Robert Mugabe. Some of these developments were the post-independence massacre of the Ndebele people by the Zimbabwe Shona-dominated army in 1983. The forceful removal of Zimbabwe’s whites from their farms since 1998 is also a point in mind. In this case, therefore, Mandaza and Ndlovu-Gatsheni should have also emphasized the continued abuse by President Robert Mugabe of security and land legislation inherited from the colonial regime which negatively affected civil control of the military in the case of the postcolonial Zimbabwean government.

Our analysis of the case study of Zambian’s civil control of the military is different from that of Mandaza and Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s above despite the fact that the two countries experienced similar challenges. This is because in our opinion, whilst the Zimbabwean government continued using colonial coercive measures in finding solutions to its ethnic problems, the Zambian government adopted consensual measures in harmonising its 73 ethnic groups in the immediate post colonial period. While the Zimbabwean army was largely dominated by the Shona ethnic group, under consensual measures, recruitment into the Zambia army reflected the ethnic composition of the country’s 73 tribes. The successful harmonization of the political elite, the military and the citizenry in Zambia, as argued in chapter 5, in terms of political power and civil control of the military through consensual measures makes the study of the Zambian case fairly unique to a large extent, in Africa.
Decalo (1991:72-74) provides an understanding of the sources of stable civilian rule in 12 African countries, including Zambia, between 1960 and 1990. He explains that the dynamics of civil-military stability were determined by seven concrete control strategies. The first was the continued use of the colonial policy of the preferential recruitment of certain ethnic groups into the armed forces. The second was the establishment of armed paramilitary structures that monitored the activities of the regular army. The third was the ‘appointment to key military and police command posts of members of the head of state’s direct family’ (ibid:72). The fourth was the appointment of expatriates to structures monitoring the loyalty of the armed forces, or to serve as a buffer against military intelligence and presidential guards (ibid:73). The fifth was external guarantees of military support in case of domestic military intervention, especially in former Franco-phone countries. The sixth was systemic legitimacy on the basis of economic and political achievements. The seventh was economic ‘payoffs’ to the military as a corporate group and to key individual officers within it (ibid:74). This study notes Decalo’s contribution to the holistic understanding of the sources of stable civilian rule in both Francophone and former British colonies in Africa. However, in the case of Zambia, this study disproves Decalo’s first point, on the continued use of the ‘colonial policy of the preferential recruitment of certain ethnic groups in the armed forces’ through the use of consensual measures. The non-application of this policy makes the Zambian case different from some other African countries. The study also disapproves of the French government’s practice of providing external guarantees of military support in their former colonies in cases of domestic military intervention. This is because external guarantees of military support has sometimes prevented these governments from developing indigenous solutions to problems of ethnicity which has been one of the major causes of military coup d’états and civil wars in some African states. This is despite the fact that, whereas the British supported Nigeria during the Biafran war and intervened shortly after independence in Tanzania to put down a coup, at the invitation of President Nyerere, the same gesture has not been widely practiced in other former British colonies including Zambia.

Hutchful and Bathily (1998:i-xiii) provide conceptual definitions of a state and regime. They demonstrate that in Africa the variety of political military relations in transition from colonialism to independence or self-government has brought out three major scenarios.

The first consists of independent governments where civilians have successfully retained control over the military and the state through parliamentary, judiciary and
executive civil controls, and have maintained their monopoly over the instruments of force. The second involves cases where the state retains its monopoly over the instruments of violence, but where control over these instruments has shifted from civil to military hands. The third occurs when the state has lost its ability to claim a monopoly over the instruments of force, bringing the very integrity of the state into dispute (ibid).

They then conclude that the management of different policies and political responses to institutional-cum-political crises in various African countries as a result of domestic military interventions made scholars realise that ‘the management of intra-military relations and accommodation among different military divisions was probably as important as accommodation between civil and military power blocs in the successful management of the civil control of the military’ (Hutchful and Bathily 1998:i-xiii).

Like Welch and Smith, Hutchful and Bathily manage to provide a holistic analysis of the nature and character of civil-military relations in states under both military rule as well as those under civilian governments in Africa. Previous examples of Ghana, Nigeria, Congo-Kishansa, Zimbabwe and Tanzania are sufficient to illustrate these authors’ analysis. In some countries – such as Zambia and Tanzania – led by civilian regimes, coercive subjective control mechanisms such as military intelligence officers in all military units were utilised, helping those regimes to prevent any military intervention in domestic politics. In those countries – such as Ghana – that strictly followed the Western professional military ethos, the military took advantage of the lack of military intelligence officers and overthrew civilian regimes.

Luckham (1998:1-8) argues that the analysis of civil-military relations in African states in transition requires ‘an integrated approach, drawing on the empirical strengths and analytical insights of both mainstream and critical or neo-Marxist modes of enquiry’. He criticises analyses that characterise the military in African states as ‘managers of modernity’, in line with attempts by Eastern and Western countries during the Cold War era to either contain imperialism or communism; these attempts, he argues, only served to politicise armies and hinder the development of effective democratic methods of civil control of the military.

He states that ‘primitive accumulation by both the military and political leadership in Africa led to the non-implementation of the promises and expectations of independence’ (ibid). This situation therefore changed the focus of civil-military relations in Africa from the military as managers of modernity towards Third World praetorianism, political decay, and a political order characterised by crumbling military establishments.
and derailed development. He further argues that notions of the state ‘as a repressive apparatus, monopolies of force, and practices of power can help scholars explain the evolution of civil-military relations in a broader sense in African states’ (ibid:8).

Using this approach, Luckham suggests that a focus on the notion of authoritarian rather than simply military rule, and on the purpose (such as an accumulation of surplus worth or of power and hegemony) for the entire ensemble of repressive apparatuses, such as the police, paramilitary, military, and military intelligence, and not the military alone can advance an analysis beyond the limited concerns of forces of the civil-military relations approach to deal with fresh issue such as the armed forces under non-military and military autocracies; violent transitions other than coups; and the factors persuading authoritarian regimes to transfer powers back to democratic governments (Luckham 1998:8).

This method of analysis is relevant especially when one contextualizes it into this study’s concepts of coercive and consensual measures in determining the democratic nature of a State. Despite the fact that a state might be under civilian control, its methods of governing some ethnic groups might be so ruthless that it can be worse than a military government. An example of such a state in Southern Africa is Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe, and its treatment of the Ndebele people in Matebeleland in 1983 and the eviction of white settlers from their farms after 1998. Zambia’s situation differs from those in other former British-ruled African countries such as Ghana, Congo and Nigeria where, shortly after independence, the military successfully intervened or overthrew democratically elected governments and assumed power. Despite the fact that similar tensions emerged in Zambia immediately after independence the effective use of consensual measures provided solutions to these problems. We will therefore briefly examine some of the literature relating to these countries’ experiences of civil control, as well as the case of Botswana where democratic, consensual measures of control were exerted.

3.5.1 Botswana

Another African country that has experienced stable civil-military relations is Botswana. Molomo et al (2007: 61-79) have argued that Botswana has been a functional stable liberal democracy since independence. Its involvement in regional security cooperation comprised the use of ‘peace means diplomacy and negotiations to the use of
force’ and this changed depending on the president who was in power. Therefore during president Seretse Khama’s period the government concentrated on the economic development of Botswana through its customs co-operation with South Africa. He, therefore, to a large extent did not provide active support to the liberation movements and ‘avoided military confrontations’ (ibid: 76). However, with the establishment of the Botswana Defence Force in 1977, president Masire’s government developed civil-military relations that involved the country in direct military intervention in regional affairs and peace-keeping activities. President Mogae’s government on the other hand examined the country’s geo-political situation and developed a civil-military policy that promoted the common principle of stability and prosperity in the region as the basis of security. Hence Botswana’s use of peaceful methods in settling the Botswana-Namibia dispute over the ‘ownership of the shifting sands of the Sedudu Island in the Chobe river through both countries acceptance of the decision of the international court of justice’ (ibid: 1976). Similarly at regional level, Botswana’s involvement of the Southern Africa Development Community intervention in Lesotho in both 1994 and 1998 in response to the deteriorating political situation in that country was done to ensure Botswana’s own security and that of its neighbours.

The study of Zambia’s civil control of the military has taken note of the context of security developments as they evolved in Botswana. However, as stated above Botswana’s civil-military relations can largely be studied in the context of liberal democracy which this study terms as consensual measures. Zambia’s case is different from that of Botswana in many ways. This is because the country was not only an active supporter of liberation movements but used both coercive and consensual measures in its civil control of the military in the four different periods under study.

3.5.2 Ghana

Shillington (1992:6-7) argues that Kwame Nkrumah’s efforts to build a new Ghanaian state were guided by the ultimate ‘aim of universal education and health facilities, combined with high-quality water and sanitation, affordable housing for all, wide access to electricity, and rapid industrialisation combined with agricultural expansion’. Despite the Nkrumah government’s achievements, which made Ghana the envy of much of independent Africa, the problems of a transitional state were reflected in high levels of corruption, inter-party and intra-party rivalries, a personality cult, and the detention of political rivals. Other coercive tendencies that characterised the Nkrumah regime included abuses of the independence of the judiciary, parliamentary reduction of
the military budget in 1966, and a failure to transform the leadership of the military from a Western to a socialist orientation. These tendencies led to antagonistic relations between the military, the political elite, and the citizenry, with the result that, on 24 February 1966, senior police and military officers overthrew Nkrumah’s regime.

Price (1971), on the other hand, examines the role of foreign factors in the coup, and argues that the training of the African officer corps at military academies such as Sandhurst in Britain and St Cyr’s in France resulted in the problem of emulation that affected these officers’ relations with post-colonial civilian political authorities as well as in their capacity as government leaders (Price 1980:323-330). This resulted in the creation of a praetorian state, and antagonistic civil-military relations.

Price (1980:327) points out that ‘when the officer corps of a nation’s military organisation, its symbol of independence and sovereignty, identifies itself strongly with a political unit other than the one it officially serves, serious consequences for the stability of the state are likely to ensure’. He states that in the former colonial state, the officer corps is most likely to share the disdain for politicians, as taught at Sandhurst and other metropolitan military academies but also is likely to ‘share its contempt for leaders of the anti-colonial movement, men who subsequently become the leaders of the governments under which these officers serve’ (ibid).

He further states that this breeds tension in civil-military relations if the leaders of the ‘new state are oriented toward nationalistic policies as opposed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Western oriented dictated policies’. He further points out that since nationalist policies are likely to ‘conflict with the officers’ psychological commitments to foreign reference groups, the officers have usually been influenced to organise coups against their governments’ (ibid).

He then adds that, in the Ghanaian case, this phenomenon was responsible for the breach between Nkrumah and his officer corps. On three occasions, Nkrumah’s major policies of supplying Ghanaian troops to solve the Unilateral Declaration of Independence problem in Southern Rhodesia and participate in the United Nation’s mission in the Congo crisis as well as accept military aid from communist countries were opposed by senior Ghanaian military officers (ibid).

Bennett (1980:344-354) explains that ‘Ghana, between the 1966 coup and the 1972 coup d’etat, was governed by a civilian government led by Kofi Busia who received the reigns of power in a smooth handover of power from the military in October 1969’. He points out that, except for a strike in September 1971 by port workers in protest...
against the ‘introduction of a development levy and a new Trade Union Act, this leadership did not experience any incidents of violence, riots, student demonstrations nor open quarrels among the leading political figures’ (ibid:347). However, the main cause of the military take-over appeared to be the ‘refusal by the government, in the face of the deepening economic crisis, to accede to the financial demands of the military in the July 1971 budget tabled in the House by the Minister of Finance’ (Bennett 1980:347).

The budget did not provide sufficient allocations for the navy and the air force. The result was that half of the total number of military vehicles was not roadworthy. ‘Free water, electricity and telephone allowances previously enjoyed by officers were discontinued. As a result of these measures the military overthrew the Busia civilian Government on 22nd January 1972’ (ibid:349).

It is clear from the foregoing that even if the prerequisites for a praetorian state were absent in the Busia government, the economic crisis alone, caused by the conditionalities attached to IMF loans, pushed the military into a corner. The situation was worsened by the failure of the military to co-operate with the civilian government on the need to meet the IMF conditionalities. This led to the coup of 1972.

3.5.3 Congo

William (1980:356) argues that at the time of independence Congo (Kinshasa) was ruled by a ‘political bourgeoisie who used public offices as major sources of wealth and prestige through the control over the instruments of power such as the legislative assemblies, administration and government’. However, civil control of the military could not be achieved and eventually collapsed in 1965, leading to the overthrow of Patrice Lumumba’s government by Lieut-Col Joseph Mobutu. The coup had various causes. Firstly, Lumumba’s government had failed to contain tribal nationalism which was characterised by ‘urban groups and communities competing against each other over economic and other employment opportunities other social economic differentiation originated by the process of colonisation itself’ (William 1980:360).

Secondly, the country lacked one or two strong political parties with widespread support. Instead, ‘one hundred and fifty political parties organised along ethnic lines all competed to form a government in one country’ (ibid:361). And thirdly, the army – the Force Publique, later renamed the National Congolese Army, which during the colonial
period was the ‘most integrated and efficient repressive body – mutinied in July 1960 and later broke up into five different fragments’ (ibid:360). These were the South Kasai State Constabulary, the army of the independent state of Katanga, the National Congolese Army of Stanleyville, the National Congolese Army of Leopoldville, loyal to its Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Joseph Mobutu, and numerous military units who formed private bodyguards receiving orders directly from the local ruler (ibid:361).

Finally, a political shift to the left led by President Joseph Kasavubu after attending the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) conference October 1965 made military officers fear that the ‘government could be strong enough and decide to fire all the officers who participated in the army mutiny in 1960. For these reasons the army under Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Mobutu overthrew Lumumba’s regime in November 1965’ (ibid:368). The case of Congo again is important for our study because Congo’s ethnic composition was almost similar to Zambia. However, lack of a clear national policy on the unity of all Congolese ethnic groups resulted in the overthrow of the Patrice Lumumba regime. Why this did not happen in Zambia as explained in chapter 5 makes the Zambian case a special one to examine.

3.5.4 Nigeria

In the case of Nigeria, Nwabueze (1981:161-200) argues that a military intervention in domestic politics was prompted by a struggle for power between the federal government and regional states; the dominance of the northern Hausa-Fulani ethnic group in the federal government; religious rivalries between Moslems, Christians and animists; and the unequal distribution of oil revenues.

This was manifested in the ‘assassination of the Northern and Western Regional States Prime ministers as well as Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Federal Prime Minister, in 1960’. Despite this action the loyal forces under the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army (G.O.C), Major General Aguiyi-Aronsi, quickly rallied the rest of the army against the coup organisers and crushed the coup (Nwabueze 1981:161).

However, the lack of a federal prime minister which could hold the government together as well as problems of regionalism and tribalism prevented remaining ministers from electing a new federal prime minister who could effectively crush the coup d’état. The result was that on
16th January 1960, Dr Nwafor Orizu, the Acting President, informed the nation that acting on behalf of the Council of Ministers surrendered the administration of the country to the armed forces of the Republic under Major General Ironsi. He wished the new administration would ensure the peace and stability of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that all citizens would give them their full co-operation (ibid:162).

This amounted to a voluntary abdication of power by the civil government and an abrogation of the republican constitution, which led to the replacement of a civilian government by a military regime with absolute authority.

Events in Ghana, Nigeria and the former Zaire clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of conventional western models for maintaining civil control over the military in most African countries. In the immediate post-independence period, and the one-party state era, the Zambian government survived all attempted military coups d’etat. It managed to do so by learning from the governance mistakes of Ghana and Nigeria, and carefully manipulating both coercive and consensual measures of control over the military. However, despite this, most one-party states and military regimes in Africa did not escape the post-Cold War collapse of socialist states. The reintroduction of plural politics required a new approach to controlling the military. How the new governments in Africa and Latin America managed civil-military relations during their democratic transitions and the relevance of these transitions to Zambia is the subject of our analysis in the next section.

3.6 Civil-military relations in democratic transitions

Silva (2003) argues that the reordering of government-military relations in post-authoritarian Chile faced historical, constitutional and political obstacles. Remaining ideological divisions among the left and right made it difficult to restructure government-military relations in line with democratic values. Investigations of abuses by the former military regime under Gen Augusto Pinochet were opposed by 40 percent of the right-wingers, as well as their parliamentary representatives (Silva 2003:118). Similarly, the constitution inherited from the Pinochet regime ‘guaranteed a tutelary role for the armed forces in the country’s political development’ (ibid:102). For instance, the 1978 amnesty law does not allow the criminal prosecution of military personnel; the National Security Council, made up of military officers, supervises government performance; And the
president has no power to change the chief of the armed forces (ibid:103). Silva’s analysis of the Chilean obnoxious constitutional provisions that worked as obstacles to the implementation of harmonious civil-military relations in Chile is relevant to the study of civil control of the military in the Zambian case. This is because this study demonstrates that from the colonial period up to 2001 when president Chiluba handed over power to president Mwanawasa, all the governments returned the constitutional provisions related to the preservation of public security as passed by the Northern Rhodesia legislative council. The study explains that all the Zambian presidents that ruled this country except president Mwanawasa abused the use of these constitutional provisions to prosecute political opponents. This, therefore, makes Silva’s analysis of the Chilean situation relevant to the study of the Zambian case.

Luckham (2002:1) argues that in a ‘transitional state, democratisation, especially after the end of the Cold War, introduced new forms of militarism, violent conflicts and insecurity and globalised violence’. He qualifies this by stating that

before the end of the Cold War the nature of the civilian control of the military was such that civilian autocracies had often depended just as much upon military and police repression and surveillance by intelligence agencies as did military dictatorships (ibid:7).

He then cites reasons why some attempted democratic transitions slip into violent conflict. These are

a loss of state (and military) legitimacy that lead to public disorder, and contradictions of development, including structural violence that have also caused conflicts rooted in conditions of poverty and social exclusion. Other reasons have been the misuse of ethnic mobilisation and the tribalisation of security as makers of economic, social and political exclusion and this has caused conflicts (ibid:24-26).

These are the coercive factors that Perlmutter, Bennett and Huntington define as the features of the praetorian state. This study’s examination of coercive measures used in the study of civil control of the military during the colonial and one party state eras in Zambia makes Luckham’s analysis relevant to the study of civil control of the military in Zambia.
Omari (2003) notes that Tanzania provides one example of an African country in which favourable civil-military relations facilitated a smooth democratic transition. He argues that key influences over civil-military relations in Tanzania had nothing to do with the established ‘aristocratic (or feudal), liberal (or traditional), communist (or penetrating or totalitarian), or professional models, but was as a result of a coherent and flexible policy that has been able to adjust to the prevailing political circumstances’ (ibid:90-91).

He explains that harmonious civil-military relations in Tanzania following independence resulted from the involvement of a large section of the population in defence and security matters – a process he describes as ‘total national defence and security’ (Omari 2003:102). He further explains that the government averted military coups by co-opting army officers into civilian spheres of administration. The ruling party also took steps to penetrate the army (ibid). Continued use of this practice under democratic governments has placed Tanzania and most former socialist countries in an interesting position. Meanwhile, Omari contends that this ‘bureaucratization of the military or militarisation of the bureaucracy’ by former socialist countries in Africa has continued under plural politics, and has helped to stabilise civil-military relations. He concludes by asking whether the continued application of Tanzania’s ‘total national defence and security is viable in the current multi-party setting’ (ibid:105).

Omari’s analysis of the evolution of harmonious civil-military relations is relevant to our understanding of the Zambian case since both countries have had similar systems of governments to date. However, what makes the Zambian case different from that of Tanzania is the system of governance and analytical tools used to describe the method of civil control of the military in each country in the different periods of study. Our opinion is that first, both countries used coercive and consensual measures in civil control of the military during the colonial and the immediate post independence periods respectively. Second, during the one party state period, both countries again used coercive measures characteristic of socialist regimes in this era, in civil control of the military. Hence Omari’s conceptualization of Tanzania’s civil-military relations has been determined by the process of ‘total national defence and security.’ However, the fundamental difference between the Zambian case and that of Tanzania can be observed in the nature, character and practice of civil control of the military in the post cold war era. In this period, the nature of regime change was such that, unlike in Tanzania, where the former ruling party won the first multiparty elections and remained in government, in Zambia the former ruling party lost the first election. The retention of the former ruling party in Tanzania did not necessarily compel the new leaders to drastically change the
coercive measures of civil control of the military as practiced in the one party state era. Hence Omari’s classification of the stable post cold war era civil-military relations in Tanzania as ‘total national defence and security interpreted as bureaucratisation of the military or militarisation of the bureaucracy under plural politics.’ In Zambia, contrary to the Tanzanian situation in this period, the party and government adopted consensual measures and introduced professionalism in the military by separating the military and party functions, while maintaining a formal interaction among the political and military elite as well as the citizenry. Hence this study contends that while Tanzania continued to a large extent to use the one party state coercive measures in civil control of the military in the post cold war multiparty era, the Zambian government to a large extent used consensual measures with strong input from the executive and the legislature as argued in chapter 7, which makes the study of the Zambian case a special one.

Hutchful (1998) argues that little attention has been paid to the military dimensions of the democratisation process in Africa. He points out that if democratising regimes and societies in Africa are to retain successful civil control of the military, with newly elected governments re-establishing civil supremacy, inculcating respect for democratic values, and improving military efficiency and capability, there is a need to:

- restore and sustain civil supremacy over the military through legislative and executive powers following periods of military rule; issues of military privileges and prerogatives ranging from the political and constitutional powers must be clearly defined; the role and mission of the military including functions in relations to internal security must be redefined in the military doctrine, force levels, appropriate institutional structures and relationships, and equipment types and levels (Hutchful 1998:600).

Hutchful’s argument is important as it implies that, given the traumatic transitional political experiences of African states such as Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, all African states should clearly specify status and internal and external roles of their national defence forces in their constitutions, as was done in South Africa after the transition to democracy in 1994. The study of civil control of the military in Zambia shows that both the external and internal roles of the military were clearly defined in Article 101 Part VII of the 1991 constitution.

Cawthra and Luckham (2002:2), on the other hand, point out that in
transitional states, democratic control of military and security institutions is strategic to democratisation because these institutions have a peculiarly intimate relationship to political power. Secondly, their security functions, including the management of insecurities that may be generated by democratisation, are essential for the survival of any democratic state.

They further argue that standard policy and governance recommendations falling under the security sector reform rubric only stand a chance of success where the State has remained functional during the transition, and its security institutions have remained largely intact, even if degraded by authoritarian imperatives or complex transitions (ibid:4).

They summarise the challenges of security sector reform in the transition from authoritarianism as:

1) Depoliticisation of the military and its subordination to civilian authority, including the establishment of an effective defence ministry, and effective parliamentary oversight.

2) Reorienting and reprofessionalising the military, including redefining its mission and roles.

3) Demilitarisation of public order policing and police reform, including reorientation of the police towards civil crime fighting.

4) Balancing the demands of the national defence with those of development.

5) Ensuring that the military, police and security agencies operate under the constitution and within the rule of law, and are held accountable for human rights violations.

6) Engaging the international community in the security sector reform programme (Cawthra and Luckham 2002:7).

Cawthra and Luckham’s above observations were to a large extent incorporated as part of the consensual measures that were implemented by Zambia’s post cold war era democratic government under the security sector reform program. As argued above when comparing the Tanzanian case from that of Zambia, Cawthra and Luckham’s analysis of
democratic control of the military and security institutions in post cold war era transitional states assisted this study to analyse this period in chapter 7.

Cawthra (1996:33) also provides a history of the South African defence forces and then clearly explains the military reforms that facilitated the transition from apartheid period to the new South Africa. He states that the new reforms categorically stated that the nature and composition of the security forces and control by civilians was to be bound by the principle of civil supremacy and subject to public scrutiny and open debate and be accountable and answerable to the public through a democratically elected Parliament (ibid:33-35).

He goes on to state that political control over the military was established through a collaborative relationship between civilians and the military. In this relationship, the constitution provided for the President to be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces even if his powers to deploy the defence forces, and declare the State of National Emergency, have to be approved by parliament. Political responsibility for defence became the responsibility of the Minister of Defence. Parliament was given powers to approve the defence budget, review its expenditure, consider and authorise major policy decisions such as those relating to arms trade, weapons procurement, international treaties, doctrine, deployment and the system of personnel procurement (Cawthra 1996:60-65).

Parliament was also given power to constitute the combined Senate-National Assembly Joint Standing Committee on Defence composed of all parties holding more than ten seats in the National Assembly, and with places allocated proportionately according to the national vote. This Committee had powers to investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget, functioning, organisation, arrangement, policy, morale, and state of preparedness of the National Defence Force (ibid).
Each time the committee met, it called upon senior officers and managers in the defence industry to reply to questions about the implementation of government policies. Cawthra’s study (1996) demonstrates that South Africa developed one of the most comprehensive transitional programmes in defence, and that its civil control of the military is one of the best in the Commonwealth. This study examines the South African government’s transitional programme for defence, and implications for civil control of the military. Since both countries followed consensual measures, the study of the South African case helps this study to identify gaps in Zambia’s transitional strategy, and consequently make recommendations on how civil control of the military in Zambia may be improved in the third republic.

3.7 Conclusion

The purpose of this literature survey and synthesis was to examine the relevance of these theories and interpretation of civil military relations to the understanding of the core focus statement of this study. This is ‘to ascertain why in contrast with many African countries after independence-the military in Zambia consistently supported the ruling elite.’ Using the analytical concepts of coercive and consensual measures, the study has ably argued the relevance of each author cited here to the study of the Zambian case in the four different periods under examination. We have also explained why the Zambian study of civil control of the military is a special case that is worthy studying and contributes substantially to the understanding of civil-military relations as they developed in the world and Africa in particular.

As noted earlier the most appropriate method of understanding civil control of the military during the colonial period in British colonies is through the analytical concept of coercive measures. The antagonism that the same measures caused became a synthesis that stimulated nationalist struggle and attainment of independence. The analysis of the colonial period begins by explaining that in this era the military was oriented towards external conquest and domination, and ‘the military type represented two extreme faces; one of separation between the military organisation and the colonial subjects and that of integration with the white settlers’ (Perlmutter 1977:92). This clearly demonstrates that the European colonies were aimed at strategic and material conquest. Consequently, whether in Africa, Australia or the United States, civil-military relations demonstrated high level of integration between the white settler communities, European powers, and the colonial army, but a high level of separation with the conquered indigenous
communities. In countries where the white settler community outnumbered the indigenous people – such as the Australia and the United States – civil-military relations resulted in complete domination by the white settler community, military, and government. When these settler communities unilaterally declared independence, as in the United States in 1876, retained the colonial coercive measures as they related to civil-military relations. Hence the dominance of the liberal-aristocratic model of civil-military relations, as expounded by Huntington (1957), in these countries.

However, the creation in Africa of independent white settler states that discriminated against Africans through coercive measures provoked anti-colonial struggles against those minority regimes. In those countries, civil-military relations had two faces: a high level of integration between the government, white settlers and the military on the one hand, and highly antagonistic relations with Africans on the other. The undemocratic nature of the colonial regime in Northern Rhodesia and its use of coercive measures is ably argued in chapter 4 and summarized in the taxonomy chart at the end of this chapter.

Where anti-colonial struggles were intensified, resulting in those countries being granted independence, the colonial powers did not adequately train nationalist leaders to assume oversight of defence and security. As our taxonomy chart at the end of this chapter demonstrates, the white civilian regime in colonial Northern Rhodesia made effective use of the military to enforce the racially discriminatory policies passed by parliament, implemented by the executive, and interpreted by the judiciary in favour of the white settler community. This in turn bred anti-colonial struggles by Africans, resulting in the constitutional abolition of colonial rule in 1964. This ushered in the immediate post-independence era in Zambia – that of the First Republic – to which we now turn.

After gaining their independence, countries such as the United States, New Zealand and Australia continued following the liberal model of civil-military relations. In Africa, however, civil-military relations assumed different forms in different countries. The bulk of the literature surveyed shows a fundamental shift from the culture of liberal democratic tradition or what this study terms as consensual measures to coercive military coups in most West, Central and North African countries. This was as a result of what Price (1980:323-330) terms the ‘emulation paradox by the African officer corps of Western military institutions and policies in comparison to those of the new African states’. In these countries, therefore, civil-military relations have mainly been
characterised by the military’s systematic erosion of democratic values; blatant violations of human rights (Shillington 1992:6-7); and disrespect for the institutions of parliament, the judiciary, and other national constitutions. The situation is even worse in stateless countries like Somalia, where the military has completely lost control over the institutions of governance. However, Decalo (1991:67-68) points out that literature on political stability in countries with relatively stable civil regimes, such as Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya, is scanty. In these countries, not only have civilian authorities resumed or entrenched their control over the military, but civil-military relations have changed peacefully, without necessitating a violent military takeover. This study ably argues that the systematic use of either coercive or consensual measures in the immediate post-independence or one-party state eras was responsible for these countries stability in civil control of the military. Hence the choice of Zambia for this case study, and its potential contribution to the study of civil control of the military in Africa. The study further draws attention to Welch’s five means of civilian control of the military that have been successfully utilised by various states throughout the world (1976:56). In this chapter we analyse Welch’s three of the five means of civilian control of the military to either fall under coercive or consensual measures. The taxonomy chart at the end of this chapter shows the adaptability and changing patterns of Zambia’s methods of civil control of the military, along the lines suggested by Welch and this study. It demonstrates – as explained in chapter 5 – that civil-military relations were guided by consensual measures. For example, when parliamentary oversight over defence expenditure threatened local and regional interests, this parliamentary oversight was curtailed in favour of direct presidential resource allocation. These measures were followed by a transition away from the consensual liberal-democratic model of civil-military relations to coercive controls in a one-party state, via the establishment of the department of military intelligence that gathered information at all military establishments. This brings us to an examination of control over the military in one-party states, and the relevance of this analysis to Zambia.

Literature on civil-military relations in one-party states includes Kolkowicz’s analysis of communist-style leadership in the Soviet Union (1967:19-21). This was marked by the introduction of coercive controls of the military as well as the general citizenry, via military intelligence as well as party representatives in all military establishments. These policies were vigorously pursued because of the Cold War tensions between the two superpowers, namely capitalist America and communist Russia. Given this tension, it did not matter whether an African country has a military, liberal, or socialist regime, as long as it aligned itself with one of the superpowers. Consequently,
Civil-military relations took three forms. The first was those countries that followed the consensual liberal model as expounded by Huntington (1957), such as Botswana as explained by Molomo et al (2006: 61-79). The second was those countries that adopted the coercive socialist model as expounded by Kolkowicz (1967), such as Zambia. The third was those countries that adopted hybrids of both the communist and capitalist models and became centres of Cold War-sponsored civil wars, such as Angola and Mozambique. Zambia adopted the socialist approach between 1973 and December 1990, largely due to its foreign policy position of providing bases to liberation movements fighting right-wing minority regimes elsewhere in Southern Africa. Hence its adoption of coercive controls of the military as the most appropriate way of surviving as a civil government in the Cold War era.

Therefore, in the taxonomy chart and our findings in chapter 6, we demonstrate that in the one-party state, parliamentary oversight over defence and security was not effective. As in the Soviet Union, executive control of the military was guided by one party, UNIP, and this was done via coercive controls. The civil authority had eyes and ears in the military and among the general citizenry that helped it to foil all attempted military coups d’état. Consequently, the policing and judicial system also played an effective role in arresting, prosecuting, and sentencing coup plotters. These measures enabled the one-party state to maintain good relations between the ruling politicians, the military, and the citizenry. This situation continued until the end of the Cold War when most one-party states in Africa, including Zambia, changed their system of governance to consensual plural politics. This brings us to core issues in the literature on civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era, characterised by democratic transitions.

Analysts have focused on three main aspects of civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era. Decalo (1991) and Omari (2003) examine how former one-party states with civil governments managed the transition from the coercive controls over the military typical of those regimes to those of plural politics. The study argues that in countries like Zambia and not Tanzania major factors include the abolition of party controls over the military and replacing them with an ethos of professionalism, via the a process of depoliticisation. Second, Hutchful (1998) examines how former military dictatorships – such as Ghana and Nigeria – managed transitions to plural politics. Major factors included returning uniformed men to their barracks, and establishing strong executive, parliamentary, and judicial oversight over defence and security. Third, Cawthra (1996:33) examines the unique case of South Africa, a white settler colony granted independence by Britain in 1910. However, it had to manage a transition from
white minority rule to an inclusive democracy. Major factors were the particular nature of this transition as against those in other African and Latin American states, and even the United States.

Drawing on these, we demonstrate that, in the case of Zambia’s third republic, the core issues were the introduction of strong consensual measures through the executive, parliamentary and judicial oversights over defence and security, supplemented by reforms of the structural and behavioural policies inherited from the last two republics. These had to be adapted to suit civil-military relations under plural politics.

These are the policies, we argue, that enabled Zambia to remain under civil control in the period under review. On the basis of this literature review, and the conceptual frameworks extracted from it as outlined above, we now proceed to our detailed examination of the situation in Zambia in each of the four periods under review.
TABLE 1: CHANGING PATTERNS OF CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN ZAMBIA: 1900-2004
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Parliamentary oversight</th>
<th>Executive control</th>
<th>Judicial control</th>
<th>Structural reforms</th>
<th>Behavioural controls</th>
<th>Nature of civil control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Period</td>
<td>Effective for whites</td>
<td>Effective for whites</td>
<td>Effective against Africans and breeds anti-colonial struggles</td>
<td>Policy of racial discrimination establishes formal institutions that determine civil control of the military</td>
<td>Policies of racial discrimination breeds anti-colonial struggles among Africans</td>
<td>Relationship between whites, government and military harmonious while that with Africans antagonistic as determined by coercive measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Republic</td>
<td>Effective up to January 1970</td>
<td>Effective since Office of the President determined allocation of resources to all Defence and Security Institutions</td>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td>Determined by the executive</td>
<td>Begin to be established through the department of Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Relationship between government, military and citizens harmonious as determined by consensual measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty Constitution</td>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td>Guided by the One Party UNIP</td>
<td>Effective against the 1980 and 1990 coup plotters</td>
<td>Reinforced by the one party state policies and supplemented by behavioural controls</td>
<td>Party penetration through (i) Military Intelligence (ii) Party functionaries in military (iii) Defence and Security Committees at National, Provincial &amp; District levels.</td>
<td>Relationship between government, military and citizens harmonious through implementation of one party state coercive measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-Dec 1990</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>Very effective against Zero option plan and 1997 coup plotters &amp; plunderers of Defence resources. Leads to accountability over Defence and security expenditure</td>
<td>Restructured to suit plural politics and professionalisation policies in the Defence force</td>
<td>Restructured to suit plural politics &amp; professionalisation policies in the Defence force</td>
<td>Relationship between government, military and citizens harmonious relations through combination of strong consensual executive and parliamentary controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Constitution</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Republic</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-2004</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>Very effective against Zero option plan and 1997 coup plotters &amp; plunderers of Defence resources. Leads to accountability over Defence and security expenditure</td>
<td>Restructured to suit plural politics and professionalisation policies in the Defence force</td>
<td>Restructured to suit plural politics &amp; professionalisation policies in the Defence force</td>
<td>Relationship between government, military and citizens harmonious relations through combination of strong consensual executive and parliamentary controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty Constitution</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
4 CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN BRITISH-RULED NORTHERN RHODESIA, 1900-1963

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we argue that civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia was based on coercive measures through racial structures applied to political, economic and social affairs which gave the military two faces: one white and one black. One was white in the sense that the interaction between white settlers, the ruling political elite, and the military was a harmonious one, and served the interests of the colonial settlers and the British Imperial government. The other was black in the sense that the economic, political and social interaction between the ruling elite and the military on the one hand and indigenous Africans on the other was an antagonistic one, that endured up to 1963. This discriminatory system was administered by four institutions: the governor, who was the executive head of government, commander of the armed forces, and imperial representative in the colony; an executive council, that made government policies; a legislative council, that made laws; and the judiciary, that enforced and interpreted those laws.

The nature of the colonial dispensation in Northern Rhodesia was largely determined by the way in which the British South Africa Company (BSAC) conquered and colonised the territory, and the system of administration it introduced.

4.2 The conquest and colonisation of Northern Rhodesia by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), 1900-1924

The conquest of North-Western Rhodesia (NWR) by the British government through the BSAC was done on the basis of collaboration by the Litunga of Barotseland, who signed the 1889 Ware Concession, the 1890 Lochner Treaty, and the 1900 Coryndon Treaty. Based on these, the British government granted the BSAC a charter to extend its rule from Southern Rhodesia to Northern Rhodesia. North-Eastern Rhodesia (NER), on the other hand, resisted colonial intrusion by force of arms until 1897 when Chief Mpezeni’s impis were crushed by superior British military forces. Following the complete conquest of both NER and NWR, the two territories were amalgamated into Northern Rhodesia in 1911.
4.3 Establishment of the BSAC Police Force

The establishment of a BSAC Police Force in both North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia followed the British colonial policy of differentiation and divide and rule. Welch argues that British colonial strategies generally centred on the recruitment of soldiers from so-called ‘martial peoples, not necessarily drawn from the territory they were to defend. These groups became closely linked with the maintenance of British power, which they upheld without questioning the external government control of the military’ (1976:15). He attributes this loyalty to the British government to four factors, namely the dominance of British soldiers in the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks; the recruitment of the rank and file from areas untouched by ‘Nationalist agitation’; rotation of units to reduce ties with the local population; and the isolation of politically conscious natives within the armed forces (ibid).

He further describes the plight of the colonial soldiers as

one of armed and somewhat privileged helots compelled by circumstances to serve their foreign masters in conquering and subjugating their fellow Africans, usually from other ethnic groups. Consequently, the local civilian populace often regarded members of such armies as hated and despicable tools of the white conquerors. The civilian control thereby maintained rested in the hands of foreign minority benefiting from the coercive strength of soldiers schooled in obedience and often little else (ibid:16).

All these legacies worked to create a conflict situation between the white settlers, their government, and the military on one hand, and the African population on the other. Under these circumstances, civil control of the military firmly favoured the interests of the white settlers in Northern Rhodesia.

Under BSAC rule, Sir Harry Johnson, Imperial Commissioner in Nyasaland and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, created the basis for the effective colonisation of Northern Rhodesia by crushing slavery and the slave trade in what later became North Western and North Eastern Rhodesia (see Hall 1968:83; Gibbons Report 1900:23; Brelsford 1949:3). This was done after the British government had recruited volunteers
from the Indian colonial government to serve in the Nyasaland military force. Upon arrival in Nyasaland, the Indian forces were used to stop the slave trade and subject Northern Rhodesia to British administration. In this way the commercial and financial interests of the BSAC in Northern Rhodesia were effectively entrenched and protected.

The Indian forces slowly began to infuse the Northern Rhodesia police force with the doctrines and control mechanisms they had learnt from their colonial masters in India. The gradual indigenisation of the police force, supervised by Indian Sikhs, and commanded by English officers, was a combination of the

British colonial military tradition followed in British India of recruiting from the ‘warrior race’ or ‘martial people’ or ‘non use of the locals’ and also the need for reliability, loyalty, and subordination among African infantry soldiers and carriers led by British colonial officers (Perlmutter 1977:118).

In July 1895 Nyasaland became the British Central Africa Protectorate, and was separated from the BSAC areas. The Sikh forces were withdrawn from ‘Northern Rhodesia even if the Nyasaland police force were still required to do gendarmerie type roles and the territorial defence of all the BSAC’s spheres of influence north of the Zambezi river’ (Brelsford 1949:4). It is important to note that the Nyasaland military police forces acted on the instructions of the Board of Directors of the BSAC, with the permission of the British High Commissioner in South Africa, relayed to Sir Harry Johnson, Resident Commissioner in Nyasaland, who was also commander-in-chief of the police forces. Therefore, right from the outset, all the forces that carried out gendarmerie-type roles in BSAC-ruled territory fell under civil control.

After the separation of Nyasaland, and for ease of administration, the area remaining under BSAC control was divided into two areas: North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia.

