questions about the extent to which local community struggles can influence the direction and form which further transformation takes from here on. In other words, it is important to investigate local community struggles and their potential for shaping particular democratic outcomes. Thus, the study of collective action and social movements is an extremely important area for understanding the complexity of social life (Wignaraja 1994).

In South Africa's present historical conjuncture, questions concerning the capacity of various communities to engage with the state on a range of issues must be placed within the context of our fledgling democracy, and the nature of that democracy. As Wignaraja (1994: 11) points out, Western conceptions view democracy (more specifically representational democracy) in a very limited way. On the other hand, debates on participatory democracy focus on social actors, such as social movements, which may use available (and changing) political spaces to bring about (further) social transformation (Wignaraja 1994). Another central issue in the debate on participatory democracy hinges around the importance of the accessibility of information and knowledge. In this regard, it is argued that informed decision-making (and hence effective participation) by social actors is facilitated by access to information. Thus, a viable area of social enquiry regarding South African society would be into the degree to which social movements are able to contribute to the establishment and institutionalisation of new democratic structures and processes which facilitate and entrench participatory non-racial and cross-class cooperation, particularly after centuries of institutionalised racial oppression, segregation and hostility.

In this context, the study of social movements (and their relationship to the state) in a transitional South African political and development milieu is particularly important, given that the Government of National Unity includes "the most important leaders of the old regime" (Adler and Webster 1995: 76). At the level of local government, many of the 'old' bureaucrats have also remained in
social reorganisation based on the principle of sustainability. It is this social reorganisation which is at the heart of 'new' struggles for social equity. As Szasz (1994:4) argues:

To call for fundamental restructuring of production is to threaten the interests of society's most powerful elites. Even modest reforms threaten someone's livelihood and are therefore resisted.

Certainly, the area of hazardous waste is fundamentally linked to power relations in industrial societies. The nature of industrial societies is such that excessive chemical production, with accompanying hazardous by-products and waste, is inevitable. These hazardous wastes have to be disposed of, and the issue of disposal raises a number of important questions relating to: where such wastes are disposed of, how such wastes are disposed of, the proximity of disposal sites to residential areas, the potential negative effects of hazardous waste on humans, and how such effects are dealt with and by whom. As Bullard (1993a/b) argues, in the USA the state and industry have tried to transfer the social and health costs of the disposal of hazardous wastes onto poor and powerless communities. However, many such communities have mobilised themselves into social movements and are opposing disposal sites close to their homes. Hence, hazardous waste issues have become a site of intense struggle between citizens, industry and the state.

The management of hazardous waste in South Africa, whether it be illegal dumping, the non-consultative siting process of a legal landfill, or insignificant penalties relating to negligence or the illegal dumping of toxic materials, raises important questions about the nature of the state, as well as the capacity of communities to gain access to information and to participate in the decision-making process. These questions are ever more salient in this transitional period, in which the state is neither authoritarian nor yet fully democratic, a period of uncertainty that is heightened by the nature and form of the Government of National Unity, as well as the as-yet unfinished process of local government restructuring. In this sense, the emergent democracy is malleable, which in turn raises
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This research project grew out of an interest in the convergence of the environmental and developmental challenges facing South Africa during this transitional phase from apartheid. In this regard, I was particularly fascinated with both the potential of social impact assessment for bridging the environmental/developmental gap, as well as with its potential for capacity-building and grassroots participation with regard to communities previously denied participation in most facets of their lives, given the nature of apartheid. However, as with many research projects, my focus changed substantially as I delved into my chosen case study. The case study, which is about community opposition to the siting of a hazardous landfill in Chloorkop, Kempton Park, raised important questions about social movement organisations and social movement activists and their role in South Africa’s transition to democracy. It was these issues that I chose to pursue in my research.

My own environmental consciousness started developing when I was younger, and was sharpened in the course of this research by contact with Earthlife Africa (ELA). What has been particularly gratifying and stimulating about the area I chose to research is that a personal environmental interest could find resonance in a growing field of sociological concern.

Sociological studies of environmentalism are becoming an increasingly important research area, given the broader debates of what is referred to as the global environmental crisis. What is of particular interest to the sociologist is the power relationships between particular interest groups and role players within any society. Struggles around environmental issues are no less a threat to the status quo than labour struggles or national liberation struggles, for example, have been. Arguments that humans are on a path to imminent self-destruction are accompanied by calls for
6.6 Chloorkop - significant 'rainbow alliance' or a case of political manipulation? 127

6.7 Rethinking democracy 129

6.8 Conclusion 130

CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSION 135

7.1 Research findings 135

7.2 Theoretical implications 138

7.3 Political challenges and further research 139

REFERENCES 142

APPENDIX A 156

MAP OF NORTH EAST RAND REGION 157
6.6 Chloorkop - significant 'rainbow alliance'
or a case of political manipulation?  127

6.7 Rethinking democracy  129

6.8 Conclusion  130

CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSION  135

7.1 Research findings  135

7.2 Theoretical implications  138

7.3 Political challenges and further research  139

REFERENCES  142

APPENDIX A  156

MAP OF NORTH EAST RAND REGION  157
CHAPTER 5 : UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
STATE, INDUSTRY AND COMMUNITY IN THE
NORTH EAST RAND REGION

5.1 State, community and industry pre-1990

5.2 Period of fluidity: 1990 - early 1994

5.3 National and regional influences on local
restructuring in the North East Rand from 1994

5.4 Conclusion

CHAPTER 6 : THE EMERGENCE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
OPPOSING THE CHLOORKOP HAZARDOUS WASTE
LANDFILL

6.1 The contradiction of Coalition leadership to the
process of collective action

6.2 Explaining the organisational context networks
underpinning the Chloorkop Coalition

6.2.1 The union movement

6.2.2 Civics

6.2.3 Youth organisations

6.2.4 Ratepayers' associations

6.2.5 Earthlife Africa

6.3 Explaining the recent emergence of environmentalism
as a mobilising issue in South Africa

6.4 Cycles of mobilisation and changing
collective action frames

6.5 The impact of Chloorkop on individuals
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Toxic waste struggles in the USA</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>A review of the international literature on social movements</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>The state, civil society and development in South Africa: past, present and future</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1</td>
<td>The South African state and its transformation</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2</td>
<td>Social movements and collective action in South Africa</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3</td>
<td>South Africa's development milieu</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3.1</td>
<td>Urban development in South Africa</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3.2</td>
<td>Racial inequality under apartheid, and environmental racism and classism</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3.3</td>
<td>Linking environment and development</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHLOORKOP CONTROVERSY: A NARRATIVE</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>A chronology of Chloorkop</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Important issues for analysis emerging from the Chloorkop case study</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIR</td>
<td>Council for Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELA</td>
<td>Earthlife Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAWU</td>
<td>Food and Allied Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSATU</td>
<td>Federation of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEM</td>
<td>Group for Environmental Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAWU</td>
<td>Metal and Allied Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDM</td>
<td>Mass Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMSA</td>
<td>National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANCO</td>
<td>South African National Civic Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAYCO</td>
<td>South African Youth Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This report explores collective action around opposition to a proposed hazardous waste landfill. Of concern is the role that social movement organisations and social movement activists, organising around environmental issues, can play in entrenching a participatory, non-racial democracy in South Africa's present transitional political phase. The analysis makes use of theories of social movements which argue that collective action is rooted in previous cycles of mobilisation, and that the role of social movement entrepreneurs or activists is crucial in collective action mobilisation. Data was collected through the use of participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Various documentary sources were also used.

This report argues that mobilisation around environmental issues can best be understood by locating such mobilisation in the heritage of previous cycles of mobilisation, most notably in the period of the 1980s. Furthermore, this report highlights the fact that the structure and form of the transitional state at national, regional and local levels presents certain constraints with regard to the extension and entrenchment of participatory democracy. Finally, it will be argued that while the Chloorkop Coalition demonstrates the potential that environmental issues have for uniting communities across traditional racial and ideological barriers, it is not clear whether a lasting cross-racial cooperation can be achieved.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor, Glenn Adler, for his guidance and patience in what proved to be a difficult year.

To my family and friends a special note of appreciation for their support and continued humour.

Finally, my appreciation to Janis Grobbelaar for her constant encouragement, Karen Appelbaum for proof-reading and encouragement, and Annekie Jansen for last-minute technical assistance.
DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination to any other university.

MICHELLE BUCHLER

_ day DECEMBER, 1995
COMMUNITY-BASED ENVIRONMENTALISM IN TRANSITIONAL SOUTH AFRICA: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY

Michelle Buchler

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment for the degree of Master of Arts.

Johannesburg 1995
argues that even though class and race are inextricably linked in American society, class plays a secondary role to race because, he suggests, even middle class people of colour are exposed to various types of environmental threat to a far greater degree, comparatively speaking, than working class whites. Furthermore, Bullard (1994) argues that the existing protective environmental legislation is unequally enforced and this further entrenches disparities between different income and race groups.

Certainly, it can no longer be said that the antitoxics movement in the USA is exclusively a middle-class, white one. What is also significant for Szasz (1994) is the fact that the issue of toxic waste has cut across race and class boundaries, and has thus united a diversity of people across the ideological spectrum. The general movement is characterised by local initiatives, which had formed in the late 1970s to early 1980s, and which have gone on to provide technical assistance, organising skills and information dissemination to low-income and black communities (Szasz 1994: 75).

Furthermore, and very significantly, is the fact that state- and national-level coalitions have been formed to take on other stakeholders which may operate at those levels. Included are information networks like the Remote Access Chemical Hazards Electronic Library (RACHEL) and the Environmental Research Foundation (Szasz 1994: 75).

One of the many examples of an urban environmental social movement which "unites civil rights movements, environmental associations, labour unions, women's groups and community associations" is WATCHDOG in Los Angeles, a coalition which "intentionally gathers multiracial and diverse components" (Pye-Smith et al 1994: 100). The coalition essentially organises around the issue of air pollution, given the high concentration of industries spewing out toxic fumes in the area, and it has been extremely successful.

Environmental movements are much written about in the social
argues that even though class and race are inextricably linked in American society, class plays a secondary role to race because, he suggests, even middle class people of colour are exposed to various types of environmental threat to a far greater degree, comparatively speaking, than working class whites. Furthermore, Bullard (1994) argues that the existing protective environmental legislation is unequally enforced and this further entrenches disparities between different income and race groups.

Certainly, it can no longer be said that the antitoxic movement in the USA is exclusively a middle-class, white one. What is also significant for Szasz (1994) is the fact that the issue of toxic waste has cut across race and class boundaries, and has thus united a diversity of people across the ideological spectrum. The general movement is characterised by local initiatives, which had formed in the late 1970s to early 1980s, and which have gone on to provide technical assistance, organising skills and information dissemination to low-income and black communities (Szasz 1994: 75).

Furthermore, and very significantly, is the fact that state- and national-level coalitions have been formed to take on other stakeholders which may operate at those levels. Included are information networks like the Remote Access Chemical Hazards Electronic Library (RACHEL) and the Environmental Research Foundation (Szasz 1994: 75).

One of the many examples of an urban environmental social movement which "unites civil rights movements, environmental associations, labour unions, women's groups and community associations" is WATCHDOG in Los Angeles, a coalition which "intentionally gathers multiracial and diverse components" (Pye-Smith et al 1994: 100). The coalition essentially organises around the issue of air pollution, given the high concentration of industries spewing out toxic fumes in the area, and it has been extremely successful.

Environmental movements are much written about in the social
that it is an exaggerated fear of chemicals which is blocking the siting of disposal facilities. Views like this form part of what could be termed a state and/or industry backlash against community opposition, and became a "discourse of disempowerment" (Szasz 1994: 103), so that "disruptive intrusions from below" could be neutralised (Szasz 1994: 116). The 'logical' conclusion of those who argue that it is chemophobia on the part of the public which is blocking siting facilities, is that communities are eventually doing themselves a disservice by opposing sites, because more dangerous practices such as illegal dumping may occur if no legal sites are available (Szasz 1994: 77-80).

The emergence of an environmental justice movement started by people of colour in the USA can be directly linked to the original struggles (initially waged largely by white communities) against hazardous waste. Szasz (1994: 75) argues that as the siting of disposal facilities became more difficult in the 1980s, due to community opposition,

... some policy analysts began to advocate a strategy of siting in communities that are least capable of politically resisting or most amenable to accepting some form of financial compensation in exchange for accepting the facility. ... Antitoxics environmentalism, then, is an environmentalism to which working people and people of color can relate.

As a result of the state's and industry's solution to community opposition, and their strategy of trying to 'force' particular facilities onto (usually) native Indian, Hispanic and Afro-American communities, the term "environmental racism" has been coined by the North American environmental justice movement to argue that people of colour in the USA, through deliberate policies, bear the brunt of environmental degradation, pollution and threat of exposure to toxic and hazardous wastes. Bullard (1993a) sees environmental racism in the USA as being a symptom of a racially divided society, which is dominated by whites. In his analysis, Bullard (1993a/b) further
The movement's activities were initially of the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) variety. As the movement evolved, it moved beyond focusing on hazardous waste to include issues such as municipal waste, military toxics, pesticides, and so on, and is now called a "toxics" movement (Szasz 1994: 5 and 76-77; also Taylor 1993: 56-57). Consequently, the initial NIMBY syndrome disappeared, as a more deep-rooted and radical ideology and grass-roots organisational strategy began to develop into what Szasz (1994: 6) has termed "radical environmental populism". Szasz (1994: 6) has coined the term radical environmental populism because:

The movement brought a whole new mass base of working people and people of color to environmentalism. It forged practical and conceptual links between environmentalism and the struggles against racism and sexism. Most recently, it has articulated the position that environmentalism is not just one more issue that exists alongside, but unconnected to, the other great social causes of the day.

Further, the evolution from NIMBYism to radical environmental populism has come about, Szasz (1994: 81-83) argues, because people came to realise that their individual local struggles were connected at a broader level because industry continued polluting in its quest for profits, while government was inadequately protecting those who had to bear the costs of that pollution. Consequently, isolated groups began assisting each other and eventually more permanent bonds developed between local groups. In this way, a complex social movement infrastructure which focused on toxic waste was forged in the USA within a decade (Szasz 1994: 69).

Szasz's (1994) research shows that one central issue arising from community collective action is that the siting of disposal facilities in the USA has become increasingly difficult, if not near to impossible. Certainly, companies (and their consultants) argue
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Because this research focused on social movement activists and collective action against a proposed hazardous waste landfill in South Africa's transitional political phase, this chapter will provide a theoretical framework for understanding social movements and cycles of collective action. A brief outline of the evolution of the toxic waste movement in the USA will also be provided. Because the emergence of such a movement raises important questions for struggles around toxic waste management in South Africa. Finally, because one of the assumptions underlying this research is that social change is rooted in previous forms of social organisation and struggles between the state and civil society, an historical overview of the apartheid state and opposition to the state will be provided. Such an historical overview provides a framework within which potential contradictions, constraints and opportunities for community involvement in the democratisation, and reconstruction and development of South Africa in a post-apartheid period can be located.

2.1 Toxic waste struggles in the USA

According to Szasz (1994: 5), the awareness of the North American public regarding hazardous waste was precipitated by events at Love Canal, events which were given extensive media coverage between 1978 and 1980. Given the conservatism of politics in the USA during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Szasz (1994: 5) argues that the emergence of collective action around hazardous waste is "remarkable":

While other movements struggled just to stay alive, concern about toxic industrial waste sparked a widespread, dynamic social movement. Thousands of local, community-based groups formed. In less than a decade, a
10. Thor Chemicals, a British-based company, has managed to avoid a ban on the importation of toxic wastes, "by claiming that it is importing raw materials for processing" (Coetzee 1991: 13).

11. This is an issue which was mentioned, in relation to environmental protection in general, in an interview with Tabogo Phadu, one of the activists involved in resistance to the hazardous waste dump at Chloorkop:

   You can't even smell an environmental flavour in all its [apartheid's] policies. It left a fragmented bureaucracy of homelands, departments, laws, and whose implementation has been, in terms of legislation for instance, very ineffectual. It has led to the continuation of degradation, especially in the homeland areas.

12. Environmental Options (1993), a South African progressive environmental consultancy, has set out the present fragmented environmental regulatory structure as follows: firstly, central state departments involved in environmental management (apart from the Department of Environment Affairs) are the Department of Rural and Land Affairs, Department of Agriculture, Department of Water affairs and Forestry, Department of National Health, Department of National Education and National Monuments Council and the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (Environmental Options 1993: 2-3). Secondly, regional governments have portfolios for environment affairs. Finally, at the local level, municipal and city councils, Regional Services Councils and special boards such as the Rand Water Board and Natal Sharks Board have a variety of environmental duties mainly including town-planning, air pollution, noise control, waste and water management, the seashore, outdoor recreation and the management of local nature reserves (Fuggle and Rabe 1992: 76, cited in Environmental Options 1993: 3). Within such a framework, it is clearly impossible to have a coherent environmental policy.

13. For example, ELA discovered an illegal toxic dump at a village outside Pietermaritzburg, but "[t]he person responsible for the dumping was not prosecuted, as the public prosecutor felt that the R400-00 maximum fine for dumping did not justify the expense and effort of the case" (Coetzee 1991: 11).

14. Another recent unpublished example which has been brought to the attention of ELA - Johannesburg concerns a drum recycling company in Kwa Thema, Springs, where the contents of industrial drums are being emptied out onto an un tarred road which borders a shack settlement (this information was presented by P. Lukey to the branch at a meeting held in Johannesburg on 02/02/95).

15. For example, it was discovered that medical waste from Natalspruit Hospital was being dumped on the Kathlehong municipal waste dump, which could lead to the spread of certain diseases (Coetzee 1991: 11).
1. Earthlife Africa is a "progressive environmental group" with a "social philosophy... similar to that of the green movement" and a "commitment to non-violent direct action" (Cock 1991: 11-12).

2. It must be remembered that the period between the 1994 (national/regional) and 1995/1996 (local) elections, and the 1999 elections is considered an interim phase. By 1999, a new constitution will have been written, and the elections which take place in 1999 will herald the end of the Government of National Unity.

3. As Hamilton (1993: 66) points out, Western industrial democracies are associated with individualism, private property and the free market, where "the "good" of the few is promoted over the "good" of the majority". Hamilton's view corresponds to what Cohen and Arato (1992: 4-8) term the elite model of democracy.

4. For example, Cock (1991: 2) makes the point that middle class consumers, because of better access to education and hence information, are able to mobilise themselves in order to oppose products and practices which may be detrimental to their health.

5. This is particularly important when considering the role of South African social movements (like the trade union movement or civic associations) in contributing to the transformation process thus far (Adler and Webster 1995: 77, 81-82).

6. As Munslow, Fitzgerald and McLennan (1995: 12) point out, during multi-party negotiations, the ANC conceded to the NP's demand that much of the existing civil service be maintained.

7. Papadakis (1993) has broadly defined environmentalism as a "concern for the environment". Environmentalism encompasses a range of environmental ideologies which recognise that environmental issues are also significant political issues (also see Eckersly 1992).

8. These new theoretical developments will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 of this report.

9. As the Third World Network (1989) has shown, many Third World countries have imported toxic waste from industrialised countries, thereby earning much needed foreign exchange which can be used for development purposes. However, the organisation points out that the environmental, social and health costs are enormous, since the Third World does not have adequate facilities to deal with the toxic material, and thus the initial payment benefits are negated. In this sense, the issue of toxic waste management, as an environmental concern, cannot really be separated from broader development debates.
Chapter 6 attempts, in more detail, to set out an explanation of who
the community actors in the Chloorkop campaign were. In this regard,
their backgrounds, organisational links and environmental awareness
are drawn out. These issues form a backdrop to the collective action
and campaign which took place in opposition to the proposed
hazardous waste landfill. Furthermore, this collective action will
be linked to community activists' conceptions of democracy, and the
relationship between communities and the state.

Finally, Chapter 7 will draw together the 'threads' of cycles of
mobilisation and the relationship between communities, industry and
the state in entrenching and extending democratic participation.
Finally, theoretical implications and political challenges, as well
as further research possibilities arising from this research, will
be dealt with.
the capacity and ability of communities to mobilise and engage with the state at the local level, around environmental issues, during this transitional phase.

Issues falling under this broader research aim included the way in which communities relate to the state, the impact that communities can have on the expansion of democracy during this transitional phase; the potential for collective action which transcends racial boundaries, and an examination of why some communities are able to, and do, mobilise in the face of threat (in this case environmental). In this regard, the focus of the research has been restricted to an analysis of the agents of collective action mobilisation, namely social movement organisations and social movement activists.

The balance of this research report deals with the aims and theoretical issues as highlighted in this introduction. Chapter 2 briefly traces social movement theory, as well as the emergence and evolution of a toxic waste movement in the USA. South Africa's changing political, social and development milieu is also dealt with.

Chapter 3 looks at the methodological framework, particularly the use of participant observation and in-depth semi-structured interviews. Problems experienced during the collection of data will also be briefly discussed.

Chapter 4 provides a chronology of the progress of events, issues and points of contention as the Chloorkop 'saga' unfolded and developed.

Chapter 5 provides an historical overview of the pre-1990 political terrain of the Kempton Park area, as well as dealing with the process of transition. Throughout, the relationship between the state, industry and communities is highlighted. In this regard, contradictions between the state and other role players, as well as contradictions within the state, are dealt with.
scattered, dispersed and generally uncoordinated". As the IDRC Mission (1994) and Environmental Options (1993) argue, this means that one of the biggest problems of waste management in South Africa relates to the fact that responsibility for administration, control and supervision has been fragmented between numerous government departments, with little central coordination. Such a fragmented system provides loopholes whereby the illegal dumping or inadequate processing of wastes is made easier. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the various departments lack inspectors and the means to follow up and enforce violations of regulations. However, the fragmentation and lack of enforcement of regulations also partially reflect the apartheid state's disregard of the effects of toxic waste mismanagement on communities. This apparent disregard for people and communities is also reflected in the lax penalties for offenders - the dumping of poisonous and polluting substances, for example, carries a penalty of R400-00 (Coetzee 1991: 11), raising questions about the state's commitment to environmental issues. As yet, none of these laws have been changed.

On the other hand, and with regard to waste producers and disposers, it has been difficult to estimate and therefore control the waste stream handled, because of secrecy and inadequate record-keeping (CSIR 1991: 323). Because of these problems, it has been relatively easy, for example, for companies which handle toxic materials to emerge and disappear, leaving behind a legacy of contamination. Such companies would include those which recycle drums used in industry. From informal discussions with toxics campaigners from ELA, it would appear that industrial companies are not adequately disposing of toxic wastes/by-products, but are supplying drums for recycling which still contain toxic material. In turn, the recycling companies themselves do not always dispose of these materials in a socially and environmentally responsible way. Numerous other examples of irresponsible practices relating to the handling and disposal of toxic and/or hazardous wastes exist.

Finally, this research was conducted with the aim of investigating
regard for affected communities. However, questions pertaining to
the extent of change in the present transitional period are
highlighted by three contentious examples, all of which were centred
on toxic waste. The first example relates to the present Minister of
Environment and Tourism who, in 1994, tried to make a case for the
importation of toxic waste, albeit under controlled circumstances.
Part of the justification for doing so hinged around the argument
that the revenue generated by the importation of toxic waste could
contribute to social development and to the Reconstruction and
example also involves the Department of Environment and Tourism, and
relates to a Finnish shipment of toxic waste which was to be
recycled in South Africa. The relevant permit was signed under
highly suspicious circumstances, and high-level departmental
officials, including the Minister, claimed to know nothing about the
matter (The Star 18/08/1995). The third example relates to the case
against Thor Chemicals, involving negligence and other occupational
safety infringements, in which a Pietermaritzburg Regional Court
magistrate, on 17 February 1995, fined the company a mere R13 500-00
for the death of two African employees and injuries to other
employees (The Weekend Star 18-19 February 1995: 10). Examples
such as these raise questions about the relationship between the
state and citizens in this transitional period, as well as raising
questions regarding social inequity and injustice – as Bullard
(1993a/b) argues, it is usually poor and powerless people who bear
the social and health costs of environmental hazards, radiation
and pollution.

Both the state and the waste management industry are extremely
important actors in the arena of toxic waste management. The central
state has had (and will continue to have) the obvious function of
drafting legislation pertaining to toxic waste management and all
its aspects. Various state departments and local authorities should
be concerned with ensuring that the relevant regulations are adhered
to. However, the CSIR (1991: 116) points to the fact that regulatory
statutes pertaining to waste management in South Africa “are
their pre-apartheid positions, and will continue to do so during the interim phase. One drawback to having these bureaucrats remain in their positions is that the capacity for attempting to maintain the status quo by blocking innovative developmental policies exists. This may, in turn, open up new sites of community struggle.

Of particular concern for this research is the emergence of environmentalism as an issue for community mobilisation in South Africa. Western theorising on collective action and social movements has linked environmentalism with the rise of "new" social movements and post-industrial values (Jennett and Stewart 1989; Papadakis 1993). Of issue for South Africa is whether the distinction between "old" and "new" social movements is a useful one. Tarrow (1991) argues that such a distinction is misleading because it obscures the continuities between collective action and social movements over time. He puts forward the idea that the so-called new social movements are in fact extensions of the old since social movement activity occurs in cycles. Previous generations of collective action leave a residue or heritage in which a new cycle of collective action can take place.

The findings from this research will demonstrate that in the South African context, a heritage of collective action around labour issues and national liberation (so-called old social movement activities), for example, has created the space for mobilisation around environmental issues (a focus of many so-called new social movements, particularly in the West), especially in this period which directly follows the successful resistance against and removal of apartheid. Further, the Chloorkop case study will demonstrate that this mobilisation around an environmental issue has drawn on the cultural heritage of the anti-apartheid struggle.

It is within this broader socio-political context that toxic waste management in South Africa should be placed. As a microcosm of broader processes of social control and management, toxic waste management has in the past been shrouded in secrecy, with little
have tended to focus almost exclusively on the central state. The result has been that many of the contradictions which occur at the regional and/or local levels, and the resultant conflict, have been obscured. Also, such a neglect of the local level has obscured the potential influence which local political struggle may have on central state policies. Finally, an analysis of the central versus local state dichotomy in the apartheid era indicates the dangers of a weak local government structure where a strong central state lacks accountability to its constituencies.

As mentioned earlier, the 1970s mark the beginning of a period of crisis in South Africa, which was consequently followed by the beginnings of reform, or what came to be known as "total strategy", the intent of which was to restore domestic peace, end international isolation, and return the economy to a path of sustained growth" (Price 1990: 152). Further, as Morris and Padayachee (1988: 11) argue, the reform process included a limited democratization of political life. For example, state restructuring at the central level ushered in the tricameral constitution of 1983, whereby coloureds and Indians were granted parliamentary representation (albeit in a limited form). As Marks and Trapido (1988: 37) argue, the tricameral parliament was an attempt, by the state, "to buy off coloured and Indian opposition" to the state (also see Price 1990: 138). The reform process also included a selective and limited redistribution of resources towards sections of the black majority.

