here on Taiwan.” What used to be called the ROC, is now referred to as the “ROK-on-
Taiwan.”

This new stance served as belated recognition by the ROC Government of Taiwan’s existence as a de facto political entity in the international arena. Since 1949, Taiwan has acted as an independent actor in the international community. The view of the ROC Government is that this entitles Taiwan to an international legal status and should be permitted to enjoy equal diplomatic status with the PRC. Pragmatic diplomacy was designed to achieve just this: to promote the ROC’s “national development and position in the international community” and to “persuade the world to adjust to the reality that there are two political entities in China, separated by the Taiwan Straits.” While adhering to the “one China” policy, the ROC Government has adopted a more practical stance, one more commensurate with reality. Taipei has therefore “eschewed ideology-driven stance for a more pragmatic flexible diplomacy.” Due to its lesser political and geographical status, the ROC’s claim of being an equal to the PRC is, however, questionable.

The ROC’s Changing Foreign Relations,

Pragmatic diplomacy has resulted in diplomatic gains for the ROC. Despite opposition from the PRC, Taipei has been able to upgrade its substantive relations in the international community. From 1988, the ROC established diplomatic relations with a number of smaller countries; these were Grenada (1988), Belize (1989), Liberia (1989), the Bahamas (1989), Panama (1989), Guinea Bissau (1990), I.e.r.who (1990), Nicaragua (1990), the Central African Republic (1991), and Niger (1992). However, during this time, its formal

1) Ibid. p.33-34.

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The Beginnings of Pragmatic Diplomacy.

With the inauguration of Lee Teng Hui as president of the ROC in January 1988, pragmatism became the basis of foreign policy-making. "The country should henceforth strive with greater determination, pragmatism, flexibility, and vision in order to develop a foreign policy based primarily on substantive relations."¹¹ The ROC uses the term "substantive relations" to describe the economic, trade, technological, and cultural ties which it enjoys with over 140 countries and regions.¹² This "pragmatic diplomacy," was designed to counter the ROC's international isolation. It ushered in a policy of "diplomatic activism" whereby Taipei would actively promote and enhance the ROC's international status.¹³

Pragmatic diplomacy has resulted in the ROC Government redefining itself in the international system. Since 1990, the government has maintained that "there is only one China, and both Taiwan and the mainland are parts of China".¹⁴ The ROC Government no longer (unrealistically) claims to represent the whole of China. It now places itself in an equal but separate position with Beijing. By doing so, the ROC no longer attempts to force states to choose between recognising either the PRC or ROC. This has created a "wider horizon" for itself internationally.¹⁵ Thus for the ROC, diplomatic recognition is no longer a zero-sum choice.¹⁶ The PRC, however, will not accept any sort of "dual recognition" in conjunction with the ROC.

The ROC government went further in redefining its international status in August 1992 when the National Unification Council defined the ROC's jurisdiction as "extending to Taiwan and its adjacent islands only". President Lee stated that, "the Republic of China is

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(1) the "one China" policy is abided by;

(2) the PRC is already a member; and

(3) the title used must be approved by the PRC and show the PRC’s sovereignty, for example "Taipei, China".  

Any attempt by the ROC to join a governmental organisation which has not been sanctioned by the PRC would undermine the "one China" policy and would therefore be unacceptable to the PRC.

As a result, the ROC has been excluded from all the United Nations organisations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank from which it was expelled in 1980. It was also replaced by the PRC in the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1981. The ROC did, however, manage to retain its membership of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) after the PRC became a member in 1986, accepting (under protest) a change of name negotiated by other ADB members to make it possible for both the Beijing and Taipei governments to have concurrent membership. The ROC is a member of only eleven governmental organisations. It is, however, a member of 81 international non-governmental organisations.

It was in this position that the ROC found itself in the late 1980’s - politically isolated due to Beijing’s international enforcement of the "one China" policy. During this period, however, Taipei’s foreign policy-making process began to become more pragmatic.

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"Despite being the world’s 14th largest trading nation, the ROC’s economic statistics are not published by the IMF or World Bank.
Beijing’s intentions vis-à-vis the ROC are as follows: Firstly, to get Taiwan to acknowledge the PRC as the representative government of China, thereby denying the ROC any claim to sovereignty in accordance with the "One China, Two Systems" formula. Secondly, Beijing claims that the ROC Government came to an end with its expulsion from China in 1949 and that Taiwan is merely a province of China. Therefore, it has no rights in international law and cannot pass itself off as a country. The PRC has been successful in effecting these ideals in the international community.

As a result, the ROC remains as one of the most politically isolated states in the world. Since the expulsion of the ROC from the United Nations in 1971, Taipei has become an international political pariah. The number of states giving the ROC diplomatic recognition dropped from fifty-nine in 1971 to twenty-two in 1978. With the United States switching diplomatic recognition to the PRC in January 1979, the ROC was further isolated with other states following America’s lead. Between 1979 and 1987, the ROC was derecognised by six states. These were: the United States, Colombia, Lesotho, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. It was, however, able to establish relations with a few minor countries, namely, Dominica, Nauru, Saint Lucia, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Vincent, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. Thus during this period, the number of states offering the ROC diplomatic recognition remained stable in the lower twenties.

Due to Beijing’s insistence, the ROC has also been excluded from international organisations. Claiming to be the sole representative of China, Beijing sees itself as having the exclusive right of participating in international affairs. For the PRC, Taiwan is only permitted into non-governmental organisations when:

35. United States President, Jimmy Carter, granted the PRC diplomatic recognition in an attempt to use the "China card" to deal with Soviet expansionism. The ROC was regarded as a dispensable pawn in this kaper strategic arena. Klintworth, Op. cit. p.82.
Why do so many people among us want to advocate independence for Taiwan? This is because Communist China blocks our various activities in the international community and leaves no way out for us. As a result, some youths and some people who are dissatisfied with what the Government has done went abroad and called for Taiwan independence. The call for Taiwan independence does not originate from within Taiwan. Rather it is as a result of Communist China's practice of isolating us from the international community...Letting the ROC have enough space in the international community is the way to truly promote the development of the ROC on Taiwan as well as reunification of our country.20

Instead of deterring pro-independence forces on Taiwan, the PRC's threat of force against Taiwan has had the opposite effect. Its tactics are isolating the people in Taiwan from the mainland, creating opposition to the "one China" principle.21 This in turn assists the proponents of independence for Taiwan who argue that Taiwan can only break out of its international isolation once it has declared independence.22 Upcoming parliamentary elections in the ROC in December 1995 followed by the first direct presidential elections in March 1996 could well push the ROC closer to independence. Furthermore, while the CCP continues to threaten the ROC with invasion, Taipei refuses to engage in unification negotiations with the CCP.

This ongoing political battle between the PRC and the ROC can be seen as a continuation of the Chinese civil war which went into "suspended animation" in 1949 after the ROC Government fled to Taiwan.23

It regards the "one country, two systems" formula as annexation under the guise of unification.\(^\text{14}\)

This stance is heightened by the PRC's threat of force against Taiwan: "While we advocate reunification through peaceful means, we do not promise to renounce the use of force. This stand is absolutely not meant for Taiwan people, it is meant for foreign forces' interference in China's reunification, and for Taiwan independence...We will never sit by and watch Taiwan become independent."\(^\text{15}\) This strong stance adopted by the PRC is designed to deter the pro-independence forces who advocate Taiwanese independence.\(^\text{16}\) In addition, any declaration of independence by Taiwan would have implications for Beijing's hold on Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. For this reason, the PRC would find it difficult to avoid a military response against Taiwan.\(^\text{17}\)

The opposition party (to the ruling KMT) in the ROC, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), advocates such a declaration of independence.\(^\text{18}\) Beijing has rejected this. It refuses to recognise Taiwan as an independent political entity. This would run counter to the "one China" principle and possibly result in the permanent division of China.\(^\text{19}\) The military might of the PRC over the ROC gives the former an uncompromising attitude on the issue. ROC President Lee Teng Hui has said the following:

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\(^{14}\) Ibid, p.3.

\(^{15}\) This statement was made on June 7, 1991 by the Taiwan Office of the Central Committee of the CCP. It was believed to be in response to the ROC's unification guidelines. Chiu, H. Op cit. p.8.

\(^{16}\) Previously, opposition to KMT rule by proposing independence for Taiwan was illegal in Taiwan. Many thousands emigrated overseas and established numerous political opposition groups with the objective of independence for Taiwan. They proposed that Taiwan should become independent, free from either KMT or CCP control as the Republic of Taiwan. Until the mid to late 1980's, such a proposal was a criminal offence, subject to severe punishment. Williams, J.P. Op cit. p.2-8.


\(^{18}\) The DPP was formed on 28 September 1986 from political opposition groups of the loosely organised "outside the KMT Party" grouping. Ibid, p.238.

This would entitle Taiwan to retain its current economic, political and social systems but would lose its claim of being the legitimate government of China.8 This policy is known as the “One China, Two Systems” formula.9 This implies that China is ruled by the Beijing Government, but that another “capitalist-type system” operates on Taiwan.10 Former PRC president, Yang Shangkun, made it clear that Taiwan would not be accorded equal status to the mainland in order to avoid the impression of there being “two Chinas”. What is of utmost importance, Yang argued, “is to have the central government positioned in Beijing as the People’s Republic, should there be any unification at all. This is definitive with no room for compromising.”11 The ROC rejects the SAR proposal. As a SAR, Taiwan would be relegated to the position of a local authority.12 This runs counter to the ROC’s view that it is an equal and legitimate government to the PRC.

The ROC Government’s interpretation of “one China” has been defined in a resolution by the National Unification Council on August 1 1992. It contends that “one China means the ROC founded in 1912 and [its] sovereignty covers all of China. Our government’s current political power, however, only covers Taiwan, Penghu, Chinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu. Taiwan is a part of China and the mainland is also part of China.” The resolution states that since 1949, China has “entered a temporary division and two political entities have ruled the two sides of the Taiwan Straits since then.”13 Taipei refuses to be considered as being...
However, with the end of the Cold War, the international arena in which the ROC must operate has radically changed. Global influence increasingly depends upon economic strength rather than military power. The ROC is taking advantage of these changes.

Taipei's "pragmatic diplomacy" is winning it greater acceptance as a political entity in the international community, despite continued opposition from Beijing.

The purpose of this chapter will be to recognize the changes in the international system and to analyse the impact they are having upon the PRC's and ROC's respective positions.

South Africa is currently facing its most important foreign policy decision vis-a-vis the ROC and the PRC. It is essential that not only the local, but also international factors, be taken into consideration before this issue of recognition is decided. This chapter will provide an understanding of the complex nature of ROC-PRC interaction in the international arena and its meaning for South Africa.

The Definition of "One China".

Since the expulsion of Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang Government and the establishment of the ROC on Taiwan in 1949, China has been a divided country. For its rival, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing, the ROC ended in 1949 when the PRC became the sole sovereign government of the country. Both governments follow the "one China" policy although both interpret it differently. For the CCP, the term refers to the PRC with its capital in Beijing with Taiwan as a "renegade province" of China which, after eventual unification, will have the status of a "Special Administrative Region" (SAR) based on the Hong Kong and Macao models of 1997 and 1999 respectively. With the return of Hong Kong and Macao to the PRC, the next logical goal for the PRC leadership is the inclusion of Taiwan into "Greater China." Provision for this has been made in the PRC constitution.²

⁵The Economist, 29 July 1995, p.39
⁶Article 31 of the PRC constitution provides for the establishment of a SAR in Taiwan. It makes provision for an SAR to be established "when necessary" and it can also be abolished when it is no longer required. Thus Article 31 offers Taiwan no SAR little legal protection. Chia, H. "Recent Chinese Communist
4. THE ROC AND PRC - COMPETITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

Introduction.

Competition between the PRC and the ROC in the international arena is clearly evident in South Africa. Both sides are exerting pressure on the South African Government of National Unity to recognise their respective governments. At present, in accordance with the “one China” policy, South Africa has diplomatic relations with the ROC and as such, recognises the government in Taipei as being the legitimate government of China. South Africa is the only country of significant size and economic power that maintains diplomatic relations with the ROC.¹ This, however, runs against the international norm as most states have recognised the Chinese Communist regime as the “sole legal government of China.”²

Despite a gradual improvement in relations between the ROC and PRC, competition between the two governments in the international arena has intensified. Taipei’s efforts to gain membership of international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and its desire for readmission to the United Nations have, until now, successfully been blocked by Beijing. It seems unlikely that either of Taipei’s initiatives will be successful without Beijing’s consent. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the PRC has an effective veto power over the ROC’s participation in the international community. Since Beijing took the seat of the ROC in the United Nations in 1971, some 160 countries have given diplomatic recognition to the PRC.³ In comparison, only 30 states recognise the ROC diplomatically. It seems apparent that Beijing has won the political victory over Taipei.

³ Aziz Palad, Deputy Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the South African Institute of International Affairs conference on the PRC: Red Dragon Rising, University of the Witwatersrand, 3 November 1994 (as delivered by Mr E de Montilla, Director: South African Department of Foreign Affairs).

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depend upon what decision the ANC-dominated Government of National Unity makes vis-à-vis recognition of the "two Chinas".
break-off relations with Taipei it is a very real possibility that this economic relationship will be damaged. After South Korea withdrew recognition from the ROC in favour of the PRC in July 1992, Taipei responded by cancelling preferential trade treatment and ended direct air links between the two countries. It is doubtful that the ROC would subject South Africa to the same harsh treatment, having become more tolerant in line with its policy of "pragmatic diplomacy" to increase its international substantive relations. However, it is likely that the ROC will scale back investment in South Africa as well as no longer offer Pretoria generous aid packages or loans. According to ROC Consul General Feng Tai, the ROC will "withdraw its commitments" in the event of a country breaking off diplomatic links.  

South Africa, however, is an important political partner to the ROC. Besides having close traditional links to the Western World, South Africa also has a large amount of influence in the Third World, being the most powerful state in Africa. From Taipei's perspective, South Africa is thus a valuable political asset which can promote the ROC's interests in the international community. For this reason, the ROC will continue to extend to South Africa economic and financial aid in an attempt to safeguard its diplomatic relationship with Pretoria.

The South African-ROC relationship is thus complementary. Even though the parish bond no longer exists, both states derive mutual benefits from the relationship - South Africa economically and the ROC politically. South African policy towards the recognition question of the "two Chinas" will be largely determined by the importance of the economic relationship the Republic has with both the ROC and the PRC. "The primary motivation of the ANC's foreign economic policies will be to place South Africa on the path of rapid economic development."

The future of the South African-ROC relationship will thus

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9 Interview, 11 October 1995.
10 This point was mentioned in a discussion with Yao-Tsung Chih, Second Cultural Secretary of the Office of the Cultural Counselor, ROC embassy, Pretoria, June 1994.
shunned by the international community as a whole and found consolation in each other’s company. As their isolation grew, so relations between Pretoria and Taipei strengthened. The pariah bond accounted for the unexpected relationship that these two countries, on opposite sides of the globe with different language, culture and history, enjoyed.

This pariah relationship has, however, come to an end. South Africa’s first multiracial democratic elections in April 1994 signalled the end of its international isolation. The elections marked the consummation of South Africa’s international reacceptance, a process that had begun with the release from prison of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the liberation movements in February 1990. South Africa thus began the process of emerging from its isolation. This is having a major impact upon the current relationship between the two countries. Democratic South Africa is realigning its foreign policy after over four decades of apartheid government. From the new South African Government of National Unity’s perspective, the ROC must now conform with this new foreign policy.

The ANC-dominated Government of National Unity (GNU) is taking advantage of South Africa’s “newly-found internationalism.” As an enthusiastic member of the United Nations, the Republic has expressed a desire to establish formal ties with the PRC - the world’s most populous nation with a seat on the Security Council. This will obviously have a profound effect upon the future state of relations between South Africa and the ROC.

Any upgrading of relations between Pretoria and Beijing will adversely affect South Africa’s relationship with the ROC. At Beijing’s insistence, South Africa will not be able to deviate from the “one China” policy - Pretoria cannot have formal diplomatic relations with both the PRC and the ROC. Therefore Pretoria will have to “choose” between the two.

In making its decision, Pretoria will not be able to ignore the important economic relationship that it has with the ROC. In 1994, trade between South Africa and the ROC amounted to R5.35 billion with South Africa enjoying a trade surplus of R664 million. The ROC is currently South Africa’s seventh largest trade partner. If South Africa were to

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Development Fund with the intention of making available US$1.1 billion worth of concessionary loans and grants to "friendly" developing countries.  

By 1995, the ROC aims to increase its foreign aid budget to 0.25% of its GNP - this being 78% of Japan's, the world's largest aid donor. The ROC is thus willing to play a greater role in the international economy. Its increasing economic weight will enhance the ROC's international power and status. President Lee has stated that the ROC will "rue its economic, sci-tech, and cultural strength to expand its external relations. The ROC has substantial foreign exchange reserves, but many other nations are short of capital for developing their economies. So we should give them a helping hand. In doing so, we can also improve our relations with them." Thus economic strength will translate into political influence. Other states will be less likely to be swayed by pressure from Beijing.

The primacy of economics is favouring the ROC's efforts to "upgrade the officiality of its relations and hinder the PRC's attempts to interfere." Such a view has been confirmed by Gary L. Ackerman, chairman of the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: "The reality is that Taiwan is an economic colossus and the inter-relationship and inter-dependency between the community of nations and Taiwan will only grow more important as time goes on." Tiananmen Square, the end of the Cold War, the global trend toward democracy, the rise of geo-economics and the nature of the Asia-Pacific economic region have all resulted in a reassessment and recognition of the ROC's regional and global importance. This contrasts with the continual abuse of human rights within the PRC and the resultant stress placed on Sino-United States relations.

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12 Chang, M. H. Op cit p.16.
13 Ibid. p.10.
both the ROC and the PRC. For Taipei, recognition is no longer a zero-sum option. This is
designed to ease the ROC’s entry into the United Nations. The impact of this
announcement has yet to be ascertained in the international community.

Pragmatic Diplomacy - An Assessment.

Pragmatic diplomacy has marked a new era of interaction with the international community
for the ROC. It is working to prevent further political isolation. Through pragmatic
diplomacy, the ROC has been successful in extending its substantive relations. Global
circumstances have provided a favourable environment for pragmatic diplomacy to develop
between 1988 and 1994. It has been “helped” in this regard by the PRC itself. “The
Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989 destroyed the reformist image Beijing had
created for itself over the previous decade. The ROC was no longer regarded as an
authoritarian regime which somehow deserved its international isolation. The world now
noticed and looked favourably upon the ROC’s democratization”.81 Taipei’s transition to
democracy contrasted with the totalitarian rule of Beijing. The ROC was thus presented
with an opportunity to gain acceptance in the international community.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War had important
ramifications for the ROC. With the disappearance of the USSR, the strategic advantage
was now held by the West. The PRC could no longer play one superpower off against the
other, thus the “China card” lost its importance.82 The ROC was now presented with
greater scope for manoeuvrability in the international arena, no longer constrained by
superpower politics.

With the collapse of the Soviet communist bloc, communist ideology in the PRC itself was
threatened. It seemed that the PRC was being surrounded by a wall of “democratic

81 Chi Shu, deputy director of the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University, Taiwan
ROC. Chi, S. Op cit. p 11
82 Ibid. p 11.
Although a political ally of the ROC, South Africa has been conspicuous by its absence from voicing its support for the ROC’s United Nations bid. This can be attributed to an apprehensiveness on the part of the South African Government of not wanting to offend the PRC. “We will not take the lead” is how J.L.Viljoen, South Africa’s ambassador to the ROC, describes his government’s policy in voicing support for the ROC’s bid for a seat in the United Nations. Bearing in mind South Africa’s high international standing, it could certainly play a positive role in this regard.

Despite having not received large support from United Nations member states, the ROC is continuing with its attempt to regain admission into the United Nations. A major hindrance to its attempt to rejoin the United Nations has been the ROC’s adherence to the “one China” policy. “The ‘one China’ policy is the major obstacle for Taiwan to persuade European nations to support its United Nations bid,” The “one China” policy has prevented states from recognising both the ROC and the PRC. The admission of the ROC into the United Nations would mark an effective end to the “one China” recognition policy in the international community of states.

Accordingly, in an attempt to encourage its acceptance by United Nations members, the ROC has renounced its claim to “represent China in the international arena.” The White Paper stated that, “Prior to unification, the two parts of China should have the right to participate alongside each other in the international community.” This announcement is the latest development in the ROC’s pragmatic diplomacy and has wide implications for the ROC’s future diplomatic relations. It has opened the way for states to jointly recognise
existence, both having different political, economic and social structures. The “one China” formula adopted by both sides is thus becoming more and more irrelevant.

Many see the KMT Government’s campaign for United Nations membership as an attempt to undercut the DPP opposition which advocates Taiwan independence and admission into the United Nations as the “Republic of Taiwan.” This view does provide a partial explanation. More importantly, United Nations membership would assist the ROC to gain entry into other international organisations which it has previously been barred from. Taipei would be able to break out from its enforced isolation and participate on an equal basis with the PRC in the international community.

Prospects for ROC Membership of the United Nations.

So far, the ROC has not made significant progress in its bid for readmission into the United Nations. This can be attributed to opposition from the PRC. In its White Paper, Beijing forewarned those United Nations members sympathetic to Taipei’s bid not to give any support to the ROC’s campaign. As a result, in 1994 only 26 countries had spoken in support of the ROC’s bid. This was up from 24 states the previous year. The ROC has been pushing its allies to propose discussion of granting it parallel recognition with the PRC in the United Nations. However, this proposal has not been accepted for the past two years. The latest attempt was a letter sent to Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali in July 1995 by fifteen signatory states calling for the establishment of an ad-hoc committee to consider the ROC’s bid. The PRC Government described this proposal as a “grave incident” which “grossly interferes in China’s internal affairs.” This was the third year in a row that such a proposal has been forwarded to the United Nations.