### 4.4 Establishment of the North-Eastern Rhodesia Police Force

In North-Eastern Rhodesia BSAC officials began to ‘recruit their own police as soon as the Nyasaland forces withdrew and some of the Nyasaland forces joined the new North-Eastern Rhodesia constabulary, as the force was called’ (Brelsford 1949:5). Numbering some 210, this force was tasked with protecting tax collectors. It also
‘guarded the property of the government and native prisoners, escorted caravans, carried messages from the administration officials to native Chiefs, and effected any arrests of natives that was required’ (Codrington 1901:75-76). The police were only stationed at posts manned by a European official. These included Serenje, Fife, Nyala and Mirongo in Chambezi district; Abercorn, Katwe, Mporokoso and Sumbu in Tanganyika district; Kalungwishi, Choma and Kazembe in Mweru district; Kasama in Awemba district; and Fort Jameson (Codrington 1901:75-76). These posts established effective BSAC administrative control in North-Western Rhodesia.

In April 1903 the BSAC decided to recruit 75 Ngoni young men to take up appointment as police officers under the North-Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary. However, after graduation, instead of serving in North-Eastern Rhodesia, these officers were posted for service to North-Western Rhodesia (NAZ 1903).

This was in line with the British military policy of using officers from one ethnic group to police others, thus reducing their ties with the local populace. Similarly, some white and native police officers recruited in North-Western Rhodesia were posted to North-Eastern Rhodesia. The was aimed at avoiding the problem of revolt and resistance experienced in 1897 when the native police force failed to suppress the Ngoni people’s uprising against BSAC rule.

Brelsford (1954:65) also notes that

as a principle, Angoni from the Eastern Province were always posted to Kasama in the Northern Province and Bemba from the north to Fort Jameson in the east. This was to ensure that in the event of trouble, Askari would not have to fire on fellow tribesmen.

Also in 1903, the ‘BSA Company further recruited 300 Ngoni men as police officers and sent them for service in the Mashonaland Native Police’ (Clark 1904:1).

4.5 Establishment of the North-Western Rhodesia Police Force

The establishment of police posts and administrative centres at Lealui in Mongu, Monze, and Kaunga in Kaleya was undertaken by white officers commanded by Col Colin Harding. However, the successful establishment of administrative centres in North-
Western Rhodesia ran into problems because most white officers suffered or died from tropical diseases such as malaria. Further, the costs of maintaining 50 white officers was far higher than that of maintaining 220 native policemen (Harding 1899). Harding estimated the cost of maintaining 50 white police officers in North-Western Rhodesia in 1900 as 12 800 pounds sterling. This included salaries; rations and transport; uniforms; horse, forage and saddles; the transport of canteen goods; and hospital comforts.

In the same year, Harding estimated the cost of maintaining 220 Native police in North-Western Rhodesia in 1900 as 5 327 pounds sterling. This included salaries, rations, salt, and uniforms (Harding 1899). He pointed out that the Native police could live mainly on local produce, thereby saving transport costs of two pounds ten shillings per 100 pounds of foodstuffs. Natives required no horses, were more disease-resistant, and, in case of emergency, could walk through the whole country without transport or provisions of any kind, obtaining their food from kraal to kraal (ibid). He further advised that ‘apart from police duties the natives could be utilised to carry the mail to and from Bulawayo, do fatigues in and about their camp, make roads and thus, to a great extent, save the employment of native labour’ (ibid).

In 1899, on the basis of Harding’s advice, the BSAC phased out detachments of white officers in North-Western Rhodesia and established a force consisting of predominantly indigenous people who were accustomed to local weather conditions and could eat local foodstuffs. Named the Barotse Native Police, the force was authorised by proclamation of 1901 by the then High Commissioner for South Africa. In the proclamation, the Barotse Native Police was ‘established, officers were authorised, powers of punishment and jurisdiction laid down, and officers were empowered to adopt such measures as could have been necessary for the safe custody and conveyance of all prisoners’ (Brelsford 1949:5).

Recruitment for the Barotse Native Police followed was British colonial policy of divide and rule. Out of 73 ethnic groups in North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia, recruitment was restricted to the Barotse, Tonga Plateau, Bemba and Ngoni tribes. These men were supervised by Indian Sikhs and commanded by British officers.

The Barotse, Tonga and Bemba were selected for recruitment to reward them for collaborating with the colonists during the in conquest of North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia. The Ngoni, on the other hand, were selected because they were thought to be good warriors (Brelsford 1954:20).
Members of the Barotse Native Police were trained as soldiers, and proved that they could obey military instructions in respect of the handling of weapons; preserving peace, order, and the rule of law among native communities; and the conduct of warfare. The force successfully took over the duties previously performed by white BSAC police, and enforced law and order among the native communities. The BSAC in turn continued its administrative and developmental duties in North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia using minimum resources and without any serious resistance from local people.

Despite being paid less than their Indian and white colleagues, the native military police forces in Northern Rhodesia observed the British and Indian military tradition of carrying out effective operations as ordered by the civilian commanders of the armed forces. These were the BSAC representatives, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, and his representative in Northern Rhodesia. As in North-Eastern Rhodesia, the BSAC representative continued to account to the BSAC administration and the colonial office in London for the estimates, procurements, and expenditures incurred by the force (NAZ 1926).

These native policemen became the backbone of colonial rule. They enforced colonial regulations such as hut, dog, and bicycle taxes, and recruited able-bodied men for migrant labour in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. They also enforced the movement of Africans from land alienated for white settlement to native reserves. Given this, they were hated by many Africans.

4.6 The amalgamation of North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia

In August 1911 the Proclamation of Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1911 amalgamated North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia into one territory known from then on as Northern Rhodesia. Section 20 of the order provided for the raising and constitution of a police force for Northern Rhodesia by proclamation. The High Commissioner [then] published the 1912 proclamation and recognised the North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia police forces as the official forces for the territory (Northern Rhodesia Government 1911:1).

The 1912 Proclamation provided for the ‘establishment and maintenance of a new force of police known as the Northern Rhodesia Police’ (Northern Rhodesia
CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN ZAMBIA

Government 1912:1). Brelsford (1954:25) notes that ‘the fact that the Northern Rhodesia Police was a military organisation was borne out by section 7 of the Northern Rhodesia Proclamation No. 17 of 1912’. The 1912 Proclamation provided that

in case of any war or other emergency, members of the force could perform either police or military duties within the limits of the Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council 1911, or within the limits of the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1898 and when so employed, was subject to such terms and regulations as the High Commissioner could determine (Northern Rhodesia Government 1912:1).

The 1912 Proclamation further provided that:

The limits of the 1911 Order in Council, Section 4, envisaged military action only within the boundaries of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. All members of the Barotse Native Police and North- Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary were automatically transferred to and enrolled as members of the Northern Rhodesia Police (Northern Rhodesia Government 1912:2).

The Administrator of Northern Rhodesia was given the power to appoint the commandant, inspectors, and other officers of the Northern Rhodesia police, with the approval of the High Commissioner. The Administrator was also given the power to alter or rescind regulations related to the enrolment, promotion, reduction, transfer, discharge or dismissal of any member of the force (ibid:16). All the other responsibilities of the civil administrators, from those that the BSAC administration instituted in the military police forces, under its administration, were inherited and continued to be used by successive governments in the colonial period. These included the British colonial administration between 1924 and 1953 and that of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963.

4.7 Impact of BSAC land and labour policies on civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1924

While the BSAC governed Northern Rhodesia in the period 1900–1924, it introduced a range of coercive measures such as the land and labour policies that favoured the economic interests of white settlers and discriminated against Africans, preventing them from utilising the same facilities for their own economic advancement.
The separation of the economic and social interests of white settlers and Africans was enforced by the Company police, who also had military responsibilities, and were authorised to use firearms.

By 1920 colonial policies in respect of labour, land, and economic development in Africa were already formulated, and widely applied throughout the continent. British colonies were no exception. In Kenya, South Africa, and Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Africans provided a reservoir of labour in ‘agriculture, industry, railway and road construction. In East Africa the African was the agricultural producer who was paid low wages which were fixed by the government and the Indian middleman’ (Kiwanuka 1970:47). In these colonies the ‘settler had the most violent laws in terms of land expropriation and segregation. Africans were forced to move into the reserves as if they were a peculiar species of mankind’ (ibid:41). The key question for the present study is what effect the policies of land alienation had on Africans in Northern Rhodesia, and how this impacted on civil control of the military. Kiwanuka argues that:

These land policies had little difference in the overall effect upon the African peoples. Whether in Kenya, Rhodesia or the Belgian Congo, it was the least productive part of the land that was left to the African. Nothing is more misleading than when statistics of acres of or square miles of alienated lands are dangled before our eyes. This is because large areas of African land were unsuitable for cultivation. Not only were they infested with tsetse fly but were either deficient in water or were located in semi desert or rocky areas (Kiwanuka 1970:41-44).

In conjunction with land alienation, Kiwanuka argues that ‘colonial regimes with European settlers operated their compulsory labour laws on the basis that the government had an obligation to the settler farmers because land was no good without labour’ (ibid:37). Therefore, settlers wanted their governments to recruit labour for them. ‘Lord Demere argued at the Assembly in 1908 that all government officers be directed and be strictly required to encourage the native to seek labour and to do their utmost to assist those who require it’ (ibid:37-40). Hence the District Commissioners, professional European labour recruiting agencies, and African chiefs implemented policies of forced labour that adversely affected Africans economically.
Kiwanuka points out that ‘whatever the local differences may have existed, they were obscured by the overwhelming common characteristics of suffering to which the Africans were subjected to’ (ibid:39-40). These included

deads in labour recruitment camps, on the journeys to and from places of work and during employment. Famine and starvation were also experienced due to the depletion of African villages of food producing populations. Then, there was the psychological impact itself of doing a job one did not want, of separating families for months and sometimes years. Apart from this the wages were low, deliberately fixed so that the African could not save and he could consequently be forced to return to the distant farms and mines of the white man (ibid).

How these land and labour policies affected Africans in Northern Rhodesia between 1900 and 1963 and their impact on civil control of the military is the subject of the next section.

4.8 Labour demands on Africans, land alienation, famine, and civil control of the military: 1900-1924

The colonisation of Southern Rhodesia and the development of mines and farms affected the development of African agriculture in Northern Rhodesia as well. In 1890 white settlers in Southern Rhodesia established mines and commercial farms using capital loaned from the BSAC. These developments required large numbers of African labourers. The Southern Rhodesian government solved the problem of labour shortages by alienating Africans from their land, and then imposing hut taxes. Thus Africans who had lost their land and could not raise money for hut tax from subsistence farming were forced to enter wage employment in whites’ mines and farms. These developments created centres of worker population that stimulated agricultural and industrial development in Southern Rhodesia.

Growing demands for African labour in Southern Rhodesia prompted the BSAC to introduce hut tax in North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia, in 1901 and 1903 respectively. Hut taxes were also used to help finance the colonial administration. These taxes were collected in forceful and even brutal ways. Brelsford (1954:19-22) reports that
members of the Barotse Native Police who were armed and trained as soldiers accompanied Company officials on the first tax collecting tours in areas such as the Zambezi valley, and little or nothing in the nature of civil police duties was undertaken. During these tours the Company police subjected hut tax defaulters to cruel punishments such as flogging, imprisonment and burning of native dwellings.

Brelsford further notes that in ‘1906 Harding retired from the post of Commandant for no other reason other than his recusant to the burning of native dwellings as a punishment for alleged hut tax defaulters’ (ibid:22). Under these conditions, African men in Northern Rhodesia had little choice but to leave their families behind and travel to Southern Rhodesia to seek work (Vail 1977:137). Under these circumstances, many Africans came to hate the Company labour policies, and the Company police, and an antagonistic relationship developed between the Company police, District Commissioners, and African communities.

Despite the introduction of hut tax in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia still did not have enough African labour. The need to achieve its labour targets for rapidly developing Southern Rhodesian industries and the construction of Cape to Cairo rail/road/telegraph networks prompted the BSAC to accelerate land alienation in Northern Rhodesia. At the same time, it began to encourage whites to settle in Northern Rhodesia.

The first land to be taken from Africans was in ‘North-Eastern Rhodesia in 1895 when the Company created the North Charterland Exploration Company and approved the grant, a concession of 10,000 square miles of land’ (NAZ 1895). After the Ngoni resistance was crushed in 1897 the ‘Company passed the 1900 Regulations which vested all land in North-Eastern Rhodesia in the Chartered Company’ (Hall 1968:90). Accordingly, in ‘1907, the Company delimited the Ngoni Native Reserve that was 43 miles in extent’ (Colonial Office 1938:57). Siamwiza (1998:251) states that in ‘Chilanga, Lusaka Province, between 1915 and 1916, 93,000 acres of the best land were alienated for European agricultural production. By 1922, 9,160,000 acres had been alienated for European occupation in the same area. … This gave each European farmer 4,250 acres against 176 per African who occupied an area with very little land with surface water.’

In North-Western Rhodesia the 1900 Coryndon Treaty gave the BSAC administrative and judicial powers to make grants of land for farming purposes in any portion of the Batoka and Mashukulumbwe areas. By 1910, land in the Southern Province had been divided into three categories, namely the ‘railway strip that covered 830 square
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miles; Crown land that covered 524 miles; [and] portion of Reserves No. 10, 11, and 12 that covered 2,945 miles’ (Read 1931–2:10). These demarcations were undertaken by the Survey Department, supported by Company police. From 1914 onwards Crown land and the railway strip were reserved for occupation by white settlers, and land in the Native Reserves for occupation by Africans. In 1912 Native District Commissioners throughout Northern Rhodesia were directed to order Africans living on Crown land to move to the Native Reserves. Those who had not yet moved were instructed to leave their homes on Crown land after the 1914 harvest (Griffin: 1958:1-38).

The Reserves were ‘over-crowded with livestock and human beings, contributing therefore to excessive soil erosion, poor crop yields, famine and death’ (Palmer 1983:93-96). The anticipated settlement of whites on Crown land did not take place immediately. Throughout Northern Rhodesia, most areas designated as Crown land reverted to bush, and became a habitat for baboons, wild pigs and elephants. Their destruction of crops worsened food shortages in the reserves, and populations of wild animals near human settlements brought the problem of tsetse fly. This led to the rapid spread of trypanosomiasis, which decimated the cattle population in the Eastern and Southern provinces of Northern Rhodesia in particular. As a result, Brelsford (1954:66) notes, the paramilitary branch of the BSAC police established a ‘Barotse cattle cordon from Sesheke to Mwengwa on the Kafue in May 1922, through 186 miles of uninhabited bush. It was a straight cut, on compass bearings. Later the line was shortened to come closer to Namwala.’

Despite these dire conditions, District Commissioners, accompanied by Company police, continued to demand hut tax. This forced able-bodied young men to migrate to travel to Southern Rhodesia for wage employment. Relations between Company officials and police on one hand and Africans on the other continued to worsen, and this trend was further accelerated by demands for military labour and food during World War I, which is the subject of the next section.

4.9 The demand for military labour and food requisitions from Africans in Northern Rhodesia: 1914-1918

Siamwiza (1998:148) notes that when the ‘First World War broke out in 1914 Northern Rhodesia had a problem of undeveloped agricultural industry, shortages of transport and poor communication systems. Settler agriculture failed to take off because of lack of markets as the copper mines had not yet been opened. Since the settler farmers
could not provide food for the war the Company administration depended on African production which was at subsistence level.’

The movement of troops, food and war equipment was also very difficult. Hostilities in southern Africa took place on the border with German East Africa, which was more than eight hundred miles away from the nearest railway line. This meant that supplies had to be carried by African porters known as Tenga Tenga. These were recruited in tens of thousands. Groves (1964:66) states that whereas the Union of South Africa recruited 35,000 African men for non-combatant duties in German South West Africa, Northern Rhodesia recruited 41,000 first-line military porters for service in German and Portuguese East Africa. Lucas (1958:287) also reports that Northern Rhodesia supplied African runners and cyclists to maintain lines of communication until emergency telegraph lines could be set up. Out of all these the runners beat both cycle and motor cycle, carrying some messages by relay with day and night travel a distance of 450 miles in six days.

The demand for African labour during World War I had far-reaching implications for labour and food and food availability among the Africans in Northern Rhodesia throughout the war’ (Siamwiza 1998:148). Labour recruitment and food requisitions began in Northern, Luapula and Eastern provinces immediately the war was declared. Siamwiza states that there were 1,200 African troops with 200 messengers and scouts on the border with Tanganyika at the end of 1914. By 1915 the number of troops increased to 2,000. Because of poor transport and communication systems all patrolling columns were accompanied by hundreds of carriers who carried war equipment and ammunitions as well as food, water and other essential commodities for the troops (ibid).

Initially, the supply of labour for war purposes was undertaken by Native District Commissioners. However, when Africans began evading recruitment by living in the bush and hiding their food in caves, the colonial authorities turned to their traditional collaborators, the African chiefs, for food and labour. If chiefs refused or failed to perform these tasks, they lost their appointments and official recognition. The need to recruit more men for war purposes and the impact of the war on administrative expenses
forced the ‘Company government to increase tax in 1915 from 3 shillings to 5 shillings in North-Eastern Rhodesia and from 5 shillings to 10 shillings in North-Western Rhodesia’ (Siamwiza 1998:152).

At the war front, several thousand carriers suffered terribly from diseases such as dysentery and influenza. Hall, citing Michael Gelfand, writes:

It was most unfortunate that this great contribution to the war effort by the porters should be accompanied by such huge losses, for the death rate amongst them was higher than could possibly have been anticipated. Lack of food was an aggravating factor. Because of bad weather and lack of the male folk to raise crops the majority of Africans who returned from service in the Lundazi sub-district of the Luangwa district arrived in a pitiable state of emaciation due to starvation and dysentery. In October 1918, an influenza epidemic swept the country, causing many more deaths. It was reported to be so serious that all forms of transport were paralysed (Hall 1968:102).

It is clear from the foregoing that the demands for labour and food to fuel the military campaign had a very negative economic and social impact on African communities. African communities came to view the colonial army as a vehicle of starvation, disease, and death. White settlers, on the other hand, viewed it as an integral part of the colonial regime whose function was to assist them in the political, economic, and social exploitation of indigenous people and the resources of Northern Rhodesia. How Africans reacted to land alienation, hut tax, and military labour demands, and its impact on civil control of the military, is dealt with in the next section.

4.10 African reaction to land alienation, hut tax and labour

Africans responded to these oppressive policies by refusing to pay hut tax, antagonising settler farmers, and killing chiefs who collaborated with the colonial regime. In 1912, colonial authorities in Kasempa convicted three natives for murdering fellow villagers and sentenced them to be hanged. Chiefs, headmen and villagers were invited to watch the hanging. Hall (1968:97) reports that the ‘execution had a sobering and restraining effect on the Bakaonde for a considerable time.’
In the same period in Kasempa district, Africans refused to pay hut tax to the Native District Commissioner and also refused to obey any regulations issued by the colonial government. According to Brelsford (1954:66), the government reacted by sending a patrol of two officers and sixty native rank and file with two Lewis Gun Sections who left for Kasempa on 15th August 1923, on orders from the Administrator. The patrol was effective and the most chastening effect, especially with the demonstrations given of Lewis gunfire. The patrol returned on 16th November 1923, having covered 1,180 miles.

This brutal use of force by the colonial government gave Africans a highly negative impression of the role of the military in the governance of Northern Rhodesia. They realised that the consequence of refusing to pay hut tax was a military assault that could result in the loss of lives.

Dispossessed Africans who worked on settler farms on former Crown land in order to earn cash wages for hut tax were very negatively disposed towards their work and their masters. A white farmer at Nega Nega in the Mazabuka district vividly reflected this when he wrote to the administrative secretary of Northern Rhodesia that the attitude of the natives towards the white man is unpleasant and menacing, and their labour less efficient than formerly and very untrustworthy, and in the writer’s opinion steadily getting worse. A native possibly suffering from the effects of smoking Indian hemp may become threatening and abusive in his manner at any time, offering to fight white men causing a general disturbance (NA Z 1926).

It can be safely argued that these factors resulted in starvation in the reserves, and that this forced Africans to steal food crops from and hunt game on settler farms. When called upon by settler farmers to stop the practice,

Africans in the Mazabuka area organised themselves into groups armed with spears and clubs and frequently attacked the white farmers while shouting and making offensive gestures. In the event that the white farmers were not armed, these native armed gangs were quite offensive and dangerous. Other gangs of Africans waited for trains at railway sidings and engaged in stone throwing (ibid).
The colonial government responded with coercive administrative and military measures. Between 1920 and 1926 the government, through the District Commissioners, registered all firearms in the hands of Africans. This enabled the police to trace the owners of any firearms dropped or captured during an assault on white settlers. All unregistered firearms were confiscated, and the importation of more firearms was regulated via customs regulations (NAZ 1926).

In the Central, Northern and Luapula provinces Africans reacted to land alienation, hut tax, and the demands for labour and food for war purposes by joining the Watch Tower Movement led by Mwanalesa. This movement preached against the colonial laws; European settlers and white missionaries; chiefs and headmen; and the uselessness of cultivating crops that would end up being donated to troops fighting white men’s wars.

In its constitution the Watch Tower Movement called for

Passive resistance to government; refusal to work, and if compelled, to accept payment and refuse to pay hut tax; that converts are released from all obedience and respect of chiefs and headmen; many things in the Bible are untrue, and the European Missionaries conceal much that is true from the Africans (NAZ 1926).

On the basis of these principles many ‘settlers, chiefs and headmen in the Central, Northern and Luapula provinces were murdered by the Watch Tower Movement for working with the colonial authorities against Africans and on the pretence that they were witches’ (Brelsford 1954:66).

In 1926 the colonial government reacted to African resistance to its coercive land and labour policies as well as the activities of the Watch Tower Movement by mobilising the paramilitary wing of the Company police. Brelsford (ibid) states that:

In 1926 strong patrols from Livingstone, Kasama and Fort Jameson converged on Serenje and made extensive tours through the areas that had been disturbed by the activities of Mwanalesa. He was a watchtower prophet whose activities became anti- European and who had murdered many natives in the Congo and Northern Rhodesia. He was hanged with two others, having been charged with the murders of thirty- two Northern Rhodesian natives, and convicted. The patrols, consisting of four Officers,
one British Non-Commissioned Officer and 150 Africans under Lieutenant-Colonel Stephenson, were some of the strongest ever sent out. Throughout Northern Rhodesia the troops carried out demonstrations and tactical schemes in the presence of chiefs and people who had been called to watch. The patrols were done under active service conditions and 2,500 miles were travelled between June and August.

The 1926 patrols taught rebellious Africans that resistance to white settlers and the colonial government and its officers could have extreme consequences. This was especially important since all the local chiefs, headmen, women and children were given an opportunity to witness field firing and other demonstrations that gave them an opportunity to realise the effects of gunfire.

While the BSAC continued to function in a corporate way in order to make maximum profits from its colonies, the British government finalised its policies of indirect rule in Africa. How the British government terminated the BSAC mandate over Northern Rhodesia and used the Legislative Council, Judiciary and Executive – including the military – to management labour, land, and nationalist policies, and its implications for civil control of the military, is examined in the next section.

4.11 Civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia as a British Protectorate: 1924-1963

In 1924 the British government terminated the Company charter to administer Northern Rhodesia and declared the territory a British Protectorate. Sir Herbert Stanley became the first colonial governor of Northern Rhodesia. As in Uganda, the colonial regime adopted a policy of indirect rule. Kiwanuka (1970:78) states that the ‘founder of indirect rule was Lord Lugard. Indirect rule then as a system of administration was based on the use of an indigenous authority or power for the coloniser.’ As has already been mentioned above, it was far cheaper, for instance, to employ an African because even if he did the same job twice as efficiently, he was always paid much less than his European counterpart. Being a mere functionary, ‘the African always did his best to please his colonial master and he was far much harsher towards his fellow Africans than the coloniser himself. Furthermore the immediate repercussions of the Africans’ harshness could not be directly associated with the coloniser but against the African Agents’ (ibid). In order to function, the system of ‘Indirect Rule operated efficiently under recognisable
indigenous authority like Chiefs to which power was delegated. The bigger the polity, the
easier it was to locate the locus of political authority. Thus Indirect Rule worked
excellently when used in centralised states such as kingdoms or chieftainships’ (ibid).
Kiwanuka criticises the same system by pointing out that

Under the system of Indirect Rule, whether a chief was hereditary or
appointed, whether he was under a British or French regime, he owed his
position to the approval of the colonial power and he retained that position
only as long as the colonial regime believed he was playing the role he was
supposed to play. For this reason the British, like other colonial regimes,
deposed many African Kings and Chiefs (Kiwanuka 1970:79).

Under this system of governance Northern Rhodesia was controlled by colonial
institutions of governance such as the Legislative Council, the Executive, and the
Judiciary. These institutions also made and implemented coercive racist policies in
respect of civil control of the military. In order to understand the context in which these
institutions operated, a number of questions need to be answered. These include: what
was the composition of the legislative council, executive, and the judiciary? How many
and what kind of Africans sat in these governance institutions? What was their role? And
what role did they play in the struggle for independence?

4.12 The role of the Legislative Council

The first legislative council held its first meeting on 23 May 1924 in Livingstone,
the then capital of Northern Rhodesia. It comprised the governor, nine official members
who represented the government and five nominated back bench members. All these were
white settlers, and no African was nominated to represent African interests. It is therefore
not surprising that, during the early years of the council, native affairs were rarely
discussed. Davidson (1946:68) notes that the non-participation of Africans in legislative
council affairs was encapsulated in a remark by a member of the council, a Mr Moore, in
1927 that ‘the natives do not come into contact with this House; they are governed in the
sense that they are legislated for by the people, but they are governed by the people who
employ them’. Twelve years later, while discussing African opposition to the
amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, the same member stated that ‘the
Natives have got no grounds for liking it or disliking it; we are running the show’
These remarks clearly indicate that the role of the first legislative council in Northern Rhodesia was to serve the interests of white settlers.

In 1932, following pressure from white settlers, the numbers of official and back bench members were equalised at eight each. One white back bench member was nominated to represent African interests. In 1945 the number of members of the legislative council was increased to 21. Eight were officials; eight were elected back bench members, and five more members were nominated to sit in the back bench, three of whom represented African interests. Again, all the members were white.

In 1948, the composition of the legislative council was changed yet again, in response to the increase in the white settler population, and pressure from the Northern Rhodesia Federation of African Welfare Societies as well as the African Representative Council established in November 1946 (Davidson 1946:32). Two African members elected by the African Representative Council were added to the ninth Legislative Council. On 10 November 1948 the governor of Northern Rhodesia ceased to be the President of the Council and was replaced by an elected Speaker. In 1948, therefore, the House was made up of nine official members who represented the Cabinet in the House, ten elected back bench members, and two official members nominated to represent African interests. The two African members did not have any impact on decision-making in the council, as any attempt by them to uphold African interests was bound to be voted out by the white members, who were in the majority. In 1954 the number of African members elected to the council by the African Representative Council was increased to four. In 1959 further constitutional changes were introduced that encouraged politics to develop along party rather than racial lines (Mulford 1967:56-57). The 1959 elections produced a Legislative Council comprising 14 Europeans and six African representatives. This time African members remained a minority because of property and monetary franchise requirements that limited the number of Africans who qualified as voters.

As Mulford (1967:183-184) notes, in 1961 further constitutional changes were introduced in Northern Rhodesia as a result of the ‘winds of change’ speech by the British Prime Minister Harold McMillan. The constitution provided that of those members to be elected, 15 would be returned from single member constituencies by upper roll voters, 15 from member constituencies by lower roll voters and 15 from national constituencies by both rolls voting together.
The 1962 elections were contested by nationalist political parties led by both whites and Africans. The white-led United Federal Party won 16 seats in the Legislative Council, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) led by Kenneth Kaunda won 14 seats, and the African National Congress led by Harry M Nkumbula won seven. The two African parties agreed to form a coalition government and to emancipate the majority of Africans from white domination. The coalition government lasted until January 1964 (ibid:298), when fresh elections were held under the Northern Rhodesia Constitution Order in Council of 1963. UNIP won 55 seats, the whites-only National Progressive Party won ten, and the African National Congress the remaining ten.

Between 1924 and 1962, the composition of the council resulted in legislation that did not promote harmonious relations among African civilians, the government, and the military. They served the economic, political and social interests of white settlers, and therefore did promote harmonious civil-military relations among white settlers, the government, and the military. These coercive laws included the Crown Lands and Native Reserves Order-in-Council 1928, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment Ordinance No 25 of 1937, the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force Ordinance No 1 of 1939, the Northern Rhodesia Compulsory Military Service Ordinance No 13 of 1940, and the Northern Rhodesia Territorial Force Ordinance No 67 of 1953.

This situation only changed between 1962 and 1964 when the dominance of Africans in the Legislative Council enabled them to start moving towards consensual, a non-racial approach to issues related to civil control of the military. Among other things, they repealed or amended all discriminatory laws relating to the relationship between the military and security establishments and the people of Zambia.

4.13 Composition and functions of the Executive Council

The Executive Council was made up of white settlers who occupied all ministerial positions, including that of governor. They were assisted by Native District Commissioners, all of whom were also white. In line with the British colonial policy of indirect rule, the executive governed Africans via government-appointed and recognised chiefs and headmen for every tribe.

The functions of the executive were to govern the country according to the laws passed by the Legislative Council. Since the colonial regime promoted the economic, political and social interests of white settlers over those of Africans, its laws and their
implementation created antagonistic methods of civil control of the military in respect of Africans. However, since these racist laws favoured the interests of white settlers, they promoted harmonious methods of civil control of the military in respect of white settlers.

The exploitative, antagonistic, and racist nature of civil control of the military under the colonial regime was only curtailed by the passage of the Northern Rhodesia Constitution Order-in-Council, 1963 and the African attainment of a majority of seats in the Legislative Council. This whole period only ended after Zambia’s independence on 24 October 1964.

4.14 Composition and functions of the judiciary

The judicial system under the colonial regime in Northern Rhodesia was divided into two components. One comprised British laws as they applied to Northern Rhodesia and the white settlers, and were interpreted by trained lawyers and magistrates. The other comprised customary laws, interpreted by African chiefs. As mere interpreters of the requirements of the law, the discriminatory nature of the colonial regime and its laws made these judicial officers punish offenders according to the demands of the law. The punishments meted out to Africans for opposing the colonial regime met with the approval of white settlers, and therefore contributed to harmonious relations among them, the government, and the military. However, the judicial system’s authorisation of the use of military force to punish Africans who defaulted on hut tax, resisted forceful removal from their ancestral lands, and fought for the independence of their people and country made many Africans hate the judicial system, the people who managed it, and the oppressive forces such as the police, prison authorities, and the military. In this sense the system did not promote harmonious civil-military relations with Africans. In order to understand the context in which the military operated, we need to examine the legislative framework in terms of which they were established and operated, to which we now turn.

4.15 Establishment of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, 1924-39

The Northern Rhodesia Regiment was established with the Northern Rhodesia Ordinance No 25 of 1937, adopted by the Legislative Council. Before its passage the Council simply advised the governor on issues related to the regiment. In terms of these arrangements the colonial government and its governor exercised effective control over the Legislative Council, and commanded the Northern Rhodesia police and military
forces. The executive introduced a policy to reorganise the regiment along the lines of other colonial units. The first step involved the secondment of an officer from the British Regular Army to command the regiment, assisted by two seconded junior officers. These officers then advised the government on the implementation of ‘the recruitment policy; what ranks were to be filled; and the appropriate time when the officers could take up their responsibilities in Northern Rhodesia’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937d: 211-237).

In November 1933, Brig-Gen C Norman, Inspector General of the Kings African Rifles and Royal West Africa Frontier Force, and commander of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, submitted recommendations to the governor of Northern Rhodesia on the reorganisation of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. He recommended an increase in military personnel from seven British non-commissioned officers and 376 African rank and file to 12 officers, seven British non-commissioned officers, 567 African rank and file; and 240 African gun porters. He further recommended that the regiment be based at Lusaka, which would therefore require the rapid transport of personnel and supplies to the scene of disturbances (Norman 1933).

He argued that this would require the establishment of an air wing, equipped with a troop carrier, and that the ability to fly 30 men to any trouble spot would be highly effective under any conditions that could be visualised in Northern Rhodesia. In case of labour disturbances at a mine, for example, it would not be possible to drop any bombs, but it would be possible to fly in 30 soldiers who could rapidly and effectively deal with the situation. He therefore recommended that plans be drawn up for moving the regiment by rail, motor transport, and air transport. The need for the rapid mobility of military personnel in Northern Rhodesia was one of the reasons for the later establishment of the Northern Rhodesia Air Force.

The Northern Rhodesian government responded to Norman’s report by slowly implementing all the recommendations, depending on the availability of funds.

In May 1935 African mineworkers went on strike for the first time, at the Roan Antelope Mine in Luanshya, and the strike quickly spread to Nkana and Mufulira mines. They were striking in protest against requirements that natives employed at the mines should pay tax. The miners damaged mine property and equipment, and threatened to attack white mineworkers, their residential areas, and their families. The Northern Rhodesia Police failed to stop the riots. This forced the governor to direct military units,
consisting mostly of Africans, to move into the Copperbelt and stop the riots. Despite the fact that the troops were grossly insulted by their own kith and kin in words calculated to make any African see red by breaking and leaving their duties in support of their African brothers, the troops stood firm and crushed the strike by following the commands which were directed by their commandant (Northern Rhodesia Government Legislative Council Debates 1937:84).

As a result of this performance, and the loyalty of African members of the Regiment to the colonial regime, in May 1936 the British government approved a decision that the Northern Rhodesia Regiment should remain in existence and be brought up to full strength. Its mobility would also be improved.

In December, 1936 one extra British non-commissioned officer took up his appointment to the Regiment, bringing the total up to seven, as recommended by Norman. On 25 January 1937 Major W A Dimoline was appointed as commander of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment with the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel (NAZ 1939-1945).

The regiment formed part of His Majesty’s forces. It was charged with defending the territory maintaining law and order, and performing any other duties as defined by the governor. The governor was its commander-in-chief.

This formalisation and institutionalisation process shows clearly how, after 1937, coercive measures in civil control of the military were increasingly exercised by the executive, legislature, and judiciary. The executive, via the governor, had dual powers over the military, as he presided over laws passed by the Legislative Council related to the constitution and duties of the military and dealing with issues such as discipline, governance, enlistment, discharge and service, general provisions, and the application of military law. At the same time, he participated directly in the allocation of government resources to the military by the Legislative Council during the budget address and the consideration of the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, including Capital and Constitutional and Statutory Expenditure. The legislature exercised civil control over the military by passing laws and approving regulations in respect of the operation of the regiment, as well as approving its annual budget. The judiciary exercised judicial powers over any military officer who committed offences that could not be tried by court-martial.
In this institutional context, we need to examine the coercive nature of the recruitment policies for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Defence Force between 1924 and 1953, and also the impact of these forces on civil control of the military, which is done in the next section.

4.16 Recruitment policies for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment: 1924-1953

In this institutional framework, after 1937 officers and soldiers of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment were recruited in terms of Part IV Article 72 of the Northern Rhodesia Ordinance No 25 of 1937 (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937b:33).

The Northern Rhodesian colonial government adopted the same recruitment strategies as the BSAC. However, recruitment was no longer limited to five tribes only, but was extended to three other tribes who had participated in World War I. In all, members were recruited from the ‘Lozi, Tonga, Bemba, Ngoni, Luvale, Lunda, Chewa, Nsenga, Tumbuka, Bisa, Kaluchazi, and Kaonde, and British citizens’ (NAZ 1939-1946).

When World War II broke out in 1939 the primary purpose of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment changed from that of providing internal security to that of repelling external invasions as well as participating in the defence of the British Empire against the Germans, Italians and Japanese.

4.17 The recruitment of Africans for military service: 1940

Following the outbreak of World War II, the Northern Rhodesian government was directed to increase the Regiment by an additional 3,000 men, making up two battalions named the third and fourth battalions. This figure was also meant to compensate for attrition in the existing two battalions. Africans were recruited voluntarily for service in the King’s African Rifles. This was the responsibility of District and Administrative Officers, in their capacity as Assistant Directors of Manpower, subject to the general control of their Provincial Commissioners and the Director of Manpower. Also, military officers were not directly recruited except when one of the District or Administrative officers was sent to the recruiting areas to assist District Officers. The procedure adopted for military recruitment was follows: On receipt of a governor’s requisition under Section 7 of Ordinance No 23 of 1940, the director of manpower, after consultation with the Provincial Commissioners concerned, allotted a quota to selected districts and required the District Officer of each district, in his capacity as Assistant
Director of Manpower, to select and provide the number of men specified in the quota for military duty. The District Officer then consulted the Native Authority of his district and decided upon the sub-division of the quota between the various Native Authorities. The District Officer also guided and directed the Native Authorities on the particular locality or localities from which recruits were to be selected, and explained the type, age, and physical standards that were required. The Native Authorities then distributed their quota, within the limits outlined by the District Officer, throughout their areas, and ensured that those men who expressed a willingness to enlist were chosen first, followed by others who had to be persuaded.

Great care was taken to see that no unduly large numbers of men were taken from any one village or community. Officers were also instructed to select young unmarried men before married men with dependents. People in areas and villages that had already contributed to the war effort in terms of increased agricultural production were to be spared in comparison with those areas inhabited by less industrious males. ‘To this effect 30 percent of the recruits in Northern Rhodesia were drawn from the Bemba group, 30 per cent from the Ngoni group and 20 per cent from Mumbwa and Namwala and 20 per cent from other suitable Districts’ (NAZ 1940b). ‘Directives were also given that areas liable to famine conditions were not to be unduly denuded of their manpower’ (NAZ 1940a).

After training, Northern Rhodesian troops were despatched to the war front. By 1943 Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had contributed ‘37,000 troops to participate in the Second World War in defence of the British Empire’ (ibid). These troops joined the East African Army Service Corps and in 1940 fought major battles in British Somaliland against Italian forces. Others were deployed in Madagascar, the Middle East, and the Far East, where they fought successfully against the Germans and Japanese on behalf of the British Empire.

4.18 Establishment of the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force

In 1939, besides the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, an exclusively white Northern Rhodesia Defence Force was established. This was done because members of the Legislative Council felt that the tasks and composition of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment compromised the safety of white settlers.
In the course of discussing the impact of the first strikes by African mineworkers on the Copperbelt, council members expressed concern over the insecurity of white settlers as a result of the lack of an organised white military force in the country. Members asked the Executive whether the native force would remain loyal during strike or other dispute between the native and white populations. The minister of defence replied that the regiment would remain loyal to its officers.

Responding to this reply, L F Moore, member for Livingstone and the Western Electoral Area, argued that

The House was not looking for a force as a private citizen that is going to remain loyal to its officers. The House wants a force that is going to remain loyal to the King, that is, the government in this case. This force is not here for any other purpose than to protect the people of this country and this government and not one that is loyal to any particular officer or person, but to the King as represented by this government. I think that we are running grave risks in not getting a white force that we can depend upon also (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937a:276-277).

A Mr Knight, member for the Southern Electoral Area, argued that the coercive nature and characteristics of a colonial regime made it imperative for the colonial government to establish a white force in Northern Rhodesia. Addressing the House, Knight argued that it was not sound policy that the entire defence of Northern Rhodesia should be placed in the hands of subject people who did not have the voting rights, freedom of movement, and other rights enjoyed by the European part of the community. He further questioned whether the government could utilise a native regiment to suppress any violent European protests or disturbances in Northern Rhodesia. Should the government use a Native Regiment against whites, the repercussions would be tremendous, from Ndola right down to Cape Town (Ibid:80-81).

