SPATIAL FUTURES: ASPIRATIONS AND ACTIONS REGARDING FORM AND SPATIAL CHANGE IN JOHANNESBURG

A report for Group Strategy, Policy Coordination and Relations, City of Johannesburg

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Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 3

2. MANAGING URBAN SPATIAL FORM: COMPACT CITY DEBATES, SUSTAINABILITY AND MOBILITY... 6
   2.1 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES........................................................................................................ 6
   2.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND JOHANNESBURG DEBATE AND EXPERIENCE............................................. 10

3. SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND SPATIAL JUSTICE ...................................................................................... 16
   3.1 PRIVATISED AND SPLINTERING URBANISM ................................................................................... 16
   3.2 GATED COMMUNITIES ...................................................................................................................... 19
   3.3 SAFETY AND SECURITY AS A DRIVER OF SPATIAL CHANGE .......................................................... 24
   3.4 GENTRIFICATION IN THE INNER CITY ............................................................................................ 27
   3.5 RIGHT TO THE CITY AND SPATIAL JUSTICE .................................................................................. 33
   3.6 RACIAL SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION ............................................................................. 36
   3.7 GENDER AND INCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 38
   3.8 MIGRANT SPACES ............................................................................................................................ 39
   3.9 POLICIES ON SOCIO-SPATIAL INTEGRATION .............................................................................. 41

4 PROCESSES OF SPATIAL CHANGE IN POOR NEIGHBOURHOODS ..................................................... 44
   4.1 INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS AND BACKYARD SHACKS ................................................................... 44
   4.2 INFORMALITY AND INFORMAL ECONOMIC PRACTICES ............................................................... 45
   4.3 BOTTOM-UP FORMS OF NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE ................................................................... 48

5 SPACE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................... 49

6 CITY-REGION MULTI-SCALAR GOVERNANCE ................................................................................... 53

7 THE 2011 GDS AND DRAFT SDF ....................................................................................................... 56
   Sustainability, Liveability and Urban Compaction/Restructuring ............................................................ 56
   Social Inclusion and the Right to the City ............................................................................................... 56
   Challenging Predominant Spatial Patterns ............................................................................................. 57
   Urban Safety ........................................................................................................................................... 58
   Densification ............................................................................................................................................ 58
   Public Transport and Spatial Access ...................................................................................................... 58
   Spatial Focus and Neglected Areas ......................................................................................................... 59
   Demographic Projections ....................................................................................................................... 59
   Accommodating the Urban Poor ............................................................................................................. 59
   Addressing Bottom-Up Processes of Change ......................................................................................... 59
   Policy and Institutional Integration ........................................................................................................ 60
   Public Space ............................................................................................................................................ 61
   Displacement and Gentrification ............................................................................................................. 61
   Gender ..................................................................................................................................................... 61
   Migrants .................................................................................................................................................. 61
   Space and Economic Development ....................................................................................................... 62
1. Introduction

Addressing the racially divided, sprawling and socially inequitable spatial form of South African cities has been key to strategic spatial planning and urban spatial frameworks in South African cities, including in Johannesburg. These ideas were included in the Johannesburg 2006 Growth and Development Strategy (GDS), and in the 2011 GDS, which focused more strongly on resilience, but making strong links to spatial form. They have also been a consistent element of various rounds of Johannesburg Spatial Development Frameworks (SDFs). However, despite several of these concerns being embodied in national urban and city policies, objectives to restructure cities spatially have proven to be very difficult to achieve, and there is a growing frustration and questioning of whether some of these objectives are still appropriate. At the same time, the urban restructuring agenda, and the areas that spatial policy addresses have been constrained in practice, and there are several gaps and silences in the issues that are addressed.

This paper provides a discussion of the choices, tensions, and trade-offs facing spatial policy in Johannesburg. It considers whether the policy objectives expressed in existing spatial policies (including the Johannesburg GDS and SDF) are still relevant, and address key spatial dynamics and issues. It does this by exploring several key areas of debate around the spatial form of cities and spatial policy internationally, examining how they manifest in Johannesburg, and highlighting these choices, tensions and trade-offs. It recognises, as a starting point, that while urban spatial policies have some power to shape spatial change, spatial trends and dynamics occur in a complex environment, where there are many drivers and shapers of spatial change.

As emphasised in the position paper on ‘Strategic Planning in a Turbulent and Uncertain Context’, spatial policies that hope to influence spatial change need to understand the (shifting) key trends and drivers that affect space, including demographic, economic and social patterns that influence the demand for space. There are many examples of spatial plans which missed key trends, vastly over- or under-estimated population growth, and consequently planned for spatial forms which proved to be inappropriate. The spatial form of cities is also shaped by markets of various forms. Planning may attempt to engage with and regulate or direct these markets in the interests of its social and spatial goals and objectives, but it does not have completely free reign. Further, there are frequently disjunctures between strategic spatial planning and implementation, reflecting limits in terms of capacity, political will, institutional cooperation/integration and other factors.
Finally, city spatial policies do not occur in isolation, nor do spatial policies necessarily have the power desired by planners. Spatial change and spatial form is critically affected by infrastructural investments, particularly in relation to transport (roads, transit systems), which are frequently follow a different planning process and logic (UN-Habitat, 2009). Likewise, differences between spheres of government and sectoral departments with power to invest in the built environment are also key to the disjunctures between spatial plans and outcomes. The emphasis on housing delivery on scale, along with cheaper land on the periphery, has undermined spatial policies towards urban compaction both internationally (Buckley et al., 2016) and in South Africa (Charlton, 2014). The recent international emphasis on ‘mega-projects’ is often driven by the private sector (such as major gated estates), but also by parts of the public sector (for example eThekwini’s airport). It is also influencing spatial change, bypassing spatial plans or forcing their adaptation (Shatkin, 2008; Robbins et al, 2015; Todes, 2014).

This paper explores several key points of focus and debate affecting the spatial futures of cities, particularly in relation to Johannesburg. It draws out the key choices, tensions and trade-offs in these areas, and their implications for future spatial planning in Johannesburg. These include:

- The debate over the creation of a more compact urban form, versus expanding and sprawling cities, including the discussion of new cities and satellite cities. Sustainability and resilience as key discourses and their implications for urban spatial form, and the role of transport and mobility will be considered in this context. Understandings of densification, how it is encouraged and managed will also be discussed.

- Trends towards social exclusion versus arguments for spatial justice and the right to the city. This discussion considers trends towards privatised and splintered urbanism, gated communities, gentrification, and safety and security as a driver. It also discusses other dimensions of exclusion/inclusion—race, gender and the question of migrant spaces, and policies on socio-spatial integration.

- Processes of spatial change in poor neighbourhoods, and initiatives to improve conditions there, including upgrading informal settlements, the growth of informal trade, addressing backyard housing.

- Relationships between space and economic development, including the dynamics of growth and decline across the city, debates over promoting development on the periphery versus existing areas of agglomeration, and initiatives to promote economic development in townships.
• City-region and multi-scalar governance, including the extent to which metropolitan governance addresses competing tensions and interests across the city, cross-border issues, and disjunctures and tensions between spheres of government.
South African urban policy, and policies embodied in the 2006 and 2011 GDSs and successive SDFs have all embraced the idea of restructuring towards more compact urban forms. There is however a recent challenge to this position in the idea of mega-projects, put forward by the national Department of Human Settlements and the Gauteng Provincial Government’s ‘new cities’ (Turok, 2016; GPG, 2015). These positions to some degree reflect broader international debates between advocates of compact urban development, and those critiquing this approach, arguing instead for acceptance of growth on the urban edge or for the creation of new satellite cities well beyond the edge. This section outlines these debates, linking them to ideas around sustainable and resilient spatial forms, and to questions of mobility, and then considers the debate in the South African and Johannesburg context.

2.1 International Perspectives

Arguments for compact urban forms have been endorsed by a range of international agencies such as the UN-Habitat (e.g. see UN-Habitat, 2009 & 2013), the United Nations Environment Programme in its Green Economy Report (UNEP, 2011), the World Bank (2010) and the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (2010), both of which link the need for urban compaction to a climate change agenda. Hence advocacy of urban compaction has been strongly connected to ideas about sustainability. Urban resilience advocates have also argued for compact cities, although they might pay greater attention to green infrastructures and spaces within cities (Harrison et al., 2014).

Urban compaction usually implies the promotion of medium to high built and/or population densities enabling efficient public transport and the thresholds to support good access to economic activities, services and facilities. It can take a number of forms from infill and brownfields development to densification of existing areas, which can occur across the city, or in relation to central areas, nodes and major public transport routes. Policies to promote compaction may include and be linked to urban containment, transit oriented development, and smart growth policies.

Compact city advocates argue that these cities are more sustainable, inclusive and efficient. They are seen as key to sustainability since they enable better use of public infrastructure, lower the costs of providing infrastructure, improve access to services, and reduce the energy demand for transport by
enabling better provision and use of public transport, allowing a shift away from reliance on the private cars. Travel costs and times are also lower, enabling easier access to employment and other livelihoods. Compact cities enable the preservation of farmlands and environmental resources since their footprint is smaller. In consequence, they can be seen as having fewer harmful environmental impacts (UN-Habitat, 2009; 2013; Boyko and Cooper, 2011). These dimensions also make compact cities more resilient as they are less dependent on particular forms of transport and energy, and are able to adapt to changing conditions (Harrison et al., 2014).

Critics challenge several of these claimed benefits, arguing that higher density is associated with congestion, pollution and crime, and puts pressure on natural resources (Chen et al., 2008; Boyko and Cooper, 2011). There are fears that compaction will lead to ‘town cramming’, redeveloping open spaces for urban development, so undermining natural systems in cities. Further, critics argue that compaction policies that restrict land supply (such as urban edges, green belts) push up the cost of land and housing, so reducing access to cities and affordability (Bertaud, 2015). Indeed Bertaud (2015) argues that instead of attempting to regulate and control the spatial form of cities or to restrict their growth, planners should rather attempt to understand and work with land markets, which closely follow traditional economic models, with densities reflecting land-cost gradients. Angel (2011) presents evidence to show that the dominant international trends have been towards urban expansion or sprawl over the last century, with only 16 out of 100 major world cities densifying over the 1990-2000 period. This expansion is seen as a consequence of rising incomes, declining transport costs relative to incomes, and improved transport technology. The trends also reflect residents’ desires for more space; hence compaction is not necessarily politically feasible or supported (Breheny, 1996). Likewise, critics argue that cities are becoming multi-nodal, polycentric spaces, operating over broader city-regions, beyond narrow conceptions of traditional compact cities (Keil, 2013).

Advocates of urban expansion argue that it is easier and quicker to develop on undeveloped land beyond the urban edge since land costs are lower, there are fewer complexities in terms of competing interests and objections, and it is easier to structure growth in rational ways (Turok, 2016). Critics of compaction suggest two models of urban expansion. One model, associated with Angel (2008; 2011) advocates for the growth of cities along a grid of roads moving out of the city, similar to the way New York developed historically, the ‘making room’ approach. A second approach advocates the establishment of ‘new cities’, beyond the urban edge, which can take the form of satellite cities.
The idea of satellite cities is not entirely new: the new town movement of the post-World War Two era included the development of urban satellites beyond urban greenbelts or on the periphery of cities in a number of countries. While many of these new towns were developed by the state and linked to attempts to create socially mixed towns offering a range of services and often employment, more recent ‘new cities’ have more often been developed by the private sector, especially in Asian countries (Percival, 2012; Firman, 2009; Shatkin, 2008), and are often aimed at the middle and upper classes, providing an escape from congested central cities, declining infrastructure and weak governance. These developments are often developed outside of spatial plans and might be seen as a form of ‘splintering urbanism’ (see section 3.1). Watson (2013) points to the growing number of proposals for forms of ‘new cities’ in African contexts, but many of these remain no more than ‘fantasy’ cities. There are also many instances where ‘new cities’ are in effect large housing areas with limited or no employment and a reliance on lengthy commuting, such as in Kilamba outside of Luanda (Buirre, 2014). Buckley et al. (2016) note that an increasing number of countries are developing large housing schemes on the urban edge, reliant on extensive commuting.

What is the evidence for and against these claims and approaches? There is a very large literature debating these issues (see Holman et al, 2015; Boyko and Cooper, 2011; Churchman, 1999; Jenks and Burgess, 2000; UN-Habitat, 2009; Harrison and Todes, 2016 for recent reviews). The contextuality of findings is emphasized in the recent literature, as is the importance of context and institutions to how particular policies play out. Even the cost efficiency of providing infrastructure and services—often assumed to be an advantage of compaction approaches—varies in terms of types of infrastructure, topography and geotechnical conditions, and on the basis of available capacity and service thresholds (Biermann, 2000).

Nevertheless, some generic points seem to emerge from this literature. Perhaps the strongest relationship is between higher densities and public transport usage: compaction does seem to support greater public transport usage, and it enables a shift away from a reliance on the motor car (Holman et al, 2015; Boyko and Cooper, 2011; Dave, 2010; UN-Habitat, 2009; 2013; Newman and Kenworthy, 2000). UN-Habitat’s (2013) review of sustainable mobility shows that there is a clear relationship between density and public transport usage across 38 studies. Indeed it argues that spatial form and compact cities are key to sustainable transit. Still, density only provides the conditions for greater use of public transport—it does not guarantee it (UN-Habitat, 2009). Some cities combine high densities with poor public transport and a reliance on paratransit such as minibus taxis, increasing levels of congestion. And
rising car use linked to income increases is also evident in high density cities with good public transport, such as Hong Kong, and Tokyo, reflecting other aspirations. Even if Transit Oriented Development (TOD) systems are put in place to encourage a shift to higher density, cities built on low density lines might find it difficult to change—spatial structures are set in place, and are difficult to change over the short term, and require well-coordinated and consistent policy and implementation over the long term (UN-Habitat, 2009). Further, it is not only density that is important, as the particular ways in which TOD is implemented, the walkability of areas, their safety, and the presence of mixed uses also affects usage (UN-Habitat, 2013).

Most studies are focused on developed countries, reflecting conditions in those countries. Some question the relevance of urban compaction in developing countries where densities are high, largely as a result of informal processes (Richardson et al., 2000). However literature on developing countries does point to the benefits of urban densification for the poor in the centre: although housing costs are high and they have less space, they have greater livelihood opportunities and can rely to a greater extent on non-motorised transport. Dave’s (2010) work on Mumbai shows that higher densities had positive impacts on access to facilities and amenities, but density does affect cost and hence the amount of living space. Negative impacts were mainly perceptual, but could be addressed through detailed design and management.

The recent literature on compaction and densities highlights the complexity of relationships and the need to consider policy in a rounded way, both in practice and in relation to decisions in particular areas. The reality is that densification can have both positive and negative elements, there are trade-offs that need to be made in particular contexts. Complex judgements must be made, requiring high levels of capacity. Holman et al. (2015) upon examining the application of density policy in London argue that policies are often applied in an unclear and inconsistent way. Relying on numbers alone is also insufficient. Rather perceptual and qualitative issues can be key, but are rarely taken into account (see Churchman, 1999; Boyko and Cooper, 2011). And while increasing density might provide the basis for supporting improved services and infrastructure, it cannot guarantee it. Instead, densification can put pressure on infrastructure and services. Hence while increasing density associated with compaction policies can lead to benefits, it also requires careful management and coordination to maximize benefits and limit problems (Holman et al., 2015; Boyko and Cooper, 2011).

