

CHAPTER 7

Conflict management in the establishment of ten South African outreach nurseries

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Summary

Although effectively managed conflicts can have positive outcomes, unresolved conflict undermines projects and relationships, as well as the morale and reputations of stakeholders. This paper examines conflict management during the development of ten South African outreach nurseries, all of which were developed within communities experiencing high levels of poverty. Conflicts between community participants were commonly caused by scarce resources, perceived distributive injustices, envy or jealousies and lack of, or confusion over, accountability. The operational styles of individuals and supporting organisations strongly influenced the process. Authoritarian personalities or organisations greatly exacerbated situations while those who were willing to cooperate with community participants managed to resolve differences, and in doing so substantially enhanced their credibility both locally and further afield. Conflicts spiraled into violence in two projects, and practitioners were threatened with violence in two. The socioeconomic and political environment strongly influenced conflict management. Two groups operated in a cooperative rather than a competitive spirit, and resolved most differences through internal discussions but also had recourse to easily available mediation through trusted local residents or staff from supporting organisations. Fostering cooperative relationships and operational environments requires concerted effort from the outset. While attention needs to be paid to local circumstances, development fundamentals need to be adhered to, with adequate time, staff and resources being allocated to project development. Ongoing education for both staff and community participants in effectively managing conflict is vital to improve the productivity and longevity of projects, and can sometimes contribute to improved relations in the wider community.

Keywords community-based conservation projects, South Africa

1. INTRODUCTION

There is a vast literature on conflict and conflict management, with increasing attention being paid to these topics in Integrated Conservation and Development Programmes (ICDPs). Conflict is a normal part of life, particularly during periods of change, and both the process and its outcomes can be positive. However, unresolved conflict not only destabilises projects and relationships, but can also result in declining morale, high staff turnovers, reduced local participation, increased operational costs, negative publicity, donor withdrawal and heightened sociopolitical tensions (Warner, 2000). This study examines conflicts experienced during the establishment of ten South African outreach nurseries.

Nurseries developed with local stakeholders to achieve natural resource management and socioeconomic goals may superficially appear to be relatively benign projects. However, they can reveal or fuel a range of inequalities and conflicts. In Sudan, for instance, disputes over land tenure arose or were exacerbated through the establishment of two nurseries and certain cultivation activities (Vogt *et al.*, 1998). Conflicts also arose between community members who were participating in a nursery project and pastoralists (Vogt *et al.*, 1998).

The paper is written from the stance of a practitioner-researcher, the first author having been involved in the development of a range of outreach projects, including a nursery in this study. The nurseries were selected to compare experiences across sectors (different nursery models, participant profiles and geographic areas, including rural and urban projects). The following key questions are addressed: (i) What were the most common sources of conflict? (ii) What conflict behaviours were exhibited? (iii) What variables aggravated or moderated conflicts? (iv) What factors contributed to effective conflict management and resilience of institutions? The nature of conflict, power relations and institution building is discussed briefly, followed by an overview of the project backgrounds, methodology, results and discussion.

(a) The nature of conflict

Anstey (1999) defines conflict as 'existing in a relationship when parties believe that their aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously, or perceive a divergence in their values, needs or interests (latent conflict), and purposefully employ their power in an effort to eliminate, defeat, neutralise or change each other to protect or further their interests in the interaction (manifest conflict)'. Conflict usually involves an emotional reaction such as fear, anger, sadness, bitterness, hopelessness or a combination of these, but it is not always necessary for both parties to experience the reaction or to be aware of the problem (Mayer, 2000).

The expression of conflict depends on the presence and influence of numerous variables that may aggravate or moderate the behaviour of those involved (Fig. 1, * chapter 7; Fig. 1, this chapter) (Anstey, 1999). This behaviour may be destructive, conciliatory, constructive or friendly but, regardless of its tone, the objective is to express the conflict and attempt to persuade the other party to meet one's needs (Mayer, 2000). Constructive controversy occurs when one party's ideas, information, conclusions, theories or opinions are incompatible with those of another, but the two attempt to reach an agreement (Johnson *et al.*, 2000). Considerable research has been conducted into variables influencing competitive and constructive conflict (Deutsch, 1973).




Figure 1. A conceptual framework for understanding conflict in outreach projects (adapted from Anstey 1999). Unstable social environment was included under sources. ‘Values’, ‘communication skills’ and ‘how power is employed’ were added to aggravators/moderators. ‘Avoidance’, ‘denial’ and ‘slander, gossip and other social disruption tactics’ were added to conflict behaviour.

A challenge facing many ICDPs is that many of the primary problems experienced by community participants are structural in nature. Conflicts related to structural problems are considerably more difficult to resolve than those arising from development pressures, as national or regional interventions are usually needed through policy or legislative reform, longer-term education and/or socioeconomic improvements (Warner, 2000). However, not all structural problems have to be removed to achieve project objectives, and their impacts on project activities can be reduced through effective conflict management (Warner, 2000) and institution building, both of which require an understanding of existing and potential power relations.

(b) Power relations

Power relations are affected by numerous variables, including the structures and institutions in society that have evolved through the cumulative effects of history (e.g. the actions, decisions, wars, justices, injustices, class, gender and race relations of our predecessors) as well as the roles that people assume within their institutions and societies (Coleman, 2000). Power also

depends on peoples' perceptions of their own and the other party's power. People often overestimate the other's power because they assess their *total* power (i.e. the sum total of their resources relative to those of the first party) rather than their *relevant* power i.e. the other's efficacy in implementing the strategies or exerting power relevant to the task at hand (Salacuse, forthcoming, cited in Coleman, 2000). Although it is commonly believed that conflict management is facilitated by a more balanced distribution of power between parties, power relations usually fluctuate as circumstances and, sometimes, the attributes of the parties change.