Col Gore-Browne, a member nominated to represent Native interests, introduced a private member’s motion calling on the government to consider the ‘preparation of a scheme to enable all sections of the community to cooperate efficiently in the defence of the country by establishing a European Defence Force to be called the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force as well as compulsory registration for all Europeans resident in Northern Rhodesia’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1939a:197).
In support of his motion, he argued that the departure of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment for British imperial duties outside Northern Rhodesia had created an internal security gap which could put European settlers and their property in danger in the event of African miners on the Copperbelt staging a riot as they did in 1935, or a sudden invasion of the Northern Rhodesia copper mines by enemy forces. He argued that it was imperative for the Northern Rhodesia government to raise a defence force with a threefold purpose.

Firstly as an internal security unit which could at all times be used in the aid of the civil power for the protection of life and property in the event of internal disorders. Secondly, the Defence Force was needed to guard and defend vulnerable points such as mine properties. Thirdly, to repel external aggression, but in the ultimate necessity only, since in order to use the Defence force as an active fighting unit, it would have been necessary to interfere seriously with essential mineral production if not actually causing it to cease entirely (Northern Rhodesia Government 1940:198).

Gore-Browne further argued that it was important for the force to be trained as an infantry unit, so that it could be ready at any time to perform these functions. The training of its members in peacetime could also prepare them for military service in the event of war. The House unanimously supported this proposal:

On 22nd March 1939 the House passed the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force Ordinance No. 1 of 1939, which provided for the establishment of the Northern Rhodesia Volunteer Defence Force. The force was under the supreme command of the Governor of Northern Rhodesia and could be called out for active service within the Units of the territory (Northern Rhodesia Government 1939b:2).

Part V of the Ordinance provided for the mobilisation of the Defence Force. Article 16(1) stated that

whenever the Governor felt it necessary to repel external aggression or to aid the civil authority in the protection of life and property and to prevent and suppress internal disorder in the Territory, the Governor could by Proclamation call out and mobilise the Defence Force or such part or parts thereof as he deemed necessary for active service. However, in the case of
sudden and imminent danger in any province or district, when it was not possible to obtain the authority of the Governor without undue delay, the Administrative Officer in charge of the province or district could call for the mobilisation of such troops for the protection of life and property provided that such officer forthwith reported to the Governor such calling out and any subsequent steps taken by him (Ibid: 4).

In June 1939 the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force was constituted under Ordinance No 1 of 1939 of 22 March 1929. Importantly, the European Reserve force that made up the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force consisted of mobilised men working on the mines, on farms, in shops and banks, and in government occupations.

Following the worsening of the war situation in Europe in June 1940, and Italy joining the hostilities against Britain, the Defence Force was reviewed. It was thought necessary to have full-time guards at vulnerable points on the mines, which required a considerable increase in personnel. As a result, in June 1940 the Compulsory Military Service Ordinance was passed, and the Governor ordered compulsory mobilisation in the Defence Force of every one in the 18-25 age group resident within five miles of the Bomas on the line of rail at which detachments existed. This increased the strength of the Defence Force from 1,470 to 1,671 and later the government changed the establishment figure from 1,671 to 1,715 British other ranks (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937b:1-7).

The Defence Force undertook the guarding of certain vital points in the mining areas, and such men as could be spared temporarily from their employment were detailed for full-time duties for periods varying from 12 hours to one month. The detachment commander arranged the guards’ hours of duties.

In March 1940, during the second African mineworkers’ strike on the Copperbelt, a large component of the still much smaller Defence Force were mobilised in cooperation with the military and police. The Defence Force carried out its duties of suppressing the riots as provided for under the ‘King’s Regulations, paragraphs 1245 to 1249, and paragraph 1255, 1250 to 1256 involving instructions to civil officers, military officers, police officers and Defence force authorities on the use of Armed force in case of civil disturbances’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937c:1-7). In this case the governor of Northern Rhodesia in his capacity as commander-in-chief and civil officer...
concluded that the available force of police was unable to cope with the situation, and that troop involvement was required. He then issued a Government Notice in which he requested the Commander of the troops to mobilise his troops and took decisive action on the rioters in enforcing the law on the subject of every citizen’s right of self-defence and defence of person and property which brought an end to the strike (ibid).

It is clear from the foregoing that the establishment of the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force exposed and reinforced the coercive racist and antagonistic nature of the colonial regime in Northern Rhodesia. Essentially, the colonial government created this force in the absence of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment as a result of World War Two in order to protect white settlers, their property, and the government against African uprisings. The introduction of the force also ensured continuing civil control of the military under colonial conditions.

4.19 Roles of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Northern Rhodesia Defence Force after World War II

After World War II the role of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment remained that of defending the territory against external aggression as well as providing internal security by protecting life and property within the territory. The force was equipped along modern lines, was efficient and mobile, and could be sent anywhere in Africa, as required under the general defence scheme of the British Empire. However, in the event of serious internal civil disturbances, troops could be requisitioned by

- either the Resident Magistrates, Provincial Commissioners; District Commissioners; District Officers; the Commissioner of Police, or Superintendent of Police to assist the police force in maintaining law and order in the country as provided for under instructions to civil officers, military officers, police officers and defence authorities (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937c:1-21).

We now need to examine civil control of the military under colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia.
4.20 Expenditure on and procurement for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Northern Rhodesia Defence Force: 1924-1963

The annual budget of the Ministry of Defence, which encompassed expenditure on the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Northern Rhodesia Defence Force, was tabled in and approved by the Legislative Council. The executive, represented by the ‘Governor and the Army Commander who was a nominated Member of the Legislative Council defended the military budget in the House annually’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1940). Despite the fact that there was no parliamentary committee that scrutinised military expenditure, the governor and his officials in the Ministry of Defence scrutinised defence expenditure, using the powers conferred by the Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia Ordinance No 25 of 1937 (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937b:8). The ordinance, for example, called for the

imprisonment of any person employed by the Northern Rhodesia Regiment who was found to have made any false documents and statements in any report, return, master-roll pay list, certificate, book, route, or other documents made or signed by him/her or the contents of which it was his duty to ascertain the accuracy or truth (ibid:10).

These measures were enforced by the regiment’s commanding officer, subject to the orders and directions of the governor. The commanding officer also supervised regiment stores, its paymaster, and its quartermaster.

It is clear from the foregoing that despite the disciplinary measures provided for in Ordinance No 25 of 1937 with regard to accountability for the use of public funds and goods by the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, a lack of transparent and independent audits by the Office of the Auditor-General made it difficult for army personnel to detect fraudulent dealings by dishonest officers. Concomitantly, the lack of a parliamentary committee for scrutinising defence expenditure left the Northern Rhodesia Regiment free to use public resources as it wished.

When World War II broke out in September 1939, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment was placed under the General Officer Command, East Africa, Nairobi. Its salaries, allowances, clothing, equipment, and all other requisites were paid for directly by the War Office in London. However, the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force, which was responsible for internal security in Northern Rhodesia, was directly controlled by the
civil government. In 1939, its first year of existence, the colonial administration spent GB£655,000 on personal emoluments, and GB£2,388 on other costs. In 1940 personal emoluments increased very considerably, because of the extensive guard duties performed at the Copperbelt and Broken Hill mines, as well as various railway and road bridges. Given the increase in size of the Defence Force, expenditure on arms and other equipment also increased, and total expenditure grew from 3 043 pounds sterling in 1939 to 47 865 pounds sterling in 1940.

In January 1941 the General Officer Commanding East Africa Force Headquarters issued a memorandum stating that the policy in terms of which the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force fell under local government instead of military control had to be changed. The reasons were that

(a) The forces were military forces and it was important that their control were under military headquarters; (b) civil governments were being consulted on defence force questions on which they had no expert knowledge and no military department to deal with such questions unless they were referred to Force Headquarters; (c) financial control was in the hands of the civil government and without expert military advice, it was felt that neither the government nor the military were getting the full value for the money; and (d) while local governments met the pay, allowances and cost of equipment the actual military equipment supplied was provided from military sources on a system of repayment by the civil governments to the military vote. It was felt that if all these matters were dealt with directly by the military authorities a better distribution of available resources could have been made (NAZ 1941b).

The military authorities would be in a better position to judge which of local forces should be equipped first, taking into account the respective roles of the forces in question.

In view of the foregoing, the directive recommended that military authorities should immediately assume full control of all local defence forces and that these forces had to fall under the direct command of the General Officer Commanding East Africa, as did all other military forces in the British territories. The General Officer Commanding would delegate control over these forces to the senior military commander in the territory concerned, or some other suitable officer.
Financial responsibility for these forces rested with civil governments, which were to pay a fixed contribution to the military authorities for their upkeep. The size of these contributions were to be worked out between governments and the military authorities, with the cost of the force over the previous 12 months taken as a basis for calculations. At the same time, the duties these forces would be required to perform should also have a bearing on the costs of maintenance.

The directive further recommended that ‘effective control of the forces by the General Officer Commanding could be done by a staff officer at Force Headquarters appointed by the General Officer Commanding styled “Staff Officer Local Forces” whose whole time was to be spent in dealing with local defence forces matters’ (NAZ 1939). Staff officers were also charged with the ‘responsibility to assist and advise and were to be the channel of all communications on defence force subjects requiring decision by the General Officer Commanding’ (ibid).

Responding to this directive, the Northern Rhodesian government observed that the draft orders did not materially conflict with existing laws, regulations or procedures. However, it decided to retain full financial control over the defence force, because of the need to take account of coercive local factors to determine expenditure on the force, such as the high cost of living in the territory and the need to offer pay and allowances equal to those in Southern Rhodesia. The Northern Rhodesian government argued that this was a ‘liability for which it had accepted full responsibility and considered that it was necessary to control the expenditure involved itself’ (NAZ 1941a). This stance demonstrated the close linkages between the government, the military, and white settlers in the context of colonial rule.

4.21 Financial control over the military in Northern Rhodesia after World War II

When the war ended in 1945, civil authorities in Northern Rhodesia retained control over Defence Force finances via the Legislative Council. However, pension benefits for soldiers and the next of kin of members of the civil defence, police and fire services killed by enemy action while on duty were paid for by the British government. Following the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Northern Rhodesian government retained control over Defence Force finances via annual approval of the defence budget by the Legislative Council. The federal government funded troops controlled by federal forces. It is again clear from the foregoing that, both administratively and financially, civil authorities determined the operations and activities
of defence forces by strictly following the coercive laws and regulations pertaining to those forces. This was again done via a consultative process involving the governor, minister of defence, army commander, Defence Council, members of the Legislative Council, provincial commissioners, district commissioners, and African chiefs. Through this consultative process the colonial government ensured that military personnel remained efficient, loyal, and obedient. This was especially demonstrated in the way in which the military handled disputes and strikes related to land and labour policies between 1924 and 1963. How these disputes impacted on civil control of the military is the subject of the next section.

4.22 The impact of land and labour policies on civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia: 1924-1963

Mining in Northern Rhodesia began with the mining of lead and zinc at Broken Hill Mine in 1906. Between 1924 and 1931 Kansashi, Chambeshi, Mufurila, Nchanga and Bwana Mkubwa mines began mining copper under the Rhodesian Select Trust and the Anglo American Corporation. Mining companies advertised for thousands of skilled and unskilled personnel. This stimulated European immigration into Northern Rhodesia, especially from South Africa and Britain, which increased from 4,000 in 1924 to 13,800 in 1931 (Bancroft 1961:27).

The rapidly growing mines also provided markets for agricultural and pastoral products. This encouraged white World War I veterans and other white settlers to take up land for agricultural and pastoral production. In this period the demand for land and native labour by both European settlers and mining companies in Northern Rhodesia increased. In order to make these means of production available to white settlers, the colonial regime, which was directly controlled by the British government after April 1924, advocated the creation of more native reserves in the Eastern Province and along the railway belt. In 1924 Sir Herbert Stanley, the first colonial governor, appointed the first Native Reserve Commission to examine the modalities of demarcating reserves in the Eastern Province, and moving Africans into them. The second and third commissions were appointed in 1926 and 1927 and recommended the creation of reserves along the railway belt as well as in the Northern Province.

Siamwiza (1998:253) writes that at the end of this process the Commissions gave each African an average of 14.2 acres of land in the Eastern Province and 74.8 and 92.8 acres in the Northern Province and along the line of railway respectively. Brelsford
records that the demarcation of Native Reserves boundaries in the Southern Province was done by the ‘Survey Platoon of the military wing of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. The platoon also made land surveys for African gardens on the Maramba stream and [performed] many other useful tasks.’ They also supervised the eventual movement of Africans to the new reserves.

Between 1953 and 1959 the colonial regime alienated more land by creating the Kariba Dam in the Gwembe Valley along the Zambezi river, on the border between Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia. Lagus (1959:42, 47) points out that dam was built to ‘provide electricity to the mines on the Copperbelt and various industries in Southern Rhodesia; to promote tourism, create a viable commercial fishing industry with an output of about 20 000 tons of fish and to provide water for irrigation’.

The damming of the area between 1955 and 1959 flooded both Crown and reserve land, resulting in the resettlement of more than 60 000 Gwembe Valley Tonga people in other, less fertile Native Reserves. Lagus further reports that the process of resettling the Gwembe Tonga met some resistance from the local people who did not want to lose their land and leave the graves of their ancestors. Troops were called in. However, on 4th June 1958, villagers in Chisamu village, under Chief Chipepo, armed with spears, resisted by attacking the Native District Commissioner’s party and troops. In self-defence the troops shot eight villagers and injured more than 32 people (ibid:148).

It was after this military defeat that the Tongas living in Headman Sianzembe’s village were forced to vacate their ancestral lands.

As noted earlier, the coercive measures employed in the movement of Africans into the Native Reserves were characterised by

over-crowding, cultivation on small acreage soon made the soils infertile and life in semi-desert conditions became the major causes of famine in Mkushi, Kalomo, Mazabuka, Livingstone (1930), Petauke, Chipata, Central, Copperbelt and Northern provinces (Siamwiza 1998:254-256).

Under these conditions, Africans living in the reserves had no alternative but to perform wage labour on the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia. Hall (1968:260) writes that the number of Africans seeking wage employment on the Copperbelt increased from 1 300 in 1924 to 16 000 in 1928 and 30 000 in 1930.
While Africans were experiencing all these hardships, the colonial regime ensured that the systematic economic exploitation of Northern Rhodesia occurred under the firm protection of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Police. Brelsford (1954:67) explains that ‘all road works along the Kapiri-Kasama-Mbala road; Lusaka-Fort Jameson road; and the construction of bridges over the Lukulu river between 1925 and 1935 were supervised by the Northern Rhodesia Regiment’. The ‘Gore-Brown First Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission of 1911-1914, Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission of 1927-1933 and the Caprivi Boundary Demarcation Commission of 1931 all received an escort of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment’ (Musambachime 2005:1-20). When foot and mouth disease broke out in Southern Rhodesia, members of the regiment searched all the trains arriving from Southern Rhodesia to ensure that the disease did not spread to the farms of white settlers in Northern Rhodesia. In March and April 1933 the regiment fought locusts in the white settled areas west of Lusaka. In the meantime the same regiment intensified its patrols in the Copperbelt and in Native Reserves in Lusaka, Mongu, Kasama and Fort Jameson with demonstrations of field firing and other military exercises where Africans were invited as witnesses (Brelsford 1954:67).

4.23 The impact of the 1935 and 1940 mineworkers’ strikes on civil control of the military

The strike by African mineworkers in 1935 had its roots in the industrial colour bar brought to Northern Rhodesia by South African mineworkers. The system distinguished between ‘white work’ and ‘kaffir work’. In 1930 African surface workers received about 20 shillings a month, while underground workers received 30 shillings. White semi-skilled miners received a minimum of 30 pounds sterling. By 1935 African mineworkers began to move into semi-skilled jobs, but did not receive corresponding pay increases. Africans were ‘resentful of the fact that Europeans were paid ten or twenty times as much as they were for the same type of work’ (Hall 1968:130). The introduction of higher tax rates by the colonial government further reduced the take-home pay of African mineworkers. The deplorable housing and sanitary conditions of African mineworkers compared with those of their white counterparts further contributed to dissatisfaction.
African mineworkers struck in support of demands for better conditions of service in May 1935. The strike was characterised by violence directed at the mining companies, white miners and their families at Nkana, Mufurila and Luanshya on the Copperbelt. In order to contain the situation, the Northern Rhodesian government airlifted 203 members of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment to the affected area. During the showdown between the rioters and the military,

African miners tried to persuade African soldiers to join the rioters by shooting their white commanders and the white miners, but the soldiers stood firm on the orders of their military commanders. The strike was only defused after six African Miners had been killed, twenty-two wounded and scores arrested. The military also dispersed the rioters who looted grain stores and thereafter took complete control of all the mining towns (Brelsford 1954:71-72).

After the strike had been quelled the government appointed a commission to investigate the causes of the strike and make recommendations to government. In its report the commission observed that the Northern Rhodesia Regiment had successfully defused the strike because it had been in a state of complete readiness and good discipline, and that the contingent which was actually confronted with danger and insult gave a fine exhibition of self-control and that the steady conduct of the forty-seven Officers and men at Luanshya prevented a renewed outbreak of the disturbance. The conduct of the Regiment was the most effective reply to the white critics in the Legislative Council who argued that the Askari could not be trusted to take action against their own people (cited in ibid :72).

In 1940 African mineworkers on the Copperbelt struck for the second time. The strike was caused by the mining companies' recognition in 1937 of the white Mine Workers Union, which promoted the industrial colour bar. The wages paid to Africans in the mining, agricultural, government, commercial and industrial sectors had also remained largely the same between 1920 and 1940, and this became a source of tension. In early 1940 European miners at Mufurila and Nkana went on strike in support of demands for wage increases and better conditions of service. Hall (1968:131) records that on ‘March 27th the strike was settled after government intervention, the workers being
granted their demands’. A day later 15,000 African mineworkers on the same mines also downed tools in support of pay demands. Notices in the streets urged Africans to beat up police officers whether they were African or European, as they used guns to keep African miners in economic bondage. The miners also called for the formation of an African mineworkers’ union (ibid:132-133).

The strike began on 3 April 1940 at Nkana and Mindolo mine shafts when nearly 6,000 Africans swarmed around the compound offices. Brelsford (1968:83-84) explains that ‘instead of the government intervening by settling the problems peacefully as they did when the white miners staged their strike on March 27th 1940, it called in troops and police reinforcements to crush the strike’. The troops protected the surface plant of the Nkana mine and the Mindolo shaft, and guarded the compound offices by cordoning off the area and lining up across the road. The strikers then hurled stones at the troops and police and injured 20 African soldiers despite warning shots being fired. The soldiers were ordered to open fire, and ‘seventeen African rioters were killed and sixty injured’. Brelsford stresses that the effectiveness of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment in dealing with the African miners was demonstrated by the fact that

there were no further disturbances and the miners did a good job of work in achieving a substantial increase in production in spite of many difficulties and obstacles which became progressively worse throughout the war years. During the six years Northern Rhodesia’s mines produced nearly one and half million tons of copper, a most valuable contribution to the Empire’s war effort (Brelsford 1968:84).

The government and mining companies, on the other hand, responded to the strike by increasing the average wages of Africans to 35 shillings 6 pence for surface and 52 shillings 11 pence for underground workers. Hall (1968:132) argues that these increments were meaningless to Africans as ‘acute shortages during World War Two [had] put up the prices of all basic commodities by between 50 percent and 100 percent’. In February 1948 the government also registered the first branch of the African mineworkers’ union at Nkana. Its first chairman was Lawrence Katilungu.

The use of military force as part of its coercive measures, by the colonial government and mining companies to break up the 1940 mineworkers’ strike showed clearly that civil control of the military served the interests of the colonial regime and white settlers. The police, the regiment, white miners, mining companies, and the colonial
regime all had a common economic and political agenda, namely to use their power to exploit African labour power and resources for the advancement of the settler community and the continuation of British rule.

The use of brutal coercive measures by the colonial authorities to suppress African land and labour grievances became one of the major causes of the nationalist struggle in Northern Rhodesia, to which we now turn.

4.24 Civil control of the military during the nationalist struggle for independence in Northern Rhodesia, 1950-1964

The impact of colonial economic, social, political, cultural, technological, scientific and educational policies on African societies in Northern Rhodesia led to the development of new social classes, and, ultimately, the rise of nationalism. These forces in turn changed the nature and character of civil control of the military by sharpening the antagonisms between Africans and white settlers, the colonial regime, and the military. This finally led to the triumph of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia in 1964. In this section, we examine the concepts of nationalism, and how the African struggle for independence changed the degree of civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia in favour of oppressed Africans in 1964.

4.24.1 Concepts of nationalism

Historians and political scientists define the term ‘nationalism’ as understood in European and African contexts in various ways, but have not come up with one universally accepted definition. Kellas (1994:4) defined nationalism as both ‘an ideology and a form of behaviour. The ideology of nationalism builds on people’s awareness of a nation (national self-consciousness) to give a set of attitudes and a programme of action. These may be cultural, economic or political.’ He also differentiates between colonial nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism, and defines colonial nationalism as that which
developed in the European colonial empires (especially the British, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and French) among the European settlers that led to the independence of the colonies from the mother country. Examples of these were the United States of America in 1776; South Africa in 1910 and the British Rhodesian settlers, with their Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. These settlers like those in Southern Rhodesia tried
to seek secession in order to maintain their own internal (racist) hegemony at a time when the mother country wanted to liberalise the situation (Kellas 1998:94).

He further defines anti-colonial nationalism as ‘the emergence of indigenous national liberation and anti-colonial movements in the British Empire that corresponded with the spread of nationalist ideology from Europe. An example of this in Africa was Pan-Africanism’ (ibid).

The above definitions are similar to Kiwanuka’s definition of nationalism (1970:104). Kiwanuka sees ‘nationalism as an expression of hostility to alien rule or influences in all their manifestations. In the colonial context nationalism is anti-colonialism’ (ibid).

In this section we will argue that coercive British colonialism in Northern Rhodesia undermined its cause by speeding up the economic, social, political and especially educational standards the Africans. This is because education produced an intellectual elite that

learnt and accepted the ideas of material improvement of the masses through popular participation in government and in the economic sector. Intellectuals discovered that such ideas of democracy, equality and social justice were anathema to the colonial regimes which were only too eager to crush advocates of such infamy and regarded any acts in that direction by Africans as subversive (Kiwanuka 1970:106).

Kiwanuka further argues that

for the educated and qualified Africans, the discriminatory distribution of the results of modernisation on the basis of one’s pigmentation deprived educated Africans gainful and satisfying employment, an emergence of a better society and an end of poverty for the masses. This could never be achieved while the centres of political and economic power were dominated by an alien rule. The inevitable alternative, therefore, was the overthrow of colonial rule (ibid).

In Northern Rhodesia, the nationalist struggle against coercive measures of British colonialism assumed three phases. The first phase saw the formation of welfare
societies by educated Africans who registered their dismay at the racist nature of the colonial regime. They condemned the non-representation of Africans in the colonial government, the creation of native reserves, and other social inequalities up to 1948. However, these leaders did not effectively challenge the colonial regime and were not regarded as a threat to government (for detailed information on this subject, see Mulford 1964). The second phase came after World War II in which the welfare societies came together and transformed themselves into a single political party voicing political demands for Africans through the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress. The third and last phase

saw the establishment of nationalist movements with the African National Congress (ANC) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) as nationalist parties and political organisations. The most extreme nationalists were now satisfied with nothing less than total political independence for their nation, and their support was broadened to include the mass of the people (Kellas 1998:97).

The fragmentation of the colonial political elite comprising white politicians, white settlers, civil servants, and the military – especially after the 1961 UNIP Cha Cha campaigns – changed the nature of civil control of the military in favour of the nationalists, who succeeded in removing the colonial regime by constitutional and democratic means. This key development is examined in the next section.

4.25 The impact of World War II on nationalist movements and civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia

Mass political organisation among Africans in Northern Rhodesia against the coercive measures of the British colonial regime developed after World War II. Among the factors that raised African nationalist hopes for self-rule was the achievement of independence by India in 1947. Africans started studying the methods the Indians used to fight for their independence. The United Nations also raised similar hopes when the organisation was set up in 1945. The UN Charter called for the self-determination of all people, and African nationalist leaders used the organisation’s committee of twenty-four to exert diplomatic pressure on their colonial rulers. Another source of encouragement was the change in the attitudes of British political parties, notably the Labour Party. The declaration by the Labour leader, Clement Atlee, in 1939 that ‘Britain should recognise
the right of an African to a place in the world’ made African leaders look upon the party as a champion of their interests, and the victory of the Labour Party in the 1945 elections gave them additional stimulus (NAZ 1972a:1). In the midst of this changing international political environment, Sir Roy Welensky, senior unofficial member of the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, ‘pressed the case for responsible government for Northern Rhodesia and the amalgamation of the three Central African territories when, in 1948, he met the Secretary of State for Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones’ (NAZ 1972a:2). Creech Jones rejected Welensky’s demand. However, he did hint that the British government was willing to consider a proposal for a federation. In 1949, therefore, Welensky and Sir Godfrey Huggins, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, convened a conference of settlers’ representatives at Victoria Falls that unanimously resolved to press for federation. ‘This decision sparked off a bitter political debate and led the two principal racial groups in Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia to marshal their strength for a confrontation’ (ibid). This in turn made the Europeans demand that the government take tough action. Congress suffered through arrests and detentions during this period but it also learnt that rights had to be fought for (ibid).

This worsened the relationship between the military and Africans. The settlers’ main motive for demanding federation was to ‘prevent African paramountcy and to entrench their domination; but they argued that the federation would be built on the principle of racial ‘partnership’ and that it would bring economic benefits to Africans’ (ibid). Africans, on the other hand, rejected federation as they had rejected amalgamation because ‘federation now would mean self-government for Northern Rhodesia by a European minority’ (ibid). The British government was convinced by the settlers’ economic argument, but while the Labour Party vacillated when it was in power, the Conservatives who succeeded Labour in late 1951 were determined to push the scheme through.

The fear of a new form of white domination prompted Africans in Northern Rhodesia to organise themselves in order to resist European initiatives. In 1946 all the native associations in Northern Rhodesia met in Lusaka and formed a single organisation called the Federation of African Societies, led by Dauti Yamba. Its aim was to ‘speak for and on behalf of Africans in rural and urban areas as the African Representative Council which the government had sponsored that year was too compromised by its association with officialdom to represent the true opinion of Africans’ (NAZ 1972:3). African
suspicion of settler intentions gathered strength and, in July 1948, members of the Federation of Welfare Societies came together and transformed the organisation into the first political party, called the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC). Its founding president was Godwin Mbikusita-Lewanika.

The programme of the NRANC was based on resistance to European ambitions. Under Mbikusita-Lewanika, Congress did nothing more than submit petitions and pass resolutions against the introduction of the federation, and did not threaten the political position of white settlers. Young men in Congress who wanted action, and enjoyed mass support, condemned this approach.

Kenneth Kaunda formed a branch of Congress in Chinsali, and organised mass opposition to the federation. In 1951 Justin Chimba, Simon Zukas and Reuben Kamanga formed an anti-Federation Action Committee in Ndola, regularly published a ‘Freedom Newsletter’, and organised public campaigns calling on people to act (ibid).

In 1951 these militant elements elected Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula as president of Congress, with R M Nabulyato continuing as secretary-general. The Congress also changed its name from the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress to the African National Congress (ANC). How the changes in the leadership of the nationalist party affected civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia between 1951 and 1963 is examined in the next section.

4.26 African nationalism and civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia, 1951-1963

Between 1951 and 1960 the ANC transformed itself into a mass movement, but its methods of campaigning for the total independence of Africans in Northern Rhodesia could not break the colonial political elite. Instead, white colonial hegemony was enhanced with the creation of the federal government.

At the party level the ANC was reorganised into a dynamic body. Its executive was renamed as the National Executive Council. Its headquarters was in Chilenje compound in Lusaka. Nkumbula appointed provincial, district and branch secretaries, and all the members of the African Mine Workers Union and the African Representative Council became members of Congress. In this way Nkumbula ‘managed to make the average African regain his/her confidence which he/she was fast losing and to keep a united front of the right and the left, the traditionalists and the intellectuals’ (NAZ
In 1952 the ANC organised a conference at which copies of the British White Paper on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were burnt. Resolutions calling for African mass action against the imposition of the federation were passed. A delegation led by Nkumbula travelled to London to campaign against the federation. They boycotted the Lancaster House Conference that examined mechanisms for the establishment of a Central African Federation.

In 1953 a constitution for the federation was approved at a conference at Carlton House Terrace in London. No Africans were present. Nkumbula called for two national days of prayer during which all Africans, including civil servants and mineworkers, were expected to demonstrate against the imposition of the federation in Northern Rhodesia. The government reacted to the ANC plan by ‘deploying troops and all security personnel throughout the country and warned all workers of dismissal if they followed Nkumbula’s orders. African mine leaders like Katilungu and others failed to respond to Nkumbula’s orders and the two days of national prayer ended in a failure’ (Hall 1968:158). Some 120 chiefs in Northern Rhodesia signed a petition protesting against the federation, and sent it to the British Houses of Parliament and the United Nations, but this also failed to stop the imposition of the federation.

In July 1953 royal assent was given to the legislation authorising the promulgation of the federal constitution and government on 23 October 1953 by Order-in-Council. This marked the failure of the ANC to achieve its political aims. In August 1953 the ANC called a national conference in Lusaka at which Nkumbula was re-elected as ANC president, but Kenneth Kaunda replaced Robinson Nabulyato as secretary-general.

The election of Kaunda and the presence of other young radicals such as Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, Rueben Kamanga, Arthur Wina and Sikota Wina resulted in the emergence of a radical leadership within the ANC. These leaders adopted a constructive programme of the social, political and economic advancement of Africans, and decided that the best way to dismantle the federation and white domination was to achieve political control at the centre. They therefore adopted a two-pronged approach. Besides picketing, they continued to participate in constitutional discussions at both the federal and protectorate levels, where the demand for one man, one vote was to be made.

Federation brought no economic benefits to Africans in the protectorates. Despite a supposed policy of partnership, social, economic and political discrimination against Africans continued unabated. Dauti Yamba, Northern Rhodesia representative in the
Federal Assembly, tabled a private member’s motion in which he advocated equal treatment of people of all races in public places, and that this should be enforced by binding federal legislation. ‘V.N. Joyce, a white back bencher representing Mufulira, and Lord Malvern dismissed the Motion as futile and insincere and declared that white women could not be expected to stand in queues with African mothers bearing dirty babies’ (Hall 1968:168).

The ANC in Northern Rhodesia responded by challenging the policy of partnership and racial discrimination. Under the slogans of ‘beat the colour bar’ and ‘partnership’, the party organised its members, including women, into groups of two to 15. These groups were instructed to visit hotels, bars, cafes and other places where racial discrimination was practised, and ask to be admitted and served (NAZ 1959). They were usually refused admission, as it was an offence to serve liquor to Africans or to allow them entry to most hotels and practically all cafes and restaurants.

In the Northern and Luapula provinces the policy of non-co-operation with the colonial regime over its coercive laws and policies took the form of violent demonstrations ‘against the fishing, game and forest conservation regulations which were imposed on the Africans in 1953’ (Sikalumbi 1977:40). Demonstrations against fish conservation measures in the Luapula Province took place in ‘Kasenga, Mulundu, Kashiba and Chief Kambwali on the south-eastern shore of lake Mweru near Mifombo’ (Musambachime 1981:284-293). The government reacted to this disobedience by sending 100 heavily armed paramilitary officers who carried out patrols in the whole of the Luapula valley. In the process seven people were arrested, Chiefs Kambwali and Mulundu were suspended for periods of six months for their involvement in the disturbances (Musambachime 1981:291-292).

In Fort Roseberry District

Senior Chief Milambo of the Ishi was deposed and deported to Chief Chungu’s area in Luwingu district and was later returned to his areas but not as a chief. The Kabende Chief Kasoma Bangweulu, now of Nsamfya District, was imprisoned and then deported to Chief Matipa’s area in Luwingu district. Another Kabende Chief, Mulakwa, also served a prison term and then was deported to Chief Chitambo’s area in Samfya district. More than 80 so called ring leaders of the demonstrations were tried at Fort Roseberry and then sent to Kasama Central Prison (Sikalumbi 1977:40).
In the Northern Province, demonstrations against fish and game conservation measures resulted in the ‘arrest and banishment of senior Chief Mwamba and Nsokolo from their areas in the Abercorn District’ (ibid). The role of the military in enforcing these draconian laws against Africans and their chiefs worsened the relationship between the government, the military, and Africans.

In 1958 the colonial political elite in Northern Rhodesia further tightened controls over Africans and their nationalist party, the ANC. Sir Roy Welensky became the federal prime minister in 1956 and secured more powers for the federal government. Britain also promised to hold the ‘Federal Review Conference, provision for which was written in the Federal Constitution at an early date in 1960, to consider plans for advancing the Federation to independence’ (NAZ 1972d:4). In 1957 the membership of the Federal Assembly was increased from 35 to 59, and African membership from six to 12. The African Affairs Board declared the complicated arrangements for electing Africans as discriminatory, but its appeals were rejected. ‘Africans lost the faith they had in the power of the Board’ (ibid).

Similarly, settlers demanded control of the Legislative and Executive Councils as well as self-government. By 1958 the ANC’s struggle for independence was further unsettled when the colonial regime tightened up territorial security arrangements. Mulford (1967:66) records that

Pressure on chiefs to take up action against local nationalist leaders limited ANC areas of legal operation. The Emergency Powers Act, 1957 provided wide powers for government action to prevent the declaration of the state of emergency. The Northern Rhodesia Police (Amendment) Act, 1957 gave powers to the police to control public meetings that took place outside Native Authorities’ areas and off public roads and streets. The Societies Act, 1957 controlled nationalist political parties by requiring them to register their branches and to supply the government with specific information about their activities and organisation. The territory’s Penal Code also gave power to the government to use weapons against politically inspired boycotts and strikes.

The militants in the ANC reacted to these draconian coercive measures by demanding that the ANC pursue a more aggressive campaign which ‘encouraged violent retaliation by the African public if provoked by security forces’ (ibid:69). On 24 October
1958, following contradictory pressures from the party as well as the colonial regime, Nkumbula agreed to participate in elections under the Benson constitution, which required both African and European voters to have a minimum of 120 pounds sterling and a Form Two level of education. This meant that the majority of the Africans were disenfranchised. Kaunda and other militant members walked out and formed the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), with Kaunda as its first president.

ZANC adopted the slogan ‘self-government now’ and declared its aim as nothing short of independence (NAZ 1972e:5). Its forceful approach was backed by the All Africa People’s Conference held in Accra, Ghana that adopted a strategy for independence and a decision to form a united front of all Central African parties to fight against the federation. Both the federal and Northern Rhodesian governments wanted to preserve the federation, and on 12 March 1959 ZANC was banned and its leaders arrested.

In January 1960 Kaunda was released from prison. He immediately took over as president of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Taking advantage of the confusion in the ANC, Kaunda rallied the masses under UNIP with the slogan ‘Freedom Now’. From July to October 1961 UNIP’s struggle for full independence led to direct confrontations with the security forces. The party’s rallying cry was ‘Cha Cha Cha, which derived from the name of a dance but in this context was interpreted to mean “face the music” of the nationalist violent incidents against colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia’ (NAZ 1972d:4). Violent incidents took place throughout the country, but especially in the Copperbelt and in Luapula and Northern provinces. By the time calm was restored, 21 people had been killed, 3 065 arrested and 2 691 imprisoned (ibid). In a report to Provincial Commissioner Kasama, District Commissioner Abercorn summarised the main incidents that took place in Northern Province as a result of the Cha Cha Cha campaigns:

An attack by approximately 80 armed Africans from Manyika, Lwimbo and Chikonkwani villages on the Federal government Land Rover on the main Abercorn/Kasama road near the Chambeshi bridge; 400 armed Africans attacked a party of District Messengers on the main Abercorn/Kasama road near Manyika village; a police patrol was attacked by 1000 armed Africans on the main Abercorn/ Kasama road at the Senga Hill turn off; 400 armed Africans attacked the District Commissioner’s entourage at Kasakalabwe; Native personnel authority at Chief Mwamba’s palace were also attacked; acts of arson involving 3 dip tanks in Chief Mwamba’s area, the welfare hall in Abercorn township, the houses of two
royal Africans in the Senga Hill area, house of an informer in Chief Mwamba’s area, a house containing thronal stools in Zombe area, Moses school and court houses at Nondo (NAZ 1961).

The government responded by sending armed troops to both Northern and Luapula provinces. On 4 August 1961 a

District Officer together with a platoon and section of the second Kings African Rifles (KAR) that consisted mostly of Malawian troops swept through Senga Hill and Chief Nondo’s villages around Moses school looking for ring leaders. Africans who were arrested were screened by the Special Branch, together with the Criminal Investigations Department with the object of finding other leaders of the riots and some information (ibid).

This enabled officers carry out further sweeps in the same area. The Special Branch also used these raids to select suitable persons for use as informers. Similar operations were also carried out by troops in Chief Mwamba’s area, the Muswilo and Mambwe areas of Nsokolo, as well as Mpande (ibid).

The Kings African Rifles platoon stationed at Mpulungu continued patrols through all the lake shore villages. A further sweep was made in Mpondela village and Chisanza that enabled the troops to pick up any of the remaining leaders of UNIP for screening (ibid). On 9 August 1961 a KAR company arrived in Abercorn by air. These troops patrolled Nakonde, Mpulungu, and Chief Mwamba’s area at night and fired flares that landed on houses thatched with grass, thus setting many of them on fire (ibid). These acts of vandalism further angered many Africans who attacked the troops with stones and other objects. When the troops fired shots at the rioters they refused to disperse, ‘saying they were not afraid of shots because it was only gas. Instead, African ring-leaders gave orders to kill the Chief’s retainers and the troops’ (NAZ 1961).

In the Kasakalabwe area a platoon of the Kings African Rifles fought pitched battles with local people. After the commander had ordered his troops to fire into the crowd, more than 200 Africans confronted all four military platoons with stones, and advanced on the troops intending to disarm them. These acts of bravery made the troops withdraw from the area (ibid). On 12 August 1961 more troops and police officers were sent to Kasakalabwe. Twenty-two people were arrested, and numerous weapons confiscated (ibid).
A government White Paper on the riots blamed UNIP party officials at the lower level, particularly those in Northern and Luapula provinces, for the violence. The large number of UNIP officials and members arrested as ringleaders were cited as evidence of this. However, UNIP denied this charge. A special issue of the UNIP magazine, *Voice of UNIP*, summarised the relationship between its members, the government and the military as follows:

During the whole tragic affair we have never heard of any African lifting a finger against a white man, an informer or member of the Security forces. It is the security people who have butchered over fifty unarmed Africans and still doing brutal beatings and torturing the people in various ways. Thousands of the people are still living in the bush together with their families for fear of the security forces. Security forces, whose security do they answer? As a result of the barbaric actions of the security forces, thousands of people are in danger of dying from starvation. Hundreds of people will remain crippled for the rest of their lives as a result of these brutal acts. Thousands of virgins have been defiled, thousands of women have been assaulted in the name of law and order (NAZ 1972d: 4).

During the Cha Cha Cha campaign the relationship between the military, white settlers, and the executive on one hand and Africans on the other had reached a new low. The behaviour of Africans towards the colonial regime and its security forces became aggressive. This marked the beginning of the fragmentation of the colonial coercive measures and political elite. The British government decided to intervene by calling for constitutional talks in London in 1962 on the basis of constitutional proposals by Ian Macleod. Kaunda and Nkumbula represented their respective parties during the talks, which were chaired by Reginald Maulding, the colonial secretary. An amendment to the 1961 constitutional proposals enabled all the political parties in Northern Rhodesia to reach a compromise and participate in the 1962 parliamentary elections. The United Federal Party (UFP) won 16 seats; UNIP won 14; and the ANC won seven.