In growing cities, it is likely that levels of urban expansion will be required, at least to avoid dramatically rising land prices. However, the form of urban expansion is important. While forms of satellite city
development may be inevitable in some contexts, such as the very large, rapidly growing cities in Asia, they are not necessarily appropriate in others. Indeed the literature on satellite cities shows a very mixed record, with many potential pitfalls (see Harrison and Todes, 2016 for a review). New cities are expensive to build and maintain, and require strong institutions to achieve coordinated development, which is not always achieved. They are vulnerable to inadequately projected or shifting demographics and economies, such as occurred in the towns planned around Paris in the 1960s which never achieved the projected population. While there are some successes, many programmes fail to attract the targeted population or to bring in the range of services and facilities which were planned. Some continue to offer poorer facilities than other areas, affecting their attractiveness (Gaborit, 2010).

Some new town programmes have attempted to promote economic development, with varying success. Over the longer term, some once successful local economies have declined with economic change, leaving poorly located and narrowly based local economies vulnerable. In most cases, satellite cities rely on commuting to other areas, and they rarely operate as autonomous entities. Some cities are planned around cross commuting along good public transport routes such as Stockholm, where satellite towns are developed around rail stations. In other cases, transport connections are less conducive. Cervero (1995) argues that commuting is shaped more by the availability of good transport infrastructure and networks than by the levels of self-containment in terms of local employment. Where networks are poor, satellite city development can add to congestion, and result in long, costly and arduous commuting patterns, such as in Cairo and Luanda.

2.2 The South African and Johannesburg Debate and Experience

South African urban policies embraced compact city ideas in response to the historical experience of racially divided and sprawling cities, and the negative consequences of these approaches in terms of access by black people to the city, to employment and livelihoods, and to quality services and facilities. The spatial disjunctures between places of employment and residence for black people, the long commutes for workers, and the costs of travel for both workers and the state (in terms of subsiding transport) were all concerns. Key debates concerned the extent to which it was possible to accommodate growth and the urban poor in well located areas close to places of employment, versus attempting to promote economic development and the growth of employment opportunities within and around the former townships and other relatively marginalised areas within the city. A third position suggested focusing instead on improving mobility to enable better access to the city and areas of employment and better facilities. City of Johannesburg policies have included a combination of these
elements through its focus on urban compaction as an approach, along with its attention to the inner city, to township redevelopment (especially Soweto), and currently to the corridors as a way of integrating the city primarily through TOD, Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and related investments. A relatively consistent set of spatial policies have developed over time to support these ends, including prioritization of infrastructure investment, a focus on nodes, infill and densification.

Arguments in favour of urban compaction in South Africa and Johannesburg have been strong. Overall, gross densities in South African cities are low by international standards (Bertaud, 2008; Angel et al., 2011), similar to some European cities (Harrison, 2013). However there are relatively high densities in inner city areas, informal settlements and in townships, but with much lower densities in former suburban areas and new middle/upper income townhouse complexes close to new nodal spaces of growth, and on the urban edge (SACN, 2011). In theory there is considerable space and potential for densification.

The FFC’s (2011) modelling of future city scenarios of sprawl vs. compaction confirmed arguments for the costs of sprawl, showing that it would cost 7% more on operating budgets than compaction, an amount of R6.8 billion per annum after 10 years. Less investment would also be required in connector infrastructure. The cost difference between the scenarios (if applied to the 6 major metros) is around 1.4% of GDP by the 10th year, increasing over time. All households would be better off in a compaction scenario, but particularly low-income households who could spend 10% less under compaction (rather than 14% more in a situation of sprawl) mainly due to transport costs. The environmental impacts of sprawl are worse due to the reliance on the car and related fuel use and emissions.

Social and transport studies also point to the significant role of inner cities (and especially the Johannesburg inner city) as ‘arrival areas’ for migrants, for enabling access to employment and economic activity (e.g. see Cross, 2011; Cross et al., 2005; Venter, 2012), and for reducing transport costs, although due to land markets rentals might be higher and space more. Drawing on GCRO Quality of Life Surveys, Venter (2012) shows the benefits to the poor of living in the central city: walking is possible and there is good access to public transport, which reduces transportation costs, points that are consistent with advocacy of compaction. Employment levels are higher, and migrants are better off than in more peripheral informal settlements. By contrast, residents of new Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP) and informal settlements, which are more peripherally located, have much lower access to transport, and more onerous and costly mobility conditions, resulting in high levels of immobility due to the absence of affordable options and long travel distance. GCRO (2014) shows that
immobility rises with distance from the city centre, reaching as much as 30% in peripheral areas. Residents in outer areas of the city rely to a greater extent on more costly taxis, which also consume a higher proportion of already low incomes. The shortage of local amenities and employment in these areas leads to reliance on long and costly public transport, with implications for affordability.

However the certainty of compaction arguments has been challenged by a series of studies in the early 2000s showing that peripheral locations are sometimes preferred by households due to the lower costs, more available space (enabling cultural activities and economic activities such as rental and agriculture), and contained transport costs, as households in these contexts limit their movement to areas of employment (Schoonraad, 2000). Biermann et al.’s (2004) study of a variety of settlements in eThekwini and Johannesburg shows the varied conditions, costs and benefits of location in various settlements, and that the growing polycentricity of cities, especially Johannesburg, means that the definition of what constitutes a peripheral location needs consideration in context: Diepsloot on analysis proved to be better located relative to growing areas of employment in the North and West than initially assumed by policy makers. Hence the picture is more complex.

Since 2000, the City of Johannesburg has had a fairly consistent set of spatial policies to support urban restructuring to greater compaction. These have been reinforced in several rounds of SDFs, also with some adjustment. Key elements have included a growth management strategy including an urban edge, prioritised infrastructure investment linked to the spatial framework, and the use of nodes and corridors. Assessments of the impact of the spatial framework and its ideas (Ahmed and Pienaar, 2014; Todes, 2012) suggest that the framework has had some positive impacts: service levels and infrastructure conditions in the former townships have improved; spatial policies have been able to direct new infrastructure investment to a large degree (at least for parts of this period); developers have been responsive to nodal focus areas and transport investments such as the Gautrain, but only in the wealthier northern areas of the city and predominantly oriented to middle and upper income groups; and growth on the edge, and particularly beyond the urban development boundary, has been constrained.

Key challenges and tensions however remain: private property developers are still largely focused on middle/upper income residential and commercial development, predominantly in the North, and the new and growing employment nodes are also focused in these areas, further spatially marginalising areas in the South, including the townships there. Although there has been some growth of employment and economic activities in these areas, it is dwarfed by the scale of growth in the North (Gotz and Todes,
There is a paucity of affordable housing in these new areas of growth, and the City has struggled to encourage developers to include inclusionary housing (see section 3.9).

While levels of urban containment are occurring, large low-cost housing projects are still occurring in relatively peripheral locations (Charlton, 2014), the effect of land prices and the requirement for large parcels of land. These projects are also the consequence of the predominant emphasis on housing delivery, and reflect conflicting institutional and governance logics. Nevertheless, there are a few projects that change this pattern, for instance, projects around Alexandra, Pennyville, and in the inner city. Some new developments and areas of growing low-income housing are also close to new areas of economic growth, and might not be seen as spatially marginal (Charlton, 2014). Still, significant spatial and class disjunctures remain, as discussed in later sections.

Recent studies also show that levels of densification are occurring within the city, although not necessarily in places and ways anticipated by policy (Todes et al., 2015). Nor are these processes necessarily well managed by policy, which may require more focused attention to these issues. In higher income areas and on the urban edge, densification is occurring through the development of townhouse complexes. Not only does this type of development tend to be exclusionary, but the built form is usually very different from the integrated mixed environments anticipated by compaction advocates. Further, densification of this sort is focused on the motor car, adding to congestion. Cumulative developments of this sort have not been well planned, from the perspective of providing an environment with a range of social facilities, and in some cases, open spaces are lost. The SDF anticipates using form based zoning, which may address some of these issues, but producing quality environments requires careful assessment and contextual response to development at a detailed level as suggested in the international literature. Numerical guidelines are insufficient. Whether there is the capacity to do this in the City of Johannesburg, where planning resources are constrained, remains a question. At the other end of the spectrum, densification is also occurring through backyard shacks (see section 4.1), and through rising occupancy densities in the inner city, not necessarily in processes managed through the formal planning system. There are significant benefits in these processes, from enabling access to a range of services and facilities, thereby generating local incomes, to increasing access to better located housing for a range of groups of people. Nevertheless, densification of this sort is not necessarily being well–managed, as planned infrastructure and systems available are stretched beyond capacity, and there is insufficient response to requirements. This again requires a carefully coordinated response across the municipality.
Although there is progress with the SDF, there is also some frustration with the extent to which spatial transformation is occurring, in particular the limited extent to which economic activity is occurring in former township and peripheral areas, and the concentration of private investment in the North, linked to wealthier areas. In part in response to these concerns, the Provincial Premier put out a document calling for ‘new cities’ and mega-human settlements which in several respects challenges the City of Johannesburg’s compaction ideas, and might be seen as close to the satellite city idea (Harrison and Todes, 2016). The idea of mega-human settlements is also one that has come from the national department of Human Settlements, which is advocating for large housing projects (minimum of 15,000 units) as a way to ramp up the delivery of housing and have government efforts effectively focused and integrated (Turok, 2016). These are also intended to include a mixture of housing types and income levels.

Although the new cities concept has not been well developed, documents and statements indicate that they are intended to be places offering a variety of facilities and employment, serving a mix of income groups, and providing spaces that are “more connected, green, liveable and smart” (Makhura, 2014 in Turok, 2016, p. 16). New cities would be developed across the province along with a series of corridors that focus on distinct economic activities. In practice, the new cities concept is quite vague, and the economic dimensions have not been well developed. A mapping of possible human settlements mega-projects compared to existing areas of economic concentration in the province (GCRO, 2015) highlighted the spatial marginality of many of these projects, which would more likely develop effectively as satellite housing areas, dependent on extensive and costly commuting. The international experience of these cities suggest that while some planned satellite cities have managed to develop local economies, this follows considerable effort and attention, which is not evident here. Further, if only narrow local economies are created, as is often the case, they are vulnerable to economic restructuring as previously discussed. The experience of several peripheral economies in Gauteng, where relatively concentrated and once successful local economies have been affected by these processes and are now experiencing decline (Harrison and Todes, 2016), is similarly instructive.

The Gauteng mega-human settlements idea, in particular the suggested location of projects, is contrary to the direction of the existing Johannesburg GDS and SDF, also in so far as the Johannesburg policies posit working with the existing city, and restructuring it, rather than escaping it and creating new cities. As has been argued, it is a highly problematic approach, unless such places are created on the immediate edge of the built environment and around areas of rapid economic growth, such as the
North, with a strong focus on affordable housing and accommodation of the urban poor. This approach, however, is likely to present challenges in terms of the availability of very large parcels of land, the value of the land, and the demand by developers to build high value properties, which accommodate only limited affordable housing, usually not including the very poor (see sections below).

Nevertheless, it must be recognised that there is a frustration with the limited extent to which spatial planning has been able to effect spatial transformation, and a need to explore further the prospects and possibilities, taking into account that spatial planning is not in a position to direct and command developer response. This is discussed further below.

There is perhaps also another set of frustrations that the compact city/urban restructuring approach of successive SDFs have tended to privilege the former townships, or marginalised areas, the central areas of the city, and corridors through parts of the North/Centre/Soweto. The corridor policy as a major focus centre on BRT routes, as does the Gautrain (although not the result of Johannesburg policy), and these spaces have been the focus for infrastructure investment. This is a strategic choice, made on the argument of both the need to prioritise in terms of available budget, and also in order to drive restructuring through infrastructure investment and TOD policies. The current draft SDF broadens this approach to some extent with its polycentric nodal approach, and new corridors linking across the North-East.

Arguably, however, this approach neglects other major areas of the city, such as the southern suburbs, which have become increasingly racially mixed, and provides spaces where parts of the growing black middle class have chosen to live, retaining social connections and links to former township areas. It also neglects the growing western and north-western areas of the city, increasingly characterised by new economic nodes, and a mixture (at a regional scale) of income groups and housing types. Resistance to growth in parts of this area was linked to compaction and urban edge policies and attempts to contain infrastructure costs (Klug et al., 2014), but growth has continued to occur there, driven by the availability of road networks well-linked to the city-region, land availability and costs. However the major investments in BRT and Gautrain miss these areas, (although they may be included over the very long term), leaving these places with poor public transport, reliant largely on taxis. There has also been less attention to how these places can be managed to improve sustainability and liveability in these places. The current use of Regional Spatial Development Frameworks covering very large areas of the city in single plans also does not engage sufficiently at this level, except in some places where levels of precinct planning have been done.
3. Social Exclusion and Spatial Justice

While concerns about urban compaction have been core to strategic spatial planning in South Africa, and are embodied in both the GDS and SDF, questions of social exclusion and spatial justice have received less focused attention. The problem of social and spatial inequality in South African cities and in Johannesburg has certainly been recognised in national policy documents, and in both the 2006 and 2011 GDS, as well as in the SDF, but policies to address these issues remain limited and weak. It presents a key tension since socio-spatial inequalities and the trends associated with social exclusion are driven by deep social processes and market forces that are difficult to address. The sections below explore various dimensions, examining both international literature and South African dynamics.

3.1 Privatised and Splintering Urbanism

Graham and Marvin (2001) argue that in the twentieth century the significance of engineering infrastructure as systems and networks was substantially overlooked in city studies. They contend that it has become a realm of major importance because of the way in which rapid changes in this terrain in conjunction with other urban dynamics are impacting on the experiences and opportunities of city dwellers. Specifically, they demonstrate that these forces are feeding into an increasing “fragmentation of the social and material fabric of cities” (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 33), which is marked by more and more differentiation in access to key infrastructure such as transport networks and information technology, as well as water, sewerage and energy. This fragmentation in urban fabric they summarise with the term ‘splintering urbanism’.

The shifts they point to include how more traditional understandings of clusters of infrastructure supplied in predictable ways by public authorities to service the city and part of a modernist agenda of a basic infrastructure grid for all and evenly to all parts of the city, has been destabilised by a new technological and investment reality in which different aspects of infrastructure are being supplied, accessed and inter-linked by a variety of actors in diverse ways. This ‘unbundling of infrastructure’ includes the involvement of the private sector in supplying and operating services, many now connected to profit driven enterprises, with the infrastructure sector now very important in flows of finance and specialist skills internationally (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Reconfiguration on the supply side impacts also on the consumer side, with technology at times enabling self-provisioning and going ‘off-grid’. In a dynamic and evolving situation, new technologies and forms of supply and access ‘support the complex restructuring of urban forms, lifestyles and landscapes’ (Graham and Marvin, 2001). At the same time
there are changes to the shapes, organisation and experiences of cities—specifically, decentralisation, car-orientation and increasingly multi-nodal city form. These two trends are combining to contribute to increasing polarisation in cities, in which the privileged are increasingly hyper-connected—in multiple ways, to diverse forms of infrastructure, both to near and distant localities—whilst others are significantly bypassed.

Key to the significance of this is acknowledging the extent to which forms of infrastructure are connected, interdependent, related to other forms of infrastructure and technology, and connected to the multiple interactions of people operating them—networked and embedded, with the distinction between social and technical no longer useful. This dependency of urban life on infrastructure and the potential vulnerability of society to it, often unseen when infrastructure functions relatively smoothly, becomes starkly apparent when ‘fears of infrastructure collapse’ surface under conditions of conflict or environmental disaster with the concomitant threat of a “breakdown of the functioning of the urban social order” (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 23).