While the scope and range of power of supporting agencies is usually stronger than those of community participants, relationships hinge on the way that this power is employed. A chronic competitive approach frequently results in alienation and resistance of the people who are subjected to the power, later limiting the ability of the more powerful to use the forms of power based on trust (e.g. normative, referent, expert and reward) (Deutch, 1973). As has been experienced in many 'fences-and-fines' conservation approaches globally, this increases the need for surveillance and control, and becomes an expensive and frequently ineffective strategy. In cooperative relationships, problems are more likely to be framed as mutual challenges that need to be solved by both parties, leading to an increased tendency to minimise power differences and enhance each group's ability to work together to achieve shared goals (Coleman, 2000). Although cooperative approaches usually facilitate the development of effective institutions, these can be achieved within competitive relationships. Effective institutions are even more critical under the latter circumstances.

(c) Institution building

Institution building is central to all forms of development and natural resource management programmes. Following Ostrom (1992), institutions in this paper refer to 'the set of rules used by a group of individuals to organise repetitive activities that produce outcomes affecting those individuals and potentially affecting others'. These include formal (rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct), as well as enforcement attributes (North, 1993, cited in Berkes and Folke, 2000).

In social-ecological systems, resilience is related to: (i) the level of shock that a system can absorb and remain in a given state; (ii) the degree to which the system is capable of self organisation; and (iii) the degree to which the system can develop capacity for learning and adaptation (Folke *et al.*, 2002). The effectiveness and resilience of institutions in common pool resource management regimes is influenced by the attributes of stakeholders, their relationships and external ecological, socioeconomic and political environments (Ostrom, 1998). The following criteria are also critical (Ostrom, 1998): (i) *Boundaries* – who is allowed to participate and why? (ii) *Costs* – what are the obligations and responsibilities of participation? e.g. time, financial, physical, social, emotional, etc. (iii) *Benefits* – what types and quantities should be distributed to members? (iv) *Management* – who needs to do what, how and when. (v) *Accountability* – how are activities, processes and outputs to be monitored and enforced? (vi) *Rule flexibility* - how are rules to be adapted over time and changing environments? (vii) *Conflicts* – how are conflicts to be resolved? These criteria have been adapted to address conditions experienced in outreach projects and,

together with the variables included in Anstey's (1999) conceptual framework (Figure 1), are used to categorise and analyse conflicts experienced during the establishment of the nurseries.

1 US dollar (\$) was equivalent to approximately 8.60 Rands (R) in 2001.

2. PROJECT BACKGROUNDS

All the nurseries were situated in contexts characterized by poverty and deprivation. Unemployment levels in the project areas ranged from 7 to 92% ($51.6 \pm 6.8\%$). Between 43 and 92% of the populations derived less than R19 200 per household per annum ($72.6 \pm 4.7\%$) (Census, 2001). The mean annual household income of community participants ranged from R3 000 to R58 200 ($R26\,549 \pm 3315$) in 2002/3 ($n=25$). Social grants were important sources of income, with pensions contributing to 61% of households and child welfare grants contributing to 57% in this study.

Education levels were low, with 16-66% of the populations over 20 years of age having received no formal education or a few years of schooling ($41.9 \pm 4.6\%$). Most community participants had received limited formal education although several younger participants had completed their secondary education. Several steering committees included individuals who had obtained tertiary education (a minister of religion and teachers).

The previous government established 'Tribal Authorities' to allocate land use rights, adjudicate civil disputes and co-ordinate development in the former 'homelands', which were established in an attempt to prevent black people from moving to urban areas.. Now called Traditional Authorities, these structures retain limited authority. However, their roles, functions and powers have not been adequately clarified which, combined with struggles over power and resources, has frequently resulted in tensions with elected local councillors (SLSA team, 2003). Traditional Authorities are sometimes regarded as illegitimate as they were perceived to have been co-opted by the apartheid government, but were still respected by respondents from rural areas in this study, and often exert considerable power at local level.

The projects incorporated a range of settings, experiences and models, including rural, peri-urban and urban locations. Four nurseries were established by groups of less than 10 participants (entrepreneurs, volunteers, traditional healers). Two were set up by participants from intermediate sized groups of 11-35 participants (a youth group and a traditional healer organisation of approximately 30 members (originally 160) although only 8-10 were active at the time of the interviews). Four nurseries were established by large groups (two schools, a project attempting to incorporate an entire community at different levels and a traditional healers' organisation of approximately 700 members, thirty of whom participated in the development of the nursery).

The nurseries received support from NGOs and/or regional and national state institutions such as national and regional conservation agencies, the Dept of Water Affairs and Forestry, and the Departments of Health and Social Welfare, and Agriculture. Many were supported by more than one organisation, with one project also receiving administrative support from private consultants.

Conservation objectives included greening communities or schoolyards, selling trees to greening and conservation rehabilitation programmes, and cultivating threatened or pressurized

species such as medicinal plants. The nurseries also aimed to contribute to improving the well-being of chronically poor community stakeholders through (i) job creation or income generation (80% of projects); (ii) improved food security (70%); (iii) business skills training (100%); (iv) development of parks (10%); (v) improved treatment of patients by cultivating a steady supply of medicinal plants (30%) and (vi) health care training and improving relations between the traditional healers and western medical practitioners (10%).

Achieving financial benefits was considerably more difficult to achieve in practice than anticipated during planning. It took 5-7 years for three projects to start generating sufficient incomes to pay wages. All the projects experienced problems through limited resources, despite two receiving substantial funding, which was mainly used to develop infrastructure. All the community participants worked for years without remuneration and, in five projects, also contributed financially (Botha *et al.*, forthcoming a, b).

3. METHODS

Key informant interviews and semi-structured discussions were held with 15 practitioners and community participants (27 individual and 3 group interviews). Non-participating residents were interviewed in seven projects. Community participants from one project and non-participating residents from three could not be interviewed due to local tensions. Interviews were conducted over 4-5 days, with follow up visits to verify and report back results. Data were also extracted from project documents such as reports, minutes of meetings and a diary maintained by the first author for the five years that she was involved in the development of one of the projects, as well as during subsequent interactions with the group.

Conflicts were described by respondents through questions regarding (i) major problems experienced during implementation; (ii) problems experienced between staff of supporting organisations and community participants and (iii) envy and jealousies¹. They were encouraged to narrate incidents, and verbatim notes were recoded. Respondents were also asked to identify their preferred means of conflict management strategies.

