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Title: An examination of the relationship between national identity and sovereignty: debates around the South African nation-state from 1990 to 2010.

Supervisor: Prof Ran Greenstein
DECLARATION

I declare that this Thesis is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other University.

_______________________________________
(Signature of candidate)

13 September 2017 in Johannesburg
Abstract:

The study attempts to examine the relationship between national identity and political sovereignty and their impact on the emergence of nations, with a special focus on debates around the South African nation-state from 1990 to 2004. Located within the postcolonialism approach, the study looks at national identity through the prism of ethnicity, language, religion and race, while sovereignty is considered through its two component parts, the state and citizenry.

By examining two postcolonial contexts, the Arab world and India, the study has developed a framework which is applied to the study of the South African state. This framework identifies nationalism as a glue which holds sovereignty and identity together in the nation-state. The two cases reveal that there is always more than one nationalist narrative, often competing against each other. In the case of the Arab world the study looks at the tensions between pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism and Islamism. In the case of India a secular Indian nationalism has had to compete against a Hindu nationalism.

The study argues that South Africa’s history has been characterised by contestation between a white, Afrikaner nationalism and an African nationalism. As in the two case studies, these narratives are not just polar ends, but rather a complex spectrum which has seen alliances being struck across the racial divide.

The essence of the former has been an attempt at addressing the ‘Native Question’, that is how to manage the continued subjugation of the overwhelming number of Africans in this country. Having its roots as a reaction to its socio-economic conditions in the Cape, it evolved into an ethnically constructed view of itself and through which it mobilised political and economic resources to perpetuate its dominance after it reached its zenith in the 1948 elections. This narrative’s arc saw it being redefined in race terms to encompass English-speaking whites, and then through a combination of anti-communist rhetoric and anti-African scare-mongering, included the coloured and Indian parts of the South African population. Today it manifests itself in a return to an ethnic laager which takes the form of attempts at discriminating against non-Afrikaans speakers on the basis of an appeal to victimhood and the exercise of constitutional rights.

The African nationalism narrative begins from the mid-1800s, tracing the impact of those educated at missionary schools on the society they came from. This Christian elite came to play a powerful role in establishing a plethora of organisations so that as the wars of resistance were ending, political mobilisation was taking off. This mobilisation took the form of voter registration and voting for those white candidates considered to be acting in the interests of Africans, church congregations as well as newspapers which served as platforms for airing of grievances. A moderate, urban-based, accommodating form of politics ran parallel to a more militant, rural-based form of resistance. The former would shape the first few decades of the African National Congress until the 1940s, while the latter was subsumed under the rhetoric of the nationalist elite – similar to the experiences of India and the Arab world.
A key debate from the inception of this narrative was the kind of Africanism which informed African nationalism. These debates continued through most of the first half of the 20th century, leading eventually to the breakaway of the PAC from the ANC because of the latter’s commitment to non-racialism and a broader definition of Africanism. This debate would be revived at different points in the history of the ANC, with the most recent one being at its 1997 conference. The CPSA/SACP played an important role in the formulation of a more radical agenda through its conceptualisation of SA as a Black Republic and later as experiencing colonialism of a special type (CST).

The study looks at how the two narratives came to clash over the formulation of the 1996 Constitution and how this foundation document of the ‘New South Africa’ has become the fulcrum around which the two nationalisms continue clashing. With the ANC in power since the 1994 election, special attention is paid to its track-record in government and the manner in which state and civil society has interacted. Core to this is an appreciation of how the two nationalisms continue morphing and the impact this is having on the South African nation-state.
I dedicate this to the memory of parents: my mother who taught me the importance of clan; my father who opened my eyes to the world
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There are several people who have shown tremendous patience throughout this long marathon: Prof Ran Greenstein, unsparing in his feedback and continuously opening new vistas for me to explore; my children Rabia and Zahra who were told at the beginning of this journey not to ask ‘are we there yet?’; and Latiefa, who had to be the most patient. My appreciation for the many hours she spent poring over early drafts to ensure that ‘the rest of us can understand it’ and for continuing to spur me on, especially when the finishing line felt just too far away.

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The usual disclaimers apply: any weaknesses in this composition are entirely mine.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

In this thesis the theoretical issues raised by the concepts sovereignty and national identity are considered within the framework of the postcolonial approach. I examine sovereignty in relation to two associated concepts – that of the state and that of citizenship. The notions of the state and citizenship evolved over many centuries to lead to contemporary formulations, which in themselves remain contested. I look at how national identity becomes expressed in sovereignty in different contexts. I am especially focused on the ethnic, language, race and religious dimensions of identity, given their salience to South Africa. I examine nationalism as the glue which connects national identity and sovereignty. I have used the cases of the Arab world and India to look at the relationship between national identity, sovereignty and nationalism. The framework which emerges from this comparative study is then applied to the South African case.

While providing a sweeping historical survey of South Africa, I chose to focus on the period 1990 – 2010 for several reasons. For one it marked a major turning point in the conceptualisation of the South African nation-state. The ushering in of a democratic order with the holding of the 1994 elections and the 1996 adoption of the new constitution represented a major turning point in the evolution of the South African nation-state. The debates which occurred before and during that period continued to reverberate into the twenty first century. I have no doubt that these debates will continue shaping notions of national identity and sovereignty in the future. This parallels the experience of India where the debates leading up to the attainment of independence in 1947 and the adoption of the new constitution in November 1949 continue to resonate up to today in various forms, but especially around the contestation between secularist and Hindutva ideas. Similarly, in the different parts of the Arab world, there were particular points when the forces of secularism and Islamism clashed, laying the basis for contemporary debates.

In the case of South Africa the period 1990 to 2010 was when Afrikaner and African nationalism could test their numerical strength and the prowess of their ideas through relatively peaceful negotiations. In doing so it engendered debates which continue to mark the sociological and political landscape today.
The core thesis I will be testing is that nation-states have been shaped by two processes: that of identity formation and the emergence of the sovereign state, which have been held together by nationalism. These two processes are isolated for conceptual purposes but I argue that there is an ongoing dynamic between them, with certain logics inherent to nationalism as a process and a phenomenon. As far as sovereignty is concerned, the thesis looks at how state, citizenship and nationalism interact. As far as national identity is concerned the notions of ethnicity, language, race and religion in different contexts are examined to assess the extent to which these impact identity as well as impact the nature of nationalism and the sovereignty a nation-state enjoys.

The privileging of the postcolonial approach is not without its challenges. At the simplest level it refers to a historical period, that is the moment after a country attains political independence. At another level it is comprised of a cluster of elements which include colonial discourse, pan-Africanism, anti-colonialism as well as the study of societies in the postcolonial state.

Section 2.4 below goes into the genesis of the approach and criticisms of it. It shall be argued in Chapter 4 that a historical perspective lends itself to seeing South Africa until 1994 as a colonial state. The unique feature in the case of South Africa is that the relationship between the colonising force and the colonised was complicated with the former, during most of the 20th century, having weak and then no direct connection to an external imperial metropole. Hence the depiction of South Africa as an example of 'colonialism of a special type' or internal colonialism, which itself was opposed by theorists arguing that South Africa was really a case of 'racial capitalism'.

The South African experience is different from those of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Palestine or the United States where the indigenous population was almost completely wiped out by the colonising forces or forcibly removed from their territory. These colonising forces have been described as 'settler colonies' or cases of 'internal colonialism'. In such cases the native population is swamped by a large mass of colonial settlers that, after generations, no longer have a metropole to return to. *Metropole and colony thus become geographically coextensive* (Weaver, 2000:222).

The key difference in the case of South Africa is the continued numerical superiority of the colonised. Notwithstanding that numerical superiority, the colonisers were able
to control power through repression and coercion, after the founding violence which led to the creation of the unified South African state in 1910. Violence continued being deployed throughout most of the 20th century until the establishment of the democratic state, ushered in by the elections of 1994 and given constitutional expression in 1996.

To clarify some of the key concepts used in this study:

- By sovereignty I shall be referring to the situation where the authority in a country is located in a single power, which is the state. The study uses O'Donnell's (2010) contribution as a working definition of the state. Working along Weberian lines, O'Donnell sees the state as a territorially based association, consisting of sets of institutions and social relations (most of them sanctioned and backed by the legal system of that state), that normally penetrates and controls the territory and its residents. Those institutions claim a monopoly in the legitimate authorization of the use of physical coercion, and normally have, as ultimate resources for implementing the decisions they make, supremacy in the control of the means of coercion over the population and the territory that the state delimits.

- As far as nation is concerned, I use Anderson’s approach to define the nation: ‘nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular kind’, leading him to define the nation ‘as an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (1983:15). In Section 2.3 it shall be argued that the concept of ‘nation’ has to be supplemented by notions of ethnicity, language, race and religion as well as civic notions of citizenship.

- The thesis follows Preuss’ approach to citizenship, where he argues that it 'denotes the legal belonging of an individual to a particular state... defines the category of persons that sovereign states recognise as legitimate objects of their respective sovereign powers' (1996:538). In the discussion in Chapter Two I will be looking at how this conferring of citizenship is a two way street – there is also the active demanding of expansion of what citizenship means.

Through much of the section on sovereignty it would be tempting to question the relevance of this to sociology. Bendix and Lipset's observation has been an important guide: 'Political science starts with a state and examines how it affects society, while political sociology starts with a society and examines how it affects the state, i.e., the
formal institutions for the distribution and exercise of power' (1957:591). I will be examining the nation-state from both angles: the discussion on sovereignty will locate the state in the context of society via its most vital component, the citizen, while discussion on national identity will look at how different expressions of identity is wielded to gain power or access to state resources. In doing so it would also attempt to address Abrams's criticism that while 'political sociologists...attempt to give a social explanation of the state, the state is in practice hardly considered at all in the normal conduct of the polity' (1988:64).

Section 2.2 shall focus on how the constitutive elements of sovereignty, that is state and citizenship, articulate to establish a single political authority. That section will then be followed by the section looking at how national identity infuses the nation-state and nationalism. These two sections will then be followed by a consideration of the postcolonial approach in terms of how its evolution relative to pan-Africanism, colonial discourse and subaltern studies has provided an analytical framework which enables the analysis of the post-liberation moments of India, the Arab world and the post-apartheid experience of South Africa.

In Chapter Three the study looks at the impact of Islam, colonialism and ethnicity/nationalism on the conceptualizing of sovereignty and the nation-state in the Arab world. In the case of India, the focus will be on the impact of pre-colonial state forms, colonialism and Hinduism on the way the colonial and postcolonial state was defined. The examination of the two cases yields a framework for approaching the postcolonial nation-state. A key feature of the framework, I argue, is that studying the nation-state requires an appreciation of the various nationalist narratives within a specific society and how these have articulated over the ages.

This will lay the basis for looking at the debates on sovereignty and national identity in South Africa in Chapter Four. In the case of South Africa it is argued that its early history was marked by the dominance of Afrikaner nationalism which morphed by the 1970s into a form of ‘white nationalism’ which encompassed English-speaking whites. This went through even further evolution when sections of the African, coloured and Indian population were drawn into this laager of dominance. This laager was characterised by the rhetoric of stability, security and prosperity. But the post 1994 experience has seen the consolidation of a new form of Afrikaner identity, which I
examine in greater detail under Chapter Five titled Faultlines of the Twenty First Century. African nationalism, it is argued, took root in the 19th century and went through several permutations before a certain variant, as represented by the principles of the ANC, became dominant amongst the black people of the country and which saw its apogee in the 1994 elections. At the core of these permutations lay the debate on the nature and content of Africanism which in the broadest sense took the form of non-racialism with African leadership a core principle, while there was a narrower, exclusivist which saw only the indigenous people of South Africa constituting the nation. Just as Afrikaner nationalism has been going through its own developments post-1994, so too has there been intense debates on the prognosis of African nationalism.

Chapter Five examines the contemporary manifestations of both these nationalisms. Bearing in mind that both nationalisms were composed of several strands, this section of the thesis shows that immanent critique and shifts in material interests are producing a variety of different responses to the reality of a democratic dispensation. These elements would have been kept in check by the totalizing effect of the variant which became dominant. Do they become consolidated into a nationalism which seeks to challenge the dominant narrative or will they find their own geographical and political is the speculative note I will be ending the thesis on.

As usual in the case of South Africa a note on the use of terminology: when referring to ‘black’, the African, Indian and coloured sections of the South African population is referred to. ‘African’ refers to the indigenous majority, while ‘Indian’ refers to those from the Indian sub-continent who arrived in the country as indentured labour circa the 1860s or as traders and professionals who arrived around the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Coloured, as shall be discussed below, remains a complex and contested notion and is a category derived from the system of racial segregation under colonialism, with apartheid classification continuing this legacy.
Chapter Two Sovereignty and national identity in the postcolonial world

Most considerations of the nation-state focus on the processes involved in the development of a national identity and the forms of nationalism which led to the creation of a nation-state. This leads to an imbalance in the treatment of the state and the manner in which it interacts with the nation. I begin by arguing that sovereignty is comprised of two key components – the state as the manifestation of a single political authority and the citizen which apportions aspects of its collective will to the state, thus making the state sovereign. This is followed by a brief genealogy of sovereignty in Western Europe, with the concomitant development of the state and citizenship. Thereafter this chapter focuses on the nation-state, national identity and nationalism.

2.1 A single political authority

In looking at sovereignty two key principles need be to borne in mind:

• Firstly, as articulated by Hinsley (1966: 26), whose contribution is seminal for discussions on sovereignty, that 'the idea of sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community… and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere'. The dissertation will explore other conceptions of sovereignty, especially those which allow for the possibility of other sources of authority claiming sovereignty – as in the Arab world where Pan-Arab nationalism and Islamist notions of sovereignty often compete. This has resulted in contestation between different political and identity-related foci of power: the state, the Arab nation, Islam and sub-national elements such as ethnic and tribal elements. This has its parallels in India where the relations between the centre and powers of the 29 states are the result of a myriad of identity, regional and class related issues.

• Secondly, as argued by Chatterjee, that in many parts of the postcolonial world there are two aspects to contemporary politics: contest over the sovereignty of the state, often taking the form of insurgent movements; and claims on governmental authorities over services and benefits, impacting on the very nature of the state (2012:47). The first can have the effect of even weakening sovereignty, because the will of the state can no longer be writ all over its land. The second could, in the context of poor or uneven delivery of services, lead to focus on delivery for those making the
claims or also parallel institutions which benefit privileged classes in the form of private education or medical care.

In many parts of the West, the transition from the medieval period to the early modern era was marked by the rise of the absolute monarchs, giving rise to tensions between the cities and kingdoms. Bourdieu (2004) describes the transcendence of the king, not so much as a state but as a maison or house. He argues that the 'dynastic state, even in its bureaucratic dimension, remains subordinated' to the king's house. This assists in understanding the king's two bodies which Kantorwicz had described, 'the duality of the transcendent institution and the person who temporally and temporarily incarnates it' (2004:18).

This period saw the establishment of the principle of rex est imperator in regno sua: king is emperor in his own realm. All territory in Europe and, eventually, most territory around the world was partitioned by sovereign governments and placed under their independent authority. The principle of cuiuis regio, eius religio embodied in the 1555 Treaty of Augsburg saw a further step being taken towards increased links between the king, the territory and people. By giving the king the right to decide on the faith of his territory the basis for the territorialisation of nations was laid (Medved, 1997:13). Miller (1995:27) captures the spirit of this when he cites Louis XIV claiming two centuries after Augsburg in 1766 'that no nationwide body of parlements could be the 'organ of the Nation, the protector of the Nation’s liberty, interests and rights'. Those who took this view forgot that 'public order in its entirety emanates from me, and that the rights and interests of the nation, which some would make a body separate from the monarch, are necessarily joined with mine, and rest entirely in my hands'.' It was in this period that sovereignty, and its attendant concepts of state and citizenship, shifted from the city level to the national level, but via monarchial rule. This changed over the centuries as demand for citizenship resulted in the demise of monarchs and the establishment of democratically elected parliaments.

Writers as diverse as Hinsley, Spruyt (1994) and Fukuyama (2011) have argued that the ascendancy of a single political authority which embodies sovereignty was never inevitable and was the product of intense rivalry and struggles with other formations – be they the gods, nature or representatives of specific class interests. The concept of citizenship itself went through several city-centric phases before it came, like
sovereignty, to be associated with the national state. In Chapter Three I will be looking at India and the Arab states as they are currently manifested in terms of colonial inheritances, coercion and modernization, and the exercise of sovereignty in relation to political participation and citizenship.

2.2. Citizenship

Reflecting on the contemporary debates around citizenship in the European Union, Preuss points out that in Ancient Greece, citizenship drew symbolic boundaries not only against those who lived outside the community but 'also against those who live within the physical space of the community but who do not belong to it socially' (1996:535). This is an exemplary expression of the way in which identity lies at the core of citizenship, and therefore state sovereignty. This is explored in Chapter 3 in the context of the Arab experience, especially in relation to the presence of Christians and Jews in predominantly Muslim cities. The experience of India, in terms of Brahminic Hindu versus non-Brahminic parts of society, especially Muslims and lower caste Hindus, is also considered in that chapter.

Isin describes how as certain groups attained citizenship, others were excluded: in Athens peasant warriors replaced the heroic warriors and demanded greater say in the running of the polis. Tradesmen, women, serfs and slaves remained excluded from citizenship. In the Roman Republic there was a complex of cities with differentiated statuses – leading to 'a layered citizenship…as a Roman, as a citizen of a province, and as a citizen of a city' (Isin, 1997: 123). The parallels between that and today's multi-level governance in a globalised world, while not examined further in this study, bear close resemblance.

O'Donnell (210:38) argues that since the decline of the city, citizenship referred 'not only to the member of the democratic demos; it is also a synonym of nationality', calling this political dominion of citizenship 'the nationalisation of citizenship' (2010:85). Leah Greenfield concludes her five country (Germany, France, the US, England, and Russia) study with the observation that 'nationalism can be traced to the structural contradictions of the society of orders' which occurred in the movement creating national boundaries which fell under monarchical rule. Nationalism 'accelerated the process of change, channelled it into a certain direction...it acknowledged and accomplished the grand social transformation from the old order to modernity'
According to her, nationalism is distinguished from other identities because it locates the source of individual identity within a 'people' which is 'the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity' (1992:3). This is referred to as 'popular sovereignty', which Jackson (1999:444) described as 'the notion that sovereignty resides in the political will or consent of the population of a territory, rather than its ruler or government: i.e., the independence of a people considered as a political community'.

This was made possible in Europe through the successful nationalist revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which saw the extension of a qualified franchise. Increasing pressure, especially at the beginning of the twentieth century, from marginalised groupings and classes such as workers, women and black people, saw the achievement of universal franchise. The democratic states thus established became the sites of further struggles for the distribution of resources and privileges which governments and the legislature were able to wield.

Miller has usefully categorised conceptions of citizenship along three lines:

- The liberal, where citizenship should be understood as a set of rights enjoyed equally by every member of the society in question (2000:44).
- The communitarian, which emphasizes 'citizenship as entailing responsibilities to promote the common good through active participation' (2000:43).
- The republican, which 'conceives the citizen as someone who plays an active role in shaping the future of his or her society through political debate and decision-making' (2000:50).

Somers (2008) makes the persuasive argument that each of these approaches is 'necessary but not sufficient' and hence suggests seeing citizenship as the 'right to have rights'. I will be arguing that this is what the anti-colonial, nationalist movements ultimately represents: a demand for basic rights which can help shape the kind of society and polity citizens want.

While not wanting to generalize the experience of particular countries to all of Europe or the United States, there is a basis to draw a line of progression from sub-national
levels of political authorities to the emergence of the national sovereign – be that in
the form of royalty or that which replaced it. The genealogy should not be seen as a
neat progression from one form of sovereignty to the next - some prior forms of political
authority persisted alongside new emergent locations of sovereignty. As Stein has
argued, when looking at pre-colonial Indian states, ‘(D)ifferent, even conflicting
principles of political association may exist in the same time and place and among the
same people, and these different principles may also be understood as appropriate,
or ‘legitimate”. That at least seems the possibility in considering the pre-colonial states
of South India, and even the early colonial state’ (1985:368).

As far as the African context is concerned writers such as Mamdani have shown the
postcolonial state has to contend with its dual heritages of precolonial state formation
as well as that created through the colonial legacy. Mbembe, argued in a similar vein
that ‘African regimes have not invented what they know of government from scratch.
Their knowledge is the product of several cultures, heritages and traditions of which
the features have become entangled over time’ (2001:24-25). In the postcolonial
situation, ‘not only the state forms but also the colonial rationality… were quickly
reappropriated by Africans. This reappropriation was not merely institutional; it also
occurred in material spheres and in the sphere of the imaginary’ (2001:40).

In the case of South Africa the thesis shall look at contemporary debates on the impact
of precolonial, colonial and apartheid legacies. What is aimed at is a critical appraisal
of the inheritances which were part of the machinery of oppression and which have
been wittingly or otherwise been retained in the current democratic state.

The use of coercion to ‘modernise’ the state appears to characterize the Indian, Arab
and South African situations being examined. Zubaida, for example, argues that the
‘Third World state, because it derives many of its powers and resources from outside
its social unit, acts discriminately upon that society, attempting to eliminate or displace
possible rivals for power within it, disrupting its social units and structures, all in an
attempt to make it governable and developed’ (2009:126).

In Chapter Three where I look at the experiences of the Arab world and India, I will be
looking at how precolonial political experiences have and continue impacting on the
emergence of the modern state. There I shall be detailing how, combined with the
experience of colonial coercion and the practices of nationalist movements, the nation-
state becomes the site of struggle between the elite who have captured the levers of state power and the subaltern who are excluded from its processes and the benefits which it distributes.

2.3 The nation-state, national identity and nationalism

Having looked at how sovereignty is expressed through state and citizenship we can now focus on national identity. Examining how the process of identity formation is invested in the evolution of state sovereignty will be a distinctive feature of the thesis. It shall be argued that nationalism provides the glue holding these two development paths together. To clarify three of the key concepts – identity, nation-state and nationalism - here:

- The thesis follows Kellas’ approach that identity ‘is only partly a spontaneous feeling which people have. It relates to the position they have in society... Politics enters into this, since it is often the state which classifies people according to ethnic groups, nationality and race. This may or may not be entirely accepted by the people concerned, but it usually leads to dual or multiple identities, especially when an historical national identity is overlaid with a contemporary political status, such as citizenship, or with a new ‘national’ identification derived from the state (1991:14).

It follows Habermas in seeing that the meaning of the term ‘nation’ changed from designating a prepolitical entity to something that was supposed to play a constitutive role in defining the political identity of the citizen within a democratic polity. I discuss different notions of citizenship in greater detail below. Here we should note that there is an ongoing tension between citizens’ ethnic and cultural identifications and the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights. At this juncture, Habermas argues, the republican strand of ‘citizenship’ completely parts company with the idea of belonging to a prepolitical community integrated on the basis of descent, a shared tradition and a common language. Viewed from this end, the initial fusion of republicanism with nationalism only functioned as a catalyst (1992:3) towards a state which did not require the monarchy.
Wilson (1996:3) explains that ‘Habermas is clearly attempting to recover a republican tradition of rights from the grasp of the particularist or nationalist traditions which it once accompanied. Here, the rule of law and the 'praxis of citizenship' can transcend nationalism in its modernist cultural and tradition-bound form…Now the cohesion necessary for urbanised, industrialised and globalised societies can be provided by a civic or 'constitutional' patriotism based upon a common experience of citizenship'. While I will not be going into current developments such as the rise of the right wing in Europe or the phenomenon of a Trump presidency in the US, these developments show that such a notion of citizenship is infused with ethnic, racial, or religious sentiments. This patriotism, I will be arguing in Chapters Three and Four, is provided in the case of post-colonial societies, by nationalism – with its source coming from a mixture of state actions or emerging from ethnic or racial discourse.

- Following Breuilly’s suggestion I see nationalism as a process which is led by political actors or entrepreneurs intent upon achieving a certain set of political aims. This process can be an open one which invites the largest constituents of society to be involved in developing notions of society or closed, even top down, imposing a certain set of ideas or objectives. Greenstein, in reviewing the South African debates around the nation and national identity, argued that ‘the lack of an adequate consideration of identity results in a failure to come to terms with ways people conceptualise their dichotomy between primary ‘objective reality’ and its secondary ‘subjective’ representation’ (1994:649).

- The concept of nation-state has raised its own set of issues, eloquently captured by Nettl more than four decades ago when he observed that the problem of 'the growing empirical difficulty of continuing to use the concept of state within the historical slot with which its development has been most closely associated – the nation-state' (Nettl, 1968: 560). Nettl suggests that it is probably due to the difference between the epistemological structures of sociological and political theory that state and nation are empirical dimensions in the former, standing in no a priori relationship to each other, while for the
latter they are closely interdependent, positively correlated, and fundamental conceptual givens’ (Nettl: 1968: Note 9, p560).

This thesis, taking a political sociology approach, marries the approaches of sociology and political theory, arguing that state and nation must be seen as discrete notions, which when combined in their hyphenated form, raise a different set of issues – especially that of nationalism. Nationalism shall be seen as an embodiment of the active citizen bearing with it a specific identity with a specific relation to state power.

There are largely two broad schools of thought concerning the processes of nation formation. Ernest Gellner, who best represents the modernist school, saw nationalism playing two roles: meeting the needs of industrial society by ensuring cultural homogeneity, leading to the second role of creating large units of society which can be serviced by standardised services such as education. Others who have contributed to this approach are Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and Leah Greenfeld. Anthony D Smith and John Hutchinson are the key representatives of the ethno-symbolist school which emphasized the ethnic root of nations. They argue that nations were a community of common descent, often relying on traditions and customs in its constitution. Working from a critique of the modernist approach, Smith claimed to wish to ‘reveal the debts of the modernist school to pre-modern ethnic ties’ (1998:202) and criticized the modernist school for not adequately explaining why the collective identity attaches itself to the nation rather than other communities.

Amongst the more recent critiques of modernism is that of Gat (2013) who argued that nations and nationalism make up a form of political ethnicity, and ethnicity has always been political, long predating the state. While Gellner sees the nation as a congruence between culture/ethnicity and the state, it is still a form of political ethnicity and thus not as a result of modernity. Gat argues that while there have been city-states and empires, nation-states have been more prevalent than recognized by modernists, especially in Europe where they became the dominant form of the state.

Gat argues further that even empires have been built around ethnically defined identities such as the Arab identity during the early Arab empires, or the Zulu nation. For him ethnie and nations are much larger extended families or clans. He argues that ethnicity, which he sees as kin culture, arises from what he calls a combination of
genetic predispositions, preferences in terms of family choices, and cultural identity marked by physical similarity, dress, food and especially language (2013:62). Looking at historical evidence, such as the enlistment of the peasantry in resisting foreign invasion and the role of religion in feudal societies, Gat has argued that the peasantry was more integrated into the national identity than appreciated by the modernists.

Breuilly, while pointing out that Smith also cannot explain why certain ethnic communities ‘went nationalist’, contributes to the debate by suggesting that it was ‘political entrepreneurs’ and the political interests they represented which led to the creation of national entities (1996). The ethno-symbolist school has also been criticized for not adequately differentiating between ethnic formations, such as Jews, and nations, calling the former ‘earlier premodern nations’.

Apart from these two schools, there are a number of different approaches such as liberal nationalism (Yael Tamir is its leading proponent), linguistic nationalism and the postmodernist approach. Reacting to the ‘historical certainty and settled nature’, which modernist thinking imbued the concept of nations with, the postmodernist school prefers seeing nation as formed and transformed continuously. Nation is seen as a product of narration and an ongoing tension between a ‘master-narrative’ and ‘counter-narratives’ ‘disturbing those ideological manoeuvres through which ‘imagined communities’ are given essential identities” (Bhabha, 1990:300). Billig, while focusing mainly on the developed world and especially the US, points out that the emergence of postmodernity is tied up with an increasingly globalised world. The ‘globalised village’ is willed daily but at the same time ironically generates a multiplicity of differences within nations, he argued (2001:140).

The rest of this section looks at the notions of identity and nationalism. It takes the view that national identity in the context of anti-colonial struggles is the product of historical processes as much as pre-colonial identities, which in themselves are not necessarily essentialist nor free of contestation. These identities are impacted upon in the postcolonial struggles by competition for state resources and power. Nationalism, on the other hand, is seen as an enterprise led and shaped by political entrepreneurs, both in the context of anti-colonial struggles and in their aftermath.

2.3.1 Identities
The study is focused on the contribution of ethnicity, language, race and religion to identity formation because of their particular relevance to colonial situations generally and South Africa in particular. This is addressed at two levels – how colonialism contributed to the emergence of identities which serviced its needs and how anti-colonial struggles developed a counter-narrative to that. I acknowledge that the reality was not so clearly dichotomous – in many cases colonialism and resistance gave rise to multiple identities which are not clearly servicing or opposing either. Hybridity, examined below, emerges in that context.

Of special interest would be how these four features of identity manifest themselves today and impact upon, or are impacted by, a national identity – whatever form the latter takes. I will argue that in dealing with its apartheid legacies there is a national identity emerging in South Africa which has been crafted by leaders of the ruling nationalist movement or to use Breuilly’s term entrepreneurs,, drawing on elements of precolonial history, colonial and apartheid period resistance, the constitution-mindedness of the modern state as well as South Africa’s culture and social life. This prevailing identity is spawning its own subalterns creating autonomous domains along linguistic/regional lines. An identification of that category shall be an important contribution of this thesis.

Anderson had pointed out that ‘print languages’ created ‘unified fields of exchange’, gave a ‘fixity to language’ and created ‘languages of power’ different from that of the ‘older administrative vernaculars’ (1983:47-48). For him this process was critical in the creation of a nation because it allowed for ‘an imagined political community’.

In looking at national identity the study shall attempt to assess the validity of searching for an ‘ethnic core’ around which the nation is constituted and how this has affected issues of political representation and citizenship. Doing this will require an examination of concepts such as clan and tribe and their relationship with ethnic identities and how these contribute to the setting of multiple ethnicities.

Two contrasting approaches to understanding how identity operates will have to be kept in mind. The first, constructionist approach, which was brought to the forefront in 1966 by Berger and Luckmann’s work titled The Social Construction of Reality. Working within this paradigm, Omi and Winant (1986) when looking at race argued that identities are created and transformed over time through political contestation over
social meanings. Brubaker and Cooper qualified their support for the constructionist position arguing that ‘attempt to “soften” the term, to acquit it of the charge of “essentialism” by stipulating that identities are constructed, fluid, and multiple - leaves us without a rationale for talking about “identities” at all and ill-equipped to examine the “hard” dynamics and essentialist claims of contemporary identity politics’ (2000: 2).

This leads us to the second approach, referred to as the essentialist approach to identity, which argues that we need to return to the cultural ‘essence’ behind the different forms of ethnicity and nationalism. Shils is an early proponent of this approach, arguing that primordial ties of kinship and religion remained vital even within modern secular societies (1957). Geertz applied this to Asian and African societies, arguing that despite the emergence of modern states the cultural realities of custom, language, race, religion and other elements explained the continuing power of ethnicity which undergirded such identity.

Striking the balance between the two, Will Kymlicka has argued that ‘if governments wish to generate shared identity on the basis of a shared history, they will have to identify citizenship, not only with acceptance of principles of [social] justice, but with an emotional-affective sense of identity, based on a veneration of shared symbols and historical myths’ (1995:238). He does provide a cautionary note saying that citizenship education to engender solidarity must include, and walk a fine line, between the creation of a ‘glorified history’ and a narrative that does not smack of ‘manipulation’ (ibid.).

We can now look briefly at the complex interplay between ethnicity, language, race and religion as elements of identity. These themes are elaborated in the cases of the Arab world, India and South Africa.

- As far as ethnicity is concerned Ake is amongst those who argued that in Africa “No project of social transformation can succeed by ignoring it (ethnicity)” (1993:9). The Arab experience of ethnic issues has often been refracted through the lens of tribalism which, as Bassam Tibi points out in Middle Eastern societies ‘(do) not bear the negative connotation that it does in the African context’. When looking at India, we need to – under the rubric of ethnicity – include caste and ‘tribe’. Vannaik has written that ‘caste in India is
an even more powerful signifier than religion itself’ (2001:54). He described caste as ‘an elaborate social hierarchy which by any comparative standards is viciously intolerant’ (Ibid:56).

- Marxists have grappled with inserting race into class analysis, with Aime Cesaire arguing that it needed to be foregrounded leading him to say: ‘Marx is all right, but we need to complete Marx’ (1972:70). The devastating effect of race was captured well in Fanon’s opening line of Black Skin, White Masks ‘I will say that the black man is not a man’ (1967:8). This was due to the crushing impact of colonialism, which had destroyed the self-worth of black people. While Cesaire and Senghor placed great emphasis on African history and the ‘collective Negro-African personality’ to define the politics of Negritude, Fanon by 1959 was distinguishing himself from them, arguing that ‘I do not want to sing the past at the expense of my present and my future…My black skin is not the repository of specific values’. He asserted the freedom to be what he willed and the dissolution of blackness.

- How does race and nation interact is a critical question for this thesis. Hardt and Negri writing about the European experience argue that the modern concept of the people is achieved via two mechanisms – through colonial racism and the dismissing of internal differences. The former constructs ‘the identity of European peoples in a dialectical lay of oppositions with their native Others. The concepts of nation, people, and race are never far apart’. Internal differences are reduced by the “eclips(ing) of internal differences through the representation of the whole population by a hegemonic group, race or class…” (2001:103). This will be explored in great detail in looking at how race was used to construct an ethnic/national identity.

Hybridity becomes a complex issue in the context of anti-colonial struggles, resulting in a number of different perspectives. Bhabha, amongst others, has argued that hybridity actually captures the essence of the colonial encounter and could be seen equally as part of the aims of some colonisers as well as part of anticolonial strategy. For Bhabha black skins/white masks and similar strategies does not represent hybridity but ‘a violated authenticity’ (1985:149). Elle Shohat on the other hand calls for a nuanced approach, arguing for discrimination between the different forms of hybridity such as ‘forced assimilation, internalized self-rejection, political co-optation,
social conformism, cultural mimicry, and creative transcendence’ (1992:110). Benita Parry provides a valid cautionary when she points out that theories of hybridity ‘can downplay the bitter tension and the clash between colonisers and the colonized and therefore misrepresent the dynamics of anti-colonial struggle’ (cited Loomba, 2005:152). I will be looking at instances of hybridity in South Africa at different historical junctures such as the impact of missionary education and the different stances taken by early nationalists on Christianity, as well debates about non-racialism or even the insertion of black people into the DA.

The thesis shall be based on the proposition that while not immutable, national identities are forged through long periods of struggles which draw in elements of tribe, caste, ethnicity, as well as religious and linguistic identities which may have existed in the pre-colonial period. Race shall be seen, in the cases of India, the Arab world and most poignantly in South Africa, as colonial constructs which also impacted on national identity and which continue leaving an imprint on postcolonial society.

2.3.2 Nationalism

As pointed out above, the thesis sees nationalism as a process binding sovereignty and national identity. This part of the literature survey shall examine how nationalism plays that role, the different forms of nationalism and which ones have been present in South Africa. The study is guided by Hobsbawm (1979:88) that nationalism and the movement to found nation-states are fundamentally different. The one was a programme to construct a socio-political artifact claiming to be based on the other.

Miller (1996:39) has placed a premium on the processes whereby nations have come into being, arguing that a line can be drawn ‘between national identities that emerge through open processes of debate and discussion to which everyone is potentially a contributor, and identities that are authoritatively imputed by repression and indoctrination’. The survey of the South African, Arab and Indian experiences make for interesting comparison precisely because of the different processes involved – at times ‘organic’, bottom-up; at times more ‘constructed’, top-down. The study regards nationalism as the most important process in shaping a national identity and the form of sovereignty.
While writing mainly about the US experience, Billig made an important contribution in coining the term ‘banal nationalism’ to ‘cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced’ (1999:6). The study will also take cognizance of what Billig saw as the rituals, symbols and spectacles which strike a chord in the hearts of people stimulating feelings such as patriotism or a sense of belonging.

In trying to isolate the different nationalisms in South Africa, India and the Arab world, the study will be guided by Smith’s suggestions that ‘In reality, few modern national states possess only one form of nationalism’ (1999:212). Apart from identifying the different types of nationalism and their relative impact on identity and sovereignty, the study will also concern itself with the role of what Breuilly refers to as ‘political entrepreneurs’. As Randrianja writes, African nationalism ‘did not awaken African nations as much as create them’ (1996:22). Working within colonial defined boundaries, which contained ethnic/tribal entities which had often been hostile to each other, nationalist leaders and their ideologies had to act as crafters of a new identity.

This creative enterprise is captured in Khilnani’s suggestion that ‘The possibility that India could be united into a single political community was the wager of India’s modern, educated, urban elite…It was a wager of an idea: the idea of India’ (2003:5). I am mindful that India was characterised by various local ideas about itself which were then shaped by colonialism, and emerged eventually as Indian nationalism while in South Africa’s case the entire idea of a country and nation is a product of colonialism, without real indigenous foundations.

The focus on the type of nationalism and the role of political entrepreneurs will assist in identifying the ideology at play, as well as the response of those who are against the nationalist elite in the post-independence context. This category of social actors shall be referred to as the ‘subaltern’, which differs in differing contexts. For example, in the Arab world it could be the observant Muslims who are marginalized by the secular nationalists. In India it could be, as argued by the Subaltern Studies group, the peasantry or Muslims who face discrimination by a Hindu chauvinist nationalist elite. This will help us understand the articulation between nationalism and political power on one hand, especially in terms of state power, and between nationalism and national identity on the other.
Compared to Indian nationalism, Arab nationalism has also gone through interesting trends: on one hand a pan Arab nationalism, best embodied in Gamel Abdel Nasser’s early idealism and which Dawisha (2003) argues exists today as Arabism, and on the other hand a country level Arab nationalism. The influence of European nationalism can be seen in both strands: Herder’s notion of German nationalism being deployed to emphasise the oneness of the Arab people, while the French experience of civic nationalism is drawn upon for country level nationalism. This is explored in greater detail in Chapter Three when looking at the experiences of the Arab world.

In looking at India, the study will look at how India came to be created as a nation, given its vast territory and population, and plethora of languages, religious beliefs, ethnicities and so forth. Khilnani makes the point, which resonates with the experience of many African nation states, that ‘the moments of actual unification in India’s past were achieved under the yoke of imperial rule’ (2003:157). Some nationalists tried to search for an ‘ethnic core’ by digging deep into India’s past, discovering some ‘classical era’ of Vedic culture in Ancient India which was forcibly ended by Muslim and then British rule. This process has been revived today for chauvinistic purposes, challenging the Nehruvian secular vision.

Arrighi and Saul, acknowledging the mixed fortunes of nationalism in Africa suggest that it ‘can in certain contexts be revitalized, used (and controlled) as a progressive instrument’ (1973:91). Saul (1981:139) captured one of the reasons for nationalism’s unfortunate experience when he wrote: ‘Given both the fact that the economies of the ‘colonies’ have developed into dependencies of the world wide system and that the new African leaders…. are themselves often active participants in such economies…. the imperialists have had little to fear from decolonisation’. The challenge most African states faced is the absence of leadership which placed the interests of that nation, which in itself was an artificial creation, above all else.

Fanon acknowledged that nationalism did provide a vehicle for social unity but raised the dangers of a post-liberation scenario when he wrote: ‘From nationalism we have moved to ultranationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism’. He argued that nationalism had to be enriched by ‘a consciousness of social and political needs’ lest it be reduced to ‘sterile formalism’ (1969:165).
The thesis shall proceed on the understanding that national identities are fostered by political entrepreneurs, drawing upon a plethora of sources, not least of which are precolonial histories as well as histories of resistance. While such identities can evolve over time, that which is crafted by such leaders should be separated from those fostered by Billig’s banal nationalism, which serves to reinforce a more fundamental identity. The thesis will explore through the three cases how the process of nationalism leaves an imprint on the nation-state and ultimately lay the basis for the kind of sovereignty enjoyed by that nation-state.

2.4 The postcolonial approach

The dissertation is encouraged by Loomba’s (2005:3) view that ‘(J)ust because colonial studies encompass such a vast area, it does not mean that we should confine ourselves to study of particular cases, without any attempts to think about the larger structures of colonial rule and thought’. In looking at the experiences of the Arab world, the Indian subcontinent and South Africa, attention will be paid to how such larger structures of colonialism manifested themselves in those contexts.

I look at postcolonialism at two levels: at the simplest level of the postcolonial period and secondly a theory about the colonial experience and its lasting impact after the attainment of independence by former colonies. The latter tends to serve as a rubric for various strands of thinking and movements which have contributed to the emergence of postcolonial theory. These include the emergence of Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism, anti-colonialism, colonial discourse, as well as subaltern studies. The postcolonial approach aims to reinsert the roles played by marginalised elements in anti-colonial struggles as a challenge to the narratives of political entrepreneurs who bore the mantle of nationalist leaders. It is a theorisation of the postcolonial condition not only in the former colonies but also in the metropoles which dominated the colonies. The latter aspect has led to it impact on a variety of disciplines such as literature to psychology to developmental studies.

Colonialism actively sought to deny the colonies their sovereignty. Robert Jackson points out that sovereignty was understood to be a distinctly European institution. ‘Non-European political systems were regarded as lacking legitimate or credible claims to sovereignty and were consequently subjected to unequal treaties and other discriminatory measures. The justification for that discrimination has a medieval ring:
it was the right and indeed the responsibility of Europeans to rule non-Europeans and other peoples of different and by implication lesser civilization than their own’. (1999: 442). This paternalism could be seen in the General Act of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) which sanctioned the partition of Africa and called ‘all the Powers exercising sovereign rights (in the continent)…to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being… bringing home to them the blessings of civilization’ (Art. VI).

The Bandung Conference of April 1955 represented the apogee of anti-colonialism. It was a meeting of about 30 countries which had been recently liberated from colonialism, as well as various fraternal parties. These leaders led the demand for ‘political and intellectual decolonisation’. Notwithstanding the various ideological strands gathered - represented by the Nassers, Nehrus, Nyereres, the Titos, or the Sukharnos - they brought into the post WWII world ‘a shared anti-imperial ethic’ (Chakrabarty, 2005:5). Anti-colonial thinking emphasised modernisation or catching up with the West. Its ideology was rooted on the nation-state which was going to uplift its people through education and ambitious development projects.

The anti-colonial discourse of the leaders at Bandung, as well as that of intellectuals such as Anouar Abdul-Malek, Samir Amin, Frantz Fanon and Aime Cesaire, were mixed with the political issues of the day in the developed world. Two important questions were addressed then: how did this movement compare to that of the nineteenth century European experience of nationalism? Secondly, how did anti-colonialism relate to the issues raised in the postcolonial era of newly liberated countries?

Samir Amin captured the concerns of Marxists when he wrote that 'the national question, which in the 19th century was primarily that of oppressed European nations, was transferred to the 20th century to Asia and Africa, where it became the colonial question' (1980:173). His view typifies the Marxist approach which sees the concepts of sovereignty and national identity as universal in nature but take different forms in different contexts.

I have inserted a consideration of Pan-Africanism here for two reasons: firstly, because of the significant impact it had on South African nationalism; and secondly, it spans the debates around colonial discourse, anti-colonialism and the postcolonial approach.
Pan Africanism can be traced back to ‘the early 1800s when American Negroes sought refuge from the horror of American racism in the Black Republics – Ethiopia, Liberia, Haiti and Sierra Leone’ (Ndletyana, 2014:147). These four countries were to play a crucial role in the Pan Africanist imaginary given that Ethiopia was never colonized, Sierra Leone (1787) and Liberia ((1822) were established by abolitionists for freed slaves and Haiti became a Black Republic in 1806 after the anti-French colonial uprising.

Amongst the early Pan Africanist thinkers ‘Some advocated either returning to Africa or fleeing to the Black Republics while others urged fighting on in the diaspora to secure citizenship and equal treatment’ (Ndletyana, 2014:148). Alexander Crummel and Edward Blyden were emblematic of the ‘Back-to-Africa’ movement, settling in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The latter ‘believed that races were irreconcilable…essentially affirming nativity’ (2014:150). However, ‘Theirs was also a classist project’, with Crummell privileging the Christianized, educated elite with the responsibility of leadership. While agreeing on their notion of elite leadership, which he termed the ‘Talented Tenth’ whereby one tenth of blacks around the world should be trained and educated for leadership, WEB Du Bois rejected Crummell and Blyden’s polygenism arguing that ‘Race was neither a determinant of culture nor did it preclude acculturation’. For him stupidity was the real cause of racial prejudice. Similarly, Blyden had also argued that the European idea of the ‘Negro…was a purely fictitious being’. This ‘fabricated knowledge’ had been ‘internalized by the Negroes’, leading to them believing in their own inferiority and also to self-hate. For Blyden, countering self-hate warranted an epistemological assault, which included an appreciation of Negro history (Ndletyana, 2014:150).

An example of early pan-African mobilisation is that of Henry Sylvester Williams who was responsible for the first pan-African conference in London in 1900 where Du Bois declared: ‘The problem of the 20th Century is the problem of the colour line – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea’ (Lemelle, 1992:94). According to Lemelle, Du Bois saw the problems of Diasporan Black Africans as part of an international struggle of oppressed people for freedom and justice. Marcus Garvey (Du Bois’ contemporary) on the other hand saw the problem in cultural, economic and psychological terms. He believed the basic problem was that Blacks lacked knowledge and pride in their African ancestry
and therefore could not counter white racism. The ultimate solution was returning to Africa and building their own state.

Marcus Garvey represented the next generation which focused especially on the Negro working class and poor, writing: ‘Yet for all his services he receives the reward of lynching, burning and wholesale slaughter’. Aligned with Blyden’s nativity supporting the call for Africans going back to Africa, and equally elitist in approach, he declared himself president of the whole of Africa. (2014: 151-152). Ndletyana points that there was a discernible shift in the 1945 Pan Africanism congress, largely due to the presence of Africans from the continent itself, who were ‘buoyed by the promise of self-determination made by the victors of the Second World War...an independent Africa turned its attention inwardly to define national identity and decide on who qualifies for citizenship of the newly independent states’ ((2014:154).

Washington’s was an ideology of entrepreneurship which Dube took up with gusto in his philosophy of self-sufficiency. Washington took what is referred to as the *festina lente* approach of self-help through industrial education, arguing that the time was not ripe for social equality and integration. In contrast to Washington, African American intellectuals from the northern states took a more radical perspective, criticizing the ‘Atlanta Compromise’ (Odendaal, 2012:253). They aimed to get the vote and civil rights within an integrated system, and eventually gave rise to the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) in 1910. This would be paralleled in South Africa in the differences that Dube’s views engendered.

It is important to distinguish between the analysis of colonial discourse and analysis of social and political conditions in the postcolonial period, including issues of resistance, which pan-Africanism represents. Edward Said was amongst those who represented the former while the subaltern studies school embodied the latter. Said, drawing upon Foucault, argued that discourse cannot be separated from the formation of a discipline. Discourse involves violence in imposing a linguistic order. This thus led Said to argue that ‘without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period’ (1995:3). At the core of Said's *Orientalism: Western conceptions of the Orient* first
published in 1978 was the attempt to draw a link between modes of knowledge about the Orient, which was a product of knowledge about the Orient with no objective geographical existence, and imperial expansion and control.

In Orientalism Said shows how a collection of institutions, traditions, and conventions repeated often enough creates an unchanging stereotype of an unchanging Orient. ‘(S)uch texts can create not only knowledge but also the very reality that they appear to describe’. Colonial discourse is assisted by a worldview which sees societies and social relations through a number of binaries: black/white; Christian/non-Christian; etc. best captured in Kipling’s ‘East is East, and West is West and ne’er the twain shall meet’.

Said’s work has been criticised by various quarters. Spivak (1985) for example argued that Said does not offer a way in which the subaltern can speak, or offer a counter-representation. While Said has admitted that as an omission, Orientalism itself opens with a line penned by Marx as an epigraph: ‘They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented’. He later argued for the voice of colonial subjects in Culture and Imperialism but emphasised that his focus was on European discourses of ‘the Orient’. This debate does highlight a problem which the Subaltern Studies approach tried to address: how is the voice or agency of the colonised subjects to be recovered?

Other criticisms of Said’s contribution have highlighted the extent to which Said’s approach depends on either a few texts, on the privileging of texts, or that it does not account for geographical and historical differences. Such critics do not appreciate that the notion of discourse takes us beyond exploitation, development and resistance, to explore patterns of thought and speech that entrench domination in hidden forms. Not doing so, according to Edmund Burke III, writing about the Maghreb, renders us ‘ill-placed to understand the institutions of the modern state…or the complex bargains and compromises with which modernity has been organised and sustained’ (2001:25).

Bhabha captured the flow between anti-colonial and postcolonial very well when he wrote that ‘Postcolonial perspectives emerge from the colonial testimony of Third World countries and the discourses of 'minorities' within the geopolitical divisions of east and west, north and south. They intervene in those ideological discourses of modernity that attempt to give a hegemonic 'normality' to the uneven development and the differentiated, often disadvantaged, histories of nations, race, communities,
peoples’ (1992). Hence Chakrabarty’s assertion that ‘Postcolonial writing and criticism …was born in the West’ (2005:1).

In tracing the roots of postcolonial theory, Chatterjee argues that post World War Two decolonization made the nation-state the universally normal form of the modern state. However, the differences in social indicators between the new and old states saw ‘sociologically grounded theories…rephrase the old arguments of colonial difference in a new language of modernisations, calling the deviation a historical lag that had to be made up’ (Chatterjee, 2011:12). Thus, anti-colonial movements drew upon Western ideas of democracy, fairplay etc – at times complementing this with their worldviews and values.

As stated earlier, postcolonialism should be seen at two levels: an attempt at re-examining the narrative elaborated by the nationalist elite as well as theorization of the postcolonial condition. Young sees postcolonialism as a dialectical concept marking the decolonization and the achievement of sovereignty ‘but also the realities of nations and peoples emerging into a new imperialistic context of economic and sometimes political domination’ (2010:57). Furthermore, it ‘names a theoretical and political position which embodies an active concept of intervention within such oppressive circumstances’ (2010:57). He argues that postcolonialism works from a range of different axes: ‘a product of revolutionary Marxism, of the national liberation movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and political and cultural critiques of 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and the historical effects of migration, past and present, forced or voluntary’ (2010:61). He argues that postcolonialism should not be seen as a ‘unitary theory espousing a single perspective and position’ (2010:63) rather a set of conceptual resources.

Young suggests that Ashish Nandy’s Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism (1983), helped in ‘setting up the basic framework of the theoretico-political environment of postcolonial studies in India, among diasporic Indian intellectuals and through them across the whole field’ (2010: 340). He points out that Nandy’s close attention on the spiritual aspects of Gandhi’s anti-colonialism linked him with the colonial Francophone tradition of Sartre and Fanon with their equal emphasis on the material and psychological effects of colonialism. It also facilitated an articulation with Said’s ‘discursive analysis of texts as a common formation of a
dominant colonial culture’ (Young, 2010: 340). *Intimate Enemy* laid the basis for an agenda which continues to seize the minds of those engaged in postcolonial studies: the psychology of resistance, the problems of resisting through ideas and drawing strategies from that which is being resisted, introducing gender into understanding imperialism and its resistance, and hybridisation as a strategy drawn from Indian anti-colonial and postcolonial cultural experience (Young, 2010:341).

Loomba suggests that postcolonialism should not be seen as signalling the demise of colonialism, but rather ‘the contestation of colonial domination and the legacies of colonialism’ (2005:16). Similarly, Young (2010:57) argues that postcolonialism is best defined as ‘coming after colonialism and imperialism, in their original meaning of direct-rule domination, but still positioned within imperialism in its later sense of the global system of hegemonic power’. This is elaborated upon by Schwarz who has written that ‘(W)e refer to ‘postcolonial’ … (as) the historical struggle against European colonialism and the emergence of new political and cultural actors on the world stage during the second half of the twentieth century. These struggles have profoundly reshaped the production of academic knowledge as much as they have reshaped world power’ (2000:1).

Young describes the broad ambit of issues which fall within the purview of postcolonialism as ranging from reaching back into precolonial history to present day realities. ‘It names the activities by which new subaltern histories, new identities, new geographies, new conceptualisations of the world – transnational rather than western – are fashioned and performed, and seeks through them to redress current imbalances of power and resources in the pursuit of more just and equitable societies’ (2010:66). Emphasising its usefulness in the current globalized world, he argues that ‘Today, postcolonial struggles for autonomy, real independence and self-determination have to contend with a complex adversary whose power is dispersed through a wide range of globalized institutions and practises’ (2010:59).

Postcolonialism itself has been subjected to a range of criticisms with this thesis focusing on critique of its positions on sovereignty and national identity. The most spectacular attack was led by Vivek Chibber in *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital* (2013) where he focusses especially on the Subaltern Studies approach and its journal by that name, founded and edited by Ranajit Guha, since it was the
visible and most reasonably coherent of all the contributions under the rubric of postcolonial theory.

Arguing from a Marxist perspective, Chibber begins his critique by suggesting that if ‘there does not exist a fundamental divergence between East and West…we are permitted to consider the possibility that the theories emanating from the European experience might well be up to the task of capturing the basic structure of Eastern development in the modern epoch’ (2015:23). He then proceeds to argue that Subaltern Studies has failed on its own two key premises:

- On the explanatory premise, he argues that it misrepresents the relation between capitalism and modernity, suggesting that its theorists have ‘taken certain aspects of twentieth century liberal culture as being defining characteristics of capitalism itself’ (2013:24). He points out that the turn to modernization came about not because national elites had internalized Western outlooks and philosophies, but because of the demands placed when governing in a capitalist world order.

- As a consequence, he argues, ‘one cannot adequately criticize a social phenomenon if one systematically misunderstands how it works’ (2013:25). More importantly, ‘far from landing a blow against colonialist and Orientalist presentations…Subaltern Studies has ended up promoting them’ by claiming certain essentialist characteristics of the Indian peasantry.(italics in the original)

Criticism of the Subaltern Studies came from several other sources as well. Gohain (2012:74-75) took strong issues with its methodology as Chibber did. He argued that in forgetting the groups ‘primordial ties…with Marxism’ it treated class as a ‘peripheral concept’. ‘It is true that castes, ethnic groups and women do not constitute classes and identity-politics has been the response of sections of such groups to domination. But to construct their history apart from objective class conditions is to push the latter to the margins and help prevent the emergence (or the making?) of class-consciousness’

On the question of the writing of subaltern history Said, in his foreword to the tome celebrating Subaltern Studies first five years, suggested that 'no matter how one tried to extricate subaltern from elite histories, they are different but overlapping and curiously interdependent territories'. Seen as a 'separatist enterprise…it runs the risk
of just being a mirror opposite the writing whose tyranny it disputes. It is also likely to be as exclusivist, as limited, provincial, and discriminatory in its suppressions and repressions as the master discourses of colonialism and elitism' (1988: ix).

This is more specifically addressed by Spivak, in her analysis of the position of women in India, where she insists that women’s rights and gender relations should be included in considering the subaltern. She argues that ‘For the (gender-unspecified) “true” subaltern group, whose identity is its difference, there is no unrepresentable subaltern subject that can know and speak itself; the intellectual’s solution is not abstain from representation’ (1990:272).

Masselos (1992) argued that the subaltern depended on the historians' reading of its interests and imputed certain moral values to it. He also points that, contrary to what was argued in the pages of Subaltern Studies, the resistance of subalterns has been of interest to elite historiography. A more damning indictment that he makes is that 'while the group is very much concerned with current political theory, with using research of the past to inform current political and theoretical debate they seem not to consider that such debate affects their constructions of the past; for them, it would seem, it merely heightens their ability to see the past accurately' (1992:111).

Masselos also alerts us to the subaltern group's silence on the issue of hegemony and power. 'The subaltern is presented as the oppressed in the act of protest and the consciousness of action…such consciousness may contain within it ideas of religion and caste, ideas of status and power, but they are all subsumed in the act of protest and opposition to domination', or what Masselos calls 'continued social warfare' (1992: 121). However, it does not indicate how the subaltern can turn the tables on the nationalist elite, thus making an impact on the state and national identity.

While located within postcolonialism, the relatively recent emergence of ‘whiteness studies’ is a good embodiment of the study of colonial discourse, especially in the South African context. Through postcolonialism, Steyn has argued, the ‘Western colonialist master narrative…has been ruptured (though not erased)…A core trope in the powerful master narratives…is the construct of ‘whiteness’…(T)urning the critical gaze on the dark centre of whiteness is a necessary, but still embryonic, part of the postcolonial undertaking’ (2001:xxvii-xxviii). For her, ‘the notion of whiteness, and the
essential attributes that it is meant to signify, can be considered a core-organising
category in modern Western ideology’. This shall be tested in the core case of the
thesis, the South African experience.

2.5 Conclusion

I will be basing my examination of the Arab, Indian and South African experience along
the three axes which this literature survey has helped develop:

- That of state sovereignty. I will be looking at how and the extent to which
  postcolonial states can claim to be the single source of political authority. At the
  same time I will examine the relationship between state and citizenry, and how
  citizenship and identity are expressed in the exercising of agency.
- That of national identity. Here I will examine the relationship between ethnicity,
  language, race and religion in the shaping of national identities and whether
  these national identities revolve around a core or are constructed through
  various devices.
- That of nationalism, which the thesis treats as an enterprise fashioned by
  political entrepreneurs.

The postcolonial approach provides an abiding framework for exploring postcolonial
entities, notwithstanding the criticisms of some of its strands. In looking at the case
studies I will be looking at the following key elements of the postcolonial approach:

- Problematizing the notion of sovereignty so that the difficult struggle that the
  postcolonial state wages to establish itself as the single political authority is
  appreciated in the context of the challenges to such sovereignty. This requires
  signalling the different arena that the battle for sovereignty is waged – such as
  the spiritual versus the political, or the modern versus the traditional, the ethnic
  versus the national.
- Challenge the prevailing concepts of citizenship so that the citizen can be
  discovered in places other than the ballot box or the community hall. This will
  require highlighting the often ungenteel forms of resistance that the citizenry
  puts up. In this was postcolonial theory helps us appreciate the manner in which
  rights are extended to the subalterns, or new rights are established.
Chapter Three

Two cases of the postcolonial world

In this chapter I look at two comparative cases, the Arab world and India, in terms of the three core themes of sovereignty, national identity and nationalism. The rationale for using these cases has been spelt out in the introduction. To recap, while the Arab world is not a homogenous bloc it has an array of experiences in responding to colonialism, the postcolonial state as well as the development of national identities. These national identities are tugged in different directions by the claims of forces of pan-Arabism and Islamism as well as the forces of tribe and clan. Similarly, while India can be considered as a single national entity especially due to the impact of colonialism, the sovereignty of the central state is often contested by the power of sub-national state forms, which in themselves are imbued with a wide configuration of linguistic, religious and caste identities. These contestations shape the very nature of citizenship in both these cases. An examination of these two cases shall lay the basis for a consideration of South Africa in terms of the sovereignty, national identity and nationalism in a postcolonial state.

3.1 The Arab world

The postcolonial experience of the Arab world is characterized by the history of Islam in this region and by the persistence of traditional, ‘premodern’ social relations which subsist alongside social relations which flow out of the modern state and economy. These ‘premodern’ relations often take patrimonial forms and are largely based on tribal and familial ties. These ties tug communities away from national identities and can often claim deeper loyalties than the pan-national identities Islam or Arabism engenders. The nation-state, with its attempts to claim loyalty to itself has to steer a careful path, weaving a tapestry from the threads of tribe and family, from Islam and pan-Arabism.

To further complicate a consideration of nation-states in the Arab world, the Arab world consists of different blocs which have followed a diverse range of trajectories and that are often at odds with each other. On the one hand, there are the conservative regimes of the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council (referred to as the GCC) countries which, while Arabic and on the Gulf, do not include Yemen and Iraq while the conservative kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco are linked politically, not formally, to the GCC. The
Arab part of the AGCC was deliberately inserted to differentiate it from Iran, which is Persian speaking and which after its 1979 revolution posed a threat to the monarchies of the GCC countries. Also, the majority of its population follow the Shi’a version of Islam, compared to the Sunni version followed by the majority of the AGCC countries.

Then there are the Maghreb countries which include most of the countries in the northwest part of Africa – Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and the Saharawi Arab Republic (Western Sahara). The Mashreq countries refer to countries to the east of Egypt and north of the Arabian Peninsula – Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. This group has overlapped with the Levant which, apart from the Mashreq countries, includes non-Arab countries such as Cyprus, Israel and parts of southern Turkey. The Arab League has 22 members covering the total population of just more than 400 million people.

I am going to use very broad definitions as starting points for the discussion on Arabism and Islamism. By the former I am referring to the notion that Arab-speakers belong to a single group – be it a ‘nation’ or an ‘ethnie’. I look at Islamism, like Arabism, as a pan-national identity which seeks to unite Muslims of different parts of the world with the aim of establishing Islamic political orders where possible or encouraging stricter observance of Islamic prescripts when the capture of state power is not the objective or not possible. I agree with Zubaida who, on the basis of his survey of the nation-state in the Arab world, concluded, ‘The rivals of the nation-state for solidarities and sentiments are not (only) the universalist entities of Arabism and Islam, but more likely particularistic and factional solidarities of community and region.’ This rivalry is not mutually exclusive, as I shall be showing in this section.

Kassab powerfully captures the spirit of Arab societal responses to modernity when she writes: ‘For more than two centuries, our sole interlocutor has been the West, to which we have tried to measure up, from which we have tried to learn, and against which we have defended ourselves in often fruitless polemics and apologetics – a sterile fixation that has reinforced the sense of solitude as well as the sense of threatened, defeated, and impotent self’ (2010:xii). At one level this denunciation may ring true when we look at the connection between many of the Arab elite and their consumption of western culture or the more sophisticated arguments of public intellectuals like Taha Hussein. Hussein, who served at one point as the Minister of
education in Egypt, argued that Egypt’s intellectual history was linked with that of European enlightenment.

This part of the chapter is divided into three sections:

- The first section will look at how Islamism has evolved as a key component of Arab identity and how it related to nationalism and state sovereignty.
- The second section shall look at the evolution of Arab nationalism, especially in relation to colonialism and postcolonialism and how it defined itself in relation to the pan-Arab nationalist (qawmiyya) and local state patriotism (wataniyya).
- The third section shall conclude this examination of the Arab world by looking at how sovereignty and citizenship are seen by Arab nationalism and Islamism.

Here, as I do in the cases of India and South Africa, I am focussed on the contestation between dominant nationalist narratives. In the Arab case the contestation is between a religious identity and a secular one, relating in different ways to the Arab nation. In the case of India I will be arguing that the struggle is also between a secular notion of the nation and one cloaked in religion, in this case Hinduism. When I get to the South African case I will be arguing that much of its history has been the contestation between an ethnically defined Afrikaner nationalism and a more civic-minded Africanism.

3.1.1 Evolution of Islamist identity

The period of the Ottoman Empire was very important in consolidating much of the form of the state and the geographical boundaries which characterized the Arab world today. The efforts to modernize the state was especially seen during the period of the Tanzimat (‘regulations’) which extended from 1839-1876. With the decline of Ottoman power vis-à-vis European states such as Britain, France and Russia, the empire had to engage in military, administrative, land and industrial reforms to strengthen itself. Initiated by Sultan Abdulmejid, the edict which initiated the reforms saw the Ottoman Empire’s legal and administrative system being consciously based on Western, and especially French, approaches.

Through these reforms it was insisted that Jews, Christians (referred to as the dhimmi) and Muslims should all be treated as equals in the eyes of the law. This was aimed at
reducing irredentist ambitions. Also, court testimony of a dhimmi was accepted, civil courts were created, and some Christian judges, such as Copts in Egypt, were appointed. This was a very important response to threats from European imperialism, in the sense that the Ottoman Empire strove to acquire the loyalty of the non-Muslims in their territory. Also, it was indicative of the principles of citizenship which had taken root in the West and were now spreading to other parts of the world. Whereas citizenship came to mean representation in Western Europe, during the Ottoman Empire it was located in the tradition of Islam, especially in terms of the debate on the rights of people of other beliefs residing in a Muslim Empire.

Describing the reformists as ‘personally suave in the European sense’, Mishra points out that they ‘could be ruthless in the preservation of their power, and prerogatives as a modernizing class, rarely hesitating to ride roughshod over traditional elite’ (2012:65). It is no surprise that while the reforms had a huge impact on the empire, they were also subject to internal resistance, from traditionalists as well as later by nationalists. The former was comprised especially of the ulema who saw the Tanzimat education reforms favouring secular education and threatening their power base, while the extension of rights to other faiths was seen as blasphemous. Worse still was the Ottoman’s rulers indulging of these groups when they were pressured by their European patrons. The latter group included those in the Balkans, Greeks, Armenians, Serbians and Bulgarians.

The series of capitulations by the Ottoman state made especially young people resentful of the rulers of the Empire. The Ottoman Constitution was suspended in 1876 by Sultan Abdulhamid who turned to pan-Islamism as a defence against rising Western influence in the Muslim world. The Constitution was reinstated by the Young Turks in 1908 and then once again suspended in 1912.

This period also saw the flowering of several debates referred to as al-nahda—the Arab/Islamic renaissance which brought in new thinking on Islam's political order. Some of the key thinkers during this period of revival were the early modernizers such as the Mufti of Egypt, Shaykh Mohammed Abduh, and Jamalludin al-Afghani. Albert Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798 – 1939, describes the major themes of the thinking as being centred around how Muslim society could catch up with the West, and the main themes of their debates were the fate of civilizations, political
justice - especially given the experience of despotic rulers, science and education, the link between religion and progress, and questions about women’s position in society.

Kassab cites Syrian historian, Aziz al-Azmeh, arguing that ‘in spite of these reversals and failures, the reforms created…real societal changes and real historical discontinuities that had repercussions throughout the twentieth century. They diminished the influence of religious institutions and authorities, and brought into being a more secular intelligentsia, more secular social mores, and a more secularized conception of political government’ (2010:230).

Apart from the Ottoman Empire, the Arab world was also having to deal with the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt which led to French control from 1798 to 1801, followed by British occupation from 1881 to 1922; the French occupation of Algeria from 1830 to 1962, and French control over Morocco from 1912 to 1956, and Tunisia from 1881 until 1956. The Sykes-Picot Agreement signed between France and Britain in 1916 and the post-WWI Mandate system impacted directly on the boundaries and capacities of the emerging Arab states.

The demise of the Ottoman Empire after WWI and the abolition of the Caliphate by Ataturk in 1924 saw Arabs redefining themselves outside of the Ottoman framework – in terms of pan-Arab, pan-Islamic terms or, in Egypt for example, also in terms of local nationalism or watanniyya. This was a direct result of the reforms and endeavours of Mohammed Ali Pasha, who reigned from 1805 until his dynasty was overthrown by the coup led by Nasser in 1952. This period saw the first Nahda, or the Arabic literary renaissance, in the 1820s. From the 1840s his government had sent many young scholars to study in the West. They returned pushing for a liberal Arab path to address the “backwardness” of the Arab world and creating a tradition which continued well into the twentieth century. Examples include secularists and leftists such as Taha Hussein and Ghali Shukri. Abu-Rabi argues that ‘In the writings of these authors, the political discourse of liberalism takes precedence over any other issue…Secularism as an Arab political concept is born’ (2010: 11). He goes on to describe the importance of what has arisen: ‘Out of the complex encounter between the Arab world and the advanced capitalist West in the nineteenth century, a distinct trend that I would like to call Arab Third-Worldism emerged’.
Some of the positions taken challenged the centuries of consensus which had tended to close off debates. For example, Ali Abd-al-Raziq (1888-1966), who was a shaykh of the pre-eminent Al Azhar University in Cairo and had been a student of Abduh, argued that the caliphate was not divinely ordained nor was the Prophet required to establish a state. It was up to Muslim societies to decide what kind of government they wanted. He saw the Caliphate as being a democratic institution, based on consultation with the community, where from it derived its legitimacy. Mohammed Rashid Rida, also a disciple of Abduh, interpreted Abduh differently, seeing the Caliphate as an Islamic commandment, galvanising the Quraan to back up his claims.

The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, when founded in 1928, was influenced by the exhortations of its founder and leader, Hassan al Banna, who emphasized the merits of religious instruction and moral example. He was especially influenced by the Indian Muslim theologian, Adul al Maududi, who promoted the concepts of a ‘theodemocracy’. The Muslim Brotherhood were Salafists in their outlook, and not particularly focused on seizing political power. The ‘Salafists’ emphasized that they were more interested in the transmission of the essential Islamic doctrines and its social thinking. The term is derived from al-salaf al-salih - the ‘pious thinkers’. Al Banna described his movement as ‘a new soul in the heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Quraan’ (cited by Hourani, 2002:338). His followers proclaimed that the 'Quraan is our Constitution'.

Two developments emerged from this thinking. The more prominent and militant approach established by Sayyid Qutb, a disciple of Hassan al Bhanna, who emphasized what had been a long standing principle of theologians over the past few centuries: ‘So long as the rulers upheld the fabric of a just society they should be obeyed, but if they ceased to do so the duty of obedience lapsed’ (cited in Hourani, 2002:398-399 from Sayyid Qutb’s Signposts of the Path). Sayyid Qutb described Islamism as ‘a colossal emancipatory revolution’ (cited in Abu-Rabi, 2004:137) while he saw Arab nationalism as ‘spiritual decadence’. In this one can discern the oscillation between a national, Egyptian perspective and pan-Arab and pan-Islam framework. As shall be discussed below, this influenced the shape of trends within political Islam, which ranged between the cross border programmes of the jihadi elements to those which remained loyal to their specific government. Qutb was hanged by the Egyptian
authorities in 1966, making him a martyr and a major inspiration for the next two
generations of militant Islamists.

The second trend in post al Banna thinking, and in response to the anti-Islamist
repression of the Nasser regime, arose when Egyptian salafists fled to Saudi Arabia
where they connected with what had become the official state version of Islam,
Wahabism. Wahabism’s roots stretch as far back as the beginning of the 18th Century
when Muhammad bin AbdulWahab of Najd connected with a chief of the Saud tribe,
Muhammad Ibn Saud, in opposition to the dominance of the Caliphs. They were
defeated by the Ottoman powers, but the concept was revived at the beginning of the
20th Century by Abdulaziz al Saud to create the Ikhwan (brotherhood) movement. This
alliance could not last very long, given the insistence of his followers on the purification
of society along fundamentalist lines. A compromise was eventually reached which
allowed the Wahabis to use the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as their base while the ruling
family was allowed to operate a ‘modern state’. Nevertheless, this has not spared the
Saudi state the attention of the jihadists.

By the 1940s individual Arab nation-states were being consolidated, leading to the
creation of the Arab League in 1945. The Charter of the Arab League recognized the
sovereignty of individual states. The image of Arab states acting in concert against the
emerging Israel in 1948 and the subsequent displacement of entire swathes of
Palestinians is belied by the separate arrangements each state arrived at. This
moment, described as the nakba, was one of the low points in Arab history, with
Constantin Zurayq in Meaning of the Disaster providing an insightful analysis thereof
(discussed below).

In the aftermath of the Arab Israeli war of 1967, there emerged a deep-seated
reflection on the shock of the defeat. One of the seminal works was that of Sadik al-
Azm’s Self Criticism After the Defeat published in 1968. In his 2007 Foreword to the
English translation, Fouad Ajami writes that ‘for all the enormity of the defeat – the loss
of the Golan Heights, and the West Bank and Gaza, the flight of the Egyptian army,
the shame that attended in the culture of pride – young Arabs didn’t have the language
and intellectual equipment to describe what had befallen their world’ (2011: 7). In the
aftermath of the nakba there was a renewed round of intellectualizing which was
labelled by Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui as the ‘second Nahda’. ‘The gap
between the two periods and mood is perceived to be so large that many post-1967 critics wonder where the legacy of the first Nahda went and why its hopeful promises and liberal impulses were aborted. In fact, reclaiming that legacy and understanding the reasons for the discontinuity with it became one of the central preoccupations of the second Nahda’ (Kassab, 2010:20).

According to Moosa (2002:24), the Islamist discourse during the first Nahda focused on modernization in terms of economic development and material progress relative to the Western world. The intellectuals of old found themselves caught between the ulema who saw them as ‘too Western-oriented while the secular Westerners saw them as apologists for Islam’. On the other hand the new Islamic discourse ‘recognizes and emphasizes the inextricable ties between Western modernity and Western imperialism,’ explains Elmesseri (1997), who comes from the left into the Muslim Brotherhood. Abu-Rabi argues that ‘the central pre-occupation of Muslim thought in the modern Arab world has been the West-Islam dichotomy (or rapprochement), rather than the reconciliation between faith and reason, which had characterised pre-capitalist Muslim and Arab cultures’ (2004:28).

The key features of the new Islamist discourse is considered under the following themes: the nature of discourse about Islam itself, the moderate trend which has come to dominate thinking and the oppositional trend. Zubaida has argued that Islamists have tended to reflect orientalist thinking when they have argued that ‘specific cultural-religious essences persist (over centuries) and ultimately triumph over superficial, imported modernity’ (2009:181). His view is that in fact Islamism is a modern ideology which is not connected to the Islamists of the past. The Muslim Brotherhood ideologues claim that they were the inheritors of the Islamic reforms which arose in the wake of the nahda. When examining Islamist discourses it may be instructive to recall Soroush’s suggestion that ‘(t)here is always a plurality of “Islams”’. He says that ‘the history of Islam, like the history of other religions such as Christianity, is fundamentally a history of different interpretations’ (2002:15-16).