The significance of the splintering urbanism thesis pertains to the “uneven customisation” (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 189) it helps explain: the differentiation between who is interconnected and who is unconnected, replacing the notion of a system of relatively standardised grids with rather a “super-inclusion” for the elite and potentially increasing marginalisation for the poor—because services, connections, and access are increasingly withdrawn in certain localities. At the same time it is argued to help explain increasing delimiting and isolation at local level—how certain areas or places (buildings, neighbourhoods) start to insulate themselves, to protect themselves against external disruption through fortification and securitisation. The many dimensions of the infrastructure and spatial trends Graham and Marvin point to include not only highways and the internet but also shopping malls, gated enclaves and entertainment complexes. Other spaces included places where elite groupings can operate relatively independently through privatised provision of infrastructure, and the inverse of this, marginalised spaces.

Others contest the idea that splintering urbanism represents a universal trend, arguing that the various contextual dimensions within which the dynamics around infrastructure supply and access are occurring need to be examined for their particular outcomes and impacts: local context needs far more primacy rather than assuming some overarching set of forces are necessarily at play (Coutard, 2008). In the introduction to an edited collected debating the notion of splintering urbanism Coutard (2008) also argues that in many lower-income contexts a modernist roll-out of an infrastructure grid has not
happened, or has happened very unevenly or in limited ways, and therefore is not a starting point from which to assess its failure or its circumvention. He also argues that a variety of other economic, political and social processes and conditions affect outcomes such as the extent of social integration, and that too much is ascribed in the splintering urbanism thesis to the extent of evenly distributed infrastructure. Infrastructure in lower income situations in many cases already involves varied and differentiated suppliers and means of provisioning, and so the shifts are not simply from a ‘bundled to an unbundled’ situation but need more careful scrutiny for the kinds of changes in control and negotiation taking place. Also in some contexts the real issue is ability to pay, whoever the service provider is, whether public or private, and it is this issue of affordability that determines issues of inclusion/exclusion.

In South Africa, Lesley Bank (2011) reflects on the notion of splintered urbanism and in the context of poverty-stricken Duncan Village in East London, invokes the notion of ‘fractured urbanism’. In poor, marginalised areas, rather than becoming autonomous from state services and connecting globally as the rich might do in, people cling to state-provided infrastructure, services and resources, compete for them, and demand more of them. Bank (2011) talks about the old social and physical infrastructure in township areas buckling under the weight of demand, under new demands, increased competition, and cracking and rupturing—this notion of fracturing—with related social processes and impacts, such as household fragmentation and regrouping. Fractured urbanism, he says, “is centrally underpinned by a desire for greater rather than less dependence on the state and usually involves social compression rather than technological innovation” (Bank, 2011, p. 242).

In Johannesburg both ‘splintered urbanism’ and ‘fractured urbanism’ arguably have resonance. Recent private-sector developments such as Waterfall City constitute the ‘privatised urbanism’ which is seen as a key component of splintering urbanism. The large scale, extent and diversity of the various infrastructure, servicing and management components making up Waterfall City are argued to be part of a new trend of “self-contained, privately-managed cities” which—crucially—operate outside the administrative reach of public authority (Herbert and Murray 2015) and include a “hypermodernist stress on ‘smart’ growth, cutting-edge technologies, and state-of-the-art infrastructure” (Murray, 2014, p. 503). This example is seen as part of a range of private-sector-led new developments, of different scales and geneses, planned or built across many different contexts—broadly, a trend towards self-containment and relative independence for the elite.

In Johannesburg, fear of crime, fear of ‘the other’, and a particular form of consumer culture, it is argued, all collude to create more, not less, separation, differentiation, and isolation than under
apartheid, and the trend is towards a less and less inclusive city form. In Johannesburg Murray (2004, p. 149) notes “the power to exclude falls to those who can afford to purchase the privilege. At the same time, when looking at the extensive roll out of infrastructure by the state both through remedial infrastructure work and extension of infrastructure in old apartheid settlements—for example the tarring of roads in Soweto that has been a major programme of the City of Joburg, or the extending of broadband to public facilities in townships—as well as the massive amounts of new infrastructure delivered through the state’s low-income housing programme, the kilometers of sewer pipes, water pipes, and roads that accompany this major distribution of land and housing, is highly significant. Johannesburg thus reflects attempts to extend a range of infrastructure to under-serviced, marginalised or deprived areas, but at the same time it exhibits aspects of ‘splintered urbanism’.

3.2 Gated Communities

A key and growing feature of urban environments has been residential spaces of exclusion, largely termed ‘gated communities’ which are seen as “residential enclaves which are walled and secured, among other things, with gates, security personnel, or security cameras in varying permutations” (Obeng-Odoo et al., 2013, p. 545). These enclaves began as sites of separation for wealthier and upper income households, but have now spread to middle-income areas (Vesselinov, 2008). Although they have long historical roots in many countries, such as the walled communities of medieval Europe (Leisch, 2002), the Islamic urban traditions of partitioning space for specific functions (AlSayyad, 1987) as well as colonial precedents of separation of indigenous and imperial housing (Abeyasekere, 1989; Leisch, 2002). The newer forms of gating are apparently related to a few core drivers: such as fear of crime, manifested in security estates; the desire for better serviced environments, often expressed in better services and amenities than the surrounding settlements; and, for some the aspiration for more prestigious lived environments (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). However, in many ways it is the nexus between these various drivers, as well as the push of global capital and the support of local governments which has ensured that these residential forms are proliferating across the globe. Whatever their drivers or combination of drivers, there does seem to be a set of negative consequences for cities and poorer people.

Since the 1970s, the United States has largely been seen as the propagator of contemporary gating, justified by the fear and perception of crime and violence (Davis, 1990; Caldeira, 1996; Blakely and
Snyder, 1999; Jeffrey, et al., 2012). This is cited as the reason across the globe for the propagation of this urban form: from the United Kingdom (Atkinson et al., 2004), Lebanon (Glasze and Alkhayyal, 2002), Mexico (Sheinbaum, 2008; Giglia, 2008), Argentina (Roitman and Giglio, 2010), Brazil (Caldeira, 2000), Indonesia (Leisch, 2000), China (Miao, 2010), Nigeria (Uduku, 2010), Australia (Lee and Herborn, 2003) and New Zealand (Dixon and Lysner, 2004). It should be noted that in most cases the level of neighbourhood crime does not warrant such responses and it is the fear and perception of these activities rather than the crime rates, which drives demand for such residential complexes (Davis, 1990). Depending on context this may have racial overtones, in the United States, Blakley and Snyder (1997) argue that gating is an extension of the construction suburbanism and the desire to get away from the Black and poor “other”. In the Brazilian cases, gated communities are seen as the “right not to be bothered” by the poor thus gating and the retreat is a retreat from heterogeneity, as well as the other into class and race-based homogeneity (Caldeira, 1996; Grant and Mittelsteadt, 2004).

In emerging economies such as India, Malaysia and Brazil the growing accumulation of wealth has constructed a perception of fear that the newly acquired material gains create resentment from those who have not benefited from the burgeoning economies. The consequence is fear of burglary and loss, leading the newly-minted wealthy to retreat to purpose-built settlements, securitised, separate and often on the periphery of older cities (Leisch, 2002).

Increasing wealth has not only created the necessary demand for such a housing typology but also the material conditions necessary to fund and purchase it, whereby an elite group could afford the far more luxurious and almost always privately built units (Robison, 1996; Obeng-Odoom, et al., 2013). Labour mobility, common in South-East Asia to richer countries has also led to increasing remittances, some of which are invested in the development or purchase of units in gated communities, which are seen as a good investment and a way to support and add to the standing of family and kin.

Such fortressing segregation and development has occurred with various degrees of collaboration from local authorities, either though promotion of such activities as in Ghana where the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre explicitly encourages gated developments and the state provides tax holidays and national state guarantee are extended to real estate companies involved in these projects (Obeng-Odoom et al., 2013, p. 544). If not actively complicit in such activities some authorities simply turn a
blind eye to their development and informally assist in smoothing the way for their development, as has been seen in Bangalore (Roy, 2009).

A further driver has been the lack of capacity for public authorities to provide services for urban residents, especially in the Global South, this has included, public security, which was described as “fragile at best” (Un-Habitat, 2010, p. 111) as well as facilities, which a burgeoning middle class and a host of trans-national elites have come to expect. Thus gated communities are offering enclosed sites with better provision of basic services, including water and power, as well as the trappings of elite lifestyles such as club houses, sports facilities and even private schools and offices (Wu and Webber, 2004; Genis, 2007).

The third strand driving gatings in many cities seems to be an aspirant middle and upper income community who are intent on copying trends from other parts of the world due to “emphasise prestige” and a sense of belonging to a “modern” world often associated with the West and American lifestyle choices (Leisch, 2002). It has been found that “Adverts to which the residents of gated communities respond positively are couched in phrases such as ‘expensive, international flair’”(Grant and Rosen, 2009, pp. 48–49). Thus the design of newer settlements may be inspired and modelled after the urban ‘glamour’ zones, and supported by the world class city aspirations of various municipalities (Un-Habitat, 2010). With better facilities and the physical separation of these spaces from the “common” problems and every day experiences of the rest of the urban dwellers, a sense of social standing is added to such spatial choices (Obeng-Odoom et al., 2013, p. 544).

The consequences of gated communities are often not as intended and Davis (1990) and Obeng-Odoom et al. (2013) demonstrate that despite advertising to the contrary there is no direct correspondence between the advent of gated communities and a reduction in crime. In point of fact, the consumption of security can generate further fear and demand for securitisation (Davis, 1990). Caldeira (2000) argues that fortifications may even exacerbate fears as ‘fortified enclaves’ home to homogenous elites become a productive element in discourses of fear and processes of othering. Enclaving also does not produce the promised results of community cohesion and neighbourliness that the marketing promises (Grant, 2005). In turn, situations outside of gated communities can be worsened (Obeng-Odoom et al., 2013, p. 544), actively contributing to increases to house and land prices as seen in Malaysia (Lean and Smyth, 2012); worsening segregation and accessibility to housing for poorer people; contributing to displacements as sites are cleared (Ali, 2001; Jomo, 2004) and dispersing crime to other areas (Helsley and Strange 1999).
Gated communities also reduce the permeability of the city (Blandy and Lister, 2003), constructing social and spatial divisions (Obeng-Odoom et al., 2013, p. 544). In their worst incarnation, gated communities contribute to food insecurity (Allen et al, 2009), as some gated community developers illegally remove the top soil of farming land for construction purposes. The use of private security in gated communities has also constructed situations of insecurity. For example in Accra (Aning, 2005), where the use of such private security guards has contributed to the growth in the number of small farms, public spaces are abandoned and are “increasingly the area abandoned to the homeless and the street children” (Caldeira, 1996).

In Johannesburg, the trend towards gated communities has increased significantly since the 1990s, (Landman and Badenhorst, 2014). This includes both the partitioning off of existing neighbourhoods and the addition of access control mechanisms as well as the construction of new-built estates and developments, which are fenced off and securitized. Broadly speaking, within this second category there are three types of estates: golf estates, nature or eco-estates, and lifestyle estates. The vast majority of the gated communities are in the northern part of the city, with just one townhouse complex, one estate and one enclosed neighbourhood in the South (Landman and Badenhorst, 2014). There are a significant number of enclosed areas in the older more established northern suburbs of the city, whilst security estates are more commonly on the edge of the metropolitan area. A 2014 study counted ten large security estates in the arch between Midrand and Ruimsig, converting older peri-urban land and small market gardens into residential areas (Klug et al, 2014). Smaller enclosed estates and townhouse complexes are more evenly distributed in the northern part of the city and occur in newer and older areas alike, with older areas, such as Houghton and Northriding, sub-dividing larger plots to accommodate the demand for higher densities (Weakley et al, 2015).

Genis (2007) and others argue (Bremner, 1999; Lipman and Harris, 1999; Vrodljak, 2002), that these communities are a response to the severe fear of crime afflicting urban South Africa, especially the sense that crime is out of control (Durington 2009). However, Landman and Badenhorst (2014) argue that this is a reductionist view and that there are a set of inter-mingled and inter-related factors contributing to the expansion of gated communities, particularly in Johannesburg. These include, territorial control (Landman, 2007) of the defining territory, “to be able to differentiate areas spatially, fortify them against crime and the fear thereof, and ensure a sense of privacy and community inside” (Breezeke et al, 2012, p. 126; Davis, 1992; Luymes, 1997; Wilson-Doenges, 2000). Further drivers include financial security (Fife 2002a; 2002b), efficient service delivery (Benit-Gbaffou, 2007; Dirsuweit and
Wafer, forthcoming), a specific lifestyle (Vrodljak and Hook, 2002; Fife, 2002) and desire to be close to nature. Kracker-Selzer and Heller’s (2010) work demonstrates that there is also much prestige attached to living in these settlements and urban professionals are encouraged to take up residence in these communities thereby reproducing class and spatial boundaries. Alternatively, Clarno (2012) sees gated communities as an attempt by White urban dwellers to re-scale governance (i.e. to find ways of reclaiming power and authority over specific spaces), in this case at the neighbourhood level. Murray (2011, p. 286) argues that whilst all of these drivers may be at work, Johannesburg’s gated communities combine all of these drivers, “thereby creating a new kind of fortified luxury estate with distinctive South African characteristics.”

The spatial consequences of these developments echo the international findings with consequences for accessibility and integration (Landman, 2006; 2007) and the fragmentation of the urban form (including Tomlinson, 2003; Dirsuweit and Wafer, forthcoming). In the South African context, these developments have also been blamed for further entrenching spatial and social divides within Johannesburg and other cities, whereby gated communities are homogenous in terms of ethnicity, race and income (Jüergens, Gnad and Bhar, 2003; Bremner, 2004; Lemanski, 2004; Durington, 2006) as well as constructing newer forms of racial and class segregation (Kracker-Selzer and Heller, 2010). However, Chipkin’s work on the West Rand, offers a different account of these spaces, whereby gated communities in Roodepoort, are ethnically and racially heterogeneous and portray a liberal openness to issues of race. He also argues that these spaces offer shared or common worlds of all of the residents, governed by the fierce private legality and daily violence of the body corporates.

Furthermore, what is not clear and is highly contested from the SA literature is whether gatings actually have any impact on the levels of crime within these areas and the surrounding neighbourhoods. In the face of little empirical evidence either way, there are assumptions that security interventions do have an impact (Coetzer, 2001), whilst others cite the lack of evidence as proof that no change is affected by gating (Naude’, 2003), or with significant caveats from a limited sample set and study in Tshwane argue that gating does not necessarily prevent crimes such as burglary however such measures can in some instances and under certain conditions attract criminal behaviour (Breetzke et al., 2012). What is evident is that these gated communities offer a form of private legality and the privatisation of civic responsibilities whereby rules and regulations are decided internally and enforced through housing and residents’ associations (Murray, 2011). The spatial segregation and peripheral development of many
gated communities also run in direct contradiction to the plans and policies of densification, infill and inclusion expressed in many of Johannesburg’s policy documents (Landman, 2012).

