THE CAPACITY FOR MONITORING & EVALUATION SYSTEMS IN THE NORTH WEST PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

by

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A Thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Public and Development Management in fulfilment of 50 percent of the requirement for the degree of Master of Management in Public Policy

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University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

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DECLARATION

I, Themba Japie Mataka, declare that this thesis is my own unaided work, and that all technical guidance and advice which I have enjoyed is detailed in the acknowledgements; that all field work and data collection was conducted by me; and that I am responsible for the text of this study and all conclusions reached. No part of this thesis has been submitted in the past, or is being submitted to any institution of higher learning for academic purpose. The data applied in the Thesis was sourced in 2013 and 2014 while I was under the employ of the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (North West Province), and a registered candidate for the degree of Master of Management in Public Policy

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DATE: ______________
ABSTRACT

The South African government has extended the constitutional mandate of the Auditor-general to cater specifically for performance information in the public sector, which has resulted in the rollout of a Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation system designed to enhance efficiency, accountability and transparency in the public sector. This study investigated the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems that caused a majority of the North West provincial government departments to receive qualified opinion on performance information between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years.

A qualitative approach was used, supported by interviews and documentary analysis to extract rich data. The capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the provincial departments manifested themselves in the form of inadequate oversight role; poor leadership; malicious compliance; lack of approved M&E policies; lack of uniformity in M&E structure and location; lack of M&E skills, inadequate budget; lack of accountability and transparency. The overall conclusion of the study is that adequate oversight role and effective leadership, and political stability are central in the implementation process of M&E systems.

Key recommendations of the study include amongst others capacitating the institutional oversight structures and leadership; approved M&E policies; streamline M&E systems; all programme managers should account for the M&E function; M&E systems should be fully resourced; and capacitate the M&E fora.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my greatest gratitude to both Prof. Susan Booysen and Mr. Murray Cairns for their immense technical advice and guidance in the production of the thesis report. The former ceased from supervising me in the first semester of the current academic year due to her Sabbatical Leave, but there was a smooth transition between the supervisors.

The North West Provincial Government, specifically the Department of Culture, Arts and Traditional Affairs, deserves credit for financing for my studies.

The thesis report is dedicated to my parents Mrs Motlalepula Mataka and the late Mr. Amos Mataka for have invested their limited resources towards my total up-bringing, more so for my schooling. I remain indebted to my wife Lerato, and children Vuyani and Kholiswa for allowing me time and space to run the race with energy and speed it deserves, indeed family quality time was sacrificed for my studies. I am also grateful to my siblings, especially Raphepheng, relatives, friends and colleagues for being supportive towards achieving my academic goal.

Steven Covey states that, “Whatever the mind of a man can conceive and believe in it, can achieve”.

### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfrEA</td>
<td>Africa Evaluation Association</td>
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<td>AG</td>
<td>Auditor General</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>Africa Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Capacity Development</td>
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<td>DPME</td>
<td>Department of Performance, M&amp;E</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMPPI</td>
<td>Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information</td>
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<td>GWM&amp;E</td>
<td>Government-wide M&amp;E</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information Communication Technology</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MFMA</td>
<td>Municipal Finance Management Act</td>
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<td>MPAT</td>
<td>Management Performance Assessment Tool</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NEPF</td>
<td>National Evaluation Policy Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation Development</td>
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<td>PFMA</td>
<td>Public Finance Management Act</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Performance Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASQAF</td>
<td>South Africa’s Statistical Quality Assessment Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Reliable and Time-bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Public Service Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM&amp;E</td>
<td>Participatory M&amp;E</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAI</td>
<td>Supreme Audit Institution</td>
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<td>SOEs</td>
<td>State Owned Enterprises</td>
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<td>Statssa</td>
<td>Statistics South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

In the current era, a result-based monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system, transparency and accountability are deeply embedded in the modern government systems. This arises from the need for societies to exercise their democratic rights by holding governments accountable for conduct and performance. This trend includes the government of South African, which strives to integrate a results-based M&E system in its budget systems and operational plans as an attempt to ensure that limited public resources are channelled towards rendering basic services better and faster. Generally, a results-based M&E system is implemented as an instrument that can gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of government policies in terms of rendering public services.

This thesis investigates the extent to which capacity gaps and systems problems in a result-based M&E system has compromised transparency and accountability in South Africa’s North West provincial government departments.

1.2 Research topic and objectives of the study

The research focuses its enquiry on the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments in relation to good governance. Good governance is an abstract concept that defines basic processes and procedures that should be followed as a measure to pursue effective service delivery and democracy. Governments, including the South African government, experience internal and external pressure as an outcome of communities, businesses and non-governmental organizations that are increasingly becoming aware of issues that are related to good governance. As an outcome of this awareness, organisations demand that their governments become more accountable, transparent, effective and efficient in terms of service delivery. In order to promote transparency, accountability and to
improve performance, M&E at both strategic and operational levels has become increasingly important (Naidoo, 2011).

A number of authors (see for instance Kusek and Rist, 2004; Mackay, 2006; World Bank, 2000) argue that the emphasis on result-based M&E systems is propelled by the need to promote transparency and accountability, thereby improving financial and non-financial performance of modern governments. A number of developing countries, including South Africa and the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) countries have taken a political stance to measure outcomes in order to improve performance and accountability (Brushett, 1998; Kusek and Rist, 2004; Mackay, 2006; World Bank, 2000).

M&E became a key strategy within the SA government, and in 2010 the Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation within the presidency was set up to drive it, and all government departments were required to set up M&E functions internally. The Department of Performance, M&E has been responsible for the development of policy frameworks and guidelines that are intended at supporting departments, municipalities and state owned enterprises to establish their own M&E systems. In May 2014, the national departments were reconfigured as an attempt to streamline the departmental mandates mainly for improving the quality of service delivery. The then Department of Planning Commission and the Department of performance, M&E was reconfigured, and this gave rise to the establishment of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation that is led by Minister Jeff Radebe.

Governments perceive result-based M&E systems as a tool that can measure their financial and non-financial performance. The World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Common Wealth Learning, the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) are some of the organizations that have been instrumental in developing guidelines that
are aimed at building government capacity to establish and institutionalize their own M&E systems.

“Without effective and accountable institutions, systems, processes and political will, economic gains are not automatically translated into development outcomes or registered as Millennium Development Goals (MDG) achievements” (UNDP, 2010: p15). Millennium Development Goals could be defined as the global partnership that has time frames and quantified targets that are aimed at addressing poverty in developing economies. The establishment of the government-wide M&E system (GWM&E) has been influenced by the result-based M&E guidelines that were developed by the above-mentioned organizations.

Although considerable progress is being made in achieving the set targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it has been found that the developing countries lack reliable statistics that could be applied to gauge their own developments (United Nations, 2013: p58). The South African government has established a government-wide M&E system as a measure to deliver on transparency and accountability as required in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. For instance, the country requires adequate, accurate, reliable and verifiable information that can be used to develop policies and interventions to promote transparency and accountability in the organs of state. In an ideal situation, the Offices of the Premiers have a critical role to play in ensuring that their provincial departments and municipalities have the capacity to use the government-wide monitoring and evaluation (GWM&E) system to design their customized M&E system, but in reality certain departments struggle to institutionalize their M&E systems and the submission of accountability reports were not monitored (Auditor-general, 2014: p13) in the municipalities of the North West province.

Monitoring is a systematic management tool that is applied during data management processes for the purpose of generating performance information that is accurate and reliable for decision-making processes (see The Presidency, 2007; Kusek and Rist,
The quality of data that has been collected, collated and analysed has a bearing on decisions that could be taken by the management and other major stakeholders pertaining to the implementation of projects, programs, and policies.

A result-based M&E system is a necessary tool that measures the effectiveness of internal management control systems, and when applied appropriately it could identify discrepancies between the utilised resources and the actual outputs. Monitoring is a data management process that is continuous in nature and its ultimate objective is to provide adequate, accurate, reliable and verifiable information that could be applied to influence decision-making processes (*ibid*).

Evaluation is a system that is focused towards analysing the impact that is yielded by the projects, programs or policies. An effective result-based M&E system should enable end users to disaggregate performance information per government, ministry, and agency, manager and support staff with ease.

South Africa is celebrating its twentieth year since the landmark 1994 elections, yet there are still organs of state that lack capacity in terms of M&E systems. For instance, in the North West provincial government there are entities and municipalities that operate without M&E Units, despite the requirement for all public institutions to have an internal control system for measuring performance. This lack could result in late or non-submission of financial and non-financial performance information to the Office of the Auditor-general during audit process period.

In terms of the Public Audit Act No. 25 of 2004 the Auditor-general of South Africa has the mandate to audit both financial and non-financial performance of all three spheres of government, namely the national, provincial and local governments as well as state owned enterprises (SOEs) on an annual basis. Late or non-submission of performance information defeats the Constitutional obligation of promoting transparency and accountability in the public service. “The value of M&E does not come simply from
conducting M&E or from having such information available; rather, the value comes from using the information to help improve government performance” (Mackay, 2007: p9).

There is a need for an effective participatory or civic M&E system in the North West provincial government departments in order to achieve clean audit reports moving forward. Participatory M&E approaches occur when the government embarks on stakeholder consultation processes with the aim of improving performance, transparency and accountability. The nature of comments from such platforms allows government to fine-tune and strengthen its M&E systems. This M&E approach could be rolled-out in the form of M&E forums or customer satisfaction surveys. A civic M&E approach takes place when non-governmental actors judge the government based on its financial or non-financial performance using for instance annual reports, which could be used as evidence by the public to support or challenge the government. In the provincial context, there are departments, entities and municipalities that are not posting their annual reports on their websites, and this denies the general public their Constitutional right regarding access to public information.

This research arises from the view that results-based M&E systems in the province have not yet matured to the level of participatory or civic approaches, and this could be attributed to the number of departmental M&E Units that lack capacity. The existence and effectiveness of the departmental M&E Units depends entirely on the level of support and commitment from the departmental management committee. Put into context, the departmental M&E reports that are ratified by management are minimally considered during the decision-making processes, meaning that reports are generated for compliance purposes. M&E units that are not participatory by nature are restricted from publicising their M&E outcomes, as the existence and operation of such units is highly dependent on political will and operational mandate which is defined by the management of the department (Naidoo, 2011: p61).
1.3 Problem statement

Between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years, more than half (Auditor-general, 2013: p15) of the North West provincial government departments received qualified opinions on non-financial performance information. Failure to provide portfolios of evidence that is packaged per targeted performance indicator, and an inability to give reasons for deviations from the approved annual performance plans compromised the departments’ submissions. The Management performance assessment tool (MPAT) reports for the past two financial years also indicated that the North West provincial government departments failed to provide portfolios of evidence to corroborate the submitted information.

The AG reports suggest that there is still a grey area in the provincial departments in terms of the oversight role that should be provided by the provincial leadership regarding data management processes. The reports further reveal that a majority of the provincial departments have developed a trend of submitting non-financial performance information that is inadequate, inaccurate and that could not be supported by portfolios of evidence. For instance, it is contained in the annual report for 2012/13 financial year that the provincial departments could not account for 93 percent of major variances. The National Treasury Framework for Managing Performance Planning Information was designed to prescribe data management processes and procedures that should be followed during data collection, data packaging and data analysis. Lastly, the reports indicate that the provincial departments could not provide reasons for any disjuncture between their actual performance achievements and their annual performance plans. In terms of the National Treasury Guide and Framework of 2007, all auditees should ensure that in the process of preparing their annual performance reports they should always provide motivation for major variances between performance targets and the actual outputs; and such reports should also be supported by adequate and reliable corroborating evidence.
This thesis provides background on the global principles and practices that have influenced the establishment of the framework for results-based M&E system. Secondly, the South African government’s *modus operadi* regarding the implementation of the government-wide M&E systems as a measure to pursue good governance will be investigated.

### 1.4 Research purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems that resulted a majority of the North-West Province departments not receiving clean audit reports on performance information between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years.

### 1.5 Research questions

What capacity gaps and systems problem in the monitoring and evaluation systems caused the majority of North West provincial government departments to receive qualified opinions on non-financial performance between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years?

In order to resolve the main question, it will also attempt to resolve the following sub-questions:-

i. Do the North West provincial government departments have their own monitoring and evaluation policies in place?

ii. Is M&E function incorporated in job descriptions of managers who are involved in data management processes?

iii. Do the North West provincial government departments have capacity for monitoring and evaluation?
iv. Which internal control systems are in place for addressing deviations from annual performance plans?

1.7 Structure of the research report

The research report comprises six chapters that will take the following sequence. Chapter one is aimed at introducing the research topic and the field of study by giving a brief background on M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments. The literature review on M&E systems and good governance will be dealt with in the second chapter. Chapter three will focus on research methodology, and chapter four, on the research findings. The research findings will be analysed in chapter five. The last chapter will provide the recommendations and conclusions of the research report.
CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

With more opportunity to promote broad-based participation in development, there is increasing recognition that M&E should be participatory (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p1). Therefore, there is a significant body of academic work from developed and developing countries including South Africa, that focuses on M&E systems as an instrument that is geared at promoting transparency and accountability (see Carlsson and Engel, 2002; Chelimsky, 2006; Engela and Ajam, 2010; Goldman et al., 2012; Gorgens and Kusek, 2010; Kusek and Rist; 2004; Mackay, 2007; Mayne, 2000; Patton, 1997; Preskill and Russ-Eft, 2005). This chapter will take two-pronged approach: it will deal specifically with literature on M&E systems on the one hand; and good governance systems in the public sector on the other. The significance of the review is to reflect relevance and interconnectedness of the principles of good governance and M&E in decision-making processes in the modern government institutions.

2.2 What is a M&E system?

Increasingly around the world, participatory M&E is being used across a range of purposes and sectors (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p5). A results-based M&E system is interpreted and implemented differently by the public and private sectors. M&E is described as management tool that could be applied to enhance performance of public and private sectors. “The value of M&E does not come simply from conducting M&E or from having such information available; rather, the value comes from using the information to help improve government performance” (Mackay, 2007: p9). The literature shows that an effective M&E system is a requirement for any organization that is results-based as a measure to enhance transparency and accountability.

The OECD (2002a: p21 & 27) defines M&E as follows:

"Monitoring is a continuous function that uses the systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds".
“Evaluation is the systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, program, or policy, including its design, implementation, and results. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision making process of both recipients and donors”.

### 2.3 Types of M&E systems

Scholars have different views of what M&E means and what it is intended to achieve. For instance, the introduction of a results-based M&E system (Kusek and Rist, 2004: p xi) capacitates decision-makers in terms of measuring the actual outputs that have been derived from the applied limited resources; and the proponents of such views within this spectrum are from those who perceive M&E system as supporting a pure accountability function (Naidoo, 2011:p41). The group that perceives M&E systems as supporting a pure accountability function is biased towards the field of auditing, compliance and performance management (Cooke, 2006). There are M&E systems that are aimed at promoting governance functions, thereby making government actors accountable for their performance. For instance, in the South African context, the Auditor-general, Public Service Commission and the general public have the Constitutional Rights to hold state organs accountable for poor service delivery. Such state organs are judged based on the set standards and norms that have been attached to each and every performance area. Ultimately, the use and purpose of participatory M&E systems depends largely on the particular objectives and information needs of the project or programme initiative (UPWARD, 1997).