Noor suggests that the modern Muslim intellectual is concerned with Islam in itself as well as related areas: ‘By addressing such issues as women’s rights, gender equality, Islamic law, history, and culture they invariably bring into question the totality of Islam as a discourse’ (2002:2). While Kassab (2010) calls this the new nahda, Bayat prefers
to label the broad sweep of this new Islamist discourse as post-Islamist discourse, which is ‘neither anti-Islamism, un-Islamic, nor is it secular… It wants to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with democracy and modernity, to achieve what some have termed an alternative modernity’.

The attention is now focused on two major trends in the contemporary Islamist discourse – the moderate and oppositional. Bayat argues that the manner in which various movements have shifted from previously doctrinaire positions is part of the post-Islamist discourse. He includes Iran’s Green Movement, Egypt’s al-Wasat, Morocco’s Justice and Development Party, the Turkish AK Party and Hezbollah as part of this phenomenon. He points out that the programs of these and other movements of civil society are nationalist in scope and aim to transcend Islamism as ‘an exclusive and totalizing ideology’, preferring instead inclusion and plurality. This is referred to as the wasatiya trend, that is a ‘moderate’ or ‘balanced’ approach. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Azhari sheikh exiled in Qatar, has argued that this trend should actually be seen as an ideology. Dialogue is a central part of the approach and is based less on interpretation of traditional texts than on practical goals, but within limits shaped by interpretation of tradition.

Another focus area of the moderate Islamist discourse is the relationship between Islam and the state. The discourse focuses on the revitalization of Islam at the grassroots while insisting that their objective is not the taking over of the state: ‘The heart of the matter is the necessity of setting bounds to the state and trimming its nails,’ according to Elmesseri. Such boundary setting, he argues, leads to the focus on civil society and the role of the awqaf (religious endowment) as well as new theories of state and administration. According to Elmessiri, there is an acceptance of ‘cultural plurality’ but ‘within the framework of Islamic values’. Alliances are struck with nationalists to confront ‘the forces of hegemony and globalization’ (Elmessiri, 1997:9).

The other major trend, oppositional Islam, has taken a number of different forms from the pacifist to the militant. Abu-Rabi has argued that ‘oppositional Islamism has embraced the cause of the Shariah as a form of protest against the Arab state’ (2004:135), with the latter seen as the product of nationalism. There are three major divides within the oppositional fold itself.
The first takes a populist form and encompasses the majority of Muslims who, unhappy with modernization, secularization, and globalization seek a return to the pious life. This revival of Islam was to be based on a just, social system founded on Islamic principles and the engagement of inner beliefs which would be the base of such a system. The activism of this populist, oppositional Islamism is in the form of 
\textit{Da’wa}, that is, invitation to Islam, whose main aim is not proselytizing but the strengthening of religious practices of Muslims. The worldwide protests against the depiction of the Prophet in Danish cartoons is a good depiction of this trend, showing its 'globally disparate, reformist and non-revolutionary character' (Bayat, 2009:237).

The second form is of a political nature, where certain groupings – drawn especially from the middle classes – have sought to engage in political action to protect the \textit{ummah}. Initially working through para-military groups, they have since the 1960s worked through legitimate political channels. The Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt is an example of such an approach. For this positioning the Muslim Brotherhood has been criticized by the Egyptian Jihad’s leader, Ayman Zawahiri, for having compromised with the secular anti-Islamic regimes, and for advocating a secular notion of democracy (Abu-Rabi, 2004:139). Even more fundamentalist in Egypt has been the Salafists organized under the Jamaat al Islamia.

The third form of the oppositional trend is a militant, radical Islamism. The Islamist agenda was initially shaped by responses to Western imperialism and attempts at making Islam compatible with the modern world. Due to a number of factors, not least of which was disappointment with secular Arab nationalists and the defeat the Arabs suffered at the hands of the Israelis, Islamic ideologues established an avowedly radical Islamist agenda. Moving from the original outlook of Islamists who sought accommodation with modernity, it took on virulent forms aimed at destroying the powers which represented such modernity or external domination. It is the best known form because of the high-profiled actions of Al Qaeda and other similar elements. French theorist Oliver Roy referred to this phenomenon as 'de-territorialized Islam'. ISIS and Boka Haram in Nigeria are examples of these. However, they must be distinguished from Al Shabaab in Somalia and the Taliban in Afghanistan which operate within state boundaries or which see themselves as liberating their countries from external powers.
Islamist thinking within Arab countries has evolved over the past two centuries in response to their position relative to that of the Western world – both in the colonial and post-colonial context. Unlike the case of India and South Africa where colonial domination was direct and deep, the colonial experience of the Arab differed widely. Some of the Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen did not go through direct, physical domination by colonial powers, while in Syria and Iraq it was superficial. Egypt to some extent and Algeria had slightly more profound experiences of colonial domination.

Notwithstanding this variance in experiences, the region was impacted by the West and the modernisation it represented. Much of the thinking during the colonial period was focused on trying to understand how Arab society, supposedly armed with the perfect religion in the form of Islam and a people with a glorious past, could not have withstood colonialism or the impact of Western influence. This spawned several different responses, especially on some of the issues which Islam had claimed consensus had been reached upon. Some sought accommodation with colonialism and exhorted their countries to try to catch up. This came to be rejected by later Islamists and nationalists who were opposed to the basis of the Enlightenment project that colonialism represented.

3.1.3 Evolution of Arab national identity

In this section we look at how Arab nationalist and secular thinking emerged and its response to colonialism and modernity. In doing so it shall also capture the often acrimonious differences between the Islamist thinking described above and secular/nationalist forces.

Debates about the origins of the ‘Arab nation’ as well as its contemporary manifestations reach back to a 1400 year history. In this chapter a distinction is drawn between the Arab community which came to exist when the Islamic empire was at its peak around 660 AD and modern Arab nationalism. It is argued that while modern Arab nationalism has almost a century old genesis, Arabism - in the sense of a solid pan-national community - has never truly existed beyond the minds of its proponents and some sections of the elite. Apart from the question of language and territory, a number of proponents of Arabism tended to emphasise the role of Islam in its definition. In privileging Islam they laid the basis an alternative to Arabism – Islamism. This can be
seen in the challenges Arab nationalists faced in the sixties, through movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, until today in the form of militant and political variants of Islamism.

A major aim of this section would be to disentangle the Arabist and Islamist narratives so that the nationalisms of various Arabic-speaking countries can be appreciated. In doing so it has adopted Rodinson’s argument that there does exist an ‘Arab ethnos’ which has emerged from the processes of Arabisation which accompanied Islamisation. Islamic ideology served as one of the elements defining the Arab identity. This kept alive an Islamist agenda, albeit in the womb of Arabism.

Debates on who is an Arab credit different criteria in playing a discriminatory role with geography/territory, language, and culture/awareness the most often cited. Rodinson points out that the term was applied only to those who were connected with one of the tribes based in the Arabian Peninsula before the advent of Islam. After that language played a more important defining role (Rodinson, 1981:6). Rodinson recommends the use of the term ‘Arab ethnos’ with members of this ethnos speaking some form of Arabic or, if they do not speak it, nevertheless have a commitment to it as their ‘mother tongue’. They also see their roots being in the history and culture of the Arab people.

The thesis does not go into the 1400 year history of Islam. It should be noted that the cities under most of the Muslim dynasties emerged as pluralistic multi-ethnic centres with inter communal relations going through various waves. Usually during better economic times, the relations between communities were peaceful. Particular roles were played by specific communities. Arabisation was an essential part of empire building, even though communities could retain their own religions. Hence the presence of large numbers of Arabised Christian and Jewish communities in Egypt and the Levant.

For about 8 centuries a variety of empires came to characterise the region. The last of the major Islamic empires was that of the Ottomans. According to Hourani, by the late nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire had become a largely Turco-Arab affair, where emphasis of the Turkish element would have upset the balance with the Arabs. At the time Egyptian, Tunisian and Algerian nationalists were responding to European rule, ‘within a clearly delimited country’ (Hourani, 2002:310). As mentioned above, due to
the redrawing of the borders in the region other countries did not enjoy such unified entities where the people and their land corresponded neatly.

The post WWI arbitrary carving up of Greater Syria and Iraq into was similar to that of the Berlin Conference experience of the African continent where often illogical lines were drawn on maps to define the boundaries of countries. The mandate territory of Palestine and the British protectorate of Transjordan removed from Syria its historic southern regions. Frontiers were drawn between Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem. The French, in execution of their mandate over Syria and Lebanon, carved out areas like Sidon, Tripoli, the Bekaa and Tyre from Syria and created Greater Lebanon. Also in the aftermath of the signing of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Mosul was transferred from Turkey’s control (in a transfer from French control to British control), making Mosul part of Iraq.

While Iraq was the first of the League of Nations Mandates to achieve full independence as a sovereign state, British influence continued to be exerted through the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. A point Tripp makes of this phase in Iraqi history bears testimony to the tenacity of history. He writes that the period of the British Mandate had made of Iraq ‘a British imperial project, corresponding in its shape and in its constitution to ideas current in Great Britain about the proper organization of power…On another level, it had delivered into the hands of those who staffed the state machinery and who commanded its resources a powerful instrument for the acquisition of land, the presentation of privilege and the maintenance of a landscape ordered to suit particular networks of favour and interest’ (2010:74).

The period of the Hashemite Monarchy (1932 – 1958) in Iraq which followed served largely to act in British interests but saw the established socio-economic relations being consolidated, if not ossified. The most salient of these which persist in some form or the other today are: Kurdish aspirations for full autonomy; the conservative politics of the tribal shaikhs, notwithstanding which side of the Islamic spectrum they came from; the emergence of parties linked to Sunni or Shi’a perspectives; the willingness of masses to take to the streets; and ultimately contestation over who controls the vast oil reserves.

The ‘Arab Awakening’ was the label George Antonius had applied to the stirring of nationalism in the Arab world which started with the nineteenth century Nahda. There
were two sources for the Arab Awakening: firstly, the minority communities of Arabic-speaking Christians centred in Beirut; and secondly, rivalries amongst the Arabic-speaking Muslim elite, especially for appointment within the Ottoman government. The former argued for ‘a secular Arab culture, to which Christians and Muslims had supposedly contributed in equal measure’. The second source was Damascus-based, was much more deeply attached to Islam, and argued for greater autonomy from Istanbul.

In the last century Arab nationalism was being viewed from a different set of lenses. Amongst the most influential of the writers, Qustantin Zurayq saw Arab nationalism as a civilizational project rather than a defensive obsession with identity boundaries in need of protection (Kassab, 2010:67). He rejected ‘narrow views of Arab history that reduce it to Islamic history or to a regionalist, factional history’. It must be ‘explored in connection with other ancient and recent civilizations of the area’ (2010:71). According to Zurayq Arab unity is ‘a goal that has to be worked for…not a telos of an inexorable ethnic or religious destiny, but a form of solidarity for mutual empowerment by democratic means aimed at serving individuals’ and communities’ dignity and freedom’ (2010:72).

The 1947/1948 defeat of the Arab countries by the Israelis plays a pivotal role in Arab historiography. In less than six months there were a number of developments which continue to shape must of Arab nationalism today. On 29 November, 1947 United Nations resolution 181 proposed the partition of Palestine which had been under British Mandate, into two states: one Jewish, which had 54% of the land and the other Arab with 46% of the land, with Jerusalem to be under international trusteeship.

The Jewish population in the former was about 54% of the total, while less than 10,000 Jews lived on the putative Arab state. An April 1948 offensive by the nascent Israeli army uprooted hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. When the state of Israel was proclaimed on 14 May 1948, the Arab armies entered the day after. About 750,000 to 800,000 Palestinians fled their homes in the areas overtaken by the Israelis, out of a total Arab population estimated at 900,000 to 1 million before the exodus. 65% of them stayed within the Palestinian borders in the West Bank and Gaza; while others reached Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan.
There was intensive reflection on what this defeat, or *nakba* meant captured by the seminal 1948 work of Syrian philosopher Constantin Zurayq titled: *Ma‘na al-nakba* [The Meaning of the Catastrophe]. The emphasis of this reflection was not so much the events itself, but what did the defeat represent at a broader pan-Arab level at both moral and material levels. For him the idea was to glean the lessons of history so that the capacity of Arab society to evolve could be reclaimed. This required radical self-criticism, long-term planning for the military and political organization through Arab unity. This would mean a secularism which prioritized separation of state and religion, emphasized modernization and industrialization, culture and science. He called for the fundamental transformation (*inqilab*) of Arab society; the vehicle for this being a well-organized elite with a clear political programme, commanding populist appeal, engendering mass support.

Notions of Arab nationalism were impacted upon by how the Arab states related to Israel. The compromises made by some of the states with Israel served to stir an avowedly ‘revolutionary’ outlook, which connected with socialism, and which espoused what Breuilly called a unification nationalism. In the 1950s this ideology took two distinct forms: Ba‘athism and Nasserism. The Ba‘ath (Resurrection) Party had its origin in debates amongst the Syrian elite about their national identity and how they should relate to other Arabic speaking communities. There was a particular urgency to this because, as shown above, because of the largely arbitrary carving up of the Levant between the French and British colonists their borders had little to do with their national or historical boundaries (Hourani, 2002:404). In looking at how the emergence of Israel impact on the Arab states, Kassab observed that it ‘imposed certain priorities, such as the military and security, at the expense of civil liberties. It also favoured the strengthening of a defensive nationalism that does not tolerate dissent’ (2004:113). There is no doubt that regimes used Israel as an excuse to legitimate the oppressive measures they were eager to implement anyway.

The Ba‘athists’ goal was the creation of one Arab state, and they believed that the differences amongst Arabs would disappear once that was achieved. Michel ‘Aflaq, a key theorist of the Ba‘ath Party and who was Christian, asserted that ‘There was a single Arab nation, with the right to live in a single united, state. It had been formed by a great historical experience, the creation by the Prophet Muhammad of the religion of Islam and the society which embodied it’ (cited in Hourani, 2002:405). In this
definition the Ba’athists, with their emphasis on pan-Arab unity which shared a single historical experience, manifested *al-qawmiya*. Aflaq’s words are important for another reason: the recognition of Islam in the definition of the Arab identity. By the mid-fifties the ideas of socialism were included in the Party’s ideology and it spread to Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and parts of the Arabian Peninsula.

Nasserism, similarly, could be seen as a form of Arab nationalism that sought to unify the entire Arab nation against imperialism. Arab socialism was regarded as the form appropriate for the Arab nation. Gamal Abdel Nasser, a colonel in the military who had fought in the 1948 war against Israel, came to power through the 1952 revolution, at the helm of the Free Officers’ Movement. This saw the ushering in of first the 1956 Constitution and then the Constitution of 1964. Between these two, Egypt and Syria united for a brief period, which resulted in a different constitutional structure. Lang Jr (2013:353) argues that ‘The initial focus seemed to be on resuscitating the 1923 constitution, but the continued political power of the Muslim Brotherhood, Communists and Wafd Party led to efforts to control them through changes to party laws and regulations, which effectively emasculated the constitutional framework, and in December 1952 the RCC (Revolutionary Command Council) abolished the 1923 constitution’.

Given the repressive measures resorted to, Anouar Abdel-Malek himself a Coptic Egyptian, disparagingly called the state the Free Officers had put in place a “nationalitarian”, drawing as it did on a form of nationalism while resorting to increasingly repressive tactics. Shokr (2013), comparing Egypt’s revolution of 1952 with that in the aftermath of the Arab Spring of 2011, argues that ‘the Free Officers were fortunate to have the weight of history behind them. They took power in a high modernist epoch when the state was celebrated as an instrument of progress, a panacea for the deficiencies of liberal parliamentarianism and the ills of unregulated capitalism... In the years before 2011, no clear alternative to the ravages of neoliberalism had attained the status of orthodoxy’.

However, repression alone is not sufficient in keeping a regime in place: Nasserism was based on an alliance with very specific sectoral interests. This included select state bureaucrats, businessmen, urban middle classes, managers of public-sector companies, the richer farmers and organised labour. According to Shokr (2013) ‘The
economic backbone of the regime became what critical observers called the state bourgeoisie’. This helped the Nasserist state avoid ‘domination by any single social group…Dissenters who refused to conform -- whether communists, Islamists or others -- were brutally repressed’, writes Shokr (2013).

In *The Philosophy of the Revolution* published in 1955 Gamal Abdel Nasser defined the three “circles” that Egypt’s foreign policy needed to address in terms of priority: the Arab, the African, and the Islamic countries. Nasserism sought to reduce the importance of Islam in Egyptian society, and it was respected so long as it was consistent with socialism and Arabism. The clergy was not allowed to have any say in matters of state.

By the 1960s the differences between Arab nation states became sharper: there were those like Egypt committed to rapid change and those ruled by conservative dynasties, suspicious of the spread of Nasserist ideas. While the idea of a pan-Arab state had died long before Nasser’s own demise in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the idea of a unified Arab identity remains a goal.

The loss the Egyptians and Syrians suffered at the hands of the Israelis in the Six Day War of 1967 forced the Arab world to re-examine its self-identity in relation to the Other – that is the West/Israel. It also resulted in the ‘radical failure of the nationalist/socialist Arab project (especially Nasserism) …and inaugurated a new phase in the relationship of Arab dependency on the capitalist West’ (Abu Rabi, 2004: 61). It continues being the source of much introspection, along the lines of the post-1947/1948 reflection.

Yassin al-Haj Saleh, a Syrian Marxist opposed to the regime said that Arab nationalist discourse had made the defeat into a kind of founding event, an original sin (Kassab, 2004:78). Georges Tarabichi, also a Syrian, has described it as a trauma for Arabs at several levels: it was an irremediable defeat which was unexpected, was a blow to the foundations of the Arab nation, there was no achievement soon after that which could make up for it, and it was lived as the shameful loss by and of the father personified in Gamal Abdel Nasser. Even the *nahda* of the nineteenth century came in for criticism, Tarabichi arguing that it was now seen as a betrayal of tradition, Islam and authenticity (cited in Kassab, 2010:167-168). In an interview with Kassab in 1997 the Syrian thinker Sadeq Jalal al-Azm said: ‘Most of the hopes revolved around the
concept of the inspired leader, and when the leader (Nasser) fell everything crashed… the defeat hit us like a lightning bolt (2010: 74).

The naksa (setback) of 1967 had a hugely negative impact on the fortunes of the left, which had come to be associated with Nasser and his concept of Arab socialism. Nasser’s legacy was dealt a severe blow by Sadat who followed a conservative economic policy, reviving the very classes Nasser had suppressed. These various backward steps by Egypt, including the signing of the Camp David Accord with Israel, are described as the ‘occultation of Egypt’ by Anouar Abdel-Malek (cited by Abu-Rabi, 2004:78). A very unflattering description of Egypt given that occultation is the astronomical term which refers to the eclipse of a body passing through the shadow of its parent planet.

In the Arab world, two distinct strands emerged from this cathartic period, both opposed to the Arabism which Nasser had promoted and personified: that of nationalism at state level and that of Islamism. The roots of these differences in direction lay in how the nation was conceptualized, whether it had existed as an entity before being colonized or if it was the creation of some colonial imagination. Those who stressed al-qawmiya, were drawing on the German traditions set by Herder and Fichte with an emphasis on the oneness of the people, (the volk), under a unifying language and a continuous historical experience. On the other hand, the Anglo-French influence lay at the root of those states which would embrace al-wataniya, that is nationalism encouraged by state institutions within a geographically limited space, allowing for a variety of religions and ethnic entities to thrive there. As mentioned above, Smith had advised that it is quite possible for more than one form of nationalism to exist at any given point in time – as was the case of al-wataniya and al-qawmiyya co-existing in most countries. We can surmise that all the states embraced local nationalism, but some regimes were also ideologically committed to pan-Arabism, even if in practice they continued to pursue their own specific interests.

The divide between the two schools was very sharp and bitter, with more conservative states such as Saudi Arabia rejecting the formulations of the pan-Arab nationalist qawmiyeen. These conservative states rather insisted on the sovereignty of their state, weak as it was. It was not long before Egypt too, under Anwar Sadat’s regime, gave
up Nasser’s pan-Arab idealism and Egyptian *wataniya*, which had its roots in the very early stages of its nationalist awakening, re-emerged.

Until the emergence of nation-states, tribal solidarity (*al-‘asabiya al-qabiliya*) had been given short shrift by the nationalists. However, in places like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, tribal loyalty was unofficially reinforced, with the monarchs or dictators like Hussein acting as “tribal overlords.”

Sadat, in following state-level nationalism borrowed heavily from Islam to buttress this approach. At the time of his take over Egypt suffered a balance of payments crisis which brought about a change in economic policy, having a huge impact on the class alliance underpinning the state. According to Shokr (2013) power shifted to new actors such as foreign investors, private business groups and speculators, global financial institutions, resurgent landowners and state elites – all the hall marks of a neo-liberal order. The constitutional developments of the 1970s and 1980s reflected a polity that was gradually becoming part of the liberal economic order, a process that culminated in an embrace of neo-liberalism by the Hosni Mubarak regime in the 1990s.

Thus, Sadat and his successor built a state which moved away from the rhetoric of socialism, centralised planning and huge welfare benefits, but retaining an array of repressive measures ranging from a very strong military and intelligence service, leaving civil society with very little room to manoeuvre – be it through the trade unions or student organisations. In an attempt to shore up the alliance Sadat was building ‘Nearly 75 percent of public spending was divided between three items: salaries for a mammoth bureaucracy inherited from the Nasser era, subsidies that expanded in the 1970s with the oil boom and rising global food prices, and debt service payments that had accumulated since the 1990s’ (according to Shokr, 2013). These measures were important to ensure the quietude of the citizenry.

Other Arab states behaved in a similar manner in the name of their own national interests. Moving away from pan-Arab identity meant the emphasizing of the territorial nation-state. Kramer (1993:183) described the effect of this as follows: ‘(B)y legitimizing themselves as states, they came that much closer to legitimizing Israel’. By the 1980s Salibi was advising that ‘No Arab country today need feel any guilt about accepting its actual existence as a wilful or unwilful departure from an Arab national historical norm’. He argued that Arabs were trying to cling to a ‘highly idealized Arab
nationalist vision of their past’ which they needed to get rid of so they could collaborate amongst themselves more closely as a ‘coherent political community’ (1988:218).

This notion of striving for Arab unity continued to impact thinking most secularists, representing one side of the Arab nationalism coin. But sectarianism was the other side of the coin. Because such nationalism was drawing in Arab and Islamic elements into the nationalist narrative, parts of society was being seen as the Other. Abdallah Laroui, a leading Arab Marxist, captures this well when he writes: ‘The Arab revolutionary intellectual has too long applauded the call to Arab unity, the while accepting and sometimes justifying the fragmentation that is reality’ (citied in Kassab, 2010:88). Apart from Sunni/Shiite sectarianism which has loomed large within the broader Islamic world, an example of sectarianism is the status of the Copts in Egypt. Constituting 10% of the national population, inter-communal relations have gone through ups and downs, often associated with the state of the economy. Unsaury remarks by Salafist elements in the context of the 2012 Egyptian parliamentary elections, the killings and counter-killings and attacks on churches have raised again the role of Arab Christians in this part of the world.

The emphasis on Islam as a defining criterion of Arabness did not acknowledge those of Christian or Jewish faiths, who did speak the language, or who promoted and even served as the fountainhead of Arab nationalist movements, such as Michael ‘Aflaq, or were Arab intellectuals, such as Anouar-Abdel Malek. It also whitewashed the role played by the Copts in Egypt where, during the ‘Liberal Age’ (1923-1952), there had been two Christian Prime Ministers. This section seeks to highlight the argument that by according Islam a key role in the definition of Arab nationalism, nationalists were sowing the seeds of their own opposition.

Islamists make three key points in their critique of Arab nationalism. Firstly, that it broke the Islamic bond between Arabs and Turks. According to the Islamists they were rewarded for this by British betrayal who divided the region with the French, part of which was the creation of Israel. Secondly, by adopting foreign ideologies such as socialism, they abandoned their reliance on God. Thirdly, Arab nationalist rulers were vicious in their attacks against the Islamists – beating, imprisoning, and even killing some of their leading lights.
The Islamists were particularly mobilized after Egypt’s 1967 defeat. Several factors have been cited as contributing to this and the Islamists’ subsequent success. A key argument is that recently urbanized populations in Egypt and other Arab countries were seeking some kind of solidity in their lives, which they found in Islam. Furthermore, as Saadallah Wannous, the Syrian playwright, had written that in view of the many defeats the Arab world had suffered, escape from reality - whether in the form of an illusory attachment to an idealized golden past or the confident expectation of a predetermined glorious future - is a great temptation, but also an ultimate defeat (Kassab, 2004). This could be applied to nationalism as well as Islamism – but the Islamists proved more adept at exploiting this. Similarly, Piscattori has argued that the Islamists success was due to 'the universal crisis of modernity' found amongst 'born again Christians and veiled-again Muslims' (1996: 315). Another factor considered important was the view that the emergence of fragmented nation-states was seen as an opportunity for the emergence of a single community, the Islamic ummah. A final factor is the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 revolution. This is discussed below when looking at the notion of an Islamic state.

Bayat argues that the urban poor in the Middle East are more concerned about survival and hence to pragmatically lend their support to a variety of political trends and powers, be they governmental or oppositional. Also, the popularity of non-governmental forces has been made possible by states following a neo-liberal agenda, withdrawing from the provision of welfare benefits, housing etc. This is the vacuum that the Muslim Brotherhood welfare networks steeped into (2009:178-179).

The Arab states responded to this incipient Islamism in different ways. For example Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat tried to make peace with Islamist forces. The education system and society generally was Islamised under the leadership of the ‘praying President’. Even Egypt’s progressive constitution was amended: Article 2 made Shariah the main source of the nation’s laws. Similarly, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia backed the spread of the conservative version of Sunni Islam, Wahabism, within his own borders as well as throughout the international Muslim community.

Hence we can see that secular Arab nationalism has a history of mixed fortunes. There were moments when it reached a high point of Arab unity, as seen in the union between Syria and Egypt. But the defeat of these countries in the 1967 war saw the
consolidation of Arab states, the pursuit of local nationalism, the implementation of conservative economic programmes and undemocratic practises, including the severe repression of the Islamists.

In the next section I look at how sovereignty and citizenship was viewed by the different ideological currents.

3.1.3. Sovereignty and citizenship

This section concludes the examination of the main currents of theoretical and ideological positions in the Arab world by consolidating thinking on sovereignty, identity and citizenship. It begins by focusing on the concept of sovereignty and the state in the Arab world, and looks at how Islamists and secularists have differed on their approach. As has been discussed above, identifying the locus of a “single political authority” which reigns supreme over all others is a complex process. The contestation or cooperation between religious or political authorities, or between ruling families and other sectors of society such as the tribe, bureaucracy or the military, are two of the more obvious historical trajectories across the Middle East.

Abdallah Laroui argues that amongst Arabs there is a lingering sultanate model or pattern of government that is adopted by rulers and the ruled alike, based on the normative values of obedience and despotism (Kassab, 2010:90). This essentialist view is back by several contributors. Hudson (2009) backs this on the basis of his research, observing that ‘(b)ereft of formal political organizations, powerful families and social networks (shillas) were the key factions’ in authoritarian post-colonial Arab states. It must be noted that when referring to family we are referring to a multi-generational structure which could have thousands of members.

The impact of ruling families gives a certain duality to the power structures in most Gulf states - a gap between those who occupy office and those who actually wield power – the kind of dual sovereignties Zubaida writes about, albeit he is writing of the Iranian context where an elected parliament’s decision can be over-ruled by the Supreme Leader. In the Arab Gulf, the same family or tribe has typically ruled over a long period, as is the case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or the Sultanate of Oman. However, certain individuals from outside the family networks with technical expertise have been appointed to ministries dealing with oil and gas, finance, trade and industry,
and so forth. The tendency has been for members of the ruling families to hold what is referred to as the ‘sovereign’ ministries such as defence, foreign affairs, and internal security.

A further contribution to this view of the ‘sultanate’ model is made by Adonis, the Syrian poet and social critic. He points out that there prevails an idealism of origin, that the Arabs are the best nation created by God, and an idealism of end, that the Arab nation is destined for heavenly paradise (cited in Kassab, 2010: 129). Dominant Arab leaders draw on this in their rhetoric to justify the system they build. According to Adonis ‘This religious tradition is consolidated by a pre-Islamic patriarchal system that is authoritarian and repressive. The state is the political image of this patriarchal system’ (Kassab, 2010:129).

However, there have been arguments against the view that the ‘sultanate’ model is intrinsic to Islam. Talal Asad, for example, has argued that ‘it is irresponsible to invite readers to regard Islamist policies as an outgrowth of tendencies essential to an original politico-religious Islam. The idea that Islam was originally – and therefore essentially – a theocratic state is, I argue, a nineteenth century European one…a ‘religious state’ is not essential to the tradition of Islam (1997:191).

Such arguments reflected broader developments in the Arab/Islamic world: Egypt had instituted constitutional reforms under Muhammad Ali Pasha as far back as the mid-1800s. The new republic formed in Turkey under the Kemalist leadership and the 1906-1909 Iranian Constitutional Revolution signalled a capacity to move beyond monarchical rule towards a democratic state. Further evidence of sovereignty shifting from the heavens to earth was shown by the emergence of Egyptian, Tunisian and Algerian nationalism, which responded to European rule ‘within a clearly delimited country’. The period of decolonization saw the overthrow of the monarchy by a military-led revolution in Egypt in 1952, end of British rule in Iraq in 1958, coups in Syria in 1963 and Libya in 1969 and the ushering in of a republican and socialist agenda. Similarly, the Algerian War of Independence saw an end to French rule in 1962.

However, there was already an ambivalent attitude towards democracy and liberalism – proving Adonis and Laroui correct in their position on the ‘sultanate’ nature of government. Kassab points out that the coups came ‘with promises of a more successful vindication of national and Arab rights…These states prevented the
democratic processes of intranational, political, ethnic, and religious conflict resolution’ (2010:19).

Notwithstanding the animosity which had been shown by the largely Sunni Arab population towards Shi’ism, the Iran Revolution impacted on the notion of the state in one very particular way: for the first time an Islamic Republic was proclaimed. Ayatollah Khomeini’s formulation of the *velayat-e-faqih*, i.e. rule by the just leader, whilst drawing on Shi’a doctrine which had emphasized the role of the Imam, combined with the notion of a republic, was unprecedented in the Islamic world. As Zubaida pointed out, this was possible only in the context of the modern nation-state (2009:x).

Undoubtedly the visions of state and nation impacted on notions of citizenship, paralleling very much the way nation and society came to be understood in the Arab world. In looking at the question of citizenship in the Arab world, Bishara pointed out that ‘democratic citizenship is the embodiment of the relationship between political sovereignty and civil society’ (2012). As Seikaly (2014) explains in her essay, the results were stark. In some places, the authoritarian notion of *ra’aya* has taken hold, where citizens are little more than followers of the leader—literally, “the herd.” Elsewhere, however, citizenship is infused with the notion of *muwatana*, the identity of the people, which includes citizens regardless of gender, ethnicity, class or religion.

All debates on the issue of citizenship in majority Muslim countries begin with what is meant by the *ummah*. El Effendi captures the term’s complexity well when he writes that ‘the concept of umma passed through many definitions, and it is used to refer to the nation-state as well as to the imagined pan-Arab entity and to the Muslim community as a whole’ (1997:9). When looking at citizenship and identity in the Arab world, the complex relationship between Shi’a and Sunni communities is also of major concern and raises the question of whether the Shi’a are part of the *ummah*. The doctrinal questions at its heart are layered by issues of identity as well as contestation for resources. In some cases, tensions between Sunni and Shi’a communities have reached tragic heights. Over the past decade this has been seen especially in Iraq but has been manifested in various countries from Bahrain to non-Arabic countries such as Pakistan. This led to an unprecedented meeting in Amman, Jordan in 2005 attended by *ulama* of both sides. The statement from the conference called unequivocally for Muslim unity, leading Allawi to comment that “the Saudi government
had formally acknowledged that the Shi’a are in fact Muslim after all.” This, however, has not stopped the bloodshed in Iraq, nor tensions in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, impacting on the potential of a unified, national identity emerging.

The rights and obligations of non-Muslims have also provoked intense debates across the period of Islam’s existence. Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians have historically been regarded as the “People of the Book” with a revealed religion. They had the status of dhimmis—they could not be compelled to enter Islam. At the beginning of the Umayyad and the Abbasid dynasties relations with the Jews and Christians were relaxed. However, as Muslims became the majority in various countries across the Arab world, the barriers between Muslims and non-Muslims increased, with some particularly nasty instances of persecution. The specific form these tensions took during the centuries of Islam and in different countries cannot be captured in this study. It is flagged here to indicate the complexity of issues when looking at citizenship in the Arab world.

The focus is on the current context and the views of the Egyptian Shiekh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Tunisian Islamist Rached Gannushi, regarded as moderates within contemporary Islamist discourse are emblematic. They have argued that Muslims and non-Muslims should enjoy equal rights. Al-Qaradawi qualifies this by saying that, in accordance with democratic principles, the rights of the majority should prevail over the minority. Also, he does not see non-Muslims as part of the Islamic ummah. Gannushi, the leader of the Tunisian al-Nahda Party, on the other hand has argued that a correct Islamist movement must take into account the needs of all citizens, not just believers. Kechichian writes that Gannushi believes that ‘Arab citizens who happened to be non-Muslims ought not to be barred from positions in government’ (2011).

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the Arab world cannot be seen as a passive, backward world which was waiting to be ignited by the self-immolation of a street vendor in Tunisia in 2010. Commenting on the uprisings in the Arab world since 2010, Bishara argues that the ‘forces of Arab civil society are trying to construct a society and a state of citizens, as well as edify citizenship as the point of intersection between the state and civil society’ (2012).
The Arab world has been engaging in many intense debates about sovereignty and identity, undergoing many 'dress rehearsals' for the uprisings which occurred during 2011 and 2012. At the centre of these dress rehearsals was the willingness of the citizenship to reclaim its agency. To cite a few examples:

- In Sudan in 1985 an uprising of students, workers and professionals ended President Numeiri's military-led government;

- In Egypt in 1992 local leaders with an Islamist agenda took over Imbaba, the poor urban quarters in Cairo. The area was subjected to a military siege before eventually relenting.

- The Palestinian Intifada of 1987 to 1993 saw a widespread solidarity movement emerge in many parts of the Arab world.

- In 2003 it is estimated that about a million people marched in Yemen to protest the invasion of Iraq by the United States.

- The Lebanese 'Cedar Revolution' of 2005 saw the active mobilization of 1.5m people, leading to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

- Around the same time the Kifaya (enough) movement in Egypt saw large scale, multi-class, multi-sectoral mobilization which Bayat described as 'post-national and post-ideological' (2009:6).

- Then in April 2008 there was the Egyptian April 7 Movement, largely a youth-based movement, using the Internet and Facebook as its main tools of communication. It came out in support of the striking textile workers, achieving a general strike which lasted several days.

It is no wonder that Rami Khouri, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based *The Daily Star* has banned the use of the word 'Spring' to describe the 2010 -2012 uprisings saying that it gives the idea of awakening after winter's slumber. It also makes it sound like an ephemeral moment. He describes the lumping together of all the uprisings under the banner 'Arab Spring' as 'some subtle Orientalism at work'. Shokr (2013) observes that "In each of the Arab countries shaken by revolt, no single force has fully appropriated the revolutionary momentum and claimed it as its own'. He argues that a sense of anti-hegemony goes ‘further back in time’ because it reflects that the state ‘never gets
things right. It reflects not only the shortcomings of individuals, but of policies, practices and institutions -- in short, a system of authority losing legitimacy’.

There is no doubt that the developments during the Arab Spring represent an important shake-up in the foundations of sovereignty and power structures in the respective countries. It also has important implications for the constituting of national identities. Observers have indicated that the success of the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings may be due to them being largely homogenous societies. However, in the aftermath of the success of Tunisia’s Islamist Al Nahda Party and the Egyptian parliamentary elections, which was won by the combined forces of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, several issues were thrust onto the agenda.

The primary one is the kind of society that Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia, or for that matter in Libya and Yemen, envisaged for their countries. The 2011 parliamentary elections in Egypt allowed the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party to enjoy a majority, in alliance with the more Islamist Al-Nour, and also Mohammed Mursi winning the Presidential election in June 2012. The constitution which was hastily drawn up under controversial circumstances under Mursi’s presidency, was successfully put to an equally controversial referendum in December 2012 and was supported largely by those who did cast their votes. The 2012 Constitution, like the 1971 constitution, states in Article 2 that the ‘principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation’. Lang Jr put a generous twist to it when he wrote that ‘it narrows the scope of how that principle can be interpreted in article 219 when it states that ‘the principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community’.

More egregious for Joshua Stacher (2013) was what the constitution promises to Egypt’s most influential institution - the army. Articles 197 and 198 enshrine guarantees not only that the military budget will remain outside legislative scrutiny, but also that Parliament cannot promulgate laws that impinge upon the armed forces’ interests. The new National Defense Council, stocked with generals, will work in concert with the chief executive, rather than for him. Lastly, the military maintains the right to try civilians in cases of perceived harm to the armed forces. He concludes that
'Mursi has overseen ratification of a status quo national charter that actually allows for expansion of the Mubarak-era state’.

The explanation for this is that the MB had become an acquiescent organization in the face of severe reprisals in its decades of existence. This accounts for their indecisiveness around the uprisings of January 2011, let alone around the Presidential election. While a major part of the Egyptian population was pouring into the streets as part of the Arab Spring, the MB was debating whether it should shift from its traditional position of taking on overtly political leadership. This also characterized its approach to Egypt’s first democratic elections leading to Islam Lutfi’s famous tweet about the Presidential elections: ‘It’s the first time a candidate grudgingly enters an election, and we grudgingly vote for him, and the powers that be grudgingly accept the outcome’.

General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power after a period of transition when Egypt slipped into military hands as a result of the coup of July 2013. Roula Khalaf, writing in Financial Times of 5 June 2014 caught the moment very well: ‘The Middle Eastern strongman is back. This week, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad staged an election in which he won a landslide victory, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was declared winner of last week’s contentious presidential poll, having secured 96.9 per cent of the vote’.

**Conclusion**

As can be seen from this examination of the complex relationship between sovereignty, identity and nationalism in the Arab world needs to be appreciated in the context of three contending forces: the presence of a religion which attempts to deterritorialise identity with its concept of a universal ummah, a pan-Arabism which is secular in content and idealises Arab unity, and local state nationalism, which draws on elements of both ideologies while pursuing a narrower set of interests. We can conclude this section with the following observations:

- The location of sovereignty can take various forms: the people as engaged citizens or the strongmen or a spiritual being. As far as a spiritual being’s claim to being sovereign is concerned, even those arguing from an Islamist position would differ on the extent to which it has been ordained that a political community is to be established in the material world or not.
Citizenship has also taken various forms. The 'Arab Spring' of 2010/2011 is the clearest manifestation of attempts to recapture the agency which citizens of the Arab world are capable of. However, such expressions of citizenship do not have a long history in parts of the Arab world, given the preponderance of family networks and tribal allegiances which act to serve as channels for dialogue and agency.

National identity in the Arab world will always have to deal with the forces of Arabism and Islamism. At different points in time they may be emphasized or exploited, upheld or rejected depending on the balance of forces at each historical point. The political entrepreneurs – be they of the bearded or the uniformed ilk – have shown an ability to exploit the popular symbols of religion and Arabic culture for their own ends. In doing so they may have outmanoeuvred the liberals and secularists of late who initially led the mass movements.

These themes will have resonance in the South African case: where is sovereignty located? What are its competitors? And how does identity, working from some foundation, manifest itself in different moments in history? We now examine these questions in relation to India.

3.2 India

Despite the overt differences with the Arab world, the case study of India also provides rich pickings for a comparative study with South African national identity and sovereignty. Like many parts of the Arab world, long before British imperialism had dominated its territory from 1858 onwards, India had a rich history of indigenous kingdoms, including the Muslim Mughal and Deccan Empires. The power of these precolonial formations had been gradually eroded by the British East Indian Company between 1757 and 1857. The suppression of the Sepok Mutiny (or what has been called the First War of Independence) of 1857 heralded the formal establishment of the British Raj from 1858 until independence was achieved on August 15, 1947 and when the new constitution was promulgated on January 26, 1950.

Like the Egyptian secularists, the Indian nationalist leadership had to factor in the deeply religious sentiments of the vast majority of Indians. While Hinduism is followed by the majority, significant minorities practice Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism and Jainism.
This long period of colonialism saw the establishment of a class of ‘brown sahibs’ – of Indian bureaucrats, royalty and businesspeople who were educated in leading private schools and English universities. As discussed below, this class occupied an ambivalent relationship with the mass of Indian people – a phenomenon similar to the Christian educated kholwa in South Africa.

The debates involving some of the leading figures of the independence movement – especially Gandhi, Ambedkar, Nehru and Jinnah – continue to echo through the intellectual debates of today. Just as important is the contrarian position taken by Rabindranath Tagore vis-à-vis nationalism. Their views are considered in the section looking at how the forces of nationalism, secularism and communalism played themselves out in the period leading to independence in 1947 and then from independence up to the present day. It shall focus especially on issues around caste, the status of Muslims and the concomitant partition of Pakistan, as well as the emergence of the chauvinistic Hindutva movement. The 2015 elective success of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) will be seen as the highpoint of the movement. The section after that looks at the connection between sovereignty, state and citizenship. The experience of the various states of the Indian Union since independence to now, as well as the nature of Indian politics played out within these states and at the central level, is examined in greater detail there.

I begin with an appraisal of how the postcolonial approach is embodied in India. Subaltern Studies has emerged as a particularly South Asian, especially Indian, form of the postcolonial approach. Best represented by the works of Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee and the discussions of the journal by the same name, it has not been without its critics, as mentioned above when considering postcolonial studies.

3.2.1 The postcolonial approach in India

Subaltern studies is regarded as the most important manifestation of the postcolonial approach and it was broadly considered in the section above dealing with postcolonial studies. Here it is considered in greater detail especially in the Indian context where its roots lie. Of particular interest is how subaltern studies viewed the question of national identity and sovereignty, and the relations between the two concepts.
The subaltern studies group was originally organised around the *Subaltern Studies* journal launched in 1982 under the editorship of Ranajit Guha. Writing in the inaugural edition of *Subaltern Studies*, Guha explained that 'subaltern' is used as the 'name for the general attribute of subordination in South Asian society, whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office, or in any other way' (written in August 1981, cited in Guha and Spivak, 1988). Guha acknowledged that its theoretical framework was informed by Gramsci's formulation of the position of the subaltern in bourgeois society.

In *Dominance without Hegemony* (1998) Guha summed some of the core themes he had developed over the past few decades. He had argued that the British could dominate India on the basis of the social systems they found in India. In post-independence India the brown elite were able to establish their own dominance over the subalterns, meaning them having been subordinated twice: by the foreign rulers and then by the native elites. This highlights Chatterjee’s seizing on how Nehru saw his role and that of Congress, as one of responsibility towards the peasantry. ‘Often the sense of responsibility towards the peasantry would compel this leadership even to cooperate with an alien state power in order to prevent or control the sudden outbursts of peasant violence’ (1993a:148).

From the opening line of his ‘manifesto’ in the inaugural issue of the journal Guha emphasised that the journal intended to redress the dominance of the Indian elite over Indian historiography, which had usually been at the expense of the peasantry. The editorial collective was particularly concerned with how Indian nationalism had come to be portrayed as ‘primarily an idealist venture’. Such historiography ‘fails to acknowledge…the contribution made by the people on their own…independently of the elite to the making and development of this nationalism’ (1988:39). Loomba argues that the approach showed that large swathes of Indian society were ‘alienated not merely from the colonial or neo-colonial Western culture, but also from the dominant postcolonial ‘Indian’ one that reflects the upper-caste Hindu culture and interests’ (2005:167).

Given that was the main aim of the Subaltern Group, what were its methods? Young suggests that it was based on Marxism, ‘but it is a Marxism now infiltrated not only with emphasis on the peasantry, low castes, tribals, …‘the underdog’, but also with
more concern respecting questions of agency, gender and psychology than it was formerly accustomed to’ (2010:350). Spivak’s particular contribution was her insistence on extending subalternity to women’s and gender issues, leading Young to remark that ‘in postcolonial studies generally, the subaltern has become a synonym for any marginalised or disempowered minority group, particularly on the grounds of gender and ethnicity’ (2010:354). A major part of the approach was the view, as argued by Nandy, that if the colonised answer colonial occupation with nationalism, they are using a concept which keeps them both comprehensible and to that degree under the control of the colonial power (Nandy, 1983: xiv, cited in Young, 2010:344), or what Chatterjee called a derivative discourse.

Being one of the seminal theorists of the subaltern studies approach the thesis draws heavily from Partha Chatterjee’s works, especially where he explored the relation between modernism and postcolonialism, citizenship and civil society, and the relationship between the elite and subaltern. Chatterjee (1993a:27) argues, on the basis of the Indian experience, that ‘the social forces which could be said to have favoured the transformation of a medieval agrarian society into a rational modern one were not unambiguously nationalist, while those that were opposed to colonial domination were not necessarily in favour of a transformation’. Nationalism ‘produced a discourse in which even as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual premises of ‘modernity’ on which colonial domination was based’. This leads him to dismiss it as a ‘derivative discourse’ (Chatterjee, 1993a:30), that is a discourse copied or adapted from others. In doing so he questions the authenticity of such discourse.

Drawing on Abdel-Malek, Chatterjee sets out a key concern of the subaltern studies approach: by asserting the flexibility of new political possibilities, nationalism has to contend with the 'essentialist character depicted in Orientalist discourse' (1993a:38). In his contribution on nationalist ideology, Chatterjee differentiates between the problematic, which deals with political philosophy, sociology and cultural analysis, and the thematic, which addresses the deeper, theoretical basis which informs nationalism. At the level of the thematic, nationalist discourse then has to be 'selective what it takes from Western rational thought' (1993a:41) thus producing a different discourse: 'This nationalist thinking is necessarily a struggle with an entire body of systematic knowledge, a struggle that is political at the same as it is intellectual' (1993:42). He
describes this as a 'positive discourse...of national power'. This aligns him with Said’s thinking in that colonial discourse had to be studied to appreciate how dominance is imbricated in the very thinking of the European Enlightenment.

Chatterjee argues that nationalist thought goes through three distinct moments: departure, manoeuvre and arrival. The first occurs when nationalist consciousness encounters post-Enlightenment thought. ‘It produces the awareness – and acceptance – of an essential cultural difference between East and West...(I)t asserts that...true modernity for the non-European nations would lie in combining the superior material qualities of Western cultures with the spiritual greatness of the East’ (1993a:50-51).

The moment of manoeuvre is seen when this perspective, shared largely by the elite, requires the mobilisation of the people in anti-colonial struggle and distancing from the colonial state. This process is accompanied by a process of preparing for expanded capitalist production ‘by resort to an ideology of anti-capitalism – in other words ‘the development of the thesis by incorporating a part of the antithesis’” (1993a:51). Arrival refers to the moment when nationalist thought ‘is now a discourse of order, of the rational organisation of power....glossing over all earlier contradictions...This ideological unity of nationalist thought it seeks to actualize in the unified state of the state’ (1993a:51).

In *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, as he concludes the survey of Indian nationalism, he sets out what can be regarded as a complement to Guha’s ‘manifesto’. 'Modern statecraft', he writes, cannot resolve 'the very real tensions' which 'are apparent in the political life of every postcolonial nationalist regime in the world. In numerous cases they appear as separatist movements based on ethnic identities, proofs of the incomplete resolution of 'the national question'. More significantly, they often appear as fervently anti-modern, anti-Western strands of politics, rejecting capitalism too for its association with modernism and the West and preaching either a cultural revival or a utopian millennialism' (1993a:169).

Chatterjee built on Guha’s earlier separation of the domains of the elite and the subaltern. Guha had described the unrepresented domain of the 'politics of the people' as 'autonomous' because 'it neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter'. Elite politics was recognisable by its legalism, constitutionalism and adaptation of British and semi-feudal institutions of pre-colonial India. The politics
of the subaltern on the other hand was based on traditional structures of kinship, territoriality, or class associations and was relatively more violent. 'The co-existence of these two domains or streams... (indicated) the failure of the Indian bourgeoisie to speak for the nation'. However, the 'braiding together' of the two strands saw the mobilised masses 'put the characteristic imprints of popular politics on campaigns initiated by the upper classes' (1988:41-42). But, as he later argued, 'The presence of populist or communitarian elements in the liberal constitutional order of the postcolonial state ought not to be read as a sign of the inauthenticity or disingenuousness of elite politics; it is rather a recognition in the elite domain of the very real presence of an arena of subaltern politics over which it must dominate and yet which also had to be negotiated on its own terms for the purposes of producing consent' (1993b:13).

Chatterjee similarly argues that 'Anti-colonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power...The material is the domain of the ‘outside’, of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, the Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an ‘inner’ domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity' (1996:217). In this spiritual domain 'nationalism realizes its most powerful, creative and historically significant project: to fashion a ‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not Western'.

Amongst the criticisms of Chatterjee has been his lack of empirical research. Also, Pannikar questions whether the modern national culture Chatterjee writes of was 'realized in a space isolated from the colonial influence...The nationalist cultural struggle was essentially based on a dual struggle, simultaneously against the colonial and the traditional' (2001:537). Young (2010:355) concedes a la Guha that because the subaltern groups 'never did succeed in establishing a national liberation movement, emphasis moves from revolution to individual, or purely local, acts of resistance'.

Chibber, apart from raising the issues discussed above about postcolonialism, does provide an in-depth critique of Chatterjee’s theory of colonial nationalism. His
argument is that Chatterjee does not ‘explain how colonial discourse cements the postcolony’s subordinate status’ pointing how ‘extravagantly Orientalist all this sounds. Why…does reason have to be the provenance of the West?’ (2013:262). Furthermore, he argues, Chatterjee never considers that the reason the political elites ‘accepted modernisation as an imperative was because it really was an imperative…where capitalism has begun to exert its influence on global affairs, state managers have compelling reasons to build a more productive and stable economic order’ (2013:262-263). He describes this as pressure from above, while there was also pressure from below – from social forces pushing for an amelioration of their conditions. ‘(N)ationalists learned to incorporate subaltern material interest into the political agenda’ (2013:267)

Chibber concludes that ‘Chatterjee’s …theory… cannot possibly work, since it is unable to accommodate the trend in the anticolonial ideologies of the twentieth century, which was to reject the sanctity of the “inner” domain. What he presents as the defining characteristic of nationalism was but a single tendency within it – a subordinate one at that’ (2013:281).

In his appraisal of subaltern studies contribution, and in response to his critics, Chatterjee sums up the most enduring contribution of Subaltern Studies as follows: it ‘contained some of the most persuasive demonstrations of the truth that the time of colonial and postcolonial modernity was heterogeneous, that its practices were hybrid, and that the archaic was in many significant ways, constitutive of the modern’ (2012:46). Chakrabarty takes a similar view: ‘The general interest in the lives and politics of the subaltern classes that Subaltern Studies stoked is here to stay, whether we agree or not with particular authors and their contributions in the field. That itself may have been the greatest legacy of Subaltern Studies’ (2013:27).

Drawing from these contributions I will proceed to examine the three key issues of this thesis:

- Sovereignty, in relation to pre-colonial experiences and the establishment of the colonial state which India had to engage with to establish a single political authority. This is manifested, inter alia, tensions between the central government and state level foci of power as well as the various forms
citizenship takes – civil and within the formal structures of the state or violent and even irredentist.

- National identity, which evolved under the impact of British rule as it created a single entity called India and which a variety of different caste, linguistic, and religious identities had to articulate with.
- Nationalism, as articulated by different elements of Indian society with a special emphasis on the role played by political entrepreneurs who were largely drawn from the Indian educated elite.

### 3.2.2 Evolution of a sovereign India

In looking at the evolution of nationalism in India, this section shall focus on two themes:

- Differing conceptions of the path to independence, especially in relation to the differences between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress (INC);
- How sovereignty evolved from the variety of pre-colonial formations and British colonial rule.

Just as the early Arab nationalists described above were trying to understand why the West managed to surpass them in various ways and especially technologically, the founders of the Indian nation were also fixed on that question. Gandhi, reflecting on the question of why India was a subject nation, concluded in *Hind Swaraj* (written in 1909): ‘The English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them’. Recognizing the impact of the post-Enlightenment basis of Western imperialism, Chatterjee argues that for Gandhi ‘it is not the physical presence of the English which makes India a subject nation, it is civilization which subjects’ (1993a:86).

*Swaraj* has been loosely translated to political independence or self-rule and was the rallying call of the movement of independence from British rule. Vajpeyi points out that traced to its Sanskrit roots, *swaraj* is composed of the words *swa* meaning ‘of the self’ and *raj* which denotes ‘dominion’. Thus the anti-colonial movement was one for India to recapture power ‘to rule over itself. It was a relationship of the self with the self – India was to be the ruler; India was to be ruled’ (2012:ix).
Gandhi exemplified this arguing that *Swaraj* ‘entailed not a struggle to evict the British from India, but a struggle of Indians with themselves that, if won, would bring the British to reason’ (Anderson, 2013:22). Veeravalli argues that for Gandhi *swaraj* ‘raised the question of independence from British rule to a question about the very understanding and definition of sovereignty’ (2011:65). *Swaraj* was based on Gandhi’s belief that embedded in India’s history was a changeless civilization, especially the self-sufficiency of ‘traditional’ village life. ‘What we have tested and found true on the anvil of experience, we dare not change’. For Gandhi, ‘independence must begin at the bottom. Thus every village will be a republic or *panchayat* having full powers’. For him the 700, 000 villages of India will dominate ‘the centre with its few towns’ (*‘Independence’, Collected Works*, vol 85, p32).

Much of the key 1907 debate at the Surat session of the Indian National Congress saw clashes between the moderate/constitutionalist and extremist/violent factions where the former could not see India breaking completely free from Britain. ‘Even the Congress at the height of its influence, under Gandhi and Nehru’s leadership in the 1920s and 1930s, did not insist on 100 percent self-determination…not until the early 1940s did the idea of *purna swaraj* or complete self-rule for India by Indians gain salience’ (Vajpeyi, 2012:59-60). This was echoed in some of the views expressed by the early South African nationalists who felt that black people were not yet ready to govern.

A concept closely associated with *swaraj* was *swadeshi* which translates to ‘belonging to one’s own country’. Often associated with the renaissance seen amongst the Bengali in the north-eastern parts of the country from the 1890s, the term was closely associated with their independence movement but was taken on by a wider array of nationalist leaders. The concept of *Swadeshi* was taken up by Gandhi, who saw it as the territory of the self as well as that of one’s nation, ‘involving the question of body, labour and mode of production’ (Veeravali, 2011:67). This was represented by the *khadi*, or the handspun cotton, and the *carkha*, the handheld spinning wheel which Gandhi promoted as symbols of India’s industrial self-reliance. Tagore was amongst those who dismissed these symbols, arguing that they rather represented the technological backwardness of the Indians.
Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha (translated as truth force) or passive resistance was picked up from Tolstoy. It stood outside the framework of nationalism, with Chatterjee in fact arguing that it ‘quite emphatically rejects (the) rationalism, scientism and historicism of the nationalists” (1993a:93). Gandhi suffused this notion with the Hindu belief system. Ahimsa (non-injury) was the complement to satyagraha, and denoted the intense political activity of large numbers of people. It was the concept, according to Chatterjee, ‘which supplied Gandhism with a theory of politics, enabling it to become the ideology of a national political movement …the ‘science of non-violence’, the ‘science of love” (1993a:107). Anderson (2013:18) argues that unlike other nationalist leaders, for Gandhi ‘religion mattered more than politics, which did not coincide with, but subjoined it. Gandhi’s aim was moksha - that perfect state when the cycle of rebirth comes to an end, with the soul united with God’.

The Muslim narrative counterpoised that of Gandhi and the other leading nationalists. The British saw the Muslims, and their hope for a return to a Muslim empire, as their major threat to dominating the subcontinent. This view was strengthened by the 1857 Revolt and the Wahhabi Movement’s challenges to the British. The revivalist Wahabi, inspired by the Salafists of the Arab world, presented a serious and concerted challenge to British dominance in India from 1830’s to 1860’s. The British thus systematically sidelined the Muslims so that by the end of the 19th century, ‘the Hindu elites consolidated their position while Muslims became marginalized and the Muslim threat to British power completely faded’ (Upadhyay and Robinson, 2012:39).

Mohammed Jinnah, who is credited with having led in the creation of Pakistan, was originally a member of the Indian National Congress. He was the architect of the INC’s pact with the Muslim League (created in 1906) which was agreed to in Lucknow in 1916. Jinnah, who favoured change through negotiations and constitutional means, resigned from the INC when at Gandhi’s urging in 1920 it launched the mass campaign of Non-Cooperation. Also, Jinnah was becoming uncomfortable with the increasing resorting to religious symbols by Congress such as the call to ban the killing of cows. This formed part of his motivation to leave the INC and take up the leadership of the Muslim League. At the core of this move was the concern that Muslim interests would not be served by remaining within the INC or even in India. As a harbinger of future developments, in 1927 Jinnah proposed to the British that one third of the seats in the
central legislature be reserved for Muslims, within a single electorate instead of a separate one.

Compared to his insistence on placing the Untouchables on the Hindu electorate, Gandhi had taken a different view on Muslims – his aim was to ‘rouse Muslims in action against the Raj under the banner of Islam itself’. 1919 saw the formation of the Khilafat Committee through which Gandhi hoped to promote Muslim representation. The committee favoured the return of the Ottoman Caliphate, which had been defeated during the First World War.

By 1930 the differences between the Muslim League and Gandhi could be felt when Muslims did not take part in the Campaign of Civil Disobedience called up by Gandhi. The low level of Muslim participation in the campaign was a testimony to the strength of the Muslim League. Numerous arrests followed, including that of Gandhi, but the mass campaigns managed to get him released. Gandhi attended the subsequent London Roundtable Conference where he found the delegations of the Muslim League, the Sikhs and Ambedkar, representing the Untouchables, demanding separate electorates, which would have led to the balkanization of India.

The Muslim population was a jigsaw puzzle spread across India. The epicenter of the Muslim elite was in Uttar Pradesh, which was also the Muslim League’s strongest base even though it attracted the support of only a third of the Muslim population. To the west lay Sindh, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier (NWF) – provinces which were largely Muslim but did not feel connected to the Muslim League. During the colonial period Punjab and Bengal were the richest provinces of India and Muslims formed a majority there. In Punjab the Muslim League had an insignificant presence, with the Union Party, a coalition of rich Muslim landlords and rich Hindu Jat farmers linked to the colonial status quo, running the show. In Bengal a mass peasant-based party of Muslims, the KPP, independent of the ML, was dominant.

Despite the ML’s weaknesses, the persona of Jinnah stood out and he was able to get these disparate formations to back him in his negotiations for Muslims. After the Congress electoral victory of 1937 the British were recognizing the ML as ‘the safest counterweight to the rise of Hindu nationalism, granting them separate electorates to ensure they would not automatically form a bloc with it in a common struggle against the Raj’ (Anderson, 2013:59). At a Muslim League conference in Lahore in 1940
Jinnah declared that in India there were two nations, not one, and that independence would require granting sovereignty to those provinces which has Muslim majorities. Nehru had dismissed the idea of a separate Muslim nation as far back as 1934 saying ‘Politically the idea is absurd; economically it is fantastic; it’s hardly worth considering’ (Anderson, 2013:61). Nehru was at pains at promoting the notion of an India which had remained united through the ages – a key trope of Hindu nationalism.

The ML was growing in strength and support: in the 1945-46 elections, it took every single Muslim seat in the central elections; at provincial level it took almost 90% of them, making it almost the sole representative of Muslims in India, just as Congress enjoyed the support of Hindus. The British proposed a federal system for independent India, which Nehru rejected. Jinnah’s attempt at mass mobilization ended in many casualties in a bloodbath in Calcutta. Back at the colonial headquarters, British attitude was turning against the Muslim League, with the Labour Party seeing the Indian National Congress as its soul mate.

As Anderson (2013:62) put it: ‘if Britain had to leave India, India should be forged as Britain had forged it’. Also, there was concern that division of the subcontinent would play into the hands of the USSR – which was emerging as a new threat to British designs on controlling markets etc. When Mountbatten arrived in India he quickly realized that partition was inevitable. The British then proposed a confederal system in which the Muslim territories were self-governing, with a central government protecting the Muslim minorities in Hindu-majority areas.

Nehru did not support Partition because it went against the Congress leadership view of having a centralized powerful state and which they saw as essential to Indian unity. They would thus have preferred unimpeded monopoly of power in the larger part of India. As Anderson (2012:67) put it: ‘So while the League talked of partition, Jinnah contemplated confederation; while Congress spoke of union, Nehru prepared for scission’. The Muslim League was not alone in pushing for Partition: In his *Thoughts on Pakistan* (1941) and *Pakistan or the Partition of India* (1944) Ambedkar had, after weighing up the various pros and cons, argued that if Muslims were of the view that their interests were best served by a separate state, then the Muslim League’s two state theory should be supported. Vajpeyi points out that it was his acknowledgement that ‘modern communities of caste or religion could constitute themselves, through
acts of political self-determination, as nationalities (2012:216). Also, the Communist Party supported the idea based on the prevailing thinking within the Communist International supporting the notion of self-determination, a debate which was also reflected in the South African context.

The arrangement which was finally hammered out excluded any consultations with the people. The legislative assembly of each province would decide whether it wished to remain with India or join the putative Pakistan. Punjab and Bengal were allowed to divide their provinces, given the size of the Muslim populations there, while the NWF was the only one allowed to have a referendum. The Muslim majority in the assembly voted to go into Pakistan. Bengal followed a very different route with the Hindu and Muslim leadership jointly calling for an independent Bengal state. The Hindu Mahasaba, progenitor of the BJP, mobilized against it in Bengal. Nehru wanted East and West Bengal to be united as long as they remained in India. When the Bengal Assembly voted on the issue it went 126 to 90 for unity. However, when they were asked to cast their ballots separately, the West chose Partition and thus remains with India, and the East against it. The east would, after a war with West Pakistan, become Bangladesh, a secular country with a Muslim majority.

The North West Frontier (NWF), a province with a 95% Muslim population, provided another tragic case study. Since the 1930s it had seen the rise of the Red Shirts led by Badshah Khan, a non-violent anti-colonialist movement, similar in outlook to that of Gandhi’s. The Muslim League had a very weak presence in the province and Badshah Khan was not keen on the notion of partition, feeling betrayed by the Congress leadership who had promised that no such thing could happen. When the referendum took place, Nehru insisted that it must not include the possibility of independence – the one escape clause the Red Shirts would have used. They thus boycotted the referendum, leaving the field open for the Muslim League to get the majority vote for joining Pakistan.

This led to the most defining moment in the development of the Indian nation. As Sarkar wrote: ‘A ‘bloodless’ winning of independence would be accompanied by an unimaginably bloody communal carnage’ (1983:408). Conservative estimates put the number killed during this period of partition at no less than a million, while about 12 to 18 million people were uprooted.
Asking whether division was inevitable, Anderson (2012:93) points to the paucity of attention paid to the issues around Partition, ‘The major question posed by the modern history of the region has yet to receive analytic treatment commensurate with it’. There has been a tendency to see Partition as the inevitable result of a British divide and rule policy. ‘But confessional antagonisms between Hindu and Muslim communities were not ... a primary instrument of control, if only because they risked aggregating dangerously wide blocs of religious identity...The division in the struggle for independence, when it came, was confessional, but it was not Jinnah who injected religion into the vocabulary and imagery of the national movement, it was Gandhi’ (2012:93).

In his *Autobiography* Nehru remarks at ‘how the bourgeois classes, both among the Hindus and Muslims, succeeded, in the sacred name of religion, in getting a measure of sympathy and support for programmes and demands which had absolutely nothing to do with the masses, or even the lower middle class...Political reactionaries came back to the political field in the guise of communal leaders, and the real explanation of the various steps they took was not so much their communal bias as their desire to obstruct political advance’ (cited in Chatterjee, 1193a:142).

Vajpeyi signals another area of poverty in thinking, which she describes as the elephant in the room, and that is ‘the place of Muslim traditions of inquiry into self and sovereignty in the making of India’. She points out that institutions such as the Aligarh Muslim University created in 1877, the Jamia Millia Islamia founded in 1920 and the Muslim League launched in 1906 all were part of a critical period in India’s intellectual development. ‘It’s almost as though the Indians left these figures to the Pakistanis to memorialise, critique or forget as they thought fit’ (2012:33).

Nehru, India’s first post-independence prime minister, agreed with Gandhi that foreign invasion had been made possible because of the long process of internal decay India had gone through. However, for Nehru this was exemplified in ‘the growing rigidity and exclusiveness of the Indian social structure... represented chiefly by the caste system’ (1946:221). For him the ‘better type of modern man’ was ‘governed by a practical idealism for social betterment...Humanity its god and social service its religion’. The ideals of the contemporary age were humanism and the scientific spirit. Chatterjee
explains that for Nehru the scientific method ‘meant quite specifically the primacy of the sphere of the economic in all social questions’ (1993a:139).

In his approach to develop the post-independence state, Nehru reached far back in Indian history – in particular the reign of Emperor Asoka of the Mauryan Empire (320-185 BC) - to frame his approach to the state. A philosopher of the time, Kautilya, said to have lived around the time of Aristotle, had written India’s oldest known treatise on the state (Vajpeyi, 2012:xxii). Asoka was the cruel emperor who upon seeing the damage caused by violence had a change of heart making nonviolence his state policy, while Kautilya’s writing emphasized the need for security and surveillance as essential elements of the state (2012:171).

In his *Discovery of India*, written in 1944 while incarcerated, Nehru set out the four principles which lay at the core of his approach: socialism, secularism, democracy and non-alignment. His popularity can be seen in the three elections he won at the helm of the INC. Writing of the role he played in consolidating the Indian nation-state, Vajpeyi points out that ‘Nehru seems to have grasped something that the colonial state did not grasp: that without an appeal that was fundamentally directed at the imagination of ordinary people, no modern state could survive and hold on to popular allegiance’. Such an appeal ‘would have to be made on the basis of shared images of the beloved nation – shared that is between the people and their rulers’ (2012:182/183).

Nehru was largely responsible for the ushering in of the key elements of the new Indian state’s identity and shows his affinity to the Asokan aspect of India’s tradition: the flag consists of the Sarnath Lion Capital and the *dharmacakra* (wheel of law) both drawn from Asokan history (1996: Volume 2, 50–56). The national motto *satyameva jayate* (Sanskrit, ‘Truth Alone Triumphs’) has a separate provenance. Cloaked in these Asokan symbols and steeped in its philosophy, Nehru saw himself as the new Asoka. If India had to keep its ‘tryst with destiny’, then only an ethical sovereign who was also a creative historian could be the keeper of the tryst – a mantle that Nehru was fully prepared to assume at independence’ (Vajpeyi, 2012:196). This symbolism was matched with a political programme to establish the modern Indian state.

BR Ambedkar, a member of the Untouchable caste, provided an intellectual counterweight to Gandhi’s moralizing. His views on caste are discussed below but his
views on statehood is best captured in examining the role he played in the drafting and eventual adoption in 1950 of the Indian constitution as the chair of the drafting committee and then as the first law minister in the Nehru cabinet.

The Indian constitution refers to the country as ‘India, that is Bharat’. ‘India’, which is derived from the name the British gave the region has its roots in a range of appellations that the Greeks and Arabs had used such as Al-Hind and Indika. Bharat’ which is derived from Sanskrit, Hindi, and a number of other languages comes out of the Sanskrit epic Mahabharata. It is short form of the Sanskrit Bharathavarsha, the land of the Bharata clan. This clan is at the centre of the epic Mahabharata. ‘India is thus constitutionally linked to a pre-Islamic past, celebrated in Hindu texts’, pointed our van der Veer.

The rest of this section on state sovereignty evaluates the evolution of two founding features of India: the Nehruvian view of socialism and democracy, and the maintenance of a unified Indian state.

Mukherjee (2015) points out that ‘While political democracy was understood by Nehru to be a necessary condition for people’s empowerment, it was by no means taken to be sufficient’. Nehru addressed this squarely in a 1952 speech when he said ‘If poverty and low standards continue then democracy, for all its fine institutions and ideals, ceases to be a liberating force. It must therefore aim continuously at the eradication of poverty…. In other words, political democracy is not enough. It must develop into economic democracy also’.

The statist economic policies hammered out in the aftermath of independence led to a very slow economic growth rate. C Rajagopalachari, the last Governor General of India and leader in Tamil Nadu, coined the phrase in 1959, ‘license permit quota raj’, which captured the impact of a sclerotic bureaucracy that controlled just about every entrepreneurial activity in India. India’s 2-3% GDP growth was disparagingly described as the ‘Hindu rate of growth’.

This came to be replaced by a set of measures to liberalise the economy in 1991 which helped India achieve 5 to 9% GDP growth rates, with its IT sector booming and more foreign capital flowing in. The number of Indian billionaires grew, as did the size of the
middle class by the late 1990s which, at about 250 million people, was described as being almost the size of the US population.

But the majority of Indians remained desperately poor and thus for most of the period of growth there were intense debates on the role of the state. For example India’s leading economist, Amaryta Sen, had argued in the mid-1990s that in a deeply hierarchical society such as India, the state had a crucial role to play in levelling the playing fields for the poorest sectors such as the lowest castes, women and minorities, such as Muslims.

Two perspectives emerged from these debates: A hard left position which argued for the reversal of liberalisation and for the state to reclaim land ownership and impose high taxation on large corporations. The second position, which was a conservative, right wing view, pushed for the strengthening of market forces, the state helping in controlling wages, for companies to be allowed to buy land directly from peasants and for hiring and firing to be made easier.

More recently, and especially in the aftermath of the right-wing BJP’s victory in last year’s elections, the more conservative outlook has been in the ascendancy. Bhagwati and Panagariya support this view, arguing that the economic growth due to the liberalising reforms of the 1990s could be optimised through greater labour flexibility. They argue that higher economic growth would make more generous public welfare policies. They base much of their argument on what has come to be referred to as the ‘Gujarat Model’, where it is claimed that the state of Gujarat enjoyed economic growth rates which were above the national average because of the highly liberalised economy in that state. They also argue that two decades of reform has resulted in ‘pulling up’ of millions of people out of poverty.

Hirway (2013:26) points out that much of this was achieved through huge incentives and subsidies for corporate investment: medium and large industries were given more than ten times that of agriculture, food and allied activities. She argues that ‘With a high dropout rate in schools, deteriorating quality of primary education in the last decade, and declining rank in literacy from four in 2001 to nine in 2011 among (India’s) major states, the performance of Gujarat is anything but respectable’. The Reserve Bank of India pointed out in 2012 that Gujarat’s expenditure on health, education and
social sectors in the last decade was one of the lowest in the state, and sank to lowest in comparison to the other 20 major states (Hirway, 2013:27).

Also, India’s Planning Commission reported in 2013 that more than 20% of the Indian population lived under the already very low poverty line. The UN Human Development Report of the same year placed India 136 of 185 countries in terms of its Human Development Index.

Sen, and his collaborator Jean Dreze, provided a counterpoint to the views of the conservative economists calling for a ‘welfare-minded state to moderate the excesses of the market’, arguing that ‘in India, public services call for far reaching expansion’. In essence they called for an activist state where growth is not an end it itself – rather a means to achieving growth-mediated development. They call especially for a focus on healthcare and education (2013:14).

The defeat of Congress by the BJP in 2014 has seen a renewed commitment to liberalising the economy. Chandra (2015) describes the state as playing a new role in relation to business. He argues that ‘the state is a plural entity that has become even more so during the decades of liberalisation. New ministries, and more ministries, now preside over the economy than before. Control over regulations and resources valued by the private sector is distributed across levels of government, with state and local governments acquiring an increasing role’.

The positive feature of this is that ‘Members of the business sector have become more active participants in democratic practice than before’. He concludes that ‘a continued stake in patronage gives business in India a stake also in procedural democracy, while remaining agnostic on the contribution of this stake to the overall stability of procedural democracy, the causes of which are in all likelihood overdetermined’.

As the BJP continues to strengthen its control over the various levers of state power, these debates on the extent of state sovereignty would continue occupying the minds of theorists. Will it lose sovereignty due to its capture by corporates and do their bidding, or will the realities of India’s several development challenges force even a conservative government to use state power in the interests of the majority?

While contemplating that question we turn the focus to another process of fissuring which emphasises the increasingly pluralistic nature of the Indian state: the creation
of more and more states. At the time of independence, which saw the creation of India as a federal union, there was a plethora of different forms of local states being welded into this huge amalgamation.

The Congress Party in its 1920 Nagpur session adopted a resolution to reorganise states primarily based on language to address local cultural aspirations. ‘Yet realising the potential of linguistic nationalism on rise, and the ensuing problems that it can create, the Congress working committee in 1938 advised people to desist from making demands for linguistic provinces. The Hyderabad session of the All India Congress Committee adopted a resolution recommending the redefinition of boundaries of the states in India primarily based on language’ (Parameswaran and Chattopadhyay, 2014).

The Government of India appointed the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) in December 1953. The following extract from its report indicates the fine balancing act it had to engage in: ‘To the extent that realisation of unilinguism at the state level would tend to breed a particularistic feeling, to counter balance that feeling by positive measures calculated to give a deeper content to Indian nationalism; to promote greater interplay of different regional cultures, and interstate cooperation and accord; and to reinforce the links between the centre and the states in order to secure a greater coordinated working of national policies and programmes’ (Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, 1955; cited in Parameswaran and Chattopadhyay, 2014).

India’s Parliament passed the States Reorganisation Act of 1956 reorganising India into 14 states and six union territories. Nehru was unhappy with state reorganisation on the basis of language preferring India to be based on economically viable and politically integrative states with a proper balance maintained between territorial size of different regions and the national sovereignty and unity of the country. The shortsightedness of the government became apparent quite quickly as more and more states splintered.