UNIP under Kaunda and the ANC under Nkumbula agreed to form a coalition government. Its first act was to pass a resolution asking for the secession of Northern Rhodesia from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This led to the 1963 Victoria Falls Conference at which the mechanisms for the dissolution of the federation were worked out.
At this point, civil control of the military changed hands from the oppressive colonial regime to an African-led government. It also changed its nature and character from being determined by coercive measures to the new consensual democratic measures. Africans also dominated the legislative council. All legislation related to the colour bar was repealed. This included the Native Registration Ordinance, the Employment of Natives Ordinance, the Collective Punishments Ordinance, the Mine Township Ordinance, and other laws incidental thereto (NAZ 1962). Race Relations Advisory and Reconciliation Committees were set up in Lusaka and all the other cities and towns in the country. These committees tried to resolve any issues that arose in their respective communities involving racial conflict between Africans and Europeans without referring to the courts.

UNIP and the ANC did not collaborate successfully, and the day-to-day functioning of the government became very difficult. In September 1963 the governor ordered fresh elections, based on universal adult suffrage. Voting took place in January 1964. After an intensive campaign, UNIP won 55 seats, the ANC 10 seats; and the National Progressive Party (NPP) all 10 reserved seats for whites. In May 1964 further talks were held in London that decided on the nature of the independence constitution. Participants agreed that, on 24 October 1964, Northern Rhodesia should become the independent Republic of Zambia.

At home the date was blazoned in triumph, and when the UNIP delegates returned they were welcomed by huge crowds. Plans for independence went rapidly ahead under the UNIP government, and at midnight 23 October 1964 all was ready for the transfer of power. The Princess Royal of the United Kingdom ceremonially lowered her country’s flag. Kaunda raised the flag of the Republic of Zambia, and in doing so became its first president (NAZ 1972d: 4).

This section has demonstrated that the struggle for self-government by both white settlers and African nationalists sharpened the antagonisms between settlers, the executive and the military on the one hand, and Africans on the other. The temporary failure by Africans to defeat the coercive measures of the colonial regime further weakened their position. The settlers almost achieved their goals by creating the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. However, the gradual evolution of African consciousness through the adoption of advanced methods of nationalist struggle and the support from other pan-Africanist movements sharpened the contradictions between Africans and the white settler regime. The timely constitutional intervention of Britain
and the assertion of its authority over colonial nationalists fragmented colonial coercive measures of civil control of the military and led to the triumph of anti-colonial nationalism. This marked the end of a period in which coercive ideas of enlightenment expounded under the theory of modernity provoked a racially discriminatory response that eventually resulted in the failure of the colonial project in Northern Rhodesia. As Kiwanuka (1970:104) has observed,

colonialism should, therefore, be observed as one of the major progenitors of African nationalism because any people subjected to alien rule will struggle to overthrow that rule. The process may take a generation or century, but it is an inevitable stage.

While Northern Rhodesia attained African majority rule in 1963, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and the Defence Force were still linked to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This continued to have a negative effect on civil control of the military. The next section explains the context in which federal forces were established and operated, how and why the federation was abolished, and what impact this had on civil control of the military.

4.27 The Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Defence Force under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 1953-1963

In 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed with the legislative approval of four countries, namely Great Britain and the three constituent countries: Southern Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe); Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia); and Nyasaland (today’s Malawi). Also called the Central African Federation (CAR), it was guided by the philosophy of modernity that determined the colonial government’s administrative policies, but modified into a concept of ‘partnership and government by responsible men irrespective of race’ (Mulford 1967:242). In terms of this concept Africans and Europeans were to collaborate in governing the CAR. However, from the outset Africans rejected the policy of partnership as Europeans continued to discriminate against them.

The headquarters of the CAR were in Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia. The federal government created its own military force called the Federal Defence Force. The Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Defence Force was renamed the Northern Rhodesia Territorial Force. This was legalised by the passage in the Legislative Council of the
'Northern Rhodesia Ordinance Number 67 of 1953 that provided for the establishment and government of a Territorial Force’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1953:1). The Southern Rhodesia Regiment and Defence Force became the Southern Rhodesia Territorial Force, while the Nyasaland Regiment and Defence Force became the Nyasaland Territorial Force.

The command structure of these forces also changed drastically. Before federation the prime minister of Southern Rhodesia was the commander-in-chief of the Southern Rhodesia Regiment and the Royal Rhodesia Air Force (RRAF). Under the Federal arrangements the Southern Rhodesian premier commanded the Southern Rhodesia Territorial Force. Territorial commanders also became answerable to the federal commanders who approved military hardware and any infrastructure development in each country. Before the CAR, the governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were the commanders-in-chief of their respective regiments and defence forces. However, since these territories were protectorates of the British government, each governor had to gain the approval of the British government before their regiments could implement certain commands. Under the federal arrangement, the British government surrendered this competency to the federal prime minister. While the federal prime minister had direct powers to command and use the federal forces, he could not use the territorial forces except with the special permission of the territorial governors.

The headquarters of the federal forces were established in Salisbury. The headquarters of the three territorial forces remained Lusaka for Northern Rhodesia, Salisbury for Southern Rhodesia, and Blantyre for Nyasaland. As at 30 June 1962, some 15 555 soldiers were employed on a permanent and pensionable basis by the federal defence forces, including the Royal Rhodesia Air Force (Howard 1963:34).

Military and intelligence officers of the federal government were spread among the three territories that made up the CAF. The First Battalion of the Northern Rhodesian Regiment and the Second Battalion of the King’s African Rifles that were based in Northern Rhodesia were federal forces under the direct command of the Federal prime minister. The first battalion of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment consisted of soldiers from Northern Rhodesia, but commanded by white federal officers. The Second Battalion of the King’s African Rifles consisted of a majority of personnel of Nyasaland origin (NAZ 1963:26). Under these administrative and command arrangements, the federal forces followed the discipline, promotion and demotion, and force operation structures defined by federal defence laws and the federal government. Territorial forces also observed
similar discipline, promotion and operational structures as defined by territorial governments and commands. However, in the case of the territorial forces certain decisions had to be approved by the federal commanders and the federal prime minister.

Despite these elaborate administrative and command arrangements, the nature and mode of operation of these military forces reflected those of their colonial antecedents. This was because recruitment at territorial level continued to be the exclusive domain of a few selected tribes. The same types of personnel were transferred to the federal forces at the inception of the CAF, and their operations, and patterns of civil control, were guided by the economic, political, social and technological interests of white settlers and the British imperial government. This was evidenced by the large number of British subjects directly recruited to serve in the Federal Defence Force, as against those recruited in the CAF’s constituent territories. African political, economic and social rights continued to be trampled on by the federal government. As noted earlier, the clashes between nationalists and both territorial and federal forces worsened the relationship between Africans, the military, and the territorial and federal governments. The failure by the federal government to influence constitutional changes in the constituent territories as well as its inability to contain nationalist struggles for independence sowed the seeds for the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The structural changes that affected the government, the military, and civil control of the military took place between 28 June and 3 July 1963 when the Central African Conference on the dissolution of the Federation convened at the Victoria Falls Hotel in Southern Rhodesia. The purpose of the conference was to ‘work out detailed administrative mechanisms and arrangements for the reversion of Federal government functions to the territorial responsibility, in such manner and order, as could best contribute to their speedy and orderly reversion’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1963a:1). The conference was also tasked with setting a ‘target date for the dissolution after mechanisms for the apportionment of the public debt, other liabilities and assets, and the future of the Federal Public Service were worked out’ (Ibid:2).

Chapter Seven of the Northern Rhodesia Conference report specifically dealt with the future of both the federal forces and territorial forces after the dissolution of the federal government. The conference decided that

when the federal government ceased to exercise responsibility for defence, the operational control was to revert to that which obtained before 1953
when Southern Rhodesia was responsible for her own forces and the United Kingdom government had operational control of the forces in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Ibid:10).

Thus, although the federal forces were partitioned among three territories, the actual task of partition was made easier by the fact that it became a question of transfer to two commands - that of Southern Rhodesia and that of the United Kingdom government in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In most cases the conference envisaged units passing under the control of either Southern Rhodesia or the United Kingdom according to their dispositions at that time (ibid).

Members of the federal forces were allowed to decide in which territory they wished to serve after the dissolution of the federation.

The conference also decided that the ‘physical assets of the forces were to remain with their units as they existed in 1963. However, the value of these assets was dealt with in the context of the general arrangements for the apportionment of Federal assets and liabilities’ (Ibid). The payment of retirement benefits and gratuities to members and former members of the Federal Defence Forces was dealt with on broadly similar lines to those of members of the Federal Public Service. A target date of 31 December 1963 was agreed for the dissolution of the federation. ‘This was on condition that substantial settlement by that time of the public debt and other liabilities and assets and the future of the Federal Public Service including that of the Defence Forces was completed’ (ibid).

Two committees set up by government representatives at the Victoria Falls Conference carried out the physical dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Committee (A) consisted of officials representing the governments of the United Kingdom, the CAR, and Southern and Northern Rhodesia. It was chaired by a British representative appointed after consultation with the other three governments. The terms of reference of the committee were to:

1) work out detailed arrangements for the reversion of federal government functions back to its constituent territories;

2) work out solutions for general problems arising from the dissolution of the federation, particularly the federal public service, and including parliamentary officers, members of statutory bodies, the armed forces, and the judiciary; and
3) make recommendations for dealing with federal assets and liabilities, including public debt, and if an apportionment commission was thought necessary, to make recommendations for its terms of reference, powers and composition (ibid:2).

Committee (A) became an intergovernmental negotiating body, and its members were tasked with reaching agreement while referring to their respective governments as necessary as the work progressed. The Committee was also empowered to set up separate sub-committees for the examination of particular functions such as Defence and Security matters. The Committee was also required to set up special sub-committees for the consideration of the Federal Public Service and assets and liabilities (ibid).

The presence of a British representative on each subcommittee was essential for their speedy and effective operation. Each government appointed ‘one principal (co-ordinating) representative to the Committee and was free to nominate at will additional or alternate representatives or advisers to the Committee and its sub-committees in accordance with the subject under discussion’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1963a:2). Different ministries were obliged to send representatives when their ministries were being discussed.

4.27.1 Federal dissolution: Defence arrangements in Northern Rhodesia

The Sub-Committee on Defence and Security made arrangements for transferring control of federal troops to Northern Rhodesia. The committee decided that the ‘1st Battalion of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and 2nd Battalion of the Kings African Rifles are taken over by the Northern Rhodesia control. However, the Northern Rhodesia government agreed to retain en-bloc the 1st Battalion whose personnel was made up of mostly people from Northern Rhodesia. The 2nd Battalion of the Kings African Rifles was disbanded because the majority of its personnel were of Nyasaland origin’ (NAZ 1963b). These were the troops that had mostly been used by the colonial government to suppress nationalist movements.

Both the Victoria Falls Conference and the Sub-Committee on Defence and Security agreed that it was beyond the capacity of the Northern Rhodesian government to take over the RRAF, or any of its bomber formations, and that it could not be divided into more than one effective striking force. This was mainly because the
Air Force pilots were mainly whites, most of whom preferred to work in colonial Southern Rhodesia other than black ruled Northern Rhodesia. In the light of lack of experience and education by the Northern Rhodesia Africans, the Committee decided to give Northern Rhodesia smaller transport aircrafts from the RRAF (NAZ 1963a:2).

However, since Northern Rhodesia had made a major contribution to the creation of an air strike force during the federation, the committee ‘assessed the value of the RRAF assets and advised the Northern Rhodesia government to claim her share of the Defence Force assets including those of the RRAF in kind and/or in cash’ (NAZ 1963b). The committee also agreed that compulsory military service for whites had to be suspended until such time as the Northern Rhodesia government decided on the pattern, structure and size of the future of Northern Rhodesia Defence Force as well as on the policies for the future of the Northern Rhodesia Territorial Units, which had to be re-organised on a non-racial basis (NAZ 1963a:26).

As noted earlier, the federal government maintained a Federal Intelligence Security Bureau. The committee on the dissolution of the federation decided to wind up the military wing of the Bureau on 31 December 1963, the date set for the dissolution of the federation. However, some staff members were offered employment with the Southern Rhodesian government. Remaining staff who were not selected or accepted by the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland governments were retired. ‘The three governments simultaneously shared the equipment for the intelligence equally’ (Ibid).

After the various bodies dealing with the dissolution of the federation had completed their work, the British government issued Statutory Instrument Number 2085 of October 1963 entitled ‘Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federal Dissolution Order-In-Council’, which was assented to by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth of England on 20 December 1963. In terms of this order, the federal government ceased to make laws that affected Northern Rhodesia. The instrument also dissolved the CAF and with it the federal government and federal legislature at midnight of 31 December 1963 (Northern Rhodesia Government 1963b:1).

Mulford (1967:5) summarises the reasons for the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland when he states that
In a sense the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a microcosm of all these various conflicting forces. … Race came to dominate not only politics but also almost all relations between Africans and Europeans. What one group gained, the other felt it had lost.

4.28 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the coercive policies and structures established during the colonial period was undemocratic. This was because Northern Rhodesia was ruled by colonial civil servants whose tasks were to collect revenue and maintain law and order on behalf of the Imperial government and the settler community. In carrying out these responsibilities the nature and character of the regime’s methods of civil control of the military were characterised by the use of coercive measures that promoted policies of discrimination against Africans and in favour of the white settler community. This explains why this study has described the nature and character of military institutions during this period as two-faced, liked by some white settlers, and hated by most Africans. Under these repressive conditions, overall military command structures, recruitment, and training programmes remained under the control of civil institutions of governance, notably the governor, the legislative council, and the executive, especially the Ministry of Defence. The colonial government’s repressive actions, notably enforced by the military, was only ended by the defeat of the regime through democratic elections, as provided for under the 1964 independence constitution. How the new independent government reshaped the coercive racial discriminatory policies of the British colonial government, including measures for civil control of the military, is described and analysed in the next chapter.

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines how the Zambian government used consensual measures to reshape racially discriminatory British colonial policies; how Zambia’s geographical position and its role in the liberation struggle for Southern African countries still under colonial regimes influenced the formulation of her foreign policy; and how these factors influenced the formulation of policies for civil control of the military. These included consensual democratic measures enshrined in the Independence Constitution, the repeal of discriminatory laws, and the development of some new military institutions such as the Defence Council and the Office of the Command Secretary. Other important influences over civil control of the military were the establishment of new physical military institutions, and changes in the defence budget process. Furthermore, the chapter assesses how the restructured military was used to good effect to crush the Lenshina uprisings, and the impact of these events on civil control of the military. It concludes by arguing that even when the country faced the problems of inter-party and intra-party rivalries and its role in the liberation struggle that led to the declaration of a one-party state, the president’s effective use of post-independence military structures and his executive powers under the Preservation of Public Security Act obviated military intervention in domestic politics in Zambia. It is also important to note that in 1964 Zambia’s political economy heavily depended on the exports of copper. ‘Copper amounted to 92% of the country’s exports, contributing 53% of the total government revenue and supplying 47% of the net domestic product (Hall 1969: 90). As a result of foreign exchange reserves provided by the copper mining, the first Zambian government had considerable financial resources at its disposal. This enabled the government to embark on a major programme of developing the missing social, physical and economic infrastructures such as educational, health and military institutions (Government of the Republic of Zambia and United Nations Systems in Zambia 1996: 20). We now turn to how the government instituted the missing social and physical infrastructures in the military and how this affected civil control of the military in Zambia.
5.2 Policy guiding military institutional development in post-independence Zambia

As noted in chapter 2, at the time of independence the Republic of Zambia had some of the characteristics of a praetorian state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003:21-22). The new state encompassed 73 different ethnic groups, with different cultures and origins. The composition of the military reflected the divisive racial and ethnic policies of the colonial regime in terms of which military forces were designed to be instruments of both imperial and colonial rule. In external terms, Zambia was in a dangerous position in that it was surrounded by hostile colonial states which resented its policy of providing bases to liberation movements fighting colonial or settler regimes in other countries in the region. Given this vulnerable political position, we need to examine how democratic consensual measures in form of structural reforms of the military in the First Republic, and their – largely positive – effects on civil control of the military in this period.

5.3 Consensual Measures Affecting Control of the Military in the First Republic

Zambia’s new parliament was largely democratically elected by means of universal adult suffrage. This included the five members nominated by the president. This was in line with Article 60 of the 1964 constitution which stated that:

The president may appoint as nominated members of the National Assembly five persons as he considers desirable to obtain the service as a member of the Assembly, by reason of his/her special qualification…..would be of special value as such a member (GRZ 1964b:48).

One of its functions was to regularise the position and role of the military in post-independence Zambia, and its relationship with the government and citizenry. It did so by repealing all racist legislation related to the Zambian defence forces, and introducing a number of constitutional and other legislative reforms that had an important bearing on the nature and quality of civil control over the military.

The Republic of Zambia (Modification and Adaptation) (General) Order, 1964, Section 3(b), stipulated that, from 24 October 1964 onwards, any reference in the existing laws to the governor of Northern Rhodesia was to be read and constructed as a reference to the president. This meant that all powers other than those specifically entrusted to
military commanders was now vested in the president. Article 49 (1) of the 1964 constitution stated that

The supreme command of the armed forces of the Republic shall vest in the President, and he shall hold the office of Commander-in-Chief (GRZ 1965:63).

Article 49 (2)(a) and (b) stated that:

… the powers conferred on the President by subsection (1) of this section shall include (a) the power to determine the operational use of the armed forces, and (b) the power to appoint members of the armed forces, to make appointments on promotion to any office in the armed forces and to dismiss any member of the armed forces (ibid).

Article 49 (3) also stated that:

the President may, by direction in writing and subject to such conditions as he may think fit, delegate to any member of the armed forces any of the powers mentioned in subsection (2) of this section (ibid).

In line with this, responsibility for the appointments, promotions and dismissals of Warrant Officers Class I and lower ranks was delegated to commanders and exercised in accordance with appropriate enlistment and service regulations.

Air force commanders were also given powers to approve the selection and appointments of officer cadets on the basis of the recommendations of Officer Selection Boards. Army commanders were also given powers to select officer cadets for training courses overseas. After cadets had completed their training courses, their commissions had to be approved by the president. Besides this, the appointment of any officer other than a cadet could not be gazetted until the president had signed the certificate bearing his commission. These measures effectively placed the appointments of senior military officers under civil control.

The president also continued the practice of appointing elected or nominated members of parliament as heads of the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964e:5). This also helped to ensure civil control of the military, in line with established practice in democratic states. Parliamentary oversight over the presidential command of the armed forces and other functionaries was enabled by Article
49 (4) of the 1964 constitution, which stated that ‘Parliament may regulate the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this section’ (GRZ 1965:63).

Within this framework, the government created important administrative and advisory institutions that facilitated civil control of the military in the First Republic – notably the Defence Council, and the Office of the Command Secretary. Another important step was the restructuring of military institutions in post-colonial Zambia.

5.4 The Defence Council

Phiri (2001:2) states that the ‘Defence Council was established in 1955, and its civilian oversight roles were adapted for the post-colonial situation after 1964’. However, our archival research indicates that the Defence Council was established by the post-colonial government. Chapter 131 of the Laws of Zambia, Number 45 of 1964, promulgated in Government Notice No 497 of 1964, authorised the government to implement the provisions of the Defence Act. One of these provided for the establishment of the Defence Council, which was intended to play a key role in civil control of the military. Chapter 131, Section 8 (1) (2) and (3) state that:

There shall be a Defence Council which shall advise the President on such matters of policy and matters affecting the command, discipline and administration of the Defence Force and shall perform such other functions and duties as may be referred to it from time to time by the President.

The Members of the Defence Council shall be appointed by the President.

The President shall have power to co-opt any other person as a member of the Defence Council from time to time as he may decide (GRZ 1964a:18).

In line with these provisions, the formation of the Defence Council was approved on Tuesday 11 February 1964. Its first task was to examine the size and shape of the army and air wing (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964a:4). The Defence Council met for the first time at Government House on Saturday 7 March 1964. Since Northern Rhodesia was preparing for independence on 24 October 1964, K D Kaunda, then prime minister of Northern Rhodesia, attended and participated fully in the first meeting of the Defence Council (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964c:1). While the Ministry of Defence remained the main policy-making and executive body in respect of defence matters, the
Defence Council was charged with advising the president on matters related to defence policy and command, discipline and administration of the defence force as stated in Chapter 131 Section 8 (1) (2) and (3) above.

The composition of the Defence Council was aimed at ensuring the maintenance of civil control of the military. Minutes of a meeting of the Defence Committee in the Ministry of Defence dated 31 October 1964 state that ‘the President’s Deputy, as Chairman of the Defence Council, will be the Vice-President, and no other alternate will be appointed at this time’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964e:1). Other members of the Defence Council were the ministers of Defence, Works and Supply, Transport, and Finance and Development; service commanders; and co-opted officers, depending on the issue under consideration. Besides the full council, three subsidiary committees were formed. The first was an Appointment and Disciplinary Committee, which was responsible for military discipline, appointments, promotions, honours and awards, training, and any other matters relating to personnel as determined by the chairman of the full council. It was chaired by a member of parliament and consisted of representatives of the army, air force, and civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964e:7).

The second was a Development, Administration and Finance Committee that was responsible for the size and shape of the defence force, its budget and budgetary controls, development projects, conditions of service, and the procurement of military equipment. It consisted of senior military officers responsible for the command and administration of the defence force and civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence, and was chaired by a former army commander who was a nominated member of parliament.

The third was a Strategy and Policy Committee responsible for defence policy and strategies related to security, the presence of foreign nationalist parties in Zambia, international relations, and research and development programmes. It consisted of senior military officers responsible for the command and administration of the defence force, civilian officials of the Ministry of Defence, and the political advisor to the president. It was chaired by a nominated member of parliament.

In all three committees, civil control of the military was ensured through their legislative and executive representatives (Ibid:7).
5.5 Office of the Command Secretary

The government also established an Office of the Command Secretary of the Zambia Defence Force. The post of command secretary was filled by a senior military officer. The secretary and his office provided an important link between the defence force, government ministries, government leaders, and parliament, and therefore served as an effective avenue for exercising and maintaining civil control of the military. Among other things, the Office of the Command Secretary liaised with the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the Auditor-General over the preparation of the military budget and the monitoring of military expenditure.

The command secretary and his staff were located in the Ministry of Defence. He was responsible to the senior finance officer of that ministry for financial matters affecting the defence forces. The senior finance officer reported to and was directed by the permanent secretary of defence, a civilian appointed by the president, who informed him of the financial policies applicable to the defence forces, which varied in accordance with agreements reached with the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1963b: 8).

The command secretary collated annual estimates of expenditure prepared by the army and air wing commanders, and submitted them to the senior finance officer, together with required explanatory material. He provided advice to the commanders of the army and air wing on the interpretation and application of the approved estimates.

He prepared monthly statements of expenditure for submission to the senior finance officer, and indicated committed and uncommitted balances on votes. He also submitted proposals to the senior finance officer for dealing with any likely over expenditure before these costs were incurred. He compiled material required by the senior finance officer for the preparation of annual financial returns. He oversaw the audit of army and air wing financial and stores records, and the submission of copies of audit reports to the auditor-general and the unit concerned. He also ensured the compilation of army and air force accounting regulations. In this regard, due consideration was given to ensuring that accounting procedures were effective, economical, and efficient. The Command secretary consulted the senior finance officer at any time when the need arose to vary approved estimates, and liaised with various ministries on financial details. He was a permanent member of the Defence Conditions of Service Committee, the Defence
Equipment Policy Committee, and the Defence Establishment Committee, and worked in terms of instructions issued by the senior finance officer (Ibid).

Early in each financial year, the Ministry of Finance issued instructions for the preparation and submission of draft estimates of expenditure for the following financial year. The government then determined levels of expenditure by each ministry, and final estimates were then submitted to parliament.

Initial responsibility for the preparation of estimates in the Ministry of Defence, in accordance with instructions by the senior finance officer, rested with the commanders of the army and air wing respectively. In the case of the army, the Pay and Record Office and estimate of other expenditure normally prepared the personal emolument estimates by the accounting authorities. Draft estimates were then passed to the command secretary for further processing, before submission to the senior finance officer. Draft estimates had to reach the Ministry of Finance in early December each year, and, after allocations were finally agreed, were [re]submitted in April to the Ministry of Finance for incorporation into the national budget. Departments in the Ministry of Defence were authorised to commit inescapable expenditure in advance of the voting of funds by the National Assembly at the Budget Session in July of each year. Authority to do so was usually conveyed through the Senior Finance Officer before the close of the Financial Year (Ibid).

Within the authority of the approved estimates,

the Commanders of the Army and Air Wing respectively could commit and expend monies without further reference to the Ministry responsible for Defence, subject always to the Defence Accounting Regulations and to any instructions issued by the Command Secretary. In cases where authority to expend was in doubt, or unforeseen expenditure arises not covered by the Estimates, the matter was referred to the Command Secretary for action (Ibid).

These functions and responsibilities of the Office of the Command Secretary ensured that military expenditure was closely monitored by civil authorities, which also became an effective method of civil control of the military.
5.6 The restructuring of military institutions in post-colonial Zambia

The restructuring of the army in post-colonial Zambia was an important consensual measure that played a key role in cementing civil control of the military. The government reviewed the composition of the army as inherited from the colonial period, confirmed the retention of some units, and closed others. Officers in units that were not retained, such as Military Intelligence were retired, and those serving in units that were retained had to demonstrate that they were loyal to the new government. This decision was taken because the Zambia Defence Force inherited British conditions of service for the officer corps, which was dominated by whites. Those officers were more loyal towards the Southern Rhodesian government than the Zambian government. In 1971 Zambia decided to fully support the liberation struggle in Southern Rhodesia. In order to avoid spying by remaining British officers, the government decided to Zambianise the officers' corps, which resulted in the retirement of British officers (Kazembe, interview, 2006).

After extensive consultations with military experts, the government gazetted the units of the Northern Rhodesia army which it intended to retain in the post-colonial era on 31 October 1964. These were:

- the Headquarters, Northern Rhodesia Defence Force; Northern Rhodesia Corps of Engineers, consisting of Number 1 Signal Squadron; and Northern Rhodesia Infantry consisting of the Northern Rhodesia Armoured Car Regiment 1st Battalion; the Northern Rhodesia 2nd Battalion; the Northern Rhodesia Regiment School of Military Training; the Royal Rhodesia Regiment; 3rd Northern Rhodesia Battalion and the Royal Rhodesia Regiment 7th Northern Rhodesia Battalion. Other military Corps and Units gazetted were the Northern Rhodesia Army Service Corps consisting of No. 1 Ordinance and Supply Company; station workshops Lusaka; station workshops Ndola; No 3 Supply and Transport Company consisting No. 12 supply and Transport platoon; and No. 14 Supply and Transport Platoon; and Northern Rhodesia Chaplains Department; Army Medical Corps; Pay Corps; and Educational Corps (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1963a).
In consultation with military officers and government architects, the government also authorised the construction of new headquarters for the Zambia Defence Forces in Lusaka:

Under these arrangements three offices in the Secretariat Annex M Block 28 were to be made available for the Air Force at the beginning of December 1963. The government further decided that the Air Force Headquarters was to be located alongside Defence Force Headquarters (Ibid).

The government also decided to establish an Air Force base at Livingstone commanded by officers who had agreed to be transferred from the Royal Rhodesia Air Force based in Salisbury. Since it became difficult for the Air Force Command in Lusaka to direct operations from the Livingstone base, the government decided to build a new air wing base in Lusaka. The construction of this new base began in December 1964. A total of GB £750,000 Sterling was released for the purpose based on GB£2.00 Sterling per square foot Headquarters’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1963a). The location of the command units in Lusaka – the seat of civil government – facilitated civil control of the military authorities.

Most of the military personnel retained by the government had been recruited under the tribal and racial policies of the colonial government. Therefore, we need to examine the new policies introduced by the post-independence government with regard to military recruitment, training, and the Zambianisation of the defence force between 1964 and 1972 – and their effect on civil control of the military.

5.7 Military recruitment and training, and the Zambianisation of the defence force

The post-independence government abolished all racial or ethnic discrimination in recruitment for the Zambia Defence Force – an important step that facilitated effective civil control of the military in the First Republic. The government was aware that ethnicity had played a major role in military intervention in domestic politics in the Congo, and a military mutiny in Tanzania. As a result, it abandoned the use of race and tribe as a basis for military recruitment, and introduced the motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’. In terms of this approach, recruitment for the defence force was guided by
Article 49 of the Constitution of Zambia, as quoted earlier, and the 1964 Defence Act Chapter 106 of the Laws of Zambia. CAP 106 provided for:

The creation and maintenance in Zambia of a Defence Force consisting of an army, comprising the Regular Force of the Army, the Territorial, Army Reserve, and Air Force comprising the Regular Force of the Air Force, the Auxiliary Air Force, the all Air Force Reserve; to provide for the conditions of discharge of the soldiers from the Regular Force and for their transfer to the Reserve Force when necessary in the public interest (GRZ 1964b:5).

Accordingly, young men and women from all 73 ethnic groups in Zambia qualified for recruitment as officer cadets as well as lower ranks as long as they met the minimum entry and application qualifications. Recruitment took place in both urban and rural provinces. Rural resident secretaries were asked to report on the recruitment potential in their provinces. After conscription by the Military Selection Board, conscripts were subjected to the same medical check-ups used during the colonial days. Thereafter, they were trained under the supervision of expatriate British military personnel brought into the country under the British government’s ‘loaned personnel agreement’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964a). This agreement required British military specialists to train Zambians for key posts in the Zambia Army Technical Corps and other specialist units. The conscripts were trained in military drill, warfare, discipline, and all other aspects taught to conscripts in the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, as noted in the previous chapter. After training, these soldiers were employed on a pensionable basis, and posted to various barracks under various commands.

While men could enter the defence force as combat troops, women recruits joined in support roles such as nurses, secretaries, accountants, and logistics and administration personnel (Kazembe, interview, 2006). These measures ensured effective civil control of the military as no single ethnic group dominated the defence force, and the possibility of one ethnic group organising a successful military coup d’etat – as had happened in Nigeria – was very remote. At the same time, military authorities were required to maintain standards in order to avoid a loss of efficiency in the defence force. Given the problem of the emulation of western military institutions, which was the main cause of President Nkwame Nkrumah’s overthrow in Ghana in 1966, President Kaunda frequently addressed the military.
The most important of his speeches was delivered at a seminar for army and air force officers at Kalewa barracks in Ndola on 21 March 1967. In it he warned against military seizure of political power. In his warning he asserted that the military is ‘ill equipped to rule’ and that consequently, the coup d’etat is followed by ‘an inevitable train of disaster and general chaos’ and by ‘an inevitable return to the dark ages.’ He, then, exhorted the officers to channel their energies into acquiring professional competence instead of planning or plotting to wrestle political power from the civilian authorities (cited in Mtshali 1972:155-156).

The Zambian government further defused the emulation problem by deciding that, while it was important to maintain good relations with Sandhurst Military College in Britain, officers should also be trained at other institutions within and outside the Commonwealth. In the interests of uniformity, Zambian military officers who had been trained elsewhere had to undergo further training and reorientation. Therefore, the government established a nine-month cadet course and other orientation courses at the School of Military Training at Kohima Barracks in Kabwe.

It was hoped that these policies would improve the relationship between the new government, the new officer corps, and the citizenry, and would gradually change the people’s view of the military from that of an oppressive colonial instrument to that of a protector of the people. The government was also aware that ‘post-independent Zambia was a member of both the Commonwealth and the United Nations. It was, therefore, important for the new government to have a viable army in order that it could make a useful contribution if the United Nations or a Commonwealth country sought assistance’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964a:2). To this end the government re-examined policies for the recruitment and promotion of Zambian officers, which is examined in the next section.

5.8 The selection and training of army officers

The policy for selecting and training army officers was guided by three main principles. The first was that officers should be selected on a non-racial basis. However, until such time as the racial imbalance inherited from the colonial era had been rectified, the numbers of Europeans selected as officers had to be restricted. The Defence Council, for instance, decided that only one out of every six cadets sent for training could be a
European. The second principle was that suitable African warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers had to be commissioned from the ranks after a restricted officer training course. They were then promoted to captain after two years, and to major after a further five years. The Defence Council also decided that best officers had to be promoted far more rapidly than previously, including to battalion command, but this would be reviewed in the light of the developing political situation.

The third principle was that all outstanding young African officers, especially those trained at Sandhurst, had to be rapidly advanced. It was decided that young officers had to progress up the promotion ladder more rapidly than those in the British army as they would have to take over from older officers due to retire in five to ten years after independence. The Defence Council further decided that the following time scale had to be taken as a guide:

- Lieutenant: three years after starting a Cadet course;
- Captain: six years after starting a Cadet course subject to recommendation and passing a promotion examination;
- Major: nine years after starting a Cadet course subject to recommendation and passing a promotion examination; and
- Lieutenant Colonel: by selection from those among the best officers (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964a).

These policies had to be backed by training capacity at officer training schools both in Zambia and abroad. To this effect the new government, through the Defence Council, also decided that a high and uniform standard of training for officer cadets had to be maintained, and that they should be trained at officer training schools in England and other Commonwealth countries. At the time of independence the officer training allocation to Northern Rhodesia was six a year at Sandhurst, and 12 a year at Mons. The new government negotiated with the British government for an intake of 12 a year at Sandhurst, and 24 a year at Mons. The Defence Council was requested to investigate the possibility of obtaining placements at other Commonwealth officer training schools. The government decided to send two cadets annually to Canada. The Defence Council was further asked to investigate the suitability of the officer training school in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, despite the fact that the language difficulties this would involve could reduce the effectiveness of the training. Following a decision to proceed with training in Addis Ababa, the government decided that the returning officers should also be trained under Commonwealth methods when they returned to Zambia.
The government further decided that when the number of African officers had increased sufficiently to occupy most command appointments, a corps of European instructors could be formed to continue addressing their lack of experience. It also recognised that, given the rapid envisaged increase in the number of African officers, a stage would be reached where further promotion would be blocked for large numbers of officers. It therefore decided to implement an early retirement scheme for officers who had served in the colonial and federal regiment, as well as European officers in general (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964: 4). This enabled the government to provide promotion opportunities for post-independence military officers. These opportunities continued to make the military work in harmony with the government, and their relationship improved further with the Zambianisation of the defence force, to which we now turn.

5.9 The Zambianisation of the defence force

In 1968 the government decided to Zambianise most senior posts in the civil service and parastatal corporations. In respect of the defence force, this process entailed giving Zambian officers supernumerary appointments before expatriate officers were retired. In terms of this arrangement, the Zambian officers worked side by side with the expatriate officers until the latter finally left. This enabled the military administration and government to prepare for a smooth handover from white expatriates to Zambians. It also enabled military and civilian administrators to observe how the Zambian officers performed their duties during the transitional period, including their loyalty to their country and government. If an officer failed to carry out his military responsibilities, and his loyalty to the government of the day was questionable, he could be removed without causing bad feelings, as the officer would have known that he was under observation. This method of administering military personnel enabled civil administrators to instil the principle of the subordination of the military to civil political authority. The direct appointment of officers to various command posts was discouraged, as this gave both military management and civil authorities no room to manoeuvre if the officer did not make the grade and needed to be removed from his post. The system of supernumerary appointments was also advantageous in the sense that ‘it did not give enough room to expatriate officers to destroy vital documents or engage in sabotage activities before their departure from office’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1970a).
On the basis of these procedures, expatriates holding key military posts were given notice of the ‘termination of their contracts, and Zambian officers replaced them. The appointments were on condition that the officers remained loyal to the civil authorities, failure to which would lead to their dismissal’ (ibid). The permanent secretary of defence further reminded officers that

the President and the Commander-in-Chief expected them to discharge their duties with utmost loyalty, devotion and diligence. The appointees were further reminded that these were temporary appointments whose confirmation depended on the officers’ abilities to carry out their duties efficiently and loyally to the government of the day and the nation at large (ibid).

Similarly, in terminating expatriates’ contracts of service with the Zambia Army and Zambia Air Force, the minister of defence thanked them for their loyal and dedicated service. The officers were informed that their retirement was necessary because of the policy of Zambianisation. The retired officers were reminded that the stage for

Zambianisation had been reached because of their great assistance in preparing Zambians to take responsible positions. Such a task required great men who have the ability to train someone whom they know would eventually take their positions and that those who had succeeded to do this deserved unreserved words of praise and appreciation for such an achievement that could only be done by very few people who believed in rendering service to their fellow men regardless of race (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1970b).

While the process of Zambianisation was under way, the posts of director of Intelligence and of Security and Political Education in the Ministry of Defence were left vacant until suitable people had been trained to fill them. By 1971 a

Chief of Military Intelligence had been appointed. This measure assisted the government to train an indigenous cadre that replaced the white officers who continued leaking information to Salisbury, in their capacity as military intelligence officers, in the light of Zambia’s open policy of supporting liberation movements (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1970c).
The post of director of Home Guards was also left vacant until the national service scheme had been in operation for two years. In the meantime the ‘affairs of the Home Guards were to be dealt with by the Assistant Director for Home Guards in the National Service Headquarters’ (ibid).

The process of Zambianisation continued until 1971. However, in March 1972 some retired expatriate military officers warned President Kaunda that they viewed the removal of British officers from Zambian military commands with some misgiving. They advised him that when Kwame Nkrumah had assumed office as the first president of Ghana he had been strongly advised by political leaders in India and elsewhere to retain British officers throughout his military commands, for reasons which became obvious from the moment he dispensed with them. The officers further stated that although Nkrumah’s regime became progressively unpopular, the traditional loyalty of British officers would have averted the military coup in which he was summarily deposed. It was extremely unlikely that a regular British officer would dishonour his sworn allegiance to any ruling authority, regardless of whatever politics such authority pursued, and that an officer troubled by conscience on any injustice in his environment could satisfy his honour by resigning his commission and retiring from further service. The former officers further reminded the president that

Zambia was a wonderful country, and the people were easy to get on with at all levels of society, and that it was indeed going to be tragic if any subversive influences were permitted to mar the picture of a Zambia many former expatriate military officers knew so well and remembered with nostalgia. The officers concluded by wishing the President sincerest wishes for his continued efforts under conditions so few people really appreciated (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1972).

The government took note of this warning, and decided that the contracts of remaining expatriate military personnel would be allowed to run up to the end of the Zambianisation programme. At that point the government would decline any requests for renewals. In this way the government allayed fears among remaining expatriates of being instantly discharged. Although this delayed the Zambianisation programme, it nevertheless gave the Ministry of Defence time to train replacements using Zambia’s own resources. The warning also prompted the government to start developing a Department of Military Intelligence, and it began to train officers in this field.
While the Zambian defence forces continued to send officers for training to military institutions in Britain and other Commonwealth countries, they also started to send officers for military training in Communist countries such as Yugoslavia, China, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany. The military training that the officers learnt in these Communist countries also included an element of political education (ibid).

Chinese and other communist military experts were also invited to conduct military training exercises within Zambia, involving Zambian military personnel. This began the process of gradually changing the outlook of the Zambia Defence Force from a purely professional formation to a partly politicised one.

While new recruitment, training, and Zambianisation policies had been implemented, the government had to find an appropriate way of deploying these graduates among the ethnic groups of Zambia. In the next section, we examine the Zambian government’s decision to establish new barracks in both rural and urban areas, and the implications of this decision for civil control of the military in the immediate post-independence period.

5.10 Physical military institutional establishment

The post-colonial government faced a number of political challenges that also influenced its decisions about the defence forces. As noted in chapter one, Zambia’s geographic location was perilous in that it was surrounded by hostile colonial states that opposed the government’s policy of providing bases to liberation movements fighting for the independence of their countries in the region.

In July 1964 a religious sect led by Alice Lenshina rose up against the new government and advised its members not to recognise the national flag or national anthem, or respect government authorities. Faced with both external and internal threats, the newly elected government decided to develop its own military institutions and arsenals. However, it decided to avoid any involvement in external defence issues until up 30 June 1965. In terms of this policy the military authorities were advised that they would not be required to undertake any operations outside the national borders. However, they would be expected to deal with any internal security problems, within the limits of trained
units available. They would also be expected to deal with minor cross-border incursions not amounting to co-ordinated armed assaults. The air force, on the other hand, was expected to continue fulfilling its role of airlifting up to one company of troops or police to any trouble spot. The implications of the above ‘policy was that “fly-in” reinforcements could be required in the event of any major emergency outside the scope of these modified roles’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964d).