Apart from M&E serving the very necessary purpose of accountability it also is meant to promote the “learning organization” (Naidoo, 2011: p42). Performance information that is derived from the M&E system should be objective in terms of identifying both the strengths and weaknesses of any institution that has been subjected to the system. Weaknesses that have been identified through the system should be prioritised for the sole purpose of converting them into the organisational gains. “The yardstick of success is the extent to which the M&E information is being used to improve government
performance” (Mackay, 2007: p2). Results-based M&E systems should not be viewed as an instrument that is applied to police the performance of employees; instead it should serve to reflect deficiencies between the organizational predetermined objectives and the actual performance. And therefore, deviations from the set standards and norms that have been exposed by a results-based M&E system warrant a remedial action (Mackay, 2007; Naidoo, 2011; Preskill and Russ-Eft, 2005).

Application of evaluation system could be tedious considering that it is easily influenced by psychological, methodological and political factors. “These factors overlap, but what is clear is that unless all the elements are lined up, organizational learning is difficult” (Mayne, 2000: p29). A results-based M&E system does not operate in a vacuum, and therefore political, methodological and psychological factors that are related to the system should be streamlined as an attempt to produce adequate, accurate, reliable and verifiable information that would enhance the decision-making processes (Mayne, 2000; Naidoo, 2011). Evaluation has the potential to allow organizations to learn from their unsatisfactory performance.

A utility-focused M&E system (Patton, 1997) challenges M&E practitioners to raise questions about the entire data management processes including roles and responsibilities. M&E practitioners should be more concerned about the quality of data collected in relation to its relevance in decision-making processes, and they strive to generate information that would necessitate political principals to make informed decisions. Focus is mainly on the extent to which performance information that has been generated through the M&E system could enhance decision making processes. “A sound M&E system should not just improve compliance; it should also enhance the reflective capacity of organizations, whilst simultaneously increasing transparency, accountability and supporting a culture of learning” Engel and Carlesson, 2002.

2.4 The evolution of M&E systems
Globally, there is an increased focus on M&E by donors, governments and non-governmental organisations (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p3). There is growing interest in participatory M&E systems as a measure to counter more traditional top-down approaches to evaluation. Developing economies are characterised by inability to implement internal management systems that could be applied to measure the effectiveness of their policies, programs and plans; and therefore the establishment of an effective M&E system would be an insurmountable task for such economies.. The adoption of the MDGs has encouraged the developing economies to design and implement their own M&E systems as a measure to pursue good governance (see Kusek and Rist, 2004:p25; Mackay, 2007; Mkandawire, 2001).

The focus on M&E system is influenced largely by factors such as the growth in the number and membership of national, regional, and global evaluation associations (Mackay, 2007: p9). Global evaluation associations, including AfrEA, have stimulated the application of M&E systems moreover in the developing economies. For instance, AfrEA was geared at pursuing predetermined goals (World Bank, 2000: pxv) such as supporting national governments to establish M&E policies, institutionalization of M&E systems, and allocation of adequate resources for the implementation of the system. Lastly, AfrEA had the responsibility to establish structures that could be applied to familiarize end users with the development, requirements and usage of M&E systems. “Implementing a performance M&E system is an exercise in induced institutional innovation requiring mature consultation to strengthen and shape the demand for evaluation information” (Ruttan, 2006: p252).

UNDP (2010: p15) claims that, “without effective and accountable institutions, systems, processes and political will, economic gains are not automatically translated into development outcomes or registered as MDG achievements”. Sustainability of M&E systems in developing economies requires unwavering support from the governmental and non-governmental actors. Financial and non-financial support is critical in the process of capacity-building for M&E systems in such economies. Governments of
emerging economies often lack the powers to deliver the required or requested policy results on their own (Hajer, 2003: p175), and therefore they operate on the basis of elaborate network relations (Foucault, 1980: p154-155).

2.5 Context and purpose of M&E system

The design of an M&E system needs to be contextual and needs to be designed fit-for-purpose. Ideally, M&E system identifies problems timeously before they could cause more havoc in the organisation. Estrella and Gaventa (1997: p6) identified general functions of participatory M&E systems such as impact assessment and public accountability. Participatory M&E is mainly applied during impact assessment and project management processes.

Traditionally, results-based M&E systems have been used by donor and government agencies to hold beneficiaries and programme recipients accountable to agreed goals of performance targets (Estrella and Gaventa 1997: p11). Participatory M&E system was applied to promote transparency and accountability thereby enabling the general public to evaluate the general performance of their governments. There needs to be a fundamental realignment of the relationship between donor and beneficiaries (Marsden and Oakley, 1990). In the United States, a citizen M&E approach has been applied to provide the communities an opportunity to hold government accountable and assess the extent to which public programmes satisfy citizen’s needs (Estrella and Gaventa 1997: p12). Literature on community-based monitoring (Parachini and Mott, 1997) was aimed at building research and monitoring skills to capacitate the communities to make higher-level institutions and policy makers accountable for the quality of public service rendered. Such efforts could strengthen local capacities in terms of promoting public accountability and could also enable the communities to participate in policy-making processes.
In an ideal situation, a results-based M&E system should be integrated into the departmental or organizational budget and plans as a measure to promote transparency and accountability. While one purpose of participatory M&E may be to evaluate the impact of a plan over time, another may be to gain in timely and effective information which can be used for improving project planning and implementation (Estrella and Gaventa 1997: p8). Participatory M&E serves as an instrument that stakeholders could apply to analyse and reflect systematically on their experience, and to plan for future goals and activities (UPWARD, 1997: p10). According to Compos and Coupal (1996: p8), participatory M&E should provide information that could be applied to gauge the extent to which the organisational objectives have been attained as opposed to limited resources that were utilised. In Zambia, the participatory M&E system was designed mainly (Nagel et al., 1992) for the purpose of improving project management, comparing planned and actual achievements in order to suggest improvements for future planning and implementation.

“It is also worth mentioning that M&E is not a policing function, but rather a catalyst for ensuring that government resources are utilised in an effective and efficient manner to meet or address the needs of beneficiaries” (Mawelela, 2012 : p32). The South African government established the Public Service Commission for the purpose of enhancing accountability in the public sector pertaining to governance matters, and therefore M&E system is critical in this process. One of the major functions of participatory M&E systems is to create a learning process to strengthen organizational and institutional learning (Estrella and Gaventa 1997: p9). Participatory M&E systems serve as an integral component that necessitates relevant stakeholders to express their needs, interests and expectations. An M&E system should serve as an instrument that is geared at identifying internal management control systems that have the potential of derailing public and private sectors from attaining good governance thereby promoting accountability and transparency.
The existence of M&E system will be influenced by both internal and external factors, and therefore it crucial for governments to scan the environment where the system would be established. An effective M&E system cannot be established overnight, and therefore a feasibility study should be conducted prior to the implementation process of the system. Kusek & Rist (2004: p41) state that, the readiness assessment is a diagnostic aid that will help where a given country stands in relation to the requirement for establishment of a results-based M&E system. "Despite positive developments, significant challenges remain in ensuring the coherence of reform initiatives conducted by central government departments, improving administrative data quality, and establishing M&E as a core role of management” (Goldman et al., 2012: p1).

This section of the thesis could be summarized by stating that literature on participatory M&E system has proven that the system is applied in various contexts and settings, and it is also applied by different institutions to advance their different purposes. The usage and purpose of participatory M&E systems depends on the objectives of the M&E process itself.

### 2.6 Establishment of M&E systems for improved support of governance

There is a need to address capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E system for the North West provincial government departments to achieve clean audit report on performance information. Capacity building is a process that necessitates structures to establish and implement effective and efficient systems that have the potential to solve development problems over time (CIDA, 1996; Morgan, 1996; and UNICEF, 1996). Alley & Negretto (1999) suggest that capacity building is long term in nature; it contributes to socio-economic development, and is demand driven.

“Nations have difficulty learning within their own contexts how to create appropriate roles for the state in development; how to organize and manage their systems so that
they can identify priority problems, formulate policies and create ways to have these policies implemented in a sustainable way” (Hiderbrand and Grindle 1994). On the other hand, Plaatjies (2011: p6) claims that a performance-oriented state has to review and where appropriate structure the capacity and organization to deliver on its constitutional and political service mandate. Capacity of any system revolves around the availability of the necessary resources such as budget, expertise, knowledge and information management, to mention but a few.

M&E systems are at the centre of sound governance arrangements (Mackay, 2007: p2), and it is because they are necessary for the achievement of good governance. M&E system does not have a fixed structure; however there are critical steps to be followed in the establishment of the system. Critical steps in the establishment of results-based M&E system (Guijt, Arevalo and Saladores, 2001) include diagnosis of the existing M&E system; the development of action plan for M&E system; benchmarking on M&E system; and continued midcourse corrections.

2.6.1 Diagnosis of the existing monitoring and evaluation system

There is a need for governments to conduct diagnosis on their existing results-based M&E systems as a measure to determine their effectiveness. This approach has the potential of identifying the prevalence of strengths and/or weaknesses in their systems regarding the actual application of M&E information and quality of M&E reports. Guijt, Arevalo and Saladores (2001: p6) argue that there is great diversity of participatory M&E experiences, and the current rate of innovations will only add to that diversity.

Participation of stakeholders in a results-based M&E process is still a challenge that appeals for immediate intervention by governments. Different indicators are applied for both the traditional and conventional M&E system, and lack of uniformity in such methodologies creates the level of uncertainties in governance. M&E principles and
practices that should be adopted by the public and private sectors have elements of advantages and disadvantages. Diagnoses of the existing M&E system is crucial for awareness campaigns and public participation processes.

2.6.2 Benchmarking on monitoring and evaluation systems

Much is already being claimed of participatory M&E systems, and this notion is challenged by Abbot and Guijt (1998) by arguing that too little is known about participatory M&E to confirm these claims. The establishment of any M&E system involves risks and therefore benchmarking process has the potential of minimising such risks. It is a fallacy that M&E system requires excessive Information Technology (IT) system and that the system guarantees adequate, accurate, verifiable and reliable information. Intensive usage of M&E information is the crux of the existence of any results-based M&E system. A results-based M&E system evolves with time, and therefore both the public and private sectors should embark on benchmarks as a measure to solicit best practices that are related to the system.

In order to guard against inherent dangers, there seems to be broad agreement in the literature regarding the need for systematic and participatory procedures to monitor and evaluate the participatory M&E (PM&E) process itself (see CONCERN 1996; Feuerstein 1986; Rubin 1995; Scott-Villiers 1997a). A PM&E system (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p47) is a continuous process that updates and improves the process itself, or is a mechanism whereby participants can gauge whether they are obtaining the information they need, the techniques used are appropriately and the process as a whole is operating as planned. Results-based M&E systems, like any other internal control system, deserve to be regularly monitored and evaluated as an attempt to gauge their performance. Evaluations need to indicate not only what has worked and why, but also under what social, economic, and environmental conditions can a particular technology or innovation be replicated (McArthur, 1997: p22). Policies that regulate the application of results-based M&E systems should be reviewed constantly as
an attempt to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of such systems. The effectiveness of M&E system is measured in terms of the extent to which the M&E information is being used to improve government performance.

2.7 Connection between M&E systems and good governance

The nine values and principles that are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic are the South African definition of “good governance” (Public Service Commission, 2012: p9). The values and principles that are enshrined in the Constitution of the RSA, Act 108 of 1996 include high standard of professional ethics; promotion of efficient, economic and effective use of resources; public administration must be development-oriented; public services should be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias; people’s needs must be responded to, and public participation process should be encouraged; public administration should be accountable; transparency should prevail in the public administration; good human resource management and career development practices should be cultivated; and public administration should be representative of the South African people.

Good governance is the ability of the government to improve the general welfare of the people in a transparent and accountable manner. The emphasis on M&E systems is driven (Dumela, 2013: p4) by the need to: promote good governance; improve government’s performance and public accountability; comply with international donor funding requirements; achieve the millennium development goals; and respond to economic and social pressures experienced by countries. The M&E function that has been undertaken by the Public Service Commission has supported democracy by ensuring that the public sector becomes accountable and transparent pertaining to the utilization of public resources. Evidence-based decision-making has gained momentum over the years, and therefore the results-based M&E system should produce
performance information that is accurate and reliable for the enhancement of effective management.

Many people do not give thought to why they are participating in M&E and simply accept that a project has been designed for them by someone else (Scott-Villiers, 1997a: p3). Involving a greater number of actors in PM&E (Armonia and Campilan, 1997: p20) may have implications for changing or reinforcing power relations among them, especially with respect to the influence with donors and implementing agencies traditionally hold over the M&E process. “At a broad level, M&E in pursuit of good governance should lead to discernable changes in the manner in which government is managed, and services experienced by citizens” (Naidoo, 2011, p20). An effective M&E system should strive to promote three pillars of good governance such as transparency, accountability and learning. The cumulative effect of M&E should strive to enhance two key pillars of good governance such as transparency and accountability. In the quest to determine the objectives of M&E system, one must know who the actors are in the process, and who the end-users will be, why the project is to be carried out, and how the results and processes are to be used (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p28).

Figure 1: Relationship between good governance and M&E

Source: Naidoo (2011:35)
Figure 1 depicts that institutions apply M&E system as a tool that is geared at promoting transparency and accountability. The figure further shows that good governance is an ideal outcome that can manifest itself in the form of adequate transparency and accountability regarding the quality of public service rendered vis-à-vis resources consumed. Chelimsky (2006: p54) suggests that the results-based M&E systems should serve as a unifier of all systems that are aimed at rendering quality services to the public. In an ideal situation, transparency and accountability cannot prevail in the absence of an effective M&E system. If a results-based M&E system is implemented poorly or inappropriately, time and resources may go to waste and problems may go unnoticed, subsequently hindering project performance and community building (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p47).

Figure 2: Support for good governance

Figure 2 above shows that aspects such as explicit policies, accessibility of public documents, accountable budget processes, entrenched performance management systems, effective internal control systems, effective M&E system, and public participation are the key pillars of good governance. Participatory M&E is unique from conventional M&E system mainly because it necessitates participation of both the
governmental and non-governmental actors in the process. Feuerstein (1996) describes the essential feature of PM&E as a ‘real partnership in development’ whereby people are involved in deciding when and how to monitor and evaluate, analyse, communicate, and use information. An effective policy can serve as a stimulus towards other internal control systems of any organisation be it public or private, and therefore there is a need to promote public participation in policy-making processes.

Figure 3: Basis for M&E effectiveness

Figure 3 above is illustrates basic components of an effective M&E system, and they include amongst others, transparent and accountable environment; promotion of pluralistic M&E approaches, M&E capacity building and support; and M&E utility evident. The prevalence of such basic components of effective M&E system has the potential of promoting good governance. Apart from M&E needing to be properly institutionalized (Mackay, 2006), it is crucial to empower the operators of the system with the required M&E skills. An effective M&E system is ideally required for the purpose of generating accurate, reliable and verifiable information that could be applied in decision-making processes. “The M&E system provides the information needed to assess and guide the project strategy, ensure effective operations, meet internal and external reporting requirements, and inform future programming” (Chaplowe, 2008: p3). Information that
is generated through a results-based M&E system should enable relevant stakeholders to take informed decisions and actions regarding service delivery.