Parameswaran and Chattopadhyay conclude that ‘The creation of new states, and continued agitations in various parts of the country, sometimes fuelled by the reorganisation itself indicate that the process is complex. It cannot be determined by a single issue such as language, but lack of development, urge for an identity, local
aspiration, administrative convenience, size and competitive politics have all played their part in different measures in articulating the demand for reorganisation’. They suggest that ‘Instead of the centre devolving power to the state, the state can devolve powers to the centre’ (2014).

3.2.3 Evolution of Indian national identity

In this section I will be looking at Indian national identity at two levels:

- In terms of the strategies used by the different nationalist leaders;
- Through the prism of caste and communal differences.

Gandhi undoubtedly contributed to the successful mobilization of support for the Indian National Congress. Party membership increased from 470 000 in 1935 to 4.5m in 1938. However, his style of paternalistic leadership led D.A. Low to describe this as ‘mass approbation, not mass mobilization’. Similarly, Chatterjee argues that while Gandhi was very pro-peasant in his approach, he was no peasant ideologue, suggesting that the unique achievement of Gandhism was ‘its ability to open up the possibility for achieving perhaps the most important historical task for a successful national revolution in a country like India viz the political appropriation of the subaltern classes by a bourgeoisie aspiring for hegemony in the new nation-state’ (1993a:100).

Evaluation of Gandhi’s role can be split between the normal hagiographic perspective which sees him as a kind of saint versus that of the dismissive view, of which Rajni Palme Dutt’s formulations is of the more harsh ilk. Dutt (1940) wrote of him as follows: ‘this Jonah of revolution, this general of unbroken disasters, (who) was the mascot of the bourgeoisie in each wave of the developing struggle’.

Rabindranath Tagore, despite two of his songs being adopted as the respective national anthems of India in 1947 and Bangladesh in 1971, disavowed nationalism and patriotism. For many Bengalis, his poetry inspired the Swadeshi movement of 1905-1908 as well as helped imagine the Bangladeshi national identity into existence. Vajpeyi explains that he was able to achieve this through the viraha, or yearning/longing that his works invoked: ‘Yearning for the past, for tradition, for the lost celestial city, as it were’ (2012:105). As she explains: ‘Poetry may allow a journey between here and there but poetry will not weave the two into a unity of perduring form, which is the nation’ (2012:115). Tagore’s was a cultural nationalism, which was
able through poetic imagination, see India ‘as a land of love and beauty, human as well as natural’ (2012:107).

Nehru on the other hand was the arch-nationalist leader. He argued that there was a need to have a relationship between nationalism and social and economic issues – the latter was needed to mobilize the masses towards the goal of a national sovereign state. In Chatterjee’s framework this was the moment of arrival – it was a reconstruction of the nationalist thought which had been unfolding until then, situating ‘nationalism within the domain of state ideology’ (1993a:132). He saw it as a passive revolution, its form *etatisme* giving a central, autonomous role to the state ‘legitimizing it by a specifically nationalist marriage between the ideas of progress and social justice’.

In this section we trace the pre-independence and post-independence debates around caste involving Gandhi, Nehru and BR Ambedkar. This differed from the issues of communalism which, while involving other faiths, is especially intense around Hindu-Muslim relations. The debates on caste and communal issues are examined in relation to the Indian notion of secularism. This section concludes with an outline of the rise of Hindutva until the overwhelming victory of the BJP in the 2014 elections.

Secularism in India has tended to take the form of recognition of religious minorities, while allowing them to act in a secular manner in society. ‘In India, secularism is not viewed as a separation of religion and politics but as giving equal status (*sarva dharma sambhava*) and acting in a non-partisan way (*dharma-nirapeksha*) towards all religions’ argue Upadhyay and Robinson (2012:47), who underline that this is still a challenge. Rajeev Bhargava has argued that ‘by accepting community-specific rights for religious minorities and endorsing state-intervention in Hinduism…the (Indian) Constitution…developed its own modern variant’ (2010:39). The reason for the latter was that because of the lack of an ecclesial order which would initiate reforms within Hinduism, it had to come from ‘powerful external institutions such as the state’. This it did by recognizing inter-caste marriages, introducing temple entry rights to Dalits, introducing the right to divorce, abolishing child marriage, making polygamy illegal to name but a few measures (Bhargava, 2010:42).

Communalism is seen as the anti-thesis of secularism in the Indian context. The former refers to tensions between adherents of the Hindu faith in relation to Islam or
Christianity. These two religions are particularly targeted by Hindu chauvinists since they are proselytising religions and thus seen as a threat to Hinduism. Upadhyay and Robinson point out that ‘The colonialist construction of history made Muslims as alien on Indian soil’ (2012:46). Vajpeyi laments that ‘Islamic and Hindu theologies are so fundamentally incompatible that even a thousand or more years of close coexistence and interaction on the subcontinent failed to yield any actual understanding, synthesis or syncretism of a doctrinally robust kind’ (2012:233).

Let us now look at caste in more detail. Van der Veer is amongst those who have argued that ‘It is European Orientalism of the eighteenth century which gradually developed notions about the people of India and their various beliefs and practices into an integrated, coherent religion called “Hinduism”’ (1999:421). A further role the British played was through its census system in the 1870s when it used caste as a basis to categorise people. The British tried to use the Vedic-based social hierarchy, which was along four functional groups: the priests, the warriors, the traders and servants. These were regional based hierarchies, which the British tried to transform into an All-India phenomenon. Perhaps it may be best to see the ossifying of the caste differentiation which the British found in a fluid form as serving their purposes as well as that of the Indian nationalists, as discussed here.

While Hinduism is referred to as the Brahminical ideology, Aloysius argues that it is not meant to imply an ideology that is confined to one group but instead a set of values, ideas, concepts, practices and myths which are identifiable in the literature and social institutions (2010: 26). Furthermore, ‘The different communities at the apex of the traditional ritual hierarchy tended to come together, breaking, to a limited extent, the taboos among themselves’ (2010:42). This could be seen in the form of cross-faith leadership in the INC as well as different business associations.

He suggests that the longevity of the caste system is due to two factors: firstly, ‘ascription enjoyed relative autonomy from the fluctuations in the polity and politics’. Notwithstanding all the various changes in the nature and form of political rule, the social order was stable. Secondly, the old order was ‘intertwined with the Brahminic religious traditions through the core ideas, concepts and beliefs evolved in the historical-mythical context of race relations between groups identified as Aryan and Dravidian’ (2010:28). The Dravidians are regarded as the original occupiers of South
India while the Indo-Aryans are believed to have migrated later to the northern part of India. Despite the former group having Brahminic roots, the northerners tended to look down upon them.

These two factors can be seen at play in the *ramarajya* which refers to the Golden Age of the god-hero Rama and was often cited by Gandhi as part of his utopian vision. Chatterjee explains that it was ‘a patriarchy in which the ruler, by his moral quality and habitual adherence to truth, always expresses the collective will’ (1993a:92). While steeped in mythology, it was also a form of economic organization according to the four levels of the *varna* system whereby people fell into certain specializations along caste lines. It was an idealistic system of reciprocal exchange of goods and services, and no discrimination between different levels of work.

Furthermore, the reinforcement of the caste system by the British administration ‘abridged the gulf between social dominance and state power and also provided the former with a new secular legitimating ideology’ (Aloysius, 2010:45). Race theory was used by the Indian elite to claim equality with the rulers, while also distancing themselves from the other, especially lower, castes. Also, the lines between Hinduism and Brahminism were blurred by the British, so that Brahminic interpretations were given prominence, as shall be discussed in detail below.

The impact of the above was that it obviated the need by the British for physical force and that opposition to the status quo was seen as a revolt against the prevailing culture. But there was resistance nevertheless, especially from within the religious framework. ‘Pan-Indian heterodoxies such as Buddhism, Jainism and the Bhakti movement…and numerous other local movements to a greater or lesser degree were expressions of anti-hierarchical aspirations and values…The relative absence of a formulated, pan-Indian counter-consciousness is both the strength as well as the weakness of these forms of resistance, for diversity in the subcontinent draws its inspiration from power as resistance’ (Aloysius, 2010:29).

However, the *varna* ideology did not penetrate vast parts of the subcontinent such as the desert regions and the hill-forest areas. Also, the south, ‘due to the racial notions undercurrent in *varna* ideology, resisted it and in due course, had developed their own versions of stratification…Yet others, by appropriating egalitarian religious ideologies
such as Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, had developed tensions between the actual and the ideal’ (2010:31).

The debate on caste and the untouchables needs to be incorporated into that framework. Gandhi separated the two – while he saw untouchability as a heinous crime, he saw caste as ‘an immutable law of nature’. During the decade’s long debates between them, Gandhi pushed Ambedkar to withdraw his demand for separate list for the Untouchables in the elections which were conducted under the British Raj. Gandhi argued that a separate list for the Untouchables would divide the Hindus into two communities, making the label of untouchables a permanent one. He declared: ‘I would rather Hinduism died than that Untouchability died’ (V, 2011:69). For Gandhi, the problem lay within Hinduism, which he believed needed to be reformed from within to get rid of what he called the sin of Untouchability. Vajpeyi captures Ambdekar’s position well: ‘the solution lay not in the self-purification of Hindus but in the self-respect of the Untouchables themselves’ (2012:222).

Gandhi got Ambedkar to compromise when he embarked on a fast. In what came to be known as the Poona Pact, the two agreed that Untouchables would be given more seats but from the Hindu electorate. Nehru was also supportive of the caste system, describing it as better than slavery. ‘Within each caste there was equality and a measure of freedom: each caste was occupational and applied itself to its particular work’ (1936). But, as Ambedkar noted, Nehru never addressed the issue of Untouchability. In fact Nehru was unhappy with Gandhi’s focus on Untouchability, chiding him for ‘choosing a side issue for his final sacrifice’ (1936:370 cited in Chatterjee, 1993a:131). Nehru saw the disappearance of the ‘communal’ problem in a future national state, through full and equal rights of citizenship. The only issues which would be of concern then were ‘economic ones, which had nothing to do with a person’s religion’ (1947:387). Chatterjee makes two key comments on the manner in which the issue of the Untouchables was resolved: that ‘(T)he homogeneity of India slides into the homogeneity of Hindus’ (2009:17); thus illustrating the ‘ambivalence of the nation as a narrative strategy as well as an apparatus of power…Heterogeneity, unstoppable at one point, is forcibly suppressed at another’ (2009:16-17).

This section focuses on the contemporary form of Hindu nationalism. In the above sections it has been shown how caste was rigidified to become the leitmotif of Indian
society. I now turn the focus on communalism. I follow Upadhyay and Robinson’s (2013) approach where they look at the issue of communalism in India as a conflict over secular issues through the prism of the position of Muslims relative to Hindus under colonial rule and in contemporary India.

Aloysius views are emblematic of the argument that the Indian National Congress (INC) was infused by Hindu nationalism from its very origins, impacting on the kind of state that India has evolved into. A similar observation shall be made of the debates around a narrow, exclusivist or a broad, inclusive Africanism in the early days of the African National Congress. He argues that India has become not a nation-state but ‘one powerful state system, comprised of multiple warring communities’. ‘Hindu communal nationalism’ seems to have offered a path out of this ‘impasse’. He describes this as a ‘communal nationalism in a double sense’: vis a vis other religious communities but also in relation to vast masses of lower castes within the Hindu fold. He thus dubs the prevailing nationalist ideology “uppercaste Brahminic nationalism” (2010:2).

An example of how Gandhi connected politics with Hinduism can be seen in the debate the Congress had on exercising power post-independence. In the lead up to independence Gandhi preferred that Congress dissolved, staying out of power, and remaining in opposition. This was based on the epic of Ramayana, symbolizing ‘the possibility of the rule of Rama (Ram rajya) even when in exile, without territory and out of power’ (Veeravalli, 2011:68).

Van der Veer points out that during the colonial period Sanskrit writings of a ‘classical age’ before 1200 AD were raised to the level of Nationalliterateur as seen by Herder. This ‘marginalized or ignores not only the literature written in Tamil, Bengali or Urdu, to mention only a few, but even the Sanskrit literature of almost a millennium preceding the nineteenth century. This construction is one of the foundational elements in the periodization of Indian history in a Hindu, a Muslim and a British period’ by British Orientalists (1999:422).

At the base of the Hindutva ideology is that of racial division between the Aryan and non-Aryan peoples. This was especially organized under Hinduism’s most important reformist movement, the Arya Samaj. Founded in 1828 under the leadership of Guru Dayananda, it called for a return to the original pure form of Hinduism based on the
Vedas, independent of its commentators. Van der Veer suggests that was part of the Hindu discursive tradition, but it had been seen as an ‘imaginary source’ since most of it was transmitted orally within Brahmin families. The texts which did exist were ‘lengthy, obscure, riddled with internal contradictions’ (1999:426). For the Arya Samaj, the Hinduism being practiced then was a degenerated form of the original Aryan religion, which itself was the base of all human civilization. ‘The Hindu Aryans are shown to be a people with a mission, namely, to spread Hindu civilization to the rest of humanity’ (1999:427).

Dayananda’s work was especially derogatory of Islam and Christianity. In much of the Hindu writings of the beginning of the 20th century there is an obsession to remove the contribution of Muslim leaders, who are portrayed as excessively fertile and militant or to warn about the growing number of Muslims compared to the Hindu population. ‘In actual acts of terrorism inflicted on minorities, (the Muslim’s circumcised penis) provides the ultimate evidence of Muslim identity’ (Rustum Bharucha, 2006:473 ‘Muslims and Other Anecdotes, Fragments and Uncertainties of Evidence’, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Vol 5 Issue 3, pp 472-485 cited in Upadhyay and Robinson, 2012:49).

Publications of the early twentieth century included titles such as *Hindus – a Dying Race* by UN Mukherjee, and *Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu* by VD Savakar, who was president of the Hindu Mahasabha from 1937 to 1942. The Hindu Mahasabha, which was a force within the INC, was led by Arya Samaj members. ‘Hindu spirituality’ was an important element in Hindu nationalism and was especially espoused by the founder of the Ramakrishna Movement, Vivekananda. This element was endorsed by Gandhi, who took it as the base of his political and philosophical approach.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was created in 1925, and grew in the period of the rise of fascism in Europe – leaving an indelible mark on its form and character. It was temporarily banned after former RSS members assassinated Gandhi, whom they perceived as being too soft on the Muslims. Today it boasts a network of 40 000 branches (*shakha*). Their early morning meetings begin with the slogan *Hindustan Hindu ka, nahim kisi baap ka* (Hindustan belongs to the Hindus, not to anybody else’s father). Organisations which are inspired by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh's ideology refer themselves as the members of the *Sangh*
Parivar. In most cases, pracharaks (full-time volunteers of the RSS) were deputised to establish these organisations.

Part of these formations were in reaction to the perspectives of the Muslim movements of the time. For example, the Wahhabi’s saw India as Dar-ul-Harb, land which was not Islamic and which had to be converted to Dar-us-Islam. The process of partition, and all the strong sentiments which ensued, saw the further eroding of the status of Muslims in India, and the rapid reduction in their numbers in government employ.

Upadhyay and Robinson point out that ‘Cultural elements of the Muslims also do not get much recognition; for instance, Urdu is spoken in many states but it is not an official language in any state’ (2012:42).

During the colonial period, while English education was being used for upward mobility by upper-caste Hindus within the colonial civil service, Muslims clung onto Persian, the language of the elite of the Mughal Empire. This kind of alienation of Muslims in India from the mainstream of public life came to the fore after Partition, when they were seen as a Fifth Column, with allegiance to Pakistan.

After a period of relative quiet post-1947, riots started breaking out in several parts of India during the 1960s and 1970s. This saw the rise of a few militant Muslim leaders. Their aggression, coupled with the gradual improvements in the income of Muslims due to remittances from family members being employed in the Arabian Gulf, set the basis for a new anti-Muslim environment. Actions by the Congress-led government, such as allowing reservation for Muslims in government jobs, allowing Muslim Personal Law to be recognized, and international events, such as the desecration of Buddhist statues in Afghanistan by the Taliban, added fuel to the fire (Upadhyay and Robinson, 2012:42). The broader association of Islam with terrorism did not help Muslims in India, with Narendra Modi, then Chief Minister of Gujrat, declaring ‘All Muslims are not terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslim’ (Bharucha, 2006:473, cited in Upadhyay and Robinson, 2012:51).

Upadhyay and Robinson argue that a big part of the problem is that the ‘majority community homogenises the socio-economic conditions of the Muslims’ (2012:44). The Sachar Committee, a government appointed commission, found that Muslims were actually, in terms of access to education, finance and employment, largely backward and deprived.
In 1990, the BJP leader LK Advani went on a countrywide *rath yatra* (chariot tour) campaign to mobilise Hindu feelings against an alleged crime committed a few hundred years ago. Babar, the first Mughal Emperor in the 16th century, was accused of having destroyed a temple in Ayodhya, where the God-King Ram was meant to have been born, and replaced it with a mosque. The campaign was marked by several deadly acts of violence against Muslims. Mobs organized by the RSS invaded the mosque and planted saffron flags on its dome. Egged on by the lack of reprisals, the mosque was demolished in full view of TV cameras two years later. More than 400 people were killed and Advani had to resign. But, as Vennaik points out, ‘It was now widely accepted that ‘Hindu sentiment’ expressed the will of the majority and must be heeded’ (2001:43).

The culpability of the state in facilitating violence against minorities was seen on many occasions. In the 1982 communal violence in Meerut the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) was implicated in the deaths of 29 people, with the PAC taking a more direct role in the Moradabad clashes with Muslims in the 1980s. The state’s resources were mobilized in anti-Sikh campaigns in the early 1980s, especially in its efforts to counter demands for Punjab to secede from India. Indira Gandhi’s assassination by her Sikh bodyguards ensured the Congress (I) enjoyed a wave of Hindu support and was returned with a record number of seats in the 1984 elections, with the BJP going back to just two seats. The Gujrat massacre of 2002, conclude Upadhyay and Robinson in their survey, ‘remains a defining moment for any understanding of communal violence and minorities in contemporary India’ (2012:54).

The BJP’s rhetoric, and especially its close connection with the RSS, saw its electoral fortunes rise over the past three decades. In 1984 it had two seats in parliament; in 1989 thanks in large measure to the Bofors arms scandal involving Rajiv Gandhi this had risen to 85 seats. Despite the sympathy wave on the back of Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination which brought Congress back in power in 1991, BJP became the main opposition with 120 seats. It led a short-lived minority government in 1996 and led a minority government in 1998 as part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). But the 1999 elections saw it take 182 seats with the NDA overall gaining 296 seats. Desai describes the NDA as the alliance of the propertied classes represented through the regional parties and has written of BJP making liberal use of ‘Hindutva’s intimidating and manipulative practices in the tribal belt’ (2004:57).
While the BJP, due to the fallout from the Gujrat massacre and its own corruption scandals, ended up with only 138 seats, Desai saw the Congress victory of 2004 as entwining the party in the Hindutva narrative. She points out that a close reading of the election figures of Gujrat show this. While the Congress was able to get 12 seats, compared to a previous 5 seats, it was due to Congress taking a ‘soft saffron’ line and not making the violence of 2002 an issue (2004:60).

The 2009 election was remarkable not only for Congress coming back into power largely due to the support gained from the Left. It was all the more noteworthy given the rising rhetoric of corruption and economic mismanagement aimed against the INC. In this climate Anna Hazare emerged. Described as an RSS-linked ‘Gandhian’ he led a largely middle-class anti-corruption movement which morphed after his resignation into the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). ‘Though most believed that AAP would take votes away from Congress, it was always more likely to take votes away from the BJP with whom it shared its constituency. This was chiefly why Hazare did not wish to turn the movement into a party’ according to Desai (2014:56-57).

In the 2014 elections, BJP was able to garner 31% of the popular votes, earning it 52% of the seats, that is 282 out of 543 members of the Lok Sabha. Chhibber and Verma argues that this was made possible by the ‘in addition to energising its traditional base of social conservatives, the BJP built this coalition by mobilising voters who favour less state intervention in the economy. The fact that social conservatives voted for the BJP is nothing new. Social conservatives, many of whom are upper caste, have always supported the BJP... What is new in this election is that the BJP managed to draw into its coalition those who would like the state to minimise its role in the economy by both reducing subsidies and business regulations’.

To date, it was always assumed that Congress could attract the marginalized groupings. However, according to Palshikar the 2014 elections showed ‘the Congress’s relatively strong base among the Scheduled Castes (SCs) has finally crumbled’ (2014:60). It did manage to hold in to its position with the other minorities with about six of every 10 Congress voters coming from the SC or Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Sikh or Christian groups, while these social groups account for only about three in every 10 BJP voters.
Another problem for the UPA, which is the Congress-led alliance, according to Chhibber and Verma (2014:50) is that opinion pools show ‘there has been a clear shift in the ideological middle ground of Indian politics…Compared to previous elections, recent data indicate that a sizeable chunk of voters have emerged as rightward leaning on economic issues’. The UPA contributed to this ‘at least in part because of the administrative failures’ of its government. ‘While the UPA government introduced several schemes that could potentially benefit a large segment of India’s population, the corruption and inefficiency with which it did so limited the electoral gains that the UPA could draw from these schemes’.

What does this mean for the future of secularism? Palshikar points out that ‘BJP has been able to both forge a political consciousness among the Hindus as Hindus and also extend that consciousness to large sections of the SC and ST communities. In contrast, the Congress has failed to transform the SC-ST-Muslim communities into a conscious political community’. Desai argued in 2004, and reiterated this view after the 2014 elections, that given the BJP’s ability to attract the upper caste and later the middle caste echelons of society ‘shouldn’t Congress then take the next logical step and become the authentic party – politically and programmatically – of the poor and the minorities: to rally the constituencies of the left as a counter to the BJP’s successful organization of the Right?’ (2004:51).

Desai had pointed out that the periods of the BJP in power has seen the increased ‘‘saffronisation’ of state and civil society (Desai, 2004:49). Some of these practices were already in place from the time of independence eg the naming of tanks and missiles after Hindu gods and symbols. But the BJP took that step further, installing personnel of the RSS/BJP in leading institutions of government, media, education and society generally. The Hindu hymn ‘Vande Matram’ was promoted to enjoy equal status with the national anthem.

In her analysis of the 2014 elections Desai wrote: ‘Modi’s BJP – now being referred to as Hindutva 2.0 – is at once newer, more exceptional (in resorting to exceptional forms of rule such as non-state violence) and more autonomous (from the bourgeoisie) in the sense of being closer to the RSS’ (2014:48). She said that the BJP will now be able to follow Hindutva’s core agenda: ‘a uniform civil code attacking the country’s Muslim minority, abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution giving special
status to the Union’s only Muslim majority state, and construction of a Ram temple at the site still disputed by Muslims’ (2014:49).

3.3 CONCLUSION

The cases of Arab and Indian nationalism have been used as cases of postcolonial nation states. The advantage of this characterisation has been to locate the source of sovereign power wielded by contemporary states in relation to their colonial pasts and the post-independence inheritances.

In the case of the Arab world we have to contend with the impact of the Ottoman Empire as well as the response of the nascent Arab nationalists to Western Enlightenment and European colonialism. The late period and eventual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire saw the emergence of an Arab literary renaissance, while European colonialism, despite being of varied forms, did have the impact of carving up the region in the aftermath of World War I.

The beginning of the twentieth century thus saw the emergence of Arab states which were responding to a European Other, embodied especially in the form of the state of Israel amongst them, occupying what they regarded as Arab territory. This, coupled with the selective mobilisation of history, Islam, and features of Arab society led to the particular forms of Arab nationalism – at times focused narrowly on the local state, and at times in specific countries, infused with pan-Arab ideals. This fusion of state and national identity was made possible by the specific forms of nationalism prevailing. Importantly, it shaped the relationship between secular nationalists and Islamists.

Despite all the differences between India and the Arab world – it was colonised largely by one colonial power, the British; many of its pre-colonial state structures persisted alongside those created by the colonial power; the country was characterised by a myriad of languages and dialects, customs and traditions as well as several religions, there are many features common to both cases. Just as Arab nationalism was challenged by many rivals for loyalty, so too India has struggled to weld a national identity in the midst of many rival local, regional identities. The emergence of a sovereign state in both cases has also been a long struggle. The Arab state has to still contend with the Islamist perspective that sovereignty lies with a supreme being, while India’s sovereignty continues being challenged by the proliferation of local states
demanding more and more power. Also, both cases highlight the need to acknowledge alternative, previously subjugated standpoints: in the case of Arab nationalism, the importance of Islam to the majority of their citizens as well as those who have been impoverished and marginalised as their states followed neo-liberal policies; in the case of India, the need to draw followers of Islam and other faiths into the mainstream of the Indian nationalist narrative.

The previous two chapters help yield a framework which the South African case shall be explored in greater detail. The key elements of this framework are:

• That of the emergence of the sovereign state, with its attendant elements of citizenship and civil society. The thesis has followed Hinsley (1966: 26), that 'the idea of sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community… and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere'. As in the case of India, South Africa has had to contend with a plethora of state formations as a result of the precolonial legacy, the impact of colonialism and the post-independence contestation between the centre and regional states. As with Arab countries such as Egypt, South Africa has had to contend with various roles played by the citizenry. This has included the denial of agency to large parts of the people during long periods of repression to moments of open, democratic expression. Just as importantly, ‘institutions such as the pass laws, the relocation townships, and the fabrication of the Bantustans not only negatively violated people’s freedoms, but they also interrupted the possibility of a public’.

• That of national identity, especially in terms of its content be it ethnically, ‘tribally’ or racially derived. The emergence of an ‘Arab ethnos’, based on language and geographical location, as well as an acknowledgement of the presence of Islam, has provided a strong base for an Arab identity in the region concerned. However, differences at a national level including disputes over borders such as the case of Syria, Iraq and Lebanon or the presence of differing Islamic sects have served to shape national identity at that level. A key element that South Africa and India share in the definition of their national identity is the way in which their territories were carved out from their neighbours as well as the various struggles that shaped which territories remained under India or South Africa. Despite the differences in their sizes, both
countries share a vast array of ethnicities and languages, which have impacted on the very way in which state sovereignty came to be defined.

- That of nationalism, which the thesis following Breuilly has treated as an enterprise fashioned by political entrepreneurs. Encouraged by Smith’s suggestions that ‘In reality, few modern national states possess only one form of nationalism’ (1999:212) the thesis has looked at how differing nationalisms have impacted on national identity and state sovereignty. Arab nationalism has also been largely a tale of two nationalisms: the secular, which Nasserism and Ba’athism are the best exemplars of, and Islamism, which the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt is the best example of. In the case of India also there have been two distinct patterns of nationalism. Hindutva nationalism has taken on a particularly primordialist, chauvinistic hue vis a vis non-Hindu parts of the Indian people, and has of late come to challenge the secular Indian nationalism which prevailed since independence in 1947. As discussed in the section on Indian nationalism, part of the problem was the inability of the secularists to acknowledge the impact of Hinduism on the national psyche. In a similar vein in the South African context, Steyn (2001:xxxi - xxxii) alerts us to the efforts of ‘South Africans …intent on dissociating the country from its racialized legacy’ leading to the ‘mould of liberal colour blindness…If we prematurely banish it (race) from our analytical framework, we serve the narrow interests of those previously advantaged’.
Chapter Four: The ‘native question’ versus the national question

In this treatment of the South African case I will be looking at Afrikaner and African nationalism, following the three axes of sovereignty, identity and nationalism established in the previous chapter. The focus on Afrikaner and African nationalisms has been deliberate because these have been the dominant narratives which other ideologies have impacted on or had to respond to. So the Marxist approach to nationalism and ethnic-based movements within the coloured and Indian communities, as well as in different African communities, shall be examined in relation to the two dominant narratives.

In doing so the thesis I will be highlighting the position of the subaltern not only historically but also in terms of the contemporary debates around the South African nation-state. The works of several Marxists writing on South Africa such as Clifton Crais, Govan Mbeki, Colin Bundy, Shula Marks, and Philip Bonner has served to highlight the role of the South African peasantry during the emergence of the otherwise urban-centric African nationalism narrative. In this sense they shared the concerns of the subaltern studies group of south Asia. ‘Who is the subaltern today?’ shall be a question the thesis shall answer in the concluding chapter, when it sets out how the contemporary South African nation-state should be viewed.

The South African case is structured along the following sections:

- The first section dealing with what is referred to as the ‘native question’, where I argue that the primary concern of the emerging Afrikaner nationalism was how to deal with the African population, whose land they were invading and occupying. The historical sweep covers developments from the 19th and 20th centuries leading to the process of negotiations of the 1990s.

- The second section, titled The National Question: Emergence of African Nationalism, where I look at the response of the African population, which saw its ultimate liberation from colonialism and then apartheid through the achievement of unity of the colonized people.
This covers the same period, so that the next section can look at developments impacting white and black people under specific themes.

- The third section, titled ‘Free at last!’ examines firstly, the differing positions taken during the negotiations in relation to issues around identity and sovereignty, the attempts at forging a national identity while consolidating a sovereign democratic state, and the impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on these issues.

In the Chapter titled Faultlines of the Twenty First Century, I focus on the debates since the 1994 democratic elections. I begin by looking at two key developments impacting Afrikaner identity and which are emblematic of the broader societal concerns: *Die Taaldebate* (the language debate) of the University of Stellenbosch where the issue of the language of instruction in tertiary education was hotly debated, and the cultural/intellectual streams which have emerged since the 1994 elections where whites generally and Afrikaners in particular have been trying to carve out a place for themselves in the South Africa of the 21st century. That chapter shall then look at contemporary manifestations of African nationalism. It shall especially look at debates within the ANC on the national question and then focus on how race and ethnicity continue to impact on the evolution of a South African national identity.

The three axes established in the previous two chapters shall underpin both these chapters:

- The state sovereignty axis. While the thesis will not be looking at the precolonial state formations in great detail, it shall take as its starting point the variety of chiefdoms and kingdoms which existed at the time of the colonial encounter. It does not intend romanticizing the past but insists on the acknowledgement of a level of social organization and economic development which was in place before the colonials arrived at different times in different parts of the country, with some of the social organisation persisting well into the 21st century. Even in 2016 the central South African state is grappling with issues of local and regional centres of power emanating from formations which have been
in existence for many centuries but which were re-shaped by colonial rule. In tracing these historical developments as prelude to the present, the thesis will also engage with the two concepts which have been recognized as sovereignty’s attendant elements: citizenship and civil society. In the first section dealing with the ‘native question’, the chapter will be looking at the evolution of the state, leading to the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the proclamation of the Republic of South Africa in 1961 and then the formation of a democratic South Africa marked by the April 1994 elections and the adoption of a new constitution in May 1996. This shall serve as backdrop to the discussion on how white Afrikaners view the state since then in terms of assertion of their citizenship and agency. The section titled the ‘national question’ shall discuss the torturous path that Africans went through to be acknowledged as citizens, the measures used to deprive them voice and agency and how this was finally secured in the defeat of apartheid. It shall pay attention to developments leading to the creation of the ANC in 1912 and the subsequent various strands of thinking which emerged amongst the opponents to colonialism and apartheid such as non-racialism, pan-Africanism and black consciousness.

- The national identity axis. The section titled the ‘native question’ shall detail how the ethnic core of Afrikaner identity came to construct itself into a broader racial construct, and at times even a cross-racial one especially as a result of emphasis on ‘Western values’, ‘civilisation’ and ‘anti-communism’. It was thus able to accommodate elements of coloured, Indian and African communities in this narrative. The ‘national question’ section shall look at a similar process in the development of a broad African identity which, while rooted in ‘tribalism’ and ethnicity, was able to craft a national identity which came to be hegemonic through most of the country, expressed through the principles of non-racialism. Of particular interest in the current context would be the manner in which the sub-national identities articulated with the national and even with supra-national ones such as that of pan-Africanism. Both discussions shall help appreciate the contemporary debates on ethnicity, language, race and the role of religion.
• The nationalism axis which the thesis has treated as an enterprise fashioned by political entrepreneurs. The discussion on Afrikaner nationalism in the ‘native question’ examines the differences which existed between the various nationalist leaders and the impact of their perspectives on the politics of the day. The ‘national question’ section shall look at the various nationalisms under the rubric of African nationalism – narrow, almost chauvinistic and hinting at a racial basis compared to those expressed in the broadest sense of encompassing all those who self-identified as Africans. Hence this chapter will look at the various tendencies within the ANC, as well those within the PAC and the proponents of the Black Consciousness Movement. Here the impact of other approaches to nationalism such as that of the Marxists shall be looked at in relation to their interaction with the African nationalist narratives.

4.1 The ‘native question’: the interplay of race and ethnicity in Afrikaner nationalism

This section examines the genesis of Afrikaner nationalism from the colonial period to its contemporary manifestations including debates around national identity and sovereignty during the process of constitutional hearings, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the first two decades of democratic South Africa. It shall be argued that the emergence of an Afrikaner nationalist identity was not guaranteed – having tenuous roots in an amalgam of languages in the context of hostilities of other white groupings. Also, given the class stratification of the nascent Afrikaner community it took assiduous efforts by political entrepreneurs to craft an ideology around which the identity cohered. When looking at contemporary manifestations, it shall be argued that in the twenty first century the major part of the white Afrikaner community displays contradictory impulses – locating itself globally, while locally becoming more inwardly focussed in relation to the rest of South African society.

This section will also look at how, from what was originally a narrow ethnic, charismatic movement before 1948, Afrikaner nationalism came to represent the interests of the majority of whites in South Africa. This shall serve as a
backdrop to the debates on identity amongst whites in the post-1990 period. This thesis argues that a white South African identity has come to be redefined in the democratic period, an identity which finds expression not in ethnic or race terms but in class terms. It has been a long journey from the purely racist/ethnic ideologies of the past to become cast in less obvious terms but it has served to draw into its fold larger and larger numbers of Indian, Coloured and even some parts of the African people. But this alignment is not always a comfortable one as shown by some parts of the white communities resorting to primordial sentiments of race or ethnicity or linguistic identification.

It shall be argued in this section on Afrikaner nationalism that the central question the white regimes in South Africa – whether they were Boer, British or Afrikaner – were obsessed with was the ‘Native Question’ in its various forms. Adam Ashforth describes it well when he writes: ‘The ‘Native Question’ was the intellectual domain in which the knowledge, strategies, policies, and justifications necessary to the maintenance of domination were fashioned’.

As far back as in the 1940s, the Fagan Commission of 1946-1948 noted that there were three approaches to the ‘Native Question’: that of total segregation favoured by those of a racist bent; that of ‘no racial discrimination in law and administration’; and the Middle Road favoured by ‘conservative democrats’ like Fagan himself, which accepts that ‘Europeans’ and ‘Natives’ ‘will continue to exist permanently side-by-side and therefore must be recognised as permanent’ (p8, Fagan Commission Report). This is a reasonably accurate summation of the views which had been expressed up to that point and the debates which continued well into the 1990s.

This section begins with looking at how the ‘Native Question’ was defined at various moments and how it impacted on identity, the consolidation of sovereignty of the state and the expression of citizenship. Broadly Afrikaner nationalism can be seen in ethno-symbolist or in constructed terms reflecting respectively the approaches of Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner discussed in Chapter Two. The former approach is best explained by Giliomee who had argued that the early economic and later political developments met ‘diverse
psychological needs’ of the Afrikaners. Gilliomee, with Adam (1979:154)), argued that ‘There seems to have been a sincerely held conviction...that only through a combination of ethnic mobilisation and volkskapitalism could the position of the poor be fundamentally altered’.

The constructed perspective is typified by O’ Meara who argued that economic entrepreneurs, especially drawn from the embryonic financial and commercial capital sectors, played a leading role in crafting a nationalist project of economic empowerment. Supporting this approach, van der Westhuizen (2007:4) has suggested that ‘The class dimension of apartheid, almost never discussed in popular Afrikaans discourses, is generally obscured by terms such as verligte and verkrampte, or die regses (the right-wingers).’ Self-determination of the volk through the capture of political power was the key aim of the mobilisation engaged in. According to her the following elements came to shape this self-identity: language, resulting in the standardisation of Afrikaans; ‘A deeply conservative variant of Calvinist religion’; ‘a mythologised history that turned the Afrikaners into ‘God’s chosen people’; racism, resulting in fears of swart oorstroming (black swamping) and gelykstelling (equalisation); and a ‘gender hierarchy aimed at protecting racial ‘purity’ through a strictly circumscribed role for Afrikaner women’ (2007:11).

Reacting to the real experience of discrimination and humiliation by the English colonial powers and capitalist class, early Afrikaner identity exhibited elements of anti-colonialism and in its initial phase anti-capitalism. However, by the early 1900s this nascent ideology came to be captured by an emerging Afrikaner capitalist class which worked in uniting the community behind its objectives, while ensuring its economic upliftment.

In a similar vein Davies has argued that language was not the only determining factor in shaping the identity of the Afrikaners. ‘Whilst Afrikaans speakers exhibit a wide range of identifications not all are connected to an ethnic, language or even racial heritage’ (2009:7). She points out that there were distinct stages in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, namely ‘group consciousness, the consciousness of being a volk, and national consciousness’
She thus suggests that Afrikaner identity should be seen at three levels: the ascriptive which has all those who use Afrikaans as the mother tongue; an auxiliary ascriptive sense which indicated all whites that indicate Afrikaans as their mother tongue; and a more circumscribed, self-identity which indicates a cultural homogeneity centred around the Afrikaans language and a sense of being a political minority in South Africa. Therefore, potentially, the Afrikaans speaking coloured people could be included in the first category; the second category consisting of white Afrikaans speakers, which excludes Coloureds but who see themselves as part of the wider South African nation, whereas the third category is seen as retreating into spatial enclaves such as Orania or social enclaves where they push for example for separate educational facilities or churches.

Steyn has inserted a critical race approach into the discourse on white Afrikaner identity. This approach emerged especially during the 1980s and 1990s, and according to Fishkin, whom she cites, have ‘put the construction of ‘whiteness’ on the table to be investigated, analysed, punctured, and probed’ and brought it to ‘centre stage as the site where power and privilege converged and conspired to sabotage ideals of justice, equality and democracy’ (Fishkin, SF. 1995. ‘Interrogating whiteness, complicating blackness: Remapping American culture.’ American Quarterly, Vol 47 No 3, 428-466).

Adopting the approach of seeing the Afrikaner as a multi-layered and multifaceted one, the next section will look at its genesis and development up to the 1990s.

4.1.1 Genesis of Afrikaner Identity

Drawing on Davenport (1966), Kriel (2010:402) has argued that ‘The first modern political party in South Africa, the Afrikanerbond (League of Afrikaners), was established in 1880 by a man commonly regarded as ‘the first Afrikaans
nationalist’ that is) S. J. du Toit. However, neither he nor the founding father of the National Party (NP), JBM Hertzog, was an Afrikaner nationalist in the ethnic/linguistic exclusive sense of the word (even though both were white supremacists’).

The emergence of this form of ethnic nationalism is examined alongside the process around state sovereignty, especially in the light of the myriad traditional, colonial and oppositional centres of power which existed at different stages of this period. In doing so, the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 is seen as the epitome of a process which consolidated the state into a single entity, albeit granting citizenship only to certain categories of people.

The tension created by the exclusion of vast parts of the citizenry on the basis of race from the body politic of the country is exemplified by the opposition to the apartheid state. These tensions were further exacerbated by the creation of ‘fake sovereignties’ through the Bantustan system – a qualified sovereignty since the bantustans remained dependent on the ‘metropole’ in Pretoria and never became the single source of authority for the territory or people supposed to fall under their sway. The democratic elections of 1994 and the subsequent adoption of the new Constitution of South Africa in 1996 represented the apogee of sovereignty of the South African state, as well as the clearest and widest definition of citizenship and the relationship between the citizenry and the state.

4.1.2 The Colonial Encounter

The history of colonialism is normally located from the 6 April 1652 arrival of three Dutch ships under the command of Jan van Riebeeck. This led to centuries long conflict between indigenous and colonial settler societies as well as various processes of movement, division and integration. Amongst the first casualties of the colonial encounter was the Khoi and the San who succumbed to colonial pressures to convert to Christianity due to its own internal social structures weakening. This, in turn, was due to to a number of factors including the pressure of European demands for their labour and land, and the impact of
a small pox epidemic in 1713. Greenstein points out that ‘By the beginning of the nineteenth century the eastern Khoisan had been transformed from external clients and enemies into an internal segment of colonial society’ (1995:103). There could be no more graphic embodiment of this than the establishment of the ‘Hottentot Corps’ or the Cape Regiment in 1793, which played a supportive role to the settlers and colonial troops.

A further demographic development over the next century was the emergence of the free burghers. Duvenage points out that ‘Within the closed culture of the VOC (ie the Dutch East Indian Company), initially the Dutch at the Cape were colonists bounded by a regime of profit and loss. But when they became free burghers and began to call themselves Afrikaners, a qualitatively different relationship started to develop between them and the land: the company was no longer their beginning and their end. From that moment, a tension started to build between their European past, and their African future’ (2014:76).

The free burghers engaged in two types of agricultural activities: food production to meet the requirements of the DEIC and for export, making extensive use of especially imported slave labour, while another group engaged in cattle production with limited agriculture, using Khoisan labour. This category is referred to as the settlers, distinguished from the DEIC and its officials. Those who could not afford to set up enterprises in the Cape moved into the ‘free’ land of the interior thus referred to as trekboers who resorted very easily to military power to take over the land as they desired.

In the 1760s onwards the trekboers encountered, in the eastern Cape, settled and relatively well organised African peoples. The relations between the arriving settlers and the African farmers had been based on how the latter had treated until then all other peoples they had encountered, such as the Khoisan. The settlers were not willing to be integrated into a common society as the Khoisan had, thus opening up an arena of conflict, referred to as the frontier zone. This was particularly centred around Zuurveld, just outside the newly established colonial district of Graaf-Reinet. The line at which this frontier was defined kept shifting over the next century, ever more easterly and later northerly, with
increasing encroachment on the land of the settled African communities. In fact, Legassick has shown that the notion of frontier usually referred to a zone of conflict and interaction. In his he questioned ‘the fact of white supremacy’. Legassick points out the existence of non-white autonomous communities with political power ‘in the frontier’, revealing the cultural intersections and the transfers that occur in ‘a frontier zone’ (2010:2).

By the late 1700s, a ‘greater cultural and political self-consciousness developed… among Afrikaners’ (Duvenage, 2014:77). Religion became an important part of this consciousness, especially Dutch Calvinism. Fredrickson argues that it would be ‘misleading to describe this faith as Calvinistic’ in the form of American puritanism. The Boers belief was non-evangelizing, and their Reform Protestantism which emerged ‘was partly an outgrowth of frontier life. …(B)eyond the reach of congregations, the Boers did most of their worshipping within the patriarchal family. Their only guide was the Bible itself, which they readily interpreted in the light of their own experience as a pastoral people wandering among the ‘heathen’ (1981:170).

Also, ‘a strong racial consciousness developed amongst Afrikaners…They saw themselves as both white and Christian – qualities they considered to be both different and superior to other racial groups living in the Cape’ (Duvenage, 2014:77). Or as Frederickson put it: ‘It was no giant step from such beliefs to the notion that the Boers were a chosen people, analogous to the ancient Israelites, who had a special and exclusive relationship with God and mandate to smite the heathen’ (1981:171)

Duvenage describes this as the ‘basic dilemma of Afrikaners’: ‘Afrikaner group formation took place vis-à-vis a distant white colonial higher class ‘them’ and a proximate non-white indigenous, lower class ‘them’. This dualism made for an ambiguous form of group identity that has manifested itself in a moral – say, anti-colonial form; as well as an immoral racist form’ (my emphasis, 2014:78).

While Duvenage is trying to address the origins of Afrikaner identity in a nuanced way, he falls into the same path trodden by nationalist historians such
as Hermann Giliomee, who seek to trace the ‘history’ of their respective nations as far back as possible. Giliomee bases his claim inter alia on observations of visitors to the Cape at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. But the accounts of the travellers of yore cannot be taken as entirely reliable. For example as Fritz Ponelis (1998:19) points out by the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth century the best part of the burgher population was sparsely distributed over a vast territory, stymying the development of social structures and institutions which could help create a collective identity. This goes to the essence of the modernist versus ethno-symbolist debate: are nations ancient ethnic entities, modern political constructs or something in between? Applied to the case at hand, the question is: which came first – Afrikaners or Afrikaner nationalism? The approach I take is that enunciated by Marx (1998:91): the notion Afrikaner ‘became infused with ethnicity only from about 1870’.

Afrikaans emerged from a mixture of Dutch with the various languages spoken in the Cape Colony – especially Malay and Portuguese (due to the slaves being imported from the Dutch colony of Indonesia and Portuguese colony of Mozambique), Khoisan, and a sprinkling of French with the arrival of the French Huguenots in 1688. This syncretic development of the language was due to the close contact between the slaves and their masters in the latter’s domestic environment. This is different from the slavery of other societies where slaves were used in large plantations and kept in completely different quarters. This intimacy was facilitated by many of the slaves embracing Christianity, apart from the Malays who constituted a visible, Muslim group. Greenstein comments that ‘Significantly, language and religion, two important cultural elements common to the majority of coloured people, were also shared by the majority of the settlers, hence the common reference to coloureds as “brown Afrikaners”’ (1995:107).

The rule of the DEIC in the Cape ended in 1795 and by 1806 the British Administration was being established. Several important decrees helped shape the future demographics, economy and politics of the Cape. For example, Ordinance 49 issued in 1828 allowed for the temporary employment of African
labour. Ordinance 50 of 1828 reversed the stipulations of the 1806 Hottentot Code, and decreed a charter of equal civil rights for all, including Khoisan and former slaves, allowing for Khoisans to hold legal title and did away with the carrying of the passes. In 1834 the imperial authorities proclaimed the emancipation of the slaves. This was especially in response to the anti-slavery movement of British abolitionists such as William Wilberforce. These moves were aimed at encouraging Khoi and San labour but was also the product of the spirit of liberalism which was passing through the Cape, a liberalism which was against legal discrimination but which overlooked social inequalities.

Andre du Toit (2005:423) writes about the significance of this 1834 moment as follows: ‘In two fell swoops the former slave society at the Cape acquired a new Constitution based on equality before the law, equal freedom of movement, and the principles of free wage labour. In the colonial context this amounted to a political transition comparable to that from the apartheid order and white minority rule with the introduction of the new Constitution and its Chapter of Fundamental Rights in the ‘New South Africa’ of the 1990s’. Significant as the 1834 moment may have been subsequent developments show that black people were still kept in subordinate positions politically and ruthlessly exploited economically.

The abolition of slavery did have a direct impact on the Boers who had already gone into the hinterland of the Cape, who were dependent on this source of cheap labour. Also, the settlers who had established various enterprises in the Cape were no longer enjoying the access to power they had during the period of the Company’s rule. The cumulative effect of all these developments was the Great Trek of disaffected Boers leaving for the interiors from 1836. Steyn writes that ‘This was the beginning of the development of a ‘tribal’ identity of Afrikaner Christian nationalism, which was inextricably connected with their particular expression of ‘whiteness’…Afrikaner ‘freedom’ came to be understood as freedom to exercise racial hegemony. The right to be ‘white’ was yoked to the rightlessness of ‘non-whites” (2001:33). Those who did not embark on the Great Trek remained in the Cape ‘as loyal British subjects for most of the nineteenth century without surrendering their church or their Dutch-Afrikaans
language – the two pillars of a culture-in-the-making’ (Duvenage, 2014:79). How this laid the basis for an Afrikaner identity is discussed in detail below.

Despite the liberals contributing to the abolition of slavery by 1834, measures were put into place to tie the farm workers to the land. This included the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1841 and Masters and Servants Act of 1856. British rule proved to be more aggressive than that of the Dutch, especially with the expansion of settlers into what came to be known as the Orange Free State, Transvaal and Natal. In the eastern part of the Cape, the encounters with the Xhosa people resulted in several major battles, referred to as the Frontier Wars. Lasting almost 100 years from 1779 to 1879 and consisting of nine separate incidents/battles it saw the ever eastern movement of the frontier. The thesis will not go into the details of these wars except to note that it involved a shifting set of alliances between the Khoi, the British, the settlers, and the Mfengus (refuges from the Mfecane wars in Natal, discussed under African nationalism).

The different colonial approaches played an important role in shaping the politics of the subjugated. The 1853 Constitution of the Cape Colony, for example, allowed a qualified non-racial franchise, and became ‘widely recognized as a model for participation by colonized people in multi-racial societies…this was one area where post-abolitionist and humanitarian sentiment combined momentarily with British national interest to deliver something ahead of its time in the colonial world’ (Odendaal, 2012:20-21). Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir George Grey, pushed for acculturation of especially of those coming from families of the traditional leaders through the provision of education, hospitals, infrastructure and land grants. A paternalistic approach motivated the government, who saw Africans as suppliers of labour and a market for their goods.

On the other hand, the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State Sovereignty were established as a result of the Great Trek, with racial exclusion built in. Frederickson highlights that the Constitution of the latter republic ‘guaranteed the freedom of the press and did not preclude women from voting, but excluded the Griquas from citizenship (1981). Van Der Westhuizen points
out that by the mid-1800s ‘little affinity existed between the Dutch/Afrikaans speakers in the British-ruled Cape Colony and those of the two independent Boer republics’ with the former having become ‘assimilated into the English-speaking white community’ (2007:13). This antipathy of the Boer republics towards the British colonialists was consolidated in the aftermath of the failed Jameson Raid of 1895/96, instigated by Cecil John Rhodes and aimed at a take-over of the Boer republic based around Pretoria. It came to provide the term ‘Afrikaner’ with anti-British and anti-imperialistic undertones (Davies, 2009:22). The aftermath of the Jameson Raid and the South African War of 1899 to 1902 is discussed in greater in Section 4.1.5.

4.1.3 Consolidation of Afrikaans and Afrikaner identity

Drawing on Hofmeyer (1987, 1988), Kriel traces the evolution of the language to an invitation extended by the British and Foreign Bible Society to SJ do Toit to publish the Bible in Afrikaans. Davids (1992) has been critical in signalling the debt owed by Afrikaans to the Arabic used by the Cape Muslims. Kriel notes that Afrikaans actually ‘lacked a written tradition in the Roman alphabet. Although this fact has long been ignored in Afrikaner nationalist historiography, it was the Cape Muslims who first devised an orthography for the Dutch/Afrikaans they spoke by employing Arabic script’ (2010:420).

The meeting Du Toit called up in August 1875 in Paarl led to the formation of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaanders (GRA). Those assembled at the meeting resolved that instead of making the translation of the Bible the priority, they should standardise the language (2010:403). However, by the 1890s, efforts to promote Afrikaans seemed to have fizzled out as Giliomee (2004: 29) reports: the Dutch- or Afrikaans-speaking Cape elite preferred Dutch as the language of their church and newspapers, and used English in the letters and diaries they wrote. Afrikaans, observers believed, was on its way out. CS van der Waal (2012) argues that the creolized version, which coloureds in the Cape had begun using, nevertheless survived. He notes that today: ‘The standard form of Afrikaans, spoken by whites and middle-class coloureds, differs in important ways from the vernacular, mainly unwritten language (known as
Kaaps) of the working-class coloured population, especially in South Africa’s Northern and Western Cape regions’ (2012: 460).

However, it was not long before developments provided a new lease of life for Afrikaans as spoken by whites. Kriel points out that in the aftermath of the South African War (Anglo-Boer War) the anglicisation programme of Lord Alfred Milner was implemented with gusto. ‘Anglicisation contributed to the shaping of a distinct identity among Afrikaners and provided the catalyst for the development of the so-called Second Afrikaans Language Movement’ (Kriel, 2010:407). The process of standardising Afrikaans and differentiating it from that of the language of the coloureds is reflective of the debates which would occur over the next century on the relations between white Afrikaner and coloureds: ‘While some leading Afrikaans authors were in favour of a racially inclusive Afrikaans-speaking community, the dominant trend in the politics of Afrikaner nationalism was to separate whites and coloureds from each other’ (van der Waal, 2012:450). This shall be revisited on the debate about the coloured voters roll as well as the NPs strategy in the lead up to the first democratic elections.

Kriel lists the following individuals as major contributors to the nascent movement: du Toit and Hertzog as founders of nationalist parties; C. J. Langenhoven as author and journalist, and as the politician who in 1914 successfully proposed that Afrikaans replace Dutch as the medium of instruction in primary schools; D. F. Malan as newspaper editor and as the cabinet minister who saw the official recognition of Afrikaans through in 1925; Eugene Marais as poet and journalist; and Gustav S. Preller as the ‘historian’ and filmmaker ‘who did more than anyone else to popularise the Afrikaner myth’ of the Great Trek (2010:408). According to Kriel, ‘The commemoration of the Trek in 1938, which marked the mass spread of national consciousness among Afrikaners, culminated in the erection of the Voortrekker Monument’ (2010: 408).

The creation of the Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns (Academy for Science and Arts) in 1909, the secret Afrikanerbroederbond in 1918 and the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK) as its major front organisation in 1929. The flame was (still is) the FAK’s symbol - the standardisation of Afrikaans was
celebrated in the Taalfees (Language Festival) of 1959 with the image of a fire as the visual symbol of the ‘miracle’ language. This celebration would be continued for many decades with, for example, in 1975 a monument to the Afrikaans language being created in Paarl to celebrate the centenary of the establishment of the GRA. The NP government declared 1975 the Year of the Language.

The early Afrikaners were quite catholic in their political strategies - on many occasions the trekkers considered or engaged in alliances with indigenous leaders against the British, as was the case of Voortrekker leader Louis Trichardt who leased land from the Xhosas when he was rebuffed by the colonials. Africans themselves were not averse to such strategies and joined forces with indigenous groups in their internal battles or against fellow Africans or to prevent encroachment from the British settlers. This resulted in entities such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, which had the status of British protectorates until the 1960s. Greenstein observes that ‘Loss of nominal independence was sometimes the price paid for greater security of land and eventual independence’ (1995:111). These shifts in alliances amongst Africans is discussed in greater detail in the section on African nationalism.

4.1.4 From agriculture to mining to manufacturing

The discovery of diamonds in 1867 in Kimberley and that of gold in 1886 served to transform the political economy of the southern African region irrevocably. The industry came to be dominated by De Beers Consolidated Mines, which held monopolistic control over the production and trade of diamonds to the present day. Pass Laws, in the comprehensive sense they came to be known by in the following century, were first introduced in Kimberley in 1872. The fact that the mines paid more than any other sector at the time ensured that Kimberley became the magnet for labour from throughout southern Africa.

Increased mechanisation of the production process needed a more stable workforce, which only became possible through the compound system introduced in 1885. The diamond mines also became the first place where the
colour bar was wielded – effectively creating a white labour aristocracy who occupied the upper echelons of the production process while the black labour force toiled at the coalface. African farmers close to the mines met the food needs of the mining industry but this comparative advantage ‘facilitated the economic and political subordination of those same people, who faced the impact of colonial expansion immediately and directly’ (Greenstein, 1995:163). Thus white farmers were turning more and more to commercial farming, instead of the subsistence farming they had practiced until then, increasing the demand for land leading to greater appropriation of land – moves which were eventually legalised in the 1913 Land Act.

The gold mining industry wrought very similar changes to the South African Republic/Transvaal, but in a proportionately larger scale. Centred around Johannesburg by 1912 the industry’s labour force grew to ten times the size of the diamond industry. However, local African workers avoided the harsh conditions of the gold mines, preferring employment in the agriculture and burgeoning industrial and service sectors. The labour needs on the mines were thus so great that Chinese workers were imported in the tens of thousands, a practise which was halted and even reversed through repatriation by 1910. The mines continued drawing workers from the rest of southern Africa.

The Mines and Works Act of 1911, which effected the colour bar, was not universally welcome because it certified white workers who did not have the requisite skills. The Mining Department of Transvaal for example complained that there was ‘plentiful supply of all classes of whites for the mines, with the exception of first class miners, who are scarce’. The persistence of this colour bar speaks to the centrality of race in the type of capitalism which was emerging.

Various measures were enacted to expedite the movement of Africans off the land and into the workforce. For many decades officials decried the ease with which Africans could meet their needs through their efficient agricultural production. This became the target through measures such as the hut tax which limited the number of families living on, and thus off the produce of, a farm.
‘Squatting’, which was in effect a tenancy system which benefited large white-owned farms, was discouraged. Reaction to these incursions in the traditional forms of life took different forms. Beinart and Bundy (1987) pointed out that a rural Africanism emerged in the countryside – an ideology which drew on elements of ‘Christianity, which in its Ethiopian or separatist form stressed a common African identity, Garveyism, African nationalism and a defensive traditionalism’. This shall be explored in greater detail in the section dealing with African nationalism.

4.1.5 Sovereignty and Citizenship from 1860s to 1910

Just as the South African landscape was a patchwork of languages and groupings such as settlers, colonisers, slaves and indigenes so too was there a myriad of governance structures. On the colonial side there were two main forms – that which embodied British liberalism in the Cape, which allowed qualified franchise and that of indirect rule which Theophilus Shepstone, the Governor General of Natal espoused. The former sought to incorporate educated African people into the Cape’s body politic. The Glen Grey Act of 1894 was eventually to play a pivotal role in achieving that.

Promulgated by Cecil John Rhodes when he was PM, the Act had three aspects: breaking up the traditional communal system of land tenure and replacing it with individual allotments; giving the state the power to confiscate land if its not being utilised and, by imposing a tax on those males who did not own allotments and had not been employed outside the district for a specific period every year cresting a labour market; and creation of a system of district councils with limited powers through which Africans would be represented. The last measure was to serve as quid pro quo for having been removed off the voters roll through the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892.

Through it ‘The councils in the early twentieth century did not replace so much as offer a new outlet to traditional and hereditary authorities in the reserve areas…’Tribalism’ was no longer a menace, but a means of control’ (Beinart and Bundy, 1987:36). African response in the eastern Cape to this Act is discussed under African nationalism.
The Natal experience saw the imposition of the British administrative system over traditional, precolonial African social structures. Where Chiefs did not exist, as in the case of the movements away from centralised authority during the Mfecane, the colonial authorities did not hesitate in imposing their own Chiefs or attaching breakaways to existing Chieftains. The segregationist policies implemented in Natal became a staging post for the full blown discriminatory practise of the 20th century. Sir Theophilus Shepstone initiated the practise of locations for African people under ‘native law’, which was applied by the chiefs and headmen. There was no provision made for indigenous people or slaves in the governance of the Boer Republics, where Dutch/Afrikaans became the language of administration.

By the 1860s this patchwork had consolidated into four separate entities. The Cape and Natal controlled by the British, and the Orange Free State and Transvaal controlled by the Boers. However there also existed a plethora of other formations of both indigenous people, such as the kingdoms of the Zulu, the Sotho, and the Swazis, the chieftaincies of the Mpondo, Venda, Tswana and so forth as well as those established by mixed races in Griqualand East and West. Greenstein explains that ‘The interpenetration of colonial, settler and indigenous spheres of influence was based on the inability of parties to achieve a decisive victory over their political opponents’ (1995:114).

The openly and crudely racist policies of the Boers made them an easy target for the British imperialists, who used the argument that attitudes back home had turned squarely against slavery, which the Boer treatment of ‘Natives’ in the form of forced labour was akin to. Lord Alfred Milner had been appointed Governor of the Cape Colony in the aftermath of the failed Jameson Raid of 1895 and was responsible for reconstruction of South Africa after the South African War. The raid, which had been approved by Cecil John Rhodes, was a foolhardy attempt at wresting control of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republic from the Boers. The South African War, referred to as the Anglo Boer War, was pursued by Milner relentlessly. The brutal treatment of entire Boer families made this one of the founding elements of Afrikaner identity. His disdain was also applied
to the black majority, with Milner claiming that ‘The white man must rule, because he is elevated by many, many steps above the black man’.

As shall be shown under the section dealing with the National Question, Africans suffered hugely during the South African War. In the aftermath of the South African War, at the negotiations for the Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902, the decision of franchise for blacks was postponed until after the Transvaal and Free State republics were granted some of self-government. Black leadership at the time was disappointed by the compromises of the British, after they had been promised by Cecil John Rhodes, ‘equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi’.

Milner appointed the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC)\(^1\) which sat from 1903 to 1905 to look at the needs of mining capital for a steady supply of cheap labour. Ashforth argues that the various considerations of the time signalled that ‘a proletariat for South African industry not simply be found but had to be made’ (1990:25). Until the SANAC sat ‘missionaries were considered specially authorised to speak on the ‘Native Question’: that is, to speak of, for and to the ‘Natives’. Ashforth emphasises that SANAC represented a crucial turning point when this role of interlocutor came to be replaced by the Native Affairs Department.

In anticipation of the creation of a federation of British colonies, the SANAC was instructed by Milner’s government to look into the status and conditions of ‘the Natives’. The SANAC served as a major mobilising point of the nascent Congress movement, with many provincial leaders leading delegations to SANAC’s hearings. This is discussed in greater detail in the section on African nationalism.

\(^1\) Adam Ashforth writes of the ‘Grand Tradition’ of inquiries into the ‘Native Question’. He sees the following belonging to that tradition because they addressed the ‘Native Question’ ‘as a whole, seeking strategies for state power in periods when social, economic and political forces had forced a re-examination of the fundamental principles underlying state power’: the 1903/1905 SANAC; the 1930/1932 Native Economic Commission; the 1946/1948 Native Laws Commission (aka the Fagan Commission); the 1950/1954 Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the BANTU Areas within the Union of South Africa (aka the Tomlinson Commission); the 1977/1980 Manpower Utilisation Commission (aka the Riekert Commission) and the parallel Labour Legislation Commission (aka the Wiehahn Commission).
The SANAC had to find homogeneity amongst the Africans because it wanted to propose a neat bureaucratic approach, based on uniform principles for all ‘the Natives’. Thus on the basis of the ‘peaceful annexation’ narrative to explain how whites came to dominate the South African region and which laid the foundation for the reservation policy, they were able to recommend that ‘Native administrators could take over the functions of the ‘Tribal Chiefs’. This became the basis of the Native Affairs Department which became a ‘state within a state’. In doing so Africans were deprived of their individual rights, especially to the franchise, which most of them did not have access to anyway since they were to be considered in terms of the groups they belonged to.

Cecil John Rhodes had set the basis for this thinking as far back as 1894 when he famously declared: ‘The natives are in a sense citizens, but not altogether citizens’. The Commission emphasised that in the ‘tribal system’ there were no elections. This led to consideration of what to do with those ‘Natives’ who had been promised the vote by the South Africa Act of 1909? This was to be achieved through voting within the ‘ancient tribal system’ (p420).

Amongst the key pieces of legislation which gave effect to the SANAC Report’s recommendations was the 1913 Land Act which had the effect of forcing African people off the land and seeking employment in urban areas, in direct competition with Afrikaners who were also going through their own process of urbanisation – it had reached 41 % by 1926, compared to less than 10% in 1900. Also the SANAC Report laid the basis for the 1920 Native Affairs Act which established the Native Affairs Commission and extended the Transkei Council System to other Reserves.

Condemnation of the recommendations contained in the SANAC Report was swift. It had laid the basis for the government to continue treating all ‘Natives’ as a homogenous bloc, something resisted by the black intelligentsia and white liberals. DDT Jabavu, for example, declared that such a ‘policy is to bring the best (‘Natives’) down to the level of the worst’.
Former Premier of the Cape Colony, John X Merriman, at the 1909 Convention which led to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, pushed for the national extension of the franchise for Coloureds which prevailed in the Cape. As a sop to Merriman, the black franchise was kept as it stands in the Cape Colony, even though he warned that keeping blacks disenfranchised was creating a future volcano (Van der Westhuizen, 2007:17).

The success of the Convention was an embodiment of the success of the ‘gold and maize alliance’ which ushered in a completely different elite pact and lasted until the elections of 1948. Referring to this as the first elite transition from competing business interests to a common set of policies, Van Der Westhuizen says it was ‘an alliance based on a cheap and regimented black workforce being reproduced in reserves for the (English-speaking) mine bosses and the (Afrikaans-speaking) maize farmers, the export of primary products and the maintenance of socio-political stability’ (2007:18).

In trying to understand why the Boer Republics accepted at the Convention a unitary state, Duvenage suggests that there were several motivating factors. At a pragmatic level it allowed for the Boer republics to remain ‘within the Western sphere of influence’, the price for which was ‘acceptance of the British Empire’. Also, the creation of four provinces ‘provided for contractual relationships between the centre and the periphery’; and thirdly, being a majority of the white population they could have a say on their own fate anyway (Duvenage, 2014:85). ‘The Afrikaner co-founders of a unitary South Africa…thought about ‘South Africanness’, not with the liberal notion of individuality (but)…a nation of groups…This perspective offered a double bind that would haunt Afrikaner thinking – though the immediate division was based on language, this hid a more ominous divide, race – and secondly, the management of the divide was to be centrally steered by the state in the twentieth century’ (2014:86).

The focus now turns to the developments which occurred within the white body politic as the issues of citizenship were being hammered out.

4.1.6 Creation of an Afrikaner Identity and Citizenry
As has been argued in Chapter Two, the granting of citizenship while a necessary condition is not *sine qua non* a guarantee of active participation in the issues of the day. Just as the Congress leadership in India and the various political leaders in the Arab world found, it requires effective mobilisation around an ideology, be it in the form of Arab nationalism, Islamism, a secular Indian nationalism or Hindu chauvinism. Similarly, the creation of the Union of South Africa ‘opened new terrains of struggle over the extent and terms of political incorporation, giving rise to conflicts between as well as within various black and white groups, themselves internally divided’ (Greenstein, 1995:231). The developments within the black groups shall be examined in greater under African nationalism. Here consideration is given to what could be regarded as the politics of power within the white group.

At the broadest level there was the struggle waged by the nascent Afrikaner nationalist movement against the British imperialists, some sectors of which tried to foster a more liberal approach to governance. Then within the putative Afrikaner movement there was a range of views extending from the extreme right, (which would come out in support of the Nazis), a liberal element, as well as those who moved to the left vehemently opposed to the segregationists and later the system of apartheid.

Between the Boers and the British, there was the attempt to homogenise the policies towards Africans, as seen above in the case of the SANAC Report. This process was similar to other colonising situations where, according to Steyn, ‘The lack of both self-knowledge, and of grounded knowledge of the people they were creating as the black race, allowed whites to continue creating homogenous, ‘mythical portraits’ both of themselves and of their other’ (2001:9). This section examines the development of the various streams within the Afrikaner identity.

Duvenage succinctly captures this moment when he writes that despite the attempts by two South African War generals – Louis Botha and the Cambridge-educated Jan Smuts – to reconcile the two groups (English and Afrikaans) through the South African Party, they were soon opposed by another South African War general, Barry Hertzog (2014:85).
In 1906 Louis Botha was head of the Het Volk which aimed to unite the different elements of the Afrikaner community – including those who had fought on the side of the British. It merged with Hertzog’s Orangia Unie and John X Merriman’s South African Party in 1911. The merged party retained the name the South African Party (SAP) and it was instrumental in bringing together the ‘maize and gold’ alliance referred to above.

Jan Smuts was Botha’s deputy and he represented the ‘South Africa First’ approach, a continuation of the two-stream, that is Boer and British, approach which saw the protection of white interests as being of primary concern. He ‘propounded the South Africanist option, in which being South African meant being white’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:19). Hence the SAP came to pass several discriminatory laws which laid the basis for apartheid. These included the 1911 Mines and Works Act, which restricted black industrial action and introduced the colour bar; the Land Act of 1913 and the Native Affairs Act of 1920 referred to above.

Hertzog broke away from the South African Party to lead the Nationalist Party which was launched in 1914. It went through several permutations before it returned to its original name. From the beginning Hertzog appealed to those whose livelihoods had been devastated by the South African War as well as to wealthy farmers, small businessmen and professionals drawn from the legal and clerical backgrounds. His approach was an amalgam of republicanism, segregation and the two-stream approach arguing that Afrikaners and English would unite as whites against the threat of black domination. This position was opposed by SJ du Toit who –apart from being a founder of the Bond – also helped found the first Afrikaans language movement, the Genootskap vir Regte Afrikaners (GRA) (the Community of True Afrikaners). His strain of nationalism saw Afrikaners as God’s chosen people. Hertzog’s slogan ‘South Africa First’ espousing a South African, but whites only, nationalism set him up explicitly against British imperialism. He served as Deputy PM to Louis Botha in the Union government who, unable to handle Hertzog strident positions against the British, asked him to resign.
1914 saw major battles amongst the Boers, as they slugged it out over who would best represent the interest of Afrikaners. When the government, under the leadership of Botha and Smuts, acceded to Britain’s request that they support them against Germany, a widespread protest involving 12 000 men broke out. Easily suppressed, it was succeeded by the march of 6 000 Afrikaner women to the Union Buildings demanding the release of the arrested protesters.

The 1915 elections saw the electoral spoils distributed in equal measure between the National Party and Botha’s South African Party. The latter ruled in alliance with the pro-British Union Party. Black mineworkers showed their rising militancy when they engaged in widespread strikes leading to some relaxation of the colour bar. This infuriated the white mineworkers who engaged in a violent uprising in 1922, which was forcibly suppressed by government. This major development is revisited in several discussions below.

Another aspect of Afrikaner citizenship being asserted was that of the economic domain. The Afrikaner Broederbond was created in 1918 to address the economic plight of the Afrikaners after the defeat in the South African War ending in 1902, the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and the increasing competition coming from the influx of Africans into the urban areas between the World Wars. Kriel points out that ‘From the outset, the Broeders’ primary concern was power – their own and their nation’s. The motto of the Broederbond through all seventy-six years of its existence was ‘Be strong” Unlike its predecessor organisations such as the GRA ‘the early generations of Broeders prioritised the economic empowerment of their volk (2010: 408/9).

One of its early achievements was notched up when it succeeded in achieving parity for Afrikaans as an official language alongside English in 1925. As mentioned above, Milner had tried to nip the nascent Afrikaner movement in the bud through enforced Anglicisation. To consolidate its position the Broederbond set out a strategy to raise the use and status of the language. ‘(The) Broederbond wished to see Afrikaans institutionalised’, Kriel (2010:411).
In the 1921 elections Botha’s South African Party held the majority. The effect of the 1922 strike could be seen in the 1924 elections when under Smuts’ leadership the SAP lost. Botha’s National Party, in alliance with the Labour Party, held the majority of seats and set up the Pact Government with Hertzog as Prime Minister. It was committed to the principle of ‘civilized labour’ which meant that white workers’ wages would be kept at a comfortable level while that of the uncivilized black labour was to be sufficient for ‘barbarous and undeveloped people’. The Pact government was able to attract the support of Afrikaners through its commitment to bilingualism, with Afrikaans replacing Dutch as the other official language; and the national flag being a compromise carrying the Union Jack as well as the flags of the Boer republics. It received a further fillip by Hertzog’s determination to remove all traces of common political citizenship, such as the Cape ‘Native Franchise’, an objective which was achieved by 1937. Black opposition took the form of inter alia the Non-European Unity Front, discussed in greater below.

The Cape ‘Native Franchise’ had been a key issue occupying the minds of the NP leadership and they needed the help of the SAP to legislate it out of existence. One of the reasons for the NP’s concern, explains Ashforth, was that ‘it prevented the application of the Land Act to the Cape, where it had been declared ultra vires due to the entrenched franchise provision’ (1990:72). Also, the Great Depression, accompanied by a severe drought, exacerbated the issue of the best ways of allocating the relatively limited supply of unskilled labour between sectors of production. The labour tenancy arrangements on the farms were breaking down because of worsening conditions for Africans, and the mines were facing the problem of recruiting limitation being imposed in Portuguese East Africa after 1928.

The 1929 elections saw the National Party get more votes on the basis of its swart gevaar (black peril) scaremongering. It still did not have the required two thirds in the upper and lower houses of parliament to make the changes to disenfranchise the black franchise in the Cape Colony which it tried to do through four ‘Native’ Bills: Representation of Natives Bill, the Union Native
Council Bill, the Coloured Person’s Rights Bill, the Coloured Persons’ Rights Bill and the 1913 Land Act Amendment.

Amongst the other key pieces of legislation passed during this period were:

- The 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act which aimed to ensure blacks were not allowed any ownership outside the reserves. It also introduced the passbook system and segregated locations. It was a direct outcome of the 1921 Stallard Commission, officially known as the Transvaal Local Government, which advocated the principle that ‘Natives’ should reside in urban areas only for such time as they ‘minister to the needs of the white man’ (cited in Howard Brotz, 1997:26). This principle also came to be embodied in the 1937 Urban Areas and Amendment Act.
- The 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, which was meant for settling industrial disputes but which excluded ‘Natives’;
- The Native Taxation and Development Act of 1925 which set a uniform level of taxation for ‘Natives’ and set out sanctions for non-payments;
- The ‘Colour Bar’ Act of 1926, extending the 1911 Mines and Works Acts, which entrenched job reservation for white workers;
- The Native Administration Act of 1927, meant to set out the governance of the reserves, which Jordan described as the ‘earliest attempt to create a comprehensive legal framework for racial oppression’ (1997:9). It provided for a Supreme Chief in the form of the Governor-General. The latter post had been created through the South African Act of 1909. Jordan described this move as the ‘institutional incorporation of ‘traditional leaders’ through a corruption of precolonial legal traditions and merely as extensions of racial domination by proxy’ (1997:9). Van Der Westhuizen writes that ‘It determined the ‘retribalisation’ of black people through a separate system of institutions and laws, thereby setting in motion the machinery that enabled the denial of black people’s citizenship’ (2007:22).