3.3 Safety and Security as a Driver of Spatial Change

In responses to the 9/11 attacks in New York, Németh and Hollander (2010) identify what they see as a new form of land use: zones of heightened security around key buildings and places, which limit or prevent access or use by ordinary people. In these zones, the securing of what was public space around buildings is privileged over attempts to maintain spaces of public connection. Another strand of securitisation encourages ordinary people to take on responsibilities in the drive to secure cities and towns against both crime and terrorism—developing ‘community resilience’ to complement other safety initiatives by a range of organisations and authorities such as the use of CCTV cameras (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008). Resilience is seen to encompass ‘preparedness’ and forward-planning to anticipate and respond to threats (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008)—which could strike it is argued at any time, place and space (Coaffee et al., 2009)—and in part encourages people to report suspicious activity (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008).

Whilst these strategies attempt to protect against a perceived threat, they foster another sort of danger in interfering with what some call ‘the lifeblood of cities’ (Németh and Hollander, 2010)—public space and the possibilities they offers for fostering mutual learning, respect and tolerance, built on observation, chance encounter and interaction. These spaces have the potential to ‘educate the city-dweller about the ‘other’ (Lofland, 2000 in Németh and Hollander, 2010, p. 20), argued to be a key part of enabling ‘open-mindedness’ (Németh and Hollander, 2010). It is precisely these sorts of roles of public space that are specifically attacked in some forms of terrorism through deliberate ‘place-destruction’, place-control and the disruption of ‘civilian life’, for example by the Taliban in Pakistan (Mustafa and Brown, 2010). Critics of the practices of securing space against free access argue it infringes on many rights and liberties, while not always clearly increasing safety (because of the range and diversity of forms that terror attack can take). The key lament from those scrutinising these changes in cities characterised by high intensity use of public space is that the balance between openness and security is being lost, and that an essential part of counter-terrorism should be the maintenance and protection of public social interaction and its humanising potential (Mustafa and Brown, 2010). More generally, securitisation of some spaces is also argued to intensify the differentiation of the city into areas of security and areas outside of this (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008).
Amongst concerns identified by urban commentators is the tension created between securitisation initiatives and urban regeneration, where both want safe spaces but the former is often about restriction—limited, selective, or no access at all—rather than opening to intensification of use (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008). Individual and community reporting is seen by some to stray too close to encouraging restriction on protest, inappropriate surveillance of fellow community-members and suspicion of different cultures and practices. These are all activities that might be inclined to promote superficial (visible) homogeneity but which run counter to the notion of public space as fostering open-mindedness. Heightened security can also have the obverse effect of attracting an attack by providing military or authorities as particular targets or identifying particular localities as housing items of value for criminal attacks.

Others refer to the extent to which security concerns, including crime and fear of crime (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008), permeate daily experiences and how a low level ‘ambient’ fear has infiltrated everyday life (Massumi, 1993 in Coaffee et al., 2009). Translation of these concerns to the design and layout of particular buildings and spaces can have the effect of alienating certain people who feel the space is welcoming to particular classes, income, ethnic or language groups only, whilst others are treated with distrust. Particular designs or strategies in the built environment are seen to foster anti-social feelings: ‘fear, suspicion, paranoia, exclusion and ultimately insecurity’ (Coaffee et al., 2009, p. 507).

In a Johannesburg context spatial modification as an anti-terrorism strategy is comparatively rare, but there are many examples of spatial modification in response to crime and fear of crime, with arguably similar social outcomes. Closing off of residential neighbourhoods through gating, fencing and limiting and controlling access excludes many people from using what were once public streets, contributing to isolation and interfering with the building of social interaction and solidarity (Landman and Schönteich, 2002), as well as inconveniencing ordinary people’s movement through the city. Whilst supporters of gated living point to the insecurities and vulnerabilities in the city that encourage the development of gated areas as a reasonable response, the choice to participate in them and to conveniently navigate through them or around them is largely related to having sufficient financial status to do so (Landman, 2006), reinforcing the social and spatial polarisation and fragmentation that post-apartheid spatial policies have sought to undo (Lemanski et al., 2010). City Improvement Districts (CIDs) are another way in which the experiences of public spaces in the City have been re-shaped, in this case through the privatisation of certain management and control functions in the public space of inner city neighbourhoods. This has been both a response to failures in effective urban management by the local
authority but also a response to security concerns. Whilst people’s passage through these areas is not physically restricted, in some cases activities such as informal trade have been prevented and private security prevents forms of usage considered undesirable (such as ‘loitering’).

Other ways in which social interaction in public space is restricted in Johannesburg is more insidious. In effect there are comparatively few spaces shared by people of widely differing income levels. This is partly related to the way transportation is stratified along class and income lines, with the middle classes overwhelming using private cars or the pricey Gautrain, with poorer residents using other forms of public transport. In other contexts public transport is often a space shared by a wide diversity of city residents, and its facilities are ‘spaces of interaction’.

Further, in Johannesburg fear of crime has shaped spaces of recreation, so that a number of these are now spaces supplied by the private sector and conflated with spaces of consumption—such as shopping malls and entertainment centres. These are often designed with limited access points, particularly for pedestrians or people arriving by public transport, and in addition, incorporate imagery and materials that are inviting to particular income or social groups but may be alienating to others. They are often not functioning as shared spaces which accept and invite social interaction amongst diverse users, in the sense referred to earlier, resulting in calls for ‘publicization’— ‘the process whereby private spaces acquire a more public dimension’ as is argued to have happened over time in the Waterfront in Cape Town (Houssay-Holzschuch and Teppo, 2009). These calls highlight the need to focus on the ‘process’ that enabled positive change: recognising that changes occur over time and as a result of forces and dynamics that need to be better understood in order for positive trends to be more actively encouraged and fostered more widely. This requires that attention be paid not only on spaces of exclusion but also on ‘the emerging forms of social cohesion and spatial ‘togetherness’” that are occurring in some places, including some shopping malls where it is argued some forms of social ‘encounter’ are in fact happening (Houssay-Holzschuch and Teppo, 2009, p. 373), in South Africa and in other parts of the world.

This perspective on the importance of public space and its social potential thus requires that more conscious attention be paid to who is included and excluded in space and how this occurs, often through subtle processes. There is a critique of the approach that public space is necessarily inclusionary if neither dominated by elites or by criminal or anti-social behaviour. Golvis (2014) is critical of the idea of a classless ‘everyman’ that has equal ability to claim the resource that is public space given the right conditions, arguing that ‘very material differences’ between people result in different needs and abilities to fulfil these, in relation to public space (2014, p. 1470). Some people are in fact dependent on public
space for their income—such as street traders or sex workers—and can fall victim to being marginalized “in the name of preserving the space for an average, classless citizenry” (Golvis, 2014, p. 1470). At both ends of the spectrum therefore—privatized spaces such as shopping malls, as well as seemingly-open and un-barred spaces—there is a need to examine actual conditions of inclusion and exclusion, for the trends that are emerging and how these can be supported or countered in fostering the particular interpretations of inclusion a city is advocating.

3.4 Gentrification in the Inner City

Gentrification has become a ubiquitous feature of urban environments across the world. First noted in the 1960s London as the social and economic process of the middle class invading “working class quarters” (Glass, 1964, p. xviii) and converting it into more luxurious accommodation. Gentrifying neighbourhoods exhibit visible physical characteristics, for example, renovated/extended houses alongside new services and cultural amenities that reflect changing class demographics. (Lemanksi, 2014, p. 2954) and changes in the class of the residents (Slater et al., 2004; Lemanksi, 2014)—it is these features, which still lies at the heart of the current understandings of gentrification. Much of what is debated are the modes, mechanisms and intentions through which it occurs.

The classical debate in discussions of gentrification is between the two polarized positions of who benefits from the process. Proponents of gentrification argue that it offers higher and better land use to areas that are over-ridden with crime and social pathology, and the material decline of the urban environment remaking and bettering parts of the city. Whereas, critics cite evidence that through such improvements, poorer households are effectively displaced either directly through no longer being able to afford the rents and house prices or indirectly as the services and goods are priced out of these households income brackets (Smith, 1996). Contemporary debates still tend to be located in one of these two camps, but have moved slightly beyond these lines of argument and focus on three inter-related arguments: the first, is the debate around the role of the state in gentrification and that current gentrification now in effect provides a more predatory form of trans-national capital, couched in language of transnational urban regeneration and facilitated by the state than earlier modes; the second, is whether the term gentrification can usefully be applied to the Global South; and the last, is the debate of how the “right to the city” has been re-cast by new young suburbanites who use such rhetoric to justify their “return to the city” and the gentrification of older inner city areas.
The view that current processes of gentrification offer something new on the cityscape, stems from Hackworth and Smith (2000) and Smith’s (2002) production-side account: through a historical perspective, they note the changing relationships between private capital, the state and transnational actors over time. Beginning with the premise that “postwar suburbanization left behind a devalorized urban core, which provided the economic landscape for subsequent reinvestment” (Ghertner, 2014, p. 1566), they argue that originally the state was a key actor in the process of gentrification, “aggressive” in its assistance in improving inner city areas. However, over time the state has moved in and out of direct support of gentrification. This began with direct interventions such as assisting with land assembly, tax incentives, and even going as far as property condemnation, in order to make land available for re-development and regenerate declining inner cities (Smith, 1979). But by the 1970s, the state had retreated and instead “prodded” the private sector through incentives such as block grants, but the approach was ad hoc and generally uncoordinated.

Since the 1990s and up until the current period, gentrification has had slightly different features with a state that has returned to direct intervention generally under the rubric of city regeneration, and there is now a conflation between the ideas of regeneration and gentrification. The contemporary form of gentrification, specifically in the north also links the global to the local in a variety of ways: in the current formulation gentrification is linked global financial markets, which partner with local developers and estate agents and are in turn facilitated by local government, these are happening at the regional scale but are also driven by multi-lateral organisations that promote specific models and modes of regeneration. The last set of trans-national regeneration strategies that traverse borders, are driven by inter-urban competition driving regeneration, whereby cities compete for capital investment for regeneration and gentrification projects in order to bolster local economies and attract urban elites to their environments (Hackworth and Smith, 2000; Smith and Defilipis, 1999). Thus the new wave of gentrification is larger in scale and ambition than the prior processes and has the capacity to change large swathes of urban land through this intersection of local and international forces. However, critics of such processes note that given its larger scale and distribution, this form of gentrification has severe consequences for the poor who may face even greater displacement to the periphery than through previous processes. Furthermore “sugarcoating” of such displacement under the rhetoric of regeneration means that such approaches are difficult to critique or assail as they seem to be undertaken with the best of intentions. The debate highlights two aspects of current gentrification processes: the first is that the role of the state is highly variable and time and context dependent and
the second, is that without due care, some of the worst depredations of gentrification can easily occur and be covered up with political rhetoric and the careless conflation of terminology.

The second key debate has been around the application of the term gentrification to the Global South and it is important to make a distinction between the use of the term gentrification for analytical purposes to examine a set of empirical findings as opposed to the use of gentrification as a model or blueprint for upgrading. In both cases, there is initial argument is that gentrification as a concept and as an approach to solving urban issues of decline has “travelled” from the north to the Global South. In the case of the model, gentrification has been taken up by a variety of local governments across the world. Schafran (2014, p. 321) states that “gentrification has never been more relevant as a global urban force”, noting that “Mumbai is gentrifying, Rio is gentrifying, Luanda is gentrifying,” It is argued that the reason the approach has been applied in local contexts in the South is because it is “fast policy”, which means that the idea is easily taken up, modelled and applied in a variety of contexts and is presented as being a creative solution to inner city problems (Peck, 2002; 2010). This is also because of they have coincided with an international move to more neo-liberal takes on governance, improvements in communication technology, which have encouraged ideas to be picked up, and translated into a variety of contexts with the assistance of highly mobile professionals (Lees, 2012). However, it is also acknowledged that there is rarely if ever a simple replication of blueprints from one context to another and there is much in the way of local translation of the idea in order to fit with the necessary local conditions.

As an analytical approach it has been taken up by theorists in a wide variety of contexts, for example in South Africa (Visser and Kotze, 2008; Winkler, 2009); China (He, 2007, 2010; Wang and Lau, 2009; Wu and Luo, 2007); Singapore (Wong, 2006). Here there are a network of arguments underlain by a larger concern with southern theory and new comparative urbanism, which seeks to go beyond using the North as the yardstick and northern theory as generalizable to the rest of the world (Lees, 2012). In such debates, using gentrification to understand changes in land use and class has been seen as a way of speaking back to northern theory. However, critics argue that using the term gentrification in sites like India and Pakistan to describe displacement, effectively sugar-coats what are violent strategies undertaken by coalitions of the state and private sector (Ghertner, 2014; 2015). However others argue that there is great utility in using the term gentrification to understand urban processes, noting that it is “helps us to develop class-relational perspectives on urban change specifically focused on the use value
of land for the sake of its extremely polarized class absorption of the exchange value” (Lopez-Morales, 2015:564) and forces a confrontation with nature of neo-liberal governance (Lees, 2012).

The final debate is seen as a consumption-side theory in which the middle classes desiring a more urban lifestyle move back to inner city neighbourhoods (Ley, 1996). This is justified both in terms of groups arguing for their “right to the city” as well as the encouragement of more “social balance” expressed as the need to “bring people back into our cities” (Smith, 1979). The trouble with such an approach is that it is generally middle class professionals who move into these areas and in doing so, even if self-initiated tend to slowly displace other groups. Although less violent and generally slower than other forms, it does create situations of exclusion wrapped up in discussions of social and racial inclusion, whilst the rights based language effectively neutralises criticism (Walsh, 2013).

The current international debates on gentrification indicate that the poor are being pushed out of a number of central sites largely for the pursuit of large international capital profit-driven motives. The debates also indicate that if not carefully interrogated poorer people’s access to these sites are being justified in languages of regeneration, social mixing and rights. It also indicates that there is much to be gained in using the analytical tools that the term gentrification offers when analysing spatial changes as it forces the dissection of intent, relationships and co-operation between various parties.

In South Africa the term gentrification is rarely used (Lemanski, 2012; Visser and Kotze, 2008; Winkler, 2009). Instead, the debates centre on the fact that in South Africa, critiquing the handful of studies as “direct applications of Anglo-American debates” lacking local adaptation (Visser and Kotze, 2008, p. 2570). Or are in keeping with international debates on the applicability of the term “gentrification” to a variety of contexts, Lemanski, working in Cape Town, argues that current northern theory on gentrification, only has very limited application to the South African situation. She suggests that what is needed is a new understanding of gentrification that “forces analysis to consider a broader range of forces shaping urban space and housing markets, leading to unexpected outcomes” as well as moving beyond gentrifications classical arguments of being driven by rent gaps or better quality of life and looks carefully at local context and drivers (2012).

Although similar to many other contexts, the Johannesburg inner city has seen growth and decline almost since its beginnings. Originally developed on a triangular-shaped piece of left over land owned by the government, the initial layout was designed to ensure as many corner plots as possible to maximise the income for the state, who thought that the new goldfields would last a few years and then dry up
and go elsewhere (Beavon, 2004). However, instead the city grew and the inner city grew with it, densifying and taking on the high-rise, although not super high-rise profile of places like New York and Hong Kong. The inner city, or central business district (CBD), became home to department stores, high end retail and commercial spaces. The CBD was surrounded by the 1960s by densifying suburbs such as Hillbrow and Yeoville that were adopting international architectural styles of flat living and café culture.

The situation began to change in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to a wide variety of political, social and economic factors. Beavon (2004) cites the 1976 Soweto Uprising as the turning point for much of the urban change that could be seen in the inner city. It was these riots, which prompted greater international censure and led to some 250 foreign firms withdrawing from the country, many of whom had situated themselves in the Johannesburg CBD (Beavon, 2004). Combined with the move of small business out of the CBD, the opening of large department stores in the newly built and increasingly popular malls in the northern suburbs, there was a significant exodus of small and large business out of the inner city. Simultaneously, there was a change in demographics as single family generally owner-occupied flats were taken over by “non-White” households, ignoring legislation. However, the high rentals and a jump in the interest rate in the early 1980s meant that many units became multi-family and multi-household dwellings in order to be affordable.