71 Ibid., p.8.
73 “Statement by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC on the Question of so-called Taiwan’s “Representation” in the UN Put Forward by a Small Number of Countries”, 29 July 1995, p.1.
74 The 18 July letter asked the United Nations to examine “the exceptional situation of the ROC on Taiwan in the international context” on the basis of both “the principle of universality” and “the established model
Fourthly, the ROC wants to base its entry into the United Nations on the models of Germany and Korea - divided nations that had have dual representation in the United Nations. The ROC maintains that simultaneous membership with the PRC in the United Nations would not jeopardise prospects for reunification but could rather contribute "to building an environment for the peaceful unification of China." The example of East and West Germany, which unified while both were members of the United Nations before reunification, is cited as evidence of this. The PRC inadvertently gave some credence to the ROC's proposal with its 1992 recognition of the two Koreas in the United Nations. Beijing, however, does not hold Korea or Germany as possible models. Seeing their previous situations as resulting from post-World War II international agreements, The PRC regards the representation of Taiwan as an internal affair, not comparable to the Korean or German examples.

The PRC has expressed strong opposition to the ROC's United Nations bid. On September 1, 1993, the PRC's State Council issued a White Paper criticising the ROC's attempt. It asserted that Taiwan cannot "re-enter the United Nations, as a sovereign state can have only one central government and China's representation has already been settled." Beijing considers Taipei's effort as an attempt to undermine the "one China" policy by "creating" two Chinas and thereby splitting the Chinese nation. In effect, this has already taken place. The reality of the situation is that since 1949, two Chinas have been in
intention to pursue re-admission into the United Nations. Its United Nations' campaign was launched in July 1993. The ROC's bid for United Nations membership is a product of its pragmatic diplomacy and a recognition of its growing confidence in the international community.

The ROC bases its case for membership on a number of arguments. First, the ROC has operated as a de facto independent state for the past four-and-a-half decades. The ROC is now the world's 14th largest trading nation with a GNP which ranks 20th and a GDP per capita of over US$11,000. The ROC also holds some of the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world. With 21 million people, Taiwan has a larger population than two-thirds of United Nations member states. Taipei argues that these objective factors alone entitle the ROC to a legal status in the United Nations.

Secondly, the ROC government views Resolution 2758 of 1971, which gave Beijing the right to represent China (at Taipei's expense), as not resolving the China representation question. "It merely replaced one form of injustice with another." The ROC wants the United Nations to admit it as a full member with international representation and to no longer avoid the question of ROC participation in the United Nations.

Thirdly, Taipei argues that its lack of representation in the United Nations is a violation of the basic rights of its 21 million populace who are entitled to international representation. ROC Premier Lien Chan has described this as an "immoral, unfair, and unreasonable situation." Thus the ROC regards this as a contravention of the principle of universality and human rights as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

On 13 June 1991, the ROC Legislative Yuan adopted a motion for the ROC government's application toward UN membership under its official designation "Republic of China". ROC Yearbook 1993, Op cit. p.181


"Chi, S. Op cit. p19


On January 1, 1990, the ROC applied for membership to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as "The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy, and Matsu." The PRC had applied for re-admission to GATT in 1986. It was originally a founding member of the GATT in 1948 but Beijing had previously withdrawn from the GATT in 1949 from what it regarded as a capitalist, Western-dominated organisation. The GATT was superseded by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on January 1, 1995.

Beijing opposes the admission of Taiwan as a member of the WTO before it itself becomes a member. Taipei rejects Beijing's attempt to prevent its gaining of membership and has been soliciting support among WTO members for its independent admission. However, due to Beijing's strong opposition, the ROC will not be able to muster the two-thirds majority approval of the membership required for admission into the WTO. Many argue that the ROC's growing international economic role oblige its participation in international organisations. It is essential to the ROC's national interest that it gain membership of an international economic organisation. With the global trend being toward regional economic blocs, the ROC could find itself isolated with its exports excluded from the world market. This could severely damage the ROC economy.

The ROC and the United Nations.

With its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, the ROC became a political pariah state. Its diplomatic status does not correspond to its economic power in the international community. It is generally held that Taipei's international standing is far below that which it justifiably deserves. For this reason, in 1991, the ROC Government announced its
between Seoul and Taipei. The geographical proximity of these states to the PRC meant that they could no longer continue to neglect the PRC’s increasing power as a regional hegemon by withholding diplomatic recognition. The PRC’s growing economic stature was also an important factor in this regard.

After a relationship that had lasted for over four decades, there was a feeling of “betrayal” within the ROC towards the ROK. Taipei responded by cancelling preferential trade arrangements with Seoul and shortly afterwards ended direct air links between the two countries. Due to the geographical size and proximity of the PRC - being the most powerful state in Asia - Asian states have often been persuaded by considerations of national security to recognise the PRC at Taipei’s expense.

The ROC and International Organisations.

The ROC is courting international organisations in an attempt to establish a position for itself in the international community, one more in accordance with its economic strength. At present, the ROC is a member of only eleven governmental organisations. However, through pragmatic diplomacy, the ROC has been able to obtain membership of several organisations. It is a member of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) as well as the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC). In November 1991, despite opposition from the PRC, the ROC joined the Asian-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APPEF). However, due to Beijing’s insistence, it had to enter under the name “Chinese Taipei” and with the proviso that its economics minister, rather than its foreign minister, would attend ministerial meetings.

15 ROC Foreign Minister Mr Frederick Chien described the situation as being one of “betrayal and defeat” by South Korea. Baum, J. “Shag in the Face” in Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 September 1992, p 10.
The ROC currently has formal relations with nine African states. In June 1992, diplomatic relations were established with Niger, causing the PRC to break off relations. The ROC's most important political partner is South Africa. The ROC is currently lobbying very hard to prevent South Africa from shifting diplomatic recognition to Beijing. If Pretoria decides to offer diplomatic recognition to the PRC, it would be a serious political loss to the ROC. It is possible that this could result in a "domino effect" of derecognition whereby other states in the region (with diplomatic relations with Taipei) follow South Africa's lead. These countries include Swaziland and Malawi. By having diplomatic relations with South Africa, Beijing would also be in an advantageous position to place greater pressure on other African states to follow suit. This is one of the reasons that the ROC recognises the importance of South Africa as a political partner.

In February 1994, the small African state of Burkina Faso attempted to establish relations with both the ROC and the PRC but its initiative was rejected by Beijing. Thus in view of the failure of Latvia and Burkina Faso to forge diplomatic relations with both the ROC and the PRC, "dual recognition" does not seem to be a viable option.

In East Asia, the ROC has not been successful in countering the PRC's political influence. Although it has managed to upgrade its substantive relations in the region, it has lost some important diplomatic partners. In 1990, Singapore and Indonesia established formal ties with the PRC, derecognising the ROC. In August 1992, South Korea (ROK) announced its intention to establish relations with the PRC, thus causing the severance of relations

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the ROC and in response closed its embassy in Riga on February 25, 1992. Beijing regards dual recognition as incompatible with the "one China" policy.

The ROC and Europe.

The only state in Western Europe which has diplomatic relations with the ROC is the Holy See. Foreign Minister Frederick Chen announced in July 1994 that relations with the Vatican were "solid" and that it will not break ties with the ROC. The ROC has been successful in improving its substantive relations in Europe. It currently has 23 representative missions in 20 European countries, while 16 European states have set up 17 representative offices in the ROC. Some European countries have also expressed their willingness to invite President Lee on formal state visits, despite opposition from Beijing.

The ROC and South and Central America.

The majority of the ROC's political partners are to be found in this region with a total of sixteen states maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC. The ROC has provided extensive political, agricultural, and economic assistance to the region. Taipei has spent large amounts of money in an attempt to secure diplomatic recognition from these states. This has been funded through the ROC's International Economic Co-operation and Development Fund (IECDF) to provide economic aid to the Third World. This "dollar diplomacy" is an important ingredient of the ROC's pragmatic diplomacy - using financial resources to promote itself in the international community.

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relations with Uruguay (1988), Saudi Arabia (1990), and South Korea (1992) were terminated. The ROC currently has diplomatic relations with 30 states.

The ROC and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Pragmatic diplomacy has enjoyed its greatest success in the former Soviet bloc. The ROC and the former Soviet Union previously had no contacts with each other. Such contacts were forbidden by both governments, with the ROC having no relations with any communist state. By the late 1980's, the ROC had begun to actively pursue commercial relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The dramatic ideological and political changes that occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provided the ROC with an opportunity to improve its substantive relations within the region. Trade between the ROC and Russia amounted to almost US$228 million in 1991. This prompted the new Russian Government to state in February 1992 that it did not feel compelled to consult with Beijing on its relations with the ROC since "contact with Taiwan is both necessary and helpful for Russia." The ROC has subsequently developed substantive relations with other Commonwealth of Independent States such as Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

A notable diplomatic success for the ROC came with the establishment of consular relations with Latvia. On 29 January 1992, Latvia upgraded Taipei's office in Riga to consulate level while at the same time having diplomatic relations with the PRC. Latvia thereby attempted to offer "dual recognition" to both Beijing and Taipei. While Taipei accepted this position, Beijing opposed Latvia having official relations with both itself and

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41. The severance of diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia in 1990 was a serious blow to the ROC. This diplomatic loss marked an end to ideology in Taipei's foreign policy-making. This caused the ROC to focus more upon substantive relations than exclusive diplomatic relations. Moller, K. "A New Role for the ROC on Taiwan in the Post-Cold War Era" in Issues & Studies, February 1995, p. 84.
South Africa. The fifty-member mission comprised government officials, senior executives of state-run corporations, financial institutions and entrepreneurs from different industrial sectors.\textsuperscript{19} Vincent Siow, ROC State Minister and leader of the delegation stated that the visit showed “confidence in the (South African) Government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme and the future of economic growth.”\textsuperscript{20} It would probably be more accurate to say that the investment delegation was designed to gain political influence over the South African Government through economic assistance.

At the conclusion of the visit, the ROC investment delegation had committed R1 105 billion in trade, investment, loans, finance, and technical co-operation.\textsuperscript{21} These contracts were highly favourable to South Africa’s balance of trade. South African Chamber of Business deputy president, Les Well, described the delegation’s visit as being, “very good news for the future of the South African economy.”\textsuperscript{22} By providing funds to assist with the RDP, the ROC is attempting to strengthen its political ties with Pretoria.

The ROC’s largest potential investment project to date is in the South African petrochemical industry. A large part of this investment would go towards shore-up the ailing state-owned “Mossgas” project which originally cost R11 billion to develop but turned out to be a “white-elephant” for the government. The ROC’s Economic Affairs Minister, Chiang Pin-Kung announced in November of 1994 that the ROC would establish a task force to examine the feasibility of such an investment.\textsuperscript{23} According to South African

\textsuperscript{19} Siow, T. Op cit. p 151.

\textsuperscript{20} Quoted in “Taiwan investment boost on the cards” in The Star, 30 August 1994, p 10

\textsuperscript{21} This covered 25 projects - R55.5 million in trade packages, R126 million in financial aid, investments worth R34.5 million, and R130 million would be used in technical co-operation to establish vocational training centres. In addition, an ROC trade centre would be established in Johannesburg by July 1995. The Bank of Taiwan in Johannesburg provided the ROC’s loans. Siow, T. Op cit. p 152, and cited in “Taiwan Pledges $1.1 Billion” in Business Day, 6 September 1994, p 5.

\textsuperscript{22} Quoted in “Taiwan investment boost on the cards” in The Star, 30 August 1994, p 10

\textsuperscript{23} Both the ROC and South African governments agreed on a two-stage approach to the envisaged project. The first stage involved the appointment of an independent consultant by the ROC Government to undertake a survey of the petrochemical industry in South Africa. This study was undertaken by the British company Chem Systems at a cost of £8300 000 which believed that there was a “second commercial basis” for such an initiative. Once the study had been completed, the findings would be considered by a joint task force to determine whether the project should be developed. Collins, M. “Taiwan to Prove R3 Investment” in Business Day, 30 November 1994, p 3. “Report Pats on Chinese Involvement” in The Star.
deterrent effect upon potential investment to this country from the ROC. This does not reflect conditions in the ROC.

- Labour costs: Labour costs at the lowest level of South African industry have risen by 500 percent since 1986. Rising labour costs are having a serious impact upon labour intensive industries in South Africa. This problem is exacerbated by the low productivity of many of these industries. This is contrary to the situation that exists in many East Asian economies.

- Resident status: Many ROC investors have difficulty in obtaining residence status in South Africa. Wanting to crack down on illegal immigration from the Far East, the Department of Home Affairs no longer readily grants residence status, even to credible investors. A number of ROC investors have been forced to leave South Africa despite having invested large sums of money.

However, despite these problems and changes within the South African economy, the ROC Government is seeking to expand investment in the country. This is being done for primarily political reasons. The ROC's support for South Africa is linked to its "pro South" policy of economically courting the Third World in an attempt to expand its foreign relations in the developing world.

In February 1994, South Africa and the ROC signed a tax accord to eliminate double taxation on their respective investors in both countries. This agreement was designed to act as an investment incentive. In August 1994, the ROC sent an investment delegation to

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16 Information obtained from an interview with a private investor from the ROC in South Africa, July 1995.
18 The accord was signed by former Finance Minister Derek Keys and his ROC counterpart, Lin Chen-Kuo in Pretoria on 14 February 1994. The agreement was based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) model, also accommodating specific provisions as found in the South African and ROC taxation systems. "A part with Taiwan ends double taxation" in Business Day, 15 February 1994, p.3.
bilateral trade with South Africa. This is to say that the ROC has granted a de facto most-favoured-nation trading status to South Africa.10

By cementing the economic relationship with South Africa, the ROC will be ensuring its political ties with Pretoria remain. No South African Government, regardless of political leaning, will wish to risk the important economic relationship that exists with the ROC by breaking formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. The ROC would undoubtedly scale back its economic contact with South Africa in the event of the latter derecognising the ROC.

ROC Ambassador Loh has stated that "if South Africa does not recognise the government of Taiwan (ROC), what does that say to Taiwan about the value of its support for South Africa?"11 In the event of South Africa breaking off formal political links with the ROC, Taipei would "withdraw its commitments" to this country.12

Investment.

Currently there are over 280 ROC-owned investments operating in South Africa. These create employment for over 40 000 people with an investment capital of over one billion Rands.13 Many of these companies were lured to South Africa by lucrative investment incentives offered by the previous government for investing in the "homeland" areas. This formed part of Pretoria's policy of industrial decentralisation. A number of these companies, however, no longer qualify for such incentives. Present as well as potential investment from the ROC is coming up against other such barriers. These are as follows:11

- Labour problems: Rising levels of labour disputes and unrest have arisen in post-apartheid South Africa. The strength and influence of the trade unions in South Africa has had a

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10 Ibid p.164.
11 Quoted in Da Joune, P. "South Africa's Chinese Puzzle" in The Sunday Times, 11 June 1993, p.1
12 Interview with ROC Consul General, Fong Tai, Johannesburg, 11 October 1993.
14 For greater detail see Sone, T. Op. cit p.90-100
contracts with the company. The inclusion of a South African company in the contract, which could have been fulfilled by other international companies, implies a favouritism in the ROC Government’s choice. The ROC will "give priority to the country with which (it) has diplomatic links."  

In late 1994, the ROC called upon South Africa to investigate the possibility of supplying coal worth more than USS150 million to meet its expectant energy requirements. Such an amount would more than quadruple South Africa’s coal exports to the ROC. This offer was made despite strong competition from the PRC and Australia, both being geographically more convenient. The ROC has also stated that it intends to more than double its existing steel imports from the South African company Iscor. The ROC’s lack of natural resources require her to import vast quantities of raw materials. These are required to fuel her export-oriented industrial economy.  

The ROC is also a large purchaser of maize from South Africa. The Taiwan Feed Industry has purchased 300,000 tons of maize up to April 1995, worth about USS35 million. Other substantial trade contracts include the purchase by the Taichung Co of USS40 million worth of bricks from South Africa in 1994. The ROC is purposely attempting to increase

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4 SA Union Carriega Wagon Company won the contract as a junior partner with the Korean company Hyundai Precision Industrial Corporation and the UK’s GBC. SA Carriega Wagon Company and GBC are to jointly deliver 64 locomotives, to the value of USS$120 million. Sung, T. Lessons From Taiwan for South Africa, IBRE Publishers, Pretoria: 1984, p 163-164. 
6 For the year to August 1994, South Africa had exported 4.5 million tons of coal to the ROC. The ROC’s request would amount to a further 15 million tons. However, South African analysts have said that this order cannot be met under existing port facilities: "South Africa cannot service the Taiwanese request unless exports are switched from Europe." Collins, M. "Taiwan Seeks Big Coal Supply Deal with SA" in Business Day, 5 December 1994, p.1. 
7 This order would increase Iscor's exports to the ROC from 80,000 tons to 160,000 of hot rolled bands as well as supply an additional 80,000 tons of steel slabs. The China Steel Corporation would use the additional imports for "meeting domestic demand and fully utilizing production capacity of hot strip mills and cold reduction mills." Cited in ibid., p.2. 
investment and aid. These are assisting in the financing of South Africa’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

Since the democratic elections of April 1994, these incentives have been granted more readily. With the inception of the new Government of National Unity in South Africa, there is a very real possibility of the ANC-led Government derecognising the ROC in favour of the PRC. Taipei’s “ch-quebouk diplomacy” is designed to counter this threat of derecognition. Up until now, this policy has been successful. Pretoria has not broken off diplomatic links with the ROC and expressed its intention to increase its (economic) contact with the ROC. During the presidential inauguration ceremony in April 1994, Mandela called for stronger economic ties between South Africa and the ROC.1

Trade Relations.

Bilateral trade between South Africa and the ROC has increased rapidly. The ROC is currently South Africa’s seventh largest trading partner with two-way trade in 1994 amounting to 5.35 billion.2 Trade between Pretoria and Taipei has increased at a rapid rate with South Africa continually enjoying a sizeable trade surplus with the ROC. For the ROC, however, South Africa is a negligible trading partner. Its trade with South Africa amounts to only 1.8 percent of its total trade figure. According to the ROC Ambassador in Pretoria, Loh I-Cheng, the ROC wants to increase this figure to, “at least five percent” of its total international trade.3 In an attempt to reach this figure, the ROC has offered to a number of South African companies lucrative trade deals.

In 1994 the ROC Government gave the South African Union Carriage Wagon Company a contract worth over R1 billion to supply railway coaches. This contract was concluded despite the ROC having not received “entirely satisfactory quality service” in previous

1 Reported in: “Taiwan Investment Boost on the Cards” in The Star, 3 August 1994, p.10
2 Information obtained from the ROC Embassy, Pretoria.
3 Cited in ibid. p.10
5. The Current Triangular Relationship Between South Africa, The PRC and The ROC.

Introduction.

The democratic elections of April 1994 and the inception of a new South African government has brought Pretoria’s “China policy” to the fore. South Africa’s international emergence marked the end of the pariah bond that had previously existed between itself and the ROC. Subsequent pressure has arisen for the ANC-led Government of National Unity to follow the global trend and establish relations with the PRC. Various factions within the Government of National Unity are either lobbying for the retention of relations with the ROC, or derecognition so as to be able to establish formal ties with the PRC. Partiality aside, this decision of recognition is being decided on the basis of South Africa’s national interest. South Africa’s democratic transformation has allowed an intense public debate to arise which will assist in the determination of South Africa’s national interest vis-a-vis the two Chinas.

This chapter will consider South Africa’s respective economic relations with the ROC and the PRC. This will provide clarification on the nature of South Africa’s national interest in the formulation of its China policy. An appraisal of South Africa’s relations with each will follow.

I. The State of SA-ROC Economic Relations.

South Africa and the ROC have a complementary relationship; one in which the ROC accords political benefits while South Africa gains economically. For the ROC, economies forms a vital component of her international relations. In an attempt to keep South Africa as a political ally and retain diplomatic recognition from Pretoria, the ROC has offered South Africa a large number of economic incentives. These have taken the form of trade,
South Africa, however, does not have the option of dual recognition. During a state visit to South Africa in May 1994, President Lee stated that Pretoria need not sever diplomatic relations with the ROC in order to forge ties with the PRC. The importance of President Lee's visit to South Africa was reflected in the fact that it was the first official trip abroad by an ROC president since 1977. Although Taipei appears to be flexible on the question of recognition, Beijing has explicitly made it clear that it will not accept any form of dual recognition that it regards as undermining the principle of "one China." According to J.I. Viljoen, South African ambassador to the ROC, dual recognition is a "non-starter", with Beijing having spelt this out in "no uncertain terms." There is however, a belief within ROC Government circles that South Africa, boosted by President Mandela's international stature, carries enough political weight to push for dual recognition. Sources tell of President Mandela supporting a policy of dual recognition. However, with its zero-sum approach, this is unacceptable to Beijing. South Africa will therefore have to choose between the "two Chinas".

113 In protest at ROC President Lee's official visit to South Africa, the PRC sent a low-ranking delegation to President Mandela's inauguration. Newsweek, 1 August 1994, p. 24.
114 Tsun Zeppel, PRC First Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister, during a five-day visit to South Africa in February 1994. Business Day, 22 February 1994, p. 3.
economic interdependence will draw the two economies even closer. The warming of United States' foreign policy towards the ROC serves as recognition of the improved status of the ROC in the new world order and will impact upon the ROC's international fortunes.

Conclusion.

Global circumstances favour the political acceptance of the ROC into the international community. The world-wide collapse of communism has left the PRC as one of the last remaining communist states. Despite this apparent moral victory of the ROC over the PRC, it has not translated into great political success for the ROC. The ROC's political standing still does not correspond to its economic power. This, however, is gradually changing. The global community must recognise the beginnings of this shift in the ROC's international status. The international tide is not so much turning against the PRC as it is in favour of the ROC.

Increased competition from the ROC will result in an intensification of the international struggle between Beijing and Taipei. The PRC will thus continue to interfere with the ROC's efforts to win political acceptance by the international community. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in South Africa. Both Beijing and Taipei are exerting large amounts of pressure on the South African Government. This has taken the form of lobbying members of Parliament and political parties. Beijing has offered the South African Trade Mission in Beijing the incentive of expanded trade and investment in South Africa. South African foreign policy should, however, be based solely on South Africa's national interest.

\[\text{Field, p.18.}\]
\[\text{During his visit to South Africa in February 1984, PRC's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tian Zengpe, attempted to get the TEC to sign an agreement to establish diplomatic relations before the elections or, alternatively, to undertake to establish such relations after the elections. It was decided by the TEC to leave this decision to the new government. Source: Interview with South African ambassador to the ROC, J.L. Viljoen, 18 July 1984, Taipei.}\]

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Washington formally upgrading its political relations with the ROC: "If the Taiwan question were not handled properly, turbulence in the Taiwan Straits would surely result in grave consequences to China-US relations, the Asia-Pacific region and world peace and stability."  