This was the context in which the Native Economic Commission (1930-1932) was set up look into the socio-economic conditions of the ‘Natives’, especially in the cities. Like the SANAC, the NEC had to deal with the term ‘Native’, with
the Commission pronouncing that it would prefer using the term *Abantu* as a noun and *Bantu* as an adjective. Ashforth explains that ‘their objection to the term derives from the fact that it is imbricated within a discourse engaging notions of rights, principally aboriginal rights to land – a matter with important political implications’ (1990:76).

Although the Commission began on the premise that the key question it was to address was of an economic nature, it conflated racial and economic categories (1990:77). It focused on a strategy of development which was seen in functional terms: ‘By development of the wealth-producing capacity of the Reserves they should absorb the surplus Natives’ from the urban area (pp142/143). However, it was also an acknowledgement of the parlous state the Reserves were in due to neglect by government as well as a severe drought which had stricken major parts of the country.

The context for this is important to understand why the NEC went in the direction it did. As shall be shown in the genesis of African nationalism, this was a period when the African middle class was agitating ever so increasingly around the defence and extension of their citizenship. The NEC was also mindful of the ‘poor white problem’, due to white peasant farmers migrating to the cities only to find no employment prospects. Thus there is an acknowledgement by the NEC of the need for a ‘civilized labour’ policy which was different from the ‘Native’ worker who was based in the urban areas.

According to the NEC Report the solution lay in the development of the reserves, while as far as the ‘Natives’ in the urban areas were concerned, the state had to halt uncontrolled movement (p383). There not being sufficient inducements to keep them in the Reserves – due to insufficient grazing land and the attraction to mining due to its system of wage labour – the NEC decided to focus on education to help create industrial workers: ‘He must learn to school his body to hard work, which is not only a condition of his advance in civilization, but of his final survival’ (p77).
Instead of basic education skills involving reading, writing and arithmetic the focus would be on ‘simple hygiene, elementary agricultural methods, and a comprehension of the fact that spirits...do not account for their fortune’ (p631). The NEC Report represented a further significant breakthrough in recommending that education should be controlled from the centre of government and not left to the Provincial Councils. This was similar to the way the SANAC reported all matters ‘Native’ were to come under the Native Affairs Department.

The NP finally fused with Smuts’ party, creating the United South African Party, which later became known as the United Party, which ruled as the Fusion Government from 1934. Following the NEC Report, a cache of bills referred to as the Hertzog Bills was passed in 1936. This included the Representation of Natives Act which fixed the political status of ‘Natives’ across the Union on a uniform basis. It abolished the Cape Natives Franchise and the common voters roll. It allowed for a separate Native voters roll in the Cape Colony, and for white representatives of Natives to be elected through electoral colleges to the Senate and House of Assembly. The electoral colleges differed from province to province but generally consisted of traditional authorities, local councils, advisory boards and reserves boards. Also The Native Trust and Land Act was passed to carry out the provision of the 1913 Land Act which allowed for Reserve- extension and the creation of a South African Native Trust.

The NP/SAP collaboration saw a split in the National Party with DF Malan leading a faction to create the Gesuiwerde (Purified) Nasionale Party (GNP) in 1934. DF Malan is regarded as a late arrival to Afrikaner politics. Van der Westhuizen shows how Malan drew on his background as a dominee to ‘alchemise Afrikaner nationalism into a civil religion’ (2007:23). Under his leadership ‘Afrikaner mythology reinterpreted the motley groups of families that had left the Cape colony as a coherent nationalist action, the Great Trek, by ethnically similar people’ becoming an act of faith (2007:23). December 16 came to be inscribed not only in the political calendar, but also the religious agenda as an example of God’s backing of the Afrikaner nationalist cause since this was the day when the Voortrekkers defeated the Zulus at the Battle of Blood
River (Ncome). It was named the Day of the Vow and the Voortrekker Monument built outside Pretoria as an indication of their commitment to the Vow, continues serving as the focal point for some sections of the Afrikaners to this day.

Malan differed hugely with the positions taken by Smuts and Botha, feeling that government had been too harsh in its suppression of the 1914 rebellion and the 1922 mineworkers’ strike, and that it was intent on thwarting South African self-determination. Malan consolidated his base amongst a growing number of organs of civil society such as the Afrikaner Broederbond, and the representative of big business the Afrikaanse Handelsinstuut. It eventually came to challenge Hertzog’s position as the guardian of the sacred ‘national treasures’ of Afrikanerdom (O’Meara, 1983:77).

With the end of the Great Depression and the abandoning of the gold standard by the Hertzog government in 1932, thus devaluing the currency and improving gold exports, the South African economy enjoyed an unprecedented level of industrialisation. This received a further boost with the outbreak of the Second World War. The state was able to reduce the level of ‘European’ unemployment through absorbing them into the state sector, while agricultural prices improved given WWII and growing domestic demand. But this also had the effect of attracting more and more Africans into the urban areas. This caused a major problem for the segregationists.

During this period there emerged a movement which at its core believed that ‘only a combination of ethnic mobilisation and volkskapitalisme could improve the lot of the economically and politically marginalised Afrikaner’ (Davies, 2009:19). It was able to pull into its orbit Afrikaner farmers from the three provinces where they were prevalent, workers, as well as the middle classes. Davies suggests that in this context the Afrikaner Economic Movement which began with the Economic Volkskongres and the Reddingsdaad of 1939 was the most important platform for the 1948 victory of the Nationalist Party (2009:20). For Van der Westhuizen ‘The 1930s marked the redefinition of Afrikaner nationalism as the Afrikaner business and cultural elite launched its campaign
of cross alliance building before battling it out for dominance in the early 1940s’ (2007:28).

The Ossewa Brandwag (OB) (Ox Wagon Sentinel) was also a creature of this period but which went against the aspirations of the emerging elite. Its variant of Afrikaner nationalism was clearly that of the national socialism of the Nazis. Of the more than one million Afrikaners, it had about 300 000 in its membership and used violent attacks on instruments of the state as one of its key tactics. Even if Giliomee’s lower estimate of 100 000 members, that would equate to one OB member for every ten Afrikaners.

While initially supportive of the OB, differences developed between it and the NP. By 1941, Malan saw the OB as the anti-thesis of the Christian nationalism the NP was pursuing, while continuing to support Germany in the war against the USSR, argued that it was necessary to stop the spread of communism. He was also appalled by its affinity to Nazism, which it counterposed to British imperialism (van der Westhuizen, 2007:35).

After WWII had begun Hertzog resigned from the UP in 1940 because of its decision to support Britain, and established the Volksparty which subsequently joined Malan’s GNP to create Herenigde National of Volksparty (HNP) with Hertzog at its helm and Malan as his deputy. Malan’s faction did not appreciate the Hertzogites emphasis on equality between English and Afrikaans speakers and were hoping for a German victory in war, even though they were opposed to the OB’s support for the Nazis, making possible a purely Afrikaner republic which would exclude the British and Jews. As Duvenage points out, ‘For Malan, English-speaking South Africans still considered England as their home and, infinitely more importantly, Afrikaners should return their country to their republic roots’ (2014:87).

The Hertzogites went ahead to form the Afrikaner Party which in 1948, in alliance with Malan’s National Party, won the game changing 1948 elections. Only about 40% of the electorate voted for the NP while Smuts and his allies
got about 54%. However, SA’s constituency system ensured the NP a majority in parliament, a major turning point in South Africa and for Afrikaner identity.

In 1947 the HNP appointed the Sauer Commission to look at the ‘Coloured Question’ which ended up painting an apocalyptic picture of assimilation leading to the destruction of the ‘white race’ or separate development along racial lines. This was a harbinger of things to come when in the 1948 election the United Party was replaced by the alliance at whose helm stood the NP, the party which would govern until 1994.

4.1.7 Citizenship and State Consolidation from 1948 to 1966

Malan now went to great lengths to show that the NP was not an anti-English party. As Koorts, his biographer, put it: ‘(H)e declared, the NP represented a set of principles, not a particular section of the white population…Malan had taken a page from Hertzog’s book, as he now promoted the principles of ‘South Africa First’ and South African nationalism as a solution to the existing tensions between the two language groups’ (2014:196). As Van der Westhuizen points out, this approach succeeded so that by the 1960s the NP was making inroads amongst English-speakers. In fact, ‘By the late 1980s the bulk of the NP’s supporters were English-speakers’ (2007:25).

But this did not mean the loss of Afrikaner identity – as Malan put it: ‘We regard the preservation of and the promotion of our own Afrikaans-speaking volk unity as an objective in itself’ (Koorts, 2007:15). In fact, Duvenage argues that his approach ‘rested on an ethnic-communitarian argument that Afrikaners had the democratic right to lead South Africa towards a republic’ (2014:86). The political entrepreneurs who were Malan’s fellow-travellers in this project were a band of nationalists such as Eric Louw, CR Swart, JG Strijdom, Eben Donges, Paul Sauer and HF Verwoerd. ‘Their immediate projects were establishment of a republic in 1961, and the implementation of the apartheid policy…Afrikaners strove to establish an independent state where they could pursue their collective freedom as a community – notwithstanding the historical ambiguity of the community’s identity’ (Duveange, 2014:87).
The NP took several steps to curb the militancy of labour and the impact of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA, later renamed South African Communist Party) through several measures such as the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act. The Act, which defined communism so broadly that just about any form of dissent could be covered, was pushed by the apartheid government because of claims that communists were infiltrating trade unions and student movements.

Another important ideological issue was the increasingly positive attitude of the various strains of Afrikaner nationalism to capitalism. Sanlam and Volkskas emerged during this period, becoming behemoths of capitals which saw the former becoming the second largest conglomerate in SA after Anglo American, and benefiting from Anglo American handing it a lucrative mining company in 1966. This was a period of rapid industrialisation and import-substitution with State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) such as Iscor, Sasol, Eskom, and Armscor amongst the leading elements in the economy. The 1950s also saw the steady rise in income of the white workers rising by 10% from 1948 to 1953, while that of black workers dropped by the same quantum in that period.

The 1948-1960 period is referred to that of ‘low apartheid’ when the NP-led government expanded on the existing segregationist policies laid by the British colonialists in areas such as Natal. However, the discriminatory laws passed – especially controlling movement of black people and the forced removal of black communities – laid the basis for the later ‘high’ or ‘grand’ apartheid. It was also a period of expansion of the welfare benefits accruing to the Afrikaners, especially in the form of employment particularly in the growing bureaucracy and through job reservation. Verwoerd was committed to an ethos based on the view that believed ‘better poor and white than rich and mixed’, even though in reality the policies increased the welfare of white workers and the poor whites.

The Tomlinson Commission, was appointed in this period, sitting between 1950 and 1954. Its core task was to give substance to the slogans of apartheid. Ashforth captures its essence well when he wrote: ‘(R)ather than being an
inquiry into the ‘Native Question’, seeking a rational solution through systematic consideration of the ‘facts’, (it) was an investigation for an already determined political solution to the ‘Native Question’ (1990:150). Although the Fagan Commission of 1946-1948 had already underlined that Reserves were untenable, the Tomlinson Commission was being asked to detail plans on how the spatially differentiated strategy of apartheid could be achieved. As Posel pointed out apartheid was not pursued as a single grand plan, and was a lot more contingent on a number of factors (Posel 1987). These included class relations within the nationalist alliance, relations between the central government and the municipalities, and the ideological battles within the Native Affairs Department. The report ran into 3,755 pages in 18 volumes, and was never actually implemented by the NP government. Rather it became a tome which the government could point as justification for the policies they were implementing in direct contradiction to the Commission’s findings.

By the time the commission began its work, the hegemonic view within the state was that ‘both black and white society are really composed of distinct cultural (and emergent national) units of which cognizance should be taken in the constitution of the state’ (Ashforth, 1990:153). But it preferred now to refer to the indigenous population as the ‘Bantu’. Moving away from the use ‘Natives’ meant that there was no tacit acknowledgement of African being claimant as the original inhabitants of the land.

The Tomlinson report argues that previous contact between whites and the ‘Bantu’ had been warlike because of the Bantus crossing the boundary to engage in cattle-thieving or because of the actions of tyrants such as Dingaan, Moshesh and Mzilikazi (Vol 7, p45). The Tomlinson Commission also emphasises the principle of national self-determination, being careful not to cast any normative judgments on ‘Bantu’ culture such as being inferior or backward. However, it emphasised that if different nations were to exist and were to shape their own internal affairs, ‘culture contact’ between them must be controlled (Vol 67, p25).
The Commission did not draw a distinction between Afrikaans- or English-speaking ‘non-Bantu’ people (Vol 1, p3). While the NP was quite happy to build on Afrikaner ideology, the state insisted on no political distinction between the two language groups. In this way we can see the roots being laid for the emergence of broader white identity which came to be consolidated by the mid-1960s.

Control of cultural contact was to be achieved through the control of labour. While segregation had deep roots already, the Commission was of the view that the economy needed to be reoriented, this through the decrease in settled ‘Bantu’ labour and increased use of migrant labour (Vol 4, p93).

The Solution the Tomlinson Commission came up with was to argue for a thinning out of the Reserves so that farmers with larger pieces of land could exploit their resources more effectively. It calculated that the Reserves could carry about 307 000 farming families, which according to the 1951 Census was about 50% of the number of African families. The rest of the people were to be encouraged into industries and services in the Bantu Areas, thus relocated off the land but staying within the reserves. The huge relocation strategy was calculated to cost about 46 million pounds (Vol 20, p114).

Until such time these mythical separate states were achieved, the Commission recommended that the government ‘concentrate within one department as many functions pertaining to the Bantu as are practicable, in other words to proceed with the conception of a ‘State within a State’ (67;25). This would require the large scale re-organisation of the Native Affairs Department (NAD).

There was widespread rejection of the balkanisation of the African people into the ‘Bantustans’. Prof ZK Matthews said that the Reserves were ‘part of a plan to circumscribe and confine the African people as far as their economic rights and political aspirations are concerned to a small portion of the country’ (see Ashforth, p189). The Commission also did not have the approbation of the very government which appointed it. The government rejected the Commission’s recommendations concerning the investment it had to make in the investment
of the ‘Bantu Areas’, the entry of European capital into the Reserves and the expansion and consolidation of Reserve land. Selective in its implementation, The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 drew on the language of the Tomlinson Commission, stating that there will be eight national units around which the ‘Bantu Areas’ will be organised. These came to be the bantustans of Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Kwa Ndebele, Gazankulu, Lebowa, Qwaqwa, KaNgwane, KwaZulu and Venda.

Evans (1997) places the role of administration, and especially the Native Affairs Department, at the centre of our understanding that apartheid in South Africa was enforced not only through terror and coercion. He argues that ‘the options of authoritarian regimes, including those of a state form as patently “illegitimate” as the apartheid behemoth, are not limited to violence and terror—a narrow perspective which has a lengthy record in the literature of South Africa… administration was crucial to “normalizing” the coercion that underpinned racial domination and was surprisingly effective in conditioning the compliance of the African majority’ (1997:2).

The study does not, of course, diminish the importance of racial repression in South Africa. Through ‘the racialization of urban space in the form of the “planned African location” and the conversion of African chiefs into administrative factotums of apartheid … coercion was systematically leached into issues of everyday administration. In this way, a complex bureaucratic web was created, ensnaring all South Africans in the blueprints and programs hatched by administrators in the DNA—but especially trapping Africans, the specific target of the department’s attentions’ (Ibid).

4.1.8 Identity formation from 1948 to the 1960s

The previous section dealt with how the state was being construed and constructed in the aftermath of the 1948 victory of the NP. This section looks at the identity which was emerging and being consolidated corresponding to the
developments within the state, especially though the lens of religion, class differentiation and language.

Afrikaner nationalism was transformed from oppositional nationalism which saw the British as the enemy into state nationalism in 1948. One of the moves the NP government introduced a language-in-education policy in terms of which white Afrikaans-speaking children and white English-speaking children in South Africa could attend separate schools. As Kriel (2010:417/8) points out, ‘This was an old Broederbond dream: mother-tongue education for Afrikaners in their own single-medium Afrikaans schools’.

The post-1948 period was that of consensus-building, with Christianity playing a more central role in the definition of the apartheid ideology. Also, ‘(T)his ideology was to be elaborated in the shape of policies to protect and advance the Afrikaans language alongside the encroachment of the state into the economic realm to overturn both real and perceived sources of disadvantage and grievance with the wider Afrikaner population’ (Davies, 2009:26). However, it could not achieve consensus on apartheid itself because of the irreconcilable needs of the different factions of capital. ‘Uniformity of sort was secured about an organisational axis comprising the state and the NP’, with racial domination and Afrikaner access to the state as being the two main pillars of the ‘readily adaptable nationalist ethos and project’ (Davies 2009: 27-28). As Hein Marais put it the Afrikaners were being differentiated and organised into a political and economic force around ‘the cultural, historical, and political mythos’ of Afrikaner nationalism.

The nationalist element of this period was served by the volksbewiging (nationalist movement) which aimed at uniting all the disparate elements of the Afrikaner people in pursuit of their interests as a community and to achieve their destiny (volkseie). Davies explains that much of the disparities lay in whether apartheid was seen as an ideology or a nationalist project. ‘Fractions within the alliance were to converge initially upon economic development to a greater degree than the ideological system apartheid itself elaborated’ (2009:30). This was not without an intense battle because for leaders like Malan capitalism was
anathema to the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism. The fear that English capital felt at the success of the NP in 1948 (foreshadowing a similar fear when the ANC came to power) was to be soon dissipated when it was realised the party’s intent was to open the economy to Afrikaner nationalists (as has happened during the ANC’s tenure in power).

However, Van der Westhuizen indicates, ‘The anti-capitalist rhetoric was geared towards reinforcing the Afrikaner nationalist class alliance and held little substance, except for a handful of leaders who were expelled in 1969’ (2007:66). Hein Marais argues that state patronage was used to develop the Afrikaners into a political and economic force, ‘as racial policies explicitly advanced the cumulative ambitions of white people’ (1998:19). Or as Van Der Westhuizen puts it ‘The (National) party’s achievement was to gather the disparate strands of nationalism and the various suggested approaches to the national question of race, and bind together increasing numbers of Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites long enough to implement its ethnic class project’ (2007:65).

Malan was replaced by JG Strijdom, who was succeeded by Verwoerd. Verwoerd marked the beginning of his tenure by crushing any dissenting voices within the NP but the seeds of discord had been laid over the past two decades. Academics, for example, had been attacking the increasingly intolerant atmosphere being created by the NP leadership, especially around the debate of the Coloured voters roll. Van der Westhuizen cites Die Burger by the end of 1950s editorialising that apartheid had ‘become a fossilised, unimaginative separation-for-separation’s sake’ (2007:84). The leading Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) academic Prof Bennie Keet asked whether apartheid was just ‘wishful thinking’, something that was impossible which helped avoid the task of grappling with reality (2007:84) while Prof Ben Marais said that apartheid could not be justified biblically. These voices of disquiet and others such as Beyers Naude were raised further in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960, with three ministers asking for the pass system to be scrapped.
Such voices remained dormant until Verwoerd’s assassination on 6 September 1966. Dan O’ Meara described what this moment meant in ideological terms well when he wrote: ‘The removal of the ‘The Rock’ Verwoerd brought into sharp relief the various creatures whose titanic battles had been hidden under his shadow’ (1996:157). His successor BJ Vorster began speaking increasingly of a white state within which Afrikaner identity was to be asserted.

This widening of the ruling bloc to include English speaking whites caused major ructions within the Afrikaner nationalist movement generally and the NP in particular. Things came to a head when a vote was forced at the Transvaal NP congress on 4 crucial issues: immigration, relations with the continent, the position of English-speakers and how to deal with visiting black sportsmen and women. The Transvaal provincial leadership’s deviation from the line ended up with the verkramptes such as Albert Hertzog and Jaap Marais being kicked out of the party in 1969. Their Hersigte (purified) National Party (HNP) which they went on to create was seen as remaining true to the ethnic Afrikaner cause.

The end of the Verwoerd era, with BJ Vorster’s assumption of power, also saw greater visibility of critical Afrikaner voices outside the NP, some of whom had been active since the 1940s. This included Afrikaans-speakers speaking out under the banner of the United and Liberal parties, the ANC-aligned Congress of Democrats, Springbok Legion, Torch Commando, Garment Workers’ Union and even the South African Communist Party. This has led Van der Westhuizen to comment: ‘Some South Africans oversimplify the NP’s core constituency, the Afrikaners, as a monolithic grouping’ (2007:64).

Some of the leading critical voices included Bram Fischer who was described as volksverraaier (traitor to the people) who had been active since the 1930s. He came from a pedigreed Afrikaner nationalist background – his grandfather was allied to Botha and Smuts, had been sympathetic to Hertzog’s position and had served in Botha’s first union cabinet. Fisher however became a leader of the SACP, was banned in the 1950s and then jailed in the 1966. He was treated particularly harshly, being released from prison just three months before he died on 8 May 1975, succumbing to the cancer he had been suffering of.
Other critical voices included theologians such as Beyers Naude who joined Bennie Keet and Ben Marais; from within parliament people like Japie Basson and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert as well as well literary figures associated with the Sestigers (the sixties), which aimed at confronting the apartheid state through Afrikaans literature. Initiated in France, where many of the writers met up, the movement included people such as Jan Rabie and Ingrid Jonker who were disowned by their own family, while Breyten Breytenbach a decade later suffered imprisonment for his involvement in Okhela, an organisation he was accused of forming in exile to launch a Russian submarine attack on Robben Island.

Breytenbach, alongside Andre Brink, Johan Degenaar and Andre Du Toit, represented critical voices of the intellectuals. A key argument made by them was that Afrikaner political power was the main threat to the language Afrikaans, because its proponents demanded that it had to be respected. Breytenbach argued for the transformation of ‘my own community’ contributing to a broader objective of liberation: ‘I can only be free to the extent that my fellow human being is free’ (Cited in Andrew Nash, 2000:344, Breytenbach, B. 1976. *Seisoen in die paradys*. Johannesburg: Perskor).

Nash points out that ‘The argument that Afrikaner nationalism was a threat to the survival (of Afrikaans) became increasingly central to Afrikaner literary politics after the establishment of the Afrikaanse Skrywersgilde (Afrikaans Writers’ Guild) in 1975. Its founding constitution recognized Afrikaans as "the language of all who speak and write it - bound to no party, dogma or colour", and committed the Guild to "building up Afrikaans as a multinational language"’ (2000: 345).

Johan Degenaar for his part had argued that Afrikaners should ‘stand in solidarity with those who have been wronged, and against the holders of power, whoever they may be’ (Cited in Nash, 2000: 346: Degenaar, J. 1980. *Voortbestaan in geregtigheid: Opstelle oor die politieke rol van die Afrikaner*. Cape Town: Tafelberg). Degenaar had argued for a ‘morally critical Afrikaner’, whose identity is based ‘on language and culture, rather than race and blood’.
He wanted an end to ‘the identification of Afrikaner culture and Afrikaner power’, seeking to establish shared values with non-Afrikaners "which can serve as the basis for a common future’ (Degenaar, J. 1982. *Keuse vir die Afrikaner*. Johannesburg: Taurus.22, 26-7). Duvenage points out that Degenaar stood for ‘political pluralism’ that is ‘a political philosophy that describes and prescribes value to the fact that man in society is not an isolated individual, but still acts in a plurality of groups’ (1980: 110) (2014:89).

Andre du Toit in (Du Toit, A. 1983. *Sondes van die vaders*. Cape Town: Rubicon. cited in Nash 2000:347) had likewise argued that because of the close relationship between Afrikaner culture and the Afrikaans language – through their association with Afrikaner power within the apartheid order – have become the ‘legitimate target of black rage’ (54). He argued that there is ‘no possible guarantee’ of Afrikaner survival - that is, survival of Afrikaners as a distinct cultural group – after the end of Afrikaner power, ‘except insofar as Afrikaners themselves have the moral and political courage to act in such a way that they convince themselves and others that such survival indeed has legitimate value’ (63). To do this, they would have to act in solidarity with oppressed people - above all, with the victims of Afrikaner oppression - in the cause of justice, freedom and the common good (59, 62). Both ‘the burdens of history and the risks of the future’ must be grasped in ways "which can be justified to ourselves and to others’ ( 68).

When assessing the relevance of Du Toit’s contribution, it is worth remembering that in the 1980s he was one of the very few intellectuals calling for a truth and reconciliation commission. As Allen (2001:23) points out ‘For du Toit, neither the reformist engineering of apartheid bureaucrats nor the faith in history displayed by many anti-apartheid activists really came to grips with the enormity of violence and suffering’. Du Toit suggested that South Africans should look at the experience of *Nunca Más*, the Argentinean Truth Commission’s account of the atrocities committed by government security forces, and hinted that something similar might be required to break the power of violence over South African society (du Toit 1986: 23-31 Du Toit, A. 1986. *Oor Politieke Pyn, Of die
The relevance and impact of the thoughts of Breytenbach, Du Toit and Degenaar in the aftermath of 1994 shall be explored below when looking at contemporary manifestations of Afrikaner nationalism. However, the ambivalent role played by English-speaking whites needs to be noted. Steyn points out that a liberal opposition emanated mainly from English speakers, but who ‘enjoyed the comfortable ‘white’ privilege Afrikaner ‘law and order’ protected, without having to take the moral censure for the system of apartheid’ (2001:40).

4.1.9 Re-enter the state in the 1960s

The organisation of the state and the NP went through different permutations under the post-Verwoerd leadership. When BJ Vorster came to power in 1966, he placed the state at the centre of the axis – Davies suggests that this was due to his lack of a political power base (Davies, 2009:34). In doing so he transformed the Nationalist Party from ‘the political embodiment of a volksbewiging in the service of the volk into a party of pluralist power centres held together by patronage and insider access’ (O’Meara:166). This dependence on the state and the strategy to weld together a broader white unity were to mark the reign of his successors, PW Botha and FW De Klerk, as well.

Racial unity was a theme Verwoerd had already expounded upon – Vorster took it further wanting to ‘relocate the greater white establishment within the political confines of the NP’. Three elements made up the thrust of its ideological position then: separation of the state from the market, so that the market became the focus of social conflict; abandoning of exclusive white access to state power, and centralisation of power in the state, and as shall be seen in the Botha era, especially in the National Security Council.

With Vorster steaming ahead with all kinds of compromises to the racial purity policies of the NP, it was inevitable that that there would be another split. This came in 1969 in the form of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) (Reconstituted
National Party) in protest against Vorster allowing a mixed race rugby team from New Zealand to visit South Africa, and allowing for a black Ambassador from Malawi after the two countries had resumed diplomatic ties. Led by Albert Hertzog (former Prime Minister JBM Hertzog’s son) it gave an indication of the more significant split to occur in 1982 when the Conservative Party was created.

The economy grew between 1964 to 1972, at a spectacular average of between 6 to 8 percent annually. By the mid-1970s the Nationalist Party was becoming a victim of its own success. The Afrikaners were becoming a predominantly urbanised middle class – by 1977 65.2% were white collar workers, compared to about 30% in 1946. Unemployment amongst Afrikaner men fell to 12% while their presence in professional and technical categories increased by more than 93%. The Afrikaner per capita income was 80% of that of English-speaking whites, up from about 50% in 1946, while still indicating a gap within the white bloc (Van der Westhuizen, 2007:93).

The period also witnessed the rise of a confident class of Afrikaner businessmen, who saw themselves as a politically-based class with their own specific interests. Building on the Vorsterian attempts at reducing the gap between English and Afrikaner capital, Botha placed large scale Afrikaner capital in key state positions in the new definition of Afrikaner nationalism. Afrikaner capital in finance grew from 5% in 1938/39 to 25% in 1975, while mining grew from 1% to 18% for the same period. But Davies argues this left Botha exposed to a ‘grouping that had little allegiance beyond the profit margin’ (2009:41). The NP ensured that it did not grow too distant from the agriculture sector, with state subsidies representing 20% of an average farmer’s income. As Van der Westhuizen points out ‘In 1967, agricultural subsidies totalled twice the amount spent on black education’ (2007:95).

However, by 1974 a number of factors combined to start threatening the South African economy. The oil emergency of 1973 exacerbated the accumulation crisis that SA entered the following year. This crisis was a direct result of the apartheid system, which had been based on the Fordist link between mass
production and mass consumption. But this was not possible given the limited size of the domestic economy, which had over all these decades been dependent on production though super-exploited black labour and consumption by the privileged whites. These crises were also impacting on the unity of the different fractions of capital which, Davies argues, meant that there was a need for ‘a new system of legitimation’ (2009:33). Thus began a series of manoeuvres which included labour reform and peaked with Botha’s total strategy.

This was the milieu which framed the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions of 1977-1981, a context in which, according to Ashforth the ‘Native Question’ came to be couched in terms of ‘Race Relations’. This was also the period when the black urban working class was beginning to have its voice heard – either though strike actions, the most dramatic being the Durban strikes of 1973, or the militant action of students epitomised by the Soweto Uprising of 1976/77. The state now had to deal with African people both in terms of political power and as workers. The 1973 strikes in Durban and East London caught the Vorster regime by surprise, and they responded with several measures including the setting up of the Wiehahn and Riekert commissions. As Evans argued, administrative control was a key part of the apartheid strategy. These developments required a review of the efficiency of the bureaucratic system, and not the immediate resort to repression as had been the case of the response to the political movements.

While having very different mandates the commissions tend to be treated as a package because they both addressed the question of African labour in the post-Soweto Uprising era. Headed by Prof Nic Wiehahn, a Professor of Industrial Relations at UNISA, the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation was appointed on 8 July 1977. It had to look into labour matters, including the issue of black trade unions and job reservation. Philip Bonner and Eddie Webster captured the context of industrial relations well when they said the South African state had faced three related dilemmas: the committee system to serve as representatives of African labour had not prevented the emergence of trade unions; international pressure, especially through the ILO
on multi-national corporations (MNCs), for recognition of these trade unions and the growing recognition, even amongst white workers, that the future lay with the black working class (Bonner 1979). Also, because of its highly restrictive labour policies South Africa faced huge skilled labour shortages.

The report pushed for the acceptance of six labour rights: ‘The freedom or capacity to work, to associate, to bargain collectively, to withhold or to lock labour, to be protected and to be trained and developed for work’ (5;2.1). The central focus of the Commission was the Industrial Conciliation Act, which had governed industrial relations since 1924.

The government response to the Commission’s recommendation was amending the definition of employee to include all those with Section 10 rights but not including ‘migrants’ or ‘commuters’. This it had to backtrack on as well, so that by July 1979 union membership was thrown open to almost all ‘Black’ workers. Much of the pressure for these reforms came from big capital because of the view that apartheid structures were undermining the efficient operation of the market – framing how the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions approached their work. Also, there were pressures from within the state – especially the administration boards and Bantustan government for a review of influx control. At that point the Native Affairs Department, which had come to be called the Bantu Affairs Department, had been re-named again as the Department of Plural Relations and Development (DPRD). Furthermore, there were now ten bantustans with varying levels of ‘autonomy’.

According to the Riekert Report the African population was divided into urban/rural groups referred to as insiders/outsiders. The different groups making up the South African nation were now referred to as population groups, which ‘serves to obscure the bases on which those groupings of society were constructed…In the Report, then, terms of official prescription such as ‘Black’, ‘Coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘White’ are transformed into terms of description’ (Ashforth, 1990:209).
It also recommended that those functions of the DPRD which were being executed by other line departments should be hived off, with the DRPD’s mandate being reduced to guiding each of the ‘Black states’ towards independence and control over the administration boards and community councils. It defined the management of surplus labour in terms of the availability of housing and employment.

The Commission used the Urban Areas Act as the dividing line between insiders and outsiders, giving the former with Section 10 rights the right to remain permanently in urban areas, thus further strengthening the provisions of that legislation. On the basis of the commission’s recommendations, black urban dwellers were allowed 30 year leasehold on properties in black townships, which was extended to ninety year leasehold in 1978. It listed a number of tough preconditions for the outsiders - such as a job offer, available housing and the non-availability of local labour – which could make it possible to dispense with the unpopular 72-hour provision of Section 10 covering outsiders coming into urban areas.

Such relaxation was not popular within the state, especially at the local level of the bureaucracy, and was thus rejected. Piet Koornhoof, Minister of Cooperation and Development, tried to implement the Riekert strategy by, inter alia, introducing the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, which retained the 72-hour rule. This was also dropped after intense opposition by civil society organisations. The pass laws were eventually dropped in July 1987, in the midst of widespread uprisings.

The use of repressive measures continued being the hallmark of NP rule and was at odds with the liberalization path. There are probably many reasons for that of which the most compelling seems to be that the white bloc which had now become consolidated around the apartheid state was afraid of any political actions which would challenge the state. The size and status of the police force increased under Vorster; laws easily passed through the pliant parliament were used for all kinds of repressive measures – banning of organisations, individuals and events; the jailing of people under the weakest pretences and
the curbing of media freedoms. This iron-fisted approach was continued by PW Botha who took over the premiership in 1978, though he tended to elevate the military to an even higher level than the police. It is estimated that between 1960 and 1990 more than 80 000 people were detained without trial.

The Information Scandal of 1977 inserted itself rudely in the dynamics of white South African politics. Also labelled Muldergate, after Connie Mulder the Minister of Information in John Vorster's government, it emerged when the government’s attempts to wage a propaganda war paid from state coffers was exposed. The scandal was seized upon by Botha to force Vorster and his putative successor Mulder to resign from government, while burnishing his own credentials as a leader of integrity. This allowed Botha a victory over Mulder in the contest for the leadership of the National Party in 1978. His win was by a narrow margin demonstrating the hold the verkramptes still had over the party machinery.

The accumulation crisis of the 1970s gave way to the legitimation crisis of the 1980s, most clearly embodied in labour unrest and rising political mobilisation of the African majority. Meeting skill shortages became a major part of the government’s strategy to meet the needs of business. This was to be done through relaxation of influx control of black people to urban areas and attempting to increase labour stability through relaxation of restrictions around trade unionism. The need to provide political cohesion to a changing class alliance saw the party begin considering some form of deracialisation of its support base, spurred on by PW Botha’s injunction ‘adapt or die’. This came on the back of the realisation that apartheid had spawned an economy which was basically aimed at meeting the needs of the small white domestic market. Also SA’s overwhelming dependence on the mining sector, especially gold and diamond, ensured the dominance of entities such as the mining giant Anglo American which by 1987 controlled almost 60% of the JSE.

At this point Botha – via a series of White Papers – set about the implementation of the ‘Total Strategy’ which was meant to be a response to the ‘Total Onslaught’ which white SA faced. It aimed to create a new national basis of consent
(Davies, 2009:34) which, in seeking allies outside the racial divide, placed it at odds with some of its traditional base, especially the Afrikaner farmers who became alienated from the state. Three key elements of Total Strategy were increasing centrality of the market, abandoning exclusive white access to the state, and further centralisation within the state, especially around the National Security Council. It was supposed to represent a decisive break with the past, with even Koornhoof famously declaring in 1979 to the Washington Press Club that ‘Apartheid is dead’.

Steyn explains the worldview which white people could have to allow them to engage in such repression of black people inside SA and on its borders, where the state engaged in a strategy of destabilising the independent Africa states: ‘fantasies of genocide were an integral part of the colonizing imagination. The package deal of white civilization included the rights of both appropriation and obliteration (2001:11). Van Der Westhuizen shows the impact of this outlook: ‘It was a mindset that obviated the imagining of different potentialities, thereby entrapping white South Africans in a destructive spiral of their own making’ (2007:151).

While the thesis will not want to regurgitate the various and numerous atrocities carried out in the name of white domination by state forces or alleged rogue elements, it would return to the issue of culpability and collective guilt when discussing the TRC and current white attitudes to a democratic, black led government. At this stage it is noted that a vast number of whites, and a number of black collaborators, were involved in the security machinery established.

SA’s new Constitution came into effect on 3 September 1984 and saw the establishment of the Tricameral parliament of 1984 which, with the creation of urban councils, was aimed at drawing in the Indian, Coloured and parts of the African elite into its power axis. The ‘consociational model’ provided for white, Coloured and Indian communities to be represented by their own prime ministers, cabinets, parliaments, regional administrators, mayors, and town councils. Representation was to be proportionately based on the relative size of the populations, ie 4:2:1 but with huge powers in the hands of the President.
It was an unpopular scheme for various reasons, primarily because it left out the majority of South Africans, or as Keith Kyle put it ‘It involves a continuation of the politics of illusion, according to which some fifteen million black Africans are ‘just visiting’ from Homelands’ (1980). Also it was unworkable because for it to have succeeded the groups must have been willing to allow their leaders to make deals on their behalf at the centre. It also made Coloureds and Indians accomplices in depriving Africans of their rights. O’ Meara points out the key problem with Total Strategy was that ‘because it refused to abandon the central elements of Grand Apartheid theory, it could not legitimate its own reforms’ (p323).

Botha’s attempts at forging a new set of class alliances was not entirely successful, especially in the aftermath of the disappointing ‘Rubicon Speech’ of 15 August 1985. From various sources it is clear that Botha decided not to announce the release of Nelson Mandela, as was originally intended for that occasion. A number of reasons have been given for this. Van Der Westhuizen argues that ‘PW’s inner white supremacist got the better of him’. Botha did say that he would not lead his people ‘to abdication and suicide’ while denying that there was any racial domination in South Africa. Former Minister Leon Wessels ascribes Botha’s move to him wanting to define the Rubicon himself. ‘He was going to resist pressure until the international community and business sector were won over through policy proposals and the NP had weakened the ANC (Interview with Leon Wessels in Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:136) The speech became infamous for Botha not having crossed the Rubicon, denting confidence in South Africa, thus leading to capital flight at a rate of 3.4% of GDP between 1985 and 1988.

4.1.10 Erosion of the base

As has been alluded to above, there were two major streams of views within the broad white Afrikaner community: the verlig view of reform while securing the rights and privileges of whites, and the verkramp view of holding onto the status quo through repressive measures. The voices supporting a democracy
based on individual rights were far and far between, and tended to end up in
the Progressive Party, the African National Congress or the broader anti-
apartheid movement.

The limited reform manoeuvres Botha engaged in had a telling impact on the
dynamics within the Nationalist Party, where the broedertwis (tensions between
brothers) took the form of bitter battles between the verkrampte and verligte
elements. The ethno-symbolist view of Giliomee would contend that because
of its emphasis on preserving Afrikaner unity and privilege this was due to
‘symbolic and status issues’ (1997:17) while O Meara sees it in terms of
divergent class interests. Davies notes that political power had ensured ‘there
was far more to fight over and far higher political costs to the discord’ (2009:38).
The NP split once again in March 1982 with the verkramptes under the
leadership of Andries Treurnicht leaving to form the Conservative Party (CP).
Davies comments that in the NP ‘ Political pragmatism had won out over

Notwithstanding the image of an Afrikaner ‘strong man’, PW Botha embodied
the verlig view par excellence. He emphasised the ‘instrumentality of apartheid’,
lowering the NP’s ideology within the two key themes of Western rhetoric of the
time – anti-communism and neo-liberalism. His ‘total strategy’ was openly
aimed at ensuring a ‘guarantee for the system of free enterprise’.

Botha ‘took South Africa into the age of technocratic government, which
propounded economistic and managerial rather than ‘ideological’ solutions…of
course the managerialism was applied in the service of white domination…The
verligtes opted for flexibility and compromise – underpinned by a commitment
to white supremacy and capitalism unfettered by apartheid’s ‘ideological
constraints’ (Van der Westhuizen, 2007:111). This economistic view, coupled
with a neo-liberal ideology served also to extend the elite base to include not
only the broad white population but also elements of the Indian, coloured and
African people. This heralded a shift away from ‘white-cross class mobilisation
to multiracial elite mobilisation’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:111).
The base had shifted dramatically over the previous couple of decades. Agriculture had come to be concentrated in fewer hands, owning larger farms. The percentage of Afrikaners active in farming had been 30% in the 1930s, to 16% in 1960 reaching 8% in 1977. By the 1970’s Afrikaner presence in manufacturing rose to 15%, in finance to 25% and mining 30%.

The convergence of white Afrikaner and English interests could be seen in Cabinet appointments such as that of the English-speaking Owen Horwood to Minister of Finance, and the creation of the Urban Foundation in 1977 with backing by the twin peaks of Afrikaner and English capital, Anton Rupert of Rembrandt and Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo American. Amongst the Urban Foundation’s first pronouncements was the urgent need to create a black middle class to ensure the survival of capitalism. The Afrikaans press took up this theme as well with the 27 February 1978 *Beeld* editorial calling for the promotion of a black bourgeoisie as a ‘bastion against the attack on our free capitalist way of life’ (cited in Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:115). High level business/government conferences were held, with the Carlton Conference of 1979 seeing business present a five point plan for reform. This was followed by the conferences in Good Hope (1981) and Bryntiron (1986). Also, Botha had business represented on his defence advisory council. The dynamism of this exchange and that of the reformists that Botha led saw ‘an end to the paralysis that had set in under Vorster because they were willing to be flexible about sacred apartheid principles’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:120).

This saw the removal of a number of apartheid laws, especially those not required for continued white domination. Job reservation legislation was repealed in 1981 and phased out in the mining sector in 1987; influx control laws removed in 1986 as was the job reservation that the Coloured community enjoyed in the Cape. Also by 1986 the Immorality Act, which outlawed mixed race marriages, was removed from the statutes.

However, as shown above, this approach failed miserably in corralling the alliance that the Botha regime hoped for, with the state becoming increasingly alienated from the majority of the population, resulting in increasing use of
kragdadigheid. It also saw the hardening of the verkramp position leading to the historic 1982 split. This split represented for Van Der Westhuizen the ‘final unshackling of Afrikaner elite interests from those of the worker’. She points out that the basis for this was set by the government’s crushing of the 1978 Afrikaner miners’ strike which was a protest against the lifting of the colour bar.

In the March 1982 split, Andries Treurnicht led 16 MPs out of the NP to create the Conservative Party. In doing so he relinquished his position as head of the NP’s Transvaal machinery to De Klerk, who was elevated to this position despite his conservative roots. Hermann Giliomee’s analysis of the subsequent general election in 1987 indicates the impact of this split. The NP enjoyed 20% support amongst the upper-middle income whites with the rest voting for the Progressive Party, while Jaap Marais’ HNP and the CP enjoyed 10%. The two wings shared the spoils for the middle categories with the NP gaining 45% while the CP/HNP got 49%. While the NP had 35% support amongst the middle income categories, the CP and HNP had garnered 41%. The Nationalist Party was thus becoming more and more a party of the middle and upper classes, and less representative of the poorer white urban and rural classes.

4.1.11 Role of religion

As mentioned above, religion played an important role alongside language and economic upliftment in the forging of the Afrikaner national identity. Religion became a major role player in the post South African War context. Feeling humiliated after the defeat, alienated by Milner’s policy of Anglicisation and suffering economic deprivation, more and more of the Afrikaners sought solace in the church.

This served the clerical class, with Van Der Westhuizen suggesting that ‘Dominees had a distinct interest in keeping Afrikaners white and Afrikaans, as these were the people who constituted their congregations’. She adds that theologians were thus seeking new ways to justify racial segregation’ (2007:50). Steyn traces this back to the centrality in the bible of Noah’s curse of Ham’s son: ‘Cursed be Canaan, a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren’ –
as a basis for slavery. In this way ‘The white master race was sanctioned by divinity’ (2001:12).

Apart from justifying the racism of the Afrikaner ideology, Christianity played a crucial role in shaping their approach to the questions of governance. Duvenage, cites a 1947 article by philosopher AH Murray, who argues that ‘Afrikaners appropriated their experience and theories about local government from their experience with church governance (kerklike bestuur) than from the example of governance that came from the Castle and its environment’ (2014:81). While the southern part of the country was dominated by the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church, referred henceforth as the DRC), two streams were established in the north: the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk, started in 1854 and the Gereformeerde Kerk formed in 1859.

Amongst the first major debates within the DRC was the status of the Bible – should there be a literal understanding of the Holy Book, which was the orthodox view, or the more liberal view of looking at it critically and in its historical context. The debate, won largely by the conservative side, occurred in the public sphere, especially in the pages of Die Zuid Afrikaan which had been started in 1830, and the more liberal Die Onderzoeker. Debates between the two broad wings were to resurface in the 1920s and 1930s around the seeming liberal theology of Prof Johannes du Plessis (Duvenage, 2014:82).

Van Der Westhuizen states that ‘nationalism became an expression of one’s obedience to the will of God…Afrikaners had a divinely ordained right to protect their racial purity’ with apartheid becoming ‘the credo of the church, and obedience to this credo was equated with obedience to God’ (2007:50). While the DRC claimed to be distanced from politics it agitated for measures such as the Mixed Marriages Act, passed in 1949. It ‘declared itself in support of a righteous application of apartheid policies, as this “did not aim at or envisage any inferiority, much less suppression”’(2007:51). The church’s acquiescence can also be seen in its acceptance of government’s diktat which prohibited black people attending churches in white areas.
The DRC responded to international condemnation with the same disdain the NP government showed to the mounting international isolation and sanctions it was facing. Thus when the World Council of Churches, which the DRC was a member of, condemned the various policies under the apartheid rubric, the DRC synod renounced its own representatives. Anti-apartheid activist Beyers Naude was also pushed out of the DRC when the synod found his Christian Institute ‘errant’ and ‘a disturbance of the good order’ (van der Westhuizen, 2007:52).

Within this climate the Dutch Reformed Church, as was to be expected, reflected the disputes in the Afrikaner community. The government reacted with hostility to the Cottesloe Statement which came out of the World Council of Churches conference held from December 14–17, 1960 in Johannesburg and which was issued in reaction to the March 21 1960 Sharpeville massacre. The DRC issued its response to the statement in 1974 in a document titled *Ras, Volk, Nasie en Volkeverhoudinge in die lig van die Skrif* (Race, Folk, Nation and People’s relations in the light of the Bible) arguing ‘that the ‘autogenous development of different population groups’ was justifiable and that mixed marriages were ‘undesired and unauthorised’ – despite an absence of biblical proscription in this regards’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:141).

However, by 1979 contrarian views were being raised, with the Cape Synod suggesting that racial discrimination went against the teachings of the bible. This was followed in 1982 when 123 DRC leading thinkers and clerics argued that the church’s primary task should be a ‘ministry of reconciliation’. In the same year the World Alliance of Reformed Churches declared apartheid a sin and constituted a status confessionis which meant that it was considered impossible to disagree on the issue of apartheid without the integrity of a common confession, as the Reformed Church was being seriously endangered.

Van Huffel (2013) provides a detailed account of the WARC General Assembly which in addition to calling apartheid a heresy, suspended the DRC and the
NHK unless the following changes had occurred: Black Christians no longer excluded from church services, especially from Holy Communion; ‘concrete support in word and deed is given to those who suffer under the system of apartheid (“separate development”); and ‘Unequivocal synod resolutions are made which reject apartheid and commit the church to dismantling this system in both church and politics”. The ‘coloured wing’ of the DRC, the Dutch Reformed Mission Church, carried out the instruction leading to the formulation of the Belhar Confession, named after the Cape Town suburb where the synod met. Amongst the leading lights of the DRMC was Rev Allan Boesak who came to play a leading role in the United Democratic Front.

The DRC felt it had been misrepresented at the Assembly, and that the WARC itself was being hijacked by theologians introducing liberation theology, notwithstanding the fact that it had sent a delegation there. The DRC’s position evolved over the next few years, admitting in 1983 that separate development and the ban on mixed marriages was not based on scripture. In October 1986 the DRC formally approved a new policy statement titled *Church and Society – a testimony of the Dutch Reformed Church* where it threw its doors open to all and accepted that apartheid had wronged people and wrongfully favoured one group over another. This led to about twenty thousand members breaking away to create the Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk. It was only in 1998 that the DRC could get itself to come around to accepting that apartheid was a sin, its biblical justification a heresy requiring a confession.

This active role the church played in exposing and opposing apartheid will be revisited in Chapter Five where I look the churches as a part of civil society.

4.2 Evolution of the National Question

The first section provides a quick survey of the various influences which came to impact on African nationalism. This is followed by an account of how black South Africans interacted with the colonial powers in the aftermath of the wars of resistance. Given the forgoing examination of the role of political entrepreneurs in
the cases of Arab, Indian and Afrikaner nationalism, there is special emphasis
placed on the nature of the individuals who emerged as leaders and the
organisations they created – be they political, religious or based on the press.

This process is referred to as the National Question for various reasons. As Samir
Amin, cited above, said: ‘the national question, which in the 19th century was
primarily that of oppressed European nations, was transferred to the 20th century
to Asia and Africa, where it became the colonial question’ (1980:173). Glaser,
locating this in the context of debates amongst South African Marxists, points out
that ‘(T)hey had to grapple, like Marxists elsewhere in the colonial and ex-colonial
world, with the ‘national question’: the question of how to relate the proletarian
struggle against capitalism to the black ‘national’ struggle against white rule’
(2001:178). As shall be discussed below the South African experience combines
an ‘external’ and ‘internal’ colonial domination leading to the notion of colonialism
of a special type or internal colonialism. The nationalism which thus emerged
combined nationalism and race in a ‘special’ way which is discussed in great detail
throughout this section.

In the Eastern Cape and Natal from the 1860s onwards a pioneering group, who
became the first generation of nationalist entrepreneurs, emerged to provide
leadership to the many struggles being waged by African people. Referred to as
the school people or amakholwa they were at an interesting intersection of
economic, religious, and political developments. Those not belonging to the kholwa
were referred to as the amaqaba (the red or blanket people or pagans). Most
tellingly, as African people were being squeezed off the land, thus losing their
traditional sources of livelihood, this group was acquiring skills for the economy
which was unfolding. In Section 4.2.1 I look at the various influences impacting on
the genesis of African nationalism and especially on this group of political
entrepreneurs. The ideological influences considered include the impact of
Christianity, pan-Africanism and socialist thinking. I include here a consideration of
the emergence of African newspapers as a medium for many of the debates of the
time.

In the subsequent section I look at African responses to colonial domination in the
various provinces and how some of these organizational responses led to the
creation of the African National Congress in 1912. I point out that the various strategies, tactics, and alliances resorted were in the pursuit of a variety of agenda, some 'tribal', some informed by notions of ethnic or linguistic identity.

Section 4.2.3, looks at the African nationalist narrative in relation to the South African War. Seen largely as a fight between two colonising powers – the Boers and the British – it drew in thousands of Africans, as well as impacted on Indians and coloureds. The subsequent Treaty of Vereeniging and the Union of South Africa it ushered is examined in relation to African perspectives in Section 4.2.4

In Section 4.2.5, I provide a lengthy account of the two key ideological battles which occurred within the rubric of African nationalism – that of Africanism and that of non-racialism. The contribution of other elements such as that of the Trotskyite informed Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) and of the Black Consciousness Movement, especially the contribution of Steve Biko, is considered here as well. On the other hand the debate which marked the Marxist circles on the Black Republic Thesis and the subsequent depiction of SA as Colonialism of a Special Type (CST) is considered in some detail. In Section 4.2.6 I extend this discussion to consider the relation between national liberation and socialism. I briefly look at developments up to the February 1990 unbanning of the political organisations in Section 4.2.7, considering the impact of developments such as the launch of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of SA Trade Unions (COSATU).

This would then lay the basis for me to look in Section 4.3 at the issues around the constitutional negotiations, the TRC, and the impact of the ANC in government. In Chapter Five I look at the contemporary manifestations of the 'native question' and the national question.

4.2.1 Ideological influences

This section deals with the development of the political entrepreneurs in terms of the different provinces which were united under the Union of South African in 1910, namely the Cape, Free State, Transvaal and Natal. While all roads eventually led to the 1912 launch of SA Native National Congress, which was renamed the African National Congress in 1925, the different parts of the country had different experiences in the emergence of this group of political entrepreneurs. This was a
result of the complex interplay between different colonial authorities and resistance by the colonised, the nature of economic development in each province as well as the role played by the missionary churches.

By the time the Union of South Africa was created there were three loci of power at the local level: the old traditional leadership which enjoyed tremendous support and respect of their people, the new leaders the colonial government was inserting and buttressing and the office of the local magistrate, which represented an extension of colonial power. African response to colonial encroachment took largely three forms: rejection, accommodation or complete embracing of the new order – but these were not necessarily fixed positions.

The shifting views of three key figures of the 1800s, namely Tshatshu, Ntsikana and Makhanda, reflects this well. Dyani Tshatshu, a product of missionary education, placed himself in the camp of working with the colonists, but then fought against them in another war. This led to him being expelled from his church, and returning to the people of Ntinde where he took on the role of leader. Notwithstanding their reputation as collaborators, the Mfengus also had militant leaders, examined in some detail below as an example of the fluidity of the emerging identities. Ntsikana, who was a key adviser of Chief Ngqika, embodied the approach of grafting the European faith onto Xhosa culture – encouraged in his endeavours by Ngqika, in contrast to the militancy of Chief Ndlambe and Chief Makhanda. This militancy resulted in Makhanda’s incarceration on Robben Island 1820. This thumbnail sketch is discussed in greater detail in this chapter, but one should note that it was in this climate that one of the earliest ‘school people’, Tiyo Soga, returned to SA after studying in Scotland between 1847 and 1857. He took on Tshatshu’s mantle of being a medium between missionary and people, but also pointedly refusing to distance himself from his community.

When looking at how debates on national identity amongst black people has been dominated by the focus on the national question and not narrow ethnic identity, a number of reasons have been proffered for this. Capturing this heady mixture of ideologies, Limb points out that ‘Sandwiched between white colonial nationalism and British imperialism and drawing upon, but in competition with rival ethnic nationalisms, African nationalism was indeed a complex phenomenon’ (2012:11).
Meli (1988) cites the formation of independent African churches, the impact of the discovery of diamonds and gold, and the subsequent emergence of an African working class as equally important factors in shaping African nationalism. He traces the roots of African nationalism to the 1882 formation of Imbumba Yama Africa (Union of Africans).

Walshe (1971) had argued that the ANC’s policy and philosophy evolved in response to white racial policies, but informed by liberalism, Christianity and labour politics. Odendaal argues in a similar vein that early nationalists were ‘Influenced by the trinity of African humanism, or Ubuntu, the egalitarian message of Christianity and mid-Victorian political liberalism’, and ‘they engaged with metropolitan debates... In the process, their struggles and activities acquired an international dimension, which became a strong feature of twentieth century political resistance in South Africa’ (Odendaal, 2012:241).

Peter Limb (2012:31) decries the tendency to ‘conflate the ANC as a wider movement with a smaller coterie of more elitist leaders’. He adds Garveyism, ethnic nationalism, social democracy and communism to the above list. For Limb, ‘African national unity (later ‘African nationalism’) was the ANC’s raison d’etre’. As an example, he cites Rev ZR Mahabane in his Presidential Address to the 1920 Cape Congress urging ‘restoration of our national solidarity and identity as a distinct people in the political economy of South Africa’ (2012:13). Not only were the early founders of the ANC dexterously weaving religion, ethnicities, culture and politics into a national tapestry, but this was against the background of deep economic transformations occurring in the Southern African region and globally.

In the discussion below it shall be shown that there is no point in determining which particular ideological influence had been of signal influence over others in determining the nature of African nationalism. The case of nationalism in the Arab world and Indian nationalism show that ideological postures are contingent upon several factors, not least of all power as embodied in the strength of a particular organisation or a government and the symbols they mobilise behind their particular appeals.

a. Impact of Christianity
In his autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, Nelson Mandela recalls that ‘the two principles that governed my life were the chieftaincy and the churches’. In this section I trace the spread of Christianity and mission schools from the early 1800s and the ensuing complex relationship between Christianity and traditions.

Odendaal (2012:9) describes the mission stations as ‘dotted around the African landscape...in a physical sense enclaves of colonialism in African lands’. A particular place in South African historiography is accorded to the 1816 venture of the London Missionary Society which included above-mentioned Dyani Tshatshu, who was the son of Chief Kote Tshatshu of the Ntinde Xhosa and who was the first of Xhosa royalty to have lived amongst the colonizing whites. Tshatshu was fluent in Dutch and acted as an intermediary for missionaries as well as government officials.

Tshatshu and the missionary delegation travelled for twenty days to get to Makhanda kaNxele, who then became an influential proselytizer of Christianity in a very strong African idiom. They moved on to the area now known as Fort Beaufort, where Chief Ngqika was based. Ntsikana, an adviser of Ngqika, had already developed a reputation for composing hymns, some of which such as *Ulo Thixo omkulu ngosezulwini* (*He, the great God in heaven*) came to be sung at conferences of the ANC.

The contrast between Ntsikana and Makhanda is emblematic of the ideological battles which were going to be being fought out amongst the various strands of African leadership towards the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. While Ngqika saturated himself in Christianity, Makhanda projected himself as ‘warrior prophet’ who came to be known for seeking ‘to attack and root out the invading settlers and became a symbol of uncompromising resistance to colonialism’ (Odendaal, 2012:11). Ndletyana says that though not as prominent as Soga, ‘Tshatshu was similarly dismayed by the prejudice and duplicity of the missionary mission. But both did not jettison the missionary fold. They remained within’ (2014:158).

Tiyo Soga’s arrival, with his Scottish wife, on Port Elizabeth’s shore in 1857 after 7 years studying in Scotland represent a poignant moment in the variant of African
nationalism which to emerge in South Africa and the internationalism which became a key element of it. He was not the only to conduct such trips: it is estimated by American Methodist Episcopal Church (AMEC) historian James Campbell (1995) that between 1894 to 1914 about 150 students studied abroad, of which 50 went to Wilberforce College in Ohio. Others, such as Charlotte Maxeke were taught by WEB du Bois at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, while John L Dube, ANC’s first president, studied at Booker T Washington’s Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. Pixley ka Isaka Seme was to earn the Curtis Medal for debating at Columbia University.

Erlank takes issue with the neat teleology connecting Christianity, education and political leadership. ‘Implicit assertions of causality’ between conversion to Christianity, access to education and anti-colonial politics ‘speaks only to certain public forms of political consciousness and tends to downplay activities which might otherwise support an anti-colonial politics because of their location outside of a modernist, westernized masculine space…as if nationalism were something the black elite caught at school’ (2012:79-80). She suggests that African nationalism took two broad forms in SA: initial, black anti-colonial forms which desired equal rights for blacks and whites; and the latter version espoused by the ANC of the early 20th century which emphasized African unity to overcome white oppression, even though ‘regional political allegiances still dominated and ethnic nationalism tended to overshadow a broader nationalism across the Union’ (2012:84).

However, Crais has argued that this view reflects a more elite form of nationalism: its counterweight was a subaltern nationalism which was the ‘politics of evil’ where anti-colonialism was not interested in equal rights but in the elimination of colonial rule. Talking of the Israelites movement he wrote: While SANNC leaders discoursed on rights and laws, on the individual and the invidiousness of segregation and racial oppression that located them as so many members of tribes, the Israelites’ subaltern speech addressed the problems of evil and good, sorrow and hope... Their faith, their membership in a ‘Black Nation’, would redeem them from a world pf poverty and racial oppression and bring order to a world of wickedness and chaos’ (2002:119-120).
Gibbs points out even within the ‘Janus faced’ missionary school there was a contradiction: ‘education was the domain in which the moral justifications for colonialism were stripped bare. Liberal notions that African pupils and white teachers shared a common humanity sat uncomfortably with another set of liberal ideas that lauded the superiority of while civilizations and cultures’ (2014:13).

Christianity, Erlank argues, ‘facilitated the growth of a shared national imagination’. It thus became ‘an organizational principle for an anti-colonial politics’ though sharing of faith, providing a common vocabulary as well as an institutional framework (2012:85). The prominence of Christian prayers at ANC meetings and its constitutive meeting in Bloemfontein in 1912 being held in a church, as well as views of some of its leading lights have been cited to emphasise the ANC’s umbilical cord relationship with Christianity. By the 1870s more and more Africans were enrolling at missionary schools. Lovedale, one of the more prominent ones, had 380 people enrolled in the three decades before 1870. In the 1870s alone, another one thousand had registered – by 1882 ‘school people’ comprised about 20% of the total African population in King Williams Town. Paralleling a similar process unfolding amongst the Afrikaners, such as the establishment of the University of Stellenbosch, Odendaal argues that Lovedale, Healdtown, St Mathews College and Clarkebury College shaped many of the first generation of nationalist leaders. As did Fort Hare which Mandela described as ‘an Oxford and Cambridge for young black South Africans like myself’ (1995:41).

Future leaders such as John Tengo Jabavu, and brothers James/Meshach Pelem were in Healdtown in 1875 and at around the same time Isaac Wauchope and Walter Rabushana were in Lovedale. The Anglican Kaffir Institution in Grahamstown, forerunner of the St Mathews College, had future leaders like Josiah Gumede, who became President of the ANC.

The experience of Christian missionaries in Natal, while showing many similarities to the experience in the Cape, displayed many stark differences as well. For example, Theophilus Shepstone secretary for native affairs and a member of the executive and legislative councils from the 1856 to 1877 did not see Africans, who had converted, as Christians; nor did he particularly promote Christian practices. Instead he promoted ‘indirect rule by recognizing rights of isiZulu-speaking chiefs
and homestead heads to preserve their customary realm, excluding ancestral worship’ (Carton, 2008:135). This is cited by Carton as one of the reasons why proselytizers found it difficult to spread the message, compared to the liberal approach adopted in the Cape which saw the quicker spread of Christianity. Also, he argues, the message of individual salvation could not penetrate the strong ethos of kinship which had developed amongst the Zulus, against the more fluid identities to be found in the Cape colony.

Anglican missionary Allen Gardiner was amongst those who appreciated that Zulus were following a highly evolved theological system where there was ‘overriding spirit’ umvelingqangi and a more diminutive Supreme Being called unkulunkulu. Certain Zulu practices such as the diets followed made Gardiner and his successor Reverend Owen consider the Zulus to be akin to their Jews, if not one of the Jewish tribes. This view was to be consolidated by Bishop Colenso. Apart from the Wesleyan missions, the Congregationalist American Board of Missions also had a presence through the Natal countryside. Adams College and the Inanda Seminary for girls served the same purpose as the missionary-run schools in the eastern Cape.

One of the ways in which the Transvaal differed from other parts of the country was the predominance of European rather than British missionaries. For example, the Berlin Mission Society which operated in areas as widely spread as Heidelberg, Middelburg and Lydenburg, was the largest missionary body in South Africa. It reached as far north as the areas occupied by the Pedi, Venda and Tsonga. The Botshabelo missionary station in Middleburg had the largest school, reaching an enrolment of 1480 in 1880. As in other parts of the country, traditional leadership developed complex relations with the Christians. For example, Kgosi Mogkatle of the Fokeng welcomed the Lutheran Hermannsburg Mission Society, encouraged all his people to convert but did not do so himself until just before he died. This was out of respect to the traditionalists amongst his people (Odendaal, 2012:188).

British missionaries arrived in the Transvaal in the form of the Kilnerton Institution in 1886, situated in Weavind Park, a suburb of Tshwane (Pretoria), named after the Rev John Kilner. He was secretary of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society who encouraged the formation of an indigenous clergy in South Africa. Mangena
Mokone of Lovedale was asked to help set up the institution, which he did with his own hands. Mokone came to play a critical role in the unfolding politics of the time, petitioning the government on several issues, especially on pass laws. He also criticized the missionary authorities for their discriminatory attitudes especially the shabby conditions blacks had to endure, including unequal pay, housing and transport. He resigned from Kilnerton in 1892, and preached as an independent Methodist in Marabastad, an area close to the centre of Pretoria. He opened his own church in 1894 and hung over the altar the words of Psalm 68:31. This connected him to Tiyo Soga who in 1867 had quoted the very same psalm in his article in Imvo. His actions marked the launch of Ethiopianism, as discussed below.

In Thembuland itself, colonial penetration arrived much later than the rest of the areas discussed above, in the form of annexation by the Cape Colony approached. There a Healdtown-trained Thembu minister, Rev Nehemiah Tile, led a campaign to maintain Thembu independence. He wrote several petitions on behalf of chief Ngangelizwe, bringing Tile in conflict with both the Wesleyan Church and government authorities. Tile left the church and set up an indigenous Thembu church and which was to become part of the Ethiopian movement. Such was the threat he posed, government pressure forced Ngangelizwe, and his successor Dalindyebo, to distance themselves from Tile. Nelson Mandela was born about three decades later as a Thembu in this context.

The Ethiopian movement came into being when several Protestant churches – especially the Congregationalists, Methodists and Presbyterians – were reacting to missionary authority by defecting. Ndletyana argues that given the emphasis on the African experience of Christianity, Ethiopianism was a form of Pan Africanism. The Ethiopian Church itself was co-founded by Rev Mangena Mokone in Pretoria and when he was expelled from the Methodist Church in 1892 he set up his own Wesleyan congregation in 1895. As the number of Ethiopian churches increased, Mokone linked up with leaders from other parts of the country, most notably James Mata Dwane, a Healdtown graduate active in missionary work and politics. Greenstein observes that ‘the Ethiopian churches generally were open to all Africans, regardless of their ethnic and tribal origins’ (1995:6). He provides an explanation why the colonial authorities came to be wary of Ethiopians movement:
‘The crucial defining feature of ‘natives’ in official eyes were not their ancestry, colour or residence as such, but rather their presumed links to the pre-colonial past in terms of land claims, ethno-linguistic identifications and supposed allegiance to traditional political institutions’ – which the church was asserting. This was seen in the way in which the official commissions and government policy grappled with the question of who is a ‘native’ discussed under the ‘native question’ section.

Through Charlotte Maxeke (nee Manye), Mokone was linked to the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AMEC) when she was in the US, studying at Wilberforce University, which was controlled by the AMEC. Charlotte Maxeke was to emerge as one of the outstanding women leaders of her time, and participated in many of the political developments of the day, including addressing the 1902 conference of the SA Native Congress. But she was not alone with several other Christian educated African women making their mark, notably the daughter of Sandile, known as Princess Emma and Nokutela Dube, wife of John Dube. There was also the remarkable example of Alice Kinloch of Kimberley who worked with Henry Sylvester Williams in setting up the prototype pan African organization, the African Association, in 1897. Also, there was the Manyano networks of women congregants of the Methodist Church.

The Ethiopian churches were absorbed into the AMEC and reorganized geographically. With African American Bishop Henry Turner’s visit to the country in 1898, the AMEC was officially launched with Dwane consecrated as Mission Bishop. By 1900 it had about 10 000 adherents meeting in 73 congregations around the country. ‘It marked the very first contact between Africans (in South Africa) and the diasporic Africans’ (Ndletyana, 2014: 160). AMEC itself was never radicalized, even though the mother body in the US was linked to Garveyism. The South African chapter soon realized that its association with the mother body was not of much use – it found that monies collected had to be largely forwarded to the US. Unlike the US church, AMEC South Africa did not support racial purity, for example AMEC did not accept interracial marriages. It withdrew in 1904, reinventing itself as the Ethiopian Catholic Church in Zion.

This association had another interesting spin-off. AMEC South Africa had sent 30 students to Wilberforce University which was linked to AMEC. This caused concern
within the government circles because of the radical political perspective some of those returning were espousing. The eventually led to the government setting up the first tertiary institution for Africans, the University of Fort Hare, in 1916.

Limb, in tracing how labour issues found various expressions in the period at the beginning of the 20th century, points out that the Ethiopian churches ‘really “took off” in the Vaal, where thousands of labourers joined; even in the 1920s many local independent church leaders held “labourers passes”’. Leaders such as James Tantsi, Marshall Maxeke, Henry Reed Ngcayiya, and later, ANC radicals such as Selby Msimang and James Ngojo, had ties with the AME.

There were several other separatist, independent churches, most notably the Presbyterian Church of Africa, created by Lovedale graduate, Pambani Mzimba. The secession of his large Lovedale Presbyterian congregation ‘shocked the white missionary establishment’ (Odendaal, 2012:198). Mzimba was able to carry the Mfengu elements of his church, while the Xhosa minority remained loyal. Despite his Mfengu base, he came out in support of the non-ethnic Congress leading Odendaal to suggest that Congress ‘in a real sense became the political wing of the Ethiopians’ (2012:206).

James Campbell has contrasted the Ethiopian church’s ‘intense localism’ and rootedness with the distance between the elite educated Christians and the majority of Africans. It would be tempting to cast the nationalist African leaders in the same light as the Brahminic leadership of the Indian National Congress. However, as shall be shown below the distance was not as great. Or as Odendaal has suggested the polite petitions of the elite were part of a ‘multi-pronged form of politics (while) religious issues were the trigger for the eruption of scarcely restrained local tensions’ (2012:208).

b. Roots of Pan-Africanism

The Africanist strand is a clear manifestation of Smith’s ethnic-based approach which sees nations being based on ‘ethnic cores’ which have been shaped into a national identity. Even though Africans in South Africa do not share an ethnic core, their connection to the land and their position in relation to the colonial powers is meant to unite them, with the experiences of the different groups being
appropriated into an overarching narrative of a single African people. There were two key moments when this strand emerged strongly: in the late 1950s leading to the eventual breakaway of the PAC from the ANC, and in 1997 when the issue of non-African representation was debated in the ANC’s structures.

Ndletyana has convincingly argued that in this part of the world, ‘Pan Africanism evolved from within South Africa. It was initially articulated in 1865 by Tiyo Soga’. However, he locates Soga’s world view within the broader debates of the day within Pan Africanism globally, discussed under the postcolonial approach above. Perhaps the first pan-Africanist treatise rooted in the South African reality was written by Soga in 1865. In that year John Aitken Chalmers, a missionary colleague of Soga, had published an article in the Indaba titled ‘What is the destiny of the Kaffir Race?’ Chalmers predicted a pessimistic future for the native population if it did not embrace Christianity. In his riposte, titled ‘What is the Destiny of the African Race’ in the King William’s Town Gazette of 11 May 1865, Sogo wrote that Africans had lived long before the missionaries arrived, thus reaffirming their resilience (Ndletyana, 2014:155). Soga insisted that chiefs received their authority from God and thus were as deserving of respect as their white counterparts. ‘I find him (the African) keeping his place among the nations, and keeping his home and country…neither the indolence of the Kaffirs, nor their aversion to change, nor the vices of civilization, all of which barriers the gospel must overthrow, shall suffice to exterminate them’ (cited in Odendaal, 2012:27).

For Ndletyana, Soga was a personification of hybridity – a fusion of the white and black worlds, but he also carried the burden of being located at this intersection: he disapproved of the customary practice of polygamy and witchcraft of the ‘natives’ as well as the abuse of alcohol and the habit of indebtedness of the colonials. Even though he was admitted to the missionary circles and events, he would be allocated separate quarters befitting a native. He was even detained for not having a pass, even though he was exempted from carrying one (2014: 157).

John Dube can be considered as the next major contributor to South Africa’s version of Pan Africanism. It is interesting to note the development in thinking of the Natal-based John Langalibalele Dube who, by the 1890s, was making a mark as a leading proponent of Pan Africanism in South Africa. He believed that
‘European missionaries were insincere, as their conduct and teaching seemed intent on destroying the self-esteem of their African pupils, rather than uplifting them’ (Ndletyana, 2014:159). Dube visited the Tuskegee College which Booker T Washington had established, which inspired him to establish the Ohlange Institute at Inanda, Durban.

Ndletyana argues that the influence of Du Bois on South Africans ‘was strongly reflected in the native elite’s conception of nationhood and citizenship. They envisaged a non-racial franchise in a common society’ with DDT Jabavu (son of JT Jabavu) arguing that the African franchise was a fulfilment of the Christian ethic of ‘doing unto others what you would have them do unto you’. Jabavu tried to assuage white fears of blacks by arguing that blacks had the Christian spirit of non-racialism. In essence, ‘Assimilationists appealed for a transracial alliance of the elite towards a common society…culturally they were similar to civilized whites. Thus they thought only the educated should exercise the franchise’ (2014:163).

Garveyism was to take root in South Africa much later in the 1920s, and especially in the Western Cape. It took the form of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, which had 7 branches in SA, with 5 in Cape Town alone. Garvey’s exclusivist Pan Africanism found expression in the Western Cape leadership of the ANC as well, with James Thaele, one of the provincial leaders, having spent ten years in the US where he came under Garvey’s influence. Similarly, ANC’s Western Cape President, Rev ZR Mahabane, also expressed Garveyist views as did Clements Kadalie, founder of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), whose ambition it was to become the ‘the great African Marcus Garvey’ (Ndletyana, 2014:166).

Pixley ka Izaka Seme was to continue the pan Africanist tradition being established when he made his historic speech at Columbia University on 5 April 1906 starting with the words: ‘I have chosen to speak to you on this occasion upon "The Regeneration of Africa." I am an African, and I set my pride in my race over against a hostile public opinion’. Similarly, when Chief Albert Luthuli, in his speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961, said: ‘Somewhere ahead there beckons a civilization which will take its place in God’s history with other great human syntheses: Chinese, Egyptian, Jewish, European. It will not necessarily be all
black: but it will be African’. Those very themes would be echoed by Thabo Mbeki ninety years later in his ‘I am an African’ speech to mark the adoption of the Constitution on May 1996.

c. Impact of socialist thinking

Limb points out that the ANC of the early 1900s is so dressed up as ‘middle class’ that workers in its midst are easily mistaken as petit bourgeoisie. He goes on to argue that ‘Historians have not always grasped the power of community, kin, and nation. The politicized nouveaux riches, if quick to build bigger houses for themselves, largely inhabited the same dusty neighbourhoods, read the same newspapers, gave allegiance to the same political bodies and suffered the same repressive laws as the less “respectable”’ (2012:21). This ensured that the elite were in direct contact with the experience of exploitation that the labouring classes had to endure. In the nationalist elite’s critique of the emerging exploitative system which was emerging it was therefore not surprising that they tended to be receptive to some extent to socialist ideas.