The residential and commercial exodus out of the inner city and the surrounding suburbs meant that many buildings were left vacant, creating the necessary conditions for a degree of informalisation to occur in the CBD. This occurred as people who had been living in the shacks and informal settlements on the periphery and in the townships to move into the abandoned and empty buildings. Furthermore, households who were unemployed or underemployed constructed informal settlements in parks, open pieces of ground and inside old industrial buildings like Turbine Hall and Johannesburg station. (Beavon, 2004).

Higher densities, slum-lording and the cutting off of services to a number of buildings as tenants boycotted rent payments due to poor service and maintenance meant that there was a decline in the quality of the urban fabric. This was coupled with a city council that was not sure how to handle the situation and as a consequence by the early-1990s, the inner city was in severe decline, home to a poor population, living in deteriorating conditions. The new government, post-1994, attempted to ameliorate the situation but initially faced significant institutional failures and was only really able to begin to consider policy response by the late 1990s to the early 2000s. At this point there were literally
thousands of abandoned buildings in the inner city and the CBD had become closely associated with crime, vice and violence, largely seen as a no-go zone after dark.

In order to address these issues the City has consistently followed the rhetoric of property-led regeneration and forms of state-supported gentrification. These have included the Bad and Better Buildings Programmes and the Inner City Property Scheme, all intended to regenerate the inner city through “turning property-around” and taking abandoned, squatted and other buildings that are in a deleterious state and handing them over to the private sector for improvement and finally rental to higher income groups (Rubin, 2014). These programmes by the city have largely been unsuccessful and have faced enormous opposition, primarily led by social rights litigation. Instead, change has mainly been through private sector responses, where there is much debate about how supportive local government has been.

The low level gentrification that has taken place has been through private sector developers buying up derelict properties and refurbishing them for the rental market in the inner city. However, this has not been for the upper income groups but rather for the working classes, looking for secure rental, located close to economic opportunities. There have thus been a handful of successful property companies which have invested heavily in the inner city, such as Afhco, which recently listed on the Johannesburg Stock exchange. There are few exceptions including the Maboneng district, located to the east of the city and driven by the private property developer to construct a creative district. Self-styled as “The heart and the essence of the city of Johannesburg”, the development stretches over 6 blocks comprising 25 converted industrial warehouses and disused factories to high-end residential units, cafes, bars, and galleries. It is highly contested by the surrounding community, who experience exclusion due to the high prices of property and goods as well as the private security guarding the entrances to the district. This sense of exclusion sparked protests in 2015 from the surrounding poorer communities and has subsequently led the property developers Propertiaity to re-look at some of their spatial policies and ways of including these residents. A further exception has been the change to Braamfontein, which over the last few years, has seen an increase in good quality student accommodation and a host of recreational land uses such as restaurants and cafes to cater for this class of residents.

The second form of class change has been in the commercial sector, and has largely been led through the adoption of improvement districts by property owners. Adapted from international practise, Johannesburg has adopted these forms of private sector-led urban regeneration and spatial control (Didier et al., 2012). These districts are managed by powerful private public partnerships, where the
private sector has often taken the lead and ensured improved urban management, service provision and security. City councils, local police forces and private security have also entered into agreements in these precincts so that many aspects of policing have been privatised including armed responses to alarms and the monitoring CCTV cameras (Minnaar and Mistry, 2004). Through these CIDs, better quality commercial space has become available for higher orders of goods and more tertiarised sectors.

Johannesburg has thus not experienced gentrification in the same way as the rest of the world, despite attempts at property-led regeneration. Nevertheless, there has been some displacement as buildings have been bought up for working class rentals and in anticipation of gentrifications strategies, which have failed (Rubin, 2014). As such, the mass renewals seen in other downtowns, combining private and public partnerships cutting swaths through poorer areas have not been a reality in Johannesburg’s CBD.

3.5 Right to the City and Spatial Justice

While justice is often seen in legal terms, there is a strong spatial element to social justice. Justice and injustice have a discernible geography. Significantly, spatial forms are not simply reflections of injustice but actively contribute to both inclusion and injustice (Soja, 2010). Given that inequality in cities is growing, likely leading to an increase in unjust spatial form, issues of socio-spatial justice are of vital importance at the present (UN-Habitat, 2016). One of the key ways in which spatial justice is discussed and understood is through the concept of the ‘right to the city’.

First conceptualised by Lefebvre in the 1960s, the right to the city has become a much-utilised concept, by both academics and activists. While the term is understood in various ways, at its core the concept of the right to the city is about the significance of the use-value, rather than simply the exchange-value, of urban space (Purcell, 2013). While the rights of the property owner supersede those of inhabitants of the city in most capitalist systems, the right to the city movement advocates that those who use the city have rights that should be acknowledged as parallel to or more significant than ownership rights. Harvey illustrates the fundamental collectiveness of this idea, saying that “the right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city” (Harvey, 2008, p. 23).

Feminist geographers have added an important dimension to our understanding of the right to the city. Critiques of Lefebvre have cited his ignorance of axes of difference that shape urban experience; most centrally, the role of patriarchal power in the city. Fenster (2005) asserts that “inclusionary practices are
not always fulfilled precisely because of the dominance of patriarchy in the different living scales: the home and the city” (p.224). There is also impracticality to the belief of a collective assertion of the right to the city, since it assumes equality and ignores the power dynamics of patriarchy (Fenster, 2005). This field has brought another significant dimension into the right to the city thinking—due to the structure of societal power relations, not all people can assert their right to the city equally.

The notion of the right to the city challenges entrenched ideas of property ownership:

What became legitimised if not sanctified [in the American and French revolutions] was the inalienable right to own property as the central principle in defining the capitalist nation-state, its systems of laws, and its revised definition of citizenship. Human rights in general and such specific claims as the right to the city become subordinated to the primacy of rights to property. (Soja, 2010, p. 45)

While the logic of individual property ownership defines most urban systems, theorists of the right to the city demonstrate that alternatives to this deeply entrenched system are possible.

There is a debate over whether the right to the city can be incorporated into the liberal democratic framework of the contemporary state. For Lefebvre, the right to the city was a revolutionary movement that should move beyond the capitalist machinery of the state (Purcell, 2013). By appropriating space in the city, inhabitants “de-alienate urban space, [and] re-integrate it into the web of social connections” (Purcell, 2013, p. 149). Lefebvre sees the key means of galvanising the right to city as appropriating land for common use. He understands urbanisation as a force independent from capitalism; the city existed before industrialisation and, as such, is a human construction. Capitalism, through industrialisation, has imposed the supremacy of landowner rights on the city, but the potential to move beyond the capitalist system also resides in the city (Purcell, 2013).

Harvey (2008), on the other hand, argues that the only way to restore the right to the city is to overthrow the ‘hegemonic liberal and neoliberal market’ system. Proffering that urbanisation is fundamentally tied with class and capitalism, Harvey (2008) sees the city as an economic entity—the development of the urban has occurred through the reinvestment of surplus product, accommodating capital accumulation. Central to the denial of the right to the city is the collusion between the state and capital. Harvey (2008, p. 38) argues: “increasingly, we see the right to the city falling into the hands of private or quasi-private interests”. He demonstrates that in Haussmann’s Paris and Moses’ New York, capital and government collaborated to ‘take a meat axe to the city’, in order to allow the urban
landscape to be more facilitating to commercial interests. The state facilitates capital investment in the city, which is frequently at odds with the right to the city of the inhabitants. As such, Harvey (2008) argues that the potential to instil the right to the city lies in overthrowing the system and fundamentally reimagining the city.

However, Brazil has integrated the right to the city into the liberal democratic framework, showing that the right to the city can become an enshrined legal right without massive systemic change. The 2001 City Statute inculcates the right to the city into law, moving beyond the socio-political value and intellectual debate around the concept. The law recognises the social function and the use value of land. While this has been hailed as a success from many quarters, urban planning and finance mechanisms tend to ignore the City Statute in favour of private property ownership (Rolnik, 2013). This case indicates that both recognition and implementation of the right to the city are vital.

Parnell and Pieterse (2010) argue that a focus on universal rights can replace neo-liberalism within a democratic system. They call for “a radical programme of urban citizenship” (p.159) and state:

Implementing a rights-based agenda at the subnational scale thus necessitates a radical critique of the instruments as well as values of the local state and will require a massive process of state rebuilding and institutional reform, without which everyday practices of urban management remain unchallenged and exclusionary. (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010, p. 159)

Many international social movements draw on the right to the city as both a justification and a mechanism of protest. After much contestation, The Zero Draft of the New Urban Agenda to be adopted at Habitat III has used the term ‘right to the city’ to refer to values of “just, inclusive and sustainable cities” (Habitat III, 2016). In South Africa, social movements and NGOs such as the Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI) and Abahlali baseMjondolo have relied on the concept of the right to the city in their work.

Given the complex conceptualisation of the right to the city and the difficulty in its adequate implementation, challenges arise in attempts to operationalise the concept. In South Africa, where the right to own property is constitutionally-protected, an overthrow of the capitalist machinery of the state is impractical and politically unpopular. However, there are ways for the state to engage that could make the right to the city a possibility in South Africa.
Firstly, at a most basic level, local governments should engage with the debates over the right to the city and understand the principles of the use value of land. Secondly, it is important to remember that there are alternative urban systems that do not prioritise private property to such an extent. Further, there are approaches to land use management and associated mechanisms that attempt to build in social equity to a greater extent. These could be explored. Finally, and most importantly, those who attempt to exercise their right to the city, especially within public space, should not be criminalised.

This last point can be illustrated through a brief discussion on homelessness in the Johannesburg context. Debates on homelessness have included whether this phenomenon results from structural conditions in society or from personal social and economic failure (such as drug addiction), or as a mix of both (Tipple and Speak, 2008). In cities of the South however, a key issue is the extent to which what appears to be a state of homelessness—including a lack of shelter or severely inadequate shelter—is in fact shaped by difficulties with transport between places of earning and places of residence, the need to retain a competitive foothold in places of income generation and the lack of cheap and appropriate accommodation in convenient localities (Tipple and Speak 2008). In other words, the notion of homelessness is complicated in developing contexts by its superficial similarities with a conventional understanding of homelessness (such as people sleeping rough, often in public places), but in many cases it is fundamentally different in terms of the reasons underpinning it and the personal circumstances of the homeless person. In cities like Johannesburg ‘homeless’ people thus include those argued to be ‘working and productive members of society’ (Tipple and Speak, 2008) and those who have alternative housing which they use during certain periods (Charlton, 2013)—what Du Toit (2010, p. 113) refers to as ‘weekday homeless persons’. In many cases these ‘weekday homeless’ are earning a living in public space (such as informal recyclers or street vendors) or are finding a form of temporary shelter in public space, but whose use of public space is often criminalised.

3.6 Racial Segregation and Desegregation

Racial segregation was the most defining feature of South African cities under apartheid, but this issue is rarely considered directly in urban policy. This trend has continued in the case of the GDS and SDF. Analysis of census data for Johannesburg post-apartheid shows that levels of segregation have declined, and that Johannesburg is the least segregated of South Africa’s six largest cities (Statistics South Africa, 2016). There has been considerable desegregation in areas formerly designated for white, coloured and Indian people, but some areas still retain these characteristics. Harrison and Todes (2013) show that by
2011 there were fewer areas where whites were predominant (mainly in the North), and that this was no longer the case in the inner city (which had become predominantly black) and in the South. The townships which were once created and reserved for black African people however have remained black African (see Figure 1).

While there is some movement of black African middle class people out of townships, many people stay there due to their ownership of property and to maintain social links and identities (Donaldson et al., 2013). Although this might be seen as perpetuating racial segregation, it does contribute to creating more diverse, class-mixed environments in these areas, such as is occurring in Soweto. The way these patterns change over time should be monitored.

There is also little mention in the GDS or SDF of patterns of segregation and desegregation within schools, or patterns of commuting across the city to access schools. Although schools are not within the sphere of influence of municipal policy, it needs to be recognised that there is considerable commuting across the city to access better schools. De Kadt (2010) shows that 25% of children commute more than
5km to school, and many go much further. Whether or not municipal policy should respond to these patterns needs consideration.

3.7 Gender and Inclusion

The question of difference in urban spaces, is one which has occupied a range of authors, asking the question of ‘what difference, does difference make to the urban experience?’ Questions of sexuality, nationality and gender have been explored in order to understand how these specific identities shape the experience of life in the city. The following section, however, will focus on one aspect of identity, that of gender. There is a current assertion that cities offers urban dwellers better quality of life, better opportunities for economic development, health and education (Turok and McGranahan, 2013). However, internationally there is some doubt that women benefit equally from the experience of urbanization (Chant, 2013). Furthermore, the discussion of difference in terms of women and space has resurfaced, evoking questions of the different experiences of different women and in different cities (Khosla, 2009). Earlier, feminist geographers argued for examining women as a heterogeneous category (Sanders, 1990; Gilbert, 1997) and dispelling myths of a universal womanhood and a generalised urban experience based on gender. Contemporary debates, while building on the idea of different experiences of the urban, also challenge the idea of generalised benefits derived from the urban. It is often illustrated that in the Global South, women contribute significantly to urban economies but enjoy fewer benefits than their counterparts in the Global North (Chant, 2013). Furthermore, cities seem to offer women something of a paradox in their urban experiences: on the one hand, urbanisation seems to offer women greater economic opportunities, opens the way to better engagement in governance and overall ensures more freedoms. However, simultaneously cities seem to expose women to higher rates of violence and crime, and can diminish social and kin networks (McIlwaine, 2013). Poorer women face greater disadvantages in cities, compared with their male counterparts; particularly in relation to questions of access to employment, shelter, health and education, transport, asset ownership, experiences of urban violence, and ability to exercise their rights (Un-Habitat, 2012).

Johannesburg is following many of the international trends around gender and urbanisation witnessed across much of the global south. This includes the feminisation of cities (Chant and McIlwaine, 2009). The city has seen a feminisation since its early days as a mining town, which ensured large gender disparities that were then reinforced by apartheid legislation that restricted the movements of black women. Current rates indicate that there is largely gender parity (StatSA, 2011), however, as in many other parts of the world, women are exposed to higher rates of contact - and gender based crime than
men. Once again there are differentials, as women who are forced to use public transport, who live in informal settlements and who routinely have to traverse public spaces at night are more vulnerable to attack than wealthier counterparts living in other parts of the city (Vetten, 2000).

Despite the dangers that women are known to face and the differences in their experience, and aside from a useful but relatively small literature on planning and participation (Todes, et al, 2009; Kihato, 2009; Duminy, 2014), there is not a well-developed literature on the gendered experience of city life in South African cities, including Johannesburg (Spiegel et al., 2005; Seedat, et al, 2006). One of the few studies to address this issue is a current project looking at Mothers in the City, undertaken by the South African Research Chair in Spatial Analysis and City Planning. Although the study has yet to be finalised, preliminary findings indicate that many women find the city extremely difficult to navigate; transport and public space is experienced as unsafe, many places are ‘out of bounds’ after dark and it is challenging to travel with young children (Dinath et al., forthcoming). As a consequence, women tend to stay close to home, reinforcing the association between domesticity and gender. The lack of publicly-funded or subsidised child development centres, the lack of cheap and easily accessible public transport, and the unequal distribution of good schools also mean that many women are faced with difficult decisions about where to locate their households, compromising on the quality of homes in order to access schools and educational facilities for their children.