In December 1965 the government, through the Ministry of Defence, allocated ‘GB£2,100,000.00 that resulted in the construction of the Military Training Establishment of Zambia (Miltez) at Kohima Barracks, Kabwe’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1965a:2). The school comprised an

officer training wing; officer’s cadet training wing; weapon training wing; driving and maintenance wing; signal training wing; and specialist training wing. The training school was expected to produce efficient military officers and other leaders to man the non-commissioned posts in the expanded Army. By the end of 1968, the school had produced a total of 1,067 warrant officers and non-commissioned officers broken down as 12 warrant officers class 1; 40 warrant officers class 2; 117 colour sergeants; 229 sergeants; and 669 corporals (ibid).

At the same time, the Ministry of Defence also moved the School of Military Training from Kalewa Barracks in Ndola to Kabwe. In December 1965 the government released ‘GB£1.4 million for the raising and training of fourth and fifth Battalions excluding a further GB£320,000 for equipment and recurrent expenditure of GB£556,000’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1965a:3).

These training facilities inside the country facilitated civil control of the military in that officer cadets could also be politically educated. Cadets were informed of the evils of colonialism against Africans and other indigenous populations in the Third World, and how different peoples had fought for their emancipation. They also learnt how the Zambian people had ‘struggled to get their independence and the problems that the indigenous people still under colonial rule in the neighbouring countries were still going through’ (UNIP Archives 1978: 99-100). According to Grey Zulu, former vice-president of Zambia and the longest serving chairman of the Defence Council, the officer cadets were also taught how western countries persuaded power-hungry and disgruntled officers
whom they had trained to overthrow their nationalist leaders, as had happened in the Congo and Ghana.

They were also taught that, given ‘Zambia’s geographical position, it was important to have an army that was nationalistic and loyal to the government of the day and its people. These lessons instilled the officer cadets with the ideals of nationalism and patriotism’ (Zulu, interview, 2005).

In line with this, Zambia’s armed forces were based along railway lines as well as in rural provinces. This mean that they were well placed to respond to any incursions by troops of minority regimes in the region in pursuit of nationalist guerrilla fighters based in Zambia. Dispersing troops throughout the rural areas also minimising the risks of presenting concentrated targets to any aggressor, especially air attacks by minority regimes. Stationing troops in rural areas had the additional benefit of stimulating economic development in those areas.

The disadvantage of dispersing military forces was that, given the relative lack of infrastructure and other resources, notably good roads and suitable airfields, it would be more difficult to deploy them rapidly and effectively. The problem was compounded by the fact that, at the time of independence, the country did not have sufficient Zambian officers to command more than two battalions. The government was also aware that the initial and recurrent costs of maintaining troops in rural areas were greater than doing so along railway lines.

Given Zambia’s geographical position, and an accurate analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of dispersing its military barracks, the government decided on a policy of dispersal, because of the economic benefits this would provide to the rural areas where the barracks were located. This approach was politically significant to local people, as these forces provided them with a sense of security. The presence of barracks in rural provinces also worked as a ‘deterrent to foreign troops and governments to organise local insurgents as they did in Southern Angola and Northern Mozambique, which turned these provinces into centres for the internal destabilisation of their own governments and people’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1965b: 1). In this way, the dispersal of military barracks led to a positive interaction among citizens, the military, and the political authorities. This policy was further strengthened by the creation of the third wing of the Zambia Defence Force, the Zambia National Service (ZNS), to which we now turn.
5.11 The Zambia National Service

The establishment of the ZNS created a third wing of the Zambia Defence Force, which led to stiff competition over the sharing of resources and promotion prospects in the Ministry of Defence. However, instead of causing friction among the forces, as was the case in Uganda, the ZNS relieved the Zambia Air Force and Zambia Army of some of their internal responsibilities, thus allowing them to concentrate on defending Zambia against external attack. Moreover, the government’s policy of dispersing ZNS camps throughout the country resulted in close ties between the military, the citizenry, and the government.

After 1964 the UNIP Youth Wing, which consisted of young men who had played an active role in the struggle for independence, had to be looked after carefully by the new government. If this was not done, it was felt that those unemployed youths could engage in criminal activities which could endanger the security of the country as a whole. The government also had to deal with food shortages, caused by the fact that a number of white commercial farmers had migrated to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa after 1964 as they did not want to be ruled by black Africans (Baylies 1978:512-515). The party and government therefore decided to introduce a programme of ‘agrarian revolution’, in which the youths were the major participants. This programme was further necessitated by a worldwide economic recession, which seriously affected the Zambian masses despite the availability of abundant natural resources.

The government felt that it was important to take advantage of the economic hardships and establish production units in the form of youth centres all over the country, in order to attain the objective of creating a self-reliant nation. These District Youth Production Camps were established in all 70 districts in Zambia and were controlled by the director of the Zambia Youth Service, who was a civilian. Recruitment was voluntary. The centres concentrated on producing maize, sunflower, tobacco, and groundnuts, and rearing cattle, sheep and goats. Recruits were also trained in skills such as carpentry and bricklaying. Following heightened tensions between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia caused by the latter’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, the Zambia Youth Service changed its name to the Zambia National Service, and was now mandated to provide youths with basic military training, thus enabling them to guard vital military installations.
5.11.1 Change from the Youth Wing to ZNS

In 1971 the government decided to transform these youth centres into both defence and development centres. To implement this, parliament passed ‘The Zambia National Service Act No 35 of 1971. The Act provided for the establishment, maintenance, government and discipline of the Zambia National Service and for matters incidental thereto’ (GRZ 1971:1). It enabled the military training of all Zambian citizens attached to former District Youth Centres as well as the Zambia National Service, and directed the ZNS to produce agricultural foodstuffs for the army and the nation as a whole. It was also required to build houses, roads and bridges and provide other productive services required by the military as well as by civilians. Therefore, from the outset the service provided a direct link between the military, civil authorities, and the citizenry, especially with regard to services rendered to the community.

In motivating the act in parliament, the minister of defence argued that in African traditional society every man and woman was basically a farmer during peacetime and a soldier during wartime. This system of training allowed everyone to defend himself or herself, and complemented the efforts of those regarded as the ‘present regular army’. In traditional society the role of the army was to keep the enemy at bay while the whole community was engaged in making spears, bows and arrows, knobkerries and shields (National Assembly of Zambia 1971:2000).

The minister further observed that after independence the Zambia Youth Service had been established as a pilot project aimed at channelling the energies and skills of youths who had helped to win Zambia’s independence into other constructive roles, such as agriculture, carpentry and bricklaying.

The developmental objective of the ZNS was to prepare participants for food production in peacetime, and defence in times of war. It was argued in the House that the ZNS would quickly equip thousands of Zambian citizens with military skills and provide them with an opportunity to render useful service to the nation, whether during an emergency or on developmental projects.

The formation of the ZNS was aimed at helping the regular military forces to stop or prevent the violation of Zambia’s territorial integrity, and the regular destruction of villages and property along Zambia’s borders by white colonial regimes. The House further agreed that the ZNS would involve all Zambians aged between 18 and 35 regardless of their educational qualifications. Clause 5, sub-clauses (1) and (2) of the
same act provided for the compulsory enlistment of all persons who had completed Form V education with effect from 1975.

Two types of camps were created, namely military training camps and production unit camps. One military training camp was established in each of Zambia’s eight provinces, and one production camp in each of its 70 districts. Since each camp was to be self-reliant in terms of food production and other services, they were all located on a minimum of 1,000 acres of arable land. Vegetables, maize, chickens, cattle and other products were produced, which were used to feed the camp personnel and the regular army. Any surplus was sold to the general public. In this way, the legislative intention to make the ZNS contribute directly or indirectly to national economic and military growth was achieved. Training members in agriculture, bricklaying and carpentry also provided villages and others areas with useful skills and manpower. In order to avoid conflicts between the army and the ZNS, the House directed that army officers would work as tutors and instructors, thus providing leadership in the early stages of the development of the ZNS.

Given this, the ZNS was looked upon as a service for the people and by the people. Upon graduating from the service, youths became members of the Home Guard Unit which was tasked with defending the security of the nation as and when the need arose. In 1971 the ZNS was integrated with the army and air force. This called for the restructuring of the defence forces as a whole, which had positive implications for civil control of the military in the First Republic. This process will be dealt with in the next section.

5.12 Integration of the Zambia Army, Zambia Air Force, and Zambia National Service

In 1972 the government decided to integrate the army, air force, and national service into one force, named the Zambia Defence Force. The expansion of the roles and functions of the Zambia Defence Force was necessitated by the transformation of the Zambia Youth Service into the Zambia National Service, which was tasked to perform defence and security duties. In order to facilitate the integration process, army officers were seconded to the ZNS as company commanders and instructors. In this sense the functions of the Zambia Army personnel were identical to the activities of the Zambia National Service. The reorganisation also required the strengthening of the Ministry of Defence by bringing in senior military personnel as administrators. These officers were
expected to work side by side with their civilian counterparts in tackling the many problems that were expected to emerge as a result of the reorganisation.

The president continued to appoint the minister of defence and his permanent secretary. The post of head of the Department of Military Intelligence and Security, which was formally recognised as a government department in 1971, but did not have any physical structures, was upgraded to chief of military intelligence and security. The president also appointed this functionary, because the chief of military intelligence and security co-ordinated all matters related to operational, strategic, and tactical intelligence as well as other security matters in the army, air force, national service, and defence headquarters. This intelligence was reported to the minister of defence for onward transmission to the vice-president and finally the president (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1970c). Despite the fact that Zambia had a liberal-democratic multiparty constitution, the Office of Chief of Military Intelligence and Security was an important one, given the country’s policy of providing bases to liberation movements fighting remaining minority regimes in the region.

Furthermore, instead of having one command secretary, the government created three similar posts that were all based at the Ministry of Defence Headquarters. These were the army secretary, the air force secretary, and the national service secretary. The three secretaries – who bore the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Zambia Army and ZNS, and squadron leader in the Air Force – were directly supervised by the chief of military intelligence and security. The three secretaries continued to perform the functions of the Office of the Command Secretary in their respective wings. In this sense, they became the principal co-ordinators of all technical and budgetary matters relating to their respective wings. These post played an important role in civil control of the military, as their occupants continued to answer to the auditor-general, the Ministry of Finance, and other civil authorities in terms of their annual budgets.

The government also created the post of army commander, and abolished the post of chief of staff. In terms of this arrangement, all the battalion commanders, senior officers in charge of departments, and directors fell under the army commander. A lieutenant-colonel from the army was appointed as commandant of the ZNS, replacing the director, who was redeployed elsewhere in the public sector. Eight other officers bearing the rank of major or captain were appointed to command the eight provincial national service camps. The expansion of the Zambia Defence Force created greater prospects for promotion, and increased the number of people whom the government could call upon in
case of any serious security threat, both internally and externally. These arrangements ensured that civil control of the military remained firmly in the hands of the civilian political authorities.

These new recruitment and training policies and the establishment of new military structures had financial implications. How this affected parliament’s oversight role over defence expenditure, and its implications for the role of parliament in maintaining civil control of the military in the First Republic, will be examined in the next section.

5.13 The defence budget

In the period 1964–9 the Zambian government continued the colonial policy of tabling an annual defence budget for approval by parliament. Welch (1976:8) argues that budgetary supervision is the most powerful means of maintaining civil control over military establishments. Despite the fact that Zambia’s foreign policies placed it at risk of retaliation by neighbouring minority regimes, the Ministry of Finance trimmed the defence budget every year, as it did with those of all the other ministries. The defence force operated under highly centralised and very rigid control by civil government departments, which resulted in organisational difficulties at the top. The army was administered by a Defence Department in the Office of the Vice-President, and financially controlled by the Ministry of Finance. A satisfactory system of collaboration between the two departments was difficult to develop. The result was that ‘endeavours to apply a very centralised and rigid control of the defence force led to conflict between the Ministry of Finance and the Defence Department’ (Wina, interview, 2006).

The approach of the assistant secretary: finance was that in course of the phased build-up of the army it was simpler to apply one code of regulations to all military departments in respect of the allocation and release of funds from the annual budget. Since the Ministry of Finance applied this practice to all other government ministries, the defence force was no exception.

The command secretary, on the other hand, believed that a lack of funds could adversely affect the formation of an efficient army, the Zambianisation of the defence force, promotion prospects for serving members, and the security of the nation. It was therefore important for the government to realise that the administration of the army was
different from that of other government departments, and that special financial arrangements were required.

After examining the financial problems at hand, the government found that a problem of overcentralisation did exist. This manifested itself in a reluctance on the part of the Ministry of Finance to delegate financial powers to the defence department. Two examples were cited. The first was that delegated powers of write-off were limited to losses not exceeding GB£10, and the second was that all Boards of Survey required Ministry of Finance approval. Even if these instances were not very important in themselves, they served to illustrate the general pattern. The government further learnt that the Ministry of Finance feared that if some financial powers were delegated, control over the use of public resources would be diminished to unacceptable levels.

As a result, the government advised the Ministry of Finance that everyone to whom financial powers were delegated would be accountable for his/her use of those powers. In addition, the criteria for delegation would be the extent to which work could be saved, and the officials to whom these powers were delegated should be senior enough to make delegation acceptable. The cabinet further pointed out that the phased build-up of the army had to be tailored to meet military requirements rather than be tied to a method developed for civil departments. There were, of course, limits to this. This was because the administration of the army had to be governed by the general financial principles of the Zambian government, and the methods of estimating and controlling expenditure had to fit in with the Ministry of Finance systems. The general principles of public accounting and stores control were universal in British and former British administrations, and it was only necessary for the army to differ in matters of detail.

Another problem that emerged between the Ministries of Defence and Finance was that the system of procurement of stores and equipment common to other government departments was cumbersome. In a small organisation such as the Zambian government, it was logical to centralise procurement to some extent. This could prevent the duplication of provisioning organisations, and could also result in more economic purchases. The government did not quarrel with the general proposition that the army could procure common user stores through existing civil departments, but there were instances in which separate purchases by the army could be as economical, and procedurally simpler. In any case, there was no fundamental reason why purchasing procedures should be cumbersome.
The government decided to iron out this difficulty by emulating a workable system practised in Britain in terms of which finance officers in the Defence Department were responsible to an accounting officer. They were also responsible for ensuring that the administration was economical, and that regulations issued by the Treasury or Ministry of Finance were observed. They were the channel through which financial propositions were made to the Treasury, but had no direct loyalty to it. Their responsibility for good husbandry derived not from supervision by the Treasury but from their loyalty to their own accounting officer, who was responsible to parliament for the performance of their department.

Given the huge planned expenditure on the defence and security sector, the need arose to resolve the problems between the ministries of Defence and Finance. On 12 August 1969 President Kaunda directed the permanent secretary of development and finance to ‘put K2.9 million in the estimates for the special fund so as to enable him to meet the challenges announced in the 1968 economic reforms and the military offensive launched by minority regimes against Zambia’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters, 12 August 1969). In acknowledging the receipt of the letter from the president, the permanent secretary advised that

after consultation with the Attorney-General, and the Auditor-General, the inclusion of the provision for security and the special fund under Head 99 and without subjecting the same to debate in the House was not constitutional and could make the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Development and Finance be subject for queries by the Auditor-General and the Public Accounts Committee (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1969a).

Auditors in the Permanent Secretary’s Office in the Ministry of Development and Finance further advised that special expenditure by the Special Division in 1969 had been abused, and that this had led to over-expenditure. The undersecretary (budget) further stated that:

I am extremely perturbed about disquieting rumours that I have heard regarding the possible abuse of the special expenditure held by Special Division. I am quite well aware that of necessity in this sphere there must be more than an element of secrecy, but I really do feel that the present system can lend itself to abuse. The Senior Finance Officer in the Office of
the President is merely requested to write out cheques, sometimes of very large denominations, to individual officers. The officers concerned at all give no explanation. I wonder whether it might be possible for you to inquire into this and at least perhaps recommend that the sole authority for disbursement of funds rests with the Permanent Secretary (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1969e).

Despite this timely warning by the permanent secretary and undersecretary on the possible abuse of defence and security funds, the cabinet approved a memorandum from the president stating that the constitution should be amended to provide that:

(a) The annual financial report required to be laid before the National Assembly pursuant to Section 110 of the Constitution shall not disclose details of Constitutional and Statutory Expenditure;

Expenditure on Defence matters and special expenditure relating to security shall, to the extent authorised by the President, be charged on the General revenue; and

The present duties of the Auditor-General under Section 113 of the Constitution shall be clarified so as to distinguish between the Audit of Accounts relating to the expenditure of money’s appropriated by Parliament and the audit of accounts relating to the expenditure of moneys charged on the general revenues (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1969d:2).

Accordingly, on 21 January 1970 the Constitutional (Amendment) (No 6) Act, 1969 was tabled in the House of Assembly. The government supported the bill on the basis that it was important to ensure that Zambia’s expenditure on defence and matters of public security was not made public. In the past, this expenditure had been published in both the printed estimates and the annual Financial Report. As both these documents were not confidential, the information was therefore available to anybody interested in it, including Zambia’s enemies.

The House was further reminded of the vulnerability of Zambia’s geographical position and of the acts of aggression committed against it by minority regimes in the region. It was therefore important for the Zambian government not to sit back and watch its people suffer without taking appropriate defensive action. The government therefore
felt that, in the interests of peace and security, defence expenditure should not be published, and the bill before the House achieved that. The government noted that Head 99 Special Expenditure was not subject to debate in the House, and that what was now being sought was a logical extension of the same principle.

Clause 2, Section 110(2) of the constitution required the financial report to show all government expenditure for a given year, including on defence and public security, which it felt had to be kept secret. Public security involved those officers who worked either in military or civil intelligence that were not yet backed by any act of parliament. The government therefore decided to amend section 110 to read:

(2) Section one hundred and ten of the Constitution is amended in subsection (2) by the deletion of ‘the expenditure of the government in that financial year’ and the substitution therefore of ‘the expenditure of the government in that financial year other than expenditure charged by this constitution or any other law on the general revenues of the Republic (GRZ 1970:79)

The government also introduced a new clause 3 which made defence and public security expenditure a direct charge on the general revenues of the Republic. This meant that this expenditure no longer needed to be shown in the printed estimates or in the financial report. It would merely form part of a lump sum under ‘Constitutional and Statutory Expenditure’, and no details would be published. The relevant new section read:

112A. ‘Expenditure of the government for purposes of defence and public security shall, unless the President, by statutory instrument, otherwise orders in respect of any head of such expenditure, be charged on the general revenues of the Republic’ (ibid).

The government also introduced a new clause that clarified the duties of the auditor-general under section 113 of the constitution. Subsection (d) ensured that the auditor-general would still be able to audit defence and public security expenditure, while internal auditors of the Ministry of Development and Finance were excluded. Such reports by the auditor-general could only be seen by the president, who would decide either to keep it secret, publish it, or distribute it in any other way he thought fit. The government assured the House that normal financial controls would continue to apply to military expenditure – the more so now that this expenditure was no longer subject to
public security, which continued to apply to all other government expenditure. The
president also assured the Ministry of Development and Finance, through its permanent
secretary, that ‘he was going to make it clear to those who handled those funds that this
was not going to mean carelessness on the part of any public officer insofar as public
funds were concerned’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1969b).

On 30 January 1970 the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill was read for a third
time, and became law when the president assented to it. Parliament had voluntarily
abdicated its responsibility for debating defence and public security expenditure. This
violated the principle of the separation of powers and checks and balances between the
executive, legislature, and judiciary. It also led to the negation of one of the fundamental
principles of civil control of the military in that the people’s representatives were denied
an opportunity to actively participate in decisions that involved the allocation of public
resources to defence and security institutions.

The other effect of this decision was that it substantially increased the influence
of the armed forces in the decision-making process. For instance,

the offices of army commander, air commander and commissioner of
police were now given dual responsibilities of being commanders of these
forces and ministers of state in their respective ministries. This allowed
them direct access to party and government policy on security issues
(Masheke, interview, 2005).

These measures not only weakened civilian political control over the armed
forces, but enabled the ‘armed forces to assume responsibility for decisions that were
fundamentally political in nature which was the allocation and distribution of finances
within the Zambia Defence Force; the formulation of personnel policy; and major
decisions related to defence planning’ (Williams 1993:12). It also brought a ‘top-heavy
military bureaucracy within the executive reaches of the Zambia Defence Force. This
brought the emergence of a new category of civil servants in uniform’ (ibid).

The decision also gave the Zambian government leeway to quietly take money
from the national coffers to pay for the ‘movement, food, and other expenses of the
members of the various liberation movements in conjunction with other countries like
Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania and the countries in the Soviet Communist bloc’ (Masheke,
interview, 2005). When asked, in an interview conducted for this study, about the
negative consequences of the same decision with regard to parliamentary oversight,
former president Kaunda replied that ‘it was the best way of handling the situation at the time’ (Kaunda, interview, 2005). Furthermore, to allow the government to continue curbing both internal and external threats to national security, parliament agreed to pass emergency acts and regulations that were undemocratic. How these affected civil control of the military in Zambia will be examined in the next section.

5.14 Emergency powers passed by the House of Assembly

Besides the budgetary measures discussed in the previous section, the House showed that it took Zambia’s external and internal threats seriously by allowing the government to legislate for emergency powers, and establish the Zambia Security Intelligence Service. To this end the National Assembly passed the Emergency Powers Act Chapter 108 No 43 of 1964, which empowered the president to make regulations whenever ‘an emergency proclamation is in force: to specify the matter which may be provided for in emergency regulations; to provide for the duration of emergency regulations; and to provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing’ (GRZ 1964c:1).

The act further empowered the president to make such regulations as he deemed necessary for securing the ‘public safety, the defence of the Republic, the maintenance of public order, and the suppression of military rebellion and riot, and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community’ (GRZ 1995b). The act empowered the president to provide for the ‘detention and exclusion from the Republic of persons who are not citizens of Zambia’. It also authorised the president ‘to take possession or control on behalf of the Republic of any property or undertaking other than land; authorise the entering and search of any premises … and provide for the apprehension, trial and punishment of persons offending against the regulations’ (ibid).

These presidential emergency powers were later backed by the Zambia Intelligence Services Act, Chapter 109, No 43 of 1973, which formalised the existence of civil and military intelligence in Zambia.

This act provided for the establishment of the ‘Zambia Security Intelligence Service, its functions and discipline; and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith’ (ibid). The functions of the service were to:

1) collect, correlate and evaluate intelligence relevant to the security or interests of the Republic;
2) disseminate such intelligence to government institutions in such manner as the President may direct;

3) advise government, public bodies or institutions, and statutory bodies or corporations on the protection of vital installations and classified documents;

4) vet all persons who may have access to classified information;

5) co-ordinate and supervise the activities of any Ministry or Department of government, the Armed Forces and Police Force in so far as such activities relate to security intelligence, and to act as a channel for the dissemination of the intelligence obtained from such activities;

6) in the exercise of his/her functions and performance of his duties, an intelligence Officer shall have all the powers conferred on a Police Officer by or under the Preservation of Public Security Act and the State Security Act and an Intelligence Officer shall be deemed to be a Police Officer for the purpose of those Acts; and

7) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, an Intelligence Officer, while on duty, shall be entitled to carry such small arms as may be prescribed by regulations made under this Act, and may, in the course of his duties, use such arms in circumstances where use of arms is necessary and justifiable (GRZ 1998: 80).

The passage of these draconian and anti-democratic pieces of legislation were important for the maintenance of civil control of the military, in the sense that both the military and civil intelligence played key roles in thwarting the Lenshina uprising between 1964 and 1968 as well as the 1980, 1990, and 1997 coup attempts, thus ensuring that governance by civil authorities continued to prevail.

However, the act was draconian and anti-democratic in the sense that it empowered security officers to violate citizens’ rights to privacy and freedom of movement and association. It contributed to what Decalo (1992:12) termed the ‘production of presidential authoritarianism of various degrees of repression, disdain for civic and human rights and enabled a small cabal of influentials to erode any existing semblance of democracy and justice’.

As noted earlier, one of the immediate threats to internal security at the time of independence was the political challenge to the new leadership posed by the Lumpa Church uprising in August 1963. How the government dealt with this threat while
ensuring that governance by civil authorities continued to prevail is examined in the next section.

5.15 UNIP and the alienation of members of the Lumpa Church, 1964-8

The uprisings of members of the Lumpa Church led by Alice Mulenga Lenshina on the eve of Zambia’s independence presented its new political leaders with a serious challenge. The new president, Kenneth Kaunda, had to deal with the complex process of multiparty politics and nation-building. In the case of the relationship between Kaunda’s ruling UNIP and the Lumpa Church the conflict originated from the Cha Cha Cha campaigns in which ‘UNIP members’ use of violent methods of victimising Lumpa Members who did not possess UNIP cards annoyed the church leadership’ (Mulenga 1998:36). Alice Lenshina, the founder of the Lumpa Church, reacted to this development by staging a rally at Kasomo in May 1962 at which she condemned the lawlessness and political violence of UNIP members. In the competition for political supremacy between UNIP and the ANC after the 1962 elections, UNIP decided to eliminate all forms of disloyalty to it in its strongholds in Northern, Luapula and Eastern provinces. Mulenga (1998:37) states that

UNIP saw itself as Zambia. Those who withheld support from UNIP were simply regarded as not just political opponents but as enemies of the nation, and had to be crushed to submission so that they did not delay the objectives of the Party.

UNIP followers implemented this principle by launching a village-to-village party card-checking exercise in Chinsali, and instant punishment was meted out to non-UNIP cardholders such as Lumpa followers.

Between 1962 and 1964 UNIP members beat up Lumpa followers wherever they found them, burnt their houses, destroyed their crops, and restricted their movements. Lumpa members moved around in groups so that if they were attacked by UNIP members, they could fight back. Thus, between 1962 and 1963, the Chinsali Rural Council observed that

the fights organised by the Lumpa Church included axing villagers at Bright village in Chinsali in 1962. In 1963, they set 11 houses on fire and injured many people at Kapimpa, Chief Nkula, Chinsali; attacked villagers
at Kaseya village, Chief Mwinecifungwe in Isoka, killed six UNIP members in Lundazi, attacked UNIP members at Mucheleka, beat up a UNIP man at Kasama village in Kasama; killed 10 and injured 60 UNIP people in Chinsali; killed 2 UNIP people in Lundazi and killed 2 UNIP people in Mpika (NAZ 1964: 10).

The violence against UNIP came to head in June 1964 when clashes between UNIP and the ANC leaders intensified. According to Mulenga (1998:51), UNIP alleged that

Lenshina was being armed and financed by opposition political parties led by Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, Tshombe of Zaire, Michelo and Welensky. UNIP further stated that some arms destined for Lenshina’s headquarters from Welensky were intercepted by UNIP leaders. It was also alleged that Tshombe had sent bags of money to Lenshina through Nkumbula and Michelo to support her fight against UNIP.

In an attempt to subdue the worsening political conflict, the government sent police patrols to the Chinsali area in June 1964 during which police inspector Dereck Smith was killed and his body dumped near the river with his penis cut and put in the mouth. The death of Smith turned what was a conflict between UNIP and the Lumpa Church into a rebellion against the government and Kaunda termed it as the Lenshina uprising (NAZ 1964:8).

The government reacted to this rebellion by de-registering the Lumpa Church on 3rd August 1964 because its activities had become prejudicial to peace, welfare and good order in the country. Sir Evelyn Hone, the last colonial Governor and Kenneth David Kaunda, the first African Prime Minister and President of UNIP, decided to use government resources and troops from the 1st and 2nd Northern Rhodesia Regiment armed with artillery, automatic rifles and armoured cars to silence Lumpa members in Chinsali, Lundazi, Isoka and Chama once and for all (Ibid).
In the ensuring conflict between government troops and the Lumpas, official statistics indicate that

in the last half of 1964 in Northern and Eastern provinces the Lumpa Sect members killed 185 villagers, wounded 128 people, killed 7 members of the forces of law and order. Due to retaliatory attacks by non Lumpas, 40 Lumpas were killed, 472 perished while resisting police and army, and over 5000 Lumpas were put in re-education centres in Luwingu, Chinsali and Mufulira districts, 34 pupils lost both their parents during the uprising (ibid).

Mulenga (1998:iv-v), a sympathiser of the Lumpa, states that in these areas soldiers killed nearly everybody, including women and children, they found in the villages whether challenged by Lumpa members or not. Slitting their throats or bayoneting them through the heart finished off the casualties. Small children who were injured were either stepped on or bashed against trees or buried beneath dead bodies where they died of suffocation. The bodies of Lumpa members were later buried in mass graves in Chinsali, Isoka, Lundazi and Chama.

This behaviour by soldiers in the period immediately preceding independence presented the new political leadership with the challenge of changing the mentality of its security personnel from that of colonial soldiers to that of troops operating under a multiparty democracy. Otherwise the actions of the soldiers would have serious implications for civil-military relations, with Zambians able to claim that the new political leaders were using the military against citizens in the same way as the colonialists had done.

On 11 August 1964 Alice Lenshina and 10 of her deacons handed themselves over to the government, and were placed in detention in Kalabo and Senanga. This enabled the government and security forces to round up more than 5 000 Lumpa members who were roaming the countryside, and place them in re-education centres in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The implications of this development for civil control of the military will be examined in the next section.
5.16 **Implications of the Lenshina uprising for civil control of the military**

The activities of a deviant religious group on the eve of Zambia’s independence were not sympathetically received by non-Lumpas. The non-Lumpas in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Zambia co-operated with government officials and military forces against members of the Lumpa sect, because they were bitter over the loss of their houses, food, loved ones, and children at the hands of Lumpa members. Even when Lenshina and ten other detainees escaped from Kalabo and Senanga prison in October 1967, ‘a combined civilian, police, army and air force operation code-named “Operation Stallion” was successfully carried out to try and recapture the escapees’ (NAZ 1967b). The operation was only called off when Lenshina and ten others were handed over to Kalabo police by guerrilla fighters of the Movement for the Peoples Liberation of Angola (MPLA), who had captured them in Angola while they were on their way to Zaire.

In 1968 the Lumpa members, both those in exile at Mokambo in the DRC and in re-education centres in Zambia, agreed with the Zambian government that it was in the interest of the common good and the maintenance of social order that they be resettled in their former villages. The repatriation and resettlement programme began on 20 June 1968, and involved the use police officers, immigration officers, army personnel, and district secretaries. Transit camps were set up at

Mkushi, Mpika, and Chinsali for the Lumpas going to Northern Province.
Other transit points were made at Chongwe, Nyimba and Chipata for the Lumpas going to the Eastern Province. The District Secretaries arranged for the dispersal to their villages in consultation with the local chiefs and Headmen (NAZ 1965a:1).

Importantly, despite the blood spilt as a result of the Lenshina uprising, the post-colonial state managed to find an acceptable solution among UNIP, the government, members of the Lumpa sect, ordinary people, and the military. After crushing the rebellion, the army was actively involved in resettling the defeated people. The post-colonial state’s methods of civil control of the military, strongly influenced by the new syllabus at the school of military training in Kabwe, gradually changed the attitude of the military from one of oppressing its own people to a humanitarian one. Hence the assertion by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:22) that ‘the major problem of the post-colonial state is that it was largely incapable of undertaking the expected role of mediating between competing
and contending forces within society’ began to be disproved by the mediation methods of the Zambian government in the process of finally resolving the Lumpa uprising.

The next challenge to civil control of the military in the First Republic involved the provision of bases for foreign nationalist parties. How the Zambian government harmonised its relations with the military in spearheading the liberation struggle against minority regimes in the region – in sharp contrast with Nkwame Nkruma’s forces – will be examined in the next section.

**5.17 The impact of foreign nationalist parties based in Zambia on civil control of the military, 1964-1972**

After attaining independence, Zambia became a member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) whose political objective was to complete the political liberation of all Africans still under colonial and apartheid rule. As noted earlier, Zambia’s location in Southern Africa and its foreign policy objectives resulted in the country providing bases for liberation movements from neighbouring state which were still under minority rule.

Foreign nationalist parties were allowed to operate in Zambia provided they were recognised by the OAU. The government decided that liberation movements could establish offices in Zambia under the following conditions:

- offices could be opened in Lusaka and other provincial headquarters in the border provinces. Office bearers and members of these organisations were allowed to operate within the country with special permission from the Office of the President. Furthermore, office bearers in Lusaka were required to render to the office of the President details of itineraries and programmes of their officials operating from their offices (NAZ 1965b).

By 1965 a number of nationalist organisations had been recognised by the OAU, and had established offices and military bases in Zambia. They included the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC), the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, the Mozambique African National Congress, the Union of Populations of Angola (UPA), and the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (ibid).
Colonial regimes launched armed raids on the military wings of these liberation movements, both in their countries of origin and at their bases in Zambia. The incursions of both SWAPO and ANC guerrilla fighters over the 180-kilometre border on the Caprivi Strip between Zambia and Namibia resulted in the South African government intensifying military patrols, and building an airstrip capable of handling large aircraft. In response, the Zambian government built security roads in the same area, such as the Sesheke-Kalomo and Mwandi Kuti-Mambova roads. The activities of South African troops in this area prompted the Zambian government to deploy military forces in order to defend the country’s borders and its people against racist incursions.

On the border with Southern Rhodesia, clashes between nationalist guerrilla fighters and Southern Rhodesian troops were reported near ‘Salisbury and Kariba in Southern Rhodesia and at Siavonga, Chirundu and Feira in Zambia between 1964 and 1967 in which the racist regime lost a number of troops’ (NAZ 1967a). This forced the Smith regime to embark on its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, and engage the guerrillas in Southern Rhodesia and at their bases in Zambia. In addition, the failure by the British government to grant Southern Rhodesia independence in return for services rendered during World War II angered Rhodesian whites (Jardim 1978:11). This forced the Zambian government to deploy forces on the border with Southern Rhodesia, and develop strategic roads and airstrips.

Nationalist guerrilla fighters from Angola and Mozambique fought against Portuguese troops in the eastern, western and north-western areas of Zambia. The Zambian government was forced to deploy its troops in these provinces to protect the life and property of Zambian citizens as well as the territorial integrity of the country.

The deployment of military forces in five of Zambia’s provinces brought an important change in civil control of the military. Military forces were now predominantly used to defend the territorial integrity of the state against external enemies, in contrast with the colonial period, in which they were largely used for internal security purposes. At the same time, the gap left by the defence forces in guarding strategic installations was filled by national service personnel who assumed the responsibilities of home guards during the colonial period. Zambian citizens’ attitude towards the military gradually changed from viewing them as oppressors to regarding them as protectors of their lives and property against colonial and apartheid troops that hunted their black brothers in the border villages. Therefore, civil control of the military was no longer adversarial or racist, but was characterised by good relations between the government, citizens, and the
military. Whereas the government had a responsibility to protect the lives and property of its citizens, citizens were also sensitised to report the presence of troops from neighbouring colonial regimes to security personnel deployed in their areas.

The last major threat to civil control of the military in the First Republic was the problem of inter-party and intra-party rivalries. How and why the Zambian government ensured that this was not used as an excuse for military intervention in domestic politics – as had happened in Zaire under Patrice Lumumba, and in Ghana under Nkwame Nkrumah – is examined in the next section.

5.18 The impact of inter-party and intra-party conflicts on civil control of the military

The period 1964-72 was one in which many African regimes were overthrown as a result of inter-party and intra-party rivalries. This was compounded by the fact that during the ‘formal transfer of power at independence, civilian control as nurtured in Great Britain was not effectively transferred in toto to Commonwealth States that gained independence after World War II’ (Welch 1978:160). To understand what was actually transferred, Price (1971:399-430) examined the ways in which perceptions of civil control of the military in the ‘case of Ghanaian senior military officers contravened nationalistic interests and democratic governance’.

Price (ibid:399-403) argues that ‘behavioural controls of ex-colonial armies suffered from the problem of non-nationalistic and non-puritanical African military officers as a result of emulating the traditions of training, ideology and values based on the Western military format’. As a result, he developed the notion of ‘the emulation paradox under the Reference Group Theory that psychologically made the ex-colonial officers identify themselves with the traditions, symbols and values of the ex-colonial power’ (ibid:402–3). ‘Such identifications and commitments, in the case of Ghana, affected the behaviour of military officers … in their relations with civilian political authorities … in ways that were neither explicable nor predictable in terms of the formal organisational model’ (ibid:407). Conversely, post-independence methods of civil control of the military suffered from a lack of ‘experienced political leadership in dealing with the civil control of the military. This was because British Colonial Administration in Africa and Asia provided little training to enable politicians to meet the demands of the armed forces’ (Welch 1978:162). A ‘putative Minister of Defence lacked a long
apprenticeship during which he could learn how to carry through civilian control, and this diminished the chances for effective political oversight of the armed forces’ (ibid).

In this context, the military authorities in Ghana found it difficult to respect the constitutional provisions that made the president the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the place of their former white commanders. Therefore, instead of strengthening African nationalist leadership and interests both locally and regionally, as they had previously supported ‘British rule in its genesis and continuation’, the Ghanaian military command worked against the ‘genesis and continuation’ of nationalist leadership. In at least three instances, Dr Nkwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president, undertook ‘major policies that ran counter to the extra-Ghanaian political loyalties of his officers, in the Rhodesia and Congo situations and in the matter of acceptance of military aid from Communist Countries’ (Price 1971:413). Furthermore, despite the appeasement of officers through a policy of Africanisation that led to the replacement of white British officers with indigenous Ghanaians, the psychological commitments of these officers to British and Commonwealth interests rather than those of Ghana and Africa prevented them from differentiating between black and white, and they overturned Nkrumah’s government in 1966.

Zambia’s economy was relatively stable. However, its military was passing through the same phase of gradual changes to suit the post-independence era. Zambia’s political leaders were also going through the process of implementing its new military policies and transforming the behaviour of its military personnel from that of a colonial soldier to that of taking up the challenges of a post-colonial state. But why did the Zambian military not use inter-party and intra-party rivalries and the gradual reorientation of military training away from western to Soviet-style methods as excuses to overthrow the Zambian government? And how did the Zambian government manage to retain its control of the military in this period, and prevent it from following its West and East African counterparts in overthrowing their civilian governments?

Firstly, unlike in Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda, where troops were mostly confined to barracks, all military personnel were kept busy in border areas preventing the incursions of minority regime troops into Zambia. Troops confined to barracks were kept busy with combat and weapons training. Thereafter these troops were moved to the borders to relieve those who had spent lengthy periods in the operational zones. These military schedules prevented the development of ‘political activists in the military organisation who are frequently members of political clubs and conspiratorial cabals.
within the military that plan and conduct military coups and military interventions in politics’ (Perlmutter and Bennett 1988:16).

The Zambianisation of the military took six to 15 years. Zambian officers had to understudy their expatriate colleagues for a specified period before their appointments were finally confirmed. During their probation period, officers in both civil and military intelligence closely monitored the behaviour of each officer, both at their places of work and elsewhere. If an officer was found to be disloyal to the regime, the commander-in-chief revoked his appointment. This process enabled the government to replace expatriate officers with Zambians loyal to the government of the day. When the problem of insufficient budgetary allocations cropped up between 1969 and 1970, the government did not become intransigent, like the Busia regime in Ghana. Instead, as noted earlier, the commander-in-chief, with the approval of parliament, assumed direct responsibility for allocating defence expenditure. These measures, while not commensurate with accepted democratic practices of transparency and accountability, ensured that the Ministry of Defence received an adequate annual budget.

5.19 Inter-party rivalry

This study defines ‘inter-party rivalry as the struggle between the different political parties for political supremacy and support among the Zambian electorate’ (Chikulo 1979:201-203). In this period the dominant parties were the ruling UNIP under Kaunda, and the ANC under Nkumbula.