2.8 M&E systems in the South African context

Engela and Ajam (2010: p30) argue that the South African government institutions are characterised by a culture of malicious compliance regarding performance reporting. On the other hand, Plaatjies (2011: p1) retorts that while there is a public discourse on the overall nature and extent of performance by the state in delivering on its constitutional mandate, the public discourse is devoid of a broadly supported, systematic and transparent performance M&E system. There is a general outcry in South Africa that the rollout process of a results-based M&E system has not yielded the desired results yet, and this could be ascribed to a lack of capacity in the public sector (see Engela and Ajam 2010; Plaatjies 2011; Chelimsky, 2006). The general public does not have full confidence and trust on the quality of the government reports that have been generated through the M&E system and this could be attributed to their minimal participation in data management processes. Within a context where information is readily shared (Castells, 1999), the general public participate voluntarily in public debates that are geared at enhancing government policies. The country’s problems in a results-based M&E systems are compounded by the fact that the system is not aligned to strategic plans and budget. In an ideal situation, M&E systems should form an integral part of the internal management control systems for the enhancement of service delivery.

It should be acknowledged that the existence of any internal management control system, including the M&E, revolves around political factors, and therefore such factors cannot be down played during the establishment of the results-based M&E systems. "While much progress has been made in understanding how institutions affect political actors, preferences, and public policy, we have little understanding of the process of
institutional change” (Tolbert, 2003: p467). The application of M&E system is equally important to the politicians, government administrators and the general public in the sense that it generates performance information that could be applied to inform socio-economic decisions. The modern South African government is more result-driven, and the establishment of the government-wide M&E system serves as a reference. In directing efforts to improve capacity (Plaatjies, 2011: p4), modern governments have to think in terms of the institutional arrangements they need to use. Improvements in one or more performance measures are realized only at the sacrifice of others’ and the resulting institutional structures reflect this (Williamson, 1985: p408). In the South African context, the government-wide M&E system was introduce as a means to measure performance of the government in terms of limited resources used against the quality of service delivery.

According to President Zuma (2009: p11),

South Africa is a developmental state, which requires the improvement of public services and strengthening of democratic institutions. The government has established the Ministry for Planning, M&E in the Presidency as a measure to strengthen strategic planning, as well as performance M&E. The President emphasizes that to ensure delivery on the government commitments; the Ministry will hold Cabinet Ministers accountable through performance instruments, using established targets and output measures. He further states that the government will also involve State-owned enterprises and development institutions in government planning processes and improve the M&E of their performance.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes provision for the establishment of independent institutions such as the Auditor General of South Africa, the Office of the Public Service Commission, the Office of the Public Protector, the National Parliament, and Provincial Legislatures as a measure to promote transparency and accountability in the public sector. The establishment of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency was not only geared at enhancing the structural and functional importance of M&E, but it is also geared at removing this function from line functions and ministries. The South African government has given the results-based
M&E system the necessary prominence it deserves thereby establishing the policy framework that regulates the system.

Since 1994, the South African government has strived to ensure that public resources that are limited in nature are utilized optimally, which is why the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) (199), the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) (2003), and the Public Service Act (PSA) (1994 as amended) were promulgated. Section 32 of the Constitution of the RSA, ACT 108 of 1996 states that “members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions”, and that they must “provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control”. Section 133 provides for accountability of members of executive council of a province to the provincial legislatures. Municipalities are held accountable in terms of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998. These public sector management reforms derive support from other policy initiatives and legal requirements that are aimed at enhancing control over public expenditure and empowering public sector managers. The existence of any institution be it private or public, relies largely on the effectiveness of its internal control systems. A M&E system, like any other internal control systems, does not operate in a vacuum, and therefore the South Africa government has designed the frameworks and guidelines within which the M&E system should operate. “In South Africa there is a wide range of regulatory sticks that should encourage the use of evaluative information” (Plaatjies, 2011: p21).

Goldman et al. (2012: p1) state that the Constitution mandates that the Auditor-general and the public service commission carry out independent monitoring of certain aspects of government and report on this to parliament. The country’s M&E system is regulated in terms of policy frameworks such as GWM&E system; the role of Premiers’ offices in GWM&E: a good practice guide; DPME guidelines; framework for managing programme performance information; South African Statistical Quality Assurance Framework; and the national evaluation policy framework. The government established the policy
framework for the government-wide M&E system to support and capacitate all three spheres of government in the institutionalisation of their own M&E systems; and the precautionary measures should be observed in the establishment of the system. Ideally, all three spheres of government should ensure that M&E initiatives are established on the basis of the public sector management, budget, accounting and performance management reforms. “How managers manage likely makes a difference in the programme outcomes that our agencies achieve, and may also help build the connections that make democracy stronger and keep citizens engaged” (Berry, 2010: p S154).

2.9 Good governance

Good governance requires the enhancement of public participation in the processes that are geared at making and implementing policies that will promote efficiency in the government institutions (Peters, 2011; and Grindle, 2007). Transparency and accountability are major yardsticks that could be applied to measure the level of efficiency in the public sector.

2.10 The origin of good governance

Morrell (2006b) claims that the origin of governance lies in the Greek term kybernesis (piloting). In the Western governments Good governance and democracy received recognition in the 1980s, and it was only in 1989 that the contemporary notion of good governance was officially embraced (Leftwich, 1994; and the World Bank, 1989). The concept of good governance was introduced by African scholars, but the concept was later owned by the developed economies for the manipulation of policies of the developing economies (Mkandawire, 2007; and Leftwich, 1994). “For African contributors, good governance related to the larger issues of state-society relations and
not just to the technocratic transparency-accountability mode that it eventually assumed in the international financial institutions” (Mkandawire, 2007: p681).

**2.11 Structural adjustment versus good governance in the African Continent**

The current Western policies are mainly aimed at capacitating the developing economies in their quest to establish and implement internal management control systems such as M&E as a measure to promote transparency and accountability. The Western governments’ interest in good governance is based on key external forces amongst others structural adjustment lending. Structural adjustment approach was aimed at declaring the internal management systems of poor countries redundant and as the result defeating the objectives of good governance (Lancaster, 1993; and the World Bank, 1991)

Structural adjustment was deliberately applied by the Western governments to enforce good governance. “Western governments regularly provided systematic economic, political and military aid for authoritarian regimes such as Argentina, Chile under Pinochet, Iran and South Korea, as well as some of the least liberal, most corrupt or straightforwardly incompetent governments, such as Iraq, Zaire, Haiti and much of sub-Saharan Africa” (Barya, 1993: p18).

**2.12 Levels of good governance**

The concept good governance has three different levels of meanings such as systematic good governance, political good governance, and administrative good governance (Leftwich, 1993). The author further suggests that the concept good governance could be associated with the World Bank pertaining to administrative and managerial terms or it could be associated politically with the Western governments.
2.12.1 Systemic good governance
Systemic good governance is a democratic system of political and socio-economic relations, and the system requires a minimal role from the government (Chalker, 1991: p2-3; House of Commons, 1990: 1235-1299; Leftwich, 1993).

2.12.2 Political good governance
Like in South Africa, power between the legislative, executive and judicial structures are clearly spelt out under political good governance system. Political structures or authorities, irrespective of their status in the societal environment, play a critical role in decision-making processes that are aimed at enhancing the general well being of the general public (Tolbert, 2003; and Easton, 1965b).

2.12.3 Administrative good governance
Administrative good governance is a form of system that is characterized by efficient, independent, accountable and open public service (Leftwich, 1993). Certain governments of emerging economies have inadequate political will and technical capacity to provide public services effectively and efficiently, and therefore their existence depends largely on networks (Foucault, 1980; Mkandawire, 2001: p291). There is no government that can operate in a vacuum, meaning that governmental actors, non-governmental actors, and internal control systems are crucial in ensuring that basic quality services are being rendered to the general public. For instance, the South African government often applies contracting-out methods as an attempt to render basic public services more efficiently. Institutions literally use networks in their endeavour to implement their policies as a measure to provide services better and faster (Innes and Booher, 2003; Tansey, 1996).

Both the public and private sectors strive to integrate their governance systems to their customised M&E system as a measure to derive maximum outputs by exploiting limited
resources that are at their disposals. The sectors desire to be as accountable and transparent as possible to their beneficiaries and therefore M&E systems come handy for this desire to be attained. “Other benefits of effective M&E are supporting policy making and decision-making processes; helping government ministries and agencies to manage activities at sector, programme and project level; enhancing transparency; and promoting accountability” (Dube, 2013: p25).

2.13 Governance in the African Continent

The Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) share a common vision and this could be ascribed to their primary objective of promoting good governance in the continent. The creators of NEPAD were aware of previous false starts and well-intentioned African initiatives and the reasons they had failed and were determined to redeem and rectify past mistakes and bad governance, and assume African ownership and leadership, responsibility and accountability in ensuring that the basic needs, demands and aspirations of the people were catered for (ECA, 2011: p52). The African conditions were further compounded by the inappropriate policies pursued by the first and subsequent generations of African leaders, lack of implementation, corruption, mismanagement and bad governance.

African leaders took full control of the government of their countries and this was after countries gained their independence from the rich and powerful economies. Such a transition necessitated that African governments were recognized as legitimate institutions that possess the necessary capacity to promote economic growth and development in the continent. Traditional governance systems barred the ordinary people from participating in decision-making processes and this was tantamount to autocracy. Governance – let alone good governance – was not in the political or bureaucratic vocabulary of those who were in power and authority in Africa, and constitutions were not always respected, laws were often disregarded; accountability
was scarcely acknowledged, and transparency and access to information were restricted (ECA, 2011: p54). There is a drastic paradigm shift on how the modern African leaders think and act. The mind-sets of the African leaders have been shifted from government to governance in the sense that traditionally their focus was mainly on governing and ruling the people. The modern African governments are democratically elected and the constitutions of their respective countries are characterized by transparency and accountability.

2.14 Factors hampering a good governance system

A good governance system could be hampered by factors such as the application of modern technology that make the modern society more difficult to be steered (Pierre and Peters, 2005). There is prevalence of inadequate sources of revenue and the lack of capacity to develop policies in the poor countries, and this has the potential of compromising elements of good governance. In the context of South Africa, the application of modern technology enhances public participation in decision-making processes, and it also necessitates non-governmental actors to access government documents online with ease. Bang and Esmark (2009: p13) argue that the society moves from mass media systems to more user-oriented and fragmented multimedia systems that are increasingly digitized and interactive.

It is stated by Painter and Pierre (2008) that the complaints about governance failures and governance capacity have been voiced in a wide variety of governments, especially in the developing democracies. Government failures are political in nature, and as a result they necessitated external pressure for the revitalization of traditional forms of governance. New Public Management (NPM) was established on the basis of ensuring that governments become steering-oriented thereby crafting policies that should be implemented by agencies on their behalf as measure to expedite the processes of rolling-out public services. New Public Management has been designed in such a way
that when its programs are implemented correctly they will yield the desired positive outcomes. “During the governments of the 1960s and 1970s, there was an emphasis on comprehensive evaluations of public policies, and currently the general strategy for assessment has shifted toward more short-term performance management” (Peters, 2011: p7).

In the South African context, the New Public Management (NPM) reforms were mainly applied for decentralising authority and responsibility to managers. Naidoo (2011: p21 that in today`s democracy), it would be difficult for government to deny the potential and power that performance results have over government, irrespective of where it stems from. New Public Management has necessitated performance information to have a direct bearing on decision-making processes in the public sector. Performance information has influence on socio-economic and political factors, and therefore the establishment of an effective M&E system is critical for generating credible information.

2.15 Conclusion

An effective M&E system is a prerequisite for good governance. Concise and unambiguous policy frameworks and guidelines that are related to a results-based mentoring and evaluation systems should be crafted and be enforced by the modern governments. Capacity building in terms of a results-based M&E system needs to be intensified as an attempt to keep managers in government institutions abreast with the latest best practices regarding the system. The North West provincial government departments should expedite the process of capacitating their M&E directorates thereby crafting their own M&E policies that are synchronized to the relevant national policy frameworks and guidelines. A sound political willingness is critical in the establishment of a well capacitated M&E system.
### 2.16 Conceptual framework

Table 1: Conceptual framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues/themes</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Relevance of the research questions</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>UNDP (2010)</td>
<td>Who, in terms of seniority, is responsible for ensuring quality assurance during the following data management processes?</td>
<td>Public accountability</td>
<td>Promote accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Naidoo (2011)</td>
<td>What do you believe are the real causes of under-performance or over-performance on non-financial information in the North West provincial government departments?</td>
<td>Systems problems</td>
<td>Promote transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalised M&amp;E</td>
<td>Goldman (2012)</td>
<td>Do the provincial government departments possess their own M&amp;E policies?</td>
<td>Institutionalization of the GWM&amp;E systems</td>
<td>Political intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity in M&amp;E</td>
<td>Guijt, Arevalo and Saladores (2001)</td>
<td>Which interventions could be applied to address deficiencies in the departmental Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Unit?</td>
<td>Capacity gaps &amp; systems problems</td>
<td>Capacity building in M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory M&amp;E</td>
<td>Estrella &amp; Gaventa (1997)</td>
<td>What is the current status of personnel that is attached to the departmental Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Unit?</td>
<td>M&amp;E specialists</td>
<td>Resourced M&amp;E Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of M&amp;E</td>
<td>Kusek &amp; Rist (2004); Naidoo (2011); &amp; Patton (1997)</td>
<td>How is M&amp;E system connected to good governance?</td>
<td>Integrated planning</td>
<td>Promote integrated planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the methodology used for the study, “and justifies the research methods and choices by presenting a justifiable and objective research process which is pivotal to answering the research questions” (Babbie and Mouton, 2006: p75). Research methodology is a systematic method that is applied by researchers to explain, explore or describe a particular matter that is being researched. The researcher is mindful of the fact that qualitative and quantitative research methodologies differ in nature. Qualitative and quantitative research methodologies are equally important, and their application depends purely on the research objective. In this thesis, qualitative research methodology was applied to investigate the prevalence of deficiencies in M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years.

Qualitative research is a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than numbers as a measure to extract meaning from what is being observed or studied (Bryman, 2012: p380; Maree, 2011: p50). “The methodology is characterized by its aims, which relate to understanding some aspect of social life, and its methods which (in general) generate words, rather than numbers, as data for analysis” (Patton and Cochran, 2007: p1); and “it studies people or systems by interacting with and observing the participants in their natural environment (in situ) and focusing on their meanings and interpretations” (Holloway and Wheeler, 1996). Relevant research methods such as interviews and documentary analysis were applied in this thesis to investigate the capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. The approach was appropriate in terms of addressing both primary and secondary research questions of this thesis.
The thesis describes, interprets, verifies or evaluates decisions or actions that were taken by a particular targeted population pertaining to matters that are related to results-based M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments. Qualitative research methodology was applied because the emphasis of the research project was mainly based on the quality and depth of information as opposed to the scope or breadth of information provided as in quantitative research. The methodology necessitated the researcher to interact physically with the relevant interviewees during data collection process, and such exercise was beneficial to the researcher considering the fact that it enabled him to tighten loopholes during the process by posing follow up questions.

3.2 Research design

Research design is a framework or structure that provides guidance about all facets of the study regarding the execution of a research method and the data analysis the researcher conducts (see Creswell, 2002; Leedy and Ormrod, 2010; Bryman, 2012). Research design serves as a framework within which the researcher operated during data collection and data analysis processes. Internal and external stakeholders were identified to serve as a sample in the process of investigating the prevalence of capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E system in the North West provincial government departments. Interviews and documentary analysis were applied as research instruments for investigating capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E in the provincial departments.