Another study undertaken as part of the Wits School of Architecture and Planning, Rosettenville Studio, reinforced the Mothers in the City view that public spaces and transport were unsafe (Dinath et al., forthcoming). The studio also surfaced that due to the male dominance of many public spaces – especially streets and markets – women are reduced to having to work on the peripheries and left over spaces, leaving the prime sites to men. This compromises women’s economic security. Aside from the dangers of public space, there are hazards found in private space due to the lack of good quality, affordable accommodation. This leads many households to share space, leaving women and girls vulnerable to depredation, rape and violence within their own homes. There is no question that more needs to be done to understand the nature and range of women’s experiences in Johannesburg and to ensure that these concerns are included in the strategic spatial plans of the City.

3.8 Migrant spaces

Debates around migrants in cities have often taken two opposing views and policy standpoints: the first is that new migrants should be integrated into the fabric of the city, creating diverse neighbourhoods
and cultures, or the “assimilationist” view, which may also attempt to geographically distribute migrant populations. Assimilationist policies tend to veer towards finding ways for migrants communities to shed their ‘otherness’ and become part of the host community (Alexander, 2003). Alternatively, local governments have followed a pluralist approach, whereby the expectation is not that the migrants will become less ‘other’ over time, or that spatial segregation is necessarily negative, but rather that diversity is enriching and the special needs of migrant communities should be accommodated and supported in order to enhance the local (Fraser, 1995; Kukathas, 1999).

There are also further debates concerning the advantages and disadvantages of migrants living in ethnic enclaves and the social and economic value of these sites (Xie and Gough, 2011). Portes (1981, pp. 290–291) defined ethnic enclaves as “immigrant groups which concentrate in a distinct spatial location and organize a variety of enterprises serving their own ethnic market and/or the general population.” The thesis maintains that there is benefit to immigrants who live and work in such environments, however this point is highly contested: those who critique ethnic enclaves argue that the thesis ignores class struggles within these sites and that there is a differential benefit for employers and employees. Critics state that ethnic enclaves can construct situations of exploitation due to trading on a shared sense of identity and because ethnic enclaves can physically trap new immigrants into these geographic sites forcing them to take on badly-paid jobs (Sanders and Nee, 1987; Light and Gold, 2000). Proponents of such enclaves argue that ‘Little Italys’ and ‘Chinatowns’ can offer new migrants secure social networks that allow for higher earnings and ‘softer landings’ in new environments (Borjas, 2000; Edin et al 2003). The consequences of these debates for public policy are significant, since depending on the situation and the group in question pluralist or assimilationist responses can support or undermine ethnic enclaves and in doing so potentially impact on the quality of life of new urban migrants.

Johannesburg has a long history of segregation, beginning with ‘locations’ for various races in the heyday of gold-mining, and later ethnically segregated mining hostels to developing a variety of ‘tribal’ neighbourhoods in Soweto and other townships. The city has experienced significant interference in the location of different groups on the landscape. Even when situations were not legislated, many groups chose to live in close proximity with each other, such as the Jewish Community in the eastern suburbs (Rubin, 2004), and the Lusophone community in Rosettenville and La Rochelle (Moyo and Cossa, 2015), amongst others. Of late three different forms of migrant spaces have been identified in Johannesburg: (1) informality and circulation between townships and the city (Somali, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani
immigrants); (2) spatial clustering and enclaves (Ethiopians/Eritreans and Chinese); and (3) blending in (South Asians in Mayfair/Fordsburg and African immigrants in Yeoville) (Thompson and Grant, 2015).

The different forms are influenced by a variety of factors, including local reception and potential xenophobic threats from host communities. In the case of Somali, Bangladeshi and Pakistani migrants, this explains why they tend to work in the townships and informal settlements but live elsewhere. Alternatively, strong ethnic identities often demonstrate the need to defend territory and support characteristic spatial enclaves (Zack, 2014; Harrison et al., 2012). These factors, coupled with transnational kin networks, often lead to geographic clustering. However there is some differentiation between groups, with Chinese migrants often seeing the enclave as a stepping stone to other locations, due to high rates of competition within the Johannesburg enclave; other groups may see these spaces as long-term options (Harrison et al., 2012). Blending in may occur when there are significant shared characteristics with a host community, allowing for a sense of commonality between immigrant and indigenous groups. In the case of Johannesburg, this is shown through a shared Muslim identity between older Fordsburg and Mayfair residents and new South Asian migrants.

The cases from Johannesburg indicate that not all migrants have a shared experience of the city and that there are a wide variety of migrant spaces across the city responding to a wide variety of factors including, fear, threat, identity and promise. As such, policy on migrants needs to be carefully disaggregated to ensure that the nuances of each experience is positively supported rather than threatened through the unintended impacts of broad approaches.

3.9 Policies on Socio-Spatial Integration

Counter to the trends of spatial and social exclusion that are often described, there have been the concurrent attempts by the state and social movements to ensure social and income mixes and inclusion, largely through housing and housing projects known as inclusionary housing. These have been in effect in Europe (Bolt, 2009) and the United States in which a new development “requires or provides incentives to private developers to incorporate affordable or social housing as a part of market-driven developments” (Calavita and Mallach, 2010, p. 1). Although it has its roots in the civil rights movements, the arguments around inclusionary housing have moved towards supporting a ‘value capture’ agenda, which requires developers to contribute to affordable housing, largely in the face of reductions in federal and other state funding into the public housing arena (Mallach, 2010). In general there is a perception that inclusionary housing policies promote more socially integrated forms of affordable
housing and allow poorer and less well-off households access to well-located property, especially in times of property booms.

Despite the best of intentions, it would seem that results of policies have been fairly mixed, and there is some concern that inclusionary housing has had limited impacts both in terms of social mixing and reducing income and ethnic segregation, and that inclusionary housing policy is ineffective in weak market environments (Bolt, 2009; Bolt et al., 2010; Calavita and Mallach, 2010). There are also further concerns that inclusionary housing pushes up property prices through imposing high regulatory costs and increases time constraints and in doing so slows construction and thus increases costs (Hughen and Read, 2014). In addition, even when poorer people are included in higher income developments, they may not be able to utilise this spatial advantage as the utilities and facilities in these environments are generally privatised and unaffordable by poorer households.

In an example from Southern Africa of a different approach to inclusion, Mosha (1996) notes that social mix is encouraged in the planning approach in Gaborone, Botswana, through the intention that any new district should contain a mix of plots and houses aimed at different income levels, although the exact mechanisms used to do this are not clear.

In South Africa, an inclusionary housing policy was developed at national level in 2007, proposing a mandatory delivery of lower income units by private residential developers, with provision for an off-site contribution as an alternative. It was never formally adopted, in part to do with concerns about the differentials in incomes between middle income and low income dwellers (‘income cliffs’) and how this might work in practice. There was resistance from the organised private sector to the idea for a range of reasons, including concern over the tools and mechanisms by which it was to be implemented (Klug et al., 2013). Although it was never envisaged to deliver large number of units, the policy was seen to be symbolically important in demonstrating a more integrated way of living in the future (Klug et al., 2013).

Johannesburg has attempted to utilize an inclusionary housing approach. Initiated in 2008 as part of the Growth Management Strategy (GMS), the approach had both a mandatory and an incentive-based component and was intended to be in effect across the city but with special reference to nodes and corridors identified in the GMS for densification. However, aside from two cases, one in Ruimsig and one in the Jerusalem project, inclusionary housing policy has not been implemented. This is largely due to the lack of legislative and institutional support for inclusionary housing from the other spheres of government and no way of enforcing the policy (Klug et al., 2013).
Instead, there have been individual negotiations between the City and private developers over the use of state subsidies into new large scale developments such as Fleurhof and Legae. These developments include mortgage linked as well as subsidised housing and are argued to be have better chance of realisation, though at some cost to the state in the form of infrastructure investment. They also reinforce the concern that mixed income developments “are likely to remain racially segregated, limited to low/lower middle-income groups, and to rely on relatively large projects, dependent on access to large pieces of land” (Klug et al., 2013, p. 677). Klug et al. (2013) argue that the details of the mechanisms, incentives and sanctions around inclusionary housing need more attention. There have been signals from national and provincial government that new inclusionary housing policy is being considered, although this is not yet finalised.

In the meantime, interesting trends are evident in some neighbourhoods in Johannesburg that relate to the debate around social mix and inclusion in residential areas. In some RDP or Breaking New Ground (BNG) settlements, low-income areas developed primarily for very low or no-income first-time property owners show forms of consolidation, alteration and investment (Nell et al., 2011; Charlton, 2013) that suggest considerable income-mixing. Whether this is through gentrification or ‘downward raiding’ by new purchasers or changed circumstances of the original beneficiaries is not clear, but it is worthy of scrutiny to understand the processes and dynamics that are transforming settlements – often criticised as low-income ghettos or seas of poverty – into more economically diverse neighbourhoods. However, if inclusionary housing is to be developed, care needs to be taken to ensure that the wider urban fabric is also able to serve the poorer households through affordable and publicly funded facilities and amenities.
4 Processes of Spatial Change in Poor Neighbourhoods

As the previous section suggests, poor neighbourhoods are not static places. A key message of this report is the need to understand and respond to these processes of change. While the GDS and successive SDFs have acknowledged informality, and argue for its acceptance, policy responses to these practices and processes of spatial change are not always well-development, and there are frequently disjunctures with state practices on the ground. This section addresses some dimensions of these changes, including around informal settlements and backyarding, informal trade, and changes occurring through bottom up processes in poor neighbourhoods.

4.1 Informal Settlements and Backyard Shacks

A wide variety of poor living conditions fall into UN-Habitat’s definition of a ‘slum’ (UN Habitat, 2011), including what is typically referred to in South Africa as informal settlements, in which residents experience a number of shelter-related deprivations. Informal settlements are a feature of many cities across the world and are projected to remain important areas of housing supply into the foreseeable future. Increasingly they are promoted by funding and support organisations as places for supportive intervention rather than neglect, marginalisation or demolition, building on a pragmatic view that they represent human agency under difficult conditions. As UN-Habitat (2011, p. 7) argues, “informal settlements in African cities come in all shapes and sizes, but the common denominator is their highly dynamic, highly resourceful response to an absolute lack of other options.”

A key response widely advocated is in-situ intervention (upgrading the existing settlement in its existing location), a key dimension of which is the promotion of tenure security, to protect residents from dispossession of their stake in the city and to encourage forms of investment and possibly wealth creation which are seen to be linked to property ownership in particular (CDE, 2001). Tenure security interventions can take many forms, and variations of the more conventional form of sub-division for individual ownership, such as collective ownership, are increasing (UN Habitat, 2011). Infrastructure interventions such as water, sanitation and access improvements are all advocated. A key point advocated by UN Habitat is also to get to know informal settlements—as with any neighbourhood, to understand their varied characteristics, economies, communities and politics prior to intervention (Un Habitat, 2011). An understanding of why a settlement is located where it is and how conveniently or otherwise it connects to opportunities in the urban area, along with the forms of intervention communities themselves wish pursue, are key to shaping informal settlement upgrading.
Huchzermeyer, Karam and Maina (2014) show that new informal settlement occurrence in Johannesburg is less widespread than sometimes assumed and correlates with the spread of new formal residential development—accommodating inter alia employees servicing those areas. Many of the City’s other informal settlements are associated with one of three large concentrations of formal low-income housing towards the edges of the metro area; alternatively with Alexandra, or associated with railway stations in the more central belt of the city and into Soweto (Huchzermeyer et al., 2014). There are almost no informal settlements in the traditional upmarket northern suburbs of the city. Writing in 2014 Huchzermeyer et al. note that many established informal settlements have seen little by way of improvement, despite an ostensibly supportive national and City policy environment in more recent years. The private land ownership underlying some settlements might help explain this.

In recent years growth of backyard dwellings in both old and new low-income residential areas in Johannesburg has been considerably more extensive than growth in the numbers of dwellings in informal settlements (Huchzermeyer et al., 2014). This latter constitutes a significant way in which densification of built-form is happening in Johannesburg (Todes et al., 2015), and is argued to offer a crucial layer of cheap accommodation for a diversity of users and form an important income source for small-scale landlords (Rubin and Gardner, 2013). It can have negative impacts such as straining infrastructure services, however, and over the years provincial and local authorities have responded in various ways to these pressures. Rubin and Gardner (2013) call for a ‘backyarding response framework’ within which the wide variety of backyard conditions can be understood and appropriately addressed, noting that both forward planning in new settlements as well as reactive strategies are needed.

Although not only accommodating poor people, ‘yard dwellings’ (in a range of physical forms) need to be recognised as forming an important part of a low income housing strategy across the city into the future.

4.2 Informality and Informal Economic Practices

Jenkins (2013) uses the term ‘alternative formalities’ rather than the term ‘informal’ as the latter term implies that there is a norm against which other non-compliant practices are judged to be sub-standard, inappropriate, or exceptional, with little nuance or distinction about their specific characteristics. He thus contests the binary that is set up between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, a position well supported in the literature which demonstrates many linkages between the two and the difficulty of disentangling them. Jenkins (2013) notes too that what is termed ‘informal’ in many African cities is in fact the norm due to the extent of its dominance. Despite the debates and contestations, the term ‘informal’ nevertheless
remains a useful shorthand for various practices occurring in cities, from forms of housing and transport, to economic activity, and it is well recognised that a substantive engagement with informal activities and what they mean for cities is an essential part of contemporary city management.

On the relevance of the informal economy specifically, evidence cited in the Aftrax report undertaken for the City of Johannesburg in 2014 showed that substantial numbers of people are dependent on informal economic activity in Johannesburg although the work is generally not well paid nor skilled (University of the Witwatersrand, 2014). It does generate jobs, however, and makes an important contribution to employment in the city (University of the Witwatersrand, 2014). As Brown and Lyons (2010, p. 33) note “in an age of globalization the street has become the new locus of employment for the urban poor.” It should also be noted that the informal and formal economy do not operate in isolation but rather that there are a set of interconnections and inter-relationships between the two sectors. Losby et al., (2002) argue that there are four main connections between the two sectors: an informal marketing chain, comprised of casual labourers employed by large firms; informal suppliers of products to the formal sector; and manufacturing and services which are sub-contracted to “independent operators” (Rajiman, 2001; Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987). Thus there are a set of upstream and downstream connections, which link the two in a variety of ways.

The informal economy has other benefits too: for example informal retail activity enables convenience shopping, smaller quantity purchases and other forms of flexibility for poor consumers by comparison with formal retailers. It can also be an important source of income for women. Informal trade can be very significant in economic terms as data from Durban’s Warwick Triangle intense retail activity shows. In Johannesburg, street trade is part of an estimated R9 billion in trade occurring in a space of ten blocks in the inner city each year through thousands of trading entities and millions of small transactions every month (JDA, 2013 cited in University of the Witwatersrand, 2014).