During the campaigns for the 1968 presidential and parliamentary elections, members of the youth wings of these parties fought against one another. They threw stones, disrupted rivals’ meetings, blocked roads with rocks and logs, and burnt political opponents’ grass-thatched houses. UNIP also promised jobs to ANC members who defected to its ranks.

These clashes became a recipe for chaos and tribalism that could have resulted in military intervention in domestic politics. Given the fact that UNIP had 57 seats in the House of Assembly as compared to the ANC’s 10 seats at the time of independence, UNIP leaders thought the ANC would go into voluntary liquidation, leaving UNIP as the sole political party (UNIP Annual General Conference proceedings; 14 to 20 August 1967:10-11). However, instead of dying a natural death, the ANC steadily increased its support. By the 1968 general elections the ANC had increased its seats in parliament from
ten to 23. Hence it became clear that UNIP was not going to succeed in establishing a one-party state system of government through the ballot box. The main cause of this problem was conflicts within UNIP itself.

5.20 Conflicts within UNIP

The conflicts within UNIP revolved around differences over regional representation in the cabinet, and membership of the central committee. The struggle over posts in the government and regional representation reached serious proportions during the UNIP general conference at Mulungushi in August 1967. This was because the party changed the procedure for election of central committee members. The previous system required the party president to make a list of possible members of the central committee, which was then submitted to the serving central committee for consideration. Once accepted, the list was passed on to the national council for further consideration. After approval by the national council, the list was then submitted to the general conference, which finally elected the central committee.

The new system opened up the election of members of the central committee through democratic means. The results of the application of this method produced a central committee that was dominated by members from Northern and Luapula provinces. North-Western and Western provinces had no representation. Worse still, on 7 September 1967, then President Kaunda reshuffled his cabinet on the basis of the 1967 UNIP general conference election results. This alignment of the central committee positions with those of ministerial positions angered UNIP members who had no representation in the central committee (Zulu, interview, 2006).

As a result of this infighting, Nalumino Mundia, a former member of the central committee, formed a splinter party called the United Party (UP), which was dominated by people from the Western Province. Kaunda responded in 1968 by imprisoning Mundia and banning the party. In order to preserve party and national unity, the central committee then decided that no province should have less than two cabinet ministers, and the party president was mandated to implement this decision. This resulted in the removal of some elected members of the central committee from Northern and Luapula provinces from their ministerial positions to make room for those provinces that had no representaion in
the cabinet. This move angered Northern Province members of UNIP (Kaunda, interview, 2005).

In 1971, therefore, a further split occurred in UNIP through the formation of the United Progressive Party (UPP), led by Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, and dominated by people from Northern Province. The formation of the UPP as another opposition party by disgruntled members of UNIP threatened the survival of the latter party, and politics based on ethnic considerations threatened the unity of the country. Pressure within UNIP to declare a one-party state mounted. President Kaunda and his government banned UPP, and on 4 February 1972 Kapwepwe and 124 members of his party were detained under the Preservation of Public Security Act.

In order to preserve national unity and prevent the military from taking advantage of the political divisions within the ruling party, on 25th February 1972 President Kaunda finally announced that his government had decided that Zambia should have a One-Party System of government in which a participatory type of democracy would be practised. Accordingly, a National Commission of Inquiry led by the then Vice-President, Mr Mainza Chona, was appointed under Statutory Instrument No. 46 of 1972 pursuant to the Inquiries Act, CAP 41. The terms of reference for the Chona Commission were to ‘work out recommendations on how the One-Party System of government was to be implemented in the interest of the people and not on whether the people wanted the One-Party System of government’ (GRZ 1972:1).

On 13 December 1972 Kaunda declared a one-party state. This outlawed not only the ANC but also any future initiative to establish opposition parties. As the then vice-president, Mainza Chona, succinctly put it

Zambia had found from bitter experience that the multi-party system of Government encouraged indiscipline as crooks jumped from one party to another (like monkeys jumping from one tree to the other) spreading dissension by false rumour. They also encouraged tribalism, and now scoundrels have no refuge in one-party participatory democracy. We have fixed them; they are now like monkeys having only one tree (Times of Zambia, 14 December 1972).

Later, UNIP’s leaders convinced Nkumbula and other ANC leaders to join UNIP. In June 1973 Kaunda and other UNIP leaders met Nkumbula and members of his party in Choma, and signed the Choma declaration. Nkumbula agreed to dissolve the ANC, and
instructed the national headquarters and provincial, district and area branches of his former party to identify with UNIP.

Importantly, whereas inter-party and intra-party conflicts were a major cause of military coups, interventions and mutinies in some West and East African states, the Zambian government managed to avert this through the effective use of the Preservation of Public Security Act and the Inquiries Act of 1967. These measures did not allow the military to intervene in civil politics. In this way, civil control of the military in Zambia effectively remained in the hands of the civil authorities, albeit at the cost of civil liberties.

5.21 Conclusion

In the period 1964-72 the independent government of Zambia used consensual measures to reshape British imperial civil–military relations, that had discriminated against Africans, to suit the new Zambian state. Parliament, the executive, and the judiciary now consisted of people who represented the interests of all Zambians. All discriminatory legislation that caused friction between Africans, the colonial government, and the military was repealed.

Under the motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’, policies related to the recruitment, training and promotion of members of the Zambia Defence Force now opened doors to all nationals regardless of colour, sex, creed, or ethnic origins. This study has also shown how the executive dealt decisively with incidents such as the Leshina uprising and inter-party and intra-party rivalries by using emergency powers provided by new security legislation. Thus stability was maintained at the cost of introducing political repression, the erosion of civil liberties, the politicisation of the military, and the undermining of transparency and accountability in defence expenditure. We will turn to these factors in the next chapter.

6.1 Introduction

In the Second Republic, Zambia’s political economy was modelled along socialist lines. UNIP became supreme and the only legal political organization in the country. In the economy the state took a leading role through the establishment of parastatal companies and centralized planning became the main method of managing the country’s economy (Sardanis 2003: 222). In the middle 1970s the shrinkage in copper earnings, the increase in oil import bills, the failure to reduce the exchange rate and the debt service requirements caused a sharp decline in Zambia’s economic performance. The average annual growth rate in gross domestic product fell from 2.4 percent in this period to 0.7 percent ‘lagging well behind even the modest level of growth in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole’ (GRZ 1996: 22). The country further failed to make necessary adjustments in economic policy and public expenditure, accumulating massive macro-economic imbalances (ibid: 22). Its support for liberation struggles in Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa made it a target for military attacks and economic destabilization by the regimes of those countries. It also suffered economic hardships because of international sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. These regional conflicts served to ‘reduce Zambia’s scope for manoeuvre, both politically and economically’ (ibid: 22). Zambia’s role as both supporter and victim of the liberation struggle was also used by the ‘government as a means of diverting attention from its failure to make tough domestic policy decisions’ (ibid: 22). Faced with all these political and economic problems the government leadership decided that the most appropriate way to avert a military takeover of government and maintain stable civil control of the military was to introduce coercive measures characteristic of socialist one party state governments.

In this chapter, therefore, it is argued that civil control of the military under the one-party dispensation in Zambia from 1973 to 1990 was exercised through largely coercive controls of military personnel, with military and civil intelligence as well as party organs in the military establishment acting as the eyes and ears of the civil government. Zambia modelled its one-party system on those in communist countries, and a brief examination of the dynamics surrounding civil control of the military in the Soviet
Union will be instructive. Kolkowicz (1967:19-21) notes that relations between the Communist Party and the military establishment in the Soviet Union were characterised by coercive measures through a severe curtailment of professional freedom, authority, and self-esteem. The party achieved this by placing military intelligence officers in all military units, charged with preparing daily reports on the private and professional activities of each soldier. Party leaders used these reports to determine the promotion, demotion, suspension, or expulsion of officers. During the Stalin era, politically aligned officers were appointed to the highest party councils such as the Political Bureau, Central Committee, and Central Auditing Committee.

As a result of these policies, substantive disagreements emerged between the military and the party. While the party maintained multiple control networks within the military establishment with the aim of securing information, indoctrinating and manipulating military personnel, and controlling the professional and private activities of anti-party officers, the military resented and directly opposed excessive pressure that interfered with its performance of its professional duties (ibid:21).

Drawing on Kolkowicz’s analysis, this chapter examines the coercive controls of the military introduced by the Zambian government during the one-party era. We then explain the problems created by the disuse of parliamentary oversight mechanisms, which began to expose the weaknesses of the one-party system. The creation of military and civil intelligence departments, the establishment of party organs at places of work, and the appointment of military officers as district governors, members of the UNIP central committee, and managing directors of parastatal organisations will be given as examples of interference that affected civil control of the military. We conclude by pointing out that various coercive controls over the military under the one-party dispensation turned into anti-democratic practices that were resented by the people. Following the end of the Cold War, the one-party state eventually gave way to multiparty politics.

6.2 Constitutional provisions for a one-party state

The introduction of the one-party system fundamentally affected methods used by civil authorities to control the military. Civil control of the military during the colonial period was characterised by largely coercive measures through the policies of racial discrimination. During the First Republic, these policies were replaced by consensual measures and limited party controls. During the Second Republic, some consensual controls were consolidated and coercive controls introduced in all military
establishments. This was important for the government leadership because the electoral system the one-party state put in place made it difficult for anyone to remove the regime in power since the political process was controlled by the fusion of party and government. The 1973 constitution increased the membership of the National Assembly from 110 to 135. Article 4(1) of the constitution stated that ‘there shall be one and only one political party or organisation in Zambia, namely the United National Independence Party, in this Constitution referred to as the Party’ (GRZ 1973a:4). Furthermore, UNIP’s supremacy over the other state organs, including parliament, was provided for in Article 5 of the 1973 UNIP constitution, which was annexed to the Republican constitution. This article stated that the party was the ‘supreme organisation and the guiding political force in the land’, and that ‘its aims and objectives as expressed in this Constitution shall provide guidelines for all persons and institutions in the land’ (GRZ 1973b:7).

The UNIP constitutional provision was reinforced by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act Number 22 of 1975 that made ‘the provisions of the Party Constitution binding and interpreted on the same basis as the Republican Constitution’ (Chibesakunda 2001:45). The act stated that

where reference to the Constitution of the Party is necessary for the purpose of interpreting or construing any provisions of this Constitution or any written law, the text of the Constitution of the Party annexed hereto, together with such amendments as may from time to time be made thereto by the Party and published in the Gazette, shall be taken to be the sole authentic text of the Constitution of the Party (GRZ 1975:10).

Therefore, the one-party state involved the formal subordination of the legislature, executive, and judiciary to the ruling party. ‘UNIP, through its machinery, National Council and the Central Committee was able to control its members of the Legislature and the Executive including the Ministry of Defence’ (Phiri, Haantobolo and Banda 2004:16). In addition, the role of its central committee as the supreme policy-making body was strengthened by Article 47(c) of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment Number 22 (f) 1975) which stated that:

The Central Committee shall formulate the policy of the government and shall be responsible for advising the President with respect to the policy of the Party and the government and with respect to such other matters as may be referred to it by the President.
Where a decision of the Central Committee is in conflict with a decision of the Cabinet, the decision of the Central Committee shall prevail (GRZ 1975:2).

Therefore, UNIP, as the sole source of political power, made decisions related to civil control of the military as well as all other aspects of governance, and parliament then translated these decisions into laws. The executive then applied those laws, and the judiciary interpreted them.

Kaunda now served as head of state, party president, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. His deputy, the executive vice-president, served as secretary-general of the party, and therefore head of the party secretariat. The party’s central committee, which was elected by its general conference, was Zambia’s supreme policy-making body. Next to the secretary-general of the party was the prime minister who served as head of cabinet, and was also an ex-officio member of the central committee. Next to the prime minister were cabinet ministers – including the minister of defence – who were appointed by the president, from among members of parliament. They were held responsible for implementing party and government policies.

The ruling nexus of party and government strengthened the structural controls of the military during the First Republic by introducing far more extensive coercive controls during the Second Republic. This fundamentally changed Zambia’s methods of control of the military from a western to a Soviet-style communist model. The reasons for introducing these measures are examined in greater detail in the next section.

### 6.3 Reasons for the introduction of coercive controls of the military

Intensified coercive measures in form of behavioural controls were introduced for a variety of reasons. Party and government leaders were well aware that the monopoly of the military over the instruments of violence allowed it to easily intervene in domestic politics.

The capacity of the security forces to influence the direction of a political process through military coups with linkages to foreign forces especially during the Cold War era and selective assassinations of leaders such as in Ghana and Nigeria were known to the Zambian leadership (Masheke, interview, 2005).
They were also well aware that the introduction of the one-party system would be strongly opposed by opposition politicians and other supporters of multi-party democracy. They therefore decided that it was important to safeguard the security of the state and its leaders against possible military intervention. Moreover, until 1978 both the army and the air force had large contingents of expatriate personnel from the British Joint Training Team (BJTT) in their ranks. These consisted of officers and men from the British Army and Royal Air Force Reserve and a handful of active officers. Many of these had either operated, trained or served in the then Southern Rhodesia during the colonial days or were part of the Federal Army and Air Force. Suffice to say that some serving army and air force personnel of the rebel Rhodesian Army and Air Force were their close friends, associates and relations (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991a).

Thirdly, the country’s policy of harbouring liberation movements had resulted in neighbouring minority regimes adopting policies towards it of offensive or pre-emptive defence. Pre-emptive defence was aimed at undermining Zambia as a country in general and the logistics, infrastructure, morale, and intelligence-gathering capabilities of the liberation movements in particular. The minority regimes deployed intelligence officers and other agents within the liberation movements and some international organisations. Raids on refugee camps around Lusaka and campaigns to assassinate key liberation figures such as Herbert Chitepo were intensified. Offensive defence also resulted in minority regimes creating a vast logistical infrastructure that supported proxy forces.

According to Gen Malimba Masheke, the first director of military intelligence in Zambia, the first proxy forces involved the alleged combined Southern Rhodesian and South African government training in South West Africa (Namibia) of 100 selected mercenaries from Zambia’s Southern, Western and North-Western provinces led by the former mayor of the Livingstone Council, Mr Chipango. The purpose of training this group was to let them enter the country and take up strategic positions and work with the South African government to support an uprising that would eventually lead to the overthrow and arrest of government leaders. After getting into government, the quislings were expected to declare a new policy of stopping the support for all liberation movements by the Zambian
government and would then throw these liberation movements out of their bases in Zambia. However, the Zambia Military Intelligence followed the training programme of this group and arrested them the same day they re-entered Zambia in 1973 (Masheke, interview, 2005).

The second proxy force involved the Mushala gang that was limited to some ethnic groups in Zambia’s North-Western Province. This force successfully entered Zambia and extensively damaged some infrastructure. It also helped to ‘divert the country’s material and military resources from concentrating on fighting minority regimes to internal rebellions, but were eventually crushed by loyal troops’ (ibid).

Fourthly, at the international level, Zambia’s desire to defend its people, infrastructure, and territorial integrity was rebuffed by western countries such as Britain and the United States that provided economic support to minority regimes and ‘did not want their kith and kin to be killed using their weapons supplied to Zambia’ (ibid). These countries, which had sold weapons, aircraft, and other military hardware to Zambia between 1964 and 1972, ‘decided to undermine the country’s security through the non-provision of technical manpower and spare parts for the weapons supplied to Zambia previously’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1976). Zambia and the liberation movements therefore turned to China, the USSR, and Yugoslavia for military aid and training.

This dependence on the communist bloc for military aid and training, the threat of subversion, the introduction of a one-party state, and the policy of pre-emptive defence by minority regimes gradually resulted in Zambia’s leaders changing their methods of civil control of the military from those of the British model to those of China and the USSR. The awareness of party and government leaders of the need to safeguard the military against being subverted by local and foreign enemies, such as minority regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa, led to an increase in military intelligence personnel between 1973 and 1980. Besides engaging in purely military strategic, operational, tactical, and counterintelligence operations, one of the main duties of military intelligence was to ‘check on non-loyal members of the military personnel to the party leadership. This in turn became one of the main coercive control mechanisms that the one-party state system in Zambia evolved as part of its civil control of the military’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991b).

In sum, a combination of domestic, regional, and international threats to Zambia’s political system were the main reasons behind the introduction of coercive
control measures in all military establishments. This was done by the establishment of the Department of Military intelligence, to which we now turn.

6.4 Establish the Department of Military Intelligence

According to Lieut-Gen Christone Tembo, former army commander, diplomat, and vice-president,

The creation of Defence intelligence centralised the Zambia Army and Zambia Air Force intelligence that previously operated separately. Military intelligence now operated under one command. This measure also brought to the fore two important divisions in the Office of the President that eventually proved crucial in the civil control of the military in Zambia. These were the Department of Defence Intelligence that now drew its personnel from the Zambia Army, Zambia Airforce and the Zambia National Service. The other one was the Special Division, made up of civil officers operating along the lines of the United States Criminal Investigation Agency, which drew its personnel from the civilians. The Directors of both Departments were directly answerable to the President who assumed a direct role as minister responsible for these two wings under the Office of the President (Tembo, interview, 2005).

Collaboration between officers in the Department of Military Intelligence and Special Branch officers ensured that very few threats to security went unnoticed. While both organisations dealt with matters related to national security, the Department of Military Intelligence had the added responsibility of dealing with operational and tactical intelligence during military operations. However, since both organisations reported directly to the government, they became important tools for maintaining civil control of the military.

As noted earlier, the functions of military intelligence were twofold. Initially, defence intelligence personnel underwent intelligence training and full military training, and then served in the military for at least two years. In addition, intelligence personnel were attached to operational defence force units and were eligible for specialised military and air force training as well as staff and command courses (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991a).
At the purely military level, defence intelligence officers were trained in strategic, operational, tactical, and counterintelligence techniques. Strategic defence has been defined as

intelligence that is required for the formulation of policy and military plans at national, regional and international levels. Strategic defence intelligence concerns interalia the capabilities, frailties and possible-probable behaviour of friendly, hostile or potentially hostile states, alliances, power blocks and organisations (Centre for Defence and Security Management 2003a:2).

Defence intelligence officers reported organisations suspected of engaging in espionage or sabotage to their headquarters. From here the information was fed directly to the president, who then directed the minister of defence and security and the chairman of the Defence Council (the secretary-general of UNIP) to recommend appropriate action. This normally resulted in these organisations being closed down, and staff members being arrested or deported. The use of strategic defence intelligence prevented Zambian military officers from selling military secrets to the country’s enemies.

Operational intelligence has been defined as

intelligence and security measures for use by military combat echelons in a specific theatre of operations. It is used in the planning and execution of operations and comprises knowledge of the operational area and the capabilities and weaknesses of the enemy, in order that the commander may determine the best application of his fire power, the best manoeuvring of his forces or the best way to secure the safety of his command (Centre for Defence and Security Management 2003b:2).

Tactical intelligence and security, on the other hand, refers to ‘the information needed by frontline soldiers, airmen or sailors and their immediate commanders in order to be able to wage war and survive on the battlefield’ (ibid). Acts of sabotage and espionage related to operational and tactical intelligence and security committed by Zambian military officers were also reported to Military Intelligence and the Defence Council for disciplinary action (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1982).

At the international level, military intelligence officers co-ordinated and supervised the activities of defence force personnel seconded to the Zambia Foreign Service as defence attachés or liaison officers, as long as such activities related to
intelligence. The Department of Military Intelligence also acted as a conduit for contact between Zambian defence attachés, military liaison officers, and advisors accredited to Zambia. Furthermore, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other security agencies, the department controlled activities of defence officials accredited to Zambia by foreign governments, recognised liberation movements, and international organisations. It also performed all these foreign responsibilities in collaboration with the special branch, other intelligence and security agencies in Zambia, the defence intelligence organisations of other countries, or as directed by the commander-in-chief through the minister of defence and security.

Zambian Counter-Intelligence, on the other hand,

had as its brief the responsibility for ensuring information and security within the armed forces and the protection of own information from disclosure, compromise and/or penetration. This has involved a range of technical tasks such as security personnel clearances, appropriate classification of security materials, the installation of locks, safes and physical protection for security premises and the use of electric/magnetic spectrum to ensure that communications are not intercepted by the enemy (Williams 1993:20).

On a number of occasions, Zambian Counter-Intelligence launched limited offensive actions to prevent information from being used by enemy forces (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1981b:3).

The Department of Military Intelligence operated under cover from the Office of the Military Secretary at the Ministry of Defence. Its staff in the army, air force, and national service operated in various pseudo-appointments ranging from artisans to physical and political education instructors. These operatives were also tasked with reporting on complaints of any kind against the government among the military and civil population. These included complaints about instances of tribalism, nepotism, and corruption. Other occurrences that attracted the attention of intelligence operatives included complaints about maladministration, ‘defeatist and cowardly talk’ by any Zambian citizen that instilled fear in members of the security forces, freedom fighters and any immoral and criminal activities by military personnel. These officers accessed military barracks, officers’ places of work and homes, as well as sergeants’ and officers’ messes. Telephones were tapped, people were followed, and mail was intercepted. Given
the increased scope of the department’s operations, it was given its own administration and budget. Its budget was independent of those of the other three services in respect of both capital and recurrent expenditure, except that the controlling officer was the permanent secretary of defence. However, direct expenditure on intelligence operations was controlled separately by the chief of defence intelligence, and was not subject to an open audit. The chief of defence intelligence issued instructions for the general administration of the department in relation to

duties distribution, inspection, training, arms, clothing, equipment and transport for the purpose of promoting efficiency and discipline or preventing negligence in the Department. However, this command, control, direction and supervision of the Department was subject to the orders and directions of the Commander-in-Chief or the Minister of Defence and Security (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991a:5).

These resources enabled intelligence officers to collect both positive and negative information about the professional and private activities of military officers, especially in relation to their loyalty to the party and its government. This information helped the government leaders – through the Defence Council – to vet all disloyal defence personnel and dismiss or demote them if deemed necessary (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1988). These functions of the defence and other intelligence agencies strengthened civil control of the military in that very few anti-party and anti-government elements went unnoticed.

By 1978 the Zambian government had learnt a number of lessons from the military coups that had taken place in Africa and Latin America. As already argued in the literature review, these were mainly caused by ‘a few politically or ideologically committed officers or civilians who infiltrate the military in search of army collaborators for civilianistic coup’ (Perlmutter and Bennet 1980:16). In order to prevent this method of organising domestic military intervention in Zambia, the government established an elaborate system of defence and security committees from the national down to the local level. This development will be examined in the next section.

6.5 The establishment of defence and security committees

In 1978, as part of coercive control measures over both the military and civilians, the government passed Standing Defence and Security Instruction Number 1 of 1978
which provided for the establishment of defence and security committees at the national, provincial, and district levels. The national committee was appointed by the president, but chaired by the secretary-general of the party.

Provincial committees were chaired by the relevant provincial member of UNIP’s central committee. Other members included the provincial political secretary, permanent secretary, intelligence officers, regional commanders, officer commanding both police and prisons, and any other co-opted members as the situation demanded.

District committees were chaired by district governors, who were also members of parliament. Other members included the district secretary, intelligence officer, officers-in-charge of police, prisons and any other co-opted member as the need arose.

The national committee met once a month. Its functions were to advise the president on all matters concerning defence and security. It also constantly reviewed the security situation in the country, and examined all intelligence reports from the security forces and the party. In carrying out these functions, the National Defence and Security Committee depended on the advice given to it by the Defence and Security Advisory Committee, which was appointed by the president. The advisory committee carrying out instructions by the Defence and Security Committee, and reviewed and worked out specific operations and joint defence and security plans.

The Defence and Security Advisory Committee relied for its advice on an operational committee called the Central Joint Operations Committee. This committee consisted of senior officers of the defence force, police force, and intelligence service. It met as often as possible. It implemented instructions from the Defence and Security Advisory Committee, and supervised Provincial Joint Operations Committees. It also updated information related to counter-insurgency and internal security operations, books, pamphlets, and publications. The Central Joint Operations Committee further assessed and evaluated all information affecting counter-insurgency and internal security operations. It ensured that all security forces maintained good relations with members of the public, as well as the efficient operation of all the security forces (ibid:3).

The Provincial Defence and Security Committees met once a month in normal situations, and twice a month in emergency situations. They were responsible to the National Defence and Security Committee in Lusaka for all defence and security matters in their provinces, and were charged with informing the national committee of all activities relevant to defence and security in those provinces.
They implemented security instructions issued by the national committee, and constantly reviewed the security situation in their provinces. They also worked out provincial plans and contingency measures for the civilian population against any external aggression, emergency, or natural disaster. The committees conducted security education, and directed and supervised all district defence and security committees on defence and security matters, including civil defence. They also reviewed intelligence reports from the security forces and the party, and monitored progress made with operations agreed upon at previous meetings, including the disposition of forces in their areas of responsibility. These committee also considered the logistical requirements for the operations of the security forces (UNIP Archives 1978:1-16).

In carrying out these functions, the Provincial Defence and Security Committees relied on the advice of Provincial Joint Operations Committees, chaired by the regional commander. Other members were the provincial police divisional commanders, provincial intelligence officers, divisional criminal investigations officers, regional military intelligence officers, and personnel from the provincial intelligence officer’s office. Some of the committee’s functions involved implementing decisions of the Provincial Defence and Security Committees relating to defence and security operations. The committees co-ordinated operations between the various services, and formed intelligence collection and assessment committees. They also planned counter-insurgency operations, as well as strategies for evacuating casualties and civilians in the event of an invasion. The Provincial Joint Operations Committees were responsible to both the Provincial Defence and Security Committees as well as the Central Joint Operations Committee (ibid:6-7).

The District Defence and Security Committees met every week. They were tasked with keeping the Provincial Defence and Security Committees informed of all defence and security matters in their districts, and performing similar functions to those of the Provincial Defence and Security Committees at a district level. The committees further directed and supervised all party branches and sections in their districts on security matters (ibid:8).

Below these committees were more local committees, and the chain of command and communication, both in peace and during emergencies, systematically moved up this system. From the bottom upwards, this system started with Section Security Committees, followed by Branch Security Committees, Ward Security Committees, Security Committee at Places of Work, District Defence and Security Committees, Provincial
Defence and Security Committees and the National. Defence and Security Committee (ibid 1978:8). These committees were meant to safeguard the Zambian government and people against both internal and external enemies, which we will deal with in the next section.

6.6 Some of the activities of security organs

Besides guarding against attacks by minority regimes, this chain of security organisations – from the local to the national level – were also tasked with politically educating citizens, particularly about the country’s national goals, as well as those threats from minority regimes. Civil control of the military was ensured by the fact that each section of the party maintained a register of all families and individuals in its area. Any new arrivals were reported to the registrar within 24 hours, and particulars of strangers were recorded. Citizens were also required to report suspicious characters, goods, and parcels and the disruption of any installations to the police and other security authorities. Furthermore, all unemployed people were registered, and people were generally advised to guard against hostile propaganda (UNIP Archives 1978:11).

Public confidence was built by making advance plans for public security in case of an attack by agents of minority regimes. This involved providing alarm systems, civilians digging trenches under the supervision of security forces, and the construction of air raid shelters and communication trenches. All military plans and security organisation at section, branch, and ward levels were organised according to the party chain of command.

During curfews and blackouts, essential services were kept going by ensuring that essential workers were issued with special identity cards which had to be produced when challenged by security forces. Under blackout conditions, all lights had to be switched off. In some places windows were fitted with blinds. Surface lights at the mines were also blacked out, but underground lighting systems continued to operate normally. In order to avoid any conflicts with the operation of the security forces, each essential service was required to produce orders pertaining to the services it provided, which were then studied by military experts. All vital installations including those dealing with energy, water supplies, telecommunications, and fire fighting were guarded against sabotage by trained and armed guards (ibid:13).
During emergencies, provincial members of the Central Committee or district governors could apply to the president for all resources to be placed at the disposal of the security committees. In such situations, any individual officer, transport, or other resources could be mobilised. The forces immediately available to the provincial member of the Central Committee and district governors for the maintenance of law and order were the Zambia police, its reserves and special constables, immigration and customs officers, and intelligence officers. When committed to internal security operations, defence force units were meant to provide support and assistance to civil authorities. Authority was exercised by civil organs, but command and control remained vested in military regional commanders (UNIP Archives 1978:15).

During attacks, defenceless and untrained citizens were usually evacuated to prearranged defence areas. After the attack the district governor and his committee were required to assess the situation and reorganise the district. When land mines had been planted, or bombs had been dropped, these areas were closed off until they had been cleared by experts. Such was the case when the Rhodesian rebels bombed Chikumbi refugee centre for Zimbabwean children and disabled refugees, 20 kilometres north of Lusaka, on 19 October 1978, killing 226 persons and injuring 629 of them. On the same day, the rebels bombed Mkushi training settlement for girls, killing 100 of them (GRZ 1980:6).

Great care was taken in dealing with members of the public, as it was important to maintain and enhance their support and confidence. Members of the press were also carefully guided and controlled in operational areas, and the issuing of press statements on various operations were strictly controlled and centralised (ibid:16-17).

These responsibilities, exercised predominantly by joint committees of civil and military intelligence during the one-party era, shaped the behavioural characteristics and controls of the Zambian people towards their leaders, security forces and the refugees they harboured on behalf of various liberation movements with bases in Zambia. According to Dr Kaunda, these guidelines were in line with ‘God’s commandments … when the Bible states that [you should] love God your creator with all your mind and body, and love your neighbour as you love yourself’ (Kaunda, interview, 2005). This system also helped to ensure that civil authorities remained firmly in control of the military.
The establishment of the Department of Military Intelligence and the Defence and Security Committees facilitated civil control of the military in Zambia. This was demonstrated by the foiling of the combined military and civilian coup attempt in 1980, to which we now turn.

6.7 Attempted coup d’etat

The attempted coup d’etat in 1980 had numerous causes. The centralisation of power in a one-party state, with policy dictated by the central committee of the ruling party, did not please many Zambians, who harboured different opinions to those of fanatical party members. Inertia and inefficiency in both the party and government became the order of the day. All privately owned companies were nationalised. Accountability for the use of public funds deteriorated. Cabinet ministers who misappropriated government funds were merely transferred to other government departments or retired ‘in the national interest’, without being charged or prosecuted.

Very few members of the central committee had higher qualifications. Several of them headed numerous ministries – as many as seven in some instances. None of these members of the old guard, including Dr Kaunda himself, showed any signs of voluntary retirement. They were kept in power by the complicated system of civilian and military intelligence described above, as well as the uniformed security wings. This gradually led to a degeneration of Zambia’s political system from a popular one into a dictatorship. The suffering of ordinary workers and peasants as a result of the ‘Zambian government’s implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic adjustment measures alienated Zambians from the principles the party and its government stood for’ (Central Statistical Office 1997: 3).

As a result, a group of Zambian businessmen, lawyers, military officers, a High Court commissioner, and some Zairean nationals decided to overthrow the Zambian government. They included Edward Jack Shamwana, Mundia Sikatana, Brig-Gen Godfrey Miyanda, Valentine Shula Musakanya, Godwin Yoram Mumba, Anderson Kambai Mporokoso, Thomas Mapunga Mulewa, Deogratias Syimba, Albert Chilambwe Chimbalile, Laurent Kanyimbu, Pierce Annifield, and some military personnel. However, the process of consultation among them was so extensive that the party and government was able to infiltrate the coup plotters using both military and civil intelligence personnel. The coup plotters, for instance,
persuaded Major-General Christopher Kabwe to make arrangements with Zambia Air Force personnel for an aeroplane that could carry Dr K D Kaunda, the President, and land at an unauthorised place where the President would fall into the hands of armed persons, who would force him at gunpoint to sign a declaration renouncing his office as President of the Republic of Zambia (Ndhlovu and Sakala 1985:51).

The process of consulting with air force personnel over making an aircraft available resulted in defence intelligence gaining knowledge of the attempted coup. Some military and civil intelligence officers allowed themselves to be recruited for the coup, but continued to report to the government. Between April and October 1980 the coup plotters recruited from Mwinilunga district ‘65 persons, some of whom came from defence intelligence. These were conveyed to a farm in Chilanga, Lusaka district, where rehearsals on how they were going to overthrow the Zambian government by unlawful means were practised’ (Ndhlovu and Sakala 1985:51-58). These rehearsals were communicated to the government by military intelligence through the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The forced abdication by the president and the hand-over of power to one of the coup plotters was to be announced on television and Radio Zambia and other forms of the mass media. The successful execution of the plot was to be followed by the arrest of the Secretary General of the Party, the Prime Minister, and the Secretary of State for Defence and Security, the three service commanders, and all Ministers (Ndhlovu and Sakala 1985:51-58).

The coup plotters enlisted the support of the National Liberation Front of Zaire. It was mutually agreed that these men would join forces with the ‘Zambian group for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Zambia, and that, thereafter, the Zambian group, would in turn, assist the Zairean group to overthrow the Zairean government’ (Ndhlovu and Sakala 1985:51-58). Again, all the execution plans were communicated to party and government leaders via defence intelligence and security by Maj-Gen Christopher Kabwe, who later became the principal witness for the prosecution during the trial of the coup plotters. This was confirmed by Alexander Grey Zulu, former secretary-general of the party and chairman of the Defence Council, during an interview for this study when he stated that:
even though the 1980 attempted military coup d’etat was well planned, with the assistance of the American and British governments, the work of the military and civil intelligence officers operating within the rebel military wings and leadership caused extensive divisions and disagreements among the coup plotters. This made it easy for the military intelligence infiltrators to report all the details about the coup to the government leadership, which then decided to take a pre-emptive move two days before the execution of the coup (Zulu, interview, 2005).

Party and government leaders reacted to the defence intelligence briefings by strengthening security around all media institutions, airports, and post offices. On Friday 24 October 1980, a few days before the coup was meant to take place, President Kaunda declared a curfew from 7 pm to 6 am in terms of the Preservation of the Public Security Regulations. The curfew covered Lusaka, Kafue, Mumbwa, Kabwe rural and urban, Keembe, Chisamba, Kapirimposhi and all the Copperbelt towns, including Ndola rural. Under the order, private and unscheduled flights were all banned. All essential service workers were required to carry special passes and National Registration Cards (Phiri 1980b:1).

On 25 October 1980 a combined air force and army contingent using ‘AB205s, Macchis and Buffalo aircraft engaged the illegal army in Chilanga with ground and air firepower and defeated them in what was termed as “Operation Early Bird”. Some members of the illegal army were killed, while others were arrested’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1981:3). Thereafter defence, police and immigration personnel led by ‘civil and military intelligence personnel arrested all the masterminds of the coup except Annifield and others who escaped out of the country through Angola after dumping their weapons in wells’ (Zulu, interview, 2005). Those arrested were tried in the High Court for treason, and ‘Edward Shamwana, Godwin Mumba, Thomas Mulewa, Deogratias Sumba, and Albert Chimbalile were convicted and condemned to death. The Supreme Court of Zambia upheld the High Court decision in 1985’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1981:3). Thereafter, all military officers who were involved in the coup plot or had plans to rescue the 1980 coup plotters such as

Macpherson Mbulo, Major Ronald Chansa, Warrant Officer class one
Christopher Chawinga, Flight Sergeant M. Mukumbuta and Lance
Corporal C M Situnda were all dismissed by the Commander-in-Chief with the advice of the Defence Council and the Defence Intelligence (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1981:3).

These events clearly demonstrate that the party, government, and military leadership effectively used coercive measures in form of behavioural controls introduced through defence intelligence to foil the coup attempt. In return for these services, the government rewarded defence intelligence personnel by appointing some to the ‘posts of prime minister, members of the central committee, ministers, nominated member of parliament, district governor, and parastatal heads’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1990:2).

The appointment of these military officers in government positions resulted in the ‘bureaucratisation of the military, or militarisation of the bureaucracy’ (Omari 2003:102). As in Tanzania, the one-party dictatorship tried to solve the problem of attempted coups by co-opting army officers into civilian administration. Williams (1993:19) has argued that in these states the presence of defence personnel and defence intelligence and security officers at all levels of the state ensemble witnessed the strengthening of that category of officers best referred to as armed bureaucrats or civil servants in uniform. Their perception of their role as administrators also affected, predictably, their corporate identity. The formulation, co-ordination and implementation of policy became regarded as part of the line of function of the Defence Force at local and national levels and not a temporary aberration to be relinquished at a later date.

Importantly, one of the lessons the Zambian government learnt from the attempted coup was that it needed to politicise the military. This, it was hoped, would further strengthen its coercive controls of the defence forces, and help to avert future coup attempts. The government did this by establishing UNIP structures in all military units, which is examined in greater detail in the next section.

6.8 Establishment of UNIP structures in military units, 1989-1990

The party and government decided to further strengthen its controls of the military by introducing more coercive measures such as UNIP structures in all military
units. In line with this policy, between 1983 and 1988, selected military personnel from the rank of private to that of army commander were send for political education in communist countries. These courses lasted between three months and seven years, and were held in the USSR, Bulgaria, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and China. Officers were taught how communist party structures were integrated in the military, and worked as the eyes and ears of the party and government. In line with this, in 1989 a Department of Political Education and Culture was created in the Ministry of Defence, with branches in all military establishments. The department was responsible for all political education in the defence force. It held political education seminars among all ranks where party policies were explained and loyalty to the party and government promoted.

During the seminars, party officials, some of whom were military intelligence officers, assessed the loyalty or otherwise of military officers from their contributions to various political topics on the agenda. Those disagreeing with the party were reported to the Department of Defence Intelligence. The department then intensified its monitoring of those officers, and submitted its findings to the Defence Council, which could recommend those officers’ resignation, retirement, or dismissal from the service. In this way the Department of Political Education and Culture acted as the principal link between ‘the Office of the Secretary General of the Party, Office of the Secretary of State for Defence and Security on one hand and the services on the other on matters relating to the attitude of military officers to politics’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1989:1). The department also used these seminars to identify loyal officers whose names were forwarded to a scholarship committee in the Office of the Secretary-General of the Party for political education courses in communist countries. In collaboration with ‘Defence Intelligence and Security, the Political Education and Culture Department took up the responsibility of processing recommendations of service personnel for decorations (medals), Honours and awards by the President, in line with the provisions of Statutory Instrument Number 347, Proclamation Number 6 of 1965 (GRZ 1965:1) and The Honours and Decorations (Prevention of abuses) Act Number 5 of 1967’ (GRZ 1967:1).

The cultural branch of the department was established to enforce party policies and their implementation through ‘sports, drama, public relations and culture. In this way it was envisaged that the Zambia Defence Force could be a people’s force that remained a true reflection of all the Zambian people’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1989:1). Wednesday afternoons were set aside as sports days for all defence force personnel, a practice that has continued to this day.
The mingling among senior and junior defence personnel through drama and sports enabled party activists and defence intelligence personnel to further assess their loyalty.

However, the tightening of coercive controls by one-party regimes did not save them from the trends and events leading up to the end of the Cold War. As noted in the literature review, Perlmutter and Bennet (1980:16) argue that ‘military officers intervene in politics as a result of dramatic events that tend to politicise entire generations’. In the period under review, these ‘dramatic events’ were the collapse of most one-party states, which marked the end of the Cold War era. It is in this context that this study analyses the attempted military coup d’etat in 1990 that forced Zambia’s leaders to replace the one-party state with a multi-party system.

### 6.9 Attempted military coup d’etat, 1990

Prior to the attempted military coup d’etat on 30 June 1990, the country’s economic problems worsened significantly. This mainly stemmed from the government’s implementation of structural adjustment programmes prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral lending institutions. In 1986 the government increased the price of maize meal, which provoked rioting and looting in the Copperbelt. The government controlled the problem by imposing a curfew in the province and called upon a combined military and police reinforcement to quell the riots. Fifteen people were shot dead by security forces, and millions of Kwacha worth of property was lost by private companies and government-owned parastatal organisations (Malama and Chirambo 1990a:1).

