CHAPTER THREE. OVERVIEW OF RWANDA

3.1. Introduction
To better understand the issue of privatisation of services in Rwanda it is important to begin with a general understanding of the country itself. This chapter provides an overview of both the past and the current situation of Rwanda.

3.2. Rwanda’s geography, population and administration

Landlocked in the central Africa, Rwanda shares borders with Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and DRC. Rwanda covers an area of only 26,338 square kilometres (land: 24,948 sq km water: 1,390 sq km), it has five volcanoes, twenty-three lakes and numerous rivers, some forming the source of the River Nile. Rwanda is predominantly rural with 91% of the population engaged in subsistence agricultural activities. With 322 persons per square kilometre, it is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. As of 2004, there were an estimated 8.6 million Rwandans living in the country (Rugumamu and Gbla 2003).
With its Capital city being Kigali, Rwanda is divided into 4 provinces\(^9\) (East, North, West and South). The Executive is composed of the President, the Prime Minister and a broad-based government of National Unity. The Legislative is composed of an 80-seat Chamber of Deputies and 26-member Senate. The Judicial is formed of the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, Council of State, Court of Appeals. Eight\(^{10}\) political parties form the government and the parliament: RPF, PDC, PSR, PDI, UDPR, PSD, PL, and PPC (International panel of eminent personalities 2000, MINECOFIN 2003, Obidegwu 2003, the government of Rwanda’s website 2006).

3.3. Pre-colonial and colonial kingdom of Rwanda

Pre-colonial Rwanda was a highly centralized kingdom presided over by kings who hailed from one ruling clan, ‘Abanyiginya’. Under three categories of chiefs (cattle chiefs, land chiefs, and military chiefs) the relationship between the ordinary Rwandans was symbiotic and one of mutual benefit. Rather than objective biological, ethnic or cultural categories the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were largely constructed social categories representing differing socio-economic positions within the Rwandan society (International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Mamdani 2001). ‘Two aspects should be noted: firstly that all shared the same language, culture, religion, territory and secondly, that intermarriages were frequent, with a certain social mobility’ (Ewald J et al. 2004:100).

Following the 1884 Berlin Conference on the division of Africa between European Nations, Rwanda became part of German\(^{11}\) East Africa in 1895, along with Burundi and Tanganyika (actual Tanzania). With the World War I, Belgian troops from Belgian Congo chased the small number of Germans out of Rwanda and took control of the country. In 1917 Belgium established a political system of indirect administration with the King effectively working under and for the Belgian Administration (Duly 2000, International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Rugumamu and Gbla 2003, Ewald J et al. 2004).

It is during the Belgian colonial rule that a cash crop economy was introduced and administered through harsh methods that further alienated the King and his chiefs from the rest of the population. At first, the Belgian authorities, for political and practical reasons,

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\(^9\) The updates are not exhaustive to give more details
\(^{10}\) MDR was dismantled in 2003 shortly before elections as it was accused of ethnic and segregationist ideology; it is at that time that PPC was formed.
\(^{11}\) Germans respected traditional institutions through the indirect rule with the King still having his full power over subjects.
favoured the King and his chiefs who were Tutsi elites and left behind Hutu. This was reinforced between 1926 and 1931, when Belgian authorities undertook administrative reforms reducing 200 chieftaincies to 40, treating Tutsi preferentially when it came to the appointment (Duly 2000, International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Mamdani 2001, Rugumamu and Gbla 2003, Ewald J et al. 2004).

The myth of Tutsi superiority was consciously cultivated during Belgian colonial rule, not only by the colonial rulers but also by senior representatives of the Catholic Church. Actually, since King Musinga demonstrated a determination to keep alive Rwandan traditions and customs and to resist the will of the administrators and missionaries the two united to overthrow him in favor of his son, who had been educated in mission schools and was likely to accept Christianity. It’s in 1931 that King Musinga was replaced with his son, King Rudahigwa Mutara III. That was one of achievements of the ‘divide and rule’ legacy, as in 1935, the Belgian Colonial Administration introduced a discriminatory national identification on the basis of ethnicity and issued for the first time, identification that clearly categorized people as ‘Hutu’, ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Twa’ on the basis of the number of heads of cattle they owned. Besides that, Belgians ethnologists put up a sort of physical characteristics that would help distinguish these two ethnicised groups based on the thesis known as Hamitic myth (Tutsi)-Bantu myth (Hutu). It is this discriminatory identification, which systematically led to the famous statistics of ‘majority Hutus’ (85% or more), ‘minority Tutsis’ (less than 14%) and ignored Twa (around 1%) (Duly 2000, International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Mamdani 2001, Ewald J et al. 2004).