Some forms of informal economic activity have particular spatial dimensions. For example street trading is dependent on the communal resource of public space, often associated with public transport interchanges and pedestrian routes, and it “by definition contests for attention (space, visibility, presence) in high intensity areas of the city, putting pressure on space, resources, and services” (University of the Witwatersrand, 2014, p. 51). It is also argued that in these contexts traders can “contribute significantly to providing oversight of an area, offering regular and sustained periods of observation imbued with local knowledge: an ‘eyes and ears’ contribution to crime prevention and to alerting to social problems in an area” (University of the Witwatersrand, 2014, p. 57). However, conflicts
with other users arise, as often the public space has not been designed or planned for this form of activity (Brown, 2006), and there are competing demands that need to be mediated. The Aftrax report argues that the role of public space in supporting this activity whilst still managing the amenity of public space for others, needs key attention:

In a context of massive unemployment...the imperative of both the state and established private sector is in fact to maximize access to areas of economic opportunity in the public sphere. This requires a recognition that this category of public space can and should be promoted and defended for a range of users: commuters on foot and in vehicles, other recreational or destination pedestrians, and those touting goods and services. (University of the Witwatersrand 2014. 58)

In Johannesburg, supportive policies around street trade have become mired in conflict and controversy in recent years, with significant tensions developing between traders and City officials around the management of street trade, exemplified by the wholesale clearances of street traders by the City from the inner city under the heading ‘Operation Clean Sweep’ in 2013. The Aftrax report argues that over the years the City’s approach to street trade has variously shifted in nature between development, management and repression, but that even within the development stance there are problems: for example the survivalist nature of much of the trade is not recognised, leading to misguided assumptions about street trade merely being a stepping stone to more formal endeavours. (University of Witwatersrand, 2014).

The report argues that a key choice needs to be made by the City: to recognise the importance of street trade as part of the retail economy and then put energy into develop really appropriate support and management, or to see it as a problematic activity in the city needing to be minimised. The report contends the latter is not a realistic option, but that the former needs serious and careful attention, and is not something to be sidelined. For example, from this stance the key symbiotic relationship between trade and transport nodes, points of access such as BRT stations, and pedestrian routes would be recognised and actively fostered rather than the more typical approach of planning and managing these two activities in isolation of each other. Furthermore, there needs to be recognition of the interconnections between the informal and formal economies in the city, so that these networks can be supported for the mutual improvement of both.
4.3 Bottom-up Forms of Neighbourhood Change

Beyond the issue of street trade, attitudes of authorities across spheres of government to new forms of economic activity emerging in residential areas remain unclear (Charlton, Gardner and Rubin, 2014). In new low-income housing developments as well as many established suburbs a range of ‘bottom-up’ transformations of the built environment reflect forms of appropriation and adaption, much of it unauthorised, which are argued to be necessary to overcome limitations of housing developments under conditions of poverty and high unemployment (Charlton, 2013; Charlton et al., 2014; Lemanski, 2009). These changes echo alterations made by home-dwellers to state-provided housing in a variety of contexts across the world (see for example Ghannam, 2002; Tipple, 2000; Schlyter, 2003), argued in some contexts to represent a form of ‘DIY’ urbanism’ (Bouzarovski et al., 2010).

Changes evident in settlements around Johannesburg include the addition of separate rooms in yards for rental, increasingly including double or multi-storey versions of these (Gardner and Rubin, 2013), as well as structures housing a wide variety of commercial or retail services (Gardner and Rubin, 2013; Nell et al., 2011). In some cases these changes are seen in a negative light by authorities as ‘re-informalisation’ which runs counter to state intentions (Robins, 2003; Lemanski, 2009), particularly if more provisional forms of materials are used.

Whilst there can be negative impacts from some activities that may require mitigation and management, Charlton et al. (2014) argue that the changes need to be seen in an overall positive light, as ways in which areas evolve from sparse housing settlements to more liveable neighbourhoods “through densification, changes in function…and using houses as platforms for a range of social, economic and personal needs” (2014, p. 90). Amongst the drivers of these changes is the need for households to generate income in a climate of highly constrained job and employment opportunities, with many people exploring ways in which their home environment can serve as a site of income generation. Importantly, these forms of transformation are not only happening in new housing settlements but also in existing and established neighbourhoods in the city, altering the form and functioning of these areas in various ways that demand substantive engagement, not least for how the City chooses to support or mediate the contribution of these suburbs to its ideals of a denser, more mixed use and more integrated city.
5 Space and Economic Development

The economic dimensions of urban spatial form and the way these shape possible spatial futures is often not well addressed in municipal spatial plans in South Africa. There is often a strong ‘design’ approach, and a projection of desired spatial futures, which does not sufficiently take into account how economic logics shape spatial outcomes. This discussion does not attempt to cover the range of possible relationships, but rather focuses on the key questions around the location of economic development, and potentials for promoting development in less desired areas, across the city region, and within low-income areas, particularly the former townships.

A recent body of literature has emphasized the importance of agglomeration and clustering to economic development, arguing that agglomeration—or the spatial concentration of economic activities in cities—is crucial to growth since there are opportunities for sharing/mutual use of infrastructure, reduced distances between firms, easier interaction between firms, available of common sets of skilled, diverse labour markets, more likely innovation, etc. This analysis has underpinned the contemporary emphasis on big city growth in international policy circles in recent years (e.g. World Bank, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2013a). Turok (2013) however argues that these potentials are not necessarily realized in African cities due to their poor management and infrastructure. Whether forms of agglomeration economies apply at a more localized level within cities is perhaps an open question, although economic clustering within particular sectors is clearly evident in certain areas, for instance the finance and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sectors in parts of the North in Johannesburg. Urban economic theories would see location as the result of the demand by economic actors for particular spaces in relation to their cost and requirements, which might include access to certain consumer markets, labour markets, other firms, inter alia. From this perspective, the location of economic activities is not completely open, although it could be influenced by policies that understand and address these dimensions. It would nevertheless be important for policy to have a strong understanding of the important economic activities in the city, their needs for location, space, infrastructure and transport, and to respond appropriately. Although the planning department has undertaken analyses of industrial areas and office location, there is a need for more systematic understanding of the Johannesburg economy, and its implications.

Within Gauteng and Johannesburg, the spatial unevenness of economic development is clearly evident. The periphery of Gauteng includes several places focuses on a single dominant industry, such as mining,
steel or metals, many of which are in decline. It also includes some places where new growth is occurring around particular industries, for instance around the energy industry in Bronkhorstpruit or the motor industry in Rosslyn. The mega-human settlements provincial vision makes the assumption that economic development can be generated in peripheral and sometimes declining places. But can this assumption be sustained? What are the prospects?

Within Johannesburg itself, Gotz and Todes (2014) show the relatively high levels of spatial concentration of economic activity—on a series of nodes from the traditional CBD through places in the North, and more scattered development linked to the tertiary sector, industrial areas in the North, West and East. Although some economic activities are evident in the former townships, particularly Soweto, they remain relatively limited, despite considerable efforts to promote development there. This presents a significant tension and challenge for the municipality. How much room is there to promote development in these places, and what are the potentials?

Internationally, there have been three broad groups of policies which attempt to encourage economic development in economically marginal areas. Traditional ‘spatial rebalancing’ approaches (Todes and Turok, 2015) centred largely on infrastructure investment and incentives to industry to attract investment to peripheral areas. In the contemporary era, this includes initiatives such as free and special economic zones where particular conditions apply or are waived to encourage development. A second set of ‘place based’ approaches (Todes and Turok, 2015) adopts a broader based perspective, seeing place and region as resources for development, exploring local/regional potentials for economic development from a range of sectors which are important to the region or might have prospects there. It assumes that careful policies, appropriately adapted to context by well-resourced, competent institutions, can make a difference. Various forms of local economic development strategy are also consistent with this approach. A third, local ‘area-based’ based approach has sometimes been used in parts of cities as a way to address persistent poverty in particular places or local economic decline in these areas. These approaches can include a wide range of targeted interventions, from those focused on social issues such as education and health; to urban renewal or investment in the physical infrastructure, environment and property development; to initiatives to grow local economies through for instance small business support (Cameron et al, 2004, Turok, 1999).

In contrast to these approaches, there are powerful voices argues for a ‘space neutral’ approach (World Bank, 2009), avoiding ‘spatial targeting’. Rather, policy should focus on removing barriers to growth, and enabling efficient, well-regulated markets. In an urban context, efficient land markets that can respond
to changing demand are critical from this perspective. Policies can also ensure good basic infrastructural and social services, and strong transport links to connect across areas, enabling workers to move across the city.

In practice in South Africa, while there have been a variety of initiatives to promote local and regional economic development, Nel and Rogerson (2016, p. 4) comment:

Notwithstanding the concerted efforts put into these interventions, capacity and budget constraints, widespread corruption, low projects success levels, the politicisation of development, targeting of unsustainable community-based interventions and ultimately the challenge of attempting to coerce market-based forces to operate in areas with the limited prospects of profitability, has generally led to a lacklustre series of outcomes.

Local economic development initiatives have largely focused on community projects, although the big metropolitan municipalities have placed more focus on pro-market approaches (Rogerson and Nel, 2016).

This history and experience raises questions about the prospects for focusing development in peripheral and declining places within the region as assumed for instance in the provincial mega-human settlements approach. Of course, there may be potentials to find of new sources of economic growth and employment creation in these areas, as suggested by place-based approaches, and this could be explored. These are likely to be shaped by dominant trajectories of economic development within a region. However development on the periphery cannot be driven by housing on the assumption that economic development will occur. It requires particular resources, capacities and local advantages, as well as firms interested in their development. The difficulties of promoting economic development on the periphery need to be acknowledged. As indicated in a previous section, the history and experience of initiatives to create economic development on the periphery of cities internationally and in South Africa has been uneven, often creating narrow, unstable economies, hardly resilient spaces.

What of the townships? Both nationally and within Johannesburg, there have been significant initiatives to promote township economic development, including planning and development of land for industry, office and retailing; crime management, business improvement districts and design; training and skills development; business advice, support and networking; small business support; space for traders; tourism; urban agriculture; cooperatives and marketing; and links with external business (DPLG, 2006).
However a focus on physical infrastructure and design has generally been a dominant element, and there has sometimes been insufficient appreciation of markets and economic potentials.

Township shopping centres have also been an important focus, especially in Johannesburg and Soweto where large markets exist. The impact of these malls on small business in surrounding areas is however much debated, and effects may range depending on distance from the centre. Lighthelm (2010) for instance shows the 48% of firms within 5km on the Jabulani Mall in Soweto closed down within 2 years. Still, there is clearly some progress with promoting economic activities in Soweto, and there are levels of transformation with the area becoming relatively mixed in terms of income, and with improvements in infrastructure and services in the area (Harrison and Harrison, 2014). Nevertheless, there are potentials to go further. Given the dominance of corporate capital, and the way it has crowded out small business (Philip et al., 2014), township economic development strategies might be seen as a space for developing these potentials, particularly given the huge consumer markets in these areas. The growth of foreign spaza shops in townships represents a recent response to these opportunities, and is significant as a form of entrepreneurialism in these areas (Piper and Charman, 2012). Unfortunately, jealousy and xenophobic violence undermines this potential. Clearly, there are significant tensions around the forms of growth and economic activity in townships.

Karuri-Sebina (2014) argues that township economies are frequently understood in too narrow a way, and that they include much more varied economies than is generally acknowledged. Potential economic opportunities could be uncovered using a more nuanced exploratory approach. Strengthening human capital is likely to be important in this context. Broader approaches locating these spaces within the context of the city/city-region as a whole may be important, for instance exploring whether parts of the value chains for particular products could be produced there (Robbins, 2012), or encouraging public sector organizations and municipal offices to locate there (Karuri-Sebina, pers. comm., 2013), a strategy that has been used to promote development in lower income areas within some cities internationally.
6 City-Region Multi-Scalar Governance

The governance of complex metropolitan areas and city-regions has long been a source of debate in the international literature. Earlier debates centred on the value of consolidated versus fragmented forms of government. Strong arguments are made in this literature that more consolidated forms of government enable redistribution across cities that contain levels of spatial inequality, and that they enable the implementation of a common set of spatial and other policies across the city, allowing metropolitan areas to address issues such as sprawl (Ahrend et al., 2014; Purcell, 2001). Under fragmented government, these are difficult to achieve since the interests of separate municipalities and areas move in different directions. These arguments were significant in the restructuring of racially divided and fragmented local government into more consolidated forms in South Africa and in Johannesburg.

Although local government consolidation in South Africa has enabled significant levels of financial redistribution within the city, and has facilitated the development of a metropolitan spatial framework looking across the city, the complexity of governance in a large city-region with diverse interests, agencies and actors shapes spatial outcomes in significant ways, affecting the extent to which city spatial planning ideas can be realised.

First, local constituencies and other groupings are able to influence how development occurs in ways consistent with their visions. For instance, some well organised and resourced residents associations have been able to use the planning process to maintain the character of their areas (Rubin et al., 2015). This was also evident in relation to participation around the planning of the Corridors of Freedom, where initially proposed policies were significantly modified in certain areas through lobbying by residents associations (Peens, 2015). For many years as well, Soweto received considerable resources, in part due to the strong representation of politicians from this area within the Council. Developer interests have also been able to prevail in parts of the city, sometimes supported through political links (Rubin et al., 2015). These processes shape spatial plans and their implementation in practice.

Second, although Johannesburg is a large municipality by international standards, it nevertheless exists within a larger, integrated city-region. The built up area of Johannesburg merges with some adjacent municipalities, but there is very little effective inter-municipal cooperation. In some cases, there are significant disjunctures between Johannesburg’s vision and that of adjacent municipalities. For instance, Johannesburg’s vision of limiting growth in parts of the North-West has been in conflict with that of Mogale City, which has seen the area as a space for expansion (Klug et al., 2014). The provincial spatial
development framework may address some of these issues, but there is clearly a need for levels of cooperation between municipalities. Johannesburg’s interconnections with other municipalities on its edge is increasingly recognised in recent SDFs, for instance the current SDF talks to the need to link areas on the edge with more proximate nodes in other municipalities. Nevertheless, this could go much further. There is a need for closer cooperation between municipalities. Internationally, in more fragmented governance contexts, strategic spatial planning processes are sometimes used as a way to gather and mobilise the various institutions, actors and agents towards a common city-region vision and approach (e.g. Albrechts, 2001; Brenner, 2002).

Third, the different perspectives and visions between spheres of government with regard to spatial development also shape outcomes. There are some obvious examples, such as differences in perspective on the nature and location of housing projects, the orientation of transport, and in the current environment, the debate over mega-human settlements. The latter reflects the divergence in interests of a provincial government concerned in part to create a new vision of city development, in contrast to Johannesburg’s focus on restructuring the existing city, but also its concern to promote development on the periphery of the province, benefitting a wider set of municipalities, rather than focusing on what is seen as the developed core.

However, the way spatial policy is shaped is more complex than what can be captured by simple hierarchical models of government. The literature on ‘multi-scalar governance’ reflects an attempt to engage with and develop concepts to understand the institutional geography of power that affects decision-making in the context of shifts in institutional landscapes, especially towards decentralisation, privatisation, and the inclusion of a wider range of actors in governance (Brenner, 2004). This literature explores the various ways in which power is exercised in multi-scalar contexts as “multiple, overlapping, tangled, interpenetrating and relational” (Allen and Cochrane, 2010, p. 1072). Allen and Cochrane (2010, p.1073) argue for moving beyond a simple hierarchical approach, suggesting that power is exercised through an “assemblage of political actors, some public, some private, where elements of the central and local state are ‘lodged’ within the region, not acting ‘above’ or ‘below’ or ‘alongside’ it”. The specific ways in which power is exercised is of course highly contextual and needs to be understood. To do this, it is necessary to trace “the different lines of authority, negotiation and engagement, and how they criss-cross one another in terms of their distinctive rhythms and spatial practices” (Allen and Cochrane, 2010, p. 1077). This allows us to understand policy contradictions and debates, and the challenges of implementation in a more practical way. This kind of nuance is not present in the GDS, or usually
documents of this sort, but might assist in working though programmatic responses to policy challenges, enabling bottlenecks to be addressed.
7 The 2011 GDS and Draft SDF

The previous sections have outlined key literatures addressing spatial change internationally and in South Africa and Johannesburg, and has drawn out some of the key issues, tensions, conflicts and trade-offs facing spatial policy in Johannesburg, with some reference to the GDS 2011 and current draft 2016 SDF. This section provides an assessment of these documents, drawing from the discussion in these sections and comments on the validity of the directions suggested in these documents, as well as possible gaps and areas needing attention. The document concludes by providing recommendations.