After the riots had been brought under control, the government decided to place more defence intelligence and security personnel in the townships. The excuse given by the Defence Council was that because of the lack of accommodation in military camps, and in line with the concept of nation-wide defence, certain members of the defence force had to live in civilian residential areas such as ‘Chimwemwe, Matero, Chelston, Olympia Park, Kanyama compound and others. This tended to destroy the image of a colonial soldier and instead enhanced integration with the people in conformity with Party wishes’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1986:2). The government argued that the ‘concentration of forces by way of all living in camps was susceptible to pre-emptive
attack. It was known for example that the regime in Guinea, Conakry survived because of the defence elements who were not in camp at the time of attack’ (ibid).

The presence of the army in the townships introduced a substantial shift in the focus of defence intelligence and security forces, and broadened their operations significantly. Prior to 1986 their activities were limited to strategic, tactical, operational and counterintelligence both on Zambia’s borders as well as among military personnel.

From that year onwards, however, military intelligence collected information about anti-party elements across a wider spectrum of society. This involved the activities of church organisations such as the Catholic Bishops Conference, as well as the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions. This further politicised the role of military intelligence-gathering.

In 1990, following the collapse of the communist bloc, it became evident that the Cold War had ended, and expectations within Zambia rose of a change away from one-party rule. Under these volatile political conditions, the government increased the prices of mealie meal on 20 June 1990. Mealie meal prices were increased by over 100 per cent, from K82.30 and K114.50 to K198 and K269 per 25-kilogramme bag of roller and breakfast meal respectively. Announcing the increments in Parliament, Prime Minister General Malimba Masheke informed the House and the nation that the increases were necessitated by increased milling costs which had risen from K160 to K442 per 90 kg bag of maize (Malama and Chirambo 1990b:1).

On 26 June 1990 students of the University of Zambia organised a demonstration at which they planned to match to State House to demonstrate against maize meal price increases. They feared that the price of meals in the university cafeteria would be increased, which would mean that they could no longer buy three meals a day. Intelligence operatives informed the government of the impending demonstration, and police blocked the intended route. The students then eluded the police encirclement by dividing themselves into small groups and attacked UNIP offices in Mtendere, Kalingalinga and Ng’ombe compounds markets where Party vigilantes were beaten up and the UNIP flags were burnt. The residents of these compounds joined the students and spontaneous rioting broke out throughout Lusaka and the Copperbelt and
property worth millions of Kwacha was looted (Malama and Chirambo 1990a:1).

During these riots, public transport ground to a halt, and thousands of Lusaka residents had to walk home after work. The government reacted by imposing a 36-hour curfew, from 26 to 28 June. During the curfew all the ‘residents of Lusaka and the Copperbelt Provinces were ordered to remain indoors, failure to which they could be arrested by security forces and charged with an offence for breaking curfew regulations’ (ibid).

In the meantime, police and military troops rounded up the rioters. During these operations security forces ‘killed over 20 people, injured over 130 and detained over 500 people at Lusaka’s Edwin Imboela stadium that had been set up as a command centre. Out of all these, 326 people were charged and arrested for rioting in the Lusaka’s Magistrate court’ (ibid).

During the curfew, numerous reports of human rights violations by military personnel and intelligence officers were published. Air force helicopters were used for the cordon and search of all locations in support of the army and police on the Copperbelt in what was termed ‘Operation Kamusale of 1978’. Similarly, in 1981 M1-8 helicopters for anti-poaching operations were effectively used in support of the police in the Luangwa valley in what was termed as ‘Operation Kudu’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1995:1).

The harsh and unruly behaviour of defence personnel resulted in a ‘loss of property that was confiscated, stolen or destroyed and looted during the operation clean-up that operated under the government declared curfews’ (GRZ 1995:75). Furthermore, the involvement of military intelligence officers in joint operations that resulted in ‘incommunicado detention, interrogations, harassment and torture of political detainees, alienated both the citizens and members of the defence force from the party and government leadership’ (ibid:74).

On 30 June 1990 a combined force of civil, defence intelligence and loyal government troops foiled an attempted military coup led by Lieut Mwamba Luchembe over the atrocities committed by members of the security forces against Zambian citizens during the food riots. This attempted coup severed the backbone of the ruling party. It took place at a time of worldwide political change prompted by the end of the Cold War.
This gave impetus to political pressure groups such as the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) that advocated the abolition of the one-party state and the reintroduction of plural politics. It instilled a sense of insecurity and fear in leading government figures, and prompted them to clear the way to plural politics three years before their term of office were due to end (Kazembe, interview, 2006). It also demonstrated the futility of the government’s continued reliance on the use of military intelligence to curb combined military and popular uprisings against the one-party system. Political detainees exposed torture and other human rights violations by law enforcement and security and military personnel at public meetings. Some of the most common methods used were:

- Brutal beatings using all sorts of objects like planks, hose pipes, electric cables, batons and iron bars; administration of electric shock using various electric gadgets; and burying a person in a shallow grave leaving only his head above the ground and driving a motor vehicle close to his head.
- Others were forcing a person to drink or wash one’s face in urine; and keeping a person in solitary confinement. Other methods used involved the continuous interrogation by different shifts of officers for very long periods. Insertion of metal objects into the anus, or penis or any other sensitive part of the body and many others incidental thereto (GRZ 1995:58-60).

To heal the wounds of hatred and disunity, UNIP’s central committee advised President Kaunda to exercise his powers of parole over all political prisoners. On 25 July 1990 he announced the beginning of a new era of reconciliation. All the soldiers and civilians who had been convicted of treason for their involvement in the attempted coups in 1980, 1988 and 1990 were pardoned and released unconditionally. This parole included people such as the late Edward Shamwana, Lt. Gen. Christone Tembo, Lt. Col. Bizwayo Nkunika, Lt. Col. Chongo Shula, Major Knight Mulenga and Lt. Mwamba Luchembe. All the 34 University of Zambia students and hundreds of looters that were held over the June 1990 food riots were also released from jail (Malama and Chirambo 1990a:1).

These steps eased political tensions between the party and government, the military elite and defence intelligence on the one hand, and the citizenry on the other. It
was also an effective method of maintaining civil control of the military. This was because serving military officers and the former coup plotters realised that the most effective way of removing Dr Kaunda and his party from government was through the ballot box. Former military officers, trade union leaders, church leaders, and representatives of non-governmental organisations organised mass rallies where they called for the reintroduction of multiparty democracy. Military officers played a key role in the transition to plural politics; while they did not actively participate in the democratic movement, they understood the national mood and the need for change. In a bid to maintain military discipline, the authorities dismissed the few disaffected officers who openly identified themselves with the opposition. According to Gen Timothy Kazembe, former director of Military Intelligence,

> despite the above, the true mood of the military manifested itself in the results of the elections in which, UNIP, the ruling party lost to the opposition by obtaining only 14 votes out of all the military cantonments in Zambia during the 31 October 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections (Kazembe, interview, 2006).

On 24 September 1990 Dr Kaunda announced the reintroduction of multiparty democracy, and directed the Speaker of the National Assembly, Fwanyanga Mulikita, to appoint a 45 member special parliamentary committee to ‘study ways of democratising the United National Independence Party and the government machinery so that they become more responsive to the wishes of the people’ (National Assembly of Zambia 1990:1). The committee was also instructed to ‘recommend legislation that could give effect on whether Zambia could continue as a one-party state or revert to a multi-party State’ (ibid).

After the committee had completed its deliberations, it made comprehensive recommendations for changes at the party and executive level. At the party level the committee recommended that the:

- principle that the party is supreme be abandoned and accordingly Articles 2, 7 and 8 of the Party Constitution should be repealed;

- party functions be separated from government functions. In that regard, Article 47(c) of the Republican Constitution and Article 53 of the Party Constitution and all other provisions in the Republican and Party Constitutions inconsistent with this separation should be repealed;
philosophy of Humanism be maintained but the aspect of achieving Humanism through Socialism be abandoned; and

tenure of office for both the party president and the Secretary General of the party is restricted to two five-year terms; except that the Secretary General may contest the Presidency (National Assembly of Zambia 1990: 13-14).

At the executive level the committee recommended that:

Cabinet Ministers be given power to make policy decisions affecting their Ministries in accordance with Article 56(2) of the Republican Constitution;

The President’s tenure of office be restricted to a maximum two-five year terms; and

The Committee expressed their concern at the practice of involving defence and security forces in politics. It was the Committee’s view that personnel in the Defence and Security forces should be above politics to ensure that they owed their loyalty to the nation and not to political parties. The Committee then recommended that personnel in the Defence and Security forces should not be politicised (National Assembly 1990:21-23).

On the basis of these recommendations, President Kaunda announced that a referendum would be held to determine whether Zambia should remain a one-party state or revert to plural politics. However, during the referendum campaign he abandoned this decision and announced that Zambia would return to plural politics. In December 1990 the government tabled legislation in the House that repealed Article 4 of the constitution. This legislative amendment abolished the one-party system of government, and reinstated a multiparty system.

In July 1990 the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) was founded. It consisted of former labour leaders, businessmen, intellectuals, and other groups and operated as a pressure group for the reintroduction of plural politics. In January 1991 the MMD was registered as a political party. It then embarked campaigns for the presidential and parliamentary elections held on 31 October 1991. The MMD won
125 seats in the House out of 150 seats. UNIP got the remaining 25 seats. The UNIP President, Dr K.D. Kaunda, got 310,761 votes representing 24 per cent of the total votes cast as against the MMD President, Mr F.T.J. Chiluba’s 997,462 votes representing 76 percent of the total votes cast in the Presidential elections. Mr F.T.J. Chiluba became the President of the Republic of Zambia and his MMD Party became the ruling party in November 1991 (Chibesakunda 2001:49).

This discussion shows clearly that, under the one-party ‘participatory democracy’, the ruling party and the executive were the driving forces of coercive measures characterized by behavioural controls over the military. In the next section, we examine the role of parliamentary oversight of the military during the one-party era.

6.10 Parliamentary oversight of defence and national security expenditure

Under the one-party state, the government decided that its defence and intelligence budgets should not be debated in parliament as this would have enabled the country’s enemies to assess Zambia’s defence capabilities, thus undermining the government’s ability to preserve and defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, the government continued the policy introduced during the First Republic of making undisclosed allocations to the defence and intelligence services without these appearing in the national budget, and without them being debated in parliament or subjected to other forms of parliamentary oversight. Writing about the experience of Commonwealth countries on budgeting for intelligence, Thompson (2000:2-12) notes that intelligence security organs were forged by the exigencies of war, both hot and cold, and the principle of secrecy, executive command and Jesuitical means had militated against parliamentary oversight. This, it was further argued, helped to secure the lives of operatives and the success of any security operations.

Before the introduction in 1973 of the one-party state there were a number of democratic mechanisms, both formal and otherwise, that subjected the executive and its policies to a degree of scrutiny. While, as noted above, the defence and intelligence budgets were not formally tabled and debated in parliament, various parliamentary procedures and structures indirectly contributed to the supervision of defence and security
administration. For example, the House could debate legislation on defence, and the opposition could present amendments. After 1973 this form of oversight also came to an end as all members of the House belonged to the same party. Under this dispensation, therefore, parliament could not effectively oversee defence and security.

While parliament passed numerous laws related to defence, intelligence and emergency powers, the lack of a parliamentary committee on national security and defence also contributed to its growing failure to scrutinise the government’s management of increased defence expenditure and activities. In 1980 the president appointed a board of inquiry to investigate poor conditions in ZNS military training camps for Form V school leavers. The board found that the mess facilities in a number of camps were inadequate and unhygienic. Kitchens, dining halls and cooks themselves were filthy, and the quantity and quality of food left much to be desired. The main cause of this problem was over centralisation at ZNS Headquarters that rendered it incapable of efficiently supplying material and food to the camps; all supplies came from the Makeni Camp in Lusaka. Furthermore, no accounting rules and regulations had been put in place for ZNS administrators to follow (UNIP Archives 1974-1989).

The failure by the Ministry of Defence to improve conditions at the camps resulted in the outbreak of typhoid at the girls’ Luamfumu Camp in Mansa in 1980 and 1981. During subsequent investigations government doctors found that ‘Drinking water in the camp was not treated with chlorine, ablution blocks were insufficient, and it was important to quarantine the recruits for twenty-one days’ (Times of Zambia 1981:1). The team then recommended that the camp be closed. Further investigations of the poor conditions in ZNS military training camps revealed that the army was suspicious of the government’s motives for allocating more weapons to ZNS camps, and reacted to this policy by ‘withholding a number of arms and ammunition, binoculars and compasses ordered from former Yugoslavia’ (UNIP Archives 1974-1989). This rivalry – which could have resulted into a military coup, as happened in Uganda when Idi Amin overthrew the government of Milton Obote – endangered government control of the military. Furthermore, the use by camp authorities of unorthodox forms of punishment for recruits such as

leopard crawl, frog jumps, beatings and others instead of productive ones like doing actual manual work in the maize fields and vegetable gardens contradicted government policy of developing a citizen who would be productive during peace times and a soldier during war times (ibid).
Consequently, these administrative problems began to breed a negative attitude among recruits and the population in general towards the ZNS. This further jeopardised the government’s defence policies.

As a result of these problems, in 1981 the government was forced to suspend and later terminate compulsory national service for Form V school-leavers. This sequence of events clearly demonstrated the value of and need for parliamentary oversight of these and other defence programmes. In an interview conducted for this study, Lt-Gen Christone Tembo, former army commander, stated that:

The architects of direct Presidential budgetary control over defence expenditure among other reasons believed that Presidential control was advantageous in that the President had financial control and was privy to defence operations which became an important cornerstone in the civil control of the military. However, lack of parliamentary scrutiny resulted in the underfunding of ZNS camps and overfunding of other defence sectors as well as inertia in the performance of personnel in the Ministry of Defence, resulting in such disasters like the abandonment of the Form V compulsory national service programme in Zambia (Tembo, interview, 2005).

The lack of parliamentary oversight of the military during the one-party era demonstrated the need to observe the principles of the separation of powers and of checks and balances between the executive, parliament and the judiciary. The non-observance of these principles exposed the futility of one wing of government trying to oversee the effectiveness of other wings, especially the military. It further denied the people’s representatives’ opportunities to investigate financial irregularities in the Ministry of Defence, and give appropriate advice to the executive. This explains why, under the multiparty democracy in the Third Republic, the new government called for strong executive and parliamentary oversight over defence and security institutions.

6.11 Conclusion

Under the one-party state of the Second Republic, the ruling party and government successfully used coercive measures that introduced behavioural controls over the military through the use of military and civilian intelligence as well as political education. Among other things, the party monitored both disloyal and loyal elements in
the military establishment through the use of tactical, operational and counterintelligence officers. This information helped the Defence Council to take decisions about the promotion, suspension, demotion, or dismissal of military officers. The same methods of investigation accompanied by massive budgetary support enabled the government to foil the attempted military coups in 1980, 1988, and 1990. This helped to preserve civilian rule in Zambia, albeit under a one-party system. The same tactics were used to foil the 1986 and 1990 maize riots by citizens throughout the country. However, this form of control collapsed at the end of the Cold War. Decalo (1992:12) points out that

the hegemonic one-party state became an autocratic patrimonial state … detached from the vital creative energies of the African people and their societies. It produced presidential authoritarianism of varying degrees of repression, it has been instrumental in plundering the economy, directly or indirectly, it resulted in disdain for civic and human rights and … a small cabal of influentials have eroded all semblance of accountability, legitimacy, democracy and justice …

During one-party ‘participatory democracy’ in Zambia, various coercive controls adopted by the ruling party and government turned into anti-democratic practices that resulted in the brutal repression of political opponents by defence and civil intelligence. Ultimately, however, this undermined the tenure in power of the ruling party. When the Cold War ended, and the communist system gave way to the capitalist system, international and local forces overpowered the one-party dictatorship and forced the government to reintroduce the multiparty democracy in December 1990.

The new government reinstated consensual measures characterized by strong executive and parliamentary oversight over the Ministry of Defence and the defence force as a whole. It also adopted a policy of professionalising the defence force. This was done through by revising the good practices developed under consensual and coercive measures in respect of the military developed by the first two republics. How these new consensual measures suited the new democratic dispensation is the subject of the next chapter.
7 CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC, 1991-2004

7.1 Introduction

The Third Republic, characterised by a return to multiparty democracy, did not come about merely as a reaction to events surrounding the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s.

Pressures for plural politics and economic liberalisation began on the day when political leaders began to talk about the imposition of a one-party ‘participatory democracy’. The Zambian people’s desire for democracy was reflected in the 1968 general election when the opposition ANC increased its seats in parliament from 10 to 23. The same impulse sparked conflicts within UNIP and led to the formation of splinter parties such as the UP and UPP. However, it failed to stop the introduction of a one-party state. Decalo (1992:13) states that

... in those early days of wine and roses, nationalism, patriotism, civic idealism did carry some values as the coin of the realm. Democratic aspirations could temporarily be put aside, especially since competitive elections proved to be little more than ethnic tugs of war.

However, after the imposition of the coercive one-party rule, the country experienced the problems of lack of competitive elections and repeated infringements of freedoms of association, speech, and movement. The political economy of the country was such that it was in an economic and social crisis. As at 1991, the crisis was characterised by a number of factors. The country’s external date stood at USA $7 billion dollars. The gross domestic product declined to 0.0%. The country experienced double digit inflation rates at 93 percent and very high nominal but negative real interest rates. The country’s huge budget deficits averaged close to 14 percent of the gross domestic product with declining investments and savings. The current account balance stood at –USA $447.7 in million dollars. Export earnings were at +USA$1.077 in million dollars compared to imports that stood at +USA$801 in million dollars. Government expenditure was at +USA$1905 in million dollars and the external debt service ration as a percentage of the gross domestic product stood at 47.3 percent (United Nations Development Programme 1997:71). Zambia further suffered from a flourishing black market for
foreign exchange, shortages of basic goods and services and dilapidated physical and social infrastructure. The country had low levels of business and consumer confidence and one of the highest levels of capital debt of about US $1000 as well as poverty embracing two thirds of the population (United Nations Development Programme 1997:10). These economic hardships angered many citizens. As recorded in chapter 6, this discontent helped to fuel the unsuccessful coups of 1980 and 1990, as well as the food riots of 1986 and 1990. By 1990, boosted by the events in Eastern Europe that marked the end of the Cold War, these pro-democracy movements and pressures became irresistible. In response, the Zambian government abolished the one-party state by amending Article 4 of the 1973 constitution, and reintroduced plural politics. In the multiparty elections held on 3 October 1991 after 17 years of one-party rule, UNIP, led by Dr Kenneth Kaunda, lost power to the MMD, led by Frederick Chiluba. This introduced a new era in Zambian politics, under a new democratic constitution, known as the Third Republic. In this period, the MMD government came to power on a promise of reform to revive growth in the economy through the economic and financial policy framework paper and several other institutional and legislative changes. One of the key factors that affected all institutions in the country including the military was the introduction of cash based budgeting system in 1993 where by all expenditures were supposed to equal total revenue (United Nations Development Programme 1997: 10). The government’s new approach to the military noted earlier, as well as economic liberalisation,

coupled with a rising political consciousness caused by the embracing of democratic values … increasingly made defence spending a focal point of this debate, breaking with the traditional secrecy which often shrouded matters of such nature (Le Roux 2004:V).

The transition to democracy was marked by accusations that the UNIP was plotting to overthrow the new MMD government by unconstitutional means. The government reacted by passing emergency regulations that empowered the president to arrest the suspected coup plotters. The constitution was also amended to prevent Kaunda from contesting the 1996 presidential elections. As a result, UNIP boycotted the elections. At the end of his maximum second term in office, Chiluba campaigned for a constitutional amendment that would allow him to rule for a third term. Countrywide
anti-third term campaigns forced the president to abandon these plans and call a presidential and parliamentary election on 31 December 2001.

The election was won by Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, who defeated ten other contestants. Therefore, our study of civil control of the military in the Third Republic ends in 2004 during the reign of President Mwanawasa, whose main theme in government has been that of combating corruption.

The transition to democracy in the Third Republic called for changes in the nature of civil control of the military. Zambia was one of few African countries in which civilian governments had survived all attempted military coups d’etat, and had managed peaceful transitions from one-party to multiparty states. This was partly due to the adoption of effective consensual policies and coercive controls over the military, aimed at ensuring that the military would continue to subject itself to the civilian political leadership and government of the day during the first and second republics respectively. We will now examine policies for control of the military developed by the new government during the reintroduction and consolidation of democracy. These mainly involved consensual measures through the restructuring of controls over the military introduced under the two previous republics, and the reintroduction of parliamentary oversight over defence expenditure (Cawthra and Luckham 2002:2-7). We begin by examining the reorganisation of the Defence Council after 1991.

### 7.2 The restructuring of the Defence Council

The Defence Act was amended to restructure the Defence Council, which – as outlined earlier – advised the president on the control and administration of the Defence Force.

The council was now chaired by the president, instead of the vice-president. Other members were appointed by the president and included cabinet ministers, permanent secretaries, and the three service chiefs. The chairman of the Defence and Security Committee of the MMD was an automatic member. This appointment was on a ‘personal-to-holder basis as long as the individual continued to exercise the responsibility of looking after the Defence and Security portfolio in the MMD’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1993).

Between November 1991 and November 1993 the council became increasingly ineffective, as the presence of the president as chairman made it difficult for other
members to freely express their opinions and give appropriate advice. ‘This arrangement also placed the Council in an awkward position as it became difficult for individuals to challenge and appeal against Council decisions where the Commander-in-Chief was the Chairman’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1993:1). Furthermore, the Defence Council failed to meet regularly because of the president’s multiple commitments. This had numerous undesirable consequences. Among other things, a number of officers who had applied for retirement remained in the defence force, awaiting a decision from the commander-in-chief through the Defence Council. In the meantime, they did not perform their duties as diligently as they should have because they had already decided to ‘leave employment with the Ministry of Defence. The membership of the ruling party’s Chairman of the Defence and Security portfolio to the Defence Council also brought into question the sincerity of effective de-linkage of the ruling party from the military’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1993:1).

Also, as part of transition from one-party rule, the Defence Council simply met to discuss simple issues of promotions, dismissals, retirements and retrenchments of military officers. Specialised important committees such as the Strategy, Policy and Development Committee and the Administration and Finance Committee were deliberately abandoned and disregarded and became non-functional. The result was that the Defence Council lacked specialised defence and security advice on national security from these committees (Kazembe, interview, 2005).

Similarly, even when the committee met it became a custom of the Committee not to complete its agenda for a long time. Important issues such as the co-ordination of strategies and the Defence Policy were left hanging and had not yet been completed and passed as at December 2004. Such laxity in the consideration of policy and personnel matters was a clear indication that the civil control of the military in the Third Republic was deteriorating (ibid).

Furthermore, the government did not examine the options for changing the roles and functions of some of the security structures established under the Second Republic. Instead, all the coercive control measures over both the military and civilians via military and civil intelligence as defined by Standing Defence and Security Instructions Number 1
of 1978 were abolished. This decision was taken because, as argued in chapter 6, these measures had become a source of tension between the government and the people. However, their abolition deprived the regime of structures for keeping the president informed on the state of national security, and therefore endangered the security of the country and civil control of the military in the transitional period.

After November 1993 the minister of defence, after having received advice to this effect from his permanent secretary, informed the president that his chairing of meetings of the Defence Council had certain negative consequences. The president then delegated this responsibility to the minister. Thereafter, the Defence Council met regularly, and its recommendations were passed on to the president.

Besides restructuring the Defence Council, the new government also identified a need to depoliticise the military. Steps taken to achieve this will be examined in the next section.

### 7.3 The Depoliticisation of the military

In 1991 the Defence Council decided that, in line with values appropriate to a multiparty democracy, the military should be politically neutral and be elevated above partisan politics. This did not mean that individual members of the defence force would lose their civic rights or franchise, but these were to be exercised under a duty of restraint. The Council also observed that the loyalty of the armed forces lay with the government of the day, parliament, the Constitution and the law of the land (Kazembe 2003:26).

On this basis the Zambian government decided to depoliticise the military via a policy of professionalisation. The Department of Political Education and Culture, previously run by staunch UNIP military officials, became the Department of Sports, and all officials were either ‘forced to retire or retrenched from the military service. Similarly, all members of the Defence Force who were appointed to political positions were either retired or retrenched from the military service’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991b:2).

The departments or posts of some of the military officials who were closely associated with the torture of former coup plotters, and reported on the views and
activities of officers during the one-party era, were abolished, and their staff were either forced to retire or retrenched. For instance, the

Public Relations Cell in the Sports Department, the Finance Cell in the Inspectorate Department and in the Catering Directorate in the Quartermaster Department at Army Headquarters were abolished. Similarly, the rank of Major in the Finance Cell, the ranks of Staff Captain, One Major, One Captain and One Warrant Officer Class 1 at Army Headquarters were also abolished. The Officers holding these positions were either retired or retrenched (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991a: 2).

In all, hundreds of officers associated with the politics of the one-party era were either retired or retrenched.

More than 90 military officers from the rank of general to second lieutenant were purged from the Defence Force. This cost the government and the defence force officers who were well trained and had used their military experience during the height of the liberation movements in the southern central region between 1964 and 1993 (Kazembe, interview, 2005).

These mass retrenchments created growing antagonism between the government and the military. The retirement packages were meant to be paid by the Pensions Board of Zambia, but this did not happen immediately. Officers due to retire stayed on in their government houses until they received the last payment of their retirement packages. This created a severe shortage of accommodation among newly appointed serving officers. In the meantime, the government had introduced a system of school fees, and the slow payment of pension benefits to retired officers meant that many of them could no longer afford to send their children to school (Central Statistics Office 1997:3). The result was that many these officers became disillusioned and regarded government as an uncaring one which was neglecting them after they had saved the nation from attacks by minority regimes. The widows of deceased military officers who also continued to occupy military houses faced a number of hardships, including the loss of free maize meal given to serving officers. Some of these widows began to work as prostitutes among serving officers, which fuelled the spread of HIV/AIDS in the military (Sinkamba, Chipili and Chinyama, interview, 2005). In the meantime, the government continued to argue that
under the new democratic dispensation it was ‘important for the Ministry of Defence to integrate the needs of the defence force into the nation’s overall priorities, competing for resources and ensuring that national objectives were realistically supported by an appropriately sized military force’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1994:1).

The economic hardships faced by retired or retrenched military officers inclined them towards intervention in domestic politics. Together with some former leading figures in the one-party state who had been defeated at the ballot box, as noted by Huntington (1968:194-197), they worked out a political destabilisation plan code-named the ‘Zero Option Plan’, to which we now turn.

7.4 The ‘Zero Option Plan’ of 1993

Due to the problems described in the previous section, some former military officers worked out a ‘scheme code-named the Zero Option Plan with the leaders of the former ruling party, UNIP, that centred around a range of activities to destabilise the government through riots, thefts, strikes, rumours, and student unrest’ (Phiri 1993d: 1). The aim of this group was to ‘wrest power from the MMD government in order to form a government responsive to the people’s needs before the 1996 Presidential and parliamentary elections’ (ibid).

The Zero Option Plan targeted four groups of people. The first was former army, police, and intelligence officers, senior civil servants, and former heads of parastatals who were forcibly retired when the MMD assumed power. Those officers were meant to organise demonstrations, which would incite people to riot in towns and cities throughout Zambia. Second, trade unions were to be infiltrated by paid agents who would replace ‘impotent leaders’ and agitate for higher salaries through strikes, sit-ins, riots, and roughing up company executives. Third, student organisations from primary school to university level as well as teachers would be incited to agitate against high school fees, the cost of uniforms, and low salaries. Fourth, youths would be incited to start riots in towns throughout the country, and threaten tourism and foreign investment by stealing from white tourists (ibid).

The government reacted by withdrawing UNIP’s status as the official opposition in parliament. The president also invoked the provisions of Article 30(1) of the constitution to declare a state of public emergency, as had been done during one-party rule. On Wednesday 10 March 1993 parliament ratified the emergency regulations as

On 6 March 1993 a combined team of police, civil and military intelligence raided homes of suspects without a police warrant. Two UNIP members of Parliament, some former intelligence officers, some former military officers, four teachers and some UNIP Members of the Central Committee were arrested and detained (Phiri 1993d:1).

These detainees underwent physical and psychological torture at the hands of police and military and civil intelligence officers. As a result, Cuthbert Nguni, member of parliament for Chama South, died in detention. The torture involved the use of some of the instruments cited in chapters 5 and 6. As was the case during the Second Republic, these acts alienated both citizens and members of the defence force from the government. The late Baldwin Nkumbula, member of parliament for Namwala, encapsulated this sentiment when he condemned parliament’s ratification of the state of emergency. Nkumbula stated that:

When any government chooses to detain people and that government is afraid to bring these people before the established court because the government knows that those people will be freed if they appeared before a Magistrate or Judge and that government chooses to detain them and then ask parliament to extend the period for their convenience, that government is a dictatorship (National Assembly of Zambia 1993:120).

He further stated that:

When we created the MMD, our ideal was to get rid of dictatorship. The ideal has not yet been achieved. By this Instrument that we now wish to apply in this land, the hope of ever seeing democracy in this country goes away forever … You are about to kill democracy. But I want to register my personal stand on this one so that posterity may judge me as it shall judge you. I refuse to subscribe to such an obnoxious instrument of legislation (ibid).
Phiri et al (2004:34) note that ‘despite such wise advice, and using MMD’s majority in the House, the executive went ahead and ratified the State of Emergency in the House’. This began a process in terms of which the executive used the legislature to pass legislation that violated human rights. This changed relations between the ruling party, opposition parties, civil society, the citizenry, and the military from harmonious to antagonistic.

While the ‘Zero Option Plan’ did threaten the security of the state, the abuse by the president of the Third Republic of security legislation inherited from the Second and Third Republics ran counter to sound civil control of the military. It worked against the rule of law, transparency, and accountability, and violated citizens’ human rights. During his 27 years in office, Dr Kaunda had used these powers to detain or restrict hundreds of Zambians whom he perceived to be foes of his government. The government commission investigating violations of human rights in Zambia between 1964 and 1995 documented ‘938 cases of people detained without trial in this period. Some of these people such as Nkaka Chisanga Puta, a prominent lawyer and Emmanuel Mwamba, a politician were detained for a continuous period of up to five years without charge or trial’ (Ministry of Legal Affairs, 1998: 1). The new leaders were aware that these abuses had soured civil-military relations in the Second Republic. However, they failed to heed these lessons of history and once again used this legislation in a way that alienated the military as well as the broader population.

The new government also had to deal with the impact of the privatisation of parastatal organisations. How this affected civil control of the military is the subject of the next section.

7.5 The privatisation of parastatals

Between 1992 and 1996 the ‘government actively pursued policies that facilitated a private sector driven economy under the structural adjustment programme supported by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other collaborating partners’ (Central Statistical Office 1997:3). These programmes included the privatisation of state-owned companies, including the giant Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, liberalisation of domestic and international trade, liberalisation of the foreign exchange market, a stringent fiscal policy which included government operating on a cash budget to reduce
inflation, health and education reforms which included the introduction of user fees, and transformation of the agriculture and transport sector (ibid).

In 1992 the Zambia Privatisation Agency began selling parastatals to private interests, as provided for by the Privatisation Act Number 21 of 1992 (GRZ 1992:1). By October 1997, 187 government-owned companies had been privatised. Nineteen of these closed after privatisation – largely because local investors lacked the capital to invest in new technology and skills, and some managements were unable to adjust to the new competitive economic environment (Zambia Privatisation Agency 2005:3). This led to the loss of 7,034 jobs.

In 1992, under the Structural Adjustment Programme imposed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the government also suddenly cut all subsidies to parastatals (Zambia Privatisation Agency 2005:3). This led to the loss of another 51,000 jobs, mainly through liquidations or the downsizing of parastatals such as Zambia Airways, Livingstone Motor Assemblies, United Bus of Zambia, Lima Bank, and Mansa Batteries.

The government also failed to account for funds realised from the sale of parastatals, including the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited. The hardships suffered by people who had lost their jobs angered military personnel who were related to them. In the meantime,

the price of mealie meal increased from K198 Zambian Kwacha in October 1991 to K50,000 in 1996. The HIV/AIDS pandemic took its toll on the unemployed who could not afford a meal per day. The problem of the street kids whose parents were either unemployed or died from HIV/AIDS emerged and the government failed to provide any meaningful solutions (Central Statistics Office and Central Board of Health 2003c:1-10).

These problems further alienated many Zambians and the military from the MMD regime, and relations between the government and the military reached its lowest ebb since independence. This resulted in the attempted military coup d’etat of 28 October 1997, which is examined in the next section.
7.6 The attempted military coup d'état of 28 October 1997

The attempted coup took place under dramatic circumstances, while government mechanisms for controlling the military were at their weakest. Unlike the situation in the Second Republic, the intelligence services had been weakened by a lack of funds, and neither these services nor the government was aware of the coup plot before the coup was actually launched. When asked, in an interview conducted for this study, why the government did not foresee this security threat, Brig-Gen Timothy Kazembe, former Director of Military Intelligence, observed that the MMD government and leadership were wallowing in democracy, which made them believe that military coup d’etats belonged to the Cold War period. As a result of this attitude very little interaction took place between the government leadership and the Defence Force. The only meeting that Dr Chiluba, the President addressed involved the Central Joint Operations Committee comprising senior Army, Air Force, Zambia National Service, Police and Security Intelligence. Apart from calling these Commanders, no other visit was recorded other than commissioning parades for graduating officer cadets (Kazembe, interview, 2005).

By contrast, Lt-Gen Christone Tembo, former army commander and vice-president, observed that the process of democratic transition from the one-party state to multipartyism was not conceived properly by the new government leadership. This was because of three reasons. First, the soldiers felt betrayed and neglected after President Chiluba won the October 1991 Presidential elections. This was because while he thanked the civilians for having given him over 51 per cent votes, he failed to make even quiet trips to thank the soldiers for having equally voted for him and his MMD government into office. Second, the Commander-in-Chief suffered from the problem of lack of proper understanding in the administration of the Zambia Defence Force despite the advice given to him by various experienced officers. The result was that he over-delegated his responsibilities to the Minister of Defence who was equally not very knowledgeable in the administration of defence forces. Third, the process
of structural and behavioural reorganisation introduced after 1991 could have been done more cautiously so that the operations of the military intelligence could not be disrupted. Instead the idea of change for the sake of change resulted in the abrupt reduction in experienced personnel and the provision of funds for operational intelligence. This caused a loss of morale among military intelligence officers to work for a system of government that did not appreciate their services nor support them with resources for their operations (Tembo, interview, 2005).

Under these circumstances, the plan to overthrow the government was hatched by Captains Jack Chiti and Steven Lungu from August to October (The Post, 18 and 19 August 2004). During these three months none of the intelligence officers gained any inkling of the plans of the coup plotters,

although speculation on conspiratorial discipline of the senior military officers had been drawn to the attention of authorities. However, like in the case of the 11th September bombing of the Trade Centre in the United States of America, the Intelligence Officers did not pay attention to the reports as they were also wallowing in democracy (Kazembe, interview, 2005).

On the day of the intended coup, the plotters recruited soldiers deployed on guard duties at ‘Quarter Guard Post, Central Ammunition Depot, General Nobby Simbeye’s residential plot in Roma Township, and [the] Central Ordinance Depot for the purpose of overthrowing by unlawful means the government of Zambia’ (Government of Republic of Zambia 2003b:1). Despite the large-scale movement of troops, none of the officers in charge of these troops reported these developments to senior military officers, intelligence officers, or the government.

That evening the coup plotters attacked the ‘First Infantry Brigade at Lusaka, in Lusaka District and without lawful authority removed eleven armoured military vehicles for the purpose of facilitating the overthrow of the Zambian government’ (ibid. In the process the coup plotters captured Lt-Co Francis Lombe Mfula and six other senior Officers of the First Infantry Brigade and detained them at Arrackan Barracks Guard Room. Instead of reporting the arrest of these senior military officers to the
military intelligence command or government leadership, the Commander and Adjutant of 2nd Zambia Regiment at Arrackan Barracks, Berrington Mukoma and Baldwin Kapulu Manase, acquiesced to the said unlawful detention by not taking measures to have the said officers released and such omission was for the purpose of facilitating the overthrow by unlawful means of the government of Zambia (ibid).

Mukoma further facilitated the coup by

ordering the war alarm to be raised without lawful authority from the Army Commander. Furthermore twenty officers in control of five armoured military vehicles, bearing registration numbers AE046, AE091, AE075, AE086 and AE095, unlawfully attacked the Army Commander’s residence with intent to murder the said Army Commander for the purpose of facilitating the overthrow by unlawful means of the Zambian government (ibid).

The first time when civil and military intelligence, the army command, and leaders learnt of the attempted coup was when 34 coup plotters entered the Zambia Mass Media complex and ‘took control of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation studios, and Captain Stephen Lungu announced over the radio the overthrow of the government of Zambia’ (GRZ 2003b:1). However, loyal elite commandos captured the coup plotters and foiled the attempt. After consulting his cabinet, President Chiluba again declared a state of public emergency. These events reveal the weakness of civil control of the military under the Third Republic. Unlike the situation in the Second Republic, there was very little co-ordination among civil and military intelligence and the government. Without the actions of loyal rank-and-file commandos, the coup would probably have succeeded.

Haantobolo and Phiri (2004 38-39) have argued that the

coup plotters should be understood as some of the many Zambians affected by the MMD’s policies that lacked sound economic and social values, especially with regard to the boosting of the local industry. Furthermore, the failure by the government to address the problem of unemployment as a result of the consequences of the privatisation of former Parastatal organisations worsened the situation.
Besides this, the MMD leaders had failed to address the problems of worsening droughts; worsening poverty, which had escalated from 62 per cent of Zambians in 1991 to 73 per cent in 1997; the collapse of the manufacturing sector; and high levels of illiteracy, estimated at no less than 75 per cent (Central Statistics 2003b:2).

Therefore, the 1997 coup attempt should not be regarded as the act of some disgruntled soldiers only but as a barometer of the feelings of many ordinary Zambians who wanted peace and food, and not empty assurances. It also reflected a fragile democratic transition in a country where the government did not enjoy a high level of constitutional and political legitimacy, since UNIP, now the main opposition party, had boycotted the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections. This was as a result of the inclusion of discriminatory clauses in the 1996 Constitution (Amendment) Bills. Article 34(3) and (8) of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act Number 17 of 1996 (GRZ 1996:52) prevented Dr K D Kaunda from contesting for the position of President since both his parents were born in Malawi and not in Zambia (GRZ 1996:52).

The irresponsible behaviour of the MMD government over the economy and the constitution – which would provide the framework for all future governments, not just the MMD – had eroded its support and the trust and goodwill of most Zambians (Phiri et al 2004:39). Under these circumstances, neglecting the intelligence agencies was a serious error.

Phiri et al argue that the MMD regime engaged in meaningless ‘zero-sum games and overlooked calls for accommodations of people that any government, that wished to remain in power could not just aim to be a bargain hunter by opting only to make gains, but had to also aim to avoid losses’ (ibid).

The detention of some of the 1997 coup suspects had local, regional, and international consequences – including consequences for civil control of the military – which will be briefly explored in the next section.
7.7 Consequences of the detention of the coup suspects for civil control of the military

The immediate consequences of the attempted coup was that, as a result of the recommendations of the Report of the Human Rights Commission of Inquiry of 6 September 1995 (GRZ 1995a:76), the government felt uneasy about using military intelligence personnel to arrest and torture of the coup suspects. Instead, military intelligence was simply asked to ‘identify military personnel that had been involved in the coup attempt’ (Kazembe, interview, 2006). This identification exercise resulted in the arrest of a number of suspected coup plotters, including Dr Kaunda, now president of UNIP; the late Dean Mungomba, president of the Zambia Democratic Congress; and Princess Nakatindi Wina, a former cabinet minister and the MMD’s chairperson for women.