For example, Allan Soga, son of Tiyo, used his editorship of the newspaper Izwi Labantu to air socialist perspectives. He gave Keir Hardie a Scottish socialist and the first Labour Member of Parliament, during his visit to South Africa in 1908, space to expand on socialism. Josiah Gumede’s radicalism was attributed to links with Pan Africanist Henry Sylvester Williams and Keir Hardie on a trip to London in 1907 to purchase land on behalf of Chiefs in the Orange River Colony.

Reflecting on labour issues in 1901 in the pages of Izwi Soga wrote that he saw the Union of South Africa as ‘a glorious country for corporation pythons and political puff-adders, forced labour and commercial despotism’. In 1906 he saw the labour conflict already occurring as ‘a phase of the coming struggle between capital and labour’. He saw the denial of the franchise to Africans as ‘the superior strategy of the …capitalist class…playing their game for cheap labour’. It condemned the ‘chapter of horrors’ mineworkers had to endure, arguing that ‘The roots of the evils that exist’ with Master and Servant relations ‘lies with the Masters’ (Limb, 2012: 87).
Over the next few decades at different points in time the works of Moses Kotane, Albert Nzula, John Gomas and JB Marks, were focused on labour and working class issues. These themes were taken up in the 1940s by Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela (notwithstanding the latter’s anti-communism at the time) who sought to combine nationalistic and class issues, as well as people like Jack and Ray Simons, amongst the first white members of the ANC. Limb admits that it is ‘undeniable that Cape liberalism and the deeply religious persuasion of much of the black elite gave early black political leaders an almost condescending wanting to “uplift” their compatriots (2012:31).

A key factor stymying the emergence of African working class organisations is the repression that was being faced. As indicated in the section on Afrikaner nationalism, all kinds of repressive devices were resorted to to address the ‘native question’. This included the universally hated pass laws and the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act which limited the movement of African workers as well as the creation and membership of labour organisations. The different provincial governments after Union refined the legislation even further to meet their specific needs. For example, African children captured during the South African War by the white commandos of the Boer Republics were kept as legally sanctioned ‘apprentices’ – a euphemism for slavery. The Transvaal and Natal amendments to the Masters and Servants Act in 1926 further restricted the movement of rural labourers (Limb, 2012:51). If this was not sufficient managers, especially in the mines, simply did not pay workers for long periods (Limb, 2012:53). Compounds served as impregnable areas of worker concentration, making it difficult for any form of working class solidarity to emerge. But it did allow for the emergence of informal networks of mutual assistance.

Of the white trade unions present before 1912, only four were willing to accept black members. Archie Crawford, editor of the Johannesburg socialist newspaper, Voice of Labour, provided space for Congress leaders such as John Dube and Abdullah Abdurahman space to air their views. An important development in this period was the splitting from the Labour Party in 1915 and the creation of the International Socialist League under the leadership of communists such as SP
Bunting, which led to the creation of the CPSA in 1921. The shifting perspectives of the CPSA/SACP is dealt with in greater detail below.

Despite the absence of trade unions, worker protest actions of all sorts were prevalent. Limb points out that strikes began almost as soon as slavery ended. These involved Mefengu beach labourers in PE in 1846; dock workers in Cape Town in 1854, 1889, 1891-1893, 1896 and 1901 and Durban in 1875 and 1901-1903 to name but a few. This reached its peak when Africans joined the white mineworkers in their 1913 strike: 9 000 Africans across five mines, though initially intimidated by the white workers, took part with many acting by their own volition.

Another effective form of opposition was labourers simply refusing to leave their lands. After the South African War of 1899-1902 ‘Africans voted with their feet against reduced mine wages and when white people attempted to reclaim lost property, some labourers refused to work on their farms’ (Limb, 2012:55). The impact of this weapon was reduced with the effect of droughts and war and eventually the Native Lands Act of 1913. Worker delegations were also sent to relevant authorities as well as resorted to the courts for relief. Limb takes pleasure in noting that ‘historians point to the ANC’s use of such tactics as petitions, delegations and courts as evidence of its petit bourgeois nature, yet workers themselves used such tactics’ (2012:53).

d. Newspapers as medium and message

In South Africa the press came to play a prominent role, very much as Benedict Anderson (1983) has described the impact of the spread of print in other contexts. With some of them using the vernacular of the different people of South Africa, its possible that they could have contributed to dividing Africans. Instead, because all of them focused on exposing and sharing the experiences of their varied readers they were able to link their struggles with that of their brethren in other parts of the country, despite speaking different languages.

*Indaba* (The News) was the first significant Xhosa newspaper, published monthly at Lovedale from 1862 to 1865. While avoiding politics and focusing on missionary issues, it did address matters such as relations between Christians and chiefs, education, liquor, justice and ‘tribal history’. Soga welcomed it in his contribution
in its inaugural issue and remained a consistent contributor alongside people such as William Kobe Ntsikana, son of Ntsikana, Simon Peter Gasa, Ntibane Mzimba and Govan Kokoba – all of whom came to play prominent roles in the unfolding politics of the day (Odendaal, 2012:30).

*Isigidimi sama-Xosa* was the popular name of the *Xhosa Express*, produced monthly in Xhosa and English. Also originating from Lovedale in October 1870, it was initially edited by its principal, Dr James Stewart, and was controlled by the missionaries. After a year, it had 800 subscribers, 500 of whom were Africans. While also eschewing politics, it came to reflect literate African opinion. It drew on the same stable of contributors as *Indaba*, with one of them, Gwayi Tyamzashe, showing the mobility of the educated class when in 1874 he became the first African minister on the Kimberley diamond fields.

As colonialist attitudes were hardening younger educated African Christians were challenging white supremacist views. ‘Kokela’ of Gcalekaland wrote to complain of how the missionaries were destroying purity of the Xhosa language by standardizing ‘Fingo’ and Xhosa into one language. On the other hand, ‘Fundani Makowetu’ (be learned my countrymen) held a view that was a bone of contention amongst the political. He or she felt that ‘Africans had still not advanced enough and that African independence retarded progress’ (Odendaal, 2012:37). As mentioned in Chapter Three such sentiments could be found in the cases of India and the Arab world.

After three years *Xhosa Express* and *Isigidimi* became separate papers, with Elijah Makiwane editing *Isigidimi*, becoming the first African newspaper editor in South Africa. From 1879 it became a bi-monthly. Makiwane was replaced by JT Jabavu in 1884, when the former became a church minister. After a few years there were differences between the leadership of Imumba and Jabavu’s editorship when the newspaper criticized the powerful National Education Association (NEA). Jabavu was also under pressure from the Lovedale leadership who wanted him to moderate the political tone. This led to his resignation on 29 May 1884, determined to set up an independent newspaper.
This was the *Imvo Zabantsandu* (Native Opinion) which was launched on 3 November 1884, with financial backing arranged through James Rose-Innes. Jabavu edited the newspaper for 40 years, until his death in 1921. Very much along the lines described by Anderson, ‘In short time the new newspaper brought together the fragmented pattern of African politics in the eastern Cape into a much more cohesive whole. As well as adding to the confidence and effectiveness of the emerging elite, it became a potent unifying force among Africans’. This development also represented a ‘loss of missionary control over school people’ (Odendaal, 2012:106-107).

The Durban-based *Inkanyiso yase Natal* (Light of Natal) survived from 1889 to 1896, with Solomon Kumalo its editor. It was the key outlet for Natal’s *khowla* such as John Dube and Josiah Gumede, with the former using its pages to promote his self-help approach to the problems Africans faced. It ‘began – gently at first and then more stridently – to criticize pass laws, the tenuous status of Africans granted exemption from Native Law and lack of *kholwa* employment opportunities’ (Limb, 2012:93). It was printed on a press provided by the Anglican Society for the propagation of the Gospel. By 1891, this Zulu-English monthly had become a weekly, with a circulation of 2,500. It was the mouthpiece of the Funamalungeo (Seeking Civic Rights) Society. Both institutions were headed by alumni of mission schools in the eastern Cape.

The longest lasting of the Natal newspapers was the *Ilanga lase Natal* (Natal Sun) which was launched in 1903, edited by John Dube. While reflecting Dube’s inclination towards free enterprise, it did distance itself from the state, especially around the 1905-1906 protests against the poll taxes which led to the Bambatha Rebellion.

*Izwi Labantu* (Voice of the People) was an East London-centred paper operating from November 1897 to 1909, whose editors included Nathaniel Umhalla, George Tyamazashe, Samuel Mghayi and Allan Soga. In its editorials and in the correspondence received it mirrored the process of proletarianization that Africans were undergoing. Given the eastern Cape’s position as a major migrant labour depot, this focus was not surprising. It served as the voice of the SANC, and was a rival to Jabavu’s *Imzo*. These dynamics are also explored in greater detail below.
It was funded through a combination of contributions from the African community and possibly Cecil John Rhodes. Odendaal suggests that the latter’s generosity was probably due to his seeking new allies after the fallout from the disastrous Jameson Raid. It gave those African ‘intellectuals and activists with a more African-centred approach to politics a forum…serving African readers in their own languages, and a major step forward in the development of Xhosa literature’ (2012:146-147). One of the later editors was Samuel Edward Krune Mqhayi, regarded as the ‘father of Xhosa poetry’, who committed the oral poetry of the imbongi or praise singers to written form. It very quickly began reaching out to areas outside the eastern Cape.

*Koranta ea Becoana* (Bechuana’s Gazette), which lasted from 1901 to 1908, based in Mafeking, was owned by a Congress leader, Silas Molema, and edited by Sol Plaatje. The role played by the latter in national politics has overshadowed his editorship role. The *Koranta* also made a name for itself exposing the conditions of workers and encouraging African leadership to come out more strongly on that. They provided space for the Chiefs in their areas to speak of the workers who had come from their localities. Plaatje himself continuously wrote about the harsh conditions and terrible punishment meted out to workers. He described the high rate of accidents as a ‘butchery’, occurring ‘with terrible frequency’ (Limb, 2012:91).

These various influences shaped African politics until the 1940s. Under Section 4.2.5 Different Approaches to the National Question, I will be building on these influences, particularly that of the CPSA/SACP and the formulation of the Black Republic Thesis and Colonialism of a Special Type (CST) approach; the configurations of Pan Africanist thinking and the processes leading to the emergence of a non-racial approach and ethos within the ANC. For now I focus on the tectonic shifts occurring amongst the Indian, coloured and African peoples at the turn of the twentieth century, and how these laid a basis for debates on the national question from the 1940s onwards.

**4.2.2 Response to colonial domination**

The experience gained in ministry work or in education equipped a large number of young people with organizational skills, which was put to good use in
establishing a plethora of organisations. At the turn of the century a number of different formations were being consolidated, most of which would become the branches and provincial structures of the African National Congress. Prominent amongst these were the Native Vigilance Associations (NVA) and the South African Native Congress established in 1898. There were also the Natal Native Congress, created in 1900, the Cape Native Congress (1902), the Transvaal Vigilance Association (1902), and the Orange River Colony NVA (1903), which was renamed the ORC Congress.

Here I look at the most prominent organisations in the Cape Colony, including those which did not join the various tributaries into the SANNC, renamed the ANC in 1925. In doing so I am emphasising Somers’ (2008) argument citizenship is seen as the ‘right to have rights’. Her approach combines the liberal view of citizenship, which many of the early nationalists were pursuing, in terms of extending the rights enjoyed by the white population; the communitarian, whereby people were coming together in the active pursuit of a common good; and the republican, which emphasises political debate and decision-making in shaping society.

In looking at how identity was evolving in the period up to the launch of the SANNC, I look at how local, ethnic or linguistic forms were being streamed into a wider nationalist narrative. This section will be looking at how the historically derived identities were articulating with the way the colonial and apartheid authorities were trying to shape identities, as discussed under the section on the ‘native question’. To recall Kellas’ view: ‘it is often the state which classifies people according to ethnic groups, nationality and race. This may or may not be entirely accepted by the people concerned, but it usually leads to dual or multiple identities, especially when an historical national identity is overlaid with a contemporary political status, such as citizenship, or with a new ‘national’ identification derived from the state (1991:14).

In discussing citizenship and identity, I shall be linking this back to the third core theme of the thesis: that of sovereignty. In this case I will be looking at how at different moments African people came to see the sovereignty which was embodied in their group or their leader was usurped by the colonial authorities who
then proceeded to establish more malleable embodiments of sovereignty – which were unsustainable because they did not represent ultimate political authority.

a. The Cape Colony

- Contestation for representation

It is tempting, when looking at the African response to colonial rule, to try and explain shifting alliances in strict colonizer or colonized terms. The 1877/8 War of Ngcayecibi is of particular importance. It saw the Gcaleka in alliance with parts of the Ngqika fighting against the colonial forces while the Mfengu, Tembu and parts of the Ngqika joining the colonial forces. Amongst the few Christian Africans siding with the Gcaleka were Dukwana, son of Ntsikana, and Gonya and Mlindazwe, sons of Chief Sandile.

Umhalla’s experience is symptomatic of those who were rejected by colonial society when they asserted their African identity. He was the son of the Ndlambe chief Mhala and maintained what Odendaal calls a ‘precarious neutrality’ between the colonisers and his own people (2012:41). He was amongst a group of children of chiefs who were sent in the mid 1800s to study at Zonnebloem in the western Cape. The value of their traditional upbringing was attested to by the missionary teachers who commented on their innate understanding of broader issues. Umhalla became a catechist teacher in Cofimvaba, and then an interpreter in King William’s Town. Notwithstanding this, he became the first African to be charged with treason for having supported the Gcaleka, only to be acquitted after his trial.

The post war settlement, captured in the Peace Preservation Act of 1878, came to signal a turn in relations between the various groups and the colony. The Act, referred to as the Disarmament Act, required all Africans to hand over their arms and, with other laws such as the Vagrant, Branding and Pass Acts, saw the systematic deprivation of Africans of the limited rights they had at the time.

The deep sense of disappointment with the peace settlement experienced by Africans generally led to the aspiring middle class to mobilise politically. JT Jabavu was to play a leading role, calling for black people to be able to elect their own representatives to parliament. He argued for African self-help, saying that whites
could not be trusted to help raise the African people economically, while also calling for collaboration with ‘friends of the native’, including those in England. The latter approach saw him linking up with liberal politicians and the Aborigines Protection Society. In 1884 he became the editor of Isigidimi, which he used to pursue his political campaigns.

A particularly important organisation of the time was the Native Educational Association (NEA) which, though initially working from a narrow base of teachers, soon spread from King William’s Town and Peddie to Alice and Fort Beaufort. It was launched by St Mathews College-based John Gawler, a grandson of Makhanda, in the early 1880s. When JT Jabavu arrived at Lovedale he was made vice-president (the authorities insisted on a white man being president). Its leadership over the next few decades consisted of people who were to play crucial political role. This included Elijah Makiwane, first editor of the Xhosa Express, Pambani Mzimba, and William Kobe Ntsikana. Walter Rubusana replaced Jabavu as vice president in 1887. In response to government’s general attack on African education it morphed from a professional association into a political body. Makiwane, however, represented the thread amongst khowla thinking which argued that ‘the natives are an inferior nation’. This view was similar to that of the Isigidimi correspondent mentioned above. Jabavu was uncomfortable with this, and when he was frustrated in pushing the NEA into a more political direction, severed all ties with the body (Odendaal, 2012:62-63).

The next critical organisation of the time was better known as the Union, which came to be contrasted with the Congress. Created by some of the leading contributors to Isigidimi, the Imbumba Yama Nyama (Union of Africans) took its name from the call made by Ntsikana that Africans must be imbumba yamanyama that is inseparably bound. Its leadership included Simon Peter Sihlahli, Meshach Pelem and Isaac Wauchope. It was launched in September 1882 in Port Elizabeth and was seen by its creators as a response to the Afrikaner Bond, with its members claiming they were the true Afrikaner Bond. They committed themselves to fighting ‘battles in writing than guns’, using traditional forms of expression such as praise poems, emphasized respect for their chiefs and campaigned for the release of the Ngqika, Thembu and Gcaleka chiefs who had been imprisoned after the 1877/8
War of Ngcayecibi. Imbumba’s constitution committed the organization to protect the rights of all Africans in South Africa, encouraging them to become voters, to monitor the Port Elizabeth municipality while encouraging Africans to become eligible for positions in parliament and in the town council, to support Isigidimi, and to overcome denominational and ethnic divisions. Its membership included many coloured people.

Odendaal points out that leading members of Imbumba were ‘tied together by a whole network of involvements and activities’ (2012:71). Despite its potential, the organization was unable to spread beyond a few urban centres but, with the change in direction of NEA, it was realized that ‘for the new style activists to be successful, they would need to be organized at regional and country-wide levels as well’ (2012:73). Imbumba’s demise could be traced to a combination of factors: Jabavu falling out with it and thus denying them access to Isigidimi, it not being based where there were large concentrations of African people and competition between NEA and Imbumba. Odendaal writes that the important lesson was that ‘the politics of the emerging middle class were not homogenous’ (2012:74).

Thus organisations continued growing along ‘local and, therefore, largely ethnic lines’ (2012:76). However, their work and that of the newspapers in the Cape had the effect, after representative government and an elected parliament was introduced in 1853, of returning candidates that black people preferred. Responsible government from the 1870s established a party system, which the Afrikaner Bond used to promote Afrikaner interests. While these efforts were sporadic there was a concerted effort from the 1880s onwards to get Africans applying for the right to vote. The number of African voters increased from 14% of the total in 1882 to 43 % in 1886.

It is unclear why African candidates did not stand for elections, with support for white candidates being the preferred route. The only exception was Walter Rubusana who secured a seat in the Cape Provincial Council. The fact that Africans had lost the right to carry arms through legislation of the 1879-1884 parliament was one of the lines used in mobilizing voters to register. In some cases, as in that of James Rose-Innes, all African voters in Victoria East in the 1884 elections voted for him. However in the case of the Aliwal North seat Jabavu
through *Isigidimi* successfully supported JW Sauer, despite his opponent H Tamplin managing to get the support of several headmen. Jabavu’s favoured candidates were returned in Victoria East, Aliwal North, Grahamstown and King William’s Town.

Opposition to black representation was one of the key debates of the 1884 parliament, with speakers describing them as politically naïve and easily manipulated, and hence exercising a blanket vote. Jabavu argued against this, pointing out that Afrikaners supported the Afrikaner Bond en masse; also that ‘from tribal experience, Africans were natural politicians and they had voted in an intelligent and independent way’ (Odendaal, 2012:100).

Flush with the success of political mobilization around candidates for parliament, many of the African intellectuals began raising the question of creating an umbrella organization. JT Jabavu felt that the NEA could adapt into playing such a role, saying that a Union of the Native was required. Inter-city activities, including competitive cricket games, were beginning to occur with increasing regularity, spurring on calls for greater regional cooperation.

The trigger for the creation of such a regional organization came in the form of the Parliamentary Voters Registration Act passed in September 1887 which extended franchise to the recently annexed Transkei Territories, but defined the property qualification as based on individual ownership, not the traditional tribally held tenure. Appropriately labelled *Tung’ umlomo* (the sewing up of the mouth), *Imvo* editorialized that ‘having taken away their weapons under the Disarmament Act, (PM) Sprigg now sought to remove even their constitutional weapons’ (Odendaal, 2012:115).

Meetings and petitions were organized to protest, while preparations were made for a delegation to England. ‘The Petition of the South African Natives to the Queen’, printed in *Imvo* in August 1887, was adopted in each of the eastern Cape districts. While the trip did not materialize, Odendaal points out that this development marked a departure from the discourse with colonial missionaries, officials and politicians.
The regional initiative was finally launched on 6 October 1887 in King Williams Town with Elijah Makiwane, past president of the NEA, chairing. At this stage Elijah Makiwane had attained the status of an eminence grise. The Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu (Union of Native Vigilante Associations) was launched at this conference, with a call to create Iliso Lomzi (eye of the house) or NVAs in all areas. Jabavu was elected Secretary General while his committee included leading lights such as Nathaniel Umhalla and Cobus Mpondo.

The African franchise came under concerted attack in the run up to the 1888 elections. Objections raised, especially by the Afrikaner Bond, were based on three key arguments: the communal tenure disqualification, insufficient property values and that some Africans were aliens since they were born outside the Cape colony as it existed then (Odendaal, 2012:124). This resulted in about 20 000 names, about 25% of the total, names being struck off the roll – almost all of them either African or coloured. Despite this several seats were voted in favour of liberal candidates referred to as ‘friends of the natives’, due especially to the bloc vote by Africans.

The Afrikaner Bond’s efforts were carried into the 1889 upper chamber elections. A bill aimed at expanding the pass laws was withdrawn only after intense campaigning led by Makiwane and Isaac Wauchope, leading Odendaal to comment: ‘Africans were now a force in Cape politics’ (2012:127). However, response to the 1894 Glen Grey Act, which Odendaal describes as ‘a step towards the formal segregation and apartheid of later years’ (Odendaal, 2012:132), was not as successfully opposed.

The differences in local African politics discussed above was institutionally manifested in differences between Ingqungqula, or Congress, vis a vis Jabavu’s Imbumba, or the Union. A number of leaders had indicated their dissatisfaction with Jabavu treating the Union as his personal fiefdom. The Congress leaders were being seen as newcomers while ‘the elders’ were congealed around Imbumba. The elders were drawn from the peasantry while the younger generation was drawn from the emerging professional class.
Jonathan Tunyiswa, with leaders such as Nathanial Umhalla, Paul Xiniwe, William Kobe Ntsikana, and Reverend Philip convened the inaugural South African Natives Congress (SANC) meeting in King William’s Town on 30/31 December 1891, with representatives from 15 eastern Cape towns. The delegates were concerned about relations with Imbumba, with Jabavu having already written the initiative off in the pages of *Imvo*. It adopted a strongly worded resolution condemning the erosion of the African franchise. Odendaal argues that SANC’s ‘very name was aspirational, pointing to the creation of a wider inter-territorial unity: South Africa at that stage was still two decades from being born’ (2012:142).

The SANC was to act actively as the voice of all Africans on many occasions. An example of this was its presentation to the SANAC. However, Limb notes, ‘The paucity of enfranchised African citizens simultaneously weakened political organisations yet made them more likely to seek alliances with other social strata, such as workers, to bolster their fortunes’ (2012:78).

SANC kept putting itself forward as representative of all Africans, even though its language was couched in ‘imperial loyalty’. But the conservative government of Gordon Sprigg was contemptuous, claiming in 1902 that it was only a body of handful of educated troublemakers. However, as the number of delegates to its meetings increased the government began recognizing it as a representative organization, useful to be engaged with and serving as a safety valve (Limb, 2012:86).

- **Identity formation**

The case of the Thembu and the Mfengus is considered in a bit more detail here to understand the complex interplay of identity and alliance politics. In the area east of the Indwe River in Transkei, the four Emigrant Thembu chiefs, Gecelo, Sitokhwe, Ndarhala and Matanzima had given land to a group of farmers, many of whom were Mfengu, and who were introducing non-traditional farming methods, thus improving productivity. However, there developed competition between these progressive and the traditionalist farmers, resulting in the rebellion of 1880-81. The latter group attacked the Mfengu, who turned to the government for protection.
Compared to the Thembu, the Mfengu had gone through a completely different trajectory in their political development. The Mfengu had fled Natal because of the Mfecane and when they reached the Cape Colony they allied themselves with the colonial authority in the 1835 war. They were allowed to settle around Peddie, effectively providing the colonials a buffer against the Xhosa and an ally during the frontier wars of 1846, 1850/3 and 1877. This original population of 17 000 had grown to 30 000 by the 1860s and were granted land in what came to be known as Fingoland. They remained loyal to the British Empire while the Xhosas ‘who had been on the receiving end of colonial conquest subsequently adopted a more nationalistic approach to political issues’ (Odendaal, 2012:17).

In the aftermath of the Nongqawuse cattle-killing of the 1850s the enfeebled Gcaleka Xhosa people of Sarhili were expelled from southern Transkei, and in 1865 their land was allocated to the Mfengu. The areas of Tsomo, Ngamakwe and Butterworth fell under the newly fangled Fingoland which lay to the east and south of the Thembu areas. Thus, right from the beginning of their settlement ‘the welfare of the Fingoland inhabitants depended on the politics of collaboration’ (Odendaal, 2012:87). The Mfengu were well rewarded for their support of the government side in the 1877/8 War of Ngcayecibi for which they enjoyed a close relationship between headmen and colonial authorities.

After the ensuing Thembuland Commission of 1883 the government provided even more land for white settlement under title, while Africans got a more tenuous ‘ticket of occupation’. The Thembu Association grew out of the resistance by 20 000 Glen Grey residents to be removed to the Transkei after the 1880-81 rebellion. Colonists had already taken some of the land which had been granted to the Thembu from them. James Pelem, who had Ngqika roots, played a leadership role here and was part of the delegation sent to meet the government in Cape Town in August 1883. This remained a central issue, with the government trying to persuade the Thembu to move to Qumbu and Tsolo.

However, the disenfranchisement they were to suffer soon after that led the Mfengu to also oppose the colonialists. As Beinart and Bundy comment (1987:8): ‘Disappointed loyalists were (often) the bitterest 20th century rebels’. To complete
the story of developments in the Transkei, by 1931 all 26 of the Transkei’s districts fell under the the federal structure of the Bunga (to discuss).

As mentioned above the Congress leadership had to deal with Jabavu and his Mfengu base. But to demonstrate his point about the ‘complexity and diversity’ of African experiences Odendaal points out how roles were reversed during the 14 May 1908 inaugural observation by the Mfengu of Fingo Emancipation Day to mark their release from Gcaleka ‘slavery’ and their coming under British rule in 1835. It was also ‘inspired by concern at the deteriorating position of Mfengu in colonial society and by the desire to have the government officially acknowledge their past services and safeguard past agreements’ (2012:154). Interestingly, the SANC President, Thomas Mqanda took part in the proceedings while some of Jabavu’s Izwi readers and other Congress leaders found this display of divisive ethnicity offensive.

These developments did provoke calls for a Xhosa festival in honour of Ntsikana, who converted to Christianity before the Mfengu exodus. Thus, Ntsikana Remembrance Day was celebrated every year from 10 April 1909. The SANC leadership was even more prominently involved in this event. Odendaal points out that the two festivals continued until 1973 ‘when, paradoxically, they were discontinued in line with the Bantustan government’s ‘Ciskeian nationality policy’, aimed at reconciling the Xhosa and the Mfengu (2012:155).

b. Natal

The colonial history of Natal has been dominated by the pre-colonial rise of the Zulu Kingdom and the subsequent brutal and imperialistic British strategy to bring the native population to heel. This resulted in prolonged periods of armed conflicts and then the establishment of a discriminatory British administration which laid the basis for the segregationist policies of apartheid. These wars delayed the emergence of the kind of political society which had emerged in the Cape in the late 1800s. While it is not within the ambit of this study to go into this history in detail, it is certainly worthwhile recalling some elements which find echo in today’s debates around identity and sovereignty.

- Contestation around representation
In this section I begin by looking at how Zulu, British and Boer attempts at stamping their own will in the region was an ongoing tale of shifting political alliances. I then look at how the issue of franchise was fought over and how various organisations emerged to give agency to the inchoate desires of the colonized people prior to the creation of the SANNC in 1912.

Centralisation of the Zulu kingdom only began in the late 18th century. Shaka is famous for having welded the different chieftainships in Natal into the Zulu kingdom. Sithole describes this as a ‘highly stratified and hierarchical society with the king and the royal aristocracy at the apex. Underneath was…the amakhosi and the iziphakanyiswa (the more important chiefs and notables) who were subjugated in the ensuing stages of Zulu expansion…(they) were made to believe that they had a shared interest in maintaining the existing social hierarchy’ (2008:xiii-xiv). The next layer were the amantungwa, the laboring layer, which was encouraged to adopt the ethnic ntungwa identity and to see themselves as sharing the culture of the upper layers. The amalala (the menials) were the majority and were restricted to the periphery of the Zulu kingdom.

Imperial over reach was an affliction even for Shaka, curbing the Zulu leader’s ambitions for further expansion and control. The emergence of disaffected elements under the leadership of his half-brother Dingane resulted in Shaka’s assassination on 24 September 1828. Dingane reduced the kingdom to a more manageable size, ceding control of territory south of the Thukela to the encroaching British colony. Port Natal had already been established by 1824 and Shaka had seen the British as trading partners complementary to the Portuguese traders in Mozambique, which borders Natal.

The native population had to contend with another white incursion in the form of the trekboers, who in October 1837, traversed the Drakensberg with arms, horses and wagons. Rapidly entering into a race-based alliance with the British, they were quickly making demands on the Zulu kingdom. This led to intense warfare of several months, starting from the February 1838 killing of Piet Retief and his party at uMgungundlovu, Dingane’s palace. Andries Pretorius led the “Voortrekkers” to victory in the 16 December 1838 defeat of the Zulus at the battle of Ncome (Blood
Dingane allowed the trekboers to settle around today’s Pietermaritzburg where they established the short-lived Republiek Natalia.

The Boers struck an alliance with Mpande, Dingane’s half-brother and rival, who proceeded to defeat Dingane in battle on 29 January 1840. Once Mpande was installed as King, he allocated vast tracts of land (almost five sixths of the territory, according to Odendaal, 2012:162) to the Boers, but which the British were not keen to allow. The latter proceeded to annex Natalia as a British possession, which Mpande formally recognized in 1843. Mpande, however, had to continue dealing with the attempts by the South African Republic (Transvaal) who wanted to grab control of the verdant northern lands of the Zulu kingdom. Upon Mpande’s death in September 1872, Cetshwayo took over the reign until the early 1900s.

‘In the interests of imperial strategy, financial saving and economic opportunity (the British) planned to bring all the white-ruled states in the region under their single authority’ (Laband, 2008:92). They had to deal with the South African Republic which had been annexed as the Transvaal Colony in 1877, which in turn demanded support of their land claims in Zululand. This led to the British turning their backs to the Zulus, with military confrontation becoming inexorable. This saw the British suffer an ignominious defeat at the Battle of Isandlwana on 22 January 1879. This war finally ended on 4 July 1879, with Cetshwayo being sent off to prison in Saint Helena. The different chiefdoms continued fighting each other, some allied with the British. Cetshwayo eventually died in February 1884 to be succeeded by the young Dinizulu.

There was a symbiotic relationship between the Natal administration and African farmers, especially since the white farmers could not meet the needs of the colony. The government thus bought basic food items such as maize from Zulus in imizi or homesteads. As Lambert puts it, these productive farmers were able to move between reserves, Crown land and settler lands ‘with relative ease, establishing new gardens and seasonally driving their cattle between pastures’ (2008:214). However, ‘overpopulation, soil exhaustion, and environmental collapse contributed to a dramatic fall in overall imizi food production. By the early twentieth century the amaZulu’s share of Natal’s maize crop dropped from 80 per cent in the early 1880s to 38 per cent’ (2008:215). This precarious situation worsened the plight of Zulus
as drought hit the area from 1883 to 1898, followed by locust plagues of 1894-1896 and spread of rinderpest from 1897 to 1899.

This had a huge impact on the social fabric of society, because with the steep decline in cattle, and Zulu fathers reluctant to allow their daughters to marry without the cattle dowry, or *lobola*, there were more childbirths outside of family structures. The resultant indebtedness led to the proletarianization of society, with the *imizi* being deserted as men went to work in urban and mining centres. Even, ‘In the countryside, old established *kholwa* settlements such as Edendale and Groutville, once prosperous beacons to some African Christians, slipped into poverty’ (Lambert, 2008:218).

Dinizulu proved to be as wily as his predecessors, striking an alliance with the Boers when the South African Republic had gained its independence from the British after the first Anglo-Boer War of 1881. He ceded the territory the Boers had been coveting all this while, which they duly proclaimed as the New Republic, with its capital in Vryheid. However, Zulus living in that territory were quickly reduced to labour tenants (Laband, 2008:94). The British could not allow the Boers to get away with this and so annexed a large part of the land under Dinizulu’s sway, calling it the British Colony of Zululand and introducing the system which had been established in Natal since 1846 already. In 1891, a new Natal Native Code was promulgated wherein chiefs, including Dinizulu, were reduced to an inferior status as paid officials, with hut tax being imposed to finance the administration. In the aftermath of internecine fighting with the Mandlakazi, Dinizulu was imprisoned in St Helena.

British colonist access to Zululand itself was nevertheless initially denied – a situation which also came to an end in December 1897 when the Colony of Zululand was annexed by the British to Natal as the Province of Zululand. ‘Thus the young men of Zululand, who in their *amabutho* had once served their king, became migrant labourers on farms and mines and in the towns of white-ruled industrializing South Africa’ (Laband, 2008:95). Upon his release, Dinizulu continued being considered as the legitimate king of the Zulus, ‘and during the Union and apartheid years his heirs continued to provide a living link with the
precolonial Zulu kingdom, and to act as a focus for a renewed sense of Zulu national consciousness, pride and unity’ concludes Laband (2008:96).

The *kholwa* in Zululand had an organic connection with the chiefs and the headmen since a large number of the believers were non-literate peasants. The traditional leaders’ involvement in politics gave a special legitimacy of the efforts of the educated activists. Despite their being about 10 000 *kholwa* in Natal by the 1880s, they were still severely discriminated against by the British, such as in the way the franchise was extended. According to Natal’s 1856 constitution all men above 21 who possessed immovable property worth £50 or paid £10 rental per annum were allowed to vote. However, the Act of 1864 quickly qualified that even further, laying conditions for exempting educated Christian Africans from ‘native law’. An African had to apply for exemption providing full and lengthy personal details, as well as proof of literacy. An unmarried woman had to get a European to support her exemption application. Exemption was still at the Governor’s discretion. The privileges thus granted included exemptions from the hut tax, imposed on traditional round dwellings, compared to the square houses occupied by Christians. It also allowed substantial mission reserves where people could farm virtually rent free, as well as have access to mission education which was the only form of schooling the government funded. Privileged Christians had to denounce polygamy and other traditional practices (Etherington, 2012:56).

The Act of 1865 required that Africans had to wait another 7 years and show they had resided in Natal for 12 years before they could petition the Governor for the franchise. This application had to be signed by three European voters and endorsed by a justice of the peace or the resident magistrate. And if that did not spur people on sufficiently, the Governor still had the discretion to grant it or not. By 1903, when SANAC sat, it found that just 2 Africans of a total of 904 041 were enfranchised while about 5 000 were covered by the exemption law (Odendaal, 2012: 160).

Johannes Khumalo’s, main spokesman of the Wesleyan Mission in Edenvale, frustration was felt most acutely during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and the subsequent civil wars when the *kholwa* found themselves between traditional Africans and the colonists – paralleling the conundrum faced in the Cape colony.
Some threw their lot in with the British while others worked closely with the uSuthu royal faction. Martin Lutuli, father of future ANC President Chief Albert Luthuli, and Josiah Gumede, who was to become ANC president in 1927, were two examples of such literate, African Christians working closely with the traditional leadership, serving as advisors to King Dinizulu.

In 1893 Britain granted the Natal colony responsible government. This brought to an end the privileges enjoyed by Christian, educated Africans. Under the new status, the Natal colony went about the task of attacking African privileges relentlessly. SO Samuelson, undersecretary for native affairs, stated in 1901 that the government’s aim was to bring the tribal system under statutory control from which no escape would be possible. Control was to be exercised from the top of the colonial authority, that is the ‘Supreme Chief and extending to the individual native in his kraal’ He saw the exemption law of 1865 as a ‘blot on our Statute Book, and should never have been enacted’ (Etherington, 2012:57). As Etherington notes: ‘The Victorian policy of Christianity and civilization had officially been pronounced dead’.

Resistance from the exempted Africans came quickly. The Council of Exempted Natives, decided to embark on a test case. Its chair, Simeon Kambule, joined Solomon Kumalo, Ezekiel Mahlanga, and Martin Luthuli in May 1896 in petitioning the governor to clarify their position. They were informed that despite their exemption under Law 28, 1865, they were ‘subject to any later laws which may be applicable to any special class which include them’. Leading lights like Isaac Seme, father of the future leader of the ANC, as well as several preachers, who had made a variety of applications for exemptions were rejected. Etherington quotes a magistrate arguing ‘the ordinary exempted native is merely a mischief maker…airing imaginary grievances of his people’ (2012:58).

The NNC was launched on 1 June 1900 with sixty delegates from various districts attending. Chief Isaac Mkize of Cedara, who had converted to Christianity, was elected as its first president. Within months it had 23 branches and from its very beginnings had a close relationship with the various chiefs in the area. The key issues it focused on were education, representation, land purchase and free trade. However, ‘even sympathetic white Natalians believed that Africans ‘should not
fancy themselves as equals of the white man and expect the same rights as him’ (Odendaal, 2012:286). The Natal government saw it in the same dangerous terms as the Ethiopian churches. The chiefs were especially vulnerable, as they were servants of the state and could be removed at the whim of the colonial authorities.

Martin Luthuli of Groutville was the first NNC chairperson, serving from 1900 to 1903. In his submission to the SANAC in 1904 he presented the NNC as the ‘voice of the natives’, aimed at defending the welfare of black society (Limb, 2012:94). One of the largest African landowner, he was supported by Chief Stephen Mini of Edendale in the NCC, who was the second largest African landowner. Mark Radebe, editor of Ipepa, was twice elected as Secretary of the NNC.

- Identity formation

The Zulu experience in the 1800s, like that in the eastern Cape, was impacted by linguistic issues, Christian education and class differentiation. While united by the first, and as shall be shown especially in the aftermath of the Bhambatha Rebellion, the latter two impacted on the politics of the day.

Much of the colonials’ wrath was directed against the Ethiopian movement which, as mentioned above, had tenuous links with the US, even though Natal ‘had seen the some of the most intense evangelizing in the world’ (De Lalouviere, 2008:258). The AMEC was banned but by then the American Zulu Mission had been launched with strong Pentecostal leanings. The revival movements which ensued made adherents believe they were superior to the rest of the Christian brethren, including ‘whites ‘who had not been purified by the experience of revival. This was supported by the young kholwa’ (Houle, 2008:234).

Those that did not join the revival movement found themselves being severely discriminated by the white establishment. This included refusing to allow Africans to preach or solemnize marriages, The imposing of this colour bar made Africans realise they were seen as less worthy than their fellow white clergymen. John Dube wrote in the Ilanga of December 1904 that only two members of the African Congregational Church were allowed to solemnize marriages, warned: ‘If we perceive that in matters of civilization and improvement we are being hampered,
they may find those amongst us with burning aspirations, acting improperly’ (Etherington, 2012:65).

But the government had even more nefarious plans to implement. Its Land Commission called for the trustees of all mission reserves to cede control of their land to the Natal Native Trust. Since such a move could never have passed muster in parliament, they needed the acceptance of the trustees, which they duly provided. The conditions they accepted was seen as a betrayal by the Africans, especially the fact that it closed any possibility for freehold title. Also, the missions were going to receive half of the revenue derived from the reserves – a move described by African leaders as Judas’ acceptance of 30 pieces of silver. The Natal Native Trust’s powers were so vast that it was akin to the government itself: ‘without reference to parliament, it could control movement in and out of the locations, lease out location lands and determine who might reside in them’ (2012:69).

The poll tax which the Natal government decided to impose resulted in the well-known Bhambatha rebellion of 1906/7. Instead of focusing on the abusive land laws which lay at the roots of the rebellion, the British Colonial Office agreed with the Natal government’s assessment that ‘The Ethiopian movement is no doubt the source when danger to South Africa is mainly to be feared’. Etherington points out that ‘It made no difference that no prominent African Christian had associated with Bhambatha and the other rebels of 1906-07’ (2012:71).

Etherington argues that for leaders like Dube ‘questions of Christianity, exemption from Native Law, land and race were not separate issues but aspects of a single larger question: how might they confidently stand on an equal footing with humankind before their God and the state? The failure of the missions to defend the reserve lands at a critical juncture contributed to a growing resolve to consolidate their own forum for the articulation of grievances’ (2012:67).

Describing the impact the Natal government’s policies, Etherington points out that ‘The formation of the Natal Native Congress (NNC) in 1900 had been a virtually all-Christian enterprise…people who looked to their religion as a road to equality before the law. …those hopes by 1910 had been shown to be illusory in Natal, as
in other parts of the new Union of South Africa. On the difficult road ahead other
allies and greater numbers would be needed’ (2012:74).

The Bhambatha Rebellion of February 1906 began with the imposition of a poll tax
on all adult males – a poll tax does not take consideration into the income of the
individuals. The protest and subsequent armed rebellion against the tax has been
named after Chief Bhambatha kaMancinza, head of the Zondi, a Zulu clan that
lived in the Mpanza Valley in the Greytown district. With a small group of
supporters, he launched a series of attacks against the colonial forces. It is
estimated about 3 500 to 4 000 Africans were killed, compared to just more than
twenty whites.

The Natal government questioned the loyalty of the NNC and the kholwa generally,
‘even though the NNC was at no stage even remotely implicated in the rebellion’
(Odendaal, 2012:289). This was especially so after Dube, in an editorial in the
Ilanga, used the evocative phrase Vukani Bantu (Rise up, people). The newspaper
was accused of being seditious and treasonable, and Dube himself was
summoned to be reprimanded by the Governor and had to issue an apology in his
newspaper. The kholwa were divided, with some preachers having joined
Bambatha’s troops while some supported the government’s forces, earning them
the tag of amambuka (traitors). Dube reckoned that it was wiser to keep the paper
going, as well as the Institute in Ohlange, by issuing the apology, believing that
‘justice would be done only when the Africans ruled the country’ (Marks,1970:75).

According to Shula Marks, the Bambatha Rebellion is remarkable for the national
unity it engendered among Africans. De Lalouviere (2008:261) argues that the
brutal repression ‘provided the Zulu elite with a terrifying metaphor of racial
eradication’ and that the ‘traditional’ past would be severed from the the unstable,
modern present’.

John Dube’s conservative approach has been mentioned above but he ‘strongly
defended Zulu culture and King Dinizulu during the latter’s trial...also harshly
criticized state repression of Bhambatha’s anti-poll tax resistance...earning a
popular name among the Zulu as uMafukuzela…”one who works tirelessly”’ (Limb,
2012:95). In the early days of the NNC there was a divide between Dube and the
key leaders of the NNC, who were drawn from the Methodists, especially in Pietermartizburg and its surrounds such as Edendale and Driefontein. These ‘denominational, regional and generational differences’ also found economic expression: ‘the midlands people were mostly individual property-holders, while at Inanda and other areas land rights tended to be communal and less secure’ (Odendaal, 2012:289). Heather Hughes, Dube’s biographer wrote: ‘This fault line – coast versus midlands – would persist for decades in the regional Congress’ (2011:107).

De Lalouviere (2008:268) argues that those kholwa coalescing around Dube were laying the foundation for a Zulu nationalism ‘born of the uneasy alliance between moderate, mostly propertied Zulu Christian leaders and the Zulu royal house’. It laid the basis for the 1920s creation of Inkatha (the crown) ‘a movement linked to the Zulu cultural revival in which Natal intellectuals and the Zulu diaspora on the Rand had played so vital a part’ (2008:269).

On the other hand was the ‘Zulu populism and racial nationalism espoused by declasse members of the kholwa elite such as George Champion’. They were linked to struggles of the tenant labourers, migrants and urban workers, finding expression in the ICU and the radical wing of the NNC. Dube’s closeness to the nascent Zulu nationalist movement resulted in the SANNC viewing him as not being committed to the unity of all Africans and he was forced to resign as president of the SANNC in 1916. Champion became Kadalie’s second-in-charge at the ICU and was responsible for the rebuffing of overtures by the CPSA to work closely with the ICU. Although he helped then president of the ANC, Dr Xuma, capture the position of the Natal Provincial Secretary of the ANC in 1945, his opposition to the ANC Youth League’s radicalism saw him being defeated in 1951 by Albert Luthuli.

c. Republic of the Orange Free State/Orange River Colony

There were three key centres of activity in this part of the world: Bloemfontein, Thaba Nchu (Black Mountain) and Basutoland. With the creation of the Orange Free State in 1854, and with Bloemfontein its capital, the Boer Republic’s constitution stipulated that only whites could be citizens, closing the door on even the few landowning blacks – even though they were liable to be called up for
military service. Blacks could not live or travel in the republic without a pass and municipal locations were tightly controlled with only those working for whites allowed to live in them.

In looking at this territory I will be examining how identities of traditional communities interacted with that of the recently arrived. Peculiar to this part of the world was the impact of the Griquas and the Mfecane which, combined with the impact of the AMEC and the discovery of diamonds, created a region of complex identities and relations to state power.

- **Contestation over representation**

  Given the various restrictions faced by Africans, political life was limited. However, a number of social activities were organized around music and sports. Kimberley boasted two African cricket clubs, with Sol Plaatjies involved in one of them as was the brother of Jonathan Jabavu. Kimberley played host to the Jubilee Singers from the US and had its own Association of African Minstrels.

  Odendaal argues that Africans in the ORC ‘did not mobilise in explicitly political organisations…perhaps because they defined themselves in this cultural melting pot more as individuals of the middle class than in ethnic terms’ (2012:183). Furthermore, political representation was firmly through the *dikgosi*, such that by 1908 there were only about 88 Africans on the voters roll.

  In 1892 the Coloured Peoples Party of South Africa, having Hadjie Ozier Ally as its chair, was formed to oppose the Franchise and Ballot Act, which the Rhodes government had introduced to further restrict the African franchise. It spoke on behalf of the coloureds of Griqualand West but included African members. Coloured and African members of the South African League called on Rhodes, in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid, to explain where he stood as far as their franchise was concerned. He told them that his policy was ‘equal rights for all civilized men south of the Zambesi’.

  In response to the Transvaal wanting to take over the territory to its west, the British intervened and declared in 1885 the southern Tswana areas, including Mafeking, the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland. At the same time, areas north of the Molopo
River up to Limpopo were declared a British Protectorate. But this began interfering with Rhodes’ imperialist ambitions and so in 1895 the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland was annexed to the Cape Colony, while the Protectorate was guaranteed autonomy after a delegation of dikgosi, including Khama, petitioned London. It was renamed Botswana in September 1966,

Political organisation took the form of ‘block men’ who were appointed by residents to represent groups of dwellings. The Native Committee of Bloemfontein created in 1902 morphed into the Orange River Colony Native Vigilance Association in 1903. In June 1906 delegates from across the colony met to launch the ORC Native Congress with several AMEC members playing leading roles. These included its President, Reverend Benjamin Khumalo, its treasurer Thomas Mapikela, and Henry Reed Ngcayiya. It described itself as the watchdog of the interests of the Africans, and campaigned for political representation and against harsh municipal regulations. In September 1904 the ORC NVA also made representations to the SANAC, where it pressed forward the views of workers and the kholwa on issues of land, work and political grievances (Limb, 2012:100). Mapikela assumed a national profile, joining the 1909 delegation to Britain. With other ORC leaders he played a critical role in 1909 in galvanizing African opposition to the racist parts of the draft Act of Union. Khumalo, who hailed from Natal, was part of the AMEC leadership.

The African Political Organisation formed in 1902 was established to represent coloured views throughout the country. While headquartered in Cape Town, the local branches in Bloemfontein, and other localities in the OFS, ‘stayed close to African activists in colony’ (Odendaal, 2012:280).

In the OFS several organisations including the AMEC, the NVA and a deputation from the Rolong of Thaba Nchu met the Ridgeway Commission. When responsible government became a reality in 1907 African mobilization focused on two key pieces of legislation: the Fixed Property Act of 1908, aimed at weakening the position of sharecroppers on farms, and the decision to dismantle the Native Affairs Department. It saw the protests following two strata: that of the landowners through the Becoana Mutual Improvement Association (BMIA) representing the Rolong of Thaba Nchu, and the Eastern Native Vigilance Association acting on behalf of the
sharecroppers. The significance of this is captured by Odendaal when he wrote: ‘The increasing restrictions placed on African sharecroppers were preliminary salvos anticipating the passage of the cruel Land Act of 1913’ (2012:284).

- **Identity formation**

A number of factors contributed to the nature of the fluid identities experienced in the ORC. For example, a prominent part of the population were the Griquas who were the progeny of Dutch colonists and Khoi or San people. They were not accorded any legal status in the Cape colony but were conscripted to serve in battle, becoming skilled in the use of arms and riding horses. They began leaving the colony and followed the itinerant lifestyles of their maternal forefathers, calling themselves the Oorlam. The Griquas were amongst the better known of the Oorlam. They developed councils which were led by Kapteins (Dutch for Captain) and had their own written constitutions. The first Griqua Kaptein was Adam Kok I, a slave who had bought his own freedom, and who led his group to eventually reach the Orange River, just west of the Orange Free State, where they settled speaking Afrikaans and practicing Christianity.

Another feature of the ORC’s fluid identities was the AMEC. Gabriel David, an alumnus of the Anglican Institute in Grahamstown, was ordained in 1890, becoming the first Tswana to receive the Anglican priesthood, based at St Patrick’s Church in Bloemfontein. From its base in Pretoria by 1899 the AMEC quickly moved into the ORC with a strong presence in Bloemfontein, Kroonstad and Parys.

The other major factor in the fluidity was obviously the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, which saw a railway line from Cape Town reaching Bloemfontein in 1890 and which soon connected it to Johannesburg. Odendaal captures the impact of this very well when he writes: ‘The traffic of people and ideas began to flow with increasing strength towards the Free State from both directions’ (2012:168). Apart from the economic activities around the urban centre of Bloemfontein, the ORC was largely an agricultural area. Africans had lost much land to white farmers, with chiefs from Witsieshoek and Harrismith employing Josiah Gumede to help them write up petitions and act as an interpreter/translator for the delegation to England in 1907 to buy land.
The second centre of activity was Thaba Nchu where the Tswana speaking Seleka Rolong, under Chief Moroka, were settled in 1834 with the help of the Wesleyan Methodist missionaries. The Chief’s death led to a bitter succession battle between his sons, leading to the death of one and the assumption of the vacant position by Samuel Moroka. The Free State government used the opportunity to annex Moroka’s land in 1884 and permanently banish Samuel Moroka. The small landowning elite came to play an important role with one of John Nyokong’s grandsons, James Moroka, becoming president of the ANC in the late 1940s.

A further contributor to the fluidity of the region was the arrival of groups as a result of the difaqane (as the Mfecane is known in Sotho) which led to groups fleeing Zululand reaching the mountain kingdom of Basutoland, which was led by Moshoeshoe. He successfully carved out the territory which was to become known as Lesotho. French missionaries from the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society had a strong presence here. Sotho intellectuals coalesced around Naledi ea Lesotho a newspaper begun by Lovedale graduate Simon Phamotse in the 1900s.

To the west of the Orange Free State and Transvaal, overlapping present day Botswana, lay territory occupied by the Tswana-speaking as well as groups of Griqua. Mafikeng, located on the Molopo River, was ruled by Chief Molema, head of the Christian part of the Tshidi Rolong. He was joined by his half-brother Montshiwa Lawana, who fled from the Transvaal Boers. Both brothers were to play critical roles in the politics of the region. Silas Molema launched the first Tswana newspaper and Mafikeng itself developed into an important staging post to Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was then called.

Of the other chiefs or dikgosi, Khama of the Ngwato developed a reputation as formidable as that of Moshoeshoe, helping to establish what would eventually be called Botswana. By the 1860s several thousand Batswana were attending missionary schools, and contributing to the missionary based newspaper, Mahoko a Becwana, published in Kuruman. With the discovery of diamonds in Hopetown in 1867, the British did not waste time in annexing the land despite protests by Boers and Africans alike and calling it Griqualand West. Kimberley became a melting pot of different cultures, races and ethnic groups. Rev Gwayi Tyamzashe of King William’s Town set up the Presbyterians of the Free Church of Scotland in
1872. Very soon permanent structures housing schools, hospitals, churches and so forth were set up.

*Imvo* was distributed in the Free State, with correspondents describing life in the ORC. Conditions for labourers living in compounds were particularly harsh with a contribution to *Imvo* rebutting claims made by the Prime Minister of the ORC. WN Somngesesi wrote: ‘His Honour the president says ‘The days of slavery are over’…Are the natives free in the Free State? …I say no… A native has no voice in politics here…a slave means one who has lost all power of resistance’ (Odendaal, 2012:169).

d. The Republic of Transvaal

With the 1886 discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg mushroomed overnight. By 1896 there were more than 100 000 residents there, with 65 lay Wesleyan preachers and about 4500 Christian Africans. By 1889 the emerging spatial segregation moved these people out of their informal locations to Newtown, where Africans were forced to live with Indians, Arabs, and coloureds. By 1900 Johannesburg had developed all the features of apartheid cities: Africans forced to carry the pass; not allowed to walk on pavements or to visit public spaces such as parks or onto the emerging public intra-urban transport system; confined to single sex compounds on the mines, not allowed to live outside the allocated locations or in the servants’ quarters of their white employers.

This could not halt their efforts to educate themselves, with the 1904 census showing the educated class making up 25 % of the black population of about 24 000. Here, as in Kimberley, a number of cultural activities were engaged in. It was in this milieu that Enoch Sontanga composed *Nkosi Sikelel’ Africa* (God Bless Africa) in 1897. This would serve as the anthem of many organisations in Southern Africa and was incorporated into South Africa’s national anthem after 1994. There were at least 10 African cricket clubs, with roller skating and tennis popular as well (Odendaal, 2012:191).

The Transvaal Native Congress (TNC) had its roots in several organisations: the Zoutpansberg Native VA, created in 1902 by about 500 ‘educated natives’, which became the Transvaal Native VA (TNVA); the SANC membership in the Rand,
when a branch was created on 16 May 1903; the Native United Political Association; Transvaal Basotho Committee; Bapedi Union; the African Political Society of Pretoria; and the African National Political Union, which was formed in 1906 under the leadership of SM Makgotho. The independent African churches were very much part of this mixture with Reverend Edward Tsweu of the Independent Native Presbyterian Free Church playing a leading role – he made a presentation to the SANAC where he complained about the mining companies decreasing the wages of miners. Rev William Mpamba, who had established the Presbyterian Free Church in the 1890s, became president of the TNVA.

The leading figures in the TNC included Jesse M Makhothe, a Lovedale graduate, and Saul Msane, a Healdtown graduate, who was also a founding member of the Natal Native Congress. Msane was to later become the secretary general of the ANC and editor of its newspaper, Abantu-Batho. The Transvaal Basotho Committee also made representations to the SANAC under the leadership of its chairperson, Paulus Malatye, who called for Africans to be allowed to own land, and opposed the strict curfews which impacted on their church work and musical activities.

By 1907-1908 the TNC was strong enough to make representations to the Transvaal Mining Industry Commission, where it attacked the harsh punishment workers endured while working (‘the problem of the booted foot and sjambok’); unfair compensation rules on the basis of a very low wage rate; and the provision of only mealie porridge to nourish them. The TNC’s General Secretary Jess Makothe drawing on his personal experience as a labourer, argued in his submission for the abolition of the passes, saying that if the mines wanted permanent workers it should provide permanent residence. Limb concludes that this pro-worker stance of the TNC is not surprising, given the number of Africans working in that province (2012).

Apart from these labour issues the various African bodies thus created protested against unfair taxation, passes, access to education, freedom of religion, trading rights, and land tenure as well their ill-treatment in town centres where they were not allowed to walk on pavements or use trams. This drove even the British High Commissioner to say: ‘I only ask the white men to consider whether they have ever
calculated the cumulative effect on the Natives on what I may call the policy of pin-pricks’ (Odendaal, 2012:276).

Notwithstanding the lateness of political organisations developing in the Transvaal, due to relative lateness of settled communities being created there, this province was to become of the SANNC/ANC in the first few decades of the twentieth century.

4.2.2 South African War and its Aftermath

The rights of Africans to citizenship and all that it entailed is also an important aspect the discussions around the South African War. Here also we see the different ways in which Africans viewed the war, often adopting opposing perspectives.

Generally, politically active Africans were on the side of Britain in its fight against the South African Republic and the Orange Free State in the hope that British liberal values would be extended to the Afrikaner republics. The British used the treatment of Africans by the Boers as one of their motivations for attacking them. As Van der Westhuizen has emphasised there were many Boers on the side of the British during this war (2007:13).

The SAP argued that the war was unjust, aligned themselves with the Afrikaner Bond rather than the British’s attempts at ‘promoting capitalist interests and Imperial intervention’ (Odendaal, 2012:261). JT Jabavu took a similar position arguing that the Progressive Party had eagerly sought the ‘war remedy’ instead of avoiding conflict through diplomacy (Odendaal, 2012:262). These views were supported by the broad anti-war movement which began in Britain. Jabavu suffered as a result of his stance, with his ‘friends of the natives’ accusing him of disloyalty; his financial backers also withdrew support and Imvo was banned by the military authorities in August 1901.

Izwi, representing the counter view, praised Imperial officials and endorsed British intervention, arguing that after victory Britain would ‘purify our Courts and Temples, and that an era of peace and government would be established for all time’. It condemned ‘Boer atrocities’, writing of the ‘narrow prejudiced and inhuman tyranny of Boer Republicanism’. The SANC and Izwi criticized the South African Party’s opposition to the war. At its inaugural meeting on 1 June 1990, the Natal Native
Congress resolved to compliment Chamberlain and Milner for the firm stand they were taking especially in respect of African rights and liberties, calling upon the British government to include rights to education, representation, free trade and acquiring of land (Odendaal, 2012:261).

Jabavu and Imvo’s travails helped strengthen the hands of his Congress rivals: ‘they were able to take the moral high ground in electoral politics by offering African voters an attractive, even if crude, anti-Afrikaner, pro-British alternative’ (Odendaal, 2012:263).

Both British and Boers did not trust the Africans enough to officially arm them, even though victorious British troops were greeted warmly by Africans as they entered Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. This despite the involvement of large numbers of Africans. Lord Kitchener himself admitted to having enlisted more than 7 000 armed African soldiers while his scorched earth policy of burning Boer and African farms resulted in the conscripting of African men and the interning of African women and children in concentration camps. It is estimated that about 110 000 Africans were imprisoned in concentration camps, the majority of whom were women and children. About 12 000 African lives were lost during what came to be called the South African War. Kept under terrible conditions, the AMEC ministered to their spiritual and material needs of the interned. ‘In this way they helped to spread the separatist church movement, which was to be closely involved in organizational politics in the former republics after the war’ (Odendaal, 2012:265).

By March 1901 the British were making it clear to the Boer leadership that they had no intention of ameliorating the conditions of Africans, especially extending the franchise from the Cape to the northern republics. This led to the inclusion of the infamous Clause 8 in the Treaty of Vereeniging which stated: ‘The question of granting the Franchise to natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government’. There was no mention of the commitment the British had made to keep the status ante of the coloured people. Africans actually saw a deterioration in their situation after the settlement at the hands of the British, with the pass laws being more strictly applied and land which had been regarded as inalienable property being appropriated by whites.
During this period, under the sway of the Liberal Party-led government in London, many of the colonies were moving to responsible government. Sir J West Ridgeway was sent in 1906 to develop an appropriate constitution for the two former republics. Here again, as in the Treaty of Vereeniging which ended the South African War, the British copped out saying that the matter of the African franchise should be left to the new self-governing states to decide upon. Responsible government was granted on 6 December 1906, but not before the British had been petitioned vigorously: the signatures of 46 chiefs and 25 738 others were attached to the petition opposing it (Odendaal, 2012:275).

4.2.4 Union and Beyond

The South African Native Convention of March 1909, presided over by Rubusana, condemned the discriminatory aspects of the Draft Act of Union but which the alliance of white interest went ahead with anyway. The Union of South Africa created in 1910 represented the incorporation into the new state of diverse people in a differentiated manner. “In formal terms South Africa’s colonial order concluded when the newly unified country became an independent dominion within the British Empire in 1910” (Glaser, 2002:27). According to Greenstein the creation of Union shifted the locus of resistance to ‘struggles for political rights within the framework of white-dominated state structures’ (1995:3).

African leadership especially focused on the limited franchise and pass laws; ‘cautious not to offend authorities, but determined to draw attention, in the first place to lack of political representation of Africans, and also to their economic injustices…Localised pressure groups now gave way to African national unity in the face of the 1910 Union of South Africa…a new political culture of newspapers and meetings merged. Ties of kin, culture, nation and space – communal location residence – enmeshed kholwa with their worker compatriots’ (Limb, 2012:103-104).

The proclamation of the Union in 1910, despite appeals to the crown to extend the qualified franchise, spurred attempts at unity amongst the African elite. African response to Union culminated in 1912 with the founding conference of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC, renamed the African National Congress in 1925) with delegates from all four provinces of the South Africa of the time. Pixley ka
Isaka Seme, in his now well-known call, urged putting an end of ‘the demon of racialism, the aberration of the Xhosa-Fingo Feud, the animosity that exists between Zulus and the Tongas, between the Basuthos and every other Native’ (Karis and Carter, 1972:73). Karis and Carter point out that he emphasised that since all Africans were one people, the Congress was to be ‘a National Society or Union for all the Natives of South Africa’. The draft constitution of the SANNC had as its goals ‘the promotion of unity and mutual co-operation between the Government and the Abantu Races of South Africa’.

Underlining the importance of the latter, Meli writes that ‘ethnic divisions were seen as a hindrance to the development and emergence of a broad African nationalism. In fact, there was a view that the defeat in the resistance wars had been caused by the fact the Africans were fighting separately and independently of each other. With the enactment of the Act of Union in 1910, the African people confronted the continued racism entrenched in the constitution; Britain had granted independence to white South Africa and the conditions of black South Africa remained the same in 1910. Black South Africa, instead of being a colony of Britain, became a colony of white South Africa’ (1988:68).

SANNC’s founding constitution was finalized in 1919, and Clause 1 states that one of its objective was ‘To encourage mutual understanding and to bring together into common action as one political people all tribes and clans of various tribes or races and by means of combined effort and united political organisations to defend their freedom, rights and privileges’. Neame argues that Seme, fresh from his sojourns to the US, may have been influenced by his experience of the US Congress and the fact that several organisations, including the Natal Indian Congress, already existed to push for ‘Congress’ to be included in the name of the organisation. These two streams – that of a legislative body and that of organisations – led him to declare in 1932 that ‘By Congress I mean a duly constituted assemblage of African men and women in one conference which may truthfully be regarded as representing all our African people’ (Karis and Carter, 1972:313).

As Limb puts it, “Congress” (or “Kongelesi”) itself was an unstable notion ‘implying a political gathering typical of, simultaneously, traditional African politics and modern Western parliaments, and a broad movement for equality (and later liberation)’
Greenstein (1995) observes that the congress sets its sights on representing indigenous people without laying claims to political power which was seen as a white institution. A council of chiefs, created with the aim of avoiding tribal differences, had an advisory role. Much has been written of the relative moderate stances taken by the SANNC in its embryonic years.

According to Meli, the narrow outlook of white workers and the limited size of the African working class did not allow for more radical tactics to be used. Two factors helped change this in the 1920s: the creation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union in 1919 which saw African workers being organized into unions and the emergence of the socialist movement within the white working class. ‘The carriers of these new socialist ideas were white immigrants from mainly Europe, particularly Eastern Europeans who had fled religious and political persecution’ (1988:69). To this could be added the influence of British socialists such as Bunting and Jones. The creation of the ICU in 1919 was a fillip to the organizing of African workers, and even though it tended to avoid strike actions it did not stop non-members taking action: ‘in the 1920s, farm workers burnt crops, sugar workers absconded to higher paying rail work, and working women took mass action over passes and beer-halls’ (Limb, 2012:61). Interestingly, the two influences Meli cites were also ideologically opposed. The ICU shunned radical action and even set out to oppose the impact of communists on the organisation.

After the 1922 white mineworkers strike, white workers generally lost their militancy and were being increasingly absorbed into the ruling alliance. However, African workers’ strikes were on the increase. In 1920 105 658 African miners truck. In 1927 the numbers were lower, 4 418, but higher than the 740 white workers striking.

The SANNC/ANC, under Josiah Gumede’s presidency from 1927 did take a radical turn taking strong anti-imperialist and pro-USSR positions. But given the moderate nature of the rest of the leadership this did not last long and he was eventually ousted in 1930 by the centrist and moderate forces such as Seme and Mahabane.

This was also a period of industrial unions, instead of craft associations, emerging – encouraged by the CPSA. The weakness of the labour movement did not deter militant actions of the African workers. Dockworkers in Durban struck in 1932, 1935, 1937 and
1939. There were continuous strikes on the gold mines in 1931 and from 1934 to 1938 as well as the coal mines. White solidarity was in short supply – while the white-dominated SA Trades and Labour Council did not support the colour bar and allowed three African-dominated unions to affiliate, it drew the line on further such applications to join. Communists like Ray Alexander was amongst the few whites who played a role in helping establish industry based unions in different parts of the country.

4.2.6 Different approaches to the National Question

This section now focuses on the key debates around the national question in South Africa after the formation of the ANC in 1912. It focuses on two clusters of arguments: the pan-Africanist and non-racial approaches which were hotly debated within the ANC and the ‘Black Republic’ or ‘Native’ thesis and colonialism of a special type (CST) approaches argued within the CPSA/SACP. Chapter 5 titled Faultlines of the 21st Century goes into the contemporary debates in greater detail - the ideological engagements presented here serves as an important backdrop to the debates during the period 1990 to 2010.

a. Africanism II

Given that by the 1930s the ANC had not lived up to the promise of its creation in 1912 of leading the African people in a united movement, the leadership of Dr Xuma provided a stimulus to black politics generally and set in place a trend of united, radical mass action – a trend which continued well into the 1990s. Till then the ANC had been characterised by the political culture which the kholwa had established – that of seeking accommodation within the established framework of white domination. This began to change in the 1940s, in part as a result of burgeoning urbanisation during the country’s second industrial revolution. The ANC membership by 1945 is estimated to have been about 4 000. In comparison the CPSA, which had been riven with internal conflict and poor capacity in the 1930s, was now growing in strength through its use of mass mobilisation tactics in the urban areas. It organised anti-pass campaigns, bus boycotts, strikes, land invasions, stay-aways and local uprisings. During this period a major advance in the ANC thinking was its pushing for the first time for an unqualified universal franchise.
At the same time, the South Africa Indian Congress (SAIC) comprised of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), which had been set up by Gandhi in 1898, and the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC), and which had gone through an inconsistent path in terms of its relationship with the struggles of the African people, was also going through very important changes. In the 1940s just as the ANC and its recently created Youth League was going through a period of radicalisation, so was the SAIC under the leadership of a group of young activists such as Dr Dadoo and Dr Naicker. They were amongst those heeding Nehru’s line that overseas Indians must identify with the causes of the indigenous struggles. They also came to be impacted by their association with the CPSA, which provided about the only forum for inter-racial connection. They played a leading role in the creation of the Non-European United Front which organised, from 1938 onwards, anti-war protests and defended arrested leaders as well as opposition to the Hertzog Bills.

Two major debates occurred during this period, and which continue to impact contemporary manifestations of the national question: that of Africanism and that of non-racial cooperation, the latter being eventually elevated to a principal belief of the ANC. DDT Jabavu (son of JT Jabavu) spearheaded the establishment of the AAC with Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, then President of the ANC on 15 December 1935 in Bloemfontein. The symbolism of choice of the date must be noted: it was the ninety-eighth anniversary of the Voortrekker victory over the Zulus at the Battle off Blood River (Ncome) in 1838. Amongst the 400 delegates, attendees included those who had been playing leading roles or will be in the unfolding struggle for African enfranchisement: Thomas. M. Mapikela, Chief Headman of all Bloemfontein locations, John Dube, Rev. Z. R. Mahabane, Dr. A B Xuma and Dr. J.S Moroka, J. B. Marks and Edwin Mofutsanyane of the CPSA, Clement Kadali of the ICU, tribal chiefs, church leaders, as well as elected members of the Urban Advisory Boards. It also included a number of women active in different organisations as well representatives of a number of local organisations, including coloureds from Cape Town.

The AAC condemned the Hertzog bills which legislated disenfranchisement, and called for common citizenship for Africans. It argued, as Karis and Carter record, for a policy of political identity so that a South African nation is created ‘in which, while
various racial groups may develop on their own lines, socially and culturally, they will be bound together by the pursuit of common political objectives’ (1972:31).

There were some serious issues dividing the leadership – in particular acceptance of the Native Representation Act of 1936 as the vehicle for African representation. Compromises DDT Jabavu made with the government, without a mandate from the AAC, saw the eventual demise of his political career. The compromises saw individuals like ZK Mathews joining the ANC in 1940 while IB Tabata came out with a scathing critique of the organisation. He was instrumental in extending an invitation to coloured and Indians to the 1943 AAC Convention, so that there is ‘show of unity against the oppressive white government’. By then fewer and fewer delegates were attending the AAC’s conventions, as a direct result of the infighting.

The ANC was riven with debates on ‘non-European’ cooperation and withdrew from the All Africa Convention in 1944. This left the space open for a left leaning group with links to Trotsky’s Fourth International to control it and eventually create the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) whose first conference coincided with the AAC’s December 1943 convention. IB Tabata emerged as its leading theorist, dismissive of the ANC and the CPSA urban-centredness and middle class nature. He emphasised the creation of a peasant-based liberation movement and a long-term strategy of political education rather than short-range action campaigns.

The NEUM became known for its Ten Point Programme, which had ‘non-European’ unity and non-collaboration with state institutions as its main principles. This was in contrast to the emphasis on African-ness which had emerged at the time. It was launched at the inaugural 1943 of the NEUM, which drew a range of supporters from the AAC and the Anti-Coloured Affairs Department (Anti-CAD).

Aspects of the Ten Point Programme were echoed in African Claims in South Africa, adopted by the ANC at its 16 December 1943 conference. It proclaimed that ‘the African people in the Union of South Africa urgently demand the granting of full citizenship rights such as are enjoyed by all Europeans in South Africa’. The Bill of Rights contained in African Claims listed the ‘Full Citizens Rights and Demands’ which called for, inter alia, ‘The right of every child to free and compulsory education’, ‘the establishment of free medical and health services for all’, and called for ‘a substantial
and immediate improvement in the economic position of the Africa’. This ‘profoundly social humanism in the ANC’s approach’ (Netshitenzhe, 2012:24) found its way in the Freedom Charter adopted in 1955 and subsequent policy documents.

The 1944 Manifesto of the ANC Youth League’s Africanist emphasis contrasted with the approach adopted by the ANC in 1943. The Manifesto could be regarded as the first avowedly Africanist document produced by a mainstream nationalist organisation. According to Williams it saw the ANC as a ‘national unity front’ through ‘which the national liberation of Africans will be achieved by Africans themselves’ (1998:77). Also, African nationalism has to create a ‘united nation out of heterogeneous tribes’ and the freeing of Africa from foreign domination and foreign leadership. The emergence of this strand so soon after the All Africa Convention, with its emphasis on non-European unity, illustrates an important point of this chapter - which different approaches to nationhood can exist simultaneously.

The ANC Youth League (ANCYL), under the leadership of Anton Lembede, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo introduced a radical form of politics into the ANC by 1944. It saw South Africa as a country of ‘four chief nationalities, three of which are minorities and three of which suffer national oppression’. It also saw the ‘national organisations of the Africans, Indians and Coloureds co-operating on common interests’. And in looking at ‘Vendors of Foreign Method’, an oblique reference to communists, it insisted ‘that we are oppressed not as a class, but as a people, as a nation’. This conflating of an African identity with the concept of a nation emphasizes the ethnic based approach to nationhood, which lay at the core of this version of Africanism.

Greenstein points out that Anton Lembede – first president of the ANC Youth League leaders - when speaking on African national identity, invoked the memory of Shaka, Moshoeshoe, Hintsa, Sikukhuni, Khama, Soboza and Mosilakazi: ‘Significantly, all these people worked and identified in their times with specific groups rather than with the general African collective … At the same time as they were appropriated by Africanists as heroes, they were also claimed by specific ethnic movements inside and
outside of South Africa. The relations with the African heritage were thus much more complex than acknowledged by African nationalists’ (1995:16).

Halisi describes Lembede’s approach as that of a black republican – thinkers who believe that, ‘African people themselves are the source of all legitimacy … black republicans see democracy and socialism as inherent in the ways of the African folk. They are apt to assert, rather than theorize about such matters. The restoration of the rights of the African people is the negation of white rule and all that it means. African people are virtuous; degradation is a consequence of external corruption’ (1988:132).

The ANCYL leadership closely followed developments on the Indian subcontinent, commenting on the independence struggle through various articles and speeches with both Lembede and Mandela quoting from Nehru’s *Discovery of India*. The two struggles crossed paths at the UN in 1947 when the recently independent India raised the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa. Given Smuts close association with the UN, this was a humiliation to him. Xuma and India’s foreign minister shared a platform in New York, focusing on the killing of at least nine African mineworkers in August 1946.

The ANC leadership, long after withdrawing from the AAC, remained split over what cooperation entailed, with some favouring organisational level cooperation that is at an elite level, rather than a fusion of groups. In February 1947, the ANC agreed after lengthy debate to pursue talks with the SAIC to look at the basis for cooperation. The different sides of the debates were along provincial lines with Xuma and his Transvaal base in favour of greater cooperation while the Natal province was opposed to it, especially given the problems of Indian/African relations in the Natal province. Empowered by the ANC’s national leadership resolution Dr Xuma signed a declaration with Dr Dadoo and Dr Naicker on 9 March 1947, which stated that ‘a Joint Declaration of cooperation is imperative for the working of a practical basis of cooperation between the National Organisations of the non-European peoples’.

This was met with a backlash especially from the Natal Congress, and in particular president of the provincial structure James Champion, and Selby Msimang, both of whom Soske described as representative of the Zulu middle classes. ‘In actively manipulating the animosities between African and Indian workers, the African petite
bourgeoisie employed an instrumental threat of racial violence (based on a particular construction of the Zulu as a fierce warrior) in order to put pressure on both the Indian elite and the Natal colonial state. Simultaneously, its actions were constrained by a convoluted alchemy of personal loyalties and dependency’ (2012:179) in the normal day to day lives of both elite. Soske argues that Champion’s hardline position on Indians, including calling for a boycott of their shops, led to his defeat by Albert Luthuli in 1951 for the Natal Congress presidency. Another source of the criticism of the Pact is that there was consistent suspicion of the intentions of the CPSA, with members of the Youth League concerned that the ANC would become its appendage.