Interviews with multiple stakeholders provided a useful means of triangulation, as did the fact that interviews were carried out over several sessions. Sources of conflict, behaviours and variables influencing these behaviours (aggravators and moderators) were then extracted and categorised according to Anstey's (1999) adapted conceptual model (Fig. 1). The categories are intended as a heuristic tool to aid analysis; several sources could be classified under different categories.

4. RESULTS

(a) Sources of conflict

Eight main sources of conflict were identified amongst community participants, and between community participants and staff from implementing organisations. Many of these conflicts were linked. The sources of conflict often reflected the deprived socioeconomic conditions in which projects operated (Table 1).

Scarce or limited resources

All the groups experienced conflicts over scarce or limited resources, particularly after working for long periods without pay, and when they struggled to meet financial or labour commitments. Former participants often caused problems by spreading gossip about those who had persevered, and conflicts frequently resurfaced when they tried to return once the nursery started generating an income.

Distribution of limited benefits was also a source of conflict, particularly in large groups. The time and resources required to establish a financially viable project was often underestimated, but practitioners put considerable effort into assisting community participants to achieve their objectives in all but one project. However, it was difficult to curb peoples' expectations to realistic levels. Practitioners from two medicinal plant projects regularly warned community participants that individual financial returns would be limited or non-existent, yet some respondents in this study expressed disappointment that they had not received monetary benefits.

Conflicts arose in two projects when other residents attempted to open a nursery nearby. Communities with low spending power are often scarcely able to support one nursery. The new entrants accused existing projects of unfair competition and, in one case, tensions spilled over into the wider community.

External groups attempted to usurp projects and/or resources in four projects. For example, after protracted negotiations, a conservation agency agreed to provide limited animal products to traditional healers participating in an ICDP that had been initiated to improve relationships with local communities.

Table 1. Summary of the conflicts experienced during the establishment of ten South African outreach nurseries. Arrow headed bullets indicate linked behaviours and outcomes, while the remaining bullets indicate common problems. Further descriptions in text.

Sources of conflict	Parties	Conflict behaviour	Outcomes
<i>Scarce or limited resources</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Balancing high personal costs with low socioeconomic benefits. Perceived distributive injustices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community participants. Residents. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build up of discouragement and resentment, in-fighting amongst community participants and within community. Withdrawal from project. Gossip, rumours, accusations of theft. ➤ Thefts and armed burglary. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conflicts spilled over to community. Some participants tried to return to project when it started to generate income, resulting in further conflict and resentments. Added costs through losses and having to employ a security guard. ➤ Centralisation of project management after armed burglary. After thefts, participants expelled from project.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Competition. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Differing resource user groups. Individuals and sub-groups of community participants' group. External individuals or groups from community and further afield, including other NGOs and state organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prolonged negotiations. Verbal coercion, including threats of violence and/or witchcraft. Reluctant acceptance of mediation by third party (a supporting organisation) and inadequate conflict management by the organisation. ➤ Power plays amongst community participants and between participants and supporting organisation, including playing different sections of supporting organisation off against each other. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Problems seldom adequately resolved, with resurfacing of same issues later. Increased timescales, financial and personal costs. ➤ One supporting organisation used the coercive tactics of the external group as an excuse to withdraw previously hard won benefits to the local group.
<i>Contestation of ownership</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contestation of ownership. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Different groups within the community. Supporting organisations. External organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Verbal confrontations and coercion, including threats of violence and witchcraft. Prolonged negotiations. Power tactics (e.g. attempting to form alliances, intimidating opponents). Gossip and conflicts within community. Undermining projects and practitioners in public fora. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prolonged conflict amongst group and sometimes within community, inhibiting progress. Participant withdrawal. Project delayed, sometimes threatened as conflicts spiraled. Threats of withdrawal by implementing organisations. Withdrawal of concessions by implementing organisations.
<i>Accountability</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Allocation of funds. Perceived and actual theft of groups' money, equipment and stock. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community participants, staff from supporting organisation. Community participants, supporting organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Competitive negotiation. Fighting, discouragement and withdrawal from project. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Funds used as originally intended, but lingering resentment on part of 'losers' (community participants). In one project, group lost two years savings and credibility within the community. In a second project, supporting organisation investigated accusations, transferred staff and implemented improved conflict management systems.

Table 1 (cont'd). Summary of the conflicts experienced during the establishment of ten South African outreach nurseries.

Sources of conflict	Parties	Conflict behaviour	Outcomes
<i>Accountability (cont'd)</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theft of money from Traditional Authority by chair of community participants' group. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community participants, broader community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Community participant fled for his life after two of his accomplices were murdered. - Conflict within community and amongst group. - Discouragement and withdrawal from project. - Loss of credibility of group. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Power struggle ensued, resulting in fracturing of group and management problems, exacerbated by limited follow up from supporting organisation at this critical time.
<i>Contestation of social boundaries</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Field officers from supporting organisation. ➤ Community participants. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Extension officer overrode decisions made by female community participants, enforcing own agenda. ➤ A sub-group collected money to pay for a hit on female co-chair during a struggle for control of the programme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Intervention by supporting organisation to get the project back on track; extension officers sent for training (long-term process). ➤ The group split, with those who placed the hit continuing their struggle to establish the nursery with diminished resources to cover costs. Further tensions.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gatekeepers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community participants - Non-participating influentials - Supporting organisations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Blocked people outside organisation from joining the project. ➤ Reluctance to work with traditional healers e.g. Christian chairperson of an umbrella forum. ➤ One supporting organisation reluctant to work with communities but, particularly, traditional healers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Participation limited to member of the community participants' networks. ➤ Project implementation stagnated until chair replaced by one more supportive of traditional culture. ➤ Project undermined from within organisation, small acts of sabotage, managerial support for staff refusing to work with group.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community participants, supporting organisation, broader community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Anger and withdrawal of community support. - Conflict within community and between community and supporting organisation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Loss of credibility of projects. - Reduced sales and income. - Participatory approach substituted for central management.
<i>Interpersonal relationships</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management and communication styles. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community participants. - Supporting organisations and community participants. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Differences in approaches between western management (participative) views and traditional (hierarchical) management systems. - Authoritarian approaches or those focusing mainly on task management resulted in confrontations, gossip, complaints amongst participants and complaints to senior management of organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Continued difficulties in encouraging group to take responsibility. - Where complaints addressed, improved relations between community participants and staff of supporting organisations. - Where complaints ignored, continued deterioration of relations.

