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INTRODUCTION

Cyprus today, is the only country in the world which has remained divided between two nations—the Greeks and the Turks. These are also ‘races’ and this presence of these two races has meant that, throughout the years, there has not only been a clash of nations, but also of religion, culture, and in general, a way of life. It is therefore interesting to examine how, for so many years, and with so many differences, these two groups have been able to co-habit on common ground.

Since about the 1950s, the Cyprus question began gaining recognition and establishing itself as a concrete subject in both European and world debate. As the occurrences and episodes on the island became more widely known, it became a heated subject, not only in specifically Cyprus itself, Greece, Turkey and Britain, but also in the EU and the UN. The conflict on the island for many years, especially in recent times, has caused much debate and controversy.

Owing to Cyprus’ strategic position in the Mediterranean, throughout history there have been international power struggles surrounding the island, by self-interested outside powers; and it has therefore been colonized by some of the most influential colonial powers. Colonialism has been a ‘recurrent and widespread feature of human history,’ (Loomba 1998: 2) and because Cyprus was under colonial rule for many years, the inhabitants wished to rid themselves of such external powers, and desired independence and self-rule.¹ One of the most important facts therefore, about the twentieth century, was that many colonial powers granted independence to the dependencies.

The twentieth century was one which not only gave rise to the struggle for self-determination, but it was also one which highlighted the importance of different nationalisms, and also produced uprisings of ethnic minority groups in different parts of

¹ It must be noted though, that the two main communities of the island—the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots—aimed for a different type of independence—the former’s main goal was to no longer function under colonial rule, but the latter on the other hand wished to become independent, not so much from being a colony, but mostly from being under Greek Cypriot administration.
the world. The course of action of more dominant powers, as well as external powers, has often been influenced by the behaviour of such minority groups. When examining such groups, then, it is interesting to note how their actions have lead to certain outcomes, such as the decolonisation of their specific states by influential colonial powers. Cyprus is a good example of this- its decolonisation from Britain, and the omnipresent nationalisms between the dominant groups, lead to events which would shape the future of this state. From the hands of the Ottoman Turks to the British, Cyprus was finally granted independence, only to be invaded by a Turkish occupying force, which forced the splitting of the country into two.

There are three main chapters in what follows, each of which is further subdivided into smaller sections. The first chapter mainly discusses the different meaning of terms, as well as the road which the Turkish Cypriots took with regard to their independence. What will be presented is, firstly, a description of what ethnic groups and minorities are, to get a sense of the complexity of each term, and then to see whether the Turkish Cypriots fall under the mainstream generalisations of what such minorities are, or whether this group has presented its political struggle differently than other minorities.

Furthermore, what will be discussed are the different nationalisms present on the island, and how the opposing groups presented their political and nationalistic aims. We will see that the clashes between the Greek and Turkish populations of the area proved to be uncontrollable, thus causing the splitting of the island into two entities, each internally functioning on its own, and under its own political terms, but only one side being internationally dominant and recognised.

Furthermore, we will see how the Turkish Cypriots were represented in the Constitution developed after independence, and the path which they followed in their aims to become a recognised sovereign entity, especially following the Turkish invasion of 1974. Their struggle in forming a Turkish Cypriot state will also be discussed.
What will furthermore be examined in this chapter is the role Turkey has played in Cyprus’ affairs, and the influence it has had on the Turkish Cypriot entity.

Lastly, this chapter will highlight the meaning of “nationalism” and “the nation,” and present a key contribution by Eric Hobsbawm, who discusses in great detail the role of nationalism and the nation in the future. What will then be presented is an argument against Hobsbawm’s theory of the role of nationalism in the future.

The second chapter considers the role the EU and the UN have had in the aspirations of Cyprus becoming an EU member, as well as the relationship these two organisations have with each group on the island. This section covers some of the key areas of debate surrounding the crisis of the Northern entity, especially after the establishment of the “TRNC”, and the problems it has had with international organisations such as the EU and the UN.

A further issue which is discussed is the entry of Cyprus into the EU (excluding the northern Cypriot entity). This follows from the discussion of a UN peace plan which was presented to both communities on the island but which proved to be unsuccessful.

In addition, the role of Turkey will again be highlighted, because Turkey is one of the main obstacles preventing the “TRNC” from gaining recognition and also preventing it from becoming an EU member. Turkey in turn however, is also affected by Cyprus, because solving the problem in Cyprus is one of the key factors which will determine whether Turkey be admitted as the first Muslim nation into the EU or not. So, we shall see how both Turkey and the “TRNC” are standing in the way of each other’s aspirations for EU membership.

Finally, the last chapter will address the issues which are preventing the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities from co-existing together in a peaceful Cyprus. Through empirical analysis, problematic issues such as safety and security, external interference, as well as general political and economic concerns, will be discussed.
Lastly, we will examine how the Greek and Turkish communities on the island wish to address, or redress rather, such setbacks with a view to building a harmonious co-existence under one state. We will also see how the current, but unsuccessful peace plan, is viewed by both groups, and whether that specific plan should be revised, or whether a totally new improved plan should be devised.
TURKISH CYPRiot ASPIRATIONS FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

The ‘Cyprus problem’ first appeared on the international scene after World War 2, and continued doing so during the 1950s, which ‘inaugurated the universal dawn for self-determination and the ensuing crisis of the colonial system.’ The struggle for sovereignty from then on started to strengthen; after being a colony for many years, the island’s inhabitants wanted to gain sovereignty and freedom from the colonists, to be able to function in an autonomous manner.

In present-day Cyprus, just like in the past, what we are dealing with is not only a clash of ethnicities, but also a clash of nations—that is, the island’s Greek Cypriot dominance, compared to a strong Turkish influenced minority who have strong trends towards consciousness of distinctive identity and statehood. It should be noted however that in spite of being in the majority the Greek Cypriots have always been threatened by the Turks not only as an opposing attacking force, but more so because of their totally opposing nationality, religion and culture, from the majority. Not unexpectedly then, clashes between these two distinct and mutually opposed national communities living on the same territory, were inevitably going to occur.

Since both Greece and Turkey have thus had influence over political movements and ideologies in Cyprus itself (representing the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively) these two countries cannot be ignored when discussing the island’s disputes. Greece and Turkey’s relationship has hardly ever been one without constant conflict; in fact, there has hardly been a time in history where the Greeks and Turks have been free from conflict. Apart from constant Christian versus Muslim clashes, yet another of the disagreements which arose was this more recent dispute over Cyprus. Because of the Greeks who had lived on the island for many centuries, as well as the Turks who began a relationship of co-existence with the Greeks in about 1571, (Stephens 2001:16) after the

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Ottoman conquest, both Greece and Turkey had nationalist claims on the island, and we will see how these two groups’ nationalistic aims were pursued.

2.1 THE POSITION OF ETHNIC GROUPS AND MINORITIES IN THE NATION-STATE

Because of the different ethnic groups existing on the island, it is necessary to examine what ethnicity means, and how such a group comes into existence. This notion, is difficult to define, even identifying its elements and components is difficult, not only because of the many different ethnic groups present in the world, but also because of the many different interpretations and ideologies placed on this term over time. Furthermore, the difficulty when dealing with such a notion, has to do with the difficulty of determining which leads to which, that is, whether nations make ethnic groups and nationalism, or whether ethnic groups and nationalism make nations.

Firstly one has to understand how an ethnic group is understood in general and ideologically, and then apply this to the group in the context with which we are dealing. To begin with, an ethnic group is simply, just like any other group, a group with a specific identity which is common to the whole group-this includes a common history, a shared religion, a common language, and a specific nationality- it is defined as a ‘self-conscious group within a nation state.’ (Nash 1989:5) This means that if a single person from the group is taken, he or she will be able to represent any other member of the group, and therefore the ethnic group as a whole. A further requirement of an ethnic group, is that there should be a common nationality among members of such a group, and ‘a shared past, and a common future.’ (Nash 1989:127)

Ethnic groups are also often the minority in a nation-state-they are those people ‘who are not politically dominant in the nation-state [but] who still ha[ve] significant cultural markers of difference and sufficient social cleavage from the dominant political majority.’ (Nash 1989: 2) So, the Turkish Cypriot community which ‘claims allegiance to an identity that is of a different origin from that of the dominant group’ (Rodinson
1989:56) therefore having its cultural markers of difference, became integrated with a
majority population due to conquest and co-habited with them, but also remained a
specific, different ethnic group with specific characteristics, the minority, with (before
independence from the colonial power) no political equality with the majority. Each
political organisation thus creates its minorities, and in Cyprus, that minority was the
Turkish population of the area. Since this group forms the minority, this term should be
further examined in order to determine whether the Turkish Cypriot community falls
under the mainstream descriptions of what a minority is, or whether it strays from such
general definitions.

In a democratic country, it is a given that minorities, as social entities and part of a
society, be given rights, which include the recognition of their general characteristics
under the respective country’s constitution. It is also a given that the basic rights of the
whole population, which include the rights to identity, religion, and culture, among
others, include the minority, and by using these basic rights, this group aspires to become
an important recognized entity in the specific state in which it is living. Furthermore,
because minorities consider themselves different to the majority, they want to preserve
their different, special characteristics, while still taking part in the functioning of the
country.

The minority situation in which the Turkish Cypriots found, and still find themselves, is
quite interesting because of the different path this minority has taken compared to other
such groups. Not only is this minority situation a complicated one, but also the term
“minority” is itself such a complex one to define. Because of the many different minority
groups in the world, with different backgrounds, different histories, different cultures and
religions, and languages, the notion of minority just like the notion of ethnicity, cannot be
reduced to a general description to define all minorities. Evidently there is no minority in
the world which is the same as any other minority group, which means that there also
cannot be a universally accepted definition of what such a notion might mean; perhaps
this is why it is so difficult to have a precise definition for any specific minority. Often,
an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority is defined, ‘first of all by its own group

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consciousness in the long run. There is no minority without a collective memory,’ (Chaliand 1989:1) as well as the groups ‘collective will to survive.’ (Chaliand 1989:6) We can therefore see that group consciousness is a necessary trait of any minority group wishing to move forward.

Each society, it should be noted, depending on context among several other factors and circumstances, is different from any other society, and because there will always be a minority in any society, in each social order there will also be a different relationship of domination—that is of the dominating and of the dominated, the majority and the minority. Each minority then, is indeed a specific case since it is ‘the result of an act of power designated [usually by the dominating majority]\(^3\) to secure the exercise of domination in a given society.’ (Fenet 1989:18) In the past, as is today, many communities were, and are treated as inferior, and therefore subordinate to the majority. For this reason, a minority is usually understood as a weak group which is subject to the will of the majority, which also makes it unable for it to take part in important decision-making processes, as well as being unable to rid itself of the situation in which it finds itself. It is, however, frequently the case that this relationship of domination is the one which pushes the minority group to work as a whole, and with its collective determination (because without even a slight element of collective consciousness and self-determination, a group cannot, and does not, exist) tries to fight and oppose the status quo and attain more rights and equality; this is, as we shall see, the case of the Turkish Cypriot minority.

Democratic ideology has also led people ‘to confuse two concepts: no one should be treated as inferior, but if some are, they are then a minority. People speak of minorities, therefore, wherever there is inferiority’. (Rodinson 1989: 55) This, as will be later proven, is not always the case, because not all groups treated as inferior are necessarily the minority, and furthermore, not all groups who are minorities are treated as inferior and subordinate to the majority. In fact, the minority being discussed here, was given equal political status to the majority (even though the majority felt this group to be unimportant), thus not being as subordinate as such groups often are.

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\(^3\) Sometimes however the minority dominates the majority, for example apartheid South Africa.
It is therefore not difficult to see why the question of minorities, and especially the one we are dealing with here, appears to be of ‘frightening complexity’ (Fenet 1989:18), since this specific group is not a weak minority as such groups are automatically expected to be. The ethnic minority with which we are dealing, is one which exists in a country, not only with a majority population which has a foreign language and culture, but more importantly, one where the majority has a different, and in fact a totally opposite, religion and thus a different way of life. When taking these major dissimilarities into consideration, one tries to understand the opposing nationalisms of the area, and it is interesting to note the relationship these two groups (Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot) have had over the years.

2.2 GREEK VERSUS TURKISH NATIONALISM

Because both Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus felt somewhat tied to their respective ethnic groups, distinct nationalisms arose from the historical, as well as the political, consciousness of each of these nations, (Minogue 1969:154) and played an important role in the behaviour of both groups. To understand the actions and highlight the differences of the opposing nationalists and how they intensified, one has to examine the events which occurred on the island over several decades, until independence in 1960.

Nationalism is understood as any form of political group-consciousness which seeks the unity of groups involved, via a certain type of group identification; once there is this identification, it enables the group to work together and strive for independence-this unity includes religious belief, language, similar values and culture, and customs, and the more of this “pre-political” homogeneity, the better’ (Minogue 1997:11)

Greek nationalism first developed into a political movement in Cyprus as a reaction to the transition from Ottoman to British rule- it took the ‘normal’ European form of seeking incorporation with a state entity with which it felt historical and linguistic unity. (Attalides 1979:181) This unity was felt with Greece- the Greeks of Cyprus felt tied to
the Greeks of Greece, because there was a feeling of closeness and unity in all aspects of life, and the more Cyprus was dominated by the British, the more Greek nationalism, with the lead of the church, kept growing. (Attalides 1979:181)

The Greeks, who date their presence on the island back to early history, have traditionally viewed Cyprus as an extension and a natural part of Greece and Hellenistic culture. For thousands of years Cyprus was considered a Greek island, and, even though there was Ottoman rule, the majority population was always Greek, and equality between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was not an option. Due to historical experience, then, it is not surprising that the idea and ultimate aim of the struggle of the church and of the majority Greek Cypriots was that Cyprus would at some stage unify and be incorporated with Greece.

This idea of “enosis” (the annexation of the island to Greece), for the Greek Cypriots, meant not only protection from the Muslim minority, as well as the threatening force of mainland Turkey, but also symbolized for many of the Greeks more of a cultural, rather than a political union. For the Greek Cypriots, “enosis” would bring about a sort of emotional reaction since they would then be joined to their motherland Greece and Greek counterparts; this feeling was especially strongly felt prior to 1950, when this attachment represented, particularly among the Greek Cypriot villagers, ‘an emotional and sentimental bond of kinship’ (Adams, Cottrell 1968: 7) with the Greeks from Greece. Mainly due to this reason, it is not unusual then, that in 1950, “enosis” was given a 96 percent affirmative vote by Greek Cypriots, (Adams, Cottrell 1968: 8) proving that nationalism was an important part of Greek Cypriot life.

Just as the Greeks of the island identified and were linked to the mainland Greeks by a Hellenic nationalist consciousness, there was also a certain identification which the Turks of Cyprus had with mainland Turkey- the Turkish Cypriots, as a nationalistic minority group, as well as the mainland Turks sent in by Turkey after the invasion, formed a unified group who identified with each other because of their shared culture and language, and also as a nationalistic homogenous group against the Greek Cypriot
population. By comparison to Greek nationalism on Cyprus though, Turkish nationalism appeared to be a mild phenomenon for a long period, because, as opposed to Greek nationalism, mainland Turkish nationalism, as well as the particular characteristics of the Islamic Turkish-speaking population of Cyprus, was developed much later (with the formation of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s). (Attalides 1979:36)

So, in reaction to the greater emphasis on “enosis”, and the threat that Cyprus might actually become a political entity of Greece, out of fear, Turkish Cypriot nationalism also ‘erupted violently in the 1950s’ (Attalides 1979:36) - the Turkish Cypriots became ‘more Turkish than they had been in centuries,’ (Adams, Cottrell 1968:8) thus becoming more nationalistic in their aims, and maintaining the ‘proud attitude of the ghazi conquerors’ (Adams, Cottrell 1968:9) who controlled Cyprus for years; the Turks feared that they might become a threatened minority in an island which was once part of their empire and which would mean that ultimately they would remain politically controlled by former subjects. Not only did the Turks of the island fear political domination, they naturally protested against “enosis”, because as followers of Islam, they were unwilling to be incorporated into a Christian state. They instead believed in a partition of the island and the joining of it with Turkey, thus forming a proper union with their Turkish counterparts.

2.3 THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

Considering the nationalistic aims of both sides, it is interesting to see that in the early sixties, even though Cyprus remained a sovereign whole, the Hellenization of Cyprus, as a whole, was still desired by the Greek Cypriot people; this meant also the Hellenizing of the North, which was the most densely packed Turkish Cypriot area. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot situation in the North differed to that of the Greek Cypriots—there was a change of attitude for the Turkish Cypriots; they no longer wished to unify and become an entity of mainland Turkey.

Turkish Cypriot nationalistic aims, which were in the past focussed on joining with Turkey, weakened, and the Turkish Cypriots no longer wished to become a political
entity belonging to Turkey; instead, a new Turkish Cypriot sentiment followed: even though the majority religion was the Islamic one, unlike their Ottoman predecessor’s notion of Pan-Islamism, their aim was not to “Islamise” or “Turkify” the island, but instead to form a totally independent Islamic whole separate from the Christian entity. It is argued that there was no Turkish Cypriot religious force comparable to the Greek Cypriot one (mainly because of the nationalist aims of the church), and that even though Turkish Cypriots were Muslims, they ‘hardly ever attend[ed] the mosque, and their religious leaders had very little if any political power,’ (Stephens 2001:15). Thus we can conclude that Turkish Cypriots desired not an Islamic state, but instead, and more importantly, they desired a sovereign state where the majority faith would be Islam.

Therefore, because of this complex situation in Cyprus, its history of colonisation, occupation, and growing nationalistic aims, both ethnic groups of the island strove for a different type of independence from the other- each group wanted its own dominating force, which meant that they wished for ‘the exclusion of any other power, either internal or external. (Fenet 1989:16) So, the Turkish Cypriots strove for sovereignty as well as recognised independence from the internal power of the Greeks of the island, and the Greek Cypriots on the other hand, strove for sovereignty from the external power-from being a British colony.

The struggle for decolonisation by the Greek Cypriots was a lengthy one; even though the Greek Cypriots had always voiced their demand for national self-determination, it was a demand which the colonial power for many years refused to satisfy. In the years leading to decolonisation, the Greek Cypriots were determined to get rid of the control of the colonial power in order to be incorporated with Greece. The colonial power was reluctant to leave one of its colonial territories, not especially because of its concern of the interests or safety of the Cypriot population, since they showed ‘complete indifference to inter-ethnic harmony in Cyprus, and even to the harmony of the NATO Alliance,’ (Attalides 1979:181) but more because they favoured having control over such territory in order to secure the many strategic interests and uses Cyprus had to offer.
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots wanted to keep the British presence as a barrier between the two ethnic communities, so that they could realise their aims without Greek Cypriot hindrance. The first political party of the Turkish Cypriot community, KATAK formed in 1943⁴, and supported the continuation of British colonial rule, which they believed would prevent “enosis” ever occurring. So, prior to the Second World War, the strategy of KATAK and the Turkish Cypriots could be summed up as opposition to the national aspirations of the Greeks of the island (that was, to prevent a union with Greece).