HIE Dhlomo and Jordan Ngubane, members of Natal’s Youth League, began promoting African Indian cooperation, in the aftermath of the Passive Resistance Campaign led by the SAIC. They emphasised the need for African unity, while calling upon Indian merchants to contribute to the ANC’s work. However, the Transvaal leadership of the Youth League, especially Anton Lembede, was firm in its opposition to such cooperation. He argued that African leaders were fighting for Africa, while Indians ‘are fighting only for their rights to trade and extract as much wealth as possible from Africa’ (1945).

Despite his admiration for Nehru ‘Lembede’s writings systematically reduced the entire Indian population in South Africa to the figure of the exploitative merchant’ (Soske, 2012:182). His untimely death in 1947 opened the way for the Youth League to review its position, stating in 1948 that Indians ‘did not come as conquerors and exploiters, but as the exploited’.

The significance of this debate around ‘Africanism’ the ANC underwent is appreciated when we keep in mind that the ANC returned to this question again in 1950s, leading to the breakaway to create the PAC and again in the 1990s in the context of a democratic South Africa. It brings to the fore Smith’s description of nationalism as a primordialist phenomenon based on ethnic nationalism.

During the 1940s and 1950s Africanism can be seen in two senses:

- The Pan-African sense, which strove to rise above ethnic and tribal identities, unite African people around the common objective of attaining their rights;
• The sense of assertion of African leadership in the struggle against apartheid due to the predominant size of the African population as well as it occupying the rung of the most oppressed and exploited section of South African society.

But, as Greenstein has argued: ‘The relations between Pan-African and more circumscribed identities were never thought through. The adherence to a global identity did not make other bases for identity disappear’ (1995:11). An instance of the persistence of other identities Greenstein refers to is the complaint by Sol Plaatjie in 1931 that ‘The demon of tribalism is the great stumbling block to our unity…’ (1995:12).

Greenstein, along the lines of the Indian Marxists mentioned above, argues that ethnicity was not necessarily obstructive to nationalism. Rather: ‘It provided building blocks for the construction of a comprehensive African identity, promoting pride in African history within the context of a regeneration of tradition on new foundations … only when ethnicity was constructed as a direct alternative to nationalism (as happened with apartheid homeland policies), did a clash between the two become inevitable’ (1995:13). The latter could be seen in the use of ethnic mobilisation by homeland leaders supported by the apartheid government to counter the project of national unity advanced by the liberation movements. And it is seen again when we discuss the contemporary debates in Chapter Five.

b. The growth of non-racialism

While the 1940s saw the emergence of a stream of Africanism in the ANC throwing up some narrowing of perspectives, there was also an alternative stream which laid the basis for widening cross-racial collaboration.

As mentioned in the previous section on Africanism, paralleling developments in the ANC and the Youth League was a growing radicalisation of Indian politics which saw the successful execution of the Passive Resistance Campaign of 1946. Indians, who had been subjected to specific forms of discrimination, were mobilised in this campaign by the leadership of Dr Y Dadoo and Dr M Naicker, leaders of the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses, respectively. By the end of the campaign, Pahad argues, ‘the foundation had been laid for greater co-operation … (resulting) in the signing of the 1947 Dadoo-Xuma-Naicker Pact’ (1988:90) referred to as ‘The Three Doctors Pact’.
Soske points out that the pro-African position of the SAIC’s Radicals ironically ‘helped consolidate an emerging racial consciousness that appears to have deepened the alienation from the African majority felt by many Indians’ (2012:169). This was worsened with the 1949 Durban Riots, a pogrom which lasted three days, resulting in 142 deaths, destruction of property and displacement of almost half of Durban’s Indian population. The NIC support base dwindled, and its leadership focused on trade union organisation and activities of the Congress Alliance which emerged in the 1950s, further increasing its alienation from the majority of Indians.

The Defiance Campaign of 1952, which saw collaboration between what was developing into the Congress Alliance, drew on the success of the Passive Resistance campaign. This came in the wake of the introspection the ANC and Youth League leadership were undergoing laying the basis for what Luthuli came to call an ‘inclusive nationalism’. David Everatt (2009) has argued that the ANC never quite clearly defined non-racialism beyond the notion of equal citizenship, and thus did not address what this meant for national identity and social conduct.

The incipient non-racial leanings of the ANC created problems for the more Africanist Youth League leadership – especially when they took over the reins of the ANC in 1949. They were, for example, scathing of the ‘Three Doctors Pact’. Halisi cites the exchange between P Raboroko, who became the PAC secretary of education, and D Nokwe, then secretary-general of the ANC: ‘Nokwe emphasized the importance of multiracial democracy and the Africanists’ own involvement in the construction of Indian-African unity in the form of the Three Doctors Pact. He asserted that multiracial democracy was revolutionary given the apartheid policy and criticized the vagueness of the Africanist position on the rights of all South Africans’ (1989:136).

The adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955, and especially the line proclaiming that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, catalysed the eventual breakaway of the Pan-Africanist Congress. For Raboroko, ‘the sacrifice of African nationalism on the altar of Charterism was the last straw...’ (1989:137). Halisi further argues that ‘nationalism defined in racial and non-racial terms have to seek very different legitimizing ideologies … yet the ideological split between the Africanists and Congress was not clear cut and both groups claimed to desire a society in which racial distinction would be irrelevant … the Africanists were not ideologically or politically autonomous enough to realign
the overall orientation of African Nationalism and had great difficulty overcoming purely oppositional politics’ (1989:138). The Africanists under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe and Potlako Lebello broke with the ANC in 1958. The PAC believed the land belongs to Africans and that, according to Lembede, cross-racial co-operation may be desirable, but, as explained by Reddy, ‘this must be between the African bloc and the non-European groups as units’ (1995:170).

The critical issue to deal with here is the way the ANC has managed potential tension between its non-racial position, and its commitment to African leadership. The former has been the core policy position of the ANC, especially since the 1950s. In 1957 Chief Albert Luthuli as ANC president, shortly after the adoption of the Freedom Charter and in the midst of debates with the Africanists, as cited by Ramutsindela argued that, ‘the ANC believes in a society in which white and non-white peoples of the Union will work and live together in harmony for the common good of the fatherland’ (1977:101).

Non-racialism became a core principle of the ANC reiterated by the ANC at every turn. For example, in a 1968 interview, Oliver Tambo then ANC president, explained that ‘our programme of struggle is geared to what is known as the Freedom Charter, which is a statement of the objectives of our political struggle … in terms of that programme, we fight for a South Africa in which there will be no racial discrimination, no inequalities based on colour, creed or race – a non-racial democracy which recognizes the essential equality between man and man’ (1987:70). The ANC’s Morogoro conference held in Tanzania in 1969 was significant in that it admitted non-Africans to join the organisation as individuals. Non-Africans were admitted to the national executive at its Kabwe, Zambia conference in 1985. More recently this approach was evident in the ANC’s Constitutional Guidelines, a set of pre-negotiations proposals drawn up in 1989 by the ANC, where it declared “It shall be state policy to promote the growth of a single national identity…the state shall recognize the linguistic and cultural diversity of the people” (Ebrahim, 1999: 551).

The PAC was not the only detractor of the ANC’s non-racialism principle. Another significant contribution from the late 1960s was that of Black Consciousness which focused on imbuing black people with a higher degree of confidence, justifying this as an essential step towards democracy. As Biko expressed it: ‘Liberation is of paramount importance in the concept of Black Consciousness (BC), for we cannot be conscious
of ourselves and yet remain in bondage...being black is not a matter of pigmentation - being black is a reflection of a mental attitude. Merely by describing yourself as black you have started on a road towards emancipation’ (cited in Reddy, 1995:184). In many ways the BC perspective was influenced by Garvey’s emphasis on self-assertion, as well as Fanon’s views on self-identity and revolt.

The writings of Steve Biko reflect an important dialogue with the thinking of Fanon, Cesaire and Senghor and the politics of negritude. In many ways these were building upon the traditions of the early versions of Pan Africanism, but now in the context of newly independent countries, heightened liberation struggles often taking the form of armed struggles and the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This context was giving a new assertiveness to anti-colonialists around the world. Notwithstanding the period of quietude mass politics was going through in the aftermath of severe repression in the post Sharpeville massacre period, the 1960s saw the roots of the Black Consciousness Movement being laid.

Négritude has often been criticized by Anglophone writers, such as Wole Soyinka, for its focus on psychological liberation. British colonialism was marked by an articulation with the cultures and traditions of the colonized. French colonialism on the other hand sough to replace indigenous culture with that of the French. Aimé Césaire represented that branch of the négritude movement which was militant and fought against displacement and dislocation of African people and their ancestry, heritage and culture. Leopold Senghor represented the other branch which placed great emphasis on African history and the ‘collective Negro-African personality’ to define the politics of Negritude’ Chipkin explains that for Fanon ‘the nation was a political and cultural unit, but not one that contained a universal black culture...What his nationalism referred to was the dissolution of blackness’ (2007:114).

Biko on the other hand believed that despite the African experience ‘yet even today one can easily find the fundamental aspects of the pure Africa soul’, thus equating freedom and Black Consciousness with a return to nature. Arguing that black people are deeply religious, he said that it is time for the black God to raise his voice and that black theologians must be encouraged to teach that it is a sin to be oppressed (1996:21)
Alexander points out that the Black Consciousness perspective, shared by some tendencies in the PAC, sees the existence of ‘two nations’ in South Africa, an oppressing white and an oppressed black, sometimes referred to as a ‘black nationality’ (1996:81-82). ‘Exponents of the Black Consciousness position have tended to conflate ‘race’ and ‘class’ to the point that in some versions all whites are projected as capitalists while all blacks are seen as workers…It seems to assume that all whites in South Africa, because they are not oppressed, cannot identify at a certain unspecifiable deep psychic levels with the oppressed and with their struggle’ (ibid).

As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the search for national unity has been the holy grail of nationalist discourse. The importance of this has been explained by Slovo who argued that ‘the modern nation-state is not always the creation of the bourgeoisie’ and that ‘whereas the economic functions of the nation-state created at the dawn of the capitalist era were served by the breaking-down of ethnic, regional, language, and cultural diversions, in most of Africa…colonial control for purposes of economic exploitation demanded ethnic fragmentation and inter-ethnic hostility…The historic process of spreading a national (as opposed to ethnic or tribal) consciousness and then national consolidation of existing state entities is, in the modern African era, generally a weapon of liberation and social advance’. Jordan (2000) refers to this as the “revolutionary perspective”.

Slovo, further argued that ‘despite the existence of cultural and racial diversity, South Africa is not a multi-national country. It is a nation in the making; a process which is increasingly being advanced in struggle and one which can only be finally completed after the racist tyranny is defeated. The concept of one united nation embracing all other ethnic communities remains the virtually undisputed liberation objective’ (1988:146).

The argument in this approach is that neither race nor ethnic affiliation determines membership of the nation. According to Jordan the nation’s ‘parameters are set by individual acts of voluntary adherence, which adherence requires the submergence of other loyalties to this larger unit; they are defined by a commitment to the country, its people and its future’ (1988:118). It was recognised within the ANC/SACP alliance that there would always be a tension between the notion of national unity and sub-national identity. This has been articulated by inter-alia Jordan who argued: ‘The ANC
recognizes that, owing to the diverse origins of the South African population, there are inevitably and will continue to be cultural expressions of this diversity. The democratic state cannot, however, seek to legislate on such matters…Neither can it abolish affinities based on such sentiment by administrative fiat…We would insist, though, that sovereignty in a democratic state can no more be determined by accidents of biology any more than by those of philology. Indeed we would insist on ‘one country, one people, with one government – a government of the people of South Africa’ that respects cultural diversity’ (ibid,117).

Williams points out that ‘the form of the Congress Alliance, of an alliance of four organisations each with a racially defined constituency, allowed the ANC to reconcile its historical purpose as the voice of the African people with its commitment to a non-racial future for South Africa” (1988:75). This approach was emphasised by Oliver Tambo who, as cited by Jordan, said: ‘Let us in South Africa learn to stop being Bantus, Coloureds, Indians and Whites. Let us be what we are, Africans in Africa. Let those who are committed racists who came to this continent determined to keep Africans in chains, to be perpetual White masters over blacks – let them persist in their role as foreigners on African soil’ (ibid,118) This approach has been formally expressed within the ANC at key points in its history. The Freedom Charter for example, proclaimed ‘that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white’, and that ‘[a]ll national groups shall have equal rights’.

c. Black/Native Republic Thesis

The Black Republic thesis (referred also as the Native Republic Thesis) is discussed as an example of a programme which reflected the totalizing approach of the modernist era. As discussed in Chapter Two Gellner, in spelling out his modernist approach to nation formation, argued that nations should be seen in terms of will, culture and political units. Greenfeld has argued that nationalism helped achieve ‘the grand social transformation from the old order to modernity’ (1992:487). This modernist approach comes to the fore when looking at how the ANC at its inception, and the Communist Party in the 1920s, defined the struggle for national liberation in South Africa, especially through the prism of the end of the anti-colonial wars.
The significance of the BRT has been commented upon by several subsequent leaders. Jordan, while describing the debate around the Black Republic thesis as ‘the most controversial chapter in South African Marxism’ saw it representing a ‘quantum leap for Marxist theory in South Africa, and for the CPSA’ (1988:123). As a result of the approach, ‘the land question, the national question and capitalist power were integrally linked. It projected a bourgeois-democratic alliance under the leadership of the working class. As Moses Kotane explained, ‘the independent Native Republic, which in essence means a bourgeois republic … must necessarily pre-suppose a democratic workers’ and peasants’ republic …’ (1988:123). Slovo points out that this thesis itself came to reflect Stalin’s definition of the nation as a community of language, culture, territory and economy.

Comparing this against a 1997 ANC position paper on the national question, Filatova points out that though the Black Republic approach was subsequently dropped ‘it must have left a deep trace in the hearts of many Communists for it successfully mingled their nationalist and socialist aspirations. The word’s ‘native South African Republic’ may be seen as incorporating Africanism in general and ‘African hegemony’ in particular, and the mention of ‘equal rights for all national minorities’ takes care of the context of multi-cultural and non-racial society’ (1997:50).

According to Simons (1969) by 1927, the ‘Brussels Congress of the League against Imperialism’ was beginning to raise the notion of a democratic, independent Native Republic. Nyawuza noted that in the same year the Comintern recognised that ‘the socio-economic and political divisions which hinder the process of the emancipation of the South African proletariat from bourgeois-nationalist ideology has divided the South African working class into workers of the colonizing, ruling nation and those of the oppressed, disenfranchised indigenous nation’ (1990:44).

Until the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 the CPSA’s programme strove for a united front of black and white workers fighting for a socialist South Africa. However, that year the Comintern got the CPSA to reconceptualise its approach and focus on the attainment of a majority ruled stated initially called the ‘native republic’. This led to what came to be referred to as the two-stage theory whereby the national democratic phase was to lay the basis for the attainment of a socialist society.
Simons and Simons point out that ‘the concept of African power was so far removed from current ideologies and apartheid realities, however, that even veteran communists doubted whether it was sound’ (1996: 338). This perception was due to the very middle class nature of the ANC which had come to be formed in 1912. IJ Pothekhin, who made a name for himself as the father of the African Studies Institute in the USSR, later insisted that the early ANC was an organisation of comprador chiefs. The Simons’ have argued however that he ‘did not adequately examine the process of amalgamating scores of formerly independent and often antagonistic societies into a single nation’ (1969:235), thus not realising the revolutionary step being taken with the creation of the SANNC. Trying to shift the blame somewhat for this lack of vision, Bunting concludes that this oversight of the CPSA to develop a correct policy to the national movement ‘was at least in part due to the failure of the national movement … to reveal its full potential’ (1992:68), which given the weakness of the SANNC after its launch, is a good reason for this oversight..

Douglas and Molly Wolton were amongst those in the Central Executive Committee in favour of the Black Republic Thesis arguing that ‘eventually blacks must predominate in this country, a Black Republic be realized’ (Nyawuza, 1990:45). Opposition was based on the basis that it was a deviation from class analysis and consciousness and would be a surrender to petit-bourgeois nationalism. There were fears that the BRT would be used by the chiefs in the ANC for narrow, tribal objectives or it would encourage anti-white attitudes. SP Bunting, who had opposed the Black Republic slogan, addressed the Comintern in 1928 on this issue saying: ‘The CPSA is itself the actual or potential leader of the Native National Movement; it makes all the national demands that the national body makes, and of course much more, and it can ‘control’ nationalism with a view to developing its maximum fighting strength. It can and will respond to the entire struggle of all the oppressed of South Africa, natives in particular’ (Brian Bunting, 1992:69).

As was the case of India discussed above, by 1932 the Comintern was calling for ‘complete and immediate national independence for the people of South Africa: for the right of the Zulu, Basuto etc. nations to form their own independent republics; for the voluntary uniting of the African nations in a Federation of Independent Native Republics, the establishment of a workers’ and peasants’ governments. Full guarantee
of the rights of all national minorities, for the coloured, Indian and white toiling masses’ (1988:143). The Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 however marked an emphasis on ‘anti-fascist popular fronts’. The CPSA thus focused more on pressing the Smut’s government for democratic change, thus reducing the focus on the African majority and shifting away from the Black Republic thesis.

Greenstein provides some explanation as to why the CPSA members opposing the BRT could not appreciate its potential. He argues that during this period concerns about land were widespread but such concerns manifested themselves in localised forms, relating to ‘specific territories rather than to indigenous rights in the abstract. As a result, rural causes were infrequently taken up by urban-based political organisations and their potential remained untapped, at least until the late 50s’ (1997:9). Paralleling the more nationalist political activity of the ANC ‘people in rural areas frequently adhered to tribal, ethnic and regional identities, leaderships and organisations with a pronounced pre-colonial bent … It is important to note that … (t)raditional symbols frequently joined new identities and organisations to provide legitimation for defiance politics’ (1997:9).

Greenstein cites the 1921 Bulhoek massacre of 200 unarmed believers of the Eastern Cape Israelite movement who had refused to move from their camping grounds and to pay taxes as representative of ‘strong rejectionist sentiments, opposing white domination and state authority in a mixture of indigenous and Christian prophetic symbolism’ (1995:10). Popular uprisings such as the 1906 Bambatha Rebellion or the peasant uprising of the 1960s in Pondoland, can be seen as examples of the subaltern that Guha and Chatterjee were writing about. Jordan points out that the latter revolt was ‘directed against both the newly installed ‘Bantu authorities’ and their paymasters in Pretoria. That revolt was inevitably led by commoners who identified with the modern liberation movement and whose assemblies adopted the Freedom Charter as their programme’ (1977:11).

However Jordan cannot gloss over the real distance between the nationalist movements and the rural masses in the first few decades of the existence of the ANC. On one hand such localised, rural resistance was unable to assume national proportions while the use of English by national political movements widened the gap between rural and urban-based politics. As Greenstein explains, the nationalist
movements ‘advanced notions of a comprehensive trans-ethnic African identity which continued to face competition from localized identities’ (1995:12). Furthermore, in the mines and factories the organisation of work teams and shifts as well as hostel arrangements were ethnic or tribal based – further strengthening such identities.

At that point in the history of South Africa when the modernist impulse from a new colony to an independent republic should have prevailed by creating a new national identity it was destroyed by a more powerful force – the all-white alliance reflected in the Union of South Africa. One can discern at the turn of the 20th Century the beginning of a fusion of will and culture (to use Gellner’s terms) but the polity was weak. This awakening can, as Greenfeld has suggested, ‘be traced to the structural contradictions of the society’ (1992:587) – in this case the struggle between the coloniser and the colonised.

Under Faultlines of the 21st Century the thesis will be considering the extent to which these ethnic identities prevail today. The ANC’s inability to bridge the gap between rural and urban continues to impact on it today, as it tries to work out a dispensation to buttress the power of traditional authorities in the system of local government. This is examined in the context of the cynical interpretation that the rural areas where the traditional authorities hold greatest sway are vote banks for the ANC.

d. Colonialism of a Special Type (CST)

A historical perspective lends itself to seeing South Africa until 1994 as a colonial state. The unique feature in the case of South Africa is that the relationship between the colonising force and the colonised was complicated with the former, during most of the 20th century, having weak and then no direct connection to an external imperial metropole. Hence the depiction of South Africa as an example of ‘colonialism of a special type ’ or internal colonialism. This is not withstanding the fact that whites in South Africa have always been in the minority. Steyn, when comparing the South African situation with that of other ‘deep-settler’ countries such as the USA, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia pointed out ‘White South Africans… for the most part, are a permanent group; although not aboriginal, they are sociologically indigenous (Using J Stones terminology, Stone, J. 1985. Racial conflict in contemporary society.
and make a strong bid to legitimate co-occupancy of the land’ (Steyn, 2001:xxiv).

This is useful to understand how the Black Republic Thesis came to be replaced by the approach of Colonialism of a Special Type (CST). It continued being reflected through the twentieth century for example when Thabo Mbeki articulated the notion of two nations in South Africa. To appreciate the CST thesis and the way a nation is constructed within the thesis, it would be useful to look at the concept ‘national democracy’. Hudson points out that the possibility of ‘transitional social structures’ which reflects the ‘interests not of any one particular class, but of the widest strata of population of the newly-free nations’ (1986:18) led to the concept of ‘national-democracy’ being introduced in the Marxist-Leninist world. It was meant to fill a significant conceptual breach and was formally introduced via the declaration of the meeting of eighty one Communist and Workers’ parties in 1960. It meant ‘to designate that category of ex-colonial (and dependent) countries which could be identified as engaged on a non-capitalist path of development in opposition to imperialism and towards national autonomy’.

This 1960 development had its roots in a long period of gestation. IJ Potekhin (1996:15), had argued in 1949 that ‘in a struggle against imperialist enslavement, the interests of the bourgeoisie coincide with these of the entire people. The leading role in the national liberation movement in most of the colonies of Tropical and South Africa is now performed by the national bourgeoisie and the national intelligentsia’. Edward Roux described had argued in a similar vein at the Sixth Comintern Congress that:

- Comintern should integrate the phenomena of the emergent African working class and anti-colonial resistance in Africa into the international movement against imperialism;
- There should be cognizance of ‘two imperialisms’. There was the white ‘local Afrikaner imperialism with its headquarters in the Union of South Africa (and) … the broader imperialism with its headquarters in Europe’ (1990:48).

The move towards the national democratic revolution framework was a remarkable step given the shifts in Marxist thinking, such as debates on the efficacy of Popular
Fronts. These shifts in thinking had concrete expression in the relationship between the ANC and the SACP. This development led to the SACP in its 1962 programme titled ‘The Road to Socialism’ depicting South Africa as a case of Colonialism of a Special Type (CST). It declared that ‘(The) system of race discrimination and oppression has its origins far back in South African history…The colonial status of the African people facilitates the maximum exploitation of their labour. The privileges extended to White businessmen, farmers, professional people and workers are a means of maintaining their support for the ruling capitalist class and for the South African colonialist system (1962:2-3).

Nyawuza described the CST theory as based on the ‘the situation where the colonizer and the colonized reside “side by side” in the same territory, which has been the case since 1910 when Britain granted political power to the whites in South Africa who used it to further oppress the black majority’ (1990:48). Until then whites had been seen as foreigners on temporary stay, while CST acknowledged them as part of the South African demography. Jordan combined the Black Republic and the CST theses in a neat rendering of the national question which he described as ‘centred on three sets of problems: those of national oppression (of minorities or majorities) within a single political unit; of colonial oppression; and of the unification of the disparate sections of potential nations’ (1988:110). He pointed out that the ANC position ‘posits that in South Africa the national and colonial questions are synonymous; it asserts that the creation of democratic institutions in South Africa is the only means of resolving the national and colonial question; and it argues that the people of South Africa today constitute two antagonistic blocks (one being the colonizer; the other the colonized), and that the only means of unifying them and dissolving the antagonism is through democracy. Thus, in South Africa, the three sets of problems that the national question sought to resolve are interpenetrating’ (ibid).

4.2.6 National liberation and socialism

The key implication of the CST was that the achievement of national liberation was to be a prelude to the creation of a socialist society. The debates around this two-stage approach is considered here. Hudson, for example, argued against the CST, writing that ‘prima facie South Africa is not a colonial society’ (1986:24). The CST ‘assumes the fact of ‘colonial domination’ and then uses this assumption to prove the validity of
its conclusions’ that the path towards socialism is through an initial stage of national democratic revolution. Hudson rejects the “two-stage” theory on the following grounds:

- ‘The material requisite for socialism exists in South Africa – there is a certain level of industrialization, the presence of socio-economic contradictions and the existence of a strong enough working class.
- The nature of national oppression in South Africa does not necessarily result in the dominance of racial/national (and not class) subjectivity, arguing that ‘if social agents in South Africa identify themselves in racial terms, this cannot be attributed to an experience of racial subjectivity, itself the product of ideological struggles’ (1986:32).

He concludes that ‘national/racial identity has not been shown by the CST analysis to enjoy an inevitable primacy in South Africa. In fact a much wider range of political identities can and does exist in South Africa than is able to be acknowledged by the CST analysis’ (ibid).

Neville Alexander similarly argued that ‘it is simply a fallacy to claim that black workers are faced with two autonomous but intersecting systems of domination, viz. a system of ‘racial domination’ and a system of ‘class domination…’ what happens in practice is that the workers, like other class agents, are confronted with a range of actual and possible identities … from which they select those which they consider appropriate to their situation. Which of these identities will be selected is a question of practical politics’ (1986:71).

Fine and Davis found common cause with Hudson and Alexander in their critique of the CST, arguing that there are four problems with the popular front approach characteristic of the national democratic revolution thesis:

- ‘The bourgeoisie in South Africa have proven to be unreliable opponents of apartheid.
- ‘Upholding the sanctity of capitalist private property in a free-market or mixed economy neglects the need … of workers to advocate methods and goals which go beyond the norms of capitalist private property.
- Taking worker support for granted may mean losing support.
- Restraining working class struggles to maintain broader unity “may weaken the liberation movement as a whole” (1988:282).

Another important critique of the CST came from those who subscribed to the racial capitalism approach, in essence arguing that the system of apartheid was but one of many manifestations of capitalism. This view finds contemporary expressions as Soske et al point out among a diverse group of scholars such as Hein Marais, Patrick Bond, William Gumede, Neville Alexander and John Saul who ‘concentrate on the domestic and international conjuncture of the 1980s to early 1990s and the structural continuities within South Africa’s unique system of racial capitalism. …(T)heir interventions challenge the idea that liberation has been achieved in any straightforward sense: core aspirations of the anti-apartheid struggle, like social equality, economic democracy, the redistribution of land and the transformation of the country’s racist urban infrastructure have largely been deferred, if not abandoned outright’ (2012:43).

According to Chipkin the debates in the 1980s between the ‘workerists’ and the United Democratic Front were precisely around this issue. For the ‘workerists’ the notion of ‘the people’ bandied by the UDF was not helpful because “the people” were composed of diverse interests, but their component sub-groupings were not reconciled around a common project, one that simultaneously advanced all their interests. That is precisely what the NDR presumed: that the struggle against racial oppression advanced the interests of the black, coloured and Indian bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie at the same time as it satisfied workers’ interests’ (2007:95). It should be noted that the notion was based on a set of common interests that would be served, not that all of their interests were common.

According to Chipkin this was due at one level to the trade union element of the Congress Alliance, SACTU, no longer impacting on the practises of the emergent new unions in the late seventies and early eighties. The shift from workerism in the mid-eighties was due to the radicalisation workers went through in the aftermath of the 1976 uprisings. While the Soweto and subsequent uprisings in other parts of the country is not dealt with in detail suffice it to note that the ANC did not have a direct hand in their initiation. It nevertheless was a major beneficiary as it was already equipped through its external mission to welcome the many young people who went
into exile in that period. Subsequent developments saw the ANC quickly regain its hegemony over black politics. The 1985 launch of the Congress of South African Trade Unions signalled ‘that within the labour movement the theory of NDR had regained its independence’ (2007:97).

Netshitenzhe (2012:26), in his evaluation of the CST, points out that the post-apartheid South Africa is characterised by a metropolis which is integrated into the global economy and which should be leveraged for inclusive growth and development. Arguing that the metropole’s’ existence is testimony to the ongoing validity of CST, he points out that this ‘large and autonomous private sector can serve as an inhibitor to ‘developmentalism’ of the Southeast Asian type’, while massive inequalities persist. Glaser argues in a similar vein that ‘If we take the ‘national’ question to be about more than the end of formal apartheid and to embrace a concern with racial equality more broadly, then that question remains unresolved and the further question of whether capitalism can contribute to its resolution still unanswered’ (2001:57).

As pointed out earlier, the unity of all South Africans is seen as a *sine qua non* for the creation of a South African nation. Neville Alexander, argued that ‘because the nation has to be constructed ideologically and politically on the basis of developing, i.e. … also changing capitalist forces and relations of production, each of the antagonistic classes in the social formation, generally speaking, conceives of the nation differently in accordance with its class ideology’ (1986:68). In answering the question why the national liberation struggle is ‘the inescapable form of the class struggle’, he cites Therborn who writes: ‘It is, then natural – and not an aberration of underdeveloped consciousness – that class ideologies co-exist with inclusive-historical ideologies, constituting the subjects of the contradictory totality of an exploitative mode of production and/or social formation’ (1982:27).

This leads us to what was regarded as the relationship between national liberation and socialism. Cronin described it as follows: ‘The national aspects of the current struggle are encompassed within the goals of building national unity and national independence…The democratic aspect embraces the struggle for basic democratic rights’. While an alliance of social forces was necessary, the following ‘sufficient conditions’ had to be met for ‘substantial transformation’ (1986: 75-76):
• Working class involvement in ‘all fronts of the national democratic struggle – on the shop-floor, in rural areas, on the civic front, and in education’.
• The deepening and extension of mass-based democracy.
• The use of a ‘scientific approach to struggle’ (in other words, a Marxist-Leninist approach)
• ‘An internationalist perspective’ within the national democratic struggle itself. (ibid).

Many of the positions outlined above are guilty of Greenstein’s charge that ‘one can study ideologies within a class-analytic framework, dismissing identity as a theoretical factor’ (1994:644). This is probably one of the key weaknesses of the CST approach: it does not adequately address the issue of what identity is engendered by the colonial situation. Greenstein warns against taking ‘identification in group terms for granted rather than analyzing it historically … all Africans were excluded from power, not because of their class origins or subversive politics, but because of their common African identity, regardless of their diverse social affiliations and relations to the process of production’ (1994:656). In other words, they were the easily identifiably colonised ‘other’.

4.2.7 The Road to Negotiations

As mentioned in the Section dealing with the ‘Native Question’, this period saw the retribalisation of the African political sphere through the Bantustan system which was meant to promise ‘formal equality’ between different groups. This separate but equal development approach, according to Davies, represented ‘a sea change in apartheid policy’ (2009:30) In keeping with the Tomlinson Commission report, ‘Natives’ were renamed ‘Bantus’ in new laws such as the 1953 Bantu Education Act. This law aimed to halt education received at missionary schools and curb the expectations of black people. The 1954 Bantu Resettlement Act, which targeted vibrant, mutli-racial areas was used to clear up areas such as Sophiatown while the Bantu Urban Areas Act finally forced African women to carry the hated passbook and was used to control the movement of black people into urban areas.
Between 1960 and 1983, about 2.9 million African people and 600 000 Indians and coloureds were forcibly removed from their homes. Most of the Africans were dumped into the Bantustans, where the number grew from 4.2 million in 1960 to 11 million in 1980. The overcrowding caused all kinds of problems from poor health and malnutrition to huge levels of unemployment. And those employed did not see much increase in their wages: Van Der Westhuizen points out that wages remained stagnant from 1866, when the majority of Africans were still living off the land to 1966, long after SA had undergone its version of the industrial revolution (2007:138).

This was also the period when the NP tried to remove the coloureds from the Cape’s voters roll. However, attitudes towards coloureds within the Afrikaner nationalist movement went through several versions. Until the 1930s they were seen as part of the alliance against Africans. In 1936, with the old SAP now behind him, Hertzog finally had enough support in parliament to change the constitution and close the common voters’ roll to Africans in the Cape. In 1938, the NP under Malan’s leadership, advocated scrapping of the Cape black franchise and removing coloured from the common voters roll. JG Strijdom, the hard-line leader from Transvaal was completely opposed to any compromise on this, even dismissing the notion of native representatives in the parliament. The 1951 Separate Representation of Voters Bill placed the coloureds on different rolls in the Cape and Natal, even though the coloured franchise had been entrenched in the 1909 South Africa Act. The Cape’s coloured voters were finally disenfranchised in 1956 (Van der Westhuizen 2007:44–50)

The steps against Indian traders taken in the Natal Colony by Shepstone in the early 1900s now found national application through the Group Areas Act of 1950, which extended terms of the Natives Land Act of 1913, which did not allow Indians to open businesses in white areas. The legislation was passed on the back of an ongoing Broederbond campaign to have Indians repatriated or their business licences revoked.

After the Sharpeville massacre and the subsequent banning of organisations and individuals, the ANC turned to the armed struggle to complement its strategies. Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) was a joint creation of the ANC and the renamed SACP, and served as the ANC’s military wing. Mass pro-ANC organisation in the country was to eventually take off in the 1980s, especially through Cosatu and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Glaser suggests that the emergence of mass
activity could be due to the quality of leadership being provided; the increasing size of
the black working class and its concentration in urban areas; the correlation between
worsening economic circumstances and popular unrest. However, repressive state
action could have the effect of dampening such mass action as was seen in the early
1960s with the banning of a range of organisations and then in the 70s with the

Perhaps the best explanation for the prevalence of mass action through most of the
1980s comes also from Glaser when he points out that ‘While the racial system
separated people out on ethnic grounds, it compressed or connected many who might
otherwise have been much more distant from each other’. They all suffered
‘votelessness, segregation and forced removal…The notion of an oppositional ‘black
people’ had enough real-world plausibility to allow it to function as a potent

Why the sustained attacks on anti-apartheid activities through measures such as the
state of emergency in the late 1980s did not put an end to such action needs to be
explored further. Perhaps the real, strong connection which had now been established
between the ANC in exile and the internal movements could be the most critical factor.
Just when the latter were weakening in the face of numerous assassinations,
detentions, and armed actions against peaceful protests, the August 1989 defiance
campaign was launched by the Mass Democratic Movement. The MDM had as its
major components the UDF and Cosatu and it had developed close collaboration with
the ANC.

In his report to the Durban conference in 1991, Secretary General of the ANC Alfred
Nzo pointed out that ‘mass activity is a vital component of our overall strategic
direction’ (ANC 1991: 18). At the same time, he also emphasised that a racially diverse
membership was an important component of the ANC’s legitimacy claims and noted
that ‘we are not making much progress in respect of the Coloured, Indian and White
populations’ (ANC 1991: 14). This combination of agency by the putative citizens of
South Africa and the impact of identity shall be explored further in the next few
sections.
I shall now look at how the contending nationalisms encountered each other during the negotiations process which began in 1990.

4.3 To the negotiations table and the first few rounds of democratic elections

On 10 February 1990 FW De Klerk crossed the Rubicon that PW Botha became stuck at. By all accounts this was a pivotal moment for the NP, the Afrikaner nationalist movement and whites generally as well as the anti-apartheid forces and the broader disenfranchised community. Within the NP the struggle between Botha and more reformist minded leaders on one hand and the right wing on the other continued unabated. By February 1989 Botha’s centralising instincts reached a dangerous peak: he resigned as the leader of the NP but not as president of the country. In the ensuing party election De Klerk narrowly beat Botha’s chosen candidate Barend du Plessis to assume leadership of the NP.

As President, Botha said he would take note of NP inputs but would ‘rise above party politics’ – severing ‘the last thread of parliamentary accountability for the presidency’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:165). The NP was not willing to allow this ‘Imperial Presidency’ to persist, leading to the party forcing his resignation on 14 August 1989, paving the way for De Klerk’s path to the presidency. Van Der Westhuizen draws parallels between this moment and DF Malan’s triumph over the national socialist Ossewa Brandwag and Nuwe Orde. ‘For a second time, fascist tendencies within Afrikaner ranks had been defeated’ (Van Der Westhuizen 2007:166).

Just as the NP and the church was going through major changes, so too was the Broederbond. The 1982 split of the NP was reflected in the Broederbond with its conservative head, Carel Boshoff, resigning in 1983. This led to a number of resignations at different levels of the organisation. Pieter de Lange, the newly elected chair, began stabilising the organisation from 1985 onwards, placing it back on the reformist path that the previous chair, Gerrit Viljoen, had been steering it towards. Its Committee for Constitutional Policy (staatkundige aangeleenthede) played a major role in ensuring the Broederbond played a vanguard role in the NP’s thinking. In June 1986, the committee produced a document entitled, Basiese Staatkundige
For the next few years it became the basis of Broederbond debates and NP thinking. The document argued that rights claimed by Afrikaners must apply to all other groups and individuals in South African society; no group should dominate any other and entrenched racial or ethnic rule must be abolished. It emphasised that the state must rule on behalf of all its subjects, regardless of race or ethnicity, favouring none. The document added that black participation at every level of the political process was essential for Afrikaner (and white) survival. This meant that the head of state would not necessarily be white, although the power of that office should be limited so as to avoid group domination. Thus, the document added, “the rights and aspirations of groups must be protected and satisfied.” Eventual constitutional negotiations for a new system should include as wide participation as possible from all power groups, else their exclusion would doom it to failure.

In 1989 the "Basic conditions" document was followed by a document entitled "Concept guidelines for political dialogue". The purpose of this was to build on its predecessor and to formulate specific constitutional guidelines. During 1990 a further document, "'n Moontlike staaaktundige model vir Suid-Afrika" ("A possible constitutional model for South Africa"), was released, containing proposals for a possible constitutional model for South Africa and was presented to the Cabinet’s Ministerial Committee on Negotiations. The most important characteristic of the model was the proposal for a bicameral parliament, a lower house with a general voters' roll and an upper house with regional and group representation.

The NP went into the 6 September 1989 election under the leadership of De Klerk and drawing on the guidelines of the Broederbond. This deviation from the traditional white, Afrikaner centric policies took its toll on the party: it took only 93 of the 166 seats in parliament. It lost seventeen seats went to the CP and 12 to the recently created Democratic Party, which had a mixture of English and Afrikaans speaking leaders in the form of Dennis Worrall and Wynand Malan, both formerly of the NP, and Zach de

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3 Most of the account of this process is drawn from the O Malley files. See https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03190.htm accessed 21 April 2016.
The election represented the first time that the NP’s base was drawn mainly from English-speakers – 50% compared to 46% from Afrikaans speakers. The CP had increased its support from 26.4% in the 1987 election to 31.2% in this election. The liberal vote showed a decline with the DP garnering 20.4% compared to the 31.2% of 1981 which went to the PFP and the latest incarnation of the old UP, the New Republic Party. Van Der Westhuizen comments that ‘The shrinking of the liberal vote – after its improved showing in the 1970s – reflected the siege mentality that gripped the white community at large during the 1980s’ (2007:176).

The NP was not being punished only by the right wing. Within the broader white community resistance to conscription was rising. The morality of serving in the SADF became a big issue for many young white men when the troops were deployed in the townships after the Soweto Uprising in the mid-1970s. The End Conscription Campaign was launched in 1983, provoking a disproportionate response by the regime, given its small size. Other voices emerged from within the Afrikaner community. These included vehicles such as the Vrye Weekblad, an alternative weekly newspaper and a number of Afrikaner musicians raising their talents against apartheid. Similarly a number of students from the Afrikaans-speaking campuses joined those white English students who had been active in the anti-apartheid movement for decades.

During this period those opposed to apartheid faced the iron fist of repression. The groundwork had been laid for this with amendments made to the Defence Act allowing for the SADF to play a role in ‘combating and repressing terrorism’ and preventing or suppressing local unrest’. Defence spending increased from 6% of the budget in 1960 to 15% in 1980, to peak at about 20% during the 1980s. In the 8 months of the declaration of the State of Emergency in July 1985, eight thousand people were detained, twenty two thousand were charged for participating in the protests, about 880 people were killed and about 240 000 workers were involved in strikes. Intense international pressure led to the lifting of the State of Emergency, but it was reinstated from June 1986 and it stayed in place until February 1990.

The frontline states of Southern African were not spared the military might of the South African government. Cross-border raids, support to proxy rebel movements, and the invasion of Angola came to serve as training grounds for the measures that the
security forces were to use inside the country. Another example of this was the success the South African government had in preventing SWAPO in Namibia from winning a two-thirds majority - using this model for its ambition of securing the actual defeat of the ANC at the polls Inkatha was transformed into such a proxy armed force responsible for much destabilization in Natal and parts of Transvaal. This is discussed in greater detail under the Section 4.3.2 looking at violence and negotiations.

A number of reasons have been offered as to why De Klerk set about making his momentous moves in February 1990 which led to full-scale negotiations. Leon Wessels argues that he was following Samuel Huntington’s advice proffered in the 1980s that the reformist leader acted decisively to gain the initiative over the revolutionary force (Van Der Westhuizen, 2009:184). The fact that PW Botha had already begun the process of contact with the ANC laid the basis for De Klerk. The NP leadership had also realised that its search for credible black leaders was not yielding much results and that working with the ANC could lead to negotiations that ‘did not necessarily translate into transfer of power and that the NP could hold onto some power’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:179).

Furthermore, with the falling of the Berlin Wall, the NP government had very little basis to justify an anti-communist position. Also, the NP felt that it was in a stronger position than the ANC. A key motivation to move was also the degree to which apartheid had lost any moral legitimacy, globally. This was something which Van Der Westhuizen argues De Klerk was more sensitive to than his thick-skinned predecessor. The deepening economic crisis was also forcing the government to consider moves which would win favour with the west. This could be seen by George Bush’s decision to lift US sanction in July 1991. She says that at the last Cabinet meeting before 2 February 1990, De Klerk shared his proposals which were unanimously endorsed. ‘But that was their last moment of solidarity. As the negotiations unfolded…enmity became the ruling sentiment amongst the NP’s executive leadership’, perhaps reflective of the disputes within the white community generally.

One of the major issues De Klerk did not shift on until the very end of the negotiations process was group rights. Rina Venter, who was Health Minister at the time, said in an interview with Van Der Westhuizen that whilst the 2 February 1990 speech represented a radical break ‘white voters were being mollycoddled: ‘We were still
saying: Don’t be worried, we are not going to hand over power. We will entrench minority rights’... The party was sending a double message – always keeping one foot in the past’ (2007:182-183). Also, in its rhetoric the NP repeatedly said it would not surrender.

For the purposes of this thesis the most crucial aspect of the speech was where De Klerk stuck to the NP’s old chestnuts of group rights. He said: ‘South Africa has its own national composition and our constitutional dispensation has to take this into account. The formal recognition of individual rights does not mean that the problems of a heterogeneous population will simply disappear. Any new constitution which disregards this reality will be inappropriate and even harmful. Naturally, the protection of collective, minority and national rights may not bring about an imbalance in respect of individual rights. It is neither the Government’s policy nor its intention that any group - in whichever way it may be defined - shall be favoured above or in relation to any of the others’.⁴ (italics mine)

Van Der Westhuizen points out that the NP had a difficult job selling its notion of ‘power sharing’, which in effect was a white veto. ‘The NP was explicit about seeking a veto: its 1990 national congress decided that the new constitution should ensure that minorities ‘have a guaranteed influence in the decision-making, whether by provision of veto powers or by a specially loaded majority requirement’ (2007:185). At the same time the NP leadership was speaking of an elite pact with the ANC along the lines that state and capital had embarked on since the mid-1970s. But it could not countenance the ANC’s ally, the SACP, being part of that pact. The other option being considered was the NP being at the helm of a multi-racial alliance which would have included the largely English, white DP, the coloured Labour Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party.

For a few years under Botha’s premiership, secret talks had been going on between the NP and the ANC. After De Klerk’s speech, contact between the ANC and the government was taken up rapidly, resulting in the signing of the Groote Schuur Minute after talks from 2-4 May 1990. The parties agreed on the conditions to be met for ending political conflict including the release of political prisoners, the return of political exiles, and the gradual lifting of the nationwide State of Emergency. On 6 August 1990

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⁴ https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02104/06lv02105.htm accessed 22 April 2016
the Pretoria Minute was agreed upon by the government and the ANC. It dealt with the release of political prisoners, return of exiles, obstacles in the Internal Security Act and suspension of violence by the ANC.

While the NP pursued talks with the ANC, the NP also tried to shore up its relations with Inkatha. The relation between the NP and the IFP was never an easy one. Even during Botha’s era Gatsha Buthelezi had proven to be an exasperating and unpredictable partner. During De Klerk’s attempts at diplomacy to bring peace to KwaZulu Natal, he was often undermined by Buthelezi. However the alliance was dealt a blow by the revelation in 1991 of a covert operation called Operation Marion to train Inkatha members to fight the ANC. For the ANC this was grist for the mill – it had been long accusing the NP of subterfuge in its relations with the IFP. ‘Inkathagate’, as the revelations came to be referred to, saw the parting of ways between NP and the IFP. It also provided further grounds for the ANC’s argument that an interim multiparty government should preside over the negotiations, not the NP nor its government. A National Peace Accord was signed in September 1991, with the IFP showing its regard for it by bussing in 2000 men dressed in their Zulu impi regalia. The National Peace Accord was signed by the government and 18 other political organizations. Given the ongoing violence, the ANC refused to disband its armed wing. At the same time the CP, AZAPO and the PAC refused to even engage with the idea of holding negotiations.

By 20 December 1991, with the opening of the formal talks titled Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), the NP government announced that it had come around to accepting the ANC’s argument that a democratically elected assembly should draft the final constitution. The significance of this was seen in the same terms as De Klerk’s 2 February 1990 speech, because it meant that the NP was relinquishing its power over the final negotiations over the constitution and accepting the inevitability of a democracy based on majority rule – something it had vowed never to accede to. A combination of developments, especially its isolation from both the right due to the CP refusing to join the process, and from the left which was united under the Patriotic Front of the ANC, SACP, PAC, DP and some of the Bantustan governments, led to the NP seeking ways of retrieving the initiative. Also, it needed to burnish its image after the damaging revelations around Inkathagate.
At CODESA 1 a declaration of intent, outlining the principles of the proposed new
democratic South Africa was signed and five working groups were appointed to look
into issues such as the principles of a new constitution, arrangements for an interim
government and the future of the homelands. These discussions were to take place
under Codesa 2.

In order to galvanise white support behind the NP, De Klerk called for a referendum
on the holding of negotiations on 17 March 1992. The trigger for this had been the
NP’s loss at the by-election in Potchefstroom, a traditional NP stronghold, to the CP.
The far right got 30% support for its ‘no’ position. The NP was particularly pleased that
it had been able to gain a majority in the generally conservative Free State. However,
the right wing had not died a quite death, as shall be discussed now.

4.3.2 Violence and Negotiations

Having black people carry out killings and attacks against black people was seized
upon and propagated by the NP government. ‘Black-on-black violence’, as it came
to be labelled, ‘was an NP propaganda creation ...(T)he ‘blacks’ were attacking each
other as they were wont to do, confirming the correctness and necessity of apartheid’
(Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:155). The level of culpability in the higher echelons of the
state became a major issue in the TRC and its aftermath. This is discussed further
below.

Timothy Sisk has argued that that ‘elite-concluded accords do not work unless elites
are able to demobilise their own constituencies ’ and he consequently attributes the
failure of the National Peace Accord of September 1991 to the inability of Mandela, De
Klerk and Buthelezi to demobilise their constituencies , concluding that ‘the underlying
forces behind the violence were mostly beyond their control’ (Guelke, 2000:242, citing

Guelke argues that the ‘ANC–IFP rivalry became a potent factor in forcing
the government to make concessions to the ANC’. He points out that the government was
at pains at avoiding the picture of instability because of the impact it could have on
investor confidence; reverse the normalisation of international relations achieved since
1990; it feared the ungovernability it saw leading to social breakdown and political
fragmentation. ‘Indeed, so clear were the threats, if no deal was done, as to generate during the course of the transition a massive shift in white attitudes towards the prospect of an ANC-led government. Ironically, by challenging the ANC so forcefully, Buthelezi and the IFP actually contributed to its triumph’ (2000: 252).

At the same time the white right was evolving to more extreme positions including a military intervention to curb the loss of power by the Afrikaners. Former SADF Chief Constand Viljoen was at the centre of moves which led to the creation of the Afrikaner-Volksfront in May 1993. In attendance at the inaugural meeting was the CP, the HNP, the Afrikaner Volksunie, Afrikaner Vryheidstigting, the Iron and Steel Workers Union, the Mynwerkersunie (which later adopted the name Solidarity) and the Church of the Creator (which Van Der Westhuizen describes as KKK-like, 2007:206). Former SADF intelligence chief Tiene Groenewald drew in the more militaristic organisations such as the AWB and Boere Weerstandbewiging, which laid claim to an army of 10 000 men, mainly farmers (Van Der Westhuizen, 2009:206). The threat posed by the right wing was real enough for both Mandela and Mbeki to spend time on winning Viljoen over.

The right wing carried out attacks on a diverse range of targets – the NUM offices, the Vrye Weekblad and the NP-supporting Beeld – targets ‘which symbolised political change’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:206). It was linked with the assassination of MK and SACP leader Chris Hani on 10 April 1992. Members of the AWB stormed the venue of the Codesa talks in June 1993. Under its leader Eugene Terreblanche it then tried to ‘invade’ the former Bantustan of Bophuthatswana in March 1994, where it was rebuffed by Bophuthatswana soldiers, with three AWB members killed in the full glare of the media. Despite its potency it remained deeply fragmented, with about 100 organisations identified as being associated with the right wing.

Constand Viljoen quickly distanced himself from these adventures and joined the constitutional process as the head of the newly created Freedom Front. This was facilitated by the signing of the ‘Accord on Afrikaner Self-Determination’ signed by Viljoen, Thabo Mbeki in his capacity as Chair of the African National Congress and Roelf Meyer on behalf of the NP and its government on 23 April. The agreement allowed for an independent Afrikaner volkstaat, as had been agreed to in the Interim Constitution, and which later found its way into section 235 of the Constitution of SA.
adopted in May 1996. Given his stature Viljoen was able to get many of the right wing whites to participate in the April 1994 elections. The key negotiators reciprocated by providing for the creation of a *volkstaatsraad* (a council for a people’s state) in the interim constitution.

Talks at CODESA 2 broke down in May 1992 over the major issues of majority rule and power sharing. In Working Group 2 of Codesa 2, the NP proposed a two-house interim parliament, with the upper house consisting of regional representatives allowing minorities to block decisions by the lower house and a rotational presidency. Also, the NP wanted a majority of 70% to be able to change the constitution and 75% to change the bill of rights. The ANC’s view was that it did not want to be committed to details of a future dispensation, and that despite the NP’s proposal being couched as interim measures, it could become a permanent arrangement.

The NP’s protection of minorities was supported by the IFP, who had its sights set on self-determination. The ANC argued that its proposal of proportional representation would cater for minority interests and that two thirds could be the basis for adoption of the constitution and its amendment. Violence erupted, notably at Boipatong near Vanderbijlpark, on 17 June 1992 where 45 people were killed. The victims were all ANC supporters while the 300 odd attackers were Inkatha supporters from nearby hostels, under white Afrikaner security command.

It gave the ANC the basis to formally withdraw from the talks, especially given its sensitivity to views from the grassroots expressed at its December 1990 conference (discussed in greater detail below under African Nationalism). This led the ANC to adopt what was referred to as the ‘Leipzig option’ named after the mass movement which toppled over the East German regime in 1989. ‘In a sense, mass action was to the ANC what the March 1992 referendum was to the NP’, suggests Van Der Westhuizen (2007:212). The attack on about 70 000 protestors by Ciskeian forces in Bisho on 7 September 1992 led to 28 people being killed.

### 4.3.3 Restarting the negotiations

Behind-the-scenes meetings in September 1992 between cabinet minister Roelf Meyer and the ANC's Cyril Ramaphosa led to the drawing up of the Record of Understanding (RoU) which was to kick-start the stalled negotiations. However, the 24
September 1992 Summit where the ROU was going to be signed was almost scuppered because De Klerk tried to obtain indemnity from prosecution for all the government’s security forces. Its eventual signing represented for people like Roelf Meyer a ‘paradigm shift’. The NP finally accepted individual rights above minority rights, a liberal democratic constitution and the Constitutional Court as the apex decision-making body of the land. In an interview with Van Der Westhuizen, Meyer said that ‘It was the point at which the NP’s negotiators finally broke with the ‘old paradigm’ of clinging to a minority veto and group rights’ (2007:217). The importance of this shift can be appreciated when it is recalled that in a 1989 poll only 7% of English-speaking whites and 5% white Afrikaans speakers supported a unitary state with a parliament elected through universal franchise. More importantly this heralded the moment of confirming the constitution as the centre of sovereignty of the future South Africa.

The ROU led to the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) which began its deliberations in April 1993. The Interim Constitution drawn up thereafter also forced the ANC to abide by certain constitutional principles that would frame the new constitution which was to be drawn up by the first democratically elected parliament. The following of the 34 principles in the Interim Constitution indicate the extent of the ANC’s compromise: protection of the diversity of language and culture; constitutional right to self-determination on territorial or linguistic and cultural basis; and the acceptance of provincial constitutions. Davies describes this as ‘a considerable climb down on the part of the ANC, and its coalition partners in the face of some very cynical politicking’ and brinkmanship from De Klerk’s administration (2009:75).

The Codesa 2 Working Group 2 had also made provision for the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council, an embodiment of the ‘dual power’ that SA had entered into. The TEC was to ‘promote the preparation for and transition to a democratic order in South Africa’. Much of its efforts was towards levelling the playing fields especially as the country moved towards the April 1994 elections. The ANC’s view was that the NP government could not be both referee and player in the elections. The TEC therefore assumed a wide range of powers, including control over the armed forces, through its seven sub councils. The PAC and the CP were amongst 7 of the original participants at the negotiations who did not participate in the TEC. While it was created
and empowered by legislation passed in September 1993, the ANC and NP differed over the TEC’s role, with the latter saying it only had supervisory powers, trying to retain ultimate authority in the hands of the NP-led government.

The onwards movement of the negotiators saw the NP jettisoning the IFP, especially after it linked up with the CP and the leaders of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana in an alliance called Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG). This group eventually walked out of the MPNF after 30 June when the Interim Constitution was adopted. Buthelezi associated himself with the hawks in the NP who wanted strong regionalism with autonomous power for the provinces. This was manifested in the post 1994 election situation when the Western Cape, under NP hawk Hernus Kriel, wrote its own constitution under the provisos of the Interim Constitution.

The proposed ‘sunset clauses’, set out by SACP Chair Joe Slovo, met one of the requirements of the NP: the prolongation of the transitional period. The proposal, endorsed by the ANC in November 1992, allowed for the creation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), general amnesty for full disclosure of crimes and pension/employment guarantees for the civil service and security forces. Netshitenzhe captured the importance of the settlement when he described it as one of ‘capturing a bridgehead: to codify basic rights and use these as a basis for more thoroughgoing transformation of South African society’. Notwithstanding the compromises the ANC had to make, the final Constitution…provided space for policies and programmes to effect such transformation’ (2012:16).

However leading lights of the Afrikaner intellectual right, such as Hermann Giliomee, continued attacking De Klerk and his team for having surrendered to the ANC. Leon Wessels said of Giliomee that whereas the academic would have ‘gone to Kempton Park to fight for a private Afrikaner school, I went to Kempton Park to fight for a constitutional state’ (Cited in Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:235). Giliomee argued that the 1992 referendum had not addressed the issue of the content of the negotiations, only asking whites whether the government should proceed with negotiations. NP leaders deny there was any lack of clarity, with Pik Botha saying ‘No voter could have claimed that he did not have an idea that we would lose political power’ (Van Der Westhuizen interview, 2009:238). Nor was there any promise of a second referendum, as Giliomee has claimed.
4.3.4 The April 1994 elections: ‘Free at last!’

Until the very day of the election itself, many of the NP leaders believed that they would win the election. As one respondent told Van Der Westhuizen, ‘Some NP members felt that as die baas praat (as the boss says) black people will vote for him’. They thought that God-fearing, conservative black people will come round to realising that salvation for their country lay with the NP. Also, in the run up to the elections busloads of black people were brought in to attend NP meetings and rallies, further creating this false expectation (2009:248).

Buthelezi was convinced at the very last minute to participate in the process. As mentioned above, South Africa was haunted by Buthelezi’s apparent pursuit of what was widely dubbed the Savimbi option after the refusal of the UNITA leader to abide by the outcome of Angola’s elections in 1992. Guelke argues that ‘(l)it is apparent that the new direction taken by Buthelezi and the IFP after the Record of Understanding was a sign of weakness rather than strength. In the 1980s Buthelezi had presented himself as an apostle of moderation in the eyes of white South Africans through his opposition to economic sanctions and to the armed struggle…However, Inkatha was compromised by the covert assistance it received from the state in its conflict with other anti-apartheid forces in the 1980s’ (2000:252). These developments may have been amongst the factors which persuaded the IFP to enter the elections, even after the ballot forms had been printed.

The ANC won 62.65% (252 seats in parliament) of the vote; the NP, drawing more votes than it ever had, 20.39% (82 seats); the IFP got 10.5% (43 seats); the Freedom Front received 2.2% (9 seats) of the votes; the DP 1.7% (7 seats) and the PAC 1.2% (5 seats). The NP and DP together attracted about 200 000 African voters, with the NP’s increased support being due to it making significant inroads into the Indian and coloured communities. With the African vote, that represented 50% of the NP’s support base. In fact by 2003 its white support had been reduced to 30%.

The results vindicated a position the verlig elements of the NP were pushing: that coloured people were part of a larger Afrikaans-speaking community which could be drawn closer to the NP. The Western Cape provincial results of the 1994 election bore
testimony to that: the NP won 53.5% of the vote versus the ANC’s 33%. The majority of South Africa’s 3.6m coloured are located in that province.

On the right wing, the FF removed Constand Viljoen from the leadership position after its poor showing in the 1999 elections when it received only 0.8% of the vote, replacing him with Pieter and Corné Mulder, sons of the former Minister Connie Mulder, who had been the likely successor to Vorster and was ousted in the aftermath of the Info Scandal. This dismal result essentially brought an end to the hopes for a volkstaat since there was not demonstrable support for it.

At the first sitting of the newly elected parliament Nelson Mandela was elected as president. During his Presidency Nelson Mandela committed himself to building a South African unity based on reconciliation. A particular poignant moment in his Presidency was his gesture at the 1995 Rugby World Cup final. Edward LiPuma and Thomas A. Koelble (2011:2) capture the significance of the iconic moment when Mandela, in the shirt of the national rugby team, handed the trophy to the captain of the winning South African team: ‘As he extends the trophy, Mandela says proudly: ‘Thank you for what you have done for South Africa’; (Francois) Pienaar replies in reverential voice: ‘We could never have done what you did for South Africa’…. Though only one moment, the moment is profoundly performative: the subject pronouns ‘we’ and ‘you’ are joined to the third person collective agent, South Africa. There is the suggestion of a horizontal citizenship (Anderson 1983) in that what each South African has in common is the ritualised experience of this ‘our’ moment’.

In Chapter 5 I shall deal in greater detail with the strategies attempted by the ANC and its allies to develop a national identity. In this section note LiPuma and Koelble’s argument that ‘As Mandela understood, the production of solidarity is crucial because especially across Africa, technologies of governmentality and state sovereignty predate the birth of the nation and the recognition of citizenship. So while a genuine sense of national identity and solidarity may be blossoming in elite circles, cultural localisms and the socioracial categories apartheid so deeply implanted continue to constrain and motivate many South Africans.’

A critical aspect of Mandela’s effect is the promotion of ‘non-racialism’ which is discussed in greater detail under African nationalism, looking at how its articulation by
the ANC has forced other parties to respond to this concept. Here I want to take note of Posel’s signalling ‘at no point was there any philosophical imagining of – or indeed aspiration to – a version of non-racialism in which the very language of race would, or could, be dismantled. Rather, the abiding metaphors of the ‘new’ South Africa asserted a racial plurality, with ‘unity in diversity’, a ‘rainbow nation’ encompassing a variety of differences, including race. This was also the version of non-racialism performed by Nelson Mandela as he enacted his willingness to ‘reconcile’ with his erstwhile oppressors: metonymic of how to ‘be together’ collectively, as if Mandela’s own powers to detoxify race could stand in for the fledgling nation at large’ (Posel, 2015: 2169). These themes shall be unpacked in Chapter Five.

4.3.5 Drafting the Constitution

A historical perspective is useful to appreciate the importance of the adoption of the new Constitution. Perhaps one perspective is that provided by Du Toit that ‘in a number of important ways the political transition of the 1830s (with the abolition of slavery and granting liberties to the Khoisan) was strikingly similar to that of the 1990s: in both cases the old political order was swept aside to make way for a new dispensation which had seemed hardly imaginable only a few years before. In both cases too, the political changes were effected primarily at a constitutional and legal level, leaving the socio-economic order largely intact’. The big difference, though, is that in the 1830s – significant as the abolition of slavery was - one system of racial domination was replaced by another. The extent to which the socio-economic order has been kept largely intact shall be explored below when looking at the performance of the ANC in government.

A Constitutional Committee drawn from the members of parliament got down to work in earnest after the 1994 elections with Cyril Ramaphosa serving as its Chair and Leon Wessels as his Deputy. In September 1994 the Constitutional Assembly created six theme committees on such topics as the nature of the democratic state, the structure of government, relationships between levels of government, fundamental rights, the judiciary, and specialised areas of government (such as the police force or defence force). It then launched a public campaign to solicit inputs from all parts of society. The Constitutional Committee developed a work plan which, according to Hassan Ebrahim
became ‘the core of the process. Without it there wouldn’t have been a constitution’, he said (1998:196). The plan called for a first draft of the Constitution by August 1995.

On February 11, 1995 the Constitutional Public Meetings programme was launched. It involved thousands of people providing inputs on a variety of issues ranging from the right to public libraries to the status of lobola (the price paid for a bride). The ANC, in having pushed for the adoption of this approach, was clearly drawing on its own tradition of mass involvement as seen in the process around the Freedom Charter drafting and the UDF’s million signature campaign. Despite Mangosuthu Buthelezi serving as Minister of Home Affairs in the GNU the IFP continued playing the spoiler role it had become known for during the negotiations and in the lead up to the 1994 elections. It reminded the Constituent Assembly that there were certain issues SUCH AS which it had been agreed should be submitted to international mediation and it also had problems with the two year deadline to write up the Constitution. Late in February 1995, the IFP walked out of the Constituent Assembly.

As the process unfolded, the parties were beginning to get stuck on differences and a deadlock-breaking subcommittee was formed. Early October 1995 the Constitutional Assembly was presented with what Cyril Ramaphosa called an ‘historic milestone’ - the first working draft of 130 pages with revisions. Also, a document which contained more than 30 contentious matters on which parties needed to reach agreement in principle, and some 130 others that needed refinement by negotiation was presented.

Amongst the issues the draft did not spell out were the relationship between central and provincial government and was like-wise quiet on such issues as the Senate and its role, language policy and traditional leaders. Notwithstanding the displeasure of the MPs at these issues not having been resolved, the working draft was approved by the Constitutional Assembly early in November and published for public comment on November 22 1995. Through a massive publicity drive under the slogan ‘Securing your rights, securing your future’, or ‘One law for one nation’ the public was given three months to comment.

Early in February 1996 it emerged that there were 65 contentious issues needing attention including questions like: Where should parliament be situated: Cape Town or Pretoria? Was it feasible to maintain equal status among 11 official languages? Should
the flag and anthem be changed? These issues reflected the differing the two dominant nationalism had travelled thus far.

The bill of rights was proving a minefield in the negotiations. The degree to which property rights would be protected was equally fraught, as were the right to life and its impact on abortion and the death penalty; and labour's right to strike versus the employer's right to lock strikers out. Other divisive issues were the shape of the National Assembly, the courts and the administration of justice. Also, there was intense debate on the freedom of expression clause in the bill of rights, with the ANC wanting a ban on ‘hate speech’ but with the DP and NP opposed to that.

The relationship between the national government and the nine provincial governments was fundamental to the constitutional balance of power within the state – again an issue that divided the parties. The Afrikaner right-wing wanted the volkstaat, while the NP wanted protection of cultural minorities. The NP pushed for protection of all ‘minority groups’, to conceal its own agenda of seeking protection of white Afrikaner interests – according to De Klerk the NP did not want Afrikaners to become an ‘identifiable target for a hostile majority’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:252). Eventually there was political agreement on the inclusion in the constitution of a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Cultural Rights.

The NP also differed with the ANC on the wording around property rights. The history of colonialism and apartheid traced above had resulted, on the eve of April 1994, in a highly functional but inegalitarian property rights system. While the new Constitution guaranteed property rights, it did not satisfy the verkramptes who were concerned about the provision for land reform in the Constitution. The clause agreed to reads as follows: ‘No one may be deprived of property except in accordance with a law of general application, and no such law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’.

In March 1995 the fourth edition of a refined working draft of the Constitution was tabled. On April 15 1996 a ‘stepping-stone’ draft, the fifth edition, was put before the Constitutional Committee. The so-called ‘technicalities’ which were still being ironed out included some of the hottest issues of the entire process as well as the key questions of the century long struggle against colonialism and apartheid: property, education, and labour rights. At this point the term ‘package approach’ entered the
negotiating vocabulary. Behind the term were notions of horse-trading and trade-offs between the ANC and the NP; in other words, deals that came as an entity and could not be unravelled by the opposition of less powerful parties or interests.

During this process, the Preamble to the Constitution was hammered out and embraced by all the parties involved. It reads as follows:

   We, the people of South Africa,

   Recognise the injustices of our past;

   Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;

   Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and

   Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity

Even this did not satisfy all, with conservative Christians protesting at what they saw as the exclusion of God from the affairs of the state.

The Constitutional Assembly debated the bill for two days and after 289 amendments were made it was approved by the Assembly on Wednesday night, April 24. Mangosuthu Buthelezi responded by telling his supporters at a public meeting that the constitution was a recipe for a ‘totalitarian autocracy’ and ‘the greatest danger to liberty in the country’.

The amendments were duly carried out and the Constitution was presented for adoption. The May 6-7 1996 days of debate in the Constitutional Assembly were acrimonious, with the ANC showing its exasperation at some of the delays by threatening to go to a referendum. Ultimately what Leon Wessels calls ‘our common South Africanness’ triumphed. In his moving ‘I am an African’ speech, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki set the tone for the debate on the Constitution – his speech is analysed under the section on African nationalism.

Li Puma and Koelble emphasise the role of the constitution in helping create the solidarity referred to above: ‘The constitution is, in Arendt’s (1977) terms, a document in which the South African nation embodies not only a set of guarantees, but emancipatory promises that can potentially bind people together. Wilson (1996:4-5)
argues that the ANC and the NP ultimately had no choice: ‘in the context of negotiations between two competing nationalisms (Afrikaner and Africanist), the constitution became the only viable political blueprint to bridge the chasm between the seemingly incommensurable political positions… in the end constitutionalism replicated elements of other nationalist narratives’.

4.3.6 The GNU: worse of two goods?

The NP found it difficult to work in the GNU coalition, used as its leaders were, to exercising power unilaterally. With the adoption of the Constitution in May 1996, the NP announced the quitting of the GNU in June. There seems to be consensus that the manner in which the NP took part in the GNU weakened it considerably. Southern (2015:239) argues that ‘while De Klerk was undoubtedly aware of the basic power dynamics of the GNU before its operationalisation in 1994 our research would suggest that this was not effectively communicated to the white South African community... white expectations regarding power-sharing within the GNU were higher than those of the NP who ended up within the multiparty cabinet’ (2015:242). Those who wanted it to remain in the GNU include former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, who felt that its participation gave a sense of comfort to the NPs constituency that their views were being represented.

Van Der Westhuizen argues that the poor communication around the departure from the GNU and the ‘lightweight’ Marthinus Van Schalkwyk’s takeover of the party’s reins contributed to the NP’s ruinous performances in the elections. Also, in its election campaigning, it was caught up in a dilemma: black voters preferred to take a more constructive stance, while whites wanted the NP to be more strident in its criticism of the ANC. Furthermore, the impact of the TRC hearings made a huge dent on the NP’s followers (discussed in greater detail below).

At this stage verligtes were abandoning the NP ship to pursue professional careers, or join other political formations as Roelf Meyer did when he set up the United Democratic Movement after Bantu Holomisa was effectively removed from the ANC. He admitted to Van Der Westhuizen that he was frustrated with the NP’s small pool of black leaders that it insisted on drawing from, often people of dubious backgrounds (2007:260). A number of the verlig elements joined him in that direction.
While Mandela was striding all over the South African landscape, drawing South Africans into the warm embrace of a single nation, within the right-wing of the NP a fissuring process was underway. It reflected patterns which were now familiar with the northern parts of the party machinery reflecting a more progressive outlook. The bittereinders (die-hards) counted Hernus Kriel in the Western Cape, Tertius Delport of the Eastern Cape and the Die Burger editor Ebbe Domisse amongst their leading lights. The latter in particular pushed for the NP to leave the GNU, to become a purely oppositional party.

The NP’s departure from the GNU saw the rise of the verkramptes in the NP with people like Tertius Delport playing a leading role. He wanted to slow down the blackening of the NP through a number of measures such as placing limits on the number of branches to be set up in black areas. Marthinus van Schalkwyk, who was part of the conservative wing of the NP, was elected as party leader on 9 September 1997. Whilst having a conservative image, drawn from his days in Military Intelligence where he worked at the height of the days of ‘total strategy’, many regarded him as too flexible in principles.

At its 27 November 1998 conference the NP renamed itself the New Nationalist Party, the name change being seen as symbolic of the paucity of ideas and alternative policy options. The NP lost support in dramatic fashion in the 1999 and 2004 elections. The DP, which had a sharper message for whites in the 1999 elections – under the slogan ‘Fight Back’ – saw it add 1.2m voters to its 1994 tally. Most of these were drawn from the NP’s support base. ‘By the early 2000s, the DP/DA had entrenched itself as the party of the employed and higher income groups, as well as former CP and AWB supporters amongst the lower classes. About 77 percent of its supporters were white’ (Van der Westhuizen, 2007:269). By ‘using language that most whites had historically come to identify with, the DP supplied a vent for anger and confusion at their loss of power and resultant anxiety’ (2007:279). Tom Lodge (1999:183) argues that the DP’s move to the right, while helping it gain 7.83%, was accompanied by a significant part of the Afrikaner electorate’s nudging to the left, allowing the newcomer UDM to garner
3.42% in the 1999 election. With the ANC increasing its majority to above 66%, much of those gains came from the 13.5% loss registered by the NNP.

1999 was the first time voter registration was required to be able to vote. It is estimated that about a third of the eligible white voters did not cast their ballot, 42% of coloureds and about 40% Indians stayed away from the polls. Lodge points out that about one million whites stayed away from the polls. This trend continued in the 2004 and 2009 elections, with Van Der Westhuizen arguing that ‘the stayaway boosted the (ANC’s) dominance’ (2007:271). Amongst the reasons cited for the withdrawal were the loss of confidence in the NP, as well as the TRC hearings where the excesses of the apartheid system were exposed possibly impacting on how younger, eligible voters saw formal politics.

Van Schalkwyk won few admirers for having led the NP to its eventual demise when he engaged in discussions with leader of the Democratic Party to create an alliance, on the basis that it seemed to be what the white voters wanted. The principles which they agreed on saw an amalgamation of the liberal values espoused by the DP and the more conservative values around religion, family and cultural/language rights of the NP. The immediate success of the DA in the local elections of 2000 supported the views of Helen Zille and Colin Eglin who had pushed for the alliance: the DA won 24% of the vote across the country, an improvement on 16% that the combined opposition had notched up in the 1995/96 local elections. This included taking over the Cape Town metro, with DA gaining 107 seats to the ANC’s 77 seats. Southern (2015:238) has raised the possibility that ‘some Afrikaners vote(d) for the DA as a result of a tendency to define their identity somewhat less narrowly in the new South Africa cannot be discounted’.

The DP needed access to the NP’s coloured voting base, as well as its formidable electoral machinery (at its height the NP had more than a thousand branches across the country), while the NP was still trying to cast off of its apartheid past. Its name change had not even helped. However, tensions developed with liberals in the DP uncomfortable with the right-wingers who had swum in with the NP tide. Also, the NP
was uncomfortable with the confrontational opposition Tony Leon and the DP seemed to be committed to.

Hence some NP members felt more comfortable with the ANC and, encouraged by those who had moved to the ANC already such as Gert Oosthuizen who was to become Deputy Minister, made use of ‘floor crossing’ mechanism which allows MPs to change their party allegiance, even though they had been elected to parliament on the basis of the country’s party-list proportional representation system. For its part the ANC recognised the evolution the NP members had been through and was willing to welcome them as long they were committed to ANC’s vision of a non-racial, non-sexist democratic SA. The practise came to an end in January 2009.

4.3.7 Western Cape: bellwether of democratic SA voting patterns?

The voting patterns in the Western Cape are of interest at two levels: firstly, this is the province in which the ANC and NP cooperation revolved around governance of the Western Cape and Cape Town; and secondly, it is a province where coloureds make up about 48 percent of the population.