There are a number of elements to be understood in relation to the introduction of limited democratisation and redistribution in the 1980s. Firstly, space was created for the open emergence of black political movements. Secondly, some state institutional restructuring at central, regional and local levels took place. Thirdly, the role of the military was greatly increased. Fourthly, all reforms were aimed not at abolishing apartheid but at retaining it by making it more 'workable' (Urban Foundation 1993: 16).
1993: 13), and hence local government structures were also not accountable to the regions they served, but to the central government. For example, as Heymans and White (1991: 5) and the Urban Foundation (1993: 13) point out, the black township governance system at the local level proved unsatisfactory to the central government because it allowed for discretionary powers on the part of (particularly liberal) white town/city councils. What this meant in practice was that certain white town/city councils were not, for example, enforcing influx control as the central government wished (Heymans and White 1991: 5), and this necessitated a restructuring of the state mechanisms controlling influx control.22

As a result of the above-mentioned problems experienced with the UBCs, Administration Boards were established in 1971 (renamed Development Boards in 1984) to both oversee black townships and to enforce influx control, and were under the control of central government (Urban Foundation 1993: 15). The UBCs continued to function, but as mere consultative bodies to the Administration Boards (Heymans and White 1991: 5). In 1977, the Community Councils Act was passed "to establish the new councils as financially self-supporting entities" (Price 1990: 169). In 1982, the Black Local Authorities Act granted local authorities (which were partially elected) full municipal status, but as Heymans and White (1991: 6) point out, such Black Local Authorities (BLAs) still experienced considerable control by the Administration/Development Boards, and were financially constrained (also see Urban Foundation 1993: 15).23 This financial constraint emanated from the fact that the BLAs were supposed to be financially independent, and the process of reform, with one of its tenets being redistribution, placed an increasing pressure on the BLAs to increase township revenue from service charges or rents (Price 1990: 169).24

The above outline, which points to contradictions between central and local government, highlights a point made by McCarthy (1992: 25): the relationship between the central and local government is extremely important because many analyses of the South African state
policies and the path which apartheid took were marked by inherent contradictions and anomalies (Bonner et al 1993; Posel 1987 and 1991). Thus, Bonner et al (1993: 7) argue that the various phases of apartheid, including the process of reform which began in the 1970s, should be seen in the context of the apartheid state attempting "to manage the contradictions of industrialisation and urbanisation ... comprehensively; and rigorously"\(^{20}\), in order to maintain the twin (and contradictory) imperatives of white economic prosperity and political supremacy (Posel 1991). Secondly, these contradictions and anomalies in no way diminish or detract from the brutality of the social policies of apartheid or the effects of the large-scale social engineering which took place, since an unprecedented expansion of the state apparatus took place from the 1960s in order to effect apartheid's social engineering (Bonner at al 1993: 3). Making apartheid 'work' shows its brutal and authoritarian side through such policies as relocation and forced removals, implementation of pass laws, enforced residential segregation, and job reservation.

In order to implement apartheid, an expansion of state apparatuses occurred not only at the national level, but also at the regional and local levels. Firstly, homeland governments were established to oversee those areas. Secondly, in urban areas various structures (discussed below) were created (and recreated) to oversee the spatially segregated apartheid cities (Dewar 1985: 39). Coloured and Indian areas were run by management committees "that were adjuncts of the white local authorities with limited executive and fiscal powers" (Swilling and Boya 1995: 179). When South Africa became a Republic in 1961, new legislation was enacted bringing into effect Urban Bantu Councils (UBCs)\(^{21}\), which were supposed to advise white local authorities on the day-to-day administration of the township areas (Haymana and White 1991: 4; Thompson and Prior 1982: 97). However, contradictions between local government structures and the national state were evident, particularly in the enforcement of apartheid. The result was that central government was continuously eroding the powers of local government structures (Urban Foundation
sought to implement. The particular compromises, and inevitable contradictions and ambiguities, which emerged as a result of South Africa’s negotiated settlement, and the potential constraints and opportunities which are posed for future collective action and the extension of participatory democracy, are also dealt with.

2.3.1 The South African state and its transformation

In order to understand the nature of the state and political processes in South Africa, it is important to understand both the national and the local, and their relationship to, and interaction with, each other. This is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was at the national level that apartheid ideology was translated into a legal, political and social structure. Secondly, the ideological vision of apartheid contained inherent contradictions, and thus the seeds of its own demise. Thirdly, an understanding of local level state structures shows that the local level, and not only the national level, was an important site of struggle for social movements. Fourthly, an examination of the local level also indicates that tensions and contradictions existed between the national and local levels, with local level politics influencing national policy. An examination of apartheid state structures indicates that day-to-day struggles were waged at the local levels in areas that affect ordinary peoples’ lives fundamentally. From the local level, collective action broadens to a national focus. This has implications for the study of contemporary social movements, in that it is more likely to be at the local level that ordinary citizens might be able to institutionalise new and inclusive patterns of democracy and democratic participation. This is particularly significant when one considers that South Africa has taken a form of representational democracy, which does not necessarily presuppose ‘true’ participatory democracy, the latter only coming about through continued activities at the grassroots.

At the national level, it is important to recognise that apartheid
resonate with a population's cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to powerholders and others. However, the collective action frames of social movements often differ from the frames used in the media, since the media, particularly television, are interested in capturing those aspects that will catch the attention of their audience(s). However, the media's relationship to framing is complex, since the media both reflect frames and create them (Gamson 1988: 224-225). Social movements thus often have to try and influence opposing frames (Tarrow 1994: 22-23).

In conclusion, Tarrow's (1991 and 1994) theoretical framework, as outlined above, points to the fact that the study of particular social movements needs to be located within the specific "conjunctural circumstances" and historical period which shaped them (Tarrow 1991: 14). Furthermore, Tarrow's approach to analysing and understanding social movements is valuable in that it focuses on both macro- and micro-social processes, as well as examining both structural (political opportunities) and agential (action frames, mobilisation networks) factors. As McAdam (1988: 127) argues:

 Movements may occur in a broad macro-context, but their actual development clearly depends on a series of more specific dynamics operating at the micro level. Just as clearly, these micro dynamics must be seen against the backdrop of the larger political-economic context in which they occur if we are to fully understand the timing and specific form they take.

2.3 The state, civil society and development in South Africa: past, present and future

This section maps out South Africa's particular socio-political terrain with regard to the relationship between the apartheid state and those organs of civil society which resisted the programme of social and political engineering and oppression which the state
resonate with a population's cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to powerholders and others.¹⁶

However, the collective action frames of social movements often differ from the frames used in the media, since the media, particularly television, are interested in capturing those aspects that will catch the attention of their audience(s). However, the media's relationship to framing is complex, since the media both reflect frames and create them (Gamson 1988: 224-225). Social movements thus often have to try and influence opposing frames (Tarrow 1994: 22-23)¹⁹.

In conclusion, Tarrow's (1991 and 1994) theoretical framework, as outlined above, points to the fact that the study of particular social movements needs to be located within the specific "conjunctural circumstances" and historical period which shaped them (Tarrow 1991: 14). Furthermore, Tarrow's approach to analysing and understanding social movements is valuable in that it focuses on both macro- and micro-social processes, as well as examining both structural (political opportunities) and agential (action frames, mobilisation networks) factors. As McAdam (1988: 127) argues:

"Movements may occur in a broad macro-context, but their actual development clearly depends on a series of more specific dynamics operating at the micro level. Just as clearly, these micro dynamics must be seen against the backdrop of the larger political-economic context in which they occur if we are to fully understand the timing and specific form they take."

2.3 The state, civil society and development in South Africa: past, present and future

This section maps out South Africa's particular socio-political terrain with regard to the relationship between the apartheid state and those organs of civil society which resisted the programme of social and political engineering and oppression which the state
conventions and repertoires of collective action, or what Tarrow (1994: 19, drawing on Tilly 1986) refers to as the "repertoire of contention". The argument here is that all societies have a range of forms of collective action which are known to both challengers and opponents alike. However, one danger is that an element of "boredom" regarding the outcome of collective action becomes inevitable, particularly in "a demonstration-sated society" (Tarrow 1994: 20), possibly resulting in collective action having little effect or influence on outcomes.

The above aspect raises the question of how "collective action [is] diffused, coordinated and sustained" (Tarrow 1994: 21). Central to answering this question is to understand the collective nature of social movements - individuals make the decision to take collective action within collectivities, and not as individuals. In this regard, then, participation is not random, because participants are drawn from a "pre-socialised group which finds collective action congenial" (Tarrow 1991: 13), the importance being that "movement networks" and "subcultures" are carried over from one cycle of mobilisation to another. Furthermore,

"[t]he mobilisation of preexisting social networks lowers the social transaction costs of mounting demonstrations, and holds participants together even after the enthusiasm of the peak of confrontation is over. In human terms, this is what makes possible the transformation of episodic collective action into social movements (Tarrow 1994: 22)."

Finally, Tarrow (1994: 22-23) argues that an ideology of shared meanings or cultural understandings (collective action frames) shapes both the emergence of social movements, as well as the interaction between participants within social movements. As Tarrow (1994: 122, drawing on Snow and Benford 1992) points out:

"Social movements are deeply involved in the work of "naming" grievances, connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning that will
and stimulate the rise of a new wave of collective action with their themes and their knowledge of how to organise collective action.\

As Tarrow (1994: 5) further points out, movement "entrepreneurs" or leaders potentially play an important part in mobilising the consensus which leads to collective action. In this regard, they have to successfully "tap more deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity". In this sense, the study of movement leaders or activists becomes crucial, as it is such activists who assist in mobilising broader support for collective action around a particular issue or goal.

Secondly, cycles of mobilisation take advantage of, and are shaped by

... external resources - opportunities, conventions, understandings and social networks - to coordinate and sustain collective action. ...
The most important opportunities are changes in the structure of political opportunity. The most important conventions relate to the forms of collective action that movements employ. Their major external resources are the social networks in which collective action occurs and the cultural and ideological symbols that frame it (Tarrow 1994: 17).

On the issue of changes in the political opportunity structure, Tarrow (1994: 18) argues that where changes in the more formal political structure occur, space is created for movement activity. Movement activity, in this context, in turn creates the potential for further political opportunities to be forced open. On this issue of changes in the political structure, Tarrow (1994: 18) identifies the most salient points as being "the opening up of access to power, from shifts in-alignments, from the availability of influential allies and from cleavages within and among elites".

Another resource available to social movements is that of
fact "not a retreat from the political sphere, but an extension of politics to cover a wider range of concerns and social relations".

In analysing what is 'new' about new social movements, Cohen (1985: 665) argues that while such movements are striking in their heterogeneity, they also reflect characteristics of old social movements. Similarly, Tarrow (1991 and 1994) argues for a theory of social movements which highlights the continuities between so-called old and new movements, by emphasising that collective action is cyclical and cumulative. Furthermore,

... the claim of "the new" fades when we contemplate the larger historical picture. For new movements not only repeat many of the themes of their predecessors, like identity, autonomy and injustice, but build on the practices and institutions of the past (Tarrow 1994: 191).

Thus, what has come to be regarded as the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s in Europe and the USA are not best understood as a unique social force, but should rather be understood as "being a product of the cycle of mobilisation of the previous decade" (Tarrow 1991: 4). In this way, the cycle of mobilisation of the 1960s left a heritage within which new mobilisation strategies and ideological themes could be harnessed in the next cycle of mobilisation".

Tarrow (1994: 16-23) argues that it is important to understand the context within which collective action can, and often does, take place. Firstly, Tarrow (1991: 18) distinguishes between social movements and social movement organisations (SMOs) where the latter is "a sustained, conflictual interaction between social challengers and opponents" (my emphasis). Social movements, on the other hand, are "self-conscious group[s] which act in concert ... by confronting elites, authorities or other groups" (Tarrow 1991: 18). On the relationship between social movements and social movement organisations, Tarrow (1991: 19) argues that

... movement organisations both precede and follow from waves of mass mobilisation. Pre-existing SMOs presage
horizontal, directly democratic associations that are loosely federated on national levels ... raising issues concerned with the democratization of structures of everyday life (Cohen 1985: 667).

In this regard, Cohen and Arato (1992: ix) define civil society as ... a sphere of social interaction between the economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication.

It is important to note that, in the above definition, Cohen and Arato (1992: ix) distinguish civil society from political society (comprising, for example, political parties and parliaments) as well as economic society. For Cohen and Arato (1992: ix), the distinction between these spheres is important because, although the political and economic spheres are seen as emerging from civil society, the actors in these two spheres are directly involved in the control and management of political and economic life.

Tarrow (1991: 3) does, however, argue that while there is a distinction between the activities of social movements and institutionalized politics,

... it is easy to overdraw this contrast, obscuring the parallels [between social movements] with politics and the partial integration between collective action and the political system.¹⁰

The views of Cohen and Arato (1992) and Tarrow (1994) on the relationship between civil society and the state differ markedly from new social movement theorists like Touraine (1977 and 1981), since the latter argues that civil society (and hence new social movements) is merely seeking to defend itself against the encroachment of a technocratic state and is not concerned with state power as such. However, as Scott (1990a: 23-24) argues, many of the demands of new social movements are inherently political and are in
conflict in the West, which are no longer necessarily class-based (Papadakis 1993b: 35). These approaches also reflect the fact that most Western societies have attained relative affluence and a higher standard of living and most of their members are therefore not concerned with struggling to have basic needs met, either by themselves or by the state.

Such approaches to understanding social movements have been criticised on a number of levels. Firstly, the applicability of materialist/post-materialist and industrial/post-industrial dichotomies to Third World societies is questionable. Secondly, while Inglehart (1977 and 1990) and Touraine (1977 and 1981) have argued, for example, that the new social movements do not represent traditional class cleavages, it has been shown that the social composition of the new social movements is still class-based because it is drawn predominantly from the new middle class (Papadakis 1989: 85; Kriesi 1980; 42). Thirdly, as Jennett and Stewart (1989: 20) and Schuurman (1989) point out, the relationship between state and society in the Third World is very different to that in the West, which means that the issues focused on and strategies used by social movements in the Third World will be very different. Fourthly, much of the literature on new social movements does not address the linkages between such movements and civil society, nor are definitions of civil society made explicit (Cohen 1985; Cohen and Arato 1992). Fifthly, the implied discontinuities between old and new social movements have been questioned by writers such as Cohen and Arato (1990), Scott (1990a) and Tarrow (1988, 1991 and 1994). Finally, K. M. Weiss and Tarrow (1988) and Tarrow (1991) argue that by focusing on the dichotomies of material/post-material, or industrial/post-industrial, the reasons why people become involved in social movements in the first place is ignored.

Cohen (1985) and Cohen and Arato (1992) argue that social movements need to be theoretically placed vis-a-vis political and economic systems. This is important because new social movements

... focus on grass-roots politics and create
movement literature, especially as environmental movements represent the archetypal new social movement. I now turn to the literature on social movements to further discuss collective action.

2.2 A review of the international literature on social movements

The international literature on social movements focuses primarily on the social movements of the West. In this regard, there has been, since the 1980s, an increasing focus on new social movements (Schuurman 1989: 9). In much of this literature on Western social movements, a distinction is made between old and new social movements because, it is argued, new social movements are not organised along more traditional lines such as class (Schuurman 1989: 9). Old social movements refer to such movements as trade union movements, peasant movements and the national liberation movements of the Third World, which are concerned with a narrow range of activities which reflect the interests of their members. New social movements refer to gay rights movements, environmental movements, civil rights movements, the peace movement and women’s movements (Jennett and Stewart 1989; Papadakis 1993b: 3). Touraine (1977), for example, makes a distinction between old and new social movements based on the view that old social movements have a far narrower focus as they are ultimately concerned with defending the interests of their members. In contrast, according to Touraine (1977), new social movements are not constituted along traditional racial/ethnic/class lines and are therefore able not only to challenge the internalisation of such cleavages, but also to present a view of the "good" society which does not focus narrowly on the interests of its members (Papadakis 1993b).

Western literature on social movements is also concerned with explaining the emergence of new social movements in terms of a shift from material to postmaterial values (for example, Inglehart 1977 and 1990)\(^6\), or in terms of a shift from an industrial to a post-industrial society (Touraine 1977 and 1981)\(^7\). Both of these approaches are concerned with the changing bases of political
resistance often contained inherent contradictions which led to unintended consequences. For example, many of the labour reforms which were intended to increase state control over the independent unions, by coopting such unions into the legal industrial relations framework, instead extended and entrenched particular strategies and forms of resistance (Friedmann 1987). Further, different movements are associated with different strategies: for example, youth and student congresses differ dramatically from trade unions, which differ from civic organisations. Thirdly, the strategy of ungovernability was implemented by organisations at the local level, and it was in response to this that the JMC structure was formed. Ironically, in less than a decade, political activists who had been part of the focus of mini-JMCs, were working with previous opponents to set up transitional local and metropolitan councils. Finally, these anti-apartheid social movement organisations developed a leadership that was both accountable to their constituencies, and which had well-developed mobilisation skills. Taken together, these issues point to the fact that, broadly-speaking, anti-apartheid movements had sought to destroy the apartheid state, not to participate in government. The unbanning of political and other organisations and the release of political prisoners forced some of these movements, such as the civic organisations, to reevaluate their role within society in relation to both the Government of National Unity, and to the reconstruction and development of communities. It is to South Africa’s development milieu that I now turn.

2.3.3 South Africa’s development milieu

The previous sections set out the broader apartheid political and legal structures governing the lives of all South Africans, as well as the responses of civil society to such a repressive system. This sub-section deals more specifically with the historical aspects of urbanisation in South Africa, apartheid and environmental racism, and South Africa’s changing development milieu.
The UDF changed its tactics - extensive consumer boycotts were undertaken, and 'street committees' proliferated (Lodge et al 1991: 79). Further, "alternative organs of peoples' power", such as peoples' courts, emerged as a complementary strategy to ungovernability (Narsoo 1993: 2).

On 12 June 1986, a nationwide state of emergency was imposed, which was particularly damaging to the UDF. However, this state of emergency, which was to remain in effect until after De Klerk's 'normalisation' of politics in 1990, still did not crush opposition. Consumer and rent boycotts continued, and many sectors established national bodies. For example, the South African Youth Congress was established to unite youth groups (Lodge et al 1991: 103). During 1988 and 1989, overt protest and resistance to the state reemerged, with 1989 seeing a Defiance Campaign being launched under the banner of the Mass Democratic Movement (NDM), a UDF-COSATU alliance. In 1989, F.W. de Klerk took over the presidency from P.W. Botha, and in February 1990, he unbanned all political organisations. On 11 February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison after twenty-seven years. During the course of 1991 the UDF was disbanded.

According to Seekings (1994: 1'), the unbanning of political organisations like the ANC gave further impetus to a strategic reconceptualisation begun in 1988 by civic organisations with regard to their future role in terms of continued political activity. In other words, civics had begun to debate the validity of separating development from political activities. As Steinberg and Adler (1995) point out, this debate has not yet resolved itself.

In conclusion, the above outline of social movements and collective action highlights a number of important issues. Firstly, as happened with the North American civil rights movement, environmental issues were sidelined in favour of the national agenda of the anti-apartheid struggle. Secondly, the history of the relationship between the apartheid state and social movement organisations shows that state interventions designed to contain growing militancy and
current acts to a historical tradition it ennobled them, infusing the daily efforts of local activists and their sympathizers with moral and emotional weightiness. It is this kind of "culture of liberation" that makes large numbers of people willing to risk all, to lay down their lives for a cause: something that an effort merely to lower rents is unlikely to do.45

The formation of the UUF in 1983 also needs to be seen in the context of changing economic and socio-political circumstances. South Africa was gripped by a recession and a drought from 1982, with rising inflation and unemployment (Lodge et al 1991: 31). In addition, the 1973 and 1976 insurrection contributed to limited socio-political reforms being introduced from 197946. What is significant about the reforms is that while they were introduced in response to previous resistance, they in turn fuelled more resistance.

Furthermore, the composition of the UDF is significant in that it emerged to coordinate opposition to the government's proposed Tricameral concept. Importantly, the UDF was a broad coalition of approximately seven hundred organisations representing a diversity of sectors and ideologies "united only in their opposition to the government " (Lodge et al 1991: 34).

On 3 September, 1984, the day that the Tricameral Parliament came into effect, a wave of protest began in the Vaal Triangle, and spread around the country "and the UDF was drawn into an uprising that it rapidly became unable to control" (Lodge et al 1991: 65). Many of those at the forefront of the opposition were children and youth47. In January 1985, an ANC statement contained the slogan "Ronder South Africa Ungovernable", and this made its way into the rhetoric of the time (Lodge et al 1991: 76). On 21 July 1985, a state of emergency was declared. This period was characterised by curfews, extensive repression, widespread detentions and torture, trials, and so on. However, opposition to the state was not crushed.
black consciousness ideology which had dominated black opposition discourse in the earlier 1970s.

The expansion of trade unionism was accompanied by a proliferation of community-based civic associations from approximately 1980\textsuperscript{3}. By 1983, civic associations were particularly strong in the Eastern and Western Cape, and the Transvaal (Lodge et al 1991: 41). At this time, the ANC presented little of a serious internal security threat to the apartheid government. This security threat emerged in 1983 with the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF)\textsuperscript{4}, out of which collective resistance coalesced on a scale and level of militancy unprecedented in South African history.

Importantly, Lodge et al (1991: 29-30) root UDF action clearly in earlier periods of struggle, demonstrating the continuity between different periods of mobilisation:

While at the moment of its birth the UDF undoubtedly borrowed from the traditions, symbols, iconography, and ideology of the ANC, it expressed them with greater force and resonance. In the 1980s the UDF vented popular anger at inequality and oppression, as the ANC had done in the 1950s, but the constituencies that fueled the anger had changed. ...

[Unlike the black urban halots of South Africa in the 1950s, the people in Soweto, Mamelodi, Mdantsane, and KwaZakhele had gained by 1980 considerable political and economic leverage. "Amandla ngawethu" ("Power is ours!") was a slogan inherited from the 1950s. Then it voiced an aspiration; in the 1980s it became an assertion (Lodge et al 1991: 29-30).

Price (1991: 181) makes a similar point when he links UDF action to the history of the ANC. He argues that this continuity developed a "culture of liberation" and

... played a significant role in providing the fledgling UDF and its affiliates with a fully developed panoply of symbols, freedom songs, heroes, and legends. By tying
In this regard, the ANC's guerrilla wing, Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), was established in 1961 (Lodge 1987: 233). What followed was an eighteen month period of sabotage, and from 1962, ANC and other resistance leadership was arrested, or went into exile. The rest of the 1960s was relatively tranquil.

However, the tranquility of the latter 1960s was not to last indefinitely. In this regard, "[t]he resistance of the 1970s provides a startling contrast in terms of scale and duration to the movements of the 1950s and early 1960s" (Lodge 1983: 321). The 1970s are marked by two events - the 1973 wave of industrial action and the 1976 Soweto student uprising. The brutal reaction of the government to protesting school children no doubt removed, for many, the apathy of the previous decade. However, and more importantly, the 1976 uprising "saw the black school-going youth catapult themselves to the forefront of militant opposition to apartheid" (Johnson 1988: 100).

Even before the 1976 uprising, Umkonto we Sizwe had begun to reestablish itself inside the country (Lodge 1983: 339). From 1976, many young people were recruited into the ANC underground and left South Africa to undergo military training. From the late 1970s, sabotage and guerilla activity inside South Africa increased dramatically (Lodge 1983: 339-340).

The wave of collective action begun in the 1970s continued into the 1980s, so that

[t]he scale of the political awakening helped make the 1980s the climax of a century of black protest in which blacks tried petitions, civil disobedience, community control, labor stayaways, and guerrilla warfare in an effort to obtain their rights (Lodge et al 1991: 4)

Lodge et al (1991: 24) argue that by 1980, the ANC had little organisational presence inside South Africa, yet enjoyed considerable support. From 1980, the ANC's nationalist, inclusive non-racial ideology began gaining strength over the exclusivist
South Africa struggled against both capitalist exploitation and apartheid oppression, and used a range of social movement tactics in order to do so. Furthermore, the ethos underlying the union movement, which has evolved from the 1970s, has been one based on participatory democracy and entrenched accountability of union officials to rank-and-file members (Adler and Webster 1995: 79), and this, in turn, influenced black politics from the late 1970s (Lodge et al 1991: 39). The union movement forged strong links with other social movements like civic associations and student and youth congresses, which, during the 1980s, presented a strong alliance opposing apartheid. These civic organisations and youth and student movements also contributed to the undermining of effective local governance in the urban areas. Lodge (1987: 14), on the influence of trade union organisational strategies on civics, argues for example that "[in the civics] the notion of a mandated leadership with very limited decision-making authority is ascribable to the influence of trade unionism."

An examination of the history of the development of community-based and liberation organisations in South Africa also reveals that, as with trade unionism, the emergence of such organisations started generations before the 1970s. For example, Lodge (1983: 1-6) dates the first African political organisation in South Africa (the South African Native National Congress, later to become the ANC) to 1912.

After more than two decades of being an exclusive, more elitist and moderate organisation, in 1949 "the ANC adopted a programme of African nationalism and mass action" (Lodge et al 1991: 5). This led to a programme of national disobedience (the Defiance Campaign) in the 1950s. Lodge (1987: 225) argues that the Sharpeville crisis following the shooting by police of anti-pass protesters on 21 March 1960

... represented a turning point in the history of African nationalism, when protest finally hardened into resistance, and when African politicians were forced into thinking in terms of a revolutionary strategy.
South Africa, since it is at the local level that people will be (re)structuring and developing their communities. As Swilling and Boya (1995: 168-169) point out, South Africa is the only international example

... where national-level constitutional transition has been accompanied by complex local-level transition. This has major implications for the future quality and durability of South Africa's newborn democracy ...

Finally, the centralised role of the national apartheid government versus weaker regional and local governments leaves a legacy against which, I would argue, local communities will need to struggle. As Munslow, Fitzgerald and McLennan (1995: 13) point out, there have been profound debates and tensions after the 1994 elections between national and regional authorities over such issues as housing.

2.3.2 Social movements and collective action in South Africa

The process of transformation which fundamentally altered South Africa's political landscape from 1990 and which was, in turn, influenced by the collective action and reforms begun in the 1970s, has created a situation where South Africa's anti-apartheid social movement organisations, particularly civic organisations are being forced to redefine not only their relationships to an ANC dominated state, but indeed their role within civil society (Steinberg and Adler 1995). It thus becomes important to understand the collective actors and social movements involved in the anti-apartheid struggle inside South Africa in order to establish the continuities between the old and the new, and also to establish the collective action frames used by the various social movements.

Historically, civil society in South Africa has been characterised by strong and mobilised social movements and social movement organisations, especially from the 1970s. In particular, the labour movement has played a key role and, because of the repressive nature of the apartheid regime, took on features characteristic of a social movement. As Adler (1994: 33) points out, the labour movement in
local transitional councils. Furthermore, "the principles of non-racialism, democracy, accountability and one tax base" were to be adhered to (Swilling and Boya 1995: 175). Forum members fell either into the statutory or non-statutory group as defined by the LGNF, because each had to nominate half the members of the transitional council which would "take over either some or all of the current functions of existing local government bodies" (Cloete 1994: 299).

An important though perhaps unavoidable contradiction existed in that these interim councils were not popularly elected but were nominated by their respective organisations.

On 1 November 1995, democratic local (community) elections took place (except in KwaZulu-Natal, parts of the Western Cape, and certain rural constituencies in Gauteng), allowing the relevant local councils to be democratically elected for the first time. This, according to Kotze (1995: 6), heralds the interim phase in local level governance. From 1 November 1995, 1:1 councils were structured in the following way: 40% of councillors were to be party representatives, and 60% were to be ward representatives. In terms of agreements reached during national level negotiations, wards were demarcated on a 50/50 split between traditionally white/coloured/Indian and black residential areas.

This rather detailed discussion of the South African state highlights the problems of the past and indicates some constraints for the future. Firstly, local authorities were effectively the implementers of apartheid segregation at the level of the day-to-day lives of all South Africans. On the one hand, this meant that no effective cross-class or cross-race co-operation took place with regard to community life. Secondly, the fact that the apartheid central state curtailed the activities of white local governments and operated within a shroud of secrecy, meant that the exercise of both participatory democracy and effective co. 1 of their own communities was denied to all South Africans, including whites. This lack of racial cooperation and democratic participation has fundamental implications for development outcomes in a democratic
maintained racially segregated local government structures.