There is, however, a large amount of support in the United States Congress for the ROC's United Nations bid.105 This reflects a growing desire in Washington for an upgrading of relations with the ROC. In May 1995, Congress voted almost unanimously to allow ROC President Lee Teng-Hui to enter the United States.106 This marks a significant departure from Washington's long-standing policy of refusing entry to senior ROC officials.107 This was a major political and symbolic victory for the ROC.

The United States will gradually increase the officiality of its relationship with the ROC.108 In view of Beijing's continued human rights and trade violations, Washington is becoming less tolerant of Beijing's bellicose approach towards Taiwan. The United States is the ROC's largest trading partner, while the ROC ranks sixth largest among America's trading partners.109 With the ROC further liberalising its economy in anticipation of entry into the World Trade Organisation, economic relations with the United States are good. Global

104 "Chinese warning on Taiwan" in The Star, 12 July 1995, p.4.
105 This was confirmed by Peter Deutsch, a member of the US Foreign Affairs Committee. Sixteen US states have passed resolutions in support of Taiwan's United Nations bid. On October 7 1994, the US House of Representatives passed a revision to the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1993, allowing the ROC president and other high-level officials to visit the United States for discussions on six issues: trade, nuclear proliferation, US national security, wildlife conservation, environmental protection and disasters. The Free China Journal, October 14 1994, p.1.
106 The House of Representatives voted 396-0 and the Senate 97-to-1 for resolutions that urged President Clinton to allow President Lee to attend a convocation ceremony at Cornell University, New York, from June 8-11. President Lee was the first ROC head of state to visit the United States since 1979 when Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Beijing reacted by recalling its ambassador from the United States. Beijing also cancelled two official state visits to the United States and threatened that if the United States "clings to its erroneous decision, serious harm will be inflicted on Sino-US relations" (Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Shen Guo-Fang). Reported in Business Day, 20 May 1995, p.7.
107 In May 1994 the United States Government amended its policy to allow for cabinet-level exchanges between itself and the ROC, although ROC officials were still barred from state visits to the United States. The Freemanist, 27 May 1995, p.61.
The improvement of the United States-ROC relationship will, however, be a gradual process. The United States is, however, starting to take steps that will lead to closer relations with the ROC. United States Senator Hank Brown recently objected that America still "treats one of our closest democratic allies in the Pacific worse than we treat North Korea, Cuba or Libya." In September 1994, however, Washington permitted the ROC to rename its representative office in the United States from "Co-ordination Council for North American Affairs" to "Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office."

The Republican-dominated Congress has recently expressed its support for an upgrading of United States-ROC relations. "It makes both economic and political sense to reaffirm the United States' relations with Taiwan because Taiwan is not only a democracy but a major trading nation that buys twice as much from the United States as communist China does." As President Bill Clinton said in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1993, the overriding goal of the United States was "to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies." Clinton said that United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War era was "to seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under free institutions." The ROC is thus an ideal candidate to benefit from this foreign policy.

Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, has even called for the United States to recognize the ROC "regardless of what happens" to its relations with the PRC. The PRC has warned the United States of serious repercussions in the event of...
The United States' relations with the ROC have been inextricably linked to its relations with Beijing. Since Washington and Beijing established formal relations on January 1, 1979, the ROC has been placed in what can be described as "political exile" by the United States. United States-ROC relations were then governed by the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the United States Congress in April 1979. This act was intended to reassure the Taiwanese and deter the PRC from any attempt to use force against Taiwan. The Act did provide for the United States to "make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." 13

In 1982, however, the PRC succeeded in bringing the Reagan Administration to sign a joint communiqué, in which the United States put a ceiling on its arms sales to the ROC and undertook to reduce these sales to a point of "final resolution".14 The contradictory intent of the Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 Joint Communiqué reflected United States uncertainty over its policy toward the ROC.

However, a clear indication of Washington's policy was its decision in September 1992 to sell 150 advanced F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan by the Bush administration. In both quantitative and qualitative terms, this sale was a breach of the 1982 Joint Communiqué. Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense, said that Chinese purchases of weapons were seen in Washington as "the largest threat to peace and stability in Asia." 15

Weinberger added that the United States arms sales to the ROC indicated America's continuing strategic interest in maintaining "a strong and free" Taiwan.16 The reaffirmation of the Taiwan Relations Act has signalled a positive change in United States' policy toward the ROC.

1. Kohnen, United (1995), p 100


United States Policy and the ROC.

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Being a permanent member of the Security Council, the PRC wields much power in the international community. The PRC’s position as a permanent member of the Security Council is relevant to South Africa when one considers the likelihood of a future restructuring of the body. This has been recognised by President Mandela. A number of states have proposed that the Security Council be expanded to include permanent representation for the Afro-Asian-Caribbean bloc. The ANC-led Government has committed itself to work for a “fundamental overhaul” of the council to more adequately reflect the United Nations global membership. United Nations Press Officer Mr Fidelis Swai has asserted that South Africa will be able to apply for a permanent position on the Security Council within the next five years. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Pahad, the Government has taken no firm decision on the matter but has confirmed that in the event of there being an African representative on the council, South Africa “should have that seat.” Considering the PRC’s veto power over all such admissions into the United Nations Security Council, South Africa would need Beijing’s endorsement. This certainly makes for a strong case for Pretoria’s diplomatic recognition of the PRC. The PRC will feature prominently in South Africa’s foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the United Nations.

Another consideration is the fate of South Africa’s interests in the colony Hong Kong which will revert back to PRC ownership on 1 July 1997. Beijing has made it clear to Pretoria that its consular office and airline landing rights would be in jeopardy if South Africa continued to maintain its political ties with the ROC after this date. This presage

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During a September 1992 visit to Beijing, Mandela recognised the importance of the PRC’s position as a permanent member of the Security Council. "Therefore, it is in the interests of South Africa to develop relations between the two countries," Qian T. and Cao, Y.X. "Nelson Mandela in Beijing" in China-Africa, No.23, November 1992, p.34

"Landsberg, C. "After half a century it is time to overhaul the UN" in Business Day, 28 December 1994, p.10.

"Quoted in The Sowetan, 24 October 1994, p.3.

"Quoted in Rapport, 1 "SA wants UN seat" in The Sowetan, 4 August 1994, p.3.

"This was made clear to a visiting South African parliamentary delegation in Beijing in July 1995. See Cameron, S. "Time has come to confront the problem of the two Chinas" in Business Day, 15 August 1995, p.9, and Duijer, P. "SA unlikely to solve two Chinas dispute, All's told" in The Star, 17 August 1995, p.6."
The PRC will be unable to match the ROC's level of investment in South Africa. A serious constraint on the PRC's South Africa policy is its inability to commit large sums of money to international investment projects. The PRC is itself a developing country and as such is an importer of capital. This makes it a serious rival to South Africa in attracting international investment. The PRC received almost US$30 billion in direct foreign investment in 1994 accounting for half the total of all developing countries. South Africa is thus competing with the PRC for much-needed foreign investment.² By nature, pledges of investment, Beijing is attempting to bring pressure to bear upon the South African government. Beijing hopes to convert such economic incentives into political influence. This will further pressure Pretoria into offering the PRC diplomatic recognition.

To obtain a clearer understanding of the issues Pretoria is now confronted with, an assessment of the two Chinas vis-à-vis South Africa is required.

(III). The Case For and Against Recognition of the PRC

The PRC is the world's most populous nation with 1.3 billion people and is the world's third largest state in land area. It possesses a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and is one of the five declared nuclear powers. The PRC has the world's third largest economy and one of the world's highest economic growth rates. The continuous high growth and size of the PRC's domestic market cannot be ignored. These factors alone make it impossible for any state to disregard the importance of the PRC in the global community. South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, has stated that "...South Africa cannot ignore the growing regional and international economic and political status of the PRC..."³


and wish to take advantage of this fact. South Africa is thus regarded as a gateway for the PRC to Southern African markets.60

Nevertheless, investment in South Africa has so far been almost negligible. The PRC does have a number of small-scale industries in operation in the country but they are not providers of significant employment.61 The PRC has, however, committed itself to establishing a greater number of factories in the South African KwaZulu-Natal province over the short term. This undertaking was given following the signing of a memorandum between the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government. These investments will reportedly create hundreds of jobs in the province. The investing industries will manufacture a diverse range of products, including textiles, hardware, electronic appliances and enamelware.62 The PRC has also expressed an interest in acquiring a large stake in Israel's Sishen iron-ore mine in return for a corresponding amount of production. This would secure for the PRC a supply of high-grade ore. Such an investment would be valued at R1 billion.63 These investments are, however, still pending.


61 By the first quarter of 1988, the PRC had launched only eleven joint-ventures and approved another twenty-one projects in South Africa. Total investment has amounted to US$ 50 million. Havenga, M. J. "The Dilemma of the Two Chinas: An Economic Perspective", delivered at the conference "Promotion of Foreign Policy: South Africa and the Two Chinas," The South African Institute of International Affairs and the Foundation for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, 30 August 1988, p. 11.

62 The official China Council for the Promotion of International Trade has agreed to establish ten factories with a capital investment of approximately R30 million in the KwaZulu-Natal province over the following eighteen months. The first project, China Welding, manufactures welding tools and is based at Bekkers in near Ladysmith. This factory employs approximately one hundred people. Other investments include a clothing and stationary manufacturer. Together these industries have invested an estimated R15 million and have created 250 jobs in the province. Jersey, N. "Chinese companies set up in KwaZulu-Natal" in Business Day, 19 July 1988, p. J. Sherocks, J. "China promises huge investment" in The Star, 12 June 1988, p. 14.

63 This possible deal was raised during a high-level PRC delegation's visit to South Africa in June 1984. The delegation proposed acquiring a 60 percent stake of Sishen's equity in return for taking 60 percent of production. The Sishen mine produces approximately 1.5 million tons of iron-ore per year. Collins, M. "China eyes stake in Sishen" in Business Day, 28 June 1984, p. 1.
- The PRC suffers from serious infrastructural problems. The shortage of railways, roads, electrical power supplies and telecommunications can be a serious hindrance to economic development.

- The PRC is not the massive market it appears to be. Only a small portion of the country’s 1.2 billion people can afford to buy foreign goods. Also, mainland China wishes to become self-sufficient and once able to produce such goods locally, will no longer look to imports.

It should be noted that South Africa has been able to trade and invest with the PRC despite there being no official relations between the two sides. The large amounts of business being conducted in the PRC by Volkswagen, Iscor and SAB have not been impeded by a lack of formal ties between the South African and PRC governments. There is no evidence to suggest that South Africa’s economic access to the PRC market has been limited by the absence of political relations. South African business has possibly been granted access to the PRC market on the belief of the PRC Government that an increase in economic cooperation with South Africa will result in the establishment of formal political relations.

PRC Investment to South Africa.

The PRC Government has expressed its intention to invest in the South African economy. Up until now, the PRC has not invested significantly in South Africa. With political and economic stability having been restored to the country, PRC investment in South Africa is likely to increase, although not dramatically. A reason for increased investment is the importance with which the PRC regards South Africa’s position in the Southern African region. "South Africa is an ideal place for Chinese investors compared to the rest of the continent." Another attractive factor is the relative lack of competition in the South African market. The Chinese see the region as not being dominated by any major economy.

Alberts, R. op cit. p 10

Shen Ding, Director of the Chinese Centre for South African Studies, Interview, Pretoria, 24 August 1998
market in the PRC "is so huge that there is space for everyone." The PRC is expected to become, after the United States, the world's second largest beer market within four years. SAB seeks to take full advantage of this forecasted growth by increasing its market share in the PRC through its joint venture.

To help facilitate this investment from South Africa in the PRC, Nedbank opened a representative office in Beijing in March 1994 after becoming the first South African bank to be granted permission to establish a presence in the country by the PRC Government. The bank was established to assist investment as well as a desire on the part of Nedbank to increase its presence in Asia. Nedbank is one of the major South African banks operating in the region.

Despite the potential lucratives of the PRC's economy, South African investors have and will continue to face a number of problems and possible deterrents when investing in the mainland economy. These are as follows:

- Economic instability. The PRC's economy is structurally unstable, suffering from rising inflation and rampant corruption.

- High levels of bureaucracy need to be overcome before a business can begin operations. This involves central and local government bodies and consumes a great deal of time and expense.

- The PRC does not have a well developed legal system to provide certainty and protection for investors. It is in dire need of definite business laws.


"Nedbank has also created a full-time post in Johannesburg to promote trade with the Far East. Nedbank chief executive, Richard Lambacher, has stated, "We believe we are well positioned in facilitating South African trade with the region." Quoted in SAI-China News, Newsletter of the South African-China Exhibition, The Beijing Show, March 22-25 1994, p.6"
Following the investment, Iscor general manager, Johan Deetlefs, stated that, "China is Iscor’s latest customer for Sishen iron ore and we want to be part of this dynamic development opportunity. I predict that any increase in Sishen ore exports will, to a large extent, be absorbed by our growing customer base within China. We intend doing long-term business with this country."

Recognising the large growth potential that exists within the PRC, Iscor launched a project in May 1994 to investigate the possibility of entering the mainstream PRC steel industry. This sector offers many opportunities. The PRC Government has invited foreign technology and capital through joint ventures to participate in the Chinese steel industry "with respect to shareholding, steel trading, equipment sales and the provision of raw materials required to produce steel." Not having large quantities of high-grade ore, the PRC has to beneficiate to obtain quality material. This provides foreign companies, such as Iscor, with potentially lucrative business opportunities.

Further South African investment in the PRC includes co-operation in the field of nuclear power technology. Eskom signed an agreement with the China Light and Power Company (CLP) covering the exchange of expertise, information, and technology. In terms of the agreement, Eskom is assisting CLP with the commissioning and operation of its own nuclear power plant. The Chinese installation is similar to that in use at Koeberg.

The largest investment to date in the PRC has been South African Breweries’ (SAB) US$25 million stake in Shenyang Brewery, the PRC’s second largest brewery. This joint venture acquisition has made SAB the world’s fifth largest brewing group in terms of volume. According to SAB’s international managing director, Mr. Evert Goedhals, the

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3. The co-operation agreement underpinned an earlier one between Eskom and the Hong Kong Nuclear Power Investment Company and the Guangdong Nuclear Power Joint Venture Company. Four Eskom employees had worked at the Chinese installation at Dava Bay (Guangdong province) in exchange for a number of Chinese staff who were being trained at Koeberg. Delmar, P. "Eskom helps Chinese power authorities" in Business Day, 28 April 1994, p. 5.
does, however, need to expand its production of coal for electric power as well as production of other minerals so as to maintain its high economic growth. In order to meet these requirements, the PRC Government announced in June 1993 that it would allow foreign participation in its mining industry. Foreign technology and investment would therefore help the PRC to increase its mineral extraction. Ali Da-chong, vice-president of the Metallurgy Industry Ministry's gold bureau has made clear his country's intention of attracting South African technology to exploit the PRC's gold mines. Contact between the PRC and the South African mining houses began even before both countries formally resumed economic relations in 1992. Not only are these companies competing with international competitors like the United States and Australia for mining contracts in the PRC, but also with each other. Besides investment projects, each is trying to capture a share of the US$50 million the PRC annually spends on mining equipment imports.

South Africa has also been actively involved in the PRC's iron and steel industry. South Africa's Iscor exports a large portion of its production to the PRC. In 1994, Iscor exported approximately four million tons of iron ore to the PRC, compared to just one million tons in 1992/3. The PRC is expected to overtake Japan as Asia's largest steel producer by the end of this century. To take advantage of this growth potential, Iscor has made a large investment in the Chinese port of Qianwan to allow for increased exports to that country.


"Amongst the South African complementaries that have visited the PRC are Gencor, Anglo American and LTA. Gencor chairman Mr Brian Gilbertson said that his company's efforts would centre on the supply of Gencor's bio-leaching technology, a biological process used to extract gold from ore. We've got some people going across to China. Bio-leaching is one thing we can contribute." Reported in Masland, T. "Gencor and China talk" in Business Day, 22 November 1993, p.3.


The PRC's steel production, 800-million tons compared with 60-million only five years ago, looks set to exceed Japan's 100-million by the year 2000. Robertson, D. "Iscor spends R35m at Chinese port to raise iron ore exports" in The Sunday Times, Business Times, 1st April 1994, p.4.

"Iscor invested R35 million in a new-ore storage facility at Qianwan on the PRC's north-east coast so as ensure the efficient handling of its ore exports. Complete in April 1994, this facility caters for 300 000 tons of ore and serves to reduce the shipment costs, making Iscor more competitive with shipments from Australia and India." Ibid, p.4
It is, however, questionable, to describe the economies of South Africa and the PRC as being "complementary." Both are developing economies seeking to increase national wealth through export-oriented growth. Approximately fifty percent of South Africa's GDP is generated by international trade of which exports contribute almost thirty percent.41 With both producing many of the same type of goods for export (i.e. textiles, clothing), it would be more correct to say that their economies are more competitive than complementary. This may restrict the future growth of trade between South Africa and the PRC.42

Trade between the two countries will, however, continue to increase over the short term. This trade will possibly be further restricted by the absence of official diplomatic relations between Pretoria and Beijing. South Africa does not have a trade agreement with the PRC and as such South African exports to the PRC are not eligible for preferential tariff treatment.43 Beijing has delayed offering South Africa such a trade agreement in an attempt to pressurise Pretoria into giving the PRC diplomatic recognition. The PRC has offered South Africa the incentive of expanded trade and investment in the event of the establishment of formal ties. This was communicated by the PRC Government to the South African mission in Beijing.44

South African Investment to the PRC.

A large proportion of economic contact between South Africa and the PRC has taken place in the field of mining technology. The PRC has a largely underdeveloped resource base and needs access to modern technology to enable it to tap these resources. The PRC has an abundance of natural resources and is therefore a mining country like South Africa.45 It

43 According to Lin Qin tia, deputy division chief of the PRC's Trade Ministry, the absence of a formal trade agreement between the two countries is a barrier to preferential trade links.
44 Interview with J.L Viljoen - South African Ambassador to the ROC Taiwan, July 18 1984.
45 Of the 163 minerals discovered in the PRC, 140 have proven reserves. Of the 35 most important minerals, the PRC has 9.7 percent of the world's reserves. Alberts, R. "Opportunities in the Mining and
In 1991 South Africa and the PRC signed a treaty establishing diplomatic relations, the first between the two countries. This event was followed by numerous high-level exchanges and cultural, economic, and scientific cooperation initiatives. The PRC's exports to South Africa include electrical goods, machinery, and textiles, while South Africa's exports to the PRC include motor vehicles, industrial machinery, and agricultural products.

A number of South African companies have invested in the PRC, with the most notable being in the fields of electronics, automotive, and mining. South Africa is also a significant market for PRC goods, particularly in the areas of electrical appliances, construction equipment, and textiles. The relationship between South Africa and the PRC has been described as mutually beneficial, with both countries seeking to expand trade and investment opportunities.

The PRC and South Africa have also cooperated in areas of education, science, and technology, with the PRC assisting in the development of South Africa's research and development capabilities. However, the relationship has been marred by political differences and tensions over issues such as human rights and territorial disputes. Despite these challenges, the PRC and South Africa continue to deepen their bilateral ties, seeking to build a strong and mutually beneficial relationship.
over R100 million in the country. Visitors from Asia comprised a significant 38.1 percent of all visitors to South Africa, a large percentage of which were from the ROC. South Africa looks set to become a major tourist destination for travellers from the ROC. 10

(II). THE STATE OF SA-PRC ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Trade Relations.

Trade between South Africa and the PRC has expanded at a rapid rate over the last few years. This followed the two countries formally restoring economic and trade ties in October 1992. Since South African trade has surged from just US$14.6 million in 1991 to US$900 million in 1994. Trade grew by 36 percent in 1994 over 1993. Such increases have led to predictions that the PRC will soon rank within South Africa's top ten trading partners. Moreover, if trade between South Africa and the PRC routed through Hong Kong is included into these figures, the total will be considerably higher. Trade between South Africa and Hong Kong amounted to R2950 million in 1994.11 Hong Kong is also the source of 1.5 percent of all foreign investment in South Africa.12

This growing trade has been facilitated by a number of visiting high-level delegations to both South Africa and the PRC. Following the May 1992 visit of (former) Finance Minister Mr. Derek Keys to Beijing, Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, Lin Shan-Zai and a PRC delegation visited South Africa in March 1993. This was the first ministerial visit to South Africa from the PRC. There have subsequently been more visits between the two countries. These visits illustrate both sides' intention to expand economic contact. Trade exhibitions for this purpose have been held in both South Africa and the

Information provided by the South African Trade Organisation (SATRO)
13. Able, G. "Take a closer look at Hong with 2 Chinese delegations" in The Star 21 December 1994
designed to build grass-roots support for the ROC among the black populace in South Africa.  

In September 1994, the ROC made available R175 million in line of credit for the South African economy. This includes a US$30 million loan to Eskom to assist with rural electrification projects under the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The Bank of Taiwan has offered to extend this loan should the need arise. Taipei has also disbursed loans to other South African parastatals. These include a US$30 million loan to Peinet and another for US$20 million to South African Airways. The Bank of Taiwan has also approved a revolving loan of US$20 million to Macsteel to enable the latter to increase its steel exports to the ROC. Further, the ROC has established a lending facility to encourage small business projects in South Africa. This has been designed to "stimulate bilateral trade between the two countries." Thus the ROC has proved to be willing to assist South Africa with financial aid and loan packages. Much of this financial assistance has gone toward the RDP.

An example of this includes the ROC’s funding of a vocational training centre in South Africa’s Gauteng province to the value of R141 million. This will provide training for five to six thousand people from the Service Corps of the South African National Defence Force in various industrial trades. The majority of the beneficiaries from this project will be former guerrillas who have been integrated into the defence force.

A further way that the ROC is contributing to the South African economy is through tourism. A total of 23,000 tourists from the ROC visited South Africa in 1994, spending
Trade and Industry director-general, Zavareh Rustomjee, this would be a massive investment “with a possible 400,000 jobs being created, which includes employment in downstream industries.” A feasibility report on the project is due for completion by July 1995.

Other ROC investments include the ROC’s Acer Group entering into a joint venture with the South African company Persotel to form Acer Africa. This company will open a computer manufacturing plant in Gauteng province with the Acer Group providing the necessary technology. Estimated first-year turnover for the joint venture is R300 million. Other ROC investments have also purchased land in Johannesburg’s Rosebank suburb for the erection of two buildings to accommodate the Taiwan Trade and Development Centre as well as offices for the ROC shipping company Nan Tai. These were completed in July 1995.