Table 1 (cont'd). Summary of the conflicts experienced during the establishment of ten South African outreach nurseries.

Sources of conflict	Parties	Conflict behaviour	Outcomes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jealousies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community participants. - Non-participating community members. - Supporting organisations. - External groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Build up of resentment. - Withdrawal from project. - Rumours, innuendo, - Vandalism of nursery equipment, theft. - Successful attempt by external group to further destabilise relations between supporting organisation and community participants. - Witchcraft innuendos and threats. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Undermining of project which, depending on whether parties aware of problems and how jealousies handled, resulted in improved relations, a further spiral of conflict or withdrawal from project activities.
<i>External power struggles</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power struggles within broader community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Between Traditional Authorities and democratically elected councillors. - Between councillors or different political parties. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protracted negotiations. - Verbal and physical coercion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Delays in project implementation and progress.
<i>Structural imbalances</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power relations between supporting organisations and community groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supporting organisations, community participants and, in certain situations, broader community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Verbal coercion. - Avoidance. - Supporting organisations insisting on right of veto. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discouragement. - Poor reputation of organisation in community and amongst other organisations in the field.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Withholding information from community groups. • Economic resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supporting organisation. - Supporting organisations withholding funding and material support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Avoidance of community groups by staff and management of organisation. - Staff having to juggle resources, resulting in conflicts with community participants from different projects. - Lack of progress. - Community participants becoming resentful and discouraged. - Loss of morale of staff of supporting organisation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ongoing problems and lack of progress, affecting group's morale and reputations. - Conflicts between supporting organisations, which were resolved after the private consultants that had mismanaged financial administration was replaced. - Where organisations consistently withheld support, community participants were undermined, relations with community deteriorated and reputation was lost.
<i>Individual or collective identities</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traditional healers. • Local leadership. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ambivalent position in society. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rumours, ostracisation, murder. - Legitimisation. - Balancing relations between leadership sectors. 	

Having shown limited interest in the development of the nursery and other plant management initiatives, their national traditional healers' organisation attempted to gain control over the distribution of the animal products, which are expensive and usually difficult to obtain. They employed a range of tactics, including lobbying senior conservation management and discrediting the project at a regional workshop that they had organised. This resulted in the conservation organisation revoking their decision after the local group had spent over two years setting up appropriate conservation and social controls (some wildlife products are feared for their potential use in witchcraft). The national traditional healers' organisation then embarked on an active recruitment drive within the villages falling within the ICDP, attempting to intimidate healers from at least three villages when they declined to join.

In a different project, resource user groups competed for infrastructure and space on land that had been subdivided between a nursery and a livestock project. Private consultants responsible for project administration attempted to resolve the conflict by unilaterally allocating resources to the groups, resulting in high levels of resentment. The nursery group later removed fences that had been erected to partition the land. Despite further mediation, the issue had still not been resolved several years later, and community participants continued to express bitterness over the issue.

Contestation of ownership

Ownership was contested in seven projects, with the local Traditional Authority attempting to take control in three cases and local councillors in two. A Traditional Authority threatened to confiscate and sell a nursery in which support from an implementing organisation had lapsed after a change in staff. The semi-literate community participants had been unable to further develop the project on their own and were not utilising the land effectively, thus breaching a key condition of land allocation which is based on usufruct rights. One project had to ward off take over attempts from both the Traditional Authority and a local councillor, who had set up an independent steering committee to manage the project. A community entrepreneur was forced to choose between his building business and his nursery, which had not yet started generating an income, because the community said that he could not have two enterprises while others were unemployed. The building business was given to a relative of a local councillor who abandoned it within months.

Ownership was also contested in an urban nursery, where an NGO had used a local youth group to gain entry to a community, and developed the nursery on their property. The NGO felt that the nursery and the few benefits that it had generated should be given to two volunteers who had worked for months without pay, while the youth group was adamant that the project belonged to them. This, combined with financial difficulties, resulted in the nursery closing a few months later.

At least three external implementing agencies attempted to gain control of projects, or competed with existing supporting organisations. An NGO from a neighbouring country laid claim to a school nursery that had been operating for five years while, in a separate but similarly timed incident, an extension officer from a non-participating state department verbally attacked a key project member at a public meeting, resulting in a substantial loss of morale when the project was undergoing numerous difficulties. Two key project members were transferred soon afterwards, and the nursery was closed a few months later. Previously, when difficulties arose, the project participant who had been verbally attacked at the meeting was instrumental in transferring the

nursery to a different venue as she strongly believed in the value of the nursery to local AIDS/HIV, greening and youth programmes.

Accountability

Conflicts developed between supporting organisations and community participants in several projects when the latter attempted to use funding for purposes other than what had been stipulated in the proposal. A manager from a supporting organisation experienced similar problems when colleagues attempted to appropriate funding for other projects.

In three projects, lack of compensation for prolonged efforts spent in developing the nursery resulted in community participants stealing stock, money and/or equipment. In the first, local residents who had been employed by the primary group of community participants pocketed money from plant sales rather than handing it over to the project. Volunteers from a second project organised a burglary in which staff and visitors were held up at gunpoint. This incident, coupled with a councillor attempting to take over the project, led to conflict within the community and resulted in the organisation centralising management rather than developing a participative project with a youth organisation as originally intended. Conflicts involving the councillor continued for several years, until he was murdered in a political dispute. Several local residents employed by community participants stole project equipment in a third project. Wages were erratic and low, and practitioners suspected that some employees were working off debt owed to a family who had taken control of the nursery. Long hours and poor leave conditions resulted in the primary participants being taken to the Council for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, but conflicts had not been resolved two years later.