In terms of the national negotiations taking place at Codesa, it was generally accepted that this national forum would need both to debate and formalise the issue of local government so that the earlier (ad hoc) local forums could be brought under a national framework and become statutory, in line with the framework and principles of the new constitution (Swilling and Boya 1995: 168). In this regard, the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 was passed, replacing the 1991 legislation, and came into effect on 27 April 1994, together with the new constitution.

The 1993 Local Government Transition Act came about largely as a result of the efforts of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), which had been formed in 1991 out of ANC-affiliated civic organisations (Cloete 1994: 296). By early 1993, SANCO had been instrumental in approaching the Minister of Local Government, and as a result the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) was established, comprising half official and half SANCO representatives. The recommendations arising from the LGNF were substantially ratified by the MPNP, and incorporated into the new constitution and the Local Government Transition Act (Cloete 1994: 296).

The provisions of the Local Government Transition Act most applicable to this research deal with the processes to be followed in the interregnum between the passage of the Act and the first local government elections which were set for November 1995. Firstly, Provincial Committees for Local Government were established (and would form sub-committees of the Transitional Executive Council) in order to monitor and jointly control, together with the relevant Administrators, the process of implementing new local government structures. Forums were to be established consisting of "incumbent councillors, ratepayers' associations, civic organisations, and local branches of political parties and movements" (Cloete 1994: 299) and these would be formalised into
(1993: 90) states: "[T]he government's goal was to retain as much power for as long as possible, and the ANC's to wrest as much power from it as soon as possible". In effect, the chasm in these views led to a deadlock in 1992, with the ANC embarking on a programme of "rolling mass action". While the effects of the mass action on the resumption of negotiations is not quite clear, Friedman (1993) argues that the Boipatong massacre was instrumental in forcing the NP back to negotiations, as the tide of international goodwill changed against the NP because of what was seen as its complicity in political violence.

Although formal negotiations between the ANC and the NP had broken down, both parties' chief negotiators kept talking informally and secretly. The result was the 'Record of Understanding' which was signed in September 1992, and which committed both parties to resuming negotiations (Sparks 1994: 179-184). This return to negotiations resumed early in 1993 in the form of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP), and in November 1993, the negotiations deadlock was finally resolved with the acceptance of the interim Constitution which, inter alia, made provision for an elected constitution-writing body. The interim constitution was ratified in Parliament. Furthermore, the transition process leading to the 27 April 1994 general democratic election would be overseen by a Transitional Executive Council, the Independent Electoral Commission and the Independent Media Commission (De Klerk 1994: 8). Thus, the 1993 Constitution effectively ended the legislative and political foundations of apartheid.

With regard to local level government reforms after 1990, enabling legislation was passed (Interim Measures for Local Government Act of 1991) by the NP government in order formally and legally to facilitate the many local negotiating forums which had sprung up and were debating new integrated forms of local government (Mackay 1993: 7). However, this legislation did not make it compulsory for local negotiating forums to be established within all local authorities. This meant that Conservative Party (CP) dominated towns and cities
"political activism" (Lodge et al 1991: 89)\textsuperscript{30}, and identify acute social problems which could become future security problems. In response, JMCs were able to provide funds for township upgrading, outside of slow and cumbersome administrative state structures, and to redress such identified problems, thereby averting potential internal security problems. By establishing structures which fell outside parliamentary and cabinet spheres and doing so in a manner hidden from public view, the government "entrenched a secretive style of exercising state power" (Morris and Padayachee 1988: 17) which, it could be argued, demonstrated a lack of accountability even to its white constituency. The very nature of the JMC structure, and the fact that it was constituted at the local level, where even white (elected) municipal councillors were included (Joeherson 1990: 20), provides evidence for the extent of secretiveness and lack of accountability which had permeated all levels of governance in South Africa during the apartheid era\textsuperscript{31}.

In 1990, South Africa’s political terrain was radically altered by the apartheid state’s unbanning of political organisations, the release from incarceration of national liberation activists, and a commitment to the removal of apartheid. From 1990, the major South African political organisations and parties began the task of negotiating South Africa’s future democratic constitutional and structural system of governance. This was facilitated by the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), which met for the first time in December 1991. Codesa was a forum in which agreements (and compromises) regarding South Africa’s road forward would be reached (Friedman 1993). Codesa was not without its problems. The principles of the transition which underlay the NP’s and the ANC’s expectations of Codesa were diametrically opposed (Friedman 1993). The NP saw Codesa as being the actual (indefinite) vehicle of transition and power-sharing, which would also draft a new constitution, while the ANC viewed Codesa’s role as setting up a framework within which a short-term constituent assembly or interim government would shortly be elected, and which had, as one of its principal tasks, power to draw up a new constitution. As Friedman
At the local level, as mentioned earlier, BLAs were established to oversee black townships. At a regional level, Regional Services Councils (RSCs) were formed in 1985 to bring together in a regional forum, the various racially segregated local municipal structures. The underlying assumption was that such a forum would be seen to be more democratic, and it would hence be accepted as legitimate by blacks (Urban Foundation 1993). Furthermore, RSCs were part of an attempt to redress imbalances in distribution (Dewar 1985) by imposing new levies on businesses in order to fund upgrading in townships (Swilling and Boya 1985: 179) as part of the government's ongoing attempts at reform in the 1980s (Humphries 1991: 78).

Despite these reforms in the 1980s, (local) commercial centres, mining areas, agricultural areas, and so on, still largely fell under white municipal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the restructuring which occurred did not change the most crucial aspect of political reality: political power still remained in the hands of the white National Party, and state structures were still racially fragmented.

This period of reform at an administrative level (as briefly outlined above), was simultaneously accompanied by increased participation of the military to combat the perceived "total onslaught" (Marks and Trapido 1988: 27), both internally and externally, on South Africa. The establishment of the National Security Management System (NSMS) was an "alternative to parliamentary and cabinet government" (Marks and Trapido 1988: 28). As Morris and Padayachee (1988: 17) point out, the NSMS formed "a shadow bureaucracy running parallel to the official government bureaucracy and answerable only to similar security bodies above it". Within the NSMS, Joint Management Committees (JMCs), sub-JMCs and mini-JMCs were established to parallel administrative structures at the provincial, regional (RSCs) and local levels respectively.

The function of the NSMS was twofold in order to "ensure a coordinated security and redistributive intervention" (Morris and Padayachee 1988: 18). In this regard, the JMCs were to eliminate
44. Although it was not explicit at first, the UDF associated itself with the principles for which the ANC stood (Price 1991: 180).

45. What is particularly significant about Lodge et al’s (1991) and Price’s (1990) analyses is that they have clearly rooted the formation of the UDF in a previous cycle of mobilisation. In this regard, the continuities of mobilisation networks are clearly important, as well as the adaptation of a previous collective action frame.

46. These reforms have been discussed in the previous section dealing with the South African state. I will not repeat the discussion here.

47. As a number of analysts (for example, Carter 1991; Johnson 1988; Marks 1993; Price 1990) have pointed out, many youth and student congresses became involved in "organs of peoples' power" to such a degree that it brought them into conflict with other organisations, of which their parents were often members.

48. Street committees meant that a low-profile leadership emerged, and was thus more resistant to leadership attrition as a result of state detentions, etc. Sue Price (1990: 204-209) for a detailed discussion of the structure and functions of the street committee system.

49. COSATU was formed in 1985, a merger of two strands within the labour movement, the one being committed to shopfloor organisation, the other arguing for allegiance to the liberation struggle (Adler and Webster 1995: 82).

50. As Steinberg (1995) points out, the debate about the future role of civic organisations has to be placed within the broader debate on the relationship between what constitutes civil society, and civil society’s relationship to the state.

51. This process of resistance, engagement and reform can be linked to Tarrow’s (1994) notion of changes in the political opportunity structure creating the potential for further concessions and reforms.

52. An example of such a policy would be the importation of toxic material in order to earn foreign exchange in the short term.
36. In non-metropolitan urban areas these would be known as Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) or Local Government Co-ordinating Committees (LGCCs), and in metropolitan areas Transitional Metropolitan Councils (TMCs) with corresponding Transitional Metropolitan Substructures (TMSs) would be established (Cloete 1994:299).

37. Kotze (1995:6) and Swilling and Boya (1995:175) refer to this as the pre-interim phase, which lasted until the first community elections.

38. This interim phase will last until 1999, when the final constitution comes into effect (Kotze 1995:6; Swilling and Boya 1995:175).

39. Friedman (1987) provides a detailed account of trade unionism before the 1973 Durban strikes. He indicates that African union strategy and mobilisation before the early 1970s were doomed to failure. He argues that the legacy of the lessons learned from earlier mistakes partially paved the way for successful mobilisation in the 1970s. As Adler and Webster (1995:79) point out, structural changes in the South African economy (increasingly advanced technology, an increase in the size of the firm, an increasing demand for semi-skilled labour, and so on) provided an opportunity for a resurgence of worker mobilisation.

40. Adler et al (1992) provide a fairly detailed analysis of the stayaway as a tactic of resistance since its emergence in 1949. Interestingly, Adler et al (1992:8, quoting Lambert 1978) make the point that, regarding the failure of a stayaway in 1958...

... it is significant that the stoppage was most complete wherever organisation was best... The only answer is to build the strength of the people on sure foundations, to organise the workers, to give them machinery in which they have confidence.

Clearly, lessons such have these have had clear reverberations in terms of mobilisation tactics and strategies for later periods, particularly in the 1970s.

41. On 16 June 1976, 20,000 students in Soweto marched in protest against the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African secondary schools. One thirteen year-old boy was killed that day. Protest and fighting spread to other areas, and "over the next sixteen months, at least seven hundred people were killed, most shot by police" (Lodge et al 1991:7).

42. This was no doubt also due to the fact that Nelson Mandela had become a symbol of hope in the liberation struggle, and was conceivably the world's most famous political prisoner (also see Lodge et al 1991:129).

43. Civic associations "sought to defend the interests of the residents of specific urban communities" (Price 1991:166). Significantly, Seekings (1994:12) indicates that in 1979, the ANC and SACP undertook a strategy reevaluation, and realised the importance of local political and sectoral struggles, in which civic organisations would clearly have an important role to play in overthrowing apartheid.
government reform (Swilling and Boya 1995: 168).

26. The Wiehahn (union) and Riekert (urbanisation) Commissions, for example, although operating within the "strictures" of apartheid policy, marked the beginning of a process of ongoing reform (Morris and Padayachee 1988: 4).

27. This strategy of cooption on the part of the state can be seen as part of a broader strategy of "manipulat[ing] the divisions and tensions within the black community" (Marks and Trapido 1988: 44).

28. However, RSCs became new sites of struggle, with extraparliamentary organizations being totally opposed to them (Humphries 1991: 79).

29. Morris and Padayachee (1988: 17) provide a detailed description of the structure of the NSMS.

30. Ironically, while political activists were being 'dealt with' at grassroots level, the government had begun a process of informal contact with Nelson Mandela (Sparks 1994).

31. What is of concern is that some former NP (and other conservative) municipal councillors have been re-elected into office following the 1995 democratic community elections. This means that, as supporters of the previous government with its particular policies and style of governance, these councillors will maintain positions of power during this transitional period, and will be in a position to negatively influence reconstruction and development outcomes. A second outcome of this lack of accountability has been that white ratepayers associations have flourished from the early 1990s, and from their inception have taken up issues with local councils.

32. The negotiation process was also dogged by IFP recalcitrance, because it objected to what it saw as ANC/NP bilateralism (Atkinson 1994).

33. On 17 June 1992, shack dwellers in the Vraal Triangle township of Boipatong were massacred by attackers thought to be nearby hostel residents (and IFP supporters).

34. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 was passed by Parliament on 22 December 1993 and came into effect on 27 April 1994, the first day of South Africa's first democratic elections.

35. Sarakinsky (1994) provides a detailed account of the negotiations involved in defining the powers of the TEC, and its subsequent legislative standing. The TEC was an interim body which was to limit the power of the National Party government until the first general election (Sarakinsky 1994: 68). The Electoral Act was passed in mid-January 1994, whereby the IEC was given formal powers to oversee the election process. The IEC had three functions, i.e. administration, monitoring and adjudication (Friedman and Stack 1994).
16. Kriesi (1988: 11) makes a similar point by arguing that the more extensive a grouping's "recruitment networks" are, the more successful it will be at mobilising people. McAdam's (1988) case study on students' participation in a civil rights project in Mississippi in 1964, for example, indicates that activists are drawn from existing networks. However, prior activity in more explicitly political organisations is more of a drawcard to activism than, for example, more social or academic type organisations.

17. Tarrow (1992: 177) defines collective action frames "as the purposively constructed guides to action created by existing or prospective movement organisers."

18. It is in this sense that social movements can be viewed as "signifying agents" (Snow and Benford 1988: 213).

19. Although Tarrow (1991 and 1994) does not refer to the frames used by the state or industry, for example, it could be argued that what Szasz (1994: 103) has referred to as a "discourse of disempowerment" could be regarded as a frame used by industry and the state to counter the frame(s) used by social movements. Furthermore, it is important to examine how the frames used by the state and industry are reflected in the media.

20. Morris and Padayachee (1988: 1) have also argued that the period of crisis beginning in the 1970s is a culmination of long-standing conflicts and contradictions between the state, capital and the "popular classes". Two events mark the period of crisis: the 1973 Durban strikes and the 1976 Soweto uprising. Further, Price (1990: 166) argues that "the legacy of Soweto was an incipient 'culture of resistance'."

21. These Councils consisted of representatives elected by township residents, and representatives nominated by the white town/city councils and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development.

22. This example illustrates how, under the NP government, local government structures were seen as mere extensions of the central government. This, I would argue, has had an effect on the way local "eval governance and democracy has been conceptualised and practiced, and leaves a problematic legacy for the extension and institutionalisation of democratic practice in this transitional phase.

23. Further, as Shubane (1991: 64) points out, from the late 1970s (black) local authorities became the focus of much resistance from civic associations. This conflict intensified in the 1980s.

24. Such increases in service charges and rents in turn contributed to widespread mobilisation and resistance in the 1980s.

25. It seems that this might be true of analyses dealing with the period of negotiated settlement in the 1990s as well. Much emphasis has fallen on national level negotiations and restructuring, and far less on local
administered to the four groups. It was found that trade unionists showed strong support for both material and post-material values. Cotgrove and Duff (1981: 103) thus concluded that ... 'post-material' is a misleading term. It reinforces the idea that such values emerge only after material values are met. Non-material values and goals relate to the non-economic dimensions of social roles and experience. Their emergence does not necessarily depend on the achievement of some level of material satisfaction.

9. I would argue that such a distinction between civil society and the political sphere is particularly pertinent to South Africa's current socio-political transition, where we have seen some of the leadership of anti-apartheid organisations, trade unions and community-based organisations, moving into the formal political sphere. The most obvious case is that of the ANC, which holds a majority at the level of national government, and which holds the majority in most of the regional governments. What this formalisation of political power has done is to open up a debate about the relationship of civic organisations, trade unions, and so on, to the new state in South Africa (also see Adler and Webstar 1995: 77). In particular, this debate is also concerned with the future role of civic associations in a post-apartheid South Africa (Steinberg and Adler 1995).

10. I would argue that this line of argument is not incompatible with Cohen and Arato's (1992) definition of civil society.

11. Furthermore, as Tarrow (1988: 282) indicates, new social movements had not only not displaced old social movements, but many of the strategies and tactics being used by the new social movements are also being used by old social movements, including religious movements.

12. Tarrow (1991) also points out that some social movements develop into SMOs, while others do not.

13. Tarrow (1994: 18) defines political opportunity structure as being "consistent - but not necessarily formal, permanent or national - dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action".

14. Also see McAdam (1988) regarding shifts in political opportunities.

15. Tarrow's (1994: 43-44) discussion of the historical development of collective action repertoires indicates that from the late 1700s, new forms of (more public) collective action, notably the boycott, the mass petition and urban insurrection, had emerged and which were "indirect, flexible and autonomous of the claims and antagonisms of established collective actors." This repertory was more universal than the more dispersed and sporadic types of collective action which had preceded it. Furthermore, these repertoires came about as a result of the fact that the state had begun consolidating and therefore represented a more centralised focus for challenge.
residents' yards and basements. Tests of the chemicals revealed that 88 chemicals were present, with concentrations being between 250 to 5000 times higher than acceptable levels. Some were known carcinogens, while others caused kidney and liver ailments (Szasz 1994: 42).

3. Bullard (1993a: 10) also refers to the fact that NIMBY opposition contributed to increasing pressure being placed on communities of colour to host disposal sites, incinerators, and so on.

4. Bullard (1993a/b) makes a much stronger case for environmental racism than does Szasz (1994), and does not deal with cross-race and class cooperation as Szasz does. One of the cornerstones of Bullard's analysis is to view environmental racism as a manifestation of "internal colonialism and white racism" (1993b: 16). One of the implications of Bullard's approach is that white environmental action is of the NIMBY variety, while Szasz's research highlights the evolution of the toxics movement from (white) NIMBYism to cross-race and class ecopopulism. However, the issue is a complex and multi-layered one; as Taylor (1993: 58) indicates, some local initiatives remain exclusively white, while others are inclusive.

5. However, not all environmentally-concerned groups in LA join WATCHDOG, because such groups may be more elitist. For example, certain homeowners' associations are more concerned with property values (Pye-Smith et al 1994: 104). This supports Taylor's (1993) point that cooperation between groups is complex.

6. Inglehart's (1977 and 1990) thesis rests on the assumption that basic needs (or material needs) are usually met in affluent societies, either by the individual or by the welfare state. This, in turn, means that people in affluent societies "are more likely to see" fulfillment of condary [postmaterial] needs, including intellectual, aesthetic and "1 needs" (Papadakis 1993b: 16).

7. For Touraine (1977 and 1981) post-industrial society (or "programmed" society), whose motivating force is "scientific progress" (Touraine 1977: 156) and the production of knowledge and information, is characterised less by the conflict between capital and labour characteristic of industrial societies. Rather, conflict in a post-industrial society is characterised by the struggle between a technocracy which manages, controls and manipulates science and information, and a more generalised consumer public which struggles against "technocratic domination" which extends fundamentally into the personal sphere. In this regard, "the social movements of the post-industrial era are primarily concerned with defending and extending civil society against a potentially all consuming state" (Scott 1990a: 66).

8. Cotgrove and Duff's research (1981) presents interesting findings regarding the materialist/post-materialist dichotomy. A comparison was made of environmentalists, industrialists, trade unionists and members of the public. A scale, which included items which could be classified as either exhibiting materialist or post-materialist values, was
Although this research will not be focusing on the social and health effects of hazardous waste per se, it is nonetheless important to be familiar with what constitutes hazardous waste, as well as with its effects, since the threat of the effects of hazardous waste mismanagement is taking on greater proportions. Concomitantly, hazardous waste, as a community and life threatening issue, is increasingly becoming a site of social struggle.

Hazardous wastes refer to by-products of industrial production that present enormous health and environmental problems. Such wastes are toxic, ignitable, corrosive, or dangerously reactive. The CSIR (1993) provides an abbreviated list of all hazardous or toxic materials which may only be disposed of in a Class HHH (formerly known as a Class 1) disposal site. These include paints and paint sludges, mercury and lead compounds, varnishes and detergents. Generators of such materials include the pharmaceutical and petrochemical industries, printing and graphical companies, processing or destruction of waste oil and other wastes from refinery products, etc.

Diseases and other health problems resulting from exposure to toxic materials include birth defects, chronic respiratory ailments, nervous disorders and various types of cancer (Amdur 1993; Kharbanda and Stallworthy 1990). Exposure to toxic materials may arise as a result of exposure to substances used in the home, such as paints containing lead. Known and well-documented effects of lead on, for example, children and foetuses include retardation, decreased learning abilities, impaired reading skills and various behavioural problems. In adults, the effects of lead poisoning include reproductive and neurological dysfunctions, hypertension and kidney damage (Amdur 1993: 33). Health consequences such as these have a particularly high cost for the poor and powerless who, for example, do not always have access to adequate health care, or access to information dealing with the nature of the problems to which they are exposed.

The effective disposal of hazardous waste is a major problem facing all countries. Landfills are the most common means for waste disposal, but are increasingly recognised as being a temporary measure. Other means of toxic waste disposal include incineration, deep-well injection and resource recovery, but as Amdur (1993) points out, there are problems associated with these methods. One line of argument gaining popularity is that the focus of toxic waste management should not be on trying to manage existing and future waste, but rather that methods for decreasing waste generation should be sought.

Until 1952, a chemical company had dumped toxic chemical waste into a partially completed and abandoned navigation channel. The area was then covered up and sold to the Niagara Falls Board of Education. The area started developing and a school was built. During heavy rains in the 1970s, the chemicals started seeping onto the school property and into
historically divided society.
environmental management is that it rests on democratic processes, community participation and access to information, a view which is supported by Pezzoli (1991) in a community case study from Mexico City.

2.4 Conclusion

The above literature review raises a number of theoretical implications and political challenges with regard to the aims of this research as set out in Chapter 1. Firstly, in combining Tarrow’s (1991 and 1994) theoretical framework for understanding cycles of collective action with South Africa’s particular social movement history, it is clear that South Africa has already experienced cycles of mobilisation. What becomes important in the balance of this research report is how those previous cycles of mobilisation, as well as the influence of movement activists, came to bear on the Chloorkop campaign. A second, and related, issue which is raised is the nature of the relationship between communities and the state, in the period between 1990 and 1994. What the literature review has charted is a picture of an authoritarian and repressive state, opposed by an array of social movement organisations, in the 1980s. Quite suddenly, in 1990, the political terrain was fundamentally altered: that same authoritarian and repressive state had committed itself to a negotiated settlement with its opponents. Given the socio-political legacies charted in this literature review, the case study of community opposition to the Chloorkop landfill is a microcosm of the period of political transition and developmental challenges facing South Africa in the 1990s. Although the case study focuses narrowly on hazardous waste policy in this transitional period, the issues which are raised in this research report echo contradictions and challenges facing South Africa at large. In particular, this case study is concerned with the relationship between different communities, as well as between communities and the state, and whether collective action around an environmental issue can influence state policy, thereby leading to the extension of participatory, non-racial democracy in an
Environmental concerns are beginning to take a more central role within the broader development debate in South Africa, as has been occurring generally in the rest of the world, particularly with regard to the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Part of the international debate has been that environmental concerns should become more central than they are, so that future development, both urban and rural, can be sustainable. In South Africa, for example, concerns are being raised that particular development policies and programmes may not be environmentally sound, but will nonetheless go ahead because of the urgency of reconstruction and development (IDRC Mission 1994).

The focus of this study, the urban milieu, presents enormous environmental problems for both present and future inhabitants. Increasing population places more demands on the provision of services, especially land and housing, while these demands, in turn, place further burdens on the environment. For example, higher levels of pollution occur, more waste is created, less land is available for 'green' areas, and more constraints are placed on water supplies (Haughton and Hunter 1994: 111). These problems, in turn, create particular health and environmental hazards for the increasingly dense cities and their human populations, and can substantially lower the quality of life of urban residents. As Swilling and Boya (1995: 169) point out with regard to the South African situation, projected population and urban growth are going to place increasing demands on the urban environment, and these demands will have to be dealt with at the local level.

With these general urbanisation problems in mind, Goodman and Redclift (1991) argue that while, on the one hand, urban environmental management is becoming increasingly important, it is most successful, on the other, when communities take active participation in these processes, primarily through their own movements. Thus, the central premise of successful urban and
Foundation (1993: 10) argues, these problems have arisen as a result of the fact that the apartheid state did not adequately plan South African cities in general, with the result that urban areas have "grown in a sprawling, uncoordinated manner."

2.3.3.2 Racial inequality under apartheid and environmental racism and classism

Very little analytical work has been done in South Africa to apply the concept of environmental racism. Nonetheless, authors such as Durning (1990), the IDRC Mission (1994) and Timberlake (1985) argue, in a similar vein to Bullard (1993a/b), that environmental degradation and community exposure to environmental threat has been most acutely experienced by the poorest segments of South African society by virtue of the fact that they are black and have been the subjects of a racially discriminatory and oppressive political and legislative system under apartheid. For example, these authors mention the acute degradation of the rural areas which resulted from forced removals and overpopulation on such small tracts of lands as set aside by the Land Acts. Thus, I would argue that if one accepts the validity of the arguments of the environmental costs of apartheid policies as put forward by Durning (1990), the IDRC Mission (1994) and Timberlake (1985), then it seems to follow logically that the concept "environmental racism" can be applied to the unintentional consequences of particular racially discriminatory and oppressive policies in a specific historical period in South Africa. In this sense, environmental racism and environmental degradation are by-products of the institutionalised racial discrimination and oppression which characterised South African society. As Durning (1990) and Timberlake (1985) point out, apartheid exacted an enormous toll on the South African environment, and the people who bore the greatest costs by far were blacks, particularly those relegated to the homelands.
2.3.3.1 Urban development in South Africa

As stated in Section 2.3.1, National Party objectives, through apartheid policies, were to maintain white economic prosperity and white political supremacy. In particular, these policies aimed at controlling and stemming the flow of African labour to the (white) urban areas (Hindson 1987; Marks and Trapido 1988: 9; Posel 1993 and 1991). Hence, "orderly urbanisation" was accompanied by influx control and pass laws, and the bantustan/homelands system (Platzky and Walker 1985). Central to the success of the whole system was the South African government's policy on forced removal or relocation into (largely) rural areas designated for use by particular race groups. Ideologically, this racially spatial division was justified on the grounds that each group would be politically enfranchised within its designated area (Heymans and White 1991: 4).

Conversely, the state's (ideal) vision was that African urban development would largely be restricted by the use of 'temporary' migrant workers, although a limited number of Africans did qualify only for permanent residency (outside of designated homelands), and not political enfranchisement, in terms of Section 10 of the 1945 Urban Areas (Amendment) Act (Marks and Trapido 1988: 13; Smith 1992: 2).

Because of its policy on limited African urbanisation, government expenditure in African urban areas was minimal (Swilling 1991: xiv-xvi). Orderly urbanisation and limited state expenditure in African urban areas have, in fact, led to a land and housing shortage, inadequate services, and overcrowding in existing residential areas in African townships (Lawson 1991: 47; Swilling 1991: xiv-xvi; Swilling and Boya 1995: 169). This situation has been exacerbated by the fact that many Africans were moving into the urban areas illegally as the homelands were increasingly strained and overcrowded, and hence were unable to support their inhabitants. This meant that existing urban residential areas became overcrowded, and squatter settlements proliferated (Mabin 1992: 19). As the Urban
could be directed to Gibson, but no date for the public meeting seemed to be given. From telephonic enquiries made by members of the public, and a list of organisations and associations in the area, an invitation list was compiled and people were invited telephonically (BGIM[c]). One major criticism against the invitation list was that the ANC and civic organisations or other township groups were not directly invited. For example, while the Tembisa Chamber of Commerce and Tembisa Town Council were invited, Ivory Park associations were invited 'via' Alan Dawson\(^3\) and Charl Niewoud (TPA), while Rabie Ridge was represented by Paul Douglas of the Rabie Ridge Management Committee. Thus, while Waste-tech and Gibson argued that all IAPs were invited, community leaders from primarily civic organisations argued that they had been excluded.