In 1960 however, Cyprus no longer continued to function as a British colony, since independence was granted to the island. Independence was formally granted on 16 August 1960,⁵ endorsing the rights of peoples⁶, which has been interpreted as meaning ‘the right of peoples to enjoy decolonization and the struggle for development.’ (Chaliand 1989: 9) The Republic of Cyprus thus achieved independence and was recognised as a sovereign state with a bi-communal structure by the international community.

2.4 POST COLONIAL NATIONALISM

When considering these two opposing ethnic groups then, who, for about three centuries, peacefully co-habited on the island, it is interesting to see how post-colonial nationalism developed on the island following independence from the colonial power, and what this type of nationalism, from both sides, entailed.

For the Greek Cypriots, the influence came mostly from the Greek Government (Attalides 1979:184) who encouraged Greek Cypriots to develop their own consciousness of becoming a national entity. Similarly, for the Turkish Cypriots, the influence came from the Turkish Government which encouraged the Turkish Cypriots to develop, with Turkey’s help, not only a Turkish Cypriot union, but, with this consciousness, a separate

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⁵ Stephens, M. The Cyprus Question, 2001, pg. 20
state where they could be free from Greek control, and thus have total power over
themselves.

Therefore, when the United Kingdom finally granted independence to Cyprus, although
there was no major change in Turkish Cypriot aims, there was a total change of attitude
from the majority Greek Cypriots, and a new sentiment followed—there was a
strengthened feeling of statehood among the Greek Cypriots, and a feeling of
separateness from Greece further developed. The Greek Cypriot sentiments were
“‘now…we are an independent people who should just exercise self-control if we are to
survive. We do not have to be united with Greece politically because we are Greek
culturally.’” (Attalides 1979:79) The intense Hellenic nationalism that the Greek Cypriots
felt in the 1950s was now less severe, and for many, even lost.

But, even though after decolonisation neither union occurred, it is still widely believed
that Greek Cypriots are tied to Greece, and the Turkish Cypriots are tied to Turkey. This
is true, since both groups have the same linguistic, religious and cultural traits as their
respective nations; this does not mean, however, that they wish to be tied to them, or
depend on them politically, and, for South Cyprus, not economically either. Nevertheless,
as we shall later see, the Greek Cypriots have not lost their Hellenistic nationalism; they
prefer to instead be an autonomous, sovereign state, under Cypriot, preferably, Greek
Cypriot, rule; the same applies to the Turkish Cypriots, who prefer to be autonomous,
from both Greek Cypriots as well as, to an extent, Turkey, even though they do require
assistance from Turkey. Both these communities, then, did not choose to rid themselves
of their respective ‘Greek’ or ‘Turkish’ identities, but rather to uphold and enjoy them, in
separate states.

2.5 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 1960 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CYPRUS

The type of independence which was thus granted to Cyprus by Britain, was a
compromise between the colonial power, the Cypriots, and of course the other interested
parties within the Alliance (Greece and Turkey). The arrangement following the decolonisation of the island was one which did not allow to the full extent the enjoyment by the Cypriots of being a sovereign people—this is because of the problematic constitution which was established. The London-Zurich Agreements of 1959 (Adams, Cottrell 1968: 8) (which gave rise to the Constitution of Cyprus) were agreements which the Greek and Turkish Governments, apparently with the consent of the leaders of the two Cypriot communities, agreed on: the main principles of these agreements would govern an independent Cyprus.

Both the communities on the island, not surprisingly, had differing ideas of what the constitution should have included; as a majority, the Greek side desired full political authority, with very little influence from the Turkish minority; and the Turkish Cypriots by contrast, aspired for a shared political partnership in the government. Putting aside their desires however, both sides signed the agreements put forward. The only reason the Greek Cypriots went along with these agreements was because they desired their independence and freedom from the colonial power and if they had not agreed or signed, then the independence of the island would probably have been denied, and the threat of a forced partition (would probably have been) intensified. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, agreed to the terms of the constitution since it included several benefits for the minority.

The newly formed constitution, included a significant advantage favouring the Turkish Cypriots, since they, as a minority group were to be fully included in a constitution which granted them equal political rights with the majority—they were basically uplifted, from having very little representation rights, to political equality. As long as Cyprus was under Ottoman or British control, the Turkish Cypriots appropriately felt protected and were not concerned about their minority relationship with the Greek Cypriots. Later however, the Turks evidently realised that they would one day have to be prepared in case British protection ceased to exist. When the British decided to withdraw then, the

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7 Dodd, C. ‘Cyprus Now and Beyond’, in Two Peoples and Two States in Cyprus at the Eleventh Hour. Proceedings of a Seminar Held at the Turkish Embassy in London. 16 February 2001, pg. 35.
Turkish Cypriots were concerned about their security on the independent self-governing island, and so demanded extensive guarantees for their protection as a minority, which were provided for in the above agreements. The agreements not only included the new constitution, which Cyprus, as a newly established independent state, would follow, but also several Treaties, which would ensure the protection and upholding of the state of affairs on the island, as well as the constitution.

The Constitution shall firstly be examined, where we shall see whether the settlement entailed by this constitution was able to work. Then, the Treaties shall be examined to see what was agreed on by both sides, as well as what was approved and what was prohibited, and whether what the constitution entailed was upheld. We shall then see whether what the Treaties entailed were adhered to, or whether they were just swept aside and not taken into consideration.

2.5.1 The Role of the Minority in the Constitution and the Main Provisions

The minority, who formed such a small and seemingly insignificant part of the total population, played a significant role while formulating the constitution, and was included in all important Articles—in fact, the newly established constitution recognised the political equality of the two communities. This is the main reason why this constitution was so contested, mostly by the Greek Cypriot majority. The constitution was thus theoretically functional, but in practise however, it did not, and could not, work or be effective, for several reasons which will further be examined in more detail.

The Agreements and Constitution nevertheless gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus. Apart from the fact that partition and annexation were prohibited (as expressed in the Treaties), this constitution included that the new independent state would be a ‘bi-communal Republic with a single territory, but a unique Constitution which embodied an agreed political partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and which [as in the Treaties] prohibited the political or economic union of Cyprus with any other state.’ (Stephens 2001:18) This meant that the island would be treated as one state which would
be shared by the two main constituent groups making up the island (one of these groups being the minority, of course), thus being bi-communal.

Therefore, because of this bi-communal constitutional framework of the state, the Republic was firmly based on the equality of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the independence and sovereignty of the island. Both communities would therefore have an equal input in the political affairs of the country, with ‘a large degree of political and cultural separateness.’ (Mendelson 2001: 6) Because of this political equality established by the creation of the bi-communal structure, the minority was included in all parts of the constitution, and this although favourable to the minority, was unacceptable to the majority.

Hence, because the majority disagreed with the apparently divisive elements of the constitution, it was doomed for failure from its very conception -the Greek Cypriots were not prepared to allow the Turkish Cypriots to function as an equal political entity with them, or have effective participation in all organs of the state. They considered it as unreasonable for a minority to be able to effectively participate in the functioning of state institutions, and clearly felt that the Turkish Cypriot minority, which was about a fifth of the population at the time, had been unfairly raised to political equality and ‘grossly over-represented’ in the institutions of the state. Having equal political status to the Greek side, meant that the Turkish Cypriots, as a substantial minority, would be able to veto the will of the Greek Cypriot majority, and this would run contrary to democratic rule, which favours the majority.

Nevertheless, together with political equality of the two communities, obviously came the provision which stated that the president and vice-president who were to rule the bi-communal state, would be a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-

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8 The only advantage the granting of political equality to the minority would have for the majority, is that because Turkey is physically larger and more populous than Greece, the constitution would have protected the majority and their fears of a forceful joining of the island to a much larger Turkey.
President, and “separately or conjointly, [they] shall have the right to final veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives or any part thereof.” (Mendelson 2001:6) The Greek Cypriots were to vote for the President, and the Turkish Cypriots were to vote for the Vice-President in each of their respective communities, and therefore, together, would govern the bi-communal structure. This act thus secured the minority’s status as an equal entity on the island.

As ideal as this constitution seemed for the Turkish Cypriots, it was never put into practise; but even if it had been, it would have proved difficult to function without conflict, since, in reality, each side would probably refuse or reject what was being proposed by the other side; not only because they would not be in favour of what was being proposed, but also because they would have the power to do so. There would therefore hardly be consensus, and a more uncooperative system than before would have been formed and would ultimately have led to a breakdown in the internal situation and new conflict on the island.

2.5.2 The Amendments to the Constitution Following its Failure

For the above reasons, the majority sought to rectify the inconsistencies in the provisions of this newly established constitution. This group believed that the constitution had to be altered and reformed if the island were to have a functioning government; therefore, proposals were made by the Archbishop and President of the time Makarios; he proposed a 13-point amendment to the constitution at the end of 1963, which involved constitutional revisions—one of these revisions included the rejection of the veto power enjoyed by both Greek President and Turkish Vice-President. In turn, the Turkish Cypriots rejected not only this specific provision since they thought of the veto as a ‘form of life insurance for the minority community,’ (Mendelson 2001:8) but also the rest of the proposed provisions. Turkey, as one of the Guarantor Powers, also rejected all the amendments proposed by the Greek Cypriots, declaring that these proposals were an attempt to undermine the constitution. (Mendelson 2001: 9)
Ultimately however, the constitution was altered by the Greek Cypriots which considered the original draft to be unfair for them as a majority; Turkey, fearing it would lose its respective community on the island, and thus lose its influence on the island, rejected these amendments. Soon after, the Turkish Cypriot vice-president stepped down, as did the other Turkish Cypriot representatives in the “government”, and declared that the Republic of Cyprus ceased to exist.

Therefore, following the failure of the constitution, apart from the many group differences as well as basic identity differences, there were many violent intercommunal incidents which proved to be uncontrollable. One of the reasons thus, that the partition of the island occurred in 1974, was because Cyprus became a vulnerable republic, and there remained, even after decolonisation, many extremists among the Greek Cypriot majority (backed by the military regime of Greece), which were still bent on union with Greece, because they believed that this was the only way to remove Turkish influence and thus get rid of the “minority problem”.

Because of all these events that took place throughout the 1960’s, the only way the Turks of the island could feel themselves protected from the majority, as well as from the constant Greek coup threats, was if they formed a separate entity (the northern territory of the island, where most Turkish Cypriots resided) where, with the help of Turkey they would be able to control themselves, and in the long run, join and become a political entity of Turkey. The previous aim of the Turkish Cypriots to unify with mainland Turkey, thus once again resurfaced. So, Turkey, fearing that union with Greece would at some stage occur, wanted to prevent domination of their Turkish counterparts, and prevent “enosis”; thus in 1974 they invaded and seized the island’s northern third, thus beginning the era of the Turkish illegal occupation.

2.5.3 The Objective of the Main Treaties

The three main Treaties which were concluded together with the constitution were: the Treaties of Alliance, the Treaty of Establishment, and the Treaty of Guarantee.
The Treaty of Alliance was concerned with general defence and the stationing of Greek and Turkish troops in Cyprus; the Treaty of Establishment was mainly concerned with the retention of British sovereign base areas in Cyprus (of which there were two, which still exist today); and the Treaty of Guarantee, which had to do with the keeping of Cyprus as a single sovereign state, as well as disallowing the joining of Cyprus with any other state. (Mendelson 2001: 7) The latter meant that South Cyprus was not entitled to join with Greece, and Northern Cyprus was not allowed forming a union with Turkey, thus forbidding the island from being partitioned in any way, and preventing either one of the two groups from imposing its political will over the other. These treaties tried to create a state of political and sovereign equality, as well as the equal constituent status of the two peoples, which was not only meant to establish a sort of balance between Greece and Turkey, but more importantly, to protect the constitutional settlement, to prevent any union with any other nation, and to ensure stability and peace on the island.

The establishing of these treaties however, granted Cyprus only a limited form of independence, because as a start, they attached conditions to the country’s independence, which should not be the case. Furthermore, these guarantees also allowed for other forces to be able to intervene and remain present on the new “independent” island. These treaties were thus disruptive to the forming and functioning of a political equality (which was included in the constitution), on the island.

2.5.4 The Treaty of Guarantee

The Treaty of most concern to us is the Treaty of Guarantee, since (as we shall shortly see) the Turkish invasion of 1974 was a breach of this Treaty for a number of reasons. Article 1 Paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee stated that Cyprus ‘undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or any economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other state or partition of the island.’ (Mendelson 2001:7) Similarly, Article 2 Paragraph 2 maintained that Greece, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom were to undertake to prohibit any of the above activities aimed at either promoting the union of Cyprus with any other state, or the partitioning of the island. (Mendelson 2001:5)

By “union with any other country” what was meant was ultimately that the Greeks would not be influenced by, or join with Greece, and the Turkish Cypriots would not join and be influenced by mainland Turkey. Even though South Cyprus was influenced neither politically, nor economically by Greece, (or any other state), the Turkish Cypriots were responsible for such actions. Turkey, as a Guarantor Power which was meant to aim at protecting the sovereignty of the island, by sending an occupying force onto the island was in breach of this treaty, not only because it caused the partitioning of the island, but also because Turkey threatened to integrate the occupied North with Turkey, which would therefore lead to the political union of it with Turkey. Furthermore, because of the weak state of Northern Cyprus at the time, Turkey had to provide economic aid, and by doing this, threatened to also economically integrate the North with Turkey. The occupation was thus seen as illegal by the other parties of the Alliance, except by the Turks and Turkish Cypriots, which subsequently led to the Northern entity becoming non-recognized by the international community.

Contrary to this though, Turkey used this same treaty as a justification for their intervening. They claimed that the occupation was, and still is, legal. The Turks held that this treaty gave Turkey a ‘legal right to intervene with troops if necessary.’ (Stephens 2001:17) It also claimed that since it was one of the Guarantor Powers, it exercised Article IV of the Treaty, which stated that ‘insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three Guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.’ (Mendelson 2001:49). It is a fact that Greece and Turkey, along with Britain, did acquire the right of military intervention with this Treaty, but only if it became necessary to protect the interests of each community on the island.
After Turkey invaded the northern part of the sovereign Cypriot state in 1974, it maintained, and has reiterated, that its presence in Northern Cyprus came under the terms of this 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, thus not being in violation of it. Turkey clearly felt it necessary to intervene at the time because of the ever-present violent clashes between the two communities, and the threat the minority Turkish Cypriots felt; thus it occupied the island in order to “re-establish” the state of affairs. However, even though the Greek Cypriots accepted that there should have been external Guarantees in order to reassure security and safety, they also maintained that none of these guaranteeing powers was authorised to act alone, or at will. Turkey had no unilateral right of intervention because it needed (and did not get) the consent of the UN Security Council. (Mendelson 2001: 50) Any of the Guarantor Powers which felt the need to intervene had to get the permission of the UN Security Council to be able to do so, and since Turkey did not, the Turkish military occupation was rendered illegal.

Since the above agreements prohibited the union of Cyprus with any other country, the Guarantor powers, (including Turkey of course), also had to undertake to prohibit any activity aimed at promoting the union of Cyprus with any other state. With the 1974 invasion then, Turkey, even as a Guarantor Power and supposedly one promoting the sovereignty of Cyprus as a single state, was again in violation of these agreements, which ultimately caused the partitioning of the island.

The Treaty further stated that none of the two sides could integrate with any other state, and even though Northern Cyprus has not actually joined with the Turkish state, it accepts much-needed economic and financial aid, thus becoming economically and financially integrated with Turkey. In addition to this integration, Turkey also provides security (with stationed Turkish troops), as well as foreign policy. This suggests a degree of political integration as well, that, if developed further, could jeopardise the autonomy of the Northern Cypriot state and make it more difficult for it to become internationally recognised as an independent state.
So we can see, that the Turkish Cypriots, feeling like a threatened minority, received very extensive guarantees that their interests would be safeguarded—‘more extensive, perhaps than any ever written into a constitution for the protection of a minority community,’ (Adams, Cottrell 1968:7); this makes the reason for Turkey’s invasion questionable, since there was no need for external intervention for protection purposes. This leads us to believe that the only reason Turkey intervened was because it wanted to secure a permanent presence on the island.

Although these guarantees were acceptable initially, the Greek Cypriots felt that they had become ‘privileges by which the minority [could] frustrate the rule of the majority,’ (Adams, Cottrell 1968: 10) since if the Turkish Cypriots ever felt threatened by the Greeks, they knew they had Turkish back-up. The need to use the rights of a Guarantor Power was more likely to arise in the case of Turkey, since the Turks formed the minority in Cyprus, and felt that this right ensured their security. The Turkish military has remained in Cyprus because of a request for military aid from the Turkish Cypriot “government”, and Turkey maintains that its military forces are still present, and will remain so in Northern Cyprus for protection purposes and in order to defend the Turkish Cypriots against any attack by the Greek Cypriots, who are much greater in number.

Turkey further maintains that if a state asks for military support from another state for protection, it does not necessarily mean that the other state has integrated with it, rules it, or is in control of it. Turkey does not want to withdraw its troops because it supports and recognizes the Turkish Cypriots. However, if the Turkish Cypriots still feel a need for a Turkish military guarantee to protect them, then this still ties the Turks of Cyprus to Turkey, and this is something that stands in the way of these peoples’ sovereignty; the Turkish Cypriots cannot be considered a sovereign people if they always depend on the backing of Turkey to keep them reassured of their position, and this gives the impression that the Turkish Cypriots do not wish to act as a sovereign people.
2.6 TURKISH CYPRIOt ASPIRATIONS FOR EQUAITY AFTER THE TURKISH INVASION

With the 1974 occupation and partition, the full decolonisation of Cyprus was only enjoyed for a little more than a decade (fourteen years to be specific); full independence was short-lived, and a setback to full decolonization.

Nevertheless, the militant minority’s feeling of statehood and aspirations toward building a nation-state had strengthened; they strove for recognised independence and sovereign nation-state status, and, since they were now free from Greek Cypriot rule, the Turkish Cypriots were able to exercise self-government in a designated area. The Turkish Cypriot Parliament declared its independence and sovereignty, based on the right of self-determination—this was further proved when, in the year after the Turkish armed force had seized Northern Cyprus, Denktash (the Turkish Cypriot leader of the time, who had actually invited Turkish intervention in 1974) declared the establishment of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (that is the occupied northern part of Cyprus) on 13 February 1975; this was only recognised by Turkey (Attalides 1979:187) This newly established “State” had protection from Turkey’s military presence on the island. Furthermore, not only did Northern Cyprus become socially integrated with Turkey, since Turkish troops occupied the island, but it also became economically integrated with Turkey, because as a matter of fact, the 1975 “Turkish Federated State” was totally dependent on Turkish economic aid, (Attalides 1979: 187) thus violating the Treaty of Guarantee.