Conflicts sometimes arose through community participants' inexperience in financial management. In several projects, a bookkeeper or treasurer was suspected of theft when books did not balance. In two projects, the juggling of resources to meet nursery costs resulting in accusations of theft against the (community) chairperson of the steering committee and a practitioner. In a third project, community participants appointed a semi-illiterate man as treasurer to prevent another from being elected. The treasurer was subsequently ousted when he was unable to account for their money.

Social boundaries

Social boundaries were contested or blurred in numerous projects as people protected their own group's boundaries, or attempted to maintain the social *status quo* (e.g. local power bases, gender inequalities within society). Community participants from four nurseries blocked local residents outside their social networks from participating. Despite concerted efforts of staff from supporting agencies to encourage broader participation, only members of the community participants' networks were permitted to join.

Conflicts also arose or were exacerbated through gender inequalities. African society is traditionally patriarchal, with hierarchical leadership structures. Gender roles continue to be fairly rigidly defined, particularly in rural areas, although women are challenging traditional norms in different ways (e.g. Preston-Whyte and Nene, 1991; Rangan and Gilmartin, 2002). As is common globally, most supporting agencies and donors were keen to improve the capacity and economic situations of women, which sometimes resulted in tensions as existing social norms were

threatened. In one nursery, conflicts arose between female participants and male extension officers who dominated project management. Continued workshops and training helped to sensitize the extension officers to the need to allow female participants to manage their projects, although continued follow up training was required to reinforce this changed behaviour.

A sub group of community participants collected 150 Rands (equivalent to 25 US dollars at the time) for a contract hit on the female co-chairperson when the male co-chair fled after embezzling the Traditional Authority (two co-accused were murdered). Unbeknown to the sub-group, the man they hired was a distant relative of the female co-chair, who warned her of their intentions. The murder was averted through a meeting facilitated by a trusted community leader. Supporters of the female co-chair withdrew from the project (approximately 30 participants), leaving eight people to continue trying to establish the nursery. A number of variables contributed to the escalation of conflict, including a power vacuum created by the unexpected departure of the male co-chair; conflicts arising over scarce resources; losses arising through internal and external threats (stolen savings and an attempt by their national traditional healers' organisation to usurp valued project benefits) and a lack of effective support from the implementing organisation at this critical period.

Conflict through crimes committed by project participants spilled into the broader community, and vice versa. Community participants from the nursery whose co-chair embezzled money from a Traditional Authority were accused of collaborating with him when they declined to press charges after he also stole their savings. Participants' reputations sometimes compromised the project's credibility. Community residents withdrew their support of a second nursery after the caretaker was convicted of molesting a child.

Interpersonal relationships

Interpersonal relationships created conflicts within five projects in which staff responsible for project implementation were authoritarian in their approach to community participants, resulting in or exacerbating conflict. Community members from two projects made veiled threats of violence against practitioners. In two cases, community members complained to senior management who responded by investigating the problems and transferring staff. The projects were situated in communities experiencing considerable social tensions, so this did not resolve all conflicts, but the fact that the organisation took community participants' views seriously did much to enhance their credibility. In a third project, a practitioner settled his differences with a group after they complained to senior management, and they then developed a positive working relationship. The fourth project was the one in which an armed burglary had occurred.

The supporting organisation from the fifth project took no action to resolve the conflicts. The director of the protected area at the time informed community participants that neither he nor the organisation recognised them, after they had unstintingly contributed to the project for five years, straining household livelihoods through the time and money that they had expended in developing the nursery. Staff from this organisation received little managerial support, and experienced constant difficulties due to inadequate funding for projects, as well as antagonism and, sometimes, petty acts of sabotage from colleagues, which jeopardised project progress and the trust of community participants, particularly in projects situated at a distance with poor telecommunications.

Envy and jealousies between community members were experienced in 60% of the projects. Not all practitioners were aware of the underlying causes or, sometimes, the problems that had arisen through this. Two community participants and a practitioner from two other projects wryly commented that the only reason that envy had not been experienced was because they had not achieved any of their objectives. Residents burgled three projects, vandalised the property of two and cut fences in one. Two projects were burgled and vandalised three times, although participants from one of these felt that recently established community structures such as policing fora had helped to curtail problems. A customer stopped planting vegetables in her tiny urban garden despite needing them badly after a crop was killed when her neighbour threw a 'white liquid' over them.

Perceived injustices over the distribution of project benefits also led to jealousies, sometimes over small items. For example, the provision of empty bottles salvaged by a practitioner from household waste to group members in one project had to be stopped when conflicts arose if there were insufficient bottles to distribute amongst the relatively large group.

Community leaders from three projects experienced problems through envy and jealousies created by too much attention being focused on them through the project. The community participant who had lost his building business said that his life had been threatened more than once.

Nursery management was impeded through conflicts arising through a teacher being 'too bright, hard working and enthusiastic' at two schools in different provinces, as colleagues resented their efforts and feared that they were being shown up. The teacher was transferred in both cases.

External power struggles

While power struggles are inherent to all conflicts, several projects were continuously derailed through conflicts that arose through external power struggles amongst community factions. Several nurseries were used by outside, influential individuals in attempts to gain political leverage or to attain access to resources. Power struggles between Traditional Authorities and democratically elected councillors undermined progress in several rural projects, while fights between councillors or other groups threatened two urban projects. In four projects, conflicts arose or were resolved through changing social dynamics when key individuals died or were transferred. The survival of another nursery remains precarious eight years after its inception, due to power struggles within the broader community.

Structural imbalances

Although the power relations between supporting organisations and community participants were highly skewed in that any support received depended on the will and commitment of the organisation, practitioners from seven projects attempted to enhance the power of community participants at operational level by developing their skills to negotiate and interact with external agencies more effectively.

By withholding material support, a conservation agency stifled the development of a medicinal plant nursery which was part of their ICDP. A manager attributed this to difficulties in securing funding. However, the project was originally popular with donors because it was being developed under the auspices of a significant protected area and aimed to develop natural

resource management and health programmes with traditional healers, which was a popular approach at the time. After the first five years, a major South African donor withdrew financial support due to the lack of commitment shown by the conservation agency. Seven years on, the organisation has still not obtained additional funding. The organisation also declined to contribute materials such as a load of thatching grass from its large surplus store, knowing that a security guard had to sleep in a roofless hut for months during a year of high rainfall (difficulties had been experienced in harvesting grass locally due to extensive fires in the communal lands). Community participants were well aware of the surplus as relatives were employed by the organisation to harvest grass. Eventually a load was accessed through the regional conservation agency from a protected area 150 kilometres away.