Two important issues marked the 12 March 1993 meeting. Firstly, one of the individuals attending the meeting asked if Waste-tech was aware "that Kempton Park City Council ha[d] planned to locate an informal settlement" ... on the borders of the disposal site" (BGIM 1993: 4), to which Waste-tech responded in the negative. The siting of this informal settlement is crucial as the closest houses to the landfill are now a mere 400 metres from the boundary of the landfill\(^12\). Secondly, Waste-tech established "a Community Consultative Group which would act as a channel for communication" between Waste-tech and residents (BGIMc 1993: 1). Despite the fact that Waste-tech initiated the formation of the Community Consultative Group, Sugruie and Dawson, for example, felt that Waste-tech was merely informing the public and that the process was not truly participatory. As Sugruie put it:

I ... was horrified, horrified at what they [Waste-tech] were presenting to us, that they were just saying this is the site and we want you to come help us monitor it.

The Community Consultative Group consisted of a Kempton Park councillor, two Waste-tech representatives, and six residents including Sugruie, Oudney\(^1\) and another ELA member. It seems that the residents on the Community Consultative Group agreed to attend the
In February 1992, the Department of Water Affairs approved the Klipfontein site. Thereafter, the Kempton Park City Council issued a Consent Use Permit (Brauch et al. 1993; Kempton Park City Council 1992), which stipulated an additional twenty-three conditions which were to be met by Waste-tech, relating inter alia, to hours for receiving waste and safety precautions (also see *The Kompton Express* 03/03/1995b: 5).

After construction of the landfill had already begun, Waste-tech retained 'issue management' consultant, Brian Gibson, to handle the public participation process. According to Gibson, Waste-tech only began the public participation process after the site was approximately one-third constructed "in an attempt to play catch-up with the changing environmental requirements" which arose out of the Department of Water Affairs' Integrated Environmental Management Guidelines document, published late in 1992. In accordance with the guidelines for integrated environmental management, a more formalised and extensive Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and the identification of Interested and Affected Parties (IAPs), for purposes of public participation, was required.

However, Waste-tech's EIA "was roundly criticised on the basis that it was done by an internal consultant, that it relied on historical documentation and no fresh work was done" (Gibson). Furthermore, no social impact assessment (SIA), which is at best regarded as a component of the EIA, was undertaken. As Ann Sugrue pointed out, the EIA which was presented

... was a joke because it talked about flora and fauna, but it never talked about people. It didn't go so far as to find out that the area across the road had been zoned for people to live in. So it was a shambles.

Criticism was also levelled against the invitations to attend the public meeting which was held on 12 March 1993. Firstly, *The Kompton Express* (10/03/1995: 8) ran an article in which it was stated that a list of interested parties was being compiled and that enquiries
CHAPTER 4

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHLOORKOP CONTROVERSY:
A NARRATIVE

This chapter will deal primarily with a chronology of the unfolding events, issues and collective action around the Chloorkop hazardous waste landfill site. Secondly, pertinent areas arising out of these events, activities and issues, relevant to the analysis of the research findings (which will be elaborated upon in the two following chapters) will be highlighted.

4.1 A chronology of Chloorkop

For the residents of Kempton Park, Tembisa, Ivory Park and Rabie Ridge, Waste-tech’s semi-constructed hazardous landfill became public knowledge on 24 February 1993, when Kempton Park’s local newspaper, The Kempton Express, ran a small article on the front page stating that:

A toxic waste dump is currently under construction in Chloorkop under the management of Waste-tech.
The site will replace the Margolis landfill in Rietfontein, Germiston, which has come under fire from residents in the surrounding areas, complaining about air pollution (The Kampton Express 24/2/1993: 1).

However, the saga of the Chloorkop landfill actually began in 1985, when Waste-tech began feasibility studies for the siting of a Class H:H waste disposal landfill at an old disused sand quarry (Klipfontein), halfway between Kempton Park and Midrand (Waste-tech 1993 & 1994). No initial Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was done (Munnik 1994), nor were the residents of nearby communities informed, let alone consulted, about the landfill which was to be built by Waste-tech.
premised upon the development of research approaches which ... empower the researched" (ibid). Such an empowering approach, I would argue, can include a variety of techniques, such as information-sharing workshops, in this case.

6. Even though I did not continue with the Ulana Park case study, the ethical issue related to a community ignorant of the dangers of the hazardous waste in their living area remained. However, the ethical problem solved itself, so to speak, as the residents of Ulana Park moved onto an adjoining piece of vacant land, apparently to ensure that ANC supporters did not occupy it. Furthermore, the Germiston Health Department has put forward a proposal that Ulana Park itself be rezoned for residential use and that a low-cost development project be developed. In this regard, the Health Department has also undertaken a clean-up of the area. Finally, providing education workshops in itself could be regarded as a political act, which may have brought me into conflict with local IFP structures.

7. Given the rather complicated nature of interim local-level restructuring, I will not deal here with how TMC officials' positions changed in both the pre-interim and interim phases. A synopsis of each individual is provided in Chapters 5 and 6.

8. In fact, I did later contact a number of people by telephone to ask a few more questions relating to missing information and points of clarification.

9. The origins of this Forum are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

10. A number of these contradictions are discussed in Chapter 5.

11. Unfortunately, the journalist had moved on to another newspaper by the time I conducted my research, and I was not able to speak to him directly.
1. When I began the process of deciding on a topic for this research component of the course, I decided that I wished to explore the methodology of social impact assessments. Through contacts at Earthlife Africa, I was pointed to a squatter community which had moved into an abandoned factory called Ulana Park in Germiston, on the East Rand. The company which had operated in this factory was a drum recycling company, and when the company was liquidated in approximately 1988, it vacated the premises, leaving behind various forms of hazardous material in open sumps (Earthlife Africa (Johannesburg) 1990). There were many industrial drums in the factory area, and from labels on these drums, it appeared that companies such as Plascon, BP, SASOL and Thor Chemicals supplied these drums. Many of the drums showed evidence of on-site incineration, and wastes such as paint residues, waste road-marking paint with glass beads, various oil sludges and waste printing inks, amongst others, were identified (Earthlife Africa 1990). Many of the paint residues had solidified and were scattered around the area. Other materials, including what seemed to be waste oil, were contained in open cement cachment areas next to the factory. Much of the toxic waste has been at the factory site since the first inhabitants moved into the area in 1988.

The first inhabitants of Ulana Park, according to Earthlife Africa (1990), were apparently Mozambiquan refugees. The present community, however, consists of people (mainly IFP supporters) who have indicated that they have fled from political violence in other areas.

2. Given the restricted amount of time for producing this research report (even with an extension of time), as well as an extremely heavy and inflexible workload at Unisa, I found it difficult to devote time to the exploration of two case studies.

3. During the four or five informal visits I made to Ulana Park, I came to realise that most community members were fairly strong IFP supporters. This would have meant that a translator would have needed to have been very carefully selected in terms of both my needs concerning the pursuit of information, as well as sympathy to and understanding of the IFP cause. Also, such a translator would have needed to have been approved of by the community.

4. This councillor was, coincidentally, white. His accessibility raises important questions about his relationship to the communities he is supposed to represent. This issue also highlights some of the contradictions of the political transition.

5. My argument for including an information-sharing and empowering component with regard to Ulana Park draws on Lather (1988: 570) who argues that "for those wishing to use research to change as well as to understand the world, conscious empowerment is built into the research design". In this regard, "an emancipatory social science must be
points out, information contained in newspaper articles can be biased and/or distorted, depending on the newspaper's political and financial interests. In this case, the managing director of the newspaper has been a local councillor for many years. However, by his own admission, he did not interfere at all with the journalist's work, even though, in retrospect, he felt that the newspaper may have given the issue too much publicity. Other documentary sources which I used are minutes of the North East Rand Environmental Forum, documents given to me by various social movement organisations, and documentation on Waste-tech and the public participation process which was given to me by Gibson, the consultant to Waste-tech.
own action.

In this regard, Papadakis (1993a) highlights the potential pitfalls of Touraine's position when the social researcher goes beyond the participant-as-observer role, by intervening in such a way that tensions and conflicts potentially emerge within the social movement, and where "[t]he sociologist aims to assist the activists in 'elevating' the level of their struggle to that of a true social movement" (Papadakis 1993a: 86). While Papadakis (1993a) acknowledges that the introduction of self-reflexivity and self-analysis into social movements may be positive, there is a danger of the social scientist trying to impose a model for social change onto social movement activists.

During my own research where I took on the role of participant-as-observer, I was very conscious of these contradictions. In group interactions I would sometimes play the role of 'devil's advocate' and introduce other possible points of view into discussion in an attempt to contribute to a process of reflexivity, but I consciously tried not to push any particular worldview, nor to present ideals that movements should strive for. However, despite these contradictions, the participant-as-observer role provides access to richer information, which may not be gained under other circumstances (Adler 1992: 233).

Finally, I used a variety of documentary sources, particularly newspaper articles, to construct a chronology of events, debates and issues as they emerged over the Chloorkop landfill. As the interviews were semi-structured, and I encouraged interviewees to discuss their perceptions, reactions and feelings to events and issues, it was difficult to construct an overall, chronological picture of what happened. One of the journalists from the local newspaper had taken up the Chloorkop issue, and as a result the campaign was extremely well-documented making it fairly easy to put together such a chronology. However, the interviews served as a cross-reference, and would have helped reduce any factual errors which may exist in the newspaper reports. As Scott (1990b: 145)
I have had contact with ELA for a number of years, and have attended some education workshops, signed petitions and occasionally gone to protest meetings. At the start of this research project, however, I became more closely involved in ELA and began attending monthly branch meetings, as well as monthly toxics campaign group meetings. Because my research involved aspects of toxic waste and brought me into contact with particular people, certain tasks were given to me. For example, because of my contact with the Germiston Health Department, I liaised with the Department on behalf of ELA. I also represent ELA on the interim steering committee of the North East Rand Environmental Forum. Although my participant-as-observer role does not relate directly to the Chloorkop Coalition committee, this role has nonetheless enabled me to gain insights into the issue of hazardous waste from the point of view of an environmental activist organisation, as well as from a civic perspective. Also, such a role has given me access to information which, although not confidential, I might otherwise not have gained, as meetings tend to be information-sharing sessions. Meetings are also a forum where events and issues are debated and discussed. In particular, attending monthly ELA meetings provided insights into contradictions with regard to the state, and emerging state positions on environmental issues. This insider access to information and situations is one advantage of the participant-as-observer role which is identified by Schatzman and Strauss (1973: 62).

One disadvantage to the role of participant-as-observer is that participant activities may be time-consuming and may not always be directly relevant to the research itself (Schatzman and Strauss 1973: 61). Papadakis (1993a) has pointed to a further tension regarding the participant-as-observer role in contemporary social movements. In this regard, Papadakis (1993a: 85) highlights the position taken by Touraine (1981) where

\[
\text{[t]he role of the researcher is to encourage the reflexivity of social actors, to assist them with self-analysis, with interpreting the significance of their...}
\]
Semi-structured interviews were chosen because they "provide greater depth" (Fontana and Frey 1994: 365) and allow for far greater flexibility than do structured interviews, for example. As Jones (1991: 204) notes, semi-structured interviews draw on an interview schedule which consists of questions, prearranged in themes and broad areas to be covered, but which allows the researcher the scope to probe and pursue other relevant areas which may emerge from individual interviews. The semi-structured, open-ended interview (as a qualitative research method) lends itself to researching perceptions and attitudes, the formation and emergence of ideas, world views, and so on. (Allan 1991: 177). Also, semi-structured interviews facilitate the development of a trust relationship which is not always as easily achieved with more impersonal or highly structured interview methods.

My second method of data collection could probably best be classified as a form of participant observation, more specifically 'participant-as-observer'. In general, participant observation involves

...social interaction between the researcher and those being studied in the milieu/environment of the latter during which data are systematically and unobtrusively collected (Van der Burgh 1988: 69).

Typically, this milieu/environment refers to the "daily lives/everyday social worlds of the people under study" (ibid; also see Burgess 1984: 79). In the case of this research, where social movement activists are under study, the relevant social setting could be considered organisation meetings and events (such as protest meetings and environmental workshops) which bring such activists together. What the researcher does, inter alia, is to enter the identified setting, "establish an identity/negotiate a role", (sometimes) participate, and observe and record the activities going on (Van der Burgh 1988: 70).

In the role of participant-as-observer, "the researcher participates as well as observes by developing relationships with informants"
unacceptable to go into the community without my research being accompanied by some form of environmental education and support regarding hazardous wastes. Clearly, to introduce an environmental education programme, even with the assistance of ELA, would have taken more time than I had available.

In view of the constraints which characterised the Ulana Park case study, I decided to focus on the Chloorkop case study, which I could then focus on in a more thorough manner.

In total, I conducted eleven in-depth, semi-structured interviews with regard to the Chloorkop case study. Eight of the interviews were with community activists, of whom seven formed the core of the Coalition committee which opposed the proposed landfill. The other activist was interviewed in order to obtain information about his organisation, since the person on the Coalition committee had not been involved with the organisation for very long. The waste company is represented by the person who conducted the public participation process on behalf of the company. The official view is represented by three TMC representatives, two of whom have carried over from the previous regime, and one of whom was a non-statutory councillor. The length of the various interviews varied between a three-quarter hour and two hours, while most interviews were between one-and-a-half and two hours. With the exception of one interview, all were recorded.

In order to establish a relationship between myself and those I interviewed, I began each interview session with a brief introduction as to who I am and what I was researching, similar to what Burgess (1984: 107) indicates he had done in various research projects. I also indicated what kinds of questions I wanted to ask and stated that the interviewee should stipulate any information which s/he would like to remain confidential. I also asked permission to contact interviewees at a later stage if I needed clarification on certain points.
second case study was about a squatter community which had moved into an abandoned factory in Ulana Park in Germiston. In the case of Ulana Park, questions pertaining to the lack of community mobilisation and collective action in the face of environmental threat would have been explored. Thus, the two case studies would have compared community access to social movement networks and information as well as previous cycles of mobilisation in order to establish if, and how, these factors influence community mobilisation around environmental issues. In this regard, the use of multiple case studies can facilitate comparison, particularly where the case studies have been chosen to demonstrate a logic of diversity (Rose 1991: 196).

However, as the research got under way, a number of problems began to emerge with regard to the Ulana Park case study. Firstly, it became evident that the scope of the two case studies exceeded the course requirements of a 'mini' report. Secondly, given the particularities of the Ulana Park community, I was seriously constrained with regard to the amount of time and effort I could allocate to research in the community. Many of the people, including the community's 'induna', spoke very broken English and I cannot speak Zulu. The community is very close-knit and highly suspicious of strangers, and I would have needed to establish a high level of trust in order to introduce a translator into the research process. Also, while I had gained access to the community itself, the 'induna' referred me to persons higher up the IFP hierarchy in order to obtain more information on certain issues. This proved to be very problematic: the IFP's East Rand office in turn referred me to their councillor on the Germiston TLC, and this person was extremely difficult to get hold of, a feat which I did not accomplish. Finally, my preliminary 'chats' with some community members indicated very little knowledge about the potentially dangerous substances contained in the community's living area. The community's lack of knowledge and its proximity to the hazardous material raised ethical issues, as well as the (related) problem of time. As regards the issue of ethics, I felt that it would be most
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Because this research focuses on social movement organisations and activists, and seeks to explain the dynamics and cycles of collective action, which are partially products of the particular experiences, interactions and interpretations of such activists, the underlying approach of this research is phenomenological. A phenomenological approach is useful because it is a means of trying to

... understand the meaning of particular events for people in particular situations ... [where] the ultimate aim is to study situations from the participants' point of view (Burgess 1984: 3).

However, using a phenomenological approach does not imply a decontextualised or ahistorical account of situations, perceptions or consciousness.

The case study is particularly useful for research areas requiring a phenomenological approach. As Rose (1991: 191) points out, one of the features of the case study is its concern with gaining access to the consciousness and experiences of people in specific social, economic, political and historical contexts. Secondly, Rose (1991: 190) also argues that one of the advantages of the case study is that it allows flexibility in the choices of methods of data collection. In this regard, my methods of data collection included semi-structured, in-depth interviews, participant observation and the use of documentary sources, including local newspaper articles, social movement organisation literature, and minutes of meetings.

At the outset of this project, I had actually identified two case studies which would be researched. As indicated in Chapter 1, the case study for this research focused on community opposition and collective action to the Chloorkop hazardous waste landfill. The
opposition could play, even at that relatively late stage of the process, after the permit had been granted.

Finally, previous social movement activity has had an important role to play in the mobilisation of the Chloorkop communities. Thus, as will be seen in the ensuing chapters, it is particularly important that community involvement and collective action occurred under the auspices of existing civic- and ratepayers associations, trade unions, and extra-parliamentary anti-apartheid political and youth organisations. Also important in the Chloorkop case study is the fact that, through their organisational networks and cooperation with Earthlife Africa, the communities around Chloorkop had access to information dealing with municipal zoning, the potential threat of toxic materials, and so on. This knowledge clearly influenced both the nature and the outcome of the struggle against the landfill. Also important is the fact that the development of an environmental consciousness, as precursor to environmental mobilisation, stemmed from both organisational activity and access to information.

The two chapters which follow will deal with the particular issues which have emerged from the interviews with key stakeholders. Chapter 5 will deal specifically with issues relating to the relationship between the state, industry and communities, while Chapter 6 will deal with individual histories, mobilisation networks and collective action frames and repertoires.
client base again.

4.2 Important issues for analysis emerging from the Chloorkop case study

The Chloorkop hazardous waste landfill raises important questions about the nature of power relations between communities, business and local state structures in this transitional period. With regard to state structures, it is crucial to examine the relationship between local, regional and national levels of government, as an issue such as toxic waste cannot be seen as a purely local problem. As will be seen in the chapters which follow, tensions and contradictions between the three levels of government have emerged around the issue of hazardous waste, of which the Chloorkop landfill is merely one aspect.

The Kempton Park City Council's role also needs careful consideration if one takes into account the fact that the first Section 59 committee found that the Kempton Park City Council did not have sufficient evidence to support a decision to let Waste-tech go ahead with the landfill. Also at issue is the fact that Kempton Park City Council did not inform Waste-tech of the proposed informal settlement on the boundary of the landfill. Finally, the incorrect zoning of the land on which the landfill is sited is also problematic.

It is clear that community and organisational resistance at this particular historical conjuncture is important because it has clearly had an impact on the relationship between the three key stakeholders, and on the extension of democracy (with regard to local government structures) and entrenchment of public participation (vis-a-vis industry). By early 1993, Waste-tech clearly realised that it could not unilaterally go ahead with the landfill without some degree of public consultation, particularly in view of the changing political climate. However, the company had obviously not taken into account the role that public and community
the area do not have a postal delivery service.

Community mobilisation in opposition to the appeal is beginning to take place again, but not under the auspices of the Coalition as such. A reconfiguration of involvement by the coalition activists has taken place, and a number are no longer part of grass-roots mobilisation around this particular issue. However, a number of original Coalition members are involved in the new initiative. For example, a different group of activists within the Rabie Ridge Civic Association organised an environmental workshop which was held on 30 September 1995. Ann Sugrue and Tebogo Phadu were present and gave short inputs. An interim steering committee for a North East Rand Environmental Forum (NEREF) was elected by those attending the workshop, which will extend to include all community-based structures and organisations in the North East Rand region (NEREF minutes 30/12/1995). One of the reasons that workshop participants chose a regional forum was because the local structure is a broader Metropolitan Council. The first issue to be dealt with was the Chloorkop landfill, and community representative meetings, education workshops and public meetings were planned in the areas immediately surrounding Chloorkop, and began to take place from 22 November 1995. Approximately twenty community representatives attended the first meeting which was held on 22 November. Organisations which were represented included ELA, Phomolong Women's League, Phomolong ANC Youth League, Rabie Ridge ANC, Rabie Ridge ANC Youth League and the Rabie Ridge Civic Association (NEREF minutes 22/11/1995).

Dudney, on the other hand, is continuing her resistance to the landfill in a private capacity. For example, Waste-tech held a tour at Chloorkop for the Gauteng MEC for the Environment on 24 October 1995. Abbey Dudney 'gatecrashed' the event and went so far as to give a speech about not needing Third World solutions to First World problems. If we have a First World industrial base then we must find First World solutions to toxic waste.

Dudney has also decided that she will send letters to Waste-tech's
Leachate, or water containing salts and heavy metals, may contaminate a subsidiary of the Jukskei River (The Kempton Express 14/09/1995: 14).

The article also mentioned that a secondary aquifer had been discovered on the site, and that this was "unchallenged during the [rezoning] hearing".

Ken Bromfield, managing director of Waste-tech, has indicated that Waste-tech, in considering the option of utilising the Chloorkop site for non-hazardous waste, would appeal to the Townships Board against the MSS rezoning decision, in order to avoid

... a lengthy administrative procedure at local level.

... Should the Townships Board agree to a rezoning, it can make a recommendation, including conditions precedent, to the Gauteng Minister of Environment, who has the power to make a final decision (The Kempton Express 21/09/1995: 1).

Furthermore, Bromfield indicated that Waste-tech was reconsidering its role in the hazardous waste management business. He stated that in view of increasing community opposition to landfills, government should take over site selection and development, while Waste-tech would "be happy to run [such sites] for them" (The Kempton Express 07/09/1995: 12).

The Townships Board was to begin the hearing on 20 November 1995. The Townships Board notified all those signatories who handed in letters of objection to the Kempton Park City Council on 16 August 1993, that they had the right to lodge objections with the Townships Board. However, there were a number of points of contention with regard to the process: objectors had to pay a R350-00 deposit upon the lodging of their objections, which was difficult as many people potentially affected by the dump are unemployed and were therefore unable to pay the deposit (The Star/Looking East 25/10/1995). The appeal would be heard in Pretoria, and thus raised problems of accessibility. The Townships Board notified original objectors of the appeal by post, yet Phomolong, Rabie Ridge and other suburbs in
The rezoning hearing reconvened in October 1994, with anti-dump protesters holding placards outside the Kempton Park civic centre on 11 October 1994. They again demanded that the unrepresentative hearing be adjourned, and that the process should wait until the Transitional Metropolitan Council (TMC) was in place (The Kempton Express 13/10/1994). Protesters also disrupted the hearing "and vowed not to allow it to go on until community representatives were appointed" (The Kempton Express 20/10/1994: 3). The Kempton Park City Council capitulated and five community representatives were appointed, four being from non-statutory organisations, and one from Midrand Town Council. Waste-tech's response was to slam the move as being the creation of a "kangaroo court", with Ken Bromfield stating: "If common sense does not prevail, we will withdraw from the hearing and seek legal remedies elsewhere" (The Kempton Express 20/10/1994: 3).

On 24 August 1995, The Kempton Express reported that the Kempton Park/Tembisa Metropolitan Substructure (MSS) of the North East Rand Transitional Metropolitan Council (TMC), had referred the matter to the TMC, which in turn referred it back to the MSS for a decision. At its monthly meeting at the end of August 1995, the Kempton Park/Tembisa MSS

... refused Waste-tech's application for the Chloorkop waste landfill site to be rezoned for hazardous industrial waste. ... Waste-tech could, however, apply for permission to operate the site for non-hazardous waste only (The Kempton Express 07/09/1995: 12).

In response to the above decision, Dudney has said that she intends to continue campaigning, in her private capacity, against the landfill being used at all:

For precisely the same reason that toxic waste should not be allowed at the toxic waste landfill site, domestic waste should not be allowed either. ...
more representative, transparent and credible forum be set up to hear the application (The Kempton Express 01/12/1993b: 2). The marchers were also addressed by the ANC’s head of science and technology, Roger Jardine, who stated that: “Everyone, irrespective of race, breathes the same air and drinks the same water. This issue affects all of us and yet the broader public was not consulted” (The Kempton Express 01/12/1993a: 1).

By now, Waste-tech had begun to realise that it would have to reach some sort of compromise with the communities opposing the landfill. Thus, in February 1994, it met with SANCO, the ANC and COSATU to try and reach an agreement whereby the landfill would initially be used as a Class G dump56 (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 1995: 1; GEM 1994: 2; The Kempton Express 16/03/1994: 1). However, some ambiguity exists, as the ANC, SANCO and SATU understood that it would be used only as a Class G landfill, while Waste-tech argued that hazardous waste would be gradually introduced as confidence in the company grew. No agreement could be reached, as Waste-tech refused to withdraw its application for a Class H landfill and reapply for a Class G landfill. Also problematic was the fact that Waste-tech did not attempt to include the entire Coalition in this agreement, but seemingly only approached those groups which, it could be argued, were strongest politically. Furthermore, according to the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1995: 1), the SANCO and ANC representatives were both local and regional. What is not clear from reports is whether Waste-tech initiated the regional participation of SANCO and the ANC with regard to this agreement. However, given the fact that certain members of the Coalition had apparently been sidelined, it is plausible that Waste-tech tried to circumvent the representatives of the local communities. However, if Waste-tech had intended to go above the local branches of organisations, then it demonstrates an ignorance on the part of Waste-tech of the structure, constitutional integrity and practice of autonomy within these organisations. Waste-tech’s attempt to reach an agreement failed, and protest against the dump by the Coalition continued (GEM 1994: 2; The Kempton Express 16/03/1994: 1;
Also at this time, Felicity de Wit thought of sending faxes to Anton Rupert of the Rembrandt Group\(^2\) to pressurise further those who had any links to Waste-tech. According to Dudney, the Coalition was not part of this particular exercise. This reflects the loose structure of the Coalition, in which organisations and structures were able to follow their own programmes of action.

In October 1993, a Section 59 committee of experts and officials, presided over by a senior advocate, was convened to hear Waste-tech’s rezoning application. The committee was requested by the Coalition, inter alia, to include community members and organisations, particularly in view of the political changes which were taking place (The Kempton Express 01/12/1993: 2). The Coalition continued to demand more legitimate representation, even after the general election in 1994. The Coalition’s first newsletter, written sometime in 1994 after the general election, demonstrates the Coalition’s strategy of challenging the legitimacy of the structures which were carried over from the pre-1994 period\(^2\). Thus, the Coalition continued to demand, inter alia, that the rezoning committee be restructured and made representative. Most of the Coalition, which had forced its way into the October 1993 hearing, walked out in protest when its demands were not met, but the Toxic Dump Action Group\(^2\) remained to present evidence to the committee. Their input was so lengthy that the three days allocated to the committee was insufficient. The committee had to reconvene in November (and would, in fact, be reconvened a third time after the 1994 election) (GEM 1994:2).

In response to the second convening of the hearing regarding the rezoning application, about 3000 anti-dump marchers\(^6\) again handed demands to Hans Muller on 29 November 1993 (The Kempton Express 01/12/1993a: 1). These demands were based on the argument that the existing Kempton Park council had no right to constitute a committee to take decisions on the lives of the majority when the council represented a minority in the greater Kempton Park area. Thus demands were made that the hearing be adjourned immediately, and a
In June 1993, Midrand Town Council discovered that the Klipfontein site was not zoned for industrial use, but for agricultural use. At the end of July, *The Kempton Express* (28/07/1993a: 2) announced that a rezoning application had been published in the *Government Gazette* of 21 July 1993, and that objections against the application had to be lodged within 28 days of publication in the *Government Gazette*. Ken Bromfield, managing director of Waste-tech, indicated that Waste-tech’s permit to operate the site was not actually affected by the application. Waste-tech was applying for the rezoning of the land because it

... had committed itself to comply with current and future legal requirements and as a measure of good faith had included detailed operational procedures in the conditions attached to the rezoning (*The Kempton Express* 28/07/1995: 2).

In response to the rezoning application representatives of the various groupings in the Coalition handed 2 256 letters of objection to Muller on 16 August 1993 (*The Kempton Express* 25/08/1993: 3). Objections included the rezoning application, people not being properly consulted, the fact that the EIA was not independent and that the site is unsuitable as it is situated on an important water table. Finally, Waste-tech’s poor management record at Margolis, another hazardous waste landfill in Germiston, was also raised.