Sustainability, Liveability and Urban Compaction/Restructuring

Both the 2011 GDS and the draft 2016 SDF emphasise resilience, sustainability, liveability, and the importance of urban compaction and spatial restructuring to these ends. On the analysis presented here, these are still important orientations and points of focus, including the argument that “decision-making in respect of new neighbourhood development [should] include issues of access, location, mobility, quality and liveability” (GDS, 2011, p. 26); the emphasis on improving mobility through investment in public transport; and building an urban form that its energy efficient.

Nevertheless there is an argument that the emphasis on compaction can drive up land prices and can be exclusionary in this sense. This aspect is not considered in either document. Whether this is an issue for Johannesburg needs assessment—it is not immediately apparent that it is a concern. There is a need to monitor land prices (also in the form of rentals of different types) in relation to both formal and informal markets to ensure that land prices remain affordable.

Social Inclusion and the Right to the City

The emphasis on social inclusion and countering segregation in both documents is still important, although neither approach goes so far as to embrace and explore the ‘right to the city’. There is for instance little attention to the exploration of land policies and mechanisms that might enable greater inclusion, such as Brazil’s special zones for social purposes (ZEIS). This is an area that could be considered in future.

The GDS and SDF both consider issues of spatial exclusion and urban sprawl and the mechanisms by which these are being entrenched such as gated communities and CIDs. The GDS recognises that “urban crime and violence and private developer-led housing have created islands of exclusion, adding another
layer to the already fractured and divided city” (GDS, 2011, p. 76). Seen as self-segregation and not contributing to spatial justice the SDF does recognize that there is a need to move “From gated private spaces to accessible public spaces” (SDF, 2016, p. 48). However what is not clear from either document are the mechanisms or plans that might be used to attempt to mitigate further enclosures and gatings, especially considering that the structural conditions which contribute to the demand for such spaces are likely to increase over the next few years given the economic downturn and slow rate of growth.

**Challenging Predominant Spatial Patterns**

The 2016 SDF provides a brave vision that does challenge the predominant pattern of spatial development, and this is to be applauded. However it is largely in contradiction with the pattern of development that property developers are used to producing. This includes policy advocacy of higher density development; brownfields development; mixed uses; the critique of gated and segregated development; resistance to inclusionary housing; inter alia. It also includes the development of large peripheral housing estates by government departments and agencies. While there is some progress with aspects of the vision as discussed in this document, in other respects, the disjuncture between policy visions and trends remains, raising the question of how the municipality takes this on, and how it is best tackled? Can it be done through regulation—is this sufficient and likely to be effective?

The SDF proposes new forms of regulation in priority areas and with regard to large developments. The new approaches envisaged are likely to require considerable negotiation by skilled planners with developers. However, if the City opts for allowing city planners to negotiate using their discretion then there are set of questions that need to be considered: Does the City have the capacity and resources to make this possible, and to achieve the required outcomes on the ground? Research by Zack and Silverman (2012) pointed to limitations in this regard—seemingly, more highly skilled staff are needed in spatial planning to begin to achieve these outcomes. This is not simply an operational issue, but needs to be addressed at a strategic level.

Linked to this point, neither document places sufficient attention on promoting the spatial vision, on persuading stakeholders, government, communities and developers that it is a better approach. The GDS does talk about building compacts between municipality, business, communities and citizens around developing an urban form that is energy efficient. However it is not clear this has received much emphasis in practice. Hence more attention needs to be given to mobilising support for particular directions, for implementing actions, and developing mechanisms to make this possible. It also requires
more engagement with the property development industry around the vision, and what is feasible. The SDF does make a point about providing certainty and confidence in the market, but this does not necessarily mean that developers will buy into their vision. Mobilising support for particular visions, and engaging with stakeholders around it is a key part of strategic planning. Whether this is undertaken through education, mutual policy development or some other mechanism, it is clear that the modes of participation in the city need to strengthened and diversified.

**Urban Safety**

The design dimensions identified in both documents (mixed use, walkable environments, street frontages, etc.) and the need to create safer environments and to promote the use of public transport remain important. The GDS included approaches to address questions of safety, but it is not known whether these have been implemented, or how effective they have been. This remains a key issue to be addressed, which severely undermines the prospects for the development of an alternative urban form. In addition, aside from design-related elements to urban safety, there needs to be a consideration of the non-physical aspects that promote safer environments such as community cohesion, better policing, and improved state and society relations.

**Densification**

Both the GDS and the SDF promote urban densification, which is supported on the analysis in this paper. It would support the SDFs view of seeing densification in the context of urban environmental quality, not just a focus on numbers and targets. There is however a need to go further in relation to addressing densification, seeing it as a process that is occurring and needs to be managed in different ways across the city. This is likely to require nuanced assessment of formal proposals, and working across departments to ensure that the required infrastructure to support larger numbers is developed in areas that are experiencing densification.

**Public Transport and Spatial Access**

The emphasis in the GDS on shifting towards public transport is supported in our analysis. However it is questionable whether the current focus on the Rea Vaya is sufficient to address issues of access. At present, it only reaches parts of the city, and it is underused with large subsidies required, and is not much used by the urban poor. More attention needs to be paid to improving conditions around more
ubiquitous forms of public transport that reach larger areas of the city, as well as to links and connections across the city-region.

**Spatial Focus and Neglected Areas**

Linked to this point, the SDF focuses on creating a compact polycentric city, with attention to particular corridors and nodes. This includes a wider set of areas than in the past SDFs, which prioritised certain corridors, the inner city, and marginalised areas. In strategic planning, choices will always need to be made about the investment focus, and it is inevitable that some places receive more attention than others. Nevertheless, places which have been outside of the SDFs spatial focus, such as the southern suburbs, or which have sometimes grown contrary to policy, such as the North-West, have in some cases been neglected. There is a need to look at what policies and strategies can be put in place to improve liveability in these areas, given that the priority focus might be elsewhere.

**Demographic Projections**

Both the GDS and SDF include quite broad demographic projections. However there is a need to understand more closely the dimensions of demographic change and its implications for space, in particular the growing proportion of the urban poor, the coming reality of an ageing population, and the intersections between a large youthful population, unemployment and space.

**Accommodating the Urban Poor**

One of the biggest tensions facing the city’s spatial future is the question of how the urban poor are accommodated. Both the GDS and SDF emphasise social inclusion, and this is critically important, but where and how the urban poor are to be accommodated remains unresolved. Policies towards inclusionary housing—still a gap in all spheres of government, and a policy that the SDF appropriately emphasises and is working hard to put in place, still only accommodates address a minority of those who qualify for ‘affordable housing’. The large bulk of the urban poor would not be accommodated in this way. It is not clear where and how these groups are to be accommodated in the city and how they are to sustain their lives. This is a critical area that needs to be addressed.

**Addressing Bottom-Up Processes of Change**

A key gap in both documents, linked to the point above, is a focus on the actual processes of change occurring in the city, and how neighbourhoods are transforming, very often through informal processes,
as discussed in this document. We argue that the city is transforming through these processes, and
neighbourhoods are becoming denser, mixed use in many areas. Places like RDP housing areas are
functioning since people are adapting these places, for instance through processes like backyard
housing, densification, home based work, and mixed uses such as taverns. Processes of change are not
only occurring in poorer areas, but are happening across the city. Some of these processes are
uncomfortable for the state, and bring up issues such as nuisance, long a concern in planning. However,
the underlying causes of informality, particularly poverty and unemployment, are getting worse and
there is a need for the City to address more constructively the ways in which people adapt. Although
many of these processes are consistent with ideas in the GDS and SDF, they may be far messier than the
imagined ideal.

There is a need for the City to understand and engage with these processes of change, and with
informality and the limits of formal regulatory planning, to develop positions on how these processes
are viewed and managed, and to develop appropriate management strategies. This will generally
require close inter-departmental working. While strategic spatial policies may ostensibly accept some of
these processes, such as street trade, the management of these processes is often separated into the
hands of other departments, which take different views. For instance, the disjuncture between stated
supportive policies towards street trade in the GDS versus actions to the contrary on the ground. In
some instances, the SDF talks positively of these processes, for instance informal back yarding, and this is
important in recognising and appreciating these processes and their value, but it is not clear what is
planned and taken forward in terms of policy and action.

Policy and Institutional Integration

Linked to this point, there is a need for better integration of policies. While both documents recognise
the potentials of TOD and the kind of environments that are required to support it, new transport nodes
such as the Gautrain and the Rea Vaya bus stops have not been planned to accommodate informal and
other trade. However these are precisely the spaces that provide the market potential for these
activities.

Similarly the question of densification, housing and transport need to be more closely institutionally
aligned, and policies from various departments need to speak to each other in order for the GDS and
SDF’s spatial vision is to be achieved.
Public Space

Both documents need support the promotion of good public spaces. It is useful to go further to look at places where positive forms of inclusion are occurring, for instance, public spaces that are commonly used by various groups, and how these dimensions can be built on and extended, and how positive public qualities can be encouraged in private spaces such as shopping malls.

Displacement and Gentrification

Places of public sector intervention such as the Corridors and the Inner City may involve levels of displacement. However this is not addressed in the GDS and SDF, and should be considered. Further, the GDS, the SDF and more recently the current Corridors of Freedom launched by the City need to be cognisant of the dangers inherent in gentrification for poorer people and there are signals that the City is aware of these issues: “market correction mechanisms must be in place to protect beneficiaries of inclusionary housing from displacement through gentrification” and the statement that there is a need to “set-up framework for land readjustment/pooling to enable home owner driven dense mixed-use development and preventing gentrification” (SDF, 2016, p.74), however without effective inclusionary housing policies it is unlikely that poorer households will be protected from market forces especially in places where gentrification is being supported through local government policies.

Gender

There are few mentions of women or gender relations in either document, although there is some discussion of diversity. In the GDS it is largely in relation to the Millennium Development Goals. However where the issue is mentioned, the GDS notes that the City will continue to work with marginalised communities such as women, however, what the City needs to realise is that women constitute half the City’s population and thus should not be a marginalised community but rather that their experiences and needs are ‘mainstream’. There is a need to understand and engage with these experiences, to incorporate these insights into policy.

Migrants

The GDS does seem to be quite sensitive to the issues of cross border migrants and the shortcomings of current approaches: a policy response both at national and local level is not evident. The local development paradigm is profoundly shaped by migration, yet policy responses lag behind these transformations. Migrants—both from within South Africa and beyond—are testing the efficacy of local
democratic participatory processes, with intervention into the creation of a different mindset necessary, if Johannesburg is to fully benefit from what the unique blend of its people. This is likely to remain an important dynamic well into the future (GDS, 2011, p. 22) The GDS notes a number of strategies including education and participation that will be needed if further xenophobia and social conflict is to be avoided.

**Space and Economic Development**

The links between space and economic development are not strongly made in either the GDS or the SDF, although both include an emphasis on diversifying and strengthening the economy of the former townships and areas housing the poor. There is also an understanding of the significance of location and agglomeration, acceptance of informal trade, plans for industrial growth, and transport systems supporting economic development. These are all important, but further strands could be explored. There needs to be greater exploration of a variety of approaches to supporting economic development in economically marginal areas as noted, and the blockages to development there. There is also a need for a stronger understanding of Johannesburg’s economy, and related requirements for location, space, infrastructure and transport. Linked to this, the basic everyday functioning of industrial estates and other economic spaces, and transport supporting these places require consideration. For instance, a recent study of industrial estates is finding that the lack of public transport in the evening is inhibiting shift work (Roberts, pers. comm.). Finding solutions to basic blockages and gaps may be important in stimulating development in the city.

**Johannesburg in a City-Region and Cross-Border Planning**

The GDS and SDF recognise that Johannesburg is not an island, and in the GDS, transport links and connections are suggested to surrounding municipalities where appropriate. However there is a need to go further, to look more explicitly at cross-border planning to ensure greater synergy between spatial visions and investments. Some of this is occurring at the provincial level, but there are also more detailed issues that need to be addressed between municipalities.

**Monitoring and Evaluation**

One limitation of the GDS is that it does not address the need for monitoring and evaluation of the plans. How have policy intentions been realised, and what have been the blocks? In relation to spatial planning, sophisticated systems were put in place to monitor the spatial plans in terms of development
applications and approvals. However this fell away at a point, although the SDF indicates that it will be done in future. This is an important emphasis, which needs support, but ideally should also be extended to include monitoring of informal processes of change. This may require additional capacity.
8 Recommendations

Several key recommendations emerge from this analysis.

- Our analysis supports the City’s continued focus on urban compaction policies, and its resistance to the ‘new city’ idea, which we have argued to be contrary to ideas of sustainability and resilience, and is likely to create sterile housing areas with poor access to economic opportunities and reliance on commuting.
- There is nevertheless a need to monitor land prices and their impact on affordability and the evidence is clear that leaving the spatial vision to market forces, will most likely have very negative impacts on the poor.
- Patterns of socio-spatial and demographic change need to be monitored, so that policies can be developed that respond appropriately to contemporary change.
- The City needs to place more attention on understanding processes of bottom-up change in the city, and developing policies and strategies that respond to these processes.
- Greater attention needs to be given to investigating the position of the urban poor within the, and how they can be accommodated and the links between the formal and informal sectors, and how they can be accommodated. Understanding bottom-up processes, and how the urban poor are accommodated through for instance small scale landlords, informal processes, densification, etc. is part of this, as well as understanding better the spatial and temporal impacts of some livelihood and survival strategies.
- There is a need to explore land policies and mechanisms which assist in the promoting access by the poor to reasonably well-located land in the city.
- More attention needs to be paid to mobilising support for the City’s spatial vision, including engaging with stakeholders around it.
- Specific attention needs to be given to gender inequality and women’s experience of the city. There is a large body of work which provides approaches enabling systematic assessment.
- Safety remains a concern that needs to be addressed—it remains a major issue for all groups in society, and compaction policies in effect depend on improvement in these conditions.
- Although a spatial focus is inevitable in strategic planning, ways of improving the quality of life across the city, in areas that are not prioritised are needed.
• More attention needs to be given to understanding Johannesburg’s economy, and requirements for location, space, infrastructure and transport.

• There needs to be more exploration of diverse ways of further developing the economies of former townships, and building entrepreneurialism there.

• Planning will require a larger number of highly skilled planners to take on the various spatial challenges in the City, and to negotiate for better spatial outcomes, and to manage spatial change. This will also require closer links between Planning and other departments concerned with the management of change.

• There needs to be a much stronger connection between policies and implementation. This document has identified a number of disjunctures that need to be addressed. In many cases, the broad policy directions are sound, but the way the policy is to be taken further is not clear. Further, there are instances where practical actions are in direct contrast to strategic policy statements.

• Mechanisms to undertake ongoing monitoring and evaluation of spatial policies needs to be supported, and seen as an integral part of strategic planning.
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