3.2.1 Sampling

The term sample is described as the segment of the population that that has been selected in a systematic manner for a particular investigation and this measure ensures that the community/users/external actors see the process as free, fair and credible (Bryman, 2012(Patton & Cochran, 2007: p11)). This research applied purposive sampling to identify both internal and external stakeholders that were interviewed during the
data collection process. Purposive sampling was applied mainly because that targeted population had the potential to provide basic information that could be beneficial to this thesis. Purposive sampling method was implemented considering the fact that the primary goal of the thesis is to describe capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E in the North West provincial government departments. Accessibility, consent and level of responsibility of officials in terms of data management processes in the North West provincial government departments were applied as criterion to identify the targeted people for the study.

Table 2: Demographics of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Number</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Experience in M&amp;E Function</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Provincial Internal Audit</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
<td>+ 10 years</td>
<td>1/12/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Office of the Premier</td>
<td>Director: M&amp;E</td>
<td>+ 5 years</td>
<td>1/12/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Department of Health</td>
<td>Director: Policy, Planning, Research &amp; M&amp;E</td>
<td>+ 5 years</td>
<td>2/12/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Department of Planning, Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>Director: M&amp;E</td>
<td>+ 5 years</td>
<td>4/12/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Auditor General of South Africa</td>
<td>Audit Manager</td>
<td>+ 5 years</td>
<td>17/12/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Department of Sport, Arts and Culture</td>
<td>Acting Director: Strategic Management</td>
<td>+ 5 years</td>
<td>12/01/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Department of Public Works, Roads &amp; Transport</td>
<td>Director: M&amp;E</td>
<td>+ 5 years</td>
<td>16/01/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
<td>Director: M&amp;E</td>
<td>+ 5 years</td>
<td>27/01/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Department of Finance</td>
<td>Director: M&amp;E</td>
<td>+ 5 years</td>
<td>30/01/15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2 Data Collection

The use of qualitative methods requires data that is primarily in the form of words, not numbers (Patton and Cochran, 2007: p13). This research applied research methods such as documentary analysis and interviews during data collection process as a measure to investigate capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments. The researcher chose documentary analysis and interviews as data collection techniques mainly because they could supplement and verify data that has been omitted, for instance; data that was missed through documentary analysis was collected through interviews and vice versa.

3.2.3 Documentary Analysis

“The use of document data refers to the process of using any kind of documents, films, television programmes and photographs, as well as written sources for analysis in relation to a particular research question” (Saeidi, 2002: p59). Any information that has been documented that is relevant to the results-based M&E system will be considered during data collection process. Saeidi (2002) claims that primary sources of data are described as data that is unpublished (but may also be in published form, like a letter in a newspaper or a company report) and which the researcher has gathered from the participants or organizations directly. Relevant documents were analysed as an attempt to identify elements of capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments.

In terms of the Constitution of the RSA, Act No. 108 of 1994, the Auditor-general of South Africa is an independent body that has been mandated to audit both financial and non-financial performance information in a fair, objective and transparent manner. The researcher had therefore delved deeper into the Auditor-general’s opinion regarding non-financial performance of the provincial departments. The following annual reports on the North West provincial audit outcomes were analysed, and the focus was on the targeted departments such as Sport, Arts and Culture; Social Development; Health; Public Works, Roads and Transport; and the Office of the Premier:
✓ [General report on provincial audit outcome for 2010/11 financial year].
✓ [General report on provincial audit outcome for 2011/12 financial year].
✓ [General report on provincial audit outcome for 2012/13 financial year].
✓ [General report on provincial audit outcome for 2013/14 financial year].

“Management performance assessment tool (MPAT) is a tool that benchmarks good management practice; and such tool does not duplicate existing monitoring and oversight by other departments, and in fact draws on secondary data from these entities to review the self-assessments of departments” (The Presidency, 2012: p4). The following management performance assessment tool reports of the North West provincial government departments were also analyzed to gauge non-financial performance information of the targeted provincial departments:

✓ [Management performance assessment tool report for 2011/12 financial year].
✓ [Management performance assessment tool report for 2012/13 financial year].

Various relevant sources that are relevant to the capacity of a M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments were analysed:

✓ [The Constitution of the RSA, act No 108 of 1996].
✓ [The Premiers’ role in the government-wide M&E systems: guideline].
✓ [Department of performance, M&E guidelines].
✓ [The departmental monthly and quarterly performance information reports].
3.2.4 Interview

Interviews differ from everyday conversations because researchers are concerned to conduct them in the most rigorous way in order to ensure reliability and validity (Patton and Cochran, 2007: p130). Interview is a tool that the interviewer applies to cross question an interviewee during data collection process. The researcher was mindful of the fact that qualitative interview should extract rich descriptive data, and that it should see the world through the eyes of the participant. The researcher ensured that qualitative interview become objective thereby developing an interview schedule that was geared at promoting credibility and transparency respectively.

A sizable number of the North West provincial government departments such as Provincial Treasury; Sport, Arts and Culture; Public Works, Roads and Transport; Health; Agriculture and Rural Development; and the Office of the Premier constituted the North West component of the selection of interviewees, and they represented about half of the number of the provincial government departments. Secondly, the researcher identified the North West Provincial internal audit, the office the Auditor-general, and the Department of planning, M&E as external stakeholders that participated in interview sessions that were geared at extracting more information regarding the capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments. Both the internal and external stakeholders were selected based on their consent to participate in the exercise, their relevance to the research project, availability of their reports on non-financial performance information, and their accessibility.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted as a measure to ensure that the collected data becomes reproducible, systematic, credible and transparent. “Semi-structured interviewing is perhaps the most common type of interview used in qualitative social research; and in this type of interview, the researcher wants to know specific information which can be compared and contrasted with information gained in other
interviews” (Dawson, 2002: p28). Patton & Cochran (2007: p13) claim that qualitative interview is reproducible when someone else could use the same topic guide to generate similar information.

The researcher strived to maintain a balance between uniformity and flexibility during data collection process, and it was against this backdrop that two schedules of semi-structured interviews were designed. The ‘internal interview schedule’ (to be used for the North West interviews), is included as Appendix A. This interview schedule was geared at soliciting information from the accounting officers and senior managers who are directly in charge of M&E units in the targeted North West provincial government departments. Accounting officers and senior managers who are attached to M&E directorates of the targeted provincial departments are critical in the data collection process. They have the function of ensuring that non-financial performance information undergoes a quality assurance process before it is submitted to the department of finance; department of performance, M&E; and the Auditor-general for compliance and audit purpose.

Appendix B contains the schedule for interviews of the external stakeholders. The provincial internal audit, the department of planning, M&E; and the Auditor-general were used in an attempt to solicit external views pertaining to capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments. The qualitative researcher interacted with all seven targeted participants that have been listed in the schedule, and they have granted their consent to participate in the data collection process. A total number of three external participants who have been listed in the schedule have confirmed their availability and willingness to participate in the data collection process. Both internal (Annexure A) and external (Annexure B) questionnaires were physically administered by the qualitative researcher, and a maximum of forty-five minutes was allocated per interviewee.
The researcher chose interview as data collection technique because time frame was allocated to a set of predetermined questions that the targeted participants were required to answer. Interview sessions enabled the researcher to interact face-to-face with the targeted people for the study, and this had the potential of creating a platform for posing follow-up questions instantly as an attempt to delve deep into the matter or to solicit more clarity or information.

3.2.5 Establish rapport

“A researcher has to establish rapport before a participant will share personal information” (Dawson, 2002: p70). The qualitative researcher was smartly dressed and arrived fifteen minutes before the start of the set interview session; and all sessions were conducted in a professional manner. The researcher posed two simple questions as an attempt to ease tension and establish rapport between the interviewer and interviewee.

3.2.6 Interview schedule

The qualitative researcher opted for semi-structured interview, and therefore both the internal and external interview schedules were rolled-out during data collection processes. Flexibility was maintained by posing probing questions where it was required. Additional information that was valuable for the research project was jotted down for enhancing data analysis process. Interview schedules were geared at investigating amongst others the main problems that could hinder the M&E Unit from producing adequate, accurate & reliable non-financial performance information, and actions that are applied against poor performance information reporting.
3.2.7 Methods of recording

The researcher applied both note taking and voice recording systems throughout interview sessions. It was explained to all interviewees that such systems were chosen simply because they were complementary to each other, for instance, information that could not be captured correctly in writing was captured adequately through voice recording gadget. A balance was maintained between note-taking and paying attention to what was being said by an interviewee. A transcription of interview data was compiled immediately after each and every interview session to avoid missing any valuable information. A cellular phone gadget was utilized for voice recording during all interview sessions, and data collected through such system was stored in a hard-drive for back-up purpose.

3.2.8 Data analysis

Data analysis is a research tool that is applied to reduce the collected data into a manageable size, and it also involves categorising the collected data according to patterns or themes. The researcher coded both the internal and external questionnaires as a measure to reduce the burden of compressing volumes of data collected into smaller and manageable set of abstract and underlying themes. Coded data that was collected was captured on a spread sheet immediately after each and every interview session has been conducted. The system was applied for data analysis process, and the results were interpreted before they could be transcribed into the research report. “There are many dedicated qualitative analysis programs of various kinds available to social researchers that can be used for a variety of different tasks” (Dawson, 2002: p121).
3.2.9 Research reliability and validity

Leedy and Ormrod (2010: p93) state that validity of a measurement instrument is the extent to which the instrument measures what is actually intended to measure, and reliability of a measurement instrument is the extent to which the instrument yields consistent results when the characteristics being measured have not changed. Any social research is evaluated based on reliability, replication, and validity of data that has been collected. Research reliability focuses mainly on the extent to which the results of a study could be repeated, and research validity focuses on the integrity of the final research report. The researcher attempted to enhance reliability and validity of the research project by conducting the interviews himself, without the involvement of research assistants.

3.2.10 Ethical considerations

The qualitative researcher was mindful of the fact that he has responsibility to his research participants, colleagues and relevant stakeholders to whom the research findings will be presented. In an attempt to avoid causing any harm to interviewees, the researcher observes four ethical principles, as elaborated by Beauchamp and Childress (1983): autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. Leedy and Ormrod (2010: p101) suggest that the research ethics focus mainly on the protection of participants from harm, people should not be coerced to participate, the right to privacy should be maintained, and honesty should prevail during the process of communicating the findings of the study.

The researcher ensured that all participants who were listed for interviews freely consented to participate, meaning they were not coerced or unfairly pressurized to partake in the process. Data collected was treated with the confidentiality and honesty it deserved. Care in handling the collected data will include that the identity of the participants will be protected at all times and that notebooks and computer files will as safeguarded (as detailed by Patton and Cochran, 2007: p7).
3.3 Conclusion

Qualitative research methodology was applied throughout in the research report. The researcher was directly involved in data collection and data analysis processes as a measure of striving to produce a report that is characterized by data that is adequate, accurate, reliable and verifiable. The research report was anchored on key research ethics such as confidentiality, protection, and honesty.
CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF THE DATA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research data regarding the capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. As Chapter three indicates, this thesis is qualitative in nature, and therefore responses that have been derived from nine key respondents; and statistical and numeric information that has been gathered through documentary analysis will be presented as a narrative in the report.

Before presenting the research data, it is worth noting that on the 7th July 2014 the North West Extraordinary Gazette was issued, which made proclamation on the reconfiguration of the provincial government departments. The researcher, through the consent of the research supervisor, had to revise the internal questionnaire as a result of the non-availability of Heads of Departments and some senior managers who gave consent to participate in the interview session prior to the reconfiguration process.

A total number of six respondents from the targeted provincial departments, including the Office of the Premier, were interviewed. In addition, three representatives from institutional oversight structures such as the provincial internal audit, the Auditor-general and the DPME were also interviewed during the data collection process. All respondents who were interviewed served at management level and they had more than five years of experience in M&E systems.

Predetermined themes and sub-themes were developed as a measure to allow the categorization of data sets that were aimed at addressing both the primary and secondary research questions pertaining to capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E system in the North West provincial government departments.
Table 3: Themes & sub-themes derived from key respondents & documentary analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sub-theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance with policy frameworks &amp; transcripts</td>
<td>Approved M&amp;E Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submission of reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reported cases of under-performance or over-performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalised M&amp;E System</td>
<td>Location of M&amp;E Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Challenges regarding availability of resources in M&amp;E Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of M&amp;E</td>
<td>Value of M&amp;E reports in decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effect of M&amp;E System on Performance Information Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory M&amp;E</td>
<td>Oversight role on M&amp;E system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linkage to M&amp;E Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and Accountability</td>
<td>Value for money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal control systems for under-performance &amp; under-performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality assurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation for deviations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E function incorporated in job descriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity in M&amp;E</td>
<td>Capacity gaps and systems problems in M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remedies for addressing the M&amp;E problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 depicts predetermined themes and sub-themes that have been applied to categorise data sets that have been solicited through interviews and documentary analysis processes.

4.1.1 Compliance with policy frameworks and prescripts

This section of the thesis is aimed at determining whether the North West provincial government departments are in compliance with policy frameworks and prescripts that regulate the results-based M&E system, and they include amongst others, the Constitution of the RSA, Act 108 of 1996; the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004; the government-wide M&E system (2007); the Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information (2007); and the Framework for Strategic Plans and Annual
Performance Plans (2010). The documents reviewed revealed that inadequate controls regarding performance information and compliance with key legislation (Auditor-general, 2014: p10) continue to prevent the North West provincial government departments from obtaining clean audit outcomes.

Part of this section was geared at addressing the following three questions that can be presented under the headings: (1) Availability of M&E Units and approved M&E policies in the departments; (2) Compliance in terms of the set statutory dates for the submission of performance information reports; and (3) Cases of non-compliance that were reported during the years under review pertaining to performance information reports.

(1) Availability of M&E Units and approved M&E policies in the departments

The policy framework for government-wide M&E system is geared at promoting the integration of internal management systems in the public sector, thereby serving as a guideline for the development and implementation of the results-based M&E system. This study has found that all the North West Provincial government departments have functional M&E Units, and this achievement was attributed to the intervention of the Office of the Premier. Respondents from the institutional oversight structures attested to the fact that all the North West provincial government departments have functional M&E Units in place, but they indicated that few of the departments, amongst them the Office of the Premier; the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture; and the Department of Public Works can provide evidence of an approved M&E policy. For instance, a concern was raised that:

“There were lack of M&E policies and procedures for performance information in most of the provincial departments during the financial years under review” (Respondent no.5, January 2017).
Three out of six respondents furnished the researcher with their approved departmental M&E policies. In the sample group, provincial departments have coined their M&E policies differently and this has the potential of promoting inconsistency in terms of the quality of performance information reports. For instance, the Office of the Premier, the Provincial Treasury, and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development apply a Performance Information Reporting Policy Guideline for performance information; and Policy Framework for Planning and Managing Performance Information respectively. Planning element is missing in other M&E policies. According to respondent no. 9:

The Provincial Treasury has an approved Guideline for Performance Information, and the guideline is recognised by the National Treasury, the Department of Public Service and Administration; and the then Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation (Respondent no.9, January 2015)

It was revealed that the Department of Health’s M&E policy is still in a draft form, and this was ascribed to the fact that the Director: M&E post has been vacant for the past four years. Such a draft policy should be ratified by the departmental management committee before it could be approved by the Accounting Officers. It leaves much to be desire for such a critical service delivery department to be operating without an approved M&E policy.