On 27 August 1993, a letter of protest, signed by Nelson Mandela, was sent by the Coalition to all Waste-tech clients, urging them “not to allow their waste to be dumped in our backyards, where we have to bear the health costs of [their] pollution” (Dudney). The idea for such a letter originated with Dudney and the representative of the Toxic Dump Action Committee. The idea was put forward at a Coalition meeting, and the ANC representatives apparently thought the idea to be excellent, and organised that a copy of the letter was signed by Mandela. The letter was then photocopied, and copies sent off to Waste-tech clients, a list of which had been compiled by Dudney.
The Chloorkop dump ... is not toxic, there was no toxic material to be involved. It's more - not even hazardous - 'objectionable' material. So the toxic is a slogan that came into the emotional situation. ... The issue became publicised, and the dump became known as a toxic waste dump, which it was never intended to be.

The next protest action occurred on 5 June 1993, when a march was held and protesters handed their demands and a petition to the mayor of Kempton Park (The Kempton Express 09/06/1995: 1). The central demand related to "the right of communities to have a say in a development that may adversely affect their quality of life and their health" (The Kempton Express 26/05/1993c: 9). Although only 100 marchers turned up, the action included a diverse group of people marching together. The Kempton Express (ibid), for example, printed a photograph of Conservative Party councillor Martin Serfontein (also a Ratepayers' Association member) among the marchers.

On 28 July 1993(b: 4), a letter from the Toxic Dump Action Committee was published in The Kempton Express. The Toxic Dump Action Committee was a sub-committee of the Kempton Park Ratepayers' Association, and had been set up to deal with the anti-dump campaign. It was also one of the groups represented on the Coalition. The Toxic Dump Action Committee's letter stated that of the 3 691 signatures from the petition against the dump, 1 400 signatures were struck off by the town clerk, Hans Muller. Signatories were urged "to query with the town clerk ... whether or not their signature had been struck out and for what reason." Expanding on the striking-out of these signatures, Dudney said that the town clerk had omitted those signatures

... because [he felt] those people didn't know what they were signing, ... so we put a letter in the newspaper [telling people to phone the town clerk]. ... It caused a ... storm - all those people phoning!
Outrage over the dump was not confined to those who were part of the Coalition. One individual was so upset that s/he had taken to threatening councillors' and their families' lives, should such councillors not support the opposition to the dump. One threat, in particular, was quoted in The Kempton Express (19/05/1993: 1): "If you do not support us you will be the first to be dumped on the dump after you have been shot!"

The first protest action of the Coalition's campaign took place on 20 May 1993, when a human chain and "die-in" was held from the fence of the landfill to Phomolong, and it was shown that the distance between the two was approximately 400m (The Kempton Express 26/05/1993a: 1). Tembisa's ANC chairperson also called for the resignation of the Kempton Park councillors as "they are irresponsible".

The same edition of The Kempton Express announced that a Section 59 committee would "investigate the correctness of procedures followed during Waste-tech's application for the Chloorkop toxic waste dump" (26/05/1993b: 1). The setting up of this Section 59 committee can be seen as a direct result of "an outcry from the public about the dump".

Interestingly, the eventual conclusion of this Section 59 Committee was that Kempton Park City Council was not competent to reach a decision on the Chloorkop hazardous waste landfill, because "the experts [they used] were not competent enough to give expert opinion as to whether the site should go ahead" (Dudney). Dawson made a similar comment with regard to the findings of this Section 59 committee. Certainly, if a comment made by Eybers is reflective of the councillors' understanding, then the competence of at least some of the 'old' Kempton Park councillors to make a decision on the siting of a hazardous dump is questionable. Eybers asserted remarkably - that
Outrage over the dump was not confined to those who were part of the Coalition. One individual was so upset that s/he had taken to threatening councillors' and their families' lives, should such councillors not support the opposition to the dump. One threat, in particular, was quoted in *The Kempton Express* (19/05/1993: 1): "If you do not support us you will be the first to be dumped on the dump after you have been shot".¹⁶

The first protest action of the Coalition's campaign took place on 20 May 1993, when a human chain and "die-in" was held from the fence of the landfill to Phomolong, and it was shown that the distance between the two was approximately 400m (*The Kempton Express* 26/05/1993a: 1). Tembisa's ANC chairperson also called for the resignation of the Kempton Park councillors as "they are irresponsible".

The same edition of *The Kempton Express* announced that a Section 59 committee would "investigate the correctness of procedures followed during Waste-tech's application for the Chloorkop toxic waste dump" (26/05/1993b: 1). The setting up of this Section 59 committee can be seen as a direct result of "an outcry from the public about the dump".¹⁷

Interestingly, the eventual conclusion of this Section 59 Committee was that Kempton Park City Council was not competent to reach a decision on the Chloorkop hazardous waste landfill, because "the experts [they used] were not competent enough to give expert opinion as to whether the site should go ahead" (Dudney). Dawson made a similar comment with regard to the findings of this Section 59 committee. Certainly, if a comment made by Eybers¹⁶ is reflective of the councillors' understanding, then the competence of at least some of the 'old' Kempton Park councillors to make a decision on the siting of a hazardous dump is questionable. Eybers asserted - remarkably - that
first meeting and "see what happened". The first meeting of the Community Consultative Group was held approximately two weeks after the first public meeting and, according to Sugrue, the Group "stormed out" because it was felt that Waste-tech merely wanted the group to endorse its action. It would appear as if certain members of the group had agreed beforehand that they would discontinue participation in the group if Waste-tech did not seem committed to participation, and then undertake their own process of participation. It seems that Dawson played a key role in this strategic thinking. After "storming out" of the first Community Consultative Group meeting, the group decided to call a second public meeting, held on 4 May 1993, to which "township communities were invited, and in this way the process was taken over" (Sugrue). Dawson played a key role in inviting local ANC branches and civic organisations, as he himself became a member of the ANC in 1993. At the second public meeting a loose coalition of groups opposing the Chloorkop hazardous waste landfill was established, and became known as the "Coalition Against the Chloorkop Toxic Dump" (hereafter referred to as the Coalition). The Coalition had representatives from the Kempton Park Ratepayers' Association, Midrand Town Council, Earthlife Africa (ELA)\(^14\), Tembisa ANC, Ivory Park and Rabie Ridge\(^15\). At this meeting the ANC warned "that if the dump were to go ahead, the ANC would mobilise the masses to oppose it" (The Kempton Express 12/05/1993a: 2).

From this meeting the Coalition embarked on a concerted campaign to demonstrate community opposition to the dump, and a groundswell of resistance took root. In response to mounting community opposition and pending protest action, a Department of Water Affairs spokesman made it clear that since the permit had already been approved for the Chloorkop site, Waste-tech was legally entitled to go ahead. The permit could only be rescinded if Waste-tech did not comply with construction specifications (The Kempton Express 12/05/1993b: 6). Mr Ken Bromfield, managing director of Waste-tech, responded to community opposition by stating that "Waste-tech was being unfairly treated as they are part of the solution to the [hazardous waste]
very selective basis”. His feeling was that community members who were asked to sit on such committees had contacts in the council. Furthermore, he believes that these Section 59 committees did not operate much before 1990/1991, and he is thus sceptical about the extent and form of democracy to which Muller referred. Furthermore, if one takes into account the initial composition of the October 1993 Section 59 committee, which heard evidence on Waste-tech’s rezoning application, then it could no doubt be argued that Muller was over-optimistic in his view of the relative openness of the democratic process in Kempton Park.  

Dudney’s earlier remark that council is “there to look after the interests of the residents, not after the interests of industry” raises the issue of the relationship between local government structures, business and communities. For example, Kempton Park Councillors seemed to accept on good faith that Waste-tech, having given its assurances of good management at the Chloorkop landfill, would present no physical threat to either community or environment. However, the Coalition argued that Waste-tech’s management and labour relations record at Margolis, for example, was not exemplary and community safety could not be guaranteed. However, and perhaps even more importantly, both Dudney and Dawson raised the issue that Fraser-Alexander is the holding company of Waste-tech, and it is Fraser-Alexander which was responsible for the Merriespruit disaster. As Dudney has argued, a commission of enquiry was held into the Merriespruit disaster and Fraser-Alexander was 

... found to be hiding the truth and trying to brush things under the carpet, and these guys [Waste-tech] are exactly the same. The 'culture' definitely filters through. 

Dudney’s views are supported by Dawson, who stressed that the relationship between Waste-tech and Fraser-Alexander is particularly pertinent to the Chloorkop landfill issue since Fraser-Alexander ... lied when the commission of enquiry was held. The most significant thing that came out of that commission of enquiry was that these people were lying through
gap, and we felt as ratepayers we had to narrow that bridge.

Dudney's perception of the council's lack of accountability is similar:

I was furious [when I heard about the dump] because our council is very good at doing things which I feel are behind the backs of the residents. ... As far as I'm concerned, they are there to look after the interests of the residents, not after the interests of industry, although the two do go hand-in-hand.

Part of the problem with secrecy and "behind closed doors" decisions, according to Kleynhans, was attributed to rumoured Broederbond connections in the Kempton Park City council:

As I said before, many decisions were taken behind closed doors. One cannot say "It is" - I'm not making an allegation. But talking to various people in the community, to the ratepayers, there is a feeling that the Broederbond and the secretiveness was very much involved in letting that [dump] go ahead. Because bearing in mind that we had a local council here, and we had the people in the national government and national departments, many of whom were members of the Broederbond.

Although Joos Kleynhans' allegations of possible Broederbond involvement are not substantiated, given academic accounts of the extent and influence of the Afrikaner Broederbond, it cannot be assumed that decision-making in Kempton Park was not influenced by the Broederbond. Accounts of the Afrikaner Broederbond indicate that it had infiltrated all levels of government, from the level of State President right down to local councils and even Teacher/Parent Associations.

Another aspect which raises the issue of contradiction is that of the Section 59 committees. As Kleynhans argues, there was some attempt "to get the community involved, but then again, it was on a
really says that all of us [should] have the right to come and sit and discuss something, and then all of us take a decision. That's democracy. But in practice you can't do that. So we elect somebody to go and do it on our behalf. If he doesn't perform then you don't elect him again.

Muller gave a more complex account of local level white politics. He argued that under the old dispensation, elections for whites were held, and councillors would be elected who would take autonomous decisions without "really going back to the people". He did, however, argue that Kempton Park City Council had, in the past, been a little more democratic than most, because the council had made use of (white) community members on Section 59 committees:

Generally, I would say that it wasn't a very democratic system in the sense that you went out and had community development forums and local development forums like we have now, where you got input from the people directly. You had the council representing the people, and then here and there in various sectors you also had private people coming in and sitting on advisory committees like Section 59s. ... So the democratic process in our region has been going a bit further than in other regions. But than again, that was primarily for the white community of Kempton Park.

However, Dudney and Kleynhans\textsuperscript{13}, criticised the undemocratic and secretive nature of local level politics far more forcefully. According to Kleynhans:

The politicians were elected to office and you never heard of these guys. Once elected to office ... that person disappeared. ... They went to parties, they went to various meetings and occasions, went overseas and we never heard from them again. There was quite a gap between councillors, who were supposed to represent the voters, and the people on the ground. There was a wide
and timing of cooperation can be seen. In September 1990, after months of negotiation, the Soweto Accord (which, inter alia, ended the rent boycott) was signed. Also in terms of the Soweto Accord, the Johannesburg Metropolitan Chamber "was formally established in April 1991" (Swilling and Boya 1995: 18i). Despite NORKOK's existence, a local government forum was only established in the North East Rand once the transitional legal framework compelled such cooperation. In contrast to Soweto, Tembisa's rent and services boycott only ended in mid-March 1993 (The Kempton Express 17/03/1993: 2).

Also, this period was one of growing uncertainty, particularly among whites, with the socio-political changes which had finally taken place. It was after 1990 that many white ratepayers associations were established, primarily, it would appear, in order to protect whites against the possibility of having to pay for township debts, a result of service charges boycotts, once residential areas started merging\textsuperscript{5}. Thus, the (white) Kempton Park Ratepayers' Association was formed in August 1992. Central to its formation was a dissatisfaction on the part of many white ratepayers in Kempton Park with what was seen to be the undemocratic nature of (white) councils and a lack of accountability on the part of councillors to their constituencies. The formation of the association seemed to be motivated by discontent with the secretive nature of the political process at the local level.

On the issue of local level democracy for whites, there seems to be some ambiguity in the perceptions of different roleplayers. For example, Eybers sees "the old dispensation" as being democratic:

If I [as a councillor] take a decision that my community really feels up-in-arms about, they may possibly not be in a position to reverse this [decision], but they are in a position to say "Those people that take decisions like that, we don't want them back as councillors". And that is how the democratic process works. We are, in fact, delegating our powers. The democratic process
set up a cooperative system between these white councils, Tembisa’s BLA, and business in the area. NORKOK was only really phased out once local government negotiations got under way in the region in early 1994. Until then, it continued with its activities in the region. Once Rabie Ridge was established, its management committee was also drawn into the NORKOK structure, according to Longmans.

According to both Hans Muller and Han Eybers, NORKOK was seen by those involved as thus being the forerunner of the North East Rand Transitional Metropolitan Council concept. However, and perhaps not surprisingly, this view was not shared by the trade union, community and political activists who were interviewed. For example, Isaac Mahlangu indicated that NORKOK had made no attempts to include community organisations at its inception, and only approached community organisations to join in 1991/1992, at which point such organisations refused.

5.2 Period of fluidity: 1990 - early 1994

This period in South Africa’s history reflects a certain degree of contradiction and ambiguity. While in 1990, the old order was still firmly in power, by 1993 transitional structures had been established. However, these transitional structures did not, and indeed could not, replace old structures, with the result that old and new existed alongside each other, often in uneasy concert. For social movements, disjuncture between oppositional mobilisation to the state, and participation in transitional structures, demanded new repertoires, frames, and strategies for continued collective action in order to influence decision-making. Furthermore, the change in the political opportunity structure during this period significantly altered the way in which movements could act.

A number of contradictions between stakeholders in the North East Rand region during this transitional phase can be discerned. For example, if the transition in the North East Rand region is compared to that of Greater Johannesburg, a great difference in the nature
state of the roads, especially among the houses ... (the secondary roads).

It could be argued that the timing of NORKOK's establishment, the circumstances of its formation and its objectives (as so succinctly stated by Muller), as well as its composition, can no doubt be linked to the National Security Management System (NSMS), with its Joint Management Committees (provincial level), sub-JMCs (regional level) and mini-JMCs (local level). As Morris and Padayachee (1988: 18) argue:

The role of the JMCs [was] to identify problems in a community and deploy expertise to upgrade township conditions in an attempt to defuse the political consequences (my emphasis).

As Han Eybers points out, the provision of expertise was one of the ways in which the councils and councillors in the North East Rand region provided assistance to Tembisa in this period:

These councillors said: "There are a lot of problems in the Tembisa area. Can we not assist in any way or try to do something, for instance, get our Town Engineer to go and give some assistance?" We made qualified people available to them. Kempton Park gave a Town Clerk, Modderfontein a Town Engineer, Edenvale gave a health official, etc.

According to Hans Muller, NORKOK also approached companies in the area for computer and financial assistance, for example. Such assistance from the private sector in the North East Rand region was obtained, and also reflects a broader cooperative relationship between industry and the state.

Given the continuing sensitivity of the JMC issue, it was not possible to directly link NORKOK to the JMC structure. However, NORKOK certainly appears to have functioned in a way which is very similar to a sub-JMC, given its objectives, the fact that it was composed of (white) town councillors from all the white municipalities in the North East Rand region, and the fact that it
the contradictions caused between new structures of governance and those carried over from the apartheid era.

5.1 State, community and industry pre-1990

The pre-1990 period in the North East Rand, comprising the then white areas of Edenvale, Modderfontein, Kempton Park and Midrand, as well as Tembisa township, is important as it lays the foundation for understanding the post-1990 period of uncertainty and fluidity in the relationship between the state, industry and communities. In general, the period of the 1980s saw particular configurations of state and community action and reaction. In particular, understanding this period of state repression and community resistance in the North East Rand region provides important insights into the politics of transition after 1990.

According to the pre-1994 ex-Kempton Park councillors/officials interviewed, Han Eybers and Hans Muller, who are now also part of the Kempton Park/Tembisa Metropolitan Substructure and the North East Rand Metropolitan Council (TMC) respectively, the formation of the North East Rand TMC has its roots in the 1986 period of insurrection and consequent general state of emergency. During the 1986 insurrection and subsequent state of emergency the North East Rand Co-ordinating Committee (NORKOK) was established. NORKOK was a joint attempt by councillors of Edenvale, Kempton Park, Modderfontein and Midrand to provide "assistance" to Tembisa (Eybers). However, Muller's periodisation of the establishment of NORKOK can be deemed quite significant, given this particular period in South Africa's history:

NORKOK was established in the riots of 1986, with the prime object of improving services and rendering assistance to Tembisa ... The intention was then to have regular meetings with councillors, then still elected councillors of Tembisa, and to supply equipment. The problem was that in 1986 with the riots the police and Defence Force couldn't get into Tembisa because of the
CHAPTER 5

UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE, INDUSTRY AND COMMUNITY IN THE NORTH EAST RAND REGION

As a microcosm of broader socio-political processes, past and present, this study of the Kloorkop campaign yields some important insights into the politics of transition in South Africa in general, as well as the political empowerment of communities in this transitional period. An analysis of the interviews, together with reports from the local newspaper, paints a picture of optimism, as well as contradiction and ambiguity regarding this transitional political phase.

In this chapter, the analysis of the research findings relating primarily to the state will be divided into three historical periods. The first will deal with the period up to 1990. Although the transitional process had not yet begun, the roots of the present transition clearly lie in the contradictory and ambiguous reform process which gained momentum from the late 1970s. The second period will deal with the very fluid period between 1990 and 1994, when the principles and process of transition were being debated and formalised. No enabling legislation had yet been passed to force local government structures to begin, in earnest, the process of local government restructuring. The process of local level transition began only in 1994, with the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993, which came into effect on 27 April 1994, the day of South Africa's first democratic election. The period between 1990 and 1994 certainly represents one of uncertainty, particularly for stakeholders such as business and white local authorities, which may have felt caught in a time warp between an authoritarian past and an as-yet relatively undetermined future. The final period will deal with 1994 to the present, and will highlight some of the contradictions which have emerged between the various levels of government in the post-general election period, as well as some of
23. Again, Dawson's influence is apparent as he played a key role in the production of the Coalition's newsletter. Furthermore, a perusal of newspaper reports shows Alan Dawson to have been an outspoken critic of the Kempton Park City Council.

24. By now, Abbey Dudney was aligned to the Kempton Park Ratepayers Association, and hence was part of the Toxic Dump Action Committee.

25. GEM (1994: 2) cites the number as being 5000 marchers.

26. Class G refers to a municipal waste dump which does not allow any form of hazardous waste.

27. The Townships Board is a regional body which was statutorily created in 1913, and makes recommendations on issues relating to land use. This includes land rezoning applications and certain aspects of title deeds.

28. It would seem as if Kempton Park City Council's justification for not informing Waste-tech of the proposed informal settlement is that the settlement would fall outside of the Department of Water Affairs' stipulated buffer zone by 140m (The Kempton Express 12/05/1993a: 2).
problems getting access to health and medical facilities. Most of the people living in Phomolong are unemployed, have no access to telephones should a spillage occur and there are no clinics nearby.

13. Dudney went to the first public meeting as a concerned individual, and was to become one of the campaign's key activists.

14. ELA is a progressive environmental activist organisation, and will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.

15. The first residents of the informal settlement of what was to become known as Phomolong had not yet moved into the area.

16. However, the threats eventually stopped, with the perpetrator not carrying out his/her threats, and also not being identified by police.

17. Section 59 refers to Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1.39. The primary function of this clause was to make provision for the appointment of committees on an ad hoc basis to advise local councils on particular issues.

18. At the time of the Chloorkop campaign Eybers was the Vice Chair of the Kempton Park City Council's Management Committee. He went on to become co-chair of the Kempton Park/Tembisa Metropolitan substructure executive committee. He was elected as a ward councillor during the November 1995 community elections. As mentioned previously, he is also manager of Kempton Park's local newspaper, The Kempton Express. He was also Administrator of Tembisa between 1992 and 1994.

19. At the start of the Chloorkop hazardous waste landfill campaign, Mul was the Town Clerk of Kempton Park, a position which he held for several years. By the time of the interview, he had become the Chief Director of the North East Rand TMC.

20. Alan Dawson also raised the issue of a poorly managed temporary hazardous waste site, run by Waste-tech, at Olifantsfontein. According to Dawson, the site was temporarily opened and used for approximately four years, and then closed in 1992. Problems included odours, and chemical sludge being spilled on the roads: "It was a litany of serious bad management". Furthermore, this site (still) poses a very real threat to the environment as it "sits on the Sterkfontein aquifer, which is the most important source of water for the Gauteng Industrial complex".

21. I was unfortunately not able to interview Felicity de Wit as she had subsequently moved and had not kept in touch with even Abbey Dudney, with whom she had developed a fairly close friendship.

22. During the search for the owners of Waste-tech, it was found that the Rembrandt Group is the major shareholder of Fraser Alexander, which owns Waste-tech.
Gibson's client base includes a company which had apparently experienced problems with its workforce with regard to issues around the mining of asbestos. Presumably, Waste-tech was anticipating public opposition, and needed an experienced consultant to play a mediation role, since Gibson's services had been recommended by the company which had had the asbestos problem.

6. The concept of integrated environmental management (IEM) was only really introduced in 1989 when the Council for the Environment began producing guidelines for IEM. However, it was only in 1994 that the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1994a/b/c) published minimum requirements for the siting, construction and monitoring of hazardous waste landfills. These requirements are more stringent than before, "but [are] less stringent than the standards adopted in the Northern Hemisphere" (1994a: i14).

7. Apparently, what Waste-tech referred to as their EIA was, in fact, merely a compilation of the reports of the geotechnical studies which were done. However, it seems that criticism of Waste-tech's EIA was far more deep-seated than Brian Gibson's assessment - for example, supporting technical documentation against Waste-tech's application for the rezoning of the land used in the rezoning hearing indicated that Waste-tech's EIA was most inadequate because it had failed to identify important groundwater systems.

8. At the time of the formation of the Chloorkop Coalition Sugrue was a member of the newly formed Midrand branch of Earthlife Africa. She also has an MSc (Microbiology) and was a researcher at the University of the Witwatersrand.

9. A similar point was raised at the 12 March meeting where "[a] number of guests indicated ... that the meeting had been poorly publicised" (BGIM 1993: 1).

10. Dawson is a former councillor and mayor of Midrand. At the time of the interview, he was a non-statutory ANC member of the North East Rand Transitional Metropolitan Council.

11. This informal settlement was initially known as Mooifontein, and the name was later changed to Phomolong.

12. As Brauch et al (1994) point out, some confusion exists over the distancing of the buffer zone. The Department of Health stipulates 800m, while the Department of Water Affairs regards a minimum of 500m as ideal. In fact, ... 00m distance is stipulated in the Department of Water Affairs' (1992) permit. The fact that Phomolong is an informal settlement is also significant in terms of the potential costs to be borne by this community. As Bullard (1993a: 11) argues with reference to the USA:

   Persons of color who live in contaminated areas are often victims of a "double whammy" in that they are exposed to elevated risks, while at the same time they often have
Endnotes

1. Interestingly, *The Kempton Express* is part of the Caxton Group of newspapers, who are owned by Fraser Alexander. The manager of *The Kempton Express* is Han Eybers, a former Kempton Park City councillor and present Metropolitan substructure Councillor. Waste-tech’s holding company is Fraser Alexander. The role of Fraser Alexander is discussed more fully in chapter 5.

2. The article went on to state that it had contacted the Kempton Park City Council and was referred to the marketing manager of the council, who was not available at time of going to press. After the appearance of this article, a spate of letters from the public protesting against the landfill appeared from the 3 March 1993 edition of *The Kempton Express*.

3. Class H:H landfills contain hazardous forms of waste (excluding, inter alia, explosives, compressed gases and radioactive materials) (Department of Water Affairs 1992: 8 & 9). Hazardous waste (1 part), which is usually liquid in form, is mixed with domestic refuse (10 parts) in a Class H:H landfill. The domestic refuse acts as a sponge for the liquid hazardous waste. Certain hazardous wastes, which cannot be treated or properly analysed, are sealed in leak-proof and earthquake-proof concrete containers (calls) (BGIM 1993: 3), and carefully labelled, until such time as waste disposal technology has been developed to the point at which the encapsulated waste can be safely disposed of (BGIM 1993: 4).

4. Only the necessary geotechnical and geohydrological studies, required by the Department of Water Affairs at the time, were done. These requirements are not equivalent to a fully-fledged EIA.

5. According to Brian Gibson *Issue Management* (b), hereafter referred to and referenced as BGIM, ‘issue management’... is a particularly useful strategic planning and problem-solving tool in the complex and challenging South African business environment.

BGIM helps organisations win the freedom to pursue corporate objectives by ensuring that organisational policy, strategy, communications and image are in balance with the norms and demands of society in general and key stakeholders in particular. The sensitive relationship between an organisation and its key stakeholders ... is analysed and managed in a manner that is sensitive, pragmatic and innovative.

This necessitates ongoing analysis of, and proactive strategic response to, the so-called "weak signals of change" in the social, political, technological, labour, marketing, environmental, legal and ethical fields.
5.4 Conclusion

This account of the relationship between the state, industry and communities shows that there has been a clear continuity between the various phases with regard to the structures and management style of the previous government. Unfortunately, because bureaucratic structures have remained in place in this transitional period, many obstacles to democratic participation by communities exist. Thus, community organisations need to clearly define their roles in such a way that the interests of local communities can be served. The following chapter examines in detail the collective action around the Chloorkop campaign.
we can't play the kind of macro-politics that they want to play.

Waste-tech's position on the issue of public participation has also shifted, although Waste-tech's shift is also contradictory. This shift in position can be seen from two examples: on the one hand, it has involved the Rietfontein residents in the Margolis Closure Committee. On the other hand, the company is planning to construct a medical waste incinerator in Gauteng. It has identified nine potential sites, and invited public participation (The Star 12/09/1995). A public meeting was held on 30 September 1995 and a site tour of the existing medical incinerator, as well as some of the proposed sites, took place. This is Waste-tech's first siting project since Chloorkop, and the company has started the public participation process much earlier. However, despite this apparent about-face, Waste-tech has been criticised by ELA who argued that the public meeting and site tour seemed to be a PR exercise, and that Waste-Tech did not seem committed to proper consultation.

This period in South Africa's political transition highlights a number of contradictions with regard to the relationship between the state and communities. If the debate on the future role of civics vis-a-vis the state is considered, then I would argue that the recent controversy over the Finnish shipment highlights the need for vigilant community-based organisations which can take up issues such as this, on behalf of their members. Community vigilance is particularly necessary considering that many bureaucrats and state officials have maintained their previous positions, and can block important projects or go against new policies. In this regard it is important, for example, to pose the counterfactual question of whether the Finnish shipment would have been allowed into South Africa had there been no public outcry or protest action by ELA.
City Times 25/08/1995). It was subsequently discovered that the permit had not been signed by a DEAT official but by consultants to the DEAT. The shipment was turned back, and an official investigation was to be conducted (Koch 14-21/09/1995: 6; The Star 18/08/1995). One of the implications is that, given Gauteng's hazardous waste disposal crisis, the importation of toxic waste would have increased the need for such disposal facilities. Furthermore, the granting of such a permit also flies in the face of vehement community opposition, and raises questions about the commitment of certain state departments to the democratic process.