The same conservation organisation also asserted its power over community participants by withholding critical documentation. It took four years to return a document denoting the group's right to occupy and use the land allocated by the local chief for the nursery that had been placed in their custody for safe keeping, despite numerous requests from the group, the chairperson of the umbrella forum of the ICDP and a former staff member. The timing was critical as the chief who had allocated land for the nursery had died, and the community and his successor were questioning the groups' right to occupy the land on which they had built the nursery.

A second project experienced difficulties in accessing funding that had been allocated to them, as a private consulting firm that had won a tender to facilitate the process had gone bankrupt, resulting in considerable conflict and accusations of theft against a conservation practitioner.

Individual or collective identities

Traditional healers from two projects referred to their ambivalent position in society, as their powers are often both respected and feared within local communities as well as in their dealings with external groups. At national level, acceptance of their contribution to healthcare was increasing after having been legally banned for decades, but some individuals and organisations remain reluctant to work with them. A project participant was hacked to death by a mob in front of her home in 1994, while the police stood by. Although this had nothing to do with the ICDP, this act of violence and incidents of witchcraft or witchcraft accusations in certain areas highlights the need to be particularly sensitive to social and cultural dynamics in projects of this nature – even more so than those being developed with curio artists, teachers, youth or other groups.

(b) Aggravators or moderators

Community participants spoke positively of the supporting organisations in all but the project in which the conservation organisation that had not provided continuity after a change in staff, despite historically poor relations or conflicts having been experienced in some instances. In these projects, community participants and practitioners shared aspirations, values, goals and perceptions of the project, although the order of importance sometimes differed. For example, the main objective of most community participants was to earn incomes, while supporting organisations aimed to achieve conservation and social responsibility objectives. Practitioners were aware of this dilemma however, and tried to enable community participants to achieve their goals, sometimes at the expense of meeting conservation objectives. Practitioners and community participants from

projects that were operating in a spirit of cooperation emphasized that they resolved problems through discussions – ‘...however long it takes...’, as one community participant put it.

Conflicts were experienced between community participants and staff from supporting organisations in five projects, three of which were resolved when community participants wrote letters of complaint to senior management. In contrast, the conservation organisation that withheld support employed a range of tactics to avoid engaging with community participants. Although structures and institutions were in place to resolve conflicts, most problems raised by community participants were either not addressed or were hard won battles. At meetings, staff from the organisation regularly appealed to shared conflict limiting norms (e.g. listening to others, remaining calm, cooperating to achieve goals) but seldom acted on suggestions by community participants, consistently made unilateral decisions or simply withdrew from the process by not attending meetings or sending subordinates with no decision making power. Community participants displayed reluctance to confront the organisation, even when the extent of the grievance was high. For example, 19 local residents who had been employed to cut thatching grass were killed in a fire in 2001 (several victims were relatives of participants involved in the nursery project). Despite the importance in African culture of family members being buried close to their homes, the organisation persuaded family members to grant permission to bury the victims at a monument erected at the main gate of the national park 50-60 kms away. The first author was in contact with local residents just after the fire and several years later, when discussions were held with relatives of the victims. All expressed anger at burying family members so far away. When asked why they had not taken the matter to a third party for mediation, they said that they would not have received financial reparations if they had not acquiesced.

Most problems amongst community participants or between community participants and members of the broader community were resolved through dialogue and, occasionally, mediation by a third party, either a respected community member or staff from the supporting organisation. Six projects experienced intense, protracted conflicts that threatened the survival of the nursery and resulted in severe consequences for community participants.

4. DISCUSSION

(a) Conflicts amongst community stakeholders

Conflicts between community participants were commonly caused by scarce resources, perceived distributive injustices, envy or jealousies and lack of, or confusion over, accountability. Much of the intensity of competition arising over the nurseries was related to the deprived socioeconomic environments in which these projects exist, as well as project timing. Fierce power struggles and competition for resources are commonly experienced during periods of political transition.

Three key principles are generally used to guide distribution decisions: *equality* (people receive equal benefits); *equity* (people receive benefits in proportion to their contribution) or *need* (people receive benefits according to their needs) (Deutsch, 2000a). These are likely to conflict with each other unless all members are equally productive and needy (Deutsch, 2000a). In institutions developed to manage common property resources, it has been hypothesised that rules that award more benefits to those who invest more, and no benefits to those who are unwilling to invest, have the best chance of winning the allegiance of different groups (McKean, 2000). In outreach projects

such as the nurseries, perceived favouritism of individuals was frequently resented, even if they had contributed more than their peers. Envy also occurred when one person or group was perceived to be doing better than others through project activities. Similar problems were experienced in Nepal, when payment of trainer farmers sometimes created envy as even a small, but regular, salary has high status (Arens *et al.*, 1998). These difficulties are often worsened when trying to improve the economic standards of the less well-off or powerful. For example, deep resentment arose when Bobo village musicians in Mali project occasionally became richer than their patrons, who were from a higher social class (Mavrocordatos and Martin, 1995). Ideally, principles relating to distribution and other key institutions should be drawn up by the group early in the development process.

Community participants recognised and were sometimes able to use community structures and social strategies to reduce envy or jealousy related tensions, but were often reluctant to raise the problem with practitioners, even when they had a good relationship with them. Supporting agencies need to ensure that their staff understand how easily envy and jealousies can occur, to enable them to avoid placing individuals in precarious situations. For instance, opportunities to participate in field trips and media attention should be spread through the group as far as possible. It is also frequently inadvisable to repeatedly visit the homes of the same people over a prolonged period.