The social integration of mainland Turks into Northern Cyprus did not only involve the Turkish occupation force; in August 1975, there were plans to re-organise the population of the island in order to strengthen the Turkish population of the North—this was by importing and settling mainland Turks in the occupied area, thus changing the demographic character of the island. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus argued that with the systematic colonization of the North and thus the increasing of the Turkish population

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11 There were plans to increase the population of the north from 110,000 to 200,000 by importing and settling mainland Turks. To begin with, 44,000 mainland settlers were sent by Turkey to colonize the occupied area, and 40,000 mainland troops were given the right to acquire Cypriot citizenship after the invasion. (Attalides, M. Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, 1979, pg. 187)
in that area, the local Greek Cypriot population living there was being forced south. There was also a widespread belief that the compulsion of the Turkish Cypriots to move to the Turkish occupied areas were all part of Turkey's long-standing expansionist policy to join the North of Cyprus to Turkey.

Therefore, after the invasion, Turkey's aims were being pursued as follows: the occupied part of Cyprus was being integrated economically, politically and socially with Turkey, while Turkish proposals for a solution provided for a partitioned Cyprus with two states, where one would be a Turkish settlement in the North, and the other a Greek Cypriot settlement in the South. The two states would be linked by a joint foreign policy, in which Turkey and the Greek Cypriots would have an equal say. (Attalides 1979:187)

As a result, because of the many problems Cyprus faced after attaining its autonomy, specifically, the demands of Turkey, the failure of the constitution, the occupation of the island, and the declaration by the international community of the legally invalid status of the Northern Cypriot entity, numerous attempts were made by international bodies to help negotiate a solution to the Cyprus problem. So, by the late 1970s the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, with UN encouragement, had engaged in negotiations towards the creation of an acceptable solution that was again focussed on a ‘bi-zonal, bi-communal federation’. (Dodd 2001: 36)

While a number of issues were agreed on, the core point of frustration this time was (again) centred on the issue of sovereignty. Greek Cyprus, the UN and later the EU, were to insist that the federation be comprised of a single sovereign entity, whereas the Turkish representatives insisted on a separate sovereignty for their part of the country and (merely) a political association between the divided North and South. After many failed attempts at negotiations, essentially focussing around the same issues, and with the UN

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12 Even though the Turks stated that the remaining Greek Cypriots in the North (about 30 000) would be allowed to stay in the Turkish occupied area, by the beginning of 1977, all but the inhabitants of one village (about 2000) were expelled, completing the elimination of a centuries old mixed settlement pattern (Attalides Op.cit. 1979, Pg. 187), and producing a ‘purely Turkish’ and ‘purely Greek’ state in Cyprus.
demanding the withdrawal of Turkish troops off the island, the North made a unilateral declaration of independence in 1983\textsuperscript{13} and renamed itself the “TRNC”.

2.6.1 The 1983 Constitution of the “TRNC”

Even though an unrecognised state entity, the Turks of the North declared their independence, and with this declaration came the establishment of a new constitution for the North-‘the Turkish Cypriot People has, in exercise of its right to self determination, proclaimed before the world and history the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’.\textsuperscript{14}

While reading the “TRNC” Constitution, it is instantly made clear that what has mainly influenced these people and their Constitution is the Turkish nation-‘Turkish Cypriots are an inseparable part of the Turkish nation.’\textsuperscript{15} It would have been understandable to expect that the Turkish Cypriots, with their cut-off territory and with a predominantly Muslim population, would function as other Islamic nations, where ‘in one form or another, Islamic law would be the law of the land.’ (Jansen 1997:5) However, because of mainly the secular influence from the Turkish state, as well as the influence from the Greek Cypriots and their many years on the island, the Turkish Cypriot nation preferred to be, like the mainland Turks, not under the control of religious leaders, but, instead, have a more “European” outlook, and as a modern nation- state adopt democracy in their territory.

So, even though the majority of Turkish Cypriots are followers of Islam, unlike other predominantly Muslim societies the “TRNC” is ‘faithful to the principles of Ataturk,’\textsuperscript{16} and it claims to be a secular state and a democracy, as specified in the first Article of the 1985 “TRNC” Constitution –‘The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a secular republic based on the principles of supremacy of democracy, social justice and

\textsuperscript{14} ‘Preamble’ in “The Constitution of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”.
\textsuperscript{15} Loc.cit.
\textsuperscript{16} Loc.cit.
law.\textsuperscript{17} Even though religious instruction is obligatory at school, there is no state religion, religious leaders have little influence in politics and Turkish Cypriots are free to choose their own religion. It can thus be presumed that Islam plays virtually no role in the functioning of the “TRNC” and did not really influence Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

2.6.2 The Re-Naming of the Northern Cypriot Entity

Although the name of the “Turkish Federated State” was altered to the “TRNC”, nothing about this entity’s illegality had changed, and just like its predecessor, its sovereignty remained unrecognised by all but Turkey, and it was condemned by resolutions of the UN Security Council and the EU as an illegal partition of the island. Despite the disapproval of the international community the northern sector actually did, and, until today, still does possess a functioning government in the area it occupies.

Therefore, even though theoretically the “TRNC” does not exist, in practise it is also not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus; instead, the “TRNC” continues to administer the northern part of Cyprus illegally. The “TRNC” though, still desires the equality of status of the two sides, and furthermore believes that it should be recognized as a single international personality governing itself. The international community still refuses, and is reluctant to grant sovereign status or recognize the “TRNC” as it stands. The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, feel as though they should be granted statehood, and because they feel themselves to be functioning as a state, reject the fact that the Greek Cypriot government acts as the Republic of Cyprus, or that it has any legal authority to represent the entire island on any issues whatsoever-they wish to represent themselves and have an equal say in any decision-making the Greek Cypriots have. By the same token, they have insisted that the EU, or any international organisation, does not have the right to negotiate, or reach agreements pertaining to Cyprus, without the Turkish Cypriot authorities having an opinion, as well as an equal say with the Greek Cypriots; they wish to become an equal and autonomous political partner to the majority- the Turkish Cypriots thus demand

‘absolute equality in the government of the island,’ (Dodd 2001: 28) which they believe will prevent the Greek Cypriots from applying a majoritarian solution to the island.

The Turkish minority therefore believes in its right to a specific territory, the right to sovereignty, and the right to political equality (which was granted after the independence of the island, but failed to have effect). The Turkish Cypriot group occupying the northern third could therefore be described as a self-conscious group within the recognised Greek nation-state, which occupies an illegitimate territory, and is aspiring for, through collective self-determination, nation-state status. This ethnic group does not recognise or accept the legitimate ruling government of the south as having any jurisdiction over their group or territory, even though the Republic of Cyprus is considered by the international community to be the sole government of the island. The Turkish Cypriots have constantly rejected and denied Greek Cypriot rule over what they believe is their legal, autonomous state, and they insist instead that the Republic of Cyprus is an illegal regime (since it does not recognise the Turkish controlled part of the island), and is therefore illegally representing their portion of the island in decisions representing not only them, but the whole of the country.

In Cyprus’ case then, the minority’s ultimate goal is for the acquired Turkish Cypriot territory to be recognized as a sovereign entity, and function as such. The Turkish Cypriots have always strived for liberation from Greek Cypriot rule-they have sought sovereign status for their northern territory, and have, to an extent, fulfilled it. Although one of their goals has been met in that the “TRNC” does function (to an extent), as a sovereign entity, it has not been recognised as such. Since the Turkish Cypriots have nevertheless become a majority in their own self-declared state, they have formed their own nation-state. After the occupation of the island, with the integration of both the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish settlers, who brought along their nationality or nationhood, they formed a mixed set of a Turkish population, but nevertheless still had their religion and language as a common trait. Thus, after the 1974 partition of the island, as well as the unilateral declaration of the “TRNC”, we could say that a Turkish Cypriot nation was formally formed.
After the 1974 invasion, and especially with the 1984 self-declaration of the “TRNC”, the Turkish Cypriots again proved that they were an unusual minority—they were a minority which had (putting aside the circumstances) formed their own state, shaped their own constitution, (under which they are still governed), and secured their future, with Turkey’s backing, of course. Furthermore, even though the Turkish Cypriots are a minority of the island as a whole, they are (since the partition of the island), within the “TRNC”, the majority, and are (self) determined to become recognised as an international community. Hence we can see that within the “TRNC” there exists the Turkish Cypriot majority which means that there is a minority in this area which is subject to the Turkish Cypriot majority, thus repeating the cycle of the dominating majority and the subordinate, dominated minority.

2.7 CONTINUING NATIONALISM OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS

As we have seen, with the minority group we are dealing with here, it is important to note that the Turkish Cypriots are by no means a weak group (especially with the help of Turkey), and did in fact transform the situation in which it found itself. After acquiring equal rights in a rather loose constitution, as well as forming their own, unrecognised, “Republic”, the Turkish Cypriots though a numerical minority, have ‘strenuously objected to outsiders characterization of them as a minority,’ (Bahchelli 2001: 209) and have in fact declared themselves an equal entity to the majority. Since the early days of independence, they have insisted on the principle of political equality for both Greek and Turkish communities.

This proves that the Turkish Cypriots believe in their importance as a community in the general population structure, as well as in their significance in the functioning of the country as a whole, thus rendering them not a minority, but instead an equal entity. This approach however, as ideal as it sounds, is quite unrealistic, especially from a political standpoint: even though the Turkish Cypriots did strive for legal equality in the country’s post-independence 1960 Constitution, and were theoretically granted such equality, in
practise they were never seriously recognised as having an equal political partnership with the Greek Cypriots, by the Greek Cypriots themselves.

According to the rule of democracy, a minority cannot become such an important political player, nor expect equal status in political decision-making, since such decision-making is chosen by the majority, and thus belongs to the majority. This is accepted quite normally in other democratic states, but serious problems arise where ‘there are states within the state.’ (Rodinson 1989:62) Even though theoretically the “TRNC” is not a state, in practise the North can be regarded as a state within a state, since it is totally self-ruled by the Turkish Cypriots.

In a liberal democracy, what is generally accepted is that even though the vote of each member of the minority group counts as much as anyone else’s, ultimately the vote of the majority triumphs. This is because of the principle of universal suffrage. This principle of universal suffrage includes that even though voters have equal input, there is unequal output under conditions of division. That means that even though in a democracy the minority is protected, it does not have the right or the power to veto any outcome or decision of the majority. The majority thus always ends up being politically superior. This is the exact reason the Turkish Cypriots wish for a bi-zonal, bi-communal state, because in such a state the Greek Cypriots will not be politically superior, and will therefore not be able to enforce their political will on the Turkish Cypriot minority.

Ultimately the Turkish Cypriots can be described as ‘numerically a minority and not dominant in [a] state, with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics different from those of the majority of the population, bound up with one another… aiming at de facto and de jure equality with the majority.’ (Chaliand 1989:7) The Turkish Cypriots are thus just that-a group (which is striving for political equality) which has different ethnic, linguistic and religious features from the Greek Cypriot majority-they are only a “physical-numerical” minority. In Cyprus’ case then, we can safely say that there is only a minority because there is a majority. The Turkish Cypriots are only a numerical minority because they are not treated like other minorities-they are treated as the (illegal)
occupants of a territory - a minority of a different kind since they have their own army for their safety, security, and protection.

In the present then, Turkish Cypriots can still be regarded as nationalists, not only because of their nationalistic characteristics and aims with regard to their sovereignty, but because of the way they present their political struggle - as ‘a homogenous society against outside oppressors.’ (Minogue 1969:154) The outside oppressors here are not only the Greeks of the island, but also, importantly, all those preventing the legitimization of the Turkish Cypriot state, that is, the whole of the international community, and also several other Muslim states who do not accept Northern Cyprus as a legitimate entity. Apart from Turkey, no member of international bodies, including other Muslim states such as Azerbaijan and Pakistan, has recognized the Turkish Cypriots. For this reason, the Cyprus issue has also caused problems for Turkey, from an international point of view, particularly from the EU and the UN.

It can be argued that minorities turn into nationalists, not only because they wish to become an important recognised entity within a specific nation, but because many nationalist movements ‘strive for freedom and self-government’. (Minogue 1967:25) Furthermore, with nationalist movements, there is the ‘attempt to modify state boundaries or areas of sovereignty.’ (Attalides 1979: vii) This is for what Turkish Cypriot nationalists have strived, and have to a certain extent, achieved, since they do freely govern themselves in their own territory. In addition, with regard to the modifying of state boundaries, there was a creation of a permanent boundary which still separates the two main ethnic groups of the island; with the occupation of the North, the minority was permanently, by their own free will, separated from the majority Greeks of the island; the “green-line” became the boundary, patrolled by UNFICYP (which was meant to keep

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19 UNFICYP was set up in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. After the hostilities of 1974, ‘the Mission's responsibilities were expanded. UNFICYP remains on the island to supervise ceasefire lines, maintain a buffer zone and undertake humanitarian activities.’ United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus, 2006.
each side isolated from the other side), and which was also a first step for the North to becoming a self-governing state.

It can also be argued however, that, as idealistic as it sounds for groups to want to achieve a substantial amount of freedom, to strive for such freedom and self-government often brings up unrealistic hopes. The Turkish Cypriots do have freedom and self-government, but only a limited amount of self-government, because even though the government is considered as a legitimate one by the Turkish Cypriots and by Turkey, its legitimacy is unrecognised by the rest of the world, and furthermore, this government has no say in any of the issues concerning the third of the island which they occupy, or on any matter concerning the whole of the island; instead the Greek Cypriots speak on behalf of both sides. Thus, the Turkish Cypriots cannot perform important political functions that other nation-states can.

2.8 THE ROLE OF TURKEY IN CYPRUS’ AFFAIRS

It is clear that the role of Turkey in Turkish Cypriot, and Cypriot affairs in general, has been one of much importance, because it has helped influence decisions as well as shape the situation in which Cyprus, has found, and still finds itself. The political situation in Northern Cyprus is especially dominated by the presence of Turkish occupation forces, the Turkish mainland settlers, and thus the overwhelming influence of Turkey. Even though Greece’s influence has to a great extent lessened in Cyprus, Turkey’s influence in the island’s affairs has in recent years intensified (one of the reason’s being because of Turkey’s aspirations in becoming an EU member).

The “TRNC”, in spite of the independence and equality it claims, would, without Turkey not exist at all. Because Turkey still, to a large extent, influences the decisions of the “TRNC”, it has not been on good terms with the international community, which is one of the main factors largely affecting Turkey’s chances of being able to enter Europe as an EU member. Even though Turkey provides a considerable amount of aid to the “TRNC”, Turkey’s bridge to Cyprus is via the Turkish Cypriots, and one has to question whether
the national interest of Turkey is really the same as that of the Turkish Cypriots, or whether Turkey has other motives, since it is no secret that Turkey continues to control the political situation in northern Cyprus and ‘dictates the policy’ of the Turkish Cypriot community on the Cyprus question.20

Because of Turkey’s role in “TRNC” matters then, the Turkish Cypriots cannot expect to be regarded as a serious entity. For this to change, Turkey should not appear to be in political control of the “TRNC”, or in economic control of it either, which is nevertheless the case. If the “TRNC” is to continue its existence, and not just disintegrate, then it seems Turkey will have to continue providing economic aid, since the “TRNC” is not capable of becoming economically prosperous, not only because of its weak economic state, but also because of the economic embargo (which is discussed in greater detail below). Consequently, the economic aid to the North provided by Turkey will have to continue to sustain the “TRNC” as best it can, and carry on taking responsibility for the “TRNC”.

This can be shown by examining the events from the point when accession negotiations of the island began, leading up to the actual joining of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU. In July 1997, it was stated in the Turkey-TRNC Joint Statement that the closer that South Cyprus moved to the EU, the closer must integration be between Turkey and the “TRNC” (Dodd 2001:31), thus again threatening the union of northern Cyprus to Turkey. Furthermore, in the 1999-2000 UN proximity talks, the UN Secretary-General, ‘accorded predominance’ to the Greek Cypriots in a suggested federal constitutional framework—they were assured of the major voice in both legislation and in decisions of the executive Council of Ministers. (Dodd 2001:28) This was the case, clearly because of the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus, and the illegality of the “TRNC”. The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, despite their constant pressures on the international community to become recognized, were pushed further away, and were troubled by this decision which they saw as denying them equal political status. One of the ways Turkey dealt with this

was by advancing the threat of the 1997 talks. This however, not only goes against the Treaties established in 1960, but would also have devastating results, not only for the status of the island, but also for the “TRNC’s”- as well as Turkey’s- relationship with Europe and the international community. Later however, both sides, not wanting to jeopardise their chances at EU accession, decided not to go forward with this threat. The fact however remains that the less the Greek Cypriots extend friendship towards Turkish Cypriots, the more the latter will turn to Turkey.

2.9 NATIONALISM: SURVIVING OR DYING NOTION?

As we have seen, the idea of opposing nationalisms has played a significant role in the events leading to the present state of Cyprus. So when considering the notion of nationalism, it is interesting to note where this idea is heading and whether it still plays a part in the formation of certain nations. The idea of nationalism is one which, as has already been mentioned, gives people a sense of belonging together as a nation. While moving towards the future, the role of nationalism, just like other ideas and entities, should be taken into consideration, and is not one which can just be forgotten, overlooked or taken for granted. It is an idea which has played a significant role throughout history, and even before nationalistic action was given the name “nationalism”. When discussing minority nationalism, and in this case, the Turkish Cypriot minority, it is interesting to see whether this feeling of nationalism will strengthen over time, or, as according to certain theories, will weaken and fade away.

There are many theories about minority nationalism, what its importance in the past has been in forming the nation-state, as well as what its role in the future will be. Several theorists have argued that nationalism is no longer important for the future. For example, E. Hobsbawm argues that even though there was a role for minority nationalists in the past, they will no longer play a role in the future, because there is no place for them in a constantly transforming future.21

21 Hobsbawm, E. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 1990, pg 192
2.9.1 The Idea of Nationalism as Viewed by Hobsbawm

Hobsbawm argues that ‘the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is modernity.’ (Hobsbawm 1990:14) Thus, the idea of nationalism initially takes place under modernisation and hence under the modern nation state. In Hobsbawm’s “Nations and Nationalism Since 1780”, Hobsbawm goes further to argue that the age of nationalism is past. (Moore 2001: 44) He views nationalism as a backward and ‘atavistic romanticism of the past which may ‘die’ a prolonged and difficult death as its adherents resist the inevitable change that accompanies global capitalism, but that is doomed to the ‘dustbin’ of history.” (Moore 2001: 45) This belief by Hobsbawm argues that whether nationalists agree with globalization or not, global capitalism will rid the world of nationalism, and when looking and moving toward the future, it does not require, support or have any space for the notion of nations and nationalism, especially with the progression of globalisation.22

Minority nationalism, by which is meant the assertion of small nationalities within larger states, is, Hobsbawm argues, an attempt to copy the nation-state model; he believes that since the nation-state is itself outdated, the copy of it-minority nationalism-is also outdated, and should also be dismissed as a ‘doomed romanticism.’ (Moore 2001: 46) This is a doomed” minority nationalism, with its celebration of the particular-that is, particular national and cultural identities and this is due to ‘economic forces in favour of increased political cooperation at the supranational level and increasingly standardized cultural forms across the globe.’ (Moore 2001: 45) The end result of cultural forms becoming more and more standardised, will be “doomed romanticisms”, and that implies the doing away with ones culture and the acquiring of a new single, universal culture.