Members of the Chloorkop Coalition also articulated the contradictions which exist between the various levels of government with regard to an issue such as hazardous waste. Sugrupe pointed to the political contradictions contained in a campaign of this nature:

It is important to remember that there are different prongs to a campaign like this - [at the political level] there are politicians. [At the level of] national politics ... [they will] be saying "Well, we need a site, nationally" and that will mean sacrificing a community; and then you're going to have provincial politics which is where you have an MEC who's accountable to his/her electorate and who will say "Well, we need a site in Gauteng, but this is getting a little too close to home, so we need to be a little more careful here"; and then you have local politicians saying "This is a campaign that I can fight and win an election on".

Dawson made a similar point when he stated that the national government sees the hazardous waste issue in a broader sense, and might not always acknowledge problems at the local level:

National government doesn't recognise [the local nature of this problem]. ... [T]hey're saying "We can write off 10 000 votes here and 10 000 votes there. It's not a problem." But when it gets to local government level, 10 000 votes happens to be the total votes in the town. So
irrespective of the impact of accidents (such as in the Holfontein example) and community opposition.

At a regional level, Gauteng has established a hazardous waste committee (Hazwac) to investigate the hazardous waste crisis in Gauteng. Policy recommendations, if it is accepted that a crisis exists, could well mean that a decision to open Chloorkop could be taken. This is not an unrealistic eventuality if one takes into account the fact that Waste-tech has appealed against the Kempton Park/Tembisa substructure's decision to refuse the rezoning of the land. In this regard, Waste-tech has lodged an appeal with the Townships Board, which will hear the appeal and make a recommendation to Gauteng's MEC for the environment, who is responsible for making the final decision (The Kempton Express 21/09/1995: 1). The issue of the Townships Board highlights another of the contradictions of the present transitional period and relates to the fact that while many of the explicitly apartheid departments have been removed, a number of departments which did not deal with apartheid issues per se, but which are imbued with an authoritarian mentality, still exist and continue with business as usual. In this regard, the Townships Board can be regarded as having an undemocratic and unaccountable structure. Already a number of contentious issues have been raised with regard to Waste-tech's appeal to the Townships Board. One relates to the fact that objectors have to pay a R350.00 deposit, which most residents in Rabie Ridge, Phomolong and Tembisa will be unable to afford. This contradiction is highlighted by a spokesperson for the Townships Board: "It's the first time that we have had objectors from a poor community and this is a learning curve for the administration" (The Star/Looking East 25/10/1995).

Given the so-called hazardous waste crisis in Gauteng, even more contradictions emerged over a permit which was granted by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) in August 1995 for the importation of a shipment of toxic waste from Finland for recycling at a company in Benoni on the East Rand (The Benoni
between the various levels of government. On the one hand, Waste-tech's Margolis site at Germiston will be closing on 31 December 1995. During its lifespan, there have been numerous complaints from residents about odours and spillages. As a result, in 1992 the Germiston City Council cancelled Waste-tech's Class 1 (now classified as H:H) permit at Margolis although the handling of domestic refuse could continue. Waste-tech appealed against the decision, but a Rand Supreme Court judgement on 29 October 1993 upheld the Germiston City Council's decision. Furthermore, an interdict was granted against the processing of hazardous waste (Saturday Star 30/10/1993: 1). However, according to a Germiston Health Department official, because of the crisis in Gauteng regarding the lack of adequate hazardous waste disposal sites, the new minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Kader Asmal, and a legal representative, decided in conjunction with Germiston City Council, to selectively apply the interdict so that a build-up of medical and hazardous wastes did not lead to the illegal dumping of such wastes. In particular, the odorous wastes at Margolis were taken care of, presumably to remove one source of complaints by residents. What this example also highlights is the relative powerlessness of a community, which has vociferously opposed the continuation of hazardous waste disposal at a site, in a situation such as this. This example demonstrates the fact that community opposition may be ignored in relation to other interests.

The second hazardous waste site in Gauteng is Enviroserv's Holfontein site near Springs. In September 1995, one of the leachate cells at Holfontein was leaking, and on 8 October 1995, the retaining wall of an ash-mixing pond broke, releasing approximately 8 000 litres of acid oil into the area adjacent to the Holfontein site (The Star 10/10/1995).

Certain roleplayers, like Waste-tech and ex- and present Kempton Park councillors, are using the Margolis and Holfontein problems as justification for the opening of the Chloorkop site in the national and regional interests of safe hazardous waste disposal,
reflective of the contradictory nature of the transition process, where a minority of old-style officials were still attempting to impose their will on a majority.

However, while there were clearly some problems in the transitional process, there was also a feeling of optimism. For example, Isaak Mahlangu said that:

In our area we do have conflict but it is not that large. There is willingness to work together. There is that change of making sure that everyone is on board. ... People are able to talk and find out if they agree on certain issues.

Finally, local community elections were held on 1 November 1995. The results in the region show that the ANC won a clear majority in the Metropolitan Council and its substructures (The Kempton Express 09/11/1995; Midrand Reporter 09/11/1995).

However, with regard to analysing the state during the post-1994 period, the contradictions pertaining to the issue of hazardous waste management are most clearly illustrated by an examination of the relationship between the various levels of government. Furthermore, these contradictions clearly affect the relationship between communities and the state.

The Chloorkop landfill cannot be regarded purely as a local issue, but must be seen in terms of a national hazardous waste management programme which has a number of implications for Chloorkop. For example, problems with other hazardous sites in the region are clearly putting pressure on the opening of the Chloorkop landfill. Also, the issue of the importation of toxic waste and controversies surrounding such importation have also come to the fore during this period.

The two other hazardous waste sites in Gauteng and their relationship to Chloorkop highlights the nature of the contradiction...
more quickly and appropriately to the changes in the structure of political opportunity which had presented itself.

5.3 National and regional influences on local restructuring in the North East Rand from 1994

As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.1) the Local Government Transition Act came into effect from 27 April 1994. Most local councils thus started the process of establishing local forums from the beginning of 1994, after Mandela and de Klerk signed an agreement whereby rent and service charges arrears would be "written off". Probably one of the greatest contradictions of this phase is that, although the end of the process would see the entrenchment of democracy at the local level, the process itself was not truly democratic. Firstly, the form, nature and process of local government restructuring had been negotiated through the Multi-Party Negotiating Process, and had been imposed through the relevant legislation. Secondly, the form of both the transitional councils, as well as the councils which would come into effect after the community elections, was also determined at national level negotiations. Finally, at the local level itself, nominations for both statutory and non-statutory members were not democratically made. In short, while democracy was being entrenched, the process itself was prescribed from above and not necessarily participatory.

On 12 February 1994, the first pre-negotiating forum was held for the North East Rand region, and was attended by more than 150 delegates, representing 45 civic and community organisations from Kempton Park, Tembisa, Edenvale, Modderfontein, Midrand, Ivory Park and Rabie Ridge. Also present, of course, were the existing councils of these areas (The Kempton Express 16/02/1994: 1). At this meeting, representatives from Midrand Town Council raised the issue that a survey in Midrand had indicated "that the majority of their people preferred to be part of a forum with Pretoria". This issue became fairly large, since the white Midrand councillors only represented a small fraction of the Greater Midrand population. This issue is
is if our household waste goes there. ... The economic benefit to us is that our refuse removal trucks won't have to travel the distances they do at the moment. That escalates the costs of the refuse removal to each family. So that is a tremendous economic benefit to the community.

However, in the opinion of Dudney, the council had been so secretive and unaccountable that she stated that she was not sure that the council would, in fact, pass such savings on to the community, as this would be one way of increasing council revenue.

One final issue relating to the complex relationship between the state, industry and communities during this period, is that of the role of Eybers and NORKOK in the administration of Tembisa. In February 1992, Eybers was appointed administrator for Tembisa (The Kempton Express 17/03/1993: 2), a position he held until the end of August 1994 (The Kempton Express 08/09/1994: 5). He stated that the BLA in Tembisa was "dismantled" in late 1991/early 1992, as "it was not able to govern Tembisa". This occurred during an investigation into corruption (which was not conclusively proved) within the BLA. However, a recent article in the Sunday Times/Metro (12/11/1995: 1) states that the Kempton Park Council has requested the Gauteng premier to open an investigation into missing funds and "crooked land deals" in Tembisa during Eybers' period of administration. Another ex-councillor was also named, and both men were linked to NORKOK. Eybers denied knowing anything about the missing funds.

In conclusion, an analysis of this period in the North East Rand region provides a clear indication of the continuities between this phase and the previous period. Both the structures and previous style of governance were evident prior to the election in 1994. The Kempton Park Council still attempted to make unilateral decisions, while some councillors apparently thought that secrecy and lack of accountability were still the order of the day. Waste-tech, too, seemed to be struggling to adapt to the transitional process. In many ways, the Coalition, in contrast, seemed to have adapted far
I would argue that this discourse of disempowerment can be regarded as the frame used by Waste-tech and Kempton Park City Council in opposition to the collective action framework used by the Coalition. Furthermore, while such a discourse of disempowerment may have been used by industry and officials, it should not be assumed that it was entirely successful. Certainly, in the case of the Chloorkop Coalition, an analysis of the strategies employed indicates that the Coalition may have been successful in negating the effects of such a disempowering discourse, by using more innovative tactics, such as highlighting the connections between Waste-tech and Fraser Alexander, thus portraying Waste-tech in an extremely negative light. Further, an analysis of the demands of the Coalition (as outlined in Chapter 4) indicates that the Coalition was contesting the local council's perception that it could continue making unilateral decisions during this period. Demands by the Coalition for inclusion on the hearing committee is, perhaps, reflective of the union strategies identified by Friedman and Shaw (1995), whereby unions demanded the establishment of more representative economic forums so that the state's position of continuing sovereignty and unilateralism could be challenged. Indeed, as Sugrue pointed out, by opposing unilateral decision-making, the Coalition did succeed in delaying the process until a more representative committee could continue the hearing after the 1994 election. However, the intransigence of the Kempton Park City Council's position does raise questions about its commitment to the reform process in general, particularly as the Section 59 committee was reconstituted only after the election.

Also at issue with regard to analysing the role of the Kempton Park City Council and the siting of the landfill, would be financial gains to the Kempton Park council. Muller was adamant that there would be no direct economic benefit:

They [Waste-tech] are not paying us a cent for that site. The only economic benefit that we can have from it...
class barriers wouldn't have done so anyway, even if there hadn't been a Chloorkop issue.

However, what a view like this cannot deal with is the fact that people of mutually opposing political views, like the AWB and ANC, came to work together. As Tebogo Phadu of the ANC put it: "I never thought in my life that I would be working with some of the people there. We had people from the AWB, for instance."

Also, an issue which came to the fore is that the siting of the dump is a "technical" issue:

The Chloorkop thing was, from our point of view, a very technical and very rational sort of thing. We said: "Do we need a landfill site, and do we need a toxic site for our industries?" and we do. ... Already people have started spilling and throwing drums of toxic waste around, everywhere. Into the spruits and veld. So we must be very careful before we get emotional about something [Muller].

The way in which the needs of industry and the interests of the greater community were articulated is also disempowering. For example, Eybers argued that the communities around the Chloorkop landfill should rather accept its location in the interests of the area, so that illegal dumping can be averted:

What will happen if I put the toxic dump 80 miles from here? I am not trying to protect the industry when I say it must be here. I'm trying to protect individuals, because I am worried that the moment we say "It is now not going to cost you R30 per kilolitre, but it's going to cost you R130", an industrialist is going to say it's now becoming cost inhibitive. Their consideration won't be people, it will be being caught out [on illegal dumping]. I would not like to put industry in that sort of dilemma, because by putting them in that sort of dilemma I am endangering my constituency, my people, the people that I work very hard for. I'm going to endanger
you "You’re going to die as a result of that hole in the ground over there", clearly any person would object strongly. This is all to do with perceptions, and the perception was created immediately that this was a potentially fatal threat to the community. In issues management I work on the principle that its very hard to dislodge perceptions based on emotion, and facts have no real impact on perceptions based on emotion. ... The Mooffontein community immediately took up action against the site, and I believe in a sense, these people were used as cannon fodder to the dispute. They are thoroughly respectable people, but my impression was that they were not highly educated. They were certainly very poor people. They were mobilised around this issue.

Eybers also made a number of references to certain sections of the Coalition being "misled":

... there were unfortunately a couple of characters in this situation who did not do any good for relations, did not do any good for anything else except that at the end of the day one got the impression that there was a self-gratification. A few individuals took this thing out of context. Yes, I think the ANC was out of context, but they were - if I use the term misled it seems as though I’m saying that they can be misled - but I think that they were misled by terminology and by emotional things to take this thing far past what it should be. ... If we can think about these things objectively, or as objectively as humanly possible, we can get somewhere.

Furthermore, Brian Gibson did not see there being any significance to the cross-race/cross-class cooperation of the Coalition:

I didn’t see anything to suggest that this was sustainable, I didn’t see anything to suggest that those who were inclined to be collaborative across race and
their teeth in a judicial commission. What chance do ordinary folk have in a community collective monitoring a dump? Let’s assume the toxic dump goes ahead at Chloorkop, what chance does a community have of getting the facts? I would say that they [Waste-tech] would cover their butts for profit.

Szasz’s (1994) research has identified a “discourse of disempowerment” operating in the USA against community collective action, where government officials and industry tried to find ways of neutralising community opposition. Very common to this discourse of disempowerment is the fact that communities were portrayed as being “terrorised into blocking construction of ... facilities”, being “traumatised by hazardous chemicals”, or as having “exaggerated perceptions about risk” (quotes in Szasz 1994: 72 & 73). Central to this discourse of disempowerment is the assumption that the ordinary citizen knows very little (or nothing) about hazardous substances, and should therefore not get involved.

This supposed lack of knowledge on the part of ordinary citizens forms the basis of industry and official views of collective action against the Chloorkop landfill. This discourse of empowerment was articulated in a number of ways: less educated communities were seen as being manipulated with misinformation; racial manipulation is said to have occurred; the significance of cross-racial cooperation was downplayed; the landfill was portrayed as being a “technical” issue; and local communities were urged to accept the landfill in the interests of the regional community.

For example, Gibson believed that the fears of residents were manipulated in order to mobilise opposition to the landfill:

As Mooifontein (Phomolong) started to become a reality, as the first settlers arrived in Mooifontein, they were, I assume, quickly organised in opposition to the site. And that can’t have been too difficult. I mean, if you arrived on your little plot of land and somebody says to
2). This has been achieved by the particular organisational strategy of building strong shopfloor structures, and accountable shop steward representation.

With regard to the beginning of the transitional period, a change in union strategy can again be seen with regard to the 1991 stayaway over the implementation of Value Added Tax (VAT). This action demonstrates the fact that the union movement was challenging the state over an issue which was not directly linked to the workplace (Adler et al 1992: 22). Most importantly, the demand at the heart of this mass action was "no taxation without representation" (Adler et al 1992: 25; my emphasis).

Friedman and Shaw (1995: 3), in analysing other demands made by the labour movement during this time, such as the establishment of an economic policy forum, argue that such demands arose from "the fear" that de Klerk's government would use the negotiation period to "unilaterally restructure" the state and society. This fear was not entirely ungrounded. As Friedman and Shaw (1995: 5) point out,

... the NP insisted throughout the early 1990s that, despite the commencement of negotiations, it remained the sovereign authority and would continue to govern. ... The position, which endured through much of the negotiation period, applied to all attempts to share decision-making, not merely to the [National Economic Forum].

I would argue that the above outline of union strategy indicates that its flexibility allowed it to respond to the changes in the political opportunity structure which emerged in 1990. In the 1970s and 1980s COSATU-aligned unions trod a very careful line between participation in the industrial relations system, and directly challenging the state on overtly political, non-industrial issues. However, the process of negotiation which began in 1990 represents an opening in the political opportunity structure, whereby unions could directly challenge the state without fear of
example, sometimes (but not always) the use of the media was effective "because bosses don't like to see their names spread in newspapers".

Also in terms of strategising, union leadership had to mediate with workers, as well as inform community organisations of the proposed action:

Usually workers would say 'Let us strike now'. In the meantime the leaders had to weigh the pros and cons of the action and say "Wait a bit. We can't take this action alone. We have to inform our friends inside and outside the organisation".

In short, union strategy from the 1970s has been two-dimensional: 1) flexibility in terms of strategy/evaluation was allowed for; and 2) most unions were prepared to 'negotiate with the enemy', particularly in the legal sphere and by making use of institutional channals. As Adler and Webster (1995: 80) point out, ... tactical flexibility ... included a capacity to distinguish principles from tactics and to choose those tactics most likely to succeed, including negotiation and compromise.

Thus, many of the gains which were made by FOSATU in the early 1980s could be ascribed to its willingness to use legal avenues in the pursuit of its goals (Adler and Webster 1995: 80; Friedman 1987). The gains made by FOSATU were clearly carried over into COSATU, and these gains were consolidated in the 1980s because of COSATU's community links. The effectiveness of the union movement's twin strategies of (legal) negotiation and mass industrial action (particularly the use of the stayaway) can be seen in the anti-Labour Relations Amendment Act campaign which began 1986, and which continued for two years'.

Finally, an important capacity-building mechanism within the union movement has been its commitment to grassroots democratic practice and accountability of union leadership to members (Adler et al 1992:
of these structures on the Coalition in terms of strategies, tactics, collective action frames and repertoires, and the process of decision-making.

6.2.1 The union movement

A number of participants in the Coalition have been part of the union movement. In his role as National Campaigns Officer for Cosatu, Mahlangu has been "involved in organising mass campaigns and was involved in all aspects of the mass campaign". The issue of mass campaigns is an important one because it demonstrates the fact that the union movement, through the federation body, was accustomed to cooperative collective action not only within the union movement, but also in alliance with organisations outside the union movement. This is an issue which also comes up in the interview with Mhlangu.

An examination of union strategy becomes important. Mhlangu, as a shop steward in MANU, said that the early union movement concentrated on building strong shop steward councils, and concentrated on bread-and-butter issues and local mobilising. However, individual shopfloors were linked into regional and national MANU (later NUMSA) structures, which in turn were affiliated to FOSATU (later COSATU). This kind of bottom-up organisation was not unique to MANU, but was indicative of the organisational strategy of the independent unions which had emerged in the 1970s. Overall strategy in the union hinged around having a programme of action which can be evaluated:

Because of the stubbornness of your opponent you may not get [demands] at the one go, but you will retreat to plan anew because it is self-destructive to embark on a campaign which doesn't have a programme. Because you must indicate that you will embark on this programme or this action for how many days, or are we going to say if they don't give us what we want we are going to go on even if it takes up 10 years.

Not only were strategies reflective, but they were flexible. For
office and became National Organiser, and presently, National Campaigns Officer. In 1994, he became mayor of the North East Rand Transitional Metropolitan Council.

Alan Dawson grew up in Cape Town, the product of a "very middle class Cape background". His family was not politically or organisationally involved in any way. At high school, he became involved in issues around academic freedom. For example, when he was in Std 9 he went to his principal and said:

I have the greatest difficulty with apartheid. He announced to me that he thought apartheid was a good idea, but he wouldn't stand in my way. What we did was to organise a campaign under the cloak of the Christian Union for 'Compassion Week'. At the time, all these people were dying in Dimbaza, which was the dumping ground in the Eastern Cape. So we collected clothes and money. ... For that stage, which was the early seventies, this was seriously revolutionary!

In the late 1980s he was involved in a civil disobedience group called 'Tots Against Apartheid', whose members refused to racially classify their children when registering them. He has also served two terms as mayor of Midrand Town Council. During his first term he instituted a tree-planting programme, which has now reached 30 000 pavement trees in four years. During his second term, he instituted the mayoral 'Green Awards' and also started a 'Help Save Our Trees Action Committee' when the Transvaal Provincial Administration threatened to cut down trees in order to widen roads. By 1993, he was a member of the ANC.

6.2 Explaining the organisational context and networks underpinning the Chloorkop Coalition

It is clear from these diverse biographies that many of the participants in the coalition had previous experiences in civic, union, student and political organisations, or were simultaneously involved in a number of movements. At issue then, is the influence
respiratory diseases in the middle of the night, in this 'soup', because at night you have inversion levels which trap all the dirt, smog and gases in this lower level and you're actually sleeping in this 'cocktail' of muck, which is obviously going to affect a child. The problem is their nutrition may not be so good, they may not have been inoculated properly against certain things, and there you have a mother with a sick child, poverty stricken, no transport, no access to medical facilities, watching her children suffering in the night. To me its barbaric.

Arnold Longmans grew up in Alexandra and was politicised at school, but his family was not politically involved. He said that he attended coloured schools where he was given anti-ANC propaganda. However, at school he was also exposed to people who were more pro-ANC, and was thus provided with a different viewpoint of mainstream politics. On giving reasons for why he entered 'the struggle', he said he had come to realise that "there was no room for a normal person in an abnormal society", and that that society therefore had to be changed. He joined the Alexandra Youth Congress (Ayco), and between 1985 and 1986, he was active in the Alexandra Action Committee. During the state of emergency in 1986 he was arrested, charged and imprisoned along with Moses Mayekiso and six other other activists. He was released in 1990, and went to live with his family in Rabie Ridge. After moving into Rabie Ridge, he became involved in establishing a residents' committee, which became the Rabie Ridge Civic Association.

Isaak Mahlungu too has a multi-organisational background. Before becoming chairperson of the North East Rand ANC, he was on the executive committee of the ANC's Tombisa branch. He has also served on peace structures and is a member of the local civic. As for involvement at work, he was a shop steward in the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) for twelve years, and was also a member of FAWU's National Executive Committee, before he moved to Cosatu head
Thereafter, he held regional and national office-bearing positions within NUMSA, and also sat on a Cosatu task group. Finally, as regards his involvement in the labour movement, he was also a member of the German-Swedish Shop Stewards Council, a forum for workers at German and Swedish subsidiaries. From 1990, he worked to establish SANCO Ivory Park and was elected President at its launch in February 1994. Mlhangu also sits on the National Housing Forum.

Ann Sugrue became involved in environmental issues only a few months before Chloorkop. Prior to that, she had had no political or other organisational experience or involvement at all. Sugrue holds an MSc in microbiology and she "basically stuck to the science field". Her participation in environmental issues was started when someone she knew asked her to write some fact sheets about chemical reactions as a result of the fact that there had been a chemical fire at a factory, called Rhone-Poulenc, in Midrand. Before that, she said, she was "totally unconscious of environmental issues." She had found the chemical fire issue so interesting that she helped establish an Earthlife Africa branch in Midrand, where she lives.

Abbey Dudney is a qualified nurse whose interest in and knowledge of environmental issues began when her now thirteen-year-old son was diagnosed as having asthma when still a baby. Dudney was born and grew up in Zimbabwe, where she also did her nursing training. She said that in Zimbabwe she had never come across anyone with asthma or any other serious type of allergy-based respiratory problem. She moved to South Africa when she was twenty-six, and her son was six months old. Through her visits to local hospitals, she noticed that a very high proportion of hospitalised children suffered from respiratory diseases, which are associated with high levels of pollution. Dudney's concern regarding the hazardous waste landfill was thus particularly focused on its potential effects on children in the area, and lack of adequate facilities in many areas:

I have sympathy for women in my position. I know what I went through. When I think of people living in shacks, with little babies and children suffering from
home we listened to parents coming home from work talking about workers' issues".

Phadu was later recruited into the ANC underground and did "propaganda work, i.e., information dissemination, concealing important documents, making pamphlets, etc." In January 1986, he went into exile and spent some time in Russia. In particular, his experiences in Russia contributed to his environmental awareness, because he joined an organisation which focused on the Chernobyl disaster:

It was only after two years that we were beginning to see the weakness of that disaster: radiation, pregnant women with deformed babies. As a result, I see environmental issues as being extremely important.

At the time of the Chloorkop campaign, Phadu was the education officer in the ANC's Tembisa branch.

Big Joe Mhlangu ascribes his eventual involvement in politics to his father's influence:

He is not a learned person. But ... managed somehow to influence me. He was working for a company in Sandton, and they were organised by MAWU [Metal and Allied Workers Union]. When they were giving pamphlets or documents to read, he would take and came and forced them on me while I was a very small boy. I'd say I cannot read them - it's English, I don't understand. It would carry on, now I can read, then I would read that line and try and interpret it for him. Then he would in turn sit with me and tell me that our union is operating like this. It went on like this. Eventually I was the one checking if he brought home documents.

When Mhlangu himself started working he quickly became a union member. He went on to work his way up the MAWU ladder and became chair of the Shop Stewards Committee in his company. After the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) was established, he went on to hold positions in the Tembisa branch."
opposition to Chloorkop. However, one central aspect seems to be the key to understanding why collective environmental action coalesced when it did: political transition since February 1990. The events of 1990, notably the unbanning of national liberation organisations and the release of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, changed people's expectations of democracy. It came to be accepted that decisions would no longer be made on behalf of communities, both black and white, without input from those communities. Secondly, even at that early stage in the transition process, organisations considered the struggle against apartheid, which had been their primary focus, to be ending, and other issues, such as environmentalism, could now be placed on their agendas. Thirdly, and related to the previous point, collective action networks from both the national liberation struggle and the union movement were still strong and in place, so that mobilisation around a new issue did not mean mobilising from scratch. Finally, returning exiles and released political prisoners brought experiences and knowledge back into communities which could benefit such communities, as the Chloorkop campaign will show.

6.1 The contribution of the Coalition leadership to the process of collective action

In examining the Coalition leadership and the contribution of these individuals to the campaign against the landfill, one is struck by the particular skills, knowledge, experiences and previous organisational networks which came to bear on the Coalition. I will proceed to outline briefly the particular skills or experiences of each individual which would have impacted upon the dynamic and interaction of the Coalition committee.

Between 1984 and 1986, Tebogo Phadu was involved in student politics at Tembisa High School where he was a member of the Students' Representative Council. He was also a member of the Tembisa Youth Congress (Tyco). His politicisation began at home and at school: "At school we used to listen to the leaders, while at
CHAPTER SIX

THE EMERGENCE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
OPPOSING THE CHLOORKOP HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILL

It is increasingly being recognised (inter alia, Goodman and Redclift [1991], Pezzoli [1991] and Wignaraja [1994]) that both successful urban environmental management and development goes hand-in-hand with democratic processes and participation in order to empower affected communities as well as marginalised groups within those communities (Lather 1988). This present transitional period in South Africa raises exciting prospects that social movements organising around environmental community issues may be able to influence both the nature and extent of democracy at the local level in a post-apartheid South Africa.

Until Chloorkop, urban environmental protest in South Africa had largely been confined to activist organisations like Earthlife Africa. Certainly, very little organisation had taken place with regard to environmental issues, particularly relating to hazardous waste. Many communities are very unaware of the potential dangers of chemical waste. Recently, a number of cases of illegal dumping of hazardous chemicals in townships, in the midst of living areas, have come to light, but communities have done very little or nothing at all to mobilise themselves in opposition to such threats. Central questions relating to Chloorkop would be: why communities had not organised around similar issues before, why community and other organisations had not placed environmental issues on their agendas before, what influence previous social movement organisations had on the Coalition, whether previous experiences of activism had any influence on, and how previous repertoires and collective action frames developed in this present cycle of mobilisation.

What emerges from the interviews conducted for this study points to a complex interaction of circumstances and actors in fuelling
Civic Association on 30 September 1995, dismissed Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) workers from the Margolis site were present. Apparently, TGWU workers at Margolis had gone on strike at the beginning of this year over working conditions and health and safety issues. Waste-tech had then dismissed all workers and employed subcontractors instead.

17. The controlling shareholder of Fraser-Alexander is the Rembrandt Group. Anton Rupert, as head of the Rembrandt Group, was one of the targets in the Coalition campaign (this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). The Merriespruit disaster refers to a slimes dam at Harmony goldmine in Virginia (Free State Province) which collapsed in late February 1994. Many houses in the area were destroyed by the mudslide, and as a result, a number of people died. An official commission of enquiry into the disaster took place.