In 1943, Belgium initiated another series of administrative reforms that eliminated local chieftains who were Hutu and replaced them with new chiefs who were Tutsi. But in 1952, King Mutara III Rudahigwa agreed with the UN, to increase again the number of Hutu representatives at all levels of the Rwanda administration. In 1954, King Mutara III Rudahigwa abolished "Ubuhake" and demanded total independence and an end to Belgian colonial occupation.

But when demands for independence began, mainly by UNAR, formed by people from the aforementioned ruling elite, the Belgian authorities hastily nurtured another party called PARMEHUTU that was founded on a sectarian ethnic ideology (anti-Tutsi). And under

12 No characteristics were given to distinguish the group of Twa, a group that was ignored
the Belgian supervision, the first massacres of Tutsi, at the hands of the PARMEHUTU occurred in 1959 (Ewald J et al. 2004). The Catholic Church encouraged Gregoire Kayibanda, a catechist, and his associates to form political parties to champion ‘Bahutu interests’ (Duly 2000, International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Mamdani 2001.).

In 1959, at a time of strained relationship between the monarch and the Belgian authorities, King Mutara III Rudahigwa died mysteriously at a Bujumbura hospital into the hands and mercy of Belgian doctors. Just after his death, he was succeeded by his brother King Kigeli V Ndahindurwa. It is also in 1959 that Guy Logiest, a Belgian Colonel, with Belgian Commandos, organized some Hutu under the auspices of PARMEHUTU to kill thousands of Tutsi and sent hundreds of thousands of others into exile. The King, himself, fled into exile in order to survive (Mamdani 2001, Ewald J et al. 2004).

In 1961, under the auspices of the UN, the Belgian Colonial Administration, under conditions of terror, organised a referendum on the monarchy. Belgium declared the end of the monarchy and Gregoire Kayibanda became the President of the new republic. The PARMEHUTU government, formed as a result of the September 1961 election, was granted internal autonomy by Belgium on January 1st, 1962 and a June 1962 UN General Assembly resolution terminated the Belgian trusteeship and granted full independence to Rwanda effective July 1, 1962. (Duly 2000, Rugumamu and Gbla 2003, Ewald J et al. 2004)

3.4. Rwanda from independence to 1994
The first Republic institutionalized discrimination against Tutsi and, periodically, used massacres against this targeted population as a means of maintaining the status quo. Some groups in the Diaspora attempted, without success, to stage a comeback through armed means. Tutsi were effectively banned from the upper reaches of the government and the military. Because the private sector was minute and international links negligible, the Tutsi’s sole opportunity for advancement was the all-important public sector where jobs were made available to ethnic groups in proportion to their numbers (quotas). The ethnic identity cards introduced 30 years earlier were retained, and these governed virtually all public and commercial relationships (International panel of eminent personalities 2000).
In 1965, Rwanda was declared a one-party state under MDR-PARMEHUTU. Under the Kayibanda regime divisionism took a step further and included regionalism. Top political leaders from the south (Banyenduga) ignored northern Hutu while the latter dominated the army forces in which they held high ranks. As a result, Banyenduga were considered as traitors by northern Hutu (Duly 2000, International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Rugumamu and Gbla 2003, Ewald J et al. 2004). Thus, by 1972, northern Hutu leaders had grown frustrated by the monopolist power of Kayibanda and his narrowly based PARMEHUTU. Desperate to hold on to office, Kayibanda emphasized ethnic divisions once more, insisting on Hutu solidarity at the expense of the Tutsi. At the same time, a wave of anti-Tutsi pogroms erupted, some of them in the countryside involving the local peasantry. Killings and the general atmosphere of intimidation and terror led to another exodus of thousands of Tutsi from the homeland.

Consequently, on July 5, 1973, the military took power, under the army chief commander and minister of defence, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana. Subsequently, Kayibanda and many prominent politicians of the first Republic were killed or imprisoned. More and more Tutsi were again killed. In 1975, Habyarimana formed the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) a single ruling party. Under aegis of the MRND, Rwandans went to the polls in December 1978, overwhelmingly endorsed a new constitution, and confirmed Habyarimana as the President. Habyarimana was re-elected in 1983 and again in 1988, as he was the sole candidate (International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Mamdani 2001, Obidegwu 2003, Ewald J et al. 2004).