Given the high rate of crime in South Africa, including regular fraud incidents in development projects, lack of accountability tends to evoke strong emotions, although people can also be surprisingly forgiving of lapses. A key principle of effective common resource property institutions is that participants who violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions, which depend on the seriousness and context of the offence (Ostrom, 1998). Most projects in this study had constitutions which incorporated penalties against a range of offences, including graduated sanctions, but routine stock takes and monitoring had often lapsed at the time of the thefts. In one project, this was a deliberate strategy by those involved, while in others it was partially due to confusion surrounding other conflicts. Erroneous accusations of theft may be reduced by increasing the levels of involvement of community participants in project management, enhancing understanding of business skills and regular report backs. Education on basic project management can reduce the temptation to spend funding on other needs by developing an understanding of funding principles and creating acceptable norms.

The difference between the two projects who reported minor conflicts that were managed constructively and the others essentially lay in their approaches to conflict management. Both groups operated in a cooperative rather than a competitive spirit, and resolved most differences through discussions, but also had recourse to easily available mediation through trusted local residents or staff from supporting organisations. Four projects that experienced the most intense and protracted conflicts were being facilitated by authoritarian practitioners or organisations who neglected social processes. The situations improved when staff were transferred or changed their behaviour. In contrast, the lack of support provided by one organisation contributed to the rapid spiral of inter-group conflict, which was exacerbated by external threats and a struggle over leadership within the group.

The levels of violence experienced or threatened in several nurseries were not anticipated by any of the practitioners, given the relatively small-scale nature of the projects. However, most

community participants had personally experienced many of the conditions for violent conflict summarised by Deutsch (2000b): (i) difficult life conditions with an increase in relative deprivation arising from war, economic depression or physical calamity, leading to insecurity and feelings of being threatened by potential rivals for scarce resources which, in this study, included control of projects and/or benefits; (ii) violence that is culturally salient and sanctioned as a result of past wars, media attention and weapons availability; (iii) an unstable political regime whose power is under threat, and who employs tactics such as scapegoating to deflect criticism and attacking potential dissidents and rivals (this applies mainly to the conditions and tactics of the previous government but, although the current ruling party has a clear majority and is stable, some of these behaviours persist); (iii) authoritarian social institutions, where non-conformity and open dissent against violence sanctioned by authority were inhibited and (iv) a claim for superiority – in this study, gender – that justifies treating the other as having inferior status. In this study, violence or threats of violence occurred when conflicts were not managed, either because the practitioner or organisation was authoritarian, or because of an internal power vacuum combined with high levels of individual and group stress, combined with lack of external support at a critical period.

(b) Conflict between communities and implementing organisations

Conflicting management systems of communities and implementing organisations sometimes resulted in latent or manifest conflict between the organisation, community participants and/or other community structures. As has occurred elsewhere, many community structures are based on hierarchical and frequently patriarchal systems, whilst supporting organisations attempt to develop 'participative' and 'equitable' project processes (e.g. Mosse, 1995). Many practitioners recognised this paradox, and gradually encouraged less powerful groups such as women to participate more actively but tried also to refrain from pressurising people to move too far out of their usual social boundaries to avoid causing internal conflicts. Despite these efforts, in several projects women who challenged social boundaries were verbally attacked or physically threatened when conflicts escalated.

Organisations usually hold considerably more power than community participants, much of which occurs in the form of legitimate power, in which people believe that the party influencing them has a right to do so through its positional power or status (French and Raven, 1959). Legitimate power often conveys control over information, rights of access and the right to organise, and is often not questioned by the different parties. Once relations have been established, they can also influence behaviour through reward, punishment, referent (the power of a person who is admired and respected) and expert power (where the influencing person is believed to have the prerequisite knowledge, experience or credibility). Organisations can 'persuade' other parties to accede to their demands using the ultimate weapon – withdrawal of relations. Where numerous development agencies are operating in an area, this is less effective as community participants may be able to source alternate external support. In South Africa, many protected areas are situated in densely populated and resource-poor communities, resulting in a 'supporting agencies market'.

However, community participants are not powerless, and people employ a range of resources in attempts to achieve their goals. They are also well able to direct what happens on their own turf. For example, despite actively attempting to broaden the scope of participation, it is almost impossible to do so unless they agree. Despite all our rhetoric of involving the 'marginalized' and

developing 'equitable' projects, in reality it is extremely difficult to achieve this without local buy-in. Less powerful parties can build their power by developing their own resources (including social organisation, cohesion and motivation for change), or eroding the resources or increasing the costs of the more powerful (Coleman, 2000). Another tactic is to appeal to the better side of the more powerful through ingratiation, guilt or helplessness to induce them to use their power more benevolently, or to raise the more powerful group's awareness of the perceived injustice (Coleman, 2000). Most community groups who experienced problems with supporting organisations attempted to resolve them by approaching staff and, when this did not succeed, senior management.

Participants from the project in which the conservation organisation withdrew support attempted unsuccessfully to resolve differences by meeting with officials to voice their problems and request continued support, but generally refrained from open confrontation. Some reticence can be explained through peoples' culture and conflict management styles. In addition, older people in South Africa have historically been reluctant to resist state actions. To date, the main tactic employed by the group has simply been to refuse to give up. Scott (1985) points out that the weakest sectors of society seldom openly confront the state, even during periods of gross injustices against them, because of the often dire consequences of doing so. Throughout the ages, the less powerful have employed what Scott (1985) termed the 'weapons of the weak' to protest the actions of those with power. Actions such as foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, acts of sabotage, etc, require little or no coordination or planning, often represent a form of individual self help and usually avoid direct confrontation with authority or elite norms. While Scott (1985) warns against overly romanticizing 'weapons of the weak' as their effects can be limited and other sectors may employ similar tactics, these forms of resistance can have a significant impact, as attested by numerous failed military campaigns and the development literature (e.g. Robins 1998, 2003). Participants in this study who had attempted to balance perceived distributive injustices through theft were middle-aged and elderly employees, some of whom appeared to be working off debts to the primary participants. They were thus considerably less powerful and more vulnerable, and less likely to openly confront the latter. The more confrontational armed robbery was planned by youth in an urban project.