The research has found that in general the provincial departments do have M&E policies in place, but some policies are still in the development stage. Poor implementation of M&E policies or the ineffectiveness thereof could be linked to the Auditor-general’s concern that the provincial departments lack M&E policies and procedures for managing performance information.

(2) Compliance in terms of the set statutory dates for the submission of performance information reports
It is worth noting that the Policy Framework for Strategic Plans and Annual Performance Plans is geared at clarifying the connection between accountability documents that should be produced by the public sector at each stage of the planning, budgeting, implementation, reporting, monitoring and evaluation cycle. Such accountability documents are in the form of monthly reports, quarterly performance reports, and in-year monitoring reports; and they must be submitted within the set dates to the relevant institutional oversight structures. Dates that have been set by the Office of the Auditor-general for audit purpose and process are statutory in nature, and therefore failure of any department or entity to submit the required information within the set turn-around time is tantamount to non-compliance (Respondent no. 5, December 2014).

The research has found that all provincial departments submitted their performance information reports timeously to the relevant institutional oversight structure, but in most instances the quality of such reports was not satisfactory. This finding was confirmed by the Provincial Internal Audit, the Auditor-general, and the Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation when they stated that the North West provincial government departments, except public entities, have slightly improved in terms of submission deadlines of accountability reports; however they raised a concern that there is a culture of submitting such reports without being quality assured and/or without attaching portfolios of evidence.

There has been little change with regard to non-submission or late submission (Auditor-general, 2013: p25) as there were still five auditees (all of them public entities) that did not prepare annual performance reports, and this could be ascribed to the lack of oversight by the MECs at public entities and departments responsible for these entities.

A significant number of cases that are related to malicious compliance regarding the quality of accountability reports were identified, and they manifested themselves in the
form of performance information reports that were not useful and reliable for decision-making purposes. This malicious compliance regarding the quality of accountability reports could be ascribed to dereliction of M&E function by programme managers.

(3) Reported cases of under-performance or over-performance

In terms of the Public Audit Act, No. 25 of 2004, the Auditor-general is mandated to audit the public sector on financial and non-financial performance, and therefore cases of under-performance and over-performance must be accounted for. The research has found that during the financial years under review the provincial departments lacked mechanisms that could be applied to deal with the identified cases of under-performance and over-performance, and this is tantamount to non-compliance with the Public Audit Act and other policy frameworks that regulated the results-based monitoring and evaluation system in the country.

Respondent no. 1 stated that inadequate systems for risk management in M&E systems; poor internal performance information framework; performance indicators that are not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and time-bound); and a lack of knowledge in M&E systems could be attributed to non-compliance of the North West provincial departments regarding performance information reports. This was further substantiated by respondent no. 5 when he stated that:

"In 2013/14 financial year, the entire North West provincial departments, except the Office of the Premier, experienced regression in terms of the quality of performance information reports that were submitted for auditing purposes” (Respondent no.5, December 2015).

The most common findings on the usefulness of performance information (Auditor-general, 2013: p25) of the North West provincial government departments were the following:
✓ Reported performance information not consistent with planned objectives, indicators/measures and targets

✓ Indicators/measures not being well defined

✓ Reasons for variances not being explained or supported by corroborating evidence

The thesis has revealed that a majority of the provincial departments could not address issues that were raised by the Auditor-general pertaining to performance indicators that are not aligned to the SMART principles. This material concern on performance indicators remained unresolved during the financial years under review, and which is why the majority of the provincial departments obtained qualified opinion on performance information during the same period.

4.1.2 Institutionalised M&E System

The policy framework for the government-wide M&E system is aimed at promoting accountability and transparency in the public sector thereby streamlining internal management control systems. The GWM&E system, however is a combination of different M&E systems (Dumela, 2013: p36), rather than an integrated system. This section of the questionnaire solicited information from the respondents regarding the extent to which the North West provincial departments have institutionalized their own M&E systems. The following sub-titles were used to investigate this aspect of the research project: (1) Location of M&E Unit in the provincial departments, and (2) Major problems that are related to the availability of resources in M&E Unit.

(1) Location of M&E Unit in the provincial departments

Interview sessions and documentary analysis that were conducted revealed that there was disparity in the provincial departments pertaining to the manner in which M&E
Units were structured and located. For instance, the Office of the Premier has two different M&E Units. The first M&E Unit is located under the Administration Branch: Strategic and Management Services, and it is solely responsible for internal M&E processes and systems. The second M&E Unit is linked to the Chief Directorate: Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation; and it is responsible for the coordination of M&E function both in the provincial departments and municipalities.

On the other hand, it was found that the Department of Health has three different programme specific M&E Units that feed into the major departmental M&E Unit that is located under the Directorate: Policy, Planning, Research, Monitoring and Evaluation. These programme specific M&E Units channel their resources towards the process of monitoring and evaluating financial and non-financial performance of their respective programmes and plans. General performance of the department is catered for under the broader M&E Unit. Respondent no. 3 highlighted that:

The Directorate: Policy, Planning, Research, Monitoring and Evaluation derive performance information reports from three departmental M&E sub-programmes such as the National Health Insurance, Planning Services, and Health Services (Respondent no.3, December 2015).

This discrepancy in the institutionalization of M&E system was evident in various provincial departments. For example, in the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture the M&E Unit is attached to the Directorate: Strategic Management, and in the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development the same Unit is housed under the Directorate: Policy and Planning. According to respondent no. 8:

The Directorate: Policy and Planning accounts directly to the Head of Department for Agriculture and Rural Development; and the directorate is also responsible for executing M&E function (Respondent no.8, January 2015).

Respondent no.1 indicated that M&E Units of the North West provincial departments are generally located under the Directorate: Strategic Management; or Directorate: Policy
and Planning; or Directorate: Strategic Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation; or Directorate Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation.

In summary, the results-based M&E Units are structured and located differently throughout the provincial departments; and this has the potential of derailing the North West provincial government from achieving clean audit on performance information in the future. There are provincial departments that operated without a dedicated M&E Unit and this impacted negatively on data management process, and the Department of Rural Development could be cited as an example. Respondent no. 9 retorted that:

Prior to 2012/13 financial year, the North West Provincial Treasury’s organisational structure had no provision for M&E Unit (Respondent no. 9, January 2015).

(2) Major problems that are related to the availability of resources in M&E Unit.

This portion of the questionnaire was aimed at identifying major problems experienced by the North West provincial government departments regarding the availability of resources for the roll-out process of the M&E system. All respondents acknowledged that resource problems that are related to the system are multifaceted in nature. Hence, they reported that their departmental M&E systems were characterized by factors such as a lack of leadership, inadequate personnel, inadequate skills, inadequate office space and inadequate budget. For instance, it was indicated that the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture’s M&E system is plagued by the following factors:

✓ Staffing both numerically and qualitative – as most of the officials do not have qualifications in M&E.
✓ Cooperation from programmes in terms of reporting on time and accurately.
✓ Provision of portfolio of evidence (POE) for reported performance information by programmes.
Albeit it is the responsibility of programme managers to ensure quality assurance on performance information, but the overall validation of such data rests with the Director: Strategic Management (Respondent no. 9, January 2015). This was further substantiated by respondent no. 7 by stating that some programme managers assume that M&E function is the sole responsibility of the Directorate: Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation.

There is a shortage of M&E skills in the provincial departments and this could be ascribed to lack of leadership and inadequate budget. For instance, the results-based M&E Unit in the Department of Health operated with one Deputy Director and one Assisted Director for some years, and the incumbent Director: Planning, Policy, Research, M&E was only appointed in the 2nd quarter of 2013/14 financial year. It was emphasised that:

“The department had no Director: Planning, Policy, Research, M&E for the past three to four years and as the result only Deputy Director and Assistant Director were responsible for the M&E function” (Respondent no. 3, December 2015).

4.1.3 Context and purpose of M&E system

This section sought to determine the extent to which the results-based M&E system has served any purpose in improving the general performance of the North West provincial government departments. Sub-themes such as the following were crafted to investigate this matter, (1) Do the management committees consider M&E reports for decision making processes; and (2) Effectiveness of M&E System on performance information reports.

Respondents generally embrace M&E as an instrument that is necessary for ensuring that the government accounts for public resources that have been applied towards
service delivery. It is however acknowledged that the system in the provincial departments is not effective and efficient as it should be.

(1) Do the management committees consider M&E reports for decision making processes?

All respondents acknowledged that their various departmental management committees consider their M&E reports for decision-making process. The departmental management committees utilise their quarterly reports to determine the extent to which their departmental performance targets have been attained, and where a need arises recovery plans are developed.

It was found that the Office of the Premier is the only institution in the entire provincial government that applied an electronic M&E system to upload performance information and relevant portfolios of evidence during data management processes. Quarterly performance reports that were generated by the electronic system were presented before the departmental management committee for interrogation and buy-in. It was indicated by respondent no. 2 that:

The departmental management committee was responsible for the development of a dashboard matrix that was applied to address the departmental under-performance and over-performance. (Respondent no. 2, December 2015).

All respondents indicated that their departmental quarterly performance reports were generated manually and they were also presented to the departmental management committee for discussions before their final sign off by their respective Accounting Officers. A concern was raised that inadequate performance information deprived the departmental management committees from taking informed decisions, and this problem was compounded by the fact that there were lack of systems that could be applied to enforce the implementation on the M&E outcomes.
Respondent 6 had a gloomier picture:

"Not really as the quarterly M&E reports are not keenly taken into account for decision making on departmental matters. It is mostly considered as a compliance matter than a guide and mirror for departmental management affair” (Respondent no. 6, January 2015).

Respondent no. 7 indicated that:

"The departmental quarterly performance reports are presented to the departmental management committee on an *ad hoc* basis for decision-making purposes, and therefore this matter needs to be improved” (Respondent no. 7, January 2015).

During the financial years under review, quarterly performance reports were indeed discussed at the departmental management committee level throughout the provincial departments. However, the Auditor-general emphasised that Action Plans that were derived from such quarterly performance reviews were irrelevant or not implementable because only few senior managers and Accounting Officers pledged their unwavering support towards their attainment.

(2) Effectiveness of M&E System on performance information reports

“The main issues militating against an effective M&E function are those of capacity, resources, and the fact that the importance of M&E is not properly communicated, leading to it not being a priority” (Naidoo, 2011: p281). One of the findings of this thesis was that problems of M&E systems in the provincial departments were complex and deep rooted. Inadequate oversight role, lack of leadership, lack of accountability, inadequate skills, inadequate policies, a lack of budget were identified as critical aspects that declared the provincial M&E system ineffective for the period under review.

Figure: 4 Three-year trend-quality of annual performance reports
The Auditor-general used Figure 4 to depict the ineffectiveness of M&E system in the North West provincial government. In 2011/12 financial year, eighty five percent of the provincial auditees obtained qualified opinion on performance information; and one percent improvement was registered in the subsequent financial year. Between 2011/12 and 2013/14 financial years there was of eight percent of the provincial auditees that received qualified opinion on performance information.

The Office of the Premier obtained a qualified opinion on performance information in the 2012/13 financial year. The Provincial Treasury was the only provincial auditee that got a clean audit on performance information in 2013/14 financial year.

Respondent no. 2 stated that:

“The Office of the Premier received a qualified report on performance information in 2013/14 financial year, and this could be attributed to the effectiveness of M&E system pertaining to the generation of performance information that is useful and reliable” (Respondent no. 2, December 2014).

Respondent no. 5 emphasised that:
The North West Provincial Treasury is the only department that obtained a clean audit report in 2013/14 financial year (Respondent no. 5, December 2014).

4.1.4 Capacity in M&E

This section of the thesis investigated capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems of the North West provincial government departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. This could be ascribed to the fact that the majority of the provincial government departments received qualified opinion on performance information during the periods under review.

The thesis revealed that the results-based M&E system in the North West provincial government departments was characterised by a significant number of capacity gaps and systems problems during the periods under review. Firstly, inadequate oversight role and poor leadership was very rife in the provincial departments and that compromised the notion of good governance. Secondly, the vacuum in the oversight role and leadership impacted negatively on the departmental internal management control systems for instance certain departments lacked approved M&E policies or they lacked an effective system that could be applied for data collection, collation, analysis and storage. Thirdly, personnel attached to the departmental M&E Directorates/Units did not possess the relevant M&E skills. Fourthly, programme managers submitted their performance information reports to the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate/Unit without being quality assured and without attaching corroborating evidence. Fifthly, departmental performance indicators did not satisfy the requirements of the SMART principle (specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and time-bound). Action plans that were derived from issues that were raised by the Portfolio Committees, the Social Cluster Audit Committee, and the Auditor-general were not monitored. Lastly, there was lack of accountability for poor reporting of performance information and poor performance.
Respondents made the following comments pertaining to capacity of the results-based monitoring and evaluation at the departmental level:

Prior to 2012/13, the North West Provincial Treasury’s organizational structure had no provision for the M&E Unit (Respondent no. 9, January 2015).

Provincial departments are characterized by capacity gaps and systems problems such as an effective M&E structure, a lack of M&E policy, lack of electronic M&E system, and ineffective quarterly performance reviews (Respondent no. 1, December 2014).

The Department of Health experienced cases of double counting on performance information and this could be attributed to a lack of national information system (Respondent no. 3, December 2014).

There is culture of submitting monthly and quarterly performance information reports to the departmental M&E Unit without being quality assured by the relevant programme managers. The problem is further compounded by factors such as poor and under-reporting; non-supply of portfolios of evidence for reported performance; non-achievement of some set targets; and lack of convincing explanation for deviations in achievement of set targets by programmes (Respondent no. 6, January 2015).

In 2013/14 financial year, there were a range of the most common audit findings (Auditor-general, 2014: p26) that were identified at the North West provincial government departments. It was highlighted that some provincial departments did not have approved and/or comprehensive policies and procedures for reporting on performance. The audit outcomes indicated that the departmental performance indicators did not always comply with the SMART criteria and therefore they could not be relied upon for generating credible performance information that could be applied for decision-making purposes. The Auditor-general emphasised that the departmental performance targets were not realistic as they were not selected based on accurate baseline information or research and evaluations. It was further reported that the provincial departments had inadequate skilled personnel for dealing with matters that
are related to M&E function. One of the grave concerns was that some provincial departments failed to hold their personnel accountable for underperformance in reporting on performance and/or achieving performance targets. Some provincial departments did not have an approved process and system for data collecting, collating, verifying, storing and reporting on actual performance. Lastly, the audit outcomes indicated that the provincial departments hardly crafted action plans for addressing underperformance that occurred or to deal with the identified performance reporting shortcomings.