Loans and Aid.

The ROC has been forthcoming in supplying South Africa with concessionary loans. In November 1994, the ROC granted a US$15 million loan to the Development Bank of Southern Africa to assist with rural development. Its purpose will be to improve small-scale farming and to increase agricultural production. The ROC also agreed to provide technical expertise for the project. In addition, the ROC has donated money to the South African Department of Agriculture for training purposes. This programme is partly


The 20-year loan will bolster the Development Bank’s R600 million farming budget and provide support through production credits. The loan is designed to accelerate the land reform process by assisting rural farmers to move away from subsistence farming. The first loan repayment is due in the year 2000. Collins, M. Op. cit. p.3

Recognition of the PRC.

South Africa's foreign policies toward the PRC and the ROC respectively are inextricably linked. By recognising the PRC, South Africa would be forced by Beijing to end its formal political relations with the ROC. Therefore, by establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, South Africa would have to sacrifice its political relations with the ROC. The ROC would undoubtedly react by cutting its aid to South Africa and reducing its economic contact with the country. This is the zero-sum option - choosing to have political relations with either the PRC or the ROC but not both.

The PRC is a very powerful state. Possessing a permanent seat on the Security Council holds much international prestige. The PRC has one of the world's fastest growing economies and looks set to become next century's economic powerhouse. South Africa cannot ignore the important position the PRC has in the international community. This does not mean, however, that South Africa should automatically accord the PRC full diplomatic recognition. The PRC's dogmatic stance towards exclusive recognition and insistence on the political isolation of the ROC is forcing Pretoria to make a choice that could well damage South Africa's national interests. Recognition of either the PRC or the ROC brings advantages. Being a developing state whose primary concern is national economic upliftment, economics must take precedence in South Africa's decision-making. South Africa's foreign policy-making must therefore be independent and based upon self-interest. By insisting on the zero-sum option, Beijing is attempting to dictate South Africa's foreign policy and undermine this independence.

Having itself experienced a history of human rights abuse, South Africa should not ignore the PRC's human rights violations. Since the 1994 democratic elections, South Africa has become an exemplary international citizen. South Africa is now on the moral high ground. The South African Government has stated its commitment to seek to "enforced human rights in (our) international relations. Human rights concerns will (also) influence the

11“Geldenhuys, D UP at p 18
state for that matter, cannot influence the PRC’s stance on the “one China” principle. South Africa’s foreign policy must be commensurate with its status as a middle-ranking power in the world.

There has, however, been a proposal for giving the dual recognition option more strength through adopting a multilateral approach to the issue of recognition. This calls for South Africa to rally the support from a coalition of states and jointly propose the recognition of both the ROC and the PRC. This could be organised on a regional level (i.e. through the Southern African Development Community) or globally including the support of the countries with which the ROC already has diplomatic relations. It is assumed that such a grouping of states would bring greater pressure to bear upon Beijing to be more flexible in its approach to dual recognition. This assumption is, however, flawed and results from a profound misunderstanding of the PRC’s view of itself. The PRC “will not compromise on its own sovereignty and territorial integrity.” For the PRC, nothing is more fundamental than the “one China” policy. Besides, the PRC has close relations with the states of the region and it is unlikely that these states would follow Pretoria’s lead. Any attempt by South Africa at dual recognition would be a failure. The PRC would flatly reject such a proposal. There is a danger that by making such a proposal, South Africa would damage its own international standing. Thus dual recognition and the PRC’s position are irreconcilable. Dual recognition should not be a serious policy consideration for South Africa.

1This proposal has been forwarded by Professor Peter Vale. See Vale, P. Op. cit., p 28.
4Shim, P. Director of the Chinese Centre of South Africa Studies, Interview, 24 August 1995.
6Ibid. p.3.
relationship with the ROC on the one hand and the PRC on the other, and wishes to maintain friendly and cordial relations with both."7

Politically insignificant states such as Latvia, Burkina Faso and most recently Gambia have attempted dual recognition but they have been rejected by Beijing. It would, however, be more difficult for the PRC to reject such an offer from Pretoria, when taking into consideration the international prestige that South Africa enjoys. The ROC has made it clear that it is willing to accept dual recognition alongside the PRC, provided South Africa does not downgrade its political relations with the ROC.

Dual recognition, however, is unacceptable to the PRC. Such a proposal would render the PRC’s “one China” policy meaningless. The “one China” policy is the cornerstone of the PRC’s policy vis-à-vis Taiwan (ROC). From Beijing’s perspective, dual recognition would cast the ROC as a political equal to the PRC and undermine Beijing’s claim of Taiwan (ROC) being merely a province of China. Some liken South Africa’s recognition of Taiwan as being the (hypothetical) equivalent of China recognising South Africa’s own KwaZulu province as an independent entity.8 For the PRC, any political relationship with Taiwan amounts to an infringement on the sovereignty of China as a whole. Taiwan can never be regarded as an “equal entity” to the mainland. This was made clear to a visiting South African parliamentary delegation to Beijing in July 1995 by PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: “There is only one China in the world. The government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. We will never accept dual recognition.”9 Beijing has thus “replied it out in no uncertain terms” that the dual recognition option is a “non-starter” for South Africa.10 Dual recognition is therefore wishful thinking on Pretoria’s part. South Africa, or any other

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7Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo on South Africa’s relations with both Chinas. Quoted in “Friends with both Chinas” in The Star, 31 January 1995, p.5
10As described by South Africa’s ambassador to the ROC, J. L. Viljoen, interview, Taipei, 18 July 1994
6. CONCLUSION.

The South African Government of National Unity’s handling of the China question will amount to its most important foreign policy decision to date. This decision has been complicated by South Africa’s recent transition to a democratic state and its changed national priorities. South Africa’s immediate economic needs are playing a large role in dictating its foreign policy. In light of South Africa’s status as a developing country and its urgent need for economic assistance, its national interest is required to focus on immediate economic concerns. The decision on recognition of the two Chinas places such economic interests in conflict with political concerns - the ROC’s economic contributions are weighed against the PRC’s political power. The decision must, however, be based solely upon South Africa’s own national interest. Thus an evaluation of the options available to South Africa in the recognition of the two Chinas must be considered. Viable options for South Africa follow.

The Dual Recognition Option.

An option proposed by many theoreticians in South Africa at present is that of dual recognition - giving diplomatic recognition to both the ROC and the PRC. Such an approach would overcome the zero-sum nature of the recognition question and would be an equitable solution to the dilemma facing South African foreign policy-makers. By proposing dual recognition of the two Chinas, Pretoria would be relying upon the international reputation and prestige of President Nelson Mandela. Some argue that South Africa, being the most powerful state in Africa and a leader of the developing world, has enough influence to succeed in giving recognition to both Beijing and Taipei. It is assumed that Beijing would not be able to reject South Africa’s and President Mandela’s advances. The option of dual recognition is one which Mandela is known to favour. The official position as of now is simply to say that the South African Government values highly its

2 Information obtained from an interview with a prominent member of a South African political party.
argue, has become obsolete, and that Pretoria should follow the international trend of
having formal political relations with the PRC at the expense of the ROC. Both Taipei and
Beijing have been placing strong lobbying pressure on Pretoria either for the retaining or
upgrading of political relations respectively. The new South African government's
handling of the "China question" will amount to its most significant foreign policy decision
to date. Pretoria has yet to make its decision. Undoubtedly the decision-making process is
being delayed by the many factions within the Government of National Unity. This delay
could possibly undermine the credibility of South Africa's foreign policy. Beijing is also
growing increasingly impatient over Pretoria's procrastination. Indicative of this was the
deliberate omission of South Africa as a destination to PRC Vice Premier Zhu Rongji's
tour to the Southern African region in July-August 1998. This despite South Africa being
the most powerful regional power and the PRC's most important trade partner in the
region. Thus increasing pressure is being brought to bear upon the South African
Government.

South Africa's decision on the "China issue" must also be "addressed against a wider
international backdrop." This is not just a triangular matter involving Pretoria, Taipei, and
Beijing. South Africa's dealings with the situation may well impact upon the international
turns of the two Chinese states. The international community is privately watching
the approach South Africa will adopt toward the two Chinas.

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[1] South Africa's decision on the "China issue" is a matter of concern to the countries that
right up to the present day. The United States, for example, remains viscerally opposed
to China's membership in the United Nations. The situation is further complicated by
competing Chinese policies, which can be seen most clearly in the recent dispute over
the status of Taiwan. See Richard B. Linfield, "Taiwan: A Question of Sovereignty and


happens to its relationship with the PRC in such an event. Such an assertion can be partly attributed to the frustration felt by United States' politicians over the PRC's continued human rights violations and international trade infringements. With the Western world no longer wanting to impose isolation upon the ROC, the international environment looks conducive for the reintegration of the ROC into the international political community.

Helping it in this regard is its status as a democracy. The ROC began a process of political liberalisation in 1987. These were followed by parliamentary elections in December 1992 and the process will be consummated with direct presidential elections in 1996. There has been speculation of South Africa delaying any announcement of a downgrading of its political ties with the ROC until after the country's elections in March 1996. A derecognition of the ROC by South Africa, its most influential political partner, would be a severe blow to President Lee's international policy and would damage his chances of re-election. In the event of a cancelling of relations, Pretoria would want to limit the consequences as best it could.

The ROC's emergent democracy contrasts with the totalitarian government on the mainland. The PRC remains as one of the few states in the world to be ruled over by a communist government (by name at least). The PRC is like South Africa, an infant democracy. It possesses many of the attributes of a stable liberal democracy, such as a highly educated populace, a high standard of living, and a largely homogenous population.

(V). Time for a Decision?

This is the situation with which South Africa is now confronted - offering diplomatic recognition to either the PRC or ROC. South Africa has had a long-standing relationship with the ROC, a product of their common international isolation. This pariah bond, many
commensurate with its political weakness. The ROC ranks fourteenth amongst the world’s trading nations and has the second highest foreign exchange reserves. The ROC is also the world’s ninth largest provider of overseas investment. Its per capita income of S$1 296 places it amongst the twenty-five richest states in the world. The ROC’s economic relationship with South Africa has already been well documented in this essay. Needless to say, however, the ROC’s economic strength has enabled it to invest heavily in South Africa. Much of this investment is being channelled into South Africa’s RDP. South Africa is thus being forced to choose between the ROC, an immediate investor in South Africa’s prosperity, or the PRC, a huge potential market.

A major consideration acting against the ROC is its international political ostracism. Its diplomatic partners are mostly minor states (such as Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Dominica and Swaziland) with little international significance. The ROC enjoys no formal political ties with any of the major Western powers. South Africa is the ROC’s most important political ally. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the ROC attaches such importance to its relationship with South Africa. By having diplomatic relations with the ROC, a state is acting against the international norm of offering recognition to the PRC. This, however, should not be taken as a reason for not having formal relations with Taipei. A state’s foreign policy should be determined by its own national interests, not that of others.

The international situation is, however, looking more favourable for the ROC. The ROC’s pragmatic diplomacy has allowed it to increase its international substantive relations. This has been facilitated by the end of the Cold War. The United States, no longer preoccupied with countering the Soviet threat in East Asia, has upgraded its relations in what it calls an “adjustment” to its relations with the ROC. This has even led to some United States politicians calling for the outright diplomatic recognition of the ROC. “Regardless of what...

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92 The Economist, 10 December 1999, p. 18.
94 Van, D. Op cit. p. 28.
that by not declaring independence, the ROC does not consider itself a state entity. Yet the ROC claims the international benefits of statehood such as membership of international organisations, most notably the United Nations. The ROC thus considers itself sovereign but not independent. This raises the question of whether the ROC is then really a state that can be recognised in international law. This issue will need to be considered by the South African Government. Even if the ROC did declare independence however, it is highly doubtful if this declaration would be recognised by the international community of states.

A factor acting in the ROC’s disfavour is its close contact with the previous South African National Party Government. In the eyes of many in the Government of National Unity, the ROC is regarded as having supported the apartheid government in South Africa by floating international sanctions and openly dealing with the regime. In an attempt to placate the ANC, the ROC made a US$5 million donation to the organisation prior to the April 1994 election. This was reportedly given at the request of Nelson Mandela. Notwithstanding, the official PRC news agency has called on the new South African Government to

“correct the historic injustice which apartheid perpetrated in relation to China when it gave diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.” The PRC’s (apparent) support for the liberation movements also counts against the ROC. The pro-Beijing faction within the South African Government has suggested that continued relations with the ROC run counter to Pretoria’s commitment to forge new sets of international relations for South Africa. Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo’s foreign policy has been criticised for being difficult to distinguish from Mr Pik Botha’s, the former foreign minister.

The most relevant factor for South Africa to consider when evaluating its relationship with the ROC is the economic role which the latter plays. The ROC’s economic power is not

1 Gildenhuys, I: Open p.9
2 Sloman, P: Open p. 13
3 Reported by Bulger. “Snags emerge over ANC-Taiwan links” in Business Day, 19 August 1993, p 2
4 Yako, P: “A Diplomatic dilemma: one China or the other?” in The Weekly Mail, 10-16 February 1998, p 38. Pik Botha, currently a cabinet member, has been regarded as being a supporter of the ROC. It should be noted that Mr Botha’s wife was previously treated extensively in a Taiwanese hospital for a serious medical condition. This could partly have influenced the former foreign minister’s stance vis-à-vis the ROC and therefore impacted upon South African foreign policy-making.
However, the fact remains that the PRC is one of the most politically, economically and strategically important states in the world. With the PRC’s growing economic stature, this importance is likely to increase into the next century.

(IV). The Case For and Against Recognition of the ROC.

The ROC remains one of the most politically isolated states in the world. It has formal diplomatic ties with only 30 states, South Africa being the most important of these. The reason for its isolation stems from the PRC’s success in its international campaign to keep the ROC politically isolated. This has been achieved through the “one China” policy. Most states have accordingly recognised the PRC over the ROC. The ROC-on-Taiwan cannot compete with the PRC on physical grounds. Its population is 21 million and land area only 36,000 sq km. This pales in comparison to the PRC’s 1.2 billion people and over 9.5 million sq km. The PRC, with the largest population of any state and massive land area, clearly overshadows that of the ROC.

In May 1991, the ROC abandoned its claim to be the legitimate political representative of the whole China. ROC Foreign Minister Frederick Chen declared, “We consider the mainland to be ruled by the PRC Government. We do not challenge that. They have full jurisdiction over the mainland.” Despite acknowledging its separation from the mainland, the ROC’s status is one of uncertainty. The ROC has not declared itself to be an independent state. Doing so could possibly provoke a military invasion by the PRC Government which has threatened such a response should the ROC declare itself independent. A declaration of independence would, in legal effect, create “two Chinas” and undermine Beijing’s “one China” policy. However, by implication, one can conclude

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\[\text{Ibid, p.9.}\]
\[\text{Ibid, p.3.}\]

ROC is a precondition for a state to have diplomatic relations with the PRC. The absolute political might that the PRC has over the ROC gives it an unyielding attitude over the issue. Many believe that it is unfair of Beijing to compel countries to choose between the two Chinas. Beijing's inflexible stance in this regard has attracted criticism from many quarters, including South Africa: "The PRC is trying to dictate this country's (South Africa's) foreign policy. at least as far as East Asia is concerned."

Ji Pei-Ding, director of the Chinese Centre for South African Studies in Pretoria has stated that Beijing wants "South Africa to follow the international practice and recognise China (PRC) as the legitimate government and accept that Taiwan is a province." It is, however, a reality that China has been a divided nation since 1949 with different political systems each on its own territory. It is unrealistic for the PRC to claim that it has jurisdiction over the Taiwan island, an area over which it has never had de jure control.

Obvious comparisons can be drawn with other recently divided nations such as Germany, Vietnam and Korea. The PRC Government, however, denies any parallels between itself and the aforementioned examples. Beijing's continued insistence on the "one China" policy seems to have become obsolete in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War period, the West had to accommodate Beijing by keeping the ROC at political arms-length. The "China card" is no longer relevant and the PRC has lost this leverage over the Western nations.

The ROC-on-Taiwan has operated as a de facto independent entity for over four decades.


According to Ji Pei-Ding, there are three reasons why China cannot be compared to the Korean or German examples. Firstly, the Taiwan issue arose as a direct result of the Chinese civil war which ended in 1949 and was not attributable to an international accord as were Germany and Korea. Secondly, there is a United Nations Resolution that recognises the PRC as the sole legal representative of China. Lastly, the former East and West Germany as well as North and South Korea both reciprocated each other before applying for simultaneous membership in the United Nations. Taiwan is not regarded as a political entity by the PRC." Interview, Pretoria, 24 August 1995.

approval of such practices" and cites the 160 states currently having formal relations with Beijing as evidence of this. This, however, is not an adequate basis for South Africa upon which to formulate its foreign policy. After enduring such a long history of gross human rights violations, South Africa should know better than most the necessity of adopting a strong position against such abuses.

Based upon previous policy statements, Pretoria would find it extremely difficult to justify giving diplomatic recognition to the PRC in light of its human rights record. South Africa already has diplomatic links with such states as Cuba and Iran, states that are not renown for their respect for human rights. This shows a certain amount of hypocrisy in South African foreign policy-making. The question of the upgrading of relations with the PRC will test the ANC's commitment to human rights concerns.

Another factor impacting negatively upon the PRC is its uncertain future. With the imminent death of Premier Deng Xiaoping, there are serious questions being raised over the PRC's future stability. A political power struggle could adversely affect the country's economic reforms and thereby impact upon social stability. The PRC's move toward economic regionalism could spill over into the political realm, resulting in an divergence of political power away from Beijing. It would, however, be wrong to presume that the mainland could break-up along political lines and suffer a similar fate to that of the former Soviet Union.7 South Africa's foreign policy-making establishment has recognised the possible consequences after the passing of Deng Xiaoping. Major political upheavals could "lead to a new situation which made a choice between the two Chinas unnecessary."7 Due to the PRC's political and economic instability, there is a need for caution in South African foreign policy towards the PRC.

Beijing's strict adherence to the "one China" policy means that the PRC rejects any state having formal relations with both itself and the ROC. Termination of political links with the

7 Ibid. p.6
from Beijing has had the effect of placing a time limit on South Africa’s decision on the recognition issue.

Despite such highly influential factors, there are other considerations that must be taken into account when making judgement on the PRC. The most important of these for South Africa is its record on human rights. The PRC has been, and continues to be, a flagrant violator of human rights. These include the repression of the peoples of Tibet as well as the persecution of political dissidents. Memories of the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989 still persist. The PRC Government is one of the few remaining communist dictatorships in a world that has moved away from such repressive forms of government. The PRC’s current relationship with the United States is probably at its worst since diplomatic relations were established in 1979. This can be partly attributed to Beijing’s continued abuse of human rights. The international community, led by the United States, is finding it difficult to continue tolerating the PRC’s human rights violations.

Most relevant for South Africa, the ANC has expressly stated that it will “condemn human rights in our (South Africa’s) international relations.” President Mandela himself has said that human rights will act as “a light” that guides South Africa’s foreign affairs. Mandela has also affirmed that South Africa will be “at the forefront of global efforts to promote and foster democratic systems of government.” This is the moral dimension of South African foreign policy. It thus seems contradictory that many people within the South African Government tend to ignore the PRC’s abysmal human rights record. Among them are veterans of the anti-apartheid struggle who placed moral concerns above economic considerations. It is therefore ironic that such proponents for recognition of the PRC are turning a blind eye to its human rights abuses. Raymond Stutner, Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly, has stated that any diplomatic relationship with the PRC should not be interpreted as “an
Chou was also successful in establishing relations with Burundi, Kenya, Tunisia and later Zambia.\(^1\)

Beijing was establishing these relations to increase its own international status as well as to undermine those of the Soviet Union and the United States. Its foreign policy had two objectives but a single goal: to confer international prestige upon China. This would be achieved by the PRC's acquisition of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The CCP leadership had a conscious desire to restore China's self-respect in the international community of states. International influence could be achieved through establishing diplomatic relations with as many states as possible and usurping the ROC as the legal representative of China. It is against this background that the PRC's foreign policy needs to be judged.\(^2\)

Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution.

The initial success of the PRC's foreign policy in Africa was, however, to be reversed during the Cultural Revolution. The domestic turmoil in the PRC experienced during the Cultural Revolution spilled over into Beijing's foreign relations. Between 1966 and 1969, the PRC's foreign relations were greatly disrupted and the PRC withdrew from the international scene - preoccupied with its own domestic affairs. Beijing's concentration with internal concerns led to a deterioration in its foreign relations. In 1967, all Chinese ambassadors, except those in the United Arab Republic and in Egypt, were recalled to Beijing. This was under the pretext of allowing them to "participate" in the Cultural Revolution but rather it was so they could answer charges against them and their Foreign Ministry.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Congo, Burundi, in February; the Central African Republic in October; and Dahomey in November. Proclamation quoted p. 10.

\(^2\) Relations with Burundi, Kenya and Tunisia were established in January; and Zambia in October. Proclamation quoted p. 10.

\(^3\) Hutchinson, A., China's African Revolution, Hutchinson Press (Published in London 1975) p. 281; Propaganda, Propaganda p. 304.
foreign policy objectives. It was against this background that PRC* Premier Chou Enlai set off on his tour of Africa in December 1963.

Chou Enlai’s Tour of Africa.

Chou Enlai’s tour of Africa was not only a reflection of the importance given to Africa by the PRC but was an attempt by Beijing to establish formal relations with as many Third World states as possible.13 At this time, the African continent was the most politically unstable and therefore the most vulnerable to outside influence.14 The PRC was thus seeking to take advantage of the turbulence of post-colonial Africa for its own political gain.

The success of Beijing’s diplomatic offensive in Africa can be judged by the number of states the PRC was able to establish political relations with during the time of Africa’s decolonisation. The first state in Africa to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was Egypt in 1956.15 By the end of 1960, the PRC had diplomatic relations with seven African countries, and by the end of 1965, with seventeen.16 France’s diplomatic recognition of Beijing in January 1964 coincided with Chou’s tour. This was to have a dramatic impact upon the PRC’s relations with the francophone states of Africa. Relations were subsequently established between the PRC and Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Senegal, and Dahomey—all of which had previously had relations with Taipei.