Hobsbawm therefore points out that because the nation-state is a modern construction, it also has to function within modernity, and since modernity entails globalization, it is suggested that with the modern nation-state, nationalism no longer makes sense, (Moore

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22 Globalization is ‘increased global economic trade, the liberation of economic markets, the advance of the multinational corporation to many corners of the globe, and capital mobility.’ Moore, M. ‘Globalisation, Cosmopolitanism, and Minority Nationalism’ in M. Keating and J. McGary, (eds.) Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order, 2001, Pg.44
and that because nationalism no longer makes sense, then neither does minority nationalism- thus globalisation will lead to the demise of minority nationalism. Particular national identities and cultures, he argues, will thus also be dissolved by globalisation, because the more globalisation dissolves particular identities, the greater the similarities of national identities, and the loss of ones identity in the ‘melting-pot’ of the new world. (Hobsbawm 1962: 97) This “acculturation”, Hobsbawm argues, will lead to the demise of minority nationalism, and thus will result in increased cultural homogeneity.

It is also argued by Hobsbawm, that attempts to establish objective criteria for nationhood, or to explain why certain groups have become ‘nations’ and others not, have often been made based on single criteria, such as language or ethnicity, or a combination of criteria, such as language, common territory, cultural traits or whatever else,(Hobsbawm 1990:5) which he believes are not sufficient because things such as language, ethnicity, and other traits are themselves ‘fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous, and as useless for purposes as the traveller’s orientation as cloud-shapes are confined to landmarks.’(Hobsbawm 1990: 6)

When considering the different theories put forward by Hobsbawm of nationalism and minority nationalism, several concerns arise.

2.9.2 The Misconceptions Arising from Hobsbawm’s ‘Nationalism’

When looking toward the future, it is difficult to picture one without distinct groups with special characteristics; it is difficult to envisage a future without conflict of different ethnic groups, let alone one with a single, standardised, homogenous crowd. Therefore, it is also difficult to imagine one which does not have space for nationalism, as is expressed by Hobsbawm. There are many arguments which could be made against the ideas put forward by him.

Firstly, it can be argued that, not only will minorities not disappear in the future, but instead, they might even become stronger than before. Ethnicity is not likely to disappear
‘so long as there are nations, inequality, and perceived injustice in the way the good things of the world are distributed among the peoples of the world.’ (Nash 1989:128) So minority nationalism, will not just disappear, not only because there will always exist ethnic groups, but also because there will more likely than not always be inequality, and the more the inequality, the more nationalistic aims will be sought. Furthermore, the idea that globalisation will dissolve everything, can also be regarded as fallacious, since today, nationalism and especially minority nationalism, still strongly exist in most parts of the world. Secondly, considering the fact that even if globalisation does lead to increased acculturation, it does not necessarily mean that nationalism or minority nationalism will just, without notice or some kind of resistance, disappear, and thus cause a national loss of identity.

Considering that the loss of a group’s culture (thus acculturation) on exceptional occasions can occur, it has to be recognised that not only will the characteristics and identity of distinct groups not just easily be given up, leading to a loss of identity, but, also, the giving up of ones identity in order to become absorbed and incorporated into an identity of a different kind thus forming an altogether different identity, is not only a rather idealistic conception, but one which will be very difficult to accomplish. Even if globalisation does lead to increased cultural homogeneity, it does not necessarily mean that minority nationalism will be eroded.

By contrast, there is nothing which positively proves that all identities will fuse into one new identity. In fact, in a post-modern world, in order to preserve certain cultural practises and identities which tie people with their past and are a constant reminder of it, there could possibly be a decrease in cultural homogeneity, thus increasing cultural diversity instead. Some also argue that in a post-modern world, ‘the nation and its context are being transformed’, and these transformations in fact tend ‘to strengthen minority nationalism, rather than suggest its obsolescence.’ (Moore 2001: 46)

Finally, Hobsbawm argues that with the effects of modernity and globalisation nationalism’s age is past and it only leads to backwardness; so with the effects of
modernity and globalisation (also in this case, the EU market), the implication is that nationalism will no longer be significant in any aspect of life- the ‘politics of identity’ for him, is a ‘symptom of sickness rather than diagnosis’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 192), which clearly shows that nationalism for Hobsbawm is an illusion. Modernisation and globalisation will thus have an effect on nationalism, and reduce the social impact of ethnicity and nationalism-since globalisation strives for doing away with all identities and forming a new identity for all, hence a new global identity. It should be argued however, that globalisation does not necessarily mean that an individual forgets or sheds his identity in any circumstance-this is an idealistic notion, and even if a ‘new global identity’ is a seemingly reachable goal, it does not necessarily mean the giving up of ones beliefs about ones identity. Besides, nationalism is a complex concept, and cannot be easily eliminated; it has in fact, proved to be an ongoing process. So globalisation and modernisation, can in fact lead to the strengthening-and not the elimination-of minority nationalism, since the feeling of homogeneity becomes stronger if a threat is sensed by a minority.

A nation, Hobsbawm argues, is an “invented tradition”, which is taken to mean ‘a set of practices normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.’ (Hobsbawm: 1983:1) Because there is continuity with the past and thus repetition of certain behaviours, rituals, rules and practises, it will not be a simple task for practises which have been continued throughout the years to just cease existing; certain notions, such as the nation, are not actively implemented by the population; instead, they come into existence by various means, and develop over time, accepted or not. The discontinuation of such an idea is therefore difficult to comprehend.

Hobsbawm makes an assumption that it is ‘not impossible that nationalism will decline with the decline of the nation-state.’(Hobsbawm 1990: 192) He further argues that nationalism is ‘at most a complicating factor, or a catalyst for other developments.’ (Hobsbawm 1990:190) Firstly, there is no valid reason why nationalism should decline,
let alone the nation-state. Furthermore, precisely because it is assumed that nationalism is a “catalyst for other developments”, it cannot just fade away or disappear; these “developments” might not necessarily help in the dissolving of the nation-state, and could instead positively affect the existence and growth of the nation-state. Turkish Cypriot nationalism, for instance, is one which is not ‘past its peak,’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 192) probably will not disappear any time soon, and has in fact strengthened, because of the admittance of the Greek Cypriots into the European Union, and the rejection of the Turkish Cypriots by this body.

Even with globalisation then, nationalism is evidently still important because many (just like both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots) will want to continue to savour the past and everything that goes with it; nationalists will look to “flourish” their culture and national history, thus continuing the “invented” tradition of the nation. The Turkish Cypriots, as we shall later see, wish to form a breakaway state- this can be taken to mean that such a notion of the disappearance or reduction of nationalism is not likely to happen (especially in this state).

2.9.3 The Role of ‘the Nation’ in the Future

Because the “nation” is a complex subject, it interesting to see what the requirements of a nation are, as well as what arises from the nation.

In order to form a nation, there has to be at least some sense of belonging together as a group, therefore some group consciousness and determination, and thus pre-political unity-making possible nationalism. For group consciousness and nationalists to arise though, there first has to be a state, in which these nationalists will be able to exercise their will. A state therefore does not just take form on its own without the existence of nationalists. Based on nationalistic aims then, nationalists shape the state into the form it eventually becomes. Hobsbawm argues that “the ‘nation’ as conceived by nationalism can be recognized prospectively [and] that the real ‘nation’ can only be recognized a posteriori.’ (Hobsbawm 1990:9)
He further argues that nationalism comes before nation, and that nations do not make states and nationalism, but instead that states and nationalism make nations, thus proving further that the nation is an a posteriori notion. (Hobsbawm 1990:10) Because nationalism makes nations, then, it is argued that most nationalists should have some kind of pre-political unity (Minogue 1969: 11) in order to form these nations. A nation cannot be formed therefore, if there is no group will; group will and determination will thus play a significant role in forming a nation, and a state. We can take for example the Turkish state-this was formed after nationalism-the emphasis on a national Turkish identity was important for forming the Turkish state. Similarly, the emphasis on Turkish Cypriot identity was important for forming the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. This proves that nationalism precedes, and is important for, the formation of a state.

On the other hand however, in order for a nation to arise, there has to be a state in which group consciousness and nationalism can emerge. In addition, since nationalists have some kind of pre-political unity, where will this unity come from if there is no nation? A nation can therefore also be regarded as a pre-condition for pre-political unity, thus proving that a nation does not necessarily come after a state, but in fact could precede it. For example, a Turkish Cypriot in the past acquired his/her nationalistic aims from the Turkish nation which already existed. Similarly, the Greek Cypriot nationalists who felt tied to Greece, felt a pre-political unity with the Greek nation, thus showing that a nation can in fact precede nationalism depending on the situation and time in history.

It is therefore difficult to define a nation, and where exactly its position lies in history; whether it precedes, or proceeds, other entities. A nation therefore cannot be understood on its own-it has to be explained with other entities, such as “nationalism” and “state”, and neither can “nationalism” and “state” be understood without considering what a nation is. These ideas are thus intertwined, and need each other for their functioning.
2.10 THE MAIN ISSUES TODAY

Simplified, the problem of the Turkish Cypriots is such:
Firstly, not only do the Turkish Cypriots believe in their national sovereignty, they also want their autonomous territory to have an equal status to that of the Greek Cypriots’. Secondly, the Turkish Cypriots refuse to accept that the government of the Republic of Cyprus is considered to be, theoretically, the representative of the whole island; they furthermore reject the government of south Cyprus, and regard it as illegal, since the Greek Cypriots themselves regard the “TRNC” regime as illegal. Thirdly, the Turkish Cypriots, as well as Turkey, refuse to remove Turkish troops off the island, and with the Republic’s entrance into the EU, the troops of a non-EU country occupying EU territory, is illegal.

We shall now turn our focus to the EU and the role it has played—was well as other international bodies (namely the UN) in trying to formulate a solution for the island, as well as Turkish Cypriot aspirations of fulfilling the requisite criteria and becoming EU members.
When it comes to the European Union, aspiring European countries have an ultimate goal of joining this organisation because of the many advantages and benefits on offer.

In recent years, as a result of constant accession talks being granted to several hopeful nations, much more emphasis has been placed on the Cyprus issue given the island’s aspirations of becoming an EU member. After EU criteria were successfully fulfilled, the EU provided an opportunity for both sides—the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots—to attain membership; i.e., if a solution to the Cyprus problem was reached before the proposed accession date, then the whole island would enter the EU as a reunified state. However, if a settlement was not reached, then the Greek Cypriot-controlled South would enjoy the benefits of becoming an EU member as the sole Government of Cyprus, and Northern Cyprus would remain outside the EU as an isolated territory.

3.1 RESOLUTION ATTEMPTS

Early after independence was granted to Cyprus by Britain, many plans by UN mediators were offered as a resolution to the Cyprus problem; all these attempts however, were unsuccessful. In addition, talks were also held between the two leaders of each respective side, without any progress. Eventually, in the early 2000s a proposal was presented to both sides of the island by the former UN Secretary-General Koffi Annan. This proposal, or plan, was believed by many to be the final attempt at a settlement, because it was thought to provide advantages for both sides, and both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot sides were expected to compromise and accept the terms and conditions of this specific plan, known as Annan Plan V. The numerous provisions of this 9,000 page plan were to be examined by both the Greek Cypriot as well as the Turkish Cypriot leader, as well as by each of the two communities of the island.

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3.2 THE ANNAN PLAN

In 2002, Kofi Annan expressed his growing concern for the situation in Cyprus, and hoped that both sides would finally put their differences aside and resolve all main concerns. On 11 November 2002\textsuperscript{24}, the two sides were provided with a detailed plan by the UN, about a possible solution for the island; both sides agreed to begin negotiations.

In April 2004, both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were given a chance to determine their own futures with two separate simultaneous referendums which were to be held by the two sides over this UN settlement plan. Prior to the referendums, Annan had declared that a ‘No’ from either side would render his plan null and void. However, if both sides voted positively, then the Annan Plan would take force, and the outcome would be not only a unified Cyprus, but a unified EU member.

Despite all the effort, the attempt by the UN was unsuccessful, due to both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders’ inability to come to any agreement, mainly due to lack of political will. The end result, was that the Greek Cypriots voted “No” and the Turkish Cypriots voted “Yes” for a ‘bi-zonal, bi-communal federation’,\textsuperscript{25} which was offered in the Plan. To the UN Secretary General, as well as the international community’s dismay, this reunification plan like all other attempts, failed because there was no consensus of the two sides. Even though there was a positive vote from the Turkish Cypriot side, the plan was rejected by an overwhelming seventy six percent\textsuperscript{26} of the Greek Cypriots. The day after the Greek Cypriot “No”, the Greek Cypriot President explained why such was the outcome of the vote. He stated that the UN, Europe and the US had expected the Greek Cypriots to ‘rubber stamp’ a plan that had been ‘tailored to accommodate Turkey’s demands’. He further added that the UN had also ‘ignored’ the needs of Turkish Cypriots, sixty four percent of whom nevertheless voted “Yes”.\textsuperscript{27} This Plan then, was believed to have favoured the Turkish Cypriot side more than the Greek

\textsuperscript{26} Purvis, A. ‘Holes in a Hard Line’, in Time magazine, 13 November 2006
\textsuperscript{27} Jansen, M. Op.cit.
Cypriots, since if the Plan had been accepted by both sides, then the Turkish Cypriots, who were an illegal entity, as well as isolated from the rest of Europe, would join Europe and no longer have such setbacks, and their standard of living would undoubtedly rise-the North would become “European”.

The main problematic issues of the Plan will now be discussed in order to throw light on the reasons this plan failed to satisfy Greek Cypriot criteria.

3.3 THE FAILURE OF THE ANNAN PLAN

There are several reasons why the Annan Plan was unfavourable to the Greek Cypriots; first and foremost, because the Plan stated that the Republic of Cyprus had to recognize and accept the “TRNC”, and allow it to join with the Republic of Cyprus thus becoming the “United Cyprus Republic” - this would lead to the dissolution of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, as well as of the unrecognised “TRNC”, and replace it with two largely autonomous states, which would function separately in all spheres, but also have equal political status, hence a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. The Annan state thus included political reunification of the island, which would function in a federated state structure and where there would be a power-sharing regime; therefore there would be two equal constituent states, each having substantial autonomy. This international recognition is what the “TRNC” has been striving for ever since the island was parted; this part of the Plan then, played a major role in what the decision of both sides would have been. It was expected that without hesitation, the Turkish Cypriots would accept the Plan, which a majority did; it was however, rejected by the Greeks who have, since division, refused to accept such a notion.

3.3.1 The Military Provisions of the Plan

Secondly, the Greeks feared that their safety and security (which was of utmost importance for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots) would be put at risk under the Plan; the solution proposed for the withdrawal of all but a fraction of its 35,000 to 40,000

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troops\textsuperscript{29}. This meant that even after reunification, Turkish troops would remain in Cyprus for security purposes; so with these troops remaining in Cyprus, Turkey’s status as a Guarantor Power (which entitles Turkey the right to unilateral military intervention) would be sustained. Greek Cypriots however did not trust Turkey to implement this provision which required the removal of their troops, because as in the past, Turkey has had a history of ignoring UN resolutions and international obligations, and even continued to intervene in Cyprus’ affairs after independence of the island in 1960. The Greek Cypriots thus did not have assurance that Turkish intervention would not occur again, this time in a proposed “United Cyprus Republic”.

In addition to the “demilitarisation” provision provided by the plan, a strict arms embargo would be imposed. Cyprus would also be excluded from the European Common Defence and Foreign Policy.\textsuperscript{30} However, due to the fraction of Turkish troops who were to remain stationed on the island, if Turkey ever got accession into the EU, it would still have intervention rights in the Greek Cypriot component state\textsuperscript{31}, which would be a great advantage to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, but totally unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots feared that Turkey would surely, at some point or another, intervene and interfere in their internal affairs- this is one of the reasons why they believed that this Plan accommodated Turkey’s demands. This perpetual presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus would not only be offensive to the Greek Cypriots, but also unacceptable in a country upholding democratic rights. Furthermore, after accession, this would be unacceptable in a country who, as a member state of the EU, expects to be totally free of external military forces occupying its territory. If this plan of a united Cyprus was agreed to, then, surely, argued the Greek Cypriots, military troops would not be necessary on the island, since the whole idea of the plan was that a harmonious solution be reached for a peaceful future settlement catering for both the needs and protection of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, therefore rendering troops unnecessary.

\textsuperscript{29} Jansen, M. Op.cit.
\textsuperscript{31} Since, after the 1974 invasion, and thus the breaching of the Treaty of Guarantee, this, as well as the other Treaties should have come to an end. However, none of the parties claimed that the Treaties were brought to an end, and that they became ‘invalid ab initio’, (Mendelson 2001:5) therefore Turkey still has intervention rights under certain circumstances.
The Turkish Cypriots believed otherwise though; they still argued the need for an army on the island to assure their protection from the Greek Cypriots, even though the Greeks have assured the Turkish Cypriots that their attitudes toward them have changed, and are not as they were in the past. They have often called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, assuring the Turkish Cypriots that the bitterness felt in the past has faded away, and instead hope to build a common future in a unified Cyprus. However, Turkish Cypriots are untrusting of the Greek Cypriots, and although they would also like to see a peaceful solution to the island, they still question their safety if the Turkish army left; they fear that because they are outnumbered, and are a minority, they would be assaulted by the Greek Cypriot armed force, even though there still exists an international peacekeeping force, which has been in Cyprus since 1964. Therefore, Turkey has not withdrawn its troops until it feels that lasting trust and confidence between the two communities is established. This shows a distrust toward not only the Greeks of the island, but also toward international bodies trying to create a peaceful society. The Plan also provided that the Guarantor Powers of the past- Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom- were to be granted similar powers as before, and provided that in case the constitutional order was not upheld, then each of the Guarantor powers would have the right to intervene in order to re-establish the constitutional order; the UN force would remain in Cyprus, to oversee the implementation of this type of solution, as well as to encourage the co-operation of the two sides.

3.3.2 The Inclusion of Settlers, Land Loss, and Political Equality in the Plan

In addition, and another of the main reasons the Greek Cypriots disagreed with the terms of the Plan was because this plan permitted the flow of Turkish settlers from mainland Turkey to the North, and because it ‘stipulated that sixty six percent of the population of the North should be native Turkish speakers’, thus ensuring that Cyprus would also

have an influx of more mainland Turks to the northern territory. This would change the demographic structure of the island, which would be unfavourable to the Greek Cypriot majority; in several years, the population of the Turks in the North would probably become equal with that of the Greeks in the South. Furthermore, under the Plan, 45,000 mainland Turkish settlers were to be given citizenship of Cyprus the day after the settlement, which would uncomfortably strengthen the Turkish minority.