Both the findings of the study and the provincial audit outcomes for 2013/14 financial highlighted a vacuum in oversight role and poor leadership as the crux of capacity gaps and systems problems in the provincial M&E system. The departments operated without basic internal management control systems such as approved M&E systems, dedicated M&E Directorate/Units, accountability system, and failure to develop action plans for addressing discrepancies in audit outcomes served as evidence that there was inadequate oversight role and poor leadership in the provincial departments. It was evident enough that the executive and accounting authorities of various provincial departments deliberately ignored the contents of the management letters that were issued by the Auditor-general during the periods under review. All matters in the management letters (Muchaonyera, 2014, p1) that are issued by the Auditor-general should be evaluated and acted upon even where a positive audit outcome has been achieved. The coordinating institutions, specifically the provincial treasury (Auditor-general, 2014: p13) should continue to improve the assistance and guidance they provide to departments and public entities to address previous year audit findings, implement action plans and address internal control deficiencies.

This portion of the thesis could be summarized by stating that all capacity gaps and systems problems in the results-based monitoring and evaluation system in the North West provincial government department are as the result of inadequate oversight role and poor leadership.
4.1.5 Participatory M&E System

This part of the thesis is geared at determining the extent to which the North West Provincial Executive Council is exercising its oversight role in the implementation of the results-based M&E system in the provincial government departments. It also seeks to investigate M&E networks that the provincial government departments have established for benchmarking purposes.

(1) The extent to which the North West Provincial Executive Council exercises its oversight role in the implementation process of the M&E System

The Constitution of the RSA, Act 108 of 1996, Section 114 (2) states that a provincial legislature must provide for mechanisms:

✔ to ensure that all provincial executive organs of state in the province are accountable to it.
✔ to maintain oversight of the exercise of provincial executive authority in the province, including the implementation of legislations.

The audit outcomes for 2013/14 financial year indicate that the North West provincial oversight institutions did not provide performance management and reporting guidance and oversight (Auditor-general, 2014: p26). Respondent no.1 & 5 shared the same concern that non-compliance matters that were raised to various provincial departments regarding performance information remained unresolved or were repetitive in nature during the periods under review. For instance, the latter respondent stated:

“In 2012/13 financial year, the resolutions of the North West Provincial Public Accounts Committee stood at hundred and fifty nine, and only forty of such resolutions were fully implemented in the following financial year” (Respondent no. 5, December 2014).
Concerns pertaining to the repetitiveness of non-compliance on performance information were presented in the following fashion:

Respondent no. 1 stated that:

Performance information matters that were escalated by the Social Cluster Audit Committee to the Provincial Executive Council, for intervention purposes, took longer to be resolved or they remained unresolved (Respondent no. 1, December 2014).

On the other hand, it was highlighted by respondent no. 5 that

The Office of the Premier minimally monitored the quality of provincial performance information, and that had the potential of derailing the process of developing the provincial capacity building strategy for the provincial departments that under-performed or had performance reporting shortcomings (Respondent no. 5, December 2014).

Despite the above-mentioned concerns, the study revealed that all the provincial departments regularly submitted their accountability documents, including performance information reports, to the relevant institutional oversight structures. And such structures were the Office of the Premier; various Portfolio Committees in the Provincial Legislatures; the Provincial Executive Council, the Broader Executive Technical Committee, the Provincial Treasury, Social Cluster Audit Committee; and Governance and Administration Cluster. All respondents were in agreement that their Accounting Officers, through the support of their departmental management committees, were responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of action plans that were derived from non-compliance issues, specifically on performance information, that were raised by the above-mentioned structures. For instance, respondent no. 6 stated that:

The oversight role is exercised through the planning commission that houses the provincial monitoring and evaluation unit, and through the provincial treasury that houses the provincial reporting system that reports quarterly to the National M&E (Respondent no. 6, January 2015).

This portion of the thesis revealed that the relevant institutional oversight structures neglected their oversight role which is why majority of the provincial departments received qualified opinion on performance information during the periods under review.
General performance of such institutional oversight structures compromised the provincial departments and the entire provincial government from attaining good governance in those financial years.

(2) Are the provincial government departments connected to M&E structures or forums and what benefits have been derived from such structures or forums?

The results-based M&E system is virtually a new public management tool that is destined at improving the quality of public service delivery thereby promoting transparency and accountability. This portion of the study is therefore geared at determining the results-based M&E networks that the North West provincial departments had established as a measure to keep their own M&E system abreast with the latest developments.

Respondents from various provincial departments confirmed that they have established networks with different M&E structures such as institutions of higher learning, the provincial and national M&E fora, mainly for benchmarking purposes. For instance, the respondent no. 2 retorted:

that the Office of the Premier was responsible for coordination of the provincial M&E forum that constituted of the departmental M&E representatives. It was further stated that the provincial M&E forum represented the provincial government in the national M&E forum that is currently coordinated by the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Office of the Presidency. Lastly, the Office of the Premier participated in planning and M&E meetings that were convened by the provincial Department of Finance (Respondent no. 2, December 2014).

It was found that except for the provincial and national M&E fora, the Department of Health also attended productivity workshops that were coordinated by the Department of Public Service and Administration.

Respondent no. 6 confirmed that the departmental M&E Unit is linked to both the provincial treasury system and that of the planning commission in the Office of the Premier.
The M&E Unit has benefited consistently through the information sharing and reporting fora periodically held by both the provincial treasury and the planning commission to address M&E matters. These fora sometimes serve as training sessions as well (Respondent no. 6, January 2015).

The study found that the existing M&E fora basically created a platform for information sharing regarding matters that were related to the institutionalisation of the results-based monitoring and evaluation system. For instance, the provincial M&E forum generally discussed M&E problems that were experienced by the provincial departments regarding the roll-out of the M&E system, and it had not assisted the departments with the actual development of performance indicators that satisfied the criteria of SMART principle. On the other hand, the then Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation was not focused on the quality of performance information, instead it applied the management performance assessment tool (MPAT) to appraise management performance based on four key performance areas such as strategic management, governance and accountability, human resource management, and financial management.

All respondents indicated that, “The departmental M&E Directorates/Units benefited enormously from information sessions that were coordinated by the provincial and the national M&E fora” (All respondents, December 2014 and January 2015).

Respondent no. 4 stated that, “MPAT is mainly aimed at developing good practice case studies that could be disseminated through learning networks” (Respondent no. 4, December 2014).

This part of the study could be summarised by stating that all provincial departments are affiliated to the provincial and national M&E fora. The findings of the study further indicated that the meetings of such fora did not yield positive outcomes in terms of addressing capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the provincial departments during the periods under review.
4.1.6 Transparency and accountability

The Constitution of the country and other policy frameworks that regulate the results-based M&E system stipulate that accountability and transparency should prevail in the public sector. For example, it is contained in the Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information (2007: p5) that performance information reported in accountability documents enables parliament, provincial legislatures, municipal councils and the public to track government performance, and to hold it accountable.

The level of transparency and accountability in the provincial government departments was investigated in this section of the thesis thereby addressing the following research questions:

(1) Is M&E function incorporated in job descriptions of managers who are directly involved in data management processes?

In terms of legislative frameworks that regulate the public sector programme managers should be held accountable for their performances and this is applied through performance management development system (PDMS). The study has indicated that only programme managers for M&E Directorates/Units were held accountable for the M&E function during the periods under review. All respondents acknowledged that M&E function found expression in performance agreement of programme managers who are attached to the M&E Directorate/Unit only. For instance, respondents reported as follows:

the results-based M&E function should be implemented by every departmental unit, but the reality is that this function does not find any expression in job specifications of all programme managers (Respondent no. 2, December 2014).

programme managers are not appraised on M&E function, except the one who is directly attached to the M&E Unit (Respondent no. 3, December 2014).
According to the findings of the study all programme managers, except those who were responsible M&E Directorates/Units, could not be held accountable for poor quality of their performance information reports. It was indicated that not all programme managers were accountable for M&E function and this impacted negatively on accountability.

(2) Who in terms of seniority is responsible for ensuring quality assurance during data management processes?

Part of this research was to investigate the extent of the value chain in quality assurance during data management processes. The results-based M&E system is a tool that could be applied to promote accountability and transparency in the public sectors.

Different provincial departments applied different internal management control systems for conducting quality assurance on performance information reports. For example, respondent no. 2 indicated that the Office of the Premier applied an electronic M&E system for data management processes. All programme managers were required by the system to conduct quality assurance on monthly performance information reports and portfolios of evidence that were uploaded on the system for accountability reasons.

The departmental M&E Unit was responsible for conducting final quality assurance on the consolidated performance information reports and portfolios of evidence before such data could be presented to the departmental management committee for ratification (Respondent no.2, December 2014).

A general concern was raised that programme managers are not hands-on in terms of validating performance information reports before submission to the M&E Directorate/Unit for consolidation. It was indicated that programme managers deliberately played ignorant by submitting accountability reports that were not quality assured. There was a trend of submitting monthly and quarterly reports that had no corroborating evidence and that was tantamount to malicious compliance. Eight respondents stated that quality assurance on performance information was conducted
to a larger extent by the programme managers who were directly responsible for the M&E Directorates/Units. The following sentiments were echoed:

Albeit it is the responsibility of all programme managers to ensure quality assurance on performance information reports, but the overall validation of such reports rests with the Director: Strategic Management (Respondent no. 9, January 2015).

The prevalence of discrepancies in performance information reports could be ascribed to poor coordination of the departmental monthly or quarterly reports and portfolios of evidence. Such data is generated and submitted directly to the departmental M&E Unit without being quality assured either by the relevant programme managers or Chief Directors (Respondent no.6, January 2015).

The Office of the Premier was the only government structure in the province that applied an internal management control system that compelled all programme managers to account for their performances. Performance information reports are generally submitted to the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate/Unit without being quality assured.

(3) Do programme managers provide reasons for under-performance or over-performance of their directorates or units?

Respondents indicated that their programme managers provided motivation for their under-performance or over-performance on quarterly basis, and such motivations were supported by comprehensive action or recovery plans. They substantiated their argument by stating that the quarterly performance report template required reasons for deviations and corrective measures that should be applied to remedy the situation.

The National Treasury introduced the Quarterly Performance System (QPS) that requires reason for under-performance or over-performance and recovery plan for such performance (Respondent no. 8, January 2015).
This was however challenged by respondent no. 1 and 5 when they stated that the provincial departments could not account for under-performance and/or over-performance on performance information that was experienced during the financial years under review.

This section of the study revealed that the departmental reasons that were provided for under-performance or over-performance were either inexplicit or irrelevant. Further than that, the departmental recovery plans were not monitored and therefore they were not implemented.

(4) Which measures have been put in place for dealing with cases of under-performance and over-performance in terms of the set departmental targets?

There were cases of under-performance and over-performance that were reported during the periods under review, and such cases manifested themselves in the form of actual performance targets that were not aligned to the approved Annual Performance Plan (APP). Action plan approach was applied as an endeavor to address such problems, and such an approach which had clear time frame. The departmental action plans that were generated were not concise, relevant or implementable. More than half of the respondents cited the implementation of unplanned projects or activities as the real causes of under-performance or over-performance.

A dashboard approach was applied to monitor the implementation of the departmental management committee resolutions pertaining to matters that were related to cases of under-performance and/or over-performance on performance information (Respondent no. 3, December 2014).

The Accounting Officer demands of senior managers to explain in writing why they under-performed or over-performed against the set standards. Some cases could even lead to disciplinary actions against the responsible managers (Respondent no. 6, January 2015).
It was stated in City Press dated the 30\textsuperscript{th} November 2014 that the management letters that were issued by the Auditor-general to accompany audit reports, were being ignored by most people as long as a positive audit outcome is achieved.

Respondent no. 1 and 5 argue that the departmental action or recovery plans that were developed during the financial years under review were inadequate and irrelevant mainly because they could not address non-compliance issues that were related to performance information.

The departmental recovery plans were inadequate; they were not addressing the identified variances; and they were not realistic (Respondent no. 1, December 2014).

Respondent no. 5 stated that:

“the departmental action plans that were developed during the financial years under review were not credible; they could not address the real root causes of deviations; they lacked time frames; and responsibilities were not assigned appropriately” (Respondent no. 5, December 2015).

This section of the study revealed that the provincial departments lacked an effective monitoring system for the implementation of recovery plans. Recovery plans that were developed lacked substance and they were not implementable.

(5) Is the quality of the departmental performance information reports worth the public funds spent?

In terms of Batho Pele Principle, the quality of services that should be provided by the public sector should be worth the value of the public funds spent. “A proper M&E system ensures that performance information enables oversight bodies and the public to determine whether public institutions are delivering value for money by comparing their performance against their budgets, service delivery and development plans
The study found that during the periods under review the North West provincial treasury was the first department to obtain clean audit outcome and that was for 2013/14 financial year. Clean audit opinion is the ultimate objective of good governance and the provincial treasury for have obtained that status was indicative of the effectiveness and efficiency of internal management control systems for both financial and non-financial performance aspects. The quality of the audit outcome was equivalent to the value of public funds that the provincial treasury spent to execute its Constitutional mandate during the period under review. The accounting officer of the provincial treasury and senior management, as the first line of defence, successfully implemented basic internal controls and accounting disciplines (Auditor-general, 2014: p10), which ensured that an effective control environment was maintained, and exercised rigorous oversight and support in driving clean audit outcomes.

Respondents no. 1 and 5 highlighted that the provincial departments were characterised by inadequate internal management control systems that impacted negatively on the notion of good governance. They further emphasised that much still needed to be done to sharpen such internal control systems, including the M&E system, for the provincial departments to produce credible accountability reports. They raised a concern that there were tendencies of implementing projects that were not budgeted for and that had the potential of contravening the Public Finance Management Act of 1999.

Respondent no. 5 stated unequivocally that there have been discrepancies in the overall performance of the North West provincial government departments, and they manifested themselves in the form of a disjuncture between the actual performance and budget consumed. Put into context, the provincial departments consistently spent
more public funds and produced less services or deliverables during the financial years under review.

Chapter 4 of the thesis could be summarized by stating that capacity gaps and systems problems in the monitoring and evaluation system in the North West provincial government departments could be ascribed to inadequate oversight role by the relevant structures and poor leadership. Institutional oversight structures, executive authorities, and accounting officers should take a bold in ensuring that the internal management control systems that are related to the M&E system are being improved as an attempt to pursue good governance.
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

This Chapter discusses the findings on the capacity gaps and systems problems in the North West provincial government departments. The discussion is aligned to objectives of the thesis and literature review that is related to M&E system & good governance.
Figure 5: Key findings regarding capacity gaps & systems problems in the provincial M&E system

Institutional Oversight Structures
- Provincial Legislature
- Provincial Executive Council
- Broader Extech
- Provincial Treasury
- Provincial Internal Audit
- Auditor General of South Africa & Department of Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation

Policy framework & prescripts
- Constitution of RSA, Act 108 of 1996
- Framework for Strategic Plans & Annual Plans, 2010
- Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information
- Government-wide monitoring & evaluation system, 2007
- Public Audit Act, 2004

Leadership
- Head of Department/Accounting Officer
- Senior Managers

Purpose of M&E system
- Inadequate performance indicators
- Useless & unreliable performance information
- Idling Action Plans

Institutionalisation of M&E system
- Lack of uniformity in M&E structure & location
- Lack of dedicated M&E units
- Inadequate M&E skills

Participatory M&E system
- Inadequate oversight role
- Poor leadership
- Lack of accountability
- Ineffective M&E fora

Capacity in M&E system
- Inadequate oversight role
- Poor leadership
- Lack of approved M&E policies
- Lack of M&E skills

Transparency & Accountability
- Lack of accountability
- Expenditure greater than actual performance targets
The above figure illustrates that inadequate oversight role and poor leadership were the major causes of capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments during the periods under review. Such a vacuum in the oversight role and leadership impacted negatively on the implementation of policy frameworks and prescripts that regulated the M&E systems in the provincial government. For instance, the departmental M&E systems were characterised by inadequate performance indicators that yielded performance information that could not satisfy the requirements of the SMART principles. There was lack of internal management control systems in place for addressing matters that were related to non-compliance of performance information reports that were submitted to the relevant oversight structures.