In the 1999 election the contest in the province remained primarily one between the ANC and the NP with the latter losing its majority status in the Western Cape. Its share of the vote dropped by 15% to 38% – 4% less than that of the ANC. The ANC increased its share of the vote to 42%, an increase of 9.1%. Cherrol Africa provides a sound explanation of the ANC’s success, saying ‘voters in the Western Cape watched ANC incumbents at national level under the leadership of Nelson Mandela lead South Africa from the brink of civil war into constitutional democracy’. However, the NNP/DP alliance kept the ANC out of power in the Western Cape, with Van Schalkwyk became the new premier. This was a pyrrhic victory - a serious blow for the psyche of the traditional NP member – the leader of the party had never been the head of a regional or provincial state structure.

The ANC was able in the 2004 elections to continue inspiring support for its programme – the Mbeki-inspired GEAR economic policy was seen as lifting the economy to unprecedented levels of growth. Also, SA was celebrating ten years of democracy. The ANC notched up in the Western Cape 45% of the vote, just short of
an outright majority and Ebrahim Rassool became the premier of the Western Cape. By this election the NNP was working in close collaboration with the ANC.

Africa points out that ‘The NNP’s support base was decimated by its incongruent and internally inconsistent campaign messages. The NNP, whose share of the provincial vote had crumbled to 11%, was dissolved into the ANC’ (2014). The DA continued improving its share of the vote in the 2004 national and provincial elections, getting 12.37% of the vote. It had gone into alliance with the IFP under a ‘coalition for change’ line, but that did not help it to achieve the 30% it hoped for. The IFP itself got about 7%. The Independent Democrats (ID), under the leadership of Patricia de Lille, won 7.8% of the vote in the Western Cape in the 2004 election but by 2009 this had dropped to 4.7%. The ID has since merged with the DA. In 2009 the newly formed Congress of the People (COPE) managed to secure 7.7% of the vote and three seats in the Western Cape legislature.

At the DA’s party conference of May 2007, Tony Leon stepped down and was replaced by Helen Zille. While effective in creating a big tent for the white conservatives to gather under, Tony Leon’s tactics had alienated him from key figures in the DA establishment. Setting its sights on a greater share of the black vote, the DA also had to burnish its liberal credentials and its commitment to non-racialism. Under the new leadership it set about the task in earnest, relaunching itself in November 2008, as a party of government that delivers for all. This was accompanied by a new logo to symbolise the DA’s diversity. The DA won the Western Cape with an outright majority of the provincial vote - decisive in this was the coloured vote which swung behind the DA.

The highly publicised rape trial of Jacob Zuma, his dismissal as Deputy President of the country, the subsequent recall of President Mbeki after ANC’s 2007 Polokwane conference and the breakaway of leading ANC members to form COPE took its toll on the ANC’s performance in elections in the Western Cape. An Afrobarometer survey conducted in late 2008 revealed that respondents in the Western Cape had very little trust in Jacob Zuma. These public sentiments were harnessed by the DA through an extremely effective election campaign in 2009 combined with the more positive positioning resulting in it winning the province outright with 51.3% of the vote, while
the ANC garnered 31.6%. It won 16, 7% of the national vote and 67 seats in the National Assembly.

Africa argues a view held generally about the DA at the national level: ‘Despite the DA’s growth in the last few elections – 12.4 percent of the vote in 2004, 16.7 percent in 2009 and 22.2 percent in 2014 – the party is still considered “too white” to threaten the supremacy of the ruling ANC’ (2014). In fact, it has been pointed out that the peak it achieved in 2014 was about the same figure that the NP and the DP combined achieved in 1994.

Given the developments within the DA as it sought to widen its base amongst black voters the stage was set within the DA for the election of Mmusi Maimane as its first black leader, on 11 May 2015. At 34 years of age, the charismatic politician known for his sharp oratory skills and slick campaigns is often dubbed the “Obama of Soweto.”

While the DA was consolidating the white vote around it, and drawing Indian, coloured and a significant number of African voters towards it, there were very few attendees at the April 2005 funeral of the NP. At its federal congress, attended by 88 delegates – compared to past congresses when 2000 delegates would have been present – the decision was taken to disband the party and be incorporated into the ANC with Van Der Westhuizen describing this as: ‘African nationalism absorbed Afrikaner nationalism’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:284). In his speech Marthinus van Schalkwyk, admitted: ‘the NP brought development to a section of South Africa, but also brought suffering through a system grounded on injustice. No party . . . could hope to successfully atone and move ahead in the same vehicle’ (Southern, 2015:240).

Southern also points out that the ‘The lesson of post-settlement South Africa is that the bonds between an ethnic party and its ethnic community are dissolvable and that voters are prepared to shift their support to parties they perceive as being more capable of furthering group interests.’ (2015: 238). This is what happened with the DA garnering up the white support which the NP had been shedding. It could well serve a salutary lesson for the ANC and the manner in which it addresses the national question.

4.3.8 Neo-liberalism’s triumph
Through the negotiations, the ANC had accepted conditions which placed its future policy options in a straightjacket. This included lower import tariffs; cuts in state spending; free trade; privatisation of state own enterprises; flexibility in capital movements. ‘The $850 million loan they took in the guise of a political shift of power from apartheid to democracy was nothing but succumbing to white monopoly capital and allowing imperialists to still be in power’. For Van Der Westhuizen, ‘The elite pact was in place – not just between the NP and the ANC, but between the established white elite and incoming African nationalist elite’ (2007:256).

The above debates were occurring in the context of increasing affluence whites generally enjoyed in the post-1994 economic growth – by the 2000s SA enjoyed its longest streak of economic growth. ‘The ANC’s adoption of a predominantly neo-liberal economic policy framework was the best possible antidote to Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation’ (Davies, 2009:84). By 2000 Stats SA reported that the average black household income had dropped by 19% since 1995, while that of whites had increased by 15%.

The impact of the growth of the economy on the black population is discussed in detail under African nationalism today. At this stage it should be noted just as English capital had played a big role in giving the emerging Afrikaner businessmen a hand up, so too did Afrikaner capital assist in setting up black businesspeople. Sanlam for example worked with Dr Nthatho Motlana, in the early 1990s to set up the first BEE arrangement through New Africa Investment Limited (NAIL).

At the same time, with the opening of the world to Afrikaner capital, entities such as Nasionale Pers and Gencor strode onto the world stage. The former, under Afrikaner businessman Koos Bekker, had developed a global presence but was particularly noted for a major investment in the social media network Ten Cent in China. The latter had grown into BHP Billiton, the largest mining company in the world.

Johann Rupert was named the second richest man in South Africa by Forbes Magazine in 2012, with a net worth of US$5.1-billion. The Sunday Times’ 2011 Rich List included four Afrikaners among the country’s top ten richest individuals: Christo Wiese (Shoprite), Laurie Dippenaar (First Rand), Johann Rupert (Rembrandt) and GT Ferreira (RMB). Davies notes that ‘Since the ending of wholly ethnic linkages between
big business and other divisions of Afrikaner capital under the National Party (NP) government, a new group that has little or no obligation to any ethnic coalition has come to the fore’ (2012:392).

Wasserman argues that Naspers has been particularly successful in positioning itself within the post-apartheid era using the ‘discourse of consumerism, part of a larger neoliberal logic that became hegemonic during the first decade of South African democracy’ (Wasserman 2009:63). At the same time Koos Bekker through Naspers played a key role in mobilising Afrikaner capital ‘within the new “common sense” of multiculturalism, majority rule and a non-racial understanding of Afrikaans as a language and ethnic marker’ (Wasserman 2009:63).

But what of white working class, which had in the past provided the bulk of the NP’s support? Perhaps the most important formation was the Mine Workers’ Union (MWU), renamed Solidarity in 1998. The MWU’s history goes back to very early days of the mining industry towards the end of the 19th century. Originally representative of English-speaking whites, the number of Afrikaner members grew and, by 1948, it was a close ally of the NP, enjoying the fruits of protection proffered by the apartheid government. As mentioned above this closeness was maintained until the 1970s in the aftermath of the Wiehahn and Riekert commission recommendations and the implementation thereof. With the splitting off of the Conservative Party from the NP in 1985, and the launching of the dismantling of apartheid through the negotiations process, the MWU defiantly called on the other white unions to form a ‘white super union’ to protect the white working class…It took the MWU a few years to realise the rules had changed in democratic South Africa’ (Boersema, 2012:412). This was shown most vividly in the dramatic drop in its membership to 30 000 by 1997, with the union in a financially parlous position.

‘The uncompromising rhetoric of threat and self-defence obscured to an extent the emergence of a new discourse and tactics in the run-up to democracy. In the early 1990s the MWU started to speak of a process of verontregting, or the taking away of rights that needed to be protested and stopped. The leadership called for a new ‘protest culture’ and ‘communication strategy’. White poverty re-emerged as a theme as the working class increasing felt ignored. Pragmatically, the union saw the need to expand its membership beyond the mining industry. It started to explore collaboration
with black trade unions like SAKU (Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunkasie-Unie) and COSATU. Hesitantly, new cultural activities were employed to draw media attention and expand the reach of the union. Slowly, the union found a new language and new tactics to further its cause’ (Boersema, 2012: 412).

Given its past association with apartheid it had to break away dramatically from its image of being a right-wing organisation. In 2001 it launched itself as Solidarity, named after the Polish workers’ movement. ‘The new name symbolised the transformation from a small, right-wing, reactionary union into a modern trade union that today is one of the most prominent voices in the political debate on Afrikaner issues’ (Boersema, 2012:413). Currently it represents about 120 000 workers.

As shall be explored in the section dealing with African nationalism, one of the key elements of the ANC’s strategy has been the transformation of the economy. In the immediate aftermath of the 1994 election it relied on persuading companies to carrying out their own programme voluntarily, targeting especially the SOEs and large companies dependent on state procurement. This was replaced by a swathe of acts and policies such as the Employment Equity Act (EEA) 55 of 1998, the Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, and the BEE Codes of Good Practice in 2007. It laid the basis for a more assertive and inclusive approach – the private sector is required to submit transformation plans and annual reports on their implementation.

Also, companies that are bidding for state tenders need to meet criteria which require demonstrable broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) that is a significant share of black ownership as well as a workforce which is representative of the South African population, which is to be attained by the policy of affirmative action. Neville Alexander was amongst those who criticised the AA and BEE policies on the ground that they perpetuate and reinscribe racial identities through ‘new social practices and inter-group dynamics’ (Alexander 2007). These issues are picked up again under African nationalism today.

However, as noted in several surveys conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation there remains strong opposition amongst whites to BEE and AA. This is notwithstanding the fact that there has been slow progress in achieving representivity in the economy or in the management echelons of the private sector.
In response to the aggressive AA policies in the public service, more and more white Afrikaans speakers are focused on private sector, especially information technology and electronics sectors as well in retail which is not so dependent on state patronage. In the IT sector by 1999, 42 per cent of JSE listed companies were headed by Afrikaans speakers. ‘Certain capital constituencies including ‘Afrikaner captains of industry’ and a younger generation of entrepreneurs have been able to optimise their position within the new capital consensus, replacing a division of capital most closely associated with the ethnic pact with a different stratum that owes comparatively little or no allegiance to any nationalist economic coalition’ argues Davies (2012:401).

She also emphasises that ‘There is little evidence of any attempts by Afrikaner capital to reintroduce any remotely dirigiste direction or innovative, counter-hegemonic strategies that might in any way tamper with or transcend the neo-liberal consensus. In fact, the evidence points quite to the contrary’.

Solidarity has been at the forefront of opposition to the AA and BEE policies. In fact Boersma suggests that ‘It is probably the single most important factor in MWU/Solidarity’s consolidation and growth’ (2012:413). Solidarity has represented large numbers of white workers when a legal case could be made of the AA programme not being implemented in a ‘balanced’ way or that it led to greater inequalities. ‘The new slogan of Solidarity, Ons beskerm ons mense, or ‘We protect our people’, resonates with the threat that affirmative action poses to white employees, particularly at the lower levels in organisations and companies where union membership is still strong’, points out Boersma (2012: 414).

Sampie Terreblanche earned the ire of the government’s policymakers when he indicated that despite more than a decade of AA and BBBEE, ‘83 per cent of the whites (or 3,7 million individuals) were among the top 20 percent of income receivers in 2008, while only 11 percent Africans (or 4,4 million individuals) were among the top 20 per cent of the population; 25 percent of coloured (or 1,1 million individuals) were among the top 20 percent; and almost 60 percent of Indians (or 740 000 individuals) were amongst the top 20 percent”. He restates these figures in a very stark picture: “95 per cent of Africans (or 23, 7 million individuals) were amongst the poorest 50 per cent of the population. The fact that the Gini-coefficient increased from 0,66 in 1992 to 0,70
in 2008 is an indication that income has become much more unequally distributed during the ‘democratic’ period”.

This has led to ongoing debate about whether South Africa can be seen as sovereign, with power located in the state or whether, as critics of the ANC have pointed out, centuries of white privilege have been allowed to persist largely intact. While the conditions of the majority of Africans has actually worsened, Habib and Bentley (2008) are amongst those who point out that given the strong affinity Africans have for the ANC it is able to retain some legitimacy. This is examined in greater detail in Chapter Five, where it is argued that this legitimacy is rapidly eroding.

4.3.9 The TRC

Thus far I have looked at the relationship between sovereignty, national identity and nationalism through the prism of debates on the Constitution, the fluctuating fortunes of the different political parties leading up to and since the 1994 elections and the impact of the government economic policies. I now turn the focus on the TRC – examining whether it served as a process and symbol of reconciliation or whether it had the opposite effect of hardening the different nationalist narratives.

The goal of the TRC was to establish ‘as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period from the 1st March 1960 to the 5th of December 1993’. It had to work within the provisos of the Constitution, adopted in May 1996, and which included the postamble of the Interim Constitution emphasising the goal of national unity and proclaiming national reconciliation to be its essential prerequisite. The relevant Constitutional provision states that there shall be understanding instead of vengeance, reparation instead of retaliation, ubuntu instead of victimisation.

As pointed out above, during the negotiations of 1993, the NP government tried to have a blanket political amnesty included in the constitutional agreement itself. The ANC was opposed to this, resulting in the compromise captured in the ‘Post-amble’ of the Interim Constitution, the final clause on National Unity and Reconciliation, where it stated that ‘in order to advance . . . reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives, committed in the course of conflicts of the past’. The qualification was that
the tribunals and procedures for providing such amnesty should be determined by Parliament, which was duly done in the form of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act.

Du Toit (2005:437) captures the context for the establishment of the TRC when he wrote that transitional justice had emerged as an important problem for the countries undergoing change, especially in terms of how new democracies should deal with the past, especially the human rights abuses of previous regimes, ‘to ensure that these would never happen again (‘Nunca Mas!’). It was in this context that the novel institution of a ‘Truth Commission’ arose… The option of a ‘Truth’ process provided a distinctive new alternative as a means towards transitional justice’.

Mamdani, speaking at the 2013 MISTRA Annual Lecture, set the cat amongst the pigeons when he distinguished between ‘victors’ justice’, which the Nuremburg trials are the prime example of, and ‘survivors’ justice’, which the South African case is an example of. He said the former approach excludes the possibility of a new political order by putting only the losers on trial. Thus crimes against humanity committed by the Allied forces were never accounted for. In the South African case, he said, ‘The real exchange took place before the TRC was set up, in the negotiations known as CODESA. It was not an exchange for truth, but amnesty for political reform, that reform being the dismantling of juridical and political apartheid’.

Wilson, (1996:14) commenting on the processes leading up to the TRC wrote ‘discussions of truth seem to lead naturally into questions of reconciliation, national unity, and nation-building… Reconciliation, like truth, has become an ubiquitous moral metaphor of a revised national identity. The heading of the post-amble of the interim Constitution is ‘National Unity and Reconciliation", where reconciliation and nation-building come together as linked aims and strategies for a new society’.

The TRC sat for 3 years and finally, on 29 October 1998, presented to President Mandela its findings in the form of a 5 volume report. It is estimated that it hosted in excess of 70 public hearings focusing on the testimony of individual victims of gross human rights violations and over 22,000 statements of survivors were recorded.

There have been a number of debates engendered around the TRC process. These include the question of the standing accorded to victims and perpetrators, and the fact
that the law did not require of participants to express remorse but only to make a full and complete disclosure of their wrongdoings. According to the guidelines set out by the TRC, individuals had to apply for amnesty detailing information about specific human right violations. Such acts had to be judged to form part of a wider political event or perpetrated in the name of a political organisation.

Norval (2009:312) points out that critics of the TRC came from ‘the ranks of those unwilling to acknowledge the wrongs of the past and from those who felt that the process… subverted the search for justice’ (italics added). There were also those ‘who thought it too beholden to a religious paradigm…, and …those who feared that it would create an opportunity simply to ‘rewrite’ the past and install a new national myth (Norval, 1998, 2001).

Needless to say those unwilling to acknowledge the past evils represented what Steyn called the ‘hardliner colonial’ and ‘This shouldn’t happen to a white’ narratives. The latter displays a discounting of the past suffering of blacks, complicity in that suffering, as well as ‘the denial of any systemic, structural, or economic advantage for whites enduring into the present’ (2001:71).

Southern cites a former senior NP member as follows: ‘The conclusions of the TRC had very serious negative implications for the NP. A huge majority of people; former supporters of the NP, were shocked and ashamed by what they heard. Telling them that they must not jump to negative conclusions by accepting everything that was told to the TRC as the absolute truth did not make any impact on them. To try and convince them that the evidence before the Commission were untested did not change their minds’.

In looking at the impact of the TRC, Southern (2015:342) wrote that former Secretary of the Federal NP, Frik Van Deventer, one of the respondents to his survey of former NP leaders assessment of the TRC process, said the process “left a very strong feeling of guilt and shame with a majority of NP supporters. I don’t think it was possible to rebuild the NP by trying to get them back.” (2015:343)

Southern also points out that his respondents argued that the TRC was one-sided, since the only person of white Afrikaans speaking background serving on the 12 person Commission was former member of the NP Wynand Malan. In his minority
report he complained of the hurried process by which the TRC arrived at its conclusion. Substantial points he made was that the evidence presented by victims was not tested for veracity, nor attested to under oath, and could have been prone to exaggeration. On the other hand the perpetrators, in their amnesty applications, ‘downplayed their own roles’ and ‘all too often deceased individuals were implicated’.

Southern points out that his respondents felt that the younger generation Afrikaners were ‘especially rattled by the commission’s investigations into state violence and that this was due to their inability to identify the anti-government premise from which, according to the respondent, it is thought the TRC operated. Presumably the respondent considers that older Afrikaners were better able to detect the work of the TRC as a “one-sided process” because they had a keener grasp of the causal factors of violence in the country but it should be emphasized that such an understanding is firmly rooted in an ethnic perspective. In this sense, it is but one of a number of competing perspectives on the conflict of the past’. (Southern, 2015:343)

Looking at the process of reconciliation more than 15 years after the release of the TRC report, it is clear that the issue of guilt plays an important role in the psyche of the white right wing. Boersma, for example, on the basis of his research into the right wing trade union movement Solidarity says that ‘it accuses the ANC for abusing guilty feelings. Most members say that guilt is politically immobilising; to admit guilt or to apologise (too) many times would keep people from getting involved in fighting black poverty (2012:419).

Boersma reports that Dirk Hermann, Secretary General of Solidarity, ‘argues that the biggest problem for Solidarity is that Afrikaners are seen as a gediskrediteerde minderheid, or a discredited minority. The stigma Solidarity carries from the history of apartheid is a shameful burden and constant frustration. It bursts to the surface in angry bouts from the union’s leadership’ (2012:420).

Amongst those feeling that reconciliation was sacrificed for justice were the families of Steve Biko who was killed in police custody as well the families of Griffiths and Victoria Mxenge and Florence Ribeiro who were assassinated during the 1980s. They challenged the removal of their right to seek civil redress as a result of amnesty being
granted. Nkhosinathi Biko (2000:196), son of Steve Biko, is representative of these views when he argued that “The question is whether the process was about truth and reconciliation at all. For some it was about amnesty – as a basis for ensuring that those directly implicated in the atrocities of the past were able to join the ranks of the indifferent.” The views of blacks towards the TRC process is considered in greater detail under African nationalism.

One of the core issues the TRC addressed was the question of culpability for the political violence around the time of the negotiations. Of particular interest of this thesis is the issue of blacks attacking and killing blacks. View were divided – the TRC worked with the Third Force theory, drawing especially from the reports of the Human Rights Commission (Guelke, 2000:240). Guelke favours another narrative which is based on ‘The strength of ethnic and racial antagonisms’ (2000:246).

Alistair Sparks was disdainful of this view: ‘All this was nonsense. Not only do Zulus and Xhosas have no history of conflict, but the black population of Natal is homogeneous, consisting almost entirely of the 7-million strong Zulu tribe. What was happening in Natal was in fact a Zulu civil war—and it was overtly political, with considerable involvement of South Africa’s security forces’. He argues that ‘the regional pattern of the violence underscores the role of political competition as the dominant factor since deprivation existed across the country’ (2000:250). For him ‘violence played a part in the strategy of the very parties that negotiated a constitutional settlement that enabled South Africa to become a democracy without the racial bloodbath that had been widely feared and predicted’.

Notwithstanding the above criticisms, what did the whole TRC process achieve in terms of consolidating a national consensus of the past upon which the ‘new’ South Africa could be built? For Posel (2015: 2169): ‘Arguably, the TRC posited a version of a shared humanity, not as the enlightened rational mind of liberal orthodoxy, but in a shared fallibility and capacity for compassion (Posel 2008). … Transcending ‘the damage’ was first and foremost a matter of dismantling the racist order and the wider violations of human rights attendant on it’.

Many writers have argued that the TRC process needs to be seen as a launchpad into the future. Norval (2009:312) for example suggests that the TRC should be read as
‘founding of the contours of a new conception of democratic community in its wake, a founding which is incomplete and requires refounding in a variety of different sites (Norval, 2007, pp. 196–207, 2009). Wilson (1996:17-18), on the other hand, feels that ‘Reports of truth commissions share a similar form with nationalist narratives in the way they render a discontinuity with the past’. For Norval this contribution to the South African nation is rendered through Laclau’s notion of sedimentation. She points out that despite the many challenges it faced it ‘became sedimented’ and normalised as a, if not the distinguishing, feature of the transition to democracy in South Africa...

However, all sedimented institutions are always open to (re)politicisation. Such repoliticisation is the result of practices of contestation that draw back into the domain of contention facets of politics that have been ‘normalised’ to a greater or lesser extent’ (2009:314). The repoliticisation of the reconciliation which the TRC tried to achieve shall be examined in greater details under African and Afrikaner nationalism today.

Du Toit (2005:446) has argued that ‘despite the initial fears of some critics and commentators that the Commission might set itself up to impose an authoritarian ‘master narrative’… a notable feature of the Report is that it is disarmingly frank and humble about its own limitations and shortcomings’.

Ultimately, one of the largest achievements of the TRC was the capturing of a major part of South Africa’s history. Writing as the process was unfolding, Wilson felt that ‘The TRC will help to codify the official history of the martyrs of that struggle in order to institutionalise those shared bitter experiences of apartheid which were silenced before; it will be a unifying theme in the new official version of the nation's history’. In this respect Dyzenhaus (2000, p. 490) notes that the TRC, far from completing a process, in fact is only the start of a process yet to be accomplished. In this sense the TRC should be seen as having established ‘an archive which others must now investigate and supplement’.

However, for that to happen there needs to be agency. This has not been particularly forthcoming especially from the side of the state. This may be due to the challenge of having to deal with too many other societal priorities such as the creation of a new

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7 Citing Laclau (1990:34): ‘In this way, the instituted tends to assume the form of a mere objective presence. This is the moment of sedimentation’. Laclau, E. (1990). New reflections on the revolution of our time. London: Verso.
state or consolidating a national identity. The latter posture would have leaders like Mandela wanting to move on from the past. However, as Ramphele noted, and as shall be reflected upon in Chapter Five, the TRC’s ‘mandate to ‘lay the ghosts of the past’ remains unfinished. Some of these ghosts continue to haunt us as we consolidate our democracy’ (2008:69).

4.3.10 Parliamentary debate on Afrikaners

On 24 March 1999 Deputy President Thabo Mbeki (1999), on the basis of a wide range of consultations with Afrikaner organisations, tabled a report on Afrikaner views. Among his sources he cited Rapport of 11 March 1997 reporting on a survey which showed ‘Sustained signs…that White Afrikaans speaking people are very pessimistic about the future of their language and culture’. He pointed out that on 4 June, 1997, Die Burger asserted that ‘There are too many areas where Afrikaners have been humiliated, threatened and eventually marginalised’.

Mbeki pointed out that while the organisations they met emphasised they did not represent the views of all Afrikaners, there was a common view of ‘a feeling of marginalisation and disempowerment among many Afrikaners… especially with regard to: the Afrikaans language; the schools with regard to language, culture and religion; the Universities and the medium of instruction; affirmative action, including affirmative action in sport; crime; and the economy’.

He quoted substantially from the submission of Die Tussentydse Afrikanerberaad, (the Interim Afrikaner Council), which indicated their requirements:

- Recognition of the Afrikaner as a community that shares a common linguistic, cultural and religious heritage, with the right to conserve it and to resist forced assimilation
- Acceptance of the Afrikaners’ desire to take up forms of self-determination on the basis of Article 185 and Article 235 of the Constitution. The former sets out the powers of a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities while the latter reads as follows:
  ‘The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of
this right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation’

- Cognisance of the Afrikaners’ resolve to support one another therein.

Mbeki’s Report, submitted to parliament in the context of heated debate, did raise contrarian views amongst Afrikaners speakers themselves. Andrew Nash points out that Breyten Breytenbach, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, Ampie Coetzee and Andre Brink had complained about the process in a letter to Die Burger, published 20 March 1999. The letter argued that the people and organisations Mbeki had consulted did not represent the Afrikaans-speaking community, saying that such practise was akin to the apartheid system’s appointment of Bantustan leaders to represent their people.

Mbeki had also cited Harald Pakendorf, the former editor of Die Vaderland, who had written in the Sunday Independent that: ‘The surest sign that all is well with Afrikaners is the existence of the Afrikaner Eenhedsbeweging – the Afrikaner unity movement that unites almost no Afrikaners and represents even fewer … They are divided, spread out over a whole range of organisations, churches and political parties.’ Pakendorf had concluded that ‘Hopefully, there will never be a debate about Afrikaners again. They are not separate enough from the rest of South Africa to be discussed as such’.

Nel, professor of political science at the time, wrote in a similar vein saying: ‘I hope I am not the only Afrikaans speaker who feels uncomfortable with being made the focus of a special debate in Parliament... “Afrikaners” may constitute a problem, but Afrikaans and Afrikaans speakers are doing well, thank you very much... enriched by their liberation from the shackles of apartheid and previous attempts at standardisation and entrenchment. The more Afrikaans celebrates its Africanness, it seems, the more it flourishes. And the more the language is re-appropriated by groups marginalised in the past, the more exciting it becomes’. He also highlighted the problem with applying the tag to such a disparate people: ‘Contrary to what many national idealists thought, and still think, one language can carry and maintain many diverse cultures’.

Davies suggests that the Report represents the ‘virtual exhaustion of the minority rights regime in government circles’ (2009:80). However, for Andrew Nash the effect
of having the debate ‘was more or less the opposite of what he (Mbeki) had intended. Instead of drawing Afrikaners more closely into a national consensus, it was the starting-point for a new politics of Afrikaans, increasingly conceived as a challenge to the emerging national consensus…it provided an occasion for Afrikaner dissidents to re-group, and for former critics of apartheid to take on a new role as critics of the ANC government…”Defeat will save us," Breyten Breytenbach had said of Afrikaners facing the end of apartheid’ (2000:342-343).

As the parliamentary debate proved, and the miniscule support for far-right wing causes such as the secessionist settlement of Orania showed, ‘Afrikaners were not attracted by promises of isolation from Western decadence and black people. Rather they embraced global values such as materialism and consumerism with abandon’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:320). Davies points out that the first report of the Volkstaat Council tabled, which had been agreed to on the eve of the 24 April 1994 elections, and was enshrined in the Constitution, ‘only highlighted the polarities of the various organisations pursuing the volkstaat dream’. The former chair of the Council, Hendrik Robbertze, said that a major obstacle was the increasing number of Afrikaners ‘who are willing to accept a form of cultural autonomy which falls short of independent statehood’ (Davies, 2009:79). Davies point out that this convinced Constand Viljoen to repackage the self-determination project to a cultural crusade.

This kind of retreat led Kriel to conclude that ‘one would be hard pressed to find an example of a stateless nation that achieved statehood only to lose it again…. To me, all the indications are that most present-day struggles for the Afrikaans language continue to be struggles to maximise Afrikaner power. All that has changed is the upper limit of power sought’ (2010: 420).

4.4 Conclusion
I have traced the shaping of positions within the wide ambit of Afrikaner and African nationalisms, demonstrating that they carry in them the striations of battles waged over decades. These struggles, at one level, have been over the location of sovereignty. Through much of the early 19th century the colonised people tried to ensure that sovereignty was located in the social structures and authorities which had evolved over many decades before the colonial encounter. As far as the white part of the population was concerned a bitter battle raged between the Boers and the British, with
the former trying to keep a distance from the former so that it could create its own political space, where its biblically justified will could prevail. British imperialism succeeded in overcoming resistance from Africans as well as the Boers to locate sovereignty in the Union of South Africa and its various apparatuses. It then entered into an all-white establishment which allowed for the highly qualified involvement of Africans in the political life of the country.

But the location of sovereignty in such a Union would have always been on shaky ground because of the majority being left substantially unrepresented in the establishment. It was also unsustainable because with the creation of the SANNC in 1912 there was an increasing appreciation of the need for Africans to unite behind the demands for extension of the franchise. In tracing this history I reflected on the positions developed over more than a century of encounters between the colonised and the colonizer.

As far as the former is concerned it had since the 1800s been trying to asserts its voice in various ways – militantly or within the colonial structures. Working with the logic of Christian education, as Indian nationalists did in relation to British education, an African elite emerged demanding some form of citizenship. Various organisational forms as well as newspapers emerged which became vehicles for such agency to be expressed, for mobilisation to occur and an awareness of their common position in society to be understood. These localised springs developed into tributaries which by the end of the nineteenth century began seeing themselves flowing into the river of a larger, national project. Thus national unity amongst all South Africans was becoming a prerogative even before South Africa as a political entity itself had become a reality from 1910.

The SANNC, and later the ANC, which embodied this larger national project, found it difficult to rid itself of the legacies of its past: it remained a moderate movement, largely based along linguistic or geographic lines, and still seeking accommodation within the status quo. This attachment to ‘tribal’ or linguistic identities reflects the ethno-symbolism that Anthony Smith theorised. It also alerts us to the difficulties in ascending that to develop a nationalist outlook.
It was only in the 1930s that the ANC actually spoke of a universal franchise for all Africans. It was only in the forties that it started taking more and more radical stances under the influence of leaders such as Lembede, Mandela, Sisulu and Tambo. And it took even longer for the ANC to match the commitment to cross-racial alliances which were emerging to oppose white rule. When the ANC did cross that threshold especially as the Congress Alliance became consolidated in the 1950s, non-racialism became a cardinal principle of the organisation. This could be an example of the constructed identity which Gellner and others are associated with.

At the same time the Africanist position within the ANC decided to breakaway and created the Pan-Africanist Congress. Is such an Africanism appealing to an ethnic core à la Anthony Smith or is it also a constructed identity? At one level, given the common experience of being dispossessed of the land that the indigenous people of this country have experienced, there could be the basis to claim a core to this identity. But as has been shown, the colonial encounter was never quite same for all the indigenous people, best illustrated in the tensions between the Mfengu and the Xhosa in Thembuland. Even within one seemingly homogenous group like the Zulus there were a number of tensions, often based on the historical experience of the clans, amongst whom some degree of coherence was experienced. There were other tensions amongst the Zulus, such as that between the amakholwa and the amaqaba, who united around the brutal repression of one of their own during the suppression of the Bhambatha Rebellion. I argued above that such an experience could have been the basis for the cultural revivalism that Solomon Dinizulu led, which saw the reassertion of pride in the Zulu language and its rituals, albeit connected with the royal family, and which came to be representative of very conservative outlooks, encompassing the like of John Dube and decades later the basis for Gatsha Buthelezi’s Inkatha movement.

The period 1990 to 1998 saw several building blocks of the South African nation being put into place. These included elements such as those Billig referred to as ‘banal nationalism’ – the adoption of a new flag, anthem, public holidays, successes of sporting teams, and so forth. There were also contested elements such as the TRC process, the kind of proportional representation system for the provincial and national elections, and the deepening of class divides. Above all this was a constructed sense
of nationhood, even though divided by race or economic circumstance, but united by a sense of being part of a larger nation. The Constitution, while not always completely understood by the public, became the embodiment of that constructed nation.

But as shall be shown below in the section dealing with Zuma, ethnic sentiments do not disappear with the emergence of a nationalist narrative. Because they remain components of the prevailing nationalism, they can be resorted to by ethnic entrepreneurs for various purposes: creating a political base within the overarching nationalist movement, securing special deals for their ethnic constituency etc. In Chapter Five I return to this theme to look at ethnic manifestations within the broad ambit of African nationalism.

As far as Afrikaner nationalism is concerned its narrative followed a trajectory of consolidating an ethnic identity vis-à-vis the force of British colonialism, and then widening that identity to encompass all whites and then sections of the coloured, Indian and parts of the African people. Whites were drawn into its orbit through the persuasive power of the Nationalist Party, which convinced English-speaking whites that their future well-being lay in a society where whites remained in power. The other race groups were drawn in through a range of devices, but most particularly around the Christian values it represented in relation to the ‘communism’ of the ANC as well as other more moderate anti-apartheid forces. The colonising force came around to accepting the loss of group power only in the 1990s.
Chapter Five  
Faultlines of the Twenty First Century

Beall, Gelb and Hassim (2006:682) wrote that after ten years of non-racial democracy the situation in South African could be characterised as one of ‘fragile stability’, a notion which they argue ‘conveys the contradictory nature of the transition after ten years. On the one hand, the society is stable: a non-racial democratic political regime has been firmly established and faces no imminent threat, and the state is accepted as the legitimate authority within the country’s territorial boundaries’. However, ‘apartheid’s legacy remains deeply etched in society, together with the impact of the political transition, so that the new regime has not yet been effectively embedded in a non-racial and democratic post-apartheid social order. Existing social fractures – faultlines – have been maintained or deepened, and new fractures created, as the emerging state has interacted with social forces and struggled to impose itself on the populace’.

In this chapter, with the benefit of more than twenty years of the new order in South Africa, I look at these old and emerging faultlines through the lens of nationalism, sovereignty and national identity. The previous chapter has captured the various debates which ensued during the negotiations and their aftermath. This section looks at the debates after 1994 and the direction these debates have been taking. In many ways they represent continuities in the original narratives of Afrikaner and African nationalism. The fundamental difference is that there is now a democratic dispensation with sovereignty located in the Constitution and a South Africa which putatively allows for individuals to self-identify.

An expectation that white Afrikaans speakers would identify with a broader South African identity has not been fully borne out by current developments. Similarly, neither has the cross-linguistic, cross-ethnic unity - which African nationalism was to have embodied - been realised in its fullest sense. It shall be argued that just as the faultlines in South African society were not neat divisions between colonizer or colonised nor African and white-Afrikaner but in fact a plethora of identities – some even lying outside these binary identities as Crais argued and some overlapping these broader identities – so too is South Africa characterised today by a broad spectrum of identities, as well as levels of agency and citizenship.
In this section I look at the three key themes of my thesis in their contemporary context:

- Under nationalism, I explore the existence or absence of nationalist movements. As I have done in the previous chapters I am still following Breuilly’s suggestion that nationalism be seen as a process which is led by political actors or entrepreneurs intent upon achieving a certain set of political aims. In the case of the Arab world nationalists like Nasser pursued a pan-Arab vision, rooted in the reality of their country. Others, such as Sadat, represented a narrower version of the Arab nation. India was led by a group which largely pursued a secular nation and which included Gandhi, Nehru, Ambedkar and initially Jinnah.

With the demise of the preeminent Afrikaner nationalist movement, can we speak of a white Afrikaner nationalist movement and what form does it take. Similarly, while the ANC insists that it is still a national liberation movement, there remain tensions within this body in relation to it being a post-liberation political party as well as how African nationalism is defined. The crucial ANC 1997 conference where the national question was debated in its greatest depth is a major focus.

- Under sovereignty, I look at citizenship and the state, which I have argued throughout are the critical components of sovereignty. The Arab state has been challenged by an Islamism agenda which located sovereignty in the spiritual realm while in the case of India regional, often linguistic-based, irredentist movements have challenged the central state. The subaltern in the case of the former has included vast parts of the working class, peasantry and the youth. In the case of the latter, the agency of the peasantry has been the focus of subaltern studies, while other less analysed elements such as the marginalised Muslim and Christian communities need to be more forcibly addressed.

In this section I look at the way in which the South African constitution, and the state based upon it, interacts with issues of identity. The relative roles played by Mbeki and Zuma is considered as well as the prospects of citizenship both through political parties as well as other organs of civil society. Experiences of NGOs in critical issues dealing with health, housing and water delivery as well as the intensive campaigns organised by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) are considered. Similarly the experiences of the largely white trade union movement, Solidarity, and its appendage
Afriforum, is examined as examples of citizenship. In this context I consider religious organisations, not simply as a source of identity but also as examples of civil society. Also, I shall explore the assertion that the tolerance shown in the conduct of politics and the exercise of citizenship during the first decade of democracy is being replaced by a tendency to deal violently with difference.

- Under national identity, I look at the ways in which ethnicity, language, and race play a role in shaping national identity in South Africa. In the case of the Arab world I looked at the tensions between Islamism, which defined the community in terms of the universalist concept of the *ummah*, pan-Arabism and the narrower versions of Arab nationalism. In a similar way there are many rivals for shaping the national identity of India ranging from the secularist notions to the communalist versions represented by Hindu nationalism.

I shall be considering here Glaser’s assertion that the 1994 elections occurred in ‘an age of post-modern scepticism about totalising ideologies and projects. The rhetoric in favour of an autonomous civil society and bottom-up development which has flowed through post-apartheid politics owes something to post-modern doubt as well as to an international convergence around liberal-democratic norms. So too does the democratic state’s rhetorical deference to the country’s linguistic diversity and culturally plural character. South Africa’s newly governing African elite has not, for example, attempted to abolish ethnic identities and institutions in the name of nation-building’ (2001:66).

While this may have been true for the process around the drawing up of the Constitution and the era of Mandela’s presidency, the period after that has raised many questions about South Africa’s future trajectory. It has been argued for example that while the encouragement of tolerance of multiple identities was a key feature of Mandela’s period, Mbeki’s administration may have been responsible for the return to racial identities while the era of Zuma encouraged the emergence of ethnic identities.

### 5.1 Nationalism at the beginning of the 21st Century

In this section I begin by looking at how Afrikaner nationalism has continued mutating along the lines which were established decades ago. In Section 5.1.2 dealing with current manifestations of African nationalism the focus is on debates around the
national question within the ANC. I explore the three types of nationalism in South Africa which Glaser had identified: multi racial nationalism where leaders of different groups came together to act against the apartheid system; non-racial nationalism which did not recognize distinctions amongst blacks or even amongst South Africans; and ethnic nationalism where the cause of a certain group was championed (2002:177).

5.1.1 Wither Afrikaner nationalism?

The election trends and developments in the economy discussed in the previous sections give a broad sense of movements within the white Afrikaner population. This section tries to capture the various faultlines that Afrikaans, Afrikaners and whites generally find themselves caught at. In many ways the key issues which were debated from 1990 to 2010 continue casting a shadow into the 2010s. A fundamental issue is that of dealing with the past, especially in terms of dealing with guilt and the question of reconciliation. This impacts on the two key themes of the thesis: the way white Afrikaner citizenship is being exercised and the way identity is being manifested, with particular reference to the status of Afrikaans, and especially in the education context. The arena of culture has been identified as the battlefield where these issues are fought over and around, and which is the stuff of Afrikaner identity politics.

First a comment about contemporary white identity in SA. Steyn argues for a disaggregation of whiteness which ‘allows for progressive white people to develop solidarity across racial lines, and with other non-racist white people, as they reconceptualise their identities in emancipatory ways’ (2001:xxx). In fact, as Steyn has shown from her depiction of the narratives within the broad white South African population, ‘white South Africans are …constructing a range of ‘petit narratives’ of whiteness, each of which is competing to explain, and to promote, a view of how being white should be construed in the new dispensation’ (Steyn 2001:151).

The issue of guilt is an important aspect of these narratives and impacts on identity and citizenship. Citing Giroux, Steyn argues that ‘fixing whiteness as a ‘space between guilt and denial’ is paralysing to those whites who seek liberating positions…He takes issue with the theorisation of whiteness that make white synonymous with being racist’ (HA Giroux, 1992. Channel Surfing: Race talk and the destruction of youth. New York:
St Martin’s Press). In the section below on the culture wars, the discussion focuses on how guilt is being dealt with in the cultural arena.

Secondly, as far as Afrikaner nationalism is concerned there are two issues. On one hand, Nash (2000: 348) feels that the discourses at the end of the 20th Century had brushed aside a theme which was essential to the critical thinkers critique of apartheid: ‘that of the need for Afrikaners to demonstrate their solidarity with the majority of oppressed South Africans by upholding common principles and values’. He pointed out that ‘In the context of the new South Africa, the defence of Afrikaans more often rests on denying the possibility of collective responsibility for the past’. This represents the obverse side of guilt – the refusal to take any responsibility for the crimes committed to maintain and protect white privilege. Nash believes that the role Mandela played in trying to achieve reconciliation contributed to this, with Afrikaners feeling that Mandela has told them they do not need to atone for the sins of the past. In his inaugural address as President of South Africa in May 1994, he chose to convey this in Afrikaans: "wat verby is, is verby" (what is past, is done with).

The second issue which pervades current debates on Afrikaner nationalism is the impact of the implosion of the NP. Afrikaner identity which, formed over two centuries, fell into a deep crisis when one of its foundational elements no longer existed. It shall be shown below that with the collapse of one of Afrikanerdom’s pillars, language has taken on an even more critical role in Afrikaner self-identity. Nel (1999) alluded to the issues which Afrikaans speakers faced during the Afrikaner debate in parliament: ‘Afrikaans speakers, both white and coloured, feel marginalised in the new South Africa, partly because they have lost political power, and partly because they feel that they are singled out for unfair criticism from official bodies such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission… These things are not Afrikaner problems, and to see them in such a light will only retard us in looking for suitable solutions to general problems’.

As mentioned above Solidarity was especially energised by the passing of AA and BEE legislation. The movement is currently involved in a range of campaigns and public platforms, tackling issues from the demise of the Afrikaans language to the issue of violence against white farmers, describing it as a modern day genocide. It has been noted for its ‘home coming’ campaign calling upon especially the large number of
mainly white South Africans who between 1990 and 1994 migrated to other countries to return and participate in post-apartheid South Africa. This is one of the moves which has seen it lay a basis for cooperation with government, which has extended the use of embassies for the activities of the ‘Home Coming Revolution’, as the campaign has come to be named. Boersma explains that ‘The strategies are part of the explicit goal of the union to be identified more as a movement than as a union. Therefore, the interests of the ‘Volk’ are increasingly broadly defined and include issues of education, language, emigration, personal freedom, minority rights, culture, and security’ (2012:414).

To give further succour to its campaigns around the civil rights of whites, Solidarity set up in 2006 Afriforum, which campaigns for ‘the protection and consolidation of civil rights’ and gives the Afrikaner community ‘a voice in a society where minorities are increasingly being ignored’. It works together with Solidarity’s new centre on constitutional rights. Boersma argues that ‘In a constitutional democracy like South Africa, it might not be surprising that the ANC’s opposition phrases its arguments in a discourse of rights... Solidarity’s trope of rights functions through a series of three oppositions: the domination of (black) majority rule is posited against (white, Afrikaans) minority rights; the gain of blacks’ rights comes at the cost of whites’ rights; and racial integration threatens the right to be Afrikaans’ (2012:415).

In looking at how Afrikaners related to the state, citizenship and identity in the below sections I will be highlighting the manifestations of white Afrikaner nationalism.

5.1.2 African nationalism

Given the preeminent role the ANC has played in the history, contemporary politics and societal development of South Africa it is critical to continue placing it at the centre of our consideration for the twenty first century. This section shall do this in some detail, noting that by 2014 the ANC had to be dealing with two breakaways – Congress of the People (COPE), which was led by that section of the organisation who were reacting to Mbeki losing his position as President of the ANC and his subsequent removal in 2008 as President of the country; and the Economic Freedom Front (EFF) which was reacting to Jacob Zuma’s leadership in his second term as President of the ANC and the country. COPE has since been weakened by internal strife as well as an inability
to position itself as clearly different from the ANC. The EFF on the other hand has emerged as a force to be reckoned with. An explanation for this is explored in the section dealing with politics and citizenship. The UDM, notwithstanding its spectacular bursting onto the electoral scene in the 1999 election, and retaining a reputation for probity, remains largely centred around the personality of its leader and founder, Bantu Holomisa. The ANC’s capacity to remain at the centre of South African politics is examined in Section 5.2.

To appreciate the contemporary ANC debates on the National Question we need to look at the watershed 1997 conference when there was an intense debate within the ANC about Africanism and non-racialism. The conference was a seminal point because it was its first meeting since obtaining power. Up to that point, the Africanist strand which existed in the ANC was committed to emphasising the centrality of national liberation which rose above ethnic and tribal identities. For example, in its February 1991 Strategy and Tactics document the ANC, while emphasising its opposition to ethnically-based mobilisation, placed particular emphasis on the role of the African majority: ‘The African people (must) take the lead in combating any notions of racial or ethnic chauvinism and create the basis of the emergence of a common South African identity’ (1998:507).

At its 1997 Conference, the Strategy and Tactics document explained the movement’s position as follows: ‘Critical to nation-building is the de-racialisation of South African society and the elimination of patriarchal relations. It means creating a society in which the station that individuals occupy in political, social and other areas of endeavour is not defined on the basis of race, ethnicity, language, gender, religious, cultural or other such considerations’ (1997:10).

Debates within the ANC after 1994 had to deal with the reality of the organisation being in power and thus able to access state and legislative resources in trying to achieve national unity. The debates thus took on a particular urgency in the lead up to the December 1997 National Conference. In an ANC discussion document for the National Conference, Jordan wrote that ‘the ANC has always maintained that democracy, national liberation and non-racialism are inseparable. But we have equally forcefully said that for democracy to advance national liberation it must entail the empowerment of the oppressed and most exploited – Africans, Coloureds and Indians … what honour
could accrue to the ANC if it were to compete with the PAC on the issue of Africanism?’ (1997:15). Responding to the type of charges made by Mokaba, Jordan argued that ‘the electoral behaviour of Coloured and Indian working class people is less likely to change until visible delivery on the part of the democratic government demonstrates that there could be sufficient resources for all the disadvantaged’. Filatova criticised the discussion document, arguing that ‘the ANC nation-building text offers little to those who are neither African nor poor-Black’ (1995:51).

In the lead up to the conference Joel Netshitenzhe drafted a document, which provided the basis for a constructive consensus which has held to this day. The final Strategy and Tactics document adopted at the conference, based on most of his ‘Ten Theses on the National Question’, made the following points concerning Africanism:

- ‘The African people were themselves nudged and coerced to develop an ethnic consciousness that the system of colonial capitalism had undermined. Some among them were rewarded with bogus positions of status in apartheid institutions’ (1997:9)

- ‘The affirmation of our Africanness as a nation has nothing to do with the domination of one culture or language by another – it is a recognition of a geographic reality and the awakening of a consciousness which colonialism suppressed’ (1997:6).

- It defines the ‘motive forces of transformation’ as the ‘African majority and blacks in general’. It also includes from ‘the white community, individuals of rare foresight and integrity … (who) made common cause with the national liberation movement’ (1997:9).

In trying to trace the link between the Black Republic thesis and the thinking of the ANC at the 1997 conference, Filatova cites the following as evidence of the Africanism which still impacted on the ANC:


- ‘Africanism…has gained momentum…(as in) the reinvention of black identity, styles and fashions, cultures, even ideology (Ubuntu), the discovery of
Africannness...this Africanist tendency is expressed much more vigorously and in much stronger terms by the ANC leadership, communists among them, than either by the PAC or BC groupings’ (1997:52). She sees South Africa’s increased engagement in Africa as another illustration of this.

- Political emotions and feelings of the ‘non-African’ minorities understandably play a much smaller role in the ANC’s political considerations (1997:52).

Other political role players also expressed concern at the emergence of sub-national identities. Dexter, for example, cited Regis Debray in arguing that ‘national identities are forged in opposition, and often most successfully in wars’ (1997:.61). He then alerts us to one of the effects of the successful transitions South Africa is undergoing – ‘it removes any significant ‘other’ against which a South African identity can be forged… the pressure to revert to old, comfortable identities that are primarily based on perceived racial and ethnic identities are therefore very great, even if these identities are artificially created’ (1997:61). Carrim also commented on this, suggesting that ‘the resilience in new forms’ of ethnic and racial identities ‘poses enormous challenges to the emergence of a broader South African national identity’ (1997c).

Given his role in the ANC and government, it would be useful to look at Thabo Mbeki’s articulation of African nationalism. His is a Pan-African ideology in the broad sense. As he had written in the ‘Foreword’ of African Renaissance: ‘The new African world which the African Renaissance seeks to build is one of democracy, peace and stability, sustainable development and a better life for the people, non-racialism and non-sexism, equality among the nationals and a just and democratic system of international governance’ (1999:.XVIII). In a different contribution: ‘and as we speak of an African Renaissance,,,we are trying to convey the message that African underdevelopment must be a matter of concern to everybody else in the world, that the victory of the African Renaissance addressed not only the improvement of the conditions of life of the peoples of Africa but also the extension of the frontiers of human dignity to all humanity’ (1988:241).

Many of Mbeki’s utterances have led some to conclude that he is an Africanist, even a racist, not entirely committed to the non-racialism of the ANC. For example his ‘I am an African’ speech delivered in May 1996 has been looked at to try to get a measure
of his Africanism. Chipkin reads in his speech several elements such as territory and history which combine to define Africans. However, he points out, it includes all non-Africans when, as according to Chapter 3 of the Constitution, they recognise the injustice of the past. ‘What Mbeki does here is situate ‘being African’ in the context of the struggle against colonialism. The nation, in other words, is produced in and through the struggle for democracy’ (2007:102).

In his speech when parliament debated the TRC Report in 1998, Mbeki pointed out that through the period of colonial domination and apartheid South Africans had been carved into two nations: the one black, the other white. . . . [the latter] is relatively prosperous and has ready access to a developed . . . infrastructure . . . The second, and larger, nation of South Africa is black and poor, living under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped infrastructure’. He argued that ‘Neither are we becoming one nation. . . . we have not made the extra effort to generate the material resources we have to invest to change the condition of the black poor’.

He argued in 2003 that that funds and resources need to be transferred from South Africa’s modern and successful ‘first economy’ to its marginalised ‘second economy’. This conceptualisation of the South African nation, as well as pursuing of BEE and AA, the hosting of the National Conference on Racism, his suggestion in the context of debates around the spread of HIV that whites saw blacks as sexually driven and other utterances have led many to consider him being race-possessed.

In their assessment Beall et al argued ‘perhaps because it insists on the separation of the two economies and the need to maintain the good performance of the first by limited intervention, Mbeki’s formulation has had very little impact on either stability or, thus far, on policy’ (2005:692). As has been seen above, when citing Terreblanche and others, the ANC’s economic record remains dismal up to today.

I shall look at the issues around race and ethnicity, which were raised in this and subsequent debates, in Section 5.3 under national identity. For now I can sum up the perspective of the ANC as follows: it retained its definition of the national question as one where the liberation of the African majority, as having been the most oppressed and still the most exploited, lay at the core of its nationalism. Other communities where
to contribute to national unity through their commitment to the liberation of the African people.

5.2 Sovereignty: state and citizenship

Chipkin (2007:177) reminds us that ‘national sovereignty refers to the control of state institutions by authentic representatives of the nation’. One of the starting points of this section is the central theme of the thesis: the relationship between citizenship and state power in relation to the processes of national identity and the exercise of sovereignty. Wilson has argued that ‘that constitutionalism, state-building and the creation of what is termed a ‘culture of human rights’ cannot be separated so easily from nation-building and the ‘rights of culture’, but are drawn into the services of a reformulated nationalist imperative in the ‘New South Africa’. The constitutionalist paradigm operates with a set of false and over-rigid dichotomies; between nationalism and constitutionalism, between political society and civil society, and between the social processes involved in constructing a 'state of right' and ethno-nationalist versions of culture’ (1996:7).

Looking at whites/Afrikaners I shall look at how the constitutionalist paradigm established in South Africa has been used to pursue ethnic and linguistic agenda. These two aspects of the narrative have become the trope for the broader racial narrative which is being played out. The African nationalism section shall look at the issues of sovereignty in the context of an ANC-led government, and the implications this has had for citizenship in the form of political participation and civil society.

In both cases I will be assessing Chatterjee’s claim that ‘The spiritual... is an ‘inner’ domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity. In this spiritual domain “nationalism realizes its most powerful, creative and historically significant project: to fashion a ‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not Western’ (1996:217). In the section on the cultural wars I will look at the ‘laager’ of Afrikaner identity, while the experience of independent African churches is looked at in terms of a spiritual

5.2.1 Whites/Afrikaners and the State/Citizenship

The preamble of the South African constitution says that South Africa ‘belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity’. For Davies this centralises the two principles of
equality and diversity as the ‘central axis’ of political and social relation. This is a far cry from the Afrikaner nationalism project, which had as its central axis the maintenance of ‘group rights’. This had evolved from the period of the free burghers and Voortrekkers to, after 1948, the protection of Afrikaner interests under apartheid, to the promotion of white interests under Grand Apartheid from the 1960s onwards; to arrive at the ‘white veto’ during the Codesa process. As has been discussed above, these various formulations had at its core the ‘Native Question’ – how to control the overwhelming black majority so that white Afrikaner privilege can be retained.

This concern with ‘swart gevaar’ came to the fore in the constitutional negotiations around the right to cultural independence and even self-determination. The need to secure white interest found expression in the first non-racial democratic elections when, in its key adverts before the first democratic elections in April 1994, the NP stated: ‘We have kept all our promises. We have got a government of National Unity, which means that the political parties will share power’ (Southern 2015:244). The white electorate saw through this false claim of the NP very soon after that election and could not wait to punish the party at the next election: they simply didn’t even bother registering for the vote. ‘In (Solidarity CEO Frik Buys) Buys’ eyes, the NP failed to defend the Afrikaners’ right of self-determination.’ (Boersma, 2012: 418). Instead when whites did go the ballot box they went for the party which did speak their language – the DA through its fighting talk. Who was the DA fighting back against, if not the vast black majority that ‘swart gevaar’ has been based on? In fact, having consolidated the white base behind it, the DA was able to broaden its appeal by abandoning such rhetoric.

When looking at the evolution of identities into the democratic South Africa, it is important to assess the impact of the constitutional arrangements. Wilson (1996:45), for example, has argued that ‘the constantly evolving and collectively produced text came to function as a cementing glue between certain shared aims of the main political actors’. On the basis of the sovereignty established by the Constitution, the South African state claims to represent all communities, no matter what their race or ethnic grouping. The negotiations around the Constitution resulted in significant compromises being made in terms of cultural, religious and linguistic communities, as
indicated in Chapter Four. This has resulted in what Neville Alexander termed as the ‘constitutionalisation of ethnic politics’.

Degenaar would have been amongst those opposed to such a path being taken, having argued that ethnicity should be located in civil society where a sense of difference can be safely expressed, without expectations of political power or privileges on the basis of identity: ‘The task of democracy is precisely to depoliticise communal culture in the sense that culture does not claim sovereignty, that is, the absolute power of the state, but relativises itself on behalf of constitutionalism’. (1990:12)

While ‘Community is at the core of the state’s interactions with civil society’ as Davies explains, ‘this interpretation is fraught with ambiguities, alluding to both traditional and indigenous categories as well as those defined by self-determination or the right to seek economic, social and cultural development’ (2009:75). This means ‘treading a fine line between populism and a genuine inclusionary citizenship project’ which presents a tension between race-conscious and non-racial perspectives, or ‘what has been termed a dual connotation of citizenship as moral conception and a legal category’ (Davies, 2009:75). She is concerned that the ‘persistence of populist sentiments might mean that solidarities to the group or nation will overwhelm the wider citizenship project’ (2009: 75). Whilst writing about Afrikaner identity in could just as well be applied to other South African identities.

The trade union movement Solidarity encapsulates these various elements: invoking populist sentiments which could threaten the broader objective of the citizenship project, as signalled by Davies, leading to the kind of constitutionalism Wilson has warned about. For example, it has been at the forefront of a campaign against violent crime especially that committed against white farmers, having delivered in 2010 23,000 protest letters to President Jacob Zuma.

Addressing the needs of arm blankes (poor whites) through its charity Helpende Hand, or Helping Hand, Solidarity focuses exclusively on helping whites. It received a major fillip to its cause when Jacob Zuma, in the lead up to the ANC’s Polokwane Conference, visited an informal settlement which had 200 whites. According to Boersma ‘The public campaign about poor whites aims to undercut the ANC’s
argument that all whites are rich and privileged. It also reinforces fears that without political power and assistance by the state, Afrikaners might again become impoverished and needy’ (2012:414).

It is quite clear that the white, Afrikaner project persists, couched in the language of ethnicity, language rights and constitutionalism generally.

5.2.2 African nationalism and state/citizenship

I begin this lengthy section by looking at the challenges the ANC has been facing in government and as a party by firstly looking at the impact of Mbeki and Zuma in their leadership positions and dynamics within and around the ANC. I then focus on the state of civil society as a vehicle for citizenship and identity. As indicated above the impact of faith-based organisations is considered here as an example of agency by civil society.

Since the 1994 elections, the state has been trying to play an increasingly large role in shaping the South African nation. Apart from the National Conference on Racism held in 2000, mentioned above, there has been an ongoing dialogue on various facets of nation-building. At one level there has been a shift from emphasis on issues of consciousness as the basis for identity, to concerns pertaining to the economy, and political participation. The state has tried to address the former through affirmative action programmes to address worker and management representivity, as well as policies aimed at broadening black ownership of the economy and land restitution. Addressing the position of women, as a means to tackle the patriarchal elements of South African society, as well as the abuse and discrimination faced by women on a daily basis, has come to be increasingly seen as part of the process of nation formation and social cohesion – even though the rhetoric has not been matched by practise. The experience of large numbers of migrants coming to South Africa, and the xenophobia or, as the NDP points out, ‘afrophobia’, it has engendered introduced a new dimension to debates on national identity in South Africa.

Glaser captured an important view of Mbeki’s presidency when he argued that ‘however the nation is conceived – whether as non-racial, multicultural or African – one crucial measure of the success of nation-building must be its capacity to bring racial minorities into a shared sense of nationhood’. Citing the black elite’s (which
Mbeki is supposed to have helped create complaints of insufficient transformation in sports and business, Mbeki’s focus on race-based appointments and procurement which his administration systematised, and rows over name changes, Glaser concludes that ‘Mbeki must be judged to have been less successful than his predecessor’ in developing a sense of nationhood (2010:25). Of his various policy initiatives, that on HIV/AIDS is seen as the most damning. I consider this in the section dealing with civil society.

McKaiser, describing Mbeki’s legacy as ‘tragically ambiguous’, prefers to distinguish between the early and late Mbeki. The former, during Mandela’s presidency, ‘negotiated the race question in particular, with Mandela-like brilliance…able to address flawed aspects of the Mandela legacy that too often went uncriticised’ (2010:189). Mandela has been accused of, inter alia, acting in an imperious, undemocratic manner, or papering over the fractures within South African society, or being too quick to forgive and reconcile. On the other hand ‘A dark and callous tonal shift in the later Mbeki’s performances reveals, by contrast, someone who essentialised race in his engagement with fellow South Africans’ (2010:190).

A more charitable perspective could be that in promoting a black-centric agenda, Mbeki was trying to get the emerging black elite to stake out its place in a postcolonial democracy with a sense of purpose and confidence. While there has been much focus on the Africanist elements of Mbeki’s thinking, there has been insufficient attention paid of the extent to which he imbued black consciousness thinking. This possibly helps appreciate his theory of South Africa consisting of two nations, one black and one white, as well as appointments such as Mojanku Gumbi, a known member of AZAPO, the current manifestation of black consciousness, as his legal adviser.

Mbeki’s economic record – despite the economic growth, improvement in employment, and reduction of the budget deficit – has been criticised as a rightwards, neo-liberal lurch which has benefited especially the black elite and further impoverished the majority of South Africans. Such has been the resultant backwards shift that Terreblanche was driven to describe it as follows: ‘In biblical idiom, we have every reason to lament the fact that the ANC was deceived on such a massive scale by false prophets who led South Africa, not into the promised land, but a desert in which the
poorer part of the population was doomed to live permanently in a systemic condition of abject poverty’ (2012).

The recent turn to seeing Mbeki’s contribution in a positive light has dismayed his critics who warn of not seeing the poor performance of the Zuma administration as the basis for forgiving the wrongs committed on his watch. This poor performance of Zuma is considered now.

One of the two most seminal developments under the Zuma administration has been the Declaration and Programme of Action which emerged from the National Social Cohesion and Nation Building Summit in 2012. The event was replete with symbolism which tried to connect it with the Freedom Charter: the conference was held in Kliptown, the venue for the conference which drew up the Freedom Charter in 1955. The summit was held on 4 and 5 July 2012, as close as diaries allowed to 25 and 26 June, the 57th anniversary of the adoption of the Freedom Charter.

The Declaration took as its starting point the well-known principle in the South African Constitution adopted in 1996 that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, both black and white, united in our diversity’. The second principle of the Declaration reveals how far down the road South Africans had travelled in defining their nation: ‘South Africa is a unitary and sovereign state based on democracy, the rule of law, pursuit of equal human rights, non-racialism, non-sexism, and the equality of all persons’. It represents a decisive move from any race or ethnic conceptions of the nation, to one which is articulated clearly in civic terms. It addressed the issues of poverty, unemployment, inequality, and landlessness as factors hindering the unity and emergence of the South African nation. In this declaration we can read Gellner’s constructed school being reflected, marking an attempt to shift away from ethnicity and race based notions of the nation as had been the case during the period of colonialism and apartheid.

The second major development has been the drafting of the National Development Plan (NDP), also released in 2012. Chapter 15 of the NDP titled ‘Transforming Society and Uniting the Country’ is dedicated to capturing the ongoing process of nation-formation. It also emphasises the role of the 1996 Constitution, describing it as ‘a national compact that defines South Africa’s common values and identifies our rights and responsibilities as people living together’ (2012:458). Hence it is not surprising
that fostering the Constitutional values tops the list of what needs to be done. This state-led, civic approach to nation-building is to be complemented by active citizenry and leadership. This must lead to a new social compact between government, business and labour.

What has been the impact of these fine-sounding programmes and declarations, which were developed under Zuma’s leadership and as his term ends in 2019 could have been his lasting legacies? I look at this through three issues: the extent to which poverty, unemployment and inequality has been addressed; the attempts at creating a social compact involving business, labour and government, and then the addressing of corruption.

Stats SA indicated in May 2016 that about 21.7% of South Africans live in extreme poverty, with 37% indicating they cannot buy essentials. It showed that unemployment had increased from 24.5% in last quarter 2015 to 26.7%. This represented a loss of 355 000 jobs, taking the number of unemployed to 5.7m. The NDP’s aim of slashing unemployment to 14% by 2020 looks increasingly like a pipe dream. The youth remain the most vulnerable – the 15-35 age group official unemployment figure is almost 70% (StatsSA, 2016: 1). The unemployment dilemma is seen as a symptom of the structure of SA’s economy, skills deficit and not responding to the ‘new’ economy which requires the use of higher levels of technology.

The South African economy, given the dominance of whites in terms of ownership of the economy, income levels and top management positions is described as colonial in character, thus leading to strident calls for decolonisation as the basis for South Africa to move on a new growth trajectory. In fact, even the ANC in its rhetoric since its 2012 conference and especially since the 2014 elections, when it lost a large number of votes to the EFF, has been taking up this call under its slogan of ‘radical economic transformation’ and assaults on ‘white monopoly capital’. What this means for the emergence of a radical left agenda is explored below.

There have been several calls for a compact between government, business and labour, but one that recognises the parameters within which they have to work out a solution. The success of the Codesa experience, the establishment of Nedlac as a site for such a compact where the three sectors plus civil society is represented, and
initiatives such as the Growth and Development Summit of 2003, as well as the response the ‘three social partners’ developed to the 2008/9 global recession have been cited as examples that a new social compact can be built upon.

In a 2015 discussion document issued by the National Planning Commission (NPC) it was noted that the ‘role of a social compact is to unite society to support a common developmental agenda where all parties contribute towards the greater good to all who are party to the agreement’ (NPC, 2015: 25-26). To date there has been very little progress on this. In fact there are deep-seated tensions between the different social partners, with structures such as Nedlac being regarded as losing its ability to convene senior enough delegations from the four parties represented in its councils. Much of this distance is attributable to the extent to which Zuma’s legitimacy as president of the country has been eroded. And a big factor contributing to that has been him being implicated in a number of illegal and corrupt activities.

Many of these illicit activities have served to benefit members of his family and close associates. These are not detailed here, with the focus being to understand what this represents of the kind of society SA is becoming. Butler and Southall point out that South Africa shares the same problems that the approximately 60 countries that were part of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation in the 1980s and 1990s went through. They argued that those that become representative democracies before they build a coherent and capable state administration were almost certain to be organised along clientelist lines. They conclude that ‘clientelism, indeed, is an almost natural development in circumstances in which mass party organisations mobilise large numbers of citizens for the first time and then distribute favours to their supporters using their party machines’ (2015:5).

The Zuma-era corruption has led to accusations that the state has been captured by corporate forces who are close to Zuma. This warrants being considered here because of the impact this has on sovereignty. Similar to Butler and Southall’s observations, Netshitenzhe has said argued that state capture is about state decision-makers being ‘agents to the principals (captors)’, pointing out that the notion of state capture gained currency especially in the aftermath of post-socialist Eastern Europe He emphasises that state capture in SA needs to be located in the framework of the inherited legacy of colonialism and apartheid, of the capitalist system which has role players which
seek to impact and direct policy, and in particular the rise of the black business class. He points out that it could occur at a micro level, such as the education department, or macro-level. ‘State capture at a macro-level can include capture of the nerve centre or critical organ of the state colossus. Where such capture relates to the very centre of government, there would be few other perfect examples of state capture’ (2016:4).

Given Zuma’s dependence on regional and ethnic players to stay in power Chipkin has suggested that major setbacks for the ANC in the urban areas in the 2016 local elections could well see the ANC consolidating itself into a rural, ethnic party. ‘Yet his removal will likely do little to change these structural dynamics’ (Sunday Times, 22 May 2016). In fact, pieces of legislation making their way through the system are aimed at buttressing traditional authorities in ways which reinforce the worst practises of the Bantustan system, including the stripping of rights of vulnerable groups such as women, children and controlling access to the land or jobs. Such an arrangement would act as vote banks delivered to the ANC via the ‘chiefs’ or traditional authorities.

While the battle for Zuma’s succession has been publicly played out since his re-election as ANC president in 2012, and has heightened as several legal judgments are made against him, there has been much discussion on the impact the behaviour of its leadership has had on the ANC. The ethics of the organisation remain a source of much concern, especially for upright ANC cadres and former leaders. There is a sense that the ANC’s focus on getting one million members resulted in all kinds of unsavoury elements swimming in with the rising tide. This is part of the context for the debate on whether it should transform itself into a more tighter political party or remain a national liberation movement. Having an undifferentiated mass membership has meant that the ANC, already compromised at the top, cannot control the ethical behaviour of its members.

Dumisani Hlophe, writing in The Sunday Independent of 22 May 2016, has suggested that much of the unruly behaviour which has seen slanging matches between the organisation and the opposition benches in parliament is as a result of the ANC unable to manage its own internal party tensions. These have seen ANC meetings being disrupted by its own members, suggestions of assassinations of its own members by its own members. ‘Parliament loses its legitimacy to lead and counsel
society...therefore is not in a position to condemn arsonists in Vuwani’ or in the various campuses (2016).

One of the explanations for state capture at micro-level and the unethical behaviour of ANC members has been the dire poverty and unemployment being experienced, especially amongst African communities. According to a 2006 survey carried out by the ANC in Gauteng amongst its members, it was found that most members joined between 1990 and 1994, and that some 42% of ordinary members and 31% of office bearers were unemployed. As many as 45% of ordinary members and 36% of leaders surveyed said that they experienced periods when they had to go hungry. Slightly over half the members earn between R299 and R2, 999 per month and only 24% have a post-matric education (cited in Reddy, 2010:199).

It is therefore not surprising that a position in a local council has been described as the difference between poverty and putting something on the table for one’s family – an indication of how high the stakes are here, leading often to violence and even assassinations. Given their limited educational qualifications and skills sets, except as effective mobilisers of their communities, it was inevitable that ANC members would be linked up as in a food chain with higher echelons to earn their positions – hence embedding patronage into the ANC’s very DNA. Reddy concludes that ‘Since politics is an attractive option for upward mobility and the assumption of political office directly affects standards of material reward, the political terrain becomes fiercely competitive’ (2010:200). The 2016 local government elections unleashed a range of furies at ANC branch level. It is estimated that 60 people were killed since the 2014 elections; that there have been 120 killings since 2003 in KZN alone.

Given these issues around Zuma’s leadership and the ANC, the SACP/ANC/COSATU alliance has been undergoing severe strains. Cosatu and the SACP are an integral part of the elite – their leadership compacting with that of the ANC, with Cosatu’s membership better off than the unemployed. Their exercise of power has been seen in the same terms as that of previous elite transitions, with big capital continuing to enjoy their collective protection. Cosatu has also come to pay a price for that close relationship. Its rank and file has found that its leadership is out of touch with ordinary member needs, resulting in the decline in support of Cosatu affiliate National Union of Mineworkers, which used to be its largest affiliate. The same critique has seen its other
major affiliate, National Union of Metalworkers of SA (NUMSA) break away from the federation and try to be at the centre of a united front of left forces. This has left Cosatu with a predominantly public sector focus with its largest unions coming from the teachers (SADTU), other public servants (NEHAWU) and the NUM.

The space in the left, which the SACP had been occupying for decades, had been left vacant because of the party’s close association with the ANC. However, once an erstwhile ally of Zuma, the SACP has been coming out more and more stridently against the ANC leadership. The decline in the SACP’s fortunes could also be linked to the decline in significance of class analysis as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the crisis of direction that most international left forces have felt. Glaser is cutting in his comment that ‘Class and the material may possess explanatory importance, but if the analysis of them is divorced from real-world political significance and above all from a concern to identify the forces making for progressive social transformation, is its significance reduced to a purely scholastic one?’ (2001:130).

Booysen (2011: 69) has argued that there is barely a ‘left ‘or ‘right’ any more. She paints the alliance which brought Zuma into the leadership of the ANC as a loose affiliation of aggrieved individuals and new political challengers. The divide is about personal loyalties, bolstered by populist appeals to regions, clans and factions. In the absence of a single, credible leader within the ANC, the centrifugal forces within the ANC have developed an almost unstoppable momentum. It would take a very resourceful party leader to turn this dynamic around.

Booysen (2012:306) has further pointed out that the ANC works at two levels: of elections, voters and representative democracy, as well as that of direct engagement ‘unmediated by the exploits of liberal-representative democracy’. This ‘regeneration of power’ is achieved through three devices: its intimate association with ‘people’s power’ and the movement’s custodianship of the power of the people (2012:309); as an ‘electoral colossus’ (2012:311) and through government and state institutions (2012:312). The result of all this has been that ‘Party problems translated seamlessly into public power problems and public sector problems affected the character and dignity of the former liberation movement’ (2012:315).
What are the prospects for other political parties? COPE has served as a transmission belt for those losing confidence in the ANC and who eventually throw their lot in with the DA (Netshitenzhe, 2015). The UDM continues providing a beacon of the moral high ground that disaffected ANC voters seek. Its resources however are limited and it remains dominated by the personality and credentials of Holomisa. As a result this part of the landscape is dominated by the DA and EFF.

As mentioned above the DA has managed to consolidate the white vote with 90% of whites voting for it in 2014, but has done what the NP could not achieve – drawn significant numbers of Coloureds, Indians and in the 2014 elections about 750 000 Africans. Also, despite the various machinations of the apartheid government such as the tricameral parliament, urban councils etc. the NP never quite succeeded in getting any credible black leaders to join it. Mmusi Maimane has been an inspired choice – young, articulate and backed by what is proving to be an effective electoral machinery – but the presence of increasingly independent-thinking blacks in its ranks places pressure on how the DA articulates with its white base.

Having been launched in 2013, the EFF won an impressive 4% of the votes in the 2014 elections, its support drawn from informal settlements, representing those desperate for change, as well as older settled parts of townships, emblematic of those less dependent on state patronage (Netshitenzhe, 2015). Those voting for them indicated an impatience with the pace of transformation; sending a warning to the ANC by tactical voting at national and provincial levels. It has undoubtedly introduced a completely new dynamic into SA politics, even if Mcebisi Ndletyana describes its ‘youthful constituency’ as ‘just defiant’ (The Sunday Independent, 29 May 2016). He points out that its core problem is that it is ‘nationally focused. It’s a patron-based party, built around a personality’. Notwithstanding that, it has been able to push the ANC to adopt the above-mentioned radical positions.