For almost 17 years, open violence against Tutsi virtually stopped. Tutsi were excluded from political and military posts, but were allowed to play limited roles in the public sector, and to have limited access to education. However,

‘During this period, much about Rwanda remained as it had been for some time. Identification cards, ethnic quotas, and spheres of exclusive ethnic concentration remained hallmarks of the society. Power at every level was still monopolized, now by the Hutu…’ (International panel of eminent personalities 2000:22).

The private sector, however, was not restricted. Tutsis came to play prominent roles as entrepreneurs, not least in international trade, a situation that gave rise to later frictions. At the end of the period, Tutsi had managed to establish themselves in several sectors beyond
the supposed quota of 9% (International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Ewald J et al. 2004).

Both the first and second Republics, repeatedly, stated that Rwanda was a small, overpopulated country that could not accommodate Rwandan refugees if they were to return. Increasingly, the entire population (across both ethnic lines) was marginalized and impoverished while the Habyarimana regime became more violently intolerant. In 1985, about 40% of the total population had an average per capita income below the poverty line. During the early 1990s, diminishing agricultural productivity and the decline in the international coffee price caused a significant reduction of per capita incomes. By 1993, 53% of the population had income per capita below the poverty line (Ewald J et al. 2004).

Political activities remained banned and it was only in response to intense pressure for political reform, that President Habyarimana announced, in July 1990, his intention to transform Rwanda into a multi-party democracy. On October 1, 1990, Rwandan exiles banded together as the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)¹³ and invaded Rwanda from their base in Uganda (Mamdani 2001). With the beginning of the armed struggle, France, Belgium, and the Democratic Republic of Congo hurriedly dispatched troops to Rwanda to support the dictatorial regime.

‘Many Tutsi businessmen and women, teachers and priests were arrested and accused on the basis of their ethnicity, of collaboration with the rebels even if they had no connection with them. From 1992 onward, the Habyarimana regime began to train Hutu extremist militia groups known as Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi, while it paradoxically pursued peace talks with the rebel forces in 1993 and early 1994’ (Rugumamu and Gbla 2003:35).

As the regime became more desperate, massacres of Tutsi, in various parts of the country, became widespread in a deliberate program of ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, the regime used violence to harass and silence the emerging internal political opposition. Violence was also used to derail the peace process. After a long period of negotiations, the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed on August 4th, 1993 but it was seen as threatening the basis of the power and privilege, which the ruling clique had so far enjoyed. Hence, it was

¹³ Against a backdrop of entrenched divisive and genocidal ideology, repeated massacres, the persistent problems of refugees in the Diaspora, and the lack of avenues for peaceful political change, the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) was formed in 1979 by some Rwandans in the diaspora with an objective of mobilising Rwandese people to resolve these problems. Nearly a decade later, in 1987, RANU became the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)

3.5. The genocide and the aftermath

The first massacres in Rwanda took place in 1959 under the Belgian-Hutu ‘coalition’. Thereafter, repeatedly, killings of the Tutsi became a custom in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. Tutsi were not only accused of being opposition but, more than that, they were treated as foreign invaders, oppressors and enemies of Hutu (who believed themselves to be real Rwandans). Roughly all historians of the then ruling regimes treated Tutsi as latecomers, and settlers from Ethiopia who subjugated Hutu for a long period (Mamdani 2001). The colonial era was nurtured as if Tutsi were real colonisers while Belgians were considered as good people that helped the ‘real Rwandans’ to get rid of invaders and oppressors (Mamdani 2001).

On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and the President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down as it prepared to land at Kigali and both presidents died. The same night military and militia groups began rounding up and killing all Tutsi and political moderates regardless of their ethnic background. When the genocide began, the first reaction of the UN, and indeed of western nations, was to withdraw their troops and their nationals respectively, leaving everything to the mercy of genocide planners and perpetrators. Under these circumstances, the RPF restarted fighting, in order to stop the genocide (International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Ewald J et al. 2004).

On July 4th, 1994, Kigali fell to the forces of the RPA, the armed wing of the RPF. The members of the so-called ‘Provisional Government’14, the armed groups, and many people who were involved in genocide, along with thousands of innocent citizens, fled mainly to the DRC and Tanzania. On July 19th, 1994, RPF established the government of national unity, under Pasteur Bizimungu, who became the President of the Republic. Weeks later, the National Assembly was formed.