5.2 Compliance with policy frameworks and prescripts

The Constitution of the RSA, Act 108 of 1996 is the supreme law of the country and therefore it serves as an overarching framework within which public policies should be developed and/or reviewed. M&E related policies such as the policy framework for government-wide M&E system; and the framework for managing programme performance information are geared at promoting two key cornerstones of the Constitution, those being: accountability and transparency in the public sector. Maphunye (2013: p22) argues that M&E processes in South Africa were introduced as a way to assist the public sector in evaluating its performance and identifying the factors which contribute to its service delivery outcomes. The process of M&E policy development, implementation and review requires effective and efficient oversight role and leadership.

In terms of the findings of the thesis, the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E system of the North West provincial government departments could be ascribed to inadequate oversight role and poor leadership by the relevant structures. The Executive Authorities did not hold their respective Accounting Authorities accountable for under-performance and/or over-performance on performance information, and the latter did
likewise to their respective programme managers. Such a vacuum in the oversight role and leadership resulted into a lack of approved M&E policies, inadequate performance indicators and poor quality of accounting reports during the periods under review. Ideally, the implementation of the M&E system should promote synchronisation of internal management control systems in any organization as an attempt to enhance principles of transparency and accountability. “Some failures in the governance of particular entities place a particular burden on M&E, which is supposed to demonstrate a strong predictive (and directive) capacity by being able to identify problems timeously, and ensure that findings and recommendations are directed to the appropriate levels before crises are experienced” (Public Service Commission, 2012: p9).

It is no longer acceptable to take for granted that the Accounting Officers would naturally demonstrate accountable behavior (Public Service Commission, 2012: p9), as democracy dictates that a form of probity is always required, and M&E assumes this responsibility. The lack of M&E policies in the North West provincial government departments remained as one of critical deficiencies in the internal management control systems over the years. The findings of the thesis revealed that certain provincial departments had no approved M&E policies and the existing M&E policies were either ineffective or were poorly implemented. The existence of an enabling legislative and policy environment (Dumela, 2013: p4) is pivotal for the implementation of the results-based M&E system.

The results of the study further revealed that monthly and quarterly performance information reports were indeed submitted timeously to the relevant institutional oversight structures, but such reports were of poor quality and that was tantamount to malicious compliance. It was found that departmental performance indicators did not satisfy the SMART principle (specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and time-bound) and this impacted negatively on the quality of performance information submitted for audit purposes. Inadequate performance indicators comprised the provincial
departments from obtaining clean audit on performance information during the periods under review. The South African government introduced the M&E policy framework (Dumela, 2013: p23) before determining the overall state of readiness of government departments.

In brief, the relevant institutional oversight structures and leadership neglected their roles in the implementation of the policy frameworks and prescripts that regulated the M&E systems, and that was tantamount to dereliction of their duties. There was a lack of commitment and dedication in the roll-out process of such policy frameworks and prescripts, and that ultimately resulted into the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments. M&E systems were at the main put in place for compliance purposes, instead of enhancing decision-making processes in the provincial departments.

5.3 Institutionalisation of M&E System

In terms of the policy framework for government-wide M&E systems, the Offices of the Premiers are champions of their respective provincial M&E systems, and the Accounting Authorities are champions of their departmental M&E systems. The policy framework ideally tasks the Offices of the Premiers with the responsibility of ensuring that the provincial and local M&E systems are aligned to the national framework. MacKay (2007: p23) states that the successful institutionalisation of M&E involves the creation of a sustainable, well functioning M&E system within a government where good quality M&E information is used intensively.

Institutional arrangements (Maphunye, 2013: p11) within government lacked M&E systems to measure performance and evaluate government policy outcomes. The results of the thesis indicated that there was lack of uniformity in terms of how the M&E systems were structured and located in the North West provincial government departments. In some instances there were provincial departments that operated without dedicated M&E Directorates/Units and that had a bearing on the coordination and quality assurance processes of performance information reports. The lack of
uniformity in the structure and location of the results-based M&E system in the provincial departments had the potential of allowing the provincial departments to apply their own discretions in terms of the institutionalization of the system. Negative audit opinions on performance information that were achieved by the majority of the North West provincial government departments could be as a result of the departments, through the support of the Office of the Premier, not having conducted M&E readiness assessment exercises.

“Sustaining an M&E system that can produce trustworthy, timely and relevant information on the performance of government, civil society or private sector projects, programmes and policies requires the overcoming of many M&E system challenges” (Gorgens and Kusek, 2009). The findings of the thesis further revealed that the provincial departments were characterised by a lack of M&E skills, dereliction of M&E function by programme managers, and inadequate budget. Most if not all officials who were attached to various M&E Directorates/Units lacked the necessary M&E skills and that had the potential of compromising the data management processes. The problem was compounded by the fact that dereliction of M&E function by the departmental programme managers was rife, and that manifested itself in the form of performance information reports that were not quality assured before they could be submitted to the M&E Directorates/Units for further processing. The responsibility of quality assurance on performance information was shifted to the programme managers who were attached to the various M&E Directorates/Units. Inadequate budget also hindered the departmental M&E Directorates/Units from being well-resourced pertaining to skilled personnel, tools and equipment. For instance, the study revealed that only the Office of the Premier possessed fully functional electronic M&E system during the periods under review.

The analysis shows that the Office of the Premier had neglected its legislative mandate of ensuring the streamlining of the M&E systems in the provincial government. For instance, the Office of the Premier, as the champion of M&E system in the province, obtained clean audit outcomes in 2012/13 financial year, but to date the model has not
yet been piloted to other provincial departments. The Office of the Premier should have developed the provincial M&E policy as a measure to capacitate the provincial departments in their endeavour to institutionalise their own M&E systems, but in vain. The champion of the provincial M&E system played a minimal role in providing technical guidance and advice pertaining to how the departmental M&E systems should be structured, located and resourced.

5.4 Context and purpose of M&E system

Systematic evaluation programmes or mechanisms could provide government with information that is credible and useful (Scott and Joubert, 2005: p2), that could also enable the incorporation of the lessons learned into the decision making process going forward. Literature emphasises that the results-based M&E system is an important tool that could be applied to enhance governance systems. Ideally, performance information reports that have been generated through the M&E system should be useful and reliable for decision-making purposes.

The results of the study indicated that the departmental quarterly performance reports were indeed discussed at the various departmental management committee meetings, but in most instances such reports were declared to be not useful and reliable by the Provincial Internal Audit and the Auditor-general. These two institutional oversight structures proved beyond reasonable doubt that there were capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems the North West provincial governments departments which is why majority of such departments got qualified opinion on performance information during the periods under review. The provincial departments were required to improve their M&E systems thereby ensuring that their performance indicators complied with the SMART principle, but in vain. What was also embedded in the systems problems was that the departmental action plans that were derived from the issues that were raised by the Provincial Internal Audit and the Audit-general were either irrelevant or not implementable.
The departmental management committees did not have confidence in the outcomes of their departmental M&E systems, and which is why such outcomes were deliberately overlooked during decision-making processes. The departmental management committees could not derive lessons from the outcomes of the M&E systems and this argument could be substantiated by the fact that deficiencies in performance indicators remained unresolved over the years. The support that the North West Provincial Treasury, the Office of the Premier, and the then Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation provided for capacity building in the departmental M&E systems did not yield the desired outcomes mainly because the challenge of useless and unreliable performance information could not be addressed over the years.

The Provincial Legislature did not exercise its legislative oversight role of holding the Members of Executive Councils (MECs) accountable for negative audit outcomes that could be attributed to deficiencies in performance indicators of their various portfolios. The MECs did not make their Accounting Officers answerable for such non-compliance with policy frameworks and prescripts that regulated performance information, and this culture was also prevalent between the Accounting Officers and their respective programme managers. Furore in data management processes was caused by the fact that the M&E function did not find expression in the performance agreement documents of programme managers, except those who were attached to their departmental M&E Directorates/Units. Ideally, programme managers are individually and collectively responsible for data management processes, but in this context the programme managers for M&E Directorates/Units were held accountable for the function.

There was a culture of submitting monthly and quarterly performance information reports to the departmental M&E Directorates/Units without being quality assured by their respective programme managers, and this defeated the purpose of accountability in the public sector. M&E function was abdicated to the programme managers for the M&E Directorates/Units, and this had the potential of subjecting performance information reports to manipulation by the departmental M&E Directorates/Units that were under-resourced. In an ideal situation, programme managers should be appraised
based on the general performance of the department, and this implies that performance incentives should be granted to the provincial departments that get positive audit outcomes.

### 5.5 Capacity of M&E

Capacity (Maphunye, 2013: p18) can be understood as the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully. Both budget and human capital are critically important for any M&E systems to be functional. A monitoring and evaluation system does not operate in a vacuum, and therefore like any other internal management control system it requires internal and external support. “Accounting officers and authorities should view the Auditor-general, internal audit units, audit committees and the risk management function as important partners in fulfilling their legislated responsibilities” (Muchaonyerwa: 2014: p1).

In 2013/14 financial year, the Auditor-general highlighted a trend of issues that hampered the North West provincial government departments from obtaining clean audit on performance information. Inadequate oversight role and poor leadership by the relevant structures were central to the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the provincial departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. Effective oversight role and adequate leadership by the relevant structures had the potential of improving internal management control systems, including the results-based M&E system, as a measure to promote transparency and accountability in the provincial departments during the periods under review. M&E becomes important in helping an administration develop the predictive capacity (Kusek and Rist, 2004) necessary to better plan and implement its policies.

The results of the thesis revealed that without a firm and competent institutional oversight structure and an effective leadership the internal management control systems, including the M&E systems, of the public sector will be compromised. The effectiveness of any organisational internal management control system revolves around the extent of weight that is exerted upon such systems by the relevant
institutional oversight structures and the magnitude of leadership skills. For instance, the departmental M&E systems were characterised by the capacity gaps and systems problems for years and this could be attributed to inadequate oversight role and poor leadership in the provincial government. It was found that both the executive and accounting authorities neglected their duties and responsibilities by not addressing performance information issues that were raised by the Auditor-general and the provincial internal audit over the years. Such authorities were never held accountable for failing to develop and implement audit action plans that were aimed at addressing deficiencies in their departmental annual reports. For instance, the provincial treasury should have played a critical role in ensuring that the departmental annual performance plans were aligned to the policy framework for managing programme performance information. The policy framework clarifies the criteria for good performance indicators and the role of performance information in planning, budgeting and reporting. On the other hand, the provincial legislature should have held the executive authorities answerable for performance information issues that were raised by the Auditor-general during the periods under review. Lastly, the executive authorities should have done likewise to their accounting authorities.

The North West Provincial Legislature did not execute its Constitutional mandate of promoting transparency and accountability in the public sector, and this manifested itself in the form of repetitive non-compliance matters on performance information. Efforts made by the various portfolio committees in summoning the provincial departments to the Provincial Legislature pertaining to such non-compliance matters were futile because negative audit outcomes remained unaddressed over the years. On the other hand, the provincial treasury played a minimal role in capacitating the provincial departments in terms of the implementation of the framework for managing programme performance information. The provincial treasury’s intervention could not assist the provincial departments in their endeavour to address the capacity gaps and systems problems in their M&E systems. Little efforts were made to develop and implement action plans that were geared at pursue clean audit outcomes.
The study further revealed aspects such as the lack of M&E policies, lack of M&E skills, lack of quality assurance, and inadequate performance indicators as other capacity gaps and systems problems in the results-based M&E systems in the provincial departments. Such internal management control systems could have been long addressed had the institutional oversight structures exercised their oversight roles. There was a need for comprehensive turnaround and enhancement of internal management control systems, governance and oversight for the provincial government departments to attain clean audit on performance information. “Sustaining an M&E system that can produce trustworthy, timely and relevant information on the performance of government, civil society or private sector projects, programmes and policies requires the overcoming of many M&E system challenges” (Gorgens and Kusek, 2009).

The provincial departments acknowledged that they experienced the capacity gaps and systems problems in their M&E systems during the periods under review. The capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems was compounded by the lack of approved M&E policies and shortage of M&E skilled personnel or the lack thereof. More than half of the departmental M&E Directorates/Units comprised of personnel who lacked the necessary qualifications and skills that are related to the M&E systems. M&E is a dynamic function that requires knowledge and experience in research, statistics, project management, graphs and tables. M&E trainings and workshops that were conducted in the departments were short-term in nature, and therefore they could not fully equip the officials with the necessary M&E skills.

5.6 Participatory M&E System

There are four core principles of participatory M&E (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997) and they include participation, learning, negotiation and flexibility. Literature emphasises that the results-based M&E system is participatory in nature considering that it is destined at unifying planning, budgeting and reporting. M&E must include participatory M&E to solicit views and opinions of key beneficiaries or citizens (Naidoo, 2011: p95).
The results of the thesis revealed that the North West provincial government departments had established ties with various M&E fora. For instance, they had representatives in the provincial internal audit, the provincial M&E forum, and the national M&E forum that was coordinated by the then department of performance, M&E. However, it was found that the technical support that was provided by such fora was inadequate considering the fact that the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the provincial departments remained unresolved during the periods under review.

Reasoning does not stand apart from experience that workshops, including M&E workshops, are often poorly coordinated and conducted to such an extent that they could be reduced to the level of talk-shows. It could be interpreted that the workshops that were conducted by the M&E fora were ineffective or their technical guidance and advice on the M&E systems were poor implemented at the departmental level. Possibilities are that the M&E workshops were attended for leisure purposes or information derived from such workshops was not cascaded down in the departments for capacity building purposes. Government officials have tendency of not providing feedback on trainings or workshops that they have attended and this has the potential of stifling capacity building in the M&E systems.

The participation of all key stakeholders supporting M&E (Dumela, 2013: p94) related activities is critical to ensure buy-in of the process. The study revealed that there was inadequate oversight role that was played by the relevant structures in ensuring that the provincial departments were capacitated in terms of the implementation and management of the M&E system. It was required of the executive authorities to mobilise both financial and human capital resources as an attempt to sharpen their departmental M&E systems, but in vain. Documentary analysis found that the executive authorities did not attend special meetings that were convened by the Auditor-general regarding matters that warranted their immediate attention. They could have encouraged their departments to benchmark with other provinces or countries that had
the best model for the results-based M&E system as a measure to capacitate their own systems.

It was found that the departmental programme managers participated passively in the value chain of the results-based M&E systems mainly because they submitted performance information reports without being quality assured. They were not hands-on on the roll-out process of the departmental action plans that were derived from performance information issues that were raised by the provincial internal audit and the Auditor-general during the periods under review. Focusing on human capacity (Gorgens and Kusek, 2009: p94) for M&E will improve the quality of the M&E system.