Coup suspects were so badly tortured by police and civil intelligence personnel that some died, and other suffered permanent injuries. This worsened relations between citizens and military personnel sympathetic to the coup plotters on the one hand and the government on the other (The Post, 18-19 August 2004). Therefore, the nature of civil control of the military now ‘changed from being secretive to dictatorial and being exercised by a democratically elected government’ (Wina, interview, 2006). Any officer suspected of being disloyal was either fired or retrenched. However, the retrenchment of military intelligence officers ceased forthwith. Instead, most of them were sent to military colleges for retraining, and were then redeployed at military establishments (Sinkamba et al, interview, 2005). This amounted to the reintroduction of some consensual and coercive measures for civil control of the military utilised under the First and Second Republics respectively. Intelligence budgets were increased in order to avoid these services deteriorating as they had done before the 1997 coup attempt. The government also sent large numbers of military officers to participate in peace-keeping missions in Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and the DRC, leaving behind a small number of officers who could be easily monitored.

The torture of and restrictions placed on opposition leaders, especially Dr Kaunda, provoked widespread indignation among Zambians and in the international community (Phiri et al 2004:43). Many Zambians felt they had been better off under Dr Kaunda’s regime than under Chiluba’s. Phiri et al (2004:43) note that ‘pro-democracy and human rights movements, churches, opposition parties organised nation-wide
demonstrations against the continued renewal of the State of Public Emergency and the detention of Dr K D Kaunda’.

Dr Kaunda’s support for liberation movements in southern Africa had won him lasting support, both from the international community as well as governments in the region formed by those former liberation movements. These countries mounted heavy diplomatic pressure on President Chiluba to release Dr Kaunda unconditionally. The late Dr Julius Nyerere of Tanzania travelled to Zambia to visit Dr Kaunda in prison and urge President Chiluba to release him. The Danish government suspended aid worth $34 million to Zambia, and the World Bank informed the Chiluba administration that a Donor Consultative Group (DCG) meeting due to be held in Lusaka would only take place once the state of emergency had been lifted, and Dr Kaunda had been released from prison (Phiri et al 2004:43).

As a result, the MMD government released all opposition leaders from prison on the basis of nole proseque. However, it continued to alienate and antagonise prominent Zambians and ordinary citizens. Some Zambians resigned from the MMD and joined UNIP, the newly formed United Party for National Development (UPND) under Anderson Mazoka, the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) under Lt-Gen Christone Tembo, and the Heritage Party (HP) of Brig Godfrey Miyanda. Many serving and former military officers as well as intelligence officers joined these opposition parties, and communicated with their counterparts still serving the government. Under these circumstances civil control of the military remained precarious.

Relations were strained even further when Dr Chiluba announced his intention to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term of office. This move was again thwarted through demonstrations by pro-democracy and human rights movements, churches, opposition parties, and a split in the MMD that led to the formation of the FDD and HP.

Faced with all these political, economic and social problems, Dr Chiluba continued to respond favourably to UN requests for military contributions to peace-keeping missions in Sierra Leone. Moreover, the civil war in the DRC and its spillover effects along the border with Zambia allowed the government to divert the attention of the defence force away from internal political problems. It is also important to note that the Zambia Defence Force exhibited high levels of neutrality under provocative political circumstances. Unlike their colleagues in Ghana and Nigeria, Zambian officers knew that if the ‘re-established democracy was to survive and the goals of governance were to be
achieved with minimum interference, military discipline through political neutrality was essential’ (Kazembe 2003:27). Furthermore, the military realised that the Chiluba regime was on its way out, and decided to facilitate this process in a peaceful way by helping to transporting ballot boxes to and from polling stations in remote districts before and after the 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Therefore, under the Third Republic, the government faced serious challenges in respect of its control of the military. However, as Larry (1989:24) argues, these problems have been typical of democratic transitions in Africa. Fortunately for Zambia, they did not result in a successful military coup. On the other hand, parliamentary oversight over defence and security did not face serious obstacles. How parliament performed this function is examined in the next section.

7.8 Parliamentary oversight of defence expenditure, 1991-2004

While, during Zambia’s democratic transition, the executive branch of government struggled to maintain effective civil control of the military, the legislative branch was far more successful. In line with the recommendations of the 1990 Report of the Special Parliamentary Select Committee and the subsequent constitutional amendments, parliament regained its control over defence expenditure. This was possible because the security threats surrounding the hosting of regional liberation movements no longer existed, as all the countries concerned had gained their independence, and South Africa was also on the road to the abolition of apartheid and the introduction of majority rule.

Le Roux (2004:V) further notes that this was a period in which government planners and others realised that the financing of defence and security programmes could not be isolated from broader developmental programmes and procedures, which in a liberal political dispensation lent themselves to the controls of prioritisation and open scrutiny.

In 1992 parliament debated and approved the defence budget for the first time since 1970. Furthermore from 1992 onwards the Public Accounts Committee was allowed to consider reports of the Auditor-General’s Office on defence expenditure. The committee’s first report on defence expenditure was based on a special auditor-general’s
report on the procurement of goods and services for the army and air force from 1992 to 1998 (GRZ 2003a:1-27). It revealed many irregularities in the way in which the Ministry of Defence spent public funds. This included the

irregular purchase by the Zambia Army of 200,000 metres of African print (Chitenge) material from Mulungushi Textiles of Zambia, ordered by the African National Congress of South Africa in the run-up to democratic elections in 1994, at a cost of K91,950,600. Out of the 200,000 metres 35,702 metres and 250 kilograms of printed faints were diverted from the Central Ordinance Depot to the Minister of Defence’s residence (National Assembly of Zambia 2001:2-6).

There was no evidence that the controlling officer had authorised the diversion of the materials from the Central Ordinance Depot to the minister’s residence. There was also no evidence that the commander-in-chief of the armed forces had approved the procurement and donation of these fabrics. The committee observed that the consignment of materials to the MMD through the minister, a senior party official, had undermined the policy of de-linking the party from government activities. The committee directed ‘the Ministry of Defence to recover the K91,950,600; institute disciplinary action against all offenders in the purchase of the African print; and recommended for improvements in record-keeping in the Zambia Army’ (ibid).

The auditor-general’s report also recorded irregularities in expenditure by the Ministry of Defence on material for uniforms and the tailoring of uniforms; belts and vehicle stickers; tents and transport; the procurement of the VIP presidential aircraft; and aircraft refurbishment and training services (ibid:7-29). A private company had also been irregularly involved in defence procurement and other projects (ibid).

In considering the committee’s report, the House deplored the fact that the army command seemed to regard itself as being above the law, and was therefore not obliged to adhere to financial procedures. The House directed that this should cease forthwith and that the service commands be compelled to comply with all established financial procedures and regulations. The House also directed the strengthening of the

Ministerial Tender Committee through which all purchases were to be channelled for appropriate scrutiny and advice before execution. The House felt that this Parliamentary directive was imperative to avoid the negligence and the loss of public resources that had been brought up to the

The House directed that all funds paid to suppliers were to be recovered immediately, especially if the goods and services had not been received. It ruled that immediate disciplinary steps be taken against all officers and others involved in the irregular transactions that had resulted in the loss of public funds.

It recommended stern disciplinary action against all officials in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development who had connived with defence personnel in the irregular expenditure of public resources (ibid:30-31). The House urged the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development to re-establish close links with the Ministry of Defence and advise it on how to improve its operations (ibid). Finally, the House recommended the introduction of strict financial controls over the armed services, and that the ‘Defence Act (CAP 106) be reconsidered and amended to provide for a clear chain of authority in the handling of public funds in the services’ (ibid).

These actions showed clearly that the Public Accounts Committee had assumed the role of and responsibility for scrutinising the expenditure of public funds by the Ministry of Defence. Between 1964 and 2003 the executive, in its Treasury minutes or public accounts reports for the previous year, simply ‘noted or explained that action had been taken on the various recommendations of all the parliamentary Committees’ (GRZ 1964 to 2003). On Friday 10 January 2003 the executive stopped this practice. As part of a drive to curb corruption, President Mwanawasa’s government directed that all the people implicated in the misappropriation of government resources in the 16 Public Accounts Committee Reports for the years 1991 to 2003 that were approved by Parliament including those from the Ministry of Defence were to be arrested and prosecuted by the courts of law for corruption. In accordance with this directive the government directed the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to proceed with the prosecutions of all those named in the Public Accounts Committee Reports (The Post, 2003).

By 2004 the task force investigating the plunder of national resources under the Chiluba regime had arrested two former commandants of the Zambia National Service and Zambia Army, who were prosecuted in civil courts. All the other officers implicated in the dubious procurement of military hardware, both in the Ministry of Defence and
Ministry of Finance, and named in the report of the Public Accounts Committee, were also arrested and prosecuted. There is no doubt that these steps raised civil control of the military under the Mwanawasa government to a higher level than during the First and Second Republics, as well as under the Chiluba regime.

Parliamentary oversight over defence and security was further enhanced by creating a committee on national security and foreign affairs. How this committee set about fulfilling its function is examined in the next section.

7.9 Creation of the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

In 1999, to complement the role of the Public Accounts Committee in overseeing the activities of the executive in general and the Ministry of Defence in particular, parliament also empowered the Committee on Foreign Affairs to play an oversight role. As a result, the committee changed its name to the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, thus allowing it to scrutinise the activities of the ministries of Defence and of Home Affairs.

Every year since 1999 the Speaker has appointed members of parliament to the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee for the duration of every session. Its functions are to

study, report and make recommendations to the government through the House on the mandate, management and operations of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs, departments and/or agencies under their portfolio;

carry out detailed scrutiny of certain activities being undertaken by the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Departments and Agencies under their portfolio and make appropriate recommendations to the House for ultimate consideration by the government;

make, if seems necessary, recommendations to the government on the need to review certain policies and/or certain existing Legislation;

consider any Bills that may be referred to them by the House;

undertake tours of selected projects and security institutions to make on-the-spot examination of their operations;
While on tour the Committee is not allowed to accept gifts given to members during their normal course of duty. This measure enables members avoid compromising the work of the Committee with the gifts they would receive; and

appointments of members to this Committee take into consideration the following:

(i) the Constitutional obligation to have representation of all parties on the Committee as in the House;

(ii) gender sensitivity in terms of balance and for representation; and

(iii) Member’s qualifications, experiences and preferences (National Assembly of Zambia 2001:1).

When the committee uncovers financial irregularities in the Ministry of Defence, it refers them to the Public Accounts Committee for further scrutiny. Some of the issues it considers are the status of Zambia’s borders, Zambian troops serving in United Nations peace-keeping operations, Zambia’s security concerns and their impact on the country’s foreign policy, and the welfare of defence personnel.

While these two committees play an important role in monitoring the implementation of defence policy, they have never been involved in defence pre-budget consultations, a very important component of the budgeting process. Even when the defence budget is presented to parliament for scrutiny and approval, it has never been referred to the two committees for comment and input. They are not empowered to scrutinise the operations of the defence force, as it is believed that this may compromise national security. Also, until 2005 they did not have a mandate to scrutinise the budgets and operations of the civil and defence intelligence services. This led to the intelligence services being used during the Chiluba regime to plunder national resources (Sichalwe 2006:1). However, the effectiveness of the executive and parliament was again demonstrated when, on Tuesday 16 July 2002, the latter passed a motion authorising the executive to lift the immunity that prevented former President Chiluba from being prosecuted for the alleged plunder of national resources.

Therefore, one can safely argue that during the Third Republic – and especially under President Mwanawasa’s leadership – consensual measures through parliamentary
and executive control of the military were restored. Their effectiveness has been demonstrated by the establishment of the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, and the arrest, prosecution and to a great extent the sentencing of people implicated in the plunder of national resources by the Public Accounts Committee between 1991 and 2003.

7.10 Conclusion

Larry (1989:24) notes that

it is unrealistic to think that countries can suddenly reverse course and institutionalize stable democratic government simply by changing leaders, constitutions and/or public mentalities. If progress is made towards developing democratic government, it is likely to be gradual, messy, fitful and slow, with many imperfections along the way (cited in Decalo 1992:35).

In the case of Zambia’s Third Republic, the reassertion of consensual measures of civil control of the military, including parliamentary oversight over defence expenditure, faced many legal and administrative obstacles introduced during the two previous republics. This resulted in the retirement and retrenchment of many military officers associated with the coercive one-party era. The failure by defence intelligence officers to infiltrate the 1997 coup plot demonstrated that civil control of the military in Zambia had reached its weakest point since 1964.

The abuse of emergency provisions to declare states of emergency and the torture and violation of human rights of political prisoners created antagonism between the citizenry, the government, and the military. It also changed the character of the Chiluba regime from a democracy to a civilian dictatorship. This imbalance in civil control of the military was reversed by the Mwanawasa government, which strengthened parliamentary and judiciary oversight of defence and security expenditure. In 2004, the end of the period under review, these bold executive steps, as well as a campaign to fight corruption even among members of the defence force, seemed set to cement successful and harmonious civil control over the military in Zambia.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, this study examined measures adopted by various governments to maintain civil control over the military in Zambia in four distinct periods in the country’s history. Against this background we can now finally set out to answer the core question: why civil control of the military in Zambia was such that - in contrast with many other African countries after independence – the military in Zambia consistently supported the ruling elite. This continued to be the case despite major transitions in regimes and systems of governance from the colonial system to a multiparty system at independence, a one-party ‘participatory democracy’, and a renewed multiparty democracy. Any deviation from this model by military dissenters in the form of attempted military coups d’etat was consistently exposed by military or civil intelligence, and crushed by loyal troops. As a result, during the period under review the country experienced relatively harmonious civil-military relations compared to other former British colonies in Africa. Why was this the case? The answer to this question is that:

Politically, during the colonial period, 1900 to 1964, British colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia was characterised by the unequal distribution of authority and income between the white settler community and the Africans. Economically, the colonial economy was founded on exploitation of the country’s agricultural and mineral resources for the benefit of the commercial and mining centres in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Britain, using the African population as a reservoir of cheap labour. The system of taxing all adult males and the movement of people from crown land, mining areas and other commercial centres as argued in chapter 4, led to high levels of migration both within the country and Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In order to maximize the economic exploitation of the African population, British colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia also promoted separate cultures and divergent interests between the white settlers and the Africans. The study, then, provides an answer to how and why civil control of the military in colonial Northern Rhodesia remained stable by explaining that the maintenance of the above oppressive system of governance was mostly managed through the enforcement of coercive measures using what Welch (1978: 159) terms as the ‘apolitical colonial army’. Force through the use of the Northern Rhodesia regiment legitimised the economic, political and cultural vices of the policy of racial discrimination as promulgated by the British colonial authorities and settlers that occupied racially
structured governance institutions such as the executive, legislative council and the judiciary. Hence the relations between the white settlers, military and government elite were stable and harmonious. This again explains why Welch remarked that ‘The apolitical character of the colonial army in fact served a profoundly political purpose: maintenance of British rule in its genesis and continuation’ (1978: 159). However, the study also demonstrated that if the colonial white settlers, military and government elite were fortunate to develop a consensus, resentment through the nationalist struggle for independence, emerged from the majority of the Africans who faced the blunt of economic exploitation manifested through the coercive measures of racial discriminatory structures of governance. Hence, this study characterises civil control of the military between the Africans, government elite and the military as being antagonistic. Despite this antagonistic situation, the answer to the core question on why stable civil control of the military continued during the colonial period up to the time of independence lies in the ‘apolitical nature’ of the Northern Rhodesia colonial army that continued to respect the directives of the colonial authorities, strict adherence to the rule of law and British military ethics.

In the immediate post independence period, 1964 to 1972, civil control of the military in Zambia remained stable because of the introduction of new methods of governance that promoted consensual democratic measures. These involved the replacement of the undemocratic colonial system of government with one elected on the basis of ‘one man one vote’. The replacement of the colonial elite in the governance institution of parliament, executive and judiciary with people appointed by democratically elected authorities was matched by the repeal and replacement of all laws that promoted the use of coercive measures through the policies of racial discrimination. The fraternal unity of all the 73 ethnic groups was also achieved through the policy of ‘One Zambia One Nation’. Effective use was made of the abundant financial resources from buoyant copper prices to develop the missing social, physical and economic infrastructure in education, health and military institutions. The development of these public services was an essential step that helped Zambia to overcome the legacy of colonial neglect and realised the maximum potential of its people. The Zambianisation of many positions and the rewards and facilities that accompanied them including those in the military contributed significantly to the development of a degree of consensus among its people. When the country faced both internal and external threats in form of the Lenshina uprisings and military attacks from mainly Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the legitimacy of governance institutions and the incumbents who occupied them obliged the
military to continue protecting the sovereignty of the country and its people. Therefore, taking into consideration the above holistic picture, the answer to why Zambia had a stable civil control over the military in the first republic, 1964 to 1972, lay mainly in the development of the consensual measures in the governance of the country. These involved the careful use of recruitment, training, promotion, retirement and budgetary policies which resulted in the development of a military culture that bred loyal and trusted officers. This, as argued in chapter 5, was supported by the use of effective structures such as the executive, parliament, Office of the Commander-In-Chief, Ministry of Defence, Defence Council and Office of the Command Secretary.

Why did Zambia achieve this consensus in comparison to Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Ghana? This study has argued in chapter 3 that despite the fact that all the three countries experienced similar challenges in civil control of the military, the Zambian case was slightly different. We demonstrate that Mandaza’s (1996) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003)’s theory on the African ‘challenges of construction a nation state from people of diverse ethnic.. backgrounds’ does not apply to Zambia but may be relevant to the Zimbabwean situation. In our comparison of the two countries, we have demonstrated that, first, whereas Zambia introduced consensual measures in this period, Zimbabwe continued with the use of colonial coercive measures in the management of its country’s affairs. Second, while consensual measures integrated the 73 ethnic groups in Zambia under the motto ‘One Zambia One Nation’ the continued use of coercive measures in Zimbabwe brought antagonism between the Shona dominated government with the Ndebele and the white settlers over ethnic superiority and land redistribution policies respectively. In the case of Nigeria, the dominance of the northern ethnic group in the military and government was largely responsible for the Biafran civil war and the 1966 coup d’etat. Zambia solved this problem by allowing all the 73 ethnic groups access to recruitment into the Zambia Defence Force. In the case of Ghana, we argue that the differences in adhering to national policies and commands between the new nationalist leaders and the pro-Sandhurst Western-oriented military officers caused military take-overs of civil governments in that country. In the case of Zambia, consensual measures facilitated respect for promulgated commands, distribution of roles and execution of directives which helped to contain the onslaught of racist regimes against Zambia for giving bases to liberation movements fighting for independence.

In the second republic, under the one party state system of governance, 1973 to December 1990, the answer to the core question above is that stability of the military was achieved through mostly coercive measures. These measures changed their nature from
those influenced by the policies of racial discrimination under the colonial period to the embedding of intelligence officers in military units, surveillance, punitive patterns of recruitment, promotion and dismissals in the military establishments. Why were these coercive measures introduced in this period? This study argues in chapter 6 that the political economy of the country degenerated from bad to worse because of a number of political and economic reasons.

Politically, the intra-party rivalry within UNIP became a major problem as the emergence of the UPP under Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe threatened the disintegration of the ruling party, UNIP, and government. The inter-party rivalries between UNIP and the ANC under Harry Mwanga Nkumbula also promoted division along tribal lines. Since these developments threatened national unity, we argue in chapter 6 that President Kaunda decided to impose the one party system of government. The consequences of the creation of this system of government was that it suppressed political opposition and criticism, and the distinction between the ruling party and the apparatus of the state ceased to exist. Freedom to vote for a political party of ones choice no longer existed.

Economically, the government to a large extent failed to sustain the public service program initiated shortly after independence because of lack of financial resources. As argued in chapter 6, copper prices at the London Metal Exchange declined to their lowest levels in the mid-1970’s and reduced the country’s earnings from its single major export commodity. At the same time the oil import bills on the international market skyrocketed to the highest levels. The country’s commitments to the liberation struggles in Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa made it a target for military attacks and economic destabilisation. The country also suffered economic hardships because of international sanctions against Southern Rhodesia’s declaration of UDI and South Africa’s practice of the apartheid system. We state in chapter 7 that ‘these regional conflicts served to reduce Zambia’s scope for manoeuvre both economically and politically. Because of Zambia’s geographical location many of these problems were unavoidable’ (GRZ 1996: 21). At the international level, the antagonisms that existed between the capitalist and communist states during the cold war era created fertile grounds for opportunists both military and civil to organise civil wars and coup d’etats. Under these local, regional and international political and economic pressures, the leaders in Zambia’s one party state government used coercive measures as the most appropriate methods of civil control of the military. These measures as argued in chapter 6 helped to avert the 1980, 1988 and 1990 attempted military coup d’etats. The use of coercive measures in civil control of the military in this period is similar to Welch’s (1976: 1-38).
argument that we advance in chapter 3, that one of the five means of civilian control of the military that have been devised and successively utilised by various states is the utilisation of party controls, by creating parallel hierarchies of command in the military establishments. Similarly, in chapter 3, using Kolkowicz (1967: 21) we also argue that the use of coercive measures along the lines employed by the Soviet Union to put down challenges to the party’s hegemony is relevant to the study of Zambia’s one party state period. In view of the foregoing, we can safely argue that the answer to why civil control of the military was maintained in Zambia under the one party state period was largely due to the effective use of coercive measures as defined during this era.

In the Third Republic, under the reintroduced multi party democratic system of government, December 1990 to 2004, Zambia’s civil control of the military was largely through the use of consensual measures. We argue in chapter 7, that the new consensual measures were slightly different from those introduced in the immediate post independence period that were limited to constitutional change and constrained by the country’s burdens of supporting liberation movements from colonial states in neighbouring countries. The new consensual measures introduced in the Third Republic embraced all the good legal and practical experiences inherited from the previous three regimes. Most important of them all, the new measures provided a strong combination of parliamentary oversight over defence budgetary allocations and programmes, executive and judicial powers as well as the loyalty of the military intelligence to the government of the day. The government also operated under a free international atmosphere that was characterised by the end of the cold war era and regional conflicts associated with colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa. Unlike in Tanzania where the old Chama Chama Pinduzi Party and its leaders were returned in government under multi-party conditions and continued with one party state measures of civil control of the military, as argued by Omari (2003) in chapter 3, in Zambia the new leaders’ methods of civil control of the military were largely influenced by the market-oriented economic system that promoted policies of privatisation and economic liberalism as opposed to centralised planning and state participation. Under this new economic system, an economic and financial policy framework programme was introduced that emphasised the ‘fiscal and monetary reforms to reduce the government’s fiscal deficit as well as monetary expansion with a view of containing inflation’ UNDP 1997: 10. The new measures that also included privatisation and a cash-based budgeting system resulted in the introduction of military professionalism and a formal separation of party structures from the military establishments. Despite the hardships associated with retrenchments that the military
personnel went through, consensual measures were largely embraced as the most appropriate methods of civil control of the military in Zambia. These measures were in line with Cawthra and Luckhams’ (2002: 2) observation on the challenges of security sector reform in the transition from authoritarianism. Some of these include the depoliticisation of the military and its subordination to civilian authority, establishment of an effective defence ministry and parliamentary oversight, reorienting and reprofessionalising the military, demilitarisation of public order policing and balancing the demands of the national defence with those of development (Cawthra and Luckham 2002: 2). Given the above analysis, one can safely argue that in the Third Republic, the answer to why civil control of the military in Zambia remained stable in comparison to traumatic transitions of those of Congo DR was largely due to effective use and manipulation of consensual measures.

In conclusion, this study has demonstrated that all the political regimes in Zambia in the 20th century managed to stave off successful coups with a mixture of coercive and consensual measures and as argued in the literature review in chapter 3, this sets Zambia apart from many African countries. However, despite the fact that these measures worked as a solution for Zambia, upon closer scrutiny, events in Zambia especially during the colonial and one party state eras, also demonstrate that civil control of the military cannot be indefinitely secured by coercive means. The most likely sustainable way of securing civil control of the military is to maintain consensual relations between the core ‘triumvirate’ namely, the political authorities/government/ruling elite; the military and military elite; and the citizenry. This is because political institutions of democratic states should guard against disadvantaging other ethnic groups or subaltern classes nor reinforcing their social and economic marginalisation, which in turn would discourage them to mobilise militarily as well as politically against the state (Cawthra and Luckham 2003:20).

8.2 Recommendations

In view of these findings, and to help ensure that Zambia does not take the relative domestic peace that its people have experienced for the past 41 years for granted, some recommendations follow for maintaining and improving civil control of the military in that country.

1) In the event of any change of government, or change of president after the maximum two terms in office, the new government or president should never
ignore the advice to examine how consensual measures and other good practices inherited from the previous governments have facilitated civil control. Instead continuous interaction with the defence force should be promoted from an early stage onwards, in order to inspire confidence, trust, and loyalty in and to the government of the day.

2) Sound and effective policies and structures for maintaining civil control of the military introduced by previous regimes should not be arbitrarily abolished, but should be retained and improved where necessary. The Zambian experience clearly demonstrates that the arbitrary abolition of previous policies and structures creates major discontinuities which may detract from political and social stability. Civil control of the military in Zambia has largely been premised on the ability of its leaders to identify and implement sound policies in respect of its defence and security forces. When such sound policies are ignored in favour of coercive measures, as in the colonial period, which did not receive appropriate affirmation from the majority of the Africans who were in the peripheral of political and economic development, the measures were vigorously opposed by the people. Nevertheless, despite these antagonistic circumstances, the thesis argues that the military remained relatively apolitical and facilitated a smooth transition of governance systems and leadership. This facilitated continued civil control of the military in the country. This study has shown that, when Zambia attained independence in 1964, its new leadership retained some major institutions introduced by the colonial government, including a written constitution, a parliament, executive, and judiciary; and, more specific to civil control of the military, a Ministry of Defence and a Defence Council. Retaining these institutions and adapting them to the new consensual democratic dispensation ensured a degree of continuity in civil control of the military. During the Second Republic the same approach of ‘change with continuity’ resulted in the introduction of largely coercive measures in civil control of the military. This study illustrates that the temporary neglect of some aspects of civil control of the military by the leaders of the Third Republic resulted in the near-success of the attempted military coup on 28 October 1997. This helped government leaders to realise the dangers of radical changes in policies in respect of the defence and security forces during the transitional period from a coercive system of government to one that promotes consensual measures. Their corrective action – the gradual reintroduction of strong executive and parliamentary oversight over
defence and security – saved the country from domestic military intervention. It is the failure of governments in Ghana and Uganda to use these sorts of management techniques in transitional periods that led to the military coup d’êtats in those countries. Therefore, as explained by Decalo (1991:72-74), Zambia’s methods of maintaining political stability, defusing religious and ethnic tensions, and avoiding military coup d’êtats should serve as an example for other African countries, and should be studied and adopted by the African Union in its initiatives to resolve ethnic and religious uprisings such as those of Darfur in Sudan.

3) New governments should not arbitrary dismiss qualified and experienced officers for petty political reasons at the expense of national security. This should only be done after other officers have been adequately trained on the cons and pros of using coercive or consensual methods of civil control of the military and have gained adequate experience to take their place. This becomes more fundamental given the failure of civil and military intelligence to learn about the attempted coup d’état of 28 October 1997, largely as a result of inadequate funding for operational intelligence. This is because democracy and democratic governance must always be protected by maintaining a reasonable mixture of both coercive and consensual measures in the control of the armed forces. This would help to ensure smooth transitions in political power. In this way, democratic governments would ensure that civil control of the military in Zambia continues to improve.

4) If consensual measures in civil control of the military are to continue to be used by civil governments in Zambia, there is need to budget and continuously release funds for operational intelligence. However, in order to prevent such funds from being abused for personal gain, as happened in 1969 and in the period 1996 to 2001 when funds were misused by the Director-General of Civil Intelligence, military and civil intelligence organs must acknowledge and internalise the concepts of accountability and transparency. Military intelligence should subscribe to a public mission statement in which it outlines the normative framework within which it operates. This should be supplemented by a more extensive network of legislative and structural ‘checks and balances’ to ensure the accountability of the military intelligence community. The adoption of an Intelligence Code of Conduct could also play a valuable role. A code of conduct for military intelligence officers and a general code for all members of the armed
forces could inhibit the emergence of praetorian and interventionist tendencies (Williams 1993:25).

5) As part of effective parliamentary oversight over defence and security the Zambian parliament established a Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security under the parliamentary reform programme. However, in order to further strengthen the use of consensual measures in civil control of the military another committee similar to the South African Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee needs to be established. This is necessary because the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security currently does not cover the intelligence services. The Intelligence Oversight Committee should be established by legislation, which should provide for the establishment of the committee, its functions and powers, access to information and documentation, secrecy, its obligations to report to parliament, and regulations. This would significantly strengthen parliamentary oversight over the military.

6) It is important to note that the study of civil control of the military in Zambia, using the analytical concepts of coercive and consensual measures in the four different periods has not been very exhaustive. In order that further research is carried out any new researcher in the field of civil-military relations in Zambia must obtain permission to begin his or her studies from civil and security government agencies - otherwise they could face ‘sanctions, political threat, and even physical threats’ (Scheurich 1995: 1-17). In our case permission to commence the research was obtained by taking three prolonged approaches. First, the author of this study realised that a gap existed in the literature as no one had produced a comprehensive study of civil control of the military in Zambia. Second, the author took advantage as an officer of parliament to lobby for permission to undertake the study through the Office of the Speaker of Parliament and the Clerk of the National Assembly. These offices provided legitimacy for the study as parliament was implementing reforms aimed at improving its oversight over defence and security institutions. These reforms were prompted by the massive misuse of public funds by government leaders between 1991 and 2001, partly via the departments of civil and military intelligence. Third, the author took advantage of relationships formed in the executive courses offered to senior Zambian military officers by the Southern African Defence and Security Network, for which he acted as resource person. The interaction with these officers and the exchanges of views with them on the
relationship between parliamentary oversight, the ministry of defence and other
security organisations led to the Ministry of Defence appreciating the need for the
study. As a result, the permanent secretary of defence gave permission for the
study to proceed on condition that a copy of the thesis be deposited with the
ministry. It would be important for any other researcher of security issues in
Zambia or perhaps any other country to follow these or similar networks –
otherwise, permission to access security files both at the Ministry of Defence
Headquarters and in the National Archives of Zambia would probably not be
granted.

7) Last but not the least, it is this researcher’s view that an understanding is still
lacking of how various Zambian governments have manipulated ethnicity in the
Zambia Defence Force as a means of exerting civil control of the military.
Research should also be undertaken on managing the military budgeting process;
integrating the defence sector into government-wide processes; and the
consequences of parliamentary oversight.
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Appendix 1

Interview Schedule

General Information
1. Age in years:
2. Gender: Male / Female
3. Marital status: Widow / Divorces / Married / Single / Other
4. Main income and source of living:

What was the nature and character of the relationship between the colonial army and the government, Africans and white settlers up to 1964?

What role did parliament, the executive and the judiciary play in ensuring that the restructuring policies of all the military establishments in the First and Third Republics enhanced the relationship between the military, government leadership and the citizenry?

In your own view, why is it that the Zambian military personnel did not follow the behaviour of their counterparts in Ghana and Uganda of overthrowing their nationalist leaders?

What are some of the behavioural controls that were put in place by government that ensured that the military remained loyal to the government leadership?

What impact did the budgetary control of the Ministry of Defence either by the President or parliament has on the relationship between the military, government and the citizenry?

What impact did the reorganisation measures on the military structures and behavioural controls that took place in the Third Republic as a result of the new democratic dispensation have on the relationship between the military, government leadership and the citizenry?

What roles have the following institutions continued to play in civil control of the military in Zambia:

8) the Defence Council;
9) the Military Intelligence; and
10) the Ruling Party’s Office of the Chairman of National Security?
Duration of the interview:

Name of the Informant / s:

Name of the interviewer:
Appendix 2

Consent Form

Dear Sir / Madam

I wish to introduce myself as a student with the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. I am carrying out a research study entitled: ‘Civil Control of the military in Zambia’. The study is undertaken towards the fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Literature and Philosophy.

Data for the study will be collected from primary documents at the National archives of Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Defence Headquarters, who have given a clearance for the study on condition that a copy of the thesis be handed in person to Defence Headquarters on completion of the study, and the National Assembly of Zambia who are the Employers of the Researcher. Secondary data will be collected from authorities like books, journals and magazines where articles related to the civil control of the military by various governments in the world have been published. It is the intention of the study to corroborate primary and secondary data with data collected through individual interviews of a few people that were responsible for the implementation of policies related to the civil control of the military in the periods under study. The interviews may last about 60 minutes. The interview will be conducted in a place and time most suitable to you, sir. Your participation in the study is voluntary, and you may stop your participation at any time during the interview. The interview will be transcribed verbatim as well as tape-recorded. The researcher promises to handle all information collected with utmost confidentiality.

Your consent to participate in the study will be highly appreciated as the results of the study will assist in understanding why the civil control of the military in Zambia revolves around the thesis that despite the two faced nature of the colonial army and various constitutional regime changes and systems of governance from multi party to one party and back to multiparty, the Zambian military consistently worked to support the economic, political and social ideals of the ruling elite. Any deviation from this ideal by the military resisters through attempted military coup d’etats or the people through food riots was consistently exposed by the military intelligence and crushed by the loyal troops. This made the country experience relatively harmonious civil- military relations as compared to other former British colonies in the three distinct periods under study. Hence the need by this study to examine the nature, character and degree of the civil control of the military in each epoch of history in Zambia which explains the methods
used by the Zambian government in the successful management of the civil control of the military.

I wish to sincerely thank you in advance for your participation in the study.

Your Faithfully

Haantobolo Godfrey H. N.

Thank you.

I accept Participation.

Respondent’s Signature: _____________________

Date: ____________________________________

Respondent’s thumb print: ___________________

Date: ____________________________________

(Researcher)
22 December, 2005
Ref.: 005-11-05

Mr Haantobolo Godfrey H. N.
National Assembly
P.O. Box 31299
LUSAKA

Dear Mr Haantobolo

RE: SUBMITTED RESEARCH PROPOSAL

The following research proposal was presented to the Research Ethics Committee meeting held on 7 December, 2005 where changes were recommended. We would like to
acknowledge receipt of the corrected version with clarifications. The proposal has now been approved. Congratulations!

Title of proposal: ‘Civil Control of the Military in Zambia: 1964 to 2004’

CONDITIONS:

- This approval is based strictly on your submitted proposal. Should there be need for you to modify or change the study design or methodology, you will need to seek clearance from the Research Ethics Committee.

- If you have need for further clarification please consult this office. Please note that it is mandatory that you submit a detailed progress report of your study to this Committee every six months and a final copy of your report at the end of the study.

- Any serious adverse events must be reported at once to this Committee.

- Please note that when your approval expires you may need to request for renewal. The request should be accompanied by a Progress Report (Progress Report Forms can be obtained from the Secretariat).

Yours sincerely,

Prof. I. T. Karashani, MB,
ChB, PhD CHAIRMAN
Date of approval: 22 December, 2005
Date of expiry: 21 December, 2006
Appendix 4

REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

PRIVATE BAG RW 17X, LUSAKA
27 July, 2005

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam

CLEARANCE MR GODFREY H N HAANTOBOLO, PhD
STUDENT WHO IS UNDERTAKING FIELD WORK

11) The above mentioned person is a Deputy Chief of Research Officer at Parliament and is currently a student at the University of Witwatersrand under the auspices of the Southern African Defence and Security Management, Department of History at the University of Zambia, studying for a PhD on the topic Civil Control of the Military in Zambia 1964 - 2004.

12) Mr Godfrey H N HAANTOBOLO has been cleared to access to documents pertaining to his study on a few selected officers on the subject of his study.

13) Kindly assist the officer.

T C YAMUKWENDA, psc
Colonel for Permanent Secretary
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Appendix 5

Oral Sources

Because of a lack of space, the twenty most useful sources only are listed below.

1. Name: Sister Bernard Nkando
   Place: Lusaka
   Date: 10th September 2002

2. Name: Mr Berts Mushala
   Place: Wroxton College, England
   Date: 15th August 2002
   Position: Former Member of Parliament, former Minister in charge of North-Western Province and son of the former rebel leader Adamson Mushala.

3. Name: Col Geoffrey Munalula
   Place: Arusha, Tanzania
   Date: 5th September 2003
   Position: Wing Commander, Army School of Education, Kabwe. Participant in the project on the civil military relations for Southern African countries coordinated by Prof. Abillah Omari of Tanzania.

4. Name: Brig. General Timothy Kazembe
   Place: Lusaka
   Date: 24th April 2005
   Position: Former Army Secretary, former Director of Military Intelligence, Former Deputy High Commissioner to Zaire and former Chairman of the United Nations Joint Peace Keeping Mission on Congo D R.

5. Name: Captain Dennis Sinkamba
   Place: Lusaka
   Date: 2nd October 2005
   Position: Secondary school teacher at the Army School of Education, Kabwe and a Masters Degree student at the University of Zambia.
6. Name: Captain Jehro Chipili  
   Place: Lusaka  
   Date: 2nd October 2005  
   Position: Secondary School teacher at the Army School of Education, Lusaka and student at the University of Zambia.

7. Name: Lt. Jonathan Chinyama  
   Place: Lusaka  
   Date: 2nd October 2005  

8. Name: Mr Alexander Grey Zulu  
   Place: Lusaka  
   Date: 5th October 2005  
   Position: Former Minister of Local government, Former Minister of Defence, Member of the Central Committee in charge of the Committee on Defence and Security, the longest serving Secretary General of the Party and government under the One-Party State and the last Vice-President before the introduction of the Third Republic. He was also the longest serving Chairman of the Defence Council and the National Committee on Defence and Security.

9. Name: Lt. General Christone Tembo  
   Place: Lusaka  
   Date: 10th October 2005  
   Position: Former Army Commander, Former Zambia’s Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and former coup detainee 1988-1991. In the Third Republic he became Member of Parliament, Minister of Tourism, and Vice-President and ended up as leader of the opposition party the Forum for Democracy and Development.

10. Name: General Malimba Masheke  
    Place: Lusaka  
    Date: 11th October 2005  
    Position: First Director of the Department of Military Intelligence, Former Army Commander, Former Minister of Defence and the last Prime Minister under the One-Party State in Zambia.

11. Name: Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda  
    Place: Lusaka  
    Date: 5th December 2005

12. Name: Princess Nakatindi Wina  
   Place: Lusaka  
   Date: 2nd January 2006  
   Position: Former Member of Parliament, former Women’s Chair Person under the MMD and former suspected coup detainee after the 1997 attempted military coup d’etat.

13. Name: Mr Sikota Wina  
   Place: Lusaka  
   Date: 2nd January 2006  
   Position: Editor of the UNIP magazine during the nationalist struggle, First Minister of Information and Broadcasting after Independence and former Deputy Speaker.

14. Name: Sergeant Chripin Milimo  
   Place: Mikango Barracks  
   Date: 8th June 2006  
   Position: One of the commandos in Mikango barracks that foiled the 1997 attempted military coup d’etat.

15. Name: Nicholas Katanekwa  
   Place: Livingstone  
   Date: 15th June 2006  
   Position: Former Director of the National Heritage Commission in Livingstone.

16. Name: Mr William Chipango  
   Place: Livingstone  
   Date: 16th June 2006  

17. Name: Mr Fredrick Mwiya Anene Maswabile  
   Place: Sesheke  
   Date: 17th June 2006  
   Position: Induna, Litunga’s representative in Nalisa village, Sesheke. One of the most bombed border village by the apartheid government in Zambia.

18. Name: Wellington Mubita Mandu  
   Place: Sesheke  
   Date: 17th June 2006
Position: Member of the royal establishment sent to the Litunga of Western Province to inform him about the suspected plans by the South African Defence Force to bomb Sesheke. The Litunga in turn informed President Kaunda who called for a press conference that temporarily stopped the South African government from authorizing the attack in 1983.

20. Name: George Siyumbwa
Place: Sesheke
Date: 17th June 2006
Position: One of the former soldiers of the South African Defence Force in Namibia, who informed his uncle Kangumu Mwambwa in Sesheke about the South African intended attacks on some areas of Western Province. This information was either sent directly to the Litunga or through civil or military intelligence and filtered through all the security organs at District, Provincial and National level to the President.

21. Name: Mr George Samulela
Place: Sesheke
Date: 18th June 2006
Position: Resident of Sesheke during apartheid troops bombings, and my Lozito English interpreter during field interviews.