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14 The Provisional Government was formed just after Habyarimana’ death, Jean Kambanda became the prime minister and the then speaker of Parliament Theoneste Sindikubwabo became the interim President of the Republic. It is this government that carried out the genocide.
In the period of April - July 1994, over 1 million Rwandans, mainly Tutsi and Hutu opposition (so-called moderates) were killed by the regime. The genocide caused destruction of assets and contributed to a dramatic increase in poverty, the proportion of households below the poverty line rose from 53% to 70% between 1993 and 1997. As the government of Rwanda puts it:

‘In 1994, schools, hospitals, factories and government departments were not functioning. Public utilities like telephones, electricity and water were also not functioning. There was total displacement of the population, both internally and externally. There was no civil service and the government's administrative capacity had collapsed. Civil servants had either been killed during the genocide or had fled the country. Survivors of genocide were still scattered all over the country and traumatised. Genocide had further polarised the Rwandan society’ (MINECOFIN, 2003:15).

Beside over two million people who fled to neighbouring countries, over one million people who had been pushed into exile by previous purges were returning into Rwanda, occupying either vacant properties left by new refugees or previously protected areas among others. The war and genocide left hundreds of thousands child-headed households, genocide survivors in great need of help and this coincided with the need for justice for over 130,000 genocide suspects in prisons. In short, due to the genocide, Rwandan society collapsed completely; business and agricultural activities ceased, skilled people and the intelligentsia were slaughtered or fled, the infrastructure was purposely destroyed, and government operations were completely dissolved (International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Obidegwu 2003, Rugumamu and Gbla 2003, Ewald J et al. 2004).

Furthermore, militiamen among the refugees, nearby Rwandan borders, regrouped militarily and, repeatedly, raided Rwanda from DRC. In late 1996, AFDL led by Laurent Désiré Kabila, together with the RPF, broke up DRC’s Rwandan refugee camps on their way to Kinshasa to topple the Mobutu regime. About 1.2 million returned voluntarily or were driven back between November 1996 and January 1997. The Tanzanian government also expelled 500,000 Rwandan refugees in January 1997. At the same time, militias from DRC entered Rwanda by evading the government’s screening process, and started causing insecurity on the national territory. Rwanda’s security was, further, compromised when a second war on DRC started, against President Laurent Désiré Kabila in August 1998. Since then, the Congolese government, constantly, sought to maintain the security threat.
to Rwanda by arming the ex-FAR\textsuperscript{15} soldiers and the Interahamwe as well as their new recruits mobilized from the two Kivu (International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Mamdani 2001, Obidegwu 2003, Rugumamu and Gbla 2003, Ewald J \textit{et al.} 2004, ).

In March 2000, following the resignation of Pasteur Bizimungu, Paul Kagame who had been the Vice-president since 1994 became the interim President of Rwanda. He led the country to 2003 democratic elections that he won and sworn-in as a democratically elected President for a renewable 7 year term.

Back to 1994, the government of national unity issued a Declaration of Principles that spelled out its political, social and economic agenda for a ‘New Rwanda’. In economic terms, the Declaration\textsuperscript{16} emphasized the government’s commitment to a market-based economy with a limited role for government and the key role of the private sector, the privatization of public enterprises, the liberalization of the trade and exchange rate regime and the reduction of the level of military expenditures. Subsequently, Rwandan government policies and actions largely followed its commitments in the Declaration, as it essentially adopted a dual track strategy of transition from emergency to development, emphasizing both short-term relief and humanitarian needs, and interventions to build the foundation for longer-term growth and poverty reduction, within an overall long term development vision (International panel of eminent personalities 2000, Obidegwu 2003, Strauss 2004).

After the genocide, the recovery of Rwanda’s trade has proved challenging. Rwanda had seen its GDP fall by 50\% in 1994, and the rate of inflation rose by 64\% and remained one of the poorest countries in the world, with per capita GDP under US$220 in 1997. In the same year over 60\% of the households were living below the poverty line. But gradually, the economic recovery began to occur and the country embarked on the daunting tasks of rehabilitation, reconstruction, reconciliation and development. The international community provided generous support conditional on compliance with the standard package of structural adjustment policies involving changes in macro-economic

\textsuperscript{15} Ex Rwandan Army Forces

\textsuperscript{16} One can assume that maybe the new leadership had checked recommendations given by IFI’s to the previous regime and wanted to attract the sympathy of IFI’s and International community by implementing those recommendations. Apart from that, as most top officials had lived Uganda, where President Museveni had had a good record in market-based policy, they may have believed that in so doing it would enable them to attract IFI’s attention for funding.
management. The government set up participatory political structures at the national and local levels, restored law and order, took and implemented many decisions required to enforce the changes demanded by the adjustment policy. These include, among others, the removal of price distortions in foreign exchange, capital, and essential commodities, improved fiscal and financial discipline, the reduction of marketing monopolies and state controls, and civil service reform (IMF 1998, The World Bank 1998).