14Van Nœs, P, Revolution and Change in Foreign Policy - Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation, University of California Press, Berkeley 1975, p 149
15This stemmed from growing PRC-Egyptian ties following the Panda’s Conference. On 16 May 1956, Egypt became the first country to recognise the PRC since the Korean War. The Egyptian leadership offered the explanation that the possibility of an arms embargo from Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union led to Egypt establishing relations with the PRC as an alternative source of supplies. Meyer, G E Egypt and the United States - The Formative Years, Associated University Presses, London 1961, p 159.
16Van Nœs, P, Op cit p 149.
In 1980, the PRC declared that together with Asia and Latin America, Africa had become the “world storm centre of revolution”. In an attempt to usurp Soviet influence in Africa, the PRC offered its own brand of revolution. This called for violent armed struggle by oppressed people against the forces of colonialism. “China supports the African people in their struggle to fight imperialism and to win and safeguard national independence.”

The Chinese placed great emphasis on “armed struggle” whereby the African people should revolt against their Western rulers. This put the PRC at odds with the Soviet Union which stressed “peaceful coexistence” in its’ dealings with the West and did not want to encourage revolution in Africa at the expense of “East-West detente. By emphasising their ideological “purity”, the Chinese were distancing themselves from Moscow. The Sino-Soviet split was later to become a major factor determining Beijing’s foreign policy making.

To woo the new African states, Beijing appealed to African nationalism. She did this by attacking the racial policy of apartheid in white-ruled South Africa. The CCP said of South Africa:

“The policy of racial discrimination and oppression is aimed at further enslaving all people other than the whites, turning them into the cheapest labour force for the mines, factories and farms owned by the white men. It aimed at turning them into slaves deprived of all rights so as to maintain the reactionary and predatory rule of the Fascists and monopolists.”

The PRC sought to mobilise an African united front against the white-ruled regimes of Southern Africa. The Chinese were using their own “non-white” status to further their

others resemble what happened around the time of the May the Fourth [cultural renaissance of 1919]. The PRC regarded itself as a “revolutionary model” which the African states were following through various stages of revolution. Through its own eyes, the PRC had reached the advanced stage of the revolutionary process.

Beijing proposed that due to China and Africa’s common history of colonialism, a united front should be created against the imperialist powers. As Chou stated during his visit to Tunisia in 1964: “We Asian and African countries created brilliant cultures as early as the dawn of history. Today we are comparatively backward economically and culturally. This is the outcome of foreign aggression and repression.” Beijing deliberately exaggerated historical foreign intervention in China in an attempt to create a commonality with Africa. China had, however, never experienced direct colonial rule to the same extent as Africa had.

Thus the Chinese adopted an almost messianic mission in Africa. This was the ideological exterior of Beijing’s foreign policy. Beijing was faced with the difficult task of creating an image of a state that was strong enough to be able to support the new African states while at the same time retain its Third World status.

The PRC sought to take full political advantage of the ending of colonialism in Africa. Decolonization of one African country after another could not fail to attract the attention of Beijing. The PRC was seeking political support from the Africans. The ideological appeal of the CCP’s revolutionary success, Beijing’s propaganda and its championing of Third World causes, all contributed to the PRC’s stature among African states.

political and social objectives - the beginnings of a "Third World" bloc. Taking advantage of the absence of the Soviet Union at Bandung, the PRC made every effort to project itself as a model for the new "Third World" camp to emulate. After the Chinese Communists' revolutionary victory in 1949, the PRC became aligned with the Soviet Union - an integral part of the Communist bloc. However, this position, subordinate to the Soviet Union, could not be easily reconciled with the Chinese Communist Party's desire to advance internationally and restore China to its traditional glory. The Chinese wanted to establish a separate identity of their own, away from that of the Soviet Union.

At Bandung, Chinese Premier Chou Enlai stated that, "the Chinese people extend their full sympathy and support ... to the just struggles waged by the peoples of Asia and Africa to shake off colonial oppression and win national independence and the people's freedom." The PRC saw itself as the first among the underdeveloped states. For the colonised nations, the PRC was the "epitome of a nation that had shaken off foreign ascendency, freeing itself from imperialism." Being a "non-white" nation also added to the PRC's Third World credentials.

"The Chinese see in all oppressed nations their own yesterday."

To emphasise this, the PRC attempted to equate itself with Africa. Ideological parallels were drawn between the wave of decolonisation spreading through Africa and China's own struggle against imperialists: "At present some parts of Africa are going through experiences similar to those we underwent in China in the Boxer uprising 40 years ago. Some of the events are like those which occurred during the revolution of 1911, while..."
The Southern African region has been an area of instability in world politics during much of the modern era. Being an international sponsor of revolutionary movements, the PRC has been active in supporting the African struggle against white-minority governments in Southern Africa. By lending its support to the South African liberation movements, the PRC sought to overthrow what it viewed as the illegitimate Pretoria Government. Pretoria viewed Beijing's support for revolution as an attempt to spread communism not only in South Africa but also throughout the African continent. This fear was exacerbated by the virulent anti-Communist stance of the National Party Government.

For these reasons the South African Government's relations with the PRC have historically been antagonistic. The objective of this chapter will be to provide an outline of the PRC's foreign policy in Africa since 1949 and more particularly, examine the state of relations that existed between the PRC and South Africa during the apartheid period and the policies pursued by Pretoria and Beijing during this time vis-a-vis each other.

The Bandung Conference of 1955.

Declaring itself the revolutionary leader against colonialism, Africa held great potential for the PRC. The wave of decolonisation across the continent would allow the PRC to extend its influence amongst both revolutionary movement and state alike. The PRC's first major political initiative into Africa was in 1955 with its attendance at the Bandung Conference. This conference was attended by newly-independent African and Asian states - brought together by a common history of colonialism. Together they held a vision of common

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1 Chinese Premier Chou Enlai attended the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia from April 18 to 24, 1955. The conference was organised by Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan with the objective of opposing colonialism in Asia and Africa. In J. F. Deegan’s ‘Bandung: The Dragon’s Ambience - The Chinese Communists and Africa, Frederick A. Praeger, New York. 1964, p. 17.
So as not to confuse the terminology, the People's Republic of China will be referred to as the PRC and the Republic of China will be referred to as the ROC (alternatively, Beijing or Taipei respectively). This is not intended to imply any sort of recognition or non-recognition of either of the PRC or the ROC. Both political entities will be accorded equal standing. It will, however, be impossible for this study to avoid the question of the legal representation in the international community of the PRC and the ROC. This issue becomes very pertinent for South Africa in dealing with the question of diplomatic recognition of the PRC and the ROC.
Africa's respective relationships with the PRC and ROC and possibly contribute to the current debate on the future direction of these relations.

Research Issues,

Within the outline of the above, a number of specific issues require consideration.

(1) What were the motivations behind the PRC's and ROC's foreign policy-making towards Africa and South Africa in particular?

(2) What were the reasons for the political asperity that existed between the South African and PRC governments and the lack of formal relations between the two?

(3) What factors led to South Africa and the ROC forming a close relationship during both states' international political isolation?

(4) How does the question of political recognition of the PRC and ROC in accordance with the "one China" policy relate to South Africa's foreign policy-making?

(5) What impact will South Africa's political transition have on the state of its relations with the ROC and the PRC?

Research Approach.

The majority of recent studies on the subject of South African-Chinese relations have been published in journals and newspaper articles. There is little comprehensive work on the topic. This study will attempt to rectify this by providing a more extensive analysis of the triangular relationship between South Africa, the PRC, and the ROC. The research method used is therefore an analysis of the past and an assessment of the present state of relations that exist between these three nations.
(i) Should South Africa continue to maintain relations with its old ally the ROC, a close political, as well as an important economic partner which has, like South Africa, made a recent shift to democratic government?

(ii) Or should Pretoria establish relations with the PRC, an influential global player having a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, the world's largest population and a high economic growth rate, while at the same time downgrading its ties with the ROC - a necessary prerequisite set by Beijing before relations can be established with the PRC?

(iii) Or could South Africa possibly adopt the dual recognition option - simultaneous recognition of both the PRC and ROC?

The recognition issue forms an important part of South Africa's international relations in East Asia, a region to which the new government has devoted much energy. The East Asian region's economic success holds many potential benefits for South Africa. Foreign Minister Mr Alfred Nzo has recognised the importance of the area for South Africa in terms of trade and investment. With both the ROC and the PRC being amongst South Africa's top ten trading partners, the Chinese recognition issue will impact heavily upon the national economic interest of South Africa.

The purpose of this study is to analyse South Africa's relations, both past and present, with the China region. This relationship has been altered by domestic political factors within both countries. South Africa's recent political transition has complicated its relationship with the ROC and the PRC and brought the question of recognition to the fore. The South African Government of National Unity has yet to formulate a definite China policy in its dealings with the PRC and ROC. This study will provide an understanding of South

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2 In 1991, South Africa had only four foreign missions in the East Asian region. By August 1995, this number had increased to eleven. These include Indonesia, Japan, the PRC, the ROC, Singapore, and South Korea.

3 Foreign Minister Mr Alfred Nzo at the South African Institute of International Affairs (annual foreign minister's address), 29 August 1995.
1. INTRODUCTION.

Purpose and Overview.

The end of apartheid in South Africa and the country's successful political transformation from an unrepresentative minority regime to a popularly elected democratic government has marked the end of South Africa's isolation and the beginning of its re-integration into the international community. It is to be expected that such a radical change in government will bring with it a realignment of foreign policy as South Africa's international relations undergo change to reflect the ideals of the new ANC-led Government of National Unity.

Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the case of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China-on-Taiwan (ROC). The South African Government has had a long-standing relationship with the ROC, a product of their common isolation and pariah status in the international system. With South Africa's recent international re-acceptance, this relationship may no longer be appropriate to South Africa's forging of a new set of international relations. Reinforcing such a view is the pressure upon South Africa to follow the international trend and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC at the cost of political relations with the ROC. In accordance with the internationally recognised "one China" policy, South Africa cannot have relations with both the ROC and the PRC, although there has been consideration of dual recognition of both of them. The sticky question of recognition amounts to one of the most important foreign policy decisions facing South Africa's Government of National Unity to date. Both economic and political as well as moral concerns must dictate South Africa's new "China policy". This decision is no longer one based upon ideology.

The options under consideration are as follows:¹

South Africa's Relations with the PRC and the ROC 1949 to 1995: The Question of Diplomatic Recognition.

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trained at bases in Africa as well as in the PRC to assist them in the armed struggle against the South African Government.\textsuperscript{69}

The PAC became a major recipient of PRC aid in Africa. However, the PAC's position as a liberation movement was weakened by the organisation's internal strife as well as the United Nations' and the OAU's recognition of the ANC as being the only true liberation movement representing South Africa.\textsuperscript{70} The PRC gradually downgraded the importance with which it regarded the PAC and reduced its aid accordingly. Despite its close links to Moscow, the PRC news media started to make mention of the ANC by name as part of the liberation struggle to "wage revolutionary warfare on the battlefields in Azania."\textsuperscript{71}

The PRC's Relationship with the ANC.

The ANC has traditionally been aligned with the Soviet Union rather than the PRC.\textsuperscript{72} However, it would be wrong to assume that the ANC has been adverse to contact with the other communist power, the PRC.\textsuperscript{73} Though not always close, the ANC and Beijing had what can be described as an amicable relationship. One should, however, avoid categorising the ANC into a definite Soviet or Chinese camp. Although at the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the mid-to-late sixties such a distinction did have validity, it was not the general rule.\textsuperscript{74} The ANC had relations with the Soviet Union while at the same time had contact, albeit limited, with the PRC.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{69}These groups, however, did not meet with much success. One such Chinese-trained unit was eliminated by Portuguese forces while trying to cross Mozambique in an effort to reach South Africa. Prunlou, D.S. Op. cit., p.249.
\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., p.250.
\textsuperscript{72}In 1963, J D Marais, a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, travelled to Beijing to participate in the "South Africa Freedom Day." He was later received by Mao Zedong for talks. Beijing Review, No.32, 6 August 1963, p.8.
\textsuperscript{74}It should be noted that although Soviet influence was predominant within the ANC, representatives have travelled freely to the PRC for both visiting and training purposes. Ibid., p.237.
Mozambique (FRELIMO), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia and the Pan African Congress (PAC) of South Africa were established. A notable exception to this list was the ANC. However, despite its siding with the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the ANC did have contact, albeit limited, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The bulk of the PRC’s support to liberation movements in South Africa went to the more radical PAC.

The PAC, and the PAC.

The PAC was formed under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe in 1959 after a group of black dissidents had broken away from the ANC a year earlier. Emphasising African freedom and espousing African nationalism, the PAC announced its intention to challenge the ANC for African support and to mobilise African people for confrontation with the Government. The radical PAC aligned itself with Beijing rather than Moscow which backed the ANC-SACP after the Sino-Soviet split. By the mid-1960’s, the PAC had become the only South African recipient organisation of Chinese aid. In July 1964, Secretary-General Potlako Leballe led a PAC delegation to Beijing where they received financial contributions. In February 1965, Leballe again visited the PRC and received further cash grants to aid the PAC. There were, however, allegations of mishandling of the money by the PAC leadership which later resulted in a split within the PAC. A total of eleven visits were made to the PRC between 1964 and 1967. PAC guerrillas were also

64 The PAC represented Pan-Africanism and claimed that the ANC had been captured by a “section of the leadership of the white ruling class”. Hutchinson, A. China’s African Revolution, Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. London: 1978, p.230.


66 PAC Secretary General Potlako Leballe called for a long revolutionary war against South Africa which would be waged as an armed struggle in the cities as well as in the countryside. Ibid p 249.

67 The PAC’s delegations to the PRC each received US$20 000 from Beijing. However, a private report by PAC member Matthew Nhouna revealed that these funds had been mismanaged: “The second grant allocated to our first mission to China was neither deposited in the Party account nor received by the Treasurer-General. This amount, like the first, was US$20 000. The second mission to China, led by Leballe with Afolo and Fhalom as members, also realised US$20 000. The entire amount of US$20 000 was handed to the Treasurer-General nor deposited in the Party account.” Tarkan, WA Op cit. p 190.
Chinese aid can be divided into the following categories:

- International support for revolutionary movements, largely in the United Nations.
- Propaganda support by means of radio, press and television.
- Financial support to the African Liberation Committees.
- Military assistance.
- Military training.
- Military equipment.

By rendering this aid, the PRC's claim of not taking sides in support of revolution to Africa seem highly questionable. However, in the mid-1970s, the PRC's support for African revolutionary movements was in terminal decline. With the exception of Southern Africa, Beijing slowly abandoned its earlier policy of supporting revolutionary organizations in opposition to established governments. This was for three reasons: the diminishing Soviet challenge; the PRC's readjustment of itself in the international community; and the obtaining of independence of African states.

Beijing has been actively involved in the support of liberation movements in Southern Africa. Close links with such prominent liberation groups as the Front for the Liberation of
negotiation with their European rulers in favour of armed struggle. These splinter groups were seen as more “ideologically correct” by the Chinese. However, aid was not only disbursed according to a movement’s revolutionary credentials. The PRC’s choice of movements to support was largely dictated by the Sino-Soviet dispute. This became the driving force of the PRC’s foreign policy in Africa.

Beijing challenged the Soviet Union in Africa at every opportunity. She did this by supporting rival factions to Soviet-backed groups, often without regard to the viability of these movements. Thus Beijing’s assertion that “China would never support one side to oppose the other” did not ring true. As the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict intensified, a division of revolutionary movements into pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing camps occurred. An example of this was in South Africa itself, where the African National Congress (ANC) aligned itself with the Soviet Union, while the more radical Pan African Congress (PAC) chose the side of the PRC.

Soviet-backed groups were generally better organised than the Chinese sponsored groups. The reason for this was the PRC’s inability to render large amounts of financial support to these liberation movements as well as the Soviets’ superior organisational skills. Not being a wealthy state, Beijing was unable to provide material assistance on a large scale. Accordingly, aid was not given in very large quantities to liberation movements. The volume of Chinese arms moving clandestinely to liberation groups, particularly in Africa, has not been significant. The PRC also gave rhetorical support and ideological training to its African clients.

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53 Priselac, D.S. Op cit. p.22
55 Four recipients of Chinese aid (PAC, ZANU, UNITA, and CORTUM) issued a statement attacking the Khartoum-held “International Conference in Support of the Liberation Movements of the Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa” (January 1980). They accused it of “calculated to control the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies and southern Africa in order to further Soviet co-operation with the United States for their joint domination of the world.” L aram, B. Op cit. p 187.
56 Beijing did support liberation movements like ZANU (Zimbabwe) and the PAC (South Africa) to a large extent. ZANU led by Robert Mugabe was to form the new government of Zimbabwe in 1980. This was one of the few successes that Beijing enjoyed in Africa.
57 Tansky, L. “China’s Foreign Aid: The Record” in Current Scene, No 9, September 1972, p 10.
At the United Nations, the PRC’s ambassador, Li Mei, stated the PRC’s position on Southern Africa as being:

"The Chinese Government firmly maintains that scheming activities by imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism to undermine the independence and sovereignty of African countries must be checked effectively, and that the white racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonialist rule must be brought to an end, so that the people of Azania, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) may achieve national independence."

The PRC was willing to support these nationalist independence movements in the colonial states. Its pragmatic objective of securing relations with these future independent states would be achieved through supporting the revolutionary struggles of the liberation movements in these countries.

The PRC and the Southern African Liberation Movements.

The PRC has a record of encouraging and assisting revolutionary groups in Africa. The PRC’s interest in and support for African revolutionary movements stems from her own international revolutionary commitment. Historically, Beijing has supported liberation movements in their fight against colonialism. The Chinese believed in the “domino-effect” of revolution in Africa whereby national revolutions would multiply and result in a widespread revolution sweeping the continent: “In each country the national revolution is paramount; on a continental scale, revolutionaries must strive to build a united front.”

With few exceptions, the PRC has aligned itself with the more radical anti-colonial groups. The Chinese were more willing to give support to revolutionary groups that had rejected

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initial contact with South Africa was limited. However, Southern Africa as a region was to become an integral part of the PRC’s Third World policy. The revolutionary potential of the region, with its minority regime governments, held an attraction for Beijing. This presented the PRC with an ideal situation to implement its revolutionary policies in the region.  

According to the Chinese Communist Party’s theory of revolution, the white-rulled states of South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia had to pass through a stage of “national revolution” which would free them from foreign imperialist oppression. Victory by the revolutionary forces would then be followed by democratic and proletarian-socialist revolutions. This model for revolution served as a “theoretical blueprint” for the achievement of independence by subjected people in colonial states. The Southern African states were therefore targets of Beijing’s revolutionary policies and were identified with the PRC’s own historical revolutionary struggle. Former PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-Zhi said:

“The Chinese Government holds that racial discrimination and apartheid which exists in Southern Africa and in other areas, are the products of the policy of colonialism and imperialism. The struggle against racial discrimination is closely bound up with the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. The people of some areas of Africa, who are engaged in a struggle against racial discrimination, can achieve national liberation and eradicate the evil of racial discrimination only by overthrowing colonial rule through their own struggle.”

apartheid laws would have on South Africa’s local Chinese population. Under the apartheid system, Chinese were not granted the same status as white people were in society. They were thus labelled with the derogatory term of “non-white”. “China’s Foreign Relations: A Chronology of Events (1949-1980)”, Home News Library of the Xinhua News Agency, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing: 1989, p.356

48 Ibid. p.134.
Co-operation as the basis for Beijing-African relations. The "Four Principles" were: (1) Beijing attaches no conditionality to its co-operation with African states; (2) developmental projects must produce better economic results from less investment; (3) co-operation contracts should be observed, the quality of work guaranteed and friendship stressed; and (4) economic co-operation should lead to self-reliance on both sides. Economics became the focus of the PRC's foreign policy.

The "Four Principles" were based on pragmatic considerations and were designed to maintain Beijing's political influence while at the same time reducing the PRC's economic commitments to Africa.

The PRC's view of Africa and the developing world remains unchanged. However, despite continued rhetorical support, the PRC is no longer willing to supply large amounts of aid as it did in the past. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has resulted in a lessening in the importance with which the PRC regards the developing world. The PRC's foreign policy is no longer dominated by the dictates of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The post-Cold War world is not characterised by ideology, but rather economics. Domestically, the PRC is pursuing economic growth. Internationally, it is seeking a more stable environment for its modernisation and emergence as a world power. This has resulted in a downgrading in importance of Africa and the developing world. This trend will continue.

The PRC and Southern Africa.

The PRC had its first political contact with South Africa in September 1980 when the PRC premiers Mao Zedong sent a telegram to the South African government in protest at the new National Party government's discriminatory policy of racial segregation. The PRC's...
However, by the late 1970’s, Beijing had tempered its ideological position and had begun to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the Third World, also referred to as the “developing world”. This coincided with the ousting of the Chinese left-wing leadership in 1976 and the consequent implementation of sweeping economic reforms under the Four Modernisations.  

In November 1978, Beijing re-evaluated the world situation and changed its foreign policy approach toward Africa and the Third World. Developments in the Third World had been characterised by the following: political settlements had largely displaced liberation movements; Third World states were faced with the difficult task of developing their national economies; conflicts between developing countries divisions had emerged in the Third World “ bloc” such as the emergence of the “newly industrialised countries”, petroleum producers, and low income countries. The Third World was no longer the coherent grouping as once regarded in Beijing. These factors resulted in a reappraisal of Beijing’s Third World policy.

The PRC dropped all reference to the Third World as being the "driving force of revolution". Instead, it asserted that, “many Third World countries have stepped into another historical stage at which the central assignment is to develop their national economies” and that "mutual assistance among Third World countries will be of prime importance." Peace and development had replaced war and revolution as the hallmarks of Chinese foreign policy. This has resulted in Beijing adopting a more realistic policy toward the Third World.

This new Third World policy was outlined by Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang during his visit to Africa in 1983. Zhao outlined the Four Principles for Economic and Technological
"The African countries are playing an increasingly prominent role in the present international arena, and the superpowers' attempt to manipulate and control international affairs will no longer work."³⁴

The PRC's successful entrance into the United Nations Security Council was largely achieved with the support of African states in the United Nations General Assembly.