18. These will be dealt with in detail in chapter 6.

19. Tarrow (1994: 115), drawing on analyses of the success of the German and French environmental movements, argues that

\[ \text{... it was [their] capacity to manipulate and combine different elements of the repertoire according to the target, the strategy of opponents and available allies that gave [them their] flexibility and much of [their] power.} \]

20. At present, Kempton Park's refuse removal trucks are travelling a distance of some 25km (one way) to the Weltevreden Regional Solid Waste Disposal Site near Brakpan (The Kempton Express 13/04/1995: 2).

21. Roelf van Loggerenberg, a health inspector at Germiston Health Department, was interviewed on 8 September 1995 in Germiston, with regard to another research project.

22. From the Earthlife Africa (Johannesburg) branch and Toxics Campaign Group meetings I have been attending since November 1994, the feeling at Earthlife is that this 'crisis' has not been confirmed. One ELA member sits on Hazwac, and argues that the possibility exists that this issue is being manipulated by the waste management industry. Waste-tech and Enviroserve, as the only two hazardous waste disposal companies in the country, are extremely competitive, and I have been told that the two companies have been involved in litigation regarding industrial espionage.

23. The Townships Board is a leftover of the previous administration, and is an example of the contradictions which arise when a change of government occurs, which is not accompanied by a change in administrative departments. The Townships Board was created statutorily in 1913, and consists of a permanent chairperson. The members of the Board who adjudicate on appeals and hearings work more on a contract system. The secretariat are provincial employees.

24. This information was presented to an ELA medical incinerator reportback meeting held on 10 October 1995.
10. For example, Muller asserted that during the state of emergency a list of all organisations and associations operating in Tembisa was drawn up. As Lodge et al (1991: 89) have indicated, one of the functions of the NSMS system from 1986 was that of "the elimination of political activism", for which the JMCs relied on "the resources of the local police and the government's three intelligence networks". Muller then stated that this list was eventually used as the starting point for drawing such organisations into the region's transitional process when it began in 1994.

11. As chair of the North East Rand region of the ANC, Isaak Mahlangu became involved in the Chloorkop campaign. At the time of the interview he was mayor of the North East Rand Transitional Metropolitan Council, and is also Cosatu's National Campaigns Officer.

12. Unfortunately, it would appear that most socio-political research and analysis done on white politics during the transition has focused more on the national level, resulting in the neglect of local organisations such as white ratepayers associations.

13. Although Joos Kleynhans played almost no part in the actual Coalition, he was interviewed because Abbey Dudney only joined the Kempton Park Ratepayers' Association as a result of the Chloorkop landfill issue, and she therefore had no background information on the Ratepayers' Association. Kleynhans was one of the founding members of the Kempton Park Ratepayers' Association.

14. The Afrikaner Broederbond is an organisation which was originally established in 1918 to promote Afrikaans culture, interests and language. Despite consistent denials to the contrary, however, by 1924 it had become a secret organisation which wielded much political power in all aspects of South African society (Adam and Gillioz [1979: 247-253]; Bunting [1986: 43]; O'Meara [1977]; Wilkins and Strydom [1979]).

15. Furthermore, as Dudney has pointed out, the whole hearing was structured in such a way that it was difficult for the ordinary citizen to attend or even to fight. For example, people would need to take off work to attend the hearing, a lawyer and access to specialists might be needed if community members wanted to present evidence to the committee:

So they're [council] trying to make it really hard for the community to fight, which is actually their right, whereas council has De Vries [council's lawyer] and paying out of our bloody rates and taxes. And obviously Waste-tech can afford to spend a fortune.

16. Margolis is a landfill situated in a (white) residential area in Germiston, and is also owned by Waste-tech. An Earthlife Africa meeting, about Waste-tech's proposed medical incinerators in Gauteng, was held on 28 September 1995. Dorothy Hughes of Action for Environmental Protection (AFEP), the Margolis residents' action group, was present to share information, as Margolis already has two medical incinerators. At an environmental workshop organised by the Rabie Ridge
Endnotes

1. Morris and Padayachee (1988) provide a concise overview of reform from the 1970s. In particular, their analysis of reform in the 1980s, and especially the National Security Management System, is useful.

2. In 1986, Tembisa was the only township in the Kempton Park/Midrand area. Ivory Park was only established in 1990, while the 'coloured' area of Rabie Ridge came about after the 1986 insurrection. According to Arnold Longmans, Rabie Ridge was developed as a coloured area, and coloureds from Alexandra and other townships were moved to Rabie Ridge. Longmans saw this as another of the NP government's strategy of 'divide and rule': "Coloureds were moved out of Alex because the state said that blacks would attack them". Longmans was interviewed on 3 August 1995 at Ebony Park. He represented the Rabie Ridge Civic Association on the Coalition committee.

3. The organisation was known by the acronym of its name as translated from Afrikaans, ie Noord-Oos Randse Koördinerende Komitee.

4. A recent article in the Sunday Times/Metro (12/11/1996: 1) described NORKOK as "a non-profit concern".

5. Morris and Padayachee (1988: 18) point out that mini-JMCs were composed of civil servants, like white municipal and BLA councillors, at the local level, and were headed up by a military/police officer. In Jochelson (1990: 20) indicates that "usually five representatives were drawn from the city council, including the town clerk, administrator or mayor". Also significant is that discredited BLA councillors were also generally included in the mini-JMCs.

6. It should be noted that the NSMS was disbanded by FW de Klerk after February 1990 (Price 1990).

7. As Marks and Trapido (1988: 28) point out, one of the functions of the JMCs was to "bring together the security and police forces with business and black local government officials."

8. Interestingly, when I raised the issue of the JMC structure with Han Eybers, he became uncomfortable and said that I "was asking questions under false pretences because [I] had not indicated that I would be asking such questions." Mr Eybers said that he was "joking"! At that point I stated that, as I had told him at the outset of the interview that I would be asking questions on local government politics and the transition, I had taken it for granted that there would also be questions relating to old structures. I also informed Mr Eybers that he had the right to reserve comment on any question or issue.

9. Longmans represented the Rabie Ridge Civic Association on the Coalition.
own inputs and contributions, so that:

The die-in was a very Earthlife thing, ... [while] the march was really coordinated and executed by Tebogo. ...
The ANC were great at that mass action and mobilising people.

A loose coalition was also suitable for the Rabie Ridge community, given the organisational constraints identified by Longmans. While the Rabie Ridge community supported the Coalition's campaign action, internal mobilisation hinged around an education programme in which the concept of environmental racism was looked at, why dumps were located next to black areas, the health implications of having a hazardous landfill nearby, and so on.

As discussed earlier, different social movement organisations were represented on the Coalition. The various activists therefore had different backgrounds with regard to strategies. It was thus perhaps inevitable that differences emerged, not with regard to political ideology, but in terms of strategy. Phadu recounts how some groups were more in favour of using the legal route, but that experiences on strategy were shared:

We [the ANC] came with another focus to say from our experience this legal route never worked. We don't think it will work in this case because we are talking millions being poured into a project. We are talking about a local government that has committed itself to that project.

However, Phadu did acknowledge that such differences over strategy were not fundamental because "sometimes the legal route has its uses". As Sugrue admitted, the fact that the Toxic Dump Action Group remained to take part in the rezoning hearing, while the rest of the Coalition walked out meant that the hearing was effectively delayed to the extent that new government structures were in place to continue the decision-making process. [Participation in the hearing] worked out very well in the end, although it wasn't planned that way.

121
Group, and establishing the Coalition points to the influence of certain strands of thinking within the ANC and the union movement (see, for example, Friedman and Shaw 1995).

The change in the political opportunity structure also had an impact on the way that opposition could be organised. Because the repression of the apartheid regime had been removed, the necessity for ideological, strategic and tactical uniformity between organisations no longer existed. Thus, the Coalition opposing the Chloorkop landfill could be loosely structured, and member organisations therefore also had the leeway to follow their own programmes of action. According to Alan Dawson, this particular strategy was probably the most successful:

We structured [the Coalition] in the right way. If we had tried a more control-oriented structure we wouldn't have had the level of success that we did.

As Tarrow (1994: 15) has pointed out, social movements cannot be understood merely in terms of a set of relationships between leaders and followers, but are more sets of interrelationships between "organisations, coalitions of organisations, intermediate groups, members, sympathisers and crowds". Furthermore, according to Oliver (1989: 4, quoted in Tarrow [1994: 15-16]), "[t] is misleading to equate a social movement with any kind of single collective decision-making entity." Certainly, this type of broad-based coalition structure should not have been novel for many of the participants in the Coalition, since an example, that of the UDF, exists in very recent collective memory. As Lodge et al (1991: 34) point out, "[the UDF's] affiliates were ideologically diverse, united only in their opposition to the government".

The Coalition committee worked in essentially collective fashion. According to Mhlangu, individuals on the committee would make strategic and/or tactical suggestions, which would then be discussed and developed or rejected by the committee. This was supported by Ann Sugrue, who also said that each group in the Coalition had its
organisations in particular are going to meet the challenges of urban planning and management, a more sophisticated environmental awareness is crucial in order that these challenges are met in a sustainable way. However, the initiative by the Rabie Ridge Civic Association to form the North East Rand Environmental Forum (discussed in Chapter 4) indicates that the necessary environmental consciousness may be moving beyond the Chloorkop campaign.

6.4 Cycles of mobilisation and changing collective action frames

As Tarrow (1994: 17) has argued, cycles of mobilisation occur because social movements, during cycles of mobilisation make use of (and in turn are shaped by) "... external resources - opportunities, conventions, understandings and social networks - to coordinate and sustain collective action ...". This section will endeavour to provide an understanding of the Chloorkop Coalition using Tarrow's (1991 and 1994) framework.

Firstly, and perhaps most strikingly, are the changes in the political opportunity structure in South Africa, which most fundamentally relate to "the opening up of access to power" (Tarrow 1994: 18). Changes in South Africa's political terrain since 1990 have meant that the struggles of the 1980s contributed to the radical reform which began to take place in the 1990s. In turn, the opening up of political space in the 1990s meant that opportunities for winning further concessions were created. As the Chloorkop case study shows, some communities used this space to make further inroads into local-level democracy. The use of overt repression by the police and the South African Defence Force, which characterised South Africa's apartheid regime, was removed and this led to a climate in which peaceful protest could begin to flourish again.

At another level, the change in the political opportunity structure also changed the nature of the relationship between industry and citizens. For example, the taking over of Wasteco's public participation process, by undermining the Community Consultative
Village and venue of the first public meeting, was one of the poorest that she had seen.

Phadu also articulated a more developed environmental consciousness by arguing for better (and cleaner) urban planning and industrial responsibility:

... government [must] begin to invest more in the environment, to begin to see the role of environment very, very seriously in terms of development, in terms of securing our national resource base. And getting tough laws which actually enforce or entice industries to move away from these [urban residential] areas and to look for cleaner production processes.

Dudney made sure that she educated herself on environmental issues, so that she could challenge both Westa-tech in particular and industry in general with regard to alternatives to both environmentally unfriendly production processes and the use of landfills as a method of waste disposal.

However, the development of an environmental awareness for some of the township activists has to be clearly rooted in their experiences of their living conditions. For example, Mhlangu recounts that his environmental awareness was heightened by a stream near his home which was full of refuse. Longmans' environmental awareness was, in part, sparked by both the slum-like living conditions in Alexandra and by Alexandra's proximity to the upmarket white area of Sandton. However, Longmans' environmental awareness was extended quite substantially by a course he attended, which was run by Khanya College in conjunction with, and for, civic organisations. It was largely a capacity-building course, and focused on such issues as welfare, local government, constitutional issues, and the environment.

The above discussion points to the fact that only a few activists in the Coalition had what could be termed a more developed environmental conscience. As Goldblatt (1995) has argued, if civic
relationship between environmental degradation and apartheid:

If one is to view the environment from a broader perspective, not from a narrow vision of saving the rhinos or saving the white sharks, but environment in the broader sense of land issues - if you deny people land and reduce the majority [of people] to 30% land, the result is severe degradation of the land. And that means the consequences of apartheid have been very, very high.

Alan Dawson, too, referred to environmental racism:

Environmental racism definitely exists in Tembisa - on the southern flank are the NCP waste pools and the Kempton Park household waste dump; on the Western flank is the Chloorkop toxic dump; on the northern flank the Midrand household waste dump had been proposed.

However, Phadu's conceptualisation of the issue of environmental racism was far more sophisticated than the others interviewed. He also brought in the issue of environmental classism with regard to the fact that apartheid had been removed:

Now that we have done away with apartheid, we are going to see more of a class character to environmental issues coming to the fore. It will not matter if you are from a white working class community or a low income community, whatever colour you will be severely affected by environmental issues. But because the black communities are the majority, they will share a high proportion of that environmental degradation. Therefore, it is unlike America where they talk about environmental racism. ... In my research through this policy process I have come to realise that even construction of polluting industries are situated either to the lower-income white communities and to the black communities.

In fact, Dudney made a reference to the fact that the Chloorkop Laerskool (primary school), situated in the (white) Chloorkop
it is an affinity to a particular political ideology, in which future social arrangements are organised differently, that influences so-called post-material values. The implications of this line of argument for South Africa might be that environmental rights and justice can be viewed as an extension of human rights (the latter being embodied, by proponents of the liberation movement, in a vision of a democratic, non-racial South Africa). Goldblatt (1995: 25) makes a similar point on the link between social justice and environmental consciousness. However, his view of the extent of that environmental consciousness is more limited and pessimistic than the one taken in this report. This is partly due to the fact that his paper focuses more narrowly on the civic who were involved in the Chloorkop campaign, and not on the entire Coalition. Goldblatt's narrower focus thus ignores the fact that a differential environmental consciousness exists between individuals, and that such an environmental consciousness is not static. In this sense, he cannot account for the fact that individual consciousness may have evolved as a result of the dynamic of the Coalition. Furthermore, interaction with individuals such as Phadu, whose environmental consciousness goes well beyond being merely rudimentary, must have had an impact on the evolution of environmental consciousness.

Certainly, the emergence of an environmental awareness is a complex process (and is beyond the scope of this report) and cannot be attributed to any one cause. The role of an environmental group like ELA is important in disseminating information, and experiences in exile, for example, are also important. Part of the process of an emerging environmental awareness has to do with the importation of ideas and concepts. An important area in this regard is the whole notion of environmental racism.

From some of the interviews emerged strong ideas on environmental racism in South Africa. In the case of Phadu, an introduction to international literature on environmental racism came about as a result of the studying he did and particular activism he was involved in while in exile. Also, he had very definite ideas on the
issues because one wouldn't want to describe the environment as such, but on the broader quality of life. Mhlangu echoed this statement when he said that: 
... the focus of the anti-apartheid movement was getting rid of the apartheid regime, so it was a case of dealing with bread and butter issues, as we used to term the programme.

With reference to trade union activity, Mhlangu made the point that: Because our struggle as workers was centred around immediate issues that would benefit workers, items such as environment, health, and so on, came onto our agendas very late.

Tebogo Phadu expressed a similar view as to why environmental issues have only recently come to the fore: 
It has to be viewed in a historical context. In a sense the issue was doing away with apartheid, and therefore ... people look at the government as an obstacle to all problems. If you do away with the National Party government, you can deal with other problems ... like the environment.

In analysing the emergence of grassroots environmentalism by people of colour in the USA in the late 1970s to early 1980s, Hamilton (1993: 74) states that "[a]fter years of struggle for civil rights, communities of color see their victories being threatened by unjust environmental decisions". Hamilton's (1993) point may seem to suggest some kind of needs hierarchy, which would also be in line with Inglehart's thesis. However, as Cotgrove and Duff (1981: 97-98) point out, needs and values should be distanced from each other as "[i]ndividuals are more likely to man the barricades out of a burning sense of injustice than from poverty and hunger as such". Cotgrove and Duff's (1981) research findings indicate that it is not the attainment of relative affluence which determines post-material values, and hence the development of environmental values. Rather,
And the protesters? They were having fun. They were putting on street theatre. They had made a cardboard bomb and sprayed it silver. They made masks and costumes for the occasion ...\(^5\).

With reference to strategy, in addition to non-violent protest action, ELA has reservations about participating in more official bodies. On the one hand, such participation makes demands on its limited reserve of volunteers, and thus detracts from campaigns. On the other, because such bodies may involve compromises which go against ELA's principles, ELA cannot maintain "the moral high ground".

The two previous sections point to a range of social movement organisations and activists with a formidable skills base being involved in the Chloorkop campaign. As will be shown in section 6.4, these previous mobilisation networks and repertoires of collective were important in contributing to the Coalition's collective action programme. However, with the exception of a few individuals, experience of mobilisation around environmental issues was, on the whole, very limited. I now turn to a consideration of environmental consciousness among the Coalition activists.

6.3 Explaining the recent emergence of environmentalism as a mobilising issue in South Africa

It seems that the emergence of environmental activism during this period of transition has to do with the fact that the struggle against apartheid was, for many in the Coalition, (technically) over. As Alan Dawson put it:

... we had higher priorities. As we fought apartheid we were talking about human survival at a very much more fundamental level, and human quality of life at a much more fundamental level. Now that normality has been returned and the totalitarian state has been overturned, we can now actually start focusing, not on the smaller
6.2.5 Earthlife Africa

Earthlife Africa (ELA) is a volunteer activist environmental group, which has twelve branches around South Africa. There is also a branch in Windhoek (Namibia) and one in Kampala (Uganda). Although ELA has drawn its membership primarily from the white middle class, its profile is beginning to change as its membership is growing due to increased media coverage regarding its campaigns. The first township-based ELA branch is being formed in KwaThema near Springs, on the Far East Rand.

While the branches are autonomous (there is no 'head office') all branches subscribe to the following principles: reverence for the earth, grassroots democracy, rejection of discrimination, non-violence and the freeing of human potential (Earthlife Africa n.d.: 2).

In a campaign such as the Chloorkop landfill, ELA does not play a prescriptive role, but cooperates with communities, who are to take the lead in the campaign. ELA also disseminates vital information to communities. In this regard, it has access to international environmental networks and to organisations like Greenpeace, so that it can obtain relevant, up-to-date information on technical and health aspects of environmental problems.

Because ELA is a volunteer organisation, its involvement in issues and campaigns tends to be of a more selective and high-profile nature, by making use of creative and innovative protest tactics to attract the attention of the media, and hence the general public. Du Toit’s (1995b: 10) report on an anti-French nuclear testing demonstration organised by ELA (Johannesburg) captures the more unconventional tactics used by ELA:

The French consulate officials were tweezer-lipped. The guests to the Bastille Day celebrations were either disdainful or whispered words of support in heavy French accents.
August 1992 because of the lack of accountability of councillors who were not averse to squandering ratepayers' money (KPRANewsletter January 1995). Also, the KPRAHas attempted to remain relatively apolitical, even though there have been factions within it which have attempted to draw in (rightwing) politics, because many people are still "clinging to the days of Paul Kruger" or the "golden years of the sixties ... and refuse to change" (Kleynhans). In August 1995, the KPRABecame a branch of the Residents' and Ratepayers' Association of South Africa (RRASA). The change in name, according to Kleynhans, is extremely significant. Prior to August 1995, only ratepayers could join KPRAB. This effectively excluded township dwellers who did not pay taxes or for services, thus making the KPRAA exclusively white organisation. RRASA, on the other hand, now includes residents, in addition to ratepayers (RRASA Manifesto).

The KPRAHas been involved with the issue of noise control in Kempton Park, because the city is home to Johannesburg International Airport. With regard to this campaign, tactics have included circulating a petition, writing letters to the press, contacting the Directorate of Civil Aviation, and so on. On the whole, it seems as if their campaign has not had much effect. In this regard, it seems as if some members are talking about taking stronger action and embarking on what could probably best be termed a programme of civil disobedience, although nothing has yet come of such talk.

At one meeting, someone said we should go and occupy the runway at Jan Smuts [Airport]. I said: OK, but I don't always one person to always go in the front and do everything, and everything is always on his shoulders. If you come up with a good idea, then you should take the lead. It's no use just standing at the back and always shout and scream and always come expect someone else to carry the brunt. So I said to this person "I'm for it, I will go along with you, you organise it, you arrange it, and I will be there". ... But nothing has happened.
Congress (Sayco), are linked to ungovernability, particularly in the mid-1980s, in a far more confrontational way than either the civics or the unions. As mentioned earlier, Tebogo Phadu was involved in student politics in high school and was a member of the Tembisa Youth Congress (Tyco). In his words:

i was a product of the three years of mass upsurge, that is from '84 to '86; you know, the smokes in the townships, the barricaded streets, and all that. That is where the whole involvement in the struggle started.

As Johnson (1988: 112) points out with regard to "the unprecedented popular rebellion" which began in the latter half of 1984:

Its outstanding feature ... was the prominence of the separately organised black youth, both in reactive campaigns against government initiatives such as the tricameral parliament, and in enactive campaigns to establish popular, alternative structures of control over township life.

According to Johnson (1988: 113), as with 1976, the 1984 period of insurrection was sparked off from within the schools, but the levels of militancy were far more intense. It was during this time that ... the incipient signs of civil war became reality. In the ensuing months, hundreds died or were injured in clashes with police and soldiers, and thousands of young blacks - exhibiting extraordinary courage - began to employ 'guerrilla-style' tactics, improvising petrol bombs, ambushes and roadblocks ... (Johnson 1988: 115).

6.2.4 Ratepayers' Associations

Almost by definition, Ratepayers' Associations demonstrated a far greater willingness to engage with existing structures, with tactics including the attending of Council meetings, contacting councillors directly, writing letters to the press, and so on (Kleynhans). The Kempton Park Ratepayers' Association (KPRA) was established in
Rabie Ridge. In talking about the organisational constraints which he faced in trying to organise the Rabie Ridge community, he cited the NP government's 'divide and rule' strategy as a major reason for fostering mistrust between Africans and coloureds. Longmans indicated that a mistrust of the Mass Democratic Movement existed amongst many of the now Rabie Ridge residents, partially as a result of their experiences in Alexandra, from where they had been moved. In turn, this mistrust affected the kinds of mobilisation strategies which could be used in Rabie Ridge. Accordingly, Longmans indicated that issues were not politicised and initially no attempts were made to organise street committees in Rabie Ridge because that particular form of organisation was associated with civic mobilisation in Alexandra. Rather, initial mobilisation in Rabie Ridge was issues-based, with a strong educational component, and later the approach became more politicised.

The examples of civic mobilisation in Alexandra, Ivory Park and Rabie Ridge raise a number of issues with regard to civic strategy. As Seekings (1994: 3) points out, between 1977 and 1989/1990, civic organisations in general subscribed to the intermediate goal of "building a movement of strong local level organisations with broad and sustained popular participation". This was done by non-violent means, in order to achieve the longer term goal of transforming the political system. To achieve these goals, civic leaders and organisers

... focused on gradualist campaigns around civic issues to draw a wide range of people into grass-roots, extra-state organisation. The strategy ... revolved around mass action, organisation-building, and informal education (Seekings 1994: 3-4).

The link between the gradualist, locally-based activism was carried over to the national political struggle (Seekings 1994: 15).

6.2.3 Youth organisations

The strategies of youth organisations, like the South African Youth
Until very recently, environmentalism in South Africa was associated with nature conservation and preservation (Cock 1991: 1).

At the start of the Chloorkop campaign Phadu was Education Officer in the ANC's Tembisa branch.

NUMSA, the result of a merger of seven unions, was launched on 23 May 1987 (Obery 1987: 8-9).

At the time of the Chloorkop campaign, Longmans was the chief organiser for the Rabie Ridge Civic Association.

Alexandra has an interesting history. In 1980, in terms of the reforms which had been proposed by the 1979 Ri Returned Commission, it was announced that Alexandra would be replanned as a residential area "for family housing and 99-year leasehold" (Jochelson 1990: 3). These reforms were part of the government's aim to distinguish between Africans in the urban areas, by categorising African urban residents in terms of 'insider' (permanent) and 'outsider' (migrant) status. However, "[t]he implementation of the masterplan acted as a catalyst for political opposition which became increasingly radical through the Eighties" (Jochelson 1990: 3). Jochelson provides a summary and analysis of the conflicts, events and organisations involved in Alexandra, particularly during the mid-eighties.

Those, such as Ann Sugrue and Abbey Dudney, who did not have histories of organisational involvement, brought specialised knowledge to the Coalition.

In 1988, after the general period of insurrection between 1984 and 1986, the state, with the support of industry, endeavoured to revoke the gains made by the union movement with the introduction of repressive labour legislation (Adler et al 1992: 5; Adler and Webster 1995: 82).

The point could be made that if these tensions were occurring at national level, there is no doubt that at least some of the National Party's position would have filtered down to the local level, particularly with regard to NP dominated municipal councils, like Kempton Park, where fourteen of the twenty councillors were from the NP (Muller).

However, it should be borne in mind that, as Seekings (1994) points out, civic movements in South Africa were not homogenous - tensions and differences existed between and within regions.

A number of authors, including Adler and Webster (1995), argue that the independent unions, with their focus on strong shopfloor organisation, influenced the organisational form of the civics. This could no doubt
dynamic of the Coalition created a campaign which was distinct from previous cycles of mobilisation. Furthermore, this distinctive campaign can also be attributed to the change in political opportunity structure, which created a climate more conducive to non-violent protest.

The campaign against the Chloorkop landfill also demonstrates that social movements can successfully engage with the state in this present transitional phase, and extend democratic participation through collective action, although constraints do exist. However, as Goldblatt (1995) has pointed out, part of the success of the Chloorkop campaign lies in the fact that it focused on a single issue. What Chloorkop did not do was to assist the civic organisations, for example, in solving their position with regard to the state. Furthermore, while the Chloorkop case study demonstrates that environmental issues do indeed have the potential to unite previously segregated communities at the local level, it is not yet certain whether cross-race cooperation will stand up to possible tensions around other issues.
of civic organisations since the ANC has been elected into power (Steinberg and Adler 1995). The central question facing civic organisations in a post-apartheid South Africa is the form that they should take, and their realm of activity, if they are to continue to survive. Mhlangu’s position has captured one standpoint in this debate. Further, Mhlangu’s comment on his mayoral position limiting participation in campaigns also reflects the contradiction between civic life and formal governance. As President of SANCO Ivory Park, Mhlangu’s position does not reflect what seems to be SANCO’s official position. For example, community election results in Ivory Park and Tembisa show that a number of SANCO leaders have been elected into office under the auspices of the ANC (The Kempton Express 09/11/1995: 1; Midrand Reporter 09/11/1995: 1).

Views on the extension of democracy and public participation also extend to community participation in environmental management:

The decision-makers, the council, politicians, the consulting engineers, should, via the media, etc, inform the public at all times. In other words there must be complete transparency about the transactions. ... If Waste-tech does go ahead at Chloorkop, then the policing of that dump should be monitored by experts, by the knowledgable people in the community. It’s got to be a joint policing/monitoring situation by specialists and by the people at grassroots level (Kleynhans).

5.8 Conclusion

This analysis of the capacity and ability of communities to mobilise and engage with the state at the local level clearly demonstrates that such mobilisation is fundamentally linked to the existence of previous cycles of mobilisation and collective action networks. Central to this process of mobilisation were the movement "entrepreneurs" or activists, who played a key role in mobilising community support in order to oppose an environmental threat. However, what the Chloorkop case study also demonstrates is that the
cross-race cooperation should, perhaps, be regarded in an incremental fashion, whereby change in the perceptions of a few people creates the foundation for future cooperation.

6.7 Rethinking democracy?

Views on democracy in this period are complex. Mhlangu’s views on environmental management and the role of community-based organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is that they should be involved in environmental management. In particular, NGOs can work as a government watchdog, because the government does have its own agenda. As Mhlangu indicated, for example, his mayoral position implies that he cannot get involved in community campaigns.