The disbandment of the North West Provincial Executive Committee of the ANC in 2009 impacted negatively on the general administration of the province. The provincial departments struggled to implement their internal management control systems, including the M&E systems, and this could be attributed to political interference. For instance, the North West Provincial Legislature did not exercise its oversight role freely and fairly mainly because the Portfolio Committees avoided exposing the departments that performed poorly considering that this will exacerbate political tension in the province. For instance, the provincial departments were not held accountable for non-compliance matters that were raised by the Auditor-general during the periods under review and this could be attributed to political tension in the province.

5.7 Transparency and accountability

It is enshrined in the Constitution of the country that accountability and transparency should prevail in the public sector. Leaders and officials that deliberately or negligently ignore their duties and disobey legislation should be decisively dealt with through performance management and by enforcing the legislated consequences for transgressions (Nombemebe, 2013: p11).
M&E partnerships increase and improve communication, participation and shared accountability (Gorgens and Kusek, 2009) among stakeholders involved in M&E. The study revealed that during the period under review it was only the Office of the Premier that possessed an electronic M&E system that compelled all programme managers to account for their submitted performance information. In other provincial departments the process of quality assurance on performance information was entirely the responsibility of the programme managers who manned the M&E Directorates/Units. Such provincial departments lacked measures that could be applied to address issues that were related to poor quality of accountability reports. There were tendencies of developing and submitting the departmental action plans that lacked substance and that were not implementable knowingly that the implementation of such plans were not monitored.

The rationale behind presenting the annual performance plans and budgets in the provincial legislatures is to promote accountability and transparency in the public sector. This process ideally gives the provincial departments powers to implement their approved plans within the limits of the approved budget allocated. The study revealed that on annual basis public expenditure was greater than the total number of actual performance targets achieved, and that could be ascribed to inadequate oversight role and poor leadership. Public officials were not held accountable for deviating from the approved annual performance plans and budget and that had the potential of defeating the objective of Operation Clean Audit 2014. Leaders and officials that deliberately or negligently ignore their duties and disobey legislation should be decisively dealt with through performance management and by enforcing the legislated consequences for transgressions (Nombembebe, 2013: p11).

M&E systems are meant to increase accountability, transparency, participation and the ability to hold people to performance plans as outcomes of the system itself. This is a high ideal, and the foundation stone of M&E systems, particularly in the public sector. What an M&E system cannot do, however, is to force the achievement of its own
outcomes where there is inadequate oversight of the system itself, which includes real and substantive penalties for non-compliance of the technical requirements of the system, and non-compliance on the part of the overseers themselves. Oversight is largely the responsibility of the politicians through the oversight committees, as well as the auditor general – if there is insufficient will and capacity in the oversight role, it is unlikely that the system will work. The political wrangling that has been a feature of the North West province in recent years may well have contributed to the lack of substantive performance in terms of M&E implementation and performance in the province.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The study investigated the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. It was triggered by the fact that the provincial departments were plagued with negative audit opinion on performance information during the periods under review. The findings of the thesis revealed that the departmental M&E systems were characterised by factors such as inadequate oversight role, poor leadership, lack of accountability, lack of M&E skills, and inadequate internal management controls.

6.2 Conclusion and recommendations

This section addresses both the primary and secondary research questions thereby submitting recommendations that could be applied to remedy the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments.

6.2.1 Compliance with policy frameworks and prescripts

The findings of the study revealed that inadequate oversight role and poor leadership by the relevant structures were at the core of the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. It was also found that certain departmental M&E policies were unapproved and others were ineffective and that resulted into negative audit opinion on performance information during the periods under review. Negative audit opinion implied that performance information that the provincial departments submitted to the relevant institutional oversight structures, for accountability purposes, did not comply with policy frameworks and prescripts that regulated the M&E systems. The researcher submits the following recommendations to remedy the situation:
Inadequate oversight role: The North West Provincial Legislature should be capacitated as a measure to intensify its legislative oversight role of holding the Executive Authorities accountable for performance information issues that were raised by the Auditor-general.

Poor leadership: The Office of the Premier is the champion of the provincial M&E system, and therefore the office should take leadership in terms of ensuring that the provincial departments develop and submit annual performance plans that meet the requirements of SMART principles (specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and time-bound).

Draft/ineffective M&E policies: The Office of the Premier and the Provincial Treasury obtained clean audit reports in 2012/13 and 2013/14 respectively, and therefore they should play a critical role in assisting the provincial departments to finalise their drafts or review their M&E policies.

6.2.2 Institutionalisation of M&E systems

It was found that there was lack of uniformity regarding how M&E Directorates/Units were structured and located in the provincial departments. For instance, the M&E Directorates/Units were reporting to the Programme Managers or directly to the Accounting Authorities, and in some instances certain provincial departments lacked dedicated M&E Directorates/Units. The study further revealed that programme managers distanced themselves from the quality assurance process, and therefore such responsibility was shifted to programme managers who were directly attached to the M&E Directorates/Units. Lastly, the M&E systems were characterised by lack of M&E skills and inadequate budget. The following options could be applied to address the above identified gaps:

Lack of uniformity in M&E structure and location: Office of the Premier should take a lead in the process of streamlining the M&E in the provincial departments.
**Lack of quality assurance on performance information**: M&E function should be incorporated in performance agreements of all programme managers as a measure to enhance accountability.

**Lack of M&E skills**: The Office of the Premier should have a centralised budget that could be utilised create a pool of M&E graduates and also to up-skill the incumbent officials who are attached to the departmental M&E Directorates/Units.

**Inadequate budget**: The electronic M&E system that is applied by the Office of the Premier should be rolled-out to all provincial departments and therefore adequate budget should be set aside for this process.

**6.2.3 Context and purpose of M&E system**

The findings of the study revealed that the performance indicators that were developed and applied by the provincial departments were not aligned to the SMART principles, and therefore performance information that was generated through the M&E systems was useless and unreliable. Such information could not assist during the departmental decision-making processes. The departmental action plans that were derived from performance information issues that were raised by the Provincial Internal Audit and the Auditor-general were irrelevant, not implementable and were not monitored.

**Inadequate performance indicators**: Office of the Premier, the Provincial Treasury, and the Department of Planning, M&E should coordinate the process of capacitating the provincial departments in terms of reviewing their performance indicators.

**Inadequate action plans**: The provincial departments should apply a dashboard approach to monitor the implementation of action plans, and programme managers should be held accountable for such plans.

**6.2.4 Capacity of the M&E system**

The results of the thesis indicated that the crux of capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the provincial departments were inadequate oversight role and
poor leadership. Vacuum in oversight role and leadership impacted negatively on the entire internal management control systems ranging from policies, human capital, quality of accountability reports, and above them all accountability element.

**Inadequate oversight role and poor leadership**: The Office of the Premier, the Provincial Treasury, and the Department of Planning, M&E should improve the assistance and guidance they provide to the provincial departments regarding the M&E systems.

**Quality of accountability reports**: The M&E function should be incorporated in performance agreements of all programme managers. This will compel all programme managers to provide assurance on the credibility and reliability of performance information reports they submit to the M&E Directorates/Units.

**6.2.5 Participatory M&E**

The study revealed that there was prevalence of minimal oversight pertaining to performance information matters that were raised by the Provincial Internal Audit, the Auditor-general, and the then Department of Performance, M&E. Documentary analysis also revealed that certain Executive Authorities did not attend special meetings that were convened by the Auditor-general for the purpose of highlighting issues that required their immediate intervention. The findings of the study indicated that a very small number of programme managers, accounting officers and executive authorities provided limited assurance or no assurance towards the improvement of the provincial audit outcome for 2013/14 financial year. Lastly, it was found that the provincial departments participated in various M&E fora, but such a platform yielded minimum results. It is recommended that the following actions be taken to turn around the situation:

**Inadequate oversight role**: Members of the executive council should be actively involved in the processes of addressing performance information issues that are raised
by the Provincial Internal Audit, the Auditor-general, and the Department of Planning, M&E.

**Passive participation in M&E function:** Accounting officers and programme managers should play a pivotal role in the value chain process regarding performance information. They should ensure that such information is useful and reliable for decision-making processes.

**M&E fora:** The Office of the Premier should establish collaboration with institutions of higher learning and foreign countries that have the best M&E model.

6.2.6 Transparency and accountability

The results of the study revealed that stringent measures were not applied to hold the executive authorities, accounting officers, and programme managers accountable for the general poor performance of their respective provincial departments. It was also found that there was disjuncture between the public expenditure and the actual performance targets over the years. It was like a norm for the public expenditure to be greater than the actual service delivery. The researcher submits the following recommendations to improve the situation in the provincial departments:

**Lack of accountability:** M&E function should form part of performance agreement of the executive authorities, accounting officers, and all programme managers.

**Lack of transparency:** The departmental performance information reports should, including annual reports, should be posted on the government website.

6.3 **Recommendations for the enhancement of this research report**

The researcher recommends that the following M&E aspects should be investigated as a measure to beef up this research report:

- What is the state of M&E readiness in the North West municipalities?
Which strategies could the North West provincial government apply to enhance oversight role and accountability in the M&E system?

6.4 Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to investigate the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E system in the North West provincial government departments.

And asked the question “What capacity gaps and systems problem in the monitoring and evaluation systems caused the majority of North West provincial government departments to receive qualified opinions on non-financial performance between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years?”

This was in response to a context of the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the North West province.

The literature review presented literature from the M&E systems which resulted into sub-themes for analysis.

The methodology used was qualitative, using interviews and documentary analysis research designs. Sampling was purposive in nature

The data showed that the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments were as the result of inadequate oversight role and poor leadership in the province.

In answer to the research question which was “What capacity gaps and systems problem in the monitoring and evaluation systems caused the majority of North West provincial government departments to receive qualified opinions on non-financial performance between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years?”
The research found that a political will is critical for promoting capacity building in the institutional oversight structures and the provincial leadership.
4. REFERENCES


Appendix A

Internal Questionnaire for administration in the North West provincial government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BACKGROUND INFORMATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A questionnaire for research on the Capacity of M&amp;E Systems in North West Provincial Government Departments, 2014. The researcher will administer this questionnaire.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surname &amp; Initials of the Interviewee</th>
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<td>Designation of the Interviewee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contact Details of the Interviewee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical address</td>
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<td>Time of the Interview</td>
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<td>Date of the Interview</td>
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<tr>
<th>EMPLOYER/ORGANISATION DETAILS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Premier</td>
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<td>Department of Sport, Arts &amp; Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial Treasury</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>QUESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. INSTITUTIONALISED M&amp;E SYSTEMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Under which directorate is your departmental Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Unit located/placed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Is there an approved M&amp;E Policy in your department? If no, please tell me the reasons why. <em>If yes, could you share a copy with me?</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Discuss in detail the major problems faced by the departmental M&amp;E Unit in terms of availability of resources.</td>
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<tr>
<th>2. PURPOSE OF M&amp;E SYSTEM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Does the Departmental Management Committee value the outcomes of the M&amp;E Unit/system for decision-making processes? <em>Please elaborate further on this matter.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 To what extent has the M&amp;E Unit/system improved non-financial performance of the department between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. PARTICIPATORY M&E SYSTEM

3.1 How does the North West Provincial Executive Council exercise its oversight role in the implementation process of the M&E Unit/system?

3.2 Is your department linked to any structure/forum that is relevant to Monitoring & Evaluation system? How has the departmental M&E Unit benefited from such structure/forum?

### 4. TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY

4.1 Who, in terms of seniority, is responsible for ensuring quality assurance during data management processes? Please substantiate your answer.

4.2 Do programme managers provide reasons for their under-performance or over-performance on a monthly basis?

4.3 Is M&E function incorporated in job descriptions of managers who are involved in data management processes?

4.4 Which measures are in place for dealing with cases of under-performance and over-performance in terms of the set departmental targets?

### 5. CAPACITY IN M&E

5.1 What capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems caused the department to receive qualified opinions on non-financial performance between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years?
Appendix B

External Questionnaire for performance auditing structures

**BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

A questionnaire for research on the Capacity of M&E Systems in North West Provincial Government Departments, 2014. The researcher will administer this questionnaire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surname &amp; Initials of the Interviewee</th>
<th>Designation of the Interviewee</th>
<th>Contact Details of the Interviewee</th>
<th>Physical address</th>
<th>Time of the Interview</th>
<th>Date of the Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**EMPLOYER/ORGANISATION DETAILS**

Auditor-general of South Africa  
National Department of Performance, Monitoring & Evaluation  
North West Provincial Internal Audit

**QUESTIONS**

**1. COMPLIANCE TO PRESCRIPTS/POLICIES**

1.1 Do all the North West provincial government departments have their own M&E Units and the approved M&E policies in place?

1.2 Do the departments submit their monthly/quarterly/annual reports within the set statutory dates for audit purposes?

1.3 Between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years, where there cases of non-compliance that were reported regarding non-financial performance by the North West provincial government departments? And what led to such cases?

**2. PURPOSE OF M&E SYSTEM**

2.1 To what extent has the M&E Unit/system improved non-financial performance of the North West provincial government departments during the years under review? Please elaborate.
3. PARTICIPATORY M&E SYSTEM

3.1 To what degree did the North West Provincial Executive Council intervene in the process of addressing non-compliance issues that are related to non-financial performance information that were raised during the periods under review? Please substantiate your answer.

4. TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY

4.1 Do the departments produce non-financial performance reports that could be equated to the public money spent (value for money)? And give reasons to support your argument.

4.2 Do the departments have systems in place for dealing with incidents of under-performance or over-performance regarding the roll-out of their annual performance plans?

5. CAPACITY IN M&E

5.1 What capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems caused the departments to receive qualified opinions on non-financial performance between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years?

5.2 Which interventions could the North West provincial government departments apply to improve their audit reports pertaining to non-financial performance?
# Appendix C

## Interview Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initials &amp; Surname</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Status of Appointment</th>
<th>Slots</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. T. Siwelela</td>
<td>Office of the Premier</td>
<td>Senior Manager: M&amp;E</td>
<td>1 Dec. 14</td>
<td>Done</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>Mahikeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. F. Reichel</td>
<td>Department of Health</td>
<td>Senior Manager: Policy, Planning, M&amp;E</td>
<td>2 Dec. 14</td>
<td>Done</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>Mahikeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. K. Lesedi</td>
<td>Department of Sport, Arts &amp; Culture</td>
<td>Senior Manager: M&amp;E</td>
<td>12 Jan. 15</td>
<td>Done</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>Mahikeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. H. Pretorius</td>
<td>Department of Public Works, Roads &amp; Transport</td>
<td>Senior Manager: Strategic Management</td>
<td>16 Jan. 15</td>
<td>Done</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>Mahikeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. M. Mahlabe</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture &amp; Rural Development</td>
<td>Senior Manager: M&amp;E</td>
<td>27 Jan. 15</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>Mahikeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. G. Lethlogile</td>
<td>Provincial Treasury</td>
<td>Senior Manager: M&amp;E</td>
<td>20 Jan. 15</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>Mahikeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J. Denton</td>
<td>Auditor-general of South Africa (AGSA)</td>
<td>Audit Manager</td>
<td>17 Dec. 14</td>
<td>Done</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>Rustenburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. P. Kole</td>
<td>Department of Performance, Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>Senior Manager: M&amp;E</td>
<td>4 Dec. 14</td>
<td>Done</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. A. Nel</td>
<td>North West Provincial Internal Audit</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
<td>1 Dec. 14</td>
<td>Done</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
<td>Mahikeng</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>