From “Revolutionary Idealism” to “Revolutionary Pragmatism”.³⁵

In an attempt to legitimate its designs on leadership of the Third World, the PRC proposed its “Three-Worlds Theory” in 1974. In a speech delivered at the United Nations General Assembly, Beijing characterised the world as being split into three camps: "The world today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America and other regions make up the Third World. The developed countries between the two make up the Second World."³⁶

The PRC placed itself in the Third World by stating that, "China is a socialist country and a developing country as well. China belongs to the Third World."³⁷ Beijing described the superpowers as being the "biggest international exploiters and oppressors."³⁸ The "Three World's Theory" was thus anti-hegemonic and was an attempt by Beijing to undermine the hegemony of the superpowers by installing itself as champion of the Third World in an international united front against imperialism.³⁹ The Chinese regarded themselves as leading this "world revolution".
The PRC's Revised Foreign Policy in Africa.

The year 1969 marked the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of the normalisation process of the PRC's foreign policy. Beijing started to court the international community and repair the damage inflicted upon its foreign relations over the previous few years. The PRC's desire to extend its international relations revolved around its competition with the ROC to be recognised as the rightful and legal state of China. The PRC's improved international image allowed it to extend its diplomatic relations in Africa. It was assisted in this by the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia. Many African states became disillusioned with the Soviet Union. In protest, demonstrations and attacks on Soviet embassies occurred. Zambian President Kaunda's prayer that "God will help the Czechoslovakian people to fight against Russian imperialism" reflected the anti-Soviet mood in Africa. Instead, many African states turned to the PRC. Emerging from its isolation of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC took advantage of the situation by extending its relations in Africa.

In 1970, formal relations were established with Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia. In 1971, a number of other states recognised Beijing, these being Nigeria, Cameroun, Libya, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Senegal, Rwanda, and Togo. In 1972, Gabon, Chad, Mauritius, Zaire, as well as Ghana and Dahomey which renewed relations with the PRC, all established formal ties with Beijing. By the end of 1972, a total of 29 African states had exchanged relations with the PRC. By 1971, the PRC's diplomatic offensive in Africa had succeeded in gaining admission into the United Nations. On Africa and its growing international role, the PRC observed that:

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33 Ibid. p.106.
The PRC significantly reduced its aid commitments to Africa during this time (with the exception of the Tanzam railway). The PRC was only willing to give aid to states with which it had close relations. These were Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Tanzania. However, for many other African states, aid was withheld or not granted. These included Egypt and Algeria which had both criticised the Cultural Revolution. Therefore Beijing’s aid policy in Africa could be described as being static over this period.

Political visits by African delegations to the PRC also declined. In 1966, the number of African visits stood at 116. By the following year, 1967, this number had dropped to 53 and by 1968 to only 12. By visiting the PRC during this time, a political leader could be regarded as an extreme revolutionary by his critics, both domestically and internationally. Only a handful of African leaders were willing to make the journey to the PRC. One was President Nyerere of Tanzania. Beijing publicised such rare visits for propaganda purposes. Chou Enlai welcomed Nyerere in such a way saying:

“The support given by the people of Tanzania and the rest of Africa and the revolutionary people of the whole world to our great proletarian cultural revolution constitutes a tremendous encouragement to the Chinese people.”

Although radical elements within the Chinese Foreign Ministry attempted to “export” this revolution to African countries, it was largely unsuccessful. However, the more radical states of Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania did adopt certain features of the Cultural Revolution. These included the creation of youth movements and people’s militias. Such moves indirectly resulted in a coup d’état in two of these countries - Mali and Congo-Brazzaville. Mao’s Cultural Revolution therefore not only served to destabilise the PRC but also a number of African states as well.

29 Ibid p.146.
In August 1967, the Red Guards, radical youth groups which were largely responsible for the chaos caused during the Cultural Revolution, took control of the Foreign Ministry. A number of violent incidents were committed by Red Guards against foreign embassies and diplomatic staff during this time. However, the Red Guards were soon ousted from the Foreign Ministry. Beijing’s foreign policy-making began to return to a state of normality. However, the PRC’s foreign relations had already been damaged. Four African states broke official relations with Beijing between 1966 and 1967 (the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Ghana, and Tunisia). Many other African governments viewed the PRC with suspicion. By 1969, Sino-African relations had declined to the extent that Beijing had diplomatic relations with only thirteen African states.

The PRC’s foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution became a reflection of its own turbulent domestic situation. It has been suggested that the radicalisation of foreign policy and the attacks on foreign interests in the PRC was based on a deliberate attempt by the Chinese leadership to win domestic support. This was designed to contribute to national unity and legitimate Mao Zedong’s claim to power. The “spilling-over” of the Cultural Revolution into foreign affairs can be partly regarded as an attempt by Mao to “use foreign policy to gain domestic advantage.” Therefore internal and external policies were inextricably linked.

The Cultural Revolution and Africa.

The PRC’s interests in Africa declined during the Cultural Revolution. Beijing was too preoccupied with its own domestic affairs to be concerned with promoting foreign relations.

Prinsloo, D.N. Op cit, p 86.
1 In January 1967, the Central African Republic broke off its diplomatic relations with Beijing following a coup. The new government accused pro-Chinese extremists of plotting a revolution in the CAR. Beijing suffered a similar diplomatic setback when Dahomey broke off relations also in January 1967. The suggestion that the PRC’s interests in Africa were the overthrow of Mamoukou in Dahomey and January 1967. The PRC’s ambassador in Tunisia was also forced to resign in September 1967. Prinsloo, D.N. Op cit, p 86.
2 Prinsloo, D.N. Op cit, p 104.
3 Prinsloo, D.N. Op cit, p 104.
late 1980's it was reported that Pretoria and Beijing had also concluded a secret US$2 billion deal. This deal gave Pretoria access to Beijing's long-range missile technology, allowing it to develop the capability of launching ballistic nuclear weapons and sending its own satellites into space.124 This contract with Beijing was reportedly scrapped by Pretoria shortly after F.W De Klerk became president in 1989. Despite this, South Africa has supposedly continued to use the Chinese technology obtained for its commercial satellite programme through the country's armaments manufacturer Denel. Beijing has, however, denied any involvement in such a deal.125

The political cost of the PRC's alleged trade with South Africa was high. Its image was sullied amongst African states who resented the PRC's double standards towards the white South African Government. Thus the PRC's trade policy seemingly operated in a political vacuum, regardless of ideology. While criticising South Africa for its human rights abuses under apartheid, Beijing was secretly trading with the apartheid regime. This has drawn some recent criticism from elements within the ANC/SACP.126

Conclusion.

Africa has been an important component of the PRC's Third World policy. Beijing's Africa policy has been guided by both ideology and pragmatism. The PRC's early contact


124 It has been reported by South African military sources that this capability would enable South Africa to hit targets more than 3000 kilometres from Pretoria. Following the deal, Pretoria developed and tested its own missiles, one of which was successfully launched 1450 km into the Indian Ocean. Ellis, R. "Beijing in Nuclear Arms Deal" in The South China Morning Post, 29 March 1989.

125 "This report is groundless", a spokesman for the PRC's foreign ministry said in the official New China News Agency (Xinhua). Reported in The South China Morning Post, 31 March 1993.

126 "The PRC's relations with the ANC has not been very good for a very long time. We know that Beijing has been secretly trading with the South African white government, supporting extremist groups like the P.W. and forces against the anti-apartheid movement." Source quoted in Kuo, P. "ANC source says ties with Beijing not that strong" in The China Post, circa July 1995.

During an interview with the author, SACP Deputy Secretary General Jeremy Cronin condemned the PRC's trade with the previous apartheid South African government saying that, "It tells us something about how they conduct politics" and that the new government "needs to be forewarned by these lessons." Interview, 11 November 1994.
"Perhaps the most sickening aspect of the communist attempt - both Russian and Chinese - to exploit Pan-Africanist feelings is the blatantness of their lip-service to our (African) demands for justice for our fellow Africans in South Africa. Peking and Moscow, to go by their words, are zealous for the prosecution of the severest economic boycott against South Africa. Yet, while African countries have suffered a good deal of hardship by implementing the boycott, Soviet craft have floated the embargo on the Apartheid Republic's ports and airfields, and China and the East European countries have been steadily increasing their trade with it."

This, along with other accusations of the PRC dealing with South Africa, resulted in much political embarrassment for Beijing. However, there is little doubt that trade between the two states continued, be it either officially or unofficially. Details of this clandestine trade are, however, extremely difficult to come by. A number of such deals have, however, come under public scrutiny.

An alleged business dealing was revealed in March 1985 by the general manager of the South African Maize Board. He claimed that PRC cereal exporters had supplied South Africa with 20 000 tons of grain, via a third country, the most likely being Hong Kong. However, a seller operating through an entrepôt such as Hong Kong would be unlikely to know the ultimate destination of his produce. Therefore it is difficult to establish the existence of an official and direct trading link between Pretoria and Beijing. However, Chinese denials did not put an end to the speculation.

In 1981, the New York Times reported that South Africa had bought reactor-grade uranium from the PRC. This deal was confirmed by the South African Atomic Energy Corporation in 1993. The value of the uranium was between R80m and R90m.\footnote{\textit{The Dragon's Embrace: The Chinese communists and Africa, Frederik A. Pregger, New York: 1966, p.78} \cite{Pregger1966} \footnote{Share, P. \textit{Op. cit. p.180} \cite{Share1982}} \footnote{This information was obtained from evidence heard in a R3.7 million claim against Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa (Nufoor) by the Swiss company Veda in the Johannesburg Rand Supreme Court. Former general manager of Nufoor, J van Riebeek, revealed that his company had acted as an}}
inadvertently revealed that South Africa’s trade with the PRC had trebled since 1963 - a substantial increase.\textsuperscript{115} This supported the assertion that despite the discontinuance of the publication of figures, it is likely that trade between the two countries continued. Such a belief resulted in the Ghanaian embassy in Beijing stating of the PRC that it “is not unaware of the effective role which hypocrisy plays in international affairs.”\textsuperscript{116}

The phrase used in Beijing’s official statement was that the “Chinese Government” had not carried on trade with South Africa. This did not exclude the possibility of trade being conducted through unofficial bodies.\textsuperscript{117} Accusations against this clandestine trade continued. It was reported in July 1964 by the official Yugoslav newspaper “Borba” that Sino-South African trade had been continuing. A United Nations report on international trade reported on the sale of explosives by the PRC to South Africa.\textsuperscript{118} In December 1971 Radio Moscow alleged that Sino-South African trade had increased to £10 million. It was reported that the PRC supplied Pretoria with oil in exchange for copper, diamonds, lead, and zinc.\textsuperscript{119}

These continued accusations resulted, in September 1970, in the PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade stating: “Recently, the press of United States’ imperialism and its accomplices has incessantly manufactured and spread rumours, slanderously accusing the PRC of trading with the white colonialist authorities in South Africa and Rhodesia.”\textsuperscript{120} Although the exact state of trade relations between the two countries could not be definitely established, the allegations caused embarrassment to the Chinese as well as embittering many African states:

South African exports to the PRC, South Africa’s economics minister replied that he “did not consider it to be in the national interest to disclose these figures” Larkin, B.J. \textit{op. cit.} p.106

\textsuperscript{115} Opimuswelo, A. \textit{op. cit.} p.150.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. p.150.
\textsuperscript{117} Prinsloo, D.S. \textit{op. cit.} p.108
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. p.108.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid. p.109
\textsuperscript{120} Larkin, B.J. \textit{op. cit.} p.107.
South Africa and the PRC, the two states did have contact, albeit unofficial, in the economic sphere.

South African-PRC Economic Links.

Political considerations have seemingly played no part in the PRC's economic dealings with South Africa. Although there have been no diplomatic relations between the states, a clandestine trade relationship has existed. Despite repeated denials by both sides, reports of this trade have been persistent. In June 1963, the Ghanaian Embassy in Beijing asked the PRC Foreign Ministry to refute claims made of PRC-South African trade. It was reported that Beijing had purchased maize from South Africa to make up for the PRC's domestic shortage of food. On 15 July 1963, the official PRC New China News Agency (Xinhua) subsequently issued a government statement stating:

"The Chinese Government has since July 1960 discontinued all its economic and trade ties with the South African colonial authorities. The Chinese Government solemnly declares that it will in future continue in have no economic and trade ties, direct or indirect, with the South African colonial authorities. This stand of the Chinese Government is unswerving."

This denial was not convincing. Up until March 1963, South Africa had been publishing its own trade figures with the PRC, showing that trade had indeed taken place between the two states. In July 1964, the President of the Durban Chamber of Commerce

115 It was reported in 1962 that the PRC's trade with South Africa consisted of exports of pharmaceuticals, textiles and light machinery. Imports were maize and food grains. This trade was estimated to be worth approximately $1 million. In 1968, the South African Foundation calculated South Africa's exports (mostly maize to the PRC) to have increased considerably, worth over two million pounds in the first two months of that year. Hutchinson, A. Op. cit. p. 197.
Pretoria regarded Beijing's support of the national liberation movements in Southern Africa as part of a greater plan to eradicate Western civilisation in the region. This fear was heightened by the PRC's financial support of the Tan-Zam railway. It was held that the railway would "transform Zambia into the southernmost outpost of the African guerrilla advance against the white regimes of Southern Africa." Another assumption was that it would provide an excellent infrastructure and communication system for Chinese military aggression against South Africa. According to former Prime Minister John Vorster,

"The greatest single threat to Africa is that the Communist Chinese have established a bridgehead in Tanzania, and the possibility that they might, through the construction of the Tan-Zam railway, infiltrate farther into the heart of Africa and establish themselves on a permanent basis in Tanzania and Zambia."

To the South African Government, the Chinese represented an unknown force. They made more "picturesque villains" than the Soviets. Pretoria used this for its own propaganda purposes. By berating the Chinese Communists, the South African Government attempted to rally domestic and international support for itself and its opposition to communism. This was largely unsuccessful. However, despite the mutual hostility that existed between

107 J.G. Owens, a South African expert on African liberation movements, wrote in the New York Times of April 1973 that, "At the completion of the Tan-Zam railway, the Chinese hope to swamp Southern Africa from the north. The coastlines are already patrolled by the Russians. It is obvious that the policy of the Chinese Communists is to eliminate the Europeans (whitest) by using the black tribes for this purpose. If that were to succeed, they would encourage inter-tribal warfare and probably total subjugation of the blacks." Hutchison, A. Op cit. p.280 and Gurusamy, A. China's Policy in Africa 1968-1971, Cambridge University Press, London: 1974, p.209.

108 "The South African Government's fears were made worse by the Tanzanian Government's statement, referring to the Tan-Zam railway, that it would serve as a 'contribution to the total liberation of Africa'." Ibid. p.209.


transferred to South Africa were designed to instil an ideological bias as well. The ANC was so concerned that its members undergoing training in the PRC would become indoctrinated, that they placed those returning under close surveillance for traces of Marxism.\textsuperscript{116}

Many states in Africa had achieved independence through peaceful and constitutional means, thereby depriving the PRC of an opportunity to implement her revolutionary model on a large-scale on the continent. Therefore the major targets for revolution were the minority white-ruled regimes of Southern Africa.

Despite denials to the contrary, it seems evident that Beijing was attempting to impose its own political ideology on its African clients. The extent to which the PRC offered revolutionary support to the Southern African liberation movements made her claims of not exporting revolution seem highly dubious.\textsuperscript{112}

The Perspective of the South African Government.

The South African government regarded the PRC’s involvement in the region as a prime threat to state security. It was viewed as bent on encouraging revolution and spreading communism in Southern Africa and the African continent. This was anathema to the virulently anti-communist apartheid government, which under PW Botha institutionalised this threat through the “total onslaught” theory. According to the South African government, total onslaught was “a ideologically motivated strategy” which was defined as the “implacable and unconditional imposition of communism as well on the target state.”\textsuperscript{113} In the case of South Africa, the aim was to replace the present constitutional order and its replacement by a subject communist-oriented black government.\textsuperscript{115}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Outterbridge, A Report p. 48
  \item Gaddis, IG. Report p. 5
  \item Larton, op. cit., South Africa, Western Policy: The Realisation State, and Europe (Tandem Books, London, 1988); and also, Larton, op. cit.
\end{itemize}
as in the case of the PAC, Beijing only gave token amounts of cash to the liberation movements. ²⁶

Beijing did, however, supply military equipment to the liberation movements. This has consisted mainly of small arms, ammunition, hand grenades, rocket launchers, landmines and explosives. ²⁶ Initially, the PRC supplied weapons that had been captured in the wars with the Japanese and the Kuomintang nationalists. Later, however, the PRC supplied more modern equipment to its African clients. The Chinese version of the Soviet AK-47 Kalashnikov automatic rifle became a standard guerrilla tool in Africa. ²⁷

However, the PRC’s most valuable contribution to the Southern African liberation movements took the form of training. Beijing specialised in training African revolutionaries in the art of guerrilla warfare. ²⁸ Courses that were taught included the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare, weapons training, and the establishment of revolutionary bases in rural areas. ²⁹ Many liberation movements were instructed by the Chinese. This included up to five thousand PAC guerrillas in camps in Tanzania. ³⁰ A number of the PRC’s trainees became future political leaders such as PRHIMO’s Samora Machel of Mozambique. ³¹ UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi also travelled to the PRC in May 1967 where he received assistance from the Chinese leadership. ³²

In addition to this training came the teaching of Mao Zedong thought - ideological indoctrination. The Chinese considered such political training as essential for “aspiring” revolutionaries. President Kaunda of Zambia once remarked that, “When they (the

²⁶ Compared with the United States, Soviet Union and other European arms suppliers, the PRC’s export of weapons to the Third World has been small, constituting only 2.5% of the total supply to these countries. Franslow, D. S. Op. cit. p.207.
²⁸ Chinese instruction took place at camps in Tanzania, Contra-Brusselsville, Angola and Ghana as well as in the PRC itself. Ibid. p.247.
²⁹ Ibid. p.247.
³⁰ Ibid. p.141.
³¹ Ibid. p.78-79.
policy assisted this process by creating the opportunity for the ANC to increase its contact with the rival communist power, the PRC."

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of ANC-SACP delegations have visited the PRC. Three delegations from the SACP have visited the PRC which included SACP leaders Joe Slovo and Chris Hani.

During this time, the PRC adopted a less radical policy towards the South African government. Revolutionary remarks had all but faded away from Beijing's official statements. Beijing had tempered its revolutionary rhetoric towards the National Party government: "We believe that what is required is that the white regime abandon apartheid and racial discrimination so that blacks and whites could form a national government in which all races cooperate." This moderation was as a result of the PRC's re-evaluation after the taking into power of Deng Xiaoping, both domestically and internationally. Economic reform and international co-operation became the cornerstones of Beijing's policy-making. Beijing's foreign policy towards South Africa accordingly became less revolutionary.

The PRC's Aid to the Southern African Liberation Movements.

The PRC utilised all the instruments available to her to promote the objectives of her foreign policy in Southern Africa. These included economic assistance, military aid and revolutionary subversion. However, the PRC's aid to the Southern African liberation movements was restricted by its own developing country status. The PRC's lack of hard currency precluded it from giving generously, despite complaints from the liberation movements of shortages of money. Along with the fear that such funds would be misused.
To take advantage of the situation, the PRC increased its contact with these liberation movements, hoping to make political gains at the expense of the Soviet Union.87 The ANC is a case in point. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the previous year (1968) had disillusioned many of its supporters within the liberation movements, including those within the ANC. This, coupled with its loss of support at the Khartoum Conference, resulted in the ANC viewing the PRC in a more favourable light. The ANC subsequently stated that “The establishment of the People’s Republic of China was a monumental and indelible achievement in the struggle for national independence and world peace. It was a great inspiration to all revolutionaries throughout the world.”88 Despite this show of allegiance, the ANC could not develop too close a relationship with the Chinese as this could result in a deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union - its major sponsor. This situation continued into the 1970’s and 1980’s.

The thawing of relations between Beijing and Moscow in the mid-1980’s paved the way for an improvement of relations between the ANC and the PRC.89 The realisation that the ANC was the dominant liberation movement in South Africa also contributed to Beijing increasing its contact with the organisation. The PAC became sidelined as a rival movement to the ANC and the aid it received from Beijing was reduced accordingly. During PRC Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang’s African tour of 1982/3, he emphasised Beijing’s support for the ANC while meeting with leaders of the organisation. Within six months, the ANC leader Oliver Tambo, had visited Beijing and returned with promises of guerrilla training, arms and ammunition.90 Ties between the ANC and the PRC continued to grow with other members of the ANC leadership visiting Beijing.91 Moscow’s 

87 By encouraging delegations from the liberation movements to visit the PRC, Beijing was able to receive the leaders of FRELIMO, PARC, and the MPLA within the short space of two years. Hutchison, A. Op cit, p. 239.
89 An improvement of relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union began in 1982 with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev’s call for better Sino-Soviet relations, “on the basis of mutual respect for each other’s interests, non-interference in each other’s affairs, and mutual benefit.” This culminated in President Gorbachev’s visit to the PRC in May 1989, the first by a Soviet leader since 1983, after which Deng Xiaoping proclaimed Sino-Soviet relations as “normalised”. Mackerras, C. and Yorke, A. The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1991, p.38,52.
91 Ibid. p.141.
By comparison, the PAC advocated violent struggle as the only means to replace colonial oppression with communism. The PRC theory of social revolution was more militant than that of the SACP and closer to that espoused by the PAC.

A measure of rapprochement between the ANC and the PRC did, however, occur after the Khartoum Conference of January 1969. This Soviet-initiated conference was an attempt by Moscow to assert its leadership over the Southern African liberation movements and at the same time subvert the influence of the PRC. However, the Soviets only succeeded in estranging the liberation groups. The liberation movements saw themselves as being used by the Soviet Union as pawns in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese-backed organisations strongly criticised the conference for just this. According to a joint statement issued by the PRC-aligned PAC, ZANU, UNITA and CUREMO movements, the conference was, “Calculated to control the liberation struggles of the Portuguese colonies and Southern Africa in order to further Soviet co-operation with the United States for their joint domination of the world.”

Moscow responded by accusing the Chinese of “exerting every effort to undermine Africa's trust in the Soviet Union and other countries of socialism and to discredit outstanding fighters for peace and unity of the peoples.” This criticism of the PRC did nothing to improve the Soviets’ image in Africa. As a result, the liberation movements became reluctant to admit to being a member of the Soviet camp. To stress their independence, the attendants of the Khartoum Conference placed greater emphasis on their commitment to non-alignment.

\(^{29}\) The Soviet Union, under the auspices of the World Council of Peace jointly with the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AATSO), organised a conference to be held in Khartoum (Sudan) to which six liberation movements popularly characterised as Soviet-controlled were invited — namely the ANC, ZAPU, SWAPO, MPLA, PACOC and PIRILMO. Hutchinson, A. Op. cit. p.256.