Gaining eight percent of their lost land was a tempting consideration for the Greek Cypriots; this was one of the provisions under the plan, which proposed for the reduction of the area under Turkish control from 37 to 29 percent. This was a decision the Greeks had to make, taking into account what would be best for their safety—whether they would prefer gaining a piece of their lost land back, but run the risk of having Turkish intervention, or remain with what they had, but continue preventing Turkey’s intervention in their political issues. The Greek Cypriots clearly opted for the latter.

Furthermore, the “United Cyprus Republic” offered political equality for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, since the presidency of the United Cyprus would have switched from the one leader to the other every few months; this was one of the main objections the Greek Cypriots had against the plan, since the Turkish Cypriots living in an illegitimate and unrecognised territory, were to be given equal status to the Greek Cypriots—a proposition with which the Greek Cypriots disagreed, since as a majority, they refused to be governed every few months by a member of the minority, especially one who differentiates considerably from the majority—by religion, culture, and language. Furthermore, that proposition could have spelled disaster for both the communities living on the island, because when the one president served his term, it is most likely he would

35 Turkish settlers who entered the island after 1974, would be granted citizenship or residence rights leading to citizenship. Furthermore, the plan allowed for anyone who was already a permanent resident in Cyprus for at least five years before the agreement to be able to claim citizenship by naturalisation four years after the settlement. In practice, this would have meant that 60,000 to 75,000 immigrants, or settlers, would have been able to remain in Cyprus and become its citizens. Also, the central government would have limited control over future Turkish immigration, and those settlers opting to return to Turkey would be compensated by Cyprus, but even though Turkey systematically brought in the settlers to alter the demography of the 2 communities, it had no responsibility for their repatriation. (Coufoudakis. V. Op cit.)

favour his people, and perhaps even worsen conditions for the other group, thus making each term served unfair to the other side. Turkey would also surely intervene when the Turkish Cypriot Presidency’s term would be served, and since Northern Cyprus can be regarded as a puppet state of Turkey, Turkish policies would probably enter Cyprus.

The Greek Cypriots further argued that the cost of economic reunification would be born by them, and that the reunification cost had been estimated close to 2 billion dollars, while the donors conference pledged only about 750 million dollars, which was not even half of the required amount. Not only would this damage the economy of the Greek South, but the Greek Cypriots would basically be paying for something they were against—for Turkey keeping both intervention rights as well as those of an occupying force.

3.3.3 The Declining of the Plan by the Two Leaders

The totality of the Plan was therefore seen as negative to Greek Cypriot interests and to those of the Republic of Cyprus, mainly because of protection and security reasons from the threatening minority and its ally. To prove this further, the Greek Cypriot President stated that one of the main reasons for rejecting the Plan, was that, “twenty four hours after a “Yes” vote in the referendum, the Republic of Cyprus will cease to exist” which clearly shows a case of distrust of Turkey, since the representative of the Greek Cypriot people believed that Turkey would no doubt intervene and thus negatively affect the state. It is not unusual then, that the Greek Cypriot President, in a speech to the nation, called on his people to reject the plan, as he felt that this proposed Plan favoured the North. Because of this speech, many myths were promoted about the Greek Cypriot “No” vote. It was argued that it was this speech that turned the Greek Cypriot public against the plan. Even though Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots blame the Greek Cypriot President for the negative outcome, it should not be assumed that it is exclusively because of this speech that the Greek Cypriots voted the way they did. It must be noted,

that most Greek Cypriots had already made up their minds one week before the speech\textsuperscript{39} on how they would vote, taking into consideration the consequences, positive and negative of the Plan itself, and on whether they felt themselves to be better off. Furthermore, a speech can not easily persuade or dissuade individuals of what actions they should take if they already have their minds made up.

What must also be considered, is that, by contrast, even though the Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Plan, the Turkish Cypriot leader of the time, Denktash, like the Greek Cypriot leader, opposed the Plan, even though the Plan was considered to favour his side. Denktash, one of the main obstacles to reconciliation on the island, was clearly against this Plan, and openly expressed his negative feelings towards it. He urged his people not to accept the Plan by voting against it, and thus against a peaceful solution and reunification. The Turkish Cypriot community though felt differently, since on 26 December 2002, a mass rally was held in the Turkish occupied part of Nicosia, in which 30,000 Turkish Cypriots called for the acceptance of the Plan so that a solution of the Cyprus problem could be found by 28 February 2003, and criticised their leader for his negative stance through the negotiations, calling on him at the same time to resign, since he was accused of dragging Cyprus into permanent division.\textsuperscript{40}

The Turkish Cypriot people, opposing their leader’s outlook, did not vote against the Plan, and, by voting in favour of it, disregarded their leader’s advice. One can assume however that their vote was cast in this way, not out of disrespect of Denktash, but because of their desperate desire for an improved lifestyle. Even though certain individuals or groups were persuaded by their leader to oppose the Plan, just like the Greek Cypriots, many of them preferred to trust their instincts. Only individuals who did not know the conditions of the Plan, or had not read the provisions of the Plan, would probably be persuaded by a single speech; but such an important document—which spelt

\textsuperscript{39} There was a seventy percent negative vote among Greek Cypriot voters, as expressed in US Embassy and other polls, proving that most of the Greek Cypriots had their minds made up before the speech was actually delivered, in ‘Cyprus Split Over UN Plan’ in Kathimerini Newspaper, Op.cit.

\textsuperscript{40} ‘Recent Documents’, in Press and Information Office, Op.cit. Denktash, was later replaced by the new Turkish Cypriot leader, Talat who was opposed to his predecessor and in favour of the Plan.
out the future of the Cypriot people if accepted-was surely not overlooked or ignored by anyone interested in the safety and security of their future.

The only Greek Cypriot people who voted “Yes” to the plan, or Turkish Cypriot people who voted “No”, were people (probably senior citizens in villages) who did not, or could not, read or understand the Plan and what it entailed. The prospect of Cyprus gaining an extra eight percent of land, for example, would probably have appealed to, and influenced refugees’ decisions, since they would be able to return to their previous homes. Other Greeks, and Turks who could have supported the Plan, were probably members of the public who were annoyed with the long-winded road of solution seeking, and were indifferent to any outcome, providing that such an outcome would offer peace, which would in the end result in the majority and minority residing together in a harmonious society. A major concern however, was that this Plan was very long (9,000 pages) which would cause many provisions to remain unread; furthermore, political parties from each side could have used the fact that the plan was so long to their advantage-to focus, highlight and provide the people with what they found appealing, and to work on areas catching the interest of their followers.

3.4 HOW THE OUTCOME OF THE PLAN AFFECTED BOTH SIDES

In the end however, even though the Greek Cypriots voted negatively for the Annan Plan, they nevertheless became EU members (and were heavily criticised by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey), which shows that since a settlement on the island was not a prerequisite for membership, it did not matter whether the Greek Cypriots voted in favour or against the Plan because whatever the result, they would still gain membership. They did not see then, the need to have to agree to the Plan’s terms and accept it. They further believed that if a solution could be reached, it would probably only happen post-EU membership, where they could use the backing of the EU against the occupation regime.

The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, rightly felt disappointed with the outcome, since, even though they voted in favour of the Plan, and in favour of what the EU
proposed, they did not gain much in return. The Turkish Cypriots’ “Yes” vote, gave the Turkish Cypriot group false hope and expectations that their positive vote would have an impact on the UN and EU, and a special preference would be made for them, to improve their lives. Their decision however, did not bring any advantages to the Turkish Cypriots, since nothing changed about the illegality of the “TRNC”.

Shortly after the outcome of the Plan was declared, a formal statement from Annan was read out by his envoy, Mr de Soto, which said, ‘“Annan, intends to give careful thought to the implications of [the] result. Once he has done so he will report to the UN Security Council that will decide whether or not the plan will remain alive.” ’ 41 Annan must have naturally been annoyed with the outcome of the referendums, especially over the Greek Cypriot rejection, because he and his team invested a great deal of time and effort (9,000 pages) in an attempt to resolve the Cypriot problem; this, however, is exactly the reason that UN officials will not give up on trying to find a solution to the problem since one is so close and still in reach. Also, shortly after the outcome, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, turned down and dismissed the possibility of calling for new negotiations and another referendum, and proposed that, since the Plan was rejected by the Greeks, but accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, it was only fair that the “TRNC” enter the EU as a breakaway state, and that this breakaway state be internationally recognised. 42

Calling Greek Cypriots to rethink or even recast their “No” vote would be fruitless because they would undoubtedly not change their views about the issue; in 2006 opinion polls, this was further proved-it showed that over sixty percent of Greek Cypriots still opposed the plan. 43 Furthermore, in mid-2006, presidential elections were held in Greek Cyprus, where Papadopoulos (the president who was in power during the referendum, and who urged the nation to vote against the Plan) won the majority vote again. This proves that the Greek Cypriot people have showed confidence in their leader and his decisions.

42 Loc.cit.
3.5 GREEK CYPRiot EU MEMBERSHIP

Since the Greek part of the island is recognised as a sovereign republic, and recognised as representing the whole of the island of Cyprus, several years ago the EU offered it the prospect of joining the Union, leading to the Republic of Cyprus submitting its application for membership in 1990. Cyprus and the EU (the then European Community) first signed an association agreement in 1972 (Bahchelli, 2001: 205) The aspirations of a majority people to become an EU member could not be ignored by the EU, and it was expected that if Greek Cyprus entered the EU alone, the desire of EU membership benefits would encourage the bulk of Turkish Cypriots to subsequently join. The EU also hoped that the prospect of membership would give both sides a reason to settle their differences. It tried to emphasize the economic benefits of membership to the poorer Turkish Cypriot side, and by doing this hoped to persuade the Turkish Cypriots to accept a settlement to the island’s disputes. Even though the Republic of Cyprus would benefit from membership, they would also have much to offer as a member state, such as the healthy state of its economy, as well as its geographically strategic position in the Mediterranean, regardless of its small size. The Turkish Cypriots believed that the EU offered accession negotiations to the Greek Cypriots because there was a European solidarity with the EU and the Greek Cypriot government, (Bahchelli 2001:209) not only because the Greek Cypriots have a European identity, but also because of a Christian solidarity against Islamism.

Greek Cypriot application for EU entry was not at all for economic reasons, since South Cyprus is quite prosperous, and even though membership would be economically beneficial to the state, the Greek Cypriots’ main goal was security. They hoped that Turkey’s Guarantor status would become ineffective, ultimately hoping for the total demilitarization of the Republic, which would remove, to some extent, Turkey’s influence on the island and also restrain Turkey from taking armed action against them. Thus, the Greek Cypriots sought EU membership whether or not a settlement was reached, because by achieving this, the Cyprus problem would not just remain a problem of Cyprus, but would most likely turn into a European problem. The Greek Cypriots
would thus be in an advantageous position because they would feel that a “European” solution to the Cyprus problem could be attained if they were EU members. On the other hand though, with membership, it would also be possible for the EU to force the Greek side, as a member, to work out a solution, and not just expect the problem to be solved by Europe.

Nevertheless, in response to the EU’s backing of the Greek Cypriot bid for accession, Turkey threatened to integrate the self-declared “TRNC” with Turkey, because Turkey believed that with Greek Cypriot membership, Turkey’s influence on the island would be reduced, or perhaps even removed. The Turkish Cypriots held that accession talks and the possible membership of Cyprus to the EU should have awaited settlement of the island’s (ethnic) disputes. It was highly desirable to both sides, as well as to the international community, that a settlement on the island be reached before the island be entered as an EU member, thus the provision of the UN Plan as a possible solution.

The Greek Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus nevertheless finally embarked on accession negotiations on 31 March 1998, and on 13 December 2002, the European Council of Copenhagen decided that Cyprus, together with nine other candidate countries, would become members of the EU on 1 May 2004, with no pre-conditions attached, which meant that whether or not a solution was found to the Cyprus problem, the recognized Greek Cypriot South would become an EU member.

After the Greek Cypriot controlled part of the island was admitted into the EU, former Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, stated that membership in the EU for Cyprus ‘violate[d] the 1960 Constitution that established the Republic of Cyprus,’ (Bahchelli, 2001: 210) and according to which the island could not join any body of which both Greece and Turkey were not members, therefore not allowing South Cyprus to become an EU member since Turkey is not a part of it. However, EU officials rejected this view, and an observer stated that this restriction did not apply to a sui generic organism such as the EU, any more than a similar provision in Austria’s 1955 State Treaty to prevent a reunion of Austria with Germany, stopped Austria from joining the EU. (Bahchelli, 2001: 210)
Furthermore, Cyprus already met ‘the convergence criteria set for participation in the third stage of economic and monetary union;’ (Bahchelli, 2001: 208) Cyprus thus entered the EU with no other problem apart from the usual political one, as well as the fact that Turkey’s rights as a Guarantor in Cyprus were not affected by the accession of the island. Also, even though before EU membership, the Republic of Cyprus was already more prosperous than several other member countries, Greek Cypriots were confident that full membership would offer more economic benefits to them since most of their trade is conducted with the EU. So, while Greek Cypriots achieved a reasonably high level of prosperity outside the EU, additional financial assistance from the EU would promote even greater levels of economic growth inside it.

3.6 THE TURKISH CYPRIOIT PROBLEM OF EU ACCESSION

The decision the Turkish Cypriots had to take with regard to whether or not to agree to a solution (in this instance, the Annan Plan) and entering the EU together with the Greek Cypriots, was quite different, and more complicated than the Greek Cypriots’. Despite the many advantages and benefits the Turkish Cypriots would be granted if they were to enter the Union as a unified member with the Greek south, they still had certain doubts and concerns. They were wary of what the consequences of such action would be, and thus had to consider both advantages and disadvantages, before making the difficult decision of accepting the conditions of unity or not. While other countries have strived to meet EU standards in order to be considered as candidates, the Turkish Cypriots, in a nothing-to-lose situation, were cautious and suspicious of the Greek Cypriots under a unified Cyprus. The Plan put forward would seem like a win-all situation, which both sides, especially the more needy Turkish Cypriots, would have accepted with both hands. However, because of a long history of animosity between these two groups, such a decision was a complex one, which required much caution and contemplation from both sides.
3.6.1 Economic Prosperity versus Political Sovereignty

One of the main concerns the Turkish Cypriots had with the Plan was that because they form the minority they would be overshadowed by the majority Greek Cypriots, who would try to force a majoritarian rule on them. The Turkish Cypriots thus had to decide whether being politically dominated by the Greek Cypriots would be worth membership. A scholar once said the problem of the Turkish Cypriots is like the problem of the rabbits in Watership Down.\textsuperscript{44} This view however is quite a pessimistic one, since this comparison makes it seem as though the fate of the Turkish Cypriots would be harmfully sealed if they joined the EU as a unified island together with the Greek Cypriots, and that they would be worse off if such a decision was taken.

The option the Turkish Cypriots were faced with, then, was whether they thought it was better to suffer economically and financially but be sovereign, and self-governing outside of the EU, or put sovereignty aside, join the EU within a unified, bi-zonal state, and prosper economically and financially. It seemed as though the former was the option for which the Turkish Cypriots would opt. The Turkish Cypriots, just like anyone, would have liked to be more affluent, but it would seem that most Turkish Cypriots are not in favour of becoming more prosperous if that meant subservience, politically to the Greek Cypriots. In addition, and very importantly, the Turkish Cypriot leadership of that time, the “Denktash Government”, constantly reminded the Turkish Cypriots that if they chased after prosperity they would find themselves suffering under the Greek Cypriot majority- that the Turkish Cypriots would find themselves in the position of ‘those skinny rabbits [who would take] refuge with the farmer not appreciating what their end would be.’ (Dodd 2001:43)

The Turkish Cypriot leadership of the time tried to convince its people that being prosperous is not more important than being autonomous, and that the Turkish Cypriots

\textsuperscript{44} In this book, a group of ‘displaced homeless rabbits’ was faced with the challenge of existing in a new countryside poorly provided with the necessary sustenance. Some rabbits could not resist and accepted the hospitality of a farmer who provided them with plenty food and a place to stay, whilst not revealing to them their eventual fate. The more cautious rabbits however ‘resisted this temptation, preferring to be skinny, free and safe; the luxury of lashings of brussel sprouts was not for them’. Dodd, C. Op.cit. pg. 33.
should ‘take sustenance from the belief that man does not live by bread alone.’ (Dodd, 2001: 43) The “TRNC Government” tried to get this message across, and this stance explains its rather negative attitude towards the UN and its policies. The attitude of Denktash was one of negativity, which tried to convince the Turkish Cypriots to vote against the Plan, against reunification and against peace. He tried to convey the message that what was of most significance to the Turkish Cypriots was being free and having total authority over themselves.

However, with this approach it would seem that the leadership was putting across to its people the preference of choosing to be caged rabbits isolated from the rest of Europe and the world. Ironically, if the Turkish Cypriots did vote against the Annan Plan and thus EU membership, they would not be free, skinny rabbits, but instead caged, skinny rabbits, since the Turkish Cypriots would still be suffering because of this chosen autonomy and thus isolation. Voting with their leader, and thus against the Plan, would have clearly meant that the Turkish Cypriot community, as an ethnic minority, would consider the political costs of a single Cyprus in the EU of utmost importance, and would therefore place their identity and political concerns ahead of materialism. However, if one continually suffers financially, which would lead to frustration, of what use is autonomy if the full privileges of being free and prosperous cannot be enjoyed?

3.6.2 Safety and Security Concerns of the Minority

Another significant reason the Turkish Cypriots feared a settlement, and entrance as a joint island into the EU, was that any settlement on Cyprus would entail the substantial or total withdrawal of Turkish troops stationed in the “TRNC”. This, they believed, would be exploited by the more numerous Greek Cypriots who would dominate them; the EU however (as well as the Greek Cypriots), assured the Turkish Cypriots that they would be protected since there is the protection of national minorities in EU member states, as well as the fact that EU membership would not compromise Turkish Cypriot security. EU officials insisted that ‘no EU law could take precedence over the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,” (Bahchelli 2001: 213) which would allow for any of the Guarantor powers
(most likely Turkey in this case) to be able to militarily intervene in Cyprus, if deemed necessary.

In addition to the above Turkish Cypriot concerns, a further fear which they had was that because any citizen of an EU country has the right to settle in any of the other member states without hindrance, the Turkish Cypriots feared that this right might be used by Greek Cypriots to re-enter the North and settle there, either because Greek Cypriots remained committed to the Hellenization of the North (in spite of the difficulties this has caused in the past), or perhaps because then Greek Cypriot refugees would try returning to their homes in the North. In addition, membership would also encourage large numbers of Turkish Cypriots in the North to emigrate to other EU countries in search of better economic conditions.

The Turkish Cypriots were thus rightfully concerned about what would happen to their ethnic minority in the North if this were to happen, because if there would be an influx of Greek Cypriots from the South, and a departure of many Turkish Cypriots from the North, then this would alter the demographic balance of the North, thus weakening the minority. The notion that Turkish Cypriots have of the Greek Cypriots wanting to resettle in the North however, is not very plausible since, even though there are many refugees in the Republic of Cyprus, who were expelled by the Turks in 1974, those refugees have re-settled in the south of Cyprus. Even though such people would be interested in regaining their land, they probably would not re-settle in the North, since living standards in Greek Cyprus have always been much higher that that in Northern Cyprus. A population loss in the South should not have been an issue of concern.