This view, that the government has its own agenda, was also articulated by Mhlangu, with regard to the continuing struggle for democracy:

I keep telling people what I believe is that this thing [democracy] is like boxing, for example, whereby I will challenge you for the title since you are the champion. I want the title that you have. Then I will train, work hard to dethrone you as the champion, but what happens when I have dethroned you? I cannot just relax and say "Well, I do have the crown", because you might strike back and take the crown. So, we do have a new democracy and so on but we must not just sit back and say "Well, Madiba" and this one will take care of everything", because the government does have the capability of concealing some things. For example, the Minister was interviewed on the question of environment, and they moved to ask him about the issue of toxic waste, but he kept saying "No, well, I don't know about that". But what we hear is that the consignment is on its way to South Africa."

What Mhlangu’s position refers to is the current debate on the role
similar point when she said:
The ANC/AWB thing never happened - and that was because it was managed very well. People didn’t actually bring it up as being an issue. ... We were there about a hazardous waste site, we weren’t there about politics. And it didn’t matter whether you were white or black, ANC or AWB, this hazardous waste was going to affect you the same.

Kleynhans of the Ratepayers' Association said:
[The Chloorkop campaign] was beneficial for all of us. It was very beneficial in the way that - here we look at each other whether you were green or blue, the colour didn’t matter. The issue was we’re going to have a waste dump which was not, in our view, properly investigated/examined, and all the pluses and minuses were not put before the public. And all the alliances stood together. So it was very beneficial that we learned that we should, when there’s an issue at stake, like this, we should stand together, because it’s our environment - we all breathe the same air. We cannot separate the air! No, it will affect all of us. ... There is no doubt in my mind that this [cooperation] is a stepping stone as we go into the future. We will build onto that foundation.

Dudney saw the value of the Coalition in terms of fostering tolerance:
There needs to be mutual respect of peoples' differences as well as their sameness, and I think that the Coalition helped to do that to a degree.

For those activists who were directly involved in the Coalition, the issue of cross-racial cooperation within the Coalition was viewed in an extremely positive light. However, it is not clear whether this sense of non-racial community extended beyond the activists in the Coalition committee. The success of the Coalition in fostering
6.6 Chloorkop – significant 'rainbow alliance' or a case of political manipulation?

Clearly, the Chloorkop campaign impacted dramatically on individuals and for the participants in the Coalition committee, the Chloorkop experience was a very positive one. However, it cannot be denied that in the greater Kempton Park area, the proposed landfill also presented an excellent mobilising issue for a political campaign. Phadu admits that the ANC in the sub-region recognised the potential which the Chloorkop issue held in terms of an election campaign:

We sensed that this is an issue we can take up. But we looked at it in two ways - [one as an environmental issue but] there was also the election coming, and for us to gain support [in the election] we need to link it to an issue, that is to win the campaign in our area. We were targeting that part of our responsibility was to win the whole of Kempton Park. That was the responsibility given to us by the leadership at a higher level.

However, Phadu also recognises the uniting effect which collective action had:

The Chloorkop issue was able to convince most people that it affects everybody. ... It cannot be seen as a black or a white issue, but is seen as an issue affecting all communities. ... I never thought in my life that I would be working with some of the people there. We had people from the AWB, for instance. But there, they were convinced that they can't do it alone, they have to enter into some form of interaction with some of the communities there. It also questions one's prejudices.

The potential uniting capacity of environmental issues is supported by many of the Coalition participants. For example, Isaak Mahlangu had this to say: "When it comes to environmental issues all those [class/racial/ideological] conflicts just disappear". Sugru made a
Phadu went on to accept a position with the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF), before joining the ANC's RDP unit where he is now assistant coordinator in the environmental office.

Sugrue admits that the Chloorkop campaign, and her involvement in the Coalition, have changed her life dramatically, both politically and career-wise: "[Chloorkop] brought me to the townships, where I had never been before. And it completely changed my life, because that's now what I do." As a result of Chloorkop, Sugrue resigned from her research position at the University of the Witwatersrand, and became a full-time environmentalist (specialising in waste) with an environmental NGO called the Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM). Part of her work entails environmental education in the townships, and also brings her into contact with stakeholders in the environmental policy arena. From November 1995, she will be in the position of Director (Waste) in the Gauteng provincial government.

Dudney has also experienced a major change of direction - she was asked to sit on a provincial environmental forum, and stood as a ward candidate in the November local community elections. However, she was not elected.

Some individuals, who were not directly involved in the Coalition itself, but who took part in the campaign, also experienced major changes. For example, Martin Serfontein, a former CP councillor, became a member of the ANC in 1994 (The Kempton Express 23/03/1994: 1).

However, it would be a mistake to view the spin-offs of the Chloorkop campaign as being limited only to individuals. As Longmans said: "[W]e also need to look at the social and political benefit to communities. It is to do with empowerment, not just window-dressing."
Dudney followed the same kinds of disconcerting campaign tactics in the rezoning hearing:

We would just throw everything that we possibly had. As far as we were concerned we didn't care how long the hearing took, because it was no skin off our noses. We would throw absolutely everything we could at these guys. We didn't know what was relevant and what wasn't. ... We would try and do as much damage as we possibly could to their case.

Furthermore, a comment by Dudney demonstrates the fact that activists can use a range of tactics which can neutralise the discourse of disempowerment adopted by industry or the state:

What I have been trying to avoid is the impression that we're a bunch of 'loonies', which is obviously what Waste-tech was trying to do. So I tried to present myself in a manner which is straightforward, clear, calm, objective. I dressed professionally, my hair was always immaculate, I wore suits, I power-dressed.

From this analysis of the Chloorkop Coalition, it can be concluded that previous cycles of mobilisation and collective action clearly influence subsequent cycles of mobilisation. What can be seen from the above account of the Chloorkop Coalition with regard to the interaction between activists is that, in formulating strategies and tactics, the Coalition took on a unique dynamic which fuelled innovation in the conventional action repertoire and in the framing of collective action.

6.5 The impact of Chloorkop on individuals

In many ways, the spin-offs of the Chloorkop campaign are significant, because many of the participants in the Coalition committees have experienced dramatic changes in their lives, and are in positions where they are now, for example, able to influence environmental policy at a regional and/or national level.
But [the Chloorkop campaign] was actually easier. We had all these different groups, all putting up press statements of different types, we had the ANC doing marches, we had the unions, we were putting pressure on Anton Rupert's family [owners of the Rembrandt group]. ... Its amazing what we got up to - we sent faxes through to Monaco, because Anton Rupert was apparently staying with Prince [Rainier] of Monaco. We attacked their customer base. ... Everywhere they [Waste-tech] turned we wanted them to have another slap in the face. So they never knew where the next rotten egg was coming from.

Dudney's comments point to three important issues. Firstly, the Coalition, because of the interaction of members with different network and personal histories, took on a dynamic of its own, distinct from past forms of protest. Brainstorming in the collective of the Coalition committee facilitated creativity and innovation in a "What can we do next?" fashion. It was in this way that the letter signed by Nelson Mandela was conceived and taken up, as well as the faxes to Rupert, and the fact that members of the public who signed the first petition were encouraged to (and did) phone the then-Kempton Park town clerk to find out if their names had been struck off the petition and why. Certainly, this dynamic and resultant creativity was not one which has been articulated or even deliberately pursued by Coalition members, but seemed to come about spontaneously. For example, attacking Waste-tech's client base can be considered part of 'corporate strategy' but it was not conceptualised as such. Secondly, sending letters to Waste-tech's clients and faxes to Rupert indicates that the change in the political opportunity structure had also had a significant effect on the relationship between industry and communities. Thirdly, the fact that Nelson Mandela could be used as a resource in the campaign points to the fact that changes in the political opportunity structure can provide additional resources which social movements can draw on in their campaigns.
the media had a role to play. Eybers indicated that one of The Kempton Express reporters became very interested in the Chloorkop landfill issue, and followed events closely. A perusal of the articles which this reporter wrote indicates that he seemed to be fairly sympathetic to the Coalition.

Secondly, the new collective action framework was also reflected in the tactic of the human chain and die-in, and points to innovation which:

... add[s] spontaneity and symbolism to the conventional core [of the collective action repertoire], which attracts attention and disconcerts opponents (Tarrow 1994: 114).

It could be argued that innovation in the conventional repertoire was linked to both the new collective action frame (by stressing unity even in diversity), as well as to the opening of political space. However, even with the innovations in the collective action frame and repertoire, one can see resonance with the past. The tone of the entire protest had resonance with non-violent action and civil disobedience of the 1950s, while the frames of inclusivity and non-racialism drew on the Charterist position and practice of the diverse UDF coalition. In contrast, the increasingly violent confrontation which came to characterise protest action in the 1980s was absent from the Chloorkop campaign, despite the fact that aspects of the conventional action repertoire, like the march and the sit-in, had been used. In terms of new repertoires of collective action (the human chain and die-in), which were combined with a new collective action frame, a new symbolic resonance was added to the campaign. This symbolism is reflected in Mhlangu's comment that "[t]he idea of the human chain was to demonstrate that we are one".

Furthermore, the strategy of the Coalition, according to Abbey Dudney, was "to put pressure wherever we could." In Jury, after leaving the nursing profession, had gone into marketing at a pharmaceutical company, and she approached the Coalition campaign as she would have done with a marketing campaign:

123
This outcome is indicative of the process identified by Friedman and Shaw (1995), whereby unions participated in forums after 1990, in order to block unilateral decision-making by the state.

Mhlangu also did not see political tensions as emerging, because people were united around the issue. This was reflected in the choice of having a human chain and die-in:

The idea of the human chain was to demonstrate that we are one. ... This issue won't affect certain individuals from a political organisation, it will affect all of us, whether you are into politics or not, whether you are a taxi-driver or not.

Mhlangu's quote points to two important issues regarding the analysis of the Coalition. Firstly, Mhlangu's use of the word "unity" points to one aspect of what I would term the collective action frame of the Chloorkop Coalition. It could be argued that this sentiment reflects a more inclusive conceptualisation of protest. As Tarrow (1994:123) points out:

Inscribing grievances in overall frames that identify an injustice, attribute the responsibility for it to others and propose solutions to it, is a central activity of social movements.

Certainly, if that sense of injustice is looked at closely, we see it being articulated in terms of environmental racism, and in terms of lack of accountability of the local government structure, which meant that organisations representing diverging political positions could work cooperatively in pursuit of a common goal. Furthermore, the collective action frame took this sense of injustice, and infused it with the right to democracy and participation, which would also have appealed to whites who may not have had an affinity for the struggle against apartheid. In this sense, the Coalition held the moral highground, because of the political changes which were taking place. As I argued in Chapter 5, Waste-tech and the Kempton Park City Council used a discourse of disempowerment against the Coalition. However, I would argue that they were not successful in neutralising the effectiveness of the Coalition. In this regard,
own inputs and contributions, so that:
The die-in was a very Earthlife thing, ... [while] the
march was really coordinated and executed by Tebogo. ...
The ANC were great at that mass action and mobilising
people.

A loose coalition was also suitable for the Rabie Ridge community, given the organisational constraints identified by Longmans. While the Rabie Ridge community supported the Coalition's campaign action, internal mobilisation hinged around an education programme in which the concept of environmental racism was looked at, why dumps were located next to black areas, the health implications of having a hazardous landfill nearby, and so on.

As discussed earlier, different social movement organisations were represented on the Coalition. The various activists therefore had different backgrounds with regard to strategies. It was thus perhaps inevitable that differences emerged, not with regard to political ideology, but in terms of strategy. Phadu recounts how some groups were more in favour of using the legal route, but that experiences on strategy were shared:

We [the ANC] came with another focus to say from our experience this legal route never worked\textsuperscript{10}. We don't think it will work in this case because we are talking millions being poured into a project. We are talking about a local government that has committed itself to that project.

However, Phadu did acknowledge that such differences over strategy were not fundamental because "sometimes the legal route has its uses". As Sugrue admitted, the fact that the Toxic Dump Action Group remained to take part in the rezoning hearing, while the rest of the Coalition walked out meant that the hearing was effectively delayed to the extent that new government structures were in place to continue the decision-making process. [Participation in the hearing] worked out very well in the end, although it wasn't planned that way.


Environmental Options. 1993. Legislative and administrative control of pollution and environmental management in South Africa. (Unpublished) report researched and prepared for Afrax Ltd.


REFERENCES

Secondary sources


1. I am most certainly not arguing that this slippage may be intentional. Rather, as can be seen from the analysis of the apartheid state, certain actions by the state contain inherent contradictions and unintended consequences may emerge. Actions by the new state are also almost certain to contain contradictions and unintended consequences, which may have profound effects on communities. As Polanyi (1944) has argued, the modern state is beset by contradictions between regulating welfareism (and redistribution in the case of South Africa) and protectionism on the one hand, against the excesses of the workings of the 'free market' on the other hand.

2. Tobego Phadu gave an input at the first environmental workshop held by the civie on 30 September 1995.
such as the Chloorkop campaign.
7.3 Political challenges and further research

The last few years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of incidents relating to hazardous waste mismanagement. Further research is required into identifying all those cases where some form of community action took place, how it was articulated, who was involved, and so on. This would be significant in charting whether an ecopolit populist trend (to use Szasz’s [1994] term) is emerging in South Africa, or whether such action is confined to the NIMBY variety. Trying to chart possible ecopolit populism in South Africa will provide insights into changing power relations, within and between communities, as well as between citizens, the state and industry.

Given the limitations pointed to in Chapter 4 with regard to the fact that Waste-tech did not do a social impact assessment for the Kloorkop landfill, and given South Africa’s urgent developmental and environmental needs, research and development into the nature and use of EIAs and SIAs is urgent. In particular, SIAs need to be evaluated in terms of their capacity, not only to identify possible constraints to particular projects, but also in terms of the potential to include communities and their organisations in all facets of project development, and to build capacity in communities in terms of access to information and so on. A political challenge is to find ways in which such SIAs are impartial, and do not minister to hidden political and/or industry agendas. In this regard, I would argue that the EIA/SIA process is not a technical one which is undertaken by engineers, but requires the skills and knowledge of sociologists, because development is a value-laden concept (and process) and cannot be treated as a technical issue.

Finally, further research needs to be undertaken into places (like Utah Park, for example) where communities are faced with immediate environmental threat, but where no community action against such threat has occurred. Factors inhibiting such mobilisation need to be isolated, and such cases need to be compared to social movements.
issues do, indeed, have the capacity to begin overcoming political and racial barriers. However, the Chloorkop campaign itself only reached a relatively small number of people in the North East Rand region. What will be important from here on is how Chloorkop’s networks extend outward.

7.2 - Theoretical implications

The Chloorkop case study has implications for social movement theory. On the one hand, it lends credence to critiques against Inglehart’s (1977 and 1990) and Touraine’s (1977 and 1981) dichotomies of, respectively, materialism/post-materialism and industrial/post-industrial. While the removal of apartheid brought political enfranchisement to all South Africans, at the time of the Chloorkop campaign most blacks had not experienced significant changes in their material conditions, nor could it be said that South Africa was suddenly a post-industrial society. In other words, the terms of reference of these two theories are seriously flawed in terms of providing an explanation for social movement action around an environmental issue in South Africa or, perhaps, elsewhere in the Third World. Furthermore, such a theoretical framework clearly obscures the fact that collective action is rooted in previous cycles of mobilisation.

In this regard, Tarrow’s (1991 and 1994) framework provides an extremely useful way of trying to understand social movement activity. Its conceptual tools which focus on both structural as well as agency-related factors mean that an understanding of both micro and macro contexts will be facilitated. As the case study of Chloorkop demonstrates, the campaign opposing the landfill was a local (micro) one, yet it was clearly rooted in regional and national (macro) debates.
in their new position, it could be argued that industry no longer clearly holds the upper hand vis-a-vis communities. What the Chloorkop campaign demonstrates is that there is space for social movements to push for further gains, and the means whereby they do this, and the tactics and strategies which they use, can negate the discourse of disempowerment which is used against social movements.

Fourthly, and related to the previous point, is the nature of social movement mobilisation and collective action itself. The Chloorkop case study demonstrates how social movements can be rooted in previous cycles of mobilisation and collective action frames, and thus have a definite cultural and socio-political heritage. However, what also becomes clear is that a particular constellation of individuals, with unique experiences in addition to their particular networks, lends a dynamic to the interactive context of a social movement which takes that social movement forward. This interactive dynamic in the Coalition led to innovation in the collective action repertoire, as well as in the collective action frame. Extremely important is the fact that, although activity in the Coalition has waned, it in turn has laid the foundation for future potential mobilisation around environmental issues. Although it is too early to chart new potential for mobilisation, already new movement can be seen in the North East Rand region. A community initiative from within the Rabie Ridge Civic Association has led to the formation of an Interim North East Rand Environmental Forum. Members of the Rabie Ridge Civic, with assistance from ELA (Jhb) and GEM (represented by Ann Sugrue) are taking the initiative forward and will be inviting participation by residents' associations and civics from Phomolong, Kanana, Ivory Park and Tembisa. At this stage it also remains to be seen whether this forum will extend to include areas beyond the traditional townships.

Finally, what of cross-race cooperation, and the breaking down of barriers between communities? Clearly, if one takes into account the shifts in political alignment of many of the more conservative whites in the Coalition, then it could be argued that environmental
relatively limited in comparison to the fact that the bureaucracy has more or less remained the same. What is vital is that the local-level impact of the Coalition has reverberated through to higher levels of government. For example, at the national level, Kader Asmal "has committed himself to public participation in solving Gauteng's waste crisis" (The Star 02/11/1995). However, reconceptualisations of, and commitment to, democratic participation are not without ambiguities and inconsistencies. Despite assurances of public participation, there is little indication yet that the process of decision-making with regard to toxic waste management has changed significantly. The state's decision to turn back the contentious Finnish shipment of toxic waste (see Chapters 1 and 5) was made as a result of public outcry and a demonstration by Earthlife activists in KwaZulu/Natal, but does not mean that the decision-making process in general has changed. Given such contradictions which have emerged from both the case study of Chloorkop as well as the national/regional hazardous waste context within which Chloorkop has to be placed, I would argue that it cannot be assumed that new structures of governance, at whatever level, will at all times be able to adhere to participatory democratic practice. Rather, communities will need to remain vigilant and ensure that, not only are their voices heard, but that what they are saying becomes translated into practice. Mhlangu's analogy that striving for democracy is akin to struggling to maintain a boxing title captures this argument perfectly. It also points to the current debate on the role that civic organisations should play now that the ANC is in power. As Goldblatt (1995) has pointed out, it is not clear to what extent civic leaders have developed the environmental consciousness to take civic organisations into a developmental role. On the other hand, the fact that a number of civic leaders have taken up local government positions under the auspices of the ANC provides the potential for the demobilisation of future social movements.

Thirdly, Waste-tech has been forced to reevaluate its position on public participation. While there are contradictions and ambiguities
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

This research into community opposition to the proposed Chloorkop hazardous landfill raises important issues with regard to understanding the nature of the relationship between communities, the state and industry. This chapter will briefly draw together the main findings of this research. It will also highlight theoretical implications and point to political challenges and areas for further research.

7.1 Research findings

Theories of cycles of mobilisation such as the one suggested by Tarrow (1991 and 1994) provide an excellent means of understanding the ebb and flow of collective action. If the case of the Chloorkop Coalition is analysed its roots are clearly rooted in the collective action of the 1970s/1980s, although some traditions can be traced back to the 1950s. Although the Coalition has clearly ceased to function, and no final decision regarding the future of the dump has yet been made, it would be a mistake to regard the Coalition as having failed in any way. The success of this particular social movement can be charted in important ways, drawing on the findings of this research.

Firstly, the impact on the individuals within the Coalition has been tremendous, and a number have moved into positions where they can influence policy, share information with communities, take community concerns forward, and so on.

Secondly, there has been a reconceptualisation of democracy. This is particularly important if one considers that some of this rethinking has occurred among local-level bureaucrats who served under the apartheid government. However, such a reconceptualisation is
overthrow.
As Narsoo (1993: 3) points out, "the activists in the "liberation" civil society organisations" took "a radical non-collaborationist stance".

19. Snow and Benford's (1988: 213) notion that social movements are also "signifying agents" is borne out by the fact that Goldblatt (1995: 19) noted that, as a result of the campaign, Tembisa residents coined the term "toxic".

20. One of the implications of cooperation around an issue such as the Chloorkop landfill is that political tensions could emerge later, under different circumstances. This issue cannot be dealt with in this report, but would need to be investigated further.

21. In fact, Eybers made reference to the fact that the newspaper had focused undue attention on the landfill issue, and may have played a role in negatively influencing public opinion against the landfill.

22. Even Kleynhans conceded that ten years ago a protest campaign such as that undertaken by the Chloorkop Coalition would have been inconceivable.

23. EJWF is an umbrella body for approximately 180 environmental groups in South Africa, including ELA. In particular, it provides a coordinating and information dissemination function between its affiliates.

24. Here Mhlangu is referring to Nelson Mandela.

25. The Minister referred to here is Dawie de Villiers, Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. The consignment refers to the controversial Finnish shipment of toxic waste which was to be recycled in South Africa.
be partially ascribed to the fact that many unionists have simultaneously been members of civics which, in this research project, has been the case with regard to Mhlangu and Mahlanga. However, it would be a mistake to overdraw the similarities between the labour and civic movements. As Seekings (1994: 10) indicates, one of the debates within the civics from the mid-1970s was around the issue “of organisation beyond the labour movement”. Furthermore, Seekings (1994: 28) points to areas of contention between unionists and civic leaders during the mid-1980s, when he notes the fact that certain unionists were “suspicious ... [of] the 'populist' politics of the UDF”.

11. As Marks' (1993) research into youth in Diepkloof has shown, many youth who joined youth congresses and the ANC Youth League were drawn into these organisations through school-based organisation.

12. Johnson's (1988) account also discusses the excesses in militant action and a lack of control over certain groups of youth, which resulted in a reassertion of authority by parents and the formation of the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee, for example.

13. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of literature available on (white) ratepayers' associations.

14. The name of the airport was changed in 1995 from Jan Smuts Airport.

15. For this particular demonstration, ELA made the front page of the Saturday Star (15/07/1995) with a large captioned photograph of a masked protester. The photograph dominated the page. This is typical of the kind of media coverage that ELA aims for. In the words of an ELA activist, "ELA tries to make maximum impact with minimum resources because its activists are volunteers and resources are limited" (ELA [Johannesburg] Toxics Campaign Group meeting 12/10/1995).

16. This course can be seen in the context of changing conceptions over the role of civic organisations. As Seekings (1994: 28-36) shows, civic organisations began reconceptualising their role in terms of development and reconstruction from approximately 1988, when a negotiated settlement appeared to be imminent. To this end, it was acknowledged that civic leaders needed new skills to deal with the challenges of development.

17. However, it should be borne in mind that sections of the Defence Force and intelligence sectors of the previous government have been involved in 'third force' and hit squad activities until quite recently.

18. Phadu's comment raises a very important point for comparison between ANC strategy and that of the trade union movement. As Adler et al (1992: 10) point out with regard to the period of the 1970s in particular:

In [the union movement's] emphasis on gradualism, flexibility, and compromise with employers and the state the strategy stood in marked contrast to the armed struggle being waged by the ANC, which aimed at the state's
APPENDIX A

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

The organisational position of the interviewees reflects the positions they held at the time of the Chloorkop Campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation/Position</th>
<th>Date Interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dudney, Abbey</td>
<td>Did not belong to an organisation. Interviewed on 04/08/1995.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eybers, Han</td>
<td>Kempton Park City Councillor, Administrator of Tembisa. Interviewed on 10/08/1995.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mhlangu, Big Joe</td>
<td>Organiser of residents' committee in Ivory Park. Later committee became SANCO Ivory Park. Interviewed on 19/08/1995.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muller, Hans</td>
<td>Town clerk, Kempton Park City Council. Interviewed on 02/08/1995.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phadu, Tebogo</td>
<td>Education officer for Tembisa ANC. Interviewed on 28/06/1995.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoeman, Mr</td>
<td>Chairperson of the Townships Board. Interviewed telephonically on 31/10/1995.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Kempton Express. 01/12/1994. Transitional council is nearly there. 9(48): 1.


The Kempton Express. 18/05/1995. Two substructures become one. 10(20): 3.


The Kempton Express. 09/11/1995. ANC, NP seize the day. 10(48): 1.


The Kempton Express, 26/05/1993a. 'Die-in' held at dump site. 8(21): 1.

The Kempton Express, 26/05/1993b. Experts will investigate. 8(21): 1.

The Kempton Express, 26/05/1993c. EarthLife wants to march. 8(21): 9.

The Kempton Express, 09/06/1993. Mass march against dump draws only 100 of expected 5000 people - demands handed to mayor. 8(23): 1.

The Kempton Express, 16/06/1995. Dump group splits from RPA. 8(24).


The Kempton Express, 10/11/1993. Margolia dump has been closed. 8(46).


The Kempton Express, 01/12/1993b. Toxic dump demands handed over. 8(49): 2.


The Kempton Express, 16/02/1994. First steps towards new local government were taken on Saturday. 9(7): 1.

The Kempton Express, 02/03/1994. Forum is now established. 9(9): 1.


The Kempton Express, 23/06/1994. Progress is made on local


The Star. 18/08/1995. Govt to probe toxic permit.

The Star. 12/09/1995. 9 potential sites for incinerator identified.

The Star. 10/10/1995. Fury over spill from toxic site.

The Star. 02/11/1995. Residents will have say regarding waste.

The Star/Looking East. 25/10/1995. Outrage over protest fee.


The Weekend Star. 18-19 February 1995. Ther gets R13 500-00 fine.
hazardous waste.


Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. 1995. Proposal: series of workshops to determine and discuss public fears and concerns; proposed Chloorkop Class H:H waste disposal site.


Newspaper articles

Benoni City Times. 25/08/1995. Toxic waste deal is off. 10(34): 3.


The Kempton Express. 03/03/1993a. Toxic dump ready soon. 8(9): 1.

The Kempton Express. 03/03/1993b. The council's 23 conditions. 8(9): 5.

The Kempton Express. 03/03/1993c. Very tight control at Chloorkop toxic dump. 8(9): 5.

The Kempton Express. 10/03/1993. Input asked on toxic dump - a list of interested parties compiled. 8(10): 8.

The Kempton Express. 17/03/1993. Tumbisa's rent boycott is off. 8(11): 5.


Original documentation

BGIM (Brian Gibson Issues Management). 16/3/1993. Selected notes of public meeting held by Waste-tech (Pty) Limited at the Chloorkop Primary School on March 12, 1993 at 17:30 to discuss the establishment of a new hazardous waste landfill disposal site.

BGIM(a). No date. Chronological record of public contacts for Waste-tech.

BGIM(b). No date. Introducing Brian Gibson Issue Management (BGIM).

BGIM(c). No date. Waste-tech public meeting: Friday, March 12, 1993 at 17:30 at Chloorkop Laerskool (list of people/organisations contacted personally by Brian Gibson regarding meeting). Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. (2 February) 1993. Permit for Class 1 waste disposal site at Chloorkop.

Coalition Against the Chloorkop Toxic Dump. No date. Newsletter No. 1.


Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. 1994. Waste management series. Minimum requirements for the handling and disposal of
Sparks, A. 1994. Tomorrow is another country. Sandton: Struik Book Distributors, Trade Division (Pty) Ltd.

Steinberg, J. 1995. Sparring with the ghosts of our former selves: "civil society" and the new South African order. Unpublished research paper for the Albert Einstein Institution's South Africa Programme.


University Press.