ANC to side against the Soviet Union after the split. The ANC’s siding with Moscow over Beijing did cause some dissension within the organisation. There were a number of internal dislocations as a result of the dispute but the majority of the members of the ANC/SACP took the side of the Soviet Union.81

Pressure was, however, exerted by Moscow as well. Through the SACP, the Soviet Union had a strong association with the ANC. This became more prevalent after the banning of the ANC in South Africa in 1960 and the subsequent Soviet assistance to the organisation during its years in exile, based in Tanzania.82 In strong support of the Soviet Union and critical of the PRC, the ANC said of the PRC’s involvement in Southern Africa:

"The oppressed people of our country and all honest revolutionaries are indignant at the unprincipled backing given by the Chinese Government to certain discredited splinter groups of Southern Africa. These groups are known to all, including the Chinese Communists, for their racialism, anti-communism and disruption of the liberation struggle. By associating with them, the Chinese leaders only expose their own opportunism and lack of principle."83

The ANC opposed the PRC giving assistance to its rival liberation movement, the PAC. PAC cadres had replaced ANC trainees in the military camps in the PRC. This further distanced the ANC from Beijing. From the ANC’s perspective, Beijing, "perceived the rivals of the liberation movements backed by the Soviet Union as their allies (without too many questions asked)."84

Further antagonism between the ANC-SACP alliance and Beijing resulted from an ideological dispute between the two. The SACP regarded liberation as resulting from three successive phases, these being, the ending of colonialism; followed by social revolution; and the attainment of African unity. These phases were not meant to incorporate violence.

81 Interview with SACP Deputy Secretary General Jeremy Cronin, 11 November 1994.
84 Cronin, J. Interview, 11 November 1994.
The PRC's first contact with the South African liberation movements was marked by the visit of Walter Sisulu of the African National Congress (ANC) to Beijing in 1955. This initial encounter was followed by other visits by ANC officials. The first being Sisulu's colleague, Lilian Ngoyi, who described her trip to Beijing as being one where she was "swept by a rush of feeling that the world was on her side." At the Bandung Conference of 1955, Moses Kotane of the ANC was one of three South African observers present. These contacts were important to the ANC in establishing allies and publicising its struggle against the racist policies of the National Party government.

After the Sino-Soviet split became irrevocable, the ANC sided with Moscow in the dispute. The reason for this was the close alliance between the South African Communist Party (SACP), which had a significant stake in the ANC, and Moscow. The SACP used its influence within the ANC to persuade the organisation to side with Moscow. This impacted upon the ANC's relations with other southern African liberation movements. Some respected nationalist and socialist leaders (for example, Samora Machel of Mozambique) had undergone training in the PRC and were attempting to implement Mao Zedong's guerrilla tactics which emphasised the revolutionary importance of the rural areas in their own country. While Machel was attempting to implement these ideas in Mozambique, they were being discarded by the ANC in South Africa.

In the early 1960's the ANC and SACP made the conscious decision to withdraw its members undergoing military training in the PRC from that country. The reason for this was the increasing pressure from the Chinese that in exchange for training, Beijing expected the

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1 South, Secretary General of the ANC of South Africa visited the PRC after the World Youth Festival Snow, P, (p.1).
3 This relationship stemmed from the founding of the SACP in 1942, when the soviets had helped to establish the organisation.
5 The ANC had previously sent a number of its members for military training in the PRC. One of the contact persons was the communist lawyer who received training for eighteen months in Shanghai before being arrested in Peking in 1954. Walter Mbelwa briefly the commander of the ANC's military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, also received training in the PRC. (Ref. 8)
both countries well. This relationship developed on the basis of their “common pariah status and economic complementarity.” The ROC-South African relationship developed as their international isolation increased.

**South Africa and the ROC as Pariah States.**

Pariah states have been described as “creatures of the Cold War” - alienated from both the Western and Communist blocs. A simplistic definition of a pariah state has been given as a state which “finds itself at odds with the existing international society.” This arose due to the pariah state’s adherence to an “unacceptable” or “obsolete” value system which placed it in conflict with the accepted norms of the international community at that time. The source of this dissociation was either ideological, political or racial.

These pariah states formed what has been described as almost a “third world”, separate from the international community, with their own distinct characteristics:

“All had common characteristics. They were ruled by immigrants or their descendants; they surpassed their neighbours in economic and political development and were envied for this; and they had all become targets and victims of communist onslaught.”

South Africa and the ROC-on-Taiwan both fitted into such a category. Possibly because of their common pariah-status, a close relationship began to develop between the two states. A sort of “alignment of the alienated” began to develop between them. This is, in itself, contradictory. Pariahs are - by definition - alone and isolated. Therefore, any sort of relationship or grouping of pariah states would undermine the concept of a pariah state.

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22 Ibid, p.64.
favour of the PRC. In the General Assembly vote, the ROC had the support of only fifteen African states. This brought into question the effectiveness of the ROC’s foreign aid programme which had been used as an instrument of foreign policy. This issue becomes very relevant to the current situation whereby the ROC is offering economic assistance to South Africa in an attempt to safeguard its diplomatic relations. This issue will be examined in a following chapter.

The ROC and Africa after 1971.

After its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, the ROC was systematically derecognised by many states. The focus of its foreign policy became the maintenance of its relations with the United States, its major benefactor. Africa no longer featured prominently in Taipei’s foreign policy-making. The ROC gradually withdrew from the African continent. Taipei had once secured recognition from twenty-two African states. By 1975, only nine African states had diplomatic relations with the ROC. By 1988, this number had decreased to three, with only South Africa, Swaziland and Malawi recognising the ROC. The ROC had become one of the most politically isolated states in the world.

Over the last few years, the ROC has, however, been giving more attention to Africa. A number of African states have offered the ROC diplomatic recognition. In return, the ROC has granted such states generous financial aid packages. The most recent example is that of Gambia which re-established formal relations with Taipei in July 1995.

The South African-ROC Relationship.

Since the mid-seventies, the ROC’s foreign policy in Africa has focused upon South Africa. Today, South Africa is Taipei’s most important political and economic partner in Africa. A mutually beneficial relationship has developed which has served the interests of

\[26\] Ibid. p.150.

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The PRC's international relations were, however, to be adversely affected by the Cultural Revolution. This period of ideological frenzy in the PRC resulted in a new radicalism in Beijing's foreign policy. This more radical foreign policy resulted in many African Governments fearing subversion from PRC-aligned opposition groups in their own countries, distancing themselves from Beijing. Many states complained of excessive displays of radicalism by Chinese diplomats, resulting in a number of states severing diplomatic relations with the PRC. The ROC benefited politically from the PRC's extremism and often its diplomatic misconduct in Africa.

By 1969, however, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution within the PRC were diminishing. The PRC's foreign policy was no longer being dictated by revolutionary ideology but was inclining towards pragmatism. The ROC once again began to face a serious challenge from the PRC to its international position as the legal representative of the Chinese Government. Beijing was gaining international ground and it seemed that it was only a matter of time before it was elected to replace Taipei in the United Nations Security Council. Numerous resolutions to replace the ROC in the United Nations had been previously defeated.

In October 1971, however, the ROC was finally ousted from the United Nations by a decisive vote in the General Assembly of seventy-five to thirty-five. In large part, the ROC's loss of its Security Council seat can be attributed to the change in the United States' "China policy." Washington's political courting of the PRC was an attempt to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet split and undermine the position of the Soviet Union. The United States, however, could only achieve this by ending its political support for the ROC. Hence Washington's failure to block the ROC's expulsion from the Security Council in

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By the mid-sixties, however, the international title was beginning to turn against Taipei. The PRC was making diplomatic gains which would eventually result in it capturing the ROC’s seat in the United Nations. PRC premier Chou Enlai’s 1963 tour of Africa was intended to counter Soviet influence on the continent but it also served to challenge the ROC on the continent. Chou outlined the eight principles of Beijing’s foreign aid policy which included equality, mutual benefit, practicality, and aid with no strings attached.  

Championing African independence, Chou’s trip strengthened Beijing’s influence and undermined the ROC’s position in Africa.

In January 1964, French President De Gaulle announced France’s intention to derecognise the ROC in favour of the PRC. This was a serious blow to Taipei. It was feared that the African Francophone states would follow France’s lead and withdraw diplomatic recognition from the ROC. This is what subsequently happened with a number of former French colonial states breaking off relations with Taipei.

In October 1964, the PRC announced that it had conducted her first nuclear test. The PRC became the fifth member of the “nuclear club” and the first developing country to acquire nuclear weapons. The PRC’s obtaining of a nuclear capability was more important politically than militarily. This greatly enhanced the PRC’s international image and prestige in the Third World. This resulted in Beijing becoming more confident in the international arena.

Ibid., p. 148.
Ibid., p. 148.
providing a model for them to follow. Its failure bolstered the position of the ROC which was itself making good economic progress. The success of Taipei’s land reform programme and its agricultural aid initiatives in Africa also made the ROC attractive to the developing African states.13

Taipei had launched numerous aid efforts in Africa. These mostly took the form of agricultural missions. Taiwan’s semi-tropical climate allowed for the “quick transfer of agricultural techniques to tropical Africa.”14 Between 1961 and 1970, twenty-three agricultural missions from the ROC consisting of 922 technicians were dispatched to Africa.15 The purpose of these was to emphasise the role of agricultural development in developing economies. The ROC also established a training programme in Taipei which catered for more than 400 African participants.16 This aid programme formed part of Taipei’s foreign policy and was designed to further the ROC’s foreign relations in Africa and was successful in generating goodwill and appreciation from its African recipients.17 Taipei was, “sparing no effort to enhance friendly relations with the African nations.”18 The ROC was, not unlike African states, a developing country. With a similar history of colonialism, it could serve as a possible model of development for Africa. Its agricultural aid to Africa “served the African recipient states economically and benefited the ROC politically.”19

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16 Basic planting techniques, agricultural policy, land reform, and marketing research were taught along with practical training. This programme suited African needs, focusing on agricultural development. Ibid, p.151.
diplomatic recognition from eighteen African states by 1963 while the PRC was recognised by only eleven.\(^\text{10}\)

Taipei's success was attributable to a number of factors. The ROC initially benefited from the PRC's radicalism in Africa. Beijing's support of opposition liberation movements in African states resulted in a suspicion of Beijing's intentions amongst African leaders. There was a concern amongst a number of African governments that the PRC's support for revolutionary groups within their own respective countries was a danger to the stability of the state. This political militancy threatened the stability of the states in Africa that had already acquired independence. Thus for African states to recognise the ROC was, "not so much a support of Taipei's foreign policy as it was a tacit disapproval of Beijing's foreign policy."\(^\text{41}\)

Beijing's support of the more revolutionary factions was evident in its support for the radical "Casablanca Group" of states which contrasted with the ROC's alignment with the more "moderate" states of the Francophone bloc.\(^\text{11}\) Beijing's radical stance often discouraged African states from forming a close relationship with the PRC. This served to consolidate the ROC's position in Africa. The French-speaking states of West Africa mostly followed France's policy of offering diplomatic recognition to the ROC over the PRC. Diplomatic links with Paris benefited the ROC's relations in Africa until France's derecognition of the ROC in 1964.

Despite Beijing's claims to the contrary, the PRC's economic experiment of the Great Leap Forward (1958) turned out to be an unmitigated disaster. This programme for rapid industrial development had been closely watched by African states in the hope of


\(^{11}\) Ibid. p.147.

\(^{12}\) The Casablanca Conference of April 1960 was convened to discuss the question of Mauritania's independence. The issue was heard in the United Nations with both the ROC and Soviet Union becoming embroiled in the dispute, linking it with the admission of Outer Mongolia as a member of the United Nations. The ROC consolidated her position in Africa by accepting Mauritanian independence and thereby preventing some African states from breaking off relations in favour of recognising the PRC. Ibid. p.147-48.
votes in the General Assembly became the largest group of votes in the United Nations. The voting power the African continent held was to become crucial to the ROC and the PRC. It would determine which government was to hold the "China seat" in the United Nations.

Aware of this, the ROC’s main policy objective in Africa was to expand its relations with the African states in the United Nations. Its secondary aim was economic. By expanding its relations within the Third World, the ROC could pursue new markets for its exports. These states would also provide Chinese workers with work opportunities outside of their country. The ROC implemented an extensive policy to extend its influence in Africa.

The ROC’s Foreign Aid to Africa.

To strengthen its ties with the continent, the ROC Government established agricultural, economic and cultural exchanges with numerous African states. These began in 1960 with an ROC delegation visiting eleven African countries. Further exchanges ensued between the ROC and African states. These included Liberia, Togo, Dahomey, Malagasy, the Congo and Libya. After visiting Taiwan in August 1961, the Dahomean Minister of Labour and Public Functions said that he was, “vividly struck by what the Chinese in Formosa have accomplished” and believed that, “the African states would be interested in visiting (the ROC), which could serve as an example for them.”

In December 1961, Taipei established the Committee on Chinese-African Technological Co-operation. This body was created to facilitate contact between the ROC and Africa. The initial success of the ROC’s diplomatic efforts was evidenced by it obtaining

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5Ibid. p.399-400.
6Ibid. p.408.
7Ibid. p.407.
8This committee was a combined venture by the ROC ministries of Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Economic Reconstruction and the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction. Ibid. p.407.
preoccupied with regional affairs - its war with Japan, civil war within China and later the Second World War. Africa did not feature in its foreign policy.

Contact between the ROC and South Africa was minimal until after the expulsion of the Kuomintang ROC Government to Taiwan by the communists in 1949. After the division of China, South Africa continued to recognise the ROC Government in Taiwan along with the major Western states. To the exiled ROC Government and the ruling PRC in China, Africa slowly began to assume a greater importance as both governments extended their international relations. The Third World was to provide an international setting for the continuation of the four-decade long struggle between the nationalist and communist forces. The ROC and the PRC would compete against each other in the international arena. This was to be played out in the forum of the United Nations, with the ROC and PRC competing for international recognition at each other's expense.

The ROC's Foreign policy in Africa.

In the 1950's, the ROC-on-Taiwan's major foreign policy objective was to maintain its relationship with the United States and to keep its seat in the United Nations Security Council. With most African territories being colonies of the Western powers, the region was initially regarded as being irrelevant to the ROC's foreign policy. Thus Africa held little importance to ROC foreign policy-making. This was to radically change with the wave of decolonisation which swept the African continent in the early 1960's.

With the ending of colonial rule, newly-independent African states began to form an influential grouping within the United Nations. Their common colonial histories and experiences of imperialism instilled a sense of unity amongst them. The political importance of the Third World grouping of states to the "China question" cannot be overstated. Of the 110 United Nations members in 1963, 33 were African. The African

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3. THE HISTORICAL SOUTH AFRICA-ROC RELATIONSHIP.

Introduction.

The strong relationship that arose between South Africa and the ROC can be explained in terms of both states' previous international isolation. Both South Africa and the ROC were international outcasts, shunned by the rest of the world but for different reasons - South Africa because of its racial apartheid policies and the ROC after its expulsion from the United Nations in the face of opposition from the PRC. Both states derived benefit from their mutual relationship. Thus a sort of "parish bond" arose. The two states came together to satisfy their own common interests.

This chapter examines the rise and development of the South African-ROC relationship and the reasons surrounding this alliance. It will conclude with an appraisal of South Africa's relationship with the ROC.

The ROC's Historical Involvement in South Africa.

Early contact between the ROC and South Africa was minimal. A Chinese consulate general was, however, opened in Johannesburg as early as 1897 while China was still under the Manchu empire and South Africa still a colony of Great Britain. In 1931, the Union of South Africa, independent since 1910, established diplomatic relations with the ROC.1 Relations between the two states, however, could not have been described as close.

The Chinese government had virtually no political interest in South Africa, except perhaps with overseas Chinese in the region.2 The large geographical distance between the two was a major constraint on the development of relations. The ROC was also first and foremost

and subsequent election. This was, however, in line with the PRC’s more pragmatic approach it adopted in its foreign policy after 1978 and especially into the 1980’s emphasising economic interaction and peaceful coexistence. From Beijing’s point of view, its previous support for the liberation movements will only become justified when the present South African Government gives diplomatic recognition to Beijing at the expense of the ROC. The PRC’s current relations with South Africa are therefore in a state of political uncertainty. Whether Beijing will reap the diplomatic benefit of recognition in South Africa from its past support for the liberation movements remains to be decided by the South African Government of National Unity.
United Nations Security Council mandatory arms embargo. However, Pretoria's overtures to the PRC did not materialise. Relations with a communist state were not, at that time, acceptable. South Africa's close alignment with the Republic of China (ROC) also made contact with the PRC very difficult.

The PRC’s historical relationship with the ANC, the major liberation movement, could not be described as close, but rather cordial. The ANC’s strong ties with the SACP and that party’s links to the Soviet Union, prevented a close alliance between the ANC and the PRC developing. Rather, the PRC has been closely associated with the more radical PAC than with the ANC. However, with Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the 1980’s and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, the ANC’s contact with the PRC grew.

The PRC’s interest in Southern Africa and its support for the regional liberation movements must be viewed against the background of:

1. The PRC’s desire to increase its credibility as a supporter of revolutionary movements and their struggles;
2. The intention of Beijing to obtain diplomatic recognition should a liberation movement seize control of the state;
3. The PRC’s desire to secure leadership of the Third World;
4. The PRC’s countering of Soviet influence in the region after the Sino-Soviet split;
5. The politics of Third World States and their relations with communist powers and the Western world;
6. The regional and internal politics of the white-minority states in the Southern African region.

The PRC’s objectives have not been, however, fulfilled in South Africa. Liberation in South Africa came about not through violent revolution but through a negotiated settlement.

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1. Ibid., pp.102-103.
with Africa was characterised by Chinese rhetoric of anti-colonialism and anti-hegemonism. Ideology was the major determinant of Beijing's foreign policy toward Africa at this time.

Ideology, however, masked the PRC's underlying intentions in the Third World - to obtain diplomatic recognition and in so doing, secure international prestige for the PRC. There existed a duality in the PRC's foreign policy. Beijing sponsored liberation movements to compete with the Soviet Union and at the same time established relations with as many states as possible. Within the short period of twenty years from its inception, the PRC was able to build up a strong international body supporting its view of the world. This was evidenced by the PRC's entrance into the United Nations in 1971. Beijing drew much of its support from Africa.

Southern Africa was a mainstay of the PRC's foreign policy in Africa. Being the most important regional player, this policy focused on South Africa. Stemming from its first contact with South Africa in 1950, the PRC supported the liberation movements in their struggle against apartheid. Besides illicit trade with South Africa, Beijing has had no official relations with the South African Government. The reason for this was the ideological differences that existed between the two states. Beijing's attempt to undermine the South African National Party Government by rendering support to the liberation movements made diplomatic relations between the respective governments impossible. Despite this, however, an attempt was made in the late 1970's by the South African Government to foster some kind of limited contact with the PRC. This was made for geopolitical reasons. Certain government figures began to question South Africa's traditional alignment with the West in light of its (particularly America's) failure to support South Africa. This came at a time when South Africa was suffering from its worst state of isolation - after the Angolan war, the Soweto riots, the death of political activist Steve Biko and the 1977

\[127\) Contacts between the PRC ambassadors in The Netherlands and Canada and a South African envoy were arranged. The South African was to be Dr Chris Barnard, the famous South African heart surgeon. The meeting fell through after Prime Minister Vorster, fearing public protest, decided against it. Reported in Geldenhuys, D. The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Macmillan, 1984, pp 115-116.
threat was not a very plausible one. However real or not, South Africa and the ROC could not rely upon Western support in the event of a military invasion by another state.

South Africa and the ROC were prevented from buying weaponry on the international arms market by international embargoes. They therefore felt that they could not depend upon purchases of conventional weaponry for their defence. Both desired a nuclear capability to serve as a guarantor of their security. Thus nuclear weapons were considered as being a sort of "strategic equaliser." Having advanced domestic arms industries of their own, Taipei and Pretoria shared nuclear technology. Accordingly, there have been reports of nuclear co-operation between Taipei and Pretoria. It is no secret that Taipei has purchased large amounts of uranium from South Africa, one of the world's main sources of the material. There has even been speculation that a joint South African-ROC nuclear test took place in September 1979 and again in December 1980 over the southern ocean. This, however, has not been proven.

Conclusion.

The South African-ROC relationship developed during a period of diplomatic isolation for both countries. This relationship grew stronger as their international isolation increased. This can be explained by the pariah bond that existed between them - both states were

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44 In December 1979, Washington had unilaterally cancelled the Mutual Assistance Treaty it had had with the ROC. For this reason, the ROC could no longer rely upon assistance from the United States in the event of a war with the PRC.
45 The Taiwan Relations Act passed by the United States' Congress in April 1979, limited Washington to supplying the ROC with "such defence articles and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability." In 1978, the United Nations had imposed a voluntary embargo on arms sales to South Africa. In 1979, the arms embargo was made complete with the Security Council announcement a mandatory arms ban on South Africa.
47 Such speculation was fuelled by the crashing of a South African Airways "47" the Heilbert in 1987. It has been reported that the accident was caused by explosive materials which were being transported from Taiwan to South Africa for use in South Africa's clandestine nuclear weapon programme.
48 During his 1980 trip to South Africa, ROC Prime Minister Sun Yen-San visited the Pelindaba nuclear facility and concluded a deal to buy a large quantity of uranium. On P.W. Botha's return visit to the ROC in October 1980, he spoke of an exchange of information on military matters. This may have included nuclear weapons technology. Barber, J and Ikeda, J. Op. cit. p. 230.
Taiwanese investors who were intolerant towards labour unions, reflecting conditions in their own country. ROC investors thus benefited from the exploitative labour conditions that were enforced by the homeland governments. By July 1994, there were 435 ROC-owned companies in the former TBVC regions of South Africa. These companies provide employment for between fifty and sixty thousand people.

A feature of ROC investment in South Africa is that it has largely been coupled with immigration. The ROC investors often accompanied their investments with many thousands of immigrants coming to the South African homelands during the 1980s. Pretoria assisted this by readily granting visas to ROC investors in the homelands. It became far easier for an ROC investor to obtain residential status in the homelands than in South Africa proper itself. This restriction, however, was later relaxed. The large numbers of immigrants from the ROC thus reflected, "the positive image South Africa enjoyed as one of the last major countries to accord full recognition to Taipei."