3.7 THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE UN PLAN BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS

Despite the fact that most Turkish Cypriots, it seemed, would have preferred to have their own state in order to secure their future, they would remain second class citizens if they did not accept a solution, and remain isolated outside the EU. Ultimately, even though the Turkish Cypriot community would give up about six percent of their land (leaving it with
about 29 percent of the total—as stated in the UN Plan), this did not stop them from voting in favour of the plan, against their leader’s views, and thus voting in favour of a European society. This shows that the Plan held more benefits for these people rather than disadvantages; the Turkish Cypriots would not vote in favour of the Plan if there were major drawbacks for them.

It can be thus concluded that the Turkish Cypriots preferred to become like the rabbits of “Watership Down”, voted for the Annan Plan, and therefore prosperity and reunification of the island, putting all their uncertainties aside, and focussing on the positive aspects and benefits with which the EU offered and would provide them. It was thus understood by the Turkish Cypriot population that their entering into the EU would not mean the eventual fate of death to Turkish Cypriots, which is what the eventual fate of rabbits would be if they joined the farmer. Contrary to the above assumptions, the Turkish Cypriot people correctly saw the prospect of joining the EU as a long-awaited opportunity to be united with the rest of the world by becoming a recognised entity, which would begin prospering, since isolation would be lifted, the embargo would be lifted, Turkish Cypriot exports would finally be able to reach European markets more easily and tourism would be increased because holiday-makers would be able to enter Northern Cyprus without difficulty. Therefore, if the Turkish Cypriots were admitted to the EU when the opportunity arose, they would be protected by the EU, the UN Security Council, and also by Turkey.

So, even though the “TRNC” would have liked to enter the EU if and after a settlement on the island was reached, they would also have liked to become members, if possible, together with Turkey. Even though the Turks of Cyprus failed to gain membership, and so far has Turkey too, Turkish Cypriots still hope for the entry of Turkey into the EU which would help ease any fears they have about their minority status. However, an issue of concern is that, while Turkey seeks membership, under pressure, they might put at risk the independence of the Turkish Cypriots to satisfy EU demands, and could agree to an unfavourable solution to the Cyprus problem. Or, Turkey might maintain that the only way they could come up with a solution to the problem would be if Turkey were to
become a member, and together with the Greek Cypriots, the EU and the UN, help find a solution. If Turkey then successfully gains membership though, they might just decide to focus on other aspects, thus abandoning the Turks of Cyprus.

Although the outcome of the membership was that the Turkish Cypriots were excluded from the EU, Turkish Cypriots have still not lost hope of one day becoming members of the EU, as perhaps a breakaway state, since they consider themselves, putting aside their economic difficulty, to be prepared and deserving of membership. Apart from their positive vote for the Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriots consider themselves more ‘modern’ than mainland Turks: they are better educated, more secular, and view themselves as ‘better equipped’ than Turkish settlers to become European citizens- apart from the fact that Northern Cyprus wants Turkey’s support and protection on the island, Turkish Cypriots want, by exposing Cyprus to European laws and norms, to limit the influence of Turkish settlers in their society, (Bahchelli 2001: 213) and with membership, reduce Turkey’s influence in the “TRNC”.

With the Turkish Cypriots in the EU, Turkey’s influence on the “TRNC” would decrease and Turkish Cypriots’ economic reliance on Turkey would end. However as much the Turkish Cypriots claim to want the reduction of mainland Turkish influence in the “TRNC”, they still, as has been mentioned above, wish to keep Turkish troops stationed on the island, and want the backing of Turkey as a Guarantor Power. This double standard of the Turkish Cypriots cannot be accepted by the EU as a reasonable proposition for a hopeful future member; the Turkish Cypriots should either be in favour of Turkey’s presence on the island, as well as accept economic aid from Turkey, or instead be in favour of reunification of the island, and the removal of Turkey’s presence, as well as assistance, on the island.

Since the northern third of the island is still isolated, the Turkish Cypriots have feelings of hostility toward not only the Greek Cypriots, but to international bodies and communities- the Turkish Cypriots surely feel as though, after all their attempts at a
peaceful solution, have been let down, thus making them more hesitant and cautious than ever in accepting any other proposed solution for a settlement.

3.8 THE MAJOR ECONOMIC CONCERNS OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS

When considering Northern Cyprus as a hopeful future EU member, apart from the “TRNC” political situation, one cannot ignore its economic status. So, when observing the economic situation in the North, it is just as complex as the political one.

Northern Cyprus has, ever since the partition of the island, suffered an economic collapse. The hindered economic development of the “TRNC” is due to several reasons, primarily to the lack of recognition and political isolation, and thus the embargo which has led to the economic and social isolation of the Northern Cypriot entity from the rest of Europe. The “TRNC” has therefore not been able to receive aid, especially from international bodies like the EU, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

3.8.1 The Imposed Embargo

After the unilateral declaration of independence of the “TRNC” by the Turkish Cypriots in 1983, the recognised government of Cyprus replied to this by imposing an embargo on the North. This embargo was backed by the UN, who declared the actions of the “TRNC” illegal, so thus endorsed the Greek Cypriot embargo. This meant that the Turkish Cypriots were forbidden to export any of their products to any other country, thus impeding their development (this excluded Turkey though, since Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus). Even though the embargo has caused much misery in the “TRNC”, the international community respects the illegality of the functioning of the “TRNC” airports and sea ports for trading purposes, and so do not perform any export-related business directly with them. Apart from protesting, there is not much the “TRNC” can do to lift the restriction. The lifting of the embargo has to come from the Greek Cypriot government which is considered the legal one. This also means that if the international community attempts to lift the embargo imposed upon the “TRNC” there
would be objections from the Greek Cypriot government, which would claim that ‘its acknowledged sovereignty ha[s] been disregarded. (Dodd 2001:40)

In 1994, after EU leaders agreed to place the Republic of Cyprus in line for EU accession negotiations, the European court of Justice ruled that exports from the North were illegal if they did not have the necessary export licenses issued by legitimate authorities, (Bahchelli 2001: 209) that is, the Greek Cypriot authorities, thus banning certificates from the “TRNC”.

With the “TRNC” not being able to export goods to other EU countries (the “TRNC’s” largest export market) without the necessary licences, provided an even bigger blow to the North’s economy. Because of the continuing problematic situation in the “TRNC”-the embargo, as well as its illegal status- the ability for economic development in the area has been severely affected. The “TRNC” thus heavily depends on Turkish economic as well as military support. Turkey has, ever since the invasion, been promoting measures to develop the economy in the North, and because of the rejection of the illegality of the “TRNC” by Turkey, the airports and sea ports of the “TRNC” are recognized as legal ports of entry by Turkey. Therefore, Turkish airplanes and vessels have access to “TRNC” ports, but more importantly, “TRNC” vessels have access to Turkish ports. Because of the many Turkish Cypriot, as well as Turkish, protests against this embargo, the situation was further considered by the EU, and an EU regulation was set out ending the economic embargo. However, the Greek Cypriot Government imposed a veto to this EU regulation deeming it as ‘un-European policy,’ which would mean that the “TRNC” would be recognised as a legal entity.

The embargo in the North has yet to be lifted, and if the “TRNC” wishes to export goods, they still have to go via Turkey. Because of this prevailing embargo imposed on it by the international community, not only is it complicated for the “TRNC” to trade with countries other than Turkey, but this restriction also affects the visit of tourists, who cannot fly directly to the airports of the “TRNC”, since direct international flights to the

45 Dodd, C. Op.cit. pg. 35
“TRNC” are also considered illegal and therefore forbidden by international law. This has added to the economic crisis, since tourists (who play a major role in the growth of the economy) are prevented from entering the island via the “TRNC”, thus substantially lessening the amount of tourists.

It is a fact that after the invasion it was not possible to make the occupied area function economically well as it did before when Cyprus was still undivided, which had significant consequences for the Turkish Cypriots; reports indicated that Turkish Cypriots were not too satisfied with their ‘liberation’ [since] living standards were lower for many Turkish Cypriots than they had been before they were “liberated”. (Attalides 1979:189) This was the price the Turkish Cypriots had to pay for their so-called liberation. The chance the Turks took in 1974, which totally disregarded what the economic state of the North would be after the invasion, was totally unlike the decision the Turkish Cypriots took in the recent 2004 referendum (the results prove so) though-this time around, the Turkish Cypriot people paid much more attention to what their financial status was, as well as what it would become if they had joined the EU as a reunified island (which unfortunately did not become a reality).

3.8.2 A Sudden Economic Boost

Despite the constraints imposed by its lack of international recognition, after the 2004 referendum the “TRNC’s” economy had a sudden boost. Since 2004, and especially after the referendum, there was a positive economic shift, which can be regarded as an outcome of the much publicised referendum in which the Turkish Cypriots gave a positive vote. Before 2004, compared to the Greek Cypriots in the South, the Turkish Cypriots made only a third of the per capita income of Greek Cypriots. (Bahchelli 2001: 213) After the referendum, “TRNC” leader Talat said that investment began flowing in, the economy was being revived, the government was taking important measures and vat rates were being lowered; he added that ‘trade is encouraged and prices are going down—this is something that we, as Turkish Cypriots are experiencing for the first time.’ (Jansen 2004) This lowering of prices further encouraged European tourists to visit the North (via
South Cyprus or Turkey)-and prices were low compared to any other European country. Furthermore many tourists saw it as an opportunity to purchase property which was also significantly cheaper than other areas, but especially cheaper than in the south of the island.

The issue of property sales in the North has, in the past few years, become even more of a contested subject because of several reasons: in recent years, and especially after 2004, there has been an increase in sales of property in Northern Cyprus. This is because tourists seeking a home, either holiday homes, or retirement homes in the Mediterranean, often look to Cyprus for several reasons. They often seek the cheaper option, and thus the cheapest property in which to invest. In Northern Cyprus, because of the weak state of the economy, things such as property, as well as the way of life, are much cheaper than in South Cyprus. Any European tourist for example, when exchanging Euros for Turkish Lire, would benefit from the very weak Turkish currency in the occupied area.

The sale of property in the North then, has obviously caused further conflict between the two sides, mainly because the Greek Cypriots who previously owned property and lived in the North, have, ever since the division of the island, wanted the restoration of their property there. One of the main arguments since the military intervention is the disagreement between the two sides over such property; the Greek Cypriots believe that the occupation regime is promoting the exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties in the North, while the Turkish Cypriots believe that after the invasion, they gained control over the property. The obvious reason the Turkish Cypriots are looking to sell, is because of the poor living conditions in the north. It is a fact though, that the illegal regime in the North occupies the most fertile areas of Cyprus, as well as the most developed tourist region of the island, which the Turkish Cypriots have, until recently, failed to maintain and sustain. Despite the North being the most popular tourist region, the Turkish

48 Loc.cit.
Cypriots did not manage to maintain the level of tourist development of the past, because, they were in no position to offer the required services after the invasion.

The argument put forward then by the Greek Cypriots is as follows: Turkish Cypriots have placed the land of the Greek Cypriots, who were forcibly expelled from the North after the invasion, under their disposal and are selling it. For this reason, the property being sold by the Turkish Cypriots is done so illegally. The buyers of such properties either purchase land because of ignorance of the situation, or believe that once land is purchased, it is under their ownership. However, because of the Greek Cypriot property being illegally sold, both parties, not only the sellers, but especially the buyers, could at the very least, lose the property bought as well as their money, but also could be subjecting themselves to the risk of criminal prosecution.

Apart from increasing property sales causing a welcome boom in the economy of the North, there are other important factors which have contributed to this; for example, residential construction since 2004, a significant increase in imports, and a boom in the education sector.\footnote{It is estimated that approximately 40,000 mainland Turks made their way to the Turkish-occupied north in 2004 alone, to engage in construction-related employment.} Furthermore, in 2006, the occupied North once again experienced a construction and ‘property sale’ boom.\footnote{All those figures show that the main booster of the economy is the construction sector, and property sales. Therefore, the Turkish Cypriot per capita income has risen from $5,000 to $11,000 in just two years thanks to the boom in the construction industry.} Yet another explanation (in a report prepared recently by the World Bank for the European Commission on the sustainability and sources of economic growth in Turkish imports went up to $1,12 billion from $309 million in 2004—vehicles top the list for imported goods followed by cement, reinforced steel, home appliances, furniture and household goods, textile manufacturing equipment and industrial machinery, which make up 30% of all imports. (Loc.cit.)}
Cyprus) are the “TRNC’s” casinos, although not advantageous to the local population’s financial state, they have as a whole contributed to the positive economic shift-casinos are considered an ‘affirmative money-launching medium’\(^{53}\)

3.8.3 The Need for Sustainable Economic Growth

Although the “TRNC” economy has slightly recovered in the past three years or so (growth has averaged 12 percent)\(^{54}\), there is no way that such growth can be sustained. This is why the “TRNC” is still dependent on Turkey for monetary transfers. But although providing a constant supply of aid since 1974, Turkey has not taken any steps towards developing production on the island, and although Turkey gives aid, it does not promote production in any way; and, due to the flow of aid, budget discipline has never really been implemented in the “TRNC”\(^{55}\)

The reality of the matter is that despite the economic boom, with the all-encompassing embargo lingering in the background, it is improbable that the present growth rate can be sustained. Even though there was an economic boom, it does not mean that the economy miraculously recovered and will hold forever-it merely “improved” in a new way. The Turkish Cypriot economy therefore definitely needs a new sustainable boost, and that can only happen if the embargo is ended, and unless that happens, the problem is only going to be intensified.

It is thus a fact that the situation in Northern Cyprus can only be solved when the Greek Cypriot side agrees to the lifting of the embargo, and thus of the isolation. If the embargo is lifted then there will be unhindered trade, as well as an increase in tourism since the revival of the tourism sector will lead to a significant revival of the economy of the North. However, if the embargo is not ended, and at present, the situation remains constant, the economic and financial state of the “TRNC”, as well the state of the population in general, will undoubtedly remain in the same poor condition, if not worsen.

\(^{53}\) Loc.cit.
\(^{54}\) Loc.cit.
\(^{55}\) Loc.cit.
If Northern Cyprus is to improve its economic performance a desperate and necessary plan for economic reform is needed. The Turkish Cypriots have argued that, apart from the embargo being lifted, the only way in which they will be able to begin achieving proper economic reform is if they achieve a greater degree of independence from the Turkish state; (Dodd 2001:32) realising this idea however, will prove to be very complicated. This is so because the Turkish Cypriot economy depends so heavily on the Turkish economy for its functioning that both the economy as well as the Turkish Cypriots will suffer if Turkey does pull out of the “TRNC”. But even if the Turkish Cypriots achieve the impossible (unless the “TRNC” enters the EU) and do cut off from Turkey, not only will this task be a very risky one, since the Turkish Cypriot economy is mostly dependent on the Turkish economy for its functioning, but it will prove, in practice, to be arduous and very resource-consuming.

If the Turkish Cypriots are trying to cut off from the Turkish state, then they will also have to move away from all that comes with it. For instance, the Turkish Lira which is used both in Turkey and in the “TRNC” would have to be done away with, and a new currency would have to be employed in the “TRNC”. This, as a starting point, would not favour the (already-poor) Turkish Cypriot economy—not only would it be expensive to implement, but also, too time-consuming, diverting resources from other more pressing problems. In the long run it would not be worth all the effort and difficulty, and would just add to the (already high) inflation rate and high taxes, blocking growth.

So, if the Turks of the North, as well as Turkey, agree to certain changes, and are granted EU membership, their economic and social woes will end—there will surely be an improvement in the majority of Turkish Cypriots’ general living standards. For the moment though, this deadlock cannot be broken, the Turkish Cypriots remain second class citizens in an EU country, and the unfavourable situation in the “TRNC” continues. Furthermore, if the situation does not improve, many Turkish Cypriots will probably be forced to emigrate because of unemployment and the worsening economic and social
conditions; there will then be a risk that mainland Turkish citizens will become the majority population of the “TRNC” in the North.

3.9 TURKEY AND ITS PROSPECTS FOR EU MEMBERSHIP

As we have seen, the Cyprus issue appears very strongly in Turkish-EU relations, and while several European countries are in favour of Turkey becoming an EU member, others have stern objections, making the decision yet another complicated one for the EU. Now that South Cyprus has become an EU member, Turkey has to decide whether or not to recognise the Republic of Cyprus, and what the consequences will be for the decision it takes. It is only fitting then, to discuss Turkey’s prospects of becoming an EU member. Turkey in the meanwhile, asks for the EU to be fair in its commitments regarding it-the Turkish community believes that ‘a fair commitment requires that Turkey’s position on the Cyprus question be better understood.’

Turkey has been awaiting the granting of accession talks from the EU for some time-Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, but was not given official candidate status until December 1999 at the European Council’s Helsinki meeting. (Bahchelli, 2001: 218). This is because for the EU Turkey has been a completely different situation to any other that it has encountered, since Turkey is unlike any other European state aspiring for membership. After the European Economic Community came into being, Turkey applied for an associate partnership, which would later help with it being granted accession talks for full membership. During a meeting of European Christian Democrats in March 1997, W. Marten, a prominent Christian Democrat in the European Parliament, bluntly stated that ‘the EU is in the process of building a civilization in which Turkey has no place’. (Bahchelli 2001: 218) In recent years however, this sentiment has, to a large extent changed, and as long as Turkey, just like other aspiring members, fulfils the criteria the EU sets out, and responds positively to the EU’s demands, then the EU cannot possibly refuse membership based on issues such as religion and culture.

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3.9.1 Potential Concerns Regarding Turkey’s Possible Membership

Turkey would no doubt to a certain extent be beneficial to the EU, for example, its geo-strategic importance to the EU with regard to it being a “bridge” to the Middle East and Central Asia, thus providing for a larger market for goods and services for Europe. Also, and very importantly, Turkey could provide a large powerful army which could help in the protection of Europe if ever needed, especially against threats from the Middle East. Furthermore, together with EU inspired reforms (which will serve as a safeguard against Muslim fundamentalism), if Turkey enters the EU, it can set an example to other Muslim nations. However in spite of several advantages, the disadvantages overshadow them.

Questions have constantly arisen whether Turkey is really committed to human rights; there is a concern about its poor human rights record, particularly its treatment of its substantial Kurdish minority (Bahchelli, 2001: 217), and also whether Turkey would be able to meet economic and political criteria the EU sets. One of the most important issues which is raised however, is that Turkey has a large Muslim population, and conservatives are against the notion of an Asian country with such a large Muslim population entering the EU since it has a different culture, does not share European values, and this “clash of identities” will pose a threat for a common European identity.