The economy rebounded, growing by 70% between 1994 and 1997, and 8.9% in 1998. However, the real GDP in 1996 remained at only 72% of the 1990 level. Inflation, as measured by the change in the consumer price index (CPI), was reduced from 17% at the end of 1997, to an average of 6.8% in 1998. To believe in the government, the period of 1995-2002 was one of systematically high growth, ranging from an average annual growth rate of 11.4% during 1996-98 to 8.1% during 2000-2002 (MINECOFIN 2003).

Agriculture and construction were the main sources of growth since 1998, as manufacturing, commerce and other service sectors stagnated following reduction in the activities and related employment of international NGOs and relief agencies. The excess capacity that facilitated the rapid rebound was quickly exhausted and new investments in productive capacity were needed to keep the economy growing. However, as the donor community asserts, despite many structural constraints, continued improvement in security after the genocide and strong government commitment to reforms led to strong economic growth which made Rwanda one of the best performers in sub-Saharan Africa until 2002 (IMF 1998, IMF 2005, The World Bank 1998, USAID 2004).

In 1998, the government has developed its vision of the new Rwanda (Vision 2020) that attempted to address the legacies of the genocide, and the structural social and economic constraints confronting Rwanda, and reflected the lessons from the years lost to civil strife. Consequently, Vision 2020 emphasizes national reconciliation, the enhancement of national security, and the reduction of poverty as key development objectives. It identifies human resource development, good governance and justice, decentralization and the broad participation of the population in the affairs of the country, together with regional integration as crucial elements for realizing its goals and vision (MINECOFIN 2003, UNDP 2005).
Vision 2020 envisages the three main pillars of economic development, employment creation and poverty reduction as being (1) rural development and agricultural transformation, (2) the development of human resources and (3) the integration of Rwanda into the regional and global economies, with emphasis on the exports of high value agricultural goods, services and light manufactures. To be successful, Rwanda would have to take advantage of developments in information and communications technology (ICT) to produce goods and services not heavily constrained by its high transport costs to global markets. National poverty reduction strategies frameworks were designed in 2000 and discussed with the IMF, which, after analyzing and endorsing the document, agreed on financial support. The nationwide consultations on the poverty reduction strategy (PRS), held in 2000-2001, confirmed and legitimized the vision and goals of Vision 2020 and led to the development of a detailed strategy for putting Rwanda on the path to realizing Vision 2020 (IMF 2005, MINECOFIN 2003, UNDP 2005).

Nevertheless, economic performance since 2003 has been faltering, reflecting the immediate impact of a drought (failed rains during 2002-2003 led to a decline in agricultural output); but also the outcome of low investment in the energy sector and weak planning with regard to energy supply and resource use. The GDP grew at a much lower rate than in previous years while high net credit to the government from the banking system and increased bank lending to private businesses led to a rapid expansion in the money supply which contributed to significant depreciation of the Rwanda franc in 2003. Thus inflation increased steadily during 2003 and 2004 due to the decline in agricultural production and depreciation of the Rwandan franc (IMF 2005, UNDP 2005, USAID 2004)

3.6. Kigali city

Kigali city is situated in the central region of Rwanda. It is surrounded by East, North and South provinces. A city of plateaus and high hills slopes (between 1450 and 1850m, Kigali was founded in 1908 by Dr R. Kandt, a German resident. It developed from a metropolitan zone made of Nyarugenge and Nyamirambo districts, which were the only ones to be urbanized at that time, the remainder still being rural areas peripheral to the city.

Since prefectures were introduced at independence, the city had been a part of the prefecture of Kigali. In 1973, new areas (Kicukiro, Gikondo, Remera, Kacyiru, Gatsata, Cyahafi, Nyakabanda, and Muhima) developed and came to be included in the sectors of
the Nyarugenge commune. In 1991, with administrative reforms, Kigali city was separated from Kigali Ngali to become the prefecture of Kigali City (known as PVK) headed by a Prefect, with a population of 235,664 habitants. The prefecture of Kigali City was made of communes Nyarugenge, Kacyiru and Kanombe each headed by a burgomaster (Kigali City, 2005).