South Africa and the ROC's close relationship was not limited to the economic sphere. Much co-operation in the military field took place.

South African-ROC Military Co-operation.

Military co-operation between Pretoria and Taipei began in 1977 with the exchange of military attaches. This was to mark the beginning of close military co-operation between Pretoria and Taipei. Both the ROC and South Africa perceived their states as facing serious external threats. The ROC faced a very real threat of invasion from the PRC. The threat of an invasion of South Africa, however, was not so apparent. In its own eyes, Pretoria feared a united "black" army descending upon it from the north. This perceived

51 Ibid., p. 320-321.
52 Ibid., p. 327.
ROC Investment in the Homelands.

ROC investment in the homelands was of great importance to these areas. After an earlier visit to Taiwan in 1984, President Lennox Sebe of Ciskei stated that, "a large proportion of present investment (in Ciskei) is from abroad and it is vital that this trend be maintained." Most of the investment coming from the ROC was of low technology as well as being labour-intensive. This provided for a mutually beneficial relationship between ROC companies and the respective homeland government. The investing companies benefited from surplus labour and low labour costs. This was significant for the homeland government for which job creation schemes were of great importance. This investment was in accordance with South Africa's homeland industrialisation policy. To encourage and "direct" this investment, Pretoria, through the homeland governments, offered lucrative investment incentives. These incentives were as follows: subsidies of up to 70 per cent of the interest on the cost of land and buildings, plant, equipment and other assets over a period of ten years; relocation allowances; rebates on transport costs; a price reference of up to 10 percent on government tenders; subsidies providing for the cost of training workers; and rebates on wage bills. These were described by one ROC investor as being, "the best incentives in the world." The incentives were successful in attracting ROC investment to the homelands to the extent that Ciskei was once referred to as, "Taiwan within (South Africa's) borders." Investors also benefited from the homelands' opposition to trade union activity within their borders. The homeland governments regarded trade unions as deterrents to investment as well as being political threats. For this reason, union activity was stifled. This placated

"The ROC's rising labour costs were causing it to lose its competitive edge against regional economic rivals such as Thailand and Malaysia. The increase in the value of its currency, the Taiwanese dollar, relative to the currencies of other states, was also affecting competitiveness. For this reason, many ROC companies sought to invest offshore in search of lower labour costs. See Pickles, J and Woods, J, 'p cit p 514.
1 Ibid p 515.
2 Ibid p 517.
4 Ibid p 523.
In an attempt to soften the blow of international sanctions, Pretoria offered attractive incentives to ROC companies investing in South Africa. This policy was designed to replace lost capital which had left the country through disinvestment. South Africa’s financial position was in a state of crisis in August 1985 when Western banks refused to extend further loans. The value of the Rand currency fell and the South African Government was forced to suspend debt repayments. South Africa was in a desperate financial position. Having some of the highest foreign exchange reserves in the world, Pretoria looked to the ROC for financial help. Sources tell of Taipei refusing assistance which led to much resentment in Pretoria. This has been denied by the ROC.

The geopolitics of the ROC’s investment in South Africa differed from Western investment already in South Africa. ROC investment focused mainly in the rural “homeland” areas. This was in line with Pretoria’s industrial decentralisation policy. To legitimise its homeland system of separate geographical areas for different ethnic groups, Pretoria had to make such areas appear economically viable. It attempted this by offering lucrative investment schemes to foreign investors to lure them to these regions. Accordingly, most of the ROC’s investment in South Africa was in the “independent” homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. By acknowledging their political existence and investing in the homelands, the ROC was extending to them a form of political recognition which the rest of the world would not. The ROC was thus giving tacit support to South Africa’s racial policies. Such a policy will certainly cause certain members of the new South African Government of National Unity to look unfavourably upon the ROC.

"Ibid. p 514.
the ability to provide many of your requirements for machinery and scientific equipment." Unlike most countries, who did not want too close an association with South Africa for fear of international criticism, the ROC was willing to extend its relationship with South Africa. In 1988, the ROC's economic counsellor in South Africa, C.C. Kau, stated that the ROC was "not satisfied with present levels (of trade)." Taipei had no qualms in defying international sanctions in its economic dealings with South Africa.

Bilateral trade between South Africa and the ROC has grown at a fast pace. In 1979, annual trade amounted to some US$300 million. Today this figure stands at R5.35 billion. The ROC now ranks as South Africa's seventh most important trading partner. South Africa, however, only accounts for 1.8 percent of the ROC's total trade figure.

To facilitate this trade between the two, South Africa and the ROC have established banking concerns in each other's countries. In 1989, Standard Bank of South Africa set up a branch in Taipei "out of concern over trade volume." The bank, concentrating primarily on business investments, has become the ROC's largest offshore banking unit. In April 1992, the bank of Taiwan (the ROC's largest bank) opened a branch in Johannesburg to, "acquire international experience and to serve Taiwanese investors in South Africa." The bank has experienced over 30 percent growth each year since its establishment and ranks twenty-fifth amongst South Africa's fifty banks.

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60 Ibid. p.902a.
61 A Commonwealth report in 1987 revealed that the ROC had substantially increased its trade with South Africa. Barber, J. and Barrett, J. Op cit. p.337.
63 Information supplied by the ROC's embassy, Pretoria.
65 Ibid. p.7.
67 The bank has more than 250 accounts, of which 90 percent are Chinese. Its share capital amounts to some R50 million. Some T. Lessons From Taiwan for South Africa, HSR Publishers, Pretoria: 1994, p.114.
technology into its economy which international sanctions were depriving it of. In turn, being a trading economy, the ROC was searching for new markets. Facilitating this economic relationship was the complementary nature of the two countries’ economies.

The Trade Relationship.

South Africa’s trade with the East Asian NIC’s, and the ROC in particular, grew at a rapid rate from the late 1970’s. This reflected South Africa’s growing estrangement from the Western economies. Facing economic sanctions and boycotts, South Africa’s relationship with the Far Eastern countries assumed a greater importance, both economically and politically. Economic contact was encouraged by the complementary nature of the South African and East Asian economies - South Africa being a source of agricultural and raw material products while serving as a market for manufactured goods from East Asia.

In 1975, South Africa and the ROC granted each other most-favoured-nation trading benefits. This helped trade to grow at an annual average of 47.5 percent between 1975 and 1978 between the two countries. In November 1979 Pretoria and Taipei signed an “extended agreement” to explore fields of cooperation other than trade between their two countries. This included, amongst other things, atomic energy.

The ROC has been described as a “natural trade partner for South Africa” because Taiwan needs raw materials while we must provide them with a market for select raw materials. South Africa is a source of raw materials and agricultural products for the ROC while in turn serving as a market for manufactured goods from the ROC.

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Shih. In March of the following year, ROC Prime Minister Sun Yun-Suan also visited South Africa. This visit was of great importance to both governments. Major trade and technical deals were announced including a large 4000-ton uranium sale to the ROC.40

In October 1980, P.W Botha visited Taiwan (he visited again in 1986). This was his first foreign visit since becoming prime minister. It was symbolic as it reflected the importance with which Pretoria regarded its relationship with the ROC.21 ROC Vice-President Lee Teng-Hui (the current president) made a return visit to South Africa in 1984. P.W Botha stated that South Africa and the ROC had, "agreed that they were bastions against communism in two key world areas, the Far East and the Cape of Good Hope."22 This sentiment was echoed by the former ROC ambassador in South Africa, H.K. Yang: "Africa and my country are joined in the fight against communism. We are in favour of free enterprise, democracy and freedom."

Both states felt that they had been "let down" by the West which had disregarded their strategic value in the global struggle against the spread of communism. However sympathetic to the pariah states, the West could not, at the same time, afford to oppose the 'Third World which was mostly opposed to political contact with South Africa and the ROC. South Africa and the ROC were isolated from both the Western and Eastern blocs.

Throughout the 1980's, relations between Pretoria and Taipei grew. This was largely due to increased economic contact between the two. South Africa needed to attract capital and

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40The "extended agreement" was signed by the Minister of Industries, Trade and Consumer Affairs, Schalk van der Merwe, and Chang Kwan-Shuh. Chang described both the ROC and South Africa as being at similar stages of development and as such, had to depend on a large extent on developed, First World states. He called for greater effort so as to develop their own economies. "This is the underlying reason for our wanting closer co-operation and permanent relations with South Africa", said Mr Cheng. "Links with Taiwan" in South African Digest, November 23 1979, p.6

21This visit was revealed after (former) Minister of Energy Affairs, P.W De Klerk, had visited Taipei in January 1981. The stated purpose of his visit was to discuss "the significance of the development of energy resources in future relations between the two countries" in "De Klerk in Taiwan" in South African Digest, January 9 1981, p.6.

22The visit resulted in the establishment of a South African trade representative office in Taipei as well as reciprocal commercial air and shipping links between the two countries.

23Barclay, G. St J. Op cit. p.8
Consolidating the Relationship.

The United States’ derecognition of the ROC in December 1978 was to impact upon the South African-ROC relationship. In a Government White Paper, Pretoria strongly criticised Washington’s rejection of a long-time ally: “The United States’ termination of its defence treaty with Taiwan in favour of normalisation of relations with Peking is the latest manifestation of attempts to rearrange the international balance of power.” Pretoria regarded Washington’s initiative as a “capitulation” to Third World pressure in support of the PRC at the expense of the ROC. According to Pretoria, Washington was trying to, “ingratiate itself with the Third World, while the Marxist threat (was) being under-estimated.” South Africa was disturbed by the West’s growing alienation of itself and other like countries which, from Pretoria’s perspective, were “bastions” against the spread of communism.

South African Prime Minister, P W Botha, described South Africa and the ROC as being, “the victims of political expedience by countries that should know better.” This obvious reference to the United States reflected the pariahs’ growing frustration with the West. Being virulently anti-Communist and facing increasing alienation from the West, South Africa and the ROC sought closer ties with each other. This was not so much as to overcome international isolation, but rather to find relief within it.

South Africa and the ROC subsequently signed an agreement to explore fields of cooperation between their two countries in November 1979. This followed a visit to South Africa by an ROC delegation led by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Chang Kwang-

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4 The United States government under President Carter published a Joint Communiqué on 15 December 1978, authorising full diplomatic recognition and the establishment of full relations with the PRC as of January 1 1979. Taipei was given seven hours notice of Washington’s intention to sever diplomatic relations and end the Mutual Assistance Treaty. Barclay, C. St J. Op cit. p.6.


6 Ibid p.7.

sympathy and practical necessity’. South Africa and the ROC came together to oppose their common enemy, the PRC.11

In March 1976, ROC Government official Yang Hsi-K’un visited South Africa and met with South African President Daniel and Prime Minister Vorster.12 On April 26, Taipei and Pretoria announced that diplomatic relations between their two countries would be raised to ambassadorial level. The upgrading of diplomatic relations is reported to have improved the position of the 8 000-strong overseas Chinese community in South Africa who were discriminated against under apartheid.13

The reasons behind the establishment of relations between the two countries were clearly elaborated upon in the South African Parliament by National Party Member for Pretoria East, J.J. Lloyd: “Taiwan is one of the strongest and most active communist bastions in the Free World. Both South Africa and Taiwan are to a certain extent experiencing problems with the organised international community.”14

Pretoria’s concern over Beijing’s influence in the Southern African region was also a factor leading to it upgrading its relations with the ROC. The threat posed by the PRC in the region was affirmed by the Chief of the South African Army in April 1974 when he stated that “The terrorist threat to the country’s borders is increasingly related to Chinese activities in some Black African states.” This fear, however real or not, resulted in Pretoria strengthening its ties with the ROC’s rival, the ROC. South Africa and the ROC thus developed a relationship based upon their common circumstances. The relationship has since developed into a mutually beneficial one, based upon complementarity. For South Africa, the gains are economic, whereas for the ROC, they are mostly political.

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11 Ibid p 360
12 Ibid p 361
13 Ibid p 364
limited. Both shared many commonalities - nationalist governments, their strong anti-Communist stance, and colonialist histories, as well their growing political isolation. Therefore the two states shared a number of common characteristics which contributed to the development of a relationship between them.

On April 26 1976, Pretoria and Taipei established full diplomatic relations. It should be noted that this occurred just two short weeks after the 1976 Soweto uprisings in South Africa, at the height of South Africa's isolation.39 The apartheid government was seeking relief from the international barrage of condemnation it was enduring.

The South Africa-ROC Relationship.

Before the mid-seventies, Pretoria had deliberately kept the ROC at political arms length so as to avoid provoking Beijing. It was feared that the PRC may have increased its support for the liberation movements, notably the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) which had close ties with Beijing.40 Conversely, the ROC could not afford to display friendship toward the apartheid white minority regime in Pretoria as this would destroy any hope that the ROC had of winning and retaining influence in black Africa.

However, the ROC's expulsion from the United Nations in 1971 led to both states re-evaluating their earlier policies. Abandoned by most of its black African allies, Taipei had been successfully isolated by the PRC in Africa. The ROC began to review its relations with Africa. South Africa, being a medium-size power, was an important political ally for Taipei. Having negligible political relations in black Africa and therefore not fearing diplomatic reprisals, the ROC sought to increase its contact with South Africa. Pretoria, feeling intensified pressure from the Communist powers and realising the impossibility of appeasing Beijing, decided to upgrade its relations with the ROC. Therefore out of "mutual

39 South, Cape Town, 7 August 1993.
The most notable pariah states were South Africa and the ROC, being the most politically isolated states in the world. South Africa was a complete pariah, being both politically and economically isolated. The ROC was a "partial pariah", excluded politically but participating freely in the global economic sphere. However, the reasons for their respective isolation, be it either complete or partial, were quite different.

South Africa’s racial apartheid policy was regarded as morally reprehensible and unacceptable to the international community and South Africa became increasingly isolated and was forced out of many international organisations. It was expelled from the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. Punitive sanctions were imposed upon South Africa in an attempt to force domestic political change. The South African Government enjoyed no political legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.\(^{15}\) South Africa's racial apartheid policy was regarded as morally reprehensible and unacceptable to the international community and South Africa became increasingly isolated and was forced out of many international organisations. It was expelled from the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. Punitive sanctions were imposed upon South Africa in an attempt to force domestic political change. The South African Government enjoyed no political legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.\(^{15}\)

The ROC’s isolation stems from its ouster from the United Nations in 1971 and its adversarial relationship with the PRC. Beijing succeeded in isolating the ROC which much of the Third World regarded as a "satrapy of the United States," and as being, "ideologically unacceptable to much of the world."\(^{16}\) As a trading nation, it was imperative for the ROC to avoid international isolation for its own economic survival.\(^{17}\) Both South Africa and the ROC thus found themselves politically isolated and shunned by the international community as a whole.

The states that still retained formal relations with South Africa were mostly in Western Europe. The ROC’s relations were limited to conservative regimes in Africa and Asia. Both, however, had important ties in Latin America.\(^{18}\) Their political relations were thus

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\(^{17}\) Discourse between writer and Yao-Tsung Chia of the ROC Cultural Office in Pretoria.

\(^{18}\) Harkavy, R.E. Em. cit. p.639.
Despite this, a relationship existed between South Africa and the ROC. Their respective relations with each other did not serve to overcome their isolation; indeed, having relations with one another could have further increased their isolation as having relations with such a state was a "political liability." Rather, by establishing relations with each other, both South Africa and the ROC sought relief within their isolation.

Harkavy points out that one should not therefore overstate the importance of such a pariah relationship. Close li. with a pariah state constituted an "international liability" for any state. By having formal relations with South Africa, the ROC was jeopardising its relations, however few, with other African states which were strongly opposed to South Africa's white minority government. This, however, is exactly what happened. Pretoria and Taipei formed a political relationship in defiance of the consequences it may have had on their respective international relations. Such was the extent of their isolation.

Although it was difficult to formulate a single definition of a pariah state, there did exist common characteristics. South Africa and the ROC unenviably shared these characteristics:

1. being a pariah, the state was ostracised by the international community as a whole;
2. the pariah regarded itself as being a "victim" of an international conspiracy against it;
3. they were both strongly anti-Communist;
4. each saw itself as being of great strategic value. This was to attract international interest to its plight; and
5. pariahs committed themselves (in rhetoric at least) to a market-orientated economy.

31 Ibid. p.644-645.
32 Vafa, P. "Taiwan's Expanding Role..." Cp cit. p.4-5.

Chiu, II. "Recent Chinese Communist Policy Toward Taiwan and the Prospect for Unification" in Issues & Studies, Vol.27, No.1, January 1991.

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The PRC’s legitimacy rests upon its size and potential economic power. These forms of legitimacy have been successful in acquiring diplomatic recognition in the past. However, the changing nature of the international system is impacting upon the international relations of the two Chinas and influencing their quests for legitimacy. The ROC’s claim to legitimacy is based upon its economic power and its status as a democratic state. Both will assist it in expanding its relations, both informal and formal, throughout the world. The PRC’s authoritarian position is increasingly putting it at odds with the international community as a whole. This is in stark contrast to the ROC’s image as a democratic and co-operative international actor. South Africa will serve as a test case of how far the ROC has been able to integrate itself into the international community. Exclusive diplomatic recognition by South Africa will underwrite the ROC’s international political emergence.

Footnote:
for the ROC and served as recognition of the ROC's growing international status. The
international community will come to recognise the fact that the ROC-on-Taiwan has
operated as a de facto state for the last four-and-a-half decades. Today it should be
recognised that two Chinese states do exist. One is the PRC and the other the ROC, each
with different political, economic and social systems. They share a common language and
culture but the dream of a reunited China seems more distant than ever. The reality of the
"one China" having two governments will become more widely accepted and pressure will
grow on Beijing to accommodate this reality rather than continue to relegate Taiwan to
provincial status under the sovereignty of the PRC. International pressure placed on Beijing
will push the PRC towards a policy of peaceful coexistence with the ROC. This will result
in international political gains for the ROC.

South Africa's foreign policy should reflect this changing nature of the ROC's international
standing. The question of diplomatic recognition of the ROC and PRC has presented
Pretoria with the task of leading an international political re-evaluation of the ROC. Being
an important actor in the undeveloped world, South Africa is well-positioned to promote
the ROC internationally. President Mandela himself has stated that, "We have no intention
of cancelling diplomatic relations with the ROC." South Africa need not fear reprisals
from the PRC. A factor acting in South Africa's favour is its geographical distance from
the PRC. South Africa is not a neighbour of the PRC as South Korea is. South Korea
recognised Beijing out of strategic and political necessity. This distance gives South Africa
the luxury of a degree of flexibility in its approach towards the PRC. South Africa should
not, however, alienate Beijing by refusing recognition and making a political enemy of the
PRC. Rather, Pretoria should offer diplomatic relations to Beijing but reiterate that such
relations will not be at the expense of the ROC. This is not dual recognition, merely an
invitation towards it. Such an approach would place the political ball in Beijing's court.
This would be South Africa's best option, as well as being an equitable one.

\[\text{Mandela reaffirms ties with Taiwan} \] in The Star, 25 April 1995
power is translating into political influence. Its substantive foreign relations have improved dramatically and resulted in a number of high-profile political visits to the ROC from the United States and Europe. This is largely attributable to the ROC's ability to expand its economic power through offshore investment, international trade, and its own domestic market's attractiveness to foreign investors.\textsuperscript{18} South Africa's national interest should be dictated by immediate economic concerns. The ROC is willing and able to provide South Africa with large amounts of investment much of which will assist the RDP.

The changing international political environment is favouring not only the economic but also the political reintegration of the ROC into the global system. In the past, diplomatic alignment into political and military blocs constrained the development of relations of states outside of such blocs. The ROC was such a country. Today, however, global trade and transnational issues greatly influence diplomatic decision-making.\textsuperscript{19} Since the end of the Cold War, the ROC has succeeded in adapting its foreign policy to these rapidly changing international conditions. Pragmatic diplomacy has increased its substantive relations in the international community. These relations serve as a safeguard against Beijing's continued attempts at isolating the ROC. Without its substantive relations, the ROC would be too exposed to pressure from the PRC. Nevertheless, the ROC's international prospects depend largely upon the ROC's ability to integrate itself into the international community. Economic interdependence will afford greater political independence.\textsuperscript{10} This process of international re-acceptance is in its early stages, but is most definite. The decline of communism, the global spread of democracy, and the primacy of economic issues in the international system are all contributing to the ROC's international political emergence. The ROC has thus managed to achieve a "degree of autonomous legitimacy" in the international community.\textsuperscript{21}

This is reflected in the United States' political overtures to the ROC. The invitation of President Lee to the United States, albeit on a "private" visit, was a major political success

\textsuperscript{18} "Pragmatic Diplomacy" in Free China Review, July 1985, p.55.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p.55.
\textsuperscript{21} Moller, K. Op.cit. p.82.
shape of our bilateral relations." Admittedly, by criticising Beijing, Pretoria will not be able to influence the PRC’s domestic policies. But in foreign affairs, the PRC may well be prompted to change and allow more political freedom. Such pressure can be exerted by South Africa not automatically according the PRC diplomatic recognition. This does not mean, however, that South Africa should cease all contact with the PRC. South Africa should have economic contact with the PRC. Although this would serve South Africa’s self-interest, it should not be regarded as a “sacrifice of principle to economic and political expediency”, but rather a pragmatic and realistic option. All states engage in economic activity with the PRC. South Africa should be no different. To bring political pressure upon the PRC, political tools should be used. The withholding of diplomatic recognition is such a political tool. This should be regarded as a South Africa-based policy of “constructive engagement” vis-à-vis the two Chinas.

Recognition of the ROC.

With the end of the Cold War, the relations of most developing countries (especially in Africa) are no longer dependent on ideological considerations. With the rise of geo-economics, the main criterion for such states to maintain diplomatic relations with either Beijing or Taipei has become economic gain. At present, Beijing cannot compete with the ROC as a provider of international aid. The ROC’s wealth has enabled it to expand its international relations. South Africa has benefited economically from its relationship with the ROC and will continue to. South Africa is a highly valued political ally to the ROC. Taipei will be willing to continue its economic support for South Africa as long as the latter retains its diplomatic relations with the ROC. For both parties, self-interest dictates their foreign policies — political gains for the ROC and economic gains for South Africa.

The ROC’s relations, both formal and informal have thus been more the result of “economic attraction than political affinity.” Notwithstanding, the ROC’s financial

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14 Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa, ANC, Johannesburg, December 1994, p.7.
17 Ibid, p.85.


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