If Turkey does become an EU member, it will be one of the largest countries in the EU, due to size, and population; and under the EU’s arrangements, Turkey will enjoy substantial political power in the EU’s institutions because of this fact. Turkey’s size however and the underdevelopment of Turkey’s economy compared to other economies of member states, poses significant challenges for the EU, thus weakening Turkey’s prospects. Another concern is the constant growth of Turkey’s population; if Turkey is granted membership, in a few years, it will probably become the most populous member of the EU. There is a fear that the poor Turks will look for employment in other European countries (because of the free labour movement within EU countries) where the standards of living is higher and where there are other social benefits, thus flooding Europe with a Turkish, and thus Muslim presence. Turkey’s population of 63 million (in 1998) is
expected to become the largest in Europe by the year 2010 (Bahchelli, 2001: 218) This is not a good prospect for the EU, having the largest member state of the Union being a Muslim one. The Europeans, concerned with preserving a Christian heritage, would feel threatened by such a considerable Muslim presence.

Another, and probably the most significant, factor which stands between Turkey and EU membership, is the Cyprus problem; Firstly, Turkey cannot expect to become a serious candidate for EU membership as long as its troops occupy the territory of another EU member, in violation of UN resolutions as well as international law. One of the most important steps to be taken by Turkey will have to be recognising the Greek Cypriot Government of Cyprus, as well as trying to resolve the crisis there. Officials nevertheless have carried on with the struggle for a negotiated settlement, where both sides might compromise and settle for a deal.

3.9.2 The Effectiveness of the Ankara Protocol

The EU, as part of EU-Turkey negotiations recently tried to persuade Turkey to open its ports and airports to Cypriot vessels and planes, which Turkey surprisingly agreed to, in 200557, in order to prevent the suspension of EU accession talks. This political solution for opening Turkish ports to Greek-Cypriot vessels was expected to lead to the lifting of the international isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriot ports. According to press reports Turkey offered to render accessible to Greek Cypriot ships and planes ‘one or two ports and one airport in Turkey, demanding that in return the EU permit the re-opening to international trading of Ercan Airport and the Port of Mayosa in the “TRNC”.’ 58 Even though Turkey would have liked to prevent the suspension of accession talks, they were in no position to be demanding of the EU, and should have rather respected its obligations and complied with EU demands; naturally the EU insisted that Turkey open up its ports without conditions attached.

Even though Turkey agreed to the opening of its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels, its ports remained closed to Greek Cypriot vessels, and the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan believed his government deserved EU membership anyway, because it recognised and supported Annan’s plan to reunify Cyprus. He further added that “the EU is unfairly blocking Turkey’s membership in the group and is unjustly punishing Turkish Cypriots with a trade embargo” and that is why Turkey decided not to open its sea ports and airports to Cypriot traffic until the EU lifted the similar embargo on trade with Northern Cyprus.

Olli Rehn, the EU enlargement commissioner, issued a stern warning to Turkey, that it was expected to act ‘urgently on the implementation of the additional protocol extending the Customs Union deal to cover all EU countries’. Now, including all EU countries, also means the inclusion of the Greek-Cypriots, who have EU membership and are recognized as the sole government of Cyprus. Extending the Customs Union to cover all EU members (including the Greek Cypriot state) was a pledge that Ankara made, and, even though it was mandatory, is one it still refuses and this therefore places it in an even more disadvantageous position. If membership is what Turkey is really aspiring, thus becoming the first Muslim state to enter the EU, then it should conform to EU demands and positions, as well as not setting out conditions for the EU to follow, or with which they expect it to comply—this just further weakens Turkey’s prospects.

So, despite Turkey’s aspirations for EU membership and feeling closer to becoming the first Muslim country to become a member, the EU Commission recommended on 29 November 2006 that the member states should not open accession negotiations with Turkey on chapters covering eight policy areas considered as relevant to Turkey’s restrictions with regards to Cyprus, because of Turkey’s ban on trade with Cyprus, and it has furthermore given no new deadline for the banning to be lifted.

There is thus a stalemate; the Greek Cypriots do not want to permit Northern Cypriot trade, because they do not recognise the illegitimate “TRNC”, and Turkey does not want to open its ports to the Greek Cypriots, because it does not acknowledge South Cyprus. Turkey, the EU, and the Greek Cypriots have been sticking to their positions with regard to the Ankara Protocol and the lifting of the isolation of the North—none of the sides are compromising, and this hurts the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey most of all.

3.10 FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT

Perhaps even now, nearly three and a half years after the Republic of Cyprus has entered the EU, the situation between the two sides has worsened, not only because of the rejection of the Annan Plan, and the Greek Cypriot side’s EU membership, but also because of the trade embargo in the North not being lifted by the Greek Cypriots, thus causing much distrust between the two communities. After the unsuccessful 2004 UN Peace Process, the situation quietened down for some time, but attempts at resolution have not been halted.

By 2006, the frustrations were continuing, not only between the Greeks and Turks of the island, but also by third parties involved, since efforts were made to breathe new life into the problem, but yet again failed. Even though the many attempts at talks and resolution have been unsuccessful, the approach in promoting reconciliation between the two communities has been well-intentioned by both the EU and UN, and if a solution is to be found, then there has to be compromise from both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides; they have to put aside their insecurities and remember their focus, because if such negative attitudes persist by any of the two sides, then a workable solution can never be achieved. The EU Summit in December 2006, proposed in its conclusion, that ‘the UN embark on a new initiative to reach an overall solution of the Cyprus issue,’ but they will probably not propose a solution that will differ considerably from the Annan Plan, which

will probably be used as the foundation to any settlement. Ban Ki-Moon, the new UN Secretary-General is expected to launch new beginnings on the Cyprus problem.

For Turkey, EU accession talks have come to a halt, and prospects for EU membership have thus moved further away, because of Turkey’s insistence that its conditions about Cyprus be fulfilled. It might however be too much for Turkey to try solve the Cyprus issue together with trying to gain EU membership. In the end though, Turkey seems destined to continue to be an unwelcome outsider of EU for the foreseeable future. Leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Talat believes a solution to the Cyprus issue is still a long way off and does not seem possible before 2008. If Turkey is not granted accession talks, they might argue that the EU, as a democratic body, does not live up to its promises and democratic values, and therefore turn towards the East and Islamism, and the Arab world, which would be an issue of great concern. The EU then, would not be in favour of cutting ties with Turkey because of this reason, and other strategic reasons.

Even though a settlement thus far has proved elusive, since both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides have disagreed on the terms of possible solutions, all inhabitants of the island, wish for a workable solution to this problem, one that is democratic, just, compatible with EU norms and principles, and durable, and which will possibly build a common prosperous future in Cyprus. Even though each group distrusts the other, they have to be willing to put aside previous animosities, and work together with the EU and the UN for a settlement. However, the more a solution is delayed, the more likely it will be to the disadvantage of the Turkish Cypriots.

We shall now turn our focus to empirical results, from tests conducted after the referenda in 2004, which will help us understand why the Annan Plan failed. Furthermore, we shall see what both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot groups would like to see included in any future-settlement plan- whether it should be the old plan developed further, or whether a totally new plan should be devised.

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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS* OF TURKISH CYPRIO T AND GREEK CYPRIO T ATTITUDES AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE UN PEACE PLAN

We have so far seen that the Annan Plan was an unsuccessful attempt at a solution to the Cyprus problem. After the failure of this plan, several opinion polls and surveys were conducted in order to find out why exactly the plan was ineffective—the terms and conditions which were included and which affected both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities will be examined. Furthermore, what more could have been included as well as proposed changes to this plan are examined via the polls, which were like referendums separately conducted in the Greek Cypriot south and the Turkish Cypriot North.

The key issues which affected the Plan from the very beginning—issues such as security, the role of the military, property, Turkish immigrants, intervention rights and foreign interference, as well as trust, integration and co-existence—should be re-examined.

We shall begin with the issue of trust between the two groups, and whether, after many years of co-existing on the island, they have learned to trust each other.

4.1 ISSUES OF TRUST AND CO-EXISTENCE

When dealing with the situation at present—after the referendum—where the situation has, we can assume, settled down, it is important to see whether Greek and Turkish Cypriots trust each other in general, and whether this will affect the chances of them ever living peacefully together.

![Graph showing the percentage of respondents who agree or disagree with statements about trust and co-citizenship.](image)
Although in the above graphs, the majority Greek Cypriots (about 74%) feel as though they can identify with the Turkish Cypriots and while several Turkish Cypriots also have some type of identification with the Greeks of the island, the majority Turkish Cypriots “totally disagree” with this notion. This could mean that among the Greek Cypriots there are fewer extremists who still believe in a solution that would include the formation of two totally separate states, and thus the total separation of both groups from each other.

The Turkish Cypriots are divided in their opinion on the above statement— that Greeks are their co-citizens and have much in common with them. About 33% of the Turkish Cypriots still believe themselves to be totally separate and different from the Greek Cypriots, and probably therefore believe that the two communities cannot co-exist, especially under a unitary state.
Taking the above graphs into consideration, we can see that even though there is a certain sense of identity between these groups, this does not mean that each group totally trusts the other, as is illustrated.

Although the Greek Cypriots feel as though they can identify with Turkish Cypriots, the majority also believes that Turkey, or mainland Turkish settlers, or just Turks in general, cannot be trusted, mostly because of the influence Turkey has had in Cyprus’ affairs, but also because of the Turkish Cypriot army presence in Cyprus.

We can also see that Turkish Cypriot feelings toward the Greek Cypriots are divided. While some totally agree that Greek Cypriots want to dominate the Turkish Cypriots because they are minority, others do not believe that the Greek Cypriots will attempt that, not only because of the presence of the Turkish army, but also because they believe the Greek Cypriots would not want to jeopardize the negotiating processes, which if disturbed again would have to restart from the beginning. Perhaps, however, what the Turkish Cypriots trust, is not the Greek Cypriots as such, but instead the fact that they are protected and that the Greek Cypriots would not attempt to dominate them because it would be too risky.
4.2 ISSUES OF SECURITY

The plan’s main security provisions included that Turkish troops would remain on Cyprus even if, (and after) the Plan was accepted by both sides. This is another reason why the Greek Cypriots rejected it, they considered the presence of troops on the island as problematic and unacceptable in a future EU country. By contrast though, this security provision was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots.
In the above two graphs we can see the response of both the groups regarding the UN Plan and its provisions about troops on the island. The Plan provided that Turkish troops would only be required to begin leaving the island much later, after a solution had been implemented, and only much later most Turkish troops would be withdrawn. Ultimately however, the plan allowed troops to remain on the island even if a solution had been found.
Firstly, for obvious reasons, a vast majority of Greek Cypriots wish for the total withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, and at a much faster pace than is provided for by the Plan.

However, Turkish Cypriots find this unacceptable because of their fear of domination by the majority. Not only do they not want the removal of troops at the proposed pace, but they are against the removal of any Turkish troops as is illustrated in the above four graphs.

Whereas Greek Cypriots are in favour of having a totally demilitarized country, and consider this as one of their primary motives, the Turkish Cypriots generally oppose this notion, and do not regard it at all as a primary motive when looking to establish a solution.

It is clear then, that the total demilitarization of the island seems essential to the majority of Greek Cypriots, but the majority of Turkish Cypriots believe this to be totally unacceptable, since they feel that they require protection on the island. Even though the Turkish Cypriots are in favour of keeping Turkish troops on the island, they also support a smaller presence.

When considering military arrangements then, the main issue is the demilitarization of the island; while Greek Cypriots are fairly comfortable with partially demilitarizing the island, the Turkish Cypriots (more than half) strongly oppose this idea. A reason for this could be that the Turkish Cypriots do not want to risk their security- which the Turkish army provides- and feel that if the troops remain the Greek Cypriot majority will not try impose a majoritarian solution on the island.
For the Greek Cypriots, even though a fifth is against this, the majority still believes that partial demilitarization is a positive step, and perhaps even one step closer to the total removal of Turkish troops, which is what the Greek Cypriots have wanted since 1974. The Turkish Cypriots, however, prefer to wait until a final settlement is reached before even considering the removal of any Turkish troops.

4.3 THE ISSUE OF INTERVENTION RIGHTS BY OUTSIDE POWERS

![Figure 2.13](Greek Cypriots)

**Greek Cypriots**

"Accept" can be analyzed as:
- Tolerable 13%
- Acceptable 4%
- Very Positive 2%

![Figure 2.14](Turkish Cypriots)

**Turkish Cypriots**

"Accept" can be analyzed as:
- Tolerable 30%
- Acceptable 25%
- Very Positive 7%
The implementation of Guarantees by the Annan Plan was rejected by a majority of Greek Cypriots for obvious reasons. The UN Plan provided for guarantees, which included Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom as Guarantor Powers. These guarantees included that if the new constitutional settlement was not upheld by any of the sides, then a Guarantor country would be able to intervene, in order to re-establish the state of affairs. A UN force would furthermore be kept on Cyprus to help oversee the situation, and which would also help in encouraging the two sides to keep the settlement.

Also, the newly established Guarantee can be regarded to be the continuation of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. This Treaty of Guarantee which allowed the intervention of the guaranteeing countries, was the one which was breached by Turkey, which unilaterally intervened in Cyprus without UN authorization, leading to the partition of the island. It is not surprising then that the Greek Cypriots are not willing to allow for the implementation of an agreement which led to unfavourable circumstances. On the other hand, the majority Turkish Cypriots accepted such a plan, considering that it came in handy in the past and could be useful in the future.

As asked about the same issue, but with the rider that intervention rights by Guarantor powers should be limited allowing Turkey to only intervene in the Turkish Cypriot state, the Turkish Cypriots voted against this notion. Turkish Cypriots would be in favour of Turkey having intervention rights, if it could intervene in not just the Turkish Cypriot portion, but in the Greek Cypriot side too. Clearly, this is because in the past Turkey was responsible for intervening and thus forming the Turkish Cypriot “state”.
Taking the above into consideration, the Turkish Cypriots deem it totally unacceptable for Turkey or Greece to have to get UN authorization to be able to intervene. If no authorization were necessary it would be much easier for Turkey to intervene at will—that could be at any time for any reason, without hindrance or control from any outside power. This however, would aggravate the situation in an already dispute-ridden country.

Considering the above, it is also interesting to see if the Greek and Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey’s actions and policies.

Greek Cypriots

Turkish Cypriots

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Figure 2.9 - Turkish Cypriot views concerning authorized intervention rights.

Figure 2.10 - Turkish Cypriot views concerning the introduction of a European Security system.

Figure 2.15

Figure 2.16
Clearly the Greek Cypriots do not trust Turkey—the vast majority (about 90%) do not trust it because of Turkey’s role in the partition of the island in 1974, and the refusal of Turkey, ever since, to withdraw its troops from the island, and because Turkey influences the North.

On the other hand, more than half of the Turkish Cypriots do trust Turkey, because they feel that Turkey protects them, and also because they have much in common with its citizens—language, religion, culture.

Whatever the case, whether Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots join the EU or not, the Turkish Cypriots will always want a mainland Turkish presence in Cyprus whatever happens on the island.

Therefore, the Greek Cypriots, as is illustrated do not identify with the Turks, and also do not trust them, and furthermore do not feel secure with the presence of Turkey on the island. The opposite is true for the Turkish Cypriots, who do trust Turkey and therefore feel secure with its presence on the island.
4.4 THE ISSUE OF SETTLERS

As is shown above, the residents in the North who have been in the country since before 1974, are Turkish Cypriots (this is about 67%). While about 17% are immigrants who came to the island between 1974 and 1979, it should be noted that out of this 17%, most of them were Turkish citizens (who obviously settled after Turkey’s invasion of the island), and fewer were Turkish Cypriots who in the 1970s returned from emigration. From the 1980s throughout the 1990s and into 2000, about 12% of Turkish settlers settled in the North. Mixed marriages between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish citizens have also been reported, and that percentage totals to about 2%.

Some assumptions have been made about the total of the population in the North. It has been calculated, that there are approximately 225,000 individuals in the North. The Turkish citizens can be seen as follows:
However, the above table does not include the so-called ‘illegal workers’, or the large group of Turkish citizens who entered Cyprus without any border control checks in the 1990s, when the requirement to present a passport was waived estimated to amount to about 40,000\textsuperscript{64}. Therefore, if the illegal workers are not counted, as is usually the practice when the Turkish Cypriots are asked to estimate the number of settlers, the total is about 60,000.\textsuperscript{65} If however, ‘illegal workers’ are included, the total number of settlers is about 100,000 individuals, children included. Under the UN Plan, the official number which was given, was 45,000 individuals, children included, whose names were to be written on a list and delivered to the UN before the approval of the agreement.

This then was considered by the Greek Cypriots not to be enough, because this portion did not even represent half of the total Turkish population. Therefore, another question which was raised was whether Greek Cypriots wanted the departure of more Turkish settlers:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Turkish Citizens who came in the 1970s & 82,500 \\
Turkish Citizens who came in the 1980s & 13,500 \\
Turkish Citizens who came in the 1990s & 9,000 \\
Turkish Citizens who came since yr 2000 & 4,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Number of Turkish Citizens who have settled in Cyprus since 1974, sorted by decade of entry.}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{65} Loc.cit.
The provisions which the Annan Plan had provided for settlers, even though quite contradictory, were accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, but rejected by about 82% of Greek Cypriots. The plan was contradictory regarding settlers, because even though it states that about 60,000 to 75,000 settlers would ultimately be given citizenship, it also mentions that (disregarding the total of about 40,000 ‘illegal workers’) 45,000 settlers would have to leave. In normal terms, this would mean that between 15,000-30,000 settlers would be able to remain. However, including the 40,000 ‘illegal workers’ would make the total 100,000 and then if, 45,000 were required to leave, this would leave a total population of 55,000, and this would mean that more than half of the settlers would be able to remain in Cyprus and become its citizens.

Therefore the majority Greek Cypriots wish for the removal of more Turkish settlers from the island, because the feeling is that the more Turkish settlers on the island, the more the influence of Turkey will be. It is therefore not surprising that the ideal situation for the Greek Cypriots would be if all the settlers left, thus leaving the island with a total population of only Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as can be seen below:

---

Greek Cypriots

*Accept* can be analyzed as:
Tolerable 20%, Acceptable 29%,
Very Positive 22%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reject</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Accept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Settlers to leave

Figure 5.7

Turkish Cypriots

*Accept* can be analyzed as:
Tolerable 23%, Acceptable 26%,
Very Positive 12%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reject</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Accept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Settlers to leave

Figure 5.8

Turkish Cypriots

The list of immigrants that may remain on the island, currently numbering 15,000, to be shortened.
(views of Turkish Cypriots)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tolerable</th>
<th>Tolerable Almost</th>
<th>Tolerable No</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Acceptable Almost</th>
<th>Acceptable No</th>
<th>Acceptable Very Positive</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>67</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.9 - Turkish Cypriot views concerning the departure of Settlers.

Turkish Settlers

The list of immigrants that may remain on the island, currently numbering 15,000, to be shortened.
(views of Settlers from Turkey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tolerable</th>
<th>Tolerable Almost</th>
<th>Tolerable No</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Acceptable Almost</th>
<th>Acceptable No</th>
<th>Acceptable Very Positive</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.10 - Settler views concerning the departure of Settlers.
When considering the views of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers, for obvious reasons Turkish settlers would like to remain in the North because it has been to many their home for many years, and to some, their only home. Even though these settlers would be compensated and provided with a home in Turkey, and also a certain amount of money after relocation, having to move and restart their life from the beginning elsewhere was not favourable to the Turks. Nevertheless, many did accept the provisions the Annan Plan made.