In 2000, with administrative reforms PVK became Kigali city, made of its former areas, former communes of Butamwa, Kanombe, and parts of Rutongo and Rubungo. With these reforms the city was restructured in 8 districts (Nyarugenge, Nyamirambo, Butamwa, Gisozi, Kacyiru, Kanombe, Kicukiro and Gikondo) headed by elected Mayors of districts. An elected Mayor, working with an elected City Council headed the Capital City. (MINECOFIN 2005).

Source: MINECOFIN (2005), Monographie de la Ville de Kigali, MINECOFIN, Kigali, p.65
Following is a summary of the Capital Kigali demographic growth.

**Figure 1. Kigali demographic growth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Number of inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907-1916</td>
<td>8ha</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1962</td>
<td>45ha - 250ha</td>
<td>1,070 - 6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1990</td>
<td>70 ha-112Km²</td>
<td>60,000 - 140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>112Km²-314Km²</td>
<td>605,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>314Km²</td>
<td>800,000 – 1,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.kigalicity.rw/history, 31/10/2005

A 2002 national general census of the population has shown that the average size of households in Kigali is 4.5 persons per household (MINECOFIN 2005).

Given its central geographic position, Kigali easily attracts people and goods from all around the country. In fact, a number of industries (brewery, sugar refinery, printing industry, soap factory, diary, textile, tobacco factory, tannery, furniture workshop, construction, mechanic…) developed along Kicukiro-Gikondo-Kimihurura border. Hotel and tourism industry have developed as well.

In this city, dominated by high hills, informal settlements are more likely to be seen than modern ones. In 2002, only 6 of 10 households had access to water taps, whether at home or in the neighbourhood. According to a National survey in 2002, only 3 of 8 districts had a high rate of tap access: Kanombe (79%), Nyamirambo (88%), Nyarugenge (95%). 2 out 4 four households in Butamwa and Gisozi were getting water from developed wells and springs. The districts of Butamwa, Kicukiro and Gisozi have an important proportion of households with serious problems of access to potable water. In fact around ½ of the total households in Butamwa and more than ¼ of households of Gisozi and Kicukiro get water from unsafe wells, streams, rivers, lacks, ponds (MINECOFIN 2005).

Regarding energy consumption, the 2002 National general census of the population shows that electricity consumption is very low as it is mostly used for lighting purposes. The table below summarizes energy consumption in Kigali city in 2002.
According to Kigali city (2002), only 6% of the people in Kigali use electricity for cooking while 73% use it for lighting, and the rest of the residents/households use other sources of power like charcoal, firewood and kerosene. Charcoal is the main source of cooking energy except for Butamwa and Gisozi where firewood is still greatly important. This leads to the fact that 9 of 10 households in Kigali depend on wood when it comes on cooking. As a very small space is reserved for forest due to the density of the city population, the city depends on the rest of the country for households’ combustibles. In the surroundings of the city there is a progressive degradation of the green forest and, the more the city population grows the more the distance and the cost increase to get the charcoal or firewood. The most endangered are the urban poor (MINECOFIN 2005).

Estimates, in the table below, summarize household income in Kigali city.

**Figure 2. Sources of energy for cooking and lighting in Kigali city (2002)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Firewood</th>
<th>Charcoal</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Kerosene</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gisozi</td>
<td>22,446</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanombe</td>
<td>12,130</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gikondo</td>
<td>17,854</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyamarambo</td>
<td>12,540</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butamwa</td>
<td>10,091</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyarugenge</td>
<td>23,955</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirundo</td>
<td>10,196</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kacyiru</td>
<td>18,890</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Kigali (2002), Kigali Economic Development Strategy, Kigali

**Figure 3. Household monthly income levels in Kigali (2002)**

Source: City of Kigali (2002), Kigali Economic Development Strategy, Kigali
3.7. Conclusion

Prior to privatisation, Rwanda experienced a history of violence, social upheavals and economic downturns. The degradation and destruction caused by the 1994 genocide resulted in reliance on international support to economic policy decisions taken accordingly. Most of the adopted policies were market-oriented and favoured private investment. Although the Rwandan economy gradually recovered the consequence of this recovery would have impacted variably depending on the relative economic situations of the residents of Kigali.