How has civil society articulated with the developments in the state and political arena? Chatterjee has argued that the standard division between state and civil society inadequately applies to post-colonial societies. It is more useful to think of political society as a domain of mediating institutions between civil society and the state. It refers to the terrain where conflict, mostly over the distribution of resources, the recognition of rights of historically subjugated groups and the expression of
subordinate culture, is fought out, often relying on a violent, desperate, and threatening discourse. He argued that political society has become the terrain for poor people to articulate their concerns, which ‘bring into the hallways and corridors of power some of the squalor, ugliness and violence of popular life’. Orderly civic relations are therefore dispensed with. Chatterjee observes, poor and marginalized groups wishing to effectively gain the goods of government programmes ‘must succeed in applying the right pressure at the right places in the governmental machinery. This would frequently mean the bending or stretching of rules, because existing procedures have historically worked to exclude or marginalize them’ (2009).

The post 1994 period was characterised by ‘demobilisation’ of organs of civil society. There was a sense that now that South Africa was rid of apartheid it could depend on the democratic state to deliver. The 1994 period of building a democratic state saw a number of activists from civil society joining the ranks of the bureaucracy or becoming career politicians. There was another level at which the demobilisation occurred: the assertion of ANC cadres returning from exile, wishing to clip the wings of those who had emerged from the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). The MDM was the combination of the UDF – which represented a coalition of civic, youth, women, professional and faith-based organisations – and the leading trade union federation, Cosatu.

Civil society was given sufficient reason for being wary of criticising government when Mbeki slapped Archbishop Tutu’s wrists when the latter dared to criticise not just the President’s HIV/AIDS policy but also said in his speech at the Nelson Mandela Foundation ‘An unthinking, uncritical, kowtowing party line-toeing is fatal to a vibrant democracy. I am concerned to see how many have so easily been seemingly cowed and apparently intimidated to comply’ (2004). COSATU Secretary General, Zwelinzima Vavi, supported Tutu, and referred to the ‘culture of sycophancy in the ANC’.

Amongst the events which have earned Mbeki a reputation for being thin-skinned was his response, through his online blog on the ANC website, where he wrote that Tutu was ‘a liar with scant regard for the truth, and a charlatan posing with his concern for the poor, the hungry, the oppressed and the voiceless’ (2005). The churches, especially through the ANC’s religious desk, and through the pronouncement of
Mandela and Mbeki, were expected to contribute to the process of reconstruction but largely through ‘moral regeneration’.

However, the situation was to change rapidly at the level of community protests as well as the tactics being used by NGOs. In 2004 there were about 20 service delivery protests. It reached a peak in 2014 of 191, with 70 recorded in the first 4 months of this year. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) and the Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP) in a 2015 report titled *The Smoke that Calls* argued that the emergence of a tiny black elite vis a vis huge black underclass lies at the root of these protests. Project Leaders Adele Kirsten and Karl von Holdt highlighted that ‘Many of those who participate in the violence are unemployed, live in poverty, and see no prospect of a change in these circumstances. Theirs, they feel, is a half-life, as they are unable to participate as full citizens in the economy and society. Impoverished young men, in particular, experience this as the undermining of their masculinity as they are unable to establish families’ (2015:3).

Gaps within the same community makes inequality even starker. The underclass thus engages in insurgency citizenship as a way of making their claims for full citizenship. The youth which becomes the backbone of this movement is ‘unschooled, untrained and unemployed’. It is therefore not surprising that violence has become the hallmark of actions in this sphere. Today violence marks the differences amongst communities and their councillors in Vuwani over demarcation issues, while Grabouw residents were responding to ‘land invasions’ by migrants from the Eastern Cape.

Bond (2014: 462) has argued that so far these actions have ‘prevented the emergence of a coherent programme that might link the local protests together in a broader critique not of ‘unconstitutional’ state delivery failure but instead, of the neoliberal policies, financing and practices that represent state success in keeping poor people in their place’. Moeletsi Mbeki (2016), on the other hand, has suggested that the elite of today faces ‘the rising and unsustainable costs related to the suppression of the underclass’. Once this cost of using force, coupled with paying grants, etc. becomes too high, the incumbent elite will hand power to the next group. He labels SA a ‘society with a hidden civil war’.

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Wilson above had highlighted the close connection between the constitution, agency and identity. The South African Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, provides for water, housing, health care and a clean environment as basic rights. Three landmark cases dealing with socio-economic rights were heard by the Constitutional Court since its inception in 1995. The 1997 Subramoney case dealt with access to renal treatment, which dealt with the principle of the right to health generally. Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, presenting the Constitutional Court’s ruling stated ‘The obligations imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27 in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water and social security are dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources’ (1997).

In the 2000 Grootboom case the ruling reasserted the government’s constitutional obligation to take all ‘reasonable ... measures to achieve the progressive realization of the right to access to housing’, including specific steps to cater to the more needy elements in the population. While it showed that the courts could enforce compliance with socioeconomic rights enshrined in the South African Constitution, Bond points out that ‘the Court did not have the courage and self-mandate to prescribe the policies and practices that would be considered for minimal acceptability, and one reason is that the Constitution formally discourages policy formulation. As a result, Grootboom and her community remained as destitute as ever’ (2014:469).

The case TAC brought in 2001 to ensure universal access to a drug, nevarapine, which was effective in reducing dramatically mother to child transmission of HIV, was concluded successfully. As Bond (2014:476) put it, ‘it allowed lawyers to claim the sole substantive offensive victory in the Constitutional Court between 1996 and 2014...(it) could not have been achieved without the broader political sensibility won by activists who converted AIDS from a personal health stigma into a social cause that required a commoning of medicines that had earlier been privately consumed, at great cost, by only those with class and race privileges’.

Bond (2014: 477) asks ‘If a kind of constitutionalism hostile to civil society results in the depoliticisation of poverty, what are the countervailing strategies to politicise basic rights, sufficiently strongly so as to one day force constitutional reform?’ For him the solution lies in ‘the transition from rights talk to ‘decommodification’ and ‘commoning’,
articulating more clearly and politically the collective claim for public goods. Robins and von Lieres (2004:578) point in a similar direction when they argue that ‘TAC’s interventions promoted growth in its grassroots support base, helping turn it into a multiclass and multiracial social movement. In addition to occupying new legal spaces, TAC engaged in widely publicised acts of “civil disobedience,” which played a central role in providing new visibility and innovative forms of organisation’. They point out ‘It bears more than a family resemblance to the pragmatic political style of the black labour movement and the anti-apartheid coalition, the United Democratic Front, during the struggles of the 1980s’ (2004:581). The effect of this is that ‘TAC’s campaigns have expanded the legitimacy of civil-society-led participation. They have also enlarged deliberation in the public sphere to include new discourses of citizenship’ (2014:582).

As indicated above religion, especially Christianity, is considered here as part of civil society because of the impact the churches have had on the political arena as described by Chatterjee above. Its significance can be seen in Lodge’s (2003:226) observation that the majority of civic movements and associations belong to the culture and religion category.

South Africa is home to a plethora of Christian denominations which does not have any particularly dominant denomination. This is not surprising given the various missions which impacted on the population here, as well as the emergence of the independent churches. It can be broken down broadly into:

- Mainstream Protestant which is about 32% of the total number of self-professed Christians. It includes the Methodist, Dutch Reformed, Anglican, Lutheran, and Presbyterian churches.
- Pentecostal, second largest at about 26%, which includes the Charismatic churches and the Apostolic Faith Mission.
- The total African independent churches represent about 25% of adherents, with the Zion Christian Church the largest at almost 14%, the Ethiopian and Shemba/Nazareth churches.
- Catholics make up about 9% of the total.

Bompani (2008:666) argues that the African independent churches, although hardly ‘new’ participants in public debate in South Africa, have much in common with ‘new
social movements’, which contest and redraw ‘the parameters of democracy [and] the very boundaries of what is properly defined as the political arena’ (citing S.E. Alvarez et al. (eds), Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-Visioning Latin American Social Movements Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1998, p.1). On the other hand the leadership of the mainstream Christian churches often entered the movement without the support of their parishes (Bompani (2006:1139). ‘Its leaders do not strive to articulate a common political stance, nor do they act in concert at the national level or collectively endorse any particular political party. In this respect, Independent Christianity in South Africa is analogous to a fluid social movement’ (2008:671).

Christian opposition, like other social movements, lost its singular identity under the United Democratic Front (UDF) structure in the name of the liberation struggle. The notion of ‘the people’ was seen as a unified whole in the 1980s, which did not allow for much internal differentiation and diversity, although in reality this movement was composed of disparate segments’.

Bompani points out that the demobilisation experienced by civil society in the wake of the 1994 elections was also reflected in the way ‘religious institutions and leaders withdrew from the political arena, and there was a return to a denominational character (abandoning the ecumenical alliance), flight of leadership and trained people into bureaucratic or political institutions, weak financial support from abroad, problems with membership and internal problems of redefinition of identity’ (2006:1140).

The wariness shown by churches and other parts of civil society began to change, as far as the mainstream churches are concerned, from 2001 onwards after the SACC’s national conference resolved to engage with the state critically. This saw it take a critical position in 2004 towards the government’s position on Zimbabwe where the Mugabe regime was stifling dissent and limiting open, democratic elections. It issued a joint statement with the South African Catholic Bishops, Conference, the South African Non-governmental Organisations Coalition (SANGOCO), Institute for Democratic Alternatives to South Africa (IDASA), the Centre for Policy Studies and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. As discussed above, many faith-based organisations supported the TAC in its campaigns. The South African Catholic Church has been the largest provider of home-based and palliative care for people living with
HIV/AIDS; in addition it is a significant provider of antiretroviral treatments’ (2006:1146).

Bompani argues that from the ‘AICs’ perspective, their contribution to the struggle for liberation, for social justice, for meaningful citizenship, both in the past and in the present, has simply not been understood. The struggle, it was said to me, advanced in a choral way, multivocally; it was not merely the struggle as represented by the campaigns of the ANC or the UDF, but a broader struggle, to which AICs were fully committed, that tried to ‘give hope to a demoralised nation, to give dignity to people who were taught to be racially inferior, to give unity to a country that was divided’. Similarly, post-apartheid political action is not exclusively the domain of organised parties or publicly recognised fragments of civil society like trade unions or NGOs’ (2008:677).

I would like to end this lengthy treatment of the state and citizenship by looking at the conclusion reached by Beall et al in 2005: ‘a move away from ‘fragile stability’ to either of the two alternatives – state collapse or full-blown democratic consolidation of state and society – would require new organisational expressions in South African politics. But there is no indication that the present fracas will produce this outcome – the focus of the opposition within the alliance remains winning state power by taking over the leadership within the ANC, rather than winning state power from the ANC’ (2005:699).

Glaser was slightly more optimistic of a left agenda emerging when he suggested that social differentiation within ethnic groups ‘raises at least the theoretical possibility of a future working class-based politics either of a socialist or populist kind, able to challenge the predominance of nationalist and ethnic politics’ (2001:218). Bond (2014:463) has argued that ‘it has been a mistake to invest too much in romantic Constitutional fantasies of socio-economic rights. … because of the danger of taming (deradicalising) social activists…the best approach to understanding political opportunities for socioeconomically and politically oppressed South Africans is …by establishing how to connect the dots between prolific protesters from communities, social movements and labour, especially as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) splinters to the left and the largest union, the metalworkers, seeks a socialist ‘United Front’. In part because the most famous precedent, the 1983–1992 United Democratic Front, helped bring down apartheid but was then swallowed by the
African National Congress (ANC), the lessons confirming the strength of well-connected (not ‘popcom’) grassroots protests have been lost.

Perhaps the more realistic expectation would be a South Africa which remains dominated by centre right politics. A ‘newer, better ANC’ is not going to mean a particularly radical ANC. This, the most recent ANC draft policy documents, have been keen to assure the business sectors and foreign investors: the Strategy and Tactics document drawn up for the organisations 2017 conference states talk of radical economic transformation does ‘not suggest any intention on the part of the ANC to spring policy surprises’. It further warns that ‘attempts at ‘radical’ giant leaps, mistimed and cynically aimed at benefiting well connected individuals and families can plunge the project of change into murky waters of defeat’ (ANC, 2017).

For the ANC the way forward is ‘to build democracy with social content, underpinned by a capable developmental state’. The emphasis on improving the capacity of the state has been reflected in all major policy documents, as well as in the NDP. This capacity is required because given the National Democratic Revolution does not eradicate capitalist relations, the state has to possess the capacity to regulate the contradictions such a system engenders’ (ANC, 2017).

Chatterjee provides a useful direction in which to understand the concern of the poor and employed expressed in the documents of the ANC: ‘The presence of populist or communitarian elements in the liberal constitutional order of the post-colonial state ought not to be read as a sign of the inauthenticity or disingenuousness of elite politics; it is rather a recognition in the elite domain of the very real presence of an arena of subaltern politics over which it must dominate and yet which also had to be negotiated on its own terms for the purposes of producing consent’ (Chatterjee, 1993:13).

In keeping open the possibility of politics moving further to the right it would be useful to cite Zubaida who argued that the ‘Third World state, because it derives many of its powers and resources from outside its social unit, acts discriminately upon that society, attempting to eliminate or displace possible rivals for power within it, disrupting its social units and structures, all in an attempt to make it governable and developed’ (2009:126). Instead of a more democratic, left agenda emerging, will we be seeing a move towards greater suppression of dissent as the country tries to remain plugged
into in the international financial system and tries to make the populace more governable? As the battle to succeed Zuma heats up, and as the ANC feels increasingly distanced from its base with open acts of dissent within its ranks becoming a daily occurrence, it is clear that SA’s political firmament is ripe for a major realignment. Whether this will eventually be expressed in the 2019 elections remains to be seen.

5.3 National Identity

It is useful to take note of Glaser’s suggestion that a distinction be drawn between large and small ethnicities. Describing race as a form of ethnicity, he argues that ‘racial ethnicities will usually be found amongst the large ethnicities, and they are often considered unifying compared to smaller ethnicities’. While the ideologues of apartheid were inconsistent on whether whites were divided into two or more ethnicities ‘black opponents of apartheid struggled to forge larger ethnicities, the largest of them all being the non-racial one of ‘South African’ (2001:137).

This section looks at how African and Afrikaner nationalism articulates with ethnicity, language and race.

5.3.1 a. Ethnicity and Afrikaner Identity

‘Cultural politics has become the new battleground’ argues Davies. ‘Stronger ethnic identification is associated with active involvement in cultural organisations and activities that involve mostly in-group members suggesting cultural politics could perhaps represent the base of a new programmatic axis for an Afrikaans grouping’ (2009:72) . Davies echoes Van Der Westhuizen’s concerns about whether the constituent parts of the emerging Afrikaans and intellectual capital ‘can secure an identity receptive to other minority groups and aligned with new global hierarchies, or whether a retreat to a more exclusive and parochial vision transpires, remains to be seen’ (2009:73). The Afrikaner identity ‘was once highly territorialised and culturally distinctive’ (Davies, 2009:74). However, the contemporary and future manifestation of the Afrikaner identity remain unclear – language is the obvious component, but race remains in the background.
Afrikaans music has shown a deep sense of anguish in dealing with the past and the search by whites for a place in the democratic South Africa – even if it is couched in terms which question the need for guilt and apology about the past. In the late 1980s an important Afrikaans rock music movement, Voëlvry, emerged. Baines (2010:254) highlights its ‘critical edge that condemned the repressive apartheid regime’. However, this morphed into an Afrikaans alternative sound typified by the music of Koos Kombuis who released caustic numbers such ‘Blameer Dit op Apartheid’ and other songs that question whether all that is wrong with the country can be blamed on the legacy of apartheid. This ‘gatvol (pissed off) factor goes hand in hand with a wish to reassert pride in Afrikanerness. This is much suggested by the appearance of slogans such as ‘Praat Afrikaans of hou jou bek!’ (Speak Afrikaans or shut up) and ‘100% Boeremeisie’ (100% Afrikaner girl) on T-shirts. This amounts to an assertive rather than apologetic Afrikanerness’ (Baines, 2010: 254).

Van Der Westhuizen cites singer Karen Zoid, who asked the question Afrikaners faced ‘what to do with the anger when you’re not allowed to hate anyone any more’ (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:287). Another cultural icon which emerged in the 2000s is Steve Hofmeyer who has made it a mission to speak out against the ANC government for its failure to combat rampant crime and endemic corruption. The Mail and Guardian of 16 February 2007 has labelled him ‘the ultimate Afrikaner issue activist’ who has made statements seen as racist. He has made controversial statements such as black people are ‘the architects of apartheid’ as well as produced a movie on the murder of white farmers by blacks, describing this as a genocide. He sees himself leading an Afrikaner self-determination movement. However, he is written off as simply using shock tactics for commercial purposes to promote his music and films.

A particularly interesting debate ensued around the song De La Ray, performed by Bok van Blerk. He has refused to allow his song to be used in right wing protest marches, nor has he allowed apartheid-era regalia such as the apartheid flag to be displayed at his concerts. The General, whom the song was about, was a Boer leader during the South African War, who preferred negotiations with the British before hostilities were resorted to. Bok’s De La Rey CD was a huge commercial success with 200 000 copies sold, when sales of 25 000 can earn you gold. Deon Opperman was inspired to write a play on the Boer General which was staged at the Pretoria State
Theatre, in 2008, and which had its run extended into 2009. Former Editor of *Beeld*, Tim du Plessis, blamed the popularity of the song on elements in the ANC who ‘were hell-bent on taunting Afrikaners’ by demonising them and their history (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:289). The right-wing trade union, Solidarity, started referring to a ‘De La Ray Generation’. The Freedom Front Plus tried to improve its base by latching on to that idea.

Arts and Culture Minister and leading ANC intellectual Pallo Jordan pointed out that only a ‘minority of right-wingers were trying to hijack it as a struggle song. But he was sufficiently concerned to warn that taking up arms in the new democracy was a crime (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007:288). The Democratic Alliance argued that the ANC President Zuma’s signature song *Lethu Umshini wami* (Zulu for ‘Bring me my machine [gun]’) was even more dangerous because it implied a return to the revolutionary rhetoric of the armed struggle (*The Star*, 2007).

Talking of the sense of victimhood which the *De la Rey* song depicted, Baines argues that at one level ‘the Afrikaner’s embrace of victimhood is in keeping with the international trend whereby minorities prefer to remember their collective suffering rather than take pride in their achievements (2013:252) But in trying to understand the resonance of the song with a mainly younger generation, he urges that it should be looked at ‘against a backdrop of a ‘plurality of subjective meanings of Afrikanerness’ as Davies had expressed it (2013:253).

Baines (2013:256) explains that ‘Nostalgia depends on the irrecoverable nature of the past for its emotional impact and appeal. ... This is not the past as actually experienced; it is the past as imagined, as idealised through memory and desire. Thus, nostalgia is less about the past than about the present. ...It is precisely during moments when ‘De la Rey’ is performed in group situations that nostalgia has its greatest purchase’. Baines feels that ‘Their adoption of ‘De la Rey’ as an anthem is likely to be little more than a passing fad, an appropriation of van Blerk’s brand of ‘Afrikaner Consciousness’ (2013:258).

The current developments bear out Steyn’s analysis that ‘more whites in South Africa may prefer to withdraw in selected areas of their lives, creating axes of autonomy that will help them feel safe and in control…as their Voortrekker ancestors did before them,
the withdrawal is likely to be a fairly thoroughgoing psychological great trek into enclaves of increasingly irrelevant and impracticable white separateness’ (2001:158).

5.3.1 b Ethnicity and African Nationalism

In the post 1994 context, there was a discernible increase in the use of indigenous languages, discussed under Section 5.3.2 in greater detail. This reassertion of African linguistic identities moved Carrim to write about the existence of ‘a narrow Africanism’ (1997a). This he saw as opposed to the broad sense of Africanism where ‘everybody who is opposed to racism and committed to uplifting the poor and to a South African national identity based on our geographical and cultural location as an African country is an Africanist’. Carrim articulates a position which most supporters of the Freedom Charter had argued that ‘it has to be recognized that since Africans constitute the vast majority in this country, bore the brunt of the struggle against apartheid, are in general the most disadvantaged and overwhelmingly constitute the social base of the governing party, they will be the prime beneficiaries of this stage of our new democracy’.

Wally Serote argued that ‘their (i.e. Africans) being indigenous to South Africa, their being in the majority and most important, their being the most oppressed in the country, dictates to and seeks a special positioning for them within the liberation process and the resolution of the national question’ (1997). Carrim suggests that ‘this approach of investing a greater African and class content to non-racialism must be distinguished from an exclusive Africanism which serves the interests primarily of an upwardly mobile narrow stratum of Africans rather than the mass of poor people’ (1997b). The views of Serote and Carrim contrasted with those of ANC Youth League Peter Mokaba whom Mandela appointed into his first Cabinet, writing in The Star, who said: ‘The Africans ask themselves … if 60% of the 62% that voted the ANC into power is African, why is it that the percentages of other national groups in the leadership structures is more than their contribution to the democratic vote?’ (23 July 1997).

The ANC has continued struggling to answer that question. It is true that there were a number of activists from coloured, white and Indian communities who ended up being arrested, imprisoned or even assassinated. For this sacrifice, as well as given its commitment to non-racialism, the ANC has had to allow for such representation in its
leadership mix. Also, given the relatively privileged socio-economic circumstances of these communities, they were imbued with more material resources as well as activists who had attained a reasonably high level of education. At the same time, as trends since 1994 have shown, the ANC has had to be sensitive to the linguistic backgrounds of its leadership.

The attempt at crafting what Glaser called a larger identity can be seen in the considerations which went into provincial demarcations, whence the ANC resolved not to draw the lines on ethnic bases. However, as Mbeki pointed out, ‘the reality is that the Eastern Cape has a Xhosa majority, in KwaZulu Natal the majority are Zulu-speaking, in the Free State they are Sotho and in the North West, Tswana’ (1994:4). Mbeki stopped short of admitting that tribal/ethnic identity is a logical legacy of the separations forced by the apartheid system and re-embodied in South Africa’s provincial system.

The redrawing of provincial demarcations saw the strengthening and emergence of ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’, often with violent consequences. The opposition by residents of Bushbuckridge being incorporated into the Northern Province (later re-named Limpopo) is an early example of this while the more recent example is that of violence around the incorporation of Vuwani into the Malamulela municipality. Ratshitanga pointed out that notwithstanding the fact that Vuwani and Malamulela were kept apart by apartheid design, to date there had been no acrimony between the Venda and Tsonga speaking communities (2016).

One response to the emergence or persistence of such identities is to declare South Africa a ‘rainbow nation’, thus establishing these identities as permanent features of the South African landscape. The concept of the rainbow nation, echoing US civil rights leader Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition, was coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and popularised by former President Mandela. It was meant to metaphorically encourage respect for the various cultures represented in South Africa. The problem with the notion is that, just as the rainbow consists of a fixed set of colours appearing in a fixed sequence, the rainbow nation concept could be seen as an attempt to ‘freeze’ the South African nation in its composition and hierarchy.
Filatova says the rainbow nation concept was meant to denote ‘something intrinsically though not sharply divided and yet indivisible… (it) was a successful albeit a romanticized representation of the Charterist interpretation of the South African nation’ (1996:65). However Dexter is less charitable, saying ‘we are already showing signs of confusion, in relation to the definition of a South African national identity where a murky, colonized, unclassed, ungendered, ‘rainbowism’ rules’ (1996:85) – and that was in the 1990s. Subsequent trends prove him prescient in his observations.

Carrim saw the rainbow nation concept as reflecting the ANC-led government’s commitment to nation-building and national reconciliation. He points out that “one nation, many cultures” (1998:51) was the theme of President Mandela’s inauguration. He urges that such an approach should not be used to fossilise ethnic and racial identities. It should pave the way for deepening non-racialism, which does not mean to contradict African leadership, especially African working class leadership. Carrim asserts: ‘Failure to assert such leadership will serve to strengthen a narrow, exclusive Africanism, on the one hand, and an empty, artificial nonracialism on the other’ (1998:55). This problem with non-racialism is examined in greater detail below.

The 1997 Strategy and Tactics Document gives an indication of the ANC’s attitude to the issue of multiple identities: ‘The ANC recognizes that individuals within such a nation will have multiple identities, on the basis of their make-up, cultural life and social upbringing. Such distinctive features will not disappear in the melting-pot of broad South Africanism’. As long as the question of identity is restricted to a simply reductive understanding of cultures and a culturalist conception of race and ethnicity, as Gilroy put it, there will be a drift ‘towards a belief in the absolute nature of ethnic categories’ (1992:50). This takes us down the slippery path of multi-culturalism and a self-defined apartheid of eleven or more identities, examined further when looking at non-racialism.

A further question which needs to be answered is: from where do these multiple identities arise? Jordan argued that under apartheid ‘the revival of African ethnicity had little to do with nostalgia for past greatness on the part of the Africans. It was even less the articulation of a ‘psychological urge’, as the theorists of ethnicity claim, to cohere as members of a unique struggle for equality and freedom on the part of the African people…Verwoerd argued that South Africa was not a common society. A historical accident had resulted in the artificial forcing together of members of a
number of discrete nations. Thirteen of these were the ‘bantu nations’, the others were the Afrikaners, the Brits, the Coloureds, the Namas, and the Asians’ (1997:10).

Ratshitanga is amongst those who lay the blame for today’s rise in ethnic differences at the feet of the ‘100% Zulu Boy’ campaign promoted by Zuma’s backers in the lead up to the 2007 conference in Polokwane. He points out that after the conference there appeared paraphernalia carrying the slogan *Shumela Venda* (work for Venda), which was the motto of the Venda Bantustan (2016). Similarly, a similar resort to ethnicity and tribalism could be read into statements made by Phumlani Mfeka of Mazibuye who asserted that in KZN: ‘Africans in this province do not regard Indians as their brethren’ (Munusamy, 2013). This in the midst of all kinds of threats on the Indian business community in KZN, echoing experiences of the 1940s and the 1980s.

Unlike experiences in other parts of the world, there seems to be little prospect for these identities to be cemented to such an extent that secession is on the cards. Apart from the Western Cape under the NP leadership insisting on certain powers to be allocated to it, there are many reasons for this unitary state to be maintained. These include, according to Glaser: ‘the urbanisation process has over the long run done more to dissolve than reinforce sub-African ethnicity’; the ‘rival magnetic pull of the larger ethnicities of African, black and non-racial identities’; and ‘ethnically divided but economically viable states, like Canada, Belgium or Britain, are more likely to hold together’ (2001:154-155).

Furthermore the concessions made in the drafting of the Constitution have helped reduce irredentist tendencies. These measures have included the recognition of constitutional monarchy in KZN, advisory Houses of Traditional Leaders in six provinces, the establishment of the Council of Traditional Leaders, chiefs being paid from the state coffers, as well as the recognition of eleven official languages.

5.3.1. Language and National Identity

Much has been made of the constitutional pronouncements on languages. These include the Constitution’s Preamble speaking of a South Africa that belongs to all its people, united in their diversity; recognises English and Afrikaans as amongst the eleven official languages; that all official languages must ‘enjoy parity of esteem and must be treated equitably’; prohibits unfair discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin,
culture or language; that everyone has the right to public education in the language of their choice where practicable; as well as allowing the right of everyone to establish independent educational institutions that do not discriminate on the basis of race.

A very important guarantee has been that ‘persons belonging to cultural, religious or linguistic communities may not be denied the right, with other members of that community, to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language and to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society - in a manner that is consistent with the other rights in the Bill of Rights’.

The South African Constitution recognises eleven official languages of South Africa: Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Northern Sotho, Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu. The Constitution also provided for the establishment of a Pan South African Language Board (PANSALB) to promote, and create conditions for, the development and use of all official languages as well as the Khoi, Nama and San languages. It is also supposed to promote and ensure respect for all languages commonly used by communities in South Africa, apart from the official languages recognised. In January 2016 the Minister of Arts and Culture dissolved the Board of PANSALB.

The organisation had been beset by numerous administrative and financial management issues as well as having failed to oversee and monitor the implementation of the Official Languages Act 12 of 2012, with less than 20 percent of National Departments had a language policy. In March 2016, the Use of Official Languages Act was enacted requiring government departments to choose and use three official languages. This move put the spotlight on a number of issues around the extension of the language rights enshrined in the Constitution.

While debates around Afrikaans have tended to dominate debates on language rights, there are a number of issues which are faced by users of the rest of the indigenous languages. For example, Ishmael Malale, writing in the Business Day of 25 February 2016 pointed out that ‘There are negligible multilingual practices in public academic institutions for academic literature and pedagogy focusing on the promotion of indigenous languages’. He emphasised that ‘language is an indispensable tool for flexing of social power, transmission of culture and communication’. While these
languages are used as a medium of instruction in the first phase of schooling, and they are offered as subjects throughout the rest of the school curriculum, the sheer practical reality of limited resources being availed for training of language specialist training, or even to adequately remunerate interpreters in official roles such as in the legal system, South Africa stands the danger of those rights being symbolic gestures.

On the other hand, Afrikaans has enjoyed a very different trajectory. Just as Afrikaans speakers showed a divergence of opinions in the report Mbeki tabled in parliament in March 1999, so too do very similar conversations continue asserting themselves in the 2000s. There emerged what has been labelled the Third Afrikaans Language Movement ‘which was an organised response by Afrikaners who were upset by the loss of protection for Afrikaans by the post-apartheid state’ (Van Der Waal, 2012:251). Largely white and elite, the dialogues were conducted in public debates, the literary website Litnet, articles and letters in the Afrikaans press. Die Taaldebate (the Language Debate) managed to organise various bodies into a coordinating organisation, the Afrikaanse Taalraad (the Afrikaans Language Council).

Explaining why a diminution of the status of Afrikaans is unpalatable, a Freedom Front Plus respondent to Southern (2012b:358) said: ‘The Afrikaner community speaks Afrikaans, thinks in Afrikaans, writes in Afrikaans, communicates in Afrikaans and worships in Afrikaans. If you take their language away, they will lose a definite part of their identity’. (FF+’s response to the questionnaire, 22 February 2010). There is very little doubt that the FF+ is talking of white Afrikaans speakers. For them in the ‘multilingual South African context Afrikaans is a set of symbols that have meaning beyond the level of communication - it is also a symbol of social solidarity with language and language usage, demarcating ethnic boundaries’ (Bosch, 2000:. 51 cited in Southern (2012b: 355).

On the other hand, the Groep van 63 (Group of 63), an attempt to get a cross-race Afrikaans speaking movement showed promise, especially when Afrikaans-speaking coloureds such as Jakes Gerwel, who served as the DG and Cabinet Secretary of the Mandela administration, and Hein Willemse, an anti-apartheid activist and Afrikaans literature academic, joined the initial discussions. However, as Van Der Waal points out, ‘the mobilisation of Afrikaners in the Third Afrikaans Language Movement retained elements of ethno-nationalism, expressed in essentialist notions of language and
identity. The movement attracted extremely conservative Afrikaner voices, such as the author and activist Dan Roodt and his movement PRAAG (ProAfrikaanse Aksiegroep, Pro-Afrikaans Action Group)’ (2012: 451).

A further problem with this movement was that ‘there was little room left for the code switching between English and Afrikaans, that coloured Afrikaans speakers preferred’. Disparagingly referred to as ‘Engifrikaans’ van der Waal explains that ‘Code-switching was… a standard practice in the Kaapse Afrikaans of the coloured population where it had a function of expressing social belonging, based on membership in both English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking social orders’ (van der Waal, 2012:452).

Unlike the conservative elements of Groep van 63 or PRAAG, the Afrikanerbond seems to be better attuned to the status of Afrikaans under the current dispensation. Jan Bosman, General Secretary of the body, on the eve of the launch of the Afrikanerbond, pointed out in an interview that ‘It is no longer a white Afrikaner organisation…From a population of 5,9-million people that speak Afrikaans, only 2,5million are from the white community, so white people can no longer claim ownership of Afrikaans….It now wants to build upon its links with the government to ensure that the concerns of Afrikaans-speaking South Africans are heard and attended to’ (Southern, 2012b:355)

The work of the De Klerk Foundation shows that he has not been able to shake off his deep roots in the apartheid system, which had mutated into a new found respect for group rights during the constitutional negotiations. Dr Theuns Eloff, chair of the foundation, in a statement marking International Mother Tongue Day, complained that: ‘Not only is there a push to establish English as the primary (and often only) language in the public sector, but there is almost no promotion of indigenous mother languages as languages of tuition in education’ (2016).

An FF+ respondent told Southern (2012b:361) ‘In practical terms it is not the Constitution that will protect Afrikaans but it is the government institutions as well as the speakers of Afrikaans who will protect the language’. Nash observed that ‘In the context of the new South Africa, the defence of Afrikaans language is less ethnically laden, hence more feasible politically, and does not necessarily exclude literary and cultural products of the language’ (2000:343). Pointing out that ‘few minority languages
diminish where residual and growing material resources are manifest’, Davies points out that white Afrikaans speakers have thus far been the ‘most privileged of the minority language groupings’ (2009:84).

Afrikanerbond’s Bosman strikes an upbeat note when he says he believes the language has never been stronger. ‘Look at the volume of Afrikaans music available, the amount of Afrikaans literature on the shelves or the number of Afrikaner festivals like Aardklop and KKNK’. Southern (2012b:362) notes ‘Significantly, the threat posed to Afrikaans by English is not thought to be politically motivated or regarded as being stimulated by ethnocultural opposition’. His FF+ respondent said: ‘I don’t feel that the ANC is anti-Afrikaner. My experience as a councillor of the Pretoria City Council is that virtually all the ANC councillors speak and understand Afrikaans’.

I now consider the three sources which have framed the debate on the use of Afrikaans in education establishments: the Constitution, the policy on language usage issued by the Higher Education Department and a speech delivered by President Nelson Mandela. The focus then shifts to the most recent Taaldebat at the University of Stellenbosch, which has come to the fore since 2015. The views of those wishing to retain institutions as exclusively or largely Afrikaans-speaking is considered as is the rebuttal of that position.

Section 29(1)(2) of the Constitution reads: ‘Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. To ensure the effective access to, and implementation of this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account: equity; practicability; and the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices’. The three principles will be considered as part of the constitutional debate on Afrikaans as a medium of instruction.

The other framing element is the approach of the Ministry of Higher Education, set out in a 2002 language policy document which state: ‘(S)ome individuals have equated institutional responsibility for promoting Afrikaans as an academic medium to the establishment of ‘Afrikaans’ universities. The notion of Afrikaans universities runs counter to the end goal of a transformed higher education system which, as indicated
in the National Plan for Higher Education (NPHE), is the creation of higher education institutions whose identity and cultural orientation is neither black nor white, English or Afrikaans speaking, but unabashedly and unashamedly South African’.

Nelson Mandela, speaking in Afrikaans, on acceptance of an honorary doctorate of the University of Stellenbosch on 26 October 1996, captured the challenges of implementing the constitutional imperatives well when he said: ‘The question is this: Amongst ourselves, how are we to negotiate a dispensation for the South African university system that meets the following three criteria? Firstly, that a milieu should be created and maintained for Afrikaans to continue growing as a language of scholarship and science. At the same time, that non-speakers of Afrikaans should not be linguistically deprived of access within the system. And, moreover, that the use and development of no single language medium should – either intentionally or unintentionally – be made the basis for the furtherance of racial, ethnic or narrowly cultural separation’.

These three framing sources are cited by both sides of the language debate. For example, Hill (2009:343) points out that ‘white English and Afrikaans speakers have tended to share both a minimum level of bilingual competence and a more-or-less positive set of dispositions towards the two official languages. The status that Afrikaans has traditionally enjoyed in higher education can therefore be explained both in terms of formal policies and the socially situated bilingual capacities of ‘middle class’ white South Africans’. However, he notes that although Afrikaans was ‘sustained as a relatively powerful objectified medium in South Africa….There has been a dramatic decline in the quantity and range of academic publication in Afrikaans since 1994’ (2009:343). Van Der Waal (2012:251) points out that ‘By the late 1990s it was clear that a number of factors worked against the maintenance of Afrikaans in higher education’. These included the issue of access, based on the values of non-racialism and equality inscribed in the Constitution. Furthermore, there was the trend of declining interest in Afrikaans as a school subject. Southern (2012b:363) suggests that ‘The confrontation is between those who endeavour to defend the language in a robust manner and those inclined towards a language policy which does not see Afrikaans as possessing a serious entitlement to a level of linguistic privilege’. In the context of demands for transformation by the HED, ‘the politicisation of Afrikaans as a language
for tertiary education was unavoidable’ (Van der Waal, 2012:251) leading to the Taaldebate.

Stellenbosch University has become one of the key battlegrounds of the Taaldebate. Giliomee (2009a, 2009b) has been at the fore arguing for the privileging of Afrikaans at the University of Stellenbosch. He paints a picture of the university as being something akin to the Stalingrad of those who battle for Afrikaans. It was therefore very significant that Russel Botman, an Afrikaans-speaking coloured, was appointed as vice-chancellor in 2007. In April 2013, after Botman’s reappointment as VC in 2012, he announced the core components of the University’s Vision 2030. These included a new residence placement policy and an enrolment target of 50% coloured, African and Indian students by 2018. However, the transformation plan became the centre of a round of attacks by the language activists with council member Pieter le Roux of the Solidarity Research Institute leading the attack. It has been speculated that Botman’s death in July 2014 due to a heart attack was brought on by the huge pressure he was facing from his detractors. With Botman’s sudden demise the intensity of the Taaldebate cooled down a little, almost out of respect.

Hill and Robins (2015) point out that the ‘The taaldebate, or language debate, has been simmering at Stellenbosch for years, but the key events of 2015 – the launching of the Open Stellenbosch movement, the Luister (Listen) video, the appearance of the RMT (Rector Management Team) before Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Higher Education and Training, and the #FeesMustFall campaign – have brought this matter to a head’.

There are three core arguments made by those in defence of keeping Afrikaans as a medium of instruction: that it was the constitutional right of Afrikaans-speakers; removing it would reduce the quality of tertiary education and that it was part of redressing the injustices felled upon Afrikaans speaking coloureds.

The rights based case was supported by a range of role players. Dave Steward, Executive Director of the De Klerk Foundation, argued that ‘The state and publicly funded institutions like universities have a duty to uphold and facilitate all these (constitutional) rights...Clearly it is practicable to do so at universities that have
traditionally offered tuition in Afrikaans - especially in the Western Cape where Afrikaans is the principal language’.

Danie van Wyk (September 2015), a coloured Afrikaans speaker, contributing to the debates on LitNet, points out that ‘Afrikaans should be seen and accepted by non-Afrikaans students as a language spoken by the majority of people in the Western Cape. There are more Afrikaans-medium schools in the Western Cape than in the rest of the country combined... Those students, the majority of whom are coloured/black Afrikaans mother-tongue speakers, have a right to be taught in the language of their choice – Afrikaans’.

In a 14 November 2015 statement, the Democratic Alliance entered the fray when it said: ‘The change would see English made the primary language of instruction, and this appears to be in contravention of the constitutional principle that every person has the right to be taught in the official language of their choice, where reasonably practicable. It cannot be argued that teaching in Afrikaans is not “reasonably practicable”. The constitutional rights of Afrikaans speaking students, therefore, need to be upheld while those of other students of different backgrounds are also met. That is what inclusiveness means in a multicultural society’.

Seemingly oblivious to the fact that it was the NP government which had marginalised the coloureds, Steward argues ‘it is essential that the tertiary education system should address the needs of Coloured South Africans who have the lowest university participation rate of any community in South Africa. The needs of disadvantaged black and Coloured English-speaking students in the Western Cape are adequately addressed by the other three universities in the province that offer tuition solely in English - but there is no provision for disadvantaged Coloured Afrikaans-speakers - particularly those from the rural areas of the Western Cape’. He issued this thinly veiled warning: ‘The management of the remaining universities where Afrikaans is still a language of tuition should also bear in mind the practical consideration of whether or not they want to alienate a significant portion of their support base - and perhaps the overwhelming base for funding and donations’.

On the opposite side, support for this policy has been based on several key areas: at the very level practical in terms of implementation; in terms of staff and student profiles
and their language preferences; and on the basis of Constitutional rights. Van der Waal points out the poverty in the thinking of the language activists in the *Taaldebat* when he writes: ‘The activists did not contextualise the language debate in terms of national or historical dimensions. Neither were the challenges of transformation or a costing of an Afrikaans dominant university included in their argumentation. Activists did not consider the need among students for exposure to social diversity or how a language ghetto and ethnic enclosure could be avoided if good staff and students would leave due to the proposed screening for Afrikaans-language skills’ (2012: 455).

In terms of the reality lecturers have to deal with, Hill and Robins point out that the December 2014 moves at the University of Stellenbosch ‘reflected an important shift… a tacit recognition that – given the University’s commitment to changing the demographic profile of the undergraduate student population – both the Afrikaans (A) and dual medium instruction (T-option) are politically untenable. The reason for this is that both assume a minimum level of proficiency in Afrikaans as a second language – and this presumption is exclusionary. At issue is not simply ‘Afrikaans’ as a spoken language, but rather the requirement of a high level competence in both English and Afrikaans as academic practices’.

Hill and Robin argue that ‘The argument that universities need to reflect regional demographics and promote “mother tongue instruction” … tends to ignore the fact that campus populations are increasingly diverse, not simply in terms of “home language” but also in terms of the complex intersection of language “repertoires” and other social markers – such as race, gender and class’.

Liebenberg and van der Walt, also of Stellenbosch University, argued why the Constitutional claims made by the language activists on maintaining Afrikaans primacy at such institutions were on weak grounds. ‘Equality and social justice are the Constitution’s founding values. … This means that the right to higher education must be equally accessible to all without any form of unfair discrimination’. This, they argue, ‘is core to the teaching project of any excellent university’.

This camp also argued that with reference to the ‘practicability’ principle, a range of considerations like financial constraints, the capacity of staff, the infrastructure supporting learning and students' language preferences need to be appreciated.
Liebenberg and van der Walt point out that ‘Academics and university managements cannot simply ignore the reality that growing numbers of students choose to be educated in English even when this is not their mother tongue’.

The third principle of redress is particularly relevant to Stellenbosch University given its association with apartheid. ‘The pace of racial change and redress at the institution has been glacially slow since democracy dawned in 1994. … All indications are that this objective (of redress) will not be achieved without a significant shift towards English as the primary language of both teaching and official interaction at the campus’.

Pierre de Vos, writing in his blog Constitutionally Speaking (November 2015), said that the DA in its approach was ‘deploying the discourse of rights, not to protect the rights of everyone, but rather to protect the political and economic interests and the social status of a group who happens to have been the main beneficiaries of apartheid exploitation and oppression…The majority of black students do not have such competence in Afrikaans. This means the policy excludes a majority of black students and thus discriminates against black people on the basis of race’.

Referring to the argument based on the high percentage of Afrikaans speakers in the Western Cape, De Vos said this view ‘fails to recognise that higher education is not a provincial competence over which the provincial government has any say. The Constitution explicitly reserves this power for the national government in recognition of the fact that – unlike primary education – higher education is a matter of national concern that speaks to the needs of the country as a whole’. He emphasises that ‘Places at Universities – especially good Universities – are limited and highly sought after. For this reason, many students attend a University in a province where they do not live. …. To allow a University to impose a language policy that would exclude the vast majority of students in the country would therefore create special privileged access for an already privileged minority to a national asset’. He concludes that ‘The current language policy has made Stellenbosch University the least diverse University in South Africa’.

Undoubtedly, the faultlines along the language divides will persist for a long time to come. Afrikaans language activists will continue trying to enlist especially coloured
Afrikaans speakers to diffuse the image of a largely white, ethnic campaign. This will have to contend with generational change, where younger people are displaying the same passion for the language. The rest of the indigenous languages are going to face tremendous challenges in realising the rights enshrined in the Constitution. This could open up the space for the ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ alluded to above to mobilise across larger swathes of the country.

5.3.3 Race and national identity

Glaser suggested that in the context of a democratic South Africa ‘(W)hat must now be theorized …is the relationship between capitalism and those features of the racial order which have outlived apartheid, including racism, race consciousness and racial inequality’ (2001:57). I have dealt with the issues of racial inequality substantially in the previous sections. I shall now focus on the forms racism and race consciousness is taking today by first looking at the practise of Afrikaners and then the complicated issue of non-racialism.

5.3.3.a Afrikaner assertion or racism?

As mentioned above, Steyn has inserted a robustly critical race approach into the discourse on white Afrikaner identity. This approach emerged especially during the 1980s and 1990s, and according to Fishkin, whom she cites, have ‘put the construction of ‘whiteness’ on the table to be investigated, analysed, punctured, and probed’ and brought it to ‘centre stage as the site where power and privilege converged and conspired to sabotage ideals of justice, equality and democracy’ (Fishkin, 1995).

Davies argues that while the ANC remains seized with debates on the national question, ‘Elsewhere, a new wave of cultural dissent somewhat less avowed of constitutional norms is discernible’. This can be found in the debates within the cultural space where examples of a ‘post-nationalist’ or ‘new Afrikaner’ identity can be found in the plethora of Afrikaans festivals, journals such as Fragmente, the web pages of Litnet, and Die Vrye Afrikaan (2009:81).

The current developments bear out Steyn’s analysis that ‘more whites in South Africa may prefer to withdraw in selected areas of their lives, creating axes of autonomy that will help them feel safe and in control…as their Voortrekker ancestors did before them,
the withdrawal is likely to be a fairly thoroughgoing psychological great trek into enclaves of increasingly irrelevant and impracticable white separateness’ (2001:158). Steyn had pointed out that ‘to the extent that Westernisation is conflated with internationalism, white South Africans will be able to position themselves as the custodians of valuable cultural and experiential resources’ (2001:167).

According to Davies, what is emerging is a ‘movement of the ‘other or new’ Afrikaner; post-nationalist Afrikaners with a strong if largely uncritical and historical sense of community…the label has hardened…and there is apparently little space in which a more inclusive refashioning of Afrikanerness can resume’ (2009:91). The problem with this dialogue, Davies points out, is that it occurs ‘within the pages of the Afrikaans print media (2009:85).

Writing about the contemporary Afrikaans speaking intellectuals, Duvenage has argued that this generation has to establish a ‘moral place to stand’ (1999: 110) in the new South Africa. Boersma points out that in contradiction, ‘Solidarity’s leadership believes there is no moral imperative to change for Afrikaners. They experienced change and loss after apartheid through a narrow lens. When they talk about 1994 as the ‘total transformation’ and the complete ‘political order change’ they do so only in reference to the collapse of Afrikaner nationalism and its organisations. They present themselves as victims’ (Boersma, 2012: 421).

Less nuanced are organisations like Dan Roodt’s PRAAG and the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (FAK). Roussouw with his ally Danie Goosen turned the FAK, a Broederbond relic, into a vehicle for a ‘revamped Afrikaner nationalism’ hoping to capitalise on perceptions of white embattlement in a democratic South Africa. But that space had already been occupied by the DA which was tapping into these sentiments as well as providing a political platform. Similarly, Solidarity was doing more for the white workers than these cultural organisations promised to do.

Most importantly, Roussouw and Goosen’s views contradicted that of the majority of middle-class Afrikaners according to Davies, who observes that they have ‘hesitated to label themselves in a minoratarian style’ (2009:77) Even the Afrikanerbond, the current incarnation of the Broederbond, has committed itself ‘to strive for the
maintenance and development of all indigenous languages’ with the obvious caveat ‘with particular emphasis on Afrikaans’.

As far as intellectual activities of Afrikaners in the 2010s is concerned, there are two streams discernible. At one level, there is the continuing impact of the thought leaders of the previous decade, embodied in the positions of Breytenbach. Nash suggests that ‘It would perhaps be more accurate to say that Breytenbach occupies two distinct - ambiguous, and even contradictory – roles’. On one hand he has identified himself with arguments which work within the framework of global capitalism and liberal constitutionalism, without addressing the persistent inequalities in South Africa. In an open letter to Mbeki which he was signatory to with 23 others committed themselves to making South Africa ‘a player to reckon with in the global economy of the new century’. But they call for minority groups to ‘have a right to have a fair share of the tax which they pay allocated to their own institutions’- leading Die Burger 1 April 2000 to label him as part of the ‘new right’ (2000:357).

On the other hand, Nash suggests, ‘In his more reflective role, he treats contemporary capitalism as a fundamental constraint on human culture, and seeks to encourage the subversive force of language as a source of self-knowledge. For these two voices to be reconciled, it is necessary for the place of language to be narrowly, even if richly, conceived’. Nash goes on to argue that Breytenbach's role within the contemporary politics of Afrikaans is reminiscent of his role in the liberation movement in the days of Okhela. Just as his political opponents in the liberation movement welcomed a prominent Afrikaner poet willing to condemn apartheid, so his Afrikaner political opponents welcome a former political prisoner willing to condemn the ANC’ (2000:359).

The second stream of intellectual engagement is embodied in a younger generation. Davies suggests that ‘Among Afrikaners of this generation, a collective intellectual project has taken shape, drawing much of its inspiration from postmodernism, which is perhaps the most lively, focused and sustained to have emerged in the new South Africa’ (2009:81). The main forum for this postmodernist thinking is the journal, Fragmente, which is framed by a critique of globalisation from the standpoint of providing a bulwark against its homogenising effect.
In grappling with what it stands for Nash points out the journal ‘rejects what it calls ‘the modem fundamentalisms (fascism, communism, liberal capitalism and apartheid)’, and their ‘totalitarian patterns of thought’. Fragmentary thought, in contrast, makes it possible to ‘keep open the space for a borderline existence in the in between’ (Fragmente 1: 4-5). The metaphor of the ‘in between’ suggest not so much an alignment in a conflict between the powerful and the powerless, but rather an attempt to live on the borders of capitalist power without quite conforming to its terms (2000:353).

Steyn, following her own advice that ‘it is appropriate to think of whitenesses’ (2001:xxx) has on the basis of her research suggested the following 5 key narratives: ‘Still colonial after all these years’, where ‘whiteness’ is constructed unilaterally, and that interventions in the new South Africa can be on white terms, for the good of the blacks (2001:60), ‘This shouldn’t happen to a white’, which sees the reversal of fortunes of whites as ‘abrupt and traumatic as nonsensical’ (2001:70); ‘Don’t Think White, Its all Right’, the ‘multicultural’/’rainbow nation’ variety with whiteness being maintained in some form or the other (2001:84); ‘A white shade of white’, which ‘disclaims any implication in whiteness…Denial is the overriding factor’ (2001:101); ‘Under African Skies (or White, but not Quite), wishes to condemn whiteness to the past, but ‘does not deny personal implication in social processes of racialisation’ (Steyn, 2001:115).

A variant of this narrative, ‘Hybridisation, That’s the Name of the Game’, which includes gay respondents, ‘are unanimous in their support of the changes taking place’, seeing ‘whiteness as a deliberate mechanism of social advantage’ (2001:129) and race is ‘not denied but acknowledged as a shaping influence through historical and structural processes’ (2001:130). Sharing concerns of many of the other subsets, such as the state of the economy and crime, it believes that reconciliation has a long way to go, accepting culpability through collusion or through omission, negligence or passivity (2001:134). Steyn argues that this narrative in particular allows for the emergence of an African whiteness, much like ‘the colonialist fear of finding the African within the European (‘the horror, the horror’) (2001: 147).

The problem with many parts of the white community retreating into its many, dispersed laagers is that when they are required to interact with other races it is very
easy to resort to the stereotypes they have developed of the ‘Other’. Then common place interfaces such as at the workplace, or at schools, restaurants or gyms can easily become infused with acts of racism. Whether a non-racial agenda can help overcome that is examined in the next section.

5.3.3 b Race and African Nationalism

Beall et al (2005: 688) had argued that ‘the ANC’s dominance has…reinforced race and nationalism as the central ideas for political mobilisation, so that the political expression of voice based on socio-economic interests is discouraged’. This is examined in relation to attempts at dealing with race consciousness and the development of non-racialism.

South African Human Rights Commission chairperson Barney Pityana in his opening address to the National Conference on Racism argued: ‘The structures which history has erected, the mind-sets and social practices are not changing fast enough to meet the pace of time’ (2000:2). For Pityana, it is important that ‘we understand and appreciate the cultural differences and we must now challenge many of the social and cultural orthodoxies that have gone to make the taken-for-granted life-world of an Europeanised South Africa’ (2000:2).

Accordingly, Gerwel emphasised that racism must not be seen as ‘another form of expression of difference in our diverse society…where poverty was so much a function of racial allocation of station, the achievement of the better life envisaged, meant a concrete addressing of the legacy of racism and the creation of circumstances where racism as felt practice would increasingly recede’ (2002:2).

Capturing the tension between multiple identities, which people may consider fixed, and the reformulation of identities, Duncan and De la Rey, arguing that racial categories are discursively constructed and change over time, wrote about the racial category of ‘Coloured’ as follows: ‘The Population Registration Act of 1950 legally constituted the category ‘Coloured’ as a person who is not white or native. This category is under continual contestation under present-day South Africa. Individuals, who during the apartheid days were classified as Coloured, variously refer to themselves as ‘black’, ‘so-called Coloured’, and ‘Coloured’ (2000:15).
As quoted above, Fanon had warned of the movement from nationalism to ultranationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism. While not getting into the detail needed I want to locate the experiences of xenophobia we see in South Africa within that. While the South African government authorities try to depict actions against migrants to South Africa as simply acts of criminality, there is a basis to ask whether the process which gave birth to a South African identity whose constitutive elements are Mandela, the flag and the anthem has become a form of chauvinism. This chauvinism could be based on the attitude that since South Africa is economically better developed than its Southern African neighbours, or that migrants have had to leave their dire conditions to seek employment in South Africa, therefore ‘we’ are superior to ‘them’.

As noted by the 2004 report of the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) ‘The ANC government – in its attempts to overcome the divides of the past and build new forms of social cohesion... embarked on an aggressive and inclusive nation-building project. One unanticipated by-product of this project has been a growth in intolerance towards outsiders... Violence against foreign citizens and African refugees has become increasingly common and communities are divided by hostility and suspicion’ (2004).

Bass, Erwin, Kinners and Maré (2012) building on Everatt’s concern at the lack of clarity on the term non-racialism, report on their analysis of focus groups conducted by the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation. One of their key concerns is worth quoting at length: ‘In South Africa the popular view of separate race groups as having their own cultures—‘rainbowisation’, in Neville Alexander’s (2002, p. 101) terminology — is simply a ‘new brand of multiculturalism, as opposed to the old brand of “pluralist” multiculturalism which late apartheid tried to disguise itself as’. In this version of multiculturalism multiplicity is acceptable only if it takes the form of recognising multiple, but separate, units of cultures, in the same way that multi-racialism is premised on separate ‘race groupings’. The constructed distances between these ‘groupings’ make this a conditional proposition of togetherness’ (2012:35).

Thus, ‘that what appears on the surface to be a liberal celebration of difference threatens to morph into justification for segregationist politics, not just in the foreseeable future but in the everyday interactions of the present... This conditionality
promotes a model of cultural representation as a viable and acceptable means through which to accumulate power and resources’ (2012:36).

Upadhyay and Robinson cited above took a similar approach when looking at the issue of communalism in India. They suggested it been seen as a conflict over secular issues through the prism of the position of Muslims relative to Hindus under colonial rule and in contemporary India. The impoverishment of the black, African majority in relation to the Indian, coloured and white sections of the population, makes it inevitable for race to be the prism through which we see the consequent tensions.

This is exacerbated where ‘South Africa has made some advances in deracialisation at the apex of the class structure…Yet it is precisely here where racial identities are being reified most because it is through the assertion of racial identities that these stakeholders can advance their material interests’ (Bentley and Habib, 2008:22).

According to Bass et al, what is required is ‘an approach in which the use of the prefix multi demands the recognition of variation within each individual and not between perceived homogeneous groups in society’ (2012:36-37). While arguing that in South Africa, race ‘remains a prison etched into the skin’ it calls for the state to play some role to challenge ‘the historic and contemporary preference for essentialism in the politics of representation’. They conclude that, as argued by Glaser above, ‘non-racialism is improbable unless inequality is addressed. Multi-racialism and racism both originate from racialism, which underpins all forms of race thinking… non-racialism—a non-racialism that challenges essentialist thinking and undermines a racial ontology—remains a project and not an existing state’ (2012:38).

5.4 Conclusion

Given the condition of the South African nation-state discussed in this chapter, it is not surprising that the words of Yeats, echoed by Chinua Achebe in his novel, are cited very often: ‘Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold’. Beall et al commented on the fragility of the transition South Africa had undergone. Ten years later, this chapter has shown, the situation remains fragile but not one where ‘Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world’. A summary of the above chapter along the axis of nationalism, sovereignty and national identity shows that the situation remains fragile but the resilience shown
by civil society and state structures ensures that the foundation of the nation-state remains intact.

Locating this thesis within the postcolonialism framework has been expedient because it highlights the many similarities which South Africa has with other parts of the postcolonial world. As Young, cited above, pointed out, postcolonialism helps understand how postcolonial orders ‘are fashioned and performed... in the pursuit of more just and equitable societies’ (Young, 2010:66). It has served to ensure that colonial inheritances are acknowledged as part of the challenges the democratic state has to contend with. The most critical of these is the continued economic privilege of those who constituted the colonising block and who remained as part of the South African population. A corollary of that is the continued impoverishment of those who for the past few centuries have been part of the colonised majority.

Despite more than two decades of a ‘New South Africa’ being proclaimed, the structures of privilege and denial remain largely intact. Several policy initiatives, many blessed with the adjective of ‘radical’ have not been able to undo these societal divides. The limit of the postcolonialism approach maybe that while it is useful for diagnostic purposes it has limits in the area of prescription. Perhaps a combination of Chatterjee’s focus on political society and Fanon’s assertion of our humanity will go towards dismantling these colonial inheritances.

It is true that there are many challenges to the sovereignty of the state. Corruption and the easy resort to violence to press home the demands of communities challenge the power of the state to the point where it is questioned whether it is the single political authority in this society. As far as the former is concerned, given the association of the president of the country, his family, members of his executive and his closest allies with vast acts of dishonesty it has been tempting to ask if the state is losing its authority. The inability of the various arms of the state, including the prosecutorial authorities as well as the legislature, to make the executive accountable for its actions strengthens that argument. It leads to suggestions that South Africa is en route to becoming a patrimonial state.

The major block to that trajectory has been the power of the Constitution, the continued independence of the judiciary and the prowess of civil society. The two streams of
African and Afrikaner nationalism placed great emphasis on the legal system. Even in its most repressive days, the latter ensured that there was some form of legal sanction for its heinous acts. Similarly the African nationalism stream, as testified to by its key documents such as the Freedom Charter, placed a constitutional democracy at the centre of its consideration about the nature of the post-apartheid state.

Civil society, having lost some of its verve and vigour in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 elections, quickly regained its agency. Combined with actions making full use of the provisions contained in the Constitution as well as mass organisation and action, it has re-emerged as a formidable voice in what Chatterjee calls ‘political society’. Space denied to the subaltern – be they migrants, the homeless, or the impoverished – is being reclaimed in very creative ways. The spiritual realm, as represented by formations such as the independent churches, remains very much a bulwark against the eroding effects of the unethical behaviour of the key players in the state.

However, the spectre of violence looms large over this arena of society. Widespread as this may be, destructive as it could be, it does not constitute yet a threat to sovereignty. Though, if a left formation which is able to ‘connect these dots’ does emerge, it is quite possible that the state’s authority could be fundamentally challenged. While there may be several moves in trying to develop a unified left platform, it is unlikely to emerge as a unified force which can take on the state nor challenge the ANC at the 2019 polls. However, the prospect of greater use of state violence in response to popular opposition cannot be discounted. This was seen dramatically at Marikana, a mining area near Rustenburg, where on 16 August 2012 police opened fire on striking miners. State force continues being deployed in a number of ‘hot spots’, as was seen for in Vuwani where residents were protesting their areas incorporation into the new municipality of Malulele.

The increasing number of protests is testimony to the scale of inequality and economic mismanagement, impacting on the legitimacy of the state and the level of trust among the population more broadly. The ensuing violence is indicative of the breaking of the founding compact, as the state does not adequately undertake its core tasks of providing services and transparently managing the fiscus towards the ends encapsulated in the Constitution.
Similarly there has been a mixed experience as far as national identity is concerned. Ethnic and language identities are being reasserted for several reasons: as part of an evolving system of patronage which links ethnic entrepreneurs with a base; or as a concealment for racial attitudes. In the Introduction I argued that nationalism will be looked upon as the glue which holds sovereignty and national identity together. The power of this ideological construct was seen in the cases of the Arab world and in India where a sense of what the nation is – presented compellingly – can shape self-identity as well as how citizenship and the state are constructed. Be it Arab nationalism, Indian secular nationalism or Hindu chauvinism it provides the centre without which things can fall apart.

There seems to be an absence of a compelling articulation of a vision for South Africa which can help all citizens transcend their differences. Also, unlike the period of Mandela’s presidency, and arguably Mbeki’s, there are no clear ‘political entrepreneurs’ who can articulate this vision. This does not mean that the centre will not hold – South African citizens will go on being part of the nation-state. It’s just that in this context, when the ‘larger ethnicity’ experienced in the 1990s is not being reaffirmed, the tendency to fissure into ethnic laagers grows.
Chapter Six Conclusion

I have located this study of the South African nation-state within the approach of post-colonialism. When looking at the emergence of this approach it was important to highlight the intellectual passage which had been travelled. This included anti-colonialism and colonial discourse as well as pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. It also had to engage with a variety of schools of thought associated with the Third World, the underdevelopment debate as well as various forms of Marxism. As Young argued, postcolonialism is best viewed as a set of intellectual resources which helps name ‘the activities by which new subaltern histories, new identities, new geographies, new conceptualisations of the world’ come into existence (2010:66). The ‘critical race theory’ introduced in this thesis via Steyn is representative of the tradition of colonial discourse, seeking to understand how the assumptions of white privilege come to be constructed.

Notwithstanding the various criticisms, subaltern studies emerged in South Asia as a fitting tribune of the colonised people. It served to identify aspects of the nationalist narrative overlooked by the mainstream. And it placed on the agenda consideration of other forms of action than that engaged by the nationalist elite. Crais is amongst the few that rendered such a service to the voices of the marginalised in the South African context. He contrasted the narratives of the urban, Christian educated elite with that of the peasantry, often illiterate, who sought to mix their traditional potions with that of the omnipotence of a God who shall help rid them permanently of the colonisers. While the former sought accommodation with the colonisers, the latter sought their disappearance. Not explored sufficiently in this thesis is the contemporary manifestations of these traditions, except when Chapter Five looked at the independent churches.

The framework which emerged from an examination of the Arab and Indian experiences showed that the nation states which have emerged in the postcolonial world have been shaped as much by religious, ethnic and linguistic factors as by the nature of the nationalism which led to their liberation from colonial control. This combination of identity and politics informed the kind of nation which entered the phase of independence. However, this phase immediately creates its own anti-thesis as previously subjugated identities and territorial linkages begin asserting themselves,
even claiming their own territorial states. Validating these claims for such ethnic states or a national one has been the work of a layer of political entrepreneurs who articulate a compelling nationalist or ethnic vision. In the Arab world these differences have taken the form of tensions between pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism and Islamism, while in India the founding secular vision has been challenged by a chauvinistic Hindu nationalism.

Therefore on the basis of the examination of the two cases of the Arab world and India, I concluded that the debates around the South African nation-state needed to be examined along three axes: that of national sovereignty, national identity and nationalism – with the latter serving as a glue for the first two. In looking at where sovereignty lies, it has been useful to be guided by Hinsley (1966: 26), that ‘the idea of sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community… and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere’.

Chapter Four provided a broad historic sweep of the two key nationalist narratives under the ‘Native Question’ and the National Question. The former referred to the framework which the colonisers used to develop responses to the question of how to manage and subjugate the numerically overwhelming indigenous population. The latter referred to how the response of the colonised was to be articulated in what evolved to be a search for national unity and liberation. This survey was organised under three phases:

**Pre-1910**: In this section I looked at developments which led to the crystallisation of Afrikaner nationalism and the Boer republics as well as Britain’s domination of the rest of the country. Until 1910 the endeavours of a number of colonizing groups had led to the creation of four republics in the southernmost tip of Africa. The South Africa Act consolidated them into one political entity in 1910 called the Union of South Africa with four provinces. The ‘Native Question’ came to be formally addressed as part of the process leading up to Union through the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC). One of the results of this was the eventual replacement of the Christian missionaries as interlocutors with the indigenous population by an emerging state apparatus.

Until the end of the 19th century opposition to the designs of the colonizers took the form of wars of resistance led by the various ‘tribal’ groupings. The longest lasting of
these were the ‘frontier wars’ of the eastern Cape and those in Natal. From the 1850s onwards the efforts of Christian missionary education was paying off with the emergence of the amakholwa. These ‘school people’ imbued with a sense of biblical righteousness began leading campaigns for the extension to Africans the rights enjoyed by whites through local organisations and newspapers. Initially treated with some suspicion and in some cases disdain by their own, more traditionally rooted brethren, they came to play leading roles in representing their people through delegations and in the form of legal action. Increasing networking made possible the emergence of regional bodies and ultimately in 1910 a South Africa-wide organisation which came to be called the African National Congress. With the excursions of many of the educated elite to the UK and the US, it was inevitable that they linked up with the nascent Pan-Africanist movement as well as the African Methodist Episcopal Church. The Africanist perspective thus garnered, combined with the internationalism experienced, and permeated with Christian values, was to be the birthmarks of the ANC.

1910 - 1948: This period saw the increasing bureaucratisation of the management of the African majority as described by Evans (1997) and Ashforth (1990). The movement of the ‘natives’ to meet the needs of mining capital and then the manufacturing sector was the avowed aim of this system of administration. A number of official commissions at national or provincial levels succeeded the SANAC, laying the basis for the system of apartheid which was to be ushered in by the 1948 electoral victory of the NP. This included legislation, passed during this period such as the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, which legislated denial of the indigenous people’s access to almost 87% of the land, as well as legislation passed in 1923 and 1937 aimed at urban segregation and control of urban/rural movement. The Native Affairs Department became a state within a state aimed at controlling all aspects of ‘native’ life. Included in this panoply of legislation and policy was the creation of what came to be contemptuously referred to as the Bantustans.

The initial decades of the ANC have been dismissed as largely ineffective. It was struggling at many levels: internally working out how best the provincial formations it was based upon could be aligned, externally how it should articulate with the new political realities where the African elite found itself even further marginalised economically and politically as well as the emergence of new classes within the African
community. Under John Dube, the ANC’s first president, a moderate line in keeping with the political traditions established in late 1800s, was followed. This was also the period in which the largely white CPSA/SACP was beginning to place at the centre of its conception of change the potential of an independent Black/’Native’ Republic. Outside of the ANC and CPSA there were moves afoot to achieve greater ‘non-European’ unity, but a narrow Africanism prevailing within the ANC ended that organisation’s involvement in such an initiative.

These various changes saw a radical ANC Youth League under emerge. Armed with a programme, *African Claims*, it pushed for a drastic change in the kinds of actions the ANC engaged in. Its efforts began bearing fruit in the form of various mass actions by the time the NP took over power. This was also the period in which the CPSA/SACP came to increasingly characterise SA as a ‘colony of a special type’. Its CST theory saw that the major difference South Africa had to ensure in comparison with other colonies was that the colonisers had made the colony their permanent home, and thus become part of the population.

1948 – 1990: With the electoral victory of the Nationalist Party in 1948, apartheid became by the 1960s the official foundation of state policy, resulting in the deepening of the segregationist policies of previous governments. It also saw the NP remaining true to its ethnic agenda, helping foster Afrikaner capital in various parts of the economy and promoting the use of Afrikaans in all aspects of society. With increasing radicalisation of black (African, Indian and coloured politics) it soon realised that it had to draw the English-speaking whites into its fold. By the end of the 1960s apartheid was morphing from a project of ethnic chauvinism to white domination. For this it was increasingly supported at the polls by the English-speaking whites.

The ANC, working closely with a number of anti-apartheid organizations, led what came to be known as the Congress Alliance and engaged in increasingly militant opposition to apartheid. This trend led to the adoption of the armed struggle as part of the ANC’s strategic framework. The alliance had been consolidated in 1955 when the Freedom Charter was adopted by it as its Programme of Action. The SACP played an important role in the shaping of the prevailing anti-apartheid strategies and policies. The Pan Africanist Congress was created as a breakaway from the ANC with members protesting against the increasing non-racialism of the Congress Alliance. This was the
result of increasingly heightened debate about the form of Africanism the ANC was espousing, a debate which had sharpened with the question of ‘non-European’ unity. The PAC members were also taking exception to the influence of the CPSA.

The clampdown of the early 1960s, in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre, resulted in resistance going underground. Open, anti-apartheid political activity started re-emerging amongst intellectuals and students in the mid-1960s, especially under the banner of the Black People’s Convention and the South African Student Organisation – both espousing an ideology of Black Consciousness with Steve Biko its key theoretician. The ANC’s non-racial policies were reasserted by the late eighties, finding its organizational manifestation in the United Democratic Front, which was created in 1983.

African people were required to exercise their will in the Bantustans and urban councils. But these little fiefdoms could not by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as sovereign. With the passing of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, sovereignty was now embodied in the constitution. This is in the sense that it is the supreme law of the land and no other law or government action can supersede the provisions of the Constitution.

Chapter Four concluded with an examination of the period 1990 to 2004, which represents the period when South Africa as a recently created postcolonial, democratic nation-state was consolidated. The period could be divided into two phases: the first began in 1990 when the ANC alongside other political organizations was unbanned and Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners were released, until the formal adoption of the new South African Constitution in May 1996. This was the period of the ‘rainbow nation’ – an attempt to project an inclusiveness towards all South Africans. The second phase is marked by Mbeki’s ascendancy to the post of president until the end of his first term in June 2004. It is marked by an attempt to focus on the economic position of the majority of the South African population, the African people, who had seen limited improvements in their lives since 1994, when the first democratic elections had been held. This continuing disparity led Mbeki to typify South Africa, \textit{a la} Disraeli, as a country of two nations.

In Chapter Five, I examined developments up to 2016 under the themes of sovereignty, national identity and nationalism. I was especially interested in looking at
how the old faultlines of the ‘Native Question’ versus the National Question expressed itself in contemporary South Africa.

It is clear that in 21st century South Africa there have been developments which could be seen as challenging its sovereignty. The prevalence of corruption in the various echelons of power, especially as it has been leading to ‘state capture’, has been cited as an example of challenges to sovereignty of the state. Further challenges to sovereignty has been the process the ANC-led government has been undertaking to grant additional power to traditional authorities, because of the control traditional leaders will continue having over access to land and work, and the loss of rights women and children will suffer. This has been quite correctly seen as part of the ANC’s manoeuvres to lock in the rural vote.

The ever increasing number of social protests, and the increasing turn to violence, can be seen either as the existence of a robust civil society, the strengthening of ‘political society’ or the erosion of the authority of the state. Chatterjee’s notion of political society has been useful in appreciating a domain of politics which is occupied by the subaltern and which challenges the state to meet its demands for amelioration. While some of these activities may be initiated by disaffected members of the parliamentary parties, in many cases attempts by these parties to connect with this domain have been rebuffed. Undoubtedly this sentiment is borne out of a deep disappointment at the lack of service delivery in the context of increasingly dire economic circumstances and suspicion of the interests represented by formal politics.

From the discussion on the evolution of sovereignty in South Africa, it is clear that identity - be it ethnically, ‘tribally’ or racially derived – has a defining impact on the state. Starting from the way South Africa’s borders were geographically defined from 1910 onwards and its provinces demarcated, there has been a continuous attempt to define the South African identity. Glaser’s differentiation between large and smaller ethnicities is a useful way of looking at how different aspects of identity can either be aligned or disrupted. The prospects of alignment is contingent on a number of factors, not least of all economic well-being. This can be seen in parts of the Indian and coloured communities’ alignment with the Nationalist Party’s ideology as it existed at the time of the 1994 elections, notwithstanding the various ways in which it acted to subvert their right to the franchise. Disruption can be seen in the emergence of smaller
identities vis a vis the larger South African ethnicity which the ANC strove for over a hundred years to establish.

As has been stated at the beginning of this thesis, this study has been encouraged by Smith’s suggestion that ‘In reality, few modern national states possess only one form of nationalism’ (1999:212). The thesis has looked at how two major, differing nationalisms have impacted on national identity and state sovereignty in South Africa. A special place has been allocated to the place of political or ethnic entrepreneurs who have served as leaders of their nationalist movements. The early Afrikaner nationalists were seized with consolidating an ethnic identity but very quickly began focusing on making economic upliftment of their community a primary objective.

The unity of all South Africans and the creation of a democratic society dominated African nationalism’s approach to the national question. The roots of the democratic constitution can be traced to the first few decades of the previous century when the founding fathers of the ANC sought to create a society free of the demon of tribalism and racism. It can also be seen in the assertion that South Africa could be an independent, predominantly black, republic. These approaches represented the modernist impulse which characterised the struggles of the oppressed European nations of the 19th century and the people of Africa and Asia in the twentieth century.

The basis upon which South Africa was depicted as a special colony prevails today. This theory constructs two nations – one which, despite the ushering in of democracy, is still privileged and which used to be the colonising nation; the other, the majority, was the colonised nation and continues to suffer from material deprivations. A further ingredient in the make-up of the South African nation is the existence of a multiplicity of identities. Should these be encouraged to exist or should there be an overriding South African identity which subsumes these sub-identities? This question gains urgency as political, economic and social bases are carved out on the basis of clan, ethnic, or linguistic, groupings.

At the heart of this still emerging South African nation exists a multi-faceted African core. Unity of this African core, the assertion of its leadership in the vernacular and aesthetics of South African cultural life and the development of a compelling socio-economic vision articulated by credible political entrepreneurs will determine the future prospects of the South African nation-state.
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