For the Turkish Cypriots, even though more than half of them would prefer to keep more Turkish immigrants on the island, their reason for this is different to that of the settlers; they believe that if Turkish settlers leave, then the Turkish population in the north as a whole will diminish, thus worsening their already minority status on the island. However, in the end, the Turkish Cypriots also accepted the settler provisions which the plan provided.
The Turkish Cypriot vote in the referendum as a whole therefore, was at a higher positive percentage than that of the Settlers, because even though the Turkish Cypriots were in favour of keeping as many Turkish settlers as possible, the other positive aspects to the plan outweighed the negative ones (one being the resettlement of Turkish settlers in Turkey).

The outcome of the Turkish settlers’ votes was a balanced “yes-no” for the totality of the Peace Plan. This probably means that those Turkish settlers who voted “no” were not in favour of the settler provisions included in the UN Plan, because it was stated in the plan that many settlers had to leave Cyprus and settle back in Turkey.
4.5 CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

For a plan with a lasting solution to be implemented in Cyprus, both communities have to start building trust with one another, and have to work together in trying to achieve a feasible settlement. One of the ideas which was brought up in these surveys was the issue of the legal status of both sides; both groups would be required to start afresh and move on into the future, while not being required to agree about the previous legal status of each side. Thus, a proposed ‘virgin birth’ would take place, which would lead to a new state of affairs, where the two sides would be asked ‘to agree about their future without necessarily agreeing on their past.’

Whereas the Greek Cypriots mostly rejected the notion of such an act, a two-thirds Turkish Cypriot majority accepted this ‘virgin birth’ status. The Greek Cypriots would regard this as unfavourable because they still regard the illegality of the North as a serious problem, and do not accept that the Turkish North does not recognise this.

The issue of trade and resettlement is one of the other proposed measures which would involve a trade-off between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. What the above graphs show is the attitudes of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots regarding the idea that while the North would be permitted to trade unhindered via an open port several Greek Cypriots would be able to resettle in a closed-off area in the North, under EU and UN supervision.

While looking at the issue of resettlement and trade, it seems as though most Greek Cypriots (nearly half) are willing to allow for the lifting of the embargo and allow for Turkish Cypriot trade since they will be able to resettle in a closed-off area of the North. The 25% of Greek Cypriots who are not in favour of this, are probably Greek Cypriots who do not wish to move to the North, are not affected by such a deal, or perhaps believe that if Turkish Cypriot ports are opened, which will permit trade, then the Turkish Cypriots will no longer be an illegitimate entity, which is a development Greek Cypriots are against.

The Turkish Cypriots have similar opinions to those of the Greek Cypriots, though for different reasons 35% of the Turkish Cypriots, even though they would be able to export some of their goods, are “very negative” about this, probably because they oppose Greek Cypriots moving to the Northern Cypriot territory.
When asked if direct trade would be permitted in the North, without a trade-off, but resulting in the improvement of the economic situation in the North (which would therefore help in balancing reunification costs between the South and the North), the Greek Cypriots were against this; allowing the North to trade directly would mean that the Greek Cypriots accepted the “TRNC”. The Turkish Cypriots were however clearly in favour of this.

When dealing with construction-related business, another proposed trade-off would be allowing direct flights to and from the Turkish Cypriot airport, while at the same halting
the construction of Greek Cypriot property in the North. This means that, with the permission of the Greek Cypriots, direct flights would be able to take place to and from Ercan Airport in the North, and at the same time, the halting of construction on Greek Cypriot properties and the use of Greek Cypriot hotels by Turkish Cypriots would no longer take place. This idea was totally “negative” to the Turkish Cypriots. This is probably because Turkish Cypriot construction is heavily based around Greek Cypriot properties. Also, Greek Cypriot hotels in the North are still popular with holiday-makers, therefore the reluctance by the Turkish Cypriots to restrict the use of hotels.

![Graph 1: More territory to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration, than currently provided for in the UN Plan.](image1)

![Graph 2: Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to be entitled to a greater percent of their property in the other constituent state, than currently provided for in the UN Plan.](image2)

**Figure 4.1 - Greek Cypriot views concerning territorial adjustment.**  
**Figure 4.2 - Greek Cypriot views concerning property rights.**

When it comes to issues of property, most Greek Cypriots believe that the returning of land and previously owned Greek Cypriot property from the North, is essential. They also believe that the UN Plan did not provide a sufficient percentage of property which would be returned under Greek Cypriot administration. Asking the Greek Cypriots how much property would be enough, though, is a question which should not even be brought up, because the answer is simple and obvious- most Greek Cypriots would require that the whole of the North be returned under Greek Cypriot administration.
The repairing and returning of religious sites would be acceptable to both sides. The only reason that such an idea might be unacceptable is because members of each of the groups would have to cross over to the other side, which would prove difficult.

Regarding the above table, the majority Greek Cypriots are in favour of being able to purchase property anywhere in Cyprus, while the Greek Cypriots would obviously purchase property in the North, which they believe previously belonged to them, and which they at present believe will never be returned to them.

4.6 PROSPECTS OF RESTARTING NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPROVING THE UN PEACE PLAN
Firstly, using the Annan Plan as a basis for any negotiations, is believed by the Greek Cypriots to be ineffective, because what it entails, is essentially what the Annan Plan did, where each side would be required to compromise with the other, and the result would lead (just like the Annan Plan did) to a dead-end. Therefore the above idea, or any which begins with the Annan Plan as its basis, will ultimately lead to no result, and more frustration.

![Figure 4.7](image1.png) ![Figure 4.8](image2.png)

In the above two graphs, when asked about the present situation in Cyprus and whether to restart negotiations immediately, or whether negotiations should wait to begin at a later stage, the majority of both Greek and Turkish communities on the island prefer that negotiations begin immediately. This is because, for the Greek Cypriots, at present they have to deal with a Turkish army stationed on the island, Turkish settlers immigrating to Cyprus from mainland Turkey, and the fact that Greek Cypriot property in the North is being exploited by the Turkish Cypriots.

Similarly, the Turkish Cypriots feel that a solution to the problem lies in beginning negotiations as soon as possible because their current situation is untenable- their state is not recognised and this, in the long run, is harmful to them, mostly economically.

The few from both communities who believe that a solution lies in the future, and that negotiations should not begin until a later stage, are probably those who believe that (in the case of the Greek Cypriots) the North will be pressurized by the EU into making a decision regarding the problem, and, with regard to the Turkish Cypriots, that the EU will force the Greek Cypriots to make a decision, and in time their isolation will be lifted.

When it comes to the issue of refugees, the vast majority (nearly 100%) of Greek Cypriots, as can be seen below, is in favour of, and has as a primary motive, the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to the North.
The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, make it clear that the return of refugees to their ancestral homes is not a primary motive at all—it is in fact ‘not at all a motive’ for a solution. This is mainly because if refugees were permitted to return to their ancestral homes there would be an influx of Greek Cypriot refugees into the North because they far outnumber the Turkish Cypriot refugees (from the South).

As we can see below, regarding the economy, even though the Greek Cypriot South has not experienced an economic crisis as the Turkish Cypriot North has, both communities prioritise the need for an improvement of economic conditions.
When considering the issue of foreign interference in Cyprus (that is of outside bodies such as the EU and Turkey for example), it is interesting to note how both sides react to this. When thinking of foreign interference however, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots immediately think of Turkey, and do not really consider other international bodies. Although a majority of Greek Cypriots definitely believes in the importance of foreign interference in Cyprus coming to an end (that is, mainly, the removal of Turkish interference and influence from the island), this is not a primary motive for Turkish Cypriots, less than half of whom think of removing foreign interference as a primary motive— they have benefited from Turkey’s influence on the island in the past.
While Greek Cypriots, as a majority, are against veto powers from the minority Turkish Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots prefer veto powers, even though this would make effective governance difficult.

![Attitude towards the UN Plan](chart)

**Figure 10.1** - Greek Cypriot attitudes towards the prospect of improving the UN Peace Plan.

Like the Annan Plan, which the Greek Cypriots rejected for obvious reasons, most Greek Cypriots are not in favour of this plan even being considered for implementation. Clearly, the Greek Cypriots believe in the burying of the plan and that a totally new solution-attempt has to be made, not taking into consideration the Annan plan at all.

The second concern the Greek Cypriots had with the plan was that it needed more effective provisions for the return of Greek refugees to their homes and properties in the North.

Others believe that security and the issue of Guarantee implementation have to be redressed in order to make the plan viable and for the Greek Cypriots to be able to accept such an arrangement.

Some Greek Cypriots, however, believe in a European solution to the problem, which, they hope, will emerge, with South Cyprus’ admittance into the EU.
Finally, about 24% (about a quarter), of this Greek Cypriot group, believe that the plan and its provisions are tolerable as they stand, and that a solution lies in modifying this UN Plan and not in another totally new and different arrangement.

The Turkish Cypriot majority, on the other hand, who voted in favour of this plan, also believed that it could be improved by addressing issues concerning economic development. About a fifth of the Turkish Cypriot group believes, that in order for such a plan to be more strongly accepted, it should provide for the stronger integration of Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

Finally, about a third believes in secession and the formation of a totally Turkish state- a breakaway state- which in essence would not be an improvement to the plan but instead a totally different arrangement altogether.
The above explains why the Annan Plan failed; the Greek Cypriots believe that any agreements they have made, and might in the future with Turkish Cypriots will not be adhered to by them. Now, of course, a deal which is favourable to the Greek Cypriots is one which includes issues surrounding Turkish troops, property rights and refugee rights.

Similarly, the Turkish Cypriots do not believe that the Greek Cypriots will adhere to what they propose, which essentially focuses around the same issues as the Greek Cypriots, as well as the recognition of their state. Again then, we can already see the same deadlock as in the past.
4.7 A COMPARISON OF GREEK CYPRIO'T VIEWS, AND TURKISH CYPRIO'T VERSUS TURKISH SETTLERS’ VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THEIR IDENTITIES AND TO THE STATE

When shifting our views to the Turkish Cypriots (compared to Turkish settlers), we can see that although most Turkish settlers (more than half) ‘totally agree’ to ‘Turkish guidance’ and are in favour of Turkey having influence, or even taking control of the North majority of Turkish Cypriots (about 64%) also supports Turkey’s influence regarding policies.
It is clear that Turkish Cypriots believe Turkey’s financial contribution to be “absolutely essential”, and thus Turkey is not only expected by the Turkish Cypriots to provide security, but also to economically aid them.

When comparing these two ethnic groups it is clear that the Turkish Cypriots, identify more with the Greek Cypriots of the island, mainly because of the fact that the majority of Turkish Cypriots were either born, or came to Cyprus, before 1974. They can thus...
more easily identify with being Cypriot. On the other hand, because Turkish immigrants settled in the country after 1974, we can see that these Turkish settlers still feel a certain nationalism, and feel themselves to be Turkish, and not Cypriot; they are, after all, Turkish Citizens, and anyhow, a group cannot lose its identity within a period of thirty years. Thus even though most Turkish Cypriots are willing to put “Cypriotness” first, and Turkish later, the Turkish settler majority is not willing to put “Cypriotness” first, and prefer putting their Turkish identity first, and Cypriot identity second.

Figure 6.12

Figure 6.13

Figure 6.14

Figure 6.15
While Greek Cypriots do not believe in the total separation of the two parts of the island, and instead believe that re-unifying with the Turkish Cypriots is a primary motive, the Turkish Cypriots mostly believe that re-unification is not a primary motive at all, and about 42% of them believe, instead, in the total separation of both states, thus forming a totally separate Turkish Cypriot entity a breakaway state.

Taking the above into consideration, it is clear that the Turkish Cypriots do not support re-unification with the Greek Cypriots, although the opposite is true- for the Greek Cypriots believe that it is a primary motive for there to be a reunifying of the island.

When comparing the Turkish Cypriot to Turkish Settler beliefs, the above two graphs should be considered; these show that, even though Turkish Cypriots do feel a Cypriot identity, about 42% is nevertheless in favour of forming a breakaway state. The Turkish Cypriots who disagree with moving on separately, probably believe that since they have come this far, a solution is reachable, and so they are not willing to jeopardize their chances of becoming legally recognized.

On the other hand, more than half (about 55%) of Turkish settlers prefer to move on separately from the Greek Cypriots. This shows that the Turkish Cypriots, but mostly the Turkish settlers, believe that the formation of a separate state is the ideal solution for the island.

Considering these views, then, ‘Cypriot Consciousness’ should not (in the near future) be expected to become structured and expressed as a political ideology on the island. Taking into consideration the two opposing communities’ past, one cannot expect for there to be a total “Cypriot” identity just yet, especially since both communities have not united under a united Cyprus. Furthermore, it should be remembered that Greek Cypriots will undoubtedly remain tied to Greece culturally, religiously and linguistically, as will Turkish Cypriots similarly remain tied to Turkey.
So, when observing the above, we can conclude that while the Greek Cypriots prefer to be “Cypriot” together with the Turkish Cypriots of the island, most Turkish Cypriots would prefer a separate, breakaway, state. We can see then, that in Cyprus’ case, ‘national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods,” (Hobsbawm 1990:11) the nationalism that the Greeks of the island felt in the 1950s (for the expansion of the island to Greece) no longer exists today. Within less than half a decade, this national identification has changed.

Although true for the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot minority on the other hand has kept its nationalistic aims of become a recognized state entity.

It can be seen here, that generally, the Greek Cypriots trust the EU and its policies; the majority of the Turkish Cypriots, though, do not trust the EU at all. This is clearly because the Greek Cypriots were admitted as EU members, while the Turkish Cypriots were not.
Finally, a federal government where both communities would function separately, but have political equality in the whole state, is quite acceptable to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This is a key factor which should be included in any plan, if it is to be accepted.

We have seen that the most important issues which both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides are concerned with, are security, foreign interference, settlers, and finding an overall solution to the problem in relation to their concerns.

We have seen that the Turkish Cypriots will not give up the presence of Turkish troops (until a workable solution is found). Furthermore, they want extensive social and economic reforms, which would improve their lifestyle. In addition, the Turkish Cypriots are in favour of keeping as much Turkish presence in the North as possible (this includes the presence of Turkish settlers) because they would not want a majoritarian solution forced on them.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots want to reduce the presence of both the Turkish military force, as well as Turkish immigrants. They furthermore wish for the restoration of their properties in the North.

These are the main issues then, which need to be redressed, since they played a significant role in the failure of the Annan Plan.

We can conclude then, that using the Annan Plan as a basis to restart any negotiations will only lead to more disappointment. Thus, even though both sides are in favour of starting negotiations as soon as possible, the UN will have to formulate a new plan,
which would accommodate both sides, with satisfactory trade-offs. For this to happen, representatives from both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot side will have to learn to trust each other, and this in turn, will only happen with the continuation of confidence-building measures.

* All graphs and illustrations are taken from:

All in co-operation with Cymar Market Research Ltd. and Kadem Cyprus Social Research: Nicosia.
CONCLUSION

We have seen that the “Cyprus Problem” is complicated. This is mainly because of the two nations occupying the island. Since the independence of Cyprus in 1960 however, the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and outside parties have been negotiating for a future political association between them, but have not reached an agreement. No political partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides has been satisfactory and thus acceptable to both sides; each has always been dissatisfied with the end result.

After several disappointments, the Turkish Cypriots shaped their own territory which they still occupy. They declared the Northern part of Cyprus a Turkish Cypriot state, and through an act of self-determination produced the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”.

Even though the Turkish Cypriot entity is regarded as an illegal entity by the international community, it nevertheless domestically functions as a separate entity from the Greek Cypriot South—that is, internally, within the “TRNC”, it exercises sole political control over itself, and is not influenced by any Greek Cypriot decisions. Externally however, and with regard to the country as a whole, the Greek South represents and functions as the legal Republic of Cyprus, and is solely responsible for decisions taken, affecting both the Greek and Turkish entities. This is something the Turkish Cypriots, as well as Turkey, reject, and wish to rid themselves of.

This brings us to the notion of “nationalism” and whether this plays a role in Turkish Cypriot affairs, or, as Hobsbawm has argued, is slowly being done away with under modernity and globalisation. As has been shown, the idea of “nationalism” is still very much alive when it comes to the Turkish Cypriot group. It has by no means weakened, and is in fact stronger than ever, since the Turkish Cypriots, as an unrecognised group, are coming together and fighting for recognition, and also are aiming for EU
membership. Their nationalism in fact strengthened even more after the Greek Cypriots entered the EU as members, and they were not.

We have seen that the UN Peace Plan, which sought to redress the animosities of the past, was not successful, in that its goals were not met in forming a unified Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot group, who fear that their security and safety as a minority is of utmost importance, have to also consider their economic problems. We have also seen that Turkey’s role in Cyprus’ affairs has had a negative impact, not only on Turkish Cypriot aspirations for EU membership, but also for Turkish hopes of becoming an EU member.

The Cyprus question has therefore proved so persistent and inflexible that bridging the gap will require an extraordinary effort. Due to historic animosities (because history cannot be forgotten or overlooked), the chronic feud, and the extreme nationalisms of the two communities, the situation in Cyprus is a stalemate. Thus far, no side has been willing to compromise, and whatever actions are taken against any side is seen as biased and unfair, thus causing the failure of the many attempts to solve the crisis. This means that no durable solution favouring both sides has been established, and a formula for a peaceful co-existence is yet to be found.

The consent of Greece and Turkey is essential to any future settlement negotiated between the Greek and Turkish communities, but for an effective settlement to be reached on the island, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are the two key parties which will have to take responsibility for finding a solution (and have the final say in any decision) since these are the two communities which will continue living in the region. However Turkey practically controls the “TRNC”, and if Turkey is held responsible for a settlement in Cyprus (by representing the Turkish Cypriots), this will undermine the claim to recognition of the “TRNC” (Dodd 2001: 32) itself, and would defeat the purpose of finding a durable solution for the two sides.

On the other hand however, as we have seen, if the Turkish Cypriots are to cut ties with Turkey, this would prove destructive for the Turkish Cypriots, and since they depend on
Turkey for, most importantly, economic aid, they have no choice but to be politically influenced by Turkey as well. Hence the vital problem here for the “TRNC” is the political one, therefore solving the political problem would be the most important requirement, and once this has been solved, the economic one will surely follow.

Whatever the case, any potential settlement requires that firstly, the realities of the internal political situation of Cyprus be dealt with. It should furthermore consider the international political players, as well as the international legal set up. It should also be able to motivate both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot groups to think less about their own self-interests and more in terms of the community as a whole, therefore try to further build up confidence-building measures. Thus, both sides have to be sincere and committed to independence, and they should not place the other side in doubt or in danger. Finally, both communities should not only be committed to their side’s welfare, but should instead focus on and be committed to the well-being of the population and state as a whole. But until a commitment is made by both sides, the “Cyprus Problem” continues.


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