Power bases can also be increased through the formation of alliances with external groups. Attempts to link the group struggling to obtain support from the conservation organisation with other service providers failed, however. In South Africa, many NGOs have switched from activism to developing cooperative projects with state agencies, partly as a means of contributing to a changing society, but also in an effort to survive in a fiercely competitive funding environment. Several NGOs were reluctant to confront the conservation agency as they were attempting to secure other project contracts. Another could not accept that the conservation organisation was not meeting the ICDP standards publicized in its media campaigns, and a regional conservation agency was unable to adopt an additional project as staff were already stretched to capacity.

A manager from the conservation organisation who failed to provide continued support ascribed their lack of continuity to a high staff turnover and the reluctance of staff to work with traditional healers. While these may explain some difficulties, many of the problems described in this and other papers have also been experienced in other components of their ICDP. Developing programmes with traditional healer groups is challenging as they are a complex stakeholder group, but this does not provide an excuse to avoid the sector. Firstly, the intense conflicts experienced by

the group were not unique. For example, the chairperson of a curio artists' group had to flee for his life when envy arose through the conservation organisation sending him on numerous field trips and continuously placing him in the limelight during extensive media coverage, as well as his unauthorised use of the project vehicle. Secondly, a group that displayed the highest levels of cooperation in this study was comprised of traditional healers. If conservation organisations do not work with traditional healers and other sectors who depend extensively on wildlife resources for survival, the local populations of highly valued wildlife species are likely to continue to decline (Botha, 2001).

(c) Enhancing conflict management in outreach projects

The recurring incidence of certain sources of conflicts suggests that at least some might be anticipated through effective planning, thus enabling practitioners and participants to better manage development associated stresses. Prior knowledge that many South African outreach nurseries have taken 5-10 years to develop into financially viable enterprises suggests that improved benefit flows and mitigation against the high costs to community participants need to be planned at the outset (Botha *et al.* 2006, forthcoming a, b). A realistic business viability study is critical if income generation is a key objective. Similarly, while it is theoretically accepted that an understanding of social environments is critical, in practice social assessments are seldom conducted. Although a comprehensive Social Impact Assessment is likely to be too expensive and time consuming to be considered in initiatives of the scale of outreach nurseries, a social probe is vital when establishing a project in either an unfamiliar area or with new stakeholder groups. Social probes draw on existing data bases such as census and municipal reports as well as group and key informant interviews to generate demographic and other relevant information (e.g. available assets and resources, tenure, community dynamics, historical factors that may influence process, etc).

Effective conflict management requires more than dealing with conflicts as they arise. Win-win attitudes need to be cultivated from the outset and may need to extend to external players who interact with the group (Deutsch, 2000c). Relations between traditional healers and the broader community, including western medical practitioners, improved dramatically during the first four years of the project that did not receive support after a change in staff. When suspicions and innuendos regarding potentially dangerous medicinal products arose, they were immediately brought to the attention of project personnel and community leaders, and the problem was effectively resolved with local residents. Regular report backs were held to elucidate project activities and provide residents with opportunities to voice their concerns through a range of fora, including community meetings. In other projects, it may be preferable to forge links with local leadership rather than the whole community, especially in a large, heterogeneous community that is not particularly interested in the project. The first author also found it helpful to spend a little time after meetings socialising with local residents, and to provide transport to meetings. Apart from strengthening bonds, contentious issues that people were reluctant to raise publicly were sometimes broached in these informal settings.

A win-win approach could be promoted through conflict management training, which increases peoples' abilities to use tools such as interest-based negotiation to enable them to resolve disputes or conflicts by consensus, and to develop strategic alliances involving excluded groups based on mutual benefit (Warner, 2000). A fundamental change in structures (e.g.

incentives) may also be necessary, to avoid fostering a win-lose environment (Deutsch, 2000c). Similarly, as project management needs to be adapted to changing circumstances, so social organisations sometimes need to adapt and even co-evolve with others to enable them to survive challenges and move forward after a period of instability (Warner, 2000).

Regular monitoring is vital to realistically assess progress, timeously identify problems and identify potential threats and opportunities. Positive monitoring in a nurturing climate can build peoples' confidence to critically assess their shortcomings, and learn to separate relationships from substantive issues. Monitoring is likely to be avoided when there are tensions – precisely when it is most needed.

An understanding of cultural differences is critical, not only relating to different races or ethnic groups, but also for people from different socioeconomic backgrounds. While some practitioners are appointed from local communities, others originate from outside the project area or middle class backgrounds, and are unfamiliar with the local social terrain. Following the advice of trusted local people can help to transcend contentious issues. A support network for practitioners is also invaluable. Some organisations hold regional and national workshops to enable practitioners and management to attend training courses and share experiences.

Despite the relatively small-scale and apparently straightforward nature of outreach nurseries, conflicts were commonly experienced during the establishment of ten South African projects, many of which were protracted and bitter. The external sociopolitical environment and operational styles of supporting organisations strongly influenced outcomes. Authoritarian personalities or organisations exacerbated conflicts while those who were willing to cooperate with community participants were able to resolve differences, and in doing so substantially enhanced their credibility both locally and further afield. Adhering to development fundamentals such as effective planning and monitoring is essential, particularly during difficult times. Fostering cooperative relationships and operational environments requires concerted effort from the outset. Ongoing education in conflict management is vital to improve the productivity and longevity of projects, and may also contribute to improved relations in the wider community. Different project models also need to be considered. Where there are hotly contested local power struggles, it may be more appropriate for the organisation to provide services through a centrally managed project than to attempt to develop a participative venture with a select group.

NOTES

¹. Although the English definitions of envy and jealousy are often conflated, it is important to distinguish them as they are caused by different situations and result in distinct responses, although these may sometimes overlap (Parrott and Smith, 1993; Duffy and Shaw, 2000). Envy occurs when a person lacks another's perceived superior quality, achievement or possession and either desires it or wishes that the other lacked it. It is often associated with feelings of inferiority, longing, resentment, ill will towards the envied person and, sometimes, guilt, denial or awareness of the inappropriateness of the ill will (Parrott and Smith, 1993). Jealousy is related to relationships, and occurs when a person fears losing an important relationship with a person to a rival. Emotions associated with jealousy include a fear of loss, anxiety, suspiciousness and anger (Parrott and Smith, 1993).

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